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diff --git a/corpus/education/text/00b5c000f45c8702.txt b/corpus/education/text/00b5c000f45c8702.txt
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+Fundamental Mechanisms of Human Learning
+
+Learning underlies nearly all human behavior and is central to education and education reform. Although recent advances in neuroscience have revealed the fundamental structure of learning processes, these insights have yet to be integrated into research and practice. Specifically, neuroscience has found that decision-making is governed by a structured process of perception, action-selection, and execution, supported by multiple neural systems with distinct memory stores and learning mechanisms. These systems extract different types of information (categorical, predictive, structural, and sequential) challenging canonical models of memory used in learning and behavioral science research by providing a mechanistic account of how humans acquire and use knowledge. Because each system learns differently, effective teaching requires alignment with system-specific processes. We propose a unified model that integrates these neuroscientific insights, bridging basic mechanisms with outcomes in education, identity, belonging, and wellbeing. By translating first principles of neural information processing into a generalizable framework, this work advances theories of skill acquisition and transfer while establishing a foundation for interdisciplinary research to refine how learning is understood and supported across domains of human behavior.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/0145c5522bfb9ea6.txt b/corpus/education/text/0145c5522bfb9ea6.txt
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+ACM COMPUTE 2025 Best Practices Track Proceedings
+
+COMPUTE is an annual Indian conference supported by ACM India and iSIGCSE. The focus of COMPUTE is to improve the quality of computing education in the country by providing a platform for academicians and researchers to interact and share best practices in teaching, learning, and education in general. The Best Practices Track of COMPUTE 2025 invited Computer Science Educators across the country to submit an experience report for the best practices under multiple categories: 1) Novel classroom activities, 2) Imaginative assignments that promote creativity and problem-solving, 3) Diverse pedagogical approaches (e.g., flipped classrooms, peer teaching, project-based learning), 4) Designing AI-resistant or AI-integrated assessment questions, and 5) Teaching CS to students from other disciplines (e.g., business, humanities, engineering). These proceedings contain papers selected from these submissions for presentation at the conference, as well as a report (written by the editors) from the two best practices sessions where these were presented.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/0652c68a6506647d.txt b/corpus/education/text/0652c68a6506647d.txt
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+Predictable Drifts in Collective Cultural Attention: Evidence from Nation-Level Library Takeout Data
+
+Predicting changes in consumer attention for cultural products, such as books, movies, and songs, is notoriously difficult. Past research on predicting the popularity of individual products suggests the existence of intrinsic prediction limits. However, little is known about the limits for predicting collective attention across cultural products. Here, we analyze four years of nationwide library loan data for approximately 2 million individuals, comprising over 100 million loans of more than 660,000 unique books. We find that culture, as measured by popularity distributions of loaned books, drifts continually from month to month at a near-constant rate, leading to a growing divergence over time, and that drifts vary between different book genres. By linking book loans to registry data, we investigate the influence of age, sex, educational level, and geographical area on cultural drift, finding heterogeneous effects from the different demographic groups. Our findings have important implications for market forecasting and developing robust recommender systems, highlighting the need to account for specific drift dynamics for different types of items and demographic groups.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/0ac36692e21bd601.txt b/corpus/education/text/0ac36692e21bd601.txt
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+Chat-GPT: An AI Based Educational Revolution
+
+The AI revolution is gathering momentum at an unprecedented rate. Over the past decade, we have witnessed a seemingly inevitable integration of AI in every facet of our lives. Much has been written about the potential revolutionary impact of AI in education. AI has the potential to completely revolutionise the educational landscape as we could see entire courses and degrees developed by programs such as ChatGPT. AI has the potential to develop courses, set assignments, grade and provide feedback to students much faster than a team of teachers. In addition, because of its dynamic nature, it has the potential to continuously improve its content. In certain fields such as computer science, where technology is continuously evolving, AI based applications can provide dynamically changing, relevant material to students. AI has the potential to replace entire degrees and may challenge the concept of higher education institutions. We could also see entire new disciplines emerge as a consequence of AI. This paper examines the practical impact of ChatGPT and why it is believed that its implementation is a critical step towards a new era of education. We investigate the impact that ChatGPT will have on learning, problem solving skills and cognitive ability of students. We examine the positives, negatives and many other aspects of AI and its applications throughout this paper.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/0ccc18a09cfa08e2.txt b/corpus/education/text/0ccc18a09cfa08e2.txt
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+A Preliminary Framework for Intersectionality in ML Pipelines
+
+Machine learning (ML) has become a go-to solution for improving how we use, experience, and interact with technology (and the world around us). Unfortunately, studies have repeatedly shown that machine learning technologies may not provide adequate support for societal identities and experiences. Intersectionality is a sociological framework that provides a mechanism for explicitly considering complex social identities, focusing on social justice and power. While the framework of intersectionality can support the development of technologies that acknowledge and support all members of society, it has been adopted and adapted in ways that are not always true to its foundations, thereby weakening its potential for impact. To support the appropriate adoption and use of intersectionality for more equitable technological outcomes, we amplify the foundational intersectionality scholarship--Crenshaw, Combahee, and Collins (three C's), to create a socially relevant preliminary framework in developing machine-learning solutions. We use this framework to evaluate and report on the (mis)alignments of intersectionality application in machine learning literature.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/0d7eb202afe7f975.txt b/corpus/education/text/0d7eb202afe7f975.txt
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+Agentic AI as Undercover Teammates: Argumentative Knowledge Construction in Hybrid Human-AI Collaborative Learning
+
+Generative artificial intelligence (AI) agents are increasingly embedded in collaborative learning environments, yet their impact on the processes of argumentative knowledge construction remains insufficiently understood. Emerging conceptualisations of agentic AI and artificial agency suggest that such systems possess bounded autonomy, interactivity, and adaptability, allowing them to engage as epistemic participants rather than mere instructional tools. Building on this theoretical foundation, the present study investigates how agentic AI, designed as undercover teammates with either supportive or contrarian personas, shapes the epistemic and social dynamics of collaborative reasoning. Drawing on Weinberger and Fischer's (2006) four-dimensional framework, participation, epistemic reasoning, argument structure, and social modes of co-construction, we analysed synchronous discourse data from 212 human and 64 AI participants (92 triads) engaged in an analytical problem-solving task. Mixed-effects and epistemic network analyses revealed that AI teammates maintained balanced participation but substantially reorganised epistemic and social processes: supportive personas promoted conceptual integration and consensus-oriented reasoning, whereas contrarian personas provoked critical elaboration and conflict-driven negotiation. Epistemic adequacy, rather than participation volume, predicted individual learning gains, indicating that agentic AI's educational value lies in enhancing the quality and coordination of reasoning rather than amplifying discourse quantity. These findings extend CSCL theory by conceptualising agentic AI as epistemic and social participants, bounded yet adaptive collaborators that redistribute cognitive and argumentative labour in hybrid human-AI learning environments.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/0e3bfaff26cb89f5.txt b/corpus/education/text/0e3bfaff26cb89f5.txt
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+Counterfactual Fairness Evaluation of Machine Learning Models on Educational Datasets
+
+As machine learning models are increasingly used in educational settings, from detecting at-risk students to predicting student performance, algorithmic bias and its potential impacts on students raise critical concerns about algorithmic fairness. Although group fairness is widely explored in education, works on individual fairness in a causal context are understudied, especially on counterfactual fairness. This paper explores the notion of counterfactual fairness for educational data by conducting counterfactual fairness analysis of machine learning models on benchmark educational datasets. We demonstrate that counterfactual fairness provides meaningful insight into the causality of sensitive attributes and causal-based individual fairness in education.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/12623944fd289980.txt b/corpus/education/text/12623944fd289980.txt
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+Agentivism: a learning theory for the age of artificial intelligence
+
+Learning theories have historically changed when the conditions of learning evolved. Generative and agentic AI create a new condition by allowing learners to delegate explanation, writing, problem solving, and other cognitive work to systems that can generate, recommend, and sometimes act on the learner's behalf. This creates a fundamental challenge for learning theory: successful performance can no longer be assumed to indicate learning. Learners may complete tasks effectively with AI support while developing less understanding, weaker judgment, and limited transferable capability. We argue that this problem is not fully captured by existing learning theories. Behaviourism, cognitivism, constructivism, and connectivism remain important, but they do not directly explain when AI-assisted performance becomes durable human capability. We propose Agentivism, a learning theory for human-AI interaction. Agentivism defines learning as durable growth in human capability through selective delegation to AI, epistemic monitoring and verification of AI contributions, reconstructive internalization of AI-assisted outputs, and transfer under reduced support. The importance of Agentivism lies in explaining how learning remains possible when intelligent delegation is easy and human-AI interaction is becoming a persistent and expanding part of human learning.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/15ce4dcfad301336.txt b/corpus/education/text/15ce4dcfad301336.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..140a119ef2654fc4885a0b733edecae0dcf25fb7
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+++ b/corpus/education/text/15ce4dcfad301336.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Artificial Intelligence Competence of K-12 Students Shapes Their AI Risk Perception: A Co-occurrence Network Analysis
+
+As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes increasingly integrated into education, understanding how students perceive its risks is essential for supporting responsible and effective adoption. This research aimed to examine the relationships between perceived AI competence and risks among Finnish K-12 upper secondary students (n = 163) by utilizing a co-occurrence analysis. Students reported their self-perceived AI competence and concerns related to AI across systemic, institutional, and personal domains. The findings showed that students with lower competence emphasized personal and learning-related risks, such as reduced creativity, lack of critical thinking, and misuse, whereas higher-competence students focused more on systemic and institutional risks, including bias, inaccuracy, and cheating. These differences suggest that students' self-reported AI competence is related to how they evaluate both the risks and opportunities associated with artificial intelligence in education (AIED). The results of this study highlight the need for educational institutions to incorporate AI literacy into their curricula, provide teacher guidance, and inform policy development to ensure personalized opportunities for utilization and equitable integration of AI into K-12 education.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/15f6da798380875e.txt b/corpus/education/text/15f6da798380875e.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0837a0a8e13ccbf728e132fa4655c241baa7760c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/15f6da798380875e.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Structured AI Demonstrations and Student LLM Use in Engineering Mechanics: Study Design and Preliminary Results
+
+The rapid integration of large language models (LLMs) into undergraduate education presents an urgent challenge for engineering instructors. Despite widespread student adoption, there remains a critical lack of domain-specific empirical evidence to guide pedagogical policies and classroom interventions. This manuscript presents a descriptive study design and preliminary findings from an undergraduate engineering mechanics course conducted in Spring 2026. We detail a reproducible survey instrument used to capture student AI usage patterns, attitudes, and verification practices, which are subsequently linked to academic performance metrics. Additionally, we document a deployable sequence of nine structured, instructor-led AI demonstrations designed to model strategic LLM delegation and evaluation. While our preliminary data highlight shifting student behaviors and complex relationships between AI reliance and course outcomes, the primary contribution of this work is the provision of an open-access methodological framework. By making our complete study design, survey tools, and demonstration materials publicly available, we urge other engineering educators to collect and share similar empirical data. Navigating this unprecedented technological shift will require a collaborative, evidence-based approach to fully understand its long-term impacts on student learning.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/18d87bd4f8fb0487.txt b/corpus/education/text/18d87bd4f8fb0487.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..80ead0a97ed121f0bdabbef2a19359403b9c4381
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/18d87bd4f8fb0487.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Physical partisan proximity outweighs online ties in predicting US voting outcomes
+
+Affective polarization and increasing social divisions affect social mixing and the spread of information across online and physical spaces, reinforcing social and electoral cleavages and influencing political outcomes. Here, using aggregated and de-identified co-location and online network data, we investigate the relationship between partisan exposure and voting patterns in the USA by comparing three dimensions of partisan exposure: physical proximity and exposure to the same social contexts, online social ties, and residential sorting. By leveraging various statistical modeling approaches, we consistently find that partisan exposure in the physical space, as captured by co-location patterns, more accurately predicts electoral outcomes in US counties, outperforming online and residential exposures across metropolitan and non-metro areas. Moreover, our results show that physical partisan proximity is the best predictor of voting patterns in swing counties, where the election results are most uncertain. We also estimate county-level experienced partisan segregation and examine its relationship with individuals' demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Focusing on metropolitan areas, our results confirm the presence of extensive partisan segregation in the US and show that offline partisan isolation, both considering physical encounters or residential sorting, is higher than online segregation and is primarily associated with educational attainment. Our findings emphasize the importance of physical space in understanding the relationship between social networks and political behavior, in contrast to the intense scrutiny focused on online social networks and elections.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/1ede642b27a5caf2.txt b/corpus/education/text/1ede642b27a5caf2.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..232595aafc974dc89b9945c6ebad50f76c142efc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/1ede642b27a5caf2.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Self-Regulated Learning in Essay Writing: Consistency of Strategies and Impact on Outcomes
+
+Background: Abilities for effective self-regulated learning (SRL) are critical for lifelong learning, particularly during adolescence when these skills consolidate and strongly influence future learning. Their importance has grown with the rise of online and blended education. Yet, little is known about how secondary school students self-regulate in online environments, how their SRL processes and strategies evolve, or how they affect outcomes. In secondary education, understanding these processes can reveal patterns and indicators of learning success, informing the design of online support mechanisms. Evidence from repeated-measures designs remains scarce. Objectives: This study aims to examine how secondary school students enact SRL strategies during online essay writing, how these strategies change over time, and how they relate to learning outcomes. Methods: We analysed metacognition-related trace data collected from secondary students during a two-wave online essay-writing task conducted one week apart in two Colombian schools (N = 93 for session 1, N = 95 for session 2) via a digital learning platform. Using a combination of process mining and unsupervised machine learning techniques, we identified dominant SRL strategies grounded in established SRL processes and examined their stability and association with learning outcomes. Results and conclusions: Three dominant SRL strategies were identified. Results showed variability: many students remained in or shifted to Read first, write next, while none used Write intensively, read selectively in session 2. Although less common, latter strategy was positively associated with learning outcomes.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/2127a96a8ac1ea94.txt b/corpus/education/text/2127a96a8ac1ea94.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cedf21b81117cb2bca585c069c7750d65c3d7346
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+++ b/corpus/education/text/2127a96a8ac1ea94.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LEAP -- Live Experiments for Active Pedagogy
+
+Interactive computational environments can help students explore algorithmic concepts through collaborative hands-on experimentation. However, static and instructor controlled demos in lectures limit engagement. Even when interactive visualizations are used, interactions are solely controlled by the instructor, leaving students as passive observers. In addition, the tools used for demonstration often vary significantly, as they are typically developed by individual instructors. Consequently, the visualizations remain confined to a single classroom, rather than being shared and adapted across courses or reused by other instructors. To address this gap and foster active engagement in live classrooms, we present a lightweight and seamless software framework named LEAP for developing interactive computational lab exercises using a simple idea: remotely callable instructor-defined functions. Using API endpoints and a provided client, students can discover and then call instructor defined functions remotely from their coding environment using scripts or interactive notebooks. Each function call is time-stamped and persistently logged in a database, allowing real-time visualization of participation, diverse solution paths, common pitfalls, and live feedback through collaboration, gamification, and quizzes. Labs are packaged as self-contained folders, each containing their own remotely callable functions. We provide example labs to demonstrate applications relevant for numerical analysis, machine learning, algorithms courses and mention some in electrical engineering (EE), economics, and physics. These capabilities enhance engagement and provide instructors with actionable insights into learning processes. With a standardized lab format and an online directory for community-contributed labs, we aim to foster a global ecosystem for exchanging and expanding interactive pedagogy enabled by LEAP.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/23e78500333e8ed3.txt b/corpus/education/text/23e78500333e8ed3.txt
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..37e413629378ac8fa3208735d52e2454f0d85d55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/23e78500333e8ed3.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Knowledge without Wisdom: Measuring Misalignment between LLMs and Intended Impact
+
+LLMs increasingly excel on AI benchmarks, but doing so does not guarantee validity for downstream tasks. This study evaluates the performance of leading foundation models (FMs, i.e., generative pre-trained base LLMs) with out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks of the teaching and learning of schoolchildren. Across all FMs, inter-model behaviors on disparate tasks correlate higher than they do with expert human behaviors on target tasks. These biases shared across LLMs are poorly aligned with downstream measures of teaching quality and often \textit{negatively aligned with learning outcomes}. Further, we find multi-model ensembles, both unanimous model voting and expert-weighting by benchmark performance, further exacerbate misalignment with learning. We measure that 50\% of the variation in misalignment error is shared across foundation models, suggesting that common pretraining accounts for much of the misalignment in these tasks. We demonstrate methods for robustly measuring alignment of complex tasks and provide unique insights into both educational applications of foundation models and to understanding limitations of models.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/2861ff638a9a61be.txt b/corpus/education/text/2861ff638a9a61be.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b98d24585b69f43c05a8cb0ed5ca76d09b9c4c48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/2861ff638a9a61be.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Artificial Intelligence for Optimal Learning: A Comparative Approach towards AI-Enhanced Learning Environments
+
+In the rapidly evolving educational landscape, the integration of technology has shifted from an enhancement to a cornerstone of educational strategy worldwide. This transition is propelled by advancements in digital technology, especially the emergence of artificial intelligence as a crucial tool in learning environments. This research project critically evaluates the impact of three distinct educational settings: traditional educational methods without technological integration, those enhanced by non-AI technology, and those utilising AI-driven technologies. This comparison aims to assess how each environment influences educational outcomes, engagement, pedagogical methods, and equity in access to learning resources, and how each contributes uniquely to the learning experience. The ultimate goal of this research is to synthesise the strengths of each model to create a more holistic educational approach. By integrating the personal interaction and tested pedagogical techniques of traditional classrooms, the enhanced accessibility and collaborative tools offered by non-AI technology, and the personalised, adaptive learning strategies enabled by AI-driven technologies, education systems can develop richer, more effective learning environments. This hybrid approach aims to leverage the best elements of each setting, thereby enhancing educational outcomes, engagement, and inclusiveness, while also addressing the distinct challenges and limitations inherent in each model. The intention is to create an educational framework deeply attentive to the diverse needs of students, ensuring equitable access to high-quality education for all.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/297e935e8827f1dc.txt b/corpus/education/text/297e935e8827f1dc.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ca8a538126a256d482ef1f1d047f5b3b92bc23a2
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+++ b/corpus/education/text/297e935e8827f1dc.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Learning to Decide with AI Assistance under Human-Alignment
+
+It is widely agreed that when AI models assist decision-makers in high-stakes domains by predicting an outcome of interest, they should communicate the confidence of their predictions. However, empirical evidence suggests that decision-makers often struggle to determine when to trust a prediction based solely on this communicated confidence. In this context, recent theoretical and empirical work suggests a positive correlation between the utility of AI-assisted decision-making and the degree of alignment between the AI confidence and the decision-makers' confidence in their own predictions. Crucially, these findings do not yet elucidate the extent to which this alignment influences the complexity of learning to make optimal decisions through repeated interactions. In this paper, we address this question in the canonical case of binary predictions and binary decisions. We first show that this problem is equivalent to a two-armed online contextual learning problem with full feedback, and establish a lower bound of $Ω(\sqrt{|H| \cdot |B| \cdot T} )$ on the expected regret any learner can attain, where $H$ and $B$ denote the sets of human and AI confidence values. We then demonstrate that, under perfect alignment between AI and human confidence, a learner can attain an expected regret of $O(\sqrt{|H| \cdot T\log T})$ and, when $\sqrt{|H|} = O(\log T)$ and $B$ is countable, a non-trivial generalization of the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz inequality improves the regret bound to $O(\sqrt{T\log T})$. Taken together, these results reveal that alignment can reduce the complexity of learning to make decisions with AI assistance. Experiments on real data from two different human-subject studies where participants solve simple decision-making tasks assisted by AI models show that our theoretical results are robust to violations of perfect alignment.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/2ed58799c3c99340.txt b/corpus/education/text/2ed58799c3c99340.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3aa916de4d99feb830882b4e368cb268305d6b93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/2ed58799c3c99340.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Navigating the Conceptual Multiverse
+
+When language models answer open-ended problems, they implicitly make hidden decisions that shape their outputs, leaving users with uncontextualized answers rather than a working map of the problem; drawing on multiverse analysis from statistics, we build and evaluate the conceptual multiverse, an interactive system that represents conceptual decisions such as how to frame a question or what to value as a space users can transparently inspect, intervenably change, and check against principled domain reasoning; for this structure to be worth navigating rather than misleading, it must be rigorous and checkable against domain reasoning norms, so we develop a general verification framework that enforces properties of good decision structures like unambiguity and completeness calibrated by expert-level reasoning; across three domains, the conceptual multiverse helped participants develop a working map of the problem, with philosophy students rewriting essays with sharper framings and reversed theses, alignment annotators moving from surface preferences to reasoning about user intent and harm, and poets identifying compositional patterns that clarified their taste.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/33346f00d35a89e7.txt b/corpus/education/text/33346f00d35a89e7.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c7276597501ff09d9bb564671774e558dd0f7ec8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/33346f00d35a89e7.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+EducaSim: Interactive Simulacra for CS1 Instructional Practice
+
+Role play is a high-impact mode of training that has demonstrated its effectiveness in improving learning outcomes. However, it is difficult to scale to teacher instruction due to its inherent dependency on providing personnel who are both trained and available to facilitate this learning environment. This poses a challenge, especially to massive online courses which may employ and aid hundreds to thousands of novice teachers. In this work, we present EducaSim: a novel framework that uses generative agents to simulate a small-group section for teachers-in-training to practice instruction. EducaSim works by implementing diverse pedagogical-based personas, actual course material, and agent-based architectures constructed for instructional practice to provide a pedagogically rich environment for teachers-in-training to engage in role play learning -- without the costly overhead that comes with it. We share our experiences with constructing and making the tool available for experimental training and preparation in a six-week CS1 course supporting 20,000 students. We found that teachers who engaged generally saw it as a positive experience. We believe that EducaSim is an important step to providing experiential teaching practice at scale for closely-defined settings and has great potential for future applications.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/390a676c1b9aa0ce.txt b/corpus/education/text/390a676c1b9aa0ce.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2388086ac5cae119d6ad9ae3a600218380f31046
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/390a676c1b9aa0ce.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Why Johnny Can't Think: GenAI's Impacts on Cognitive Engagement
+
+Context: Many students now use generative AI in their coursework, yet its effects on intellectual development remain poorly understood. While prior work has investigated students' cognitive offloading during episodic interactions, it remains unclear whether using genAI routinely is tied to more fundamental shifts in students' thinking habits. Objective: We investigate (RQ1-How): how students' trust in and routine use of genAI affect their cognitive engagement -- specifically, reflection, need for understanding, and critical thinking in STEM coursework. Further, we investigate (RQ2-Who): which students are particularly vulnerable to these cognitive disengagement effects. Method: We drew on dual-process theory, cognitive offloading, and automation bias literature to develop a statistical model explaining how and to what extent students' trust-driven routine use of genAI affected their cognitive engagement habits in coursework, and how these effects differed across students' cognitive styles. We empirically evaluated this model using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling on survey data from 299 STEM students across five North American universities. Results: Students who trusted and routinely used genAI reported significantly lower cognitive engagement. Unexpectedly, students with higher technophilic motivations, risk tolerance, and computer self-efficacy -- traits often celebrated in STEM -- were more prone to these effects. Interestingly, prior experience with genAI or academia did not protect them from cognitively disengaging. Implications: Our findings suggest a potential cognitive debt cycle in which routine genAI use progressively weakens students' intellectual habits, potentially driving over-reliance and escalating usage. This poses critical challenges for curricula and genAI system design, requiring interventions that actively support cognitive engagement.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/39436cf8f9436263.txt b/corpus/education/text/39436cf8f9436263.txt
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..202b3e36fc8fc9d0f551057b2035f10fcb828201
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+++ b/corpus/education/text/39436cf8f9436263.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Findings of the First Teaching Monster Challenge: A Benchmark of Pedagogical Content Knowledge in AI Agents
+
+AI agents can now solve problems, answer like subject experts, and generate long-form multimodal content. However, whether they can adapt a lesson to fit a specified learner, which education calls Pedagogical Content Knowledge (PCK), has not been benchmarked. To measure it, we introduce the Teaching Monster Challenge, the first instructional video generation benchmark to treat the learner persona as an explicit evaluation criterion. Each system is given a topic and a learner persona and must generate a complete instructional video. Every video is screened by an LLM-judge, ranked by crowd pairwise voting, and finalized by an expert panel. The first edition shows that today's systems handle the content well but are far weaker at presenting it and adapting it to the learner. The same process exposes a limit of automatic judging. The LLM-judge separates a clear low-performing tail but ranks the strongest systems poorly. The strongest systems receive nearly identical scores from the judge, so its ranking of them does not match human preference. Progress therefore requires not only better teaching systems but also better automatic judges, and we release the benchmark, rubric, and human judgments as a testbed for both.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/464b474cf410abe1.txt b/corpus/education/text/464b474cf410abe1.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ec0e3324f3b3c955948e5e3b27397fbc680eef77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/464b474cf410abe1.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+GeoDial: A Multimodal Conversational Tutoring Dataset for Geometry Problem-Solving with Visual Tutor Turns
+
+Several educational domains rely heavily on diagrams and visual cues, yet most existing tutoring datasets are limited to text-only interactions. This limits the development of AI tutors that can teach in visually grounded ways used by human instructors. Thus, we introduce GeoDial, a multimodal tutoring dataset of over 1.3K teacher-student dialogs in the domain of geometry collected from experienced math teachers, where instructional turns are explicitly grounded in diagram highlights. We propose a scalable annotation protocol that integrates dialog acts, visual highlighting, and feedback, enabling fine-grained supervision of both language and visual tutoring behavior. To illustrate the challenges posed by this setting, we fine-tune several vision-language models on GeoDial and evaluate their ability to generate tutoring utterances and diagram highlights. While supervised fine-tuning substantially improves the quality of generated dialog, it struggles to produce accurate diagram highlights, revealing a key limitation of current methods and highlighting the need for approaches that more effectively integrate visual reasoning with pedagogical interaction.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/4a1ea9dc1d5e400a.txt b/corpus/education/text/4a1ea9dc1d5e400a.txt
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ac9f8fcae84cd536359e38c700bbcb06ea8bf023
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/4a1ea9dc1d5e400a.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Your Thoughtful Opponent: Embracing Cognitive Conflict with Peer Agent
+
+As complex societal issues continue to emerge, fostering democratic skills like valuing diverse perspectives and collaborative decision-making is increasingly vital in education. In this paper, we propose a Peer Agent (PA) system designed to simulate a deliberative conversational partner that induces socio-cognitive conflict within dilemma-based game play. Drawing on by the Inner Thoughts framework and grounded in value-sensitive discourse analysis, the PA actively participates in voice-based multi-party deliberation with human players. The system architecture consists of five core modules: Context Interpreter, Agent State Manager, Thought Generator, Thought Evaluator, and Thought Articulator.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/4b9bdefa621bb5c6.txt b/corpus/education/text/4b9bdefa621bb5c6.txt
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..31117377c3de64eca852e1a31a7cfcbaf640ec10
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+++ b/corpus/education/text/4b9bdefa621bb5c6.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+A Multi-level Analysis of Factors Associated with Student Performance: A Machine Learning Approach to the SAEB Microdata
+
+Identifying the factors that influence student performance in basic education is a central challenge for formulating effective public policies in Brazil. This study introduces a multi-level machine learning approach to classify the proficiency of 9th-grade and high school students using microdata from the System of Assessment of Basic Education (SAEB). Our model uniquely integrates four data sources: student socioeconomic characteristics, teacher professional profiles, school indicators, and principal management profiles. A comparative analysis of four ensemble algorithms confirmed the superiority of a Random Forest model, which achieved 90.2% accuracy and an Area Under the Curve (AUC) of 96.7%. To move beyond prediction, we applied Explainable AI (XAI) using SHAP, which revealed that the school's average socioeconomic level is the most dominant predictor, demonstrating that systemic factors have a greater impact than individual characteristics in isolation. The primary conclusion is that academic performance is a systemic phenomenon deeply tied to the school's ecosystem. This study provides a data-driven, interpretable tool to inform policies aimed at promoting educational equity by addressing disparities between schools.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/4f4db87857d04e60.txt b/corpus/education/text/4f4db87857d04e60.txt
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4a8b1b332d0660b6ac40b845162ea822cf171eb1
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+++ b/corpus/education/text/4f4db87857d04e60.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+MathVC: An LLM-Simulated Multi-Character Virtual Classroom for Mathematics Education
+
+Mathematical modeling (MM) is considered a fundamental skill for students in STEM disciplines. Practicing the MM skill is often the most effective when students can engage in group discussion and collaborative problem-solving. However, due to unevenly distributed teachers and educational resources needed to monitor such group activities, students do not always receive equal opportunities for this practice. Excitingly, large language models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strong capability in both modeling mathematical problems and simulating characters with different traits and properties. Drawing inspiration from the advancement of LLMs, in this work, we present MATHVC, the very first LLM-powered virtual classroom containing multiple LLM-simulated student characters, with whom a human student can practice their MM skill. To encourage each LLM character's behaviors to be aligned with their specified math-relevant properties (termed "characteristics alignment") and the overall conversational procedure to be close to an authentic student MM discussion (termed "conversational procedural alignment"), we proposed three innovations: integrating MM domain knowledge into the simulation, defining a symbolic schema as the ground for character simulation, and designing a meta planner at the platform level to drive the conversational procedure. Through experiments and ablation studies, we confirmed the effectiveness of our simulation approach and showed the promise for MATHVC to benefit real-life students in the future.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/50c4704cc30708f7.txt b/corpus/education/text/50c4704cc30708f7.txt
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..00d5566176f3854ac6d28059ae63c1672f21bd35
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+++ b/corpus/education/text/50c4704cc30708f7.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+A Participatory Strategy for AI Ethics in Education and Rehabilitation grounded in the Capability Approach
+
+AI-based technologies have significant potential to enhance inclusive education and clinical-rehabilitative contexts for children with Special Educational Needs and Disabilities. AI can enhance learning experiences, empower students, and support both teachers and rehabilitators. However, their usage presents challenges that require a systemic-ecological vision, ethical considerations, and participatory research. Therefore, research and technological development must be rooted in a strong ethical-theoretical framework. The Capability Approach - a theoretical model of disability, human vulnerability, and inclusion - offers a more relevant perspective on functionality, effectiveness, and technological adequacy in inclusive learning environments. In this paper, we propose a participatory research strategy with different stakeholders through a case study on the ARTIS Project, which develops an AI-enriched interface to support children with text comprehension difficulties. Our research strategy integrates ethical, educational, clinical, and technological expertise in designing and implementing AI-based technologies for children's learning environments through focus groups and collaborative design sessions. We believe that this holistic approach to AI adoption in education can help bridge the gap between technological innovation and ethical responsibility.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/51f707ec990e307f.txt b/corpus/education/text/51f707ec990e307f.txt
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..19230683ab29ab47c4c23968fd69a3db1f5ca1fa
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+++ b/corpus/education/text/51f707ec990e307f.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Artificial Intelligence in Secondary Education: Educational Affordances and Constraints of ChatGPT-4o Use
+
+The purpose of this study was to examine, from the perspective of secondary education students, the educational affordances and constraints of using Artificial Intelligence (AI) in teaching and learning. The sample consisted of 45 students from the 2nd year of General Lyceum (11th grade, ages 16-17) in Greece, who, after becoming familiarized with ChatGPT-4o and completing six activities, filled in an open-ended questionnaire related to the research purpose. Open, axial, and selective coding of the data revealed that students recognize five educational affordances: the creation of new knowledge building on prior knowledge, immediate feedback, friendly interaction through messaging, ease and speed of access to information, and skills development. Concurrently, three main constraints were identified: content reliability, anxiety about AI use, and privacy concerns. The study concludes that students are positive toward AI use in education.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/54bc5b07e833380c.txt b/corpus/education/text/54bc5b07e833380c.txt
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..77d59d16b5e72eb78b2e0a35832014e6f304daa8
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+++ b/corpus/education/text/54bc5b07e833380c.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Measuring the Impact of Student Gaming Behaviors on Learner Modeling
+
+The expansion of large-scale online education platforms has made vast amounts of student interaction data available for knowledge tracing (KT). KT models estimate students' concept mastery from interaction data, but their performance is sensitive to input data quality. Gaming behaviors, such as excessive hint use, may misrepresent students' knowledge and undermine model reliability. However, systematic investigations of how different types of gaming behaviors affect KT remain scarce, and existing studies rely on costly manual analysis that does not capture behavioral diversity. In this study, we conceptualize gaming behaviors as a form of data poisoning, defined as the deliberate submission of incorrect or misleading interaction data to corrupt a model's learning process. We design Data Poisoning Attacks (DPAs) to simulate diverse gaming patterns and systematically evaluate their impact on KT model performance. Moreover, drawing on advances in DPA detection, we explore unsupervised approaches to enhance the generalizability of gaming behavior detection. We find that KT models' performance tends to decrease especially in response to random guess behaviors. Our findings provide insights into the vulnerabilities of KT models and highlight the potential of adversarial methods for improving the robustness of learning analytics systems.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/55a8fd7c240f73cc.txt b/corpus/education/text/55a8fd7c240f73cc.txt
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f7a98177d84f5aed771563e9dbe280a21f318802
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/55a8fd7c240f73cc.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+PACEE: Supporting Children's Personal Emotion Education through Parent-AI Collaboration
+
+Emotion education is a crucial lesson for children aged 3 to 6. However, existing technologies primarily focus on promoting emotion education from the child's perspective, often neglecting the central role of parents in guiding early childhood emotion development at home. In this work, we conducted co-design sessions with five experienced kindergarten teachers and five parents to identify parental challenges and the roles that AI can play in family emotion education. Guided by these insights, we developed PACEE, an assistant for supporting parent-AI collaborative emotion education. PACEE enables parents to engage in conversations about common emotional scenarios, with multiple forms of AI support to address parents' challenges. It combines insights from parents and AI to model children's emotional states and delivers personalized, parent-mediated guidance. In a user study involving 16 families, we found that PACEE significantly enhances parent-child engagement, encourages more in-depth emotional communication, and improves the parental experience. Our findings advance emotion coaching guidelines for family education in the era of generative AI, offering valuable insights for designing AI-supported, parent-centered family education systems.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/59e860f21aad384b.txt b/corpus/education/text/59e860f21aad384b.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cbe754fdb95db653bc448a845396399e699c9548
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/59e860f21aad384b.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Facial-Expression-Aware Prompting for Empathetic LLM Tutoring
+
+Large language models (LLMs) enable increasingly capable tutoring-style conversational agents, yet effective tutoring requires sensitivity to learners' affective and cognitive states beyond text alone. Facial expressions provide immediate and practical cues of confusion, frustration, or engagement, but remain underexplored in LLM-driven tutoring. We investigate whether facial-expression-aware signals can improve empathetic tutoring responses through prompt-level integration, without end-to-end retraining. We build a scalable simulated tutoring environment where a student agent exhibits diverse facial behaviors from a large unlabeled facial expression video dataset, and compare four tutor variants: a text-only LLM baseline, a multimodal baseline using a random facial frame, and two Action Unit estimation model (AUM)-based methods that either inject textual AU descriptions or select a peak-expression frame for visual grounding. Across 960 multi-turn conversations spanning three tutor backbones (GPT-5.1, Claude Ops 4.5, and Gemini 2.5 Pro), we evaluate targeted pairwise comparisons with five human raters and an exhaustive AI evaluator. AU-based conditioning consistently improves empathetic responsiveness to facial expressions across all tutor backbones, while AUM-guided peak-frame selection outperforms random-frame visual input. Textual AU abstraction and peak-frame visual injection show model-dependent advantages. Control analyses show that this improvement does not come at the expense of worse pedagogical clarity or responsiveness to textual cues. Finally, AI-human agreement is highest on facial-expression-grounded empathy, supporting scalable AI evaluation for this dimension. Overall, our results show that lightweight, structured facial expression representations can meaningfully enhance empathy in LLM-based tutoring systems with minimal overhead.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/5a0aefc59e92dc12.txt b/corpus/education/text/5a0aefc59e92dc12.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..748ca19113a85e7020e207d301fdc720aae0400c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/5a0aefc59e92dc12.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+How should AI knowledge be governed? Epistemic authority, structural transparency, and the case for open cognitive graphs
+
+Through widespread use in formative assessment and self-directed learning, educational AI systems exercise de facto epistemic authority. Unlike human educators, however, these systems are not embedded in institutional mechanisms of accountability, review, and correction, creating a structural governance challenge that cannot be resolved through application-level regulation or model transparency alone. This paper reconceptualizes educational AI as public educational cognitive infrastructure and argues that its governance must address the epistemic authority such systems exert. We propose the Open Cognitive Graph (OCG) as a technical interface that externalizes pedagogical structure in forms aligned with human educational reasoning. By explicitly representing concepts, prerequisite relations, misconceptions, and scaffolding, OCGs make the cognitive logic governing AI behaviour inspectable and revisable. Building on this foundation, we introduce the trunk-branch governance model, which organizes epistemic authority across layers of consensus and pluralism. A case study of a community-governed educational foundation model demonstrates how distributed expertise can be integrated through institutionalized processes of validation, correction, and propagation. The paper concludes by discussing implications for educational equity, AI policy, and sustainability. By shifting attention from access to governance conditions, the proposed framework offers a structural approach to aligning educational AI with democratic accountability and public responsibility.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/68f71c297936e898.txt b/corpus/education/text/68f71c297936e898.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..858c6544acd61b327a1ab5b3dbf2d51aecfb995a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/68f71c297936e898.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Designing for Community Care: Reimagining Support for Equity & Well-being in Academia
+
+Academic well-being is deeply influenced by peer-support networks, yet they remain informal, inequitable, and unsustainable, often relying on personal connections and social capital rather than structured, inclusive systems. Additionally, institutional well-being responses frequently focus on student populations, neglecting the emotional labour of faculty and staff, reinforcing an exclusionary academic culture. Drawing on HCI methodologies, participatory design, and care ethics, this workshop will provide a space for rethinking how academic communities can support inclusive networks. Through pre-workshop engagement, co-design activities, and reflection, participants will examine systemic gaps in networks and explore ways to embed care, equity, and sustainability into academic peer-support frameworks -- from informal, exclusionary models to structured, inclusive care-based ecosystems. At the end of the workshop, participants will co-develop design strategies for integrating care and resilience in academic ecosystems, resources for designing equitable support systems, and a peer network invested and committed to fostering a supportive academic community.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/69e1d09d0d71b952.txt b/corpus/education/text/69e1d09d0d71b952.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a05c920f28f449df228eafe41192a479b93eda29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/69e1d09d0d71b952.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+CounterQuill: Investigating the Potential of Human-AI Collaboration in Online Counterspeech Writing
+
+Online hate speech has become increasingly prevalent on social media, causing harm to individuals and society. While automated content moderation has received considerable attention, user-driven counterspeech remains a less explored yet promising approach. However, many people face difficulties in crafting effective responses. We introduce CounterQuill, a human-AI collaborative system that helps everyday users with writing empathetic counterspeech, not by generating automatic replies, but by educating them through reflection and response. CounterQuill follows a three-stage workflow grounded in computational thinking: (1) a learning session to build understanding of hate speech and counterspeech, (2) a brainstorming session to identify harmful patterns and ideate counterspeech ideas, and (3) a co-writing session that helps users refine their counter responses while preserving personal voice. Through a user study \r{ho}(N=20), we found that CounterQuill helped participants develop the skills to brainstorm and draft counterspeech with increased confidence and control throughout the process. Our findings highlight how AI systems can scaffold complex communication tasks through structured, human-centered workflows that educate users on how to recognize, reflect on, and respond to online hate speech.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/69f68ad63e8ba22b.txt b/corpus/education/text/69f68ad63e8ba22b.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1cf8c623b913254f072e1bd158d2ac079549455d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/69f68ad63e8ba22b.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Frontier AI's Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape
+
+The impact of frontier AI in cybersecurity is rapidly increasing. In this paper, we comprehensively analyze this trend through three distinct lenses: a quantitative benchmark analysis, a literature review, and an expert survey. We find that while AI is already widely used in attacks, its application in defense remains limited, especially in remediation and deployment. Aligned with these analyses, experts expect AI to continue favoring attackers over defenders, though the gap will gradually narrow. These findings underscore the urgent need to mitigate frontier AI's risks while closely monitoring emerging capabilities. We provide concrete calls-to-action regarding: the construction of new cybersecurity benchmarks, the development of AI agents for defense, the design of provably secure AI agents, the improvement of pre-deployment security testing and transparency, and the strengthening of user-oriented education and defenses. Our paper summary and blog are available at https://rdi.berkeley.edu/frontier-ai-impact-on-cybersecurity/.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/6b9eb5522a72606d.txt b/corpus/education/text/6b9eb5522a72606d.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6e79fcc5740570be3c6bdaf9dcdb67c896eef3d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/6b9eb5522a72606d.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Designing AI Peers for Collaborative Mathematical Problem Solving with Middle School Students: A Participatory Design Study
+
+Collaborative problem solving (CPS) is a fundamental practice in middle-school mathematics education; however, student groups frequently stall or struggle without ongoing teacher support. Recent work has explored how Generative AI tools can be designed to support one-on-one tutoring, but little is known about how AI can be designed as peer learning partners in collaborative learning contexts. We conducted a participatory design study with 24 middle school students, who first engaged in mathematics CPS tasks with AI peers in a technology probe, and then collaboratively designed their ideal AI peer. Our findings reveal that students envision an AI peer as competent in mathematics yet explicitly deferential, providing progressive scaffolds such as hints and checks under clear student control. Students preferred a tone of friendly expertise over exaggerated personas. We also discuss design recommendations and implications for AI peers in middle school mathematics CPS.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/716e9399e657200a.txt b/corpus/education/text/716e9399e657200a.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c9899c82b81cf9497fca8e1c0131a4e6e487bff6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/716e9399e657200a.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+DiscussLLM: Teaching Large Language Models When to Speak
+
+Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in understanding and generating human-like text, yet they largely operate as reactive agents, responding only when directly prompted. This passivity creates an "awareness gap," limiting their potential as truly collaborative partners in dynamic human discussions. We introduce $\textit{DiscussLLM}$, a framework designed to bridge this gap by training models to proactively decide not just $\textit{what}$ to say, but critically, $\textit{when}$ to speak. Our primary contribution is a scalable two-stage data generation pipeline that synthesizes a large-scale dataset of realistic multi-turn human discussions. Each discussion is annotated with one of five intervention types (e.g., Factual Correction, Concept Definition) and contains an explicit conversational trigger where an AI intervention adds value. By training models to predict a special silent token when no intervention is needed, they learn to remain quiet until a helpful contribution can be made. We explore two architectural baselines: an integrated end-to-end model and a decoupled classifier-generator system optimized for low-latency inference. We evaluate these models on their ability to accurately time interventions and generate helpful responses, paving the way for more situationally aware and proactive conversational AI.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/72793afeca459616.txt b/corpus/education/text/72793afeca459616.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1aaed82cce0244db553cd26b432d1f05b63764aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/72793afeca459616.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+AI-Generated Traces for Novice Programmers: Learning Effects and Learner Differences in a Multi-Institutional Study
+
+Introductory programming (CS1) courses often struggle to support students' understanding of program execution. While visualizations can make execution processes explicit, their effectiveness depends on design and context, and empirical evidence for AI-generated visualizations remains limited. We propose Generated Animated Traces (GATs), AI-generated, analogy-based, narrated animations that coordinate source code, execution state, and conceptual analogies. We conduct a study at two institutions in CS1 courses (Python, N=961; Java N=151) comparing GATs to textual explanations. We measure immediate learning performance and experience, end-of-course engagement and exam performance. Results show that GATs can yield selective benefits for immediate learning, but benefits are context-dependent and short-term. We observe that GATs' influence on performance is moderated by learner engagement profiles. This finding underscores the importance of personalized approaches.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/74fc4150871e1290.txt b/corpus/education/text/74fc4150871e1290.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d8fd66a9c82e344504f975d4db67f9d4891492d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/74fc4150871e1290.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Atomic Learning Objectives Labeling: A High-Resolution Approach for Physics Education
+
+This paper introduces a novel approach to create a high-resolution "map" for physics learning: an "atomic" learning objectives (LOs) system designed to capture detailed cognitive processes and concepts required for problem solving in a college-level introductory physics course. Our method leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) for automated labeling of physics questions and introduces a comprehensive set of metrics to evaluate the quality of the labeling outcomes. The atomic LO system, covering nine chapters of an introductory physics course, uses a "subject-verb-object'' structure to represent specific cognitive processes. We apply this system to 131 questions from expert-curated question banks and the OpenStax University Physics textbook. Each question is labeled with 1-8 atomic LOs across three chapters. Through extensive experiments using various prompting strategies and LLMs, we compare automated LOs labeling results against human expert labeling. Our analysis reveals both the strengths and limitations of LLMs, providing insight into LLMs reasoning processes for labeling LOs and identifying areas for improvement in LOs system design. Our work contributes to the field of learning analytics by proposing a more granular approach to mapping learning objectives with questions. Our findings have significant implications for the development of intelligent tutoring systems and personalized learning pathways in STEM education, paving the way for more effective "learning GPS'' systems.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/756c6efb5e880309.txt b/corpus/education/text/756c6efb5e880309.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..14d3f1a396687b4b58ec5994d3ca6f1c71c119db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/756c6efb5e880309.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+An Agent-Based Simulation of Regularity-Driven Student Attrition: How Institutional Time-to-Live Constraints Create a Dropout Trap in Higher Education
+
+High dropout rates in engineering programmes are conventionally attributed to student deficits: lack of academic preparation or motivation. However, this view neglects the causal role of "normative friction": the complex system of administrative rules, exam validity windows, and prerequisite chains that constrain student progression. This paper introduces "The Regularity Trap," a phenomenon where rigid assessment timelines decouple learning from accreditation. We operationalize the CAPIRE framework into a calibrated Agent-Based Model (ABM) simulating 1,343 student trajectories across a 42-course Civil Engineering curriculum. The model integrates empirical course parameters and thirteen psycho-academic archetypes derived from a 15-year longitudinal dataset. By formalizing the "Regularity Regime" as a decaying validity function, we isolate the effect of administrative time limits on attrition. Results reveal that 86.4% of observed dropouts are driven by normative mechanisms (expiry cascades) rather than purely academic failure (5.3%). While the overall dropout rate stabilized at 32.4%, vulnerability was highly heterogeneous: archetypes with myopic planning horizons faced attrition rates up to 49.0%, compared to 13.2% for strategic agents, despite comparable academic ability. These findings challenge the neutrality of administrative structures, suggesting that rigid validity windows act as an invisible filter that disproportionately penalizes students with lower self-regulatory capital.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/7661eb0d5b546212.txt b/corpus/education/text/7661eb0d5b546212.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1c814b416452140eda8ff5313b8921970e7bca04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/7661eb0d5b546212.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+MedSimAI: Simulation and Formative Feedback Generation to Enhance Deliberate Practice in Medical Education
+
+Medical education faces challenges in scalability, accessibility, and consistency, particularly in clinical skills training for physician-patient communication. Traditional simulation-based learning, while effective, is resource-intensive, difficult to schedule, and often highly variable in feedback quality. Through a collaboration between AI, learning science, and medical education experts, we co-developed MedSimAI, an AI-powered simulation platform that enables deliberate practice, self-regulated learning (SRL), and automated assessment through interactive patient encounters. Leveraging large language models (LLMs), MedSimAI generates realistic clinical interactions and provides immediate, structured feedback using established medical evaluation frameworks such as the Master Interview Rating Scale (MIRS). In a pilot study with 104 first-year medical students, we examined engagement, conversation patterns, and user perceptions. Students found MedSimAI beneficial for repeated, realistic patient-history practice. Conversation analysis revealed that certain higher-order skills were often overlooked, though students generally performed systematic histories and empathic listening. By integrating unlimited practice opportunities, real-time AI assessment, and SRL principles, MedSimAI addresses key limitations of traditional simulation-based training, making high-quality clinical education more accessible and scalable.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/772d996e374e9e29.txt b/corpus/education/text/772d996e374e9e29.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..14fda3040ab2716d055dd6c3366e783867249790
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/772d996e374e9e29.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Digital Engagement, Income Disparities, and Job Seeking in the United States since 2010
+
+Surveys often record how frequently people use the internet without measuring the infrastructures, skills, and support systems that make digital participation possible. Using the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort, we study how internet-use frequency relates to labor income, employment attachment, and job seeking after 2010. The main digital-engagement analysis uses the comparable 2011, 2013, and 2015 waves, with 2017 retained as later labor-market context. Across repeated cross sections, daily internet use consistently marks higher income and stronger employment attachment. Relative to daily use, less-than-daily use is associated with roughly 11 to 20 percent lower income, while nonuse is associated with about 18 to 21 percent lower income in 2011 and 2013. Respondents reporting no internet use are also 13 to 23 percentage points less likely to report full-year work. Job-search estimates reveal a distinct mechanism: active search is governed by employment status, search intensity, and application support, so a frequency item sorts respondents more sharply on durable labor-market attachment than on short-window search. Education accounts for a substantial share of the raw digital gradient, and pooled lagged-outcome and doubly robust transition estimates separate durable stratification from positive adoption margins. The results establish internet-use frequency as an informative behavioral marker of digitally mediated labor-market stratification and clarify why routine use should not be treated as a simple measure of digital access.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/781f6b796687e06b.txt b/corpus/education/text/781f6b796687e06b.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d41c3bb64eab877df53790a7d62cb1f29c5b96ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/781f6b796687e06b.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+AI Unplugged: Embodied Interactions for AI Literacy in Higher Education
+
+As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes increasingly integrated into daily life, higher education must move beyond code-centric instruction to foster holistic AI literacy. We present a novel pedagogical approach that integrates embodied, unplugged activities into a university-level Introduction to AI course. Inspired by the effectiveness of CS Unplugged in K-12 education, our physical, collaborative activities gave students a first-person perspective on AI decision-making. Through interactive games modeling Search Algorithms, Markov Decision Processes, Q-learning, and Hidden Markov Models, students built an intuition for complex AI concepts and more easily transitioned to mathematical formalizations and code implementations. We present four unplugged AI activities, describe how to bridge from unplugged activities to plugged coding tasks, reflect on implementation challenges, and propose refinements. We suggest that unplugged activities can effectively bridge conceptual reasoning and technical skill-building in university-level AI education.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/7c5ed4b79fae2df8.txt b/corpus/education/text/7c5ed4b79fae2df8.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7d0280e3821cd16a2c1a0de17f150da5d718bcfb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/7c5ed4b79fae2df8.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Reimagining the Traditional Flight Computer: E6BJA as a Modern, Multi-Platform Tool for Flight Calculations and Training
+
+Traditional flight computers -- including mechanical "whiz-wheels" (e.g. E6B, CRP series) and electronic flight calculators (e.g. ASA CX-3, Sportys E6-B) -- have long played a central role in flight planning and training within general aviation (GA). While these tools remain pedagogically valuable, their fixed form factors, constrained interaction models, and limited extensibility are increasingly misaligned with the expectations and workflows of pilots operating in modern digital environments. This paper presents E6BJA (Jamies Flight Computer), a fully featured, multi-platform, software-based flight computer designed natively for Apple iOS, Android, and Microsoft Windows devices, with a complementary web-based implementation. E6BJA reproduces the core calculations of traditional flight computers while extending them through enhanced modelling capabilities such as the 1976 International Standard Atmosphere, carburettor icing risk estimation, and aircraft-specific weight and balance calculators. Each calculator is accompanied by embedded educational monographs that explain underlying assumptions, variables, and equations. We compare E6BJA with mechanical and electronic flight computers across functional, cognitive, and technical dimensions, demonstrating improvements in accuracy, error reduction, discoverability, and educational value. We also discuss design trade-offs associated with native multi-platform development and examine how contemporary mobile computing environments can support safer and more intuitive pre-flight planning for pilots, trainees, instructors, and flight planning personnel. By combining the conceptual rigour of traditional flight planning methods with modern human-computer interaction design, E6BJA represents a meaningful evolution in pilot-facing flight tools, supporting both computation and instruction in aviation training contexts.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/817d9ab631a3fdf3.txt b/corpus/education/text/817d9ab631a3fdf3.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..60f4332d78406793fff22571ebdf33e3760784fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/817d9ab631a3fdf3.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Iy\`aw\'oBench: A Benchmark for Evaluating Large Language Model Clinical Triage Accuracy on Undifferentiated Febrile Illness in Nigerian Primary Health Settings
+
+Background. Undifferentiated febrile illness is the leading cause of primary care outpatient visits in Nigeria, yet no validated benchmark exists for evaluating large language model (LLM) clinical triage reasoning in West African primary health settings. Methods. We introduce Iy\`aw\'oBench v1.0, a dataset of 200 synthetic clinical vignettes across eight febrile illness categories derived from statistical distributions of 1,200 real patient encounters at 19 primary health centres (PHCs) in Oyo State, Nigeria. Six LLMs were evaluated on structured triage classification across two metrics: triage accuracy and safety score. Results. All six models achieved 100% safety scores (95% CI: 96.4-100.0%), never downgrading a critical REFER NOW case to TREAT HERE. Triage accuracy varied substantially: Claude Sonnet (claude-sonnet-4-5) 67.5% (95% CI: 60.8-73.7%), Llama 4 Scout 59.5% (52.5-66.2%), Llama 3.3 70B 43.0% (36.2-50.0%), and Llama 3.1 8B 39.0% (32.4-45.9%). Two models demonstrated near-zero accuracy attributable to structured output non-compliance. Conclusions. Modern LLMs exhibit safe triage behaviour but vary substantially in structured clinical accuracy. Clinically engineered systems with embedded WHO guidelines outperform general-purpose models by up to 28.5 percentage points. Iy\`aw\'oBench provides the first reproducible evaluation framework for LLM clinical decision support in West African primary care.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/829ca69a6ed2b2ca.txt b/corpus/education/text/829ca69a6ed2b2ca.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..03bc900b1c94ff138a80a8fc428cd9e08aa2f4e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/829ca69a6ed2b2ca.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+PedaCo-Gen: Scaffolding Pedagogical Agency in Human-AI Collaborative Video Authoring
+
+While advancements in Text-to-Video (T2V) generative AI offer a promising path toward democratizing content creation, current models are often optimized for visual fidelity rather than instructional efficacy. This study introduces PedaCo-Gen, a pedagogically-informed human-AI collaborative video generating system for authoring instructional videos based on Mayer's Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning (CTML). Moving away from traditional "one-shot" generation, PedaCo-Gen introduces an Intermediate Representation (IR) phase, enabling educators to interactively review and refine video blueprints-comprising scripts and visual descriptions-with an AI reviewer. Our study with 23 education experts demonstrates that PedaCo-Gen significantly enhances video quality across various topics and CTML principles compared to baselines. Participants perceived the AI-driven guidance not merely as a set of instructions but as a metacognitive scaffold that augmented their instructional design expertise, reporting high production efficiency (M=4.26) and guide validity (M=4.04). These findings highlight the importance of reclaiming pedagogical agency through principled co-creation, providing a foundation for future AI authoring tools that harmonize generative power with human professional expertise.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/82f8d18f95dfb309.txt b/corpus/education/text/82f8d18f95dfb309.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..230bd646ab87807fad1c1c1583473ee716be66f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/82f8d18f95dfb309.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Teaching Language Models How to Code Like Learners: Conversational Serialization for Student Simulation
+
+Artificial models that simulate how learners act and respond within educational systems are a promising tool for evaluating tutoring strategies and feedback mechanisms at scale. However, many existing approaches in programming education rely on prompting large, proprietary language models, raising concerns around privacy, cost, and dependence. In this work, we propose a method for training open-weight artificial programming learners using authentic student process data. Our approach serializes temporal log traces into a conversational format, representing each student's problem-solving process as a dialogue between the learner and their automated assessment system. Student code submissions and environment feedback, such as test outcomes, grades, and error traces, form alternating conversational turns, enabling models to learn from the iterative debugging process. We additionally introduce a training pipeline combining supervised fine-tuning with preference optimization to align models with authentic student debugging behavior. We evaluate our framework by training Qwen models at 4B and 8B scales on a large-scale dataset of real student submissions to Python programming assignments. Our results show that incorporating environment feedback strengthens the models' ability to replicate student debugging behavior, improving over both prior code-only approaches and prompted large language models baselines in functional alignment and code similarity. We release our code to support reproducibility.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/87e8478022179425.txt b/corpus/education/text/87e8478022179425.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..547917dc0e00e42618e704788b9e6faa36772460
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/87e8478022179425.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Hybrid E-Assessment in Higher Education: Semi-Automated Grading of Paper-Based Written Examinations
+
+This paper examines the limitations of fully digital and partially digital e-assessment approaches in summative examinations in higher education. The analysis focuses on the didactic narrowing caused by closed question formats and on organizational, technical, and legal constraints that become particularly relevant in large student cohorts. As an alternative, the paper proposes a hybrid e-assessment approach that retains paper-based, problem-oriented examination tasks while enabling semi-automated grading. Assessment-relevant intermediate results are encoded in a structured answer format, entered by students by hand, and subsequently captured from table fields. The central technical bottleneck is reliable recognition of handwritten characters under realistic examination conditions. Recent vision-capable large language models, combined with a two-pass validation principle and comparison against a solution key, can reduce misclassifications and thereby improve the validity, fairness, and scalability of summative assessment.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/8c49f56f8d666085.txt b/corpus/education/text/8c49f56f8d666085.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..481e070aaa19b06d0dffa5f5bca7539423619a54
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/8c49f56f8d666085.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Tuning Qwen2.5-VL to Improve Its Web Interaction Skills
+
+Recent advances in vision-language models (VLMs) have sparked growing interest in using them to automate web tasks, yet their feasibility as independent agents that reason and act purely from visual input remains underexplored. We investigate this setting using Qwen2.5-VL-32B, one of the strongest open-source VLMs available, and focus on improving its reliability in web-based control. Through initial experimentation, we observe three key challenges: (i) inaccurate localization of target elements, the cursor, and their relative positions, (ii) sensitivity to instruction phrasing, and (iii) an overoptimistic bias toward its own actions, often assuming they succeed rather than analyzing their actual outcomes. To address these issues, we fine-tune Qwen2.5-VL-32B for a basic web interaction task: moving the mouse and clicking on a page element described in natural language. Our training pipeline consists of two stages: (1) teaching the model to determine whether the cursor already hovers over the target element or whether movement is required, and (2) training it to execute a single command (a mouse move or a mouse click) at a time, verifying the resulting state of the environment before planning the next action. Evaluated on a custom benchmark of single-click web tasks, our approach increases success rates from 86% to 94% under the most challenging setting.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/8c58e33e4d665f0c.txt b/corpus/education/text/8c58e33e4d665f0c.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5efeb7f0d305acf705f2298cf36a246854d866a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/8c58e33e4d665f0c.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+From job titles to jawlines: Using context voids to study generative AI systems
+
+In this paper, we introduce a speculative design methodology for studying the behavior of generative AI systems, framing design as a mode of inquiry. We propose bridging seemingly unrelated domains to generate intentional context voids, using these tasks as probes to elicit AI model behavior. We demonstrate this through a case study: probing the ChatGPT system (GPT-4 and DALL-E) to generate headshots from professional Curricula Vitae (CVs). In contrast to traditional ways, our approach assesses system behavior under conditions of radical uncertainty -- when forced to invent entire swaths of missing context -- revealing subtle stereotypes and value-laden assumptions. We qualitatively analyze how the system interprets identity and competence markers from CVs, translating them into visual portraits despite the missing context (i.e. physical descriptors). We show that within this context void, the AI system generates biased representations, potentially relying on stereotypical associations or blatant hallucinations.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/8f6cd6c29efc5c68.txt b/corpus/education/text/8f6cd6c29efc5c68.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8e4a77c346a20d6a2c4ce2017941e82d49a2387c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/8f6cd6c29efc5c68.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Playsemble: Learning Low-Level Programming Through Interactive Games
+
+Teaching assembly programming is a fundamental component of undergraduate computer science education, yet many students struggle with its abstract and low-level concepts. Existing learning tools, such as simulators and visualisers, support understanding by exposing machine states. However, they often limit students to passive observation and provide few opportunities for meaningful interaction. To address these limitations, we introduce Playsemble, a gamified learning system that transforms assembly instructions into interactive, game-like tasks in which students control Pac-Man to collect items, avoid ghosts, and reach targets. Playsemble integrates a code editor, a CPU emulator, and visual debugging tools within a browser-based environment, allowing students to work offline without installation or configuration. It also provides immediate formative feedback enhanced by large language models. We deployed Playsemble in an undergraduate computer architecture course with 107 students. The course featured a sequence of assignments of increasing complexity, covering core concepts such as register and memory manipulation, control structures including loops and conditionals, and arithmetic operations. Our findings suggest that Playsemble promotes active experimentation, sustained engagement, and deeper conceptual understanding through meaningful game-based learning experiences.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/97efecb178db37bb.txt b/corpus/education/text/97efecb178db37bb.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..268119bf59a28bf26f13c45a8a06b5e96da85d99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/97efecb178db37bb.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+SensPS: Sensing Personal Space Comfortable Distance between Human-Human Using Multimodal Sensors
+
+Personal space, also known as peripersonal space, is crucial in human social interaction, influencing comfort, communication, and social stress. Estimating and respecting personal space is essential for enhancing human-computer interaction (HCI) and smart environments. Personal space preferences vary due to individual traits, cultural background, and contextual factors. Advanced multimodal sensing technologies, including eye-tracking and wristband sensors, offer opportunities to develop adaptive systems that dynamically adjust to user comfort levels. Integrating physiological and behavioral data enables a deeper understanding of spatial interactions. This study develops a sensor-based model to estimate comfortable personal space and identifies key features influencing spatial preferences. Our findings show that multimodal sensors, particularly eye-tracking and physiological wristband data, can effectively predict personal space preferences, with eye-tracking data playing a more significant role. An experimental study involving controlled human interactions demonstrates that a Transformer-based model achieves the highest predictive accuracy (F1 score: 0.87) for estimating personal space. Eye-tracking features, such as gaze point and pupil diameter, emerge as the most significant predictors, while physiological signals from wristband sensors contribute marginally. These results highlight the potential for AI-driven personalization of social space in adaptive environments, suggesting that multimodal sensing can be leveraged to develop intelligent systems that optimize spatial arrangements in workplaces, educational institutions, and public settings. Future work should explore larger datasets, real-world applications, and additional physiological markers to enhance model robustness.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/9adb4ef4965ac49b.txt b/corpus/education/text/9adb4ef4965ac49b.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3231dce736f61bc3cbbe5e151dd3956d812cb3a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/9adb4ef4965ac49b.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LLMs for Survey Text Analysis - A Performance Comparison Between Humans and GPT-5 on Inductive Content Analysis
+
+Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to support text analysis in qualitative research, yet evidence on their performance in inductive content analysis remains limited. This study compares human and LLM-based inductive coding of open-ended survey responses from 903 answers across six variables from a European PhD student survey. Five human coders performed inductive content analysis following a standardized coding scheme, while an LLM (GPT-5.4) conducted the same task using an established prompting procedure. Agreement between human and LLM outputs was assessed using the Adjusted Rand Index (ARI). Results showed an alignment between humans and the LLM, with ARI values of 0.61 for coding and 0.54 for theme generation. These values were close to the internal consistency of coding and theme results within humans (ARI = 0.68) and the LLM (ARI = 0.76). Agreement varied widely across variables, with low within-entity consistency consistently linked to low between-entity agreement, underscoring the role of data characteristics and individual performance in reliability. Overall, the findings suggest that LLMs can approximate human coding in this case-specific setting, particularly at the coding level, and may serve as a scalable support tool for inductive qualitative analysis.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/9b15fb10c5969f30.txt b/corpus/education/text/9b15fb10c5969f30.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0fcd013d628c52579ed434c59054c00c5ac8ab40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/9b15fb10c5969f30.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Global Automation Atlas
+
+Automation affects the labour content of work differently across different contexts. Yet, most existing exposure measures assign fixed scores to tasks or occupations, limiting comparisons of automation exposure across countries. We develop a task-based and country-specific approach to classify automation exposure across the world to disentangle labor-substituting from labor-augmenting automation, the relevant technology channel, and the material role of AI. Our measure spans 124 countries, generating an atlas of 2.33 million task-country labels for economies covering 99% of world population and GDP. We present five descriptive results. First, exposure is highly uneven, ranging from 3.3% of tasks in South Sudan to 61.6% in China, and rises strongly with income, although substantial variation remains within income groups. Second, across countries, exposed tasks are skewed towards substitution rather than augmentation, but low-income countries are disproportionately exposed to substitution, whereas middle-income countries are more heterogeneous. Third, less technologically advanced forms of automation account for more than half of exposed tasks in low-income countries but about one quarter in high-income countries; while other more complex channels generally rise with income levels. Fourth, AI tends to be less prevalent in simpler channels of automation, but also more prevalent in labour-substituting margins in lower income settings and to augment labour in higher income settings. Fifth, we find that females seem to be disproportionately more exposed to labour-substituting automation than males. Our methodology provides a basis for comparing automation exposure across development stages, linking it with cross-country data and allowing us to treat exposure levels, labour margins, technological channels and AI involvement as separate dimensions.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/9f113b2526fdce5f.txt b/corpus/education/text/9f113b2526fdce5f.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..68a6c8caf18409ccd3571d37abbe321a9f042811
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/9f113b2526fdce5f.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Training the next generation of physicians for artificial intelligence-assisted clinical neuroradiology: ASNR MICCAI Brain Tumor Segmentation (BraTS) 2025 Lighthouse Challenge education platform
+
+High-quality reference standard image data creation by neuroradiology experts for automated clinical tools can be a powerful tool for neuroradiology & artificial intelligence education. We developed a multimodal educational approach for students and trainees during the MICCAI Brain Tumor Segmentation Lighthouse Challenge 2025, a landmark initiative to develop accurate brain tumor segmentation algorithms. Fifty-six medical students & radiology trainees volunteered to annotate brain tumor MR images for the BraTS challenges of 2023 & 2024, guided by faculty-led didactics on neuropathology MRI. Among the 56 annotators, 14 select volunteers were then paired with neuroradiology faculty for guided one-on-one annotation sessions for BraTS 2025. Lectures on neuroanatomy, pathology & AI, journal clubs & data scientist-led workshops were organized online. Annotators & audience members completed surveys on their perceived knowledge before & after annotations & lectures respectively. Fourteen coordinators, each paired with a neuroradiologist, completed the data annotation process, averaging 1322.9+/-760.7 hours per dataset per pair and 1200 segmentations in total. On a scale of 1-10, annotation coordinators reported significant increase in familiarity with image segmentation software pre- and post-annotation, moving from initial average of 6+/-2.9 to final average of 8.9+/-1.1, and significant increase in familiarity with brain tumor features pre- and post-annotation, moving from initial average of 6.2+/-2.4 to final average of 8.1+/-1.2. We demonstrate an innovative offering for providing neuroradiology & AI education through an image segmentation challenge to enhance understanding of algorithm development, reinforce the concept of data reference standard, and diversify opportunities for AI-driven image analysis among future physicians.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/a544606b3b1e552e.txt b/corpus/education/text/a544606b3b1e552e.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4438adc1cc225d4d7830982bbb61f862b2640354
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/a544606b3b1e552e.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Simulated Students in Tutoring Dialogues: Substance or Illusion?
+
+Advances in large language models (LLMs) enable many new innovations in education. However, evaluating the effectiveness of new technology requires real students, which is time-consuming and hard to scale up. Therefore, many recent works on LLM-powered tutoring solutions have used simulated students for both training and evaluation, often via simple prompting. Surprisingly, little work has been done to ensure or even measure the quality of simulated students. In this work, we formally define the student simulation task, propose a set of evaluation metrics that span linguistic, behavioral, and cognitive aspects, and benchmark a wide range of student simulation methods on these metrics. We experiment on a real-world math tutoring dialogue dataset, where both automated and human evaluation results show that prompting strategies for student simulation perform poorly; supervised fine-tuning and preference optimization yield much better but still limited performance, motivating future work on this challenging task.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/a71986260ec905b7.txt b/corpus/education/text/a71986260ec905b7.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aa3d05753d719e30d64c0ade6d6c72d7ca3021a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/a71986260ec905b7.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Artificial Intelligence in Sports: Insights from a Quantitative Survey among Sports Students in Germany about their Perceptions, Expectations, and Concerns regarding the Use of AI Tools
+
+Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools such as ChatGPT, Copilot, or Gemini have a crucial impact on academic research and teaching. Empirical data on how students perceive the increasing influence of AI, which different types of tools they use, what they expect from them in their daily academic tasks, and their concerns regarding the use of AI in their studies are still limited. The manuscript presents findings from a quantitative survey conducted among sports students of all semesters in Germany using an online questionnaire. It explores aspects such as students' usage behavior, motivational factors, and uncertainties regarding the impact of AI tools on academia in the future. Furthermore, the social climate in sports studies is being investigated to provide a general overview of the current situation of the students in Germany. Data collection took place between August and November 2023, addressing all sports departments at German universities, with a total of 262 students participating. Our Findings indicate that students have a strong interest in using AI tools in their studies, expecting them to improve their overall academic performance, understand the complexity of scientific approaches, and save time. They express confidence that the proliferation of AI will not compromise their critical thinking skills. Moreover, students are positive about integrating more AI-related topics into the curriculum and about lecturers adopting more AI-based teaching methods. However, our findings also show that students have concerns about plagiarism, lecturer preparedness and their own skills and future skill development.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/ad2c40efc56e80a2.txt b/corpus/education/text/ad2c40efc56e80a2.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9962831c7ceab9fb5276ff54a2a90467711d2921
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/ad2c40efc56e80a2.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+GROW: A Conversational AI Coach for Goals, Reflection, Optimism, and Well-Being
+
+College students face well-being challenges driven by academic pressure, financial strain, and social expectations. While campus counseling and student-success programs offer support, access is often limited by stigma, waitlists, and scheduling constraints. Existing digital tools focus on emotional check-ins or chatbots and may overlook structured goal setting and aligning goals with personal values. We present GROW, a goal-centered well-being coaching system that puts values-aligned goals at the center of the student experience. GROW combines the SMART framework with principles from Acceptance and Commitment Therapy in a conversational AI coach that helps students clarify aspirations, break them into concrete steps, and reflect on progress. The system links action plans with Google Calendar, sends reminders, and provides a dashboard that shows progress and engagement. We evaluated GROW through interviews with clinical psychologists, student-success staff, and faculty, followed by a one-week deployment with 30 undergraduates. Findings offer design implications for interactive systems that support engagement, accountability, and sense of purpose in higher education.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/adce3584e2a793cd.txt b/corpus/education/text/adce3584e2a793cd.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3c0e002e66037e864816e3d4547e6f573e04d09c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/adce3584e2a793cd.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+MedEasy: Designing AI Standardized Patients for Clinical Consultation Training
+
+AI standardized patients are becoming a setting for professional training in clinical consultation. This paper presents MedEasy, a multi-agent system that organizes virtual-patient practice through patient dialogue, clinical actions, decision submission, documentation, and feedback. We first conducted a formative study with 12 clinical-year medical students through interviews and three co-design workshops. The findings informed a staged workflow, structured case records, action-contingent findings, and trajectory-based review. We then conducted an evaluative user study with a separate cohort of 12 clinical-year medical students, with each participant completing two counterbalanced cases. Learners interpreted MedEasy as a connected consultation environment. They used patient responses, examination findings, available actions, and feedback together to judge whether the represented case remained coherent. They valued repeatable practice and recorded review, while questioning missing actions and feedback criteria. The paper contributes design implications for AI-supported professional training systems that use case-specific standards to connect situated practice.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/b189099228de6a06.txt b/corpus/education/text/b189099228de6a06.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..08fccadafd4af17706d9f14356cc7be940aa72e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/b189099228de6a06.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Toward LLM-Supported Automated Assessment of Critical Thinking Subskills
+
+Critical thinking represents a fundamental competency in today's education landscape. Developing critical thinking skills through timely assessment and feedback is crucial; however, there has not been extensive work in the learning analytics community on defining, measuring, and supporting critical thinking. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of measuring core "subskills" that underlie critical thinking. We ground our work in an authentic task where students operationalize critical thinking: student-written argumentative essays. We developed a coding rubric based on an established skills progression and completed human coding for a corpus of student essays. We then evaluated three distinct approaches to automated scoring: zero-shot prompting, few-shot prompting, and supervised fine-tuning, implemented across three large language models (GPT-5, GPT-5-mini, and ModernBERT). GPT-5 with few-shot prompting achieved the strongest results and demonstrated particular strength on subskills with separable, frequent categories, while lower performance was observed for subskills that required detection of subtle distinctions or rare categories. Our results underscore critical trade-offs in automated critical thinking assessment: proprietary models offer superior reliability at higher cost, while open-source alternatives provide practical accuracy with reduced sensitivity to minority categories. Our work represents an initial step toward scalable assessment of higher-order reasoning skills across authentic educational contexts.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/b55df2f892eb0cc8.txt b/corpus/education/text/b55df2f892eb0cc8.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c5ee7afb0d62ef3925b77909f4920c34e012505d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/b55df2f892eb0cc8.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Quantifying Student Success with Generative AI: A Monte Carlo Simulation Informed by Systematic Review
+
+The rapid development of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) tools such as ChatGPT has intensified interest in their role in higher education, particularly in how students perceive and use them and how these perceptions may relate to educational outcomes. This study employs a hybrid methodological approach that combines a PRISMA-guided systematic literature review with simulation-based modeling to examine student perceptions of GenAI in higher education. Nineteen empirical articles published between 2023 and 2025 were identified through a Scopus-based review, and thematic synthesis was used to organize the emerging patterns in the literature. Of these, six studies reported item-level means and standard deviations suitable for probabilistic modeling. From this subset, one well-structured Likert-scale dataset was selected as a canonical example for inverse-variance-weighted Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation generated a composite perception-based Success Score, enabling estimation of both central tendency and uncertainty under different thematic configurations. The findings indicate that usability-related factors, particularly System Efficiency and Learning Burden, exert the greatest influence on the composite score under the specified weighting scheme, while other themes also contribute positively but more modestly. The study offers a transparent and privacy-preserving bridge between thematic synthesis and predictive probabilistic modeling, providing a reproducible framework for linking GenAI perceptions to educational outcomes in future research.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/bb3c279b0d18f551.txt b/corpus/education/text/bb3c279b0d18f551.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1d39a4dbdee20b81cdd4c83690b178e8d394a009
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/bb3c279b0d18f551.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+The Hidden Cost of Contextual Sycophancy: an AI Literacy Intervention in Human-AI Collaboration
+
+Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in educational settings as interactive tools for collaboration. However, their tendency toward sycophancy, aligning with user beliefs even when incorrect, raises concerns for learning and decision-making, especially for less knowledgeable users. This study investigates how sycophantic alignment emerges in authentic multi-turn human-AI interactions and whether interventions targeting increasing AI literacy and prompting competencies can mitigate its effects. In a controlled mixed-design experiment, 60 participants completed analytical survival ranking tasks by first generating individual rankings and then making final decisions after collaborating with an AI assistant, both before and after receiving either general or sycophancy-focused prompting training. Preliminary results show that LLMs are highly sensitive to user input: lower-quality initial responses lead to poorer AI advice, suggesting that the model mirrors or incorporates user reasoning rather than correcting it or offering better alternatives that are missing or less frequent in the conversation. Critically, the propagation of user errors into AI responses significantly reduced both the quality of AI feedback and final user task performance, revealing a form of contextual sycophantic dependence. While the intervention did not eliminate the propagation of contextual errors, it significantly improved AI advice by reducing the direct mirroring of incorrect user rankings. These findings suggest that prompting and AI literacy alone may be insufficient to ensure epistemically independent AI support, highlighting the need for system-level approaches that better promote critical engagement in human-AI collaboration.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/bc0c32502e3bdbf5.txt b/corpus/education/text/bc0c32502e3bdbf5.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f14b5156e5ed8a0a313ac74d9b7010f0e29cecdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/bc0c32502e3bdbf5.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Open Educational Resources: Barriers and Open Issues
+
+Open Educational Resources (OER) are freely available teaching and learning materials, such as textbooks, videos, and interactive games, that can be used, reused, adapted, and shared. OER can leverage access, collaboration, and innovation in education; however, their adoption and long-term use remain limited. Motivated by this issue, this manuscript examined the literature and identified 26 social, economic, and technical barriers that hinder teachers, students, and institutions from creating, using, and maintaining OER. These barriers were evaluated through semi-structured interviews with experts to ensure their understandability, correctness, completeness, and relevance. We adopted a four-step research method: (1) a tertiary study that identified barriers from 26 secondary studies; (2) analysis and classification of the barriers according to social, economic, and technical dimensions and the OER lifecycle activities they affect; (3) design of the conceptual model to represent relationships among OER elements, barriers, and mitigation actions; and (4) evaluation through expert interviews. These barriers are also illustrated using a real-world OER. The findings provide insights for the education community, supporting inclusive strategies, institutional actions, and public policies to reduce social, economic, and technical barriers to OER. By addressing factors that affect accessibility, sustainability, and equitable participation, this manuscript advances universal access to educational resources and fosters more inclusive educational ecosystems.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/bd7af583d3946560.txt b/corpus/education/text/bd7af583d3946560.txt
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dd5b4abe7f2fb58bae033d6f6791a6ede91c9307
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/bd7af583d3946560.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LECTOR: Summarizing E-book Reading Content for Personalized Student Support
+
+Educational e-book platforms provide valuable information to teachers and researchers through two main sources: reading activity data and reading content data. While reading activity data is commonly used to analyze learning strategies and predict low-performing students, reading content data is often overlooked in these analyses. To address this gap, this study proposes LECTOR (Lecture slides and Topic Relationships), a model that summarizes information from reading content in a format that can be easily integrated with reading activity data. Our first experiment compared LECTOR to representative Natural Language Processing (NLP) models in extracting key information from 2,255 lecture slides, showing an average improvement of 5% in F1-score. These results were further validated through a human evaluation involving 28 students, which showed an average improvement of 21% in F1-score over a model predominantly used in current educational tools. Our second experiment compared reading preferences extracted by LECTOR with traditional reading activity data in predicting low-performing students using 600,712 logs from 218 students. The results showed a tendency to improve the predictive performance by integrating LECTOR. Finally, we proposed examples showing the potential application of the reading preferences extracted by LECTOR in designing personalized interventions for students.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/c09c86878168cde5.txt b/corpus/education/text/c09c86878168cde5.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6aa1581a1e4c1879a1808ef011fc3fab9e996b4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/c09c86878168cde5.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Artificial Intelligence as a Training Tool in Clinical Psychology: A Comparison of Text-Based and Avatar Simulations
+
+Clinical psychology students frequently report feeling underprepared for the interpersonal demands of therapeutic work, highlighting the need for accessible opportunities to practise core counselling skills before seeing real clients. Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) now enable simulated interaction partners that may support early skills development. This study examined postgraduate clinical psychology students' perceptions of two AI-based simulations: a text-based chatbot (ChatGPT) and a voice-based avatar (HeyGen). Twenty-four students completed two brief cognitive-behavioural role-plays (counterbalanced), one with each tool, and provided both quantitative ratings and qualitative feedback on perceived usefulness, skill application, responsiveness and engagement, and perceived skill improvement. Both AI tools were evaluated positively across dimensions. However, the avatar was rated significantly higher than the chatbot for perceived usefulness, skill application, and perceived skill improvement, and qualitative comments highlighted the added value of voice-based interaction for conveying social and emotional cues. These findings suggest that AI-driven simulation may supplement early-stage clinical skills training, with voice-based avatars offering additional benefits. Future work should test whether such simulated interactions translate to objective improvements in real therapeutic performance.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/c44cf8f5b78ea09f.txt b/corpus/education/text/c44cf8f5b78ea09f.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..11d8480d4c82ab86a12efccbdffb019cbbaa7412
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/c44cf8f5b78ea09f.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Context in the Task of Automated Essay Scoring in Transformer-Based Models
+
+Automated Essay Scoring (AES) has emerged to prominence in response to the growing demand for educational automation. Providing an objective and cost-effective solution, AES standardises the assessment of extended responses. Although substantial research has been conducted in this domain, recent investigations reveal that alternative deep-learning architectures outperform transformer-based models. Despite the successful dominance in the performance of the transformer architectures across various other tasks, this discrepancy has prompted a need to enrich transformer-based AES models through contextual enrichment. This study delves into diverse contextual factors using the ASAP-AES dataset, analysing their impact on transformer-based model performance. Our most effective model, augmented with multiple contextual dimensions, achieves a mean Quadratic Weighted Kappa score of 0.823 across the entire essay dataset and 0.8697 when trained on individual essay sets. Evidently surpassing prior transformer-based models, this augmented approach only underperforms relative to the state-of-the-art deep learning model trained essay-set-wise by an average of 3.83\% while exhibiting superior performance in three of the eight sets. Importantly, this enhancement is orthogonal to architecture-based advancements and seamlessly adaptable to any AES model. Consequently, this contextual augmentation methodology presents a versatile technique for refining AES capabilities, contributing to automated grading and evaluation evolution in educational settings.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/c5bd47de3b06aaf4.txt b/corpus/education/text/c5bd47de3b06aaf4.txt
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f98ca7cd8b2dff4d0bf64b5d8d0f77bded6f91b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/c5bd47de3b06aaf4.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Explainable AI for Automated User-specific Feedback in Surgical Skill Acquisition
+
+Traditional surgical skill acquisition relies heavily on expert feedback, yet direct access is limited by faculty availability and variability in subjective assessments. While trainees can practice independently, the lack of personalized, objective, and quantitative feedback reduces the effectiveness of self-directed learning. Recent advances in computer vision and machine learning have enabled automated surgical skill assessment, demonstrating the feasibility of automatic competency evaluation. However, it is unclear whether such Artificial Intelligence (AI)-driven feedback can contribute to skill acquisition. Here, we examine the effectiveness of explainable AI (XAI)-generated feedback in surgical training through a human-AI study. We create a simulation-based training framework that utilizes XAI to analyze videos and extract surgical skill proxies related to primitive actions. Our intervention provides automated, user-specific feedback by comparing trainee performance to expert benchmarks and highlighting deviations from optimal execution through understandable proxies for actionable guidance. In a prospective user study with medical students, we compare the impact of XAI-guided feedback against traditional video-based coaching on task outcomes, cognitive load, and trainees' perceptions of AI-assisted learning. Results showed improved cognitive load and confidence post-intervention. While no differences emerged between the two feedback types in reducing performance gaps or practice adjustments, trends in the XAI group revealed desirable effects where participants more closely mimicked expert practice. This work encourages the study of explainable AI in surgical education and the development of data-driven, adaptive feedback mechanisms that could transform learning experiences and competency assessment.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/c5eafce3c0bd70e6.txt b/corpus/education/text/c5eafce3c0bd70e6.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cefffeac3257f11b3310182ef8db8eb04cf6d8f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/c5eafce3c0bd70e6.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Toward Socially-Aware LLMs: A Survey of Multimodal Approaches to Human Behavior Understanding
+
+LLM-powered multimodal systems are increasingly used to interpret human social behavior, yet how researchers apply the models' 'social competence' remains poorly understood. This paper presents a systematic literature review of 176 publications across different application domains (e.g., healthcare, education, and entertainment). Using a four-dimensional coding framework (application, technical, evaluative, and ethical), we find (1) frequent use of pattern recognition and information extraction from multimodal sources, but limited support for adaptive, interactive reasoning; (2) a dominant 'modality-to-text' pipeline that privileges language over rich audiovisual cues, striping away nuanced social cues; (3) evaluation practices reliant on static benchmarks, with socially grounded, human-centered assessments rare; and (4) Ethical discussions focused mainly on legal and rights-related risks (e.g., privacy), leaving societal risks (e.g., deception) overlooked--or at best acknowledged but left unaddressed. We outline a research agenda for evaluating socially competent, ethically informed, and interaction-aware multi-modal systems.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/cbe3cc2ee24f8811.txt b/corpus/education/text/cbe3cc2ee24f8811.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..96d29c761fa841df7e14210091befd34ac8d1b76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/cbe3cc2ee24f8811.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Concept Map Assessment Through Structure Classification
+
+Due to their versatility, concept maps are used in various educational settings and serve as tools that enable educators to comprehend students' knowledge construction. An essential component for analyzing a concept map is its structure, which can be categorized into three distinct types: spoke, network, and chain. Understanding the predominant structure in a map offers insights into the student's depth of comprehension of the subject. Therefore, this study examined 317 distinct concept map structures, classifying them into one of the three types, and used statistical and descriptive information from the maps to train multiclass classification models. As a result, we achieved an 86\% accuracy in classification using a Decision Tree. This promising outcome can be employed in concept map assessment systems to provide real-time feedback to the student.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/cd94ffcabc861a1c.txt b/corpus/education/text/cd94ffcabc861a1c.txt
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..187d678df460b66868a15395344fc8ecb282d6e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/cd94ffcabc861a1c.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Web Privacy based on Contextual Integrity: Measuring the Collapse of Online Contexts
+
+The collapse of social contexts has been amplified by digital infrastructures but surprisingly received insufficient attention from Web privacy scholars. Users are persistently identified within and across distinct web contexts, in varying degrees, through and by different websites and trackers, losing the ability to maintain a fragmented identity. To systematically evaluate this structural privacy harm we operationalize the theory of Privacy as Contextual Integrity and measure persistent user identification within and between distinct Web contexts. We crawl the top-700 popular websites across the contexts of health, finance, news & media, LGBTQ, eCommerce, adult, and education websites, for 27 days, to learn how persistent browser identification via third-party cookies and JavaScript fingerprinting is diffused within and between web contexts. Past work measured Web tracking in bulk, highlighting the volume of trackers and tracking techniques. These measurements miss a crucial privacy implication of Web tracking - the collapse of online contexts. Our findings reveal how persistent browser identification varies between and within contexts, diffusing user IDs to different distances, contrasting known tracking distributions across websites, and conducted as a joint or separate effort via cookie IDs and JS fingerprinting. Our network analysis can inform the construction of browser storage containers to protect users against real-time context collapse. This is a first modest step in measuring Web privacy as contextual integrity, opening new avenues for contextual Web privacy research.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/cf1c5a2f8f9bd672.txt b/corpus/education/text/cf1c5a2f8f9bd672.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b1c2a11690eb135e9d3c1f16601d3c27f5b407ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/cf1c5a2f8f9bd672.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+The Future of Feedback: How Can AI Help Transform Feedback to Be More Engaging, Effective, and Scalable?
+
+With digital learning environments becoming more prevalent, the ease with which generative AI enables the scalable production of real-time, automated feedback holds the potential to reshape learning and teaching experiences. This meeting report synthesizes the interdisciplinary perspectives of 50 scholars from educational psychology, computer science, science education, and the learning sciences on the use of generative AI for feedback and its promises and risks in educational practice. We highlight points of convergence in the scholarship, identify areas of debate and unresolved challenges, and outline open questions and future directions for research and educational practice that emerged from structured small-group activities designed to bridge disciplinary barriers.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/cf7a2b9c1bba80c1.txt b/corpus/education/text/cf7a2b9c1bba80c1.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..30e8da47c896b1dee3d6db4c5aedb7dec3ad94f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/cf7a2b9c1bba80c1.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Towards the Development of Detection of Learned Helplessness in Mathematics: Design and Data Collection Challenges from a Developing Country Perspective
+
+This study investigates the challenges in designing, data collection, and implementation of a web-based Tutoring System (TS) for teaching linear equations within a developing country context. Originally designed as an Android app, the system was redeveloped as a web application to facilitate cross-platform access and data collection. This redesign enabled enhanced tracking through interaction logs and included features like problem skipping, hints, difficulty-based problem sequencing, and game modes with adaptable progression (e.g., easy-to-hard, hard-to-easy). The main objective was to document the design and data collection challenges encountered in data collection for the development of a model capable of detecting learned helplessness in students' behaviors while using a web application for solving linear equation. Challenges included outdated devices, unreliable internet, and logistical constraints such as limited session durations and delays in obtaining approvals. Environmental disruptions like class cancellations and curriculum gaps further complicated the process, with only 118 out of 410 students eligible and actively participating. These obstacles highlight the complexities of collecting interaction data for detecting learned helplessness in real-world, resource-constrained educational settings.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/d46448ccd2282945.txt b/corpus/education/text/d46448ccd2282945.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e00acb854ba188c2c627682c1fb84b504eddf63a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/d46448ccd2282945.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Towards SocratiCode: Designing a Generative AI-Based Programming Tutor for K-12 Students through a 4-Week Participatory Design Study
+
+Generative AI creates new opportunities for programming education, but many existing systems remain overly directive, producing lengthy explanations and premature solutions that can overwhelm K-12 novices. In this paper, we present a participatory design study of how an adaptive tutorial system, SocratiCode, evolved toward a Socratic tutoring model for beginner programming instruction. Drawing on weekly learner feedback, we iteratively refined the system over a four-week study with two K-12 students learning Python. Across iterations, the system shifted from flexible tutorial generation toward a more dialogic form of support characterized by guided questioning, reflection prompts, misconception checks, incremental hints, and mandatory pauses for learner input. Our preliminary observations suggest that this Socratic shift improved explanation clarity, supported problem-solving engagement, and better aligned instruction with novice learners' needs, especially when combined with human guidance. We argue that generative AI in K-12 programming education may be most effective not as an answer engine, but as a Socratic, adaptive learning companion embedded within a human-guided instructional framework.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/d4a13fd7285b6f9d.txt b/corpus/education/text/d4a13fd7285b6f9d.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ac01af543ca4b6691e16f15d2d1ec089bca7854d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/d4a13fd7285b6f9d.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Interpretability Framework for LLMs in Undergraduate Calculus
+
+Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used in education, yet their correctness alone does not capture the quality, reliability, or pedagogical validity of their problem-solving behavior, especially in mathematics, where multistep logic, symbolic reasoning, and conceptual clarity are critical. Conventional evaluation methods largely focus on final answer accuracy and overlook the reasoning process. To address this gap, we introduce a novel interpretability framework for analyzing LLM-generated solutions using undergraduate calculus problems as a representative domain. Our approach combines reasoning flow extraction and decomposing solutions into semantically labeled operations and concepts with prompt ablation analysis to assess input salience and output stability. Using structured metrics such as reasoning complexity, phrase sensitivity, and robustness, we evaluated the model behavior on real Calculus I to III university exams. Our findings revealed that LLMs often produce syntactically fluent yet conceptually flawed solutions, with reasoning patterns sensitive to prompt phrasing and input variation. This framework enables fine-grained diagnosis of reasoning failures, supports curriculum alignment, and informs the design of interpretable AI-assisted feedback tools. This is the first study to offer a structured, quantitative, and pedagogically grounded framework for interpreting LLM reasoning in mathematics education, laying the foundation for the transparent and responsible deployment of AI in STEM learning environments.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/d635d248c385f0e0.txt b/corpus/education/text/d635d248c385f0e0.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a31599cf4cb61983bad95bea36df847efd425c41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/d635d248c385f0e0.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bridge2AI: Building A Cross-disciplinary Curriculum Towards AI-Enhanced Biomedical and Clinical Care
+
+Objective: As AI becomes increasingly central to healthcare, there is a pressing need for bioinformatics and biomedical training systems that are personalized and adaptable. Materials and Methods: The NIH Bridge2AI Training, Recruitment, and Mentoring (TRM) Working Group developed a cross-disciplinary curriculum grounded in collaborative innovation, ethical data stewardship, and professional development within an adapted Learning Health System (LHS) framework. Results: The curriculum integrates foundational AI modules, real-world projects, and a structured mentee-mentor network spanning Bridge2AI Grand Challenges and the Bridge Center. Guided by six learner personas, the program tailors educational pathways to individual needs while supporting scalability. Discussion: Iterative refinement driven by continuous feedback ensures that content remains responsive to learner progress and emerging trends. Conclusion: With over 30 scholars and 100 mentors engaged across North America, the TRM model demonstrates how adaptive, persona-informed training can build interdisciplinary competencies and foster an integrative, ethically grounded AI education in biomedical contexts.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/d66b28dcb855305e.txt b/corpus/education/text/d66b28dcb855305e.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..47c0d3e9ff9ae33f8a6eff4f88b72337de3a8262
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/d66b28dcb855305e.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Does online sustainability communication shape public discourse? Insights from six years of tenant-housing provider interactions
+
+Authorities increasingly rely on social media to advance sustainability transitions, infrastructure investment, and service reform. Yet how citizens respond to these digital communications remains poorly understood. Existing approaches rely on aggregate engagement metrics (e.g., likes), providing limited insight into discourse structure and quality. We developed a data-driven, multidimensional framework to analyse how social media communication shapes the content of discourse, focusing on sustainability-related engagement in Dutch public housing. We analysed 792 posts and 3,197 tenant comments from the Facebook pages of 92 housing providers (2018-2023). A machine-learning pipeline classified comments into recurring discourse configurations across three dimensions - communicative intent, sentiment, and semantic relatedness. Multinomial logistic regression estimated the effects of post-design and organisational characteristics on discourse. Tenant comments were significantly more semantically aligned with their corresponding posts than with randomly paired content, indicating that organisational communication structures responses to topics. Six discourse types emerged, with critical and inquiry-driven engagement increasing over time. Post-level features did not significantly explain variation; organisational characteristics dominated. Larger housing associations attracted more substantive responses, while lower-rent organisations received fewer evaluative comments. While applied to housing associations, our methodology provides a scalable approach to analyse online discourse dynamics, quality, and content across organisations and contexts.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/d8b7b1c70074860a.txt b/corpus/education/text/d8b7b1c70074860a.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..595f2695f3a208bd890ff090a2e5e584f321e18b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/d8b7b1c70074860a.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+NeuroLit Navigator: A Neurosymbolic Approach to Scholarly Article Searches for Systematic Reviews
+
+The introduction of Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly impacted various fields, including education, for example, by enabling the creation of personalized learning materials. However, their use in Systematic Reviews (SRs) reveals limitations such as restricted access to specialized vocabularies, lack of domain-specific reasoning, and a tendency to generate inaccurate information. Existing SR tools often rely on traditional NLP methods and fail to address these issues adequately. To overcome these challenges, we developed the ``NeuroLit Navigator,'' a system that combines domain-specific LLMs with structured knowledge sources like Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) and the Unified Medical Language System (UMLS). This integration enhances query formulation, expands search vocabularies, and deepens search scopes, enabling more precise searches. Deployed in multiple universities and tested by over a dozen librarians, the NeuroLit Navigator has reduced the time required for initial literature searches by 90\%. Despite this efficiency, the initial set of articles retrieved can vary in relevance and quality. Nonetheless, the system has greatly improved the reproducibility of search results, demonstrating its potential to support librarians in the SR process.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/da7ea755ac73b197.txt b/corpus/education/text/da7ea755ac73b197.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c0acc18cb493be6a6bf5999ad6d95f38d82d8101
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/da7ea755ac73b197.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Assessing AI-Generated vs. Human-Authored Spear Phishing SMS Attacks: An Empirical Study
+
+Personalized phishing is difficult to defend against because messages can be tailored to a target's work, interests, and social context. Large language models may make such tailoring faster and easier, but it remains unclear whether messages produced from simple prompts are more convincing than those written by people. This 25-target pilot study compared personalized smishing messages generated by GPT-4 with messages written by novice student authors working under time constraints. Using the proposed Threshold Ranking Approach for Personalized Deception (TRAPD), participants ranked 12 messages written for them, indicated the point at which they would intend to click, explained their reasoning, and judged whether each message was authored by GPT-4 or a human. GPT-4-generated messages elicited an intention to click more often than student-authored messages (28% versus 21%), although the difference was uncertain. More broadly, our findings suggest that a simple prompt can produce personalized messages that participants found comparably convincing within the uncertainty of this pilot study. Job-related messages were significantly more likely to elicit an intention to click than hobby- or social-media-related messages. When asked whether a message was written by a human or generated by AI, participants identified the source no more accurately than chance, although the two study-specific message sets remained computationally distinguishable based on their text. Together, these findings suggest that accessible AI-assisted personalization may increase the practical scale of social-engineering threats, while also demonstrating both the value and current limitations of TRAPD for controlled and ethical comparison.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/dbf74a13fc8d0326.txt b/corpus/education/text/dbf74a13fc8d0326.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ed3679f78ef90866c18e30f6e383e07804da7c6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/dbf74a13fc8d0326.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+The AI Pyramid A Conceptual Framework for Workforce Capability in the Age of AI
+
+Artificial intelligence (AI) represents a qualitative shift in technological change by extending cognitive labor itself rather than merely automating routine tasks. Recent evidence shows that generative AI disproportionately affects highly educated, white collar work, challenging existing assumptions about workforce vulnerability and rendering traditional approaches to digital or AI literacy insufficient. This paper introduces the concept of AI Nativity, the capacity to integrate AI fluidly into everyday reasoning, problem solving, and decision making, and proposes the AI Pyramid, a conceptual framework for organizing human capability in an AI mediated economy. The framework distinguishes three interdependent capability layers: AI Native capability as a universal baseline for participation in AI augmented environments; AI Foundation capability for building, integrating, and sustaining AI enabled systems; and AI Deep capability for advancing frontier AI knowledge and applications. Crucially, the pyramid is not a career ladder but a system level distribution of capabilities required at scale. Building on this structure, the paper argues that effective AI workforce development requires treating capability formation as infrastructure rather than episodic training, centered on problem based learning embedded in work contexts and supported by dynamic skill ontologies and competency based measurement. The framework has implications for organizations, education systems, and governments seeking to align learning, measurement, and policy with the evolving demands of AI mediated work, while addressing productivity, resilience, and inequality at societal scale.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/defebd35db0c7b3d.txt b/corpus/education/text/defebd35db0c7b3d.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6caeb706f27d07569037561340c33a48d6b05027
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/defebd35db0c7b3d.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+The Agency Gap: How Generative AI Literacy Shapes Independent Writing after AI Support
+
+Generative AI (GenAI) tools are rapidly transforming higher education, yet little is known about how students' GenAI literacy shapes their ability to perform independently once such support is removed. This study investigates what we term the agency gap, introduced as the extent to which GenAI literacy predicts student writing performance in contexts that require self-initiation and regulation. Seventy-nine medical and nursing students completed multimodal academic writing tasks based on visual data, supported either by a reactive or proactive GenAI chatbot, followed by a parallel task without AI support. Writing was evaluated across insightfulness, visual data integration, organisation, linguistic quality, and critical thinking. Results showed that GenAI literacy predicted independent writing performance only in the reactive condition, where students had to actively mobilise their own strategies. Mediation analyses revealed no indirect effect via in-task performance, indicating that GenAI literacy acts as a direct, task-general competence rather than a proxy for domain knowledge or other literacies. By contrast, proactive scaffolding equalised outcomes across literacy levels, reducing reliance on learners' GenAI literacy. The agency gap highlights when GenAI literacy matters most, with implications for designing equitable AI-supported learning environments that both leverage and mitigate differences in students' GenAI literacy.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/dfc8ddcd88f47f51.txt b/corpus/education/text/dfc8ddcd88f47f51.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..88c57fe00c08f2b5a7ee52ec4302c0e90f074b43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/dfc8ddcd88f47f51.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Improving Human-Autonomous Vehicle Interaction in Complex Systems
+
+Unresolved questions about how autonomous vehicles (AVs) should meet the informational needs of riders hinder real-world adoption. Complicating our ability to satisfy rider needs is that different people, goals, and driving contexts have different criteria for what constitutes interaction success. Unfortunately, most human-AV research and design today treats all people and situations uniformly. It is crucial to understand how an AV should communicate to meet rider needs, and how communications should change when the human-AV complex system changes. I argue that understanding the relationships between different aspects of the human-AV system can help us build improved and adaptable AV communications. I support this argument using three empirical studies. First, I identify optimal communication strategies that enhance driving performance, confidence, and trust for learning in extreme driving environments. Findings highlight the need for task-sensitive, modality-appropriate communications tuned to learner cognitive limits and goals. Next, I highlight the consequences of deploying faulty communication systems and demonstrate the need for context-sensitive communications. Third, I use machine learning (ML) to illuminate personal factors predicting trust in AVs, emphasizing the importance of tailoring designs to individual traits and concerns. Together, this dissertation supports the necessity of transparent, adaptable, and personalized AV systems that cater to individual needs, goals, and contextual demands. By considering the complex system within which human-AV interactions occur, we can deliver valuable insights for designers, researchers, and policymakers. This dissertation also provides a concrete domain to study theories of human-machine joint action and situational awareness, and can be used to guide future human-AI interaction research. [shortened for arxiv]
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/e1ec8fa4096df709.txt b/corpus/education/text/e1ec8fa4096df709.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1d3f1ebc633ae5faee7e48e7e7dcb8b7457ece4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/e1ec8fa4096df709.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+AAAI-26 Dual Submissions: Novel Challenges
+
+Dual submissions, in which identical or substantially similar papers are simultaneously submitted to one or more archival venues, without cross-citation or disclosure, are a growing problem for the AAAI Conference and other scientific publication venues. These submissions increase the burden on the peer-review system and pollute the scientific record. As part of the AAAI-26 review process, we (conference organizers) compared AAAI main-track submissions to nine other archival venues with overlapping review periods. We also searched for dual submissions within the AAAI-26 main track. We employed title+abstract similarity assessment to prioritize highly similar paper pairs for subsequent triage by an LLM-based overlap assessment tool, followed by manual review of the highest severity pairs. Manual review of such pairs led to the desk-rejection of 141 AAAI-26 main-track submissions. We seek to alert future organizers, and the broader artificial intelligence research community, to the enormous growth in dual submissions. The incidence of exact duplicate submissions, which are easy to detect, has been eclipsed by the number of papers that use different words to describe the same contribution, which are extremely time-consuming to detect. The growth in this phenomenon is likely facilitated by increasing access to generative AI tools. We include several recommendations for addressing this challenge, including (1) updating the AAAI Multiple Submission Policy and educating the community about acceptable practice, (2) having dual-submission checking tools in place before submissions close, (3) working across venues to converge on consistent policies and penalties to aid in reducing the incidence of dual submission, and (4) creating a community-driven adversarial challenge to accelerate the development of robust detection tools.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/e330a1eb3e56dca9.txt b/corpus/education/text/e330a1eb3e56dca9.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b90aab49e2f4b18e43fb023bf416059855dec9d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/e330a1eb3e56dca9.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Auditing Student-AI Collaboration: A Case Study of Online Graduate CS Students
+
+As generative AI becomes embedded in higher education, it increasingly shapes how students complete academic tasks. While these systems offer efficiency and support, concerns persist regarding over-automation, diminished student agency, and the potential for unreliable or hallucinated outputs. This study conducts a mixed-methods audit of student-AI collaboration preferences by examining the alignment between current AI capabilities and students' desired levels of automation in academic work. Using two sequential and complementary surveys, we capture students' perceived benefits, risks, and preferred boundaries when using AI. The first survey employs an existing task-based framework to assess preferences for and actual usage of AI across 12 academic tasks, alongside primary concerns and reasons for use. The second survey, informed by the first, explores how AI systems could be designed to address these concerns through open-ended questions. This study aims to identify gaps between existing AI affordances and students' normative expectations of collaboration, informing the development of more effective and trustworthy AI systems for education.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/e448f62f60fba5fa.txt b/corpus/education/text/e448f62f60fba5fa.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a7c1cf635992d183c92c52d75cb86b089515d8c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/e448f62f60fba5fa.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+LLM Contribution Summarization in Software Projects
+
+This full paper in innovative practice provides an automated tool to summarize individual code contributions in project-based courses with external clients. Real industry projects offer valuable learning opportunities by immersing students in authentic problems defined by external clients. However, the open-ended and highly variable scope of these projects makes it challenging for instructors and teaching assistants to provide timely and detailed feedback. This paper addresses the need for an automated and objective approach to evaluate individual contributions within team projects. In this paper, we present a tool that leverages a large language model (LLM) to automatically summarize code contributions extracted from version control repositories. The tool preprocesses and structures repository data, and uses PyDriller to isolate individual contributions. Its uniqueness lies in the combination of LLM prompt engineering with automated repository analysis, thus reducing the manual grading burden while providing regular and informative updates. The tool was assessed over two semesters during a three-week, full-time software development sprint involving 65 students. Weekly summaries were provided to teams, and both student and faculty feedback indicated the tool's overall usefulness in informing grading and guidance. The tool reports, in large proportion, activities that were in fact performed by the student, with some failure to detect students' contribution. The summaries were considered by the instructors as a useful potential tool to keep up with the projects.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/e44f74534cb505df.txt b/corpus/education/text/e44f74534cb505df.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e7bc613efc818a5fb8ac41bf693cacf34e266b17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/e44f74534cb505df.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Exposure to Content Written by Large Language Models Can Reduce Stigma Around Opioid Use Disorder in Online Communities
+
+Widespread stigma, both in the offline and online spaces, acts as a barrier to harm reduction efforts in the context of opioid use disorder (OUD). This stigma is prominently directed towards clinically approved medications for addiction treatment (MAT), people with the condition, and the condition itself. Given the potential of artificial intelligence based technologies in promoting health equity, and facilitating empathic conversations, this work examines whether large language models (LLMs) can help abate OUD-related stigma in online communities. To answer this, we conducted a series of pre-registered randomized controlled experiments, where participants read LLM-generated, human-written, or no responses to help seeking OUD-related content in online communities. The experiment was conducted under two setups, i.e., participants read the responses either once (N = 2,141), or repeatedly for 14 days (N = 107). We found that participants reported the least stigmatized attitudes toward MAT after consuming LLM-generated responses under both the setups. This study offers insights into strategies that can foster inclusive online discourse on OUD, e.g., based on our findings LLMs can be used as an education-based intervention to promote positive attitudes and increase people's propensity toward MAT.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/e86fe68cae7fd20e.txt b/corpus/education/text/e86fe68cae7fd20e.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..822be109b9c4373857cb04fb5e83829aaccebed6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/e86fe68cae7fd20e.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+AI Across Borders: Exploring Perceptions and Interactions in Higher Education
+
+This study investigates students' perceptions of Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI), with a focus on Higher Education institutions in Northern Ireland and India. We collect quantitative Likert ratings and qualitative comments from 1,211 students on their awareness and perceptions of AI and investigate variations in attitudes toward AI across institutions and subject areas, as well as interactions between these variables with demographic variables (focusing on gender). We find that: (a) while perceptions varied across institutions, responses for Computer Sciences students were similar; and (b) after controlling for institution and subject area, we observed no effect of gender. These results are consistent with previous studies, which find that students' perceptions are predicted by prior experience. We consider the implications of this relation and some considerations for the role of experience.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/e88849cb7d2b0080.txt b/corpus/education/text/e88849cb7d2b0080.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..457c0a3ac89a3b24930cac01c520cc077056164c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/e88849cb7d2b0080.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+A Formal Descriptive Language for Learning Dynamics: A Five-Layer Structural Coordinate System
+
+Understanding learning as a dynamic process is challenging due to the interaction of multiple factors, including cognitive load, internal state change, and subjective evaluation. Existing approaches often address these elements in isolation, limiting the ability to describe learning phenomena within a unified and structurally explicit framework. This paper proposes a multi-layer formal descriptive framework for learning dynamics. Rather than offering a predictive or prescriptive model, the framework introduces a symbolic language composed of state variables, mappings, and layer-specific responsibilities, enabling consistent description of learning processes without commitment to specific functional forms or optimization objectives. This descriptive framework is intended to serve as a structural substrate for analyzing learning processes in human learners, and by extension, in adaptive and Al-assisted learning systems. A central design principle is the explicit separation of descriptive responsibilities across layers, distinguishing load generation, internal understanding transformation, observation, and evaluation. Within this structure, cognitive load is treated as a relational quantity arising from interactions between external input and internal organization, while subjective evaluation is modeled as a minimal regulatory interface responding to learning dynamics and environmental conditions. By emphasizing descriptive clarity and extensibility, the framework provides a common language for organizing existing theories and supporting future empirical and theoretical work.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/e8b3208943dfa4e9.txt b/corpus/education/text/e8b3208943dfa4e9.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c1b2f7b06d530b2b5dd6c6a6a836342d3ce2515b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/e8b3208943dfa4e9.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Guided Reality: Generating Visually-Enriched AR Task Guidance with LLMs and Vision Models
+
+Large language models (LLMs) have enabled the automatic generation of step-by-step augmented reality (AR) instructions for a wide range of physical tasks. However, existing LLM-based AR guidance often lacks rich visual augmentations to effectively embed instructions into spatial context for a better user understanding. We present Guided Reality, a fully automated AR system that generates embedded and dynamic visual guidance based on step-by-step instructions. Our system integrates LLMs and vision models to: 1) generate multi-step instructions from user queries, 2) identify appropriate types of visual guidance, 3) extract spatial information about key interaction points in the real world, and 4) embed visual guidance in physical space to support task execution. Drawing from a corpus of user manuals, we define five categories of visual guidance and propose an identification strategy based on the current step. We evaluate the system through a user study (N=16), completing real-world tasks and exploring the system in the wild. Additionally, four instructors shared insights on how Guided Reality could be integrated into their training workflows.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/ef9a1191c182fe73.txt b/corpus/education/text/ef9a1191c182fe73.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e46baae25de680a3f87897c72c7c6874a2e6723c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/education/text/ef9a1191c182fe73.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Baseline Performance of AI Tools in Classifying Cognitive Demand of Mathematical Tasks
+
+Teachers face increasing demands on their time, particularly in adapting mathematics curricula to meet individual student needs while maintaining cognitive rigor. This study evaluates whether AI tools can accurately classify the cognitive demand of mathematical tasks, which is important for creating or adapting tasks that support student learning. We tested eleven AI tools: six general-purpose (ChatGPT, Claude, DeepSeek, Gemini, Grok, Perplexity) and five education-specific (Brisk, Coteach AI, Khanmigo, Magic School, School$.$AI), on their ability to categorize mathematics tasks across four levels of cognitive demand using a research-based framework. The goal was to approximate the performance teachers will achieve with straightforward prompts. On average, AI tools accurately classified cognitive demand in only 63% of cases. Education-specific tools were not more accurate than general-purpose tools, and no tool exceeded 83% accuracy. All tools struggled with tasks at the extremes of cognitive demand (Memorization and Doing Mathematics), exhibiting a systematic bias toward middle-category levels (Procedures with/without Connections). The tools often gave plausible-sounding explanations likely to be persuasive to novice teachers. Error analysis of AI tools' misclassification of the broad level of cognitive demand (high vs. low) revealed that tools consistently overweighted surface textual features over underlying cognitive processes. Further, AI tools showed weaknesses in reasoning about factors that make tasks higher vs. lower cognitive demand. Errors stemmed not from ignoring relevant dimensions, but from incorrectly reasoning about multiple task aspects. These findings carry implications for AI integration into teacher planning workflows and highlight the need for improved prompt engineering and tool development for educational applications.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/f8110ae12db81c7d.txt b/corpus/education/text/f8110ae12db81c7d.txt
new file mode 100644
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+The AI Productivity Index (APEX)
+
+We present an extended version of the AI Productivity Index (APEX-v1-extended), a benchmark for assessing whether frontier models are capable of performing economically valuable tasks in four jobs: investment banking associate, management consultant, big law associate, and primary care physician (MD). This technical report details the extensions to APEX-v1, including an increase in the held-out evaluation set from n = 50 to n = 100 cases per job (n = 400 total) and updates to the grading methodology. We present a new leaderboard, where GPT5 (Thinking = High) remains the top performing model with a score of 67.0%. APEX-v1-extended shows that frontier models still have substantial limitations when performing typical professional tasks. To support further research, we are open sourcing n = 25 non-benchmark example cases per role (n = 100 total) along with our evaluation harness.
diff --git a/corpus/education/text/f8fb5b567c8902b7.txt b/corpus/education/text/f8fb5b567c8902b7.txt
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+Bridging LMS and Generative AI: Dynamic Course Content Integration (DCCI) for Connecting LLMs to Course Content -- The Ask ME Assistant
+
+The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) with Learning Management Systems (LMSs) has the potential to enhance task automation and accessibility in education. However, hallucination where LLMs generate inaccurate or misleading information remains a significant challenge. This study introduces the Dynamic Course Content Integration (DCCI) mechanism, which dynamically retrieves and integrates course content and curriculum from Canvas LMS into the LLM-powered assistant, Ask ME. By employing prompt engineering to structure retrieved content within the LLM's context window, DCCI ensures accuracy, relevance, and contextual alignment, mitigating hallucination. To evaluate DCCI's effectiveness, Ask ME's usability, and broader student perceptions of AI in education, a mixed-methods approach was employed, incorporating user satisfaction ratings and a structured survey. Results from a pilot study indicate high user satisfaction (4.614/5), with students recognizing Ask ME's ability to provide timely and contextually relevant responses for both administrative and course-related inquiries. Additionally, a majority of students agreed that Ask ME's integration with course content in Canvas LMS reduced platform-switching, improving usability, engagement, and comprehension. AI's role in reducing classroom hesitation and fostering self-directed learning and intellectual curiosity was also highlighted. Despite these benefits and positive perception of AI tools, concerns emerged regarding over-reliance on AI, accuracy limitations, and ethical issues such as plagiarism and reduced student-teacher interaction. These findings emphasize the need for strategic AI implementation, ethical safeguards, and a pedagogical framework that prioritizes human-AI collaboration over substitution.
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+SARHAchat: An LLM-Based Chatbot for Sexual and Reproductive Health Counseling
+
+While Artificial Intelligence (AI) shows promise in healthcare applications, existing conversational systems often falter in complex and sensitive medical domains such as Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH). These systems frequently struggle with hallucination and lack the specialized knowledge required, particularly for sensitive SRH topics. Furthermore, current AI approaches in healthcare tend to prioritize diagnostic capabilities over comprehensive patient care and education. Addressing these gaps, this work at the UNC School of Nursing introduces SARHAchat, a proof-of-concept Large Language Model (LLM)-based chatbot. SARHAchat is designed as a reliable, user-centered system integrating medical expertise with empathetic communication to enhance SRH care delivery. Our evaluation demonstrates SARHAchat's ability to provide accurate and contextually appropriate contraceptive counseling while maintaining a natural conversational flow. The demo is available at https://sarhachat.com/}{https://sarhachat.com/.
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+Order Code 97-915 EPW
+
+CRS Report for Congress
+
+Received through the CRS Web
+
+Tax Benefits for Education
+
+ in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997: 
+
+ New Legislative Developments
+
+Updated September 14, 2000
+
+Bob Lyke
+
+Specialist in Social Legislation
+
+Domestic Social Policy Division
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ Tax Benefits for Education
+
+ in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997: 
+
+ New Legislative Developments
+
+ Summary 
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34) substantially expanded tax
+
+benefits for education. Four widely publicized provisions — two new tax credits, new
+tax-exempt education savings accounts, and a new deduction for interest payments
+on education loans — can help families pay for college and other postsecondary
+education expenses.
+
+Other provisions in the legislation extended the tax exclusion for employer
+
+education assistance, exempted individual retirement account (IRA) withdrawals used
+for higher education from early withdrawal penalties, expanded the tax exclusion for
+student loans that are forgiven, and authorized an enhanced deduction for corporate
+contributions of computer technology and equipment to elementary and secondary
+schools. The legislation also created new qualified zone academy bonds for public
+school renovation and program improvement.
+
+The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-
+
+206) made minor amendments, largely technical, in several education provisions of the
+1997 Act. Other changes would have occurred in these provisions under the
+Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999 (H.R. 2488), which the President vetoed.
+Some provisions were extended by the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives
+Improvement Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-170).
+
+In the closing days of the 106th Congress, it is unclear whether the education tax
+
+benefits created by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 will be expanded or otherwise
+revised. This report will track relevant legislation that is reported from committee or
+is scheduled for floor consideration. Among these bills are the Affordable Education
+Act of 2000 (S. 1134), passed by the Senate on March 2, 2000, and the Education
+Savings and School Excellence Act of 2000 (H.R. 7), reported by the House Ways
+and Means Committee on March 24, 2000.
+
+ 
+ Contents 
+
+Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+
+Tax Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+Education IRAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+Interest Deduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+Employer Education Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+State Tuition Savings Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+IRA Early Withdrawal Penalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+Forgiven Student Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+Computer Donations by Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+Provisions in Antecedent Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+
+ 
+ Tax Benefits for Education
+
+ in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997: 
+
+ New Legislative Developments
+
+ Introduction 
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34) that President Clinton signed on
+
+August 5, 1997, contained new higher education tax benefits for students and their
+families. Most notable were two tax credits (the HOPE Scholarship and Lifetime
+Learning credits), tax-exempt education savings accounts called education IRAs, and
+a deduction for interest payments on education loans. The Act also made other
+changes regarding state tuition savings programs, IRA withdrawal penalties, employer
+education assistance, and student loan forgiveness. In addition, it authorized new
+bonds for public school renovation and program improvement and an enhanced
+deduction for corporations that donate computers to elementary and secondary
+schools. While the Internal Revenue Code previously had provisions favoring
+education, the new legislation marked a significant expansion in the use of tax policy
+to encourage enrollment and to help families and communities pay for schools. The
+numerous special tax benefits for education and other purposes distinguish this
+legislation from the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514), which generally reduced
+special incentives.
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 offered families multiple ways to get tax
+
+subsidies for higher education. They can benefit in years when they save for college,
+when they pay tuition costs, and when they repay loans. The legislation thus
+supported different approaches toward financing postsecondary education and gives
+families flexibility to adapt their plans as circumstances change.
+
+At the same time, the new options make financial planning for college more
+
+complicated. The added complexity raises concerns that families in similar economic
+circumstances will receive different levels of benefits. The extent to which the tax
+benefits will supplement or supplant assistance provided by state or other federal
+sources remains unclear.
+
+It is also unclear whether the new tax benefits, estimated by the Joint Committee
+
+on Taxation to cost $30 billion over FY2000 through FY2004, are resulting in
+additional enrollment or other investment in education. The benefits may encourage
+some students to continue their studies, particularly after obtaining their initial degree,
+and some to consider a wider range of schools. However, it is likely that most of the
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+benefits are accruing to families whose students would have enrolled anyway. Some
+of the benefits may be captured by the schools through higher tuition.1
+
+This report summarizes highlights of the education provisions of the Taxpayer
+
+Relief Act of 1997. It provides general information and does not cover all provisions
+that individual taxpayers may consider important. For more details, readers might
+consult either the Act itself or the conference committee report, both of which are
+printed in part II of the Congressional Record for July 30, 1997.
+
+The report also tracks legislative developments at the end of the 106th Congress
+
+that would affect the tax benefits enacted in 1997. It identifies bills that have been
+reported by either the Senate Finance or House Ways and Means Committee.2
+Referenced legislation includes the Affordable Education Act of 2000 (S. 1134),
+passed by the Senate on March 2, 2000, and the Education Savings and School
+Excellence Act of 2000 (H.R. 7), reported by the House Ways and Means Committee
+on March 24, 2000.
+
+ Tax Credits 
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 is perhaps best known for the two new
+
+education tax credit it authorized. The HOPE Scholarship credit equals 100% of
+the first $1,000 of qualified tuition and fees and 50% of the next $1,000 that taxpayers
+pay for themselves, their spouse, or their dependents. The credit may be claimed for
+two taxable years with respect to each student , provided the student has not
+completed the first two years of postsecondary education before the beginning of the
+year for which the credit is claimed. An eligible student must be enrolled (or accepted
+for enrollment) in a degree, certificate, or other program leading to a recognized
+educational credential and must carry at least one-half the normal full-time work load.
+The HOPE credit is not allowed for a student who has been convicted of a felony
+drug offense.
+
+The Lifetime Learning credit equals 20% of the first $5,000 of qualified tuition
+
+and fees (the first $10,000 after 2002) that taxpayers pay for themselves, their spouse,
+or their dependents. The credit may be claimed any number of years for any level of
+postsecondary education; it can also apply to students who are enrolled in a single
+course to acquire or improve job skills. For a particular student, either the HOPE
+credit, the Lifetime Learning credit, or the exclusion of distributions from an
+
+1 For a discussion of these issues, see CRS Report 97-581, Tax Subsidies for Higher
+Education: An Analysis of the Administration’s Proposals, by Jane Gravelle and Dennis
+Zimmerman.
+
+2 Congressional offices can construct comprehensive lists of bills on particular proposals by
+using the Legislative Information System (LIS) available through the CRS home page. Under
+the Legislation heading, click on the LIS and then on Bill Text: Adv. In the Word/Phrase box,
+type either a term like “HOPE Scholarship” or a combination of words and connectors like
+“deduction adj/5 education” and then click on Search. Search results may yield some
+irrelevant bills without identifying all relevant ones; thus, the lists should be reviewed
+carefully. For technical assistance with searches, offices might call the La Follette
+Congressional Reading Room at 7-7100.
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+education IRA may be claimed in one year. However, all three tax benefits might be
+claimed the same year, even by one taxpayer, with respect to three different students.
+
+The HOPE and Lifetime Learning credits are allowed for payment of qualified
+
+tuition and fees at institutions eligible to participate in student aid programs
+authorized by title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA); this includes nearly all
+colleges and universities as well as many proprietary (for-profit) trade schools.
+Payments attributable to scholarships, veterans’ educational assistance, or other
+sources that are excludable from gross income for tax purposes (such as employer
+tuition reimbursements) generally cannot be taken into account. However, tuition and
+fee payments made from gifts and inheritances may be considered for the credits, as
+may payments made from loans.
+
+To give a simple example, consider an independent student who attends a school
+
+with tuition and fees charges of $5,000. If the student receives a $1,000 Pell Grant,
+a $1,000 scholarship from the school, and a $1,500 loan, qualified tuition and fees
+would equal $3,000 (this is, $5,000 minus the grant and the scholarship). Subject to
+limitations in the following paragraphs, the HOPE credit would be $1,500 (that is,
+100% of the first $1,000 paid and 50% of the next $1,000). The Lifetime Learning
+credit would be $600 (20% of the $3,000 paid).
+
+The HOPE Scholarship and Lifetime Learning credits are phased out for
+
+taxpayers with modified adjusted gross incomes between $40,000 and $50,000
+($80,000 to $100,000 in the case of a joint return). Thus, for single filers with
+modified adjusted gross incomes of $42,500 the maximum HOPE credit would be
+limited to $1,125.3 
+
+The two credits are not refundable: the sum of them and other nonrefundable
+
+credits generally is limited to the taxpayer’s regular income tax liability.4 Thus, for
+taxpayers with combined nonrefundable credits of $1,000 and a regular tax liability
+of $800, the allowable credits can be no more than $800. Under a provision in the
+Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, personal
+nonrefundable credits are not limited by the taxpayer’s tentative minimum tax in tax
+years 2000 and 2001.
+
+Taxpayers are not eligible for either the HOPE or Lifetime `Learning credit if
+
+they can be claimed as dependents by other taxpayers (for example, students who can
+be claimed as dependents by their parents). However, in this case the taxpayers who
+claim the dependent are eligible for the credits (assuming the income parameters
+described above are met) and they make take into account tuition payments made by
+the dependent. 
+
+3 The maximum credit of $1,500 x [($50,000 - $42,400)/$10,000] = $1,125. Modified
+adjusted gross income is adjusted gross income (a prominent line on tax returns) increased by
+the foreign earned income and housing exclusion and amounts excluded for income within
+Puerto Rico and certain territories.
+
+4 Regular income tax liability is the product of taxable income (gross income minus deductions
+and personal and dependency exemptions) times the taxpayer’s tax rate. The regular tax
+liability does not reflect any reductions due to tax credits.
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 modified the reporting
+
+requirements for educational institutions.
+
+The President’s FY2001 budget would increase the Lifetime Learning credit rate
+
+from 20% to 28% and also increase the income phase-out ranges to $50,000 to
+$60,000 ($100,000 to $120,000 for joint returns). Phase-out ranges for the HOPE
+Scholarship credit would not be changed. Instead of claiming the Lifetime Learning
+credit, taxpayers would be allowed to deduct up to $5,000 in qualified tuition and fees
+(up to $10,000 after 2002); the deduction would be taken in calculating adjusted
+gross income (an “above-the-line” deduction) and so would not restricted to
+taxpayers who itemize. 
+
+ Education IRAs 
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 authorized new investment accounts that
+
+families can use to save for higher education. The accounts are called education
+individual retirement accounts (education IRAs) although they have nothing to do
+with retirement. Like other IRAs, however, these accounts are designated trusts that
+are held by banks and other financial entities. Contributions to education IRAs can be
+made until beneficiaries are age 18; the annual limit for all contributors combined is
+$500, though this amount is reduced and then eliminated for contributors with
+modified adjusted gross incomes between $95,000 and $110,000 ($150,000 and
+$160,000 for joint returns).
+
+Education IRA contributions are not deductible, but accounts are exempt from
+
+taxation and distributions are excluded from beneficiaries’ gross income if used for
+qualified higher education expenses: tuition, fees, books, supplies, equipment
+required for enrollment or attendance, and certain room and board expenses.
+Qualifying expenses must be incurred at Title IV HEA institutions. Distributions for
+other purposes generally are taxable (that is, the part representing earnings is taxable)
+and a 10% penalty applies. The exclusion cannot be claimed the same year either the
+HOPE or the Lifetime Learning credit is claimed for the student. Remaining balances
+must be distributed when beneficiaries reach age 30.
+
+The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 included numerous technical
+
+corrections and clarifications of education IRAs regarding the taxation of
+distributions, rollover contributions, changes in beneficiaries, and rules for death and
+divorce.
+
+Both the Senate-passed Affordable Education Act of 2000 (S. 1134) and the
+
+House-reported Education Savings and School Excellence Act of 2000 (H.R. 7)
+would increase the annual contribution limit from $500 to $2,000. They also would
+allow the accounts to be used for elementary and secondary education expenses,
+including private and home schooling.5 Additional changes would include the
+following: (1) the accounts would be renamed “education savings accounts”; (2)
+contributions to accounts of beneficiaries with special needs (i.e., with disabilities)
+
+5 For more information, see CRS Report RS20289, Education Savings Accounts for
+Elementary and Secondary Education, by Bob Lyke and James B. Stedman.
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+could occur after age 18 and their accounts could continue after age 30; (3)
+contributors other than individuals (e.g., corporations) would not be subject to
+income ceilings; (4) beneficiaries could exclude distributions from their accounts and
+claim the Hope Scholarship or Lifetime Learning tax credit the same year (though not
+for the same expenses); and (5) in S. 1134 only, eligibility for the credit for joint
+returns would phase out between $190,000 and $220,000, not $150,000 to $160,000.
+
+ Interest Deduction 
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 authorized a new deduction for interest
+
+payments on qualified education loans. The deduction is taken in calculating adjusted
+gross income (an “above-the-line” deduction) and so is not restricted to taxpayers
+who itemize. The deduction is allowed only with respect to interest paid during the
+first 60 months (whether or not consecutive) in which interest payments are required;
+it was limited to $1,000 in 1998 and $1,500 in 1999, while the limit is $2,000 in 2000
+and $2,500 in 2001 and thereafter. The maximum allowable deduction is phased out
+for taxpayers with modified adjusted gross incomes between $40,000 and $55,000
+($60,000 to $75,000 in the case of a joint return). Taxpayers are not eligible for the
+deduction if they can be claimed as a dependent by another taxpayer.
+
+Qualified education loans are any indebtedness incurred to pay qualified expenses
+
+of taxpayers, their spouse, or their dependents at Title IV HEA institutions or at
+institutions of higher education, hospitals, or health care facilities conducting
+internship or residency programs leading to a certificate or degree. At the time the
+debt is incurred, students must be enrolled (or accepted for enrollment) in a degree,
+certificate, or other program leading to a recognized educational credential and must
+carry at least one-half the normal full-time work load. Qualified expenses generally
+equal the cost of attendance minus scholarships and other education payments
+excluded from taxes. Qualified loans also include indebtedness to refinance qualified
+education loans. 
+
+The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 included a technical amendment
+
+regarding the interest deduction for education loans.
+
+The President’s FY2001 budget would eliminate the 60-month limit on the
+
+deduction of interest. Both the Senate-passed Affordable Education Act of 2000 (S.
+1134) and the House-reported Education Savings and School Excellence Act of 2000
+(H.R. 7) would repeal the 60-month limit, which would also eliminate the restriction
+that nonmandatory interest payments were not deductible. The House bill would raise
+the income phase-out range to $45,000 to $60,000 ($90,000 to $105,000 in the case
+of a joint return); the Senate measure would increase the range for joint returns to
+$80,000 to $110,000.
+
+ Employer Education Assistance 
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 extended the exclusion for employer education
+
+assistance through May 31, 2000. The exclusion, in Section 127 of the Internal
+Revenue Code, allows tuition reimbursements and other forms of employer education
+assistance to be exempt from taxes of the recipient even if the education does not
+
+ 
+ CRS-6
+
+qualify as a deductible business expense (that is, even if it is not job-related).
+Qualifying education is not restricted to Title IV HEA schools. The extension did not
+apply to graduate-level courses, which had not been covered after June 30, 1996.6
+
+The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 extended
+
+the exclusion (again without covering graduate-level courses) through December 31,
+2001.
+
+The President’s FY2001 budget would expand the exclusion to include graduate-
+
+level courses beginning after July 1, 2000 and before January 1, 2002. The Senate-
+passed Affordable Education Act of 2000 (S. 1134) would make the current-law
+exclusion permanent and also expand it to include graduate-level courses. The
+comparable reported House bill (the Education Savings and School Excellence Act
+of 2000, H.R. 7) has no provision regarding employer education assistance.
+
+ State Tuition Savings Plans 
+
+The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-188) clarified the tax
+
+treatment of qualified state tuition savings plans; it generally provided that account
+earnings are to be included in designated beneficiaries’ gross income when they
+receive distributions to attend school. Previously, it appeared that account earnings
+might be subject to annual taxation. State tuition savings plans (often called section
+529 plans) are either prepaid tuition contracts or college savings accounts established
+by a state agency. 
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 expanded the definition of qualified higher
+
+education expenses for state tuition savings plans to include reasonable costs for room
+and board in the case of students attending at least half-time. As under prior law,
+qualified expenses also include tuition, fees, books, supplies, and equipment required
+for enrollment or attendance. The Act also expanded the definition of eligible
+institution to include all Title IV HEA institutions.
+
+The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 clarified that qualified state
+
+tuition plan distributions are taxed under the general annuity rules (unless excludable
+as a scholarship, etc.); thus, part of each distribution is considered to be earnings and
+part is considered a return of the contribution.
+
+Both the Senate-passed Affordable Education Act of 2000 (S. 1134) and the
+
+House-reported Education Savings and School Excellence Act of 2000 (H.R. 7)
+generally would exempt state tuition savings plan distributions from taxation if they
+were used for qualified expenses. Both would also allow educational institutions to
+establish Section 529 savings plans, allow the new exclusion to be claimed the same
+year that the Hope Scholarship or Lifetime Learning tax credit is claimed (though not
+for the same expenses), and make modifications in the definition of family members
+(for making changes in beneficiaries) and qualified higher education expenses. 
+
+6 For additional information, see CRS Report 97-243, Employer Education Assistance:
+Overview of Tax Status in 2000, by Bob Lyke.
+
+ 
+ CRS-7
+
+ IRA Early Withdrawal Penalty 
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 exempted IRA distributions used for qualified
+
+higher education expenses from the early withdrawal penalty. The penalty otherwise
+applies to distributions before age 59½, with a number of exceptions; it equals 10%
+of the amount of the distribution that is included in gross income. Qualified higher
+education expenses include tuition, fees, books, supplies, and equipment required for
+enrollment or attendance at Title IV HEA institutions, plus (in the case of students
+attending at least half-time) reasonable costs for room and board. The education must
+be for the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse or child (including stepchildren), or for
+a grandchild of the taxpayer or of the taxpayer’s spouse.
+
+The Act also authorized Roth IRAs. The general rule for these IRAs is that
+
+distributions are exempt from taxation and penalties if they have been held for 5 years
+and the account owner has attained age 59½, is disabled or has died, or is using the
+distribution to purchase a first home. However, no Roth IRA distribution is taxable,
+regardless of when it is withdrawn or how it is used, until the total of all distributions
+exceeds the amount of contributions. Thus, some amounts might be withdrawn
+before age 59½ without taxation or penalty in any case.
+
+Technical amendments regarding distributions from Roth IRAs that had rollover
+
+contributions from other IRAs (conversions) were included in the IRS Restructuring
+and Reform Act of 1998.
+
+Penalties for IRA distributions used for education expenses are not a legislative
+
+issue at the end of the 106th Congress.
+
+ Forgiven Student Loans 
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 expanded the tax exclusion allowed student
+
+loans that are forgiven (in whole or in part) to include loans made by tax-exempt
+educational institutions (for example, private colleges) even if the funds originated
+from a private, nongovernmental source. As under prior law, the exclusion applies
+only if the borrower works for a certain period of time in certain professions for any
+of a broad class of employers (for example, teaches in an inner-city school).7 There
+is an additional requirement for loans made by tax-exempt educational institutions
+from private nongovernmental sources: the loans must be issued pursuant to a
+program designed to encourage students to work in an occupation or area with unmet
+needs and provide services either for or under the direction of a tax-exempt charitable
+organization of governmental entity.
+
+Technical amendments regarding this provision were included in the IRS
+
+Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.
+
+Forgiven student loans are not a legislative issue at the end of the 106th
+
+Congress.
+
+7 The provision also extends the exclusion to refinancing loans issued by tax-exempt entities,
+provided the requirement about working in an area or occupation with unmet needs is met. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-8
+
+ Computer Donations by Corporations 
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 authorized an enhanced deduction for
+
+contributions of computer technology and equipment to elementary and secondary
+schools or to tax-exempt charitable organizations supporting elementary and
+secondary education. Contributions may be made through a private foundation. The
+property must be donated within two years after it was acquired or constructed, and
+it must be originally used by either the donor or the donee. The enhanced deduction,
+like others allowed under prior law, is limited to corporations other than S-
+corporations;8 it is equal to the fair market value of the contributed property minus
+50% of the ordinary income that would have been recognized had the property been
+sold for its fair market value. (Without this exception, the deduction would equal the
+corporation’s basis in the property, which usually is less.) However, the enhanced
+deduction is limited to twice the basis of the property. Authorization for the enhanced
+deduction expires for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2000.
+
+The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 included several minor
+
+amendments to this provision.
+
+The President’s FY2001 budget would extend the enhanced deduction for
+
+computer donations to schools through July 1, 2004; in addition, it would expand
+eligible recipients to include certain public libraries and community technology
+centers.
+
+The House-reported Education Savings and School Excellence Act of 2000
+
+(H.R. 7) would extend the enhanced deduction for one year (December 31, 2001).
+In lieu of an extension, the Senate-passed Affordable Education Act of 2000 (S.
+1134) would authorize a business tax credit for computer donations to schools and
+senior centers. 
+
+ Bonds 
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 authorized tax credits for a new form of
+
+obligation called qualified zone academy bonds .9 Qualified zone academies are
+public schools and programs that provide education and training below the
+postsecondary level; they must be designed in cooperation with business to enhance
+the academic curriculum, increase graduation and employment rates, and better
+prepare students for college and the workforce. The academies must either be located
+
+8 S-corporations generally are tax-reporting rather than tax-paying entities. Their charitable
+contributions are divided among shareholders and reported on the latter’s separate tax returns.
+Corporations may elect S-corporation status if they meet a number of Internal Revenue Code
+requirements; among other things, they cannot have more than 75 shareholders or more than
+one class of stock.
+
+9 For additional information, see CRS Report RS20606, Qualified Zone Academy Bonds: A
+Description of Tax Credit Bonds, by Steven Maguire.
+
+ 
+ CRS-9
+
+in empowerment zones or enterprise communities10 or have 35% or more of their
+students eligible for free or reduced price lunches. At least 95% of bond proceeds
+must be used for rehabilitating or repairing public school facilities, providing
+equipment, developing course materials, or training teachers and other school
+personnel. Private entities must contribute equipment, technical assistance, employee
+services, educational opportunities, and other property worth at least 10% of bond
+proceeds.
+
+Qualified zone academy bonds are not tax-exempt; however, bondholders are
+
+allowed a nonrefundable tax credit based upon a credit rate that the Secretary of the
+Treasury determines would allow bonds to be issued without discount or interest cost
+to the issuer. Thus, unlike tax-exempt bonds, the federal government will pay all the
+interest costs. Qualified zone academy bondholders are limited to banks, insurance
+companies, and corporations actively engaged in the business of lending money.
+
+Under the 1997 Act, state and local governments could issue qualified zone
+
+academy bonds only in 1998 and 1999, subject to a national limitation of $400 million
+each year that is allocated proportionally to their share of the population in poverty.
+
+The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 authorized
+
+up to $400 million of qualified zone academy bonds to be issued in each of 2000 and
+2001. Unused authority may be carried over for several years.
+
+The President’s FY2001 budget would increase the authorization for qualified
+
+zone academy bonds by $1 billion in 2001 and $1.4 billion in 2002. Bond proceeds
+could also be used for school construction. In addition, the budget would authorize
+$11 billion in new school modernization bonds in each of 2001 and 2002. The latter
+bonds would also be tax credit bonds.
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 also expanded the arbitrage rebate exception 
+
+that applies to small issuers of governmental bonds. The general rule has been that
+governmental units that do not issue more than $5 million annually in governmental
+bonds do not have to refund arbitrage earnings to the federal government. The Act
+provided that up to $5 million annually in school construction bonds issued after 1997
+need not be counted for purposes of the $5 million ceiling.
+
+Both the Senate-passed Affordable Education Act of 2000 (S. 1134) and the
+
+House-reported Education Savings and School Excellence Act of 2000 (H.R. 7)
+would increase the small issuer arbitrage rebate exception by allowing $10 million
+annually in school construction bonds not to be counted for purposes of the ceiling.
+In addition, the Senate bill would allow certain public education facility bonds to be
+treated as exempt facility bonds and permit the Federal Housing Finance Board to
+guarantee school construction bonds. The House measure would extend the time
+
+10 Empowerment zones and enterprise communities are economically distressed areas that
+qualify for special tax incentives and other federal assistance under P.L. 103-66. See CRS
+Report 97-257E, Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Communities Program: Implementation
+and Developments, by Bruce Mulock.
+
+ 
+ CRS-10
+
+period in which the proceeds of public school bonds must be spent in order to avoid
+arbitrage rebate.11
+
+Finally, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 repealed the $150 million ceiling on the
+
+total amount of tax-exempt bonds that may be issued by 501(c)(3) nonprofit
+organizations , including private universities.
+
+ Provisions in Antecedent Legislation 
+
+The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 did not include several education provisions
+
+that had been in the House version of the legislation (H.R. 2014) when it was first
+passed. One would have terminated the exclusion for qualified tuition reductions
+given employees (including graduate teaching assistants) of educational institutions;
+a second would have authorized a 50% nonrefundable credit (limited to $150) for
+amounts families paid for supplementary elementary and secondary education
+services.
+
+Similarly, several provisions that had been in the Senate bill (S. 949) were not
+
+included in the final legislation. One would have allowed elementary and secondary
+school teachers who itemize deductions to deduct professional development expenses
+without regard to the 2% adjusted gross income floor; a second would have allowed
+tax-free withdrawals from education IRAs for elementary and secondary school
+expenses.
+
+11 For analysis of a similar proposal, see CRS Report 98-803, Bonds for Public Schools:
+Relaxation of Arbitrage Restrictions in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1998, by Dennis
+Zimmerman.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/corpus/politics/text/0ab3a9f9092524a4.txt b/corpus/politics/text/0ab3a9f9092524a4.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..36f8427b0fe7146ae8c781a1125173fb68b230d9
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+++ b/corpus/politics/text/0ab3a9f9092524a4.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,23040 @@
+Education Stabilization Fund Programs Funded February 1, 2022 
+
+ by the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA: 
+
+ Rebecca R. Skinner 
+
+ Background and Analysis 
+
+Specialist in Education 
+Policy 
+
+From March 2020 through March 2021, three laws provided increasing levels of federal 
+
+ 
+
+funding for elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education primarily through the 
+
+ Joselynn H. Fountain 
+
+Education Stabilization Fund (ESF) in response to the national emergency related to the 
+
+Analyst in Education Policy 
+
+COVID-19 pandemic as declared by President Trump on March 13, 2020. On March 27, 
+
+ 
+
+2020, $30.750 billion was initially appropriated for the ESF by the Coronavirus Aid, 
+
+ Cassandria Dortch 
+
+Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136). On December 27, 2020, 
+
+Specialist in Education 
+
+the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 
+
+Policy 
+
+(CRRSAA; Division M of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 [P.L. 116-260]), 
+
+ 
+
+was enacted, providing an additional $81.880 billion in appropriations for an amended 
+ESF. On March 11, 2021, the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2), a 
+
+ 
+
+budget reconciliation measure, provided an additional $169.609 billion for programs originally enacted as part of 
+the ESF. 
+
+The ESF is generally composed of three emergency relief funds: (1) a Governor’s Emergency Education Relief 
+(GEER) Fund, which includes the Emergency Assistance to Non-Public Schools (EANS) program; (2) an 
+Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief (ESSER) Fund; and (3) a Higher Education Emergency 
+Relief Fund (HEERF). Funds were to remain available through September 30, 2021, under the CARES Act; and 
+remain available through September 30, 2022, under the CRRSAA and through September 30, 2023, under the 
+ARPA. The General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) provides for an automatic one-year extension of these 
+deadlines for the GEER Fund, EANS program, and ESSER Fund. 
+
+Each act specifies either a percentage of the appropriated ESF funds to be made available under each ESF 
+program after reserving funds for required purposes, such as the outlying areas and the Bureau of Indian 
+Education, or specifies the amount of funding to be provided to individual programs. 
+
+ GEER Fund 
+ The GEER Fund received $2.953 billion under the CARES Act in FY2020 and $4.053 billion under the CRRSAA 
+in FY2021 for a total of $7.006 billion. From the CRRSAA funds, the Secretary of Education is required to 
+reserve $2.750 billion to provide grants to states to provide services and assistance to private schools under the 
+EANS program. While the GEER Fund did not receive an appropriation under the ARPA, the EANS program 
+received a separate appropriation of $2.750 billion. Each governor may choose to use GEER funds not reserved 
+for the EANS program to provide emergency funds to local educational agencies (LEAs) and institutions of 
+higher education (IHEs) serving students within the state for the continuity of operations or to any other IHE, 
+LEA, or education-related entity within the state for a broad array of purposes, including the provision of child 
+care and the protection of education-related jobs. 
+
+ ESSER Fund 
+ The ESSER Fund received $13.229 billion under the CARES Act in FY2020, $54.311 billion under the CRRSAA 
+in FY2021, and $122.775 billion under the ARPA in FY2021, for a total of $190.315 billion. State educational 
+agencies (SEAs) are required to provide at least 90% of the funds received to LEAs to be used for myriad 
+purposes such as any activity funded under various federal education laws, coordination of preparedness and 
+response to the COVID-19 emergency, technology acquisition, mental health services, and activities related to 
+summer learning. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ HEERF 
+ The HEERF received $13.953 billion under the CARES Act in FY2020, $22.697 billion under the CRRSAA in 
+FY2021, and $39.585 billion under the ARPA in FY2021, for a total of $76.234 billion. The HEERF is generally 
+composed of three programs: (1) direct grants to IHEs, (2) minority serving institutions (MSIs) programs, and (3) 
+assistance provided through the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education Program (FIPSE). The 
+majority (90% or more) of funds under each act are awarded as direct grants to IHEs. A minimum specified 
+percentage of each direct grant must be used for financial aid grants to students; any remaining funds may be used 
+for specified institutional expenses. A portion (7.5%) of HEERF funds from each act is made available to MSIs. 
+The remaining HEERF funds are made available to IHEs through FIPSE. Grants under the MSI and FIPSE 
+programs may be used for financial aid grants to students and specified institutional expenses. 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 20 link to page 22 link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 25 link to page 26 link to page 27 link to page 27 link to page 27 link to page 29 link to page 30 link to page 31 link to page 31 link to page 32 link to page 32 link to page 32 link to page 33 link to page 33 link to page 34 link to page 34 link to page 35 link to page 36 link to page 36 link to page 40 link to page 40 link to page 43 link to page 45 link to page 46 link to page 48 link to page 50 link to page 51 link to page 52 link to page 58 link to page 60 link to page 61 link to page 61 link to page 61 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Contents 
+
+ Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
+ Education Stabilization Fund Overview and Appropriations .......................................................... 2 
+ Funds for the Outlying Areas, the BIE, and Competitive Grants .................................................... 7 
+
+ Reservation for the Outlying Areas ........................................................................................... 7 
+ Reservation for the Bureau of Indian Education ....................................................................... 9 
+ Competitive State Grants under the CARES Act .................................................................... 10 
+
+ ESF Rethink K-12 Education Models (ESF-REM) Grants................................................ 11 
+ ESF Reimagining Workforce Preparation (ESF-RWP) Grants ......................................... 13 
+
+ Summary of Provisions Related to Reservations from the Total ESF Appropriations ............ 15 
+
+ Governor’s Emergency Education Relief (GEER) Fund............................................................... 17 
+
+ Requirements for ED to Award Funds .................................................................................... 17 
+State Grant Formula ................................................................................................................ 17 
+ Uses of Funds .......................................................................................................................... 18 
+ Reallocation of Funds ............................................................................................................. 19 
+
+ Emergency Assistance to Non-Public Schools (EANS) Program ................................................. 20 
+
+ Allocation of Funds to Governors ........................................................................................... 20 
+Application for Grants ............................................................................................................. 20 
+ Uses of Funds .......................................................................................................................... 22 
+ Provision of Services and Assistance to Nonpublic Schools .................................................. 23 
+ Paycheck Protection Program ................................................................................................. 24 
+
+ Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief (ESSER) Fund ......................................... 24 
+
+ Reservation of ARPA ESSER Funds for Homeless Children and Youth ................................ 25 
+State Grant Application ........................................................................................................... 25 
+
+ ESSER I ............................................................................................................................ 25 
+ ESSER II ........................................................................................................................... 26 
+ESSER III ......................................................................................................................... 26 
+
+ Formula Grants to SEAs ......................................................................................................... 27 
+Formula Grants to LEAs ......................................................................................................... 27 
+ Other State Reservations of Funds .......................................................................................... 28 
+ LEA Plan to Return to In-Person Instruction .......................................................................... 29 
+LEA Uses of Funds ................................................................................................................. 29 
+ Reallocation of Funds ............................................................................................................. 33 
+
+ Equitable Services for Private School Students and Teachers Under the CARES Act ................. 33 
+ Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF) ................................................................... 36 
+
+ Direct Grants ........................................................................................................................... 38 
+ Minority Serving Institutions Programs .................................................................................. 39 
+ Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education ......................................................... 41 
+ Excise Tax Provision ............................................................................................................... 43 
+ Application, Distribution, and Reallocation Process............................................................... 44 
+ Uses of Funds .......................................................................................................................... 45 
+
+ Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund Student Aid ................................................... 51 
+ Other Provisions ............................................................................................................... 53 
+
+ Maintenance of Effort and Maintenance of Equity ....................................................................... 54 
+
+ CARES Act ............................................................................................................................. 54 
+CRRSAA ................................................................................................................................. 54 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ link to page 62 link to page 62 link to page 62 link to page 64 link to page 64 link to page 65 link to page 65 link to page 65 link to page 66 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 22 link to page 22 link to page 25 link to page 29 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 37 link to page 37 link to page 44 link to page 44 link to page 45 link to page 45 link to page 46 link to page 46 link to page 49 link to page 53 link to page 53 link to page 67 link to page 67 link to page 70 link to page 70 link to page 72 link to page 72 link to page 75 link to page 75 link to page 75 link to page 79 link to page 79 link to page 79 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ ARPA ...................................................................................................................................... 55 
+
+ MOE.................................................................................................................................. 55 
+MOEq................................................................................................................................ 55 
+
+ Reporting Requirements ................................................................................................................ 57 
+
+ General CARES Act Reporting Requirements ........................................................................ 57 
+ Education Stabilization Fund Reporting Requirements .......................................................... 58 
+Department of Education-Established Reporting Requirements ............................................. 58 
+
+ Continued Payment to Employees ................................................................................................. 58 
+ Definitions ..................................................................................................................................... 59 
+
+ 
+
+ Tables 
+ Table 1. Appropriations for the ESF and ESF Programs as Provided by the CARES Act, 
+
+ CRRSAA, and ARPA ................................................................................................................... 4 
+
+ Table 2. Summary of Reservations under the ESF as Provided by the CARES Act and 
+
+ CRRSAA, and Funds for Similar Purposes Under the CARES Act and ARPA ......................... 15 
+
+ Table 3. Allowable Uses of GEER Funds Under the CARES Act and CRRSAA ......................... 18 
+ Table 4. Allowable Uses of EANS Funds Under the CRRSAA and ARPA .................................. 22 
+ Table 5. Summary of SEA Grant Reservation Requirements Under the ESSER Fund 
+
+ Included in the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA ................................................................... 28 
+
+ Table 6. Allowable Uses of ESSER Funds by LEAs Under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, 
+
+ and ARPA ................................................................................................................................... 30 
+
+ Table 7. Reservations of Funds Under the HEERF as Provided by the CARES Act, 
+
+ CRRSAA, and ARPA ................................................................................................................. 37 
+
+ Table 8. Percentage of Funds Allocated by Each Formula Factor For the HEERF Direct 
+
+ Grants to IHEs Under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA .................................................. 38 
+
+ Table 9. Actual Reservations of Funds for the MSI Programs Under HEERF of the 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA ............................................................................................ 39 
+
+ Table 10. CRRSAA SAIHE Eligibility and Formula Allocation Methodology ............................ 42 
+ Table 11. Allowable Uses of HEERF by IHEs Under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and 
+
+ ARPA.......................................................................................................................................... 46 
+
+ 
+
+ Table A-1. GEER Funds, ESSER Fund State Grants, and HEERF IHE Grants Aggregated 
+
+ at the State Level for the CARES Act ESF ................................................................................ 60 
+
+ Table A-2. GEER Funds, ESSER Fund State Grants, and HEERF IHE Grants Aggregated 
+
+ at the State Level for the CRRSAA ESF .................................................................................... 63 
+
+ Table A-3. EANS Program, ESSER Fund State Grants, and HEERF IHE Grants 
+
+ Aggregated at the State Level for the ARPA .............................................................................. 65 
+
+ Table A-4. Total GEER Funds, EANS Program, ESSER Fund State Grants, and HEERF 
+
+ IHE Grants Aggregated at the State Level for the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+ESF ............................................................................................................................................. 68 
+
+ Table A-5. Actual Grants to the Outlying Areas from ESF Funds Reserved Under the 
+
+ CARES Act and CRRSAA, and from Funds for the Outlying Areas Under the ARPA, 
+for Programs Administered by ED ............................................................................................. 72 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ link to page 81 link to page 81 link to page 82 link to page 82 link to page 83 link to page 83 link to page 85 link to page 85 link to page 87 link to page 91 link to page 95 link to page 98 link to page 101 link to page 104 link to page 104 link to page 108 link to page 108 link to page 110 link to page 110 link to page 113 link to page 113 link to page 116 link to page 116 link to page 119 link to page 119 link to page 123 link to page 67 link to page 80 link to page 87 link to page 87 link to page 91 link to page 91 link to page 95 link to page 95 link to page 108 link to page 108 link to page 123 link to page 125 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Table B-1. Obligation and Liquidation Periods for the GEER Fund Under the CARES Act 
+
+ and CRRSAA ............................................................................................................................. 74 
+
+ Table B-2. Obligation and Liquidation Periods for the EANS Program Under the 
+
+ CRRSAA and ARPA .................................................................................................................. 75 
+
+ Table B-3. Obligation and Liquidation Periods for the ESSER Fund Under the CARES 
+
+ Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA ......................................................................................................... 76 
+
+ Table B-4. Obligation and Liquidation Periods for IHEs Under the HEERF Under the 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA ............................................................................................ 78 
+
+ Table C-1. GEER Fund State Grants Provided by the CARES Act and CRRSAA ....................... 80 
+ Table D-1. EANS Program State Grants Provided by the CRSSAA and ARPA ........................... 84 
+ Table E-1. State Grants Under the ESSER Fund Provided by the CARES Act (ESSER I) .......... 88 
+ Table E-2. State Grants Under the ESSER Fund Provided by the CRRSAA (ESSER II) ............. 91 
+ Table E-3. State Grants Under the ESSER Fund Provided by the ARPA (ESSER III) ................. 94 
+ Table E-4. State Grants Under the ESSER Fund Provided by the CARES Act, CRRSAA, 
+
+ and ARPA ................................................................................................................................... 97 
+
+ Table F-1. Estimated Allocations to IHEs Under the HEERF Provided by the CARES 
+
+ Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA, Aggregated at the Institutional Sector Level .............................. 101 
+
+ Table F-2. Estimated Allocations to IHEs Under the HEERF Provided by the CARES 
+
+ Act, Aggregated at the State Level (HEERF I) ........................................................................ 103 
+
+ Table F-3. Estimated Allocations to IHEs Under the HEERF Provided by the CRRSAA, 
+
+ Aggregated at the State Level (HEERF II)............................................................................... 106 
+
+ Table F-4. Estimated Allocations to IHEs Under the HEERF Provided by the ARPA, 
+
+ Aggregated at the State Level (HEERF III) ............................................................................. 109 
+
+ Table F-5. Estimated Allocations to IHEs Under the HEERF Provided by the CARES 
+
+ Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA, Aggregated at the State Level ....................................................... 112 
+
+ Table G-1. Department of Education Established Deadlines to Apply for the HEERF ............... 116 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendixes 
+ Appendix A. Grants to States, the Outlying Areas, and IHEs Under ESF Programs .................... 60 
+ Appendix B. Obligation and Liquidation of Funds Under ESF Programs .................................... 73 
+ Appendix C. Actual State Grants Under the Governor’s Emergency Education Relief 
+
+ (GEER) Fund.............................................................................................................................. 80 
+
+ Appendix D. Actual State Grants Under the Emergency Assistance for Non-Public 
+
+ Schools (EANS) Program .......................................................................................................... 84 
+
+ Appendix E. Actual State Grants Under the Elementary and Secondary Schools 
+
+ Emergency Relief (ESSER) Fund .............................................................................................. 88 
+
+ Appendix F. Estimated HEERF IHE Allocations Aggregated at the Institutional Sector 
+
+ and State Levels for the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA ESF ........................................... 101 
+
+ Appendix G. Department of Education Established Deadlines to Apply for HEERF .................. 116 
+
+ 
+
+ Contacts 
+ Author Information ....................................................................................................................... 118 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Introduction 
+ From March 2020 through March 2021, three laws providing federal funding for elementary, 
+secondary, and postsecondary education were enacted in response to the national emergency 
+related to the COVID-19 pandemic declared by President Trump on March 13, 2020.1 The second 
+of these laws provided a higher amount of funding than the first, and the third provided a higher 
+amount than the second. The funds were intended to help the U.S. educational system “prevent, 
+prepare for, and respond to coronavirus.” Funds were generally made available to states, local 
+educational agencies (LEAs), private schools, and institutions of higher education (IHEs) to 
+support the transition to remote learning, provide support services to students, protect education-
+related jobs, provide institutional support, and provide grant aid to postsecondary students. 
+
+On March 27, 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 
+116-136) was signed into law. Included in the act was the Education Stabilization Fund (ESF), 
+which was created “to prevent, prepare for, and respond to coronavirus, domestically or 
+internationally.” The ESF was composed of three emergency relief funds: 
+
+1. a Governor’s Emergency Education Relief (GEER) Fund, 
+
+2. an Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief (ESSER) Fund, and 
+
+3. a Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF).2 
+
+It also included a reservation of funds from the total ESF appropriation for the outlying areas,3 the 
+Bureau of Indian Education (BIE), and a competitive grant program. The ESF, administered by 
+the U.S. Department of Education (ED), had an appropriations level of $30.750 billion for 
+FY2020 under the CARES Act.4 The act provided that these funds were to remain available 
+through September 30, 2021.5 
+
+On December 27, 2020, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (CAA; P.L. 116-260) was 
+enacted. Division M of the act is the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental 
+Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA). The CRRSAA reauthorized the ESF and provided 
+additional appropriations for it. The ESF continued to include appropriations for the GEER Fund, 
+ESSER Fund, and HEERF. From appropriations for the GEER Fund, the Secretary of Education 
+(hereinafter referred to as the Secretary) was required to reserve funds for the Emergency 
+Assistance to Non-Public Schools (EANS) program. The ESF also included a reservation of funds 
+for the outlying areas and BIE from the total ESF appropriation but not a reservation of funds for 
+
+ 
+1 The White House, “Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease 
+(COVID-19) Outbreak,” March 13, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-
+national-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/; also at U.S. President (Trump), 
+“Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID–19) Outbreak,” 85 Federal 
+Register 53, March 18, 2020. 
+
+2 The acronyms used throughout this report are those utilized by the Department of Education in ESF-related materials. 
+3 The outlying areas are American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and the U.S. 
+Virgin Islands. 
+
+4 The CARES Act appropriations provided for the ESF are designated as being for an emergency requirement pursuant 
+to Section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 
+
+5 Section 421 of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA), commonly referred to as the “Tydings amendment,” 
+provides that any funds appropriated for an applicable program that are not obligated and expended by the recipient 
+educational agencies and institutions before the end of the fiscal year shall remain available for obligation for one 
+additional fiscal year (e.g., through September 30, 2022, in this case). This extension of the period of obligation of 
+funds applies to the GEER and ESSER Funds. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+1 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+the competitive grant program enacted under the CARES Act. Under the CRRSAA, the ESF had 
+an appropriation level of $81.880 billion for FY2021.6 The CRRSAA provided that these funds 
+are to remain available through September 30, 2022.7 
+
+On March 11, 2021, President Biden signed into law the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 
+(ARPA; P.L. 117-2), an FY2021 budget reconciliation measure developed in response to the 
+COVID-19 pandemic.8 It provided mandatory appropriations for the ESSER Fund and HEERF.9 
+It also provided a separate appropriation for the EANS program, which had been initially 
+authorized as a reservation of funds for the GEER Fund under the CRRSAA. The ARPA did not 
+provide additional funding for the GEER Fund. It also did not include funding for the outlying 
+areas or the BIE as part of the ESF.10 Under the ARPA, the ESSER Fund, EANS program, and 
+HEERF had a total appropriations level of $165.109 billion for FY2021. The ARPA provides that 
+these funds are to remain available through September 30, 2023.11 
+
+This report discusses the ESF and the programs initially authorized under it that were included in 
+the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA. The report begins with an overview of the appropriations 
+available for the ESF and the required reservations of funds under each act. It then discusses each 
+of the emergency education relief funds, including the EANS program. The next part of the report 
+provides an overview of the other provisions included in the ESF: maintenance of effort (MOE) 
+and maintenance of equity (MOEq) provisions, reporting requirements, continued payments to 
+employees, and definitions. The report also includes several appendices that provide information 
+on state funding under the GEER Fund, EANS program, and ESSER Fund, and funding 
+aggregated at the state level and institutional sector level under the HEERF based on ED’s 
+published grant amounts, as well as information about periods of obligation and liquidation of 
+funds and deadlines that apply to HEERF. 
+
+ Education Stabilization Fund Overview and 
+Appropriations 
+ The ESF was initially authorized by the CARES Act. Under the act, funds were reserved from the 
+total appropriation for grants to the outlying areas and BIE and for competitive grants. The 
+remaining funds were then allocated to the GEER Fund, ESSER Fund, and HEERF. The 
+
+ 
+6 The CRRSAA appropriations provided for the ESF are designated as being for an emergency requirement pursuant to 
+Section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 
+
+7 The “Tydings amendment” provides that any funds appropriated for an applicable program that are not obligated and 
+expended by the recipient educational agencies and institutions before the end of the fiscal year shall remain available 
+for obligation for one additional fiscal year (e.g., through September 30, 2023, in this case). This extension of the 
+period of obligation of funds applies to the GEER Fund and ESSER Fund. 
+
+8 See the House Budget Committee report (H.Rept. 117-7) for a discussion of the context surrounding the ARPA. 
+9 ESF appropriations provided under the CARES Act and CRRSAA were discretionary appropriations. 
+10 The outlying areas received an appropriation of $850,000,000 under Title II—Committee on Health, Education, 
+Labor, and Pensions—of the ARPA. The BIE received an appropriation of $850,000,000 under Title XI—Committee 
+on Indian Affairs—of the ARPA. Statutory language did not specify that the funds for the outlying areas or the funds 
+for the BIE had to be used for purposes authorized by ESF programs. 
+
+11 The “Tydings amendment” provides that any funds appropriated for an applicable program that are not obligated and 
+expended by the recipient educational agencies and institutions before the end of the fiscal year shall remain available 
+for obligation for one additional fiscal year (e.g., through September 30, 2024, in this case). This extension of the 
+period of obligation of funds applies to the ESSER Fund. At this time, it is unclear if it would apply to the EANS 
+program. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+2 
+
+ 
+ link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 67 link to page 79 link to page 80 link to page 87 link to page 91 link to page 95 link to page 108 link to page 123 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+CRRSAA reauthorized the ESF and preserved a structure for it similar to that under the CARES 
+Act: reservations of funds for the outlying areas and BIE, with the remaining funds allocated to 
+the GEER Fund, ESSER Fund, and HEERF.12 Under the CRRSAA, about two-thirds of the funds 
+appropriated for the GEER Fund were reserved for the EANS program. The ARPA did not 
+reauthorize the entire ESF. Rather, appropriations were provided separately for the ESSER Fund, 
+EANS program, and the HEERF. Separate appropriations were also provided for the outlying 
+areas and BIE.13 No funds were appropriated for the GEER Fund. 
+
+ Table 1 provides appropriations for the ESF and programs initially authorized by the ESF. It 
+indicates instances where funds are required to be reserved under the GEER Fund or ESSER 
+Fund for various purposes. It also provides a breakdown of how HEERF funds must be allocated 
+by ED for five major purposes. In response to congressional interest, the appropriations data 
+presented i n Table 1 have not been rounded. 
+
+The appendices of this report include detailed tables of funding allocations and other aspects of 
+the ESF. Specifically, 
+
+ Appendix A details ESF grants by state under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, 
+
+ARPA, and all three acts combined. 
+
+ Table A-5 provides ESF grants to the outlying areas as well as funds provided 
+
+directly to the outlying areas under the ARPA. 
+
+ Appendix B includes a detailed discussion of the periods of obligation and 
+
+liquidation of funds that correspond to the GEER Fund, EANS program, ESSER 
+Fund, and HEERF. 
+
+ Appendix C includes state grants under the GEER Fund under the CARES Act 
+
+and CRRSAA. 
+
+ Appendix D displays state grants under the EANS program under the CRRSAA 
+
+and ARPA. 
+
+ Appendix E presents actual state grant amounts under the ESSER Fund as 
+
+provided under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, ARPA, and all three acts combined. 
+
+ Appendix F presents estimated IHE allocations under the HEERF aggregated by 
+
+institutional sector and state under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, ARPA, and all 
+three acts combined. 
+
+ Appendix G displays the established application deadlines for the various 
+
+HEERF subprograms. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+12 The CRRSAA did not include a reservation of funds for competitive grants. 
+13 The ARPA appropriation for the BIE was provided directly to the bureau. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+3 
+
+ 
+ link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 13 link to page 13 
+
+ Table 1. Appropriations for the ESF and ESF Programs as Provided by the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act (FY2020 )a 
+
+ CRRSAA (FY2021 )a 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ from Total 
+
+ from Total 
+
+ Appropriation 
+
+ Appropriation 
+
+ Total 
+
+ or Remaining 
+
+ or Remaining 
+
+ AR PAa 
+
+ (FY2020 and 
+
+ Program or Activity 
+
+ Fund sb 
+
+ Appropriations 
+
+ Fund sb 
+
+ Appropriations 
+
+ (FY2021) 
+
+ FY2021) 
+
+ Total appropriation 
+
+ 
+
+$30,750,000,000 
+
+ 
+
+$81,880,000,000 $165,109,370,000 $277,739,370,000 
+
+Outlying areas 
+
+Up to 0.5 %c 
+
+$153,750,000 
+
+0.5% 
+
+$409,400,000 
+
+ $0d 
+
+$563,150,000 
+
+Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) 
+
+0.5 %e 
+
+$153,750,000 
+
+0.5% 
+
+$409,400,000 
+
+ $0d 
+
+$563,150,000 
+
+Competitive grants for states with the 
+
+1.0% 
+
+$307,500,000 
+
+NA 
+
+$0 
+
+$0 
+
+$307,500,000 
+
+“highest coronavirus burden ”f 
+
+ Subtotal for outlying areas, BIE, and 
+
+2% of total 
+
+$615,000,000 
+
+1% of total 
+
+$818,800,000 
+
+$0 
+
+$1,433,800,000 
+
+ competitive grants 
+
+appropriation 
+
+appropriation 
+
+ Remaining funds for GEER, ESSER, 
+
+100.0% of the 
+
+$30,135,000,000 
+
+100.0% of the 
+
+$81,061,200,000 $165,109,370,000 $276,305,570,000 
+
+ EANS program, and HEERF 
+
+remaining funds 
+
+remaining funds 
+
+Governor’s Emergency Education Relief 
+
+9.8% 
+
+$2,953,230,000 
+
+5.0% 
+
+$4,053,060,000 
+
+$0 
+
+$7,006,290,000 
+
+(GEER) Fund 
+
+ Reservation of funds for the Emergency 
+
+ NA 
+
+ NA 
+
+ NA 
+
+ $2,750,000,000 
+
+ NA 
+
+ $2,750,000,000 
+
+ Assistance to Non-Public Schools (EANS) 
+progr am g 
+
+Emergency Assistance to Non-Public Schools 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$2,750,000,000 
+
+$2,750,000,000 
+
+(EANS) Progr amg 
+
+Elementary and Secondary School 
+
+43.9% 
+
+$13,229,265,000 
+
+67.0% 
+
+$54,311,004,000 $122,774,800,000 $190,315,069,000 
+
+Emergency Relief (ESSER) Fund 
+
+ Reservation of funds for homeless children 
+
+ NA 
+
+ NA 
+
+ 
+
+ NA 
+
+ $800,000,000 
+
+ $800,000,000 
+
+ and youth 
+
+Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund 
+
+46.3% 
+
+$13,952,505,000 
+
+28.0% 
+
+$22,697,136,000 
+
+$39,584,570,000 
+
+$76,234,211,000 
+
+(HEERF) 
+
+CRS-4 
+
+ 
+ link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 80 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act (FY2020 )a 
+
+ CRRSAA (FY2021 )a 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ from Total 
+
+ from Total 
+
+ Appropriation 
+
+ Appropriation 
+
+ Total 
+
+ or Remaining 
+
+ or Remaining 
+
+ AR PAa 
+
+ (FY2020 and 
+
+ Program or Activity 
+
+ Fund sb 
+
+ Appropriations 
+
+ Fund sb 
+
+ Appropriations 
+
+ (FY2021) 
+
+ FY2021) 
+
+ Direct Grants to Institutions of Higher 
+
+ NA 
+
+ $12,557,254,500 
+
+ NA 
+
+ NA 
+
+ NA 
+
+ $12,557,254,500 
+
+ Education (IHEs) 
+
+ Direct Grants to Public and Private 
+
+ NA 
+
+ NA 
+
+ NA 
+
+ $20,200,451,040 
+
+ $36,021,958,700 
+
+ $56,222,409,740 
+
+ Nonprofit IHEs 
+
+ Direct Grants to Proprietary IHEs 
+
+ NA 
+
+ NA 
+
+ NA 
+
+ $680,914,080 
+
+ $395,845,700 
+
+ $1,076,759,780 
+
+ Programs for Minority Serving Institutions 
+
+ NA 
+
+ $1,046,437,875 
+
+ NA 
+
+ $1,702,285,200 
+
+ $2,968,842,750 
+
+ $5,717,565,825 
+
+ Fund for the Improvement of 
+
+ NA 
+
+ $348,812,625 
+
+ NA 
+
+ $113,485,680 
+
+ $197,922,850 
+
+ $660,221,155 
+
+ Postsecondary Education 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136); the 
+Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) included as Division M in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (CAA; P.L. 
+116-260); and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2). 
+ Note: NA: not applicable. 
+a. While funds provided under the CARES Act and CRRSAA were discretionary appropriations, funds provided under the ARPA were mandatory appropriations. The 
+
+ARPA did not provide funds for the ESSER Fund or HEERF based on a percentage of overall ESF funds available. Rather, the ARPA specified the appropriations for 
+each program. The period of availability of funds varies by act and may be extended. Funds for ESF programs authorized by the CARES Act are available through 
+September 30, 2021. Funds for ESF programs provided by the CRRSAA are available through September 30, 2022. Funds for ESF programs provided by the ARPA 
+are available through September 30, 2023. Se e Appendix B for more information about how these periods of availability may be extended. 
+
+b. Under the CARES Act and CRRSAA, appropriations for the outlying areas, the BIE, and competitive grants were determined based on a statutorily specified 
+
+percentage of the total ESF appropriation. The appropriations for the GEER Fund, ESSER Fund, and HEERF were determined based on a statutorily specified 
+percentage of the funds remaining after reserving funds for the outlying areas, the BIE, and competitive grants. 
+
+c. The Secretary was required to allocate up to 0.5% of the total appropriation to the outlying areas on the basis of their relative need as determined by him/her, in 
+
+consultation with the Secretary of the Interior. The outlying areas—American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and the U.S. 
+Virgin Islands—are as defined in Section 8101 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as amended. The Secretary opted to allocate the ful 0.5% to the 
+outlying areas under the ESF authorized by the CARES Act. 
+
+d. The outlying areas received an appropriation of $850,000,000 under Title II—Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions—of the ARPA. The BIE 
+
+received an appropriation of $850,000,000 under Title XI—Committee on Indian Affairs—of the ARPA. Statutory language did not specify that the funds for the 
+outlying areas or the BIE had to be used for purposes authorized by ESF programs. These funds are not included in the table; if the funds had been included, the 
+
+CRS-5 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+outlying areas total would have been $1,413,150,000, the BIE total would have been $1,413,150.000, and the ARPA overall total would have been $166,809,370,000. 
+The overall total for the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA would have been $279,439,370,000. 
+
+e. Outside of the ESF, the BIE received a direct appropriation of $69,000,000 under Title VII of Division B—Emergency Appropriations for Coronavirus Health 
+
+Response and Agency Operations—of the CARES Act. 
+
+f. 
+
+Statutory language does not define “highest coronavirus burden” or indicate how this should be determined. 
+
+g. The CRRSAA required that $2.75 bil ion (just over two-thirds) of the funds appropriated for the GEER Fund ($4.05 bil ion) be reserved for the EANS program. The 
+
+ARPA appropriated $2.75 bil ion for the EANS program directly. 
+
+ 
+
+CRS-6 
+
+ 
+ link to page 79 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Funds for the Outlying Areas, the BIE, and 
+Competitive Grants 
+ As discussed previously, both the CARES Act and CRRSAA included reservations of funds from 
+the total ESF appropriation for the outlying areas and BIE. The CARES Act also included a 
+reservation of funds for competitive grants. The ARPA did not reserve funds under the ESF for 
+any of these purposes but did provide separate funding for the outlying areas and BIE. 
+
+ Reservation for the Outlying Areas 
+ This section provides an overview of the availability of ESF funds to the outlying areas. It begins 
+with a discussion of how grant amounts were determined and awarded under the CARES Act. 
+This is followed by discussion of supplemental funding provided to the outlying areas under the 
+ESF provided by the CRRSAA. This section ends with a description of the funds available to the 
+outlying areas under ARPA, although such funds are not part of the ESF. 
+
+Following the enactment of the CARES Act, ED announced on May 5, 2020, that it would award 
+the full allowable 0.5% of the ESF overall appropriation to the outlying areas (§18001).14 ED 
+calculated grant amounts for each outlying area in accordance with the provisions of the GEER 
+Fund and the ESSER Fund.15 ED awarded 20% of the funds to the outlying areas based on factors 
+similar to those that were used to award state grants under the GEER Fund, including each 
+outlying area’s share of the population ages 5 to 24 relative to the total population ages 5 to 24 
+across the outlying areas, and each outlying area’s share of the count of children used to 
+determine Title I-A grants under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) relative to 
+the total number of children included in the determination of Title I-A grants for the outlying 
+areas. The remaining 80% of the funds were awarded using factors similar to those used to award 
+state grants under the ESSER Fund, including each outlying area’s share of prior year Title I-A 
+grants relative to the total amount of Title I-A funding provided to the outlying areas in the prior 
+year (see subsequent discussion of each fund for more information about these factors).16 The 
+grant amounts available to each outlying area are detailed in Table A-5 . To receive available 
+funds under the GEER Fund, the governor of an outlying area had to submit a Certification and 
+Agreement document (application) to ED.17 To receive available funds under the ESSER Fund, 
+the state educational agency (SEA) of an outlying area had to submit a Certification and 
+Agreement document.18 Outlying areas can use funds received under the GEER Fund and ESSER 
+Fund in similar ways as states (see subsequent discussion of each fund). For each application, the 
+applicant must provide various assurances, respond to questions about the use of funds, and agree 
+to comply with CARES Act reporting requirements. 
+
+ 
+14 U.S. Department of Education, Formula Grants to the Outlying Areas , May 5, 2020, https://oese.ed.gov/offices/
+education-stabilization-fund/outlying-areas/. 
+
+15 U.S. Department of Education, Education Stabilization Fund Grants to the Outlying Areas , https://oese.ed.gov/files/
+2020/05/OA-Allocations-Table.pdf. 
+
+16 With respect to the number of individuals ages 5-24 in each of the outlying areas, ED used data from the 2010 
+Decennial Census, as annual data are not available for the outlying areas. 
+
+17 A copy of the application is available at https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/05/Governors-ESF-OA-Certification-and-
+Agreement.pdf. 
+
+18 A copy of the application is available at https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/05/SEA-ESF-OA-Certification-and-
+Agreement.pdf. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+7 
+
+ 
+ link to page 79 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+Under the CRRSAA, the Secretary was required to reserve 0.5% of the total ESF appropriation 
+for the outlying areas for supplemental awards (§311). The funds had to be allocated to the 
+outlying areas not more than 30 calendar days after enactment of the CRRSAA. ED was required 
+to distribute the funds on the basis of the terms and conditions for funding provided to the 
+outlying areas under the CARES Act. Thus, ED used the same methodology to distribute funds to 
+the outlying areas under the CRRSAA ESF as it used to distribute funds to them under the 
+CARES Act ESF.19 An outlying area did not have to complete a new application to receive these 
+f unds. Table A-5 provides the grant amounts for each of the outlying areas under the CRRSAA 
+ESF. 
+
+As discussed previously, the ARPA did not provide an overall appropriation for the ESF. Rather, it 
+provided appropriations for specific programs that were part of the ESF under the CARES Act or 
+CRRSAA. Thus, there was no total ESF appropriation from which to reserve funds for the 
+outlying areas. The ARPA, however, did provide $850 million for the outlying areas. These funds 
+are independent of the ESF and are therefore not considered ESF funds. The ARPA did not 
+specify the purpose or allowable uses of the funds. According to ED, the $850 million would 
+enable SEAs in the outlying areas to 
+
+ enact measures to help schools implement mitigation strategies that are consistent 
+
+with recommendations from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
+(CDC) to the “greatest extent” practicable; 
+
+ address the effects of COVID-19 on students, including effects resulting from 
+
+interrupted instructions; 
+
+ implement strategies to meet students’ academic, social, emotional, and mental 
+
+health needs; 
+
+ offer evidence-based summer, afterschool, and extended learning and enrichment 
+
+programs; 
+
+ support early childhood education; 
+ invest in staff capacity; and 
+ avoid layoffs.20 
+
+ED also stated that the ARPA funds would enable schools in the outlying areas to “support 
+students who have been most severely impacted by the pandemic and are likely to have suffered 
+the most because of longstanding inequities in our communities and schools.”21 Thus, while funds 
+provided to the outlying areas under the ARPA were not provided as part of the ESF, they can be 
+used for similar purposes as the ESSER funds provided under the ARPA. However, unlike the 
+ESF funds provided to the outlying areas under the CARES Act and CRRSAA, the ED-
+
+ 
+19 ED used the most current Title I-A formula child count data available for the outlying areas to determine allocation 
+amounts under the CARES Act and CRRSAA. As the same Title I-A formula child counts were used to determine 
+allocations to the outlying areas under both acts, each outlying area’s proportionate share of funds available under the 
+CARES Act and CRRSAA was the same. For more information about the data used to determine CARES Act ESF and 
+CRRSAA ESF grants to the outlying areas, see U.S. Department of Education, Education Stabilization Fund 
+Allocations to the Outlying Areas , https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/05/OA-Allocations-Table.pdf; and U.S. Department of 
+Education, Education Stabilization Fund II Allocations to the Outlying Areas , https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/01/
+CRRSA-OA-allocations-and-methodology-1.11.21.doc, respectively. 
+
+20 Letter from Ian Rosenblum, Delegated the Authority to Perform the Functions and Duties of the Assistant Secretary, 
+Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, U.S. Department of Education, to Commissioner, April 2021, 
+https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/04/ARP-Cover-letter-to-Commissioners-in-OAs.docx (hereinafter referred to as “ED 
+letter about ARPA grants to the outlying areas”). 
+21 ED letter about ARPA grants to the outlying areas. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+8 
+
+ 
+ link to page 79 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+established uses of funds provided to the outlying areas under the ARPA do not include higher 
+education. Table A-5 details funds appropriated for the outlying areas under the ESF as provided 
+by the ARPA. 
+
+In addition to the aforementioned funds, institutions of higher education (IHEs) in the outlying 
+areas and those in the freely associated states of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the 
+Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau are also eligible for grants under the 
+HEERF as funded by the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA. 
+
+In total, the outlying areas received $1.413 billion under the CARES Act ESF reservation, 
+CRRSAA ESF reservation, and ARPA appropriation. 
+
+ Reservation for the Bureau of Indian Education 
+ This section provides an overview of the availability of ESF funds to the BIE. The BIE, part of 
+the U.S. Department of the Interior, manages and funds an educational system for over 40,000 
+Indian students that includes 183 elementary and secondary education schools and dormitories 
+and two BIE postsecondary schools. The BIE also funds tribal colleges and universities (TCUs). 
+The section begins with a discussion of how grant amounts were distributed under the CARES 
+Act and CRRSAA. This is followed by a description of funding provided directly to the BIE for 
+similar purposes under the CARES Act and ARPA although such funds were not part of the ESF. 
+
+Under the CARES Act, the Secretary was required to reserve 0.5% of the total ESF appropriation 
+for the BIE (§18001). The statutory language requires that the funds be provided for programs 
+operated or funded by the BIE in consultation with ED. In accordance with listening sessions with 
+stakeholders and the agreement with ED, the BIE allotment was disbursed as follows: 70% to BIE 
+elementary and secondary schools based on weighted student counts,22 20% to TCUs based on the 
+Indian student count,23 and 10% for emergency needs determined by the BIE.24 The BIE was 
+permitted to reserve up to 0.5% of the total BIE allocation for administrative costs, which would 
+be taken from the 10% of funds reserved for emergency needs. Elementary and secondary schools 
+may use the funds in accordance with the ESSER Fund (see subsequent discussion). TCUs may 
+use the funds in accordance with the HEERF (see subsequent discussion) except that funds are 
+not required to be expended for student grants.25 
+
+Under the CRRSAA, the Secretary also was required to reserve 0.5% of the total ESF 
+appropriation for the BIE for a supplemental award (§311). The Secretary was required to award 
+the funds to the Secretary of the Interior not more than 30 calendar days after enactment of the 
+CRRSAA. The funds must be used for programs operated or funded by the BIE under the terms 
+and conditions established for funding provided to the BIE under the CARES Act. The statutory 
+language further specifies that 60% of the funds must be allocated for BIE-funded elementary and 
+
+ 
+22 The BIE assigns weights to student counts based on several factors including, but not limited to, school size, grade 
+levels, and number of English language learners. 
+
+23 Tribal colleges and universities are as defined in Section 316 of the Higher Education Act, as amended. In addition to 
+funds from the BIE reservation, TCUs are also separately eligible to receive funds under the HEERF. 
+
+24 U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, CARES Act Flash Report: Bureau of Indian Education 
+Snapshot , No. 2020-FIN-050, July 14, 2020. 
+
+25 U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of the Interior, Agreement Between the U.S. Department of 
+Education (DOE) and the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) – Bureau of Indian Education (BIE), June 11-12, 2020. 
+School-level allocations are available at U.S. Department of the Interior, Indian Affairs, 2020 CARES Act, 
+https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/opa/Attachment%202%20-
+%20TCUs%20and%20Schools%20Allocations.pdf. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+9 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+secondary schools. These schools may not be required to submit a spending plan prior to 
+receiving the funds. The remaining 40% of funds must be distributed to TCUs in accordance with 
+Section 316(d)(3) of the Higher Education Act.26 Under agreement with ED, the BIE may reserve 
+up to 10% of the total BIE reservation for national-level support, from which BIE may reserve up 
+to 0.5% of the total BIE reservation for administrative costs. 
+
+Outside of the ESF, the BIE received a direct appropriation of $69 million under the CARES Act 
+and $850 million under the ARPA. These funds are independent of the ESF and are therefore not 
+considered ESF funds. The CARES Act funds were provided for the programs and activities 
+supported by the BIE to prevent, prepare for, and respond to COVID-19, and at least $20 million 
+was required be allocated to TCUs. Of the CARES Act funds, the BIE allocated $46.1 million to 
+its K-12 schools based on weighted student counts,27 $2.7 million to its postsecondary schools, 
+and $20.2 million to TCUs (other than the BIE postsecondary schools) based on the Indian 
+student count.28 ARPA funds must be allocated within 45 calendar days of enactment to programs 
+or activities operated or funded by the BIE.29 Of the ARPA funds, the BIE allocated $535.5 
+million to BIE K-12 schools based on weighted student counts, $229.5 million to TCUs based on 
+Indian student counts, and $85.0 million for BIE-managed information technology and facilities 
+projects.30 The CARES Act funds were available until September 30, 2021; while the ARPA funds 
+are available until expended. 
+
+Overall, the BIE received $563 million under the ESF as funded by the CARES Act and 
+CRRSAA. In addition, it received direct appropriations of $919 million under the CARES Act 
+and ARPA. In total, the BIE received $1.482 billion from the three acts. 
+
+ Competitive State Grants under the CARES Act 
+ Under the ESF as authorized by the CARES Act, the Secretary was required to reserve 1% of the 
+overall ESF appropriation to provide competitive grants to the states with the “highest 
+coronavirus burden” to support activities under the ESF. The CARES Act did not include a 
+definition of “highest coronavirus burden.” The ESF as funded by the CRRSAA did not include a 
+reservation of funds for competitive state grants. The ARPA also did not include a reservation of 
+funds for competitive state grants. 
+
+Within 30 days of enactment of the CARES Act, the Secretary was required to issue a notice 
+inviting states to apply for the competitive grants. Upon receipt of an application, the Secretary 
+had 30 days to approve or deny it. On April 27, 2020, ED announced that two types of 
+competitive grants would be awarded: 
+
+1. $180 million would be made available for Education Stabilization Fund—
+
+Rethink K12 Education Models Grants (ESF-REM Grants), and 
+
+ 
+26 In addition to funds from the BIE reservation, TCUs are also separately eligible to receive funds under the HEERF. 
+27 The BIE assigns weights to student counts based on several factors including, but not limited to, school size, grade 
+levels, and number of English language learners. 
+
+28 U.S. Department of the Interior, Indian Affairs, 2020 CARES Act, Bureau of Indian Education Virtual Listening 
+Session- July 8, https://www.bia.gov/covid-19/cares-act. 
+
+29 BIE-funded schools are as defined in 25 U.S.C. 2021(3), and TCUs are as defined in HEA Section 316(b)(3). 
+30 U.S. Department of the Interior, Indian Affairs, BIE Implementation of American Rescue Plan (ARP) Funding, 
+https://www.bia.gov/service/american-rescue-plan-act/bie-implementation-arp-funding. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+10 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+2. $127.5 million would be made available for Education Stabilization Fund—
+
+Reimagining Workforce Preparation Grants (ESF-RWP Grants).31 
+
+ ESF Rethink K-12 Education Models (ESF-REM) Grants 
+
+The ESF-REM Grant was “aimed at opening new, innovative ways for students to access K-12 
+education with an emphasis on meeting students’ needs during the coronavirus national 
+emergency.”32 Awards were made to states for “activities to help prevent, prepare for, and respond 
+to the devastating effects of COVID-19.”33 Each SEA could submit only one application and was 
+required to apply to use ESF-REM Grants under one of three absolute priorities established by 
+ED: 
+
+1. microgrants34 to parents to meet the educational needs of their school-age 
+
+children through increased access to high-quality remote learning to support their 
+educational needs, 
+
+2. development or expansion of a high-quality course-access program or statewide 
+
+virtual school, and 
+
+3. new, field-initiated models for providing remote education to meet the specific 
+
+educational needs of the state.35 
+
+ First Absolute Priority: Microgrants to Parents 
+ Under the first absolute priority,36 a state was required to provide parents and students with a list 
+of service providers from which the parents and students may select. The list had to include more 
+than one education service for remote learning. The notice included examples of 11 possible 
+remote learning options that could be made available, including tuition and fees for a public or 
+private course or program, especially online; special education and related services; tutoring; 
+summer or afterschool education programs; and testing preparation and examination fees. 
+
+The state was required to provide an online and other method to allow parents and students to 
+select services, ensure that microgrant accounts were established within the project period of the 
+grant, and ensure that each parent is aware of how much funding is available. The state was also 
+required to establish a parent involvement and feedback process that, for example, described a 
+way for parents to request services and providers that were not currently offered and to have input 
+ 
+31 U.S. Department of Education, “Secretary DeVos Launches New Grant Competition to Spark Student-Centered, 
+Agile Learning Opportunities to Support Recovery from National Emergency,” press release, April 27, 2020, 
+https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/secretary-devos-launches-new-grant-competition-spark-student-centered-agile-
+learning-opportunities-support-recovery-national-emergency. 
+
+32 U.S. Department of Education, “Secretary DeVos Launches New Grant Competition to Spark Student-Centered, 
+Agile Learning Opportunities to Support Recovery from National Emergency,” press release, April 27, 2020, 
+https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/secretary-devos-launches-new-grant-competition-spark-student-centered-agile-
+learning-opportunities-support-recovery-national-emergency. 
+
+33 U.S. Department of Education, “Notice Inviting Applications (NIA) for the FY2020; Education Stabilization Fund-
+Rethink K-12 Education Models (ESF-REM) Discretionary Grant Program,” 85 Federal Register 25411-25417, May 1, 
+2020 (hereinafter referred to as “ESF-REM notice”), p. 25411. 
+34 The notice defines a microgrant as “an account established for a parent that provides funds directly to service 
+providers to expand educational choice. The parent must have easy access to and visibility into the account and it must 
+allow the parent to select particular education services, expenses, or materials, to expand the ability to choose high-
+quality educational opportunities to meet their needs” (ESF-REM notice, p. 25414). 
+35 ESF-REM notice, pp. 25412-25413. 
+36 ESF-REM notice, pp. 25412-25415. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+11 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+on the creation of the list of services and providers. The state was also required to include a “fair 
+and documented”37 process for selecting which students would be served if requests for services 
+from the parents of public and nonpublic school students exceeds capacity. The state also had to 
+ensure that at least 80% of the grant funds are used for services that are directly utilized by public 
+and nonpublic school students under the microgrants. No more than 5% of the funds could be 
+used by the state for administration. 
+
+ Second Absolute Priority: Statewide Program 
+ A state choosing the second absolute priority38 was required to develop or expand a statewide 
+virtual learning or course-access program, provided that it also proposed to implement either a 
+statewide course-access program or virtual school. The state’s application also had to propose to 
+widely disseminate information on the availability of course-access programs or virtual school 
+programs. Additionally, it had to include a parent involvement and feedback process that, for 
+example, describes a way for parents to request courses or programming that are not currently 
+offered and to provide input on services provided through the project. 
+
+ Third Absolute Priority: Proposals for Remote Learning 
+ Under the third absolute priority,39 applications should “propose projects that demonstrate a 
+rationale and that are designed to create, develop, implement, replicate, or take to scale field-
+initiated educational models for remote learning.”40 Proposed projects were required to address 
+specific needs related to accessing high-quality remote learning opportunities. 
+
+ Nonpublic School Students 
+ In addition, the notice stated that an applicant must ensure equitable access for nonpublic school 
+students under the absolute priority that it proposes to address.41 The notice defined this to mean 
+providing students in nonpublic schools “with the same opportunity to access program benefits as 
+students attending public schools, which may include proportional provision of services to both 
+public and non-public school students.”42 
+
+ Application Review 
+ Applications were reviewed and assigned a score of up to 100 points. Of these, up to 40 points 
+were based on the coronavirus burden in each state. Under the requirements of Section 18001 of 
+the CARES Act, the Secretary was required to provide competitive grants to the states with the 
+“highest coronavirus burden” to support activities under the ESF.43 For the purposes of the ESF-
+ 
+37 ESF-REM notice, p. 25413. 
+38 ESF-REM notice, pp. 25413-25415. 
+39 ESF-REM notice, pp. 25413-25415. 
+40 ESF-REM notice, p. 25413. 
+41 ESF-REM notice, p. 25413. 
+42 ESF-REM notice, p. 25414. 
+43 ED defined coronavirus burden to mean the “burden on a State from coronavirus based on the measures in the 
+application package and any measures identified by the applicant in response to Application Requirement 3” (ESF-
+REM notice, pp. 25413-25414). Application Requirement 3 requires the state to provide a description of the state’s 
+coronavirus burden based on “indicators and information factors other than those provided in the application package 
+that demonstrate the significance of the impact of COVID-19 on students, parents, and schools in the State” (ESF-REM 
+notice, p. 25414). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+12 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+REM grants, ED established a series of four metrics to determine, in part, the coronavirus burden 
+in each state: the (1) percentage of the population without broadband access, (2) percentage of 
+students ages 5-17 in poverty, (3) state percentage share of confirmed COVID-19 cases per 
+capita, and (4) percentage of students in rural LEAs.44, 45 
+
+ Grant Awards46 
+ Overall, 39 SEAs applied for ESF-REM grants. Of these, 11 received an award. Of the six 
+applicants that applied under the first absolute priority, two SEAs (Louisiana and Tennessee) 
+received grants. Of the 14 applicants that applied under the second absolute priority, four SEAs 
+(Georgia, Iowa, Rhode Island, and Texas) received grants. Of the 19 applicants that applied under 
+the third absolute priority, five SEAs (Maine, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
+South Dakota) received grants. The average grant award was $16.4 million. Grant amounts 
+ranged from $6.9 million for South Dakota to $20 million for Tennessee. The project period for 
+all grants is scheduled to run through July 31, 2023. 
+
+ ESF Reimagining Workforce Preparation (ESF-RWP) Grants 
+
+These grants were “designed to expand short-term postsecondary programs and work-based 
+learning programs in order to get Americans back to work and help small businesses return to 
+being our country’s engines for economic growth.”47 ED established two absolute priorities and 
+three competitive priorities for the grant program.48 
+
+ Absolute Priority 1: Short-Term Opportunities or Career Pathways 
+ Under Absolute Priority 1, states could create or expand short-term education and training 
+opportunities or career pathway programs to help citizens return to work, become entrepreneurs, 
+or expand their small businesses. Short-term education programs or career pathways created or 
+expanded under this priority must lead to some type of workplace-relevant credential that 
+responds “to the needs of employers or facilitate entrepreneurship.”49 Grantees could use funds to 
+develop and implement short-term education and training programs and career pathways, hire 
+qualified instructors, obtain needed equipment and supplies, and subsidize tuition and fees. Funds 
+
+ 
+44 U.S. Department of Education, Application for Grants Under the Education Stabilization Fund—Rethink K-12 
+Education Models (ESF-REM) Discretionary Grants Program, April 2020, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/04/ESF-REM-
+Application-Package-FY20.pdf. 
+
+45 ED published the final metrics on June 29, 2020 (U.S. Department of Education, Education Stabilization Fund—
+Rethink K12 Education Models Discretionary Grants , https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/07/ESF-REM-Burden-
+Methodology-Appendix-FINAL-6.29.20.pdf). 
+
+46 The information discussed in this section is available from U.S. Department of Education, Education Stabilization 
+Fund: Rethink K-12 Education Models Discretionary Grant Program Award Fact Sheet , July 2020, https://oese.ed.gov/
+files/2020/07/ESF-REM-Award-Fact-Sheet-7.29.20_FINAL.pdf. 
+
+47 U.S. Department of Education, “Secretary DeVos Launches New Grant Competition to Spark Student-Centered, 
+Agile Learning Opportunities to Support Recovery from National Emergency,” press release, April 27, 2020, 
+https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/secretary-devos-launches-new-grant-competition-spark-student-centered-agile-
+learning-opportunities-support-recovery-national-emergency. 
+
+48 U.S. Department of Education, “Notice Inviting Applications (NIA) for the FY2020 Education Stabilization Fund—
+Reimagine Workforce Preparation (ESF-RWP) Grants Program,” 85 Federal Register 37636-37648, June 23, 2020 
+(hereinafter referred to as “ESF-RWP notice”). 
+
+49 ESF-RWP notice, p. 37636. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+13 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+could also be used for other purposes, such as student support services, transportation vouchers, 
+and child care support. 
+
+Two competitive priorities applied to applications submitted under Absolute Priority 1. Under the 
+first competitive priority, preference was given to applications that propose a project in which 
+short-term educational programs and training programs “include didactic education that will be 
+principally delivered through distance education.”50 Under the second competitive priority, 
+competitive preference was given to applicants that propose to “serve lifelong learners in 
+distressed communities.”51 
+
+ Absolute Priority 2: Small Business Incubators 
+ Under Absolute Priority 2, states could use grants to “create or expand small business incubators 
+that offer education and training, mentorship, as well as shared facilities and resources that will 
+help small businesses recover and grow and new entrepreneurs thrive.”52 According to ED, the 
+incubators create new opportunities for IHEs to expand their offerings and create new revenue 
+streams, enabling the institutions to “become entrepreneurial at a time when declining 
+enrollments and COVID-19 related disruptions may result in longer-term underutilization of 
+campus facilities. In this regard, these funds assist in the stabilization of institutions and the local 
+economy.”53 
+
+ED established one competitive priority for applicants under Absolute Priority 2. Under this 
+competitive priority, competitive preference was given to applicants serving entrepreneurs and 
+businesses in distressed communities. 
+
+ Application Review 
+ For the purposes of the ESF-RWP grants, a state’s coronavirus burden was determined based on 
+three equally weighted factors: (1) percentage of population without broadband access, (2) initial 
+unemployment insurance claims filed (as a percentage of the civilian labor force), and (3) state 
+percentage share of confirmed COVID-19 cases per 100,000 persons.54 Using these three factors, 
+ED calculated a burden score for each state and ranked states based on their burden score.55 
+
+ Grants Awarded 
+ Grant applications were made available in June 2020 and were due on August 24, 2020.56 ED 
+awarded eight ESF-RWP grants, ranging in size from $13.3 million to $18.1 million, to grantees 
+in eight states (Alabama, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Michigan, Nevada, New York, and 
+Virginia).57 
+
+ 
+50 ESF-RWP notice, p. 37639. 
+51 ESF-RWP notice, p. 37639. Distressed communities refers to rural communities or Opportunity Zones. 
+52 ESF-RWP notice, p. 37637. 
+53 ESF-RWP notice, p. 37637. 
+54 ESF-RWP notice, pp. 37646-37648. 
+55 ED updated these data and state burden scores on August 24, 2020. The updated data are available at 
+https://s3.amazonaws.com/PCRN/file/ESF-RWP_Burden_Methodology_Appendix_Final.pdf. 
+
+56 U.S. Department of Education, Application for Grants Under the Education Stabilization Fund—Reimagine 
+Workforce Preparation (ESF-RWP) Discretionary Grants Program, June 2020, https://apply07.grants.gov/apply/
+opportunities/instructions/PKG00262274-instructions.pdf. 
+
+57 For more information, see U.S. Department of Education, ESF-RWP FY2020 Awards , 2020, https://oese.ed.gov/
+offices/education-stabilization-fund/reimagine-workforce-preparation/awards-4/. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+14 
+
+ 
+ link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 23 link to page 23 link to page 23 link to page 24 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Summary of Provisions Related to Reservations from the Total ESF 
+Appropriations 
+ Table 2 provides an overview of the key provisions related to the outlying areas, the BIE, and 
+competitive state grants under the ESF as funded by the CARES Act and CRRSAA. It also 
+includes information about the funds appropriated for the outlying areas and BIE under the 
+CARES Act and ARPA, which were not part of the ESF. 
+
+ Table 2. Summary of Reservations under the ESF as Provided by the CARES Act and 
+
+ CRRSAA, and Funds for Similar Purposes Under the CARES Act and ARPA 
+
+ Provision 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ Outlying Areas 
+
+Allocation of funds 
+
+Secretary may reserve up 
+
+Secretary must reserve 
+
+Separate appropriation of 
+
+to 0.5% of the total ESF 
+
+0.5% of the total ESF 
+
+$850 mil ion was provided 
+
+appropriatio n.a 
+
+appropriation. 
+
+(non-ESF funds). 
+
+Application process 
+
+Outlying areas required 
+
+No additional application 
+
+No application process 
+
+to apply for funds. 
+
+required for outlying 
+
+was specified. 
+
+areas that received funds 
+under the CARES Act. 
+
+Timing for distribution of 
+
+Not specified in statutory 
+
+Must be allocated by the 
+
+Must be allocated by the 
+
+funds 
+
+language. 
+
+Secretary no more than 
+
+Secretary no more than 
+
+30 calendar days after 
+
+30 calendar days after 
+
+enactment of the 
+
+enactment of the ARPA. 
+
+CRRSAA. 
+
+Uses of funds 
+
+Funds must be used to 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+No uses of funds were 
+
+carry out the ESF. 
+
+specifi ed.b 
+
+ BIE 
+
+Allocation of funds 
+
+(1) Secretary must 
+
+Secretary must reserve 
+
+Separate appropriation of 
+
+reserve 0.5% of the total 
+
+0.5% of the total ESF 
+
+$850 mil ion was provided 
+
+ESF appropriation. 
+
+appropriation. 
+
+to the BIE (non-ESF 
+
+(2) Separate appropriation 
+
+funds). 
+
+of $69 mil ion was 
+provided to the BIE (non-
+ESF funds). 
+
+Timeline for distributing 
+
+(1) Not specified in 
+
+Must be allocated by the 
+
+Must be allocated by the 
+
+funds to the BIE 
+
+statutory language. 
+
+Secretary to the Secretary Director of the BIE within 
+
+(2) Not specified in 
+
+of the Interior not more 
+
+45 calendar days after 
+
+statutory language. 
+
+than 30 calendar days 
+
+enactment of the ARPA. 
+
+after enactment of the 
+CRRSAA. 
+
+Allocation of funds within 
+
+(1) Not specified in 
+
+60% for BIE-funded 
+
+Statutory language does 
+
+the BIE 
+
+statutory languag e.c 
+
+schools and 40% for 
+
+not specify an allocation 
+
+(2) BIE must reserve at 
+
+T CUs.d 
+
+of funds between the 
+
+least $20 mil ion for tribal 
+
+programs or activities 
+
+col eges and universities 
+
+operated or funded by 
+
+(TCUs). 
+
+the BIE, BIE-funded 
+schools, and TC Us.e 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+15 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Provision 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+Uses of funds 
+
+(1) Funds must be used 
+
+Funds must be used for 
+
+Funds must be used for 
+
+for programs operated or 
+
+programs operated or 
+
+programs or activities 
+
+funded by the BIE to carry funded by the BIE under 
+
+operated or funded by 
+
+out the ESF. 
+
+the terms and conditions 
+
+the BIE for BIE-funded 
+
+(2) Funds provided for 
+
+established under the 
+
+schools and TCUs. 
+
+programs and activities 
+
+CARES Act for BIE-
+
+funded by the BIE to 
+
+operated and funded 
+
+prevent, prepare for, and 
+
+elementary and secondary 
+
+respond to COVID-19. 
+
+schools and TCUs. 
+
+ Competitive State Grants 
+
+Allocation of funds 
+
+Secretary must reserve 
+
+No reservation of funds 
+
+No reservation of funds 
+
+1% of the total ESF 
+
+for competitive state 
+
+for competitive state 
+
+appropriation for grants 
+
+grants. 
+
+grants. 
+
+to states with the “highest 
+coronavirus burden.” 
+
+Application process 
+
+Secretary must issue a 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+notice inviting applications 
+not later than 30 days 
+after the enactment of the 
+CARES Act and must 
+approve or deny 
+applications not later than 
+30 days after receipt. 
+
+Timeline for distributing 
+
+Not specified, but the 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+funds 
+
+Secretary is required to 
+approve or deny 
+applications for funding 
+not later than 30 days 
+after receipt. 
+
+Uses of funds 
+
+Funds must be used to 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+support activities under 
+the ESF. 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
+Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136); the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental 
+Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) included as Division M in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 
+(CAA; P.L. 116-260); and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2). 
+a. The Secretary reserved the ful 0.5% of ESF appropriations for the outlying areas (U.S. Department of 
+
+Education, Formula Grants to the Outlying Areas , May 5, 2020, https://oese.ed.gov/offices/education-
+stabilization-fund/outlying-areas/). 
+
+b. ED specified the uses of funds in a letter to the outlying areas (Letter from Ian Rosenblum, Delegated the 
+
+Authority to Perform the Functions and Duties of the Assistant Secretary, Office of Elementary and 
+Secondary Education, U.S. Department of Education, to Commissioner, April 2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/
+2021/04/ARP-Cover-letter-to-Commissioners-in-OAs.docx). 
+
+c. The BIE allotment was disbursed as fol ows: 70% to BIE elementary and secondary schools and early 
+
+childhood education programs, 20% to TCUs, and 10% for emergency needs determined by the BIE. The 
+BIE was permitted to reserve up to 0.5% of the total BIE allocation for administrative costs, which would be 
+taken from the 10% of funds reserved for emergency needs (U.S. Department of Education and U.S. 
+Department of the Interior, Agreement Between the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) and the U.S. 
+Department of the Interior (DOI) – Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) , June 11-12, 2020). 
+
+d. The BIE allotment was disbursed as fol ows: 54% to BIE elementary and secondary schools and early 
+
+childhood education programs, 36% to TCUs, and 10% for national-level support. The BIE was permitted to 
+reserve up to 0.5% of the total BIE allocation for administrative costs, which would be taken from the 10% 
+of funds reserved for national-level support (U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Education, 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+16 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+Listening Session Documents: CRRSA Funding Distribution and Waiver Overview, Completed BIE K-12 
+ESF-II COVID-19 Relief Act Allocations, https://www.bie.edu/sites/default/files/inline-files/BIE%20K-
+12%20Schools%20ESF-II%20COVID-19%20Relief%20Act%20Allocations_0.pdf). 
+
+e. The BIE plans to disburse its allotment as fol ows: 63% to BIE elementary and secondary schools and early 
+
+childhood education programs, 27% to TCUs, and 10% for BIE-wide investments (U.S. Department of the 
+Interior, BIE Implementation of American Rescue Plan (ARP) Funding, https://www.bia.gov/service/american-
+rescue-plan-act/bie-implementation-arp-funding). 
+
+ Governor’s Emergency Education Relief (GEER) 
+Fund 
+ Both the CARES Act and the CRRSAA provided appropriations for the GEER Fund. In each 
+state58 receiving GEER funds, the governor may use the grant to provide emergency funds to 
+LEAs and IHEs serving students within the state to provide for the continuity of operations, or to 
+any other IHE, LEA, or education-related entity within the state for a broad array of purposes, 
+including the provision of child care and the protection of education-related jobs. The CARES 
+Act appropriated $2.953 billion in FY2020 for the GEER Fund (commonly referred to as GEER 
+I). The CRRSAA provided $4.053 billion in supplemental ESF appropriations in FY2020. 
+However, the CRRSAA created a new reservation of funds under the GEER Fund (commonly 
+referred to as GEER II) for providing grants to governors to be used by SEAs for providing 
+services and assistance to private schools. Of the $4.053 billion provided for the GEER Fund 
+under the CRRSAA, $2.750 billion (about two-thirds) was reserved for the Emergency Assistance 
+to Non-Public Schools program. The remaining $1.303 billion was available for grants to 
+governors. The ARPA did not include an appropriation for the GEER Fund. 
+
+This section discusses the provisions of the GEER Fund authorized under the CARES Act and the 
+CRRSAA. The EANS program is discussed in a subsequent section. 
+
+ Requirements for ED to Award Funds 
+ Under GEER I, the Secretary was required to make grants to the governor of each state with an 
+approved application. The Secretary was required to issue a notice inviting states to apply for the 
+grants within 30 days of enactment of the CARES Act. Upon receipt of an application, the 
+Secretary had 30 days to approve or deny it. The statutory language did not provide for an appeals 
+process for any state whose application was denied. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 
+Puerto Rico had their applications for funding approved. 
+
+Under the CRRSAA, governors were not required to submit a new application to receive GEER II 
+funds. Rather, the governor of each state with an approved GEER Fund application under the 
+CARES Act was eligible to receive GEER funds under the CRRSAA. ED was required to make 
+GEER funds available for state grants, after reserving $2.75 billion for the EANS program, within 
+30 calendar days of enactment of the CRRSAA. 
+
+ State Grant Formula 
+ Under the CARES Act and the CRRSAA, after reserving $2.75 billion for the EANS program, as 
+discussed below, the funds available for the GEER Fund were awarded to states based on two 
+
+ 
+58 For the purposes of the GEER Fund, state is defined to include the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto 
+Rico. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+17 
+
+ 
+ link to page 87 link to page 25 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+formula factors: (1) 60% was awarded based on each state’s share of individuals ages 5-24 
+relative to the total number of individuals in this age group in all states,59 and (2) 40% was 
+awarded based on each state’s share of children counted under Section 1124(c) of the ESEA 
+relative to the total number of children counted under this section for all states. Population 
+estimates for the first factor were available from the U.S. Census Bureau. For the purposes of 
+GEER allocations under the CARES Act, ED used 2018 state-level resident population estimates 
+for individuals ages 5-24 that were released by the U.S. Census Bureau in June 2019. For GEER 
+allocations under the CRRSAA, ED used 2019 state-level resident population estimates for 
+individuals ages 5-24 that were released by the U.S. Census Bureau in June 2020. 
+
+Data for the second factor are based on formula child counts used to determine Title I-A grants 
+under the ESEA. These state counts consist of children who are ages 5-17 (1) living in families in 
+poverty, according to estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty 
+Estimates (SAIPE) program; (2) in institutions for neglected or delinquent children or in foster 
+homes; and (3) in families receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) payments 
+with income above the federal poverty level. For state grants under GEER I, ED used formula 
+child counts for FY2020 Title I-A grants. For state grants under GEER II, ED used preliminary 
+formula child counts for FY2021 Title I-A grants. Thus, as the underlying data used to determine 
+state allocations differ for GEER I and GEER II, some states’ shares of the available GEER Fund 
+appropriations differ under each act. 
+
+ Table C-1 includes state grants under GEER I and GEER II. 
+
+ Uses of Funds 
+ Grants awarded to governors from the GEER Fund may be used for educational services in three 
+categories: (1) elementary and secondary education, (2) higher education, and (3) elementary, 
+secondary, higher, and other areas of education, including child care, early childhood education, 
+social and emotional support, and protecting education-related jobs . Table 3 provides a list of all 
+authorized activities under the CARES Act and CRRSAA. The specific wording of these uses of 
+funds in the CARES Act column has been taken directly from statutory language. 
+
+ Table 3. Allowable Uses of GEER Funds Under the CARES Act and CRRSAA 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ (GEER I) 
+
+ (GEER II) 
+
+ Notes 
+
+“Provide emergency support through 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+Neither the CARES Act nor the 
+
+grants to local educational agencies that 
+
+CRRSAA includes a definition for 
+
+the State educational agency deems have 
+
+“most significantly impacted by 
+
+been most significantly impacted by 
+
+coronavirus” or provides any metrics 
+
+coronavirus to support the ability of such 
+
+by which this should be determined. 
+
+local educational agencies to continue to 
+
+Thus, the criteria used by SEAs to 
+
+provide educational services to their 
+
+identify LEAs that are eligible to receive 
+
+students and to support the on-going 
+
+emergency education relief funds may 
+
+functionality of the local educational 
+
+differ from state to state. 
+
+agency.” 
+
+ 
+59 Data for the 50 states and the District of Columbia were available from the U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of 
+the Resident Population for Selected Age Groups by Sex: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019 , https://www.census.gov/data/
+tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-state-detail.html#par_textimage_673542126. More recent data for Puerto Rico 
+by age groups were not yet available, so data from 2018 were used. These data are available at Annual Estimates of the 
+Resident Population by Single Year of Age and Sex for the United States, States, and Puerto Rico Commonwealth: 
+April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2018 , https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-state-detail.html. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+18 
+
+ 
+ link to page 26 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ (GEER I) 
+
+ (GEER II) 
+
+ Notes 
+
+“Provide emergency support through 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+Neither the CARES Act nor the 
+
+grants to institutions of higher education 
+
+CRRSAA includes a definition for 
+
+serving students within the State that the 
+
+“most significantly impacted by 
+
+Governor determines have been most 
+
+coronavirus” or provides any metrics 
+
+significantly impacted by coronavirus to 
+
+by which this should be determined. 
+
+support the ability of such institutions to 
+
+Thus, the criteria used by SEAs to 
+
+continue to provide educational services 
+
+identify IHEs that are eligible to receive 
+
+and support the on-going functionality of 
+
+emergency education relief funds may 
+
+the institution.” 
+
+differ from state to state. 
+
+“Provide support to any other institution 
+
+Similar to the CARES 
+
+Neither the CARES Act nor the 
+
+of higher education, local educational 
+
+ Act.a 
+
+CRRSAA includes a definition of what 
+
+agency, or education related entity within 
+
+qualifies an entity as essential for 
+
+the State that the Governor deems 
+
+carrying out emergency educational 
+
+essential for carrying out emergency 
+
+services to students. Thus, the criteria 
+
+educational services to students for 
+
+used by governors to identify these 
+
+authorized activities described in section 
+
+entities may vary from state to state. 
+
+18003(d)(1) of this title or the Higher 
+Education Act, the provision of child care 
+and early childhood education, social and 
+emotional support, and the protection of 
+education-related jobs.” 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
+Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136); and the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental 
+Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) included as Division M in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 
+(CAA; P.L. 116-260). 
+a. The reference to Section 18003(d)(1) in the CARES Act and a reference to Section 313(d)(1) in the 
+
+CRRSAA are both references to the uses of ESSER Funds by LEAs in each act, respectively. 
+
+While the uses of funds under GEER I and GEER II are broad, the CRRSAA includes some 
+restrictions on the uses of GEER II funds that did not apply to GEER I funds. More specifically, 
+GEER II funds and the funds reserved for the EANS program cannot be used to provide direct or 
+indirect assistance to scholarship granting organizations or related entities for elementary or 
+secondary education. In addition, such funds cannot be used to provide or support vouchers, 
+tuition tax credit programs, education savings accounts, scholarships, scholarship programs, or 
+tuition-assistance programs for elementary or secondary education. The one exception to these 
+restrictions is that GEER II funds not reserved for the EANS program may be used to provide 
+such support to students who received such assistance with GEER I funds provided under the 
+CARES Act for the 2020-2021 school year, but only for the same assistance previously provided 
+to students.60 This exception does not apply to funds used under the EANS program but does 
+apply to unobligated EANS funds that revert to the governor for use under GEER II requirements. 
+
+ Reallocation of Funds 
+ Any funds that a governor does not award under GEER I or GEER II within one year of receiving 
+them must be returned to the Secretary. The Secretary is required to reallocate such funds to the 
+remaining states based on the formula used to provide the initial grant amounts. 
+
+ 
+60 The statutory provision requires that the “same assistance” be provided to students but does not specify whether this 
+means the same type of assistance (e.g., voucher), the same amount of assistance, or both. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+19 
+
+ 
+ link to page 91 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Emergency Assistance to Non-Public Schools 
+(EANS) Program 
+ This section discusses appropriations reserved for the EANS program under GEER II by the 
+CRRSAA (EANS I) and appropriations provided directly for the EANS program under the ARPA 
+(EANS II). With exceptions noted in the subsequent discussion, the ARPA referenced the 
+CRRSAA EANS program provisions in its provision of additional funds for the EANS program. 
+The EANS program provides grants to SEAs, which in turn use the funds to provide services or 
+assistance to nonpublic schools to address educational disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 
+emergency. 
+
+ Allocation of Funds to Governors 
+ The CRRSAA required that $2.75 billion (just over two-thirds) of the funds appropriated for the 
+GEER Fund ($4.05 billion) be reserved for the EANS program. These funds were allocated to 
+states based on their proportional share of children ages 5-17 from families with incomes at or 
+below 185% of poverty. The remaining $1,303,060,000 was distributed to states based on the 
+GEER Fund state grant formula described in the previous section. 
+
+The ARPA appropriated $2.75 billion for the EANS program directly. The ARPA did not include 
+appropriations for the GEER Fund. Based on the requirements of the EANS program included in 
+the CRRSAA, funds provided under the EANS program must be allocated to states based on their 
+proportional share of children ages 5-17 enrolled in private schools from families with incomes at 
+or below 185% of the poverty level. 
+
+The governor is required to designate the SEA as the program administrator for the EANS 
+program . Table D-1 details EANS grants to states under the CRRSAA and ARPA. 
+
+ Application for Grants 
+ The Secretary was required to issue a notice inviting applications for EANS funds not later than 
+30 days after the enactment of the CRRSAA. The Secretary was required to approve or deny an 
+application not later than 15 days after receiving it. 
+
+The CRRSAA required each governor to provide an assurance in its application that the SEA 
+would do the following: 
+
+ distribute information about the EANS program to nonpublic schools and make 
+
+the information and application to apply for services or assistance easily 
+available; 
+
+ process all applications submitted promptly and approve or deny an application 
+
+not later than 30 days after the date of receipt; 
+
+ ensure that services or assistance that is provided is available to any nonpublic 
+
+school that meets three criteria: 
+1. it is a nonpublic school that under EANS I enrolls low-income students and 
+
+is “most impacted by the qualifying emergency” and under EANS II enrolls a 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+20 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+“significant percentage of low-income students” and is “most impacted by 
+the qualifying emergency”61; 
+
+2. the school submits an application to the SEA at such time, in such manner, 
+
+and accompanied by such information that the SEA may require, which shall 
+include the following: (1) the number and percentage of students from low-
+income families enrolled by such nonpublic school in the 2019-2020 school 
+year, (2) a description of the services that such nonpublic school requests that 
+the SEA provide, and (3) whether such nonpublic school requesting services 
+or assistance received a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan that was 
+made prior to the date of enactment of the CRRSAA, and what the loan 
+amount was;62 and 
+
+3. the school requests services or assistance that is allowable under the EANS 
+
+program; 
+
+ to the extent practicable, obligate all EANS funds provided for services or 
+
+assistance to nonpublic schools in an “expedited and timely” manner; and 
+
+ obligate all EANS funds provided for services or assistance to nonpublic schools 
+
+not later than six months after receiving such funds from ED. 
+
+While it was not part of the assurances that a governor must provide, an SEA was required to 
+make the application for services or assistance available to nonpublic schools not later than 30 
+days after the receipt of EANS funds. 
+
+For purposes of the CRRSAA, an SEA was required to prioritize services or assistance to 
+nonpublic schools that enroll low-income students and were the most impacted by the COVID-19 
+emergency. The statutory language did not define which students qualify as “low-income” or how 
+to determine which schools are “most impacted” by the COVID-19 emergency. Under the ARPA, 
+SEAs may only provide services or assistance to nonpublic schools that serve a “significant 
+percentage of low-income students” and are “most impacted” by the COVID-19 emergency. 
+Similar to CRRSAA, these terms were not defined in the ARPA.63 
+
+ 
+61 The CRRSAA did not establish a threshold with respect to the enrollment of low-income students or define “most 
+impacted by a qualifying emergency.” Similarly, the ARPA did not define what constitutes a “significant percentage of 
+low-income students” or define “most impacted by a qualifying emergency.” ED solicited feedback on how the ARPA 
+terms should be implemented. (For more information, see U.S. Department of Education, Notice Inviting Applications 
+and Announcing Allocations for the Emergency Assistance to Non-Public Schools Program under the American Rescue 
+Plan Act of 2021; Invitation for Comment , April 12, 2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/04/FINAL-ARP-EANS-
+notice-4.12.21.pdf.) The measures that states are required to use with respect to the ARPA are detailed in the state 
+application for EANS program funds. (U.S. Department of Education, Application for Funding: Emergency Assistance 
+to Non-Public Schools (EANS) Program Under the American Rescue Plan of 2021 (ARP Act) , July 7, 2021, pp. 1-2, 
+https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/07/ARP-EANS-Application-7.7.21_FINAL.pdf). 
+
+62 The application for EANS I funds is available at U.S. Department of Education, Certification and Agreement: 
+Emergency Assistance to Non-Public Schools Program under the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental 
+Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSA Act), January 11, 2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/01/
+Final_EANS_CertificationandAgreement_FY21_1.11.21.pdf (hereinafter referred to as ED, EANS I application). The 
+application for EANS II funds is available at U.S. Department of Education, Application for Funding: Emergency 
+Assistance to Non-Public Schools (EANS) Program Under the American Rescue Plan of 2021 (ARP Act), July 7, 2021, 
+https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/07/ARP-EANS-Application-7.7.21_FINAL.pdf (hereinafter referred to as ED, EANS II 
+application). 
+
+63 ED solicited feedback on how the ARPA terms should be implemented (for more information, see U.S. Department 
+of Education, Notice Inviting Applications and Announcing Allocations for the Emergency Assistance to Non-Public 
+Schools Program under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021; Invitation for Comment, April 12, 2021, 
+https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/04/FINAL-ARP-EANS-notice-4.12.21.pdf). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+21 
+
+ 
+ link to page 29 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+An SEA may reserve not more than the greater of $200,000 or 0.5% of the EANS grant for 
+administering the services and assistance provided under the EANS program to nonpublic 
+schools. 
+
+Each SEA that complies with all of the aforementioned assurances provided by the governor but 
+has unobligated EANS funds remaining six months after receiving them is required to return the 
+unobligated funds to the governor for use under the GEER II uses of funds requirements. This 
+also applies to the EANS program funds provided by ARPA.64 According to ED guidance, any 
+EANS program funds returned to the governor under the CRRSAA or ARPA remain available to 
+the governor for use through the full period of availability of the funds.65 
+
+ Uses of Funds 
+ A nonpublic school receiving services or assistance under the EANS program is required to use 
+such services or assistance to address educational disruptions from the COVID-19 emergency. 
+ Table 4 provides a complete list of authorized activities under the CRRSAA and ARPA. The 
+specific wording of these uses of funds in the CRRSAA column has been taken directly from 
+statutory language. 
+
+ Table 4. Allowable Uses of EANS Funds Under the CRRSAA and ARPA 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+“(A) supplies to sanitize, disinfect, and clean school facilities” 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA 
+
+“(B) personal protective equipment” 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA 
+
+“(C) improving ventilation systems, including windows or portable air 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA 
+
+purification systems to ensure healthy air in the non-public school” 
+
+“(D) training and professional development for staff on sanitation, the use of 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA 
+
+personal protective equipment, and minimizing the spread of infectious 
+diseases” 
+
+“(E) physical barriers to facilitate social distancing” 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA 
+
+“(F) other materials, supplies, or equipment to implement public health 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA 
+
+protocols, including guidelines and recommendations from the Centers for 
+Disease Control and Prevention for the reopening and operation of school 
+facilities to effectively maintain the health and safety of students, educators, and 
+other staff during the qualifying emergency” 
+
+“(G) expanding capacity to administer coronavirus testing to effectively 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA 
+
+monitor and suppress coronavirus, to conduct surveillance and contact tracing 
+activities, and to support other activities related to coronavirus testing for 
+students, teachers, and staff at the non-public school” 
+
+ 
+64 U.S. Department of Education, Application for Funding: Emergency Assistance to Non-Public Schools (EANS) 
+Program Under the American Rescue Plan of 2021 (ARP Act), July 7, 2021, pp. 1-2, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/07/
+ARP-EANS-Application-7.7.21_FINAL.pdf. 
+
+65 U.S. Department of Education, Frequently Asked Questions: Emergency Assistance to Non-Public Schools (EANS) 
+Program as Authorized by the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 (the CRRSA 
+Act) and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARP Act), September 17, 2021, Item G-4, https://oese.ed.gov/files/
+2021/09/Final-EANS-FAQ-Update-9.17.21.pdf. However, the Certification and Agreement for Funding documents for 
+EANS I and EANS II indicate that the governor must return to the Secretary any EANS funds that are not awarded or 
+obligated within one year of receiving such funds. It is unclear whether the one year time period begins on the date on 
+which the state originally received the EANS funds or the date on which any unobligated EANS funds are returned to 
+the governor. In either case, the one year time period aligns with statutory language but differs from the aformentioned 
+guidance provided by ED. For more information, see ED, EANS I application and ED, EANS II application. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+22 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+“(H) educational technology (including hardware, software, connectivity, 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA 
+
+assistive technology, and adaptive equipment) to assist students, educators, and 
+other staff with remote or hybrid learning” 
+
+(I) redeveloping instructional plans, including curriculum development, for 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA 
+
+remote learning, hybrid learning, or to address learning loss 
+
+“(J) leasing of sites or spaces to ensure safe social distancing to implement 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA 
+
+public health protocols, including guidelines and recommendations from the 
+Centers for Disease Control and Prevention” 
+
+“(K) reasonable transportation costs” 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA 
+
+“(L) initiating and maintaining education and support services or assistance for 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA 
+
+remote learning, hybrid learning, or to address learning loss” 
+
+“(M) reimbursement for the expenses of any services or assistance described 
+
+Not permitted 
+
+in this paragraph (except for subparagraphs (C) (except that portable air 
+purification systems shall be an allowable reimbursable expense), (D), (I), and 
+(L)) that the non-public school incurred on or after the date of the qualifying 
+emergency, except that any non-public school that has received a loan 
+guaranteed under paragraph (36) of section 7(a) of the Small Business Act (15 
+U.S.C. 636(a)) as of the day prior to the date of enactment of this Act shall not 
+be eligible for reimbursements described in this paragraph for any expenses 
+reimbursed through such loan” 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of provisions in the Coronavirus Response and Relief 
+Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) included as Division M in the Consolidated Appropriations 
+Act, 2021 (CAA; P.L. 116-260), and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2). 
+
+As previously discussed, EANS funds cannot be used to provide direct or indirect assistance to 
+scholarship granting organizations or related entities for elementary or secondary education. In 
+addition, EANS funds cannot be used to provide or support vouchers, tuition tax credit programs, 
+education savings accounts, scholarships, scholarship programs, or tuition-assistance programs 
+for elementary or secondary education.66 Unobligated EANS funds that revert to the governor for 
+use under the GEER II uses of funds requirements, however, may be used for these purposes 
+under certain circumstances as detailed in the GEER II discussion above. 
+
+ Provision of Services and Assistance to Nonpublic Schools 
+ Statutory language requires that a public agency control the EANS funds used to provide services 
+or assistance to nonpublic schools and that title to materials, equipment, and property purchased 
+with such funds be retained by a public agency. In addition, a public agency must administer such 
+funds, services, assistance, materials, equipment, and property. The provision of services and 
+assistance must be provided by employees of a public agency or through a contract between such 
+public agency and an individual, association, agency, or organization. Such employee, individual, 
+agency, or organization has to be independent of the nonpublic school receiving services or 
+assistance, and such employment and contracts shall be under the control and supervision of the 
+
+ 
+66 In the applications for EANS I and EANS II funds, ED indicates that the SEA may use funds for these purposes for 
+students who received such assistance under GEER for the 2020-2021 school year, and only for the same assistance 
+provided to such students. This does not appear to be permitted by the statutory language (§321(e)(2)). For more 
+information, see ED, EANS I application, p. 6, and ED, EANS II application, p. 9. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+23 
+
+ 
+ link to page 11 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+public agency. All services or assistance provided, including equipment, material, and other 
+items, are required to be secular, neutral, and nonideological. 
+
+Under the EANS program as funded by the CRRSAA and the ARPA, private schools and their 
+students and teachers can benefit from the services and assistance provided. However, the 
+governor, not the private school, is the recipient of federal financial assistance and is responsible 
+for ensuring the SEA “administers the EANS program in accordance with applicable laws, 
+including civil rights laws.”67 In its nonregulatory guidance, ED states, “A non-public school 
+whose students and teachers receive services or assistance under the EANS program, even if such 
+services or assistance are delivered through reimbursement, is not a ‘recipient of Federal financial 
+assistance’.”68 Thus, according to ED’s interpretation of these laws and consistent with ED’s 
+interpretation of equitable service provisions in the ESEA,69 none of the equitable services 
+provided through the CARES Act (see subsequent discussion), CRRSAA, or ARPA result in a 
+nonpublic school being considered a recipient of federal financial assistance. 
+
+ Paycheck Protection Program 
+ As mentioned previously, a nonpublic school had to state in its application for services or 
+assistance whether it received a PPP loan prior to the enactment date of the CRRSAA and the 
+amount of the loan. In addition, to receive services or assistance under the EANS program, a 
+nonpublic school also had to provide an assurance that it did not and would not apply for a PPP 
+loan that is made on or after the enactment date of the CRRSAA. The receipt of a PPP loan prior 
+to the enactment date of the CRRSAA did not make a nonpublic school ineligible to receive 
+services and assistance under the EANS program. 
+
+ Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief 
+(ESSER) Fund 
+ Under the ESSER Fund, grants are provided to SEAs, which are then required to provide at least 
+90% of the funds received to LEAs to be used for myriad purposes such as any activity 
+authorized under various federal education laws, coordination of preparedness and response to the 
+COVID-19 emergency, technology acquisition, mental health services, and activities related to 
+summer learning. As shown i n Table 1 , t he ESSER Fund received an increasing amount of 
+appropriations under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA. The CARES Act provided $13.2 
+billion dollars for the ESSER Fund (ESSER I), the CRRSAA provided $54.3 billion for the 
+ESSER Fund (ESSER II), and the ARPA provided $122.8 billion for the ESSER Fund (ESSER 
+III)—for a total of $190.3 billion. Under ESSER I and ESSER II, the appropriated amount was 
+then allocated to states by formula. Under ESSER III, as discussed in the next section, the 
+
+ 
+67 U.S. Department of Education, Frequently Asked Questions: Emergency Assistance to Non-Public Schools (EANS) 
+Program as Authorized by the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act (CRRSAA), March 
+19, 2021, Item D-12, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/03/Final-EANS-FAQ-2.0-3.19.21.pdf (hereinafter referred to as 
+“U.S. Department of Education, FAQs: EANS Program”). 
+68 U.S. Department of Education, FAQs: EANS Program , Item D-12. 
+69 See, for example, U.S. Department of Education, Frequently Asked Questions—General Issues Related to Non-
+Public Schools , August 2019, Item 11, https://www2.ed.gov/about/inits/ed/non-public-education/files/onpe-faqs-
+aug2019.pdf. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+24 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+Secretary was required to reserve $800 million from the ESSER III appropriation for homeless 
+children and youth, leaving $122.0 billion to be allocated by formula to states. 
+
+ Reservation of ARPA ESSER Funds for Homeless Children and 
+Youth 
+ Under the ARPA, from the total appropriated for the ESSER Fund, the Secretary is required to 
+reserve $800 million to identify homeless children and youth and provide these youth with wrap-
+around services and assistance needed to attend school and fully participate in school activities.70 
+The statutory language does not address how these funds should be distributed to other entities to 
+meet the aforementioned uses of funds. The remaining $121,974,800,000 must be used to award 
+ESSER Fund grants to SEAs. Neither the CARES Act nor the CRRSAA included a similar 
+requirement. 
+
+Of the $800 million reserved for services and assistance to homeless children and youth, ED 
+reserved $1 million for national activities and provided the remaining funds to states71 in two 
+allocations.72 In April 2021, ED awarded 25% ($199,750,000) of the remaining funds to states. 
+The other 75% ($599,250,000) of the remaining funds was awarded to states following the 
+completion and approval of an application for funds that states were required to submit to ED in 
+July 2021.73 Each installment of funds was awarded based on the proportion of funds that each 
+state received under Title I-A of the ESEA for the prior fiscal year (i.e., FY2020) relative to all 
+states. 
+
+ State Grant Application 
+ This section discusses the application requirements that each SEA was required to meet under 
+ESSER I, ESSER II, and ESSER III to receive funding. 
+
+ ESSER I 
+
+Under ESSER I, the Secretary was required to make ESSER Fund grants available to each SEA 
+with an approved application. Similar to the GEER Fund grants, the Secretary was required to 
+issue a notice inviting states to apply for the grants within 30 days of enactment of the CARES 
+Act. Upon receipt of an application, the Secretary had 30 days to approve or deny it. The statutory 
+language did not provide for an appeals process for any state whose application was denied. 
+
+ 
+70 For more information on the uses of funds, see U.S. Department of Education, Frequently Asked ARP-HCY 
+Questions and Answers , 2021, https://oese.ed.gov/offices/american-rescue-plan/american-rescue-plan-elementary-
+secondary-school-emergency-relief-homeless-children-youth-arp-hcy/frequently-asked-arp-hcy-questions-and-answers/
+; Letter from Miguel A. Cardona, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, to Chief State School Officers, April 23, 
+2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/04/ARP-Homeless-DCL-4.23.pdf; and U.S. Department of Education, Application 
+for Funding under the American Rescue Plan Act Education for Homeless Children and Youth (ARP-HCY): Second 
+Disbursement (ARP Homeless II) , July 6, 2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/07/ARP-HCY-Application_FINAL_07-
+06-2021.docx. 
+
+71 For the purposes of this reservation of funds, states include the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 
+72 State grant amounts are available at U.S. Department of Education, “American Rescue Plan Supporting the Needs of 
+Homeless Children and Youth: Reservation from the Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief Fund,” July 
+2, 2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/07/Revised-Attachment-1-ARP-Homeless-I-II-Total-Allocations.docx. 
+
+73 U.S. Department of Education, Application for Funding under the American Rescue Plan Act Education for 
+Homeless Children and Youth (ARP-HCY): Second Disbursement (ARP Homeless II), July 6, 2021, 
+https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/07/ARP-HCY-Application_FINAL_07-06-2021.docx. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+25 
+
+ 
+ link to page 64 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+On April 23, 2020, in a letter to each state commissioner of education, ED announced the 
+availability of grants under the ESSER Fund and the opening of the application process.74 To 
+apply, each state had to complete a Certification and Agreement form.75 In the letter, ED indicated 
+that once a state submitted a completed Certification and Agreement form, ED would process the 
+application and obligate the funds within three business days. 
+
+The Certification and Agreement form required each state to provide programmatic, fiscal, and 
+reporting assurances. These included, for example, assurances related to the distribution of at 
+least 90% of the funds received to LEAs, and to the statutory requirement that LEAs provide 
+equitable services to students and teachers in nonpublic schools. Required assurances also 
+pertained to the provision of technical assistance to LEAs related to remote learning, and the use 
+of funds retained by the SEA. 
+
+The application further required the SEA to describe the information the SEA could request that 
+LEAs include in their subgrant applications. In addition, it required the SEA to specify the extent 
+to which the SEA intended to use funds reserved at the state level to support (1) technological 
+capacity and access to support remote learning and (2) remote learning by developing “new 
+informational and academic resources and expanding awareness of, and access to, best practices 
+and innovations in remote learning and support for students, families, and educators.”76 A 
+governor also had to include an assurance that the state would comply with the reporting 
+requirements included in Section 15011(b)(2) of Division B of the CARES Act (see the 
+ “Reporting Requirements” section) and submit quarterly reports to the Secretary containing such 
+information as the Secretary may reasonably require. For example, within 60 days of receipt of 
+funds, the SEA was required to provide ED with a report that includes a budget specifying how 
+the SEA would use funds reserved at the state level. 
+
+ ESSER II 
+
+Under ESSER II, the Secretary was required to award funds to each SEA with an approved 
+application for ESSER I within 30 days of enactment of the CRRSAA. All SEAs had an approved 
+application for ESSER I, so all SEAs were eligible to receive ESSER II funds without having to 
+complete an application. 
+
+ ESSER III 
+
+The ARPA did not require SEAs to have an approved application on file or to submit a new 
+application. The statutory language did not address the application process. In addition, it did not 
+establish any deadlines for when ED needed to allocate funds to SEAs. 
+
+In the absence of statutory language, ED made two-thirds of the ESSER III funds available for 
+grants to SEAs in March 2021. By accepting the funds, an SEA had to agree to submit a plan that 
+contained information that the Secretary may “reasonably require.” The plan had to be submitted 
+
+ 
+74 Letter from Betsy DeVos, Secretary of Education, to State Commissioner of Education, April 23, 2020, 
+https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/04/ESSER-Fund-Cover-Letter.pdf. 
+
+75 A copy of the Certification and Agreement form is available at https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/04/ESSERF-
+Certification-and-Agreement-2.pdf. 
+
+76 U.S. Department of Education, Certification and Agreement for Funding under the Education Stabilization Fund 
+Program Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief Fund (ESSER Fund) , April 2020, https://oese.ed.gov/
+files/2020/04/ESSERF-Certification-and-Agreement-2.pdf. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+26 
+
+ 
+ link to page 95 link to page 95 link to page 98 link to page 101 link to page 104 link to page 95 link to page 98 link to page 101 link to page 101 link to page 104 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+based on the timeline established by the Secretary for an SEA to receive the remaining one-third 
+of its ESSER III grant. 
+
+In April 2021, ED released the application that SEAs were required to complete as a condition of 
+receiving ESSER III funds.77 The application required an SEA to provide information on its 
+current status and needs, how the SEA would support LEAs in safely reopening schools and 
+sustaining the safe operation of schools, the SEA’s plans for consultation and for coordinating the 
+use of ESSER III funds with other resources to meet the needs of students, the SEA’s evidence-
+based strategies for maximizing the use of funds to support students, how the SEA would support 
+LEAs in developing high-quality plans for their use of ESSER III funds, strategies the SEA would 
+use to support and stabilize the educator workforce and make staffing decisions, and how the SEA 
+is building capacity at the SEA and LEA levels to ensure high-quality data collection and 
+reporting and to ensure funds are used for their intended purposes. The application also included 
+several required assurances, including those related to the uses of funds, maintenance of effort, 
+maintenance of equity, and civil rights protections. 
+
+ Formula Grants to SEAs 
+ ESSER Fund appropriations were awarded to states based on their relative shares of grants 
+awarded under Title I-A of the ESEA for the most recent fiscal year. The ESSER Fund state 
+grants calculated by ED under the CARES Act were based on FY2019 Title I-A grants. The 
+ESSER Fund state grants calculated by ED under the CRRSAA and ARPA were based on 
+FY2020 Title I-A grants (se e Appendix E ) . The ESEA requires that Title I-A grant amounts used 
+to determine other formula grants to states be calculated assuming no hold harmless provisions 
+are applied.78 Thus, ED calculated state grants for the ESSER Fund using Title I-A grants with no 
+hold harmless provisions applied. Because the underlying data used for calculating ESSER Fund 
+state grants under the CRRSAA and ARPA are more recent than the underlying data used by ED 
+in calculating ESSER Fund state grants under the CARES Act, some states’ shares of the 
+appropriations available for the ESSER Fund differ under each act. 
+
+ Table E-1 , Table E-2 , Table E-3 , a nd Table E-4 present actual state grant amounts under the 
+ESSER Fund as provided under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA, respectively . Table E-1 , 
+ Table E-2 , an d Table E-3 also show the amount of funds that states were required to reserve for 
+various purposes under each of the laws . Table E-3 also details the amount of funding that LEAs 
+were required to reserve for learning loss . Table E-4 provides a summary of state grant amounts 
+across the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA. 
+
+ Formula Grants to LEAs 
+ Under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA, each state is required to use at least 90% of the 
+funds received to make subgrants to LEAs in proportion to each LEA’s share of Title I-A grants 
+made to all LEAs in the state during the most recent fiscal year. The ESSER I grants to LEAs 
+
+ 
+77 For more information, see Letter from Miguel A. Cardona, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, to Chief State 
+School Officers, April 21, 2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/04/21-002903-ARP-application-DCL_FINAL.pdf, and 
+U.S. Department of Education, State Plan for the American Rescue Plan Elementary and Secondary School Emergency 
+Relief Fund , April 21, 2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/04/ARP-ESSER-State-Plan-Template-04-20-
+2021_130PM.pdf. 
+
+78 The requirement to determine state grants with no hold harmless provisions applied is in Section 1122(c)(3) of the 
+ESEA. For more information on Title I-A formulas, see CRS Report R44461, Allocation of Funds Under Title I-A of 
+the Elementary and Secondary Education Act . 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+27 
+
+ 
+ link to page 35 link to page 36 link to page 36 link to page 36 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+were calculated based on FY2019 Title I-A grants. The ESSER II and ESSER III grants to LEAs 
+were calculated based on FY2020 Title I-A grants. 
+
+The ARPA included a new requirement that an SEA must award grants to LEAs in an “expedited 
+and timely manner and, to the extent practicable, not later than 60 days” after the SEA received 
+the funds. Neither the CARES Act nor the CRRSAA included a similar requirement. 
+
+ Other State Reservations of Funds 
+ Under ESSER I and ESSER II, an SEA was permitted to reserve up to 10% of the funds received 
+for administration and for other state activities as determined by the SEA “to address issues 
+responding to coronavirus.” An SEA could reserve no more than 0.5% of the total grant amount 
+for administration. 
+
+While SEAs were permitted to reserve ESSER III funds for administration and other state 
+activities, there are additional requirements for the reservation of funds by the SEA. Under 
+ESSER III, SEAs were required to reserve at least 5% of the total grant award for activities to 
+address learning loss. SEAs also were required to reserve at least 1% of the total grant award for 
+evidence-based summer enrichment programs and at least 1% for “evidence-based 
+comprehensive” afterschool programs. Each SEA was permitted to reserve up to 0.5% of its total 
+grant award for administration. Any remaining funds could be used by the SEA for other state 
+activities as determined by the SEA to “address issues responding to coronavirus.” 
+
+For purposes of this report, it was assumed that SEAs would reserve the full 0.5% for 
+administration under each ESSER Fund enacted by the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA. 
+Under the CARES Act and CRRSAA, this would leave a maximum of 9.5% for other state 
+activities. Under the ARPA, this would leave a maximum of 2.5% for other state activities. Any 
+funds not used for administration could be used for other state activities. 
+
+The SEA grant reservation requirements and the allocation of funds to LEAs under the CARES 
+Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA are summarized i n Table 5 . 
+
+ Table 5. Summary of SEA Grant Reservation Requirements Under the ESSER Fund 
+
+ Included in the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ Percentage of Total SEA Grant Award to Be Reserved or 
+
+ 
+
+ Allocated by the SEA 
+
+ SEA Reservations and 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+Allocation of funds for grants to LEAs 
+
+At least 90.0% 
+
+At least 90.0% 
+
+At least 90.0 %a 
+
+Reservation of funds for other state 
+activiti esb 
+
+At most 9.5% 
+
+At most 9.5% 
+
+At most 2.5% 
+
+Reservation of funds for 
+administratio nb 
+
+At most 0.5% 
+
+At most 0.5% 
+
+At most 0.5% 
+
+Reservation of funds for activities to 
+address learning loss 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+At least 5.0% 
+
+Reservation of funds for summer 
+enrichment activities 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+At least 1.0% 
+
+Reservation of funds for afterschool 
+programs 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+At least 1.0% 
+
+ Total 
+
+ 100.0% 
+
+ 100.0% 
+
+ 100.0% 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+28 
+
+ 
+ link to page 37 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
+Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136); the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental 
+Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) included as Division M in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 
+(CAA; P.L. 116-260), and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2). 
+a. LEAs are required to reserve at least 20.0% of the funds received to address learning loss. 
+b. It was assumed that each state would reserve the ful 0.5% for administrative purposes. Any funds not used 
+
+for administrative purposes could be used for other state activities. 
+
+ LEA Plan to Return to In-Person Instruction 
+ The ARPA included a new requirement for LEAs receiving ARPA funds. Within 30 days of 
+receipt of such funds, an LEA was required to make publicly available on its website a plan for 
+the “safe return to in-person instruction and continuity of services.” Prior to making the plan 
+publicly available, the LEA must seek public comments on it and take such comments into 
+account in the development of the plan. Neither the CARES Act nor the CRRSAA included a 
+similar requirement. 
+
+ LEA Uses of Funds 
+ Funds provided to LEAs under the ESSER Fund can be used for a multitude of purposes. Under 
+the ARPA, however, LEAs must reserve at least 20% of their funds to address learning loss before 
+using funds for other activities. While both the CRRSAA and ARPA added additional uses of 
+funds to the uses of funds specified in the CARES Act, these additional uses were already 
+permissible under the CARES Act.79 For example, the CRRSAA and ARPA included statutory 
+language allowing ESSER funds for the following two purposes: 
+
+1. “School facility repairs and improvements to enable operation of schools to 
+
+reduce risk of virus transmission and exposure to environmental health hazards, 
+and to support student health needs.” 
+
+2. “Inspection, testing, maintenance, repair, replacement, and upgrade projects to 
+
+improve the indoor air quality in school facilities, including mechanical and non-
+mechanical heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems, filtering, 
+purification and other air cleaning, fans, control systems, and window and door 
+repair and replacement.” 
+
+While not included in the CARES Act statutory language, school facility repairs and 
+improvements and projects to improve the indoor air quality in school facilities also are allowable 
+uses of funds under the CARES Act. 
+
+ Table 6 provides a list of all authorized activities under each of the acts. The specific wording of 
+the uses of funds has been taken directly from statutory language (where applicable). 
+
+ 
+79 See, for example, U.S. Department of Education, Fact Sheet: Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief 
+Fund II, Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021, 2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/
+2021/01/Final_ESSERII_Factsheet_1.5.21.pdf. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+29 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Table 6. Allowable Uses of ESSER Funds by LEAs Under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, 
+
+ and ARPA 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+“Any activity authorized by the 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+Similar to the CARES Act, but does 
+
+ESEA of 1965, including the Native 
+
+not include a specific reference to 
+
+Hawaiian Education Act and the 
+
+the Native Hawaiian Education Act 
+
+Alaska Native Educational Equity, 
+
+and the Alaska Native Educational 
+
+Support, and Assistance Act (20 
+
+Equity, Support, and Assistance Act. 
+
+U.S.C. 6301 et seq.), the Individuals 
+
+These acts are included in the 
+
+with Disabilities Education Act (20 
+
+ESEA, so it is not a substantive 
+
+U.S.C. 1400 et seq.) (‘‘IDEA’’), the 
+
+change. However, using funds under 
+
+Adult Education and Family Literacy 
+
+Title VII-B of the McKinney-Vento 
+
+Act (20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq.), the 
+
+Homeless Assistance Act is no 
+
+Carl D. Perkins Career and 
+
+longer included in the list of uses of 
+
+Technical Education Act of 2006 
+
+funds. The ARPA, unlike the CARES 
+
+(20 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.) (‘‘the 
+
+Act or CRRSAA, requires the 
+
+Perkins Act’’), or subtitle B of title 
+
+Secretary to reserve $800 mil ion 
+
+VII of the McKinney-Vento 
+
+from the total ESSER appropriation 
+
+Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 
+
+for homeless children and youth. 
+
+11431 et seq.).” 
+
+“Coordination of preparedness and 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+response efforts of local educational 
+agencies with State, local, Tribal, 
+and territorial public health 
+Departments, and other relevant 
+agencies, to improve coordinated 
+responses among such entities to 
+prevent, prepare for, and respond 
+to coronavirus.” 
+
+“Providing principals and other 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+Not included in statutory language. 
+
+school leaders with the resources 
+necessary to address the needs of 
+their individual schools.” 
+
+“Activities to address the unique 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+needs of low-income children or 
+students, children with disabilities, 
+English learners, racial and ethnic 
+minorities, students experiencing 
+homelessness, and foster care 
+youth, including how outreach and 
+service delivery wil meet the needs 
+of each population.” 
+
+“Developing and implementing 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+procedures and systems to improve 
+the preparedness and response 
+efforts of local educational 
+agencies.” 
+
+“Training and professional 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+development for staff of the local 
+educational agency on sanitation 
+and minimizing the spread of 
+infectious diseases.” 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+30 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+“Purchasing supplies to sanitize and 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+clean the facilities of a local 
+educational agency, including 
+buildings operated by such agency.” 
+
+“Planning for and coordinating 
+
+Similar to the CARES Act: 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA. 
+
+during long-term closures, including 
+
+“Planning for, coordinating, and 
+
+for how to provide meals to eligible 
+
+implementing activities during long-
+
+students, how to provide 
+
+term closures, including providing 
+
+technology for online learning to all 
+
+meals to eligible students, providing 
+
+students, how to provide guidance 
+
+technology for online learning to all 
+
+for carrying out requirements 
+
+students, providing guidance for 
+
+under the Individuals with 
+
+carrying out requirements under 
+
+Disabilities Education Act (20 
+
+the IDEA and ensuring other 
+
+U.S.C. 1401 et seq.) and how to 
+
+educational services can continue to 
+
+ensure other educational services 
+
+be provided consistent with all 
+
+can continue to be provided 
+
+Federal, State, and local 
+
+consistent with all Federal, State, 
+
+requirements.” 
+
+and local requirements.” 
+
+“Purchasing educational technology 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+(including hardware, software, and 
+connectivity) for students who are 
+served by the local educational 
+agency that aids in regular and 
+substantive educational interaction 
+between students and their 
+classroom instructors, including 
+low-income students and students 
+with disabilities, which may include 
+assistive technology or adaptive 
+equipment.” 
+
+“Providing mental health services 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+Similar to the CARES Act: 
+
+and supports.” 
+
+“Providing mental health services 
+and supports, including through the 
+implementation of evidence-based 
+ful -service community schools.” 
+
+“Planning and implementing 
+
+Similar to the CARES Act. 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA. 
+
+activities related to summer 
+
+Changes the phrase “students with 
+
+learning and supplemental 
+
+disabilities” to “children with 
+
+afterschool programs, including 
+
+disabilities.” 
+
+providing classroom instruction or 
+online learning during the summer 
+
+ 
+
+months and addressing the needs of 
+low-income students, students with 
+disabilities, English learners, migrant 
+students, students experiencing 
+homelessness, and children in foster 
+care.” 
+
+“Other activities that are necessary 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+Same as the CARES Act. 
+
+to maintain the operation of and 
+continuity of services in local 
+educational agencies and continuing 
+to employ existing staff of the local 
+educational agency.” 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+31 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+Not included in statutory language. 
+
+“Addressing learning loss among 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA. 
+
+students, including low-income 
+students, children with disabilities, 
+English learners, racial and ethnic 
+minorities, students experiencing 
+homelessness, and children and 
+youth in foster care, of the local 
+educational agency, including by— 
+(A) Administering and using high-
+quality assessments that are valid 
+and reliable, to accurately assess 
+students’ academic progress and 
+assist educators in meeting 
+students’ academic needs, including 
+through differentiating instruction. 
+(B) Implementing evidence-based 
+activities to meet the 
+comprehensive needs of students. 
+(C) Providing information and 
+assistance to parents and families 
+on how they can effectively support 
+students, including in a distance 
+learning environment. 
+(D) Tracking student attendance 
+and improving student engagement 
+in distance education.” 
+
+Not included in statutory language. 
+
+“School facility repairs and 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA. 
+
+improvements to enable operation 
+of schools to reduce risk of virus 
+transmission and exposure to 
+environmental health hazards, and 
+to support student health needs.” 
+
+Not included in statutory language. 
+
+“Inspection, testing, maintenance, 
+
+Same as the CRRSAA. 
+
+repair, replacement, and upgrade 
+projects to improve the indoor air 
+
+quality in school facilities, including 
+mechanical and non-mechanical 
+heating, ventilation, and air 
+conditioning systems, filtering, 
+purification and other air cleaning, 
+fans, control systems, and window 
+and door repair and replacement.” 
+
+Not included in statutory language. 
+
+Not included in statutory language. 
+
+“Developing strategies and 
+implementing public health 
+protocols including, to the greatest 
+extent practicable, policies in line 
+with guidance from the Centers for 
+Disease Control and Prevention for 
+the reopening and operation of 
+school facilities to effectively 
+maintain the health and safety of 
+students, educators, and other 
+staff.” 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
+Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136); the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+32 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) included as Division M in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 
+(CAA; P.L. 116-260), and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2). 
+
+ Reallocation of Funds 
+ Under ESSER I, ESSER II, and ESSER III, any funds that a state does not award within one year 
+of receiving them must be returned to the Secretary. The Secretary is required to reallocate such 
+funds to the remaining states based on the formula used to provide the initial amounts. 
+
+ Equitable Services for Private School Students and 
+Teachers Under the CARES Act 
+ In addition to assistance available to nonpublic schools through the EANS program (see previous 
+discussion), the CARES Act included equitable services requirements that apply to funds received 
+by LEAs under the GEER I and the ESSER I. This section provides an overview of these 
+requirements and discusses the controversy related to them stemming from ED’s interpretation of 
+the statutory provisions. 
+
+Under the CARES Act, an LEA that received funds under the GEER Fund or the ESSER Fund is 
+subject to equitable services requirements. More specifically, LEAs receiving such funds are 
+required to provide equitable services to students and teachers in nonpublic schools, as 
+determined in consultation with representatives of nonpublic schools, in the same manner as 
+under Section 1117 of the ESEA. After reserving the required amount of funding to provide 
+services for nonpublic school students and teachers, the LEA is then required to provide services 
+that are equitable in comparison to services provided to public school students and teachers. 
+Services provided to nonpublic school students and teachers must be provided in a timely manner. 
+Such services, including materials and equipment, must be secular, neutral, and nonideological. 
+
+Under Section 1117 of the ESEA, an LEA’s determination of how much funding should be 
+reserved to serve nonpublic school students is based on the number of low-income students who 
+reside in the school attendance area of Title I-A public schools in the LEA, regardless of where 
+those children attend a nonpublic school (i.e., at a nonpublic school located inside or outside the 
+LEA). Funding provided to public schools under Title I-A is based on the percentage of low-
+income students enrolled in each school. The LEA in which the nonpublic school student resides 
+is responsible for providing services to students in the school that the nonpublic school student 
+attends, even if that school is in another LEA.80 The provision of Title I-A services is not limited 
+to low-income public school or nonpublic school students.81 
+
+ 
+80 An LEA can also provide equitable services to eligible students attending a private school that is part of a group of 
+private schools by pooling the Title I-A funds that were generated by students from low-income families who reside in 
+participating Title I-A public school attendance areas and attend a private school that is part of the group of private 
+schools for which funds are being pooled. For more information, see U.S. Department of Education, Title I, Part A of 
+the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as Amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act: Updated Non-
+Regulatory Guidance , October 7, 2019, Items B-8 and B-9, https://www2.ed.gov/about/inits/ed/non-public-education/
+files/equitable-services-guidance-100419.pdf. 
+
+81 With respect to private school students, “in general, to be eligible for Title I services, a private school child must 
+reside in a participating Title I public school attendance area and must be identified by the LEA as low achieving on the 
+basis of multiple, educationally related, objective criteria” (ibid., Item C-1). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+33 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ED’s initial interpretation of this provision indicated that only a portion of the Section 1117 
+provisions applied. Nonbinding guidance from ED82 indicated that the determination of the share 
+of funds available to serve nonpublic school students from GEER Fund and ESSER Fund grants 
+received by LEAs should be based on total enrollment in nonpublic schools located in the LEA. 
+The guidance explained that all public school students in the LEA are eligible to be served under 
+the GEER Fund and ESSER Fund. That is, the programs are not limited to serving low-income 
+public school students, so the required equitable services should not be limited to low-income 
+nonpublic school students. In practice, this means that LEAs would determine the amount of 
+funding to reserve to provide services to nonpublic school students and teachers based on the total 
+number of nonpublic school students enrolled in the LEA relative to total public and nonpublic 
+school enrollment. For some LEAs, this may result in them reserving a substantially larger 
+percentage of the funds they received under the GEER Fund or ESSER Fund than they would 
+have reserved if the calculation had been based only on the number of eligible low-income 
+nonpublic school students relative to the total number of eligible low-income nonpublic and 
+public school students.83 
+
+Some Members of Congress indicated that they did not agree that the guidance issued by ED 
+reflects congressional intent. For example, former Senator Lamar Alexander, then-Chair of the 
+Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, stated that he thought, and he 
+believed that most Members also thought, that LEAs would reserve funds to serve nonpublic 
+school students and teachers in the same way that they are reserved under Title I-A. However, he 
+did not say that Secretary DeVos had exceeded any boundaries in issuing the guidance nor did he 
+commit to overturning the guidance, which does not have the force of law.84 In addition, several 
+Democratic Members sent a letter to Secretary DeVos indicating that they did not believe that the 
+ED guidance reflects congressional intent.85 The letter argued that the CARES Act’s reference to 
+the equitable services provision in Section 1117 of the ESEA requires the determination of how 
+much funding should be reserved to serve students and teachers in nonpublic schools to be made 
+based on the number of nonpublic school students who would be included in the count of students 
+used to determine funding for equitable services under Title I-A of the ESEA (i.e., low-income 
+nonpublic school students) rather than based on the count of all students attending nonpublic 
+schools in the LEA. 
+
+The letter further stated that if Congress had wanted to have funding determined based on the 
+number of students attending all nonpublic schools and have LEAs serve teachers and students 
+attending all nonpublic schools located in the LEA, it could have cited the equitable services 
+
+ 
+82 ED has removed the guidance from its website, as the guidance does not match the interim final rule that ED 
+published in July. The guidance is available to congressional clients from the authors of this report upon request. 
+
+83 See, for example, Letter from Carissa Moffat Miller, Executive Director, Council of Chief State School Officers, to 
+Secretary Betsy DeVos, Secretary of Education, May 5, 2020, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&
+source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwj73ZLI1cfpAhWRgnIEHZugAZoQFjAAegQIBBAB&url=
+https%3A%2F%2Fccsso.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2F2020-05%2FDeVosESLetter050520.pdf&usg=
+AOvVaw2GJDElYRfzHpWo8Udl7QSC. 
+
+84 Andrew Ujifusa, “Sen. Alexander Splits From Betsy DeVos on COVID-19 Aid to Help Private Schools,” Education 
+Week , May 21, 2021, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2020/05/alexander-devos-COVID-aid-private-
+schools-CDC-reopening.html. 
+
+85 Letter from Representative Robert C. “Bobby” Scott, Chair, Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of 
+Representatives; Representative Rosa L. DeLauro, Chair, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Health and 
+Human Services, Labor, and Education and Other Related Services, U.S. House of Representatives; and Senator Patty 
+Murray, Ranking Member, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, U.S. Senate, to The Honorable 
+Betsy DeVos, Secretary of Education, May 20, 2020, https://edlabor.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2020-5-
+20%20Ltr%20to%20DeVos%20re%20Equitable%20Services.pdf. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+34 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+provisions included in ESEA Section 8501 rather than Section 1117. Under the Section 8501 
+provision, all nonpublic school students who are eligible to be served by the relevant program are 
+included in the count used to determine the amount of funding that should be reserved to serve 
+nonpublic school students and teachers. In addition, under Section 8501 the determination of 
+eligible nonpublic school students is based on the number of eligible nonpublic school students 
+attending nonpublic schools in the LEA. 
+
+On July 1, 2020, ED published an interim final rule (IFR) providing LEAs with three options for 
+implementing the equitable services provision.86 (ED also removed the prior guidance from its 
+website.) Under one option, an LEA could determine the proportional share based on enrollment 
+in participating nonpublic elementary and secondary schools in the LEA compared to the total 
+enrollment in public and participating nonpublic elementary and secondary schools in the LEA 
+(total enrollment option). 
+
+The remaining options included in the IFR were available to LEAs only if they agreed to use the 
+funds available for public education exclusively to serve students and teachers in public Title I-A 
+schools. If this condition was met, an LEA could determine the share of funds to be reserved to 
+serve students and teachers in nonpublic schools by either (1) using the proportional share of Title 
+I-A funds calculated by the LEA under Section 1117(a)(4)(A) of the ESEA for school year 2019-
+2020, or (2) determining the number of children ages 5-17 who are from low-income families and 
+attend each nonpublic school in the LEA that would be participating in a CARES Act program 
+compared to the total number of children ages 5-17 who are from low-income families in Title I-
+A schools and participating nonpublic elementary and secondary schools in the LEA. In addition, 
+if an LEA chose to implement one of these two options, it was required comply with the 
+supplement not supplant requirement included in Section 1118(b) of the ESEA.87 Among other 
+things, this requirement prohibited the LEA from allocating CARES Act funds to Title I-A 
+schools and then redirecting state or local funds to non-Title I-A schools. 
+
+The IFR was subsequently challenged in four U.S. district courts.88 On September 4, 2020, in 
+ National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Elisabeth D. DeVos , the U.S. 
+District Court for the District of Columbia issued an opinion89 and an order90 vacating the IFR. 
+ED did not appeal the rulings. In revised guidance following the court rulings, ED indicated that 
+
+ 
+86 U.S. Department of Education, “CARES Act Programs; Equitable Services to Students and Teachers in Non-Public 
+Schools,” 85 Federal Register 39479-39488, July 1, 2020. 
+87 The CARES Act did not apply a supplement not supplant requirement to either the GEER Fund or the ESSER Fund. 
+For more information about the Title I-A supplement not supplant requirement, see CRS In Focus IF10405, Fiscal 
+Accountability Requirements That Apply to Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) . 
+
+88 See Washington v. DeVos, No. 2:20-cv-1119-BJR, 2020 WL 5079038 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2020) (granting 
+preliminary injunction against the Department); Michigan v. DeVos, No. 3:20-cv-4478-JD, 2020 WL 5074397 (N.D. 
+Cal. Aug. 26, 2020) (granting preliminary injunction against the Department); NAACP v. DeVos, No. 20-cv-1996 
+(DLF), 2020 WL 5291406 (D. D.C. Sept. 4, 2020) (vacating the IFR); and Council of Parent Attorneys & Advocates, 
+Inc. v. DeVos, No. 1:20-cv-2310-GLR (D. Md.); U.S. Department of Education, Providing Equitable Services to 
+Students and Teachers in Non-Public Schools Under the CARES Act Programs , October 9, 2020, p. ii, 
+https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/10/Providing-Equitable-Services-under-the-CARES-Act-Programs-Update-10-9-
+2020.pdf (hereinafter referred to as “U.S. Department of Education, Providing Equitable Services Under the CARES 
+Act Programs .”) 
+
+89 Memorandum Opinion, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Elisabeth D. DeVos , No. 20-
+cv-1996 (DLF) (United States District Court for the District of Columbia 2020), September 4, 2020, 
+https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/09/NAACP-v-DeVos-DDC_Opinion-Granting-Partial-Summary-Judgment.pdf. 
+
+90 Order, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Elisabeth D. DeVos , No. 20-cv-1996 (DLF) 
+(United States District Court for the District of Columbia 2020), September 4, 2020, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/09/
+NAACP-v-DeVos-DDC_Order-granting-Partial-SJ-09-04-2020.pdf. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+35 
+
+ 
+ link to page 11 link to page 44 link to page 11 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+LEAs must calculate the proportional share for equitable services using the formula included in 
+ESEA Section 1117.91 In determining the proportional share, LEAs may use the proportional 
+share calculated for Title I-A purposes from either school year 2019-2020 or school year 2020-
+2021. However, unlike the requirements of Section 1117, ED determined that the LEA in which a 
+nonpublic school is located should provide the equitable services, which is similar to the 
+provision of services under ESEA Title VIII-F-1.92 
+
+ Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF) 
+ The HEERF provides funds to IHEs to address needs related to the COVID-19 emergency. IHEs 
+may variously use awards to provide grant aid to students, support the transition to distance 
+education, defray institutional expenses incurred as a result of the emergency, and provide support 
+services to students. 
+
+As shown i n Table 1 , the HEERF has received increasing levels of appropriations under each of 
+the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA. The CARES Act provided $13.9 billion for the HEERF 
+(HEERF I), the CRRSAA provided $22.7 billion (HEERF II), and the ARPA provided $39.6 
+billion (HEERF III). The amounts available for the HEERF are awarded to IHEs through three 
+types of programs: (1) direct grants to IHEs; (2) the minority serving institutions (MSIs) 
+programs authorized under Title III-A, Title III-B, Title V-A, and Title VII-A-4 of the Higher 
+Education Act (HEA);93 and (3) the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education 
+(FIPSE) authorized under HEA Title VII-B. The reservation of funds for the three types of 
+programs, the allocation of funds within the three types of programs, application requirements, 
+and allowable uses of funds differ between each of HEERF I, HEERF II, and HEERF III. This 
+section provides an overview of the statutory requirements and secretarial discretion exercised 
+under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA. 
+
+The reservation requirements for the three types of programs within the HEERF under the 
+CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA are summarized i n Table 7 . The funds represented by each 
+reservation are also displayed. The CRRSAA required that ED augment the reservation for direct 
+grants to public and private nonprofit IHEs under CRRSAA with CARES Act HEERF direct 
+grant funds and Safe Schools and Citizenship Education funds that were unobligated as of the 
+date of enactment of CRRSAA.94 As a consequence, an additional $317.8 million was repurposed 
+from the CARES Act to the CRRSAA reservation for direct grants to public and private nonprofit 
+IHEs.95 The repurposed funds are not reflected i n Table 1 . Actual amounts distributed to IHEs 
+under each program will differ. 
+
+ 
+91 U.S. Department of Education, Providing Equitable Services Under the CARES Act Programs , Item 10. 
+92 U.S. Department of Education, Providing Equitable Services Under the CARES Act Programs , Item 4. 
+93 For more information on Programs for Minority Serving Institutions, see CRS Report R43237, Programs for 
+Minority-Serving Institutions Under the Higher Education Act . 
+
+94 The CARES Act provided $100,000,000 under the Safe Schools and Citizenship Education account to prevent, 
+prepare for, and respond to COVID-19, by supplementing funds otherwise available for Project School Emergency 
+Response to Violence (SERV). Project SERV funds short-term and long-term education-related services for LEAs and 
+IHEs to help them recover from a violent or traumatic event in which the learning environment has been disrupted. 
+Such funds that were previously designated by Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to the Balanced Budget 
+and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 are designated by Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to 
+Section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 
+
+95 U.S. Department of Education, HEERF II: Institutional Portion for Public and Nonprofit Institutions (a)(1), 
+Methodology for Calculating Allocations, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/heerfiiinstitutional.html. Such 
+repurposed funds are designated as an emergency requirement pursuant to Section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Balanced 
+Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+36 
+
+ 
+ link to page 44 link to page 44 link to page 44 
+
+ Table 7. Reservations of Funds Under the HEERF as Provided by the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ Total 
+
+ Required 
+
+ Required 
+
+ Required 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Amount 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Amount 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Amount 
+
+ Amount 
+
+Direct Grants to Institutions of Higher 
+
+90.0% 
+
+$12,557,255 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$12,557,255 
+
+Education (IHEs): public, private nonprofit, 
+and proprietary IHEs and postsecondary 
+vocational institutions 
+
+Direct Grants to IHEs: public and private 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+89.0% 
+
+$20,518,30 2a 
+
+91.0% 
+
+$36,021,959 
+
+$56,540,261 
+
+nonprofit IHEs and postsecondary vocational 
+institutions 
+
+Direct Grants to IHEs: proprietary IHEs 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+3.0% 
+
+$680,914 
+
+1.0% 
+
+$395,846 
+
+$1,076,760 
+
+ Subtotal for Direct Grants to IHEs 
+
+— 
+
+$12,557,255 
+
+— 
+
+$21,199,21 6a 
+
+— 
+
+$36,417,804 
+
+$70,174,275 
+
+Programs for Minority Serving Institutions 
+
+7.5% 
+
+$1,046,438 
+
+7.5% 
+
+$1,702,285 
+
+7.5% 
+
+$2,968,843 
+
+$5,717,566 
+
+Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary 
+
+2.5% 
+
+$348,813 
+
+0.5% 
+
+$113,486 
+
+0.5% 
+
+$197,923 
+
+$660,221 
+
+Education 
+
+ Total Funding 
+
+100.0% 
+
+$13,952,505 
+
+100.0% 
+
+$23,014,98 7a 
+
+100.0% 
+
+$39,584,570 
+
+$76,552,062 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136); the 
+Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) included as Division M in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (CAA; P.L. 
+116-260), the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2); and U.S. Department of Education documentation. 
+ Note: Details many not add to totals due to rounding. NA: not applicable. 
+a. This amount includes an additional $317,851,129 of designated CARES Act funds that were unobligated as of December 27, 2020, in accordance with the CRRSAA. 
+
+U.S. Department of Education, HEERF II: Institutional Portion for Public and Nonprofit Institutions (a)(1), Methodology for Calculating Allocations, 
+https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/heerfi institutional.html. 
+
+ 
+
+CRS-37 
+
+ 
+ link to page 45 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Direct Grants 
+ The HEERF direct grants were allocated to public, private nonprofit, and proprietary IHEs and 
+postsecondary vocational institutions, as defined in Section 102 of the HEA,96 based on the 
+enrollment of Pell Grant recipients and students who were not Pell Grant recipients who were and 
+ were not enrolled exclusively in distance education prior to the COVID-19 emergency.97 The 
+specific formula factors and associated weights under the formula for the CARES Act, CRRSAA, 
+and ARPA are shown i n Table 8 . 
+
+ Table 8. Percentage of Funds Allocated by Each Formula Factor For the HEERF 
+
+ Direct Grants to IHEs Under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ Formula Factor 
+
+ Percentage of Appropriation 
+
+Ful -time equivalent (FTE) enrol ment of Pell Grant 
+
+75.0% 
+
+37.5% 
+
+37.5% 
+
+recipients who were not enrol ed exclusively in distance 
+education prior to the COVID-19 emergency, relative to 
+the total FTE enrol ment of such individuals in all eligible 
+institutions of higher education (IHEs). 
+
+12-month unduplicated headcount of Pell Grant recipients 
+
+NA 
+
+37.5% 
+
+37.5% 
+
+who were not enrol ed exclusively in distance education 
+prior to the COVID-19 emergency, relative to the total 
+unduplicated headcount of such individuals in all eligible 
+IHEs. 
+
+FTE enrol ment of students who were not Pell Grant 
+
+25.0% 
+
+11.5% 
+
+11.5% 
+
+recipients and were not enrol ed exclusively in distance 
+
+education prior to the COVID-19 emergency, relative to 
+the total FTE enrol ment of such individuals in all eligible 
+IHEs. 
+
+12-month unduplicated headcount of students who were 
+
+NA 
+
+11.5% 
+
+11.5% 
+
+not Pell Grant recipients and were not enrol ed exclusively 
+in distance education prior to the COVID-19 emergency, 
+relative to the total unduplicated headcount of such 
+individuals in all eligible IHEs. 
+
+FTE enrol ment of Pell Grant recipients who were 
+
+NA 
+
+1.0% 
+
+1.0% 
+
+enrol ed exclusively in distance education prior to the 
+COVID-19 emergency, relative to the total FTE 
+enrol ment of such individuals in all eligible IHEs. 
+
+12-month unduplicated headcount of Pell Grant recipients 
+
+NA 
+
+1.0% 
+
+1.0% 
+
+who were enrol ed exclusively in distance education prior 
+to the COVID-19 emergency, relative to the total 
+unduplicated headcount of such individuals in all eligible 
+IHEs. 
+
+ Total 
+
+ 100.0% 
+
+ 100.0% 
+
+ 100.0% 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
+Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136); the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental 
+
+ 
+96 IHEs outside the United States, as defined in HEA Section 102(a)(2), are excluded. 
+97 For a description of the Pell Grant program, see CRS Report R45418, Federal Pell Grant Program of the Higher 
+Education Act: Primer . 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+38 
+
+ 
+ link to page 108 link to page 108 link to page 110 link to page 113 link to page 113 link to page 116 link to page 119 link to page 119 link to page 46 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) included as Division M in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 
+(CAA; P.L. 116-260), and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2). 
+ Notes: NA: not applicable. 
+
+Although not required by the statutory provisions, ED reserved $50 million of the CARES Act 
+HEERF funds for direct grants for institutions that may have been eligible for an allocation but 
+may have been excluded from the original estimates.98 ED did not reserve funds for such a 
+purpose from the CRRSAA or ARPA. 
+
+ Appendix F presents estimated IHE allocations aggregated at the institutional sector level (e.g., 
+public two-year) and state level for the HEERF direct grants, as funded under the CARES Act, 
+CRRSAA, ARPA, and all of the acts combined. Actual amounts awarded to IHEs may differ as 
+IHEs must apply and/or agree to accept the terms and conditions of the awards. Specifically, 
+ Table F-1 displays IHE allocations aggregated at the institutional sector level; Table F-2 , Table 
+F-3 , and Table F-4 show the IHE allocations aggregated at the state level for each act; and Table 
+F-5 provides a summary of IHE allocations aggregated at the state level across the CARES Act, 
+CRRSAA, and ARPA. 
+
+ Minority Serving Institutions Programs 
+ The HEA authorizes several grant programs to assist IHEs that serve high concentrations of 
+minority and/or financially needy students. These programs are collectively known as the MSI 
+programs. Under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA, the HEERF MSI funds were to be 
+allocated to the MSI programs authorized under HEA Titles III-A, III-B, V-A, V-B, and VII-A-4 
+according to each program’s proportional share of funds allocated under the Further Consolidated 
+Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94).99 The actual reservations of funds for each of the select 
+MSI programs within the HEERF under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA are summarized 
+in Table 9 . 
+
+ Table 9. Actual Reservations of Funds for the MSI Programs Under HEERF of the 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+Programs sorted in order of statutory authority 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ CARES 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ Total 
+
+Strengthening Institutions Program (HEA, Title III-A) 
+
+$148,591 
+
+$241,719 
+
+$421,565 
+
+$811,874 
+
+Strengthening American Indian Tribally Control ed 
+
+$50,469 
+
+$82,101 
+
+$143,186 
+
+$275,756 
+
+Col eges and Universities (HEA, Title III-A) 
+
+Strengthening Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian-
+
+$25,239 
+
+$41,058 
+
+$71,607 
+
+$137,904 
+
+Serving Institutions (HEA, Title III-A) 
+
+Strengthening Predominantly Black Institutions (HEA, 
+
+$18,182 
+
+$29,577 
+
+$51,583 
+
+$99,341 
+
+Title III-A) 
+
+ 
+
+Strengthening Native American-Serving, Nontribal 
+
+$6,123 
+
+$9,960 
+
+$17,370 
+
+$33,452 
+
+Institutions (HEA, Title III-A) 
+
+ 
+98 U.S. Department of Education, “Methodology for Calculating Allocations per Section 18004(a)(1) of the CARES 
+Act,” available at https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/heerf90percentformulaallocationexplanation.pdf. 
+
+99 In FY2020, the Minority Science and Engineering Improvement Program (MSEIP) authorized under HEA Title III-E 
+received $12.8 million in discretionary appropriations. The CARES Act does not authorize the Secretary to allocate 
+funds to the MSEIP. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+39 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ Total 
+
+Strengthening Asian American and Native American 
+
+$6,123 
+
+$9,960 
+
+$17,370 
+
+$33,452 
+
+Pacific Islander-Serving Institutions (HEA, Title III-A) 
+
+Strengthening Historically Black Col eges and 
+
+$447,466 
+
+$727,912 
+
+$1,269,503 
+
+$2,444,881 
+
+Universities (HBCUs) (HEA, Title III-B) 
+
+Strengthening Historically Black Graduate Institutions 
+
+$115,720 
+
+$188,247 
+
+$328,308 
+
+$632,275 
+
+(HEA, Title III-B) 
+
+Developing Hispanic-Serving Institutions (HEA, Title 
+
+$197,123 
+
+$320,668 
+
+$559,256 
+
+$1,077,047 
+
+V-A) 
+
+Promoting Postbaccalaureate Opportunities for 
+
+$17,687 
+
+$28,772 
+
+$50,179 
+
+$96,638 
+
+Hispanic Americans (HEA, Title V-B) 
+
+Masters Degrees at HBCUs (HEA, Title VII-A-4) 
+
+$13,716 
+
+$22,313 
+
+$38,915 
+
+$74,944 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $1,046,438 $1,702,285 $2,968,843 $5,717,566 
+
+ Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on allocation data published by the U.S. 
+Department of Education (ED), Formula Allocations for Section 18004 of the CARES Act, https://www2.ed.gov/
+about/offices/list/ope/caresact.html as of May 22, 2020, and ED allocation data for Section 314(a)(2) of the 
+CRRSAA, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/crrsaa.html as of July 14, 2021; and ED, “U.S. Department of 
+Education Announces $3.2 Bil ion in Additional Higher Education Emergency Relief Funds to Support Students at 
+Historic and Under-Resourced Institutions,” press release, July 29, 2021. 
+
+The allocation of funds to IHEs within some MSI programs under the CARES Act differs from 
+that under the CRRSAA and ARPA. The CARES Act does not specify how program funds should 
+be distributed among IHEs eligible to participate in the MSI programs. Generally, the Secretary 
+allocated funds within each MSI program using the same formula established to distribute the 
+direct grants to IHEs. 
+
+Under the CRRSAA and ARPA, most of the grants within each MSI program were to be allocated 
+in general accordance with the direct grants formula—with several exceptions, as follows: 
+
+ Funds for the Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) program 
+
+and Master’s Degree Programs at HBCUs were to be allocated as follows: 70% 
+in accordance with each IHE’s 12-month unduplicated headcount of students 
+who were Pell Grant recipients, relative to the total unduplicated headcount of 
+such individuals at all eligible HBCUs; 20% in accordance with each IHE’s 12-
+month unduplicated headcount of all students relative to the total unduplicated 
+headcount of such individuals at all eligible HBCUs; and 10% in accordance with 
+each IHE’s inverse share of total endowments.100 In order to implement the 
+inverse share of total endowments, ED issued regulations to treat an institution 
+that has a total endowment of $0-$1.0 million as having an endowment of $1.0 
+million.101 Under the ARPA, institutions with endowments of less than $1.0 
+million, including $0 endowments, were adjusted to $1.0 million before 
+calculating the inverse endowment share. 
+
+ 
+100 The inverse share of total endowments is the ratio of total endowment size at all eligible institutions to the 
+endowment size at each such institution. 
+
+101 U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Calculation of the Endowment Factor for 
+Allocations to Historically Black Colleges and Universities Under Section 314(a)(2)(A) of the Coronavirus Response 
+and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021,” 86 Federal Register 21190-21195, April 22, 2021. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+40 
+
+ 
+ link to page 108 link to page 108 link to page 110 link to page 113 link to page 113 link to page 116 link to page 119 link to page 119 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Funds for the Historically Black Graduate Institutions (HBGIs) program were to 
+
+be allocated to eligible IHEs in accordance with each such IHE’s share of the 
+program’s FY2020 appropriation. 
+
+ Funds for the Tribally Controlled Colleges and Universities (TCCUs) program 
+
+were to be allocated to eligible IHEs in accordance with the HEA TCCU program 
+formula. 
+
+ Appendix F presents estimated IHE allocations aggregated at the institutional sector level (e.g., 
+public two-year) and state level for the HEERF MSI programs, as funded under the CARES Act, 
+CRRSAA, ARPA, and all of the acts combined. Actual amounts awarded to IHEs may differ as 
+IHEs must apply and/or agree to accept the terms and conditions of the awards. Specifically, 
+ Table F-1 displays IHE allocations aggregated at the institutional sector level; Table F-2 , Table 
+F-3 , and Table F-4 show the IHE allocations aggregated at the state level for each act; and Table 
+F-5 provides a summary of IHE allocations aggregated at the state level across the CARES Act, 
+CRRSAA, and ARPA. 
+
+ Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education 
+ FIPSE authorizes the Secretary to make awards to public and private nonprofit IHEs to promote 
+innovation and improvement in postsecondary education. The CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+direct the Secretary to allocate FIPSE funds to IHEs that the Secretary determines to “have the 
+greatest unmet needs related to coronavirus.” 
+
+Under the CARES Act, the Secretary is required to give priority to IHEs that do not otherwise 
+receive grants of at least $500,000 through the HEERF. The Secretary allocated sufficient funds 
+for each eligible IHE to receive at least $500,000 through their combined allocations under the 
+HEERF direct grants, MSI programs, and FIPSE under the CARES Act. Of the $348.8 million 
+available for awards under FIPSE I, $320.6 million was allocated to raise all public and private 
+nonprofit IHEs up to the $500,000 level.102 These grants are referred to as the CARES Act FIPSE 
+Formula Grants. 
+
+The CARES Act does not establish additional eligibility criteria for the disbursal of FIPSE funds. 
+To award the remaining (originally estimated at approximately $28.2 million) CARES Act FIPSE 
+funds, ED invited applications under the competitive Institutional Resilience and Expanded 
+Postsecondary Opportunity (IREPO) Grants program.103 To be eligible, public and private 
+nonprofit IHEs or consortia of such IHEs must demonstrate the greatest unmet need by having 
+greater than 30% Pell Grant recipient enrollment among full-time students prior to March 13, 
+2020, and/or by being underserved by other CARES Act programs. An IHE may have been 
+underserved by other CARES Act programs because it did not receive a loan under the Paycheck 
+Protection Program, and/or it serves large numbers of part-time students relative to IHEs of 
+similar total enrollment, and it had other unmet needs due to the COVID-19 emergency. 
+Applicants were required to propose projects to enable them to resume operations, serve the 
+needs of students, reduce disease transmission, and/or implement safe and effective instructional 
+
+ 
+102 U.S. Department of Education, Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund- FIPSE, Methodology for Calculating 
+Allocations, available at https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/heerffipse.html. 
+
+103 Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Applications for New Awards; Institutional 
+Resilience and Expanded Postsecondary Opportunity Grants Program,” 85 Federal Register 51685-51692, August 21, 
+2020. Applications were due October 20, 2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+41 
+
+ 
+ link to page 49 link to page 50 link to page 50 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+delivery models. Despite the original estimate of $28.2 million, ED awarded $112.5 million in 
+CARES Act IREPO grants in July 2021.104 
+
+The CRRSAA and ARPA establish that FIPSE funds be granted to IHEs that the Secretary 
+determines have, after allocating other HEERF II and HEERF III funds, respectively, the 
+“greatest unmet needs related to coronavirus,” including IHEs with large populations of graduate 
+students and IHEs that did not otherwise receive an allocation under HEERF II. 
+
+To award the FIPSE funds under the CRRSAA, the Secretary issued an invitation for applications 
+for Supplemental Assistance to Institutions of Higher Education (SAIHE).105 To be eligible, an 
+IHE had to meet one of the seven absolute priorities established by ED. The Secretary indicated 
+that funds would be allocated to each priority depending on the number of applicants and award 
+amounts will be determined by a formula specific to each priority. The CRRSAA SAIHE 
+institutional eligibility requirements and formula allocation methodology is outlined i n Table 10 . 
+ In July 2021, ED announced the award of more than $113 million to 110 IHEs under the 
+CRRSAA SAIHE program.106 
+
+ Table 10. CRRSAA SAIHE Eligibility and Formula Allocation Methodology 
+
+ Absolute 
+
+ Public or Private Nonprofit IHE 
+
+ Priority 
+
+ Eligibility Requirements 
+
+ Formula Allocation Methodology 
+
+1 
+
+Designated as eligible for at least one of the MSI 
+
+Based on the methodology used for CRRSAA 
+
+programs authorized under HEA Titles III and V 
+
+MSI program allocations. 
+
+after ED made the initial CRRSAA MSI 
+allocations. 
+
+2 
+
+Eligible for but did not receive a CRRSAA direct Based on the methodology used for CRRSAA 
+grant because it did not report academic year 
+
+direct grants, but institutional data from the 
+
+2018-2019 enrol ment data to ED’s Integrated 
+
+application. 
+
+Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). 
+
+3 
+
+Eligible for but did not receive a CARES Act 
+
+Based on the amount an applicant would have 
+
+direct grant because it tried but failed to 
+
+received under the CARES Act direct grant 
+
+successful y apply by the deadline. 
+
+program. 
+
+4 
+
+HEA Title III or Title V-eligible branch campus 
+
+Based on the methodology used for CRRSAA 
+
+that was not funded directly or indirectly 
+
+MSI program allocations. 
+
+through the CRRSAA MSI programs because ED 
+did not have the requisite data to calculate an 
+allocatio n.a 
+
+5 
+
+Merged after December 27, 2020, or had a 
+
+Based on the methodology used for CRRSAA 
+
+recent change to its HEA Title IV Program 
+
+direct grants, but institutional data from the 
+
+Participation Agreement (PPA) effective date 
+
+application, while taking into account any funds 
+
+resulting in the institution being underfunded 
+
+already received under a CRRSAA direct grant. 
+
+under the CRRSAA direct grant progr am.b 
+
+ 
+104 The difference between the original estimate and actual awards might reflect FIPSE formula funds that were not 
+accepted by institutions. U.S. Department of Education, “All successful applicants awarded the IREPO Grant,” 
+https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/caresirepoallocationtable.pdf. 
+
+105 U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Applications for New Awards; Fund for the 
+Improvement of Postsecondary Education-Supplemental Assistance to Institutions of Higher Education (SAIHE),” 86 
+Federal Register 16338-16342, March 29, 2021. 
+
+106 U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “U.S. Department of Education Announces $3.2 
+Billion in Additional Higher Education Emergency Relief Funds to Support Students at Historic and Under-Resourced 
+Institutions, press release, July 29, 2021, https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-announces-
+32-billion-additional-higher-education-emergency-relief-funds-support-students-historic-and-under-resourced-
+institutions. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+42 
+
+ 
+ link to page 108 link to page 108 link to page 110 link to page 119 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Absolute 
+
+ Public or Private Nonprofit IHE 
+
+ Priority 
+
+ Eligibility Requirements 
+
+ Formula Allocation Methodology 
+
+6 
+
+Community col ege or IHE located in a rural 
+
+An amount per Pell Grant recipient, as 
+
+setting. In addition, the IHE must have a fall 
+
+established by ED based on all the applications 
+
+2018 undergraduate enrol ment of at least 50% 
+
+received under this priority. 
+
+Pell Grant recipients and an enrol ment decline 
+of at least 4.5%. 
+
+7 
+
+Student population of at least 90% graduate 
+
+Based on the number of graduate students 
+
+students. 
+
+enrol ed at the institution and reported on the 
+application. 
+
+ Source: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Applications for New Awards; Fund 
+for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education-Supplemental Assistance to Institutions of Higher Education 
+(SAIHE),” 86 Federal Register 16338-16342, March 29, 2021. 
+a. The relevant HEA Title III and Title V-eligible institutions are as listed in ED’s FY 2021 Eligibility Matrix 
+
+available at https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/idues/2021eligibilitymatrix.xlsx. 
+
+b. Each IHE that wants to participate in the HEA Title IV student aid programs is required to have a current 
+
+PPA with ED. The PPA lists the date on which the PPA expires and the date on which the IHE must reapply 
+for participation. 
+
+ 
+
+To award the FIPSE funds under the ARPA, the Secretary has proposed eligibility requirements 
+for the Supplemental Support under American Rescue Plan (SSARP).107 Much like SAIHE, the 
+proposal includes five categories of IHEs that may not have received funding or full funding from 
+the other HEERF III programs. On January 20, 2022, ED announced that it would invite 
+applications for the SSARP grants during the following week.108 
+
+ Appendix F presents estimated IHE allocations aggregated at the institutional sector level (e.g., 
+public two-year) and state level for the CARES Act FIPSE Formula Grants. Actual aggregations 
+under the CARES Act IREPO program, CRRSAA SAIHE program, and ARPA SSARP program 
+are not available as of the date of this report. Specifically , Table F-1 displays IHE allocations 
+aggregated at the institutional sector level for the CARES Act FIPSE Formula Grants , Table F-2 
+ shows the IHE allocations aggregated at the state level for the CARES Act FIPSE Formula 
+Grants , and Table F-5 , w hich provides a summary of the available IHE allocations aggregated at 
+the state level across the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA, also includes the CARES Act FIPSE 
+Formula Grants. 
+
+ Excise Tax Provision 
+ Under the CRRSAA, private IHEs that are subject to a 1.4% excise tax109 on net investment 
+income for tax year 2019 are to have their total HEERF allocation reduced by 50%, unless 
+waived by the Secretary. Private nonprofit IHEs that are eligible work colleges are exempt from 
+
+ 
+107 U.S. Department of Education, ARP: American Rescue Plan (HEERF III), Notice of Proposed institutional 
+Eligibility Criteria for Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF) Supplemental Support under American 
+Rescue Plan (SSARP) Program, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/arp.html. 
+
+108 U.S. Department of Education, “Biden-Harris Administration Takes Actions to Support Students’ Basic Needs and 
+Mitigate the Spread of COVID-19 at Colleges and Universities,” press release, January 20, 2022, https://www.ed.gov/
+news/press-releases/biden-harris-administration-takes-actions-support-students%E2%80%99-basic-needs-and-mitigate-
+spread-covid-19-colleges-and-universities. 
+
+109 Section 4968 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+43 
+
+ 
+ link to page 67 link to page 108 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+this provision.110 The Secretary may waive the allocation reduction if, upon application, an IHE 
+demonstrates need (including additional need for financial aid grants to students, payroll 
+expenses, or other expenditures) for the total amount of CRRSAA direct grant funds. The 
+Secretary must make publicly available a written justification for the denial of any waiver 
+application. The excise tax provisions under CRRSAA do not apply under the CARES Act or 
+ARPA. The aggregations of estimated allocations i n Appendix A and Appendix F do not reflect 
+allocation reductions resulting from the excise tax provision as ED has not incorporated the 
+provision in its published estimated allocations. 
+
+According to the Internal Revenue Service, this tax is estimated to affect 40 or fewer private 
+institutions.111 The Secretary requires that all IHEs subject to the excise tax (1) notify ED within 
+30 days of determining the tax applies and (2) not draw down more than 50% of their total 
+allocation under CRRSAA HEERF prior to any request or approval for a waiver.112 
+
+ Application, Distribution, and Reallocation Process 
+ There are differences in the statutory requirements for IHEs to apply for the HEERF and for ED 
+to initially distribute funds or reallocate remaining funds across the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and 
+ARPA. This section highlights the differences and describes ED’s implementation of the 
+differences. 
+
+The CARES Act does not establish any IHE application requirements. ED initially required 
+interested IHEs that received an allocation under the direct grants or MSI programs to submit 
+ Certification and Agreement forms that indicated the IHE’s agreement to comply with various 
+terms, conditions, and requirements in order to receive their allocated funds. 
+
+The CRRSAA establishes that IHEs with an approved HEERF application prior to December 27, 
+2020, would not be required to submit a new or revised application to receive HEERF II funds. 
+As a consequence, the supplemental HEERF II funds were made available to the HEERF I 
+grantees.113 ED required all proprietary IHEs to submit a new application for HEERF II direct 
+grant funds because CRRSAA created a separate direct grant program for proprietary IHEs.114 All 
+applicants to HEERF II FIPSE and new applicants to the other HEERF II programs were also 
+required to submit an application.115 
+
+ 
+110 Work colleges are defined in Section 448 of the HEA as public and private nonprofit, four-year, degree-granting 
+institutions with a commitment to community service that have operated a comprehensive work-learning service 
+program for at least two years, require students to participate in a comprehensive work-learning-service program, and 
+provide students with the opportunity to contribute to their education and the welfare of the community as a whole. 
+
+111 For more information, see https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-issues-guidance-on-the-tax-on-the-net-investment-
+income-of-certain-private-colleges-and-universities. 
+
+112 U.S. Department of Education, Required Notification of Endowment Excise Tax Paid, https://www2.ed.gov/about/
+offices/list/ope/crrsaa.html, dated January 14, 2021. 
+
+113 ED treats the portion of the award required to be used for student aid and the portion of the award that may be used 
+for other purposes as separate awards. Letter from Christopher J. McCaghren, Ed.D., Acting Assistant Secretary for 
+Postsecondary Education, U.S. Department of Education, to Public and Private Nonprofit College and University 
+Presidents, January 14, 2021, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/asstsecretaryheerfiia1letter.pdf. 
+
+114 U.S. Department of Education, CRRSAA: Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF II), CRRSAA 
+HEERF II Section 314(a)(4) Frequently Asked Questions (published January 14, 2021, and updated: March 19, 2021), 
+https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/crrsaa.html. 
+
+115 U.S. Department of Education, “CRRSAA: Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF II),” 
+https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/crrsaa.html. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+44 
+
+ 
+ link to page 123 link to page 53 link to page 53 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+Like the CARES Act, the ARPA does not establish any IHE application requirements. ED did not 
+require IHEs to apply for HEERF III programs if they previously received HEERF II funding 
+from the same program. 
+
+The CARES Act and ARPA do not establish a timeline for the distribution of HEERF funds. The 
+CRRSAA establishes a timeline for the Secretary to distribute HEERF monies. The Secretary 
+must allocate direct grant amounts within 30 calendar days of the date of enactment and MSI 
+program amounts within 60 calendar days of the date of enactment. In addition, with respect to 
+FIPSE the Secretary must brief the appropriations committees no later than seven days before 
+publishing the application within 60 calendar days of enactment and allocate amounts within 120 
+calendar days of enactment. Table G-1 shows the ED-established deadlines for IHEs to apply for 
+funds. 
+
+The CARES Act and CRRSAA require that HEERF direct grant funds be distributed to each IHE 
+using the same systems used to distribute HEA Title IV aid to IHEs. The CARES Act and 
+CRRSAA do not specify how ED must distribute MSI and FIPSE program funds to IHEs. The 
+ARPA does not establish a method of distribution for any of the program funds. 
+
+The CARES Act and ARPA do not provide for the reallocation of HEERF funds. The CRRSAA 
+included two provisions for the reallocation of funds. One provision required that ED reallocate 
+any CARES Act direct grant funds that were unobligated as of December 27, 2020, and include 
+them in the available funds for the CRRSAA direct grants for public and private nonprofit 
+IHEs.116 
+
+Under the second HEERF II reallocation provision, any funds that are allocated under the direct 
+grant and MSI programs but for which an IHE does not apply within 90 days of the notice 
+inviting applications are to be reallocated. The Secretary is required to reallocate such funds to 
+IHEs that have submitted direct grant applications based on the formula used to provide direct 
+grants to public and private nonprofit IHEs. HEERF II FIPSE funds are not required to be 
+reallocated. 
+
+In like manner, ED announced that HEERF III direct grant funds that were declined, not 
+accepted, not awarded, or returned within 90 days, by August 11, 2021, would be distributed to 
+grantees that have not declined or returned funds.117 
+
+ Uses of Funds 
+ The CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA establish how IHEs may use their HEERF funds. Table 
+11 provides the authorized activities under each of the acts. IHEs receiving direct grant funds 
+must use a specified portion of funds for student aid. Most but not all grantees may use a portion 
+
+ 
+116 The reallocation also included funds that had not been obligated from the CARES Act “Safe Schools and 
+Citizenship Education” account. 
+117 ED extended the application deadline for proprietary institutions to September 10, 2021. U.S. Department of 
+Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Notice Inviting Applications for Public and Private Nonprofit 
+Institutions of Higher Education Under the Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF), Section 2003 of the 
+American Rescue Plan Act, 2021 (ARP),” 86 Federal Register 26215-26220, May 13, 2021; U.S. Department of 
+Education, HEERF III: Institutional Portion for Public and Nonprofit Institutions (a)(1), ARP HEERF III Section 2003 
+Frequently Asked Questions (issued May 11, 2021), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/
+heerfiiiinstitutional.html; and U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Reopening; Notice 
+Inviting Applications for the Proprietary Institution Grant Funds for Students Program Under the Higher Education 
+Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF); American Rescue Plan Act, 2021 (ARP),” 86 Federal Register 45975-45976, 
+August 17, 2021. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+45 
+
+ 
+ link to page 53 link to page 58 link to page 58 link to page 58 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+of funds to defray eligible institutional expenses, which may include lost revenue,118 technology 
+costs associated with a transition to distance education, and payroll. Other eligible uses of funds 
+are also shown i n Table 11 . The Secretary has issued several guidance documents to help clarify 
+the uses of funds. In addition, ED has interpreted that HEERF expenses must have been first 
+incurred on or after March 13, 2020, the date of the proclamation of national emergency.119 
+
+ Table 11. Allowable Uses of HEERF by IHEs Under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Student Aid 
+
+ Institutional Uses 
+
+ Other Uses 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+Direct Gran tsa 
+
+No less than 50% of such funds 
+
+NA 
+
+Any costs associated with 
+
+to provide emergency financial 
+
+significant changes to the delivery 
+
+aid grants to students for 
+
+of instruction due to COVID-19. 
+
+expenses related to the 
+
+Funds remaining on or after 
+
+disruption of campus operations 
+
+December 27, 2020, may, subject 
+
+due to COVID-19 (including 
+
+to the student aid requirement 
+
+eligible expenses under a 
+
+(see the “Student Aid” column), 
+
+student’s cost of attendance, 
+
+be used to 
+
+such as food, housing, course 
+materials, technology, health 
+
+(1) defray expenses associated 
+
+care, and child care). 
+
+with COVID-19 (including lost 
+revenue, reimbursement for 
+
+An IHE that repurposes funds on 
+
+expenses already incurred, 
+
+or after December 27, 2020 (see 
+
+technology costs associated with 
+
+the “Other Uses” column), shall 
+
+a transition to distance 
+
+ensure that not less than 50% of 
+
+education, faculty and staff 
+
+the funds are used for financial 
+
+trainings, and payrol ); 
+
+aid grants to students under 
+either the CARES Act direct 
+
+(2) carry out student support 
+
+grants provisions or the 
+
+activities authorized by the HEA 
+
+CRRSAA direct grants 
+
+that address needs related to 
+
+provisions, or a combination of 
+
+COVID-19; or 
+
+those provision s.b 
+
+(3) provide financial aid grants to 
+students (including students 
+exclusively enrol ed in distance 
+education), which may be used 
+for any component of the 
+student’s cost of attendance or 
+for emergency costs that arise 
+due to COVID-19, such as 
+tuition, food, housing, health care 
+(including mental health care), or 
+child care. In making financial aid 
+grants to students, an IHE shall 
+prioritize grants to students with 
+
+exceptional need, such as those 
+who receive Pell Gran ts.b 
+
+ 
+118 In responses to questions, ED has provided specific guidance on costs that may be considered lost revenue and 
+required documentation at U.S. Department of Education, CRRSAA: Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund 
+(HEERF II), HEERF Lost Revenue FAQs (March 19, 2021), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/
+heerflostrevenuefaqs.pdf. 
+
+119 U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Notice of Interpretation Regarding Period of 
+Allowable Expenses for Funds Administered Under the Higher Education Emergency Relief (HEERF) Program,” 85 
+Federal Register 15208-15209, March 22, 2021. Under 2 C.F.R. Sections 200.458 and 200.308(d)(1), a grantee may 
+incur project costs no more than 90 calendar days before the date of the grant award. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+46 
+
+ 
+ link to page 58 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Student Aid 
+
+ Institutional Uses 
+
+ Other Uses 
+
+MSI Programs 
+
+Grants to students for any 
+
+Defraying expenses (including 
+
+Funds remaining on or after 
+
+component of the student’s cost 
+
+lost revenue, reimbursement for 
+
+December 27, 2020, may, subject 
+
+of attendance (as defined under 
+
+expenses already incurred, 
+
+to the CRRSAA student aid 
+
+Section 472 of the HEA), 
+
+technology costs associated with 
+
+requirements, be used to 
+
+including food, housing, course 
+
+a transition to distance 
+
+(1) defray expenses associated 
+
+materials, technology, health 
+
+education, faculty and staff 
+
+with COVID-19 (including lost 
+
+care, and child care. 
+
+trainings, and payrol ) incurred 
+
+revenue, reimbursement for 
+
+Funds remaining on or after 
+
+by IHEs. 
+
+expenses already incurred, 
+
+December 27, 2020, may be 
+
+technology costs associated with 
+
+used for financial aid grants to 
+
+a transition to distance 
+
+students as authorized by 
+
+education, faculty and staff 
+
+CRRSAA. 
+
+trainings, and payrol ); 
+(2) carry out student support 
+activities authorized by the HEA 
+that address needs related to 
+COVID-19; or 
+(3) provide financial aid grants to 
+students (including students 
+exclusively enrol ed in distance 
+education), which may be used 
+for any component of the 
+student’s cost of attendance or 
+for emergency costs that arise 
+due to COVID-19, such as 
+tuition, food, housing, health care 
+(including mental health care), or 
+child care. In making financial aid 
+grants to students, an IHE shall 
+prioritize grants to students with 
+exceptional need, such as those 
+who receive Pell Gran ts.b 
+
+FIPSE 
+
+Grants to students for any 
+
+Defraying expenses (including 
+
+NA 
+
+component of the student’s cost 
+
+lost revenue, reimbursement for 
+
+of attendance (as defined under 
+
+expenses already incurred, 
+
+Section 472 of the HEA), 
+
+technology costs associated with 
+
+including food, housing, course 
+
+a transition to distance 
+
+materials, technology, health 
+
+education, faculty and staff 
+
+care, and child care. 
+
+trainings, and payrol ) incurred 
+
+ 
+
+by IHEs. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+47 
+
+ 
+ link to page 58 link to page 58 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Student Aid 
+
+ Institutional Uses 
+
+ Other Uses 
+
+ CRRSA Ac 
+
+Direct Grants 
+
+Financial aid grants to students 
+
+Defraying expenses associated 
+
+Carrying out student support 
+
+(including students exclusively 
+
+with COVID-19 (including lost 
+
+activities authorized by the HEA 
+
+enrol ed in distance education), 
+
+revenue, reimbursement for 
+
+that address needs related to 
+
+for any component of the 
+
+expenses already incurred, 
+
+COVID-19. 
+
+student’s cost of attendance or 
+
+technology costs associated with 
+
+Private for-profit IHEs may not 
+
+for emergency costs that arise 
+
+a transition to distance 
+
+use funds for other uses. 
+
+due to COVID-19, such as 
+
+education, faculty and staff 
+
+tuition, food, housing, health care trainings, and payrol ). 
+
+Private IHEs subject to the 
+
+(including mental health care), or 
+
+excise tax provision may only 
+
+Private for-profit IHEs may not 
+
+child care. In making financial aid 
+
+use funds for financial aid grants 
+
+use funds for institutional uses. 
+
+grants, an institution shall 
+
+or for sanitation, personal 
+
+prioritize grants to students with 
+
+protective equipment, or other 
+
+exceptional need, such as those 
+
+expenses associated with the 
+
+who receive Pell Grants. 
+
+general health and safety of the 
+campus environment related to 
+
+IHEs shall provide at least the 
+
+the qualifying emergency. 
+
+same amount of funding in 
+emergency financial aid grants to 
+
+ 
+
+students as was required to be 
+provided under the CARES Act 
+direct grants progr am.d 
+An IHE receiving funds in 
+accordance with students 
+exclusively enrol ed in distance 
+education courses prior to the 
+qualifying emergency may only 
+use funds so apportioned for 
+financial aid grants to students. 
+Private IHEs subject to the 
+excise tax provision may only 
+use funds for financial aid grants 
+or for sanitation, personal 
+protective equipment, or other 
+expenses associated with the 
+general health and safety of the 
+campus environment related to 
+the qualifying emergency. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+48 
+
+ 
+ link to page 58 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Student Aid 
+
+ Institutional Uses 
+
+ Other Uses 
+
+MSI Programs 
+
+Financial aid grants to students 
+
+Defraying expenses associated 
+
+Carrying out student support 
+
+(including students exclusively 
+
+with COVID-19 (including lost 
+
+activities authorized by the HEA 
+
+enrol ed in distance education), 
+
+revenue, reimbursement for 
+
+that address needs related to 
+
+for any component of the 
+
+expenses already incurred, 
+
+COVID-19. 
+
+student’s cost of attendance or 
+
+technology costs associated with 
+
+Private IHEs subject to the 
+
+for emergency costs that arise 
+
+a transition to distance 
+
+excise tax provision may only 
+
+due to COVID-19, such as 
+
+education, faculty and staff 
+
+use funds for financial aid grants 
+
+tuition, food, housing, health care trainings, and payrol ). 
+
+or for sanitation, personal 
+
+(including mental health care), or 
+
+protective equipment, or other 
+
+child care. In making financial aid 
+
+expenses associated with the 
+
+grants, an institution shall 
+
+general health and safety of the 
+
+prioritize grants to students with 
+
+campus environment related to 
+
+exceptional need, such as those 
+
+the qualifying emergency. 
+
+who receive Pell Grants. 
+Private IHEs subject to the 
+excise tax provision may only 
+use funds for financial aid grants 
+or for sanitation, personal 
+protective equipment, or other 
+expenses associated with the 
+general health and safety of the 
+campus environment related to 
+the qualifying emergency. 
+
+FIPS Ee 
+
+Financial aid grants to students 
+
+Defraying expenses associated 
+
+Carrying out student support 
+
+(including students exclusively 
+
+with COVID-19 (including lost 
+
+activities authorized by the HEA 
+
+enrol ed in distance education), 
+
+revenue, reimbursement for 
+
+that address needs related to 
+
+for any component of the 
+
+expenses already incurred, 
+
+COVID-19. 
+
+student’s cost of attendance or 
+
+technology costs associated with 
+
+for emergency costs that arise 
+
+a transition to distance 
+
+due to COVID-19, such as 
+
+education, faculty and staff 
+
+tuition, food, housing, health care trainings, and payrol ). 
+(including mental health care), or 
+child care. In making financial aid 
+grants, an institution shall 
+prioritize grants to students with 
+
+exceptional need, such as those 
+who receive Pell Grants. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+49 
+
+ 
+ link to page 58 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Student Aid 
+
+ Institutional Uses 
+
+ Other Uses 
+
+ AR PAc 
+
+Direct Grants 
+
+Financial aid grants to students 
+
+Defraying expenses associated 
+
+An institution shall use a portion 
+
+(including students exclusively 
+
+with COVID-19 (including lost 
+
+of funds received under this 
+
+enrol ed in distance education), 
+
+revenue, reimbursement for 
+
+section and not required for 
+
+for any component of the 
+
+expenses already incurred, 
+
+student aid to 
+
+student’s cost of attendance or 
+
+technology costs associated with 
+
+(1) implement evidence-based 
+
+for emergency costs that arise 
+
+a transition to distance 
+
+practices to monitor and 
+
+due to COVID-19, such as 
+
+education, faculty and staff 
+
+suppress COVID-19 in 
+
+tuition, food, housing, health care trainings, and payrol ). 
+
+accordance with public health 
+
+(including mental health care), or 
+
+guidelines; and 
+
+child care. In making financial aid 
+grants, an institution shall 
+
+(2) conduct direct outreach to 
+
+prioritize grants to students with 
+
+financial aid applicants about the 
+
+exceptional need, such as those 
+
+opportunity to receive a financial 
+
+who receive Pell Grants. 
+
+aid adjustment due to the recent 
+unemployment of a family 
+
+An IHE receiving funds in 
+
+member or independent student, 
+
+accordance with the enrol ment 
+
+or other circumstances 
+
+of students exclusively enrol ed 
+
+described in Section 479A of the 
+
+in distance education courses 
+
+HEA. 
+
+prior to the qualifying emergency 
+may only use funds so 
+apportioned for financial aid 
+grants to students. 
+An institution that receives an 
+allocation in accordance with the 
+enrol ment of students who 
+were not exclusively enrol ed in 
+distance education courses prior 
+to the qualifying emergency shall 
+use not less than 50% of such 
+allocation to provide emergency 
+financial aid grants to students. 
+A private for-profit (proprietary) 
+IHE may only use funds for 
+financial aid grants. 
+
+MSI Programs 
+
+Financial aid grants to students 
+
+Defraying expenses associated 
+
+An institution shall use a portion 
+
+(including students exclusively 
+
+with COVID-19 (including lost 
+
+of funds received under this 
+
+enrol ed in distance education), 
+
+revenue, reimbursement for 
+
+section and not required for 
+
+for any component of the 
+
+expenses already incurred, 
+
+student aid to 
+
+student’s cost of attendance or 
+
+technology costs associated with 
+
+(1) implement evidence-based 
+
+for emergency costs that arise 
+
+a transition to distance 
+
+practices to monitor and 
+
+due to COVID-19, such as 
+
+education, faculty and staff 
+
+suppress COVID-19 in 
+
+tuition, food, housing, health care trainings, and payrol ). 
+
+accordance with public health 
+
+(including mental health care), or 
+
+guidelines; and 
+
+child care. In making financial aid 
+grants, an institution shall 
+
+(2) conduct direct outreach to 
+
+prioritize grants to students with 
+
+financial aid applicants about the 
+
+exceptional need, such as those 
+
+opportunity to receive a financial 
+
+who receive Pell Grants. 
+
+aid adjustment due to the recent 
+unemployment of a family 
+member or independent student, 
+or other circumstances 
+described in Section 479A of the 
+HEA. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+50 
+
+ 
+ link to page 53 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Student Aid 
+
+ Institutional Uses 
+
+ Other Uses 
+
+FIPSE 
+
+Financial aid grants to students 
+
+Defraying expenses associated 
+
+An institution shall use a portion 
+
+(including students exclusively 
+
+with COVID-19 (including lost 
+
+of funds received under this 
+
+enrol ed in distance education), 
+
+revenue, reimbursement for 
+
+section and not required for 
+
+for any component of the 
+
+expenses already incurred, 
+
+student aid to 
+
+student’s cost of attendance or 
+
+technology costs associated with 
+
+(1) implement evidence-based 
+
+for emergency costs that arise 
+
+a transition to distance 
+
+practices to monitor and 
+
+due to COVID-19, such as 
+
+education, faculty and staff 
+
+suppress COVID-19 in 
+
+tuition, food, housing, health care trainings, and payrol ). 
+
+accordance with public health 
+
+(including mental health care), or 
+
+guidelines; and 
+
+child care. In making financial aid 
+grants, an institution shall 
+
+(2) conduct direct outreach to 
+
+prioritize grants to students with 
+
+financial aid applicants about the 
+
+exceptional need, such as those 
+
+opportunity to receive a financial 
+
+who receive Pell Grants. 
+
+aid adjustment due to the recent 
+unemployment of a family 
+member or independent student, 
+or other circumstances 
+described in Section 479A of the 
+HEA. 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
+Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136); the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental 
+Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) included as Division M in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 
+(CAA; P.L. 116-260), and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2). 
+
+ NA means not applicable. 
+a. The CARES Act specifically excludes costs that include payment to contractors for the provision of pre-
+
+enrol ment recruitment activities, endowments, or capital outlays associated with facilities related to 
+athletics, sectarian instruction, or religious worship. 
+
+b. Such funds are designated by Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to Section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of 
+
+the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 
+
+c. No funds received under the CRRSAA or ARPA can be used to fund contractors for the provision of pre-
+
+enrol ment recruitment activities; marketing or recruitment; endowments; capital outlays associated with 
+facilities related to athletics, sectarian instruction, or religious worship; senior administrator or executive 
+salaries, benefits, bonuses, contracts, and incentives; stock buybacks, shareholder dividends, capital 
+distributions, and stock options; or any other cash or other benefit for a senior administrator or executive. 
+
+d. ED indicates that this amount is the larger of either the amount the IHE was required to provide to 
+
+students under the CARES Act, or the amount the IHE is receiving based on its share of students who were 
+enrol ed exclusively in distance education prior to the qualifying emergency. Letter from Christopher J. 
+McCaghren, Ed.D., Acting Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education, U.S. Department of Education, 
+to Public and Private Nonprofit Col ege and University Presidents, January 14, 2021, https://www2.ed.gov/
+about/offices/list/ope/asstsecretaryheerfi a1letter.pdf. 
+
+e. The uses of funds in the table are as established by HEERF II. ED has established more specific requirements 
+
+for grants awarded under some of the absolute priorities. U.S. Department of Education, Office of 
+Postsecondary Education, “Applications for New Awards; Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary 
+
+Education-Supplemental Assistance to Institutions of Higher Education (SAIHE),” 86 Federal Register 16338-
+16342, March 29, 2021. 
+
+ Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund Student Aid 
+
+As discussed earlier and as evidenced i n Table 11 , I HEs receiving direct grants must use a portion 
+of the funds for emergency financial aid grants to students, as established under the HEERF I 
+direct grants program, or financial aid grants to students, as established by the HEERF II. IHEs 
+receiving MSI or FIPSE program funds may use a portion of the funds for grants to students or 
+ financial aid grants to students. Emergency financial aid grants to students are only for student 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+51 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+expenses related to the disruption of campus operations due to COVID-19.120 ED has indicated 
+that the emergency financial aid grants are not considered federal student aid as authorized under 
+HEA Title IV; thus, the amount of the emergency financial aid grant may allow a student to 
+receive total aid in excess of his/her cost of attendance.121 Financial aid grants to students are 
+available for any component of the student’s cost of attendance or for emergency costs that arise 
+due to COVID-19. Grants to students are for any component of the student’s cost of 
+attendance.122 
+
+The CARES Act does not explicitly establish eligibility criteria for students to receive student aid 
+under the HEERF from their IHE. ED issued guidance and an interim final rule for the CARES 
+Act that limited eligibility to students who were or could be eligible for HEA Title IV aid and 
+prohibited eligibility for students who were enrolled exclusively in online programs prior to 
+March 13, 2020.123 Under HEA Title IV, for example, eligible students must be enrolled in or 
+accepted for enrollment in a program leading to a recognized educational credential (e.g., degree), 
+meet citizenship-related requirements (e.g., undocumented immigrants are ineligible), and must 
+not be enrolled in elementary or secondary school. Aside from these limitations, ED provided 
+IHEs discretion to determine individual grant amounts and additional student eligibility 
+requirements.124 The actions by the Secretary to limit student eligibility generated some dissent.125 
+Several Members of Congress wrote to the Secretary opposing ED’s imposition of eligibility 
+requirements as contradicting congressional intent and harming students.126 Several courts 
+preliminarily enjoined ED from applying some or all eligibility requirements to HEERF financial 
+aid grants at specified IHEs, and that litigation is ongoing.127 
+
+The HEERF II and HEERF III establish that financial aid grants to students are available to 
+students exclusively enrolled in distance education and are required to be awarded in a manner 
+
+ 
+120 U.S. Department of Education, Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund- Student Aid, CARES HEERF 
+Certification and Agreement - Student Portion, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/heerfstudent.html. 
+
+121 Generally, the HEA prohibits a student from receiving HEA Title IV aid and other financial assistance in excess of 
+his/her cost of attendance. U.S. Department of Education, CARES Act: Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund, 
+CARES Act HEERF Rollup FAQs (rollup of all five previously released HEERF FAQ documents in one document; 
+issued October 14, 2020, and revised January 28, 2021), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/caresact.html. 
+
+122 Cost of attendance is defined in HEA Section 472. It includes estimated costs for tuition and fees, books and 
+supplies, room and board, dependent care, and other costs in different amounts for different categories of students. 
+
+123 U.S. Department of Education, Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund- Institutional Portion, Cares Act HEERF 
+Institutional Portion of the HEERF under Section 18004(a)(1) and 18004(c) FAQs (issued April 9, 2020, and revised 
+January 28, 2021), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/heerfinstitutional.html; and U.S. Department of 
+Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Eligibility of Students at Institutions of Higher Education for Funds 
+Under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,” 85 Federal Register 36494-36504, June 17, 
+2020. 
+
+124 Letter from Betsy DeVos, Secretary of Education, to College and University Presidents, April 9, 2020, 
+https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/caresactgrantfundingcoverletterfinal.pdf. 
+
+125 U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Eligibility of Students at Institutions of Higher 
+Education for Funds Under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,” 85 Federal Register 
+36494-36504, June 17, 2020; and U.S. Department of Education, “Frequently Asked Questions about the Emergency 
+Financial Aid Grants to Students under Section 18004 of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
+(CARES) Act,” https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/heerfstudentfaqs.pdf (accessed April 22, 2020). 
+126 Letter from Michael F. Bennet, United States Senator, Robert Menendez, United States Senator, and Richard J. 
+Durbin, United States Senator et al. to The Honorable Betsy DeVos, Secretary of Education, April 27, 2020; and Letter 
+from Eric Swalwell, Member of Congress, Suzanne Bonamici, Member of Congress, and Steve Cohen, Member of 
+Congress et al. to The Honorable Betsy DeVos, Secretary, United States Department of Education, April 27, 2020. 
+
+127 Washington v. DeVos , No. 2:20-cv-00182-TOR, Order at 36, ECF No. 31; Oakley v. DeVos , No. 4:20-cv-03215-
+YGR, Order at 28, ECF No. 44; and Noerand v. DeVos , No. 1:20-cv-11271-LTS, Order at 15, ECF No. 16. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+52 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+that prioritizes “students with exceptional need.”128 ED did not establish any restrictions on 
+student eligibility for aid under the HEERF II and HEERF III, allowing financial aid grants “to 
+non-degree seeking, non-credit, dual enrollment, and continuing education students … [and] 
+students who are qualified aliens, as defined within 8 U.S.C. section 1641 (including refugees and 
+persons granted asylum).”129 
+
+ED issued final regulations effective on May 14, 2021, and applicable to each of the HEERF 
+programs funded under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA clarifying eligibility for any 
+individual who is or was enrolled at an eligible institution on or after March 13, 2020, the date the 
+national emergency was declared for COVID-19.130 The final rule supersedes the interim final 
+rule. For example, the final regulations provide eligibility to students who are in dual-enrollment 
+or noncredit programs and undocumented students. IHEs may determine which individuals 
+currently or previously enrolled at an institution are eligible to receive student aid given that the 
+CRRSAA and ARPA require IHEs to prioritize awarding grants to students with “exceptional 
+need,” such as those who receive Pell Grants. 
+
+In addition, the Internal Revenue Service has provided guidance on the federal income tax 
+treatment of HEERF student aid funds received by students. Emergency financial aid grants under 
+the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA are not included in the student’s gross income used to 
+determine federal income tax liability. Such emergency financial aid grants may be used to claim 
+a tuition and fees deduction, the American Opportunity Credit, or the Lifetime Learning Credit if 
+the student and expenses meet the deduction or credit requirements.131 
+
+ED has clarified that HEERF student aid under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, or ARPA is not 
+counted as income when calculating a family’s expected family contribution (EFC).132 As such, 
+the aid will not reduce a student’s eligibility for HEA Title IV aid in future years. 
+
+ Other Provisions 
+
+The CARES Act and CRRSAA specifically allow MSI program recipients to use prior awards 
+provided under HEA Titles III, V, and VII to prevent, prepare for, and respond to COVID-19. The 
+ARPA does not include the same allowance. 
+
+Funds paid through the HEERF I will not be included as revenue for the purposes of ensuring that 
+a proprietary IHE has derived at least 10% of its revenue from non-HEA Title IV funds (i.e., no 
+more than 90% of its revenue can come from HEA Title IV funds).133 If an IHE violates the 
+
+ 
+128 The HEERF II does not define students with exceptional need. 
+129 U.S. Department of Education, HEERF II: Minority Serving Institutions (a)(2), (a)(2), Frequently Asked Questions, 
+(published January 14, 2021, updated March 19, 2021), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/heerfiimsi.html. 
+
+130 U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Eligibility To Receive Emergency Financial 
+Aid Grants to Students Under the Higher Education Emergency Relief Programs,” 86 Federal Register 26608-26631, 
+May 14, 2021. 
+
+131 Internal Revenue Service, Higher Education Emergency Grants Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.irs.gov/
+newsroom/higher-education-emergency-grants-frequently-asked-questions (last updated May 19, 2021). 
+
+132 U.S. Department of Education, HEERF III: Institutional Portion for Public and Nonprofit Institutions (a)(1), ARP 
+HEERF III Section 2003 Frequently Asked Questions (issued May 11, 2021), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
+ope/heerfiiiinstitutional.html. 
+
+133 U.S. Department of Education, Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund- Institutional Portion, Cares Act HEERF 
+Institutional Portion of the HEERF under Section 18004(a)(1) and 18004(c) FAQs (issued April 9, 2020, and revised 
+January 28, 2021), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/heerfinstitutional.html. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+53 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+requirement (the 90/10 rule) for two consecutive years, it loses its eligibility to administer HEA 
+Title IV student financial aid for at least two years.134 
+
+ Maintenance of Effort and Maintenance of Equity 
+ The CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA include different maintenance of effort (MOE) 
+requirements.135 All three acts include MOE requirements that apply to elementary and secondary 
+education and to higher education. The ARPA also includes maintenance of equity (MOEq) 
+requirements that apply at the state and LEA levels with respect to elementary and secondary 
+education. 
+
+ CARES Act 
+ The CARES Act ESF included two MOE requirements—one that applied to state support for 
+elementary and secondary education and one that applied to state support for higher education. If 
+a state applied for a grant under the GEER Fund or the ESSER Fund, the grant application was 
+required to include assurances that the state would meet both MOE requirements. 
+
+For elementary and secondary education, the state had to provide an assurance that it would 
+maintain support in FY2020 and FY2021 at least at the average level of support provided for 
+elementary and secondary education during the three fiscal years preceding the enactment date of 
+the CARES Act.136 
+
+Similarly, for higher education the state or outlying area had to provide an assurance that it would 
+maintain support in FY2020 and FY2021 at least at the average level of support provided for 
+higher education during the three fiscal years preceding the enactment date of the CARES Act. 
+For the purposes of determining state support for higher education, states had to include state 
+funding to IHEs and state need-based financial aid. States did not have to include support for 
+capital projects, support for research and development, or tuition and fees paid by students. 
+
+The Secretary has the authority to waive these MOE requirements to relieve fiscal burdens on 
+states that have “experienced a precipitous decline in financial resources.” In deciding whether to 
+grant such a waiver, it is up to the Secretary to determine whether such a decline in financial 
+resources has occurred. 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+ Similar to the CARES Act, the CRRSAA included two MOE requirements—one that applies to 
+state support for elementary and secondary education and one that applies to state support for 
+higher education. States were required to provide an assurance that they would meet both MOE 
+requirements. 
+
+For elementary and secondary education, a state was required to provide an assurance that it 
+would maintain support in FY2022 at least at the proportional levels of state support for 
+
+ 
+134 For more information on the 90/10 rule, see CRS Report R46773, The 90/10 Rule Under HEA Title IV: Background 
+and Issues . 
+
+135 For additional information, see U.S. Department of Education, Guidance on Maintenance of Effort Requirements 
+and Waiver Requests under the Elementary and Secondary School emergency Relief (ESSER) Fund and the 
+Governor’s Emergency Education Relief (GEER) Fund, April 2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/04/MOE-
+Chart_with-waiver-FAQs_FINAL_4.21.21Update.pdf. 
+
+136 Typically, this will be FY2017, FY2018, and FY2019. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+54 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+elementary and secondary education relative to the state’s overall spending, averaged over 
+FY2017, FY2018, and FY2019. For higher education, the state was required to provide an 
+assurance that it would maintain support in FY2022 at least at the proportional levels of state 
+support for higher education relative to the state’s overall spending, averaged over FY2017, 
+FY2018, and FY2019. For the purposes of determining state support for higher education, states 
+are required to include state funding to IHEs and state need-based financial aid. States do not 
+have to include support for capital projects, support for research and development, or tuition and 
+fees paid by students. 
+
+Similar to the CARES Act, the Secretary has the authority to waive these MOE requirements to 
+relieve fiscal burdens on states that have “experienced a precipitous decline in financial 
+resources.” In deciding whether to grant such a waiver, it is up to the Secretary to determine 
+whether such a decline in financial resources has occurred. 
+
+ ARPA 
+ Unlike the CARES Act and CRRSAA, the ARPA includes both MOE and MOEq requirements. 
+Both are discussed below. 
+
+ MOE 
+
+As a condition of receiving funds under the ESSER III, states had to agree to meet the same MOE 
+requirements as those included in the CRRSAA, except that effort must be maintained for both 
+FY2022 and FY2023.137 The ARPA also included a provision permitting the Secretary to waive 
+any MOE requirements associated with the ESF for the purpose of relieving fiscal burdens 
+experienced by states in “preventing, preparing for, and responding to the coronavirus.” This 
+waiver authority differs from that provided under the MOE waiver available under the CARES 
+Act and CRRSAA in two ways. First, it allows the Secretary to provide a waiver under certain 
+circumstances of any MOE requirements associated with the ESF, which could include funds 
+provided under the CARES Act and the CRRSAA. Second, rather than the Secretary only being 
+allowed to waive MOE requirements for states that have experienced a “precipitous decline in 
+financial resources,” the ARPA language permits the Secretary to provide MOE waivers to relieve 
+“fiscal burdens incurred by States in preventing, preparing for, and responding to the 
+coronavirus.” 
+
+ MOEq 
+
+The ARPA included two maintenance of equity requirements. The first focuses on high-need 
+LEAs and the highest-poverty LEAs, and the second focuses on high-poverty schools. Each 
+requirement is discussed below. 138 
+
+ 
+137 For both FY2022 and FY2023, comparisons will be made to a state’s overall spending, averaged over FY2017 and 
+FY2018. 
+
+138 For more information about MOEq requirements, see U.S. Department of Education, Frequently Asked Questions 
+American Rescue Plan Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief Fund: Maintenance of Equity , October 1, 
+2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/10/Maintenance-of-Equity-updated_10_1_21-FAQs.Final_.pdf; and Letter from 
+Miguel A. Cardona, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, to Chief State School Officers and School District 
+Superintendents, August 6, 2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/08/21-006207-MOEquity-DCL-F08-05-2021-
+SIGNED.pdf. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+55 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ MOEq Requirements for High-Need LEAs and Highest-Poverty LEAs 
+ An SEA that receives ESSER III funds is prohibited in FY2022 and FY2023 from reducing state 
+funding calculated on a per-pupil basis for any high-need LEA in the state by an amount that 
+exceeds the overall per-pupil reduction in state funds (if any) across all LEAs in the state in such 
+fiscal year. That is, any per-pupil reduction in funding for a high-need LEA in FY2022 or FY2023 
+cannot be greater than the overall per-pupil reduction in state funds139 across all LEAs in the state 
+for that fiscal year. For the purposes of this requirement, the ARPA defines a high-need LEA as 
+one that is among the group of LEAs in the state that (1) in rank order have the highest 
+percentages of economically disadvantaged students, and (2) collectively serve not less than 50% 
+of the state’s total enrollment of students served by all LEAs in the state. 
+
+In addition, an SEA is prohibited in FY2022 and FY2023 from reducing state funding, as 
+calculated on a per-pupil basis, for any of the highest-poverty LEAs below the level of funding, 
+as calculated on a per-pupil basis, provided to each such LEA in FY2019. Thus, this provision 
+establishes a floor for state aid for the highest-poverty LEAs in each state. For the purposes of 
+this requirement, the ARPA defines a highest-poverty LEA as one that is among the group of 
+LEAs in the state that (1) in rank order have the highest percentages of economically 
+disadvantaged students in the state, and (2) collectively serve not less than 20% of the state’s total 
+enrollment of students served by all LEAs in the state. 
+
+For the definitions of high-need LEA and highest-poverty LEA, the determination of the highest 
+percentages of economically disadvantaged students in the state must be made based on the most 
+recent satisfactory data available from the Department of Commerce. This would include data 
+available from the U.S. Census Bureau’s SAIPE dataset, which provides data on the number of 
+children ages 5-17 living in families in poverty in an LEA. For LEAs for which data are not 
+available through the Department of Commerce (e.g., charter schools that are independent LEAs), 
+states must use other data that the Secretary determines are satisfactory. 
+
+ MOEq Requirements for High-Poverty Schools 
+ There are two requirements that LEAs receiving funds under the ESSER III must meet with 
+respect to maintaining equity in FY2022 and FY2023. First, an LEA is prohibited in FY2022 and 
+FY2023 from reducing per-pupil funding based on combined state and local funding for any high-
+poverty school served by the LEA by an amount that exceeds the total reduction in LEA funding 
+from combined state and local funding for all schools served by the LEA in such fiscal year (if 
+any), divided by the number of children enrolled in all schools served by the LEA in such fiscal 
+year. In addition, an LEA is prohibited in FY2022 and FY2023 from reducing per-pupil, full-time 
+equivalent (FTE) staff in any high-poverty school by an amount that exceeds the total reduction 
+in FTE staff in all schools served by the LEA for such fiscal year (if any), divided by the number 
+of children enrolled in all schools served by the LEA in such fiscal year. 
+
+ 
+139 The overall per-pupil reduction in state funds for a given fiscal year is defined as the amount of any reduction in the 
+total amount of state funds provided to all LEAs in the state in such fiscal year compared to the total amount of state 
+funds provided to all LEAs in the state in the previous fiscal year, divided by the aggregate number of children enrolled 
+in all schools served by all LEAs in the state in the fiscal year for which the determination is being made. ED has 
+provided guidance on how to implement this requirement; see U.S. Department of Education, Frequently Asked 
+Questions American Rescue Plan Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief Fund: Maintenance of Equity , 
+October 1, 2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/10/Maintenance-of-Equity-updated_10_1_21-FAQs.Final_.pdf. For 
+example, for FY2022 an SEA would determine the overall level of per-pupil funding for FY2021 and FY2022 and 
+determine whether overall per-pupil funding decreased between the two fiscal years. The SEA would then calculate the 
+level of per-pupil funding for FY2021 and FY2022 for each high-need LEA. If there is a decrease in the level of per-
+pupil funding for a high-need LEA, it cannot exceed the overall decrease in per-pupil funding (if any). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+56 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+These MOEq requirements do not apply to any LEA that meets at least one of the following 
+criteria in a given fiscal year: 
+
+ it has a total enrollment of less than 1,000 students, 
+ it operates only one school, 
+ it serves all students within each grade span in a single school, or 
+ it “demonstrates an exceptional or uncontrollable circumstance, such as 
+
+unpredictable changes in student enrollment or a precipitous decline in the 
+financial resources of such agency, as determined by the Secretary of Education.” 
+
+A high-poverty school is defined as one in the highest quartile of schools served by an LEA based 
+on the percentage of economically disadvantaged students served. In identifying economically 
+disadvantaged students, the state must select a measure of poverty established for the purposes of 
+the definition of a high-poverty school by the Secretary and apply such measure consistently to 
+all schools in the state. 
+
+ Reporting Requirements 
+ The CARES Act and CRRSAA include various reporting requirements for the ESF programs. 
+These include general reporting requirements that apply broadly to programs included in the acts 
+as well as reporting requirements specific to the ESF programs. ED has also established reporting 
+requirements for ESF recipients under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA. To facilitate the 
+public release of data collected, ED has established a website dedicated to tracking, collecting, 
+and disseminating data related to the ESF.140 In addition, the Pandemic Response Accountability 
+Committee (PRAC) makes publicly available detailed pandemic relief spending data based on the 
+CARES Act and other related legislation, including the CRRSAA and ARPA.141 A summary of the 
+reporting requirements included in the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA is provided below. 
+
+ General CARES Act Reporting Requirements 
+ Section 15011, Division B of the CARES Act establishes several reporting requirements for 
+federal agencies and other entities receiving CARES Act funds. Within 90 days of enactment, 
+agencies had to describe to the PRAC how funds would be used. Federal agencies had to report to 
+the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Bureau of Fiscal Service in the 
+Department of the Treasury, the PRAC, and the appropriate congressional committees any 
+obligation or expenditure of CARES Act funds over $150,000 on a monthly basis until September 
+30, 2021. The OMB Director, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
+Administrator of the Small Business Administration, and the Chairperson of the Council of 
+Economic Advisors, must provide quarterly reports to the appropriate congressional committees 
+and on a public website on the impact programs funded by more than $150,000 have on 
+employment, estimated economic growth, and other key economic indicators. 
+
+To facilitate agency reporting, recipients of CARES Act funds must submit a report to the PRAC 
+and applicable agency not later than 10 days after the end of each calendar quarter. The report 
+must include the total amount of funds received under the ESF and a detailed list of all projects or 
+activities for which funds were expended or obligated, including their names, a description of 
+them, and the estimated number of jobs created or retained by them. Additionally, the report must 
+
+ 
+140 See https://covid-relief-data.ed.gov/. 
+141 See https://www.pandemicoversight.gov/. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+57 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+include detailed information on any level of subcontracts or subgrants awarded by the governor or 
+his/her subcontractors or subgrantees. The information included in these reports must be made 
+public by the PRAC not later than 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter through 
+September 30, 2025. 
+
+ Education Stabilization Fund Reporting Requirements 
+ In addition to the general reporting requirements described above, the CARES Act requires that 
+IHEs receiving HEERF monies report the use of funds to the Secretary, at such time and in such 
+manner as the Secretary may require. 
+
+The CRRSAA establishes a requirement that ED report spending plans to Congress and a 
+requirement that ESSER Fund and HEERF recipients report uses of funds to ED. The CRRSAA 
+requires that ED provide spending plans to the appropriations committees beginning 30 days after 
+enactment and every 60 days thereafter until September 30, 2024. The spending plan provides 
+anticipated uses of funds, including estimated personnel and administrative costs and the amount 
+of each contract obligation over $5,000,000 that has not previously been reported. 
+
+The CRRSAA requires that states receiving ESSER funds and IHEs receiving HEERF monies 
+report a detailed accounting of the use of funds, not later than six months after receiving funding 
+and as required by ED thereafter. The state reports must include how a state uses funds to 
+measure and address learning loss among students disproportionately affected by COVID-19 and 
+school closures, including low-income students, children with disabilities, English learners, racial 
+and ethnic minorities, students experiencing homelessness, and children and youth in foster care. 
+
+The ARPA did not establish ESF reporting requirements. 
+
+ Department of Education-Established Reporting Requirements 
+ Through the grant application process, ED has established various reporting requirements for 
+governors, SEAs, and IHEs receiving ESF grants. In addition to some initial reports that outline 
+how entities plan to use the funds, ED has generally established quarterly and annual reporting 
+requirements that focus on expenditures; subgrant recipients, if applicable; and administration. 
+For example, within 45 days of receiving a GEER Fund grant each governor must provide to ED 
+an initial report that details how the state would award funds to LEAs, IHEs, and other education-
+related entities; the criteria the state would use for determining those entities that are “most 
+significantly impacted by coronavirus” or “essential for carrying out emergency educational 
+services”; and a description of the process and deliberations involved in developing these 
+criteria.142 The quarterly HEERF reports focus on expenditures and the method and distribution of 
+student aid.143 
+
+ Continued Payment to Employees 
+ Under the CARES Act and CRRSAA, any LEA, state, IHE, or other entity that receives funds 
+under the ESF is required to the “greatest extent practicable” to pay its employees and contractors 
+during periods of disruption or closure related to the COVID-19 emergency. As entities receiving 
+funds are required to comply with this requirement only to the greatest extent practicable, this 
+
+ 
+142 See previous discussion of CARES Act reporting requirements. 
+143 U.S. Department of Education, Reporting and Data Collection, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/
+heerfreporting.html. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+58 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+provision does not ensure that their employees or contractors will continue to be paid during such 
+periods. This provision was not included in the ARPA. 
+
+ Definitions 
+ The ESF includes definitions that apply only to the ESF programs in the CARES Act, CRRSAA, 
+and ARPA. These include specific definitions of elementary education, secondary education, IHE, 
+Secretary, state, nonpublic school, and public schools. There is also a provision that indicates that 
+if any of the other terms used in the ESF are defined in Section 8101 of the ESEA, the term shall 
+have the meaning given to it by that section. The definitions section does not apply to the HEERF 
+III. 
+
+Of particular note is the definition of state that applies to the GEER Fund, EANS program, and 
+ESSER Fund. For these programs, state is defined to include the 50 states, the District of 
+Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Thus, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are treated as states 
+with respect to the allocation of funds under these emergency education relief funds. 
+
+The HEERF does not use the term state . ED has interpreted the definition of IHE to include IHEs 
+in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin 
+Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall 
+Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau.144 
+
+ 
+144 The outlying areas may receive funds under the ESF set-aside for the outlying areas, and IHEs in the outlying areas 
+may receive funds under the HEERF. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+59 
+
+ 
+ link to page 69 link to page 69 link to page 69 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendix A. Grants to States, the Outlying Areas, 
+and IHEs Under ESF Programs 
+ 
+
+ Table A-1. GEER Funds, ESSER Fund State Grants, and HEERF IHE Grants 
+
+ Aggregated at the State Level for the CARES Act ESF 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ Provided to 
+
+ the State or 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ GEER I: 
+
+ ESSER I: 
+
+ HEERF I: 
+
+ IHEs in the 
+
+ GEER I, 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Sum of 
+
+ State (Col. B ESSER I, and 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ + Col. C + 
+
+ HEERF I 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Amoun ta 
+
+ Amount 
+
+ Allocation sb 
+
+ Col. D)b 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Alabama 
+
+$48,853 
+
+$216,948 
+
+$274,097 
+
+$539,898 
+
+1.79% 
+
+Alaska 
+
+$6,504 
+
+$38,408 
+
+$14,325 
+
+$59,236 
+
+0.20% 
+
+Arizona 
+
+$69,199 
+
+$277,423 
+
+$305,028 
+
+$651,649 
+
+2.16% 
+
+Arkansas 
+
+$30,665 
+
+$128,759 
+
+$137,321 
+
+$296,745 
+
+0.98% 
+
+California 
+
+$355,238 
+
+$1,647,306 
+
+$1,825,854 
+
+$3,828,398 
+
+12.70% 
+
+Colorado 
+
+$44,006 
+
+$120,994 
+
+$176,585 
+
+$341,585 
+
+1.13% 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+$27,882 
+
+$111,068 
+
+$146,095 
+
+$285,045 
+
+0.95% 
+
+Delaware 
+
+$7,917 
+
+$43,493 
+
+$47,155 
+
+$98,565 
+
+0.33% 
+
+District of Columbia 
+
+$5,808 
+
+$42,006 
+
+$58,108 
+
+$105,923 
+
+0.35% 
+
+Florida 
+
+$173,591 
+
+$770,248 
+
+$822,906 
+
+$1,766,745 
+
+5.86% 
+
+Georgia 
+
+$105,724 
+
+$457,170 
+
+$466,890 
+
+$1,029,784 
+
+3.42% 
+
+Hawaii 
+
+$9,994 
+
+$43,385 
+
+$54,057 
+
+$107,436 
+
+0.36% 
+
+Idaho 
+
+$15,677 
+
+$47,855 
+
+$61,503 
+
+$125,034 
+
+0.41% 
+
+Il inois 
+
+$108,501 
+
+$569,467 
+
+$463,599 
+
+$1,141,567 
+
+3.79% 
+
+Indiana 
+
+$61,593 
+
+$214,473 
+
+$244,016 
+
+$520,082 
+
+1.73% 
+
+Iowa 
+
+$26,218 
+
+$71,626 
+
+$125,145 
+
+$222,989 
+
+0.74% 
+
+Kansas 
+
+$26,275 
+
+$84,529 
+
+$112,390 
+
+$223,194 
+
+0.74% 
+
+Kentucky 
+
+$43,712 
+
+$193,187 
+
+$165,949 
+
+$402,848 
+
+1.34% 
+
+Louisiana 
+
+$50,279 
+
+$286,980 
+
+$241,362 
+
+$578,621 
+
+1.92% 
+
+Maine 
+
+$9,274 
+
+$43,793 
+
+$44,051 
+
+$97,118 
+
+0.32% 
+
+Maryland 
+
+$45,659 
+
+$207,834 
+
+$238,803 
+
+$492,297 
+
+1.63% 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+$50,845 
+
+$214,894 
+
+$297,207 
+
+$562,947 
+
+1.87% 
+
+Michigan 
+
+$89,435 
+
+$389,797 
+
+$369,838 
+
+$849,070 
+
+2.82% 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+60 
+
+ 
+ link to page 69 link to page 69 link to page 69 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ Provided to 
+
+ the State or 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ GEER I: 
+
+ ESSER I: 
+
+ HEERF I: 
+
+ IHEs in the 
+
+ GEER I, 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Sum of 
+
+ State (Col. B ESSER I, and 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ + Col. C + 
+
+ HEERF I 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Amoun ta 
+
+ Amount 
+
+ Allocation sb 
+
+ Col. D)b 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Minnesota 
+
+$43,428 
+
+$140,137 
+
+$193,737 
+
+$377,302 
+
+1.25% 
+
+Mississippi 
+
+$34,664 
+
+$169,883 
+
+$205,185 
+
+$409,732 
+
+1.36% 
+
+Missouri 
+
+$54,645 
+
+$208,443 
+
+$231,621 
+
+$494,709 
+
+1.64% 
+
+Montana 
+
+$8,765 
+
+$41,295 
+
+$42,656 
+
+$92,716 
+
+0.31% 
+
+Nebraska 
+
+$16,358 
+
+$65,085 
+
+$70,585 
+
+$152,029 
+
+0.50% 
+
+Nevada 
+
+$26,478 
+
+$117,185 
+
+$74,319 
+
+$217,982 
+
+0.72% 
+
+New Hampshire 
+
+$8,892 
+
+$37,641 
+
+$43,152 
+
+$89,685 
+
+0.30% 
+
+New Jersey 
+
+$68,867 
+
+$310,371 
+
+$347,359 
+
+$726,597 
+
+2.41% 
+
+New Mexico 
+
+$22,263 
+
+$108,575 
+
+$75,316 
+
+$206,154 
+
+0.68% 
+
+New York 
+
+$164,291 
+
+$1,037,046 
+
+$991,802 
+
+$2,193,139 
+
+7.28% 
+
+North Carolina 
+
+$95,642 
+
+$396,312 
+
+$471,675 
+
+$963,628 
+
+3.20% 
+
+North Dakota 
+
+$5,933 
+
+$33,298 
+
+$31,549 
+
+$70,780 
+
+0.23% 
+
+Ohio 
+
+$104,920 
+
+$489,205 
+
+$431,271 
+
+$1,025,396 
+
+3.40% 
+
+Oklahoma 
+
+$39,921 
+
+$160,950 
+
+$180,863 
+
+$381,734 
+
+1.27% 
+
+Oregon 
+
+$32,509 
+
+$121,099 
+
+$134,996 
+
+$288,603 
+
+0.96% 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+$104,421 
+
+$523,807 
+
+$526,141 
+
+$1,154,369 
+
+3.83% 
+
+Puerto Rico 
+
+$47,815 
+
+$349,113 
+
+$344,083 
+
+$741,011 
+
+2.46% 
+
+Rhode Island 
+
+$8,704 
+
+$46,350 
+
+$66,915 
+
+$121,970 
+
+0.40% 
+
+South Carolina 
+
+$48,470 
+
+$216,311 
+
+$207,135 
+
+$471,916 
+
+1.57% 
+
+South Dakota 
+
+$7,944 
+
+$41,295 
+
+$35,096 
+
+$84,336 
+
+0.28% 
+
+Tennessee 
+
+$63,584 
+
+$259,891 
+
+$276,821 
+
+$600,296 
+
+1.99% 
+
+Texas 
+
+$307,036 
+
+$1,285,886 
+
+$1,147,979 
+
+$2,740,901 
+
+9.10% 
+
+Utah 
+
+$29,190 
+
+$67,822 
+
+$149,085 
+
+$246,097 
+
+0.82% 
+
+Vermont 
+
+$4,489 
+
+$31,148 
+
+$24,267 
+
+$59,904 
+
+0.20% 
+
+Virginia 
+
+$66,777 
+
+$238,599 
+
+$343,673 
+
+$649,050 
+
+2.15% 
+
+Washington 
+
+$56,771 
+
+$216,892 
+
+$234,057 
+
+$507,720 
+
+1.68% 
+
+West Virginia 
+
+$16,354 
+
+$86,640 
+
+$82,049 
+
+$185,043 
+
+0.61% 
+
+Wisconsin 
+
+$46,552 
+
+$174,778 
+
+$185,285 
+
+$406,614 
+
+1.35% 
+
+Wyoming 
+
+$4,701 
+
+$32,563 
+
+$13,695 
+
+$50,958 
+
+0.17% 
+
+American Samoa 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,624 
+
+$1,624 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+61 
+
+ 
+ link to page 69 link to page 69 link to page 69 link to page 69 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ Provided to 
+
+ the State or 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ GEER I: 
+
+ ESSER I: 
+
+ HEERF I: 
+
+ IHEs in the 
+
+ GEER I, 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Sum of 
+
+ State (Col. B ESSER I, and 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ + Col. C + 
+
+ HEERF I 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Amoun ta 
+
+ Amount 
+
+ Allocation sb 
+
+ Col. D)b 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Federated States of 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$3,655 
+
+$3,655 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Micronesia 
+
+Guam 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$6,237 
+
+$6,237 
+
+0.02% 
+
+Marshall Islands 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,964 
+
+$1,964 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Northern Mariana 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,847 
+
+$1,847 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Islands 
+
+Palau 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$763 
+
+$763 
+
+0.00% 
+
+U.S. Virgin Islands 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$3,589 
+
+$3,589 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Additional fund sc 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$78,176 
+
+$78,176 
+
+0.26% 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $2,953,230 
+
+ $13,229,265 
+
+ $13,952,505 
+
+ $30,135,000 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. 
+Department of Education (ED) at https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/06/
+GEERI_Methodology_Table_Revised_6.25.21_FINAL.pdf (GEER 1), https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/04/ESSER-
+Fund-State-Allocations-Table.pdf (ESSER I), and https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/caresact.html (HEERF 
+I). 
+ Notes: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded 
+numbers. NA: not applicable. The amounts exclude funds awarded to the outlying areas from the ESF reservation 
+for the outlying areas and from the ARPA appropriation for the outlying areas. 
+a. As discussed in the source of data for GEER I grant amounts cited above, the GEER state grant amounts 
+
+were revised as of June 25, 2021, due to changes in the underlying data used to calculate GEER Fund state 
+grants. This table provides the revised state grant amounts. 
+
+b. With a few exceptions, the HEERF allocation amounts are amounts available to eligible IHEs. Actual 
+
+amounts awarded to IHEs may differ as IHEs must apply and/or agree to accept the terms and conditions of 
+the awards. 
+
+c. The additional funds to be allocated under the HEERF I include $50 mil ion set aside by ED from the direct 
+
+grants for institutions that may have been eligible but may have been excluded by the formula, and 
+approximately $28.0 mil ion competitively awarded under FIPSE funds through the IREPO Grants. 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+62 
+
+ 
+ link to page 72 link to page 72 link to page 72 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Table A-2. GEER Funds, ESSER Fund State Grants, and HEERF IHE Grants 
+
+ Aggregated at the State Level for the CRRSAA ESF 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ (including 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ reservation 
+
+ Provided to 
+
+ for EANS 
+
+ the State or 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ program): 
+
+ ESSER II: 
+
+ HEERF II: 
+
+ IHEs in the 
+
+ GEER II, 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Sum of 
+
+ State (Col. B 
+
+ ESSER II, 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ + Col. C + 
+
+ and HEERF 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Amoun ta 
+
+ Amount 
+
+ Allocation sb 
+
+ Col. D)b 
+
+ II Funds 
+
+Alabama 
+
+$66,859 
+
+$899,465 
+
+$441,336 
+
+$1,407,660 
+
+1.73% 
+
+Alaska 
+
+$8,192 
+
+$159,719 
+
+$26,372 
+
+$194,283 
+
+0.24% 
+
+Arizona 
+
+$85,323 
+
+$1,149,716 
+
+$454,260 
+
+$1,689,298 
+
+2.08% 
+
+Arkansas 
+
+$36,253 
+
+$558,017 
+
+$229,499 
+
+$823,770 
+
+1.01% 
+
+California 
+
+$341,469 
+
+$6,709,634 
+
+$3,083,996 
+
+$10,135,099 
+
+12.45% 
+
+Colorado 
+
+$47,868 
+
+$519,324 
+
+$300,106 
+
+$867,298 
+
+1.07% 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+$28,283 
+
+$492,426 
+
+$223,898 
+
+$744,608 
+
+0.91% 
+
+Delaware 
+
+$8,425 
+
+$182,885 
+
+$70,809 
+
+$262,119 
+
+0.32% 
+
+District of Columbia 
+
+$7,729 
+
+$172,013 
+
+$80,212 
+
+$259,954 
+
+0.32% 
+
+Florida 
+
+$288,791 
+
+$3,133,879 
+
+$1,406,743 
+
+$4,829,413 
+
+5.93% 
+
+Georgia 
+
+$126,259 
+
+$1,892,093 
+
+$818,088 
+
+$2,836,439 
+
+3.49% 
+
+Hawaii 
+
+$14,272 
+
+$183,595 
+
+$92,636 
+
+$290,503 
+
+0.36% 
+
+Idaho 
+
+$26,440 
+
+$195,890 
+
+$116,966 
+
+$339,296 
+
+0.42% 
+
+Il inois 
+
+$132,402 
+
+$2,250,805 
+
+$764,297 
+
+$3,147,504 
+
+3.87% 
+
+Indiana 
+
+$108,190 
+
+$888,184 
+
+$416,869 
+
+$1,413,242 
+
+1.74% 
+
+Iowa 
+
+$37,839 
+
+$344,864 
+
+$211,586 
+
+$594,290 
+
+0.73% 
+
+Kansas 
+
+$38,346 
+
+$369,830 
+
+$194,426 
+
+$602,601 
+
+0.74% 
+
+Kentucky 
+
+$59,918 
+
+$928,275 
+
+$282,535 
+
+$1,270,728 
+
+1.56% 
+
+Louisiana 
+
+$78,557 
+
+$1,160,119 
+
+$399,082 
+
+$1,637,758 
+
+2.01% 
+
+Maine 
+
+$16,834 
+
+$183,139 
+
+$73,202 
+
+$273,175 
+
+0.34% 
+
+Maryland 
+
+$56,614 
+
+$868,771 
+
+$372,939 
+
+$1,298,325 
+
+1.60% 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+$46,854 
+
+$814,890 
+
+$476,685 
+
+$1,338,429 
+
+1.64% 
+
+Michigan 
+
+$125,666 
+
+$1,656,308 
+
+$615,386 
+
+$2,397,360 
+
+2.95% 
+
+Minnesota 
+
+$61,394 
+
+$588,036 
+
+$327,545 
+
+$976,975 
+
+1.20% 
+
+Mississippi 
+
+$46,935 
+
+$724,533 
+
+$329,639 
+
+$1,101,107 
+
+1.35% 
+
+Missouri 
+
+$91,696 
+
+$871,172 
+
+$381,905 
+
+$1,344,773 
+
+1.65% 
+
+Montana 
+
+$16,742 
+
+$170,099 
+
+$69,785 
+
+$256,626 
+
+0.32% 
+
+Nebraska 
+
+$24,434 
+
+$243,074 
+
+$123,525 
+
+$391,033 
+
+0.48% 
+
+Nevada 
+
+$31,388 
+
+$477,322 
+
+$123,870 
+
+$632,580 
+
+0.78% 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+63 
+
+ 
+ link to page 72 link to page 72 link to page 72 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ (including 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ reservation 
+
+ Provided to 
+
+ for EANS 
+
+ the State or 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ program): 
+
+ ESSER II: 
+
+ HEERF II: 
+
+ IHEs in the 
+
+ GEER II, 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Sum of 
+
+ State (Col. B 
+
+ ESSER II, 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ + Col. C + 
+
+ and HEERF 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Amoun ta 
+
+ Amount 
+
+ Allocation sb 
+
+ Col. D)b 
+
+ II Funds 
+
+New Hampshire 
+
+$10,869 
+
+$156,066 
+
+$95,706 
+
+$262,641 
+
+0.32% 
+
+New Jersey 
+
+$98,681 
+
+$1,230,972 
+
+$546,089 
+
+$1,875,741 
+
+2.30% 
+
+New Mexico 
+
+$27,132 
+
+$435,939 
+
+$140,547 
+
+$603,618 
+
+0.74% 
+
+New York 
+
+$322,887 
+
+$4,002,382 
+
+$1,562,702 
+
+$5,887,971 
+
+7.24% 
+
+North Carolina 
+
+$127,753 
+
+$1,602,591 
+
+$763,480 
+
+$2,493,824 
+
+3.06% 
+
+North Dakota 
+
+$6,731 
+
+$135,924 
+
+$51,131 
+
+$193,787 
+
+0.24% 
+
+Ohio 
+
+$201,199 
+
+$1,991,251 
+
+$677,710 
+
+$2,870,160 
+
+3.53% 
+
+Oklahoma 
+
+$48,699 
+
+$665,039 
+
+$275,806 
+
+$989,544 
+
+1.22% 
+
+Oregon 
+
+$41,770 
+
+$499,154 
+
+$237,123 
+
+$778,047 
+
+0.96% 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+$197,105 
+
+$2,224,964 
+
+$781,918 
+
+$3,203,987 
+
+3.94% 
+
+Puerto Rico 
+
+$125,997 
+
+$1,320,626 
+
+$477,661 
+
+$1,924,285 
+
+2.36% 
+
+Rhode Island 
+
+$10,954 
+
+$184,792 
+
+$105,629 
+
+$301,374 
+
+0.37% 
+
+South Carolina 
+
+$61,075 
+
+$940,421 
+
+$335,104 
+
+$1,336,599 
+
+1.64% 
+
+South Dakota 
+
+$11,277 
+
+$170,099 
+
+$55,591 
+
+$236,967 
+
+0.29% 
+
+Tennessee 
+
+$100,646 
+
+$1,107,656 
+
+$466,437 
+
+$1,674,739 
+
+2.06% 
+
+Texas 
+
+$287,526 
+
+$5,529,552 
+
+$1,972,687 
+
+$7,789,764 
+
+9.57% 
+
+Utah 
+
+$37,180 
+
+$274,072 
+
+$293,452 
+
+$604,704 
+
+0.74% 
+
+Vermont 
+
+$6,215 
+
+$126,973 
+
+$37,562 
+
+$170,751 
+
+0.21% 
+
+Virginia 
+
+$76,589 
+
+$939,281 
+
+$546,806 
+
+$1,562,675 
+
+1.92% 
+
+Washington 
+
+$71,719 
+
+$824,852 
+
+$387,856 
+
+$1,284,428 
+
+1.58% 
+
+West Virginia 
+
+$16,113 
+
+$339,032 
+
+$120,396 
+
+$475,541 
+
+0.58% 
+
+Wisconsin 
+
+$98,328 
+
+$686,056 
+
+$326,565 
+
+$1,110,949 
+
+1.37% 
+
+Wyoming 
+
+$6,645 
+
+$135,231 
+
+$25,257 
+
+$167,133 
+
+0.21% 
+
+American Samoa 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$2,679 
+
+$2,679 
+
+0.00% 
+
+Federated States of 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$6,773 
+
+$6,773 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Micronesia 
+
+Guam 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$10,486 
+
+$10,486 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Marshall Islands 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$3,733 
+
+$3,733 
+
+0.00% 
+
+Northern Mariana 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$3,286 
+
+$3,286 
+
+0.00% 
+
+Islands 
+
+Palau 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,288 
+
+$1,288 
+
+0.00% 
+
+U.S. Virgin Islands 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$6,824 
+
+$6,824 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+64 
+
+ 
+ link to page 72 link to page 72 link to page 72 link to page 72 link to page 75 link to page 75 link to page 75 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ (including 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ reservation 
+
+ Provided to 
+
+ for EANS 
+
+ the State or 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ program): 
+
+ ESSER II: 
+
+ HEERF II: 
+
+ IHEs in the 
+
+ GEER II, 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Sum of 
+
+ State (Col. B 
+
+ ESSER II, 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ + Col. C + 
+
+ and HEERF 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Amoun ta 
+
+ Amount 
+
+ Allocation sb 
+
+ Col. D)b 
+
+ II Funds 
+
+Additional fund sc 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$188,508 
+
+$188,508 
+
+0.23% 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $4,053,060 
+
+ $54,311,004 
+
+ $23,014,987 
+
+ $81,379,051 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. 
+Department of Education (ED) at https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/06/FINAL_GEERII_EANS-
+Methodology_Table_Revised_6.25.21.pdf (GEER II), https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/01/
+Final_ESSERII_Methodology_Table_1.5.21.pdf (ESSER II), and https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/
+crrsaa.html (HEERF II). 
+ Notes: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded 
+numbers. NA: not applicable. The amounts exclude funds awarded to the outlying areas from the ESF reservation 
+for the outlying areas and from the ARPA appropriation for the outlying areas. 
+a. As discussed in the source of data for GEER II grant amounts cited above, the GEER state grant amounts 
+
+were revised as of June 25, 2021, due to changes in the underlying data used to calculate GEER Fund state 
+grants. This table provides the revised state grant amounts. 
+
+b. With a few exceptions, the HEERF allocation amounts are amounts available to IHEs. Actual amounts 
+
+awarded to IHEs may differ as IHEs must apply and/or agree to accept the terms and conditions of the 
+awards. 
+
+c. The additional funds to be allocated under the HEERF II include $75 mil ion to be awarded under the MSI 
+
+Historically Black Col eges and Universities program in accordance with each IHE’s inverse share of total 
+endowments and $113 mil ion to be distributed under FIPSE through SAIHE program. 
+
+ 
+
+ Table A-3. EANS Program, ESSER Fund State Grants, and HEERF IHE Grants 
+
+ Aggregated at the State Level for the ARPA 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ ESSER III 
+
+ (not 
+
+ including 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ reservation 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ for 
+
+ Provided to 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ EANS 
+
+ Homeless 
+
+ the State or 
+
+ EANS 
+
+ Program: 
+
+ Education): 
+
+ HEERF III: 
+
+ IHEs in the 
+
+ Program, 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Sum of 
+
+ State (Col. B 
+
+ ESSER III, 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ + Col. C + 
+
+ and HEERF 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Amount 
+
+ Amoun ta 
+
+ Allocation sb 
+
+ Col. D)b 
+
+ III Funds 
+
+Alabama 
+
+$44,896 
+
+$2,021,519 
+
+$799,913 
+
+$2,866,327 
+
+1.74% 
+
+Alaska 
+
+$5,882 
+
+$358,771 
+
+$42,283 
+
+$406,936 
+
+0.25% 
+
+Arizona 
+
+$54,445 
+
+$2,583,944 
+
+$716,416 
+
+$3,354,804 
+
+2.04% 
+
+Arkansas 
+
+$22,903 
+
+$1,254,120 
+
+$406,223 
+
+$1,683,246 
+
+1.02% 
+
+California 
+
+$181,312 
+
+$15,079,696 
+
+$5,273,345 
+
+$20,534,353 
+
+12.50% 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+65 
+
+ 
+ link to page 75 link to page 75 link to page 75 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ ESSER III 
+
+ (not 
+
+ including 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ reservation 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ for 
+
+ Provided to 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ EANS 
+
+ Homeless 
+
+ the State or 
+
+ EANS 
+
+ Program: 
+
+ Education): 
+
+ HEERF III: 
+
+ IHEs in the 
+
+ Program, 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Sum of 
+
+ State (Col. B 
+
+ ESSER III, 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ + Col. C + 
+
+ and HEERF 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Amount 
+
+ Amoun ta 
+
+ Allocation sb 
+
+ Col. D)b 
+
+ III Funds 
+
+Colorado 
+
+$28,710 
+
+$1,167,154 
+
+$516,690 
+
+$1,712,554 
+
+1.04% 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+$15,957 
+
+$1,106,697 
+
+$377,433 
+
+$1,500,086 
+
+0.91% 
+
+Delaware 
+
+$3,889 
+
+$410,861 
+
+$123,298 
+
+$538,049 
+
+0.33% 
+
+District of Columbia 
+
+$4,534 
+
+$386,477 
+
+$133,015 
+
+$524,026 
+
+0.32% 
+
+Florida 
+
+$221,189 
+
+$7,043,370 
+
+$2,390,632 
+
+$9,655,191 
+
+5.88% 
+
+Georgia 
+
+$75,408 
+
+$4,252,432 
+
+$1,410,018 
+
+$5,737,858 
+
+3.49% 
+
+Hawaii 
+
+$10,365 
+
+$412,530 
+
+$140,872 
+
+$563,767 
+
+0.34% 
+
+Idaho 
+
+$21,962 
+
+$440,132 
+
+$207,298 
+
+$669,392 
+
+0.41% 
+
+Il inois 
+
+$83,246 
+
+$5,058,602 
+
+$1,318,505 
+
+$6,460,353 
+
+3.93% 
+
+Indiana 
+
+$78,874 
+
+$1,996,145 
+
+$715,283 
+
+$2,790,302 
+
+1.70% 
+
+Iowa 
+
+$23,744 
+
+$775,053 
+
+$373,024 
+
+$1,171,821 
+
+0.71% 
+
+Kansas 
+
+$25,070 
+
+$831,171 
+
+$346,330 
+
+$1,202,570 
+
+0.73% 
+
+Kentucky 
+
+$42,666 
+
+$2,001,217 
+
+$486,129 
+
+$2,530,012 
+
+1.54% 
+
+Louisiana 
+
+$55,674 
+
+$2,607,344 
+
+$683,440 
+
+$3,346,458 
+
+2.04% 
+
+Maine 
+
+$12,327 
+
+$411,429 
+
+$124,774 
+
+$548,530 
+
+0.33% 
+
+Maryland 
+
+$39,249 
+
+$1,952,539 
+
+$650,508 
+
+$2,642,295 
+
+1.61% 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+$24,826 
+
+$1,831,417 
+
+$841,406 
+
+$2,697,650 
+
+1.64% 
+
+Michigan 
+
+$86,894 
+
+$3,722,478 
+
+$1,059,774 
+
+$4,869,146 
+
+2.96% 
+
+Minnesota 
+
+$40,489 
+
+$1,321,564 
+
+$565,146 
+
+$1,927,199 
+
+1.17% 
+
+Mississippi 
+
+$30,461 
+
+$1,628,366 
+
+$574,773 
+
+$2,233,601 
+
+1.36% 
+
+Missouri 
+
+$68,642 
+
+$1,957,916 
+
+$676,833 
+
+$2,703,391 
+
+1.65% 
+
+Montana 
+
+$12,063 
+
+$382,019 
+
+$121,679 
+
+$515,762 
+
+0.31% 
+
+Nebraska 
+
+$18,619 
+
+$546,290 
+
+$217,666 
+
+$782,575 
+
+0.48% 
+
+Nevada 
+
+$18,181 
+
+$1,072,783 
+
+$213,515 
+
+$1,304,480 
+
+0.79% 
+
+New Hampshire 
+
+$6,699 
+
+$350,561 
+
+$166,007 
+
+$523,267 
+
+0.32% 
+
+New Jersey 
+
+$70,948 
+
+$2,766,530 
+
+$936,663 
+
+$3,774,140 
+
+2.30% 
+
+New Mexico 
+
+$17,426 
+
+$979,762 
+
+$244,870 
+
+$1,242,058 
+
+0.76% 
+
+New York 
+
+$252,458 
+
+$8,995,282 
+
+$2,699,075 
+
+$11,946,816 
+
+7.27% 
+
+North Carolina 
+
+$82,952 
+
+$3,601,780 
+
+$1,313,201 
+
+$4,997,934 
+
+3.04% 
+
+North Dakota 
+
+$4,151 
+
+$305,338 
+
+$95,798 
+
+$405,287 
+
+0.25% 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+66 
+
+ 
+ link to page 75 link to page 75 link to page 75 link to page 75 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ ESSER III 
+
+ (not 
+
+ including 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ reservation 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ for 
+
+ Provided to 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ EANS 
+
+ Homeless 
+
+ the State or 
+
+ EANS 
+
+ Program: 
+
+ Education): 
+
+ HEERF III: 
+
+ IHEs in the 
+
+ Program, 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Sum of 
+
+ State (Col. B 
+
+ ESSER III, 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ + Col. C + 
+
+ and HEERF 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Amount 
+
+ Amoun ta 
+
+ Allocation sb 
+
+ Col. D)b 
+
+ III Funds 
+
+Ohio 
+
+$155,190 
+
+$4,475,244 
+
+$1,182,235 
+
+$5,812,669 
+
+3.54% 
+
+Oklahoma 
+
+$31,482 
+
+$1,494,647 
+
+$455,392 
+
+$1,981,521 
+
+1.21% 
+
+Oregon 
+
+$28,356 
+
+$1,121,815 
+
+$414,733 
+
+$1,564,904 
+
+0.95% 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+$152,741 
+
+$5,000,509 
+
+$1,342,372 
+
+$6,495,623 
+
+3.95% 
+
+Puerto Rico 
+
+$104,193 
+
+$2,968,079 
+
+$786,120 
+
+$3,858,393 
+
+2.35% 
+
+Rhode Island 
+
+$6,210 
+
+$415,146 
+
+$184,282 
+
+$605,637 
+
+0.37% 
+
+South Carolina 
+
+$40,560 
+
+$2,113,568 
+
+$601,134 
+
+$2,755,262 
+
+1.68% 
+
+South Dakota 
+
+$7,609 
+
+$382,019 
+
+$95,859 
+
+$485,488 
+
+0.30% 
+
+Tennessee 
+
+$73,683 
+
+$2,489,423 
+
+$819,673 
+
+$3,382,780 
+
+2.06% 
+
+Texas 
+
+$152,146 
+
+$12,427,523 
+
+$3,423,851 
+
+$16,003,520 
+
+9.74% 
+
+Utah 
+
+$26,428 
+
+$615,929 
+
+$505,968 
+
+$1,148,326 
+
+0.70% 
+
+Vermont 
+
+$3,877 
+
+$285,223 
+
+$66,060 
+
+$355,161 
+
+0.22% 
+
+Virginia 
+
+$46,344 
+
+$2,110,989 
+
+$948,164 
+
+$3,105,497 
+
+1.89% 
+
+Washington 
+
+$45,745 
+
+$1,853,788 
+
+$677,769 
+
+$2,577,302 
+
+1.57% 
+
+West Virginia 
+
+$9,764 
+
+$761,960 
+
+$212,053 
+
+$983,777 
+
+0.60% 
+
+Wisconsin 
+
+$73,876 
+
+$1,541,867 
+
+$579,425 
+
+$2,195,168 
+
+1.34% 
+
+Wyoming 
+
+$4,683 
+
+$303,779 
+
+$44,604 
+
+$353,067 
+
+0.21% 
+
+American Samoa 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$6,927 
+
+$6,927 
+
+0.00% 
+
+Federated States of 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$17,413 
+
+$17,413 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Micronesia 
+
+Guam 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$27,202 
+
+$27,202 
+
+0.02% 
+
+Marshall Islands 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$9,608 
+
+$9,608 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Northern Mariana Islands 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$8,425 
+
+$8,425 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Palau 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$3,317 
+
+$3,317 
+
+0.00% 
+
+U.S. Virgin Islands 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$12,225 
+
+$12,225 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Additional fund sc 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$197,923 
+
+$197,923 
+
+0.12% 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $2,750,000 $121,974,800 
+
+ $39,584,570 $164,309,370 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. 
+Department of Education (ED) at https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/04/Final_ARP-EANS-Methodology-and-Table-
+3.16.21.pdf (EANS II), https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/06/Revised-ARP-ESSER-Methodology-and-Allocation-
+Table_6.25.21_FINAL.pdf (ESSER III), and https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/arp.html (HEERF III). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+67 
+
+ 
+ link to page 77 link to page 77 link to page 78 link to page 78 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Notes: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded 
+numbers. NA: not applicable. The amounts exclude funds awarded to the outlying areas from the ESF reservation 
+for the outlying areas and from the ARPA appropriation for the outlying areas. 
+a. As discussed in the source for ESSER III grant amounts cited above, the ESSER state grant amounts were 
+
+revised as of June 25, 2021, due to changes in the underlying data used to calculate ESSER Fund state grants. 
+While the change in the underlying data affected ESSER state grants under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and 
+ARPA, all of the needed adjustments in state grant amounts were made to the ESSER state grants funded by 
+the ARPA. This table provides the revised state grant amounts. The $800 mil ion reservation for homeless 
+education was not included in the table. The total appropriation for ESSER III including the $800 mil ion 
+reservation is $122,774,800,000. 
+
+b. With a few exceptions, the HEERF allocation amounts are amounts available to eligible IHEs. Actual 
+
+amounts awarded to IHEs may differ as IHEs must apply and/or agree to accept the terms and conditions of 
+the awards. 
+
+c. The additional funds to be allocated under the HEERF III represent $197 mil ion to be distributed under 
+
+FIPSE through the SSARP program. 
+
+ 
+
+ Table A-4. Total GEER Funds, EANS Program, ESSER Fund State Grants, and HEERF 
+
+ IHE Grants Aggregated at the State Level for the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ ESF 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ GEER and 
+
+ Provided to 
+
+ Total GEER 
+
+ EANS 
+
+ the State or 
+
+ and EANS 
+
+ Program: 
+
+ ESSER: 
+
+ IHEs in the 
+
+ Program, 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ HEERF: Sum State (Col. B 
+
+ ESSER, and 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ of Estimated 
+
+ + Col. C + 
+
+ HEERF 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Amoun ta 
+
+ Amoun tb 
+
+ Allocation sc 
+
+ Col. D)c 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Alabama 
+
+$160,608 
+
+$3,137,931 
+
+$1,515,345 
+
+$4,813,884 
+
+1.75% 
+
+Alaska 
+
+$20,578 
+
+$556,898 
+
+$82,979 
+
+$660,456 
+
+0.24% 
+
+Arizona 
+
+$208,966 
+
+$4,011,082 
+
+$1,475,704 
+
+$5,695,752 
+
+2.06% 
+
+Arkansas 
+
+$89,821 
+
+$1,940,896 
+
+$773,043 
+
+$2,803,760 
+
+1.02% 
+
+California 
+
+$878,019 
+
+$23,436,636 
+
+$10,183,195 
+
+$34,497,850 
+
+12.51% 
+
+Colorado 
+
+$120,584 
+
+$1,807,472 
+
+$993,381 
+
+$2,921,437 
+
+1.06% 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+$72,122 
+
+$1,710,191 
+
+$747,426 
+
+$2,529,739 
+
+0.92% 
+
+Delaware 
+
+$20,232 
+
+$637,239 
+
+$241,263 
+
+$898,734 
+
+0.33% 
+
+District of Columbia 
+
+$18,070 
+
+$600,497 
+
+$271,335 
+
+$889,902 
+
+0.32% 
+
+Florida 
+
+$683,571 
+
+$10,947,497 
+
+$4,620,281 
+
+$16,251,349 
+
+5.89% 
+
+Georgia 
+
+$307,391 
+
+$6,601,694 
+
+$2,694,996 
+
+$9,604,081 
+
+3.48% 
+
+Hawaii 
+
+$34,630 
+
+$639,511 
+
+$287,565 
+
+$961,706 
+
+0.35% 
+
+Idaho 
+
+$64,078 
+
+$683,877 
+
+$385,767 
+
+$1,133,723 
+
+0.41% 
+
+Il inois 
+
+$324,149 
+
+$7,878,874 
+
+$2,546,401 
+
+$10,749,424 
+
+3.90% 
+
+Indiana 
+
+$248,657 
+
+$3,098,801 
+
+$1,376,167 
+
+$4,723,626 
+
+1.71% 
+
+Iowa 
+
+$87,801 
+
+$1,191,543 
+
+$709,755 
+
+$1,989,099 
+
+0.72% 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+68 
+
+ 
+ link to page 77 link to page 77 link to page 78 link to page 78 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ GEER and 
+
+ Provided to 
+
+ Total GEER 
+
+ EANS 
+
+ the State or 
+
+ and EANS 
+
+ Program: 
+
+ ESSER: 
+
+ IHEs in the 
+
+ Program, 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ HEERF: Sum State (Col. B 
+
+ ESSER, and 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ of Estimated 
+
+ + Col. C + 
+
+ HEERF 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Amoun ta 
+
+ Amoun tb 
+
+ Allocation sc 
+
+ Col. D)c 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Kansas 
+
+$89,691 
+
+$1,285,529 
+
+$653,145 
+
+$2,028,365 
+
+0.74% 
+
+Kentucky 
+
+$146,296 
+
+$3,122,679 
+
+$934,613 
+
+$4,203,587 
+
+1.52% 
+
+Louisiana 
+
+$184,510 
+
+$4,054,444 
+
+$1,323,884 
+
+$5,562,837 
+
+2.02% 
+
+Maine 
+
+$38,435 
+
+$638,361 
+
+$242,027 
+
+$918,823 
+
+0.33% 
+
+Maryland 
+
+$141,522 
+
+$3,029,144 
+
+$1,262,250 
+
+$4,432,917 
+
+1.61% 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+$122,525 
+
+$2,861,202 
+
+$1,615,299 
+
+$4,599,025 
+
+1.67% 
+
+Michigan 
+
+$301,996 
+
+$5,768,584 
+
+$2,044,998 
+
+$8,115,577 
+
+2.94% 
+
+Minnesota 
+
+$145,310 
+
+$2,049,738 
+
+$1,086,428 
+
+$3,281,477 
+
+1.19% 
+
+Mississippi 
+
+$112,060 
+
+$2,522,782 
+
+$1,109,598 
+
+$3,744,440 
+
+1.36% 
+
+Missouri 
+
+$214,982 
+
+$3,037,532 
+
+$1,290,358 
+
+$4,542,872 
+
+1.65% 
+
+Montana 
+
+$37,570 
+
+$593,414 
+
+$234,120 
+
+$865,104 
+
+0.31% 
+
+Nebraska 
+
+$59,411 
+
+$854,449 
+
+$411,777 
+
+$1,325,637 
+
+0.48% 
+
+Nevada 
+
+$76,047 
+
+$1,667,291 
+
+$411,705 
+
+$2,155,042 
+
+0.78% 
+
+New Hampshire 
+
+$26,460 
+
+$544,268 
+
+$304,865 
+
+$875,593 
+
+0.32% 
+
+New Jersey 
+
+$238,495 
+
+$4,307,873 
+
+$1,830,110 
+
+$6,376,478 
+
+2.31% 
+
+New Mexico 
+
+$66,822 
+
+$1,524,275 
+
+$460,733 
+
+$2,051,830 
+
+0.74% 
+
+New York 
+
+$739,636 
+
+$14,034,710 
+
+$5,253,579 
+
+$20,027,925 
+
+7.26% 
+
+North Carolina 
+
+$306,347 
+
+$5,600,683 
+
+$2,548,356 
+
+$8,455,386 
+
+3.07% 
+
+North Dakota 
+
+$16,816 
+
+$474,560 
+
+$178,478 
+
+$669,854 
+
+0.24% 
+
+Ohio 
+
+$461,310 
+
+$6,955,700 
+
+$2,291,216 
+
+$9,708,226 
+
+3.52% 
+
+Oklahoma 
+
+$120,102 
+
+$2,320,636 
+
+$912,061 
+
+$3,352,799 
+
+1.22% 
+
+Oregon 
+
+$102,634 
+
+$1,742,068 
+
+$786,852 
+
+$2,631,554 
+
+0.95% 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+$454,268 
+
+$7,749,281 
+
+$2,650,431 
+
+$10,853,979 
+
+3.94% 
+
+Puerto Rico 
+
+$278,006 
+
+$4,637,818 
+
+$1,607,864 
+
+$6,523,688 
+
+2.37% 
+
+Rhode Island 
+
+$25,868 
+
+$646,288 
+
+$356,826 
+
+$1,028,982 
+
+0.37% 
+
+South Carolina 
+
+$150,104 
+
+$3,270,299 
+
+$1,143,373 
+
+$4,563,777 
+
+1.65% 
+
+South Dakota 
+
+$26,830 
+
+$593,414 
+
+$186,546 
+
+$806,790 
+
+0.29% 
+
+Tennessee 
+
+$237,913 
+
+$3,856,971 
+
+$1,562,931 
+
+$5,657,814 
+
+2.05% 
+
+Texas 
+
+$746,708 
+
+$19,242,962 
+
+$6,544,517 
+
+$26,534,186 
+
+9.62% 
+
+Utah 
+
+$92,799 
+
+$957,822 
+
+$948,505 
+
+$1,999,126 
+
+0.72% 
+
+Vermont 
+
+$14,582 
+
+$443,345 
+
+$127,889 
+
+$585,816 
+
+0.21% 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+69 
+
+ 
+ link to page 77 link to page 77 link to page 78 link to page 78 link to page 78 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ GEER and 
+
+ Provided to 
+
+ Total GEER 
+
+ EANS 
+
+ the State or 
+
+ and EANS 
+
+ Program: 
+
+ ESSER: 
+
+ IHEs in the 
+
+ Program, 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ Actual 
+
+ HEERF: Sum State (Col. B 
+
+ ESSER, and 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ Grant 
+
+ of Estimated 
+
+ + Col. C + 
+
+ HEERF 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Amoun ta 
+
+ Amoun tb 
+
+ Allocation sc 
+
+ Col. D)c 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Virginia 
+
+$189,710 
+
+$3,288,869 
+
+$1,838,643 
+
+$5,317,222 
+
+1.93% 
+
+Washington 
+
+$174,235 
+
+$2,895,533 
+
+$1,299,682 
+
+$4,369,449 
+
+1.58% 
+
+West Virginia 
+
+$42,230 
+
+$1,187,633 
+
+$414,498 
+
+$1,644,361 
+
+0.60% 
+
+Wisconsin 
+
+$218,755 
+
+$2,402,701 
+
+$1,091,275 
+
+$3,712,732 
+
+1.35% 
+
+Wyoming 
+
+$16,029 
+
+$471,573 
+
+$83,556 
+
+$571,158 
+
+0.21% 
+
+American Samoa 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$11,230 
+
+$11,230 
+
+0.00% 
+
+Federated States of 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$27,841 
+
+$27,841 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Micronesia 
+
+Guam 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$43,924 
+
+$43,924 
+
+0.02% 
+
+Marshall Islands 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$15,306 
+
+$15,306 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Northern Mariana Islands 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$13,558 
+
+$13,558 
+
+0.00% 
+
+Palau 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$5,367 
+
+$5,367 
+
+0.00% 
+
+U.S. Virgin Islands 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$22,639 
+
+$22,639 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Additional fund sd 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$464,607 
+
+$464,607 
+
+0.17% 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $9,756,290 $189,515,069 
+
+ $76,552,062 $275,823,421 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. 
+Department of Education (ED). 
+
+CARES Act: https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/06/GEERI_Methodology_Table_Revised_6.25.21_FINAL.pdf (GEER 
+1), https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/04/ESSER-Fund-State-Allocations-Table.pdf (ESSER I), and https://www2.ed.gov/
+about/offices/list/ope/caresact.html (HEERF I). 
+
+CRRSAA: https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/06/FINAL_GEERII_EANS-Methodology_Table_Revised_6.25.21.pdf 
+(GEER II), https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/01/Final_ESSERII_Methodology_Table_1.5.21.pdf (ESSER II), and 
+https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/crrsaa.html (HEERF II). 
+ARPA: https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/04/Final_ARP-EANS-Methodology-and-Table-3.16.21.pdf (EANS II), 
+https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/06/Revised-ARP-ESSER-Methodology-and-Allocation-Table_6.25.21_FINAL.pdf 
+(ESSER III), and https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/arp.html (HEERF III). 
+ Notes: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded 
+
+numbers. NA: not applicable. The amounts exclude funds awarded to the outlying areas from the ESF reservation 
+for the outlying areas and from the ARPA appropriation for the outlying areas. 
+a. As discussed in the sources of data for GEER I and GEER II grant amounts cited above, the GEER state grant 
+
+amounts were revised as of June 25, 2021, due to changes in the underlying data used to calculate GEER 
+Fund state grants. This table provides the revised state grant amounts. 
+
+b. As discussed in the source for ESSER III grant amounts cited above, the ESSER state grant amounts were 
+
+revised as of June 25, 2021, due to changes in the underlying data used to calculate ESSER Fund state grants. 
+While the change in the underlying data affected ESSER state grants under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and 
+ARPA, all of the needed adjustments in state grant amounts were made to the ESSER state grants funded by 
+the ARPA. This table provides the revised state grant amounts. The $800 mil ion reservation for homeless 
+education is not included in the table. The total appropriation for ESSER III including the $800 mil ion 
+reservation is $122,774,800,000. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+70 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+c. With a few exceptions, the HEERF allocation amounts are amounts available to eligible institutions of higher 
+
+education (IHEs). Actual amounts awarded to IHEs may differ as IHEs must apply and/or agree to accept the 
+terms and conditions of the awards. 
+
+d. The additional funds to be allocated under HEERF include $50 mil ion set aside by ED from the HEERF I 
+
+direct grants for institutions that may have been eligible but that may have excluded by the formula; 
+approximately $28.0 mil ion competitively awarded under the HEERF I FIPSE funds through IREPO Grants; 
+$75 mil ion to be awarded under the HEERF II MSI Historically Black Col eges and Universities program in 
+accordance with each IHE’s inverse share of total endowments; $113 mil ion to be distributed under the 
+HEERF II FIPSE through the SAIHE program; and $197 mil ion to be distributed under the HEERF III FIPSE 
+through the SSARP program. 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+71 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Table A-5. Actual Grants to the Outlying Areas from ESF Funds Reserved Under the CARES Act and CRRSAA, and from 
+
+ Funds for the Outlying Areas Under the ARPA, for Programs Administered by ED 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ J 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act ESF 
+
+ CRRSAA ESF 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Total (Col. 
+
+ Total (Col. 
+
+ Total (Col. 
+
+ D + Col. G 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Outlying Area 
+
+ GEER Fund 
+
+ ESSER Fund 
+
+ B + Col. C) 
+
+ GEER Fund 
+
+ ESSER Fund 
+
+ E + Col. F) 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ + Col. H) 
+
+ Total 
+
+American Samoa 
+
+$7,272 
+
+$38,322 
+
+$45,594 
+
+$19,364 
+
+$102,042 
+
+$121,406 
+
+$264,826 
+
+$431,827 
+
+30.56% 
+
+Commonwealth 
+of the Northern 
+Mariana Islands 
+
+$4,777 
+
+$23,164 
+
+$27,941 
+
+$12,721 
+
+$61,680 
+
+$74,400 
+
+$160,075 
+
+$262,416 
+
+18.57% 
+
+Guam 
+
+$12,500 
+
+$41,522 
+
+$54,022 
+
+$33,284 
+
+$110,563 
+
+$143,848 
+
+$286,941 
+
+$484,810 
+
+34.31% 
+
+U.S. Virgin 
+Islands 
+
+$6,201 
+
+$19,992 
+
+$26,193 
+
+$16,511 
+
+$53,235 
+
+$69,746 
+
+$138,158 
+
+$234,097 
+
+16.57% 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $30,750 
+
+ $123,000 
+
+ $153,750 
+
+ $81,880 
+
+ $327,520 
+
+ $409,400 
+
+ $850,000 
+
+ $1,413,150 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from U. S. Department of Education (ED), Education Stabilization Fund 
+Allocations to the Outlying Areas , May 2020, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/05/OA-Allocations-Table.pdf; ED, Education Stabilization Fund II Allocations to the Outlying Areas , 
+January 11, 2021; and ED, American Rescue Plan Allocations to the Outlying Areas , April 6, 2021, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/04/ARP-OAs-Methodology-and-Table.docx. 
+ Notes: Details may not round to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded numbers. The ARPA did not provide funds for the outlying 
+areas under the ESF. Rather, the outlying areas received an appropriation of $850,000,000 under Title II—Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions—of the 
+ARPA. These funds are to be allocated by the Secretary of Education based upon the respective needs of the outlying areas. The ARPA did not define the term outlying 
+areas for purposes of the Title II funds. The amounts exclude funds allocated to IHEs in the outlying areas through the HEERF. 
+
+ 
+
+CRS-72 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendix B. Obligation and Liquidation of Funds 
+Under ESF Programs 
+ This appendix provides specific information about the obligation and liquidation of 
+appropriations provided under the GEER Fund, EANS program, ESSER Fund, and HEERF, as 
+funded under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA.145 
+
+All periods of obligation and liquidation discussed in this appendix are the maximum amount of 
+time an entity has available to obligate or liquidate funds that have been awarded by ED. The 
+entity is not required to use the maximum amount of time available to do so. 
+
+It may be possible for a grantee to receive an extension of time to obligate or liquidate funds 
+beyond the periods included in the tables below. These options are discussed below. However, 
+extensions of the period to obligate or liquidate funds cannot extend beyond the date on which the 
+funds revert to the U.S. Treasury. At that point, the funds are no longer available for obligation or 
+liquidation. 
+
+The remainder of this appendix discusses the obligation and liquidation of funds under the GEER 
+Fund, EANS program, ESSER Fund, and HEERF. The GEER Fund, EANS program, and ESSER 
+Fund are discussed in one section and the HEERF is discussed in a subsequent section, as the 
+requirements for the obligation and liquidation of funds differ for state-administered programs 
+(i.e., the GEER Fund, EANS program, and ESSER Fund) and non-state-administered programs 
+(i.e., HEERF). 
+
+ Obligation and Liquidation of Funds Under the GEER Fund, EANS 
+Program, and ESSER Fund 
+ This section discusses the obligation and liquidation of funds under the GEER Fund, EANS 
+program, and ESSER Fund, which are all state-administered programs. While there are similar 
+provisions that apply to all of these programs, they each have unique features. This section begins 
+with a general discussion of provisions that apply to all three programs, followed by a discussion 
+of provisions specific to each program. 
+
+For the GEER Fund, EANS program, and ESSER Fund, the period of availability of funds varies 
+for funds appropriated under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA but is the same for each of 
+the three programs under each act in which the program is authorized. For the GEER Fund, 
+EANS program, and ESSER Fund, Section 421 of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA), 
+commonly referred to as the Tydings period or Tydings amendment , extends the period of 
+obligation of funds by LEAs and other subrecipients of grants by one year beyond the period of 
+availability included in statutory language.146 Following the Tydings period, LEAs and other 
+subgrantees have 120 days to liquidate the obligated funds.147 
+
+ 
+145 Obligation and liquidation periods for funds provided to the outlying areas and BIE under the ESF as provided by 
+the CARES Act and CRRSAA are not specifically discussed. 
+
+146 The Tydings period only applies to programs administered by ED that are subject to 34 C.F.R., Part 76, which 
+includes state-administered formula grant programs. 
+
+147 2 C.F.R. §200.344. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+73 
+
+ 
+ link to page 81 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+For state-administered programs, ED will consider late liquidation requests that, if approved, 
+extend the period for the liquidation of funds.148 Thus, under the GEER Fund, EANS program, 
+and ESSER Fund, an LEA or subgrantee (or SEA with respect to administrative funds) may 
+request that ED provide a late liquidation period. Such a request must be submitted to ED no later 
+than 18 months after the end of the Tydings period.149 According to ED policy, “in all 
+circumstances, including late liquidations, Federal funds may be used only for obligations that 
+were incurred during the grant period (including the Tydings period) and only for allowable costs 
+under the relevant program.”150 ED will only consider late liquidation requests beyond 18 months 
+from the end of the Tydings period under “extraordinary circumstances or in cases involving 
+lengthy construction contracts.”151 Funds will revert to the U.S. Treasury five years from the end 
+of the original period of availability (as opposed to the end of the Tydings period).152 
+
+ GEER Fund 
+
+ Table B-1 details obligation153 and liquidation periods for the GEER Fund. These requirements 
+apply to the subgrant recipients under the fund. Statutory provisions require that any funds not 
+awarded by a governor within one year of receipt must be returned to ED for distribution to other 
+states. 
+
+ Table B-1. Obligation and Liquidation Periods for the GEER Fund Under the CARES 
+
+ Act and CRRSAA 
+
+ 18-Month 
+
+ Request 
+
+ Period for 
+
+ 120-Day 
+
+ Late 
+
+ Extension for 
+
+ Liquidation 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ Extension of 
+
+ LEAs and 
+
+ for LEAs and 
+
+ Time for 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ Other 
+
+ Other 
+
+ Governors to 
+
+ Obligation 
+
+ Subgrantees 
+
+ Subgrantees 
+
+ Subgrant 
+
+ for LEAs and 
+
+ to Liquidate 
+
+ Following 
+
+ Date on 
+
+ Awards 
+
+ Other 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Tydings 
+
+ Which Funds 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ (Before 
+
+ Subgrantees 
+
+ Following 
+
+ Period 
+
+ Revert to the 
+
+ Availability in Funds Revert 
+
+ (Tydings 
+
+ Tydings 
+
+ (Requires ED 
+
+ U.S. 
+
+ Act 
+
+ Law 
+
+ to ED) 
+
+ Period) 
+
+ Period 
+
+ Approval) 
+
+ Treasury 
+
+CARES Act 
+
+Through 
+
+One year from 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+9/30/2026 
+
+9/30/2021 
+
+receipt of funds 
+
+9/30/2022 
+
+1/28/2023 
+
+3/30/2024 
+
+CRRSAA 
+
+Through 
+
+One year from 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+9/30/2027 
+
+9/30/2022 
+
+receipt of funds 
+
+9/20/2023 
+
+1/28/2024 
+
+3/30/2025 
+
+ 
+148 U.S. Department of Education, Extension of Liquidation Periods and Related Accounting Adjustments for Grantees 
+under Department of Education State-Administered Programs, June 5, 2007, https://www2.ed.gov/policy/fund/guid/
+lateliquidation.doc. (Hereinafter referred to as ED, Extension of Liquidation Periods, 2007.) 
+
+149 ED, Extension of Liquidation Periods , 2007. 
+150 ED, Extension of Liquidation Periods , 2007, p. 3. 
+151 ED, Extension of Liquidation Periods , 2007, pp. 2-3. 
+152 ED, Extension of Liquidation Periods , 2007. 
+153 Subgrants to an LEA, IHE, or other education-related entity by the governor are not considered an obligation of 
+funds. Funds are considered obligated when the LEA, IHE, or other education-related entity commits those funds to a 
+specific purpose. For more information, see U.S. Department of Education, Frequently Asked Questions About the 
+Governors Emergency Education Relief Fund (GEER Fund) , 2020, Item A-19, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/10/FAQs-
+GEER-Fund.pdf. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+74 
+
+ 
+ link to page 82 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
+Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136); the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental 
+Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) included as Division M in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 
+(CAA; P.L. 116-260; and CRS email correspondence with the U.S. Department of Education, May 4-5, 2021. 
+ Notes: The GEER Fund did not receive appropriations under the ARPA. 
+
+ EANS Program 
+
+ Table B-2 details obligation and liquidation periods for the EANS program. The requirements 
+that apply to this program are similar to those that apply to the GEER Fund. The one major 
+difference is that under the EANS program, per statutory requirements, SEAs have six months 
+from the receipt of funds by the state to obligate funds to provide assistance and services to 
+nonpublic schools. After this six-month period, any funds not obligated for these purposes revert 
+to the governor to use for purposes authorized by the GEER Fund under the CRRSAA.154 As with 
+the GEER Fund, the governor must subgrant these funds within one year of the original receipt of 
+the funds by the state. Any funds not subgranted by the governor within a year must be returned 
+to ED for distribution to other states. 
+
+ Table B-2. Obligation and Liquidation Periods for the EANS Program Under the 
+
+ CRRSAA and ARPA 
+
+ Period of Time 
+
+ for SEAs to 
+
+ Obligate Funds 
+
+ to Provide 
+
+ 18-Month 
+
+ Services and 
+
+ Late 
+
+ Assistance to 
+
+ Liquidation 
+
+ Nonpublic 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ 120-Day 
+
+ Request 
+
+ Schools (After 
+
+ Time for 
+
+ Extension 
+
+ Period for 
+
+ Which Funds 
+
+ Governors 
+
+ Extension of 
+
+ for LEAs and 
+
+ LEAs and 
+
+ Revert to the 
+
+ to 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ Other 
+
+ Other 
+
+ Governor to 
+
+ Subgrant 
+
+ Obligation 
+
+ Subgrantees 
+
+ Subgrantees 
+
+ Date on 
+
+ Use Under the 
+
+ Awards 
+
+ for LEAs and 
+
+ to Liquidate 
+
+ Following 
+
+ Which 
+
+ GEER Fund, 
+
+ (Before 
+
+ Other 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Tydings 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ Assuming SEA 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Subgrantees 
+
+ Following 
+
+ Period 
+
+ Revert to 
+
+ Availability 
+
+ Met Certain 
+
+ Revert to 
+
+ (Tydings 
+
+ Tydings 
+
+ (Requires ED 
+
+ the U.S. 
+
+ Act 
+
+ in Law 
+
+ Requirements) 
+
+ ED) 
+
+ Period) 
+
+ Period 
+
+ Approval) 
+
+ Treasury 
+
+CRRSAA 
+
+Through 
+
+Six months from 
+
+One year 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+9/30/2027 
+
+9/30/2022 
+
+receipt of funds 
+
+from date 
+
+9/30/2023 
+
+1/28/2024 
+
+3/30/2025 
+
+the funds 
+
+were initially 
+
+received by 
+
+the state 
+
+ARPA 
+
+Through 
+
+Six months from 
+
+One year 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+9/30/2028 
+
+9/30/2023 
+
+receipt of funds 
+
+from date 
+
+9/30/2024 
+
+1/28/2025 
+
+3/30/2026 
+
+the funds 
+
+were initially 
+
+received by 
+
+the state 
+
+ 
+154 This requirement only applies if the SEA has met certain requirements related to obligating funds to provide 
+assistance and services to nonpublic schools. For example, an SEA must have distributed information about the EANS 
+program to nonpublic schools and make the information and application to apply for services or assistances easily 
+available. An SEA must also process all applications submitted promptly and approve or deny an application not later 
+than 30 days after the date of receipt. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+75 
+
+ 
+ link to page 83 link to page 83 link to page 83 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of provisions in the Coronavirus Response and Relief 
+Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) included as Division M in the Consolidated Appropriations 
+Act, 2021 (CAA; P.L. 116-260); the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2); and CRS email 
+correspondence with the U.S. Department of Education, May 4-5, 2021. 
+ Notes: EANS did not receive appropriations under the CARES Act. 
+LEAs: local educational agencies. 
+
+ Table B-3 details obligation155 and liquidation periods for the ESSER Fund. These requirements 
+generally do not apply to funds allocated to SEAs under the ESSER Fund, as statutory provisions 
+require that any funds not awarded by an SEA within one year of receipt must be returned to ED 
+for distribution to other states. The one exception to this is that funds allocated to SEAs that are 
+retained by the SEA for administrative purposes are subject to the obligation and liquidation 
+periods detailed i n Table B-3 . 156 The requirements detailed i n Table B-3 also apply to subgrant 
+recipients under the ESSER Fund, including LEAs. 
+
+An SEA awards funds when it makes a subgrant to an LEA or, in the case of the SEA Reserve, 
+when it enters into a subgrant or contract with a subrecipient. ESSER funds are obligated when 
+the subrecipient commits those funds to specific purposes consistent with 34 C.F.R. Section 
+76.707. If an SEA awards a contract from the SEA Reserve, that is an obligation. In contrast, 
+subgranting funds to an LEA or other subrecipient is not an obligation; rather, these funds are not 
+obligated until the LEA or other subrecipient commits the funds to specific purposes. 
+
+ Table B-3. Obligation and Liquidation Periods for the ESSER Fund Under the 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 18-Month 
+
+ Late 
+
+ 120-Day 
+
+ Liquidation 
+
+ Extension 
+
+ Request 
+
+ for LEAs, 
+
+ Period for 
+
+ Extension of 
+
+ Other 
+
+ LEAs, Other 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ Subgrantees, 
+
+ Subgrantees, 
+
+ Obligation for 
+
+ and SEAs 
+
+ and SEAs 
+
+ LEAs, Other 
+
+ (Administra- 
+
+ (Administra- 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ Subgrantees, 
+
+ tive Funds 
+
+ tive Funds 
+
+ Time for 
+
+ and Funds 
+
+ Only) to 
+
+ Only) 
+
+ SEAs to 
+
+ Reserved by 
+
+ Liquidate 
+
+ Following 
+
+ Subgrant 
+
+ SEA for 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Tydings 
+
+ Date on 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ Awards 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ Following 
+
+ Period 
+
+ Which Funds 
+
+ Availability in 
+
+ (Before Funds 
+
+ (Tydings 
+
+ Tydings 
+
+ (Requires ED 
+
+ Revert to the 
+
+ Act 
+
+ Law 
+
+ Revert to ED) 
+
+ Period) 
+
+ Period 
+
+ Approval) 
+
+ U.S. Treasury 
+
+CARES Act 
+
+Through 
+
+One year from 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+9/30/2026 
+
+9/30/2021 
+
+receipt of funds 
+
+9/30/2022 
+
+1/28/2023 
+
+3/30/2024 
+
+ 
+155 In its ESSER guidance, ED specifies what constitutes an obligation of ESSER funds: “An SEA awards funds when 
+it makes a subgrant to an LEA or, in the case of the SEA Reserve, when it enters into a subgrant or contract with a 
+subrecipient. ESSER funds are obligated when the subrecipient commits those funds to specific purposes consistent 
+with 34 C.F.R. § 76.707. If an SEA awards a contract from the SEA reserve, that is an obligation. In contrast, 
+subgranting funds to an LEA or other subrecipient is not an obligation; rather, these funds are not obligated until the 
+LEA or other subrecipient commits the funds to specific purposes.” (U.S. Department of Education, Frequently Asked 
+Questions About the Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief Fund (ESSER Fund) , 2020, Item 10, 
+https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/05/ESSER-Fund-Frequently-Asked-Questions.pdf.) 
+
+156 U.S. Department of Education, Frequently Asked Questions about the Elementary and Secondary School Emergency 
+Relief Fund (ESSER Fund) , 2020, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/05/ESSER-Fund-Frequently-Asked-Questions.pdf. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+76 
+
+ 
+ link to page 43 link to page 85 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ 18-Month 
+
+ Late 
+
+ 120-Day 
+
+ Liquidation 
+
+ Extension 
+
+ Request 
+
+ for LEAs, 
+
+ Period for 
+
+ Extension of 
+
+ Other 
+
+ LEAs, Other 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ Subgrantees, 
+
+ Subgrantees, 
+
+ Obligation for 
+
+ and SEAs 
+
+ and SEAs 
+
+ LEAs, Other 
+
+ (Administra- 
+
+ (Administra- 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ Subgrantees, 
+
+ tive Funds 
+
+ tive Funds 
+
+ Time for 
+
+ and Funds 
+
+ Only) to 
+
+ Only) 
+
+ SEAs to 
+
+ Reserved by 
+
+ Liquidate 
+
+ Following 
+
+ Subgrant 
+
+ SEA for 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Tydings 
+
+ Date on 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ Awards 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ Following 
+
+ Period 
+
+ Which Funds 
+
+ Availability in 
+
+ (Before Funds 
+
+ (Tydings 
+
+ Tydings 
+
+ (Requires ED 
+
+ Revert to the 
+
+ Act 
+
+ Law 
+
+ Revert to ED) 
+
+ Period) 
+
+ Period 
+
+ Approval) 
+
+ U.S. Treasury 
+
+CRRSAA 
+
+Through 
+
+One year from 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+9/30/2027 
+
+9/30/2022 
+
+receipt of funds 
+
+9/30/2023 
+
+1/28/2024 
+
+3/30/2025 
+
+ARPA 
+
+Through 
+
+One year from 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+Through 
+
+9/30/2028 
+
+9/30/2023 
+
+receipt of funds 
+
+9/30/2024 
+
+1/28/2025 
+
+3/30/2026 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
+Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136); the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental 
+Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) included as Division M in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 
+(CAA; P.L. 116-260); the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2); and CRS email correspondence 
+with the U.S. Department of Education, May 4-5, 2021. 
+
+ Obligations and Liquidation of Funds Under the HEERF 
+ The HEERF is distributed directly to IHEs through three types of programs: (1) direct grants to 
+IHEs, (2) MSI programs, and (3) the FIPSE. Under the CARES Act, the Secretary awarded a 
+portion of FIPSE funds under the FIPSE Formula Grant program and the remainder under the 
+competitive IREPO program.157 The Secretary has indicated that FIPSE funds would be 
+distributed by formula under the CRRSAA SAIHE program and the ARPA SSARP program.158 
+(See the “Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund” section for a detailed description of the 
+subprograms.) 
+
+ Table B-4 details obligation and liquidation periods for the HEERF Direct Grants, MSI programs, 
+and funds awarded through the CARES Act FIPSE Formula Grants program.159 Unlike the GEER 
+
+ 
+157 U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Applications for New Awards; Institutional 
+Resilience and Expanded Postsecondary Opportunity Grants Program,” 85 Federal Register 51685-51692, August 21, 
+2020. 
+
+158 U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Applications for New Awards; Fund for the 
+Improvement of Postsecondary Education—Supplemental Assistance to Institutions of Higher Education (SAIHE),” 85 
+Federal Register 16338-16342, March 29, 2021; and U.S. Department of Education, HEERF III: Supplemental Support 
+under American Rescue Plan (SSARP) (a)(3), Notice of Proposed Eligibility: (a)(3) Supplemental Support under 
+American Rescue Plan (ALN 84.425S), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/ssarp.html, as of May 13, 2021. 
+
+159 With the exception of the FIPSE grants awarded under the CARES Act as formula grants to IHEs that received less 
+than $500,000 under the Direct Grant and MSI programs, FIPSE grants have their own obligation and liquidation 
+timeline. For example, the CARES Act FIPSE grants awarded under the IREPO Grants program have an initial grant 
+period of up to 24 months. The CRRSAA FIPSE grants awarded under the SAIHE program have an initial grant period 
+of up to 12 months. The ARPA FIPSE grant award terms have not yet been released. Grantees should refer to the notice 
+inviting applications for each FIPSE competition for the project period. These grant programs are also subject to the 
+no-cost extension principles that apply under 34 C.F.R., Part 75. (U.S. Department of Education, Office of 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+77 
+
+ 
+ link to page 86 link to page 86 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+Fund, EANS program, or ESSER Fund, ED has indicated that there is not a Tydings period 
+associated with HEERF.160 Rather, IHEs have one calendar year from the last date on which they 
+received funds under each specific subprogram (e.g., direct grants to proprietary IHEs), which is 
+referred to as the period of performance.161 For example, a public or private nonprofit IHE that 
+receives a direct grant award under the CARES Act, a supplemental direct grant award under the 
+CRRSAA, and a supplemental direct grant award under the ARPA has one year from receipt of 
+the supplemental direct grant award under the ARPA to spend all remaining direct grant funds 
+under the CARES Act and CRRSAA and the direct grant funds under the ARPA. An IHE may 
+also request a no cost extension (NCE) of the period of performance of up to 12 months to 
+complete the project activities.162 This NCE requires ED approval. Following the period of 
+performance, there is a 120-day extension period for IHEs to liquidate their funds. Funds will 
+revert to the U.S. Treasury five years from the end of the original period of availability.163 
+
+ Table B-4. Obligation and Liquidation Periods for IHEs Under the HEERF Under the 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 120-Day 
+
+ Extension to 
+
+ Date on 
+
+ Liquidate 
+
+ Which 
+
+ Period of Time 
+
+ No Cost 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ to Obligate 
+
+ Extension 
+
+ Following the 
+
+ Revert to 
+
+ Availability in 
+
+ Funds (Period of 
+
+ (Requires ED 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ the U.S. 
+
+ Act 
+
+ Law 
+
+ Performance) 
+
+ Approval) 
+
+ Performance 
+
+ Treasury 
+
+CARES Ac ta 
+
+Through 
+
+One year from 
+
+Up to 12 months 
+
+120 days after the 
+
+9/30/2026 
+
+9/30/2021 
+
+receipt of funds or 
+
+after the end of 
+
+end of the period 
+
+one year from 
+
+the period of 
+
+of performance 
+
+receipt of 
+
+performance 
+
+supplemental funds 
+
+under the HEERF II 
+
+or HEERF I IIb 
+
+ 
+Postsecondary Education, “Applications for New Awards; Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education—
+Supplemental Assistance to Institutions of Higher Education (SAIHE),” 85 Federal Register 16338-16342, March 29, 
+2021; U.S. Department of Education, HEERF III: Supplemental Support under American Rescue Plan (SSARP) (a)(3), 
+Notice of Proposed Eligibility: (a)(3) Supplemental Support under American Rescue Plan (ALN 84.425S), 
+https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/ssarp.html, as of May 13, 2021; and an email to CRS from ED on May 11, 
+2021.) 
+
+160 ED has indicated that the Tydings period only applies to programs that are subject to 34 C.F.R., Part 76, which 
+includes state-administered programs. The HEERF programs are direct grant programs. (Information provided in an 
+email to CRS from ED on May 11, 2021.) 
+
+161 U.S. Department of Education, HEERF III: Institutional Portion for Public and Nonprofit Institutions (a)(1), ARP 
+HEERF III Section 2003 Frequently Asked Questions (issued May 11, 2021), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
+ope/heerfiiiinstitutional.html. 
+
+162 See 34 C.F.R. §75.261(a). According to CRS email correspondence with ED on May 11, 2021, grantees may initiate 
+a second 12-month NCE by submitting a request for prior approval to ED at least 45 calendar days before the end of the 
+project period that justifies the need for the additional time, provides updated timelines with completion dates, lists 
+remaining activities to be completed, and identifies unobligated funds. (Also see 34 C.F.R. §75.261(c)). 
+
+163 31 U.S.C. §1552(a). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+78 
+
+ 
+ link to page 86 ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ 120-Day 
+
+ Extension to 
+
+ Date on 
+
+ Liquidate 
+
+ Which 
+
+ Period of Time 
+
+ No Cost 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ to Obligate 
+
+ Extension 
+
+ Following the 
+
+ Revert to 
+
+ Availability in 
+
+ Funds (Period of 
+
+ (Requires ED 
+
+ Period of 
+
+ the U.S. 
+
+ Act 
+
+ Law 
+
+ Performance) 
+
+ Approval) 
+
+ Performance 
+
+ Treasury 
+
+CRRSAA 
+
+Through 
+
+One year from 
+
+Up to 12 months 
+
+120 days after the 
+
+9/30/2027 
+
+9/30/2022 
+
+receipt of funds or 
+
+after the end of 
+
+end of the period 
+
+one year from 
+
+the period of 
+
+of performance 
+
+receipt of 
+
+performance 
+
+supplemental funds 
+
+under the HEERF 
+
+ IIIb 
+
+ARPA 
+
+Through 
+
+One year from 
+
+Up to 12 months 
+
+120 days after the 
+
+9/30/2028 
+
+9/30/2023 
+
+receipt of funds 
+
+after the end of 
+
+end of the period 
+
+the period of 
+
+of performance 
+
+performance 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
+Economic Security Act (CARES Act; P.L. 116-136); the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental 
+Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) included as Division M in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 
+(CAA; P.L. 116-260); the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2); 34 C.F.R., Part 75; CRS email 
+correspondence with the U.S. Department of Education on May 5, 2021, and May 11, 2021; and U.S. Department 
+of Education, HEERF III: Institutional Portion for Public and Nonprofit Institutions (a)(1), ARP HEERF III Section 
+2003 Frequently Asked Questions (issued May 11, 2021), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/
+heerfi i nstitutional.html. 
+ Notes: The obligation and liquidation periods apply to the HEERF direct grants, MSI programs, and funds 
+awarded through FIPSE under the CARES Act and CRRSAA. No information is available at this time regarding 
+FIPSE under the ARPA. 
+a. The CRRSAA required the Secretary to use direct grant funds that were not obligated under the CARES 
+
+Act as of December 27, 2020, to supplement the direct grant funds for public and private nonprofit IHEs 
+available under the CRRSAA. Such CARES Act funds ($317.8 mil ion) are available for obligation and 
+liquidation as CRRSAA funds are. 
+
+b. To be considered supplemental funds, the award must be from the same HEERF program (i.e., Developing 
+
+Hispanic-Serving Institutions) as in a prior act. HEERF II direct grants to proprietary IHEs do not 
+supplement HEERF I direct grants. FIPSE grants do not supplement other FIPSE grants. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+79 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Appendix C. Actual State Grants Under the Governor’s Emergency Education 
+Relief (GEER) Fund 
+
+ Table C-1. GEER Fund State Grants Provided by the CARES Act and CRRSAA 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ J 
+
+ K 
+
+ 
+
+ GEER I 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ GEER Total 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ GEER Total 
+
+ Available 
+
+ Available 
+
+ EANS 
+
+ Available 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ (Including 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ for State 
+
+ State 
+
+ for State 
+
+ Program 
+
+ for EANS 
+
+ Total (Col. 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ EANS; Col. 
+
+ GEER Total 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Program 
+
+ D + Col. F) 
+
+ Total Funds 
+
+ B + Col. H) 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Alabama $48,853 
+
+1.65% 
+
+$21,357 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$45,502 
+
+1.65% 
+
+$66,859 
+
+1.65% 
+
+$115,712 
+
+1.65% 
+
+Alaska 
+
+$6,504 
+
+0.22% 
+
+$2,824 
+
+0.22% 
+
+$5,368 
+
+0.20% 
+
+$8,192 
+
+0.20% 
+
+$14,696 
+
+0.21% 
+
+Arizona $69,199 
+
+2.34% 
+
+$30,909 
+
+2.37% 
+
+$54,414 
+
+1.98% 
+
+$85,323 
+
+2.11% 
+
+$154,521 
+
+2.21% 
+
+Arkansas $30,665 
+
+1.04% 
+
+$13,381 
+
+1.03% 
+
+$22,872 
+
+0.83% 
+
+$36,253 
+
+0.89% 
+
+$66,918 
+
+0.96% 
+
+California $355,238 
+
+12.03% 
+
+$153,993 
+
+11.82% 
+
+$187,476 
+
+6.82% 
+
+$341,469 
+
+8.42% 
+
+$696,707 
+
+9.94% 
+
+Colorado $44,006 
+
+1.49% 
+
+$19,434 
+
+1.49% 
+
+$28,434 
+
+1.03% 
+
+$47,868 
+
+1.18% 
+
+$91,874 
+
+1.31% 
+
+Connecticut $27,882 
+
+0.94% 
+
+$12,451 
+
+0.96% 
+
+$15,832 
+
+0.58% 
+
+$28,283 
+
+0.70% 
+
+$56,165 
+
+0.80% 
+
+Delaware $7,917 
+
+0.27% 
+
+$3,459 
+
+0.27% 
+
+$4,966 
+
+0.18% 
+
+$8,425 
+
+0.21% 
+
+$16,342 
+
+0.23% 
+
+District of 
+Columbia 
+
+$5,808 
+
+0.20% 
+
+$2,416 
+
+0.19% 
+
+$5,313 
+
+0.19% 
+
+$7,729 
+
+0.19% 
+
+$13,536 
+
+0.19% 
+
+Florida $173,591 
+
+5.88% 
+
+$75,813 
+
+5.82% 
+
+$212,978 
+
+7.74% 
+
+$288,791 
+
+7.13% 
+
+$462,382 
+
+6.60% 
+
+Georgia $105,724 
+
+3.58% 
+
+$47,084 
+
+3.61% 
+
+$79,175 
+
+2.88% 
+
+$126,259 
+
+3.12% 
+
+$231,983 
+
+3.31% 
+
+Hawaii 
+
+$9,994 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$4,456 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$9,815 
+
+0.36% 
+
+$14,272 
+
+0.35% 
+
+$24,265 
+
+0.35% 
+
+Idaho 
+
+$15,677 
+
+0.53% 
+
+$6,858 
+
+0.53% 
+
+$19,582 
+
+0.71% 
+
+$26,440 
+
+0.65% 
+
+$42,116 
+
+0.60% 
+
+CRS-80 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ J 
+
+ K 
+
+ 
+
+ GEER I 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ GEER Total 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ GEER Total 
+
+ Available 
+
+ Available 
+
+ EANS 
+
+ Available 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ (Including 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ for State 
+
+ State 
+
+ for State 
+
+ Program 
+
+ for EANS 
+
+ Total (Col. 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ EANS; Col. 
+
+ GEER Total 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Program 
+
+ D + Col. F) 
+
+ Total Funds 
+
+ B + Col. H) 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Il inois 
+
+$108,501 
+
+3.67% 
+
+$47,912 
+
+3.68% 
+
+$84,490 
+
+3.07% 
+
+$132,402 
+
+3.27% 
+
+$240,903 
+
+3.44% 
+
+Indiana $61,593 
+
+2.09% 
+
+$26,534 
+
+2.04% 
+
+$81,656 
+
+2.97% 
+
+$108,190 
+
+2.67% 
+
+$169,783 
+
+2.42% 
+
+Iowa 
+
+$26,218 
+
+0.89% 
+
+$11,568 
+
+0.89% 
+
+$26,271 
+
+0.96% 
+
+$37,839 
+
+0.93% 
+
+$64,057 
+
+0.91% 
+
+Kansas $26,275 
+
+0.89% 
+
+$11,679 
+
+0.90% 
+
+$26,667 
+
+0.97% 
+
+$38,346 
+
+0.95% 
+
+$64,621 
+
+0.92% 
+
+Kentucky $43,712 
+
+1.48% 
+
+$19,100 
+
+1.47% 
+
+$40,818 
+
+1.48% 
+
+$59,918 
+
+1.48% 
+
+$103,630 
+
+1.48% 
+
+Louisiana $50,279 
+
+1.70% 
+
+$22,991 
+
+1.76% 
+
+$55,566 
+
+2.02% 
+
+$78,557 
+
+1.94% 
+
+$128,836 
+
+1.84% 
+
+Maine 
+
+$9,274 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$4,083 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$12,751 
+
+0.46% 
+
+$16,834 
+
+0.42% 
+
+$26,108 
+
+0.37% 
+
+Maryland $45,659 
+
+1.55% 
+
+$20,736 
+
+1.59% 
+
+$35,879 
+
+1.30% 
+
+$56,614 
+
+1.40% 
+
+$102,273 
+
+1.46% 
+
+Massachusetts $50,845 
+
+1.72% 
+
+$22,628 
+
+1.74% 
+
+$24,225 
+
+0.88% 
+
+$46,854 
+
+1.16% 
+
+$97,698 
+
+1.39% 
+
+Michigan $89,435 
+
+3.03% 
+
+$38,889 
+
+2.98% 
+
+$86,777 
+
+3.16% 
+
+$125,666 
+
+3.10% 
+
+$215,101 
+
+3.07% 
+
+Minnesota $43,428 
+
+1.47% 
+
+$19,486 
+
+1.50% 
+
+$41,907 
+
+1.52% 
+
+$61,394 
+
+1.51% 
+
+$104,822 
+
+1.50% 
+
+Mississippi $34,664 
+
+1.17% 
+
+$15,582 
+
+1.20% 
+
+$31,353 
+
+1.14% 
+
+$46,935 
+
+1.16% 
+
+$81,599 
+
+1.16% 
+
+Missouri $54,645 
+
+1.85% 
+
+$24,145 
+
+1.85% 
+
+$67,550 
+
+2.46% 
+
+$91,696 
+
+2.26% 
+
+$146,340 
+
+2.09% 
+
+Montana $8,765 
+
+0.30% 
+
+$3,926 
+
+0.30% 
+
+$12,816 
+
+0.47% 
+
+$16,742 
+
+0.41% 
+
+$25,507 
+
+0.36% 
+
+Nebraska $16,358 
+
+0.55% 
+
+$7,162 
+
+0.55% 
+
+$17,272 
+
+0.63% 
+
+$24,434 
+
+0.60% 
+
+$40,792 
+
+0.58% 
+
+Nevada $26,478 
+
+0.90% 
+
+$12,012 
+
+0.92% 
+
+$19,376 
+
+0.70% 
+
+$31,388 
+
+0.77% 
+
+$57,866 
+
+0.83% 
+
+New Hampshire $8,892 
+
+0.30% 
+
+$3,800 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$7,069 
+
+0.26% 
+
+$10,869 
+
+0.27% 
+
+$19,761 
+
+0.28% 
+
+New Jersey $68,867 
+
+2.33% 
+
+$29,931 
+
+2.30% 
+
+$68,750 
+
+2.50% 
+
+$98,681 
+
+2.43% 
+
+$167,547 
+
+2.39% 
+
+New Mexico $22,263 
+
+0.75% 
+
+$9,850 
+
+0.76% 
+
+$17,282 
+
+0.63% 
+
+$27,132 
+
+0.67% 
+
+$49,396 
+
+0.71% 
+
+CRS-81 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ J 
+
+ K 
+
+ 
+
+ GEER I 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ GEER Total 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ GEER Total 
+
+ Available 
+
+ Available 
+
+ EANS 
+
+ Available 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ (Including 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ for State 
+
+ State 
+
+ for State 
+
+ Program 
+
+ for EANS 
+
+ Total (Col. 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ EANS; Col. 
+
+ GEER Total 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Program 
+
+ D + Col. F) 
+
+ Total Funds 
+
+ B + Col. H) 
+
+ Funds 
+
+New York $164,291 
+
+5.56% 
+
+$72,774 
+
+5.58% 
+
+$250,113 
+
+9.10% 
+
+$322,887 
+
+7.97% 
+
+$487,178 
+
+6.95% 
+
+North Carolina $95,642 
+
+3.24% 
+
+$42,929 
+
+3.29% 
+
+$84,824 
+
+3.08% 
+
+$127,753 
+
+3.15% 
+
+$223,395 
+
+3.19% 
+
+North Dakota $5,933 
+
+0.20% 
+
+$2,733 
+
+0.21% 
+
+$3,999 
+
+0.15% 
+
+$6,731 
+
+0.17% 
+
+$12,664 
+
+0.18% 
+
+Ohio $104,920 
+
+3.55% 
+
+$46,303 
+
+3.55% 
+
+$154,896 
+
+5.63% 
+
+$201,199 
+
+4.96% 
+
+$306,120 
+
+4.37% 
+
+Oklahoma $39,921 
+
+1.35% 
+
+$17,713 
+
+1.36% 
+
+$30,986 
+
+1.13% 
+
+$48,699 
+
+1.20% 
+
+$88,620 
+
+1.26% 
+
+Oregon $32,509 
+
+1.10% 
+
+$14,174 
+
+1.09% 
+
+$27,595 
+
+1.00% 
+
+$41,770 
+
+1.03% 
+
+$74,279 
+
+1.06% 
+
+Pennsylvania $104,421 
+
+3.54% 
+
+$47,083 
+
+3.61% 
+
+$150,022 
+
+5.46% 
+
+$197,105 
+
+4.86% 
+
+$301,527 
+
+4.30% 
+
+Puerto Rico $47,815 
+
+1.62% 
+
+$21,836 
+
+1.68% 
+
+$104,161 
+
+3.79% 
+
+$125,997 
+
+3.11% 
+
+$173,812 
+
+2.48% 
+
+Rhode Island $8,704 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$3,805 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$7,149 
+
+0.26% 
+
+$10,954 
+
+0.27% 
+
+$19,658 
+
+0.28% 
+
+South Carolina $48,470 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$21,093 
+
+1.62% 
+
+$39,981 
+
+1.45% 
+
+$61,075 
+
+1.51% 
+
+$109,544 
+
+1.56% 
+
+South Dakota $7,944 
+
+0.27% 
+
+$3,504 
+
+0.27% 
+
+$7,773 
+
+0.28% 
+
+$11,277 
+
+0.28% 
+
+$19,221 
+
+0.27% 
+
+Tennessee $63,584 
+
+2.15% 
+
+$27,808 
+
+2.13% 
+
+$72,838 
+
+2.65% 
+
+$100,646 
+
+2.48% 
+
+$164,230 
+
+2.34% 
+
+Texas $307,036 
+
+10.40% 
+
+$134,357 
+
+10.31% 
+
+$153,168 
+
+5.57% 
+
+$287,526 
+
+7.09% 
+
+$594,562 
+
+8.49% 
+
+Utah 
+
+$29,190 
+
+0.99% 
+
+$13,202 
+
+1.01% 
+
+$23,978 
+
+0.87% 
+
+$37,180 
+
+0.92% 
+
+$66,370 
+
+0.95% 
+
+Vermont $4,489 
+
+0.15% 
+
+$1,931 
+
+0.15% 
+
+$4,284 
+
+0.16% 
+
+$6,215 
+
+0.15% 
+
+$10,704 
+
+0.15% 
+
+Virginia 
+
+$66,777 
+
+2.26% 
+
+$29,971 
+
+2.30% 
+
+$46,618 
+
+1.70% 
+
+$76,589 
+
+1.89% 
+
+$143,366 
+
+2.05% 
+
+Washington $56,771 
+
+1.92% 
+
+$25,456 
+
+1.95% 
+
+$46,263 
+
+1.68% 
+
+$71,719 
+
+1.77% 
+
+$128,490 
+
+1.83% 
+
+West Virginia $16,354 
+
+0.55% 
+
+$7,060 
+
+0.54% 
+
+$9,052 
+
+0.33% 
+
+$16,113 
+
+0.40% 
+
+$32,467 
+
+0.46% 
+
+Wisconsin $46,552 
+
+1.58% 
+
+$20,836 
+
+1.60% 
+
+$77,492 
+
+2.82% 
+
+$98,328 
+
+2.43% 
+
+$144,880 
+
+2.07% 
+
+CRS-82 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ J 
+
+ K 
+
+ 
+
+ GEER I 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ GEER Total 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ GEER Total 
+
+ Available 
+
+ Available 
+
+ EANS 
+
+ Available 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ (Including 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ for State 
+
+ State 
+
+ for State 
+
+ Program 
+
+ for EANS 
+
+ Total (Col. 
+
+ GEER II 
+
+ EANS; Col. 
+
+ GEER Total 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Program 
+
+ D + Col. F) 
+
+ Total Funds 
+
+ B + Col. H) 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Wyoming $4,701 
+
+0.16% 
+
+$2,042 
+
+0.16% 
+
+$4,603 
+
+0.17% 
+
+$6,645 
+
+0.16% 
+
+$11,346 
+
+0.16% 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $2,953,230 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $1,303,060 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $2,750,000 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $4,053,060 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $7,006,290 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) at https://oese.ed.gov/files/
+2021/06/GEERI_Methodology_Table_Revised_6.25.21_FINAL.pdf (GEER 1) and https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/06/FINAL_GEERII_EANS-
+Methodology_Table_Revised_6.25.21.pdf (GEER II). 
+ Notes: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded numbers. As discussed in the sources above, the GEER state 
+grant amounts were revised as of June 25, 2021, due to changes in the underlying data used to calculate GEER Fund state grants. This table provides the revised state 
+grant amounts. 
+
+ 
+
+CRS-83 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Appendix D. Actual State Grants Under the Emergency Assistance for Non-
+Public Schools (EANS) Program 
+
+ Table D-1. EANS Program State Grants Provided by the CRSSAA and ARPA 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ 
+
+ EANS I 
+
+ EANS II 
+
+ EANS Total 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ State 
+
+ (reservation 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ from 
+
+ State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ State 
+
+ State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ (Col. B + 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ GEER II) 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ Col. E) 
+
+ State Funds 
+
+Alabama 
+
+$45,502 
+
+1.65% 
+
+$228 
+
+$44,896 
+
+1.63% 
+
+$224 
+
+$90,398 
+
+1.64% 
+
+Alaska 
+
+$5,368 
+
+0.20% 
+
+$200 
+
+$5,882 
+
+0.21% 
+
+$200 
+
+$11,250 
+
+0.20% 
+
+Arizona 
+
+$54,414 
+
+1.98% 
+
+$272 
+
+$54,445 
+
+1.98% 
+
+$272 
+
+$108,858 
+
+1.98% 
+
+Arkansas 
+
+$22,872 
+
+0.83% 
+
+$200 
+
+$22,903 
+
+0.83% 
+
+$200 
+
+$45,776 
+
+0.83% 
+
+California 
+
+$187,476 
+
+6.82% 
+
+$937 
+
+$181,312 
+
+6.59% 
+
+$907 
+
+$368,788 
+
+6.71% 
+
+Colorado 
+
+$28,434 
+
+1.03% 
+
+$200 
+
+$28,710 
+
+1.04% 
+
+$200 
+
+$57,144 
+
+1.04% 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+$15,832 
+
+0.58% 
+
+$200 
+
+$15,957 
+
+0.58% 
+
+$200 
+
+$31,789 
+
+0.58% 
+
+Delaware 
+
+$4,966 
+
+0.18% 
+
+$200 
+
+$3,889 
+
+0.14% 
+
+$200 
+
+$8,855 
+
+0.16% 
+
+District of Columbia 
+
+$5,313 
+
+0.19% 
+
+$200 
+
+$4,534 
+
+0.16% 
+
+$200 
+
+$9,847 
+
+0.18% 
+
+Florida 
+
+$212,978 
+
+7.74% 
+
+$1,065 
+
+$221,189 
+
+8.04% 
+
+$1,106 
+
+$434,167 
+
+7.89% 
+
+Georgia 
+
+$79,175 
+
+2.88% 
+
+$396 
+
+$75,408 
+
+2.74% 
+
+$377 
+
+$154,583 
+
+2.81% 
+
+Hawaii 
+
+$9,815 
+
+0.36% 
+
+$200 
+
+$10,365 
+
+0.38% 
+
+$200 
+
+$20,180 
+
+0.37% 
+
+Idaho 
+
+$19,582 
+
+0.71% 
+
+$200 
+
+$21,962 
+
+0.80% 
+
+$200 
+
+$41,544 
+
+0.76% 
+
+Il inois 
+
+$84,490 
+
+3.07% 
+
+$422 
+
+$83,246 
+
+3.03% 
+
+$416 
+
+$167,736 
+
+3.05% 
+
+CRS-84 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ 
+
+ EANS I 
+
+ EANS II 
+
+ EANS Total 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ State 
+
+ (reservation 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ from 
+
+ State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ State 
+
+ State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ (Col. B + 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ GEER II) 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ Col. E) 
+
+ State Funds 
+
+Indiana 
+
+$81,656 
+
+2.97% 
+
+$408 
+
+$78,874 
+
+2.87% 
+
+$394 
+
+$160,530 
+
+2.92% 
+
+Iowa 
+
+$26,271 
+
+0.96% 
+
+$200 
+
+$23,744 
+
+0.86% 
+
+$200 
+
+$50,015 
+
+0.91% 
+
+Kansas 
+
+$26,667 
+
+0.97% 
+
+$200 
+
+$25,070 
+
+0.91% 
+
+$200 
+
+$51,737 
+
+0.94% 
+
+Kentucky 
+
+$40,818 
+
+1.48% 
+
+$204 
+
+$42,666 
+
+1.55% 
+
+$213 
+
+$83,483 
+
+1.52% 
+
+Louisiana 
+
+$55,566 
+
+2.02% 
+
+$278 
+
+$55,674 
+
+2.02% 
+
+$278 
+
+$111,240 
+
+2.02% 
+
+Maine 
+
+$12,751 
+
+0.46% 
+
+$200 
+
+$12,327 
+
+0.45% 
+
+$200 
+
+$25,078 
+
+0.46% 
+
+Maryland 
+
+$35,879 
+
+1.30% 
+
+$200 
+
+$39,249 
+
+1.43% 
+
+$200 
+
+$75,127 
+
+1.37% 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+$24,225 
+
+0.88% 
+
+$200 
+
+$24,826 
+
+0.90% 
+
+$200 
+
+$49,051 
+
+0.89% 
+
+Michigan 
+
+$86,777 
+
+3.16% 
+
+$434 
+
+$86,894 
+
+3.16% 
+
+$434 
+
+$173,671 
+
+3.16% 
+
+Minnesota 
+
+$41,907 
+
+1.52% 
+
+$210 
+
+$40,489 
+
+1.47% 
+
+$202 
+
+$82,396 
+
+1.50% 
+
+Mississippi 
+
+$31,353 
+
+1.14% 
+
+$200 
+
+$30,461 
+
+1.11% 
+
+$200 
+
+$61,815 
+
+1.12% 
+
+Missouri 
+
+$67,550 
+
+2.46% 
+
+$338 
+
+$68,642 
+
+2.50% 
+
+$343 
+
+$136,192 
+
+2.48% 
+
+Montana 
+
+$12,816 
+
+0.47% 
+
+$200 
+
+$12,063 
+
+0.44% 
+
+$200 
+
+$24,880 
+
+0.45% 
+
+Nebraska 
+
+$17,272 
+
+0.63% 
+
+$200 
+
+$18,619 
+
+0.68% 
+
+$200 
+
+$35,891 
+
+0.65% 
+
+Nevada 
+
+$19,376 
+
+0.70% 
+
+$200 
+
+$18,181 
+
+0.66% 
+
+$200 
+
+$37,556 
+
+0.68% 
+
+New Hampshire 
+
+$7,069 
+
+0.26% 
+
+$200 
+
+$6,699 
+
+0.24% 
+
+$200 
+
+$13,768 
+
+0.25% 
+
+New Jersey 
+
+$68,750 
+
+2.50% 
+
+$344 
+
+$70,948 
+
+2.58% 
+
+$355 
+
+$139,698 
+
+2.54% 
+
+New Mexico 
+
+$17,282 
+
+0.63% 
+
+$200 
+
+$17,426 
+
+0.63% 
+
+$200 
+
+$34,708 
+
+0.63% 
+
+New York 
+
+$250,113 
+
+9.10% 
+
+$1,251 
+
+$252,458 
+
+9.18% 
+
+$1,262 
+
+$502,572 
+
+9.14% 
+
+CRS-85 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ 
+
+ EANS I 
+
+ EANS II 
+
+ EANS Total 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ State 
+
+ (reservation 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ from 
+
+ State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ State 
+
+ State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ (Col. B + 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ GEER II) 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ Col. E) 
+
+ State Funds 
+
+North Carolina 
+
+$84,824 
+
+3.08% 
+
+$424 
+
+$82,952 
+
+3.02% 
+
+$415 
+
+$167,776 
+
+3.05% 
+
+North Dakota 
+
+$3,999 
+
+0.15% 
+
+$200 
+
+$4,151 
+
+0.15% 
+
+$200 
+
+$8,150 
+
+0.15% 
+
+Ohio 
+
+$154,896 
+
+5.63% 
+
+$774 
+
+$155,190 
+
+5.64% 
+
+$776 
+
+$310,087 
+
+5.64% 
+
+Oklahoma 
+
+$30,986 
+
+1.13% 
+
+$200 
+
+$31,482 
+
+1.14% 
+
+$200 
+
+$62,468 
+
+1.14% 
+
+Oregon 
+
+$27,595 
+
+1.00% 
+
+$200 
+
+$28,356 
+
+1.03% 
+
+$200 
+
+$55,951 
+
+1.02% 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+$150,022 
+
+5.46% 
+
+$750 
+
+$152,741 
+
+5.55% 
+
+$764 
+
+$302,764 
+
+5.50% 
+
+Puerto Rico 
+
+$104,161 
+
+3.79% 
+
+$521 
+
+$104,193 
+
+3.79% 
+
+$521 
+
+$208,355 
+
+3.79% 
+
+Rhode Island 
+
+$7,149 
+
+0.26% 
+
+$200 
+
+$6,210 
+
+0.23% 
+
+$200 
+
+$13,358 
+
+0.24% 
+
+South Carolina 
+
+$39,981 
+
+1.45% 
+
+$200 
+
+$40,560 
+
+1.47% 
+
+$203 
+
+$80,542 
+
+1.46% 
+
+South Dakota 
+
+$7,773 
+
+0.28% 
+
+$200 
+
+$7,609 
+
+0.28% 
+
+$200 
+
+$15,382 
+
+0.28% 
+
+Tennessee 
+
+$72,838 
+
+2.65% 
+
+$364 
+
+$73,683 
+
+2.68% 
+
+$368 
+
+$146,522 
+
+2.66% 
+
+Texas 
+
+$153,168 
+
+5.57% 
+
+$766 
+
+$152,146 
+
+5.53% 
+
+$761 
+
+$305,314 
+
+5.55% 
+
+Utah 
+
+$23,978 
+
+0.87% 
+
+$200 
+
+$26,428 
+
+0.96% 
+
+$200 
+
+$50,407 
+
+0.92% 
+
+Vermont 
+
+$4,284 
+
+0.16% 
+
+$200 
+
+$3,877 
+
+0.14% 
+
+$200 
+
+$8,162 
+
+0.15% 
+
+Virginia 
+
+$46,618 
+
+1.70% 
+
+$233 
+
+$46,344 
+
+1.69% 
+
+$232 
+
+$92,962 
+
+1.69% 
+
+Washington 
+
+$46,263 
+
+1.68% 
+
+$231 
+
+$45,745 
+
+1.66% 
+
+$229 
+
+$92,008 
+
+1.67% 
+
+West Virginia 
+
+$9,052 
+
+0.33% 
+
+$200 
+
+$9,764 
+
+0.36% 
+
+$200 
+
+$18,816 
+
+0.34% 
+
+Wisconsin 
+
+$77,492 
+
+2.82% 
+
+$387 
+
+$73,876 
+
+2.69% 
+
+$369 
+
+$151,368 
+
+2.75% 
+
+Wyoming 
+
+$4,603 
+
+0.17% 
+
+$200 
+
+$4,683 
+
+0.17% 
+
+$200 
+
+$9,286 
+
+0.17% 
+
+CRS-86 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ 
+
+ EANS I 
+
+ EANS II 
+
+ EANS Total 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ State 
+
+ (reservation 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ from 
+
+ State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ State 
+
+ State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ (Col. B + 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State 
+
+ GEER II) 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ Col. E) 
+
+ State Funds 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $2,750,000 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $17,037 
+
+ $2,750,000 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $17,023 
+
+ $5,500,000 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) at https://oese.ed.gov/files/
+2021/06/FINAL_GEERII_EANS-Methodology_Table_Revised_6.25.21.pdf (GEER II, which included a reservation of funds for the EANS I), and https://oese.ed.gov/files/
+2021/04/Final_ARP-EANS-Methodology-and-Table-3.16.21.pdf (EANS II). 
+ Notes: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded numbers. An SEA may reserve not more than the greater of 
+$200,000 or 0.5% of the EANS grant to administer the services and assistance provided under the EANS program to nonpublic schools. 
+
+ 
+
+CRS-87 
+
+ 
+ link to page 97 link to page 97 
+
+ Appendix E. Actual State Grants Under the Elementary and Secondary 
+Schools Emergency Relief (ESSER) Fund 
+
+ Table E-1. State Grants Under the ESSER Fund Provided by the CARES Act (ESSER I) 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Reservation for State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ Minimum Reservation 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ for LEAs 
+
+ State 
+
+ State Grant 
+
+ Share of State Funds 
+
+ (9.5% of Col. B )a 
+
+ (0.5% of Col. B )a 
+
+ (90% of Col. B) 
+
+Alabama 
+
+$216,948 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$20,610 
+
+$1,085 
+
+$195,253 
+
+Alaska 
+
+$38,408 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$3,649 
+
+$192 
+
+$34,567 
+
+Arizona 
+
+$277,423 
+
+2.10% 
+
+$26,355 
+
+$1,387 
+
+$249,681 
+
+Arkansas 
+
+$128,759 
+
+0.97% 
+
+$12,232 
+
+$644 
+
+$115,883 
+
+California 
+
+$1,647,306 
+
+12.45% 
+
+$156,494 
+
+$8,237 
+
+$1,482,576 
+
+Colorado 
+
+$120,994 
+
+0.91% 
+
+$11,494 
+
+$605 
+
+$108,894 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+$111,068 
+
+0.84% 
+
+$10,551 
+
+$555 
+
+$99,961 
+
+Delaware 
+
+$43,493 
+
+0.33% 
+
+$4,132 
+
+$217 
+
+$39,143 
+
+District of Columbia 
+
+$42,006 
+
+0.32% 
+
+$3,991 
+
+$210 
+
+$37,806 
+
+Florida 
+
+$770,248 
+
+5.82% 
+
+$73,174 
+
+$3,851 
+
+$693,223 
+
+Georgia 
+
+$457,170 
+
+3.46% 
+
+$43,431 
+
+$2,286 
+
+$411,453 
+
+Hawaii 
+
+$43,385 
+
+0.33% 
+
+$4,122 
+
+$217 
+
+$39,047 
+
+Idaho 
+
+$47,855 
+
+0.36% 
+
+$4,546 
+
+$239 
+
+$43,069 
+
+Il inois 
+
+$569,467 
+
+4.30% 
+
+$54,099 
+
+$2,847 
+
+$512,520 
+
+Indiana 
+
+$214,473 
+
+1.62% 
+
+$20,375 
+
+$1,072 
+
+$193,025 
+
+Iowa 
+
+$71,626 
+
+0.54% 
+
+$6,804 
+
+$358 
+
+$64,463 
+
+CRS-88 
+
+ 
+ link to page 97 link to page 97 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Reservation for State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ Minimum Reservation 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ for LEAs 
+
+ State 
+
+ State Grant 
+
+ Share of State Funds 
+
+ (9.5% of Col. B )a 
+
+ (0.5% of Col. B )a 
+
+ (90% of Col. B) 
+
+Kansas 
+
+$84,529 
+
+0.64% 
+
+$8,030 
+
+$423 
+
+$76,076 
+
+Kentucky 
+
+$193,187 
+
+1.46% 
+
+$18,353 
+
+$966 
+
+$173,868 
+
+Louisiana 
+
+$286,980 
+
+2.17% 
+
+$27,263 
+
+$1,435 
+
+$258,282 
+
+Maine 
+
+$43,793 
+
+0.33% 
+
+$4,160 
+
+$219 
+
+$39,414 
+
+Maryland 
+
+$207,834 
+
+1.57% 
+
+$19,744 
+
+$1,039 
+
+$187,051 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+$214,894 
+
+1.62% 
+
+$20,415 
+
+$1,074 
+
+$193,405 
+
+Michigan 
+
+$389,797 
+
+2.95% 
+
+$37,031 
+
+$1,949 
+
+$350,817 
+
+Minnesota 
+
+$140,137 
+
+1.06% 
+
+$13,313 
+
+$701 
+
+$126,124 
+
+Mississippi 
+
+$169,883 
+
+1.28% 
+
+$16,139 
+
+$849 
+
+$152,895 
+
+Missouri 
+
+$208,443 
+
+1.58% 
+
+$19,802 
+
+$1,042 
+
+$187,599 
+
+Montana 
+
+$41,295 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$3,923 
+
+$206 
+
+$37,166 
+
+Nebraska 
+
+$65,085 
+
+0.49% 
+
+$6,183 
+
+$325 
+
+$58,577 
+
+Nevada 
+
+$117,185 
+
+0.89% 
+
+$11,133 
+
+$586 
+
+$105,467 
+
+New Hampshire 
+
+$37,641 
+
+0.28% 
+
+$3,576 
+
+$188 
+
+$33,877 
+
+New Jersey 
+
+$310,371 
+
+2.35% 
+
+$29,485 
+
+$1,552 
+
+$279,334 
+
+New Mexico 
+
+$108,575 
+
+0.82% 
+
+$10,315 
+
+$543 
+
+$97,717 
+
+New York 
+
+$1,037,046 
+
+7.84% 
+
+$98,519 
+
+$5,185 
+
+$933,341 
+
+North Carolina 
+
+$396,312 
+
+3.00% 
+
+$37,650 
+
+$1,982 
+
+$356,680 
+
+North Dakota 
+
+$33,298 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$3,163 
+
+$166 
+
+$29,968 
+
+Ohio 
+
+$489,205 
+
+3.70% 
+
+$46,474 
+
+$2,446 
+
+$440,285 
+
+Oklahoma 
+
+$160,950 
+
+1.22% 
+
+$15,290 
+
+$805 
+
+$144,855 
+
+CRS-89 
+
+ 
+ link to page 97 link to page 97 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Reservation for State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ Minimum Reservation 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ for LEAs 
+
+ State 
+
+ State Grant 
+
+ Share of State Funds 
+
+ (9.5% of Col. B )a 
+
+ (0.5% of Col. B )a 
+
+ (90% of Col. B) 
+
+Oregon 
+
+$121,099 
+
+0.92% 
+
+$11,504 
+
+$605 
+
+$108,989 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+$523,807 
+
+3.96% 
+
+$49,762 
+
+$2,619 
+
+$471,426 
+
+Puerto Rico 
+
+$349,113 
+
+2.64% 
+
+$33,166 
+
+$1,746 
+
+$314,202 
+
+Rhode Island 
+
+$46,350 
+
+0.35% 
+
+$4,403 
+
+$232 
+
+$41,715 
+
+South Carolina 
+
+$216,311 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$20,550 
+
+$1,082 
+
+$194,680 
+
+South Dakota 
+
+$41,295 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$3,923 
+
+$206 
+
+$37,166 
+
+Tennessee 
+
+$259,891 
+
+1.96% 
+
+$24,690 
+
+$1,299 
+
+$233,902 
+
+Texas 
+
+$1,285,886 
+
+9.72% 
+
+$122,159 
+
+$6,429 
+
+$1,157,297 
+
+Utah 
+
+$67,822 
+
+0.51% 
+
+$6,443 
+
+$339 
+
+$61,040 
+
+Vermont 
+
+$31,148 
+
+0.24% 
+
+$2,959 
+
+$156 
+
+$28,034 
+
+Virginia 
+
+$238,599 
+
+1.80% 
+
+$22,667 
+
+$1,193 
+
+$214,739 
+
+Washington 
+
+$216,892 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$20,605 
+
+$1,084 
+
+$195,203 
+
+West Virginia 
+
+$86,640 
+
+0.65% 
+
+$8,231 
+
+$433 
+
+$77,976 
+
+Wisconsin 
+
+$174,778 
+
+1.32% 
+
+$16,604 
+
+$874 
+
+$157,300 
+
+Wyoming 
+
+$32,563 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$3,093 
+
+$163 
+
+$29,306 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $13,229,265 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $1,256,780 
+
+ $66,146 
+
+ $11,906,339 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) at https://oese.ed.gov/files/
+2020/04/ESSER-Fund-State-Allocations-Table.pdf. 
+ Notes: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded numbers. 
+a. It was assumed that SEAs would reserve the ful 0.5% for administration, which would leave a maximum of 9.5% for other state activities. Any funds not used for 
+
+administration could be used for other state activities. 
+
+CRS-90 
+
+ 
+ link to page 97 link to page 97 
+
+ Table E-2. State Grants Under the ESSER Fund Provided by the CRRSAA (ESSER II) 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Reservation for State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ Minimum Reservation 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ for LEAs 
+
+ State 
+
+ State Grant 
+
+ Share of State Funds 
+
+ (9.5% of Col. B )a 
+
+ (0.5% of Col. B )a 
+
+ (90% of Col. B) 
+
+Alabama 
+
+$899,465 
+
+1.66% 
+
+$85,449 
+
+$4,497 
+
+$809,518 
+
+Alaska 
+
+$159,719 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$15,173 
+
+$799 
+
+$143,747 
+
+Arizona 
+
+$1,149,716 
+
+2.12% 
+
+$109,223 
+
+$5,749 
+
+$1,034,744 
+
+Arkansas 
+
+$558,017 
+
+1.03% 
+
+$53,012 
+
+$2,790 
+
+$502,216 
+
+California 
+
+$6,709,634 
+
+12.35% 
+
+$637,415 
+
+$33,548 
+
+$6,038,670 
+
+Colorado 
+
+$519,324 
+
+0.96% 
+
+$49,336 
+
+$2,597 
+
+$467,392 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+$492,426 
+
+0.91% 
+
+$46,781 
+
+$2,462 
+
+$443,184 
+
+Delaware 
+
+$182,885 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$17,374 
+
+$914 
+
+$164,597 
+
+District of Columbia 
+
+$172,013 
+
+0.32% 
+
+$16,341 
+
+$860 
+
+$154,812 
+
+Florida 
+
+$3,133,879 
+
+5.77% 
+
+$297,718 
+
+$15,669 
+
+$2,820,491 
+
+Georgia 
+
+$1,892,093 
+
+3.48% 
+
+$179,749 
+
+$9,460 
+
+$1,702,883 
+
+Hawaii 
+
+$183,595 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$17,442 
+
+$918 
+
+$165,236 
+
+Idaho 
+
+$195,890 
+
+0.36% 
+
+$18,610 
+
+$979 
+
+$176,301 
+
+Il inois 
+
+$2,250,805 
+
+4.14% 
+
+$213,826 
+
+$11,254 
+
+$2,025,724 
+
+Indiana 
+
+$888,184 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$84,377 
+
+$4,441 
+
+$799,365 
+
+Iowa 
+
+$344,864 
+
+0.63% 
+
+$32,762 
+
+$1,724 
+
+$310,378 
+
+Kansas 
+
+$369,830 
+
+0.68% 
+
+$35,134 
+
+$1,849 
+
+$332,847 
+
+Kentucky 
+
+$928,275 
+
+1.71% 
+
+$88,186 
+
+$4,641 
+
+$835,447 
+
+Louisiana 
+
+$1,160,119 
+
+2.14% 
+
+$110,211 
+
+$5,801 
+
+$1,044,107 
+
+CRS-91 
+
+ 
+ link to page 97 link to page 97 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Reservation for State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ Minimum Reservation 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ for LEAs 
+
+ State 
+
+ State Grant 
+
+ Share of State Funds 
+
+ (9.5% of Col. B )a 
+
+ (0.5% of Col. B )a 
+
+ (90% of Col. B) 
+
+Maine 
+
+$183,139 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$17,398 
+
+$916 
+
+$164,825 
+
+Maryland 
+
+$868,771 
+
+1.60% 
+
+$82,533 
+
+$4,344 
+
+$781,894 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+$814,890 
+
+1.50% 
+
+$77,415 
+
+$4,074 
+
+$733,401 
+
+Michigan 
+
+$1,656,308 
+
+3.05% 
+
+$157,349 
+
+$8,282 
+
+$1,490,677 
+
+Minnesota 
+
+$588,036 
+
+1.08% 
+
+$55,863 
+
+$2,940 
+
+$529,233 
+
+Mississippi 
+
+$724,533 
+
+1.33% 
+
+$68,831 
+
+$3,623 
+
+$652,080 
+
+Missouri 
+
+$871,172 
+
+1.60% 
+
+$82,761 
+
+$4,356 
+
+$784,055 
+
+Montana 
+
+$170,099 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$16,159 
+
+$850 
+
+$153,090 
+
+Nebraska 
+
+$243,074 
+
+0.45% 
+
+$23,092 
+
+$1,215 
+
+$218,766 
+
+Nevada 
+
+$477,322 
+
+0.88% 
+
+$45,346 
+
+$2,387 
+
+$429,590 
+
+New Hampshire 
+
+$156,066 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$14,826 
+
+$780 
+
+$140,459 
+
+New Jersey 
+
+$1,230,972 
+
+2.27% 
+
+$116,942 
+
+$6,155 
+
+$1,107,875 
+
+New Mexico 
+
+$435,939 
+
+0.80% 
+
+$41,414 
+
+$2,180 
+
+$392,345 
+
+New York 
+
+$4,002,382 
+
+7.37% 
+
+$380,226 
+
+$20,012 
+
+$3,602,144 
+
+North Carolina 
+
+$1,602,591 
+
+2.95% 
+
+$152,246 
+
+$8,013 
+
+$1,442,332 
+
+North Dakota 
+
+$135,924 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$12,913 
+
+$680 
+
+$122,332 
+
+Ohio 
+
+$1,991,251 
+
+3.67% 
+
+$189,169 
+
+$9,956 
+
+$1,792,126 
+
+Oklahoma 
+
+$665,039 
+
+1.22% 
+
+$63,179 
+
+$3,325 
+
+$598,535 
+
+Oregon 
+
+$499,154 
+
+0.92% 
+
+$47,420 
+
+$2,496 
+
+$449,239 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+$2,224,964 
+
+4.10% 
+
+$211,372 
+
+$11,125 
+
+$2,002,468 
+
+Puerto Rico 
+
+$1,320,626 
+
+2.43% 
+
+$125,459 
+
+$6,603 
+
+$1,188,564 
+
+CRS-92 
+
+ 
+ link to page 97 link to page 97 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Reservation for State 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ Minimum Reservation 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ for LEAs 
+
+ State 
+
+ State Grant 
+
+ Share of State Funds 
+
+ (9.5% of Col. B )a 
+
+ (0.5% of Col. B )a 
+
+ (90% of Col. B) 
+
+Rhode Island 
+
+$184,792 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$17,555 
+
+$924 
+
+$166,312 
+
+South Carolina 
+
+$940,421 
+
+1.73% 
+
+$89,340 
+
+$4,702 
+
+$846,379 
+
+South Dakota 
+
+$170,099 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$16,159 
+
+$850 
+
+$153,090 
+
+Tennessee 
+
+$1,107,656 
+
+2.04% 
+
+$105,227 
+
+$5,538 
+
+$996,890 
+
+Texas 
+
+$5,529,552 
+
+10.18% 
+
+$525,307 
+
+$27,648 
+
+$4,976,597 
+
+Utah 
+
+$274,072 
+
+0.50% 
+
+$26,037 
+
+$1,370 
+
+$246,665 
+
+Vermont 
+
+$126,973 
+
+0.23% 
+
+$12,062 
+
+$635 
+
+$114,276 
+
+Virginia 
+
+$939,281 
+
+1.73% 
+
+$89,232 
+
+$4,696 
+
+$845,353 
+
+Washington 
+
+$824,852 
+
+1.52% 
+
+$78,361 
+
+$4,124 
+
+$742,367 
+
+West Virginia 
+
+$339,032 
+
+0.62% 
+
+$32,208 
+
+$1,695 
+
+$305,129 
+
+Wisconsin 
+
+$686,056 
+
+1.26% 
+
+$65,175 
+
+$3,430 
+
+$617,451 
+
+Wyoming 
+
+$135,231 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$12,847 
+
+$676 
+
+$121,708 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $54,311,004 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $5,159,545 
+
+ $271,555 
+
+ $48,879,904 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) at https://oese.ed.gov/files/
+2021/01/Final_ESSERII_Methodology_Table_1.5.21.pdf. 
+ Notes: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded numbers. 
+a. It was assumed that SEAs would reserve the ful 0.5% for administration, which would leave a maximum of 9.5% for other state activities. Any funds not used for 
+
+administration could be used for other state activities. 
+
+CRS-93 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Table E-3. State Grants Under the ESSER Fund Provided by the ARPA (ESSER III) 
+
+Dollars in thousands 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ J 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ State 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ State 
+
+ State 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Minimum LEA 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ for 
+
+ for State 
+
+ State 
+
+ for LEA 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ for Learning 
+
+ for Summer 
+
+ Afterschool 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ for Learning 
+
+ State 
+
+ Loss 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ (2.5% of 
+
+ (0.5% of 
+
+ (90% of 
+
+ Loss 
+
+ State 
+
+ State Grant 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ (5% of Col. B) 
+
+ (1% of Col. B) 
+
+ (1% of Col. B) 
+
+ Col. B)a 
+
+ Col. B)a 
+
+ Col. B) 
+
+ (20% of Col. I) 
+
+Alabama 
+
+$2,021,519 
+
+1.66% 
+
+$101,076 
+
+$20,215 
+
+$20,215 
+
+$50,538 
+
+$10,108 
+
+$1,819,367 
+
+$363,873 
+
+Alaska $358,771 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$17,939 
+
+$3,588 
+
+$3,588 
+
+$8,969 
+
+$1,794 
+
+$322,894 
+
+$64,579 
+
+Arizona $2,583,944 
+
+2.12% 
+
+$129,197 
+
+$25,839 
+
+$25,839 
+
+$64,599 
+
+$12,920 
+
+$2,325,549 
+
+$465,110 
+
+Arkansas 
+
+$1,254,120 
+
+1.03% 
+
+$62,706 
+
+$12,541 
+
+$12,541 
+
+$31,353 
+
+$6,271 
+
+$1,128,708 
+
+$225,742 
+
+California 
+
+$ 15,079,696 
+
+12.36% 
+
+$753,985 
+
+$150,797 
+
+$150,797 
+
+$376,992 
+
+$75,398 
+
+$13,571,726 
+
+$2,714,345 
+
+Colorado 
+
+$ 1,167,154 
+
+0.96% 
+
+$58,358 
+
+$11,672 
+
+$11,672 
+
+$29,179 
+
+$5,836 
+
+$1,050,439 
+
+$210,088 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+$ 
+
+1,106,697 
+
+0.91% 
+
+$55,335 
+
+$11,067 
+
+$11,067 
+
+$27,667 
+
+$5,533 
+
+$996,027 
+
+$199,205 
+
+Delaware $410,861 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$20,543 
+
+$4,109 
+
+$4,109 
+
+$10,272 
+
+$2,054 
+
+$369,775 
+
+$73,955 
+
+District of 
+
+$386,477 
+
+0.32% 
+
+$19,324 
+
+$3,865 
+
+$3,865 
+
+$9,662 
+
+$1,932 
+
+$347,829 
+
+$69,566 
+
+Columbia 
+
+Florida $7,043,370 
+
+5.77% 
+
+$352,169 
+
+$70,434 
+
+$70,434 
+
+$176,084 
+
+$35,217 
+
+$6,339,033 
+
+$1,267,807 
+
+Georgia $4,252,432 
+
+3.49% 
+
+$212,622 
+
+$42,524 
+
+$42,524 
+
+$106,311 
+
+$21,262 
+
+$3,827,189 
+
+$765,438 
+
+Hawaii $412,530 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$20,627 
+
+$4,125 
+
+$4,125 
+
+$10,313 
+
+$2,063 
+
+$371,277 
+
+$74,255 
+
+Idaho $440,132 
+
+0.36% 
+
+$22,007 
+
+$4,401 
+
+$4,401 
+
+$11,003 
+
+$2,201 
+
+$396,119 
+
+$79,224 
+
+Il inois $5,058,602 
+
+4.15% 
+
+$252,930 
+
+$50,586 
+
+$50,586 
+
+$126,465 
+
+$25,293 
+
+$4,552,742 
+
+$910,548 
+
+Indiana $1,996,145 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$99,807 
+
+$19,961 
+
+$19,961 
+
+$49,904 
+
+$9,981 
+
+$1,796,531 
+
+$359,306 
+
+Iowa $775,053 
+
+0.64% 
+
+$38,753 
+
+$7,751 
+
+$7,751 
+
+$19,376 
+
+$3,875 
+
+$697,548 
+
+$139,510 
+
+Kansas $831,171 
+
+0.68% 
+
+$41,559 
+
+$8,312 
+
+$8,312 
+
+$20,779 
+
+$4,156 
+
+$748,053 
+
+$149,611 
+
+CRS-94 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ J 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ State 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ State 
+
+ State 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Minimum LEA 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ for 
+
+ for State 
+
+ State 
+
+ for LEA 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ for Learning 
+
+ for Summer 
+
+ Afterschool 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ for Learning 
+
+ State 
+
+ Loss 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ (2.5% of 
+
+ (0.5% of 
+
+ (90% of 
+
+ Loss 
+
+ State 
+
+ State Grant 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ (5% of Col. B) 
+
+ (1% of Col. B) 
+
+ (1% of Col. B) 
+
+ Col. B)a 
+
+ Col. B)a 
+
+ Col. B) 
+
+ (20% of Col. I) 
+
+Kentucky $ 2,001,217 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$100,061 
+
+$20,012 
+
+$20,012 
+
+$50,030 
+
+$10,006 
+
+$1,801,095 
+
+$360,219 
+
+Louisiana $2,607,344 
+
+2.14% 
+
+$130,367 
+
+$26,073 
+
+$26,073 
+
+$65,184 
+
+$13,037 
+
+$2,346,610 
+
+$469,322 
+
+Maine $411,429 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$20,571 
+
+$4,114 
+
+$4,114 
+
+$10,286 
+
+$2,057 
+
+$370,286 
+
+$74,057 
+
+Maryland 
+
+$1,952,539 
+
+1.60% 
+
+$97,627 
+
+$19,525 
+
+$19,525 
+
+$48,813 
+
+$9,763 
+
+$1,757,285 
+
+$351,457 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+$ 1 ,831,417 
+
+1.50% 
+
+$91,571 
+
+$18,314 
+
+$18,314 
+
+$45,785 
+
+$9,157 
+
+$1,648,275 
+
+$329,655 
+
+Michigan $3,722,478 
+
+3.05% 
+
+$186,124 
+
+$37,225 
+
+$37,225 
+
+$93,062 
+
+$18,612 
+
+$3,350,230 
+
+$670,046 
+
+Minnesota 
+
+$ 1,321,564 
+
+1.08% 
+
+$66,078 
+
+$13,216 
+
+$13,216 
+
+$33,039 
+
+$6,608 
+
+$1,189,408 
+
+$237,882 
+
+Mississippi $1,628,366 
+
+1.34% 
+
+$81,418 
+
+$16,284 
+
+$16,284 
+
+$40,709 
+
+$8,142 
+
+$1,465,530 
+
+$293,106 
+
+Missouri $1,957,916 
+
+1.61% 
+
+$97,896 
+
+$19,579 
+
+$19,579 
+
+$48,948 
+
+$9,790 
+
+$1,762,125 
+
+$352,425 
+
+Montana $382,019 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$19,101 
+
+$3,820 
+
+$3,820 
+
+$9,550 
+
+$1,910 
+
+$343,817 
+
+$68,763 
+
+Nebraska $546,290 
+
+0.45% 
+
+$27,315 
+
+$5,463 
+
+$5,463 
+
+$13,657 
+
+$2,731 
+
+$491,661 
+
+$98,332 
+
+Nevada 
+
+$1,072,783 
+
+0.88% 
+
+$53,639 
+
+$10,728 
+
+$10,728 
+
+$26,820 
+
+$5,364 
+
+$965,505 
+
+$193,101 
+
+New 
+
+$350,561 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$17,528 
+
+$3,506 
+
+$3,506 
+
+$8,764 
+
+$1,753 
+
+$315,505 
+
+$63,101 
+
+Hampshire 
+
+New Jersey 
+
+$ 
+
+2,766,530 
+
+2.27% 
+
+$138,326 
+
+$27,665 
+
+$27,665 
+
+$69,163 
+
+$13,833 
+
+$2,489,877 
+
+$497,975 
+
+New Mexico 
+
+$ 979,762 
+
+0.80% 
+
+$48,988 
+
+$9,798 
+
+$9,798 
+
+$24,494 
+
+$4,899 
+
+$881,786 
+
+$176,357 
+
+New York 
+
+$ 
+
+8,995,282 
+
+7.37% 
+
+$449,764 
+
+$89,953 
+
+$89,953 
+
+$224,882 
+
+$44,976 
+
+$8,095,754 
+
+$1,619,151 
+
+North 
+
+$3,601,780 
+
+2.95% 
+
+$180,089 
+
+$36,018 
+
+$36,018 
+
+$90,045 
+
+$18,009 
+
+$3,241,602 
+
+$648,320 
+
+Carolina 
+
+North Dakota 
+
+$ 305,338 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$15,267 
+
+$3,053 
+
+$3,053 
+
+$7,633 
+
+$1,527 
+
+$274,804 
+
+$54,961 
+
+CRS-95 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ J 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ State 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Maximum 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ State 
+
+ State 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Reservation for 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Minimum LEA 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ for 
+
+ for State 
+
+ State 
+
+ for LEA 
+
+ Reservation 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ for Learning 
+
+ for Summer 
+
+ Afterschool 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ Administration 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ for Learning 
+
+ State 
+
+ Loss 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ Activities 
+
+ (2.5% of 
+
+ (0.5% of 
+
+ (90% of 
+
+ Loss 
+
+ State 
+
+ State Grant 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ (5% of Col. B) 
+
+ (1% of Col. B) 
+
+ (1% of Col. B) 
+
+ Col. B)a 
+
+ Col. B)a 
+
+ Col. B) 
+
+ (20% of Col. I) 
+
+Ohio $4,475,244 
+
+3.67% 
+
+$223,762 
+
+$44,752 
+
+$44,752 
+
+$111,881 
+
+$22,376 
+
+$4,027,719 
+
+$805,544 
+
+Oklahoma 
+
+$ 
+
+1,494,647 
+
+1.23% 
+
+$74,732 
+
+$14,946 
+
+$14,946 
+
+$37,366 
+
+$7,473 
+
+$1,345,182 
+
+$269,036 
+
+Oregon 
+
+$1,121,815 
+
+0.92% 
+
+$56,091 
+
+$11,218 
+
+$11,218 
+
+$28,045 
+
+$5,609 
+
+$1,009,633 
+
+$201,927 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+$ 5,000,509 
+
+4.10% 
+
+$250,025 
+
+$50,005 
+
+$50,005 
+
+$125,013 
+
+$25,003 
+
+$4,500,458 
+
+$900,092 
+
+Puerto Rico 
+
+$ 2,968,079 
+
+2.43% 
+
+$148,404 
+
+$29,681 
+
+$29,681 
+
+$74,202 
+
+$14,840 
+
+$2,671,271 
+
+$534,254 
+
+Rhode Island $415,146 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$20,757 
+
+$4,151 
+
+$4,151 
+
+$10,379 
+
+$2,076 
+
+$373,631 
+
+$74,726 
+
+South Carolina 
+
+$ 
+
+2 ,113,568 
+
+1.73% 
+
+$105,678 
+
+$21,136 
+
+$21,136 
+
+$52,839 
+
+$10,568 
+
+$1,902,211 
+
+$380,442 
+
+South Dakota 
+
+$382,019 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$19,101 
+
+$3,820 
+
+$3,820 
+
+$9,550 
+
+$1,910 
+
+$343,817 
+
+$68,763 
+
+Tennessee 
+
+$ 2,489,423 
+
+2.04% 
+
+$124,471 
+
+$24,894 
+
+$24,894 
+
+$62,236 
+
+$12,447 
+
+$2,240,481 
+
+$448,096 
+
+Texas 
+
+$12,427,523 
+
+10.19% 
+
+$621,376 
+
+$124,275 
+
+$124,275 
+
+$310,688 
+
+$62,138 
+
+$11,184,771 
+
+$2,236,954 
+
+Utah $615,929 
+
+0.50% 
+
+$30,796 
+
+$6,159 
+
+$6,159 
+
+$15,398 
+
+$3,080 
+
+$554,336 
+
+$110,867 
+
+Vermont $285,223 
+
+0.23% 
+
+$14,261 
+
+$2,852 
+
+$2,852 
+
+$7,131 
+
+$1,426 
+
+$256,701 
+
+$51,340 
+
+Virginia $2,110,989 
+
+1.73% 
+
+$105,549 
+
+$21,110 
+
+$21,110 
+
+$52,775 
+
+$10,555 
+
+$1,899,890 
+
+$379,978 
+
+Washington 
+
+$ 1 ,853,788 
+
+1.52% 
+
+$92,689 
+
+$18,538 
+
+$18,538 
+
+$46,345 
+
+$9,269 
+
+$1,668,409 
+
+$333,682 
+
+West Virginia $761,960 
+
+0.62% 
+
+$38,098 
+
+$7,620 
+
+$7,620 
+
+$19,049 
+
+$3,810 
+
+$685,764 
+
+$137,153 
+
+Wisconsin 
+
+$ 1,541,867 
+
+1.26% 
+
+$77,093 
+
+$15,419 
+
+$15,419 
+
+$38,547 
+
+$7,709 
+
+$1,387,681 
+
+$277,536 
+
+Wyoming $303,779 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$15,189 
+
+$3,038 
+
+$3,038 
+
+$7,594 
+
+$1,519 
+
+$273,401 
+
+$54,680 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $121,974,800 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $6,098,740 
+
+ $1,219,748 
+
+ $1,219,748 
+
+ $3,049,370 
+
+ $609,874 
+
+ $109,777,320 
+
+ $21,955,464 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) at https://oese.ed.gov/files/
+2021/06/Revised-ARP-ESSER-Methodology-and-Al ocation-Table_6.25.21_FINAL.pdf. 
+
+CRS-96 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Notes: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded numbers. As discussed in the source above, the ESSER state 
+grant amounts were revised as of June 25, 2021, due to changes in the underlying data used to calculate ESSER Fund state grants. While the change in the underlying data 
+affected ESSER state grants under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA, all of the needed adjustments in state grant amounts were made to the ESSER state grants 
+funded by the ARPA. This table provides the revised state grant amounts. The $800 mil ion reservation for homeless education was not included in the table. The total 
+appropriation for ESSER III including the $800 mil ion reservation is $122,774,800,000. 
+a. It was assumed that SEAs would reserve the ful 0.5% for administration, which would leave a maximum of 2.5% for other state activities. Any funds not used for 
+
+administration could be used for other state activities. 
+
+ Table E-4. State Grants Under the ESSER Fund Provided by the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ J 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ Reservation of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Funds for 
+
+ ESSER I State 
+
+ State 
+
+ ESSER II 
+
+ Share of State 
+
+ ESSER III 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Total ESSER 
+
+ Share of State 
+
+ Grants to LEAs 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ State Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ State Grants 
+
+ State Funds 
+
+ State Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ (90% of Col. H) 
+
+Alabama 
+
+$216,948 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$899,465 
+
+1.66% 
+
+$2,021,519 
+
+1.66% 
+
+$3,137,931 
+
+1.66% 
+
+$2,824,138 
+
+Alaska $38,408 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$159,719 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$358,771 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$556,898 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$501,208 
+
+Arizona $277,423 
+
+2.10% 
+
+$1,149,716 
+
+2.12% 
+
+$2,583,944 
+
+2.12% 
+
+$4,011,082 
+
+2.12% 
+
+$3,609,974 
+
+Arkansas $128,759 
+
+0.97% 
+
+$558,017 
+
+1.03% 
+
+$1,254,120 
+
+1.03% 
+
+$1,940,896 
+
+1.02% 
+
+$1,746,806 
+
+California 
+
+$ 1,647,306 
+
+12.45% 
+
+$6,709,634 
+
+12.35% 
+
+$15,079,696 
+
+12.36% 
+
+$23,436,636 
+
+12.37% 
+
+$21,092,972 
+
+Colorado 
+
+$120,994 
+
+0.91% 
+
+$519,324 
+
+0.96% 
+
+$1,167,154 
+
+0.96% 
+
+$1,807,472 
+
+0.95% 
+
+$1,626,725 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+$ 111,068 
+
+0.84% 
+
+$492,426 
+
+0.91% 
+
+$1,106,697 
+
+0.91% 
+
+$1,710,191 
+
+0.90% 
+
+$1,539,172 
+
+Delaware $43,493 
+
+0.33% 
+
+$182,885 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$410,861 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$637,239 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$573,515 
+
+District of 
+
+$42,006 
+
+0.32% 
+
+$172,013 
+
+0.32% 
+
+$386,477 
+
+0.32% 
+
+$600,497 
+
+0.32% 
+
+$540,447 
+
+Columbia 
+
+Florida $770,248 
+
+5.82% 
+
+$3,133,879 
+
+5.77% 
+
+$7,043,370 
+
+5.77% 
+
+$10,947,497 
+
+5.78% 
+
+$9,852,747 
+
+Georgia $457,170 
+
+3.46% 
+
+$1,892,093 
+
+3.48% 
+
+$4,252,432 
+
+3.49% 
+
+$6,601,694 
+
+3.48% 
+
+$5,941,525 
+
+Hawaii $43,385 
+
+0.33% 
+
+$183,595 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$412,530 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$639,511 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$575,560 
+
+CRS-97 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ J 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ Reservation of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Funds for 
+
+ ESSER I State 
+
+ State 
+
+ ESSER II 
+
+ Share of State 
+
+ ESSER III 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Total ESSER 
+
+ Share of State 
+
+ Grants to LEAs 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ State Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ State Grants 
+
+ State Funds 
+
+ State Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ (90% of Col. H) 
+
+Idaho $47,855 
+
+0.36% 
+
+$195,890 
+
+0.36% 
+
+$440,132 
+
+0.36% 
+
+$683,877 
+
+0.36% 
+
+$615,489 
+
+Il inois $569,467 
+
+4.30% 
+
+$2,250,805 
+
+4.14% 
+
+$5,058,602 
+
+4.15% 
+
+$7,878,874 
+
+4.16% 
+
+$7,090,987 
+
+Indiana $214,473 
+
+1.62% 
+
+$888,184 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$1,996,145 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$3,098,801 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$2,788,921 
+
+Iowa $71,626 
+
+0.54% 
+
+$344,864 
+
+0.63% 
+
+$775,053 
+
+0.64% 
+
+$1,191,543 
+
+0.63% 
+
+$1,072,389 
+
+Kansas $84,529 
+
+0.64% 
+
+$369,830 
+
+0.68% 
+
+$831,171 
+
+0.68% 
+
+$1,285,529 
+
+0.68% 
+
+$1,156,976 
+
+Kentucky 
+
+$193,187 
+
+1.46% 
+
+$928,275 
+
+1.71% 
+
+$2,001,217 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$3,122,679 
+
+1.65% 
+
+$2,810,411 
+
+Louisiana $286,980 
+
+2.17% 
+
+$1,160,119 
+
+2.14% 
+
+$2,607,344 
+
+2.14% 
+
+$4,054,444 
+
+2.14% 
+
+$3,648,999 
+
+Maine $43,793 
+
+0.33% 
+
+$183,139 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$411,429 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$638,361 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$574,525 
+
+Maryland $207,834 
+
+1.57% 
+
+$868,771 
+
+1.60% 
+
+$1,952,539 
+
+1.60% 
+
+$3,029,144 
+
+1.60% 
+
+$2,726,230 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+$ 
+
+214,894 
+
+1.62% 
+
+$814,890 
+
+1.50% 
+
+$1,831,417 
+
+1.50% 
+
+$2,861,202 
+
+1.51% 
+
+$2,575,082 
+
+Michigan $389,797 
+
+2.95% 
+
+$1,656,308 
+
+3.05% 
+
+$3,722,478 
+
+3.05% 
+
+$5,768,584 
+
+3.04% 
+
+$5,191,725 
+
+Minnesota 
+
+$140,137 
+
+1.06% 
+
+$588,036 
+
+1.08% 
+
+$1,321,564 
+
+1.08% 
+
+$2,049,738 
+
+1.08% 
+
+$1,844,764 
+
+Mississippi $169,883 
+
+1.28% 
+
+$724,533 
+
+1.33% 
+
+$1,628,366 
+
+1.34% 
+
+$2,522,782 
+
+1.33% 
+
+$2,270,504 
+
+Missouri $208,443 
+
+1.58% 
+
+$871,172 
+
+1.60% 
+
+$1,957,916 
+
+1.61% 
+
+$3,037,532 
+
+1.60% 
+
+$2,733,779 
+
+Montana $41,295 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$170,099 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$382,019 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$593,414 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$534,073 
+
+Nebraska $65,085 
+
+0.49% 
+
+$243,074 
+
+0.45% 
+
+$546,290 
+
+0.45% 
+
+$854,449 
+
+0.45% 
+
+$769,004 
+
+Nevada $117,185 
+
+0.89% 
+
+$477,322 
+
+0.88% 
+
+$1,072,783 
+
+0.88% 
+
+$1,667,291 
+
+0.88% 
+
+$1,500,562 
+
+New 
+
+$37,641 
+
+0.28% 
+
+$156,066 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$350,561 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$544,268 
+
+0.29% 
+
+$489,842 
+
+Hampshire 
+
+New Jersey 
+
+$ 310,371 
+
+2.35% 
+
+$1,230,972 
+
+2.27% 
+
+$2,766,530 
+
+2.27% 
+
+$4,307,873 
+
+2.27% 
+
+$3,877,085 
+
+CRS-98 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ J 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ Reservation of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Funds for 
+
+ ESSER I State 
+
+ State 
+
+ ESSER II 
+
+ Share of State 
+
+ ESSER III 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Total ESSER 
+
+ Share of State 
+
+ Grants to LEAs 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ State Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ State Grants 
+
+ State Funds 
+
+ State Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ (90% of Col. H) 
+
+New Mexico 
+
+$ 
+
+1 08,575 
+
+0.82% 
+
+$435,939 
+
+0.80% 
+
+$979,762 
+
+0.80% 
+
+$1,524,275 
+
+0.80% 
+
+$1,371,848 
+
+New York 
+
+$ 
+
+1 , 037,046 
+
+7.84% 
+
+$4,002,382 
+
+7.37% 
+
+$8,995,282 
+
+7.37% 
+
+$14,034,710 
+
+7.41% 
+
+$12,631,239 
+
+North 
+
+$396,312 
+
+3.00% 
+
+$1,602,591 
+
+2.95% 
+
+$3,601,780 
+
+2.95% 
+
+$5,600,683 
+
+2.96% 
+
+$5,040,615 
+
+Carolina 
+
+North Dakota 
+
+$ 33,298 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$135,924 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$305,338 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$474,560 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$427,104 
+
+Ohio $489,205 
+
+3.70% 
+
+$1,991,251 
+
+3.67% 
+
+$4,475,244 
+
+3.67% 
+
+$6,955,700 
+
+3.67% 
+
+$6,260,130 
+
+Oklahoma 
+
+$ 160,950 
+
+1.22% 
+
+$665,039 
+
+1.22% 
+
+$1,494,647 
+
+1.23% 
+
+$2,320,636 
+
+1.22% 
+
+$2,088,573 
+
+Oregon $121,099 
+
+0.92% 
+
+$499,154 
+
+0.92% 
+
+$1,121,815 
+
+0.92% 
+
+$1,742,068 
+
+0.92% 
+
+$1,567,861 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+$523,807 
+
+3.96% 
+
+$2,224,964 
+
+4.10% 
+
+$5,000,509 
+
+4.10% 
+
+$7,749,281 
+
+4.09% 
+
+$6,974,353 
+
+Puerto Rico $ 349,113 
+
+2.64% 
+
+$1,320,626 
+
+2.43% 
+
+$2,968,079 
+
+2.43% 
+
+$4,637,818 
+
+2.45% 
+
+$4,174,037 
+
+Rhode Island $46,350 
+
+0.35% 
+
+$184,792 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$415,146 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$646,288 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$581,659 
+
+South Carolina 
+
+$ 
+
+216,311 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$940,421 
+
+1.73% 
+
+$2,113,568 
+
+1.73% 
+
+$3,270,299 
+
+1.73% 
+
+$2,943,270 
+
+South Dakota 
+
+$41,295 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$170,099 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$382,019 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$593,414 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$534,073 
+
+Tennessee 
+
+$259,891 
+
+1.96% 
+
+$1,107,656 
+
+2.04% 
+
+$2,489,423 
+
+2.04% 
+
+$3,856,971 
+
+2.04% 
+
+$3,471,274 
+
+Texas 
+
+$1,285,886 
+
+9.72% 
+
+$5,529,552 
+
+10.18% 
+
+$12,427,523 
+
+10.19% 
+
+$19,242,962 
+
+10.15% 
+
+$17,318,665 
+
+Utah $67,822 
+
+0.51% 
+
+$274,072 
+
+0.50% 
+
+$615,929 
+
+0.50% 
+
+$957,822 
+
+0.51% 
+
+$862,040 
+
+Vermont $31,148 
+
+0.24% 
+
+$126,973 
+
+0.23% 
+
+$285,223 
+
+0.23% 
+
+$443,345 
+
+0.23% 
+
+$399,011 
+
+Virginia $238,599 
+
+1.80% 
+
+$939,281 
+
+1.73% 
+
+$2,110,989 
+
+1.73% 
+
+$3,288,869 
+
+1.74% 
+
+$2,959,982 
+
+Washington $ 
+
+216,892 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$824,852 
+
+1.52% 
+
+$1,853,788 
+
+1.52% 
+
+$2,895,533 
+
+1.53% 
+
+$2,605,979 
+
+West Virginia $86,640 
+
+0.65% 
+
+$339,032 
+
+0.62% 
+
+$761,960 
+
+0.62% 
+
+$1,187,633 
+
+0.63% 
+
+$1,068,869 
+
+CRS-99 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ A 
+
+ B 
+
+ C 
+
+ D 
+
+ E 
+
+ F 
+
+ G 
+
+ H 
+
+ I 
+
+ J 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ Minimum 
+
+ Reservation of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Funds for 
+
+ ESSER I State 
+
+ State 
+
+ ESSER II 
+
+ Share of State 
+
+ ESSER III 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Total ESSER 
+
+ Share of State 
+
+ Grants to LEAs 
+
+ State 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ State Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ State Grants 
+
+ State Funds 
+
+ State Grants 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ (90% of Col. H) 
+
+Wisconsin 
+
+$174,778 
+
+1.32% 
+
+$686,056 
+
+1.26% 
+
+$1,541,867 
+
+1.26% 
+
+$2,402,701 
+
+1.27% 
+
+$2,162,431 
+
+Wyoming $32,563 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$135,231 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$303,779 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$471,573 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$424,416 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $13,229,265 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $54,311,004 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $121,974,800 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $189,515,069 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $170,563,562 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) at https://oese.ed.gov/files/
+2020/04/ESSER-Fund-State-Allocations-Table.pdf, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/01/Final_ESSERII_Methodology_Table_1.5.21.pdf, and https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/06/
+Revised-ARP-ESSER-Methodology-and-Allocation-Table_6.25.21_FINAL.pdf. 
+ Notes: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded numbers. As discussed in the last-listed source document, the 
+ESSER state grant amounts were revised as of June 25, 2021, due to changes in the underlying data used to calculate ESSER Fund state grants. While the change in the 
+underlying data affected ESSER state grants under the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA, all of the needed adjustments in state grant amounts were made to the ESSER 
+state grants authorized by the ARPA. This table provides the revised state grant amounts. The $800 mil ion reservation from ESSER III for homeless education was not 
+included in the table. The total appropriation for ESSER III including the $800 mil ion reservation is $122,774,800,000. 
+
+ 
+
+CRS-100 
+
+ 
+ link to page 109 
+
+ Appendix F. Estimated HEERF IHE Allocations Aggregated at the 
+Institutional Sector and State Levels for the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+ESF 
+ 
+
+ Table F-1. Estimated Allocations to IHEs Under the HEERF Provided by the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA, Aggregated at 
+
+ the Institutional Sector Level 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ 
+
+ Institutional Sector 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Public 
+
+ Private Nonprofit 
+
+ Proprietary 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Less- 
+
+ Less- 
+
+ Less- 
+
+ Act/ 
+
+ than-2- 
+
+ than-2- 
+
+ than-2- 
+
+ Additional 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Year 
+
+ 2-Year 
+
+ 4-Year 
+
+ Year 
+
+ 2-Year 
+
+ 4-Year 
+
+ Year 
+
+ 2-Year 
+
+ 4-Year 
+
+ Fundin ga 
+
+ Total 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+Direct Grants 
+
+$39,531 
+
+$2,607,919 
+
+$6,257,087 
+
+$10,986 
+
+$32,909 
+
+$2,464,951 $317,830 $408,170 $367,871 
+
+$50,000 
+
+$12,557,255 
+
+MSI Programs 
+
+$0 
+
+$194,890 
+
+$663,300 
+
+$0 
+
+$4,810 
+
+$183,438 
+
+$0 
+
+$0 
+
+$0 
+
+$0 
+
+$1,046,438 
+
+FIPSE 
+
+$72,906 
+
+$20,726 
+
+$4,268 
+
+$12,648 
+
+$32,817 
+
+$177,272 
+
+$0 
+
+$0 
+
+$0 
+
+$28,176 
+
+$348,813 
+
+Subtotal 
+
+$112,437 
+
+$2,823,535 
+
+$6,924,655 
+
+$23,633 
+
+$70,536 
+
+$2,825,662 $317,830 $408,170 $367,871 
+
+$78,176 
+
+$13,952,505 
+
+Share of 
+
+0.81% 
+
+20.24% 
+
+49.63% 
+
+0.17% 
+
+0.51% 
+
+20.25% 
+
+2.28% 
+
+2.93% 
+
+2.64% 
+
+0.56% 
+
+100.00% 
+
+HEERF I Funds 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+Direct Grants 
+
+$74,114 
+
+$5,680,955 
+
+$10,685,414 
+
+$19,844 
+
+$68,797 
+
+$4,010,091 $186,817 $225,144 $248,040 
+
+$0 
+
+$21,199,216 
+
+MSI Programs 
+
+$0 
+
+$375,276 
+
+$931,733 
+
+$0 
+
+$7,613 
+
+$312,641 
+
+$0 
+
+$0 
+
+$0 
+
+$75,023 
+
+$1,702,285 
+
+FIPSE 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$113,486 
+
+$113,486 
+
+Subtotal 
+
+$74,114 
+
+$6,056,231 
+
+$11,617,147 
+
+$19,844 
+
+$76,410 
+
+$4,322,732 $186,817 $225,144 $248,040 
+
+$188,508 
+
+$23,014,987 
+
+CRS-101 
+
+ 
+ link to page 109 
+
+ 
+
+ Institutional Sector 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Public 
+
+ Private Nonprofit 
+
+ Proprietary 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Less- 
+
+ Less- 
+
+ Less- 
+
+ Act/ 
+
+ than-2- 
+
+ than-2- 
+
+ than-2- 
+
+ Additional 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Year 
+
+ 2-Year 
+
+ 4-Year 
+
+ Year 
+
+ 2-Year 
+
+ 4-Year 
+
+ Year 
+
+ 2-Year 
+
+ 4-Year 
+
+ Fundin ga 
+
+ Total 
+
+Share of 
+
+0.32% 
+
+26.31% 
+
+50.48% 
+
+0.09% 
+
+0.33% 
+
+18.78% 
+
+0.81% 
+
+0.98% 
+
+1.08% 
+
+0.82% 
+
+100.00% 
+
+HEERF II 
+Funds 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+Direct Grants 
+
+$131,429 
+
+$9,926,575 
+
+$18,772,725 
+
+$34,740 $116,618 
+
+$7,052,485 $110,341 $131,731 $141,160 
+
+$0 
+
+$36,417,804 
+
+MSI Programs 
+
+$0 
+
+$684,783 
+
+$1,631,340 
+
+$0 
+
+$21,821 
+
+$630,900 
+
+$0 
+
+$0 
+
+$0 
+
+$0 
+
+$2,968,843 
+
+FIPSE 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+$197,923 
+
+$197,923 
+
+Subtotal 
+
+$131,429 
+
+$10,611,358 
+
+$20,404,064 
+
+$34,740 $138,439 
+
+$7,683,385 $110,341 $131,731 $141,160 
+
+$197,923 
+
+$39,584,570 
+
+Share of 
+
+0.33% 
+
+26.81% 
+
+51.55% 
+
+0.09% 
+
+0.35% 
+
+19.41% 
+
+0.28% 
+
+0.33% 
+
+0.36% 
+
+0.50% 
+
+100.00% 
+
+HEERF III 
+Funds 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+Total HEERF 
+
+$317,979 
+
+$19,491,124 
+
+$38,945,866 
+
+$78,217 $285,384 
+
+$14,831,779 $614,989 $765,045 $757,072 
+
+$464,607 
+
+$76,552,062 
+
+Share of Total 
+
+0.42% 
+
+25.46% 
+
+50.88% 
+
+0.10% 
+
+0.37% 
+
+19.37% 
+
+0.80% 
+
+1.00% 
+
+0.99% 
+
+0.61% 
+
+100.00% 
+
+HEERF Funds 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) at https://www2.ed.gov/
+about/offices/list/ope/caresact.html, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/crrsaa.html, and https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/arp.html (HEERF III). 
+ Notes: With a few exceptions, the allocation amounts are amounts available to eligible IHEs. Actual amounts awarded to IHEs may differ as IHEs must apply and/or 
+agree to accept the terms and conditions of the awards. Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded numbers. NA: 
+not applicable. 
+a. The additional funds to be allocated under the HEERF include $50 mil ion set aside by ED from the HEERF I direct grants for institutions that may have been eligible 
+
+but may have been excluded by the formula; approximately $28.0 mil ion competitively awarded under the HEERF I FIPSE funds through the IREPO Grants; $75 
+mil ion to be awarded under the HEERF II MSI Historically Black Col eges and Universities program in accordance with each IHE’s inverse share of total 
+endowments; $113 mil ion to be distributed under the HEERF II FIPSE through the SAIHE program; and $197 mil ion to be distributed under the HEERF III FIPSE 
+through the SSARP program. 
+
+CRS-102 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Table F-2. Estimated Allocations to IHEs Under the HEERF Provided by the CARES Act, Aggregated at the State Level 
+
+ (HEERF I) 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ Estimated MSI 
+
+ Actual and 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Direct Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ FIPSE Grants 
+
+ Subtotal 
+
+ HEERF I Funds 
+
+Alabama 
+
+$199,119 
+
+$73,118 
+
+$1,860 
+
+$274,097 
+
+1.96% 
+
+Alaska 
+
+$9,432 
+
+$3,923 
+
+$970 
+
+$14,325 
+
+0.10% 
+
+Arizona 
+
+$288,752 
+
+$13,573 
+
+$2,703 
+
+$305,028 
+
+2.19% 
+
+Arkansas 
+
+$120,858 
+
+$14,618 
+
+$1,846 
+
+$137,321 
+
+0.98% 
+
+California 
+
+$1,709,452 
+
+$83,627 
+
+$32,775 
+
+$1,825,854 
+
+13.09% 
+
+Colorado 
+
+$167,984 
+
+$4,807 
+
+$3,793 
+
+$176,585 
+
+1.27% 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+$141,283 
+
+$2,488 
+
+$2,324 
+
+$146,095 
+
+1.05% 
+
+Delaware 
+
+$34,027 
+
+$11,894 
+
+$1,235 
+
+$47,155 
+
+0.34% 
+
+District of Columbia 
+
+$47,868 
+
+$8,004 
+
+$2,236 
+
+$58,108 
+
+0.42% 
+
+Florida 
+
+$740,208 
+
+$68,460 
+
+$14,237 
+
+$822,906 
+
+5.90% 
+
+Georgia 
+
+$406,119 
+
+$57,778 
+
+$2,993 
+
+$466,890 
+
+3.35% 
+
+Hawaii 
+
+$31,026 
+
+$22,835 
+
+$197 
+
+$54,057 
+
+0.39% 
+
+Idaho 
+
+$60,036 
+
+$1,097 
+
+$370 
+
+$61,503 
+
+0.44% 
+
+Il inois 
+
+$438,443 
+
+$12,089 
+
+$13,067 
+
+$463,599 
+
+3.32% 
+
+Indiana 
+
+$235,548 
+
+$4,184 
+
+$4,284 
+
+$244,016 
+
+1.75% 
+
+Iowa 
+
+$119,776 
+
+$2,358 
+
+$3,011 
+
+$125,145 
+
+0.90% 
+
+Kansas 
+
+$104,951 
+
+$4,773 
+
+$2,666 
+
+$112,390 
+
+0.81% 
+
+Kentucky 
+
+$156,808 
+
+$6,432 
+
+$2,708 
+
+$165,949 
+
+1.19% 
+
+Louisiana 
+
+$189,864 
+
+$49,591 
+
+$1,908 
+
+$241,362 
+
+1.73% 
+
+Maine 
+
+$41,093 
+
+$1,156 
+
+$1,802 
+
+$44,051 
+
+0.32% 
+
+Maryland 
+
+$188,939 
+
+$46,662 
+
+$3,202 
+
+$238,803 
+
+1.71% 
+
+CRS-103 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Estimated MSI 
+
+ Actual and 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Direct Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ FIPSE Grants 
+
+ Subtotal 
+
+ HEERF I Funds 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+$280,277 
+
+$4,933 
+
+$11,997 
+
+$297,207 
+
+2.13% 
+
+Michigan 
+
+$354,834 
+
+$9,116 
+
+$5,888 
+
+$369,838 
+
+2.65% 
+
+Minnesota 
+
+$183,849 
+
+$5,673 
+
+$4,215 
+
+$193,737 
+
+1.39% 
+
+Mississippi 
+
+$149,058 
+
+$55,209 
+
+$918 
+
+$205,185 
+
+1.47% 
+
+Missouri 
+
+$205,995 
+
+$11,789 
+
+$13,836 
+
+$231,621 
+
+1.66% 
+
+Montana 
+
+$31,873 
+
+$10,067 
+
+$715 
+
+$42,656 
+
+0.31% 
+
+Nebraska 
+
+$67,223 
+
+$2,311 
+
+$1,051 
+
+$70,585 
+
+0.51% 
+
+Nevada 
+
+$70,350 
+
+$3,160 
+
+$808 
+
+$74,319 
+
+0.53% 
+
+New Hampshire 
+
+$40,698 
+
+$371 
+
+$2,084 
+
+$43,152 
+
+0.31% 
+
+New Jersey 
+
+$323,081 
+
+$13,162 
+
+$11,116 
+
+$347,359 
+
+2.49% 
+
+New Mexico 
+
+$62,283 
+
+$11,938 
+
+$1,096 
+
+$75,316 
+
+0.54% 
+
+New York 
+
+$920,624 
+
+$28,458 
+
+$42,720 
+
+$991,802 
+
+7.11% 
+
+North Carolina 
+
+$378,297 
+
+$88,086 
+
+$5,292 
+
+$471,675 
+
+3.38% 
+
+North Dakota 
+
+$23,287 
+
+$6,959 
+
+$1,303 
+
+$31,549 
+
+0.23% 
+
+Ohio 
+
+$394,599 
+
+$11,610 
+
+$25,062 
+
+$431,271 
+
+3.09% 
+
+Oklahoma 
+
+$159,882 
+
+$12,997 
+
+$7,984 
+
+$180,863 
+
+1.30% 
+
+Oregon 
+
+$127,113 
+
+$3,656 
+
+$4,226 
+
+$134,996 
+
+0.97% 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+$487,129 
+
+$13,259 
+
+$25,753 
+
+$526,141 
+
+3.77% 
+
+Puerto Rico 
+
+$323,782 
+
+$16,929 
+
+$3,372 
+
+$344,083 
+
+2.47% 
+
+Rhode Island 
+
+$64,731 
+
+$1,739 
+
+$445 
+
+$66,915 
+
+0.48% 
+
+South Carolina 
+
+$180,498 
+
+$25,783 
+
+$855 
+
+$207,135 
+
+1.48% 
+
+South Dakota 
+
+$27,147 
+
+$5,990 
+
+$1,959 
+
+$35,096 
+
+0.25% 
+
+Tennessee 
+
+$237,170 
+
+$30,474 
+
+$9,176 
+
+$276,821 
+
+1.98% 
+
+CRS-104 
+
+ 
+ link to page 112 
+
+ Estimated MSI 
+
+ Actual and 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Direct Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ FIPSE Grants 
+
+ Subtotal 
+
+ HEERF I Funds 
+
+Texas 
+
+$1,022,172 
+
+$115,083 
+
+$10,724 
+
+$1,147,979 
+
+8.23% 
+
+Utah 
+
+$143,643 
+
+$3,977 
+
+$1,465 
+
+$149,085 
+
+1.07% 
+
+Vermont 
+
+$21,566 
+
+$327 
+
+$2,374 
+
+$24,267 
+
+0.17% 
+
+Virginia 
+
+$294,171 
+
+$41,056 
+
+$8,446 
+
+$343,673 
+
+2.46% 
+
+Washington 
+
+$226,092 
+
+$5,552 
+
+$2,413 
+
+$234,057 
+
+1.68% 
+
+West Virginia 
+
+$66,559 
+
+$6,131 
+
+$9,358 
+
+$82,049 
+
+0.59% 
+
+Wisconsin 
+
+$176,734 
+
+$5,209 
+
+$3,342 
+
+$185,285 
+
+1.33% 
+
+Wyoming 
+
+$13,586 
+
+$29 
+
+$79 
+
+$13,695 
+
+0.10% 
+
+American Samoa 
+
+$1,618 
+
+$6 
+
+$0 
+
+$1,624 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Federated States of Micronesia 
+
+$3,640 
+
+$14 
+
+$0 
+
+$3,655 
+
+0.03% 
+
+Guam 
+
+$5,834 
+
+$23 
+
+$379 
+
+$6,237 
+
+0.04% 
+
+Marshall Islands 
+
+$1,957 
+
+$8 
+
+$0 
+
+$1,964 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Northern Mariana Islands 
+
+$1,839 
+
+$7 
+
+$0 
+
+$1,847 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Palau 
+
+$759 
+
+$3 
+
+$0 
+
+$763 
+
+0.01% 
+
+U.S. Virgin Islands 
+
+$1,714 
+
+$1,875 
+
+$0 
+
+$3,589 
+
+0.03% 
+
+Additional fund sa 
+
+$50,000 
+
+$0 
+
+$28,176 
+
+$78,176 
+
+0.56% 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $12,557,255 
+
+ $1,046,438 
+
+ $348,813 
+
+ $13,952,505 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) at https://www2.ed.gov/
+about/offices/list/ope/caresact.html. 
+ Notes: With a few exceptions, the allocation amounts are amounts available to eligible IHEs. Actual amounts awarded to IHEs may differ as IHEs must apply and/or 
+agree to accept the terms and conditions of the awards. Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded numbers. NA: 
+not applicable. 
+a. The additional funds to be allocated under the HEERF I include $50 mil ion set aside by ED from the direct grants for institutions that may have been eligible but 
+
+may have been excluded by the formula and approximately $28.0 mil ion competitively awarded under FIPSE funds through the IREPO Grants. 
+
+ 
+
+CRS-105 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Table F-3. Estimated Allocations to IHEs Under the HEERF Provided by the CRRSAA, Aggregated at the State Level (HEERF 
+
+ II) 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ Estimated MSI 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Actual FIPSE 
+
+ HEERF II 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Direct Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Subtotal 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Alabama 
+
+$338,269 
+
+$103,067 
+
+NA 
+
+$441,336 
+
+1.92% 
+
+Alaska 
+
+$19,137 
+
+$7,235 
+
+NA 
+
+$26,372 
+
+0.11% 
+
+Arizona 
+
+$432,145 
+
+$22,115 
+
+NA 
+
+$454,260 
+
+1.97% 
+
+Arkansas 
+
+$208,632 
+
+$20,867 
+
+NA 
+
+$229,499 
+
+1.00% 
+
+California 
+
+$2,942,033 
+
+$141,963 
+
+NA 
+
+$3,083,996 
+
+13.40% 
+
+Colorado 
+
+$291,842 
+
+$8,264 
+
+NA 
+
+$300,106 
+
+1.30% 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+$219,776 
+
+$4,123 
+
+NA 
+
+$223,898 
+
+0.97% 
+
+Delaware 
+
+$57,790 
+
+$13,020 
+
+NA 
+
+$70,809 
+
+0.31% 
+
+District of Columbia 
+
+$68,894 
+
+$11,318 
+
+NA 
+
+$80,212 
+
+0.35% 
+
+Florida 
+
+$1,307,582 
+
+$99,161 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,406,743 
+
+6.11% 
+
+Georgia 
+
+$696,293 
+
+$121,795 
+
+NA 
+
+$818,088 
+
+3.55% 
+
+Hawaii 
+
+$56,160 
+
+$36,476 
+
+NA 
+
+$92,636 
+
+0.40% 
+
+Idaho 
+
+$114,948 
+
+$2,018 
+
+NA 
+
+$116,966 
+
+0.51% 
+
+Il inois 
+
+$744,346 
+
+$19,951 
+
+NA 
+
+$764,297 
+
+3.32% 
+
+Indiana 
+
+$408,976 
+
+$7,893 
+
+NA 
+
+$416,869 
+
+1.81% 
+
+Iowa 
+
+$207,509 
+
+$4,077 
+
+NA 
+
+$211,586 
+
+0.92% 
+
+Kansas 
+
+$186,643 
+
+$7,783 
+
+NA 
+
+$194,426 
+
+0.84% 
+
+Kentucky 
+
+$269,308 
+
+$13,227 
+
+NA 
+
+$282,535 
+
+1.23% 
+
+Louisiana 
+
+$320,676 
+
+$78,406 
+
+NA 
+
+$399,082 
+
+1.73% 
+
+Maine 
+
+$71,297 
+
+$1,905 
+
+NA 
+
+$73,202 
+
+0.32% 
+
+Maryland 
+
+$318,988 
+
+$53,951 
+
+NA 
+
+$372,939 
+
+1.62% 
+
+CRS-106 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Estimated MSI 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Actual FIPSE 
+
+ HEERF II 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Direct Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Subtotal 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+$468,513 
+
+$8,172 
+
+NA 
+
+$476,685 
+
+2.07% 
+
+Michigan 
+
+$600,279 
+
+$15,108 
+
+NA 
+
+$615,386 
+
+2.67% 
+
+Minnesota 
+
+$318,387 
+
+$9,159 
+
+NA 
+
+$327,545 
+
+1.42% 
+
+Mississippi 
+
+$246,710 
+
+$82,930 
+
+NA 
+
+$329,639 
+
+1.43% 
+
+Missouri 
+
+$362,845 
+
+$19,060 
+
+NA 
+
+$381,905 
+
+1.66% 
+
+Montana 
+
+$53,538 
+
+$16,247 
+
+NA 
+
+$69,785 
+
+0.30% 
+
+Nebraska 
+
+$119,717 
+
+$3,808 
+
+NA 
+
+$123,525 
+
+0.54% 
+
+Nevada 
+
+$118,659 
+
+$5,211 
+
+NA 
+
+$123,870 
+
+0.54% 
+
+New Hampshire 
+
+$94,460 
+
+$1,246 
+
+NA 
+
+$95,706 
+
+0.42% 
+
+New Jersey 
+
+$525,639 
+
+$20,450 
+
+NA 
+
+$546,089 
+
+2.37% 
+
+New Mexico 
+
+$120,602 
+
+$19,946 
+
+NA 
+
+$140,547 
+
+0.61% 
+
+New York 
+
+$1,517,598 
+
+$45,104 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,562,702 
+
+6.79% 
+
+North Carolina 
+
+$647,225 
+
+$116,255 
+
+NA 
+
+$763,480 
+
+3.32% 
+
+North Dakota 
+
+$39,819 
+
+$11,312 
+
+NA 
+
+$51,131 
+
+0.22% 
+
+Ohio 
+
+$657,881 
+
+$19,829 
+
+NA 
+
+$677,710 
+
+2.94% 
+
+Oklahoma 
+
+$256,381 
+
+$19,425 
+
+NA 
+
+$275,806 
+
+1.20% 
+
+Oregon 
+
+$230,470 
+
+$6,653 
+
+NA 
+
+$237,123 
+
+1.03% 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+$762,951 
+
+$18,968 
+
+NA 
+
+$781,918 
+
+3.40% 
+
+Puerto Rico 
+
+$453,200 
+
+$24,461 
+
+NA 
+
+$477,661 
+
+2.08% 
+
+Rhode Island 
+
+$103,048 
+
+$2,580 
+
+NA 
+
+$105,629 
+
+0.46% 
+
+South Carolina 
+
+$300,624 
+
+$34,480 
+
+NA 
+
+$335,104 
+
+1.46% 
+
+South Dakota 
+
+$45,848 
+
+$9,743 
+
+NA 
+
+$55,591 
+
+0.24% 
+
+Tennessee 
+
+$404,593 
+
+$61,844 
+
+NA 
+
+$466,437 
+
+2.03% 
+
+CRS-107 
+
+ 
+ link to page 115 
+
+ Estimated MSI 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Actual FIPSE 
+
+ HEERF II 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Direct Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Subtotal 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Texas 
+
+$1,790,050 
+
+$182,637 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,972,687 
+
+8.57% 
+
+Utah 
+
+$286,618 
+
+$6,834 
+
+NA 
+
+$293,452 
+
+1.28% 
+
+Vermont 
+
+$36,989 
+
+$573 
+
+NA 
+
+$37,562 
+
+0.16% 
+
+Virginia 
+
+$492,404 
+
+$54,402 
+
+NA 
+
+$546,806 
+
+2.38% 
+
+Washington 
+
+$378,793 
+
+$9,063 
+
+NA 
+
+$387,856 
+
+1.69% 
+
+West Virginia 
+
+$109,659 
+
+$10,737 
+
+NA 
+
+$120,396 
+
+0.52% 
+
+Wisconsin 
+
+$318,009 
+
+$8,555 
+
+NA 
+
+$326,565 
+
+1.42% 
+
+Wyoming 
+
+$25,201 
+
+$56 
+
+NA 
+
+$25,257 
+
+0.11% 
+
+American Samoa 
+
+$2,670 
+
+$9 
+
+NA 
+
+$2,679 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Federated States of 
+
+$6,750 
+
+$24 
+
+NA 
+
+$6,773 
+
+0.03% 
+
+Micronesia 
+
+Guam 
+
+$10,448 
+
+$37 
+
+NA 
+
+$10,486 
+
+0.05% 
+
+Marshall Islands 
+
+$3,719 
+
+$13 
+
+NA 
+
+$3,733 
+
+0.02% 
+
+Northern Mariana Islands 
+
+$3,275 
+
+$12 
+
+NA 
+
+$3,286 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Palau 
+
+$1,283 
+
+$5 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,288 
+
+0.01% 
+
+U.S. Virgin Islands 
+
+$3,121 
+
+$3,703 
+
+NA 
+
+$6,824 
+
+0.03% 
+
+Additional fund sa 
+
+$0 
+
+$75,023 
+
+$113,486 
+
+$188,508 
+
+0.82% 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $21,199,216 
+
+ $1,702,285 
+
+ $113,486 
+
+ $23,014,987 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) at https://www2.ed.gov/
+about/offices/list/ope/crrsaa.html. 
+ Notes: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded numbers. NA: not available. 
+a. The additional funds to be allocated under HEERF II include $75 mil ion to be awarded under the MSI Historically Black Col eges and Universities program in 
+
+accordance with each IHE’s inverse share of total endowments and $113 mil ion to be distributed under FIPSE through the SAIHE program. 
+
+ 
+
+CRS-108 
+
+ 
+ link to page 118 
+
+ Table F-4. Estimated Allocations to IHEs Under the HEERF Provided by the ARPA, Aggregated at the State Level (HEERF III) 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ Estimated MSI 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Actual FIPSE 
+
+ HEERF III 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Direct Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grant sa 
+
+ Subtotal 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Alabama 
+
+$587,239 
+
+$212,674 
+
+NA 
+
+$799,913 
+
+2.02% 
+
+Alaska 
+
+$32,426 
+
+$9,856 
+
+NA 
+
+$42,283 
+
+0.11% 
+
+Arizona 
+
+$675,275 
+
+$41,141 
+
+NA 
+
+$716,416 
+
+1.81% 
+
+Arkansas 
+
+$358,844 
+
+$47,379 
+
+NA 
+
+$406,223 
+
+1.03% 
+
+California 
+
+$5,029,222 
+
+$244,123 
+
+NA 
+
+$5,273,345 
+
+13.32% 
+
+Colorado 
+
+$500,777 
+
+$15,913 
+
+NA 
+
+$516,690 
+
+1.31% 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+$369,909 
+
+$7,523 
+
+NA 
+
+$377,433 
+
+0.95% 
+
+Delaware 
+
+$100,337 
+
+$22,961 
+
+NA 
+
+$123,298 
+
+0.31% 
+
+District of Columbia 
+
+$113,189 
+
+$19,826 
+
+NA 
+
+$133,015 
+
+0.34% 
+
+Florida 
+
+$2,222,100 
+
+$168,533 
+
+NA 
+
+$2,390,632 
+
+6.04% 
+
+Georgia 
+
+$1,193,438 
+
+$216,581 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,410,018 
+
+3.56% 
+
+Hawaii 
+
+$98,042 
+
+$42,830 
+
+NA 
+
+$140,872 
+
+0.36% 
+
+Idaho 
+
+$205,191 
+
+$2,107 
+
+NA 
+
+$207,298 
+
+0.52% 
+
+Il inois 
+
+$1,281,479 
+
+$37,026 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,318,505 
+
+3.33% 
+
+Indiana 
+
+$701,068 
+
+$14,215 
+
+NA 
+
+$715,283 
+
+1.81% 
+
+Iowa 
+
+$364,873 
+
+$8,151 
+
+NA 
+
+$373,024 
+
+0.94% 
+
+Kansas 
+
+$331,913 
+
+$14,417 
+
+NA 
+
+$346,330 
+
+0.87% 
+
+Kentucky 
+
+$456,988 
+
+$29,141 
+
+NA 
+
+$486,129 
+
+1.23% 
+
+Louisiana 
+
+$539,050 
+
+$144,390 
+
+NA 
+
+$683,440 
+
+1.73% 
+
+Maine 
+
+$122,114 
+
+$2,660 
+
+NA 
+
+$124,774 
+
+0.32% 
+
+Maryland 
+
+$549,526 
+
+$100,982 
+
+NA 
+
+$650,508 
+
+1.64% 
+
+CRS-109 
+
+ 
+ link to page 118 
+
+ Estimated MSI 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Actual FIPSE 
+
+ HEERF III 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Direct Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grant sa 
+
+ Subtotal 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+$826,184 
+
+$15,222 
+
+NA 
+
+$841,406 
+
+2.13% 
+
+Michigan 
+
+$1,034,831 
+
+$24,943 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,059,774 
+
+2.68% 
+
+Minnesota 
+
+$548,184 
+
+$16,962 
+
+NA 
+
+$565,146 
+
+1.43% 
+
+Mississippi 
+
+$425,419 
+
+$149,354 
+
+NA 
+
+$574,773 
+
+1.45% 
+
+Missouri 
+
+$630,404 
+
+$46,429 
+
+NA 
+
+$676,833 
+
+1.71% 
+
+Montana 
+
+$93,551 
+
+$28,129 
+
+NA 
+
+$121,679 
+
+0.31% 
+
+Nebraska 
+
+$208,815 
+
+$8,851 
+
+NA 
+
+$217,666 
+
+0.55% 
+
+Nevada 
+
+$203,746 
+
+$9,769 
+
+NA 
+
+$213,515 
+
+0.54% 
+
+New Hampshire 
+
+$163,737 
+
+$2,270 
+
+NA 
+
+$166,007 
+
+0.42% 
+
+New Jersey 
+
+$906,504 
+
+$30,159 
+
+NA 
+
+$936,663 
+
+2.37% 
+
+New Mexico 
+
+$210,709 
+
+$34,160 
+
+NA 
+
+$244,870 
+
+0.62% 
+
+New York 
+
+$2,621,517 
+
+$77,558 
+
+NA 
+
+$2,699,075 
+
+6.82% 
+
+North Carolina 
+
+$1,109,199 
+
+$204,003 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,313,201 
+
+3.32% 
+
+North Dakota 
+
+$75,899 
+
+$19,899 
+
+NA 
+
+$95,798 
+
+0.24% 
+
+Ohio 
+
+$1,140,470 
+
+$41,765 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,182,235 
+
+2.99% 
+
+Oklahoma 
+
+$418,623 
+
+$36,769 
+
+NA 
+
+$455,392 
+
+1.15% 
+
+Oregon 
+
+$403,043 
+
+$11,690 
+
+NA 
+
+$414,733 
+
+1.05% 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+$1,315,051 
+
+$27,321 
+
+NA 
+
+$1,342,372 
+
+3.39% 
+
+Puerto Rico 
+
+$744,563 
+
+$41,557 
+
+NA 
+
+$786,120 
+
+1.99% 
+
+Rhode Island 
+
+$179,607 
+
+$4,675 
+
+NA 
+
+$184,282 
+
+0.47% 
+
+South Carolina 
+
+$523,207 
+
+$77,927 
+
+NA 
+
+$601,134 
+
+1.52% 
+
+South Dakota 
+
+$78,736 
+
+$17,123 
+
+NA 
+
+$95,859 
+
+0.24% 
+
+Tennessee 
+
+$704,130 
+
+$115,543 
+
+NA 
+
+$819,673 
+
+2.07% 
+
+CRS-110 
+
+ 
+ link to page 118 link to page 118 
+
+ Estimated MSI 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Actual FIPSE 
+
+ HEERF III 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Direct Grants 
+
+ Grants 
+
+ Grant sa 
+
+ Subtotal 
+
+ Funds 
+
+Texas 
+
+$3,099,154 
+
+$324,697 
+
+NA 
+
+$3,423,851 
+
+8.65% 
+
+Utah 
+
+$496,708 
+
+$9,260 
+
+NA 
+
+$505,968 
+
+1.28% 
+
+Vermont 
+
+$65,168 
+
+$892 
+
+NA 
+
+$66,060 
+
+0.17% 
+
+Virginia 
+
+$843,882 
+
+$104,282 
+
+NA 
+
+$948,164 
+
+2.40% 
+
+Washington 
+
+$659,967 
+
+$17,802 
+
+NA 
+
+$677,769 
+
+1.71% 
+
+West Virginia 
+
+$190,063 
+
+$21,991 
+
+NA 
+
+$212,053 
+
+0.54% 
+
+Wisconsin 
+
+$564,550 
+
+$14,876 
+
+NA 
+
+$579,425 
+
+1.46% 
+
+Wyoming 
+
+$44,354 
+
+$251 
+
+NA 
+
+$44,604 
+
+0.11% 
+
+American Samoa 
+
+$4,674 
+
+$2,253 
+
+NA 
+
+$6,927 
+
+0.02% 
+
+Federated States of Micronesia 
+
+$11,778 
+
+$5,635 
+
+NA 
+
+$17,413 
+
+0.04% 
+
+Guam 
+
+$18,304 
+
+$8,898 
+
+NA 
+
+$27,202 
+
+0.07% 
+
+Marshall Islands 
+
+$6,498 
+
+$3,111 
+
+NA 
+
+$9,608 
+
+0.02% 
+
+Northern Mariana Islands 
+
+$5,685 
+
+$2,739 
+
+NA 
+
+$8,425 
+
+0.02% 
+
+Palau 
+
+$2,243 
+
+$1,074 
+
+NA 
+
+$3,317 
+
+0.01% 
+
+U.S. Virgin Islands 
+
+$5,647 
+
+$6,579 
+
+NA 
+
+$12,225 
+
+0.03% 
+
+Additional fund sb 
+
+$0 
+
+$0 
+
+$197,923 
+
+$197,923 
+
+0.50% 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $36,417,804 
+
+ $2,968,843 
+
+ $197,923 
+
+ $39,584,570 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) at https://www2.ed.gov/
+about/offices/list/ope/arp.html. 
+ Note: With a few exceptions, the allocation amounts are amounts available to eligible IHEs. Actual amounts awarded to IHEs may differ as IHEs must apply and/or agree 
+to accept the terms and conditions of the awards. Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded numbers. NA: not 
+available. 
+a. On January 20, 2022, ED announced that it planned to invite applications for the ARPA FIPSE grants during the fol owing week; therefore, the funds have not been 
+
+distributed. 
+
+b. The additional funds to be allocated under the HEERF III represent $197 mil ion to be distributed under FIPSE through the SSARP program. 
+
+CRS-111 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Table F-5. Estimated Allocations to IHEs Under the HEERF Provided by the CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA, Aggregated at 
+
+ the State Level 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ HEERF I 
+
+ HEERF I 
+
+ HEERF II 
+
+ HEERF II 
+
+ HEERF III 
+
+ HEERF III 
+
+ Total HEERF 
+
+ Share of Total 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ HEERF Funds 
+
+Alabama 
+
+$274,097 
+
+1.96% 
+
+$441,336 
+
+1.92% 
+
+$799,913 
+
+2.02% 
+
+$1,515,345 
+
+1.98% 
+
+Alaska 
+
+$14,325 
+
+0.10% 
+
+$26,372 
+
+0.11% 
+
+$42,283 
+
+0.11% 
+
+$82,979 
+
+0.11% 
+
+Arizona 
+
+$305,028 
+
+2.19% 
+
+$454,260 
+
+1.97% 
+
+$716,416 
+
+1.81% 
+
+$1,475,704 
+
+1.93% 
+
+Arkansas 
+
+$137,321 
+
+0.98% 
+
+$229,499 
+
+1.00% 
+
+$406,223 
+
+1.03% 
+
+$773,043 
+
+1.01% 
+
+California 
+
+$1,825,854 
+
+13.09% 
+
+$3,083,996 
+
+13.40% 
+
+$5,273,345 
+
+13.32% 
+
+$10,183,195 
+
+13.30% 
+
+Colorado 
+
+$176,585 
+
+1.27% 
+
+$300,106 
+
+1.30% 
+
+$516,690 
+
+1.31% 
+
+$993,381 
+
+1.30% 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+$146,095 
+
+1.05% 
+
+$223,898 
+
+0.97% 
+
+$377,433 
+
+0.95% 
+
+$747,426 
+
+0.98% 
+
+Delaware 
+
+$47,155 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$70,809 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$123,298 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$241,263 
+
+0.32% 
+
+District of Columbia 
+
+$58,108 
+
+0.42% 
+
+$80,212 
+
+0.35% 
+
+$133,015 
+
+0.34% 
+
+$271,335 
+
+0.35% 
+
+Florida 
+
+$822,906 
+
+5.90% 
+
+$1,406,743 
+
+6.11% 
+
+$2,390,632 
+
+6.04% 
+
+$4,620,281 
+
+6.04% 
+
+Georgia 
+
+$466,890 
+
+3.35% 
+
+$818,088 
+
+3.55% 
+
+$1,410,018 
+
+3.56% 
+
+$2,694,996 
+
+3.52% 
+
+Hawaii 
+
+$54,057 
+
+0.39% 
+
+$92,636 
+
+0.40% 
+
+$140,872 
+
+0.36% 
+
+$287,565 
+
+0.38% 
+
+Idaho 
+
+$61,503 
+
+0.44% 
+
+$116,966 
+
+0.51% 
+
+$207,298 
+
+0.52% 
+
+$385,767 
+
+0.50% 
+
+Il inois 
+
+$463,599 
+
+3.32% 
+
+$764,297 
+
+3.32% 
+
+$1,318,505 
+
+3.33% 
+
+$2,546,401 
+
+3.33% 
+
+Indiana 
+
+$244,016 
+
+1.75% 
+
+$416,869 
+
+1.81% 
+
+$715,283 
+
+1.81% 
+
+$1,376,167 
+
+1.80% 
+
+Iowa 
+
+$125,145 
+
+0.90% 
+
+$211,586 
+
+0.92% 
+
+$373,024 
+
+0.94% 
+
+$709,755 
+
+0.93% 
+
+Kansas 
+
+$112,390 
+
+0.81% 
+
+$194,426 
+
+0.84% 
+
+$346,330 
+
+0.87% 
+
+$653,145 
+
+0.85% 
+
+Kentucky 
+
+$165,949 
+
+1.19% 
+
+$282,535 
+
+1.23% 
+
+$486,129 
+
+1.23% 
+
+$934,613 
+
+1.22% 
+
+Louisiana 
+
+$241,362 
+
+1.73% 
+
+$399,082 
+
+1.73% 
+
+$683,440 
+
+1.73% 
+
+$1,323,884 
+
+1.73% 
+
+CRS-112 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ HEERF I 
+
+ HEERF I 
+
+ HEERF II 
+
+ HEERF II 
+
+ HEERF III 
+
+ HEERF III 
+
+ Total HEERF 
+
+ Share of Total 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ HEERF Funds 
+
+Maine 
+
+$44,051 
+
+0.32% 
+
+$73,202 
+
+0.32% 
+
+$124,774 
+
+0.32% 
+
+$242,027 
+
+0.32% 
+
+Maryland 
+
+$238,803 
+
+1.71% 
+
+$372,939 
+
+1.62% 
+
+$650,508 
+
+1.64% 
+
+$1,262,250 
+
+1.65% 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+$297,207 
+
+2.13% 
+
+$476,685 
+
+2.07% 
+
+$841,406 
+
+2.13% 
+
+$1,615,299 
+
+2.11% 
+
+Michigan 
+
+$369,838 
+
+2.65% 
+
+$615,386 
+
+2.67% 
+
+$1,059,774 
+
+2.68% 
+
+$2,044,998 
+
+2.67% 
+
+Minnesota 
+
+$193,737 
+
+1.39% 
+
+$327,545 
+
+1.42% 
+
+$565,146 
+
+1.43% 
+
+$1,086,428 
+
+1.42% 
+
+Mississippi 
+
+$205,185 
+
+1.47% 
+
+$329,639 
+
+1.43% 
+
+$574,773 
+
+1.45% 
+
+$1,109,598 
+
+1.45% 
+
+Missouri 
+
+$231,621 
+
+1.66% 
+
+$381,905 
+
+1.66% 
+
+$676,833 
+
+1.71% 
+
+$1,290,358 
+
+1.69% 
+
+Montana 
+
+$42,656 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$69,785 
+
+0.30% 
+
+$121,679 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$234,120 
+
+0.31% 
+
+Nebraska 
+
+$70,585 
+
+0.51% 
+
+$123,525 
+
+0.54% 
+
+$217,666 
+
+0.55% 
+
+$411,777 
+
+0.54% 
+
+Nevada 
+
+$74,319 
+
+0.53% 
+
+$123,870 
+
+0.54% 
+
+$213,515 
+
+0.54% 
+
+$411,705 
+
+0.54% 
+
+New Hampshire 
+
+$43,152 
+
+0.31% 
+
+$95,706 
+
+0.42% 
+
+$166,007 
+
+0.42% 
+
+$304,865 
+
+0.40% 
+
+New Jersey 
+
+$347,359 
+
+2.49% 
+
+$546,089 
+
+2.37% 
+
+$936,663 
+
+2.37% 
+
+$1,830,110 
+
+2.39% 
+
+New Mexico 
+
+$75,316 
+
+0.54% 
+
+$140,547 
+
+0.61% 
+
+$244,870 
+
+0.62% 
+
+$460,733 
+
+0.60% 
+
+New York 
+
+$991,802 
+
+7.11% 
+
+$1,562,702 
+
+6.79% 
+
+$2,699,075 
+
+6.82% 
+
+$5,253,579 
+
+6.86% 
+
+North Carolina 
+
+$471,675 
+
+3.38% 
+
+$763,480 
+
+3.32% 
+
+$1,313,201 
+
+3.32% 
+
+$2,548,356 
+
+3.33% 
+
+North Dakota 
+
+$31,549 
+
+0.23% 
+
+$51,131 
+
+0.22% 
+
+$95,798 
+
+0.24% 
+
+$178,478 
+
+0.23% 
+
+Ohio 
+
+$431,271 
+
+3.09% 
+
+$677,710 
+
+2.94% 
+
+$1,182,235 
+
+2.99% 
+
+$2,291,216 
+
+2.99% 
+
+Oklahoma 
+
+$180,863 
+
+1.30% 
+
+$275,806 
+
+1.20% 
+
+$455,392 
+
+1.15% 
+
+$912,061 
+
+1.19% 
+
+Oregon 
+
+$134,996 
+
+0.97% 
+
+$237,123 
+
+1.03% 
+
+$414,733 
+
+1.05% 
+
+$786,852 
+
+1.03% 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+$526,141 
+
+3.77% 
+
+$781,918 
+
+3.40% 
+
+$1,342,372 
+
+3.39% 
+
+$2,650,431 
+
+3.46% 
+
+Puerto Rico 
+
+$344,083 
+
+2.47% 
+
+$477,661 
+
+2.08% 
+
+$786,120 
+
+1.99% 
+
+$1,607,864 
+
+2.10% 
+
+CRS-113 
+
+ 
+ link to page 122 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ HEERF I 
+
+ HEERF I 
+
+ HEERF II 
+
+ HEERF II 
+
+ HEERF III 
+
+ HEERF III 
+
+ Total HEERF 
+
+ Share of Total 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ HEERF Funds 
+
+Rhode Island 
+
+$66,915 
+
+0.48% 
+
+$105,629 
+
+0.46% 
+
+$184,282 
+
+0.47% 
+
+$356,826 
+
+0.47% 
+
+South Carolina 
+
+$207,135 
+
+1.48% 
+
+$335,104 
+
+1.46% 
+
+$601,134 
+
+1.52% 
+
+$1,143,373 
+
+1.49% 
+
+South Dakota 
+
+$35,096 
+
+0.25% 
+
+$55,591 
+
+0.24% 
+
+$95,859 
+
+0.24% 
+
+$186,546 
+
+0.24% 
+
+Tennessee 
+
+$276,821 
+
+1.98% 
+
+$466,437 
+
+2.03% 
+
+$819,673 
+
+2.07% 
+
+$1,562,931 
+
+2.04% 
+
+Texas 
+
+$1,147,979 
+
+8.23% 
+
+$1,972,687 
+
+8.57% 
+
+$3,423,851 
+
+8.65% 
+
+$6,544,517 
+
+8.55% 
+
+Utah 
+
+$149,085 
+
+1.07% 
+
+$293,452 
+
+1.28% 
+
+$505,968 
+
+1.28% 
+
+$948,505 
+
+1.24% 
+
+Vermont 
+
+$24,267 
+
+0.17% 
+
+$37,562 
+
+0.16% 
+
+$66,060 
+
+0.17% 
+
+$127,889 
+
+0.17% 
+
+Virginia 
+
+$343,673 
+
+2.46% 
+
+$546,806 
+
+2.38% 
+
+$948,164 
+
+2.40% 
+
+$1,838,643 
+
+2.40% 
+
+Washington 
+
+$234,057 
+
+1.68% 
+
+$387,856 
+
+1.69% 
+
+$677,769 
+
+1.71% 
+
+$1,299,682 
+
+1.70% 
+
+West Virginia 
+
+$82,049 
+
+0.59% 
+
+$120,396 
+
+0.52% 
+
+$212,053 
+
+0.54% 
+
+$414,498 
+
+0.54% 
+
+Wisconsin 
+
+$185,285 
+
+1.33% 
+
+$326,565 
+
+1.42% 
+
+$579,425 
+
+1.46% 
+
+$1,091,275 
+
+1.43% 
+
+Wyoming 
+
+$13,695 
+
+0.10% 
+
+$25,257 
+
+0.11% 
+
+$44,604 
+
+0.11% 
+
+$83,556 
+
+0.11% 
+
+American Samoa 
+
+$1,624 
+
+0.01% 
+
+$2,679 
+
+0.01% 
+
+$6,927 
+
+0.02% 
+
+$11,230 
+
+0.01% 
+
+Federated States of 
+
+$3,655 
+
+0.03% 
+
+$6,773 
+
+0.03% 
+
+$17,413 
+
+0.04% 
+
+$27,841 
+
+0.04% 
+
+Micronesia 
+
+Guam 
+
+$6,237 
+
+0.04% 
+
+$10,486 
+
+0.05% 
+
+$27,202 
+
+0.07% 
+
+$43,924 
+
+0.06% 
+
+Marshall Islands 
+
+$1,964 
+
+0.01% 
+
+$3,733 
+
+0.02% 
+
+$9,608 
+
+0.02% 
+
+$15,306 
+
+0.02% 
+
+Northern Mariana 
+
+$1,847 
+
+0.01% 
+
+$3,286 
+
+0.01% 
+
+$8,425 
+
+0.02% 
+
+$13,558 
+
+0.02% 
+
+Islands 
+
+Palau 
+
+$763 
+
+0.01% 
+
+$1,288 
+
+0.01% 
+
+$3,317 
+
+0.01% 
+
+$5,367 
+
+0.01% 
+
+U.S. Virgin Islands 
+
+$3,589 
+
+0.03% 
+
+$6,824 
+
+0.03% 
+
+$12,225 
+
+0.03% 
+
+$22,639 
+
+0.03% 
+
+Additional fund sa 
+
+$78,176 
+
+0.56% 
+
+$188,508 
+
+0.82% 
+
+$197,923 
+
+0.50% 
+
+$464,607 
+
+0.61% 
+
+CRS-114 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ CARES Act 
+
+ CRRSAA 
+
+ ARPA 
+
+ CARES Act, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ Share of 
+
+ HEERF I 
+
+ HEERF I 
+
+ HEERF II 
+
+ HEERF II 
+
+ HEERF III 
+
+ HEERF III 
+
+ Total HEERF 
+
+ Share of Total 
+
+ State/Entity 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ Funds 
+
+ Allocations 
+
+ HEERF Funds 
+
+ Total 
+
+ $13,952,505 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $23,014,987 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $39,584,570 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ $76,552,062 
+
+ 100.00% 
+
+ Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on data available from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) at https://www2.ed.gov/
+about/offices/list/ope/caresact.html, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/crrsaa.html, and https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/arp.html. 
+ Notes: With a few exceptions, the allocation amounts are amounts available to IHEs. Actual amounts awarded to IHEs may differ as IHEs must apply and/or agree to 
+accept the terms and conditions of the awards. Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Percentages were calculated based on unrounded numbers. NA: not 
+applicable. 
+a. The additional funds to be allocated under the HEERF include $50 mil ion set aside by ED from the HEERF I direct grants for institutions that may have been eligible 
+
+but may have excluded by the formula; approximately $28.0 mil ion competitively awarded under the HEERF I FIPSE funds through the IREPO Grants; $75 mil ion to 
+be awarded under the HEERF II MSI Historically Black Col eges and Universities program in accordance with each IHE’s inverse share of total endowments; $113 
+mil ion to be distributed under the HEERF II FIPSE through the SAIHE program; and $197 mil ion to be distributed under the HEERF III FIPSE through the SSARP 
+program. 
+
+CRS-115 
+
+ 
+ link to page 123 link to page 124 link to page 124 
+
+ Appendix G. Department of Education Established Deadlines to Apply for 
+HEERF 
+
+ Table G-1. Department of Education Established Deadlines to Apply for the HEERF 
+
+ Act 
+
+ Program 
+
+ Deadline 
+
+CARES Act (HEERF I) 
+
+Direct Grants, MSI Programs, and FIPSE Formula Grant 
+
+September 30, 202 0a 
+
+FIPSE Competitive Grant 
+
+October 20, 2020 
+
+CRRSAA (HEERF II) 
+
+Direct Grants 
+
+April 15, 2021 
+
+MSI Programs 
+
+July 13, 2021 
+
+FIPSE Program 
+
+April 28, 2021 
+
+ARPA (HEERF III) 
+
+Direct Grants 
+
+August 11, 2021, and September 10, 202 1b 
+
+MSI Programs 
+
+October 1, 2021 
+
+FIPSE Program 
+
+Not publish edc 
+
+ Source: U.S. Department of Education, Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund- FIPSE, CARES Act Certification and Agreement- FIPSE, https://www2.ed.gov/about/
+offices/list/ope/heerffipse.html; CARES Act Certification and Agreement - Historically Black Col eges and Universities, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/
+heerfhbcu.html; U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Applications for New Awards; Institutional Resilience and Expanded Postsecondary 
+Opportunity Grants Program,” 85 Federal Register 51685-51692, August 21, 2020; Letter from Christopher J. McCaghren, Ed.D., Acting Assistant Secretary for 
+Postsecondary Education, U.S. Department of Education, to Public and Private Nonprofit Col ege and University Presidents, January 14, 2021, https://www2.ed.gov/about/
+
+offices/list/ope/asstsecretaryheerfi a1letter.pdf; U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Inviting Applications for Funds Under the Higher 
+Education Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF), Section 314(a)(2); Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) for Institutions of 
+Higher Education That Meet the Criteria for the Strengthening Institutions Program (SIP),” 86 Federal Register 19249-19252, April 13, 2020; U.S. Department of 
+Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Inviting Applications for Funds Under the Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF), Section 314(a)(2); 
+Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSAA) for Institutions of Higher Education That Meet the Criteria for the Minority Serving 
+Institutions (MSIs) Program,” 86 Federal Register 19252-19256, April 13, 2020; U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Notice Inviting 
+Applications for Fund Under the Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF) Section 2003 of the American Rescue Plan (ARP) for Institutions of Higher Education 
+That Meet the Criteria for the Minority Serving Institutions (MSI) Program,” 86 Federal Register 41454-41458, August 2, 2021; and U.S. Department of Education, Office 
+of Postsecondary Education, “Applications for New Awards; Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education-Supplemental Assistance to Institutions of Higher 
+Education (SAIHE),” 86 Federal Register 16338-16342, March 29, 2021. 
+a. HEERF I MSI program and FIPSE formula grant applicants that submitted timely applications but were denied funding due to technical errors with their submission or 
+
+that did not apply for the ful amount of their allocation within a particular funding stream were given an opportunity to resubmit their applications by January 11, 
+2021. U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, “Notice Reopening the Application Period for Certain Applicants Under the Higher 
+
+CRS-116 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+Education Emergency Relief Fund (HEERF), Sections 18004(a)(1), 18004(a)(2), and 18004(a)(3); Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,” 85 
+Federal Register 83917-83918, December 23, 2020. 
+
+b. ED extended the application deadline for proprietary institutions to September 10, 2021. U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, 
+
+“Reopening; Notice Inviting Applications for the Proprietary Institution Grant Funds for Students Program Under the Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund 
+(HEERF); American Rescue Plan Act, 2021 (ARP),” 86 Federal Register 45975-45976, August 17, 2021. 
+
+c. As of October 2021, ED had not yet invited applications for the HEERF III FIPSE program. 
+
+ 
+
+CRS-117 
+
+ 
+ ESF Funded by CARES, CRRSAA, and ARPA 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Author Information 
+
+ 
+Rebecca R. Skinner 
+
+ Cassandria Dortch 
+
+Specialist in Education Policy 
+
+Specialist in Education Policy 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Joselynn H. Fountain 
+
+ 
+
+Analyst in Education Policy 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Acknowledgments 
+
+Emma Nyhof, former CRS Research Assistant, also contributed to this report. 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan 
+shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and 
+under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other 
+than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in 
+connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not 
+subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in 
+its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or 
+material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to 
+copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+R47027 · VERSION 1 · NEW 
+
+118
\ No newline at end of file
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+++ b/corpus/politics/text/0eb4f16eb7e58d07.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,495 @@
+September 19, 2018
+
+ Intellectual Property Law: A Brief Introduction 
+
+Intellectual property (IP) law comprises a set of exclusive 
+
+If the PTO grants the patent, the patentee has the exclusive 
+
+rights to exclude others from making, copying, or using 
+
+right to make and use the invention for a set term, usually 
+
+certain intangible creations of the human mind. The U.S. 
+
+20 years from the date that the application was filed. Any 
+
+Constitution’s IP Clause provides Congress with the power 
+
+other person wishing to practice the invention needs 
+
+to grant “Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
+
+permission from the patent holder during this period. To 
+
+respective Writings and Discoveries” in order “[t]o promote 
+
+enforce the patent, the patent holder may sue alleged 
+
+the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” IP rights are 
+
+infringers in federal court and seek an injunction, damages, 
+
+intended to encourage innovation and the spread of 
+
+and other remedies. Patents are presumed to be valid, but 
+
+knowledge by providing incentives to create new works and 
+
+accused infringers may defend against lawsuits by claiming 
+
+generate useful inventions. 
+
+noninfringement (i.e., what they did was not covered by the 
+patent) or invalidity (i.e., the patent should never have been 
+
+The U.S. economy is increasingly knowledge-based, with a 
+
+issued because, for example, the invention was not new). 
+
+growing focus on technology and innovation. A recent 
+study by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
+
+ Copyright Law 
+
+(PTO) found that IP-intensive industries—such as computer 
+
+Copyright grants creators of “original works of authorship” 
+
+technology, entertainment, and pharmaceuticals—account 
+
+a set of exclusive rights in their creative works. Forms of 
+
+for 28 million American jobs and $6.6 trillion in economic 
+
+expression that are copyrightable include literary works 
+
+value, representing 38% of U.S. gross domestic product. IP 
+
+(such as books and computer code); musical works and 
+
+law, given its economic and cultural significance, is 
+
+sound recordings; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
+
+therefore more important than ever to Congress. 
+
+audiovisual works (such as movies and television); and 
+architectural works. The key requirements for a copyright 
+
+At the federal level, IP comprises three distinct, yet often 
+
+are that the work is independently created, at least 
+
+confused, forms of legal protection: patents, copyrights, and 
+
+minimally creative, and fixed in some tangible form. 
+
+trademarks. Each form of IP protects a different type of 
+
+Copyright does not extend to ideas, processes, systems, 
+
+intellectual creation, has a different procedure for obtaining 
+
+discoveries, or methods of operation. 
+
+rights, and grants the IP owner rights that vary in scope and 
+duration. As a result, each of these different areas of law is 
+
+Copyright attaches once a work is created and fixed in a 
+
+best considered separately. This product provides a brief 
+
+tangible medium of expression (e.g., recorded in a 
+
+overview of each form of federal IP protection. 
+
+computer file or on a piece of paper). Unlike patent and 
+trademark, the copyright holder does not need to apply with 
+
+ Patent Law 
+
+the government to obtain a copyright. However, in order to 
+
+Whoever invents or discovers “any new and useful process, 
+
+sue in federal court, American copyright holders must first 
+
+machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
+
+register their copyright with the U.S. Copyright Office. 
+
+new and useful improvement thereof” may apply to obtain a 
+patent before the PTO. Patents can be obtained on almost 
+
+Holders of copyrights generally have the exclusive right to 
+
+any invention made by humans, save for laws of nature, 
+
+reproduce the work, publicly perform and display it, 
+
+abstract ideas, and natural phenomena. For example, new 
+
+distribute it, and prepare derivative works from it. For most 
+
+pharmaceutical drugs are often patented. The key 
+
+works created today, the copyright does not expire until 70 
+
+requirements for a patent are that the claimed invention is 
+
+years after the death of the author. Once the copyright is 
+
+novel, useful, and nonobvious, and that the inventor is the 
+
+registered, copyright holders may sue infringers in court to 
+
+first person to file a patent application. 
+
+seek injunctions and damages. 
+
+The process for obtaining a patent before the PTO—called 
+
+“Fair use” is an important limitation on copyright that 
+
+“patent prosecution”—is fairly demanding. The patent 
+
+permits certain socially valuable uses that would otherwise 
+
+application must contain a written specification that 
+
+be infringements (e.g., using portions of a copyrighted work 
+
+describes the claimed invention such that a person skilled in 
+
+in a parody or book review). Fair use is governed by a four-
+
+the relevant field is able to make and use the invention. 
+
+factor test: courts will consider the purpose and character of 
+
+During prosecution, a patent examiner at the PTO is to 
+
+the use, the nature of the original work, the substantiality of 
+
+review the claimed invention to determine if the invention 
+
+what was copied, and any market harm from the use. Courts 
+
+is (1) truly novel, useful, and nonobvious; (2) directed at 
+
+also consider whether the use is “transformative,” that is, 
+
+patentable subject matter; and (3) adequately described in 
+
+whether it adds new expression, has a different purpose, 
+
+the patent application. 
+
+and/or alters the original work with new expression or 
+meaning. 
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+ 
+ Intellectual Property Law: A Brief Introduction 
+
+ Trademarks 
+
+trademarks. In addition, descriptive terms (e.g., New York 
+
+Trademarks are the third main area of federal IP law. 
+
+Pizza, Fast Dry Cleaners) cannot be trademarked unless the 
+
+Although a form of IP, trademarks are not a product of the 
+
+term acquires an association with a particular source of a 
+
+Constitution’s IP Clause. Rather, Congress’s power to 
+
+product (so-called “secondary meaning”). 
+
+regulate interstate commerce is the source of authority for 
+federal trademark law. Trademark law seeks to protect 
+
+To obtain a federal trademark, a business is required to 
+
+consumers from unfair competition by preventing 
+
+register the mark with the PTO. (Limited common law 
+
+businesses from misrepresenting the source of goods or 
+
+rights are available without registration.) Each registration 
+
+services. 
+
+for a mark is limited to a particular type of good or service. 
+
+In general, any “word, name, symbol, or device” may be 
+
+Owners of trademarks have the right to prevent other 
+
+used as a trademark to identify a particular business’s goods 
+
+businesses or persons from using similar marks to identify 
+
+or services. Familiar examples include brand names and 
+
+their goods or services, if such use is likely to cause 
+
+logos such as NIKE and its familiar swoosh. However, 
+
+consumer confusion. Like other forms of IP, trademark 
+
+generic terms (i.e., the name for a particular type of good) 
+
+owners may sue to obtain injunctions and damages in court. 
+
+or deceptive terms may not be registered or protected as 
+
+If properly renewed, trademark rights may last indefinitely. 
+
+ Table 1. Comparison of Each Form of Federal Intellectual Property Protection 
+
+ 
+
+ Patent 
+
+ Copyright 
+
+ Trademark 
+
+ Constitutional Basis 
+
+IP Clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, 
+
+IP Clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
+
+Commerce Clause (U.S. 
+
+§ 8, cl. 8) 
+
+cl. 8) 
+
+CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3) 
+
+ Statutory Basis 
+
+1952 Patent Act, as amended, 
+
+1976 Copyright Act, as amended, 
+
+1946 Lanham Act, as amended, 
+
+ see 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390 
+
+ see 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 
+
+ see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n 
+
+ Initial Rightsholder 
+
+Inventor 
+
+Author 
+
+Business or person using mark 
+to identify goods or services 
+
+ Subject Matter 
+
+Any “new and useful process, 
+
+“[O]riginal works of authorship” 
+
+Any “word, name, symbol, or 
+
+machine, manufacture, or 
+
+device” used to identify goods 
+
+composition of matter” 
+
+or services 
+
+ Subject-Matter 
+
+Pharmaceuticals, industrial 
+
+Books, musical works, movies, fine 
+
+Brand names, logos, distinctive 
+
+ Examples 
+
+machinery, biotechnology, 
+
+art, architecture, software 
+
+trade dress 
+
+manufacturing processes 
+
+ Requirements for 
+
+Novelty; nonobviousness; 
+
+Originality (independent creation 
+
+Nongeneric; (intent to) use in 
+
+ Protection 
+
+utility; first to file 
+
+and minimal creativity); fixation 
+
+commerce; first to register 
+
+ Excluded From 
+
+Laws of nature, natural 
+
+Any “idea, procedure, process, 
+
+Generic terms; descriptive 
+
+ Protection 
+
+phenomena, and abstract ideas 
+
+system, method of operation, 
+
+terms that lack “secondary 
+
+concept, principle, or discovery” 
+
+meaning” 
+
+ Process to Secure 
+
+PTO patent application process 
+
+Create and fix the work 
+
+PTO trademark registration 
+
+ Rights 
+
+(“patent prosecution”) 
+
+(registration is required to sue) 
+
+process 
+
+ Exclusive Rights 
+
+To make, use, offer to sell, sell, 
+
+To reproduce, distribute, or 
+
+Prevent uses of confusingly 
+
+ Granted 
+
+and import the patented 
+
+publicly perform/display the work, 
+
+similar marks with respect to a 
+
+invention 
+
+and/or make derivative works 
+
+particular good or service 
+
+ Duration 
+
+20 years 
+
+Life of author plus 70 years 
+
+Potentially indefinite 
+
+ Infringement Test 
+
+Practice the claimed invention 
+
+Substantially similar to original 
+
+Likely to confuse consumers 
+
+ Main Defenses to 
+
+Invalidity; noninfrginement; 
+
+Fair use 
+
+Fair use; nominative use 
+
+ Infringement 
+
+inequitable conduct 
+
+ Selected Legislative 
+
+Leahy-Smith America Invents 
+
+Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
+
+Trademark Dilution Revision 
+
+ Amendments 
+
+Act (2011); Hatch-Waxman Act 
+
+(1998); Copyright Term Extension 
+
+Act (2006); Anti-
+
+(1984); Bayh-Dole Act (1980) 
+
+Act (1998); Berne Convention 
+
+Cybersquatting Consumer 
+
+Implementation Act (1988) 
+
+Protection Act (1999) 
+
+ Source: CRS.
+ 
+
+ IF10986 
+
+ Kevin J. Hickey , Legislative Attorney 
+ 
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+ 
+ Intellectual Property Law: A Brief Introduction 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to 
+congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. 
+Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has 
+
+been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the 
+United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be 
+reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include 
+copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you 
+wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+ 
+
+ https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10986 · VERSION 2 · NEW
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+Order Code RS21061
+
+Updated November 29, 2001
+
+CRS Report for Congress
+
+Received through the CRS Web
+
+ Small Business Disaster Assistance: 
+
+ Responding to the Terrorist Attacks 
+
+Bruce K. Mulock
+
+Specialist in Government and Business
+
+Government and Finance Division
+
+ Summary 
+
+In addition to causing the loss of more than 4,000 human lives, the September 11th
+
+terrorist attacks destroyed or shut down an estimated 15,000 businesses—the vast
+majority being small businesses—in and around New York City’s World Trade Center
+complex. Staggering as these business losses were, they account for only a small fraction
+of the impact nationwide. Serious economic injury resulting from the attacks quickly
+spread to countless firms across the United States.
+
+On the whole, start-ups and other small businesses have been particularly hard-hit
+
+because they are generally less prepared financially and otherwise to deal with crisis. In
+contrast, virtually all large firms already had written disaster plans. Certain types of small
+businesses have been disproportionately affected. Those especially hard hit: suppliers,
+service providers, or firms in complementary industries to those sectors most adversely
+affected, notably the financial, hospitality, and travel and tour industries.
+
+The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) has long-standing disaster loan
+
+programs as well as other loan and managerial assistance programs that can help
+businesses deal with the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. (Details on SBA’s response
+to the September 11 terrorist attacks can be accessed from the agency’s home page at
+[http://www.sba.gov/].) Subsequent to the attacks, several emergency relief bills were
+introduced to make additional firms eligible for SBA assistance under more favorable
+terms. This report discusses the impact of the terrorist attacks on small businesses,
+provides an overview of the types of relief assistance currently available from the SBA,
+notes the agency’s response to date, summarizes proposed legislation, and analyzes
+policy options for Congress. It will be updated as events warrant.
+
+ Impact of Terrorist Attacks on Small Businesses 
+
+The image that typically comes to mind when one thinks about the people who were
+
+working in and around the World Trade Center when the terrorist attacks took place is
+that of stockbrokers and others associated with large financial services companies. That
+image, however, is misleading. The 375,000 or so people who commute to the area
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+around the twin Trade Towers were more likely to be florists and jewelers, card-shop
+owners and newsstand workers, clothing-store clerks and shoe-repairmen. Thus, in
+addition to a host of major firms, a large number of small businesses in and around
+“ground zero” have been destroyed, damaged, or significantly disrupted since the
+September 11th attacks. The potential number is high.
+
+Approximately 14,600 businesses inside and around the World Trade Center have
+
+been affected, according to the Empire State Development Corporation, New York
+State’s economic development agency. Also, tens of thousands of people who rented or
+owned housing in the area have incurred losses—thousands were forced to abandon their
+dwellings. Economic injury extends further.
+
+Nationwide, some experts say that many thousands of small businesses—with
+
+combined losses in the billions of dollars—are suffering from the financial impact of the
+terrorist attacks. Restaurants, hotels, and other businesses associated with the tourist
+industry, for example, are experiencing sharp declines in revenue. According to a survey
+conducted for the National Federation of Small Businesses (NFIB) during the week
+ending October 18, 2001, a third of small businesses in the U.S. and two-thirds in New
+York City have seen their sales drop primarily as a result of the events of September 11.1
+
+In absolute numbers, many damaged, destroyed, or economically injured firms had
+
+some type of insurance coverage. The amount of insured losses will not be known for
+some time, but according to a CRS report, credible industry-wide loss estimates for
+insurers range from $30 billion to $70 billion, making the terrorist attacks of September
+11 the costliest insured catastrophic loss in the history of property/casualty insurance—
+surpassing Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which resulted in $19.7 billion in claims.2
+
+ Current SBA Disaster Loan Programs: Overview 
+
+The legislation creating the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) was signed
+
+into law (P.L. 83-163) in 1953. It declared it to be “the policy of Congress that the
+federal government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect insofar as is possible the
+interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to
+ensure that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for supplies and services
+for government be placed with small business enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen
+the overall economy of the nation.” Since its inception, the SBA has included disaster
+assistance as an integral part of fulfilling its mission.3
+
+1 National Federation of Independent Businesses, “Sales Drop for One-Third of Small Businesses,
+Survey Says,” NFIB Issues in the News, [http://www.nfib.com], visited Oct. 30, 2001.
+
+2 For an insurance industry perspective on the events of September 11th, see CRS Report RS21053,
+ Impact of Terrorist Attacks on the U.S. Insurance Industry , by Rawle O. King; or see the CRS
+Terrorism Briefing Book, Insurance Industry , under the heading “Economic Repercussions,” at
+[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter1.shtml].
+
+3 Section 207(b) of P.L. 83-163 [15 U.S.C. 636(b)] officially authorized the SBA “to make such
+loans as the Administration may determine to be necessary or appropriate because of floods or
+other catastrophes.”
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+SBA’s disaster loans are a key component of the overall federal disaster recovery
+
+effort and they are the primary form of federal assistance for nonfarm, private sector
+disaster losses caused by hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and the like.4 The agency offers
+both Physical Disaster Loans to repair or replace disaster-damaged property and
+Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) to cover operating expenses that businesses could
+otherwise have afforded to pay if the disaster had not occurred.
+
+SBA physical disaster assistance is not limited to small firms. The agency makes
+
+such loans to businesses of all sizes, nonprofit organizations, homeowners, and renters.
+It is also the agency’s largest direct loan program. The loan program’s low interest rates
+and long terms (up to 30 years) are intended to make recovery affordable.5 Disaster
+victims repay the loans to the Treasury.
+
+In addition to the Physical Disaster and EIDL programs, the agency also administers
+
+a Military Reservists EIDL program. The purpose of the MREIDL program is to provide
+funds to eligible small businesses to meet the ordinary and necessary operating expenses
+they could have met, but are unable to meet because of essential employees being “called
+up” to active duty as military reservists.
+
+ SBA Response to Terrorist Attacks 
+
+The agency is working in partnership with the Federal Emergency Management
+
+Agency (FEMA) and other federal, state, and local agencies, as well as the American Red
+Cross, in support of the New York City Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management
+(NYOEM) to assist city residents who were stricken by the recent terrorist attacks.6
+
+Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the SBA dispatched
+
+employees from its headquarters and regional offices to augment its staff in New York.
+Experienced SBA loan officers are available in Disaster Assistance Service Centers
+located throughout the disaster area to assist business owners and individuals.
+
+As of November 26, 2001, FEMA had referred more than 15,000 businesses to
+
+SBA’s New York Disaster Assistance Service Centers; and, as of November 27, the
+agency (SBA) reported that it had received 5,172 business applications (844 for physical
+damage and 4,328 for economic injury) and approved 629 loans for a total of $64.3
+million (average size loan: approximately $102,000). By comparison, in Virginia, SBA
+
+4 For a brief descriptive overview of federal programs that both specifically and generally apply
+to disasters caused by terrorists, see CRS Report RL31125, Recovery from Terrorist Attacks: A
+Catalog of Selected Federal Assistance Programs , coordinated by Ben Canada.
+
+5 Currently, interest rates fluctuate according to statutory formulas: a lower rate, not to exceed 4
+% is available to those applicants unable to obtain credit elsewhere, while a higher rate, not to
+exceed 8 % is charged when other sources of credit are available.
+
+6 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers assistance authorized by the
+Stafford Act and is responsible for coordinating the response efforts of all federal agencies to major
+disasters declared by the President. For additional information see the CRS Terrorism Briefing
+Book, FEMA Role and Responsibility , at [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter76.html], as
+well as FEMA’s website at [http://www.fema.gov].
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+had approved 17 loans for $2.3 million in connection with the attack on the Pentagon
+(average size loan: approximately $136,000).7
+
+The SBA assistance provided after September 11 may be compared to other
+
+catastrophes. In response to California’s Northridge earthquake in 1994, SBA made
+51,688 loans to homeowners and renters totaling $1.167 billion, and 13,328 loans to
+businesses totaling $6.545 billion. Specifically regarding loans made in response to
+terrorism, SBA made 172 loans for $10.4 million for the Oklahoma City Bombing, and
+nine loans for $512,400 for the World Trade Center Bombing in 1993. Prior to the
+September 11 attacks, these are the only disaster loans made by the agency in response
+to terrorism.
+
+In response to the needs of victims of September 11, SBA officials provided greater
+
+access to Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) effective October 22, 2001. Previously,
+only businesses located in declared disaster areas were eligible for the EIDL program.
+Under the new regulations, EIDL assistance will be available nationwide to eligible small
+businesses that have suffered substantial economic injury as a direct result of the
+September 11 attacks or a federal action taken in response to the attacks. EIDLs will
+provide eligible firms with the working capital needed to pay ordinary and necessary
+operating expenses that they would have been able to pay had the disaster not occurred.
+
+ Legislation 
+
+While the SBA has several disaster loan programs available to businesses and
+
+individuals that have suffered physical and economic damage as a result of the September
+11 terrorist attacks, Congress may decide to modify or expand authority for those
+programs to respond to the losses resulting from the attacks.
+
+In the Senate, S. 1499, introduced by Senator Kerry on October 9, 2001, and cited
+
+as the “American Small Business Emergency Relief and Recovery Act of 2001,” would
+make several significant changes designed to strengthen and expand existing SBA loan
+programs, including the agency’s principal non-disaster lending and venture capital
+programs. S. 1499 addresses three categories of small businesses:
+
+! Small businesses directly affected because they are physically located in or near
+
+the building or areas attacked or closed for security measures, or are located in
+national airports. Such firms would be eligible for SBA economic injury
+disaster loans—under more favorable terms than are currently available—such
+as deferring the payments and forgiving the interest on these loans for two years,
+as well as increasing the loan caps and extending the deadline for applying for
+disaster loans to one year.
+
+! Small businesses not physically damaged or destroyed, or in the immediate
+
+vicinity of the World Trade Center or the Pentagon, but directly or indirectly
+affected because they are suppliers, service providers, or complementary
+industries, especially the financial, hospitality, travel and tour industries.
+
+7 Alan Escobar, U.S. Small Business Administration, email to the author, Oct. 29, 2001.
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+! Small businesses in need of capital and investment financing, procurement
+
+assistance, or management counseling in the economic aftermath of September
+11. Such businesses would be eligible for a number of SBA programs with
+enhanced incentive features, e.g., waiving the borrower’s fee for a regular 7(a)
+loan for working capital or a 504 loan to buy equipment to increase productivity
+or lower operating costs.
+
+In the House, H.R. 3230, introduced by Representative Manzullo and others on
+
+November 6, 2001, and cited as the American Small Business Emergency Relief and
+Recovery Act, was identical to S. 1499, discussed above. On November 14, the bill was
+approved by the House Small Business Committee by voice vote. As modified by
+amendments offered by Representative Velazquez, the legislation would allow the SBA
+to: offer grants to small businesses that are in such dire financial straits that they cannot
+afford to secure loans, lower interest rates on SBA disaster loans, and permit the SBA to
+forgive disaster loans for borrowers suffering the greatest financial hardships.
+
+Also in the House, H.R. 2961, introduced by Representative LaFalce and others on
+
+September 25, 2001, and cited as the Terrorist Disaster Relief for Small Business Act,
+would allow the Administrator of the Small Business Administration to authorize
+providing loans under the EIDL program to firms located in all areas of the United States,
+not just those that have already been declared disaster areas. H.R. 3011, introduced by
+Representative Velazquez on October 3, 2001, and cited as the Small Business Emergency
+Relief Act of 2001, would authorize SBA’s Administrator to make certain changes in the
+agency’s disaster loan programs, including the making of loans without regard to the
+ability of small business concerns to obtain credit elsewhere as well as waiving loan
+amount limitations and size standards. Some of the bill’s provisions were, as noted above,
+incorporated into H.R. 3230.
+
+ Concluding Observations 
+
+The loan authorities proposed in response to the attacks are without precedent and
+
+will be costly according to economic analysts. SBA’s disaster loans, unlike its 7(a)
+ guaranteed loans, come directly from the Treasury. Further, with regard to proposed
+legislative changes making the 7(a) business loans available at more favorable terms to
+borrowers (lower interest rates and longer repayment times), such program changes could
+necessitate substantial increases in appropriations for the agency. Some analysts have
+stated that the more favorable terms proposed for the 7(a) program would lead to
+increased subsidy rates and larger default rates for the program.
+
+Many small firms suffering economic injury resulting from the terrorist attacks are
+
+expected to seek SBA assistance. Many small businesses typically purchase
+“businessowner” insurance policies that include broad coverage provisions similar to a
+homeowner’s policy that automatically cover basic losses when business is interrupted.
+However, as Donald Griffin, director of business and personal lines with the National
+Association of Independent Insurers, notes, “[b]usiness interruption insurance is very
+complicated and not everyone buys it.”8
+
+8 Donald Griffin, National Association of Independent Insurers, Chicago, IL, telephone
+
+(continued...)
+
+ 
+ CRS-6
+
+As noted above, some of the legislative proposals are designed to mitigate
+
+bankruptcies, business closures, and layoffs directly related to the attacks. They also
+address the shrinking availability of credit and venture capital to small businesses through
+traditional lenders and investors, a condition that has been exacerbated by the attacks.
+Many small businesses would welcome the legislative changes these bills contain, including
+the opportunity to borrow money under the SBA’s 7(a) program at lower interest rates,
+with the option of deferring the principal payments for one or two years. On the other
+hand, on October 10, 2001, National Federation of Independent Businesses’ (NFIB) chief
+economist, William Dunkelberg, testified that, “regarding capital markets, credit has been
+widely available and getting cheaper.”9 He went on to point out that in a recent NFIB
+survey only 3% of respondents reported credit availability as their most important business
+problem. It may be argued, of course, that the legislation is intended target a specific
+group of firms, i.e., those suffering economic distress as a direct result of the terrorist
+attacks, not the entire universe of U.S. small business.
+
+8 (...continued)
+
+conversation with the author, Oct. 31, 2001.
+
+9 Testimony of William Dunkelberg on behalf of NFIB before the House Committee on Small
+Business, The Role of Small Businesses in Jump-Starting the Economy , October 10, 2001,
+available at [http://www.house.gov/smbiz/hearings/107th/2001/011010/dunkleberg.html], visited
+Nov. 9, 2001.
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+The Missing and Exploited Children's (MEC) Program: Background and Policies
+
+ July 22, 2019
+ (RL34050)
+ 
+ Jump to Main Text of Report 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Contents
+
+ 
+ Introduction 
+
+ Background 
+
+ Demographics of Missing and Exploited Children 
+
+ Overview 
+
+ Missing Children 
+
+ Sexually Exploited Children 
+
+ Funding for the MEC Program 
+
+ National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
+
+ Missing Children's Services 
+
+ Call Center 
+
+ Case Management 
+
+ Project ALERT (America's Law Enforcement Retiree Team) and Team Adam 
+
+ Forensic Services Unit 
+
+ International Missing Children's Cases 
+
+ Response to Child Sexual Exploitation 
+
+ The Child Victim Identification Program (CVIP) 
+
+ CyberTipline 
+
+ Sex Offender Tracking Team 
+
+ Child Sex Trafficking Team 
+
+ Family Advocacy Services 
+
+ Training and Technical Assistance 
+
+ Partnerships 
+
+ Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force 
+
+ ICAC Task Forces 
+
+ National ICAC Data System (NIDS) 
+
+ National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction 
+
+ AMBER Alert Program 
+
+ AMBER Alert Coordinator and Standards 
+
+ AMBER Alert Grant Programs 
+
+ Grant Programs and Technical Assistance 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tables
+
+ 
+ Table 1. Actual Funding for the Missing and Exploited Children's Program, by Component, FY2007-FY2018 
+
+ Table A-1. The Missing Children's Assistance Act of 1984 and Amendments to the Act 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+ Appendixes
+
+ 
+ Appendix. The Missing Children's Assistance Act of 1984, as Amended 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Summary
+
+ Beginning in the late 1970s, highly publicized cases of children who were abducted, sexually abused, and sometimes murdered prompted policymakers and child advocates to declare a missing children problem. At that time, about 1.8 million children annually were reported to the police as missing. More recent data indicate that the number of children who go missing has declined. A survey from 2013 provides the most recent and comprehensive information on missing children. About 238,000 children (3.1 per 1,000 children) were reported to law enforcement by their caretakers that year as missing due to a family or nonfamily abduction; running away or being forced to leave home; becoming lost or injured; or for benign reasons, such as a miscommunication about schedules. 
+
+ As a policy issue, missing children are often included in discussions of sexual victimization. Children who go missing—as well as children who are not missing—may be sexually exploited. A study that examined the prevalence of children's exposure to violence in 2008 found that 1 in 16 (6.1%) surveyed children were sexually victimized in the past year and nearly 1 in 10 (9.8%) were sexually victimized at some point over their lifetimes.
+
+ Recognizing the need for greater federal coordination of local and state efforts to recover and support missing and exploited children, Congress passed the Missing Children's Assistance Act ( P.L. 98-473 ) in 1984. The act directed the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to establish a national resource center to respond to cases of missing and exploited children, among other related activities. The Missing Children's Assistance Act has been amended multiple times, most recently by the Missing Children's Assistance Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-267 ). 
+
+ Activities authorized under the Missing Children's Assistance Act and selected other laws are collectively referred to as the Missing and Exploited Children's (MEC) program. The program includes the following components:
+ The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC): Since 1984, NCMEC has served as the national resource center and has carried out many of the objectives of the Missing Children's Assistance Act in collaboration with OJJDP. NCMEC case managers provide support to law enforcement and families of missing children. Most children reported missing to NCMEC have run away.
+
+ T he Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force program : This program assists state and local enforcement cyber units in investigating online child sexual exploitation. It was authorized under the PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-401 ), as amended. 
+
+ AMBER (America's Missing: Broad cast Emergency Response) Alert support : AMBER Alerts publicly broadcast bulletins in the most serious child abduction cases. The AMBER Alert program is authorized under the PROTECT Act ( P.L. 108-21 ), and as administered, provides training and technical assistance to law enforcement and other stakeholders about issuing and disseminating such alerts.
+
+ Other initiatives : These include training and technical assistance on investigating and preventing child victimization. They also include support to membership-based nonprofit missing and exploited children's organizations. These initiatives are authorized by the Missing Children's Assistance Act. 
+ The FY2018 and FY2019 appropriations to DOJ for the MEC program were $76 million and $82 million, respectively. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ Introduction
+
+ The Missing and Exploited Children's (MEC) program—administered by the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) in the Office of Justice Programs (OJP)—seeks to prevent cases of missing and sexually exploited children and to support communities in responding to such cases. The program is composed of activities that are grouped in four main areas. Multiple laws provide funding authority for these activities, which are funded together under the MEC program appropriation. 1 
+
+ The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) is a nonprofit organization in Alexandria, VA, that serves as a resource center for law enforcement agencies working on cases of missing and exploited children, the families of child victims, and the public more broadly. NCMEC personnel take reports of missing and exploited children through a hotline and online portal. Most of the children reported missing have run away. NCMEC also provides technical assistance to locate abductors and recover missing children, and helps with identifying child victims of sexual exploitation. Funding for NCMEC was $28.3 million in FY2018. 
+
+ The Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force program funds state and local law enforcement agencies in investigating online child sexual exploitation. The program also includes the National ICAC Data System (NIDS), which is used by law enforcement agencies to coordinate information about perpetrators who sexually abuse children on the internet and to recover these children. Funding for the ICAC program was $28.6 million in FY2018. 
+
+ Under the AMBER Alert (America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response) program, DOJ supports a grantee, Fox Valley Technical College, that provides technical assistance to states and localities in alerting the public when children are abducted and believed to be in imminent danger. AMBER Alert technical assistance was funded at $3.4 million in FY2018.
+
+ The MEC program also provides grants for training and technical assistance on child victimization and related supports. Training and technical assistance is delivered via a grantee (Fox Valley Technical College) that provides assistance through classroom instruction, web-based learning, and in-person support. These grants can vary from year to year, and funding was $15.7 million in FY2018. 
+
+ This report covers selected aspects of policies and research concerning missing and exploited children. It begins with background on federal involvement in missing children's issues. The next section includes definitions and approximate numbers of children who are missing and sexually exploited. The report then provides information about each component of the MEC program. The report does not include information about the broader federal response to sexually exploited children. 2 
+
+ Background
+
+ Congress has long been concerned about missing children. In the early 1970s, Congress held hearings about a subset of these children—those who had run away from home. Testimony focused on the interaction that runaway youth had with police and their increasing reliance on social service agencies for support. These hearings and related activity led to the passage of the Runaway Youth Act of 1974 as Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ( P.L. 93-415 ). The act, as amended, authorizes assistance to runaway and homeless youth through shelters and other services. 3 
+
+ Beginning in the late 1970s, highly publicized cases of children who were abducted, sexually abused, and sometimes murdered prompted policymakers and child advocates to declare a missing children problem. At that time, many of the victims' families and communities perceived that kidnappings were becoming more commonplace. Prominent cases of missing children were highly publicized and a docudrama, "Adam," depicted the story of abducted six-year-old Adam Walsh, son of John and Revé Walsh. 4 Testimony at congressional hearings about missing children further reinforced the perception of a missing children problem. Witnesses testified that as many as 1.8 million children were missing. They also highlighted the accompanying sexual exploitation that children often experienced during missing episodes. 5 In some parts of the country, nonprofit organizations formed by the parents of missing children were often the only entities that organized recovery efforts and provided counseling for victimized families.
+
+ Congress responded by passing two bills, both of which were enacted. The Missing Children Act of 1982 ( P.L. 97-292 ) directed the Attorney General to keep records on missing children in the National Crime Information Center's (NCIC's) Missing Persons File, maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and to disseminate those records to state and local agencies. 6 That law neither created new federal jurisdiction over missing children's programs nor required federal law enforcement officials to coordinate missing children efforts. Two years later, the Missing Children's Assistance Act ( P.L. 98-473 ) was enacted. It directed OJJDP to lead federal efforts to recover missing children and establish a national resource center on missing children. NCMEC has served as the resource center since 1984. The Missing Children's Assistance Act has been amended multiple times to further specify the responsibilities of OJJDP and NCMEC in responding to missing and exploited children. The act was most recently reauthorized by the Missing Children's Assistance Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-267 ). It authorizes $40 million for each of FY2014 through FY2023 for OJJDP to fund activities carried out under the act. Of this amount, up to $32.2 million is to be allotted to NCMEC. 7 P.L. 115-267 also revised the purpose areas to add that each year tens of thousands of children run away or are abducted or removed from their parents; and adds a definition of parent : "a legal guardian or other individual who may lawfully exercise parental rights with respect to the child." P.L. 115-267 also states that NCMEC is to carry out specified activities, some of which were already carried out by the organization before the law was enacted. Such activities include responding to foster care children who are missing from state child welfare agencies by coordinating with such agencies and courts handling juvenile dependency matters; and identifying, locating, and recovering child victims of, and at risk for, sex trafficking. (The Appendix provides a description of the original act and its amendments.)
+
+ The federal government has since provided additional resources in support of missing and exploited children. Selected activities have been subsumed under the MEC program. DOJ first funded the ICAC Task Force program in 2008 to support state and local law enforcement agencies in combatting online enticement of children and the proliferation of pornography. The PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-401 ) formally authorized the program. This law provided two authorizations for the ICAC Task Force program—one for $60 million for FY2009-FY2013 for ICAC activities generally, including grants for ICAC task forces, and one for $2 million for each of FY2009-FY2016 for the National ICAC Data System, which facilitates online law enforcement investigations of child exploitation. The Child Protection Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-206 ) authorized annual appropriations of $60 million for the ICAC Task Force program generally (including the data system and the National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction, discussed later in this report) through FY2018. The Providing Resources, Officers, and Technology to Eradicate Cyber Threats to Our Children Act of 2017 (PROTECT Our Children Act of 2017, P.L. 115-82 ) extended annual authorizations of $60 million for the ICAC Task Force program generally through FY2022. 
+
+ Separately, OJP first provided funding ($10 million in discretionary appropriations) in 2002 for states and localities to develop AMBER Alert programs. The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act, P.L. 108-21 ), directed the Attorney General to create a national AMBER Alert program, including appointing a coordinator and developing standards for issuing an alert. 8 P.L. 108-21 also authorized funding in FY2004 for activities to support states in developing AMBER Alert communication plans and technologies. As discussed in more detail later in this report, DOJ has used continuous appropriations for the MEC program since FY2004 to provide technical assistance to states' AMBER Alert plans and in responding to child abductions. The Ashlynne Mike Amber Alert in Indian Country Act ( P.L. 115-166 ), enacted in 2018, directs DOJ to carry out AMBER Alert grants to tribes for developing and enhancing their AMBER Alert systems and integrating these systems into regional and state systems. 
+
+ Demographics of Missing and Exploited Children
+
+ Overview
+
+ Missing children and sexually exploited children are distinct but overlapping populations. The term "missing child" is defined under the Missing Children's Assistance Act as an individual under age 18 whose whereabouts are unknown to that individual's legal custodian. Although the Missing Children's Assistance Act does not define child sexual exploitation, both criminal and civil federal statutes specify acts of sexual exploitation for purposes of prosecuting offenders and providing minimum standards of child abuse for states to use in their own definitions of child abuse. 9 
+
+ The actual number of children who are currently missing or sexually exploited is unknown; however, studies have estimated the rate of children who are missing or sexually exploited (as discussed in more detail below). 
+
+ Missing Children
+
+ The Missing Children's Assistance Act requires OJJDP triennially to conduct incidence studies of the number of missing children, the number of children missing due to a stranger abduction or parental abduction, and the number of missing children who are recovered. 10 Since the act's passage in 1984, DOJ has supported three national incidence studies, known as the National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, and Thrownaway Children (NISMART- 1, 2, and 3). NISMART-1 was conducted in 1988, NISMART-2 was conducted in 1999, and NISMART-3 was conducted in 2011 and 2013. 
+
+ DOJ has issued findings from NISMART- 3 in two reports. 11 One of the reports includes findings from a telephone and online survey of households. 12 As with NISMART-2, NISMART-3 includes five categories of missing children: 
+ abductions by a family member; 
+
+ abductions by a nonfamily member perpetrator; 
+
+ run away or thrown away children; 
+
+ missing because they were lost, stranded, or injured; or 
+
+ missing for benign reasons (e.g., misunderstanding about a child's schedule). 
+ The study classifies missing children cases as "caretaker missing" and "reported missing." For an episode to qualify as "caretaker missing," the child's whereabouts must have been unknown to the primary caretaker, with the result that the caretaker was alarmed for at least one hour and tried to locate the child. A "caretaker missing" child was considered "reported missing" if a caretaker additionally contacted the police or a missing children's agency to locate the child.
+
+ The NISMART-3 household survey indicates that the rates of children who were caretaker missing and reported missing declined since the NISMART-2 study. There was a decrease of 32% for caretaker missing cases (from 9.2 per 1,000 in 1999 to 6.3 per 1,000 in 2013) and a decrease of 52% for reported missing cases (from 6.5 per 1,000 in 1999 to 3.1 per 1,000 in 2013). The drop was largely driven by the decline in the rate of children who were missing due to benign reasons. One of the NISMART-3 reports speculates that the increased use of cell phones has improved communication between parents and their children, and therefore fewer children were perceived or reported as missing. The report raises concerns about the methodological challenges with the survey, including that households were difficult to reach because many now only have cell phones. As a result, the overall sample was smaller than the NISMART-2 sample. 
+
+ The second NISMART-3 report, which focuses on stereotypical kidnappings, was based on cases known to law enforcement in 2011. 13 Such kidnappings refer to nonfamily abduction in which a slight acquaintance or stranger moves the child at least 20 feet or holds the child at least one hour. In addition to these criteria, the child has to be detained overnight, transported at least 50 miles, held for ransom, abducted with the intent to keep the child permanently, or killed. The report indicates that 105 children were victims of stereotypical kidnappings in 2011. 
+
+ Sexually Exploited Children
+
+ The true number of sexual exploitation incidents—whether they accompany missing children cases or not—is unknown because this type of abuse often goes undetected. In addition, studies of child sexual exploitation report varying numbers because of differences in their methodology, the time periods over which the data were collected, and how exploitation is defined. Nonetheless, one federal study, the National Survey of Children's Exposure to Violence, provides some insight into the prevalence of sexual exploitation. The study shows that a significant number and share of children under age 18 have been sexually victimized.
+
+ The National Survey of Children's Exposure to Violence, conducted by the University of New Hampshire with support from OJJDP, examined the incidence and prevalence of children's exposure to violence in 2008. 14 Researchers interviewed a nationally representative sample of children under age 18 and their caretakers by phone. They asked whether children had experienced certain forms of violence and victimization, including sexual victimization, within the past year and over their lifetime. The sexual victimization category encompasses seven types of victimization: sexual conduct or fondling by an adult the child knew, sexual conduct or fondling by an adult stranger, sexual contact or fondling by another child or teenager, attempted or completed intercourse, exposure or "flashing," sexual harassment, and consensual sexual conduct with an adult. The study found that 1 in 16 (6.1%) surveyed children and youth were sexually victimized in the past year and nearly 1 in 10 (9.8%) were sexually victimized at some point over their lifetimes. Girls were more likely than boys to report that they had been sexually victimized, with 7.4% of girls reporting sexual victimization within the past year and 12.2% reporting victimization over their lifetimes. Female adolescents ages 14 to 17 had the highest rate of victimization. Nearly 8% had been sexually victimized within the past year and 18.7% had been sexually victimized over their lifetimes.
+
+ Funding for the MEC Program
+
+ The MEC program was initially funded at $4 million in FY1985 and has received funding increases in most years since 1991. Funding more than doubled from $6.0 million in FY1997 to $12.3 million in FY1998, when the ICAC Task Force program was implemented. Another funding peak, from FY2003 to FY2004, was the result of increased funds for the AMBER Alert program and NCMEC. 
+
+ Funding increased again—from $50 million in FY2008 to $70 million in FY2009—following reauthorization of the program. Also in FY2009, Congress appropriated funding for the program under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ). ARRA provided funding for myriad federal programs and initiatives to address the economic recession that began in December 2007 and extended through June 2009. Specifically, the law appropriated $50 million for the ICAC Task Force program. 
+
+ Total FY2019 funding was $82 million. Table 1 shows total funding and funding for each of the program's components from FY2007 through FY2018. NCMEC has received the most funding in each of these years, followed by the ICAC Task Force program. The next highest level of funding support went to activities including program administration, training and technical assistance on missing and exploited children, support services for missing children's organizations, and grant programs that can vary from year to year. 
+
+ As with prior appropriations legislation, the FY2018 omnibus appropriations law ( P.L. 115-141 ) did not specify the level of funds for each of the program's components. DOJ allocated $76 million for the program, primarily for NCMEC. According to DOJ, the increase in funding for the AMBER Alert program was to build capacity to respond to these alerts in Indian Country. 15 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Table 1. Actual Funding for the Missing and Exploited Children's Program, by Component, FY2007-FY2018
+
+ (In thousands of dollars)
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Program Component
+
+ 
+ 
+ FY2007
+
+ 
+ 
+ FY2008
+
+ 
+ 
+ FY2009
+
+ 
+ 
+ FY2010
+
+ 
+ 
+ FY2011
+
+ 
+ 
+ FY2012
+
+ 
+ 
+ FY2013
+
+ 
+ 
+ FY2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ FY2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ FY2016
+
+ 
+ 
+ FY2017
+
+ 
+ 
+ FY2018
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ NCMEC
+
+ 
+ 
+ $26,500
+
+ 
+ 
+ $24,740
+
+ 
+ 
+ $30,488
+
+ 
+ 
+ $30,496
+
+ 
+ 
+ $30,130
+
+ 
+ 
+ $26,623
+
+ 
+ 
+ $25,500
+
+ 
+ 
+ $26,005
+
+ 
+ 
+ $25,700
+
+ 
+ 
+ $28,343
+
+ 
+ 
+ $28,343
+
+ 
+ 
+ $28,343
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ ICAC Task Force Program
+
+ 
+ 
+ $11,779 a 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $15,950
+
+ 
+ 
+ $25,000 b 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $28,800 b 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $28,583
+
+ 
+ 
+ $25,670
+
+ 
+ 
+ $25,050
+
+ 
+ 
+ $27,049
+
+ 
+ 
+ $27,049
+
+ 
+ 
+ $27,600
+
+ 
+ 
+ $27,600
+
+ 
+ 
+ $28,600
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ AMBER Alert Training and Technical Assistance
+
+ 
+ 
+ $5,000
+
+ 
+ 
+ $4,481
+
+ 
+ 
+ $5,000
+
+ 
+ 
+ $3,150
+
+ 
+ 
+ $4,075
+
+ 
+ 
+ $2,515
+
+ 
+ 
+ $2,364
+
+ 
+ 
+ N/A c 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $2,402
+
+ 
+ 
+ $2,400
+
+ 
+ 
+ $2,400
+
+ 
+ 
+ $3,400
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Grant Programs and Technical Assistance d 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $4,108
+
+ 
+ 
+ $4,829
+
+ 
+ 
+ $9,512
+
+ 
+ 
+ $7,554
+
+ 
+ 
+ $7,072
+
+ 
+ 
+ $10,192
+
+ 
+ 
+ $9,478
+
+ 
+ 
+ $7,270
+
+ 
+ 
+ $5,865
+
+ 
+ 
+ $4,194
+
+ 
+ 
+ $4,231
+
+ 
+ 
+ $15,657
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Total Funding 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $47,387 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $50,000 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $70,000 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $70,000 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $69,860 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $65,000 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $62,392 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $60,324 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $61,016 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $62,536 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $63,124 
+
+ 
+ 
+ $ 76,000 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Source s : Congressional Research Service, correspondence with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Justice Programs (OJP), Office of Communications, March, July, and October 2014; October 2015; October 2016; December 2017; December 2018; and June 2019. Also, the Continuing and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 ( P.L. 113-6 ); Rules Committee Print 113-32 on the amendment to H.R. 3547 , which was enacted as P.L. 113-67 ; Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ); and Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ). Appropriations reflect rescissions where applicable, and the FY2013 appropriations reflect amounts post-sequestration as required under the terms of the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ) and the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 ( P.L. 99-177 ), as amended. 
+
+ Notes: In most years, some funding is reprogrammed to support activities under OJP. In addition, some funding (generally between $1 and $60,000) is unobligated. For example, the FY2017 appropriation for the MEC program was $72,500,000. Of this amount, $63,124,000 was allocated to the components of the program; $7,091,479 was reprogrammed for other OJP activities; and $2,227,026 was used to support OJJDP functions (i.e., website, communication functions, training and technical assistance standards, and performance measures). Another $57,652 was unobligated. 
+
+ a. The ICAC Task Force program received an additional $11.5 million in 2007 through the Byrne Discretionary Grant Program to expand the program, provide training and technical assistance, and improve the forensic capabilities of task forces and reduce the backlog of cases they handle. These funds are not shown here.
+
+ b. The ICAC received $50 million under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) to support four ICAC activities authorized under the PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-401 ): (1) ICAC grants; (2) ICAC Training and Technical Assistance grant; (3) ICAC Research grants to encourage innovative and independent research and data collection to further understand the scope and prevalence of technology and Internet crimes against children; and (4)Â the National ICAC Data System. These funds are not shown here.
+
+ c. Remaining funds from previous years were carried over to support AMBER Alert activities through FY2014.
+
+ d. This includes funding for program management and administration, support services for missing children's organizations, and grant programs that can vary from year to year. For example, the FY2018 allocations included $8,960,308 for program management and administration; $4,196,692 for the MEC training and technical assistance program, specialized services for victims of child sex trafficking training and technical assistance, specialized services for victims of child sex trafficking programs, and evaluation of the ICAC program; and $2,500,000 for strengthening investigative tools and technology for combating child exploitation. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
+
+ NCMEC is a primary component of the MEC program and employs more than 300 people at its Alexandria, VA, headquarters and regional offices in California, Florida, New York, and Texas. These regional offices provide case management and technical support in their geographic areas. 
+
+ NCMEC provides multiple activities and services pertaining to 
+ missing children, including those abducted to or from the United States;
+
+ exploited children; 
+
+ training and technical assistance; 
+
+ families of missing children; and 
+
+ partnerships with state missing children's clearinghouses and other stakeholders. 
+ These activities and services are detailed further in this section. 16 Note that some missing children and exploited children programs are not mutually exclusive, and this report does not provide an exhaustive discussion of all services provided by NCMEC. 17 In addition to funding through the MEC program, NCMEC is also funded through private contributions, other DOJ grants, and the United States Secret Service (USSS) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-322 ), Congress has mandated that the USSS provide forensic and technical assistance to NCMEC and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in matters involving missing and exploited children. In recent years, funding provided by the USSS has been transferred to OJP to be provided directly to NCMEC. 
+
+ Missing Children's Services
+
+ Call Center
+
+ NCMEC's Call Center receives calls on its 24-hour toll-free hotline (1-800-THE-LOST), primarily from parents and law enforcement officials. In FY2018, the center responded to over 171,000 calls reporting missing children; sightings of missing children; and requests for assistance, information, and technical assistance from families of missing children, law enforcement agencies, and others. 18 Since 1987, reports of child sexual exploitation received through the CyberTipline are routed to the Call Center. Assistance activities range from sending publications or educational materials to providing technical support to law enforcement and families about missing children cases. The Call Center also provides information to families of missing children about free or low-cost transportation services or requests transportation for families needing assistance with reunification. 
+
+ NCMEC is the only nonprofit, non-law enforcement entity to have access to the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Missing Person File, which is reviewed by Call Center staff for records of missing children added by local and state law enforcement agencies and updates of these records. Law enforcement agencies submitting information to NCIC on a missing child are to notify NCMEC of each report that relates to a child reportedly missing from foster care, and they must maintain close liaison with NCMEC (and child welfare agencies) to exchange information and technical assistance about missing children cases generally. 19 Cases of children who are believed to be seriously at risk are flagged in NCIC for NCMEC. NCMEC is permitted to search the Missing Person File to assist with long-term missing children who would be over age 18. 
+
+ Case Management
+
+ Each missing child case is entered into NCMEC's nationwide database, and a case manager in the Missing Children's Division is assigned. NCMEC case managers serve as the single point of contact for the searching family and provide technical assistance to locate abductors and recover missing children. In FY2018, case managers handled 26,813 cases (i.e., individual children). Of these, about 9 out of 10 involved children who had run away. 20 
+
+ Project ALERT (America's Law Enforcement Retiree Team) and Team Adam
+
+ The Project ALERT program was established in 1992 to assist law enforcement agencies with the recovery of missing children—particularly long-term cases—at no cost to the agencies. Project ALERT members include nearly 150 retired federal, state, and local law enforcement officials who have recent and relevant investigative experience. 21 Project ALERT services include case review, organization, recommendation of investigative strategies, assistance with case interviews, and liaison efforts with the family of a missing child. Representatives also conduct outreach to the community through public speaking and attending conferences.
+
+ Team Adam, created in 2003, is designed to be a rapid, onsite response and support system that provides investigative and technical assistance to local law enforcement agencies at no cost to them. The team is staffed by approximately 90 retired federal, state, and local investigators, and is chosen by a committee with representatives from the FBI and state and local law enforcement executives experienced in crimes-against-children investigations. 22 Team Adam consultants determine the additional resources or assistance that would assist in the search for the victim, the investigation of the crime, and family crisis management. 
+
+ Forensic Services Unit
+
+ The Forensic Services Unit is composed of the Forensic Imaging Unit and a Biometrics Team. The teams assist in the recovery of long-term missing children and work to identify the remains of deceased children and young adults believed to have gone missing. The Forensic Imaging Unit was created in 1990 to "age-progress" images of missing children through software programs using the most recent picture of the child. The age-progressed image appears in clothing and with a hairstyle consistent with the child's current age. Missing children photos are age-progressed every two years, and adult photos are age-progressed in five-year increments. Age-progressed images are distributed to the local police, searching families, and media, and posted on the NCMEC website. The Forensic Unit also creates age-regressed images. These are produced at the request of law enforcement agents posing as youth in online communication with adults who seek to engage in sexual acts with children. 
+
+ Staff in the Biometric Team provide support and resources for long-term missing child cases and cases of unidentified human remains of victims believed to be children and young adults. They assist law enforcement and medical examiners/coroners in identifying unknown children, either deceased or living, by facilitating the collection of DNA, dental information, fingerprints, facial reconstructions, photo enhancements, and documentation of personal belongings found with the child. Once collected, the information is uploaded to the National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs), so it can be compared directly against the information collected from unidentified persons. 23 NamUs is a program created by OJP to serve as a central repository and resource center for missing persons and unidentified decedent records. It contains databases storing detailed information about missing people and unidentified remains and may be searched for possible matches among cases. 24 
+
+ International Missing Children's Cases
+
+ NCMEC assists with cases of children abducted to and from the United States. 25 From 1995 through May 2008, NCMEC had a Cooperative Agreement with the State Department and OJJDP to handle incoming cases of international abduction to the United States under The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the "Hague Convention"). 26 The State Department is now responsible for handling these cases. NCMEC assists the State Department with developing and distributing posters for missing children. Signatories to the Hague Convention pledge to work toward the prompt return of abducted children. Of the 195 officially recognized countries in the world, however, 119 do not have formal civil mechanisms in place with the United States to facilitate the return of a parentally abducted child. 27 
+
+ NCMEC also coordinates cases of American children abducted abroad, or outgoin g cases. NCMEC provides technical assistance to law enforcement in support of federal statute that criminalizes removing a child from the United States "with the intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights." 28 
+
+ NCMEC handles hundreds of prevention and abduction-in-progress matters each year that involve international abduction. It also coordinates the provision of pro-bono legal assistance to victim families and provides technical support, including legal technical assistance to parents, lawyers, court officers, law enforcement officials, and others. 
+
+ Response to Child Sexual Exploitation
+
+ Pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-322 ), Congress mandated that the United States Secret Service provide forensic and technical assistance to NCMEC and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in matters involving missing and exploited children. NCMEC's Exploited Children's Division (ECD) was established in January 1997 with a grant from USSS received pursuant to P.L. 103-322 . The USSS continues to provide funding for this purpose. 
+
+ The ECD administers the Child Victim ID Program (CVIP) and CyberTipline. The unit also analyzes data and forwards requests to appropriate NCMEC divisions and departments and monitors online services, news reports, and other sources each day for new cases and information relative to the issues of child sexual exploitation. The ECD follows up with law enforcement agencies about cases of exploited children. In addition to the ECD, two separate units in NCMEC—the Sex Offender Tracking Team and the Child Sex Trafficking Team within the Case Analysis Division—also work on exploited children's issues. 
+
+ The Child Victim Identification Program (CVIP)
+
+ CVIP formally began in 2002 in response to the decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002), in which the Supreme Court held that federal laws prohibiting pornography are enforceable when they involve identified children, not images that appear to be children. 29 CVIP analysts assist law enforcement officers and prosecutors with child pornography cases throughout the country using their knowledge of child pornography series and relevant computer software. Law enforcement agencies may submit seized images to federal law enforcement agents detailed to NCMEC and request that CVIP examine the images. CVIP analysts use computer software and visual analysis to determine whether any of the images contain identified child victims. In addition, NCMEC has a secure website (the Child Victim Identification Lab) for law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and social service workers to examine sanitized images that contain clues about a child's whereabouts. Authorized users can examine the images and post comments and suggestions for both NCMEC and other authorized users. 
+
+ CyberTipline
+
+ The CyberTipline, created in March 1998, serves as the national clearinghouse for tips and leads about child sexual exploitation, and is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The tipline allows the public to report online incidents involving child sexual exploitation, and electronic communication services or remote computing service providers (collectively known as electronic service providers or ESPs) are required by law to report such incidents. 30 Although the CyberTipline began operating in 1998, NCMEC's role as its administrator was formally authorized by the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003 ( P.L. 108-21 ). The authorizing statute for the MEC program states that the CyberTipline is intended to take reports of "internet related and other instances of child sexual exploitation." After evaluating the reports and rating them based on risk to the child, NCMEC makes reports to the CyberTipline (along with accompanying analysis) available to select federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies through a secure web-based system. 31 
+
+ Sex Offender Tracking Team
+
+ The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-248 ) expanded the requirements for state law enforcement and prison officials to track and register sex offenders. NCMEC's Sex Offender Tracking Team, in its Case Analysis Division, provides assistance to federal, state, and local law enforcement in their efforts to locate and apprehend noncompliant sex offenders by providing technical assistance and analysis. The team developed a standard protocol in response to law enforcement requests for assistance in locating fugitive sex offenders, which generally includes information obtained through public databases and search tools routinely used by NCMEC analysts. The team participates in the National Sex Offender Targeting Center, an interagency intelligence and operations center created by the U.S. Marshals Service.
+
+ Child Sex Trafficking Team
+
+ The Child Sex Trafficking Team compares reports of suspected child sex trafficking victims submitted to the CyberTipline with reports of missing children received by the Missing Children's Division. It also provides technical support and analysis to the FBI's Innocence Lost National Initiative. The team provides technical assistance to law enforcement agencies working to identify and recover children in the United States who have been victimized by sex trafficking, including those involved in the FBI's Innocence Lost National Initiative. Analysts in the unit provide reports about offenders who sexually exploited children through sex trafficking, and they provide information to law enforcement officials about known missing child cases possibly linked to sex trafficking. 32 
+
+ Family Advocacy Services
+
+ NCMEC's Family Advocacy Division provides support, crisis intervention, and technical assistance to families, law enforcement, and family-advocacy agencies. Team HOPE (Help Offering Parents Empowerment), a component of the division, consists of trained volunteers who have experienced the disappearance of a child in their family. These volunteers mentor other parents and families of missing children to help them cope during and after the incident. 
+
+ Training and Technical Assistance
+
+ NCMEC staff provide onsite and offsite training and technical assistance to law enforcement, criminal and juvenile justice professionals, and healthcare professionals nationwide and in Canada. Training involves issues relating to child sexual exploitation and missing-child case detection, identification of victims, investigation, prevention, and forensic imaging. NCMEC provides nationally accredited training about infant security for healthcare professionals and law enforcement. 
+
+ Partnerships
+
+ NCMEC works closely with federal agencies, some of which have detailed agents and analysts to work at NCMEC part-time or full-time. These analysts follow CyberTipline leads and work with NCMEC to develop policy and procedures around children missing internationally, among other activities.
+
+ NCMEC also works with missing children's clearinghouses in each state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Canada. 33 These clearinghouses disseminate information and collect data about missing individuals, provide technical assistance in cases of missing and exploited children, and network with other clearinghouses. NCMEC provides the clearinghouses with training, technical assistance, and information to assist them in handling missing-children cases.
+
+ Further, NCMEC serves as the national clearinghouse for AMBER Alert information about abducted children and their perpetrators, and employs an AMBER Alert law enforcement liaison. (See " AMBER Alert Program " for more information.) NCMEC verifies AMBER Alerts and disseminates information about an abduction to authorized secondary distributors, such as hotel chains and internet service providers, which can target messages to their customers in a specific geographic region. Only law enforcement can initiate and release AMBER Alerts for primary distribution to the general public. 34 NCMEC also maintains data on the number of children recovered through AMBER alerts. 35 
+
+ In 2006, NCMEC and the International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children joined with 34 international financial institutions and internet industry leaders to combat commercial online child pornography. 36 The purpose of the coalition is to prevent the purchase and sale of child pornography over the internet and to engage in prevention efforts. NCMEC, law enforcement agencies, and financial institutions share information pertaining to commercial child pornography websites, with the goal of eliminating the ability of users to pay for access to them.
+
+ Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force
+
+ ICAC Task Forces 37 
+
+ The ICAC Task Force program is authorized under the PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-401 ), as amended. The program supports state and local law enforcement task forces in responding to online enticement of children by sexual perpetrators, child exploitation, and child obscenity and pornography cases. The program serves multiple purposes, including
+ increasing the capabilities of state and local law enforcement officers to detect internet crimes against children and apprehend offenders; 
+
+ conducting proactive and reactive internet crimes against children investigations; 
+
+ providing training and technical assistance to ICAC task forces and other law enforcement agencies in the areas of investigation, forensics, prosecution, community outreach, and capacity-building, using recognized experts to assist in the development and delivery of training programs; 
+
+ increasing the number of internet crimes against children offenses being investigated and prosecuted; 
+
+ enhancing nationwide responses to offenses involving internet crimes against children; and 
+
+ delivering internet crimes against children public awareness and prevention programs. 
+ An ICAC task force is formed when a state or local law enforcement agency enters into a grant contract with OJJDP, and then into a memorandum of understanding with other federal, state, and local agencies. Currently, 61 task forces are in operation, each of which is composed of multiple affiliated organizations (most of which are city and county law enforcement agencies). 38 The task forces receive leads from CyberTipline analysts at NCMEC and concerned citizens or develop leads through proactive investigations and undercover operations. The Attorney General is to award grants to state and local ICAC task forces using a formula established by DOJ to distribute 75% of the funds; the remaining 25% is to be distributed based on need. 
+
+ In establishing any formula, DOJ must ensure that each state or local ICAC receives at least 0.5% of the funds available. In addition, DOJ is to take into consideration factors such as—each state's population; the number of investigative leads within the task force's jurisdiction; the number of criminal cases related to internet crimes against children referred to a task force for federal, state, or local prosecution; the number of successful prosecutions of child exploitation cases by a task force; the amount of training, technical assistance, and public education or outreach conducted by a task force on child exploitation offenses; and other criteria established by DOJ to demonstrate the level of need for additional resources. 
+
+ Pursuant to the law, DOJ established the ICAC Training and Technical Assistance program to provide assistance to ICAC task forces. Multiple entities have been awarded funds to provide training on improving investigation, technologies, and prosecutorial capabilities. 39 
+
+ National ICAC Data System (NIDS) 
+
+ The authorizing law for ICAC directs the Attorney General to establish the National ICAC Data System (NIDS). 40 As discussed in the law, the intent of Congress in authorizing the data system was to build upon Operation Fairplay, developed by the Wyoming Attorney General's office. Operation Fairplay established a secure, undercover infrastructure that has facilitated online law enforcement investigations of child exploitation, information sharing, and the capacity to collect and aggregate data on the extent of the problem of child exploitation. 41 The law specified that the system is to be housed and maintained within DOJ or a credentialed law enforcement agency and is to be available for a nominal charge to support law enforcement agencies' efforts to combat child exploitation. It must also collect and report real-time data; provide an undercover infrastructure for users; identify high-priority suspects; and include a network that provides for secure, online data storage and analysis, among other items. 
+
+ DOJ issued a grant solicitation in March 2009 for constructing, maintaining, and housing NIDS; however, grant applicants were notified in January 2010 that DOJ would not make an award under that solicitation and instead would pursue a different system for "deconfliction" and investigation than was described in the solicitation. 42 DOJ issued another solicitation in June 2010 to select a grantee to conduct a national needs assessment and perform other tasks to support the future development of NIDS. 43 
+
+ In September 2011, DOJ awarded funds to the West Virginia State Police to develop and implement the ICAC Deconfliction System (IDS), which was launched in December 2014. It is used by all ICAC task forces and other registered law enforcement users. IDS enables users to contribute and access data (e.g., name, alias, email address, IP address of perpetrator and related information) to resolve case conflicts. Information about a potential perpetrator is compared against other databases that store information about crimes committed against children. IDS alerts the user if information has been collected on the potential perpetrator in these other systems, and informs the user of other law enforcement agencies working on a case involving the perpetrator. 44 
+
+ National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction 
+
+ The ICAC authorizing law directs the Attorney General to create and implement a National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction. 45 The law specifies that the strategy is to involve establishing long-range, comprehensive goals concerning child exploitation and that DOJ is to coordinate its programs to combat child exploitation with other federal programs, as well as with international, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies and the private sector. As part of this strategy, DOJ is directed to assess the ICAC program, including an evaluation of how entities that comprise each task force coordinate on investigations, and the success of task forces in leveraging state and local resources and matching funds. The law also directs the Attorney General to conduct periodic reviews of the effectiveness of each ICAC task force, and to submit a report on the strategy to Congress every other year. Two reports have been issued, one in August 2010 and another in April 2016. Both reports discuss the ICAC Task Force program, an assessment of threats to children, and the work of federal agencies to combat child sexual exploitation. 46 As of April 2019, DOJ did not have immediate plans to issue a subsequent report. 47 
+
+ AMBER Alert Program
+
+ AMBER (America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response) Alert systems are state-administered communication systems to inform the public about children who are abducted. AMBER systems are voluntary partnerships—between law enforcement agencies, broadcasters, and transportation agencies—to activate messages in a targeted area when a child is abducted and believed to be in grave danger. The first system began locally in 1996 when fourth-grader Amber Hagerman was abducted and murdered near her home in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. After the abduction, law enforcement agencies in North Texas and the Dallas-Fort Worth Association of Radio Managers developed a plan to send out an emergency alert about a missing child to the public through the Emergency Alert System (EAS), which interrupts broadcasting. Soon after, jurisdictions in Texas and other states began to create regional alert programs.
+
+ OJP first provided funding ($10 million in discretionary appropriations) in 2002 for states and localities to develop AMBER Alert programs. The PROTECT Act ( P.L. 108-21 ), enacted in 2003, directed the Attorney General to create a national AMBER Alert program, including appointing a coordinator and developing standards for issuing an alert. 48 P.L. 108-21 also authorized funding for activities to support states in developing AMBER Alert communication plans and technologies. The law has since been amended by the Ashlynne Mike AMBER Alert Act ( P.L. 115-166 ), which directs DOJ to make grants to Indian tribes to develop and expand their alert systems. DOJ must also provide a report to Congress by April 2019 that evaluates the readiness, education, and training needs; technological challenges; and specific obstacles encountered by Indian tribes in integrating with regional or state AMBER Alert communication plans. In June 2019, DOJ provided the report, which delivered information from surveys of federally recognized tribes and state AMBERAlert coordinators about the extent to which tribes have tribal alerting systems or have training on a state AMBER Alert plan, and the challenges for tribes in supporting and accessing the plan (e.g., about one-third of tribes do not have an agreement with the state AMBER Alert plan to allow access to it). 49 
+
+ AMBER Alert Coordinator and Standards
+
+ P.L. 108-21 provided that the Attorney General appoint an AMBER Alert coordinator to (1) work with states to encourage the development of additional regional and local AMBER Alert plans; (2)Â serve as the regional coordinator for abducted children throughout the AMBER Alert network; (3) create voluntary standards for the issuance of alerts, including minimum standards that address the special needs of the child (such as health care needs), and limit the alerts to a geographic area most likely to facilitate the abduction of the child, without interfering with the current system of voluntary coordination between local broadcasters and law enforcement; (4)Â submit a report to Congress by March 1, 2005, on the activities of the coordinator and the effectiveness and status of the AMBER plans of each state that has implemented one; and (5) consult with the FBI and cooperate with the Federal Communications Commission in implementing the program.
+
+ In 2003, the DOJ AMBER Alert coordinator was appointed. The coordinator convened a national advisory group to oversee the national initiative and make recommendations on the AMBER Alert criteria, examine new technologies, identify best practices, and identify issues with implementation. On the basis of the group's recommendations, the department issued guidelines for issuing an alert: 
+ law enforcement officials have a reasonable belief that an abduction has occurred, 
+
+ law enforcement officials believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury or death, 
+
+ enough descriptive information exists about the victim and the abductor for law enforcement to issue an alert, 
+
+ the victim is age 17 or younger, and 
+
+ the child's name and other critical data elements have been entered into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Missing Person File.
+ A new AMBER Alert "flag" was created within the NCIC's Missing Person File for abducted children for whom an alert has been issued. DOJ submitted a report to Congress in 2005 that provided an overview of its strategy to facilitate a national AMBER Alert plan and the criteria developed for issuing an alert. 50 
+
+ In 2019, DOJ issued a second edition of a guide on best practices for law enforcement and its partners in preparing for, and responding to, AMBER Alerts; and a field guide for law enforcement officers in issuing AMBER Alerts. 51 
+
+ AMBER Alert Grant Programs
+
+ The AMBER Alert statute provides three authorizations to support states in implementing AMBER Alert communication plans and technologies: (1) an authorization of $4 million in FY2019 to DOJ for grants to states and Indian tribes to develop and implement AMBER Alert communication programs, which allows states to pursue activities specified in the law (e.g., the integration of state or regional AMBER Alert communication plans with an Indian tribe);Â (2) an additional $5 million in FY2019 to DOJ to provide funding to states to develop and implement new technologies to improve Amber Alert communications and to integrate state or regional AMBER Alert communication plans with those of Indian tribes; and (3) $20 million to the Department of Transportation (DOT) in FY2004 for grants to states to develop and enhance notification or communication systems along highways. 52 
+
+ With regard to the DOJ authorization, the law specifies that the department is to provide grants to states, on a geographically equitable basis if possible, for developing and enhancing their AMBER Alert communications plans. The federal government is to provide no more than 50% of the costs for carrying out the activities specified in the law related to communication plans, except that DOJ can determine that an Indian tribe does not have sufficient funds and can increase the federal share above 50%. DOJ determined that funds would be most efficiently spent providing training and technical assistance to law enforcement and state officials on abducted children, including providing assessments of AMBER Alert communication plans. 53 This is instead of funding that is awarded to states to implement communication plans, including the more narrow activity of developing and implementing new technologies. Every five years, OJJDP issues a competitive solicitation seeking bids to provide technical assistance, and it has awarded funding under this solicitation to Fox Valley Technical College. 54 
+
+ As noted, the statute authorized $20 million in FY2004 for DOT to fund states in developing and enhancing communications systems along highways for alerts and other information to assist in the recovery of abducted children. States are eligible to receive funding (up to $400,000 each) to be used for the implementation of a communications program that employs changeable message signs or other motorist information systems—if DOT determines that the state has already developed the program. 55 The federal share of the cost of these activities is not to exceed 80%, and federal funds are available until expended. 56 As of November 2018, 40 states and the District of Columbia had received funding, and approximately $3.1 million was still available. 
+
+ Grant Programs and Technical Assistance
+
+ The MEC program provides funding to support other activities related to missing and exploited children, including training and technical assistance for public and private nonprofit organizations. 57 OJJDP contracts with Fox Valley Technical College to provide technical assistance, which focuses on strengthening multi-disciplinary responses in child victimization cases. Assistance is provided through distance learning, webinars, onsite technical assistance, or classroom formats. 
+
+ The program additionally supports program administration, printing of publications for Missing Children's Day, generally recognized annually in May, 58 and grant programs that vary from year to year.
+
+ 
+
+ Appendix. The Missing Children's Assistance Act of 1984, as Amended
+
+ 
+ 
+ Table A-1. The Missing Children's Assistance Act of 1984 and Amendments to the Act
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Year (Public Law)
+
+ 
+ 
+ Description 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 1984 ( P.L. 98-473 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ —Defines missing child as any individual under age 18 whose whereabouts are unknown to such individual's legal custodian if he or she was removed from control of his or her legal custodian without custodian's consent or the circumstances strongly indicate that such individual is likely to be abused or sexually exploited;
+
+ —Directs the Administrator of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to
+
+ (1) facilitate effective coordination among all federally funded programs relating to missing children,
+
+ (2) establish and operate a national toll-free telephone line for individuals to report information regarding the location of any missing child, or other child 13 years old or younger whose whereabouts are unknown,
+
+ (3) establish and operate a national resource center and clearinghouse designed to provide technical assistance to state and local governments and law enforcement agencies, disseminate information about innovative and model missing children's programs, and periodically conduct national incidence studies to determine the number of missing children,
+
+ (4) analyze, compile, publish, and disseminate an annual summary of recently completed research relating to missing children with emphasis on effective models of inter-governmental coordination and effective programs designed to promote community awareness of missing children, among others, and
+
+ (5) prepare an annual comprehensive plan for facilitating cooperation and coordination among all agencies and organizations with responsibilities related to missing children;
+
+ —Authorizes the OJJDP Administrator to make grants and enter into contracts for research, demonstration projects, or service programs designed to disseminate information about missing children, locate missing children, and collect information from states or localities on the investigative practices used by law enforcement agencies in missing children's cases, among other purposes; and
+
+ —Provides funding authorization at $10 million for FY1985 and such sums as necessary for FY1986 through FY1988.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 1988 ( P.L. 100-690 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ —Removes the requirement that the OJJDP Administrator analyze, compile, publish, and disseminate an annual summary of recently completed research concerning missing and exploited children;
+
+ —Requires the OJJDP Administrator to submit a report, within 180 days after the end of each fiscal year, to the President and Congress, including a comprehensive plan for facilitating coordination among all agencies and organizations with responsibilities related to missing children; identify and summarize effective models of cooperation; identify and summarize effective programs for victims of abduction; and describe in detail the activities in the national resource center and clearinghouse, among other requirements;
+
+ —Requires the OJJDP Administrator to disseminate information about free or low-cost legal, restaurant, lodging, and transportation services available for the families of missing children, as well as information about the lawful use of school records and birth certificates to identify and locate missing children;
+
+ —Requires the OJJDP Administrator to establish annual research, demonstration, and service program priorities for making grants and contracts, and criteria based on merit for making such grants and contracts; limits a grant or contract to $50,000 unless the grant is competitive;
+
+ —Provides funding authorization at such sums as necessary for FY1989 through FY1992.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 1989 ( P.L. 101-204 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ Technical amendments only.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 1992 ( P.L. 102-586 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ Provides funding authorization at such sums as necessary for FY1993 through FY1996.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 1994 ( P.L. 103-322 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ Establishes a task force composed of law enforcement officers from pertinent federal agencies to work with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) and coordinate federal law enforcement resources to assist state and local authorities in investigating the most difficult cases of missing and exploited children. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 1996 ( P.L. 104-235 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ —Requires that the OJJDP Administrator use only up to 5% of the amount appropriated for a fiscal year to conduct an evaluation of the effectiveness of programs and activities under the Missing Children's Assistance Act;
+
+ —Provides funding authorization at such sums as necessary for FY1997 through FY2001.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 1998 ( P.L. 105-314 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ Deletes the language to establish a task force composed of law enforcement officers from pertinent federal agencies to work with NCMEC. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 1999 ( P.L. 106-71 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ —Provides an annual grant to NCMEC to carry out the activities originally designated to the OJJDP Administrator, including the following:
+
+ (1) operate the national 24-hour, toll-free telephone line,
+
+ (2) coordinate the operation of the telephone line with the operation of the Runaway and Homeless Children Program's national communications system, and
+
+ (3) operate the official national resource center and information clearinghouse for missing and exploited children, among other responsibilities;
+
+ —Requires the OJJDP Administrator to make grants to or enter into contracts to periodically conduct national incidence studies to determine for a given year the actual number of children reported missing, among other statistics; and
+
+ —Provides funding authorization for NCMEC at $10 million for FY2000 through FY2003 and such sums as necessary for the Missing Children's Assistance Act program for these same years.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2003 ( P.L. 108-21 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ —Provides funding authorization for NCMEC at $20 million for FY2004 through FY2005; and
+
+ —Provides that NCMEC coordinate the operation of a cyber tipline to provide online users an effective means of reporting internet-related child sexual exploitation in the areas of distribution of child pornography, online enticement of children for sexual acts, and child prostitution. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2003 ( P.L. 108-96 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ Provides funding authorization for NCMEC at $20 million for FY2004 through FY2008 and such sums as necessary for the Missing Children's Assistance Act program for these same years.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2006 ( P.L. 109-248 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ Changes the definition of missing child to any individual less than 18 years of age whose whereabouts are unknown to such individual's legal guardian.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2008 ( P.L. 110-240 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ Provides funding authorization for NCMEC at $40 million for FY2008 and such sums as necessary for FY2009 through FY2013, and such sums as necessary for the Missing Children's Assistance Act program for these same years. The law also authorizes the OJJDP Administrator to make the grant to NCMEC to carry out specified activities, some of which were already carried out by the organization before the law was enacted. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2008 ( P.L. 110-344 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ Provides authority to an Inspector General to authorize staff to assist NCMEC by conducting reviews of inactive case files to develop recommendations for further investigations and by engaging in similar activities.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2013 ( P.L. 113-38 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ Provides funding authorization of $40 million for each of FY2014 through FY2018 for OJJDP to fund activities carried out under the act. Of this amount, up to $32.2 million is to be used for NCMEC. The law also requires more regular (every three years) studies on missing and sexually exploited children and implements new accountability standards for grant recipients.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2018 ( P.L. 115-267 )
+
+ 
+ 
+ Provides funding authorization of $40 million for each of FY2014 through FY2023 for OJJDP to fund activities carried out under the act. Of this amount, up to $32.2 million is to be used for NCMEC. The law also revised the purpose areas to add that each year tens of thousands of children run away or are abducted or removed from their parents; and adds a definition of parent : "a legal guardian or other individual who may lawfully exercise parental rights with respect to the child." Further, the law adds that the grant to NCMEC is to be used to carry out specified activities, some of which were already carried out by the organization before the law was enacted. Such activities include (1) responding to foster care children who are missing from state child welfare agencies in coordinating with such agencies and courts handling juvenile dependency matters; (2) identifying, locating, and recovering child victims of, and at risk for, sex trafficking; (3) utilizing emerging technology to provide additional outreach and educational materials to parents and families; and (4) annually providing reports to DOJ and the public on children reported missing to NCMEC, including specifying the number of victims of non-family and family abductions, and the number who are recovered; and (5) tracking the number of attempted child abductions to identify links and patterns, and to provide this information to law enforcement and, as appropriate, the public. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Source: Compiled by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
+
+ Notes: This compilation only includes amendments to the Missing Children's Assistance Act, which outlines the duties of OJJDP and NCMEC. The act is codified at §34 U.S.C. 11293 et seq. (Chapter 111, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention). In addition to funding for NCMEC and selected other activities, the Missing and Exploited Children's program supports the Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force program and the AMBER Alert program. The ICAC Task Force program is codified at 34 U.S.C. §§21112-21117 (Chapter 211, Combating Child Exploitation) and was authorized under the PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-401 ), as amended. The AMBER Alert program is codified at 34 U.S.C. §20501 (Chapter 205, AMBER Alert) and was authorized under the PROTECT Act ( P.L. 108-21 ). The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-22 ) made a change to one of the CyberTipline categories, which was subsequently changed by P.L. 115-267 . 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Author Contact Information
+ 
+ Adrienne L. Fernandes-Alcantara, Specialist in Social Policy
+ ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed])
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Footnotes
+
+ 
+ 
+ 1 .
+ 
+ 
+ Grants for NCMEC, training and technical assistance, and related supports are authorized under the Missing Children's Assistance Act ( P.L. 98-413 ), as amended (34 U.S.C. §11293 et seq.; Chapter 111, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention). The ICAC Task Force program is authorized under the PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-401 ), as amended (34 U.S.C. §§21112-21117; Chapter 211, Combating Child Exploitation). The AMBER Alert program is authorized under the PROTECT Act ( P.L. 108-21 ), as amended (34 U.S.C. §20501; Chapter 205, AMBER Alert).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2 .
+ 
+ 
+ For a broader perspective, see U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), The National Strategy for Child Exploitation and Prevention: A Report to Congress , April 2016. See also, CRS Report RL33785, Runaway and Homeless Youth: Demographics and Programs ; CRS Report R41878, Sex Trafficking of Children in the United States: Overview and Issues for Congress ; and CRS Report R44101, Dark Web . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 3 .
+ 
+ 
+ For further information, see CRS Report RL33785, Runaway and Homeless Youth: Demographics and Programs .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 4 .
+ 
+ 
+ Martin L. Forst and Martha-Elin Blomquist, Missing Children (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 56-66.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 5 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, Missing Children's Assistance Act hearing, 98 th Congress, 2 nd sess., February 7, 1984 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 6 .
+ 
+ 
+ The NCIC is a digital index of information on crimes and criminals used by federal, state, and local law enforcement officials. The FBI authorizes the National Central Bureau of Interpol to input missing-child cases into the Missing Person File where no U.S. law enforcement agency jurisdiction exists (34 U.S.C. §41308). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 7 .
+ 
+ 
+ NCMEC coordinates and is involved with several federal activities relating to missing and exploited children. Some of these activities are funded from sources other than the MEC program, though it provides the largest share of federal funds for NCMEC.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 8 .
+ 
+ 
+ 34 U.S.C. §20501. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 9 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, Title 18 of the U.S. Code includes multiple crimes involving the sexual exploitation of children, such as commerce in child pornography; transferring obscene material to a child by mail or through interstate or foreign travel; traveling abroad to engage in a sexual act with a child; and using a misleading domain name, words, or digital images on the internet with the intent to deceive a minor into viewing material that is harmful to that minor. Most federal criminal statutes on child sexual exploitation are in Chapters 71, 77, 109A, 109B, 110, and 117. In addition, Title 42 of the U.S. Code, at 42 U.S.C. §5106g, provides definitions related to child sexual abuse for purposes of defining "child abuse and neglect" in selected federal child welfare law. Title 34 of the U.S. Code requires individuals convicted of specified crimes against children or sexually violent crimes to register their addresses.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 10 .
+ 
+ 
+ 34 U.S.C. §11293(c). P.L. 113-38 amended the prior law by changing the requirement for OJJDP to conduct incidence studies of missing children from "periodically" to "triennially."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 11 .
+ 
+ 
+ Due to challenges with fielding NISMART-3, DOJ made a competitive award with FY2017 funding to improve data collection of missing children more generally under a new iteration of the study, NISMART-4. DOJ, Office of Justice Programs (OJP), Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), Grant Solicitation, OJJDP FY 2017 National Incidence Studies of Missing Children Reported to Law Enforcement , 2017. DOJ awarded funds to researchers to collect data on child victims of stereotypical kidnappings known to law enforcement agencies and develop and evaluate strategies to collect information from law enforcement agencies about children who are reported missing to them. The funding was awarded to Westat, Inc., a policy research organization, which has partnered with the University of New Hampshire's Crimes Against Children Research Center. DOJ expects NISMART-4 findings to be available in 2020. See DOJ, OJP, OJJDP, "National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, and Thrownaway Children (NISMART) 1, 2, 3," https://www.ojjdp.gov/research/NISMART1-3.html.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 12 .
+ 
+ 
+ Andrea J. Sedlak, David Finkelhor, and J. Michael Brick, "National Estimates of Missing Children: Updated Findings From a Survey of Parents and Other Primary Caretakers," Juvenile Justice Bulletin, DOJ, OJP, OJJDP, June 2017, https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/250089.pdf . The report includes definitions of these terms. Some children reported in NISMART-3 were missing, but their caretakers may not have been alarmed or contacted authorities; these children were identified as "non-missing." 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 13 .
+ 
+ 
+ Janis Wolak, David Finkelhor, and Andrea J. Sedlak, "Child Victims of Stereotypical Kidnappings Known to Law Enforcement in 2011," DOJ, OJP, OJJDP, Juvenile Justice Bulletin, June 2016.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 14 .
+ 
+ 
+ David Finkelhor et al., Children's Exposure to Violence: A Comprehensive National Survey , DOJ, OJP, OJJDP, October 2009.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 15 .
+ 
+ 
+ Based on CRS correspondence with DOJ, OJP, April 2019. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 16 .
+ 
+ 
+ Unless otherwise noted, the description of these services is based on a site visit to NCMEC, interviews and ongoing correspondence with NCMEC staff, and quarterly progress reports submitted by NCMEC to the Department of Justice about the status of the grant received under the Missing and Exploited Children's program.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 17 .
+ 
+ 
+ For further information about NCMEC, see its website: http://www.missingkids.org/ . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 18 .
+ 
+ 
+ Based on correspondence with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, December 2018.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 19 .
+ 
+ 
+ 34 U.S.C. §41308. Child welfare agencies must report cases of missing or abducted children to NCMEC and to law enforcement for entry into the NCIC, no later than 24 hours after receiving information on these children. 42 U.S.C. §671 (a)(B)(35).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 20 .
+ 
+ 
+ Based on correspondence with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, December 2018.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 21 .
+ 
+ 
+ NCMEC, NCMEC Quarterly Progress Reports, July 1 – Sept. 30, 2018, p. 18. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 22 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid., p. 21. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 23 .
+ 
+ 
+ NCMEC, NCMEC Quarterly Progress Reports, July 1 to Sept. 30, 2018 , p. 16.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 24 .
+ 
+ 
+ DOJ, OJP, National Institute of Justice, "NamUs," http://www.namus.gov/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 25 .
+ 
+ 
+ The International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children ("ICMEC") is a sister organization affiliated with NCMEC. ICMEC focuses on policy, advocacy, and training, and does not perform case work. ICMEC advocates for adoption of treaties in regard to children's rights; engages international law enforcement officials, civil service organizations, and government representatives; offers technical assistance in creating missing children centers; and creates and distributes reports on international child abduction and child sexual exploitation.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 26 .
+ 
+ 
+ The Department of State is designated as the U.S. Central Authority for the Hague Convention. NCMEC was permitted to serve as the representative of the State Department pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §11608.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 27 .
+ 
+ 
+ NCMEC, NCMEC Quarterly Progress Report: July 1-September 30, 2018, p. 63, footnote 61.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 28 .
+ 
+ 
+ 18 U.S.C. §1204(a). The term parental rights refers to the right to joint or sole physical custody of a child obtained through a court order, a legally binding agreement between the involved parties, or operation of law. For further information about the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act and the Hague Convention, see CRS Report RS21261, International Parental Child Abductions . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 29 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition , 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 30 .
+ 
+ 
+ 34 U.S.C. §11293(b)(1)(P). The tipline enables ESPs and members of the public to report under eight categories: (1) possession, manufacture, and distribution of child pornography; (2) online enticement of children for sexual acts; (3) child sex trafficking; (4) child sex tourism; (5) child sexual molestation by someone other than a family member; (6) unsolicited obscene material sent to a child; (7) misleading domain names; and (8) misleading words or digital images on the internet. The first three reporting categories were specified in P.L. 108-21 , and the other five categories were specified in the Protecting Our Children Comes First Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-240 ). The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act ( P.L. 114-22 ) struck "child prostitution" and replaced it with "child sex trafficking, including child prostitution." 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 31 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Combating Child Pornography: Steps are Needed to Ensure That Tips to Law Enforcement are Useful and Forensic Examinations are Cost Effective , GAO-11-334, March 2011, p. 9 (hereinafter, GAO, Combating Child Pornography ).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 32 .
+ 
+ 
+ NCMEC, "Child Sex Trafficking," http://www.missingkids.com/theissues/trafficking. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 33 .
+ 
+ 
+ For further information, see NCMEC, "Missing Child Clearinghouses," http://www.missingkids.com/Clearinghouses .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 34 .
+ 
+ 
+ DOJ, OJP, OJJDP, Report to the Congress on AMBER Alert , July 2005, p. 7. (Hereinafter, DOJ, OJP, OJJDP, Report to the Congress on AMBER Alert .)
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 35 .
+ 
+ 
+ NCMEC, "Get Help Now: AMBER Alerts," missingkids.org/amber.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 36 .
+ 
+ 
+ ICMEC, "U.S. Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography," https://www.icmec.org/fcacp/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 37 .
+ 
+ 
+ 34 U.S.C. §§21112 et seq. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 38 .
+ 
+ 
+ DOJ, OJP, OJJDP, "Program Summary: Internet Crimes Against Children Task Program," http://www.ojjdp.gov/programs/progsummary.asp?pi=3 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 39 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 40 .
+ 
+ 
+ 34 U.S.C. §21115.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 41 .
+ 
+ 
+ DOJ, The National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction: A Report to Congress , August 2010, pp. 10-12, http://www.justice.gov/psc/docs/natstrategyreport.pdf . (Hereinafter, DOJ, The National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction: A Report to Congress .)
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 42 .
+ 
+ 
+ Deconfliction is the coordination and information sharing among law enforcement agencies on multi-jurisdiction investigations to help ensure officer safety and the effective use of resources. GAO, Combating Child Pornography . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 43 .
+ 
+ 
+ DOJ OJP, OJJDP, Needs Assessment and Development Activities for the National Internet Crimes Against Children Data System (NIDS) , no date, http://www.ojjdp.gov/grants/solicitations/FY2010/ARRA%20NIDS.pdf . In September 2010, OJJDP awarded a grant to the Massachusetts State Police (MASP) and its partners to conduct a national needs assessment for NIDS. According to DOJ, work on and payment for the grant were suspended due to misconduct involving a former MASP employee who was investigated by DOJ's Office of the Inspector General. P.L. 112-206 required DOJ to submit a report to Congress about the status of the data system. See DOJ, OJP, OJJDP, Report on the National Internet Crimes Against Children Data System (NIDS) Project, Pursuant to the Child Protection Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-206 ) , no date.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 44 .
+ 
+ 
+ DOJ, OJP, OJJDP, Internet Crimes Against Children Data System , fact sheet, no date; and CRS correspondence with DOJ, OJP, October 2015 and April 2019. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 45 .
+ 
+ 
+ 34 U.S.C. §2111. The law additionally directed the Department of Justice to appoint a senior official to serve as coordinator of the national strategy. DOJ appointed the National Coordinator in January 2010. Soon thereafter, the national coordinator convened the National Strategy Working Group to assist in implementing the national strategy. See GAO, Combating Child Pornography , pp. 12-13.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 46 .
+ 
+ 
+ DOJ, The National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction: A Report to Congress , August 2010; and DOJ, The National Strategy for Child Exploitation and Prevention: A Report to Congress , April 2016. The first report identified the following types of child sexual exploitation: (1) child pornography, (2) online enticement of children for sexual purposes, (3) commercial sexual exploitation of children (primarily domestic prostitution), and (4) child sex tourism. The second report identified five types of child sexual exploitation: (1) child pornography, (2) sextortion and live streaming of child sexual abuse, (3) child sex trafficking, (4) child sex tourism, and (5) sex offender registry violations. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 47 .
+ 
+ 
+ Based on CRS correspondence with DOJ, OJP, April 2019. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 48 .
+ 
+ 
+ 34 U.S.C. §20501. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 49 .
+ 
+ 
+ DOJ, OJJDP, OJP, Implementation of the Ashlynne Mike AMBER Alert in Indian Country Act of 2018: A Report to Congress , May 2019. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 50 .
+ 
+ 
+ DOJ, OJP, OJJDP, Report to the Congress on AMBER Alert .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 51 .
+ 
+ 
+ DOJ, OJP, OJJDP, AMBER Alert Best Practices , 2 nd ed., 2019; and DOJ, OJP, OJJDP, AMBER Alert: Field Guide for Law Enforcement Officers, May 2019.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 52 .
+ 
+ 
+ P.L. 108-21 originally provided $5 million for FY2004 under the first two authorization categories. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 53 .
+ 
+ 
+ This information was provided to the Congressional Research Service by DOJ, OJP in May 2007 and updated in December 2017. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 54 .
+ 
+ 
+ DOJ, "AMBER Alert Program, Technical Assistance," http://www.amber-net.org/technicalassistance.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 55 .
+ 
+ 
+ Pursuant to the PROTECT Act, states are eligible to receive two types of DOT grants. Development grants to be used to develop general policies, procedures, training, and communication systems for changeable message signs or other motorist information about an abduction. Implementation grants are to be used to support the infrastructure of the program. Funding authorized under the PROTECT Act was used exclusively for the implementation of communication systems to issue AMBER alerts. However, states are eligible to apply for grants of up to $125,000 each, through a separate DOT appropriation for the Intelligent Transportation Systems program, to support state departments of transportation efforts related to AMBER Alert planning. These funds are available until expended. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 56 .
+ 
+ 
+ Based on CRS correspondence with Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, December 2018. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 57 .
+ 
+ 
+ For further information, see Fox Valley Technical College, "Missing and Exploited Children," https://ncjtc.fvtc.edu/training . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 58 .
+ 
+ 
+ See DOJ, OJP, OJJDP, "About Missing Children's Day," https://www.ojjdp.gov/missingchildrensday/ .
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,3401 @@
+Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+November 9, 2020 
+
+U.S.-Turkey tensions have raised questions about the future of bilateral relations and 
+have led to congressional action against Turkey, including informal holds on major new 
+
+ Jim Zanotti 
+
+arms sales (such as upgrades to F-16 aircraft) and efforts to impose sanctions. 
+
+Specialist in Middle 
+
+Nevertheless, both countries’ officials emphasize the importance of continued U.S.-
+
+Eastern Affairs 
+
+Turkey cooperation and Turkey’s membership in NATO. Observers voice concerns 
+
+ 
+
+about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 
+
+ Clayton Thomas 
+
+Turkey’s polarized electorate could affect Erdogan’s future leadership. His biggest 
+
+Analyst in Middle Eastern 
+
+challenge may be structural weaknesses in Turkey’s economy—including a sharp 
+
+Affairs 
+
+decline in Turkey’s currency—that have worsened since the Coronavirus Disease 2019 
+
+ 
+
+pandemic began. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. 
+
+ 
+
+ Turkey’s strategic orientation and U.S./NATO basing. Traditionally, Turkey has 
+relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and 
+investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. A number of complicated situations in Turkey’s surrounding 
+region—including those involving Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh (a region disputed by Armenia and 
+Azerbaijan), and Eastern Mediterranean energy exploration—affect its relationships with the United States and 
+other key actors, as Turkey seeks a more independent role. President Erdogan’s concerns about maintaining his 
+parliamentary coalition with Turkish nationalists may partly explain his actions in some of the situations 
+mentioned above. Turkey-Russia cooperation has grown in some areas. However, Turkish efforts to counter 
+Russia in several theaters of conflict at relatively low cost—using domestically produced drone aircraft 
+(reportedly with some U.S. components) and Syrian mercenaries—suggest that Turkey-Russia cooperation is 
+situational rather than comprehensive in scope. 
+
+Since Turkey’s 2019 agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord on Eastern Mediterranean maritime 
+boundaries, and its increased involvement in Libya’s civil war, Turkey’s tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean 
+with countries such as Cyprus and Greece have become more intertwined with its rivalry with Sunni Arab states 
+such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. In this context, some observers have 
+advocated that the United States explore alternative basing arrangements for U.S. and NATO military assets in 
+Turkey—including a possible arsenal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Base. The August 2020 
+agreement between Israel and the UAE to normalize their ties could increase tensions between Turkey and these 
+other regional U.S. allies and partners. 
+
+ Russian S-400 purchase and U.S. responses. Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense 
+system led to its removal by the United States from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The S-400 deliveries 
+that began in July 2019 also reportedly triggered informal congressional holds on major new arms sales. If Turkey 
+transitions to major Russian weapons platforms with multi-decade lifespans, it is unclear how it can stay closely 
+integrated with NATO on defense matters. The S-400 deal could trigger U.S. sanctions under Section 231 of the 
+Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA, title II of the Countering America’s 
+Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA; P.L. 115-44). President Trump has reportedly delayed CAATSA 
+sanctions while seeking to persuade Turkey to refrain from operating the S-400. It is unclear how sanctions 
+against Turkey could affect its economy, trade, and defense procurement. Future U.S. actions in response to 
+Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 could affect U.S. arms sales and sanctions with respect to other U.S. partners 
+who have purchased or may purchase advanced weapons from Russia—including India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and 
+Qatar. 
+
+ Congressional initiatives and other U.S. actions. Congressional and executive branch action on arms sales, 
+sanctions, or military basing regarding Turkey and its rivals could have implications for bilateral ties, U.S. 
+political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s strategic orientation and financial well-being. How closely to 
+engage Erdogan’s government could depend on U.S. perceptions of his popular legitimacy, likely staying power, 
+and the extent to which a successor might change his policies in light of geopolitical, historical, and economic 
+considerations. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 8 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 15 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 20 link to page 22 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 24 link to page 25 link to page 27 link to page 28 link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 30 link to page 31 link to page 32 link to page 35 link to page 38 link to page 6 link to page 10 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 21 link to page 23 link to page 26 link to page 30 link to page 33 link to page 35 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Contents 
+
+ Introduction and Issues for Congress .............................................................................................. 1 
+ Country Overview and the Erdogan Era ......................................................................................... 2 
+
+ Political Assessment .................................................................................................................. 4 
+ Economic Assessment ............................................................................................................... 7 
+
+ Overview ............................................................................................................................. 7 
+ Energy ................................................................................................................................. 8 
+
+ The Kurdish Issue .................................................................................................................... 11 
+
+ Background ........................................................................................................................ 11 
+ Government Approaches to the Kurds .............................................................................. 12 
+
+ Religious Minorities ................................................................................................................ 12 
+
+ Halki Seminary and Hagia Sophia .................................................................................... 13 
+ Alevis ................................................................................................................................ 14 
+
+ Turkey’s Strategic Orientation and Military Involvement ............................................................ 14 
+
+ U.S./NATO Presence ............................................................................................................... 16 
+ Issues with Other U.S./NATO Allies ....................................................................................... 18 
+
+ Eastern Mediterranean and Offshore Natural Gas ............................................................ 18 
+ Middle East and Libyan Civil War .................................................................................... 19 
+
+ The Syrian Conflict ................................................................................................................. 20 
+
+ Countering the Syrian Kurdish YPG................................................................................. 21 
+ Turkish-Occupied Areas and Idlib .................................................................................... 23 
+
+ Role in Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute: Armenia and Azerbaijan ............................................... 24 
+ Turkish Defense Procurement ................................................................................................. 25 
+
+ Background ....................................................................................................................... 25 
+ U.S. Arms Sales and Aid ................................................................................................... 26 
+ Key Weapons Systems and Turkey’s Relationships: S-400, F-35, Patriot ........................ 27 
+ Drones: Domestic Production, U.S. and Western Components, and Exports ................... 28 
+
+ Congressional Scrutiny: U.S. Responses and Options .................................................................. 31 
+ Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 34 
+
+ 
+
+ Figures 
+ Figure 1. Turkey at a Glance ........................................................................................................... 2 
+ Figure 2. Turkey: 2018 Parliamentary Election Results in Context ................................................ 6 
+ Figure 3. Turkish Natural Gas Imports by Country ......................................................................... 9 
+ Figure 4. Turkey and Southeastern European Gas Infrastructure .................................................. 10 
+ Figure 5. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey .................................................... 17 
+ Figure 6. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean .......................................................... 19 
+ Figure 7. Syria-Turkey Border ...................................................................................................... 22 
+ Figure 8. Arms Imports as a Share of Turkish Military Spending ................................................. 26 
+ Figure 9. Bayraktar TB2 Drone ..................................................................................................... 29 
+ Figure 10. Turkish Military Export Statistics ................................................................................ 31 
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ link to page 39 link to page 47 link to page 50 link to page 52 link to page 52 link to page 53 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendixes 
+ Appendix A. Turkey’s Foreign Policy Relationships .................................................................... 35 
+ Appendix B. Profiles of Key Figures in Turkey ............................................................................ 43 
+ Appendix C. Timeline of Turkey’s Involvement in Syria (2011-2020) ........................................ 46 
+ Appendix D. Significant U.S.-Origin Arms Transfers or Possible Arms Transfers to 
+
+ Turkey ........................................................................................................................................ 48 
+
+ 
+
+ Contacts 
+ Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 49 
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ link to page 39 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Introduction and Issues for Congress 
+ While U.S.-Turkey ties have always been complicated, tensions in recent years have produced a 
+number of crises and have led to questions about the status and future of the bilateral relationship. 
+Although the United States and Turkey, NATO allies since 1952, share some vital interests, 
+harmonizing priorities can be difficult. These priorities sometimes diverge irrespective of who 
+leads the two countries, based on contrasting geography, threat perceptions, and regional roles. 
+This report provides background information and analysis on the following topics: 
+
+ Turkey’s domestic setting. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist-
+
+leaning Justice and Development Party ( Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi , or AKP), in 
+power since 2003, rule in a largely authoritarian manner. Erdogan has steadily 
+consolidated control through elections and increasing dominance over the 
+country’s security apparatus and other key institutions. Erdogan’s biggest 
+challenge may be structural weaknesses in Turkey’s economy—including a sharp 
+decline in Turkey’s currency—that have worsened since the Coronavirus Disease 
+2019 pandemic began. Concerns about maintaining his political support and the 
+AKP’s parliamentary coalition with the Nationalist Movement Party ( Milliyet 
+Halk Partisi , or MHP) may partly explain Erdogan’s policies in the Eastern 
+Mediterranean and Middle East, and his efforts to weaken domestic minorities 
+(including the Kurds) and opponents. 
+
+ Turkey’s strategic orientation. Policy differences and public acrimony between 
+
+Turkey and the United States have fueled concern about their relationship and 
+about Turkey’s status as a U.S. ally and NATO member. Turkey appears to 
+compartmentalize its relationships with United States, Russia, the European 
+Union (EU), China, and its regional neighbors depending on various 
+circumstances (se e Appendix A ) . For example, Turkey has purchased an S-400 
+surface-to-air defense system from Russia and cooperates with it in some other 
+areas, but also has blocked or opposed Russian interests in Syria, Libya, and 
+Nagorno-Karabakh (a region disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan). 
+
+ Congressional scrutiny and U.S. responses and options. U.S.-Turkey tensions 
+
+have led to a number of congressional initiatives and other U.S. actions. These 
+include informal congressional holds and proposed legislation aimed at 
+restricting arms sales, possible sanctions on Turkey, and other efforts to limit 
+strategic cooperation or empower Turkey’s rivals. 
+
+According to the Turkish Coalition of America, a non-governmental organization that promotes 
+positive Turkish-American relations, as of November 2020, there are at least 101 Members of the 
+House of Representatives (98 of whom are voting Members), and four Senators in the 
+Congressional Caucus on Turkey and Turkish Americans.1 Reduced caucus membership numbers 
+since 2018 may reflect the increased difficulties in bilateral relations and congressional concerns 
+about Turkey’s trajectory under President Erdogan. 
+
+ 
+1 See http://www.tc-america.org/in-congress/caucus.htm. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+1 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 1. Turkey at a Glance 
+
+ 
+
+ Geography 
+
+ Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas 
+
+ People 
+
+ Population: 82,017,514. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.2 mil, Ankara 5.1 mil, Izmir 3 mil, 
+Bursa 2.0 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.7 mil. 
+ % of Population 14 or Younger: 23.4% 
+ Ethnic Groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 7%-12% (2016) 
+ Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% (2017) 
+ Literacy: 96.2% (male 98.8%, female 93.5%) (2017) 
+
+ Economy 
+
+ GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $26,768 
+ Real GDP Growth: -3.9% (2020), 3.6% (2021 projection) 
+ Inflation: 11.9% 
+ Unemployment: 14.6% 
+ Budget Deficit as % of GDP: 5.6% 
+ Public Debt as % of GDP: 38.0% 
+ Current Account Deficit as % of GDP: 3.7% 
+ International currency reserves: $81.9 bil ion 
+
+ Source: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using 
+Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2020 
+estimates unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; 
+Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook . 
+
+ Country Overview and the Erdogan Era 
+ Turkey’s large and diversified economy, strong military, Muslim-majority population, and 
+geographic position straddling Europe and the Middle East make it a significant regional power. 
+For decades since its founding in the 1920s, the Turkish republic had relied upon its military, 
+judiciary, and other bastions of its Kemalist (a term inspired by Turkey’s republican founder, 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+2 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) “secular elite” to protect it from political and ideological extremes—
+sacrificing at least some of its democratic vitality in the process. Major political developments in 
+Turkey over the past two decades appear to stem partly from significant socioeconomic changes 
+that began in the 1980s. The military-guided governments that came to power after Turkey’s 1980 
+coup helped establish Turkey’s export-driven economy. This led to the gradual political 
+awakening of a largely Sunni Muslim middle class from Turkey’s Anatolian heartland. 
+
+These changes helped fuel Turkey’s dramatic transformation after 2002, led by the Islamist-
+leaning AKP and President (formerly Prime Minister) Erdogan. The AKP won governing 
+majorities four times—2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015—during a period in which Turkey’s economy 
+generally enjoyed growth and stability. 
+
+During his first decade as Turkey’s leader, Erdogan worked to reduce the political power of the 
+“secular elite.” He subsequently clashed with other possible rival power centers, including 
+previous allies in the Fethullah Gulen movement.2 Domestic polarization intensified after 2013: 
+nationwide antigovernment protests that began in Istanbul’s Gezi Park took place that year, and 
+corruption allegations later surfaced against a number of Erdogan’s colleagues in and out of 
+government.3 
+
+After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential 
+election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a “presidential system” of 
+governance. Analyses of Erdogan sometimes characterize him as one or more of the following: a 
+pragmatic populist, a protector of traditionally marginalized groups, a budding authoritarian, or 
+an Islamic ideologue.4 While there may be some similarities between Turkey under Erdogan and 
+countries like Russia, Iran, or China, some factors distinguish Turkey from them. For example, 
+unlike Russia or Iran, Turkey’s economy cannot rely on significant rents from natural resources if 
+foreign sources of revenue or investment dry up. Unlike Russia and China, Turkey does not have 
+nuclear weapons under its command and control. Additionally, unlike all three others, Turkey’s 
+economic, political, and national security institutions and traditions have been closely connected 
+with those of the West for decades. 
+
+Erdogan’s consolidation of power has continued and arguably accelerated since 2014. After 
+Erdogan survived a July 2016 coup attempt staged by rogue military officers, Turkey’s parliament 
+approved a state of emergency. The state of emergency enabled Turkish authorities to target many 
+of Erdogan’s political opponents and civil society critics beyond those with proven connections to 
+the coup attempt. More than 60,000 Turks were arrested and 130,000 dismissed from government 
+posts.5 Erdogan and his supporters also gained greater control over the country’s government, 
+security, educational, media, and business institutions.6 After winning controversial victories in an 
+April 2017 constitutional referendum and June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections, (see 
+below), Erdogan’s presidential powers expanded. In July 2018, parliament lifted the state of 
+emergency, but enacted many of its features into law for another three years. However, the 
+positive economic conditions that helped propel Erdogan’s early political popularity have turned 
+ 
+2 For more on Gulen and the Gulen movement, see CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United 
+States: A Reference , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 
+
+3 Freedom House, Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey , February 3, 2014. 
+4 See, e.g., Soner Cagaptay, The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey , New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. 
+Ltd, 2017; Burak Kadercan, “Erdogan’s Last Off-Ramp: Authoritarianism, Democracy, and the Future of Turkey,” War 
+on the Rocks, July 28, 2016. 
+
+5 Carlotta Gall, “Turkish Leader’s Next Target in Crackdown on Dissent: The Internet,” New York Times , March 4, 
+2018. 
+
+6 Kareem Fahim, “As Erdogan prepares for new term, Turkey dismisses more than 18,000 civil servants,” Washington 
+Post , July 8, 2018. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+3 
+
+ 
+ link to page 47 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+into largely negative ones in the past two years, raising questions about how much popularity he 
+can maintain over time. 
+
+ Human Rights Concerns in Turkey 
+
+During the second decade of President Erdogan’s leadership of Turkey, domestic and international observers have 
+raised claims about human rights violations that they assert—amid some opposing views—are more widespread 
+and systematic than in the country’s past eras. During the 2000s, some of these observers expressed hopes that 
+reducing the role of Turkey’s military in its institutions of civilian governance could lead to a more liberal 
+democracy—and perhaps European Union membership. Since then, however, many have voiced worries about the 
+largely unchecked, Islamist-tinged civilian rule that Erdogan justifies on the basis of elections of questionable 
+legitimacy.7 
+Official analyses from the United States and European Union, as well as unofficial reports from human rights 
+monitors and other third parties, identify a number of issues,8 including the fol owing: 
+ 
+
+Practices by the government or its supporters (e.g., media control, censorship, intimidation, voter fraud or 
+manipulation) that may undermine the “free and fair” nature of Turkey’s elections. 
+
+ 
+
+Arbitrary arrest, indefinite detention, and improper interrogation practices (including instances of torture), 
+and some general erosion of the justice sector’s independence and evidentiary standards. 
+
+ 
+
+Imprisonment, forced closures or asset transfers, and other measures targeting journalists, civil society 
+leaders, Erdogan’s political opponents, and independent institutions. The government justifies some measures 
+on the basis of countering terrorism, even though sometimes those targeted appear to have had only minimal 
+or superficial contacts with organizations classified by Turkey as terrorist groups—such as the Kurdistan 
+Workers’ Party (PKK) or the Fethul ah Gulen movement. 
+
+ 
+
+Significant limits on the right to assemble and protest. 
+
+ 
+
+Conditions on and legal prosecution of content posted on key Internet and social media sites (i.e., YouTube, 
+Facebook, Twitter). 
+
+ 
+
+Increased spending on Sunni Muslim religious ( imam hatip ) secondary schools, and expanded religious 
+instruction in other schools. 
+
+As a member of the Council of Europe, Turkey agrees to accept the rulings of the European Court of Human 
+Rights (ECHR), but has not done so in some cases.9 Specific concerns regarding the treatment of Turkey’s large 
+ethnic Kurdish population and its religious minorities are discussed in various sections below. 
+
+Erdogan and various other key Turkish figures (including political party leaders) are profiled in 
+ Appendix B . 
+
+ Political Assessment 
+ President Erdogan retains sweeping power over Turkey. However, he presides over a polarized 
+electorate and faces substantial domestic and international criticism for governing in an 
+authoritarian manner. Many Turks’ opposition to his continued rule, along with Turkey’s ongoing 
+economic challenges, could undermine Turkey’s future stability and prosperity, even if it does not 
+lead to Erdogan leaving office.10 
+
+ 
+7 See, e.g., “Democracy Talks: Mustafa Akyol, Author and Journalist,” George W. Bush Presidential Center, April 28, 
+2020. 
+
+8 Department of State, “Turkey,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 ; European Commission, Turkey 
+2020 Report , October 6, 2020; Human Rights Watch, “Turkey,” World Report 2020 ; Freedom House, “Turkey,” 
+ Freedom in the World 2020 . 
+
+9 “Turkey’s Erdogan says ECHR ruling on jailed politician supports terrorism,” Reuters , November 21, 2018. 
+10 See, e.g., Max Hoffman, “Turkey’s President Erdoğan Is Losing Ground at Home,” Center for American Progress, 
+August 24, 2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+4 
+
+ 
+ link to page 10 link to page 10 link to page 16 link to page 16 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+Erdogan won the June 2018 presidential elections with about 53% of the vote. To obtain a 
+parliamentary majority in the June 2018 elections, Erdogan’s AKP relied on the MHP (se e Figure 
+2 below). The MHP is the country’s traditional Turkish nationalist party, and is known for 
+opposing political accommodation with the Kurds. The MHP also had provided key support for 
+the constitutional amendments approved in 2017. Erdogan started courting nationalist 
+constituencies around the time Kurdish voter support for the AKP decreased in 2015 with the end 
+of Turkey-PKK peace negotiations and the resumption of armed conflict (see “Government 
+Approaches to the Kurds” below). Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced in 
+connection with the June 2018 elections,11 which was also the case with the April 2017 
+constitutional referendum.12 
+
+ The Post-2018 Presidential System 
+
+Two years into the presidential system in Turkey, it is unclear how the formalities of government and the 
+
+surrounding politics wil affect checks and balances. Commentators routinely compare Turkey’s system with other 
+presidential systems, particularly those in the United States and France.13 Under Turkey’s constitutional changes, a 
+president may serve for up to two five-year terms, and presidential and parliamentary elections occur at the same 
+time. The president can appoint ministers, other senior officials, and a large majority of senior judges without 
+parliamentary approval, and also is responsible for preparing the budget proposals. 
+The 600-seat parliament has some ability to counter presidential actions. It retains power to legislate, appoint 
+some judges and bureaucrats, and approve the president’s budget proposals. It also may impeach the president 
+with a two-thirds majority. The president can declare a state of emergency, but parliament can reverse this action, 
+and decrees made during a state of emergency lapse if parliament does not approve them within three months. 
+
+ 
+11 OSCE, International Election Observation Mission, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, 
+Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24, 2018 (published June 25, 2018). 
+
+12 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final 
+Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017). 
+
+13 See, e.g., Chris Morris, “Turkey elections: How powerful will the next Turkish president be?” BBC News , June 25, 
+2018. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+5 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 2. Turkey: 2018 Parliamentary Election Results in Context 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Sources: Institute for the Study of War; Bipartisan Policy Center. 
+ Note: Each square represents 12 parliamentary seats. 
+
+In 2019 local elections, the AKP maintained the largest share of votes but lost some key 
+municipalities to opposition candidates from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party 
+( Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi , or CHP). The AKP’s most significant losses in those elections include 
+the capital, Ankara, and Istanbul, Turkey’s largest city and economic hub. The Istanbul municipal 
+election was particularly controversial: though CHP candidate Ekrem Imamoglu appeared to win 
+a narrow victory in the March 2019 election, the AKP disputed his vote total and the election was 
+annulled by the Supreme Electoral Council. In the closely watched June 2019 re-vote, Imamoglu 
+won a decisive victory over AKP candidate and former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+6 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+It is unclear to what extent, if at all, these losses were connected with Turkey’s economic troubles 
+and represent a threat to Erdogan’s rule. Imamoglu and some other opposition mayors have 
+national profiles and by some measures reportedly may rival Erdogan in popularity.14 Using 
+access to information that their positions afford, they have claimed that their AKP predecessors 
+engaged in corrupt and wasteful practices.15 Additionally, since the local elections, Ahmet 
+Davutoglu and Ali Babacan, who are prominent former AKP figures from previous Erdogan-led 
+governments, each have established new political parties that could weaken Erdogan’s hold on his 
+conservative political base. Erdogan is up for reelection at the end of his term in 2023. He could 
+call early elections at any time, but may be unlikely to do so unless a comfortable AKP victory 
+seems assured.16 
+
+ Economic Assessment 
+
+ Overview 
+
+The AKP’s political successes during the 2000s were aided considerably by robust Turkish 
+economic growth. Growth rates were comparable at times to other major emerging markets, such 
+as the BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Key Turkish businesses include 
+diversified conglomerates (such as Koc and Sabanci) from traditional urban centers as well as 
+“Anatolian tigers” (small- to medium-sized export-oriented companies) scattered throughout the 
+country. 
+
+In the past decade, however, growth has at times slowed or reversed, and the Turkish economy 
+has experienced significant volatility. The “low-hanging fruit”—numerous large infrastructure 
+projects and the scaling up of low-technology manufacturing—that largely drove the previous 
+decade’s economic success may be unlikely to produce similar results going forward. Turkey’s 
+relatively large current account deficit increases its vulnerability to higher borrowing costs. 
+Concerns about rule of law in Turkey and the possibility of U.S. sanctions may also drive 
+volatility. In July 2018, Erdogan gave himself the power to appoint central bank rate-setters and 
+appointed his son-in-law Berat Albayrak (the former energy minister) to serve as treasury and 
+finance minister, exacerbating concerns about greater politicization of Turkey’s monetary 
+policy.17 
+
+The steady depreciation over several years of Turkey’s currency, the lira, has put further strain on 
+the economy. As of November 2020, the value of the lira had declined nearly 30% for the year. 
+With net foreign currency reserves probably in negative territory, and interest rates below the rate 
+of inflation, analysts have predicted that Turkey will need to raise interest rates—perhaps 
+dramatically—or seek significant external assistance to address its financial fragility.18 In 
+November, Erdogan replaced Turkey’s central bank governor and Albayrak resigned as treasury 
+and finance minister, fueling speculation about the likelihood of interest rate hikes despite 
+Erdogan’s long-expressed disdain of them.19 Turkey unsuccessfully sought currency swap lines 
+
+ 
+14 Laura Pitel and Funja Guler, “Turkish opposition mayors outshine Erdogan with ‘kindness’ campaigns,” Financial 
+Times , June 23, 2020. 
+
+15 Laura Pitel, “Turkish mayors accuse government of coronavirus cover-up,” Financial Times , August 30, 2020. 
+16 Nick Danforth, “The Outlook for Turkish Democracy: 2023 and Beyond,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
+March 2020. 
+
+17 Marcus Ashworth, “Erdogan’s New Dynasty Makes Turkey Uninvestable,” Bloomberg , July 10, 2018. 
+18 Economist Intelligence Unit, Turkey country report (retrieved November 3, 2020). 
+19 Laura Pitel, “Shock change in Turkey’s economic leadership raises stakes for lira,” Financial Times , November 8, 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+7 
+
+ 
+ link to page 13 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+from the U.S. Federal Reserve earlier in 2020, having relied to date for some liquidity on swaps 
+from Qatar and China.20 
+
+Some observers have speculated that if investment dries up, Turkey may need to turn to the 
+International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a financial assistance package.21 Erdogan has publicly 
+rejected such speculation. Doing so would be a sensitive challenge for Erdogan because his 
+political success story is closely connected with helping Turkey become independent from its 
+most recent IMF intervention in the early 2000s. 
+
+ Energy 
+
+Turkey’s importance as a regional energy transport hub makes it relevant for world energy 
+markets while also providing Turkey with opportunities to satisfy its own domestic energy needs. 
+With few hydrocarbon resources of its own, Turkey has been traditionally dependent on other 
+countries for energy imports—particularly Russia and Iran. However, Turkey has significantly 
+reduced its dependence on natural gas delivered via pipeline from Russia (see Figure 3 ) , in part 
+by increasing its purchases of liquefied natural gas (LNG). From 2016 to June 2020, Russia’s 
+share of Turkish natural gas imports reportedly fell from 50% to 14%, while U.S. LNG as a share 
+of Turkey’s imports grew from 0% to 10%.22 Turkey faces challenges in maintaining and 
+broadening its efforts at diversification, including some pertaining to long-term supply contracts 
+and physical infrastructure. Additionally, Russia may retain leverage with Turkey on issues such 
+as arms sales, nuclear energy, and regional crises (i.e., Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh). 
+
+ 
+2020. 
+
+20 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkey’s ‘peg-legged’ foreign currency reserves,” Al-Monitor , July 6, 2020. 
+21 Bobby Ghosh, “Erdogan should break his IMF taboo,” Bloomberg , April 19, 2020. 
+22 Rauf Mammadov, “Turkey Makes Strides in Diversifying Its Natural Gas Imports,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 17, 
+Issue 97, July 6, 2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+8 
+
+ 
+ link to page 14 
+
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 3. Turkish Natural Gas Imports by Country 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK), 2019 Annual Report 
+
+In January 2020, Presidents Erdogan and Putin inaugurated the TurkStream pipeline project (see 
+ Figure 4 ) , which carries Russian natural gas across the Black Sea to southern and central Europe 
+via Turkey.23 A planned second line is to extend northward as far as Austria. The Countering 
+Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44) authorizes sanctions 
+on individuals or entities that invest in or engage in trade for the construction of Russian energy 
+export pipelines. In October 2017, the Administration published guidance noting that Section 232 
+sanctions would not apply to projects for which contracts were signed prior to August 2, 2017, the 
+date of CRIEEA’s enactment. However, in July 2020, the Administration updated that guidance 
+and stated that while the initial TurkStream pipeline would not be subject to Section 232 
+sanctions, the second line would be. The FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, 
+P.L. 116-92) enacted in December 2019 included, as Title LXXV, the Protecting Europe’s Energy 
+Security Act of 2019 (PEESA). This Act mandates sanctions—subject to a presidential waiver for 
+national security reasons—for actors involved in laying subsea pipeline for TurkStream and 
+possible successor projects on a going forward basis. 
+
+Turkey’s location has made it a key country in the U.S. and European effort to establish a 
+southern corridor for pipelines to Europe that bypass Russia.24 In late 2011, Turkey and 
+Azerbaijan reached deals for the transit of natural gas to and through Turkey via the Trans-
+Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP);25 the project was inaugurated in June 2018.26 As of September 
+2020, work is nearing completion on the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which is to transport 
+
+ 
+23 CRS In Focus IF11177, TurkStream: Russia’s Newest Gas Pipeline to Europe , by Sarah E. Garding et al. 
+24 Department of State press statement, “The Importance of Diversity in European Energy Security,” June 29, 2018. 
+25 The terms of the Turkey-Azerbaijan agreement specified that 565 billion-700 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas 
+would transit Turkey, of which 210 bcf would be available for Turkey’s domestic use. 
+26 “Leaders open TANAP pipeline carrying gas from Azerbaijan to Europe,” Hurriyet Daily News , June 12, 2018. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+9 
+
+ 
+ link to page 22 
+
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+Azeri gas to Italy via TANAP.27 Difficult relations with Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt are 
+likely to complicate Turkish efforts to play a larger role in the development and transport of 
+natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean (see “Eastern Mediterranean and Offshore Natural Gas” 
+ below).28 
+
+In August 2020, President Erdogan announced a Turkish discovery of offshore natural gas 
+deposits in the Black Sea. It is unclear how this news might impact the situation in the Eastern 
+Mediterranean and Turkey’s overall energy policies.29 Even if the deposits can be accessed, 
+commercially developing them for domestic consumption or trade could take years.30 
+
+ Figure 4. Turkey and Southeastern European Gas Infrastructure 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: Created by CRS using data from U.S. Department of State, HIS, ESRI, European Network of 
+Transmission System Operators for Gas, Bulgartransgaz. 
+
+Another part of Turkey’s strategy to become more energy independent is to increase domestic 
+energy production. Turkey has entered into an agreement with a subsidiary of Rosatom (Russia’s 
+state-run nuclear company) to have it build and operate what would be Turkey’s first nuclear 
+power plant in Akkuyu near the Mediterranean port of Mersin. Construction, which had been 
+delayed for several years, began in April 2018, with operations expected to begin in 2023.31 Some 
+observers have expressed both skepticism about the construction timeline and concerns that the 
+plant could provide Russia with additional leverage over Turkey.32 Plans for Japan to assist with 
+
+ 
+27 Shabnam Hasanova, “Where does the TAP gas pipeline project stand to date? The view from Baku,” Jamestown 
+Foundation, June 30, 2020. 
+
+28 Yigal Chazon, “Race to exploit Mediterranean gas raises regional hackles,” Financial Times , March 9, 2018. 
+29 See John V. Bowlus, “Pulling Back the Curtain on Turkey’s Natural Gas Strategy,” War on the Rocks, August 26, 
+2020. 
+
+30 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Erdogan Unveils Biggest Ever Black Sea Natural Gas Discovery,” Bloomberg , August 21, 2020. 
+31 “Construction starts on 2nd unit of Turkey’s 1st nuclear power plant Akkuyu,” Daily Sabah , June 28, 2020. 
+32 See, e.g., Aram Ekin Duran, “Akkuyu nuclear plant: Turkey and Russia’s atomic connection,” Deutsche Welle, April 
+3, 2018. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+10 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+the construction of a second nuclear power plant in Sinop on the Black Sea coast were abandoned 
+in January 2020.33 
+
+ The Kurdish Issue 
+
+ Background 
+
+Ethnic Kurds reportedly constitute approximately 19% of Turkey’s population.34 Kurds are 
+largely concentrated in the less economically developed southeast, though populations are found 
+in urban centers across the country. Some Kurds have been reluctant to recognize Turkish state 
+authority in various parts of the southeast—a dynamic that also exists between Kurds and national 
+governments in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. This reluctance and harsh Turkish government measures to 
+quell Kurdish demands for rights have fed tensions that have occasionally escalated since the 
+foundation of the republic in 1923. Since 1984, the Turkish military has periodically countered an 
+on-and-off separatist insurgency and urban terrorism campaign by the PKK.35 The initially 
+secessionist demands of the PKK have since ostensibly evolved toward the less ambitious goal of 
+greater cultural and political autonomy.36 According to the U.S. government and EU, the PKK 
+partially finances its activities through criminal activities, including its operation of a Europe-
+wide drug trafficking network.37 
+
+The struggle between Turkish authorities and the PKK was most intense during the 1990s, but has 
+flared periodically since then. The PKK uses safe havens in areas of northern Iraq under the 
+nominal authority of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The Turkish military’s 
+approach to neutralizing the PKK has been routinely criticized by Western governments and 
+human rights organizations for being overly hard on ethnic Kurds. Thousands have been 
+imprisoned and hundreds of thousands have been displaced or had their livelihoods disrupted for 
+suspected PKK involvement or sympathies. 
+
+ 
+33 “Turkey, Japan scrap partnership in Sinop nuclear plant in Turkey’s north,” Hurriyet Daily News , January 20, 2020. 
+34 CIA World Factbook, Turkey (accessed August 2020). 
+35 According to the International Crisis Group, around 14,000 Turks have been killed since fighting began in the early 
+1980s. This figure includes Turkish security personnel of various types and Turkish civilians (including Turkish Kurds 
+who are judged not to have been PKK combatants). Estimates of PKK dead run from 33,000 to 43,000. International 
+Crisis Group, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: The Rising Toll” (interactive blog updated into 2018); Turkey: Ending the PKK 
+Insurgency , Europe Report No. 213, September 20, 2011. 
+
+36 Kurdish nationalist leaders demand that any future changes to Turkey’s constitution (in its current form following the 
+2017 amendments) not suppress Kurdish ethnic and linguistic identity. The first clause of Article 3 of the constitution 
+reads, “The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.” Because the 
+constitution states that its first three articles are unamendable, even proposing a change could face judicial obstacles. 
+
+37 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018; U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, “Five 
+PKK Leaders Designated Narcotics Traffickers,” April 20, 2011. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+11 
+
+ 
+ link to page 47 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Government Approaches to the Kurds 
+
+ PKK Designations by U.S. 
+
+Until the spring of 2015, Erdogan appeared to 
+
+ Government 
+
+prefer negotiating a political compromise with 
+
+ Designation 
+
+ Year 
+
+PKK leaders over the prospect of armed 
+conflict.
+
+Foreign Terrorist 
+
+1997 
+
+38 However, against the backdrop of 
+
+Organization 
+
+PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups’ success in Syria 
+and domestic political considerations, Erdogan 
+
+Special y Designated 
+
+2001 
+
+then adopted a more confrontational political 
+
+Global Terrorist 
+
+stance with the PKK. Within that context, a 
+
+Significant Foreign 
+
+2008 
+
+complicated set of circumstances involving 
+
+Narcotics Trafficker 
+
+ 
+
+terrorist attacks and mutual suspicion led to a 
+resumption of violence between government forces and the PKK in the summer of 2015. As a 
+result of the violence, which has been concentrated in southeastern Turkey and was most intense 
+from 2015 to 2016, hundreds of fighters and civilians have died.39 In addition to mass population 
+displacement, infrastructure in the southeast has suffered significant damage. U.S. officials, while 
+supportive of Turkey’s prerogative to defend itself from attacks, have advised Turkey to show 
+restraint and proportionality in its actions.40 
+
+Under the state of emergency enacted after the failed July 2016 coup attempt, Turkey’s 
+government cracked down on Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Since then, dozens of elected Kurdish 
+mayors have been removed from office and replaced with government-appointed “custodians.” In 
+November 2016, the two then-co-leaders of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party 
+( Halklarin Demokratik Partisi , or HDP) were arrested along with nine other parliamentarians 
+under various charges of crimes against the state; some remain imprisoned, along with other party 
+leaders and members who have been detained on similar charges.41 Turkish officials routinely 
+accuse Kurdish politicians of support for the PKK, but these politicians generally deny close ties. 
+
+The future trajectory of Turkey-PKK dealings may depend on a number of factors, including 
+
+ which Kurdish figures and groups (imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan 
+
+[profiled i n Appendix B ] , various PKK militant leaders, the professedly 
+nonviolent HDP) are most influential in driving events; 
+
+ Erdogan’s approach to the issue, which has alternated between conciliation and 
+
+confrontation; and 
+
+ possible incentives to Turkey’s government and the Kurds from the United States 
+
+or other actors for mitigating violence and promoting political resolution. 
+
+ Religious Minorities 
+ Many Members of Congress follow the status of religious minorities in Turkey. Religious 
+minorities are generally concentrated in Istanbul and other urban areas, as well as the southeast, 
+and collectively represent around 0.2% of Turkey’s population. Adherents of non-Muslim 
+
+ 
+38 As prime minister, Erdogan had led past efforts to resolve the Kurdish question by using political, cultural, and 
+economic development approaches, in addition to the traditional security-based approach, in line with the AKP’s 
+ideological starting point that common Islamic ties among Turks and Kurds could transcend ethnic differences. 
+
+39 International Crisis Group, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: The Rising Toll.” 
+40 Mark Landler and Carlotta Gall, “As Turkey Attacks Kurds in Syria, U.S. Is on the Sideline,” New York Times , 
+January 22, 2018. 
+
+41 See https://hdp-usa.com/political-prisoners. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+12 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+religions and minority Muslim sects (most prominently, the Alevis) often attract, and to some 
+extent rely on, legal appeals, political advocacy, and support from Western countries. 
+
+The Turkish government controls or closely oversees religious activities in the country. This 
+arrangement was originally used to enforce secularism (often referred to as “laicism”), partly to 
+prevent religion from influencing state actors and institutions as it did under Ottoman rule. 
+However, since at least 2015, observers have detected some movement by state religious 
+authorities in the direction of the AKP’s Islamist-friendly worldview, and successive Department 
+of State International Religious Freedom Reports indicate that the Turkish government limits the 
+rights of religious minorities.42 
+
+U.S. concerns focus largely on the rights of Turkey’s Christian and Jewish communities, which 
+have sought greater freedom to choose leaders, train clergy, own property, and otherwise function 
+independently of the Turkish government.43 
+
+ Halki Seminary and Hagia Sophia 
+
+Some Members of Congress routinely express grievances through proposed congressional 
+resolutions and letters on behalf of the Ecumenical (Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate of 
+Constantinople, the spiritual center of Orthodox Christianity based in Istanbul.44 The Patriarchate, 
+along with various U.S. and European officials, continues to press for the reopening of its Halki 
+Theological School,45 which was closed after a 1971 ruling by Turkey’s Constitutional Court 
+prohibiting the operation of private institutions of higher education.46 In February 2019, then-
+Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras made the first-ever visit by a Greek prime minister to the 
+seminary. In the past, Erdogan has reportedly said that Halki’s reopening would depend on 
+measures by Greece to accommodate its Muslim community.47 
+
+Turkey has converted some historic Christian churches from museums into mosques, most 
+notably Istanbul’s landmark Hagia Sophia ( Ayasofya in Turkish), a sixth-century Greek Orthodox 
+cathedral that was converted to a mosque after the 1453 Ottoman conquest of Istanbul and then 
+became a museum during the early years of the Turkish Republic. A popular movement to convert 
+the site back into a mosque gained strength in recent years, culminating in President Erdogan’s 
+public support for such a move during the March 2019 local elections campaign.48 In July 2020, a 
+
+ 
+42 See also, e.g., Ceren Lord, Religious Politics in Turkey: From the Birth of the Republic to the AKP (Cambridge 
+University Press), 2018. 
+
+43 Since 2009, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has given Turkey designations 
+ranging from “country of particular concern” (highest concern) to “monitored.” As of the 2020 report, Turkey is 
+recommended for the Department of State’s Special Watch List. For additional information on Turkey’s religious 
+minorities, see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report for 2019. 
+44 On December 13, 2011, for example, the House passed H.Res. 306—“Urging the Republic of Turkey to safeguard its 
+Christian heritage and to return confiscated church properties”—by voice vote. In June 2014, the House Foreign Affairs 
+Committee favorably reported the Turkey Christian Churches Accountability Act (H.R. 4347). The Turkish 
+government does not acknowledge the “ecumenical” nature of the Patriarchate, but does not object to others’ reference 
+to the Patriarchate’s ecumenicity. 
+45 The Patriarchate also presses for the Turkish government to lift the requirement that the Patriarch be a Turkish 
+citizen, and for it to return previously confiscated properties. 
+
+46 In remarks accompanying the release of the 2018 religious freedom report, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said, 
+“We urge the immediate reopening of the Halki Seminary.” Department of State, “Secretary of State Michael R. 
+Pompeo at the Release of the 2018 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom,” June 21, 2019. 
+
+47 Stelyo Berberakis, “Patriarch hopes to reopen seminary after talks with president,” Daily Sabah , May 11, 2018; 
+“Turkey ready to open Halki Seminary in return for a mosque in Greece: report,” Hurriyet Daily News , May 8, 2015. 
+48 “Turkey’s Erdogan Says He Plans to Change Hagia Sophia’s Title from Museum to Mosque,” Reuters, March 29, 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+13 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+Turkish court invalidated the 1934 decree that created Hagia Sophia as a museum, and President 
+Erdogan subsequently approved its conversion to a mosque and led the first prayers there. The 
+move, also seen as a political overture to conservative Turkish nationalists, was criticized by 
+Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, a number of Members of Congress, and the EU Foreign 
+Affairs Council. 
+
+ Alevis 
+
+About 10 to 20 million Turkish Muslims are Alevis (of whom about 20% are ethnic Kurds). The 
+Alevi community has some relation to Shiism and may contain strands from pre-Islamic 
+Anatolian and Christian traditions.49 Alevism has been traditionally influenced by Sufi mysticism 
+that emphasizes believers’ individual spiritual paths, but it defies precise description owing to its 
+lack of centralized leadership and reliance on secret oral traditions. Despite multiple decisions by 
+Turkey’s top appeals court that the state financially support cemevis (Alevi houses of worship), 
+the government still does not do so.50 
+
+Alevis have long been among the strongest supporters of secularism in Turkey, which they 
+reportedly see as a form of protection from the Sunni majority.51 Arab Alawites in Syria and 
+southern Turkey are a distinct Shia-related religious community. 
+
+ Turkey’s Strategic Orientation and Military 
+Involvement 
+ Numerous points of tension and Turkey’s military operations in various places have raised 
+questions within the United States and Turkey about the two countries’ alliance, as well as 
+Turkey’s commitment to NATO and its Western orientation. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish 
+officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on a number of issues—including regional security 
+and counterterrorism—remains mutually important.52 
+
+Concerns among Turkish leaders that U.S. policy might undermine Turkey’s security date back at 
+least to the 1991 Gulf War,53 but the following developments have fueled them since 2010: 
+
+ 
+2019. In 2014, then-Prime Minster Erdogan responded to activists calling for Hagia Sophia to be opened as a mosque 
+by saying that other extant mosques in the area should be fully utilized before any change would be made to Hagia 
+Sophia. Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “What caused Erdogan’s change of heart on Hagia Sophia?” Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse , 
+March 29, 2019. 
+
+49 For additional historical background, see Elise Massicard, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and managing 
+territorial diversity , New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 11-18. 
+
+50 Patrick Kingsley, “Turkey’s Alevis, a Muslim Minority, Fear a Policy of Denying Their Existence,” New York Times , 
+July 22, 2017; “Turkey’s top appeals court rules for state to pay utilities of Alevi houses of worship,” Daily Sabah , 
+November 29, 2018. 
+
+51 According to a scholar on Turkey, “Alevis suffered centuries of oppression under the Ottomans, who accused them 
+of not being truly Muslim and suspected them of colluding with the Shi’i Persians against the empire. Alevi Kurds were 
+victims of the early republic’s Turkification policies and were massacred by the thousands in Dersim [now called 
+Tunceli] in 1937-39. In the 1970s, Alevis became associated with socialist and other leftist movements, while the 
+political right was dominated by Sunni Muslims. An explosive mix of sectarian cleavages, class polarization, and 
+political violence led to communal massacres of Alevis in five major cities in 1977 and 1978, setting the stage for the 
+1980 coup.” Jenny White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013, p. 14. 
+
+52 Stephen J. Flanagan, et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and 
+the U.S. Army , RAND Corporation, 2020. 
+
+53 See, e.g., Keith Johnson and Robbie Gramer, “Who Lost Turkey?” foreignpolicy.com, July 19, 2019. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+14 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Close U.S. military cooperation against the Islamic State with Syrian Kurdish 
+
+forces linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist 
+organization that has waged an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish 
+government since the 1980s while using safe havens in both Syria and Iraq. 
+
+ Turkey’s view that the United States supported or acquiesced to events during 
+
+post-2011 turmoil in Egypt and Syria that undermined Sunni Islamist figures tied 
+to Turkey. 
+
+ Many Western leaders’ criticism of President Erdogan for ruling in a largely 
+
+authoritarian manner. Erdogan’s sensitivity to Western concerns was exacerbated 
+by the 2016 coup attempt. Erdogan blames the coup attempt on Fethullah Gulen, 
+a former Turkish imam (prayer leader) who leads a worldwide socioreligious 
+movement and lives in the United States. 
+
+Turkey arguably seeks a more independent foreign policy course than at any time since joining 
+NATO in 1952, driven partly by geopolitical and economic considerations. Traditionally, Turkey 
+has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for 
+trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Turkish leaders’ interest in 
+reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging Western influence over their 
+domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia in 
+Syria and purchase a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains 
+significant differences with Russia—with which it has a long history of discord—including over 
+political outcomes in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Also, as mentioned above, Turkey 
+appears to be making efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. While Turkey-Russia 
+cooperation on some issues may not reflect a general Turkish realignment toward Russia, Russia 
+may be content with helping weaken Turkey’s ties with the United States, NATO, and the EU to 
+reduce obstacles to Russian actions and ambitions.54 
+
+Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other global 
+powers as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on and 
+maintain its leverage with these actors.55 This approach may to some extent reflect President 
+Erdogan’s efforts to consolidate control domestically. Because Erdogan’s Islamist-friendly AKP 
+maintains a parliamentary majority in partnership with the more traditionally nationalist MHP, 
+efforts to maintain the support of core constituencies may imbue Turkish policy with a 
+nationalistic tenor. A largely nationalistic foreign policy also has precedent from before Turkey’s 
+Cold War alignment with the West.56 Turkey’s history as both a regional power and an object of 
+great power aggression translates into wide domestic popularity for nationalistic political actions 
+and discourse, as well as sympathy for Erdogan’s “neo-Ottoman” narrative of restoring Turkish 
+regional prestige. 
+
+ Turkish Hard Power: Using Drones and Proxy Forces in Regional Conflicts 
+
+During Erdogan’s first decade as prime minister, Turkey’s main approach in its surrounding region (with the 
+exception of its long-running security operations against the PKK) was to project political and economic influence, 
+or “soft power,” backed by diplomacy and military deterrence. As regional unrest increased near Turkey’s borders 
+with the onset of conflict in Syria, however, Turkey’s approach shifted dramatically in light of newly perceived 
+
+ 
+54 See, e.g., Marc Pierini, “How Far Can Turkey Challenge NATO and the EU in 2020?” Carnegie Europe , January 29, 
+2020; Andrew Higgins, “Putin and Erdogan Reach Accord to Halt Fighting in Syria,” New York Times , March 5, 2020. 
+55 Flanagan, et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course . 
+56 Pierini, “How Far Can Turkey Challenge NATO and the EU?” 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+15 
+
+ 
+ link to page 32 link to page 32 link to page 39 link to page 21 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+threats. This was especial y the case after Erdogan (as president) began courting Turkish nationalist constituencies 
+in 2015 and consolidating power fol owing the July 2016 coup attempt. 
+Under this modified approach, Turkey now largely relies on hard power to affect regional outcomes. Specifically, 
+Turkey has focused on a relatively low-cost method of using armed drones (see “Drones: Domestic Production, 
+U.S. and Western Components, and Exports”) and/or proxy forces (particularly Syrian fighters who oppose the 
+Syrian government and otherwise have limited sources of income) in theaters of conflict including northern Syria 
+and Iraq, western Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Partly because the drones and proxy forces limit Turkey’s 
+political and economic risk, Turkish leaders have shown less constraint in deploying them, and they have 
+reportedly proven effective at countering other actors’ more expensive but less mobile armored vehicles and air 
+defense systems. Turkey’s early 2018 “Operation Olive Branch” against PKK-linked Syrian Kurds in Syria’s Afrin 
+province was reportedly a crucial early test of this method. 
+During 2020, Turkey’s drones and proxies appear to have blocked or made inroads against Russian-assisted forces 
+in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh.57 Turkish efforts to counter Russia in multiple theaters suggest that 
+Turkey-Russia cooperation is situational rather than comprehensive in scope (see Appendix A ) , and that U.S. 
+and Turkish interests may overlap in some of these cases. 
+
+ U.S./NATO Presence 
+ Turkey’s location near several global hotspots has made the continuing availability of its territory 
+for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and 
+NATO. From Turkey’s perspective, NATO’s traditional value has been to mitigate its concerns 
+about encroachment by neighbors. Turkey initially turned to the West largely as a reaction to 
+aggressive post-World War II posturing by the Soviet Union. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near 
+the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile 
+defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces command in Izmir (see Figure 5 ) . 
+Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea through its straits pursuant to the Montreux 
+Convention of 1936. 
+
+ Incirlik Air Base 
+
+Turkey’s Incirlik (pronounced een-jeer-leek ) air base in the southern part of the country has long been the symbolic 
+and logistical center of the U.S. military presence in Turkey, with the U.S. Air Force’s 39th Air Base Wing based 
+there. Since 1991, the base has been critical in supplying U.S. military missions in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, 
+and Syria. Anti-Islamic State coalition flights in Syria and Iraq began in 2014, but reportedly dropped off significantly 
+by 2018 owing to U.S.-Turkey tensions.58 
+The use of Incirlik by coup plotters within Turkey’s military in July 2016 caused temporary disruptions of some 
+
+U.S. military operations, and intensified concerns about Turkey’s stability and the safety and utility of Turkish 
+territory for U.S. and NATO assets. Several open source media outlets have speculated about whether U.S. 
+tactical nuclear weapons may be based at Incirlik Air Base, and if so, whether U.S. officials might consider taking 
+them out of Turkey.59 
+
+Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions 
+about the continued use of Turkish bases. As a result of the tensions and questions about the 
+ 
+57 Mitch Prothero, “Turkey's Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year — here's how he did it,” Business Insider , 
+October 22, 2020. 
+
+58 Gordon Lubold, et al., “U.S. Pares Operations at Base in Turkey,” Wall Street Journal , March 12, 2018. 
+59 Dorian Jones, “US Military Base in Turkey Has Uncertain Future,” Voice of America , November 24, 2019; Miles A. 
+Pomper, “Why the US has nuclear weapons in Turkey—and may try to put the bombs away,” The Conversation , 
+October 23, 2019. A bill introduced in the Senate in October 2019 (S. 2644) would, among other provisions, require the 
+President to provide an interagency report to Congress “assessing viable alternative military installations or other 
+locations to host personnel and assets of the United States Armed Forces currently stationed at Incirlik Air Base in 
+Turkey.” 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+16 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets, some observers have advocated 
+exploring alternative basing arrangements in the region.60 Some reports suggest that expanded or 
+potentially expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might 
+be connected with concerns about Turkey.61 
+
+ Figure 5. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey 
+
+ 
+
+ Sources: Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets; adapted by CRS. 
+ Notes: All locations are approximate. 
+
+There are historical precedents for the United States withdrawing military assets from Turkey and 
+Turkey restricting U.S. use of its territory or airspace. These include the following: 
+
+ 1962 - Cuban Missile Crisis . The United States withdrew its nuclear-tipped 
+
+Jupiter missiles following this crisis. 
+
+ 1975 - Cyprus. Turkey closed most U.S. defense and intelligence installations in 
+
+Turkey during the U.S. arms embargo that Congress imposed in response to 
+Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus. 
+
+ 
+60 See, e.g., Xander Snyder, “Beyond Incirlik,” Geopolitical Futures , April 19, 2019. 
+61 “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor , September 16, 2020; Joseph 
+Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” The 
+Drive , January 14, 2019. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+17 
+
+ 
+ link to page 23 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ 2003 - Iraq. A Turkish parliamentary vote did not allow the United States to 
+
+open a second front from Turkey in the Iraq war. 
+
+Assessing costs and benefits to the United States of a U.S./NATO presence in Turkey, and of 
+potential changes in U.S./NATO posture, largely revolves around three questions: 
+
+ To what extent does the United States rely on direct use of Turkish territory or 
+
+airspace to secure and protect U.S. interests? 
+
+ How important is U.S./NATO support to Turkey’s external defense and internal 
+
+stability, and to what extent does that support serve U.S. interests? 
+
+ To what extent would other regional countries provide more or less stability and 
+
+protection for U.S./NATO military assets and personnel? 
+
+ Issues with Other U.S./NATO Allies 
+ Turkey’s regional ambitions have contributed to difficulties with some of its neighbors that are 
+(like Turkey) U.S. allies or partners. 
+
+ Eastern Mediterranean and Offshore Natural Gas 
+
+A dispute during the past decade between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus about Eastern 
+Mediterranean energy exploration arguably has brought Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Egypt closer 
+together.62 Turkey has objected to Greek Cypriot transactions in the offshore energy sector 
+because they have not involved the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus that controls 
+the northern one-third of the island. Turkey also has supported Turkish Cypriot claims to an 
+exclusive economic zone around part of the island. Cyprus, Greece, and Israel have discussed 
+possible cooperation to export gas finds to Europe via a pipeline bypassing Turkey.63 
+
+In late 2019, the Turkey-Cyprus dispute became intertwined with longtime Turkey-Greece 
+disagreements over continental shelves, territorial waters, airspace, and exclusive economic zones 
+when Turkey signed an agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) on 
+maritime boundaries (se e Figure 6 ) .64 The dispute has increased Turkey-Greece naval tensions, 
+especially after Greece and Egypt reached a maritime agreement in August 2020 rivaling the 2019 
+Turkey-Libya deal.65 Some observers assert that nationalistic and anti-Western sentiment within 
+elite Turkish national security circles may help drive Turkey’s recent naval buildup and 
+maximalist maritime claims, citing arguments within these circles that Turkey is entitled to a 
+“Blue Homeland” in surrounding waters.66 Turkish decisions may partly stem from concerns 
+about potential geostrategic encirclement and exclusion from potentially lucrative commercial 
+energy transactions. 
+
+ 
+62 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Turkey, Rivals Square Off Over Gas Finds,” Wall Street Journal , August 3, 2020. 
+63 “Battling over boundaries,” Economist , August 22, 2020. The feasibility of such a pipeline is unclear. Sue Surkes, 
+“Mistake to leave Turkey out of new East Med gas club – international expert,” Times of Israel , September 27, 2020. 
+64 For background, see “Turkish-Greek Aegean Dispute” at globalsecurity.org. 
+65 Michael Tanchum, “How Did the Eastern Mediterranean Become the Eye of a Geopolitical Storm?” 
+foreignpolicy.com, August 18, 2020. 
+
+66 Ryan Gingeras, “Blue Homeland: The Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy,” War on the Rocks , 
+June 2, 2020; “The Turkish Navy in an Era of Great Power Competition,” War on the Rocks, April 30, 2019. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+18 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 6. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: Main map created by The Economist , with slight modifications by CRS. 
+
+The disputes involving Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece have prompted U.S. and broader Western 
+criticism of Turkey and some EU sanctions against Turkish individuals aimed at discouraging 
+Turkish drilling near Cyprus.67 Diplomatic prospects to reduce the Turkey-Greece tensions, which 
+could undermine NATO unity, remain uncertain as Turkish ships with naval escorts have engaged 
+in exploration activities and Greece, Cyprus, France, and Italy have held military exercises aimed 
+at deterring these Turkish actions.68 
+
+ Middle East and Libyan Civil War 
+
+In the Middle East, Sunni Arab states that support traditional authoritarian governance models in 
+the region—notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt—regard Turkey 
+with suspicion, largely because of the Turkish government’s sympathies for Islamist political 
+groups and its close relationship with Qatar.69 Ties with Turkey bolster Qatar amid its isolation 
+
+ 
+67 Council of the European Union press release, “Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: EU 
+puts two persons on sanctions list,” February 27, 2020. 
+
+68 Steven Erlanger, “Tensions Over Drilling Between Turkey and Greece Divide E.U. Leaders,” New York Times, 
+August 28, 2020. 
+
+69 Flanagan, et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course ; Andrew England, et al., “UAE vs Turkey: the regional rivalries pitting 
+MBZ against Erdogan,” Financial Times , October 26, 2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+19 
+
+ 
+ link to page 39 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+from other Arab states, and Turkey has relied on Qatari resources to strengthen its troubled 
+financial position and support its regional military efforts.70 
+
+One aspect of Turkey’s rivalry with some Sunni Arab states is their support for opposing sides in 
+Libya’s civil war. Turkey and Qatar have supported forces aligned with the U.S.- and U.N. 
+Security Council-recognized GNA, while Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (along with Russia 
+and possibly France) have supported those of Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). 
+Turkey has sent drone aircraft, military personnel, and allied Syrian fighters to Libya, and 
+suffered some casualties in helping GNA-allied forces drive back an LNA offensive against 
+Tripoli in early 2020.71 GNA-allied forces face threats of heightened intervention from Egypt if 
+they advance east.72 Further signs of tension between Turkey and Sunni Arab states come from a 
+Turkish military presence at bases in Qatar and Somalia.73 
+
+Turkey’s involvement in Libya and maritime dealings with the GNA have increased the overlap 
+between Turkey’s disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and its rivalry with Sunni Arab states. 
+The U.S.-brokered agreement between Israel and the UAE in August 2020 to normalize their 
+relations could further solidify common cause among Eastern Mediterranean countries and Arab 
+Gulf states to counter Turkish regional influence.74 Some Saudi business leaders have called for a 
+boycott of Turkish goods, fueling speculation about possible efforts to encourage other Arab Gulf 
+and North African states to reduce regional trade with Turkey.75 Turkey maintains diplomatic ties 
+and significant levels of trade with Israel, but Turkey-Israel relations have deteriorated 
+significantly during Erdogan’s rule (see Appendix A ). 
+
+ The Syrian Conflict 
+ Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since 2011 has been complicated and costly, and has 
+severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.76 Turkey’s priorities in Syria have evolved during the course 
+of Syria’s civil war. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it has engaged in 
+a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (Asad’s supporters) on some matters 
+since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Similar interaction takes place 
+between Turkey and the United States given the U.S. military presence in key areas of northern 
+Syria east of the Euphrates River. 
+
+ 
+70 Ibrahim Sunnetci, “Turkey and Qatar: Foul-Weather Friends!” Defence Turkey , Vol. 14, Issue 98, 2020, pp. 34-47; 
+“Qatar boosts support for Turkey’s regional forays,” The Arab Weekly, July 5, 2020. 
+71 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, North and West 
+Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020-
+March 30, 2020 , July 16, 2020. 
+
+72 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11556, Libya and U.S. Policy , by Christopher M. Blanchard. Instability 
+within the GNA and how different Libyan political groups interact could also affect Turkey’s position. 
+
+73 Sunnetci, “Turkey and Qatar”; “Turkey to train 1/3 of entire Somali military, envoy says,” Daily Sabah , August 4, 
+2020. 
+
+74 Simon A. Waldman, “Erdogan’s Crumbling Superpower Dreams Make Turkey Even More Dangerous,” haaretz.com, 
+August 24, 2020. 
+
+75 “Saudi imports from Turkey rise in August despite informal boycott,” Reuters, October 25, 2020. Turkey-Saudi 
+relations also have been affected by the killing of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 
+October 2018. 
+
+76 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the 
+Making,” War on the Rocks , August 4, 2017. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+20 
+
+ 
+ link to page 50 link to page 26 link to page 26 link to page 26 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Countering the Syrian Kurdish YPG 
+
+In the ongoing conflict, Turkey seeks to manage and reduce threats to itself and to influence 
+political and security outcomes (se e Appendix C for a timeline of Turkey’s involvement). 
+Turkish-led forces have occupied and administered parts of northern Syria since 2016 (see Figure 
+7 ) . Turkey’s chief objective has been to thwart the PKK-linked Syrian Kurdish People’s 
+Protection Units (YPG) from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with 
+Turkey. Turkish-led military operations to that end included Operation Euphrates Shield (August 
+2016-March 2017) against an Islamic State (IS)-controlled area in northern Syria, and Operation 
+Olive Branch in early 2018 directly against the Kurdish enclave of Afrin. 
+
+Turkey has considered the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), 
+to be a top threat to Turkish security because of Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains 
+emboldened the PKK in Turkey.77 The YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic 
+Forces (SDF)—an umbrella group including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became 
+the main U.S. ground force partner against the Islamic State in 2015. Shortly after the YPG/PYD 
+and SDF began achieving military and political success, Turkey-PKK peace talks broke down, 
+tensions increased, and occasional violence resumed within Turkey. 
+
+In October 2019, Turkey’s military attacked some SDF-controlled areas in northeastern Syria 
+after President Trump ordered a pullback of U.S. Special Forces following a call with President 
+Erdogan.78 The declared aims of what Turkey called Operation Peace Spring (OPS) were to target 
+“terrorists”—both the YPG and the Islamic State—and create a “safe zone” for the possible return 
+of some of the approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey.79 The ground component of 
+the Turkish operation—as during previous Turkish operations in Syria—was carried out to a 
+major extent by Syrian militia forces comprised largely of Sunni Arab opponents of the Syrian 
+government. 
+
+Turkey’s capture of territory from the SDF during OPS separated the two most significant 
+Kurdish-majority enclaves in northern Syria, complicating Syrian Kurdish aspirations for 
+autonomy. Turkey then reached agreements with the United States and Russia that ended the 
+fighting, created a buffer zone between Turkey and the YPG, and allowed Turkey to directly 
+monitor some areas over the border (se e Figure 7 ). 80 
+
+ 
+77 See, e.g., Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,” 
+ Washington Institute for Near East Policy , August 7, 2019. 
+
+78 In the previous months, joint U.S.-Turkey ground patrols had monitored the border area and some YPG fortifications 
+were dismantled, but Turkish leaders repeatedly criticized the United States for not doing enough to secure the removal 
+of the YPG from the border area. Ryan Browne et al., “US and Turkish troops conduct first joint ground patrol of 
+Syrian ‘safe zone,’” CNN , September 8, 2019. 
+79 Ibrahim Kalin, Twitter post, 4:32 AM, October 7, 2019. 
+80 White House, “The United States and Turkey Agree to Ceasefire in Northeast Syria,” October 17, 2019; Department 
+of State, “Special Representative for Syria Engagement James F. Jeffrey Remarks to the Traveling Press,” October 17, 
+2019; White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Situation in Northern Syria,” October 23, 2019; President of 
+Russia, Memorandum of Understanding Between Turkey and the Russian Federation , October 22, 2019. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+21 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 7. Syria-Turkey Border 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS, using area of influence data from IHS Jane’s Conflict Monitor. All areas of influence approximate 
+and subject to change. Other sources include U.N. OCHA, Esri, and social media reports. 
+ Note: This map does not depict all U.S. bases in Syria. 
+
+Ultimate Turkish and YPG objectives regarding the northern Syrian areas in question remain 
+unclear. U.S. officials have continued partnering with SDF forces against the Islamic State in 
+some areas of Syria south of the zones from which YPG personnel were cleared,81 while the SDF 
+has made some arrangements for its own protection by Syrian government forces. 
+
+ 
+81 “US to deploy more troops to eastern Syria to secure oilfields,” Al Jazeera , October 25, 2019. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+22 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Syrian Refugees in Turkey 
+
+In addition to its ongoing military activities in Syria, Turkey hosts about 3.6 mil ion registered Syrian refugees—
+more than any other country. Turkey has largely closed its border to additional refugee influxes since 2016, 
+though it also assists thousands of displaced Syrians in makeshift camps near the border.82 President Erdogan 
+claimed in 2019 that Turkey had spent $40 bil ion on refugee assistance,83 though one source estimated in 
+November 2019 that the amount could be closer to $24 bil ion.84 Turkey closed several refugee camps in 2019 
+and encouraged Syrians in those camps to integrate into Turkish society while resolution of their long-term status 
+is pending. 
+Economic competition—particularly at a time of general economic uncertainty in Turkey—may fuel some tensions 
+between refugees and Turkish citizens.85 Surveys suggest that a majority of Turks have concerns about refugees’ 
+impact on Turkey’s society and economy.86 While a July 2019 study indicated that 84% of refugee households had 
+at least one member working, most Syrians’ jobs are in the informal sector, where wages are below the legal 
+minimum and workers can face exploitation and unsafe working conditions.87 The United Nations estimates that 
+64% of Syrian refugees in Turkish cities (where the vast majority reside) live below the poverty line. 
+The return of refugees to Syria is a sensitive issue. Some reports claim that, in light of domestic pressure,88 
+Turkey may have forcibly returned thousands of Syrian refugees to Syria,89 though Turkish officials deny these 
+claims.90 Erdogan presented a plan to U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in November 2019 for facilitating 
+the return of one mil ion refugees to areas of Syria that Turkey captured during OPS, but the plan does not 
+appear to have elicited serious consideration to date. 
+
+ Turkish-Occupied Areas and Idlib 
+
+In areas of northern Syria that Turkey has occupied since 2016, Turkey has set up local councils, 
+though questions persist about future governance and Turkey’s overarching role. The local 
+councils and associated security forces reportedly provide public services in these areas with 
+funding, oversight, and training from Turkish officials. One Turkish analyst has observed that the 
+migration of thousands of Sunni Arabs to these areas has significantly changed their demography, 
+while Syrian Kurds maintain self-rule in some areas, even though they are less contiguous with 
+each other and the Turkish border.91 The same analyst has written that Turkish officials debate 
+how permanent their control in northern Syria should be, surmising that Erdogan foresees a long-
+term Turkish presence rather than a transition to Syrian government rule.92 
+
+ 
+82 Kemal Kirisci and Basak Yavcan, “As Covid-19 worsens precarity for refugees, Turkey and the EU must work 
+together,” Brookings Institution, June 11, 2020. 
+83 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “Erdogan: Turkey is Stepping Up Where Others Fail to Act,” Wall Street Journal , October 
+14, 2019. 
+
+84 Mustafa Sonmez, “Mystery surrounds Turkey’s $40 billion refugee bill,” Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse , November 2, 
+2019. 
+
+85 Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Refugee Dilemma,” Center for American Progress, March 13, 2019; Sarah Dadouch, 
+“‘They want to kill you’: Anger at Syrians erupts in Istanbul,” Reuters , July 9, 2019. 
+86 Suat Kiniklioglu, “Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Changing Attitudes and Fortunes,” German Institute for International 
+and Security Affairs, February 2020. 
+
+87 Dogus Simsek, “Integration for whom?” Heinrich Boll Stiftung, October 1, 2019; “Refugees in Turkey: Livelihoods 
+Survey Findings 2019,” Turkish Red Crescent and World Food Programme, July 11, 2019. 
+88 Pinar Tremblay, “Are Syrians in Turkey no longer Erdogan’s ‘brothers’?” Al-Monitor, July 30, 2019. 
+89 Human Rights Watch, “Turkey: Syrians Being Deported to Danger,” October 24, 2019; Amnesty International, Sent 
+to a War Zone: Turkey’s Illegal Deportations of Syrian Refugees , October 2019. 
+90 Fahrettin Altun, “Turkey Is Helping, Not Deporting, Syrian Refugees,” foreignpolicy.com, August 23, 2019. 
+91 Asli Aydintasbas, “A new Gaza: Turkey’s border policy in northern Syria,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 
+May 28, 2020. 
+
+92 Ibid. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+23 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+Turkey has increasingly focused on Syria’s northern province of Idlib. The majority of the armed 
+opposition to the Asad government—including elements aligned with Al Qaeda—is based there, 
+along with millions of civilians (including many internally displaced persons from other areas of 
+the country). Idlib is one of the specific “de-escalation zones” identified in a September 2017 
+agreement as part of the Astana Process involving Turkey, Russia, and Iran. The Syrian 
+government has since seized the other zones. Turkey deployed troops to Idlib to protect it from 
+government forces and prevent further refugee flows into Turkey. 
+
+The Turkish military remains in a standoff with Russia and the Syrian government over the future 
+of Idlib. A limited outbreak of conflict in early 2020 led to several Turkish casualties (including 
+dozens reportedly killed in Russian air operations), displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrian 
+civilians, and opened highway access for Syrian forces through the province to other parts of the 
+country. After the fighting, the United States announced that it would provide ammunition for the 
+Turkish military, as well as $108 million in humanitarian assistance for U.N. programs aiding 
+Syrian civilians.93 Russian willingness to back Syrian operations in Idlib perhaps stems in part 
+from Turkey’s unwillingness or inability to enforce a 2018 Turkey-Russia agreement by removing 
+heavy weapons and “radical terrorist groups” from the province.94 
+
+ Role in Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute: Armenia and Azerbaijan 
+ Turkey plays a significant role in the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of 
+Nagorno-Karabakh, due largely to Turkey’s close ethnic and linguistic ties with Azerbaijan and 
+its troubled history with the Armenian people. Nagorno-Karabakh is within Azerbaijan’s borders 
+but has been controlled by its ethnic Armenian majority—with Armenian assistance—since the 
+end of an initial conflict over the area in 1994 after the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
+
+As Azerbaijan’s energy-rich economy allowed it to spend more on its military over the past 
+decade, its capabilities relative to Armenian rivals improved. Key Azeri acquisitions reportedly 
+have included Turkish-origin drones, as well as kamikaze drones and ballistic missiles from 
+Israel.95 Azeri weapons purchases from Turkey surged over the first nine months of 2020, totaling 
+around $123 million, compared with $21 million over the same time period in 2019.96 After some 
+Armenia-Azerbaijan border clashes in July 2020, Turkey held joint exercises with Azerbaijan on 
+its territory. According to some reports, Turkey may have left some key equipment and personnel 
+in Azerbaijan.97 
+
+The frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh resumed in September 2020, with Azeri units 
+reportedly using Israeli Harop and Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones in its attacks on ethnic 
+Armenian positions, including armored vehicles and air defense systems. Azeri President Ilham 
+Aliyev has stated that some Turkish F-16s are based in Azerbaijan and available for use if the 
+conflict escalates.98 Additionally, reports suggest that Turkey has recruited and paid Syrian 
+
+ 
+93 Tuvan Gumrukcu, “U.S. willing to give Turkey ammunition for Syria’s Idlib,” Reuters, March 3, 2020; Jared Malsin, 
+“U.S. Offers Aid, not Missiles, as Turkey Pushes Back Syrian Forces,” wsj.com, March 3, 2020. 
+94 Text of agreement available at https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on-
+idlib-revealed-1.771953. 
+
+95 Anton Troianovski, “Resignation and Despair Stoke Armenian Conflict,” New York Times , October 19, 2020. 
+96 Ece Toksabay, “Turkish arms sales to Azerbaijan surged before Nagorno-Karabakh fighting,” Reuters , October 14, 
+2020. 
+
+97 Paul Antonopoulos, “Hundreds of Turkish military personnel are orchestrating Azerbaijan’s invasion of Artsakh: 
+reports,” Greek City Times, October 18, 2020. 
+
+98 “Aliyev threatens to use Turkish F-16s against possible external aggression,” Turkish Minute , October 26, 2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+24 
+
+ 
+ link to page 30 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+mercenaries to assist Azerbaijan’s military, as it has previously done in Libya.99 One Turkish 
+journalist has observed that placing Sunni Arab Syrians in predominantly Shia Azerbaijan could 
+fan sectarian tensions and also raise concerns in Russia about the potential for Islamist political 
+unrest among its own Muslim population in the Caucasus.100 In October, Secretary of State 
+Pompeo criticized Turkey for increasing the risk in the conflict by lending its firepower to 
+Azerbaijan, and as of November 6, 97 Representatives were co-sponsoring an introduced 
+nonbinding resolution (H.Res. 1165) that would condemn Azerbaijan’s military operations and 
+denounce Turkey’s involvement.101 
+
+President Erdogan has supported Azeri demands that Armenian forces withdraw from Nagorno-
+Karabakh. In doing, he has opposed some calls from the Minsk Group (chaired by the United 
+States, Russia, and France) for a cease-fire.102 
+
+The mutual involvement of Turkey and Russia in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis could give one or 
+both of them leverage over the other on their other issues of mutual interest, such as Syria, Libya, 
+arms sales, and energy. Russia maintains close political and security ties with both Armenia and 
+Azerbaijan. Russia’s treaty obligation to defend Armenia from attack does not appear to apply to 
+Nagorno-Karabakh because it is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.103 
+
+ Turkish Defense Procurement 
+
+ Background 
+
+Turkish goals to become more self-sufficient on national security matters and increase Turkey’s 
+arms exports affect the country’s procurement decisions. After the 1975-1978 U.S. arms embargo 
+over Cyprus significantly hampered Turkish arms acquisitions, Turkey sought to decrease 
+dependence on foreign sources by building up its domestic defense industry (see Figure 8 ). 104 
+Over time, Turkish companies have supplied an increased percentage of Turkey’s defense needs, 
+on equipment ranging from armored personnel carriers and naval vessels to drone aircraft. For 
+key items that Turkey cannot produce itself, its leaders generally seek deals with foreign suppliers 
+that allow for greater co-production and technology sharing.105 
+
+ 
+99 Raja Abdulrahim, “Hundreds of Syrian Rebels Join Armenia-Azerbaijan Fight,” Wall Street Journal, October 14, 
+2020. 
+
+100 Fehim Tastekin, “Syrian fighters add snarls to tangled south Caucasus,” Al-Monitor , October 2, 2020. 
+101 “Pompeo Criticizes Turkey's Involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Reuters, October 16, 2020. 
+102 The Minsk Group formed in 1992 to lead the efforts of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe in 
+mediating a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
+
+103 Dmitri Churciu, “Russia says defense pact does not apply to Karabakh,” Anadolu Agency , October 7, 2020. 
+104 Omar Lamrani, “Facing Sanctions, Turkey’s Defense Industry Goes to Plan B,” Stratfor , November 7, 2019. 
+105 “Turkey - Market Report,” Jane’s Navigating the Emerging Markets , March 5, 2020. According to one source, since 
+Erdogan became prime minister in 2003, Turkey went from providing around 20% of its own defense industry needs to 
+around 65%. Interview with Bulent Aliriza of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Aaron Mehta, “4 
+questions on the risks facing Turkey’s defense industry,” Defense News , April 22, 2019. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+25 
+
+ 
+ link to page 52 
+
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 8. Arms Imports as a Share of Turkish Military Spending 
+
+ 
+
+ Sources: Stratfor, based on information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms 
+Traders Database. 
+
+ U.S. Arms Sales and Aid 
+
+Historically, Turkey was one of the largest recipients of U.S. arms, owing to its status as a NATO 
+ally, its large military, and its strategic position. Since 1948, the United States has provided 
+Turkey with approximately $13.8 billion in overall military assistance (nearly $8.2 billion in 
+grants and $5.6 billion in loans). 
+
+However, U.S. arms sales to Turkey have declined over time given Turkey’s efforts mentioned 
+above to become more self-reliant, as well as recent bilateral tensions. Current annual military 
+assistance is limited to approximately $2 million in International Military Education and Training 
+(IMET). See Appendix D for information on recent arms sales or potential sales. 
+
+An August 2020 article reported that some Members of congressional committees have placed 
+informal holds on major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey over the past two years in 
+connection with the Turkey-Russia S-400 transaction discussed below. Such a disruption has not 
+occurred since the 1975-1978 embargo over Cyprus.106 Major sales (valued at $25 million or 
+
+ 
+106 Valerie Insinna, et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense 
+News , August 12, 2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+26 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+more) supposedly on hold include structural upgrades for Turkey’s F-16 aircraft and export 
+licenses for engines involved in a Turkish sale of attack helicopters to Pakistan. Sales already 
+underway or for smaller items and services—such as spare parts, ammunition, and maintenance 
+packages for older equipment—are not subject to these holds. 
+
+ Key Weapons Systems and Turkey’s Relationships: S-400, F-35, Patriot 
+
+How Turkey procures key weapons systems affects its partnerships with major powers. For 
+decades, Turkey has relied on important U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, 
+missiles, and other munitions to maintain military strength.107 Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-
+400 surface-to-air defense system and its exploration of possibly acquiring Russian Sukhoi fighter 
+aircraft may raise the question: If Turkey transitions to major Russian weapons platforms with 
+multi-decade lifespans, how can it stay closely integrated with NATO on defense matters? 
+
+A number of factors may have influenced Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400 instead of the 
+U.S.-origin Patriot system. One is Turkey’s apparent desire to diversify its foreign arms 
+sources.108 Another is Erdogan’s possible interest in defending against U.S.-origin aircraft such as 
+those used by Turkish military personnel in the 2016 coup attempt.109 
+
+Turkey’s general interest (discussed above) in procurement deals that feature technology sharing 
+and co-production also may have affected its S-400 decision. Lack of agreement between the 
+United States and Turkey on technology sharing regarding the Patriot system over a number of 
+years possibly contributed to Turkey’s interest in considering other options.110 While Turkey’s S-
+400 purchase reportedly does not feature technology sharing,111 Turkish officials express hope 
+that a future deal with Russia involving technology sharing and co-production might be possible 
+to address Turkey’s longer-term air defense needs, with another potential option being Turkish 
+co-development of a system with European partners.112 
+
+In response to the beginning of S-400 deliveries to Turkey, the Trump Administration announced 
+in July 2019 that it was removing Turkey from participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
+program. In explaining the U.S. decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 program, Under 
+Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord said, “Turkey cannot field a 
+Russian intelligence collection platform [within the S-400 system] in proximity to where the F-35 
+program makes, repairs and houses the F-35. Much of the F-35’s strength lies in its stealth 
+capabilities, so the ability to detect those capabilities would jeopardize the long-term security of 
+the F-35 program.”113 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization 
+
+ 
+107 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany 
+(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype). 
+
+108 “Turkey is buying Russian missiles to diversify supply,” Oxford Analytica , January 26, 2018. 
+109 Nicholas Danforth, “Frustration, Fear, and the Fate of U.S.-Turkish Relations,” German Marshall Fund of the 
+United States , July 19, 2019; Ali Demirdas, “S-400 and More: Why Does Turkey Want Russian Military Technology 
+So Badly?” nationalinterest.org, July 14, 2019. 
+
+110 Flanagan, et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course . 
+111 Aaron Stein, “Putin’s Victory: Why Turkey and America Made Each Other Weaker,” Foreign Policy Research 
+Institute , July 29, 2019. 
+
+112 Burak Ege Bekdil, “West’s reluctance to share tech pushes Turkey further into Russian orbit,” Defense News , 
+January 10, 2020. 
+
+113 Department of Defense transcript, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and 
+Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey 
+Accepting Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air And Missile Defense System, July 17, 2019. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+27 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+Act (P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to transfer F-35s to Turkey unless the Secretaries 
+of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400. 
+
+Turkey had planned to purchase at least 100 U.S.-origin F-35s and was one of eight original 
+consortium partners in the development and industrial production of the aircraft.114 According to 
+U.S. officials, most of the supply chain handled by Turkish companies was due to move 
+elsewhere by March 2020, with a few contracts in Turkey continuing until completion.115 The cost 
+of shifting the supply chain, beyond some production delays,116 was estimated in July 2019 to be 
+between $500 million and $600 million.117 
+
+Into 2020, Turkey continued discussions with the Trump Administration about having the United 
+States deploy or sell Patriot surface-to-air defense systems to Turkey if Turkey returned the S-400 
+to Russia or limited its use,118 but the discussions have stalemated.119 Since 2013, various NATO 
+countries have stationed air defense batteries in southern Turkey as a means of assisting Turkey 
+during Syria’s civil war. The United States removed its contribution of Patriot batteries from 
+Turkey in 2015, explaining the action in terms of its global missile defense priorities while 
+contributing to doubts among Turkish leaders about the U.S. commitment to their security.120 As 
+of September 2020, Spain operates a Patriot system in the Turkish city of Adana under NATO 
+auspices. 
+
+ Drones: Domestic Production, U.S. and Western Components, and Exports 
+
+Over the past decade, Turkey has built up a formidable arsenal of unmanned aerial vehicles 
+(UAVs), or drone aircraft, to carry out armed attacks or perform target acquisition. Their primary 
+purpose has been to counter the PKK or PKK-linked militias in southeastern Turkey, Iraq, and 
+Syria. In 2020 Turkey and its allies also have reportedly used armed drones against Syrian 
+government forces in Idlib, the LNA in Libya, and ethnic Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
+Open source accounts report that the drones have been effective in targeting adversaries, while 
+also raising concerns about the legality of their use in these settings and the danger they pose to 
+civilians. Since 2018, some open sources have claimed that Turkish drones have made 
+reconnaissance flights over Greek islands, Cyprus, and Eastern Mediterranean waters.121 
+
+ 
+114 A 2007 memorandum of understanding among the consortium participants is available at https://www.state.gov/
+documents/organization/102378.pdf, and an earlier 2002 U.S.-Turkey agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/
+documents/organization/196467.pdf. For information on the consortium and its members, see CRS Report RL30563, F-
+35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program , by Jeremiah Gertler. 
+
+115 Marcus Weisgerber, “Turkey Will Make F-35 Parts Throughout 2020, Far Longer Than Anticipated,” Defense One , 
+January 14, 2020. 
+
+116 Paul McLeary, “F-35 Production Hurt If Turkey Kicked Out of Program: Vice Adm. Winter,” Breaking Defense , 
+April 4, 2019. 
+
+117 Department of Defense transcript. It is unclear whether the United States or the F-35 consortium could be liable for 
+financial penalties beyond refunding Turkey’s initial investment in the program, an estimated $1.5 billion. Michael R. 
+Gordon, et al., “U.S. to Withhold Order of F-35s from Turkey,” Wall Street Journal , July 17, 2019. 
+118 Tuvan Gumrukcu and Orhan Coskun, “Turkey says U.S. offering Patriot missiles if S-400 not operated,” Reuters , 
+March 10, 2020. 
+
+119 Aaron Stein, “Finding Off Ramps to the Ongoing S-400 Crisis with Turkey,” Foreign Policy Research Institute , 
+July 1, 2020. 
+
+120 Jim Townsend and Rachel Ellehuus, “The Tale of Turkey and the Patriots,” War on the Rocks , July 22, 2019; 
+Ibrahim Kalin, “No, Turkey Has Not Abandoned the West,” Bloomberg , July 22, 2019. 
+121 Dan Gettinger, “Turkey’s military drones: an export product that’s disrupting NATO,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
+Scientists , December 6, 2019. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+28 
+
+ 
+ link to page 33 
+
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+Turkey has focused on producing drones domestically. This is partly due to its failure in the early 
+2010s to acquire U.S.-made armed MQ-9 Reapers because of reported congressional 
+opposition,122 as well as to concerns that Israel may have deliberately delivered underperforming 
+versions of its Heron reconnaissance drones to Turkey in 2010.123 Kale Group and Baykar 
+Technologies have produced the Bayraktar TB2 (se e Figure 9 ) , and Turkish Aerospace Industries 
+(TAI) has produced the Anka-S. Turkey anticipates adding both larger (the Aksungar and 
+Bayraktar Akinci) and smaller drones (the Kargu-2 and Alpagu) to its arsenal over the next 
+decade.124 Selcuk Bayraktar, a son-in-law of President Erdogan, has played a key role in 
+engineering the Bayraktar drones that dominate Turkey’s fleet.125 
+
+ Figure 9. Bayraktar TB2 Drone 
+
+ 
+
+While Turkish companies have assembled the drones, they apparently rely on Western countries 
+for some key components, including engines, optical sensors, and camera systems.126 After a 
+
+ 
+122 Ibid. 
+123 Itamar Eichner, “Turkey accuses Israel of selling them defective drones,” Ynetnews , June 24, 2018. 
+124 Paul Iddon, “Turkey’s Drones Are Coming in All Sizes These Days,” forbes.com, October 4, 2020. 
+125 Umar Farooq, “The Second Drone Age: How Turkey Defied the U.S. and Became a Killer Drone Power,” The 
+Intercept , May 14, 2019. 
+
+126 “Canadian decision to halt tech exports exposes key weakness in Turkish drone industry,” Turkish Minute , October 
+17, 2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+29 
+
+ 
+ link to page 35 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+Canadian-produced camera system was reportedly found in a Bayraktar TB2 downed in Nagorno-
+Karabakh in October 2020, Canada halted export permits for parts used in Turkish drones 
+pending an investigation.127 Also in October, a Canadian company whose Austrian subsidiary 
+produces engines for Bayraktar TB2s announced that it would suspend engine deliveries to 
+“countries with unclear usage.”128 Additionally, Armenian sources have raised concerns about the 
+possible use of some U.S.-origin components in Bayraktar TB2s that could affect their future 
+availability.129 
+
+It is unclear if Turkey can produce replacements for Western-origin drone components. Since 
+2018, TAI has reportedly been integrating domestically produced engines into its drones, 
+including the Anka-S.130 Following the Canadian decision on export permits, the head of Turkey’s 
+government defense procurement agency said that Turkey is beginning mass production of a 
+domestic camera system for its drones.131 
+
+Turkey’s drones’ apparent effectiveness—such as in destroying Russian-origin air defense 
+systems132—may have boosted global demand for Turkish defense exports (see Figure 10 ) . In 
+addition to Azerbaijan, Qatar and Ukraine have reportedly purchased Bayraktar TB2s. Ukraine 
+apparently seeks to make additional purchases, which could lead to some form of co-
+production.133 Serbia, Indonesia, and Tunisia also have supposedly expressed interest in Turkish 
+drones. It is unclear whether a more combative Turkish foreign policy approach that helps market 
+drones to other countries is a net plus or minus for Turkey’s fragile economy, in light of the 
+potential for Turkey’s actions to isolate it from major powers that represent key sources of trade 
+and investment.134 
+
+ 
+127 Levon Sevunts, “Armenia claims it found Canadian tech on downed Turkish drone,” Radio Canada International , 
+October 20, 2020. 
+
+128 Levon Sevunts, “Bombardier Recreational Products suspends delivery of aircraft engines used on military drones,” 
+ Radio Canada International , October 25, 2020. 
+
+129 “How much does the production of Turkish ‘local’ Bayraktar TB2 ATS depend on foreign supplies?” Ermeni Haber 
+Ajansi (translated from Armenian), October 26, 2020. 
+
+130 Beth Davidson, “IDEF’19: Anka Aksungur to Fly with Turkish Engine by Year-end,” AIN Online , May 1, 2019. 
+131 Gokhan Ergocun, “‘Turkish defense industry moving on despite embargoes,’” Anadolu Agency , October 6, 2020. 
+132 Seth Frantzman, “Russian air defense systems outmatched by Turkish drones in Syria and Libya,” Long War 
+Journal (Foundation for Defense of Democracies), June 10, 2020. 
+
+133 “Ukraine considers buying 48 Bayraktar TB2 drones from Turkey,” Daily Sabah , October 6, 2020. 
+134 See, e.g., Metin Gurcan, “Turkey's foreign policy becoming alarmingly militarized,” Al-Monitor, September 22, 
+2020; Sinan Ulgen, “A Weak Economy Won’t Stop Turkey’s Activist Foreign Policy,” foreignpolicy.com, October 6, 
+2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+30 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 10. Turkish Military Export Statistics 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Scrutiny: U.S. Responses and 
+Options 
+ In a context where many Members of Congress are increasingly critical of Turkey’s domestic and 
+foreign policy actions, as reflected in legislative proposals and oversight, some U.S. concerns 
+have led to sanctions and other measures against Turkey, and to efforts to empower Turkey’s 
+rivals. These measures or others in the future could, in turn, affect U.S.-Turkey relations more 
+broadly. 
+
+ Selected Events Affecting U.S.-Turkey Tensions 
+
+July 2016 
+
+Failed coup attempt in Turkey. President Erdogan and many Turks blame the Fethul ah 
+Gulen movement for the coup and call for Gulen’s extradition from the United States 
+(which has not happened to date). Several domestic and international observers, 
+including in the United States, criticize Turkey’s post-coup arrests and purge of the 
+public sector. 
+
+May 2017 
+
+During President Erdogan’s visit to Washington, DC, several of his security guards 
+reportedly assault ethnic Kurdish protestors gathered near the Turkish ambassador’s 
+residence in Sheridan Circle, drawing sharp criticism from some Members of 
+Congress. 
+
+August 2018 
+
+The United States and Turkey levy reciprocal sanctions against one another over 
+disagreements relating to Turkey’s imprisonment of American pastor Andrew 
+Brunson. Brunson is released in October 2018, but three Turkish nationals employed 
+by U.S. consulates remain under various forms of legal confinement or restraint. 
+
+July 2019 
+
+Turkey begins receiving S-400 system components from Russia; Department of 
+Defense announces Turkey’s removal from F-35 program. 
+
+October 2019 
+
+Turkey and allied Syrian militias seize territory in northeastern Syria and attack PKK-
+linked Syrian Kurdish forces that partner with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition, 
+drawing intense criticism from many Members of Congress. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+31 
+
+ 
+ link to page 30 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Department of Justice charges Turkey’s largely state-owned Halkbank for various 
+offenses related to a supposed multi-bil ion dol ar scheme to evade U.S. sanctions on 
+Iran. Criminal penalties could affect Turkey’s economy; the case also could implicate 
+Erdogan directly, and it has some connection to his domestic struggles against the 
+Gulen movement.135 
+
+Summer 2020 
+
+Turkey-Greece tensions intensify in the Eastern Mediterranean over energy, maritime, 
+and airspace disputes, fueling U.S. and European criticism of Turkey. 
+
+Fall 2020 
+
+Turkey provides political and material support for Azerbaijan in its resumption of 
+conflict with ethnic Armenians over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, further 
+increasing U.S. criticism of Turkey. 
+
+Sanctions’ effect on Turkish behavior may be difficult to gauge. One financial strategist said in 
+October 2019 that measures constraining Turkish banks from transacting in dollars could 
+particularly affect Turkey’s financial system.136 While negative effects on Turkey’s economy 
+could lead to domestic pressure to change Turkish policies,137 they also could increase popular 
+support for the government. While Turkey has long-standing, deeply rooted ties with the West, 
+some sanctions could potentially create incentives for Turkey to increase trade, investment, and 
+arms dealings with non-Western actors.138 President Erdogan has stated that U.S. actions against 
+Turkey could lead to the ejection of U.S. military personnel and assets from Turkey.139 
+
+Relevant U.S. measures affecting or potentially affecting Turkey include: 
+
+ Congressional action on arms sales. Beyond the informal holds mentioned 
+
+above (see “U.S. Arms Sales and Aid”) , Congress could respond to Turkish 
+policies of concern—in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, Nagorno-Karabakh, or 
+elsewhere—by taking action on specific arms sales or on sales generally, 
+including U.S.-origin components used in domestically produced systems. In 
+October 2020, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Bob 
+Menendez introduced S.Res. 755, a resolution entitled to expedited consideration 
+in the Senate (under Section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; 22 
+USC 2304(c)) that could require a Department of State report within 30 days on 
+possible Turkish human rights abuses both domestically and in the South 
+Caucasus, Syria, Libya, and Iraq; and lead to expedited action on U.S. arms sales 
+and assistance to Turkey. 
+
+ CAATSA sanctions. The S-400 acquisition also could trigger the imposition of 
+
+U.S. sanctions under CRIEEA (Title II of the Countering America’s Adversaries 
+
+ 
+135 According to one media source, the charges against Halkbank might have come sooner and also been brought 
+against some prominent individuals involved with the transactions in question were it not for direct efforts by President 
+Erdogan to seek Trump Administration intervention with the prosecutor’s office, given considerations that might range 
+from foreign policy sensitivities to personal affinities between Presidents Trump and Erdogan. Eric Lipton and 
+Benjamin Weiser, “Trump Ties to Erdogan Snarled U.S. Inquiry into Turkish Bank,” New York Times, October 30, 
+2020. 
+
+136 Sebastian Galy, cited in Jack Ewing, “Tariffs Won’t Stop Turkey’s Invasion of Syria, Analysts Warn,” New York 
+Times , October 15, 2019. 
+
+137 Ewing, “Tariffs Won’t Stop Turkey’s Invasion of Syria, Analysts Warn.” 
+138 Remarks by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Congressional Record vol. 165, no. 173, Senate - October 
+31, 2019, p. S6310 (Turkey and Syria); Paul McLeary, “Tough Sanctions May Drive Turkey into Russia’s Arms,” 
+ Breaking Defense , October 10, 2019; Burak Ege Bekdil and Matthew Bodner, “No obliteration: Western arms embargo 
+has little impact on Turkey as it looks east,” Defense News , October 24, 2019. 
+
+139 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Pentagon chief questions Turkey’s NATO loyalty after base threat,” Bloomberg , December 17, 
+2019. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+32 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA; P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C. 9525). Under 
+Section 231 of CAATSA, the President is required to impose sanctions on any 
+party that he determines has knowingly engaged in “a significant transaction with 
+a person that is part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence 
+sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation.” Section 1292 of the 
+FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act passed by the House in July 2020 
+(H.R. 6395) has a provision that would require the Administration to impose 
+CAATSA sanctions on Turkey. The Administration imposed CAATSA sanctions 
+against China in September 2018, roughly eight months after it took possession 
+of Russian S-400-related components and fighter aircraft.140 President Trump has 
+appeared to favor an “interim solution” allowing Turkey to avoid sanctions if it 
+does not operate the S-400. Reportedly, Turkey has delayed plans to put the 
+system into use, but has tested it multiple times since 2019.141 
+
+ Sanctions related to Syria. In October 2019, the Trump Administration imposed 
+
+sanctions on some Turkish cabinet ministries and ministers in response to 
+Turkey’s armed incursion against Kurdish-led forces in Syria, but lifted them 
+later that same month.142 The sanctions came pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 
+13984, which President Trump signed on October 14, 2019, and which remains 
+in effect.143 That same month, Congress considered a number of sanctions bills in 
+response to Turkey’s incursion into Syria, with the House passing the Protect 
+Against Conflict by Turkey Act (H.R. 4695). 
+
+ End of arms embargo against Cyprus. Section 1250A of the FY2020 National 
+
+Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92), enacted in December 2019, lifted a 32-
+year-old embargo on U.S. arms sales to the Republic of Cyprus, amid the Turkey-
+Greece-Cyprus tensions over Eastern Mediterranean energy exploration and 
+maritime boundary issues described above. In July 2020, the U.S. embassy in 
+Cyprus announced that the United States would begin providing some 
+International Military Education and Training to Cyprus in FY2021.144 In 
+September, Secretary of State Pompeo waived restrictions on the U.S. sale of 
+non-lethal defense articles and services to Cyprus for FY2021, attracting 
+criticism from Turkish officials. 
+
+ Reduced U.S.-Turkey cooperation against the PKK. One media report citing 
+
+U.S. and Turkish officials stated that in response to Turkey’s October 2019 
+military operations against the YPG, the U.S. military stopped drone flights that 
+
+ 
+140 Department of State, “CAATSA Section 231: Addition of 33 Entities and Individuals to the List of Specified 
+Persons and Imposition of Sanctions on the Equipment Development Department,” September 20, 2018. 
+
+141 Stein, “Finding Off Ramps”; Joyce Karam, “Turkey tests S-400 Russian missile system with US jets, defying 
+Washington,” The National , November 25, 2019; “US Condemns Turkey for Testing Russian-Made S-400 Missile,” 
+ Voice of America, October 17, 2020. 
+
+142 Department of the Treasury, Executive Order on Syria-related Sanctions; Syria-related Designations; Issuance of 
+Syria-related General Licenses , October 14, 2019; Department of the Treasury, Syria-related Designations Removals , 
+October 23, 2019. 
+
+143 White House, “Executive Order on Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the 
+Situation in Syria,” 84 Federal Register 55851-55855, October 14, 2019. 
+
+144 U.S. Embassy in Cyprus, “U.S. International Military Education and Training for the Republic of Cyprus,” July 8, 
+2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+33 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+had been sharing intelligence to help Turkey target PKK locations in northern 
+Iraq for more than a decade.145 
+
+ Outlook 
+ The future of U.S.-Turkey relations could depend on a number of factors, including: 
+
+ whether Turkey makes its Russian S-400 system fully operational and considers 
+
+additional Russian arms purchases; 
+
+ how various regional crises (Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Mediterranean 
+
+disputes with Greece and Cyprus) unfold and influence Turkey’s relationships with key 
+actors (including the United States, Russia, China, the European Union, Israel, Iran, and 
+Sunni Arab states); 
+
+ whether Turkey can project power and create its own sphere of influence using military 
+
+and economic cooperation (including defense exports); and 
+
+ whether President Erdogan is able to maintain broad control over the country given its 
+
+economic problems and human rights concerns. 
+
+Administration and congressional actions regarding Turkey can have implications for bilateral 
+ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s strategic orientation and financial 
+well-being. For example, U.S. actions in response to Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 could 
+affect U.S. relations with respect to other key partners who have purchased or may purchase 
+advanced weapons from Russia—including India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. These actions 
+could include placing conditions on arms sales, whether and how to impose CAATSA sanctions, 
+assessing U.S./NATO basing options, and balancing relations with Turkey and its regional rivals. 
+
+How closely to engage Erdogan’s government could depend on U.S. perceptions of his popular 
+legitimacy, likely staying power, and the extent to which a successor might change his policies in 
+light of geopolitical, historical, and economic considerations. Key constituencies to consider 
+include pious Sunni Muslims, secular Turks, nationalists, Kurds, Alevis, various elites, and the 
+middle and working classes. 
+
+ 
+145 Humeyra Pamuk and Phil Stewart, “Exclusive: U.S. halts secretive drone program with Turkey over Syria 
+incursion,” Reuters , February 5, 2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+34 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendix A. Turkey’s Foreign Policy Relationships 
+ A number of considerations drive the complicated dynamics behind Turkey’s international 
+relationships. Turkey’s maintenance of cooperative relationships with countries whose respective 
+interests may conflict involves a balancing act. Turkey’s vulnerability to threats from Syria and 
+Iraq on its southern border increases the pressure on it to manage this balance, a balance further 
+complicated by the active involvement of other regional and global powers in these countries. 
+
+ Russia 
+ After reaching a low point in Turkey-Russia relations in 2015-2016 (brought about by the Turkish 
+downing of a Russian plane near the Turkey-Syria border and Russia’s temporary imposition of 
+sanctions), President Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin cultivated closer ties. Putin 
+showed support for Erdogan during the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, and subsequently allowed 
+Turkey to carry out military operations in northern Syria over the next two years that helped roll 
+back Kurdish territorial control and reduce refugee flows near Turkey’s border. The S-400 
+transaction and cooperation on natural gas pipelines and nuclear energy are other positive aspects 
+of Turkey-Russia relations, even though the two countries have a centuries-long history of 
+geopolitical conflict. 
+
+While some Western observers express concern that Turkey-Russia cooperation could undermine 
+Turkey’s relationships with the United States, the European Union, and NATO, Turkish and 
+Russian interests diverge significantly in several places throughout the region. Several observers 
+have remarked that Turkey’s use of relatively inexpensive drones and proxy forces in Syria, 
+Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh have frustrated Russia’s aspirations in these places—ironically by 
+borrowing some of the tactics Putin has used to frustrate Western designs in its near abroad.146 
+Additionally, Turkey is strengthening its defense cooperation with Ukraine in a way that seems 
+calculated to check Russian regional dominance, and Turkey continues to oppose Russia’s 
+annexation of Crimea.147 
+
+These differences between Turkey and Russia may not lead to a major rupture between them. 
+They suggest that any Turkish drift away from the West might lead Turkey toward more 
+compartmentalization of its relations—in which cooperation or competition with different actors 
+will depend on the specific circumstances of each issue—rather than toward close alignment with 
+Russia or any other great power. Reinforcing this is Turkey’s ongoing diversification of energy 
+imports and the uncertainty surrounding its use of the S-400 and future defense cooperation with 
+Russia. 
+
+ China 
+ Turkey and China cooperate on various matters in a way that generally does not affect the tense 
+regional crises that enmesh Turkey and other international actors. For Turkey, China is a growing 
+source of imports, lending, investment, and tourism at a time of economic difficulty and 
+uncertainty in its relations with its traditional strategic partners in the West. For China, Turkey’s 
+strategic location at the crossroads of Eurasian transportation corridors makes it an important 
+country for China’s Belt and Road Initiative.148 Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE have 
+ 
+146 Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year.” 
+147 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 30, 2020. 
+148 For more information on the Belt and Road Initiative, see CRS Report R45898, U.S.-China Relations , coordinated 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+35 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+increased their involvement in Turkey’s telecommunications sector, and other Chinese firms have 
+made significant investments in Turkish energy and transportation infrastructure.149 Turkey and 
+China also maintain some bilateral defense ties. Nevertheless, Turkey-China economic, military, 
+and political ties remain relatively limited in contrast to Turkey’s linkages with the United States 
+and Europe.150 
+
+China’s negative treatment of its Uyghur minority may be an obstacle to closer Turkey-China 
+relations because the Uyghurs—a Turkic Muslim people—share ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
+ties with most Turks. An estimated 50,000 Uyghurs have fled China in the past decade and found 
+refuge in Turkey.151 Once publicly critical of China’s repression of the Uyghurs, Erdogan has 
+become less outspoken in recent years despite China’s detention of roughly 1.5 million Uyghurs 
+in political re-education centers. His reticence may be due at least partly to Turkey’s hopes that 
+expanded Chinese lending and investment can help its struggling economy.152 Reports in 2020 
+that suggest some Uyghur dissidents living in Turkey have been repatriated to China via third 
+countries prompted a Department of State spokesperson to issue the following statement in July: 
+“The United States will continue to call on the People’s Republic of China to immediately end its 
+campaign of repression in [China’s] Xinjiang [province, where most Uyghurs live], release all 
+those arbitrarily detained, and cease efforts to coerce members of Muslim minority groups 
+residing abroad to return to China to face an uncertain fate.”153 
+
+ European Union154 
+ Turkey has a long history of partnership with the EU (and its predecessor organizations) and 
+began negotiations to join the EU in 2005. Talks stalled shortly thereafter and Turkey’s 
+membership is now seen as unlikely, at least in the near future. Many analysts argue that 
+resistance to Turkish EU accession has been rooted in a fear that Turkey’s large Muslim 
+population would fundamentally change the cultural character of the EU and dilute the power of 
+the EU’s founding Western European states in particular. Turkey’s unwillingness to normalize 
+diplomatic and trade relations with EU member Cyprus presents a major obstacle to its accession 
+prospects. Other EU concerns over Turkey’s qualifications for membership center on the 
+treatment of Kurds and religious minorities, media freedoms, women’s rights, and the proper and 
+transparent functioning of Turkey’s democratic and legal systems.155 
+
+ 
+by Susan V. Lawrence. 
+
+149 Ayca Alemdaroglu and Sultan Tepe, “Erdogan Is Turning Turkey into a Chinese Client State,” foreignpolicy.com, 
+September 16, 2020. 
+
+150 Gonul Tol, “The Middle Kingdom and the Middle Corridor: Prospects for China-Turkey ties,” Middle East Institute, 
+May 29, 2020. 
+
+151 Aykan Erdemir and Philip Kowalski, “China Buys Turkey’s Silence on Uyghur Oppression,” The Diplomat , August 
+21, 2020. 
+
+152 Ibid. 
+153 Emily Judd, “US calls on China to stop coercing Uighurs to return after Turkey extradition report,” Al Arabiya, July 
+26, 2020. 
+
+154 For more information on this subject, see archived CRS Report RS22517, European Union Enlargement: A Status 
+Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations , by Vincent L. Morelli; and CRS Report RS21344, European Union 
+Enlargement , by Kristin Archick and Vincent L. Morelli. 
+
+155 European Commission, Turkey 2020 Report . 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+36 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+Debate regarding the extent to which Turkey meets EU standards has intensified in recent years in 
+light of domestic controversies since 2013 and President Erdogan’s consolidation of power. 
+Erdogan has used anti-European rhetoric to gain support both at home and among the substantial 
+Turkish diaspora communities in Europe. Turkish domestic expectations of full accession to the 
+EU have apparently been in decline for several years. Despite the lack of significant progress in 
+
+accession negotiations, the EU has provided 
+
+ Turkey-EU Relations in Brief 
+
+Turkey with more than €9 billion in pre-
+
+ 1959: Turkey applies for associate membership in 
+
+accession financial and technical assistance 
+
+the then-European Economic Community (EEC) 
+
+since 2002 (which is separate from the support 
+
+ 1963: Turkey is made an associate member of the 
+
+for refugees addressed below). Based on 
+
+EEC (Ankara Agreement) 
+
+concerns about Turkish backsliding on reforms, 
+
+ 1970: Protocol signed outlining eventual 
+
+the EU reduced pre-accession assistance levels 
+
+establishment of Customs Union 
+
+in 2018. Annual assistance levels that ranged 
+
+ 1982: European Community (EC, successor to the 
+
+from between €493-626 million for 2014-2017 
+
+EEC and forerunner of the EU) freezes relations with 
+Turkey in response to 1980 coup; relations resume 4 
+
+dropped to slightly less than €400 million for 
+
+years later 
+
+2018-2020.156 
+
+ 1987: Turkey applies to join the EC as a ful member 
+
+Since 2011, nearly four million refugees or 
+
+ 1996: Customs Union between Turkey and the EU 
+
+migrants from Syria and other countries have 
+
+takes effect 
+
+come to Turkey, posing significant 
+
+ 1999: EU recognizes Turkey as a candidate for 
+
+humanitarian, socioeconomic, and security 
+
+membership 
+
+challenges. Many have sought to cross from 
+
+ 2005: Accession negotiations begin 
+
+Turkey into Europe. Turkey and the EU reached 
+
+ 2016: The European Parliament passes a nonbinding 
+
+an arrangement in March 2016 providing for the 
+
+resolution urging that accession talks with Turkey be 
+halted 
+
+return from Greece to Turkey of “irregular 
+migrants or asylum seekers whose applications 
+
+have been declared inadmissible.”157 In exchange, the EU agreed to resettle one Syrian refugee 
+for every Syrian readmitted to Turkey and provide Turkey with €6 billion to be used to support 
+refugees, among other incentives.158 The deterrent effect of the arrangement on migrants appears 
+to have helped dramatically reduce the number of people crossing from Turkey to the Greek 
+islands.159 
+
+In February 2020, as conflict in Syria’s Idlib province threatened to bring a new wave of refugees 
+into Turkey, President Erdogan—apparently partly owing to a desire for bolstered and expedited 
+EU funding—announced that Turkey would no longer abide by the agreement. Turkish officials 
+reportedly facilitated efforts by thousands of migrants—mostly Afghans, not Syrians—to cross 
+Turkey’s land border with Greece.160 While such threats may highlight the potential for Turkey to 
+use refugees as leverage with the EU,161 in this case Turkish leverage appears to have been 
+ 
+156 See https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180817-revised-indicative-strategy-paper-
+2014-2020-for-turkey.pdf. 
+
+157 European Commission Fact Sheet, “Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement—Questions and Answers,” June 15, 
+2016, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1664_en.htm. The arrangement is controversial 
+because of questions surrounding its compatibility with international legal and human rights standards. 
+
+158 For more, see https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
+enlargement/sites/near/files/fourth_annual_report_on_the_facility_for_refugees_in_turkey.pdf. 
+
+159 “UN agency praises ‘huge impact’ of EU-Turkey refugee deal,” Hurriyet Daily News , April 18, 2018. 
+160 Berkay Mandiraci, “Sharing the Burden: Revisiting the EU-Turkey Migration Deal,” International Crisis Group, 
+March 13, 2020. 
+
+161 Kemal Kirisci and Basak Yavcan, “As COVID-19 worsens precarity for refugees, Turkey and the EU must work 
+together,” Brookings Institution, June 11, 2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+37 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+relatively light given robust Greek border controls and reportedly little interest in leaving Turkey 
+among Syrian refugees who live there.162 
+
+ Armenia 
+ Turkey’s relations with Armenia are fraught for historical reasons. From 1915 to 1923, hundreds 
+of thousands of Armenians died as a result of actions of the Ottoman Empire (Turkey’s 
+predecessor state). U.S. and international characterizations of these events influence Turkey’s 
+domestic and foreign policy, and are in turn influenced by developments in Turkey-Armenia 
+relations. Turkey and Armenia initially agreed in 2009 on a set of joint protocols to normalize 
+relations, but the ratification process in both countries stalled shortly thereafter. Armenia 
+cancelled the protocols in 2018 in light of Turkish inaction. Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan in the 
+ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh crisis also has implications for its relations with Armenia. 
+
+All U.S. Presidents since Jimmy Carter have made public statements memorializing the events, 
+with President Ronald Reagan referring to a “genocide of the Armenians” during a Holocaust 
+Remembrance Day speech in 1981.163 In annual statements issued on every April 24 of his 
+presidency, President Trump (echoing statements made by President Obama) has said that the 
+events were “one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century” and that “one and a half million 
+Armenians were deported, massacred, or marched to their deaths.”164 In addition to past 
+statements or actions by U.S. policymakers, the website of the Armenian National Institute, a 
+U.S.-based organization, asserts that at least 29 other countries (not counting the United States or 
+Armenia) have characterized the events as genocide in some way, including 16 of the 27 EU 
+member states.165 
+
+Congress has considered how to characterize the events of 1915-1923 on a number of occasions. 
+In 1975 (H.J.Res. 148) and 1984 (H.J.Res. 247), the House passed proposed joint resolutions that 
+referred to “victims of genocide” of Armenian ancestry from 1915 and 1915-1923, respectively.166 
+Neither proposed joint resolution came to a vote in the Senate. Fifteen other proposed resolutions 
+characterizing these World War I-era events as genocide were reported by various congressional 
+
+ 
+162 Kadri Gursel, “Why Ankara’s Syrian refugee threat has lost its impact,” Al-Monitor , March 19, 2020. 
+163 Additionally, in a May 1951 written statement to the International Court of Justice, the Truman Administration cited 
+“Turkish massacres of Armenians” as one of three “outstanding examples of the crime of genocide” (along with Roman 
+persecution of Christians and Nazi extermination of Jews and Poles). International Court of Justice, Reservations on the 
+Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1951: 
+Pleadings, Arguments, Documents , p. 25. 
+
+164 See, e.g., White House, “Statement by the President on Armenian Remembrance Day,” April 24, 2020. Beginning 
+with President Obama in 2009, annual White House statements (including those from President Trump) have 
+continuously referenced the “Meds Yeghern,” an Armenian phrase that translates roughly to “great crime.” Vartan 
+Matiossian, “The ‘Exact Translation’: How ‘Medz Yeghern’ Means Genocide,” Armenian Weekly , May 15, 2013. 
+165 The EU states listed as having recognized a genocide are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
+France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Sweden. The 
+European Parliament has also referred to the deaths as genocide. The non-EU states are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
+Canada, Chile, Lebanon, Paraguay, Russia, Switzerland, Vatican City, Venezuela, and Uruguay. In April 2015, the 
+Republic of Cyprus’s ethnic Greek parliament passed a resolution making it a crime to deny that the events constituted 
+genocide. In 2007, Switzerland criminally fined an ethnic Turkish politician for denying that the events constituted 
+genocide, and in 2012 France passed a law making it a crime to deny that the events constituted genocide—though the 
+law was subsequently invalidated by the French Constitutional Council. Long-standing Turkish law criminalizes 
+characterization of the events as genocide. 
+
+166 Neither H.J.Res. 148 nor H.J.Res. 247 explicitly identified the Ottoman Empire or its authorities as perpetrators of 
+the purported genocide. H.J.Res. 247 stated that “one and one-half million people of Armenian ancestry” were “the 
+victims of the genocide perpetrated in Turkey.” 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+38 
+
+ 
+ link to page 22 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+committees from 1984 to 2014, but neither chamber passed measures related to the issue until the 
+116th Congress. 
+
+In late 2019, the House and Senate passed nonbinding resolutions (H.Res. 296 in October 2019 
+and S.Res. 150 in December 2019) characterizing the “killing of 1.5 million Armenians by the 
+Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923” as genocide. The resolutions came shortly after Turkish 
+military operations against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria drew 
+significant congressional denunciation. Turkish officials roundly criticized both resolutions, but 
+did not announce any changes to defense cooperation or any other aspect of U.S.-Turkey 
+relations, despite having threatened to do so in years past in connection with similar proposed 
+resolutions. In response to the Senate’s December 2019 vote, the Department of State released a 
+statement reading, “The position of the Administration has not changed. Our views are reflected 
+in the president’s definitive statement on this issue from last April.”167 
+
+ Cyprus and Greece 
+ Since Cyprus became independent of the United Kingdom in 1960, Turkey has viewed itself as 
+the protector of the island’s ethnic Turkish-Cypriot minority from potential mistreatment by the 
+ethnic Greek-Cypriot majority.168 Responding to Greek and Greek-Cypriot political developments 
+that raised concerns about a possible Greek annexation of Cyprus, Turkey’s military intervened in 
+1974 and established control over the northern third of the island. This prompted an almost total 
+ethnic and de facto political division along geographical lines that persists today.169 The ethnic 
+Greek-Cypriot-ruled Republic of Cyprus is internationally recognized as having jurisdiction over 
+the entire island, while the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (in the 
+northern third) has only Turkish recognition. 
+
+The Republic of Cyprus’s accession to the EU in 2004 and Turkey’s refusal to normalize political 
+and commercial relations with it are seen as major obstacles to Turkey’s EU membership 
+aspirations. Moreover, EU accession may have reduced incentives for Cyprus’s Greek population 
+to make concessions toward a reunification deal.170 Incoming TRNC leader Ersin Tatar, who was 
+elected in October 2020, favors a separate Turkish Cypriot state. 
+
+Turkey’s relations with Greece are also fraught. The two countries joined NATO in 1952, but 
+intercommunal tensions, the Cyprus question, and airspace and maritime border disputes 
+“ensured that war between the two allies remained a real risk well into the 1990s.”171 Despite 
+more regular diplomatic relations in the following two decades, Turkish relations with Greece 
+have again deteriorated in recent years, including a resumption of Turkey-Greece border incidents 
+(see “Eastern Mediterranean and Offshore Natural Gas”) . In August 2020, in the context of 
+
+ 
+167 Senate Resolution 150, Department of State, December 17, 2019. 
+168 Turkey views its protective role as justified given its status as one of the three guaranteeing powers of the 1960 
+Treaty of Guarantee that was signed at the time Cyprus gained its independence. The United Kingdom and Greece are 
+the other two guarantors. 
+
+169 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot 
+soldiers). This is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to 50,000 reserves. 
+“Cyprus - Army,” Jane’s Group UK , October 2019. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) 
+of approximately 900 personnel within a buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia (known as 
+Lefkosa in Turkish). Since the mission’s inception in 1964, UNFICYP has suffered 186 fatalities. The United Kingdom 
+maintains approximately 3,000 personnel at two sovereign military bases on the southern portion of the island at 
+Akrotiri and Dhekelia. 
+
+170 The Greek Cypriots rejected by referendum a United Nations reunification plan (called the Annan plan after then 
+Secretary-General Kofi Annan) in 2004 that the Turkish Cypriot population accepted. 
+
+171 “Why Turkey and Greece cannot reconcile,” Economist , December 14, 2017. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+39 
+
+ 
+ link to page 23 link to page 23 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+disputes over maritime borders and offshore natural gas exploration, Greek and Turkish frigates 
+had a minor collision in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
+
+ Middle East and North Africa 
+ Turkey’s Middle Eastern profile expanded in the 2000s as Erdogan (while serving as prime 
+minister) sought to build economic and political linkages—often emphasizing shared Muslim 
+identity—with Turkey’s neighbors. However, efforts to increase Turkey’s influence and offer it as 
+a “model” for other regional states appear to have been set back by a number of developments 
+since 2011: (1) conflict and instability that engulfed the region and Turkey’s own southern border, 
+(2) Turkey’s failed effort to help Muslim Brotherhood-aligned groups gain lasting power in Syria 
+and North Africa, and (3) domestic polarization accompanied by government repression. Turkey’s 
+troubled relations with some Sunni Arab states are described in “Middle East and Libyan Civil 
+War,” while its relations with other key regional states are outlined below. 
+
+ Iran 
+
+While Turkey and Iran are sometimes rivals for regional influence, the two neighbors also work 
+together on certain regional issues. Along with Russia, they coordinate efforts in Syria as part of 
+the Astana Process. They also have some common concerns regarding Kurdish militant groups 
+that maintain presences in Iraq.172 However, Turkey is wary of Tehran’s ambitions near its borders 
+in those two countries, as well as its close relations with their governments. Turkish officials have 
+periodically criticized Iran in stark terms, accusing it of destabilizing the region in pursuit of 
+sectarian interests or “Persian expansionist policies.”173 
+
+Turkey and Iran maintain significant economic ties, though Turkey’s traditional reliance on 
+Iranian oil and gas has declined in recent years. Turkey cut oil imports in 2019 in light of the re-
+imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran. Turkey is still one of the largest importers of Iranian gas 
+(under a contract that expires in 2026), but Iran’s share of Turkish gas imports has decreased over 
+the past decade as Turkey has increased its imports of LNG.174 Iran has opposed the proposed 
+Trans-Caspian Pipeline, which would bypass Iran by connecting Turkmenistan’s considerable gas 
+reserves with Azerbaijan, and from there to Turkey. 
+
+ Iraq 
+
+Turkey’s first priority in Iraq is to counter threats to Turkey from the PKK, which maintains safe 
+havens there. Another concern—despite the generally positive relations described below between 
+Turkey and Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—is the possibility that Iraqi Kurdish 
+moves toward independence could spread separatist sentiment among Kurds in Turkey. Turkey 
+has conducted airstrikes against PKK targets in Iraq since 2007. The KRG—given its own rivalry 
+with the PKK—has not generally objected to these strikes, though it is sensitive to pan-Kurdish 
+
+ 
+172 Iran faces a separatist Kurdish insurgency by an affiliate of the PKK known as PJAK (Kurdish acronym for 
+Kurdistan Free Life Party). Like the PKK, the PJAK has a presence in Iraq. Turkey and Iran have conducted separate 
+operations against the two groups in northern Iraq, periodically coordinating but generally not to a significant extent. 
+
+173 “Iran and Turkey trade barbs over Syria and Iraq,” Al Jazeera , February 21, 2017; Ilnur Cevik, “Turkey is caught 
+between the US and Iran,” Daily Sabah , July 23, 2018. 
+174 Tamer Badawi, “The economic turn in Turkish-Iranian relations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
+March 12, 2020; Omid Shokri Kalehsar, “The future of Iranian natural gas exports to Turkey,” National Interest , June 
+24, 2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+40 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+sympathies among its population.175 Large Turkish air and ground offensives targeting PKK safe 
+havens in 2020 have been condemned both by the KRG and Iraq’s central government.176 
+
+Around 2008, Turkey started developing a political and economic partnership with the KRG. As 
+part of this cooperation, in 2013 the KRG began transporting oil through pipelines to Turkish 
+ports for international export. Turkey halted these exports after the KRG’s symbolic 2017 
+referendum on independence, which it strongly opposed, but has since resumed them. Periodic 
+attacks attributed to the PKK have shut down these pipelines at times.177 
+
+Turkey maintains an uneasy relationship with Iraq’s central government over concerns that its 
+Shia leaders are unduly influenced by Iran and that Iraq’s security forces and Shia militias often 
+mistreat Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and ethnic Turkmen. Relations with Baghdad are also strained by 
+Iraqi concerns about the potential impact that Turkish dam construction and water management 
+decisions could have on downstream Iraqi communities.178 Turkey’s military maintains various 
+posts inside northern Iraq and a presence at a base in Bashiqa near Mosul. 
+
+ Israel 
+
+Ties between Turkey and Israel, which were close during the 1990s and early 2000s, have 
+deteriorated considerably during Erdogan’s rule. This slide has reflected the military’s declining 
+role in Turkish society relative to Erdogan and other leaders whose criticisms of Israel resound 
+with domestic public opinion. Despite the countries’ differences, trade between the two countries 
+has grown. 
+
+After years of downgraded diplomatic ties following the 2010 Mavi Marmara (or Gaza flotilla) 
+incident,179 Turkey and Israel announced the full restoration of diplomatic relations in 2016, in a 
+deal reportedly facilitated by the United States.180 Nevertheless, the bilateral relationship remains 
+tense. 
+
+Israelis routinely decry Turkey’s ties with Palestinian Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a 
+U.S.-designated terrorist organization). Erdogan’s Islamist sympathies have contributed to these 
+ties.181 Some reports claim that some Hamas operatives are located in Turkey and involved in 
+planning attacks on Israeli targets.182 In September 2019, the Department of the Treasury 
+designated an individual and an entity based in Turkey—under existing U.S. counterterrorism 
+sanctions authorities—for providing material support to Hamas.183 
+
+ 
+175 CRS In Focus IF10350, The Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 
+176 Amberin Zaman, “KRG seeks US help to rein in Turkish attacks,” Al-Monitor , August 5, 2020. 
+177 Mohammed Hussein et al., “PKK suspected of Iraq-Turkey Pipeline attack,” Iraq Oil Report , October 30, 2020. 
+178 “Iraq complains Turkey causing water shortages,” Arab Weekly , July 17, 2020. 
+179 The incident took place in international waters under disputed circumstances and resulted in the death of nine Turks 
+and an American of Turkish descent. 
+
+180 According to media reports, the rapprochement included Israeli compensation to the families of those killed in the 
+flotilla incident in exchange for an end to legal claims, as well as opportunities for Turkey to assist with humanitarian 
+and infrastructure projects for Palestinian residents in the Gaza Strip. 
+
+181 Department of State spokesperson, President Erdogan’s Meeting with Hamas Leadership, August 25, 2020. 
+182 See, e.g., Raf Sanchez, “Exclusive: Hamas plots attacks on Israel from Turkey as Erdogan turns blind eye,” 
+telegraph.co.uk, December 14, 2019. 
+
+183 Department of the Treasury press release, Treasury Targets Wide Range of Terrorists and Their Supporters Using 
+Enhanced Counterterrorism Sanctions Authorities, September 10, 2019. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+41 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+For their part, Turkish leaders often condemn Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, especially in the 
+Gaza Strip. Additionally, Erdogan has sought to lead regional opposition to various U.S. policies 
+that go against Palestinian stances, including the 2017 recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital 
+and the encouragement of Israeli normalization of relations with Arab states such as the UAE, 
+Bahrain, and Sudan. After the U.S. embassy moved to Jerusalem in May 2018, Turkey expelled 
+Israel’s ambassador to Turkey, leading Israel to respond in kind with Turkey’s ambassador to 
+Israel. The ambassadors have not returned to date. Israeli officials are reportedly interested in 
+countering Turkish aid, tourism, and civil society initiatives in Jerusalem seen as bolstering the 
+city’s Islamic identity and Arab residents.184 
+
+Some observers have characterized negative statements by Erdogan and other prominent Turkish 
+voices about Israel, Zionism, and various regional and global trends as anti-Semitic.185 Erdogan 
+insists that his criticisms of the Israeli government and its policies are not directed to the Jewish 
+people or to Jews in Turkey. 
+
+ Other International Relationships 
+ Turkey seeks to use political and economic influence to strengthen relationships with non-
+Western countries. Through political involvement, increased trade and investment, and 
+humanitarian and development projects, Turkey has curried favor with foreign countries not only 
+in the greater Middle East, but also in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and sub-
+Saharan Africa. Gulen movement-affiliated organizations had spearheaded some of these ties with 
+other countries before Turkey’s government classified the movement as a terrorist organization. 
+Questions persist about how these ties will develop in response to changes in Turkey. 
+
+ 
+184 Ahmad Melham, “Israel goes after Turkish projects in Jerusalem,” Al-Monitor , July 2, 2020. 
+185 Hannah Lucinda Smith, et al., “Turkey blames ‘Jewish lobby’ for economic crisis,” Times (UK), May 30, 2018. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+42 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendix B. Profiles of Key Figures in Turkey 
+
+ Recep Tayyip Erdogan—President 
+ (pronounced air-doe-wan ) 
+Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on 
+the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious imam hatip secondary school in Istanbul. 
+In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a 
+business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different 
+Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan. 
+Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office, 
+imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious 
+incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After 
+Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party 
+was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP 
+
+ won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After 
+
+ 
+
+the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special 
+election, and after he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister. 
+Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of 
+the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to 
+power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and 
+won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018. Many observers 
+believe that he primarily seeks to consolidate power and to avoid the reopening of 
+corruption cases that could implicate him and close family members or associates. 
+Erdogan is married and has two sons and two daughters. He is widely believed to be 
+positioning his son-in-law Berat Albayrak (currently treasury and finance minister) as a 
+possible successor. Erdogan does not speak English fluently. 
+ Kemal Kilicdaroglu—Leader of Republican People’s Party (CHP) 
+ ( kill-itch-dar-oh-loo) 
+ Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi background, 
+Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP, which is the main opposition party and 
+traditional political outlet of the Turkish nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the 
+party has also attracted various liberal and social democratic constituencies. 
+After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara, 
+Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the 
+director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil 
+service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to 
+parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to 
+
+ root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara. 
+
+Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has since faced criticism for the 
+CHP’s failure to make electoral gains. 
+Kilicdaroglu is married with a son and two daughters. 
+
+ Devlet Bahceli—Leader of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 
+( bah-cheh-lee ) 
+Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the 
+MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for 
+opposing political accommodation with the Kurds. 
+Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher 
+education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a 
+career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a 
+leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997 
+and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He 
+was initially elected to parliament in 2007. 
+
+ Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017 
+
+constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018. 
+Bahceli speaks fluent English. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+43 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Meral Aksener—Founder and Leader of the Good ( Iyi ) Party 
+ ( awk-sheh-nar ) 
+Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from 
+Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party 
+in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s 
+alliance with Erdogan. 
+Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from 
+Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was 
+first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior 
+minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by 
+a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from 
+
+ 
+
+2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker. 
+Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to 
+provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum 
+establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned 
+vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the 
+controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its 
+presidential candidate in the 2018 elections. 
+ Selahattin Demirtas—Former Co-Leader and Presidential Candidate of 
+Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) 
+( day-meer-tosh ) 
+Born in 1973 to an ethnic Kurdish family, Demirtas is the most prominent member of 
+the HDP, which has a Kurdish nationalist base but has also reached out to a number 
+of non-Kurdish constituencies, particularly liberals and minorities. The constituency of 
+the party and its various predecessors overlaps with that of the PKK, but the party 
+professes a nonviolent stance and claims an independent identity. 
+Demirtas was raised in Elazig in eastern Turkey. He attended universities in both Izmir 
+and Ankara and received his law degree from Ankara University. He became a human 
+rights activist leader in Diyarbakir and was elected to parliament for the first time in 
+
+ 2007, becoming co-leader of the HDP’s immediate predecessor party in 2010. His 
+
+national visibility increased after he ran as one of two candidates opposing Erdogan for 
+the presidency in 2014. His personal popularity and charisma are generally seen as 
+major reasons for the HDP becoming the first pro-Kurdish party to pass the electoral 
+
+threshold of 10% in June and November 2015 parliamentary elections. 
+Demirtas was arrested in November 2016 on terrorism-related charges, and received 
+a 4-year, 8-month sentence for incitement in September 2018 and is imprisoned in 
+Edirne. He stepped down from party leadership in January 2018 but ran for president 
+in 2018 from prison, garnering about 8.5% of the vote. 
+Demirtas is married with two daughters. 
+ Abdullah Ocalan—Founder of the PKK 
+( oh-juh-lawn) 
+ Born in or around 1949 in southeastern Turkey (near Sanliurfa), Ocalan is the 
+founding leader of the PKK. 
+After attending vocational high school in Ankara, Ocalan served in civil service posts 
+in Diyarbakir and Istanbul until enrol ing at Ankara University in 1971. As his interest 
+developed in socialism and Kurdish nationalism, Ocalan was jailed for seven months in 
+1972 for participating in an il egal student demonstration. His time in prison with 
+other activists helped inspire his political ambitions, and he became increasingly 
+political y active upon his release. 
+
+ Ocalan founded the Marxist-Leninist-influenced PKK in 1978 and launched a separatist 
+
+militant campaign against Turkish security forces—while also attacking the traditional 
+Kurdish chieftain class—in 1984. He used Syrian territory as his safe haven, with the 
+group also using Lebanese territory for training and Iraqi territory for operations. 
+Syria forced Ocalan to leave in 1998 after Turkey threatened war for harboring him. 
+After traveling to several different countries, Ocalan was captured in February 1999 in 
+Kenya—possibly with U.S. help—and was turned over to Turkish authorities. The 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+44 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+PKK declared a cease-fire shortly thereafter. Ocalan was sentenced to death, in a trial 
+later ruled unfair by the European Court of Human Rights, but when Turkey abolished 
+the death penalty in 2002, the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He 
+resides in a maximum-security prison on the island of Imrali in the Sea of Marmara, 
+and was in solitary confinement until 2009. 
+Although other PKK leaders such as Cemil Bayik and Murat Karayilan have exercised 
+direct control over PKK operations during Ocalan’s imprisonment, some observers 
+believe that Ocalan stil ultimately controls the PKK through proxies. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+45 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendix C. Timeline of Turkey’s Involvement in 
+Syria (2011-2020) 
+
+2011 
+
+Though the two leaders once closely corresponded, then-Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan calls for 
+Syrian President Bashar al Asad to step down as protests and violence escalate; Turkey begins 
+support for Sunni Arab-led opposition groups in cooperation with the United States and some Arab 
+Gulf states 
+
+2012-2014 
+
+As conflict escalates in Syria and involves more external actors, Turkey begins facing cross-border 
+fire and jihadist terrorist attacks in border areas and urban centers; as well as allegations of Turkish 
+government permissiveness with jihadist groups that oppose the Asad government 
+
+ 
+
+Turkey unsuccessful y calls for U.S. and NATO assistance to establish safe zones in northern Syria 
+as places to train opposition forces and gather refugees and IDPs 
+
+ 
+
+At Turkey’s request, a few NATO countries (including the United States) station air defense 
+batteries in Turkey near Syrian border 
+
+2014 
+
+The Islamic State obtains control of large swath of northern Syria 
+
+ 
+
+IS attack on Kurdish-majority Syrian border town of Kobane unchallenged by Turkish military but 
+repulsed by YPG-led Syrian Kurds (and some non-YPG Kurds from Iraq permitted to transit 
+Turkish territory) with air support from U.S.-led coalition, marking the beginning of joint anti-IS 
+efforts between the United States and YPG-led forces (including non-Kurdish elements) that (in 
+2015) become the SDF through U.S. train-and-equip initiatives 
+
+ 
+
+Turkey, with Erdogan now president, begins allowing anti-IS coalition aircraft to use its territory for 
+reconnaissance purposes 
+
+2015 
+
+Turkey begins permitting anti-IS coalition aircraft to conduct airstrikes from its territory 
+
+ 
+
+As YPG-led forces find success in taking over IS-control ed areas with U.S.-led coalition support, a 
+Turkey-PKK peace process (ongoing since 2013) breaks down and violence resumes in Turkey; 
+Turkish officials’ protests intensify in opposition to U.S. partnership with SDF in Syria 
+
+ 
+
+U.S. military withdraws Patriot air defense battery from Turkey; some other NATO countries 
+continue operating air defense batteries on Turkey’s behalf 
+
+ 
+
+In September, Russia expands its military involvement in Syria and begins helping Asad regain 
+control over much of the country 
+In November, a Turkish aircraft shoots down a Russian aircraft based in Syria under disputed 
+circumstances; Russia responds with punitive economic measures against Turkey 
+
+2016 
+
+After failed coup attempt in Turkey in July, Turkey partners in August with Syrian opposition forces 
+on its first military operation in Syria (Operation Euphrates Shield), an effort to eject IS fighters 
+from and occupy an area between SDF-control ed enclaves 
+
+2017 
+
+Turkey begins Astana peace process on Syria with Russia and Iran 
+
+ 
+
+In preparation for the campaign against the final major IS-held urban center in Raqqah, U.S. officials 
+decide in May to arm YPG personnel directly, insisting to protesting Turkish officials that the arms 
+wil be taken back after the defeat of the Islamic State 
+
+2018 
+
+Turkey and its Syrian opposition partners militarily occupy the Kurdish enclave of Afrin (Operation 
+Olive Branch); significant Kurdish displacements prompt humanitarian and human rights concerns 
+In September, Turkey and Russia agree on parameters for Idlib province, including a demilitarized 
+zone 
+
+2019 
+
+Erdogan insists on a safe zone in Syria to prevent opportunities for YPG attacks in Turkey or 
+col aboration with Turkey-based PKK forces, and to resettle Syrian refugees; U.S. officials try to 
+prevent conflict and to get coalition assistance to patrol border areas in northeastern Syria 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+46 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+In October, President Trump announces highly controversial pul back of U.S. Special Forces from 
+SDF-control ed border areas; to date, the United States had not recovered U.S.-origin arms from 
+YPG personnel 
+Turkey launches Operation Peace Spring (OPS), with Turkish-led forces obtaining control of various 
+border areas and key transport corridors in northeastern Syria; reports of civilian casualties and 
+displacement take place amid general humanitarian and human rights concerns 
+Turkey reaches agreements with United States and Russia that end OPS and create a buffer zone 
+between Turkey and the YPG 
+
+2020 
+
+A Russian-aided Syrian offensive in Idlib province leads to several Turkish and Syrian casualties, 
+displaces hundreds of thousands of Sunni Arabs, and opens access for Syrian forces through the 
+province to other parts of the country 
+
+ Sources: Various open sources. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+47 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendix D. Significant U.S.-Origin Arms 
+Transfers or Possible Arms Transfers to Turkey 
+
+ (Congressional notifications since 2009) 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Year 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ FMS or 
+
+ Cong. 
+
+ Primary 
+
+ Estimated 
+
+ Amount/Description 
+
+ DCS 
+
+ Notice 
+
+ Contract Delivery Contractor(s) 
+
+ Cost 
+
+400 RIM-162 Ship-air 
+
+DCS 
+
+2009 
+
+Signed 
+
+2011-
+
+Raytheon 
+
+$300 mil ion 
+
+missiles (ESSM) 
+
+2019 
+
+72 Patriot Advanced 
+
+FMS 
+
+2009 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Raytheon and 
+
+$4 bil ion 
+
+Capability Missiles 
+
+Lockheed 
+
+(PAC-3), 197 Patriot 
+
+Martin 
+
+Guidance Enhanced 
+Missiles, and associated 
+equipment 
+
+14 CH-47F CHINOOK 
+
+FMS 
+
+2009 
+
+2011 and 
+
+2016, 
+
+Boeing 
+
+$1.2 bil ion 
+
+Helicopters 
+
+2015 
+
+2018-
+
+($531 mil ion 
+
+ 
+
+2019 (10) 
+
+for 10) 
+
+3 AH-1W SUPER 
+
+FMS 
+
+2011 
+
+Signed 
+
+2012 
+
+N/A (from U.S. 
+
+$111 mil ion 
+
+COBRA Attack 
+
+Marine Corps 
+
+Helicopters 
+
+inventory) 
+
+117 AIM-9X-2 
+
+FMS 
+
+2012 
+
+2014 
+
+2015-
+
+Raytheon 
+
+$140 mil ion 
+
+SIDEWINDER Block II 
+
+2016 
+
+Air-air missiles (SRAAM) 
+and associated 
+equipment 
+
+48 MK-48 Mod 6 
+
+FMS 
+
+2014 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Raytheon and 
+
+$170 mil ion 
+
+Advanced Technology 
+
+Lockheed 
+
+All-Up-Round (AUR) 
+
+Martin 
+
+Warshot torpedoes and 
+associated equipment 
+
+145 AIM-120C-7 Air-air 
+
+FMS 
+
+2014 
+
+Signed 
+
+2016-
+
+Raytheon 
+
+$320 mil ion 
+
+missiles (AMRAAM) 
+
+2019 
+
+21 MK-15 Phalanx Block 
+
+FMS 
+
+2015 
+
+2015 and 
+
+2017-
+
+Raytheon 
+
+$310 mil ion 
+
+1B Baseline 2 Close-in 
+
+2016 
+
+2018 
+
+weapons systems 
+
+(for 10) 
+
+(4 
+
+(CIWS) (sale/upgrade) 
+
+estimated) 
+
+Joint Direct Attack 
+
+FMS 
+
+2015 
+
+2015 and 
+
+2017-
+
+Boeing 
+
+$70 mil ion 
+
+Munitions (JDAM) and 
+
+2017 
+
+2018 
+
+associated equipment 
+
+(1,400 
+
+estimated) 
+
+80 Patriot MIM-104E 
+
+FMS 
+
+2018 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Raytheon and 
+
+$3.5 bil ion 
+
+Guidance Enhanced 
+
+Lockheed 
+
+Missiles, 60 PAC-3 
+
+Martin 
+
+Missile Segment 
+Enhancement missiles 
+and related equipment 
+
+ Sources: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms 
+Transfer Database, Defense News , Hurriyet Daily News , Global Security. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+48 
+
+ 
+ Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 
+
+ 
+
+ Notes: All figures and dates are approximate; blank entries indicate that data is unknown or not applicable. FMS 
+refers to “Foreign Military Sales” contemplated between the U.S. government and Turkey, while DCS refers to 
+“Direct Commercial Sales” contemplated between private U.S. companies and Turkey. 
+
+ 
+
+ Author Information 
+
+ 
+Jim Zanotti 
+
+ Clayton Thomas 
+
+Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs 
+
+Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan 
+shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and 
+under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other 
+than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in 
+connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not 
+subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in 
+its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or 
+material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to 
+copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+R41368 · VERSION 69 · UPDATED 
+
+49
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+++ b/corpus/politics/text/1a5ae298620b0ec5.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
+February 9, 2023
+
+ Title IX and Athletics: Legal Basics 
+
+Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) 
+
+role in enforcing Title IX against schools that receive ED 
+
+prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in education 
+
+funding. OCR investigates complaints of discrimination 
+
+programs and activities that receive federal financial 
+
+against recipients and also publishes guidance, such as 
+
+assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Although the statute does not 
+
+“Dear Colleague” letters, explaining the meaning of, and 
+
+mention athletics, long-standing regulations implementing 
+
+how to comply with, Title IX and its implementing 
+
+Title IX provide that recipients may not discriminate based 
+
+regulations. 
+
+on sex in athletics programs or activities. 34 C.F.R. 
+§§ 106.41 (athletics); 106.37 (financial assistance). As 
+
+ Separate Athletics Teams 
+
+recipients of federal funding, most private and public 
+
+While Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in recipient 
+
+postsecondary institutions, as well as public schools at the 
+
+schools’ athletics programs, this does not mean all sex-
+
+K-12 level, are subject to Title IX (the statute does have 
+
+based distinctions are banned. According to Title IX 
+
+exemptions, including for admissions policies at certain 
+
+regulations, schools may offer separate athletics teams for 
+
+educational institutions). Since the law’s passage, women’s 
+
+each sex where selection is based on competitive skill or the 
+
+participation in athletics has increased substantially at both 
+
+activity is a contact sport. In addition, subject to the 
+
+the high school and college levels. 
+
+obligations described below, while schools must provide 
+equal athletics opportunity to members of both sexes, they 
+
+To clarify the requirements in Title IX’s athletics 
+
+do not necessarily need to offer the same sports for each 
+
+regulations, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
+
+sex. That said, if a school only offers a sport for one sex, 
+
+Welfare issued a Policy Interpretation in 1979 to offer 
+
+and opportunities for the other sex have been previously 
+
+guidance for covered colleges and universities operating 
+
+limited, a student from the excluded sex must be allowed to 
+
+intercollegiate athletics programs. Congress soon after split 
+
+try out for the team unless it is a contact sport. (Contact 
+
+that agency into the Department of Health and Human 
+
+sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, 
+
+Services and the Department of Education (ED). Drawing 
+
+football, and basketball.) 
+
+from Title IX’s athletics regulations, the Policy 
+Interpretation lays out three basic categories in which 
+
+ Three Categories of Obligations 
+
+recipient schools face Title IX obligations with respect to 
+
+The three general categories of legal obligations that Title 
+
+their athletics programs and activities: 
+
+IX imposes on school athletics programs relate to 
+(1) scholarships; (2) equivalent program treatment; and 
+
+ Proportional Financial Assistance (i.e., scholarships) 
+
+(3) accommodation of interest and abilities. 
+
+ Equivalent Benefits and Opportunities 
+
+ Proportional Scholarships 
+ When colleges and universities award athletics 
+
+ Effective Accommodation of Interest and Abilities 
+
+scholarships, they must offer reasonable opportunities for 
+awards for members of each sex in proportion to the 
+
+While directed toward intercollegiate athletics, the general 
+
+number of students participating in intercollegiate athletics. 
+
+principles and standards in the Policy Interpretation often 
+
+This obligation does not mean the dollar amount of 
+
+apply to interscholastic athletics programs at the elementary 
+
+scholarships for men and women must be perfectly equal. 
+
+and secondary levels, as well as to club and intramural 
+
+Instead, total assistance awarded to each sex must be 
+
+programs. This In Focus provides background on Title IX’s 
+
+substantially proportionate to the participation rates of men 
+
+athletics requirements, including the basics of what legal 
+
+and women. Put another way, if 60% of an institution’s 
+
+obligations recipient schools face, how the law is enforced, 
+
+intercollegiate athletes are women, then the total amount of 
+
+and emerging legal questions relevant to athletics. 
+
+aid to women athletes should be approximately 60%. 
+Disparities can be justified by certain legitimate, 
+
+ Enforcement 
+
+nondiscriminatory factors. 
+
+Title IX is generally enforced in two ways: (1) through 
+private lawsuits brought directly against recipients in 
+
+ Equivalent Benefits and Opportunities 
+
+federal court and (2) by federal agencies that provide 
+
+Title IX regulations require recipients that operate athletics 
+
+funding to recipients. Federal agencies that distribute 
+
+programs to provide “equal athletic opportunity for 
+
+federal financial assistance to education programs are 
+
+members of both sexes.” In determining whether this 
+
+responsible for promulgating regulations to implement Title 
+
+standard is met, a range of factors are relevant, including 
+
+IX and may terminate or suspend assistance in cases of non-
+
+equipment; scheduling; travel expenses; coaching and 
+
+compliance. Because ED distributes substantial financial 
+
+tutoring, including compensation thereof; practice and 
+
+assistance in the elementary, secondary, and postsecondary 
+
+competitive facilities; medical and training facilities and 
+
+contexts, ED’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) plays a lead 
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+ 
+ Title IX and Athletics: Legal Basics 
+
+services; and publicity, as well as recruitment and support 
+
+responsive to the developing interests and abilities of an 
+
+services. 
+
+underrepresented sex. A history of program expansion 
+could be shown through adding or upgrading teams to 
+
+According to OCR, institutions must provide equivalent 
+
+intercollegiate status as well as increasing the number of 
+
+treatment, benefits, and services with respect to these 
+
+participants for the underrepresented sex. Evidence of a 
+
+components of the athletics program. Each component is 
+
+continuing practice of expansion may be shown through 
+
+examined by comparing availability, quality, the kinds of 
+
+factors such as current implementation of a 
+
+benefits, the kinds of opportunities, and the kinds of 
+
+nondiscriminatory policy for requesting the addition or 
+
+treatment. According to the equivalency standard, identical 
+
+elevation of sports and communication of this policy to 
+
+benefits or treatment are not required, as long as the overall 
+
+students. 
+
+effects of any differences are negligible. Compliance issues 
+can arise if disparities are “of a substantial and unjustified 
+
+ Full and Effective Accommodation : The third prong of 
+
+nature in a school’s overall athletics program” or “if 
+
+the test can be satisfied if a school can show that students of 
+
+disparities in individual program areas are substantial 
+
+an underrepresented sex are not denied opportunities 
+
+enough” to deny equal athletic opportunity. 
+
+because their interests and abilities are fully and effectively 
+accommodated. OCR is to consider whether there is an 
+
+Equality of opportunity is not measured through a sport-
+
+unmet interest in a sport, ability to sustain a team in that 
+
+specific comparison. Instead, schools have flexibility in 
+
+sport, and “a reasonable expectation of competition for the 
+
+distributing athletics resources. 
+
+team.” If each of these factors is present, then a recipient 
+has not satisfied the third prong. 
+
+ Effective Accommodation of Interests and Abilities 
+ Title IX regulations require schools that offer athletics 
+
+OCR recommends that institutions have procedures for 
+
+programs to “effectively accommodate the interests and 
+
+determining the interests and abilities of students of the 
+
+abilities of members of both sexes.” OCR assesses whether 
+
+underrepresented sex, including documentation and 
+
+an institution has effectively accommodated the athletic 
+
+monitoring of the underrepresented sex’s participation in 
+
+interests and abilities of students sufficient to provide equal 
+
+club and intramural sports. OCR recommends similar 
+
+athletic opportunities by using a “Three-Part Test.” Under 
+
+examination of the participation of the underrepresented sex 
+
+this test, institutions will be in compliance with the 
+
+in high school athletics programs, amateur associations, and 
+
+effective accommodation requirement if 
+
+community leagues in the areas from which an institution 
+draws its students. This type of documentation may be 
+
+1. “Intercollegiate level participation 
+
+needed to demonstrate that an institution is properly 
+
+opportunities for male and female 
+
+assessing the interests and abilities of its students. Surveys 
+
+students are provided in numbers 
+
+are one method of accomplishing this goal. 
+
+substantially proportionate to their 
+respective enrollments”; or 
+
+ Emerging Legal Issues 
+
+2. “[T]he institution can show a history and 
+
+One developing legal issue regarding athletics and Title IX 
+
+continuing practice of program 
+
+is the participation of transgender students on sports teams. 
+
+expansion” responsive to the interests of 
+
+State laws and policies on the matter range from permitting 
+
+an underrepresented sex; or 
+
+transgender students to participate consistent with their 
+gender identity to prohibitions on doing so. In turn, legal 
+
+3. The institution is “fully and effectively” 
+
+challenges alleging Title IX violations have been brought 
+
+accommodating the interests and abilities 
+
+against both approaches. For instance, students have 
+
+of an underrepresented sex. 
+
+challenged policies that permit transgender girls to 
+
+Recipient schools need to meet only one of the prongs to 
+
+participate in sports consistent with their gender identity, 
+
+comply with the effective accommodation requirement. 
+
+arguing it deprives them of equal athletic opportunities. 
+Likewise, transgender students prohibited from competing 
+
+ Substantially Proportionate : An inquiry into whether 
+
+in sports consistent with their gender identity have 
+
+participation opportunities are substantially proportionate to 
+
+challenged such policies as discrimination based on sex in 
+
+male and female enrollment is conducted on a case-by-case 
+
+violation of Title IX. 
+
+basis, with consideration of the specific circumstances and 
+size of a program. For instance, if an institution’s 
+
+In June 2022, ED issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
+
+enrollment percentages for each sex match participation 
+
+that would address other aspects of Title IX, such as sex-
+
+rates, this prong is satisfied. According to OCR, the test can 
+
+based harassment and gender identity more generally. See 
+
+also be met if the number of opportunities “required to 
+
+CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10804, Education Department 
+
+achieve proportionality would not be sufficient to sustain a 
+
+ Proposes New Title IX Regulations: Responding to Sex 
+
+viable team.” In other words, if the participation rate for a 
+
+ Discrimination and Harassment at School , by Jared P. 
+
+given sex is less than the enrollment figures but the 
+
+Cole; and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10830, Education 
+
+difference in prospective additional athletes would not be 
+
+ Department Proposes New Title IX Regulations: Sexual 
+
+enough to sustain a viable intercollegiate team, then the test 
+
+ Orientation and Gender Identity , by Jared P. Cole. The 
+
+may be satisfied. 
+
+agency indicated it would conduct a separate rulemaking 
+addressing athletics that would specifically establish what 
+
+ Program Expansion : The second prong of the three-part 
+
+criteria schools may use to determine a student’s ability to 
+
+test asks if an institution can show a history and continuing 
+
+participate on a particular female or male team.
+
+practice of program expansion that is demonstrably 
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+ 
+ Title IX and Athletics: Legal Basics 
+
+ 
+
+ Jared P. Cole , Legislative Attorney 
+
+ IF12325 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to 
+congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. 
+Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has 
+been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the 
+United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be 
+reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include 
+copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you 
+wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+ 
+
+ https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12325 · VERSION 1 · NEW
\ No newline at end of file
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+Order Code RL33757
+
+ U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment 
+
+ Requirements: Background and Issues 
+
+ for Congress 
+
+ Updated June 15, 2007 
+
+Andrew Feickert
+
+Specialist in National Defense
+
+Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
+
+ 
+ U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment Requirements:
+
+Background and Issues for Congress
+
+ Summary 
+
+The United States Army and Marine Corps have been at war — first in
+
+Afghanistan and then Iraq — since November 2001. The Army’s and Marine
+Corps’ equipment has been employed in what has been described as “the harsh
+operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan” where the heat, sand, and dust as
+well as operational rates “well in excess of peacetime rates” have taken a heavy toll
+on the Army’s and Marines’ equipment. 
+
+Re-equipping Reserve and National Guard units that, in many cases, were
+
+under-equipped to start with and then required to leave their equipment in theater
+also presents challenges to the services. The Army and Marine Corps are also
+undertaking efforts to re-equip their pre-positioned stocks which were drawn upon
+to provide equipment for use in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are also concerns that
+the Army and Marines have not always aggressively pursued the best force protection
+equipment available and the Army has been questioned on its efforts to improve the
+standard soldier assault rifle. Congress, in its appropriation, authorization, and
+oversight roles may be faced with some of the following issues:
+
+! What are the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) and the Service’s
+
+plans to re-equip reserve forces so that they are sufficiently
+resourced for domestic missions and to properly train for
+deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan?;
+
+! What is the current state of pre-positioned stocks that have been
+
+drawn down again to support the Iraq “surge”? What type of
+equipment is being used to restock pre-positioned stocks and is this
+equipment fully operational or in a lesser state of readiness?;
+
+! Were the Services aggressive enough in pursuing the acquisition of
+
+MRAPs or is the recent move to replace all uparmored high-
+mobility, multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) with MRAPs “too
+little, too late”?; and
+
+! Have bureaucratic difficulties attributed to the Army and DOD had
+
+an adverse impact on efforts to find a suitable replacement for the
+Army’s M-16/M-4 series of assault rifles?
+
+This report will be updated on a periodic basis.
+
+ 
+ Contents 
+
+Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+
+Historical Perspective on Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+
+Equipping Units to Their Authorized Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+Equipping Units Above Authorized Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+
+Current Initiatives Impacting Equipping the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+
+The Iraq Troop “Surge” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+Increase to Army and Marine Corps Endstrengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+
+Coping With Equipment Shortfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+
+Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Proof (MRAP) Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+
+The Evolving Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+MRAP Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+Recent Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+
+Body Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+
+Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+Marines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+Dragon Skin Body Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+Replacing M-16 and M-4 Carbines? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+
+Reset: Replacing Damaged, Destroyed, and Worn-Out Equipment . . . . . . 14
+
+The Army and Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+The Marines and Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
+
+Potential Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
+
+Equipping Reserve Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
+The State of Prepositioned Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
+Were the Services Aggressive Enough in Acquiring MRAPs? . . . . . . . . . . 18
+A Replacement for M-16/M-4 Carbines? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
+
+ List of Tables 
+
+Table 1. Selected MEF (Forward) Equipment Density Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+
+ 
+ U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment
+
+Requirements: Background and Issues for
+
+Congress
+
+ Background 
+
+The United States Army and Marine Corps have been at war — first in
+
+Afghanistan and, then Iraq — since November 2001. The Army is in its sixth year
+of sustained combat and has maintained up to 21 brigade combat teams in Iraq and
+Afghanistan.1 In a similar manner, the Marine Corps has deployed its forces and
+equipment in what has been described as “the harsh operating environments of Iraq
+and Afghanistan” where the heat, sand, and dust as well as operational rates “well in
+excess of peacetime rates” have taken a heavy toll on the service’s equipment, which,
+in some cases, was more than 20 years old when the conflicts first began.2 
+
+Equipping Reserve and National Guard units also presents challenges to the
+
+services. Traditionally, the Army National Guard and Reserve have been
+characterized as under-equipped and often times equipped with older equipment than
+their Active component counterparts. The Army has committed to both man and
+equip the Army Reserves and National Guard in a similar manner to the Active
+component. 3 The Army and Marine Corps are also undertaking efforts to re-equip
+their pre-positioned stocks which were drawn upon to provide equipment for use in
+Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army and Marines are also actively pursuing the
+acquisition of new equipment based on wartime experiences. The Army and Marines
+have a number of equipment-related challenges to rectify which may require
+significant funding and management efforts.
+
+ Historical Perspective on Equipment 
+
+Equipping Army and Marine units has been a long-standing concern of
+
+Congress that has taken on added importance as weapons and equipment have
+become exponentially more sophisticated and expensive. With few exceptions,
+almost all Army and Marine Corps units have historically faced equipment shortages.
+
+1 Congressional Transcripts, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Hearing on
+Army Acquisition Programs, April 17, 2007, p. 3.
+
+2 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
+Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
+Services, House of Representatives, “Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
+Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps,” GAO-06-604T,
+March 30, 2006. 
+
+3 Donna Miles, “Army to Ensure Reserve Components Fully Manned, Trained, Equipped,”
+American Forces Press Service, February 2, 2006.
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+In these cases, units either “made do” with the equipment on hand or, if leadership
+directed, equipment could be transferred from one unit to another — referred to as
+“cross leveling” — to increase a unit’s equipment holdings at the expense of another
+unit or organization. Reserve forces, which in the past constituted the nation’s
+“Strategic Reserve,” usually had less equipment than their active duty counterparts
+and much of this equipment tended to be older models. 
+
+Protracted conflicts — like Afghanistan and Iraq — serve the purpose of
+
+identifying what equipment works and what equipment does not, as well as
+identifying requirements for new equipment. In the later case, the wars in Iraq and
+Afghanistan have generated requirements for new equipment such as Mine-
+Resistant, Ambush-Proof (MRAP) vehicles. Protracted conflicts also dramatically
+increase equipment operational usage rates, resulting in reduced useful life and
+increasing repair and replacement requirements.
+
+ Equipping the Force 
+
+There are a number of dimensions to equipping Army and Marine Corps units
+
+that are examined in the following sections. Equipping units might appear to be a
+relatively straight forward exercise, but there are a variety of factors involved.
+Funding is perhaps the foremost issue, as funding is often limited, requiring the
+services often to make trade-offs between equipment needed to sustain operations
+and equipment for reorganization or modernization efforts. Another issue is that even
+if funds are readily available, the equipment might not be. Army officials maintain
+that for some systems, it can take up to three years after receiving funding before they
+can be fielded to units.4 
+
+ Equipping Units to Their Authorized Levels. Prior to units being
+
+deployed on operations, the Army and Marine Corps typically attempt to bring these
+units up to their authorized levels of both personnel and equipment. In terms of
+equipping forces, there are a number of options available. The first option is to
+requisition the needed equipment through each service’s respective supply chain, but
+this option may not be practical if a unit’s equipment needs are significant or if the
+unit does not have a great deal of time before it deploys. Other options for equipping
+units include cross-leveling and drawing equipment “in-theater” when a unit deploys.
+These other two options will be discussed in greater detail in following sections. 
+
+ Equipping Units Above Authorized Levels. Both the Army and Marines
+
+are providing their units with additional equipment over and above their peacetime
+authorized levels, which is placing significant equipment demands on both services.5
+
+4 From discussions with the Army’s Material Division, G-8 Section of the Army Staff on
+October 25, 2006.
+
+5 Information in this section is taken from the Statement of General Michael W. Hagee,
+Commandant of the Marine Corps before the House Armed Services Committee Hearing on
+Army and Marine Corps Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006,
+and a discussion with the Army’s Material Division, G-8 Section of the Army Staff on July
+
+(continued...)
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+The Army maintains that its brigade combat teams (BCTs) are operating over a much
+wider geographical area than they were designed for and therefore require additional
+equipment to facilitate these dispersed operations. In addition, units such as the 10th
+Mountain Division, 101st Airborne, and 82nd Airborne, the Army’s light, largely foot-
+mobile infantry units, require extensive equipment augmentation — particularly
+vehicles — in order to operate over the large areas assigned to them. 
+
+The Marines suggest that: 
+
+The Marine Corps is executing a number of operational missions that are
+inherently ground equipment intensive. Stability and Support Operations
+(SASO), Counter-Insurgency (COIN), Civil Military Operations, and Foreign
+Military Training all require a greater quantity of equipment than our
+programmed levels for traditional combat operations. In order to adapt to these
+new mission requirements, we have revised the Equipment Density List,
+increasing the quantity of equipment issued to Marine Units deploying into the
+CENTCOM6 ... Our forward operating bases are not in close proximity to each
+other; the large distances between forward operational bases require additional
+vehicles, communications capabilities, and crew-served weapons over and above
+the standard unit Equipment Density List ... The increased ground equipment
+requirement, when coupled with high utilization rates, results in a Corps-wide
+degradation of equipment.7
+
+The following table provides a selective comparison of a Marine Expeditionary
+
+Force (MEF) (Forward) — an approximately 18,000 Marine force — pre-war and
+revised equipment requirements.8
+
+ Table 1. Selected MEF (Forward) Equipment Density 
+
+ Comparison 
+
+ Pre-War Equipment 
+
+ Revised Equipment 
+
+ Equipment 
+
+ Density List 
+
+ Density List 
+
+PRC-117 Radio
+
+78
+
+205
+
+7-Ton Medium Tactical
+Vehicle Replacement (MTVR)
+
+540
+
+1015
+
+Armored HMMWV
+
+311
+
+981
+
+M-2 50-Caliber Machine Gun
+
+534
+
+634
+
+5 (...continued)
+12, 2006.
+
+6 U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is the Unified Combatant Command responsible for
+operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other geographical locations within their
+command jurisdiction. 
+
+7 Statement of General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps before the
+House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Army and Marine Corps Strategies for
+Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006, p. 5.
+
+8 Ibid.
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+ Current Initiatives Impacting Equipping the Force 
+
+ The Iraq Troop “Surge” 
+
+In early January 2007, President Bush directed that five additional Army active
+
+duty BCTs and two additional Marine battalions plus additional Army and Marine
+support units would deploy to Iraq to help the Iraqi government stabilize the ever-
+worsening security situation.9 Each Army BCT consists of approximately 4,000
+soldiers and some 40,000 pieces of equipment. The unforecasted requirement to
+fully equip these “surge” forces will likely cause additional strain on already depleted
+equipment stocks, with some suggesting that specialized items such as electronic
+jammers to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs), M117 Armored Security
+Vehicles, and Mine Resistant Ambush-Proof (MRAP) vehicles might be in
+particularly short supply.10 
+
+ Increase to Army and Marine Corps Endstrengths 
+
+On January 19, 2007, after having resisted previous congressional calls to
+
+permanently increase the end strengths of the Army and Marine Corps, the
+Department of Defense announced that it would seek approval to increase the
+permanent end strengths of the active Army by 65,000 and the active Marine Corps
+by 27,000.11 The Army plans to create six additional brigade combat teams (BCTs),
+and two additional Patriot missile battalions and the Marines plan to create an
+additional regimental combat team (RCT) from the increased endstrength.12 These
+additional troops will also permit both services to fill shortages in existing
+organizations and create other smaller units that are in high demand. Although
+specific types and quantities of equipment needed for new Army units has not been
+made publically available, Army officials have stated that they will require $18
+billion over the next five fiscal years to equip these new units.13
+
+ Coping With Equipment Shortfalls 
+
+ Cross-Leveling. Cross-leveling is the practice of transferring equipment to
+
+a unit either from another unit or from some type of equipment pool such as pre-
+positioned stocks. In the case of a unit-to-unit transfer, the transferred equipment
+
+9 David S. Cloud and Thom Shanker, “Bush’s Troop-Increase Plan is Expected to Draw Six
+Guard Brigades to Iraq,” New York Times, January 10, 2007.
+
+10 Peter W. Singer, “While Some Welcome Additional Troops, Equipment and Retention
+Rates could Suffer,” Defense News, January 29, 2007.
+
+11 Department of Defense (DOD) Press Transcripts, DOD News Briefing with Under
+Secretary of Defense David Chu, Lieutenant General Stephen Speakes, and Lieutenant
+General Emerson Gardner from the Pentagon, January 19, 2007. 
+
+12 Ibid. 
+
+13 Nathan Hodge, “US Army to Spend $18 Billion to Equip a Larger Force,” Jane’s Defence
+Weekly , January 31, 2007.
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+often comes from a similar-type unit, usually in a non-deployable status. Both the
+Army and Marines have made extensive use of cross-leveling, particularly early on
+in the Afghan and Iraq conflicts. According to General Michael W. Hagee,
+Commandant of the Marine Corps, “equipment across the Marine Corps is
+continuously cross-leveled and redistributed to ensure that units preparing to deploy
+have sufficient equipment available.”14 
+
+ Equipment in Theater. 15 The Army has kept large quantities of equipment
+
+in theater, primarily to conserve strategic transportation assets and reduce costs, but
+also to ensure that units are adequately equipped when deployed. This initiative —
+called Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) — began in late 2003 when Army units,
+including Active, National Guard and Reserve, were directed to leave much of their
+equipment in theater when they redeployed back to the United States. This
+equipment is then “handed-off” to units deploying to both Operations Enduring
+Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). TPE consists of
+a variety of equipment items including armored vehicles, individual soldier body
+armor, and equipment used to counter improvised explosive devices. The Marines
+have also directed that equipment needed for OEF and OIF be left in theater. As
+previously noted, because mission requirements require additional equipment beyond
+a unit’s peacetime equipment allowance, the Marines have developed expanded
+equipment packages in theater for deploying units.
+
+Both Services have also set aside pools of equipment to rapidly replace
+
+equipment damaged and destroyed during operations. The Army refers to this pool
+of equipment as Theater Sustainment Stocks (TSS). This includes as many as 400
+different types of vehicles and equipment numbering about 174,000 pieces of
+equipment including, Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, HMMWVs, and other
+support vehicles. The Marines also have developed a similar pool of equipment
+known as Forward In-Stores to replace major equipment damaged or destroyed.
+
+ Requirement to Replace Reserve and National Guard Equipment 
+
+ Left in Theater. In late 2003, the Army directed National Guard and Reserve units
+to leave selected items of equipment in theater when redeploying to the United
+States.16 This equipment left behind by Guard and Reserve units is placed in both the
+TPE and TSS equipment pools, along with equipment left in theater by Active Army
+
+14 Statement of General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps before the
+House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Army and Marine Corps Strategies for
+Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006, p. 3.
+
+15 Information in this section is taken from United States Government Accountability Office
+(GAO) Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land
+Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Defense Logistics:
+Preliminary Observations on Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and
+Marine Corps, GAO-06-604T, March 30, 2006, p. 6.
+
+16 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
+Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
+Services, House of Representatives, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
+Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps, GAO-06-604T,
+March 30, 2006, p 16.
+
+ 
+ CRS-6
+
+units. DOD Policy17 requires that the Army replace equipment transferred to it by
+reserve components and if that equipment is left in theater, the Army must provide
+“plans to replace equipment for units returning home to ensure training readiness.”18
+National Guard leadership has reportedly stated that the Army National Guard, on
+aggregate, has only 56% of its authorized equipment.19 It is not known if the Army
+has developed plans to replace National Guard and Reserve equipment left in Iraq
+and if efforts are underway to meet this DOD policy.
+
+ Recent Congressional Action. The House Armed Services Committee,
+
+concerned over the Reserve’s deteriorating equipment situation, recommended
+adding $1 billion to the President’s $5.7 billion request for Army Reserve and
+National Guard equipment procurement for FY2008. 20 The Senate Armed Services
+Committee supported the Administration’s $5.7 billion request for FY2008.21
+
+ Equipment from Prepositioned Stocks. Another source for equipping
+
+Army and Marine Corps units is equipment from prepositioned stocks either ashore
+or afloat. Reports maintain that both the Army and Marines have drawn extensively
+on prepositioned stocks to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.22 While
+drawing on these stocks has facilitated operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, by
+depleting these stocks, DOD has assumed near-term operational risks if another large
+scale conflict breaks out. While the remnants of these prepositioned stocks provide
+a degree of residual capability, there are supposedly some significant inventory and
+maintenance shortfalls.23 
+
+To support operations, the Army reportedly used almost all of its prepositioned
+
+ship stocks and its stocks ashore in Kuwait and Qatar as well as some stocks in
+
+17 Department of Defense Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, April 7, 2005.
+
+18 Ibid., p. 3.
+
+19 Peter Spiegel, “Guard Equipment Levels Lowest Since 9/11,” Los Angeles Times, May
+10, 2007.
+
+20 House Armed Services Committee Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for
+Fiscal Year 2008 (H.R. 1585), H.Rept. 110-146, May 11, 2007, pp. 466-7.
+
+21 Senate Armed Services Committee Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for
+Fiscal Year 2008 (S. 1547), S.Rept. 110-77, June 5, 2007.
+
+22 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from United States
+Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the Subcommittee on
+Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
+Representatives, “Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on Equipment Reset
+Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps,” GAO-06-604T, March 30, 2006,
+pp. 15-16.
+
+23 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
+Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives,
+“Military Prepositioning: Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs During
+Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond,” GAO-04-562T, March 24, 2006, p. 11. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-7
+
+Europe.24 This included more than 10,000 pieces of rolling stock, 670,000 repair
+parts, 3,000 containers and thousands of other items of equipment.25 According to
+General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Marines drew
+equipment and supplies from the Marine Corp’s two prepositioning programs — the
+Maritime Prepositioning Force and the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program
+(Norway) — to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.26 
+
+ Reconstituting Prepositioned Stocks. The Army and Marines are attempting
+
+to reconstitute their prepositioned stocks. The Army is reportedly focusing on
+building two brigade-sized equipment sets in Kuwait and battalion sized sets in Qatar
+and Afghanistan.27 Equipment that is being used to form these sets is coming from
+a combination of equipment left in theater, equipment being transferred from U.S.
+depots, and from units around the world. Much of this equipment is described as
+needing “substantial repair.”28
+
+ Prepositioned Stocks Being Used to Support Iraq “Surge”. Reports
+
+suggest that prepositioned stocks that were being rebuilt, have been drawn on heavily
+primarily to support the Iraq “surge” resulting in the lowest level of prepositioned
+stocks in five years.29 Under normal circumstances, the Army has five full brigades’
+worth of prepositioned equipment available: two brigades’ worth in Kuwait; one
+brigade in Korea, and two brigades’ worth aboard ships in Guam and at the U.S.
+naval base at Diego Garcia.30 In order to provide equipment to surging forces, the
+Army used the afloat stocks and are also using the Kuwaiti stocks to equip units.
+Only the South Korean stocks are largely intact. According to former Chief of Staff
+of the Army General (GEN) Peter Schoomaker, it will take two years to rebuild the
+prepositioned stocks, a fact that worries both military officials and Congress, as these
+equipment shortages severely limit the Army’s ability to respond to other military
+contingencies. The Army estimates that it will require an additional $2.2 billion to
+
+24 Ibid. 
+
+25 Ibid. 
+
+26 Statement of General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps before the
+House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Army and Marine Corps Strategies for
+Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006, p. 6.
+
+27 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
+Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
+Services, House of Representatives, “Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
+Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps,” GAO-06-604T,
+March 30, 2006, pp. 15-16.
+
+28 Ibid.
+
+29 Roxana Tiron, “Panel Questions Equipment Deployment,” The Hill.com, March 14, 2007
+and Kris Osborn, “U.S. Army: Prepositioned Stocks at 5-Year Low,” DefenseNews.com ,
+April 11, 2007.
+
+30 Information in this section is taken from Ann Scott Tyson, “Military is Ill-Prepared for
+Other Conflicts, Washington Post, March 19, 2007.
+
+ 
+ CRS-8
+
+replace prepositioned equipment that was issued to support the “surge.”31 In
+February 2007, the Marines testified to Congress that “two of our three Maritime
+Prepositioning Squadrons have undergone extensive equipment maintenance and
+have been restored to historical readiness rates of 98 percent” and that the remaining
+Maritime Prepositioning Squadron “is at about 48 percent and is still awaiting
+delivery of equipment.”32
+
+ War-Related Equipment Needs 
+
+The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have generated a variety of equipment
+
+requirements. These requirements range from developing new equipment, providing
+commercially-available equipment to service members and units, and modifying
+existing equipment. The early years of the Afghan and Iraq wars revealed
+deficiencies both in quantity and quality of protective equipment such as body armor
+for individual troops and armor protection for wheeled vehicles. Congressional
+involvement has played a significant role in focusing DOD’s attention and resources
+in addressing these force protection deficiencies, which have seen significant
+improvement over the past few years. Body armor remains an ongoing issue; some
+are concerned that the Army’s M-16 series of weapons are not reliable; and one
+relatively current force protection initiative, the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Proof
+(MRAP) vehicle, is receiving considerable attention. 
+
+ Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Proof (MRAP) Vehicles 
+
+MRAP refers to a family of vehicles produced by a variety of U.S. and
+
+international companies that generally incorporate a “V” shaped hull and armor
+plating designed to provide protection against mines and improvised explosive
+devices (IEDs) which are responsible for about 70% of U.S. casualties in Iraq. There
+are three categories of MRAPs that DOD intends to procure: 
+
+! Category I vehicles weighing about seven tons and capable of
+
+carrying six passengers;
+
+! Category II vehicles weighing about 19 tons, are capable of carrying
+
+10 passengers and can perform a variety of missions including
+ambulance transport and convoy escort; and
+
+! Category III vehicles intended to be used primarily to clear mines
+
+and IEDs, weighing about 22.5 tons and capable of carrying up to 12
+passengers.
+
+31 Congressional Transcript - House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Hearing on
+Army Reset, April 18, 2007, p. 4.
+
+32 Statement of Lieutenant General Emerson N. Gardner, Jr., “U.S. Marine Corps and U.S.
+Navy Reset Requirements,” before the House Subcommittees on Readiness and on
+Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, February 13, 2007, p. 2.
+
+ 
+ CRS-9
+
+In contrast, the High Mobility, Multi Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) weighs
+
+about three tons and the M-1 Abrams tank, about 71 tons.33 The Army and Marines
+have employed two versions of MRAPs (the Buffalo and Cougar, respectively) in
+limited numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003, primarily for route clearance
+and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations. MRAPs have been described as
+providing “twice as much protection against IEDs”34 as uparmored HMMWVs. Both
+the Army and Marines continue to use various armored versions of the HMMWV as
+their primary troop transport. In February 2007, senior defense officials reportedly
+planned to accelerate the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program (the
+HMMWV’s replacement) so it could be fielded to units in 2012 — meaning that
+U.S. forces would continue to employ HMMWVs as their primary wheeled ground
+troop transport for at least another five years.35
+
+ The Evolving Requirement. The Army’s Buffalo MRAP vehicle was
+
+originally intended to be fielded only to engineer units. The Army planned to stand
+up three Route Clearance Companies per year starting in FY2007, for a total of
+twelve companies.36 The Army requested $500 million and the Navy $172 million
+in FY2008 for MRAPs; and the Army another $520 million additional supplemental
+funding for the end of FY2007.37 As of February 2007, the Army reportedly planned
+to acquire 2,500 MRAPs while the Marines planned to acquire 3,594 MRAPs.38
+Senior Army officials stressed that MRAPs were only “an interim strategy” and that
+the Army was still “dedicated to the future of the [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle].39
+Also in February 2007, it was reported that Marine Corps leadership decided to
+replace all uparmored HMMWVs in Iraq with MRAPs while Army leadership would
+continue to rely on uparmored HMMWVs.40 Reports suggest, however, that Marine
+leadership chose not to procure 1,169 MRAP vehicles that were requested in
+February 2005 by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, opting to continue using
+uparmored HMMWVs instead.41 
+
+33 Ibid.
+
+34 Tom Vanden Brook, “Troops in Iraq Get Safer Vehicle, USA Today, May 10, 2007.
+
+35 Nathan Hodge, “US Considers Accelerating Purchase of JLTV,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
+February 28, 2007, p. 11. 
+
+36 Statement by Major General Stephen M. Speakes, Major General Jeffrey A. Sorenson, and
+Brigadier General Stephen D. Mundt, Readiness Subcommittee and Tactical Air and Land
+Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Army Force Protection and
+Aviation Safety Programs, February 1, 2006, p. 6.
+
+37 Fawzia Sheikh, “Industry Unclear About Army’s Pans for Joint-Service MRAP Program,”
+ InsideDefense.com, February 12, 2007.
+
+38 Ibid. 
+
+39 Ibid. 
+
+40 David Wood, “Marines to Replace Humvees in Iraq,” Baltimore Sun, February 15, 2007.
+
+41 Jason Sherman, “Marines Rejected Original Request for MRAP in 2005; Biden Shocked
+and Sickened.” InsideDefense.com, May 22, 2007 and Tom Vanden Brook, “Corps Refused
+2005 Plea for MRAP Vehicles,” USA Today, May 24, 2007.
+
+ 
+ CRS-10
+
+The Marines placed their first order for 215 MRAPs out of a total requirement
+
+of almost 3,600 MRAPs on February 15, 2007,42 and placed their second order for
+180 additional MRAPs on February 23, 2007.43 In March 2007, the MRAP
+requirement for all services reportedly grew by 15% as the Navy, Air Force, and the
+Special Operations Command (SOCOM) added requirements for MRAPs which
+stood at 7,774 DOD-wide as of March 26, 2007.44 
+
+Many in Congress were not pleased with DOD’s FY2008 Budget requests for
+
+the funding of MRAP vehicles, noting that “they were dismayed by the shortfall of
+funding requested by the Department of Defense in its supplemental request”45 and
+“concerned that the fiscal year 2008 budget request ... did not adequately resource the
+remaining MRAP funding requirement.”46 In early May, allegedly due to the requests
+from Army commanders in Iraq, Army leadership reportedly began considering the
+possibility of replacing all uparmored HMMWVs in Iraq with MRAPs — thereby
+increasing the Army’s total requirement to approximately 17,000 MRAP vehicles.47
+The Army might increase its total MRAP requirement to more than 23,000 vehicles
+as Army officials have recently been dispatched to the U.S. Central Command
+(CENTCOM) area of operations to better ascertain commander’s MRAP
+requirements.48
+
+On May 2, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates declared that “the MRAP
+
+program should be considered the highest priority Department of Defense acquisition
+program” and also expressed his concern with “the wide variance in approach”
+between the Army and Marine Corps.49 After this memorandum was issued, the
+Acting Secretary of the Army reportedly increased the Army’s MRAP requirements
+to 17,700 vehicles to replace over the next two years all 17,700 HMMWVs in Iraq,
+with 9,000 MRAPs to be produced in FY2008 and 8,700 in FY2009.50 On May 30,
+2007 the Secretary of Defense established an MRAP Task Force to speed production
+and fielding of MRAPs and also designated the MRAP program as a “DX” program,
+
+42 Natahn Hodge, “USMC Moves Quickly to Place MRAP Contracts,” Jane’s Defence
+Weekly, February 21, 2007, p. 10.
+
+43 Alon Ben-David, “USMC Places More Orders for MRAP Vehicles,” Jane’s Defence
+Weekly, March 7, 2007, p. 10. 
+
+44 Jason Sherman, “MRAP Requirement Rises 15 Percent as Navy, Air Force, SOCOM
+Weigh In,” InsideDefense.com, March 26, 2007.
+
+45 Fawzia Sheikh, “House Criticizes DOD’s Funding Request for Vehicles Countering
+IEDs,” InsideDefense.com, April 2, 2007.
+
+46 House Armed Services Committee Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for
+Fiscal Year 2008,” Report 110-146, May 11, 2007, p. 466.
+
+47 Jason Sherman, “Army Eying the Replacement of all Humvess in Iraq with MRAP
+Vehicles,” Inside the Pentagon, May 3, 2007. 
+
+48 Jason Sherman, “Army Leaders Due in Iraq to Add Up MRAP Needs: Program Could
+Grow,” Inside the Army, June 11, 2007.
+
+49 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “MRAP Acquisition,” May 2,
+2007. 
+
+50 Gina Cavallro, Army to Make Request for 17,000 MRAPs,” Army Times, May 10, 2007.
+
+ 
+ CRS-11
+
+giving it priority for resources.51 Some maintain that DOD’s emphasis on acquiring
+large numbers of MRAPs for the Services will essentially “kill the Joint Light
+Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and HMMWV lines.”52
+
+ MRAP Concerns. While MRAP vehicles appear to offer significantly more
+
+protection than the current fleet of uparmored HMMWVs, there are a number of
+concerns. Reports suggest that no single company can produce more than 1,200
+MRAPs per month and some suggest that Pentagon believes that by the end of the
+year, only a maximum of 977 MRAPs can be produced per month.53 Another
+concern is that there might not be adequate supplies of steel for armor and rubber for
+tires.54 The priority placed on MRAP production might also have an impact on other
+programs such as the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) program
+because of a competition for resources such as tires, thin-gauge armor, and high
+strength steel plates.55 Another potential concern is that MRAPs may not be able to
+withstand Explosive Formed Penetrator (EFP)-type of improvised explosive devices
+currently being employed by Iraqi insurgents with great effect. Reports suggest that
+add-on armor might be required to provide MRAPs with additional protection.56
+Even if production and armor concerns are overcome, some believe that the
+deployment of MRAPs in any meaningful quantities will be “too little, to late,” as
+U.S. forces in Iraq may be significantly reduced over the next year if progress is not
+made to bring stability to the country. Although MRAPs provide enhanced armored
+protection, some military officials note that they are often too large and too unwieldy
+to operate in restrictive environments and the Marines maintain that MRAPs are not
+expeditionary and are not shipboard compatible.57 It is also not unreasonable to
+assume that MRAPs will have similar air transportability issues which could impact
+on rapid unit deployment during contingency operations. 
+
+ Recent Congressional Action. The House Armed Services Committee,
+
+“concerned that the fiscal year 2008 budget request ... did not adequately resource the
+remaining MRAP funding requirement,” recommended $4.6 billion, an increase of
+
+51 Jason Sherman, “Gates Establishes MRAP Task Force to Speed Up Production, Fielding,
+InsideDefense.com, June 4, 2007 and Emelie Rutherford, “Gates Approves DX Rating for
+MRAP,” InsideDefense.com, June 4, 2007.
+
+52 Gina Cavallaro, “MRAP Request May be the End of the Road for Humvee,” Army Times,
+ May 10, 2007.
+
+53 Jason Sherman, “Army Eyes $10 Billion in Procurement Cuts to Fund Larger MRAP
+Fleet,” Inside the Pentagon, May 17, 2007 and Tom Vanden Brook, “Army Seeks $20
+Billion for MRAPS, But Quick Fielding Has Hurdles,” USA Today, May 18, 2007.
+
+54 Jason Sherman, “Army Eyes $10 Billion in Procurement Cuts to Fund Larger MRAP
+Fleet.”
+
+55 Emelie Rutherford, “DOD Reviews How MRAP Priority Rating Might Affect Other
+Programs,” InsideDefense.com, June 11, 2007.
+
+56 Tom Vanden Brook, “MRAPS May Need Extra Armor to face EFPs,” USA Today, May
+31, 2007.
+
+57 Tom Vanden Brook, “Army Seeks $20 Billion for MRAPS, But Quick Fielding Has
+Hurdles,” USA Today, May 18, 2007 and Geoff Fein, “MRAP Testing Near Completion,
+Contracts Expected in June,” Defense Daily, April 25, 2007.
+
+ 
+ CRS-12
+
+$4.1 billion, to complete DOD’s MRAP requirement, using Service and DOD
+procurement funds from what it considered lower priority programs.58 The Senate
+Armed Services Committee added $4 billion over DOD’s requests for MRAPs —
+with almost $2 billion for Navy and Marine Corps requirements; over $1.5 billion for
+Army requirements; $430 million for Air Force MRAPs; and $124 million for
+SOCOM vehicles.59
+
+ Body Armor 
+
+In June 2007, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that “the
+
+Army and Marines are currently meeting theater ballistic requirements and the
+required amount of body armor needed for personnel in theater, including amounts
+needed for the surge of troops to Iraq.”60 Both the Army and Marines are involved in
+efforts to improve the current Interceptor body armor systems used in Iraq and
+Afghanistan.
+
+ Army. In April 2007, the Army announced that it would begin fielding
+
+improved body armor.61 The new body armor — the Improved Outer Tactical Vest
+(IOTV) — will continue to use Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI), and
+will weigh three pounds less than the current Outer Tactical Vest.62 In May 2007, the
+Army reportedly awarded two contracts to two different firms for $167 million to
+produce 230,000 IOTVs.63 
+ 
+
+ Marines. In March 2007, Marines began receiving a new Modular Tactical
+
+Vest that provides increased protection, improved load carrying capacity, and
+improved overall comfort.64 The new vest, although slightly heavier than the current
+version, provides more shrapnel protection against lower back and kidney areas and
+protects the side torso also. The Marine’s initial rollout is for 60,000 MTVs which
+is expected to be completed by December 2007.
+
+58 House Armed Services Committee Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for
+Fiscal Year 2008 (H.R. 1585), Report 110-146, May 11, 2007, pp. 466-7.
+
+59 Senate Armed Services Committee Press Release, Senate Statement on the FY-08 Defense
+Authorization Bill, May 25, 2007, p. 2.
+
+60 United States Government Accountability Office Testimony Before the House Armed
+Services “Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps” Body Armor Requirements,
+Controls, and Other Issues,” June 6, 2007, p. 3. 
+
+61 Program Executive Office - Soldier, “Army to Field Improved Body Armor” Ft. Belvoir,
+VA, April 2, 2007.
+
+62 Nathan Hodge, “US Army to Field Upgraded Body Armour System,” Jane’s Defence
+Weekly, April 11, 2007, p. 31.
+
+63 Matthew Cox, “Army Awards Contracts for New Vest,” Army Times, May 23, 2007. 
+
+64 Information in this section is from Sgt. Ethan E. Rocke, “Okinawa Marines First to
+Receive New Body Armor; Initial Reviews Positive for Corp’s Next Vest,” Marine Corps
+News, April 5, 2007. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-13
+
+ Dragon Skin Body Armor. On March 17, 2006, the Army issued a Safety of
+
+Use Message discontinuing the use of Dragon Skin body armor — a commercially
+developed product by Pinnacle Armor — that some soldiers had acquired privately
+for use in Iraq and Afghanistan.65 Army officials at the time, who had been
+examining Dragon Skin for potential use by the Army, stated that Dragon Skin was
+“not certified against small arms threats.”66 Since the ban on Dragon Skin by the
+Army, Pinnacle Armor Inc., as well as others have alleged that Dragon Skin
+performed better on the Army’s tests and subsequent private tests than the Army has
+suggested.67 On May 21, 2007, to counter these charges, the Army held a press
+conference where Army officials allege that Dragon Skin had “catastrophically
+failed” the Army’s tests.68 On May 21, Senators Levin and McCain wrote Secretary
+of Defense Gates asking him to have the Directors of Defense Research Engineering
+and Operational Test and Evaluation “conduct a comprehensive technical assessment
+of the individual body armor systems currently available.”69 During a House Armed
+Services Committee hearing on body armor on June 6, 2007, committee members
+called for additional testing for Dragon Skin body armor and the Army reportedly
+agreed to re-test Dragon Skin if its maker responded to the Army’s current request
+for proposal (RFP) for new body armor.70 The Air Force Material Command has
+reportedly recommended that the Air Force prohibit Pinnacle Armor, Inc., from
+signing new contracts with the U.S. government due the allegation that Pinnacle
+Armor had made false claims about Dragon Skin meeting government testing
+standards.71
+
+ Replacing M-16 and M-4 Carbines? 72 In the mid-1990s, the Army began
+
+fielding the M-4 carbine, a lighter, more compact version of the Vietnam-era M-16
+rifle which had a history of malfunctioning in combat. Both M-16 and M-4 carbines
+are manufactured by Colt and are currently used by U.S. forces fighting in Iraq and
+
+65 Safety of Use Message (SOUM) 06-017, “Discontinue Use of Unauthorized Body Armor,
+Dragon Skin,” issued by Program Executive Office - Soldier, March 17, 2006.
+
+66 Ibid.
+
+67 Adam Ciralsky and Lisa Meyers, “Are U.S. Soldiers Wearing the Best Body Armor,”
+MSNBC.com, May 20, 2007 and Matthew Cox, “ TV Report Questions Army Ban on
+Dragon Skin,” Army Times, May 21, 2007.
+
+68 DOD News Transcript, “DOD News Briefing with BG Brown from the Pentagon,” May
+21, 2007.
+
+69 Letter from the Senate Armed Services Committee from Senators Levin and McCain dated
+May 21, 2007.
+
+70 Jen DiMascio, “Lawmakers Support Test of Dragon Skin Body Armor,” Defense Daily,
+ Volume 234, Issue 47, June 7, 2007, p. 13 and Michelle Tan, “Army Agrees to Test Dragon
+Skin Body Armor,” Army Times, June 7, 2007.
+
+71 Megan Scully, “Air Force Officials Seek Disbarment of Body Armor Maker,” National
+Journal’s Congress Daily PM, June 11, 2007.
+
+72 Information in this section is taken from a series of articles by Matthew Cox, “Better than
+the M-4, But You Can’t Have One,” Army Times, March 1, 2007; “Competition Sought for
+New Army Rifle,” Army Times, April 27, 2007; and “Doomed Carbine the Victim of Army
+Infighting,” Army Times, June 4, 2007.
+
+ 
+ CRS-14
+
+Afghanistan. While many maintain that the M-4 is a much more reliable rifle than the
+M-16, it is alleged that soldiers have expressed significant concerns over the M-16’s
+and M-4’s lethality and reliability during combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2004,
+the Army’s Special Forces Operational Detachment — Delta (commonly referred to
+as “Delta Force”) replaced their M-4 carbines with Heckler & Koch 416 carbines.
+The Army’s program to replace the M-16 family of weapons — the Objective
+Individual Combat Weapon (OICW) program — began in 1994 and one component
+of that program, Heckler & Koch’s XM-8 assault rifle, was considered by some as
+the M-16’s/M-4’s replacement. As late as 2005, the XM-8 was reportedly close to
+being officially approved as the Army’s new assault rifle, but alleged acquisition and
+bureaucratic conflicts within the Army and between the Army and DOD supposedly
+compelled the Army to cancel the XM-8 program in October 2005. The Army
+reportedly plans to continue its procurement of M-16s and M-4s for “years to come,”
+and some in Congress have called for a “open competition” to choose a successor to
+the M-16 and M-4 assault rifles. 
+
+ Reset: Replacing Damaged, Destroyed, and Worn-Out
+Equipment 
+
+Replacing damaged, destroyed, and worn-out equipment arguably constitutes
+
+the most significant equipment issue - both in terms of cost and magnitude - facing
+the Army and Marine Corps. The process of replacing this equipment is generally
+referred to as “reset” by the Army and the Marines and is further defined as follows:73
+
+! Reset is defined as “a series of actions taken to restore unit
+
+equipment to a desired level of combat capability after returning
+from contingency operations”;
+
+! Reset includes the functions of repairing equipment and replacing 
+
+equipment that has either been lost in combat or worn to the point of
+being uneconomically repairable; and
+
+! Reset also includes the function of recapitalization which is the
+
+rebuilding or systemic upgrading of currently fielded systems to a
+“zero time/zero miles” status which is intended to extend service
+life, reduce operations and support costs, and improve reliability and
+enhance capability - often based on lessons learned in Iraq and
+Afghanistan. 
+
+ The Army and Reset. Army leadership has credited funding and “around-
+
+the-clock work” for an increase in FY2007’s reset rate.74 By the end of FY2007, the
+
+73 Statement by General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, Before the
+Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, “The Army’s Reset
+Strategy and Plan for Funding Reset Requirements,” June 27, 2006 and “Resetting the
+Force: The Equipment Challenge,” Association of the United States Army (AUSA)
+Torchbearer National Security Report, October 2005.
+
+74 Information in this section is taken from a statement by BG Charles A. Anderson, MG
+
+(continued...)
+
+ 
+ CRS-15
+
+Army predicts that it will have reset approximately 117,000 major items of
+equipment including:
+
+! 557 Aircraft;
+
+! 1,700 Tracked Vehicles;
+
+! 8,115 HMMWVs;
+
+! 1,800 Trucks;
+
+! 1,200 Trailers;
+
+! 39,000 Small Arms; and
+
+! 7,400 Generators.
+
+In FY2008, the Army hopes to reset 24 brigade combat teams (BCT), consisting
+
+of about 4,000 soldiers and about 40,000 pieces of equipment each, returning from
+operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
+
+ Funds for Reset. 75 In FY2007, the Army received $17.1 billion for reset and
+
+had obligated $11.2 billion of those funds by February 1, 2007. Also provided in
+FY2007 were $8.5 billion for reset-related procurement and $8.6 billion for
+Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA). For FY2008, the Army estimates that
+it will require between $16.1 to $17.1 billion for reset, but this figure could be higher
+due to requirements generated from “surge” operations in Iraq as well as the planned
+expansion of the Army. 
+
+ Recent Congressional Actions. The House Armed Services Committee,
+
+recognizing that the increased force levels in Iraq would “increase the amount of
+equipment that must be reset,” recommended $13.6 billion for Army reset for
+FY2008.76 The Senate Armed Services Committee supported the Administration’s
+$13.6 billion request for FY2008.77
+
+ The Marines and Reset. The Marines estimated that the cost to rest the
+
+Marine Corps at the end of FY2006 was $13.7 billion, a “rolling estimate that
+
+74 (...continued)
+Vincent E. Boles, BG Robert M. Radin, and Mr. Thomas E. Mullins before the House
+Subcommittee on Readiness and Air and Land Forces, January 31, 2007 and Gerry J.
+Gilmore, “Army Equipment Reset Program Ahead of 2006 Pace,” American Forces Press
+Services, February 1, 2007.
+
+75 Ibid.
+
+76 House Armed Services Committee Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for
+Fiscal Year 2008, H.Rept. 110-146, May 11, 2007, pp. 466-7.
+
+77 Senate Armed Services Committee Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for
+Fiscal Year 2008 (S. 1547), S.Rept. 110-77, June 5, 2007.
+
+ 
+ CRS-16
+
+included two years worth of depot at the conclusion of the current hostilities and is
+thus somewhat variable.”78 The Marines also noted that as of February 2007,
+Congress had provided $10.2 billion towards the $13.7 billion estimated total cost
+of Marine reset.79
+
+ Funds for Rest. In FY2007, the Marines received $4.2 billion for reset and
+
+had obligated 55% of these funds by February 13, 2007.80 For FY2008, the Marines
+requested $1.7 billion towards reset requirements.81
+
+ Recent Congressional Actions. The House Armed Services Committee
+
+recommended $8.4 billion for Marine reset for FY2008.82
+
+ Potential Issues for Congress 
+
+ Equipping Reserve Forces 
+
+There are continued concerns about the availability of equipment for reserve
+
+forces — particularly the Army National Guard — in terms of readiness to address
+domestic responsibilities as well as when these units are deployed to Iraq and
+Afghanistan. In January 2007, Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that:
+
+The high use of the National Guard for federal overseas missions has reduced
+equipment available for its state-led domestic missions, at the same time it faces
+an expanded array of threats at home.83
+
+On March 27, 2007, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National
+
+Guard Bureau, told the House Subcommittee on Readiness that the Army National
+Guard had only 40% of its required equipment on-hand, with an additional 11% of
+that equipment either deployed with units or left in theater for other units to use.84
+Lieutenant General Blum further maintained that this situation hindered the ability
+
+78 Statement of Lieutenant General Emerson N. Gardner, Jr., “U.S. Marine Corps and U.S.
+Navy Reset Requirements,” before the House Subcommittees on Readiness and on
+Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, February 13, 2007, p. 3.
+
+79 Ibid.
+
+80 Ibid., p. 4.
+
+81 Statement of Honorable Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy, before the House
+Armed Services Committee, March 1, 2007, p. 5.
+
+82 House Armed Services Committee Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for
+Fiscal Year 2008, H.Rept. 110-146, May 11, 2007, pp. 466-7.
+
+83 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) “Report on Reserve Forces:
+Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and
+Readiness,” GAO-07-60, January 2007, p. 1. 
+
+84 Statement by Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau
+before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness on Readiness of
+the Army and Air National Guard, March 27, 2007, p. 3.
+
+ 
+ CRS-17
+
+to train units and could slow the National Guard’s domestic response to disasters or
+terrorist incidents.85 Recent reports suggest that National Guard soldiers training for
+deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan are not able to train with the same rifles,
+HMMWVs, night vision, and other types of equipment that these soldiers will be
+issued when they arrive in theater which has raised questions as to how well these
+units will be able to function in combat when they are provided equipment that they
+are not familiar with?86 The Army has reportedly pledged to spend $21 billion over
+the next four years to re-equip the National Guard, but some are concerned that this
+equipment will instead be deployed to Iraq to support the “Surge” instead of being
+used to re-equip depleted National Guard units at home as they prepare to support
+domestic missions and train for overseas deployments.87 
+
+Given these concerns, Congress might decide to examine DOD’s and the
+
+Army’s plans to re-equip National Guard units. Such an examination could focus on
+how units will be re-equipped to deal with domestic responsibilities and also how
+these units will be provided with the same equipment that they will receive upon
+deployment for home-station training in the United States. This examination might
+also examine how DOD and the Army plan to bring the Reserve’s aggregate
+equipment level from about the current 40% level to at least the 80% level that Guard
+and Reserve leadership have called an “acceptable level” to meet both domestic and
+overseas requirements.88 
+
+ The State of Prepositioned Stocks89 
+
+Some in Congress have expressed alarm in both the extended duration of time
+
+that DOD has allocated to reconstitute prepositioned stocks as well as a lack of a
+comprehensive plan to reconstitute these strategic assets. In its version of the FY2008
+National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1585), the House Armed Services
+Committee requires DOD to submit an annual report on the status of U.S.
+prepositioned stocks, including funding requirements, intended future strategic use
+of these stocks, and strategic risk mitigation plan if these stocks are used before fully
+replenished. There are other potential considerations related to preposition stocks
+that Congress might decide to review. Will the Army and Marines reconstitute
+preposition stocks with equipment such as Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs),
+MRAPs, and other specialized equipment developed in response to wartime needs
+or will the Services instead replenish prepositioned stocks to pre-war authorization
+standards? Another consideration is the readiness status of equipment being used for
+
+85 Ibid.
+
+86 James Hannah, “Differences in Guard Weapons Raise Concern,” Army Times, May 31,
+2007 and Matthew Dolan, “Preparing for Battle,” Baltimore Sun, May 31, 2007. 
+
+87 Sonya Crawford, “National Guard Dealing with Equipment Shortages,” ABC News,
+February 24, 2007. 
+
+88 Jefferson Morris, “National Guard Needs $40 Billion to Bring Equipment Up to Snuff,
+Chief Says,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, February 1, 2007.
+
+89 Information in this section is taken from House Armed Services Committee press release,
+“House Armed Services Committee Approves Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Authorization
+Bill,”May 9, 2007, p. 7. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-18
+
+replenishment. Some reports have asserted that much of the equipment being used
+in DOD’s current restocking efforts is in poor condition and requires extensive
+maintenance. 
+
+ Were the Services Aggressive Enough in Acquiring MRAPs? 
+
+The relatively sudden decision by the Army and Marine Corps to replace
+
+uparmored HMMWVs in Iraq with MRAPs is considered by some as a prudent force
+protection measure, but there is concern that DOD’s plan to replace all uparmored
+HMMWVs in Iraq over the next two years is “too little, too late.” Various
+commercially-available versions of MRAP-type vehicles — such as South African
+and Rhodesian versions — which have demonstrated their survivability in combat
+operations, have been available for decades.90
+
+Initial use of these vehicles by the
+
+Army and Marines in late 2002-early 2003 for mine and IED clearance in Iraq
+demonstrated their survivability. Reportedly as of May 2007, no Marines had been
+killed in 300 attacks on MRAPs and only 2 Army soldiers had been killed in an
+attack on an MRAP.91 By contrast, HMMWVs, despite a variety of initiatives to
+improve its armor, have continued to be vulnerable to small arms and IED attacks,
+resulting in a significant number of casualties. Despite these circumstances, the Army
+and Marines planned to continue using uparmored HMMWVs as their primary means
+of wheeled troop transport in Iraq as late as March 2007, noting that the HMMWVs
+“successor,” the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), would be in service by 2012.
+
+Some in public and in Congress have questioned why it has taken the Services
+
+so long to decide to provide service members with MRAPs with one member of
+Congress reportedly saying that the services “finally get it.”92 Others maintain that
+even if DOD realizes its goal of replacing all uparmored HMMWVs in Iraq with
+MRAPs by December 2009, that “most of America’s troops may already be home”93
+thereby significantly reducing the requirement for MRAPs, a vehicle that the Army
+and Marines consider an “interim solution.”
+
+ A Replacement for M-16/M-4 Carbines? 
+
+Allegations that the successor of the Army’s M-16/M-4 carbine, the Heckler &
+
+Koch’s XM-8 assault rifle, was cancelled due to bureaucratic conflicts among Army
+and DOD acquisition officials might be an issue for congressional examination.
+Some may question why the Army remains committed to upgrading an almost 50-
+year-old weapon when other DOD organizations, such as special operations units,
+have adopted other weapons that are considered more reliable and effective in
+combat than the M-4 carbine. It can be argued that the Army has exhibited a
+
+90 Guy Raz, “New Mine-Resistant Vehicles Aimed at Foiling IEDs,” National Public Radio,
+June 6, 2007 and J. Ethan Hoaldridge, “Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles Counter
+IEDs, Ambushes, Marine Corps News, June 24, 2005.
+
+91 Tom Vanden Brook, “Troops in Iraq Get Safer Vehicle,” USA Today, May 10, 2007.
+
+92 Ibid.
+
+93 Guy Raz, “New Mine-Resistant Vehicles Aimed at Foiling IEDs,” National Public Radio,
+June 6, 2007.
+
+ 
+ CRS-19
+
+tendency to pursue incremental improvements to legacy systems, such as repeated
+add-on armor upgrades to HMMWVs, instead of fully examining and rapidly
+procuring commercially-available systems that prove to be more effective than
+current systems.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/corpus/politics/text/1d795e52baed1d80.txt b/corpus/politics/text/1d795e52baed1d80.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a275ed8805647049d59c5503872c02c34194e93b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/politics/text/1d795e52baed1d80.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+Order Code RS22187
+
+Updated June 17, 2008
+
+ Brazil’s WTO Case Against the 
+
+ U.S. Cotton Program: A Brief Overview 
+
+Randy Schnepf
+
+Specialist in Agricultural Policy
+
+Resources, Science, and Industry Division
+
+ Summary 
+
+On June 2, 2008, a World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body (AB)
+
+publicly released its final report upholding a December 2007 compliance panel ruling
+that the United States has not fully complied with a March 2005 WTO ruling against
+certain U.S. cotton support programs. This AB ruling was part of a prolonged dispute
+settlement case (DS267) originated by Brazil against certain aspects of the U.S. cotton
+program in September 2002. 
+
+The ruling against the United States could necessitate further U.S. farm program
+
+changes or, if no further changes are forthcoming, clear the way for Brazil to request
+WTO authorization for retaliatory trade sanctions. The AB ruling must first be adopted
+by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (within 30 days of the ruling’s release); then the
+United States and Brazil will likely resume arbitration over the value of sanctions
+authority requested by Brazil (to be completed within 60 days).
+
+This report provides a brief overview of Brazil’s case against the U.S. cotton
+
+program, the evolution and current status of the case, and the potential role for Congress.
+For a more detailed discussion of the U.S.-Brazil WTO dispute settlement case, see CRS
+Report RL32571, Brazil’s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program , by Randy
+Schnepf. This report will be updated as events warrant.
+
+ Introduction 
+
+The United States is the world’s largest cotton exporter. During the 2001-2003
+
+period, U.S. cotton exports accounted for 40% of world trade, while U.S. cotton subsidies
+averaged $3 billion per year. In late 2002, Brazil — a major cotton export competitor —
+expressed its growing concerns about U.S. cotton subsidies by initiating a WTO dispute
+settlement case (DS267) against specific provisions of the U.S. cotton program. On
+September 8, 2004, a WTO dispute settlement panel ruled against the United States on
+several key aspects of U.S. cotton programs (discussed below). This ruling was appealed
+by the United States, and on March 3, 2005, a WTO Appellate Body (AB) upheld the
+panel’s ruling and provided specific deadlines for removal or modification of the
+offending U.S. subsidies. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+ The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel’s Recommendation 
+
+In their ruling against the United States, the WTO panel and the AB identified two
+
+subsidy types — prohibited and actionable. Each subsidy involves a different type of
+response and a different timetable for implementation.1 Under the WTO’s Agreement on
+Agriculture, prohibited subsidies are treated with greater urgency than actionable
+subsidies — in particular, they are given a shorter time frame for compliance. 
+
+ Prohibited Subsidies. Two U.S. programs were found to operate as prohibited
+
+subsidies: Step 2 payments and export credit guarantees. Step 2 payments were part of
+special cotton marketing provisions authorized under U.S. farm program legislation to
+keep U.S. upland cotton competitive on the world market.2 Step 2 payments were made
+to both exporters and domestic mill users to compensate them for their purchase of U.S.
+upland cotton, which tends to be priced higher than the world market price. Step 2
+payments were deemed WTO-illegal because they were paid only to users of U.S. cotton
+(i.e., they discriminated against foreign cotton by encouraging the use of domestic
+products over imported products) and because they were unscheduled (i.e., export
+subsidies applied to commodities not listed on a country’s WTO schedule or made in
+excess of the value listed on the schedule).3
+
+USDA’s export credit guarantee programs (GSM-102, GSM-103, and SCGP)
+
+underwrite credit extended by private U.S. banks to approved foreign banks for purchases
+of U.S. agricultural products by foreign buyers.4 GSM-102 covers credit terms up to three
+years, while GSM-103 covered longer credit terms up to 10 years. The Supplier Credit
+Guarantee Program (SCGP) insured short-term, open account financing designed to make
+it easier for exporters to sell U.S. food products overseas. The WTO panel found that all
+three export credit programs effectively functioned as export subsidies because the
+financial benefits returned to the government by these programs failed to cover their long-
+run operating cost. Furthermore, the panel found that this export-subsidy aspect of export
+credit guarantees applies not just to cotton but to all recipient commodities that benefit
+from U.S. commodity support programs. In other words, so long as the credit guarantees
+act as an implicit export subsidy, only U.S. program crops that have export subsidies
+listed in their WTO country schedule are eligible for U.S. export credit guarantees. The
+AB recommended that the United States withdraw its “prohibited” subsidies by July 1,
+2005. 
+
+1 For disputes involving prohibited (or WTO-illegal) subsidies, the prescribed remedy compliance
+time is halved. For more information on WTO disputes, see CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute
+Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases , by Jeanne Grimmett.
+
+2 For more information on Step 2 payments, see CRS Report RL32442, Cotton Production and
+Support in the United States .
+
+3 For more information on country schedules, see CRS Report RL32916, Agriculture in the WTO:
+Policy Commitments Made Under the Agreement on Agriculture , by Randy Schnepf.
+
+4 For information on these programs, see USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, “Export Credit
+Guarantee Programs,” at [http://www.fas.usda.gov/excredits/default.htm]. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+ Actionable Subsidies. Any subsidy may be challenged in the WTO (i.e., is
+
+“actionable”) if it fulfills the WTO definition of a subsidy5 and is alleged to cause adverse
+effects to the interests of other WTO members. In particular, price-contingent payments
+(i.e., payments dependent on changes in current market prices) — including marketing
+loan provisions, Step 2 payments, market loss payments, and counter-cyclical payments
+(CCP) — were identified as contributing to serious prejudice to the interests of Brazil by
+depressing prices for cotton on the world market during the marketing years 1999-2002.
+The panel recommended that the United States take appropriate steps to remove the
+prejudicial effects of “actionable” subsidies or to withdraw the subsidies entirely. The
+AB upheld the original panel’s recommendation and added a deadline of September 21,
+2005, for their removal. 
+
+Such actionable subsidies were previously afforded some protection under the
+
+so-called “Peace Clause” (Article 13) of the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture.
+However, the WTO panel reviewing the cotton case found that the United States was in
+violation of its Peace Clause spending limit such that Brazil’s dispute settlement case
+could proceed.6 The panel ruled that neither production flexibility contract (PFC)
+payments under the 1996 farm bill nor direct payments (DP) under the 2002 farm bill
+qualify for the WTO’s green box exemption as decoupled payments due to a planting
+restriction on fruits, vegetables, and wild rice on program base acres. As a result, PFC
+and DP payments were counted against the U.S. Peace Clause limit. See the “Role of
+Congress” section at the end of this report for a discussion of related 2008 farm bill
+provisions.
+
+ U.S. Response to the Panel Ruling 
+
+After losing its appeal, the United States announced that it intended to fully comply
+
+with the panel recommendations. In July 2005, USDA instituted a temporary fix for its
+export credit guarantee programs to make the fees charged by the programs more risk-
+based. Higher fees were needed to ensure that the financial returns of these programs
+fully cover their long-run operating costs, thereby eliminating their subsidy component.
+In addition, the CCC stopped accepting applications for payment guarantees under GSM-
+103. These efforts were formalized in the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-234, Sec. 3101),
+which eliminated the GSM-103 and SCGP programs and removed a 1% cap on fees that
+could be charged under the GSM-102 program. On August 1, 2006, the Step 2 cotton
+program, which was authorized by the 2002 farm act (P.L. 107-171, Sec. 1207), was
+eliminated by a provision (Sec. 1103) in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-
+171). The Administration likely felt that sufficient program changes had been enacted to
+fully comply with the “actionable subsidies” portion of the WTO ruling. 
+
+ Brazil Seeks $4 Billion in Retaliatory Trade Measures 
+
+According to WTO rules, trade sanctions are limited to a value not to exceed the
+
+level of lost benefits. As the reform deadlines under the two different subsidy types
+
+5 As defined in Article 1 of the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures .
+
+6 For more information on the Peace Clause and its role in this dispute, see CRS Report RL32571,
+ Background on the U.S.-Brazil WTO Cotton Subsidy Dispute , by Randy Schnepf.
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+expired, Brazil first requested (July 4, 2005) authorization from the WTO to impose $3
+billion in countermeasures against the prohibited U.S. subsidies. This value corresponds
+to (1) Step 2 payments made in the then-most-recently-concluded marketing year
+(2004/2005) and (2) the total of exporter applications received under the three export
+credit guarantee programs, for all unscheduled commodities and for rice, for the then-
+most-recent fiscal year (2004).7 To achieve $3 billion in retaliation, Brazil proposed to
+suspend tariff concessions as well as obligations under the WTO Agreement on Trade-
+Related Intellectual Property Rights and the General Agreement on Trade in Services.
+The United States objected to the amount of Brazil’s proposed sanctions, and requested
+WTO arbitration. However, the United States and Brazil reached a procedural agreement
+temporarily suspending arbitration proceedings concerning the prohibited subsidies. 
+
+Second, as the September 21, 2005, deadline to address the actionable subsidy ruling
+
+expired, Brazil charged that the United States had neither taken nor announced any
+specific initiative for the price-contingent programs deemed to cause prejudicial impact
+to Brazil’s trade interest. Brazil then requested authorization from the WTO to impose
+countermeasures valued at $1 billion as retaliation against the actionable programs. Once
+again, the United States requested WTO arbitration over the level of the proposed
+sanctions. Again, the United States and Brazil reached a procedural agreement, thereby
+temporarily suspending further arbitration proceedings on the actionable subsidies. 
+
+The suspensions were likely intended to permit policy reform to occur in a less
+
+confrontational forum under either the then-ongoing congressional debate on an extension
+or revision of U.S. farm legislation (as current farm law was set to expire in 2007) or the
+ongoing Doha negotiations. 
+
+ Brazil Requests a Compliance Panel 
+
+Initially Brazil showed a willingness to permit the U.S. legislative process —
+
+motivated by the 2007 expiration of U.S. farm programs and the prospects of a successful
+Doha Round of trade negotiations8 — to bring U.S. farm programs into compliance with
+the WTO ruling, even if this process extended well beyond the deadlines established
+under the WTO dispute settlement ruling. However, on August 21, 2006, Brazil
+requested the establishment of a WTO compliance panel to review whether the United
+States had fully complied with the panel and AB rulings. On December 18, 2007, the
+WTO compliance panel released its final report ruling that the United States had not fully
+complied with the March 2005 WTO ruling against certain U.S. cotton support programs.
+
+In February 2008, the United States appealed the compliance panel’s ruling. In June
+
+2008, a WTO Appellate Body (AB) publicly released its final report upholding the
+compliance panel’s ruling that the United States had not fully complied with the March
+2005 WTO ruling. The ruling against the United States could necessitate further U.S.
+farm program changes or, if no further changes are forthcoming, clear the way for Brazil
+to request WTO authorization for retaliatory trade sanctions. The AB report must first be
+
+7 For details, see CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in
+Pending Cases , by Jeanne J. Grimmett.
+
+8 For more information on the status of Doha negotiations see, CRS Report RL33144, WTO Doha
+Round: The Agricultural Negotiations , by Charles Hanrahan and Randy Schenpf.
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+adopted by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (within 30 days of the ruling’s release);
+then the United States and Brazil will likely resume arbitration over the value of sanctions
+authority requested by Brazil (to be completed within 60 days). The U.S. response to the
+WTO cotton ruling is being watched closely by developing countries, particularly by a
+consortium of four African cotton-producing countries that has submitted its own
+proposal to the WTO calling for a global agreement to end all production-related support
+for cotton growers of all WTO-member countries.9 
+
+ Role of Congress 
+
+When confronted with a negative WTO dispute settlement ruling, a country has
+
+essentially five options to choose from: eliminate the subsidy; reduce the subsidy to
+diminish its adverse effect; revise the program function to reduce the linkage between the
+subsidy and the adverse effect (referred to as decoupling); pay a mutually acceptable
+compensatory payment to offset the adverse effects of the subsidy; or suffer the
+consequences of trade retaliation.
+
+Ultimately, Congress is responsible for passing farm program legislation that
+
+complies with U.S. commitments in international trade agreements. The United States
+would appear to have already complied with most, if not all, of the AB’s
+recommendation concerning “prohibited subsidies” by eliminating the Step 2, GSM-103,
+and SCGP programs, and by removing the fee cap on GSM-102 credit guarantees (i.e.,
+by eliminating the “subsidy” component of export credit guarantees). However, some
+questions remain as to what extent the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-234) has addressed the
+serious prejudice charge related to price-contingent subsidies. Instead of eliminating or
+reducing program triggers, the 2008 farm bill appears to offer higher levels of price and
+income support that potentially could aggravate the perception (if not the reality) of
+“serious prejudice” in the marketplace. Several of the proposed changes are specifically
+relevant to the Brazil cotton case, but also germane to the broader issue of program
+vulnerability to WTO challenge.10 For example, the enacted 2008 farm bill:11
+
+! extends the counter-cyclical payments (CCP) program and current
+
+marketing loan provisions (Sections 1104 and 1201 of P.L. 110-234);
+
+! raises both target prices and loan rates for several commodities, while
+
+only lowering (marginally) the target price for upland cotton (Sections
+1104 and 1202);
+
+! offers producers the choice (subject to a 30% reduction in marketing loan
+
+rates and in lieu of 100% of CCP and 20% of direct payments) of a
+revenue-based support option under the Average Crop Revenue Election
+program (ACRE; Section 1105) with potentially higher per-acre revenue
+guarantees for several crops than under the previous 2002 farm bill; and
+
+! creates a new cotton-user payment of 4 cents per pound (Section 1207).
+
+This payment appears similar to the WTO-illegal Step 2 payment except
+
+9 For more information, see CRS Report RS21712, The African Cotton Initiative and WTO
+Agriculture Negotiations , by Charles Hanrahan.
+
+10 For more information on this issue, see CRS Report RS22522, Potential Challenges to U.S.
+Farm Subsidies in the WTO: A Brief Overview , by Randy Schnepf.
+
+11 See CRS Report RL33934, Farm Bill Legislative Action in the 110th Congress .
+
+ 
+ CRS-6
+
+that cotton from all origins (not just domestic sources) is eligible for the
+payment. Since the United States imports very little cotton, most
+payments would still likely go to domestically sourced cotton. As a
+result, this subtle technical loophole might ultimately be subject to a
+WTO challenge, but would not be part of the current WTO cotton case.
+
+Finally, the 2008 farm bill does not address the issue surrounding the disqualification
+
+of direct payments from the WTO’s green box exclusion as decoupled payments due to
+the planting restriction on fruits, vegetables, and wild rice on program base acres. Instead,
+direct payments are extended with no change to the current planting restriction, except for
+a small pilot program on 75,000 acres in seven states (P.L.110-234, Sec. 1107). This
+retention of the status quo has important WTO implications, as both Canada and Brazil
+have recently initiated WTO cases against the United States charging that the United
+States has exceeded its total limit for the aggregate measure of support (AMS) on several
+occasion in recent years if direct payments are included in the AMS calculation.12 
+
+Additional uncertainty arises from the ongoing Doha Round of trade negotiations,
+
+where a successful conclusion could potentially mitigate or end Brazil’s interest in
+continuing its case against the U.S. farm programs. Both agriculture committees (House
+and Senate) of the 110th Congress will likely continue to monitor developments in the
+WTO cotton case and the Doha negotiations, as well as the aftermath of the compliance
+panel’s final ruling.
+
+12 See CRS Report RL34351, Brazil and Canada’s WTO Cases Against U.S. Agricultural Support
+ by Randy Schnepf.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/corpus/politics/text/1e4254528a71bcc0.txt b/corpus/politics/text/1e4254528a71bcc0.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0869334b9cf0f7af4785593ec46002b707f84693
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/politics/text/1e4254528a71bcc0.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+An Overview of Recent Tax Reform Proposals
+
+ February 28, 2017
+ (R44771)
+ 
+ Jump to Main Text of Report 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Contents
+
+ 
+ Introduction 
+
+ Tax Reform in the 115 th Congress 
+
+ Legislative Proposals 
+
+ Reform the Income Tax System 
+
+ Replace the Income Tax System 
+
+ Other Tax Reform Proposals 
+
+ Tax Reform in the 114 th Congress 
+
+ Legislative Proposals 
+
+ Reform the Income Tax System 
+
+ Replace the Income Tax System 
+
+ Other Tax Reform Proposals 
+
+ Tax Reform in the 113 th Congress 
+
+ Legislative Proposals 
+
+ Reform the Income Tax System 
+
+ Replace the Income Tax System 
+
+ Other Tax Reform Proposals 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Summary
+
+ Many agree that the U.S. tax system is in need of reform. Congress continues to explore ways to make the U.S. tax system simpler, fairer, and more efficient. In doing so, lawmakers confront challenges in identifying and enacting policies, including consideration of competing proposals and differing priorities. To assist Congress as it continues to debate the intricacies of tax reform, this report provides a review of legislative tax reform proposals introduced since the 113 th Congress.
+
+ Although no comprehensive tax reforms have been introduced into legislation yet in the 115 th Congress, two 2016 reform proposals appear to be at the forefront of current congressional debates—the House GOP's "A Better Way" tax reform proposal, released in June 2016, and President Trump's campaign reform proposal, released in September 2016. As with most recent tax reform proposals, both of these plans call for lower tax rates coupled with a broader tax base. In either case, numerous technical details would need to be addressed before either plan could be formulated into legislation. 
+
+ Several proposals have already been introduced in the 115 th Congress to replace the current income tax system. The Fair Tax Act of 2017 ( H.R. 25 / S. 18 ) would repeal the individual income tax, the corporate income tax, all payroll taxes, the self-employment tax, and the estate and gift taxes. These taxes would be effectively replaced with a 23% (tax-inclusive, meaning that the rate is a proportion of the after-tax rather than the pre-tax value) national retail sales tax. The Tax Code Termination Act ( H.R. 29 ) would terminate the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and declares that its replacement meet several criteria regarding simplicity, fairness, and efficiency. Both of these proposals have been introduced in previous Congresses. 
+
+ In the 114 th Congress, no comprehensive proposals to reform the individual and corporate income tax systems were introduced. There were, however, reform proposals to replace the income tax with an alternative system or abolish the current system altogether. 
+
+ In the 113 th Congress, then-chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means Dave Camp introduced the Tax Reform Act of 2014 ( H.R. 1 ). This legislative proposal was preceded by several tax reform discussion drafts, the first of which was introduced during the 112 th Congress. The Tax Reform Act of 2014 would have made substantial changes to the current federal tax system, modifying individual, corporate, and business income taxes, as well as the tax treatment of multinational corporations. The proposal would also have made a number of changes related to the treatment of tax-exempt entities, tax administration and compliance, and excise taxes.
+
+ This report will be updated as warranted by legislative changes. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ An Overview of Recent Tax Reform Proposals
+
+ 
+ Introduction
+
+ Tax reform has been a subject of debate in the past several Congress and many policymakers agree that the U.S. tax system is in need of reform. Recent tax reform proposals seek to lower tax rates, broaden the tax base, and provide a simpler and fairer tax system overall. The difficulty with tax reform, however, is agreeing on the crucial details needed to refresh the tax system. How far should rates be lowered? Which tax provisions should be modified or eliminated? Should the reformed tax system be income-based or consumption-based? What are the objectives regarding federal deficits and the debt? To assist Congress as it continues to debate tax reform options, this report provides a review of recent legislative proposals introduced since the 113 th Congress. 
+
+ Policymakers often speak of the goal to achieve comprehensive reform of the entire tax code. If comprehensive tax reform is not deemed feasible, Congress could choose to consider reforms to certain parts of the code as an alternative. For example, the corporate tax system could be reformed first and the individual tax system, and perhaps payroll tax system, at a later date. Similarly, Congress could choose to reform only portions of the corporate system, such as just the international aspects of the corporate system. Alternatively, Congress could choose to evaluate business-only options, which would involve changes to the corporate system and portions of the individual system under which "pass-through" business income generated by sole proprietors, partnerships, limited liability companies, and S corporations is taxed. 1 
+
+ Before reviewing recent reform proposals, it may be helpful to review the three criteria by which economists often evaluate tax policy—equity, efficiency, and simplicity. Equity concerns the fairness of a particular tax system. Economists rely on two concepts of equity—horizontal equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity holds that taxpayers with similar incomes should face similar tax burdens. Vertical equity examines the distribution of tax burdens across different income groups. Under an ability-to-pay standard, vertical equity suggests that taxpayers in higher income groups should pay more. Efficiency relates to the degree to which the tax system distorts economic decision making. Low marginal tax rates applied to a broad tax base, with few exclusions or exemptions, tend be more economically efficient. S implicity considers the amount of resources that must be committed to administering, enforcing, and complying with the tax system. Tradeoffs may exist between these three objectives. 
+
+ Tax Reform in the 115 th Congress
+
+ Tax reform continues to be actively debated in the 115 th Congress. Although no comprehensive tax reforms have been introduced into legislation yet in the 115 th Congress, two 2016 reform proposals appear to be at the forefront of current congressional debates—the House GOP's "A Better Way" tax reform proposal, released in June, 2016, and President Trump's campaign reform proposal, released in September 2016. 2 
+
+ The House GOP's tax reform proposal is intended to be revenue neutral. 3 On the individual side, the proposal, also referred to as the tax reform "blueprint," calls for consolidating the current seven tax rates on individual labor income into three: 10%, 20%, and 25%. The proposal also would reduce taxes on active pass-through business income, dividends, and capital gains; increase the standard deduction; repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA)-related tax provisions; and repeal the alternative minimum tax (AMT). To offset the revenue loss associated with these proposals, the blueprint calls for the repeal of all itemized deductions, except the deduction for charitable contributions and mortgage interest; the repeal of personal exemptions; and the repeal of various and to-be-determined tax expenditures. 
+
+ On the corporate side of the tax code, the House blueprint proposes reducing the corporate tax rate to 20% and repealing the corporate AMT. Investment would be eligible for expensing, although the interest on new debt would not be deductible. Other fundamental changes include implementing a territorial tax system and a border adjustment (exports would not be subject to tax; imports would be subject to tax). Currently held untaxed overseas earnings would be subject to a deemed repatriation tax of 8.75% on cash and cash-equivalents, and 3.5% on earnings held in all other forms. Most current corporate tax provisions would be repealed with the exception of net operating loss (NOL) carryforwards, last-in-first-out (LIFO) accounting, and the research and design (R&D) tax credit.
+
+ President Trump's campaign proposal is also intended to be revenue neutral. 4 Similar to the House plan, the President's campaign proposal calls for consolidating the seven tax rates on individual income into three: 12%, 25%, and 33%. The proposal also would increase the standard deduction, limit deductions, and repeal the 3.8% unearned Medicare tax, as well as the AMT. All businesses (corporate and pass-through) would be subject to a 15% income tax. The income of corporations with overseas operations would no longer be eligible for deferral, and previously earned foreign-source income would be subject to a 10% deemed repatriation tax, payable over 10 years. Most corporate tax expenditures would be eliminated except for the R&D tax credit.
+
+ Legislative Proposals
+
+ Reform the Income Tax System
+
+ As of the date of this report, no legislation has been introduced that would provide a comprehensive reform of the individual and corporate income tax systems.
+
+ Replace the Income Tax System
+
+ Two bills have been introduced in the 115 th Congress thus far that would repeal and replace the income tax system. The Fair Tax Act of 2017 ( H.R. 25 and S. 18 ) 5 proposes to repeal the individual income tax, the corporate income tax, all payroll taxes, the self-employment tax, and the estate and gift taxes. These taxes would be effectively replaced with a 23% (tax-inclusive, meaning that the rate is a proportion of the after-tax rather than the pre-tax value) national retail sales tax. The tax-inclusive retail sales tax would equal 23% of the sum of the sales price of an item and the amount of the retail sales tax. Every family would receive a rebate of the sales tax on spending amounts up to the federal poverty level (plus an extra amount to prevent any marriage penalty). The Social Security Administration would provide a monthly sales tax rebate to registered qualified families. The 23% national retail sales tax would not be levied on exports. The sales tax would be separately stated and charged. Social Security and Medicare benefits would remain the same with payroll tax revenue replaced by some of the revenue from the retail sales tax. States could elect to collect the national retail sales tax on behalf of the federal government in exchange for a fee. Taxpayer rights' provisions are incorporated into both acts. The sales tax would sunset at the end of a seven-year period beginning on the enactment of this act if the Sixteenth Amendment is not repealed. The amendment provided Congress with the "power to lay and collect taxes on incomes."
+
+ Other Tax Reform Proposals
+
+ The Tax Code Termination Act ( H.R. 29 ) would terminate the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and declares that any new tax system be a simple and fair system that (1) applies a low rate to all Americans; (2) provides tax relief for working Americans; (3) protects the rights of taxpayers and reduces tax collection abuses; (4) eliminates the bias against savings and investment; (5) promotes economic growth and job creation; and (6) does not penalize marriage or families.
+
+ Tax Reform in the 114 th Congress
+
+ The 114 th Congress did not enact comprehensive tax reform or legislation to replace the income tax system.
+
+ Legislative Proposals
+
+ Reform the Income Tax System
+
+ No legislative proposals were introduced in the 114 th Congress to comprehensively reform the individual and corporate income tax systems. As previously discussed, the House majority released a tax reform proposal blueprint as part of their "A Better Way" policy agenda in June 2016and President Trump released a campaign tax reform proposal in September 2016. Please see " Tax Reform in the 115th Congress " for more details on these proposals. 
+
+ Replace the Income Tax System
+
+ Several proposals to replace the income tax system were introduced in the 114 th Congress: the Fair Tax Act of 2015 ( H.R. 25 / S. 155 ), the Flat Tax Act ( H.R. 1040 ), and the Simplified, Manageable, and Responsible Tax (SMART) Act ( H.R. 1824 / S. 929 ). The Fair Tax Act of 2015 would have replaced the current income tax system with a national retail sales tax. Both the Flat Tax Act and the SMART Act would have imposed a flat tax system that is structurally similar to the Hall-Rabushka flat tax proposal, taxing wages and business taxable income. 
+
+ The Fair Tax Act of 2015 (H.R. 25/S. 155)
+
+ Please see " Replace the Income Tax System 's" Fair Tax Act of 2017 ( H.R. 25 / S. 18 ) for a summary of The Fair Tax Act of 2015.
+
+ The Flat Tax Act (H.R. 1040) 6 
+
+ This proposal would have authorized an individual or a person engaged in business activity to make an irrevocable election to be subject to a flat tax (in lieu of the existing tax provisions). It also would have repealed estate and gift taxes.
+
+ For individuals not engaged in business activity who selected the flat tax, their initial tax rate would have been 19%, but after two years this rate would have declined to 17%. The individual flat tax would have been levied on all wages, retirement distributions, and unemployment compensation. An individual's taxable income also would have included taxable income of each dependent child who has not attained age 14 as of the close of such taxable year.
+
+ The flat tax would have had "standard deductions" equal to the sum of the "basic standard deduction" and the "additional standard deduction."
+
+ The basic standard deduction would have depended on filing status:
+ $32,496 for a married couple filing jointly or a surviving spouse,
+
+ $20,739 for a single head of household, or
+
+ $16,248 for a single person or a married person filing a separate return.
+ The additional standard deduction would have been an amount equal to $6,998 for each dependent of the taxpayer. All deductions would have been indexed for inflation using the consumer price index (CPI).
+
+ For individuals engaged in business activity who selected the flat tax, their initial tax rate would have been 19% (declining to 17% when the tax was fully phased in two years after enactment) on the difference between the gross revenue of the business and the sum of its purchases from other firms, wage payments, and pension contributions.
+
+ For those employees who elected the flat tax, government employers and employers of nonprofit organizations would have paid a flat tax on their employees' fringe benefits, except retirement contributions, because activities of government entities and tax-exempt organizations would have been exempt from the business tax.
+
+ Any congressional action that would have raised the flat tax rate or reduced the amount of the standard deduction would have required a three-fifths (supermajority) vote in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
+
+ The Simplified, Manageable, And Responsible Tax (SMART) Act 
+(H.R. 1824/S. 929) 7 
+
+ The SMART Act ( H.R. 1824 / S. 929 ) would have replaced the current individual and corporate income taxes and estate and gift taxes with a flat tax. This flat tax proposal had two components: a wage tax and a cash-flow tax on businesses. 
+
+ The individual wage tax would have been levied at a 17% rate on all wages, salaries, pension distributions, and unemployment compensation. An individual's taxable income would have included taxable income of each dependent child who has not attained age 14 as of the close of the taxable year. The individual wage tax would not have been levied on Social Security income. Thus, the current partial taxation of Social Security payments on high-income households would have been repealed. Social Security contributions would have continued to be taxed; that is, they would not have been deductible and would be made from after-tax income. Firms would have had to pay the business tax on their Social Security contributions. Individuals would have had to pay the wage tax on their Social Security contributions. The individual wage tax would have had standard deductions that would equal the sum of the basic standard deduction and the additional standard deduction.
+
+ The basic standard deduction would have depended on filing status:
+ $28,960 for a married couple filing jointly or a surviving spouse,
+
+ $18,490 for a single head of household, or
+
+ $14,480 for a single person or a married person filing a separate return.
+ The additional standard deduction would have been an amount equal to $6,240 for each dependent of the taxpayer. All deductions would have been indexed for inflation using the CPI.
+
+ Businesses would have paid a tax of 17% on the difference (if positive) between gross revenue and the sum of purchases from other firms, wage payments, and pension contributions. This business tax would have covered corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships. Pension contributions would have been deductible but there would have been no deductions for fringe benefits. State and local taxes (including income taxes) and payroll taxes (e.g., Social Security, Medicare) would have not been deductible. 
+
+ If the business's aggregate deductions had exceed gross revenue, then the excess of aggregate deductions could have been carried forward to the next year and increased by a percentage equal to the three-month Treasury rate for the last month of the taxable year.
+
+ Government and nonprofit organizations employers would have paid a 17% tax on their employees' fringe benefits, except retirement contributions, because activities of government entities and tax-exempt organizations would have been exempt from the business tax.
+
+ A supermajority vote in the House and Senate would have been required to (1) increase any federal income tax rate; (2) create any additional federal income tax rate; (3) reduce the standard deduction; or (4) provide any exclusion, deduction, credit, or other benefit that reduces federal revenues.
+
+ The American Business Competitiveness Act (H.R. 4377)
+
+ The American Business Competitiveness Act ( H.R. 4377 ) proposed a top rate of 25% on net business income, whether that income was earned by a corporation or a business in a noncorporate form. Most business tax credits and deductions would have been repealed. The current system of depreciation also would have been repealed (with provisions allowing for depreciation deductions accrued before enactment to be claimed as scheduled), and businesses would expense capital purchases. Interest would have no longer been deductible as a business expense, and interest income for individuals would be taxed at the same rate as capital gains and dividends. Net operating losses could have been carried back five years, and carried forward indefinitely. All businesses would have been required to use the cash method of accounting. The AMT would have been repealed for business income. The proposal also would have converted to a territorial system for taxing overseas income. A cash flow tax, similar to what was proposed in H.R. 4377 , is essentially the business component of a flat tax.
+
+ Other Tax Reform Proposals
+
+ Other legislation introduced in the 114 th Congress would have eliminated the current tax code, leaving it to Congress to design a new tax code. The Tax Code Termination Act ( H.R. 27 ) would have terminated the IRC and declared any new tax system be a simple and fair system that (1) applies a low rate to all Americans; (2) provides tax relief for working Americans; (3) protects the rights of taxpayers and reduces tax collection abuses; (4) eliminates the bias against savings and investment; (5) promotes economic growth and job creation; and (6) does not penalize marriage or families. (This is the same bill, H.R. 29 , introduced in the 115 th Congress.) 
+
+ Tax Reform in the 113 th Congress
+
+ Several major tax reform proposals were put forward by Members in the 113 th Congress, but not enacted. Some of these may inform the current debate in the 115 th Congress. 
+
+ Legislative Proposals
+
+ Reform the Income Tax System
+
+ The Tax Reform Act of 2014 ( H.R. 1 )
+
+ The Tax Reform Act of 2014 ( H.R. 1 ) was introduced late in the 113 th Congress. This formal legislative proposal was preceded by several tax reform discussion drafts, the first of which was introduced during the 112 th Congress. The Tax Reform Act of 2014 would have made substantial changes to the current federal tax system, modifying individual, corporate, and business income taxes, as well as the tax treatment of multinational corporations. The proposal also would have made a number of changes related to the treatment of tax-exempt entities, tax administration and compliance, and excise taxes.
+
+ Under the proposal, there would have been two regular income tax brackets, with rates of 10% and 25%. A third bracket would have applied to an alternative definition of income, making for a top statutory rate of 35%. The 35% bracket results from a 10% tax on modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) above certain income thresholds ($400,000 for single filers and $450,000 for joint filers, adjusted for inflation). The 10% bracket would have phased out for certain higher-income taxpayers. Brackets would have been adjusted for inflation using chained-CPI. Dividends and capital gains would have been taxed as ordinary income, but 40% of net capital gains and qualified dividends would have been excluded from taxable income. The proposal also would have repealed AMT. 
+
+ Other substantial changes to the individual income tax system's structure included eliminating personal exemptions and increasing the standard deduction. The standard deduction would have been set at $22,000 for joint filers and $11,000 for other individual filers. An additional standard deduction of $5,500 would have been available for single filers with at least one child. The standard deduction would have been phased out for certain higher-income taxpayers. 
+
+ The proposal also would have modified or eliminated a number of individual income tax credits, deductions, and other provisions. Major changes included eliminating the deduction for state and local tax payments; scaling back the mortgage interest deduction and earned income tax credit (EITC); modifying the charitable deduction and education incentives; and changing 401(k) and Roth IRA retirement savings vehicles.
+
+ Under the proposal, all C corporations would have been taxed at a top statutory rate of 25%, with the statutory rate reduction phased in through 2019. Other business income, including income earned by S corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships, would have been taxed through the individual income tax system. Similar to the individual system, the proposal would have modified or eliminated a number of corporate and business income tax credits, deductions, and other provisions. The proposed changes included eliminating the modified accelerated cost recovery system (MACRS); requiring amortization of research and experimental expenditures and advertising expenses; modifying the net operating loss (NOL) deduction; repealing by phasing out the Section 199 domestic production activities deduction; and repealing the last-in, first-out (LIFO) method of inventory accounting. The corporate also AMT would have been repealed. 
+
+ The proposal would have made significant changes to the tax treatment of foreign source income earned by U.S. multinational corporations. Specifically, it proposed adopting a 95% exemption for dividends received by U.S. corporations from foreign subsidiaries. Subpart F rules would have been modified, providing broad taxation of intangible income of foreign subsidiaries when earned, with foreign intangible income subject to a 15% rate (once fully phased in). The proposal also included "thin capitalization" rules that would have restricted domestic interest deductions and a one-time tax on previously untaxed earnings and profits (E&P) of U.S. corporations' foreign subsidiaries. E&P retained as cash would have been taxed at 8.75% and any remaining E&P would have been taxed at 3.5%.
+
+ Numerous changes also were proposed with respect to tax-exempt entities, administration and compliance, and excise taxes, including an excise tax on systemically important financial institutions.
+
+ The Family Fairness and Opportunity Tax Reform Act ( S. 1616 )
+
+ The Family Fairness and Opportunity Tax Reform Act ( S. 1616 ) proposed substantive changes to the current income tax. Specifically, S. 1616 would have consolidated the tax brackets, repealed the AMT, provided an additional child tax credit and personal credit, eliminated the standard deduction and most itemized deductions (retaining, with modifications, the deduction for mortgage interest and charitable contributions), in addition to making other changes to the tax code. 
+
+ Flat Tax Rate Act ( H.R. 5882 )
+
+ The Flat Tax Rate Act ( H.R. 5882 ) would have imposed a single income tax rate of 15%. 
+
+ Replace the Income Tax System
+
+ Several proposals were introduced in the 113 th Congress that would have replaced the income tax system with some alternative form of taxation at the federal level. The Fair Tax Act of 2013 ( H.R. 25 / S. 122 ) would have repealed the individual income tax, the corporate income tax, all payroll taxes, the self-employment tax, and the estate and gift taxes. These taxes would have effectively been replaced with a national retail sales tax. Thus, under H.R. 25 / S. 122 , the current federal tax system, based on taxing income, would have been replaced with a system that taxes consumption. The Fair Tax Act was reintroduced in the 114 th Congress (discussed above).
+
+ The Flat Tax Act ( H.R. 1040 ) proposed to allow taxpayers to elect to be subject to a flat tax, as an alternative to the current tax system. Individuals and businesses electing a flat tax would pay a flat rate of 19% for the first two years, and a rate of 17% thereafter. The SMART Act ( S. 173 ) also proposed a 17% flat tax on individuals' wages and businesses' taxable incomes. The flat tax systems proposed in H.R. 1040 and S. 173 were structurally similar to the Hall-Rabushka flat tax proposal. 8 Both of these proposals were reintroduced in the 114 th Congress (discussed above).
+
+ The American Growth & Tax Reform Act of 2013 ( H.R. 2393 ) would have required the Secretary of the Treasury to submit to Congress a legislative proposal for a progressive consumption tax. H.R. 2393 would have been designed to eliminate the public debt outstanding. Specifically, the Treasury would have been directed to provide rates and details on a progressive consumption tax to eliminate the public debt under scenarios in which (1) the consumption tax would be in addition to all other federal taxes in effect on the date of enactment; (2) the consumption tax would replace the individual income tax; and (3) the consumption tax would replace the corporate income tax. 
+
+ The Progressive Consumption Tax Act of 2014 ( S. 3005 ) proposed a 10% consumption tax on most goods and services (structured as a value-added tax [VAT])). 9 Although the legislation would not fully replace the income tax system, it would have reduced individual and corporate income tax rates to a maximum rate of 28% and 17%, respectively. The legislation also would have broadened the income tax base, eliminating a number of individual tax expenditures. Further, the legislation would have provided an allowance of $50,000 for single filers ($100,000 for married filing jointly), that would have effectively exempted most taxpayers from the individual income tax. Refundable tax credits for families would effectively be replaced with rebates to offset consumption tax liability for lower-income families. 
+
+ Other Tax Reform Proposals 
+
+ Legislation introduced in the 113 th Congress would have eliminated the existing tax code, leaving it to Congress to design a new tax code. The Tax Code Termination Act ( H.R. 352 ) would have terminated the IRC and declared that any new tax system be a simple and fair system that met a set of criteria, as noted above. 
+
+ The End Wasteful Tax Loopholes Act ( S. 8 ) proposed to express the sense of the Senate that Congress should pass legislation to (1) eliminate wasteful tax loopholes; (2) eliminate corporate tax loopholes and wasteful tax breaks for special interests; (3) enhance tax fairness by reforming or eliminating tax breaks that provide excessive benefits to millionaires and billionaires; (4) crack down on tax cheaters and close the tax gap; (5) use the revenue saved by curtailing tax loopholes to reduce the deficit and reform the federal tax code; (6) address provisions in the tax code that make it more profitable for companies to create jobs overseas than in the United States; and (7) reform the tax code in a manner that promotes job creation, competitiveness, and economic growth.
+
+ Although no legislation was ever proposed, former Committee on Finance Chairman Max Baucus released several discussion drafts related to tax reform in the 113 th Congress. The former chairman released discussion drafts related to international tax reform, tax administration, cost recovery and accounting, and energy tax policy. The discussion drafts were released in addition to a series of tax reform options papers put forward by the committee earlier in 2013. 10 
+
+ Under Senator Baucus's international tax reform proposal, passive and highly mobile forms of foreign-earned income would have been taxed at the full U.S. rate, as would have income earned from goods ultimately consumed in the United States. Two alternatives were put forth for taxing income earned from products and services sold abroad. "Option Y" would have subjected all foreign-earned income to a minimum tax, which the draft set at 80% of the U.S. statutory rate. "Option Z" would have taxed 60% of foreign active business income at the U.S. rate. Similar to Chairman Camp's international tax proposals contained in Tax Reform Act of 2014 ( H.R. 1 ), undistributed foreign earnings would have been subjected to a one-time tax. The Baucus discussion draft set this rate at 20%. 
+
+ Reforms to cost recovery and accounting rules were also put forward by former Chairman Baucus as a discussion draft. Proposed reforms would have eliminated the MACRS, enacting instead a system that uses asset pools and longer lives that more closely approximate economic depreciation. Certain intangibles, including research and experimentation as well as advertising expenditures, would have been capitalized and amortized. LIFO inventory accounting rules would have been repealed. Small-business expensing allowances would have been increased such that more businesses would have been allowed to use cash accounting. A number of similar proposals appeared in the Tax Reform Act of 2014, discussed above.
+
+ Former Chairman Baucus had also released a discussion draft related to tax administration and energy tax reform. This tax administration draft contained several proposals designed to reduce the tax gap, enacting additional data reporting requirements and anti-fraud provisions. The energy tax reform discussion draft proposed clean energy production and investment tax credits designed to replace existing incentives for renewables and other clean electricity resources (e.g., nuclear, carbon capture, and sequestration). These credits would have been available for the long term, but were designed to begin phasing out once the annual average greenhouse gas emissions rate fell below a specified threshold. The proposal also contained a new tax credit for clean transportation fuels. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Author Contact Information
+ 
+ [author name scrubbed], Specialist in Economics
+ ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed])
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Footnotes
+
+ 
+ 
+ 1 .
+ 
+ 
+ For more information on tax reform issue related to businesses, see CRS Report R44220, Issues in a Tax Reform Limited to Corporations and Businesses , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2 .
+ 
+ 
+ "A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America - Tax," June 24, 2016, http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf ; Donald J. Trump, "Fact Sheet: Donald J. Trump's Pro-Growth Economic Policy Will Create 25 Million Jobs," press release, September 15, 2016, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/fact-sheet-donald-j.-trumps-pro-growth-economic-policy-will-create-25-milli .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 3 .
+ 
+ 
+ The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) is the official tax revenue estimator for Congress. Although the JCT occasionally will provide preliminary estimates on tax proposals, official estimates are not released until legislation has been introduced. The JCT has not released a score of the House GOP tax reform blueprint so it is not possible to know whether the plan will be revenue neutral according to the JCT's methods. Additionally, the House blueprint appears to rely on assumptions not typically used by the JCT to argue for revenue neutrality. Specifically, it calls for using a current policy instead of a current law baseline, as well as dynamic scoring, and assumes ACA-related tax revenues are not part of the baseline. Still, two outside groups have attempted to score the proposal. The Tax Policy Center (TPC) estimates a "static" revenue loss from the proposal of $3.1 trillion over 10 years. The TPC also conducted a "dynamic" analysis that placed the revenue loss at between $2.5 trillion and $3 trillion, depending on the model used. In contrast, the Tax Foundation's static estimate puts the 10-year revenue loss at $2.4 trillion, and the dynamic revenue loss at $191 billion. See, Jim Nunns, et al., An Analysis of the House GOP Tax Plan , Tax Policy Center, September 16, 2016, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/analysis-house-gop-tax-plan/full ; and Kyle Pomerleau, Details and Analysis of 2016 House Republican Tax Reform Plan , Tax Foundation, July 5, 2016, https://taxfoundation.org/details-and-analysis-2016-house-republican-tax-reform-plan .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 4 .
+ 
+ 
+ The TPC estimates a static revenue loss from the proposal of $9.5 trillion over 10 years. The TPC did not conduct a dynamic analysis of the President's campaign proposal. The Tax Foundation's static estimate puts the 10-year revenue loss at between $4.4 trillion and $5.9 trillion, and the dynamic revenue loss at between $2.6 trillion and $3.9 trillion. The Tax Foundation's ranges reflect uncertainty over the specifics of the proposal's tax policy provisions. See, Jim Nunns, et al., An Analysis of Donald Trump's Revised Tax Plan , Tax Policy Center, October 18, 2016, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/analysis-donald-trumps-revised-tax-plan ; and Alan Cole, Details and Analysis of Donald Trump's Tax Plan, September 2016 , September 19, 2016, https://taxfoundation.org/details-analysis-donald-trump-tax-plan-2016/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 5 .
+ 
+ 
+ The Fair Tax Act was introduced in the 114 th Congress as H.R. 25 / S. 155 and the 113 th Congress as H.R. 25 / S. 122 . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 6 .
+ 
+ 
+ Similar legislation was introduced in the 113 th Congress as the Flat Tax Act ( H.R. 1040 ) and the 112 th Congress as the Freedom Flat Tax Act ( H.R. 1040 ). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 7 .
+ 
+ 
+ The Simplified, Manageable, And Responsible Tax (SMART) Act was introduced in the 112 th Congress as S. 820 and the 113 th Congress as S. 173 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 8 .
+ 
+ 
+ For background information on the Hall-Rabushka flat tax proposal, see CRS Report 98-529, Flat Tax: An Overview of the Hall-Rabushka Proposal, report is available upon request.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 9 .
+ 
+ 
+ Further discussion of S. 3005 can be found in William R. Davis, "Cardin's VAT Bill: Driving Debate Or Another Back-Seat Attempt," Tax Notes , January 19, 2015, pp. 329-334.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 10 .
+ 
+ 
+ The Senate Finance Committee's tax reform options papers are available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/issue/?id=6c61b1e9-7203-4af0-b356-357388612063 .
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+Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical 
+Education (CHGME) 
+
+Updated October 21, 2021 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+R45067 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+ Summary 
+ The Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) program provides direct 
+financial support to children’s hospitals to train medical residents and fellows. The program is 
+administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within the 
+Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and is authorized in Section 340E of the Public 
+Health Service Act (PHSA). CHGME receives annual discretionary appropriations, and its 
+funding has increased in recent years. The program was funded at $340 million in FY2020 and 
+$350 million in FY2021. 
+
+Hospitals typically receive support for graduate medical education (GME) through Medicare, and 
+those payments are provided to hospitals based on their Medicare patient volume. Because the 
+Medicare program is used primarily by people who are over the age of 65, and children’s 
+hospitals treat primarily people below the age of 18, children’s hospitals have low Medicare 
+patient volume and receive few Medicare GME payments. 
+
+Prior to the CHGME program, advocates argued that the lack of direct federal support for GME 
+in children’s hospitals impeded the development of the pediatric workforce. Program proponents 
+argued that children’s hospitals, rather than general hospitals, are more likely to have the patient 
+volume necessary to train pediatric subspecialists. Since the program was created in 1999, the 
+size of the pediatric subspecialty workforce has increased. The CHGME program supports the 
+training of nearly half of general pediatricians and more than half of all pediatric subspecialists. 
+In the most recent year for which final training data are available (academic year 2019-2020), the 
+program provided financial support to more than 13,250 medical residents and fellows. In 
+FY2021, the program supported training at 59 free-standing children’s hospitals located in 29 
+states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 
+
+The program’s appropriations were reauthorized in 2018 by P.L. 115-241, the Dr. Benjy Frances 
+Brooks Children’s Hospital GME Support Reauthorization Act of 2018, which extended the 
+program’s authorizations of appropriations until FY2023 and increased the amount authorized to 
+$325 million. The reauthorization did not include substantive changes to the program. In FY2020 
+and FY2021, the amount appropriated exceeded the authorized amount. The CHGME program 
+also provides additional quality bonus funding to children’s hospitals that meet certain training 
+criteria. Measuring, reporting, and rewarding quality training is unique to this program as 
+compared with other sources of federal GME support. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 9 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 17 link to page 8 link to page 13 link to page 13 link to page 13 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 22 Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+ Contents 
+
+ CHGME Purpose and Program Structure ........................................................................................ 1 
+ Program Origins .............................................................................................................................. 2 
+ CHGME Authorization and Appropriations .................................................................................... 4 
+ CHGME Payments .......................................................................................................................... 6 
+
+ CHGME Quality Bonus System ............................................................................................... 9 
+
+ CHGME Eligible Hospitals and Payment Distribution ................................................................... 9 
+ CHGME Residents Trained ........................................................................................................... 10 
+ Other Sources of GME Funding for Children’s Hospitals ............................................................. 11 
+ Concluding Observations .............................................................................................................. 14 
+
+ 
+
+ Tables 
+ Table 1. Children’s Hospitals GME Funding and Authorizing Legislation .................................... 5 
+ Table 2. Children’s Hospital GME Funding in FY2020, by State ................................................. 10 
+Table 3. Number of Residents Trained and Hospitals Receiving CHGME Awards 
+
+ FY2000-FY2018 ........................................................................................................................ 10 
+
+ 
+
+ Table A-1. Children’s Hospitals that Received CHGME Support, FY2000-FY2020 ................... 15 
+ 
+
+ Appendixes 
+ Appendix. Children’s Hospitals that Received CHGME .............................................................. 15 
+
+ 
+
+ Contacts 
+ Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 19 
+ 
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+he Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) program provides direct 
+financial support to children’s hospitals—those that treat primarily patients below the age 
+
+T of 18—to train medical residents and fellows. The program is administered by the Health 
+
+Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within the Department of Health and Human 
+Services (HHS) and is authorized in Section 340E1 of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA).2 
+CHGME receives annual discretionary appropriations, which are authorized through FY2023. 
+The use of discretionary appropriations to fund CHGME differs from other federal sources of 
+graduate medical education (GME) support. For example, Medicare—the largest source of GME 
+payments—is mandatory.3 More information on other GME programs and how programs interact 
+is available in CRS Report R44376, Federal Support for Graduate Medical Education: An 
+Overview . 
+
+This report describes the CHGME program’s (1) purpose and structure, (2) history, and (3) 
+authorizations and appropriations. It also provides select program data, including the number of 
+hospitals supported under the program, their location, the amount of funding they receive, and the 
+number of residents trained. Finally, the report discusses alternative sources of GME funding 
+available. 
+
+ CHGME Purpose and Program Structure 
+ As detailed in the text box below, the CHGME program provides direct financial support to 
+children’s hospitals to train medical residents and fellows. 
+
+ Medical Residents and Fellows 
+
+ “Medical resident” refers to medical school graduates who directly enter into training in a specialty who, after 
+the completion of such training, are eligible to become board certified in that specialty. In the case of CHGME, the 
+majority of support provided is for pediatric residents. 
+ “Fellow” refers to medical school graduates who have completed their residency training and are pursuing 
+additional training, called a fellowship, after which they are eligible to become board certified in a subspecialty. In 
+the case of CHGME, such fellows would be individuals training in pediatric medical subspecialties (such as pediatric 
+cardiology or pediatric gastroenterology) or pediatric surgical subspecialties (such as pediatric trauma surgery or 
+pediatric cardiothoracic surgery). Pediatric subspecialists are qualified to provide patient care or conduct research 
+in an organ-specific area of medical or surgical care for children. 
+Both residents and fellows must be training in a program accredited by either the Accreditation Commission for 
+Graduate Medical Education or the American Osteopathic Association. The two accreditors transitioned to a joint 
+accreditation system in 2020; therefore, effectively, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education is 
+the active accreditor. 
+ Source: CRS analysis of 42 U.S.C. §256e and CRS Report R44376, Federal Support for Graduate Medical Education: 
+An Overview . For information on program accreditation and the transition to a single accreditation system, see 
+Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, “The Single GME Accreditation System,” 
+https://www.acgme.org/What-We-Do/Accreditation/Single-GME-Accreditation-System/. 
+
+The CHGME program provides GME funds to “free-standing children’s hospitals,” which are 
+hospitals that have a patient population that is primarily under the age of 18. Free-standing 
+children’s hospitals specialize in treating children, but are not part of a larger hospital system. For 
+example, a general teaching hospital may offer pediatric training as part of its integrated services, 
+
+ 
+1 42 U.S.C. §256e. 
+2 42 U.S.C. §§201 et seq. 
+3 The Medicare program provided an estimated $15.0 billion in GME payments in FY2018. U.S. Government 
+Accountability Office, Physician Workforce: Caps on Medicare-Funded Graduate Medical Education at Teaching 
+Hospitals , 21-391, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-391.pdf. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
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+ Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
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+
+or perhaps as part of a dedicated children’s center, but such a center would receive Medicare 
+GME support as part of the larger hospital’s GME programs. Such a center would not be 
+considered to be a free-standing children’s hospital, and, therefore, would not be eligible for 
+CHGME. 
+
+Hospitals eligible to participate in CHGME must have a Medicare Provider Agreement, and must 
+be excluded from the Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS).4 In addition, 
+CHGME-eligible hospitals must operate programs that train pediatricians, or pediatric medical or 
+surgical subspecialists, and these programs must be accredited (see text box above for 
+definitions).5 The 2013 program reauthorization, discussed below, expanded the program to make 
+additional hospitals eligible for a subset of the program’s appropriation.6 These hospitals were 
+defined as (1) free-standing; (2) having a Medicare payment agreement and being excluded from 
+the Medicare IPPS; (3) having an inpatient population composed predominantly of individuals 
+under 18 years of age; and (4) having an approved medical residency training program, but not 
+one qualified to receive Medicare GME payments.7 The Government Accountability Office 
+(GAO) examined the newly eligible programs and found that the new programs included one 
+psychiatric hospital and three hospitals that had not previously participated in the program.8 
+
+ Program Origins 
+ The CHGME program was created in the Healthcare Research and Quality Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-
+129), which authorized payments to children’s hospitals for FY2000 and FY2001 to support 
+medical residency training. Medicare—which provides approximately $15.0 billion to support 
+residency training9—is the largest supporter of medical residency training, but the level of 
+Medicare support at any hospital is based on the volume of services that the hospital provides to 
+Medicare beneficiaries. Because the Medicare program is used primarily by people who are over 
+the age of 65, and children’s hospitals treat primarily people below the age of 18, children’s 
+hospitals have low Medicare patient volume and receive few Medicare GME payments. 
+
+Prior to the program’s inception, advocates argued that the lack of direct federal support for GME 
+in children’s hospitals impeded the development of the pediatric workforce because children’s 
+hospitals, rather than general hospitals, are more likely to have the patient volume necessary to 
+train pediatric subspecialists.10 To operate an accredited training program, a hospital must have 
+
+ 
+4 Social Security Act 1886(d)(1)(B)(iii). 
+5 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, “Children’s Hospital 
+Graduate Medical Education Payment Program,” http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/childrenshospitalgme/index.html. 
+
+6 Specifically, it permitted the newly eligible hospitals to receive GME payments from up to $7 million from an amount 
+that was up to 25% of the total amount of the CHGME appropriation that exceeds $245 million. 
+
+7 42 U.S.C. §254e(h). 
+8 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Physician Workforce: Expansion of the Children’s Hospital Graduate 
+Medical Education Payment Program , 18-66R, October 31, 2017. 
+
+9 The Medicare program provided an estimated $15.0 billion in GME payments in FY2018. U.S. Government 
+Accountability Office, Physician Workforce: Caps on Medicare-Funded Graduate Medical Education at Teaching 
+Hospitals , 21-391, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-391.pdf. 
+
+10 The American Academy of Pediatrics, the major professional association for pediatricians, released a 2000 report 
+detailing shortages in pediatric subspecialties and calling for additional financial support for training and research. See 
+Alan Gruskin et al., “Final Report of the FOPE II Pediatric Subspecialists of the Future Workgroup,” Pediatrics , vol. 
+106, no. 5 (November 2000), pp. 1224-1244. The Academy released another workforce statement in 2013, which also 
+called for more training. See Committee on Pediatric Workforce, American Academy of Pediatrics, “Pediatrician 
+Workforce Policy Statement,” Pediatrics , vol. 132 (July 29, 2013), pp. 390-397. More recent research found that the 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
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+ Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
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+sufficient patient volume to ensure that residents receive the full measure of training in a given 
+field. As such, children’s hospitals are more likely to have the range of cases necessary to train 
+pediatric subspecialists who focus on specific pediatric conditions or types of surgery in 
+children.11 
+
+Since the CHGME program began, the size of the pediatric subspecialty workforce has 
+increased.12 Despite these increases, some children lack access to pediatric subspecialty care (see 
+text box), with long wait times for children to access certain types of pediatric subspecialists.13 
+Moreover, some children’s hospitals report physician vacancies and difficulties hiring in certain 
+subspecialties.14 Researchers have found that some geographic areas have a shortage of pediatric 
+subspecialists, leading some children to seek care with subspecialists who focus on adults, which 
+may adversely affect the care the children receive.15 In contrast, future projections find growth in 
+the pediatric generalist population that exceeds growth in demand for pediatricians.16 In addition, 
+other projections find that because of fertility declines, future demand for pediatric subspecialists 
+will be less than current demand.17 However, projections are limited by the assumptions made, 
+which generally assume that the future workforce will follow the same employment patterns as 
+the current workforce. Researchers have found increasing numbers of pediatricians working part 
+time, which may affect whether future surpluses are realized.18 
+
+ 
+number of pediatric subspecialists have grown, but that some areas still lack access to pediatric subspecialty care. See 
+Adam Turner, Thomas Ricketts, and Laurel K. Leslie, “Comparison of Number and Geographic Distribution of 
+Pediatric Subspecialists and Patient Proximity to Specialized Care in the US Between 2003 and 2019,” JAMA 
+Pediatrics , vol. 174, no. 9 (May 18, 2020), pp. 852-860. 
+
+11 Both general hospitals and children’s hospitals may have sufficient patient volume to train general pediatricians. 
+12 See House Consideration and Passage of S. 1557, Congressional Record , daily edition, vol. 160 (April 1, 2014), pp. 
+H2782-H2784. 
+
+13 Children’s Hospital Association, Pediatric Workforce Shortages Persist , Pediatric Workforce Shortage Fact Sheet, 
+Washington, DC, January 19, 2018, https://www.childrenshospitals.org/Issues-and-Advocacy/Graduate-Medical-
+Education/Fact-Sheets/2018/Pediatric-Workforce-Shortages-Persist. 
+
+14 Ibid. 
+15 Kristin N. Ray et al., “Use of Adult-Trained Medical Subspecialists by Children Seeking Medical Subspecialty 
+Care,” Journal of Pediatrics , vol. 176 (September 2016), pp. 173-181. 
+16 Health Resources and Services Administration, Health Workforce, National Center for Health Workforce Analysis, 
+ Health Workforce Projections: General Pediatricians , Rockville, MD, April 2017, https://bhw.hrsa.gov/sites/default/
+files/bureau-health-workforce/data-research/pediatrician-fs-51817.pdf. 
+
+17 IHS Markit Ltd., The Complexities of Physician Supply and Demand: Projections from 2019 to 2034 , Association of 
+American Medical Colleges, Washington, DC, June 2021. 
+
+18 Robert J. Vinci, “The Pediatric Workforce: Recent Data Trends, Questions and Challenges for the Future,” 
+prepublication 2021, pp. https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/early/2021/03/08/peds.2020-
+013292.full.pdf. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
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+ Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
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+
+ Access to, and the Geographic Distribution of, the Pediatric Subspecialty 
+
+ Workforce 
+
+Although the size of the pediatric subspecialty workforce has increased since the CHGME program began, some 
+geographic areas do not have access to these providers. Children’s hospitals provide on average 30% of all 
+pediatric inpatient care and have more pediatric subspecialty care types than do other types of hospitals. 
+Children’s hospital providers are generally also teaching and conducting research and not providing ful -time 
+clinical care. Therefore, an overall increase of subspecialists may not translate ful y into increased access to care. In 
+addition, children’s hospitals are generally located in urban areas, which may make the care they provide less 
+accessible to rural populations. Researchers have also found that areas with higher percentages of the population 
+below the federal poverty level have less access to subspecialty care and that there are fewer pediatric 
+subspecialists in the Mountain States (Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah) and West North Central States 
+(Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota). Less is known about the 
+
+implications of lack of access on children’s health. One study examined this issue in Pennsylvania and found that 
+children who lived in counties without pediatric subspecialists have higher rates of emergency room visits, but it 
+did not otherwise find differences in diseases burden (e.g., differences in days of schools missed). The authors 
+speculate that general pediatricians in areas without pediatric subspecialists may compensate for this shortage by 
+managing patients’ conditions in cases where they would otherwise refer to a subspecialist. The authors speculate 
+that it might be possible to ameliorate geographic and overall shortages by training general pediatricians to manage 
+patients’ specialty conditions more effectively. 
+
+ Sources: Children’s Hospital Association, “An Examination of Certain Network Adequacy Measures and 
+Their Potential Impact on Children’s Access to a Children’s Hospital, December 2014, 
+https://www.childrenshospitals.org/-/media/Files/CHA/Main/Issues_and_Advocacy/Key_Issues/
+Exchanges_and_Private_Coverage/Issue-Briefs-and-Reports/Capacity_of_Childrens_Hospitals_Dec2014.pdf; 
+Gary L. Free, “The Pediatric Subspecialty Workforce Is More Complex Than Meets the Eye,” JAMA Pediatrics , 
+(June 28, 2021); David M. Keller, Mathew M. Davis, and Gary L. Free, “Access to Pediatric Subspecialty Care 
+for Children and Youth: Possible Shortages and Potential Solutions,” Pediatric Research , vol. 87 (April 15, 
+2020), pp. 1151-1152; Michelle L. Mayer, “Disparities in Geographic Access to Pediatric Subspecialty Care,” 
+ Maternal and Child Health Journal , vol. 12, no. 5 (September 2008), pp. 624-63; and Kristin N. Ray et al., 
+“Supply and Utilization of Pediatric Subspecialist in the United States,” Pediatrics , vol. 133, no. 6 (2014), pp. 
+1061-1069. 
+
+ Note: The American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Board of Pediatrics—the professional association 
+for pediatricians and the certifying board for pediatricians, respectively—have developed pediatric subspecialty fact 
+sheets at the state level that also calculates driving distance to specialty care by state; for these estimates, see 
+https://www.aap.org/en/advocacy/pediatric-subspecialty-shortages-fact-sheets/. 
+
+HRSA’s program data indicate that CHGME plays a significant role in training nearly half of the 
+pediatric physician workforce. HRSA data show that the program provided financial support to 
+more than 13,000 medical residents and fellows in the 2019-2020 academic year (the last year of 
+final data available).19 Among those supported, 41% were pediatric residents, 25% were pediatric 
+subspecialty residents or fellows, 3% were dental residents, and approximately 30% were 
+residents training in adult medical or surgical specialties who would have rotated to a children’s 
+hospital for part of their training.20 
+
+ CHGME Authorization and Appropriations 
+ The program was created in the Healthcare Research and Quality Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-129), 
+which authorized payments to children’s hospitals for FY2000 and FY2001 to support medical 
+resident training. The program’s appropriations were then reauthorized through FY2005 in the 
+
+ 
+19 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, “HRSA Health 
+Workforce: Children’s Hospital Graduate Medical Education Program, Academic Year 2019-2020,” 
+https://bhw.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/bureau-health-workforce/funding/chgme-accomplishments.pdf. 
+
+20 Ibid. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
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+ link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 12 Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
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+ 
+
+Children’s Health Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-310). That law also made changes to the program’s 
+payment methodology and reporting requirements. The program was unauthorized, but it received 
+appropriations in FY2006. It was then reauthorized for a third time in the Children’s Hospital 
+GME Support Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-307), which reauthorized the program from 
+FY2007 through FY2011. It was subsequently reauthorized for the fourth time in 2013—in the 
+Children’s Hospital Reauthorization Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-98)—which authorized appropriations 
+from FY2014 through FY2018. The 2013 reauthorization broadened the definition of hospitals 
+eligible to participate to include children’s psychiatric hospitals and hospitals that had not been 
+able to participate in the program for technical reasons (i.e., those that HRSA had determined did 
+not technically meet the statutory definition in PHSA Section 340E).21 This reauthorization also 
+established a quality bonus system to provide bonus payments to CHGME-participating hospitals 
+that meet quality standards established by the HHS Secretary. These standards are to include, for 
+example, improving interpersonal and communication skills of residents, delivering patient-
+centered care, and practicing in integrated health systems, such as by training in community-
+based health settings. The law required the Secretary to collaborate with stakeholders in 
+developing these quality standards.22 Finally, the program was most recently reauthorized from 
+FY2019 through FY2023 in 2018 in the Dr. Benjy Frances Brooks Children’s Hospital GME 
+Support Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-241). This reauthorization increased the amount of 
+funding authorized and extended the period of the program’s authorization of appropriations to 
+FY2023. The reauthorization did not include substantive program changes. 
+
+The CHGME program has received funding since its inception, despite a lapse in authorization in 
+FY2006, FY2012, and FY2013 . Table 1 presents funding and authorizing history from FY2000 
+to FY2023. 
+
+ Table 1. Children’s Hospitals GME Funding and Authorizing Legislation 
+
+ Appropriation 
+
+ Authorizing 
+
+ Year 
+
+ (in millions) 
+
+ Legislation 
+
+ Authorized Level 
+
+2000 
+
+$40.0 
+
+P.L. 106-129 
+
+$280 mil ion 
+
+2001 
+
+$235.0 
+
+P.L. 106-129 
+
+$285 mil ion 
+
+2002 
+
+$284.9 
+
+P.L. 106-310 
+
+Such sums as may be necessary 
+
+2003 
+
+$290.1 
+
+P.L. 106-310 
+
+Such sums as may be necessary 
+
+200 4a 
+
+$303.2 
+
+P.L. 106-310 
+
+Such sums as may be necessary 
+
+2005 
+
+$300.7 
+
+P.L. 106-310 
+
+Such sums as may be necessary 
+
+2006 
+
+$296.8 
+
+Authorization Expired 
+
+Not applicable 
+
+2007 
+
+$297.0 
+
+P.L. 109-307 
+
+$330 mil ion 
+
+2008 
+
+$301.6 
+
+P.L. 109-307 
+
+$330 mil ion 
+
+2009 
+
+$310.0 
+
+P.L. 109-307 
+
+$330 mil ion 
+
+2010 
+
+$316.8 
+
+P.L. 109-307 
+
+$330 mil ion 
+
+2011 
+
+$268.4 
+
+P.L. 109-307 
+
+$330 mil ion 
+
+2012 
+
+$265. 2b 
+
+Authorization Expired 
+
+Not applicable 
+
+2013 
+
+$251.2 
+
+Authorization Expired 
+
+Not applicable 
+
+ 
+21 See House Consideration and Passage of S. 1557, Congressional Record , daily edition, vol. 160 (April 1, 2014), pp. 
+H2782-H2784. 
+
+22 P.L. 113-98. Note that these standards did not exist at the time of 2013 reauthorization and have since been 
+developed (see “CHGME Quality Bonus System” ). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
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+ link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 9 Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
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+ 
+
+ Appropriation 
+
+ Authorizing 
+
+ Year 
+
+ (in millions) 
+
+ Legislation 
+
+ Authorized Level 
+
+2014 
+
+$264.3 
+
+P.L. 113-98 
+
+$300 mil ion 
+
+2015 
+
+$265.0 
+
+P.L. 113-98 
+
+$300 mil ion 
+
+2016 
+
+$294.3 
+
+P.L. 113-98 
+
+$300 mil ion 
+
+2017 
+
+$299. 3c 
+
+P.L. 113-98 
+
+$300 mil ion 
+
+2018 
+
+$315.0 
+
+P.L. 113-98 
+
+$300 mil ion 
+
+2019 
+
+$325. 0b 
+
+P.L. 115-241 
+
+$325 mil ion 
+
+2020 
+
+ $340. 0b 
+
+P.L. 115-241 
+
+$325 mil ion 
+
+2021 
+
+ $350. 0b 
+
+P.L. 115-241 
+
+$325 mil ion 
+
+2022 
+
+ $350. 0d 
+
+P.L. 115-241 
+
+$325 mil ion 
+
+2023 
+
+ TBD 
+
+P.L. 115-241 
+
+$325 mil ion 
+
+ Source: TBD=to be determined. CRS Analysis of Congressional Justifications FY2006-FY2022 from the Health 
+Resources and Services Administration. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Office of Budget: 
+Archive of Past Budgets” at http://archive.hhs.gov/budget/docbudgetarchive.htm. 
+
+a. P.L. 108-490 amended how newborn infants were counted for indirect GME expenses beginning in FY2005. 
+b. The President’s Budget for FY2012, FY2019, FY2020, and FY2021 did not request funding for this program. 
+
+Instead, in these years it proposed consolidating CHGME with other HHS sources of GME support. This 
+proposal was not enacted in any of the requested years. 
+
+c. The FY2017 President’s Budget proposed making CHGME mandatory funding; however, this proposal was not 
+
+enacted. 
+
+d. Amount included in the FY2022 President’s Budget Request. See U.S. Department of Health and Human 
+
+Services, FY022: Health Resources and Services Administration: Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committee” 
+https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/hrsa/about/budget/budget-justification-fy2022.pdf, p. 20. 
+
+ CHGME Payments 
+ CHGME payments are structured similarly to Medicare GME payments. In both programs, 
+hospitals receive two types of payments: direct and indirect. Direct payments are intended to 
+cover the salary and benefits of residents and their supervisors, as well as other costs associated 
+with operating a residency training program, including space and administrative support. Indirect 
+payments are made to hospitals to offset the cost a hospital incurs from training residents; for 
+example, for the extra tests they order as part of their training, and for the reduced productivity of 
+hospital staff.23 The CHGME program uses formulas to derive hospital-specific payment amounts 
+similar to those used in the Medicare program (see text box). 
+
+ 
+23 Medicare Payment Advisory Commission’s June 2009 Report to Congress: Improving Incentives in the Medicare 
+Program , Chapter 1, at http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/Jun09_EntireReport.pdf and June 2010 
+Report to Congress: Aligning Incentives in Medicare , Chapter 4, at http://medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/
+Jun10_EntireReport.pdf?sfvrsn=0; and Committee on the Governance and Financing of Graduate Medical Education; 
+Board on Health Care Services and Institute of Medicine, Graduate Medical Education That Meets the Nation’s Health 
+Needs , ed. Jill Eden, Donald Berwick, and Gail Wilensky (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2014). Both of 
+these reports also note the possibility that, in some cases, residents (particularly those in later years of training) may 
+generate revenue for the hospital where they are training. Other research has also found that hospitals using residents 
+may have lower costs per case with similar outcomes when compared to similar cases that did not have residents 
+participating in their care. See Jose A. Perez et al., “Comparison of Direct Patient Care Costs and Quality Outcomes of 
+the Teaching and Non-Teaching Hospitalist Service at a Large Academic Medical Center,” Academic Medicine , vol. 
+93, no. 3 (February 2018), pp. 491-497. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+6 
+
+ 
+ Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+ Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education Payments 
+
+ Direct Graduate Medical Education (DGME) Payments : The amount determined by fiscal year for direct 
+expenses associated with operating an approved GME program. It is a formula of the per resident amount (PRA) 
+multiplied by the average number of ful -time equivalent residents training in approved medical residency training 
+programs. 
+ PRA : The per resident amount (PRA) is hospital specific. It is a rol ing average of resident counts using three 
+years of cost report data, weighted by the number of ful -time primary care (i.e., pediatric) and non-primary-care 
+residents (i.e., pediatric subspecialty). The amount is calculated using expenses allowed under Section 1887(h)(2) 
+of the Social Security Act, as calculated using hospital cost reports from FY1997. The amount is further 
+standardized to account for wage- and nonwage-related expenses and geographic differences in wages. The PRA is 
+updated annually by the consumer price index for urban consumers. 
+Indirect Graduate Medical Education (IME) Payments: IME payments are for the indirect expenses 
+associated with the treatment of more severely il patients and the additional costs of teaching residents in an 
+approved GME program. IME is calculated by taking into account the case mix of a children’s hospital and its ratio 
+of residents to beds (not including those occupied by healthy newborn infants). The IME amount is based on a 
+rol ing average of residents-to-beds, calculated over the three most recently filed Medicare cost reports. 
+ Capped Amount : The total amount of both types of payments is capped because payments cannot exceed the 
+program’s annual appropriation. CHGME recipients are required to report certain information, and amounts 
+received for DGME under the CHGME program can be reduced by up to 25% for failing to report. 
+ FTE Cap : HRSA determined each participating hospital’s “cap” based on the hospital’s number of ful -time 
+equivalent residents training as of 1996 (the base year). Hospitals that did not have a “cap” at that time could 
+receive one by affiliating with another hospital or by beginning a new residency training program. A hospital’s FTE 
+count reflects the hospital’s number of residents training in the hospital and at certain nonhospital sites 
+throughout the hospital’s fiscal year. FTE counts may exceed the number of individual residents in a training 
+program because some periods of a resident’s training may not count for purposes of the cap. As such, the 
+number of residents a hospital trains generally exceeds its cap. 
+ Payment Processes : Hospitals are paid monthly on an interim basis with amounts withheld to ensure that 
+hospitals are not overpaid. Final amounts are determined based on hospital cost reports; at that time, payments 
+are adjusted, and any overpayment to a hospital is expected to be returned. 
+ Source : CRS Analysis of 42 U.S.C. §256(e)(c) and 42 U.S.C. §256(e)(d). 
+
+Despite similarities in the structure of Medicare GME and CHGME payments, there are two 
+noteworthy funding differences between the two programs and a third difference in the reporting 
+requirements for the two programs. First, the CHGME program is a discretionary program, with 
+funds drawn from the Treasury. Congress must appropriate funds annually in order for hospitals 
+to receive CHGME payments. In contrast, Medicare GME payments are mandatory and are 
+drawn from the Medicare trust funds.24 As a result, Medicare GME funds do not need to be 
+appropriated annually and do not need to be reauthorized. 
+
+A second difference is that CHGME spending is limited by the size of the annual appropriation. 
+Given this, if CHGME appropriations do not increase, adding new hospitals to the program would 
+result in a reduction in the amount of funds that existing hospitals receive.25 Conversely, 
+Medicare GME funds flow to a hospital based on the size of its approved residency training 
+programs, the number of Medicare-recognized residents, and its Medicare inpatient volume. 
+Distributing Medicare GME funds to one hospital does not affect the Medicare GME funds paid 
+to another. 
+
+ 
+24 GME funds are drawn from the Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance) trust fund. 
+25 This constraint means that adding new hospitals or hospital types to the program may reduce existing funding 
+available to children’s hospitals that currently participate in the program. It would also mean that hospitals that seek to 
+expand their training programs by adding residents could result in lower levels of support per resident at other 
+CHGME-supported hospitals. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+7 
+
+ 
+ Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+A third difference between Medicare GME and the CHGME program is that, in statute, hospitals 
+that receive CHGME support are required to report to HRSA the number of residents they train 
+by specialty; such hospitals may be penalized—in the form of reduced DGME payments—for 
+failure to report. In contrast, the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—which 
+administers the Medicare program—does not require its programs to report data on the trainees 
+supported with Medicare funds.26 Additionally, HRSA is required by the CHGME statute to 
+aggregate the data it receives from GME programs and report on 
+
+1. the types of residency training programs (by specialty); 
+
+2. the number of residents supported in each specialty; 
+
+3. the training programs that hospitals operate that provide care to diverse and 
+
+underserved children; 
+
+4. changes in training programs from the prior year (including curricula changes); 
+
+and 
+
+5. the number of graduates of a hospital’s residency training programs that practice 
+
+within the service area where they trained.27 
+
+CMS does not have similar reporting requirements for Medicare GME, nor does CMS generally 
+collect the component data that would be required to compile such a report.28 The 2013 CHGME 
+reauthorization also included authorization for a quality bonus system, whereby hospitals that 
+meet established standards are eligible for additional payments. This represents the first system 
+within a federal GME payment program where payments are distributed based on hospitals 
+reporting certain data and having programs that meet certain established goals.29 No similar 
+system exists for Medicare GME payments; however, expert groups, including the Institute of 
+Medicine (now National Academy of Medicine), recommend that some Medicare GME be 
+awarded based on program performance.30 
+
+ 
+26 Committee on the Governance and Financing of Graduate Medical Education; Board on Health Care Services; 
+
+Institute of Medicine, Graduate Medical Education That Meets the Nation’s Health Needs , ed. Jill Eden, Donald 
+Berwick, and Gail Wilensky (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2014). 
+
+27 42 U.S.C. §256(e)(b)(2)(B). 
+28 The lack of data on the residents supported with Medicare GME payments has been raised as a critique of the 
+program by a number of expert groups. For example, the Government Accountability Office has recommended better 
+data collection in a series of reports. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Physician Workforce: HHS Needs 
+Better Information to Comprehensively Evaluate Graduate Medical Education Funding , 18-240, March 9, 2018 and 
+see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Health Care Workforce: Comprehensive Planning by HHS Needed to 
+Meet National Needs , 16-17, December 11, 2015. 
+
+29 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, FY2022: Health Resources and Services Administration: 
+Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committee” https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/hrsa/about/budget/
+budget-justification-fy2022.pdf, pp. 175-176. 
+
+30 Committee on the Governance and Financing of Graduate Medical Education; Board on Health Care Services; 
+Institute of Medicine, Graduate Medical Education That Meets the Nation’s Health Needs , ed. Jill Eden, Donald 
+Berwick, and Gail Wilensky (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2014). In 2017, the National Academies 
+convened a workshop to discuss GME outcome metrics, including the quality of training that programs provide and the 
+quality of care provided by residents. See Board on Health Care Services, Health and Medicine Division, The National 
+Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Graduate Medical Education Outcomes and Metrics: Proceedings 
+of a Workshop, Payal Martin, Mariana Zindel, and Sharyl Nass, Rapporteurs (Washington, DC: National Academies 
+Press, 2018). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+8 
+
+ 
+ link to page 18 link to page 13 Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+ CHGME Quality Bonus System 
+ Hospitals began reporting under this system in FY2019, with hospitals initially reporting 
+information about their trainees. Based on these reports in FY2020 and FY2021, a subset of 
+hospitals received bonus payments—29 of 59 hospitals in FY2020; FY2021 information was not 
+available.31 HRSA contracted with George Washington University to develop metrics that will 
+link bonus payments to program performance on specific measures. The measures will focus on 
+access to general and specialty care (particularly for underserved and rural populations), attempt 
+to ensure a diverse and inclusive pediatric workforce, and include educational priorities related to 
+team-based care.32 CHGME hospitals are to begin reporting on these measures in FY2022. 
+
+ CHGME Eligible Hospitals and Payment 
+Distribution 
+ As discussed above, the CHGME program provides GME funds to free-standing children’s 
+hospitals. According to HRSA, when the program first began in FY2000, there were 60 hospitals 
+eligible. In FY2001, the program supported residents training at 57 of these 60 hospitals.33 In 
+FY2020, the most recent year of final data available, the program supported training at 59 free-
+standing children’s hospitals located in 29 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.34 
+(See t he Appendix for a list of hospitals that received CHGME and the amount of payments they 
+received.) 
+
+More than half of states have an eligible free-standing children’s hospital that receives CHGME 
+payments. These states are geographically dispersed. Residents in states with no CHGME-funded 
+hospitals may benefit from the program by traveling to receive services at a CHGME-supported 
+hospital or by receiving treatment from a pediatrician or a pediatric subspecialist who trained at 
+one. The extent to which this occurs is unknown. 
+
+The 10 states receiving the highest amount of CHGME payments in FY2020 were generally 
+states with large populations. Among the 10 states, all had at least one large children’s hospital 
+that received more than $5 million annually in CHGME payments (e.g., Children’s Hospital of 
+Philadelphia in Pennsylvania and Boston Children’s Hospital in Massachusetts) . Table 2 presents 
+the 10 states that received the highest payment amounts under this program. 
+
+ 
+31 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, FY2022: Health Resources and Services Administration: 
+Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committee” https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/hrsa/about/budget/
+budget-justification-fy2022.pdf, pp. 175-176. 
+
+32 Ibid. 
+33 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, Justification of 
+Estimations for Appropriations Committees, FY2004, Rockville, MD at http://archive.hhs.gov/budget/
+docbudgetarchive.htm. 
+
+34 Hospitals in the following 21 states did not have hospitals that received CHGME payments in FY2020: Alaska, 
+Idaho, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, North 
+Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
+See Health Resources and Services Administration, Children’s Hospital Graduate Medical Education Program, 
+Program Data at https://bhw.hrsa.gov/funding/children-hospitals-graduate-medical-education-awardee-map. In prior 
+years, hospitals in New Mexico and South Carolina have received CHGME funding. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+9 
+
+ 
+ link to page 13 link to page 14 Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+ Table 2. Children’s Hospital GME Funding in FY2020, by State 
+
+ Number of 
+
+ Hospitals 
+
+ Receiving 
+
+ State Name 
+
+ Payments 
+
+ Funding Level 
+
+ Rank 
+
+California 
+
+7 
+
+$45.4 mil ion 
+
+1 
+
+Pennsylvania 
+
+3 
+
+$45.3 mil ion 
+
+2 
+
+Ohio 
+
+6 
+
+$30.9 mil ion 
+
+3 
+
+Texas 
+
+7 
+
+$26.6 mil ion 
+
+4 
+
+Massachusetts 
+
+2 
+
+$22.5 mil ion 
+
+5 
+
+Washington, DC 
+
+1 
+
+$14.1 mil ion 
+
+6 
+
+Missouri 
+
+2 
+
+$13.8 mil ion 
+
+7 
+
+Michigan 
+
+1 
+
+$13.1 mil ion 
+
+8 
+
+Il inois 
+
+2 
+
+$11.7 mil ion 
+
+9 
+
+Washington 
+
+2 
+
+$10.7 mil ion 
+
+10 
+
+ Source: CRS Analysis of grant data, downloaded from https://data.hrsa.gov/data/download. 
+ Notes: For the purposes of this table, the District of Columbia is included as a state. Were it to be excluded, 
+the state where hospitals received the next highest CHGME payment (fol owing Washington) would have been 
+Florida ($9.6 mil ion awarded to three hospitals). 
+
+ CHGME Residents Trained 
+ Table 3 presents the number of residents that received CHGME support since the program’s 
+inception in FY2000. The number of residents trained has steadily increased, but the program’s 
+appropriation has varied over time. Given this, the amount of funding awarded to support each 
+individual resident has also varied. In addition, the table shows that the number of hospitals that 
+participate in the program has fluctuated over time; in some years, CHGME funds are awarded to 
+fewer hospitals that, on average, are training more residents. Note that the 2013 reauthorization 
+added new hospitals to the program, but it reserved a portion of the program’s appropriation for 
+these new hospitals to mitigate decreases in payment amounts for hospitals that were already 
+participating in the program. 
+
+ Table 3. Number of Residents Trained and Hospitals Receiving CHGME Awards 
+
+ FY2000-FY2018 
+
+ Number of 
+
+ Residents 
+
+ Number of 
+
+ Appropriation 
+
+ Fiscal Year 
+
+ Trained 
+
+ Hospitals 
+
+ (in millions) 
+
+FY2000 
+
+4,820 
+
+55 
+
+$40.0 
+
+FY2001 
+
+4,665 
+
+59 
+
+$235.0 
+
+FY2002 
+
+4,303 
+
+60 
+
+$284.9 
+
+FY2003 
+
+N /Aa 
+
+61 
+
+$290.1 
+
+FY2004 
+
+4,892 
+
+61 
+
+$303.2 
+
+FY2005 
+
+5,103 
+
+61 
+
+$307.7 
+
+FY2006 
+
+5,243 
+
+60 
+
+$296.8 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+10 
+
+ 
+ link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 14 Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+ Number of 
+
+ Residents 
+
+ Number of 
+
+ Appropriation 
+
+ Fiscal Year 
+
+ Trained 
+
+ Hospitals 
+
+ (in millions) 
+
+FY2007 
+
+5,406 
+
+57 
+
+$297.0 
+
+FY2008 
+
+5,600 
+
+56 
+
+$301.6 
+
+FY2009 
+
+5,840 
+
+56 
+
+$310.0 
+
+FY2010 
+
+6,040 
+
+55 
+
+$316.8 
+
+FY2011 
+
+6,185 
+
+55 
+
+$268.4 
+
+FY2012 
+
+6,015 
+
+55 
+
+$265.2 
+
+FY2013 
+
+6,535 
+
+54 
+
+$251.2 
+
+FY2014 
+
+6,698 
+
+54 
+
+$264.3 
+
+FY2015 
+
+6,877 
+
+57 
+
+$265.0 
+
+FY2016 
+
+7,16 4b 
+
+58 
+
+$294.3 
+
+FY2017 
+
+7,36 7c 
+
+58 
+
+$299.3 
+
+FY2018 
+
+7,52 2d 
+
+ 58d 
+
+$314.2 
+
+FY2019 
+
+7,75 7e 
+
+58 
+
+$323.4 
+
+FY2020 
+
+N /Af 
+
+N /Af 
+
+$340.0 
+
+FY2021 
+
+N /Ag 
+
+N /Ag 
+
+$350.0 
+
+ Source: N/A=not available. CRS Analysis of Congressional Justifications FY2000-FY2022 from the Health 
+Resources and Services Administration. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Budgets in Brief 
+and Performance Reports,” https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/asfr/budget/budgets-in-brief-performance-
+reports/index.html, and Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services 
+Administration, “Budget,” for more recent budget years. 
+
+a. HRSA budget documents did not include these data. 
+b. HRSA began using the academic year (i.e., July 1 through June 30) for its CHGME data in the FY2017 HRSA 
+
+budget justification, which included data for academic year 2015-2016. 
+
+c. Academic Year 2016-2017 data. 
+d. Academic Year 2018-2019. 
+e. Academic Year 2019-2020. 
+f. 
+
+Academic Year 2020-2021 data were not available at the time of this report’s publication (note that the 
+academic year ended on June 30, 2021). 
+
+g. This wil be for Academic Year 2021-2022, which began on July 1, 2021. 
+
+ Other Sources of GME Funding for 
+Children’s Hospitals 
+ CHGME funds are one source of medical residency training support at children’s hospitals. Other 
+sources exist, including patient care or other revenue, Medicaid, state and local funds, and private 
+donations.35 However, CHGME payments are the only source for which a specific amount can be 
+quantified. 
+
+ 
+35 For a general overview of Medicaid, see CRS Report R43357, Medicaid: An Overview . For information about 
+Medicaid GME payments, see Medicaid section in CRS Report R44376, Federal Support for Graduate Medical 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+11 
+
+ 
+ Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+Some have suggested that the availability of other sources of GME funding lessens, or obviates, 
+the need for the CHGME program. For example, the Office of Management and Budget in a 2003 
+CHGME Program Assessment stated that the program was performing adequately, but noted that 
+the program is “fundamentally duplicative of other Federal, state, and private efforts.”36 The 
+assessment went on to say that children’s hospitals have higher profit margins than other 
+hospitals, which could lead to more revenue available to support training programs. The 
+assessment concluded with a recommendation to more closely track the accountability of 
+children’s hospitals receiving payments under the program and to assess whether the program 
+should be continued.37 
+
+More recent data also indicate that children’s hospitals are still operating at higher profit margins 
+than other hospital types. These data also suggest that despite these hospitals having tax-exempt 
+status, some provide little charity care.38 Given that profits in a nonprofit hospital are intended to 
+be reinvested in the hospital,39 these funds are a potential source of GME support. However, this 
+research is historical, and it is not clear whether these financial advantages persist. In addition, the 
+CHGME pays hospitals less per resident than do other sources of GME.40 The Children’s 
+Hospital Association—the organization the represents children’s hospitals—contends that the 
+program is not paying the full cost of resident training and will disadvantage pediatric training, as 
+these payments grow at a slower rate than do Medicare GME payments.41 The true “cost” of 
+training residents is difficult to determine, as it may vary by the type of resident, the year the 
+resident is in training, and the resident’s specialty, among other things.42 Given this complexity, it 
+
+ 
+ Education: An Overview . Some pediatric fellows may conduct research as part of their training program; federal 
+research grants, including those from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), may offset some or all of the costs 
+associated with such research, including the fellow’s salary. In this case, while a children’s hospital may receive 
+research funding to support fellows, the funding would not be for medical training. Information on the total amount of 
+research funding that children’s hospitals receive, or the percentage of that amount used to support pediatric 
+subspecialty training, is not available. For more information about NIH research grants in general, see CRS Report 
+R41705, The National Institutes of Health (NIH): Background and Congressional Issues . 
+
+36 ExpectMore.Gov, “Program Assessment: Children’s Hospital Graduate Medical Education Payment Program,” 2003, 
+http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/expectmore/summary/10001063.2003.html. 
+
+37 Ibid. 
+38 Gilbert M. Gaul, “Growing Size and Wealth of Children’s Hospitals Fueling Questions about Spending,” September 
+25, 2011, Kaiser Health News, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/September/26/Childrens-Hospitals-Part-
+One.aspx; and Gilbert M. Gaul, “Nonprofit Children’s Hospitals Get Valuable Tax Exemptions but Many Provide 
+Little Free Care,” Kaiser Health News , September 25, 2011, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/September/
+26/Childrens-Hospitals-Charity-Care.aspx. 
+
+39 There have been ongoing issues raised with respect to nonprofit hospitals; see CRS Report RL34605, 501(c)(3) 
+Hospitals and the Community Benefit Standard . 
+
+40 The Children’s Hospital Association estimates that the program pays on average $75,000 per resident. See FY2022 
+statement Children’s Hospital Association, “Improving Children’s Access to Care: Increase Funding for CHGME to 
+$485 Million for FY2022,” February 2021, https://www.childrenshospitals.org/-/media/Files/CHA/Main/
+Issues_and_Advocacy/Key_Issues/Graduate_Medical_Education/Talking_Points/chgme_fy22_talking_points.pdf. The 
+Government Accountability Office estimated that Medicare pays on average $171,000 per resident in 2018. U.S. 
+Government Accountability Office, Physician Workforce: Caps on Medicare-Funded Graduate Medical Education and 
+Teaching Hospitals , 21-391, May 2021, p. 7, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-391.pdf. 
+
+41 FY2022 statement Children’s Hospital Association, “Improving Children’s Access to Care: Increase Funding for 
+CHGME to $485 Million for FY2022,” February 2021, https://www.childrenshospitals.org/-/media/Files/CHA/Main/
+Issues_and_Advocacy/Key_Issues/Graduate_Medical_Education/Talking_Points/chgme_fy22_talking_points.pdf. 
+
+42 See CRS Report R44376, Federal Support for Graduate Medical Education: An Overview , for an overview of the 
+complexities related to the costs of training. In addition, the Government Accountability Office found that cost of 
+resident training estimates ranged from $35,000 per year to $226,000 per year. U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
+ Physician Workforce: Caps on Medicare-Funded Graduate Medical Education and Teaching Hospitals , 21-391, May 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+12 
+
+ 
+ Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+is not possible to evaluate whether the CHGME program is paying full resident costs, nor do 
+systematic data exist on the use of hospital revenue to support GME. Given that these data do not 
+exist, the Congressional Research Service cannot determine whether, and to what extent, hospitals 
+use their own revenue to support GME. Despite data showing the impact of the CHGME program 
+on pediatric residency training, it is not clear whether the pediatric workforce would have 
+increased without the program’s explicit support, because many of the available funding sources 
+existed prior to the program’s inception. Similarly, it is not possible to know whether the 
+increased workforce size could be attributable to training supported by other funding sources 
+available to children’s hospitals. 
+
+Another source of GME funding for children’s hospitals is Medicaid reimbursements, but data are 
+limited regarding the extent to which these funds are used. Medicaid is a joint federal-state 
+program in which states operate their own program under federal oversight. States may choose to 
+use Medicaid funds to support GME, but not all states choose to do so. Data on states’ use of 
+Medicaid funds to support GME are scarce. There are two sources of information about Medicaid 
+GME payments: the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) and CMS-64 data. The 
+information from these two sources is significantly different, and both sources have limitations. 
+
+AAMC—the organization that represents medical schools and teaching hospitals—conducts a 
+biannual survey of state Medicaid program GME payments. The most recent survey, released in 
+2019, examined 2018 payments and found that 42 states and the District of Columbia provided 
+payments for either direct or indirect GME under Medicaid. This is the same number as the 2015 
+survey; however, two states indicated in the survey that they are considering ending Medicaid 
+GME payments. The actual dollar amount, estimated at $5.58 billion, had increased since 2009, 
+when it was estimated at $3.78 billion.43 The analysis was not specific to children’s hospitals, so 
+the total amount awarded to children’s hospitals would be less than the $5.58 billion total. 
+
+CMS administers the Medicaid program, and its data differ from that of AAMC. CMS started 
+collecting expenditure data for Medicaid GME payments in FY2010 in the CMS-64 data.44 
+According to these data, 31 states including the District of Columbia reported making Medicaid 
+GME payments through the fee-for-service delivery system in FY2018, and those payments 
+totaled $2.3 billion, with the federal government paying 62% of that amount.45 These expenditure 
+data are lower than those that AAMC found. This discrepancy may occur for a number of reasons. 
+For example, CMS-64 data include only fee-for-service payments and do not include payments 
+made through state-managed care plans. In contrast, the AAMC survey indicates that 16 states 
+including the District of Columbia made Medicaid GME payments under managed care directly 
+to a teaching hospital or other teaching entity, and AAMC includes these data in state totals.46 
+
+ 
+2021, p. 7, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-391.pdf. 
+
+43 Tim M. Henderson, Medicaid Graduate Medical Education Payments: Results from the 2018 50-State Survey , 
+Association of American Medical Colleges, Washington, DC, July 2019, https://store.aamc.org/downloadable/
+download/sample/sample_id/284/. Of note, this survey found that states are increasingly collecting data from hospitals 
+that receive GME payments, to estimate payment changes and in some cases to examine the impact of Medicaid GME 
+payments on the state’s health workforce. 
+44 States submit the CMS-64 form to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services on a quarterly basis, and the CMS-
+64 form is a statement of expenditures for which states are entitled to federal Medicaid matching funds. States are 
+required to provide supporting documentation for total Medicaid expenditures. 
+
+45 Oklahoma had negative Medicaid GME payments in FY2018 that may have been due to prior period adjustments. 
+(Congressional Research Service analysis of CMS-64 data as of April 12, 2020.) 
+
+46 This number is from the 2018 AAMC survey. Tim M. Henderson, Medicaid Graduate Medical Education 
+Payments: Results from the 2018 50-State Survey , Association of American Medical Colleges, Washington, DC, July 
+2019. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+13 
+
+ 
+ Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+ Concluding Observations 
+ Appropriations for the CHGME program were reauthorized in 2018 through the end of FY2023. 
+Though the reauthorization did not include substantive changes, the program’s unique reporting 
+requirements and quality bonus system, which has been implemented since that reauthorization, 
+may be of congressional interest given concerns about accountability in federal GME funding. 
+
+The CHGME program collects and reports a number of data elements on the residents trained. 
+This differs from other and larger sources of federally supported GME program (e.g., Medicare). 
+As such, the CHGME program data may be useful for Congress to examine to determine whether 
+such data are sufficient and whether it would be useful for other programs to collect such data 
+elements. The CHGME program has also implemented a quality bonus system that provides 
+additional payments to programs that provide data. In FY2022, payments will be allocated to 
+programs that meet established training targets related to program policy goals (e.g., to increase 
+the diversity of the pediatric workforce). The implementation of this system is unique among 
+federal GME programs and is in line with the recommendations of expert groups (e.g., the 
+Institute of Medicine).47 As such, the implementation of this system and its potential application 
+to other GME programs may be an area for future congressional oversight. 
+
+ 
+47 Committee on the Governance and Financing of Graduate Medical Education; Board on Health Care Services and 
+Institute of Medicine, Graduate Medical Education That Meets the Nation’s Health Needs , ed. Jill Eden, Donald 
+Berwick, and Gail Wilensky (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2014). The Institute of Medicine is now 
+called the National Academy of Medicine. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+14 
+
+ 
+ link to page 18 link to page 21 Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendix. Children’s Hospitals that 
+Received CHGME 
+ Table A-1 presents the most recent data on hospitals that participate in the program, the state in 
+which they are located, and the amount of CHGME funding they received. 
+
+ Table A-1. Children’s Hospitals that Received CHGME Support, FY2000-FY2020 
+
+(in millions of dollars, alphabetical by state or territory) 
+
+ Name of 
+
+ State/ 
+
+ FY2000- 
+
+ FY2011- 
+
+ FY2000- 
+
+ Hospit ala 
+
+ Territory 
+
+ FY2010 
+
+ FY2015 
+
+ FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 
+
+ FY2020 
+
+Children’s 
+
+AL 
+
+$55.88 
+
+$21.06 
+
+$4.75 
+
+$5.18 
+
+$5.57 
+
+$5.73 
+
+$5.94 
+
+$104.11 
+
+Hospital of 
+Alabama 
+
+University of 
+
+AL 
+
+$19.35 
+
+$12.17 
+
+$2.61 
+
+$2.59 
+
+$2.91 
+
+$2.83 
+
+$3.36 
+
+$45.82 
+
+South Alabama 
+Children's 
+
+Arkansas 
+
+AR 
+
+$74.42 
+
+$32.60 
+
+$7.20 
+
+$7.28 
+
+$7.40 
+
+$8.05 
+
+$8.11 
+
+$145.06 
+
+Children’s 
+Hospital 
+
+Phoenix 
+
+AZ 
+
+$18.29 
+
+$8.85 
+
+$2.65 
+
+$2.69 
+
+$2.82 
+
+$2.81 
+
+$3.03 
+
+$41.15 
+
+Children's 
+Hospital, Inc. 
+
+Children's 
+
+CA 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$6.51 
+
+$2.29 
+
+$2.29 
+
+$2.50 
+
+$2.75 
+
+$2.65 
+
+$18.99 
+
+Healthcare of 
+California 
+
+Children's 
+
+CA 
+
+$75.80 
+
+$34.09 
+
+$8.16 
+
+$8.37 
+
+$8.60 
+
+$8.77 
+
+$9.21 
+
+$153.00 
+
+Hospital and 
+Research Center 
+at Oakland 
+
+The Children’s 
+
+CA 
+
+$100.49 
+
+$18.29 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$14.29 
+
+$133.07 
+
+Hospital of Los 
+Angeles 
+
+Long Beach 
+
+CA 
+
+$33.97 
+
+$17.35 
+
+$3.44 
+
+$3.68 
+
+$3.98 
+
+$4.15 
+
+$4.31 
+
+$70.89 
+
+Memorial Medical 
+Center 
+
+Lucile Salter 
+
+CA 
+
+$62.27 
+
+$31.84 
+
+$7.72 
+
+$7.80 
+
+$8.27 
+
+$8.47 
+
+$9.56 
+
+$135.92 
+
+Packard Children’s 
+Hospital at 
+Stanford 
+
+Rady Children’s 
+
+CA 
+
+$39.84 
+
+$19.27 
+
+$4.14 
+
+$4.30 
+
+$4.26 
+
+$4.55 
+
+$4.82 
+
+$81.18 
+
+Hospital-San 
+Diego 
+
+Valley Children’s 
+
+CA 
+
+$6.94 
+
+$2.87 
+
+$0.54 
+
+$0.54 
+
+$0.59 
+
+$0.60 
+
+$0.61 
+
+$12.68 
+
+Hospital 
+
+Children’s 
+
+CO 
+
+$68.90 
+
+$30.88 
+
+$6.73 
+
+$6.07 
+
+$6.61 
+
+$7.07 
+
+$7.28 
+
+$133.54 
+
+Hospital Colorado 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+15 
+
+ 
+ link to page 21 Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+ Name of 
+
+ State/ 
+
+ FY2000- 
+
+ FY2011- 
+
+ FY2000- 
+
+ Hospit ala 
+
+ Territory 
+
+ FY2010 
+
+ FY2015 
+
+ FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 
+
+ FY2020 
+
+Connecticut 
+
+CT 
+
+$37.07 
+
+$13.52 
+
+$2.83 
+
+$2.86 
+
+$3.03 
+
+$3.03 
+
+$3.28 
+
+$65.62 
+
+Children’s Medical 
+Center 
+
+Children’s 
+
+DC 
+
+$127.26 
+
+$58.72 
+
+$11.80 
+
+$12.08 
+
+$12.58 
+
+$13.50 
+
+$14.12 
+
+$250.06 
+
+National Medical 
+Center 
+
+The Nemours 
+
+DE 
+
+$35.82 
+
+$14.79 
+
+$3.67 
+
+$3.59 
+
+$4.04 
+
+$3.98 
+
+$4.32 
+
+$70.20 
+
+Foundations 
+
+Johns Hopkins All 
+
+FL 
+
+$28.65 
+
+$10.00 
+
+$2.28 
+
+$2.33 
+
+$2.52 
+
+$2.67 
+
+$2.66 
+
+$51.10 
+
+Children’s 
+Hospital, Inc. 
+
+The Nemours 
+
+FL 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$1.36 
+
+$1.36 
+
+Foundation 
+
+Variety Children’s 
+
+FL 
+
+$54.84 
+
+$22.81 
+
+$5.29 
+
+$5.46 
+
+$5.73 
+
+$5.67 
+
+$5.65 
+
+$105.45 
+
+Hospital 
+
+Egleston 
+
+GA 
+
+$50.36 
+
+$22.37 
+
+$5.46 
+
+$5.54 
+
+$6.01 
+
+$5.77 
+
+$6.03 
+
+$101.55 
+
+Children’s 
+Hospital at Emory 
+University, Inc. 
+
+Scottish Rite 
+
+GA 
+
+$8.12 
+
+$5.33 
+
+$1.01 
+
+$0.95 
+
+$1.03 
+
+$0.98 
+
+$1.00 
+
+$18.41 
+
+Children’s Medical 
+Center, Inc. 
+
+Kapiolani Medical 
+
+HI 
+
+$34.21 
+
+$17.14 
+
+$4.00 
+
+$3.96 
+
+$4.38 
+
+$4.16 
+
+$4.49 
+
+$72.35 
+
+Center for 
+Women and 
+Children 
+
+Ann & Robert H. 
+
+IL 
+
+$93.72 
+
+$41.15 
+
+$9.74 
+
+$9.56 
+
+$10.54 
+
+$11.25 
+
+$11.58 
+
+$187.53 
+
+Lurie Children’s 
+Hospital of 
+Chicago 
+
+La Rabida 
+
+IL 
+
+$2.41 
+
+$0.87 
+
+$0.19 
+
+$0.18 
+
+$0.19 
+
+$0.16 
+
+$0.13 
+
+$4.13 
+
+Children’s 
+Hospital 
+
+Children’s 
+
+LA 
+
+$32.53 
+
+$21.03 
+
+$5.01 
+
+$5.28 
+
+$5.38 
+
+$4.78 
+
+$5.27 
+
+$79.28 
+
+Hospital 
+
+The Children’s 
+
+MA 
+
+$213.88 
+
+$88.93 
+
+$20.41 
+
+$21.12 
+
+$21.66 
+
+$21.58 
+
+$22.23 
+
+$409.81 
+
+Hospital 
+Corporation 
+
+Franciscan 
+
+MA 
+
+$0.21 
+
+$0.79 
+
+$0.18 
+
+$0.23 
+
+$0.30 
+
+$0.31 
+
+$0.30 
+
+$2.31 
+
+Hospital for 
+Children, Inc. 
+
+Kennedy Krieger 
+
+MD 
+
+$2.74 
+
+$1.21 
+
+$0.28 
+
+$0.33 
+
+$0.38 
+
+$0.38 
+
+$0.44 
+
+$5.76 
+
+Children's 
+Hospital, Inc. 
+
+VHS Children’s 
+
+MI 
+
+$135.78 
+
+$57.83 
+
+$12.09 
+
+$12.45 
+
+$13.02 
+
+$12.83 
+
+$13.13 
+
+$257.13 
+
+Hospital of 
+Michigan, Inc. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+16 
+
+ 
+ link to page 21 link to page 21 Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+ Name of 
+
+ State/ 
+
+ FY2000- 
+
+ FY2011- 
+
+ FY2000- 
+
+ Hospit ala 
+
+ Territory 
+
+ FY2010 
+
+ FY2015 
+
+ FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 
+
+ FY2020 
+
+Children's 
+
+MN 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$8.48 
+
+$3.22 
+
+$3.29 
+
+$3.60 
+
+$3.87 
+
+$4.13 
+
+$26.60 
+
+Healthcare 
+
+Gil ette Children’s 
+
+MN 
+
+$4.88 
+
+$3.02 
+
+$0.58 
+
+$0.58 
+
+$0.62 
+
+$0.62 
+
+$0.72 
+
+$11.02 
+
+Specialty 
+Healthcare 
+
+Children’s Mercy 
+
+MO 
+
+$62.29 
+
+$24.70 
+
+$5.19 
+
+$5.38 
+
+$5.72 
+
+$5.97 
+
+$6.57 
+
+$115.81 
+
+Hospital 
+
+St. Louis 
+
+MO 
+
+$71.88 
+
+$28.21 
+
+$6.24 
+
+$6.20 
+
+$6.80 
+
+$7.30 
+
+$7.26 
+
+$133.90 
+
+Children’s 
+Hospital 
+
+Children’s 
+
+NE 
+
+$9.21 
+
+$4.20 
+
+$1.14 
+
+$1.07 
+
+$1.21 
+
+$1.21 
+
+$1.38 
+
+$19.42 
+
+Hospital 
+
+Children’s 
+
+NJ 
+
+$0.52 
+
+$0.22 
+
+$0.05 
+
+$0.06 
+
+$0.07 
+
+$0.06 
+
+$0.06 
+
+$1.04 
+
+Specialized 
+Hospital 
+
+Blythedale 
+
+NY 
+
+$0.73 
+
+$0.40 
+
+$0.10 
+
+$0.09 
+
+$0.08 
+
+$0.06 
+
+$0.07 
+
+$1.53 
+
+Children’s 
+Hospital, Inc. 
+
+Children’s 
+
+OH 
+
+$112.89 
+
+$46.81 
+
+$10.35 
+
+$10.38 
+
+$10.71 
+
+$10.79 
+
+$11.19 
+
+$213.12 
+
+Hospital Medical 
+Center 
+
+Children’s 
+
+OH 
+
+$35.83 
+
+$14.45 
+
+$3.25 
+
+$3.12 
+
+$3.36 
+
+$3.38 
+
+$3.62 
+
+$67.00 
+
+Hospital Medical 
+Center of Akron 
+
+The Cleveland 
+
+OH 
+
+$0.29 
+
+$0.16 
+
+$0.04 
+
+$0.03 
+
+$0.03 
+
+$0.03 
+
+$0.03 
+
+$0.61 
+
+Clinic Foundation 
+
+Dayton Children’s 
+
+OH 
+
+$29.21 
+
+$12.69 
+
+$2.76 
+
+$2.91 
+
+$3.17 
+
+$3.18 
+
+$2.80 
+
+$56.71 
+
+Hospital 
+
+Nationwide 
+
+OH 
+
+$85.35 
+
+$34.89 
+
+$6.87 
+
+$7.20 
+
+$7.55 
+
+$7.71 
+
+$7.98 
+
+$157.55 
+
+Children’s 
+Hospital 
+
+University 
+
+OH 
+
+$51.79 
+
+$19.86 
+
+$4.49 
+
+$4.68 
+
+$4.73 
+
+$4.90 
+
+$5.28 
+
+$95.73 
+
+Hospital/Cleveland 
+Medical Center 
+
+The Children’s 
+
+PA 
+
+$209.00 
+
+$87.61 
+
+$20.10 
+
+$19.60 
+
+$21.83 
+
+$22.19 
+
+$24.73 
+
+$405.05 
+
+Hospital of 
+Philadelphia 
+
+Children’s 
+
+PA 
+
+$92.15 
+
+$43.34 
+
+$9.63 
+
+$9.62 
+
+$10.33 
+
+$10.67 
+
+$11.04 
+
+$186.79 
+
+Hospital of 
+Pittsburgh 
+
+STC OPCO, LL Cb 
+
+PA 
+
+$67.53 
+
+$40.21 
+
+$9.41 
+
+$9.55 
+
+$9.49 
+
+$9.29 
+
+$9.53 
+
+$155.01 
+
+Department of 
+
+PR 
+
+$17.90 
+
+$6.96 
+
+$1.51 
+
+$1.47 
+
+$1.89 
+
+$1.76 
+
+$1.83 
+
+$33.31 
+
+Health 
+
+Emma Bradley 
+
+RI 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.29 
+
+$0.32 
+
+$0.31 
+
+$0.31 
+
+$0.29 
+
+$0.31 
+
+$1.84 
+
+Pendleton 
+Hospital 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+17 
+
+ 
+ link to page 21 Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+ Name of 
+
+ State/ 
+
+ FY2000- 
+
+ FY2011- 
+
+ FY2000- 
+
+ Hospit ala 
+
+ Territory 
+
+ FY2010 
+
+ FY2015 
+
+ FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 
+
+ FY2020 
+
+St. Jude Children’s 
+
+TN 
+
+$13.22 
+
+$5.13 
+
+$1.36 
+
+$1.23 
+
+$1.33 
+
+$1.34 
+
+$1.41 
+
+$25.01 
+
+Research Hospital 
+
+Ascension Seton 
+
+TX 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$1.96 
+
+$2.34 
+
+$4.30 
+
+Children's Health 
+
+TX 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$7.07 
+
+$7.07 
+
+Clinical 
+Operations 
+
+CHRISTUS Santa 
+
+TX 
+
+$6.98 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$0.86 
+
+$0.41 
+
+$1.34 
+
+$1.18 
+
+$1.98 
+
+$12.75 
+
+Rosa Health Care 
+Corporation 
+
+Cook Children’s 
+
+TX 
+
+$1.45 
+
+$0.54 
+
+$0.12 
+
+$0.11 
+
+$0.12 
+
+$0.14 
+
+$0.15 
+
+$2.65 
+
+Medical Center 
+
+Driscol Children’s 
+
+TX 
+
+$19.47 
+
+$7.50 
+
+$1.80 
+
+$1.58 
+
+$1.65 
+
+$1.68 
+
+$1.80 
+
+$35.47 
+
+Hospital 
+
+El Paso Children’s 
+
+TX 
+
+$0.00 
+
+$1.05 
+
+$1.11 
+
+$1.46 
+
+$1.17 
+
+$1.24 
+
+$1.28 
+
+$7.31 
+
+Hospital 
+Corporation 
+
+Texas Children’s 
+
+TX 
+
+$108.70 
+
+$46.70 
+
+$10.83 
+
+$10.95 
+
+$11.71 
+
+$11.58 
+
+$11.98 
+
+$212.44 
+
+Hospital 
+
+Intermountain 
+
+UT 
+
+$55.13 
+
+$24.66 
+
+$5.55 
+
+$5.41 
+
+$5.61 
+
+$6.03 
+
+$6.38 
+
+$108.78 
+
+Health Care, Inc 
+
+Children’s 
+
+VA 
+
+$30.86 
+
+$9.64 
+
+$2.52 
+
+$2.62 
+
+$2.82 
+
+$2.87 
+
+$2.98 
+
+$54.32 
+
+Hospital of the 
+King’s Daughters, 
+Inc. 
+
+Multicare Health 
+
+WA 
+
+$2.50 
+
+$1.41 
+
+$0.26 
+
+$0.31 
+
+$0.33 
+
+$0.30 
+
+$0.33 
+
+$5.44 
+
+System 
+
+Seattle Children’s 
+
+WA 
+
+$95.85 
+
+$42.48 
+
+$9.80 
+
+$9.49 
+
+$9.45 
+
+$9.42 
+
+$10.35 
+
+$186.84 
+
+Hospital 
+
+Children’s 
+
+WI 
+
+$90.12 
+
+$35.60 
+
+$7.22 
+
+$7.02 
+
+$7.03 
+
+$7.60 
+
+$8.29 
+
+$162.87 
+
+Hospital of 
+Wisconsin, Inc. 
+
+ 
+
+ $2,798.22 $1,233.12 $280.63 $282.82 $299.69 
+
+$306.15 $324.02 $5,524.67 
+
+ Source: CRS Analysis of grant data downloaded from https://data.hrsa.gov/data/download. 
+
+a. In a number of cases, hospital names have changed over the time period. In these cases, the name listed in 
+
+HRSA’s FY2020 grant data is used. 
+
+b. STC OPCO, LLC was previously St. Christopher’s Healthcare, LLC. There were two values for STC OPCO, 
+
+LLC in FY2020, which represented the closure and transition of funds from St. Christopher’s to STC OPCO, 
+LLC. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+18 
+
+ 
+ Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education (CHGME) 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Author Information 
+
+ 
+Elayne J. Heisler 
+
+ 
+
+Specialist in Health Services 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Acknowledgments 
+
+Emma C. Nyhof, CRS Research Assistant, and Kenneth Fassel, former CRS Research Assistant, provided 
+valuable assistance preparing the tables and figures included in this report. 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan 
+shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and 
+under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other 
+than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in 
+connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not 
+subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in 
+its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or 
+material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to 
+copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+R45067 · VERSION 8 · UPDATED 
+
+19
\ No newline at end of file
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cdec9c5545f87ade1db0e817aeefdb34de08cd1f
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+++ b/corpus/politics/text/290bf7a3ab0f9cbe.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+Order Code RS21717
+Updated April 9, 2004
+
+ CRS Report for Congress 
+
+ H.R. 3108: The Pension Funding Equity Act 
+
+Patrick Purcell and Paul Graney
+
+Domestic Social Policy Division
+
+ Summary 
+
+The U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 3108, the Pension Funding Equity 
+
+ Act by a vote of 336-69 on April 2, 2004. The legislation was approved by the Senate
+on April 8 by a vote of 78-19. President Bush is expected to sign the bill into law later
+in April. The bill will make several changes to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and the
+Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) with respect to funding
+requirements for defined benefit pension plans. Many of these plans experienced
+declines in the value of their pension fund assets as a result of the stock market decline
+from 2000 through 2002, and increases in the value of plan liabilities resulting from
+historically low interest rates. The bill will change the interest rate used to calculate the
+
+present value of pension plan liabilities, temporarily reduce the amount of additional
+plan contributions required to be made by sponsors of underfunded plans (but only in
+certain industries), and make changes to the schedule for amortizing investment losses
+incurred by some multiemployer plans.
+
+ Temporary Replacement of Interest Rate on 30-Year Treasury 
+
+ Securities with Interest Rate on Conservatively Invested Long-Term
+Corporate Bonds. The Internal Revenue Code requires defined benefit pension plans
+to use the interest rate on 30-year U.S. Treasury Bonds (1) to determine the funded status
+of a defined benefit plan, (2) to calculate the amount of lump-sum distributions to plan
+participants, and (3) to determine maximum benefit amounts. Under the terms of the Job
+Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-147), plan sponsors were
+
+permitted to use an interest rate equal to 120% of the 4-year average interest rate on
+long-term Treasury bonds for these purposes. The Treasury Department stopped issuing
+30-year bonds in September 2001, and statutory authority to use an interest rate tied to the
+Treasury bond rate expired on December 31, 2003.
+
+The bill will replace the interest rate on 30-year Treasury bonds with an interest rate
+
+based on the average rate of return on high-quality long-term corporate bonds for plan
+years beginning in 2004 and 2005. For determining whether the plan meets minimum
+
+*RS21717*
+*RS21717*
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+funding requirements, the maximum permissible interest rate will be the weighted average
+of conservatively invested long-term corporate bond rates during the 4-year period ending
+on the last day before the beginning of the plan year. The Secretary of the Treasury will
+prescribe in regulations the method for determining the applicable interest rate, but the
+rate must be based on two or more bond indices in the top two quality levels that reflect
+average maturities of 20 years or more. The calculation of lump-sum distributions to plan
+participants will not be affected by the change in interest rates during the two-year period
+that the law will be in effect. Employers can elect to disregard the interest rate
+replacement for purposes of calculating the maximum deductible contribution to the
+pension plan.
+
+The interest rate used to determine maximum permissible benefits under a defined
+
+benefit plan will be 5.5% for plan years beginning in 2004 and 2005. A transition rule
+provides that for 2004, the maximum will not be less than the maximum amount
+determined using the interest rate in effect on the last day of the preceding plan year.
+
+ Election of Alternative Deficit Reduction Contribution (DRC). Pension
+
+plans that are less than 90% funded, i.e., that have a funding deficit of more than 10%, are
+required by law to make "deficit reduction contributions" to the pension plan. The
+amount of the contribution is based on the plan's current liabilities, as determined using
+a specific rate of interest and an approved mortality table. Under the bill, some employers
+can elect temporary relief from required deficit reduction contributions for plan years
+beginning after December 27, 2003 and before December 28, 2005. Only plans that were
+
+not subject to the deficit reduction contribution in 2000 will qualify for this relief.
+Commercial airlines, steel producers, and the Transportation and Communication
+Workers' Union staff plan automatically qualify for the relief, unless they were subject to
+the DRC in 2000. Under the bill, companies that qualify for DRC relief still will be
+required to make the "regular contribution" that the company would have to make without
+regard to the DRC provision, but the required DRC would be reduced by 80% in 2004 and
+2005. Companies will be prohibited from increasing benefits during the lifetime of the
+relief, unless:
+
+!
+
+the plan's actuary certifies that the amendment provides for an increase in
+
+annual contributions that will exceed the increase in annual charges to the funding
+standard account that are attributable to the amendment; or
+
+!
+
+the increase is required by an existing collective bargaining agreement.
+
+Employers who elect relief from DRCs will have to notify participants, beneficiaries,
+
+and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The notice to participants must
+include the amount of relief and information about PBGC benefit guarantees. The notice
+to the PBGC must include the amount of the relief, the expected number of years before
+the plan will be fully funded, and a comparison of the amount of underfunding to the
+company's capitalization.
+ 
+
+ Multiemployer Plan Funding Notices. Most companies that sponsor pension
+
+plans for their employees do so as the sole sponsor of the plan. In some industries,
+however, it is common for employers to jointly sponsor plans for their workers. These
+are called "multiemployer plans." Many trucking companies, for example, participate in
+multiemployer plans, and many members of the Teamsters' Union are covered under
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+multiemployer pension plans. Under the bill, the administrator of a multiemployer
+defined benefit plan will have to provide an annual notice to participants, beneficiaries,
+labor organizations representing participants, and employers contributing to the plan that
+includes:
+
+! a statement that the plan's current liability funded percentage is at least
+
+100% or, if less than 100%, the actual funded percentage;
+
+! the value of assets and benefit payments, and the ratio of assets to benefit
+
+payments;
+
+! a summary of the rules that govern insolvent multiemployer plans,
+
+including the limitations on benefit payments and any potential benefit
+reductions or suspensions; and
+
+! a description of PBGC guaranteed benefits.
+
+ Amortization Hiatus for Net Experience Losses in Multiemployer Plans. 
+
+In a typical defined benefit plan, 50% or more of the assets held by the plan are invested
+in stocks. The 3-year decline in the stock market from 2000 to 2002 therefore resulted
+in substantial losses in the value of the assets held by pension funds. Differences between
+the expected return on assets in a pension plan and the actual return on assets are called
+"experience losses" (or gains). Experience losses (and gains) are amortized beginning in
+the year after they occur. Under the bill, some multiemployer plans may elect to delay the
+start of the 15-year amortization period for "experience losses" for up to three years. The
+election can apply to losses for any two plan years beginning after June 30, 2002 and
+before July 1, 2006.
+
+Plans that elect relief from amortizing experience losses would have to notify
+
+participants, beneficiaries, labor organizations representing participants, and employers
+contributing to the plan of the relief election. The notice would include the amount of
+payment being deferred and the maximum PBGC guaranteed monthly benefit if the plan
+were to terminate while underfunded. The bill establishes rules for multiemployer plans
+seeking to delay the amortization of net experience losses. Under the rules, a
+multi-employer plan:
+
+C
+
+must have had a net experience loss of 10% or more in 2002;
+
+C
+
+must be certified by the plan’s actuary as expected to have a funding deficiency in
+2004, 2005, or 2006, based on the actuarial assumptions for plan year 2003; 
+
+C
+
+must have paid on time any excise tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Service;
+
+C
+
+must not have had a plan year after June 30, 1993 when employers were required to
+contribute an average of less than 10 cents per hour; and
+
+•
+
+must not have previously received a funding waiver from the Internal Revenue
+Service.
+
+During the delay in the start of the amortization period, a multiemployer plan could
+
+not increase benefits unless the benefit increase had already been negotiated under an
+existing collective bargaining agreement or unless contributions to the plan exceeded the
+annual charges attributable to the benefit change. In additions, the plan's actuary must
+certify that the contributions exceed the charges to the plan. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+ Two-Year Extension of Transition Rule to Pension Funding 
+
+ Requirements. Section 1508 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34) allows
+the pension plan of Greyhound bus lines to be treated as fully funded for plan years
+beginning before 2005 if the funded current liability percentage is at least 85% (instead
+of 90%, as applies to most plans.) Under the bill, the Greyhound/Amalgamated Transit
+Union pension plan can use a specialized mortality table in calculating the funding
+liability to its defined benefit plan in 2004 and 2005, and will be exempted from the
+deficit reduction contribution and variable PBGC premiums in 2004 and 2005.
+
+ Procedures Applicable to Disputes Involving Pension Plan Withdrawal
+Liability. In a multiemployer plan, plan liabilities are shared by the companies that
+sponsor the plan. A company that withdraws from the plan must pay a proportion of the
+plan's outstanding liability. If the withdrawing company is a subsidiary of a parent
+company, the parent company may be responsible for paying part of the subsidiary's
+withdrawal liability unless it can prove that the subsidiary was not created for the purpose
+of evading withdrawal liability. Under the bill, the burden of proof that a subsidiary was
+created to avoid termination liability is shifted from the employer to the multiemployer
+plan if the transaction occurred before January 1, 1999, and the employer had not received
+notice of a claim before October 31, 2003. The employer also will not be required to start
+making payments of withdrawal liability before a final court or arbitration decision had
+been issued.
+
+ Extension of Transfers of Excess Pension Assets to Retiree Health 
+
+ Accounts. Under current law, an employer that sponsors a defined benefit pension
+which is has excess assets is permitted to use some of those assets to fund retiree health
+benefits. This authority expires on December 31, 2005. The bill extends the
+authorization to use some excess pension assets to fund retiree health benefits through
+December 31, 2013.
+
+ Repeal of Reduction of Deductions for Mutual Life Insurance 
+
+ Companies. The conference agreement would repeal section 809 of the Internal
+Revenue Code, relating to reductions in certain deductions for mutual life insurance
+companies.
+
+ Clarification of Exemption from Tax for Small Property and Casualty 
+
+ Insurance Companies. The conference agreement would treat certain small
+insurance companies as tax-exempt organizations under section 501(c) of the Internal
+Revenue Code.
+
+ Confirmation of Antitrust Status of Graduate Medical Resident 
+
+ Matching Programs. The conference agreement would confirm that federal antitrust
+laws do not prohibit medical schools from sponsoring, conducting, or participating in a
+graduate medical education residency matching program, or agreeing to do so and ensure
+that institutions that sponsor, conduct or participate in such matching programs will not
+be subjected to the burden and expense of defending against litigation that challenges
+such matching programs under the antitrust laws.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/corpus/politics/text/2d1a0bc3992dd5fe.txt b/corpus/politics/text/2d1a0bc3992dd5fe.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f196110461a6a0a45adfbd64731e6d51b35aa51c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/politics/text/2d1a0bc3992dd5fe.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+Order Code RS21083
+
+Updated September 12, 2003
+
+CRS Report for Congress
+
+Received through the CRS Web
+
+ Identity Theft and the Fair Credit Reporting 
+
+ Act: An Analysis of TRW v. Andrews and 
+
+ Current Legislation 
+
+Angie A. Welborn
+
+Legislative Attorney
+
+American Law Division
+
+ Summary 
+
+One of the ways in which victims of identity theft may recover for financial harm
+
+is by filing suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.1 However, the Act imposes a two
+year statute of limitations on suits filed. On November 13, 2001, the Supreme Court
+decided a case interpreting when the Act’s statute of limitations begins to run. In that
+case, the Court held that the statute of limitations begins to run when inaccurate
+disclosures first occur, and not when the consumer learns of the inaccuracies in his
+report.
+
+Several pieces of legislation attempting to provide consumers with additional time
+
+to file suit have been introduced in response to the Court’s decision. This report will
+provide a brief summary of the Fair Credit Reporting Act provisions in question, as well
+as an analysis of the recent Supreme Court decision and an overview of recent
+legislation (S. 22, S. 1533, S. 1581 and H.R. 818) introduced in response to that
+decision. This report will be updated as events warrant.
+
+ Fair Credit Reporting Act 
+
+The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) was enacted on October 26, 1970.2 The
+
+purpose of the FCRA is “to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable
+procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance,
+and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with
+
+1 For more information on remedies available to victims of identity theft, see CRS Report
+RS21163, Remedies Available to Victims of Identity Theft .
+
+2 P.L. 91-508, tit. 6, § 601, 84 Stat. 1128, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et. seq. For more information on the
+Fair Credit Reporting Act, see CRS Report RL31666, Fair Credit Reporting Act: Rights and
+Responsibilities. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such
+information.”3
+
+The FCRA applies to the files maintained by “consumer reporting
+
+agencies,” a term broadly defined to include anyone in the business of furnishing reports
+on the credit worthiness of consumers to third parties.4 Consumer credit reports generally
+include information about a consumer’s “credit worthiness, credit standing, credit
+capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living.”5 This
+information is gathered and sold to creditors, employers, landlords and other businesses.
+The FCRA outlines a consumer’s rights in relation to his or her credit report, as well as
+permissible uses for credit reports and disclosure requirements. In addition, the FCRA
+requires credit reporting agencies to follow “reasonable procedures to assure maximum
+possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report
+relates.”6
+
+The FCRA allows consumers to file suit for violations of the Act, which could
+
+include the disclosure of inaccurate information about a consumer by a credit reporting
+agency.7 A consumer who is a victim of identity theft could file suit against a credit
+reporting agency for the agency’s failure to verify the accuracy of information contained
+in the report and the agency’s disclosure of inaccurate information as a result of the
+consumer’s stolen identity. Generally, the FCRA requires consumer to file suit “within
+two years from the date on which the liability arises.”8 However, there is an exception in
+cases where there was willful misrepresentation of information that is required to be
+disclosed to a consumer and such information is material to the establishment of the
+defendant’s liability.9 In such cases, the action “may be brought any time within two
+years after the discovery by the individual of the misrepresentation.”10
+
+ TRW v. Andrews 
+
+The plaintiff in TRW v. Andrews was a victim of identity theft.11 An imposter, who
+
+had the same last name and first initial as the plaintiff, obtained Andrews’ social security
+number and attempted to open numerous credit accounts under the imposter’s name. On
+four occasions, the creditors responding to the impostor’s applications sought reports
+
+3 15 U.S.C. 1681(b).
+
+4 15 U.S.C. 1681a(f).
+
+5 15 U.S.C. 1681a(d). In addition to credit information, consumer reporting agencies are allowed
+to include information on the failure of the consumer to pay overdue child support, if such
+information has been provided to the agency by a state or local child support enforcement agency
+or verified by any state or federal government agency. This information remains on the consumer
+report for up to 7 years. 15 U.S.C. 1681s-1.
+
+6 15 U.S.C. 1681e(b).
+
+7 15 U.S.C. 1681n; 15 U.S.C. 1681o.
+
+8 15 U.S.C. 1681p.
+
+9 Id. 
+
+10 Id. 
+
+11 122 S. Ct. 441 (2001).
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+from TRW, a credit reporting agency. TRW matched the social security number, last
+name, and first initial with Andrews’ file and disclosed her credit history to the creditors.
+
+Andrews did not learn of the disclosures until she attempted to refinance her home
+
+and requested a copy of her credit report, which reflected the impostor’s activity. TRW
+corrected Andrews’ file when notified of the mistakes. However, Andrews alleged that
+the blemishes on her credit report “forced her to abandon her refinancing efforts and settle
+for an alternative line of credit on less favorable terms.”12
+
+Andrews filed suit against TRW on October 21, 1996, approximately 17 months
+
+after she became aware of the inaccurate information on her credit report and more than
+two years after TRW made the two initial disclosures.13 Andrews alleged that TRW’s
+failure to verify, prior to disclosing information to creditors, that she initiated the requests
+or was otherwise involved in the underlying transactions was in violation of the Fair
+Credit Reporting Act’s requirement that credit reporting agencies maintain reasonable
+procedures to avoid improper disclosures.14 By failing to verify that Andrews was the
+initiator of the requests, Andrews alleged that TRW facilitated the identity theft. She
+sought injunctive relief, punitive damages and other compensation.
+
+TRW argued that Andrews’ claims based on the two earliest disclosures were barred
+
+because the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s two year statute of limitations had expired.15
+Andrews countered that all of her claims were timely because the statute of limitations did
+not toll until the date she learned of the inaccurate disclosures. This argument was based
+upon Andrews’ contention that the FCRA incorporated a general federal rule which tolls
+the statute of limitations at the time the plaintiff becomes aware of the injury. The
+District Court agreed with TRW, and held that a general federal discovery rule was not
+incorporated into the Fair Credit Reporting Act, thus barring Andrews’ claims based on
+the two earliest disclosures.16
+
+The District Court also granted TRW’s motion for
+
+summary judgement on the two remaining claims, finding that TRW had maintained
+adequate procedures to avoid improper disclosures.17
+
+The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, applying the “general
+
+federal rule . . . that a federal statue of limitations begins to run when a party knows or has
+reason to know that she was injured.”18 The Ninth Circuit rejected the District Court’s
+assertion that the text of 15 U.S.C. 1681p, including the exception to the commencement
+of the statute of limitations, precluded the application of general federal discovery rules,
+
+12 122 S. Ct. 445.
+
+13 Id. 
+
+14 Id. Not relevant to the Supreme Court’s opinion was an additional claim by Andrews that
+TRW failed to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the
+information” in the reports, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1681e(b). This claim was resolved by a jury
+in favor of TRW. Id at 446, note 3.
+
+15 122 S. Ct. at 446.
+
+16 Andrews v. Trans Union Corp. , 7 F. Supp.2d 1056, 1066-1067 (CD Cal. 1998).
+
+17 7 F. Supp.2d at 1068-1071.
+
+18 Andrews v. TRW , 225 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000).
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+holding that “unless Congress has expressly legislated otherwise the equitable doctrine
+fo discovery is read into every federal statute of limitations.”19 The court concluded that
+since the Fair Credit Reporting Act contained no express legislative directive the general
+rule applied, thus the statute of limitations had not expired on any of Andrews’ claims.20
+
+TRW appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
+
+stating that the Ninth Circuit “conspicuously overstated” the scope and force of the
+presumption that general discovery rules apply unless Congress has expressly legislated
+otherwise.21 The Court said that while some lower federal courts have applied a general
+discovery rule when a statute is silent on the issue, the Supreme Court has not adopted
+that position. Furthermore, the Court stated that it had “never endorsed the Ninth
+Circuit’s view that Congress can convey its refusal to adopt a discovery rule only by
+explicit command, rather than by implication from the structure or text of the particular
+statute.”22
+
+While the Ninth Circuit correctly noted that the Fair Credit Reporting Act contains
+
+no specific directive against the application of general federal discovery rules, the Court
+noted that the statute does set forth a specific statute of limitations, along with a single
+exception to the general rule.23 Based upon the text and structure of the statute in
+question, the Supreme Court determined that Congress’ “intent to preclude judicial
+implication of a discovery rule” was clear.24 Citing an earlier case, the Court held that
+“[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition,
+additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary
+legislative intent.”25 Applying general principles of statutory construction, the Court
+reasoned that “Congress implicitly excluded a general discovery rule by explicitly
+including a more limited one.”26 To allow the incorporation of a general rule in light of
+this fact, would have the practical effect of rendering the stated exception to the general
+rule “entirely superfluous in all but the most unusual circumstances,” thus violating a
+“cardinal principal of statutory construction” - that “a statute ought, upon the whole, to
+be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be
+superfluous, void or insignificant.”27
+
+As if anticipating the Court’s decision, Andrews argued that if the statute of
+
+limitations was to commence on the date on which liability arises, the date should be the
+date on which the inaccuracies come to the attention of the potential plaintiff, rather than
+
+19 225 F.3d at 1067.
+
+20 Id. at 1066.
+
+21 122 S. Ct. at 446.
+
+22 Id at 447 . 
+
+23 15 U.S.C. 1681p.
+
+24 122 S. Ct. at 447.
+
+25 Id . at 447, citing Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-617 (1980).
+
+26 Id .
+
+27 Id. at 449 (citations omitted).
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+the date on which the credit reporting agency made the inaccurate disclosure.28 Andrews
+relied on legislative history pointing to Congress’ consideration of alternative language
+in making her argument. The Court rejected Andrews’ reliance on legislative history
+noting that TRW was able to present information to the contrary.29 The Court also
+rejected Andrews’ argument that liability did not arise until actual damages materialized.
+Refusing to address the issue because it was not raised earlier, the Court doubted that the
+argument would have aided Andrews due to the fact that Andrews’ alleged damages
+began to materialize when the inaccurate disclosures were made, causing the statute of
+limitations to toll at the same time as under the statutory language in question.30
+
+By reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court barred Andrews’
+
+claims based upon the two earliest disclosures. The case was remanded for further
+proceedings consistent with the opinion, presumably allowing Andrews to go forward
+with the other claims.
+
+ Legislative Proposals 
+
+Several bills related to identity theft have been introduced in the 108th Congress. At
+
+least four of these bills include a provision to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s
+statute of limitations. To date, no action has been taken on any of the bills discussed
+below.
+
+S. 22, the Justice Enhancement and Domestic Security Act of 2003, would amend
+
+the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s statute of limitations generally to allow suit to be brought
+“not later than 2 years from the date of the defendant’s violation of any requirement under
+[the Act].”31 In cases where the defendant “materially and willfully misrepresented any
+information required to be disclosed to an individual,” an action may be brought “at any
+time within 2 years after the date of discovery by the individual of the misrepresentation.”
+If the plaintiff is a victim of identity theft, the statute of limitations would be extended to
+4 years from the date of the defendant’s violation.
+
+S. 1533, the Identity Theft Victims Assistance Act of 2003, would amend the
+
+FCRA’s statute of limitations to allow victims of identity theft to file suit not later than
+5 years from the date of the defendant’s violation.32 Other suits could be filed “not later
+than 2 years from the date of the defendant’s violation,” or in any case in which the
+defendant has materially and willfully misrepresented any information required to be
+disclosed under the Act, “at any time within 2 years after the date of discovery by the
+individual of the misrepresentation.”33
+
+28 Id. at 449.
+
+29 Id at 450.
+
+30 Id. at 451.
+
+31 S. 22, Sec. 3114, 108th Cong.
+
+32 S. 1533, Sec. 4, 108th Cong.
+
+33 Id. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-6
+
+S. 1581, also entitled the Identity theft Victims Assistance Act of 2003, is similar to
+
+S. 1533, except that it requires victims of identity theft to file suit not later than 4 years
+from the date of the defendant’s violation.34
+
+H.R. 818, the Identity Theft Consumer Notification Act, would amend the Fair
+
+Credit Reporting Act’s statute of limitations to allow suit to be brought “not later than 2
+years after the date on which the violation is discovered or should have been discovered
+by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”35
+
+34 S. 1581, Sec. 4, 108th Cong.
+
+35 H.R. 818, Sec. 3, 108th Cong.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/corpus/politics/text/2e4e866bc0705860.txt b/corpus/politics/text/2e4e866bc0705860.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d6d37327dc981ccc7aa53deadad35652ba5a71c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/politics/text/2e4e866bc0705860.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+Legal Sidebari 
+
+ 
+
+ Drug Price Disclosures and the First 
+Amendment 
+
+May 13, 2019 
+On May 10, 2019, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) published a final rule that will 
+require direct-to-consumer (DTC) television advertisements for certain prescription drugs and biologics to 
+include the wholesale acquisition cost of covered pharmaceuticals, also known as the list price, in those 
+ads. During the comment period on the rule , a number of commenters raised concerns about two distinct 
+legal issues: (1) whether the disclosure requirement would unlawfully compel advertisers’ speech in 
+violation of the Free Speech Clause of the Constitution, and (2) even if the new rule is permissible as a 
+constitutional matter, whether CMS possesses the statutory authority to promulgate this rule in the first 
+place. This Sidebar investigates the first question. (A future Sidebar will focus on the statutory 
+interpretation issue.) 
+
+ CMS Regulation to Require Drug Pricing Transparency 
+ The final rule, scheduled to become effective on July 9, 2019, provides that DTC television ads for 
+prescription drugs and biological products for which payment is available under Medicare or Medicaid 
+“must contain a textual statement indicating the current list price for a typical 30-day regimen or for a 
+typical course of treatment.” The rule specifies the precise statement to be made: 
+
+“The list price for a [30-day supply of] [typical course of treatment with] [name of prescription drug 
+or biological product] is [insert list price]. If you have health insurance that covers drugs, your cost 
+may be different.” 
+
+The rule also requires that the statement be presented “in a legible manner, meaning that it is placed 
+appropriately and is presented against a contrasting background for sufficient duration and in a size and 
+style of font that allows the information to be read easily.” The quoted provisions are identical to t he rule 
+proposal that CMS issued in late 2018. C MS says that the rule is intended to “improve the efficient 
+administration of the Medicare and Medicaid programs” by providing consumers “with relevant 
+information about the costs of prescription drugs,” ensuring that “they can make informed decisions” to 
+minimize costs. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+LSB10298 
+
+ CRS Legal Sidebar 
+ Prepared for Members and 
+
+ Committees of Congress 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+2 
+
+ Commercial Disclosure Requirements and the First Amendment 
+ During the comment period, a number of groups argued that the proposed rule violated the First 
+Amendment by compelling manufacturers to state a drug’s list price in DTC advertisements. The rule’s 
+disclosure requirement likely does regulate speech rather t han non-expressive conduct: the Supreme Court 
+ held in 1976 that “prescription drug price advertising” is protected by the First Amendment, and more 
+recently , said that if the government regulates “the communication of prices rather than prices 
+themselves,” the government is regulating speech. Further, as discussed in more detail i n this report, the 
+Supreme Court has said that, generally, disclosure requirements compel speech and are accordingly 
+subject t o heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. 
+
+CMS, however , maintains that the new list-price disclosure requirement is constitutional under the 
+authority of a Supreme Court decision call ed Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel — also discussed 
+i n the report mentioned above. In Zauderer , the Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a state 
+rule requiring attorney advertisements that mentioned contingent-fee rates to disclose how the fee would 
+be calculated. The Supreme Court acknowledged that in other contexts, it had previously ruled that the 
+government could not compel speech. For example, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette , 
+ the Court held that a state could not punish students who refused to salute the flag. In subsequent years, 
+the Supreme Court has affirmed that, as a general matter, a g overnment law compelling noncommercial 
+ speech will be subject to strict scrutiny and presumptively unconstitutional. 
+
+But in Zauderer , the Court said that the free speech interest of the attorney challenging the state rule was 
+“not of the same order” as the interests discussed in Barnette . The Court has generally treat ed commercial 
+speech— defined as speech that “does no more than propose a commercial transaction”—differently than 
+“other constitutionally guaranteed expression,” and has said that the Constitution “accords a lesser 
+protection to commercial speech.” Noting that commercial speech is valuable because of its potential to 
+inform consumers, the Court concluded in Zauderer that the attorney’s First Amendment “interest in not 
+providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.” Under the circumstances, the 
+Court held “that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are 
+reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” The Court concluded that 
+this standard was met in the case before it , stating that the possibility of deception was “self-evident” 
+because “members of the public are often unaware of the technical meanings of such terms as ‘fees’ and 
+‘costs’—terms that, in ordinary usage, might well be virtually interchangeable.” Consequently, the Court 
+ said that the state’s “position that it is deceptive to employ advertising that refers to contingent-fee 
+arrangements without mentioning the client’s liability for costs is reasonable enough to support a 
+requirement that information regarding the client’s liability for costs be disclosed.” 
+
+Therefore, for certain commercial disclosure requirements, to survive a constitutional challenge, Zauderer 
+requires the government to show only that a disclosure requirement is “reasonably related” to a sufficient 
+government interest. This standard is easier for the government to meet tha n strict scrutiny, w hich requires 
+the government to show that the law is “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Zauderer is 
+also a more lenient test than t he intermediate scrutiny standard that generally applies to commercial 
+speech, which requires that a regulation “directly advance” a “substantial” governmental interest and be 
+no “more extensive than is necessary to service that interest.” However, as the Supreme Court recently 
+ emphasized, “[e]ven under Zauderer , a disclosure requirement cannot be unjustified or unduly 
+burdensome.” 
+
+Importantly, courts have concluded that Zauderer ’s “reasonably related” standard only applies to certain 
+types of disclosure requirements: in particular, Zauderer governs the constitutional analysis of provisions 
+that compel the disclosure of “factual and uncontroversial” commercial information related to the goods 
+or services the speaker provides . Some judges have argued that to be eligible for review under Zauderer ’s 
+more lenient standard, the government must also justify the requirement by citing an interest in preventing 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+3 
+
+misleading speech, rather t han, for example, an interest in protecting public health and safety. However, 
+ most courts that have considered the question have rejected this position, applying Zauderer and 
+ upholding disclosure requirements even where the government asserts an interest other than preventing 
+consumer deception. (The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this last question.) 
+
+ Assessing the New CMS Rule under the First Amendment 
+ A number of parties commenting on CMS’s proposed list-price disclosure rule argued that Zauderer does 
+not apply and the rule should be subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny . Some commenters 
+ claimed that a drug’s list price is not “purely factual” or “uncontroversial” because the list price does not 
+reflect the cost paid by most consumers. For exampl e, many patients pay lower prices because insurance 
+covers some of the cost. Commenters also argued that Zauderer should not apply because CMS was not 
+claiming that prescription drug advertisements are misleading or that the disclosure would prevent 
+consumer deception. Others claimed that even if Zauderer governs the analysis, the rule should 
+nonetheless be considered unconstitutional because it was unjustified, arguing that CMS has not proved 
+that consumers are currently unaware of drugs’ prices or that providing consumers with that information 
+would help lower drug prices . Still others argued that the rule was unduly burdensome, forcing drug 
+manufacturers to devote a relatively significant portion of their limited television advertising space to a 
+government-scripted message that would distract from their own message. 
+
+In its explanation of the final rule, CMS addressed these arguments, describing a drug’s list price as “an 
+objective fact” a nd claiming that because the list price “is a truthful statement of objective fact that is not 
+subject to dispute, it is ‘uncontroversial.’” The agency al so said that the final sentence in the disclosure, 
+advising consumers that if they have insurance, their costs may be different, “directly addresses” the 
+concern that consumers might “misunderstand” the list price disclosure. With respect to the argument that 
+ Zauderer only applies to disclosures intended to prevent consumer deception, CMS cited lower court 
+decisions to the contrary an d concluded that the better view of “current law” is “that the Zauderer test is 
+not limited to disclosures designed to prevent consumer deception.” The agency further argued that its 
+interest in combating “rising drug prices” was sufficient to justify the disclosure requirement. But CMS 
+al so claimed that ads that do not include the list price may be misleading because without access to that 
+information, “consumers appear to dramatically underestimate their [out-of-pocket] costs for expensive 
+drugs.” Finally, C MS said that the disclosure would not be unduly burdensome, because the “brief textual 
+statement . . . neither drowns out the speaker’s message nor rules out broadcast advertisements as a mode 
+of communication.” 
+
+CMS al so argued in the alternative that even if the rule did not qualify for Zauderer review, the disclosure 
+requirement would withstand the intermediate scrutiny that generally applies to government acts affecting 
+commercial speech. The intermediate scrutiny standard requires the government regulation to “directly 
+advance” a “substantial” interest and be no “more extensive than is necessary to service that interest,” 
+CMS first said that it has a “substantial government interest in reducing prescription drug or biological 
+product costs generally, as well as the costs borne by Medicare and Medicaid.” Further, the agency argued 
+ that disclosure of the list price “clearly and directly advances this interest” by improving market 
+efficiencies and “helping consumers make informed choices.” Turning to the question of whether the rule 
+burdened more speech than necessary to serve its interest, some commenters ha d argued that as a less 
+speech-restrictive alternative, CMS should “encourage companies to institute voluntary price disclosure 
+measures.” (At least one industry gr oup announced last year that members would soon include a website 
+in their DTC television ads where consumers could find more information about medicine costs.) In 
+response, C MS concluded that these “voluntary measures will be insufficient to ensure the continued 
+commitment of all of the relevant companies.” 
+
+Ultimately, if the rule is challenged in court, it is somewhat difficult to predict whether a court would 
+agree with CMS’s assessment of the disclosure’s constitutionality. While lower courts hav e upheld a wide 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+4 
+
+variety of commercial disclosure requirements, the Supreme Court has left open a number of significant 
+questions regarding when and how to apply Zauderer . In addition, the Supreme Court may have signaled 
+ last term that lower courts should, in the future, apply more rigorous review to commercial disclosure 
+requirements when applying Zauderer . In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. 
+Becerra , the Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a California law that required certain crisis 
+pregnancy centers to disclose in their advertising that the facilities were “not licensed as a medical 
+facility.” A majority of the Court concluded that even under the more deferential Zauderer standard, 
+California had not proved that its disclosure requirement was justified and not unduly burdensome. One 
+attorney for the Washington Legal Foundation—a group that filed a comment opposing the adoption of 
+the list-price disclosure rule—has argued that NIFLA suggests that the Court may be shifting its approach 
+to commercial speech, subjecting government restrictions on commercial speech to heightened scrutiny. 
+But as C MS noted in its final rule, the Supreme Court has not expressly overruled its cases affording less 
+protection to commercial speech, and so far, has continued to review restrictions on commercial speech 
+under a more permissive standard. 
+
+ Implications for Congress 
+ This rulemaking highlights the First Amendment issues that may arise if the government requires the 
+disclosure of prescription drug price information—issues that Congress may confront as it evaluates 
+legislative proposals concerning medical bills and drug pricing. Congress has in the past considered bills 
+ that would require drug manufacturers to disclose drug prices in commercial advertisements as well as 
+other communications with health care practitioners. At least one bill introduced this session would 
+require pharmacists to disclose certain drug costs to customers. And a number of bills currently pending 
+ would require drug manufacturers to report various pricing information to the government. To the extent 
+that these efforts could be viewed as compelling or otherwise burdening protected speech, they may 
+implicate the First Amendment. Disclosure requirements that apply outside the context of advertising, 
+however, may raise distinct First Amendment concerns. 
+
+But not every regulation of speech is unconstitutional, and courts may uphold disclosure requirements 
+even if they do burden a drug manufacturer’s free speech rights, so long as the court determines that the 
+burden is sufficiently justified and tailored to the problem at hand. For example, in Citizens United v. 
+Federal Election Commission (FEC) , the Supreme Court upheld a federal provision requiring persons 
+who spent more than $10,000 on electioneering communications to file disclosure statements with the 
+FEC—even though the provision did “burden the ability to speak.” The evaluation of any given disclosure 
+requirement’s constitutionality under the First Amendment would likely be highly fact-specific and 
+context-dependent, given the nature of the law in this area. 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Author Information 
+
+ 
+Valerie C. Brannon 
+
+ 
+
+Legislative Attorney 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+5 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff 
+to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of 
+Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of 
+information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. 
+CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United 
+States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, 
+as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the 
+permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+LSB10298 · VERSION 1 · NEW
\ No newline at end of file
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+++ b/corpus/politics/text/33521a6c34fbfada.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,1176 @@
+Order Code RS21415
+
+Updated January 5, 2004
+
+CRS Report for Congress
+
+Received through the CRS Web
+
+ Largest Mergers and Acquisitions by 
+
+ Corporations: 2003 
+
+John Williamson
+
+Technical Information Specialist
+
+Resources, Science, and Industry Division
+
+ Summary 
+
+After declining in numbers for two years, the numbers of mergers and acquisitions
+
+worldwide had a mixed year in 2003.1 This report provides a listing of the largest
+mergers (announced value of at least two billion U.S. Dollars) or acquisitions during
+2003 through December 31, 2003. Completion dates for the mergers or acquisitions are
+included and merger or acquisition failures noted. These data have been drawn from
+publicly available sources and have not been otherwise verified by CRS. (For the top
+25 mergers of 1998, see CRS Report RS20502, Twenty-five Largest Mergers and
+Acquisitions by Corporations: 1998 ; for the top 25 mergers of 1999, see CRS Report
+RS20503, Twenty-five Largest Mergers and Acquisitions by Corporations: 1999 ; for the
+top 25 mergers of 2000, see CRS Report RS20504, Twenty-five Largest Mergers and
+Acquisitions by Corporations: 2000; for the top 25 mergers of 2001, see CRS Report
+RS20804 , Twenty-five Largest Mergers and Acquisitions by Corporations: 2001; and,
+for the top 25 mergers of 2002, see CRS Report RS21147, Largest Mergers and
+Acquisitions by Corporations: 2002 .) This report will not be updated.
+
+ Largest Mergers or Acquisitions: 2003 (ranked by value) 
+
+(All amounts cited are U.S. Dollars)
+
+Acquirer, Sector, and
+
+Target Firm
+
+Date
+
+Date
+
+Value
+
+New Name (if applicable)
+
+ and Sector
+
+Announced Completed ($ billions)
+
+Bank of America
+
+Fleet Financial Corp.
+
+10/27/03
+
+Pending*
+
+$47.06
+
+ Banking and finance
+
+ Banking and finance
+
+ExxonMobil
+
+OAO Yukos – 40%
+
+10/2/03
+
+Pending*
+
+$25.04
+
+ Energy
+
+ Energy
+
+Anthem Inc.
+
+WellPoint Health Networks Inc.
+
+10/27/03
+
+Pending*
+
+16.46
+
+ Health insurance
+
+ Health insurance
+
+Travelers Property Casualty
+
+St. Paul Cos.
+
+11/17/03
+
+Pending*
+
+16.26
+
+Corp.
+
+ Insurance
+
+ Insurance
+
+1 Politi, James, and Lina Saigol. “M&A bounces back as dealmakers return.” Financial Times ,
+December 29, 2003. p. 17; and, Sidel, Robin. “Year-End Review of Markets & Finance 2003;
+Mergers and Acquisitions Pick Up.” Wall Street Journal , January 2, 2004. p. R2.
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+Acquirer, Sector, and
+
+Target Firm
+
+Date
+
+Date
+
+Value
+
+New Name (if applicable)
+
+ and Sector
+
+Announced Completed ($ billions)
+
+AO Yukos Oil Co.
+
+OAO Sibneft
+
+4/22/03 De-merger
+
+15.06
+
+ Energy
+
+ Energy
+
+announced
+
+OAO YukosSibneft
+
+12/9/03
+
+General Electric Co.
+
+Vivendi Universal S.A.
+
+9/1/03
+
+Pending*
+
+14.06
+
+ Conglomerate
+
+ Entertainment, cable networks
+
+Manulife Financial Corporation John Hancock Financial Services
+
+9/29/03
+
+Pending*
+
+11.04
+
+ Insurance group
+
+ Insurance group
+
+General Electric Co.
+
+Amersham plc
+
+10/10/03
+
+Pending*
+
+9.54
+
+ Conglomerate
+
+ Medical diagnostic substances
+
+Schemaventotto SpA
+
+Autostrade SpA
+
+2/11/03
+
+2/21/03
+
+8.886
+
+ Benetton holding company
+
+ Private highway operator
+
+France TelecomS.A.
+
+Orange S.A.
+
+9/1/03
+
+Pending*
+
+7.693
+
+ Telecommunications
+
+ Telecommunications
+
+First Data Corp.
+
+Concord EFS Inc.
+
+4/2/03
+
+Pending*
+
+7.04
+
+ Credit-card processor
+
+ ATM machine network
+
+News Corporation
+
+Hughes Electronics
+
+4/9/03
+
+12/22/03
+
+6.64
+
+ Media conglomerate
+
+ Satellite broadcaster
+
+Procter & Gamble
+
+Wella AG – 80%
+
+3/18/03
+
+9/03/03
+
+6.96
+
+ Conglomerate
+
+ Hair care products
+
+BP
+
+TNK
+
+2/11/03
+
+8/29/03
+
+6.756
+
+ Energy
+
+OAO Sidanco
+ Energy
+
+Biogen Inc.
+
+Idec Pharmaceuticals
+
+6/23/03
+
+11/12/03
+
+6.446
+
+ Pharmaceuticals
+
+ Pharmaceuticals
+
+Biogen Idec Inc.
+
+Oracle Inc.
+
+PeoplelSoft Inc.
+
+6/6/03
+
+Pending*
+
+6.36
+
+ Software
+
+ Software
+
+R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
+
+Brown & Williamson div.
+
+10/27/03
+
+Pending*
+
+6.25
+
+Holdings, Inc.
+
+ British-American Tobacco plc.
+
+ Tobacco 
+
+ Tobacco
+
+Enterprise Product Partners
+
+GulfTerra Energy Partners
+
+12/15/03
+
+Pending*
+
+5.84
+
+ Energy
+
+ Energy
+
+General Electric Corp.
+
+Transamerica Finance Corporation
+
+8/5/03
+
+1/04
+
+5.44
+
+ Conglomerate
+
+ Commercial lending
+
+(Projected)
+
+Devon Energy Corp.
+
+Ocean Energy Corp.
+
+2/24/03
+
+4/25/03
+
+5.36
+
+ Energy
+
+ Energy
+
+Tchibo Holding AG
+
+Beiersdorf AG
+
+10/23/03
+
+Pending*
+
+5.24
+
+ Conglomerate
+
+ Personal care products
+
+KfW (Kreditanstalt Fuer
+
+Deutsche Post AG
+
+11/17/03
+
+Pending*
+
+5.14
+
+Wiederaufbau)
+
+ Postal service provider
+
+ Banking and finance
+
+Great-West Lifeco
+
+Canada Life
+
+2/18/03
+
+7/10/03
+
+4.74
+
+ Insurance
+
+ Insurance
+
+Alcan Inc.
+
+Pechiney S.A.
+
+7/7/03
+
+12/16/03
+
+4.54
+
+ Aluminium producer
+
+ Aluminium producer
+
+ArvitMeritor Inc.
+
+Dana Corp.
+
+7/8/03
+
+11/23/03
+
+4.44
+
+ Auto Parts
+
+ Auto Parts
+
+Withdrawn
+
+Koch Industries
+
+Invista div. E.I. DuPont Co.
+
+11/17/03
+
+Pending*
+
+4.44
+
+ Private
+
+ Testile manufacturer
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+Acquirer, Sector, and
+
+Target Firm
+
+Date
+
+Date
+
+Value
+
+New Name (if applicable)
+
+ and Sector
+
+Announced Completed ($ billions)
+
+Spirit Group Plc
+
+Scottish & Newcastle pubs division
+
+10/6/03
+
+11/7/03
+
+4.153
+
+ Blackstone Group
+
+ Brewing
+
+ CVC Capital Partners
+ Texas Pacific Group
+Pub manager and investors
+
+Australia and New Zealand
+
+National Bank of New Zealand
+
+8/12/03
+
+Pending*
+
+4.124
+
+Banking Group Ltd.
+
+ Banking and finance
+
+ Banking and finance
+
+Vivendi Environnement
+
+Southern Water plc
+
+4/29/03
+
+Pending*
+
+3.864
+
+Royal Bank of Scotland
+
+ Utility
+
+ Utility operator
+
+R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.
+
+Moore Wallace Inc.
+
+11/10/03
+
+3/04
+
+3.74
+
+ Printers
+
+ Printers
+
+(Projected)
+
+BC Partners
+
+SEAT Pagine Gialle
+
+6/11/03
+
+Pending*
+
+3.62
+
+CVC Capital Partners
+
+ Telephone directories
+
+Investitori Associati
+Permira Advisers
+ Investors
+
+Deutsche Bank, et al.
+
+Northumbrian Water (div. Suez SA)
+
+5/17/03
+
+5/23/03
+
+3.584
+
+ Investors
+
+ Utility
+
+Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Sicor Inc.
+
+10/31/03
+
+Pending*
+
+3.46
+
+Ltd.
+
+ Medical/Pharmaceutical
+
+ Pharmaceuticals
+
+Zimmer Holdings Inc.
+
+Centerpulse AG
+
+5/20/03
+
+10/2/03
+
+3.226
+
+ Medical device manufacturer
+
+ Medical device manufacturer
+
+Konica
+
+Minolta
+
+1/7/02
+
+8/5/03
+
+3.14
+
+ Imaging
+
+ Imaging
+
+Konica Minolta Holdings
+
+Riverwood Holding Inc.
+
+Graphic Packaging International
+
+3/26/03
+
+8/8/03
+
+3.02
+
+ Conglomerate
+
+Corp.
+ Carton manufacturer
+
+Citigroup
+
+Sears, Roebuck & Co. Credit Card
+
+7/15/03
+
+11/1/03
+
+3.03
+
+ Banking and finance
+
+ Credit card/finance division
+
+TCL International Holdings,
+
+Thomson S.A. 
+
+11/3/03
+
+Pending*
+
+3.06
+
+Ltd.
+
+consumer electronics division (RCA)
+
+ Electronics
+
+ Electronics
+
+BB&T Corp.
+
+First Virginia Banks Inc.
+
+1/21/03
+
+10/17/03
+
+2.976
+
+ Banking and finance
+
+ Banking and finance
+
+Xstrata plc
+
+M.I.M. Holdings Ltd. 
+
+4/7/03
+
+6/20/03
+
+2.964
+
+ Mining 
+
+ Mining 
+
+United Health Group, Inc.
+
+Mid-Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.
+
+10/27/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.956
+
+ Health insurance
+
+ Health insurance
+
+Henkel KGaA
+
+Dial Corp.
+
+12/15/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.8753
+
+ Consumer products
+
+ Consumer products
+
+Johnson & Johnson
+
+Scios, Inc.
+
+2/10/03
+
+4/29/03
+
+2.75
+
+ Medical/pharmaceutical
+
+ Biotechnology
+
+CVC Capital
+
+Debenhams plc
+
+9/12/03
+
+12/5/03
+
+2.654
+
+Texas Pacific Group
+
+ Department stores
+
+ Private equity groups
+
+Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Neuberger Berman Inc.
+
+7/22/03
+
+10/31/03
+
+2.636
+
+ Securities trading
+
+ Asset management
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+Acquirer, Sector, and
+
+Target Firm
+
+Date
+
+Date
+
+Value
+
+New Name (if applicable)
+
+ and Sector
+
+Announced Completed ($ billions)
+
+British American Tobacco Plc
+
+Ente Tabacchi Italiani SpA
+
+7/16/03
+
+10/28/03
+
+2.66
+
+ Tobacco 
+
+ Tobacco
+
+Edgar Bronfman, Jr.
+
+Time Warner music division
+
+11/22/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.64
+
+Thomas H. Lee Partners
+
+ Entertainment
+
+Haim Saban
+Bain Partners
+Providence Equity Partners
+ Investors
+
+Finanziaria de Agostini SpA.
+
+Toro Assicurazioni SpA
+
+3/24/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.56
+
+ Investment company
+
+ Insurance company
+
+AIG
+
+GE Edison Life Insurance Co.
+
+6/26/03
+
+8/29/03
+
+2.53
+
+ Insurance
+
+ Insurance
+
+AIG Edison Life Insurance Co.
+
+Goldman Sachs
+
+Cogentrix Energy Inc.
+
+10/20/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.44
+
+ Investment bank
+
+ Electricity generator
+
+Oregon Electric Construction
+
+Portland General Electric
+
+11/18/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.42
+
+Inc.
+
+ Electricity distributor
+
+ Electrical contractor
+
+Federal Express
+
+Kinko’s
+
+12/30/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.46
+
+ Transportation
+
+ Copy center operator
+
+Lockheed Martin
+
+Titan Corporation
+
+9/15/03
+
+3/04
+
+2.384
+
+ Conglomerate
+
+ Defense contractor
+
+(Projected)
+
+Goldman Sachs Capital
+
+Deutsche Telekom AG cable tv
+
+1/28/03
+
+4/1/03
+
+2.34
+
+Partners
+
+ Cable television
+
+Apax Partners, Providence
+Equity Partners
+ Investors
+
+DnB Holding ASA
+
+Gjensidige NOR Sparebank ASA
+
+3/18/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.34
+
+ Banking and finance
+
+ Banking and finance
+
+Exelon Corp.
+
+Illinois Power
+
+11/3/03 Withdrawn
+
+2.236
+
+ Energy 
+
+ Energy
+
+11/24/03
+
+Ripplewood Holdings
+
+Japan Telecom fixed-line business
+
+8/13/03
+
+11/14/03
+
+2.184
+
+ Investor
+
+ Telecommunications
+
+Novartis AG
+
+Roche Holding AG
+
+1/23/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.173
+
+ Pharmaceuticals
+
+ Pharmaceuticals
+
+PMI Group, Inc.
+
+Financial Guaranty Insurance 
+
+8/5/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.163
+
+ Private mortgage insurer
+
+(div. GE)
+
+Blackstone Group
+
+ Guarantees financial obligations
+
+Cypress Group
+
+ 
+
+CVC Partners
+ Investors
+
+Heineken NV
+
+BBAG
+
+5/1/03
+
+10/10/03
+
+2.144
+
+ Brewer
+
+ Brewer
+
+DSM NV
+
+Roche Holding AG, div.
+
+2/10/03
+
+10/3/03
+
+2.12
+
+ Pharmaceuticals, chemicals
+
+ Vitamins, fine chemicals
+
+Prudential Financial, Inc.
+
+Cigna retirement services
+
+11/18/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.14
+
+ Insurance and finance
+
+ Insurance and finance
+
+Bank of New York Co.
+
+Pershing clearing unit, CSFB
+
+1/7/03
+
+5/1/03
+
+2.06
+
+ Banking and finance
+
+ Banking and finance
+
+Federal-Mogul
+
+Bendix
+
+1/31/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.04
+
+ Automotive parts
+
+ Brakes
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+Acquirer, Sector, and
+
+Target Firm
+
+Date
+
+Date
+
+Value
+
+New Name (if applicable)
+
+ and Sector
+
+Announced Completed ($ billions)
+
+Telefónica S.A.
+
+Terra Lycos S.A.
+
+5/28/03
+
+7/25/03
+
+2.04
+
+ Communications
+
+ Telecommunications
+
+PeopleSoft Inc.
+
+JD Edwards & Co.
+
+6/2/03
+
+7/17/03
+
+2.03
+
+ Software
+
+ Software
+
+E.On AG
+
+Midlands Electricity Plc
+
+10/21/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.04
+
+ Energy
+
+ Utility
+
+Blackstone Group LP
+
+Celanese AG
+
+12/16/03
+
+Pending*
+
+2.06
+
+ Investors
+
+ Chemicals
+
+* The designation “Pending” often indicates that regulatory approval needed for actual merger has not
+been obtained.
+
+ Note: Values given for transactions are expressed as the value of the combined assets of the two
+firms when there is a merger. In an acquisition, the value shown is the purchase price of the target
+corporation. These figures sometimes vary from one source to another and can change as the market
+value of the company’s stock changes; values are shown in U.S. Dollars. U.S. Dollar value can
+fluctuate with changes in exchange rates. The values shown above are derived from the following
+sources:
+
+1 Source for value: Mergers & Acquisitions .
+2 Source for value: Mergerstat .
+3 Source for value: The Wall Street Journal .
+4 Source for value: The Financial Times .
+5 Source for value: The Washington Post .
+6 Source for value: bloomberg.com
+ 7 Source for value: forbes.com 
+
+Sources: Mergerstat Online (http://www.mergerstat.com); Mergers & Acquisitions Magazine ,
+various issues; The Wall Street Journal , various dates; The Financial Times , various dates;
+announcement and closing dates from The Wall Street Journal or The Financial Times , various
+dates.
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ November 21, 2024
+
+ Current Employment Survey Benchmark Revisions 
+
+ On February 7, 2025, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is scheduled to release annual “benchmark” revisions to official estimates of national-level nonfarm employment from April 2023 through October 2024. BLS announced on August 21, 2024, that the “preliminary estimate” of these revisions would downwardly adjust national nonfarm employment in March 2024 by 818,000 jobs. This would be larger than most recent benchmark revisions and has attracted attention from Congress. 
+
+ This In Focus provides an overview of BLS annual benchmark revisions, which have been part of regular BLS employment estimation processes since 1935. Benchmark revisions incorporate less timely but more comprehensive data into employment estimates. 
+
+ Initial Employment Change Estimates 
+ BLS initially estimates month-to-month employment changes for the previous three months as part of the Current Employment Statistics (CES) program. These estimates rely on a survey of nonfarm establishments and models of employment in establishments that cannot be surveyed. 
+
+ Survey The CES survey, also known as the payroll survey or the establishment survey , is a monthly survey of approximately 119,000 businesses and government agencies. The employers surveyed are randomly selected to represent all nonfarm employers by state, industry, and employer size categories. After selection, employers are surveyed for at least two years. Each month, BLS asks these employers how many civilians were on their payroll during the pay period that included the 12 th day of the month. 
+
+ Employment reports received by the last Friday of the month are incorporated into “first preliminary estimates,” which BLS releases on the first Friday of the next month. Additional employment reports received in time for the following month’s estimates are incorporated into revised, “second preliminary estimates.” Employment reports received from more employers responding to the survey in time for a third month of estimation are incorporated into “third and final sample-based estimates” for each month. 
+
+ Business Birth and Death Modeling Some businesses cannot be chosen for the CES survey because they are too new to be included. Other businesses do not answer the survey because they are no longer operating. Patterns of business openings and closings over the year vary by industry in predictable ways. BLS uses historical data to model employment changes due to business “births” and “deaths” and updates this model with new data every year. This modeled component is part of all national-level CES employment estimates (except during 
+
+ the COVID-19 pandemic, when use of the model was modified because business births and deaths were not following usual patterns). 
+
+ Seasonal Adjustment Some month-to-month changes in employment are part of seasonal patterns, such as the opening and closing of ski resorts as the seasons change. Seasonal employment patterns differ by industry. BLS uses historical data to model these patterns and produces both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted estimates of month-to-month changes. 
+
+ Benchmarking 
+ The CES program produces estimates of month-to-month changes in the number of jobs soon after the end of each month. However, BLS revises these estimates of monthly employment changes based on additional data on overall civilian employment levels. 
+
+ Additional Data BLS receives additional data on employment levels after publishing the survey-based CES estimates. Employers are required to report the number of workers in jobs covered by Unemployment Insurance (UI) on their payrolls to states every quarter. UI covers about 97% of nonfarm payroll employment in the United States. These payroll reports are then forwarded to BLS, which receives them several months after CES survey responses. BLS also receives periodic employment data for employers not covered by UI, such as railroads. 
+
+ These additional data sources provide information on the actual employment of all covered employers. They are not affected by which businesses respond to a survey or by the accuracy of models. BLS uses these additional data to further revise, or benchmark , estimates of employment. The same data are also used to produce the model of employment changes due to business births and deaths. 
+
+ Benchmark Process BLS uses the additional data to make a more accurate estimate of employment levels by industry for the previous March. The difference between the previous estimate of employment and the new, more accurate estimate is called the “benchmark revision . ” 
+
+ At the time of the benchmark revision, estimates of employment changes in the 11 months before and 9 months after March are adjusted proportionately to match the new, more accurate March employment levels by industry. 
+
+ Benchmark Timing Benchmark employment estimates for the previous March are released in early February. However, in August BLS 
+
+ 
+ Current Employment Survey Benchmark Revisions 
+
+ https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+ releases a “preliminary estimate” of the overall size of the upcoming benchmark revision. 
+
+ Although BLS benchmarks employment levels only once per year, it publishes quarterly employment totals from the UI data by industry and geography about six months after the quarter ends. Federal Reserve district banks in Dallas, Philadelphia, and New York use these employment totals to estimate and publish their own estimates of benchmarked employment more frequently than BLS. 
+
+ BLS continues to benchmark national level employment estimates annually because quarterly revisions can be larger than annual revisions and because the seasonal pattern of employment changes in the CES is different than the seasonal pattern of employment changes in UI data. 
+
+ An Example of Benchmark Revisions Figure 1 illustrates CES benchmark revisions for March 2019 through March 2020. Employment in this period was the subject of a large negative benchmark employment revision, similar to 2024. This period ended just before the labor market disruptions of the pandemic period. 
+
+ Figure 1. CES Estimates for March 2019 – March 2020 Final Sample-Based and Revised Estimates 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: BLS, CES vintage estimates, available from https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cesvininfo.htm. Notes: Non-seasonally adjusted estimates of employment in the pay period including the 12 th day of each month. March 2019 benchmark estimates were released February 7, 2020; March 2020 benchmark estimates were released February 5, 2021. 
+
+ The March 2019 benchmark revisions reduced the estimate of total nonfarm civilian employment in March 2019 from 149,864,000 to 149,359,000 (a decrease of 505,000). This benchmark affected estimates of employment from April 2018 through October 2019 and was incorporated into final survey-based CES estimates for November 2019 and later. The March 2020 benchmark revisions reduced the estimate of employment in March 2020 from 150,073,000 to 149,952,000 (a decrease of 121,000). This benchmark affected estimates of employment from April 2019 through October 2020 and was incorporated into final survey-based estimates for November 2020 and later. 
+
+ Estimates of employment for April 2019 through October 2020 were affected by both of these benchmark revisions. However, the impact of the benchmark revisions on month- to-month employment changes (the main focus of the CES program) were small. For example, the third and final survey-based estimates for September 2019 showed non- seasonally adjusted employment growth from August to September 2019 of 409,000. The March 2019 benchmark 
+
+ revision revised this non-seasonally adjusted month-to- month employment growth to 415,000, while the March 2020 benchmark revision revised it to 417,000. 
+
+ Magnitude of Benchmark Revisions From 2002 through 2023, the magnitude of benchmark revisions averaged 255,000, meaning that on average the estimate of employment in the previous March was revised by 255,000. As shown in Figure 2 , some benchmark revisions are negative and others are positive. Over these 22 years, the largest benchmark revision (in absolute value) was a decrease in employment of 902,000 for March 2009, while the smallest benchmark revision (in absolute value) was a decrease in employment of 7,000 for March 2021. The benchmark revision in March 2009 was -0.7% of the revised employment level. 
+
+ Figure 2. Magnitude of CES Benchmark Revisions Compared with estimated percentage change in employment from the previous March, 2003-2024 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: BLS, CES, Annual Benchmark Revisions, various years Notes: Estimates and revisions shown are not seasonally adjusted. 
+
+ Reasons for Large Benchmark Revisions As shown in Figure 2 , benchmark revisions tend to be particularly large in years when employment changes are different from the previous year. This happens because the employer birth and death modeling component of CES estimates cannot anticipate off-trend changes in employment, such as when recessions or expansions will begin. The preliminary estimate of a negative benchmark revision for March 2024 is consistent with this pattern because employment grew more slowly from March 2023 to March 2024 than from March 2022 to March 2023 or from March 2021 to March 2022. 
+
+ The accuracy of CES preliminary estimates is also affected by response rates to the CES survey. In recent years, this response rate has been falling, which reduces the accuracy of survey-based preliminary estimates of month-to-month employment changes. 
+
+ Data on Benchmark Revisions 
+ CES benchmark revisions for 2002 through 2023 are described in articles listed at https://www.bls.gov/web/ empsit/cesbmkarch.htm. Data are available by industry, and also include information on earnings and hours worked. Full details of the 2024 CES benchmark revision are scheduled to be released on February 7, 2025. 
+
+ Elizabeth Weber Handwerker , Analyst in Labor Policy 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Current Employment Survey Benchmark Revisions 
+
+ https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12827 · VERSION 1 · NEW 
+
+ IF12827 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+
+ This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/corpus/politics/text/418fa1384c0b11cb.txt b/corpus/politics/text/418fa1384c0b11cb.txt
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--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1,675 @@
+U.S. Export Controls and China: Advanced Semiconductors
+
+ August 22, 2025
+ (R48642)
+ 
+ Jump to Main Text of Report 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Contents
+
+ 
+ Introduction 
+
+ Overview of U.S. Government Actions 
+
+ Gaps, Workarounds, and Countermeasures 
+
+ Issues for Congress 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tables
+
+ 
+ Table A-1. Select Details of U.S. Advanced Chip Controls on China (2022-2025) 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Appendixes
+
+ 
+ Appendix. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Summary
+
+ Semiconductors are strategic and uniquely important electronic devices. They are fundamental to most industrial and national security activities and serve as essential building blocks of other technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI). Policymakers, including top leaders in the United States, the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China), and elsewhere, see semiconductors and AI technologies as critical to future economic competitiveness, national security, and global leadership. In 2014, the PRC government issued a national semiconductor industrial policy with the stated goal of establishing a world-leading semiconductor industry in all areas of the integrated circuit supply chain by 2030. To achieve its goals of technology leadership and independence, China has used government financing and certain policies to foster targeted foreign commercial ties across the semiconductor supply chain. 
+
+ Since 2018, the U.S. government has sought to strengthen U.S. export controls of advanced semiconductors with the stated intent of both restricting PRC access to the technologies and ability to produce advanced chips, and curtailing PRC access to related computing and AI applications. U.S. actions have also sought to sustain U.S. leadership in advanced chips, related parts of the semiconductor supply chain, and computing and AI applications, while slowing China's development of competitive capabilities. U.S. actions have been grounded in concerns about PRC efforts to build an indigenous, self-sufficient, and secure and controllable semiconductor ecosystem; and PRC military-civil fusion policies that seek to use commercial advancements in semiconductors, AI, and other technologies for military uses. Some analysts have noted that before 2018, some U.S. controls and licensing policies vis-a-vis China allowed some U.S. firms across the supply chain to contribute to the development of China's semiconductor industry. U.S. efforts to enhance controls have restricted some advanced technologies and activities from China. Other parts of the semiconductor supply chain remain open to China. 
+
+ Congress and the Trump Administration are assessing how to advance U.S. competitiveness in semiconductors and AI. In this context, some stakeholders have called for removing controls on advanced chips to promote U.S. competitiveness and possibly increase PRC entities' reliance on U.S. firms; others have said liberalizing controls could cede some U.S competitive advantages to China in part by filling PRC gaps in advanced chips. Some stakeholders have argued U.S. controls could encourage PRC efforts to indigenize technology. PRC policies already seek technology "self-reliance" and restrict foreign firms' market access as PRC firms gain technological capabilities. Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about President Trump's negotiation of U.S. export control terms with China and approval of Nvidia's H20 and AMD's MI308 for sale in China. Some former U.S. officials have expressed concerns about what they have described as negotiating national security decisions in exchange for trade concessions or government revenue, and have pointed out that such actions could be seen as contradicting past U.S. practice to reject PRC efforts to negotiate on such terms. Congress may assess the authority for the U.S. government to receive proceeds from licensed chip sales. Of potential relevance, depending on the facts as they continue to emerge, may be Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits the federal imposition of export taxes and duties (not user fees), and 50 U.S.C. §4815(c) , which prohibits BIS from collecting fees for considering or issuing export licenses.
+
+ Related CRS reports include CRS Report R46767, China's New Semiconductor Policies: Issues for Congress ; CRS Report R47558, Semiconductors and the CHIPS Act: The Global Context ; CRS In Focus IF10964, Made in China 2025 and Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress ; CRS Report R47523, Frequently Asked Questions: CHIPS Act of 2022 Provisions and Implementation ; CRS Report R47508, Semiconductors and the Semiconductor Industry CRS In Focus IF12899, Data Centers and Cloud Computing: Information Technology Infrastructure for Artificial Intelligence ; CRS Report R46795, Artificial Intelligence: Background, Selected Issues, and Policy Considerations ; CRS In Focus IF12629, Regulation of U.S. Outbound Investment to China ; CRS In Focus IF12958, Section 301 and China: Mature-Node Semiconductors ; CRS In Focus IF11627, U.S. Export Controls and China ; and CRS Report R46814, The U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 . 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Introduction
+
+ Since 2018, the U.S. government has sought to strengthen U.S. export controls to restrict the PRC's access to advanced semiconductor ("chip") technologies and ability to produce advanced chips. U.S. actions have focused on sustaining the lead in advanced chips, and related computing and AI applications, and slowing China's development of competitive capabilities, including in defense and intelligence. 1 The controls also sought to counter and slow PRC efforts to build an indigenous, self-sufficient, and secure and controllable semiconductor ecosystem and thwart PRC military-civil fusion policies that have sought to apply commercial advancements in semiconductors, AI, and other technologies for military purposes. 2 Prior to 2018, U.S. controls and export licensing policies vis-a-vis China allowed firms across the semiconductor supply chain to sell a range of products and services in China. 3 This activity provided revenue for U.S. firms. It also allowed China to develop some competitive capabilities. 4 Parts of the supply chain that remain open to China include some advanced chips (through licensing) equipment and tools; third-party computing; mature-node technology; research and development (R&D) and open-source technology; materials and intermediates; and training for PRC staff. This report discusses U.S. export control actions related to advanced semiconductors, potential gaps, and issues before Congress. Text Box I describes the technologies discussed in the report; Table A-1 provides a timeline of U.S. export control actions . 5 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ I: Advanced Semiconductor Chips and Supply Chains
+
+ Discussions of advanced semiconductors focus on a particular set of chips, specifically, a dvanced logic chips —including Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) and Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs)— advanced memory chips —including High-Band Memory (HBM) and Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) chips, and graphic processing units (GPUs), which provide the speed and levels of computing power required to process vast amounts of data and perform complex calculations used in supercomputing and AI applications. 6 Other parts of the advanced semiconductor supply chain include: a) design and intellectual property (IP); b) certain materials (e.g., metals, minerals, elements, chemicals, and gases); c) specialized processed inputs (e.g., photoresists and photomasks); d) specialized manufacturing processes (e.g., deposition, etching, and photolithography); e) semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME); f) electronic design automation (EDA) hardware and software tools; and g) advanced packaging and testing techniques and tools that can enhance a chip's performance. 7 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ Overview of U.S. Government Actions
+
+ The first Trump Administration expanded export controls on semiconductor technologies to China, mostly through an actor-based approach that added some PRC firms (e.g., Huawei) to the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)' Entity List (EL). The EL lists foreign persons and entities who are involved, or have the potential to be involved, in activities contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. It requires licenses for exports of dual-use items (items with both commercial and military uses) listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL) and other items. 8 In 2020, BIS expanded the foreign-produced direct product rule (FDPR) to subject any firm to U.S. export controls when using U.S. technology, software, or equipment to produce chips for Huawei. 9 BIS also reconstituted its Military End User (MEU) list—a list of entities requiring licensing for exports, reexports, or transfers of specific dual-use items to the PRC, Russia and China because of risks of technology transfer for military use and retightened license requirements for PRC firms on the MEU. 10 BIS had previously waived license requirements for dual-use exports to PRC military firms if the items were for non-military uses.
+
+ During the Biden Administration, BIS added more PRC entities to the EL and strengthened technology-based and country-based controls for advanced chips and related semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME), such as SME using extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV) and deep ultraviolet lithography (DUV). The U.S. government also negotiated terms with Japan and the Netherlands to align SME export controls vis-a-vis China. 11 In 2022, BIS added controls on certain advanced logic chips, integrated circuits, and SME related to advanced computing. 12 In 2023, BIS added PRC entities involved in advanced computing and AI to the EL. 13 BIS closed gaps in controls for certain Nvidia chips designed for China that fell below earlier computing control thresholds and added details to SME controls. 14 BIS also exempted some foreign-owned facilities in China that are not PRC-majority owned from certain controls. Also, in 2023, former President Biden issued Executive Order 14105, followed by an implementing rule in 2024, to restrict U.S. investment in advanced chips and certain types of AI in China. 15 In 2024, BIS expanded the FDPR to apply to SME and chips and further restricted exports to 16 PRC entities. 16 BIS added China wide-controls for advanced packaging SME, high-bandwidth memory (HBM), and dynamic random-access memory (DRAM), which, with the expansion of the FDPR, extended controls to South Korean firms operating in China. 17 BIS added controls for "node-agnostic" tools (used for legacy and advanced chip production) and DUV and multi-patterning techniques. Other SME is subject to end-use/end-user controls and has a new license exception. BIS added 140 PRC entities to the EL and removed three PRC firms from the validated end-user program (VEU). 18 
+
+ On January 15, 2025, BIS issued a global AI Diffusion Rule to curtail PRC access to advanced chips and AI computing power through third countries and in an effort to create a secure global ecosystem for AI data centers. 19 The rule proposed a global licensing framework that grouped countries into three categories for export controls on advanced chips, computers, and AI model weights. Tier I included the United States and 18 countries with whom the United States partners on intelligence, security, and semiconductors, and exempted them from licensing. Tier II included most other parts of the world; these countries would be licensed through a data center VEU program, which would operate under a presumption of license approval. The VEU program provided a general authorization for U.S. exports of advanced chips to pre-approved data centers. These countries also were subject to a per-company per-country cumulative total computing power allocation. Tier III included China, Russia and North Korea, which were subject to a presumption of denial. 20 The rule also aimed to close gaps in controls by considering multichip modes and total computing power, and by restricting PRC access to third parties, including via cloud computing services. BIS also ended license exceptions for front-end chip fabricators and outsourced assembly and testing; and restricted PRC access to advanced U.S. AI model weights. 21 
+
+ The second Trump Administration to date has both tightened and loosened export controls on chips. Initial actions tightening controls have included adding 42 PRC entities to the EL; and requiring Nvidia to apply for a license to sell its H20 GPU in China. 22 The H20 is the latest in a series of chips Nvidia modified in response to U.S. export controls (see Text Box II ). Also, BIS assessed in May 2025 that Huawei had developed its Ascend chips in violation of U.S. controls and warned that using such chips would violate U.S. export controls. 23 BIS also informed firms that produce electronic design automation (EDA) hardware and software tools that they would need a license for PRC sales. 24 Actions loosening controls have included rescinding the Biden Administration's AI Diffusion Rule, which ended proposed controls on PRC access to third-party computing centers, and issuing the AI Action Plan in July 2025, which promoted the U.S. export of "its full AI technology stack—hardware, models, software, applications, and standards—to countries that join America's AI alliance." 25 Also, BIS reportedly withheld export control actions against China during U.S.-China tariff talks. 26 In July 2025, BIS rescinded license requirements for EDA firms after the PRC agreed to resume licensing rare earth magnets for U.S. firms. 27 In August 2025, BIS approved Nvidia's H20 and Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD)'s MI308 GPUs for sale in China under terms that the U.S. government would receive 15% of proceeds. 28 
+
+ Gaps, Workarounds, and Countermeasures
+
+ BIS's targeting controls on certain PRC entities, technology levels, and industry segments has left gaps in controls and enabled corporate workarounds. The EL's actor-based approach is limited to specific entities, of which only parts of the firm and named subsidiaries are listed. 29 Some PRC firms have restructured around these EL-based controls. For example, in November 2020, Huawei sold its 5G business, Honor, to a PRC government consortium. 30 Huawei reportedly transferred some of its R&D teams and advanced technology and design capabilities to the new entity. 31 BIS did not list Honor on the EL—either as a Huawei subsidiary or affiliate, or under a new listing—allowing Honor to come out from under U.S. export controls and resume technology licensing and partnerships with U.S. and foreign firms. 32 U.S. firms AMD and Nvidia have responded to controls by calibrating GPUs for China that fall just below control thresholds but still support AI development and advanced computing functions. 33 Licensing guidance in some cases only restricts certain technologies and allows BIS discretion to approve dual-use exports on a case-by-case basis, such as BIS's approval of Nvidia's H20 and AMD's MI308 for export to China. 34 Some critics have contended that BIS has been slow to list PRC firms, strengthen controls, and respond to workarounds to address White House concerns about PRC semiconductor policies since at least 2016. 35 Also, BIS's process of developing controls takes time and may signal to firms that controls may be coming. BIS's issuance of general licenses after controls are in effect would allow some sales of the controlled technology to China to continue for certain periods of time. With such possible signaling of impending BIS actions, together with BIS' use of general licenses, PRC firms may then be able to stockpile SME and chips. 36 Advanced packaging techniques, aimed at enhancing performance and competitiveness with leading-edge nodes, also may allow firms to circumvent controls by grouping multiple mature-node chips. 37 U.S. joint ventures (JVs) and R&D in China have supported some PRC chip advancements. 38 BIS "red flag" guidance obligates certain corporate due diligence but a "knowledge" standard limits the extent to which firms are liable for knowing the end use of their exports. Some Members of Congress criticized Nvidia for not stemming PRC circumvention via third markets. 39 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ II: Nvidia's Modified Chips for China
+
+ In October 2022, after BIS controlled its A100 and H100 GPUs, Nvidia customized its A800 and H800 chips for China by reducing the NVLink interface (high-speed, low-latency GPU-to-GPU communication) from 600GB/s to 400GB/s. (PRC firm DeepSeek used the H800 in its AI language model). In November 2023, after BIS controlled the A800 and H800 chips, Nvidia announced H20, L20, and L2 chips for China. The H20 is a modified H100 chip that is optimized for AI inference and memory bandwidth. It has a reduced core count but uses HBM3 technology, which BIS restricted in 2024, that supports AI applications. The L20 is a modified AD102. The L2 is a modified AD104. In May 2025, after BIS controlled the H20, Nvidia announced a new R&D center in China and said it would further optimize the H20 and develop the B30 based on its Blackwell RTX Pro with multi-GPU scaling and GDDR7 memory instead of HBM3 (which is subject to BIS controls).
+
+ Source: Britney Nguyen, "Here Are the Chips that Nvidia Can Sell to China," Quartz, March 27, 2025. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ BIS has coordinated export controls with certain governments; differences in controls and licensing nevertheless exist. China has access to foreign-owned foundries in the PRC and Taiwan. 40 PRC dual-use industrial policies complicate BIS's ability to implement controls by obfuscating military and civilian entities and functions, and by requiring firms in strategic sectors, including semiconductors, to use a PRC government-tied partner, raising risks of technology spillage. 41 BIS has also faced challenges in inspecting licensed end users in China. 42 The PRC government has used export controls on advanced manufacturing inputs (e.g., germanium, gallium, and rare earth magnets) and antitrust and other regulatory actions to retaliate against U.S. export controls. 43 As U.S. and foreign firms have complied with PRC technology transfer requirements, the PRC has pressed to secure even more advanced technology. After the H20 was approved, the PRC raised security concerns about the chip and reportedly is also pressing to relax controls on HBM chips. 44 China may use its purported security concerns about the H20 to press for technology disclosures and access to more advanced chips. 45 Nvidia's CEO has said he plans to sell chips more advanced than the H20 to compete in China. 46 
+
+ Issues for Congress
+
+ Congress and the Trump Administration are assessing how to advance U.S. competitiveness in semiconductors and AI. In this context, some stakeholders have called for removing controls on advanced chips to promote U.S. competitiveness and possibly increase PRC entities' reliance on U.S. firms; others have said liberalizing controls could cede some U.S competitive advantages to China in part by filling PRC gaps in advanced chips. 47 Some stakeholders have argued U.S. controls could encourage PRC efforts to indigenize technology. PRC policies already seek technology "self-reliance" and restrict foreign firms' market access as PRC firms gain technological capabilities. 48 Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about President Trump's negotiation of U.S. export control terms with China and approval of Nvidia's H20 and AMD's MI308 for sale in China. 49 Some former U.S. officials have expressed concerns about what they have described as negotiating national security decisions in exchange for trade concessions or government revenue, and have pointed out that such actions could be seen as contradicting past U.S. practice to reject PRC efforts to negotiate on such terms. 50 Congress may assess the authority for the U.S. government to receive proceeds from licensed chip sales. Of potential relevance, depending on the facts as they continue to emerge, may be Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits the federal imposition of export taxes and duties (not user fees), and 50 U.S.C. §4815(c) , which prohibits BIS from collecting fees for considering or issuing export licenses.
+
+ Congress could consider legislation barring profit sharing in exchange for licensing approval or permitting BIS to charge fees for such approvals; requiring quarterly BIS reports on classification determinations, licensing decisions, and export data; instructing BIS to issue the annual public reports it has traditionally published in the past on China trade, which it has not issued since 2022; codifying existing BIS rules; and directing BIS to report to Congress on PRC semiconductor advances, possibly including, for example, on how such progress may have been made with U.S. support and on the quality of such advances (e.g., the ability of PRC firms to produce chips at consistent quality and scale to meet PRC demand). 51 Legislation related to semiconductor export controls introduced in the 119 th Congress include H.R. 1316 passed the Senate in August 2025 to require BIS to report annually to Congress with specific licensing details; H.R. 3447 / S. 1705 to require the Secretary of Commerce to issue standards for chip security mechanisms; H.R. 2683 to require remote access for export licensed trade; H.R. 1122 to control the export to China of some chip technology; S. 1053 and H.R. 2246 to restrict some semiconductor investments in China and PRC firms; and S. 1473 to create an export control whistleblower program.
+
+ Appendix. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Table A-1. Select Details of U.S. Advanced Chip Controls on China (2022-2025)
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Date and Notice a 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Details
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Oct . 2022 
+
+ (87 FR 62186)
+
+ 
+ Added to the Commerce Control List (CCL) new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) for certain advanced logic chips, integrated circuits, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) for certain end uses related to advanced computing and supercomputing. 
+
+ Revised Entity List (EL) guidance for 28 PRC entities.
+
+ Expanded the foreign direct product rule (FDPR) to anyone "knowingly" involved in a transaction subject to the EL and the new advanced computing and supercomputing controls.
+
+ Added a Temporary General License for production of items destined for use outside China. 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Jan . 2023 
+
+ (88 FR 2821)
+
+ 
+ Added Macau to the October 2022 controls.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Oct . 2023 
+
+ (88 FR 71991)
+
+ (88 FR 73424)
+
+ (88 FR 73458)
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Added PRC entities involved in advanced computing and AI to the EL. 
+
+ Imposed worldwide license requirements for certain end-uses conducted on behalf of entities headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent company headquartered in the PRC.
+
+ Refined October 2022 controls and required licenses for chips designed for China that fell just below October 2022 thresholds.
+
+ Confirmed certain items (e.g., photomasks and testing equipment that does not change a chip's capability to a node of concern) not subject to controls.
+
+ Clarified that "presumption of denial" allows for case-by-case consideration/approval.
+
+ Created some exceptions for facilities in China that are non-PRC majority owned.
+
+ Added specifications for SME controls which may narrow or broaden certain controls.
+
+ Narrowed list of products subject to a license exception.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Oct . 2024 
+
+ (89 FR 80080)
+
+ 
+ Expanded the validated end user (VEU) program to include global data centers.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Dec . 2024 
+
+ (89 FR 96790)
+
+ (89 FR 96830)
+
+ 
+ Expanded the FDPR to apply to SME and chips. 
+
+ Further restricted SME for16 PRC entities. 
+
+ Added China wide-controls for high-bandwidth memory (HBM), dynamic random-access memory (DRAM), and advanced packaging SME; end use/user controls for other SME. 
+
+ Exempted countries that align with U.S. policies. 
+
+ Added "Red-Flag" guidance that requires certain corporate due diligence. 
+
+ Added 140 PRC and PRC-tied entities to the EL and removed three firms from the VEU. 
+
+ Added controls for "node-agnostic" tools (used for legacy and advanced chip production) and deep ultraviolet lithography and multi-patterning techniques.
+
+ Added license exception category (Restricted Fabrication Facility) for less advanced SME
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Ja n . 2025 
+
+ (90 FR 4544)
+
+ (90 FR 5298)
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Added due diligence rules for exporters.
+
+ Proposed the AI Diffusion Rule which would create a global licensing system for advanced chips, computers, and AI model weights:
+
+ Tier I : not subject to licensing; includes the United States and 18 countries with whom the United States partners on intelligence, security, and semiconductor policies. 
+
+ Tier II : subject to licensing through the data center VEU program; includes most countries. 
+
+ Tier III : subject to a presumption of denial; includes China, Russia, and North Korea.
+
+ D ata center VEUs : subject to a presumption of approval. 
+
+ Ended exceptions for front-end fabricators and outsourced assembly and test. 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Ma r . - July 2025 
+
+ (90 FR 14032)
+
+ 
+ Added 42 PRC entities to the EL.
+
+ Rescinded the January 2025 AI Diffusion Rule. 
+
+ Issued guidance that any use of Huawei's Ascend AI chips violates U.S. export controls.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Source: CRS based on U.S. government announcements. 
+
+ Notes: 
+
+ a. Federal Register (FR) notice citation.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+ Footnotes
+
+ 
+ 
+ 1 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Office of the White House, "Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the Special Competitive Studies Project, Global Emerging Technologies Summit," September 16, 2022. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), "Export Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing Items," 88 Federal Register 73424, October 25, 2023.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 3 .
+ 
+ 
+ See CRS Report R46767, China's New Semiconductor Policies: Issues for Congress and CRS Report R47558, Semiconductors and the CHIPS Act: The Global Context .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 4 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) increased four-fold between 2014, when China launched its national semiconductor industrial policy, and 2021. SME exports went from $1.4 billion in 2014 to $6.8 billion in 2021. U.S. SME exports to China in 2022 were $5.1 billion (2022); $4.4 billion (2023); and $4.2 billion (2024). U.S. Census Bureau data via China Trade Monitor; does not include U.S. sales to China via third markets.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 5 .
+ 
+ 
+ Also see CRS Report R47508, Semiconductors and the Semiconductor Industry . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 6 .
+ 
+ 
+ Other chips used for AI training and applications include neural processing units and tensor processing units.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 7 .
+ 
+ 
+ See CRS Report R47508, Semiconductors and the Semiconductor Industry and Chris Musso et al., "Creating a Thriving Chemical Semiconductor Supply Chain in America," McKinsey & Company, March 25, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 8 .
+ 
+ 
+ Other PRC firms added to the BIS EL included Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), Hisilicon, Chengdu Haiguang (Higon), Sugong, and Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC) The EL is at https://www.bis.gov/regulations/ear/744#supplement-4-744 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 9 .
+ 
+ 
+ BIS, "Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Amendments to General Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule) and the Entity List," 85 Federal Register 29849, May 19, 2020.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 10 .
+ 
+ 
+ BIS, "Addition of 'Military End User' (MEU) List to the Regulations and Addition of Entities to the MEU," 85 FR 83793, December 23, 2020.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 11 .
+ 
+ 
+ Gregory C. Allen and Emily Benson, "Clues to the U.S.-Dutch-Japanese Semiconductor Export Controls Deal Are Hiding in Plain Sight," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) , March 1, 2023.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 12 .
+ 
+ 
+ BIS, "Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification," 87 Federal Register 62186 , October 13, 2022.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 13 .
+ 
+ 
+ BIS, "Entity List Additions," 88 Federal Register 71991, October 19, 2023. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 14 .
+ 
+ 
+ BIS, "Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Updates and Corrections," 88 Federal Register 73458, October 25, 2023; and "Export Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing Items," 88 Federal Register 73424, October 25, 2023.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 15 .
+ 
+ 
+ Treasury Department, "Provisions Pertaining to U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern," 89 Federal Register 90398, November 15, 2024.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 16 .
+ 
+ 
+ BIS, "Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; Removals from the Validated End-User (VEU) Program," 89 Federal Register 96830, December 5, 2024.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 17 .
+ 
+ 
+ BIS, "Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items," 89 Federal Register 96790, December 5, 2024; and Gregory C. Allen, "Understanding the Biden Administration's Updated Export Controls," CSIS , December 11, 2024.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 18 .
+ 
+ 
+ BIS created the VEU program in 20027 to allow approved U.S. exporters to ship designated items to pre-approved entities in China under a general authorization instead of individual export licenses. For the current VEU list, see https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-748#Supplement-No.-7-to-Part-748 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 19 .
+ 
+ 
+ BIS, "Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion," 90 Federal Register 4544 , January 15, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 20 .
+ 
+ 
+ Applicants would likely be U.S. firms (Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Meta) as the top global operators of data centers. Felix Richter, "Amazon and Microsoft Stay Ahead in Global Cloud Market," Statistica , February 27, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 21 .
+ 
+ 
+ BIS, "Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion," 90 Federal Register 4544, January 15, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 22 .
+ 
+ 
+ BIS, "Additions and Modifications to the Entity List," 90 Federal Register 14032, March 28, 2025; and Nvidia Corporation, Form 8-K, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, April 9, 2025. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 23 .
+ 
+ 
+ BIS, "Guidance on Application of General Prohibition 10 (GP10) to People's Republic of China (PRC) Advanced-Computing Integrated Circuits (ICs)," May 13, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 24 .
+ 
+ 
+ Synopsys, "Synopsys Issues Statement in Connection with BIS Letter," press release, May 29, 2025; Karen Freifeld, "U.S. Curbs Chip Design Software, Chemicals, Other Shipments," Reuters , May 29, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 25 .
+ 
+ 
+ The White House reportedly intends to replace the Diffusion Rule. BIS, "Department of Commerce Announces Rescission of Biden-Era Artificial Intelligence Diffusion Rule, Strengthens Chip-Related Export Controls," press release, May 13, 2025; and Office of the White House, Winning the AI Race: American AI Action Plan , July 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 26 .
+ 
+ 
+ Demetri Sevastopulo, "Donald Trump Freezes Export Controls to Secure Trade Deal with China," Financial Times , July 28, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 27 .
+ 
+ 
+ Sherry Qin, "U.S. Eases Some Chip Software Curbs on China," Wall Street Journal , July 3, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 28 .
+ 
+ 
+ Demetri Sevastopulo and Michael Acton, "US Licenses Nvidia to Export Chips to China after CEO Meets Trump," Financial Times , August 8, 2025; and Samantha Subin, "AMD to Resume MI308 AI Chip Exports to China," CNBC , July 15, 2025; Demetri Sevastopulo and Michael Acton, "Nvidia and AMD to Pay 15% of China Chip Sale Revenues to US Government," Financial Times , August 10, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 29 .
+ 
+ 
+ BIS is reportedly preparing to extend EL controls to subsidiaries that are 50% or more owned by entities on the EL or MEU, or subject to sanctions. See, for example, Steptoe, "New BIS 50% Rule Will Significantly Impact US Businesses Exporting Advanced Technology and Components," Stepwise Risk Outlook , July 9, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 30 .
+ 
+ 
+ Scott Livingston, "Huawei, HONOR, and China's Evolving State Capitalist Tool Kit," CSIS Brief, December 2020; Chen Qingqing and Shen Weiduo, "Update: Former Chief Executive of Honor Zhao Ming becomes CEO of 'New' Company After Sub-brand Sold by Huawei," Global Times , November 17, 2020; and "Huawei Officially Sold Glory to Shenzhen Zhixinxin: The Shareholder Structure Behind it is Disclosed," Sina Technology , November 17, 2020.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 31 .
+ 
+ 
+ Scott Livingston, "Huawei, HONOR, and China's Evolving State Capitalist Tool Kit," CSIS Brief, December 2020; Chen Qingqing and Shen Weiduo, "Update: Former Chief Executive of Honor Zhao Ming becomes CEO of 'New' Company After Sub-brand Sold by Huawei," Global Times , November 17, 2020; and "Huawei Officially Sold Glory to Shenzhen Zhixinxin: The Shareholder Structure Behind it is Disclosed," Sina Technology , November 17, 2020.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 32 .
+ 
+ 
+ Zhao Juecheng and Shen Weiduo, "Honor 50 Series Handset Powered with Qualcomm Chips Launched in Shanghai," Global Times , June 16, 2021; and Celia Chen, "Exclusive: Honor CEO Speaks Out: Unburdened by U.S. Sanctions on Huawei, the Budget Smartphone Brand Looks to Take on Apple and Former Parent," South China Morning Post , January 27, 2021
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 33 .
+ 
+ 
+ Stephen Nelis and Jane Lee, "Nvidia Tweaks Flagship H100 Chip for Export to China as H800," Reuters , March 21, 2023; Tobias Mann, "AMD Says It'll Jump Through Uncle Sam's Hoops to Sell AI Ships to China," The Register , August 3, 3023.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 34 .
+ 
+ 
+ Guidance for SMIC restricts below the 10 nm node while technology at and above 14 nm does not require a license. Guidance for Huawei restricts 5G but not 4G, 6G, or other technologies. Between November 2020 and April 2021, BIS reportedly licensed exports valued at over $100 billion for Huawei and SMIC. Between January and March 2022, BIS reportedly licensed exports valued at over $25 billion to EL firms. House Foreign Affairs Committee, "BIS Approved More than $23B of Tech Licenses to Blacklisted Companies," press release, February 23, 2023.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 35 .
+ 
+ 
+ Some experts say Huawei built its Ascend chips with fabs notified to BIS that were not added to the EL. BIS kept AMEC, a top PRC SME producer, on its VEU list, which facilitates multiple dual-use sales, until December 2024. Ian King and Debby Wu, "Huawei Building Secret Network for Chips, Trade Group Warns," Bloomberg , August 23, 2023. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 36 .
+ 
+ 
+ Jacky Wong, "China Is Stockpiling for Next Phase of the Chip Wars," Wall Street Journal , February 26, 2024; Charles Mok, "Taking Stock of the DeepSeek Shock," Cyber Policy Center, Stanford University, February 5, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 37 .
+ 
+ 
+ Anton Shilov, "Patent Reveals Huawei's Quad-Chiplet Rival for Nvidia's Rubin AI GPUs Could Use Packaging Tech that Rivals TSMC—Ascend 910D Rumors Have Seemingly Solid Foundation," Tom's Hardware , June 14, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 38 .
+ 
+ 
+ In 2016, AMD optimized its x86 chip architecture to contribute to a JV with PRC firms now on the EL. In 2023, Intel said it would partner with Inspur, a PRC firm on the EL to produce an advanced chip. In May 2025, Nvidia announced plans for an R&D center in China. Dashveenjit Kaur, "Intel Joins Nvidia in Tackling the U.S. Ban with an AI Chip for China," TechWire Asia , July 14, 2023; Kate O'Keeffe and Brian Spegele, "How a Big U.S. Chip Maker Gave China the 'Keys to the Kingdom'," Wall Street Journal , June 27, 2019; and Raffaele Huang, "Nvidia to Set Up Research Center in Shanghai, Maintaining Foothold in China," Wall Street Journal , May 16, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 39 .
+ 
+ 
+ "Deepseek Unmasked: Exposing the CCP's Latest Tool for Spying, Stealing and Subverting U.S. Export Control Restrictions, House Select Committee on the CCP, April 16, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 40 .
+ 
+ 
+ Karen Freifeld and Fanny Potkin, "Exclusive: US ordered TSMC to Halt shipments to China of Chips Used in AI Applications," Reuters, November 10, 2024.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 41 .
+ 
+ 
+ Karen M. Sutter, "Foreign Technology Transfer Through Commerce," in William C. Hannas and Didi Kirsten Tatlow, eds., China's Quest for Foreign Technology: Beyond Espionage (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2021). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 42 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ian Cohen, "Commerce Officials Talk Export Enforcement, End-Use Checks with China," International Trade Today , August 31, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 43 .
+ 
+ 
+ Meaghan Tobin et al., "China Opens Investigation into Nvidia Over Potential Antitrust Violations," New York Times , December 9, 2024.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 44 .
+ 
+ 
+ Demetri Sevastopulo, "China Wants U.S. to Relax Export Controls on Chips as Part of Trade Deal," Financial Times , August 10, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 45 .
+ 
+ 
+ Sherry Qin, "China's Cybersecurity Regulator Summons Nvidia Over Chip-Security Issue," Wall Street Journal , July 31, 2025; and "China Urges Firms to Avoid Nvidia H20 Chips After Trump Resumes Sales," Bloomberg , August 12, 2025. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 46 .
+ 
+ 
+ Lingling Wei et al., "With Billions at Risk, Nvidia CEO Buys His Way Out of the Trade Battle," Wall Street Journal , August 11, 2025. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 47 .
+ 
+ 
+ Kif Leswing, "Commerce Secretary Lutnick says China is only getting Nvidia's '4 th best' AI chip," CNBC , July 15, 2025; Eva Dou, Trump's Retreat on China Chip Ban Triggers Policy Spat, Washington Post , July 28, 2025; and Economist , "America is Easing Chip-Export Controls at Exactly the Wrong Time," July 31, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 48 .
+ 
+ 
+ Kristina Partsinevelos and Chris Eudaily, "Jensen Huang Says U.S. Chip Restrictions Have Cut Nvidia's China Market Share Nearly in Half," CNBC , May 22, 2025; Liza Lin, "China Intensifies Push to 'Delete America' From Its Technology," Wall Street Journal , March 7 2024; Alex Rubin et al, "The Huawei Moment, CSET, July 2020; James McGregor, "China's Drive for 'Indigenous Innovation': A Web of Industrial Policies," U.S. Chamber of Commerce, APCO Worldwide, July 2010; Xi Jinping, "Speech at the National Science and Technology Conference, the National Science and Technology Award Conference, and the Academician Conference of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences," June 24, 2024; CRS Report R46767, China's New Semiconductor Policies: Issues for Congress .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 49 .
+ 
+ 
+ Eva Dou, "Trump's Retreat on China Chip Ban Triggers Policy Spat," Washington Post , July 28, 2025. Senators Mark W. Warner, Jack Reed, Elizabeth Warren, Christopher A Coons, and Charles E. Schumer, Letter to Secretary of Commerce Howard W. Lutnick, July 28, 2025; and John Moolenaar, Chairman, House Select Committee on the CCP, Letter to Secretary of Commerce Howard W. Lutnick, July 18, 2025. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 50 .
+ 
+ 
+ Eva Dou and Grace Moon, "Nvidia, AMD Agree to Pay U.S. government 15% of AI Chip Sales to China," Washington Post , August 11, 2025; and Jill Lawless and Ken Moritsugu, "The US and China Say They Have Agreed on a Framework to Resolve their Trade Disputes," Reuters, June 11, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 51 .
+ 
+ 
+ For archived reports up until 2022, see https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/statistical-reports/country-analysis/1787 .
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/corpus/politics/text/455d47cbdc4d32c9.txt b/corpus/politics/text/455d47cbdc4d32c9.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dec571ec6fd171e514054f4f00f8e9cc2f273cb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/politics/text/455d47cbdc4d32c9.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+Order Code RS21865
+
+June 18, 2004
+
+CRS Report for Congress
+
+Received through the CRS Web
+
+ Assistance to Afghan and Iraqi Women: 
+
+ Issues for Congress 
+
+Febe Armanios
+
+Analyst in Middle East Religions and Cultures
+
+Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
+
+-name redacted- 
+
+Analyst in Humanitarian Assistance and Post-Conflict Affairs
+
+Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
+
+ Summary 
+
+This report reviews the U.S.-sponsored funding and programs directed toward
+
+women and children in Afghanistan and Iraq. The national and international response
+to the plight of Afghan and Iraqi women, even to their most recent experience under the
+Taliban in Afghanistan or Baathist regime in Iraq, will impact their future role and the
+long-term developments in each country, such as the implementation of a new
+constitution, the incorporation of women in local and national governance, the role of
+Islam and the state, the growth of the economy, the curbing of security concerns, and the
+role of U.S. and international assistance. This report will be updated as events warrant.
+
+ Background 
+
+The issue of women’s rights in Afghanistan and Iraq has taken on new relevance
+
+following the U.S.-led military actions in Afghanistan in 2001, and the invasion of Iraq
+in 2003, and the subsequent reconstruction efforts. One of the major questions facing the
+United States regarding the reconstruction process is the extent to which the United States
+can help women reintegrate into the political, educational, and economic spheres after a
+long period of societal decline, exacerbated by several major wars and, in the case of Iraq,
+more than a decade of economic sanctions. Advancing the position of women and
+committing adequate resources to women and girls’ education have both been linked, on
+a global level, to the achievement of efficient and stable development, particularly in post-
+conflict regions.1
+
+1 See CRS Report RL32376, Women in Iraq: Background and Issues for U.S. Policy , by Febe
+Armanios. A longer CRS report on Afghan women is anticipated later in 2004.
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+Congressional initiatives focused on women have covered a range of political,
+
+economic, and social issues. Particular areas of concern include the incorporation of
+women in local and national governance, the inclusion of women’s rights in a new
+constitution, participation by women in the workforce, access to education, and provision
+of health care. Basic relief assistance has also been highlighted. This report focuses on
+foreign aid authorized and appropriated through the Foreign Operations Appropriation or
+the State Department, which are the primary sources for humanitarian and reconstruction
+assistance in Afghanistan and Iraq. Programs funded through the Department of Health
+and Human Services, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Department of Labor, and
+Department of Defense are not treated here.2 
+
+ U.S. Assistance to Afghan and Iraqi Women 
+
+Determining precise figures for U.S. Government (USG) assistance provided to
+
+women and children is difficult. Many U.S.-funded projects address overall societal
+issues, such as refugee care and resettlement, health, and job training. These broader
+humanitarian and reconstruction programs may include women and children, but have
+other points of focus as well, making it difficult to determine exact amounts spent on
+women and children. This report emphasizes discrete programs that focus exclusively on
+women and children.3 The President’s FY2005 budget request does not contain specified
+amounts for aid to women, although the Administration says that a significant amount of
+the funds for development programs will support activities benefitting women and girls.
+
+ Afghanistan: Funding for Women in FY2003 and FY2004. Overall, the
+
+situation of women in Afghanistan, has vastly improved since the fall of the Taliban in
+2001, particularly in terms of education and job opportunities. A great deal remains
+undone concerning improvements in the basic standard of living and means of livelihood
+for the average Afghan woman, including issues related to health care, education, family
+care, and participation in the political process. In rural areas throughout the country, but
+particularly in the south and east, attitudes toward women are still conservative and
+progress toward improved living standards is slow. 
+
+Identified below are specific legislative earmarks to support programs for Afghan
+
+women and children and general funds that identify women and children among the
+program beneficiaries. Not included in this discussion are programs that may benefit
+women, but do not mention them specifically in the legislation, such as general support
+for schools and education, human rights, health, Afghan communities and families
+suffering losses due to military operations, etc.
+
+ FY2003 Regular and Supplemental Appropriations. In H.J.Res. 2 (P.L.
+
+108-7), the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, $5 million was earmarked
+in the Foreign Operations Appropriation from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) to
+
+2 The State Department July 2002 and 2003 reports, U.S. Support for Afghan Women, Children,
+and Refugees, provide a good summary of the overall funding from the USG. The 2004 report
+is expected to be distributed in late June 2004.
+
+3 The Department of State, Office of International Women’s Issues provides useful information
+on assistance to Afghan women including a matrix with specific details on projects and sources
+of funding. See [http://www.state.gov/g/wi].
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+support activities coordinated by the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs, including
+support for the establishment of women’s centers in Afghanistan. A further $60 million
+from International Disaster Assistance specifically for humanitarian assistance also
+mentions the improvement of the status of women with priority placed on girls’ and
+women’s education, health, legal and social rights, economic opportunities, and political
+participation. Through the FY2003 State Department budget (Commerce, Justice, State
+appropriations), about $10.5 million was earmarked for the Asia Foundation and $2
+million for the National Endowment for Democracy for women’s rights in Afghanistan.
+The FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11) contained no specific earmarks for women’s
+programs in Afghanistan.
+
+ FY2004 Regular and Supplemental Appropriations. In the FY2004 Foreign
+
+Operations Appropriation (Division D of P.L. 108-199), $5 million was earmarked from
+the ESF to support programs to address the needs of Afghan women through training and
+equipment for women-led Afghan non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The FY2004
+Supplemental Appropriations included a $60 million ESF earmark for women’s programs,
+including technical and vocational education, programs for women and girls against
+sexual abuse and trafficking, shelters for women and girls, humanitarian assistance for
+widows, support of women-led non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and programs
+for and training on women’s rights.
+
+ Earlier Congressional Action. The Afghan Women and Children Relief Act of 
+
+ 2001 (P.L. 107-81) was signed into law on December 12, 2001 to authorize the provision
+of educational and health care assistance to the women and children of Afghanistan. No
+specific amount was authorized.4 The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L.
+107-327) authorized $15 million for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs.
+
+ Programs and Projects. In FY2004, Afghanistan was the fourth largest annual
+
+recipient of U.S. foreign aid. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
+supports Afghan women through a number of grants and programs. Specific activities
+include small grants to establish the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, assistance for Afghan
+NGOs, and opportunities for income generation. Larger aid programs, such as
+humanitarian assistance and education, have included support for women, and in some
+cases, have been integrated into other multi-year development programs. 
+
+In USAID’s current programs, seventeen women’s centers are being established in
+
+different parts of the country, a range of health and education programs are under way,
+and programs to support opportunities for women in agriculture and rural environments
+are being developed. Future activities to support women include additional education
+initiatives, expansion of rural health programs, development of private sector programs,
+and a range of projects to encourage political involvement by women, such as registration
+and participation of women in the national elections and inclusion in community
+development councils at the local governance level. Thus far, of those registered to vote
+in the presidential elections now scheduled for September 2004, only 30 percent are
+women. On June 4, 2004 USAID announced a new $5 million Women’s Private Sector
+Initiative and plans to initiate a Women’s Teacher Training Institute in Kabul.
+
+4 The State Department July 2002 and 2003 reports U.S. Support for Afghan Women, Children,
+and Refugees were mandated by this legislation.
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+The State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)
+
+provides support to Afghan refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees and
+other vulnerable members of the population. Its primary implementing partners include
+the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the
+Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
+Societies (IFRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), other U.N.
+agencies, and NGOs. PRM funds some small programs that target women specifically,
+such as income generation and literacy training programs for women IDPs and returnees,
+but most support provided through the implementing partners mentioned above covers
+assistance and capacity building that includes women, but these programs cannot easily
+separate out expenditures by gender. 
+
+ Current Legislative Proposals. Two similar bills, S. 2032 and H.R. 4117,
+
+ Afghan Women Security and Freedom Act of 2004 , would authorize assistance and
+security for women and children in Afghanistan. Each would authorize appropriations
+of $300 million in 2005, 2006, and 2007, of which $20 million is earmarked for the
+Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs and $10 million is earmarked for the Afghan
+Independent Human Rights Commission for each such fiscal year. S. 2032 was referred
+to the Committee on Foreign Relations on January 27, 2004. H.R. 4117 was referred to
+the House International Relations Committee on April 1, 2004.
+
+ Iraq: Funding for Women in FY2003 and FY2004. Since the U.S.-led
+
+invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the formation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),
+the Bush Administration has stated its interest in ensuring that Iraqi women are involved
+in rebuilding and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.5 Although figures on total U.S. spending
+on Iraqi women’s programs are not available, the Bush Administration has launched some
+initiatives in the past year targeting women. In light of increasing violence in Iraq, it is
+difficult to assess the extent to which these programs have been sustained.6 
+
+ Congressional Action. In conference report language (H.Rept. 108-337),
+
+accompanying the FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation (P.L. 108-106,
+enacted in November 2003), which provides $18.4 billion for Iraqi reconstruction,
+conferees included $10 million “to support women’s programs” in Iraq. In February
+2004, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced that “the United States is
+giving special emphasis to helping Iraqi women achieve greater equality and has allocated
+$27 million for women’s programs.” He added that “Education for women is one of the
+highest priorities, and the United States has committed more than $86.8 million to
+
+5 “U.S. Policy on Iraqi Women’s Political, Economic, and Social Participation,”August 7, 2003,
+[http://www.state.gov/g/wi/rls/22492.htm]. Also see CRS Report RL32376, Women in Iraq:
+Background and Issues for U.S. Policy , by Febe Armanios.
+
+6 Iraqi reconstruction funds, in general, have been managed by USAID, the Department of State,
+the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department
+of Treasury. For more information on sector allocations within the FY2004 Emergency
+Supplemental Appropriation, see [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/apfor38.html], “Iraq
+Reconstruction and Supplemental Proposal” (on the CRS Foreign Operations Appropriations
+page), by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+education projects, with special emphasis on ensuring that girls are registered and
+attending school.”7
+
+ Programs and Projects. In March 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell
+
+announced a $10 million Iraqi Women’s Democracy Initiative, intended to “train Iraqi
+women in the skills and practices of democratic public life. Programs will include
+education for democracy, leadership and political advocacy workshops, entrepreneurship
+projects, media training for women aspiring to careers in journalism, and activities to help
+non-governmental organizations build capacity.”8 The Secretary also announced the
+formation of a “U.S.-Iraq Women’s Network” (USIWN). Iraqi women’s issues and
+women’s programs have also received an indeterminable amount of funding through other
+Iraqi reconstruction funds, targeting women in education, local governance, healthcare,
+and civil society. 
+
+In FY2004, Iraq was the leading annual recipient of U.S. foreign aid. Since April
+
+2003, USAID has implemented a number of programs targeting women, especially in
+governance. Some of these initiatives have been managed under the auspices of the Iraq
+Local Governance Program (LGP), an activity intended to provide a foundation for Iraq’s
+transition to democracy. This program has attempted to deal with the obstacles presented
+by Iraqi culture to women in governance. The Iraqi Women in Local Governance Group
+(IWLGG) has also been established in order to “enhance the political participation of
+women through civic education and training and monitoring the progress of female
+participation in each local government.”9
+
+The LGP also supports and funds initiatives by local women’s groups to develop
+
+their own NGOs, civil society organizations, and professional associations. A major
+component of the project, according to USAID, is to facilitate the participation of women
+in city councils. Through this program, USAID has held a number of workshops for
+women throughout Iraq, specifically in cities such as Arbil, Hillah, Karbala, and Baghdad.
+At these conferences, “international and local participants discuss issues such as Islam,
+democracy, oppression of women, women’s rights and participation in future elections.”10
+
+USAID has supported accelerated learning programs that are specifically targeted
+
+toward girls’ education. These programs are intended to provide girls with life skills and
+the academic background necessary to return to formal schooling. A USAID report
+discussing reconstruction accomplishments in March 2004 indicates that USAID has
+rehabilitated 2,351 schools and trained over 32,000 teachers and education administrative
+workers. The report indicates that these efforts “have resulted in children returning to
+
+7 “Women in the New Iraq,” February 1, 2004, [http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/
+sp20040201-depsecdef0844.html].
+
+8 “Secretary of State Colin L. Powell To Announce Iraqi Women’s Democracy Initiative and
+Creation of the U.S.-Iraq Women’s Network,” March 8, 2004, [http://www.state.gov/
+r/pa/prs/ps/2004/30223.htm].
+
+9 Information provided to CRS by the Research Triangle Institute, March 2004.
+
+10 Ibid.
+
+ 
+ CRS-6
+
+school. Notably, female attendance has surpassed male attendance.”11 It is expected that
+these programs will continue after the June 30 handover and will be administered through
+the local U.S. embassy.
+
+ Issues for Congress 
+
+ Challenges for Women Within Afghanistan and Iraq. In the transition to a
+
+post-conflict environment, Afghan and Iraqi women face particular challenges, especially
+in a climate of uncertainty and insecurity. A critical step in the promotion of women’s
+participation in local and national governance will be their ability to register for and vote
+freely in elections, campaign for political office, and have full confidence in the design,
+interpretation, and implementation of their constitution. Congressional funding for
+democracy building will obviously have an impact on women’s roles in each country,
+particularly amid the ongoing security challenges. Other key issues include participation
+in the workforce, educational opportunities, and access to health care.
+
+ Designating Funds for Women. One of the key ways Congress has had an
+
+impact on the situation for Afghan women has been through a series of legislative
+earmarks. To date, in Iraq, although some funds have been designated to include women,
+such as $10 million for the Iraqi Women’s Democracy Initiative, Congress has not used
+legislative earmarks extensively for women’s programs. 
+
+ Oversight and Reporting. Similarly, in terms of oversight and reporting, The 
+
+ Afghan Women and Children Relief Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-81) mandates that the State
+Department submit an annual status report to Congress on spending for Afghan women.
+No such legislation or mandate has yet been developed for Iraqi women, but anticipated
+supplemental appropriations in early 2005 might provide greater specificity on funding
+allocations.12
+
+ Future Developments. In consideration of the funding appropriated in FY2003
+
+and FY2004, there are some similarities in the approach taken by the United States to
+improve the lives of Afghan and Iraqi women. However, not only do Afghanistan and
+Iraq have a different starting point in terms of economic development and assistance from
+the international community, but the timetables for reconstruction are uniquely influenced
+by ongoing events on the ground. Although it is too soon to draw specific lessons learned
+from either country, as Congress examines the progress of reconstruction programs for
+women, it may be important to consider the effect of religious versus secular forces, the
+variation in local traditions and cultures, and the differences between rural and urban
+communities to see if the assistance provided to Afghan and Iraqi women is effective and
+can be used as a model in future post-conflict regions.
+
+11 “USAID accomplishments in Iraq Mar 2003 to Mar 2004,” March 18, 2004,
+[http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/CEC16D9F9A47731085256E5C0056EE14].
+
+12 H.Con.Res. 196 (May 2003) and H.Con.Res. 342 (November 2003) each call for an increased
+role for Iraqi women in governance, civil society, and political-economic life, but do not specify
+an amount. 
+
+ 
+ EveryCRSReport.com
+
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+Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on 
+
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+
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\ No newline at end of file
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+Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation 
+in the 113th Congress 
+
+ Charles Doyle 
+ Senior Specialist in American Public Law 
+
+November 5, 2013 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+7-5700 
+
+www.crs.gov 
+
+R43296 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+ Summary 
+
+Defendants convicted of violating any certain federal criminal laws face the prospect of 
+mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment. Bills offered during the 113th Congress would 
+supplement, enhance, or eliminate some of these. In the most all-encompassing, H.R. 1695 
+(Representative Scott (Va.)) and S. 619 (Senator Paul) would permit federal courts to impose a 
+sentence below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum when necessary to avoid violating 
+certain statutory directives. 
+
+Federal drug statutes feature a series of mandatory minimums. S. 1410 (Senator Durbin) would 
+reduce several of the most severe of these. H.R. 3088 (Representative Waters) would eliminate 
+virtually all of them. The Durbin bill would also enlarge the safety valve exception. The safety 
+valve provision allows a federal court to sentence qualified defendants below the statutory 
+mandatory minimum in drug cases, if the defendant has a virtually spotless criminal record, that 
+is, not more than one criminal history point. S. 1410 would expand safety valve eligibility to 
+defendants with a slightly more extensive criminal record. Elsewhere, H.R. 2372 (Representative 
+Scott (Va.)) would drop the sentencing distinction between powder and crack cocaine by striking 
+the cocaine base specific references. Two proposals address the Fair Sentencing Act’s retroactive 
+application. One, H.R. 2369 (Representative Scott (Va.)) would permit a court to reduce, 
+consistent with the act, a previously imposed sentence for crack cocaine possession or trafficking. 
+The second, S. 1410 (Senator Durbin), would also permit a court to reduce such sentences, but 
+would limit the authority to instances in which the defendant had not been previously granted or 
+denied a similar reduction. 
+
+The firearms bills are mixed. H.R. 2405 (Representative Scott (Va.)) would strip the mandatory 
+minimums from §924(c) that outlaws possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of 
+violence or serious drug offense. On the other hand, H.R. 722 (Representative King (N.Y.)) would 
+add two years to each of §924(c)’s mandatory minimums, if the firearm were stolen or had had its 
+serial number defaced. H.R. 404 (Representative Schiff) would establish a two-year mandatory 
+minimum term of imprisonment for violation of either of the two firearm acquisition false 
+statement (straw purchaser) proscriptions, if the offense involved two or more firearms and an 
+intent to subsequently transfer them to an ineligible person. H.R. 117 (Representative Holt) would 
+require the Attorney General to establish a system of handgun registration and licensing. 
+Possession without a federal license or of an unregistered handgun would be punishable by 
+imprisonment for not less than 15 years. 
+
+Several proposals add or enhance the mandatory minimums associated with individual offenses. 
+For instance, H.R. 1468 (Representative Blackburn) would create a separate crime for anyone 
+who, during and in relation to a computer fraud or abuse violation, substantially impaired or 
+attempted to impair the operation of a critical infrastructure computer system or an associated 
+critical infrastructure. H.R. 457 (Representative Issa) would establish mandatory minimum 
+penalties for an alien previously removed from the U.S. for his criminal activities. H.R. 1577 
+(Representative Poe) and S. 698 (Senator Cornyn) would expand the class of protected public 
+servants; increase the penalties associated with homicides committed against them; establish 
+mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for killing or assaulting them; and create a new 
+flight-to-avoid-prosecution offense for fugitives accused of such crimes, punishable by a 
+mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+ Contents 
+
+Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1 
+A General Exception ........................................................................................................................ 1 
+Drug Offenses .................................................................................................................................. 2 
+
+Attorney General’s Approval ..................................................................................................... 5 
+Safety Valve ............................................................................................................................... 5 
+Cocaine Sentencing ................................................................................................................... 6 
+
+Fair Sentencing Retroactivity .............................................................................................. 7 
+
+Firearms ........................................................................................................................................... 8 
+
+Stolen Firearms, Crimes of Violence, and Drug Trafficking ..................................................... 8 
+Straw Purchasers........................................................................................................................ 9 
+Handguns ................................................................................................................................. 10 
+
+Aggravated Computer Abuse ......................................................................................................... 10 
+Illegal Reentry ............................................................................................................................... 11 
+Violence Against Public Servants .................................................................................................. 12 
+
+Homicide ................................................................................................................................. 12 
+Flight to Avoid Prosecution ..................................................................................................... 14 
+Assaulting a Federal Officer or Employee .............................................................................. 14 
+
+ 
+
+ Tables 
+
+Table 1. Terms of Imprisonment: Controlled Substances ................................................................ 4 
+
+ 
+
+ Contacts 
+
+Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 15 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+ Introduction 
+
+Federal crimes are usually punishable by a statutory maximum term of imprisonment, for 
+example, “imprisoned for not more than 5 years.”1 A surprising number also have statutory 
+minimum terms of imprisonment, for example, “imprisonment which may not be less than 10 
+years or for life.”2 Under some circumstances, mandatory minimums have proven controversial.3 
+Opponents contend that in some instances they can be arbitrary and unduly severe. Proponents 
+contend that they ensure the offenders of the most serious offenses will receive at least some 
+minimum punishment. Legislative proposals in the 113th Congress reflect both perspectives. 
+
+Some would establish or enhance mandatory minimums for a variety of offenses including 
+violent attacks on law enforcement officers, firearms offenses, reentry into the United States by 
+dangerous aliens, and computer attacks on the nation’s critical infrastructure. Others would repeal 
+or mitigate the impact of existing mandatory minimums, particularly with regard to controlled 
+substance offenses. 
+
+ A General Exception 
+
+Federal courts are required to weigh the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) before sentencing a 
+defendant. The factors include things like “the need for the sentence imposed ... to provide just 
+punishment for the offense” and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities ...”4 In doing 
+so, however, the courts may not disregard any applicable statutory mandatory minimums. 
+
+H.R. 1695 (Representative Scott (Va.)) and S. 619 (Senator Paul) would permit federal courts to 
+impose a sentence below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum when necessary to avoid 
+violating the requirements of §3553(a).5 When exercising the authority, the court would have to 
+
+ 
+
+1 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(relating to false statements); see also, 18 U.S.C. 1955(a)(relating to operating an illegal gambling 
+business); 18 U.S.C. 2339B(“imprisoned not more than 15 years”)(relating to providing material support to designated 
+terrorist organizations); 18 U.S.C. 1341(“imprison not more than 20 years”)(relating to mail fraud). 
+2 See generally, CRS Report RL32040, Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Statutes . 
+3 See generally, United States Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the 
+Federal Criminal Justice System, Policy Views About Mandatory Minimum Penalties , 85-103 (Oct. 2011), available at 
+http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Mandatory_Minimum-
+Penalties/20111031_Rtc_Mandatory_Minimum.cfm. 
+4 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 
+purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, 
+shall consider- (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) 
+the need for the sentence imposed- (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
+provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public 
+from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
+medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the 
+kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established ... issued by the Sentencing Commission ... (5) any pertinent 
+policy statement ... issued by the Sentencing Commission ... (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
+among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide 
+restitution to any victims of the offense”). 
+5 H.R. 1695, §2, proposed 18 U.S.C. 3553(g)(1); S. 619, §2, proposed 18 U.S.C. 3553(g)(1). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+1 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+provide the government and the defendant a chance to be heard and to provide a written statement 
+of the §3553(a) factors that justify the decision to sentence below the mandatory minimum.6 
+
+ Drug Offenses 
+
+The Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act established 
+a series of mandatory minimum sentences for violation of their prohibitions. Trafficking - that is, 
+importing, exporting, or possessing with the intent to distribute - a very substantial amount of 
+various highly addictive substances such as more than a kilogram of heroin is punishable by 
+imprisonment for not less than 10 years or more than life.7 A subsequent conviction carries a 
+sentence of imprisonment for not less than 20 years or more than life.8 When substantial but 
+lesser amounts are involved, such as 100 grams of heroin, sentences of imprisonment for not less 
+than five years or more than life are called for, and imprisonment for not less than 10 years or 
+more than life in the case of a subsequent conviction.9 
+
+S. 1410 (Senator Durbin) would reduce those mandatory minimum sentences by half.10 The 20-
+year mandatory minimums would become 10-year mandatory minimums; the 10-year mandatory 
+minimums would become five-year mandatory minimums; and the five-year mandatory minimum 
+would become a two-year mandatory minimum.11 
+
+ 
+
+6 H.R. 1695, §2, proposed 18 U.S.C. 3553(g)(2), (3); S. 619, §2, proposed 18 U.S.C. 3553(g)(2), (3). 
+7 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A); 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1). The threshold amounts covered by the sections in addition to a kilogram 
+of heroin are: (ii) 5 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of- (I) coca leaves, 
+except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves from which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or their salts 
+have been removed; (II) cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers; (III) ecgonine, its 
+derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers; or (IV) any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any 
+quantity of any of the substances referred to in subclauses (I) through (III); (iii) 280 grams or more of a mixture or 
+substance described in clause (ii) which contains cocaine base; (iv) 100 grams or more of phencyclidine (PCP) or 1 
+kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of phencyclidine (PCP); (v) 10 grams or 
+more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD); (vi) 400 grams or 
+more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of N-phenyl-N- [1- (2-phenylethyl) -4-piperidinyl] 
+propanamide or 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of any analogue of N-
+phenyl-N-[1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidinyl] propanamide; (vii) 1,000 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance 
+containing a detectable amount of marihuana, or 1,000 or more marihuana plants regardless of weight; or (viii) 50 
+grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers or 500 grams or more of a mixture or 
+substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, or salts of its isomers.” 21 U.S.C. 
+841(b)(1)(ii)-(vii). 
+8 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A); 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1)(“ ... If any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a 
+felony drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which of not less than 
+20 years and not more than life imprisonment.... ”). 
+9 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B); 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(2). Beyond 100 grams of heroin, the threshold amounts for this lower 
+sentencing plateau are: (ii) 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of ... cocaine ... 
+(iii) 28 grams or more of a mixture or substance described in clause (ii) which contains cocaine base; (iv) 10 grams or 
+more of phencyclidine (PCP) ... (v) 1 gram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of 
+lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD); (vi) 40 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of ... 
+propanamide ... (vii) 100 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marihuana ... 
+or (viii) 5 grams or more of methamphetamine.... ” 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(vii). 
+10 S. 1410, §4, proposed 21 U.S.C 841(b)(1) and proposed 21 U.S.C. 960(b). 
+11 Id. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+2 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+H.R. 3088 (Representative Waters) would eliminate the mandatory minimum sentences so that 
+each of those offenses would be punishable by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.12 
+Unlike the Durbin bill (S. 1410), the Waters proposal (H.R. 3088) would eliminate virtually every 
+other controlled substance mandatory minimum as well.13 
+
+Under present law, when a death or serious bodily injury results from the trafficking in a very 
+substantial amount of a controlled substance like heroin, the mandatory minimum term of 
+imprisonment is 20 years rather than 10 years.14 When death or serious bodily injury results from 
+trafficking in a substantial but somewhat lower amount of a controlled substance like heroin, the 
+mandatory minimum term of imprisonment is 20 years rather than five years.15 When an offender 
+has two or more prior controlled substance convictions, trafficking a very substantial amount of a 
+controlled substance like heroin carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.16 Without 
+regard for the type or amount of the controlled substance, simple possession by an offender with a 
+prior controlled substance conviction is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 15 days and 
+not more than two years.17 The penalty is imprisonment for not less than 90 days and not more 
+than three years when the offender has two or more prior convictions.18 H.R. 3088 would repeal 
+each of these mandatory minimums, but would leave the existing maximum penalties 
+unchanged.19 
+
+Finally, penalties double when the commission of a controlled substance offense involves 
+distribution to or using a child, or when it involves distribution near a school or other protected 
+location.20 These offenses often come with a one-year mandatory minimum term of 
+imprisonment, when the underlying distribution crime would not otherwise carry a mandatory 
+minimum because of the type or amount of the drugs involved.21 The Waters bill (H.R. 3088) 
+would dispose of these mandatory minimums as well.22 
+
+It leaves in place, however, a fairly unique provision found in the school distribution, repeat 
+offender provision of 21 U.S.C. 860(b): 
+
+ 
+
+12 H.R. 3088, §4(b), (c), proposed 21 U.S.C 841(b)(1) and proposed 21 U.S.C. 960(b). 
+13 H.R. 3088, §4, proposed 21 U.S.C. 841(b); proposed 21 U.S.C. 844; proposed 21 U.S.C. 859; proposed 21 U.S.C. 
+860; proposed 21 U.S.C. 861; and proposed 21 U.S.C. 960(b). 
+14 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1). 
+15 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(2). 
+16 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1). 
+17 21 U.S.C. 844. 
+18 Id. 
+ 19 H.R. 3088, §4, proposed 21 U.S.C. 841(b); proposed 21 U.S.C. 844; and proposed 21 U.S.C. 960(b). 
+20 21 U.S.C. 859 (distribution to a child under 21 years of age)(penalties for repeat offenders are tripled); 21 U.S.C. 860 
+(trafficking “within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elementary, vocational, or 
+secondary school or a public or private college, junior college, or university, or a playground, or housing facility owned 
+by a public housing authority, or within 100 feet of a public or private youth center, public swimming pool, or video 
+arcade facility”)(penalties for repeat offenders are tripled); 21 U.S.C. 861(use of a child for controlled substance 
+violations or distribution to a pregnant individual)(penalties for repeat offenders are tripled). 
+21 E.g., 21 U.S.C. 859(a) (“ ... Except to the extent a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by section 841(b) 
+of this title, a term of imprisonment under this subsection shall be not less than one year ... ”); similar provisions apply 
+with respect to 21 U.S.C. 859 (b); 21 U.S.C. 860(a); 21 U.S.C. 861(b), (c), (f). Repeat offenders under 21 U.S.C. 860 
+face a mandatory minimum of imprisonment of not less than three years in the absence of a higher otherwise applicable 
+mandatory minimum, 21 U.S.C. 860(b). 
+22 H.R. 3088, §4, proposed 21 U.S.C. 859(a), (b); 21 U.S.C. 860(a), (b); proposed 21 U.S.C. 861(b), (c). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+3 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+Any person who violates section 841(a)(1) of this title ... by distributing, possessing with 
+intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or within one thousand 
+feet of ... a ... school ... or housing facility owned by a public housing authority, or within 
+100 feet of a public or private youth center, public swimming pool, or video arcade facility, 
+after a prior conviction under subsection (a) of this section has become final is punishable (1) 
+by the greater of (A) a term of imprisonment of not less than three years and not more than 
+life imprisonment or (B) three times the maximum punishment authorized by section 841(b) 
+of this title. . . . 
+
+A summary of the changes in the existing controlled substance mandatory minimum terms of 
+imprisonment, proposed in the Durbin (S. 1410) and Waters (H.R. 3088) proposals, appears in the 
+following chart. 
+
+ Table 1. Terms of Imprisonment: Controlled Substances 
+
+ Offense 
+
+ Present Law 
+
+ S. 1410 
+
+ H.R. 3088 
+
+I. (a)(i) Trafficking: Sec. 
+
+not less than 10 years or 
+
+not less than 5 years or 
+
+any term of years or life 
+
+841(b)(1)(A) substances 
+
+more than life 
+
+more than life 
+
+(no mandatory minimum) 
+
+(e.g. 1 kilo. + of heroin) 
+
+ (ii) if death or serious 
+
+not less than 20 years or 
+
+no change 
+
+any term of years or life 
+
+injury results 
+
+more than life 
+
+(no mandatory minimum) 
+
+ (b)(i) one prior violation 
+
+not less than 20 years or 
+
+not less than 10 years or 
+
+any term of years or life 
+
+more than life 
+
+more than life 
+
+(no mandatory minimum) 
+
+ (i ) and death or serious 
+
+life 
+
+no change 
+
+any term of years or life 
+
+injury results 
+
+(no mandatory minimum) 
+
+ (c) two or more prior 
+
+life 
+
+no change 
+
+any term of years or life 
+
+violations 
+
+(no mandatory minimum) 
+
+II. (a)(i) Trafficking: Sec. 
+
+not less than 5 years or 
+
+not less than 2 years or 
+
+not more than 40 years 
+
+841(b)(1)(B) substance 
+
+more than 40 years 
+
+more than 40 years 
+
+(no mandatory minimum) 
+
+(e.g. 100g + of heroin) 
+
+ (i ) if death or serious 
+
+not less than 20 years or 
+
+no change 
+
+any term of years or life 
+
+injury results 
+
+more than life 
+
+(no mandatory minimum) 
+
+ (b)(i)one prior violation 
+
+not less than 10 years or 
+
+not less than 5 years or 
+
+any term of years or life 
+
+more than life 
+
+more than life 
+
+(no mandatory minimum) 
+
+ (i ) and death or serious 
+
+life 
+
+life 
+
+any term of years or life 
+
+injury results 
+
+(no mandatory minimum) 
+
+III. (a) Trafficking to a child 
+
+not less than 1 year 
+
+no change 
+
+no mandatory minimum 
+
+where no mandatory 
+minimum otherwise 
+applies 
+
+ (b) Using a child to traffic 
+
+not less than 1 year 
+
+no change 
+
+no mandatory minimum 
+
+or trafficking to a pregnant 
+person where no 
+mandatory minimum 
+otherwise applies 
+
+ (c)(i) Trafficking near a 
+
+not less than 1 year 
+
+no change 
+
+no mandatory minimum 
+
+school or protected 
+location where no 
+mandatory minimum 
+otherwise applies 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+4 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+ Offense 
+
+ Present Law 
+
+ S. 1410 
+
+ H.R. 3088 
+
+ (ii) with a prior 
+
+not less than 3 years 
+
+no change 
+
+no mandatory minimum 
+
+conviction 
+
+ (iii) with a prior 
+
+the greater of (A) 
+
+no change 
+
+no change 
+
+conviction 
+
+imprisonment for not less 
+than 3 years or more than 
+life or (B) three times the 
+otherwise applicable 
+penalty 
+
+IV. (a) Simple possession 
+
+not less than 15 days or 
+
+no change 
+
+no mandatory minimum 
+
+and prior conviction 
+
+more than 2 years 
+
+ (b) Simple possession and 
+
+not more than 90 days or 
+
+no change 
+
+no mandatory minimum 
+
+2 or more prior 
+
+more than 3 years 
+
+convictions 
+
+ Source: Congressional Research Service, based on S. 1410; H.R. 3088; and 21 U.S.C. 841, 844, 859, 860, 861, 
+960. 
+
+ Attorney General’s Approval 
+
+The Waters bill (H.R. 3088) also contains a proposal apparently designed to reserve federal 
+prosecutions to the most serious cases. It would require the Attorney General’s written approval 
+for any prosecution for possession or trafficking in amounts less than those necessary to trigger 
+the most severe mandatory minimums (e.g., less than a kilogram of heroin), or in the case of 
+cocaine, less than 500 grams.23 
+
+ Safety Valve 
+
+The so-called safety valve provision of 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) allows a court to sentence qualified 
+defendants below the statutory mandatory minimum in controlled substance trafficking and 
+possession cases.24 To qualify, a defendant may not have used violence in the course of the 
+offense.25 He must not have played a managerial role in the offense if it involved group 
+participation.26 The offense must not have resulted in a death or serious bodily injury.27 The 
+
+ 
+
+23 H.R. 3088, §3. The limitation would apply to prosecution of any offense or conspiracy to commit any offense under 
+the Controlled Substances Act or the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act. 
+24 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(“ Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case of an offense under section 401, 404, or 
+406 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841, 844, 846) or section 1010 or 1013 of the Controlled Substances 
+Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 960, 963), the court shall impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines promulgated by 
+the United States Sentencing Commission under section 994 of title 28 without regard to any statutory minimum 
+sentence, if the court finds at sentencing, after the Government has been afforded the opportunity to make a 
+recommendation ... ”). 
+25 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(2)(“ ... if the court finds at sentencing ... that ... (2) the defendant did not use violence or credible 
+threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in 
+connection with the offense”). 
+26 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(4)(“ ... if the court finds at sentencing ... that ... (4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, 
+manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a 
+continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act”). 
+27 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(3)(“ ... if the court finds at sentencing ... that ... (3) the offense did not result in death or serious 
+bodily injury to any person”). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+5 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+defendant must make full disclosure of his involvement in the offense, providing the government 
+with all the information and evidence at his disposal.28 Finally, the defendant must have a 
+virtually spotless criminal record, that is, not more than 1 criminal history point.29 
+
+Criminal history points are a feature of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Sentencing Guidelines. 
+The Guidelines assign points based on the sentences imposed for prior state and federal 
+convictions. For example, the Guidelines assign 1 point for any past conviction that resulted in a 
+sentence of less than incarceration for 60 days; 2 points for any conviction resulting in a sentence 
+of incarceration for at least 60 days; and 3 points for any conviction resulting in a sentence of 
+incarceration of more than a year and a month.30 
+
+The Sentencing Commission’s report on mandatory minimum sentences suggested that Congress 
+consider expanding safety valve eligibility to defendants with 2 or possible 3 criminal history 
+points.31 The report indicated that under the Guidelines a defendant’s criminal record “can have a 
+disproportionate and excessively severe cumulative sentencing impact on certain drug 
+offenders.”32 It explained that the Guidelines are construed to ensure that the sentence they 
+recommend in a given case calls for a term of imprisonment that is not less than an applicable 
+mandatory minimum.33 In addition, the drug offenses have escalated mandatory minimums for 
+repeat offenders.34 Moreover, similarly situated drug offenders may be treated differently, because 
+states punish simple drug possession differently and prosecutors decide when to press recidivism 
+qualifications differently.35 
+
+The Durbin bill (S. 1410) would expand safety valve eligibility from defendants with no more 
+than 1 criminal history point to those with no more than 3 points.36 
+
+ Cocaine Sentencing 
+
+Originally, the Controlled Substances Act made no distinction between powder cocaine and crack 
+cocaine (cocaine base).37 The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act introduced a 100-1 sentencing ratio 
+
+ 
+
+28 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(5)(“ ... if the court finds at sentencing ... that ... (5) not later than the time of the sentencing 
+
+hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has 
+concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the 
+fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of 
+the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement”). 
+
+29 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(1)(“ ... if the court finds at sentencing ... that - (1) the defendant does not have more than 1 
+criminal history point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines”). 
+30 U.S.S.G. §4A1.1. 
+31 United States Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal 
+Criminal Justice System , 355 (Oct. 2011). 
+32 Id . at 352. 
+33 Id. 
+ 34 Id. 
+ 35 Id. at 353 (“Interviews of prosecutors and defense attorneys in 13 districts confirm that different districts have 
+adopted different practices with respect to filing the necessary information required to seek an enhanced penalty under 
+21 U.S.C. §851[relating to proof of a prior conviction] in part because of its severity. The structure of the recidivist 
+provisions in 21 U.S.C. §§841 and 960 fosters inconsistent application, in part, because their applicability turns on the 
+varying statutory maximum penalties for state drug offenses”). 
+36 S. 1410, §2, proposed 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(1). The bill sets the ceiling at criminal history category II, that is, not more 
+than 3 criminal history points, U.S.S.G. ch.5, pt. A. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+6 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+between the two, so that trafficking in 50 grams of crack cocaine carried the same penalties 
+trafficking in 5,000 grams of powder cocaine.38 The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act introduced the 
+present 500-28 ratio, so that trafficking in 280 grams of crack cocaine carries the same penalties 
+as 5,000 grams of powder cocaine.39 It also abolished the mandatory minimum for simple crack 
+cocaine possession that the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act had established.40 The Sentencing 
+Commission subsequently revised the Sentencing Guidelines to reflect the change and made the 
+modification retroactively applicable at the discretion of the sentencing court.41 
+
+H.R. 2372 (Representative Scott (Va.)) would eliminate the sentencing distinction between 
+powder and crack cocaine by eliminating the cocaine base specific references.42 Trafficking in 
+cocaine would carry the same penalties regardless whether the substance was powder or crack 
+cocaine.43 
+
+ Fair Sentencing Retroactivity 
+
+The Fair Sentencing Act reductions apply to offenses committed thereafter. They also apply to 
+offenses committed beforehand when sentencing occurs after the time of enactment.44 Federal 
+courts have discretion to reduce a sentence imposed under a Sentencing Guideline that was 
+subsequently substantially reduced.45 The Fair Sentencing Act, however, does not apply to 
+sentences imposed prior to its enactment,46 and it does not apply in sentence reduction hearings 
+triggered by new Sentencing Guidelines.47 In such proceedings, the courts remain bound by the 
+mandatory minimums in effect prior to enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act.48 
+
+ 
+(...continued) 
+37 P.L. 91-513, §§401, 1010; 84 Stat. 1260, 1290 (1970); 21 U.S.C. 841, 960 (1970 ed.). 
+38 P.L. 99-570, §§1002, 1004; 100 Stat. 3207-2, 3207-6; 21 U.S.C. 841, 960 (1988 ed.) 
+39 P.L. 111-220, §2, 124 Stat. 2372, 21 U.S.C. 841, 960. 
+40 P.L. 111-220, §3, 124 Stat. 2372, 21 U.S.C. 844. 
+41 18 U.S.C. 3582(c); U.S.S.G. 1B1.10; U.S.S.G. App. C, Amends. 750, 759. 
+42 H.R. 2372, §2, proposed 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(B), 960(b)(1), 960(b)(2). 
+43 Id . 
+44 Dorsey v. United States , 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2326 (2012). 
+45 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). 
+46 United States v. Rivera , 726 F3.d 17, *28 (1st Cir. 2013)(internal citations omitted)(“[I]n United States v. Goncalves , 
+we joined ten of our fellow Circuit Courts of Appeal in concluding that the FSA is not retroactive for the benefit of a 
+defendant like Carrasquillo-Ocasio, whose criminal conduct and sentencing occurred before the FSA became law”); see 
+also, United States v. Hodge , 721 F.3d 1279, 1281 (10th Cir. 2013). 
+47 United States v. Swangin , 726 F.3d 205, 208 (D.C.Cir. 2013)(“Finally, we note that every circuit that has addressed 
+the question post- Dorsey has likewise concluded that courts cannot retroactively apply the Fair Sentencing Act’s new 
+mandatory minimums in §3582(c)(2) proceedings to defendants who were sentenced before the Act’s effective date”); 
+ United States v. Hodge , 721 F.3d at 1281 (“As an initial matter, the FSA does not provide an independent basis for a 
+sentence reduction; only the statutory exceptions in 18 U.S.C.§3582 provide such grounds. In a §3582 proceeding, the 
+court applies the statutory penalties in effect at the time of the original sentencing”). 
+48 United States v. Reeves , 717 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 2013)(“[E]ight of the nine federal circuits to address the issue 
+have held that the statutory provisions applicable when the defendant was originally sentenced – not the statutory 
+provisions in the Fair Sentencing Act – apply in section 3582(c)(2) proceedings”). The single contrary opinion was 
+later vacated for en banc rehearing, United States v. Blewett , 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013). The divided Blewett panel 
+held that defendants sentenced prior to the Fair Sentence Act’s enactment were entitled to its reductions are a matter of 
+equal protection, United States v. Blewett , 719 F.3d at 494. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+7 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+Two proposals address the Fair Sentencing Act’s retroactive application. One, H.R. 2369 
+(Representative Scott (Va.)), begins with an expression of concern that some district courts may 
+not be applying the act to pending cases.49 It would then make it clear that the act’s amendments 
+apply to cases in which sentencing has yet to occur and to cases in which an appellate court 
+remands for sentencing consistent with the act.50 It would also permit a court to reduce, consistent 
+with the act, a previously imposed sentence for crack cocaine possession or trafficking.51 
+
+The second, S. 1410 (Senator Durbin), would also permit a court to reduce such sentences, but 
+would limit the authority to instances in which the defendant has not been previously granted or 
+denied a similar reduction.52 
+
+ Firearms 
+
+ Stolen Firearms, Crimes of Violence, and Drug Trafficking 
+
+Section 924(c), in its current form, imposes one of several different minimum sentences when a 
+firearm is used or possessed in furtherance of another federal crime of violence or of drug 
+trafficking.53 The mandatory minimums, imposed in addition to the sentence imposed for the 
+underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking, vary depending upon the circumstances: 
+
+• imprisonment for not less than five years, unless one of higher mandatory 
+
+minimums below applies; 
+
+• imprisonment for not less than seven years, if a firearm is brandished; 
+• imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is discharged; 
+• imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is a short-barreled rifle or 
+
+shotgun or is a semi-automatic weapon; 
+
+• imprisonment for not less than 15 years, if the offense involves the armor 
+
+piercing ammunition; 
+
+• imprisonment for not less than 25 years, if the offender has a prior conviction for 
+
+violation of §924(c); 
+
+• imprisonment for not less than 30 years, if the firearm is a machine gun or 
+
+destructive device or is equipped with a silencer; and 
+
+• imprisonment for life, if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of 
+
+§924(c) and if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped 
+with a silencer.54 
+
+ 
+
+49 H.R. 2369, §2. 
+50 H.R. 2369, §3. 
+51 H.R. 2369, §4. 
+52 S. 1410, §3. 
+53 18 U.S.C. 924(c). 
+54 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1), (5). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+8 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+H.R. 2405 (Representative Scott (Va.)) would strip §924(c) of its mandatory minimum penalties. 
+Each of its not-less-than penalties would become not-more-than penalties.55 So, for example, 
+possession of a shotgun in furtherance of a crime of violence or of drug trafficking would be 
+punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years. Possession of a machine gun in 
+furtherance of such an offense would be punishable by imprisonment for not more than 25 years, 
+and so forth. 
+
+The Scott bill would also append in large measure the procedure used in Controlled Substance 
+Act cases to establish the existence of a qualifying prior conviction, 21 U.S.C. 851.56 It would, 
+however, drop the provision in §851 that affords the defendant the right to have the question 
+presented to the grand jury in the case of serious enhancements.57 It would also abandon the 
+provision that bars questioning the validity of remote convictions.58 
+
+H.R. 722 (Representative King (N.Y.)) would add two years to each of these base mandatory 
+minimums of §924(c)(1)(A), if the firearm were stolen or had had its serial number defaced. 
+Thus, use of a stolen firearm or one with a defaced serial number during or in relation to a federal 
+crime of violence or drug trafficking would be punishable by imprisonment for not less than 
+seven years.59 If a stolen or defaced firearm were brandished under such circumstances, the 
+mandatory minimum would be nine years.60 If a stolen or defaced firearm were discharged, the 
+mandatory minimum would be 12 years.61 
+
+ Straw Purchasers 
+
+Federal law now punishes false statements in conjunction with a firearm’s purchase under two 
+sections. Section 924(a)(1) imposes a term of imprisonment of not more than five years for false 
+statements relating to information required for licensing or record-keeping purposes.62 Section 
+922(a)(6) outlaws false statements in the acquisition of a firearm.63 Section 924(a)(2) makes the 
+offense punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years.64 
+
+ 
+
+55 H.R. 2405, §2(1), (2), proposed 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), (B), (C), (5)(A). 
+56 H.R. 2405, §2(3), proposed 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(6). 
+57 Id . (“The provisions of ... 21 U.S.C. 851, other than subsections (a)(2) and (e) ... shall apply to sentencing for 
+convictions under this subsection.... ”). 21 U.S.C. 851(a)(2) provides: “An information may not be filed under this 
+section if the increased punishment which may be imposed is imprisonment for a term in excess of three years unless 
+the person either waived or was afforded prosecution by indictment for the offense for which such increased 
+punishment may be imposed.” 
+58 Id . (“The provisions of ... 21 U.S.C. 851, other than subsections (a)(2) and (e) ... shall apply to sentencing for 
+convictions under this subsection.... ”). 21 U.S.C. 851(e) provides: “No person who stands convicted of an offense 
+under this part may challenge the validity of any prior conviction alleged under this section which occurred more than 
+five years before the date of the information alleging such prior conviction.” 
+59 H.R. 722, §8, proposed 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). 
+60 H.R. 722, §8, proposed 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
+61 H.R. 722, §8, proposed 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
+62 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(1)(A)(“[W]hoever - (A) knowingly makes any false statement or representation with respect to the 
+information required by this chapter to be kept in the records of a person licensed under this chapter or in applying for 
+any license or exemption or relief from disability under the provisions of this chapter; ... shall be ... imprisoned not 
+more than five years”). 
+63 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6)(“It shall be unlawful ... (6) for any person in connection with the acquisition or attempted 
+acquisition of any firearm or ammunition from a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed 
+collector, knowingly to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement or to furnish or exhibit any false, fictitious, 
+(continued...) 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+9 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+H.R. 404 (Representative Schiff) would establish a two-year mandatory minimum term of 
+imprisonment for violation of either false statement proscription if the offense involved two or 
+more firearms and an intent to subsequently transfer them to an ineligible person.65 
+
+ Handguns 
+
+H.R. 117 (Representative Holt) would require the Attorney General to establish a system of 
+handgun registration and licensing.66 The system would be inapplicable in states that already had 
+a comparable system as long as the state outlawed possession of unlicensed or unregistered 
+handguns or the failure to complete required firearms safety training.67 Elsewhere, possession 
+without a federal license or of an unregistered handgun would be punishable by imprisonment for 
+not less than 15 years.68 
+
+ Aggravated Computer Abuse 
+
+Federal law prohibits various forms of computer abuse in 18 U.S.C. 1030, ranging from 
+espionage to hacking to computer fraud to damaging computer systems.69 
+
+H.R. 1468 (Representative Blackburn) would create a separate crime for anyone who, during and 
+in relation to a violation of §1030 substantially impaired or attempted to impair the operation of a 
+critical infrastructure computer system or an associated critical infrastructure.70 The bill defines 
+the term “critical infrastructure computer” to mean “a computer that manages or controls systems 
+or assets vital to national defense, national security, national economic security, public health or 
+safety, or any combination of those matters, whether publicly or privately owned or operated, 
+including - (A) oil and gas production, storage, conversion, and delivery systems; (B) water 
+
+ 
+(...continued) 
+or misrepresented identification, intended or likely to deceive such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector with 
+respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such firearm or ammunition under the 
+provisions of this chapter”). 
+64 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2). 
+65 H.R. 404, §2, proposed 18 U.S.C. 924(q)(1). 
+66 H.R. 117, §2, proposed 18 U.S.C. 932(a)(1). 
+67 H.R. 117, §2, proposed 18 U.S.C. 932(b). 
+68 H.R. 117, §2, proposed 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(7). In what may have been a scrivener’s error, the bill attaches the penalty 
+not to a violation of its provisions (proposed 18 U.S.C. 932), but to a violation of 18 U.S.C. 931(relating to possession 
+of body armor by convicted violent felons). That construction is complicated by the fact that although the drafters of 
+H.R. 117 believed that no 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(7) now exists (“Section 924(a) of such title is amended by adding at the end 
+the following: (7) ... ”), the section not only exists but applies to violations of 18 U.S.C. 931. 
+69 More precisely, the seven crimes defined in 18 U.S.C. 1030 are (1) computer trespassing (e.g., hacking) in a 
+government computer; (2) computer trespassing (e.g., hacking) resulting in exposure to certain governmental, credit, 
+financial, or computer-housed information; (3) damaging a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used 
+in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce (e.g., a worm, computer virus, Trojan horse, time bomb, a denial of 
+service attack, and other forms of cyberattack, cybercrime, or cyberterrorism); (4) committing fraud an integral part of 
+which involves unauthorized access to a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, 
+interstate or foreign commerce; (5) threatening to damage a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer 
+used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce; (6) trafficking in passwords for a government computer, or when 
+the trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce; and (7) accessing a computer to commit espionage. 
+70 H.R. 1468, §305(a), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1030A(b). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+10 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+supply systems; (C) telecommunication networks; (D) electrical power generation and delivery 
+systems; (E) finance and banking systems; (F) emergency services; (G) transportation systems 
+and services; and (H) government operations that provide essential services to the public.”71 
+
+ The offense would be punishable by imprisonment for not less than three years or more than 20 
+years.72 Some of the federal statutes calling for imposition of a minimum term of imprisonment 
+suggest the possibility of a fine as an alternative to imprisonment. For example, the penalty for 
+trafficking in 1,000 grams or more of heroin is “a term of imprisonment which may not be less 
+than 10 years or more than life ... a fine not to exceed ... $10,000,000 ... or both.”73 The bill would 
+suggest the possibility of a fine as an alternative to imprisonment as well.74 Experience with other 
+mandatory minimums, coupled with implementing Sentencing Guidelines, suggests that this 
+alternative may be more hypothetical than real.75 
+
+ Illegal Reentry 
+
+Foreign nationals who reenter or attempt to reenter the United States after having been deported, 
+excluded, or otherwise removed are punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years.76 If 
+the alien was removed following conviction for an aggravated felony, the penalty is increased to 
+imprisonment for not more than 20 years.77 If removed following conviction for a misdemeanor 
+involving drugs or crimes against the person or for a lesser felony, the penalty is imprisonment 
+for not more than 10 years.78 The same 10-year maximum term of imprisonment attends reentry 
+or attempted reentry following removal prior to completion of service of imprisonment for a non-
+violent felony.79 
+
+Those who aid and abet the commission of a federal crime are subject to the same penalties as 
+those who actually commit the underlying offenses.80 Those who conspire to violate federal law 
+are liable not only for conspiracy but for any crimes committed by one of their conspirators in 
+furtherance of the plot.81 
+
+ 
+
+71 H.R. 1468, §305(a), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1030A(a)(2). 
+72 H.R. 1468, §305(a), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1030A(c). 
+73 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A); see also, 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(2). 
+74 H.R. 1468, §305(a), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1030A(c)(“Any person who violates subsection (b) shall be – (1) fined 
+under this title; (2) imprisoned for not less than 3 years but not more than 29 years; or (3) penalized under paragraphs 
+(1) and (2) ”). 
+75 U.S.S.G. §5G1.1(b)(“Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable 
+guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence”). 
+76 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). 
+77 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2). 
+78 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1). 
+79 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(4). 
+80 18 U.S.C. 2. 
+81 18 U.S.C. 371; Pinkerton v. United States , 328 U.S. 640, 645-48 (1946); United States v. Grasso , 724 F.3d 1077, 
+1089 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Walker , 721 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Clark , 717 F.3d 790, 
+808-809 (10th Cir. 2013). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+11 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+H.R. 457 (Representative Issa) would establish mandatory minimum penalties for each of these 
+reentry offenses.82 The minimums would be pegged at half the maximum. Thus, simple reentry 
+would carry a one-year mandatory minimum term.83 Reentry following an aggravated felony 
+conviction would be punishable with a mandatory minimum of 10 years.84 Finally, the mandatory 
+minimums for the reentry offenses with 10-year maximums would be set at five years.85 
+
+The Issa bill would also make accessory and conspirator liability more specific. Anyone who 
+aided or abetted an alien’s unlawful reentry or conspired to accomplish it would be subject to the 
+same penalties including mandatory minimums as the reentering alien.86 
+
+ Violence Against Public Servants 
+
+Federal law protects federal judges and employees against murder, manslaughter, attempted 
+murder or manslaughter, and assault. With the exception of first degree murder which is 
+punishable by death or imprisonment for life, none of the prohibitions carry a mandatory 
+minimum term of imprisonment. Flight to avoid prosecution is also a federal crime, but it does 
+not come with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment either. 
+
+H.R. 1577 (Representative Poe) and S. 698 (Senator Cornyn) would expand the class of protected 
+public servants; increase the penalties associated with homicides committed against them; 
+establish mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for killing or assaulting them; and create a 
+new flight-to-avoid-prosecution offense for fugitives accused of such crimes, punishable by a 
+mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.87 
+
+ Homicide 
+
+Federal law outlaws killing any federal officer or employee, including federal judges, during or 
+on account of the performance of their duties.88 It also protects anyone assisting them.89 The 
+penalties imposed depend on the nature of the homicide: 
+
+• first degree murder: death or life imprisonment;90 
+• second degree murder: imprisonment for any term years or for life;91 
+
+ 
+
+82 H.R. 457, §2(b), proposed 8 U.S.C. 1326. 
+83 H.R. 457, §2(b)(1), proposed 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). 
+84 H.R. 457, §2(b)(2)(B), proposed 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2). 
+85 H.R. 457, §2(b)(2)(A), (C), proposed 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1), (b)(4). 
+86 H.R. 457, §2(C), proposed 8 U.S.C. 1327(b). 
+87 The bills as introduced were identical and consequently will be referred to hereafter as H.R. 1577/S. 698. 
+88 18 U.S.C. 1114 (“Whoever kills or attempts to kill any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in 
+any branch of the United States Government (including any member of the uniformed services) while such officer or 
+employee is engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties, or any person assisting such an officer or 
+employee in the performance of such duties or on account of that assistance, shall be punished ... ”). 
+89 Id. 
+90 18 U.S.C. 1114, 1111. 
+91 Id. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+12 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+• voluntary manslaughter: imprisonment for not more than 15 years;92 
+• involuntary manslaughter: imprisonment for not more than eight years;93 
+• attempted murder: imprisonment for not more than 20 years;94 
+• attempted manslaughter: imprisonment for not more than seven years;95 and 
+• conspiracy to murder: imprisonment for any term of years or for life.96 
+
+Federal law outlaws the murder of state or local officers or employees assisting in a federal 
+investigation.97 Offenders are punishable by death or life imprisonment.98 It also outlaws the 
+murder of a state correctional officer by a federal prisoner or while the officer is transporting a 
+prisoner in interstate commerce.99 Offenders are punishable by imprisonment for not less than 20 
+years or for life or by death.100 Murder of a federal, state, or local law enforcement officer in 
+furtherance of a violation of the Controlled Substances Act or the Controlled Substances Import 
+and Export Act is punishable as well by imprisonment for not less than 20 years or for life or by 
+death.101 
+
+H.R. 1577/S. 698 would establish 30-year mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for 
+killing, attempting to kill, or conspiring to kill three classes of public servants: (1) federal judges 
+and federal law enforcement officers, regardless of whether the crime occurred during or on 
+
+ 
+
+92 18 U.S.C. 1114, 1112. 
+93 Id. 
+ 94 18 U.S.C. 1114, 1113. 
+95 Id. 
+ 96 18 U.S.C. 1117. 
+97 18 U.S.C. 1121(a)(“Whoever intentionally kills- (1) a State or local official, law enforcement officer, or other officer 
+or employee while working with Federal law enforcement officials in furtherance of a Federal criminal investigation- 
+(A) while the victim is engaged in the performance of official duties; (B) because of the performance of the victim’s 
+official duties; or (C) because of the victim’s status as a public servant; or (2) any person assisting a Federal criminal 
+investigation, while that assistance is being rendered and because of it, shall be sentenced according to the terms of 
+section 1111, including by sentence of death or by imprisonment for life”). 
+
+98 Id. 18 U.S.C. 1111. 
+99 18 U.S.C. 1121(b)(“Whoever, in a circumstance described in paragraph (3) of this subsection, while incarcerated, 
+intentionally kills any State correctional officer engaged in, or on account of the performance of such officer’s official 
+duties, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which shall not be less than 20 years, and may be sentenced to life 
+imprisonment or death. (2) As used in this section, the term, ‘State correctional officer’ includes any officer or 
+employee of any prison, jail, or other detention facility, operated by, or under contract to, either a State or local 
+governmental agency, whose job responsibilities include providing for the custody of incarcerated individuals. (3) The 
+circumstance referred to in paragraph (1) is that- (A) the correctional officer is engaged in transporting the incarcerated 
+person interstate; or (B) the incarcerated person is incarcerated pursuant to a conviction for an offense against the 
+United States”). 
+100 Id. 
+ 101 21 U.S.C. 848(e)(1)(B)(“[A]ny person, during the commission of, in furtherance of, or while attempting to avoid 
+apprehension, prosecution or service of a prison sentence for, a felony violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of 
+this chapter who intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of any 
+Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer engaged in, or on account of, the performance of such officer’s official 
+duties and such killing results, shall be sentenced to any term of imprisonment, which shall not be less than 20 years, 
+and which may be up to life imprisonment, or may be sentenced to death. 2) As used in paragraph (1)(B), the term ‘law 
+enforcement officer’ means a public servant authorized by law or by a Government agency or Congress to conduct or 
+engage in the prevention, investigation, prosecution or adjudication of an offense, and includes those engaged in 
+corrections, probation, or parole functions”). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+13 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+account of the performance of their duties;102 (2) federally funded public servants (state, local, 
+territorial, and tribal law enforcement officers, firefighters, chaplains, rescue squad and 
+ambulance crew members) during or on account of the performance of their official duties;103 and 
+(3) former federal judges, former law enforcement officers, and former federally funded public 
+servants, killed on account of performance of their official duties.104 
+
+In addition to the 30-year mandatory minimum, the offense would carry the prospect of 
+imprisonment for life and, if a killing occurred, of the death penalty.105 
+
+ Flight to Avoid Prosecution 
+
+It is a federal crime punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years to travel in 
+interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of avoiding state or federal prosecution.106 
+
+H.R. 1577/S. 698 would create an additional flight statute that would proscribe flights to avoid 
+prosecution for killing, attempting to kill, or conspiring to kill a federal judge, federal law 
+enforcement officer, or federally funded public servant.107 The offense would be punishable by 
+imprisonment for any term of years not less than 10 years.108 
+
+ Assaulting a Federal Officer or Employee 
+
+Section 111 prohibits assaulting a federal officer or employee during or on account of his or her 
+official duties.109 Simple assault is punishable under the provision by imprisonment for not more 
+than one year.110 If the assault results in physical contact or is committed with the intent to 
+commit another felony, the penalty increases to imprisonment for not more than eight years.111 If 
+the assault involves the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or results in bodily injury, the 
+penalty becomes imprisonment for not more than 20 years.112 
+
+If the assault resulted in substantial bodily injury (temporary but substantial disfigurement or loss 
+of bodily or mental capacity) to a federal judge or federal law enforcement officer, H.R. 1577/ S. 
+698 would make the offense punishable by imprisonment for not less than five years or more than 
+
+ 
+
+102 H.R. 1577/S. 698, §3(a), proposed 18 U.S.C.1123(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (B). 
+103 H.R. 1577/S. 698, §3(a), proposed 18 U.S.C.1123(a)(2), (7), (b)(1)(C). 
+104 H.R. 1577/S. 698, §3(a), proposed 18 U.S.C.1123 (b)(2). The proposal does not include attempts to kill or 
+conspiracies to kill members of this class of former judges, officers, or public servants. 
+105 H.R. 1577/S. 698, §3(a), proposed 18 U.S.C.1123(c). 
+106 18 U.S.C. 1073. 
+107 H.R. 1577/S. 698, §3(b), proposed 18 U.S.C.1075(a). 
+108 H.R. 1577/S. 698, §3(b), proposed 18 U.S.C.1075(b). 
+109 18 U.S.C. 111. 
+110 18 U.S.C. 111(a). 
+111 Id. H.R. 1577/S. 698, §3(e), proposed 18 U.S.C. 111(b)(2)(B)(ii) would increase the maximum penalty to 
+imprisonment for not more than 10 years. 
+112 18 U.S.C. 111(b). H.R. 1577/S. 698, §3(e), proposed 18 U.S.C. 111(b)(2)(B)(iv) would increase the maximum 
+penalty to imprisonment for not more than 30 years when the assault resulted in substantial bodily injury or involved 
+the use or possession of a dangerous weapon. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+14 
+
+ 
+ Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress 
+
+ 
+
+30 years.113 If the assault resulted in serious bodily injury (risk of death, extreme pain, etc.) or 
+involves possession or use of a dangerous weapon, H.R. 1577/S. 698 would make the offense 
+punishable by imprisonment for any term of years not less than 10 years or for life.114 
+
+ 
+
+ Author Contact Information 
+ 
+Charles Doyle 
+
+ 
+
+Senior Specialist in American Public Law 
+cdoyle@crs.loc.gov, 7-6968 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+113 H.R. 1577/S. 698, §3(e), proposed 18 U.S.C.111(b)(1)(A). H.R. 1577/S. 698 would adopt the definition of 
+“substantial bodily injury” found in 18 U.S.C. 113(b)(1): “the term ‘substantial bodily injury’ means bodily injury 
+which involves - (A) a temporary but substantial disfigurement; or (B) a temporary but substantial loss or impairment 
+of the function of any bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.” 
+114 H.R. 1577/S. 698, §3(e), proposed 18 U.S.C.111(b)(1)(B). H.R. 1577/S. 698 would adopt the definition of “serious 
+bodily injury” found in 18 U.S.C. 1365(h)(3): “the term ‘serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury which involves - 
+(A) a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme physical pain; (C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (D) protracted 
+loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.” 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+15
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+Retailer Inventory and Pricing Behavior During Supply Chain Disruptions
+
+ April 23, 2026
+ (R48916)
+ 
+ Jump to Main Text of Report 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Contents
+
+ 
+ Introduction 
+
+ Retailing Background 
+
+ Retail Inventory Management 
+
+ Retail Prices: Markups 
+
+ Retailers and Supply Chain Disruptions 
+
+ Vehicle Dealership Markups: Great Recession and Pandemic 
+
+ Great Recession 
+
+ COVID-19 Pandemic 
+
+ Grocery Store Markups During Selected Agricultural Shortages 
+
+ Import Volumes and Tariffs in 2025 
+
+ Selected Policy Options for Congress 
+
+ Continued Oversight 
+
+ Defense Production Act of 1950 
+
+ Retailer Price Gouging 
+
+ Supply Chain Resiliency 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Figures
+
+ 
+ Figure 1. Vehicle Markups and Inventories During the Great Recession 
+
+ Figure 2. Vehicle Markups and Inventories During the COVID-19 Pandemic 
+
+ Figure 3. Supermarket and Grocery Store Fresh Meats During Selected Agricultural Shortages 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Summary
+
+ Recent supply chain disruptions have contributed to price increases for certain consumer goods, such as vehicles, groceries, apparel, and consumer electronics. Congress has expressed interest in various types of retailers that sell these consumer goods, particularly after their profits and prices have increased following supply chain disruptions.
+
+ Retailers provide services to producers and consumers and charge a price for their services. One of their main services is inventory management . That is, retailers acquire, hold, and maintain goods that are for sale to consumers. A retailer's inventory management can affect its pricing behavior, particularly during supply chain disruptions. For example, if supply chain disruptions prevent a retailer from acquiring new inventory, the retailer might choose to increase prices to potentially increase its profits, avoid selling out of a product, or both. The price of a retail service is typically the markup charged on the product—the difference between the amount a retailer pays the supplier and the amount the retailer charges the consumer. The size of a markup may vary with time, retailer type, and a variety of competitive and contextual factors. 
+
+ Retailer behavior can affect how supply chain disruptions transmit down to the consumer. Retailers' responses to such events may vary by the type of retailer, type of disruption, and a variety of contextual factors, such as inventory levels, competition, retail pricing strategies, and information access. Because of these factors, changes in markups and consumer prices are not uniformly driven by supplier price changes. Retailers might increase, decrease, or maintain their markups following changes in supplier pricing. During the Great Recession, vehicle dealerships paid higher prices to manufacturers that faced tightening financial constraints but did not pass those higher costs on to consumers. In contrast, during the COVID-19 pandemic, vehicle dealerships increased markups while experiencing record low vehicle inventories. As another example, grocery stores increased markups for meats during certain agricultural supply chain disruptions. Changes in tariffs in 2025 contributed to changes in import volumes and prices paid by retailers, both of which might affect retailer behavior. How a retailer responds to a supply chain disruption can affect both its profitability and consumer prices.
+
+ A retailer typically makes pricing and inventory decisions in response to market forces, such as consumer demand for its products, competitive pressure from other retailers, and the diversity of its upstream supplier network. Statute can affect retailers' pricing behaviors within certain contexts. For example, Section 102 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. §4512) prohibits hoarding of materials that the President has designated as scarce for the purpose of selling those goods at an elevated price.
+
+ No federal laws or regulations explicitly prohibit price gouging , a term often used to describe price increases perceived to be excessive, typically in response to sudden changes in supply or demand (e.g., caused by a supply chain disruption). Price gouging bills introduced by Members of the 119 th Congress and state price gouging laws often have focused on supply chain disruptions or other market shocks. Congress might consider using its oversight authority to ask federal agencies to take actions to enforce existing laws that can affect pricing during supply chain disruptions. Congress might consider addressing price gouging through legislation. If Members of Congress choose to introduce additional legislation related to price gouging, considerations may include the circumstances in which a price increase might be considered excessive, whether to prohibit a specific price increase in statute or direct a federal agency to promulgate regulations to define the terms excessive or price gouging, and whether to prohibit price gouging in specific contexts or for certain goods. 
+
+ Congress also might consider legislation addressing supply chain resiliency. One option that Congress might consider is to direct research to identify industries to build supply chain resiliency and support domestic production of certain goods. The House and Senate passed their respective versions of a Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025 ( H.R. 2444 ; S. 257 ), which would direct the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis to lead and establish an intergovernmental working group to develop plans and analyses to increase U.S. supply chain resiliency for industries and goods critical to U.S. economic or national security.
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Introduction
+
+ A range of recent supply chain disruptions have contributed to price increases for certain consumer goods, 1 such as vehicles, groceries, apparel, and consumer electronics. In some cases, price increases for these goods have coincided with higher retail profits. Congress has expressed interest in various types of retailers that sell these consumer goods, particularly after their profits and prices increased following supply chain disruptions. 2 For example, the pricing behavior, inventory levels, and profits of grocery stores and vehicle dealerships received attention from some Members of Congress following recent supply chain disruptions. Additionally, some Members have also commented on the potential effects of certain tariff increases on the availability and price of retail goods such as apparel and consumer electronics. 3 
+
+ This report discusses how retailer behavior and inventory levels can affect consumer prices for certain goods during supply chain disruptions. The specific types of retail goods that receive congressional attention generally reflect the concerns of consumers. The behaviors and disruptions of a selection of consumer goods analyzed in this report illustrate the range of possible retailer pricing and inventory behaviors during supply chain disruptions.
+
+ During the 119 th Congress, some Members have introduced legislation that could affect the availability and pricing of retail goods during supply chain disruptions. This report (1) provides background on the retail industry, (2) analyzes the pricing behavior of certain retailers during selected supply chain disruptions, and (3) discusses selected policy options for Congress. Selected options discussed in this report include continued oversight, legislation to prohibit certain price increases in some contexts, and legislation to affect supply chain resiliency. 
+
+ Retailing Background
+
+ Retailers provide services to producers and consumers. 4 Generally, these services can help consumers acquire goods and provide producers a place to store and market their goods. Retailers charge a price for these services and typically charge consumers a higher price for goods than the retailers pay the suppliers of these goods. 5 Retailers also seek other profit opportunities tied to their services and goods (e.g., financial products, insurance products, warranties). 6 This section describes and analyzes (1) retail inventory management and (2) the prices retailers charge for providing their services.
+
+ Retail Inventory Management
+
+ Retailers aim to maximize their revenue by matching consumers and products across a range of preferences, characteristics, prices, and time horizons. They facilitate that matching process by managing inventory and evaluating consumer behavior, among other activities. Inventory management is one of the main services of a retailer that can affect its pricing behavior, particularly during supply chain disruptions.
+
+ Retailers acquire, hold, and maintain inventories available for sale to consumers. Inventories are the unfinished or finished goods that a business possesses at its facilities that it has not yet sold; for retailers, these are generally finished goods. Retailers typically acquire these inventories from multiple suppliers, although some retailers might acquire them from one supplier. Retailer inventory management can help producers reduce manufacturing costs by, for example, enabling manufacturers to produce larger batches of goods, thereby reducing the average per-unit cost of production. Retail inventory management services also can allow producers to shift the cost of overproduction to retailers if consumer demand is lower than expected because the retailer would hold the excess inventory. If demand is higher than expected, the retailer might be able to increase prices and obtain a greater profit. Retailers also help suppliers reach consumers in different geographic areas. These services also can help consumers find a variety of goods and brands to choose from in one location.
+
+ Holding and maintaining inventories is costly for retailers. 7 Thus, retailers tend to hold an inventory level that they believe balances the conflicting risks of losing potential revenue by selling out of inventory and of incurring additional costs from potentially holding inventory levels that exceed consumer demand. 8 The amount of inventory a retailer holds depends on factors such as the characteristics of their consumer base and the costs of holding inventory. The costs to retailers to hold inventory may include financing and insurance, maintenance, depreciation, spoilage, obsolescence, and theft. Different products or industries may have different cost profiles. For example, a vehicle may have higher inventory financing and insurance costs than a food item at a grocery store. 9 These factors, among others, result in different types of retailers holding different levels of inventories relative to their sales. 
+
+ Supply chain disruptions can limit a retailer's ability to acquire inventories. Congress has held hearings on the effect of some recent supply chain disruptions on retail inventory levels and prices. 10 Because retailers tend to hold the amount of inventory that they believe balances the risks of selling out or holding too much, unexpected changes in supply or demand can contribute to shortages or excess inventory. If supply chain disruptions become more frequent, some retailers may choose to hold more inventory to be more resilient to these disruptions. For retailers and consumers, this increased retail inventory might reduce the likelihood of shortages and related short-term, scarcity-driven price increases. Holding more inventory might also increase costs for retailers, who might pass on these costs to consumers through higher prices.
+
+ Retail Prices: Markups
+
+ Retailers charge a price for the services they provide. The price of a retail service is typically the markup charged on the product—that is, the difference between what a retailer pays the supplier and what the retailer charges the consumer. 11 For example, if a retailer pays its supplier $20 for a shirt and sells it to a consumer for $30, the price of the retail service and markup would be $10. Markups can be expressed in dollars or as a percent. In the example above, the dollar markup would be $10 and the markup percent would be 50% ($10 ÷ $20). For retailers that sell many types of products, the markup on each product may differ. The markup charged by a retailer can vary across retailer types. For example, in 2024, publicly traded vehicle dealerships typically had a markup percent between 6% and 9%, 12 while publicly traded grocery stores typically had a markup percent between 30% and 40%. 13 
+
+ A retailer with a higher markup is not necessarily more profitable than a retailer with a lower markup. Retailers use the gross profits 14 generated from selling products to pay their other costs (e.g., operating costs such as wages, utilities, and rents). If the gross profits exceed those other costs, then the retailer will have generated a net profit . 15 A retailer's total profitability also depends on the total value of its sales, its other costs, and other ancillary services from which it might profit. 16 For example, a retailer with $1 million in sales at an 8% markup would earn a gross profit of $74,074, whereas a retailer with $300,000 in sales at a 30% markup would earn a lesser gross profit of $69,231. Cash generated from gross profits can be used to pay a retailer's operating costs, which can vary across retailers. For example, in 2024, operating costs for publicly traded grocery stores were typically between 17% and 26% of total sales, whereas operating costs for publicly traded vehicle dealerships were typically between 10% and 12% of total sales. 17 
+
+ The markup a retailer charges is influenced by consumer behavior, the prices it pays suppliers, and a range of competitive and contextual factors. These factors include the availability of substitutes for a retailer's product, competition among retailers to sell the same product in the same market, cost structure of products and markets, inventory levels for products for sale, and a retailer's range of products. Retailers sometimes implement a pricing strategy tailored to one or more of those factors. 
+
+ To maximize revenues, retailers may change prices and markups in response to changes in market conditions. For example, if a retailer thinks demand is increasing faster than it can acquire additional inventory, the retailer might increase prices so that it can get the most revenue out of its available inventory. Conversely, if demand is falling and the retailer is concerned it might have excess inventory, the retailer might decrease prices to attract consumers and stimulate sales. Producers may change their production levels in response to retailer price changes, which might result in additional changes in price. For example, when retailers increase their markups and prices, doing so can incentivize producers to increase production. If supply chains are functioning smoothly and producers are able to increase production, retailers may have more inventory to sell, which can result in decreases in prices if inventory levels increase relative to sales. 
+
+ In some cases, ethical considerations could arise when retailers increase prices during supply chain disruptions. Some consumers and policymakers might assert that the fairest way to allocate scarce goods is to adjust the price. This allows the consumers who are willing to pay more for these goods to obtain them and retailers to generate a higher profit. Alternatively, some consumers and policymakers might assert it is unethical or unfair for a retailer to raise prices during a disruption when supply is constrained and inventories are low. When supply is constrained, higher markups and retail prices might not result in increased supply of a good. This can contribute to perceptions of profiteering , which is a word commonly used to describe someone gaining a profit without providing a commensurate value in return. Price increases that occur during rapid supply or demand changes, such as in response to a natural disaster or other supply chain disruption, are sometimes considered to be price gouging , which is a term often used to describe price increases perceived to be excessive, typically in response to sudden changes in supply or demand (e.g., caused by a supply chain disruption). For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Attorney General for the District of Columbia suggested that a convenience store was "price gouging" for selling scarce cleaning supplies at a reported 200% markup. 18 Some retailers might use extra revenue earned during supply chain disruptions to make improvements, such as investing in commercial infrastructure that might help them manage inventory effectively. 
+
+ If supply chain disruptions were to become more frequent, retailers might respond by holding more inventory or diversifying their supplier network by identifying additional sources of goods. This might result in fewer price fluctuations if retailers are less susceptible to supply chain disruptions. It might also incentivize more producers to enter supplier markets, resulting in supply chain resiliency without intervention from policymakers. Retailers may be unable to diversify their supplier network if it is too costly or if additional sources of the goods do not exist. For example, scarcity-driven price increases may be too small or too brief to incentivize domestic producers to enter a market. As another example, tariffs or other trade restrictions could prevent retailers from using suppliers in other countries.
+
+ Retailers and Supply Chain Disruptions
+
+ Retailers' pricing behaviors during supply chain disruptions highlight their role as the final node in supply chains for new consumer goods. Retailer behavior can affect how supply chain disruptions transmit down to the consumer. Retailers might respond differently depending on whether the disruption directly affects prices, inventories, or both. Changes to inventory levels are some of the main contributors to changes in retail prices during supply chain disruptions, 19 but other factors can affect retail prices (e.g., competition, consumer demand, retail pricing strategies, and information access). Because of these factors, changes in retailer markups and consumer prices are not uniformly driven by changes in supplier prices or inventory levels. 
+
+ During a supply chain disruption, retailers might increase, decrease, or maintain their markups in response to changes in supplier pricing or inventory levels. For example, multiple studies found that retail markups accounted for some of the increased inflation during the COVID-19 pandemic; 20 during the Great Recession of 2007-2009 (GR), some retailers absorbed price increases from manufacturers by decreasing their markups. 21 When retailers anticipate disruptions, they might adjust their inventories before and during the disruption.
+
+ This section analyzes retailer pricing and inventory behavior during a selection of disruptions to illustrate the different ways a retailer and its inventories can affect prices or product availability for consumers. Each of the disruptions and associated retailer responses may be relevant to potential policy options that Congress might consider. This section uses three examples that illustrate retailers increasing or decreasing their markups or adjusting their inventories during supply chain disruptions: (1) vehicle dealerships' responses to the GR and the COVID-19 pandemic, (2) grocery stores' responses to agricultural supply chain disruptions, and (3) import supply disruptions following changes in tariff conditions in 2025. The characteristics that distinguish each disruption include consumer demand, inventories, and the degree to which the disruption was anticipated.
+
+ Vehicle Dealership Markups: Great Recession and Pandemic
+
+ The changes in consumer prices and markups at vehicle dealerships during the GR and the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate how inventory levels, consumer demand, and supplier prices may affect retailer behavior and prices during disruptions. The supply chain disruptions in each case had different characteristics, which contributed to contrasting responses from dealerships.
+
+ Great Recession
+
+ The GR precipitated some unique supply and demand conditions that affected vehicle dealership (retailer) behavior. The GR was a broad decrease in economic activity that lasted from December 2007 to June 2009. A contributing factor to the GR was a financial crisis that reduced the supply of cash and other liquid financial assets available to banks, households, and manufacturers. 22 Although the GR was primarily a demand disruption in that consumer demand decreased as the financial crisis deepened, the underlying financial crisis contributed to some supply chain disruptions—especially for automotive manufacturers and vehicle dealerships. The GR example discussed in this subsection illustrates the role of retail inventory management services during disruptions and how prices charged by retailers can decrease despite price increases from their suppliers.
+
+ During the GR, vehicle dealerships paid higher prices to manufacturers and absorbed excess inventories while reducing prices for consumers. Because of tightening financial conditions and the potential of bankruptcy caused by the financial crisis, 23 manufacturers of new vehicles increased prices to remain solvent during the GR despite a decrease in consumer demand. 24 From December 2007 to January 2009, 25 prices paid by dealerships to acquire new vehicles increased on average by 2.5% for domestically produced vehicles and by 1.9% for imported vehicles. 26 Because of decreased consumer demand, dealerships could not pass these price increases onto consumers while maintaining vehicle sales. Inventory levels at dealerships increased, and the excess inventory contributed to lower markups (see Figure 1 ) and consumer prices at dealerships. 27 From December 2007 to January 2009, dealership markups decreased by 18.9%, 28 and prices that dealerships charged consumers for vehicles decreased by 2.7%. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Figure 1. Vehicle Markups and Inventories During the Great Recession
+
+ January 2007 to January 2010
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Source: CRS with data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
+
+ Notes: Dealership New Vehicle Dollar Markup is a BLS price index that measures the change to the dollar markup (price – cost of goods sold). Dealership New Vehicle Dollar Markup, Inflation-Adjusted on Cost Basis is the Dealership New Vehicle Dollar Markup adjusted for inflation by the Producer Price Index and U.S. Import Price Indexes for vehicles. The inflation-adjusted measure indicates whether dollar markups grew at a faster or slower rate than supplier price changes. The Vehicle Dealership Inventory-to-Sales Ratio is a measure of inventory levels, where inventories are expressed as a ratio to sales. In the vehicle dealership industry, inventory levels sometimes have a relationship with dealership pricing behavior. The Great Recession (GR) began in December 2007 and lasted until June 2009 (illustrated by the gray box). The Global Financial Crisis began in summer 2007. January 2007 was chosen as the base year to provide pre-GR and pre-GFC context. January 2010 was chosen as the ending month because dealership markups had generally reached pre-GR levels by this time.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ COVID-19 Pandemic
+
+ The COVID-19 pandemic was the worldwide spread of a new strain of coronavirus that affected numerous supply chains and consumer behaviors. 29 The pandemic example discussed in this subsection demonstrates how retailers may allocate scarce resources during a supply chain disruption by increasing prices, how decreases in inventories across retailers can enable them to increase prices without losing customers, 30 and how retailer price increases can materialize as a result of supply constraints originating further back in the supply chain.
+
+ During the COVID-19 pandemic, imbalances between demand and supply contributed to vehicle shortages at vehicle dealerships. When the COVID-19 pandemic began, many automotive manufacturers expected a prolonged economic recession and cancelled orders for new goods across their supply chains. 31 The cancelled orders made it challenging to restart production in the automotive sector. For example, when automotive manufacturers cancelled orders for semiconductors, the cancellations contributed to semiconductor manufacturers pivoting their capacity and production toward technology companies. 32 Automotive manufacturers then faced difficulties obtaining semiconductors, which delayed new vehicle production and contributed to limited inventories at dealerships. Meanwhile, consumer demand increased as a result of economic stimuli and pandemic-related behavior changes. 33 
+
+ Because of the changes in production and consumer demand, the automotive industry experienced record-low vehicle inventories at dealerships and an increase in vehicle consumer prices that outpaced the increase in supplier prices. From January 2020 through June 2022, 34 the prices dealerships paid to manufacturers for new vehicles increased on average by 7.3% for domestically produced vehicles and 3.9% for imported vehicles. 35 Meanwhile, the prices dealerships charged consumers for vehicles increased on average by 16.2%. 36 This differential was reflected in higher markups at dealerships (see Figure 2 ). 37 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Figure 2. Vehicle Markups and Inventories During the COVID-19 Pandemic
+
+ January 2020 to January 2025
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Source: CRS with data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
+
+ Notes: Dealership New Vehicle Dollar Markup is a BLS price index that measures the change to the dollar markup (price – cost of goods sold). Dealership New Vehicle Dollar Markup, Inflation-Adjusted on Cost Basis is the Dealership New Vehicle Dollar Markup adjusted for inflation by the Producer Price Index and U.S. Import and Export Price Indexes for vehicles. The inflation-adjusted measure indicates whether dollar markups grew at a faster or slower rate than supplier price changes. The Vehicle Dealership Inventory-to-Sales Ratio is a measure of inventory levels, where inventories are expressed as a ratio to sales. In the vehicle dealership industry, inventory levels sometimes have a relationship with dealership pricing behavior. A national emergency for the COVID-19 pandemic was declared in March 2020 and was terminated in April 2023 (illustrated by the gray box). This chart begins in January 2020 to provide pre-pandemic context. January 2025 is the ending date because it generally excludes certain tariff changes that occurred in 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ Grocery Store Markups During Selected Agricultural Shortages
+
+ Certain agricultural supply chain disruptions 38 have contributed to lower retail inventories and higher retail prices for meats. 39 The markup behavior of grocery stores during these agricultural supply chain disruptions highlight how dollar markups and retail prices can increase when retail markup percentages do not increase. 40 Additionally, this example discusses how an increasing dollar markup can contribute to higher retail profits regardless of whether markup percentages increase.
+
+ Several agricultural supply chain disruptions started in 2021 and 2022. In part due to droughts, 41 beef cow herd sizes decreased at successively accelerating annual rates from 2021 through 2023, and decreases continued into 2026. 42 In 2025, live beef cow inventories reached the lowest level since 1961. 43 Around the same time as the beef supply chain disruptions, starting in early-2022, culling of poultry began increasing at accelerating rates in response to an avian flu, 44 which reduced the supply of poultry. These disruptions contributed to grocery stores facing higher supplier prices and less inventory available for meats. 45 
+
+ In response to these supply chain disruptions, 46 as Figure 3 illustrates, grocery stores generally increased their average retail meat prices by a larger dollar amount than their average supplier price increases but not by a larger percent change. Generally, dollar markups increasing at a slower percent rate than supplier prices means that the markup percent decreased. 47 Similarly, when supplier prices increase at a higher percent rate than consumer prices, it means the markup percent decreased but not necessarily the dollar markup. 
+
+ As a discrete example of how a dollar markup can increase while the percent markup does not, consider a supermarket that buys one pound of ground beef for $3 and sells it to a consumer for $4 in January 2021; the hypothetical dollar markup would be $1, and the hypothetical markup percent would be 33.3% ($1 ÷ $3). Then, in January 2023, if the supermarket buys one pound of ground beef for $4.25 and sells it to a consumer for $5.50, the hypothetical dollar markup would be $1.25, and the hypothetical markup percent would be 29.4% ($1.25 ÷ $4.25). Although the dollar markup increased by 25% in this example, the markup percent decreased by 11.7%. Additionally, in this example, the dollar markup increased although the consumer price percent increase of 37.5% was smaller than the supplier percent increase of 41.7%. 
+
+ This example underscores the distinction between dollar markups and percent markups and how dollar markups can increase when percent markups remain constant or decrease, which might inform certain policy considerations. The effects of higher meat dollar markups during these supply chain disruptions on net profits for a grocery retailer depend on the retailer's other costs (e.g., rent, utilities, wages) and its total sales volume.
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Figure 3. Supermarket and Grocery Store Fresh Meats During Selected Agricultural Shortages
+
+ July 2020 to January 2025
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Source: CRS with data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and U.S. Department of Agriculture.
+
+ Notes: Grocery Store Fresh Meats Dollar Markup is a BLS price index that measures the change to the dollar markup (price – cost of goods sold). Grocery Store Fresh Meats Dollar Markup, Inflation-Adjusted on Cost Basis is the Grocery Store Fresh Meats Dollar Markup adjusted for inflation by the Producer Price Index (PPI) for Meats, Poultry, and Fish. The inflation-adjusted measure indicates whether dollar markups grew at a faster or slower rate than supplier price changes. This chart begins in July 2020 to exclude certain COVID-19-related volatility that occurred in the first half of 2020 that was unrelated to the drought that began in 2020 and to include the effects of the drought and the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza. January 2025 is the ending date because it generally excludes certain tariff changes that occurred in 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ Import Volumes and Tariffs in 2025
+
+ Tariff increases in 2025 disrupted retail supply chains. 48 This disruption was widely anticipated by businesses, 49 including some retailers, 50 and generally contributed to higher costs and lower inventories for retailers of the goods affected by the tariff increases. Retailer behavior during this supply chain disruption highlights the role of inventories in retail markups for a range of retailer types and highlights how retailers might respond when they anticipate a disruption.
+
+ Changes in import data reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) suggest that retailers adjusted their inventories before and after tariff increases in 2025. 51 According to BEA, quarterly real imports of consumer goods (excluding automotive and food) 52 increased by 25% from the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2024 to Q1 of 2025. 53 This increase in imports was likely due to retailers acquiring inventories before tariff increases took effect. 54 Subsequently, as some tariff increases took effect in Q2 of 2025, 55 BEA's estimate of quarterly inflation-adjusted consumer goods imports decreased by 26% from Q1 to Q2 of 2025, 56 then decreased by 8% from Q2 to Q3 of 2025, and then by 6% from Q3 to Q4 of 2025. 57 In Q4 of 2025, BEA's quarterly estimate of these imports was the lowest since Q3 of 2020, 58 which was a quarter coinciding with the COVID-19 pandemic supply chain disruptions. According to BEA, the categories listed under consumer goods with import volumes that decreased on an annual basis from 2024 to 2025 were (1) furniture and household items; (2) apparel, footwear, and household goods; (3) household and kitchen appliances; (4) home entertainment and recreational equipment and materials; (5) other durable consumer goods; and (6) other nondurable consumer goods.
+
+ These import decreases were not accompanied by a decrease in retail sales, 59 suggesting retailers drew down inventories to maintain sales. Seasonally adjusted inventories relative to sales decreased for retailers across a range of product types from Q4 of 2024 to Q4 of 2025. 60 Some businesses and business associations have reported that sudden decreases in imports can generally contribute to potential inventory shortages. 61 In November 2025, the founder of a consumer electronics retailer reportedly stated, "we have sold down to extremely low stock levels—we probably have about 10% of the inventory we need." 62 
+
+ Some retailers, knowing that their competitors would also likely import fewer goods and thus have fewer inventories, may have increased their markups. 63 Some research suggests that when supply shocks are widely anticipated and known by all market participants—as is the case with the 2025 tariff increases—retailers might increase prices to a greater degree and at a faster rate compared with an unexpected shock. 64 According to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, dollar markups at retailers of certain types of consumer goods (e.g., electronics, apparel, and furniture) increased at accelerated rates in 2025 compared with 2024 and prior years. 65 In some cases, the types of consumer goods with markups that increased at accelerated rates in 2025 also experienced import volume decreases in 2025. For example, from December 2024 to December 2025, in-store dollar markups of "furniture retailers" increased by 8% after decreasing the prior year. 66 As another example, in 2025, in-store dollar markups of "hobby, toy, and game retailers" increased by 13% after averaging an annualized change of 0% in the prior four years. Not all retailer types had increases in markups in 2025.
+
+ Selected Policy Options for Congress
+
+ Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about retailers' price increases and perceptions of price gouging, particularly during supply chain disruptions. These concerns tend to be focused on retailers of certain goods that are experiencing increases in price or decreases in availability. Should Congress consider policy options to affect such behavior, Congress might evaluate how certain retailers and other market participants might respond to these policies. Retailers tend to respond to policy changes in manners that allow them to maximize their profits, which might include responses that are contrary to the goal of the policy.
+
+ This section provides some considerations were Congress to (1) continue oversight of retailers through existing laws, (2) consider legislation to affect price gouging, and/or (3) consider legislation to strengthen supply chain resiliency. 
+
+ Continued Oversight
+
+ Congress might choose not to take legislative action and continue monitoring how retailers respond to public perceptions of their behavior and other market conditions, such as consumer demand for their products, competitive pressure from other retailers, and changes in their supplier network during supply chain disruptions. For example, a retailer might choose not to increase prices when demand is high because of concerns that its customers would choose to patronize a competing retailer. Alternatively, a retailer might choose to vary its prices with demand, which could contribute to higher prices in some cases and lower prices in others. Congress has exercised oversight of such behavior by, for example, evaluating it in hearings or sending letters to retailers, some of which might be publicly available. 67 
+
+ Congress might consider using its oversight authority of federal agencies to review their enforcement of existing federal statutes that may affect retailer pricing behavior during supply chain disruptions. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau published a joint press release warning consumers about potential scams and price gouging in the wake of hurricanes and other natural disasters. 68 The FTC also released a report on grocery store supply chain disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided insights on how market structure and business conduct differed across grocery retailers, wholesalers, and producers. 69 DOJ has taken action against individuals for violating the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA, 50 U.S.C. §§4501 et seq.), as discussed below.
+
+ Defense Production Act of 1950
+
+ The DPA was enacted during the Korean War to provide the President with greater executive powers to control defense production and aspects of industrial and economic policy; it has been used primarily in the context of national defense. 70 Section 102 of the DPA prohibits the accumulation of materials that the President has designated as scarce "in excess of the reasonable demands of business, personal, or home consumption" or for the purpose of resale of products "at prices in excess of prevailing market prices." 71 
+
+ The first Trump Administration and the Biden Administration used the authority provided by Section 102 of the DPA during the COVID-19 pandemic. President Trump used this authority to instruct the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to prevent hoarding of certain health and medical products, including personal protective equipment. 72 Subsequently, DOJ created a COVID-19 Hoarding and Price Gouging Task Force to "pursue bad actors who amass critical supplies either far beyond what they could use or for the purpose of profiteering." 73 The Biden Administration extended this scarcity designation, 74 and DOJ indicted several individuals in multiple cases for violating Section 102 of the DPA. Section 102 does not explicitly prohibit price gouging, but DOJ used the term to describe its indictments in press releases. 75 To the extent that Section 102 affects price gouging, it would be limited to the context of prohibiting hoarding of materials designated as scarce by the President for the purpose of price gouging. 
+
+ As part of its oversight activities, Congress could ask the President to designate certain products as scarce and use the President's authority under Section 102 of the DPA to prevent retailers from hoarding and reselling these products at an elevated price. Congress also could amend the DPA to explicitly address price gouging as proposed in some bills discussed in the following section.
+
+ Retailer Price Gouging
+
+ Some Members of the 119 th Congress have introduced bills that would prohibit price gouging; the majority of these bills include provisions on supply chain disruptions. 76 For example, the Cracking Down on Price Gouging Act ( H.R. 4720 ) would amend Section 102 of the DPA to include "price gouging" and presume that a violation has occurred if prices increase by a certain percent after a shortage caused by a supply chain disruption. Similarly, the Price Gouging Prevention Acts of 2025 ( H.R. 4528 and S. 2321 ) would presume that a violation has occurred if sales at a "grossly excessive price" occur during a "market shock" 77 and other conditions are met. As another example, the Stop Disaster Price Gouging Act ( H.R. 2427 ) would prohibit price gouging for certain goods after the date on which the President declares a major disaster or emergency, which are events that typically include or cause supply chain disruptions.
+
+ No federal laws or regulations explicitly prohibit price gouging. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, as of January 2025, 39 states, the District of Columbia, and some U.S. territories have statutes or regulations that prohibit price gouging. 78 Most of these state laws and regulations prohibit price gouging in response to a disaster or state of emergency, 79 in response to market disruptions, 80 or at all times; 81 some are applicable for specific consumer products, such as fuel or milk. 82 
+
+ A fundamental question for legislation on price gouging is the circumstances or situations in which a price increase is considered excessive. In the 119 th Congress, some bills would prohibit a certain percentage increase in price over a specified time period in certain cases. 83 Other bills would prohibit an excessive increase in prices, direct the FTC to promulgate regulations to define excessive, and provide a percentage increase for the FTC to consider in its definition. 84 Both sets of bills include an exception or affirmative defense if the seller increases prices in response to an increase in costs. Congress could consider specifying a maximum dollar or percent markup in legislation 85 because the markup explains the relationship between the price at which the retailer sells a good and its acquisition cost. 86 Specifying a maximum in terms of a markup percent might result in a more flexible policy that would allow retailers to adjust their markup based on the magnitude of their costs but might not address price increases where a retailer is maintaining a constant markup percent. Specifying the maximum markup in terms of dollars might account for price increases where the markup percent is constant, but the inflation-adjusted size of the markup would decrease over time unless Congress were to adjust the maximum dollar markup for inflation. Congress might also consider using different markups for different types of retailers, 87 which might accommodate the fact that retailers of different types of goods tend to have different markups. 
+
+ How Congress chooses to address the definition of excessive or price gouging in legislation, if Congress chooses to address it, might have different tradeoffs. Legislation that would direct a federal agency to define the term might provide agency flexibility to adapt to changing market conditions, such as how suppliers are responding to a supply chain disruption. Alternatively, legislation that would explicitly define excessive or price gouging in statute could provide retailers more clarity on how to comply with the law but might not allow regulating agencies to adapt to changing market conditions or the economy over time. 
+
+ Congress might consider the scope of a price gouging prohibition; legislation could apply in certain contexts, such as supply chain disruptions, or at all times. Legislation in which a proposed prohibition focuses on supply disruptions might target instances where retail markup increases do not generally result in suppliers increasing production because supply is constrained. Such a scope might also require regulators and retailers to identify when a supply chain disruption is occurring and when the law would apply. 
+
+ Congress also could limit the scope of a prohibition to, for example, certain goods that tend to be in demand during supply chain disruptions, 88 such as groceries or fuel, or apply it to all goods. Limiting a prohibition to certain goods might focus policymaking on areas where consumer concerns around fairness and access are more acute than others. A potential bill could define or list certain "essential goods," but the types of goods that consumers perceive to be essential might vary, change, and include goods that are not covered by the law. Similarly, when a supply chain disruption begins, its duration is typically unknown; the length of a supply chain disruption can affect which goods are perceived to be essential by consumers. 89 Congress, regulators, or the courts would need to determine which goods are considered essential and thus covered by the law.
+
+ Congress also might consider how retailers operating in the United States may respond if they were to face explicit restrictions on the prices they charge, particularly during a supply chain disruption. The immediate effect might be lower consumer prices and retail profits for a period, but there might be other longer-term effects. For example, lower retailer profits might result in store closures or lower retailer investments in assets such as financial stocks, logistical infrastructure, excess inventory buffers, or upstream supply chain infrastructure. 
+
+ A restriction on prices that retailers charge might also incentivize the development of less-regulated underground resale markets, particularly if supply of the product is constrained by a disruption. For example, if consumers are willing to pay more than the capped price, someone might acquire and hoard the good and then resell it to other consumers in an undocumented market. Generally, less-regulated markets might be less likely to comply with a price-gouging law and might be more susceptible to other illegal or unethical commercial behavior.
+
+ It is unclear how retailers would choose to allocate scarce goods if they were unable to adjust prices above a threshold. Although consumers might pay lower prices than they would without a price gouging prohibition in place, consumers might encounter other allocation systems that could raise other potential congressional concerns. With reduced pricing flexibility, retailers might sell the goods to consumers who arrive first, which could contribute to longer lines. 90 Retailers also might prioritize certain consumers, such as repeat customers, customers with social or political capital, or customers who buy memberships with the retailer. The relative value of prioritizing certain consumers might be higher if retailers were unable to sell their goods at prices that maximize revenues. Congress also may choose not to pursue legislation and to defer to market forces and consumer responses to address price gouging.
+
+ Supply Chain Resiliency
+
+ Congress might consider addressing underlying supply chain conditions to reduce uncertainty and minimize disruptions, which may reduce incidences of short-term scarcity-driven retail price increases. The supplier network available to retailers can affect their ability to acquire inventories, which can affect their pricing behavior, particularly during disruptions. 91 In some cases, increasing supply chain resiliency to address short-term disruption-driven price increases may contribute to longer-term structural cost increases, which may be passed on to consumers.
+
+ Congress might consider incentivizing diversified supplier networks for certain goods to affect supply chain resiliency. Some consumer goods are mostly manufactured, or depend on components that are mostly manufactured, outside of the United States. Globalized supply chains generally have provided U.S. consumers with a more diverse selection of goods, typically resulting in lower prices during stable economic periods, but also may contribute to import reliance and exposure to global supply chain disruptions. 92 Domestic production also can be vulnerable to supply chain disruptions under certain market conditions, such as when most of the production is conducted by a few firms and when it is difficult for new firms to enter the market. 93 One way Congress might help diversify supplier networks and build supply chain resiliency is with policies that support domestic production capacity. These policies could result in decreased incidences of short-term scarcity driven price increases but may also contribute to longer-term structural cost increases for the private sector because producers in the United States sometimes have higher costs than those located in other countries. 
+
+ Congress has sometimes sought to ease the tension between supply chain resiliency and private sector costs by subsidizing certain industries (e.g., by providing production or investment tax credits while allowing competition from imports). 94 These types of policies may reduce the likelihood of shortages and help diversify supply chains. They could also contribute to countries retaliating against each other with increases in their respective subsidies. 95 Additionally, production or investment tax credits could decrease federal government revenues. 96 Depending on how the subsidies are specified, they also may raise potential concerns regarding U.S. commitments to certain trade agreements. 97 
+
+ Congress might consider identifying industries and consumer goods for which it determines supply chain resiliency potentially is needed to help prevent shortages and price fluctuations for these items during supply chain disruptions. A Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025 (PRSCA; H.R. 2444 as passed by the House; S. 257 as passed by the Senate) would direct the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis to lead and establish an intergovernmental working group to develop plans and analyses to increase U.S. supply chain resiliency for industries and goods critical to the economic or national security of the United States. The bills would direct the Assistant Secretary to identify which industries, supply chains, and goods are critical to the economic security of the United States. The bills would consider both domestic and international components of the supply chain. The Senate and the House passed their respective versions of PRSCA, which differ regarding the role of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Each chamber of Congress might consider the role of the DHS in supply chain resiliency and whether its potential role is appropriate. The Congressional Budget Office estimates it would cost less than $500,000 to execute the activities proposed in the PRSCA bills. 98 
+
+ 
+ Author Contact Information
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+ Footnotes
+
+ 
+ 
+ 1 .
+ 
+ 
+ A supply chain disruption is an event that affects supplier networks and that typically contributes to supplier prices increasing at accelerated rates or the availability of goods decreasing or both. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce, Pandemic Profiteers: Legislation to Stop Corporate Price Gouging , hearing, 117 th Cong., 2 nd sess., February 2, 2022, https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=114360 ; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, The Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress , hearing on the Oversight on the Monetary Policy Report to Congress Pursuant to the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, 118 th Cong., 1 st sess., March 7, 2023, S.Hrg. 118-205; and U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on Aging, Making Washington Work for Seniors: Fighting to End Inflation and Achieve Fiscal Sanity , hearing, 119 th Cong., 1 st sess., January 29, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/event/119th-congress/senate-event/LC74258/text .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 3 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Joint Economic Committee, Representative Don Beyer, "Trump's Tariff Plans Will Drive up Costs for the Average American Family between $1,600 and $2,000 per year," March 3, 2025, https://beyer.house.gov/uploadedfiles/jec_house_dems_trump_tariffs_report_3.3.25.pdf ; and "Short Term Pain, Long Term Gain: Rep. Burchett on Tariffs," Bloomberg , April 3, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2025-04-03/short-term-pain-long-term-gain-rep-burchett-on-tariffs-video .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 4 .
+ 
+ 
+ In the context of this report, a retailer is a business with a physical store that purchases goods for purposes of resale to final consumers. A producer is a business that creates a physical good through an assembly, manufacturing, agricultural, mining, packaging, or other physical activity. Producers might sell their physical goods directly to a retailer or to an intermediary (commonly referred to as a wholesaler).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 5 .
+ 
+ 
+ A supplier is a business that sells a physical good to a retailer. Suppliers can be producers or wholesalers. Wholesalers acquire their goods from producers or other wholesalers.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 6 .
+ 
+ 
+ Kevin Camp et al., "Automotive Dealerships 2007-19: Profit-Margin Compression and Product Innovation," Monthly Labor Review , BLS (October 2022), https://doi.org/10.21916/mlr.2022.26 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 7 .
+ 
+ 
+ Amulya Gurtu, "Optimization of Inventory Holding Cost Due to Price, Weight, and Volume of Items," Journal of Risk and Financial Management , vol. 14, no. 2 (February 2021), p. 65, https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm14020065 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 8 .
+ 
+ 
+ Eric T. Anderson et al., "Measuring and Mitigating the Costs of Stockouts," Management Science , vol. 52, no. 11 (November 2006), p. 1751, http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0577 ; and Terry Damron and William T. Rupp, "Inventory Control in the Retail Sector: Case Studies of Best Business Practices," International Journal of Procurement Management , vol. 9, no. 3 (2016), p. 354, http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJPM.2016.076309 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 9 .
+ 
+ 
+ Unless noted otherwise, throughout this report, grocery store refers to a store that primarily sells food intended for consumption at home (e.g., Kroger, Albertsons); it does not include a supercenter (e.g., Walmart Supercenter, Target) or warehouse club (e.g., Costco, Sam's Club). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 10 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce, Pandemic Profiteers: Legislation to Stop Corporate Price Gouging , hearing, 117 th Cong., 2 nd sess., February 2, 2022, https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=114360 . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 11 .
+ 
+ 
+ Producer Price Index Program Staff, "Wholesale and Retail Producer Price Indexes: Margin Prices," Beyond the Numbers , U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), vol. 1, no. 8 (August 2012), https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-1/wholesale-and-retail-producer-price-indexes-margin-prices.htm ; and BLS, Handbook of Methods: Producer Price Indexes , July 31, 2025, https://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/ppi/concepts.htm .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 12 .
+ 
+ 
+ Typical range identified by CRS analysis of vehicle dealership 10-Ks. For example, see AutoNation, Inc., Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2024 , filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), February 14, 2025, https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0000350698/000035069825000029/an-20241231.htm . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 13 .
+ 
+ 
+ Typical range identified by CRS analysis of grocery store 10-Ks. For example, see Albertsons Companies, Inc., Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended February 22, 2025 , filed with the SEC, April 21, 2025, https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0001646972/000164697225000052/aci-20250222.htm . This markup percent does not apply to supercenters (e.g., Walmart, Target) and warehouse clubs (e.g., Costco, Sam's Club). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 14 .
+ 
+ 
+ Gross profits are revenues minus inventory acquisition costs (i.e., net profits before subtracting operating, administrative, and other costs).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 15 .
+ 
+ 
+ Net profits are revenues minus total costs.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 16 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, vehicle dealerships generally earn more profits from financial and insurance sales than they do from vehicle sales; Camp et al., "Automotive Dealerships 2007-19."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 17 .
+ 
+ 
+ In this report, operating costs refer to selling, general, and administrative costs. Typical range identified by CRS analysis of vehicle dealership and grocery store 10-Ks. For example, in 2024, Albertsons Companies' "selling & administrative expenses" were 26% of its total revenue, whereas AutoNation's "selling, general, and administrative expenses" were 12% of its total revenue (see Albertsons Companies, Inc., Form 10-K ; and AutoNation, Inc., Form 10-K , respectively).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 18 .
+ 
+ 
+ Sydney Coplin, "DC Convenience Store Accused of Price Gouging During State of Emergency," NBCWashington , May 4, 2020, https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/coronavirus/dc-convenience-store-accused-of-price-gouging-during-state-of-emergency/2292842/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 19 .
+ 
+ 
+ Neil Mehrotra et al., Retail Inventories and Inflation Dynamics: The Price Margin Channel , International Finance Discussion Papers no. 1424, October 2025, https://doi.org/10.17016/IFDP.2025.1424 ; Florian Zettelmeyer et al., Scarcity Rents in Car Retailing: Evidence from Inventory Fluctuations at Dealerships , NBER, May 2006, http://www.nber.org/papers/w12177 ; Ayelet Israeli et al., "How Market Power Affects Dynamic Pricing: Evidence from Inventory Fluctuations at Car Dealerships," Journal of Management Science , vol. 68, no. 4 (October 2021), http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.3967 ; and Salomé Baslandze and Simon Fuchs, "The Price of Delay: Supply Chain Disruptions and Pricing Dynamics," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 2025-8a, revised March 2026, https://www.atlantafed.org/-/media/Project/Atlanta/FRBA/Documents/research/publication/working-paper/2025/09/24/08-the-price-of-delay-supply-chain-disruptions-and-pricing-dynamics.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 20 .
+ 
+ 
+ Andrew Glover et al., "How Much Have Record Corporate Profits Contributed to Recent Inflation," Economic Review , Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 108, no. 1 (January 2023), https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/9329/EconomicReviewV108N1GloverMustredelRiovonEndeBecker.pdf ; Michael Havlin, "Automotive Dealerships 2019-22: Dealer Markup Increases Drive New-Vehicle Consumer Inflation," Monthly Labor Review , BLS (April 2023), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2023/article/automotive-dealerships-markups.htm ; and Leila Davis, "Profits and Markups During the Post-COVID-19 Inflation Shock in the U.S. Economy: A Firm-Level Lens," European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies , vol. 21, no. 1 (September 2024), p. 309, https://doi.org/10.4337/ejeep.2024.0137 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 21 .
+ 
+ 
+ Camp et al., "Automotive Dealerships 2007-19."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 22 .
+ 
+ 
+ For more information on the Great Recession (GR) and financial crises, see CRS Report R47479, Common Causes of Economic Recession , by Lida R. Weinstock. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 23 .
+ 
+ 
+ Simon Gilchrist et al., Inflation Dynamics During the Financial Crisis , National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), November 2016, http://www.nber.org/papers/w22827 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 24 .
+ 
+ 
+ Camp et al., "Automotive Dealerships 2007-19." 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 25 .
+ 
+ 
+ December is baseline peak month immediately preceding the GR, and January 2009 is when dealership markups reached a GR minimum.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 26 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS calculations based on Producer Price Index (PPI) and Import Price Index (IPP) data from BLS, accessed via the BLS one-screen data tool; BLS, PPI for Commodity Data , accessed September 16, 2025, https://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm ; and BLS, "Data Tools," accessed September 16, 2025, https://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 27 .
+ 
+ 
+ Inventory levels affect vehicle dealerships' pricing power; see Florian Zettelmeyer et al., Scarcity Rents in Car Retailing: Evidence from Inventory Fluctuations at Dealerships ; and Ayelet Israeli et al., "How Market Power Affects Dynamic Pricing: Evidence from Inventory Fluctuations at Car Dealerships.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 28 .
+ 
+ 
+ According to the BLS PPIs that track dollar markups. Unless otherwise specified, references to percent changes in dollar markups in this report are based on the BLS PPIs that directly measure changes to dollar markups.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 29 .
+ 
+ 
+ For more information on the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the U.S. economy, see CRS Report R46606, COVID-19 and the U.S. Economy , by Lida R. Weinstock.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 30 .
+ 
+ 
+ Zettelmeyer et al., Scarcity Rents in Car Retailing ; and Israeli et al., "How Market Power Affects Dynamic Pricing."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 31 .
+ 
+ 
+ David Coffin et al., The Roadblocks of the COVID-19 Pandemic in the U.S. Automotive Industry , International Trade Commission, Working Paper ID-091, June 2022, https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/final_the_roadblocks_of_the_covid-19_pandemic_in_the_automotive_industry.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 32 .
+ 
+ 
+ Coffin et al., The Roadblocks of the COVID-19 Pandemic in the U.S. Automotive Industry ; and Havlin, "Automotive Dealerships 2019-22."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 33 .
+ 
+ 
+ Havlin, "Automotive Dealerships 2019-22."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 34 .
+ 
+ 
+ January 2020 is used as the pre-Covid-19 baseline because some portions of the economy were being affected as early as February 2020, and June of 2022 is the referenced time period because it is when vehicle dealership markups reached the maximum level between January 2020 and January 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 35 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS calculations based on PPI and IPP data, accessed via the BLS one-screen data tool; BLS, "Data Tool," accessed September 16, 2025, https://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 36 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS calculations based on Consumer Price Index (CPI) data from BLS, accessed via the BLS one-screen data tool; BLS, "Data Tool," accessed September 16, 2025, https://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 37 .
+ 
+ 
+ For demonstration of how these measures relate, see Havlin, "Automotive Dealerships 2019-22."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 38 .
+ 
+ 
+ The proportion of food manufacturers identifying "insufficient supply of materials" as the reason for underutilized plant capacity increased from the first quarter (Q1) of 2021 to Q4 of 2025, with accelerated increases occurring in 2021 and 2022, which is an indicator of a supply chain disruption. U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Survey of Plant Capacity Utilization, accessed April 7, 2026, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/qpc/data/tables.html ; and Neil Mehrotra et al., Retail Inventories and Inflation Dynamics: The Price Margin Channel .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 39 .
+ 
+ 
+ Thomas Bittmann et al., "Short- and Long-Term Drought Impacts on the U.S. Beef Value Chain," Environmental Research Letters , vol. 20 (2025), https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ade45d ; and Omid Zamani et al., "The Effect of Avian Influenza Outbreaks on Retail Price Premiums in the United States Poultry Market," Poultry Science , vol. 103, no. 10 (October 2024), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psj.2024.104102 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 40 .
+ 
+ 
+ For discussion of the difference between a dollar markup and markup percent, see " Retail Prices: Markups ."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 41 .
+ 
+ 
+ R. Aaron Hrozencik, "The Stocking Impact and Financial-Climate Risk of the Livestock Forage Disaster Program," Economic Research Service, Report no. 329 (January 2024), https://ers.usda.gov/sites/default/files/_laserfiche/publications/108372/ERR-329.pdf?v=57904 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 42 .
+ 
+ 
+ Bernt Nelson, "Smaller Cattle Herd Creates Market Volatility," American Farm Bureau Federation, February 10, 2026, https://www.fb.org/market-intel/smaller-cattle-herd-creates-market-volatility ; U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), "United States Cattle Inventory Report," news release, July 25, 2025, https://web.archive.org/web/20250725203702/https://www.nass.usda.gov/Newsroom/2025/07-25-2025.php ; and USDA NASS, Quick Stats , accessed April 7, 2026, https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/results/81B2426E-08E0-3871-B132-06D93D6C72A2 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 43 .
+ 
+ 
+ USDA NASS, Quick Stats . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 44 .
+ 
+ 
+ USDA Economic Research Service (ERS), Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry Outlook: May 2022 , Mary 18, 2022, https://ers.usda.gov/sites/default/files/_laserfiche/outlooks/103952/LDP-M-335.pdf?v=80650 ; USDA, "Confirmations of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Commercial and Backyard Flocks," Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, https://www.aphis.usda.gov/livestock-poultry-disease/avian/avian-influenza/hpai-detections/commercial-backyard-flocks ; and CRS Report R48518, The Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Outbreak in Poultry, 2022-Present , by Christine Whitt.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 45 .
+ 
+ 
+ Bittmann et al., "Short-and Long-Term Drought Impacts on the U.S. Beef Value Chain"; and USDA ERS, Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry Outlook: May 2022 . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 46 .
+ 
+ 
+ Bittmann et al., "Short-and Long-Term Drought Impacts on the U.S. Beef Value Chain"; and Zamani et al., "The Effect of Avian Influenza Outbreaks on Retail Price Premiums in the United States Poultry Market."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 47 .
+ 
+ 
+ An exception would be when dollar markups are negative in the initial period.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 48 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, see Marina Azzimonti et al., "Tariffs: Estimating the Economic Impact of the 2025 Measures and Proposals," Economic Brief, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, April 2025, https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_brief/2025/eb_25-12 . For discussion of tariff increases during 2025 and the products that were affected, see CRS Report R48549, Presidential 2025 Tariff Actions: Timeline and Status , by Keigh E. Hammond and William F. Burkhart.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 49 .
+ 
+ 
+ Philippe Andrade et al., "Who Will Pay for Tariffs? Businesses' Expectations about Costs and Prices," Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Current Policy Perspectives , vol. 25, no. 13 (September 2025), https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/current-policy-perspectives/2025/who-pays-for-tariffs.aspx .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 50 .
+ 
+ 
+ Russell Mills et al., "SOURCE Insights: An Initial Look at the Anticipated Impact of Tariffs on Fourth District Businesses," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, February 2025, https://www.clevelandfed.org/publications/cleveland-fed-district-data-brief/2025/cfddb-20250422-sorce-insights-anticipated-impact-of-tariffs ; and T. Woods, "3 Major Retailers that Will Raise Prices Immediately Under Trump—Tariffs Play Key Role," Yahoo!Finance , January 3, 2025, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/3-major-retailers-raise-prices-150119217.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 51 .
+ 
+ 
+ The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides a measure of real imports, which is adjusted for both inflation and seasonal trends.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 52 .
+ 
+ 
+ The category of data published by the BEA is "consumer goods, except food and automotive"; this is a category of data that is inflation-adjusted and seasonally adjusted by BEA.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 53 .
+ 
+ 
+ Largest percent increase on record going back to Q1 2007, which is when this data series became available; see BEA, "Table 4.2.6B Real Exports and Imports of Goods and Services by Type of Product, Chained Dollars: Quarterly," accessed on February 26, 2025.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 54 .
+ 
+ 
+ Retail Dive Staff, "3 Ways Tariffs are Impacting Retailers," RetailDive , August 28, 2025, https://www.retaildive.com/news/3-ways-tariffs-are-impacting-retailers/758864/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 55 .
+ 
+ 
+ For discussion of tariff increases during 2025, see CRS Report R48549, Presidential 2025 Tariff Actions: Timeline and Status , by Keigh E. Hammond and William F. Burkhart.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 56 .
+ 
+ 
+ Largest percent decrease on record going back to Q1 of 2007, which is when this data series became available; see BEA, "Table 4.2.6B Real Exports and Imports of Goods and Services by Type of Product, Chained Dollars: Quarterly."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 57 .
+ 
+ 
+ BEA, "Table 4.2.6B Real Exports and Imports of Goods and Services by Type of Product, Chained Dollars: Quarterly."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 58 .
+ 
+ 
+ BEA, "Table 4.2.6B Real Exports and Imports of Goods and Services by Type of Product, Chained Dollars: Quarterly."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 59 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS analysis of retail sales data from Census Bureau, Time Series / Trend Charts , accessed April 1, 2026, https://www.census.gov/econ/currentdata/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 60 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS analysis of data in BEA, "Table 3BU. Real Inventory-Sales Ratios for Manufacturing and Trade, Seasonally Adjusted," accessed March 13, 2026.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 61 .
+ 
+ 
+ Fin Daniel Gómez and Richard Escobedo, "Walmart, Target CEOs Privately Warned Trump Tariffs Could Lead to Empty Shelves Soon," CBSNews , April 23, 2025, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/walmart-target-trump-tariff-supply-chains/ ; and Lori Ann LaRocoo, "The Trade War's Wave of Retail Shortages Will Hit U.S. Consumers in Stages. Here's When," CNBC , April 24, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/04/24/unsustainable-china-trade-war-retail-shortage-warnings.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 62 .
+ 
+ 
+ Deborah Mary Sophia and Savyata Mishra, "Small US Retailers Face Holiday Supply Chaos Due to Trump Tariffs," Reuters, November 26, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/small-us-retailers-face-holiday-supply-chaos-due-trump-tariffs-2025-11-26/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 63 .
+ 
+ 
+ For more information on the retail inventory-markup relationship, see Neil Mehrotra et al., Retail Inventories and Inflation Dynamics: The Price Margin Channel , International Finance Discussion Papers no. 1424, October 2025, https://doi.org/10.17016/IFDP.2025.1424 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 64 .
+ 
+ 
+ Alverez-Blaser et al., Markups and Cost Pass-through Along the Supply Chain ; Isabella M. Weber and Evan Wasner, "Sellers' Inflation, Profits and Conflict: Why Can Large Firms Hike Prices in an Emergency?," Review of Keynesian Economics , vol. 2, no. 2 (April 14, 2023), p. 183, https://doi.org/10.4337/roke.2023.02.05 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 65 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS analysis of BLS retail trade price indexes.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 66 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS calculations based on BLS retail trade price indexes.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 67 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce, Pandemic Profiteers: Legislation to Stop Corporate Price Gouging , hearing, 117 th Cong., 2 nd sess., February 2, 2022, https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=114360 ; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, The Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress , hearing on the Oversight on the Monetary Policy Report to Congress Pursuant to the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, 118 th Cong., 1 st sess., March 7, 2023, S.Hrg. 118-205; and U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on Aging, Making Washington Work for Seniors: Fighting to End Inflation and Achieve Fiscal Sanity , hearing, 119 th Cong., 1 st sess., January 29, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/event/119th-congress/senate-event/LC74258/text .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 68 .
+ 
+ 
+ FTC, "FTC, DOJ and CFPB Warn Consumers About Potential Scams and Price Gouging in the Wake of Hurricanes and other Natural Disasters," press release, October 9, 2024, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/10/ftc-doj-cfpb-warn-consumers-about-potential-scams-price-gouging-wake-hurricanes-other-natural .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 69 .
+ 
+ 
+ FTC, Feeding America in a Time of Crisis: The United States Grocery S upply Chain and the COVID-19 Pandemic , March 21, 2024, https://www.ftc.gov/reports/feeding-america-time-crisis-ftc-staff-report-united-states-grocery-supply-chain-covid-19-pandemic .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 70 .
+ 
+ 
+ For more information on the Defense Production Act of 1950, see CRS Report R43767, The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and Considerations for Congress , by Alexandra G. Neenan. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 71 .
+ 
+ 
+ 50 U.S.C. §4512; and see CRS Report R43767, The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and Considerations for Congress , by Alexandra G. Neenan.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 72 .
+ 
+ 
+ Executive Order 13910 of March 23, 2020, "Preventing Hoarding of Health and Medical Resources to Respond to the Spread of COVID-19," 85 Federal Register 17001, March 26, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/03/26/2020-06478/preventing-hoarding-of-health-and-medical-resources-to-respond-to-the-spread-of-covid-19 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 73 .
+ 
+ 
+ Department of Justice, "Combating Price Gouging & Hoarding," March 23, 2022, https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus/combatingpricegouginghoarding .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 74 .
+ 
+ 
+ Executive Order 14001 of January 21, 2021, "A Sustainable Public Health Supply Chain," 86 Federal Register 7219, January 26, 2021; and Department of Health and Human Services, "Extension of Designation of Scarce Materials or Threatened Materials Subject to COVID-19 Hoarding Prevention Measures; Extension of Effective Date with Modifications," 86 Federal Register 35810, July 7, 2021.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 75 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, see U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Puerto Rico, "Individual Indicted for Price Gouging," press release, April 29, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/usao-pr/pr/individual-indicted-price-gouging .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 76 .
+ 
+ 
+ The price gouging bills that do not include supply chain disruption provisions tend to focus on specific products, such as medications or groceries.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 77 .
+ 
+ 
+ Market shock is a term that commonly includes supply chain disruptions.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 78 .
+ 
+ 
+ National Conference of State Legislatures, "Price Gouging State Statutes," updated January 21, 2025, https://www.ncsl.org/financial-services/price-gouging-state-statutes . For more information on selected examples of state laws on price gouging, see CRS Report R47072, Gasoline Price Increases: Federal and State Authority to Limit "Price Gouging" , by Adam Vann.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 79 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, see Conn. Gen. Stat. §29-319, https://www.cga.ct.gov/2025/pub/chap_541.htm#sec_29-319 ; and Ind. Code §§4-6-9.1-1 et seq., https://iga.in.gov/laws/2025/ic/titles/4#4-6-9.1-1 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 80 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 §1105, https://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/10/title10sec1105.html ; and N.Y. General Business Law §396-r, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/GBS/396-R .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 81 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, see Mich. Comp. laws 445.903, https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=MCL-445-903 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 82 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, see Conn. Gen. Stat. §29-319, https://www.cga.ct.gov/2025/pub/chap_541.htm#sec_29-319 ; Ind. Code §4-6-9.1-1 et seq., https://iga.in.gov/laws/2025/ic/titles/4#4-6-9.1-1 ; and N.Y. General Business Law §396-rr, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/GBS/396-RR .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 83 .
+ 
+ 
+ See Cracking Down on Price Gouging Act ( H.R. 4720 ) and Stop Disaster Price Gouging Act ( H.R. 2427 ). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 84 .
+ 
+ 
+ See Price Gouging Prevention Acts of 2025 ( H.R. 4528 and S. 2321 ) and Stop Price Gouging in Grocery Stores Act of 2025 ( H.R. 4966 ).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 85 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, similar to the language in §2(a)(1)(B) of the Stop Disaster Price Gouging Act ( H.R. 2427 ).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 86 .
+ 
+ 
+ See " Retailers and Supply Chain Disruptions ."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 87 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, similar to what is accounted for by the language contained in §2(a)(2)(A(i)(II) of H.R. 2427 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 88 .
+ 
+ 
+ Consumers may find it difficult to abstain from certain goods for any amount of time, even when prices increase. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 89 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, consumers might be able to abstain from purchasing a new vehicle for a shorter time period but find it more difficult to abstain from purchasing a new vehicle for a longer period of time.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 90 .
+ 
+ 
+ Yoram Barzel, "A Theory of Rationing by Waiting," The Journal of Law & Economics , vol. 17, no. 1 (April 1974), p. 73, https://doi.org/10.1086/466785 ; and H. E. Frech III and William C. Lee, "The Welfare Cost of Rationing-By-Queuing Across Markets: Theory and Estimates from the U.S. Gasoline Crises," The Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol. 102, no. 1 (February 1987), p. 97, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884682 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 91 .
+ 
+ 
+ See " Retailers and Supply Chain Disruptions ."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 92 .
+ 
+ 
+ For analysis of a selection of these disruptions, see " Retailers and Supply Chain Disruptions ."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 93 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, the supply chain disruptions in the domestic production of infant formula (see FTC, Market Factors Relevant to Infant Formula Supply Disruptions 2 022 , March 13, 2024, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/infant_formula_report_final.pdf ). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 94 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, see the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act ( P.L. 117-58 ), the CHIPS Act of 2022 (Division A of P.L. 117-167 ), P.L. 117-169 (the FY2022 budget reconciliation law, commonly referred to as the Inflation Reduction Act), and P.L. 119-21 (the FY2025 budget reconciliation law, commonly referred to as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 95 .
+ 
+ 
+ Elizabeth Van Heuvelen, "Subsidy Wars," Finance & Development Magazine , IMF, June 2023, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2023/06/B2B-subsidy-wars-elizabeth-van-heuvelen .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 96 .
+ 
+ 
+ Subsidies that are government expenditures would increase government expenditures, and subsidies that reduce tax obligations would reduce government revenues.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 97 .
+ 
+ 
+ For list of trade agreements, see CRS Report R45846, Congressional Votes on Free Trade Agreements and Trade Promotion Authority , by Keigh E. Hammond. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 98 .
+ 
+ 
+ Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate , February 19, 2025, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-02/s0257.pdf .
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+Legal Sidebari 
+
+ 
+
+ Civil Rights Remedies in Cummings and 
+Implications for Title VI and Title IX 
+
+June 29, 2022 
+Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) prohibit 
+various types of discrimination in federally funded programs and other covered entities. The Supreme 
+Court recently held i n Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller that a plaintiff bringing suit to enforc e Section 
+504 and Section 1557 cannot recover emotional distress damages. Emotional distress damages are a form 
+of relief aimed at compensating individuals for emotional harm or injury caused by the unlawful conduct 
+at issue. As neither Section 504 nor Section 1557 contains statutory text specifying whether emotional 
+distress damages are available in a private suit, the Court interpreted the statutes in light of common law 
+contract doctrine to conclude that neither statute permits such a remedy. Under Cummings , it appears that 
+compensatory relief in a private suit will now be limited to recovery for economic harm caused by 
+unlawful discrimination under those statutes. 
+
+This Sidebar discusses the Court’s analysis in Cummings , including its reliance on common law contract 
+principles to interpret statutes like Section 504, which the Court reads as legislation enacted based on 
+Congress’s Spending Clause power. The Spending Clause basis and operation of several civil rights 
+statutes are more fully explored in other CRS reports. This Sidebar reviews the likely impact of the 
+Court’s decision on the availability of emotional distress damages under other statutes, such as Title VI of 
+the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), and 
+potential considerations for Congress. 
+
+ Legal Background: Private Suits and Remedies 
+ The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Cummings builds on judicial precedent and legislative action linking 
+together the remedial schemes of Title VI, Title IX, Section 504, and the Age Discrimination Act . Section 
+504 prohibits federally funded programs from discriminating against individuals based on disability. 
+ Section 1557 prohibits covered entities from discriminating on the grounds prohibited under Section 504, 
+ Title VI (race, color, or national origin) , Title IX (sex in federally funded education programs), and the 
+ Age Discrimination Act (age). Section 1557 also states that the “enforcement mechanisms provided for 
+and available under” Title VI, Title IX, Section 504, and the Age Discrimination Act apply to Section 
+1557 violations. In light of such legislative action and earlier judicial decisions, courts have generally 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+LSB10775 
+
+ CRS Legal Sidebar 
+ Prepared for Members and 
+
+ Committees of Congress 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+2 
+
+treated remedies under these four statutes in a largely parallel manner: if a remedy is permitted or 
+foreclosed under one, courts have permitted or foreclosed them under another. 
+
+W hen Title VI was enacted in 1964, followed by Title IX several years later, neither statute expressly 
+addressed whether an individual harmed by unlawful discrimination could bring a private suit seeking 
+relief for these statutory violations. The Supreme Court has long interpreted Title VI and Title IX to 
+permit private suits to enforce their provisions and has separately addressed the remedies available in 
+such private rights of action. For example, in 1979, the Court interpreted Title IX in Cannon v. University 
+of Chicago to permit a private suit in light of several considerations relating to Title VI. The Court pointed 
+out that lower courts had consistently interpreted Title VI to permit a private suit and presumed that 
+Congress was aware of these interpretations. Stating that Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI, and 
+Title IX’s drafters explicitly assumed it would be interpreted as Title VI had been, the Court concluded 
+that Congress intended Title IX to likewise permit individual enforcement. In 1992, the Court reached the 
+question i n Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools of available relief in a Title IX suit to hold that a 
+plaintiff could recover monetary damages. 
+
+While the Court has interpreted Title IX’s remedial scheme in relation to Title VI, Congress has also 
+legislatively linked the remedies of another statute to Title VI . Section 504, en acted nearly a decade after 
+Title VI, provides that the “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI” shall apply to aggrieved 
+individuals under Section 504. Section 504 does not otherwise specify types of relief available in a private 
+suit for statutory violations. In addition, implicitly endorsing Cannon , C ongress enact ed legislation in 
+1986 (the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization provision) to permit private suits in federal court against 
+ state entities under Title VI, Title IX, Section 504, and the Age Discrimination Act, but without specifying 
+particular remedies. 
+
+Given this legislative coupling of Section 504 remedies to Title VI, when the Court considered in Barnes 
+v. Gorman whether punitive damages were available in a Section 504 suit, it also had to address whether 
+Title VI permitted the award of punitive damages. In the absence of text in Title VI expressly addressing 
+punitive damages, however, the Court turned to common law contract doctrine as an interpretive tool. In 
+the Court’s view, Spending Clause-based statutes operate much like a contract in which the federal 
+government offers federal financial assistance in exchange for recipients’ agreement to comply with 
+certain requirements. Extending that contract analogy, the Court has explained that recipients must have 
+clear notice of those requirements. In the context of remedies, the Court reasoned in Barnes that—in the 
+absence of express statutory text—a federal funding recipient would lack the requisite notice that it was 
+liable for damages for which common law doctrine did not traditionally provide a damages remedy for a 
+breach of contract. The Court concluded that because common law contract doctrine treats punitive 
+damages as a special remedy, and not as ordinarily available for a contract breach, funding recipients did 
+not have adequate notice that they were subject to punitive damages. The Court in Barnes held that it 
+would read Title VI—and by extension, Section 504—to foreclose the recovery of punitive damages. 
+
+Although Barnes addressed the relationship between Section 504 and Title VI, Section 504 is not the only 
+civil rights statute that links its remedies to Title VI. In 2010, Congress enacted Section 1557 and linked 
+ that statute’s enforcement to the “enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under” Title VI, 
+Title IX, Section 504, and the Age Discrimination Act. Section 1557 does not otherwise address or specify 
+available remedies. 
+
+ The Supreme Court’s Analysis in Cummings 
+ The Cummings plaintiff, who is deaf and legally blind, alleged that a federally funded health care 
+provider’s refusal to provide a sign language interpreter violated Section 504 and Section 1557. A federal 
+district court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that relief for emotional harm was unavailable under 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+3 
+
+these statutes in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Barnes . On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
+for t he Fifth Circuit affirmed. 
+
+In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court held that compensatory relief for 
+emotional harm is unavailable in suits brought under Section 504 and Section 1557. In reaching this 
+conclusion, the Court once again drew upon common law contract doctrine. Observing that “the statutes 
+at issue are silent as to available remedies,” the Court stated that it was “not obvious how to decide 
+whether funding recipients would have had the requisite ‘clear notice’” regarding liability in a private 
+right of action for emotional distress damages. Looking to its analysis in Barnes , the Court explained that 
+it had held that punitive damages were not available there because punitive damages under common law 
+contract doctrine were an “exception to the general rule,” and therefore “not enough to give funding 
+recipients the requisite notice that they could face such damages.” 
+
+Extending that analysis to Cummings , the Court reasoned that because emotional distress damages are 
+generally unavailable as a remedy for a breach of contract under common law, under Barnes , it could not 
+treat federal funding recipients as having the requisite notice that they could be subject to emotional 
+distress damages. When judicially implying a remedy in these Spending Clause civil rights statutes, the 
+Court explained, it will imply only those remedies “‘normally available for contract actions.’” While the 
+Court acknowledged that th e Restatement of Contracts, a legal treatise, discusses “the special rule that 
+‘recovery for emotional disturbance’ is allowed” when the contract or breach at issue is “‘of such a kind 
+that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result,’” the Court described that relief as an 
+exception and an unusual or narrowly applied remedy. The Court also stated that the Restatement “does 
+not reflect the consensus rule,” pointing to legal commentaries discussing the absence of a majority rule 
+for emotional harm in contract breach actions. 
+
+The Court’s opinion drew a dissent by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. While the 
+dissenting Justices agreed that its precedent instructed the Court to apply contract law, they disagreed with 
+the majority’s application of the relevant doctrine. Traditional contract law, the dissent stated, made 
+emotional distress damages available where a contract breach was “‘particularly likely to result in serious 
+emotional disturbance.’” In such contracts—like a contract for marriage, or the delivery of a sensitive 
+telegram—emotional distress damages were traditionally available to address the non-economic nature of 
+a breach in those circumstances. Civil rights statutes addressing “intentional invidious discrimination”—
+such as a teacher’s sexual assault of a student—also have “clearly nonpecuniary” purposes, the dissent 
+stated, and are analogous to those contracts whose breach is likely to result in emotional suffering. Given 
+that emotional distress damages were traditionally available for such types of breach, the dissent 
+contended that contract law supported the conclusion that “victims of intentional violations of these 
+antidiscrimination statutes can recover compensatory damages for emotional suffering.” Under the 
+majority’s decision, the dissent stated, victims of discrimination must now provide proof of economic 
+harm to recover compensatory damages, “even though the primary harm inflicted by discrimination is 
+rarely economic.” The dissent further asserted that the Court’s interpretation departed from the remedial 
+schemes of other civil rights statutes for which Congress expressly allowed recovery for emotional harm, 
+such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
+
+ Implications for Other Civil Rights Statutes 
+ While the Supreme Court in Cummings addressed emotional distress damages in the context of a suit 
+brought under Section 504 and Section 1557, its reasoning in that case could be read to foreclose 
+emotional distress damages for claims under Title VI, Title IX, and the Age Discrimination Act. 
+
+The Court’s analysis in Cummings arguably has the most immediate effect on Title VI, as the Court held 
+that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under Section 504, which defines its remedies as 
+those available under Title VI. In addition, and more broadly, the Court’s reasoning in Cummings also 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+4 
+
+appears to implicate emotional distress damages under Title IX and the Age Discrimination Act. Under 
+the rationale of Cummings , entities subject to Section 504 and Section 1557 lack adequate notice that they 
+could be liable for emotional distress damages in a private suit because common law contract doctrine 
+does not typically award such damages for a contract breach. Because t he Court interprets Title IX to 
+require clear notice to covered entities, and the text of Title IX also does not address emotional distress 
+damages, some litigants might argue that the rationale of Cummings likewise forecloses emotional 
+distress damages in Title IX suits because covered entities lack the requisite notice that they could be 
+liable for emotional distress damages in a private suit under that statute. To the extent lower courts 
+construe the Age Discrimination Act as Spending Clause legislation modeled after Title VI and Title IX, 
+litigants might raise such arguments under the Age Discrimination Act as well. 
+
+The Court’s Cummings decision, however, does not change the availability of injunctive relief in such 
+cases, nor attorney’s fees authorized under other statutory provisions expressly permitting that recovery in 
+suits brought under Title VI and Title IX ( see 42 U.S.C. § 1988( b)), Section 504 ( see 29 U.S.C. 
+§ 794a( b)), and the Age Discrimination Act ( see 42 U.S.C. § 6104( e)). 
+
+ Considerations for Congress 
+ Congress has broad authority to determine the remedies available for violations of federal statutes. At 
+present, the statutory text in Section 504, Section 1557, Title VI, and Title IX does not specify the 
+availability of compensatory relief for emotional harm, punitive damages, or any other relief apart from 
+attorney’s fees, nor does the text explicitly foreclose certain types of relief. (As noted above, attorney’s 
+fees are expressly made available in provisions addressing the recovery of those fees in private suits under 
+Title VI, Title IX, Section 504, and the Age Discrimination Act.) Apart from attorney’s fees and injunctive 
+relief, the Age Discrimination Act also lacks text addressing relief in a private suit. 
+
+Congress could amend some or all of these statutes to explicitly provide for or foreclose specific forms of 
+relief. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, for example, contains statutory text specifically providing for 
+court-order ed equitable relief such as back pay awards, injunctive relief, punitive damages, and 
+compensatory damages for “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental 
+anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses.” Should there be legislative interest in 
+amending civil rights statutes enacted based on Congress’s power, Supreme Court precedent applicable to 
+such legislation requires that the remedies available for liability are set out in clear and unambiguous 
+terms. I n an earlier decision, for example, the Court held that “expert fees” were not recoverable in a 
+private suit brought under another Spending Clause statute because its statutory text did not expressly 
+refer to expert fees or otherwise plainly indicate that such fees were recoverable. 
+
+More generally, while the Supreme Court has previously construed the remedies under Title VI, Title IX, 
+Section 504, and the Age Discrimination Act in a parallel manner, and Congress has previously cross-
+referenced certain remedies to those available under one of those statutes, Congress could choose to 
+differentiate among these statutes in terms of the remedies available. Congress could also provide specific 
+remedies depending on the type of discriminatory conduct or nature of the claim at issue. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+5 
+
+ Author Information 
+
+ 
+Christine J. Back 
+
+ 
+
+Legislative Attorney 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff 
+to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of 
+Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of 
+information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. 
+CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United 
+States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, 
+as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the 
+permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+ 
+
+LSB10775 · VERSION 1 · NEW
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+INSIGHTi 
+
+ Should Railroads Help Pay for Grade 
+Crossing Improvements? 
+
+June 24, 2020 
+
+ Background 
+ A n uptick in fatal accidents at grade crossings following a prolonged decline, along wit h recent court 
+decisions barring states from enforcing limits on trains that block crossings, have drawn congressional 
+
+attention to grade crossing safety. A key point of debate has been what responsibility, if any, a private 
+railroad company should have to provide for the safety and convenience of motorists and pedestrians at 
+grade crossings beyond compliance with federal y mandated operating practices. This question has come 
+
+to the fore as Congress considers legislation reauthorizing federal surface transportation programs. 
+
+Congress provides federal funds to improve grade-crossing safety in the Railway-Highway Crossings 
+program (23 U.S.C. §130), more commonly known as the Section 130 program. Section 130, a 
+component of the federal-aid highway program, distributes funding from the Highway Trust Fund to 
+states according to a formula that slightly favors states with a greater share of the nation’s road-rail 
+
+crossings. These funds can be used for railroad-crossing safety projects at the discretion of state 
+departments of transportation. Projects may range from instal ing warning lights to blocking off a minor 
+
+road that crosses tracks to building a bridge that separates road traffic from train traffic. 
+
+ Dividing the Cost 
+ Railroads already contribute to certain Section 130 projects at a level commensurate with the net benefits 
+
+that theoretical y accrue to the railroad from a more secure grade crossing, such as reduced maintenance 
+and inspection costs, fewer accidents, and less disruption to rail traffic. Under current law, the Secretary 
+of Transportation may require a railroad to pay up to 10% of project costs depending on the type of 
+project. However, a contribution that large is not currently required for any project type, and no railroad 
+
+contribution whatsoever is required for many project types. 
+
+The surface transportation bil pending in the House of Representatives (H.R. 2, the INVEST in America 
+Act), would fund Section 130 at its FY2020 level of $245 mil ion for each of fiscal years 2021 through 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+IN11434 
+
+ CRS INSIGHT 
+ Prepared for Members and 
+
+ Committees of Congress 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+2 
+
+2025, but would require railroads to share more of the cost of grade-crossing improvement projects. It 
+
+would 
+
+ direct the Secretary of Transportation to set the railroad’s share of total costs for each 
+
+type of grade-crossing safety project; 
+
+ al ow the Secretary to permit railroads to meet a portion of their obligations with noncash 
+
+contributions (materials and labor) under conditions defined elsewhere in federal 
+regulations; 
+
+ specify that the “total project costs” which railroads would have to share include costs 
+
+incurred during the planning, engineering, and design phases; and 
+
+ eliminate the 10% maximum project share al ocable to the railroad under current law. 
+
+Section 130 currently requires at least 10% of the cost of grade-crossing projects receiving federal 
+funding to come from non-federal sources such as a state or local government or a railroad. Depending on 
+
+the cost shares specified by the Secretary of Transportation, the changes i n H.R. 2 could shift some of the 
+burden of funding the non-federal project costs from state and local governments to the private railroad 
+
+companies that own the tracks. 
+
+ Shared Assumptions 
+ During the markup of H.R. 2 in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
+Representative Greg Pence proposed a n amendment (Pence amendment) that would have increased the 
+
+incentive for railroads to subsidize the elimination of crossings, rather than requiring them to pay a larger 
+share of al project costs. Local and state governments may be reluctant to close off streets that cross train 
+tracks due to the inconvenience to travelers and the potential for longer response times by emergency 
+vehicles. Section 130 permits railroads to make “incentive payments” to local governments to close 
+crossings, and a state may use Section 130 funds to match those incentive payments up to a maximum of 
+
+$7,500 per crossing. The Pence amendment would have raised the maximum Section 130 payment for 
+
+closing a crossing to $100,000, potential y leading to the closure of more crossings. 
+
+Although the Pence amendment was not adopted by the committee, the amendment and the adopted 
+
+language i n H.R. 2 share the assumptions that railroad operations benefit from fewer grade crossings and 
+that making a crossing safer or closing it altogether offers calculable benefits to the railroad. Both 
+approaches would seek to have railroads defray part of the cost of grade-crossing improvements in view 
+
+of the financial benefits they receive from such improvements. 
+
+In the Senate, a bil to reauthorize highway programs (S. 2302 , the America’s Transportation 
+Infrastructure Act) was reported by the Committee on Environment and Public Works in August 2019. 
+Unlike H.R. 2, the Senate bil would not seek to increase railroads’ share of the cost of grade-crossing 
+safety projects. Rather, it would raise the maximum federal share of a project from 90% to 100% and 
+
+eliminate a provision in current law setting aside a portion of Section 130 funds for instal ation of 
+protective devices, such as crossing gates. A rail title that might be incorporated into a broader surface 
+transportation reauthorization bil has not been offered in the Senate. The current authorization of federal 
+
+surface transportation programs, including Section 130, expires September 30, 2020. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+3 
+
+ Author Information 
+ 
+Ben Goldman 
+
+ 
+
+Analyst in Transportation Policy 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff 
+to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of 
+Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of 
+
+information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. 
+CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United 
+States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, 
+as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the 
+permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+ 
+
+IN11434 · VERSION 1 · NEW
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+The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy and Economic Management in Oil Exporting Countries
+
+Despite massive oil rent incomes since
+            the early 1970s, the economic performance of oil-exporting
+            countries-with notable exceptions-is poor. While there is
+            extensive literature on the management of oil resources,
+            analysis of the underlying political determinants of this
+            poor performance is more sparse. Drawing on concepts from
+            the comparative institutionalist tradition in political
+            science, the authors develop a generalized typology of
+            political states that is used in analyzing the political
+            economy of fiscal and economic management in oil-exporting
+            countries with widely differing political systems. In
+            assessing performance, the authors focus on issues of
+            long-term savings, economic stabilization, and efficient use
+            of oil rents. The comparisons of country experiences suggest
+            that countries with strong, mature, democratic traditions
+            have advantages in managing oil rents well because of their
+            ability to reach consensus, their educated and informed
+            electorates, and a high level of transparency that
+            facilitates clear decisions on how to use rents over a long
+            horizon. Yet even these systems, ensuring cautious use of
+            oil income is a continuing struggle. Traditional and
+            modernizing autocracies have also demonstrated their ability
+            to sustain long decision horizons and implement
+            developmental policies. But resistance to transparency and
+            the danger of oil-led spending and expenditure commitments
+            becoming the major legitimizing force behind the state may
+            pose risk to the long-term sustainability of their current
+            development strategies. In contrast, little positive effect
+            can be expected from the politically unstable, predatory
+            autocracies, which typically have very short policy horizons
+            and sometimes the characteristics of "roving
+            bandit" regimes. Factional democracies, with weak
+            political parties and highly personalized politics, present
+            particular challenges because they lack a sufficiently
+            effective political system to create a consensus among
+            strong competing interests. Special attention will be needed
+            to increase transparency and raise public awareness in these
+            countries. And oil rent makes it more difficult to sustain a
+            constituency in favor of sound, longer-run economic
+            management because it weakens incentives for agents to
+            support checks and balances that impinge on their individual
+            plans to appropriate the rents. The country comparisons
+            further demonstrate that technical solutions-such as the
+            establishment of oil stabilization funds and budgetary
+            reforms-to enhance transparency and efficiency in the use of
+            oil rents will not work well unless constituencies can be
+            developed in support of such measures.
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+Air Force F-15EX Eagle II Fighter Program 
+
+May 2, 2022 
+
+On March 11, 2021, the U.S. Air Force took delivery of its first F-15EX Eagle II fighter. The 
+original Eagle II program was intended to deliver 144 aircraft to replace aging F-15Cs, most of 
+
+ John R. Hoehn 
+
+which are in the Air National Guard; however, the FY2023 President’s budget request adjusts the 
+
+Analyst in Military 
+
+intention of procuring 80 aircraft. 
+
+Capabilities and Programs 
+ 
+
+The Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget proposal included a request for $2.6 billion to buy 
+24 F-15EX aircraft, the second to last procurement toward a planned initial buy of 80. 
+
+ 
+
+The subsequent FY2022 defense budget proposal requested about $1.32 billion in procurement funding for 12 Eagle IIs and 
+$133.5 million in advance procurement for future aircraft. The proposed budget also requested about $118.1 million for F-
+15EX research and development. 
+
+ FY2022 defense authorization act: The FY2022 defense authorization bill funded F-15EX procurement at $1.76 billion, an 
+increase of $576 million from the requested level, for “additional aircraft, spares, support equipment.” 
+
+ FY2022 defense appropriations bill: The final omnibus budget bill funded F-15EX procurement at $1.16 billion for 12 
+aircraft, $82.4 million below the Biden Administration’s request, citing “prior year carryover.” 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 4 link to page 7 link to page 11 link to page 12 Air Force F-15EX Eagle II Fighter Program 
+
+ 
+
+ Contents 
+
+ Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
+
+ Congressional Action ................................................................................................................ 2 
+ Manufacturing Locations .......................................................................................................... 3 
+Basing ........................................................................................................................................ 3 
+Procurement Quantities ............................................................................................................. 3 
+
+ Planned Total Quantities ..................................................................................................... 3 
+Annual Quantities ............................................................................................................... 3 
+ Initial Production ................................................................................................................ 4 
+
+ Why Is the Air Force Requesting F-15EXs? ................................................................................... 5 
+
+ Industrial Base Concerns ........................................................................................................... 5 
+
+ Does the F-15EX Replace the F-35? ............................................................................................... 6 
+
+ Appropriate Fighter Mix ........................................................................................................... 7 
+
+ FY2023 Budget ............................................................................................................................... 8 
+Possible Questions for Congress ..................................................................................................... 8 
+
+ Procurement and Cost ............................................................................................................... 8 
+ Strategy and Oversight .............................................................................................................. 9 
+
+ 
+
+ Figures 
+ Figure 1. F-15EX Eagle II ............................................................................................................... 1 
+ Figure 2. F-15EX Procurement Quantities FY2022-FY2027 ......................................................... 4 
+ 
+
+ Tables 
+ Table 1. F-15EX Funding ................................................................................................................ 8 
+ 
+
+ Contacts 
+ Author Information .......................................................................................................................... 9 
+ 
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ link to page 4 link to page 4 
+
+ Air Force F-15EX Eagle II Fighter Program 
+
+ 
+
+ Background 
+ On March 11, 2021, the U.S. Air Force took delivery of its first F-15EX Eagle II fighter ( Figure 
+1 ) .1 The Eagle II program is intended to deliver 144 aircraft to replace aging F-15Cs, most of 
+which are in the Air National Guard. 
+
+As the F-15 has formed the backbone of the Air Force’s air superiority fleet and later its heavy 
+strike capability, with units stationed around the country, Congress has devoted increasing 
+attention to the jet’s longevity and questions regarding its ongoing suitability for use as the fleet 
+ages. 
+
+The Air Force received its first F-15 Eagle air superiority fighter in 1974. Subsequently, the F-15 
+evolved to encompass more roles, most notably with the deployment of the F-15E Strike Eagle in 
+1989. The F-15E added substantial air-to-ground capability, including a second cockpit for a 
+weapons systems officer. The Air Force has 453 F-15s of all variants, the newest of which, an F-
+15E, was ordered in 2001. Following the last U.S. order, F-15s have continued in production for a 
+variety of international customers, including (among others) Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Japan. 
+
+ Figure 1. F-15EX Eagle II 
+
+First delivery to the U.S. Air Force 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: U.S. Air Force photo/1st Lt. Karissa Rodriguez. 
+
+Current F-15s have stronger airframes and more advanced sensors, processors, and flight control 
+systems than those in the U.S. fleet. Many also include conformal fuel tanks to extend range and 
+increase payload. The F-15EX is based on the most advanced Eagles, currently in production for 
+Qatar, and would add radar and other subsystems unique to the United States. Boeing says that 
+
+ 
+1 Ilka Cole and Samuel King Jr., AF’s first F-15EX arrives at Eglin AFB , U.S. Air Force, Eglin Air Force Base Public 
+Affairs, March 12, 2021, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2535577/afs-first-f-15ex-arrives-at-eglin-
+afb/. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+1 
+
+ 
+ Air Force F-15EX Eagle II Fighter Program 
+
+ 
+
+the F-15EX would have 70% parts commonality with existing U.S. F-15s.2 Recognizing that the 
+aircraft is both a continuation but carries new capabilities, the Air Force has named the aircraft 
+“Eagle II.”3 
+
+The F-15EX first flew at Boeing’s St. Louis, MO, plant on February 2, 2021.4 
+
+ Congressional Action 
+ The Trump Administration’s FY2020 budget proposal included a request for $1.1 billion to buy 8 
+F-15EX aircraft, the first procurement toward a planned initial buy of 144.5 This proposal 
+represented a change from previous Air Force plans to procure only stealthy “fifth-generation” 
+fighter aircraft. 
+
+The subsequent FY2022 defense budget proposal requested about $1.34 billion in procurement 
+funding for 12 Eagle IIs and $147.9 million in advance procurement for future aircraft. The 
+proposed budget also requested about $118.1 million for F-15EX research and development. 
+
+ FY2021 defense authorization act: The FY2021 defense authorization bill funded F-15EX 
+procurement at $1.24 billion, a reduction of $27.6 million from the requested level, for “airframe 
+excess to need.” The report accompanying the bill included language prohibiting divestment of F-
+15Cs in the European theater pending delivery of a plan to maintain equal or better air capability 
+in that theater. 
+
+ FY2021 defense appropriations bill: The final omnibus budget bill funded F-15EX procurement 
+at $1.23 billion for 12 aircraft, $36.2 million below the Trump Administration’s request, citing 
+“unit cost adjustment.” 
+
+ 
+2 Boeing briefing to CRS, March 6, 2019. See also John A. Tirpak, “F-15EX vs. F-35A,” Air Force Magazine , April 
+18, 2019, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/f-15ex-vs-f-35a/. 
+
+3 Valerie Insinna, “The F-15EX has a new name,” Defense News , April 7, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/air/
+2021/04/07/the-f-15ex-has-a-new-name/. The practice of naming aircraft after predecessors can be confusing, and has 
+varied purposes. The F-35 Lightning II was named to honor a World War II aircraft built by the same contractor, with 
+no other connection between the two aircraft. In another approach from the early 1990s, the Boeing F/A-18E/F was 
+named “Super Hornet” to emphasize its commonality with the preceding F-18A-D Hornet for program and budget 
+purposes, despite the aircraft differing greatly. By contrast, the Eagle II name denotes an upgraded Eagle, using a 
+largely common airframe but with different subsystems. The Eagle II has much more in common with the Eagle than 
+the Super Hornet had to the Hornet. 
+
+4 Stefano D'Urso, “The New F-15EX Flies For The First Time Ahead Of The First Deliveries Later This Year,” The 
+Aviationist , February 2, 2021, https://theaviationist.com/2021/02/02/the-new-f-15ex-flies-for-the-first-time-ahead-of-
+the-first-deliveries-later-this-year/. U.S. Air Force, 173rd Fighter Wing, “F-15EX completes first flight,” press release, 
+February 11, 2021, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2500770/f-15ex-completes-first-flight/. 
+
+5 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Costs by 
+Weapons System , February 2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+2 
+
+ 
+ link to page 7 Air Force F-15EX Eagle II Fighter Program 
+
+ 
+
+ Manufacturing Locations 
+ Boeing manufactures the F-15EX at Lambert Field in St. Louis, MO.6 General Electric’s F110-
+GE-229 engine powers this variant, as well as other F-15 variants and some F-16s. The F110 is 
+produced in Evendale, OH.7 8 Raytheon builds the Eagle II’s APG-82 radar in Forest, MS. 
+
+ Basing 
+ On August 14, 2020, the Air Force announced Kingsley Field, OR, would host the Air Force’s F-
+15EX training schoolhouse beginning in 2022. The first operational F-15EX squadron is to be at 
+Portland Air National Guard Base, OR, in 2023. 
+
+The Air Force has not yet decided whether the Air National Guard F-15s at Barnes Airport, MA; 
+Fresno Yosemite Airport, CA; and Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans will be 
+replaced with F-35As or F-15EXs.9 
+
+ Procurement Quantities 
+
+ Planned Total Quantities 
+
+The F-15EX program currently plans to deliver 80 aircraft: 2 funded through R&D, 6 through 
+existing F-15 budget lines, and 78 through a dedicated F-15EX budget line. The program 
+originally planned to procure 144 aircraft; however it changed its plan with the FY2023 budget 
+request. The F-15EX program is a middle-tier acquisition program but is expected to become a 
+Major Defense Acquisition Program following the establishment of an Acquisition Program 
+Baseline, which will declare the total number of aircraft included in the program. That total is not 
+yet known, in part because the Air Force has yet to decide its desire for Eagle IIs to replace the 
+current F-15E Strike Eagle fleet in addition to the planned F-15Cs. 
+
+ Annual Quantities 
+
+The FY2023 Air Force budget request included a request to procure 24 F-15EXs in FY2023. 
+ Figure 2 shows F-15EX procurement quantities authorized through FY2020, requested 
+procurement quantities for FY2021, and projected requests through the FYDP. The figures in the 
+table do not include two aircraft procured with research and development funding. 
+
+ 
+6 This is the former McDonnell Douglas military aircraft factory. McDonnell Douglas, which designed the original F-
+15, merged with Boeing in 1997. 
+
+7 General Electric, “GE’s F110 engine powers first flight of Boeing F-15EX,” press release, February 2, 2021, 
+https://www.geaviation.com/press-release/military-engines/ges-f110-engine-powers-first-flight-boeing-f-15ex. 
+
+8 Trevor Peters and Brian Planalp, “GE Aviation lands $100m Air Force contract for F-15 engines,” Fox 19, Cincinnati , 
+July 6, 2020, https://www.fox19.com/2020/07/06/ge-aviation-wins-air-force-contract/. 
+
+9 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “Air Force announces Guard locations for F-35A, F-15EX,” press release, 
+August 14, 2020, https://go.usa.gov/xHXRK. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+3 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Air Force F-15EX Eagle II Fighter Program 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 2. F-15EX Procurement Quantities FY2022-FY2027 
+
+Figures shown are for production aircraft; table excludes two research and development aircraft 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD data. The program is expected to continue beyond the DOD five-
+year projection shown here. 
+
+ Initial Production 
+
+F-15EXs are currently produced under a sole-source, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity 
+contract covering the first eight Eagle IIs. That initial contract is for $1.2 billion; the contract for 
+all 144 jets is estimated at $22.9 billion.10 
+
+On October 29, 2021, the Air Force awarded GE Aviation, Cincinnati, OH, a $1.6 billion firm-
+fixed-price contract to provide up to 329 engines for the F-15EX fleet. There was one other 
+bidder for the award.11 GE will supply the F110 engine used in all previous F-15EXs.12 
+
+On January 10, 2021, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen 
+Lord signed a memorandum waiving many of the testing requirements for the F-15EX. DOD said 
+it intends to use historical data from previous F-15 variants for elements common to the EX rather 
+than testing anew. 
+
+ 
+10 Jane Edwards, “Boeing Awarded Potential $23B Air Force F-15EX Fighter Jet Production IDIQ,” GovConWire , July 
+14, 2020, https://www.govconwire.com/2020/07/boeing-awarded-potential-23b-air-force-f-15ex-fighter-jet-production-
+idiq/. 
+
+11 Department of Defense, Contracts For Oct. 29, 2021 , Washington, DC, October 29, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/
+News/Contracts/Contract/Article/2827649/. The contract announcement referenced the F110-GE-129; as previous F-
+15EXs had been equipped with the F110-GE-229, this may have been a typographical error. 
+
+12 Brian Everstine, “GE Aviation Wins F-15EX Engine Contract,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , October 29, 
+2021, https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/ge-aviation-wins-f-15ex-engine-contract. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+4 
+
+ 
+ Air Force F-15EX Eagle II Fighter Program 
+
+ 
+
+ Why Is the Air Force Requesting F-15EXs? 
+ Air Force officials have offered several justifications for the F-15EX: 
+
+ Replacing the older, 1980s-era F-15Cs with F-15EXs could enable the Air Force 
+
+to avoid some or all of the costs of F-15C upgrades. In addition to the eight F-
+15EXs, the FY2020 defense appropriation included $899 million for upgrades to 
+existing F-15s, with another $851 million requested in FY2021.13 While costing 
+more per aircraft than modernizing legacy F-15s, a new Eagle II is expected to 
+have a longer service life. 
+
+ Buying F-15EXs, according to the Air Force, is an economical way of reaching 
+
+the service’s goals for fighter fleet size and average age.14 
+
+ Operating F-15EXs could cost less over time than operating fifth-generation 
+
+fighters like the F-35 and F-22. While the per-hour cost of F-15s is fairly well 
+established, there is less real-world experience with the F-35 fleet. This 
+complicates a direct comparison; comparison with the F-22 may be more 
+instructive, as it is also a twin-engine air-superiority fighter. 
+
+Then-Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson said publicly that the Air Force did not request F-
+15EXs in its initial FY2020 budget submission.15 This proposal appears to have been added by 
+the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the budget build process, without a request for 
+proposals or explanation.16 
+
+ Industrial Base Concerns 
+ Another argument proposed for the F-15EX, although not by the Air Force, concerns the U.S. 
+fighter aircraft industrial base. The Boeing plant in St. Louis builds the F-15 and F/A-18 fighters, 
+and it is expected to soon begin production of the T-7 trainer jet. The Navy has requested no F/A-
+18s in several recent budgets, and the end of that program would leave Lockheed Martin’s F-35 
+as the only fighter in production. A DOD official stated that part of the F-15EX decision was to 
+maintain competition, as it is “good to have multiple providers in the tactical aircraft portfolio.”17 
+Other commentators note that Congress has continued to add F/A-18s to the budget, meaning that 
+Boeing could continue as a viable fighter producer without F-15EX.18 
+
+ 
+13 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Costs by 
+Weapons System , February 2020. 
+
+14 “USAF’s Holmes on Roles for New F-15s, Surge Exercises and Improving Readiness,” Defense and Aerospace 
+Report , March 1, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PtkfYv9W4h8. 
+
+15 See, inter alia, John A. Tirpak, “F-15EX: Careful What You Don’t Ask For,” Air Force Magazine , March 22, 2019, 
+https://www.airforcemag.com/article/f-15ex-careful-what-you-dont-ask-for/, and John A. Tirpak, “No Sign of ‘The Air 
+Force We Need’ in USAF Budget; 80-Plus New-Old F-15s Coming,” Air Force Magazine , March 22, 2019, 
+https://www.airforcemag.com/No-Sign-of-The-Air-Force-We-Need-in-USAF-Budget-80-Plus-New-Old-F-15s-
+Coming/. 
+
+16 Valerie Insinna, “Industrial base considerations played role in F-15X decision,” Defense News , March 22, 2019, 
+https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/03/22/industrial-base-considerations-played-role-in-f-15x-decision/. 
+
+17 Vivienne Machi, “DoD Official: F-15EX Buy About Capacity Building, Supporting Defense Industrial Base,” 
+ Defense Daily , March 22, 2019, https://www.defensedaily.com/dod-official-f-15ex-buy-capacity-building-supporting-
+defense-industrial-base/air-force/. 
+
+18 See, inter alia, John Venable, Nine Reasons Congress Should Nix the Air Force’s F-15EX Purchase , The Heritage 
+Foundation, August 13, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/nine-reasons-congress-should-nix-the-air-
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+5 
+
+ 
+ link to page 10 Air Force F-15EX Eagle II Fighter Program 
+
+ 
+
+ Does the F-15EX Replace the F-35? 
+ The Air Force has emphasized that the F-35 and F-15EX are not rivals, but complementary. 
+According to the Air Force, the F-35 brings superior stealth and sensor fusion; the F-15 can carry 
+more payload. (Air Force officials describe this as the difference between “capability” and 
+“capacity.”)19 
+
+The two systems are planned, at least at first, to have very different missions. Most of the F-15Cs 
+the Eagle II will replace are in the Air National Guard, dedicated to the air sovereignty mission of 
+defending U.S. airspace. The F-15EX will bring wider capabilities than the F-15Cs. Some 
+observers wonder why they would not replace F-15E Strike Eagles that they more closely 
+resemble and give the air sovereignty mission to aircraft whose characteristics more closely 
+match that mission.20 
+
+The planned different missions of the two aircraft may be seen in the emphasis on F-15EX as a 
+successor to existing F-15s in their current roles. According to Air Combat Command commander 
+General Mark Kelly, “I just don't see us discussing an apples-versus-oranges in an F-35-versus-F-
+15EX scenario.”21 
+
+Given a fixed Air Force budget topline, however, increases in one program require cuts in others. 
+Former Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein said, “If we had the money, those would 
+be 72 F-35s. But we’ve gotta look at this from a cost/business case…. If we’re refreshing the F-
+15C fleet, as we’re building up the F-35 fleet, this is not about any kind of a trade.”22 
+Subsequently, the Air Force has started a review of its tactical aircraft portfolio to determine 
+whether it should adopt a more heterogeneous fighter fleet (see “Appropriate Fighter Mix” 
+ below).23 
+
+The Trump Administration’s FY2020 budget submission maintained the planned purchase of 48 
+F-35As in FY2020 and FY2021 and reduced outyear F-35As from the previous plan by 24 
+aircraft through FY2024. Congress subsequently added 14 F-35As to the 2020 request and 
+another 12 in 2021. The reduction in planned purchases of F-35As at the same time as the onset 
+of the F-15EX program has led some to see a tension between the two programs.24 
+
+ 
+forces-f-15ex-purchase. 
+
+19 Valerie Insinna, “Lockheed CEO: Boeing’s F-15X won’t disrupt F-35 program,” Defense News , January 29, 2019, 
+https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2019/01/29/lockheed-ceo-boeings-f-15x-wont-disrupt-f-35-program/. 
+
+20 See, for example, Tyler Rogoway and Jamie Hunter, “Let’s Talk About The Air Force Potentially Replacing The F-
+15E With The F-15EX,” The War Zone , August 2, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/35312/lets-talk-
+about-the-air-force-potentially-replacing-the-f-15e-with-the-f-15ex, and counterarguments in Drew Brooks, “Not Your 
+Father’s F-15,” National Guard Magazine , March 2021, https://www.ngaus.org/magazine/not-your-fathers-f-15. The F-
+15EX’s speed and maneuverability may not seem immediately relevant to air sovereignty, which involves intercepting 
+bombers and cruise missiles traveling in comparatively straight paths. 
+
+21 Marcus Weisgerber, “Air Force General Defends Plans for Mixed F-35, F-15 Fleet,” Defense One , September 15, 
+2020, https://www.defenseone.com/business/2020/09/air-force-general-defends-plans-mixed-f-35-f-15-fleet/168466/. 
+
+22 Jeff Martin, “If the money is there, new and improved F-15s could be coming soon to the Air Force,” Defense News , 
+January 26, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/newsletters/2019/01/26/if-the-money-is-there-new-and-improved-f-
+15s-could-be-coming-soon-to-the-air-force/. 
+
+23 Oriana Pawlyk, “The Air Force May Soon Be Shopping for a New Fighter Jet,” Military.com , February 24, 2021, 
+https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/02/24/air-force-may-soon-be-shopping-new-fighter-jet.html. Theresa 
+Hitchens, “‘Clean Sheet’ F-16 Replacement In The Cards: CSAF Brown,” Breaking Defense , February 17, 2021, 
+https://breakingdefense.com/2021/02/clean-sheet-f-16-replacement-in-the-cards-csaf-brown/. 
+
+24 Marcus Weisgerber, “Lockheed Martin is Waging War on Boeing’s F-15EX,” Defense One , March 15, 2019, 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+6 
+
+ 
+ Air Force F-15EX Eagle II Fighter Program 
+
+ 
+
+ Appropriate Fighter Mix 
+ The Air Force is in the process of reconsidering its future fighter mix. According to Air Force 
+Chief of Staff General C.Q. Brown, “One of the areas we are pushing through is a [tactical air] 
+study for the U.S. Air Force, to look at what is the right force mix. There is a high-end fight. 
+There’s also a mixture for low-end fight.”25 
+
+Previous plans had focused on the F-35 as the mainstay of the future fighter fleet, in keeping with 
+an Air Force initiative to move to an all-fifth-generation-and-beyond force. The FY2020 request 
+for F-15EXs changed that approach. 
+
+Subsequently, the Air Force justified the request on two grounds: that the operating costs of the F-
+35 were significantly higher than fourth-generation aircraft like the F-15EX, and that the service 
+needed to acquire 72 new fighters per year to maintain the size of its fleets as older aircraft 
+retire.26 
+
+As mentioned above, the Air Force has maintained that F-35 and F-15EX do not compete directly 
+for funding. Observers note that, regardless, the F-15EX proposal came at a time when the Air 
+Force reduced its planned F-35 buy from 60 to 48 jets per year. Further, some argue that the 
+additional capabilities inherent in the F-35 provide a better value at similar cost.27 F-15 advocates 
+note the age of current U.S. F-15s, and that new F-15EXs offer better value than extending the 
+lives of existing ones.28 
+
+In addition to addressing the role of the F-15EX in the context of the F-35, the use of unmanned 
+aircraft systems may draw attention regarding the extent of the F-15EX need. The Air Force has 
+been considering replacing some F-16s, which had been expected to be replaced by F-35s, with 
+unmanned systems instead. 
+
+[Then-Air Combat Command commander General Mike] Holmes suggested that low-cost 
+and attritable unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) might be considered … as a replacement 
+for F-16 Block 25/30 jets … within 5-8 years. In congressional testimony on March 12, 
+Holmes added that ACC’s goal is to achieve a fighter fleet ratio of 60% fifth-generation 
+jets, such as F-35As and F-22s, to 40% fourth-generation aircraft, including F-15s, F-16s 
+and A-10s.29 
+
+ 
+https://www.defenseone.com/business/2019/03/lockheed-martin-waging-war-boeings-f-15ex/155598/. 
+
+25 Garrett Reim, “USAF rethinks future fleet, ponders clean-sheet 4.5-generation fighter,” FlightGlobal , February 17, 
+2021, https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/usaf-rethinks-future-fleet-ponders-clean-sheet-45-generation-fighter/
+142471.article. Steve Trimble, “F-16, F-15EX Enjoy Unlikely Renaissance As Air Force Priorities Shift,” Aviation 
+Week , February 4, 2021, https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/budget-policy-operations/f-16-f-15ex-enjoy-unlikely-
+renaissance-air-force-priorities. 
+
+26 Valerie Insinna, “The US Air Force doesn’t want F-15X. But it needs more fighter jets,” Defense News , February 28, 
+2019, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/air-warfare-symposium/2019/02/28/the-air-force-doesnt-
+want-f-15x-but-it-needs-more-fighter-jets/. Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Wants Both F-35 and F-15EX. But if Forced to 
+Choose, It’s No Contest: SecAF,” Military.com , May 20, 2019, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/05/20/air-
+force-wants-both-f-35-and-f-15ex-if-forced-choose-its-no-contest-secaf.html. 
+
+27 See, for example, John Venable, The F-35A Is the World’s Most Dominant, Cost-Effective Fighter: The Air Force 
+Needs to Accelerate Its Acquisition Now , The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, March 2, 2020, 
+https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-f-35a-the-worlds-most-dominant-cost-effective-fighter-the-air-force-needs-
+0. 
+
+28 Brian Everstine, “NORTHCOM Stresses Importance of F-15EX Buy for Homeland Defense,” Air Force Magazine , 
+March 12, 2020, https://www.airforcemag.com/northcom-stresses-importance-of-f-15ex-buy-for-homeland-defense/. 
+
+29 Steve Trimble, “As USAF Fleet Plans Evolve, Can the F-35A Program Survive Intact?,” Aviation Week , March 19, 
+2020, https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/usaf-fleet-plans-evolve-can-f-35a-program-survive-intact. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+7 
+
+ 
+ link to page 11 link to page 11 Air Force F-15EX Eagle II Fighter Program 
+
+ 
+
+That ratio had previously been expressed as 50-50.30 
+
+ FY2023 Budget 
+ funding levels. 
+
+ Table 1 shows the FY2023 appropriations for research and development and procurement 
+funding for the F-15EX program, along with FY2022 funding levels. 
+
+ Table 1. F-15EX Funding 
+
+Figures in millions of current dollars 
+
+ FY2022 
+
+ FY2023 
+
+ 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ Quantity Funding 
+
+ Quantity 
+
+RDT&E 
+
+107.1 
+
+ 
+
+83.8 
+
+ 
+
+Procurement 
+
+1,237.9 
+
+12 
+
+2,570.3 
+
+24 
+
+Advance 
+
+147.9 
+
+ 
+
+264.0 
+
+ 
+
+Procurement 
+
+ TOTAL 
+
+1,492.9 
+
+12 
+
+2,918.1 
+
+24 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of FY2023 Air Force Aircraft Procurement and Research and Development Volume II Budget 
+justifications. 
+
+ Possible Questions for Congress 
+ As Congress evaluates the FY2022 and subsequent budget requests, it may consider the F-15EX 
+program from a number of perspectives. 
+
+ Procurement and Cost 
+ Congress is faced with decisions regarding the extent to which the F-15EX program funding 
+should be considered relative to other Air Force and DOD priorities. These decisions may be 
+reflected in upcoming consideration of authorization and appropriations legislation. For example 
+
+ Should acquisition of new fighters be a competitive procurement? 
+ What are the relative costs of upgrading and modernizing existing F-15s as 
+
+opposed to buying new ones? How many flight hours does the Air Force expect 
+to get from the jets in each case? 
+
+ If new F-15EXs are purchased, would the Air Force retire older F-15s rather than 
+
+upgrading them? How many and what value of upgrades would be forgone for 
+each new F-15 purchased? 
+
+ 
+30 Valerie Insinna, “The US Air Force doesn’t want F-15X. But it needs more fighter jets,” Defense News , February 28, 
+2019, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/air-warfare-symposium/2019/02/28/the-air-force-doesnt-
+want-f-15x-but-it-needs-more-fighter-jets/. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+8 
+
+ 
+ Air Force F-15EX Eagle II Fighter Program 
+
+ 
+
+ Strategy and Oversight 
+ Congress may consider USAF decisions regarding the F-15EX program in the context of other 
+USAF strategic decisions. These considerations may be raised in the context of authorization 
+language and in oversight hearings. Such questions might include the following: 
+
+ What is DOD’s commitment to completing the planned buy of F-35As? 
+ How does replacing F-15s fit with the Air Force’s declared goal of growing to 
+
+386 squadrons? 
+
+ If stealthy aircraft are required in a given conflict only until air superiority is 
+
+established, which allows older-technology aircraft to operate with impunity, 
+does it make sense to size the buy of fifth-generation aircraft to requirements for 
+the early phases of conflict? 
+
+ What is the national interest in maintaining more than one tactical aircraft 
+
+manufacturer and, if advisable, how should that be done? 
+
+ How does the F-15EX fit with the current National Military Strategy 
+
+emphasizing capability against sophisticated adversaries? 
+
+ Eagle IIs are slated to replace F-15C air superiority fighters, most of which are in 
+
+the Air National Guard. 
+ What are the Air Force’s plans for fielding F-15EXs to the active Air Force? 
+
+Do they get priority over reserve component units? 
+
+ A main mission of the Air National Guard F-15s is continental air defense/air 
+
+sovereignty. Do the Eagle II’s new capabilities enhance accomplishing that 
+mission? Might other aircraft be more efficient at those tasks? 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Author Information 
+
+ 
+John R. Hoehn 
+
+ 
+
+Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Acknowledgments 
+
+Jeremiah Gertler, former Specialist in Military Aviation, originally authored this report.
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+9 
+
+ 
+ Air Force F-15EX Eagle II Fighter Program 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan 
+shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and 
+under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other 
+than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in 
+connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not 
+subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in 
+its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or 
+material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to 
+copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+R46801 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED 
+
+10
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+Order Code 98-116 F
+
+CRS Report for Congress
+
+Received through the CRS Web
+
+Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile
+
+Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law
+
+Updated January 17, 2001
+
+Dianne E. Rennack
+
+Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation
+
+Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation
+
+Sanctions: Selected Current Law
+
+ Summary 
+
+The use of sanctions specifically to stem weapons proliferation is a relatively new
+
+development in U.S. foreign policy. While earlier legislation required the cutoff of
+foreign aid to countries engaged in specified nuclear proliferation activities and
+mentioned other sanctions as a possible mechanism for bringing countries into
+compliance with goals of treaties or international agreements, it was not until 1990
+that Congress enacted explicit guidelines for trade sanctions related to missile
+proliferation. In that year a requirement for the President to impose sanctions against
+U.S. persons or foreign persons engaging in trade of items or technology listed in the
+Missile Technology Control Regime Annex (MTCR Annex) was added that year to
+the Arms Export Control Act and to the Export Administration Act of 1979.
+Subsequently, Congress legislated economic sanctions against countries that
+contribute to the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in a broad
+array of laws.
+
+This report offers a listing and brief description of legal provisions that require
+
+or authorize the imposition of some form of economic sanction against countries,
+companies, or persons who violate U.S. nonproliferation norms. For each provision,
+information is included on what triggers the imposition of sanctions, their duration,
+what authority the President has to delay or abstain from imposing sanctions, and
+what authority the President has to waive the imposition of sanctions.
+
+ 
+ Contents 
+
+Selected Current Law: Sanctions Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+
+18 U.S.C. (relating to criminal procedure) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States
+
+and China, Joint Resolution Approving the Proposed Agreement 
+for Nuclear Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+
+Arms Export Control Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+Atomic Energy Act of 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act 
+
+of 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+
+Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 . . . . . . . . . . 13
+Export Administration Act of 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
+Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
+Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
+
+Appropriations Act, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
+
+International Emergency Economic Powers Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
+Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
+Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
+Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
+National Emergencies Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
+North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
+Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
+Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
+
+ 
+ Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile
+
+Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law
+
+The use of sanctions specifically to stem weapons proliferation is a relatively new
+
+development in U.S. foreign policy.1 While earlier legislation required the cutoff of
+foreign aid to countries engaged in specified nuclear proliferation activities and
+mentioned other sanctions as a possible mechanism for bringing countries into
+compliance with goals of treaties or international agreements,2 it was not until 1990
+that Congress enacted explicit guidelines for trade sanctions related to missile
+proliferation. In that year a requirement for the President to impose sanctions against
+U.S. persons or foreign persons engaging in trade of items or technology listed in the
+Missile Technology Control Regime Annex (MTCR Annex) was added to the Arms
+Export Control Act and to the Export Administration Act of 1979. Subsequently,
+Congress legislated economic sanctions against countries that contribute to the
+proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in a broad array of laws.
+
+This report offers an alphabetic listing and brief description of legal provisions
+
+that require or authorize the imposition of some form of economic sanction against
+countries, companies, or persons who violate U.S. nonproliferation norms.3 For each
+provision, information is included on what triggers the imposition of sanctions, their
+duration, what authority the President has to delay or abstain from imposing
+sanctions, and what authority the President has to waive the imposition of sanctions.
+
+1 For a more general discussion on the use of sanctions in foreign policy, see Economic
+Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law ,
+Dianne E. Rennack and Robert D. Shuey, CRS Report 97-949; and Economic Sanctions:
+Legislation in the 106th Congress , Dianne E. Rennack, CRS Report RL30384.
+
+2 The International Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
+1978 sought to increase international participation in and adherence with the International
+Atomic Energy Agency and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, respectively, and, to that end,
+authorized the President to enter into international discussions, including the imposition of
+sanctions against those who abrogate or violate these international agreements.
+
+3 The list is arranged alphabetically, with references to U.S. Code and Legislation on Foreign
+Relations where applicable. Legislative history of pertinent amendments is also given, in
+italics.
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+ Selected Current Law: Sanctions Provisions 
+
+ 18 U.S.C. (relating to criminal procedure) 4
+
+ 18 U.S.C. 229-229F (part I, chapter 11) makes it generally unlawful for a
+
+person knowingly “(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or
+indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any
+chemical weapon; or (2) to assist, induce, in any way, any person to violate paragraph
+(1), or to attempt or conspire to violate paragraph (1).” The sections establish
+criminal and civil penalties, and terms of criminal forfeiture.
+
+ Sec. 201 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 
+
+ (Division I of P.L. 105-277; approved October 21, 1998) enacted these sections to
+bring the criminal and civil penalties section of United States Code into conformity
+with the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
+
+ 18 U.S.C. 2332a makes it an offense to use, threaten to use, attempt or conspire
+
+to use certain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against a national of the United
+States or within the United States. Weapons of mass destruction include a range of
+destructive devices, defined in 18 U.S.C. 921, and “any biological agent, toxin, or
+vector.” One found to have used a WMD for such use “shall be imprisoned for any
+term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be punished by death or imprisoned
+for any term of years of for life.”
+
+ Sec. 60023(a) of P.L. 103-322 (108 Stat. 1980) added sec. 2332a. The section 
+
+ was substantially reworked by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
+1996 (P.L. 104-132; approved April 24, 1996). The Chemical Weapons Convention
+Implementation Act of 1998 (Division I of P.L. 105-277; approved October 21,
+1998) exempted chemical weapons from application of this section of 18 U.S.C., and
+in its place enacted chapter 11B of part I of 18 U.S.C. to establish criminal and civil
+penalties in conformity with the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
+
+ Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States
+and China, Joint Resolution Approving the Proposed Agreement 
+for Nuclear Cooperation 5
+
+The agreement requires Presidential certification that China is not violating
+
+section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which places restrictions on exports
+to nations that assist or encourage non-nuclear weapon states to acquire nuclear
+weapons.
+
+4 Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1996 , vol. II, page 707.
+
+5 P.L. 99-183; approved December 16, 1985; 99 Stat. 1174. Legislation on Foreign
+Relations Through 1996 , vol. II, p. 1522. On January 12, 1998, the President made the
+certification required by sec. (b)(1) of this law. The determination also certified that China
+had met nuclear weapons nonproliferation standards stated in section 902(a)(6)(B)(i) of P.L.
+101-246 (22 U.S.C. 2151; often referred to part of the “Tiananmen Square sanctions” in that
+Act). See Presidential Determination No. 98-10 (63 F.R. 3447; January 23, 1998).
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+ No amendments. 
+
+ Arms Export Control Act 6
+
+The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, authorizes U.S.
+
+government military sales, loans, leases, and financing, and licensing of commercial
+arms sales to other countries. The AECA coordinates such actions with other foreign
+policy considerations, including nonproliferation, and determines eligibility of
+recipients for military exports, sales, leases, loans, and financing.
+
+ Section 3(f) (Eligibility; 22 U.S.C. 2753(f)) prohibits U.S. military sales or
+
+leases to any country that the President determines is in material breach of binding
+commitments to the United States under international treaties or agreements regarding
+nonproliferation of nuclear explosive devices and unsafeguarded special nuclear
+material. 
+
+ Subsec. (f) was added by sec. 822(a)(1) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention 
+
+ Act of 1994 (title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994
+and 1995; P.L. 103-236; approved April 30, 1994). 
+
+ Section 38 (Control of Arms Exports and Imports; 22 U.S.C. 2778) 
+
+authorizes the President to control the import and export of defense articles and
+services, to provide foreign policy guidelines to U.S. importers/exporters, and to
+promulgate the United States Munitions List constituting what defense articles and
+services are regulated. Section 38(c) establishes that any person who willfully violates
+any provision of the section (or of section 39 relating to the reporting of fees,
+contributions, gifts, and commissions paid by those involved in commercial sales of
+defense articles or services) may be fined not more than $1 million, imprisoned not
+more than ten years, or both. Section 38(e) gives the Secretary of State the authority
+to assess civil penalties and initiate civil actions against violators; any civil penalty for
+violations under this section is capped at $500,000. Section 38(j) authorizes the
+President to exempt a foreign country from licensing requirements under the AECA
+when that country commits to a binding bilateral agreement with the United States to
+establish export controls on a par with export controls in U.S. law and regulations.
+
+ Section 38 was added by sec. 212(a)(1) of the International Security Assistance 
+
+ and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329; approved June 30, 1976).
+Subsec. (c) was added by the 1976 amendment; the fine and imprisonment terms
+were amended, however, by sec. 119(a) of the International Security and
+Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83; approved August 8, 1985).
+Formerly, fine was “not more than $100,000,” and period of imprisonment was not
+more than two years. Subsec. (e) was added by the 1976 amendment. Sec. 119(b)
+of P.L. 99-83, in 1985, however, added the language that caps civil penalties, and
+sec. 1303 of the Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Security Assistance Act of 1999
+(division B of the Nance/Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 2000-
+2001; H.R. 3427, enacted by reference in P.L. 106-113), gave civil action authority 
+
+6 P.L. 90-629; approved October 22, 1968; 22 U.S.C. 2751 and following. Legislation on
+Foreign Relations Through 1999 , vol. I-A, p. 335.
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+ to the Secretary of State. Previously the section referred to such authority in the
+Export Administration Act, which resides with the Secretary of Commerce and was
+capped in that Act at $100,000. Sec. 102(a) of the Security Assistance Act of 2000
+(P.L. 106-280; approved October 6, 2000) added subsec. (j). 
+
+ Section 40 (Transactions With Countries Supporting Acts of International 
+
+ Terrorism; 22 U.S.C. 2780) prohibits exporting or otherwise providing munitions,
+providing financial assistance to facilitate transfer of munitions, granting eligibility
+status for such transfers, issuing licenses for such transfers, or otherwise facilitating
+the acquisition of munitions to a country the government of which “has repeatedly
+provided support for acts of international terrorism.” The section includes in its
+definition of acts of international terrorism, “all activities that the Secretary [of State]
+determines willfully aid or abet the international proliferation of nuclear explosive
+devices to individuals or groups or willfully aid or abet an individual or groups in
+acquiring unsafeguarded special nuclear material.”7
+
+The President may rescind the Secretary’s determination (sec. 40(f)) by reporting
+
+to the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
+Committee, before issuing the rescission, that the leadership and policies of the
+country in question have changed, the government is not supporting international
+terrorism, and the government has issued assurances that it will not support
+international terrorism in the future. Congress may block the rescission of the
+terrorist determination by enacting a joint resolution. The President, however, may
+unilaterally waive any or all of the prohibitions in this section if he determines to do
+so is essential to the national security interests of the United States, and so reports to
+Congress.
+
+Those found to be in violation of the section face criminal prosecution with
+
+penalties of as much as a $1 million fine and imprisonment of not more than ten years.
+Civil penalties for violations under this section, similar to those in sec. 38, are capped
+at $500,000; the Secretary of State has the authority to assess civil penalties and
+initiate civil actions against violators.
+
+ Section 40 was added by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism 
+
+ Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-399; approved August 27, 1986), and later amended and
+restated by the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-
+222; approved August 27, 1986). Sec. 822(a)(2)(A) of the Nuclear Proliferation
+Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
+Years 1994 and 1995; P.L.103-236; approved April 30, 1994) added a definition of
+acts of international terrorism that would lead the Secretary of State to make a
+determination. The same section added definitions “nuclear explosive device” and
+“unsafeguarded special nuclear material”. Sec. 321 of the Foreign Relations
+Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (P.L. 102-138; approved October 28,
+1991) made technical changes to the guidelines for Congress’s passage of a joint
+resolution relating to the section. Sec. 1303 of the Arms Control, Nonproliferation
+and Security Assistance Act of 1999 (division B of the Nance/Donovan Foreign 
+
+7 See also sec. 549 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
+Appropriations Act, 2000.
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+ Relations Authorization Act, FY 2000-2001; H.R. 3427, enacted by reference in P.L.
+106-113), gave civil action authority to the Secretary of State. Previously the section
+referred to such authority in the Export Administration Act, which resides with the
+Secretary of Commerce and was capped in that Act at $100,000. 
+
+ Sections 72 and 73 (Denial of the Transfer of Missile Equipment or 
+
+ Technology by U.S. Persons; 22 U.S.C. 2797a; Transfers of Missile Equipment
+or Technology by Foreign Persons; 2797b), require sanctions against any U.S.
+citizen or any foreign person whom the President determines to be engaged in
+exporting, transferring, conspiring to export or transfer, or facilitating an export or
+transfer of, any equipment or technology identified by the Missile Technology Control
+Regime (MTCR) that “contributes to the acquisition, design, development, or
+production of missiles in a country that is not an MTCR adherent ...” 
+
+Sanctions vary with the type of equipment or technology exported, and are
+
+increasingly severe where the type of equipment or technology is more controlled.
+Worst-case sanctions may be imposed for not less than two years, and include denial
+of U.S. government contracts, denial of export licenses for items on the U.S.
+Munitions List, and a prohibition on importation into the United States.
+
+The law allows several exceptions, wherein some or all of the sanctions may not
+
+be imposed against foreign persons:
+
+! if an MTCR adherent with jurisdictional authority finds the foreign
+
+person innocent of wrongdoing in relation to the transaction;
+
+! if the State Department issues an advisory opinion to the individual
+
+stating that a transaction would not result in sanctions;
+
+! if the export, transfer, or trading activity is authorized by the laws of
+
+an MTCR adherent and not obtained by misrepresentation or fraud,
+except when the activity in question is conducted by an entity
+subordinate to a government of an independent state of the former
+Soviet Union, and when the President determines that that
+government has knowingly transferred missiles or missile technology
+in a manner inconsistent with MTCR guidelines;
+
+! if the export, transfer, or trade is made to an end-user in a country
+
+that is an MTCR adherent;
+
+! in the case of foreign persons fulfilling contracts for defense services
+
+or defense articles; then the President will not prohibit importations
+if 
+
+—
+
+the articles or services are considered essential to U.S.
+national security, 
+
+—
+
+the President determines that the provider is a sole supplier
+and the articles or services are essential to U.S. national
+security, or
+
+ 
+ CRS-6
+
+—
+
+the President determines that the articles or services are
+essential to U.S. national security under defense
+cooperation agreements or NATO Programs of
+Cooperation;
+
+! in the case of foreign persons importing products or services into the
+
+United States in fulfillment of contracts entered into before the
+President announces intentions to impose sanctions, then the
+President will not prohibit importations; or
+
+! in the case of foreign persons providing spare parts, component parts
+
+essential to U.S. products or production, routine service and
+maintenance, essential information and technology.
+
+Sanctions are not imposed, or those imposed may be lifted, against individuals
+
+when the President certifies that a foreign government, which is an MTCR adherent,
+has adequately attended to the violation through some judicial process or enforcement
+action.
+
+The President may waive the sanction, for either a U.S. citizen or foreign person,
+
+if he certifies to Congress that it is essential to the national security of the United
+States, or that the individual provides a product or service essential to U.S. national
+security, and that that person is sole provider of the product or service.
+
+ Section 1703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 
+
+ (P.L. 101-510; approved November 5, 1990) added sections 71-74. In section 72,
+sec. 734(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995
+(P.L. 103-236; approved April 30, 1994), added paragraph about “presumption”
+in guidelines for Presidential determination on transfers of MTCR Annex materials.
+In sec. 73, sec. 323(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992
+and 1993 (P.L.102-138; approved October 28, 1991), added assisting another
+country in acquiring missiles to the list of sanctionable acts; sec. 1136 of the Arms
+Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999 (title XI of the Nance/Donovan Foreign
+Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001; H.R. 3427, enacted by
+reference in P.L. 106-113; approved November 29, 1999) added potential limitation
+on independent states of the former Soviet Union and the President’s certification
+pertaining to judicial attention by MTCR adherents. Sec. 734(b) of the Foreign
+Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 added the Director of the
+Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to those with whom the Secretary of State
+consults when administering the policy. This language, however, was struck out to
+conform with agency reorganization, particularly that of ACDA being incorporated
+into the State Department, by sec. 1136 of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation
+Act of 1999. Sec. 1408 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
+1996 (P.L. 104-106; approved February 10, 1996) made technical changes to
+reporting requirements relating to issuing a waiver. 
+
+ Section 73B (Authority Relating to MTCR Adherents; 22 U.S.C. 2797b-2) 
+
+authorizes the President to impose sanctions against a foreign person, notwithstanding
+that person’s operating in compliance of the laws of an MTCR adherent or that
+person’s exporting to an end-user in a country that is an MTCR adherent, if the
+
+ 
+ CRS-7
+
+country of jurisdiction over that foreign person is a country (1) that has entered into
+an understanding with the United States after January 1, 2000, (2) for which the
+United States retains the right to impose sanctions against those in the country’s
+jurisdiction for exporting of controlled items that contribute to the acquisition, design,
+development, or production of missiles in a country that is not an MTCR adherent.
+
+ Sec. 1137 of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999 (title XI of the 
+
+ Nance/Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001;
+H.R. 3427, enacted by reference in P.L.. 106-113; approved November 29, 1999)
+added sec. 73B, and made supporting amendments in sec. 73 relating to conditions
+of applicability, and sec. 74, defining “international understanding.” 
+
+ Section 74 (Definitions; 22 U.S.C. 2797c) provides definitions of terms that
+
+also affect how the sanctions may be applied. For example, while the MTCR is a
+policy statement originally announced on April 16, 1987, by the United States, the
+United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, the term “MTCR
+adherent” in this law is much more broadly defined, to include the countries that
+participate in the MTCR “or that, pursuant to an international understanding to which
+the United States is a party, controls MTCR equipment or technology in accordance
+with the criteria and standards set forth in the MTCR.”8 Within that definition, the
+term “international understanding” has been further defined to limit its applicability
+or to make the President’s authority to impose sanctions broader. As another
+example, the term “person” has changed over time. The law formerly included as part
+of the definition of “person,” “countries where it may be impossible to identify a
+specific governmental entity.” This has been amended to refer to “countries with non-
+market economies (excluding former members of the Warsaw Pact).” The same
+definition formerly restricted government activity relating to development of aircraft;
+this now refers specifically to military aircraft.
+
+ Sec. 323 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 
+
+ 1993 (P.L. 102-138; approved October 28, 1991) amended the definition of
+“person” to target China—the “Helms amendment,” and narrowed the definition
+of “person” to include activities of a government affecting the development of,
+among other things, “military aircraft” (formerly referred to “aircraft”). Sec.
+1136(a) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999 (title XI of the
+Nance/Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001;
+H.R. 3427, enacted by reference in P.L. 106-113; approved November 29, 1999)
+added the definition of “international understanding,” a term used in the course of
+defining “MTCR adherent.” 
+
+ Section 81 ([CBW] Sanctions Against Foreign Persons; 22 U.S.C. 2798) 
+
+requires imposition of sanctions to deny government procurement, contracts with the
+U.S. government, and imports from foreign persons who knowingly and materially
+
+8 See also sec. 73A of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2797b-1), which requires the President to notify
+Congress when U.S. action results in any country becoming an MTCR adherent. The sections
+also requires an independent assessment to be submitted to Congress by the Director of
+Central Intelligence covering the newly designated MTCR adherent and several proliferation
+issues.
+
+ 
+ CRS-8
+
+contribute, through exports from the United States or another country, or through
+other transactions, to foreign efforts to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise
+acquire chemical or biological weapons. Foreign persons are sanctionable if the
+recipient country has used chemical or biological weapons in violation of international
+law, has used chemical or biological weapons against its own people, or has made
+preparations to engage in such violations. Foreign persons are sanctionable if the
+recipient country has been determined to be a supporter of international terrorism,
+pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, or if the President has
+specifically designated the country as restricted under this section.
+
+The President may delay the imposition of sanctions for up to 180 days if he is
+
+in consultation with the sanctionable person’s government to bring that government
+to take specific and effective steps to terminate the sanctionable activities. The
+President may not be required to impose sanctions if the sanctionable person
+otherwise provides goods needed for U.S. military operations, if the President
+determines that the sanctionable person is a sole source provider of some good or
+service, or if the President determines that goods and services provided by the
+sanctionable person are essential to U.S. national security under defense cooperation
+agreements. Exceptions are also made for completing outstanding contracts, the
+purchase of spare or component parts, service and maintenance otherwise not readily
+available, information and technology essential to U.S. products or production, or
+medical or other humanitarian items.
+
+The President may terminate the sanctions after 12 months, if he determines and
+
+certifies to Congress that the sanctioned person no longer aids or abets any foreign
+government, project, or entity in its efforts to acquire biological or chemical weapons
+capability. The President may waive the application of a sanction after a year of its
+imposition, if he determines it is in U.S. national security interests to do so. Not less
+than 20 days before a national security waiver is issued, the President must notify
+Congress, fully explaining the rationale for waiving the sanction.
+
+ Sec. 81 was added by sec. 305 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control 
+
+ and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (title III of P.L. 102-182; approved December
+4, 1991.) 9
+
+ Section 101 (Nuclear Enrichment Transfers; 22 U.S.C. 2799aa) (similar to
+
+former section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) prohibits foreign economic
+or miliary assistance to any country that the President determines delivers or receives
+nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology. The prohibition is not
+required if the countries involved in the transaction agree to place all materials,
+equipment, or technology under multilateral safeguard arrangements. The prohibition
+
+9 Two versions of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act
+of 1991 were enacted. Title V of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992
+and 1992 (P.L. 102-138; approved October 28, 1991) enacted the first. Later in the same
+session, title III of P.L. 102-182 (a trade act otherwise unrelated to nonproliferation issues)
+repealed the first version and enacted a new Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
+Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. This report refers only to the second enactment—that
+which currently stands in law.
+
+ 
+ CRS-9
+
+is not required, furthermore, if the recipient country has an agreement with the
+International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding safeguards.
+
+The President may waive the sanction if he determines, and certifies to the
+
+Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that denying
+assistance would have a serious adverse effect on vital U.S. interests, and he has been
+assured that the country in question will not acquire, develop, or assist others in
+acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. Congress may negate a certification by
+enacting a joint resolution stating its disapproval.
+
+ Sec. 826(a) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of the 
+
+ Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236;
+approved April 30, 1994) added secs. 101 and 102. Similar language, however,
+previously had been in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as secs. 669 and 670.
+Sec. 669 was added by sec. 305 of the International Security Assistance and Arms
+Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329; approved June 30, 1976). The section was
+amended and restated by sec. 12 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1977
+(P.L. 95-92; approved August 4, 1977), which also added sec. 670 to the law. Sec.
+669 was further amended by secs. 10(b)(4) and 12 of the International Security
+Assistance Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-384; approved September 26, 1978). Sec. 737(b)
+of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-
+113; approved December 29, 1981) amended and restated both secs. 669 and 670.
+ Sec. 1204 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985
+(P.L. 99-83; approved August 8, 1985), made further changes to sec. 670 before
+both sections were repealed in 1994 and similar language was incorporated into the
+AECA. 
+
+ Section 102 (Nuclear Reprocessing Transfers, Illegal Exports for Nuclear 
+
+ Explosive Devices, Transfers of Nuclear Explosive Devices, and Nuclear
+Detonations; 22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1) (similar to former section 670 of the Foreign
+Assistance Act of 1961) prohibits foreign economic or military assistance to countries
+that the President determines deliver or receive nuclear reprocessing equipment,
+material, or technology to or from another country; or any non-nuclear-weapon state
+that illegally exports, through a person serving as that country’s agent, from the
+United States items that would contribute to nuclear proliferation.
+
+The President may waive the sanction if he determines, and certifies to the
+
+Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that
+terminating assistance would adversely impact on the United States’ nonproliferation
+objectives, or would jeopardize the common defense and security. Congress may
+negate a certification by enacting a joint resolution stating its disapproval.
+
+The section further prohibits assistance (except humanitarian or food assistance),
+
+defense sales, export licenses for U.S. Munitions List items, other export licenses
+subject to foreign policy controls (except medicines or medical equipment), and
+various credits and loans (except Department of Agriculture credits and support to
+procure food and agriculture commodities) to any country that the President has
+determined (A) transfers a nuclear explosive device to a non-nuclear-weapon state;
+(B) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and either (i) receives a nuclear explosive device;
+or (ii) detonates an nuclear explosive device; (C) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon
+
+ 
+ CRS-10
+
+state any design information or component that is determined by the President to be
+important to, and known by the transferring country to be intended by the recipient
+state for use in, the development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive devices; or
+(D) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and seeks and receives any design information or
+component that is determined by the President to be important to, and intended by the
+recipient state for use in, the development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive
+device.
+
+In any of these latter four instances, sanctions are mandatory once the President
+
+has determined that an event has occurred. If the event has to do with transferring a
+nuclear explosive device to a non-nuclear-weapon state, or a non-nuclear-weapon
+state receiving or detonating a nuclear explosive device, the President may delay the
+imposition of sanctions for 30 days (of congressional continuous session) if he
+determines that the immediate imposition of sanctions “would be detrimental to the
+national security of the United States,” and so certifies to the Speaker of the House
+and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
+
+If the President makes such a determination, he may further waive the imposition
+
+of sanctions if the Congress, within those 30 days after the first determination, takes
+up a joint resolution under expedited procedure,10 that states:
+
+That the Congress having received on ________ a certification by the President
+under section 102(b)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act with respect to ________,
+the Congress hereby authorizes the President to exercise the waiver authority
+contained in section 102(b)(5) of that Act.
+
+With passage of a joint resolution authorizing him to exercise further waiver
+
+authority, the President may waive any sanction which would otherwise be required
+in instances involving the transferring of a nuclear explosive device to a non-nuclear-
+weapon state, or a non-nuclear-weapon state receiving or detonating a nuclear
+explosive device. To exercise this waiver, the President determines and certifies in
+writing to the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
+“that the imposition of such sanction would be seriously prejudicial to the
+achievement of United State nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the
+common defense and security.”
+
+Alternatively, if Congress does not take up a relevant joint resolution within the
+
+30 days, the sanctions enter into effect. Section 102 does not state the means for
+otherwise suspending or terminating the sanctions.11
+
+10 Sec. 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
+P.L. 94-329. See Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1999 , volume I-A, page 619.
+
+11 Sanctions under sec. 102 were applied to India and Pakistan after each country tested
+nuclear explosive devices in May 1998. Congress enacted three laws after the sanctions were
+imposed to ease their application or authorize the President to waive their application. See
+the Agriculture Export Relief Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-194; approved July 14, 1998), India-
+Pakistan Relief Act of 1998 (title IX of P.L. 105-277; approved October 21, 1998), and the
+Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000, title IX (P.L. 106-79; approved October
+
+(continued...)
+
+ 
+ CRS-11
+
+ For legislative history of the origin of and early changes to this section, see 
+
+ discussion following sec. 101, above. Sec. 2(a) of the Agriculture Export Relief Act
+of 1998 (P.L. 105-194; approved July 14, 1998) broadened the kinds of exchanges
+that are exempt from the application of sanctions to include medicine, medical
+equipment, and Department of Agriculture financing. 
+
+ Atomic Energy Act of 1954 12
+
+The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 declares U.S. policy for the development, use,
+
+and control of atomic energy. The Act authorizes the Nuclear Regulatory
+Commission to oversee the export of special nuclear materials and nuclear technology
+in accordance with bilateral and international cooperation agreements negotiated by
+the Department of State. The Act defines the nature and requirements of those
+cooperative agreements and the procedure by which Congress reviews them. The Act
+states export licensing criteria for nuclear materials and sensitive equipment and
+technology.
+
+ Section 129 (Conduct Resulting in Termination of Nuclear Exports; 42 
+
+ U.S.C. 2158) prohibits the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment, or sensitive
+technology from the United States to any non-nuclear-weapon state that the President
+finds to have detonated a nuclear explosive device, terminated or abrogated
+safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), materially violated
+an IAEA safeguards agreement, or engaged in manufacture or acquisition of nuclear
+explosive devices. The section similarly prohibits transfers to any country, or group
+of countries, that the President finds to have violated a nuclear cooperation agreement
+with the United States, assisted, encouraged, or induced a non-nuclear-weapon state
+to engage in certain activities related to nuclear explosive devices, or agreed to
+transfer reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to a non-nuclear-weapon
+state, except under certain conditions.
+
+The President may waive the restriction if he determines that the prohibition
+
+would hinder U.S. nonproliferation objectives or jeopardize the common defense and
+security. Sixty days before a determination is issued, the President is required to
+forward his reasons for waiving the sanctions to Congress, which may block the
+waiver by adopting a concurrent resolution. Congress may alternatively counter the
+Presidential determination with passage of a joint resolution within 45 days of the
+President’s action.
+
+ Sec. 307 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242; approved 
+
+ March 10, 1978) added sec. 129. 
+
+11 (...continued)
+25, 1999).
+
+12 P.L. 83-703, approved August 30, 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 and following. Legislation on
+Foreign Relations Through 1996 , vol. II, p. 1440.
+
+ 
+ CRS-12
+
+ Chemical and Biological Weapons Control 
+and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 13
+
+The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of
+
+1991 mandates U.S. sanctions, and encourages international sanctions, against
+countries that use chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law.
+
+ The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act 
+
+ of 1991 was enacted as title III of P.L. 102-182 (a law dealing with trade issues
+otherwise unrelated to nonproliferation). No amendments have been enacted. 14
+
+ Section 307 (Sanctions Against Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons; 22 
+
+ U.S.C. 5605) requires the President to terminate foreign assistance (except
+humanitarian, food, and agricultural assistance) arms sales and licenses, credits,
+guarantees, and certain exports to a government of a foreign country that he has
+determined has used or made substantial preparation to use chemical or biological
+weapons. Within three months, the President must determine and certify to Congress
+that the government: is no longer using chemical or biological weapons in violation
+of international law, is no longer using such weapons against its own people, has
+provided credible assurances that such behavior will not resume, and is willing to
+cooperate with U.N. or other international observers to verify that biological and
+chemical weapons are not still in use. Without this 3-month determination, sanctions
+are required affecting multilateral development bank loans, U.S. bank loans or credits,
+exports, imports, diplomatic relations, and aviation access to and from the United
+States.
+
+The President may lift the sanctions after a year, with a determination and
+
+certification to Congress that the foreign government has met the conditions listed
+above, and that it is making restitution to those affected by its use of chemical or
+biological weapons.
+
+The President may waive the imposition of these sanctions if he determines and
+
+certifies to Congress and the appropriate committees that such a waiver is essential
+to U.S. national security interests.
+
+13 P.L. 102-182; approved December 4, 1991; 22 U.S.C. 5601-5606. Legislation on Foreign
+Relations Through 1996 , vol. II, p. 1394.
+
+14 Two versions of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination
+Act of 1991 were enacted. Title V of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
+1992 and 1992 (P.L. 102-138; approved October 28, 1991) enacted the first. Later in the
+same session, title III of P.L. 102-182 (a trade act otherwise unrelated to nonproliferation
+issues) repealed the first version and enacted a new Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
+and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. This report refers only to the second enactment—that
+which currently stands in law.
+
+ 
+ CRS-13
+
+ Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 15
+
+The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 implements the
+
+Chemical Weapons Convention, which was originally signed on January 13, 1993, and
+to which the United States became a party on April 29, 1997.16 The Convention bans
+the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, requires the
+destruction of existing weapons and related materials, establishes an international
+verification regime, and requires export controls and punitive measures to be leveled
+for noncompliance.
+
+ Section 103 (Civil Liability of the United States; 22 U.S.C. 6713) requires
+
+a wide range of sanctions to be imposed, for a period of not less than ten years, on an
+individual who is a member of, or affiliated with, the Organization for the Prohibition
+of Chemical Weapons “whose actions or omissions the United States has been held
+liable for a tort or taking...” or a foreign company or an individual affiliated with that
+company, “which knowingly assisted, encouraged, or induced, in any way, a foreign
+person” affiliated with the Organization “to publish, divulge, disclose, or make known
+in any manner or to any extent not authorized by the Convention any United States
+confidential business information” including:
+
+! no arms export transactions – sales of items on U.S. Munitions List,
+
+transactions under Arms Export Control Act; no licenses for goods
+or services covered by foreign policy controls under the Export
+Administration Act of 1979;
+
+! U.S. opposition to support from international financial institutions;
+! no U.S. Export-Import Bank transactions;
+! prohibition on U.S. private banks engaging with sanctions person;
+! assets in United States to be frozen by Presidential action; and
+! no rights to land aircraft in the United States (other than in cases of
+
+emergency).
+
+The Secretary of State is further required to deny a visa to any individual affiliated
+with the Organization who divulges any confidential U.S. business if that disclosure
+results in financial loss or damages.
+
+The section requires the President to impose similar sanctions on any foreign
+
+government found by the President to have similarly divulged such information, with
+the sanctions imposed for not less than five years. Foreign countries are further
+subject to:
+
+! no U.S. economic assistance (other than humanitarian assistance),
+
+military assistance, foreign military financing, grant military education
+and training, military credits, guarantees; and no export licensing for
+commercial satellites.
+
+15 Division I of P.L. 105-277; approved October 21, 1998; 112 Stat. 2681-856. See also 18
+U.S.C. 229 et seq .
+
+16 See S.Res. 75, 105th Congress, 1st Session.
+
+ 
+ CRS-14
+
+Sanctions may be suspended if the sanctioned entity fully and completely
+
+compensates the U.S. government to cover the liability. The President, alternatively,
+may waive the sanctions if he determines and notifies Congress that U.S. national
+security interests are served by such a waiver.
+
+ Export Administration Act of 1979 17
+
+The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) authorizes the executive branch
+
+to regulate private sector exports of particular goods and technology to other
+countries. The EAA coordinates such actions with other foreign policy
+considerations, including nonproliferation, and determines eligibility of recipients for
+exports. Section 5 (National Security Controls; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404) authorizes
+the President to curtail or prohibit the export of any goods or services for national
+security reasons: to comply with other laws regarding a potential recipient country’s
+political status or political stability, to cooperate with international agreements or
+understandings, or to protect militarily critical technologies. Section 6 (Foreign
+Policy Controls; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405) similarly authorizes the President to curtail
+or prohibit the export of goods or services for foreign policy reasons. Within section
+6, for example, section 6(j) establishes the State Department’s list of countries found
+to be supporting acts of international terrorism, a list on which many other restrictions
+and prohibitions in law are based.18 Section 6(k) restricts exportation of certain crime
+control equipment. Section 6(l) restricts exportation for a list of dual use goods and
+technology. Section 6(m) restricts exportation for a list of goods and technology that
+would directly and substantially assist a foreign government or group in acquiring the
+capability to develop, produce, stockpile, or deliver chemical or biological weapons.
+
+ Section 11A (Multilateral Export Control Violations; 50 U.S.C. app. 2410a) 
+
+requires the President to prohibit, for two to five years, the U.S. government from
+contracting with or procuring goods or services from a foreign person that has
+violated any country’s national security export regulations in accordance with the
+agreement of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
+(COCOM),19 and that the violation results “in substantial enhancement of Soviet and
+
+17 P.L. 96-72; approved September 29, 1979; 50 U.S.C. App. 2401. Legislation on Foreign
+Relations Through 1996 , vol. III, p. 1022. Authority granted by the Export Administration
+Act was continued to August 20, 2001, by the Export Administration Modification and
+Clarification Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-508; approved November 13, 2000).
+
+18 Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) and sec. 40 of the
+Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780) grant similar authority to the Secretary of State
+to withhold assistance and programs governed by those two laws. See Legislation on Foreign
+Relations Through 1999 , vol. I-A, pages 263, 404, respectively. See also sec. 40A of the
+AECA (22 U.S.C. 2781), which denies defense articles and defense services to a foreign
+country the President has determined is not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts;
+ Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1999 , vol. I-A, page 411.
+
+19 The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) agreed to cease
+to exist on March 31, 1994. Member nations agreed to retain current control lists until a
+successor organization is established. On December 19, 1995, the United States and 27 other
+countries, including NATO participants and Russia, agreed to establish a new multilateral
+
+(continued...)
+
+ 
+ CRS-15
+
+East Bloc capabilities in submarines or antisubmarine warfare, ballistic or antiballistic
+missiles technology, strategic aircraft, command, control, communications and
+intelligence, or other critical technologies.” The President also is required generally
+to prohibit importation of products from the sanctioned person. The President may
+impose sanctions at his discretion if the first but not the second condition exists. In
+this case, the restrictions may be in place no longer than five years.
+
+Sanctions may not be required for some goods if contracts with the sanctionable
+
+person meet U.S. operational military requirements, if the President determines that
+the sanctionable person is a sole source provider of an essential defense article or
+service, or if the President determines that such articles or services are essential to
+U.S. national security under defense coproduction agreements. The President also
+may not be required to apply sanctions if he determines that a company affiliated with
+the sanctionable person had no knowledge of the export control violation. After
+sanctions have been in place for two years, the President may modify terms of the
+restrictions under certain conditions, and if he notifies Congress.
+
+ Sec. 2444 of the Multilateral Export Control Enhancement Amendments Act 
+
+ (title II, subtitle D, part II of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988;
+P.L. 100-418; approved August 23, 1988) added sec. 11A. The section has not been
+amended. 
+
+ Section 11B (Missile Proliferation Control Violations; 50 U.S.C. app. 
+
+ 2410b) is similar to sections 72 and 73 of the AECA, but authorizes sanctions against
+U.S. persons and foreign persons who engage in commercial transactions that violate
+missile proliferation controls. The section requires sanctions against any U.S. citizen
+who the President determines to be engaged in exporting, transferring, conspiring to
+export or transfer, or facilitating an export or transfer of, any equipment or
+technology identified by the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex. Sanctions
+vary with the type of equipment or technology exported; worst-case sanctions deny
+export licenses for goods on the U.S. Commodity List for not less than two years.
+
+The President may waive the imposition of sanctions if he certifies to Congress
+
+that the product or service to be restricted is essential to U.S. national security, and
+that the provider is a sole source provider.
+
+The section further requires sanctions against any foreign person who the
+
+President determines to be engaged in exporting, transferring, conspiring to export
+or transfer, or facilitating an export or transfer of, any MTCR equipment or
+technology that contributes to the design, development, or production of missiles in
+a country that is not an MTCR adherent. Sanctions vary with the type of equipment
+
+19 (...continued)
+export control arrangement. The Wassenaar Arrangement for Export Controls for
+Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (“Wassenaar Arrangement”)
+became operational in 1996. On January 15, 1998, the Bureau of Export Administration of
+the Department of Commerce issued an interim rule to implement the Wassenaar Arrangement
+list of dual-use items and revisions to the Commerce Control List required by implementation
+of the Wassenaar Arrangement. See 63 F.R. 2452.
+
+ 
+ CRS-16
+
+or technology exported; worst-case sanctions deny licenses for transfer to the foreign
+person items otherwise controlled by the Export Administration Act for not less than
+two years. The President may also prohibit importation into the United States of
+products produced by the foreign person.
+
+The law allows several exceptions, wherein some or all of the sanctions may not
+
+be imposed against foreign persons. These exceptions are nearly identical to those
+found in sections 72 and 73 of the AECA. The President may waive the imposition
+of sanctions for national security reasons, but must notify Congress beforehand. The
+Presidential authority to restrict importation is conditional in a manner identical to that
+in section 73 of the AECA.
+
+The definition of “MTCR adherent” in section 11B is also identical to that in
+
+section 74 of the AECA. The definition of “person,” however, retains its earlier form,
+applying to all “countries where it may be impossible to identify a specific
+governmental entity,” and not adopting the narrower reference to military aircraft but
+referring to government activity relating to development of aircraft generally.
+
+ Sec. 1702(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 
+
+ (P.L. 101-510; approved November 5, 1990) added sec. 11B. The section has not
+been amended. 
+
+ Section 11C (Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation Sanctions; 50 
+
+ U.S.C. app. 2410c) , similar to section 81 of the AECA, authorizes the President to
+apply procurement and import sanctions against foreign persons that he determines
+knowingly contribute to the use, development, production, stockpile, or acquisition
+of chemical or biological weapons by exporting goods or technology from the United
+States or any other country.
+
+The President may delay the imposition of sanctions for up to 180 days if he is
+
+in consultation with the sanctionable person’s government to bring that government
+to take specific and effective steps to terminate the sanctionable activities. The
+President may not be required to impose or maintain sanctions if the sanctionable
+person otherwise provides goods needed for U.S. military operations, if the President
+determines that the sanctionable person is a sole source provider of some good or
+service, or if the President determines that goods and services provided by the
+sanctionable person are essential to U.S. national security under defense cooperation
+agreements. Exceptions are also made for completing outstanding contracts, the
+purchase of spare or component parts, service and maintenance otherwise not readily
+available, information and technology essential to U.S. products or production, or
+medical or other humanitarian items.
+
+The President may terminate the sanctions after 12 months, if he determines and
+
+certifies to Congress that the sanctioned person no longer aids or abets any foreign
+government, project, or entity in its efforts to acquire biological or chemical weapons
+capability. The President may waive the application of a sanction after a year of its
+imposition, if he determines it is in U.S. national security interests to do so. Not less
+than 20 days before a national security waiver is issued, the President must notify
+Congress, fully explaining the rationale for waiving the sanction.
+
+ 
+ CRS-17
+
+ Sec. 505(a) of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare 
+
+ Elimination Act of 1991 (title III of P.L. 102-182; approved December 4, 1991)
+added sec. 11C. No amendments have been enacted. 
+
+ Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 20
+
+The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 establishes the Export-Import Bank of the
+
+United States and authorizes the Bank to finance and facilitate exports and imports
+and the exchange of commodities and services between the United States and foreign
+countries.
+
+ Section 2(b)(1)(B) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(1)(B)) generally states the United States’
+
+policy of administering loan programs through the Export-Import Bank. The section
+provides that the Bank will deny applications for credit for nonfinancial or
+noncommercial considerations only when the President determines it is in the U.S.
+national interest to deny credit to advance U.S. policies in international terrorism,
+nuclear proliferation, environmental protection, and human rights.
+
+ The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 was enacted as P.L. 79-173; approved 
+
+ July 31, 1945. Sec. 2(b)(1) has been amended and restated in 1972 (P.L. 92-126)
+and again in 1974 (P.L. 93-646). The language pertaining to “international
+terrorism, nuclear proliferation, ...” was added by sec. 1904 of the Export-Import
+Bank Act Amendments of 1978 (title XIX of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and
+Interest Rate Control Act of 1978; P.L. 95-630; approved November 10, 1978). 
+
+ Section 2(b)(4) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(4)) provides that the Secretary of State can
+
+determine, and report to Congress and to the Export-Import Bank Directors, if:
+
+! any country has agreed to IAEA nuclear safeguards but has
+
+materially violated, abrogated, or terminated such safeguards after
+October 26, 1977;
+
+! any country has entered into a cooperation agreement with the
+
+United States concerning the use of civil nuclear energy, but has
+violated, abrogated, or terminated any guarantee or other
+undertaking related to that agreement after October 26, 1977;
+
+! any country has detonated a nuclear explosive device after October
+
+26, 1977, but is a not a nuclear-weapon state; 
+
+! any country willfully aids or abets, after June 29, 1994, any non-
+
+nuclear-weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or to
+acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material; or
+
+! any person knowingly aids or abets, after September 23, 1996, any
+
+non-nuclear-weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or to
+acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material.
+
+20 Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1996 , vol. III, p. 952.
+
+ 
+ CRS-18
+
+If such a determination is made relating to a person, the Secretary is urged to consult
+with that person’s government to curtail that person’s activities. Consultations are
+allowed 90 days, at the end of which the Secretary will report to Congress as to their
+progress. After the 90 days, unless the Secretary requests an additional 90 days, or
+unless the Secretary reports that the violations have ceased, the Ex-Im Bank will not
+approve any transactions to support U.S. exports to any country, or to or by any
+person, for which/whom a determination has been made. The imposition of sanctions
+may also be waived if the President, 45 days before any transaction is approved,
+certifies that the violations have ceased, and that steps have been taken to ensure the
+questionable transactions will not resume. The President may also waive the
+imposition of sanction if he certifies that to impose them would have a serious adverse
+effect on vital U.S. interests, or if he certifies that objectionable behavior has ceased.
+
+ Sec. 2(b)(4) was added by sec. 3(b) of P.L. 95-143; approved October 26, 1977. 
+
+ Sec. 825 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of the
+Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236;
+approved April 30, 1994) added “(as defined in section 830(4) of the Nuclear
+Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994), or that any country has willfully aided or
+abetted any non-nuclear-weapons state (as defined in section 830(5) of that Act) to
+acquire any such nuclear explosive device or to acquire unsafeguarded special
+nuclear material (as defined in section 830(8) of that Act).” to define “nuclear
+explosive device” and to broaden what acts are sanctionable. This is referred to as
+a “Glenn Amendment.” The section was further amended and restated by sec. 1303
+of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201;
+approved September 23, 1996). Sec. 1303(b) of that Act further required the
+President to report to Congress within 180 days “his recommendations on ways to
+make the laws of the United States more effective in controlling and preventing the
+proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The report shall identify
+all sources of government funds used for such nonproliferation activities.” 
+
+ Section 2(b)(12) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(12)) requires the President to notify the
+
+Export-Import Bank if he determines “that the military or Government of the Russian
+Federation has transferred or delivered to the People’s Republic of China an SS-N-22
+missile system and that the transfer or delivery represents a significant and imminent
+threat to the security of the United States... Upon receipt of the notice and if so
+directed by the President of the United States, the Board of Directors of the Bank
+shall not give approval to guarantee, insure, extend credit, or participate in the
+extension of credit in connection with the purchase of any good or service by the
+military or Government of the Russian Federation.”
+
+ Sec. 12 of the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-121; 
+
+ approved November 26, 1997) added paragraph 12. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-19
+
+ Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 21
+
+The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) authorizes U.S. government foreign
+
+aid programs including development assistance, economic support funding, numerous
+multilateral programs, housing and other credit guaranty programs, Overseas Private
+Investment Corporation, international organizations, debt-for-nature exchanges,
+international narcotics control, international disaster assistance, development funding
+for Africa, assistance to states of the former Soviet Union, military assistance,
+international military education and training, peacekeeping, antiterrorism, and various
+regional enterprise funds.
+
+ Section 307(c) (Withholding of United States Proportionate Share for 
+
+ Certain Programs of International Organizations; 22 U.S.C. 2227) requires that
+foreign assistance the United States pays in to international organizations and
+programs not be used for programs in certain countries. The section exempts the
+International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from this limitation, except for
+particular projects the IAEA funds in Cuba. U.S. proportionate support to the IAEA,
+in particular, is not available to any IAEA project relating to the Juragua Nuclear
+Power Plant near Cienfugeos, Cuba, or the Pedro Pi Nuclear Research Center in
+Cuba, unless Cuba (I) ratifies the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
+or the Treaty of Tlatelelco and is in compliance with terms of the treaty; (II)
+negotiates full-scope safeguards of the IAEA not later than two years after treaty
+ratification; and (III) “incorporates internationally accepted nuclear safety
+safeguards.”
+
+ Section 307 was added to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by sec. 403 of the 
+
+ International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83;
+approved August 8, 1985). The countries to which it is applied has changed over
+time; the countries for which program funding is currently restricted are Burma,
+Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Iran, Cuba, and the Palestine Liberation
+Organization (though application to the PLO has been waived under other
+legislation in the course of peace negotiations), and communist countries listed
+elsewhere in the Act. Limitations in subsec. (c) were originally added by sec.
+431(a)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236;
+approved April 30, 1994). Language pertaining to nuclear developments in Cuba
+was added by sec. 2809(a)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 1998 and
+1999 (subdivision B of division G of P.L. 105-277; approved October 21, 1998). 
+
+21 P.L. 87-195; approved September 4, 1961; 22 U.S.C. 2151 and following. Legislation on
+Foreign Relations Through 1999 , vol. 1-A, p. 15. See also chapter 9 in this Act, relating to
+“Nonproliferation and Export Control Assistance,” added by sec. 301 of the Security
+Assistance Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-280; approved October 6, 2000), codified at 22 U.S.C.
+2349bb et seq . This chapter does not impose sanctions; instead it makes assistance available
+to friendly countries to ultimately “enhance the nonproliferation and export control
+capabilities...by providing training and equipment to detect, deter, monitor, interdict, and
+counter proliferation”.
+
+ 
+ CRS-20
+
+ Section 498A(b) (Criteria for Assistance to Governments of the 
+
+ Independent States; 22 U.S.C. 2295a(b)) requires that the President not provide
+assistance to independent states of the former Soviet Union if he determines that the
+government of that state, among other things, (1) has failed to implement arms control
+obligations signed by the former Soviet Union, or (2) has knowingly transferred to
+another country: missiles or missile technology inconsistent with guidelines and
+parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime; “any material, equipment, or
+technology that would contribute significantly to the ability of such country to
+manufacture any weapon of mass destruction (including nuclear, chemical, and
+biological weapons) if the President determines that the material, equipment, or
+technology was to be used by such country in the manufacture of such weapon.” The
+section further prohibits foreign assistance under chapter 11 of the Foreign Assistance
+Act of 1961 to any country for which a determination has been issued pursuant to
+sections 101 or 102 of the Arms Export Control Act or sections 306(a)(1) or 307 of
+the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991.
+
+The President may waive the prohibition – other than that based on other
+
+proliferation legislation as cited in the section – on U.S. national security grounds, if
+he determines that furnishing assistance “will foster respect for internationally
+recognized human rights and the rule of law or the development of institutions of
+democratic governance,” or to alleviate suffering resulting from a natural or man-
+made disaster. Assistance may also be provided under the U.S. Information Agency's
+(USIA) secondary school exchange program notwithstanding a country's ineligibility
+(except in instances where ineligibility is based on nonproliferation violations). Any
+waiver requires an immediate report to Congress of any determination or decision.
+
+ Section 498A was added by sec. 201 of the FREEDOM Support Act (P.L. 102- 
+
+ 511; approved October 24, 1992). See also discussion above, on sec. 73(b)(2) and
+sec. 73B of the AECA, as amended. Those sections refer to sec. 498A(b)(3)(A) to
+limit certain transactions with independent states of the former Soviet Union if the
+transactions involve missiles or missile technology and are conducted in a manner
+inconsistent with guidelines and parameters of the MTCR. 
+
+ Section 620(y) (Prohibitions Against Furnishing Assistance; 22 U.S.C. 
+
+ 2370) restricts foreign assistance, or assistance pursuant to any other act, to any
+country providing nuclear fuel, related assistance, and credits to Cuba. Assistance
+denied the country in question equals the value of that country’s nuclear development
+assistance, sales, or transfers to Cuba. The requirement to limit assistance is waived
+if Cuba (A) ratifies the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or the Treaty
+of Tlatelelco and is in compliance with terms of the treaty; (B) “has negotiated and
+is in full compliance with full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy
+Agency” within two years of the treaty ratification; and (C) “incorporates and is in
+compliance with internationally accepted nuclear safety safeguards.” The section also
+requires an annual report on the matter to filed with Congress by the Secretary of
+State.
+
+ Added by sec. 2810(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 
+
+ 1998 and 1999 (subdivision B of Division G of P.L. 105-277; approved October 21,
+1998) .
+
+ 
+ CRS-21
+
+ Section 620A (Prohibition on Assistance to Governments Supporting 
+
+ International Terrorism; 22 U.S.C. 2371) prohibits any foreign assistance, food
+assistance, Peace Corps funding, and support under the Export-Import Bank Act of
+1945 from being made available to countries that the Secretary of State has certified
+as supporters of international terrorism.22 The restriction remains in place until such
+time that the Secretary certifies that there has been a fundamental change in the
+leadership and policies of the targeted country, the country is no longer supporting
+international terrorists, and that the targeted government has assured no such support
+will resume.
+
+The President may waive the prohibition on the basis of U.S. national security,
+
+and some assistance may be restored to address humanitarian concerns. A waiver
+requires notification and justification being provided to Congress 15 days before
+assistance is given.
+
+ Section 620A was added by sec. 303 of the International Security Assistance 
+
+ and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329; approved June 30, 1976). The
+section has been amended and restated since then by sec. 503(a) of the International
+Security Assistance and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83;
+approved August 8, 1985) and sec. 5 of the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export
+Amendments Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-222; approved December 12, 1989). 
+
+ Section 620E (Assistance to Pakistan; 22 U.S.C. 2375) , related to U.S.
+
+assistance to Pakistan, was enacted in reaction to the threat posed by Soviet
+occupation of neighboring Afghanistan. Section 620E(d) authorizes the President to
+waive sanctions under section 101 of the AECA to provide assistance to Pakistan, if
+he determines it is in the U.S. national interest to do so.
+
+ Subsection 620E(e) states that no military assistance shall be furnished and no
+
+military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan unless the
+President certifies to the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the Senate
+Foreign Relations Committee that, for the fiscal year in which the assistance, sale or
+transfer would occur, Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that
+proposed military assistance would significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will
+possess a nuclear explosive device. This restriction does not apply to international
+narcotics control assistance, International Military Education and Training funds,
+funding for humanitarian and civic assistance projects, peacekeeping or other
+multilateral operations funds, or antiterrorism assistance.
+
+ Enacted as P.L. 87-195; approved September 4, 1961. Sec. 620E was added 
+
+ to the Foreign Assistance Act by sec. 736 of the International Security and
+Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-113; approved December 29, 1981).
+Sec. 620E(d) was amended in 1994 by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 
+
+22 Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780) and sec. 6(j) of the Export
+Administration Act (50 U.S.C. app. 2404) grant similar authority to the Secretary of State to
+withhold assistance and programs governed by those two laws. See also sec. 40A of the
+AECA (22 U.S.C. 2781), which denies defense articles and defense services to a foreign
+country the President has determined is not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts.
+
+ 
+ CRS-22
+
+ 1994 (title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and
+1995; P.L. 103-236; approved April 30, 1994) to reflect the repeal of secs. 669 and
+670 and the enactment of secs. 101 and 102 of the Arms Export Control Act. Sec.
+620E(e), the “Pressler amendment,” was added by sec. 902 of the International
+Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83; approved August
+8, 1985). Sec. 559(a)(1)(D) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
+Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107; approved February 12,
+1996), amended the section to exclude certain assistance programs from the ban, as
+noted in the last sentence, above. The same Act made several changes to restrict
+only “military assistance,” formerly the section had referred to assistance generally.
+The same Act amended the section to authorize the President to: release Pakistan
+from paying storage costs of items purchased before October 1, 1990, but not
+delivered (presumably F-16s); release other items serviced in the United States; and
+continue the applicability of other laws pertaining to ballistic missile sanctions. 
+
+ After India and Pakistan tested nuclear explosive devices in May 1998, 
+
+ sanctions were imposed in accordance with requirements of sec. 102 of the Arms
+Export Control Act (see above). Subsequently, Congress enacted three laws to grant
+the President discretionary authority to waive those sanctions. The third, the
+Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000 (P.L. 106-79; approved October
+21, 1999; see title IX), authorized the President to waive section 620E(e) as well. 
+
+ Section 620G (Prohibition on Assistance to Countries that Aid Terrorist 
+
+ States; 22 U.S.C. 2377) requires the President to withhold all foreign assistance to
+the government of any country that provides assistance to the government of a
+country listed as a terrorist state by the Secretary of State pursuant to sec. 620A of
+this Act (22 U.S.C. 2370). 
+
+The President may waive the imposition of the sanction if he determines that
+
+furnishing such assistance is important to the U.S. national interest and notifies the
+appropriate congressional committees of his intent 15 days prior to lifting the ban.
+His notification shall include the determination, a detailed explanation of the
+assistance to be provided with its estimated dollar amount, and an explanation of how
+such assistance furthers U.S. national interests.
+
+ Section 620G was added by sec. 325 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
+
+ Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132; approved April 24, 1996). See also sec. 40 of
+the AECA (above). 
+
+ Section 620H (Prohibition on Assistance to Countries that Provide Lethal 
+
+ Military Equipment to Terrorist States; 22 U.S.C. 2378) requires the President to
+withhold all foreign assistance to the government of any country that provides lethal
+military equipment to a country listed by the Secretary of State as a supporter of
+international terrorism, either on the sec. 6(j) list under the Export Administration
+Act, or the sec. 620A list pursuant to this Act. The prohibition remains in place until
+one year after such transfers or transactions cease. The section is not retroactive, but
+includes all contracts entered into after April 24, 1996 (the date of enactment of the
+amendment).
+
+ 
+ CRS-23
+
+The President may waive the imposition of the sanction if he determines that
+
+furnishing such assistance is important to the U.S. national interest and notifies the
+appropriate congressional committees of his intent 15 days prior to lifting the ban.
+His notification shall include the determination, a detailed explanation of the
+assistance to be provided with its estimated dollar amount, and an explanation of how
+such assistance furthers U.S. national interests.
+
+ Section 620H was added by sec. 326 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
+
+ Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132; approved April 14, 1996). 
+
+ Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
+Appropriations Act, 2001 23
+
+A Foreign Operations Appropriations Act is enacted annually, generally at the
+
+start of a fiscal year, to make appropriations for various foreign assistance, military
+assistance, and international financial institutions programs. Language in the current
+fiscal year act usually pertains only to that fiscal year. Congress has not enacted a
+foreign aid authorization bill since 1985, however; as a result, the annual
+appropriations act increasingly has become a means of enacting authorizing language
+that carries the force of law beyond the fiscal year.
+
+ Title I, Export-Import Bank of the United States , prohibits the use of Export-
+
+Import Bank funds in the current fiscal year to be used to make expenditures,
+contracts, or commitments for the export of nuclear equipment, fuel or technology to
+any non-nuclear-weapon state, if that state is otherwise eligible to receive economic
+or military assistance under this Act.
+
+ Title II, Assistance for the New Independent States of the Former Soviet 
+
+ Union, appropriates $810 million for assistance to the states of the former Soviet
+Union but withholds 60 percent of funds obligated for the Government of Russia until
+the President determines and certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that the
+Government of Russia has terminated its efforts “to provide Iran with technical
+expertise, training, technology, or equipment necessary to develop a nuclear reactor,
+related nuclear research facilities or programs, or ballistic missile capability.” The
+restriction does not apply to assistance for combating infectious diseases or for child
+survival activities, nor does it apply to nonproliferation and disarmament programs
+authorized under title V of the FREEDOM Support Act.
+
+ Congress has incorporated this language into the foreign assistance 
+
+ appropriations bill for several years. In previous years, the President was
+authorized to waive the restriction on the basis of vital U.S. national security
+interests, or if he found that the Government of Russia was taking meaningful steps
+to limit major supply contracts and to curtail the transfer of technology and
+technical expertise to certain programs in Iran. The FY2001 Act does not include
+such a waiver. 
+
+23 H.R. 5526, enacted by reference in P.L. 106-429; approved November 6, 2000. See also
+sec. 506, Prohibition n Financing Nuclear Goods; sec. 534, Compliance with U.N. Sanctions
+Against Iraq; and sec. 572, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization.
+
+ 
+ CRS-24
+
+ Section 549, Prohibition on Assistance to Foreign Governments That 
+
+ Export Lethal Military Equipment to Countries Supporting International
+Terrorism, prohibits assistance to such foreign governments that provide equipment
+to any country the government of which the Secretary of State has found, pursuant
+to sec. 40(d) of the AECA, to be a terrorist government. The President may waive
+the prohibition if he determines it important to U.S. national interests to do so, but
+must report to Congress the basis for the determination, the nature and value of
+resumed assistance, and an explanation of how such assistance furthers U.S. national
+interests.
+
+ Similar language has been included in the annual foreign assistance 
+
+ appropriations measure since FY1994. 
+
+ International Emergency Economic Powers Act 24
+
+ Section 203 (Grants of Authorities; 50 U.S.C. 1702) authorizes the President
+
+“to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threats with respect to a declared national
+emergency.” After he declares a national emergency exists, pursuant to the authority
+in the National Emergencies Act, the President may use the authority in this section
+to investigate, regulate, or prohibit foreign exchange transactions, credit transfers or
+payments, currency or security transfers, and may take specified actions relating to
+property in which a foreign country or person has interest. In terms of
+nonproliferation concerns, it is pursuant to this section that the President has
+continued the authority of the expired Export Administration Act, prohibited
+transactions with “those who disrupt the Middle East peace process,” issued export
+controls on encryption items, and established export controls related to weapons of
+mass destruction.25
+
+ Enacted as title II of P.L. 95-223; approved December 28, 1977, to update and 
+
+ continue authority carried earlier in the Trading With the Enemy Act (P.L. 65-92;
+approved October 6, 1917). It has been amended from time to time to update the list
+of what cannot be restricted, mostly to keep up with changes in technology (for
+example, the law allows the free flow of informational materials, most recently
+amended to include CD ROMs). 
+
+24 50 U.S.C. 1701 and following. Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1996 , vol. III,
+p. 1144.
+
+25 See Executive Order 12947, Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten To
+Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process (January 23, 1995; 60 F.R. 5079; 50 U.S.C. 1701
+note); Executive Order 12924,Continuation of Export Control Regulations (August 19, 1994;
+59 F.R. 43437; 50 U.S.C. App. 2401 note); Executive Order 12981, Administration of Export
+Controls (December 5, 1995; 60 F.R. 62981; 50 U.S.C. App. 2401); and Executive Order
+13026, Administration of Export Controls on Encryption Products (November 15, 1996; 61
+F.R. 58767; 50 U.S.C. App. 2401 note). The President also uses the authority in IEEPA to
+issue executive orders to implement United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Of the
+several that are current, Executive Order 12724, Blocking Iraqi Government Property and
+Prohibiting Transactions with Iraq (August 9, 1990; 55 F.R. 33089; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note)
+has relevance to issues of proliferation.
+
+ 
+ CRS-25
+
+ Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 26
+
+ Section 1604 (Sanctions Against Certain Persons) requires the President to
+
+impose sanctions against any person whom he has determined to be engaged in
+transferring goods or technology so as to contribute knowingly and materially to the
+efforts by Iran or Iraq to acquire chemical, biological, nuclear, or destabilizing
+numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons. Section 1605 (Sanctions
+Against Certain Foreign Countries) similarly addresses activities of foreign
+governments. 
+
+In both cases, mandatory sanctions prohibit, for a period of two years, the U.S.
+
+government from entering into procurement agreements with, or issuing licenses for
+exporting to or for the sanctioned person or country. Where a foreign country is
+found to be in violation of the law, the President must suspend U.S. assistance;
+instruct U.S. Executive Directors in the international financial institutions to oppose
+multilateral development bank assistance; suspend codevelopment and coproduction
+projects the U.S. government might have with the offending country for one year;
+suspend, also for one year, most technical exchange agreements involving military and
+dual-use technology; and prohibit the exportation of U.S. Munitions List items for one
+year. In the case of foreign countries targeted for sanctions under this Act, the
+President may, at his discretion, use authority granted him under the International
+Emergency Economic Powers Act to further prohibit transactions with the country.
+
+The President may waive the mandatory sanctions against persons or foreign
+
+country with 15 days notice to congressional committees that exercising such a waiver
+is essential to U.S. national interests.
+
+ Section 1603 (Application to Iran of Certain Iraq Sanctions) makes
+
+sanctions in section 586G(a)(1) through (4) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1990 also
+fully applicable against Iraq (see below).
+
+ Enacted as title XVI of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
+
+ 1993 (P.L. 102-484; approved October 23, 1992). Sec. 1408(a) of P.L. 104-106
+(110 Stat. 494) amended sections 1604 and 1605 to apply not just to conventional
+weapons but also to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. 
+
+ Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 27
+
+ Sections 2 through 5 (Reports; Application; Procedures; Determination; 
+
+ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) require the President to report to Congress twice a year to
+identify “every foreign person with respect to whom there is credible information
+
+26 50 U.S.C. 1701 note. Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1996 , vol. II, p. 1389.
+
+27 114 Stat. 38. See also sec. 708 of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-280; 114
+Stat. 862; 22 U.S.C. 2797b note; approved October 6, 2000), which requires the President
+to certify that Russian persons he identifies as “a party to an agreement related to commercial
+cooperation on MTCR equipment or technology with a United States person” is not also one
+who transfers goods, services, or technology to Iran, as identified pursuant to sec. 2(a)(1)(B)
+of this Act.
+
+ 
+ CRS-26
+
+indicating that that person, on or after January 1, 1999, transferred to Iran...” goods,
+services or technology the export of which (1) is controlled for nonproliferation
+reasons in accordance with various international agreements, or (2) is not controlled
+by the country of origin but would subject to controls if shipped from the United
+States. The President is authorized to apply a range of sanctions against any foreign
+person included in his report, including denial of procurement contracts with the U.S.
+government, prohibition on importation into the United States, and denial of foreign
+assistance – sanctions laid out in Executive Order 12938, as amended.28 A foreign
+person named in the President’s report may also be denied U.S. government sales of
+items on the U.S. Munitions List and export licenses for dual-use items.
+
+The decision to impose sanctions is left to the President, but he is required to
+
+notify Congress of his reasons to take no action. The President may also take no
+action if he finds that (1) the person in question did not “knowingly transfer”
+objectionable items to Iran; (2) the goods, services or technology “did not materially
+contribute to Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or
+ballistic or cruise missile systems; (3) the named person falls under the jurisdiction of
+a government that is an adherent to “one or more relevant nonproliferation regimes”
+and his actions were consistent with such regime’s guidelines; or (4) the government
+of jurisdiction “has imposed meaningful penalties” on the named person.
+
+ Section 6 (Restrictions on Extraordinary Payments in Connection with the 
+
+ International Space Station) prohibits any agency of the U.S. government from
+making extraordinary payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, or any
+affiliates, or the Government of the Russian Federation, or any entities of the
+government, until the President determines and reports to Congress that: (1) it is the
+Russian government’s policy “to oppose the proliferation to Iran of weapons of mass
+destruction and missile systems capable of delivering such weapons;” (2) the Russian
+government has demonstrated a commitment to preventing transfers of such goods
+to Iran; and (3) the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, or its affiliates, has not made
+such transfers to Iran in the preceding year (other than those allowed by the
+President’s certification for exemptions).
+
+The President may allow extraordinary payments when “such payments are
+
+necessary to prevent the imminent loss of life by or grievous injury to individuals
+aboard the International Space Station.” This allowance requires the President to
+notify to Congress such payments will be allowed, and to report to Congress on
+details within 30 days of the initial notification. The President may also allow
+extraordinary payments for specific development programs of the International Space
+Station provided he notify Congress ahead of payment and that the recipients of that
+payment are not subject to nonproliferation sanctions.
+
+ P.L. 106-168; approved March 14, 2000. It has not been amended. 
+
+28 Executive Order authorizing the Secretaries of Commerce, Treasury, and State to limit or
+prohibit some transactions to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Issued
+November 14, 1994 (59 F.R. 59099); subsequently amended. See 50 U.S.C. 1701 notes for
+current text.
+
+ 
+ CRS-27
+
+ Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 29
+
+This Act reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to sanctions leveled by the
+
+United Nations after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The findings, laid out in
+ section 586F (Declarations Regarding Iraq’s Long-Standing Violations of
+International Law) , cite Iraq’s violation of international law relating to chemical and
+biological warfare, Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran and its own Kurdish
+population, efforts to expand its chemical weapons capabilities, evidence of biological
+weapons development, and its efforts to establish a nuclear arsenal.
+
+ Section 586C (Trade Embargo Against Iraq) continues sanctions imposed
+
+pursuant to four executive orders issued at the outset of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
+Sanctions include foreign assistance, trade, economic restrictions, and the freezing of
+Iraqi assets under U.S. jurisdiction. The President may alter or terminate the
+sanctions issued in his executive orders only with prior 15-day notification to
+Congress.
+
+ Section 586D (Compliance with U.N. Sanctions Against Iraq) prohibits
+
+foreign assistance, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) funding, and
+assistance or sales under the AECA to countries found to be not in compliance with
+United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iraq. The President may waive
+these sanctions if he determines and certifies to Congress that assistance is in U.S.
+national interest, that assistance will benefit the targeted country’s needy, or such
+assistance will be in the form of humanitarian assistance for foreign nationals fleeing
+Iraq and Kuwait.
+
+ Section 586G (Sanctions Against Iraq) prohibits the United States from
+
+engaging in the following activities relating to Iraq: (1) U.S. foreign military sales
+under the AECA; (2) commercial arms sales licensing of items on the U.S. Munitions
+List; (3) exports of control list goods and technology, as defined by secs. 4(b) and
+5(c)(1) of the Export Administration Act; (4) issuance of licenses or other
+authorizations relating to nuclear equipment, materials, and technology; (5)
+international financial institutions support; (6) Export-Import Bank funding;
+(7)Commodity Credit Corporation funding; and (8) foreign assistance other than
+emergency medical or humanitarian funding.
+
+Pursuant to section 586H (Waiver Authority) , the President may waive the
+
+application of sec. 586G sanctions if he certifies to Congress that the Government of
+Iraq has demonstrated improved respect for human rights, does not support
+international terrorists, and “is not acquiring, developing, or manufacturing (i) ballistic
+missiles, (ii) chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, or (iii) components for such
+weapons; has forsworn the first use of such weapons; and is taking substantial and
+verifiable steps to destroy or otherwise dispose of any such missiles and weapons its
+possesses...” The President must further certify that Iraq is meeting its obligations
+under several international agreements. Finally, the President must certify that it is
+in the national interest of the United States to make such a waiver and resume any or
+all of these economic supports. The section also authorizes the President to waive the
+
+29 Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1999 , vol. I-B, p. 30.
+
+ 
+ CRS-28
+
+restrictions in response to a fundamental change in Iraq’s leadership, provided the
+new government makes credible assurances that it meets the above criteria.
+
+ Section 586I (Denial of Licenses for Certain Exports to Countries Assisting 
+
+ Iraq’s Rocket or Chemical, Biological, or Nuclear Weapons Capability) prohibits
+the export licensing of supercomputers to any government (or its officials) that the
+President finds to be assisting Iraq in improving its rocket technology, or chemical,
+biological, or nuclear weapons capability. While the section includes no waiver
+authority, it is triggered by the President making a determination and so its
+implementation rests with the executive branch.
+
+ Enacted as secs. 586-586J of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
+
+ Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (P.L. 101-513; approved November 5,
+1990). It has not been amended. 
+
+ National Emergencies Act 30
+
+ Title II (50 U.S.C. 1621, 1622) authorizes the President to declare, administer,
+
+and terminate national emergencies. Such a condition is required for the President to
+exercise his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
+
+ P.L. 94-412; approved September 14, 1976. There have been no substantive 
+
+ amendments relevant to proliferation issues. 
+
+ North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 
+
+The North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 prohibits the entering into effect
+
+for the United States any international agreement or agreement for cooperation with
+North Korea that would result in North Korea obtaining nuclear materials. The law
+also prohibits U.S. issuance of export licenses for, or approval for transfer or
+retransfer of, nuclear materials, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or
+technology that would be subject to such an agreement. To make such materials
+available, the President must determine and report to Congress that North Korea has
+met certain benchmarks on the safe use of nuclear materials, including: cooperation
+with the IAEA on inspections, compliance with IAEA safeguard agreements,
+compliance with terms of the Agreed Framework it reached with the United States,
+implementation of terms of the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization, no accrual
+enriched uranium or the means to develop that material, and no efforts to acquire or
+develop nuclear weapon capability. The President must also determine and certify
+that it is the U.S. national interest to transfer key nuclear components to North Korea.
+
+ Enacted as subtitle B of title VIII of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg 
+
+ Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001
+(H.R.3427, enacted by reference in sec. 1000(a)(7) of P.L. 106-113; 113 Stat.
+1501A-472; approved November 29, 1999). 
+
+30 Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1996 , vol. III, p. 1150.
+
+ 
+ CRS-29
+
+ Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 31
+
+The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 states U.S. policy for actively
+
+pursuing more effective international controls over the transfer and use of nuclear
+materials, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes in order to prevent
+proliferation. The policy statement includes the establishment of common
+international sanctions. The Act promotes the establishment of a framework for
+international cooperation for developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy, authorizes
+the U.S. government to license exports of nuclear fuel and reactors to countries that
+adhere to nuclear non-proliferation policies, provides incentives for countries to joint
+international cooperative efforts in nuclear non-proliferation, and authorizes relevant
+export controls. The Act requires the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to publish
+regulations establishing procedures for granting, suspending, revoking or amending
+nuclear export licenses. The Act also requires the Department of Commerce to issue
+regulations relating to all export items that could be of significance for nuclear
+explosive purposes.
+
+ Section 304(b) (Export Licensing Procedures; 42 U.S.C. 2155a) requires the
+
+Nuclear Regulatory Commission to publish regulations establishing the procedures for
+granting, suspending, revoking or amending nuclear export licenses. Section 309 (42
+U.S.C. 2139a) similarly requires the Department of Commerce to issue regulations
+relating to all export items that could be of significance for nuclear explosive
+purposes.
+
+ Section 402 (Additional Requirements; 42 U.S.C. 2153a) provides that,
+
+unless otherwise stated in a cooperation agreement, no source or special nuclear
+material exported from the United States may be enriched after exportation unless the
+United States approves the enrichment. The section prohibits the export of nuclear
+material for the purpose of enrichment or reactor fueling if the recipient country is
+party to a cooperation agreement with the United States amended or concluded after
+1978, unless the agreement specifically allows for such transfers. Finally, the section
+prohibits export of any major critical component of any uranium enrichment, nuclear
+fuel reprocessing, or heavy water production facility, unless a cooperation agreement
+specifically designates these items as exportable.
+
+ The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 was enacted as P.L. 95-242; 
+
+ approved March 10, 1978. Secs. 304(b) and 402 have not been amended. Minor
+changes have been incorporated into sec. 309, relating to a requirement of prior
+consultation and the reorganization of the Department of State. 
+
+ Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 32
+
+The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 was enacted to update current
+
+law to reflect growing concerns about nuclear proliferation.
+
+31 Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1996 , vol. II, p. 1417.
+
+32 Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1996 , vol. II, p. 1356.
+
+ 
+ CRS-30
+
+ Section 821 (Imposition of Procurement Sanction on Persons Engaging in 
+
+ Export Activities That Contribute to Proliferation; 22 U.S.C. 3201 note) requires
+U.S. government procurement sanctions against any U.S. person or foreign person
+if the President determines that that person has materially, and with requisite
+knowledge, contributed, through export of goods or technology, to efforts to acquire
+unsafeguarded special nuclear material, or to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or
+otherwise acquire a nuclear explosive device. Terms of the sanctions are that the U.S.
+government may not, for 12 months, procure from or enter into procurement
+contracts with the sanctioned individual. Sanctions may be terminated after 12
+months if the President determines and certifies to Congress that the individual has
+stopped whatever activities that brought on the sanctions, and that the individual will
+not engage in such activities in the future. Otherwise, to waive the sanctions at the
+end of 12 months, the President must determine and certify to Congress, 20 days in
+advance, that continuing the sanctions would have a serious adverse effect on vital
+U.S. interests.
+
+The President is not required to apply or maintain sanctions if the articles or
+
+services provided are essential to U.S. national security; if the provider is a sole
+source; if the articles or services is essential to national security under defense
+cooperative agreements; if the articles are essential spare parts, essential component
+parts, routine servicing or maintenance, or information and technology essential to
+U.S. production. Sanctions may also not be required if the individual relied on an
+advisory opinion of the State Department stating that a particular activity was not
+deemed to be sanctionable.
+
+In the case of a foreign person, the President is required to enter into
+
+consultation with the foreign government with primary jurisdiction over that person,
+and thus may delay the imposition of sanction for up to 90 days. Sanctions may be
+further averted if the President determines and certifies that the foreign government
+has taken steps to end the foreign person’s activities.
+
+ Section 823 (Role of International Financial Institutions; 22 U.S.C. 3201 
+
+ note) requires the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct U.S. executive directors of
+international financial institutions to use voice and vote to oppose promotion of the
+acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material or the development, stockpiling,
+or use of nuclear explosive devices by any non-nuclear-weapon state.
+
+ Section 824 (Prohibition on Assisting Nuclear Proliferation Through the 
+
+ Provision of Financing; 22 U.S.C. 3201 note) prohibits financial institutions and
+persons involved with financial institutions from assisting nuclear proliferation
+through the provision of financing. The section requires that when the President
+determines that a U.S. person or foreign person has engaged in a prohibited activity,
+he shall impose the following sanctions: (1) ban on dealing in U.S. government debt
+instruments; (2) ban on serving as a depositary for U.S. government funds; (3) ban on
+pursuing, directly or indirectly, new commerce in the United States; and (4) ban on
+conducting business from a new location in the United States.
+
+The President is required to consult with any foreign government that serves as
+
+primary jurisdiction for any foreign person sanctioned under this section. Sanctions
+may be delayed for 90 days while consultation with a foreign government is
+
+ 
+ CRS-31
+
+underway, and may be further averted if the foreign government takes steps to stop
+the prohibited activity.
+
+Sanctions are in place for not less than 12 months, and are terminated then only
+
+if the President determines and certifies to Congress that the person’s engagement in
+prohibited activity has ceased and will not resume. The President may waive the
+continued use of sanctions when he determines and certifies to Congress that
+continuing the restrictions would have a serious adverse effect on the safety and
+soundness of the domestic or international financial system or the domestic or
+international payments system.
+
+ The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 was enacted as title VIII of 
+
+ the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236;
+approved April 30, 1994). Sec. 157(b) of P.L. 104-164 (approved July 21, 1996)
+made changes to sec. 824, including striking out a requirement that any Presidential
+determination pursuant to subsec. (c) be reviewed by the courts.
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1a2599d0bca081e68416b6cf1376f5de397a22ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/politics/text/613fbb2fdbdd3cfd.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+Electoral Accountability and Local Government Spending in Indonesia
+
+This paper takes advantage of the
+            exogenous phasing of direct elections in districts and
+            applies the double-difference estimator to measure impacts
+            on (i) human development outcomes and (ii) the pattern of
+            public spending and revenue generation at the district
+            level. The analysis reveals that four years after the switch
+            to direct elections, there have been no significant effects
+            on human development outcomes. However, the estimates of the
+            impact of Pilkada on health expenditures at the district
+            level suggest that directly elected district officials may
+            have become more responsive to local needs at least in the
+            area of health. The composition of district expenditures
+            changes considerably during the year and sometimes the year
+            before the elections, shifting toward expenditure categories
+            that allow incumbent district heads running as candidates in
+            the direct elections to "buy" voter support.
+            Electoral reforms did not lead to higher revenue generation
+            from own sources and had no effect on the budget surplus of
+            districts with directly elected heads.
\ No newline at end of file
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7f6f2d2896b9762a024b860a315f004d28facab9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/politics/text/66b1f7796a8944c5.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
+Updated December 14, 2023
+
+ Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations 
+
+ Overview 
+
+effort are highlighted: to defend the nation; prepare to fight 
+
+The Department of Defense (DOD) defines cyberspace as a 
+
+and win the nation’s wars; protect the domain with allies 
+
+global domain within the information environment (IE) 
+
+and partners; and build enduring advantages in cyberspace. 
+
+consisting of the interdependent networks of information 
+technology infrastructures and resident data, including the 
+
+ Cyber Mission Force 
+
+internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, 
+
+DOD began to build a Cyber Mission Force (CMF) in 2012 
+
+and embedded processors and controllers. Joint Publication 
+
+to carry out DOD’s cyber missions. The CMF consists of 
+
+(JP) 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations describes 
+
+133 teams that are organized to meet DOD’s three cyber 
+
+cyberspace operations as the employment of cyberspace 
+
+missions. Specifically, Cyber Mission Force teams support 
+
+capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve 
+
+these mission sets though their respective assignments: 
+
+objectives in or through cyberspace. The DOD Information 
+Network (DODIN) is a global infrastructure carrying DOD, 
+
+• Cyber National Mission Teams defend the nation by 
+
+national security, and related intelligence community 
+
+observing adversary activity, blocking attacks, and 
+
+information and intelligence. 
+
+maneuvering in cyberspace to defeat them. 
+
+Cyberspace operations are composed of the military, 
+
+• Cyber Combat Mission Teams conduct military cyber 
+
+intelligence, and ordinary business operations of the DOD 
+
+operations in support of combatant commands. 
+
+in and through cyberspace. Military cyberspace operations 
+use cyberspace capabilities to create effects that support 
+
+• Cyber Protection Teams defend the DOD information 
+
+operations across the physical domains and cyberspace. 
+
+networks, protect priority missions, and prepare cyber 
+forces for combat. 
+
+Cyberspace operations are categorized into the following: 
+
+• Cyber Support Teams provide analytic and planning 
+
+• Offensive Cyberspace Operations , intended to project 
+
+support to National Mission and Combat Mission teams. 
+
+power by the application of force in and through 
+cyberspace. These operations are authorized like 
+
+CMF teams reached full operational capacity at over 6,200 
+
+operations in the physical domains. 
+
+individuals in May 2018. Organizationally, the Cyber 
+Mission Force is an entity of the United States Cyber 
+
+• Defensive Cyberspace Operations , to defend DOD or 
+
+Command. 
+
+other friendly cyberspace. These are both passive and 
+active defense operations and are conducted inside and 
+
+ United States Cyber Command 
+
+outside of DODIN. 
+
+In response to the growing cyber threat, in 2009 the 
+Secretary of Defense directed the establishment of a new 
+
+• DODIN Operations , to design, build, configure, secure, military command devoted to cyber activities. 
+
+operate, maintain, and sustain DOD communications 
+
+USCYBERCOM’s stated mission is to “to direct, 
+
+systems and networks across the entire DODIN. 
+
+synchronize, and coordinate cyberspace planning and 
+operations to defend and advance national interests in 
+
+ Cyber Strategy 
+
+collaboration with domestic and international partners.” 
+
+In March 2023, the White House released a national 
+
+Elevated to a unified combatant command in May 2018, 
+
+cybersecurity strategy consisting of five pillars: (1) defend 
+
+USCYBERCOM is commanded by a four-star general, who 
+
+critical infrastructure; (2) disrupt and dismantle threat 
+
+is also the director of the National Security Agency and 
+
+actors; (3) shape market forces to drive security and 
+
+chief of the Central Security Service. The commander 
+
+resilience; (4) invest in a resilient future; and (5) forge 
+
+manages day-to-day global cyberspace operations and leads 
+
+international partnerships to pursue shared goals. 
+
+defense and protection of DODIN. Each of the military 
+services provides support to USCYBERCOM. 
+
+In 2022, DOD issued a new, classified Cyber Strategy, 
+superseding the unclassified 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy. 
+
+ Military Service Components 
+
+The unclassified summary of the 2022 Strategy (released in 
+2023) maintains the previous strategy’s emphasis on 
+
+United States Army: Army Cyber Command 
+
+operations to defend forward, meaning to disrupt or halt 
+
+United States Navy: Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet 
+
+malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that 
+
+United States Air Force: 16th Air Force/Air Forces Cyber 
+
+falls below the level of armed conflict. Defending forward 
+may involve an aggressive active defense, meaning 
+
+United States Marine Corps: Marine Corps Forces 
+
+activities designed to disrupt an adversary’s network when 
+
+Cyberspace Command 
+
+hostile activity is suspected. Four complementary lines of 
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+ 
+ Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations 
+
+Some services may reorganize their Cyber Commands into 
+
+operations in cyberspace, including clandestine operations, 
+
+Information Warfare Commands or similarly named 
+
+short of hostilities or in areas in which hostilities are not 
+
+commands to emphasize the role of information. 
+
+occurring; it also states that a clandestine military activity 
+or operation in cyberspace shall be considered a traditional 
+
+ Other Defense Components 
+
+military activity (TMA). Section 1642 of the FY2019 
+
+Other entities within the DOD and the IC are tasked with a 
+
+NDAA provides authority for DOD “to take appropriate 
+
+supporting or collaborative role in cyberspace operations. 
+
+and proportional action in foreign cyberspace to disrupt, 
+
+defeat, and deter” in response to “an active, systematic, and 
+
+ National Security Agency 
+
+ongoing campaign of attacks against the Government or 
+
+The National Security Agency (NSA) works closely with 
+
+people of the United States in cyberspace, including 
+
+USCYBERCOM. NSA’s two primary missions are 
+
+attempting to influence American elections and democratic 
+
+information assurance for national security systems and 
+
+political processes.” 
+
+signals intelligence. USCYBERCOM is co-located with the 
+NSA at Fort Meade, MD. The Director of NSA is dual-
+
+Under Title 50, a “covert action” is subject to a presidential 
+
+hatted as the Commander of USCYBERCOM. 
+
+finding and Intelligence Committee notification 
+requirements. 50 U.S.C. 3093 allows the President to 
+
+ Defense Information Systems Agency 
+
+authorize the conduct of a covert action if he determines 
+
+The mission of the Defense Information Systems Agency 
+
+such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign 
+
+(DISA) is to provide and ensure command and control and 
+
+policy objectives of the United States and is important to 
+
+information-sharing capabilities and a globally accessible 
+
+the U.S. national security, which determination shall be set 
+
+enterprise information infrastructure in direct support to 
+
+forth in a finding that shall be in writing, unless immediate 
+
+joint warfighters across the full spectrum of military 
+
+action is required. TMAs are excepted from this 
+
+operations. The Director of DISA is responsible for the 
+
+requirement. The FY2018 NDAA required notification of 
+
+remediation of critical DODIN infrastructure issues. The 
+
+the use of cyber weapons and quarterly cyber operations 
+
+Joint Force Headquarters – DODIN (JFHQ-DODIN) 
+
+briefings to the congressional Armed Services Committees. 
+
+oversees the day-to-day operation of DOD’s networks and 
+actively defends the DODIN. The JFHQ-DODIN 
+
+The Obama Administration’s classified 2012 Presidential 
+
+commander is dual-hatted as the director of DISA. 
+
+Policy Directive 20 governed U.S. cyber operations policy, 
+but it did not grant new authorities. According to the former 
+
+ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
+
+officials, the document required interagency approval for 
+
+ Cyber Policy 
+
+significant cyber operations. In September 2018, the White 
+
+This is the Office of Primary Responsibility in the Office of 
+
+House acknowledged replacing it with new, classified 
+
+the Secretary of Defense for policy matters related to 
+
+guidance, National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, 
+
+activities in cyber or involving cyber systems. Its mission 
+
+which reportedly offers more authority to the commander of 
+
+includes ensuring cyber-related activities are integrated into 
+
+USCYBERCOM. 
+
+national and DOD strategies; and developing, coordinating 
+and overseeing implementation of U.S. government and 
+
+ Law of Armed Conflict in Cyberspace 
+
+DOD policy and strategy for military and intelligence cyber 
+
+The law of war regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It 
+
+operations activities. It also works with stakeholders and 
+
+encompasses all international law binding on the United 
+
+partners across government. 
+
+States, including treaties and international agreements to 
+which the United States is a party, and applicable 
+
+ Federal Role 
+
+customary international law. DOD policy states that the 
+
+The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead 
+
+fundamental principles of the law of war will apply to 
+
+federal department for critical infrastructure protection and 
+
+cyberspace operations. 
+
+nonmilitary federal cybersecurity. DOD is responsible for 
+supporting the DHS coordination of efforts to protect the 
+
+ Relevant Statutes 
+
+Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and the DODIN portion of 
+the DIB. Together, the two are charged with defending the 
+
+Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces, Section 394: Authorities 
+
+U.S. homeland and U.S. national interests against 
+
+concerning military cyber operations. 
+
+cyberattacks of significant consequence. Military cyber 
+
+50, U.S. Code , War and National Defense, Section 3093: Secure 
+
+assets may be deployed in the event of a major cyberattack 
+
+U.S. interests by conducting military and foreign intelligence 
+
+on U.S. critical infrastructure only when directed to do so. 
+
+operations in cyberspace. 
+
+ Authorities 
+
+ 
+
+Section 954 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
+
+ Other Resources 
+
+(NDAA) for FY2012 affirms that “the Department of 
+
+DOD. Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations , 
+
+Defense has the capability, and upon direction by the 
+
+December 2022. 
+
+President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace 
+to defend our Nation, Allies, and interests, subject to the 
+
+DOD. 2023 Summary of the Cyber Strategy of the Department of 
+
+policy principles and legal regimes that the Department 
+
+ Defense, September 2023. 
+
+follows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed 
+conflict and the War Powers Resolution.” Section 1632 of 
+the FY2019 NDAA affirms that DOD may conduct 
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+ 
+ Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations 
+
+ 
+
+ IF10537 
+
+ Catherine A. Theohary , Specialist in National Security 
+Policy, Cyber and Information Operations 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to 
+congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. 
+Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has 
+been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the 
+United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be 
+reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include 
+copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you 
+wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+ 
+
+ https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10537 · VERSION 11 · UPDATED
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@@ -0,0 +1,1106 @@
+Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification
+
+ March 23, 2016
+ (R40446)
+ 
+ Jump to Main Text of Report 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Contents
+
+ 
+ Background 
+
+ E-Verify 
+
+ Verification Process 
+
+ Growth and Participation 
+
+ Funding 
+
+ Recent Proposals on Electronic Employment Verification 
+
+ Legislation in Recent Congresses 
+
+ E-Verify Regulations 
+
+ Policy Considerations 
+
+ Unauthorized Employment 
+
+ Verification System Accuracy, Efficiency, and Capacity 
+
+ Accuracy of Findings 
+
+ Database Accuracy 
+
+ System Efficiency 
+
+ System Capacity 
+
+ Discrimination 
+
+ Employer Compliance 
+
+ Privacy 
+
+ System Usability and Employer Burden 
+
+ Conclusion 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Summary
+
+ Unauthorized immigration and unauthorized employment continue to be key issues in the ongoing debate over immigration policy. Today's discussions about these issues build on the work of prior Congresses. In 1986, following many years of debate about unauthorized immigration to the United States, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). This law sought to address unauthorized immigration, in part, by requiring all employers to examine documents presented by new hires to verify identity and work authorization and to complete and retain employment eligibility verification (I-9) forms. Ten years later, in the face of a growing unauthorized population, Congress attempted to strengthen the employment verification process by establishing pilot programs for electronic verification, as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). 
+
+ The Basic Pilot program (known now as E-Verify), the first of the three IIRIRA employment verification pilots to be implemented and the only one still in operation, began in November 1997. Originally scheduled to terminate in November 2001, it has been extended several times. It is currently authorized until September 30, 2016, in accordance with the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ).
+
+ E-Verify is administered by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). As of March 7, 2016, there were 642,782 employers enrolled in E-Verify, representing more than 2.1 million hiring sites. E-Verify is a largely voluntary program, but there are some mandatory participation requirements. Among them is a rule, which became effective on September 8, 2009, requiring certain federal contracts to contain a new clause committing contractors to use E-Verify. 
+
+ Under E-Verify, participating employers enter information into an online system about their new hires (name, date of birth, Social Security number, immigration/citizenship status, and alien number, if applicable). This information is automatically compared with information in Social Security Administration and, if necessary, DHS databases to verify identity and employment eligibility. 
+
+ Legislation on electronic employment eligibility verification has been considered in recent Congresses. In weighing proposals on electronic employment verification, Congress may find it useful to evaluate them in terms of their potential impact on a set of related issues: unauthorized employment; verification system accuracy, efficiency, and capacity; discrimination; employer compliance; privacy; and verification system usability and employer burden.
+
+ 
+ 
+ Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification
+
+ 
+ Background
+
+ Many years of debate about unauthorized immigration to the United States culminated in the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. 1 That year, there were an estimated 3.2 million unauthorized immigrants (illegal aliens) in the country. 2 IRCA coupled legalization programs for certain segments of the unauthorized population with provisions to deter future unauthorized immigration by reducing the magnet of employment. These latter provisions reflected a belief, widely held then and now, that most unauthorized aliens enter and remain in the United States in order to work. To reduce the job magnet, IRCA amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 3 to add a new Section 274A, which makes it unlawful to knowingly hire, recruit, or refer for a fee, or continue to employ, an unauthorized alien, and requires all employers to examine documents presented by new hires to verify identity and work authorization and to complete and retain employment eligibility verification (I-9) forms. These INA Section 274A provisions are sometimes referred to collectively as employer sanctions . 
+
+ The IRCA provisions did not have the effect of curtailing future illegal immigration. After falling to an estimated 1.9 million in 1988 as eligible unauthorized aliens legalized their status, the unauthorized population began to grow. By the early 1990s, it had surpassed pre-IRCA levels. 4 The I-9 process was effectively undermined by the ready availability of genuine-looking fraudulent documents. The challenge that document fraud continues to pose to the I-9 system was discussed in a 2009 report prepared for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS): 
+
+ [T]he likelihood of employers detecting counterfeit documents depends on the quality of the documents, the employers' familiarity with immigration and other documents, and their expertise in detecting fraudulent documents. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) expects employers to exercise reasonable diligence in reviewing documents but does not expect them to be experts or to question reasonable-appearing documents. 5 
+
+ Ten years after the enactment of IRCA, Congress attempted to strengthen the employment verification process as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). 6 IIRIRA directed the Attorney General to conduct three largely voluntary pilot programs for electronic employment eligibility confirmation. After examining documents and completing I-9 forms as required under INA Section 274A, 7 employers participating in a pilot program would seek to confirm the identity and employment eligibility of their new hires. IIRIRA tasked the Attorney General with establishing a confirmation system to respond to inquiries made by participants in these pilot programs "at any time through a toll-free telephone line or other toll-free electronic media concerning an individual's identity and whether the individual is authorized to be employed." The former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) within the U.S. Department of Justice had initial responsibility for administering the employment eligibility confirmation pilot programs. In 2003, DHS assumed this responsibility. 8 
+
+ E-Verify
+
+ The Basic Pilot program, the first of the three IIRIRA employment verification pilots to be implemented and the only one still in operation, began in November 1997 in the five states with the largest unauthorized alien populations at the time. 9 In December 2004, in accordance with P.L. 108-156 , the program became available nationwide, although it remained primarily voluntary. The Basic Pilot program has changed over the years. Since July 2005, it has been entirely Internet-based. It is administered by DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).
+
+ The Basic Pilot Program was briefly renamed the Employment Eligibility Verification (EEV) Program by the Administration of George W. Bush, and was again renamed E-Verify by that Administration in August 2007. 10 IIRIRA, as originally enacted, directed the Attorney General to terminate the Basic Pilot program four years after going into effect, unless Congress provided otherwise. Congress has extended the life of the Basic Pilot program/E-Verify several times. Most recently, it extended E-Verify until September 30, 2016, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. 11 
+
+ Verification Process
+
+ As part of the I-9 process, all employers must review documents presented by new hires to verify their identity and employment authorization and, along with the new hires, must complete I-9 forms. (A new revised I-9 form was published by USCIS in 2013.) 12 Employers participating in E-Verify then must submit information from the I-9 form about their new hires (name, date of birth, Social Security number, immigration/citizenship status, and alien number, if applicable) via the Internet for confirmation. 
+
+ The information in the employer's query is automatically compared with information in SSA's primary database, the Numerical Identification File (Numident), which contains records of individuals issued Social Security numbers. For those employees identifying themselves as citizens, if the information submitted by the employer matches the information in Numident and SSA records confirm citizenship, the employer is notified that the employee's work authorization is verified. If the information submitted by the employer about a self-identified citizen matches the information in Numident but SSA records cannot confirm citizenship, the information is automatically checked against USCIS naturalization databases. If this check confirms citizenship, the employer is notified that the employee's work authorization is verified. If the employer-submitted information about a new hire does not match information in Numident, the employer is notified that the employee has received an SSA tentative nonconfirmation finding. 
+
+ In cases in which the employer-submitted information matches SSA records but the individual self-identifies as a noncitizen, the information is sent electronically to USCIS for verification of work authorization. If the USCIS electronic check confirms work authorization, the employer is so notified. If the electronic check does not confirm work authorization, an Immigration Status Verifier (ISV) at USCIS checks additional databases. If the ISV is unable to confirm work authorization, the employer is notified that the employee has received a USCIS tentative nonconfirmation finding. 13 
+
+ Employers are required to notify their employees about SSA and USCIS tentative nonconfirmation findings. If an employee chooses to contest a tentative nonconfirmation finding, the employer must refer the case to SSA or USCIS, as appropriate. 14 The employee has eight federal government work days from the referral date to contact the appropriate agency to resolve the issue. If an employee does not contest the finding within that period or the contest is unsuccessful, the system issues a final nonconfirmation. 
+
+ Growth and Participation
+
+ E-Verify has been growing in recent years. On January 31, 2006, there were 5,272 employers enrolled in the program, representing 22,710 hiring sites. Three years later, on January 10, 2009, there were 103,038 employers enrolled, representing 414,110 hiring sites. Three years after that, on March 17, 2012, there were 345,467 employers enrolled, representing more than 1,090,000 hiring sites. On March 7, 2016, employer enrollment in E-Verify stood at 642,782, and there were more than 2.1 million participating sites. 15 Based on the number of firms in the United States in 2013 according to U.S. Census Bureau data, 16 these enrolled employers represented about 11% of U.S. employers.
+
+ As the number of enrolled employers has grown, so has the number of employer queries, or cases, received by E-Verify. Between FY2007 and FY2015, the annual number of E-Verify queries increased more than ninefold, from 3.3 million to 31.7 million. 17 For general comparison purposes, there were about 61.7 million nonfarm hires in the United States in calendar year 2015, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 18 
+
+ As mentioned, E-Verify is a largely voluntary program. Under IIRIRA, however, violators of INA prohibitions on unlawful employment or those who engage in unfair immigration-related employment practices may be required to participate in a pilot program. IIRIRA also states that each department of the federal government and each Member of Congress, each officer of Congress, and the head of each legislative branch agency "shall elect to participate in a pilot program." 19 In August 2007, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a memorandum requiring all federal departments and agencies to begin verifying their new hires through E-Verify as of October 1, 2007. 20 In addition, federal regulations that went into effect in 2008 and 2009 included new E-Verify participation requirements, as discussed below.
+
+ Funding
+
+ USCIS, which administers E-Verify, is a fee-supported agency. Until FY2007, funding for the Basic Pilot program came from unrelated USCIS fees. (As discussed below, employers are not charged a fee to participate in E-Verify.) In recent years, however, Congress has provided funds for E-Verify as part of DHS/USCIS appropriated funding for Research, Development, Training, and Services. Since FY2009, Congress has appropriated at least $100.0 million each year for E-Verify. 21 For FY2016, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, includes $119.7 million for E-Verify. 22 
+
+ Recent Proposals on Electronic Employment Verification
+
+ Although the unauthorized alien resident population has declined in size since its 2007 high point of an estimated 12 million, it remains substantial. According to estimates by DHS, unauthorized alien residents in the United States numbered about 11.4 million in 2012. 23 The Pew Research Center has estimated that there were 11.2 million unauthorized residents in 2012, of which some 8.1 million were in the civilian labor force. 24 Policy makers have considered an expansion of electronic employment verification—whether though E-Verify or a new system—as a key option for addressing unauthorized employment. 
+
+ Legislation in Recent Congresses
+
+ In recent years, bills related to electronic employment eligibility verification have been introduced in Congress. These bills have variously proposed to make E-Verify permanent, make E-Verify mandatory for all employers or a subset of employers, permit or require the verification of previously hired workers through E-Verify, and authorize a new electronic employment eligibility verification system. Some bills have seen legislative action. In the 113 th Congress, the Senate passed a comprehensive immigration reform bill, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act ( S. 744 ), that included related provisions, and the House Judiciary Committee ordered to be reported the Legal Workforce Act ( H.R. 1772 ). Both of these measures would have amended the INA to permanently authorize a new electronic verification system modeled on E-Verify, which would be mandatory for all employers. 25 
+
+ While some electronic employment eligibility verification-related provisions have been enacted in recent years, these provisions have been limited and have included language to extend the E-Verify program, as noted above. 26 In the 114 th Congress, the Legal Workforce Act ( H.R. 1147 ), which is similar to the bill of the same name considered in the 113 th Congress, has been ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee. 27 
+
+ E-Verify Regulations
+
+ Several federal rules that became effective in 2008 and 2009 require employers to participate in E-Verify in order to take advantage of certain opportunities. One of these rules implements an executive order issued by President George W. Bush in 2008 to require federal contractors to conduct electronic employment eligibility verification. The order read, in part:
+
+ Executive departments and agencies that enter into contracts shall require, as a condition of each contract, that the contractor agree to use an electronic employment eligibility verification system designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to verify the employment eligibility of: (i) all persons hired during the contract term by the contractor to perform employment duties within the United States; and (ii) all persons assigned by the contractor to perform work within the United States on the Federal contract. 28 
+
+ The Secretary of Homeland Security subsequently designated E-Verify as the required employment eligibility verification system for contractors. 29 The final rule to implement the executive order was published in November 2008. 30 It requires covered federal contracts to contain a new clause committing contractors to use E-Verify "to verify that all of the contractors' new hires, and all employees (existing and new) directly performing work under Federal contracts, are authorized to work in the United States." 31 After several delays, the rule became applicable on September 8, 2009. 32 
+
+ In addition, immigration regulations issued by the Bush Administration require employers to be users of E-Verify in order to be able to employ certain temporary residents (nonimmigrants). 33 In an interim final rule, effective April 8, 2008, DHS extended the maximum period of optional practical training (OPT) for foreign students on F-1 visas who have completed a science, technology, engineering, or mathematics degree. Under this rule, eligible F-1 students can extend their post-graduation OPT period, previously limited to 12 months, for 17 additional months, for a maximum OPT period of 29 months. In order to be eligible for this extension, however, the students must be employed by an employer that is enrolled in and is a participant in good standing in E-Verify. 34 
+
+ A DHS final rule on the H-2A temporary agricultural worker program, effective January 17, 2009, likewise requires employer participation in E-Verify as a condition of receiving an employment authorization benefit. Under the rule, an H-2A worker who is waiting for an extension of H-2A status based on a petition filed by a new employer can begin working for that new employer before the extension is approved, if the new employer is enrolled in and is a participant in good standing in E-Verify. If the new employer is not an E-Verify participant, the worker would not be authorized to begin working for the new employer until the extension of stay application is approved. 35 
+
+ Policy Considerations
+
+ In weighing proposals that may emerge on electronic employment eligibility verification, policy makers may want to consider potential impacts on the key issues of unauthorized employment; verification system accuracy, efficiency, and capacity; discrimination; employer compliance; privacy; and verification system usability and employer burden.
+
+ Unauthorized Employment
+
+ The primary goal of an employment eligibility verification system is to ensure that individuals holding jobs are authorized to work in the United States. Independent studies of E-Verify, conducted for INS and DHS over the years by Westat and Temple University's Institute for Survey Research, have evaluated whether the system has reduced unauthorized employment and met other policy goals. 36 An evaluation issued by Westat in 2012 considered the accuracy of E-Verify findings, particularly for employment-authorized workers. 37 
+
+ Westat evaluators have determined that most individuals receiving final nonconfirmations (FNCs), or final findings that employment authorization cannot be confirmed, are, in fact, not authorized to work. Thus, if and when workers receiving final nonconfirmations are terminated, unauthorized employment would decrease. The extent of this decrease would depend, in part, on whether these workers were able to find other employment and if so, how long it took them to do so. It may be that E-Verify further helps reduce unauthorized employment by deterring unauthorized workers from applying for positions with employers that participate in E-Verify. 
+
+ The effectiveness of E-Verify in reducing unauthorized employment through either final nonconfirmation findings or by discouraging applications, however, is limited by the size of the program relative to overall employment. Its effectiveness is also limited by its inability to detect various forms of fraud. Under E-Verify, the information on the I-9 form is checked against information in SSA and DHS databases. The system is able to detect certain types of document fraud, such as when a new hire presents counterfeit documents containing information about a non-work authorized or nonexistent person. As discussed in the next section, however, E-Verify has only limited ability to detect other types of document fraud and identity fraud. 
+
+ In the future, the authors of the 2009 Westat report posit, E-Verify may indirectly deter unauthorized employment by increasing the cost of securing that employment. According to the report, as unauthorized workers become more knowledgeable about E-Verify, they will increasingly obtain counterfeit, borrowed, or stolen documents with information about work-authorized persons, or will use fraudulent breeder documents, such as birth certificates, to obtain "legitimate" ones. The authors speculate that the perceived need for more sophisticated forms of fraud, with more expensive price tags, may have the long-term effect of reducing unauthorized employment: 
+
+ As it becomes harder to obtain fraudulent documents that will not be detected by E-Verify, the cost of such documents will presumably increase. Therefore, an important deterrent value of the Program ultimately may be to increase the cost of obtaining unauthorized employment, which, in turn, would cause some reduction in unauthorized employment; however, the amount of such reduction cannot be easily determined. 38 
+
+ Another possible outcome, if E-Verify makes it too difficult for unauthorized aliens to obtain legitimate employment, is that they may end up working under the table, thereby increasing the risks of worker exploitation. An opinion piece on Reason Online, affiliated with Reason magazine, made this argument:
+
+ In the end, E-verify will not "turn off the tap," "dry up the pool of jobs," or "turn off the magnet." It will simply encourage workers underground, where they will be more vulnerable to abuse and less likely to pay taxes. 39 
+
+ Verification System Accuracy, Efficiency, and Capacity
+
+ In order for an electronic employment eligibility verification system to reduce unauthorized employment and not deprive legal workers of job opportunities, it must respond to queries correctly—that is, it must confirm the employment eligibility of individuals who are, in fact, authorized to work and not confirm the employment eligibility of individuals who lack work authorization. To be most effective, the system also must be efficient. IIRIRA required that the confirmation system, intended to be used as part of all three of the original pilot programs, be designed and operated to, among other things, maximize its reliability. 40 
+
+ Accuracy of Findings
+
+ Independent evaluations of E-Verify conducted by Westat and the Institute for Survey Research have analyzed the accuracy of the system using a variable known as the erroneous tentative nonconfirmation (TNC) rate for ever-authorized employees . This error rate, which can be calculated from available data, is defined as the percentage of individuals ultimately verified through the system that initially receives a tentative nonconfirmation finding. The erroneous TNC rate for ever-authorized employees was 4.8% for the first two years of the Basic Pilot Program (November 1997-December 1999 period); that is, 4.8% of the workers who were ultimately found to be work authorized first received a tentative nonconfirmation. 41 The erroneous TNC rate decreased significantly in subsequent years, amounting to 0.3% in the third quarter of FY2010 (April 2010-June 2010). 42 
+
+ There are important limitations to the erroneous TNC rate as a measurement of error, however. The variable does not take into account work-authorized individuals who receive tentative nonconfirmations but who, for whatever reason, do not contest them; these individuals are not classified as "ever-authorized." In addition, the data used to calculate the erroneous TNC rate include individuals who are found to have work authorization by the system, but who are not , in fact, work authorized. Eliminating these false positives (used here to refer to findings that unauthorized workers are work-eligible) from the calculation would change the error rate. Thus, as explained in the 2009 Westat report:
+
+ [T]he erroneous TNC rate is an imperfect measure of program success because it underestimates the inaccuracy rate for authorized workers and because it is not possible to produce an estimate of an analogous inaccuracy rate for non-employment-authorized workers. 43 
+
+ There are similar limitations to the related "confirmed after initial mismatch" statistic reported by USCIS. It represents the percentage of all E-Verify cases that are confirmed as work authorized after receiving and successfully contesting a TNC finding. 44 USCIS considers this statistic an important performance metric for E-Verify but does not use it as a measure of the program's accuracy. 45 
+
+ As part of its 2009 evaluation, Westat developed new measures of inaccuracy to more fully assess the system's performance. These new inaccuracy rates are estimates of the consistency of E-Verify findings with actual work authorization status. The inaccuracy rate for authorized workers is an estimate of the percentage of work-authorized workers not initially found to be authorized to work through E-Verify. For the period from April 2008 to June 2008, the inaccuracy rate for authorized workers was approximately 0.8%, meaning that less than 1% of authorized workers were initially found by the system to lack work authorization. 46 
+
+ Analogously, the inaccuracy rate for unauthorized workers is an estimate of the percentage of workers without work authorization that is initially and incorrectly found to be employment authorized through E-Verify. For the April 2008-June 2008 period, the inaccuracy rate for unauthorized workers was approximately 54%, meaning that about half of the unauthorized workers checked through E-Verify were incorrectly found to be authorized to work. The total inaccuracy rate is an estimate of the percentage of all workers checked through E-Verify who receive inaccurate initial work authorization findings. For the April 2008-June 2008 period, E-Verify's total inaccuracy rate was approximately 4.1%, meaning that 4.1% of workers received initial E-Verify findings that were inconsistent with their actual work authorization status. 47 
+
+ There are several key reasons for the inconsistencies between E-Verify findings and actual work authorization status. Inaccurate findings for authorized workers are due mainly to data input errors and inaccurate or out-of-date federal government records. For unauthorized workers, incorrect work authorization findings are due mainly to fraud—both document fraud, in which employees present counterfeit or invalid documents or fraudulently obtained "valid" documents, and identity fraud, in which employees present valid documents issued to other individuals. The 2009 and 2012 Westat reports cited identity fraud as a chief source of inaccurate work authorization findings for unauthorized workers. While E-Verify can detect certain types of document fraud, it has limited ability to detect such fraud when the "counterfeit documents are of reasonable quality and contain information about actual work-authorized persons who resemble the worker providing the documentation." 48 
+
+ Some observers, like Jim Harper of the Cato Institute, are particularly concerned about the potential for increased identity fraud if E-Verify were to become mandatory for all employers. In written testimony for a 2007 House hearing on employment verification and worksite enforcement, Harper took the position that expanding E-Verify would increase identity fraud. He argued that to gain approval under a nationwide electronic system, unauthorized workers would seek "documents with genuine, but rarely used, name/SSN combinations," which would "increase illicit trade in Americans' Social Security numbers." 49 
+
+ Initiatives to Improve Accuracy
+
+ USCIS has made changes to E-Verify over the years to address the sources of inaccuracy for both authorized and unauthorized workers. One set of changes aims to reduce inaccuracies for authorized workers due to data input errors and incorrect federal government records. Since September 2007, in cases where an initial electronic check of SSA or USCIS records indicates a mismatch, the system automatically prompts the employer to double check the data in a query and make any corrections before E-Verify issues an SSA TNC or refers a case to an USCIS Immigration Status Verifier for additional database checks. 50 A December 2009 addition "enables E-Verify to recognize European date format and common clerical errors of transposed visa and passport numbers." 51 
+
+ Other enhancements involve inclusion of additional databases in the E-Verify process that are automatically checked, as appropriate, before a tentative nonconfirmation is issued. In a May 2008 change, which is known as Naturalization Phase I and is described above as part of the standard verification process, USCIS naturalization databases are automatically checked in cases in which SSA records cannot confirm citizenship for a self-identified citizen. 52 This change seeks to reduce the number of TNCs issued to naturalized citizens whose SSA records have not been updated to reflect their citizenship status. 53 In February 2009, Department of State passport records were incorporated into the E-Verify program. These records are checked when a self-identified citizen presents a U.S. passport to establish identity and employment eligibility as part of the I-9 process and DHS or SSA cannot immediately confirm work eligibility. 54 In addition, in May 2008, real time arrival data for noncitizens from the Integrated Border Inspection System was added to the system. 55 In October 2012, access to another database—DHS's Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) database—was added to E-Verify. These enhancements are intended to reduce mismatches for recent arrivals.
+
+ Another initiative, known as E-Verify Self Check, enables individuals to voluntarily check their work authorization status online through E-Verify to determine whether there are any mismatches between the information they enter and the information in SSA or DHS databases that need to be corrected. First implemented on a pilot basis in March 2011, E-Verify Self Check became available nationwide in February 2012. 56 
+
+ USCIS has likewise implemented enhancements to E-Verify aimed at reducing inaccuracies for unauthorized workers. In September 2007, the agency launched a Photo Screening Tool to improve E-Verify's ability to detect a certain type of identity fraud. The Photo Tool comes into play if a new hire presents an Employment Authorization Document (EAD), a Permanent Resident Card (green card), or a U.S. Passport 57 to establish employment authorization. In such cases, the employer checks the photo on the document provided by the new hire against the image stored in USCIS databases. This tool enables detection of legitimately issued documents that have been altered by photo-substitution. The effectiveness of the Photo Tool, however, is greatly limited by the fact that new hires do not have to show either an EAD, a green card, or a U.S. Passport; they can opt to show other documents to evidence identity and employment eligibility. 58 According to USCIS, approximately 15% of all E-Verify cases in FY2012 used the Photo Tool. 59 In FY2015, 5% of all E-Verify cases used the Photo Tool. 60 
+
+ Another feature to reduce inaccurate findings for unauthorized workers is known as Records and Information from DMVs for E-Verify (RIDE). Launched in June 2011, RIDE seeks to detect document fraud in cases in which a new hire presents a driver's license or state-issued identification card to establish identity as part of the I-9 process. When a new hire presents a driver's license or state-issued identification card from a participating state, RIDE enables E-Verify to compare the information on the document against state records. Mississippi became DHS's first partner in this effort in June 2011. Since then, six other states have joined the RIDE program. 61 
+
+ A November 2013 enhancement to E-Verify enables the system to lock Social Security numbers that appear to have been used fraudulently. According to USCIS, it "will use a combination of algorithms, detection reports and analysis to identify patterns of fraudulent SSN use and then lock the number in E-Verify." 62 
+
+ A more recent enhancement, known as myE-Verify, builds on this lock feature and the Self Check initiative described above. Launched in October 2014 in five states and the District of Columbia and available nationwide since April 2015 with additional features, myE-Verify incorporates Self Check and enables individuals to track the status of an E-Verify case. By creating a myE-Verify account, individuals also have the ability to lock their own Social Security numbers to prevent unauthorized use in E-Verify and to track where their identities have been used in E-Verify and Self Check.
+
+ E-Verify does not have a formal administrative review process through which employees can request a review of FNC findings, and there have been discussions about adding one for a number of years. In December 2015 testimony prepared for the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security, USCIS Director Leon Rodriguez indicated that USCIS was developing such a formal process "to help reduce erroneous results." 63 
+
+ Incorporating biometrics into the E-Verify system also has been suggested as a way to address identity fraud. Biometric proposals, however, are highly controversial and raise a variety of concerns, including about costs and worker privacy (see " Privacy "). 
+
+ Database Accuracy
+
+ An accurate verification system requires accurate underlying data. Data inaccuracies can be a source of false positives (i.e., findings that unauthorized workers are work-eligible) as well as false negatives (i.e., findings that authorized workers are not work-eligible). In establishing the Basic Pilot program and the other pilots, IIRIRA directed SSA and the former INS to maintain accurate records. 64 
+
+ The 2002 evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program found that there were "serious problems with the timeliness and accuracy of the INS database." 65 The 2007 Westat evaluation reported progress on this front, but indicated that additional improvements were needed. 66 
+
+ The accuracy of SSA's Numident database was the subject of a report issued by the SSA Inspector General in December 2006. 67 Prompted by a congressional request, this review examined the accuracy of the Numident fields relied on by E-Verify. The report found Numident to be "generally accurate," but also "identified some discrepancies" that could result in employers receiving incorrect information in the employment eligibility verification process. More specifically, the SSA Inspector General estimated that "discrepancies in approximately 17.8 million (4.1%) of the 435 million Numident records could result in incorrect feedback when submitted through Basic Pilot." The report noted particular concern about the "extent of incorrect citizenship information" in Numident for foreign-born U.S. citizens and noncitizens. 68 
+
+ The 2009 Westat evaluation of E-Verify reported improvement in database accuracy, stating that "the accuracy of the USCIS database, as measured by the erroneous TNC rate for workers ever found authorized, has improved considerably" (see " Initiatives to Improve Accuracy "). 69 The 2012 Westat report noted continuing efforts to improve database accuracy, while also making clear that "[m]aintaining accurate, timely, and complete information on biographic data and immigration and citizenship status presents a major challenge for Federal databases accessed by E-Verify." The report cited as reasons for these ongoing challenges the changing nature of immigration status and a lack of public knowledge about the need to report name changes to SSA and immigration agencies. 70 
+
+ System Efficiency
+
+ The efficiency of an employment eligibility verification system, like its accuracy, is multidimensional. One measure of efficiency used in the independent evaluations of E-Verify is the percentage of employees verified automatically or after initial review by a USCIS Immigration Status Verifier—without a tentative nonconfirmation being issued (see " Verification Process "). As reported by Westat, in the June 2004-March 2007 period, 93% of cases were verified automatically or after initial ISV review. In April 2008-June 2008, 96% of cases were verified automatically or after initial ISV review. According to USCIS, in FY2015, 98.9% of cases were verified automatically, either instantly or within 24 hours. 71 
+
+ At the same time, some employer groups and advocates for immigrants and low-income families have maintained that E-Verify is not efficient. In opposing legislative efforts to require certain employers to use E-Verify, groups have argued that such mandatory participation would result in increased bureaucracy and hiring delays. 72 
+
+ System Capacity
+
+ The capacity of an electronic employment eligibility verification system to handle queries about most or all newly hired workers in the United States has arisen as an issue in light of proposals to expand electronic verification or make it mandatory for all employers. In FY2015, as noted, E-Verify received 31.7 million queries. In 2011 congressional testimony, a USCIS official reported on E-Verify's capacity to handle an expanded workload: "E-Verify currently has the capacity to receive at least 60 million electronic queries annually if all new hires were run through the E-Verify program." 73 
+
+ A 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report further cited information from E-Verify program officials that USCIS had tested the E-Verify system in 2007 and determined that it could process 240 million queries annually. 74 
+
+ Discrimination
+
+ At the time of IRCA's enactment, there was widespread concern that the new employer sanctions provisions would result in employment discrimination against foreign-looking or foreign-sounding work-authorized individuals as, for example, employers opted not to hire them for fear that they lacked work authorization or treated them differently than other work-authorized job applicants or workers. 75 To partly address these types of concerns, IRCA added a new Section 274B to the INA to make it an unfair immigration-related employment practice to discriminate against an individual, other than an unauthorized alien, in hiring, recruitment or referral for a fee, or termination because of the individual's national origin or the individual's citizenship or permanent immigration status. IRCA, as originally enacted, also directed GAO to report to Congress on the implementation and enforcement of Section 274A to determine, among other things, if "a pattern of discrimination has resulted" against U.S. citizens or other work-eligible jobseekers. 76 In 1990, GAO reported that widespread discrimination had occurred as a result of IRCA. 77 Congress, however, took no action on these findings.
+
+ One goal of the IIRIRA employment eligibility verification pilot programs was to reduce the type of discrimination associated with the I-9 process. To that end, the law required that the confirmation system, intended to be used as part of all three of the original pilot programs, be designed and operated 
+
+ to have reasonable safeguards against the system's resulting in unlawful discriminatory practices based on national origin or citizenship status, including (A) the selective or unauthorized use of the system to verify eligibility; (B) the use of the system prior to an offer of employment; or (C) the exclusion of certain individuals from consideration for employment as a result of a perceived likelihood that additional verification will be required, beyond what is required for most job applicants. 78 
+
+ These enumerated behaviors are prohibited under the E-Verify system, but evaluations have found that some employers nevertheless practice them (see " Employer Compliance "). 
+
+ The potential impact of the IIRIRA pilot programs on employment discrimination was the subject of much debate during congressional consideration of the legislation. Some stakeholders maintained that the availability of electronic verification could make employers more likely to hire foreign-born individuals, thus reducing discrimination. On the other hand, immigrant advocates expressed concerns that discrimination would increase, even if employers followed proper pilot program procedures. They argued, for example, that work-authorized foreign-born individuals would be more likely than their U.S.-born counterparts to receive tentative nonconfirmations and, thus, to be subject to the inconveniences and other negative consequences associated with these findings. 
+
+ Evaluations of E-Verify have found evidence to support both of these predictions. In 2013, Westat conducted a survey of E-Verify employers and found the following:
+
+ Across survey years, a large majority of E-Verify users (75 percent) reported that their companies were neither more nor less willing to hire job applicants who appear to be foreign-born than they were prior to using E-Verify. 79 
+
+ Among those reporting an effect, the percentage of users across survey years who indicated that the system made them more willing to hire immigrant workers was substantially greater than the percentage who indicated that it made them less likely to do so. 80 
+
+ At the same time, evaluations of E-Verify have consistently found that work-authorized foreign-born workers are more likely than U.S.-born workers to receive erroneous tentative nonconfirmations (initial findings that an individual's work authorization cannot be confirmed). Based on this increased likelihood of receiving an erroneous TNC, the 2009 Westat report stated that "E-Verify contributes to post-hiring discrimination against foreign-born workers." 81 The report discussed some of the impacts on workers of receiving a TNC, such as missed work time to contest the finding and associated financial costs. In addition, according to the report, some work-authorized employees who receive TNCs may quit their jobs. In cases in which employers do not follow proper procedures, a TNC may result in a worker being fired. 82 
+
+ Historically, naturalized U.S. citizens have had relatively high erroneous TNC rates compared to U.S.-born citizens or work-authorized noncitizens. These relatively high rates have been attributed mainly to SSA records not reflecting the fact that the noncitizens had naturalized. USCIS has taken steps to address this problem with apparent success. The Naturalization Phase I initiative, as described in " Initiatives to Improve Accuracy ," was credited in the 2009 Westat report with bringing about "a dramatic reduction in the erroneous TNC rate for foreign-born citizens." 83 In a March 2009 news release, USCIS reported that the addition of passport data was "already reducing the incidences of mismatches among foreign-born citizens." 84 In a related effort to correct erroneous TNCs issued to naturalized citizens, USCIS implemented the Naturalization Phase II initiative in May 2008 to give naturalized citizens who receive a tentative nonconfirmation the option of telephoning USCIS, rather than visiting an SSA field office, to resolve the issue. 85 
+
+ Employer Compliance
+
+ Employer compliance in the context of E-Verify refers to employers' properly following the program's policies and procedures, which include submitting an E-Verify query to verify a new hire's employment eligibility within three days after the hire date, providing written notice to employees of tentative nonconfirmation findings, and not taking adverse actions against employees who choose to contest TNC findings. Employer compliance helps strengthen E-Verify, while employer noncompliance can reduce the effectiveness of the program in curtailing unauthorized employment and can result in discrimination. In the interest of preventing discrimination, as noted, certain employer behaviors are prohibited by law. These include the selective use of the system to verify employment eligibility and the use of the system to prescreen job applicants.
+
+ The 2009 Westat evaluation found that employer compliance with the various E-Verify requirements was "generally much higher than noncompliance." In a notable example, the data analyzed by Westat supported the idea that employers were not selectively submitting queries only for citizens or noncitizens. The discussion of employer compliance in the 2009 report, however, focused mainly on "noncompliant behaviors of interest." 86 Based on self-reported information in the 2008 employer survey, supplemented by information from worker interviews, record reviews, and other sources, the evaluation identified a range of prohibited behaviors that employers were engaging in, including the following:
+ Some employers did not follow procedures with respect to training employees on the E-Verify system.
+
+ Some employers used E-Verify to screen job applicants.
+
+ Some employers used E-Verify for existing employees.
+
+ Some employers did not notify employees of TNC findings at all or did not provide written notification of TNCs.
+
+ There was evidence that a small number of employers discouraged employees with TNCs from contesting the findings.
+
+ Some employers took prohibited adverse actions against employees while they were contesting TNC findings. These actions included restricting work assignments, delaying training, or reducing pay.
+
+ Some employers did not always follow the legal requirement to promptly terminate the employment of employees receiving FNC findings. 87 
+ The 2012 Westat report further discussed the negative implications for E-Verify accuracy of employers' not following proper procedures when employees receive TNCs. According to Westat, if all employment-authorized workers were properly informed of tentative nonconfirmations, there would be a significant decrease in the issuance of final nonconfirmations to work-authorized workers. As mentioned, the 2012 Westat report indicated that about 94% of workers who received FNCs in FY2009 were unauthorized workers. This measure is known as the FNC accuracy rate. The Westat evaluators estimated as part of the 2012 report that if all employment-authorized workers had been informed of their TNCs and the contesting process, the FNC accuracy rate in FY2009 would have increased to 99%. 88 
+
+ Westat's 2013 survey of E-Verify employers found that "[o]verall, users continued to report high levels of compliance with E-Verify policies." Some employers, however, did report engaging in prohibited behavior. For example, Westat found instances of selective use of E-Verify, as "some employers self-reported that they used E-Verify for workers they believed to be not work authorized." 89 With respect to TNCs, the 2013 survey found "[A]mong E-Verify employers that had ever received a TNC finding for a worker, some reported taking adverse action against such workers including restricting work assignments ... and delaying training until work authorization could be confirmed." 90 In addition, Westat reported:
+
+ Across survey years, a small percentage of employers agreed with the practice of discouraging workers from contesting TNCs, either because the process was perceived to be too time-consuming or it rarely resulted in work authorizations. 91 
+
+ A key issue to consider with respect to employer compliance is the extent to which requiring employers to participate in E-Verify or another electronic employment eligibility verification system, as under some legislative proposals, could affect compliance. It seems plausible that, for a variety of reasons, mandatory participants as a whole may have lower levels of compliance than voluntary users. Westat, however, found little support for this hypothesis in its 2013 survey of E-Verify employers. It instead concluded "With a few exceptions, mandated users were no more or less likely to comply with procedures compared to voluntary users." 92 
+
+ Privacy
+
+ Employee privacy was another issue considered in the development of the original IIRIRA pilot programs. Among the IIRIRA requirements for the confirmation system was that the system be designed and operated "with appropriate ... safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure of personal information." 93 
+
+ The 2009 Westat report stated that SSA and USCIS had taken steps to protect worker privacy in connection with E-Verify. It explained that both agencies had policies to ensure the security of the databases used in E-Verify. According to the report, all employers participating in E-Verify must sign a memorandum of understanding and are only given access to the cases they submit.
+
+ The 2009 report also noted some potential privacy-related weaknesses of E-Verify. Among them is a concern that individuals could improperly use E-Verify to obtain information about others. Another potential weakness involves employers not informing workers that they have received TNCs in private settings. In the 2008 employer survey conducted as part of the 2009 Westat evaluation of E-Verify, 89% of employers that had received any TNCs reported that they consistently informed workers of TNCs in private. That figure was 93% in the 2013 survey. 94 
+
+ Proposals to expand E-Verify, particularly proposals to make the system mandatory for all employers, have heightened the concerns of some interested parties about employee privacy. In his 2007 House testimony, Jim Harper of the Cato Institute argued that a nationwide electronic employment verification system would have serious privacy consequences. He drew sharp distinctions between a paper-based I-9 system, in which employee information "remains practically obscure," and a web-based electronic system, in which the entered information is very easy for the participating agencies to access, copy, and use. In Harper's view, any electronic verification system would be at risk of becoming "a surveillance system ... that observes all American workers." 95 
+
+ The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) likewise expressed concerns about the threats to privacy posed by a mandatory E-Verify system, in a statement submitted to the House Judiciary Committee at the time of the committee's E-Verify hearing in February 2013. 96 The statement argued that a mandatory E-Verify system "would create a virtual national ID and would lay the groundwork for a possible biometric national ID system." In the view of the ACLU, a "national ID system" would threaten personal privacy and individual freedom:
+
+ Our society is built on the presumption of privacy: as long as we obey the law, we are all free to go where we want and do what we want ... without the government (or the private sector) looking over our shoulders or monitoring our behavior. A national ID system would turn those assumptions upside down by making every person's ability to participate in a fundamental aspect of American life—the right to work—contingent upon government approval.
+
+ System Usability and Employer Burden 
+
+ Another of the IIRIRA requirements for the pilot program confirmation system was that it be designed and operated to maximize its ease of use by employers. 97 According to Westat's 2008 and 2013 employer surveys, most employers found E-Verify to be an effective tool that was not unduly burdensome. More than 90% of employers in both years indicated that E-Verify was effective. 98 To measure burden, employers were asked about meeting the processing requirements of the program. In 2008, 19% of employers agreed that it was impossible to meet their obligations under E-Verify; in 2013, the comparable percentage was 11%. 99 
+
+ Employers are not charged a fee by the government to participate in E-Verify, but they may incur set-up costs (such as, for training and computer hardware) and operating costs (such as, for wages for verification staff and computer maintenance). In the 2008 employer survey, 74% of employers indicated that they incurred no direct set-up costs. This percentage was 78% in the 2013 survey. The median total cost for those reporting direct set-up costs in both survey years was $100. With respect to operating costs, 77% of employers in the 2008 survey and 85% in the 2013 survey reported no direct maintenance costs. The median annual cost for those reporting direct maintenance costs in the 2008 and 2013 surveys was $350 and $300, respectively. 100 
+
+ If E-Verify were to become a mandatory program, the percentage of employers in the higher-cost group may grow. Employers that do not currently have the personnel or hardware to conduct electronic verifications could find required participation particularly burdensome.
+
+ Conclusion
+
+ The policy issues discussed here may be especially important to consider in the context of proposals to require all employers to conduct electronic employment eligibility verification. A mandatory system could arguably make it possible to identify many more unauthorized workers. At the same time, under such a system, any inaccuracies, inefficiencies, or privacy breaches that occurred could affect much larger numbers of employees and employers. Employer compliance under a mandatory system would seem to be a salient issue, especially since it has direct implications for other issues, notably discrimination. Employer burden may be another important consideration. It may be that a mandatory system would require new strategies to address these issues.
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Author Contact Information
+ 
+ [author name scrubbed], Specialist in Immigration Policy
+ ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed])
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Footnotes
+
+ 
+ 
+ 1 .
+ 
+ 
+ P.L. 99-603 , November 6, 1986.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2 .
+ 
+ 
+ See archived CRS Report RL33874, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986 , p. 2.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 3 .
+ 
+ 
+ Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, as amended. The INA is the basis of current immigration law.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 4 .
+ 
+ 
+ See archived CRS Report RL33874, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986 , pp. 2-3.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 5 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat, Findings of the E-Verify Program Evaluation , December 2009, p. 131 (hereinafter cited as Westat Report, December 2009). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 6 .
+ 
+ 
+ Division C of P.L. 104-208 , September 30, 1996.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 7 .
+ 
+ 
+ IIRIRA modified the I-9 requirements for pilot program participants.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 8 .
+ 
+ 
+ The Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 , November 25, 2002) abolished INS and transferred most of its functions to DHS as of March 1, 2003. P.L. 108-156 (December 3, 2003) amended IIRIRA to transfer responsibility for the pilot programs from the Attorney General to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 9 .
+ 
+ 
+ The original Basic Pilot states were California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas. The other two IIRIRA pilot programs—the Machine-Readable Document Pilot (MRDP) and the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot (CAVP)—were terminated in 2003.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 10 .
+ 
+ 
+ The IIRIRA provisions were never amended to reflect these name changes, however. In this report, "E-Verify" is used to refer to the program generally, and "Basic Pilot" is used at times to refer to the program prior to the August 2007 E-Verify name change.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 11 .
+ 
+ 
+ P.L. 114-113 , December 18, 2015. The earlier extensions were enacted in P.L. 107-128 , January 16, 2002 (which amended IIRIRA to direct that the program be terminated after six years); P.L. 108-156 , December 3, 2003 (which amended IIRIRA to direct that the program be terminated after 11 years); P.L. 110-329 , September 30, 2008 (which effectively established a March 6, 2009, termination date); P.L. 111-6 , March 6, 2009 (which effectively established a March 11, 2009, termination date); P.L. 111-8 , March 11, 2009 (which established a September 30, 2009, termination date); P.L. 111-68 , October 1, 2009 (which effectively established an October 31, 2009, termination date); P.L. 111-83 , October 28, 2009 (which established a September 30, 2012, termination date); P.L. 112-176 , September 28, 2012 (which established a September 30, 2015, termination date); P.L. 114-53 , September 30, 2015 (which effectively established a December 11, 2015, termination date); P.L. 114-96 , December 11, 2015 (which effectively established a December 16, 2015, termination date), and P.L. 114-100 , December 16, 2015 (which effectively established a December 22, 2015, termination date).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 12 .
+ 
+ 
+ Among the changes to the I-9 form are new data fields, including for employee telephone number and e-mail address, and revised instructions.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 13 .
+ 
+ 
+ Another type of USCIS tentative nonconfirmation finding may occur if the employee presents a document that triggers the Photo Screening Tool (see " Initiatives to Improve Accuracy "). If the employer indicates that there is a mismatch between the photograph on the employee's document and the photograph in the E-Verify system, the employee receives a USCIS tentative nonconfirmation. If the employee chooses to contest the finding, the employer must send a copy of the employee's document to USCIS. See USCIS E-Verify "Tentative Nonconfirmations" page, https://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/employers/tentative-nonconfirmations .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 14 .
+ 
+ 
+ Prior to September 8, 2013, an employee who received a TNC would first be given a TNC notice by the employer. If the employee opted to contest the TNC, the employer would then provide the employee with a referral letter. As of September 8, 2013, the TNC notice and referral letter have been combined into the further action notice. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 15 .
+ 
+ 
+ E-Verify Weekly Report, March 7, 2016, provided by USCIS to CRS. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 16 .
+ 
+ 
+ According to U.S. Census Bureau Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) annual data, there were 5,775,055 firms in the United States in 2013. A firm is defined as "a business organization consisting of one or more domestic establishments in the same state and industry that were specified under common ownership or control." SUSB data and definitions are available at http://www.census.gov/econ/susb/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 17 .
+ 
+ 
+ FY2007 query data are from Statement of Theresa C. Bertucci, USCIS, at U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, E-Verify — Preserving Jobs for American Workers , hearing, 112 th Cong., 1 st sess., February 10, 2011, p. 1, http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Bertucci%2002102011.pdf (hereinafter cited as USCIS hearing testimony, February 2011); FY2015 query data are from E-Verify Weekly Report, March 7, 2016.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 18 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Job Openings and Labor Turnover—January 2016," news release, March 17, 2016. Note that there are limitations to the BLS data for comparison purposes. For example, the BLS data include only nonfarm hires, while farm hires can be run through E-Verify. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 19 .
+ 
+ 
+ IIRIRA §402(e). These IIRIRA provisions have never been amended to reflect the fact that only one pilot program remains in operation. The federal department provisions further state that the secretary of each department may limit pilot program participation to hiring in certain states or geographic areas and to specified divisions within the department. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 20 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Office of Management of Budget, "Verifying the Employment Eligibility of Federal Employees," Memorandum for the Heads of Departments and Agencies, August 10, 2007.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 21 .
+ 
+ 
+ $100.0 million for FY2009, P.L. 110-329 , September 30, 2008; $137.0 million for FY2010, P.L. 111-83 , October 28, 2009; $103.4 million for FY2011, P.L. 112-10 , April 15, 2011; $102.4 million for FY2012, P.L. 112-74 , December 23, 2011: $111.9 million for FY2013, P.L. 113-6 , March 26, 2013; $113.9 million for FY2014, P.L. 113-76 , January 17, 2014; and $124.4 million for FY2015, P.L. 114-4 , March 4, 2015. Note that P.L. 112-10 contained full-year continuing appropriations for FY2011 and, unlike the other bills, did not include a DHS Research, Development, Training, and Services title; the E-Verify appropriation was in Div. B. Title VI, §1639.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 22 .
+ 
+ 
+ See CRS Report R44053, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2016 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 23 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2012 , by Bryan C. Baker and Nancy Rytina, March 2013. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 24 .
+ 
+ 
+ Jeffrey S. Passel, D'Vera Cohn , Jens Manuel Krogstad, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera , As Growth Stalls, Unauthorized Immigrant Population Becomes More Settled , Pew Research Center, September 3, 2014, p. 4; Jeffrey S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14 , Pew Research Center, November 18, 2014, p. 8.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 25 .
+ 
+ 
+ See CRS Report R43320, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 113th Congress . Also see CRS Report R43097, Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the 113th Congress: Major Provisions in Senate-Passed S. 744 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 26 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, archived CRS Report R42036, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 112th Congress 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 27 .
+ 
+ 
+ For a discussion of this bill, see CRS Report R44230, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 114th Congress . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 28 .
+ 
+ 
+ Executive Order 13465, "Amending Executive Order 12989, as Amended," 73 Federal Register 33285-33287, June 11, 2008.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 29 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "DHS Designates E-Verify as Employment Eligibility Verification System for All Federal Contractors," news release, June 9, 2008.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 30 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Defense, General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, "Federal Acquisition Regulation; FAR Case 2007-013, Employment Eligibility Verification," 73 Federal Register 67651-67705, November 14, 2008.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 31 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid., p. 67654. The rule requires inclusion of the E-Verify clause in prime federal contracts with a period of performance of at least 120 days and a value above the simplified acquisition threshold ($100,000), with some exemptions. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 32 .
+ 
+ 
+ The rule originally had an effective date of January 15, 2009, but both the effective date of the rule and the applicability date of the rule, on or after which contracting officers would include the new E-Verify clause in relevant contracts, were subsequently changed. The final amendment changed the applicability date to September 8, 2009. U.S. Department of Defense, General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, "Federal Acquisition Regulation; FAR Case 2007-013, Employment Eligibility Verification," 74 Federal Register 26981, June 5, 2009.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 33 .
+ 
+ 
+ Nonimmigrants are foreign nationals who are admitted to the United States for a designated period of time and a specific purpose. See CRS Report RL31381, U.S. Immigration Policy on Temporary Admissions .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 34 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Extending Period of Optional Practical Training by 17 Months for F-1 Nonimmigrant Students With STEM Degrees and Expanding Cap-Gap Relief for All F-1 Students With Pending H-1B Petitions," 73 Federal Register 18944-18956, April 8, 2008; 8 C.F.R. 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 35 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Changes to Requirements Affecting H-2A Nonimmigrants," 73 Federal Register 76891-76914, December 18, 2008; 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(b)(21).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 36 .
+ 
+ 
+ The evaluation reports include Institute for Survey Research, Temple University, and Westat, INS Basic Pilot Evaluation Summary Report , January 29, 2002; Institute for Survey Research, Temple University, and Westat, Findings of the Basic Pilot Program Evaluation , June 2002 (hereinafter cited as Basic Pilot Evaluation Report, June 2002); Westat , Interim Findings of the Web-Based Basic Pilot Evaluation , December 2006; Westat, Findings of the Web Basic Pilot Evaluation , September 2007 (hereinafter cited as Westat Report, September 2007); Westat Report, December 2009; and Westat, Findings of the E-Verify User Survey , July 8, 2011. The latter two reports are available on the USCIS "E-Verify Program Reports" web page, https://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/about-program/e-verify-program-reports .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 37 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat, Evaluation of the Accuracy of E-Verify Findings , July 2012 (hereinafter cited as Westat Report, July 2012). This report is available on the USCIS "E-Verify Program Reports" web page, https://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/about-program/e-verify-program-reports .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 38 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat Report, December 2009, p. 133.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 39 .
+ 
+ 
+ Kerry Howley, "Walls of Paper," April 21, 2008, https://reason.com/archives/2008/04/21/walls-of-paper . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 40 .
+ 
+ 
+ IIRIRA §404(d)(1).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 41 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat Report, September 2007, p. 57.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 42 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat Report, July 2012, p. 22.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 43 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat Report, December 2009, p. 116.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 44 .
+ 
+ 
+ In FY2015, 0.18% of all E-Verify cases were confirmed as work authorized after contesting a TNC. That year, -1.35% of all E-Verify cases received TNCs. See USCIS E-Verify "Performance" page, https://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/about-program/performance .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 45 .
+ 
+ 
+ Information provided in email from USCIS to CRS, March 10, 2016.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 46 .
+ 
+ 
+ The 2012 Westat report did not include an updated inaccuracy rate for authorized workers.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 47 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat Report, December 2009, pp. 116-117. The total inaccuracy rate is much closer to the inaccuracy rate for authorized workers than to the inaccuracy rate for unauthorized workers because the overwhelming majority of workers in the labor force and checked through E-Verify are authorized to work. The 2012 Westat report did not include an updated inaccuracy rate for unauthorized workers or an updated total inaccuracy rate.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 48 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid., p. 131.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 49 .
+ 
+ 
+ Statement of Jim Harper, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law, Proposals for Improving the E lectronic Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement System , hearing, 110 th Cong., 1 st sess., April 26, 2007 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007), p. 79 (hereinafter cited as Harper Testimony, April 2007).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 50 .
+ 
+ 
+ Statement of Michael Aytes, USCIS Acting Deputy Director, at U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Priorities Enforcing Immigration Law , hearing, 111 th Cong., 1 st sess., April 2, 2009, p. 2. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 51 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Employment Verification: Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps to Improve E-Verify, but Significant Challenges Remain , GAO-11-146, December 2010, p. 18 (hereinafter cited as GAO, Employment Verification ). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 52 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "USCIS Announces Enhancements to E-Verify Program," news release, May 5, 2008 (hereinafter cited as USCIS news release, May 2008). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 53 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Westat Evaluation of the E-Verify Program: USCIS Synopsis of Key Findings and Program Implications , January 28, 2010, p. 10 (hereinafter cited as USCIS Synopsis of Westat Report). Prior to implementation of Naturalization Phase I, if SSA records were unable to confirm citizenship for a self-identified citizen, SSA would issue a tentative nonconfirmation finding. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 54 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "USCIS Adds Passport Data in E-Verify Process for Foreign-Born Citizens," news release, March 4, 2009 (hereinafter cited as USCIS news release, March 2009).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 55 .
+ 
+ 
+ USCIS news release, May 2008. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 56 .
+ 
+ 
+ On March 21, 2011, E-Verify Self Check became available to residents of five states (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Mississippi, and Virginia) and Washington, DC. Additional information about E-Verify Self Check is available at http://www.uscis.gov/selfcheck . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 57 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Passport and U.S. Passport Card photographs were added to the Photo Tool in September 2010. USCIS hearing testimony, February 2011, p. 6.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 58 .
+ 
+ 
+ The 2009 Westat report recommended that USCIS discontinue use of the Photo Tool "until progress can be made on expanding it to include a broader range of documents, including documents that are less tamper-proof and counterfeit-resistant than are the documents currently in the Photo Screening Tool." Westat Report, December 2009, p. 244. USCIS rejected this recommendation, arguing that the Photo Tool was essential to its efforts to combat identity fraud. USCIS Synopsis of Westat Report, p. 8.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 59 .
+ 
+ 
+ USCIS hearing testimony, February 2013.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 60 .
+ 
+ 
+ Data provided in email from USCIS to CRS, March 10, 2016.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 61 .
+ 
+ 
+ Florida joined RIDE in December 2012, Idaho joined in July 2013, Iowa joined in September 2013, Nebraska joined in February 2015, North Dakota joined in June 2015, and Wisconsin joined November 2015.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 62 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "New Security Enhancement Helps E-Verify Deter Employee Fraud," news release, November 18, 2013.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 63 .
+ 
+ 
+ Testimony of USCIS Director Rodriguez for House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security, Oversight of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services , 114 th Cong., 1 st sess., December 9, 2015, http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/3e325f61-1d4a-4a8a-ad2f-1909cd14eec5/12-9-15-uscis-rodriguez-oversight-testimony.pdf ; https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/12/09/written-testimony-uscis-director-house-judiciary-subcommittee-immigration-and-border .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 64 .
+ 
+ 
+ IIRIRA §404(g).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 65 .
+ 
+ 
+ Basic Pilot Evaluation Report, June 2002, p. 143.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 66 .
+ 
+ 
+ See Westat Report, September 2007, p. xxi.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 67 .
+ 
+ 
+ Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, Accuracy of the Social Security Administration's Numident File , Congressional Response Report, A-08-06-26100, December 2006.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 68 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid., p. ii.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 69 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat Report, December 2009, p. 233.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 70 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat Report, July 2012, p. 28.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 71 .
+ 
+ 
+ USCIS E-Verify "Performance" page, https://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/about-program/performance .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 72 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Richard Kaplan, "Senate Excludes E-Verify Check on Illegal Immigrant Workers from Stimulus Package," February 10, 2009, http://www.hispanicbusiness.com ; Friends Committee on National Legislation, "Strip E-Verify from the Final Stimulus Package," February 11, 2009, http://www.fncl.org .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 73 .
+ 
+ 
+ USCIS hearing testimony, February 2011, p. 10.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 74 .
+ 
+ 
+ GAO, Employment Verification , p. 44. According to the report, 240 million queries per year is the "higher estimate of the number of queries expected to be generated by a mandatory E-Verify program." 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 75 .
+ 
+ 
+ Employment discrimination is defined here, as in the 2009 Westat report, as "differential treatment based on individual characteristics, such as race or gender, that are unrelated to productivity or performance." Westat Report, December 2009, p. GL-2.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 76 .
+ 
+ 
+ INA §274A(j), eliminated by IIRIRA §412(c). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 77 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination , GAO/GGD-90-62, March 1990. Note: At the time of the 1990 report, GAO was the General Accounting Office. It is now the Government Accountability Office.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 78 .
+ 
+ 
+ IIRIRA §404(d)(4).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 79 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat, Findings of the E-Verify User Survey , April 30, 2014 (hereinafter cited as Westat, Findings of 2013 survey), p. 33.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 80 .
+ 
+ 
+ See Ibid., pp. 33-34.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 81 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat Report, December 2009, p. 235.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 82 .
+ 
+ 
+ The issue of differential rates of erroneous TNC findings for different groups has been a major concern for immigrant advocates and certain other interested parties. For a comparison of erroneous TNC rates for U.S. citizens, LPRs, and other employment-authorized noncitizens, see Westat Report, July 2012, pp. 23-25.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 83 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat Report, December 2009, p. 239. The Westat report also described an "unintended consequence" of this initiative in increasing the percentage of unauthorized workers who were found work authorized. These workers were committing identity fraud by using the identity of naturalized citizens.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 84 .
+ 
+ 
+ USCIS news release, March 2009. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 85 .
+ 
+ 
+ USCIS news release, May 2008. For further discussion of these changes and their impacts, see USCIS hearing testimony, February 2011, and USCIS hearing testimony, February 2013.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 86 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat Report, December 2009, p. 147.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 87 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid . , p. 147-160.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 88 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat Report, July 2012, p. 39. In a related E-Verify change, an employee e-mail address field was added to the system in June 2013. In cases in which an employee opts to provide an e-mail address on the new I-9 form, the employer must enter this information into E-Verify. E-Verify can then send the employee e-mail notifications about his or her case, including TNCs. Employers, however, continue to receive E-Verify notifications as well and are still required to provide TNC notifications to employees.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 89 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat, Findings of 2013 survey, p. xx.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 90 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid., p. ix.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 91 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid., p. 52.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 92 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid., p. xxii.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 93 .
+ 
+ 
+ IIRIRA §404(d)(3).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 94 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat, Findings of 2013 survey, pp. 50-51. An onsite study of workers conducted in 2008 as part of the 2009 evaluation yielded different findings, with about a quarter of the workers who commented on the subject indicating that they were not notified of a TNC in a private area. Westat Report, December 2009, p. 202
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 95 .
+ 
+ 
+ Harper Testimony, April 2007, p. 82.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 96 .
+ 
+ 
+ Written statement of the American Civil Liberties Union, for a hearing by U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, How E-Verify Works and How It Benefits American Employers and Workers, February 27, 2013, http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_statement_mandatory_everify_house_hearing_022713_final.pdf . (The ACLU did not testify at the hearing.)
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 97 .
+ 
+ 
+ IIRIRA §404(d)(1).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 98 .
+ 
+ 
+ Westat, Findings of 2013 survey, pp. 27-28.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 99 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid., pp. 35-36.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 100 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid., pp. 81-84.
\ No newline at end of file
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+++ b/corpus/politics/text/72eca2d5e1e24b80.txt
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+Order Code RL34354
+
+ Congressional Influences on Rulemaking Through 
+
+ Appropriations Provisions 
+
+ Updated February 11, 2008 
+
+Curtis W. Copeland
+
+Specialist in American National Government
+
+Government and Finance Division
+
+ 
+ Congressional Influences on Rulemaking Through
+
+Appropriations Provisions
+
+ Summary 
+
+The statutory provision known as the “Congressional Review Act” (CRA) (5
+
+U.S.C. §§801-808) established expedited procedures by which Congress may
+disapprove agencies’ rules by enacting a joint resolution of disapproval, with
+subsequent presentation to the President for signature or veto. Although initially
+viewed as a reassertion of congressional authority over rulemaking and regulatory
+agencies, the CRA is now viewed by some as much less effective — having been
+used to overturn only one rule in the more than 11 years since it took effect.
+However, Congress has various other methods to influence agency rulemaking
+activity, including the addition of provisions to appropriations bills. 
+
+This report examines the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2008 (P.L. 110-
+
+161) and identifies four types of provisions that prevent or restrain federal
+rulemaking or regulatory activities: (1) restrictions on the issuance of particular final
+regulations, (2) restrictions on the development of general categories of regulations,
+(3) implementation or enforcement restrictions, and (4) conditional restrictions.
+Examples of each of these categories are provided in this report. Although none of
+these appropriations provisions appears designed to reverse agency rulemaking
+actions (as the CRA was intended to permit), the number and variety of the
+provisions clearly illustrate that Congress’s ability to oversee and affect regulatory
+agencies is not confined to CRA resolutions of disapproval. 
+
+Provisions prohibiting the development or finalization of regulations appear
+
+more effective than limitations on the enforcement of regulations, which do not
+relieve regulated entities of their compliance responsibilities. Also, some regulations
+are implemented through state or local governments, and some state or local
+governments have their own statutory and regulatory requirements that are the same
+as or similar to the federal rules at issue. Finally, it is unclear whether the President
+will view any of these regulatory restrictions on agency action as unconstitutional
+infringements on his authority to manage the executive branch. 
+
+This report will be updated if any changes occur that alter the factual
+
+information in the report.
+
+ 
+ Contents 
+
+Restrictions on the Issuance of Particular Final Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+Restrictions on Regulatory Activity Within Certain Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+Implementation or Enforcement Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+Conditional Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+Concluding Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+
+ 
+ Congressional Influences on Rulemaking
+
+Through Appropriations Provisions
+
+In March 1996, the statutory provisions commonly known as the “Congressional
+
+Review Act” (CRA) (5 U.S.C. §§801-808) were included as part of the Small
+Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA). Under the CRA, before
+any final rule can take effect, it must be filed with each house of Congress and the
+Government Accountability Office (GAO). The act established expedited procedures
+by which Congress may disapprove agencies’ rules by enacting a joint resolution of
+disapproval, with subsequent presentation to the President for signature or veto.1 
+
+Although initially considered a reassertion of congressional authority over
+
+rulemaking agencies, the CRA is now viewed by some observers as far less effective
+than originally anticipated.2 Between April 1996 and October 2007, federal agencies
+submitted more than 46,000 rules to GAO (and, presumably, to Congress), and 43
+CRA joint resolutions of disapproval were introduced regarding 32 rules. However,
+during this 11-year period, only one rule was overturned through the CRA’s
+procedures — OSHA’s ergonomics standard in March 2001 — and that reversal was
+the result of a unique set of circumstances.3 
+
+Even though the CRA has not proven to be an effective way for Congress to
+
+reverse agency rulemaking, Congress does influence regulatory activity in a variety
+of other ways. Those methods include how specifically the underlying statutes are
+written,4 statutory requirements delineating the analytical and procedural steps that
+
+1 For a detailed discussion of CRA procedures, see CRS Report RL31160, Disapproval of
+Regulations by Congress: Procedure Under the Congressional Review Act , by Richard S.
+Beth.
+
+2 Testimony of Morton Rosenberg, Specialist in American Public Law, Congressional
+Research Service, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
+Commercial and Administrative Law, Oversight of the Congressional Review Act , hearings,
+110th Cong., 1st sess., November 6, 2007. On page 2 of his written testimony, Rosenberg
+said, “we know enough to conclude that [the CRA] has not worked well to achieve the
+objectives of its sponsors: to set in place an effective mechanism to keep Congress informed
+about the rulemaking activities of federal agencies and to allow for expeditious
+congressional review, and possible nullification, of particular rules.”
+
+3 In this case, the incoming President (George W. Bush) did not veto the resolution
+disapproving the outgoing President’s (William J. Clinton’s) rule. See CRS Report
+RL30116, Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Update and Assessment of the
+Congressional Review Act After a Decade , by Morton Rosenberg, for a description of
+several possible factors affecting the law’s use.
+
+4 All regulations start with an act of Congress, and are the means by which statutes are
+
+(continued...)
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+must be followed in the development of proposed and final rules,5 oversight hearings
+on particular rules or rulemaking requirements, confirmation hearings for the heads
+of regulatory agencies, and provisions included in the text of agencies’ appropriations
+bills.6 
+
+Compared to the other congressional methods, the effects of appropriations
+
+provisions on rulemaking have received comparatively little attention by analysts, but
+those provisions can have substantial effects on agencies’ regulatory activities. Some
+of the appropriations provisions direct agencies to develop rules in particular areas,
+or to take particular enforcement actions. For example, within the Consolidated
+Appropriations Act for 2008 (P.L. 110-161, signed by President George W. Bush on
+December 26, 2007), Section 563 within Division E of the legislation (the
+Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008) amends the Homeland
+Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. §361 et seq .) and requires the Secretary of the
+Department of Homeland Security to “regulate the sale and transfer of ammonium
+nitrate by an ammonium nitrate facility in accordance with the subtitle to prevent the
+misappropriation or use of ammonium nitrate in an act of terrorism.” The legislation
+delineates what the regulations must contain (e.g., a registration process for owners,
+records that must be maintained, and an appeals process); and mandates that the
+Secretary “(1) shall issue a proposed rule implementing this subtitle not later than 6
+months after the date of the enactment of this subtitle; and (2) shall issue a final rule
+implementing this subtitle not later than 1 year after such date of enactment.” 
+
+Other appropriations provisions affect the process by which rules are developed.
+
+For example, a provision within Title II within Section D of the Consolidated
+Appropriations Act for 2008 states that “none of the funds appropriated in this Act
+for the Office of Management and Budget [OMB] may be used for the purpose of
+reviewing any agricultural marketing orders or any activities or regulations under the
+provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (7 U.S.C. §601 et 
+
+4 (...continued)
+implemented and specific requirements are established. The specificity of the statutory
+basis for a regulation can vary significantly, from broad grants of rulemaking authority that
+state the general intent of the legislation to very specific requirements delineating exactly
+what regulatory agencies should do and how they should do it. For examples of both
+general and specific statutory authorities, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Regulatory
+Burden: Some Agencies’ Claims Regarding Lack of Rulemaking Discretion Have Merit ,
+GAO/GGD-99-20, January 8, 1999. 
+
+5 These statutory rulemaking requirements include the Administrative Procedure Act (5
+U.S.C. §551 et seq.), the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. §§3501-3520), the
+Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. §§601-612), Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
+Act (2 U.S.C. §§1532-1538), and the Information Quality Act (44 U.S.C. §§3504(d)(1) and
+3516). For a discussion of these and other requirements, see CRS Report RL32240, The
+Federal Rulemaking Process: An Overview , by Curtis W. Copeland.
+
+6 Limitations on the expenditure of funds may be in the text of legislation, or in committee
+reports, conference reports, or managers’ statements. Only provisions in the text of the
+legislation are legally binding. See CRS Report 98-518 GOV, Earmarks and Limitations
+in Appropriations Bills , by Sandy Streeter. In this report, all of the provisions mentioned
+were in the text of the legislation. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+ seq .).”7 Language prohibiting OMB review of agricultural marketing orders and
+other materials has been in legislation funding OMB for about 25 years.
+
+Still other provisions in appropriations acts are intended to prevent regulatory
+
+agencies from taking certain actions. For example, for six years (FY1996 through
+FY2001), the Department of Transportation’s appropriations acts stated that none of
+the funds in the act could be used to prepare, propose, or promulgate regulations
+prescribing corporate average fuel economy, or “CAFE,” standards for automobiles
+that differed from the standards promulgated prior to the enactment of the legislation.
+Therefore, the department concluded that it was required to keep the same CAFE
+standard that applied in each of the previous years.8 Such repetitive restrictions in
+appropriations acts appear to be an effective way to block certain rules. Conversely,
+discontinuance of those restrictions would remove the bar and permit agencies to go
+forward with those rules.
+
+The remainder of this report focuses on the Consolidated Appropriations Act for
+
+2008 and identifies four types of provisions in the legislation that appear to prevent
+or restrict federal rulemaking or regulatory activities: (1) prohibitions on the issuance
+of particular final regulations, (2) prohibitions on the development of regulations
+with regard to particular statutes or issues, (3) implementation or enforcement
+restrictions, and (4) conditional restrictions. Examples of each of these categories are
+provided below, followed by a brief concluding discussion. Although none of these
+appropriations provisions would nullify agency rulemaking actions (e.g., eliminating
+a rule from the Code of Federal Regulations, as the CRA was intended to permit),
+the number and variety of the provisions clearly illustrate that Congress’s ability to
+oversee and affect rulemaking and regulatory agencies is not confined to CRA
+resolutions of disapproval. 
+
+ Restrictions on the Issuance of Particular Final Rules 
+
+Certain provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2008 prevent the
+
+finalization of particular proposed rules by denying the use of funds. For example:
+
+! Section 723 within Division A of the legislation (the Agriculture,
+
+Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
+Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008) states that “None of the funds
+made available by this Act may be used to issue a final rule in
+furtherance of, or otherwise implement, the proposed rule on
+cost-sharing for animal and plant health emergency programs of the
+
+7 Under Executive Order 12866, OMB reviews draft regulations before they are published
+as proposed or final rules. See CRS Report RL32397, Federal Rulemaking: The Role of the
+Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs , by Curtis W. Copeland. 
+
+8 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Department of Transportation, National Highway
+Traffic Safety Administration: Light Truck Average Fuel Economy Standard, Model Year
+2000 , GAO/OGC-98-42, April 17, 1998; and U.S. Government Accountability Office,
+ Vehicle Fuel Economy: Reforming Fuel Economy Standards Could Help Reduce Oil
+Consumption by Cars and Light Trucks, and Other Options Could Complement These
+Standards , GAO-07-921, August 2, 2007.
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service published on July 8,
+2003 (Docket No. 02-062-1; 68 Fed. Reg. 40541).” Other than the
+extension of the proposed rule’s comment period until November
+2003,9 the agency had taken no further action on the July 2003
+proposed rule, and had not indicated in recent editions of the Unified
+Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions that it
+intended to take action on the rule in the future.10 
+
+! Section 735 within Division D of the legislation (the Financial
+
+Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2008) states
+that “none of the funds appropriated or made available under this
+Act or any other appropriations Act may be used ... to implement the
+proposed regulations of the Office of Personnel Management [OPM]
+to add sections 300.311 through 300.316 to part 300 of title 5 of the
+Code of Federal Regulations, published in the Federal Register,
+volume 68, number 174, on September 9, 2003 (relating to the detail
+of executive branch employees to the legislative branch).” Among
+other things, the proposed regulation would prohibit any executive
+agency from detailing or otherwise assigning an employee to the
+legislative branch without the approval of the OPM Director. The
+agency had taken no further action on the September 2003 proposed
+rule, and had not indicated in recent editions of the Unified Agenda
+ that it intended to take action on the rule in the future.
+
+! Section 559 of Division E of the legislation states that “None of the
+
+funds made available in this Act may be used by the Secretary of
+Homeland Security or any delegate of the Secretary to issue any rule
+or regulation which implements the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
+related to Petitions for Aliens To Perform Temporary
+Nonagricultural Services or Labor (H-2B) set out beginning on 70
+Fed. Reg. 3984 (January 27, 2005).” Other than the extension of the
+comment period until April 2005,11 the agency had taken no further
+action on the January 2005 proposed rule, and had not indicated in
+the Unified Agenda that it intended to take action in the future.
+
+! Section 432 of Division F of the legislation (the Department of the
+
+Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
+2008) states that “None of the funds made available under this Act
+may be used to promulgate or implement the Environmental
+
+9 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, “Cost-
+Sharing for Animal and Plant Health Emergency Programs,” 68 Federal Register 51713,
+August 28, 2003.
+
+10 The Unified Agenda is published twice each year in the Federal Register , and provides
+uniform reporting of data on regulatory activities under development throughout the federal
+government.
+
+11 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
+“Petitions for Aliens to Perform Temporary Nonagricultural Services or Labor (H-2B),” 70
+ Federal Register 11585, March 9, 2005.
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+Protection Agency [EPA] proposed regulations published in the
+Federal Register on January 3, 2007 (72 Fed. Reg. 69).” The
+proposed rule at issue would have amended the general provisions
+to the national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants,
+replacing a policy that had been established in 1995. The agency
+had taken no further action on the proposed rule, and had not
+indicated in the Unified Agenda that it intended to take action in the
+future.
+
+! Section 170 within Division K of the legislation (the Transportation,
+
+Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies
+Appropriations Act, 2008) states that “None of the funds provided
+or limited under this Act may be used to issue a final regulation
+under section 5309 of title 49, United States Code, except that the
+Federal Transit Administration may continue to review comments
+received on the proposed rule (Docket No. FTA-2006-25737).”
+Section 5309 of Title 49 involves “capital investment grants.” The
+proposed rule was issued on August 3, 2007, and proposed changes
+in the Federal Transit Administration’s “Small Starts” capital
+investment grant program.12 The December 2007 Unified Agenda
+ listed the rule as part of the Department of Transportation’s
+Regulatory Plan (signifying it as one of the department’s most
+important regulatory actions), but did not indicate when any final
+rule was expected to be issued.13
+
+ Restrictions on Regulatory Activity Within Certain Areas 
+
+Other provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2008 are more
+
+general, prohibiting the development, issuance, amendment, implementation, or
+enforcement of regulations regarding a particular statute or within a particular area.
+For example:
+
+! Section 726 within Division A of the legislation states that “None of
+
+the funds provided in this Act may be used for salaries and expenses
+to draft or implement any regulation or rule insofar as it would
+require recertification of rural status for each electric and
+telecommunications borrower for the Rural Electrification and
+Telecommunication Loans program.”14
+
+12 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, “Major Capital
+Investment Projects,” 72 Federal Register 43327, August 3, 2007.
+
+13 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, “Major Capital
+Investment Projects — New/Small Starts,” 72 Federal Register 69906, December 10, 2007.
+
+14 This provision was also in the “Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug
+Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006” (P.L. 109-97, November
+10, 2005, Sec. 762).
+
+ 
+ CRS-6
+
+! Section 511 within Division D of the legislation states that “None of
+
+the funds appropriated by this Act may be used by the Federal
+Communications Commission to modify, amend, or change its rules
+or regulations for universal service support payments to implement
+the February 27, 2004 recommendations of the Federal-State Joint
+Board on Universal Service regarding single connection or primary
+line restrictions on universal service support payments.”
+
+! Section 617 within Division D of the legislation states that “for
+
+fiscal years 2008 and 2009, neither the Board of Governors of the
+Federal Reserve System nor the Secretary of the Treasury may
+determine, by rule, regulation, order, or otherwise, for the purposes
+of section 4(K) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, or
+section 5136A of the Revised Statutes of the United States, that real
+estate brokerage activity or real estate management activity (which
+for purposes of this paragraph shall be defined to mean ‘real estate
+brokerage’ and ‘property management’ respectively, as those terms
+were understood by the Federal Reserve Board prior to March 11,
+2000) is an activity that is financial in nature, is incidental to any
+financial activity, or is complementary to a financial activity. For
+purposes of this paragraph, ‘real estate brokerage activity’ shall
+mean ‘real estate brokerage’, and ‘real estate management activity’
+shall mean ‘property management’ as those terms were understood
+by the Federal Reserve Board prior to March 11, 2000.”
+
+! Section 823 within Division D of the legislation (within the general
+
+provisions applicable to the District of Columbia) states that “None
+of the funds contained in this Act may be used to enact or carry out
+any law, rule, or regulation to legalize or otherwise reduce penalties
+associated with the possession, use, or distribution of any schedule
+I substance under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et
+seq.) or any tetrahydrocannabinols derivative.”
+
+! Section 433 of Division F of the legislation states that “None of the
+
+funds made available by this Act shall be used to prepare or publish
+final regulations regarding a commercial leasing program for oil
+shale resources on public lands pursuant to section 369(d) of the
+Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-58) or to conduct an oil
+shale lease sale pursuant to subsection 369(e) of such Act.”
+
+! The section of the legislation providing funds for salaries and
+
+expenses at the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
+(OSHA) within Division G of the legislation (the Departments of
+Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related
+Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008) contains a provision stating that
+“none of the funds appropriated under this paragraph shall be
+obligated or expended to prescribe, issue, administer, or enforce any
+standard, rule, regulation, or order under the Act which is applicable
+to any person who is engaged in a farming operation which does not
+
+ 
+ CRS-7
+
+maintain a temporary labor camp and employs 10 or fewer
+employees.”
+
+! A section of the legislation within Division K of the act having to do
+
+with Federal Aviation Administration Operations states that “none
+of the funds in this Act shall be available for the Federal Aviation
+Administration to finalize or implement any regulation that would
+promulgate new aviation user fees not specifically authorized by law
+after the date of the enactment of this Act.”
+
+! Section 111 within Division K states that “None of the funds in this
+
+Act shall be used to pursue or adopt guidelines or regulations
+requiring airport sponsors to provide to the Federal Aviation
+Administration without cost building construction, maintenance,
+utilities and expenses, or space in airport sponsor-owned buildings
+for services relating to air traffic control, air navigation, or weather
+reporting: Provided, That the prohibition of funds in this section
+does not apply to negotiations between the agency and airport
+sponsors to achieve agreement on ‘below-market’ rates for these
+items or to grant assurances that require airport sponsors to provide
+land without cost to the FAA for air traffic control facilities.”
+
+ Implementation or Enforcement Restrictions 
+
+In still other cases, language in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008
+
+specifically prevents the implementation or enforcement of a rule or set of rules by
+withholding funds. In some cases a particular rule or set of rules is specified, but in
+other cases it is not clear whether any particular rules are already in place. For
+example:
+
+! Section 741 within Division A of the legislation states that “None of
+
+the funds made available in this Act may be used to pay the salaries
+or expenses of personnel to — (1) inspect horses under section 3 of
+the Federal Meat Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. 603); (2) inspect horses
+under section 903 of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and
+Reform Act of 1996 (7 U.S.C. 1901 note; Public Law 104-127); or
+(3) implement or enforce section 352.19 of title 9, Code of Federal
+Regulations.”
+
+! A condition in Division D of the legislation that is associated with
+
+a nearly $118 million payment to the Postal Service Fund for
+revenue forgone on free and reduced-rate mail was that “none of the
+funds made available to the Postal Service by this Act shall be used
+to implement any rule, regulation, or policy of charging any officer
+or employee of any State or local child support enforcement agency,
+or any individual participating in a State or local program of child
+support enforcement, a fee for information requested or provided
+concerning an address of a postal customer.”
+
+ 
+ CRS-8
+
+! Section 621 within Division D of the legislation states that “None of
+
+the funds made available by this Act may be used by the Federal
+Communications Commission to implement the Fairness Doctrine,
+as repealed in General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
+Licensees (50 Fed. Reg. 35418 (1985)), or any other regulations
+having the same substance.”
+
+Other provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2008 appear to
+
+have the opposite intent — i.e., forbidding the prohibition of regulatory enforcement.
+For example, Section 606 within Division D of the legislation states that “None of
+the funds made available by this Act shall be available for any activity or for paying
+the salary of any Government employee where funding an activity or paying a salary
+to a Government employee would result in a decision, determination, rule, regulation,
+or policy that would prohibit the enforcement of section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930
+(19 U.S.C. 1307).”
+
+ Conditional Restrictions 
+
+Another set of provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 make
+
+implementation of a particular rule or set of rules conditional upon certain other
+actions by agencies or Congress. For example:
+
+! A provision within Division F of the legislation states that “None of
+
+the funds made available to the Indian Health Service in this Act
+shall be used to implement the final rule published in the Federal
+Register on September 16, 1987, by the Department of Health and
+Human Services, relating to the eligibility for the health care
+services of the Indian Health Service until the Indian Health Service
+has submitted a budget request reflecting the increased costs
+associated with the proposed final rule, and such request has been
+included in an appropriations Act and enacted into law.”
+
+! Section 110 within Division G of the act states that “None of the
+
+funds made available in this or any other Act shall be available to
+finalize or implement any proposed regulation under the Workforce
+Investment Act of 1998, Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, or the Trade
+Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002 until such time as
+legislation reauthorizing the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 and
+the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002 is enacted.”15
+
+! Section 305 within Division G states that “None of the funds made
+
+available in this Act may be used to promulgate, implement, or
+enforce any revision to the regulations in effect under section 496 of
+the Higher Education Act of 1965 on June 1, 2007, until legislation
+specifically requiring such revision is enacted.”
+
+15 This provision also appeared in the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007
+(P.L. 110-5, February 15, 2007). 
+
+ 
+ CRS-9
+
+ Concluding Observations 
+
+These examples illustrate that, through a variety of provisions added to
+
+appropriations acts, Congress can have a substantive effect on agency rulemaking
+activity beyond joint resolutions of disapproval pursuant to the Congressional
+Review Act. Some of the provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for
+2008 had been in previous appropriations measures, but some appeared to be new to
+this legislation.16 Similarly, previous appropriations measures contained restrictions
+on the development or implementation of regulations that were not included in the
+Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008.17 Provisions in appropriations acts are
+binding only for the period of time covered by the legislation (i.e., a fiscal year or a
+portion of a fiscal year). Therefore, any regulatory restriction that is not repeated in
+the next relevant appropriations act or enacted in other legislation is no longer
+binding on the relevant agency or agencies.
+
+Most of the regulatory restrictions are in appropriations bills providing funds for
+
+particular agencies or groups of agencies (e.g., agencies funded by the Agriculture,
+Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
+Appropriations Act, 2008). Therefore, the prohibitions are applicable only to the
+agencies funded by that appropriations measure. However, some of the regulatory
+prohibitions are in the “General Provisions — Government-wide” section of one of
+the appropriations measures (for FY2008, Title VII of the Financial Services and
+General Government Appropriations Act), and are therefore applicable to virtually
+all federal agencies. For example, the provision in Section 735 of Division D of the
+Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 that prohibited the use of funds to
+implement a proposed rule on details to the legislative branch was in the “General
+Provisions — Government-wide” section of the act. Although this and other
+restrictions in that section are applicable government-wide, they are often written in
+such a way that, in practice, only certain agencies are actually affected (in this case,
+OPM).
+
+As noted earlier in this report, unlike joint resolutions of disapproval under the
+
+Congressional Review Act, the provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act
+for 2008 do not nullify final rulemaking actions taken by regulatory agencies.
+Therefore, any final rule that has taken effect and been codified in the Code of
+Federal Regulations will continue to be binding law — even if language in the
+
+16 The provisions having to do with the Rural Electrification and Telecommunication Loans
+program, the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, and the Trade Adjustment Assistance
+Reform Act, inter alia , were in previous appropriations acts. 
+
+17 For example, Section 760 of the “Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug
+Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006” (P.L. 109-97, November
+10, 2005) stated that “None of the funds provided in this Act may be used for salaries and
+expenses to carry out any regulation or rule insofar as it would make ineligible for
+enrollment in the conservation reserve program established under subchapter B of chapter
+1 of subtitle D of title XII of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3831 et seq.) land
+that is planted to hardwood trees as of the date of enactment of this Act and was enrolled
+in the conservation reserve program under a contract that expired prior to calendar year
+2002.” No similar provision was in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2008.
+
+ 
+ CRS-10
+
+relevant regulatory agency’s appropriations act prohibits the use of funds to enforce
+the rule. Regulated entities are still required to adhere to applicable requirements
+(e.g., installation of pollution control devices, submission of relevant paperwork),
+even if violations are unlikely to be detected and enforcement actions cannot be taken
+by federal agencies. 
+
+Some of the appropriations provisions restricting regulatory actions may not be
+
+all encompassing. Some federal agencies may derive funds from sources other than
+congressional appropriations (e.g., user fees), and the use of those funds to develop,
+implement, or enforce rules does not appear to be legally constrained by language
+stating that funds in a particular appropriations measure could not be used to draft a
+rule or implement its provisions. Also, some federal regulations (particularly those
+issued by EPA and OSHA) are primarily enforced by state or local governments, and
+those governments may have sources of funding that are independent of the federal
+funds that are restricted by the appropriations provisions. Some state or local
+governments may also have their own statutory and regulatory requirements that are
+the same as or similar to the federal rules at issue. If state or local funds or legal
+authorities are used to develop, implement, or enforce regulations, those actions
+would not appear to be constrained by statutory provisions limiting the use of federal
+ funds to restrict action on particular federal laws and regulations. 
+
+Also unclear is how these restrictions on regulatory agencies in the Consolidated
+
+Appropriations Act for 2008 will be viewed and implemented by the President. In
+his December 26, 2007, signing statement on the legislation, President George W.
+Bush said the act “contains certain provisions similar to those found in prior
+appropriations bills passed by the Congress that might be construed to be inconsistent
+with my Constitutional responsibilities. To avoid such potential infirmities, the
+executive branch will interpret and construe such provisions in the same manner as
+I have previously stated in regard to similar provisions.”18 If President Bush views
+these restrictions on agencies’ rulemaking and regulatory authorities as
+unconstitutional infringements on his ability to manage the executive branch, the
+agencies might be directed to ignore the restrictions in the appropriations act. On the
+other hand, because all agency regulations are based on some type of statutory
+rulemaking authority, Congress may view any failure to adhere to the appropriations
+restrictions as equally unconstitutional.19 In this situation, federal courts may have
+to decide whether the appropriations provisions are binding on the agencies. 
+
+18 To view a copy of this signing statement, see [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
+2007/12/20071226-1.html]. For more information on signing statements, see CRS Report
+RL33667, Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and Institutional Implications ,
+by T.J. Halstead. For information on how signing statements have been implemented, see
+U.S. Government Accountability Office, Presidential Signing Statements Accompanying the
+Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations Acts , B-308603, June 18, 2007; and U.S. Government
+Accountability Office, Presidential Signing Statements — Agency Implementation of Ten
+Provisions of Law , B-309928, December 20, 2007.
+
+19 For more on the perspective of federal rulemaking agencies as extensions of Congress,
+and regulations as extensions of legislative activity, see David H. Rosenbloom, Building a
+Legislative-Centered Public Administration: Congress and the Administrative State, 1946-
+1999 (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2000).
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,677 @@
+Oil and Natural Gas Industry Tax Issues in the 
+FY2013 Budget Proposal 
+
+ Robert Pirog 
+ Specialist in Energy Economics 
+
+March 2, 2012 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+7-5700 
+
+www.crs.gov 
+
+R42374 
+
+ CRS Report for Congress
+ Pr 
+
+ epared for Members and Committees of Congress 
+
+ 
+ Oil and Natural Gas Industry Tax Issues in the FY2013 Budget Proposal 
+
+ 
+
+ Summary 
+
+The Obama Administration, in the FY2013 budget proposal, seeks to eliminate certain tax 
+expenditures that benefit the oil and natural gas industries. Supporters of these tax provisions see 
+them as comparable to those affecting other industries and supporting the production of domestic 
+oil and natural gas resources. Opponents of the provisions see these tax expenditures as subsidies 
+to a profitable industry the government can ill afford, and impediments to the development of 
+clean energy alternatives. 
+
+The FY2013 budget proposal outlines a set of proposals, framed as the termination of tax 
+preferences, that would potentially increase the taxes paid by the oil and natural gas industries, 
+especially those of the independent producers. These proposals include repeal of the enhanced oil 
+recovery and marginal well tax credits, repeal of the current expensing of intangible drilling costs 
+provision, repeal of the deduction for tertiary injectants, repeal of the passive loss exception for 
+working interests in oil and natural gas properties, elimination of the manufacturing tax deduction 
+for oil and natural gas companies, increasing the amortization period for certain exploration 
+expenses, and repeal of the percentage depletion allowance for independent oil and natural gas 
+producers. In addition, a variety of increased inspection fees and other charges that would 
+generate more revenue for the Department of the Interior (DOI) are included in the budget 
+proposal. 
+
+The Administration estimates that the tax changes outlined in the budget proposal would provide 
+$22.133 billion in revenues over the period FY2013 to FY2017, and $38.56 billion from FY2013 
+to FY2022. These changes, if enacted by Congress, also would reduce the tax advantage of 
+independent oil and natural gas companies over the major oil companies. They would also raise 
+the cost of exploration and production, with the possible result of higher consumer prices and 
+more slowly increasing domestic production. 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ Oil and Natural Gas Industry Tax Issues in the FY2013 Budget Proposal 
+
+ 
+
+ Contents 
+
+Background...................................................................................................................................... 1 
+The FY2013 Budget Proposal.......................................................................................................... 1 
+Repeal Enhanced Oil Recovery Credit ............................................................................................ 2 
+Repeal Credit for Oil and Gas from Marginal Wells ....................................................................... 3 
+Repeal Expensing of Intangible Drilling Costs ............................................................................... 3 
+Repeal Tertiary Injectants Deduction............................................................................................... 4 
+Repeal Passive Loss Exception for Working Interests in Oil Properties ......................................... 4 
+Repeal Percentage Depletion Allowance......................................................................................... 5 
+Repeal Manufacturing Tax Deduction (§199) ................................................................................. 5 
+Increase Geological and Geophysical Amortization Period ............................................................ 6 
+Other Tax Policies............................................................................................................................ 7 
+
+Last In, First Out (LIFO) ........................................................................................................... 7 
+Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund .................................................................................................... 8 
+Superfund .................................................................................................................................. 8 
+Dual Capacity Rule and Foreign Tax Credits ............................................................................ 8 
+
+Department of the Interior Budget................................................................................................... 9 
+Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 9 
+
+ 
+
+ Tables 
+
+Table 1. FY2013 Oil/Gas Industry Tax Proposal Revenue Estimates.............................................. 2 
+
+ 
+
+ Contacts 
+
+Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 9 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ Oil and Natural Gas Industry Tax Issues in the FY2013 Budget Proposal 
+
+ 
+
+ Background 
+
+The Obama Administration, in the FY2013 budget proposal, has proposed eliminating a variety of 
+federal tax deductions and credits available to the oil and natural gas industries. This year’s 
+proposals are similar to those sent to Congress in conjunction with the FY2010 through FY2012 
+budget requests. New revenue estimates for the FY2013 proposed tax changes are $38.561 billion 
+over the next decade, contrasted with decade estimates of $43.6 billion in 2012, $36 billion in 
+2011, and $31 billion in 2010, for essentially the same proposed changes. Although these 
+proposals have failed to be implemented by Congress in previous years, the current atmosphere of 
+high federal deficits, record earnings by the major oil companies, and an increasing price of 
+gasoline might reduce resistance to increasing taxes on the industry. 
+
+The Administration characterizes the deductions and credits slated for elimination as tax 
+preferences, or oil and gas subsidies, that are costly to U.S. taxpayers and do little to either 
+provide incentives for increased production or reduce prices to consumers.1 A contrasting 
+description is provided by the American Petroleum Institute (API), which describes the tax 
+provisions slated for elimination as “standard business deductions (some available to all other 
+industries) and mechanisms of cost recovery—a fundamental and necessary component to a 
+national income tax system.”2 
+
+The Administration also characterizes repealing these tax preferences as eliminating market 
+distortions, and links them to providing resources for investments in clean, renewable, efficient 
+energy resources. 
+
+ The FY2013 Budget Proposal 
+
+The Administration’s proposals to foster a clean energy economy and reduce consumption of 
+fossil fuels have led to eight proposed tax changes for the oil and natural gas industries. Table 1 
+ identifies the proposed tax changes and the Administration’s estimates of the revenue gains for 
+2013, the five year period FY2013-FY2017, and the 10-year period FY2013-FY2022. 
+
+Many of these proposed tax changes have the effect of equalizing the tax treatment of 
+independent oil producers to that of the major oil companies. Equalization is accomplished by 
+eliminating preferential tax treatment of the independent companies not available to the major oil 
+companies.3 In some cases, for example, the expensing of intangible drilling expenses, the major 
+oil companies have been excluded from the benefits of the tax provision for years, while the 
+independent companies continue to receive the benefit. 
+
+ 
+
+1 FY2013 federal budget request, Department of Energy, Cuts, Consolidations, and Savings, p. 80. 
+2 American Petroleum Institute, “FY2013 Budget Calls for Targeted Tax Increases on America’s Oil & Natural Gas 
+Producers,” February 2012, http://www.api.org. 
+3 Independent companies are generally defined to mean non-integrated companies. They might, for example, work in 
+exploration and production, but not in refining or marketing. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 1 
+
+ 
+ Oil and Natural Gas Industry Tax Issues in the FY2013 Budget Proposal 
+
+ 
+
+ Table 1. FY2013 Oil/Gas Industry Tax Proposal Revenue Estimates 
+
+(in millions of dollars) 
+
+ Proposed Change 
+
+ 2013 
+
+ 2013-2017 
+
+ 2013-2022 
+
+Repeal Enhance Oil Recovery Credit 
+
+0 
+
+0 
+
+0 
+
+Repeal Credits for Oil and Gas from Marginal Wells 
+
+0 
+
+0 
+
+0 
+
+Repeal Expensing of Intangible Dril ing Costs 
+
+3,490 
+
+10,968 
+
+13,902 
+
+Repeal Deduction for Tertiary Injectants 
+
+7 
+
+51 
+
+100 
+
+Repeal Passive Loss Exception for Working Interests 
+
+9 47 82 
+
+in Oil and Natural Gas Properties 
+
+Repeal Percentage Depletion for Oil and 
+
+612 5,029 11,465 
+
+Natural Gas Wells 
+
+Repeal the Domestic Manufacturing Deduction for 
+
+574 4,877 11,612 
+
+Oil and Natural Gas Companies 
+
+Increase Geological and Geophysical Amortization 
+
+61 1,161 1,400 
+
+Periods 
+
+Totals 4,753 
+
+22,133 
+
+38,561 
+
+ Source: FY2013 federal budget request, Department of Energy, Cuts, Consolidations, and Savings, p. 80. 
+
+ Notes: Revenues represent changes from current law. A zero entry in Table 1 implies no revenue effect under 
+current and forecasted conditions in oil and natural gas markets. Order of proposals is as per the budget 
+proposal. 
+
+As shown in Table 1 , the proposed tax changes would have the effect of raising an estimated $4.8 
+billion in FY2013. Almost all (96%) of the revenues from the proposed tax preference repeal 
+from FY2013-FY2022 would come from only three of the proposals, while two of the proposals 
+would provide no revenue at all. 
+
+Compared to the FY2012 budget proposal, the current proposal provides more revenue in the 
+current year, $4.8 billion compared to $3.5 billion, but lower revenues over the 10-year period, 
+$38.6 billion compared to $43.6 billion. The major difference in the revenue estimates comes 
+from a revision of the gains from repealing the domestic manufacturing deduction. That provision 
+was expected to yield $18.3 billion over the 10-year time horizon in 2012, compared to only 
+$11.6 billion in the current estimate. 
+
+ Repeal Enhanced Oil Recovery Credit 
+
+The enhanced oil recovery credit provides for a credit of 15% of allowable costs associated with 
+the use of oil recovery technologies, including the injection of carbon dioxide, to supplement 
+natural well pressure, that can enhance the production from older wells. The credit is only 
+available during periods of low oil prices, determined by yearly guidance with respect to what 
+constitutes a low price. The credit has not been in effect over the past several years. Elimination 
+of this credit would likely not have any effect on current, or expected, oil production, as oil prices 
+are generally expected to remain high. Periods of low oil prices are usually associated with excess 
+supply in the market. During periods of excess supply, it is unlikely that keeping older, higher-
+cost, low-production wells producing is an effective strategy for oil companies. Revenues from 
+these wells are unlikely to cover operating costs in periods of low prices, although the credit 
+could provide the margin that keeps these wells in production. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 2 
+
+ 
+ Oil and Natural Gas Industry Tax Issues in the FY2013 Budget Proposal 
+
+ 
+
+ Repeal Credit for Oil and Gas from Marginal Wells4 
+
+The marginal well tax credit was implemented as the result of a recommendation by the National 
+Petroleum Council in 1994.5 The purpose was to keep low-production oil and natural gas wells in 
+production during periods of low prices for those fuels. The tax credit is designed to maximize 
+U.S. production levels even when energy markets result in low world prices for oil, and low 
+regional prices for natural gas. It is believed that up to 20% of U.S. oil production and 12% of 
+natural gas production might be sourced from wells of this category. The credit was enacted in 
+2004, but has not been utilized because market prices have been high enough since that time to 
+justify production on economic grounds without the application of the credit. The credit is not 
+likely to be an important factor if prices remain high, or if the United States is successful in 
+transitioning to alternative energy sources. The high-cost wells that fall into the marginal well 
+category are likely to be some of the first eliminated on economic efficiency grounds if a 
+reduction in petroleum prices occurs even if the credit were maintained. 
+
+ Repeal Expensing of Intangible Drilling Costs 
+
+The expensing of intangible drilling costs has been part of the federal tax code since 1913. 
+Intangible drilling costs generally include cost items that have no salvage value, but are necessary 
+for the drilling of an exploratory well, or the development of a well for production. Intangible 
+drilling costs cover a wide range of activities and physical supplies, including ground clearing, 
+draining, surveying, wages, repairs, supplies, drilling mud, chemicals, and cement required to 
+commence drilling, or to prepare for development of a well. The purpose of allowing current-year 
+expensing of these costs is to attract capital to what has historically been a highly risky 
+investment. Current expensing allows for a quicker return of invested funds through reduced tax 
+payments. 
+
+In recent years, the risk associated with finding oil has been reduced, but not eliminated, through 
+the use of advanced technology, including three-dimensional seismic analysis and advanced 
+horizontal drilling techniques, among others. These advances make expensive “dry holes” less 
+likely, and expand the physical range of exploration and production activities available from a 
+drilling rig, reducing the cost of exploration of prospective oil and natural gas fields.6 
+
+In the current law, the full expensing of intangible drilling costs is available to independent oil 
+producers. Since 1986, major integrated oil companies have been able to expense 70% of their 
+intangible drilling costs and capitalize the remaining 30% over a 60-month period. The FY2013 
+budget proposal would repeal both direct expensing and the capitalization requirement, and 
+substitute generally applicable accounting procedures for cost recovery. 
+
+ 
+
+4 Marginal wells produce on average less than 15 barrels per day, produce heavy oil, or produce up to 25 barrels per 
+day, but with 95% or more water content. 
+5 The credit is $3 per barrel (inflation adjusted), and/or $0.50 per thousand cubic feet of natural gas (inflation adjusted) 
+from a marginal well. The credit phases out once threshold prices are reached. 
+6 According to Energy Information Administration data, in 1961 there were 44,254 oil and natural gas exploration and 
+development wells drilled in the United States, of which 17,331 were dry (39%). In 2011, 45,529 oil and natural gas 
+exploration and development wells were drilled in the United States, of which 4,761 were dry (10%). Data available at 
+http://www.eia.gov. Part of the reduced cost of dry holes is offset by the cost of using new technologies. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 3 
+
+ 
+ Oil and Natural Gas Industry Tax Issues in the FY2013 Budget Proposal 
+
+ 
+
+Administration estimates are that the repeal of the expensing of intangible drilling costs provision 
+will yield $13.9 billion in revenue over the decade to 2022. In response to a similar tax proposal 
+in the FY2010 federal budget proposal, the Independent Petroleum Association of America 
+(IPAA) estimated that the tax change would result in an initial year reduction in investment in 
+U.S. oil development of about $3 billion.7 IPAA’s estimated reduction in oil development 
+spending implied an almost dollar-for-dollar relationship between higher taxes and reduced 
+investment. Little empirical evidence for the estimate was provided. The effect of the elimination 
+of the expensing of intangible drilling costs in FY2012 was estimated by IPAA to result in an 
+almost immediate one-third reduction in drilling budgets.8 
+
+Actual reductions in drilling budgets are likely to be determined by the effect of increased taxes 
+in conjunction with the price of oil. If the price of oil were to settle in the $40-per-barrel range 
+that prevailed in December 2008, the burden of additional tax expense on the independent firms 
+could reduce drilling activity. The combination of low oil prices and additional taxes might not 
+justify the development of relatively high-cost resources, especially in deep waters, as in the Gulf 
+of Mexico. However, with the February 2012 price of oil above $100 per barrel, supported by 
+political unrest in the Middle East and other factors, the additional tax expense is likely to have a 
+smaller effect on reducing oil development activity.9 
+
+ Repeal Tertiary Injectants Deduction 
+
+Tertiary injection expenses, including the injectant cost, can be fully deducted in the current tax 
+year. Supporters of the favorable current treatment of these expenses point to the importance of 
+tertiary recovery methods in maintaining the output of older wells, as well as the environmental 
+advantages of injecting carbon dioxide, a primary tertiary injectant, into wells. Repeal of the 
+deduction, or less favorable tax treatment of the expenses, would be likely to reduce oil output 
+from older producing fields during periods when the profit margin, and the price of oil, is low. 
+During a period of high oil prices, the repeal is likely to have a smaller effect on production 
+levels. 
+
+ Repeal Passive Loss Exception for Working Interests 
+in Oil Properties 
+
+Repeal of the passive loss exception for working interests in oil and natural gas properties is a 
+relatively small item in terms of tax revenues, estimated at $82 million from FY2013 to FY2022. 
+The provision exempts working interests, investments, in gas and oil exploration and 
+development from being categorized as “passive income (or loss)” with respect to the Tax Reform 
+Act of 1986. This categorization permits the deduction of losses in oil and gas projects against 
+other active income earned without limitation, and is believed to act as an incentive to induce 
+investors to finance oil and gas projects. 
+ 
+
+7 Independent Petroleum Association of America, “New Natural Gas and Oil Taxes Would Crush America’s Clean 
+Energy and Energy Security,” http://www.ipaa.org/news/docs/ObamasNewtaxes2009.pdf. 
+8 Independent Petroleum Association of America, “Increasing Taxes on America’s Independent Natural Gas and Oil 
+Producers—A Bad Idea,” http://www.ipaa.org. 
+9 On February 22, 2012, the observed price of West Texas Intermediate on the NYMEX was $106.17 per barrel. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 4 
+
+ 
+ Oil and Natural Gas Industry Tax Issues in the FY2013 Budget Proposal 
+
+ 
+
+ Repeal Percentage Depletion Allowance 
+
+Percentage depletion is the practice of deducting from an oil company’s gross income a 
+percentage value, in the current law 15%, which represents, for accounting and tax purposes, the 
+total value of the oil deposit that was extracted in the tax year. Percentage depletion has a long 
+history in the tax treatment of the oil industry, dating back to 1926. The purpose of the percentage 
+depletion allowance is to provide an analog to normal business depreciation of assets for the oil 
+industry, in effect equating the tax treatment of oil deposits to the tax treatment of capital 
+equipment in more traditional manufacturing industries. The analogy is based on the observation 
+that both capital equipment in traditional manufacturing, as well as an oil deposit, are “wasting 
+resources” in the sense that they both require capital investment to generate an income stream, 
+and that both will eventually become nonproductive through obsolescence or through wearing 
+out. Depreciation allowances are applied against the investment in capital equipment, and 
+depletion allowances are applied to the value of oil deposits as a way to recover initial 
+investments. 
+
+In its current form, the allowance is limited to domestic U.S. production by independent 
+producers, on the first 1,000 barrels per day, per well, of production, and is limited to 65% of the 
+producer’s net income. 
+
+Percentage depletion was eliminated for the major oil companies in 1975. Although major oil 
+companies’ profits were likely affected by the tax change, their production of oil showed little 
+variation as a result. Production of oil within the United States remains attractive for companies 
+because ownership of the oil is allowed in this country. In most areas of the world, ownership of 
+oil is vested in the national oil company, as a proxy for the state itself. The result is generally a 
+lower share of revenues for private oil companies producing outside the United States. The 
+Administration projects that the repeal of the percentage depletion allowance would yield tax 
+revenues of approximately $11.5 billion over the period FY2013 through FY2022. 
+
+ Repeal Manufacturing Tax Deduction (§199) 
+
+A provision in the proposed budget for FY2013 that affects both independent and the major 
+companies’ oil and natural gas tax liabilities is the repeal of the domestic manufacturing tax 
+deduction.10 As shown in Table 1 , the Administration estimates that the repeal of this deduction 
+for the oil and natural gas industries would contribute $4.88 billion in revenue for the period 
+FY2013 to FY2017. The total increase in tax revenue is estimated to be $11.61 billion from 
+FY2013 to FY2022, according to data reported in the budget proposal. 
+
+This tax provision was enacted in 2004 as part of the American Jobs Creation Act to encourage 
+the expansion of American employment in manufacturing. The oil industry was categorized as a 
+manufacturing industry, and hence, eligible for the deduction, which was to be phased in over 
+several years, beginning at 3% in 2005, and rising to a maximum of 9% in 2010. The base of the 
+tax is net income from domestic manufacturing activities, capped by a limitation related to the 
+
+ 
+
+10 The FY2013 budget proposal also requests repeal of the deduction for coal and other hard minerals in addition to 
+fossil fuels. This proposal is revenue-neutral because revenues gained by the repeal of the deduction for these industries 
+would be used to finance an increase in the deduction rate for domestic manufacturing firms. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 5 
+
+ 
+ Oil and Natural Gas Industry Tax Issues in the FY2013 Budget Proposal 
+
+ 
+
+size of the company’s payroll. Section 199(d)(9) of the Tax Code limits the rate available to the 
+oil and natural gas industries to 6%. 
+
+This tax deduction was intended to provide domestic firms an incentive to increase domestic 
+employment in manufacturing at a time when there was concern that manufacturing jobs were 
+migrating overseas. By allowing a percent deduction of net income, up to the payroll limitation, 
+the effective cost of labor to the manufacturer was reduced. The reduction in net labor cost was 
+intended to expand employment, increase output, and reduce prices, making domestically 
+manufactured goods more competitive in the U.S. and world markets. 
+
+Although the oil and natural gas industries are classified as manufacturing industries for data 
+reporting and tax purposes, they differ from traditional factory manufacturing in a number of 
+ways. For example, the production of petroleum products at a refinery is only indirectly related to 
+the level of employment.11 This implies that if wage costs go down due to the tax deduction, there 
+is less chance that the result will be increased output due to higher employment. Even if 
+employment did increase, it would have little effect on national employment levels due to the 
+capital-intensive nature of the industry. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that oil and natural 
+gas extraction industries employed approximately 185,500 workers in December 2011, of which 
+about 105,700 were classified as production workers. 
+
+The period since 2004, while difficult for American manufacturing as a whole, has been generally 
+one of high profits for the oil industry. The generally high, although volatile, prices for oil 
+prevailing since 2004 that have generated the high profits for the industry are seen as the critical 
+factor in oil investment. Oil exploration tends to increase when prices are expected to increase, 
+and possibly remain high, and investment decreases when prices are expected to decrease and 
+possibly remain low for a sustained period. The variability and level of expected oil and natural 
+gas prices are likely to be a more important factor in determining capital investment budgets, and 
+hence exploration and production development budgets, than the repeal of a tax benefit that is 
+capped by a relatively low wage bill for the companies. 
+
+ Increase Geological and 
+Geophysical Amortization Period 
+
+Geological and geophysical expenses are incurred during the process of oil and natural gas 
+resource development. The most favorable tax treatment of these costs would be to allow them to 
+be deducted in the year they are incurred. Requiring these costs to be amortized, or spread out for 
+tax purposes, over several years is less favorable. The longer the amortization period, the less 
+favorable the tax treatment, because a smaller amount is deducted each year, and more time is 
+required to recover the entire cost. 
+
+Currently, the major integrated oil companies amortize geological and geophysical costs over a 
+period of seven years. Independent producers amortize these costs over a period of two years. 
+Under the FY2013 budget proposal, independent producers would have their amortization period 
+extended to seven years, equalizing treatment with the integrated oil companies. The extended 
+amortization period for independent producers is projected by the Administration to yield 
+ 
+
+11 The refinery can attain different utilization rates and product mixes with no, or minor, variations in labor utilization. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 6 
+
+ 
+ Oil and Natural Gas Industry Tax Issues in the FY2013 Budget Proposal 
+
+ 
+
+$1.4 billion over the period FY2013 to FY2022. IPAA estimated in 2010 that a similar proposal in 
+the FY2011 budget proposal would likely reduce exploration and development activities on a 
+dollar-for-dollar basis as a result of altering this tax provision. However, it seems unlikely that oil 
+producers would reduce exploration investment to this extent if the spread of the market price 
+over the full cost of oil exploration and development remains high, as it generally has been in the 
+period of high oil prices since 2004. Additionally, if prices decline to a level near the cost of 
+exploration and development, investment is likely to be curtailed even with the more favorable 
+tax treatment of geological and geophysical expenses currently in place. If the industry were 
+experiencing a time of stagnant oil prices that were near the cost of production, relatively small 
+changes in tax expenditures might affect investment and production activities. However, in a time 
+of high and volatile oil prices, small changes in tax expenses are likely to be overshadowed by 
+price changes derived from other factors. 
+
+ Other Tax Policies 
+
+API, in responding to President Obama’s FY2013 budget proposal, identifies a number of other 
+proposed tax changes that would affect the oil industry. These changes include the repeal of the 
+last-in-first-out (LIFO) accounting method, increasing the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund taxes, 
+reinstating Superfund taxes, and modifying the Dual Capacity Rule. 
+
+ Last In, First Out (LIFO) 
+
+LIFO, as described by API, is not a tax loophole, but a well-established accounting methodology 
+to determine taxable earnings.12 Under LIFO accounting procedures, firms assume that the last 
+unit of a good that the company acquires in its inventory is the first unit of the good that is sold. 
+In periods of price inflation, or periods when the expected cost of acquiring inventories is rising, 
+LIFO is beneficial in reducing taxes by allowing the cost deduction of the most recent 
+(expensive) goods, independently of which goods were actually sold out of inventory. 
+
+The general upward movement of oil prices since 2004 has been, with the significant exception of 
+the period when the effects of the recession drove oil prices down (September 2008 to January 
+2009), a favorable period for the oil industry to be using LIFO. To the extent that demand 
+conditions and political unrest in oil exporting regions might keep the price of oil rising, keeping 
+LIFO in place would be a tax advantage for the oil industry. API states that, if it were repealed, 
+companies might have to redirect cash or sell assets to cover the tax payment, destroying some 
+businesses. Changing the LIFO provision could raise $78.3 billion over the period FY2013 to 
+FY2022, with $25.8 billion coming from the oil and natural gas industries.13 
+
+ 
+
+12 American Petroleum Institute, “FY2013 Budget Calls for Targeted Tax Increases on America’s Oil & Natural Gas 
+Producers,” February 2012, http://www.api.org. 
+13 Ibid. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 7 
+
+ 
+ Oil and Natural Gas Industry Tax Issues in the FY2013 Budget Proposal 
+
+ 
+
+ Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund 
+
+The FY2013 budget proposal includes a proposed increase in the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund 
+financing, by raising the tax on imported and domestic oil to 9 cents per barrel in 2013 and to 
+10 cents per barrel in 2017. The current tax is 8 cents per barrel, to rise to 9 cents per barrel in 
+2016. These proposed tax increases to finance the fund at a higher rate were likely motivated as a 
+response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.14 
+
+ Superfund 
+
+The Superfund finances cleanup of the nation’s high risk contaminated sites for which the 
+responsible parties cannot be found, or cannot pay. Superfund taxing authority expired at the end 
+of 1995. The FY2013 budget proposal would reinstate an excise tax of 9.7 cents per barrel on 
+domestic and imported crude oil, including crude oil sourced from bituminous deposits and 
+kerogen-rich rock.15 In addition, to the oil excise tax, other dedicated taxes on chemicals and 
+corporate income have been proposed.16 The Administration and supporters of reauthorization 
+believe that reinstatement of Superfund taxes would reduce the reliance on general Treasury 
+revenues. The API contends that the excise taxes would impose a disproportionate share of the 
+total cleanup costs on oil production and the sale of petroleum products. The API also questions 
+whether a shift away from the use of general Treasury revenues as a source of funding would 
+speed up cleanup efforts, if the overall appropriations from the trust fund were to remain constant 
+and only the funding sources changed.17 The FY2013 budget proposes a cut in the Hazardous 
+Substance Superfund resourcing level of about 3%. 
+
+ Dual Capacity Rule and Foreign Tax Credits 
+
+The credit for foreign income taxes paid, upon which the Dual Capacity Rule is based, dates back 
+to 1918. Since that time corporations have been able to credit, directly from their U.S. income tax 
+liabilities, income tax payments made to foreign governments. The period from the end of World 
+War II to 1950 saw a new interpretation of this tax rule develop with respect to the oil industry. 
+Before that time, oil-producing countries like Saudi Arabia charged the oil companies operating 
+in their countries royalties, based on the resources extracted, as well as other taxes. For U.S. tax 
+purposes, the royalties were treated as costs of doing business, hence, an expense, but not a direct 
+credit against U.S. tax liabilities. In 1950, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. major oil companies 
+operating there began negotiations to transform royalty payments into income taxes. This change 
+had the effect of allowing the companies to pay more to Saudi Arabia, increase their after-tax 
+earnings, at the expense of essentially transferring funds from the U.S. Treasury to the Saudi 
+government.18 
+
+ 
+
+14 See National Pollution Trust Fund Center, U.S. Coast Guard, for details on the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. 
+Available at http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/About_NPFC/osltf.asp. 
+15 For a discussion of issues regarding reauthorization of Superfund taxes, see the section on the “Harzardous Substance 
+Superfund Trust Fund” in CRS Report R41039, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
+Act: A Summary of Superfund Cleanup Authorities and Related Provisions of the Act , by David M. Bearden. 
+16 In the 112th Congress, see H.R. 1596, H.R. 1634, H.R. 3638 (Subtitle G of Title II), and S. 461. 
+17 American Petroleum Institute, “FY2013 Calls for Targeted Tax Increases on America’s Oil and Natural Gas 
+Producers,” February 2012, available at http://www.api.org. 
+18 Daniel Yergin, The Prize , Simon & Schuster, New York, 1991, p. 446. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 8 
+
+ 
+ Oil and Natural Gas Industry Tax Issues in the FY2013 Budget Proposal 
+
+ 
+
+Proposed modification of the dual capacity rules would restrict companies from claiming the full 
+amount of foreign income taxes as a credit against U.S. taxes. Instead, the oil companies would 
+only be allowed to credit amounts equal to the general corporate tax rate applicable to other 
+industries. Any additional tax payments would be classified as tax-deductible operating expenses. 
+The effect of the change in dual capacity rules would be to reduce after-tax revenues for the 
+companies, as well as returns from overseas investments. This could lead to U.S. firms choosing 
+to invest in fewer marginal overseas projects. 
+
+ Department of the Interior Budget 
+
+The Department of the Interior (DOI) budget proposal contains several changes in fees and other 
+revenue-generating items that would affect the oil and natural gas industries. 
+
+The FY2013 budget proposal includes provisions to transfer the cost of drilling inspection and 
+permit fees to the companies in the form of increased fees. Additionally, fees would be 
+established for new nonproducing oil and gas leases to encourage development and production. 
+Royalty rate adjustment and terminating the royalty-in-kind program are also included in the 
+budget proposal. 
+
+Although these fees and charges would increase the cost of exploring, developing, and operating 
+oil and natural gas facilities under DOI’s management, and are likely to reduce those activities as 
+suggested by opponents of the proposals, the effects are likely to be small, as these fees represent 
+only a fraction of the revenues, profits, or other taxes and fees paid to the government. Supporters 
+of these fees might make the argument that they represent “user charges” consistent with 
+environmentally sound management of resources on federal lands. 
+
+ Conclusion 
+
+On the one hand, the tax changes proposed in Table 1 would increase tax collections from the oil 
+and natural gas industries and may have the effect of decreasing exploration, development, and 
+production, while increasing consumer prices and possibly increasing the nation’s dependence on 
+foreign oil. These same proposals, from an alternate point of view, might be considered to be the 
+elimination of tax preferences that have favored the oil and natural gas industries over other 
+energy sources and made oil and natural gas products artificially inexpensive, with consumer cost 
+held below the true cost of consumption when external costs associated with environmental costs 
+and energy dependence, among others, are included. 
+
+ 
+
+ Author Contact Information 
+ 
+Robert Pirog 
+
+ 
+
+Specialist in Energy Economics 
+rpirog@crs.loc.gov, 7-6847 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 9
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,3106 @@
+Order Code RL32837
+
+CRS Report for Congress
+
+Received through the CRS Web
+
+ Science and Technology Policy: 
+
+ Issues for the 109th Congress 
+
+ Updated February 3, 2006 
+
+Frank Gottron, Coordinator
+
+Resources, Science, and Industry Division
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ Science and Technology Policy: Issues for the 109th
+
+Congress
+
+ Summary 
+
+Science and technology have a pervasive influence over a wide range of issues
+
+confronting the nation. Decisions on how much federal funding to invest in research
+and development (R&D), and determining what programs have the highest priority,
+for example, may have implications for homeland security, new high technology
+industries, government/private sector cooperation in R&D, and myriad other areas.
+
+This report indicates the sweep of science and technology in many public policy
+
+issues, although it cannot provide a comprehensive examination of every science or
+technology issue which may be of interest to Congress. In some areas, such as global
+climate change and stem cell research, the importance of science and technology is
+explicit and in the forefront of the policy debate. In others, such as patent protection
+and telecommunications reform, science and technology may not be as explicit, but
+are important drivers affecting how policy makers may make decisions. This report
+also addresses key issues that directly affect, or are affected by, science and
+technology. Other mechanisms which may indirectly impact science and technology
+ — such as tax, antitrust, and trade policies — are outside the scope of this report. 
+
+The appropriate level of federal funding for research and development (R&D)
+
+is among the issues facing Congress. One consequence of President Bush’s objective
+of constraining the growth of discretionary spending is that funding for federal R&D
+would increase only slightly in the FY2006 budget. If adjusted for inflation, it would
+decline for the first time since FY1996. Federal R&D funding spurs technological
+advancement, which contributes to economic growth, and plays a role in the
+education of future scientists and engineers. Members of congressional committees
+that oversee R&D have expressed concern about the possible repercussions of
+restraining R&D funding.
+
+Science and technology also are important components of homeland security
+
+issues. Not only is Congress debating funding levels for R&D for counterterrorism,
+but issues concerning public access to scientific information, and technological and
+privacy aspects of “data mining” (a potential means to identity terrorist activities and
+track individual terrorists themselves). Congress is addressing a wide range of other
+science and technology policy issues, from tsunami forecasting and warning, to
+“telecom reform” (revising the Telecommunications Act of 1996), to cloning and
+stem cell research, to ocean policy and global climate change. Several energy issues
+are being debated, including President Bush’s Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, and
+reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The “transformation” of the National Aeronautics
+and Space Administration (NASA) as it implements President Bush’s “Vision for
+Space Exploration,” is receiving close attention as the agency announces related job
+cuts and program changes, including sharp cutbacks in aeronautics R&D.
+
+This report identifies other CRS reports that treat most of those issues in more
+
+depth. It is updated occasionally. Many of the CRS reports cited herein are updated
+more often, and should be consulted for timely information. 
+
+ 
+ Key Policy Staff 
+
+Bioagent Lab Registration and Security
+
+Sarah Lister
+
+7-7320
+
+Broadband Internet Access
+
+Len Kruger
+
+7-7070
+
+Chem/Bio/Rad/Nuke Terrorism Countermeasures R&D
+
+Frank Gottron
+
+7-5854
+
+Counterterrorism R&D
+
+Genevieve Knezo & Dan Morgan
+
+7-6610, 7-5849
+
+Data Mining
+
+Jeffrey Seifert
+
+7-0781
+
+Digital Television
+
+Len Kruger
+
+7-7070
+
+E-Government
+
+Jeffrey Seifert
+
+7-0781
+
+E-Health
+
+Steve Redhead
+
+7-2261
+
+Foreign Science and Engineering Presence in U.S.
+
+Christine Matthews
+
+7-7055
+
+Fusion Research: ITER
+
+Dan Morgan
+
+7-5849
+
+Global Climate Change
+
+John Justus
+
+7-7078
+
+Govt. Perf. and Results Act & President’s Management Agenda
+
+Genevieve Knezo
+
+7-6610
+
+Human Cloning and Embryonic Stem Cell Research
+
+Judy Johnson & Erin Williams
+
+7-7077, 7-4897
+
+Hydrogen Fuel and Fuel Cell Vehicles
+
+Brent Yacobucci
+
+7-9662
+
+Information Quality Act Implementation and Peer Review 
+
+Curtis Copeland & Michael Simpson
+
+7-0632, 7-7010
+
+Information Tech. Mgmt for Dept. of Homeland Security
+
+Jeffrey Seifert
+
+7-0781
+
+National Institutes of Health (NIH)
+
+Pamela Smith
+
+7-7048
+
+Networking Information Technology R&D
+
+Patty Figliola
+
+7-2508
+
+Ocean Science and Oceanic Affairs
+
+John Justus
+
+7-7078
+
+Open Source Software
+
+Jeffrey Seifert
+
+7-0781
+
+Public Access to Scientific Information
+
+Genevieve Knezo & Dana Shea
+
+7-6610, 7-6844
+
+R&D Budgets and Budget Trends
+
+Mike Davey
+
+7-7074
+
+Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel
+
+Tony Andrews
+
+7-6843
+
+Science & Technology Education
+
+Christine Matthews
+
+7-7055
+
+Space and Aeronautics Issues
+
+Marcia Smith & Dan Morgan
+
+7-7076, 7-5849
+
+Spectrum Management and Wireless Technologies
+
+Linda Moore
+
+7-5853
+
+Technological Innovation and the Economy
+
+Wendy Schacht
+
+7-7066
+
+Technology Development
+
+Wendy Schacht
+
+7-7066
+
+Technology for Warning Systems and Alerts
+
+Linda Moore
+
+7-5853
+
+Telecommunications Act fo 1996 Revision
+
+Angele Gilroy
+
+7-7778
+
+Tsunami Forecasting and Warning
+
+Wayne Morrissey
+
+7-7072
+
+Water Supply Technology and Energy-Water Efficiency
+
+Nicole Carter
+
+7-0854
+
+Wireless Privacy, Internet Privacy, and Spyware
+
+Marcia Smith
+
+7-7076
+
+ 
+ Contents 
+
+Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+
+Research and Development Budget, Management,
+
+and Workforce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+Federal Government Investment in R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+FY2006 R&D Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and the
+
+President’s Management Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+
+Information Quality Act Implementation and Peer Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+Science and Technology Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+Foreign Science and Engineering Presence in U.S.
+
+Institutions and the Labor Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+
+Homeland Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+
+Counterterrorism R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism
+
+ Countermeasures R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+
+Bioagent Lab Registration and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+Public Access to Scientific Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+Information Technology Management for the
+
+Department of Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
+
+Data Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
+
+Technology Development Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
+
+Technological Innovation and the Economy:
+
+Impact of Federal R&D Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
+
+R&D Partnerships and Intellectual Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
+Advanced Technology Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
+Prescription Drugs: Costs, Availability, and Federal R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
+
+Telecommunications and Information Technology Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
+
+Telecommunications Act of 1996 Revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
+Broadband Internet Regulation and Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
+Transition to Digital Television . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
+Spectrum Management and Wireless Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
+Networking Information Technology R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
+E-Health: Health Information Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
+E-Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
+Open Source Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
+Wireless Privacy, Internet Privacy, and Spyware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
+
+Tsunamis and Other Emergencies: Forecasting and Warning Systems . . . . . . . . 30
+
+Tsunami Forecasting and Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
+Technology for Warning Systems and Alerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
+
+Geosciences Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
+
+Ocean Commissions: Ocean Science and Oceanic Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
+
+ 
+ Global Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
+
+Energy and Water Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
+
+Hydrogen Fuel and Fuel Cell Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
+Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
+Fusion Research: ITER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
+Water Supply Technology and Energy-Water Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
+
+Biomedicine Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
+
+National Institutes of Health (NIH) Organization
+
+and Management Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
+
+Human Cloning and Embryonic Stem Cell Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
+
+Space and Aeronautics Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
+
+Impact of The “Vision for Space Exploration” on
+
+NASA’s Aeronautics and Other Space Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
+
+The Future of the Hubble Space Telescope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
+National Security Space Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
+
+Appendix: List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
+
+ 
+ Science and Technology Policy: Issues for
+
+the 109th Congress
+
+ Introduction 
+
+Science and technology are an underpinning of, and have a pervasive influence
+
+over, a wide range of issues confronting the nation. Decisions on how much federal
+funding to invest in basic and applied research and in research and development
+(R&D), and determining what programs have the highest priority, for example, could
+have implications for homeland security, new high technology industries,
+government/private sector cooperation in R&D, and myriad other areas.
+
+Following are brief discussions of key science and technology issues being
+
+debated in the 109th Congress. Where available, additional CRS reports and issue
+briefs that discuss these topics in more detail are identified at the end of each section.
+Many of those reports are regularly updated, and should be consulted for timely
+information.
+
+ Research and Development Budget, Management, 
+
+ and Workforce 
+
+ Federal Government Investment in R&D 
+
+The constrained fiscal environment is putting pressure on the full range of
+
+federal government spending, including funding for research and development
+(R&D). Debate is ongoing in the 109th Congress over how much to spend on various
+R&D activities (see next issue), but a more fundamental question is why the
+government invests in R&D at all rather than relying on the private sector,
+universities, and other non-profit groups. 
+
+Traditionally, the government’s role in R&D funding is to meet the mission
+
+requirements of the federal departments and agencies. Included is support for basic
+research — that work undertaken to gain knowledge and understanding of the
+fundamental aspects of nature. The payoff for basic research is generally long in
+coming, the results may be unmarketable, and the rewards often diffused among
+many users, making private sector investment less likely. However, as stated in the
+ Analytical Perspectives accompanying President Bush’s FY2006 budget request,
+“R&D is critically important for keeping our nation economically competitive, and
+it will help solve the challenges we face in health, defense, energy, and the
+environment” (p. 61). 
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+In the United States, while the development of new products, processes and
+
+services for the commercial marketplace is primarily a private sector activity, the
+government may get involved for certain limited purposes. Federal support is often
+provided for those efforts that typically have been determined to be necessary for the
+“national good” but which cannot, or will not, be financed by industry. Government
+also plays a role in structuring the environment in which business decisions are made
+and thereby influences private sector behavior. Direct federal funding, tax policies,
+and the existence of government markets for certain technologies, including defense,
+public health, and information technology-related goods, have helped influence
+resource allocations in the business community. 
+
+According to the National Science Foundation’s Science and Engineering 
+
+ Indicators 2004 (p. 4-9), in 2002 (the latest year for which data are available)
+industry funds accounted for 66% of U.S. R&D, while the government financed 28%
+of the total spending, with the remaining 6% provided by universities, colleges, and
+other non-profit institutions. Industrial support for R&D is concentrated on
+development rather than on research activities. The government encourages private
+investment in R&D through direct measures such as the research and
+experimentation (R&E) tax credit (see CRS Report RL31181), and through indirect
+measures including ownership of intellectual property and cooperative R&D
+activities (discussed below under Technology Development Issues ).
+
+The myriad effects of federal R&D spending highlight the importance of
+
+decisions regarding the amount and distribution of federal R&D funds. Choices
+made by the 109th Congress related to the financing of research and development
+may have immediate impacts on current programs as well as long term effects on the
+nation’s technological progress. 
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB91132, Industrial Competitiveness and Technological 
+
+ Advancement: Debate Over Government Policy 
+
+CRS Report RL32799, Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2006 
+CRS Issue Brief IB10088, Federal Research and Development: Budgeting and 
+
+ Priority-Setting Issues, 109th Congress 
+
+CRS Report RL31181, Research Tax Credit: Current Status, Legislative Proposals, 
+
+ and Policy Issues 
+
+ FY2006 R&D Budget 
+
+The Bush Administration requested $132.4 billion in federal research and
+
+development (R&D) funding for FY2006. This sum represented a $400 million
+increase over the FY2005 estimated funding level of $132.0 billion. CRS estimates
+that Congress has approved a record $135.7 billion for federal R&D in FY2006 (this
+figure does not reflect the 1% across-the-board rescission passed in the Department
+of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006, P.L. 109-148). This represents a 2.8% increase
+over the FY2005 estimated funding level. Most of the increase can be attributed to
+increases in defense weapons systems and the National Aeronautics and Space
+Administration’s (NASA) human space exploration technology program. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+Five agencies account for 90% of all federal basic research expenditures. For
+
+FY2006, basic research funding declined to an estimated $26.7 billion before the 1%
+rescission (0.5% below estimated FY2005 levels). Total federal research funding
+(the sum of basic and applied research) is projected to increase $1 billion to $57
+billion. However, the majority of that increase would go to NASA, while most of the
+remaining federal agencies would receive increases below the inflation rate for
+research funding. 
+
+While the President essentially requested flat funding for the Department of
+
+Defense (DOD) R&D programs, Congress approved an estimated $ 72.1 billion DOD
+R&D, a 4.2 % increase over FY2005 funding levels. Much of that increase is a result
+of Congress increasing DOD’s proposed science and technology budget by $2.5
+billion more than was requested by the Administration. 
+
+After the 1% rescission, funding for the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
+
+declined, in current dollars, for the first time in 36 years. When accounting for
+inflation, most R&D funding agencies now face budgets that are shrinking to levels
+of years past. NIH, National Science Foundation, DOE’s Office of Science, NASA
+(excluding human space exploration), and Agriculture all have less R&D funding in
+FY2006 than in FY2003 in constant dollars.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL32799, Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2006 
+CRS Issue Brief IB10088, Federal Research and Development: Budgeting and 
+
+ Priority-Setting Issues, 109th Congress 
+
+ Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and the
+President’s Management Agenda 
+
+The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), P.L. 103-62,
+
+is intended to produce greater efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in federal
+spending and to ensure that an agency’s programs and priorities meet its goals. It
+also requires agencies to use performance measures for management and, ultimately,
+for budgeting. Recent actions have required agencies to identify more precisely R&D
+goals and measures of R&D outcomes. As underscored in The President’s
+Management Agenda, beginning in FY2001 and in each year thereafter, the Bush
+Administration has emphasized the importance of performance measurement,
+including for R&D. In a memorandum dated June 5, 2003, signed jointly by the
+Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) Director and the Office of
+Management and Budget (OMB) Director regarding planning for the FY2005 R&D
+budget requests, the Administration announced that its effort to base budget decisions
+on program performance would continue and be expanded (OMB M-03-15). OMB
+referred to this memo again in the FY2006 and FY2007 R&D budget guidance,
+which reiterated the importance of performance assessment for R&D programs
+(respectively, OMB M-04-23 and OMB M-05-18.)
+
+Section 5 of OMB’s Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, 
+
+ FY2006, discusses requirements for agencies to use OMB criteria to measure
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+research outcomes, focusing on relevance, quality, and performance. R&D
+performed by industry is to meet additional criteria relating to the appropriateness of
+public investment, demonstrate a capability to measure benefits, and identify decision
+points to transition the activity to the private sector. The Administration assessed
+some R&D programs by use of the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) which
+uses the OMB R&D criteria and other measures. PART results for 84 R&D
+programs were used when making FY2006 budget decisions. OMB’s Analytical
+Perspectives volume reports that 25 programs were judged effective, 31 were
+moderately effective, and at least 19 were ranked ineffective or results not
+demonstrated. Commentators point out that it is difficult to define priorities for most
+research and to measure the results quantitatively, since research outcomes cannot be
+defined well in advance and often take a long time to demonstrate. As a result some
+say they have little confidence that R&D performance measures can be used to
+recommend budget levels. Congress may increase attention to using R&D
+performance measures in authorizations and appropriations as discretionary spending
+becomes constrained. 
+
+Interest continues in monitoring the PART process, as well as in the
+
+Administration’s budget and performance integration initiative and in
+implementation of GPRA. In the 109th Congress, the House Government Reform
+Committee has approved H.R. 185, to provide a statutory mandate for PART-like
+reviews; it is similar to H.R. 3826, which the committee reported favorably in the last
+Congress. Also in the 109th Congress, the Administration has proposed to create a
+sunset commission, which would require performance reviews and automatic
+program termination unless programs were reauthorized. Bills reflecting the
+Administration’s proposal have been introduced (S. 1399, H.R. 3276, H.R. 3277).
+Hearings were held in September 2005 on the two House bills. There are also
+proposals in the 109th Congress to create accountability commissions (H.R. 2470 and
+S. 1155). Some in Congress are not yet comfortable with using performance
+measurement data to make budget decisions and prefer to use traditionally formatted
+budget information, which focuses on inputs, rather than outputs, or political
+judgements to make budget decisions. (See Amelia Gruber, “Lawmakers Remain
+Skeptical of Linking Budget, Performance,” GovExec.com, Jan. 13, 2004, and GAO,
+ Performance Budgeting: Observations on the Use of OMB’s Program Assessment
+Rating Tool for the FY2004 Budget , GAO-04-174, Jan. 2004). 
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL32164, Performance Management and Budgeting in the Federal 
+
+ Government: Brief History and Recent Developments 
+
+CRS Report RS22181, A Sunset Commission for the Federal Government: Recent 
+
+ Developments 
+
+CRS Report RL32726, Proposals for a Commission on the Accountability and 
+Review of Federal Agencies (CARFA): Analysis and Issues for Congress 
+
+ Information Quality Act Implementation and Peer Review 
+
+The Information Quality Act (IQA), sometimes referred to as the Data Quality
+
+Act, was enacted in December 2000 as Section 515 of the Treasury and General
+Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (P.L. 106-554). The act
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+required OMB to issue guidance to federal agencies designed to ensure the “quality,
+objectivity, utility, and integrity” of information disseminated to the public. It also
+required agencies to issue their own information quality guidelines, and to establish
+administrative mechanisms that allow affected persons to seek correction of
+information maintained and disseminated by the agencies that they believe does not
+comply with OMB guidance. OMB’s February 2002 final guidance notes that IQA
+applies to virtually all federal agencies and defines “information” as “any
+communication or representation of knowledge such as facts or data, in any medium
+or form.” The guidelines define “dissemination” as any “agency initiated or
+sponsored distribution of information to the public.” OMB indicated that “quality”
+encompasses elements of utility, objectivity, and integrity, and said agencies can
+generally presume that data are “objective” if they have been subject to an
+independent peer review process. 
+
+In April 2004, OMB provided Congress with a report on the implementation of
+
+IQA during FY2003. The report said the agencies received only about 35 substantive
+correction requests during the year, and said the correction requests came from all
+segments of society. However, OMB Watch (a public interest group) said OMB’s
+report was “seriously flawed” in that it understated the number of correction requests
+and did not disclose that nearly three-quarters of the requests were from industry.
+OMB issued a second report on the IQA in December 2005, noting that agencies had
+received a total of 85 substantive correction requests by the end of FY2004. Of
+these, 45 were denied and 28 were appealed.
+
+A major test of the IQA’s effectiveness is whether agencies’ denials of
+
+correction requests are subject to judicial review. In June and November 2004, two
+U.S. District Courts ruled that IQA does not permit judicial review regarding
+agencies’ compliance with its provisions. One district court decision was appealed
+by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. In the Chamber’s view, if the district court’s
+decision is reversed on appeal, parties will be able to seek judicial review of an
+agency’s final disposition of IQA petitions. 
+
+In December 2004, OMB published a final bulletin on “Peer Review and
+
+Information Quality” that sought to establish a peer review process for all “influential
+scientific information,” which was defined as including any scientific information
+that the agency “reasonably can determine will have or does have a clear and
+substantial impact on important public policies or private sector decisions.” Other,
+more specific requirements were placed on “highly influential scientific assessments”
+(i.e., influential scientific information that involved an evaluation of a body of
+knowledge that could have a $500 million impact on decision-making or was
+precedent setting, novel, complex, or involved significant interagency interest). The
+final bulletin requires agencies to disclose the names of peer reviewers and requires
+agencies to report annually on their peer review activities. Both OMB and the
+agencies have a significant amount of discretion in the administration of the peer
+review bulletin (e.g., deciding when peer review is required, the selection of peer
+reviewers, whether to use alternative procedures), so its impact on information
+quality, consistency of peer review practices, and rulemaking will become clear only
+through its administration. In December 2005, agencies were to file their first reports
+with OMB on the implementation of their peer review programs. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-6
+
+Congressional interest in both OMB’s peer review bulletin and IQA during the
+
+second session of the 109th Congress is expected to center on how the agencies and
+OMB are carrying out their responsibilities, the effect of the bulletin and the act on
+the pace of rulemaking, and whether Congress should amend the IQA and provide
+for judicial review.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL32532, The Information Quality Act: OMB’s Guidance and Initial 
+
+ Implementation 
+
+CRS Report RL32680, Peer Review: OMB’s Proposed and Revised Bulletins 
+
+ Science and Technology Education 
+
+An important aspect of U.S. efforts to maintain and improve economic
+
+competitiveness is the existence of a capable scientific and technological workforce.
+A January 2004 report of the National Science Foundation (NSF), Science and
+Engineering Indicators 2004 , states that between the years 2000 and 2010,
+employment in science and engineering fields will increase at more than three times
+the rate for all other occupations. In addition, approximately 86% of the increase in
+science and engineering will be in computer-related positions. Simultaneous with
+predictions of the future scientific workforce are data reporting a decline in the
+number of students seeking degrees in certain fields. While 33% of the
+undergraduate degrees awarded are in science and engineering, the portion of degrees
+earned in the physical sciences, mathematics, computer science, and engineering has
+been static or declining. Disciplines that have witnessed an increase in degrees
+earned have been primarily psychology and the biological sciences. There is growing
+concern by many in the scientific community, industry, research-driven federal
+agencies, and Congress about the production of the nation’s science, mathematics,
+engineering, and technical personnel.
+
+The demographics of the science and engineering workforce have been the
+
+subject of debate. The demographics of the nation have been changing, with more
+than 25% of the U.S. population composed of certain minorities — blacks,
+Hispanics, and Native Americans. As a group, these minorities have traditionally
+been underrepresented in the science and engineering disciplines compared to their
+proportion of the total population. Another underrepresented group in the sciences
+is women, a group that comprises 50.8% of the population. Together, these groups
+comprise what some may call a “new majority.” While minorities have increased
+their share of degrees awarded in the past 10 years, poor preparation in science and
+mathematics is said to be a major factor limiting the appeal of science and
+engineering to many in these groups. In addition, a large number of blacks,
+Hispanics, and Native Americans lack access to many of the more rigorous college
+preparatory course offerings. John Brooks Slaughter, president and chief executive
+officer of the National Action Council for Minorities in Engineering, states that
+“Improving minority participation at all levels of higher education, especially in
+scientific and engineering disciplines, is critical for America.”
+[http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2004/1004diversity.shtml].
+
+ 
+ CRS-7
+
+Congress has held a number of hearings in recent years to examine the decline
+
+in the nation’s scientific and technical workforce, to seek further solutions for
+improving aspects of undergraduate science and mathematics education, and the
+aging of the science and engineering workforce, especially at the National
+Aeronautics and Space Administration. The FY2005 DOD authorization act (P.L.
+108-375) established a program of financial assistance for undergraduate degrees in
+science and technology. The disciplines that would receive support are those that are
+critical to national security. 
+
+On April 14, 2005, winners of the 2004 Presidential Awards for Excellence in
+
+Mathematics and Science Teaching testified before the House Committee on Science
+on the need to improve science and mathematics education at the precollege level.
+All five of the winners discussed the importance of expanding federal efforts directed
+at the professional development of teachers, including both pre-service and in-service
+training. They discussed also the need to encourage more students to enter the
+scientific disciplines and to make the teaching profession more attractive as a career.
+Introduced in April 2005, H.R. 1547/S. 765, the Math and Science Incentive Act of
+2005, is designed to respond to those needs. The bill, among other things, provides
+loan forgiveness for undergraduates pursuing careers in science, mathematics,
+engineering, and technology or teaching those subjects at the precollege level. It is
+anticipated that the 109th Congress will continue to examine issues important to
+science and mathematics education, including those of the preparation and
+performance of U.S. students at the precollege level, the diversity of the scientific and
+technical workforce, and the impact of visa regulations on foreign students in
+graduate science and engineering programs (see next issue).
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report 98-871 STM, Science, Engineering, and Mathematics Education: Status 
+
+ and Issues 
+
+ Foreign Science and Engineering Presence in U.S.
+Institutions and the Labor Force 
+
+The increased presence of foreign students in U.S. graduate science and
+
+engineering programs continues to be of concern. Enrollment of U.S. citizens in
+graduate science and engineering programs has not kept pace with that of foreign
+students in those programs. In many institutions, foreign graduate students on
+temporary visas comprise 40% to 50% of some science and engineering programs.
+In addition to the number of foreign students, a significant number of university
+faculty in the scientific disciplines are foreign, and foreign-born doctorates are
+employed in large numbers by industry. 
+
+Many in the scientific and engineering communities maintain that in order to
+
+compete with countries that are rapidly expanding their scientific and technological
+capabilities, the United States needs to bring in those whose skills will benefit society
+and will enable us to compete in the new-technology-based global economy.
+Individuals supporting this position believe instead of limiting the number of foreign
+students, the conditions under which foreign talent enters U.S. colleges and
+
+ 
+ CRS-8
+
+universities and the labor force should be more carefully scrutinized and controlled
+to address any security concerns. Furthermore, there are those who contend that the
+underlying concern of foreign students in graduate science and engineering programs
+is not necessarily that there are too many foreign-born students, but that there are not
+enough U.S. students entering the disciplines.
+
+The debate on the presence of foreign students in graduate science and
+
+engineering programs and the workforce has intensified as a result of the terrorist
+attacks of September 11, 2001. Concerns have been expressed about certain foreign
+students receiving education and training in sensitive areas. In addition, there has
+been increased discussion about the access of foreign scientists and engineers to
+R&D related to chemical and biological weapons. In May 2004, several higher
+education organizations released a combined statement on the impact of the new visa
+policies on higher education and the scientific enterprise. They maintain that the new
+procedures have made the visa system inefficient and that the tighter visa restrictions
+are a major deterrent to foreign students and scholars considering working and
+studying in this country. During the 108th Congress, several hearings were held to
+examine the visa system for foreign students. Discussions focused on the increased
+scrutiny of foreign students from countries that sponsor terrorism, and the restrictions
+placed on the participation of foreign students and scientists in military-sponsored
+projects and other types of R&D.
+
+On February 15, 2005, the State Department announced that progress has been
+
+made in reducing the clearance time for the Visas Mantis process. Currently, the
+process averages 15 days. Additionally, the State Department has revised the
+clearance procedures by reducing the restrictions placed on students and scholars and
+extending the validity of the clearances (lengthening the time for each clearance). In
+February 2005, the Government Accountability Office released the report Border
+Security: Streamlined Visas Mantis Program Has Lowered Burden on Foreign
+Science Students and Scholars, but Further Refinements Needed which details the
+efforts and the improvements that have been made in the visa processing. 
+
+A May 10, 2005 report of the National Academies, Policy Implications of 
+
+ International Graduate Students and Postdoctoral Scholars in the United States ,
+notes the importance of international students to U.S. society not only academically
+and economically, but in terms of global and cultural knowledge and understanding.
+However, NSF data reveal that the number of non-U.S. citizens enrolling in U.S.
+colleges and universities has slowed since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
+because of the tightening of U.S. visa policies, increased global competition for
+graduates in scientific and technical disciplines, and reports that foreign students
+may encounter an “inhospitable environment.”
+
+On September 13, 2005, the House Subcommittee on National Security,
+
+Emerging Threats, and International Relations held a hearing to examine the
+procedures put in place to correct the gaps and vulnerabilities in the visa process.
+Attention was directed at the mechanisms that are necessary to strengthen the visa
+process as an antiterrorism tool while simultaneously facilitating legitimate travel by
+foreign students, scientists, researchers, and others in the United States. Witnesses
+testified that consular workloads have increased significantly, yet the visa-processing
+offices continue to lack strategic direction, adequate resources, and training. In
+
+ 
+ CRS-9
+
+addition, reliable data are not readily available, across and among departments and
+agencies, to determine security and visa fraud related issues and overall increased
+visa wait times. Witnesses stated that because visa policies and requirements are
+ongoing and can change quickly, clear procedures on visa issuance and monitoring
+operations worldwide are necessary to guarantee that visas are adjudicated in a
+consistent manner at each visa-issuing post. 
+
+In the 109th Congress, legislation has been introduced to reform the visa
+
+application process for foreign students — S. 455, the American Competitiveness
+Through International Openness Act of 2005. It is anticipated that the 109th Congress
+will continue to monitor the participation of foreign students in graduate science and
+engineering programs and the processing of visas for foreign science students and
+scholars. In addition, there may be further debate regarding the increased scrutiny
+of foreign students from countries that sponsor terrorism, and the restrictions placed
+on the participation of foreign students and scientists in certain types of R&D. There
+are questions as to whether or not a continued reduction in the immigration of foreign
+scientists may impact negatively on the competitiveness of U.S. industry.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report 97-746, Foreign Science and Engineering Presence in U.S. Institutions 
+
+ and the Laborforce 
+
+ Homeland Security Issues 
+
+ Counterterrorism R&D 
+
+Since the terrorist attacks in 2001, additional federal funding has been devoted
+
+to counterterrorism R&D, and new planning and coordination mechanisms have been
+established both in individual agencies and in the White House. The Homeland
+Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) consolidated some R&D activities and
+coordination responsibilities in the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
+especially in its Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T). During the 108th
+Congress, oversight focused on the establishment of the S&T Directorate. In the
+109th Congress, policy issues include the coordination of programs and priorities,
+both between agencies and within DHS; the use of performance goals and metrics to
+monitor S&T program accomplishments; DHS’s use of the Homeland Security S&T
+Advisory Committee; the adequacy of R&D resources for topics of particular
+congressional interest, such as cybersecurity; and the integration of threat assessment
+information into R&D priority setting and coordination.
+
+Coordination of federal counterterrorism R&D is a particular challenge because
+
+relevant programs exist in many different agencies and accurate information about
+their activities can be difficult to obtain. The R&D programs of DHS account for
+only about one-third of total expenditures for homeland security R&D, which are
+estimated at about $4.0 billion, or about $4.6 billion if facilities are included. This
+excludes funding for R&D on combating terrorism overseas. Other agencies with
+large counterterrorism R&D responsibilities include the National Institutes of Health
+
+ 
+ CRS-10
+
+(focused on bioterrorism) and the defense and intelligence agencies. Also involved
+are the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Energy, and Agriculture, the National
+Science Foundation, the Environmental Protection Agency, and others. Under the
+Homeland Security Act, DHS has some authority to coordinate and help set priorities
+for other federal homeland security R&D, including human health-related R&D.
+What that authority means in practice remains to be seen. The heads of other
+agencies have no formal role in DHS’s R&D priority-setting and coordination, and
+conversely, the role of the DHS Secretary in setting priorities for those agencies is
+undetermined. DHS’s effectiveness in planning and coordinating R&D may depend
+upon the Secretary’s ability to influence other agencies through his interactions with
+existing counterterrorism coordination mechanisms in OSTP, NSTC, and interagency
+committees. 
+
+Internal coordination and priority-setting within DHS are also of congressional
+
+interest. The FY2004 homeland security appropriations conference report (H.Rept.
+108-280) expressed concern about the potential for duplication, waste, and
+inadequate management oversight, and directed DHS to “consolidate all
+Departmental research and development funding within the science and technology
+programs in the FY2005 budget request.” DHS did propose consolidating the Coast
+Guard RDT&E program and some smaller programs into the Science and
+Technology Directorate in FY2005, but Congress rejected the move of the Coast
+Guard program. For FY2006, DHS again proposed consolidating the Coast Guard
+program, along with the R&D activities of the Transportation Security
+Administration and some smaller programs. Congress again rejected the Coast
+Guard move. Consolidation remains an issue for congressional oversight in the 109th
+Congress. Other issues include questions about how DHS sets priorities among its
+various R&D programs, how it utilizes the R&D capabilities of the national
+laboratories, and how it manages and oversees R&D procurement.
+
+Federal funding for counterterrorism R&D has increased significantly since the
+
+terrorist attacks in 2001, despite the constrained budget environment. In FY2004, the
+government-wide total exceeded $3.5 billion, compared with less than $600 million
+in FY2001. For FY2006, the Administration’s total request for homeland security
+R&D, including facilities construction, was an estimated $4.6 billion (of which only
+$1.4 billion of was in DHS). The Administration has made homeland security a
+budget priority for interagency R&D planning, but further growth may pose
+challenges as the 109th Congress continues to balance competing needs in a tight
+budget.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RS21270, Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Research and 
+
+ Development: Funding, Organization, and Oversight 
+
+CRS Report RL31914, Research and Development in the Department of Homeland 
+
+ Security 
+
+CRS Report RL32481, Homeland Security Research and Development Funding and 
+
+ Activities in Federal Agencies: A Preliminary Inventory 
+
+CRS Report RL32482, Federal Homeland Security Research and Development 
+
+ Funding: Issues of Data Quality 
+
+ 
+ CRS-11
+
+ Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism
+Countermeasures R&D 
+
+Federal chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism
+
+countermeasure research and development is concentrated in three departments: the
+Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Homeland
+Security (DHS), and the Department of Defense (DOD). HHS, largely through the
+National Institutes of Health (NIH), has traditionally focused on basic research to
+support biomedical countermeasure development. Increasingly, HHS supports the
+development of new countermeasures by grants to fund advanced development and
+clinical trials. DHS CBRN research and development programs focus on threat
+awareness and characterization (including material threat determinations for Project
+BioShield), agent surveillance and detection, forensics, and post-event response and
+restoration. DOD has a significant biomedical countermeasure research and
+development program which focuses on protecting warfighters from CBRN weapons
+and tends to emphasize prophylaxis.
+
+The three departments’ programs have the potential for either synergy or
+
+redundancy. Strong executive branch management and congressional oversight may
+be crucial for maximizing synergy and avoiding redundancy. In the 109th Congress,
+committees in both chambers have held hearings related to interagency coordination
+of CBRN defense efforts. This attention appears likely to continue for the remainder
+of the 109th Congress.
+
+Enactment of the Project BioShield Act of 2002 (P.L. 108-276), a ten-year $5.6
+
+billion biomedical countermeasures acquisition program, removed some of the
+barriers that had discouraged pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies from
+developing countermeasures. Both chambers have held hearings during the 109th
+Congress on the implementation of this program. Congressional concerns include
+the perceived slow rate that the program acquires countermeasures and the decision
+process for choosing countermeasures. This scrutiny is likely to continue with
+additional oversight hearings. 
+
+Congress is considering several bills which add to or modify the Project
+
+BioShield Act of 2002. As part the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006
+(P.L. 109-148), Congress limited the tort liability of biomedical countermeasure
+producers. Some of remaining issues likely to receive congressional consideration
+are provisions removing additional barriers that discourage private-sector
+countermeasures development, such as streamlining the Food and Drug
+Administration drug approval process and helping transition products from basic
+research into advanced development. Additional financial incentives for companies
+developing countermeasures, including tax credits and patent extensions, are also
+likely to receive congressional consideration.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RS21507, Project BioShield
+ CRS Report RS21270, Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Research and 
+
+ Development: Funding, Organization, and Oversight 
+
+ 
+ CRS-12
+
+CRS Report RS22327, Pandemic Flu and Medical Biodefense Countermeasure 
+
+ Liability Legislation: P.L. 109-148, Division C (2005) 
+
+ Bioagent Lab Registration and Security 
+
+A program to track organisms that could potentially be used for bioterrorism —
+
+the Select Agent program — was first established in the Antiterrorism and Effective
+Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132). The law required the Secretary of HHS
+to regulate the transfer (though not the possession) of so-called select agents , which
+are viruses, bacteria, fungi, and toxins that may pose a severe threat to public health
+and safety. The initial regulation, administered by the Centers for Disease Control
+and Prevention (CDC), required the registration of any laboratory shipping or
+receiving the agents, and documentation of these transfers. Information and
+application materials for the CDC program are available at
+[http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap].
+
+The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
+
+of 2002 (P.L. 107-188) expanded the scope of the Select Agent program by requiring
+all facilities possessing select agents, not just those shipping or receiving them, to
+register with CDC. In addition, P.L. 107-188 instructed the HHS Secretary, in
+consultation with the Attorney General, to establish safety and security requirements
+for registered laboratories “commensurate with the level of risk to public health and
+safety,” and to conduct background screening for all persons seeking access to select
+agents. Congress authorized the program through 2007 with an indefinite
+appropriation.
+
+P.L. 107-188 gave the Department of Agriculture (USDA) similar authority to
+
+develop a list of biological agents and toxins that may pose a severe threat to crops
+and livestock and to regulate facilities that possess, use, or transfer those agents and
+toxins. The law instructed HHS and USDA to coordinate their activities regarding
+so-called overlap agents , those agents that affect both human and animal health and
+that therefore appear on both agencies’ lists. Both P.L. 107-188 and the USA
+PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) barred access by certain groups of individuals, based
+on criminal history, immigration status, and other factors.
+
+In December 2002, HHS and USDA issued interim final regulations to
+
+implement the expanded program. Both departments issued final rules, with only
+minor changes, in March 2005. The HHS regulation is codified at 42 CFR 73.0, and
+the USDA regulation at 7 CFR 331 and 9 CFR 121. In addition to the provisions
+discussed above, all labs possessing select agents are required to submit detailed
+security, training, and record-keeping plans in order to be registered. Individuals
+given access to select agents must undergo background investigations conducted by
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
+
+In March 2005, a laboratory certification organization inadvertently sent a
+
+sample of a highly pathogenic influenza strain to thousands of laboratories around
+the world. While no one became ill as a result, policymakers asked why such an
+error had occurred despite heightened controls. In fact, the Select Agent rule did not
+apply in this situation because this strain of human influenza is not included on the
+list of HHS select agents. However, highly pathogenic strains of avian influenza
+
+ 
+ CRS-13
+
+(“bird flu”), including the H5N1 strain now causing concern in Asia and Europe, are
+included on the USDA list. When scientists from the CDC and the Armed Forces
+Institute of Pathology recently re-created the 1918 pandemic flu virus, since it was
+a human influenza strain, it was not on the Select Agent list. It was subsequently
+added by HHS Secretary Leavitt on October 20, 2005. Other flu strains that typically
+affect humans — but not birds — remain unregulated at this time. Some have
+questioned whether human influenza strains should be included.
+
+Congress expanded the Select Agent program in response to concerns that the
+
+anthrax used in the 2001 mail attacks may have been obtained from a U.S. research
+facility. Lawmakers sought to improve lab security without unduly impeding vital
+biomedical and biodefense research. While some academic and industry scientists
+have praised the government for striking an appropriate balance between science and
+security, others have been critical, saying that the regulations are burdensome and
+costly, and would not substantially improve security. Some scientists have
+discontinued research on select agents because of the security requirements and out
+of fear that breaking the new law, even inadvertently, could result in stiff criminal
+penalties. For example, as the anthrax attacks were unfolding in the fall of 2001,
+officials at the Iowa State University destroyed their research collection of anthrax
+strains, collected over decades, fearing they would not have the resources to properly
+safeguard the collection in the new security climate.
+
+ Public Access to Scientific Information 
+
+Policies to provide access to scientific and technical information that protect the
+
+nation against terrorist attacks require balancing issues of national security, scientific
+communication, and constitutional and statutory protections that permit public access
+to information used for accountability and oversight. Historically, the U.S.
+government has used classification procedures to protect scientific and technical
+information that might compromise national security. Fundamental scientific
+information whose release does not compromise security is to remain unclassified
+pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and National Security Decision Directive 189.
+After the 2001 terrorist attacks, the government widened controls on access to
+information and scientific components. Policies are being implemented to control
+access to federally owned information labeled “sensitive but unclassified” (SBU) or
+“sensitive homeland security information” (SHSI). This includes information that
+agencies previously posted on websites or made available upon request.
+Consideration is being given to preventing publication of some non-federally owned
+scientific and technical information.
+
+Some critics say that criteria for identifying SBU information have not been
+
+defined clearly, causing inconsistency among agencies and complicating the design
+and implementation of policies to access and safeguard such information. White
+House directives and federal agencies have used the term SBU in various ways to
+label and control information. Some agencies refer to definitions for controlled
+information, such as for “sensitive,” found in the Computer Security Act, or to
+information exempt from disclosure through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
+or the Privacy Act. Those laws gave agencies some discretion and permitted use of
+risk analysis to identify information to be safeguarded. Pursuant to the Federal
+Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), the National Institute of
+
+ 
+ CRS-14
+
+Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed guidance for agencies to identify
+and use risk-based criteria to control access to unclassified, including sensitive,
+information and information systems. These were to become mandatory in
+December 2005, but NIST’s release of all required documentation has been delayed
+for a few months. 
+
+P.L. 107-296, the Homeland Security Act, requires the President to prescribe
+
+and implement procedures for agencies to identify and safeguard sensitive but
+unclassified homeland security information (Secs. 891 and 892). OMB had planned
+to issue related guidance in 2003; on July 29, 2003, in Executive Order 13311, the
+President delegated his responsibility for preparing such guidance to the DHS
+Secretary; guidance has not been issued as of January 2006. On December 16, 2005
+the President instructed federal agencies by memorandum to standardize procedures
+to designate, mark, and handle SBU information, and to forward recommendations
+for government-wide standards to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). In
+2004, DHS promulgated rules for safeguarding its own sensitive unclassified
+information and that provided to it by other agencies and nongovernmental entities.
+Issues of possible interest to Congress include whether agencies, which have some
+discretion to identify SBU, are using uniform criteria to identify such information,
+to control it, and to permit access to it while protecting information that should be
+withheld; design of an appeals process since the information is not classified;
+assessment of the pros and cons of wider SBU controls in relation to accountability;
+and possible classification of federally-owned basic research information, since heads
+of some agencies performing basic research were given original classification
+authority. Legislation has been introduced on these issues and the Government
+Accountability Office is inventorying federal agency use of SBU procedures.
+
+The federal government has traditionally supported the open publication of
+
+federally funded, extramural research results conducted by nongovernmental
+scientists. In cases where release of fundamental research results might compromise
+national security (e.g. atomic energy and cryptography research), federal policy
+prescribes the use of classification to limit dissemination. A series of research
+publications have increased concern whether publication of some federally funded
+extramural research results could threaten national security. As a result, some have
+suggested that such research results should be reviewed for security implications
+before publication, while others say that such review would damage scientific
+progress and productivity. Most scientists and publishers have begun to implement
+voluntary self-regulatory measures regarding publication of potentially sensitive
+manuscripts, but these efforts may not be considered stringent enough. The
+Department of Health and Human Services, following select recommendations
+presented by the National Academies report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of
+Terrorism , established the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to
+provide guidance for the identification of research that may require special security
+attention. The controls designed by professional groups undoubtedly will be guided
+by federal policy as it develops. 
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL31695, Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security 
+
+ Concerns: Issues for Congress 
+
+ 
+ CRS-15
+
+CRS Report RL31845, ‘Sensitive But Unclassified’ and Other Federal Security 
+
+ Controls on Scientific and Technical Information: History and Current
+Controversy 
+
+ Information Technology Management for the
+Department of Homeland Security 
+
+One of the biggest challenges facing the Department of Homeland Security
+
+(DHS) is the ongoing effort to consolidate the computer and communications systems
+of the 22 agencies that comprise the Department. In many respects, DHS functions
+as a virtual department, connecting new and existing agencies into a network that
+capitalizes on their knowledge assets to facilitate information sharing and enhanced
+communication. Organizationally, this involves breaking down the “stovepipes” that
+have previously separated the agencies and developing an encompassing
+organizational culture that promotes cooperation and information sharing.
+Technologically, this involves integrating existing systems and infrastructures while
+simultaneously infusing new technologies as they become available. Rigorous
+oversight of these activities is continuing in the 109th Congress.
+
+A critical variable that will contribute to the success or failure of these
+
+objectives is the development and implementation of an enterprise architecture for
+the Department. An enterprise architecture serves as a blueprint of the business
+operations of an organization, and the technologies needed to carry out these
+functions. It is designed to be comprehensive and scalable, to account for future
+growth needs. 
+
+As the Department moves forward with its enterprise architecture plans, it will
+
+encounter several issues. Its enterprise architecture is being used to identify common
+functions and eliminate redundancies among its component agencies. This requires
+making choices between competing systems and reallocating resources and staff
+accordingly. In doing so, DHS will need to improve the interoperability of its
+systems as well, by selecting common data formats, equipment, and processes. This,
+in turn, would enable DHS to carry out its information sharing responsibilities, as
+described in the Homeland Security Act and the National Intelligence Reform Act of
+2004. Since some of these information sharing initiatives involve agencies and
+organizations at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as agencies within the
+Department, additional coordination with these external partners is necessary to
+ensure the smooth flow of information and compliance with security procedures.
+Other oversight issues Congress is considering include the authority and influence
+of the DHS chief information officer (CIO), IT funding, information security,
+outsourcing, and technology development. In addition, in light of the
+interrelationships between DHS and other departments, the impact of the DHS
+enterprise architecture on related e-government initiatives currently underway has
+also attracted interest.
+
+ Data Mining 
+
+Data mining has emerged as one of the key features of many homeland security
+
+initiatives, and an issue that is attracting strong congressional oversight. Data mining
+
+ 
+ CRS-16
+
+involves the use of data analysis tools to discover previously unknown, valid patterns
+and relationships in large data sets. In the context of homeland security, data mining
+is often viewed as a potential means to identify terrorist activities, such as money
+transfers and communications, and to identify and track individual terrorists
+themselves, such as through travel and immigration records. 
+
+Data mining is carried out in both the private and public sectors. Some common
+
+uses include detecting fraud, assessing risk, and measuring and improving program
+performance. While data mining represents a substantial advance in the type of
+analytical tools currently available, some of the homeland security data mining
+applications represent a significant expansion in the quantity and scope of data to be
+analyzed, compared to earlier efforts. Since September 2001, there have been a
+number of initiatives to use data mining to identify potential terrorists and/or
+terrorist-related activities that have attracted a high level of congressional interest.
+Some of these initiatives include DARPA’s Total Information Awareness (TIA)
+program and the U.S. Army’s Able Danger project, both of which are reported to
+have been discontinued; and the proposed Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening
+System II (CAPPS II) project, which is being replaced by the Secure Flight passenger
+screening program, administered by the Transportation Security Administration.
+Most recently, some Members of Congress have called for a broader congressional
+review of domestic data mining activities following the public revelation of reported
+ongoing data collection and sharing activities by the National Security Agency (NSA)
+in an attempt to identify potential terrorists who may be in the United States.
+
+While technological capabilities are important, there are other implementation
+
+and oversight issues that can influence the success of a data mining project’s
+outcome. One issue is data quality, which refers to the accuracy and completeness
+of the data being analyzed. A second issue is the interoperability of the data mining
+software and databases being used by different agencies. Interoperability is a critical
+part of the larger efforts to improve interagency collaboration and information
+sharing through e-government and homeland security initiatives. A third issue is
+privacy. Questions being considered include the degree to which government
+agencies should use and mix commercial data with government data, whether data
+sources are being used for purposes other than those for which they were originally
+designed, and applicability of the 1974 Privacy Act to these initiatives. 
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL31798, Data Mining: An Overview 
+
+ Technology Development Issues 
+
+ Technological Innovation and the Economy:
+Impact of Federal R&D Funding 
+
+Technological advancement is an important factor in the nation’s economic
+
+growth. Experts widely accept that technical progress is responsible for up to one-
+half the growth of the U.S. economy and is one principal driving force for increases
+
+ 
+ CRS-17
+
+in our standard of living. Historically, industrial expansion was based on the use of
+technology to exploit natural resources. Today, such growth tends to be founded on
+scientific discoveries and engineering knowledge and is even more dependent than
+before on the development and use of technology. Technology can drive the
+economy because it contributes to the creation of new goods and services, new
+industries, new jobs, and new capital. It can expand the range of services offered and
+extend the geographic distribution of those services. The application of technologies
+also can contribute to the resolution of those national problems that are amenable to
+technological solutions.
+
+Technological progress is achieved through innovation, the process by which
+
+industry provides new and improved products, manufacturing processes, and
+services. Research and development are important to this technological advancement
+in many ways. R&D contributes to economic growth by its impact on productivity.
+Generally, productivity growth in an industry or a firm is related to the amount spent
+previously on R&D in that industry or company. Analysts estimate that one-half of
+productivity increases (output per person) are the result of investments in research
+and development (see CRS Report RL32324). Others argue that innovations arising
+from R&D are the most important ones. Profound changes in our society have been
+brought about by advances in research, resulting in new products and processes in the
+areas of medicine, semiconductors, computers, and materials, just to name a few. 
+
+Traditionally, the government funds R&D to meet the mission requirements of
+
+the federal departments and agencies. The government also supports work in areas
+where there is an identified need for research, primarily basic research, not being
+performed in the private sector. Basic research, that work undertaken to gain
+knowledge and understanding of the fundamental aspects of nature, is the foundation
+of many important new innovations. However, the payoff for basic research is
+generally long in coming, the results may be unmarketable, and the rewards often
+diffused among many users. Yet, while basic research is usually performed with
+little certainty that it will produce goods and services in the future, it appears that
+there is a significant relationship between the conduct of basic research and increases
+in productivity.
+
+Federal funding reflects a consensus that while basic research is important for
+
+innovation, the rate of return to society as a whole generated by investments in this
+activity is significantly larger than the benefits that can be captured by any one firm
+performing it. It is estimated that the social rate of return on R&D spending is over
+twice that of the rate of return to the inventor. Ideas often can be easily imitated, the
+knowledge associated with an innovation dispersed and adapted to other products and
+processes. This, it is argued, often leads to underinvestment in research by the
+private sector and thus the need for federal funding.
+
+Expert analysis has shown the importance of federally funded R&D to
+
+advancements in innovation (see CRS Report RL32076). Studies undertaken by
+economists in the field demonstrate that collaboration with publicly funded research
+organizations increased private sector productivity in many industries, findings that
+parallel additional work showing the importance of public science to innovation and
+technological advancement across industrial sectors. This federal R&D stimulates
+
+ 
+ CRS-18
+
+the additional and often substantial private investment necessary to bring new and
+improved technologies to the marketplace.
+
+In the United States, the development of new products, processes and services
+
+for the commercial marketplace is primarily a private sector activity. The
+government generally becomes involved only for certain limited purposes, including
+activities that typically have been determined to be necessary for the “national good”
+but which cannot, or will not, be supported by industry. However, government plays
+a role in structuring the environment in which business decisions are made and
+thereby influences private sector behavior. Direct federal funding and the existence
+of government markets for certain technologies, including defense and information
+technology-related goods, have helped influence resource allocations in the business
+community. 
+
+The myriad effects of federal research and development spending on innovation
+
+and the economic growth generated by technological advancement highlight the
+importance of decisions regarding the amount and distribution of federal R&D funds.
+Choices made by the 109th Congress related to financing the research endeavor may
+have immediate impacts on current programs as well as long term effects on the
+nation’s technological progress. 
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB91132, Industrial Competitiveness and Technological 
+
+ Advancement: Debate Over Government Policy 
+
+CRS Report RL32324, Federal R&D, Drug Discovery, and Pricing: Insights from 
+
+ the NIH-University-Industry Relationship 
+
+CRS Report RL32076, The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected Issues in Patent Policy and the 
+
+ Commercialization of Technology 
+
+ R&D Partnerships and Intellectual Property 
+
+A major emphasis of R&D-related legislative activity has been to augment
+
+research in the private sector through efforts to encourage firms to undertake
+cooperative R&D arrangements. Various laws, including the Stevenson-Wydler
+National Technology Innovation Act (P.L. 96-418) and the “Bayh-Dole” Act (P.L.
+96-517), as amended, have created an environment conducive to joint ventures
+between government and industry, or between industry and universities, as well as
+among companies. To date, Congress has determined that providing title to
+inventions made under federal funding to contractors and/or collaborating parties
+should be used to support innovation. In return for patent ownership, Congress has
+accepted as satisfactory the anticipated payback to the country through goods and
+services to improve our health, welfare, and standard of living. These benefits have
+been considered more important than the initial cost of the technology to the
+government or any potential unfair advantage of one company over another in a
+cooperative venture.
+
+As such cooperative efforts become more widespread, new and additional issues
+
+have emerged. Concerns have been expressed regarding the cost of drugs developed
+in part with federal funding or in conjunction with federal agencies. Conflicts have
+
+ 
+ CRS-19
+
+surfaced over federal laboratories patenting inventions that collaborating parties
+believe to be their own. In some agencies, delays continue in negotiating cooperative
+research and development agreements (CRADAs) because of disagreements over the
+dispensation of intellectual property. Questions have been raised as to the effects of
+patenting early stage discoveries (e.g. research tools) on additional innovation. The
+National Institutes of Health has encountered difficulties obtaining for government-
+sponsored research new experimental compounds developed and patented by drug
+companies because of concerns over diminished effectiveness of the intellectual
+property if additional applications are discovered. Given these issues, additional
+decisions may need to be made during the 109th Congress regarding the way to
+maintain a balance between the importance of bringing new products and processes
+to the marketplace and protecting the public investment in R&D.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB89056, Cooperative R&D: Federal Efforts to Promote Industrial 
+
+ Competitiveness 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB85031, Technology Transfer: Use of Federally Funded Research 
+
+ and Development 
+
+CRS Report RL32076, The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected Issues in Patent Policy and the 
+
+ Commercialization of Technology 
+
+CRS Report RL30320, Patent Ownership and Federal Research and Development 
+
+ (R&D): A Discussion of the Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson-Wydler Act 
+
+CRS Report RL32324, Federal R&D, Drug Discovery, and Pricing: Insights From 
+
+ the NIH-University-Industry Relationship 
+
+CRS Report 98-862, R&D Partnerships and Intellectual Property: Implications for 
+
+ U.S. Policy 
+
+ Advanced Technology Program 
+
+The Advanced Technology Program (ATP) was created by P.L. 100-418, the
+
+Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, to encourage public-private
+cooperation in the development of pre-competitive technologies with broad
+application across industries. Administered by the National Institute of Standards
+and Technology (NIST), a laboratory of the Department of Commerce, this activity
+has been targeted for elimination as a means to cut federal spending. Critics argue
+that R&D aimed at the commercial marketplace should be funded by the private
+sector, not by the federal government. Others stress that ATP is market driven and
+that investments in research are shared by industry and the public sector.
+
+Beginning several years ago, the House of Representatives attempted to
+
+terminate ATP but strong support provided by the Senate led to continued funding.
+The Bush Administration also proposed eliminating the program in its FY2002,
+FY2004, FY2005, and FY2006 budget requests. These actions have renewed the
+debate over the role of the federal government in promoting commercial technology
+development. In arguing for less direct federal involvement, opponents of the
+Advanced Technology Program believe that the market is superior to government
+in deciding which technologies are worthy of investment. They prefer mechanisms
+that enhance the market’s opportunities and abilities to make such choices. It is also
+suggested that agency discretion in selecting one technology over another can lead
+
+ 
+ CRS-20
+
+to political intrusion and industry dependency. On the other hand, supporters of
+direct methods maintain that reliance on indirect measures can be wasteful,
+inefficient, and ineffective and can compromise other goals of public policy in the
+hope of stimulating innovative performance. Proponents of ATP argue that it is
+important to put the nation’s scarce resources to work on those technologies which
+will have the greatest promise as determined by industry and supported by the private
+sector’s willingness to match federal funding. They assert that the government serves
+as a catalyst for companies to cooperate and undertake important new work, which
+would not be possible without federal participation. As Congress proceeds with the
+appropriations process in the 109th Congress, these issues are expected to be debated
+once again.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB91132, Industrial Competitiveness and Technological 
+
+ Advancement: Debate Over Government Policy 
+
+CRS Report 95-36, The Advanced Technology Program
+ CRS Report 95-50, The Federal Role in Technology Development 
+
+ Prescription Drugs: Costs, Availability, and Federal R&D 
+
+Congressional interest in methods to provide prescription drugs at lower cost,
+
+particularly for the elderly, has focused attention on achieving a balance between the
+public’s interest in new and improved technologies and concern over providing
+companies valuable benefits without adequate accountability or compensation. The
+federal government has various programs and policies facilitating the development
+of pharmaceuticals and their availability in the marketplace. Several laws, including
+the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act and the Bayh-Dole Act, encourage
+commercialization of federally-funded R&D through technology transfer, cooperative
+R&D, and intellectual property rights (particularly patent ownership). These laws are
+intended to stimulate the private sector investment often necessary to develop
+marketable products utilizing the results of the government’s research enterprise. 
+
+Congress also has acted to encourage the development of lower cost generic
+
+drugs through the Hatch-Waxman Act. This 1984 law made several significant
+changes to the patent laws as they apply to pharmaceutical products in an attempt to
+stimulate the search for innovative new drugs while providing less expensive generic
+products. As a result of this legislation, generics generally are rapidly available after
+patent expiration and at lower prices than their brand name predecessors.
+Concurrently, given the increasing investment in pharmaceutical R&D and the gains
+in research intensity of the pharmaceutical industry, it appears that, on balance, the
+act has not deterred the search for, or the development of new drugs. However, Title
+XI of the Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-173)
+modified the Hatch-Waxman Act as it pertained to the listing of pharmaceutical
+patents in the Orange Book maintained by the Food and Drug Administration, patent
+challenges by generic firms, and the award of market exclusivity, among other things.
+It remains to be seen how these provisions affect the availability and cost of
+prescription drugs.
+
+ 
+ CRS-21
+
+Concerns have been expressed by Members of Congress over whether the
+
+current legislative approach to encouraging innovation, particularly with respect to
+drug discovery, is appropriate. In the debate, some argue that the government’s
+financial, scientific, and/or clinical support of biomedical R&D entitles the public to
+commensurate considerations in the prices charged for any resulting drugs. Others
+view government intervention in price decisions based upon initial federal R&D
+funding as contrary to a long-term trend of government promotion of innovation,
+technological advancement, and the commercialization of technology by the business
+community. Supporters of existing incentives for technology development argue that
+they have given rise to robust pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Critics
+maintain that the need for such incentives in the pharmaceutical and/or biotechnology
+sectors is mitigated by industry access to government-supported work at no cost,
+monopoly power through patent protection, and additional regulatory and tax
+advantages such as those conveyed through the Hatch-Waxman Act. At issue, is
+which legislative initiatives, if any, can actually reduce the cost of safe and effective
+prescription drugs to individuals in the United States and what may be the long-term
+effects of these efforts on innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL32377, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Legislative Changes Affecting 
+
+ Pharmaceutical Patents 
+
+CRS Report RL30756, Patent Law and Its Application to the Pharmaceutical 
+
+ Industry: An Examination of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
+Restoration Act of 1984 
+
+CRS Report RL31379, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Selected Patent-Related Issues
+ CRS Report RL32076, The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected Issues in Patent Policy and the 
+
+ Commercialization of Technology 
+
+CRS Report RL32324, Federal R&D, Drug Discovery, and Pricing: Insights From 
+
+ the NIH-University-Industry Relationship 
+
+CRS Report RL30320, Patent Ownership and Federal Research and Development 
+
+ (R&D): A Discussion of the Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson-Wydler Act 
+
+CRS Report RL32400, Patents and Drug Importation 
+
+ Telecommunications and Information Technology 
+
+ Issues 
+
+ Telecommunications Act of 1996 Revision 
+
+The Telecommunications Act of 1996, signed into law on February 8, 1996
+
+(P.L. 104-104), represented the first major rewrite of our nation’s
+telecommunications policy. The 1996 Act redefined and recast the 1934
+Communications Act to address the emergence of competition in what were
+previously considered to be monopolistic markets. Despite its relatively recent
+enactment, however, a consensus has been growing that the 1996 Act is inadequate
+to address the convergence and technological changes now facing the
+telecommunications and broadcasting sectors. Whether a further rewrite is required,
+what form such a rewrite might take, and the timing of a rewrite, remains unclear;
+
+ 
+ CRS-22
+
+however, both the House and Senate are expected to continue to take an active role
+in examining and debating the issues related to a possible revision of existing
+telecommunications law. Included among the policy issues likely to be examined are:
+the universal availability of and access to broadband, the regulatory treatment of
+incumbent cable and telecommunications providers and the impact of recent mergers,
+the funding of and eligibility criteria for the universal service fund (USF), the impact
+and regulatory treatment of newly emerging technologies such as voice over internet
+protocol (VoIP) and broadband over power lines (BPL), municipal deployment of
+broadband, and the relationship between the Federal Communications Commission
+(FCC) and state regulatory bodies. 
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL32949, Communications Act Revisions: Selected Issues for 
+
+ Consideration 
+
+CRS Report RL33034, Telecommunications Act: Competition, Innovation, and 
+
+ Reform 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB10045, Broadband Internet Access: Background and Issues
+ CRS Report RL32421, Broadband Over Powerlines: Regulatory and Policy Issues 
+
+ Broadband Internet Regulation and Access 
+
+Broadband Internet access gives users the ability to send and receive data at
+
+speeds far greater than conventional “dial up” Internet access over existing telephone
+lines. Broadband technologies — cable modem, digital subscriber line (DSL),
+satellite, and fixed wireless Internet — are currently being deployed nationwide
+primarily by the private sector. While President Bush has set a goal of universal
+broadband availability by 2007, some areas of the nation — particularly rural and
+low-income communities — continue to lack full access to high-speed broadband
+Internet service. In order to address this problem, the 109th Congress is considering
+the scope and effect of federal broadband financial assistance programs (including
+universal service), and the impact of telecommunications regulation and new
+technologies on broadband deployment. 
+
+ Some policymakers, believing that disparities in broadband access across
+
+American society could have adverse economic and social consequences on those left
+behind, assert that the federal government should play a more active role to avoid a
+“digital divide” in broadband access. One approach is for the federal government to
+provide financial assistance to support broadband deployment in underserved areas.
+Others, however, question the reality of the “digital divide,” and argue that federal
+intervention in the broadband marketplace would be premature and, in some cases,
+counterproductive. Another issue under examination is whether present laws and
+subsequent regulatory policies are needed to ensure the development of competition
+and its subsequent consumer benefits, or conversely, whether such laws and
+regulations are overly burdensome and discourage needed investment in and
+deployment of broadband services.
+
+Finally, emerging broadband technologies — such as wireless (including “3G”,
+
+“wi-fi” and “Wimax”) and broadband over power lines (BPL) — continue to be
+developed and/or deployed, and have the potential to affect the regulatory and market
+
+ 
+ CRS-23
+
+landscape of broadband deployment. Congress and the FCC will likely consider
+policies to address the emergence of these and other new broadband technologies. 
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB10045, Broadband Internet Access: Background and Issues
+ CRS Report RL30719, Broadband Internet Access and the Digital Divide: Federal 
+
+ Assistance Programs 
+
+CRS Report RL32421, Broadband over Powerlines: Regulatory and Policy Issues
+ CRS Report RS20993, Wireless Technology and Spectrum Demand: Advanced 
+
+ Wireless Services 
+
+CRS Report RL32985, Defining Cable Broadband Internet Access Service: 
+
+ Background and Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Brand X Decision 
+
+ Transition to Digital Television 
+
+Digital television (DTV) is a new service representing the most significant
+
+development in television technology since the advent of color television in the
+1950s. DTV can provide sharper pictures, a wider screen, CD-quality sound, better
+color rendition, multiple video programming or a single program of high definition
+television (HDTV), and other new services currently being developed. Congress and
+the FCC set a target date of December 31, 2006 for broadcasters to transition to DTV,
+cease broadcasting their analog signals, and return their existing analog television
+spectrum licenses to be auctioned for commercial services (such as broadband) or
+used for other purposes, such as public safety telecommunications. If and when
+analog TV signals are turned off, consumers will not be able to receive over-the-air
+television broadcast signals unless they have a digital television or connect their
+existing analog televisions to converter boxes. 
+
+The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) required the FCC to grant
+
+extensions for reclaiming the analog television licenses in the year 2006 from stations
+in television markets where at least 15% of television households do not receive
+digital signals. Given the slower-than-expected pace at which digital televisions have
+been introduced into American homes, few observers believe that the goal of digital
+televisions in 85% of American homes by 2006 will be reached, with the result that
+television stations would continue to broadcast both analog and digital signals past
+the 2006 deadline. The key issue for Congress and the FCC is: what steps should be
+taken by the government to further facilitate a timely, efficient, and equitable
+transition to digital television? 
+
+Paramount in this debate is setting a “hard” and “date-certain” deadline for the
+
+digital transition and addressing the millions of American over-the-air households
+whose existing analog televisions will require converter boxes in order to receive
+television service after analog signals are turned off. The FY2005 budget
+reconciliation conference agreement (Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, S. 1932,
+H.Rept. 109-362) sets the digital transition deadline at February 17, 2009, and
+allocates up to $1.5 billion for a digital-to-analog converter box subsidy program. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-24
+
+Other issues related to the digital transition could possibly be addressed during
+
+the second session of the 109th Congress. The conference agreement did not contain
+language addressing the multicast must-carry issue or the broadcast flag. Also, the
+conference agreement did not retain provisions in the House bill on digital to analog
+conversion and must carry (the “downconversion” issue, which addresses cable and
+satellite provision of broadcast signals to analog televisions). 
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL31260, Digital Television: An Overview
+ CRS Report RL32622, Public Safety, Interoperability and the Transition to Digital 
+
+ Television 
+
+CRS Report RS22218, Spectrum Use and the Transition to Digital TV
+ CRS Report RS22106, Copyright Protection of Digital Television: The ‘Broadcast 
+
+ Flag’ 
+
+ Spectrum Management and Wireless Technologies 
+
+Spectrum policy issues are characterized by economic, technological and
+
+regulatory complexity. Spectrum, a valuable resource governed by available
+technology, is regulated by the federal government with the primary objectives of
+maximizing its usefulness and efficiency, and preventing interference among
+spectrum users. To minimize interference, users are assigned radio frequencies
+within spectrum bands allocated for defined uses. Spectrum policy covers both
+satellite and terrestrial (primarily antenna-broadcast) transmissions. Members of
+Congress, through hearings and public statements, have expressed a willingness to
+address spectrum management issues. 
+
+The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) required
+
+the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, in consultation with the
+Secretary of Homeland Security and others, to prepare a study for Congress by year
+end 2005 on public safety uses of spectrum. In the study requested by Congress, the
+FCC sought comment on whether additional spectrum should be made available for
+public safety, possibly from the 700 MHz band. ( Report to Congress; on the study
+to assess short-term and long-term needs for allocations of additional portions of the
+electromagnetic spectrum for federal, state and local emergency response providers,
+ Federal Communications Commission, December 19, 2005.) Comments received
+from the public safety community overwhelmingly supported the need for additional
+spectrum, although other bands besides 700 MHz were also mentioned. The FCC did
+not make a specific recommendation for additional spectrum allocations in the short-
+term although it stated that it agreed that public safety “could make use of such an
+allocation in the long-term to provide broadband services.” It further announced
+that it would move expeditiously to see whether the current band plan for the 24
+MHz at 700 MHz currently designated for public safety could be modified to
+accommodate broadband applications.
+
+Spectrum is integral to wireless technology and so its management is connected
+
+to many issues that may be of interest to Congress. These include new technologies
+such as “third-generation” (3G) cell phone services, wireless Internet, mesh
+
+ 
+ CRS-25
+
+networks, software-defined radio (SDR), Ultra-Wideband (UWB) and location-
+finding technology. The latter includes applications for wireless enhanced 911.
+
+CRS Report RL32594, Public Safety Communications Policy
+ CRS Report RL31764, Spectrum Management: Auctions
+ CRS Report RS21508, Spectrum Management and Special Funds
+ CRS Report RS22218, Spectrum and the Transition to Digital TV
+ CRS Report RL32408, Spectrum Policy: Public Safety and Wireless 
+
+ Communications Interference 
+
+CRS Report RS20993, Wireless Technology and Spectrum Demand: Advanced 
+
+ Wireless Services 
+
+ Networking Information Technology R&D 
+
+At the federal level, almost all of the funding for information science and
+
+technology and Internet development is part of a single government-wide initiative,
+the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development program
+(NITRD). This program was previously (1997-2000) called the Computing,
+Information, and Communications program (CIC) and, prior to that (1992-1997), the
+High Performance Computing and Communications program (HPCC). The NITRD
+is an interagency effort to coordinate key advances in information technology (IT)
+research and leverage funding into broader advances in computing and networking
+technologies. Under the NITRD, participating agencies receive support for high-
+performance computing science and technology, information technology software
+and hardware, networks and Internet-driven applications, and education and training
+for personnel. 
+
+The President’s FY2006 budget calls for $2.155 billion for the NITRD Program,
+
+a 4.5% decrease from the FY2005 budget of $2.256 billion (See CRS Issue Brief
+IB10130 for updated information). The majority of funding goes to the National
+Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health, National Aeronautics and Space
+Administration, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Department
+of Energy’s Office of Science. 
+
+Research emphases are focused on eight program component areas (also called
+
+PCAs): High-End Computing (HEC) Infrastructure and Applications, HEC Research
+and Development, Cyber Security and Information Assurance, Human Computer
+Interaction and Information Management, Large Scale Networking, Software Design
+and Productivity, High Confidence Software and Systems, and Social, Economic, and
+Workforce Implications of IT and IT Workforce Development. Key issues facing
+congressional policymakers include whether NITRD is accomplishing its goals and
+objectives to enhance U.S. information technology research and development,
+whether the funding level is appropriate or should be changed to reflect changing
+U.S. priorities, and defining the private sector’s role in this initiative.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB10130, Federal Networking and Information Technology 
+
+ Research and Development Program: Funding Issues and Activities 
+
+ 
+ CRS-26
+
+ E-Health: Health Information Technology 
+
+The Institute of Medicine, the National Committee on Vital and Health
+
+Statistics, and the Commission on Systemic Interoperability are among a growing
+number of expert panels that have identified information technology (IT) as one of
+the most powerful tools for reducing medical errors, lowering health costs, and
+improving the quality of care. The U.S. health care industry lags well behind other
+sectors of the economy in its investment in IT, despite growing evidence that the
+electronic exchange of health information can play a critical role in addressing the
+many challenges the industry faces. However, there are significant financial, legal,
+and technical obstacles to the adoption of health IT systems. The issue for Congress,
+in which there is broad bipartisan support for health IT, is how best to create
+incentives for IT adoption throughout the health care industry.
+
+On April 27, 2004, President Bush called for the widespread adoption of
+
+interoperable electronic health records (EHRs) within 10 years so that health
+information will follow patients throughout their care in a seamless and secure
+manner. To help achieve that goal the President established the Office of the
+National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONCHIT) within the
+Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to coordinate federal health IT
+activities and work with the private sector on its health IT efforts. ONCHIT began
+by developing a strategic framework for the nationwide implementation of
+interoperable EHRs. That was followed by a request for public comment on how
+best to develop a National Health Information Network (NHIN). There is broad
+consensus among stakeholders that the NHIN should be a decentralized and Internet-
+based architecture, built on a framework of open standards and policies.
+
+ONCHIT recently awarded contracts to fund activities in four key areas: (1)
+
+harmonizing health information standards, (2) certifying health IT products to ensure
+consistency with standards, (3) addressing variation in privacy and security policies
+that can pose challenges to interoperability, and (4) developing an architecture for
+nationwide sharing of electronic health information. In another important
+development, the HHS Secretary has established the American Health Information
+Community, a 17-member public-private body that will provide input and
+recommendations on the market-based transition to interoperable EHRs.
+
+Congress has taken a number of important steps to promote health IT and is
+
+poised to enact new legislation to boost federal investment and leadership in this
+area. In November 2005, the Senate passed the bipartisan Wired for Health Care
+Quality Act (S. 1418) which, among other things, would authorize grants to facilitate
+widespread EHR adoption and the creation of regional health information networks.
+Such networks are seen as a critical step towards the goal of interconnecting the
+health care system nationwide. Competing health IT legislation has been introduced
+in the House (H.R. 4157). Congress laid the groundwork for establishing an NHIN
+when it enacted the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
+(HIPAA). HIPAA instructed the HHS Secretary to develop privacy standards to give
+patients more control over the use of their medical information, and security
+standards to safeguard electronic patient information against unauthorized access,
+use, or disclosure.
+
+ 
+ CRS-27
+
+Congress also may take up legislation (S. 1356, H.R. 3617) to introduce pay for
+
+performance into Medicare’s payment systems. Basing a portion of the payment on
+the quality of care would be a major shift in the way Medicare pays for many
+products and services. Currently, Medicare pays health care providers the same
+regardless of the quality of their services. Introducing pay for performance into
+Medicare would have important implications for IT adoption. Many private sector
+health plans and purchasers have incorporated IT use into their pay for performance
+initiatives. Thus, adoption of IT in the clinical setting is included as one of the
+measures used to financially reward providers on the basis of quality.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL32858, Health Information Technology: Promoting Electronic 
+
+ Connectivity in Healthcare 
+
+CRS Report RS22310, Hurricane Katrina: HIPAA Privacy and Electronic Health 
+
+ Records of Evacuees 
+
+ E-Government 
+
+Electronic government (e-government) is an evolving concept, generally
+
+referring to the integration of information technology, especially Internet-related
+technology, into the delivery of government information and services. E-government
+initiatives vary significantly in their breadth and depth from state to state and agency
+to agency. A central issue is oversight of the coordination and implementation of the
+disparate e-government initiatives across the federal government.
+
+Pursuant to the July 18, 2001, OMB Memorandum M-01-28, an E-Government
+
+Task Force created a strategy for achieving the Bush Administration’s e-government
+goals [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/egovstrategy.pdf]. In doing so, the
+Task Force identified 23 interagency initiatives designed to better integrate agency
+operations and information technology investments. These initiatives, sometimes
+referred to as the Quicksilver projects, are grouped into five categories; government-
+to-citizen (G2C), government-to-government (G2G), government-to-business (G2B),
+internal effectiveness and efficiency, and addressing barriers to e-government
+success. Examples of these initiatives include an e-authentication project led by the
+General Services Administration (GSA) to increase the use of digital signatures, the
+eligibility assistance online project (also referred to as GovBenefits.gov) led by the
+Department of Labor to create a common access point for information regarding
+government benefits available to citizens, and the Small Business Administration’s
+One-Stop Business Compliance project, being designed to help businesses navigate
+legal and regulatory requirements. A 24th initiative, a government wide payroll
+process project, was subsequently added. 
+
+On December 17, 2002, President Bush signed the E-Government Act of 2002
+
+(P.L. 107-347) into law. The law contains a variety of provisions related to federal
+government information technology management, information security, and the
+provision of services and information electronically. One of the most recognized
+provisions involves the creation of an Office of Electronic Government within OMB.
+The Office is headed by an Administrator, who is responsible for carrying out a
+
+ 
+ CRS-28
+
+variety of information resources management (IRM) functions, as well as
+administering the interagency E-Government Fund provided for by the law.
+
+For the 109th Congress, some of the oversight issues attracting the most interest
+
+include agency funding contributions for OMB-led e-government initiatives; the
+development of a second generation of e-government initiatives based on the federal
+government’s lines of business (LoB) - core business functions common to most
+departments and agencies; efforts to develop a Federal Enterprise Architecture
+(FEA); and the implementation of the E-Government Act, as well as efforts to
+mediate the differences and capitalize on the similarities between e-government and
+homeland security priorities. In addition, the movement to expand the presence of
+government online raises as many issues as it provides new opportunities. Some of
+these issues concern: security, privacy, management of governmental technology
+resources, accessibility of government services (including “digital divide” concerns
+as a result of a lack of skills or access to computers, or disabilities), and preservation
+of public information (maintaining comparable freedom of information procedures
+for digital documents as exist for paper documents). Although these issues are
+neither new nor unique to e-government, they do present the challenge of performing
+governance functions online without sacrificing the accountability of or public access
+to government that citizens have grown to expect (see CRS Report RL31057). For
+a discussion of evolving policies related to scientific and technical information
+access, see the Public Access to Scientific Information section above.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RS22194, Federal Enterprise Architecture and Information Technology 
+
+ Management: A Brief Overview 
+
+CRS Report RL31057, A Primer on E-Government: Sectors, Stages, Opportunities, 
+
+ and Challenges of Online Governance 
+
+CRS Report RL31289, The Internet and the USA PATRIOT Act: Potential 
+
+ Implications for Electronic Privacy, Security, Commerce, and Government 
+
+ Open Source Software 
+
+Open source software refers to a computer program whose source code, or
+
+programming instructions, is made available to the general public to be improved or
+modified as the user wishes. In contrast, closed source, or proprietary, programs,
+which comprise the majority of the software products most commonly used, are those
+whose source code is not made available and can only be altered by the software
+manufacturer. Some examples of open source software include the Linux operating
+system and Apache Web server software.
+
+The use of open source software by the federal government has been gaining
+
+attention as organizations continue to search for opportunities to enhance their
+information technology (IT) operations while containing costs. For the federal
+government and Congress, discussion over the use of open source software intersects
+several other issues, including, but not limited to, the development of homeland
+security and e-government initiatives, improving government information technology
+management practices, strengthening computer security, and protecting intellectual
+property rights. In the 109th Congress, the discussion over open source software
+
+ 
+ CRS-29
+
+revolves primarily around information security and intellectual property rights.
+However, issues related to cost and quality are also of interest.
+ 
+
+For proponents, open source software is often viewed as a means to reduce an
+
+organization’s dependence on the software products of a few companies while
+possibly improving the security and stability of one’s computing infrastructure. For
+critics, open source software is often viewed as a threat to intellectual property rights
+with unproven cost and quality benefits. So far, there appear to be no systematic
+analyses available that have conclusively assessed security issues for closed source
+versus open source software. In practice, computer security is highly dependent on
+how an application is configured, maintained, and monitored. Similarly, the costs of
+implementing an open source solution are dependent upon factors such as the cost
+of acquiring the hardware/software, investments in training for IT personnel and end
+users, maintenance and support costs, and the resources required to convert data and
+applications to work in the new computing environment. Consequently, some
+computer experts suggest that it is not possible to conclude that either open source
+or closed source software is inherently more secure or more cost efficient.
+
+The growing emphasis on improved information security and critical
+
+infrastructure protection overall will likely be an influential factor in future decisions
+on whether to implement open source solutions. The rapidly changing computer
+environment may also foster the use of a combination of open source and closed
+source applications, rather than creating a need to choose one option at the exclusion
+of another. 
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL31627, Computer Software and Open Source Issues: A Primer 
+
+ Wireless Privacy, Internet Privacy, and Spyware 
+
+Wireless telecommunications devices are ubiquitous. Some consumers, already
+
+deluged with unwanted commercial messages ( “spam”) via computers that access
+the Internet by traditional wireline connections, are concerned that such unsolicited
+advertising is expanding to wireless communications, further eroding their privacy.
+Another concern is that their cell phone numbers may soon become public because
+some of the wireless service providers are creating a “wireless 411” phone directory.
+Whether the service providers should be legally required to obtain customers’
+consent before including their phone numbers in the directory, or if the service
+providers should be allowed to charge customers a fee if they want an unlisted
+number, is currently being debated. In addition, some cell phone records, including
+phone numbers dialed and the caller’s location, are being sold on the Internet, raising
+questions as to whether telephone companies are adequately safeguarding cell phone
+records.
+
+Internet privacy issues encompass a range of concerns. One is the monitoring
+
+of electronic mail (e-mail) and Web usage by law enforcement officials or employers.
+In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, debate over the issue of
+monitoring of e-mail and Web usage by law enforcement and government officials
+has intensified, with some advocating increased tools for law enforcement to track
+
+ 
+ CRS-30
+
+down terrorists, and others cautioning that fundamental tenets of democracy, such as
+privacy, not be endangered in that pursuit. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56)
+makes it easier for government and law enforcement officials to monitor Internet
+activities, and for Internet Service Providers to voluntarily disclose the content of e-
+mails under certain conditions. Congress is debating whether to extend the lifetime
+of several provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, including two that affect Internet
+privacy (Sections 212 and 217), that otherwise will expire under sunset provisions
+in the act.
+
+Another Internet privacy issue, spyware, is also a focus of congressional
+
+concern. There is no firm definition of spyware, but one example is software
+products that include a method by which information is collected about the use of the
+computer on which the software is installed, and the user. When the computer is
+connected to the Internet, the software periodically relays the information back to the
+software manufacturer or a marketing company. Some spyware traces a user’s Web
+activity and causes advertisements to suddenly appear on the user’s monitor — called
+“pop-up” ads — in response. Typically, users have no knowledge that the software
+they obtained included spyware and that it is now resident on their computers.
+Congress is debating what restrictions, if any, should be placed on spyware.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL31636, Wireless Privacy and Spam: Issues for Congress
+ CRS Report RL31408, Internet Privacy: Overview and Pending Legislation 
+CRS Report RL31289, The Internet and the USA PATRIOT Act: Potential 
+
+ Implications for Electronic Privacy, Security, Commerce, and Government 
+
+CRS Report RL32706, Spyware: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
+ CRS Report RS22082, Identity Theft: the Internet Connection 
+
+ Tsunamis and Other Emergencies: Forecasting and 
+
+ Warning Systems 
+
+ Tsunami Forecasting and Warning 
+
+Some U.S. lawmakers became concerned about the possible vulnerability of
+
+U.S. coastal areas to tsunamis, and about the adequacy of early warning for coastal
+areas of the far Pacific possessions and western Atlantic Ocean. These concerns stem
+from the December 26, 2004, tsunami that devastated many coastal areas around the
+northern Indian Ocean, where few tsunami early warning systems currently operate.
+Others have questioned whether the risks for the United States justify such
+expenditures, however. 
+
+On February 14, 2005, the Bush Administration committed $30 million over two
+
+years to the National Weather Service to upgrade U.S. tsunami warning capabilities,
+including expanded coverage for the Pacific Ocean and the U.S. Atlantic seaboard.
+Passage of FY2005 emergency supplemental appropriations (P.L. 109-13) provided
+$24.3 million toward that goal. Congress is considering how to deploy such systems,
+including next generation tsunami detection buoys, additional coastal tidal-gages, and
+
+ 
+ CRS-31
+
+telecommunications enhancements for the U.S. Geological Survey’s Global Seismic
+Network, which detects underwater earthquakes that can generate tsunamis. 
+
+Many developed nations currently have the technological capacity to build
+
+warning networks, and some have long established advanced emergency management
+capabilities. Others, however, will have to rely on an international consolidation of
+resources and expertise to develop local tsunami warning capacity; to educate
+indigenous people and visitors about such disasters; and to learn to employ strategies
+for adapting to such risks. Participation in the Global Environmental Observation
+System of Systems (GEOSS) is one way the United States plans to meet global
+tsunami warning challenges. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
+(NOAA, part of the Department of Commerce) is the lead U.S. agency in the 61-
+nation GEOSS program. In December of 2005 President Bush released a report
+ Tsunami Risk Reduction for the United States: A Framework for Action (July 2005)
+prepared by the White House National Science and Technology Council outlining
+necessary actions to reduce tsunami risk domestically and in U.S. territories in the far
+Pacific Ocean and Carribean Sea.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL32739, Tsunamis: Monitoring, Detection, and Early Warning 
+
+ Systems 
+
+CRS Report RS22109, The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
+
+ (NOAA) Budget for FY2006: President’s Request, Congressional
+Appropriations, and Related Issues 
+
+ Technology for Warning Systems and Alerts 
+
+As was demonstrated on September 11, 2001, after the southeast Asian tsunami
+
+on December 26, 2004, and again when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in
+August 2005, the ability to provide effective communications before and after a
+disaster is a critical factor in saving lives. Today, the two major alert systems in the
+United Stares are the Emergency Alert System (EAS) and the NOAA Weather Radio
+(NWR) All-Hazards Network (NOAA is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
+Administration, an agency of the Department of Commerce). The EAS is jointly
+administered by the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal
+Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It depends on radio and television
+broadcasters, as well as most cable operators, to provide information in times of
+emergency. Widely used for local warnings about weather and other emergencies,
+EAS has never been activated for a national emergency. The other mainstay for
+emergency alerts is provided through the National Weather Service (NWS) of
+NOAA. NWS sends alerts through the NWR All-Hazards Network. NOAA
+continues to expand its weather alert system to include warnings for all hazards and
+is working to expand the network to include all types of media. Several initiatives
+are underway within the federal government to improve, expand, and integrate
+existing warning systems. An important one — in terms of using, testing and
+developing leading-edge technology — is the Integrated Public Alert and Warning
+System (IPAWS), a public-private partnership in which the Department of Homeland
+Security (DHS) has a leadership role. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-32
+
+Among the technologies proposed or being tested to expand broadcast
+
+capabilities for emergency alerts are equipping cell phones with NOAA Weather
+Radio receivers; developing data casting for digital broadcasting; and using cell
+phone broadcasting technology. Data casting is a one-way broadcast transmission
+using Internet Protocols. The broadcasts can carry voice and data, including videos,
+graphics, and text messages. In an IPAWS pilot testing digital technologies, data
+casting is being broadcast to digital televisions and antennae linked to computer
+networks or directly to computers and laptops. Some advanced wireless phones and
+other portable devices can receive digital TV broadcasts, as is being demonstrated in
+several pilots. Some countries are advocating the use of cell broadcasting to send
+alerts to cell phones based on location. The Netherlands, for example, requires cell
+operators to transmit government warnings with cell broadcasts of text messages.
+Satellite radio could also become part of the new era of digital signal alert systems.
+XM Satellite Radio will broadcast emergency alerts to the D.C. region through a link
+with the alert system of Arlington County, Virginia. 
+
+The convergence of communications technology, typified by the near-ubiquity
+
+of the Internet and the wide availability of advanced wireless telephony, presages a
+world of end-to-end communications for public safety communications, including
+warning systems. The 9/11 Commission commented on the often inadequate
+response of the 911 call centers serving New York City, and suggested that 911 call
+centers be integrated into the emergency response team, in order to involve them in
+providing up-to-date information and assistance to the public. In a bill enacted in
+December 2004, Congress created an E-911 Implementation Coordination Office to
+foster improvements in 911 call centers (P.L. 108-494, Title I).
+
+CRS Report RL32527, Emergency Communications: The Emergency Alert System 
+
+ and All-Hazard Warnings 
+
+CRS Report RL32939, An Emergency Communications Safety Net: Integrating 911
+and Other Services 
+
+ Geosciences Issues 
+
+ Ocean Commissions: Ocean Science and Oceanic Affairs 
+
+In June 2003, the Pew Oceans Commission presented to Congress and the nation
+
+26 recommendations in its final report, America’s Living Oceans: Charting a Course
+for Sea Change . The report outlined a national agenda for protecting and restoring
+our oceans. The final report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean
+Blueprint for the 21st Century , containing extensive recommendations on a
+coordinated and comprehensive national ocean policy, was delivered to Congress and
+the President on September 20, 2004.
+
+Those reports cover an array of issues, such as law of the sea; national and
+
+regional governance; federal organization, regulation, and enforcement; offshore
+management regimes; funding for sound science, research and exploration and for
+implementing commission recommendations; oceanic education; coastal and
+watershed management; and ecosystem based management. Congress is in the
+
+ 
+ CRS-33
+
+process of considering legislative responses to the findings and recommendations of
+both commissions. Ancillary issues relate to questions about the timing and level of
+the response and the fiscal implications and out-year budgetary impacts on current
+and future ocean programs. While some argue that congressional action is more
+pressing for major coastal and marine laws that are expiring or expired, others
+counsel delay in reauthorization until Congress can draw from the reports. The same
+law that created the U.S. Commission (P.L. 106-256) also required the President to
+submit to Congress a statement responding to the commission’s recommendations
+for a national policy on ocean and coastal resources. That statement, U.S. Ocean
+Action Plan , was delivered to Capitol Hill on December 17, 2004. It was largely
+limited to documenting current efforts. Many in the ocean community view the
+Administration’s response as limited and are likely to seek more extensive action
+through Congress, especially to address topics that are driving this interest. In the
+current Congress, thus far, committees of relevant jurisdiction have adhered to their
+own ocean action agendas, guided, in large part, by the Pew and U.S. Commission
+reports, and have shown little interest in holding hearings to assess the
+Administration’s statement.
+
+Consideration has focused on organic legislation for the National Oceanic and
+
+Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), a prominent recommendation in both
+commission reports. Members have dealt with such organizational issues as
+establishing NOAA as an independent agency, transferring NOAA to another
+department, or maintaining the status quo in the Department of Commerce with
+enhanced budget authority. The 109th Congress is also considering other ocean
+matters, including ocean exploration; ocean and coastal observing systems; marine
+debris research, prevention, and reduction; and ocean and coastal mapping
+integration. Related issues have arisen, such as whether to: (1) provide additional
+funds for ocean and coastal resource management, oceanic education, marine science,
+and ocean research; (2) replace a fragmented administrative structure with a more
+overall, coherent federal organization; or (3) adopt bold new approaches for
+managing marine resources, such as setting aside large reserves from selected or all
+uses. Omnibus legislation has been introduced in the House and Senate whose
+contents encompass this broad array of crosscutting concerns. Hearings on that
+legislation are anticipated in the second session of the 109th Congress.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB10132, Ocean Commissions: Ocean Policy Review and Outlook 
+
+ Global Climate Change 
+
+Congress has maintained an active and continuing interest in the implications
+
+of, and the issues associated with, possible global climate change for the United
+States. Having received the required number of ratifications, the Kyoto Protocol to
+the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change entered into force on
+February 16, 2005, establishing binding commitments for reductions in greenhouse
+gases. The United States “signed” the protocol, but then-President Clinton did not
+submit it to the Senate for ratification. In March 2001, the Bush Administration
+indicated its opposition to the Kyoto Protocol and essentially rejected it, citing
+possible harm to the U.S. economy and lack of developing country participation. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-34
+
+On February 14, 2002, President Bush announced a U.S. policy framework for
+
+global climate change, outlining a Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI) and
+a National Climate Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI), along with a new
+Cabinet-level Committee on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration to
+oversee their implementation. The CCRI focuses on short-term, policy-relevant
+objectives of climate change science. A previously established U.S. Global Change
+Research Program (USGCRP) supports long-term, fundamental, scientific research
+objectives. Both the new CCRI and the existing USGCRP were combined for the
+first time into the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) in the FY2004 budget.
+The FY2006 budget includes a total spending level of $1.891 billion for research
+managed by the CCSP, which is $26 million (-1.4%) below the FY2005 funding
+estimate of $1.917 billion. Included in the $1.891 billion CCSP funds are $180.6
+million for the CCRI. While funding for the embedded CCRI experienced growth
+over two fiscal years from FY2003 to FY2005, the FY2006 funding for CCRI at
+$180.6 million is $36 million (-17%) less than the FY2005 funding estimate of
+$216.7 million. That leaves FY2006 funding for the embedded USGCRP standing
+at $1.710 billion, which is $10 million (+0.6%) above the FY2005 funding estimate
+of $1.700 billion. There is some $3.069 billion in the FY2006 funding profile for
+technology research and development in the NCCTI/Climate Change Technology
+Program, an amount $79 million (+2.6%) above the FY2005 funding estimate of
+$2.99 billion. Four reports currently serve as guidance documents for those
+activities: Climate Change Science Program Strategic Plan (2003), Climate Change
+Technology Program Strategic Plan Public Review Draft (2006), U.S. Climate
+Change Technology Program: Technology Options for the Near and Long Term
+ (2005), and U.S. Climate Change Technology Program: Vision and Framework for
+Strategy and Planning (2005). Release of the completed CCTP strategic plan is
+expected sometime in 2006. Two issues of concern for Congress are the extent to
+which spending for the CCRI and CCTP represent new money versus how much is
+attributable to the reclassification of ongoing research and technology programs, and
+whether the overall reduced level of funding may be deemed necessary or sufficient
+to accomplish the work of the CCSP. 
+
+Discourse in Congress over the prospect of global warming and what the United
+
+States could or should do about it has yielded, over the last several years, a range of
+legislative proposals. Arguments have been presented that policy actions to reduce
+emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases should be taken now, in line
+with the intent of the Kyoto Protocol. Alternative arguments have called for delay,
+citing challenging issues that were regionally complex, politically delicate, and
+scientifically uncertain; the need to expand technological options for mitigating or
+adapting to the effects of any climate change; and the associated high cost of certain
+mitigation schemes that would prematurely replace existing capital stock before the
+end of its economic life. Issues before the 109th Congress include greenhouse gas
+reduction and carbon dioxide emissions trading systems (see CRS Report RS22076
+and CRS Report RL32721); energy issues relevant to climate change, especially
+those associated with energy efficiency and alternative energy sources; carbon
+sequestration technologies and methodologies; federal and national response
+strategies vis-a-vis the prospect of abrupt climate change, climate change impacts,
+and climate system surprises; performance and results of federal spending on climate
+change science and technology programs, and, more broadly, on global change
+research programs; long-term research and development programs to foster new
+
+ 
+ CRS-35
+
+technologies to help stabilize greenhouse gas emissions; and efforts to promote
+climate change technology deployment both here and abroad.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB89005, Global Climate Change
+ CRS Issue Brief IB10041, Renewable Energy: Tax Credit, Budget and Electricity 
+
+ Production Issues 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB10020, Energy Efficiency: Budget, Oil Conservation, and 
+
+ Electricity Conservation Issues 
+
+CRS Report RL32997: Climate Change: Federal Expenditures for Science and 
+
+ Technology 
+
+ Energy and Water Issues 
+
+ Hydrogen Fuel and Fuel Cell Vehicles 
+
+Hydrogen fuel and fuel cell vehicles have been the focus of increased attention,
+
+especially with the announcement of the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative during the January
+2003 State of the Union Address. Over five years, the Administration is seeking a
+total funding increase of $720 million. This initiative would fund research on
+hydrogen fuel and fuel cells for transportation and stationary applications, and would
+complement the existing FreedomCAR initiative, which focuses research on the
+development of advanced technologies for passenger vehicles. For FY2004,
+Congress approved an increase of approximately $46 million for the initiatives. For
+FY2005, Congress approved an additional $23 million above FY2004. In FY2006
+Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-103), Congress
+approved a slight increase ($3 million) above FY2005 — $73 million above FY2003.
+
+In addition to appropriations legislation, on August 8, 2005, the President signed
+
+the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (H.R. 6). Among other provisions, this bill includes
+authorizations for hydrogen and fuel cell R&D. The energy bill authorizes a total of
+$3.3 billion between FY2006 and FY2010. The bill also establishes tax credits for
+the purchase of hydrogen-fueled and fuel cell vehicles, and for the installation of
+hydrogen fueling infrastructure.
+
+Issues facing Congress on hydrogen fuel and fuel cell vehicles include the proper
+
+role of the government in the research and development of consumer products; the
+ultimate viability of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies; the potential role for the
+government in expanding hydrogen fueling infrastructure; safety standards, codes,
+and liability concerns surrounding new technology and a new system for delivering
+energy; and issues related to future market penetration of fuel cell vehicles.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RS21442, Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Vehicle R&D: FreedomCAR and the 
+
+ President’s Hydrogen Fuel Initiative 
+
+ 
+ CRS-36
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB10128, Alternative Fuels and Advanced Technology Vehicles: 
+
+ Issues in Congress 
+
+ Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
+
+Spent fuel from commercial nuclear reactors contains plutonium produced
+
+during reactor operations and most of its original uranium. A fundamental issue in
+nuclear policy is whether spent fuel should be “reprocessed” to extract plutonium and
+uranium for new reactor fuel, or directly disposed of without reprocessing.
+Proponents of nuclear power point out that spent fuel still contains substantial energy
+that reprocessing could recover. However, reprocessed plutonium can also be used
+in nuclear weapons, so federal support for reprocessing could undermine U.S. nuclear
+nonproliferation policies, contend groups concerned about weapons proliferation.
+ 
+
+In the 1950s and 1960s, the federal government expected that all commercial
+
+spent fuel would be reprocessed, even though “light water reactors” — the type still
+in use today — produced relatively little plutonium. The federal strategy called for
+replacing light water reactors with “breeder reactors” that would convert uranium
+into enough plutonium to fuel new commercial breeder reactors indefinitely.
+
+Increased concern about weapons proliferation in the 1970s and the slower-
+
+than-projected growth of nuclear power prompted President Carter to halt
+commercial reprocessing efforts in 1977, along with a federal demonstration breeder
+project. President Reagan restarted the breeder demonstration project, but Congress
+halted project funding in 1983 while continuing to fund breeder-related research and
+development in an “Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor” (or the Integral Fast Reactor).
+To address proliferation concerns, this program would have used electrometallurgical
+reprocessing to only partially separate plutonium and uranium. Congress stopped
+funding breeder-reactor development in 1993, and reduced appropriations for
+reprocessing research.
+
+The Bush Administration’s 2001 National Energy Policy called for renewing
+
+federal support for reprocessing, which the Department of Energy has implemented
+through the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI). The Energy Policy Act of 2005
+(Sec. 953), calls for AFCI to evaluate proliferation-resistant fuel recycling and
+transmutation technologies as an alternative to previously developed reprocessing
+technologies. This program also supports the evaluation of alternative national
+strategies for spent nuclear fuel and Generation IV advanced reactor concepts.
+
+The President’s FY2006 budget request of $70.0 million in FY2006 was
+
+increased an additional $10 million by Congress (P.L 109-103) to accelerate the
+design activities associated with a proposed Engineering Scale Demonstration,
+submit a spent nuclear fuel recycling technology plan by March 1, 2006, and select
+a preferred technology no later than the end of FY2007. 
+
+The Bush Administration has yet to announce details an initiative tentatively
+
+referred to as the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, which is intended to give U.S.
+vendors the opportunity to sell nuclear reactors to developing nations under the
+condition that the Unites States would back the spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing.
+
+ 
+ CRS-37
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB88090, Nuclear Energy Policy
+ CRS Report RL32163, Radioactive Waste Streams: An Overview of Waste 
+
+ Classification for Disposal 
+
+ Fusion Research: ITER 
+
+The ITER project is an international scientific collaboration to construct a
+
+facility for fusion energy research. The international partners are China, the
+European Union, India (joined December 2005), Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the
+United States. Canada withdrew its participation in December 2003. A long-running
+disagreement over where to build the facility was resolved in June 2005 with the
+selection of a site in Cadarache, France, in preference to a site in Japan. (The United
+States initially supported the Japanese site.) In 1998, the United States withdrew
+from the design phase of ITER at congressional direction, largely because of
+concerns about cost and scope. The project has since been restructured, and in
+January 2003, the Administration announced its intention to reenter the project. The
+U.S. share of the cost of building ITER (about 10%) is expected to be about $1.1
+billion over eight years. Only a small portion of that would be required in FY2006
+since the construction work site was only opened in December 2005. Once
+construction is complete, the U.S. share of the cost of operating ITER is expected to
+be about an additional $58 million per year. Key issues in the 109th Congress are the
+cost of U.S. participation and the budget impact of ITER on the rest of the U.S.
+fusion program.
+
+ Water Supply Technology and Energy-Water Efficiency 
+
+Water resources research represents 0.5% of the approximately $130 billion
+
+annual federal R&D investment. This research is spread across almost twenty
+agencies. A 2004 report by the National Research Council (NRC), Confronting the
+Nation’s Water Problems: The Role of Research , called for a commitment to water
+resources research to address the nation’s water problems, and suggested a central
+role for federal research in informing water resources issues. In particular, the report
+promoted both federally-funded research on water use and institutions, and a more
+coordinated federal water research agenda.
+
+Real levels of spending on water research have remained relatively constant, at
+
+$700 million (in 2000 dollars) annually since the mid-1970s. Although the overall
+level is constant, funding declined for some specific research categories, including
+the water supply augmentation and conservation, water quality management and
+protection, water resources planning and institutions, and water resource data. In
+contrast, aquatic ecosystem research has increased substantially.
+
+Growing demands on developed water supplies has increased interest in water
+
+supply technologies, and desalination in particular. Desalination — the process of
+removing dissolved solids (primarily dissolved salts and other minerals) from water
+ — has become an increasingly attractive water supply option as the cost of the
+dominant technology in the nation — reverse osmosis — has fallen and the pressure
+
+ 
+ CRS-38
+
+to develop new water supplies has grown. Opportunities for using desalination are
+greatest for meeting water demands for coastal communities that can desalinate
+seawater or estuarine water, interior communities above brackish groundwater
+aquifers, and communities with contaminated water supplies. Desalination’s
+attraction is that it can create a new source of freshwater from otherwise unusable
+waters, and a more predictable source than freshwater supplies that rely more directly
+on annual or multi-year precipitation, runoff, and recharge rates. The Bush
+Administration has expressed support for current desalination research efforts aimed
+at reducing costs, while criticizing bills seeking financial support for specific
+desalination facilities. 
+
+Proposed legislation and enacted appropriations in the 109th Congress have
+
+aimed to reverse the declining trend in federal research funds for desalination and
+other water supply technologies. According to the 2004 NRC report, “water supply
+augmentation and conservation” research by federal agencies totaled $14.5 million
+in FY2000. In the past the federal government invested more in this area; in the late
+1960s, federal research in desalination and other saline water conversion activities
+exceeded $100 million (in 2000 dollars) annually. Increasing federal funding for
+desalination research raises questions, such as: what should be the respective roles
+of federal agencies, academic institutions, and the private sector in conducting
+research and commercializing the results, and should federal research be focused on
+basic research or promoting the use of technologies?
+
+ Biomedicine Issues 
+
+ National Institutes of Health (NIH) Organization
+and Management Issues 
+
+The National Institutes of Health (NIH), the primary medical research agency
+
+of the federal government, is facing challenges in a number of areas that may interest
+the Congress. In the budgetary arena, the past three years have been a time of rapid
+transition from a period of marked growth in the NIH appropriation to the current
+climate of restrained domestic discretionary spending. Over a five-year period,
+Congress doubled the NIH budget, from $13.6 billion in FY1998 to $27.1 billion in
+FY2003. After FY2003, growth slowed to below the rate of inflation, and the final
+FY2006 level represents a drop in funding for the first time since FY1970. NIH’s
+budget for FY2006 is $28.5 billion, a decrease of $81 million or 0.3% below the
+FY2005 program level.
+
+Since the doubling, the extramural research community has expressed its
+
+concerns about the lack of growth in the NIH budget, asserting that sustained funding
+is necessary to maintain support of research grants, keep young investigators in the
+pipeline, and capitalize on the momentum of discoveries in both basic and applied
+research. NIH has announced its FY2006 grant funding policies, which will involve
+cutbacks in grant budgets and in numbers of grants, tight competition for new
+awards, and possible postponement of some large projects previously anticipated,
+including clinical trials. Advocates warn that research advances on the major chronic
+conditions that burden our society, such as heart disease, cancer, stroke, and diabetes,
+
+ 
+ CRS-39
+
+may be slowed. Other commentators advise that coping with the reality of budget
+constraints will require NIH and the research community to rethink some of their
+traditional approaches to planning and organizing research. The resources of the
+doubling years have spurred development of unifying concepts of fundamental
+biology and understanding of disease processes that formerly were thought to be
+unrelated. Scientific leaders in and out of NIH urge critical examination of the best
+ways to transform knowledge into medical applications and allocate resources into
+the most critical priorities for return on the public’s investment.
+
+A key factor in such rethinking is consideration of NIH’s organizational
+
+structure, which has expanded markedly over time along with the growth in the
+budget. The agency is comprised of 27 semi-autonomous institutes and centers,
+loosely coordinated by the central Office of the Director. As new entities have been
+created by Congress, each with its own mission, budget, staff, review office, and
+other bureaucratic apparatus, the costs and complexities of administering the
+enterprise have multiplied. Further, NIH wishes to emphasize a culture of inter-
+disciplinary teamwork, but many observers fear that the present structure of multiple
+independently operated institutes may undermine important initiatives in cross-
+disciplinary research, especially in fields such as neurosciences. To address these
+issues, NIH has been increasingly emphasizing an effort termed the “NIH Roadmap
+for Medical Research” [http://nihroadmap.nih.gov]. Launched in September 2003,
+the Roadmap has identified critical scientific gaps that may be constraining rapid
+progress in biomedical research, and which no one institute can tackle alone. NIH-
+wide priorities and initiatives have been developed in three broad areas, focusing on
+new paths to biological discoveries, more interdisciplinary research, and improving
+clinical research. Congress has already held a number of hearings on these issues,
+and has been supportive of the goals of the Roadmap and of NIH’s efforts to improve
+the management of its research portfolio.
+
+The last major reauthorization of NIH was in 1993, although a number of laws
+
+focusing on individual NIH-related topics have amended the Public Health Service
+Act since then. Oversight hearings and discussions on a draft reauthorization bill
+have considered questions such as NIH’s stewardship of its resources; the relative
+roles of the NIH Director and the institutes; and the optimum alignment of budgetary
+accounts, organizational structure, and statutory authority. Possible proposals for
+change include giving the NIH Director’s Office more planning involvement and
+budgetary control over cross-institute research initiatives, grouping the institutes and
+centers differently for authorizations and/or appropriations, and, for the first time,
+setting overall authorization levels for NIH. Some other areas of concern which
+Congress might consider include improving public reporting of research results,
+enhancing public access to scientific journal articles, and exploring ways to shorten
+the process for young researchers to become independent investigators.
+
+An ongoing oversight issue is NIH’s implementation of new conflict-of-interest
+
+regulations. Depending on the level of their positions, NIH scientists and other
+employees are subject to restrictions on their financial holdings and their ability to
+consult with industry and outside interests and colleagues. Questions have been
+raised about the impact of the ethics regulations on recruitment and retention of
+employees.
+
+ 
+ CRS-40
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL32799, Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2006 
+
+ Human Cloning and Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
+
+Embryonic stem cells have the ability to develop into virtually any cell in the
+
+body, and may have the potential to treat medical conditions such as diabetes and
+Parkinson’s disease. Human embryonic stem cells are derived from very early
+embryos (5-days-old) that were created by in vitro fertilization (IVF) either for
+infertility treatment or for research purposes. Work on human embryonic stem cells
+is controversial, as some oppose such research because the process of removing the
+stem cells destroys the embryo.
+
+Another potential source of embryonic stem cells involves cloning: the nucleus
+
+of an egg is removed and replaced by the nucleus from a mature body cell, such as
+a skin cell. The cell created via cloning is allowed to develop for five days and then
+the stem cells are removed. Stem cells derived from cloned embryos may offer the
+best hope for understanding and treating disease. Although South Korean scientists
+had announced the creation of cloned human embryos and isolation of human stem
+cells from cloned embryos, an investigation in December 2005 found that the results
+had been fabricated — a major setback for the field. These developments and the
+unsubstantiated announcement by Clonaid in December 2002 of the birth of a cloned
+child have contributed to the controversy over research on human embryos.
+
+One impediment to human stem cell research is the Dickey Amendment which
+
+has been added to each Labor, HHS and Education appropriations act from FY1997
+through FY2006. It prohibits HHS from using appropriated funds for the creation of
+human embryos for research purposes or for research in which human embryos are
+destroyed. As a result, federal funds cannot be used for most forms of human
+embryo research including the isolation of new stem cell lines or the cloning of
+human embryos for any purpose. 
+
+In August 2001 President Bush announced that, for the first time, federal funds
+
+would be used to support research on human embryonic stem cells, but funding
+would be limited to “existing stem cell lines.” The National Institutes of Health
+(NIH) has established the Human Embryonic Stem Cell Registry which lists stem cell
+lines eligible for use in federally funded research. Although 78 embryonic stem cell
+lines are listed, only 22 are currently available. Subsequently the debate has centered
+on whether the number of cell lines allowed under the Bush policy are sufficient to
+permit U.S. research to remain internationally competitive in this very important new
+technology. Scientists are concerned about the quality, longevity, and availability of
+the 22 stem cell lines. For a variety of reasons, many believe research advancement
+requires new embryonic stem cell lines. The Bush Administration established the
+President’s Council on Bioethics in November 2001 to consider all of the medical
+and ethical ramifications of biomedical innovation. In July 2002, the Council
+released its report on human cloning, which unanimously recommended a ban on
+reproductive cloning and, by a vote of 10 to 7, a four-year moratorium on cloning for
+medical research purposes. The Council released a second report on the issue,
+ Monitoring Stem Cell Research , in January 2004.
+
+ 
+ CRS-41
+
+In May 2005 the House passed H.R. 810 (Castle) that would allow federal
+
+support of research using embryonic stem cells regardless of the date on which the
+stem cells were derived from a human embryo, thus negating the current policy that
+limits funding to stem cell lines in existence as of August 2001. Only excess IVF
+embryos that the individuals seeking fertility treatments have determined will not be
+implanted and will be discarded are eligible for stem cell derivation; written consent
+is required. Action on H.R. 1357 (Weldon), a version of which passed the House in
+the 108th Congress but not the Senate, is also likely. The bill bans the process of
+cloning as well as the importation of any product derived from an embryo created via
+cloning. It bans not only reproductive applications, but also research on therapeutic
+uses, which has implications for stem cell research. Advocates of the legislative ban
+say that allowing any form of human cloning research to proceed raises serious
+ethical issues and will inevitably lead to the birth of a baby that is a human clone.
+Critics argue that the measure would curtail medical research and prevent Americans
+from receiving life-saving treatments created overseas. Legislation that bans only
+human reproductive cloning has also been introduced, as well as bills focused on
+alternative sources of stem cells. On December 20, 2005, the President signed
+legislation which provides for the collection and maintenance of human cord blood
+stem cells (a type of adult stem cell) for the treatment of patients and for research
+(P.L. 109-129). For information on the status of 109th Congress legislation, see CRS
+Report RL31015 and CRS Report RL31358. 
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RL31358, Human Cloning
+ CRS Report RL31015, Stem Cell Research
+ CRS Report RL31422, Substantive Due Process and a Right to Clone
+ CRS Report RS21044, Background and Legal Issues Related to Stem Cell Research
+ CRS Report RL31142, Stem Cell Research and Patents: An Introduction to the 
+
+ Issues 
+
+CRS Report RS21517, State Laws on Human Cloning
+ CRS Report RL31211, Cloning: A Select Chronology 
+
+ Space and Aeronautics Issues 
+
+ Impact of The “Vision for Space Exploration” on
+NASA’s Aeronautics and Other Space Activities 
+
+On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush announced a new Vision for
+
+Space Exploration, directing NASA to focus its efforts on returning humans to the
+Moon by 2020, and someday sending them to Mars and “worlds beyond.” (See CRS
+Report RS21720.) The President’s plan calls for most of the funding for the Vision
+to come from redirecting spending from other NASA activities. Advocates of
+aeronautics, space science, and earth science research worry that funding for their
+activities will suffer. In the FY2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce
+appropriations act (P.L.109-108), which includes NASA, and the 2005 NASA
+authorization act (P.L. 109-155), Congress expressed its support for the Vision, but
+
+ 
+ CRS-42
+
+stressed that NASA needs to maintain a balanced program that includes aeronautics
+and science. 
+
+The amount of funding for various activities will affect workforce levels at the
+
+nine NASA field centers around the country, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a
+Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) operated for NASA
+by the California Institute of Technology. NASA’s FY2006 budget request assumed
+that the agency would cut about 2,500 civil service jobs by the end of FY2006.
+NASA officials insist that there are no plans to close any NASA centers. The agency
+is offering buy-outs and other incentives to encourage staff in certain disciplines to
+leave, but to date these efforts have not achieved their targets. NASA officials
+explain that everyone who currently is employed by NASA is funded through the end
+of FY2006. How to “right size” NASA, its facilities, and its workforce, and ensure
+NASA has the necessary skill mix for the Vision, are among the issues facing
+Congress. The FY2006 appropriations act that includes NASA (P.L. 109-108)
+restricts NASA’s use of buyouts and Reductions in Force (RIFs) prior to NASA
+providing certain reports to Congress. The 2005 NASA authorization act (P.L. 109-
+155) prohibits RIFs or other involuntary separations (except for cause) prior to March
+16, 2007.
+
+The Vision also calls for the space shuttle fleet to be retired in 2010. Placing a
+
+fixed termination date on the shuttle system, however, may create schedule pressure
+similar to what the Columbia Accident Investigation Board found to have contributed
+to the February 2003 Columbia tragedy (see CRS Report RS21408). Also, retiring
+the shuttle without another vehicle to replace it means that the United States would
+be dependent on Russia to take American crews to and from ISS until a new “Crew
+Exploration Vehicle” (CEV) is available. The President directed NASA to have the
+CEV ready for Earth-orbital flights by 2014, although NASA Administrator Griffin
+is taking action to accelerate the CEV’s development. Some argue that the shuttle
+should be retained until the CEV is available, while others want to retire the shuttle
+as soon as possible either so the funding can be redirected toward other aspects of the
+Vision, or because of shuttle safety concerns. Meanwhile, the shuttle’s schedule
+remains uncertain because of problems during the launch of the first Return to Flight
+mission (STS-114) in July 2005. NASA indefinitely postponed the next shuttle
+mission because of a foam-shedding event that occurred during STS-114’s launch
+that is similar to what led to the loss of Columbia. The next launch is expected some
+time in 2006.
+
+NASA officials have indicated that NASA plans to complete its use of the ISS
+
+by 2016. Under the Vision, the only U.S. research that will be conducted on ISS is
+that needed to fulfill the Vision, i.e., to support human health and safety in exploring
+the Moon and Mars. NASA spends about $2 billion a year on ISS, in addition to the
+costs of the shuttle program (about $4-5 billion annually). Some question whether
+ISS is worth that level of investment considering the modest research objectives that
+remain. NASA is building ISS in partnership with Canada, Japan, Russia, and 10
+European countries. Fulfilling U.S. commitments to those partners may be another
+rationale for continued U.S. involvement.
+
+ 
+ CRS-43
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RS21720, Space Exploration: Overview of President Bush’s “Vision for 
+
+ Space Exploration,” and Key Issues for Congress 
+
+CRS Report RS22063, The National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
+
+ Overview, FY2006 Budget in Brief, and Key Issues for Congress 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB93026, Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, 
+
+ Commercial Competition, and Satellite Exports 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB93017, Space Stations 
+
+ The Future of the Hubble Space Telescope 
+
+Two days after the President’s Vision speech (see above), NASA announced that
+
+it would not use the space shuttle to conduct further servicing missions to the Hubble
+Space Telescope (see CRS Report RS21767). Then-NASA Administrator Sean
+O’Keefe cited shuttle safety concerns as the primary reason for his decision.
+Widespread criticism led NASA to explore the possibility of a robotic servicing
+mission, but a report from the National Research Council (NRC) in December 2004
+concluded that a robotic servicing mission was unlikely to succeed in the time
+available. The NRC recommended proceeding with a shuttle servicing mission
+instead, but Mr. O’Keefe did not change his mind. Dr. Michael Griffin, who became
+NASA Administrator in April 2005, has stated that he will reassess whether to use
+the shuttle to service Hubble after the shuttle returns to flight status and flies two
+successful missions. In the 2005 NASA authorization act (P.L.109-155), Congress
+supported this plan “unless such a mission would compromise astronaut safety.” It
+also required a status report on servicing plans within 60 days of the landing of the
+second successful shuttle flight. Problems during the launch of the first RTF mission
+in July 2005 led NASA to reground the shuttle fleet; a second mission is now
+expected some time in 2006. It is not known what impact this delay will have on the
+prospects for servicing Hubble. Meanwhile, cost estimates of $1 billion or more
+have raised questions about the affordability of a servicing mission. Congress
+provided $80 million in FY2006. Whether or not to service Hubble is a major issue
+facing Congress.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RS21767, Hubble Space Telescope: Should NASA Proceed with a 
+
+ Servicing Mission? 
+
+ National Security Space Programs 
+
+The Department of Defense (DOD) and the intelligence community conduct a
+
+space program larger in terms of funding than NASA. It involves building and
+launching satellites for communications, navigation, early warning of missile
+launches, weather, intelligence collection, and other purposes. Tracking the overall
+funding amount for the national security space program is difficult because it is not
+consolidated into a single account. According to the DOD Comptroller’s office,
+DOD requested $22.5 billion for space programs in FY2006. DOD has not released
+a figure for how much was appropriated.
+
+ 
+ CRS-44
+
+A number of DOD space programs are encountering cost growth and schedule
+
+delays, including the Air Force’s Space Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High)
+for early warning of missile launches, the Air Force’s Advanced Extremely High
+Frequency (AEHF) communications satellite system, and the National
+Reconnaissance Office’s (NRO’s) Future Imagery Architecture reconnaissance
+satellite system. DOD requests to initiate new programs, including the
+Transformational Satellite (T-SAT) communications satellite program, and a Space
+Radar (formerly the “Space-Based Radar”) program, are controversial because of the
+potentially large costs involved (and therefore their affordability), and concern as to
+how to avoid the cost growth and schedule delays experienced in other DOD space
+programs.
+
+ For Further Information 
+
+CRS Report RS21148, Issues Concerning DOD’s SBIRS and STSS Programs 
+CRS Issue Brief IB92011, U.S. Space Programs: Civil, Military, and Commercial
+ CRS Issue Brief IB93062, Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, 
+
+ Commercial Competition, and Satellite Exports 
+
+ 
+ CRS-45
+
+ Appendix: List of Acronyms 
+
+ATP
+
+Advanced Technology Program
+
+AFCI
+
+Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative 
+
+CBRN
+
+Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (terrorism)
+
+CCRI
+
+Climate Change Research Initiative
+
+CCSP
+
+Climate Change Science Program
+
+CDC
+
+Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
+
+DARPA
+
+(Department of) Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
+
+DHHS
+
+Department of Health and Human Services (alternatively, 
+HHS)
+
+DHS
+
+Department of Homeland Security
+
+DOD
+
+Department of Defense
+
+DOE
+
+Department of Energy
+
+DTV
+
+Digital Television
+
+EHR
+
+Electronic Health Records
+
+FCC
+
+Federal Communications Commission
+
+FDA
+
+Food and Drug Administration
+
+FOIA
+
+Freedom of Information Act
+
+GAO
+
+Government Accountability Office
+
+GPRA
+
+Government Performance and Results Act
+
+GSA
+
+General Services Administration
+
+HHS
+
+(Department of) Health and Human Services (alternatively,
+DHHS)
+
+IQA
+
+Information Quality Act
+
+IT
+
+Information Technology
+
+MEP
+
+Manufacturing Extension Partnership
+
+NAS
+
+National Academy of Sciences (which together with the
+National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of
+Medicine form the “National Academies”)
+
+ 
+ CRS-46
+
+NASA
+
+National Aeronautics and Space Administration
+
+NCCTI
+
+National Climate Change Technology Initiative
+
+NHIN
+
+National Health Information Network
+
+NIAID
+
+National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (part of
+NIH)
+
+NIH
+
+National Institutes of Health (part of the Department of Health
+and Human Services)
+
+NIST
+
+National Institute of Science and Technology (part of the
+Department of Commerce)
+
+NITRD
+
+Networking Information Technology R&D
+
+NOAA
+
+National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (part of the
+Department of Commerce)
+
+NSF
+
+National Science Foundation
+
+NSTC
+
+National Science and Technology Council (part of OSTP)
+
+OHS
+
+Office of Homeland Security (in the White House)
+
+OMB
+
+Office of Management and Budget
+
+ONCHIT
+
+Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information
+
+OSTP
+
+Office of Science and Technology Policy
+
+PART
+
+Program Assessment Rating Tool
+
+R&D
+
+Research and Development
+
+R&E
+
+Research and Experimentation
+
+RDT&E
+
+Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
+
+SBU
+
+Sensitive But Unclassified
+
+SHSI
+
+Sensitive Homeland Security Information
+
+USDA
+
+U.S. Department of Agriculture
+
+USGCRP
+
+U.S. Global Change Research Program
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/corpus/politics/text/8f2f2ea860c1c2e9.txt b/corpus/politics/text/8f2f2ea860c1c2e9.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6c6b6ea123f40bc2914ea481b5e8f77bc429869f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/politics/text/8f2f2ea860c1c2e9.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,1859 @@
+The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
+Explosives (ATF): Budget and Operations 
+for FY2011 
+
+ William J. Krouse 
+ Specialist in Domestic Security and Crime Policy 
+
+January 6, 2011 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+7-5700 
+
+www.crs.gov 
+
+R41206 
+
+ CRS Report for Congress
+ P 
+
+ repared for Members and Committees of Congress 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+ Summary 
+ The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is the lead federal law 
+enforcement agency charged with administering and enforcing federal laws related to the 
+manufacture, importation, and distribution of firearms and explosives. Congress transferred ATF’s 
+enforcement and regulatory functions for firearms and explosives from the Department of the 
+Treasury to the Department of Justice (DOJ) as part of the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296). 
+ATF is also responsible for investigating arson cases with a federal nexus, as well as criminal 
+violations of federal laws governing the manufacture, importation, and distribution of alcohol and 
+tobacco. Congress authorized appropriations for ATF in the Department of Justice Authorization 
+Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-162) for FY2006 through FY2009; however, the 111th Congress did not 
+consider legislation to reauthorize annual appropriations for DOJ or ATF. 
+
+For three fiscal years, FY2008 through FY2010, Congress has provided about $49 million in 
+program increases to address firearms trafficking. About $43 million of this funding has been 
+allocated to Project Gunrunner, an ATF initiative to reduce gun trafficking across the Southwest 
+border, or other projects to assist the government of Mexico. In the 110th Congress, the House 
+passed a bill (H.R. 6028) that would have authorized appropriations over three years, for FY2008 
+through FY2010, of $73.5 million to increase ATF resources dedicated to stemming illegal gun 
+trafficking into Mexico. In the 111th Congress, bills with similar authorizations were introduced 
+(S. 205, H.R. 495, H.R. 1448, and H.R. 1867). 
+
+For FY2011, the Administration requested $1.163 billion for ATF, an increase of 3.8% over the 
+agency’s FY2010 appropriation ($1.121 billion). For Project Gunrunner, the request included 
+$11.8 million to annualize 37 positions that were previously funded by the American Recovery 
+and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5). It also included $1.2 million to enable ATF to coordinate state 
+and local law enforcement efforts in the event of a national emergency and, thus, fulfill the 
+Attorney General’s Emergency Support Function #13 obligations under the National Response 
+Framework. The FY2011 request assumed $35.2 million and 46 FTE positions in base 
+adjustments, less offsets and other reductions. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported a 
+bill that would have matched the FY2011 request (S. 3636), but no further action was taken on 
+that bill. In the absence of an enacted CJS appropriations bill, Congress has passed a series of 
+continuing resolutions, the most recent of which funds ATF at its FY2010 enacted level through 
+March 4, 2011 (P.L. 111-322). Congress also provided ATF with $37.5 million in supplemental 
+FY2010 appropriations for Project Gunrunner (P.L. 111-230). 
+
+In March 2010, the House Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations Subcommittee held a hearing 
+on the ATF FY2011 budget submission. Members of the subcommittee raised questions about gun 
+trafficking on the Southwest border, regulatory backlogs, violent crime impact teams, and inter-
+agency coordination on gang violence. Congress passed and the President signed into law the 
+Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (P.L. 111-154). This act grants ATF greater authority to 
+inspect the businesses and records of “cigarette deliverers.” In addition, under the Mérida 
+Initiative, ATF released a Spanish-language version of its firearms trace request software (e-Trace 
+4.0) to Mexico, Guatemala, and Costa Rica, and established a U.S.-Mexico ballistic information 
+exchange capability. Also of note, in November 2010, the DOJ Office of the Inspector General 
+(OIG) released an updated report on ATF’s Project Gunrunner, which recommended among other 
+things that ATF work with DOJ to require federally licensed gun dealers to report multiple long 
+gun sales. In addition, the OIG released reports on ATF’s efforts to investigate contraband 
+cigarette trafficking, and on ATF’s concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Bureau of 
+Investigation for explosives-related investigations. This report complements CRS Report 
+RL34514, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF): Budget and 
+Operations for FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 , and will be updated as needed. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+ Contents 
+
+Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1 
+
+ATF Mission ............................................................................................................................... 2 
+
+ATF Appropriations .................................................................................................................... 3 
+
+ATF Budget Structure ........................................................................................................... 3 
+Administration’s FY2011 Request ......................................................................................... 4 
+Funding and Staffing, FY1999-FY2010................................................................................. 6 
+
+Regulatory Backlogs ................................................................................................................... 8 
+
+Firearms Budget Program ........................................................................................................... 9 
+
+Violent Crime and Gangs ...................................................................................................... 9 
+Compliance Inspections of Licensed Gun Dealers ............................................................... 11 
+Southwest Border Gun Trafficking ...................................................................................... 12 
+
+Project Gunrunner ......................................................................................................... 13 
+Electronic Trace Submission System ............................................................................. 15 
+DOJ OIG Report, Mexican Trace Data, and Multiple Long Gun Sales ........................... 16 
+Related Legislation in the 110th and 111th Congresses .................................................... 17 
+
+Arson and Explosives Budget Program...................................................................................... 18 
+
+Safe Explosives Act ............................................................................................................ 18 
+ATF and FBI Concurrent Jurisdiction over Explosives Investigations .................................. 19 
+
+Alcohol and Tobacco Budget Program ...................................................................................... 20 
+
+Alcohol Diversion............................................................................................................... 21 
+Tobacco Diversion .............................................................................................................. 21 
+Related Legislation in the 110th and 111th Congresses .......................................................... 22 
+
+ 
+
+ Figures 
+
+Figure 1. ATF Appropriations ...................................................................................................... 4 
+
+ 
+
+ Tables 
+
+Table 1. ATF Appropriations for Salaries and Expenses (S&E) and Construction Line 
+
+Item Appropriations Accounts, FY2010 Enacted Compared to FY2011 Request ....................... 5 
+
+Table 2. ATF Appropriations, FY1999-FY2010 ........................................................................... 6 
+
+Table A-1. ATF Authorizations Compared to Appropriations ..................................................... 24 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendixes 
+
+Appendix. Authorizations Compared to Appropriations ............................................................. 24 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+ Contacts 
+
+Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 25 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+his report provides an overview of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
+Explosives (ATF) budget and operations. This report chronicles congressional action on 
+
+T the FY2011 Commerce, Justice, Science (CJS), and Related Agencies Appropriations bills, 
+
+as well as any FY2010 supplemental appropriations bills, that provide funding for ATF. 
+
+ Recent Developments 
+
+In February 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ) released the ATF Congressional Budget 
+Submission, Fiscal Year 2011 .1 In March 2010, the House CJS subcommittee held a hearing on 
+the ATF FY2011 budget submission. Members of the subcommittee raised questions about gun 
+trafficking on the Southwest border, regulatory backlogs, violent crime impact teams, and inter-
+agency coordination on gang violence. On July 22, 2010, the Senate Appropriations Committee 
+reported its FY2011 CJS appropriations bill (S. 3636; S.Rept. 111-229). This measure would have 
+provided ATF with $1.163 billion for FY2011, matching the Administration’s request. However, 
+no further action was taken on this measure. In the absence of an enacted CJS appropriations bill, 
+Congress has passed continuing resolutions, which the President has signed into law (P.L. 111-
+242, P.L. 111-290, P.L. 111-317, P.L. 111-322). The most recent continuing resolution funds those 
+federal agencies, including ATF, that have not received an enacted FY2011 appropriation through 
+March 4, 2011, at their FY2010 enacted level. 
+
+Also, on June 22, 2010, the Administration requested an FY2010 supplemental appropriation of 
+$39.1 million for ATF to increase Southwest border gun trafficking investigations. The House 
+Appropriations Committee included this amount in the Emergency Border Security Supplemental 
+Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 5875), and the House passed this measure on July 28, 2010. The 
+Senate passed its version of H.R. 5875 (adopting the text of S. 3721 as a substitute amendment) 
+on August 5, 2010. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 5875 included $37.5 million for ATF. On 
+August 9, the House introduced a new border security supplemental bill (H.R. 6080), which was 
+subsequently passed by the House on August 10. H.R. 6080 contains identical language to 
+Senate-passed H.R. 5875. Reportedly, the House took up the bill with a new number to avoid a 
+dispute related to its constitutional obligation to originate all revenue measures.2 This dispute 
+arose with the addition of funding provisions in Senate-passed H.R. 5875 that were not included 
+in the House-passed version. On August 12, the Senate passed H.R. 6080. On August 13, 2010, 
+the President signed H.R. 6080 into law (P.L. 111-230). It provided ATF with an additional $37.5 
+million for Project Gunrunner. 
+
+In addition, Congress passed and President Obama signed into law the Prevent All Cigarette 
+Trafficking Act (P.L. 111-154). This act grants ATF greater authority to inspect the businesses and 
+records of “cigarette deliverers.” In addition, under the Mérida Initiative, ATF released a Spanish-
+language version of its firearms trace request software (e-Trace 4.0) to Mexico, Guatemala, and 
+Costa Rica, and established a U.S.-Mexico ballistic evidence exchange capability under the 
+National Integrated Ballistic Imaging Network (NIBIN) program.3 
+
+ 
+1 Available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011justification/pdf/fy11-atf-justification.pdf. 
+2 Theo Emery and Edward Epstein, “Border Security Bill Passes in House,” CQ Today , August 10, 2010, online 
+edition. 
+3 In the late 1990s, ATF developed NIBIN to enable law enforcement agencies to share computerized images of bullets 
+and cartridge casings recovered by law enforcement, including crime scene evidence. To capture such images, ATF 
+also deploys Integrated Ballistic Identification Systems to state and local law enforcement agencies. Those images are 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 1 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+Furthermore, in the fall of 2009, the DOJ Office of Inspector General (OIG) released three reports 
+on ATF operations. The first examined Project Gunrunner, an ATF initiative to reduce illegal gun 
+trafficking from the United States to Mexico.4 The second examined ATF’s efforts to investigate 
+contraband cigarette trafficking.5 The third examined ATF’s concurrent jurisdiction with the 
+Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for explosives-related investigations.6 In November 2010, 
+the OIG released another review of Project Gunrunner, recommending among other things that 
+ATF ought to work with DOJ to explore options to require multiple long gun sales reporting from 
+federally licensed gun dealers in the four Southwest border states.7 
+
+ ATF Mission 
+
+Located in DOJ, the ATF is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with administering 
+and enforcing federal laws related to the manufacture, importation, and distribution of firearms 
+and explosives. As part of the Homeland Security Act, Congress transferred ATF’s enforcement 
+and regulatory functions for firearms and explosives to the DOJ from the Department of the 
+Treasury (Treasury), adding “explosives” to ATF’s title.8 ATF is also responsible for investigating 
+arson cases with a federal nexus, as well as criminal violations of federal laws governing the 
+manufacture, importation, and distribution of alcohol and tobacco. The regulatory aspects of 
+those alcohol and tobacco laws are the domain of the Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB), which was 
+established at Treasury following ATF’s transfer to DOJ.9 
+
+As a law enforcement agency within the DOJ, ATF’s first priority is preventing terrorist attacks 
+within the United States.10 ATF is responsible for countering the illegal use and trafficking of 
+ 
+
+(...continued) 
+
+uploaded into several regional computer networks under the NIBIN program. For further information, see Daniel L. 
+Cork et al., Ballistic Imaging, Committee to Assess the Feasibility, Accuracy, and Technical Capability of a National 
+Ballistic Database , National Research Council, 2008, p. 133. 
+4 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, Interim Review of 
+ATF’s Project Gunrunner , Report Number I-2009-006, September 2009. 
+5 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluations and Inspections Division, The Bureau of 
+Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ Efforts to Prevent the Diversion of Tobacco , Report Number I-2009-0005, 
+September 2009. 
+6 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, Explosives Investigation Coordination 
+Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives , Audit 
+Report 10-01, October 2009, 104 pp. 
+7 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, Review of ATF’s 
+Project Gunrunner , Report Number 1-2011-001, November 2010. 
+8 P.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, November 25, 2002. 
+9 ATF was originally established as a separate bureau in the Department of the Treasury (DOT) in 1972 by Treasury 
+Department Order No. 120-1. While ATF traces its origins back to the first federal tax on distilled spirits in 1791, its 
+firearm regulatory responsibilities can largely be traced back to the 1934 National Firearms Act (NFA). As the NFA is 
+essentially a tax law, it was administered initially by the Department of the Treasury’s Bureau of Internal Revenue 
+(BIR) and its Miscellaneous Tax Unit. In 1942, the firearm enforcement duties were transferred to BIR’s Alcohol Tax 
+Unit (ATU). In 1952, the BIR was reorganized and renamed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the firearm and 
+tobacco programs were transferred to ATU, which was renamed, the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division (ATTD). 
+Following the Gun Control Act of 1968, the ATTD was given responsibility for explosives as well, and was renamed 
+the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATFD). See George Thomas Kurian, Editor in Chief, A Historical Guide 
+to the U.S. Government , Vicki Herrmann, “Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Bureau of,” (New York, 1998), pp. 39-41. 
+10 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Stewards of the American Dream: FY 2007—FY 2012 
+Strategic Plan . 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 2 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+firearms and explosives, and the criminal diversion of alcohol and tobacco products as an illegal 
+source of funding for terrorist activities. In criminal investigations, ATF agents have reportedly 
+uncovered foreign terrorists and their supporters bootlegging cigarettes as part of larger terrorist-
+financing operations in the United States.11 With those responsibilities, ATF special agents are 
+partners on DOJ’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces.12 
+
+As shown below, however, the lion’s share of ATF’s resources are allocated to its firearms 
+compliance and investigations program. While the ATF periodically checks the records of 
+federally licensed gun dealers, the major focus of the firearms program is the reduction of 
+firearms-related violence. 
+
+ ATF Appropriations 
+
+For the past three fiscal years, FY2008 through FY2010, Congress provided ATF with about $49 
+million in program increases to address firearms trafficking, or the diversion of firearms from 
+legal to illegal markets. Most of this funding has been dedicated to ATF efforts to reduce firearms 
+trafficking from the United States to Mexico.13 Congress has also provided ATF with nearly $30 
+million for the construction of a National Center for Explosives Training and Research 
+(NCETR).14 In the 110th Congress, the House passed a bill (H.R. 6028) that would have 
+authorized increasing ATF appropriations over three years, for FY2008 through FY2010, by 
+nearly $74 million to address Southwest border gun trafficking. Similar bills have been 
+introduced in the 111th Congress. Meanwhile, as a DOJ bureau, the ATF authorization of 
+appropriations expired for FY2010. Previously, Congress provided annual appropriations 
+authorizations, for FY2006 through FY2009, in the Department of Justice Authorization Act of 
+2005 (P.L. 109-162) (see Appendix ). The 112th Congress may consider legislation to reauthorize 
+appropriations for ATF. 
+
+ ATF Budget Structure 
+
+Congress appropriates funding annually for ATF in a salaries and expenses account and, for some, 
+but not all years, in a construction account. Both accounts are given a line item in the CJS 
+appropriations bill. With regard to salaries and expenses, the ATF subdivides this account into 
+three budget decision units: 
+
+ 
+11 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, The Bureau of 
+Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearm and Explosives’ Efforts to Prevent the Diversion of Tobacco, Report Number I-2009-005 
+(September 2009), p. 15. 
+12 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The Department of Justice’s Terrorism Task Forces , 
+Report Number I-2005-007, June 2005. 
+13 For further information on Operation Gunrunner, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest 
+Border , by Vivian S. Chu and William J. Krouse. 
+14 NCETR (pronounced “en-SEE-der”) was authorized under section 1114 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 
+107-296; 116 Stat. 2280). Although this provision designated Fort A.P. Hill as the location for this center, it has been 
+established at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, AL. At NCETR, ATF is providing explosives-related research and 
+training to federal, state, local, and international law enforcement personnel. Hence, it is co-located with the FBI 
+Hazardous Devices School, where the FBI has been providing explosives-related training to federal state, local, and 
+international law enforcement personnel since the 1980s. In addition, the FBI is relocating the Terrorist Explosive 
+Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) to Redstone Arsenal. It is located currently in Quantico, VA. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 3 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+• firearms compliance and investigations, 
+• arson and explosives investigations, and 
+• alcohol and tobacco diversion. 
+
+Although Congress does not appropriate monies for the ATF (or any other DOJ agency) by 
+decision unit, the appropriators often address whether program increases requested specifically by 
+the Administration are to be provided in report language and more rarely in bill language for the 
+salaries and expenses account itself. As a consequence, the amounts requested for decision units 
+are binding in the sense that the appropriators are aware of the increases that were provided in the 
+annual bureau appropriation and how those increases would affect the decision unit totals. If 
+funding is shifted from one decision unit to another, statutory budget reprogramming 
+requirements are usually triggered, under which DOJ and its agencies are required to notify the 
+appropriations committees about such shifts.15 ATF budget decision units are described in greater 
+detail below. 
+
+ Administration’s FY2011 Request 
+
+The President’s FY2011 budget request 
+
+ Figure 1. ATF Appropriations 
+
+included $1.163 billion for ATF, an increase 
+of $42.2 million, or 3.8%, compared to the 
+FY2010-enacted appropriation of $1.121 
+billion. Figure 1 shows proposed budget 
+decision unit allocations accompanying the 
+FY2011 budget request. Of these programs, 
+the firearms compliance and investigations 
+decision unit was allocated the lion’s share of 
+appropriated funding, about 72%. The arson 
+and explosives investigations decision unit 
+and the alcohol and tobacco diversion 
+
+ 
+
+decision unit were allocated 26% and 2%, 
+
+ Source: ATF Congressional Budget Submission, Fiscal 
+
+respectively, of the requested appropriation. 
+
+ Year 2011 . 
+
+ As Table 1 shows, the FY2010 appropriation of $1.121 billion included $1.115 billion for 
+salaries and expenses and $6 million for construction. The Administration, however, requested no 
+funding for ATF construction for FY2011. Compared to the $1.115 billion Congress appropriated 
+for ATF salaries and expenses for FY2010, the Administration’s FY2011 budget request proposed 
+a net increase of $48.2 million and 86 full-time equivalent (FTE) positions for ATF. This amount 
+included 
+
+• $35.2 million in base adjustments (less certain offsets and other reductions) and 
+
+46 FTE positions;16 
+
+ 
+15 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117, section 505 of the CJS general provisions [123 Stat. 
+3149-3159]), includes several requirements regarding the reprogramming of funding provided under Division B of the 
+act. Among other things, these requirements prohibit any reprogramming that proposes to use funds directed for a 
+specific activity by either the House or Senate Appropriations Committees, unless both Committees are notified 15 
+days in advance. 
+16 For most DOJ agencies, the Administration of President George W. Bush had routinely proposed “base adjustments” 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 4 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+• $11.8 million and 37 FTE positions for Project Gunrunner; and 
+• and $1.2 million and 3 FTE positions for Emergency Support Function #13.17 
+
+ Table 1. ATF Appropriations for Salaries and Expenses (S&E) and Construction Line 
+
+ Item Appropriations Accounts, FY2010 Enacted Compared to FY2011 Request 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ FY2010 Enacted a FY2011 
+
+ Base b FY2011 
+
+ Increases c FY2011 
+
+ Request 
+
+ Decision 
+
+ Units 
+
+ Dollars FTE d Dollars FTE d Dollars FTE d Dollars FTE d 
+
+Firearms $802,636 
+
+3,614 
+
+$824,651 
+
+3,660 
+
+$12,699 40 
+
+$837,350 
+
+3,700 
+
+Arson & 
+
+289,841 1,321 302,057 1,321 
+
+320 
+
+0 302,377 1,321 
+
+Explosives 
+
+Alcohol & 
+
+22, 295 
+
+90 
+
+23,235 
+
+90 
+
+24 
+
+0 
+
+23,259 
+
+90 
+
+Tobacco 
+
+S&E Subtotal 
+
+1,114,772 
+
+5,025 
+
+1,149,943 
+
+5,071 
+
+13,043 
+
+40 
+
+1,163,986 
+
+5,111 
+
+Constructio
+
+6,000 0 
+
+0 0 0 0 
+
+0 0 
+
+n 
+
+Total 1,120,772 
+
+5,025 
+
+1,149,943 
+
+5,071 
+
+13,043 
+
+40 
+
+1,163,986 
+
+5,111 
+
+ Source: ATF Congressional Budget Submission, Fiscal Year 2011 . 
+
+ Notes: Amounts may not add to totals due to rounding. 
+
+a. The FY2010 enacted amounts do not reflect $37.5 million and 53 FTE positions provided by an emergency 
+
+border security supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-230). 
+
+b. The base budget essential y represents an estimated level of resources that ATF would need to provide the 
+
+anticipated level of services for the current fiscal year (FY2010) in the next fiscal year (FY2011). 
+
+c. FY2011 increases are requested program increases over base. In other words, if appropriated, these 
+
+resources will be for new activities and services. 
+
+ 
+
+(...continued) 
+
+to the number of FTE and permanent positions that were considered “authorized” (funded or appropriated for) as part 
+of estimating an agency’s base budget, which was a departure from past practices. For FY2010 and FY2011, the 
+Obama Administration proposed making similar adjustments to the ATF base budget, as described above. The base 
+budget essentially represents an estimated level of resources that an agency would need to provide the anticipated level 
+of services for the current fiscal year in the next fiscal year. In the past, base budgets did not include adjustments to the 
+number of permanent positions, and the number of “authorized” permanent positions was generally static, unless 
+changed by Congress by increasing or decreasing funding associated with those positions. As happened in the FY2008 
+budget cycle, the Administration has periodically (about every 10 years) proposed eliminating “hollow” positions, for 
+which the modular costs and underlying assumptions are no longer sufficient to fund those positions. Authorized or 
+funded positions are generally displayed by job series in a “Table of Organization” in the agency’s budget submissions 
+to Congress. The ATF FY2011 proposed budget assumed base adjustments of $41.9 million that were reduced by $6.7 
+million in non-reoccurring costs and other offsets. 
+17 Emergency Support Function #13 (ESF #13) falls under the Public Safety and Security Annex to the National 
+Response Framework (NRF). The NRF sets broad responsibilities and lines of authority for federal agencies in the 
+event of a national emergency or major disaster. Under the NRF, the Attorney General is responsible for ESF-13, which 
+entails all hazards law enforcement planning and coordination for the entire United States and its territories. The 
+Attorney General, in turn, has delegated his responsibility for ESF-13’s implementation to the ATF. For more 
+information, see CRS Report RL34758, The National Response Framework: Overview and Possible Issues for 
+Congress , by Bruce R. Lindsay. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 5 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+d. A ful -time equivalent (FTE) position represents the amount of funding necessary to provide for a single 
+
+position for an entire year. Not all positions (new, temporary, and part-time) are fully funded for the entire 
+
+year. New positions, for example, are often partially funded, as such positions are filled incrementally and at 
+
+some point during the fiscal year. Hence, they do not require ful funding for the first year. 
+
+The $13.0 million in proposed program increases are broken out by budget decision unit in Table 
+1 in the “FY2011 Increases” column. The $1.2 million for Emergency Support Function #13 is 
+spread across all three budget decision units: $854 thousand for firearms, $320 thousand for arson 
+and explosives, and $24 thousand for alcohol and tobacco. The $35.2 million in base adjustments 
+and other offsets is the difference between the “FY2010 Enacted” and “FY2011 Base” columns. 
+
+ Funding and Staffing, FY1999-FY2010 
+
+As Table 2 shows, from FY1999 to FY2010, Congress increased ATF appropriations from $541.6 
+million to nearly $1.121 billion, an increase of 107%. For that time period, the annual percent 
+growth was 6.8%. With some fluctuation, ATF staffing increased from 3,969 to 5,025 FTE 
+positions, a 27% increase.18 Since its transfer to DOJ in FY2003, ATF has also reported 
+permanent positions, in addition to FTE positions. 
+
+ Table 2. ATF Appropriations, FY1999-FY2010 
+
+(Dollars in thousands) 
+
+ Fiscal Year 
+
+ Appropriation(s) 
+
+ Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Positions a Permanent 
+
+ Positions 
+
+1999 $541,574b 3,969 
+
+N/A 
+
+2000 $565,959c 4,221 
+
+4,492 
+
+2001 $771,143d 4,643 
+
+5,049 
+
+2002 $854,747e 5,029 
+
+5,143 
+
+2003 $826,801f 5,111 
+
+5,231 
+
+2004 $827,289g 4,735h 4,862h 
+
+2005 $882,465i 4,885 
+
+5,073 
+
+2006 $935,817j 5,040 
+
+5,128 
+
+2007 $988,097k 5,053 
+
+5,128 
+
+2008 $1,011,597l 4,880m 4,956m 
+
+2009 $1,078,215n 4,957 
+
+5,008 
+
+2010 $1,120,772o 5,025 
+
+5,101 
+
+ Source: CRS presentation of ATF funding and staffing data presented in Department of the Treasury and 
+
+Department of Justice budget submissions to Congress for FY2000-FY2011. 
+
+ Notes: N/A = not applicable 
+
+a. A ful -time equivalent (FTE) position represents the amount of funding necessary to provide for a single 
+
+position for an entire year. Not all positions (new, temporary, and part-time) are fully funded for the entire 
+
+year. New positions, for example, are often partially funded, as such positions are filled incrementally and at 
+
+some point during the fiscal year. Hence, they do not require ful funding for the first year. 
+
+ 
+18 These staffing amounts do not reflect FTE positions provided for law enforcement availability pay (LEAP), overtime 
+pay, or FTE positions funded with reimbursable resources. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 6 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+b. For FY1999, an appropriation of $541.6 million was provided in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
+
+Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 (P.L. 105-277). This amount, however, does not reflect $14.5 
+
+million in Y2K emergency funding that was transferred to ATF for FY1999. 
+
+c. For FY2000, an appropriation of $566.0 million was provided in the Treasury and General Government Act, 
+
+2000 (P.L. 106-58). This amount, however, does not reflect a transfer of $40.9 million from the Violent 
+
+Crime Reduction Trust Fund, nor the effect of a $1.2 million rescission under the Consolidated 
+
+Appropriations Act, 2000 (P.L. 106-113). 
+
+d. For FY2001, an appropriation of $768.7 million was provided in the FY2001Omnibus Appropriations Act 
+
+(P.L. 106-554), $4.1 million in the FY2001 Transportation Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-346), and a 
+
+rescission of $1.7 million under P.L. 106-554. 
+
+e. For FY2002, an appropriation of $823.3 million was provided in the FY2002 Treasury Appropriations Act 
+
+(P.L. 107-67) and $31.4 million in the FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-117). 
+
+f. 
+
+For FY2003, an appropriation of $886.4 million was provided in the Consolidated Appropriations 
+
+Resolution, 2003 (P.L. 108-7). Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), however, most of 
+
+ATF was transferred to DOJ. Reflecting that transfer and the fact that part of ATF remained at Department 
+
+of the Treasury as the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB), the FY2003 appropriation for 
+
+ATF was $826.8 million, according to DOJ budget documents. 
+
+g. For FY2004, an appropriation of $836.1 million was provided by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 
+
+(P.L. 108-199). House Appropriations Committee tables showed the FY2004 ATF appropriation as $827.3 
+
+million (H.Rept. 108-576. p. 154). 
+
+h. The decrease of 376 FTE positions and 369 permanent positions for FY2004, as compared with FY2003, 
+
+reflects TTB funding and staffing that remained at Treasury. 
+
+i. 
+
+For FY2005, an appropriation of $886.4 million was provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 
+
+(P.L. 108-447). With rescissions, this amount was reduced to $878.5 million. Congress also provided ATF 
+
+with $4.0 million in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on 
+
+Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005 (P.L. 109-13). 
+
+j. 
+
+For FY2006, an appropriation of $911.8 million was provided in the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and 
+
+Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-108). Congress also provided ATF with $20 million in 
+
+the Department of Defense Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of 
+
+Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act (P.L. 109-148) and $4 million in the Emergency Supplemental 
+
+Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery (P.L. 109-234). 
+
+k. For FY2007, an appropriation of $984.1 million was provided in the Continuing Resolution Act, 2007 (P.L. 
+
+110-5). Congress also provided ATF with a supplemental of $4.0 million in the Troop Readiness, Veterans’ 
+
+Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-28). 
+
+l. 
+
+For FY2008, appropriations of $984.1 million for salaries and expenses and $23.5 million for construction 
+
+were provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161). Congress also provided ATF 
+
+with $4.0 million in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252). 
+
+m. The decrease of 173 FTE positions and 172 permanent positions for FY2008, as compared with FY2007, 
+
+reflects adjustments to base and other technical adjustments to the ATF budget that were made to 
+
+eliminate “hollow” or “unfunded” positions. 
+
+n. For FY2009, an appropriation of $1.054 billion was provided in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 
+
+111-8). Congress also provided ATF with $24.0 million in supplemental appropriations, of which $10.0 
+
+million was provided under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-5) and $14.0 
+
+million under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32). 
+
+o. For FY2010, under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117), Congress provided ATF with 
+
+$1.021 billion. This amount included $6 million for construction. This amount does not reflect the $37.5 
+
+million (53 FTE, and 105 positions) provided under the FY2010 border security emergency supplemental 
+
+appropriation (P.L. 111-230). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 7 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+The FY2010 appropriation funds 5,101 permanent positions, including 2,485 special agents 
+(SAs), 834 industry operations investigators (IOIs, formerly inspectors) and investigative research 
+specialists (IRIs), and 1,782 “other” positions.19 In addition, as has been the case in recent years, 
+55 ATF permanent positions (54 SAs and one other position) are to be funded through 
+reimbursable resources.20 
+
+ Regulatory Backlogs 
+
+On March 4, 2010, the House CJS Appropriations Subcommittee held a hearing on the 
+Administration’s FY2011 ATF budget request.21 As in past hearings, the subcommittee chair, 
+Representative Alan Mollohan, observed that the request did not include any additional positions 
+dedicated to regulation writers, despite a regulatory backlog.22 He observed that 15 of 16 ATF 
+positions previously associated with such duties had remained at Treasury, following ATF’s 
+transfer to DOJ in January 2003.23 (With the exception of two positions, those positions have not 
+been backfilled.) If ATF previously needed anywhere near 16 positions for such purposes, 
+Representative Mollohan asked rhetorically, was not the ATF request “woefully inadequate?”24 
+ATF Deputy Director Kenneth Melson25 did not comment on the regulatory backlog, but 
+conceded that the agency needed additional “regulation writers.”26 
+
+ 
+19 U.S. Department of Justice, ATF Congressional Budget Submission, Fiscal Year 2011 , Exhibit I—Detail of 
+Permanent Positions by Category. 
+20 Ibid. 
+21 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related 
+Agencies, Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
+Firearms, and Explosives , 111th Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 2010 (CQ Congressional Transcripts). 
+22 In the conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, conferees expressed their 
+concern generally with regulatory backlogs at DOJ agencies, and particularly at the ATF. Conferees noted, “While 
+ATF and other relevant bureaus hold primary responsibility for getting their regulations drafted, reviewed and disposed 
+of in a timely manner, the Department also plays a significant role, and lengthy delays in the Department’s 
+consideration of proposed regulations are contributing to the larger timeliness problem.” With regard to reducing 
+regulatory backlogs, conference report language directs DOJ to report within 120 days of enactment (April 16, 2010) to 
+the Appropriations Committees on recommended process reforms and resource investments. (H.Rept. 111-366, p. 659.) 
+23 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related 
+Agencies, Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
+Firearms, and Explosives , 111th Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 2010 (CQ Congressional Transcripts). 
+24 Ibid. 
+
+ 
+
+25 Section 504 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177; March 9, 2006; 
+120 Stat. 247) requires the ATF Director to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
+The position of ATF Director, however, has not been filled permanently since August 2006, after ATF Director Carl J. 
+Truscott resigned due to preliminary findings by the DOJ OIG that he had engaged in questionable expenditures and 
+management practices while serving as ATF Director. In September 2006, President George W. Bush appointed the 
+U.S. Attorney for the District of Boston, Michael J. Sullivan, acting ATF Director. Sullivan served in both posts 
+concurrently. In February 2008, his confirmation as ATF Director was blocked in the Senate, when several Senators 
+voiced their concern about ATF’s “overly aggressive” enforcement of gun laws and the nominee’s views on such 
+matters. Sullivan resigned as acting ATF Director on January 20, 2009. Ronnie Carter served as acting Director until 
+April 2009, when Kenneth Melson was appointed acting Director. In November 2009, Melson was appointed acting 
+Deputy Director, because the 210-day statutory limit on the acting Director’s tenure had expired. On November 17, 
+2010, the Obama Administration nominated Andrew Traver, the ATF Special Agent in Charge in Chicago, to be ATF 
+Director. Because the Senate did not act on this nomination in the 111th Congress, Traver was renominated by the 
+Administration on January 5, 2010. See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Oversight and 
+Review Division, Report of Investigation Concerning Alleged Mismanagement and Misconduct by Carl J. Truscott , 
+ Former Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (October 2006). Jonathan Saltzman, 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 8 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+With regard to the regulatory backlog, it is significant to note that, in most cases, ATF IOIs serve 
+as the “subject area experts,” who are usually tasked with drafting regulations. ATF’s capabilities 
+to regulate U.S. firearms and explosives commerce adequately and deter the illegal use of these 
+commodities is undergirded by its ability to promulgate clear and concise regulations. Although 
+most of the ATF subject area experts on alcohol and tobacco remained with the Department of 
+Treasury’s Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB), ATF is still responsible for the 
+bulk of enforcement of criminal statutes related to these commodities. Other issues raised by 
+subcommittee members included the scope of gun trafficking on the Southwest border, the 
+effectiveness of violent crime impact teams, and inter-agency coordination on gang violence. 
+These issues are discussed below. 
+
+ Firearms Budget Program 
+
+ATF’s firearms budget program funds activities related to administering and enforcing federal 
+laws related to the manufacture, importation, and distribution of firearms. The principal focus of 
+ATF’s firearms-related activities, however, is the reduction of firearms-related violence. As part 
+of this focus, the ATF has dedicated increased resources in recent years toward investigating the 
+criminal activities of violent street gangs, ensuring that federally licensed gun dealers comply 
+with the law, and suppressing gun trafficking. ATF’s authority to regulate firearms commerce in 
+the United States is derived generally from three statutes: (1) the National Firearms Act of 1934 
+(NFA),27 (2) the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA),28 and (3) the Arms Export Control Act of 
+1976.29 The proposed FY2011 firearms program allocation accompanying the Administration’s 
+budget request is $837.4 million, or 72% of the FY2011 budget request ($1.163 billion). The 
+proposed allocation includes an increase of $12.7 million over base ($11.8 million for Project 
+Gunrunner and $854 thousand for Emergency Support Function #13). 
+
+ Violent Crime and Gangs 
+
+As a full partner in the President’s Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), which was initiated in 
+FY2001, ATF has joined with DOJ attorneys and other federal law enforcement agencies, along 
+with state, local, and tribal authorities, to investigate and prosecute offenders, with a particular 
+focus on armed violent and career criminals. ATF also leads the Attorney General’s Violent Crime 
+Impact Teams (VCITs) in 31 cities30 in an effort to reduce the number of homicides and other 
+
+ 
+
+(...continued) 
+
+“Sullivan ATF Confirmation Blocked; La. Senator Objects to Gun-License Stance,” Boston Globe , February 14, 2008, 
+p. B1. Jonathan Saltzman, “US Attorney To Resign Sooner Than Expected: List of Finalists for Post Not Yet Sent To 
+Obama,” Boston Globe , April 16, 2009, p. 2. Andrew Ramanos, “Senate Returns ATF Nomination to White House,” 
+ Main Justice: Politics, Policy and the Law , December 23, 2010. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
+“Presidential Nominations Sent to the Senate,” January 5, 2011. 
+26 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related 
+Agencies, Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
+Firearms, and Explosives , 111th Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 2010 (CQ Congressional Transcripts). 
+27 P.L. 73-474; June 26, 1934; 48 Stat. 1236, codified, as amended, at 26 U.S.C., Chapter 53, § 5801 et seq . 
+28 P.L. 90-618; October 22, 1968; 82 Stat. 1213; codified, as amended, at 18 U.S.C., Chapter 44, § 921 et seq . 
+29 P.L. 94-329, June 30, 1976; 90 Stat. 729; codified, as amended, at 22 U.S.C. § 2778 et seq . 
+30 Those cities are Albuquerque, NM; Atlanta, GA; Baltimore, MD; Baton Rouge and New Orleans, LA; Birmingham, 
+AL; Camden, NJ; Columbus, OH; Fresno, Los Angeles, and San Bernardino, CA; Greensboro, NC; Hartford, CT; 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 9 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+violent crimes committed with firearms.31 According to ATF, the VCITs assist state and local 
+authorities by 
+
+• systematically investigating all firearms-related leads; 
+• responding to all street recoveries of firearms and interviewing those involved to 
+
+determine the source of the firearms; 
+
+• targeting and investigating violent and career criminals, and removing them from 
+
+the streets; 
+
+• infiltrating criminal groups through undercover operations and confidential 
+
+informants; 
+
+• tracing all recovered guns used in crime to determine their origin; 
+• imaging and storing all ballistic evidence in the National Integrated Ballistic 
+
+Information Network (NIBIN); and 
+
+• inspecting and, when appropriate, investigating corrupt federal firearms 
+
+licensees.32 
+
+Under the VCIT initiative, defendants referred by ATF for prosecution in gang-related 
+investigations have increased from 403 in FY2000 to 4,381 in FY2007, nearly a tenfold 
+increase.33 In FY2008, ATF referred over 4,100 gang members and their associates for 
+prosecution.34 For FY2010, Congress provided ATF with a $10 million increase to expand VCITs. 
+
+During the March 4, 2010, CJS appropriations hearing, Representative Frank Wolfe questioned 
+ATF Deputy Director Melson about how the FBI and ATF divided their anti-gang 
+responsibilities.35 Melson responded that, when operating in the same city, the two agencies 
+usually divide their respective operational areas geographically, so that an ATF-led VCIT would 
+work one high-crime area and an FBI-led Safe Streets Task Force would work another.36 
+Representative Wolfe also asked about ATF’s presence at the FBI-led National Gang Intelligence 
+Center (NGIC).37 Melson responded that ATF has a presence at NGIC, as well as at the DOJ-led 
+National Gang Targeting Enforcement and Coordination Center (GangTECC), and that ATF and 
+
+ 
+
+(...continued) 
+
+Houston and Laredo, TX; Las Vegas, NV; Miami, Orlando, and Tampa, FL; Milwaukee, WI; Minneapolis, MN; 
+Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, PA; Richmond, VA; Mesa and Tucson, AZ; San Juan, PR; Tulsa, OK; Memphis and 
+Nashville, TN; and Jackson, MS. 
+31 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, “ATF Fact Sheet: Violent Crime Impact 
+Teams Initiative,” March 2010. 
+32 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Congressional Budget 
+Submission, Fiscal Year 2007 (February 2006), p. 47. 
+33 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives , ATF Congressional Budget 
+Submission, Fiscal Year 2009 (February 2008), p. 22. 
+34 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Congressional Budget 
+Submission, Fiscal Year 2011 (February 2010), p. 9. 
+35 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related 
+Agencies, Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
+Firearms, and Explosives , 111th Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 2010 (CQ Congressional Transcripts). 
+36 Ibid. 
+37 Ibid. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 10 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+its partner agencies were satisfied that the center was a success.38 It is noteworthy that FY2010 
+conference report language accompanying the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act directs 
+ATF to coordinate with the FBI and other DOJ entities on efforts to maximize the effectiveness of 
+anti-gang efforts and to report back to the Appropriations Committees within 120 days (April 16, 
+2010).39 ATF indicated that the report’s target release date was May 16, 2010.40 Also, for FY2008, 
+Congress appropriated $373,000 for ATF to assign two positions to GangTECC. This program 
+increase was incorporated into ATF’s base budgets for FY2009, FY2010, and the FY2011 request. 
+
+ Compliance Inspections of Licensed Gun Dealers 
+
+ATF inspects federal firearms licensees (FFLs) to monitor their compliance with the GCA and to 
+prevent the diversion of firearms from legal to illegal channels of commerce. In the past, despite 
+its crime-fighting mission, ATF’s business relationships with the firearms industry and larger gun-
+owning community have been a perennial source of tension, which from time to time has been the 
+subject of congressional oversight.41 Nevertheless, under current law, ATF Special Agents (SAs) 
+and Industry Operations Investigators (IOIs) are authorized to inspect or examine the inventory 
+and records of an FFL without search warrants under three scenarios:42 
+
+• in the course of a reasonable inquiry during the course of a criminal investigation 
+
+of a person or persons other than the FFL; 
+
+• to ensure compliance with the record keeping requirements of the GCA—not 
+
+more than once during any 12-month period, or at any time with respect to 
+records relating to a firearm involved in a criminal investigation that is traced to 
+the licensee; or 
+
+• when such an inspection or examination is required for determining the 
+
+disposition of one or more firearms in the course of a criminal investigation. 
+
+By inspecting the firearms transfer records that FFLs are required by law to maintain, ATF 
+investigators are able to trace crime guns from their domestic manufacturer or importer to the first 
+retail dealer that sold those firearms to persons in the general public, generating leads in homicide 
+
+ 
+38 Ibid. Also, for more information on the NGIC and GangTECC, see U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector 
+General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, A Review of the Department’s Anti-Gang Intelligence and Coordination 
+Centers , Report Number I-2010-001, November 2009. 
+39 H.Rept. 111-366, p. 670. 
+40 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Congressional Budget 
+Submission, Fiscal Year 2011 (February 2010), Exhibit M – Status of Congressionally Requested Studies, Reports, and 
+Evaluations. 
+41 For example, in the 109th Congress, the House Judiciary Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security Subcommittee 
+held two oversight hearings examining ATF firearms enforcement operations at gun shows in Richmond, VA, in 2005. 
+ATF agents reportedly provided state and local law enforcement officers with confidential information from 
+background check forms (ATF Form 4473s), so that those officers could perform residency checks on persons who had 
+otherwise legally purchased firearms at those gun shows. Questions were also raised as to whether ATF agents had 
+profiled gun purchasers at those gun shows on the basis of race, ethnicity, and gender. See U.S. Congress, House of 
+Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Oversight 
+Hearing on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE) Parts I & II: Gun Show Enforcement , 
+February 15 and 28, 2006. Also see Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The Bureau of Alcohol, 
+Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ Investigative Operations at Gun Shows , Report Number I-2007-007, June 2007. 
+42 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(B). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 11 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+and other criminal investigations.43 In addition, by inspecting those records, ATF investigators are 
+often able to uncover evidence of corrupt FFLs transferring firearms “off the books,” straw 
+purchases,44 and other patterns of suspicious behavior. 
+
+In July 2004, the DOJ Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported on ATF inspections of FFLs. 
+Among other things, the OIG reported that ATF inspected the operations of 4.5% of the 104,000 
+FFLs in FY2002.45 Since then, according to ATF, 10,106 firearms compliance inspections were 
+conducted in FY2007, covering about 9.3% of the nearly 109,000 FFLs in that fiscal year;46 
+11,169 in FY2008, covering nearly 10% of the 111,600 FFLs; and 11,375 compliance in FY2009, 
+covering nearly 10% of the 115,101 FFLs.47 Notwithstanding progress, at a March 2010 CJS 
+Appropriations Subcommittee hearing, ATF Deputy Director Melson testified that many FFLs are 
+not inspected for five years or more because of a lack of ATF personnel.48 
+
+ Southwest Border Gun Trafficking49 
+
+On the Southwest border with Mexico, firearms violence has reportedly spiked in recent years as 
+drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have competed for control of key smuggling corridors into 
+the United States.50 Beginning in December 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón responded 
+by deploying elements of the Mexican Army and federal police to trouble spots around Mexico, 
+including on the northern frontier.51 The DTOs and other criminals, however, are reportedly 
+buying semiautomatic versions of AK-47 and AR-15-style assault rifles, other military style 
+firearms, and .50 caliber sniper rifles in the United States.52 With those rifles and other small 
+arms, the DTOs are reportedly achieving parity in terms of firepower in shootouts with the 
+
+ 
+43 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, “ATF Fact Sheet: ATF’s National Tracing 
+Center,” March 2010. 
+44 A “straw purchase” occurs when a person, who is otherwise eligible to purchase a firearm, purchases a firearm from 
+a federally licensed dealer for another person, who is either prohibited from possessing a firearm or does not want a 
+paper trail linking him to the purchased firearm. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), it is illegal to a make a false statement to 
+a federally licensed firearms dealer. Both the dealer and the buyer are required to fill out an ATF Form 4473, on which 
+the buyer (transferee) attests to the dealer (transferor) that he is buying the firearm for himself and that he is not 
+otherwise prohibited from possessing a firearm. Knowingly making a false statement on a ATF Form 4473 is 
+punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) by a fine or imprisonment for 10 years or both. 
+45 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Inspections of Firearms Dealers by the Bureau of 
+Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives , Report Number I-2004-005, (July 2004), p. xi. 
+46 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Congressional Budget 
+Submission, Fiscal Year 2008 , (February 2007), p. 29. 
+47 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Congressional Budget 
+Submission, Fiscal Year 2010 , May 2009, p. 5. 
+48 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related 
+Agencies, Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
+Firearms, and Explosives , 111th Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 2010 (CQ Congressional Transcripts). 
+49 For further information, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border , by Vivian S. Chu and 
+William J. Krouse. 
+50 For further information, see CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring 
+Spillover Violence , coordinated by Kristin M. Finklea. 
+51 Ibid. 
+52 Sara Miller Llana, “US Guns Arm Mexico’s Drug Wars,” Christian Science Monitor , July 19, 2007, p. 1. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 12 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+Mexican Army and law enforcement.53 In March 2008, President Calderón called upon the United 
+States to increase its efforts to suppress the flow of illegal U.S. firearms into Mexico.54 
+
+ATF reports that there are 6,647 FFLs in the United States operating in the Southwest border 
+region of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California.55 Moreover, ATF reports that DTOs are 
+increasingly using surrogates (straw purchasers) in the United States to buy 10 to 20 military-
+style firearms at a time from FFLs. These firearms are reportedly routinely smuggled into Mexico 
+in smaller shipments of four or five firearms as part of a process known as the “ant run.”56 
+
+ Project Gunrunner 
+
+For FY2006, ATF dedicated 84 SAs and 15 IOIs to a Southwest border initiative known as 
+“Project Gunrunner” to disrupt the illegal flow of guns from the United States to Mexico.57 For 
+FY2007, ATF increased those numbers to 103 SAs and 36 IOIs for this effort.58 Those agents 
+investigated 187 firearms trafficking cases and recommended 465 defendants for prosecution.59 
+By the end of FY2008, ATF had deployed 148 SAs and 47 IOIs to the Southwest border to bolster 
+Project Gunrunner60 at an estimated cost of $32.2 million.61 According to the DOJ Office of 
+Inspector General, ATF has established five main objectives for Project Gunrunner: 
+
+• investigate individuals responsible for illicit firearms trafficking along the 
+
+Southwest border; 
+
+• coordinate with U.S. and Mexican law enforcement along the border in firearms 
+
+cases and violent crime; 
+
+• train U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials to identify firearms traffickers; 
+• provide outreach education to gun dealers; and 
+• trace all firearms to identify firearms traffickers, trends, and patterns, and 
+
+networks.62 
+
+The ATF FY2009 budget request was $1.028 billion, including $948,000 to fund 12 industry 
+operations investigator positions to bolster efforts already underway as part of Project 
+
+ 
+53 Oscar Becera, “Firing Line—Tracking Mexico’s Illegal Weapons,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , April 28, 2008. 
+54 Ibid. 
+55 ATF briefing provided to CRS on May 5, 2008. 
+56 Oscar Becera, “Firing Line—Tracking Mexico’s Illegal Weapons,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , April 28, 2008. 
+57 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, Review of ATF’s 
+Project Gunrunner , I-2011-001, November 2010, p. 6. 
+58 Ibid. 
+59 Statement of William Hoover, Assistant Director for Field Operations, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
+Explosives, before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
+Representatives, concerning “U.S. Obligations under the Mérida Initiative,” February 7, 2008. 
+60 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, Review of ATF’s 
+Project Gunrunner , I-2011-001, November 2010, p. 6. 
+61 CRS conversations with Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Office of Legislative Affairs, May 
+14, 2008. 
+62 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Interim Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner , Report 
+Number I-2009-006, September 2009, p. 3. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 13 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+Gunrunner.63 This was the only program increase/budget enhancement in the ATF FY2009 budget 
+request. As described above, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 111-8) included $1.054 
+billion for ATF, including an increase of not less than $5.9 million for Project Gunrunner.64 Also, 
+to ramp up Project Gunrunner, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) 
+included $10 million for ATF and $30 million to assist state and local law enforcement with 
+counter-narcotics efforts. In addition, the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32), 
+included $6 million for Project Gunrunner. As a result, Congress provided a total of $21.9 million 
+in increasing funding for Project Gunrunner for FY2009.65 In congressional testimony, ATF 
+Deputy Director Kenneth Melson summed up the results of Project Gunrunner: 
+
+Between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2009, ATF has had [a] significant impact on the 
+trafficking in Southwest Border States. ATF has recommended 984 cases involving 2,034 
+defendants for prosecution. To date, 1,397 defendants have been arrested, 1,303 defendants 
+have been indicted, 850 defendants have been convicted, and 636 defendants have been 
+sentenced to an average of 86 months incarceration. Three-hundred and seven of the cases 
+and 881 of the defendants recommended for prosecution involve gang related offenses. Four 
+hundred and ninety-seven cases have [been] charged [with] violations related to trafficking 
+of an estimated 14,923 firearms. One hundred and fifty-nine of these cases involved gang-
+related trafficking of over 3,665 firearms. In all investigations, over 6,688 firearms have been 
+seized and are no longer available to violent criminals and gang members.66 
+
+The ATF FY2010 budget request was $1.121 billion for ATF, including a proposed increase of 
+$17.9 million and 92 permanent positions (including 34 SAs) to support Project Gunrunner.67 
+Congress matched this request in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3288), 
+including the $17.9 million for Project Gunrunner.68 According to the House Committee, this 
+increase would bring total funding for Southwest border firearms trafficking efforts to $59.9 
+million. This amount includes one-time stimulus funding of $10 million provided in the American 
+Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5).69 By comparison, Senate report language 
+noted that this increase would bring total Project Gunrunner funding to over $61 million. By mid-
+
+ 
+63 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Congressional Budget 
+Submission, Fiscal Year 2009 (February 2008), Exhibit C—Program Increases/Offsets by Decision Unit. 
+64 House reported language accompanying the FY2009 CJS appropriations bill indicated that the House bill (H.R. 7322; 
+H.Rept. 110-919) would have provided $5 million for Project Gunrunner. Corresponding report language 
+accompanying a Senate bill (S. 3182; S.Rept. 110-397) was silent as to whether such an increase would be provided 
+under that bill. The Senate, however, had included $15 million for Project Gunrunner in the FY2008 supplemental 
+appropriations bill (H.R. 2642), but that funding was not included in the enacted appropriation (P.L. 110-252). 
+65 According to DOJ, ATF allocated 187 SAs, 142 IOIs, and 25 other positions for FY2009. See U.S. Department of 
+Justice, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner , I-2011-
+001, November 2010, p. 6. 
+66 Statement of Kenneth E. Melson, Deputy Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, before the 
+House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, on the Fiscal 
+Year 2011 Appropriations, March 4, 2011. 
+67 U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, FY2010 Budget and Performance Summary (May 2009), 
+p. 139. Available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2010summary/. 
+68 The House-reported FY2010 CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 2847; H.Rept. 111-149) would have provided ATF with 
+$1.106 billion, including the requested $17.9 million for Project Gunrunner. The Senate-reported version of this bill 
+(H.R. 2847; S.Rept. 111-34) would have provided ATF with the same amount as requested by the Administration 
+($1.121 billion), including the $17.9 million increase for Project Gunrunner. 
+69 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related 
+Agencies, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2010 , to accompany H.R. 2847, 
+111th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2009, H.Rept. 111-149, p. 66. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 14 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+February 2010, ATF reported that it had deployed approximately 190 SAs, 145 IOIs, and 25 
+support staff to Project Gunrunner in the four contiguous border states.70 DOJ reported that the 
+final FY2010 allocation for Project Gunrunner included 224 SAs, 165 IOIs, and 32 other 
+positions.71 
+
+The ATF FY2011 budget request included $1.163 billion, including $11.8 million to annualize the 
+37 positions (21 SAs) previously funded under the ARRA (P.L. 111-5). During a March 2010 CJS 
+appropriations hearing, Representative Mollohan questioned ATF Deputy Director Melson about 
+emerging gun trafficking patterns and ATF initiatives, like Project Gunrunner, undertaken to 
+respond to related criminal activity.72 Melson observed that while firearms were being illegally 
+trafficked principally from Southwest border states into Mexico, they were also being trafficked 
+from other states within the interior of the United States.73 Representative Mollohan noted that, 
+despite the apparent success of ATF’s efforts, the request did not include any additional positions 
+to bolster ongoing efforts to address illegal gun trafficking.74 As described above, Congress 
+provided ATF with $37.5 million in supplemental appropriations for FY2010 (P.L. 111-230) for 
+Project Gunrunner, as requested by the Administration. 
+
+ Electronic Trace Submission System 
+
+ATF maintains a foreign attaché in Mexico City to administer an Electronic Trace Submission 
+System (ETSS), also known as the eTrace program, for Mexican law enforcement authorities. 
+From FY2005 through FY2007, ATF traced just over 11,700 firearms recovered by Mexican 
+authorities, and approximately 90% of those firearms were either manufactured in, or imported 
+into, the United States.75 Caution should be exercised when drawing conclusions from ATF 
+firearm trace data, however. Although it is valid to say that 90% of traced firearms originated in 
+the United States, it would be incorrect to conclude that 90% of all guns used in crime in Mexico 
+originated in the United States. Although crime gun trace data are useful measurements of crime 
+gun trends, in most cases the issues of consistent, random, and unbiased data collection have not 
+been adequately addressed through comprehensive tracing and other controls. Hence, it is often 
+not possible to test for statistical significance.76 Nevertheless, even though a statistically valid 
+
+ 
+70 Statement of Kenneth E. Melson, Deputy Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, before the 
+House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, Fiscal Year 
+2011 Appropriations , March 4, 2011. 
+71 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, Review of ATF’s 
+Project Gunrunner , I-2011-001, November 2010, p. 6. 
+72 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related 
+Agencies, Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
+Firearms, and Explosives , 111th Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 2010 (CQ Congressional Transcripts). 
+73 Ibid. 
+74 Ibid. 
+75 ATF briefing provided to CRS on May 5, 2008. 
+76 With regard to the limitations of firearms trace data, Congress has included a general provision in the annual CJS 
+appropriations act for the last several years that prohibits ATF from releasing “tracing studies” without adequate 
+disclaimers that make it clear that broad conclusions about firearms-related crime cannot be made from such data, 
+because: “(1) Firearm traces are designed to assist law enforcement authorities conducting investigations by tracking 
+the sale and possession of specific firearms. Law enforcement agencies may request firearms traces for any reason, and 
+those reasons are not necessarily reported to the Federal Government. Not all firearms used in crime are traced and not 
+all firearms traced are used in crime. (2) Firearms selected for tracing are not chosen for purposes of determining which 
+types, makes, or models of firearms are used for illicit purposes. The firearms selected do not constitute a random 
+sample and should not be considered representative of the larger universe. Firearms are normally traced to the first 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 15 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+percentage estimate of U.S.-sourced firearms used in crime in Mexico cannot be made based on 
+trace data, criminal investigations have documented that there is great demand for certain 
+firearms that are available in normal (non-military) commercial channels in the United States and 
+that those firearms have been illegally trafficked to Mexico in large numbers. 
+
+Moreover, successful firearm traces are instrumental in developing investigative leads in 
+homicide and gun trafficking cases. According to ATF, some of those cases uncover corrupt FFLs 
+who were involved in larger criminal conspiracies to smuggle firearms into Mexico.77 In January 
+2008, ATF announced that e-Trace technology would be deployed to an additional nine U.S. 
+consulates in Mexico (Mérida, Juarez, Monterrey, Nogales, Hermosillo, Guadalajara, Tijuana, 
+Matamoros, and Nuevo Laredo).78 The number of traces performed by ATF for Mexican 
+authorities during FY2008 increased markedly. For FY2008, preliminary data showed that ATF 
+had traced 7,743 firearms recovered by Mexican authorities, as compared with the 11,700 
+firearms traced over a three-year period, FY2005-FY2007.79 Of those firearms, 63.5% were 
+determined to have been manufactured in the United States and 29.5% were determined to have 
+been manufactured abroad, but imported into the United States.80 Consequently, 93% of firearms 
+traced by ATF during FY2008 for Mexican authorities were either made in, or imported to, the 
+United States.81 
+
+In March 2010, ATF released eTrace 4.0, a Spanish language version of the software, to Mexico, 
+Guatemala, and Costa Rica.82 ATF anticipates that trace requests from these countries will 
+increase markedly in FY2010 and FY2011 with this new software.83 Also, as part of the National 
+Integrated Ballistic Imaging Network (NIBIN) program, ATF is currently establishing a U.S.-
+Mexico ballistic information exchange capability that will allow firearms technicians to acquire 
+and compare digital images of markings left on fired bullets and cartridges either gathered in test-
+firings or recovered at crime scenes.84 Canada already participates in ATF’s NIBIN program. 
+
+ DOJ OIG Report, Mexican Trace Data, and Multiple Long Gun Sales 
+
+In November 2010, the OIG released another review of Project Gunrunner, in which updated 
+Mexican firearms trace data were reported.85 According to the new data, ATF traced 64,510 
+
+ 
+
+(...continued) 
+
+retail seller, and sources reported for firearms do not necessarily represent the sources and methods by which firearms 
+in general are acquired for use in crime.” For FY2010, see §516 of P.L. 111-117; December 16, 2009; 123 Stat. 3151-
+3152. 
+77 ATF briefing provided to CRS on May 5, 2008. 
+78 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Office of Public Affairs, “ATF Expands Efforts to Combat 
+Illegal Flow of Firearms to Mexico,” January 16, 2008. 
+79 ATF briefing provided to CRS on April 16, 2009. 
+80 Ibid. 
+81 Ibid. 
+82 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related 
+Agencies, Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
+Firearms, and Explosives , 111th Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 2010 (CQ Congressional Transcripts). 
+83 Ibid. 
+84 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Congressional Budget 
+Submission, Fiscal Year 2011 (February 2010), p. 60. 
+85 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, Review of ATF’s 
+ (continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 16 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+firearms for Mexican authorities that were reportedly seized during FY2006-FY2009.86 For 
+firearms traced between December 1, 2006, and December 31, 2009, and sold for the first time, 
+OIG analysis showed that those firearms included 973 rifles (77%) and 279 handguns (23%).87 It 
+also indicated that traced long guns had a shorter time-to-crime interval than handguns.88 In 
+addition, the OIG reported that evidence suggests that Mexican DTOs are obtaining long guns in 
+multiple sales. As a consequence, the OIG recommended among other things that ATF ought to 
+work with DOJ to explore options for seeking a requirement for reporting multiple long gun 
+sales.89 
+
+On December 17, 2010, DOJ and ATF published an emergency regulation that proposed requiring 
+multiple long gun sales reports from FFLs whenever they dispose of two or more semiautomatic 
+long guns of greater than .22 caliber within five business days.90 On December 20, 2010, ATF 
+issued a press release in which acting ATF Director Ken Melson indicated that ATF was 
+proposing this requirement administratively under its demand letter authority found at 18 U.S.C. 
+§ 923(g)(5)(A), and that the emergency rule would only be implemented in the four Southwest 
+border states.91 However, in response to the OIG’s recommendation, Melson had previously 
+responded that a multiple long gun sales reporting requirement could be beyond ATF’s or DOJ’s 
+statutory authority under current law.92 
+
+ Related Legislation in the 110th and 111th Congresses 
+
+In the 110th Congress, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported the Mérida Initiative to 
+Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce Organized Crime Authorization Act of 2008 (H.R. 6028; 
+H.Rept. 110-673) on May 14, 2008.93 This bill would have authorized to be appropriated over 
+three years, for FY2008 through FY2010, a total of $73.5 million to increase the number of ATF 
+positions dedicated to Project Gunrunner ($45 million) and assign ATF agents to Mexico ($28.5 
+million). The House passed this bill on June 10, 2008, by a roll call vote: 311 to 106 (Roll no. 
+393). Similar authorizations were included in the Southwest Border Violence Reduction Act of 
+2008 (S. 2867, H.R. 5863, and H.R. 5869). In the 111th Congress, similar bills were introduced (S. 
+205, H.R. 495, H.R. 1448, and H.R. 1867). The three-year Mérida Initiative expired at the end of 
+FY2010. In recent talks, Mexican and U.S. officials have agreed to refocus and continue the 
+initiative, however.94 
+
+ 
+
+(...continued) 
+
+ Project Gunrunner , 1-2011-001, November 2010. 
+86 Ibid., p. 25. 
+87 Ibid., p. 38. 
+88 Ibid. 
+89 Ibid., p. 40. 
+90 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “60-Day Emergency Notice of Information Collection Under 
+Review: Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Rifles,” 75 Federal Register 79021, December 17, 
+2010. 
+91 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, Review of ATF’s 
+Project Gunrunner , 1-2011-001, November 2010, p. 108. 
+92 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, Review of ATF’s 
+Project Gunrunner , 1-2011-001, November 2010, p. 108. 
+93 For further information, see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and 
+Beyond , by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea. 
+94 Ibid. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 17 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+ Arson and Explosives Budget Program 
+
+ATF’s arson and explosives budget program covers activities related to administering and 
+enforcing federal laws governing the manufacture, importation, and distribution of explosives, as 
+well as investigating arson cases with a federal nexus. The federal statutory provisions regulating 
+explosives commerce in the United States were enacted under Title XI of the Organized Crime 
+Control Act of 1970 (often referred to as the Explosives Control Act of 1970).95 The Anti-Arson 
+Act of 1982 amended this act to create a federal crime of arson.96 The act was amended further by 
+the Safe Explosives Act, which was included in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.97 The 
+proposed FY2011 allocation for the ATF arson and explosives program is $302.4 million, or 
+about 26% of the FY2011 budget request ($1.163 billion). The proposed FY2011 allocation 
+includes a program increase of $320,000 for Emergency Support Function #13. 
+
+Among law enforcement agencies, the ATF is recognized for its investigative expertise in 
+responding to both arson and explosive incidents. The Attorney General (AG), for example, made 
+the ATF responsible for maintaining a consolidated database of all arson and explosive incidents 
+that occur in the United States. Reportedly, as part of the department’s law enforcement 
+information-sharing program, this and other databases are to be linked and made Web-accessible, 
+and first responders anywhere in the United States are to have access to critical information about 
+arson and explosive cases nationwide.98 Nevertheless, as described below, both ATF and the FBI 
+share concurrent jurisdiction over federal criminal investigations involving explosives, and both 
+bureaus have maintained separate databases on explosives incidents. At times, this shared 
+jurisdiction appears to have resulted in an inter-agency rivalry. 
+
+ Safe Explosives Act 
+
+Under the Safe Explosives Act,99 Congress made ATF responsible for more closely regulating the 
+U.S. explosives industry. This act made ATF responsible for fully investigating all explosive 
+thefts and losses, as well as providing background checks for licensees and permittees to prevent 
+prohibited persons from acquiring explosives. In FY2008, ATF completed 68,645 explosives 
+employee/possessor background checks and 3,231 responsible persons background checks. The 
+act also requires ATF to inspect explosive licensees and permittees every three years to ensure 
+that all explosive materials are properly stored and accounted for. ATF reports that there are about 
+12,000 licensees and permittees nationwide, so that to comply with the act, about 4,000 
+inspections would need to be conducted by ATF annually.100 ATF conducted 3,291 explosives 
+
+ 
+95 P.L. 91-452; October 15, 1970; 84 Stat. 952; codified, as amended, at Chapter 40, 18 U.S.C. § 841 et seq . 
+96 P.L. 97-298; October 12, 1982; 96 Stat. 1319. 
+97 P.L. 107-296; November 25, 2002; 116 Stat. 2280 (Title XI, Subtitle C of the Homeland Security Act of 2002). 
+98 The Federal Bureau of Investigation reportedly continues to maintain its own bomb data center despite the AG’s 
+memorandum. See Jerry Markon, “FBI, ATF Battle for Control of Cases: Cooperation Lags Despite Merger,” 
+ Washington Post , May 10, 2008, p. A1. 
+99 P.L. 107-296; November 25, 2002; 116 Stat. 2280 (Title XI, Subtitle C of the Homeland Security Act of 2002). 
+100 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Congressional Budget 
+Submission, Fiscal Year 2007 (February 2006), p. 53. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 18 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+compliance inspections in FY2007 (or about 28% of licensees/permittees), 3,055 in FY2008 
+(27%), and 2,640 in FY2009 (22%).101 
+
+ ATF and FBI Concurrent Jurisdiction over 
+Explosives Investigations 
+
+As described above, ATF was transferred from Treasury to DOJ in January 2003. This transfer, 
+however, did little to ameliorate the perennial source of tension between the ATF and FBI over 
+their concurrent jurisdiction over explosives. In March 2003, then Attorney General John 
+Ashcroft convened an Explosives Review Group (ERG) to develop recommendations to improve 
+coordination between the ATF and FBI. In August 2004, the Attorney General responded to the 
+ERG’s report and directed (1) the ATF and FBI to consolidate all of the DOJ’s arson and 
+explosives incidents databases into a single database; (2) that all consolidated arson and 
+explosives incident databases be maintained by the ATF; and (3) both agencies coordinate post-
+blast explosives training and explosives detection canine training.102 In response to this directive, 
+ATF established the U.S. Bomb Data Center (USBDC) as the sole repository of arson and 
+explosives related incident data.103 On the other hand, the Attorney General also directed the FBI 
+to take the lead on any terrorism-related cases (domestic and international) that involved 
+explosives, and directed ATF to take the lead on all other criminal cases involving explosives. 
+
+Notwithstanding the Attorney General’s directives, the partnership on federal explosives-related 
+investigations between the FBI and ATF continues to be marked by what has been described as an 
+acrimonious rivalry and competition for mission share and resources.104 The FBI apparently had 
+not transferred its bomb data to the ATF, arguing that such a transfer would be detrimental to the 
+FBI’s ability to conduct counterterrorism investigations.105 In response to this, the Senate 
+Judiciary Committee chair, Senator Patrick Leahy, and ranking minority member of that 
+committee, Senator Arlen Specter, wrote a letter to the then Attorney General, Michael Mukasey, 
+urging that an end be brought to this inter-agency rivalry.106 Meanwhile, FBI and ATF officials at 
+the headquarters level have maintained that their partnership produces examples of interagency 
+cooperation on a daily basis. They point to their jointly administered Terrorist Explosive Device 
+Analytical Center (TEDAC), which is based at the FBI laboratory in Quantico, VA. This center 
+was established to process and evaluate evidence from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that 
+have been recovered in Iraq and Afghanistan.107 
+
+ 
+101 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Congressional Budget 
+Submission, Fiscal Year 2011 (February 2010), p. 60. 
+102 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
+Explosives’ and Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Arson and Explosives Intelligence Databases , Audit Report 05-01, 
+October 2004, p. 34. 
+103 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “ATF Fact Sheet: U.S. Bomb Data Center,” September 
+2008. 
+104 Jerry Markon, “End FBI-ATF Rift, Senators Urge,” Washington Post , May 17, 2008, p. A03. 
+105 Ibid. 
+106 Ibid. 
+107 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Fact Sheet on Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center, revised June 15, 2009, 
+available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june09/tedac061709.html. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 19 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+In October 2009, the DOJ OIG found that ATF and FBI are not adequately coordinating 
+explosives investigations and related operations and that the two agencies have developed parallel 
+capabilities to respond to explosives incidents.108 As noted above, both agencies maintain separate 
+explosives-related databases, despite the Attorney General’s May 2004 directives. Nor have the 
+agencies coordinated post-blast explosives training and explosives detection canine training, 
+despite a directive from the Attorney General to do so. The OIG also observed that investigative 
+jurisdictional disputes, lack of information sharing, and lack of coordination between the two 
+agencies hinders DOJ’s ability to effectively respond, investigate, and prevent explosives crimes. 
+The OIG underscored that these circumstances could increase the risk that DOJ would not meet 
+the requirements set out by then President George W. Bush in Homeland Security Directive 
+(HSPD)-19, which envisions a comprehensive U.S. government strategy to mitigate the threat, 
+and prevent the use, of explosives by terrorists.109 
+
+ Alcohol and Tobacco Budget Program 
+
+The ATF alcohol and tobacco budget program covers expenses related to agency efforts to 
+counter a rising trend in the illegal diversion of tobacco products, as well as the illegal movement 
+of distilled alcohol products. The FY2010 allocation for the Alcohol and Tobacco program totals 
+$22.3 million, or about 2% of ATF’s direct appropriation ($1.115 billion) for salaries and 
+expenses, which is in line with historical budget trends (FY2004 through FY2010). The proposed 
+FY2011 allocation accompanying the Administration’s budget request is $23.3 million, or again 
+about 2% of the request ($1.163 billion). In addition, through DOJ’s asset forfeiture authority, 
+ATF also has “churning budget authority,” or the authority to obligate the proceeds of seized 
+assets to fund tobacco diversion and other long-term, complex undercover investigations.110 
+
+Notwithstanding this additional funding authority, in September 2009, the DOJ OIG issued a 
+report on ATF’s efforts to prevent tobacco diversion, which includes contraband cigarette 
+trafficking. In this report, the Inspector General found that tobacco diversion investigations, along 
+with alcohol diversion investigations, are accorded a low priority at ATF, as compared to its other 
+mission areas, such as investigating firearms- and explosives-related crime, particularly violent 
+crime, and arson.111 This low priority is partly the result of the view that tobacco diversion is 
+largely a nonviolent crime, despite its connections with terrorist financing and organized crime.112 
+Between FY2004 and FY2008, ATF conducted 645 alcohol and tobacco diversion investigations, 
+or about 1% of ATF’s investigative caseload. Of these cases, 566 investigations (88%) involved 
+tobacco and 79 (12%) involved alcohol.113 With regard to the greater number of tobacco cases 
+than alcohol cases, ATF observed that tobacco diversion is much more lucrative to criminal 
+enterprises than is alcohol, as the latter is much more difficult to transport in large quantities. 
+
+ 
+108 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, Explosives Investigation Coordination 
+Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives , Audit 
+Report 10-01, October, 2009, p. 12. 
+109 Ibid., p. 33. 
+110 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
+Explosives’ Efforts to Prevent the Diversion of Tobacco , Report Number I-2009-005, September 2009, p. 6. 
+111 Ibid., p. 35. 
+112 Ibid., p. 15. 
+113 Ibid., p. 1. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 20 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+Alcohol diversion, moreover, is also limited to certain geographic areas and generally such cases 
+today are handled by state and local authorities. 
+
+The FY2011 budget request includes a program increase of $24,000 for Emergency Support 
+Function #13. It is significant to note that the OIG reported that the FY2010 departmental budget 
+request to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) included $28.3 million for tobacco 
+diversion, but this request was denied by OMB and was not included in the ATF’s FY2010 
+congressional budget submission (request).114 
+
+ Alcohol Diversion 
+
+The federal statutes that address the diversion of distilled spirits (alcohol) are many. They include, 
+but are not limited to, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC),115 the Federal Alcohol Administration 
+(FAA) Act,116 the 21st Amendment, the Webb-Kenyon Act,117 the Federal Criminal Code,118 and 
+federal Indian laws.119 Although ATF has primary jurisdiction for illegal interstate transportation 
+of liquor and related racketeering activities, the regulatory statutes underlying those violations are 
+found in the IRC. In addition, the Department of the Treasury has primary jurisdiction over the 
+IRC, as well as the FAA and Webb-Kenyon Act. While historically ATF traces its roots back to 
+Eliot Ness and other Treasury agents who battled organized crime during the era of prohibition 
+and illegal liquor production (moonshining), since its transfer to the DOJ, ATF’s role in enforcing 
+liquor laws has been diminished, as is evident in part by its small investigative caseload. Most of 
+the ATF personnel dedicated to the regulation of alcohol and tobacco remained at Treasury within 
+the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB).120 
+
+ Tobacco Diversion 
+
+According to ATF, it has primary jurisdiction over criminal provisions related to tobacco in the 
+Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act (CCTA) of 1978.121 In May 2004, the General Accounting 
+Office (now the Government Accountability Office) reported that the illegal diversion and 
+smuggling of cigarettes in the United States results in an unknown but significant loss in tax 
+revenues.122 ATF criminal intelligence indicates that cigarette bootlegging is a lucrative criminal 
+
+ 
+114 Ibid., p. 22. 
+115 See 26 U.S.C., Chapter 51, Alcohol Excise Taxes. 
+116 See 27 U.S.C., Chapter 8, Federal Alcohol Administration Act. 
+117 The Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act of 1913 (37 Stat. 699), otherwise known as the Webb-Kenyon Act, 
+prohibits a person from receiving, possessing, selling, or in manner using, intoxicating liquor of any kind that has been 
+transported from one state into another in violation of any law of any state. See 27 U.S.C., Chapter 9. 
+118 See 18 U.S.C., Chapters 59 and 95, which are related liquor traffic and racketeering. 
+119 See 18 U.S.C., Chapter 53. 
+120 For FY2010, Congress appropriated $103 million for the TTB, of which $3 million was provided to hire, train, and 
+equip SAs and related support personnel. When ATF was transferred to DOJ, all its SAs were also transferred to DOJ 
+as part of the newly constituted ATF. Consequently, until FY2010, the TTB had no funded SA positions, with which to 
+hire criminal investigators to conduct alcohol- or tobacco-related investigations. 
+121 P.L. 95-575; November 2, 1978; 92 Stat. 2463; codified, as amended, at 18 U.S.C., Chapter 114, § 2341 et seq. The 
+Department of the Treasury, however, has primary jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provisions related 
+to excise taxes on cigarettes that have to be violated in order to trigger the criminal provisions in the CCTA. See 26 
+U.S.C., Chapter 52, Tobacco Excise Taxes. 
+122 U.S. General Accounting Office, Cigarette Smuggling: Federal Law Enforcement Efforts and Seizures Increasing , 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 21 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+venture that terrorist groups have used and would possibly use to finance their future criminal 
+activities,123 including drug and weapons trafficking, identity theft, and various types of fraud. 
+ATF has investigated Armenian, Chinese, Middle Eastern, Russian, Taiwanese, Ukrainian, and 
+Native American organized crime groups engaged in diverting large quantities of contraband and 
+counterfeit cigarettes and counterfeit tax stamps.124 These activities have become increasingly 
+lucrative as states and the federal government have raised excise taxes on cigarettes.125 According 
+to the Inspector General, transporting contraband cigarettes from low-tax states to high-tax states, 
+and reselling those cigarettes on the black market, can yield high profits: 
+
+• a car load of 10 cases can yield an estimated $18,000 to $23,000; 
+• a van load of 50 cases, an estimated $90,000 to $115,000; and 
+• a small truck load of 200 cases, an estimated $360,000 to $465,000.126 
+
+Nonetheless, the Inspector General described the ATF’s tobacco diversion efforts as “ad hoc,”127 
+and underscored that there is no systematic method within the agency to share intelligence and 
+information between field divisions.128 The Inspector General reported, moreover, that ATF 
+headquarters is not facilitating information sharing between its field agents and personnel at 
+Treasury’s TTB, which maintains a database on tobacco licensees, and had not coordinated with 
+tobacco companies, which often provide cigarettes for undercover operations.129 
+
+ Related Legislation in the 110th and 111th Congresses 
+
+The 110th and 111th Congresses considered legislation to strengthen federal laws that address 
+contraband cigarette trafficking. Representative Anthony Weiner introduced the Prevent All 
+Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act (H.R. 1676). The House Judiciary Committee reported this 
+measure (H.Rept. 111-117) on May 18, 2009, and the House passed it on May 21, 2009, by a 
+recorded vote (two-thirds required): 397-11 (Roll no. 287). Senator Herb Kohl introduced a 
+similar measure (S. 1147). The Senate Judiciary Committee amended the bill with substitute 
+language and reported it without a written report on November 11, 2009. It was passed by the 
+Senate on March 11, 2010. It was passed by the House on March 17, 2010, by a recorded vote 
+(two-thirds required): 387-25 (Roll no. 124). On March 31, 2010, President Obama signed S. 
+1147 into law (P.L. 111-154). 
+
+The House-passed H.R. 1676 included two sections that addressed ATF’s tobacco diversion 
+mission, but only one of these sections (section 5) was included in the Senate- and House-passed 
+
+ 
+
+(...continued) 
+
+GAO-04-641 (May 2004), p. 7. 
+123 Ibid. 
+124 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, The Bureau of 
+Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ Efforts to Prevent the Diversion of Tobacco , Report Number I-2009-005, 
+September 2009, p. 15. 
+125 Ibid., p. 11. 
+126 Ibid., p. 13. 
+127 Ibid., p. 26. 
+128 Ibid., p. 26. 
+129 Ibid., p. 23. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 22 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+bill (S. 1147) that was signed into law by the President. Section 7 of the House-passed H.R. 1676, 
+which was not included in P.L. 111-154, would have authorized ATF to establish 
+
+• six regional contraband tobacco trafficking teams over a three-year period in 
+
+New York City; Washington, DC; Detroit; Los Angeles; Seattle; and Miami; 
+
+• a tobacco intelligence center to serve as the “nerve center” for all ongoing 
+
+tobacco diversion investigations; 
+
+• a covert national warehouse for undercover operations; and 
+• a computer database to track the retail sale of tobacco products through the 
+
+Internet, by mail-order, or in any other non-face-to-face transaction. 
+
+For these purposes, section 7 would have also authorized to be appropriated $8.5 million for five 
+years beginning with FY2010. 
+
+By comparison, the other section, which was included in P.L. 111-154, authorizes ATF to enter 
+the business premises of “delivery sellers” and inspect their records and information and any 
+cigarettes or smokeless tobacco stored at such premises. It also authorizes federal district courts 
+to compel such inspections, and imposes a civil penalty for failure to comply with inspections. 
+
+In the 110th Congress, the House passed a similar bill (H.R. 4081) on September 10, 2008, by a 
+recorded vote (two-thirds required): 379 to 12 (Roll no. 584). This bill was reported by the House 
+Judiciary Committee on the previous day (H.Rept. 110-836). The Senate Judiciary Committee 
+reported a similar bill on September 11, 2007 (S. 1027; S.Rept. 110-153), but the Senate took no 
+further action on this bill. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 23 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendix. Authorizations Compared 
+to Appropriations 
+
+Congress last provided authorizations for ATF’s annual appropriation in the Violence Against 
+Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005.130 This act authorized 
+appropriations for DOJ as a whole and ATF as a DOJ agency for FY2006 through FY2009. 
+Congress did not associate authorized dollar amounts with FTE or permanent positions. The 
+annual authorization for appropriations lapsed for FY2010, as the 110th and 111th Congresses have 
+not considered legislation to reauthorize appropriations for either DOJ or ATF. As Table A-1 
+shows, Congress has generally appropriated more money for ATF than has been authorized.131 
+
+ Table A-1. ATF Authorizations Compared to Appropriations 
+
+(Dollars in millions) 
+
+ 
+
+ FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 
+
+Authorization 923.6a 960.6a 999.0a 1,038.9a NA 
+
+Appropriation 935.8b 988.1c 1,011.6d 1,078.2e 1,120.8 
+
+ Source: FY2006 CJS Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-108); Gulf Hurricanes and Pandemic Influenza Supplemental 
+
+Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-148); Global War on Terror and Hurricane Recovery Supplemental 
+
+Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-234); Revised Continuing Appropriation Resolution, 2007 (P.L. 110-5); 
+
+Katrina-Iraq Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-28); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-
+
+161); Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252); Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8); 
+
+Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 
+
+111-5) and Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117). 
+
+ Notes: NA = no authorization. 
+
+a. Authorizations for appropriations provided in the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice 
+
+Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-162). 
+
+b. Includes a supplemental appropriation of $20 million provided under P.L. 109-148 and $4 million under P.L. 
+
+109-234. 
+
+c. Includes a supplemental appropriation of $4.0 million provided under P.L. 110-28. 
+
+d. Includes a supplemental appropriation of $4.0 million provided under P.L. 110-252. 
+
+e. Includes supplemental appropriations of $10 million provided under P.L. 111-5 and $14 million under P.L. 
+
+111-32. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+130 P.L. 109-162, January 5, 2006, 119 Stat. 2960. 
+131 For further information, see CRS Report RS20371, Overview of the Authorization-Appropriations Process , by Bill 
+Heniff Jr. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 24 
+
+ 
+ ATF Budget and Operations for FY2011 
+
+ 
+
+ Author Contact Information 
+
+ 
+William J. Krouse 
+
+ 
+
+Specialist in Domestic Security and Crime Policy 
+wkrouse@crs.loc.gov, 7-2225 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 25
\ No newline at end of file
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+++ b/corpus/politics/text/9806db904043e4cf.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
+Order Code RS22978
+
+October 27, 2008
+
+ Federal Research and Development Funding: 
+
+ Possible Impacts of Operating under a 
+
+ Continuing Resolution 
+
+Dana A. Shea, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
+
+Daniel Morgan, Analyst in Science and Technology Policy
+
+Resources, Science and Industry Division
+
+ Summary 
+
+On September 30, 2008, President Bush signed into law the Consolidated Security,
+
+Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329). Division
+
+A of this law is a continuing resolution and provides funding (through March 6, 2009,
+
+unless superseded by further congressional action) for agencies and programs normally
+
+funded by nine of the 12 regular appropriations bills. The same law also includes the
+
+other three FY2009 appropriations acts: one funding the Department of Defense
+
+(Division C of P.L. 110-329), one funding the Department of Homeland Security
+
+(Division D of P.L. 110-329), and one funding military construction, the Department of
+
+Veterans Affairs, and related agencies (Division E of P.L. 110-329). The continuing
+
+resolution funds most other agencies and programs at FY2008 pre-supplemental levels.
+
+The continuing resolution generally prohibits agencies from beginning or resuming
+
+programs that did not receive appropriations in FY2008. Thus new civilian research and
+
+development programs and funding increases for existing activities will be delayed until
+
+further appropriations bills have passed. For many research and development programs,
+
+FY2008 funding was provided under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L.
+
+110-161), which largely extended FY2007 funding levels. FY2007 funding was
+
+provided under a continuing resolution (P.L. 110-5) based on FY2006 appropriations.
+
+Therefore, some programs are operating in FY2009 with budgets similar to those of
+
+FY2006.
+
+Federal funding for research and development (R&D) is generally supported by both
+
+Congress and the Administration, though programmatic priorities often differ.1 The Bush
+
+Administration states that it has requested $147 billion in federal R&D funding for
+
+FY2009, approximately 2.7% more than the estimated FY2008 appropriation of $143
+
+1 In the context of this report, research and development funding includes funding for research
+
+and development facilities.
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+billion.2 The bulk of the proposed increase would come from continuing the American
+
+Competitiveness Initiative (ACI) and treating the new availability of previously
+
+appropriated funds for purchasing biodefense countermeasures through Project BioShield
+
+as research and development funding.3
+
+The President proposed the ACI in response to growing concerns about America’s
+
+ability to compete technologically in the global marketplace. As part of the ACI, the
+
+President called for doubling, over 10 years, the aggregate funding of the National Science
+
+Foundation (NSF), the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science, and the core
+
+programs of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The main focus
+
+of the increases would be to support basic research in the physical sciences and
+
+engineering. The FY2009 request would increase R&D funding for NSF by $701 million,
+
+for the DOE Office of Science by $749 million, and for NIST core programs by $33
+
+million relative to FY2008 appropriated levels.4
+
+The President’s request shifts the funding balance between research and
+
+development. Despite the President’s continued support for the ACI, total funding for
+
+basic and applied research would decrease by 0.3% in 2009 compared to 2008. While
+
+some specific agency basic and applied research budgets would increase, these increases
+
+are more than offset by decreases at other agencies. In contrast, funds for development
+
+would increase by 1.9%. This increase in support for development more than offsets the
+
+decrease in support for research, thus total R&D funding would increase under the
+
+President’s proposal.
+
+ The Current Status of FY2009 R&D Appropriations 
+
+The 110th Congress has passed three appropriations acts, the Department of Defense
+
+Appropriations Act, 2009 (Division C of P.L. 110-329), the Department of Homeland
+
+Security Appropriations Act, 2009 (Division D of P.L. 110-329), and the Military
+
+Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2008 (Division E of P.L. 110-
+
+329). Since the beginning of FY2009 on October 1, 2008, funding for all other agencies
+
+and programs has been provided through a continuing resolution (Division A of P.L.
+
+110-329). The continuing resolution maintains current funding levels through March 6,
+
+2009, or until superseded by subsequent appropriations law, for the agencies covered
+
+under the nine regular appropriations bills still outstanding.
+
+2 Office of Management and Budget, The White House, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the 
+
+ United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 (Government Printing Office: Washington, DC),
+
+2008, pp. 45-55. Different sources give somewhat different figures for federal R&D
+
+expenditures, largely because of methodological differences in identifying which programs and
+
+activities are considered to be R&D. For example, the totals cited in Analytical Perspectives are
+
+not precisely comparable with those in Table 1 of this report.
+3 For more information on the American Competitiveness Initiative and related efforts, see CRS
+
+Report RL34396, The America COMPETES Act and the FY2009 Budget , by Deborah D. Stine.
+
+For more information on Project BioShield, see CRS Report RS21507, Project BioShield: 
+
+ Purposes and Authorities , by Frank Gottron.
+4 When calculating funding for the ACI, the White House includes the entire budget of NSF, not
+
+just R&D funds. The entire FY2009 budget of NSF is increased by $821 million over the F2008
+
+budget.
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+For all agencies that have not had an appropriations bill for FY2009 signed into law,
+
+the continuing resolution provides funding at the same level they received in FY2008.
+
+Funds are provided on a prorated basis for the duration of the continuing resolution. The
+
+continuing resolution also generally prohibits agencies from using these funds to “initiate
+
+or resume any project or activity for which appropriations, funds, or other authority were
+
+not available during fiscal year 2008.”5 The current status of FY2009 funding for R&D
+is summarized by agency in Table 1 .
+
+The three major crosscutting multiagency R&D initiatives are all funded largely by
+
+agencies operating under the continuing resolution:
+
+! The FY2009 request for the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NII) is
+
+$1.532 billion, a 2% increase from $1.497 billion in FY2008.
+
+Approximately 72% of this request is at agencies operating under the
+
+continuing resolution.
+
+! The FY2009 request for the Networking and Information Technology
+
+R&D (NITRD) program is $3.566 billion, a 6% increase from $3.372
+
+billion in FY2008. Approximately 65% of this request is at agencies
+
+operating under the continuing resolution.
+
+! The FY2009 request for the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP)
+
+is $2.105 billion, a 10% increase from $1.838 billion in FY2008. More
+
+than 99% of this request is at agencies operating under the continuing
+
+resolution.6
+
+ Issues for Congress 
+
+If the federal government continues to operate under a continuing resolution, most
+
+existing nondefense R&D programs would continue to receive funding at the FY2008
+
+level. To some extent, this funding mechanism is likely to cause federal agencies to
+
+continue to support existing R&D priorities, rather than shifting to new ones, since only
+
+existing programs retain funding. In addition, because of inflation, even funds provided
+
+at the FY2008 level represent a reduction in actual purchasing power.7 For R&D
+
+programs in some agencies, FY2008 funding is close to the level appropriated in FY2006.
+
+For these programs, the loss of purchasing power and the difficulty of adjusting policy
+
+goals and priorities may be especially challenging.
+
+5 P.L. 110-329, Sec. 104.
+6 Office of Management and Budget, The White House, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the 
+
+ United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 (Government Printing Office: Washington, DC),
+
+2008, Table 5-3. For more information on these three initiatives, see CRS Report RL34401, The 
+
+ National Nanotechnology Initiative: Overview, Reauthorization, and Appropriations Issues , by
+
+John F. Sargent; CRS Report RL33586, The Federal Networking and Information Technology 
+
+ Research and Development Program: Funding Issues and Activities , by Patricia Moloney
+
+Figliola; and CRS Report RL33817, Climate Change: Federal Funding and Tax Incentives , by
+
+Jane A. Leggett.
+7 For example, P.L. 110-329 contains a provision (Sec. 142) mandating a 3.9% increase in civil
+
+service employee pay rates. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+Most new nondefense R&D programs planned for FY2009 would not be allowed to
+
+start. Even once regular appropriations for FY2009 become law, allowing new programs
+
+to begin, agencies may have difficulty meeting their projected R&D milestones and goals
+
+because of the shortened time frame for obligating funds for these programs. Expected
+
+completion times for research programs may need to be revised and new research
+
+performers identified. Also, agency plans for purchase of major instruments and other
+
+capital equipment may be delayed or prevented under the continuing resolutions. For new
+
+R&D programs, milestones planned to occur in the first half of FY2009 are unlikely to
+
+be met, since, if the continuing resolution extends through March 6, 2009, the first half
+
+of the fiscal year will be almost completed. Another issue for new programs is whether
+
+agencies will be able to obligate whatever new appropriations they receive. Most agency
+
+appropriations for R&D expire at the end of the fiscal year for which they are
+
+appropriated. Because most new programs cannot be started under a continuing
+
+resolution, even if appropriations for them are eventually received, agencies will have less
+
+time than the full fiscal year to establish these programs and obligate the funds for them.
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+ Table 1. Estimated Federal R&D Appropriations for FY2009 
+
+($ in millions)
+
+ FY2008 
+
+ FY2009 
+
+ FY2009 FY2009 
+
+ FY2009 
+
+ Department/Agency 
+
+ Estimate 
+
+ Request 
+
+ House 
+
+ Senate 
+
+ Appropriation 
+
+Department of Energy
+
+9,903
+
+10,535
+
+10,903
+
+11,010
+
+—
+
+Department of Defensea
+
+76,905
+
+79,616
+
+—
+
+—
+
+80,302
+
+National Aeronautics and
+
+12,212
+
+12,857
+
+12,967
+
+13,044
+
+—
+
+Space Administration 
+National Institutes of
+
+29,321
+
+29,165
+
+30,316
+
+30,191
+
+—
+
+Health
+National Science
+
+6,032
+
+6,854
+
+6,854
+
+6,854
+
+—
+
+Foundation
+Department of
+
+2,591
+
+2,280
+
+—
+
+2,543
+
+—
+
+Agriculture
+Department of Homeland
+
+1,340
+
+1,449
+
+1,447
+
+1,476
+
+1,465
+
+Securityb
+National Institute of
+
+756
+
+636
+
+817
+
+814
+
+—
+
+Standards and
+
+Technology
+National Oceanic and
+
+581
+
+577
+
+—
+
+633
+
+—
+
+Atmospheric
+
+Administration
+Department of
+
+823
+
+901
+
+—
+
+912
+
+—
+
+Transportation
+Department of the
+
+671
+
+628
+
+—
+
+—
+
+—
+
+Interior
+Environmental Protection
+
+713
+
+726
+
+—
+
+—
+
+—
+
+Agency
+
+ Source : Compiled by CRS from various sources. For details, see CRS Report RL34448, Federal Research 
+
+ and Development Funding: FY2009 , coordinated by John F. Sargent.
+
+ Note : Agencies for which no FY2009 appropriations act has been signed into law are funded under the
+
+continuing resolution (P.L. 110-329) at FY2008 levels.
+
+a. This line consists of Title IV funding in the Department of Defense appropriations act and does not
+
+include research, development, testing, and evaluation funds associated with the Defense Health
+
+Program, the Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction Program, and the Mine Resistant Ambush
+
+Protected Vehicle program. It also does not include R&D funds from supplemental or additional
+
+appropriations acts.
+
+b. This line does not include the $2.175 billion newly available from prior appropriations for Project
+
+BioShield.
\ No newline at end of file
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new file mode 100644
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+Methane: An Introduction to Emission Sources and Reduction Strategies
+
+ August 15, 2016
+ (R43860)
+ 
+ Jump to Main Text of Report 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Contents
+
+ 
+ Introduction 
+
+ Issues for Congress 
+
+ Legislative Initiatives 
+
+ Administrative Initiatives 
+
+ The Obama Administration's Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions 
+
+ Methane: A Primer 
+
+ Emissions 
+
+ Historical Trends 
+
+ Source Sectors and Mitigation Activities 
+
+ Agriculture Sector 
+
+ Fossil Energy Sector 
+
+ Waste Management Sector 
+
+ Issues in Measurement 
+
+ Cost-Benefit Analysis 
+
+ Conclusion 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Figures
+
+ 
+ Figure 1. U.S. Methane Emissions, 2014: Sources 
+
+ Figure 2. U.S. Methane Emissions: Historical Trends by Source Sector 
+
+ Figure 3. U.S. Methane Emissions: Historical Trends by Source Category 
+
+ Figure 4. Natural Gas Industry Sectors 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+ Tables
+
+ 
+ Table A-1. A Selection of Recent Legislative Proposals with Methane Components 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+ Appendixes
+
+ 
+ Appendix A. Recent Legislative Proposals 
+
+ Appendix B. Recent Executive Branch Initiatives 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Summary
+
+ The Obama Administration's Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions 
+
+ On June 25, 2013, President Obama announced a national "Climate Action Plan" (CAP) to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs), as well as to encourage adaptation to expected climate change. One of the initiatives within the CAP focused on the control of methane emissions, a potent short-lived climate pollutant. It called for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, the Interior, Labor, and Transportation to develop a comprehensive interagency "Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions." The Strategy, released on March 28, 2014, committed to steps to cut methane emissions by an estimated 16% from 2012 levels by 2020 through both voluntary actions and agency rulemaking. It also outlined the Administration's efforts to improve the measurement and assessment of these emissions.
+
+ Perspectives on the Strategy 
+
+ Some stakeholders, including many in the affected sectors (i.e., agriculture, fossil energy, and waste management), have raised concerns over federal proposals requiring more stringent controls. They argue that further regulation of methane emissions would not provide cost-effective health and environmental benefits. Some industries contend that they are already doing everything feasible to capture and reuse methane emissions (for requisite safety and economic reasons) and that state and local authorities—who share a closer understanding of the industries' specific circumstances—are best equipped to oversee and enforce emission reduction efforts within their jurisdictions.
+
+ Other stakeholders, including many health and environmental advocates, contend that the Strategy and its proposed rulemakings fall short. They argue that methane emissions can jeopardize worker safety, lead to ground-level ozone formation (commonly referred to as "smog"), and act as a potent GHG. Recent events in the United States (e.g., the rise in domestic oil and natural gas production, the encroachment of domestic oil and natural gas production on new or more populated areas, and the revitalization of the petrochemical manufacturing sector) have led these stakeholders to suggest the need for more enforceable standards. Likewise, they estimate that the Obama Administration's recent GHG reduction targets, offered under the U.S. commitments to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, would be unattainable without further controls.
+
+ The Role of Methane 
+
+ Behind it all is methane—the world's simplest hydrocarbon and the primary component of natural gas. It is released into the atmosphere by both natural sources (such as wetlands and wildfires) and human activities (such as oil and natural gas systems, coal mines, landfills, and the raising of livestock). When captured, methane can be used as either a fuel or a chemical feedstock, with many advantages over other fossil fuels (e.g., it is more versatile and less polluting). Its dual nature as both a pollutant and a commodity makes efforts to control emissions potentially beneficial to both the environment and the economy.
+
+ For these reasons, as far back as the 1970s, the federal government has sought policies to help reduce, capture, and reuse methane emissions. Whether strategies to control emissions are effective and cost-efficient for a given industry may depend upon a number of factors, including the nature and extent of the emissions, the technology available for capture, and the market price for the recovered products. In this way, the cost-benefit considerations are similar to those of energy efficiency efforts, wherein high up-front investments and other market barriers, if confronted by producers, may be offset over time. 
+
+ Recent federal policies have included a variety of funding programs for research and technology development as well as voluntary programs and tax incentives for industry. Historically, methane emissions were addressed directly by two federal rules: one on new municipal landfills and another on federal oil and gas leases. Since the Strategy's release, the Administration has proposed and finalized several additional rules—on oil and natural gas systems, coal mines, and municipal landfills. These rulemakings—as well as a variety of legislative efforts in Congress—attest to the continued interest in an appropriate policy response to the issue of methane emissions.
+
+ 
+ 
+ Methane: An Introduction to Emission Sources and Reduction Strategies
+
+ 
+ Introduction
+
+ Methane is the world's simplest hydrocarbon, with a chemical formula CH 4 (one atom of carbon and four atoms of hydrogen). It is gaseous under normal atmospheric conditions and is commonly produced through the decomposition of organic materials in the absence of oxygen. It is released into the atmosphere by natural sources such as wetlands, oceans, sediments, termites, volcanoes, and wildfires, 1 as well as human activities such as oil and natural gas systems, coal mines, landfills, wastewater treatment facilities, and the raising of livestock. 
+
+ Methane, when captured, can be used as either a fuel or a chemical feedstock. When used as a fuel—for example, methane is the primary component of natural gas 2 —it has many advantages over other hydrocarbons (e.g., coal and oil). Methane is more versatile: It can heat homes, fuel stoves, run vehicles, fire power plants, and, when liquefied, be exported to support the energy needs of U.S. allies and trading partners. Methane is cleaner-burning: It emits, on average, about half as much carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) as coal and one-quarter less than oil when consumed in a typical electric utility plant. 3 Further, its combustion emits no mercury (a persistent, bioaccumulative neurotoxin), virtually no particulate matter or sulfur dioxide, and less nitrogen oxides, per unit of energy, than either coal or oil. Recent expansion in natural gas production, primarily as a result of improved technologies (e.g., hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling) 4 used on unconventional resources (e.g., shale, tight sands, and coalbed methane), 5 has made methane an increasingly significant component in the energy supply and security of the United States.
+
+ When used as a chemical feedstock, methane is a manufacturing component for a variety of household and industrial products including plastic, fertilizer, antifreeze, and fabrics. Abundant and economical supplies of methane may serve arguably to reinvigorate the U.S. petrochemical sector, bringing manufacturing industries back on shore and aiding in the creation of domestic jobs and economic development. 6 
+
+ For these reasons, many in both the public and private sectors have advocated for the increased production and use of methane (via natural gas extraction or other capture technologies) and have hailed it as a potential "cost-effective bridge" to a less polluting and lower greenhouse-gas-intensive economy. 7 This position has been supported by many Members of Congress as well as the Obama Administration. 8 
+
+ Methane, however, when released or allowed to escape into the atmosphere (commonly referred to as "vented" and "fugitive" emissions, respectively), has adverse impacts on human health, safety, and the environment. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration lists methane as both an asphyxiant and an explosive, as increased concentrations in local settings can jeopardize worker safety. 9 Further, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) classifies methane as both a precursor to ground-level ozone formation 10 (commonly referred to as "smog") and a potent greenhouse gas (GHG), albeit with a shorter atmospheric life than CO 2 . 11 Methane's effect on climate change is up to 34 times greater than that of CO 2 when averaged over a 100-year time period and even greater when considered over the first 20 years after it is emitted. 12 An increase in emissions may counteract some of the environmental benefits that the U.S. economy has to gain by switching from coal or oil to natural gas and other sources of methane. For these reasons, some stakeholders, including some Members of Congress, have called for increased controls on methane emissions in several sectors of the economy, including oil and natural gas production and transportation, coal mining, industrial processes, and agriculture.
+
+ In many cases, efforts to control air pollution can compete against the economic considerations of the affected industries. However, in methane's case, its dual nature as both a commodity and a pollutant provides a unique set of incentives. Under certain conditions, the value of fugitive methane and other byproducts that can be recovered and sold at market may be able to offset the cost of their capture. Further, the value of these recovered products during oil and gas extraction could contribute to increased royalty payments to state and federal governments.
+
+ The difficulty, however, is that methane emissions are not always easy to capture. Methane, unlike some other pollutants (e.g., sulfur dioxide or CO 2 ), is not commonly emitted in a concentrated stream from industrial processes. Rather, it is released into the atmosphere through dispersion, leaks, vents, accidents, and ruptures. In this way, methane emissions are most similar to those of other volatile organic compounds (VOCs), both in manner and control. 13 Efforts to capture or abate these emissions are generally more difficult and costly than for other pollutants. Whether recovery of methane is profitable for producers may depend upon a number of factors, including the nature and extent of the release, the technology available for capture, and the market price for the recovered products. In this way, the cost-benefit consideration of methane capture becomes very similar to that of energy efficiency efforts, wherein high up-front investments and other market barriers, if confronted by producers, may have the potential to be offset over time.
+
+ This report examines the many facets of methane: from commodity to coproduct to byproduct to waste. It begins with a survey of past and present attempts by Congress and the executive branch to address methane emissions for the purposes of energy policy and pollution control. It then provides a general overview of methane before focusing on specific sectors of the economy in order to (1) characterize different sources of methane and the data available on their emissions; (2) discuss current practices, opportunities, and challenges for emission controls; and (3) outline recent initiatives proposed by Congress and the Administration.
+
+ Issues for Congress
+
+ Through the years, the federal government has sought policies to control methane emissions for a variety of economic, environmental, and public health and safety reasons. Some justifications for federal involvement have included the following:
+ 1. Promoting domestic energy production and energy security,
+
+ 2. Protecting the property rights of mineral owners (including federal resources and associated royalties to the American taxpayer),
+
+ 3. Assuring the operational safety of employees who work with or near significant emission sources, and
+
+ 4. Safeguarding the general population from air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 
+ Initially, policies to capture methane emissions were motivated in part by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries oil embargo of 1973 and the subsequent calls for U.S. energy independence. During this time, the United States saw natural gas and other sources of methane as a potential alternative to imported crude oil. Efforts to incentivize the capture of methane and use it as an alternative fuel were proposed by both Congress and the Administration across the full range of commercial sectors. They included a variety of funding programs for research and technology development, voluntary guidelines and tax incentives for industry, and/or rules for mineral rights lessees on federal lands.
+
+ As an understanding of methane's role in ozone formation and climate change grew during the 1990s, some state and federal authorities turned their attention to reducing methane emissions as a form of pollution control. Once again, the key policy tools used for pollution abatement took the form of voluntary guidelines and tax incentives. However, in a few instances, where reductions in other pollutants could serve the co-benefit of aiding in the reduction of methane, regulatory emission standards were proposed and/or promulgated. In the 2000s, as Congress considered comprehensive market-based strategies to reduce GHG emissions across the entire U.S. economy, more innovative proposals for methane reduction became prevalent. Methane capture was commonly suggested as an "offset" credit for higher GHG-emitting industries, as the net costs of reducing methane emissions, in some instances, could be more favorable than directly controlling for CO 2 emissions.
+
+ Recent events in the United States (e.g., the rise in domestic oil and natural gas production, its encroachment on new or more populated areas, and the revitalization of the petrochemical manufacturing sector) have led some stakeholders to suggest the need for more enforceable standards. At the state level, Colorado, Wyoming, Ohio, California, and Pennsylvania have recently promulgated or proposed rules to control for methane emissions from their oil and gas sectors. 14 Further, many states have standards to control for methane emissions from coal mining and landfill operations. Some have regulations that focus on methane's potential as an energy source, and a few classify methane as a renewable energy source. 15 
+
+ Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 16 EPA has the authority to regulate methane emissions as both an ozone precursor and a GHG. Currently, EPA has no standards in place to regulate methane as an ozone precursor, and it has shown a disinclination for doing so in the past. 17 Conversely, EPA has regulated methane as a GHG since 1996 under its standards for municipal landfills. 18 The agency's authority to regulate methane as a GHG was upheld by the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA , 19 which determined that GHGs fall under the definition of "air pollutant" as used in the CAA. Following this decision, EPA determined that six GHGs, including methane, endangered public health and welfare 20 and issued several rules focused primarily on CO 2 . 21 
+
+ Recently, under the directive of the Obama Administration's 2014 "Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions" 22 (discussed in further detail in the remainder of this report), EPA has proposed and promulgated a suite of voluntary and regulatory programs to address methane emissions across a range of industrial sectors. Additionally, the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, the Interior, Labor, and Transportation have some authorities to monitor, give guidance for, and make rules to control for methane emissions (e.g., see the Bureau of Land Management's [BLM's] 1980 notice on venting and flaring for oil and gas leases on federal lands). 23 As with EPA, some of these agencies have also proposed initiatives under the directive of the Administration's Strategy.
+
+ Some stakeholders, including many in the affected sectors (i.e., agriculture, fossil energy, and waste management), have raised concerns over federal proposals requiring more stringent controls. They argue that further regulation of methane emissions would not provide cost-effective health and environmental benefits. Some industries contend that they are already doing everything feasible to capture and reuse methane emissions (for requisite safety and economic reasons) and that state and local authorities—who share a closer understanding of the industries' specific circumstances—are best equipped to oversee and enforce emission reduction efforts within their jurisdictions.
+
+ Efforts by the federal government to incentivize the reduction, capture, and reuse of methane—including the Obama Administration's Strategy—are summarized in the following two sections: " Legislative Initiatives " and " Administrative Initiatives ." Further, Table A-1 of Appendix A provides a detailed list of recent congressional proposals both in support of and in opposition to increased methane emission controls. Finally, Appendix B provides a selected chronology of recent executive branch initiatives.
+
+ Legislative Initiatives
+
+ Congress has pursued policies in support of methane emissions reduction since the 1970s. Legislation aimed at capturing methane emissions from agricultural activities and promoting the use of the recovered gas dates back, at least, to the 94 th Congress. 24 Similar bills targeting emissions from coal mines and municipal landfills were introduced in the 96 th and 97 th Congresses, respectively. 25 These efforts often promoted methane as an alternative fuel source, specifically as a replacement for imported crude oil. Legislation addressing methane's role as an air pollutant (e.g., as a GHG) reaches back to the 101 st Congress, wherein several bills were introduced with specific methane control provisions. These included one in 1989 by then-Senator Al Gore to analyze "the contribution of methane to global climate change, the sources and sinks of methane, and the methods of controlling emissions of methane. " 26 A similar set of studies was codified by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which required EPA to report on the "activities, substances, processes, or combinations thereof that could reduce methane emissions and that are economically and technologically justified." 27 Methane reduction was also included as a qualifying activity in market-based GHG control proposals as far back as the 101 st Congress. 28 
+
+ Recent congressional interest continues to focus on methane's role as a GHG, with legislative efforts aimed at both supporting EPA's authority to regulate methane emissions and revoking it. Recent bills and amendments in the 114 th Congress have proposed several different policy tools as strategies for reduction. They include (1) providing economic incentives (e.g., tax benefits) for activities that capture and use fugitive gas (e.g., H.R. 2142 , the Capitalizing on American Methane Act of 2015), (2) authorizing the Administration or a specific agency to investigate or directly regulate methane emissions (e.g., H.R. 508 , the SUPER Act of 2015), and (3) providing a market-based mechanism (e.g., fee) to incentivize methane reduction (e.g., S. 1548 , the American Opportunity Carbon Fee Act of 2015).
+
+ Conversely, many bills in recent Congresses have aimed to remove the executive branch's authority to regulate methane emissions based predominantly on arguments for economic growth and employment. Some examples of these efforts include (1) amending the CAA to remove "methane" and other GHGs from the definition of "air pollutant" (e.g., H.R. 1806 , America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2015) and (2) prohibiting appropriated funds from being used by agencies to regulate methane (e.g., H.R. 2822 , Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016). 
+
+ For a selected list of recent bills and amendments that address methane, see Table A-1 of Appendix A .
+
+ Administrative Initiatives
+
+ Historically, many of the methane control initiatives administered by the federal government have taken the form of either research funding or voluntary public-private partnerships with industry. Federal funding has been provided for the research and dev elopment of new technologies aimed at enabling more cost-effective emission reductions across various sectors of the economy. Offices that have provided financial and technical assistance in the past include the Department of Agriculture (USDA) Conservation Innovation Grants, Environmental Quality Incentive Program, Rural Energy for America Program, Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels, and Biorefinery Assistance Program; the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Fossil Fuels, Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis, and Section 1703 Loan Guarantee Program; the Department of Labor (DOL) Mine Safety and Health Administration; the Department of Transportation (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration; the EPA Office of Air and Radiation; and the Department of the Interior (DOI) BLM.
+
+ Similarly, voluntary partnerships managed by federal agencies have aimed to leverage the resources of the federal government to assist the private sector in overcoming the economic barriers to methane capture. They include the EPA's Natural Gas STAR Program and the Coalbed Methane Outreach Program for the energy sector, EPA/USDA's AgSTAR Program for the agricultural sector, EPA's Landfill Methane Outreach Program for the waste sector, and EPA's Global Methane Initiative for international activities. 29 The goals of these programs are to (1) raise awareness of emission levels and the value of lost fuel, (2) provide information and training on new technologies and practices, and (3) discuss the barriers embedded in traditional operations, limited infrastructure, and uncertain investment climates. As with many voluntary initiatives, these programs have returned mixed results. 30 
+
+ The Obama Administration's Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions
+
+ On June 25, 2013, President Obama refocused his Administration's efforts to address GHG emissions with the release of the "Climate Action Plan" (CAP). 31 Federal activities in support of methane emission reductions became one of the cornerstones of the CAP. During its presentation, the President stated that "curbing emissions of methane is critical to our overall effort to address global climate change." Many stakeholders have suggested that the Administration's recent GHG reduction targets, offered under the U.S. commitments to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 32 would be unattainable without significant methane controls. 33 The CAP set guidelines for EPA and the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, the Interior, Labor, and Transportation to develop a comprehensive interagency methane strategy, 34 which was released on March 28, 2014, under the title "Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions." 
+
+ Key initiatives of the Strategy include the following:
+
+ 1. Agriculture. A joint USDA, EPA, and DOE "Biogas Roadmap" outlining voluntary strategies to accelerate adoption of methane digesters and other cost-effective technologies to reduce U.S. dairy sector GHG emissions by 25% by 2020 (released on August 1, 2014). 35 
+
+ 2. Petroleum and Natural Gas. 
+ EPA standards and guidelines to (1) build on the 2012 New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for VOC emissions 36 to address methane emissions from new and modified activities and equipment in the sector uncovered by the previous rule (finalized on May 12, 2016); 37 (2) provide VOC reduction guidelines to state, local, and tribal air agencies for existing oil and gas sources in ozone nonattainment areas and states in the Ozone Transport Region (proposed August 18, 2015); 38 and (3) expand voluntary efforts under the Natural Gas STAR program. 39 
+
+ A BLM proposal to update standards to reduce venting and flaring from oil and gas production on public lands (proposed January 22, 2016). 40 
+
+ Several Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) proposals for natural gas pipeline safety standards. 41 
+
+ DOE-convened roundtables, as part of the Quadrennial Energy Review, to identify "downstream" methane reduction opportunities (the summary of which was released on July 29, 2014). 42 
+ 3. Coal Mines. A BLM Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) to gather public input on the development of a program for the capture and sale or disposal of waste mine methane on lands leased by the federal government (released on April 28, 2014). 43 
+
+ 4. Landfills. EPA standards to reduce methane from new and existing municipal solid waste landfills (finalized on July 14, 2016). 44 
+
+ 5. Improving Methane Measurement . Data quality improvement, including developing new measurement technologies, addressing areas of higher uncertainty in bottom-up inventories, and enhancing top-down modeling and monitoring based on direct measurement of atmospheric concentrations.
+
+ These initiatives are summarized in greater detail, by sector, in the remainder of this report. For a selected chronology of executive branch initiatives related to the White House's Strategy, see Appendix B .
+
+ Methane: A Primer
+
+ Methane is both a precursor to ground-level ozone formation and a potent GHG. As a precursor to ground-level ozone formation, methane reacts with nitrogen oxides in the presence of sunlight to form what is commonly referred to as smog. Methane, however, is generally less reactive than other hydrocarbons. For this reason—and at this time—EPA has excluded it from the definition of regulated hydrocarbons called volatile organic compounds (VOCs). 45 
+
+ As a GHG, methane emitted into the atmosphere absorbs terrestrial infrared radiation, which contributes to increased global warming and continuing climate change. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report 2013 (AR5), in 2011, methane concentrations in the atmosphere exceeded preindustrial levels by 150%. Further, they contributed about 16% to global warming due to anthropogenic GHG sources, making methane the second-leading climate forcer after CO 2 globally. 46 While the perturbation lifetime for methane is only 12 years (compared to CO 2 's, which is considerably longer and does not undergo a simple decline over a single predictable timescale), its immediate impacts are significantly greater (see Text Box ). For this reason, methane is commonly characterized as a "short-lived climate forcer," along with black carbon and various hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs).
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Global Warming Potential
+
+ The climate change impacts of methane are commonly compared to those of CO 2 through the use of an index referred to as "global warming potential" (GWP): a measure of the total energy that a gas absorbs over a particular period of time compared to CO 2 . Key factors affecting the GWP of any given gas include its average atmospheric lifetime and the ability of that molecule to trap heat. While methane is a highly potent GHG for a short period of time after its initial release, its capacity to trap heat dissipates after approximately 12 years. By comparison, CO 2 's perturbation lifetime is considerably longer and does not undergo a simple decline over a single predictable timescale. Instead, the excess atmospheric carbon from CO 2 emissions mixes into the oceans and biosphere (e.g., plants) over a period of a few hundred years, and then it is slowly removed over hundreds of thousands of years as it is gradually incorporated into carbonate rocks.
+
+ As recently as November 2013, EPA reported GWP values for methane that were accepted by parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as they were presented in the IPCC Second Assessment Report 1995 (SAR). The SAR lists methane's GWP as 21 over a 100-year time horizon. (That is, the same amount of methane emissions by mass is approximately 21 times more potent than CO 2 emissions when averaged over a 100-year time horizon.) EPA recently adopted GWP values for methane that were accepted by parties to the UNFCCC as they were presented in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 2007 ( AR4). 47 The AR4 lists methane's GWP as 25 and 72 over a 100-year and a 20-year time horizon, respectively. EPA's most recent Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks : 1990-201 4 , released in April 2016, uses the AR4 values. AR5, released in September 2013, lists methane's GWP as 28 and 84 over a 100-year and a 20-year time horizon, respectively, but these values have not yet been accepted officially by parties to the UNFCCC. Further, the AR5 reports methane's GWP inclusive of methane's indirect effects on aerosols as 34 and 86 over a 100-year and a 20-year time horizon, respectively. 
+
+ The data in this report are based on EPA's 2015 Inventory and the IPCC AR4 GWP values for methane.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ Emissions
+
+ According to EPA, methane is the second-most prevalent GHG emitted by the United States (behind CO 2 ), and in 2014 it accounted for 730.8 million metric tons of CO 2 equivalent, or about 10.6% of all domestically produced emissions from human activities (see Figure 1 ). 48 Some academic studies have put these emissions higher. 49 Of the total, over 44% was emitted from sources in the energy production sector, over 30% from sources in the agricultural sector, and over 20% from sources in the waste management sector (see Figure 2 ).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Figure 1. U.S. Methane Emissions, 2014: Sources
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Source: CRS, with data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-201 4 , EPA 430-R-16-002, April 15, 2016.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ Historical Trends
+
+ Between 1990 and 2014, methane emissions in the United States decreased by a little over 5%. However, trends have fluctuated over the past decade, with slight increases reported over the last few years. Since 1990, emissions from sources associated with agricultural activities have increased, while emissions from sources associated with waste management and energy and industrial processes have decreased (see Figure 2 ). Comparatively, the source categories for landfills and coal mining have seen the most notable reductions over the past 25 years (-18% and -30%, respectively) and manure management and petroleum systems the most notable increases (+65% and +76%, respectively), but many other subcategories have seen little or no change (see Figure 3 ).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Figure 2. U.S. Methane Emissions: Historical Trends by Source Sector
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Source: CRS, with data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-201 4 , EPA 430-R-16-002, April 15, 2016.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Figure 3. U.S. Methane Emissions: Historical Trends by Source Category
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Source: CRS, with data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-201 4 , EPA 430-R-16-002, April 15, 2016.
+
+ Notes: "Other" sources include stationary and mobile combustion; abandoned coal mines; petrochemical production; composting; iron, steel, and coke production; and the burning of agricultural residue.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ Source Sectors and Mitigation Activities
+
+ Emissions of methane can be categorized into three broad source categories: agriculture, energy and industrial processes, and waste management. The following section reviews each of these categories, and
+ characterizes the major sources in the sector and the respective data on emissions, 50 
+
+ discusses current practices, opportunities, and challenges for emission control,
+
+ summarizes current and applicable government programs and program performance data, and
+
+ outlines the proposed initiatives in the White House's recent Strategy.
+ Agriculture Sector 51 
+
+ Agricultural sources of methane emissions include the following:
+ Enteric f ermentation. Methane is produced as part of normal digestive processes in animals, which is moreso an issue with ruminant livestock (e.g., cattle). Microbes that reside in the animal's digestive system ferment food consumed by the animal and produce methane as a byproduct, which can be eructated (i.e., belching or flatulence) by the animal.
+
+ Manure m anagement. Methane is produced from manure management systems, primarily liquid and slurry systems. The treatment and storage of livestock manure can produce methane through its anaerobic decomposition.
+
+ Rice c ultivation. Methane is produced from the anaerobic environment resulting from flooded fields used for rice cultivation. Decomposition of organic material gradually depletes most of the oxygen present in the soil, causing anaerobic soil conditions.
+
+ Field b urning of a gricultural r esidues. Methane is emitted from the field burning of agricultural residues, which is done usually for disposal purposes. Field burning of agricultural residues occurs more frequently in some parts of the United States and is regulated or monitored depending on state and local law. Internationally, slash-and-burn agriculture is a common form of field burning in tropical and forested areas.
+ The agriculture sector constituted approximately 33% of U.S. anthropogenic methane emissions in 2014. 52 From 1990 to 2014, methane emissions from agricultural sources increased by nearly 11% (see Figure 2 ). Enteric fermentation is the leading source of agricultural methane emissions and the second-leading source of methane emissions from all industry sectors. Livestock manure management is the second-leading agricultural source (see Figure 3 ).
+
+ While best practices exist to reduce methane emitted from enteric fermentation (e.g., diet modification), it has been economically and technically challenging to systematically capture a significant portion of the methane emitted at this stage. There are, however, opportunities to reduce methane emissions from other agricultural sources, and efforts have focused on the second-largest agricultural source, manure management.
+
+ Anaerobic digestion (AD) systems 53 employed on stockpiles of manure at animal feeding operations may offer the most practical and economic method of capture. Operators have experience with AD systems partly because, for at least the last 20 years, USDA, DOE, and EPA have supported their use with financial and technical assistance (e.g., EPA/USDA's AgSTAR Program, established in 1994). 54 There are, however, some economic, operational, and safety concerns associated with the use of AD systems. 55 
+
+ The Obama Administration's Strategy takes a two-pronged approach to the reduction of agricultural methane from manure management. First, the Strategy supports a Biogas Roadmap—issued by USDA, EPA, and DOE on August 1, 2014—that outlines voluntary strategies to accelerate the adoption of AD systems and other technologies. 56 The Biogas Roadmap is a deliverable of an April 2013 Memorandum of Understanding between USDA and the Innovation Center for U.S. Dairy. 57 Second, the Strategy supports the continued use of previously established voluntary efforts (e.g., AD system deployment through assistance from numerous USDA programs).
+
+ If the primary goal of the Administration's Strategy is methane emission reduction, then the omission of the sector's major source of emissions—enteric fermentation—is noteworthy. With this omission, some may wonder how much impact methane reduction from the agricultural sector can have. However, if the primary goal is cost-effective methane emission reduction, addressing manure management may be the most viable option for the agriculture sector at the moment.
+
+ Although federal support for AD systems using voluntary measures is not new, it is difficult to calculate the full impact of past and continued federal support. It is not clear that an adequate emissions baseline has been established among the appropriate federal entities for AD systems that receive federal support. An emissions baseline could allow for long-term analysis, which is necessary to gauge future impacts (e.g., number of AD systems, number of AD systems that are fully operational, amount of financial assistance provided, amount of methane captured, amount of methane flared, amount of methane used to generate electricity). Federal program data about AD systems tend to be disparate. The Strategy may give the federal government an opportunity to improve methods to document the impact of AD systems. 
+
+ Beyond the availability and impact of adequate mitigation technologies for the agricultural sector, economic factors may also dampen the adoption of best practices. For these reasons, it could be argued that the establishment of a carbon market, the use of direct government payment programs for mitigating technologies such as anaerobic digestion systems, and the development of voluntary mitigation-related contracts 58 could help alleviate costs and incentivize innovation. On the other hand, expansion of mitigation technologies such as anaerobic digestion systems may face challenges larger than economics, such as national infrastructure and cooperation with utilities or other industries that can use—but do not necessarily agree that they need—the product being sold.
+
+ Fossil Energy Sector 59 
+
+ Fossil energy sources of methane emissions include the following:
+ Petroleum s ystems . Methane emissions from petroleum systems are primarily associated with crude oil production, transportation, and refining operations. During each of these activities, methane is released to the atmosphere as fugitive emissions, vented emissions, emissions from operational accidents, and emissions from incomplete fuel combustion.
+
+ Natural g as s ystems . The U.S. natural gas system encompasses hundreds of thousands of wells, hundreds of processing and liquefaction facilities, and over 1 million miles of transmission and distribution pipelines. Emissions of methane (i.e., the principal component of natural gas) arise from vented and fugitive emissions from system components, natural gas engine and turbine uncombusted exhaust, bleed and discharge emissions from pneumatic devices, and emissions from operational accidents.
+
+ Coal m ining . Three types of coal-mining-related activities release methane to the atmosphere: underground mining, surface mining, and post-mining (i.e., coal-handling) activities. While surface mines account for the majority of U.S. coal production, underground coal mines contribute the largest share of methane emissions due to the higher methane concentrations in deeper coal seams.
+ The fossil energy sector constituted nearly 45% of U.S. anthropogenic methane emissions in 2014. 60 From 1990 through 2014, methane emissions from fossil energy sources have decreased by approximately 10% (see Figure 2 ). Natural gas systems are the leading source of emissions from the sector, and they have historically vied with enteric fermentation as the leading man-made source of methane emissions in the United States (see Figure 3 ). Methane emissions from coal mining have fluctuated over the past two decades—but for the most part declined—and currently account for approximately 10% of made-made emissions in the United States.
+
+ Taken together, the petroleum and natural gas industry (as shown in Figure 4 ) is one of the largest sources of methane emissions in the country, contributing in excess of 33% of U.S. anthropogenic methane emissions in 2014. 61 In the 2016 Inventory, EPA revisited its calculations for the oil and gas industry and reported that methane emitted by the sector had increased by 9% since 2010 and had remained virtually unchanged since 1990. (Conversely, the 2015 Inventory reported that emissions from the sector generally declined by 12% since 1990.)
+
+ Sources of emissions in the oil and gas sector include the following:
+ Upstream p roduction . Methane may be emitted while drilling through gas-bearing geologic formations, during drilling mud circulation, during well development (following well stimulation by hydraulic fracturing) when formation fluids and fracture fluids flow back to the surface, and from field treatment equipment that separates oil, gas, and water.
+
+ Midstream p rocessing and t ransmission . Gathering lines connecting the wellhead to field treatment equipment that separates gas, oil, and water into product streams represent another source for fugitive methane and gas condensate emissions. Leaking valves, transmission lines, and pump stations add to this sector's emissions.
+
+ Downstream d istribution . Emissions from leaking distribution pipelines are most likely to occur from older pipelines. In 2014, there were more than 1.2 million miles of distribution mains in the United States. Of these, more than 32,000 miles of mains were older cast iron or wrought iron, and more than 61,000 miles were unprotected steel. 62 
+ Some companies in the oil and gas industries have made significant voluntary reductions in methane emissions over the past decade. By volume, some of the largest reductions have come from using reduced emissions completions (or "green completions") 63 during hydraulic fracturing activities, leak detection and repair technologies at processing facilities and compressor stations, reduced venting of associated gas at oil wells, and the replacement of high‐emitting pneumatic devices. A number of these technologies and practices have been promoted and supported by EPA's public-private partnerships with industry, including the Natural Gas STAR Program 64 and the Coalbed Methane Outreach Program. 65 However, voluntary adoption of control techniques has been uneven across companies and regions. Consequently, in 2012, EPA promulgated emission standards for conventional pollutants (e.g., volatile organic compounds) for the oil and gas sector through a series of New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) and National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants. 66 These standards have the co-benefit of reducing methane emissions from certain new sources in some segments of the gas industry. 67 Further, some states have established or proposed regulations that specifically address methane emissions from the oil and gas industry (e.g., Colorado, California, Ohio, Wyoming, and Pennsylvania, as well as a Western Governors' Association policy resolution). 68 Notwithstanding, many sources have remained uncontrolled by state or federal standards.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Figure 4. Natural Gas Industry Sectors
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Source: DTE Energy, Natural Gas Processing, Delivery, and Storage.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ Additional to EPA's standards, BLM has issued rulemakings that indirectly address methane emissions on federal lands under the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA). 69 The MLA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to lease onshore lands owned by the United States that contain fossil fuel deposits, with the federal government retaining title to the lands. The framework of the MLA provides BLM and the federal government with flexibility to use federal lands to help satisfy the nation's energy needs while generating revenue for the federal government and protecting environmentally sensitive areas. Existing BLM rulemakings affecting methane emissions include BLM's 1980 "Notice to Lessees and Operators of Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases (NTL-4A): Royalty or Compensation for Oil and Gas Loss," 70 which outlines appropriate payment terms for losses of natural resources under the authority of the MLA. The notice lists circumstances wherein operators are authorized to vent or flare methane without incurring royalty obligations.
+
+ The Obama Administration's Strategy targets methane control in the fossil energy sector through a number of agencies. Since its release, the Administration has proposed and promulgated a number of rulemakings, 71 including
+ An EPA rule to build on the 2012 NSPS "to set standards for methane and VOC emissions from new and modified oil and gas production sources, and natural gas processing and transmission sources" 72 (finalized on May 12, 2016). 73 The new standards set first-ever controls for methane emissions and extend controls for VOC emissions beyond the existing requirements to include new or modified hydraulically fractured oil wells, pneumatic pumps, compressor stations, and leak detection and repair at well sites, gathering and boosting stations, and processing plants. EPA estimates that the standards for new and modified sources are expected to reduce 510,000 short tons of methane in 2025—the equivalent of reducing 11 million metric tons of carbon dioxide—and yield net climate benefits of $170 million in 2025. The final rule also includes the issuance for public comment of an Information Collection Request (ICR) that would require companies to provide extensive information that would be instrumental for developing comprehensive regulations to reduce methane emissions from existing oil and gas sources.
+
+ An EPA proposal to extend VOC reduction requirements to existing oil and gas sources in ozone nonattainment areas and states in the Ozone Transport Region (proposed on August 18, 2015). 74 These requirements would be in the form of Control Techniques Guidelines and would be similar to the proposed NSPS. However, Control Techniques Guidelines do not apply any requirements directly to facilities; rather, they provide recommendations for state and local air agencies to consider in determining reasonably available control technology for reducing emissions from covered processes and equipment. States may use different technology and approaches, subject to EPA approval, provided they achieve the same level of emissions reductions as would be achieved under the guidelines.
+
+ An EPA rule to clarify the definitions for "major source" categories in the oil and natural gas sector for the purpose of permitting (finalized on May 12, 2016). 75 
+
+ An EPA initiative to expand voluntary efforts under the Natural Gas STAR program and provide several new mechanisms through which oil and gas companies could make and track commitments to reduce methane emissions (launched on March 30, 2016, with 41 founding partners). 76 
+
+ An EPA rule to strengthen its Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program to require reporting in all segments of the industry (finalized on October 22, 2015). 77 
+
+ A BLM proposal to update standards to reduce venting and flaring from oil and gas production on federal lands (proposed on January 22, 2016) 78 and an ANPRM to develop a program for the capture and sale or disposal of waste mine methane on lands leased by the federal government (released on April 28, 2014). 79 
+
+ Several Department of Transportation PHMSA proposals for natural gas pipeline safety standards. 80 
+
+ The President's FY2016 budget request for $15 million in funding for DOE to develop and demonstrate more cost-effective technologies to detect and reduce losses from natural gas transmission and distribution systems and $10 million in funding to launch a program to enhance the quantification of emissions from natural gas infrastructure.
+
+ DOE proposals to issue energy efficiency standards for natural gas and air compressors, advance research and development to bring down the cost of detecting leaks, work with Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to modernize natural gas infrastructure, and partner with local distribution companies to accelerate pipeline repair and replacement at the local level.
+
+ DOE's Quadrennial Energy Review, which includes "additional policy recommendations and analysis on the environmental, safety, and economic benefits of investments that reduce natural gas system leakage." 81 
+ The Administration states that these proposals are key components under the CAP to put the United States on track to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas sector by 40%-45% from 2012 levels by 2025. The oil and natural gas industry has argued against the need for additional standards, contending that they are unnecessary (due to the historical decline in the sector's emissions), duplicative (of many state requirements), and a burden (as many domestic producers are already doing everything feasible to capture and reuse methane emissions for requisite safety and economic reasons). Health and environmental advocates welcomed the proposed and promulgated rules but suggested that the NSPS does not go far enough in addressing existing sources of emissions. 
+
+ With the issuance of the ICR, the possibility remains open for EPA to propose performance standards on methane emissions for existing sources in the future. That is, for certain pollutants, promulgation of NSPS under Section 111(b) triggers a mandatory EPA duty under CAA Section 111(d) to address existing sources in the same source category. At present, however, there is a looming legal question as to precisely what those "certain pollutants" are. This question of which pollutants trigger the Section 111(d) program for existing sources is likely to be front and center in the litigation over EPA's Clean Power Plan. 82 The answer provided by the courts could affect EPA's ability to move forward with regulation of existing sources of methane from the oil and natural gas sector.
+
+ Waste Management Sector 83 
+
+ Waste management sources of methane emissions include the following:
+ Landfills. Landfill gas—a mixture of roughly 50% methane, 50% CO 2 , and small amounts of other gases—is released into the atmosphere if not captured. The amount of gas produced at any given landfill depends on the amount of organic material in the waste, the landfill's design, the climate at the site of the landfill, and the operating practices used by the site's operator. In general, large amounts of organic waste and high levels of moisture in a landfill lead to greater gas production.
+
+ Wastewater t reatment. Wastewater from domestic and industrial sources is commonly treated to remove soluble organic matter and other contaminants. Soluble organic matter may be removed using biological processes in which microorganisms consume the organic matter for maintenance and growth. On occasion, these processes may be accidentally or deliberately managed under anaerobic conditions, producing methane.
+
+ Composting. Composting of organic waste—such as food waste, garden (yard) and park waste, and sludge—is a common practice in the United States. Methane is formed in anaerobic sections of the compost, but its impacts are generally mitigated due to oxygenation in the aerobic sections of the compost.
+ Waste management and treatment activities constituted approximately 23% of U.S. anthropogenic methane emissions in 2014. Landfills accounted for just over 20% of this total, the third-largest contribution of any methane source in the United States. Landfills emitted 148.0 million metric tons of CO 2 equivalents, or 2.2% of total U.S. GHG emissions (see Figure 1 ). 84 Although substantial, estimated methane emissions from landfills have declined 18.5% in recent years from a high of 181.7 million metric tons (MMT) in 1991 (see Figure 3 ). Additionally, wastewater treatment and composting of organic waste accounted for 2.0% and less than 0.3% of U.S. methane emissions, respectively. 
+
+ Currently, landfill gas is captured at the nation's largest landfills. A common landfill gas capture system consists of an arrangement of vertical wells and horizontal collectors usually installed after a landfill cell has been capped. A 1996 CAA regulation known as the "Landfill Gas Rule" established NSPS and guidelines that require landfills with a 2.5 MMT design capacity that accepted waste after November 8, 1987, to capture and burn the gas. The gas can be either flared or used for energy production—it is often used as fuel for electricity generation. In promulgating the 1996 rule, EPA said that the 2.5 MMT minimum "corresponds to cities greater than 100,000 people." The agency also stated that the regulations "will only affect less than 5 percent of all landfills" but would reduce emissions of methane by 37% at new landfills and by 39% at existing facilities. Partly as a result of the 1996 regulation, and partly due to tax incentives and voluntary programs, there were 648 operational methane capture projects at landfills as of March 2016. 85 This represents roughly one-third of the 1,800 to 1,900 municipal solid waste landfills reported in operation by EPA. 86 
+
+ Even under ideal conditions, the capture of landfill gas is a technical challenge in an operationally dynamic environment. Whatever success existing regulations, tax incentives, and voluntary programs may be having, a significant amount of methane continues to be emitted even at landfills subject to the Landfill Gas Rule. In addition, there are few methane capture projects at smaller landfills and at landfills that ceased operation before November 1987 (those not covered under the CAA). The latter group, numbering in the tens of thousands of sites, poses a particular challenge. But EPA notes that production of landfill gas diminishes over time, especially after a landfill is closed, 87 and there is often no responsible party who might implement a methane collection system if the site's original owner is no longer in business.
+
+ In response to the Administration's "Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions," EPA has reviewed the 1996 Landfill Gas Rule and Guideline. On July 14, 2016, the agency released revisions to the NSPS for new and modified landfills and to the Emission Guidelines for existing landfills. 88 The revised NSPS makes no change in the universe of new or modified landfills subject to its requirements: The threshold remains at 2.5 MMT of design capacity (or 2.5 million cubic meters of waste). But it does change the emission threshold at which landfills will be required to begin capturing landfill gases. Under the rule, EPA will require that a gas collection control system be installed and operational within 30 months after landfill gas emissions reach 34 metric tons of nonmethane organic compounds (NMOC) or more per year. Under the 1996 NSPS, this threshold was 50 metric tons per year. 89 
+
+ EPA expects relatively few landfills to be affected by the revised NSPS, because few new and modified landfills will be constructed. According to an agency fact sheet, 115 new, modified, or reconstructed landfills will be subject to the emission control requirements of the revised standards by 2025. Compared to the requirements of the 1996 standards, the revised standards would reduce annual methane emissions by an additional 44,000 metric tons beginning in 2025. This would be the equivalent of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 1.1 MMT per year, less than 1% of current estimated landfill emissions. 90 
+
+ The revised guidelines for existing landfills will require the installation of landfill gas collection and control systems at active landfills that emit more than 34 metric tons of NMOC annually, as well. The annual threshold has been 50 metric tons under the 1996 guidelines. Closed landfills will remain subject to the 1996 threshold of 50 metric tons per year, however. 
+
+ As a result of the lower threshold for active landfills, EPA estimates that the emission control requirements will apply at 731 existing open and closed landfills, as compared to 638 facilities currently subject to emission control requirements. Methane emissions are expected to be reduced by 290,000 metric tons annually beginning in 2025 at these existing facilities, compared to the 1996 guideline requirements (the equivalent of reducing 7.1 MMT of CO 2 ). This would be a 5% reduction from the current level of landfill methane emissions. 91 
+
+ Issues in Measurement 92 
+
+ Unlike CO 2 , whose emissions are reported using well-tracked energy statistics, 93 methane is emitted to the atmosphere primarily through fugitive releases of the gas (e.g., leaks in infrastructure, vapors from landfills, eructation [i.e., belching or flatulence] from livestock). By definition, fugitive emissions are diffuse, transitory, and elusive. Thus, one of the greater difficulties in understanding the impacts of methane emissions is acquiring comprehensive and consistent observational data. Broadly, there are two approaches to measuring fugitive emissions of methane: "bottom-up" and "top-down." Each approach has its respective strengths, weaknesses, and uncertainties. At present, the difference in data acquisition and analysis between these two approaches has returned competing—and occasionally conflicting—emission estimates.
+ Bottom- u p a pproaches . Bottom-up methodologies begin by directly measuring the emissions from a number of randomly selected pieces of equipment or activities to determine an average "emission factor" for each type. Emissions for the entire industry are then estimated by multiplying these emission factors by the activity levels for each component (e.g., the total population of livestock and its diet, the number of oil and gas wellheads and other components, or the volume of landfill material). Thus, while the inventory is supported by initial direct measurements, the final results are statistical averages derived through computation and may not reflect actual emissions in the field. Because the quality of methane data for some sources can be either absent or highly variable, bottom-up emission estimates entail considerable uncertainty.
+
+ Top- d own a pproaches . Other studies use "top-down" methodologies for the calculation of leakage (e.g., satellite observations, ambient atmospheric measurements, and geostatistical inverse modeling). Atmospheric studies use data sets of ambient concentrations of methane and related hydrocarbons in the vicinity of the targeted industry, along with the known emission profiles for these gases from industry operations, to infer the emissions from the sectors. (That is, these methodologies capture methane emissions from all natural, agricultural, and industrial activities. Researchers must then parse data estimates for attribution to their appropriate sources using such analyses as isotopic ratios or prevalence signatures from accompanying nonmethane hydrocarbons.) Due to the technology requirements, these studies are rarer than bottom-up approaches. As with the bottom-up approaches, different top-down studies have returned different emission estimates. Further, reported emission rates have varied considerably across different regions, making source attribution highly uncertain at the national level.
+ In general, top-down methodologies have returned higher emission estimates than bottom-up approaches. Reasons for this discrepancy include (1) researchers may be attributing naturally occurring methane emissions to man-made sources; (2) researchers may be attributing emissions inaccurately from one man-made sector to another; (3) atmospheric measurements may capture emissions that are not accounted for in EPA's Inventory (e.g., leakage from abandoned gas wells); (4) atmospheric measurements capture all the gross emitters, accidents, spills, and human errors, whereas component measurements use emission factors averaged over instances of "normal operation"; and (5) atmospheric studies may be biased to regions where there is known leakage.
+
+ Currently, the primary source of information on methane emissions in the United States is EPA's annually published Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks . EPA's Inventory is a "bottom-up" approach, employing commonly accepted emission factors and activity levels to calculate aggregate estimates for all source categories. Methodologies for the Inventory are based primarily on 2006 guidelines released by the IPCC 94 and supplemented with additional domestic information where available. 95 Bottom-up methodologies are used also for EPA's Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, 96 as well as the Energy Information Administration's Natural Gas Annual . Further, there are many examples of state, 97 local, and nongovernmental inventories 98 commissioned by a range of stakeholders—from regional and municipal agencies to community groups and academic institutions.
+
+ Due to the differences in emission factors, industry reporting, and levels of uncertainty, current inventories have returned a variety of emission estimates. These differences have also contributed to periodic revisions to EPA's Inventory, and these revisions have returned occasionally significant fluctuations in reporting. (For example, emission estimates in the Inventory for natural gas systems have fluctuated between 96.4 MMTCO 2 e and 221.2 MMTCO 2 e over the past several years due primarily to changes in reporting methodology.) These periodic revisions have made it challenging to analyze trends in emissions. Furthermore, EPA's Inventory has been challenged by a number of academic studies as both over- and under-reporting methane releases from man-made sources. (As examples, a 2015 study by Yale researchers concludes that methane emissions from U.S. landfills may be double EPA's estimates; 99 a 2014 study by federal and academic researchers suggests that methane emissions from gas-producing areas in Colorado are as much as three times higher than EPA inventories; 100 a 2013 paper published by Harvard University researchers and federal scientists reports that EPA's oil and gas figures may be underestimated in some cases by as much as 50%; 101 a February 2014 study by Stanford University researchers estimates that methane leakage from natural gas lines and other sources could be 50% higher than current EPA estimates; 102 and, conversely, an April 2016 paper by New Zealand researchers reports that increases in global methane emissions since 2006 are predominantly biogenic, as fossil fuel emissions were seen to have stagnated or diminished.) 103 
+
+ The White House Strategy proposes actions to enhance U.S. methane measurement in support of two broad goals: (1) improving the bottom-up emission data relevant for mitigation, and (2) advancing the science and technology for monitoring and validating atmospheric concentrations. 104 Actions in the Strategy include efforts to (1) enhance EPA's Inventory through new scientific evidence and data sources, (2) encourage the development of cost-effective measurement technologies through funding at DOE's Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy, (3) maintain and further develop a nationwide methane monitoring network through funding at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 105 and (4) improve local, regional, and global emission modeling at EPA and DOE. EPA is already in the process of outlining a comprehensive strategy for significantly improving its methodology for estimating emissions from the oil and natural gas sector. This effort is in response to recommendations made by an EPA inspector general report. 106 Moving forward, the Strategy will need to find a way to harmonize the differences in reporting between the bottom-up and top-down studies, dampen the artificial annual fluctuations in reported estimates, and provide more transparent and unbiased source data in order to guarantee credibility in EPA's Inventory for all stakeholders and fairness in any subsequent rulemaking.
+
+ Cost-Benefit Analysis
+
+ Efforts to protect the environment and conserve natural resources are generally assessed by how much they benefit human health and welfare. Often, these benefits are weighed against the economic costs incurred by the affected industries in an effort to determine the "net costs" or "net benefits" of a given action. Such an accounting is commonly referred to as cost-benefit analysis (CBA). One challenge in conducting CBA is that costs and benefits may not be quantified and translated comprehensively into monetary terms. Further, even if the costs and benefits can be accurately estimated, criticisms arise from the fact that benefits may accrue to individuals or groups other than those paying the up-front costs. 
+
+ Both EPA and BLM considered the costs and the benefits of their respective rulemakings stemming from the Administration's Methane Strategy. These considerations were conducted as required by statute (e.g., CAA, 107 MLA 108 ) and by orders and guidance from the Administration (e.g., Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review, Executive Order 13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, and Circular A-4 from the Office of Management and Budget). 109 Neither the CAA nor the MLA requires that the regulatory agency set the level of control based on CBA. However, developing and considering CBA, as well as producing a Regulatory Impact Analysis and other administrative addenda, is required by executive orders. 110 Specifically, the executive orders encourage agencies to "propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs." As such, to the extent allowed by law, 111 the agencies have generally sought options that yield only net benefits (i.e., that are worth more to society than they cost).
+
+ In their respective analyses, the agencies calculated regulatory compliance costs for the affected industry to include initial capital costs and annualized engineering costs. These calculations incorporated estimates for new technology investment, increased monitoring and reporting requirements, and the adoption of additional management or workplace practices. Costs were then adjusted for the estimated revenues generated from the recovered natural gas and other products that would otherwise have been vented or flared. 
+
+ The agencies calculated regulatory benefits in both monetized and non-monetized terms. Monetized benefits included those from reductions in methane emissions, which were valued using the social cost of methane (SC-CH 4 ). 112 Non-monetized benefits included estimates for improvements in ambient air quality and reductions in negative health effects associated with exposure to hazardous air pollutants, ozone, and particulate matter, which the agencies determined could not be adequately monetized with the data currently available. In addition to these health improvements, non-monetized benefits included improvements in visibility, ecosystem effects, and additional natural gas recovery. 
+
+ EPA reported the net monetized benefits of the final oil and gas NSPS to be $180 million in 2025 and the net monetized benefits of the final landfill NSPS and emissions guidelines to be $452 million in 2025. BLM reported the net monetized benefits of the proposed venting and flaring rule to be $43 million to $48 million in 2025. The agencies stated that these estimates were conservative (i.e., that assumptions and errors were more likely to minimize benefits than maximize them). However, some stakeholders have called into question several of the agencies' assumptions, including the choice of discount rate, the projected volume of and prices for recovered products, the value and validity of the SC-CH 4 metric, and the failure to monetize reductions in other pollutants. 
+
+ Conclusion
+
+ For a variety of economic, environmental, and public health and safety reasons, various stakeholders have sought policies to reduce, capture, and reuse methane emissions for the past several decades. But emissions of methane have proven difficult to measure and hard to control. Their naturally occurring presence in the environment, their wide and varied sources of emissions, and the fugitive nature of their release have contributed to these difficulties. Nevertheless, methane is a valuable resource. Its dual nature as both pollutant and commodity has offered a unique opportunity for control, and many strategies have attempted to capitalize on the economics of recovery. Whether a given control strategy is effective and cost-efficient for a given industry depends upon a number of factors, including (1) the nature and extent of the emissions, (2) the technology available for capture, and (3) the market price for the recovered products. (For example, with declining natural gas prices, the economics of capture technology are less favorable.) Some significant efforts have been made by industry and some state regulators to address methane emissions in their particular localities. For its part, the federal government has contributed funding for research and technology development, voluntary guidelines and tax incentives for industry, rules for mineral rights lessees on federal lands, and, on occasion, air pollution standards.
+
+ While the most current data on domestic methane emissions show a 5% decrease over the past two decades, the source categories that have contributed to these reductions are few (i.e., landfills, coal mines, and natural gas systems). While these industries have made noteworthy strides in emission reductions through a combination of best management practices and the co-benefits provided by other air pollution standards, they may represent only the "low-hanging fruit." Other sources of methane emissions have confronted greater challenges. They may lack adequately demonstrated control technologies or cost-effective opportunities. They may not co-emit methane with other air pollutants and thus may lack the "co-benefits" accrued through other air quality standards. Some of these sources have seen recent or sustained increases in emissions (e.g., petroleum systems and manure management, respectively). Other sources (e.g., enteric fermentation and wastewater treatment) have gone unaddressed for decades, as no economically viable technology solution has been offered.
+
+ The Obama Administration's recent Strategy—as well as a variety of recent proposals in Congress—attests to the continued interest in better emission assessments and appropriate policy responses. In considering strategies moving forward, it may be useful to ask the following questions:
+ 1. Is the current set of methodologies used for measurement adequate to rationalize and/or prioritize the appropriate controls?
+
+ 2. Is the projected rise in domestic fossil fuel production and petrochemical manufacturing significant enough to rationalize and/or prioritize additional controls?
+
+ 3. Is the recent rate of increase in observed emissions expected to continue; or, if not, are the long-run decreases sufficient enough to discharge the public health, safety, and environmental concerns? 
+
+ 4. To what extent might fluctuations in the market price of crude oil and natural gas affect industry and regulatory efforts to mitigate and/or recover methane emissions? Will changes in the natural gas industry result in fewer small companies and a greater market share for large companies, which may already have control practices in place?
+
+ 5. To what extent may recently promulgated and proposed rulemaking for air pollutants commonly co-emitted with methane also serve the co-benefit of reducing methane emissions (e.g., the NSPS for VOCs on the oil and gas production sector and the petroleum refinery sector, and the revised National Ambient Air Quality Standard for ozone)?
+
+ 6. To what extent may the recently promulgated and proposed rulemakings for methane emissions in the oil and natural gas sector and the landfill sector serve to (1) curb emissions from both new and existing sources in each sector and (2) curb the aggregate of all domestic emissions?
+
+ 7. If further reductions are under consideration for a given source category, should the response come from the federal government, state governments, the industries, or the market? 
+
+ 8. If further reductions are under consideration for a given source category, which policy tool(s) would be most appropriate: (1) increased funding for technology research, (2) expanded public-private demonstration projects with industry, (3) regionally targeted or state-sponsored guidance or rulemaking, (4) methane-specific state or federal command-and-control air pollution standards, or (5) economy-wide market-based mechanisms for either ozone or GHG controls? 
+
+ 9. How should the burden of GHG reductions be distributed among the various GHG emissions sources?
+
+ 10. How should methane's other environmental benefits (in comparison to oil and coal combustion) be weighed in the context of its GHG control?
+ 
+
+ Appendix A.
+
+ Recent Legislative Proposals
+
+ 
+ 
+ Table A-1. A Selection of Recent Legislative Proposals with Methane Components
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Cong.
+
+ 
+ 
+ Bill No.
+
+ 
+ 
+ Bill Title
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sponsor
+
+ 
+ 
+ Last Action
+
+ 
+ 
+ Methane Component
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 5668 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Transparency and Honesty in Energy Regulations Act of 2016
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Jenkins, Evan H.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 07/07/2016: Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would prohibit the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from taking the social cost of carbon or the social cost of methane into account when taking any action and for other purposes.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 5538 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Calvert, Ken
+
+ 
+ 
+ 7/14/2016: Passed House by the Yeas and Nays: 231 - 196 (Roll no. 477).
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would prohibit any funds made available in the act to be used to develop, propose, finalize, implement, or enforce (1) any rule or guideline to address methane emissions from sources in the oil and natural gas sector under Sections 111(b) or (d) of the CAA; (2) any rule changing the term "adjacent" for purposes of defining "stationary source" and "major source" as applied to the oil and gas sector under the CAA; and (3) proposed Draft Control Techniques Guidelines for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 4037 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Keeping Oil and Natural Gas Flowing for Consumers Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Fleming, John
+
+ 
+ 
+ 11/20/2015: referred to the Subcommittee on Energy and Power.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would prohibit EPA from proposing, finalizing, implementing, or enforcing any prohibition or restriction under the CAA with respect to the emission of methane from the oil and natural gas source category.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 3289 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Natural Gas Environmental and Economic Security Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Lowenthal, Alan S.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 7/29/2015: referred to the Committee on Natural Resources.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would aim to prevent the waste of gas produced under oil and gas leases on federal land and to collect royalty on all gas production.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 3140 
+
+ 
+ 
+ AMPLE Oil and Gas Royalties Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Lipinski, Daniel
+
+ 
+ 
+ 8/4/2015: referred to the Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would require federal oil and gas leases to report and pay royalties on oil and gas production based on the actual volume of oil and gas withdrawn under a lease.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 2822 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Calvert, Ken
+
+ 
+ 
+ 7/8/2015: Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union rises leaving H.R. 2822 as unfinished business.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would prohibit any funds made available in the act to be used to promulgate or implement any regulation requiring the issuance of permits under Title V of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7661 et seq.) for carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, water vapor, or methane emissions resulting from biological processes associated with livestock production.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 2202 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tax Pollution, Not Profits Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Delaney, John K.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 5/1/2015: referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would amend the Internal Revenue Code to impose an excise tax on GHG emissions, including methane, from fossil fuel products and from any facility that is required to report emissions or to which emissions are attributed. The tax is equal to $30 per metric ton of CO 2 or CO 2 equivalent in 2016, increasing each subsequent year at 4% above inflation.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 2142 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Capitalizing on American Methane Act of 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Thompson, Glenn
+
+ 
+ 
+ 4/30/2015: referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would amend the Internal Revenue Code to include in the tax credit for investment in a qualifying gasification project any qualified methane conversion technology.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 2111 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Wasteful EPA Programs Elimination Act of 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Johnson, Sam
+
+ 
+ 
+ 08/18/2015: Referred to the Subcommittee on Environment.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would prohibit EPA from using any funds to implement an ozone standard, including any national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard for ozone promulgated (or revised) under Section 109 of the Clean Air Act, and eliminate funding for the Global Methane Initiative, among other EPA GHG programs.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 1971 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Climate Solutions Act of 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Lieu, Ted
+
+ 
+ 
+ 4/24/2015: referred to the Subcommittee on Energy and Power.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would require the EPA Administrator to promulgate annual GHG emission reduction targets, inclusive of methane, for each of calendar years 2030 through 2050.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 1926 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Robert C. Byrd Mine Safety Protection Act of 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Scott, Robert C. "Bobby"
+
+ 
+ 
+ 11/16/2015: referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations requiring that mining equipment used in a coal mine incorporate an atmospheric monitoring and recording device that samples and records the methane, oxygen, carbon monoxide, and coal dust levels in the mine. The bill was introduced in the 112 th Congress as S. 3443 and the 113 th Congress as S. 805 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 1806 
+
+ 
+ 
+ America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Smith, Lamar
+
+ 
+ 
+ Passed House; 5/21/2015: received in the Senate and read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would amend Section 302(g) of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7602(g)) by adding "The term 'air pollutant' does not include carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, or sulfur hexafluoride."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 1487 
+
+ 
+ 
+ American Energy Renaissance Act of 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Bridenstine, Jim
+
+ 
+ 
+ 4/8/2015: referred to the Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would amend Section 302(g) of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7602(g)) by adding "The term 'air pollutant' does not include carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, or sulfur hexafluoride."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 972 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Managed Carbon Price Act of 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. McDermott, Jim
+
+ 
+ 
+ 2/20/2015: referred to the Subcommittee on Energy and Power.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would amend the Internal Revenue Code to require U.S. coal producers, oil refinery operators, first sellers of natural gas, and producers of other GHG emission substances and importers of any GHG emission substance to purchase a federal emission permit from the Department of the Treasury for the sale, combustion, or other use of a GHG emission substance and would establish emission reduction targets for 2016 through 2060 decreasing from 90% to 20% of the CO 2 equivalents emitted in the United States in 2005.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 508 
+
+ 
+ 
+ SUPER Act of 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Peters, Scott H.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 1/23/2015: referred to the Subcommittee on Energy and Power.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would require the President to establish a task force on short-lived climate pollutants including methane. The task force would review existing and potential policies that promote emissions reduction, identify duplications and gaps in current programs, recommend efficiencies, and identify, compile, evaluate, and develop best practices. The bill was introduced in the 113 th Congress as H.R. 1943 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 2399 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Climate Protection and Justice Act of 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Sanders, Bernard
+
+ 
+ 
+ 12/10/2015: referred to the Committee on Finance.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would require the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Administrator, to impose a fee on any manufacturer, producer, or importer of a carbon polluting substance to be assessed on a per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent content.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 2089 
+
+ 
+ 
+ American Energy Innovation Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Cantwell, Maria
+
+ 
+ 
+ 09/29/2015: placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 241.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would provide for the Secretary of Energy to make grants to eligible entities to accelerate or expand utility programs that improve the safety and environmental performance of natural gas distribution systems, based on, among other provisions, the project's magnitude of methane emission reductions.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 2076 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Super Pollutants Act of 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Murphy, Chris
+
+ 
+ 
+ 9/24/2015: referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would establish a task force to review policies and measures to promote, and develop best practices for, reduction of short-lived climate pollutants including methane. The bill was introduced in the 113 th Congress as S. 2911.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 1645 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Murkowski, Lisa
+
+ 
+ 
+ 6/23/2015: placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 126.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would prohibit any funds made available in the act to be used to promulgate or implement any regulation requiring the issuance of permits under Title V of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7661 et seq.) for CO 2 , nitrous oxide, water vapor, or methane emissions resulting from biological processes associated with livestock production.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 1548 
+
+ 
+ 
+ American Opportunity Carbon Fee Act of 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Whitehouse, Sheldon
+
+ 
+ 
+ 6/10/2015: read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide for CO 2 and other GHG emission fees, including supplemental fees for escaped methane from coal, petroleum, and natural gas production activities. Further, the bill would establish and implement a program to provide for the collection of data on methane emissions by major non-natural sources, including methane emissions attributable to the extraction and distribution of coal, petroleum products, and natural gas.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 1264 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Renewable Electricity Standard Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Udall, Tom
+
+ 
+ 
+ 5/19/2015: Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Hearings held.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would amend the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 to establish a renewable electricity standard, including landfill methane as a category of biogas.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 1215 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Methane Hydrate Research and Development Amendments Act of 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Murkowski, Lisa 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 5/19/2015: Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Hearings held.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would amend the Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act of 2000 to provide for the development of methane hydrate as a commercially viable source of energy.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 1208 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Pipeline Modernization and Consumer Protection Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Markey, Edward J.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 5/6/2015: read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would require operators of a gas pipeline facility, in accordance with an integrity management program, to accelerate the repair, rehabilitation, and replacement of gas piping or equipment that is leaking or may pose high risk of leaking. Further, the bill would direct the administrator of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to issue nonbinding best practices guidelines for identifying and classifying high-risk pipeline infrastructure and leaks for repair or replacement.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 1145 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Robert C. Byrd Mine Safety Protection Act of 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Casey, Robert P., Jr.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 4/30/2015: read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations requiring that mining equipment used in a coal mine incorporate an atmospheric monitoring and recording device that samples and records the methane, oxygen, carbon monoxide, and coal dust levels in the mine. The bill was introduced in the 112 th Congress as S. 3443 and the 113 th Congress as S. 805 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 828 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Fracturing Regulations are Effective in State Hands Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Inhofe, James M.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 3/19/2015: read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would give states the sole authority to promulgate or enforce any regulation, guidance, or permit requirement regarding hydraulic fracturing on or under any land within their boundaries.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 791 ( H.R. 3880 includes similar provisions.)
+
+ 
+ 
+ American Energy Renaissance Act of 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Cruz, Ted
+
+ 
+ 
+ 3/18/2015: read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would amend Section 302(g) of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7602(g)) by adding "The term 'air pollutant' does not include carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, or sulfur hexafluoride."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 3895 
+
+ ( H.R. 4286 , H.R. 4304 , and S. 2170 include similar provisions.)
+
+ 
+ 
+ Energy Exploration and Production to Achieve National Demand Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Duncan, Jeff
+
+ 
+ 
+ 6/20/2014: referred to House subcommittee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have aimed to reduce or eliminate financial, regulatory, and technical barriers to energy exploration and production. It would have amended Section 302(g) of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7602(g)) by adding "The term 'air pollutant' does not include carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, or sulfur hexafluoride." 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 3547 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Smith, Lamar
+
+ 
+ 
+ 1/17/2014: became P.L. 113-76 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill prohibited any funds made available in the act to be used to promulgate or implement any regulation requiring the issuance of permits under Title V of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7661 et seq.) for CO 2 , nitrous oxide, water vapor, or methane emissions resulting from biological processes associated with livestock production.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 3424 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Converting Methane Into Petroleum Act of 2013
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Larson, John B.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 10/30/2013: referred to House committee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have amended the Internal Revenue Code to (1) include in the tax credit for investment in a qualifying gasification project any qualified methane conversion technology, and (2) allow an alternative fuel excise tax credit for liquid fuel produced through qualified methane conversion technology at a facility. It defined "qualified methane conversion technology" as a process for the molecular conversion of methane into other hydrocarbons and the use of such hydrocarbons to replace or reduce the quantity of petroleum present in motor vehicle fuel and for the production of chemicals.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.Amdt. 507 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Amendment to H.R. 2728 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Holt, Rush
+
+ 
+ 
+ 11/20/2013: House amendment not agreed to; failed by recorded vote: 190-230 (Roll no. 601).
+
+ 
+ 
+ Amendment would have allowed the Secretary of the Interior to issue regulations to reduce methane emissions from oil and gas drilling operations on public lands.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 1943 
+
+ 
+ 
+ SUPER Act of 2013
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Peters, Scott H.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 5/10/2013: referred to House subcommittee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have required the President to establish a task force on short-lived climate pollutants including methane. The task force would review existing and potential policies that promote emissions reduction, identify duplications and gaps in current programs, recommend efficiencies, and identify, compile, evaluate, and develop best practices.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.Amdt. 512 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Amendment to H.R. 1900 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Tonko, Paul
+
+ 
+ 
+ 11/21/2013: House amendment not agreed to; failed by recorded vote: 183-233 (Roll no. 605).
+
+ 
+ 
+ The amendment would have required an application for a natural gas pipeline to include information ensuring that methane emissions would be minimized before such application can be considered for approval.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 621 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Ensuring Affordable Energy Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Poe, Ted
+
+ 
+ 
+ 2/15/2013: referred to House subcommittee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have prohibited any funds appropriated or otherwise available for the EPA Administrator from being used to implement or enforce (1) a cap-and-trade program, or (2) any statutory or regulatory requirement pertaining to emissions of one or more GHGs, including methane, from stationary sources.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 83 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Christensen, Donna M.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 12/16/2014: became P.L. 113-235 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill prohibited any funds made available in the act to be used to promulgate or implement any regulation requiring the issuance of permits under Title V of the CAA Act (42 U.S.C. 7661 et seq.) for CO 2 , nitrous oxide, water vapor, or methane emissions resulting from biological processes associated with livestock production and any provision in a rule requiring mandatory reporting of GHG emissions from manure management systems.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 2940 
+
+ 
+ 
+ American Opportunity Carbon Fee Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Whitehouse, Sheldon
+
+ 
+ 
+ 11/19/2014: referred to Senate committee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have amended the Internal Revenue Code to impose a fee on (1) fossil fuel products including coal, petroleum products, and natural gas, for CO 2 emissions; and (2) emissions of any GHG, including methane, from any GHG emission source. The bill would have established, implemented, and reported on a program to collect data on methane emissions by major non-natural sources, including emissions attributable to the extraction and distribution of coal, petroleum products, and natural gas.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 2911 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Super Pollutants Act of 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Murphy, Chris, and Sen. Collins, Susan
+
+ 
+ 
+ 12/2/2014: Committee on Environment and Public Works. Hearings held.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have established a task force to review policies and measures to promote, and develop best practices for, reduction of short-lived climate pollutants including methane.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 2739 
+
+ ( H.R. 860 includes similar provisions.)
+
+ 
+ 
+ Biogas Investment Tax Credit Act of 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Schumer, Charles
+
+ 
+ 
+ 7/31/2014: referred to Senate committee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have amended the Internal Revenue Code to allow for an energy tax credit through 2018 for investment in qualified biogas property, among other things. Eligible qualified biogas property was defined as including systems that use anaerobic digesters or other biological, chemical, thermal, or mechanical processes (alone or in combination) to convert biomass into methane for use as a fuel. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 805 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Robert C. Byrd Mine and Workplace Safety and Health Act of 2013
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Rockefeller, John D., IV
+
+ 
+ 
+ 4/24/2013: referred to Senate committee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations requiring that mining equipment used in a coal mine incorporate an atmospheric monitoring and recording device that samples and records the methane, oxygen, carbon monoxide, and coal dust levels in the mine. The bill was introduced in the 112 th Congress as S. 3443 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 332 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Climate Protection Act of 2013
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Sanders, Bernard
+
+ 
+ 
+ 2/14/2013: referred to Senate committee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have required the EPA Administrator to impose a fee on any manufacturer, producer, or importer of a GHG polluting substance and submit to Congress a report describing the quantity of fugitive methane emissions emitted as a result of any leak in natural gas infrastructure, including recommendations for eliminating each such leak.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 112
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 6212 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Biogas Investment Tax Credit Act of 2012
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Kind, Ron
+
+ 
+ 
+ 7/26/2012: referred to House committee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have amended the Internal Revenue Code to allow for an energy tax credit through 2018 for investment in qualified biogas property. Eligible qualified biogas property was defined as including systems that use anaerobic digesters or other biological, chemical, thermal, or mechanical processes (alone or in combination) to convert biomass into methane for use as a fuel.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 112
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 2055 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Culberson, John Abney
+
+ 
+ 
+ 12/23/2011: became P.L. 112-74 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill prohibited any funds made available in the act or any other act to be used to promulgate or implement any regulation requiring the issuance of permits under Title V of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7661 et seq.) for CO 2 , nitrous oxide, water vapor, or methane emissions resulting from biological processes associated with livestock production.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 112
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 199 
+
+ ( S. 231 and S.Amdt. 215 to S. 493 include similar provisions.)
+
+ 
+ 
+ Protect America's Energy and Manufacturing Jobs Act of 2011
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Capito, Shelley Moore
+
+ 
+ 
+ 2/1/2011: referred to House subcommittee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have suspended, during the two-year period beginning on the date of enactment of the act, any EPA action under the CAA with respect to CO 2 or methane pursuant to certain proceedings, other than with respect to motor vehicle emissions. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 112
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 153 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Ensuring Affordable Energy Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Poe, Ted
+
+ 
+ 
+ 2/1/2011: referred to House subcommittee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have prohibited any funds appropriated or otherwise available for the EPA Administrator from being used to implement or enforce (1) a cap-and-trade program, or (2) any statutory or regulatory requirement pertaining to emissions of one or more GHGs, including methane, from stationary sources.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 112
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 97 
+
+ ( H.R. 1023 , H.R. 1287 , H.R. 1292 , H.R. 1777 , H.R. 3400 , H.R. 4301 , S. 706 , S. 1720 , S. 2199 , and S. 2365 include similar provisions.)
+
+ 
+ 
+ Free Industry Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Blackburn, Marsha
+
+ 
+ 
+ 2/1/2011: referred to House subcommittee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have amended Section 302(g) of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7602(g)) by adding "The term 'air pollutant' does not include carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, or sulfur hexafluoride." Some similar bills focused solely on the exclusion of agricultural emissions. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 112
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 3443 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Robert C. Byrd Mine and Workplace Safety and Health Act of 2012
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Rockefeller, John D., IV
+
+ 
+ 
+ 7/25/2012: referred to Senate committee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations requiring that mining equipment used in a coal mine incorporate an atmospheric monitoring and recording device that samples and records the methane, oxygen, carbon monoxide, and coal dust levels in the mine.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 6511 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Ensuring Affordable Energy Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Poe, Ted
+
+ 
+ 
+ 12/9/2010: referred to House committee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have prohibited any funds appropriated or otherwise available for the EPA Administrator from being used to implement or enforce (1) a cap-and-trade program, or (2) any statutory or regulatory requirement pertaining to emissions of one or more GHGs, including methane, from stationary sources.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 4753 
+
+ ( S. 3072 includes similar provisions.)
+
+ 
+ 
+ Stationary Source Regulations Delay Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Rahall, Nick J., II
+
+ 
+ 
+ 3/4/2010: referred to House committee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have suspended, during the two-year period beginning on the date of enactment of the act, any EPA action under the CAA with respect to CO 2 or methane pursuant to certain proceedings, other than with respect to motor vehicle emissions. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 3598 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Energy and Water Research Integration Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Gordon, Bart
+
+ 
+ 
+ 12/1/2009: passed/agreed to in House by voice vote. 12/2/2009: referred to Senate committee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have directed the Secretary of Energy to identify each of DOE's energy research, development, and demonstration programs and projects into which it would be appropriate to integrate water considerations. This included developing a strategic plan to evaluate and establish technical milestones for technologies to treat and utilize produced waters discharged from oil, natural gas, coalbed methane, and mining activities, among others.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 3534 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Rahall, Nick J., II
+
+ 
+ 
+ 7/30/2010: passed/agreed to in House by the Yeas and Nays: 209-193, 1 Present (Roll no. 513). 8/4/2010: placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill, as introduced in the House, would have amended the Mineral Leasing Act (30 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) to require any federal coal lease and any modification of an existing coal lease to include terms that establish (1) the inclusion of methane released in conjunction with mining activities within the scope of the lease if the United States owns both the coal and gas resources, (2) a requirement that the lessee recover the associated methane to the maximum feasible extent, (3) a requirement to analyze the extent to which associated methane can be economically captured, and (4) a requirement that any federal coal mine methane resources that are captured and used or sold pursuant to a federal coal lease be subject to a royalty of not less than 12.5%. (These provisions were not included in the bill as reported or engrossed in the House or placed on the Senate calendar.)
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 2454 
+
+ 
+ 
+ American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Waxman, Henry A.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 6/26/2009: passed/agreed to in House; passed by recorded vote: 219-212 (Roll no. 477). 7/7/2009: placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have set forth provisions concerning clean energy, energy efficiency, reducing global warming pollution, transitioning to a clean energy economy, and providing for agriculture and forestry related offsets. The bill would have required the EPA Administrator to establish a cap-and-trade system for GHG emissions and set goals for reducing such emissions from covered sources by 83% of 2005 levels by 2050. Methane was defined as a GHG, given a GWP of 25, and included in the offset program. Any source category that was responsible for at least 10% of the uncapped methane emissions in 2005 was covered under the program. Methane recovered from landfill gas, wastewater treatment gas, coal mine methane used to generate electricity at or near the mine mouth, and qualified waste-to-energy projects were covered under the program's renewable electricity standard. The bill would have explicitly exempted agriculture from the cap-and-trade program. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 1426 
+
+ ( H.R. 527 includes similar provisions.)
+
+ 
+ 
+ To amend the Clean Air Act to prohibit the issuance of permits under title V of that act for certain emissions from agricultural production
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Lucas, Frank D.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 3/12/2009: referred to House subcommittee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have amended the CAA to prohibit the issuance of permits under Title V of that act for any CO 2 , nitrogen oxide, water vapor, or methane emissions resulting from biological processes associated with livestock production. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 1158 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Biogas Production Incentive Act of 2009
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Higgins, Brian
+
+ 
+ 
+ 2/24/2009: referred to House committee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have amended the Internal Revenue Code to allow for an energy tax credit for investment in qualified biogas property. Eligible qualified biogas property was defined as including systems that use anaerobic digesters or other biological, chemical, thermal, or mechanical processes (alone or in combination) to convert biomass into methane for use as a fuel.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 469 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Produced Water Utilization Act of 2009
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Hall, Ralph M.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 2/11/2009: passed House on voice vote. 2/12/2009: received in Senate and referred to committee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have set forth provisions for the Secretary of Energy to encourage research, development, and demonstration of technologies to facilitate the utilization of water produced in connection with the development of domestic energy resources including coalbed methane, oil, natural gas, or any other substance to be used as an energy source.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111
+
+ 
+ 
+ H.R. 391 
+
+ 
+ 
+ To amend the Clean Air Act to provide that greenhouse gases are not subject to the act, and for other purposes
+
+ 
+ 
+ Rep. Blackburn, Marsha
+
+ 
+ 
+ 1/14/2009: referred to House subcommittee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have amended Section 302(g) of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7602(g)) by adding "The term 'air pollutant' does not include carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, or sulfur hexafluoride." Some similar bills focused on this definition solely with respect to agricultural emissions.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 2729 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Clean Energy Partnerships Act of 2009
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Stabenow, Debbie
+
+ 
+ 
+ 11/4/2009: referred to Senate committee.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have set forth provisions to establish a program to govern the creation of credits from emission reductions from uncapped domestic sources and sinks. The bill would have required the Secretary of Agriculture and the EPA Administrator to establish a cap-and-trade system for GHG emissions. Methane controls were an eligible offset activity and included collection and combustion projects at mines, landfills, natural gas systems; manure management, composting, or anaerobic digestion; recycling and waste minimization; rice cultivation; and animal management practices including dietary modifications and pasture-based livestock systems. Further, the bill would have exempted the requirement to hold allowances for emissions resulting from the use of gas as an energy source if the gas was derived from a domestic methane offset project. The bill included research and demonstration assistance for approaches to reducing methane emissions associated with agricultural production (including livestock and crop production), including quantification of those reductions.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 1733 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Kerry, John F.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 2/2/2010: reported out of the Committee on Environment and Public Works; placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have set forth provisions concerning the reduction of global warming pollution, energy efficiency, renewable energy, water efficiency, green jobs and worker transition, and adaptation to the impacts of climate change. The bill would have required the EPA Administrator to establish a cap-and-trade system for GHG emissions. Methane was defined as a GHG, given a GWP of 25, and included in the offset program. Eligible offset activity included methane collection and combustion projects at active underground coal mines, landfills, oil and natural gas systems, and manure management and biogas facilities.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111
+
+ 
+ 
+ S. 1462 
+
+ 
+ 
+ American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sen. Bingaman, Jeff
+
+ 
+ 
+ 7/16/2009: placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The bill would have required the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, to support a civilian research program to develop advanced membrane technology that would be used in the separation of gases from applications, including those that pull gases from landfills and separate out methane.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Source: CRS.
+
+ Notes: This section was prepared with the assistance of [author name scrubbed], Information Research Specialist. The table lists only those bills that specifically mention "methane." Bills are ordered by Congress, split between the House and the Senate, and arranged by bill number starting with the most recent. If similar language is contained in different bills from the same Congress, the first bill introduced is presented in the table (with the subsequent bill numbers given in parentheses).
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendix B.
+
+ Recent Executive Branch Initiatives
+
+ 
+ 
+ A Selected Chronology of Recent Executive Branch Initiatives
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ June 25, 2013
+
+ 
+ 
+ White House released "The President's Climate Action Plan" (CAP) with a stated goal of "reducing methane emissions" through the development of an interagency strategy and the pursuit of collaborative approaches across the economy.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ November 29, 2013
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA released a Final Rule (FR) to amend the GHG reporting rule to raise the 100-year GWP of methane from 21 to 25, in line with the 2007 IPCC AR4 findings agreed to by parties to the UNFCCC. EPA, "2013 Revisions to the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule and Final Confidentiality Determinations for New or Substantially Revised Data Elements, FR," 78 Federal Register 71903.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ March 28, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ White House released the "Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions." The Strategy summarized the sources of methane emissions, committed to new steps to cut emissions, and outlined the Administration's efforts to improve the measurement of these emissions. The Strategy proposed steps to further cut methane emissions from landfills, coal mining, agriculture, and oil and gas systems through both voluntary actions and potential regulatory standards.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ April 15, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA released the Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2012 , which reported that U.S. GHG emissions in 2012 totaled 6,526 MMT of CO 2 equivalents, of which 567.3, or about 9%, was methane.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ April 15, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA released for external peer review five technical white papers on potentially significant sources of methane emissions in the oil and gas sector (pneumatic devices, liquids unloading, well completions, compressors, and leak detection). The white papers focused on technical issues covering emissions and mitigation techniques that target methane and VOCs.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ April 28, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ BLM released an ANPRM soliciting input on the development of a program to capture, sell, or otherwise dispose of coalbed methane or methane gases that are released from coal or other type of mineral seam into the air during extraction operations. BLM, "Waste Mine Methane Capture, Use, Sale, or Destruction, ANPRM," 79 Federal Register 23923.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ April 27, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ DOE hosted a roundtable under the CAP with representatives of labor and manufacturing organizations to discuss methane emissions from the midstream and downstream natural gas systems.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ May 8, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA proposed the "Gas STAR Gold" initiative, a program to certify oil and gas facilities that reduce emissions of methane.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ May 20, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ DOE hosted a roundtable under the CAP with scientists and representatives from environmental groups and other nongovernmental organizations to discuss methane emissions from the natural gas sector.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ July 17, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA released a Proposed Rule that updated the standards of performance for new municipal solid waste landfills. The proposed limits for new landfills would require operators to capture two-thirds of their methane and air toxics emissions by 2023. EPA, "Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," 79 Federal Register 41795. EPA released an ANPRM soliciting input on methods to reduce methane and other emissions from existing municipal solid waste landfills. EPA, "Emission Guidelines and Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 79 Federal Register 41772.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ July 25, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) released a report that stated that EPA "has placed little focus and attention on reducing methane emissions from pipelines in the natural gas distribution sector." EPA OIG, "Improvements Needed in EPA Efforts to Address Methane Emissions From Natural Gas Distribution Pipelines," Report No. 14-P-0324.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ July 29, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ DOE announced a series of steps aimed at reducing methane emissions from natural gas transmission and distribution systems, including setting energy efficiency rules for new natural gas compressors and working with industry on research and development to improve natural gas system efficiency and reduce leaks. DOE, "Factsheet: An Initiative to Help Modernize Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution Infrastructure."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ July 31, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ USDA released guidance for calculating GHG emissions from agriculture and forestry activities, part of its larger efforts to address agriculture's potential effects on climate change. USDA, "Quantifying Greenhouse Gas Fluxes in Agriculture and Forestry: Methods for Entity-Scale Inventory."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ August 1, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ USDA, DOE, and EPA released the "Biogas Opportunities Roadmap: Voluntary Actions to Reduce Methane Emissions and Increase Energy Independence," a comprehensive list of programs, funding opportunities, and strategies to increase construction and use of methane-fed biogas reactors in the agriculture, wastewater treatment, landfill, and other sectors in part as a way to create a market for use of the gas.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ November 24, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ BLM's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Onshore Oil and Gas Order 9, Waste Prevention and Use of Produced Oil and Gas for Beneficial Purposes, is placed on the Fall 2014 Unified Agenda with an April 2015 date for the NPRM and an April 2016 date for final action.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ December 9, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA proposed amendments to subpart W of the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program that would add reporting of GHG emissions from gathering and boosting systems, completions and workovers of oil wells using hydraulic fracturing, and blowdowns of natural gas transmission pipelines. EPA, "Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule: 2015 Revisions and Confidentiality Determinations for Petroleum and Natural Gas Systems; Proposed Rule," 79 Federal Register 73148.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ December 16, 2014
+
+ 
+ 
+ DOE's Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy office announced $60 million in awarded grants for cutting-edge technology that will detect, locate, and measure methane emissions, among other initiatives.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ January 14, 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA announced a series of steps the agency planned to take in 2015 to address methane emissions from the oil and gas sector, including (1) building on the 2012 NSPS for VOCs to address new and modified activities and equipment in the sector uncovered by the previous rule, (2) extending VOC reduction requirements to existing oil and gas sources in ozone nonattainment areas and states in the Ozone Transport Region (in the form of Control Techniques Guidelines, which states would need to address in their State Implementation Plans), and (3) expanding voluntary efforts under the Natural Gas STAR program.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ April 16, 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission released a policy statement, "Cost Recovery Mechanisms for Modernization of Natural Gas Facilities," which would allow interstate natural gas pipelines to recover the costs of modernizing their facilities and infrastructure to enhance the efficient and safe operation of their systems.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ April 21, 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ DOE released the Quadrennial Energy Review, which called for a competitive program that would provide financial assistance to states to help speed replacement of old natural gas distribution lines. The proposal envisioned "targeted funding to offset incremental costs to low income households, and funding for enhanced direct inspection and maintenance programs," with an estimated costs of $2.5 billion to $3.5 billion over 10 years.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ April 22, 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ DOJ, in a settlement with the natural gas company Noble Energy over alleged Clean Air Act violations, set a precedent for a "basin-wide" approach to curbing emissions from energy extraction, an approach that some believe would aid regulators in implementing further EPA rules regulating methane.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ July 13, 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ BLM released proposed, updated regulations to its Order 3 rulemaking to ensure accurate measurement, accountability, and royalty payments for oil and gas production from federal and Indian leases aimed at preventing theft and loss of the resources. Public comment on the rule ran through September 11, 2015. BLM, "Onshore Oil and Gas Operations; Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases; Site Security," Proposed Rule, 80 Federal Register 40767.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ July 23, 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA released its proposed framework for a revised Natural Gas STAR program for voluntary cuts in methane emissions from existing sources, proposing a program that the agency says included more flexibility for industry, such as company-wide options, than the facility-based approach that the agency was forced to withdraw last year in the face of industry opposition.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ August 14, 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA released a proposed supplement to the 2014 proposed NSPS for new municipal solid waste landfills, "Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," and a proposed rule for existing municipal landfills, "Emission Guidelines and Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills." The proposals would set an emissions threshold of 34 metric tons of methane, a level at which landfills would be required to begin capturing emissions of landfill gas, which contains methane and other pollutants. The figure is lower than a 40-ton threshold EPA proposed in 2014 as well as the current NSPS threshold of 50 metric tons.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ August 18, 2015
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA released proposed rules for the oil and gas industry, including (1) proposed updates to the 2012 NSPS that would set methane and VOC requirements for additional new and modified sources in the oil and gas industry; (2) Draft Control Techniques Guidelines, which would target VOC emissions from existing oil and gas sources in certain ozone nonattainment areas and states in the Ozone Transport Region; (3) a proposed source determination rule, which would clarify EPA's air permitting requirements as they apply to the oil and natural gas industry; and (4) a proposed Federal Implementation Plan for EPA's Indian Country Minor New Source Review program for oil and gas production sources.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ January 21, 2016
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA finalized the voluntary "Natural Gas STAR Methane Challenge Program ("Methane Challenge") Best Management Practice (BMP) Commitment Framework" which would provide a new mechanism through which oil and gas companies can make and track commitments to reduce methane emissions. The final version did not include several provisions from the proposal, including a commitment to set interim milestones.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ January 22, 2016
+
+ 
+ 
+ BLM released proposed rules to update standards to reduce venting and flaring from oil and gas production on federal lands. The proposal would revise the existing royalty provisions for onshore oil and gas leases as well as set (1) flaring limits on drilling operations, (2) requirements for the submission of pre-drilling gas capture plans, (3) requirements for leak detection and repair, and (4) prohibitions on venting.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ March 30, 2016
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA launched the Natural Gas STAR Methane Challenge Program with 41 founding partners at the Global Methane Forum in Washington, D.C. Founding partners made a commitment to implement a suite of best management practices across their operations within five years.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ April 15, 2016
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA issued the final Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-201 4 , which revised upward estimated methane emissions from the oil, gas, and landfill sectors in 2014 compared with previous data.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ May 12, 2016
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA issued final rules for the oil and gas industry, including (1) updates to the 2012 NSPS that would set methane and VOC requirements for additional new and modified sources in the oil and gas industry; (2) a source determination rule, which would clarify EPA's air permitting requirements as they apply to the oil and natural gas industry; (3) a Federal Implementation Plan for EPA's Indian Country Minor New Source Review program for oil and gas production sources; and (4) a draft Information Collection Request to require oil and natural gas companies to provide extensive information needed to develop regulations to reduce methane emissions from existing oil and gas sources. In addition, the agency announced plans to issue a Request for Information to seek information on innovative strategies that can accurately and cost-effectively locate, measure, and mitigate methane emissions.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ July 14, 2016
+
+ 
+ 
+ EPA announced final updates to its NSPS to reduce emissions of methane-rich landfill gas from new, modified, and reconstructed municipal solid waste (MSW) landfills. In a separate action, EPA issued guidelines for reducing emissions from existing MSW landfills, updating the previous Emissions Guidelines, which were issued in 1996.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Source: CRS.
+
+ Note: Initiatives were selected based upon CRS's consideration of significance.
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Author Contact Information
+ 
+ [author name scrubbed], Coordinator, Specialist in Environmental Policy
+ ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed])
+ 
+
+ [author name scrubbed], Specialist in Agricultural Conservation and Natural Resources Policy
+ ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed])
+ 
+
+ [author name scrubbed], Specialist in Environmental Policy
+ ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed])
+ 
+
+ [author name scrubbed], Information Research Specialist
+ ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed])
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Acknowledgments
+
+ This report was originally co-authored by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in Energy Policy. The current authors would also like to thank [author name scrubbed], Graphics Specialist, CRS; and James Kidd, Editor, CRS.
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Footnotes
+
+ 
+ 
+ 1 .
+ 
+ 
+ For a discussion of the sources of naturally occurring methane, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Methane and Nitrous Oxide Emissions from Natural Sources , EPA 430-R-10-001, Washington, DC, April 2010.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2 .
+ 
+ 
+ Natural gas extracted through drilling operations by the oil and gas industry is commonly composed of the following: methane, 70%-90%; ethane, propane, and butane, 0%-20%; carbon dioxide, 0%-8%; oxygen, 0%-0.2%; nitrogen, 0%-5%; hydrogen sulfide, 0%-5%; and rare gases (e.g., A, He, Ne, Xe) in trace amounts. See the Natural Gas Supply Association's educational website, http://naturalgas.org/overview/background/ , for further discussion of composition.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 3 .
+ 
+ 
+ The stated reduction values are estimates based on carbon dioxide emitted per unit of energy generated. For a more detailed discussion, see CRS Report R44090, Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Assessment of Coal and Natural Gas in the Power Sector , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 4 .
+ 
+ 
+ Hydraulic fracturing (hydrofracking, fracking, or fracing) is commonly defined as an oil or gas well completion process that directs pressurized fluids typically containing any combination of water, proppant, and any added chemicals to penetrate tight rock formations, such as shale or coal formations, in order to stimulate the oil or gas residing in the formation and subsequently requires high-rate, extended flowback to expel fracture fluids and solids. The National Petroleum Council estimates that hydraulic fracturing will account for nearly 70% of natural gas development within the next decade. See National Petroleum Council, Prudent Development: Realizing the Potential of North America's Abundant Natural Gas and Oil Resources , September 15, 2011. For more discussion on this technology, see the section on "Hydraulic Fracturing" in CRS Report R42333, Marcellus Shale Gas: Development Potential and Water Management Issues and Laws , by [author name scrubbed] et al.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 5 .
+ 
+ 
+ These unconventional resources are commonly defined as follows: Tight sands gas is natural gas trapped in low-permeability and nonporous sandstones. Shale gas is natural gas trapped in shale deposits, a very fine-grained sedimentary rock that is easily breakable into thin, parallel layers. Coalbed methane is natural gas trapped in coal seams. These resources are referred to as "unconventional" because, in the broadest sense, they are more difficult and/or less economical to extract than "conventional" natural gas, usually because the technology to reach them had not until recently been developed fully or had been too expensive. For a more detailed discussion of these definitions, see the Natural Gas Supply Association's website, http://naturalgas.org/overview/unconventional-ng-resources/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 6 .
+ 
+ 
+ "Growth in production of dry natural gas and natural gas plant liquids contributes to the expansion of several manufacturing industries (such as bulk chemicals and primary metals) and the increased use of [natural gas] feedstocks in place of petroleum-based naphtha feedstocks." U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2015 , April 14, 2015. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 7 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ernest J. Moniz et al., The Future of Natural Gas: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, June 25, 2010.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 8 .
+ 
+ 
+ In his 2012 State of the Union speech, President Obama stated, "We have a supply of natural gas that can last America nearly 100 years, and my administration will take every possible action to safely develop this energy." President Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address," Washington, DC, January 24, 2012.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 9 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Chemical Sampling Information, Methane . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 10 .
+ 
+ 
+ Health effects associated with exposure to ozone include premature death, heart failure, chronic respiratory damage, and premature aging of the lungs. Ozone may also exacerbate existing respiratory illnesses such as asthma and emphysema. See EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Final National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone , July 2011. While methane is a precursor to ground-level ozone formation, it is less reactive than other hydrocarbons. For further discussion on methane as an ozone precursor, see section " Methane: A Primer ."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 11 .
+ 
+ 
+ As a GHG, methane emitted into the atmosphere absorbs terrestrial infrared radiation, which contributes to increased global warming and continuing climate change. For further discussion on methane as a GHG, see section " Methane: A Primer ." For further discussion on climate change and its potential impacts, see CRS Report RL34266, Climate Change: Science Highlights , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 12 .
+ 
+ 
+ Here, as elsewhere in the report, GHGs are quantified using a unit measurement called carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2 e), wherein gases are indexed and aggregated against one unit of CO 2 . This indexing is referred to as the Global Warming Potential (GWP) of the gas. For more discussion on GWP, see section " Methane: A Primer ."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 13 .
+ 
+ 
+ Like methane, other VOCs are difficult to capture because of the diffuse nature of their releases. Also, leak prevention and recovery of VOCs may pay dividends in reducing product losses. Because the value of VOCs is highly variable, state and federal regulatory programs have required control of VOC emissions, even when the product value does not result in a net cost savings to the potential emitter (e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, vehicle standards, and State Implementation Plans for ozone precursor controls).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 14 .
+ 
+ 
+ See discussion under section " Fossil Energy Sector ."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 15 .
+ 
+ 
+ See "State Methane Policies," National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/state-methane-policies.aspx .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 16 .
+ 
+ 
+ Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq . For a summary of the CAA and EPA's air and radiation activities and its authorities, see EPA's website and CRS Report RL30853, Clean Air Act: A Summary of the Act and Its Major Requirements , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 17 .
+ 
+ 
+ While methane is a precursor to ground-level ozone formation, it is less reactive than other hydrocarbons. Thus, EPA has officially excluded it from the definition of regulated hydrocarbons called volatile organic compounds (VOCs). See EPA, Conversion Factors for Hydrocarbon Emission Components , EPA-420-R-10-015, July 2010.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 18 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, "Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Guidelines for Control of Existing Sources: Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," 61 Federal Register 9905, March 12, 1996. The rule states that "the emissions of concern are non-methane organic compounds (NMOC) and methane" and that "methane emissions contribute to global climate change and can result in fires or explosions when they accumulate in structures on or off the landfill site."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 19 .
+ 
+ 
+ Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 20 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, "Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases," 74 Federal Register 66496, December 15, 2009. The "endangerment" language in Sections 108, 111, 211, 213, 115, and 231 provides fundamental authorities. Also, Section 111(d) provides authority to control GHG emissions from existing sources, and Section 111(b) and (e) provide similar authorities for new sources.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 21 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, EPA and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, "2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule," 77 Federal Register 62623, October 15, 2012; and EPA, "Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units; Proposed Rule," 79 Federal Register 34829, June 18, 2014. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 22 .
+ 
+ 
+ Executive Office of the President (EOP), "Climate Action Plan: Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions," March 2014.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 23 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of the Interior, "Notice to Lessees and Operators of Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases (NTL-4A): Royalty or Compensation for Oil and Gas Loss," January 1, 1980.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 24 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, the Family Farm Energy Conversion Act ( S. 3714 ).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 25 .
+ 
+ 
+ For example, the Underground Coal Gasification and Unconventional Gas Research, Development and Demonstration Act ( S. 2774 ) and the bill "to provide for the development and improvement of the recreation facilities and programs of Gateway National Recreation Area through the use of funds obtained from the development of methane gas resources within the Fountain Avenue Landfill site by the City of New York" ( S. 2218 ).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 26 .
+ 
+ 
+ World Environment Policy Act of 1989 ( S. 201 ).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 27 .
+ 
+ 
+ Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 ( S. 1630 ). The findings were reported in EPA, Anthropogenic Methane Emissions in the United States: Estimates for 1990, Report to Congress , EPA 430-R-93-003, 1993, which was expanded and replaced by EPA, U.S. Methane Emissions 1990-2020: Inventories, Projections, and Opportunities for Reductions , EPA 430-R-99-013, 1999.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 28 .
+ 
+ 
+ CO 2 Offsets Policy Enabling Act of 1990 ( H.R. 5966 ).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 29 .
+ 
+ 
+ These programs are discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this report.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 30 .
+ 
+ 
+ For a discussion of the performance of these and other voluntary programs, see the subsequent sections of this report on the respective industry sectors.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 31 .
+ 
+ 
+ EOP, The President's Climate Action Plan, June 2013. For a summary of the CAP, see CRS Report R43120, President Obama's Climate Action Plan , coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 32 .
+ 
+ 
+ For a discussion of the pledged commitments to the UNFCCC, see CRS Report R44092, Greenhouse Gas Pledges by Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change , by [author name scrubbed]. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 33 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, as one example, projections made by the Climate Action Tracker, an independent scientific analysis produced by four research organizations, including Climate Analytics, Ecofys, NewClimate Institute, and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/usa.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 34 .
+ 
+ 
+ CAP, p. 10.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 35 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Fact Sheet: Biogas Opportunities Roadmap: Voluntary Actions to Reduce Methane Emissions, Increase Energy Independence and Grow the Economy," August 1, 2014.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 36 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, "Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, Final Rule," 77 Federal Register 49489, August 16, 2012.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 37 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, "Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources: Final Rule," May 12, 2016. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 38 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, "Control Techniques Guidelines for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry (Draft)," EPA-453/P-15-001, August 2015, https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/og_ctg_draft_081815.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 39 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, "Natural Gas STAR Methane Challenge Program," https://www3.epa.gov/gasstar/methanechallenge/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 40 .
+ 
+ 
+ BLM, "Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation: Proposed Rule," January 22, 2016.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 41 .
+ 
+ 
+ For an update on PHMSA pipeline rulemaking, see http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/regs .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 42 .
+ 
+ 
+ DOE, "Factsheet: An Initiative to Help Modernize Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution Infrastructure," July 29, 2014.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 43 .
+ 
+ 
+ BLM, "Waste Mine Methane Capture, Use, Sale, or Destruction," 79 Federal Register 23923, April 28, 2014.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 44 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, "Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," Final Rule, and "Emission Guidelines and Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," Final Rule, pre-publication copies, https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/landfill/landflpg.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 45 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, Conversion Factors for Hydrocarbon Emission Components , Washington, DC, EPA-420-R-10-015, July 2010.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 46 .
+ 
+ 
+ IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis , Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 47 .
+ 
+ 
+ See IPCC, Climate Change 2007 : The Physical Science Basis , Working Group I Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "2013 Revisions to the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule and Final Confidentiality Determinations for New or Substantially Revised Data Elements," 78 Federal Register 71903, November 29, 2013.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 48 .
+ 
+ 
+ As calculated over 100 years. EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-201 4 , EPA 430-R-16-002, April 15, 2016.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 49 .
+ 
+ 
+ For further discussion, see section " Issues in Measurement ."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 50 .
+ 
+ 
+ As shown in Figure 3 , there are many sources of methane emissions. For editorial reasons, this report focuses only on the most significant emitters. For greater discussion on smaller sources of emissions (such as forest fires, rice cultivation, stationary combustion, abandoned coal mines, petrochemical production, mobile combustion, and iron, steel, and coke production), see EPA, Inventory.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 51 .
+ 
+ 
+ This section was authored by [author name scrubbed], Specialist in Agricultural Conservation and Natural Resources Policy.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 52 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, Inventory.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 53 .
+ 
+ 
+ An AD system feeds manure or other feedstock into a digester that breaks it down in a closed facility in the absence of oxygen to produce a variety of outputs including methane. The methane can then be captured for use as an energy source to produce heat or generate electricity. For more information on AD systems, see CRS Report R40667, Anaerobic Digestion: Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction and Energy Generation , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 54 .
+ 
+ 
+ AgSTAR is a collaborative outreach effort of EPA, USDA, and DOE designed to reduce methane emissions from livestock waste management operations by promoting the use of biogas recovery systems. For more on the program, see information at http://www.epa.gov/agstar/ . Federal funding opportunities available for AD systems are provided at http://www.epa.gov/agstar/tools/financing/index.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 55 .
+ 
+ 
+ AD system concerns include the expense associated with system construction and operation. Additionally, the technology requires daily operation and maintenance, some of which may exceed the technical capability of the average agricultural producer. Lastly, if the methane captured from an AD system is generated for electricity and sold to a utility, there may be utility collaboration concerns, especially regarding whether the utility will accept the electricity generated and at what price.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 56 .
+ 
+ 
+ USDA, "Fact Sheet: Biogas Opportunities Roadmap: Voluntary Actions to Reduce Methane Emissions, Increase Energy Independence and Grow the Economy," August 1, 2014.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 57 .
+ 
+ 
+ USDA, "USDA and Dairy Producers Renew Agreement to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Increase Sustainability of Dairy Production," press release, April 24, 2013.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 58 .
+ 
+ 
+ ICF International, Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Options and Costs for Agricultural Land and Animal Production within the United States , February 2013. See chapter 3 of the report for more information on methane emission reduction potential of selected types of AD systems and break-even costs.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 59 .
+ 
+ 
+ This section was authored by Richard Lattanzio, Analyst in Environmental Policy.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 60 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, Inventory.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 61 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 62 .
+ 
+ 
+ American Gas Association, https://www.aga.org/annual-statistics/distribution-and-transmission-miles-pipeline . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 63 .
+ 
+ 
+ A reduced emissions completion is "a well completion following fracturing or refracturing where gas flowback that is otherwise vented is captured, cleaned, and routed to the flow line or collection system, reinjected into the well or another well, used as an on-site fuel source, or used for other useful purpose that a purchased fuel or raw material would serve, with no direct release to the atmosphere." EPA, "Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, Final Rule," 77 Federal Register 49489, August 16, 2012.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 64 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA's Natural Gas STAR Program is designed to be a flexible, voluntary partnership that encourages oil and natural gas companies—both domestically and abroad—to adopt cost-effective technologies and practices that improve operational efficiency and reduce emissions of methane. For more on the program, including recommended technologies and practices, see http://www.epa.gov/gasstar/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 65 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA's Coalbed Methane Outreach Program is designed to be a voluntary program with a goal of reducing methane emissions from coal mining activities. For more on the program, including recommended technologies and practices, see http://www.epa.gov/cmop/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 66 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector NSPS.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 67 .
+ 
+ 
+ For further discussion, see CRS Report R42986, An Overview of Air Quality Issues in Natural Gas Systems , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 68 .
+ 
+ 
+ See Colorado's rules at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/GovHickenlooper/CBON/1251648046456 , California's rules at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB1371 , Ohio's proposed rules at http://www.epa.ohio.gov/dapc/genpermit/genpermits.aspx , Wyoming's proposed rules at http://deq.state.wy.us/aqd/proposedrules.asp , and the Western Governors' Association Policy Resolution 2015-02, Methane Emissions Regulation, at http://westgov.org/images/stories/policies/RESO_Methane_15-02.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 69 .
+ 
+ 
+ Mineral Leasing Act, as amended and supplemented, 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq. For a summary of the MLA and BLM's leasing activities, see BLM's website and CRS Report R40806, Energy Projects on Federal Lands: Leasing and Authorization , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 70 .
+ 
+ 
+ DOI, "Notice to Lessees and Operators of Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases (NTL-4A): Royalty or Compensation for Oil and Gas Loss," January 1, 1980. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 71 .
+ 
+ 
+ EOP, "Fact Sheet: Administration Takes Steps Forward on Climate Action Plan by Announcing Actions to Cut Methane Emissions," January 14, 2015.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 72 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid. For a discussion of the source categories, see EPA, "White Papers on Methane and VOC Emissions," April 15, 2014, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/whitepapers.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 73 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, "Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources: Final Rule," May 12, 2016.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 74 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, "Control Techniques Guidelines for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry (Draft)," EPA-453/P-15-001, August 2015, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/og_ctg_draft_081815.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 75 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, "Source Determination for Certain Emission Units in the Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Final Rule," May 12, 2016.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 76 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, Natural Gas STAR Methane Challenge Program Proposal, http://www.epa.gov/gasstar/methanechallenge/index.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 77 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, "Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule: 2015 Revisions and Confidentiality Determinations for Petroleum and Natural Gas Systems; Final Rule," 80 Federal Register 64262, October 22, 2015.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 78 .
+ 
+ 
+ BLM, "Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation: Proposed Rule," January 22, 2016.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 79 .
+ 
+ 
+ BLM, "Waste Mine Methane Capture, Use, Sale, or Destruction," 79 Federal Register 23923, April 28, 2014.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 80 .
+ 
+ 
+ For an update on PHMSA pipeline rulemaking, see http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/regs .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 81 .
+ 
+ 
+ EOP, Fact Sheet. For more discussion, see DOE, "Factsheet: An Initiative to Help Modernize Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution Infrastructure," http://energy.gov/articles/factsheet-initiative-help-modernize-natural-gas-transmission-and-distribution . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 82 .
+ 
+ 
+ For further discussion, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG781, EPA Regulation of Greenhouse Gases from Existing Power Plants—Part One: Does the Clean Air Act Allow It? , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 83 .
+ 
+ 
+ This section was authored by [author name scrubbed], Specialist in Environmental Policy.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 84 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, Inventory.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 85 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, Landfill Methane Outreach Program, Energy Projects and Candidate Landfills, https://www3.epa.gov/lmop/projects-candidates/index.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 86 .
+ 
+ 
+ Slightly different estimates of the number of operational MSW landfills were presented at various points in EPA's July 2014 ANPRM for existing MSW landfills. See EPA, "Emission Guidelines and Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 79 Federal Register 41778, July 17, 2014.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 87 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, "Final Updates to Performance Standards for New, Modified, and Reconstructed Landfills, and Updates to Emission Guidelines for Existing Landfills: Fact Sheet," p. 3, https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/landfill/landfills-final-nsps-eg-factsheet.pdf . Hereinafter, "EPA Fact Sheet."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 88 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, "Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," Final Rule, and "Emission Guidelines and Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," Final Rule, pre-publication copies, https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/landfill/landflpg.html . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 89 .
+ 
+ 
+ Landfills with modeled NMOC emissions between 34 and 50 metric tons per year that demonstrate surface methane emissions below 500 parts per million will not have to install controls.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 90 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA Fact Sheet, pp. 2, 4.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 91 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 92 .
+ 
+ 
+ This section was authored by Richard Lattanzio, Analyst in Environmental Policy.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 93 .
+ 
+ 
+ According to EPA's Inventory, over 93% of CO 2 emissions in 2013 are attributed to fossil fuel combustion for energy use. Further, many other CO 2 emissions arise from similar combustion processes in various industries.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 94 .
+ 
+ 
+ IPCC, 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 95 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA has undertaken its own emissions studies and modeling practices for the various U.S. sectors, including the development of the EPA Cattle Enteric Fermentation Model the Gas Research Institute and EPA, Methane Emissions from the Natural Gas Industry, Volumes 1-15, GRI-94/0257 and EPA 600/R-96-080, June 1996. EPA also references a multitude of academic literature for its calculations (see respective references in the Inventory). Further to this, EPA annually takes comments on its Inventory methodology, and adopts revisions where appropriate.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 96 .
+ 
+ 
+ In response to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( H.R. 2764 ; P.L. 110-161 ), EPA issued the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule (74 Federal Register 56260), which requires reporting of GHG data and other relevant information from large sources and suppliers in the United States. Sectors include petroleum and natural gas systems, industrial and municipal landfills, and industrial wastewater treatment facilities but not agriculture or forestry sources. See EPA GHG Reporting Program website at http://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 97 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, Barnett Shale Phase Two Special Inventory Data , 2011, http://www.tceq.texas.gov/airquality/point-source-ei/psei.html ; Colorado Department of Natural Resources "State to Undertake Major Study on Oil and Gas Emissions," press release, January 9, 2013, http://dnr.state.co.us/Media/Pages/PressReleases.aspx ; and California Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventory, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/inventory.htm .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 98 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, the Environmental Defense Fund, which, in conjunction with several universities and environmental engineering firms, announced on October 10, 2012, the launch of a comprehensive study of methane emissions from natural gas infrastructure in an effort to accumulate new data. These studies replicate the "component measurement" methodologies of EPA's Inventory, using current conditions and measurement practices. The first sector study—production—was published in 2013 (David T. Allen et al., "Measurement of Methane Emissions at Natural Gas Production Sites in the United States," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , vol. 10, no. 44, pp. 17768-17773, October 29, 2013). For more information, see Environmental Defense Fund's Methane Leakage Study at http://www.edf.org/methaneleakage .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 99 .
+ 
+ 
+ Jon T. Powell et al., "Estimates of Solid Waste Disposal Rates and Reduction Targets for Landfill Gas Emissions," Nature Climate Change , published online September 21, 2015.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 100 .
+ 
+ 
+ Gabrielle Patron et al., "A New Look at Methane and Non-Methane Hydrocarbon Emissions from Oil and Natural Gas Operations in the Colorado Denver-Julesburg Basin," Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres , vol. 119, no. 11 (June 16, 2014), pp. 6836-6852.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 101 .
+ 
+ 
+ Scott Miller et al., "Anthropogenic Emissions of Methane in the United States," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , vol. 110, no. 50 (December 10, 2013), pp. 20018–20022 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 102 .
+ 
+ 
+ Adam Brandt et al., "Methane Leaks from North American Natural Gas Systems," Science , vol. 343, no. 6172 (February 14, 2014), pp. 733-735 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 103 .
+ 
+ 
+ Hinrich Schaefer et al., "A 21 st -Century Shift from Fossil-fuel to Biogenic Methane Emissions Indicated by 13 CH 4 ," Science, vol. 352, no. 6281 (April 1 2016), pp. 80-84.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 104 .
+ 
+ 
+ EOP, Strategy , pp. 11-14.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 105 .
+ 
+ 
+ The President's FY2015 budget requests $8 million above current funding of $6.5 million for this program.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 106 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA, Office of the Inspector General, "EPA Needs to Improve Air Emissions Data for the Oil and Natural Gas Production Sector," Report No. 13-P-0161, February 20, 2013.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 107 .
+ 
+ 
+ The CAA defines "a standard of performance" as "a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any non-air quality health and environmental impact and energy requirement) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated" (42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(1)). The CAA does not provide specific direction regarding what metric or metrics to use in considering costs for a standard of performance, affording EPA considerable discretion in choosing a means of cost consideration.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 108 .
+ 
+ 
+ The MLA requires BLM to set royalty rates and determine the quantity of produced oil and gas that is subject to royalties under the terms and conditions of a federal lease. The MLA also requires BLM to ensure that lessees "use all reasonable precautions to prevent waste of oil or gas developed in the land" ( 30 U.S.C. 225 ). BLM has long read the MLA to exempt from royalty payments production that is "unavoidably lost" in the course of production. (See 44 Federal Register 76600.) In determining when production is unavoidably versus avoidably lost, BLM has generally considered the technical and economic feasibility of preventing the loss of gas. (See NTL-4A.)
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 109 .
+ 
+ 
+ Under Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, each economically significant regulatory action taken by covered agencies (under any statutory authority) must include estimates of the cost and benefits of the action in Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) before it is proposed, and again before it is promulgated. These RIAs can play a major role in the interagency review process overseen by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which precedes the publication of most agencies' significant proposed and final rules in the Federal Register . See Executive Order 12866, "Regulatory Planning and Review," 58 Federal Register 51735, October 4, 1993; and Executive Order 13563, "Improving Regulations and Regulatory Review" 76 Federal Register 3821, January 21, 2011. For more on this OMB review process, see CRS Report RL32397, Federal Rulemaking: The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs , coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 110 .
+ 
+ 
+ See CRS Report R41974, Cost-Benefit and Other Analysis Requirements in the Rulemaking Process , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111 .
+ 
+ 
+ Some statutory provisions require other criteria for setting the stringency of a regulation, for example, to protect the most vulnerable populations.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 112 .
+ 
+ 
+ EPA and other federal agencies use metrics recommended by an interagency working group and publicly peer reviewed for the social cost of carbon (SC-CO 2 ) to estimate the climate benefits of rulemakings. EPA and BLM have used, in a few cases, the SC-CH 4 , which employs similar methods but for methane (published citation below). The SC-CO 2 and SC-CH 4 are estimates of the economic damages associated with a small increase in CO 2 and methane emissions, conventionally analyzed as one metric ton, in a given year. The stream of projected, future avoided damages due to those emissions, translated into monetary values, are discounted back to a single "net present value" for the year of emissions. The avoided damages noted, in their analytical documentation, are not comprehensive of all likely climate change damages, though they include changes in net agricultural and forest productivity, human health, protection against sea level rise, and changes in energy system costs, such as reduced costs for heating and increased costs for air conditioning. However, given current modeling and data limitations, they do not include all damages. See Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon. "Technical Support Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866," July 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/scc-tsd-final-july-2015.pdf ; and Alex Marten and Stephen C. Newbold, "Estimating the Social Cost of Non-CO 2 GHG Emissions: Methane and Nitrous Oxide," Energy Policy 51 C (2012), pp. 957-972.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/corpus/politics/text/9ce406d0f4a5f28f.txt b/corpus/politics/text/9ce406d0f4a5f28f.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f1c5305995cf70f50124ee0bcdad7b3145cc998e
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+++ b/corpus/politics/text/9ce406d0f4a5f28f.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,1191 @@
+Order Code IB10009
+
+CRS Issue Brief for Congress
+
+Received through the CRS Web
+
+Endangered Species:
+
+ Continuing Controversy
+
+Updated May 8, 2000
+
+M. Lynne Corn
+
+Resources, Science, and Industry Division
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ CONTENTS
+
+SUMMARY
+
+MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
+
+BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
+
+What is the ESA?
+What is the Impact of the ESA?
+Has ESA Been Effective?
+Leading Causes of Extinction
+Is Extinction Normal?
+
+Issues in the 106th Congress
+
+Funding for Land Conservation
+Salmon Conservation
+Making the ESA User-Friendly
+Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
+Legislation in the 106th Congress
+Appropriations Issues
+Appropriations Riders, FY1998 — FY2000
+
+Major Provisions of the Current Law: Domestic
+
+Major Provisions of the Current Law: International
+
+LEGISLATION
+
+FOR ADDITIONAL READING
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ IB10009 
+
+ 05-08-00 
+
+Endangered Species: Continuing Controversy
+
+SUMMARY
+
+The Endangered Species Act of 1973
+
+In the 106th Congress, there are two
+
+(ESA) has been one of the most controversial
+
+broad approaches to amending the act. H.R.
+
+of all environmental laws. Undoubtedly, the
+
+960 is supported by a number of environmen-
+
+controversy stems from the strict substantive
+
+tal, scientific, and religious groups. H.R.
+
+provisions of this law compared to many other
+
+3160, introduced by Chairman Young, is
+
+environmental laws which tend to be more
+
+supported by property rights groups and
+
+procedurally oriented or to permit greater
+
+several industries. Hearings on H.R. 3160
+
+administrative discretion. As a result of the
+
+were held on February 2 and March 1, 2000,
+
+ESA’s standards, the Act often plays a role in
+
+and more hearings are expected. One nar-
+
+disputes in which all sides agree that a given
+
+rowly tailored approach is S. 1100, which (as
+
+species is not the center of the debate. 
+
+reported) would among other things, move the
+designation of critical habitat to the time when
+
+ The authorization for spending under
+
+a final recovery plan is released under most
+
+ESA expired on October 1, 1992. The prohi-
+
+circumstances. Various bills have also been
+
+bitions and requirements of the Act have rema-
+
+introduced to fund federal land acquisition and
+
+ined in force, even in the absence of an autho-
+
+provide support for private landowners to
+
+rization, and funds were appropriated to im-
+
+conserve listed species on their land. H.R.
+
+plement the administrative provisions of the
+
+701, to provide permanent appropriations for
+
+Act in each subsequent fiscal year.
+
+various programs that would benefit listed
+species (among other purposes), was reported
+
+In the 106th Congress, most observers see
+
+on February 16, 2000 (H.Rept. 106-499).
+
+only a small chance of floor action on ESA,
+due to a variety of factors, including first the
+
+In April 2000, the signatories to the
+
+impeachment debate and then the approaching
+
+Convention on International Trade in Endan-
+
+presidential election. As a result of these and
+
+gered Species met in Nairobi, Kenya. There
+
+other factors, any actions to modify parts of
+
+was relatively little controversy over the meet-
+
+the ESA appear likely to occur either as ad 
+
+ing.
+
+ hoc amendments to appropriations bills or as
+narrow legislation addressing specific prob-
+lems. It is unclear whether the House or the
+Senate will be more likely to initiate action. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ IB10009
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+MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
+
+ In the 106th Congress, only a few bills have been introduced to make significant 
+
+ changes in ESA. On February 2 and March 1, hearings were held on H.R. 3160, which
+would make extensive amendments in a number of provisions in current law. On July 28,
+1999, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works reported S. 1100 (S.Rept.
+106-126). The bill would change procedures for designation of critical habitat. Several
+bills have been introduced to provide funding from revenues from the Outer Continental
+Shelf oil and gas receipts to benefit land acquisition and other programs for the
+conservation of listed species. H.R. 701 reported by the House Resources Committee on
+February 16, 2000 (H.Rept. 106-499); it would provide permanent appropriations for new
+and certain existing programs that would benefit listed species. It was referred to the House
+Committees on Agriculture and Budget for a limited time. An Administration proposal to
+delist or downlist a number of species, including the threatened grizzly bears around
+Yellowstone National Park, may generate congressional oversight hearings. Proposals to
+revise Administration guidelines or regulations in the development of Critical Habitat, and
+new regulations for “no surprises” agreements and candidate conservation agreements may
+also spark congressional interest. 
+
+BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
+
+ What is the ESA? The 1973 ESA (16 U.S.C. 1531-1543; P.L. 93-205, as amended)
+
+began as a comprehensive attempt to protect all species and to consider habitat protection as
+an integral part of that effort. It is administered primarily by the Fish and Wildlife Service
+(FWS), but also by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for certain marine species.
+Under the ESA, certain species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) are
+listed as either “endangered” or “threatened” according to assessments of the risk of their
+extinction. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools are available to aid the recovery of
+the species and the protection of its habitat. As of Sept. 30, 1999, 1,775 species of animals
+and plants (of which 1,197 occur in the United States and its territories and the remainder
+only in other countries) had been listed as either endangered or threatened. Of the U.S.
+species, 886 were covered in 525 recovery plans. The authorization for funding under ESA
+expired on October 1, 1992, though Congress has appropriated funds in each succeeding
+fiscal year. (See the FWS website at [http://www.fws.gov/r9endspp.html].) 
+
+ What is the Impact of the ESA? While the ESA plays an important role in the
+
+protection of species, it can also become a surrogate, at times, in quarrels whose primary
+focus is the allocation of scarce or diminishing lands or resources. Cases in which all
+economic interests line up squarely against those of a vanishing species are rare. Because
+other laws often lack the strict substantive provisions that Congress included in the ESA (see
+Major Provisions sections, below) regarding taking of species, critical habitat, and avoidance
+of jeopardy, the ESA often becomes the battleground by implication. Like the miners’
+canaries, declining species tend to flag larger controversies over resource scarcities and
+altered ecosystems. Examples of resource debates in which species were symptoms of larger
+controversies include the Tellico Dam (hydropower development and construction jobs versus
+farmland protection and tribal graves, as well as the snail darter); northwest timber harvest
+(protection of logging jobs and communities versus commercial and sport fishing, recreation,
+
+CRS-1
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+and ecosystem protection, as well as salmon and spotted owls); and the Edwards Aquifer
+(allocation of water among various users with differing short- and long-term interests, with
+a few spring-dependent species caught in the cross-fire).
+
+In recent years, tensions over ESA have increased as species have been added to the
+
+protected list, and as the greater demands of a growing economy and human population have
+affected species’ habitats. Both Congress and the Administration have sought to lessen these
+tensions by, among other things, tailoring application of the Act to special local
+circumstances. The Act’s critics contend that the Administration’s efforts do not go far
+enough; some feel that the same was true of the stalled efforts of the 105th Congress. The
+Act’s defenders counter that it merely balances an inherent bias toward development in other
+governmental laws and policies, and that some of the current Administration’s policies may
+go too far.
+
+Debate, pro and con, on ESA splits largely along demographic lines. While most
+
+demographic groups support species conservation, that support is stronger among urban and
+suburban populations and less so in rural areas; and strong among those in the east and along
+the coasts and less so in central and mountain states. Sport hunters and anglers seem divided
+on the issue. It is also noteworthy that, while the debate often centers on jobs and biology,
+people on both sides claim ethical support for their positions, and some religious groups now
+participate in the debate. In addition, some industries (e.g., logging and land development)
+generally see ESA as a serious problem, while others (e.g., some commercial fishing and many
+recreation interests) see it as generally supporting their interests. 
+
+ Has ESA Been Effective? The answer to this question depends very much on the
+
+choice of measurement. Since a major goal of the ESA is the recovery of species to the point
+at which the protection of the Act is no longer necessary, this seems a good starting point.
+If this is the only standard, the Act could be considered a failure, since only 11 species have
+been delisted due to recovery, as of July 31, 1997. Seven species have become extinct since
+their listing, and nine have been de-listed due to improved data. In the latter case, some of
+the nine species were originally listed to protect any last remaining few that might have been
+alive at the time of listing. It can be quite difficult to prove whether extraordinarily rare
+species are simply that, or in fact already extinct. For example, a rare shorebird thought by
+many to be extinct was re-discovered in a remote area of Canada a few years ago; it might
+just as easily have quietly gone extinct without being re-discovered. Rare species are, by
+definition, hard to find. In May 1998, Secretary Babbitt announced that FWS would study
+a number of species for delisting and downlisting. Like the pattern just noted, some would be
+delisted for reasons other than recovery. The announcement does not preclude the
+consideration of other species; the possible delisting of threatened grizzly bears around
+Yellowstone National Park, for example, was considered by FWS after this announcement.
+
+Even so, since some scientific studies demonstrated that most species are listed only
+
+once they are very depleted (e.g., median population of 407 animals for endangered
+vertebrates according to one study), another measure of effectiveness might be the number
+of species that have stabilized or increased their populations, even if the species is not actually
+de-listed. If this is the only standard, the Act could be considered a success, since a large
+number (41% of listed species according to one study) have improved or stabilized their
+population levels. Other species (e.g., red wolves and California condors) might not exist at
+all without ESA protection, and this too might be considered a measure of success, even
+
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+though the species are still rare. (See CRS Report 98-32, Endangered Species Act List
+Revisions: A Summary of Delisting and Downlisting .)
+
+ Leading Causes of Extinction. Until recent decades, the focus of the extinction debate
+
+was on losses due to over-exploitation, generally through hunting, trapping, or fishing. The
+poster species of the debate were passenger pigeons, tigers, wolves, and other well-known
+animals of today’s ESA debate. But in the 20th century, a shift of focus and probably of fact
+has occurred. The vast majority of species now protected under the ESA reached that status
+due to habitat loss. Even those species for which direct taking was probably an early factor
+in their decline are generally also at risk due to habitat loss. Habitats reduced now to a small
+fraction of their former extent include tall-grass prairie, fresh and salt water wetlands, old
+growth forests of most types, free-flowing rivers, coral reefs, undisturbed sandy beaches, and
+others. 
+
+Another very high-ranking factor in the demise of many species is the introduction of
+
+non-native species. The non-natives can be diseases or parasites (e.g., avian malaria in Hawaii,
+or Asian long-horned beetles in North America), predators (brown tree snakes in Guam and
+Hawaii), or competitors (e.g., barred owls in the Pacific Northwest). The gradual
+homogenization of the world’s flora and fauna has led to a demise of affected species. (See
+CRS Report RL30123, Harmful Non-Native Species: Issues for Congress .)
+
+ Is Extinction Normal? If extinction is normal, then one could argue that there is no
+
+need for government to intervene in a natural process. The vast majority of species that have
+ever lived on Earth are now extinct — an observation uncontested by paleontologists. But
+is the current rate of extinction different from background (“normal”) extinction rates over
+time, and if so, by how much? Calculating current rates of extinction, much less making
+comparisons with the geologic past, is extremely difficult. Those who make the attempt
+generally base each step in their calculation on what they believe to be conservative
+assumptions, thus generating extinction rates that they consider low estimates. The estimates
+of numbers of species becoming extinct per year (17,000 species per year being a typical
+estimate) seem astonishingly large in part because laymen are generally unaware of the huge
+number of species in groups people pay little or no attention to (e.g., beetles, marine
+invertebrates, fish, etc.), and the large number of species estimated on Earth. Current
+estimates of total species range from 5 million to 100 million, with 10-30 million being
+commonly accepted numbers. If scientists are unsure of how many species exist, it is
+naturally difficult to estimate how fast they are going extinct.
+
+Widely diverse methods all suggest that current rates of extinction exceed background
+
+rates, which are thought to be from one to ten species per 10 million per year. (That is, if
+there are 20 million species now, background levels would be about 2 to 20 species
+extinctions per year.) Common estimates of current extinction rates range from 100 to
+10,000 times background rates — roughly comparable to the five great episodes of extinction
+in the geologic past. Critics most frequently question these calculations by stressing
+uncertainties, rather than citing specific factual errors. This criticism is not surprising, since
+no single step in these calculations can be 100% certain (e.g., estimating the number of
+existing species). A well-known critic, the late Julian Simon (Professor of Business
+Administration at the University of Maryland), called the calculations “statistical flummery.”
+Most biologists counter by noting that similar numbers are generated in studies of widely
+different groups by scientists using not only different methods, but conservative assumptions.
+
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+Robust results (i.e., similar results from the testing of a hypothesis in a variety of ways) are
+usually considered scientifically sound.
+
+Evolution continues, even in the face of high extinction rates, so perhaps new species
+
+will evolve that are better adapted to new conditions. If so, how long would evolutionary
+recovery (to an equal number albeit different species) take? Examining the geologic record
+after major extinction episodes, some scientists estimate that recovery to approximately equal
+numbers of species took up to 25 million years for the most severe extinction crises. Thus,
+if the current extinction rate and recovery rate are comparable, the return to species numbers
+of the pre-historic era would take several million years.
+
+ Issues in the 106th Congress 
+
+ Some landowners fear that the presence of a listed species or the designation of their
+
+land as critical habitat will result in loss of some or all of their property rights. (“This is
+nothing but confiscation.... The government is stealing the property of citizens...,” said John
+Silber, Chancellor of Boston University, regarding an ESA controversy near his property in
+Texas.) A more widespread concern is that there may be restrictions on new or current
+activities, thereby causing economic losses or reducing land values. At the other end of the
+spectrum, there are those who view the presence of a rare flower or frog on their land as an
+honor. The FWS claims that this attitude is common, particularly in the Northeast and
+Midwest, though rarely mentioned in the press.
+
+Under the Constitution, no person’s property can be taken without “just compensation,”
+
+whether the taking occurs under ESA or any other federal law or whether the taking is done
+by FWS or any other agency. But “taking” has been interpreted strictly by the courts in the
+past and, according to current interpretations by the Supreme Court, does not include
+restrictions on permitted uses or a decrease in the value of the land unless the constraints are
+very severe, and the prohibited uses could not have been barred at the time the property was
+acquired. 
+
+Some critics of ESA have argued that the current standard is too strict when applied to
+
+ESA controversies, and would like to see the ESA amended to provide compensation in a
+broader range of circumstances than those required under the Constitution. (In general, such
+proposals target ESA, and sometimes the Clean Water Act; they do not typically change the
+threshold under the Constitution for compensation for taking of land by other agencies under
+other laws or for other purposes.) These critics generally propose compensation be offered
+for some specified percentage decrease in the value of their assets (including losses related
+to any loss of use of their land), since they feel that the property owner is otherwise forced
+to bear the cost of a public benefit. 
+
+Opponents of a new standard counter that they do not wish to see ESA singled out as
+
+having a different, more generous standard for payment of compensation from that required
+under current interpretation of the Constitution or for any other agency or law. They further
+state that the right of a property owner to use his or her land has never been absolute in any
+case. The cost to the federal government from changed thresholds for compensation and the
+constraints that would likely be placed on the operation of the ESA under a more lenient
+standard are among the contentious issues slowing action on reauthorization. (See also CRS
+Report 93-346A, Endangered Species Act and Private Property Rights: A Legal Primer .)
+
+CRS-4
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+ Funding for Land Conservation. A comparatively favorable federal budget estimate
+
+at the beginning of the 106th Congress led to interest in providing additional funds for the
+conservation of listed species, and one bill (H.R. 701), which would provide permanent
+appropriations for this and other purposes, was reported on February 16, 2000. The
+Administration has offered general support for such concepts through its Lands Legacy
+Initiative (see CRS Report RS20471, The Administration’s Lands Legacy Initiative in the
+FY2001 Budget Proposal – a Fact Sheet ) but has endorsed no particular bill of its own.
+Among other things, H.R. 701 would offer greater funding for land acquisition by the various
+federal land-managing agencies, including FWS, through the Land and Water Conservation
+Fund, and also provide incentives for conservation of listed species on private lands. It
+includes increased funding for measures to protect various species that are not listed; such
+programs could reduce the need for listing target species later. In the Senate, S. 25 is similar
+in many respects to H.R. 701 in its treatment of the LWCF. The recently introduced S. 2181
+also shares many features of H.R. 701 in its sections dealing with the LWCF. A key feature
+of such proposals is that they would nearly all be permanently appropriated, and therefore
+offer a more secure funding source on which agencies and state governments could rely and
+plan. While such provisions would clearly be welcomed by the beneficiaries, they also
+augment the level of controversy surrounding the measures. (For a more information, see
+CRS Report RL30444, Resource Protection: A Comparison of H.R. 701 (Amended)/S. 2123,
+S. 25 and S. 2181 with Current Law .)
+
+ Salmon Conservation. NMFS officials listed nine salmon and steelhead populations
+
+in Washington and Oregon (March 1999) and two additional chinook salmon populations in
+California (September 1999), and proposed listing northern California steelhead trout (early
+February 2000). This completed most of the pending decisions on Pacific salmon, with a total
+of 26 populations now listed as either threatened or endangered. NMFS officials are working
+closely with state, local, and tribal officials, as well as the public, in developing a variety of
+recovery measures to address habitat restoration and other concerns. A critical decision will
+come on May 22, 2000 when NMFS will decide, in response to an Army Corps of Engineers
+review, whether to recommend to Congress that the four Lower Snake River hydroelectric
+dams be breached to benefit salmon recovery. NMFS is expected to announce that the four
+Lower Snake River dams should remain in place for at least 5 or 10 more years, to allow for
+a more complete assessment of progress toward recovering endangered salmon.
+
+ Making the ESA User-Friendly. As a result of the controversy over ESA and property
+
+rights, Interior Secretary Babbitt moved to decrease ESA conflict in several ways. New FWS
+policies relieve owners of small parcels of land of some of their responsibilities, and efforts
+were made to encourage landowners to increase the populations of listed species on their
+land. Under these “safe harbor agreements”, the landowners receive, in return, promises that
+the presence of additional individuals of a listed population would not restrict their decisions
+to change the use of the land (see below). There has also been an Administration focus on
+listing species as threatened rather than endangered, to allow FWS to take advantage of the
+Act’s more flexible provisions on the protection of threatened species. 
+
+The Administration also simplified some measures and requirements to address many of
+
+the concerns of private landowners. For example, as of February 1, 2000, 269 incidental take
+permits (ITPs) had been issued after permittees developed Habitat Conservation Plans
+(HCPs). FWS and NMFS have a simplified version for smaller projects with fewer impacts.
+HCPs have been criticized by industry as cumbersome, expensive, and unworkable (though
+this appears to be changing as industries gain more experience with them), while
+
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+environmental groups have frequently denounced them as plans without serious protection,
+unmonitored and forgotten once signed, and most likely to be useful to large corporations.
+While these changes have been made within the framework of existing law, there is great
+interest among some groups in including many of them in an amended ESA.
+
+ No Surprises. Among the administrative changes of greatest interest is the “no surprises
+
+rule.” Inclusion of this provision in an agreement with a landowner means that the owner
+properly carrying out a conservation agreement is assured that there will be no further costs
+or restrictions on the use of the property, except by mutual consent. In some cases, changes
+may be carried out provided that the costs are not borne by the landowner. While landowners
+like the increased certainty, the program has been criticized by conservationists as potentially
+locking in conservation measures that are inadequate or unable to respond to changing
+conditions. One conservation group sued over the agencies’ failure to go through formal
+rule-making. The FWS and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration jointly
+proposed a “no surprises” rule (62 FED. REG. 29091 (May 29, 1997)) in response to the
+March 21, 1997 settlement agreement in Spirit of the Sage v. Babbitt No. 1:96CV02503
+(SS)(D.D.C.). A final rule was published at 63 FED. REG. 8859 (February 23, 1998). An
+attempt to enact this “no surprises” policy and regulation into law was a major impetus for
+Administration interest in ESA legislation in the 105th Congress. 
+
+The changes in the Federal Register of June 17, 1999 (see Safe Harbor Agreements ,
+
+below) modified the no surprises policy, in part. Specifically, a condition of an incidental take
+permit is a finding that the permitted taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the
+survival and recovery of the species. If continuation of permitted activities would be
+inconsistent with the finding, and the inconsistency is not remedied in a timely fashion, the
+new regulations provide for cancellation of the incidental take permits with no surprises
+agreements.
+
+ Safe Harbor Agreements. A safe harbor agreement is made between a landowner or
+
+other responsible party and FWS (or NMFS). The agreement is voluntary and unlike an HCP
+in that the agreement is not done as a condition of getting a permit. Rather, it is an attempt
+by the landowners to see that their “good deeds” in conserving listed species and habitat
+(beyond the requirements of the law) are not “punished” by increased restrictions based on
+the voluntary improvements. The landowners agree to carry out certain activities on the land
+that would tend to increase the numbers of the listed species. The agreement covers a
+specified number of years. 
+
+If, at the end of the agreement, the owner wishes to take actions that might reduce the
+
+resulting elevated population or the quality or quantity of the improved habitat, there will be
+no penalty under ESA for doing so, provided that the baseline conditions in the agreement
+continue to be met. (Provisions are included to require that the agency receive advanced
+warning so as to remove as many of the listed plants or animals as possible and take specified
+other steps to retain as much of the advantages gained during the terms of the agreement as
+possible.) Final rules for this program (including “No surprises” provisions similar to those
+discussed above) were published June 17, 1999 (64 FR 32706). Some property rights groups
+criticize the program as offering insufficient incentive to landowners; conservation groups are
+concerned that the standard for entering the agreements does not require that they support
+recovery, and in the end might harm recovery efforts if the landowner returns the property
+to baseline conditions.
+
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+ Candidate Conservation Agreements. A landowner might enter such an agreement with
+
+FWS or NMFS to conserve a declining but unlisted species. If the landowner carries out the
+agreement as promised, she or he receives assurances from the agency that should the species
+be listed in the future no additional measures will be required beyond those specified. 
+Landowners’ efforts, singly and collectively, may stave off a listing. Criticism of these
+agreements on the one hand is that they do not offer sufficient incentive to landowners to
+stimulate their participation, and may indeed require them to carry out measures more strict
+than those that might have been necessary with a listed species. Environmentalists and others
+counter that the requirements on landowners may be minimal, and might stave off listing when
+such a decision is biologically unjustified. Final rules for this program were published June
+17, 1999 (64 FR 32706). 
+
+ Critical Habitat Designation. The Administration has supported restrictions on its own
+
+ability to designate critical habitat (CH) under ESA ( e.g. , see proposed restrictions under
+appropriations process, below). In an announcement on Oct. 22, 1999, FWS placed
+designation of CH at the lowest priority in its listing budget, and stated that it could not
+comply with all of the demands of ESA under current budget constraints. Conservation
+groups saw a contradiction between that claim, and the agency’s failure to request more funds
+for listing as well as its request in the last budget cycle to have Congress place a special cap
+on funding for designation of CH. (See Appropriations Riders , below.)
+
+In the agency’s view, CH offers little protection for a species beyond that already
+
+available under the listing process. Moreover, though the avoidance of adverse modification
+of CH is an obligation only for federal agencies and actions, it is frequently misunderstood by
+the public as a major restriction on a landowner’s authority to manage land. While a
+landowner may feel some restrictions on management of land because of the presence of a
+listed species, the bulk of the restrictions, so this view holds, come as a result of the Act’s
+prohibition on taking a listed species, and only occasionally due to the added strictures
+resulting from designated CH. Thus (according to some agency officials), the expense of CH
+designation, combined with the small margin of additional conservation benefit, make CH
+requirements a poor use of scarce budgetary resources, especially if the public views CH as
+the major regulatory impact of ESA, rather than as a supplement to the ESA’s prohibition on
+“taking” a listed species. According to FWS, CH designation shows its greatest conservation
+benefit when it includes areas not currently occupied by the species; these areas may be
+important as connecting corridors between populations or as areas in which new populations
+may be re-introduced. 
+
+Under current law, the agency is obliged to designate CH at the time of listing. Two
+
+exceptions are provided. If the designation is not “prudent” ( e.g. due to the threat of illegal
+collection or killing), it may be omitted. If it is not “determinable” due to insufficient data,
+it may be postponed up to one year after listing. In practice, FWS has designated CH for only
+about 10% of listed domestic species; in every case brought against the agency for failure to
+designate CH, the agency has lost. (At least 13 cases have been decided; others are pending.)
+
+In a notice soliciting public comment, FWS proposes to “develop policy or guidance
+
+and/or revise regulations, if necessary, to clarify the role of habitat in endangered species
+conservation” (64 FR 31871-31874, June 14, 1999). The notice clarifies the agency’s long-
+standing disaffection for this provision of the law and its view that its conservation benefit is
+low compared to its cost. Given the agency’s stated position, the importance that the
+environmental community attaches to CH especially in some specific cases, and the distress
+
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+its designation causes among many landowners, the issue has been the focus of at least one
+bill (S. 1100) in the 106th Congress. See CRS Report RS20263, The Role of Designation of
+Critical Habitat under the Endangered Species Act. 
+
+ Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. The 11th Conference
+
+of Parties to this treaty (CITES) will be held in Nairobi, Kenya in April 2000. U.S. draft
+proposals were published on July 8, 1999 (64 FR 36893), and are being finalized. To date,
+the likely issues at the meeting have not generated great controversy. For more information
+from FWS, see http://international.fws.gov/cop11/cop11.html.
+
+ Legislation in the 106th Congress. S. 1100 (Chafee, S.Rept. 106-126) would require,
+
+among other things, that CH be designated with the release of the final recovery plan for a
+species (due in 2½ years), or within 3 years of listing for species without a recovery plan. The
+change would lengthen the potential delay after listing from one year, as required in current
+law, to 3 years. As a practical matter, on the other hand, FWS has stated its negative view
+of CH designation generally, and (partly as a result) 90% of species have no designated CH.
+Therefore, if the change prompted FWS to revise its current practice and follow the proposed
+law, designation of CH might be shortened (i.e., from “nearly never, unless sued” to 3 years).
+CH could also be designated at the time of listing if necessary to avoid extinction. 
+
+In the House, Chairman Young introduced H.R. 3160 on Oct. 22, 1999; hearings were
+
+held on February 2 and March 1, 2000, and additional hearings are expected. The bill would
+reauthorize ESA, allow economic injury as grounds for a citizen lawsuit, increase the role of
+states in listing decisions, place a deadline on recovery plans, make data considered in listing
+decisions publicly available, permit federal agencies to go ahead with actions that may affect
+listed species if FWS or NMFS fail to meet deadlines for consultation, and make other
+changes. Hearings were held on February 2 and March 1, 2000; additional hearings are
+expected. H.R. 960 (Miller) is very similar to H.R. 2351 of the 105th Congress. It is a far-
+reaching reauthorization broadly supported by the environmental community.
+
+ Appropriations Issues. Appropriations bills continue to play an important role in the
+
+ESA debate in the 106th Congress. ESA funding over the last several years is shown in Figure
+1 (below).
+
+In a broader sense, the amount the federal government and others spend on ESA has
+
+been hotly debated. Even in an agency like NMFS, with major responsibilities for ESA, the
+amount of spending for endangered species cannot be reliably allocated to ESA alone.
+(NMFS’s budget counts spending for both ESA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act
+under “Protected Species” and does not, for practical reasons, attempt to distinguish funds
+spent under one law or the other.) FWS itself funds some activities which benefit listed
+species through other programs, e.g., management of refuges which provide not only hunting,
+fishing, and bird-watching opportunities, but also habitat for listed species. Agencies with
+high probabilities of spending to benefit listed species include the Forest Service, National
+Park Service, and Bureau of Land Management. Agencies with responsibilities for dams and
+irrigation, soil erosion, pollution cleanup, etc., may also spend some fraction of their budget
+each year in ways that protect (or avoid deliberate harm to) listed species. Since some of the
+activities by these agencies might be done for more than just their ESA benefits (e.g., the re-
+routing of a trail to protect prime grizzly bear habitat may also benefit soil erosion control,
+bird habitat, and human safety), FWS spending might be viewed as the most readily measured
+part of federal spending. 
+
+CRS-8
+
+ 
+ IB10009
+
+05-08-00
+
+In addition, state and local governments, business, and individuals may also spend in
+
+similarly complex ways. A FWS report estimated the “reasonably identifiable” expenditures
+of federal and certain state governments at $233 million for FY1993, with 18% of the amount
+used for land acquisition. One effort to take a more expansive view of this question was
+prepared by the Majority Staff of the House Resources Committee (Serial No. 104-65, p.
+192-223). After discussion of many aspects of spending by various agencies and an attempt
+to develop estimates for many of them, the report noted “...it is probably impossible to
+quantify the costs of recovery since many costs may be indirect or hidden in other
+expenditures and the estimated costs found in recovery plans may bear no actual relationship
+to reality.”
+
+ Figure 1. FWS Endangered Species Program Appropriations (Current dollars*) 
+
+100
+
+80
+
+Coop. End.
+
+60
+
+Sp. Fund
+
+$ millions
+
+Recovery
+
+40
+
+20
+
+Consultation
+
+Listing
+
+Candidate 
+
+0
+
+Conserv.
+
+1997
+
+1998
+
+1999
+
+2000
+
+FY2001 Request
+
+*Amounts for recovery in the FY2001 request include $4.98 million for the Landowner Incentive
+
+Program (LIP). 
+
+Sources: Annual FWS Budget Justifications.
+
+ Multinational Species Conservation Fund. The Multinational Species Conservation
+
+Fund, which benefits Asian and African elephants, tigers, and the six species of rhinoceroses,
+would increase from $2.4 million to $3.0 million (+25%) under the President’s request for FY
+2001. The Fund often works with efforts under the Convention on International Trade in
+Endangered Species (CITES), to which the United States is a Party. This program is
+authorized under three acts, described below. Table 1 shows funding levels for FY2000-
+2001. In the appropriations bill, the Fund is a separate line item from ESA funding. 
+
+CRS-9
+
+ 
+ IB10009
+
+05-08-00
+
+ Table 1. Funding for Multinational Species Conservation Fund, FY 2000-2001 
+
+(x $1000)
+
+Multinational Species
+
+FY2000 Enacted
+
+FY2001 Requested
+
+Conservation Fund
+
+African elephant
+
+966
+
+970
+
+Tiger and Rhinos
+
+676
+
+970
+
+Asian elephant
+
+677
+
+970
+
+Administration
+
+72
+
+90
+
+ Total 
+
+ 2,391 
+
+ 3,000 
+
+ Appropriations Riders, FY1998 — FY2000. In FY1998, Congress set a limit in the
+
+text of the Interior Appropriations bill on expenditures for the listing function (which, through
+FY1998, included listing, delisting, up-listing, downlisting, and designation of critical habitat).
+The effect is to limit the discretion of the agency to transfer funds for additional listings, e.g.,
+if lawsuits mandate agency action on listing certain species. Without a cap, funding could
+have been transferred from other listing activities to meet the additional requirements of a
+lawsuit, or from other programs within the agency’s Resources Management function. With
+the cap, a court order to carry forward a listing decision on particular species makes listing
+into a zero-sum game, at least at a fiscal level: the listing of some species or designation of
+their critical habitat would preclude the listing of others. FWS welcomed this change as a
+protection of other programs whose budgets it wishes to protect. (There are various lawsuits
+regarding listing pending in the courts, including one for a failure to list a number of plant
+species in southern California.)
+
+For FY1999, Congress passed a variant of the previous year’s language. The change
+
+exempts steps to delist or downlist a species from the cap on spending for Listing by
+transferring delisting and downlisting activities from the Listing function to the Recovery
+function, and listing of foreign species to the International Affairs program. The result of
+these changes leaves the Listing program managing only its most controversial functions:
+listing and uplisting of domestic species, plus critical habitat designation, and these functions
+would be subject to the cap.
+
+For FY2000, the Administration proposed to add, within the cap for listing, a further
+
+restriction on designation of critical habitat, which is part of the listing function. Under the
+Administration’s proposal, of the total amount for listing ($7.5 million proposed), no more
+than $1 million would have been allowed to be spent on designation of additional critical
+habitat. Since such designations are very costly, perhaps only one or two new areas may be
+able to be designated under this additional restriction. Congress accepted the restriction on
+the total amount available for listing, but did not include the restriction on designating critical
+habitat. 
+
+CRS-10
+
+ 
+ IB10009
+
+05-08-00
+
+ Major Provisions of the Current Law: Domestic 
+
+The ESA (16 U.S.C. 1531-1543) was passed in 1973, but was preceded by simpler acts
+
+in 1966 and 1969. It has been amended on numerous occasions since then: 1976, 1977,
+1978, 1979, 1980, 1982, and 1988. The following are its major domestic provisions in the
+order they appear in the U.S. Code:
+
+1.
+
+An endangered species is defined as “any species which is in danger of extinction
+throughout all or a significant portion of its range....” A threatened species is
+defined as “any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the
+foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” The ESA
+does not rely on a numerical standard: such a standard would not reflect the wide
+variety of many species’ biology. (For example, a population of 10,000 butterflies,
+all confined to one mountaintop, would clearly be at greater risk than 10,000
+butterflies scattered over thousands of square miles.) The protection of the Act
+extends to all species and subspecies of animals (not just birds and mammals),
+although for vertebrates, further protection can be given even for distinct
+population segments within a species, and not just the species as a whole. More
+limited protection is available for plant species under the Act. (16 U.S.C. 1532)
+
+2.
+
+The term “take” under the Act means to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
+wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct”
+(16 U.S.C. 1532). (Harassment and harm are further defined in regulation at 50
+C.F.R. 17.3.) Taking is prohibited under 16 U.S.C. 1538. There has been
+controversy over the extent to which the prohibition on taking may include habitat
+modification. A 1995 Supreme Court decision ( Sweet Home ) held that the
+inclusion of significant habitat modification was a reasonable interpretation of the
+term “harm” in the law. (See CRS Report 95-778 A.)
+
+3.
+
+Most listed species are managed by the Secretary of the Interior through FWS.
+However, marine species, including some marine mammals, are the responsibility
+of the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the National Marine Fisheries
+Service (NMFS). The law assigns the major role to the Secretary of the Interior
+(all references to “Secretary” below are to the Secretary of the Interior unless
+otherwise stated) and provides in detail for the relationship of the two Secretaries
+and their respective powers. (16 U.S.C. 1533)
+
+4.
+
+When the appropriate Secretary initiates or receives a substantive petition from a
+party (which may be a state or federal agency — including FWS or NMFS, an
+individual, or some other entity), the Secretary must decide whether to list the
+species, based only on the best scientific information and trade statistics, and after
+an extensive series of procedural steps to ensure public participation and the
+collection of information. The Secretary may not take into account the economic
+effects that listing may have on the area where the species occurs. This is the only
+place in the ESA where economic considerations are expressly forbidden. (See
+CRS Report 89-274 A, Consideration of Economic Factors under the Endangered
+Species Act , for an analysis of when the ESA does allow consideration of such
+factors.) Some steps may be skipped for emergency listings. Economic factors are
+not taken into account at this stage because Congress felt that listing was
+fundamentally a scientific question: is the continuation of the species threatened
+
+CRS-11
+
+ 
+ IB10009
+
+05-08-00
+
+or endangered? Through the 1982 amendments particularly, Congress clearly
+intended to separate this scientific question from subsequent decisions on
+appropriate protection. (16 U.S.C. 1533)
+
+5.
+
+In the interval between a proposal and a listing decision, the Secretary must
+monitor the status of these “candidate” species and promptly list them to prevent
+sudden significant risks (16 U.S.C. 1533). Furthermore, federal agencies must
+confer with the appropriate Secretary on actions likely to jeopardize the continued
+existence of the species proposed to be listed. However, the agencies are not
+required, for candidate species, to avoid irretrievable commitments of resources.
+(16 U.S.C. 1536)
+
+6.
+
+If a species is listed, the Secretary must designate critical habitat (either where the
+species is found or, if it is not found there, where there are features essential to its
+conservation) at the time of listing. However, if the publication of this information
+is not “prudent” because it would harm the species (e.g., by encouraging vandals
+or collectors), the Secretary may decide not to designate critical habitat. The
+Secretary may also postpone designation for up to one year if the information is not
+determinable. (16 U.S.C. 1533 etc.) As a practical matter, critical habitat has not
+been designated for many listed species. While any area, whether or not federally
+owned, may be designated as critical habitat, private land is affected by designation
+primarily if some federal action (e.g., license, loan, permit, etc.) is also involved.
+In either case, federal agencies must avoid “adverse modification” of critical
+habitat, either through their own actions or activities that are federally approved or
+funded. 
+
+7.
+
+The appropriate Secretary must develop recovery plans for the conservation and
+survival of listed species. Recovery plans to date tend to cover birds and mammals,
+but a 1988 amendment now forbids the Secretary to favor particular taxonomic
+groups. (16 U.S.C. 1533) The Act and regulations provide little detail on the
+requirements for recovery plans, nor are these plans binding on federal agencies or
+others.
+
+8.
+
+Land may be acquired to conserve (recover) endangered and threatened species,
+and money from the Land and Water Conservation Fund may be appropriated for
+this acquisition. (16 U.S.C. 1534)
+
+9.
+
+The appropriate Secretary must cooperate with the states in conserving protected
+species and must enter into cooperative agreements to assist states in their
+endangered species programs, if the programs meet certain specified standards. If
+there is a cooperative agreement, the states may receive federal funds to implement
+the program, but the states must normally provide a minimum 25% matching
+amount. Under the 1988 amendments, a fund was created to provide for the state
+grants. While the authorized size of the fund is determined according to a formula,
+money from the fund still requires annual appropriation. (16 U.S.C. 1535)
+
+10. If their own actions or actions of non-federal parties that require the agencies’
+
+approval, permits, or funding may affect a listed species, federal agencies must
+ensure that those actions (including those affecting private actions such as funding,
+permit approval, etc.) are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of any
+
+CRS-12
+
+ 
+ IB10009
+
+05-08-00
+
+endangered or threatened species, nor to adversely modify critical habitat. To be
+sure of the effects of their actions, they must consult with the appropriate
+Secretary. “Action” is quite broadly defined: it includes anything authorized,
+funded, or carried out by the agency, including permits and licenses. If the
+appropriate Secretary finds an action would jeopardize the species, he must suggest
+reasonable and prudent alternatives that would avoid harm to the species. Pending
+completion of the consultation process, agencies may not make irretrievable
+commitments of resources that would foreclose any of these alternatives. (16
+U.S.C. 1536)
+
+11. Proponents of federal action may apply for an exemption for that action (not for
+
+a species) from the Act. Under the ESA, a Committee of six specified federal
+officials and a representative of each affected state (commonly called the “God
+Squad”) must decide whether to allow a project to proceed despite future harm to
+a species; at least five votes are required to pass an exemption. The law includes
+extensive rules and deadlines to be followed in applying for such an exemption and
+some stringent rules for the Committee in deciding whether to grant an exemption.
+The Committee must grant an exemption if the Secretary of Defense determines
+that an exemption is necessary for national security. (16 U.S.C. 1536) (For further
+discussion, see CRS Reports 89-274 A and 90-242 ENR.)
+
+12. For actions without a federal nexus, the Secretary may also issue permits to allow
+
+incidental take of species for otherwise lawful actions that do not involve some
+federal nexus such as loans, permits, licenses, etc. The applicant for an “incidental
+take permit” must submit a habitat conservation plan (HCP) that shows the likely
+impact, the steps to minimize and mitigate the impact, the funding for the
+mitigation; the alternatives that were considered and rejected; and any other
+measures that the Secretary may require. Secretary Babbitt has vastly expanded
+use of this section and provided streamlined procedures for activities with minimal
+impacts. (16 U.S.C. 1539)
+
+13. Other provisions specify certain exemptions for raptors; regulate subsistence
+
+activities by Alaskan natives; prohibit interstate transport and sale of listed species
+and parts; control trade in parts or products of an endangered species that were
+owned before the law went into effect; and specify rules for the establishment of
+experimental populations, among other specialized provisions. (Provisions of the
+Act referring to international activities are discussed below.) (16 U.S.C. 1539)
+
+14. Prohibited actions are set out and criminal and civil penalties are specified, and
+
+provision is made for citizen suits to enforce the Act in certain respects. (16
+U.S.C. 1538 and 1540)
+
+ Major Provisions of the Current Law: International 
+
+For the United States, the ESA implements the Convention on International Trade in
+
+Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”; TIAS 8249; see CRS Report 94-675
+ENR, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species: Its Past and Future ),
+signed by the United States on March 3, 1973; and the Convention on Nature Protection and
+Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (the “Western Hemisphere Convention”; 50
+
+CRS-13
+
+ 
+ IB10009
+
+05-08-00
+
+Stat. 1354; TS 981), signed by the United States on October 12, 1940. CITES parallels the
+ESA by dividing its listed species into groups, according to the estimated risk of extinction,
+but uses three major categories, rather than two. In contrast to the ESA, however, CITES
+focuses exclusively on trade, and does not consider or attempt to control habitat loss. The
+following are the major international provisions of the ESA:
+
+1.
+
+The Secretary may use foreign currencies (available under 7 U.S.C. 1691, the Food
+for Peace program) to provide financial assistance to other countries for conserving
+endangered species. (As a practical matter, however, very little money is currently
+available under this provision.) The Act also authorizes appropriations for this
+purpose. (16 U.S.C. 1537 and 1542)
+
+2.
+
+The Act designates the Interior Secretary as the Endangered Species Scientific
+Authority (ESSA) under CITES. As the ESSA, the Secretary must determine that
+export from the United States and import from other countries of living or dead
+organisms, or their products, will not harm the species in question. The Secretary
+has authority to enforce these determinations. The Secretary is required to base
+export determinations upon “the best available biological information,” although
+population estimates are not required. Certain other responsibilities are also spelled
+out in CITES. (16 U.S.C. 1537-1538)
+
+3.
+
+The Interior Secretary is also named as the Management Authority for the United
+States under CITES. The Management Authority must assure that specimens are
+exported legally, that imported specimens left the country of origin legally, and that
+live specimens are shipped under suitable conditions. Certain other responsibilities
+are also spelled out in CITES. (16 U.S.C. 1537)
+
+4.
+
+The ESA makes violations of CITES violations of U.S. law if committed within the
+jurisdiction of the United States. (16 U.S.C. 1538)
+
+5.
+
+The ESA requires importers and exporters of controlled products to use certain
+ports and provides for exemptions for scientific purposes and for programs
+intended to assist the recovery of listed species. There are also certain exemptions
+for Alaska Natives and for products owned before December 28, 1973, including
+scrimshaw. (16 U.S.C. 1538-1539)
+
+6.
+
+The 1988 amendments created a major program for the conservation of African
+elephants. 
+
+LEGISLATION
+
+ P.L. 106-113 (H.R. 3194, Istook)
+Section 1001 (a)(3) contains appropriations for Interior and Related Agencies. Signed
+
+by President on November 29, 1999.
+
+CRS-14
+
+ 
+ IB10009
+
+05-08-00
+
+ H.R. 701 (Don Young)
+ Creates a new program to benefit conservation of listed species on private lands and
+
+amends several existing programs, resulting in benefits to listed species or in reducing the risk
+of later species listings. These and other titles funded through permanent appropriations of
+receipts from leasing energy resources on Outer Continental Shelf. Introduced February 10,
+1999; referred to Committee on Resources. Reported (amended) February 16, 2000 (H.Rept.
+106-499, Part I). Referred sequentially to Committee on Agriculture until March 17, and to
+Committee on the Budget until March 31 for such provisions as fall within their respective
+jurisdictions.
+
+ H.R. 960 (Miller)
+ Reauthorizes and amends Act, adding several benefits in tax code for measures to
+
+conserve listed species on non-federal lands. Introduced March 4, 1999; referred to
+Committee on Resources.
+
+ H.R. 3160 (Don Young)
+ Reauthorizes ESA, allows economic injury as grounds for a citizen lawsuit, increases the
+
+role of states in listing decisions, places a deadline on recovery plans, makes data considered
+in listing decisions publicly available , permits federal agencies to go ahead with actions that
+may affect listed species if FWS or NMFS fail to meet deadlines for consultation, and makes
+other changes. Hearings held February 2 and March 1, 2000. Introduced October 27, 1999;
+referred to Committee on Resources.
+
+ S. 1100 (Chafee)
+ Amends ESA to require designation of critical habitat concurrent with recovery plan or
+
+within 3 years, whichever is first. Adds “military training and operations” to economic
+impacts as a factor to be considered in designation. Introduced May 20, 1999; referred to
+Committee on Environment and Public Works. Reported July 28, 1999 (amended), S. Rept.
+106-126.
+
+FOR ADDITIONAL READING
+
+U.S. General Accounting Office. Endangered Species Act: Types and Number of 
+
+ Implementing Actions . [Washington] 1992. 40 p.
+
+GAO/RCED-92-131BR
+
+U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Resources. Oversight Hearing on Examining 
+
+ the Expenditures of Agencies that Participate in Efforts to Save Endangered and
+Threatened Species. Apr. 17, 1996. 350 p.
+
+Serial No. 104-65
+
+ CRS Products 
+
+CRS Report RS20263, The Role of Designation of Critical Habitat under the Endangered 
+
+ Species Act. Pamela Baldwin. 6 p.
+
+CRS Report RL30444, Resource Protection: A Comparison of H.R. 701 (Amended)/ S. 
+
+ 2123, S. 25 and S. 2181 with Current Law . Jeffrey Zinn and M. Lynne Corn. 52 p.
+
+CRS-15
+
+ 
+ IB10009
+
+05-08-00
+
+CRS Report RL30123. Harmful Non-Native Species: Issues for Congress , by M. Lynne
+
+Corn, Eugene H. Buck, Jean Rawson, and Eric Fischer. 50 p.
+
+CRS Report 98-178 A. Endangered Species Act Amendments: Analysis of S. 1180 and H.R. 
+
+ 2351 , by Pamela Baldwin and M. Lynne Corn. 51 p.
+
+CRS Report 98-32 ENR. Endangered Species List Revisions: A Summary of Delisting and 
+
+ Downlisting , by Robert J. Noecker. 19 p.
+
+CRS Report 97-752 ENR. African Elephant Issues: CITES and CAMPFIRE , by M. Lynne
+
+Corn and Susan R. Fletcher. 6 p.
+
+CRS Report 93-664 ENR. The Clinton Administration’s Forest Plan for the Pacific 
+
+ Northwest, by Ross W. Gorte. 6 p.
+
+CRS Report 94-675 ENR. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species: Its 
+
+ Past and Future , by M. Lynne Corn. 17 p.
+
+CRS Report 93-346 A. Endangered Species Act and Private Property Rights: A Legal 
+
+ Primer , by Robert Meltz.
+
+CRS Report 90-242 ENR. Endangered Species Act: The Listing and Exemption Processes ,
+
+by M. Lynne Corn and Pamela Baldwin. 29 p.
+
+CRS Report 95-778 A. Habitat Modification and the Endangered Species Act: The Sweet 
+
+ Home Decision , by Pamela Baldwin. 2 p.
+
+CRS Report 98-666 ENR. Pacific Salmon — Anadromous Trout: Management Under the 
+
+ Endangered Species Act , by John R. Dandelski and Eugene H. Buck. 6 p.
+
+CRS-16
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/corpus/politics/text/9d836f0afac51cd4.txt b/corpus/politics/text/9d836f0afac51cd4.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e7c875dec4fc96a608e7d0bda1595af951227b68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/politics/text/9d836f0afac51cd4.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,12858 @@
+Order Code RL31872
+
+Report for Congress
+
+Received through the CRS Web
+
+ Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: 
+
+ Background and Issues for Congress 
+
+ April 25, 2003 
+
+Elizabeth Bone
+
+Research Associate
+
+Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
+
+Christopher Bolkcom
+
+Specialist in National Defense
+
+Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:
+
+Background and Issues for Congress
+
+ Summary 
+
+Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been referred to in many ways: RPV
+
+(remotely piloted vehicle), drone, robot plane, and pilotless aircraft are a few such
+names. Most often called UAVs, they are defined by the Department of Defense
+(DOD) as powered, aerial vehicles that do not carry a human operator, use
+aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted
+remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal
+payload.
+
+The war on terrorism has put a high premium on the primary mission of UAVs,
+
+intelligence gathering. Furthermore, the military effectiveness of UAVs in recent
+conflicts such as Iraq (2003), Afghanistan (2001), and Kosovo (1999) has opened
+the eyes of many to both the advantages and disadvantages provided by unmanned
+aircraft. Long relegated to the sidelines in military operations, UAVs are now
+making national headlines as they are used in ways normally reserved for manned
+aircraft. Conventional wisdom states that UAVs offer two main advantages over
+manned aircraft: they are considered more cost-effective, and they minimize the risk
+to a pilot’s life. However, the current UAV accident rate (the rate at which the
+aircraft are lost or damaged) is 100 times that of manned aircraft. 
+
+UAVs range from the size of an insect to that of a commercial airliner. DOD
+
+currently possesses five major UAVs: the Air Force’s Predator and Global Hawk,
+the Navy and Marine Corps’s Pioneer, and the Army’s Hunter and Shadow. Other
+key UAV developmental efforts include the Air Force and Navy’s unmanned combat
+air vehicle (UCAV), Navy’s vertical takeoff and landing UAV (VTUAV), and the
+Broad Area Maritime Surveillance UAV(BAMS), and the Marine Corps’s Dragon
+Eye and Dragon Warrior. The services continue to be innovative in their use of
+UAVs. Recent examples include arming UAVs (Predator, Hunter), using UAVs to
+extend the eyes of submarines, and teaming UAVs with strike aircraft and armed
+helicopters to improve targeting.
+
+In the past, tension has existed between the services’ efforts to acquire UAVs
+
+and congressional initiatives to encourage a consolidated DOD approach. Some
+observers argue that the result has been a less than stellar track record for the UAV.
+However, reflecting the growing awareness and support in Congress and the
+Department of Defense for UAVs, investments in unmanned aerial vehicles have
+been increasing every year. The Fiscal Year 2001 (FY01) investment in UAVs was
+approximately $667 million, while the FY03 funding totaled over $1.1 billion
+dollars. The Pentagon has asked for $1.39 billion in procurement and development
+funding for FY04, with much more planned for the out years. 
+
+Congressional considerations include the proper pace, scope, and management
+
+of DoD UAV procurement; appropriate investment priorities for UAVs versus
+manned aircraft; UAV future roles and applications; and aerospace industrial base
+considerations. This report will be updated as necessary.
+
+ 
+ Contents 
+
+Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+
+Congressional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+
+Pace, Scope, and Management of DOD Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+UAVs and Investment Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+UAV Roles and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+Industrial Base Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
+
+Current DOD UAV Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
+
+Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
+Operational UAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
+
+MQ-1 Predator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
+RQ-2 Pioneer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
+RQ-5 Hunter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
+RQ-7 Shadow 200 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
+FQM-151 Pointer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
+
+Developmental UAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
+
+RQ-4 Global Hawk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
+UCAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
+Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical UAV (VTUAV) . . . . . . . . . . . 39
+Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
+Dragon Eye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
+Dragon Warrior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
+A-160 Hummingbird . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
+Scan Eagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
+Eagle Eye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
+UCAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
+Force Protection Aerial Surveillance System (FPASS) . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
+
+ List of Figures 
+
+Figure 1. UAV Programs, 1985-2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+Figure 2. Comparison of Total Numbers of
+
+Manned vs. Unmanned Aircraft-Feb03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+
+Figure 3. Comparison of Total Numbers of Manned Reconnaissance vs.
+
+Unmanned Aircraft-Feb 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+
+Figure 4. UAV Annual Funding Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+Figure 5. UAV Funding Over the FYDP,
+
+by Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+
+Figure 6. Manned vs. Unmanned Funding Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+Figure 7. Predator Flying in Support of
+
+OEF, Equipped with Hellfire Missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
+
+Figure 8. Pioneer Ready To Launch from Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
+Figure 9. A U.S. Army Hunter UAV Is Prepared For Launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
+Figure 10. U.S. Army Personnel Prepare To Launch
+
+An RQ-7A Shadow 200 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
+
+ 
+ Figure 11. FQM-151 Pointer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
+Figure 12. RQ-4A Global Hawk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
+Figure 13. Boeing X-45A Flight Demonstrator, Conducting First Flight Test
+
+at Edwards Air Force Base, California, on May 22, 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
+
+Figure 14. VTUAV Firescout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
+Figure 15. Marine Holding Dragon Eye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
+Figure 16. Artist’s Rendition of the Dragon Warrior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
+Figure 18. Eagle Eye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
+Figure 19. Micro Air Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
+
+ List of Tables 
+
+Table 1. UAV Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+Table 2. Characteristics of Current UAV Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+
+ 
+ Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:
+
+Background and Issues for Congress
+
+ Background 
+
+Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been referred to in many ways: RPVs
+
+(remotely piloted vehicle), drones, robot planes, and pilotless aircraft are a few such
+names. Most often called UAVs, they are defined by the Department of Defense
+(DOD) as powered, aerial vehicles that do not carry a human operator, use
+aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted
+remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal
+payload. Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles
+are not considered UAVs by the DOD definition.1 UAVs differ from RPVs in that
+some UAVs can fly autonomously. UAVs are either described as a single air vehicle
+(with associated surveillance sensors), or a UAV system, which usually consists of
+three to six air vehicles, a ground control station, and support equipment. 
+
+The military effectiveness of UAVs in recent conflicts such as Iraq (2003),
+
+Afghanistan (2001), and Kosovo (1999) has opened the eyes of many to the
+advantages and disadvantages provided by unmanned aircraft. Long relegated to the
+sidelines in military operations, UAVs are now making national headlines as they
+assume missions normally reserved for manned aircraft. UAVs are thought to offer
+two main advantages over manned aircraft: they are arguably cheaper to procure, and
+they eliminate the risk to a pilot’s life. UAVs protect the lives of pilots by
+performing the “3-D” missions - those dull, dirty, or dangerous missions that do not
+require a pilot in the cockpit. However, the lower procurement cost of UAVs must
+be weighed against their greater proclivity to crash, while the minimized risk should
+be weighed against the dangers inherent in having an unmanned vehicle flying in
+airspace shared with manned assets.
+
+There are a number of reasons why UAVs have only recently been given a
+
+higher priority. Technology is now available that wasn’t available just a few short
+years ago. Some say that the services’ so-called “silk scarf syndrome” of preferring
+manned aviation over unmanned, has diminished as UAVs entered the mainstream.
+UAVs might have gained momentum earlier if a crisis had occurred, such as an
+extreme shortage of surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft during a conflict. The
+lack of such a crisis, along with the paradigm shift that needed to occur before
+unmanned vehicles were accepted, meant that UAVs have evolved as technology has
+become available.
+
+1Joint Publication 1-02, “DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+Although only recently procured in significant numbers by the United States,
+
+UAVs have had a century-old history in aviation. First included in Jane’s All the
+World’s Aircraft in 1920, UAVs were tested during World War I, but not used in
+combat by the United States during that war. Germany’s use of the simple yet deadly
+V-1 “flying bomb” during World War II, laid the groundwork for post-war UAV
+programs in the United States. However, it was not until the Vietnam War that
+UAVs such as the AQM-34 Firebee were used in a surveillance role. The Firebee
+exemplifies the versatility of UAVs – initially flown in the 1970s, it was recently
+modified to deliver payloads and flew its first flight test as an armed UAV on
+December 20, 2002.2 
+
+The Israeli Air Force pioneered several UAVs in the late 1970s and 1980s that
+
+were eventually integrated into the United States’s UAV inventory. U.S. observers
+noticed Israel’s successful use of UAVs during operations in Lebanon in 1982,
+encouraging then-Navy Secretary John Lehman to acquire a UAV capability for the
+Navy. Interest also grew in other parts of the Pentagon, and the Reagan
+Administration’s FY1987 budget submission included increased UAV procurement.3
+This marked the transition of UAVs in the United States from experimental projects
+to acquisition programs. 
+
+One of the UAVs acquired from Israel, Pioneer, emerged as a useful source of
+
+intelligence at the tactical level during Desert Storm. Pioneer was used by Navy
+battleships to locate Iraqi targets for its 16-inch guns. Following the Gulf War,
+military officials recognized the worth of UAVs, and the Air Force’s Predator
+became a UAV on a fast track, quickly adding new capabilities.4 Debuting in the
+Balkans conflict, the Predator performed surveillance missions such as monitoring
+area roads for weapons movements and conducting battle damage assessment.
+Operations in Afghanistan have featured the Air Force’s newest UAV, Global Hawk,
+as well as adding a new mission for Predator that allows the UAV to live up to its
+name — armed reconnaissance. There are currently five major UAVs in the U.S.
+inventory: the Navy and Marine Corps’s Pioneer, the Air Force’s Global Hawk and
+Predator, and the Army’s Hunter and Shadow UAVs.
+
+Reflecting a growing awareness and support in Congress for UAVs, investment
+
+in unmanned aerial vehicles has increased annually. The FY01 investment in UAVs
+was approximately $667 million, while the FY03 funding totaled over $1.1 billion
+dollars. The Pentagon has asked for $1.39 billion in procurement and development
+funding for FY04, with much more planned for the out years. 
+
+Congress’s role in UAV development has been one of strong encouragement
+
+tempered with concern. Taking a proactive stance in UAV program management,
+
+2Jefferson Morris. “Northrop Grumman Modifies BQM-34 Firebee To Drop Payloads.”
+ Aerospace Daily , January 22, 2003.
+
+3For more on the early history of UAV use, CRS Report 93-686 F, Intelligence Technology
+in the Post-Cold War Era: The Role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) , by Richard A.
+Best, Jr., 1993, p. 7-10, is available from author on request.
+
+4Jim Garamone. “From U.S. Civil War To Afghanistan: A Short History Of UAVs.”
+ American Forces Information Service, Defenselink.mil , April 16, 2002.
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+Congress has in the past directed the formation of joint program offices to ensure
+commonality between the services’ UAV programs. Congress has also expressed
+concern that DOD’s “growing enthusiasm may well lead to a situation in which there
+is no clear path toward the future of UAVs”, and so has required DOD to submit a
+UAV roadmap.5 In some instances, Congress has advocated a more aggressive
+approach to fielding UAVs. For example, in 1996, the House Armed Services
+Committee (HASC) supported legislation directing DOD to weaponize both the
+Predator and Hunter, but DOD opposed the initiative.6 The scope of Congress’s
+support and confidence in UAV technology can be gleaned from the National
+Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, which stated that, “Within ten years,
+one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft will be unmanned.”7
+
+ Congressional Considerations 
+
+UAVs have been labeled as transformational technologies that could change
+
+how wars are fought and won. President Bush used the UAV as an example of a
+technology that is changing the face of the battlefield during a speech to the Citadel
+in December 2001. Speaking of the conflict in Afghanistan, Bush stated: 
+
+The Predator is a good example. This unmanned aerial vehicle is able to circle
+over enemy forces, gather intelligence, transmit information instantly back to
+commanders, then fire on targets with extreme accuracy. Before the war,
+Predator had skeptics, because it did not fit the old ways. Now it is clear the
+military does not have enough unmanned vehicles. We’re entering an era in
+which unmanned vehicles of all kinds will take on greater importance.8
+
+Because they are labeled transformational programs, UAVs could be given
+
+higher priority and corresponding funding increases. This will likely cause the pace
+and scope of DOD UAV efforts to increase in the years to come. How should these
+efforts be managed so that they are cost-efficient, effective, and interoperable? Are
+DOD UAV plans on track to meet congressional direction? How do UAV programs
+compare to manned aircraft programs?
+
+Investment priorities could change as the introduction of UAVs into the U.S.
+
+inventory shifts the balance between manned and unmanned capabilities. Congress,
+as part of its defense oversight responsibilities, may assess DOD’s current UAV
+efforts to verify that they match up with new investment goals and strategies.
+
+5U.S. Congress, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations,
+Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2003, H.Rept. 107-532, p.207.
+
+6Hearing of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
+Committee. “Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request for Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles and
+Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Programs.” March 26, 2003.
+
+7U.S. Congress, 106th Congress, 2d Session, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National
+Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S.Rept 106-292, p.141.
+
+8“President Speaks On War Effort To Citadel Cadets.” Whitehouse.gov , Remarks by the
+President, December 2001.
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+Conventional wisdom states that UAVs are cheap, or cost-effective. Is this true
+today? How do UAV costs compare to manned aircraft costs?
+
+UAVs have traditionally been used for reconnaissance and surveillance, but 
+
+today they are being employed in roles and applications that their designers never
+envisioned. The unanticipated flexibility and capability of UAVs has led some
+analysts to suggest that more, if not most, of the missions currently undertaken by
+manned aircraft could be turned over to unmanned aerial platforms, and that manned
+and unmanned aircraft could operate together. Congress may soon have to
+contemplate the replacement of a significant portion of the manned aircraft fleet with
+unmanned aircraft that have yet to be designed.
+
+ Industrial base issues also need to be considered. If defense companies devote
+
+more of their time and expenses to develop unmanned aircraft, will the skills and
+technologies needed for manned aircraft design erode? Those who argue that UAVs
+will replace manned aircraft in the future are not as concerned with the industrial
+base issue as those who feel manned aircraft will still be needed to combat future
+threats. 
+
+ Pace, Scope, and Management of DOD Efforts 
+
+UAV programs range from the combat tested — Pioneer, Hunter, Predator and
+
+Global Hawk — to the not yet tested — the Air Force and Navy’s Unmanned
+Combat Air Vehicles. Sizes and ranges of UAVs also vary greatly: the Pioneer at 14
+feet long has a combat radius of 100nm, while the Global Hawk at 44 feet long (the
+size of a medium sized corporate jet) has a combat radius of 5,400nm. Figure 1
+ shows the evolution of UAVs and provides a useful reference to DOD’s major UAV
+programs.9 
+
+9For a more comprehensive treatment of these UAV programs, see “Current DoD UAV
+Programs” on p.18 of this report.
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-5
+
+ Figure 1. UAV Programs, 1985-2015 
+
+ Source: DODBackground Briefing on UAVs, [http://www.defenselink.mil], October 31, 2001.
+ *Note : “Navy” includes Navy and Marine Corps; Navy VTUAV Firescout program cancelled in 2001,
+causing the Navy Pioneer program to be extended through 2010.
+
+DOD UAV procurement efforts have been often criticized in the past for being
+
+slow, expensive, and inefficient.10 However, operational success has stimulated
+DOD to accelerate the pace and widen the scope of its UAV efforts. As of April
+2003, the services operated five major UAVs — the Air Force’s Global Hawk and
+Predator, the Navy and Marine Corps’s Pioneer, and the Army’s Hunter and Shadow
+— comprising 163 vehicles. Table 1 indicates current inventories.
+
+ Table 1. UAV Platforms 
+
+UAV 
+
+Sponsoring Service
+
+Inventory (Feb 03)
+
+Global Hawk
+
+Air Force
+
+4
+
+Predator
+
+Air Force
+
+48
+
+Pioneer
+
+Navy/Marine Corps
+
+47
+
+Hunter
+
+Army
+
+43
+
+Shadow
+
+Army 21
+
+Total 
+
+ 163 
+
+ Source: OSD UAV Planning Task Force, February 2003
+
+10To cite just one example, U.S. Congress, 102d Congress, 1st Session, House of
+Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill,
+1992, H.Rept. 102-95, p.214, where Congress noted: “with displeasure, that despite...the
+appropriation of $350 million in R&D funding since 1988, the JPO has yet to produce a
+single UAV system.”
+
+ 
+ CRS-6
+
+This compares to an operational fleet of 90 vehicles in June 2000 Projected
+
+UAV procurement is expected to bring the total number of UAVs in the military
+inventory to 249 by the end of Fiscal Year 2007.
+
+Although Pioneer and Hunter are no longer being produced, at least one new
+
+UAV program will be introduced in this decade, the Air Force’s UCAV, in the 2008-
+2010 timeframe. The overall UAV inventory could also increase if emergency or
+supplemental funds for future conflicts are added to UAV programs, as happened in
+the 2003 budget. Instead of the expected procurement of seven Predators in FY03,
+25 Predators were acquired to meet operational demands in the war against terrorism.
+In addition, these figures do not include the category of small UAVs, which DOD
+expects to see the most rapid growth and fielding in future years.
+
+ The services are likely to continue adding missions to their existing and future
+
+UAVs. Predator B (nicknamed “Hunter-Killer”) is being designed with a strike
+capability, and some Predator As are being modified to carry weapons. The Air
+Force and Navy UCAV designs will target air defenses (missiles, artillery, air bases,
+and command-and-control facilities). The UCAV, which is the first UAV developed
+primarily for combat, is expected to be flown by the Air Force in 2010, and by the
+Navy in 2015.
+
+ Table 2 provides an overview of the five UAV programs mentioned above.
+
+ Table 2. Characteristics of Current UAV Programs 
+
+ UAV 
+
+ Pro- 
+
+ Radius 
+
+ Max. 
+
+ Endur- 
+
+ Pay- 
+
+ Wt. 
+
+ Est. Unit 
+
+ Model 
+
+ ducer 
+
+ (nm) 
+
+ Alt. (ft) 
+
+ ance 
+
+ load 
+
+ (lbs) 
+
+ Cost per 
+
+ (hours) 
+
+ (lbs) 
+
+ vehicle ($) 
+
+Pioneer
+
+AAI 100
+
+15,000
+
+5
+
+75
+
+452
+
+1M
+
+Hunter
+
+Northrop
+
+144
+
+15,000
+
+11.6
+
+200
+
+1,600
+
+1.2M
+
+Grumman
+
+Shadow
+
+AAI
+
+27
+
+15,000
+
+4
+
+60
+
+327
+
+350,000
+
+Predator
+
+General
+
+400
+
+25,000
+
+24+
+
+450
+
+2,250
+
+4.5M
+
+Atomics
+
+Global
+
+Northrop
+
+5,400 65,000 
+
+32
+
+1,950
+
+26,750
+
+57 
+
+M
+
+Hawk
+
+Grumman
+
+ Source: OSD UAV Roadmap, December 2002; Teal Group Corporation, World Missiles Briefing.
+
+DOD’s UAV research and development (R&D) programs are numerous for a
+
+variety of reasons: UAVs are considered a growth industry, many UAVs are
+relatively inexpensive to produce and new technology in miniaturization has helped
+accelerate the development of many UAV types. Research and development costs
+continue to approximately double that of procurement costs. In FY03, procurement
+costs for the Global Hawk, Predator and Shadow were $394 million while R&D costs
+were $805 million.
+
+ 
+ CRS-7
+
+Comparing unmanned to manned aircraft systems, Figure 2 reveals that UAVs
+
+make up only one percent of the United States’s aircraft inventory. Both fixed and
+rotary wing aircraft are used in this comparison. 
+
+ Figure 2. Comparison of Total Numbers of 
+
+ Manned vs. Unmanned Aircraft-Feb03 
+
+ Source : Table 1, UAV Platforms; The Military Balance 2002-2003 
+
+UAVs comprise a more significant percentage of aircraft, 32%, when compared
+
+only to manned fixed wing reconnaissance aircraft as seen in Figure 3. This
+comparison is chosen because the primary mission of UAVs is reconnaissance.
+
+ Figure 3. Comparison of Total Numbers of 
+
+ Manned Reconnaissance vs. Unmanned 
+
+ Aircraft-Feb 03 
+
+Source: Table 1, UAV Platforms; The Military Balance 2002-2003 
+
+ 
+ CRS-8
+
+Congressional direction has provided both challenges and goals to accelerate the
+
+pace and scope of DOD UAV efforts. One of the more ambitious challenges came
+from the Senate Armed Services Committee in the FY01 defense authorization
+conference report, which set as a goal one-third of the military’s operational deep
+strike aircraft (defined as the B-2 Spirit bomber and the F-117A Nighthawk stealth
+fighter) be unmanned by 2010. In 2010, there will be an estimated 75 B-2s and F-
+117As in the inventory.11 The Air Force plans to have 14 UCAVs flying by 2010.
+By this measure, DOD will be slightly short of the 1/3 goal.12 
+
+There are four paths to Congress’s goal: Accelerate the UCAV program, retire
+
+manned aircraft, weaponize existing UAVs, or rapidly develop a new combat UAV.
+DOD dismissed the first option, stating that UCAV development depends upon
+unpredictable cutting-edge technology.13 However, others argue that UCAV
+development could be accelerated by additional funding. The Air Force does not
+plan to retire manned aircraft to make room for more UCAVs, as they view the
+UCAV as an augmentation aircraft, not a replacement. The last two options appear
+more feasible, considering UAVs such as Predator and Hunter are already being
+weaponized and R&D programs are developing new combat aircraft. 
+
+Although supported by both Congress and DOD, UAV programs in the past had
+
+the reputation of rarely progressing past the development phase. In some cases, this
+was the result of having to choose funding unmanned systems over manned systems
+in an aviation culture that was built around manned systems. Also, requirements for
+joint systems have not always been easy to satisfy, as it is difficult to find a UAV that
+meets the distinct needs of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army, for example. The
+Navy needs a longer range, ship launched UAV, while the Marine Corps and Army
+require a shorter range platform. 
+
+Over the years, management of UAV programs has gone full circle from the
+
+military services, to a Navy-run Joint Program Office (JPO), to the Defense Airborne
+Reconnaissance Office (DARO) and then back to the services, under the auspices of
+OSD. The JPO was established in 1988, but met criticism in Congress. In 1992,
+Congress expressed its:
+
+serious reservations over the management of these [UAV] programs by the joint
+program office. Remarkably little progress has been registered during the past
+
+11Air Force Fact Sheets on B-2 and F-117, www.af.mil. Inventory on fact sheets is for
+current year. However, since the B-2 and F-117 are no longer being procured, the
+assumption made is that there will be no attrition and the inventory will remain the same in
+2010 as it is currently.
+
+12DOD is less likely to meet the 1/3 goal if a different definition of deep strike aircraft is
+used. Using the assumption that the Air Force’s three bomber aircraft, the B-1, B-2 and B-
+52, comprise the military’s deep strike aircraft, unmanned deep strike aircraft would have
+to equal 63, or one-third of the bomber inventory in 2010. See Pierre Bernasconi and
+Christopher Bolkcom’s CRS Report RL31544, “Long Range Bombers: Background and
+Issues for Congress, August 22, 2002, p.4, for bomber inventory. 
+
+13See CRS Report RL31014, Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles: Issues and Outlook , by
+Robert E. Chapman II, June 14, 2001, p.15.
+
+ 
+ CRS-9
+
+five years in this area. The conferees believe the Secretary of Defense should
+undertake a comprehensive review of the joint [project] office.14
+
+The JPO was replaced by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office
+
+(DARO), created in 1993 to more effectively manage DOD’s disparate airborne
+reconnaissance programs, including UAVs. DARO was disbanded in 1998, amid
+further criticism of problems, redesigns, and accidents with the family of systems that
+it was formed to develop.15 Some argue that DARO was dissolved due to resistance
+to UAVs in favor of manned aircraft. 
+
+Since DARO’s demise, there has been no single procurement focal point to
+
+manage DOD UAV efforts; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
+Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (OASD(C3I)) provides
+oversight, while the military services manage program development and acquisition.
+In 2001, a UAV planning task force was stood up under the Pentagon’s acquisition
+chief to help promote a common vision for future UAV-related efforts. The task
+force’s vehicle for this has been the UAV Roadmap, published in March 2003 and
+signed by both the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) and the Assistant Secretary
+of Defense (C3I). Another DOD initiative is the DOD UAV Interoperability
+Working Group, stood up in 2003 to pursue joint-service and international
+cooperation in UAV programs to support systems development. Congressional
+concerns with UAV acquisition management, program duplication, interoperability,
+and other issues continue.16 
+
+To encourage commonality of systems, Congress has directed JPOs again be
+
+established to promote interoperability and to reduce duplication of effort.17 Most
+recently, a UCAV JPO was stood up in December 2002 to address joint Air Force
+and Navy issues. This office’s goal is to create standards that will allow UCAVs to
+be built along common lines, in hopes of decreasing costs. Additionally, some of the
+services have been working towards a common ground control system, called the
+Tactical Control System (TCS), which is software that would be used to control
+multi-service UAV systems.18 However, there are still major UAV programs like
+Global Hawk, which do not have plans to move towards the common ground system.
+
+14U.S. Congress, 102d Congress, 2d Session, Committee of Conference, National Defense
+Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, H.Rept. 102-966, p.635.
+
+15Bill Sweetman. “DARO Leaves A Solid Legacy,” Journal of Electronic Defense, June
+1998, p.43.
+
+16For example, in 2002, the House Committee on Armed Services noted: “The committee
+expresses its concern about proper program management elsewhere in this report, and is
+specifically concerned that UAV programs adhere to the same standards as other acquisition
+programs.” U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives,
+Committee on Armed Services, Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal
+Year 2003, H.Rept. 107-436, p.243.
+
+17These JPOs for various UAVs should not be confused with the single JPO that existed
+from 1988-1993, which served as the focal point for all UAV programs. 
+
+18TCS is a Navy-developed and managed program. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-10
+
+The variety of UAV acquisition processes has added to the difficulty of
+
+managing the programs. UAVs have been acquired in three ways: through the
+traditional acquisition pipelines, as Advance Concept Technology Demonstrations
+(ACTDs), and through evolutionary acquisition with spiral development (EA/SD).
+UAV programs have at times been accelerated by circumventing traditional
+development milestones. Instead, UAVs such as Predator and Global Hawk have
+gone through the shorter ACTD timelines (three to five years instead of a decade or
+more), or been considered an EA/SD program like Global Hawk, adding capabilities
+incrementally as new technology becomes available. The remaining three major
+UAV programs, Pioneer, Hunter, and Shadow, have been acquired through
+traditional acquisition means. 
+
+The success of programs like Predator and Global Hawk has meant their non-
+
+traditional acquisition methods have also been looked upon favorably. This could
+lead DOD to manage new UAV programs using these methods. One potential
+implication of using ACTDs and EA/SD is that they lack traditional program
+development milestones, which may make it more difficult for DOD to provide
+benchmarks for congressional oversight. On the other hand, these acquisition
+methods have proven successful in getting technology into the warfighters’ hands
+more quickly than traditional acquisition pipelines.19
+
+ UAVs and Investment Priorities 
+
+The significant investment considerations for UAVs may be to find the most
+
+effective balance between manned and unmanned aircraft funding, determining how
+to balance UAV cost with capability, and even determining how best to characterize
+UAV costs.20
+
+If the upward trend in UAV funding continues, as shown in Figure 4 , DOD is
+
+projected to invest over $10 billion in UAVs in the first decade of the new century.
+This is triple what it did in the previous decade.21 
+
+19For more on EA/SD and how it differs from the traditional weapon acquisition process, see
+CRS Report RS21195, Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development in DoD Programs:
+Policy Issues for Congress , by Gary J. Pagliano and Ronald O’Rourke, January 23, 2003.
+
+20UAV cost can either be defined by unit cost of an individual air vehicle, or by system cost.
+System cost could include one to six air vehicles, the sensor package, the ground control
+station, and various support equipment. Acquisition cost is one measure, to include research
+and development and procurement costs, but operation and maintenance (O&M) cost is
+another factor. Costs stated are acquisition costs unless otherwise noted.
+
+21OSD, UAV Roadmap 2002-2027, December 2002, p.19. Each number in the chart
+represents the amount DOD invested in UAVs per fiscal year. 
+
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+
+CRS-11
+
+ Figure 4. UAV Annual Funding Profile 
+
+ Source: OSD, UAV Roadmap 2002-2027, December 2002, p.20.
+
+ Figure 5 breaks out the planned funding for each UAV throughout the Future
+
+Years Defense Plan (FYDP):
+
+ Figure 5. UAV Funding Over the FYDP, 
+
+ by Platform 
+
+ Source : DOD UAV task force data sheet
+
+ 
+ CRS-12
+
+ Figure 6 compares manned to unmanned funding from 2000 to 2010.22 The
+
+chart reveals that UAVs will make up an increased portion of aircraft funding over
+the FYDP, growing from 4% in 2000 to 31% in 2010.
+
+ Figure 6. Manned vs. Unmanned Funding 
+
+ Comparison 
+
+100%
+
+ % 80%
+
+ e 
+
+60%
+
+ tag 
+
+40%
+
+ rcen 20%
+
+ e
+P 
+
+0%
+
+1
+
+ 2000 
+
+ 2 2 003 
+
+ 2 3
+
+ 006 
+
+4
+
+ 2010 
+
+Manned
+
+Unmanned
+
+ Source: DOD UAV Roadmap 2002-2027; Teal Group Corporation, World Military and Civil
+Aircraft Briefing
+
+Cost savings have long been touted by UAV advocates as one of the advantages
+
+offered by unmanned aircraft over manned aircraft. However, critics point out that
+the cost savings are often negligible if you consider that money saved by not having
+a pilot in the cockpit must be applied to the “ground cockpit” of the UAV aircrew
+operating the UAV from the ground control station. So although the air vehicle
+might be cheaper than a manned aircraft, the UAV system as a whole is not always
+less expensive.23 On the other hand, UAV ground control stations can be capable of
+simultaneously flying multiple UAVs, somewhat restoring the advantage in cost to
+the unmanned system.24 Congress has noted that, “while the acquisition per unit cost
+may be relatively small, in the aggregate, the acquisition cost rivals the investment
+in other larger weapon systems.”25 
+
+DOD has stated that one of its major UAV challenges is to balance cost with
+
+capability. A significant concern with some UAVs is their rising price tag. At what
+threshold does an “expendable” UAV cost too much to lose? Sensors are starting to
+
+22UAV funding data extracted from the DOD UAV Roadmap 2002-2027, p.20. The three
+aircraft chosen to represent manned aircraft in this comparison, the F/A-22 Raptor, the F/A-
+18 E/F Super Hornet, and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), were selected because they are the
+three major aircraft acquisition programs. 
+
+23As an example, the Predator air vehicle costs $4.5 million while the Predator system,
+consisting of four air vehicles, cost $30 million. 
+
+24DOD UAV Roadmap 2000, p.53.
+
+25U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Bob Stump National
+Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, H.Rept. 107-436, p.243.
+
+ 
+ CRS-13
+
+dominate the cost of the air vehicle, according to Air Force Secretary Jim Roche.26
+These costs are increasing due to the basic law of supply and demand: growing
+demand matched up with a shortage of competition, and a lack of commercial sensor
+equivalents means that UAV sensor producers can set their own price. Global Hawk
+is an example of a UAV whose sensor costs have caused the total cost of the UAV
+to increase.27
+
+UAV costs compared to manned aircraft costs is a topic that has been the subject
+
+of debate. Two studies have addressed the manned vs. unmanned cost issue. The
+first, a CBO study, showed that replacing Army manned attack helicopters with
+UCAVs would produce no significant savings in steady-state procurement costs
+relative to current plans.28 DOD also studied the comparative costs of manned vs.
+unmanned aircraft in their UAV Roadmap 2000. They found that development costs
+were essentially the same while there was a cost savings in procurement costs when
+an F-16 was compared to a UCAV.29 
+
+Manned combat aircraft costs range from $37 million for the Joint Strike Fighter
+
+to $1.2 billion for the B-2 Spirit bomber.30 UAV costs, on the other hand, range from
+the Marine Corp’s developmental Dragon Eye at $30,000 per unit to Global Hawk
+at $57 million. However, the less expensive UAV systems must be replaced or
+restored at a greater rate than manned aircraft, adding to their total cost31. 
+
+ Growing costs have even prompted some to recommend equipping UAVs with
+
+self-protection devices, suggesting those UAVs are no longer considered expendable.
+There are two schools of thought for UAV employment that could help balance cost
+with capability. One is to field many cheaper, less capable UAVs commanded and
+controlled by robust communications networks.32 A second school of thought
+advocates fielding fewer, more expensive and more capable UAVs that are less
+networked with other systems, such as the autonomous Global Hawk.
+
+26U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
+“Department of Defense Policies and Programs to Transform the Armed Forces to Meet the
+Challenges of the 21st Century,” Senate Hearing 107-771, April 9, 2002, p.124.
+
+27See p.24 of this report for more information on Global Hawk’s rising price tag.
+
+28A CBO Study. “The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans.” January 2003,
+p.94.
+
+29DOD UAV Roadmap 2000, p. 51-54.
+
+30“JSF Holds Costs Steady Despite First Production Cuts,” Aerospace Daily, February 11,
+2003, p.7. $37 million is the unit cost in Fiscal Year 2002 dollars, for the Air Force’s JSF
+variant. 
+Air Force B-2 Fact Sheet, www.af.mil. Unit cost is in Fiscal Year 98 constant dollars.
+
+31UAVs are employed in high-risk environments and are lost at a much higher rate than
+manned aircraft. Nevertheless, 20 percent of UAV losses are due to human error, not enemy
+action, and DOD is studying how to reduce this noncombat loss.
+
+32Some have referred to this option as the “swarming UAV” concept.
+
+ 
+ CRS-14
+
+ UAV Roles and Applications 
+
+UAVs have traditionally been used as Intelligence, Surveillance and
+
+Reconnaissance/Target Acquisition (ISR/TA) assets. However, DOD has recently
+broadened this into new missions such as armed reconnaissance. Due to its ability
+to perform multiple missions as well as its success in recent military operations, the
+UAV has demonstrated surprisingly fast exploration of new roles.
+
+The five major UAVs flown today are still used primarily for reconnaissance 
+
+purposes. These aircraft provide commanders with imagery intelligence, electronic
+intelligence, and streaming video. This information can be used for everything from
+directing fighter aircraft to their targets, to monitoring enemy troop movements, to
+conducting battle damage assessment. 
+
+Predator is the first UAV to add the strike mission to its repertoire, stalking
+
+Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and Yemen and striking these targets
+with Hellfire missiles.33 Most recently, the Predator has been credited with two
+strikes in Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. One strike targeted an anti-
+aircraft vehicle while another fired its Hellfire missile at a TV satellite dish in
+downtown Baghdad. 
+
+DOD plans for other UAVs are not far behind. The Army has experimented
+
+with firing Brilliant Anti-Armor Technology(BAT) submunitions34 from Hunter
+UAVs in October 2002 and Northrop Grumman has stated plans to fire a dummy
+Hellfire missile from its RQ-8A Firescout unmanned helicopter. Another role that
+has emerged from operations in Afghanistan is special operations support. The
+Predator has been used to feed imagery to AC-130 special operation gunships and
+special operations teams on the ground. 
+
+UAVs in the future will likely be lethal by design. R&D platforms such as the
+
+UCAV are being developed with a primary offensive mission of strike and
+suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). DARPA, along with the Army, is
+developing a helicopter called the Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft (UCAR).
+The new and improved Predator, the Predator B, will have the capability to carry
+eight Hellfire missiles instead of two Hellfires.
+
+DOD plans call for UAVs to play an integral role in battlefield operations.
+
+UAVs will team up with manned aircraft to carry out operational missions. The
+Navy is considering pairing a UAV such as Global Hawk or the Predator B with its
+planned multi-mission maritime aircraft (MMA), as a replacement for its aging long
+range patrol aircraft, the P-3C Orion. The Army envisions helicopters such as the
+AH-64 Apache controlling UAVs and receiving direct video feeds from the UAV.
+It has also been directed by DOD to add a companion UAV to its newest helicopter
+purchase, the RAH-66 Comanche. To make this a reality, the Army procurement
+
+33The laser-guided Hellfire missile was originally designed to provide heavy anti-armor
+capability for attack helicopters.
+
+34BAT is a self-guided submunition that uses on-board sensors to seek, identify and destroy
+moving tanks and other armored combat vehicles. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-15
+
+plan for the armed reconnaissance helicopter was halved to 650 Comanches in 2002.
+The intention is that the companion UAV, such as the Shadow or UCAR, would
+make up for the canceled Comanches. This is significant in that it is likely the first
+time procurement of a manned aircraft system has been scaled back to allow for the
+introduction of an unmanned capability.
+
+Additional roles for UAVs in the near future may include homeland security and
+
+medical resupply. The Coast Guard and Border Patrol, parts of the newly formed
+Department of Homeland Security, already have plans to deploy UAVs to watch
+coastal waters, patrol the nation’s borders, and protect major oil and gas pipelines.
+Congressional support exists for using UAVs like the Predator for border security.
+During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on homeland defense, it was
+stated that although it would not be appropriate or constitutional for the military to
+patrol the border, domestic agencies using UAVs could carry out this mission.35 
+
+Another potential role is long-duration law enforcement surveillance, a task
+
+performed by manned aircraft during the October 2002 sniper incident near
+Washington, D.C. The Transportation Department has looked at possible security
+roles for UAVs, such as following trucks with hazardous cargo, while the Energy
+Department has been developing high-altitude instruments to measure radiation in
+the atmosphere.36 On the medical side, UAVs such as the Army’s Shadow have been
+studied as delivery vehicles for critical medical supplies needed on the battlefield.
+
+ Not all of these new applications have been approved — UAV advocates state
+
+that in order for UAVs to take an active role in homeland security, Federal Aviation
+Administration (FAA) regulations concerning the use of UAVs will have to change.
+The Coast Guard will most likely take the lead in resolving UAV airspace issues with
+the FAA.37 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the
+UAV industry will also be working with the FAA on the issue, as they are joining
+forces in an initiative to achieve routine UAV operations in the national airspace
+within a few years.38 
+
+Further in the future, large UAVs could take on the aerial refueling task now
+
+performed by KC-10 and KC-135 tanker aircraft. Although DOD has not expressed
+plans for exploring the aerial refueling role, it appears to some to be a mission well
+suited for unmanned aircraft. The flight profiles flown by KC-10 and KC-135 aircraft
+are relatively benign compared to many other aircraft, and they tend to operate far
+from enemy air defenses. Except for operating the refueling boom (to refuel Air
+Force aircraft), the refueling crew’s primary job is to keep the aircraft flying straight,
+
+35Marc Selinger. “Sen. McCain Says Predator May Be Useful For Border Security,”
+ Aerospace Daily , April 9, 2003.
+
+36 National Journal’s Congress Daily . “Pilotless Aircraft Makers Seek Role For Domestic
+Uses,” December 17, 2002.
+
+37Jefferson Morris. “Coast Guard Leaning Away From Global Hawk, Manager Says.”
+ Aerospace Daily , January 14, 2003. 
+
+38Jefferson Morris. “NASA, UNITE Group Planning Details Of New UAV Initiative,”
+ Aerospace Daily , March 13, 2003.
+
+ 
+ CRS-16
+
+level, and at a steady speed. The Global Hawk’s recent trans-oceanic flights (from
+the United States to Australia and from the United States to Portugal) demonstrate
+the ability of current UAVs to fly missions analogous to aerial refueling missions.
+
+Another, far more difficult future task, could be air-to-air combat. DOD is
+
+experimenting with outfitting today’s UAVs with the sensors and weapons required
+to conduct such a mission. In fact, a Predator has reportedly already engaged in air-
+to-air combat with an Iraqi fighter aircraft. In March, 2003 it was reported that a
+Predator launched a Stinger air-to-air missile at an Iraqi MiG before the Iraqi aircraft
+shot it down.39 While this operational encounter may be a “baby step” on the way
+toward an aerial combat capability, it appears significant. Aerial combat is often
+described as the most challenging mission for manned aircraft to perform, and, some
+say, one that UAVs will never be able to accomplish. Though embryonic, the recent
+Predator launch of an air-to-air missile will likely hearten UAV advocates who wish
+to see more aggressive missions for unmanned aircraft.
+
+Are UAVs always the preferred platforms for these new roles and applications?
+
+Other options could include manned aircraft, blimps, and space satellites. Each
+platform offers both advantages and disadvantages. Manned aircraft provide a
+flexible platform, but risk a pilot’s life. Some of the country’s largest defense
+contractors are competing to develop unmanned blimps that may be capable of
+floating months at a time at an altitude of 70,000 feet and carrying 4,000 pounds of
+payload. These blimps would be used in a surveillance role to spot incoming enemy
+missiles and planes. The goal is to develop an operational system by 2010 which
+could carry out such missions for homeland security.40 
+
+Space satellites offer many benefits — they are relatively invulnerable to attack,
+
+and field many advanced capabilities. However, tasking the satellites can be
+cumbersome, especially with competing national priorities. The limited number of
+systems can only serve so many customers at one time. Additionally, satellites lack
+the loitering capability of UAVs, only passing over the same spot on Earth about
+once every three days. Due to the high costs of space launches, UAVs like Global
+Hawk are being considered for communication relays as substitutes for low-orbiting
+satellite constellations.41
+
+One of the primary concerns about UAV roles and applications is “gold
+
+plating.” Some have declared that if the military does not control requirements creep,
+UAVs will be priced out of business. The fear is that good designs will become
+loaded up with more sensors, more weapons, and more missions until they become
+too expensive to build or too valuable to use (and risk losing) in combat. Additional
+potential impediments include negative aviation culture mindsets and command,
+control, and communications bandwidth limitations and constraints. 
+
+39David Fulghum. “Predator’s Progress.” Aviation Week & Space Technology. March 3,
+2003.
+
+40Peter Pae. “A Rebirth For Blimps; Military Has Plan For Cousin of Hindenburg,” Los
+Angeles Times , November 4, 2002.
+
+41David Fulghum. “Air Force Chief Predicts Growth of UAV Use By Military,” Aviation
+Week and Space Technology . March 17, 2003.
+
+ 
+ CRS-17
+
+It has not always been easy for the aviation culture to adapt to flying aircraft
+
+from the ground vice in the air. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, during a
+hearing on transformation, stated that:
+
+Not long ago, an Air Force F-15 pilot had to be persuaded to forego a rated
+pilot’s job to fly Predator. Now Air Force leadership is working hard to
+encourage this pilot and others to think of piloting UAVs as a major mission and
+to become trail blazers in defining new concepts of operations.42
+
+The Air Force has realized the retention implications of requiring rated pilots to fly
+their UAVs43, and has offered enticements such as plum assignments after flying the
+UAV, and allowing pilots to keep up their manned flying hours during their UAV
+tour of duty.
+
+The requirement for bandwidth grows with every war the U.S. fights44. Since
+
+September 11, 2001, the need has increased eight-fold in Central Command due to
+the war in Afghanistan and the pursuit of terrorists in the region.45 UAVs are major
+consumers of bandwidth. Some sources say that the military does not have enough
+bandwidth to download video and radar images via satellite communications from
+more than one UAV at a time. DOD is working on solving this problem through a
+$200 million program called Extended Tether, which is not scheduled to be in place
+until FY05.46 
+
+The director of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems for OSD
+
+has stated that UAV and network centric operations are a primary reason the Defense
+Department has earmarked $3 billion starting in FY03 for the Transformational
+Communications program, as OSD does not want UAV operations limited by
+bandwidth. New developments such as satellite laser communications could
+streamline space data links so that three satellite links are no longer needed to support
+a single Global Hawk mission over Afghanistan, as is the case now.47 DOD has
+testified that a more autonomous UAV would require less bandwidth, since more
+data are processed on board and less data are being moved.48 However, it is unclear
+
+42U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d Session, Hearing Before the Committee On Armed
+Services United States Senate. “Department of Defense Policies And Programs To
+Transform The Armed Forces To Meet The Challenges Of The 21st Century.” April 9, 2002,
+p.10. 
+
+43Currently the Air Force is the only service to require rated pilots to fly their UAVs.
+
+44Bandwidth is defined as the amount of data that can be transmitted over a communications
+link in a fixed amount of time.
+
+45David Hughes. “Pentagon Targets Bandwidth Expansion.” Aviation Week and Space
+Technology , January 27, 2003, p.57. 
+
+46Andrew Koch. “Air Reconnaissance Assets Still In Short Supply.” Jane’s Defense
+Weekly , February 12, 2003.
+
+47Craig Covault. “Military Satcom, Relay Programs Boost Industry, Enhance Warfare.”
+ Aviation Week & Space Technology , January 6, 2003, p.43.
+
+48Hearing of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
+
+(continued...)
+
+ 
+ CRS-18
+
+that autonomy will actually decrease bandwidth requirements since Global Hawk, an
+autonomous UAV, is currently the most aggressive bandwidth user.
+
+One solution to alleviating the bandwidth problem is allowing UAVs to be
+
+operated from a manned stand-off aircraft such as a command and control aircraft.
+Stationing the mission control element of the UAV system in another aircraft instead
+of on the ground would reduce the reliance on satellites for beyond line of sight
+communication, simplifying command and control. Not only would this help
+overcome the bandwidth issue, but it would also combat another problem area, which
+is the pilot retention issue. Pilots in this case would still get to “fly” while operating
+the UAV. Experimentation is currently ongoing in this area, with the first step being
+controlling the UAV’s sensor payload from the air.
+
+ Industrial Base Considerations 
+
+Another issue that may confront Congress is the concern that increased pursuit
+
+of UAV development could have an effect on the U.S. aerospace industrial base. If
+UAVs are increasingly designed and built at the expense of manned aircraft, then
+some fear that the technical expertise required to design, and perhaps build manned
+combat aircraft could erode. Many point out that the ability to produce world class
+combat aircraft is a distinct U.S. comparative advantage, and should be guarded
+closely. Others disagree that the pursuit of UAVs could harm the industrial base.
+They argue that the Joint Strike Fighter is likely to be the last manned tactical fighter,
+and that the industrial base is naturally evolving toward the skills and processes
+required to make increasingly advanced UAVs.
+
+Those who fear manned industrial base atrophy argue that the future of UAVs
+
+is overrated, and that there will be a demand for tactical manned aircraft in the post-
+JSF timeframe. In their eyes, crucial skills and technologies could thus be lost by
+concentrating only on unmanned aircraft design, possibly causing U.S. dominance
+in tactical aircraft design to wane. These proponents point out that UAVs have been
+around for almost a century, yet only recently became operationally effective, and are
+not likely to replace manned aircraft in the near future.49 
+
+UAV advocates argue that critical manned aircraft design skills are not
+
+jeopardized by increased pursuit of UAVs because there is considerable commonality
+between manned and unmanned combat aircraft. Except for the obvious lack of a
+cockpit, unmanned combat aircraft may require stealthy airframes, advanced
+avionics, and high performance engines just like manned combat aircraft. Also, major
+defense contractors have already begun to shift to unmanned aircraft design in order
+to stay competitive. This is because UAVs are beginning to play a prominent role in
+warfare, as seen in Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 and Operation Iraqi
+
+48(...continued)
+Committee. “Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request for Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles and
+Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Programs.” March 26, 2003.
+
+49For more information on the arguments for and against future demand of tactical aircraft,
+see CRS Report RL31360, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): Potential National Security Questions
+Pertaining to a Single Production Line , by Christopher Bolkcom and Daniel Else. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-19
+
+Freedom in 2003. The same skills and technologies required for building manned
+aircraft will likely lend themselves to unmanned aviation design as well. Companies
+that have lost out in recent aviation contracts, such as Boeing and the Joint Strike
+Fighter (JSF) in 2001, are looking towards unmanned bombers and fighters as
+prospects for growth.50 If Boeing were to design manned aircraft in the future, the
+critical skills needed would still be present, according to this argument.
+
+The Pentagon’s decision regarding UCAV design and production could affect
+
+the UAV industrial base and be indicative of future UAV production decisions. With
+the Pentagon deciding not to follow the same philosophy as the JSF, and have a
+single company like Lockheed Martin design the aircraft, vendors will instead be
+encouraged to compete throughout the life of the effort. This would combat the
+concern in the aerospace industry after the JSF contract — namely, that expert
+product teams in companies other than Lockheed Martin would disappear. OSD has
+also stated that there are requirements which could be filled by smaller companies as
+well as the three large vendors: Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman.51
+Competition is expected to encourage cost reduction and aircraft design innovation.
+ 
+ 
+
+ Current DOD UAV Programs 
+
+ Overview 
+
+In the past, tension has existed between the services’ efforts to acquire UAVs
+
+and congressional initiatives to encourage a consolidated DOD approach. Some
+observers argue that the result has been a less than stellar track record for the UAV.
+However, DOD funding for UAVs has increased dramatically over the past few
+years. During 1998-2001, DOD spent an average of $363 million a year on UAVs.52
+In FY02, this number rose to $970 million while in FY03 it increased again to $1.1
+billion. In FY03, Congress either matched the DOD budget requests for each UAV
+program or added funds. In FY03, $52 million was added to the Predator, Pioneer,
+and Shadow UAV programs. UAV successes in recent conflicts have contributed to
+the increase in UAV funding, with emergency fund money and supplemental dollars
+being allocated towards UAV programs. The FY03 Supplemental recommended
+$15.7 billion for the Iraq Freedom Fund, for procurement of items to meet anticipated
+requirements for weapons and equipment such as unmanned aerial vehicles.53 It is
+anticipated that these funds would help replace UAVs lost during Operation Iraqi
+Freedom (OIF). 
+
+50Andy Pasztor. “Boeing Aims For Slice Of Fighter-Jet Contract Awarded to Lockheed, But
+Blow Still Stings,” Wall Street Journal , October 29, 2001.
+
+51Amy Butler. “OSD Frowns On “Winner-Takes-All” As Companies Posture for UCAV,”
+ Inside the Air Force , March 28, 2003.
+
+52OSD. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2000-2025.” April 2001, p.11.
+
+53U.S. Congress, 108th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Committee of
+Conference, Making Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year
+2003, and For Other Purposes , H.Rept. 108-76, p.64.
+
+ 
+ CRS-20
+
+DOD currently operates five major UAVs: the Air Force’s Predator and Global
+
+Hawk, the Navy and Marine Corp’s Pioneer, and the Army’s Hunter and Shadow.
+Other key UAV developmental efforts include the Air Force and Navy’s UCAV, the
+Navy’s VTUAV Firescout and BAMS, and the Marine Corp’s Dragon Eye and
+Dragon Warrior. The services continue to be innovative in their use of UAVs.
+Recent examples include arming UAVs (Predator, Hunter), using UAVs to extend
+the eyes of submarines, and teaming UAVs with strike aircraft and armed helicopters
+to decrease the time it takes to attack a target. DOD used one type of UAV, Pioneer,
+in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, three systems – Global Hawk, Pointer and Predator –
+in Afghanistan in 2001, and more than ten systems in Operation Iraqi Freedom in
+2003. These systems include the Air Force’s Global Hawk, Predator and Force
+Protection Surveillance System; the Army’s Hunter, Pointer and Shadow; and the
+Marine Corps’ Dragon Eye and Pioneer.54
+
+ Operational UAVs 
+
+ MQ-1 Predator. 
+
+The Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator is a UAV with many “firsts” to its name. It is
+
+the first Department of Defense advanced concept technology demonstration
+(ACTD)55 UAV to transition to active military duty. It is also the first UAV in
+history to fire offensive weapons against enemy combat forces.56 Proving itself in
+recent conflicts such as Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, the Predator’s production rate
+has been accelerated and funding has been increased through transfers from the
+Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) and Congressional plus-ups. Although
+featuring a high attrition rate, the Predator has enjoyed considerable success in the
+global war against terrorism, increasing the situational awareness of other aircraft
+such as the Air Force’s AC-130 gunship, and employing its revolutionary armed
+strike capability against Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership.
+
+54Marc Selinger. “U.S. Using More Than 10 Types of UAVs in Iraq War, Official Says.”
+ Aerospace Daily , March 27, 2003.
+
+55ACTDs were initiated in 1994 to permit the early and inexpensive evaluation of mature
+advanced technologies. The ACTD program is structured and executed so that, when
+successful, technologies can transition rapidly into formal acquisition. 
+
+56“Kudos for Predator.” Unmanned Systems. Nov/Dec 2002.
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-21
+
+ Figure 7. Predator Flying in Support of 
+
+ OEF, Equipped with Hellfire Missile 
+
+ Source: Air Force Magazine.
+
+ System Characteristics. Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance
+
+UAV, roughly half the size of an Air Force F-16 fighter. At 27 feet long and 7 feet
+high, it has long, thin wings and a tail like an inverted V. The Predator typically
+operates at 10,000 to 15,000 feet to get the best imagery from its video cameras,
+although it has the ability to reach a maximum altitude of 25,000 feet. The air
+vehicle launches and lands like a regular aircraft, but is controlled by a pilot on the
+ground using a joystick. Each vehicle can remain on station, over 400nm away from
+its base, for 24 hours before returning home. The 11th, 15th and 17th Reconnaissance
+Squadrons operate the Predator, all based at Indian Springs Auxiliary Field, Nevada.
+On February 1, 2002, the Air Force changed the Predator’s military designation from
+RQ-1B (reconnaissance unmanned) to the MQ-1 (multi-mission unmanned) due to
+its added capabilities of laser designation and missile-firing.57
+
+ Mission and Payload. The Predator’s primary function is airborne
+
+reconnaissance and target acquisition. To accomplish this mission, the Predator is
+outfitted with a 450-lb surveillance payload, which includes two electro-optical (E-O)
+cameras and one infrared (IR) camera for use at night. These cameras are housed in
+a ball-shaped gimbal turret that can be easily seen underneath the vehicle’s nose.
+New production Predators will have a Multi-Spectral Targeting System (MTS) sensor
+ball which will add a laser designator to the E-O/IR payload. The Predator’s payload
+also includes a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), which allows the UAV to “see”
+through inclement weather. The Predator’s satellite communications provide for
+beyond line-of-sight operations. New payloads are being tested on Predator,
+including launching smaller UAVS such as the Finder UAV, a 57-lb satellite guided
+system that can carry different sensors.58
+
+57Glenn W. Goodman, JR. “UAVs Come of Age.” The ISR Journal , July 2002, p.24.
+
+58Robert Wall. “Predator UAV Tested With New Payloads.” Aviation Week & Space
+Technology , September 2, 2002, p.47.
+
+ 
+ CRS-22
+
+ Program Status. The Predator air vehicle is built by San Diego’s General
+
+Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. The UAV began as an ACTD in 1994 and then
+transitioned to the Air Force in 1997 after successfully flying missions over Bosnia
+the year before. In 2001, the Air Force purchased two Predator B (MQ-9) UAVs for
+testing. The B variant, also referred to as the “hunter-killer,” is a larger version of
+the Predator,59 with improvements in altitude, payload, speed and range. The MQ-9
+can fly at altitudes of 45,000 to 52,000 feet, and carry eight Hellfire missiles
+(compared to two for the MQ-1). All Predators coming off the assembly line will be
+capable of carrying Hellfires, while older Predators are planned to be retrofitted to
+carry the missile. 
+
+ Inventory. Due to production rates and current operational use causing high
+
+attrition, the inventory of Predators can change greatly from month to month. The
+Air Force currently has 48 air vehicles and eight ground control stations in its
+inventory. The service is purchasing replacement air vehicles based on an initial
+attrition study by the Air Force Studies Analysis Agency of seven air vehicles lost a
+year.60 Some media reports have stated nearly 30 Predators out of 60 to 70 in the
+fleet have been lost since the plane entered service in 1994.61 A more accurate report
+could be the Air Force Safety Center analysis that stated 13 Predators have been lost
+since 1997.62 Reasons for the high attrition rates include Predator flying combat
+missions as a developmental ACTD, and the lack of redundant equipment in
+unmanned vehicles. In October 2001, the Secretary of the Air Force approved an
+option to accelerate production rate to two air vehicles per month. FY02
+Supplemental and FY03 Appropriations included funds to support this acceleration.
+ The Air Force contracted with General Atomics in December 2002 to build 12 more
+Predators, due out by April 2004.63 The CIA reportedly also owns and operates an
+undisclosed number of Predators.64
+
+ Cost. Each Predator air vehicle is estimated to cost $4.5 million. An entire
+
+Predator UAV system costs $30 million. Due to these costs, Predator is considered
+attritible rather than expendable.
+
+ Recent Operations. 
+
+ Operation Allied Force (Kosovo). Although the Predator’s first combat
+
+appearance occurred in Bosnia in 1995, it was during Operation Allied Force in 1999
+that the Predator began to make a name for itself. Video feeds were downloaded
+from the UAV to the command center at Aviano Airbase, Italy. Information was then
+
+59The original version of the Predator, the RQ-1/MQ-1, is also referred to as the Predator A.
+
+60Air Force Background Paper, January 31, 2003.
+
+61Mike Mount. “U.S. Loses Many Military Drones.” CNN.com, January 2, 2003.
+
+62Air Force Safety Center. “Air Force Safety Analysis 1993-2002.” January 2003, p.20.
+
+63Hampton Stephens. “Air Force Will Buy 12 More Predators From General Atomics.”
+ Inside the Air Force, December 6, 2002.
+
+64Bradley, Graham. “Pentagon Loses Two Unmanned Spy Planes Over Bosnia.” The
+Washington Post , August 15, 1995, p.A10.
+
+ 
+ CRS-23
+
+relayed to airborne forward air controllers (FACs), allowing the FACs to find targets
+that would have been difficult to locate otherwise. By the end of the war, Predator
+was being outfitted with laser designators to aid bombers with their target
+recognition. However, the Predator would have to wait until Operation Enduring
+Freedom to test out this new capability. 
+
+ Operation Southern Watch (Iraq). Predators also started flying above Iraq
+
+to help monitor the no-fly zone in Operation Southern Watch. Prior to Operation
+Iraqi Freedom in 2003, Predators had expanded their surveillance mission in Iraq to
+include an offensive role. Predators successfully destroyed Iraqi mobile radar units
+using Hellfire air-to-ground missiles. The Predators’ success meant that they were
+targeted by the Iraqis, who shot down as many as three of the UAVs over southern
+Iraq. One Predator was shot down by an Iraqi MIG on December 23, 2002, but not
+before shooting a missile of its own at the MIG.65
+
+ Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). Operation Enduring Freedom
+
+(OEF) has provided the catalyst for the evolution of the Predator. While still carrying
+out its traditional mission of aerial reconnaissance, the Predator has moved into
+previously unchartered territory for UAVs with new capabilities such as close air
+support and armed strike.66 A particularly significant aspect of the use of UAVs
+during OEF was that they were pivotal in the network-centric operations in
+Afghanistan. UAVs were a critical element in the chain that allowed targets to be
+struck within five minutes of their identification.67 In Afghanistan, Predators have
+worked in tandem with both the Air Force’s AC-130 gunship and the Navy’s F/A-18
+Hornet, locating targets for these strike aircraft and using its laser designator to aid
+in target acquisition.68 Central Command outfitted the AC-130s with terminals that
+enabled the aircrews to get Predator feeds directly in the airplane — a major
+improvement on the 1999 Kosovo war, when Predator video was downloaded to the
+operations center and then passed piecemeal to pilots in the air.69 
+
+ War On Terrorism (Worldwide). In February 2001, the Predator added a
+
+lethal capability when weapons replaced cameras on some of the air vehicles. Prior
+to employing weapons on UAVs, the U.S. government performed a treaty-
+compliance review, and the weaponized Predator was deemed fully compliant with
+
+6560 Minutes II, CBSNEWS.Com, January 8, 2002. CBS reported Predator fired missile in
+dogfight. However, the Air Force has stated that the Predator will not be used in a dogfight,
+but rather will only fire air-to-air missiles in self-defense. No information was provided as
+to the fate of the MIG.
+
+66Capt. Russell Parker. “UAVs Take Center Stage In The War On Terrorism.” Airman ,
+December 2002.
+
+67Anil R. Pusta. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Trends and Prospects.” Military Technology ,
+2002.
+
+68Judith Miller and Eric Schmitt. “Ugly Duckling Turns Out To Be Formidable In The Air.”
+ New York Times , November 23, 2001.
+
+69Richard J. Newman. “The Little Predator That Could.” Air Force Magazine, March 2002.
+
+ 
+ CRS-24
+
+the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.70 An armed Predator UAV
+belonging to the CIA, carrying Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, was credited with a
+hit on a senior Al Qaeda operative in Yemen in November 2002, as well as one
+against Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan. The Air Force has tested the Stinger air-to-
+air missile for use with the Predator, which would give the UAV a self-defense
+capability. The satellite-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) will also be
+carried by the Predator, making it the second attack weapon certified for use on the
+Predator B.71 General Franks, CENTCOM commander, stated in November 2001,
+“The Predator is my most capable sensor in hunting down and killing Al Qaeda and
+Taliban leadership and is proving absolutely critical to our fight.”72 
+
+ 
+
+ Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq). Although official DOD reports have not
+
+been released on Predator’s performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), early
+press reporting suggests that the Predator has continued building on its success in
+previous conflicts. The Predator struck an Iraqi anti-aircraft vehicle using a Hellfire
+missile in March 2003. Predators have flown one-way decoy missions in Baghdad,
+in order to reveal the locations of Iraqi air defenses. Predator cameras also allowed
+U.S. commanders oversee the rescue of a U.S. Army prisoner-of-war in April 2003.73
+
+ Predator Losses. Amongst all its successes, real world operations in
+
+Afghanistan have revealed some shortcomings of the Predator. Two UAVs crashed
+in Afghanistan due to wing icing caused by flying in clouds. Other losses might have
+been caused by the loss of its satellite communications link, which is often difficult
+to reestablish. The altitudes at which the Predator must fly to avoid bad weather or
+obtain imagery often put the UAV in the range of enemy air defense assets. Some
+of these vulnerabilities were mentioned in a 2001 report by the Pentagon’s
+operational test and evaluation office, which concluded, “As tested, the Predator
+UAV system is not operationally effective or suitable.”74 Despite this finding,
+several Predator teams were among the first troops dispatched to central Asia after
+the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,75 and have been singled out by operational
+commanders as vital to their mission. In OIF, at least one Predator has been
+reportedly lost, although its mission was to act as a decoy. 
+
+ FY03/04 Developments. 
+
+ Administration’s Request. In FY03, the administration began with a baseline
+
+request of $23 million to procure seven Predator air vehicles. The anticipation of
+funds from the DERF increased this request to $105 million for procurement of 22
+
+70U.S. Department of Defense. “Background Briefing on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.”
+Defenselink.mil, October 31, 2001.
+
+71Ron Laurenzo. “New Predator Will Carry New JDAM.” Defense Week , January 6, 2002.
+
+72Air Force Background Paper, January 31, 2003.
+
+73Jim Krane. “Iraqi Successes Have Air Force’s Pilotless Planes Stealing Pilots’ Jobs.” The
+Associated Press , April 24, 2003.
+
+74George C. Wilson. “Pilots! Unman Your Airplanes!” National Journal, December 1, 2001.
+
+75Richard J. Newman. “The Little Predator That Could.” Air Force Magazine, March 2002.
+
+ 
+ CRS-25
+
+air vehicles and $3.8 million for research and development. Additionally, $37
+million was requested in the DOD FY02 Supplemental Request, to accelerate
+production of Predator to two air vehicles a month, and $8 million was requested to
+retrofit a ground station.76 In 2004, the Administration’s request was $193.6 million
+for 16 air vehicles. The R&D request for endurance unmanned aerial vehicles
+(including Predator and Global Hawk) is $398.6 million for 2004.
+
+ Authorization. The House Armed Services committee recommended an
+
+increase of $26 million for six Predator B UAVs, noting, “the improved speed and
+payload capacity of turbo prop-powered Predator B UAV is critical to future combat
+operations.”77 The original budget request of $23 million did not include funds for
+the Predator B. Additionally, the Armed Services Committee conferees transferred
+$10 million from the DERF for research and development of the Predator B. The
+conferees authorized $131 million for procurement of 28 Predator air vehicles and
+$13.8 million for research and development.78
+ 
+
+ Appropriation. Congress allocated a total of $131 million for the purchase of
+
+22 Predator air vehicles and $13.8 million for research and development.79 To the
+Administration’s original request of $23 million, they transferred $68 million from
+the DERF to purchase the original variant of the Predator, $14 million from the
+DERF for Predator equipment and added an additional $26 million for procuring “not
+less than three” Predator Bs .80 The $93 million FY02 supplemental request for
+Predator was also approved.
+
+ RQ-2 Pioneer. 
+
+The Navy and Marine Corps’ only operational UAV, the Pioneer was initially
+
+developed in Israel, then acquired by the U.S. Navy in 1986. The venerable Pioneer
+has played a critical role in generating U.S. interest in tactical UAVs. Originally
+flown from Navy battleships, the Pioneer is currently being launched from
+amphibious ships and land based facilities. The Pioneer was only intended to be an
+interim UAV pending the development of a joint tactical UAV. In fact, Congress
+ordered the Navy to halt future purchases in FY88 due to the decision to press ahead
+
+76See CRS Report RL31406, “Supplemental Appropriations for FY2002: Combating
+Terrorism and Other Issues,” by Amy Belasco and Larry Nowels, updated August 30, 2002,
+p.70.
+
+77U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d session, House of Representatives, Committee on
+Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 , H.Rept 107-436,
+May 3, 2002, p. 103.
+
+78U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Conference Report
+to Accompany H.R.4546, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, H.Rept.
+107-772, November 12, 2002.
+
+79U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Conference Report
+to Accompany H.R.5010, Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the
+Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2003, and for Other Purposes, H.Rept. 107-732, October
+9, 2002.
+
+80Ibid.
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-26
+
+with such a UAV.81 As the joint tactical UAV failed to materialize, the Navy used
+its Pioneer attrition replacements in such conflicts as the Persian Gulf War, which
+proved the worth of a tactical UAV. Lacking a new tactical UAV on the horizon, the
+Marine Corps instituted a Pioneer Improvement program in 2000, which should keep
+the Pioneer viable until the end of the decade. FY03 funding includes money for
+Pioneer upgrades, but only for use by the Marine Corps as the Navy no longer flies
+the Pioneer.
+
+ Figure 8. Pioneer Ready To Launch from Ship 
+
+ Source: Navy UAV homepage, (http//uav.navair.navy.mil)
+
+ System Characteristics. At 14 feet long, the Pioneer is roughly half the size
+
+of the Air Force’s Predator UAV. It can reach maximum altitudes of 15,000 feet, but
+flies an optimal altitude of 3-5,000 feet above its target. The Pioneer can stay aloft
+for five hours during the daytime, and has a range of 100nm. Since its inception in
+the 1980s, Pioneer has flown over 23,000 hours in direct support of Navy and Marine
+Corps operational commanders.
+
+ Mission and Payload. The mission of the Pioneer is to provide real time
+
+intelligence and a reconnaissance capability to the field commander. Pioneer can be
+used for over-the-horizon targeting, surveillance, Naval gunfire spotting, and battle
+damage assessment. Its 100 lb payload consists of an electro-optical and IR camera.
+Other payloads which have been demonstrated include a meteorological sensor, a
+mine detection sensor and a chemical detection sensor.
+
+ Program Status. The Navy had planned to retire the Pioneer, built by AAI,
+
+Hunt Valley, MD, in 2003 or 2004, and replace it with the VTUAV. However, when
+that program was curtailed, the decision was made to give all of its Pioneer systems
+to the Marine Corps and keep them flying another 10 years to meet that Service’s
+requirements through a product improvement program.82
+
+81Steven Zaloga. RQ-2A Pioneer. World Missiles Briefing October 2002. Teal Group
+Corp.
+
+82Glenn W. Goodman Jr. “UAVs Come Of Age.” The ISR Journal, July 2002. p.28.
+
+ 
+ CRS-27
+
+ Inventory. According to OSD, the Navy and Marine Corps have 47 Pioneer
+
+air vehicles. These air vehicles are organized into four Pioneer systems (two each for
+the Navy and Marine Corps), which are in a contingency status; meaning that they
+can be deployed rapidly.83
+
+ Cost. Per unit cost estimates of the Pioneer range from $250,000 to $1 million,
+
+depending on payload and production rate. 84
+
+ Recent Operations. 
+
+ Operation Desert Storm (Iraq) . Flying a total of 533 sorties, the Pioneer rose
+
+to fame during Operation Desert Storm where it was used for surveillance and to
+define accuracy for the battleship’s 16-inch guns; the Iraqi military learned to fear the
+sight of the Pioneer. During one widely reported incident, Iraqi soldiers actually
+surrendered to the Pioneer flying overhead, knowing that gunfire from the battleship
+was imminent. 
+
+ Post Gulf War Operations . Since its success in Operation Desert Storm, the
+
+Pioneer has supported every major U.S. contingency operation to date. These
+contingencies include operations in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan and
+Iraq.
+
+ FY03/04 Developments. 
+
+ Administration’s Request. The Administration requested no procurement or
+
+research and development funds in 2003. In 2004, the Administration requested
+$13.6 million for the Pioneer program.
+
+ Authorization. The Armed Services Committee Conferees (H.Report 107-772)
+
+authorized $15 million for Pioneer upgrades and no funds for Pioneer R&D.
+
+ Appropriation. The Appropriations Committee Conferees (H.Report 107-732)
+
+agreed to provide a total of $16 million for Pioneer upgrades in support of the Marine
+Corps. This incorporated $7 million from Research, Development, Test and
+Evaluation, Navy Appropriation, and $9 million from the Weapons Procurement,
+Navy appropriation. Furthermore, the conferees “direct that these funds, and any
+additional funds as required, shall be used only to upgrade the Pioneer UAV in
+support of the Marine Corps.”85 
+
+83GlobalSecurity.org. Pioneer Short Range (SR) UAV .
+
+84 World Missile Briefing . Teal Group Inc. RQ-2A Pioneer. October 2002.
+
+85U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d session, House of Representatives, Committee of
+Conference, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 5010 , H.Rept 107-732, October 9,
+2002, p. 280.
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-28
+
+ RQ-5 Hunter. 
+
+The Hunter UAV is currently one of the Army’s two operational UAV systems.
+
+Manufactured by TRW (now owned by Northrop-Grumman) in San Diego, CA, and
+Israel Aircraft Industries, Hunter was originally planned to fulfill the Army’s short-
+range UAV requirement. However, procurement was halted in 1996 before full-rate
+production had begun due to technical difficulties. Using the seven low rate initial
+production systems the service retained during the final stages of development, the
+Army has operated a Hunter company in Eastern Europe for reconnaissance missions
+in the Balkans since 1999. Considered a division and corps level asset, it has been
+fielded to units in Fort Hood, TX (III Corps), Fort Polk, LA (XVIII Airborne Corps),
+the Army’s intelligence school at Fort Huachuca, AZ, and is expected to be
+operational with the US Army Europe’s V Corps in Germany by January 2004.86
+
+ Figure 9. A U.S. Army Hunter UAV 
+
+ Is Prepared For Launch 
+
+ Source: Jane’s Defense Weekly.
+
+ System Characteristics. Hunter can fly at altitudes up to 25,000 feet, reach
+
+speeds of 106 knots, and spend up to 12 hours in the air. Weighing 1,600 lbs, it has
+an operating radius of 144nm.
+
+ Mission and Payload. Possessing the standard UAV mission of
+
+reconnaissance and surveillance, Hunter is equipped with an E-O/IR sensor payload
+for day/night operations. However, it has recently conducted tests of other missions,
+to include a helicopter manned/unmanned teaming mission and an armed mission.
+The Army realized that it could use UAVs in concert with their armed reconnaissance
+and attack helicopters like the Apache and Comanche, to extend the helicopter’s
+reach. During 2002, Hunter was involved in various experiments with the Apache
+helicopter controlling both the Hunter airframe and its sensor in flight. This linkage
+would increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Apache crew. The Pentagon
+is now requiring the Army to develop a companion UAV for its Objective Force
+manned helicopters such as the RAH-66 Comanche.87 Like the Predator, the Army
+
+86Kim Burger. “US Army Looks At Arming Hunter UAVs.” Jane’s Defense Weekly ,
+January 8, 2003, p.8.
+
+87John R. Guardiano. “Manning and Unmanning Army Aviation.” Rotor & Wing ,
+
+(continued...)
+
+ 
+ CRS-29
+
+has also been experimenting with UAV weaponization. Their weapon of choice for
+these tests was the Brilliant Anti-Armor submunition (BAT). On October 11, 2002,
+BATs were successfully dropped from a Hunter UAV at White Sands Missile Range,
+NM, striking their intended practice targets, a tank and an armored personnel
+carrier.88 
+
+ Inventory. The Army has approximately 43 operational Hunter air vehicles
+
+remaining.89 Although originally organized into a Hunter system of eight vehicles,
+it is now deployed with six. The Army does not have an active Hunter air vehicle
+production line. However the Army does maintain a sustainment funding line to
+ensure required parts and contractor logistics support are maintained for the existing
+Hunter units. 
+
+ Cost. The cost for an air vehicle with its payload is $1.2 million. The
+
+approximate cost of a Hunter system is $30 million.90 
+
+ Recent Operations. Hunter has proven itself as an intelligence and
+
+reconnaissance asset in the Balkans. The UAV was used extensively during
+Operation Allied Force in 1999, suffering seven losses attributed to either crashes or
+enemy fire. Hunter conducted 246 sorties during Allied Force totaling 1, 357 flight
+hours (highest flight hours of any NATO reconnaissance platform).91 U.S. Army
+Europe has requested the Hunter each year since 1999, to aid in peacekeeping
+operations in the Balkans region. One vulnerability of the Hunter UAV is that it
+cannot fly in bad weather. It is sent home each year from the Balkans once the winter
+weather season begins. In January 2003, the Hunter UAV system began a new phase
+of operations, when the UAV deployed to the CENTCOM area of operations to aid
+in the war on terrorism.92 The UAV was also sent to Iraq to participate in OIF.
+
+ Future Programs. Currently, the Army’s Hunter UAV provides surveillance
+
+and reconnaissance for the corps commander, while the more tactical Shadow UAV
+is designed for the brigade commander. With the cancellation of the Hunter program,
+the Army is envisioning an Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ERMP) UAV which
+would fulfill Hunter’s role. The Army has not decided what air vehicle to choose for
+its ERMP UAV. It could buy an updated version of Hunter, or go with an entirely
+different UAV platform, such as an unmanned helicopter. The Army wants to award
+
+87(...continued)
+December 2002, p.8.
+
+88“Hunter UAV Successfully Drops BAT Munitions.” Defense Daily , October 16, 2002.
+
+89Army Background Information, January 2003.
+
+90Ibid.
+
+91Mark Hewish. “Pilotless Progress Report-UAVs Have Made Exceptional Strides
+Recently.” Janes.com, October 2000, p.68.
+
+92Erin Q. Winograd. “Army UAVs Sent To CENTCOM Area Of Operations, May Soon
+Be Armed.” Inside The Army , January 20, 2003.
+
+ 
+ CRS-30
+
+a contract in fiscal year 2004 and achieve full-rate production by the second quarter
+of FY06.93 
+
+ FYO3/04 Developments. 
+
+ Administration’s Request. In 2003, the Administration requested $1.5 million
+
+from the DERF for procurement and $12.1 million from the DERF for research and
+development funds. No funds were requested for FY04. 
+
+ Authorization. The Armed Services Committee Conferees (H.Report 107-772,
+
+H.R.4546) matched the Administration’s request for Hunter. They recommended
+$1.5 million for Hunter upgrades and interoperability with the Shadow TUAV system
+to be transferred from the DERF. Under research and development, the Committee
+recommended $12.1 million from the DERF to make the Hunter ground control
+system compatible with the Shadow UAV and develop an automated take-off and
+landing capability. 
+
+ Appropriation. The Appropriations Committee Conferees (H.Rept. 107-732,
+
+H.R.5010) agreed to provide the $1.5 million for Hunter upgrades and the $12.1
+million of research and development funds that the Armed Services Committee
+recommended.
+
+ RQ-7 Shadow 200. 
+
+The Army’s Tactical UAV (TUAV) program was dormant for several years, as
+
+the Army worked with the Navy to develop a joint tactical UAV. It was revived in
+1994 due to problems with the Hunter UAV program. When the Navy backed out
+of the program in favor of pursuing its own vertical takeoff and landing UAV, the
+Army was allowed to choose a new air vehicle with a shorter range in keeping with
+their own requirements. The vehicle they chose was the Shadow 200 TUAV,
+selected in December 1999. After 20 years, the Army is on its way to acquiring its
+own UAV. It had to give up its desire for a custom built design and opted instead for
+the low-cost, off-the-shelf solution it found in the Shadow 200.94 
+
+93Erin Q. Winograd. “Army Eyeing New UAV With More Endurance, Capabilities Than
+Shadow.” Inside The Army , January 13, 2003, p.14. 
+
+94Teal Group Corporation. World Missiles Briefing, RQ-7A Tactical UAV. January 2001,
+p.6. 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-31
+
+ Figure 10. U.S. Army Personnel Prepare To Launch 
+
+ An RQ-7A Shadow 200 
+
+ Source: Jane’s Defense Weekly.
+
+ System Characteristics. Built by AAI Corporation of Hunt Valley, MD,
+
+the Shadow is 11 feet long with a wingspan of 13 feet. It has a range of 30nm, a
+distance picked to match brigade operations, and an average flight duration of four
+hours. Although the Shadow can reach a maximum altitude of 14,000 feet, its
+optimum level is about 8,000 feet. The Shadow is catapulted from a rail on a
+launcher, and recovered with the aid of arresting gear. The UAV has an automatic
+takeoff and landing capability.
+
+ Mission and Payload. The Shadow provides real-time reconnaissance,
+
+surveillance and target acquisition information to Army brigades. A potential
+mission for the Shadow is the perilous job of medical resupply. The Army is
+considering expanding the UAV’s traditional missions to include a medical role,
+where several crucial items such as blood, vaccines and fluid infusion systems could
+be delivered to troops via parachute.95 The Shadow’s 60-pound payload consists of
+an E-O/IR sensor turret which produces day or night video, and can relay its data to
+a ground station in real-time via a line-of-sight data link. 
+
+ Program Status. The Shadow has moved into full-rate production as of
+
+FY03, making the TUAV the first Defense Department UAV officially to enter full-
+rate production. Although current funding allows the Army to finish fielding Shadow
+in 2009, Army programmatic efforts are focused at identifying funding for complete
+fielding by FY07. 
+
+95Erin Q. Winograd. “Army Eyes Shadow UAVs Potential For Medical Resupply
+Missions.” InsideDefense.com , December 20, 2002, p.14.
+
+ 
+ CRS-32
+
+ Inventory. The Army plans to field 41 Shadow systems96; four will be used
+
+for institutional training and 37 will be assigned to deployable units.97 
+
+ Cost. The cost of a single Shadow air vehicle is $350,000, while the Shadow
+
+system costs approximately $10.7 million.98 
+
+ FY03/04 Developments. 
+
+ Administration’s Request. In 2003, the Administration requested $109
+
+million for the procurement of ten Shadow TUAV systems, to include $9.5 million
+transferred from the DERF for support equipment and $15 million for initial spares.
+ $46.6 million was requested for research and development, which was amended to
+$57.9 million to include $11.4 million for Crusader-TUAV target location error. In
+2004, the Administration requested $88.8 million for eight air vehicles and $11.7
+million for research and development. 
+
+ Authorization. The Armed Services Committee Conferees (H.Rept. 107-772,
+
+4546) matched the Administration’s request and recommended a total of $109
+million for TUAV procurement and $57.9 for research and development in 2003. 
+
+ Appropriation. The Appropriations Committee Conferees (H.Rept. 107-732,
+
+H.R.5010) agreed to provide the $115.5 million in procurement funds, transferring
+$6.5 million for Shadow TUAV-Block II upgrades from the $11.4 million that had
+been requested for Crusader. The Conferees agreed to provide $56.5 million in
+research and development funds, adding $10 million for one I-GNAT UAV system
+with sensors, spares, training, logistics and deployment support to develop tactics,
+techniques and procedures (TTPs) for Army medium range UAV employment. 
+
+ FQM-151 Pointer. 
+
+All of the U.S. military forces have demonstrated and experimented with the
+
+hand-launched six foot Pointer over the last fifteen years, and it has been deployed
+in a number of U.S. operations, including the Gulf War and Operation Enduring
+Freedom (OEF). AeroVironment’s Pointer UAV has a weight of ten pounds, and a
+wing span of nine feet. The Pointer can fly at an altitude of 100-300 ft, and can stay
+airborne for about ninety minutes at a range of three miles from its ground station.
+The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is buying the hand-launchable
+UAVs to meet urgent requirements identified in OEF.99 Special Operations
+Command Europe (SOCEUR) has employed one system of three aircraft in Europe,
+
+96A Shadow system consists of four air vehicles, two ground control stations, a portable
+ground control station, a hydraulic launcher, a Tactical Automatic Landing System, and
+arresting gear.
+
+97“Full-Rate Production of Shadow UAV Approved By Army Leadership.” Inside The
+Army , September 30, 2002, p.1.
+
+98Army Background Paper, January 2003.
+
+99Kim Burger. “US Special Operations To Receive Pointer Unmanned Air Vehicles.” Jane’s
+Defence Weekly , May 15, 2002.
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-33
+
+and the Army acquired six systems for use at its Military Operations in Urban Terrain
+facility at Ft. Benning, GA. In the past, the Navy used Pointer to keep the
+controversial Vieques training range in Puerto Rico free of protestors by using it to
+conduct reconnaissance of the range.100 Pointers have served as testbeds for
+numerous miniaturized sensors and have performed demonstrations with the Drug
+Enforcement Agency, National Guard, and special operations forces.
+
+ Figure 11. FQM-151 Pointer 
+
+ Source: [http://www.uavforum.com]
+
+ Developmental UAVs 
+
+ RQ-4 Global Hawk. 
+
+The largest and most expensive UAV ever produced, the high altitude, long
+
+endurance Global Hawk provides near-real-time imagery of large geographic areas.
+Global Hawk claimed its place in history when it flew from California to Australia
+April 22-23, 2001, marking the first trans-Pacific flight by a UAV. It is also known
+for its use in Afghanistan, where as an experimental system, it was tested in an actual
+combat environment, flying more than 50 missions and 1,000 combat hours. Still in
+an ACTD status, despite its combat experience, the first production Global Hawk is
+not expected to be delivered until September 2003. Like the Predator, Global Hawk
+received a transfer of funds from the DERF in FY03, although no additional funds
+were appropriated for acceleration of the program. A signals intelligence capability
+is planned to be added to Global Hawk’s existing imagery capabilities, making the
+Global Hawk the first multi-intelligence air vehicle. However, these added
+capabilities are causing many to be concerned about the rising costs of an already
+expensive UAV system.
+
+100Mike McCarthy. “Small Drone Sought Out Vieques Protestors.” Defense Week , July 2,
+2001, p.1.
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-34
+
+ Figure 12. RQ-4A Global Hawk 
+
+ Source: Jane’s Defense Weekly.
+
+ System Characteristics. At 44 feet long, 26, 750 lbs, Global Hawk is about
+
+as large as a medium sized corporate jet. Global Hawk flies at nearly twice the
+altitude of commercial airliners and can stay aloft at 65,000 feet for as long as 35
+hours without refueling. It can fly to a target area 5,400 nm away and loiter at 60,000
+feet while monitoring an area the size of Illinois for 24 hours, then return. Besides
+the obvious size difference between the Predator UAV and Global Hawk, another
+significant difference between the two UAVs is that Global Hawk flies autonomously
+from takeoff to landing and in any weather.
+
+ Mission and Payload. The Global Hawk UAV has been called “the theater
+
+commander’s around-the-clock, low-hanging (surveillance) satellite.”101 The UAV
+provides a long-dwell presence over the battlespace, giving military commanders a
+persistent source of high quality imagery. As the result of a January 2002 Air Force
+requirements summit, the UAV will expand its payload to become a multi-
+intelligence air vehicle. The current imagery payload consists of a 2,000-lb
+integrated suite of sensors much larger than those found on the Predator. These
+sensors include an all-weather SAR with Moving Target Indicator (MTI) capability,
+an E-O digital camera and an IR sensor. A signals intelligence (SIGINT) sensor will
+be added to this payload to make Global Hawk a multi-intelligence air vehicle. A
+potential mission for the Global Hawk was supposed to be demonstrated in January
+2003, when the Air Force planned to perform three missions to Ecuador to
+demonstrate the system’s ability to aid in drug interdiction. Congress asked for and
+funded the demonstration to support U.S. Southern Command, which has
+responsibility for the region.102 However, this exercise has been temporarily
+postponed due to operational commitments. 
+
+101Glenn W. Goodman, Jr. “UAVs Come Of Age.” The ISR Journal, July 2002.
+
+102“Global Hawk Missions.” Aviation Week & Space Technology , January 13, 2003.
+
+ 
+ CRS-35
+
+ Program Status. Developed by Northrop Grumman Ryan of Palmdale, CA,
+
+Global Hawk began life as an ACTD in 1994. The requirement for a high altitude
+long endurance UAV came about in response to ISR deficiencies highlighted during
+Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Iraq. Prior to September 11, 2001, the
+Global Hawk program office concentrated on the UAV’s acquisition and
+development. This focus changed following the terrorist attacks in 2001, and the
+UAV deployed to Afghanistan to support OEF as a developmental air vehicle in
+2001. Global Hawk entered low-rate initial production in February 2002. Production
+plans call for the Air Force to buy 51 Global Hawks. Some Global Hawk advocates
+hoped the Pentagon would accelerate production of the system. Acceleration has
+long been a controversial subject, since many proposals for speeding Global Hawk
+development would entail taking money from the Air Force’s U-2 program.103
+However, production will remain steady at 4-7 aircraft a year, until the final five
+aircraft are produced in FY11. The Air Force hopes to take delivery of its first
+production Global Hawk in September 2003. The Navy is also buying two Global
+Hawks in 2003 to evaluate them as part of a plan to buy a fleet of endurance UAVs
+to supplement its maritime patrol aircraft.104 The Coast Guard was considering
+Global Hawk to fulfill its high altitude surveillance requirements, but now is
+reportedly leaning towards the less costly Predator.105 
+
+ Inventory. There are no operational Global Hawk air vehicles, as the first
+
+production Global Hawk does not deliver until September 2003 and the program does
+not achieve initial operational capability until 2006. There are four residual air
+vehicles from the ACTD Global Hawk developmental program.106 ACTD assets
+were deployed previously in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. After two
+losses during missions supporting operations in Afghanistan, these assets are now
+being used for testing and training. While the crashes in Afghanistan have caused
+some skeptics to question the use of experimental technology on the battlefield,
+others point out that the kinds of things that caused the UAVs to crash would
+probably have happened in a test scenario as well. Additionally, the Global Hawks
+in operation were built to carry the program through the testing phase, and not with
+the demands of an operational deployment in mind.107 
+
+ Cost. The Air Force is still striving to meet its $48 million goal for unit cost,
+
+with research and development costs increasing the price of the unit to as high as $73
+million. The average cost of a Global Hawk is $57 million. This figure takes into
+account all air vehicles, sensors, mission control elements, launch and recovery
+
+103See Richard A. Best, Jr. and Christopher Bolkom. Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance &
+Reconnaissance (ISR): The U-2 Aircraft and Global Hawk UAV Programs , CRS Report
+RL30727, December 1, 2000.
+
+104Ron Laurenzo. “Northrup Grumman, Navy Get Ready For Global Hawk.” Defense Week,
+ April 8, 2002. More information also found in the developmental UAV section of this
+report, under “BAMS UAV.”
+
+105Jefferson Morris. “Coast Guard Leaning Away From Global Hawk, Manager Says.”
+ Aerospace Daily , January 14, 2003, p.1.
+
+106Air Force Background Paper, January 2003.
+
+107Ibid.
+
+ 
+ CRS-36
+
+elements, spares, and associated equipment. Concern among Air Force and DOD
+officials is that the constant addition of new features is making the aircraft
+unaffordable.108 The House Appropriations Committee stated in the FY03 Defense
+Appropriations Bill that they are “very pleased that the Air Force is aggressively
+pursuing cost reduction initiatives in an effort to reduce the overall cost of this
+system.”109 The Committee also “believes a major factor in the cost of this system
+is the development of short-term and longer-term sensor packages that would be
+integrated into the vehicle.”110 
+
+The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence also mentioned their concerns
+
+about the management and cost growth of the Global Hawk program in the report
+accompanying the FY03 Intelligence Authorization Act. Stating that changes to the
+air vehicle have made the platform too expensive to risk losing, the Committee said
+the Global Hawk “must be considered, like the U-2, a standoff collection system that
+needs to be protected.” What was once a $10 million air vehicle, “has become at
+least a $30-40 million aircraft, and the cost will increase substantially further as
+additional and improved sensors, and corresponding power/payload upgrades, are
+added.” Moving on to other concerns, the Committee noted that there is “now an
+effort to flood the Global Hawk program with money, there are ad hoc plans for
+rapid, major upgrades before requirements have been established, and no sign of
+serious examination of where and how Global Hawk fits into an overall collection
+architecture.” To cite one example, “DoD has taken no serious steps to be able to
+relay and process the huge amounts of data from Global Hawk...The Committee
+understands the Department’s eagerness to address the shortage of airborne collection
+systems by investing heavily in Global Hawk, but it is concerned that it is engaged
+in this process in an ad hoc basis.”111
+ 
+
+ Recent Operations. 
+
+ Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). Called the imagery intelligence
+
+workhorse for OEF, Global Hawk has provided more than 15,000 images to support
+the conflict during 50 combat missions surpassing 1,000 flight hours.112 Global
+Hawk was tasked to provide more than 50% of the OEF targets on the days it flew.
+Two Global Hawks have been lost since the UAV started flying missions in
+Afghanistan, one crash in December 2001 and the other in July 2002. Flight test
+operations were temporarily halted after each crash. The 2002 crash was attributed
+to engine failure, while the 2001 crash was due to an improperly installed bolt on the
+
+108Robert Wall. “Global Hawk Plan Gets Pentagon Nod.” Aviation Week & Space
+Technology, January 13, 2003.
+
+109H.Rept. 107-532, p.285.
+
+110Ibid.
+
+111U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d session, House of Representatives, Permanent Select
+Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 , H.Rept.
+107-592, p.21-22.
+
+112Sue Baker. “UAVs Provide Warfighters A View.” Aeronautical Systems Center Public
+Affairs, December 10, 2002.
+
+ 
+ CRS-37
+
+air vehicle.113 OEF has highlighted two of the limitations of the Global Hawk UAV -
+its high cost does not make the air vehicle readily expendable, and its altitude,
+although putting the vehicle out of range of enemy fire, prevents video cameras from
+being used.
+
+ Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq). Early press reports from OIF reveal some
+
+of the missions in which Global Hawk has contributed. During severe sandstorms
+March 24-27, Global Hawk’s synthetic aperture radar and infrared cameras
+reportedly picked out Iraqi targets.114
+
+ FY03/04 Developments. 
+
+ Administration’s Request. In 2003, the Administration requested $170
+
+million for three Global Hawks, which included a baseline of $105 million and $65
+million from the DERF. The baseline amount was for the procurement of two air
+vehicles and one launch and recovery element115, while the DERF dollars were for
+the procurement of an additional air vehicle. The request for research and
+development was $306 million, which includes continuing the spiral development of
+the air vehicle and sensors. The Administration also requested $48 million for one
+replacement air vehicle and two sensor packages in its FY02 Supplemental request.116
+In 2004, the Administration requested $253 million for four air vehicles. The R&D
+request for endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (including Predator and Global
+Hawk) is $398.6 million for 2004.
+
+ Authorization. The Conference Committee (H.Rept. 107-772, H.R. 4546)
+
+matched the Administration’s $170 million request for procurement. The committee
+increased R&D to $311 million by transferring $5 million from DERF for a SIGINT
+capability.
+ 
+
+ Appropriation. The Conference Committee (H.Rept. 107-732, H.R. 5010)
+
+voted $170 million for procurement, unchanged from the authorized funds. R&D
+appropriations totaled $339 million, including $35 million from the DERF for a
+defensive system and SIGINT. The $48 million FY02 supplemental request was also
+approved. 
+
+113Jim Skeen. “Global Hawk Gets Mideast Order.” Los Angeles Daily News, March 5,
+2003.
+
+114Jim Krane. “Iraqi Successes Have Air Force’s Pilotless Planes Stealing Pilots’ Jobs.” The
+Associated Press , April 24, 2003.
+
+115The Global Hawk program consists of the air vehicle, a ground segment and the support
+system. The ground segment includes the Mission Control Element (MCE) and the Launch
+and Recovery Element (LRE).
+
+116See CRS Report RL31406, Supplemental Appropriations for FY2002: Combating
+Terrorism and Other Issues , by Amy Belasco and Larry Nowels, updated August 30, 2002,
+p.70.
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-38
+
+ UCAV. 
+
+The Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) is the first unmanned recoverable
+
+system designed from inception for combat. It is currently in varying stages of
+development, with the Air Force variant being more mature than the Navy version.
+ UCAV development began when the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
+(DARPA) embarked on two ongoing demonstration projects, the UCAV Advanced
+Technology Demonstration (ATD) and the Naval UCAV (UCAV-N) ATD. These
+ATDs are considered high-risk, high-payoff programs, due to the number of critical
+technologies that must be developed before an operational UCAV would be viable.
+The UCAV ATD is a joint effort between DARPA and the Air Force, while the
+UCAV-N ATD is a joint project between DARPA and the Office of Naval Research.
+Boeing is working with DARPA to build the Air Force’s UCAV (X-45), while the
+competing prime contractors for UCAV-N are Boeing (X-46) and Northrop
+Grumman (X-47). The Air Force conducted its first flight demonstration of the X-
+45A on May 22, 2002 and plans to fly an operational vehicle by 2008. The Navy
+plans to deploy its UCAV in 2015. In December 2002, the decision was made to
+combine Air Force and Navy UCAV efforts under a new joint office, similar to the
+Joint Strike Fighter effort. 
+
+ Figure 13. Boeing X-45A Flight Demonstrator, 
+
+ Conducting First Flight Test at Edwards Air 
+
+ Force Base, California, on May 22, 2002 
+
+ Source: Boeing.
+
+Close in size to the Air Force’s Predator at 27 feet long, with a 34-foot wing
+
+span, the demonstration UCAV air vehicle will be designed to have a flight radius
+of 500-1000nm and a deployment time of 24 hours. Smaller than manned fighters
+carrying comparable weapon payloads, the air vehicle has stealthiness and
+survivability advantages. The UCAV was highlighted in the fiscal 2001 defense
+authorization conference report, which set a goal for the military to have one-third
+of its operational deep strike aircraft be unmanned by 2010. Issues of potential
+congressional interest for UCAVs include acquisition strategy, affordability,
+
+ 
+ CRS-39
+
+procurement quantity, arms control implications, manning implications, and
+suitability as a surveillance platform.117 
+
+ Potential Missions and Payloads. The UCAV is envisioned to carry
+
+1,000-3,000 lb of weapons payload. Its early combat application would likely be the
+Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) mission, followed by precision strike.
+Low observable UCAVs could contribute to the success of an air campaign by
+providing a powerful “Day One” force enabler through the SEAD mission,
+supplementing deep penetration aircraft such as the B-2 and F-117, or providing a
+persistent presence to rapidly strike time critical targets such as mobile surface-to-
+surface missile systems.118 The Air Force and Navy have very different missions
+planned for the UCAV. The Air Force is focused on the SEAD mission, as well as
+an electronic attack role. The Navy wants a long-dwell air surveillance aircraft that
+could also perform strike missions.119 The two UCAVs would also be employed
+differently, with the Air Force keeping their vehicle in storage until needed, while the
+Navy plans on more frequent usage for its UCAV.120 
+
+ FY03/04 Developments. 
+
+ Administration’s Request. The Air Force requested $40 million for UCAV
+
+R&D in 2003, which was agreed to by the Armed Services Committee Conferees.
+In 2004, $275 million was requested for UCAV development; $182 million for Air
+Force’s UCAV, including a $5 million request for a UCAV Joint Program Office,
+$57 million for UCAV-N R&D, and $36 million for DARPA R&D.
+
+ Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical UAV (VTUAV). 
+
+The VTUAV Firescout program was the culmination of Navy efforts to field a
+
+shipboard-capable UAV for reconnaissance and targeting. The helicopter-derived
+Fire Scout was intended to begin replacing Navy and Marine Corps Pioneers in 2003.
+However, stating “changed requirements,” the Navy cancelled the program in 2001
+and will only be manufacturing low-rate initial production (LRIP) air vehicles for
+testing purposes. Critics of the VTUAV point out its slow speed, concerns about
+survivability and mobility, limited range and endurance and a small payload. The
+UAV is about 23 feet long and has an altitude ceiling of 20,000, with an endurance
+of more than six hours. It can remain on station 110 nm from the ship for three
+hours, and flies at a speed of 115 knots. Unlike the Pioneer, which is recovered
+aboard ship by flying into a net, the Firescout lands automatically using sensors. The
+
+117See Robert E. Chapman II. “Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles: Issues and Outlook.” CRS
+Report RL31014, June 14, 2001, p. 23-31 for discussion of congressional items of interest.
+
+118Ibid, p.4. 
+
+119For more information on the Naval UCAV, see CRS Report RS21294, Unmanned
+Vehicles for U.S. Naval Forces: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O’Rourke,
+Updated October 22, 2002, p.2-3.
+
+120Robert Wall. “Uncertainty Engulfs Pentagon’s Unmanned Aircraft Plans.” Aviation
+Week & Space Technology , September 16, 2002, p.27.
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-40
+
+Fire Scout decision leaves the Navy with no shipboard UAV asset, as the one Navy
+squadron of Pioneers is being turned over to the Marine Corps. 
+
+ Figure 14. VTUAV Firescout 
+
+ Source: Jane’s Defense Weekly.
+
+ Mission and Payload. Northrop Grumman’s RQ-8A Fire Scout is an
+
+unmanned version of the commercial Schweitzer helicopter. It carries an E-O/IR
+sensor payload that incorporates a laser designator. The air vehicle will have a
+primary training and experimentation mission. Boeing has contracted Northrop
+Grumman to look at the Fire Scout as a possible adjunct to the Army’s Future
+Combat System, while the Marine Corps plans to demonstrate its Cobra coastal
+mine-detection system on the RQ-8A next year. Additionally, there are plans to fire
+a dummy Hellfire missile from the Fire Scout in the future. Northrop Grumman has
+also been marketing the UAV for a variety of other roles, including special operations
+support and homeland security monitoring.121 
+
+ Inventory. The VTUAV inventory consists of five LRIP air vehicles, which
+
+are expected to go to Naval Air Station, Fallon, Nevada, in 2004 for experiments and
+to help train fighter pilots in UAV operations. Navy officials say these air vehicles,
+while not providing the Navy with a tactical UAV shipboard capability, will help
+develop pieces of the Navy’s planned ISR system. These pieces include the tactical
+common datalink, the sensor payload and laser designator, and an automatic takeoff
+and landing helicopter.122 
+
+ FYO3/04 Developments. 
+
+ Administration’s Request. In FY03, the administration requested $43.6
+
+million for VTUAV research and development. For 2004, $56.5 million was
+requested for R&D for Navy tactical UAVs. 
+
+121Jefferson Morris. “Northrop Grumman To Fire Hellfire Missile From Fire Scout UAV.”
+ Aerospace Daily, October 23, 2002.
+
+122Hunter Keeter. “Uncertainty Continues for Naval Tactical UAV Capability.” Defense
+News. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-41
+
+ Authorization. Due to the Navy’s termination of the Fire Scout program, the
+
+House Armed Services Committee recommended a decrease of $43.6 million for
+VTUAV R&D (H.Rept. 107-772, H.R.4546). The committee expressed their
+concerns about the impact on the joint tactical control system (TCS),123 noting that
+“though the Navy, which is the lead service for the joint tactical control system
+(TCS) development, no longer has a TUAV program, its responsibilities for program
+management for TCS remain.”124 The Committee went on to say the Shadow UAV
+program is critically dependent on successful Navy program management of TCS.
+
+ Appropriation. The Appropriation Committee conferees (H.Rept. 107-732,
+
+5010) agreed to reduce by $43.6 million the Navy’s request for VTUAV R&D
+funding. 
+
+ Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS). 
+
+The BAMS UAV will provide the Navy with global coverage through persistent
+
+long range surveillance. The Navy currently lacks a long-dwell standoff ISR
+capability. Initially using the Air Force’s Global Hawk, the Navy will employ its first
+system for experimentation towards answering the BAMS UAV requirement. The
+BAMS UAV is being developed to meet Naval requirements such as persistent
+maritime/land ISR capability, the ability to send sensor data directly to the aircraft
+carrier, and a wide range of sensors to include E-O, IR and SIGINT. The Navy feels
+it needs to develop its own version of the Global Hawk, because the Air Force’s
+model does not provide the following capabilities the Navy requires: the radar and
+sensors do not have 360-degrees point of view, no surface search radar, no
+communications intelligence, and no acoustic relay. BAMS concept of operations
+(CONOPS) development has explored using five world wide locations to forward
+base the UAV, including Hawaii, Florida, Italy, Diego Garcia and Japan. Navy
+planners would like the BAMS vehicle to operate alongside the multi-mission
+maritime aircraft, which is the planned follow-on to the P-3C Orion maritime
+surveillance aircraft.
+
+ Program Status. The BAMS program is being carried out in two phases.
+
+Phase I is known as the Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD). In this
+phase, one system125 will be procured in FY03 and delivered in FY05. The full
+system will be bought from the Air Force under the existing Global Hawk contract.
+Phase I will be used to develop CONOPS, experiment with alternate sensors, and
+study the integration of the tactical control system (TCS) into both land support
+centers and aircraft carriers/amphibious ships. Phase II, known as BAMS UAV,
+would have an initial operating capability in FY08. It has not been decided whether
+
+123The Navy-developed Tactical Control Station is designed to give users control over a
+number of different UAVs. Currently, the services possess unique ground stations for each
+of their UAVs.
+
+124U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Committee on
+Armed Services, Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,
+H.Rept. 107-436, May 3, 2002, p.186.
+
+125One system consists of 2 air vehicles with a ground control station, 2 launch and recovery
+elements (LRE) and support equipment.
+
+ 
+ CRS-42
+
+Phase II would continue using the Global Hawk air vehicle or evolve to a different
+UAV.
+
+Citing concerns that the BAMS program has an unrealistic schedule, the
+
+Pentagon comptroller has instructed the Navy to hold back $122 million in research
+and development earmarked for FY04, and split it between the FY06 and FY07
+budgets for a more feasible timetable. One reason the BAMS program is in danger
+of running behind schedule is the Navy’s desire for 360-degree radar coverage, which
+is technologically difficult and expensive. The alternate funding plan suggested
+would cause the prototype production to slip from FY04 to FY05.126 
+
+ FY03/04 Developments. 
+
+ Administration’s Request . In 2003, the administration requested $180.3
+
+million of research and development funds for the BAMS program. These funds
+include $152 million for Global Hawk and $28.3 million in the DERF, and will be
+used to acquire one marinized Global Hawk system, and start maritime payload
+development. In 2004, $101 million was requested for BAMS R&D. 
+
+ Authorization. The Armed Services Committee Conferees (H.Rept. 107-772,
+
+H.R. 4546)) recommended $180.3 million for BAMS, to include $28.3 million from
+the DERF for sensor development. The House Armed Services Committee expressed
+their concerns about the BAMS program, noting that there is currently “no mission
+needs statement, no analysis of multiple concepts, and no specific exit criteria.”127
+The Committee directed the Secretary of the Navy not to obligate more than 20
+percent of the Navy’s Global Hawk funding until these requirements have been met.
+ 
+
+ Appropriation. The Appropriations Committee conferees agreed to provide
+
+$194 million for the Navy BAMS UAV (H.Rept. 107-732, H.R. 5010). Of the $42.3
+million additional funds over the Administration’s baseline request of $152 million,
+$28.3 million is from the DERF; $7 million is to determine the requirement for
+utilizing existing infrastructure at the Tactical Support Center’s located at Navy P-
+3/EP-3 bases, for use with BAMS; and $7 million is for producibility initiatives such
+as tooling enhancements and improvements and special test equipment, which the
+Navy should coordinate with the Air Force.128 The House Appropriations Committee
+noted that, “despite its obvious support of the Navy’s planned BAMS concept
+exploration and experimentation, the Committee is concerned about the lack of
+
+126Malina Brown. “Pentagon Comptroller Pushes Back Funding, IOC for Navy’s BAMS
+UAV.” Inside the Navy , December 9, 2002.
+
+127U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Armed Services
+Committee, Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2003 , H.Rept.
+107-436, May 3, 2002, p. 208-209.
+
+128U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Appropriations
+Committee, Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year
+Ending September 30, 2003,and For Other Purposes , H.Rept. 107-732, October 9, 2002, p.
+279.
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-43
+
+specificity and documentation provided thus far by the Navy.”129 The Navy was
+thereby directed to submit a detailed BAMS UAV report by February 1, 2003.
+Additionally, the Committee commented that “the Navy has indicated that despite its
+plan to spend $24 million on two air vehicles that would be delivered in 2005, the Air
+Force has not made a firm commitment to that delivery schedule.”130 The Air Force
+was directed to ensure the air vehicles and equipment are provided as scheduled.
+
+ Dragon Eye. 
+
+On the other end of the spectrum from Global Hawk lies the Marine Corps’ five
+
+pound UAV, the Dragon Eye. Dragon Eye provides over-the-hill reconnaissance,
+surveillance, and target acquisition at the tactical level. With a wingspan of just 45
+inches, the UAV can be stored in a backpack and launched by either hand or bungee
+cord. The reconnaissance UAV can fly 40 miles per hour, covering a combat radius
+of six miles and staying aloft for an hour. Its operating altitude is 300-500 feet.
+Developed by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and Navy Research
+Laboratory, the Dragon Eye system is being built by two competing contractors,
+AeroVironment and BAI Aerosystems. Current prototype systems, consisting of
+laptop-based ground control equipment and two air vehicles, run a total of $60,000-
+70,000. The production system will include three air vehicles and could cost
+$90,000.131 The Marine Corps plans to buy and field a total of 1,000 air vehicles and
+200 control stations for about $5 million.132 The first production systems are
+scheduled to be available in July 2003133, with 10 prototype systems being given to
+three Marine Expeditionary Forces in late 2002.
+
+ Figure 15. Marine Holding 
+
+ Dragon Eye 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: Janes.com
+
+129H.Rept. 107-532, p. 263.
+
+130H.Rept. 107-532, p. 264.
+
+131Jefferson Morris. “Army Plans To Test And Evaluate Marine Corps Dragon Eye UAV.”
+ Aerospace Daily , September 12, 2002. 
+
+132Teal Group Corporation. “UAV-Very Low Cost.” World Missiles Briefing , October 2002,
+p.5.
+
+133“Small But Well Equipped.” Jane’s International Defense Review , October 2002, p.53.
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-44
+
+ Potential Missions and Payloads. Dragon Eye has been designed for
+
+over-the-hill reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition for platoons, squads,
+and fire teams. This capability will make the small unit UAV very useful in an urban
+warfare environment. Other potential missions include infrastructure security and
+chemical and biological sensor. A pre-production version of the UAV was
+considered to support Marine Security forces protecting the American Embassy in
+Kabul, Afghanistan.134 Operation Enduring Freedom has caused the Marine Corps
+Warfighting Lab to evaluate ways to speed up the development of Dragon Eye, so
+that the UAV could be outfitted to carry a chemical sensor capability.135 Other
+services have also expressed an interest in Dragon Eye, with the Army’s 1st Division
+in Germany receiving one system for testing and evaluation in 2002, and the Navy
+considering a version which would be called Sea-All. Interchangeable payloads for
+the Dragon Eye include a daytime camera, an infrared camera and a low-light black
+and white camera. 
+
+ Dragon Warrior. 
+
+A vertical take-off and landing UAV, the Marine Corp’s Dragon Warrior is
+
+being developed by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and the Naval Research
+Laboratory. Resembling a small helicopter, this UAV is envisioned to fill a middle
+ground between the Dragon Eye and a not-yet-named larger UAV system. The goal
+is to be able to transport the entire system in one Humvee. The initial system, at 105
+inches long, will have a range of 50 nautical miles and an endurance of three hours.
+The Marine Corps plans to begin fielding Dragon Warrior in 2006. The air vehicles
+and ground control stations are estimated to cost around $750,000 each, while the
+payloads cost from $100,000-350,000.136
+
+ Figure 16. Artist’s Rendition of 
+
+ the Dragon Warrior 
+
+ Source: Jane’s Defense Weekly.
+
+134Marc Strass. “Marine Corps Plans To Deploy Dragon Eye UAV To Protect Kabul
+Embassy.” Defense Daily , March 19, 2002, p.10.
+
+135Randy Woods. “Marine War Lab Hopes Airborne Sensor Can Help In War On
+Terrorism.” Inside the Navy , February 4, 2002.
+
+136Jefferson Morris. “Marine Corps Dragon Warrior UAV To Fly By End Of This Month.”
+ Aerospace Daily , July 12, 2002.
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-45
+
+ Potential Missions and Payloads. Dragon Warrior will carry a
+
+communications payload and a target acquisition package, which consists of an E-
+O/IR sensor and laser designator. Like the Dragon Eye, the Dragon Warrior is
+envisioned to play a major role in urban reconnaissance.
+
+ A-160 Hummingbird. 
+
+A DARPA/Army joint program, the A-160 Hummingbird unmanned helicopter
+
+is being developed as a part of the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS). Built to
+fly much longer and farther than conventional rotorcraft, the Hummingbird will
+probably operate at a range of 2,000 nm and an endurance of 24-48 hours. The
+project goal is to devise a 4,000-lb helicopter with a 2,500 nm range and 40 hours of
+endurance while carrying a 300 lb payload. Maximum altitude is planned to be
+30,000 feet, with a speed of 130-140 kt. Potential missions include surveillance and
+targeting, communications and data relay, lethal and non-lethal weapons delivery,
+and special operations missions. DARPA and Frontier Systems logged their first
+flight of the Hummingbird in January 2002. The Army and U.S. Special Operations
+Command have expressed the greatest amount of interest in the UAV. The Army is
+considering buying the first two helicopters in 2006, while special operations forces
+are contemplating using the vehicle to extract personnel who have come under fire.137
+
+ Figure 17. A-160 Hummingbird 
+
+Interchangeable Payload
+
+EO/IR
+
+Retractable Landing
+
+Nose Section: Versatile
+
+Payload
+
+Gear. 33” Ground
+
+Installation and Volume
+
+Clearance for Large
+
+Growth to 110ft3
+
+Payloads/Antennas
+
+ Source: DARPA.
+
+137Robert Wall. “Hummingbird UAV Begins Flight Test Program.” Aviation Week & Space
+Technology . February 4, 2002.
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-46
+
+ Scan Eagle. 
+
+Developed by Boeing, this UAV would be launched from ship, ashore or from
+
+a submarine. The Navy tested this new capability from January 17-27, 2003, during
+the Giant Shadow exercise in the Bahamas. During the exercise, the four foot long
+UAV was launched from land and acted as a reconnaissance and communications
+relay for the submarine. The concept of operations is to have a swarm of UAVs
+reporting back directly to the submarine. UAVs would also be launched directly
+from the submarine in the future. This experiment likely marked the first time the
+Navy has used a UAV to extend the range of submarine communications. Although
+the Scan Eagle demonstrated the potential value of UAVs to subs, the Navy could
+choose a smaller UAV to fulfill this new role.138
+
+ Eagle Eye. 
+
+The Coast Guard plans to acquire Bell Helicopter Textron’s Eagle Eye UAV as
+
+part of its Deepwater Modernization program. Deepwater will be run by a joint
+venture between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. The $3 million Eagle
+Eye takes off like a helicopter, but then tilts up its rotor to fly like a plane. The Coast
+Guard will get up to 70 of these remote-controlled aircraft, which will extend the
+surveillance capability of their cutters. The Eagle Eye can fly up to 220 knots and
+has an operational radius of roughly 300 miles.139 The UAV, which will be able to
+patrol the U.S. coastline for drug smugglers, refugees and ships in distress, can also
+transmit video and infrared images to the cutter and command centers ashore. The
+Eagle Eye is set to enter into service in 2006.
+
+ Figure 18. Eagle Eye 
+
+ Source: Jane’s Defense Weekly.
+
+138Jefferson Morris. “UAVs Prove Value To Submarines In “Giant Shadow” Experiment,
+Captain Says.” Aerospace Daily, January 30, 2003.
+
+139Jefferson Morris. “No Plans To Use Fire Scout UAV, Deepwater Team Leader Says.”
+ Aerospace Daily , August 12, 2002, p.4.
+
+ 
+ 
+
+CRS-47
+
+ Figure 19. Micro Air Vehicle 
+
+ Source: DARPA.
+
+ Micro Air Vehicles (MAV). 
+
+The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is currently
+
+working on a $30 million micro air vehicle (MAV) effort. Funded by DARPA, the
+Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, DARPA is producing 350 MAVs
+as part of an ACTD due to end in FY05. Unlike other UAVs, MAVs are measured
+in inches, not feet, and cost thousands of dollars instead of millions. A prototype
+nine-inch wide MAV, called the Organic Air Vehicle (OAV), is being delivered to
+the Army in February 2003 for testing as part of their future combat system (FCS).
+OAV, which employs a ducted-fan design vice a fixed wing, carries E-O sensors and
+could be upgraded to include infrared and acoustic sensors, according to its producer,
+Allied Aerospace.140 One operational advantage of a MAV compared to a larger
+UAV, is the ability to conduct a “perch and stare” mission. Most UAVs perform
+their missions while they are flying; the MAV will be able to land and watch, using
+its camera to take pictures of any movements or other signs of enemy activity.141
+MAVs are likely to increase in utility value as technology advances, and small,
+lightweight cameras become available.
+
+ UCAR. 
+
+Four industry teams, led by Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and
+
+Sikorsky Aircraft, are under contract with DARPA to develop concepts for the
+unmanned combat armed rotorcraft (UCAR). In May 2003, DARPA will reportedly
+downselect to two teams.142 UCAR will be employed by the Army to perform armed
+reconnaissance and attack missions. It will be capable of collaborating with other
+manned and unmanned Army systems. The affordability goal for UCAR is 20-40%
+
+140Jefferson Morris. “Prototype MAVs To Be Delivered To Army For Testing Next Month.”
+ Aerospace Daily , November 22, 2002.
+
+141John G. Roos. “Organic Air Vehicle.” The ISR Journal , July 2002, p.45.
+
+142Jefferson Morris. “Northrop Grumman UCAR Team Meeting With DARPA Next Week.”
+ Aerospace Daily , November 11, 2002.
+
+ 
+ CRS-48
+
+of the Comanche helicopter’s flyaway costs. UCAR would transition to the Army
+in FY09.
+
+ Force Protection Aerial Surveillance System (FPASS). 
+
+The Air Force is pursuing a variety of small UAVs such as Lockheed Martin’s
+
+FPASS, also referred to as Desert Hawk. FPASS is a member of Lockheed Martin’s
+SentryOwl family of mini air vehicles. The UAV is battery powered, and launched
+with a bungee cord. It has a length of 3 ft, can carry a payload of 1 lb, and has a
+radius of 5nm, with an endurance of 60-90 minutes. The system was developed to
+enhance security at overseas bases. It accomplishes this by conducting area
+surveillance and patrolling base perimeters and runway approach/departure paths.
+The system is currently being used in Operation Iraqi Freedom by the Air Force, as
+a force protection UAV to keep a camera out for ambushers.
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,1510 @@
+The Internet of Things: Frequently Asked Questions
+
+ October 13, 2015
+ (R44227)
+ 
+ Jump to Main Text of Report 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Contents
+
+ 
+ What Is the Internet of Things (IoT)? 
+
+ How Does the IoT Work? 
+
+ What Impacts Will the IoT Have? 
+
+ Economic Growth 
+
+ Economic Sectors 
+
+ Agriculture 
+
+ Energy 
+
+ Health Care 
+
+ Manufacturing 
+
+ Transportation 
+
+ Infrastructure and Smart Cities 
+
+ Social and Cultural Impacts 
+
+ What Is the Current Federal Role? 
+
+ What Issues Might Affect the Development and Implementation of the IoT? 
+
+ Technical Issues 
+
+ Internet Addresses 
+
+ High-Speed Internet 
+
+ Wireless Communications 
+
+ Standards 
+
+ Other Technical Issues 
+
+ Cybersecurity 
+
+ Safety 
+
+ Privacy 
+
+ Other Policy Issues 
+
+ Federal Role 
+
+ Spectrum Access 
+
+ Net Neutrality 
+
+ What Actions Has Congress Taken? 
+
+ Legislation 
+
+ Bills 
+
+ Resolutions 
+
+ Hearings 
+
+ Caucuses 
+
+ Where Can I Find Additional Resources on This Topic? 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Summary
+
+ "Internet of Things" (IoT) refers to networks of objects that communicate with other objects and with computers through the Internet. "Things" may include virtually any object for which remote communication, data collection, or control might be useful, such as vehicles, appliances, medical devices, electric grids, transportation infrastructure, manufacturing equipment, or building systems. 
+
+ In other words, the IoT potentially includes huge numbers and kinds of interconnected objects. It is often considered the next major stage in the evolution of cyberspace. Some observers believe it might even lead to a world where cyberspace and human space would seem to effectively merge, with unpredictable but potentially momentous societal and cultural impacts.
+
+ Two features make objects part of the IoT—a unique identifier and Internet connectivity. Such "smart" objects each have a unique Internet Protocol (IP) address to identify the object sending and receiving information. Smart objects can form systems that communicate among themselves, usually in concert with computers, allowing automated and remote control of many independent processes and potentially transforming them into integrated systems.
+
+ Those systems can potentially impact homes and communities, factories and cities, and every sector of the economy, both domestically and globally. Although the full extent and nature of the IoT's impacts remain uncertain, economic analyses predict that it will contribute trillions of dollars to economic growth over the next decade. Sectors that may be particularly affected include agriculture, energy, government, health care, manufacturing, and transportation. 
+
+ The IoT can contribute to more integrated and functional infrastructure, especially in "smart cities," with projected improvements in transportation, utilities, and other municipal services. The Obama Administration announced a smart-cities initiative in September 2015. 
+
+ There is no single federal agency that has overall responsibility for the IoT. Agencies may find IoT applications useful in helping them fulfill their missions. Each is responsible for the functioning and security of its own IoT, although some technologies, such as drones, may fall under the jurisdiction of other agencies as well. Various agencies also have relevant regulatory, sector-specific, and other mission-related responsibilities, such as the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and Transportation, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. 
+
+ Security and privacy are often cited as major issues for the IoT, given the perceived difficulties of providing adequate cybersecurity for it, the increasing role of smart objects in controlling components of infrastructure, and the enormous increase in potential points of attack posed by the proliferation of such objects. The IoT may also pose increased risks to privacy, with cyberattacks potentially resulting in exfiltration of identifying or other sensitive information about an individual. With an increasing number of IoT objects in use, privacy concerns also include questions about the ownership, processing, and use of the data they generate.
+
+ Several other issues might affect the continued development and implementation of the IoT. Among them are
+ the lack of consensus standards for the IoT, especially with respect to connectivity;
+
+ the transition to a new Internet Protocol (IPv6) that can handle the exponential increase in the number of IP addresses that the IoT will require;
+
+ methods for updating the software used by IoT objects in response to security and other needs; 
+
+ energy management for IoT objects, especially those not connected to the electric grid; and
+
+ the role of the federal government, including investment, regulation of applications, access to wireless communications, and the impact of federal rules regarding "net neutrality."
+ No bills specifically on the IoT have been introduced in the 114 th Congress, although S.Res. 110 was agreed to in March 2015, and H.Res. 195 was introduced in April. Both call for a U.S. IoT strategy, a focus on a consensus-based approach to IoT development, commitment to federal use of the IoT, and its application in addressing challenging societal issues. House and Senate hearings have been held on the IoT, and several congressional caucuses may consider associated issues. Moreover, bills affecting privacy, cybersecurity, and other aspects of communication could affect IoT applications.
+
+ 
+ 
+ The Internet of Things: Frequently Asked Questions
+
+ 
+ T he Internet of Things (IoT) is a complex, often poorly understood phenomenon. The term is more than a decade old, but interest has grown considerably over the last few years as applications have increased. 1 The impacts of the IoT on the economy and society more generally are expected by many to grow substantially. This report was developed to assist Congress in responding to some commonly asked questions about it:
+ " What Is the Internet of Things (IoT)? "
+
+ " How Does the IoT Work? "
+
+ " What Impacts Will the IoT Have? "
+
+ " What Is the Current Federal Role? "
+
+ " What Issues Might Affect the Development and Implementation of the IoT? "
+
+ " What Actions Has Congress Taken? "
+
+ " Where Can I Find Additional Resources on This Topic? "
+ What Is the Internet of Things (IoT)?
+
+ When people talk about the Internet, they are usually referring to the electronic network that permits computers around the world to communicate with each other. What, then, is the IoT? There is no universally agreed-upon definition, 2 but generally, the term is used to describe networks of objects that are not themselves computers but that have embedded components that connect to the Internet. "Things" may include, for example, smart meters, fitness trackers, personal vehicles, home appliances, medical devices, and even clothing used by individual consumers. They may also include embedded devices in roadways and in other components of infrastructure such as electric grids, manufacturing plants and other buildings, farms, and virtually any other object, element, or system for which remote communications, control, or data collection and processing might be useful. 
+
+ While fixed and mobile computing devices such as desktop computers, smartphones, and tablets are generally not considered to be IoT objects, smartphones in particular have features such as motion and position sensors that blur the distinctions. 3 Some smartphone applications, for example, enable them to be used in fitness tracking and other health monitoring.
+
+ In other words, the IoT potentially includes huge numbers and kinds of interconnected objects. In practice, IoT refers not to a simple or uniform network of objects but rather to a complex collection of objects and networks. Specific dimensions of the IoT may be referred to by terms such as smart grid, connected cities, and Industrial Internet. 4 Other terms may also be used in the context of IoT to denote related concepts such as cyber-physical systems 5 and the Internet of Everything. 6 
+
+ The IoT is often considered the next major stage in the evolution of cyberspace. 7 The first electronic computers were developed in the 1940s, but 40 years passed before connecting computers through wired devices began to spread in the 1980s. The first decade of the 21 st century saw the next stage, marked by the rapid spread of smartphones and other mobile devices that use wireless communications, 8 as well as social media, big-data analytics, and cloud computing. 9 Building on those advances, connections between two or more machines (M2M) and between machines and people are expected by many observers to lead to huge growth in the IoT by 2020. 10 
+
+ How Does the IoT Work?
+
+ The IoT is not separate from the Internet, but rather, a potentially huge extension and expansion of it. The "things" that form the basis of the IoT are objects. They could be virtually anything—streetlights, thermostats, electric meters, 11 fitness trackers, factory equipment, automobiles, unmanned aircraft systems (UASs or drones), 12 or even cows or sheep in a field. 13 What makes an object part of the IoT is embedded or attached computer chips or similar components that give the object both a unique identifier and Internet connectivity. Objects with such components are often called "smart"—such as smart meters and smart cars.
+
+ Internet connectivity allows a smart object to communicate with computers and with other smart objects. Connections of smart objects to the Internet can be wired, such as through Ethernet cables, or wireless, such as via a Wi-Fi or cellular network.
+
+ To enable precise communications, each IoT object must be uniquely identifiable. That is accomplished through an Internet Protocol (IP) address, a number assigned to each Internet-connected device, whether a desktop computer, a mobile phone, a printer, or an IoT object. 14 Those IP addresses ensure that the device or object sending or receiving information is correctly identified.
+
+ What kinds of information do IoT objects communicate? The answer depends on the nature of the object, and it can be simple or complex. For example, a smart thermometer might have only one sensor, used to communicate ambient temperature to a remote weather-monitoring center. A wireless medical device might, in contrast, use various sensors to communicate a person's body temperature, pulse, blood pressure, and other variables to a medical service provider via a computer or mobile phone. 
+
+ Smart objects can also be involved in command networks. For example, industrial control systems can adjust manufacturing processes based on input from both other IoT objects and human operators. Network connectivity can permit such operations to be performed in "real time"—that is, almost instantaneously.
+
+ Smart objects can form systems that communicate information and commands among themselves, usually in concert with computers they connect to. This kind of communication enables the use of smart systems in homes, vehicles, factories, and even entire cities. 
+
+ Smart systems allow for automated and remote control of many processes. A smart home can permit remote control of lighting, security, HVAC (heating, ventilating, and air conditioning), and appliances. In a smart city, an intelligent transportation system (ITS) may permit vehicles to communicate with other vehicles and roadways to determine the fastest route to a destination, avoiding traffic jams, and traffic signals can be adjusted based on congestion information received from cameras and other sensors. 15 Buildings might automatically adjust electric usage, based on information sent from remote thermometers and other sensors. 16 An Industrial Internet application can permit companies to monitor production systems and adjust processes, remotely control and synchronize machinery operations, track inventory and supply chains, and perform other tasks. 17 
+
+ IoT connections and communications can be created across a broad range of objects and networks and can transform previously independent processes into integrated systems. These integrated systems can potentially have substantial effects on homes and communities, factories and cities, and every sector of the economy, both domestically and globally.
+
+ What Impacts Will the IoT Have?
+
+ The IoT may significantly affect many aspects of the economy and society, although the full extent and nature of its eventual impacts remains uncertain. Many observers predict that the growth of the IoT will bring positive benefits through enhanced integration, efficiency, and productivity across many sectors of the U.S. and global economies. 18 Among those commonly mentioned are agriculture, energy, health care, manufacturing, and transportation. Significant impacts may also be felt more broadly on economic growth, infrastructure and cities, and individual consumers. However, both policy and technical challenges, including security and privacy issues, might inhibit the growth and impact of IoT innovations.
+
+ Economic Growth
+
+ Several economic analyses have predicted that the IoT will contribute significantly to economic growth over the next decade, but the predictions vary substantially in magnitude. The current global IoT market has been valued at about $2 trillion, with estimates of its predicted value over the next 5 to 10 years varying from $4 trillion to $11 trillion. 19 Such variability demonstrates the difficulty of making economic forecasts in the face of various uncertainties, including a lack of consensus among researchers about exactly what the IoT is and how it will develop. 20 
+
+ Economic Sectors
+
+ Agriculture
+
+ The IoT can be leveraged by the agriculture industry through precision agriculture, with the goal of optimizing production and efficiency while reducing costs and environmental impacts. For farming operations, it involves analysis of detailed, often real-time data on weather, soil and air quality, water supply, pest populations, crop maturity, and other factors such as the cost and availability of equipment and labor. 21 Field sensors test soil moisture and chemical balance, which can be coupled with location technologies to enable precise irrigation and fertilization. 22 Drones and satellites can be used to take detailed images of fields, giving farmers information about crop yield, nutrient deficiencies, and weed locations. 23 For ranching and animal operations, radio frequency identification (RFID) chips and electronic identification readers (EID) help monitor animal movements, feeding patterns, and breeding capabilities, while maintaining detailed records on individual animals. 24 
+
+ Energy
+
+ Within the energy sector, the IoT may impact both production and delivery, for example through facilitating monitoring of oil wellheads and pipelines. 25 When IoT components are embedded into parts of the electrical grid, the resulting infrastructure is commonly referred to as the "smart grid." 26 This use of IoT enables greater control by utilities over the flow of electricity and can enhance the efficiency of grid operations. 27 It can also expedite the integration of microgenerators into the grid. 28 
+
+ Smart-grid technology can also provide consumers with greater knowledge and control of their energy usage through the use of smart meters in the home or office. 29 Connection of smart meters to a building's HVAC, lighting, and other systems can result in "smart buildings" that integrate the operation of those systems. 30 Smart buildings use sensors and other data to automatically adjust room temperatures, lighting, and overall energy usage, resulting in greater efficiency and lower energy cost. 31 Information from adjacent buildings may be further integrated to provide additional efficiencies in a neighborhood or larger division in a city.
+
+ Health Care
+
+ The IoT has many applications in the health care field, 32 in both health monitoring and treatment, including telemedicine and telehealth. 33 Applications may involve the use of medical technology and the Internet to provide long-distance health care and education. 34 Medical devices—which can be wearable or nonwearable, or even implantable, injectable, or ingestible 35 —can permit remote tracking of a patient's vital signs, chronic conditions, or other indicators of health and wellness. 36 Wireless medical devices may be used not only in hospital settings but also in remote monitoring and care, freeing patients from sustained or recurring hospital visits. 37 Some experts have stated that advances in healthcare IoT applications will be important for providing affordable, quality care to the aging U.S. population. 38 
+
+ Manufacturing
+
+ Integration of IoT technologies into manufacturing and supply chain logistics is predicted to have a transformative effect on the sector. 39 The biggest impact may be realized in optimization of operations, making manufacturing processes more efficient. 40 Efficiencies can be achieved by connecting components of factories to optimize production, but also by connecting components of inventory and shipping for supply chain optimization. 41 Another application is predictive maintenance, which uses sensors to monitor machinery and factory infrastructure for damage. Resulting data can enable maintenance crews to replace parts before potentially dangerous and/or costly malfunctions occur. 42 
+
+ Transportation
+
+ Transportation systems are becoming increasingly connected. New motor vehicles are equipped with features such as global positioning systems (GPS) and in-vehicle entertainment, as well as advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS), which utilize sensors in the vehicle to assist the driver, for example with parking and emergency braking. 43 Further connection of vehicle systems enables fully autonomous or self-driving automobiles, which are predicted to be commercialized in the next 5-20 years. 44 
+
+ Additionally, IoT technologies can allow vehicles within and across modes—including cars, buses, trains, airplanes, and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones)—to "talk" to one another and to components of the IoT infrastructure, creating intelligent transportation systems (ITS). Potential benefits of ITS may include increased safety and collision avoidance, optimized traffic flows, and energy savings, among others. 45 
+
+ Infrastructure and Smart Cities
+
+ The capabilities of the smart grid, smart buildings, and ITS combined with IoT components in other public utilities—such as roadways, sewage and water transport and treatment, public transportation, and waste removal—can contribute to more integrated and functional infrastructure, especially in cities. 46 For example, traffic authorities can use cameras and embedded sensors to manage traffic flow and help reduce congestion. 47 IoT components embedded in street lights or other infrastructure elements can provide functions such as advanced lighting control, environmental monitoring, and even assistance for drivers in finding parking spaces. 48 Smart garbage cans can signal waste removal teams when they are full, streamlining the routes that garbage trucks take. 49 
+
+ This integration of infrastructure and service components is increasingly referred to as smart cities, or other terms such as connected, digital, or intelligent cities or communities. A number of cities in the United States and elsewhere have developed smart-city initiatives. 50 
+
+ As with IoT and other popular technology terms, there is no established consensus definition or set of criteria for characterizing what a smart city is. Specific characterizations vary widely, but in general they involve the use of IoT and related technologies to improve energy, transportation, governance, and other municipal services for specified goals such as sustainability or improved quality of life. 51 The related technologies include 
+ social media (such as Facebook and Twitter), 
+
+ mobile computing (such as smartphones and wearable devices), 
+
+ data analytics (big data—the processing and use of very large data sets; and open data—databases that are publicly accessible), and 
+
+ cloud computing (the delivery of computing services from a remote location, analogous to the way utilities such as electricity are provided). 52 
+ Together, these are sometimes called SMAC. 53 
+
+ Social and Cultural Impacts
+
+ The IoT may create webs of connections that will fundamentally transform the way people and things interact with each other. The emerging cyberspace platform created by the IoT and SMAC has been described as potentially making cities "like 'computers' in open air," where citizens engage with the city "in a real-time and ongoing loop of information." 54 
+
+ Some observers have proposed that the growth of IoT will result in a hyperconnected world in which the seamless integration of objects and people will cause the Internet to disappear as a separate phenomenon. 55 In such a world, cyberspace and human space would seem to effectively merge into a single environment, with unpredictable but potentially substantial societal and cultural impacts.
+
+ What Is the Current Federal Role?
+
+ There is no single federal agency that has overall responsibility for the IoT, just as there is no one agency with overall responsibility for cyberspace. Federal agencies may find the IoT useful in helping them fulfill their missions through a variety of applications such as those discussed in this report and elsewhere. 56 Each agency is responsible under various laws and regulations for the functioning and security of its own IoT, although some technologies, such as drones, may also fall under some aspects of the jurisdiction of other agencies.
+
+ Various agencies have regulatory, sector-specific, and other mission-related responsibilities that involve aspects of IoT. For example, entities that use wireless communications for their IoT devices will be subject to allocation rules for the portions of the electromagnetic spectrum that they use. 
+ The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) allocates and assigns spectrum for nonfederal entities. 57 
+
+ In the Department of Commerce , the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) fulfills that function for federal entities, 58 and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) creates standards, develops new technologies, and provides best practices for the Internet and Internet-enabled devices. 59 
+
+ The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulates and enforces consumer protection policies, including for privacy and security of consumer IoT devices. 60 
+
+ The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating security for the 16 critical infrastructure sectors. 61 Many of those sectors use industrial control systems (ICS), which are often connected to the Internet, and the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) has an ICS Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) to help critical-infrastructure entities address ICS cybersecurity issues. 62 
+
+ The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also has responsibilities with respect to the cybersecurity of Internet-connected medical devices. 63 
+
+ The Department of Justice (DOJ) addresses law-enforcement aspects of IoT, including cyberattacks, unlawful exfiltration of data from devices and/or networks, and investigation and prosecution of other computer and intellectual property crimes. 64 
+
+ Relevant activities at the Department of Energy (DOE) include those associated with developing high-performance and green buildings, and other energy-related programs, including those related to smart electrical grids. 65 
+
+ The Department of Transportation (DOT) has established an Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office (ITS JPO) to coordinate various programs and activities throughout DOT relating to the development and deployment of connected vehicles and systems, involving all modes of surface transportation. 66 DOT mode-specific agencies also engage in ITS activities. 67 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is involved in regulation and other activities relating to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 68 and commercial systems (UAS). 69 
+
+ The Department of Defense was a pioneer in the development of much of the foundational technology for the IoT. Most of its IoT deployment has related to its combat mission, both directly and for logistical and other support. 70 
+ In addition to the activities described above, several agencies are engaged in research and development (R&D) related to the IoT. 
+ Like NIST, the National Science Foundation (NSF) engages in cyber-physical systems research and other activities that cut across various IoT applications. 71 
+
+ The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program (NITRD), under the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) coordinates federal agency R&D in networking and information technology. The NITRD Cyber Physical Systems Senior Steering Group "coordinates programs, budgets and policy recommendations" for IoT R&D. 72 Other agencies involved in such R&D include the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and several DOD agencies. 
+
+ The White House has also announced a smart-cities initiative focusing on the development of a research infrastructure, demonstration projects, and other R&D activities. 73 
+ What Issues Might Affect the Development and Implementation of the IoT?
+
+ The Internet of Things is often lauded for its potentially revolutionary applications. Indeed, IoT devices are today being implemented in many different sectors for a vast array of purposes. However, it is still unclear how IoT will progress due to challenges associated with both technical and policy issues . 
+
+ Technical Issues
+
+ Prominent technical limitations that may affect the growth and use of the IoT include a lack of new Internet addresses under the most widely used protocol, the availability of high-speed and wireless communications, and lack of consensus on technical standards.
+
+ Internet Addresses
+
+ A potential barrier to the development of IoT is the technical limitations of the version of the Internet Protocol (IP) that is used most widely. IP is the set of rules that computers use to send and receive information via the Internet, including the unique address that each connected device or object must have to communicate . Version 4 (IPv4) is current ly in widest use. It can accommodate about 4 billion addresses, and it is close to saturation, with few new addresses available in many parts of the world. 74 
+
+ Some observers predict that Internet traffic will grow faster for IoT objects than any other kind of device over the next five years, 75 with more than 25 billion IoT objects in use by 2020 , 76 and perhaps 50 billion devices altogether. 77 I Pv4 appears unlikely to meet that growing demand, even with the use of workarounds such as methods for sharing IP addresses. 78 
+
+ Version 6 (IPv6) allows for a huge increase in the number IP addresses . With IPv4 , the maximum number of unique addresses , 4.2 billion, is not enough to provide even one address for each of the 7.3 billion people on Earth. IPv6 , in contrast, will accommodate over 10 38 addresses—more than a trillion trillion per person . 
+
+ It is highly likely that to accommodate the anticipated growth in the numbers of Internet-connected objects, IPv6 will have to be implemented broadly. It has been available since 1999 but was not formal ly launched until 2012. 79 In most countries, fewer than 10% of IP addresses were in IPv6 as of September 2015 . Adoption is highest in some European countries and in the United States , 80 where adoption has doubled in the past year to about 20% . 81 Globally, adoption has doubled annually since 2011, to about 7% of addresses in mid-201 5 . 82 While growth in adoption is expected to continue, it is not yet clear whether the rate of growth will be sufficient to accommodate the expected growth in the IoT. That will depend on a number of factors, including replacement of some older systems and applications that cannot handle IPv6 addresses , 83 resolution of security issues associated with the transition, and availability of sufficient resources for deployment . 84 
+
+ Efforts to transition federal systems to IPv6 began more than a decade ago. 85 According to estimates by NIST, adoption for public-facing services has been much greater within the federal government th an within industry or academia. 86 However, adoption varies substantially among agencies, and some data suggest that federal adoption plateaued in 2012. 87 Data were not available for this report on domains that are not public-facing, and it is not clear whether adoption of IPv6 by federal agencies will affect their deployment of IoT applications. 
+
+ High-Speed Internet
+
+ Use and growth of the IoT can also be limited by the availability of access to high-speed Internet and advanced telecommunications services, commonly known as broadband, on which it depends. While many urban and suburban areas have access, that is not the case for many rural areas, for which private-sector providers may not find establishment of the required infrastructure profitable, and government programs may be limited. 88 
+
+ Wireless Communications
+
+ Many observers believe that issues relating to access to the electromagnetic spectrum 89 will need to be resolved to ensure the functionality and interoperability of IoT devices. Access to spectrum, both licensed and unlicensed, is essential for devices and objects to communicate wirelessly. IoT devices are being developed and deployed for new purposes and industries, and some argue that the current framework for spectrum allocation may not serve these new industries well . 90 
+
+ Standards
+
+ Current ly, there is no single universal ly recognized set of technical standard s for the IoT, especially with respect to communication s , 91 or even a commonly accepted definition among the various organizations that have produced IoT standards or related documents . 92 Many observers agree that a common set of standard s will be essential for interoperability and scalability of devices and systems. 93 However, other s have expressed pessimism that a universal standard is feasible or even desirable , given the diversity of objects that the IoT potentially encompasses. 94 Several different sets of de facto standard s have been in development, and some observers do not expect formal standards to appear before 2017. Whether conflicts between standards will affect growth of the sector as they did for some other technologies i s not clear. 95 
+
+ Other Technical Issues
+
+ Several other technical issues might impact the development and adoption of IoT. For example, if an object's software cannot be readily updated in a secure manner, that could affect both function and security. Some observers have therefore recommended that smart objects have remote updating capabilities. 96 However, such capabilities could have undesirable effects such as increasing power requirements of IoT objects or requiring additional security features to counter the risk of exploitation by hackers of the update features.
+
+ Energy consumption can also be an issue. IoT objects need energy for sensing, processing, and communicating information. If objects isolated from the electric grid must rely on batteries, replacement can be a problem, even if energy consumption is highly efficient. That is especially the case for applications using large numbers of objects or placements that are difficult to access. Therefore, alternative approaches such as energy harvesting, whether from solar or other sources, are being developed. 97 
+
+ Cybersecurity
+
+ The security of devices and the data they acquire, process, and transmit is often cited as a top concern in cyberspace. 98 Cyberattacks can result in theft of data and sometimes even physical destruction. Some sources estimate losses from cyberattacks in general to be very large—in the hundreds of billions or even trillions of dollars. 99 As the number of connected objects in the IoT grows, so will the potential risk of successful intrusions and increases in costs from those incidents.
+
+ Cybersecurity involves protecting information systems, their components and contents, and the networks that connect them from intrusions or attacks involving theft, disruption, damage, or other unauthorized or wrongful actions. 100 IoT objects are potentially vulnerable targets for hackers. 101 Economic and other factors may reduce the degree to which such objects are designed with adequate cybersecurity capabilities built in. IoT devices are small, are often built to be disposable, and may have limited capacity for software updates to address vulnerabilities that come to light after deployment. 
+
+ The interconnectivity of IoT devices may also provide entry points through which hackers can access other parts of a network. For example, a hacker might gain access first to a building thermostat, and subsequently to security cameras or computers connected to the same network, permitting access to and exfiltration or modification of surveillance footage or other information. 102 Control of a set of smart objects could permit hackers to use their computing power in malicious networks called botnets to perform various kinds of cyberattacks. 103 
+
+ Access could also be used for destruction, such as by modifying the operation of industrial control systems, as with the Stuxnet malware that caused centrifuges to self-destruct at Iranian nuclear plants. 104 Among other things, Stuxnet showed that smart objects can be hacked even if they are not connected to the Internet. The growth of smart weapons and other connected objects within DOD has led to growing concerns about their vulnerabilities to cyberattack and increasing attempts to prevent and mitigate such attacks, including improved design of IoT objects. 105 Cybersecurity for the IoT may be complicated by factors such as the complexity of networks and the need to automate many functions that can affect security, such as authentication. Consequently, new approaches to security may be needed for the IoT. 106 
+
+ IoT cybersecurity will also likely vary among economic sectors and subsectors, given their different characteristics and requirements. Each sector will have a role in developing cybersecurity best practices, unique to its needs. The federal government has a role in securing federal information systems, as well as assisting with security of nonfederal systems, especially critical infrastructure. 107 Cybersecurity legislation considered in the 114 th Congress, while not focusing specifically on the IoT, would address several issues that are potentially relevant to IoT applications, such as information sharing and notification of data breaches. 108 
+
+ Safety
+
+ Given that smart objects can be used both to monitor conditions and to control machinery, the IoT has broad implications for safety, with respect to both improvements and risks. For example, objects embedded in pipelines can monitor both the condition of the equipment and the flow of contents. Among other benefits, that can help both to expedite shutoffs in the event of leaks and to prevent them through predictive maintenance. 109 Connected vehicles can help reduce vehicle collisions through crash avoidance technologies and other applications. 110 Wireless medical devices can improve patient safety by permitting remote monitoring and facilitating adjustments in care. 111 
+
+ However, given the complexities involved in some applications of IoT, malfunctions might in some instances result in catastrophic system failures, creating significant safety risks, such as flooding from dams or levees. 112 In addition, hackers could potentially cause malfunctions of devices such as insulin pumps 113 or automobiles, 114 potentially creating significant safety risks.
+
+ Privacy
+
+ Cyberattacks may also compromise privacy, resulting in access to and exfiltration of identifying or other sensitive information about an individual. For example, an intrusion into a wearable device might permit exfiltration of information about the location, activities, or even the health of the wearer. 
+
+ In addition to the question of whether security measures are adequate to prevent such intrusions, privacy concerns also include questions about the ownership, processing, and use of such data. With an increasing number of IoT objects being deployed, large amounts of information about individuals and organizations may be created and stored by both private entities and governments. 
+
+ With respect to government data collection, the U.S. Supreme Court has been reticent about making broad pronouncements concerning society's expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution while new technologies are in flux, as reflected in opinions over the last five years. 115 Congress may also update certain laws, such as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, given the ways that privacy expectations of the public are evolving in response to IoT and other new technologies. 116 IoT applications may also create challenges for interpretation of other laws relating to privacy, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and various state laws, as well as established practices such as those arising from norms such as the Fair Information Practice Principles. 117 
+
+ Other Policy Issues
+
+ Federal Role
+
+ As described in the section, " What Is the Current Federal Role? " many federal agencies are involved in different aspects of the IoT. Some business representatives and others have stressed the role of effective public/private partnerships in the development of this technology space. 118 However, observers have also expressed concerns about the role of government regulations and policy, as discussed further in sections below, and about the degree and effectiveness of coordination among the involved federal agencies. 119 Concerns of some extend beyond the federal role to that of state, local, and foreign governments. 120 
+
+ Given the eclectic nature of the IoT, overall coordination of federal efforts may be challenging with respect to identification of both the goals of coordination and the methods for achieving them. Nevertheless, several observers have argued in favor of a national strategy for the IoT, 121 including in resolutions considered in the 114 th Congress (see " What Actions Has Congress Taken? "). 
+
+ Some interagency initiatives have been established with respect to specific aspects of the IoT. For example, in addition to the R&D coordination activities for cyber-physical systems under the NITRD program, 122 a specific framework has been developed for smart cities 123 as part of the overall White House initiative involving several federal agencies, local governments, and the private sector. 124 
+
+ Spectrum Access
+
+ Radio frequency (electromagnetic) spectrum is widely regarded as a critical link in IoT communications, with reliable and affordable access to it required to accommodate the billions of new IoT devices projected to go online over the next decade. 125 New technology for mobile communications is predicted to allow devices to operate on any available radio frequency and potentially permit communications technologies and cyber-physical systems to converge further. 126 Concerns have been raised that current spectrum policy may favor consumer-oriented mobile services and the wireless industry, rather than emerging markets for IoT devices, such as transportation and manufacturing. 127 Congress may therefore be faced with decisions about whether the current policy needs to be revised.
+
+ Net Neutrality
+
+ The concept of "net neutrality" includes the two general principles that owners of the networks that comprise and provide access to the Internet should not control how end users lawfully use that network, and that they should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network. 128 The FCC adopted an order in February 2015 that established regulatory guidelines to protect the marketplace from potential abuses that could threaten the net neutrality concept. 129 The order bans broadband Internet access providers (both fixed and wireless) from blocking and throttling lawful content, and it prohibits paid prioritization of affiliated or proprietary content. 130 The order also creates a general conduct standard that Internet service providers cannot harm consumers or providers of applications, content, and services. These rules went into effect, with limited exceptions, on June 12, 2015, but have been challenged in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 131 
+
+ It remains unclear how the FCC order will affect IoT devices and services. Some observers view the implementation of FCC regulations as a positive development. They believe that it will ensure openness and nondiscrimination for service providers, leading to the growth of new services and consumer demand. Others have expressed concerns that the regulations will stifle investment and innovation to the detriment of the expansion and growth of Internet deployment and services. Furthermore, the rules are subject to "reasonable network management," as defined by the FCC, and a category of "specialized services" defined as those that "do not provide access to the Internet generally" are exempt from the rules established by the order. 132 Depending on how individual IoT services and devices are categorized and the degree of network management such specialized services may need, the order could also affect IoT applications on a case-by-case basis.
+
+ What Actions Has Congress Taken?
+
+ Legislation
+
+ Bills
+
+ No bills have been introduced in the last two Congresses relating specifically to the IoT. However, many bills have been introduced with provisions related to aspects of the IoT such as connected vehicles, cyber-physical systems, smart cities, and the smart grid. None of those bills were enacted as of September 2015, although some bills with provisions on applications and appropriations relating to telehealth and telemedicine were enacted in both the 113 th and 114 th Congresses. Several bills in the 114 th Congress would address issues that are potentially relevant to IoT applications, such as information sharing in cybersecurity, privacy, and notification of data breaches. 133 
+
+ Resolutions
+
+ Two similar resolutions on the IoT have been submitted in the 114 th Congress, one in the House ( H.Res. 195 /Lance, introduced April 13, 2015) and one in the Senate ( S.Res. 110 /Fischer, introduced and passed March 24). Both call for
+ a U.S. strategy for development of the IoT to improve social well-being while allowing for innovation and protecting against misuse,
+
+ recognition of the importance of a consensus-based approach and the role of businesses in that development,
+
+ federal government commitment to use the IoT, and
+
+ a U.S. commitment to use the IoT for developing new technologies to address challenging societal issues.
+ The House version also calls for the use of cost-benefit analysis to determine when federal action is needed to address "discrete harms" in the marketplace. It also refers explicitly to energy optimization and the need for cybersecurity.
+
+ Hearings
+
+ Both the House and the Senate have held hearings on the IoT in 2015. In the Senate, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation held a hearing on February 11. 134 In the House, one was held by the Energy and Commerce Committee on March 24, 135 and another by the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary on July 29. 136 The hearings featured witnesses from businesses and associations who discussed the growth, uses, and economic potential of the IoT, as well as some of the issues described in this report, such as privacy, regulation, security, spectrum management, and standards. 
+
+ Caucuses
+
+ There are several congressional caucuses that may consider issues associated with the IoT. Among them are caucuses on cloud computing, 137 cybersecurity, 138 the Internet, 139 and high-performance buildings. In addition, new caucuses announced in this session included one expressly on the Internet of Things, 140 and one on smart transportation. 141 
+
+ Where Can I Find Additional Resources on This Topic?
+
+ For additional assistance on the IoT and related topics, see CRS Report R44225, The Internet of Things: CRS Experts , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Congressional offices may also contact CRS by placing a request via telephone or online through the CRS website (see http://www.crs.gov/AboutCRS/Contact-Us ).
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Author Contact Information
+ 
+ [author name scrubbed], Senior Specialist in Science and Technology 
+ ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed])
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Acknowledgments
+
+ This report was originally coauthored by [author name scrubbed] while she was a CRS research assistant. Stephanie performed most of the research and provided much of the organizational structure and text for the report. Her insights and other contributions were invaluable.
+
+ The following CRS staff contributed to sections of this report: [author name scrubbed] to " Net Neutrality ," [author name scrubbed] to " Spectrum Access ," [author name scrubbed] to " Agriculture ," and [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] to " Privacy ."
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Footnotes
+
+ 
+ 
+ 1 .
+ 
+ 
+ Postscapes, "A Brief History of the Internet of Things," 2015, http://postscapes.com/internet-of-things-history .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Roberto Minerva, Abyi Biru, and Domenico Rotondi, "Towards a Definition of the Internet of Things (IoT)" (IEEE Internet Initiative, May 27, 2015), http://iot.ieee.org/images/files/pdf/IEEE_IoT_Towards_Definition_Internet_of_Things_Revision1_27MAY15.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 3 .
+ 
+ 
+ Adam Thierer, "The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation" (Mercatus Center (George Mason University), November 19, 2014, http://mercatus.org/publication/internet-things-and-wearable-technology-addressing-privacy-and-security-concerns-without .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 4 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, "Our Thinking—What Is the Internet of Things?," Goldman Sachs , September 2014, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/iot-infographic.html . Some observers even use Industrial Internet as a synonym for the IoT, although it more commonly applies to manufacturing and other industrial activities. See, for example, World Economic Forum, "Industrial Internet of Things: Unleashing the Potential of Connected Products and Services" (World Economic Forum, January 2015), http://www.weforum.org/reports/industrial-internet-things-unleashing-potential-connected-products-and-services ; Industrial Internet Consortium, "Home," 2015, http://www.industrialinternetconsortium.org/index.htm .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 5 .
+ 
+ 
+ National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Cyber-Physical Systems," May 22, 2015, http://www.nist.gov/cps/index.cfm . NIST defines cyber-physical systems as "co-engineered interacting networks of physical and computational components." It is a somewhat broader concept than the IoT, in that such systems need not be connected to the Internet to function.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 6 .
+ 
+ 
+ Cisco, "The Internet of Everything," 2013, http://perma.cc/Y4LQ-633J?type=live . This concept is similar to that of the IoT but emphasizes its ubiquity, leading some observers to argue that it is more comprehensive (Dorothy Shamonsky, "Internet of Things vs. Internet of Everything: Does the Distinction Matter to User Experience Designers?," ICS Insight Blog , July 13, 2015, http://www.ics.com/blog/internet-things-vs-internet-everything-does-distinction-matter-user-experience-designers ). For purposes of this report, they are treated as synonymous. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 7 .
+ 
+ 
+ The term cyberspace usually refers to the worldwide collection of connected ICT components, the information that is stored in and flows through those components, and the ways that information is structured and processed. Its evolution has been characterized in many different ways, but IoT's emergence is a common theme. See, for example, Janna Anderson and Lee Rainie, "The Internet of Things Will Thrive by 2025," Pew Research Center , May 14, 2014, http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/05/14/internet-of-things/ ; Simona Jankowski et al., "The Internet of Things: Making Sense of the Next Mega-Trend" (Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, September 3, 2014), http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/internet-of-things/iot-report.pdf ; The White House, "Cyberspace Policy Review," May 29, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 8 .
+ 
+ 
+ Pew Research Internet Project, "Device Ownership over Time," January 2014, http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/mobile/device-ownership/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 9 .
+ 
+ 
+ Nicholas D. Evans, "SMAC and the Evolution of IT," Computerworld , December 9, 2013, http://www.computerworld.com/article/2475696/it-transformation/smac-and-the-evolution-of-it.html . SMAC stands for social media, mobile devices, analytics (big data), and cloud computing. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 10 .
+ 
+ 
+ Gartner, Inc., "Gartner Says 4.9 Billion Connected 'Things' Will Be in Use in 2015" (press release, November 11, 2014), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2905717 ; Leon Spencer, "Internet of Things Market to Hit $7.1 Trillion by 2020: IDC," June 5, 2014, http://www.zdnet.com/article/internet-of-things-market-to-hit-7-1-trillion-by-2020-idc/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 11 .
+ 
+ 
+ See CRS Report R42338, Smart Meter Data: Privacy and Cybersecurity , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 12 .
+ 
+ 
+ See CRS Report R44192, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Commercial Outlook for a New Industry , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 13 .
+ 
+ 
+ Tove B. Danovich, "Internet-Connected Sheep and the New Roaming Wireless," The Atlantic , February 9, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/02/internet-connected-sheep-and-the-new-roaming-wireless/385274/ ; David Evans, "Introducing the Wireless Cow," The Agenda , July 2015, http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/06/internet-of-things-growth-challenges-000098 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 14 .
+ 
+ 
+ Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Number Resources," 2015, https://www.iana.org/numbers .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 15 .
+ 
+ 
+ Department of Transportation, "Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)," 2015, http://www.its.dot.gov/index.htm ; Bruce Katz, "Why the U.S. Government Should Embrace Smart Cities" (Brookings Institution, July 26, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/07/26-cities-katz .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 16 .
+ 
+ 
+ Richard Barker and Amy Liu, "Smart Buildings the Next Step for Seattle," Brookings Institution , July 28, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2014/07/28-smart-buildings-seattle-barker-liu ; Bob Violino, "Smart Cities Are Here Today—and Getting Smarter," Computerworld , February 12, 2014, http://www.computerworld.com/article/2487526/emerging-technology-smart-cities-are-here-today-and-getting-smarter.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 17 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Industrial Internet Consortium, "Home."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 18 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, "NSTAC Report to the President on the Internet of Things," November 19, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NSTAC%20Report%20to%20the%20President%20on%20the%20Internet%20of%20Things%20Nov%202014%20%28updat%20%20%20.pdf . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 19 .
+ 
+ 
+ Denise Lund et al., "Worldwide and Regional Internet of Things (IoT) 2014–2020 Forecast: A Virtuous Circle of Proven Value and Demand," May 2014; Gartner, Inc., "Gartner Says the Internet of Things Installed Base Will Grow to 26 Billion Units By 2020" December 12, 2013, http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2636073 ; James Manyika et al., "The Internet of Things: Mapping the Value Beyond the Hype" (McKinsey Global Institute, June 2015), http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights/Business Technology/Unlocking the potential of the Internet of Things/Unlocking_the_potential_of_the_Internet_of_Things_Full_report.ashx; Verizon, "State of the Market: The Internet of Things 2015," February 20, 2015, http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_state-of-market-the-market-the-internet-of-things-2015_en_xg.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 20 .
+ 
+ 
+ Anderson and Rainie, "The Internet of Things Will Thrive by 2025."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 21 .
+ 
+ 
+ Jasper Janangir Mohammed, "Surprise: Agriculture Is Doing More with IoT Innovation than Most Other Industries," VentureBeat , December 7, 2014, http://venturebeat.com/2014/12/07/surprise-agriculture-is-doing-more-with-iot-innovation-than-most-other-industries/ ; IBM Research, "Precision Agriculture," 2015, http://www.research.ibm.com/articles/precision_agriculture.shtml .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 22 .
+ 
+ 
+ Agnes Szolnoki and Andras Nabradi, "Economic, Practical Impacts of Precision Farming—With Especial Regard to Harvesting," Applied Studies in Agribusiness and Commerce 8, no. 2–3 (2014): 141–46, http://ageconsearch.umn.edu//handle/202892 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 23 .
+ 
+ 
+ Matthew J. Grassi, "Imagery: Which Way Is Right for Me?," PrecisionAg , August 6, 2015, http://www.precisionag.com/data/imagery/imagery-which-way-is-right-for-me/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 24 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Adrianne Jeffries, "Internet of Cows: Technology Could Help Track Disease, but Ranchers Are Resistant," The Verge , May 13, 2013, http://www.theverge.com/2013/5/10/4316658/internet-of-cows-technology-offers-ways-to-track-livestock-but ; The State of Victoria, "On-Farm Benefits of Sheep Electronic Identification (EID)," Agriculture , 2015, http://agriculture.vic.gov.au/agriculture/farm-management/national-livestock-identification-system/nlis-sheep-and-goats/on-farm-benefits-of-sheep-electronic-identification .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 25 .
+ 
+ 
+ Verizon, "State of the Market: The Internet of Things 2015."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 26 .
+ 
+ 
+ Department of Energy, "The Smart Grid," 2015, http://www.smartgrid.gov/the_smart_grid#smart_grid .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 27 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS Report R41886, The Smart Grid and Cybersecurity—Regulatory Policy and Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 28 .
+ 
+ 
+ Jean Kumagai, "The Rise of the Personal Power Plant," IEEE Spectrum , May 28, 2014, http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/the-smarter-grid/the-rise-of-the-personal-power-plant .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 29 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS Report R42338, Smart Meter Data: Privacy and Cybersecurity , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 30 .
+ 
+ 
+ Institute for Building Efficiency, "What Is a Smart Building?," April 2011, http://www.institutebe.com/smart-grid-smart-building/What-is-a-Smart-Building.aspx .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 31 .
+ 
+ 
+ IBM, "Smarter Buildings," 2015, http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/green_buildings/overview/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 32 .
+ 
+ 
+ The use of IoT in medicine is sometimes referred to as "connected" or "digital" health. See, for example, Food and Drug Administration, "Digital Health," September 22, 2015, http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm20035974.htm .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 33 .
+ 
+ 
+ American Telemedicine Association, "What Is Telemedicine?" 2015, http://www.americantelemed.org/about-telemedicine/what-is-telemedicine .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 34 .
+ 
+ 
+ Health Resources and Services Administration, "Telehealth," Department of Health and Human Services , 2015, http://www.hrsa.gov/ruralhealth/about/telehealth/telehealth.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 35 .
+ 
+ 
+ Manyika et al., "The Internet of Things: Mapping the Value Beyond the Hype."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 36 .
+ 
+ 
+ Jerome Couturier et al., "How Can the Internet of Things Help to Overcome Current Healthcare Challenges," Digiworld Economic Journal , no. 87 (Q 2012): 67–81, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304133 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 37 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Food and Drug Administration, "Wireless Medical Devices," September 22, 2015, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/WirelessMedicalDevices/default.htm .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 38 .
+ 
+ 
+ See testimony from Senate Special Committee on Aging, Roundtable: Harnessing the Power of Telehealth: Promises and Challenges? , 2014, http://www.aging.senate.gov/hearings/roundtable-harnessing-the-power-of-telehealth-promises-and-challenges ; House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, Internet of Things , 2015, http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2015/7/hearing-internet-of-things .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 39 .
+ 
+ 
+ Lopez Research, "Building Smarter Manufacturing with the Internet of Things (IoT)," January 2014, http://www.cisco.com/web/solutions/trends/iot/iot_in_manufacturing_january.pdf ; James Macaulay, Lauren Buckalew, and Gina Chung, "Internet of Things in Logistics" (DHL Trend Research and Cisco Consulting Services, 2015), http://www.dhl.com/content/dam/Local_Images/g0/New_aboutus/innovation/DHLTrendReport_Internet_of_things.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 40 .
+ 
+ 
+ Manyika et al., "The Internet of Things: Mapping the Value Beyond the Hype."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 41 .
+ 
+ 
+ Macaulay, Buckalew, and Chung, "Internet of Things in Logistics."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 42 .
+ 
+ 
+ Manyika et al., "The Internet of Things: Mapping the Value Beyond the Hype."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 43 .
+ 
+ 
+ Intel, "Technology and Computing Requirements for Self-Driving Cars," June 2014, http://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/white-papers/automotive-autonomous-driving-vision-paper.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 44 .
+ 
+ 
+ James M. Anderson et al., Autonomous Vehicle Technology: A Guide for Policymakers (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2014), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR443-1/RAND_RR443-1.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 45 .
+ 
+ 
+ Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) and Joint Program Office (JPO), "ITS 2015-2019 Strategic Plan" (Department of Transportation, February 19, 2015), http://www.its.dot.gov/strategicplan.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 46 .
+ 
+ 
+ Manyika et al., "The Internet of Things: Mapping the Value Beyond the Hype"; Matthew Cuddy et al., "The Smart/Connected City and Its Implications for Connected Transportation" (Department of Transportation, October 14, 2014), http://www.its.dot.gov/itspac/Dec2014/Smart_Connected_City_FINAL_111314.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 47 .
+ 
+ 
+ Katz, "Why the U.S. Government Should Embrace Smart Cities."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 48 .
+ 
+ 
+ GE Lighting, "GE Announces Programs for Intelligent Cities on Both U.S. Coasts as It Pilots New Connected LED Solution" (Press Release, April 15, 2015), http://pressroom.gelighting.com/news/ge-announces-programs-for-intelligent-cities-on-both-u-s-coasts-as-it-pilots-new-connected-led-solution#.VcuyzfnYjnh .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 49 .
+ 
+ 
+ See Andrea Zanella et al., "Internet of Things for Smart Cities," IEEE Internet of Things Journal 1, no. 1 (February 2014): 22–32, doi:10.1109/JIOT.2014.2306328.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 50 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Brookings Institution, "Getting Smarter About Smart Cities," April 18, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/04/smart-cities/bmpp_smartcities.pdf ; City of Scottsdale, "myScottsdale," 2015, http://www.scottsdaleaz.gov/service-request/myScottsdale ; City of Dubuque, "DBQ IQ Water Management," 2015, http://www.cityofdubuque.org/1786/DBQ-IQ ; Cleantech San Diego, "Smart Cities San Diego," 2015, http://cleantechsandiego.org/smart-city-san-diego/ ; Boyd Cohen, "The 10 Smartest Cities In North America," Fast Company , November 14, 2013, http://www.fastcoexist.com/3021592/the-10-smartest-cities-in-north-america ; GE Lighting, "GE Announces Programs for Intelligent Cities"; Smart Cities Council, "Vision," 2015, http://smartcitiescouncil.com/category-vision ; Violino, "Smart Cities Are Here Today—and Getting Smarter."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 51 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Brookings Institution, "Getting Smarter About Smart Cities"; Hafedh Chourabi et al., "Understanding Smart Cities: An Integrative Framework" (45 th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, IEEE, 2012), 2289–97, doi:10.1109/HICSS.2012.615; Frost and Sullivan, "Strategic Opportunity Analysis of the Global Smart City Market," August 2013, http://twimgs.com/audiencedevelopment/JC/LANDINGPAGES/GOV/YEAR_2014/020314/4Define.pdf ; GSMA and A.T. Kearney, "GSMA Mobile Economy 2013," July 19, 2013, http://www.gsmamobileeconomy.com/GSMA%20Mobile%20Economy%202013.pdf ; Smart Cities Council, "Definitions and Overviews," 2015, http://smartcitiescouncil.com/smart-cities-information-center/definitions-and-overviews .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 52 .
+ 
+ 
+ See CRS Report R42887, Overview and Issues for Implementation of the Federal Cloud Computing Initiative: Implications for Federal Information Technology Reform Management , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 53 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Evans, "SMAC and the Evolution of IT."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 54 .
+ 
+ 
+ Carlo Ratti of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as quoted in Violino, "Smart Cities Are Here Today—and Getting Smarter."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 55 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Hayley Tsukayama, "What Eric Schmidt Meant When He Said 'the Internet Will Disappear,'" The Washington Post , January 23, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/01/23/what-eric-schmidt-meant-when-he-said-the-internet-will-disappear/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 56 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Joseph Bradley et al., "Internet of Everything: A $4.6 Trillion Public-Sector Opportunity," White Paper (Cisco, 2013), http://internetofeverything.cisco.com/sites/default/files/docs/en/ioe_public_sector_vas_white%20paper_121913final.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 57 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS Report RL32589, The Federal Communications Commission: Current Structure and Its Role in the Changing Telecommunications Landscape , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43256, Spectrum Policy: Provisions in the 2012 Spectrum Act , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 58 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS Report R43866, The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA): An Overview of Programs and Funding , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 59 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Cyber-Physical Systems."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 60 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, FTC Staff, "Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World" (Federal Trade Commission, January 2015), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 61 .
+ 
+ 
+ For descriptions of these sectors, see The White House, "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience" (Presidential Policy Directive 21, February 12, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil . The directive also identifies sector-specific agencies for each of the identified sectors. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 62 .
+ 
+ 
+ Department of Homeland Security, "About the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center," April 27, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/about-national-cybersecurity-communications-integration-center .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 63 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Food and Drug Administration, "Cybersecurity for Medical Devices and Hospital Networks: FDA Safety Communication," June 13, 2013, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm356423.htm .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 64 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Department of Justice, "FY 2015 Budget Request: Cybersecurity," February 28, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/08/18/cyber-security.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 65 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, CRS Report R40147, Issues in Green Building and the Federal Response: An Introduction , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R41886, The Smart Grid and Cybersecurity—Regulatory Policy and Issues , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 66 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Brian Cronin and Kevin Dopart, "Connected Vehicles—Improving Safety, Mobility, and the Environment" (U.S. Department of Transportation, April 9, 2014), http://www.its.dot.gov/presentations/pdf/NASA_Briefingv3.2.pdf ; Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) and Joint Program Office (JPO), "ITS 2015-2019 Strategic Plan."; CRS Report R42367, Medicaid and Federal Grant Conditions After NFIB v. Sebelius: Constitutional Issues and Analysis , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 67 .
+ 
+ 
+ Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office, "About ITS," Department of Transportation , 2015, http://www.its.dot.gov/its_program/about_its.htm .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 68 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS Report R42718, Pilotless Drones: Background and Considerations for Congress Regarding Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System , by [author name scrubbed]. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 69 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS Report R44192, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Commercial Outlook for a New Industry , by [author name scrubbed]. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 70 .
+ 
+ 
+ Denise E Zheng and William A. Carter, "Leveraging the Internet of Things for a More Efficient and Effective Military" (Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/150915_Zheng_LeveragingInternet_WEB.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 71 .
+ 
+ 
+ National Science Foundation, "Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)," 2015, http://www.nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=503286&org=CISE&sel_org=CISE&from=fund ; National Science Foundation, "Partnerships for Innovation: Building Innovation Capacity," 2015, http://nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=504708 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 72 .
+ 
+ 
+ Subcommittee on Networking and Information Technology Research and Development, Committee on Technology, "Supplement to the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2015: The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program," February 2015, https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/2016supplement/FY2016NITRDSupplement.pdf . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 73 .
+ 
+ 
+ The White House, "Fact Sheet: Administration Announces New 'Smart Cities' Initiative to Help Communities Tackle Local Challenges and Improve City Services" (Press Release, September 14, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/14/fact-sheet-administration-announces-new-smart-cities-initiative-help .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 74 .
+ 
+ 
+ Iljitsch van Beijnum, "It's Official: North America Out of New IPv4 Addresses," Ars Technica , July 2, 2015, http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/07/us-exhausts-new-ipv4-addresses-waitlist-begins/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 75 .
+ 
+ 
+ Cisco predicts an annual growth rate of 71% for IoT traffic during that period, with mobile devices at about 63% and desktop computers under 10% (Cisco, "The Zettabyte Era—Trends and Analysis," May 2015, http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/VNI_Hyperconnectivity_WP.html ).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 76 .
+ 
+ 
+ Lund et al., "Worldwide and Regional Internet of Things (IoT) 2014–2020 Forecast: A Virtuous Circle of Proven Value and Demand"; Gartner, Inc., "Gartner Says the Internet of Things Installed Base Will Grow to 26 Billion Units By 2020."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 77 .
+ 
+ 
+ Dave Evans, "The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of the Internet Is Changing Everything" (Cisco Internet Business Solutions Group (IBSG), April 2011), http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/innov/IoT_IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf . The latter figure also includes computers and mobile devices such as smartphones. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 78 .
+ 
+ 
+ Matt Ford et al., "Address Sharing-Coming to a Network near You," IETF Journal , June 2009, http://www.internetsociety.org/articles/address-sharing-coming-network-near-you .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 79 .
+ 
+ 
+ Internet Society, "Ipv6: Making Room for the Next 5 Billion People," March 26, 2014, http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/gen-ipv6factsheet-201403-en_FA_web.pdf . The launch was essentially an organized attempt to stimulate adoption. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 80 .
+ 
+ 
+ The top five were Belgium (34%), Switzerland (19%), the United States (18%), Germany, and Peru (17% each) (Akamai, "IPv6 Adoption by Country and Network," State of the Internet , September 16, 2015, https://www.stateoftheinternet.com/trends-visualizations-ipv6-adoption-ipv4-exhaustion-global-heat-map-network-country-growth-data.html ).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 81 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid.; Google, "IPv6," September 23, 2015, http://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/ . Google lists the U.S. adoption rate at 21%.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 82 .
+ 
+ 
+ Google, "IPv6"; Internet Society, "World IPv6 Launch," May 27, 2014, http://www.worldipv6launch.org/infographic/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 83 .
+ 
+ 
+ IPv6 addresses are four times longer than those in IPv4, and some systems and applications cannot process the longer addresses properly (van Beijnum, "It's Official: North America Out of New IPv4 Addresses"). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 84 .
+ 
+ 
+ Sheila Frankel et al., "Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6," SP 800-119 (National Institute of Standards and Technology, December 2010), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-119/sp800-119.pdf ; van Beijnum, "It's Official: North America Out of New IPv4 Addresses"; Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos, "The Rise of IPv6," Air and Space Power Journal , April 2015, 103–28, http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/digital/pdf/articles/2015-Mar-Apr/F-Pano.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 85 .
+ 
+ 
+ Chief Information Officers Council, "Planning Guide/Roadmap toward IPv6 Adoption Within the U.S. Government," June 2012, https://cio.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/09/2012_IPv6_Roadmap_FINAL_20120712.pdf ; Yannakogeorgos, "The Rise of IPv6."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 86 .
+ 
+ 
+ National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Estimating IPv6 & DNSSEC Deployment Status," September 24, 2015, http://fedv6-deployment.antd.nist.gov/snap-all.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 87 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid.; Mohana Ravindranath, "Government Outpacing Private Sector in IPv6 Adoption, Official Says," NextGov: CIO Briefing , May 18, 2015, http://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2015/05/government-could-be-outpacing-private-sector-ipv6-adoption/113056/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 88 .
+ 
+ 
+ For more information, see CRS Report R44080, Municipal Broadband: Background and Policy Debate , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL30719, Broadband Internet Access and the Digital Divide: Federal Assistance Programs , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 89 .
+ 
+ 
+ Electromagnetic spectrum, commonly referred to as radio frequency spectrum or wireless spectrum, refers to electromagnetic waves that, with applied technology, can transmit signals to deliver voice, text, and video communications. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 90 .
+ 
+ 
+ For more information, see CRS Report R43256, Spectrum Policy: Provisions in the 2012 Spectrum Act , by [author name scrubbed]. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 91 .
+ 
+ 
+ Colin Neagle, "A Guide to the Confusing Internet of Things Standards World," Network World , July 21, 2014, http://www.networkworld.com/article/2456421/internet-of-things/a-guide-to-the-confusing-internet-of-things-standards-world.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 92 .
+ 
+ 
+ Minerva, Biru, and Rotondi, "Towards a Definition of the Internet of Things (IoT)."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 93 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, World Economic Forum, "Industrial Internet of Things: Unleashing the Potential of Connected Products and Services."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 94 .
+ 
+ 
+ Christopher Null, "The State of IoT Standards: Stand by for the Big Shakeout," TechBeacon , September 2, 2015, http://techbeacon.com/state-iot-standards-stand-big-shakeout .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 95 .
+ 
+ 
+ Lawson, "Why Internet of Things 'Standards' Got More Confusing in 2014," PC World , December 24, 2014, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2863572/iot-groups-are-like-an-orchestra-tuning-up-the-music-starts-in-2016.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 96 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Roger Ordman, "Efficient Over-the-Air Software and Firmware Updates for the Internet of Things," Embedded Computing Design , April 10, 2014, http://embedded-computing.com/articles/efficient-software-firmware-updates-the-internet-things/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 97 .
+ 
+ 
+ Keita Sekine, "Energy-Harvesting Devices Replace Batteries in IoT Sensors," Core & Code , Q3 2014, http://core.spansion.com/article/energy-harvesting-devices-replace-batteries-in-iot-sensors/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 98 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, "NSTAC Report to the President on the Internet of Things."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 99 .
+ 
+ 
+ Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime" (McAfee, June 2014), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf?cid=BHP028 ; World Economic Forum, "Industrial Internet of Things: Unleashing the Potential of Connected Products and Services."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 100 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS Report R43831, Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 101 .
+ 
+ 
+ Scott R. Peppet, "Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Consent," Texas Law Review, Forthcoming , March 1, 2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2409074 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 102 .
+ 
+ 
+ Government Accountability Office, "Federal Facility Cybersecurity: DHS and GSA Should Address Cyber Risk to Building and Access Control Systems," December 12, 2014, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-6 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 103 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Eduard Kovacs, "'Spike' DDoS Toolkit Targets PCs, Servers, IoT Devices: Akamai," Security Week , September 25, 2014, http://www.securityweek.com/spike-ddos-toolkit-targets-pcs-servers-iot-devices-akamai .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 104 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS Report R41524, The Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 105 .
+ 
+ 
+ Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., "Cybersecurity Now Key Requirement for All Weapons: DoD Cyber Chief," Breaking Defense , January 27, 2015, http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/cybersecurity-now-key-requirement-for-all-weapons-dod-cio/ ; Patrick Tucker, "For Years, the Pentagon Hooked Everything to the Internet. Now It's a 'Big, Big Problem,'" Defense One , September 29, 2015, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/09/years-pentagon-hooked-everything-internet-now-its-big-big-problem/122402/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 106 .
+ 
+ 
+ Benjamin Jun, "Make Way for the Internet of Things!" (RSA Conference 2014, San Francisco, CA, February 27, 2014), http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/tech-r02-internet-of-things-v2.pdf ; Benjamin Jun, "Endpoints in the New Age: Apps, Mobility, and the Internet of Things" (RSA Conference 2015, San Francisco, CA, April 21, 2015), https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/eco-t07r-endpoints-in-the-new-age-apps-mobility-and-the-internet-of-things.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 107 .
+ 
+ 
+ Critical infrastructure was defined by the USA PATRIOT Act as "systems and assets, physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health and safety, or any combination of those matters" (5 U.S.C. §5195c(e)).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 108 .
+ 
+ 
+ For more discussion of congressional and executive-branch actions in cybersecurity, see CRS Report R43831, Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief , by [author name scrubbed], and related reports.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 109 .
+ 
+ 
+ Adam Lesser, "Internet of Things: The Influence of M2M Data on the Energy Industry" (GigaOm Research, March 4, 2014), http://research.gigaom.com/report/internet-of-things-the-influence-of-m2m-data-on-the-energy-industry/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 110 .
+ 
+ 
+ Cronin and Dopart, "Connected Vehicles—Improving Safety, Mobility, and the Environment."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 111 .
+ 
+ 
+ Couturier et al., "How Can the Internet of Things Help to Overcome Current Healthcare Challenges."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 112 .
+ 
+ 
+ AIG, "The Internet of Things: Evolution or Revolution?," June 10, 2015, https://www.aig.com/Chartis/internet/US/en/AIG%20White%20Paper%20-%20IoT%20English%20DIGITAL_tcm3171-677828.pdf .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 113 .
+ 
+ 
+ FTC Staff, "Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 114 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ian Foster et al., "Fast and Vulnerable: A Story of Telematic Failures," in Proceedings of the 9 th USENIX Conference on Offensive Technologies (USENIX Association, 2015), 15–15, https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot15/woot15-paper-foster.pdf ; Andy Greenberg, "Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It," accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 115 .
+ 
+ 
+ In the 2010 case City of Ontario v. Quon , the Court sidestepped the question whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their electronic communications by resolving the case on other grounds (City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) ["The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear."]). Similarly, in the 2012 GPS tracking case United States v. Jones , the majority avoided the question of whether people should expect privacy in their public movements over a long period of time by instead relying on a hundreds-year-old trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment (United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 [2012]). More recently, in the 2015 case California v. Riley , the Court held that the government must obtain a warrant before accessing the data on a cellphone confiscated upon an arrest; however, the ruling did not separately opine on the level of protections for data stored in the cloud, on which IoT applications will undoubtedly rely (California v. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 [2015]). 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 116 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, CRS Report R44036, Stored Communications Act: Reform of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 117 .
+ 
+ 
+ FTC Staff, "Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World"; Thierer, "The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 118 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Brookings Institution, "Getting Smarter About Smart Cities"; House Committee on Energy and Commerce, The Internet of Things: Exploring the Next Technology Frontier , 2015, http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/internet-things-exploring-next-technology-frontier ; House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, Internet of Things .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 119 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Gary Arlen, "Internet of Things Caucus Readies House Hearings," Multichannel News , July 8, 2015, http://www.multichannel.com/blog/i-was-saying/internet-things-caucus-readies-house-hearings/392024 ; Darren Samuelson, "The Agenda—Internet of Things," July 2015, http://www.politico.com/agenda/issue/internet-of-things-july-2015 .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 120 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Helen Rebecca Schindler et al., "Europe's Policy Options for a Dynamic and Trustworthy Development of the Internet of Things" (RAND Europe, July 26, 2013), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR356/RAND_RR356.pdf ; Thierer, "The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 121 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example, Samuelson, "The Agenda—Internet of Things."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 122 .
+ 
+ 
+ See " What Is the Current Federal Role? " above.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 123 .
+ 
+ 
+ Subcommittee on Networking and Information Technology Research and Development, Committee on Technology, "Smart Cities and Connected Communities Framework," September 11, 2015, https://www.nitrd.gov/sccc/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 124 .
+ 
+ 
+ The White House, "Fact Sheet: Administration Announces New 'Smart Cities' Initiative."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 125 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS Report R43256, Spectrum Policy: Provisions in the 2012 Spectrum Act , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 126 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS Insight IN10191, What Is 5G? Implications for Spectrum and Technology Policy , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 127 .
+ 
+ 
+ CRS Insight IN10221, The Robot Did It: Spectrum Policy and the Internet of Things , by [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 128 .
+ 
+ 
+ For additional information on the net neutrality issue see CRS Report R40616, Access to Broadband Networks: The Net Neutrality Debate , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R43971, Net Neutrality: Selected Legal Issues Raised by the FCC's 2015 Open Internet Order , by [author name scrubbed]. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 129 .
+ 
+ 
+ Federal Communications Commission, "Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet; Final Rule," Federal Register 80, no. 70 (April 13, 2015): 19738–850, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-04-13/pdf/2015-07841.pdf . 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 130 .
+ 
+ 
+ Paid prioritization occurs when a broadband Internet access provider accepts payment (monetary or otherwise) to manage its network in a way that benefits particular content, applications, devices, or services. 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 131 .
+ 
+ 
+ The challenges were consolidated under U.S. Telecom Association v. FCC, D.C. Cir. No. 15-1063, April 14, 2015.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 132 .
+ 
+ 
+ The FCC order cited heart monitors and energy consumption sensors as examples of "specialized services." See Federal Communications Commission, "Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet; Final Rule" para. 35.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 133 .
+ 
+ 
+ For more information, see CRS Report R43831, Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief , by [author name scrubbed], and related reports.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 134 .
+ 
+ 
+ Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, The Connected World: Examining the Internet of Things , 2015, http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=d3e33bde-30fd-4899-b30d-906b47e117ca .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 135 .
+ 
+ 
+ House Committee on Energy and Commerce, The Internet of Things: Exploring the Next Technology Frontier .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 136 .
+ 
+ 
+ House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, Internet of Things .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 137 .
+ 
+ 
+ Cloud Computing Caucus Advisory Group, "Home," 2015, https://www.cloudcomputingcaucus.org/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 138 .
+ 
+ 
+ Congressional Cybersecurity Caucus, "Welcome," 2015, http://cybercaucus.langevin.house.gov/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 139 .
+ 
+ 
+ Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory Committee, "NetCaucus," 2015, http://www.netcaucus.org/ .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 140 .
+ 
+ 
+ The Honorable Suzan DelBene, "U.S. Reps. DelBene and Issa Announce Creation of the Congressional Internet of Things Caucus" (Press Release, January 13, 2015), https://delbene.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/us-reps-delbene-and-issa-announce-creation-of-the-congressional-internet .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 141 .
+ 
+ 
+ Senator Gary Peters, "Peters, Gardner Announce New Bipartisan Smart Transportation Caucus" (press release, June 10, 2015), http://www.peters.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/peters-gardner-announce-new-bipartisan-smart-transportation-caucus .
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,2374 @@
+The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): 
+Overview and Analysis 
+
+ R. Sam Garrett 
+ Analyst in American National Government 
+
+ L. Paige Whitaker 
+ Legislative Attorney 
+
+ Erika K. Lunder 
+ Legislative Attorney 
+
+May 28, 2010 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+7-5700 
+
+www.crs.gov 
+
+R41264 
+
+ CRS Report for Congress
+ P 
+
+ repared for Members and Committees of Congress 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+ Summary 
+
+As it has periodically for decades, Congress is again considering how or whether to regulate 
+campaign financing. The latest iteration of the debate over which kinds of groups should be 
+permitted to spend funds on political advertisements, and how so, was renewed on January 21, 
+2010, when the Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in Citizens United v. 
+Federal Election Commission . Following Citizens United , corporations and labor unions may 
+now fund political advertisements explicitly calling for election or defeat of federal candidates—
+provided that the advertisements are not coordinated with the campaign. The legislative response 
+receiving the most attention to date—and the emphasis of this report—is the House version of the 
+DISCLOSE (“Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections”) Act, H.R. 
+5175, sponsored by Representative Van Hollen. This bill was reported, as amended, by the 
+Committee on House Administration on May 25, 2010. Senator Schumer has introduced a 
+companion measure, S. 3295. 
+
+This report provides an overview and analysis of (1) major policy issues addressed in Citizens 
+United and the DISCLOSE Act; (2) major provisions of H.R. 5175 versus current federal 
+campaign finance law; and (3) issues for congressional consideration and potential implications 
+of enacting or not enacting the DISCLOSE Act. H.R. 5175 proposes a combination of disclosure 
+and disclaimer provisions designed to provide additional information to regulators and the public 
+about political advertising that could emerge following Citizens United . The legislation also 
+prohibits government contractors, foreign nationals (including some U.S. subsidiaries of foreign 
+corporations), and recipients of Temporary Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds from making 
+certain political expenditures. A variety of issues for Congress discussed in this report, such as 
+how various provisions in the bill might be interpreted or implemented, may be relevant for 
+House and Senate consideration of the DISCLOSE Act. 
+
+The report will be updated as events warrant. 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+ Contents 
+
+Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 
+
+Evolution of Policy and Legal Issues........................................................................................... 2 
+
+Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ......................................................................... 3 
+
+Congressional Response.............................................................................................................. 4 
+
+Legislative Action on the DISCLOSE Act Thus Far..................................................................... 5 
+
+An Overview of H.R. 5175, As Reported..................................................................................... 6 
+
+Major Differences Between the House and Senate Bills......................................................... 7 
+
+Potential Implications and Considerations for Congress............................................................... 7 
+
+General Considerations ......................................................................................................... 7 
+Maintaining the Status Quo ................................................................................................... 8 
+Modifying the Definitions of Independent Expenditures and Electioneering 
+
+Communications ................................................................................................................ 9 
+
+Entities Covered by the Disclosure and Disclaimer Provisions............................................... 9 
+Prohibitions on Making Contributions or Expenditures........................................................ 10 
+
+Government Contracts .................................................................................................. 10 
+TARP Recipients........................................................................................................... 11 
+Foreign Nationals.......................................................................................................... 11 
+
+Coordinated Party Expenditures .......................................................................................... 11 
+Potential Effects of Disclosure and Disclaimer Provisions ................................................... 12 
+Campaign-Related Activity Accounts .................................................................................. 13 
+Potential Implementation Concerns ..................................................................................... 13 
+
+Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 14 
+
+ 
+
+ Tables 
+
+Table 1. Comparison of Major Provisions of H.R. 5175 With Current Federal Campaign 
+
+Finance Law .......................................................................................................................... 15 
+
+ 
+
+ Contacts 
+
+Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 22 
+
+Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 22 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+ Introduction 
+
+Political information—particularly political advertising—has been at the heart of American 
+campaigns and elections for more than a century. Throughout the last century, candidates, parties, 
+and interest groups have competed to make their case to voters in the hopes of winning elections 
+and shaping policy debates. At the same time, Congress, regulatory agencies, and the courts have 
+wrestled with how much, and what kind, of information should be available to the public about 
+the sources of those political messages. Questions have also emerged about whether certain 
+actors, such as corporations and unions, should be permitted to participate in elections and other 
+political debates to the same extent as voters. Modern campaign finance policy and law, which 
+emerged in the 1970s, but which built on reforms first pursued in the early 1900s, has responded 
+with a combination of provisions designed to restrict the amounts and sources of funds in federal 
+elections on one hand, and documenting the sources and amounts of funds that are permitted on 
+the other.1 
+
+Political advertising has both enabled the public to become more informed about campaigns and 
+policy contests, and, perhaps, made it more challenging for the electorate and policymakers to 
+keep track of the various players and issues involved in political debates. This has been 
+particularly true since the 1960s, when broadcast political advertising first became prominent, 
+political professionals began to specialize in media production, and the electorate increasingly 
+turned to television for information.2 
+
+The latest iteration of the debate over which corporations, unions, and other groups should be 
+permitted to spend funds on political ads, and how so, was renewed on January 21, 2010, when 
+the U.S. Supreme Court issued its highly anticipated decision in Citizens United v. Federal 
+Election Commission (FEC) .3 The DISCLOSE Act, “Democracy is Strengthened by Casting 
+Light on Spending in Elections,” which the Committee on House Administration reported, as 
+amended, on May 25, 2010, is the most prominent legislative response to Citizens United to date. 
+As with the case itself, the DISCLOSE Act is particularly relevant for the ongoing policy debate 
+surrounding political advertising and its transparency. 
+
+This report is designed to provide an overview and analysis of (1) major policy issues addressed 
+in Citizens United and the DISCLOSE Act; (2) major provisions of H.R. 5175 compared with 
+current federal campaign finance law, as shown in Table 1 at the end of this report; and (3) issues 
+for congressional consideration and potential implications of enacting or not enacting the 
+DISCLOSE Act.4 Although the report briefly discusses the Senate companion measure, it 
+
+ 
+1 On the development of federal campaign finance policy and law, see, for example, Kurt Hohenstein, Coining 
+Corruption: The Making of the American Campaign Finance System (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 
+2007); Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law (New 
+York: Praeger, 1988); Raymond J. La Raja, Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform 
+(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008); and John Samples, The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform 
+(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
+2 See, for example, Stephen Ansolabehere, Roy Behr, and Shanto Iyengar, The Media Game: American Politics in the 
+Television Age (New York: Macmillan, 1993); and Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections , eds. James 
+A. Thurber, Candice J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000). 
+3 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
+4 This report does not provide a constitutional analysis and does not address all policy or legal factors that might be 
+relevant for Congress. For analysis of the constitutionality of possible legislative responses to Citizens United , see CRS 
+Report R41096, Legislative Options After Citizens United v. FEC: Constitutional and Legal Issues , by L. Paige 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 1 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+primarily addresses the House measure, as reported. As the two bills are substantially similar, 
+much of the following analysis of H.R. 5175 is also relevant for S. 3295. Additional material 
+about the Senate bill will be added in future updates. 
+
+ Evolution of Policy and Legal Issues 
+
+ Citizens United is significant because of its potential to change the ways in which corporations, 
+unions, and tax-exempt organizations participate in American elections. Although restrictions on 
+those actors have evolved over time, corporations, unions, and certain tax-exempt organizations 
+were largely banned from spending treasury funds in federal elections for decades. As a result of 
+ Citizens United, these groups are permitted to use general treasury funds to make independent 
+expenditures, which are defined as communications “expressly advocating the election or defeat 
+of a clearly identified candidate” and that are not coordinated with any candidate or party,5 and 
+ electioneering communications, which are defined as broadcast, cable or satellite transmissions 
+that refer to a clearly identified federal candidate, aired within 60 days of a general election or 30 
+days of a primary.6 Corporations and unions are still subject to the prohibition on using general 
+treasury funds to make contributions to candidates and political parties.7 
+
+The 1907 Tillman Act, 8 which is considered to be the first major federal campaign finance law, 
+prohibited corporations from making contributions to political parties. With the 1947 Taft-Hartley 
+Act,9 Congress expanded the prohibition to include corporate contributions to both parties and 
+candidates, as well as expenditures in federal elections. Taft Hartley also included labor unions in 
+the prohibition. The early prohibitions on corporate and labor union treasury funded contributions 
+and expenditures were included in the first modern federal campaign finance law, the Federal 
+Election Campaign Act of 1971, also known as FECA. 10 The prohibitions are codified at 2 U.S.C. 
+§ 441b. In an exception to the prohibition on corporate and union treasury spending, FECA 
+allows for the creation of separate segregated funds or political action committees , also known as 
+ PACs . Specifically, corporations and unions can use their treasury funds to establish, operate and 
+solicit voluntary, limited contributions to their PACs.11 These voluntary PAC donations can then 
+be used to contribute to federal campaigns or to make expenditures that expressly advocate 
+election or defeat of federal candidates. 
+
+In the 1976 landmark Supreme Court decision, Buckley v. Valeo ,12 the constitutionality of many 
+provisions in FECA was challenged. This case is important because it established the framework 
+for constitutional analysis of campaign finance regulation. In Buckley , the Court upheld 
+ 
+
+(...continued) 
+
+Whitaker et al. For analysis of the policy implications of various legislative options, see CRS Report R41054, 
+ Campaign Finance Policy After Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission: Issues and Options for Congress , by 
+R. Sam Garrett. 
+5 2 U.S.C. § 431 (17). 
+6 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3). 
+7 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a). 
+8 34 Stat. 864. 
+9 61 Stat. 136. 
+10 Codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq . 
+11 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C). 
+12 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 2 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+reasonable contribution limits, invalidated certain expenditure limits, and upheld reporting and 
+disclosure requirements. In addition, the Court created the distinction between issue advocacy and 
+ express advocacy , finding that a communication could be regulated if it contained words express 
+advocacy of the election or defeat of a candidate, which includes words such as “vote for” or 
+“vote against.” By contrast, such ads could not be regulated if they only contained general public 
+policy messages that fell short of calling for election or defeat of candidates, sometimes referred 
+to as issue advocacy . A generation would pass between the enactment of FECA and the next time 
+that Congress would again enact major campaign finance legislation—the Bipartisan Campaign 
+Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)—but political advertising and the funding sources for that 
+advertising remained prominent during both legislative debates. 
+
+As the legislation that became BCRA was being debated in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a chief 
+concern surrounding issue advocacy was whether the ads were actually about public policy 
+issues—as proponents of the advertisements suggested—or whether they were really messages 
+designed to encourages votes for or against candidates within in the context of ads that were only 
+nominally related to public policy.13 In an effort to restrict issue advocacy, BCRA created a new 
+concept within FECA known as electioneering communications in order to regulate messages that 
+might affect elections, but did not expressly advocate for the election or defeat of a clearly 
+identified federal candidate. Importantly, BCRA prohibited corporations and unions from using 
+general treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications, meaning that potentially any ad 
+that even mentioned a political candidate during pre-election periods would have to be paid for 
+with PAC funds or not aired. 
+
+In 2007, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 14 the Supreme Court limited the application of 
+the prohibition, thereby easing some restrictions on corporate- and union-funded ads that would 
+otherwise be classified as electioneering communications. As a result of the Court’s ruling, if an 
+advertisement could reasonably be interpreted as something other than calling for a vote for or 
+against a candidate, it could not be prohibited. While this ruling limited the application of the 
+electioneering communication prohibition, it did not expressly overrule it. 
+
+ Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
+
+Citizens United, a corporation exempt from taxes under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 
+501(c)(4), produced a documentary about a presidential candidate, then-Senator Hillary Clinton. 
+The group released the film in theaters and on DVD, and planned to make it available through 
+video-on-demand and to fund broadcast and cable television advertisements promoting the movie. 
+In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), 15 the U.S. Supreme Court considered 
+to what extent the organization was subject to the federal prohibitions on corporate treasury 
+
+ 
+13 For a historical overview, see, for example, Anthony Corrado et al., The New Campaign Finance Sourcebook 
+(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), pp. 35-47. 
+14 551 U.S. 449 (2007). For additional discussion, see CRS Report RS22687, The Constitutionality of Regulating 
+Political Advertisements: An Analysis of Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. , by L. Paige 
+Whitaker; and CRS Report RL34324, Campaign Finance: Legislative Developments and Policy Issues in the 110th 
+Congress , by R. Sam Garrett. 
+15 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). For additional discussion, see CRS Report R41045, The Constitutionality of Regulating 
+Corporate Expenditures: A Brief Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling in Citizens United v. FEC , by L. Paige 
+Whitaker. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 3 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+funding of independent expenditures, electioneering communications, and related reporting 
+requirements. 
+
+On January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited ruling in this case, and 
+invalidated the prohibition on corporations and labor unions using their general treasury funds to 
+make independent expenditures and electioneering communications. The Court determined that 
+these prohibitions constitute a “ban on speech” in violation of the First Amendment.16 In so doing, 
+the Court also overturned its 1990 ruling in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce ,17 which 
+had upheld restrictions on corporate-funded independent expenditures, finding that it provided no 
+basis for allowing the government to limit such independent expenditures. The Court also 
+overturned the portion of its decision in McConnell v. FEC 18 upholding the facial validity of the 
+prohibition on electioneering communications in BCRA, finding that the McConnell Court relied 
+on Austin. 19 
+
+The Court in Citizens United, however, upheld the disclaimer and disclosure requirements for 
+electioneering communications as applied to the documentary. These requirements, the Court 
+held, could be applied to the film and related advertisements that Citizens United had produced.20 
+According to the Court, while they may burden the ability to speak, disclaimer and disclosure 
+requirements “impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities.”21 
+
+It does not appear that the Court’s ruling in Citizens United affects the validity of Title I of 
+BCRA,22 which generally bans the raising of unregulated, also known as “soft,” money by 
+national parties and federal candidates or officials, and restricts soft money spending by state 
+parties for “federal election activities.” Furthermore, Citizens United does not appear to affect the 
+ban on corporate or union contributions to political candidates. As a consequence of Citizens 
+United , federal campaign finance law does not limit corporate and labor union treasury funding 
+for independent expenditures and electioneering communications. Corporations and unions may 
+still establish PACs, but are only required to use PAC funds in order to make contributions to 
+candidates, parties, and other political committees. 
+
+ Congressional Response 
+
+Given these developments, questions have emerged about how political advertising might be 
+affected by the Court’s decision in Citizens United and whether the airwaves will be flooded with 
+corporate and labor union express advocacy.23 Similar questions have arisen about the extent to 
+
+ 
+16 Id. at 898. 
+17 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
+18 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
+19 See Citizens United , 130 S. Ct. at 912-14 . For further discussion of McConnell v. FEC and Austin v. Michigan 
+Chamber of Commerce, see CRS Report RL30669, The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: Buckley v. 
+Valeo and Its Supreme Court Progeny , by L. Paige Whitaker. 
+20 See id. at 913-15. 
+21 Id . at 914 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976)). 
+22 See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a). 
+23 For an overview of the questions and points of debate referenced in this section, see, for example U.S. Congress, 
+House Committee on House Administration, DISCLOSE Act , report to accompany H.R. 5175, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 
+May 25, 2010, H.Rept. 111-492 (Washington: GPO, 2010). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 4 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+which the Court’s decision might lead to increased campaign activity by tax-exempt 
+organizations, particularly § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations and § 501(c)(6) trade 
+associations. Many of the these organizations are incorporated, and thus, prior to Citizens United , 
+were generally prohibited from using their treasury funds for independent expenditures and 
+electioneering communications.24 Additionally, all § 501(c) organizations, regardless of whether 
+they were incorporated, could not serve as conduits for corporate or labor union treasury funds to 
+fund independent expenditures and electioneering communications. In light of the Court’s 
+decision in Citizens United , some are expecting increased campaign activity by tax-exempt 
+organizations. Additionally, some have expressed concern that organizations might be used as 
+shadow groups—groups to which corporations, other entities, and individuals might give funds to 
+engage in campaign activity with little or no public disclosure. 
+
+Because this is the first time in modern history that corporate and union independent expenditures 
+have been permitted at the federal level, it remains to be seen how much additional money, if any, 
+might flow into the political system. A more complete understanding of how Citizens United will 
+affect the political environment, including campaign spending, will likely be unavailable until 
+after the 2010 election cycle, at the earliest. Proponents of legislative action have, nonetheless, 
+argued that preemptive legislation is necessary to avoid or at least document an expected 
+onslaught of new political advertising. 
+
+ Legislative Action on the DISCLOSE Act Thus Far 
+
+Legislative responses to Citizens United began developing immediately after the January 21 
+ruling. More than 40 bills that are potentially relevant have been introduced in the 111th 
+Congress.25 The primary focus has been on the DISCLOSE Act. Representative Van Hollen 
+introduced the House measure, H.R. 5175, on April 29, 2010. Senator Schumer introduced the 
+Senate version, S. 3295, on April 30, 2010. 
+
+Although committees in both chambers have held hearings on Citizens United , the House has 
+largely focused on the DISCLOSE Act.26 Both the Committee on House Administration and 
+House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties held 
+hearings to assess the Citizens United ruling on February 3, 2010. The Committee on House 
+Administration held two hearings on H.R. 5175 specifically, on May 6, 2010, and May 11, 2010. 
+
+ 
+24 An exception existed for qualified nonprofit corporations , which were defined as a § 501(c)(4) corporation meeting 
+the following criteria: (1) its only express purpose is the promotion of political ideas;v44 (2) it cannot engage in 
+business activities; (3) it has no shareholders or other persons with an ownership interest or claim on the organization’s 
+assets or who receive any benefit from the corporation that is a disincentive for them to disassociate themselves from 
+the corporation’s position on a political issue; and (4) it was not established by and does not accept donations from 
+business corporations. 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(c). The regulatory criteria for “qualified nonprofit corporations” is based on 
+the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL) , 479 U.S. 238 (1986), holding 
+that the FECA prohibition on corporations using their treasury funds to make independent expenditures could not 
+constitutionally be applied to certain non-profit corporations. 
+25 See CRS Report R41054, Campaign Finance Policy After Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission: Issues 
+and Options for Congress , by R. Sam Garrett. 
+26 Thus far, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration and Committee on the Judiciary have both held 
+ Citizens United hearings, although those hearings did not address specific legislation per se. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 5 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+The committee held a markup on May 20, 2010, when H.R. 5175 was ordered favorably reported, 
+as amended.27 
+
+The versions of the bill as introduced and as reported from the Committee on House 
+Administration are generally similar. Among others, amendments adopted at the markup modified 
+the bill to 
+
+• raise the threshold for prohibiting expenditures by government contractors from 
+
+contracts valued of at least $50,000 to contracts of at least $7 million; 
+
+• clarify that Internet communications are generally not subject to FECA’s 
+
+disclosure and disclaimer requirements, except for paid political advertising; 
+
+• require that independent expenditures and electioneering communication reports 
+
+be filed electronically and in a format that permits sorting and searching data (for 
+reports with at least $10,000 in expenditures); and 
+
+• require automated political telephone calls ( robo calls ) to include “stand-by-
+
+your-ad” disclaimers.28 
+
+ An Overview of H.R. 5175, As Reported 
+
+ Table 1 analyzes major provisions of current law compared with the House version of the 
+DISCLOSE Act. In brief, major provisions in the DISCLOSE Act would 
+
+• expand the current definitions of independent expenditure and electioneering 
+
+communication, thereby mandating expanded disclosure and disclaimer 
+requirements for certain political advertisements run by corporations, unions, and 
+certain 527 or 501(c) organizations ( covered organizations ), and broadening the 
+kind of ads that may be subject to FECA prohibitions; 
+
+• require covered organizations to report to the FEC information about their donors 
+
+(including transfers) and spending for certain independent expenditures and 
+electioneering communications; 
+
+• require corporate chief executive officers or other high-ranking officials in 
+
+covered organizations to state their approval for advertising content, similar to 
+current “stand by your ad” requirements for candidate ads; 
+
+ 
+27 The Committee reported the bill on May 25, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on House Administration, 
+ DISCLOSE Act , report to accompany H.R. 5175, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 25, 2010, H.Rept. 111-492 (Washington: 
+GPO, 2010). Also in the House, on March 11, the Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, 
+Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, held a hearing addressing corporate governance and shareholder 
+protection after Citizens United. In addition to exploring general themes, various legislative proposals, including 
+Representative Capuano’s Shareholder Protection Act (H.R. 4790), were discussed. At the May 20, 2010, Committee 
+on House Administration markup, Rep. Capuano initially offered the Shareholder Protection Act as an amendment to 
+the DISCLOSE Act. He ultimately withdrew the amendment, saying that it would be pursued separately. 
+28 For additional discussion of automated political calls, see CRS Report RL34361, Automated Political Telephone 
+Calls (“Robo Calls”) in Federal Campaigns: Overview and Policy Options , by R. Sam Garrett and Kathleen Ann 
+Ruane. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 6 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+• prohibit certain government contractors, Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
+
+recipients, and organizations subject to certain control or ownership by foreign 
+nationals from making expenditures or contributions in federal elections; and 
+
+• remove existing limits on coordinated party expenditures in some 
+
+circumstances.29 
+
+ Major Differences Between the House and Senate Bills 
+
+The House and Senate versions of the DISCLOSE Act are substantially similar. The Senate bill, 
+however, addresses at least two topics that are excluded from the House bill. First, and perhaps 
+most notably, S. 3295, would address certain broadcasting provisions, including the lowest unit 
+rate (LUR, also called the lowest unit charge ).30 Currently, the LUR essentially entitles candidate 
+campaigns to purchase advertising time at the cheapest rates offered to commercial advertisers 
+seeking to purchase the same class of time on the same day. Among other amendments to 
+broadcasting provisions, S. 3295 would provide national party committees with access to the 
+LUR. 
+
+A second issue addressed in S. 3295, but not in H.R. 5175, concerns electronic filing of Senate 
+campaign finance reports.31 Unlike all other federal political committees (except those raising or 
+spending less than $50,000 annually), Senate campaign committees, party committees, and PACs 
+currently are not required to file campaign finance reports electronically. Senate reports are also 
+unique because they are filed with the Secretary of the Senate rather than directly with the FEC. 
+S. 3295 would require Senate political committee reports to be filed electronically and directly 
+with the Commission. 
+
+ Potential Implications and Considerations 
+for Congress 
+
+ General Considerations 
+
+As Congress evaluates the DISCLOSE Act, several factors could be relevant. It could first be 
+useful to consider what the bill would and would not do. In short, the DISCLOSE Act’s 
+provisions are essentially tailored to political advertising—the main policy issue raised by 
+ Citizens United . In brief, the DISCLOSE Act appears aimed at documenting additional political 
+advertising in general, and restricting it where potential corruption might occur in specific 
+circumstances. Nonetheless, the bill would not necessarily affect political spending per se, nor 
+would it necessarily deter those entities that wished to call for election or defeat of federal 
+
+ 
+29 Coordinated party expenditures permit parties to make purchases benefitting their candidates, and to do so in concert 
+with those candidates. Additional discussion appears later in this report and CRS Report RS22644, Coordinated Party 
+Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview , by R. Sam Garrett and L. Paige Whitaker. 
+30 47 U.S.C. § 315(b). 
+31 2 U.S.C. § 432(g). For additional discussion, see CRS Report R40091, Campaign Finance: Potential Legislative and 
+Policy Issues for the 111th Congress , by R. Sam Garrett. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 7 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+candidates. As such, the bill would not necessarily ensure an equal playing field among various 
+political advertisers—including campaigns—nor could it necessarily do so. 
+
+In general, the bill would broadly apply additional disclosure and disclaimer provisions to entities 
+making independent expenditures and electioneering communications, as defined in the bill. 
+Corporations, unions, and certain tax-exempt § 501(c) and § 527 organizations would all be 
+subject to these provisions—provided that their activities met the financial and time thresholds 
+required to classify their communications as independent expenditures or electioneering 
+communications. On the other hand, the bill’s restrictions on political expenditures are tailored 
+only to specific kinds of organizations—namely those government contractors, entities subject to 
+foreign control, or TARP recipients falling under the DISCLOSE Act’s provisions barring certain 
+political expenditures. 
+
+The bill would not, however, directly affect candidate campaigns in most cases. Indeed, the 
+provisions of the bill appear to be aimed primarily at non-campaign actors, particularly 
+corporations, unions, and tax-exempt organizations. The bill does not increase contribution limits 
+for candidate campaigns; it also generally does not address other political committees—parties 
+and PACs. A notable exception, discussed below, would permit parties to make additional 
+coordinated expenditures supporting their candidates. This is the only instance in which the bill 
+explicitly allows for more political spending than would be possible under the status quo. 
+
+In addition to the general policy approaches described above, specific provisions in the legislation 
+could be the subject of debate during House and Senate consideration of the DISCLOSE Act. 
+Because the effects of Citizens United will be unclear until at least the conclusion of the 2010 
+election cycle, and because of the quickly evolving debate in Congress, all the bill’s major 
+implications cannot be predicted. The following sections discuss some of the potential 
+implications of the bill, which Congress may wish to consider when evaluating the legislation. 
+
+ Maintaining the Status Quo 
+
+If Congress chooses to maintain the status quo by not enacting a legislative response, some argue 
+that certain spending by corporations, unions, and tax-exempt organizations to influence elections 
+could go undocumented under current campaign finance law. In particular, it is possible that 
+under certain circumstances, undisclosed funds could be transferred from one organization to 
+another for the purpose of funding independent expenditures or electioneering communications. 
+Those organizations that the bill proposes to prohibit making expenditures, such as certain U.S. 
+subsidiaries of foreign corporations, would also be free to fund advertising as they saw fit. On the 
+other hand, if substantial additional spending following Citizens United does not occur, it is 
+possible that additional legislative action is unnecessary. In addition, some might contend that 
+existing law is sufficient to cover many of the topics addressed in the DISCLOSE Act.32 
+
+ 
+32 See, for example, Letter from Joan D. Aikens, et al., Former Members of the Federal Election Commission, to Reps. 
+Robert Brady and Dan Lungren, Committee on House Administration, May 19, 2010, 
+http://www.campaignfreedom.org/docLib/20100519_DISCLOSEcomments05192010.pdf. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 8 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+ Modifying the Definitions of Independent Expenditures and 
+Electioneering Communications 
+
+As noted previously, now that corporations and unions are free to use general treasury funds for 
+independent expenditures and electioneering communications, H.R. 5175 proposes to document 
+such spending through disclosure and disclaimer requirements—and to prohibit some entities 
+from making such expenditures. The activities to which these requirements would apply depend 
+largely on how key terms are defined. Importantly, H.R. 5175 would broaden the definitions of 
+independent expenditures and electioneering communications, thereby expanding the scope of 
+FECA’s regulation. 
+
+Specifically, the bill would expand the definition of independent expenditure to include an 
+expenditure “that, when taken as a whole, expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly 
+identified candidate, or is the functional equivalent of express advocacy because it can be 
+interpreted by a reasonable person only as advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, taking 
+into account whether the communication involved mentions a candidacy, a political party, or a 
+challenger to a candidate, or takes a position on a candidate’s character, qualifications, or fitness 
+for office.”33 In other words, it is possible that an advertisement could be subject to DISCLOSE 
+Act regulation as an independent expenditure even if it does not explicitly call for election or 
+defeat of a clearly identified candidate if the ad can reasonably be interpreted only as advocating 
+election or defeat of a candidate. In addition, the bill would double the period (from 60 to 120 
+days) prior to general election in which communications are treated as electioneering 
+communications. These provisions are noteworthy because they would affect the kind of political 
+advertising subject to regulation under the DISCLOSE Act and, by extension, other provisions in 
+FECA. 
+
+ Entities Covered by the Disclosure and Disclaimer Provisions 
+
+The bill’s disclosure, disclaimer, and shareholder/member reporting requirements would apply to 
+covered organizations, which would be defined as corporations, labor organizations, tax-exempt § 
+501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) organizations,34 and § 527 political organizations that are not political 
+committees for purposes of FECA.35 One question that might arise concerns the extent to which 
+the provisions would apply to tax-exempt organizations. While four types of tax-exempt 
+
+ 
+33 DISCLOSE Act, § 201. 
+34 Section 501(c)(4) organizations include social welfare organizations; § 501(c)(5) describes labor, agricultural and 
+horticultural organizations; and § 501(c)(6) organizations are commonly referred to as trade associations. 
+35 IRC § 527 provides tax-exempt status to political organizations , which are entities or funds that are organized and 
+operated primarily to influence “the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, 
+State, or local public office or office in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential 
+electors.... ” Under FECA, political committee is defined to include “any committee, club, association, or other group 
+of persons which receives contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes 
+expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year,” with both contribution and expenditure defined 
+as monies or anything of value “for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A), 
+(8)(A), (9)(A). With respect to entities engaging in federal election activity, § 527 political organizations include the 
+entities that are regulated as political committees under FECA. However, political organization is broader than political 
+committee , in part because it also includes the groups colloquially referred to as 527s that have been controversial in 
+recent years because they appear intended to influence federal elections in ways that may place them outside the 
+definition of political committee. For more information on 527s, see CRS Report RS22895, 527 Groups and Campaign 
+Activity: Analysis Under Campaign Finance and Tax Laws , by L. Paige Whitaker and Erika K. Lunder. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 9 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+organizations are expressly listed—those described in IRC § 501(c)(4), (c)(5), (c)(6) and § 527—
+the term covered organization could apply to more tax-exempt entities because many are 
+incorporated, and therefore would appear to fall within the definition of covered organizations as 
+corporations. It is important to note that the IRC imposes restrictions on the ability of tax-exempt 
+organizations to engage in campaign activity. For example, § 501(c)(3) charitable organizations 
+are absolutely prohibited from engaging in campaign activity under the IRC,36 although what 
+constitutes campaign activity under the IRC and FECA are not always the same.37 
+
+ Prohibitions on Making Contributions or Expenditures 
+
+In addition to its disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting requirements, H.R. 5175 contains several 
+prohibitions. Specifically, it would prohibit certain government contractors, TARP recipients, and 
+organizations subject to certain control or ownership by foreign nationals from making 
+expenditures or contributions in connection with federal elections. 
+
+ Government Contracts 
+
+Section 101 of H.R. 5175 would prohibit government contractors from making electioneering 
+communications or independent expenditures “only if the value of the contract is equal to or 
+greater than $7,000,000.” This language appears to suggest that this prohibition is intended to 
+apply only to contractors holding a single contract of at least $7 million. 
+
+As mentioned above, H.R. 5175 as introduced applied to contracts of at least $50,000, but was 
+later increased to $7 million. Some have suggested that this modification was made to exempt 
+small business government contractors from the prohibition. While the value of the “average” 
+federal procurement contract may seem low ($120,634 in FY2008),38 even small businesses 
+routinely receive much larger contracts,39 arguably providing one rationale for exempting 
+contractors who have not received a contract valued at more than $7 million from the proposed 
+ban on independent expenditures and electioneering communications.40 Agencies may, for 
+example, award contracts valued at up to $3.5 million ($5.5 million for manufacturing contracts) 
+to small businesses participating in the 8(a) Minority Business Development Program without 
+
+ 
+36 IRC § 501(c)(3) (prohibiting the organizations described therein from “participat[ing] in, or intervene[ing] in … any 
+political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office”). 
+37 For more information, see CRS Report R40141, 501(c)(3) Organizations and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under 
+Tax and Campaign Finance Laws , by Erika K. Lunder and L. Paige Whitaker. 
+38 This figure was obtained by dividing the total contract dollars awarded by the total number of contracts, as reported 
+on USASpending.gov. See http://www.usaspending.gov/explore?carryfilters=on&trendreport=top_cont&fromfiscal=
+yes&tab=By+Recipient&fiscal_year=2009&tab=By+Recipient&fiscal_year=2008&fromfiscal=yes&carryfilters=on&
+Submit=Go. 
+ 39 For purposes of federal procurement, a “small” business is one that is independently owned and operated, is “not 
+dominant in its field of operation,” and meets any definitions or standards established by the Small Business 
+Administration. 15 U.S.C. § 632(a)(1)-(2)(A). These standards focus primarily upon the size of the business, as 
+measured by the number of employees, its annual average gross income, and the size of other businesses within the 
+same industry. 13 C.F.R. §§ 121.101-121.108. For example, businesses in the field of scheduled passenger air 
+transportation are small if they have fewer than 1,500 employees, while those in the data processing field are small if 
+they have a gross income of less than $25 million. 13 C.F.R. § 121.201. 
+40 The relevant provisions of the DISCLOSE Act appear to apply to the value of each individual contract, not the total 
+value of contracts received by a particular contractor. However, it is unclear whether the value is measured in terms of 
+the base contract, or all options under the contract. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 10 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+competing them,41 and some small businesses have received contracts valued at over half a billion 
+dollars.42 “Large” government contractors, in contrast, can receive contracts valued at over $1 
+billion.43 
+
+ TARP Recipients 
+
+Section 101 of H.R. 5175 would prohibit recipients of TARP funds from directly or indirectly 
+making contributions, independent expenditures, or electioneering communications. Notably, it 
+appears that the prohibitions would apply to TARP recipients using TARP funds, as well as their 
+own funds. The applicable period of the prohibition would begin on the later of the 
+commencement of the negotiations for such financial assistance under title I of the Emergency 
+Economic Stabilization Act of 200844 or the date of enactment of H.R. 5175, and end on the later 
+of the ending of negotiations or the repayment of such financial assistance. 
+
+ Foreign Nationals 
+
+Several questions of interpretation could be raised by Section 102 of the bill, which would apply 
+existing prohibitions on contributions or expenditures by foreign nationals to “foreign-controlled 
+domestic corporations.” For example, it is unclear how the FEC or a court would interpret or 
+administer some of the key terms contained in the various tests of foreign control that Section 102 
+would establish. One of these tests focuses upon direct or indirect ownership by a foreign national 
+of 20% or more of the voting shares of a corporation, but would appear to leave the FEC 
+substantial discretion in determining what constitutes “indirect ownership” or at what point in 
+time ownership is determined. Another test similarly focuses upon whether one or more foreign 
+nationals “has the power to direct, dictate, or control the decision-making process of the 
+corporation with respect to its interest in the United States.” However, this test would also appear 
+to leave the FEC substantial discretion to determine what forms of conduct or business 
+arrangements would indicate that a foreign national has the power to “direct, dictate, or control” 
+corporate decision-making. 
+
+ Coordinated Party Expenditures 
+
+Section 104 of H.R. 5175 appears to lift the existing caps on coordinated party expenditures 
+unless “the communication is controlled by, or made at the direction of, the candidate or an 
+authorized committee of the candidate.”45 In the absence of increased contribution limits, 
+candidates may face substantial obstacles responding to corporate and union advertising post-
+
+ 
+41 15 U.S.C. § 637 note; 48 C.F.R. § 19.805-1(b)(2). Certain group-owned 8(a) firms are not subject to even these 
+limitations and may receive sole-source contracts of any value. 
+42 Gov't Accountability Office, Contract Management: Increased Use of Alaska Native Corporations’ Special 8(a) 
+Provisions Calls for Tailored Oversight, GAO-06-399, April 2006, at 15, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
+d06399.pdf (reporting a $593 million sole-source award to Chugach Management Services, Inc.). 
+43 For example, Lockheed Martin Corp., the top federal contractor in FY2009, received five contracts valued at over $1 
+billion in FY2009. See USASpending.gov, http://www.usaspending.gov/explore?tab=By%20Recipient&contractorid=
+359799&fromfiscal=yes&carryfilters=on&fiscal_year=2009. 
+44 12 U.S.C. § 5211 et seq . 
+45 For additional discussion of coordinated party expenditures, see CRS Report RS22644, Coordinated Party 
+Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview , by R. Sam Garrett and L. Paige Whitaker. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 11 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+ Citizens United . Lifting the caps on coordinated party expenditures arguably provides parties with 
+a way to help their candidates facing potential corporate, union, or tax-exempt organization-
+funded advertising. On the other hand, some may object to increasing the amount of money in the 
+political system, even if it is to respond to corporate or union advertising. In addition, the 
+standard for communications “controlled by, or made at the direction of, the candidate or an 
+authorized committee of the candidate” is not defined. Given this potential ambiguity, and an 
+ongoing FEC rulemaking on coordination, some in Congress might wish to clarify terms. 
+
+ Potential Effects of Disclosure and Disclaimer Provisions 
+
+H.R. 5175 may expand donor disclosure and, in some circumstances, would require disclosing an 
+organization’s donors even if their donations were not specifically designated to support 
+independent expenditures or electioneering communications. As noted in Table 1 , the bill’s 
+disclosure provisions primarily include reporting information to the FEC. By contrast, disclaimer 
+provisions primarily include the stand-by-your ad requirements. Disclosure and disclaimer 
+requirements would not necessarily, in and of themselves, limit overall spending on political 
+advertising. Ultimately, corporations, unions, and other groups intent on making independent 
+expenditures and electioneering communications could choose to do so regardless of disclosure or 
+disclaimer requirements. The additional reporting requirements proposed in the bill might, 
+however, cause potential advertisers to consider whether they wish to be publicly accountable for 
+the advertising. 
+
+One notable feature of the bill is that, under certain circumstances, a covered organization would 
+be deemed to have transferred funds to another entity for the purpose of campaign-related 
+activity. These deemed transfers would then subject the transferor to potential disclosure. The bill 
+would provide exceptions for transfers occurring in the ordinary course of business. 
+
+The bill would require additional disclosure of donors to covered organizations. The provisions 
+may be understood, at least in part, as a mechanism to limit the possibility that non-profit 
+organizations might be used as “shadow groups”—groups to which corporations, other entities, or 
+individuals would give funds to be used for campaign activities with little or no public disclosure. 
+A notable aspect of the bill is that it would require the disclosure of certain donors who did not 
+give money specifically for political activities, unlike, for example, the existing independent 
+expenditure provision, which only requires the disclosure of donors who gave “for the purpose of 
+furthering” the expenditure.46 
+
+Another potentially notable aspect of the donor disclosure provisions is that they apply to § 527 
+ political organizations that are not political committees under FECA. These would include the Ҥ 
+527 groups” that have been controversial in recent years because they seem intended to influence 
+federal elections in ways that might be outside the scope of FECA. Like political committees, 
+these § 527 groups must periodically report information about their expenditures and donors to a 
+federal agency47—political committees report to the FEC, while the § 527 groups report to the 
+
+ 
+46 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(2)(C); 11 C.F.R. § 109.10. 
+47 In general, these groups are required to periodically report to the IRS any expenditure of at least $500 and donors 
+who have given at least $200 during the year. IRC § 527(j). These requirements do not apply to independent 
+expenditures. For more information, see CRS Report RS21716, Political Organizations Under Section 527 of the 
+Internal Revenue Code , by Erika K. Lunder; CRS Report RS20918, 527 Organizations and Campaign Activity: Timing 
+of Reporting Requirements under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws , by Erika K. Lunder and L. Paige Whitaker. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 12 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+IRS. In both cases, the information is publicly available. The other types of covered organizations 
+are not currently subject to similar reporting requirements. 
+
+ Campaign-Related Activity Accounts 
+
+Section 213 of H.R. 5175 would permit covered organizations to establish optional accounts for 
+campaign-related activity, including independent expenditures and electioneering 
+communications. Because such accounts do not currently exist, it is unclear how significant this 
+provision might be. Several issues, however, could be relevant. First, it appears that once an 
+organization elected to establish the account, it would be required to use that account exclusively 
+for future campaign-related activity— a strategic or administrative decision that some 
+organizations might not be willing to make on a permanent basis. Second, the provisions specify 
+that amounts in the account be “exclusively for disbursements by the covered organization for 
+campaign-related activity.”48 Given this language, it is unclear whether or not an organization 
+using a campaign-related activity account could dispose of its funds if it decided to abandon 
+political spending altogether. If Congress wishes to provide a non-campaign-related mechanism 
+to do so, existing provisions in FECA permitting charitable contributions could be an option.49 
+Finally, it should be noted that because the account would not be considered a separate segregated 
+fund under FECA,50 it appears any § 501(c) organization making expenditures from such an 
+account could be subject to a 35% tax on the lesser of its net investment income or the taxable 
+political expenditures.51 
+
+ Potential Implementation Concerns 
+
+Even if Congress enacts the DISCLOSE Act quickly, aspects of the legislation will require 
+agency implementation. The process could affect how quickly and how clearly the act affects 
+campaigns and related spending (e.g., independent political advertising). Because the DISCLOSE 
+Act would primarily amend FECA, the FEC would be responsible for administering and 
+enforcing most of the bill’s provisions.52 
+
+It is possible that the FEC could implement the DISCLOSE Act quickly, although various factors 
+suggest that it is unlikely the Commission could fully implement the act before the 2010 
+November general elections.53 In addition to the time required to develop and reach agreement on 
+rules, for those rules to be finalized (upon publication in the Federal Register ), the Commission 
+would have to also approve an explanation and justification (E&J) statement explaining its 
+rationale and offering practical guidance about what the regulations mean and how they will be 
+
+ 
+48 DISCLOSE Act, § 213. 
+49 2 U.S.C. § 439a(a)(3). These provisions apply to permissible use of candidate campaign committee funds, 
+suggesting that amendment would be required to make them applicable to campaign-related-activity accounts. 
+50 DISCLOSE Act, § 213. 
+51 IRC § 527(f). Because the tax is imposed on the lesser of the taxable political expenditures or the organization’s net 
+investment income, it would not be a significant disincentive to organizations with minimal investment income or 
+taxable expenditures. 
+52 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b). 
+53 Some primary elections have already occurred without FEC action or legislation implementing the Court’s decision 
+in Citizens United . Those who believe that the case marked a victory for protected speech might contend that an 
+apparent lack of overwhelming new advertising could be evidence that additional regulation or legislation responding 
+to the ruling is unnecessary. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 13 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+enforced. This process routinely takes months, even for expedited rulemakings. The Commission 
+would have to also amend its reporting forms to adhere to the act’s new requirements. 
+
+Importantly, FECA requires that adopting rules and developing forms (among other provisions) 
+requires affirmative votes from at least four of the six Commissioners.54 A series of deadlocked 
+votes (e.g., 3-3 ties) among members of the current Commission, however, suggests that 
+disagreement among Commissioners is possible—particularly on controversial or ambiguous 
+aspects of the legislation.55 If disagreements resulted in deadlock or failure to implement the law 
+as Congress intends, the DISCLOSE Act’s effectiveness could be delayed or compromised. 
+
+Perhaps in response to those concerns, most of the bill’s provisions would become effective 30 
+days after enactment, with at least one becoming effective immediately upon enactment. The bill 
+specifies that its provisions would generally take effect regardless of whether the FEC had 
+promulgated rules to implement the legislation. Nonetheless, the “regulated community” might 
+lack practical and administrative guidance about how to comply with the act’s provisions until the 
+Commission could issue rules and begin considering advisory opinions. Nonetheless, even if 
+rulemaking or amending forms were delayed, the law itself would still take effect as stated in the 
+act. Therefore, even if some details remained to be determined, enacting the DISCLOSE Act or 
+other legislation could permit Congress to place additional requirements on political advertisers 
+or other campaign actors regardless of Commission action or inaction. 
+
+ Conclusion 
+
+It is currently unclear precisely how Citizens United will affect campaigns or political advertising, 
+but if Congress chooses to enact the DISCLOSE Act, it would provide additional information to 
+the public and regulators about political advertising funded by corporations, unions, and tax-
+exempt organizations. It would also prohibit certain entities from funding electioneering 
+communications and independent expenditures, as well as providing political parties with greater 
+ability to make coordinated party expenditures in some cases. 
+
+Except for the spending prohibitions in the bill, nothing in the legislation would necessarily 
+prevent corporations, unions, or other entities from funding political advertising calling for 
+election or defeat of clearly identified candidates. The disclosure and disclaimer provisions could, 
+however, provide the public and regulators with additional information about the sources of that 
+advertising. Public disclosure could also cause would-be advertisers to think carefully before 
+making political expenditures. For those who believe that Citizens United will usher in a new era 
+or corporate- or union dominance in elections, such an outcome might be welcome. On the other 
+hand, those who believe that Citizens United correctly strengthens corporate and union speech 
+rights might be wary of any provisions perceived as stifling the ability to participate in elections. 
+As Congress considers the DISCLOSE Act, issues related to how terms are defined, the kinds of 
+organizations that would be regulated, implementation, and other concerns may be relevant. 
+
+ 
+54 For a brief overview of Commission duties requiring consensus among at least four Commissioners, see CRS Report 
+RS22780, The Federal Election Commission (FEC) With Fewer than Four Members: Overview of Policy Implications , 
+by R. Sam Garrett. 
+55 For an overview of deadlocked votes during the current Commission’s first year, between July 2008 and June 2009, 
+see CRS Report R40779, Deadlocked Votes Among Members of the Federal Election Commission (FEC): Overview 
+and Potential Considerations for Congress , by R. Sam Garrett. Deadlocks have continued on some matters since that 
+time. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 14 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+ Table 1. Comparison of Major Provisions of H.R. 5175 With Current Federal 
+
+ Campaign Finance Law 
+
+ Overview of Major Relevant 
+
+ Major Policy 
+
+ Provisions in Current Federal 
+
+ Overview of Major Provisions in 
+
+ Issue 
+
+ Campaign Finance Law 
+
+ H.R. 5175, As Reported 
+
+Definition of 
+
+ Independent expenditure is defined as an 
+
+Would expand definition of independent 
+
+ Independent 
+
+expenditure “expressly advocating the 
+
+ expenditure to include an expenditure 
+
+ Expenditure 
+
+election or defeat of a clearly identified 
+
+“that, when taken as a whole, expressly 
+
+ 
+
+candidate” and that is not made in 
+
+advocates the election or defeat of a 
+
+coordination with a candidate or party. 
+
+clearly identified candidate, or is the 
+
+functional equivalent of express advocacy 
+
+[2 U.S.C. § 431(17)] 
+
+because it can be interpreted by a 
+
+According to Supreme Court precedent, 
+
+reasonable person only as advocating the 
+
+the “functional equivalent of express 
+
+election or defeat of a candidate, taking 
+
+advocacy” is a communication that is 
+
+into account whether the communication 
+
+susceptible of no reasonable interpretation 
+
+involved mentions a candidacy, a political 
+
+other than as an appeal to vote for or 
+
+party, or a chal enger to a candidate, or 
+
+against a specific candidate. 
+
+takes a position on a candidate’s 
+
+character, qualifications, or fitness for 
+
+[ Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889-
+
+office.” 
+
+90 (2010), quoting FEC v. Wisconsin Right to 
+
+ Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2007)] 
+
+Would impose 24-hour reporting 
+
+requirement for expenditures of $10,000 
+
+or more made during the period up to 
+
+and including the 20th day before an 
+
+election and expenditures of $1,000 or 
+
+more made during the period after the 
+
+20th day, but more than 24 hours before 
+
+an election. 
+
+[§ 201] 
+
+Definition of 
+
+ Electioneering communication is defined as a 
+
+Would expand period prior to general 
+
+ Electioneering 
+
+broadcast, cable, or satellite transmission 
+
+election in which communications are 
+
+ Communication 
+
+that refers to a clearly identified federal 
+
+treated as electioneering communications 
+
+office candidate and is made within 60 days 
+
+to 120 days. 
+
+of a general election (or within 30 days of a 
+
+primary). 
+
+[§ 202] 
+
+[2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(II)] 
+
+Definition of 
+
+ Public Communication is defined as a 
+
+Would exempt Internet communications, 
+
+ Public 
+
+communication by means of broadcast, 
+
+unless placed for a fee on another 
+
+ Communication 
+
+cable, or satellite communication, 
+
+person’s website, from being treated as a 
+
+Exempting Free 
+
+newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising 
+
+form of “general public political 
+
+Internet 
+
+facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to 
+
+advertising, “ thereby exempting such 
+
+Communications the general public, or any other form of 
+
+communications from the definition of 
+
+general public political advertising. 
+
+ public communication . 
+
+[2 U.S.C. § 431(22)] 
+
+[§ 105] 
+
+Involvement in 
+
+Foreign nationals are prohibited from 
+
+Would prohibit contributions in federal, 
+
+Federal 
+
+making contributions in federal, state, or 
+
+state, or local elections; and independent 
+
+Elections by 
+
+local elections, and are prohibited from 
+
+expenditures and electioneering 
+
+Foreign 
+
+making independent expenditures and 
+
+communications in federal elections by 
+
+Nationals 
+
+electioneering communications in federal 
+
+U.S. corporations if: a foreign national 
+
+elections, [2 U.S.C. § 441e], but U.S. 
+
+indirectly or directly owns at least 20% of 
+
+subsidiaries of foreign corporations may 
+
+voting shares; or the majority of the 
+
+form PACs to make expenditures and 
+
+board are foreign nationals; or one or 
+
+contributions under certain circumstances. 
+
+more foreign nationals can “direct, 
+
+dictate, or control” decision-making of 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 15 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+ Overview of Major Relevant 
+
+ Major Policy 
+
+ Provisions in Current Federal 
+
+ Overview of Major Provisions in 
+
+ Issue 
+
+ Campaign Finance Law 
+
+ H.R. 5175, As Reported 
+
+FEC regulations provide that foreign 
+
+the corporation with respect to its 
+
+nationals shall not “direct, dictate, control, 
+
+activities in connection with federal, state, 
+
+or directly or indirectly participate” in the 
+
+or local elections, including making 
+
+decision-making process of a corporation, 
+
+contributions, donations, expenditures, 
+
+labor union, political committee, or political independent expenditures, disbursements 
+
+organization with regard to federal or non-
+
+for electioneering communications or 
+
+federal election-related activities, such as 
+
+administration of a PAC established or 
+
+decisions concerning the making of 
+
+maintained by the corporation. 
+
+contributions, donations, expenditures, or 
+
+[§ 102] 
+
+disbursements in connection with federal, 
+
+state or local election or regarding the 
+
+Would require CEOs (or highest-ranking 
+
+administration of a political committee. 
+
+corporate official) to certify under penalty 
+
+of perjury, to the FEC, before making 
+
+[11 C.F.R. § 110.20(i)] 
+
+expenditures in connection with federal 
+
+office elections, that the foreign-national 
+
+prohibitions above do not apply to the 
+
+corporation. 
+
+[§ 102] 
+
+Would clarify that provision does not 
+
+prohibit a corporation, which is not a 
+
+foreign national, from establishing a 
+
+political action committee (PAC) so long 
+
+as none of the funds in the PAC are 
+
+provided by a foreign national and no 
+
+foreign national has power to “direct, 
+
+dictate, or control” the PAC. 
+
+[§ 102] 
+
+Involvement in 
+
+Government contractors are prohibited 
+
+Would prohibit government contractors 
+
+Federal 
+
+from making contributions. 
+
+holding contracts of $7,000,000 or more 
+
+Elections by 
+
+from making independent expenditures 
+
+Government 
+
+[2 U.S.C. § 441c] 
+
+and electioneering communications. 
+
+Contractors 
+
+ 
+
+[§ 101] 
+
+Contributions, 
+
+Corporations are prohibited from using 
+
+Would prohibit entities receiving or 
+
+Independent 
+
+general treasury funds to make 
+
+negotiating for TARP funds from making 
+
+Expenditures, 
+
+contributions. 
+
+contributions, independent expenditures, 
+
+and 
+
+or electioneering communications until 
+
+Electioneering 
+
+[2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)] 
+
+the funds were repaid (or if the 
+
+Communications As a result of Citizens United , it appears that negotiations ended without the entity 
+
+by Those 
+
+regardless of whether having received 
+
+receiving funds). 
+
+Receiving TARP 
+
+TARP funds, corporations are permitted to 
+
+Funds 
+
+[§ 101] 
+
+make independent expenditures and 
+
+electioneering communications. 
+
+[ Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
+
+(2010)] 
+
+ Stand by Your Ad 
+
+Corporations and labor unions funding 
+
+Would expand types of communications 
+
+Disclaimers in 
+
+ express advocacy messages are required to 
+
+funded by “covered organizations” that 
+
+Political 
+
+indentify in the communication: their name, 
+
+trigger disclaimer requirements to include 
+
+Advertising 
+
+address, and contact information; and that 
+
+disbursements for an “independent 
+
+the communication “is not authorized by 
+
+expenditure consisting of a public 
+
+any candidate or candidate’s committee.” 
+
+communication.” 
+
+[2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(3)] 
+
+[§ 214] 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 16 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+ Overview of Major Relevant 
+
+ Major Policy 
+
+ Provisions in Current Federal 
+
+ Overview of Major Provisions in 
+
+ Issue 
+
+ Campaign Finance Law 
+
+ H.R. 5175, As Reported 
+
+Corporate and union radio and TV ads are 
+
+Would expand disclaimer requirements 
+
+required to include an audio statement that 
+
+for disbursements by covered 
+
+the corporation or union paid for the ad. In organizations for independent 
+
+TV ads, the statement is required to be 
+
+expenditures or electioneering 
+
+conveyed by a view or voice-over of a 
+
+communications to require the 
+
+corporate or union representative. 
+
+organization’s CEO or highest ranking 
+
+official or any “significant funder” to state 
+
+[2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2)] 
+
+their approval for the communication, and 
+
+Candidates are currently required to state 
+
+would require listing the “Top Five 
+
+their approval for their broadcast 
+
+Funders.” 
+
+advertising. 
+
+[§ 214] 
+
+[2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(1)] 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+For automated political telephone calls 
+
+For automated political telephone calls 
+
+( robo calls ): 
+
+( robo calls ): 
+
+Would require political robo calls to 
+
+Election law and telecommunications law 
+
+include a disclaimer at the beginning of 
+
+do not address political robo calls per se. 
+
+the call. 
+
+ Robo calls that advocate for election or 
+
+[§ 214] 
+
+defeat of candidates or solicit funds appear 
+
+to require disclaimers stating who paid for 
+
+the communication. [2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)] 
+
+ Among other requirements, 
+
+telecommunications law appears to require 
+
+that prerecorded phone calls identify the 
+
+entity responsible for the cal at the 
+
+beginning of the message [47 U.S.C. § 
+
+227(d)(3); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(b)(2)]. 
+
+Disclosure of 
+
+In quarterly reports to the FEC, entities 
+
+Would require covered organizations 
+
+Expenditures 
+
+making independent expenditures in excess 
+
+making independent expenditures that 
+
+of $250 during a calendar year must 
+
+aggregate at least $10,000 in a calendar 
+
+Disclosure of 
+
+disclose donors who contribute more than 
+
+year to disclose, within 48 hours: 
+
+donors to 
+
+$200 “for the purpose of furthering” the 
+
+organizations 
+
+expenditure. If the entity spends at least 
+
+(1) donors who gave at least $600 for 
+
+making 
+
+$10,000 toward independent expenditures 
+
+campaign-related activity or in response 
+
+independent 
+
+during an election year, those expenditures 
+
+to solicitation for funds for such activity; 
+
+expenditures 
+
+must be reported to the FEC within 48 
+
+and 
+
+and 
+
+hours if the expenditure occurred up to 20 
+
+electioneering 
+
+(2) donors who gave unrestricted 
+
+days before the general election. Entities 
+
+communications 
+
+donations during the reporting period of 
+
+that spend at least $1,000 on independent 
+
+at least: 
+
+ 
+
+expenditures less than 20 days before the 
+
+election must report that spending to the 
+
+- $6,000 if the disbursements for “public 
+
+FEC within 24 hours. Donors of more than 
+
+independent expenditures” were made 
+
+$200 must also be included in the 48-hour 
+
+exclusively from Campaign-Related 
+
+and 24-hour reports. 
+
+Activity Account , or 
+
+[2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(2)(C); 11 C.F.R. § 
+
+- $600 if any disbursement was not from 
+
+109.10] 
+
+the account. 
+
+Entities making at least $10,000 in 
+
+For entities making at least $10,000 in 
+
+electioneering communications must 
+
+electioneering communications, the $600 
+
+disclose donors who contribute at least 
+
+and $6,000 amounts are increased to 
+
+$1,000; however, if the disbursement is 
+
+$1,000 and $10,000. Rule would apply in 
+
+made from a separate account that contains lieu of existing statutory requirement. 
+
+only contributions by U.S. citizens and legal 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 17 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+ Overview of Major Relevant 
+
+ Major Policy 
+
+ Provisions in Current Federal 
+
+ Overview of Major Provisions in 
+
+ Issue 
+
+ Campaign Finance Law 
+
+ H.R. 5175, As Reported 
+
+resident aliens made directly to the account Rules would not apply to payments 
+
+for electioneering communications, then 
+
+received in the regular course of business. 
+
+only those donors who contribute at least 
+
+$1,000 to the account are disclosed. 
+
+[§ 211(a), (b)] 
+
+[2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(E), (F)] 
+
+If organization uses Campaign-Related 
+
+Activity Account, al disbursements for 
+
+11 C.F.R. § 104.20 contains rules for 
+
+such activity would have to come from 
+
+corporations, labor unions, and qualified 
+
+the account, and account funds must be 
+
+nonprofit corporations that make certain 
+
+used “exclusively” for such purposes. 
+
+types of electioneering communications. Its 
+
+applicability in light of Citizens United is 
+
+Account would contain: donations made 
+
+unclear. 
+
+for “campaign-related activity” or in 
+
+response to solicitations for funds for 
+
+Section 527 political organizations that are 
+
+such activity; and amounts transferred 
+
+not political committees under FECA are 
+
+from other accounts (including general 
+
+generally required to periodical y report 
+
+treasury funds). Could not contain funds 
+
+information regarding their donors and 
+
+the donor/payor said in writing could not 
+
+expenditures to the IRS (or a state). Such 
+
+be used for such activity. 
+
+information is made publically available. The 
+
+reporting requirement does not apply to 
+
+[§ 213] 
+
+expenditures that are independent 
+
+If the donation would be disclosed and 
+
+expenditures. 
+
+the organization and donor “mutually 
+
+[26 U.S.C. § 527(j), (k)] 
+
+agree” at the time of the donation that 
+
+the funds are not to be used for 
+
+campaign-related activity, then the 
+
+organization’s CFO would have to certify 
+
+to the donor, within 30 days of receipt, 
+
+that the funds would not be used for such 
+
+activity and the person’s identity would 
+
+not be disclosed in any manner. 
+
+[§ 212] 
+
+Disclosure of 
+
+No comparable existing statutory 
+
+A covered organization would be treated 
+
+Expenditures 
+
+provision. 
+
+as making an independent expenditure or 
+
+electioneering communication if it 
+
+Transfers 
+
+transferred funds to another person for 
+
+subsequently 
+
+such purpose or was deemed to have 
+
+used for 
+
+made a transfer. 
+
+campaign activity 
+
+The organization would be deemed to 
+
+have made such a transfer if: 
+
+• the transferor designates, requests, 
+
+or suggests that the amounts be used 
+
+for public independent expenditures 
+
+or electioneering communications 
+
+and the transferee agrees to do so; 
+
+• the person making the expenditure 
+
+(or someone acting on his/her behalf) 
+
+solicited funds from the transferor or 
+
+transferee for making such 
+
+expenditures; 
+
+• there were “substantial” discussions 
+
+about such expenditures between 
+
+the transferor and transferee; 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 18 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+ Overview of Major Relevant 
+
+ Major Policy 
+
+ Provisions in Current Federal 
+
+ Overview of Major Provisions in 
+
+ Issue 
+
+ Campaign Finance Law 
+
+ H.R. 5175, As Reported 
+
+• the transferor or transferee knew 
+
+(or should have known) of the 
+
+transferor’s intent to make such 
+
+expenditures; or 
+
+• the transferor or transferee made a 
+
+public independent expenditure 
+
+during the 2-year period ending on 
+
+the date of the transfer. 
+
+An exception would exist for commercial 
+
+transactions occurring in the ordinary 
+
+course of business between the transferor 
+
+and transferee. 
+
+[§ 211(a), (b)] 
+
+CEO 
+
+No comparable existing statutory 
+
+If a covered organization makes a 
+
+Certification of 
+
+provision. 
+
+disbursement for “campaign-related 
+
+Certain 
+
+activity” during the calendar quarter, the 
+
+Information to 
+
+CEO or designee would be required to 
+
+the FEC 
+
+certify to FEC, within 15 days of the 
+
+quarter’s end, that the disbursement was 
+
+made in compliance with applicable law. 
+
+[§ 212] 
+
+(See also CEO certification requirements 
+
+in the Involvement in Federal Elections by 
+
+ Foreign Nationals row above. [§ 102]) 
+
+Disclosure of 
+
+Lobbyists must semiannual y report 
+
+Would require lobbyists to disclose in 
+
+Certain Lobbyist “contributions” exceeding $200 made to 
+
+certain Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) 
+
+Spending 
+
+candidates, leadership PACs, or parties. 
+
+reports: 
+
+[2 U.S.C. § 1604(d)(1)(D)] 
+
+(1) independent expenditures of at least 
+
+$1,000 funded by those lobbyists; the 
+
+(Note: Additional FEC electioneering 
+
+names of candidates supported or 
+
+communication and independent 
+
+opposed in the ads; and the amount spent 
+
+expenditure reporting requirements may 
+
+supporting or opposing each candidate; 
+
+apply to lobbyists in certain circumstances, 
+
+but are not intended to apply specifical y to 
+
+(2) electioneering communications of at 
+
+lobbyists.) 
+
+least $1,000 funded by lobbyists; the 
+
+names of candidates referred to in the 
+
+ads; and whether the ad supported or 
+
+opposed the candidate(s). 
+
+[§ 221] 
+
+Disclosure to 
+
+There is no comparable requirement, 
+
+A covered organization would be required 
+
+Shareholders, 
+
+although disclosure may be required to the 
+
+to disclose disbursements for campaign-
+
+Members, and 
+
+FEC (e.g., for independent expenditures or related activity in any “regular, periodic 
+
+Donors of 
+
+electioneering communications) or, in the 
+
+reports” on its finances/activities provided 
+
+ Covered 
+
+case of tax-exempt organizations, to the 
+
+to its shareholders, members, and donors. 
+
+ Organizations 
+
+IRS, and such information is generally 
+
+Information would include the date and 
+
+subject to public disclosure. 
+
+amount spent on independent 
+
+expenditures and electioneering 
+
+[2 U.S.C. § 434; 26 U.S.C. §§ 527, 6033, 
+
+communications, the source of the funds, 
+
+6103] 
+
+the name of candidates referred to in the 
+
+ads and whether the ads supported or 
+
+opposed the candidate, and information 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 19 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+ Overview of Major Relevant 
+
+ Major Policy 
+
+ Provisions in Current Federal 
+
+ Overview of Major Provisions in 
+
+ Issue 
+
+ Campaign Finance Law 
+
+ H.R. 5175, As Reported 
+
+about transferred funds. 
+
+A covered organization would also be 
+
+required to post a hyperlink on its 
+
+homepage to the location at the FEC 
+
+website which contains the required 
+
+reports regarding public independent 
+
+expenditures and electioneering 
+
+communications. 
+
+[§ 301] 
+
+Coordination of 
+
+Prohibits coordination between a 
+
+Would expand time period that 
+
+Certain 
+
+corporation or union, for most 
+
+coordination is prohibited between a 
+
+Expenditures 
+
+communications, with candidates and 
+
+corporation or union and House or 
+
+parties made within 90 days before House 
+
+Senate candidates, referenced in 
+
+or Senate primary or general election and 
+
+corporate/union ads, to those made 90 
+
+within 120 days of presidential primary, 
+
+days before the primary through the 
+
+nominating convention or caucus, or 
+
+general election. 
+
+general election. 
+
+Would expand time period that 
+
+[11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c)(4)(i), (ii)] 
+
+coordination is prohibited between 
+
+corporation or union and Presidential or 
+
+Provides limits on expenditures by parties 
+
+Vice Presidential candidates, referenced in 
+
+in connection with federal office candidates. corporate/union ads made 120 days 
+[2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)] 
+
+before the first presidential primary 
+
+through the general election. 
+
+Safe Harbor for Endorsements/Solicitations: 
+
+Provides that a public communication in 
+
+Would specify that a covered 
+
+which a federal office candidate endorses 
+
+communication may not be considered 
+
+another federal or non-federal candidate is 
+
+coordinated “solely on the grounds” that 
+
+not considered coordinated with respect to a person provided information to the 
+
+the endorsement of the federal candidate 
+
+candidate or committee regarding that 
+
+unless the public communication promotes, 
+
+person’s position on a legislative or policy 
+
+supports, attacks, or opposes the endorsing matter, (including urging the candidate or 
+
+candidate or another candidate seeking 
+
+party to adopt that person’s position), so 
+
+election to the same office. Further 
+
+long as there is no discussion regarding 
+
+provides that a public communication in 
+
+the candidate’s campaign for federal office. 
+
+which a federal office candidate solicits 
+
+Would expressly preserve FEC 
+
+funds for another federal or non-federal 
+
+regulations, 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(g) or (h), 
+
+candidate, political committee, or tax-
+
+providing safe harbor for endorsements 
+
+exempt organization is not considered 
+
+and solicitations by federal candidates and 
+
+coordinated with respect to the soliciting 
+
+for establishment and use of a firewall. 
+
+federal office candidate unless the public 
+
+communication promotes, supports, 
+
+[§ 103] 
+
+attacks, or opposes the soliciting candidate 
+
+or another candidate seeking election to 
+
+Would provide that direct costs incurred 
+
+the same office. 
+
+by a political party for a communication 
+
+made in connection with a federal office 
+
+Safe Harbor for Firewalls: Provides that 
+
+campaign is not subject to the 
+
+“conduct standard,” under which 
+
+coordinated party expenditure limits 
+
+coordination is found, is not met if 
+
+unless the communication is “controlled 
+
+commercial vendor, former employee, or 
+
+by, or made at the direction of” the 
+
+political committee has established a 
+
+candidate or the candidate’s authorized 
+
+firewal that meets certain requirements. 
+
+committee. 
+
+Safe harbor provision does not apply if 
+
+specific information indicates that despite 
+
+ [§ 104] 
+
+firewall, information regarding candidate or 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 20 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+ Overview of Major Relevant 
+
+ Major Policy 
+
+ Provisions in Current Federal 
+
+ Overview of Major Provisions in 
+
+ Issue 
+
+ Campaign Finance Law 
+
+ H.R. 5175, As Reported 
+
+party campaign plans, projects, activities, or 
+
+ 
+
+needs, which are material to the creation, 
+
+production, or distribution of the 
+
+communication, was used or conveyed to 
+
+the person paying for the communication. 
+
+Further provides that firewall must prohibit 
+
+flow of information between employees or 
+
+consultants providing services for the 
+
+person paying for the communication and 
+
+those employees or consultants providing 
+
+services to the candidate, who is clearly 
+
+identified in the communication, or the 
+
+candidate’s opponent, or a party; and that 
+
+the firewall must be described in a written 
+
+policy that is distributed to all relevant 
+
+employees, consultants, and clients. 
+
+[11 C.F.R. § 109.21 (g), (h)] 
+
+Judicial Review 
+
+— 
+
+If the constitutionality of the Act is 
+
+challenged, the action shall be filed in U.S. 
+
+District Court for D.C. and appealed to 
+
+the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
+
+with expedited review; any Member of 
+
+the House or Senate shal have the right 
+
+to intervene or bring suit challenging the 
+
+constitutionality. 
+
+[§ 401] 
+
+Severability 
+
+— 
+
+If any provision of the Act or application 
+
+of a provision is held unconstitutional, the 
+
+ 
+
+remainder shall not be affected by the 
+
+holding. 
+
+[§ 402] 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of H.R. 5175 and current federal campaign finance law, or applicable regulations as noted. 
+
+ Note : H.R. 5175 would change the definitions of independent expenditures and electioneering communications . Thus, 
+
+the terms do not have the same meanings in two of the columns. The column describing major provisions in 
+
+current law use the terms independent expenditures and electioneering communications as defined under existing 
+
+law, while the column describing major provisions in H.R. 5175 uses the expanded definitions of the terms as set 
+
+forth in the legislation. 
+
+Throughout H.R. 5175, the term covered organizations is defined as corporations, labor organizations, tax-exempt 
+
+§ 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) organizations, and § 527 political organizations that are not political committees under 
+
+FECA. 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 21 
+
+ 
+ The DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175): Overview and Analysis 
+
+ 
+
+ Author Contact Information 
+
+ 
+R. Sam Garrett 
+
+ Erika K. Lunder 
+
+Analyst in American National Government 
+
+Legislative Attorney 
+
+rgarrett@crs.loc.gov, 7-6443 
+
+elunder@crs.loc.gov, 7-4538 
+
+L. Paige Whitaker 
+
+ 
+
+Legislative Attorney 
+lwhitaker@crs.loc.gov, 7-5477 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Acknowledgments 
+
+Kate M. Manuel, Legislative Attorney, contributed to this report. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 22
\ No newline at end of file
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/politics/text/a8b505f74982b6b6.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@
+FDA Regulation of Cosmetics and 
+
+October 30, 2023 
+
+ Personal Care Products Under the 
+
+ Nora Wells 
+
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 
+
+Analyst in Health Policy 
+ 
+
+ 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+For a copy of the full report, 
+please call 7-5700 or visit 
+
+The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has the authority to regulate cosmetic products and 
+
+www.crs.gov. 
+
+their ingredients. This authority was granted by the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
+(FFDCA), which included provisions regarding the adulteration and misbranding of cosmetics. Cosmetic products are also 
+regulated under the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA) and related legislation. Although the Color Additive 
+Amendments Act of 1960 and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970 amended some of FFDCA’s provisions, 
+cosmetics regulation remained largely unchanged from the original FFDCA until 2022, when the Modernization of 
+Cosmetics Regulation Act (MoCRA) was enacted. Most of MoCRA’s provisions will take effect at the close of 2023. 
+
+Prior to the passage of MoCRA, FDA had limited authority regarding cosmetic product registration; testing; premarket 
+notification, clearance, or approval; good manufacturing practices; mandatory risk labeling; adverse event reports; and 
+recalls. FDA could not impose registration requirements on cosmetic manufacturers. Rather, manufacturers could voluntarily 
+comply with FDA registration regulations. Additionally, with the exception of color additives, FDA did not require 
+premarket notification, safety testing, review, or approval of the chemicals used in cosmetic products. Although FDA had 
+released draft good manufacturing practices (GMP) guidelines for cosmetic manufacturers, they were not required to adhere 
+to them, nor were manufacturers required to file ingredient information with, or report adverse reactions to, the agency. 
+Instead, under a voluntary FDA program, cosmetic manufacturers and packagers could choose to report the ingredients used 
+in their product formulations. FDA also did not have the authority to require a manufacturer to recall a cosmetic product from 
+the marketplace, although the agency did issue general regulations on voluntary recalls. 
+
+With the passage of MoCRA, FDA’s regulatory authority over cosmetics has been expanded. Under MoCRA, FDA will now 
+require facility registration and listing of cosmetics products with the agency, as well as certain product labeling information. 
+FDA will also promulgate final GMP regulations, require the reporting of serious adverse events, and gain the ability to issue 
+mandatory product recalls. Moreover, manufacturers must substantiate cosmetic product safety and maintain related records. 
+The passage of MoCRA, however, will not require cosmetics to be subject to premarket review. 
+
+FDA’s authority over cosmetics, both pre- and post-MoCRA, overlaps in some ways with other FDA-regulated products, 
+such as food, drugs, medical devices, and tobacco. For example, prior to MoCRA, FDA had the authority to take certain 
+enforcement actions—such as seizures, injunctions, and criminal penalties—against adulterated or misbranded cosmetics, as 
+it does with foods, drugs, devices, and tobacco products. In addition, FDA could inspect cosmetic manufacturing facilities, as 
+it may with drug and food companies, and prohibit the importation of cosmetics that violate the FFDCA. Moreover, the 
+agency has issued rules restricting the use of ingredients that it determines are poisonous or deleterious. 
+
+Despite these similarities in applicability FDA’s authority over cosmetics in certain respects remains less comprehensive than 
+its authority over other FDA-regulated products. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 5 link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 14 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 24 link to page 10 link to page 25 Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+ Contents 
+
+ Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
+ History of FDA’s Cosmetics Regulation Authority ......................................................................... 2 
+
+ Scope and Definitions: Cosmetics, Drugs, and Cosmetic/Drug Combinations ........................ 2 
+
+ Cosmetics ............................................................................................................................ 2 
+ Drugs ................................................................................................................................... 3 
+ Cosmetics Containing Drug Ingredients ............................................................................. 4 
+
+ History ....................................................................................................................................... 5 
+
+ The Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) ............................................. 7 
+
+ Cosmetic Regulatory Controls .................................................................................................. 8 
+
+ Premarket Requirements ..................................................................................................... 8 
+ Registration and Listing ...................................................................................................... 9 
+ Adulterated and Misbranded Cosmetics ............................................................................ 11 
+ Mandatory Recall .............................................................................................................. 14 
+ Labeling ............................................................................................................................ 15 
+ Good Manufacturing Practices ......................................................................................... 16 
+ Reporting Adverse Events and Reactions to Cosmetics ................................................... 17 
+
+ Regulation of Specific Cosmetic Ingredients ................................................................................ 18 
+
+ Talc .......................................................................................................................................... 18 
+ PFAS ....................................................................................................................................... 19 
+
+ FDA’s Authority to Regulate Cosmetics in the Future .................................................................. 20 
+ Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 22 
+
+ 
+
+ Tables 
+ Table 1. New FFDCA Sections Added by MoCRA Section 3502 ................................................... 7 
+ 
+
+ Contacts 
+ Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 22 
+ 
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ link to page 14 link to page 14 Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+ Introduction 
+ The U.S. cosmetic, beauty supply, and perfume retail industry consists of over 184,000 
+establishments, with a projected combined annual revenue of about $45.2 billion by the close of 
+2023.1 Worldwide, the cosmetics and personal care products industry collects more than $529.3 
+billion in annual retail sales.2 The cosmetic market includes numerous personal care products 
+other than the facial makeup that the term “cosmetics” typically implies.3 Domestic industry sales 
+are concentrated in the following areas (percentage of sales by product category): (1) cosmetics, 
+37.9%; (2) haircare products, 27.1%; (3) skincare products, 20.9%; and (4) nail products, 
+deodorants, and other products, 14.1%.4 
+
+The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has the authority, generally under the Federal Food, 
+Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), to regulate cosmetic products and their ingredients. In this 
+context, the agency’s primary regulatory responsibilities include ensuring that cosmetics are not 
+adulterated or misbranded.5 FDA’s authority over cosmetic products has been greatly expanded 
+via the passage of the Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA). 
+
+This report (1) describes the definitional differences between cosmetics, drugs, and cosmetic/drug 
+combinations; (2) outlines the statutory provisions and rules under which FDA regulates 
+cosmetics, including those newly introduced under MoCRA; and (3) identifies outstanding 
+considerations about FDA’s authority over cosmetics. The report focuses on FDA regulation of 
+cosmetics under MoCRA; it does not discuss Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulation of 
+cosmetics advertising or the regulation of potentially dangerous chemicals, pesticides, or other 
+products by other agencies.6 
+
+ 
+
+1 Alexia M. Zambrano, Beauty, Cosmetics & Fragrance Stores in the US: Industry Performance , IBISWorld, April 
+2023, https://my.ibisworld.com/us/en/industry/44612/industry-performance. 
+
+2 Personal Care Products Council, “About PCPC,” https://www.personalcarecouncil.org/about-us/. Note: this value was 
+calculated using data from 2021. Personal Care Products Council, Year in Review 2022 , p. 7, 
+https://www.personalcarecouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/PCPC_YIR2022_DIGITAL-SINGLE.pdf. 
+
+3 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) estimates that most Americans use 6 to 12 cosmetic products every day. 
+FDA, “Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-laws-
+regulations/modernization-cosmetics-regulation-act-2022. Additionally, the gender distribution of traditional makeup 
+product usage has shifted in recent years. Surveys have documented that anywhere between 20% and 50% of American 
+men have reported using traditional makeup products, including concealer, foundation, bronzer, lip products, and eye 
+makeup, among others. See, for example, Forbes, “Why Cosmetic Companies Targeting Male Consumers are 
+Marketing on the Down-Low,” https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackiehuba/2020/10/22/why-cosmetic-companies-
+targeting-male-consumers-are-marketing-on-the-down-low/?sh=6d3f95839b46; NPR, “My Journey Into the World of 
+Men’s Beauty,” https://www.npr.org/2019/11/12/776744697/my-journey-into-the-world-of-mens-beauty; Prim&Prep, 
+“The Changing Views of Men Using Makeup (2019 Survey Results),” https://www.primandprep.com/the-changing-
+views-of-men-using-makeup/. 
+
+4 Alexia M. Zambrano, IBISWorld, “Beauty, Cosmetics & Fragrance Stores in the US: Products & Markets,” 
+https://my.ibisworld.com/us/en/industry/44612/products-and-markets. 
+
+5 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) §§601, 602 (21 U.S.C. §§361, 362). See the “Adulterated and 
+Misbranded Cosmetics” section of this report. 
+
+6 P.L. 117-328, Division FF, Title III, Subtitle E—Cosmetics. Under Section 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
+“[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ... to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false advertisement—(1) By 
+United States mails, or in or having an effect upon commerce, by any means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is 
+likely to induce, directly or indirectly the purchase of ... cosmetics; or (2) By any means, for the purpose of inducing, or 
+which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly, the purchase in or having an effect upon commerce, of ... cosmetics” 
+(15 U.S.C. §52). In addition, cosmetics are explicitly excluded from the definition of “consumer product” in Section 
+3(a)(5)(H) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, which is enforced by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (15 
+U.S.C. §2052(a)(5)(H)). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+1 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+ History of FDA’s Cosmetics Regulation Authority 
+
+ Scope and Definitions: Cosmetics, Drugs, and 
+Cosmetic/Drug Combinations 
+ This section discusses how the FFDCA defines cosmetics and drugs. The distinction between 
+them, which determines how products are classified, is a concern for manufacturers because 
+cosmetics are not subject to the same approval, regulatory, or registration requirements as drugs, 
+unless the cosmetic also meets the definition a drug.7 Having a product classified as cosmetic 
+only—not as a drug or cosmetic/drug combination—saves manufacturers time and expense and 
+enables them to market their products with less regulatory oversight. 
+
+ Cosmetics 
+
+FFDCA defines a “cosmetic” as an article intended to be “applied to the human body … for 
+cleansing, beautifying, promoting attractiveness, or altering the appearance.”8 The term covers a 
+broad range of FDA-regulated products that may be used externally and internally.9 Cosmetics 
+include products for the eyes, face, nails, hair, skin, and mouth, such as makeup, nail polish, hair 
+dyes and coloring, suntan preparations, fragrances, oral care, and bath products.10 Although soap 
+was explicitly exempted from the definition of a cosmetic, it may be regulated by the FDA as a 
+cosmetic product in certain instances.11 In addition, coal-tar hair dye was provided a limited 
+exemption from the FFDCA’s adulteration provisions.12 Inks used for tattooing are also classified 
+as cosmetics under the FFDCA.13 Under MoCRA, FFDCA will separately define a “cosmetic 
+product” as “a preparation of cosmetic ingredients with a qualitatively and quantitatively set 
+composition for use in a finished product.”14 
+
+ 
+
+7 FFDCA §509 (21 U.S.C. §359). Under MoCRA, cosmetic/drug combinations are treated as drugs for listing and 
+selected other provisions. See FFDCA §613(a) (21 U.S.C. §364i(a)). 
+
+8 FFDCA §201(i) (21 U.S.C. §321(i)). 
+9 Examples of cosmetics “that may be introduced into the body are limited, but include mouthwashes, breath 
+fresheners, and vaginal douches.” John E. Bailey, “Organization and Priorities of FDA’s Office of Cosmetics and 
+Colors,” in Cosmetic Regulation in a Competitive Environment , Norman F. Estrin & James M. Akerson, eds., p. 217, 
+2000. 
+
+10 21 C.F.R. §720.4(c). 
+11 FDA regulations define “soap” as applying only to articles for which “(1) [t]he bulk of the nonvolatile matter in the 
+product consists of an alkali salt of fatty acids and the detergent properties of the article are due to the alkali-fatty acid 
+compounds; and (2) [t]he product is labeled, sold, and represented only as soap” (21 C.F.R. §701.20(a)). A product 
+intended not only for cleansing, but also for other cosmetic uses, such as beautifying, moisturizing, or deodorizing, 
+would be regulated by FDA as a cosmetic. A soap-like product may also be a drug if it is intended to cure, treat, or 
+prevent disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the human body. For example, a soap-like product that is 
+not only intended for cleansing, but also for moisturizing or deodorizing and that contains a medication preventing 
+fungal growth, may be regulated as both a cosmetic and a drug product. The intended use of a product is determined by 
+several factors, including claims stated on the product label, in advertising, or other promotional materials; consumer 
+perception and the product’s reputation; and ingredients that may cause the product to be considered a drug by industry 
+standards or public perception. See FDA, “Is It a Cosmetic, a Drug, or Both (Or Is It Soap?),” https://www.fda.gov/
+cosmetics/cosmetics-laws-regulations/it-cosmetic-drug-or-both-or-it-soap. 
+
+12 FFDCA §601(a) (21 U.S.C. §361(a)). Coal-tar hair dyes include permanent, semipermanent, and temporary hair 
+dyes. FDA, “Hair Dyes,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetic-products/hair-dyes. 
+13 FDA, “Tattoos, Temporary Tattoos & Permanent Makeup,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetic-products/
+tattoos-temporary-tattoos-permanent-makeup. 
+
+14 FFDCA §604(2) (21 U.S.C. §364(2)). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+2 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+ Drugs 
+
+The FFDCA defines a “drug” in part as “articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
+mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease”; articles “(other than food) intended to affect the 
+structure or any function of the body”; and “articles intended for use as a component” of such 
+drugs.15 
+
+Drug manufacturers must comply with Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMP) rules for 
+drugs.16 Failure to comply will cause a drug to be considered adulterated.17 Drug manufacturers 
+are required to register their facilities,18 list their drug products with the agency,19 and report 
+adverse events to FDA, among other requirements.20 
+
+Unlike cosmetics and their ingredients (with the exception of color additives), drugs are subject to 
+FDA approval before entering interstate commerce. Drugs must either (1) receive the agency’s 
+premarket approval under a new drug application (NDA), or an abbreviated NDA (ANDA),21 in 
+the case of a generic drug, or (2) conform to a set of FDA requirements known as a monograph.22 
+Monographs govern the manufacture and marketing of most over-the-counter (OTC) drugs and 
+specify the conditions under which OTC drugs in a particular category (such as antidandruff 
+shampoos or antiperspirants) will be considered generally recognized as safe and effective 
+(GRASE).23 Monographs also indicate how OTC drugs must be labeled so they are not deemed 
+misbranded.24 
+
+ 
+
+15 FFDCA §201(g)(1) (21 U.S.C. §321(g)(1)). 
+16 Current Good Manufacturing Practices set the “minimum requirements for the methods, facilities, and controls used 
+in manufacturing, processing, and packing of a drug product.” For general information, see FDA, “Current Good 
+Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) Regulations,” https://www.fda.gov/drugs/pharmaceutical-quality-resources/current-
+good-manufacturing-practice-cgmp-regulations. 
+
+17 FFDCA §501(a)(2)(B) (21 U.S.C. §351(a)(2)(B)). 
+18 FFDCA §510 (21 U.S.C. §360), 21 C.F.R. Part 207. 
+19 Ibid. 
+20 21 C.F.R. §310.305; 21 C.F.R. §314.80; 21 C.F.R. §314.98. 
+21 FFDCA §505 (21 U.S.C. §355). A new drug application (NDA) is the process through which drug sponsors propose 
+that FDA approve a new pharmaceutical for sale and marketing in the United States. The agency approves an NDA 
+after examining reports and investigations that demonstrate the drug’s safety and effectiveness, among other 
+considerations. 
+
+22 An OTC drug monograph is similar to a recipe in that it covers active ingredients, dosages, formulations, and 
+labeling claims. If an OTC drug product complies with the relevant monograph, it does not need FDA approval prior to 
+marketing. FDA assesses monograph compliance as part of its inspection process. Historically, monographs have been 
+established and amended through rulemaking. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act; 
+P.L. 116-136), enacted on March 27, 2020, replaced the rulemaking process with the administrative order process—a 
+less burdensome alternative. For additional information, see CRS Report R46985, FDA Regulation of Over-the-
+Counter (OTC) Drugs: Overview and Issues for Congress . 
+
+23 21 C.F.R. §§330-358. 
+24 Labels must include a Drug Facts panel, which lists the product’s active ingredients, purposes, uses, applicable 
+warnings, directions, other information, and inactive ingredients, and may contain a telephone number for questions 
+about the product. See 21 C.F.R. §201.66(c). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+3 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+ Cosmetics Containing Drug Ingredients 
+
+Although the term “cosmeceutical” has been used to refer to combination cosmetic/drug products, 
+such products have no statutory or regulatory definition.25 Historically, FDA has indicated that 
+cosmetic/drug combinations are subject to FDA’s regulations for both cosmetics and drugs.26 
+
+Determining whether a cosmetic is also a drug, and therefore subject to the additional statutory 
+requirements that apply to drugs, depends on the distributor’s claims regarding the drug’s intent 
+or intended use.27 A product’s intended use may be established in several ways, such as claims on 
+the label or in advertising or promotional materials, customer perception of the product, and the 
+inclusion of ingredients that cause the product to be considered a drug because of a known 
+therapeutic use.28 For example, if a lipstick (a cosmetic) contains sunscreen (a drug), historically, 
+the mere inclusion of the term “sunscreen” in the product’s labeling required the product to be 
+regulated as a drug as well as a cosmetic.29 The text box below provides examples of other 
+cosmetic/drug combinations and compares cosmetic and drug classifications.30 
+
+ Comparison of Cosmetic and Drug Product Classifications 
+
+A suntan product is a cosmetic, but a sunscreen product is a drug. 
+A deodorant is a cosmetic, but an antiperspirant is a drug. 
+A shampoo is a cosmetic, but an antidandruff shampoo is a drug. 
+A toothpaste is a cosmetic, but an anticaries toothpaste is a drug. 
+A skin exfoliant is a cosmetic, but a skin peel is a drug. 
+A mouthwash is a cosmetic, but an antigingivitis mouthwash is a drug. 
+A hair bulking product is a cosmetic, but a hair growth product is a drug. 
+A skin product to hide acne is a cosmetic, but an antiacne product is a drug. 
+An antibacterial deodorant soap is a cosmetic, but an antibacterial anti-infective soap is a drug. 
+A skin moisturizer is a cosmetic, but a wrinkle remover is a drug. 
+A lip softener is a cosmetic, but a product for chapped lips is a drug. 
+
+ Source: Peter B. Hutt, “Legal Distinction in the United States between a Cosmetic and a Drug,” in 
+ Cosmeceuticals and Active Cosmetics , ed. Raja K. Sivamani et al., 3rd ed. (Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis Group, 
+2016), p. 432. 
+
+ 
+
+25 FDA, “Cosmeceutical,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-labeling-claims/cosmeceutical. 
+26 FDA, “Is it a Cosmetic, a Drug, or Both (Or Is it Soap?),” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-laws-
+regulations/it-cosmetic-drug-or-both-or-it-soap. Note, however, that this will no longer always be the case post-
+MoCRA. See FFDCA §613(a) (21 U.S.C. §364i(a)); FDA, Registration and Listing of Cosmetic Product Facilities and 
+Products: Guidance for Industry (Draft Guidance) , August 2023, p. 11, https://www.fda.gov/media/170732/download. 
+
+27 FFDCA §201(g) (21 U.S.C. §321(g)). 
+28 FDA, “Is It a Cosmetic, a Drug, or Both (Or Is It Soap?),” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-laws-
+regulations/it-cosmetic-drug-or-both-or-it-soap. 
+
+29 21 C.F.R. §700.35(a). “A product that includes the term ‘sunscreen’ in its labeling ... comes within the definition of a 
+drug.... [T]he use of the term ‘sunscreen’ or similar sun protection terminology in a product’s labeling generally causes 
+the product to be subject to regulation as a drug.” 
+30 In addition, some of the products commonly referred to as “personal care products” may be considered either 
+cosmetics, drugs, or other regulatory categories, depending on the intended use of the product. For more information, 
+see FDA, “Are All ‘Personal Care Products’ Regulated as Cosmetics?,” https://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-basics-
+industry/are-all-personal-care-products-regulated-cosmetics. FDA has distinguished between cosmetics and medical 
+devices in the past as well. FDA, “Warning Letters Highlight Differences Between Cosmetics and Medical Devices,” 
+https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/warning-letters-related-cosmetics/warning-letters-highlight-differences-between-
+cosmetics-and-medical-devices. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+4 
+
+ 
+ link to page 14 Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+ History 
+ Prior to the enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) in 1938, cosmetics 
+were not regulated by the federal government.31 Instead, they were regulated under a collection of 
+state laws that had been enacted to regulate food and drugs.32 At that time, multiple “cosmetics 
+and drugs were made from the same natural materials” and often the “laws did not include 
+explicit definitions of the products regulated.”33 Following several incidents in which cosmetics 
+were allegedly the cause of serious health problems, as well as industry concerns about states 
+enacting their own laws, provisions were included in the FFDCA that prohibited the sale of 
+adulterated or misbranded cosmetics in interstate commerce.34 The FFDCA also established 
+uniform regulation of FDA-regulated cosmetic products nationwide.35 However, state laws 
+regarding cosmetics regulation have continued to evolve since FFDCA’s passage, with some 
+states implementing stricter measures than others.36 
+
+In addition to their regulation under the FFDCA, cosmetics are regulated under the Fair 
+Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA) and related regulations.37 The FPLA applies to the 
+packaging and labeling of “consumer commodities,” which include cosmetics “customarily 
+produced or distributed for sale through retail sales agencies or instrumentalities for consumption 
+by individuals, or use by individuals for purposes of personal care ... and which [are] usually 
+consumed or expended in the course of such consumption or use.”38 The FPLA does not apply to 
+“wholesale or retail distributors of consumer commodities, except to the extent that such persons 
+
+• are engaged in the packaging or labeling of such commodities, or 
+• prescribe or specify ... the manner in which such commodities are packaged or 
+
+labeled.”39 
+
+The FFDCA prohibits the adulteration and misbranding of cosmetics in interstate commerce and 
+the introduction, receipt, and delivery of adulterated or misbranded cosmetics into interstate 
+commerce.40 From 1938 until 2022, with the exception of provisions governing color additives, 
+the FFDCA statutory provisions addressing cosmetics remained basically unchanged, though the 
+
+ 
+
+31 Senate Committee on Commerce, S.Rept. 91, 75th Cong., p. 5, 1937. 
+32 Peter B. Hutt, “A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Cosmetics,” in Cosmetic 
+Regulation in a Competitive Environment , ed. Norman F. Estrin & James M. Akerson (New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, 
+Inc., 2000), p. 2, (hereinafter, Hutt, “A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of 
+Cosmetics”). 
+33 Hutt, “A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Cosmetics,” p. 2. 
+34 Hutt, “A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Cosmetics,” p. 6; Jacqueline A. 
+Greff, “Regulation of Cosmetics That are Also Drugs,” Food and Drug Law Journal , vol. 51, no. 2 (1996), pp. 243-
+244. 
+
+35 Hutt, “A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Cosmetics,” pp. 2-3, 6. 
+36 See, for example, Lisa Benson and Karen Reczek, A Guide to United States Cosmetic Products Compliance 
+Requirements , National Institute of Standards and Technology, NISTIR 8178, May 31, 2017, pp. 22-28, 
+https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2017/nist.ir.8178.pdf. 
+
+37 P.L. 89-755 (15 U.S.C. §1451 et seq.). 
+38 FPLA §10(a) (15 U.S.C. §1459(a)). FPLA specifically regulates “any person engaged in the packaging or labeling of 
+any consumer commodity … for distribution in commerce, or … any person [(with some exceptions)] … engaged in 
+the distribution in commerce of any packaged or labeled consumer commodity.” §3(a) (15 U.S.C. §1452(a)). 
+39 FPLA §3(b) (15 U.S.C. §1452(b)). 
+40 FFDCA §§301(a)-(c) (21 U.S.C. §§331(a)-(c)). See the “Adulterated and Misbranded Cosmetics” section of this 
+report. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+5 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+cosmetic industry has continuously grown over the past 80 years. Consequently, the concerns of 
+consumer and industry groups have often remained similar since the enactment of the FFDCA. 
+
+Prior to MoCRA, due to statutory authority limitations, certain FDA cosmetics regulations and 
+procedures relied on voluntary manufacturer compliance, even though similar regulations and 
+procedures were mandatory for other FDA-regulated products (such as drugs). For example, FDA 
+had promulgated regulations for the voluntary registration of establishments that manufactured or 
+packaged cosmetics.41 In contrast, mandatory registration requirements existed for other FDA 
+product-category manufacturers (e.g., drugs, food).42 Moreover, unlike drug manufacturers, 
+cosmetic manufacturers were not required to submit safety data on ingredients or to report 
+cosmetic-related injuries to FDA.43 Instead, under a voluntary FDA program, cosmetic 
+manufacturers and packagers could choose to report the ingredients used in their product 
+formulations.44 Furthermore, consumers, health care professionals, and cosmetic manufacturers 
+could voluntarily report adverse reactions to cosmetics to FDA.45 Finally, FDA did not have 
+mandatory recall authority to require a cosmetic manufacturer to recall a product from the 
+marketplace. However, the agency could request a voluntary recall, and FDA has issued general 
+regulations outlining its expectations for manufacturers during such recalls.46 Although FDA did 
+not have the authority to require compliance with these regulations, it could take action against 
+adulterated or misbranded cosmetics.47 
+
+FDA’s authority over cosmetics prior to MoCRA was less comprehensive than its authority over 
+other FDA-regulated products with regard to good manufacturing practices (GMP), premarket 
+clearance or approval, testing, and mandatory risk labeling.48 FDA released GMP guidelines for 
+cosmetic manufacturers49 and stated that “[f]ailure to adhere to GMP may result in an adulterated 
+or misbranded product.”50 FDA did not review or approve ingredients used in cosmetic products 
+other than color additives, although cosmetic manufacturers were responsible for substantiating 
+the safety of their products and ingredients before marketing.51 Drug products, on the other hand, 
+
+ 
+
+41 21 C.F.R. Part 710; FDA, “Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/voluntary-
+cosmetic-registration-program. 
+
+42 FFDCA §415 (21 U.S.C. §350d) (food); FFDCA §510 (21 U.S.C. §360) (drugs and devices); FFDCA §905 (21 
+U.S.C. §387e) (tobacco). 
+
+43 Donald R. Johnson, “Not in My Makeup: The Need for Enhanced Premarket Regulatory Authority Over Cosmetics 
+in Light of Increased Usage of Engineered Nanoparticles,” Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy , vol. 26, 
+no. 1 (2009), pp. 82, 114. 
+
+44 21 C.F.R. §720.4. 
+45 FDA, “Using Adverse Event Reports to Monitor Cosmetic Safety,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/how-report-
+cosmetic-related-complaint/using-adverse-event-reports-monitor-cosmetic-safety. 
+
+46 21 C.F.R. Part 7, Subpart C. Note: these regulations apply to all products subject to FDA’s jurisdiction. 
+47 FFDCA §§301-304 (21 U.S.C. §§331-334). 
+48 FDA’s authority over cosmetic products is based primarily on FFDCA provisions on cosmetics, color additives, and 
+drugs. The agency also has authority under FPLA for labeling requirements. Other agencies may use their own 
+authorities to regulate certain aspects of cosmetic products (e.g., the Federal Trade Commission regulates the 
+advertising of cosmetics). 
+
+49 FDA, “Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) Guidelines/Inspection Checklist,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/
+cosmetics-guidance-documents/good-manufacturing-practice-gmp-guidelinesinspection-checklist-cosmetics. 
+
+50 FDA, “Inspection of Cosmetics,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-compliance-enforcement/inspection-
+cosmetics. 
+
+51 FFDCA §721 (21 U.S.C. §379e); FFDCA §509 (21 U.S.C. §359). Premarket approval for color additives was 
+established in 1960 with the Color Additive Amendments of 1960 (P.L. 86-618). A color additive is basically defined 
+as a substance that, when added or applied to a cosmetic or the body, is capable of imparting coloring. Examples of 
+cosmetics with color additives include lipstick, blush, and eye makeup. FFDCA §201(t) (21 U.S.C. §321(t)). Regarding 
+(continued...) 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+6 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+generally are reviewed by FDA prior to marketing to ensure they meet FFDCA requirements for 
+safety and effectiveness.52 
+
+After decades of minimal regulatory development for cosmetic products, on December 29, 2022, 
+Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (CAA, 2023).53 The CAA, 2023, 
+included MoCRA,54 which has established several new FDA authorities and responsibilities 
+related to cosmetics regulation. Although MoCRA addresses many stakeholder concerns, some 
+remain outstanding. 
+
+ The Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 
+2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ Table 1. New FFDCA Sections Added by MoCRA Section 3502 
+
+FFDCA Section 604 
+
+Definitions 
+
+FFDCA Section 605 
+
+Adverse Events 
+
+FFDCA Section 606 
+
+Good Manufacturing Practice 
+
+FFDCA Section 607 
+
+Registration and Product Listing 
+
+FFDCA Section 608 
+
+Safety Substantiation 
+
+FFDCA Section 609 
+
+Labeling 
+
+FFDCA Section 610 
+
+Records 
+
+FFDCA Section 611 
+
+Mandatory Recall Authority 
+
+FFDCA Section 612 
+
+Small Businesses 
+
+FFDCA Section 613 
+
+Exemption for Certain Products and Facilities 
+
+FFDCA Section 614 
+
+Preemption 
+
+ Source: P.L. 117-328, Division FF, Title III, Subtitle E—Cosmetics, §3502. 
+
+According to FDA, MoCRA is “the most significant expansion of the FDA’s authority to regulate 
+cosmetics since the [FFDCA] was passed in 1938.”55 The bulk of amendments made to the 
+FFDCA are outlined in Section 3502 of MoCRA.56 Broadly, MoCRA grants FDA a host of new 
+authorities to protect consumer safety. These authorities include the ability, under some 
+circumstances, for FDA to access specific types of cosmetic product records and issue mandatory 
+cosmetic product recalls.57 In addition, MoCRA establishes new industry requirements, including 
+reporting adverse events to FDA, registering manufacturing and processing facilities with FDA, 
+listing marketed products and their ingredients with FDA, and maintaining records of safety 
+
+ 
+
+safety substantiation expectations, see 21 C.F.R. §740.10 and FDA, “Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Products Warning 
+Statements,” 40 Federal Register 8912, 8916, March 3, 1975. 
+52 FFDCA §505 (21 U.S.C. §355). 
+53 P.L. 117-328. 
+54 P.L. 117-328, Division FF, Title III, Subtitle E—Cosmetics. 
+55 FDA, “Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-laws-
+regulations/modernization-cosmetics-regulation-act-2022. 
+
+56 MoCRA §3502. 
+57 Ibid. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+7 
+
+ 
+ link to page 15 Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+substantiation for cosmetic products.58 Furthermore, MoCRA requires that industry follow 
+forthcoming FDA regulations regarding good manufacturing practices (GMP) for cosmetic 
+manufacturing facilities, fragrance allergen labeling, and standardized testing methods for 
+detecting and identifying asbestos in talc-containing cosmetics.59 For some small businesses, 
+certain exemptions to specific requirements introduced under MoCRA may also apply.60 These 
+new requirements for cosmetics pursuant to MoCRA, as well as select enforcement mechanisms 
+related to those requirements, are described below. 
+
+ Cosmetic Regulatory Controls 
+
+ Premarket Requirements 
+
+Unlike its authority over drugs and some devices, FDA does not have the authority, either pre- or 
+post-MoCRA, to require premarket approval of cosmetics or their ingredients, except for color 
+additives.61 Prior to MoCRA, it was FDA’s position that manufacturers were responsible for 
+substantiating the safety of their products and ingredients before the products were marketed.62 
+
+With the passage of MoCRA, manufacturers are now statutorily required to substantiate the safety 
+of their products. MoCRA also expands upon required recordkeeping by manufacturers, packers, 
+and distributors. A “responsible person”63 for a cosmetic product must ensure that it has been 
+adequately tested to substantiate safety,64 and that records supporting this substantiation are 
+maintained by the same responsible person.65 Certain products and facilities already regulated 
+under Chapter V of FFDCA as a drug or device are exempt from MoCRA’s safety substantiation 
+and recordkeeping requirements.66 However, if such a facility also manufactures or processes 
+cosmetic products not subject to FFDCA Chapter V, the exemption does not apply to those 
+particular cosmetic products.67 
+
+ 
+
+58 Ibid. 
+59 Ibid. 
+60 Ibid. 
+61 FDA, “FDA Authority Over Cosmetics: How Cosmetics Are Not FDA-Approved, but Are FDA-Regulated,” 
+https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-laws-regulations/fda-authority-over-cosmetics-how-cosmetics-are-not-fda-
+approved-are-fda-regulated. FFDCA §721 (21 U.S.C. §379e) addresses color additive safety. 
+
+62 FDA, “Product Testing of Cosmetics,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-science-research/product-testing-
+cosmetics. 
+
+63 Under the newly MoCRA-added FFDCA §604(4) (21 U.S.C. §364(4)), a “responsible person” is defined as “the 
+manufacturer, packer, or distributor of a cosmetic product whose name appears on the label of such cosmetic product in 
+accordance with section 609(a) of [the FFDCA] or section 4(a) of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act.” 
+
+64 Under FFDCA §608(c)(1) (21 U.S.C. §364d(c)(1)), “adequate substantiation of safety” is defined as “tests or studies, 
+research, analyses, or other evidence or information that is considered, among experts qualified by scientific training 
+and experience to evaluate the safety of cosmetic products and their ingredients, sufficient to support a reasonable 
+certainty that a cosmetic product is safe.” In turn, “safe” means “the cosmetic product, including any ingredient thereof, 
+is not injurious to users under the conditions of use prescribed in the labeling thereof, or under such conditions of use as 
+are customary or usual.” It is noted that a cosmetic ingredient will not be considered injurious if it simply causes 
+“minor and transient reactions or minor and transient skin irritations in some users.” To determine safety, “the 
+Secretary may consider, as appropriate and available, the cumulative or other relevant exposure to the cosmetic 
+product, including any ingredient thereof.” FFDCA §608(c)(2) (21 U.S.C. §364d(c)(2)). 
+
+65 FFDCA §608(a) (21 U.S.C. §364d(a)). The coal-tar hair dye exemption is preserved under MoCRA, though a 
+responsible person must maintain records related to the safety of coal-tar hair dye products. FFDCA §608(b) (21 U.S.C. 
+§364d(b)). For more information on the coal-tar hair dye exemption, see footno te 96. 
+
+66 FFDCA §613(a) (21 U.S.C. §364i(a)). 
+67 FFDCA §613(b) (21 U.S.C. §364i(b)). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+8 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+ Enforcement 
+
+Among various enforcement mechanisms, under MoCRA, FDA may access and copy all records 
+related to a cosmetic product that it reasonably believes is likely adulterated and a serious danger 
+to humans. FDA may access and copy all records necessary to determine whether a cosmetic or 
+related product is adulterated and a serious threat to human health, barring certain cosmetic 
+formula, personnel, research, and financial data records. Accessible records include those related 
+to safety substantiation data for cosmetic products and their ingredients.68 
+
+ Registration and Listing 
+
+Prior to MoCRA, cosmetic manufacturers were not required to register their establishments or list 
+their products with FDA. Instead, according to FDA regulations, owners or operators of 
+establishments that manufactured or packaged cosmetics were requested to register with FDA.69 
+Likewise, previous to MoCRA, manufacturers, packers, and distributors of cosmetic products 
+were requested to file a cosmetic product ingredient statement (CPIS) containing certain 
+information on each cosmetic product they marketed.70 Entities could submit registration 
+information and CPISs to FDA’s Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program (VCRP).71 
+
+Under MoCRA, both facility72 registration and product listings are now required.73 Existing and 
+new facilities that manufacture or process cosmetic products for distribution in the United States 
+must be registered with FDA. These registrations must be renewed every two years and updated 
+within 60 days of a content revision.74 Domestic facilities registering with FDA must provide the 
+facility’s name, physical address, email address, and phone number, while foreign facilities must 
+provide contact information for an agent within the United States and, if available, electronic 
+contact information. Additionally, a facility must include its registration number, if one was 
+previously assigned, and all brand names associated with cosmetic products sold that were 
+manufactured or processed at that facility. The product categories and responsible person for each 
+cosmetic product manufactured or processed at the facility must also be provided.75 
+
+Each responsible person must also ensure the submission of a cosmetic product listing with FDA 
+that is renewed and updated annually.76 The product listing must contain the manufacturing or 
+processing facility’s registration number, the responsible person’s name and contact number, the 
+name of the cosmetic product as it appears on the label, the categories the cosmetic product falls 
+under, and the product’s listing number. Additionally, the product listing must include a list of the 
+cosmetic product’s ingredients, “including any fragrances, flavors, or colors, with each ingredient 
+
+ 
+
+68 FFDCA §610 (21 U.S.C. §364f). 
+69 21 C.F.R. §710. 
+70 21 C.F.R. Part 720. 
+71 FDA, “Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/voluntary-cosmetic-registration-
+program. 
+
+72 A “facility” is generally defined as “any establishment (including an establishment of an importer) that manufactures 
+or processes cosmetic products distributed in the United States.” FFDCA §604(3) (21 U.S.C. §364(3)). 
+
+73 FFDCA §607 (21 U.S.C. §364c). 
+74 FFDCA §607(a) (21 U.S.C. §364c(a)). 
+75 FFDCA §607(b) (21 U.S.C. §364c(b)). 
+76 For existing facilities engaging in the manufacturing or processing of cosmetic products at the time of MoCRA’s 
+enactment, such registration must occur no later than December 29, 2023. For facilities that begin manufacturing or 
+processing cosmetic products after MoCRA’s enactment, such registration must occur within 60 days of initial activity 
+or 60 days after December 29, 2023, whichever is later. FFDCA §607(a) (21 U.S.C. §364c(a)). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+9 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+identified by name.”77 FDA will assign private product and facility identification numbers upon 
+initial listing submission or registration.78 
+
+With the advent of MoCRA, FDA reported the VCRP had been discontinued and was no longer 
+accepting submissions. In a draft guidance released in August 2023, FDA stated it is developing a 
+new electronic submission portal for registration and listing information.79 FDA noted that this 
+new portal is expected to be available by October 2023.80 In the interim, FDA requests that no 
+registration or listing information be sent to the agency, adding that information previously listed 
+in the VCRP will not be transferred.81 In September 2023, FDA released for comment draft 
+versions of the prospective electronic submission portal, Cosmetics Direct, and paper forms.82 
+
+MoCRA exempts certain small businesses83 from both facility registration and product listing 
+requirements.84 However, a small business is not exempt from these requirements if it is engaged 
+in the manufacturing or processing of higher-risk cosmetic products that “regularly come into 
+contact with [the] mucus membrane of the eye under conditions of use that are customary or 
+usual,” “[c]osmetic products that are injected” (see the text box below), “intended for internal 
+use,” or that are meant to “alter [one’s] appearance for more than 24 hours under conditions of 
+use that are customary or usual and removal by the consumer is not part of such conditions of use 
+that are customary or usual.”85 
+
+ Injected Cosmetics: Tattoo Inks 
+
+In 2019, one in three Americans reported having at least one tattoo. The ink used in tattooing, including for both 
+decorative and medical purposes, is classified by FDA as a cosmetic. Consequently, the pigments used in tattoo 
+inks are considered color additives and would typically be subject to premarket review. Traditionally, FDA has 
+chosen not to enforce this authority, citing “competing public health priorities and a previous lack of evidence of 
+safety problems specifically associated with these pigments.” However, over the years, reports of adverse events 
+related to tattooing have prompted increased FDA scrutiny. For example, there have been multiple voluntary 
+recalls of tattoo inks, often due to microbial contamination. In one independent survey of sealed tattoo and 
+permanent makeup inks in the United States cited by FDA, 49% were contaminated with microorganisms, 
+including fungi and pathogenic bacteria. Other pigments that have been identified in tattoo inks are chemically 
+similar or identical to industrial paints and printer inks. MoCRA specifically amends FFDCA by adding Section 
+612(b)(2), which ensures that injected cosmetics may not be exempted from future GMP and registration and 
+product listing requirements. In June 2023, FDA released a draft guidance for industry entitled “Insanitary 
+Conditions in the Preparation, Packing, and Holding of Tattoo Inks and the Risk of Microbial Contamination.” 
+
+ 
+
+77 FFDCA §607(c) (21 U.S.C. §364c(c)). 
+78 FFDCA §607(d) (21 U.S.C. §364c(d)). 
+79 FDA, Registration and Listing of Cosmetic Product Facilities and Products: Guidance for Industry , FDA-2023-D-
+1716, August 2023, p. 10. 
+
+80 FDA, “FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Registration and Listing of Cosmetic Product Facilities and Products,” 
+https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-news-events/fda-issues-draft-guidance-registration-and-listing-cosmetic-
+product-facilities-and-products?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery. 
+
+81 FDA, “FDA Has Stopped Accepting Submissions to the Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program (VCRP),” 
+https://www.fda.gov/food/cfsan-constituent-updates/fda-has-stopped-accepting-submissions-voluntary-cosmetic-
+registration-program-vcrp. 
+
+82 FDA, “FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Registration and Listing of Cosmetic Product Facilities and Products,” 
+https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-news-events/fda-issues-draft-guidance-registration-and-listing-cosmetic-
+product-facilities-and-products. 
+
+83 A “small business” is defined as a facility that has “average gross annual sales in the United States of cosmetic 
+products for the previous 3-year period [that are] less than $1,000,000, adjusted for inflation.” FFDCA §612(a) (21 
+U.S.C. §364h(a)). 
+
+84 FFDCA §612(a) (21 U.S.C. §364h(a)). 
+85 FFDCA §612(b) (21 U.S.C. §364h(b)). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+10 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+ Sources: Jessica C. Dixon, “The Perils of Body Art: FDA Regulation of Tattoo and Micropigmentation 
+Pigments,” Administrative Law Review , vol. 58, no. 3 (Summer 2006), p. 668; FDA, Insanitary Conditions in the 
+Preparation, Packing, and Holding of Tattoo Inks and the Risk of Microbial Contamination: Guidance for Industry , FDA-
+2023-D-1083, June 2023; FDA, “Tattoos & Permanent Makeup: Fact Sheet,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/
+cosmetic-products/tattoos-permanent-makeup-fact-sheet; and S.W. Nho et al., “Microbiological Survey of 
+Commercial Tattoo and Permanent Makeup Inks Available in the United States,” Journal of Applied Microbiology , 
+vol. 124, no. 5 (May 2018), p. 1296. 
+
+Additionally, certain products and facilities already regulated under Chapter V of FFDCA as a 
+drug or device are exempt from facility registration and product listing requirements.86 However, 
+if such a facility also manufactures or processes cosmetic products not subject to FFDCA Chapter 
+V, the exemption does not apply.87 
+
+ Enforcement 
+
+Under MoCRA, if FDA determines that a cosmetic product has a reasonable probability of 
+causing serious harm to human health, and if FDA has a reasonable belief that other products 
+manufactured or processed at the same facility may be similarly affected, FDA may suspend the 
+registration of the facility connected with such products.88 If a facility’s registration is suspended, 
+any cosmetic product from that facility is barred from introduction or delivery for introduction 
+into U.S. commerce.89 
+
+Before suspending a facility’s registration, the FDA must provide notice to a responsible person 
+for the facility specifying the reason for suspension, as well as an opportunity, within five 
+business days of the notice, to present a plan to correct the issue identified.90 FDA must provide 
+the responsible person with the opportunity for an informal hearing to review actions required for 
+registration reinstatement and why the facility registration should be reinstated.91 If, based upon 
+the evidence presented at this informal hearing, FDA determines there are inadequate grounds to 
+continue the suspension, the facility registration will be restored.92 However, if there is 
+insufficient evidence presented, the suspension may continue, and FDA shall require the 
+responsible person to submit a corrective action plan for review.93 
+
+If at any point FDA determines there is inadequate evidence to justify the continued suspension of 
+a facility’s registration, the registration shall be promptly reinstated.94 
+
+ Adulterated and Misbranded Cosmetics 
+
+Since its passage in 1938, the FFDCA has prohibited the adulteration and misbranding of 
+cosmetics. It also prohibits the introduction, receipt, and delivery of adulterated or misbranded 
+cosmetics into interstate commerce and may take enforcement actions in such instances.95 
+
+A cosmetic is deemed adulterated—and potentially subject to FDA enforcement actions—if it 
+
+ 
+
+86 FFDCA §613(a) (21 U.S.C. §364i(a)). 
+87 FFDCA §613(b) (21 U.S.C. §364i(b)). 
+88 FFDCA §607(f) (21 U.S.C. §364c(f)). 
+89 Ibid. 
+90 Ibid. 
+91 Ibid. 
+92 Ibid. 
+93 Ibid. 
+94 Ibid. 
+95 FFDCA §§301(a)-(c) (21 U.S.C. §§331(a)-(c)). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+11 
+
+ 
+ link to page 5 Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+• “bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it 
+
+injurious to users under the conditions of use prescribed in the labeling ... except 
+that this provision shall not apply to coal-tar hair dye”; 96 
+
+• consists of “any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance”; 
+• was “prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have 
+
+become contaminated” or “rendered injurious to health”; 
+
+• is in a container composed of “any poisonous or deleterious substance which may 
+
+render the contents injurious to health”; 
+
+• contains an unsafe color additive, except for hair dyes;97 
+• “has been manufactured or processed under conditions that do not meet the good 
+
+manufacturing practice requirements of [FFDCA] section 606”; or 
+
+• “is a cosmetic product, and the cosmetic product, including each ingredient in the 
+
+cosmetic product, does not have adequate substantiation for safety, as defined in 
+[FFDCA] section 608(c).’’98 
+
+FDA has issued rules restricting the use of certain ingredients in cosmetic products. If FDA 
+determines that a cosmetic’s ingredients are poisonous or deleterious, that cosmetic is considered 
+adulterated.99 One example of an adulterated cosmetic is the use of henna, also known as mehndi, 
+for temporary skin decoration.100 Although the color additive used in henna products is allowed 
+for hair dye, it is not allowed for direct skin contact.101 Therefore, under FDA regulations, the use 
+of henna for skin decoration renders the product “adulterated.”102 
+
+Under the FFDCA, a cosmetic is deemed misbranded if 
+
+• the “labeling is false or misleading in any particular”; 
+• the label lacks required information;103 
+
+ 
+
+96 FFDCA §601 (21 U.S.C. §361). 21 C.F.R. §740.18. “The coal tar hair dye exemption allows coal tar hair dyes, not 
+intended for use on eyelashes or eyebrows, to be marketed to consumers, even if they have been found to be injurious 
+to the user under conditions of use” (see footno te 9, Bailey, p. 220). The label for coal-tar hair dye products must 
+contain the statutorily required caution statement to be considered unadulterated, as well as “adequate directions for 
+conducting such preliminary testing,” which are not specified by FDA, but rather have been set as a self-evaluation 
+patch test with a wait time of 48 hours by the industry-established Cosmetic Ingredient Review (CIR) (Bailey, pp. 219-
+220). If the coal-tar hair dye product does not contain that information, the coal-tar dye is “subject to regulation as a 
+cosmetic coal additive and must be approved by FDA and listed in the CFR before marketing” (Bailey, p. 220). In 
+1952, a congressional committee report recommended the elimination of the coal-tar hair dye exemption (Hutt, “A 
+History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Cosmetics,” p. 25). The Government 
+Accountability Office (GAO) also issued a report in the late 1970s recommending the elimination of this exemption 
+(Hutt, p. 27). 
+
+97 FFDCA §601 (21 U.S.C. §361). 
+98 FFDCA §601 (21 U.S.C. §361). Note that the last two bullets were added under MoCRA §3503. 
+99 FFDCA §601(a) (21 U.S.C. §361(a)). 
+100 Henna, also known as mehndi, is a form of temporary body-decoration that uses a colored paste, derived from the 
+henna plant, directly applied to the skin. Carrie G. Basas, “Henna Tattooing: Cultural Tradition Meets Regulation,” 
+ Food and Drug Law Journal , vol. 62, no. 4 (2007), pp. 779, 781. 
+
+101 Ibid. FDA Import Alert 53-19, December, 2010, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms_ia/importalert_138.html. 
+102 Ibid. 
+103 FFDCA §602 (21. U.S.C. §362). 21 C.F.R. §701.11 (identity labeling); 21 C.F.R. §701.12 (name and place of 
+business or manufacturer, packer, or distributor); 21 C.F.R. §701.13 (declaration of net quantity of contents); 21 C.F.R. 
+701.3 (designation of ingredients); 21 C.F.R. §201.66 (format and content requirements for over-the-counter [OTC] 
+drug product labeling); 21 C.F.R. §1.21 (failure to reveal material facts); 21 C.F.R. Parts 700 (general) and 740 
+(continued...) 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+12 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+• the required labeling information is not prominently placed and “in such terms as 
+
+to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under 
+customary conditions of purchase and use”; 
+
+• the “container is so made, formed, or filled as to be misleading”; 
+• the use of a color additive does not conform to packaging and labeling 
+
+requirements; or 
+
+• the packaging or labeling violates the regulations issued under the Poison 
+
+Prevention Packaging Act of 1970.104 
+
+Cosmetic products that meet the FPLA’s definition of a “consumer commodity”105 are considered 
+misbranded under the FFDCA if they do not comply with FPLA’s requirements.106 Consumer 
+commodity (retail) cosmetic products subject to the FPLA are required to bear a label that 
+identifies the product and the name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or 
+distributor, as well as the net quantity of contents on the principal display panel.107 The net 
+quantity of contents information must be declared in a legible type size that is uniform for 
+packages of about the same size.108 FDA’s ingredient labeling rules, issued under the authority of 
+the FPLA, require ingredients be listed on cosmetic products in descending order of 
+predominance.109 
+
+ 
+
+(cosmetic product warning statements). Note that FFDCA §602(b) (21 U.S.C. §362(b)) has been amended under 
+MoCRA §3503. 
+
+104 FFDCA §602 (21 U.S.C. §362). FDA regulations provide that “[t]he labeling of a cosmetic which contains two or 
+more ingredients may be misleading by reason ... of the designation of such cosmetic in such labeling by a name which 
+includes or suggests the name of one or more but not all such ingredients, even though the names of all such ingredients 
+are stated elsewhere in the labeling.” 21 C.F.R. §701.1(b). 
+105 “Consumer commodity” refers to those cosmetic items as defined by FFDCA §201(i) that are usually produced or 
+distributed for sale for use by individuals. FPLA §10(a) (15 U.S.C. §1459(a)). 
+
+106 FPLA §7(a) (15 U.S.C. §1456(a)). The FPLA provision on unfair and deceptive packaging and labeling makes it 
+unlawful for persons engaged in packing or labeling consumer commodities to distribute, or cause to be distributed, a 
+consumer commodity in a package or with a label that does not meet the FPLA provisions. FPLA §3(a) (15 U.S.C. 
+§1452(a)). 
+
+107 FPLA §4 (15 U.S.C. §1453). The principal display panel is “that part of a label that is most likely to be displayed, 
+presented, shown, or examined under normal and customary conditions of display for retail sale.” FPLA §10(f) (15 
+U.S.C. §1459(f)); 21 C.F.R. §701.10. 
+
+108 FPLA §4(a)(3) (15 U.S.C. §1453(a)(3)); 21 C.F.R. §701.2 (form of stating labeling requirements). 
+109 FPLA §5(c)(3) (15 U.S.C. §1454(c)(3)); 21 C.F.R. §701.3(a). However, FDA’s regulation does “not require the 
+declaration of incidental ingredients that are present in a cosmetic at insignificant levels and that have no technical or 
+functional effect in the cosmetic,” such as processing aids. 21 C.F.R. §701.3(l). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+13 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+ Enforcement 
+
+If a cosmetic is deemed adulterated or misbranded, FDA may take enforcement actions.110 FDA 
+may issue import alerts111 and warning letters112 to entities that manufacture or distribute a 
+violative product. Other enforcement actions may include, with assistance from the Department 
+of Justice, seeking an injunction (which could prevent a company from making or distributing the 
+violative product), seizing the violative product, or seeking criminal penalties.113 
+
+ Mandatory Recall 
+
+Prior to MoCRA, FDA did not have the authority to order mandatory recalls of cosmetic 
+products. The agency could, however, request a company to voluntarily recall cosmetic products 
+of concern.114 Under MoCRA, a responsible person may still have the opportunity to voluntarily 
+recall an adulterated or misbranded cosmetic; however, now FDA also has the authority to issue a 
+mandatory recall.115 A mandatory recall may be initiated “[i]f the Secretary determines that there 
+is a reasonable probability that a cosmetic is adulterated … or misbranded … and the use of or 
+exposure to such cosmetic will cause serious adverse health consequences or death,” and the 
+responsible person refuses to comply with a voluntary recall in a timely manner. Upon FDA 
+issuing an order for a mandatory recall, the responsible person must immediately stop distributing 
+the identified product.116 
+
+If such an order is issued, the responsible person is entitled to an opportunity for a timely 
+informal hearing to review the adequacy of evidence for the order.117 Depending on the outcome 
+of this review, the order may be vacated, continued until a specified date, or amended to further 
+require the recall of the cosmetic product, along with other measures regarding notifications, 
+timetables, and updates.118 FDA may require the responsible person to issue a notice of recall or 
+ceased distribution to appropriate persons, including manufacturers, distributors, importers, and 
+
+ 
+
+110 FDA, “FDA Authority Over Cosmetics: How Cosmetics Are Not FDA-Approved, but Are FDA-Regulated,” 
+https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-laws-regulations/fda-authority-over-cosmetics-how-cosmetics-are-not-fda-
+approved-are-fda-regulated. Note, however, that FDA has enforcement discretion, meaning the agency may choose not 
+to enforce certain provisions of the FFDCA depending on factors such as agency priorities and available resources. See 
+CRS Report R43609, Enforcement of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Select Legal Issues (particularly the “Does 
+FDA Address Every Violation of the FD&C Act?” section). 
+
+111 FDA, “Cosmetics Importers,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-international-activities/cosmetics-
+importers. Import alerts inform both FDA employees and members of the public that FDA has enough evidence to 
+detain certain products that appear to be in violation of FDA regulations. For more information, see FDA, “Import 
+Alerts,” https://www.fda.gov/industry/actions-enforcement/import-alerts. 
+112 Warning letters notify entities that FDA believes they have violated a regulation or law and sets forth what 
+corrective action the entity needs to take to rectify the situation. Warning letters have been issued to a number of 
+entities for a variety of cosmetics-related issues. For more information, see FDA, “Warning Letters Related to 
+Cosmetics,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-compliance-enforcement/warning-letters-related-cosmetics. 
+113 FDA, “FDA Authority Over Cosmetics: How Cosmetics Are Not FDA-Approved, but Are FDA-Regulated,” 
+https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-laws-regulations/fda-authority-over-cosmetics-how-cosmetics-are-not-fda-
+approved-are-fda-regulated; FFDCA §§301-304 (21 U.S.C. §§331-334). 
+
+114 FDA, “FDA Recall Policy for Cosmetics,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-recalls-alerts/fda-recall-policy-
+cosmetics; 21 C.F.R. §7.40(b); FDA, Regulatory Procedures Manual , July 2021, chap. 7, at https://www.fda.gov/
+media/71814/download. 
+
+115 FFDCA §611 (21 U.S.C. §364g). 
+116 FFDCA §611(a) (21 U.S.C. §364g(a)). 
+117 FFDCA §611(b) (21 U.S.C. §364g(b)). 
+118 FFDCA §611(c) (21 U.S.C. §364g(c)). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+14 
+
+ 
+ link to page 12 link to page 11 Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+sellers.119 If a product is recalled, FDA must ensure that a press release announcing the action is 
+published, as well as appropriate alerts and public notices, to provide consumers and retailers 
+with information about the cosmetic product and the circumstances of the recall. If an image of 
+the product is available and appropriate, FDA shall also ensure the publication of that image on 
+its website.120 Certain products and facilities already regulated under Chapter V of FFDCA as a 
+drug or device are exempt from MoCRA’s mandatory recall authority.121 However, if such a 
+facility also manufactures or processes cosmetic products not subject to FFDCA Chapter V, the 
+exemption does not apply to those particular cosmetic products.122 
+
+ Enforcement 
+
+Again, under MoCRA, FDA may access and copy all records related to a cosmetic product that it 
+reasonably believes is likely adulterated and a serious danger to humans.123 
+
+ Labeling 
+
+Consumers may seek out particular cosmetics based on their labeling, such as those claiming to 
+be made with organic ingredients or not tested on animals. However, FDA does not define certain 
+terms used by manufacturers, including “organic” and “not tested on animals.”124 Though this 
+specifically has not changed under MoCRA, the new act does introduce certain labeling 
+requirements.125 
+
+Under MoCRA, cosmetic product labels must include a domestic address, domestic phone 
+number, or electronic contact information (e.g., a website) through which a responsible person 
+may be contacted regarding adverse events in response to usage of the product.126 Cosmetic 
+product labels must also identify each fragrance allergen contained in the product.127 For cosmetic 
+products intended only for professional use,128 labels must include “a clear and prominent 
+statement that the product shall be administered or used only by licensed professionals,” and meet 
+the labelling requirements of the FFDCA and FPLA Section 4(a).129 
+
+ 
+
+119 FFDCA §611(e) (21 U.S.C. §364g(e)). 
+120 FFDCA §611(f) (21 U.S.C. §364g(f)). 
+121 FFDCA §613(a) (21 U.S.C. §364i(a)). 
+122 FFDCA §613(b) (21 U.S.C. §364i(b)). 
+123 FFDCA §610 (21 U.S.C. §364f). For further details on records access, see the “Enforcement” subsection in the 
+ “Premarket Requirements” section of this report. 
+124 FDA, “‘Organic’ Cosmetics,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-labeling-claims/organic-cosmetics; FDA, 
+“‘Cruelty Free’/‘Not Tested on Animals,’” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-labeling-claims/cruelty-freenot-
+tested-animals. 
+
+125 MoCRA §3507 does, however, state that “[i]t is the sense of the Congress that animal testing should not be used for 
+the purposes of safety testing on cosmetic products and should be phased out with the exception of appropriate 
+allowances.” 
+126 FFDCA §609(a) (21 U.S.C. §364e(a)). FFDCA §609(a) is to take effect on December 29, 2024. MoCRA 
+§3503(b)(2) (21 U.S.C. §364e note). FFDCA §609(a) does not apply if the cosmetic product or facility is already 
+regulated under Chapter V of FFDCA as a drug or device. FFDCA §613(a) (21 U.S.C. §364i(a)). However, if such a 
+facility also manufactures or processes cosmetic products not subject to FFDCA Chapter V, the exemption does not 
+apply to those particular cosmetic products. FFDCA §613(b) (21 U.S.C. §364i(b)). 
+
+127 FFDCA §609(b) (21 U.S.C. §364e(b)). 
+128 In this context, “professional” is defined as “an individual who is licensed by an official State authority to practice 
+in the field of cosmetology, nail care, barbering, or esthetics.” FFDCA §609(c)(1) (21 U.S.C. §364e(c)(1)). 
+129 FFDCA §609(c)(2) (21 U.S.C. §364e(c)(2)). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+15 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+ Enforcement 
+
+What constitutes a fragrance allergen is to be decided by FDA via rulemaking. Pursuant to this 
+rulemaking, FDA is to consider “international, State, and local requirements for allergen 
+disclosure, including the substance and format of requirements in the European Union, and may 
+establish threshold levels of amounts of substances subject to disclosure.”130 A notice of proposed 
+rulemaking must be issued no later than June 29, 2024, with a final rule promulgated no later than 
+180 days after the close of the proposed rule’s public comment period.131 
+
+ Good Manufacturing Practices 
+
+Prior to MoCRA, cosmetic product manufacturing was not subject to good manufacturing 
+practices (GMP). Instead, FDA had published a draft guidance in 1997, which was later updated 
+in 2008 and 2013, recommending GMP for cosmetic products.132 FDA had also published a web 
+page containing cosmetic establishment instructions, adapted from its Inspection Operations 
+Manual, meant to “serve as guidelines for effective [establishment] self-inspection.” FDA noted 
+that “[a] good inspection score means that an establishment follows good manufacturing 
+practices.”133 
+
+With the passage of MoCRA, FDA has been tasked with establishing GMP via rulemaking.134 
+Subsequently, FDA announced that it plans to withdraw or revise, then reissue, the 2013 draft 
+guidance.135 Under MoCRA, these GMP should be consistent with, to the degree practicable, 
+national and international standards.136 The intent of the GMP should be to “protect the public 
+health and ensure that cosmetic products are not adulterated.”137 These requirements must also be 
+scalable to the size and scope of the businesses subject to them to ensure that smaller businesses 
+are not exposed to undue hardship.138 In developing these GMP, FDA is to consult with cosmetic 
+manufacturers, including smaller businesses.139 
+
+ 
+
+130 FFDCA §609(b) (21 U.S.C. §364e(b)). 
+131 Ibid. 
+132 FDA, Guidance for Industry: Cosmetic Good Manufacturing Practices (Draft Guidance) , June 2013. 
+133 FDA, “Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) Guidelines/Inspection Checklist for Cosmetics,” https://www.fda.gov/
+cosmetics/cosmetics-guidance-documents/good-manufacturing-practice-gmp-guidelinesinspection-checklist-cosmetics. 
+
+134 FFDCA §606(a) (21 U.S.C. §364b(a)). 
+135 FDA, “Draft Guidance for Industry: Cosmetic Good Manufacturing Practices,” https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-
+information/search-fda-guidance-documents/draft-guidance-industry-cosmetic-good-manufacturing-practices. 
+
+136 FFDCA §606(a) (21 U.S.C. §364b(a)). 
+137 Ibid. 
+138 FFDCA §606(b) (21 U.S.C. §364b(b)). FFDCA Section 606 (GMP) does not apply to certain small businesses. 
+FFDCA §612(a) (21 U.S.C. §364h(a)). However, a small business is not exempt from these GMP requirements if it is 
+engaged in the manufacturing or processing of cosmetic products that “regularly come into contact with [the] mucus 
+membrane of the eye under conditions of use that are customary or usual,” “[c]osmetic products that are injected,” 
+“intended for internal use,” or that are meant to “alter [one’s] appearance for more than 24 hours under conditions of 
+use that are customary or usual and removal by the consumer is not part of such conditions of use that are customary or 
+usual.” FFDCA §612(b) (21 U.S.C. §364h(b)). Additionally, certain products and facilities that are already regulated 
+under Chapter V of FFDCA as a drug or device are exempt from GMP. FFDCA §613(a) (21 U.S.C. §364i(a)). 
+However, if such a facility also manufactures or processes cosmetic products not subject to FFDCA Chapter V, the 
+exemption does not apply to those particular cosmetic products. FFDCA §613(b) (21 U.S.C. §364i(b)). 
+
+139 Ibid. FDA held a listening session to facilitate these consultations on June 1, 2023. FDA, “Public Meeting: Good 
+Manufacturing Practices for Cosmetic Products,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-news-events/public-
+meeting-good-manufacturing-practices-cosmetic-products-06012023. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+16 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+ Enforcement 
+
+To ensure these GMP are followed, MoCRA allows for the inspection of facility records to 
+demonstrate compliance during a larger facility inspection, an authority that predated MoCRA.140 
+Regarding a timeline for the implementation of these GMP, MoCRA requires that a notice of 
+proposed rulemaking be published no later than December 29, 2024, and that a final rule 
+published no later than December 29, 2025.141 
+
+ Reporting Adverse Events and Reactions to Cosmetics 
+
+Prior to MoCRA, FDA did not have the statutory authority to require cosmetic manufacturers to 
+notify the agency of adverse events associated with their products, nor could it require cosmetic 
+companies to report information received from consumers and others regarding adverse events.142 
+Consequently, before MoCRA was enacted, FDA relied exclusively on voluntary reports of 
+adverse events from cosmetic companies and consumers. The public could report adverse events 
+to FDA via MedWatch, the FDA’s product safety reporting program.143 
+
+Under MoCRA, a responsible person for a particular cosmetic product used domestically must 
+report associated serious adverse events144 to FDA.145 It is expected that the responsible person 
+will be informed of such events via the required contact information listed on the product’s 
+label.146 Upon learning of an adverse event, a responsible person must relay this information to 
+FDA, along with a copy of the specific product’s label, within 15 business days.147 For one year 
+following this initial report, the responsible person must update FDA on “any new and material 
+medical information” related to the serious adverse event within 15 business days of receipt.148 In 
+addition to reporting a serious adverse event, the responsible person must also maintain related 
+records for a period of six years.149 However, if a responsible person represents a small business 
+that does not engage in the manufacturing or processing of higher-risk cosmetic products, records 
+
+ 
+
+140 FFDCA §606(a) (21 U.S.C. §364b(a)). FDA has the authority to inspect any establishment in which cosmetics are 
+manufactured, processed, packed, or held, before or after introduction into interstate commerce, and any vehicle used to 
+transport such cosmetics in interstate commerce. FFDCA §704(a) (21 U.S.C. §374(a)). 
+
+141 FFDCA §606(c) (21 U.S.C. §364b(c)). 
+142 FDA, “How to Report a Cosmetic Related Complaint,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-compliance-
+enforcement/how-report-cosmetic-related-complaint. 
+
+143 FDA, “MedWatch: The FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting Program,” https://www.fda.gov/
+safety/medwatch-fda-safety-information-and-adverse-event-reporting-program. 
+
+144 An “adverse event” is defined as “any health-related event associated with the use of a cosmetic product that is 
+adverse.” FFDCA §604(1) (21 U.S.C. §364(1)). A “serious adverse event” is categorized as “an adverse event that … 
+results in … death[,] a life-threatening experience[,] inpatient hospitalization[,] a persistent or significant disability or 
+incapacity[,] a congenital anomaly or birth defect[,] an infection[,] or significant disfigurement (including serious and 
+persistent rashes, second- or third-degree burns, significant hair loss, or persistent or significant alteration of 
+appearance), other than as intended, under conditions of use that are customary or usual.” Additionally, an event that 
+“requires, based on reasonable medical judgment, a medical or surgical intervention to prevent … outcome[s] 
+[previously] described” qualifies as a serious adverse event. FFDCA §604(5) (21 U.S.C. §364(5)). 
+145 FFDCA §605(a) (21 U.S.C. §364a(a)). 
+146 FFDCA §605(d) (21 U.S.C. §364a(d)). 
+147 FFDCA §605(b)(1) (21 U.S.C. §364a(b)(1)). It appears that this information should still be submitted to FDA 
+through MedWatch under MoCRA. FDA, “FDA Provides Draft Recommendations to Help Reduce Microbial 
+Contamination in Tattoo Inks,” https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-provides-draft-
+recommendations-help-reduce-microbial-contamination-tattoo-inks. 
+
+148 FFDCA §605(b)(2) (21 U.S.C. §364a(b)(2)). 
+149 FFDCA §605(e)(1) (21 U.S.C. §364a(e)(1)). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+17 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+need only be maintained for three years.150 Exemptions to the requirements surrounding serious 
+adverse events may be established by regulation if FDA determines they “would have no 
+significant adverse effect on public health.”151 
+
+Additionally, if FDA reasonably believes that a fragrance or flavor ingredient contributed to a 
+reported serious adverse event, the agency may request a written list of ingredients or ingredient 
+categories in the fragrance or flavor of concern. A responsible person must convey this 
+information to FDA within 30 days of the request.152 
+
+ Enforcement 
+
+Under MoCRA, records kept regarding adverse events are subject to inspection.153 A responsible 
+person must allow an authorized person154 access to these records during a larger facility 
+inspection.155 
+
+ Regulation of Specific Cosmetic Ingredients 
+ Some ingredients used in cosmetic products have received particular attention due to concerns 
+about their potential health risks. For example, there have been long-standing concerns regarding 
+the use of coal-tar hair dyes as color additives. Concerns have also been raised about a group of 
+synthetic compounds known as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).156 Both coal-tar hair 
+dyes and PFAS have been the focus of congressional interest. However, these substances are not 
+the only ingredients to have raised concern. FDA has online resources with information regarding 
+other ingredients that consumers have inquired about, including talc, parabens, and phthalates, 
+among others.157 
+
+ Talc 
+ Talc is a naturally occurring mineral composed of magnesium, silicon, oxygen, and hydrogen.158 
+It is used in many cosmetics, often to “absorb moisture, … prevent caking, … make facial 
+makeup opaque, … [and] improve the feel of a product.”159 Safety concerns regarding talc have 
+existed for decades, with published literature in the 1960s suggesting a possible connection 
+between talc and ovarian cancer, followed in the 1970s by concerns about asbestos 
+contamination. Asbestos, also a naturally occurring mineral, is a proven carcinogen, and often 
+
+ 
+
+150 Ibid. 
+151 FFDCA §605(c) (21 U.S.C. §364a(c)). 
+152 FFDCA §605(f) (21 U.S.C §364a(f)). 
+153 FFDCA §605(e)(2) (21 U.S.C. §364a(e)(2)). 
+154 An “authorized person” is “an officer or employee of the Department of Health and Human Services who has … 
+appropriate credentials, as determined by the Secretary; and … been duly designated by the Secretary to have access to 
+the records required under this section.” FFDCA §605(e)(2)(B) (21 U.S.C. §364a(e)(2)(B)). 
+
+155 FFDCA §605(e)(2) (21 U.S.C. §364a(e)(2)). FFDCA Section 605 does not apply if the cosmetic product or facility 
+is already regulated under Chapter V of FFDCA as a drug or device. FFDCA §613(a) (21 U.S.C. §364i(a)). However, if 
+such a facility also manufactures or processes cosmetic products not subject to FFDCA Chapter V, the exemption does 
+not apply to those particular cosmetic products. FFDCA §613(b) (21 U.S.C. §364i(b)). 
+
+156 FDA, “Per and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) in Cosmetics,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetic-
+ingredients/and-polyfluoroalkyl-substances-pfas-cosmetics. 
+
+157 FDA, “Cosmetic Products & Ingredients,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetic-products-ingredients. 
+158 FDA, “Talc,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetic-ingredients/talc. 
+159 Ibid. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+18 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+geologically forms in proximity to talc. Thus, when talc is mined, asbestos may sometimes 
+become inadvertently commingled. FDA conducts ongoing research on the safety of talc, and in 
+2022, the agency published a report testing selected talc-containing cosmetics for asbestos.160 Of 
+the 50 cosmetic samples tested for the report, none contained asbestos.161 
+
+Due to the potential for talc to be contaminated by asbestos, FDA has noted the importance of 
+selecting “talc mining sites carefully and tak[ing] steps to test the ore sufficiently.”162 
+Consequently, MoCRA directs FDA to, no later than December 29, 2023, “promulgate proposed 
+regulations to establish and require standardized testing methods for detecting and identifying 
+asbestos in talc-containing cosmetic products.”163 FDA must publish a final regulation within 180 
+days after the public comment period closes.164 
+
+ PFAS 
+ PFAS are a group of synthesized chemical compounds used in a range of industrial and consumer 
+products, including cosmetics. Although PFAS are sometimes referred to as “forever chemicals,” 
+their persistence varies—both between longer-chain versus shorter-chain PFAS, and between 
+more fluorinated versus less fluorinated PFAS—thus potential health effects may also vary.165 
+PFAS ingredients may intentionally be added to certain cosmetics to improve their texture or 
+consistency, condition and smooth skin, or give skin a shiny appearance.166 PFAS are used as 
+ingredients in lotions, cleansers, nail polishes, shaving creams, and some makeup products (e.g., 
+lipstick, eyeliner, eyeshadow, and mascara).167 PFAS may be unintentionally added to cosmetics 
+via raw material impurities or the breakdown of PFAS ingredients that form other types of 
+PFAS.168 Although intentionally added PFAS ingredients are typically declared on a cosmetic 
+product’s label, unintentional PFAS may not be.169 
+
+According to FDA, research on the presence of PFAS in cosmetics is limited, and it is unclear 
+whether PFAS in cosmetics are absorbed through the skin at levels harmful to humans. Studies 
+have found varying concentrations of PFAS in cosmetics, ranging “from the parts per billion level 
+
+ 
+
+160 Ibid. 
+161 FDA, “FDA Releases Data from the Agency’s 2022 Testing of Talc-Containing Cosmetic Products for Asbestos,” 
+https://www.fda.gov/food/cfsan-constituent-updates/fda-releases-data-agencys-2022-testing-talc-containing-cosmetic-
+products-asbestos. 
+
+162 FDA, “Talc,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetic-ingredients/talc. 
+163 MoCRA §3505(1) (21 U.S.C. §364d note). 
+164 MoCRA §3505(2) (21 U.S.C. §364d note). 
+165 CRS Report R45986, Federal Role in Responding to Potential Risks of Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances 
+(PFAS) . 
+
+Any compound that has the chemical structure of at least one carbon atom attached to two or more 
+fluorine atoms, or a chain of at least two carbon atoms attached to two or more fluorine atoms, may 
+be considered a PFAS. Individual PFAS vary in terms of the numbers of fluorinated carbon atoms. 
+The extent to which a chain of carbon atoms is fluorinated would determine whether a chemical may 
+be considered a perfluoroalkyl substance or a polyfluoroalkyl substance. Given the possible 
+variations in the length of the carbon chain, number of fluorinated carbon atoms, and other atoms 
+attached to the chain, PFAS potentially could include thousands of chemical compounds if every 
+possible combination were created. Ibid. 
+
+166 FDA, “Per and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) in Cosmetics,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetic-
+ingredients/and-polyfluoroalkyl-substances-pfas-cosmetics. 
+
+167 Ibid. 
+168 Ibid. 
+169 Ibid. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+19 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+to the 100s of parts per million range.”170 FDA has called for more research into PFAS, and some 
+Members of Congress have introduced legislation regarding research needs and the use of these 
+compounds in certain consumer goods.171 
+
+MoCRA directly addresses this lack of information. Under Section 3506, FDA is tasked with 
+assessing the use of PFAS “in cosmetic products and the scientific evidence regarding the safety 
+of such use in cosmetic products, including any risks associated with such use.”172 FDA may 
+consult with the National Center for Toxicological Research during this assessment.173 FDA must 
+publish a report summarizing the assessment on its website no later than December 29, 2025.174 
+
+ FDA’s Authority to Regulate Cosmetics in 
+the Future 
+ Prior to MoCRA, various stakeholders, GAO, and some Members of Congress identified 
+limitations to FDA’s authority to regulate cosmetics, noting that these limitations could expose 
+consumers to unnecessary health risks. Some advocacy groups, for example, cited regulatory 
+schemes adopted by foreign governments for cosmetic products and contended that these schemes 
+allowed those governments a greater degree of control over the manufacturing and selling of 
+cosmetic goods.175 Some of the limitations identified by stakeholders included FDA’s lack of 
+authority to require premarket approval for cosmetic products,176 order mandatory recalls,177 
+require cosmetics facility registration,178 make risk assessments more robust,179 require mandatory 
+reporting of adverse events related to cosmetics,180 and issue cosmetic GMP regulations.181 
+
+The passage of MoCRA may alleviate many stakeholder concerns regarding FDA’s cosmetic 
+regulatory capacity, such as FDA’s authority to issue a mandatory recall, require cosmetics 
+
+ 
+
+170 Ibid. 
+171 Ibid., and see, for example, the No PFAS in Cosmetics Act (117th Congress, S. 2047 and H.R. 3990). 
+172 MoCRA §3506(a). 
+173 Ibid. 
+174 MoCRA §3506(b). 
+175 See, for example, Brandon Inouye, Environmental Working Group, “On Protecting Consumers from Toxics in 
+Cosmetics, U.S. Lags at Least 80 Countries,” https://www.ewg.org/news-insights/news/2021/08/protecting-consumers-
+toxics-cosmetics-us-lags-least-80-countries. 
+
+176 FDA, “Using Adverse Event Reports to Monitor Cosmetic Safety,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/how-report-
+cosmetic-related-complaint/using-adverse-event-reports-monitor-cosmetic-safety. 
+
+177 See, for example, the Cosmetic Safety Enhancement Act of 2019 (116th Congress, H.R. 5279), the Safe Cosmetics 
+and Personal Care Products Act of 2019 (116th Congress, H.R. 4296), and the Personal Care Products Safety Act (117th 
+Congress, S. 2100). 
+
+178 See, for example, the Cosmetic Modernization Amendments of 2017 (115th Congress, H.R. 575), the FDA Cosmetic 
+Safety and Modernization Act (115th Congress, S. 2003), the Cosmetic Safety Enhancement Act of 2019 (116th 
+Congress, H.R. 5279), the Safe Cosmetics and Personal Care Products Act of 2019 (116th Congress, H.R. 4296), and 
+the Personal Care Products Safety Act (117th Congress, S. 2100). 
+
+179 Grace Wallack, “Rethinking FDA’s Regulation of Cosmetics,” Harvard Journal on Legislation , vol. 56, no. 1 
+(2019), p. 336. 
+
+180 See, for example, the Cosmetic Modernization Amendments of 2017 (115th Congress, H.R. 575), the FDA Cosmetic 
+Safety and Modernization Act (115th Congress, S. 2003), the Cosmetic Safety Enhancement Act of 2019 (116th 
+Congress, H.R. 5279), the Safe Cosmetics and Personal Care Products Act of 2019 (116th Congress, H.R. 4296), and 
+the Personal Care Products Safety Act (117th Congress, S. 2100). 
+
+181 See, for example, the FDA Cosmetic Safety and Modernization Act (115th Congress, S. 2003), the Cosmetic Safety 
+Enhancement Act of 2019 (116th Congress, H.R. 5279), the Safe Cosmetics and Personal Care Products Act of 2019 
+(116th Congress, H.R. 4296), and the Personal Care Products Safety Act (117th Congress, S. 2100). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+20 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+facility registration, require mandatory reporting of adverse events, and issue cosmetic GMP. 
+Furthermore, the safety assessment report required for PFAS may allay some concerns about a 
+lack of risk assessment robusticity. 
+
+However, even with the enactment of MoCRA, some previously identified issues remain—
+primarily the ongoing lack of premarket approval for cosmetics and many other ingredients of 
+concern not selected for risk assessment. Among these unaddressed ingredients are parabens, “a 
+family of related chemicals that are commonly used as preservatives” to prevent the 
+contamination and spoilage of many cosmetic products.182 The most common types of parabens 
+found in cosmetics include methylparaben, propylparaben, butylparaben, and ethylparaben.183 
+FDA has received many consumer inquiries about the safety of parabens due to public concerns, 
+often raised by advocacy groups, primarily about potential links between the ingredient family 
+and endocrine disruption.184 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
+“[h]uman health effects from environmental exposure to low levels of parabens are unknown.”185 
+In turn, FDA states that it does not currently “have information showing that parabens as they are 
+used in cosmetics have an effect on human health.”186 However, FDA notes that it continuously 
+reviews published studies on paraben safety and will alert industry and consumers if a health 
+hazard is determined to exist.187 
+
+At present, the implementation of MoCRA introduces some uncertainties, such as certain 
+enforcement timelines and what constitutes sufficient safety substantiation. Regarding timelines, 
+some stakeholders have pointed out that enforcement timelines for certain provisions may differ; 
+for example, adulteration provisions are slated for enforcement by the close of 2023, even though 
+they are predicated in part on the promulgation of GMP, which could remain in the rulemaking 
+process until the close of 2025.188 Others have pointed out that MoCRA does not specifically state 
+what will satisfy the requirement for adequate cosmetic product safety substantiation, and have 
+noted that cosmetics companies may need to look elsewhere for guidance.189 Moreover, in the 
+context of these uncertainties, FDA has indicated that cosmetics regulation may be moved to a 
+new office within FDA, in part to better implement MoCRA.190 
+
+ 
+
+182 Examples of some cosmetic product types that may contain parabens include makeup, moisturizers, hair products, 
+shaving products, and potentially some deodorants. FDA, “Parabens in Cosmetics,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/
+cosmetic-ingredients/parabens-cosmetics. Parabens are also used in many drug and food products. Ibid. 
+
+183 Often, multiple parabens are used in combination with one another or other preservatives to increase efficacy. Ibid. 
+184 See, for example, Campaign for Safe Cosmetics, “Parabens,” https://www.safecosmetics.org/chemicals/parabens/; 
+Environmental Working Group, “What Are Parabens, and Why Don’t They Belong in Cosmetics?,” 
+https://www.ewg.org/what-are-parabens. 
+
+185 CDC, “Parabens Factsheet,” https://www.cdc.gov/biomonitoring/Parabens_FactSheet.html. 
+186 FDA, “Parabens in Cosmetics,” https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetic-ingredients/parabens-cosmetics. 
+187 Ibid. 
+188 See, for example, Cooley, “FDA Regulatory Framework for Cosmetics Gets Major Overhaul,” 
+https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2023/2023-01-06-fda-regulatory-framework-for-cosmetics-gets-major-overhaul. 
+
+189 See, for example, Food and Drug Law Institute, “MoCRA is Here—Now What? Unpacking Litigation and 
+Regulatory Risk for Cosmetics Brands Following MoCRA’s Enactment,” https://www.fdli.org/2023/02/mocra-is-here-
+now-what-unpacking-litigation-and-regulatory-risk-for-cosmetics-brands-following-mocras-enactment/. 
+
+190 FDA, “FDA Provides Update on Proposed Human Foods Program and Office of Regulatory Affairs Restructuring,” 
+https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-provides-update-proposed-human-foods-program-and-
+office-regulatory-affairs-restructuring. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+21 
+
+ 
+ Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA) 
+
+ 
+
+ Conclusion 
+ Historically, FDA’s regulatory authority over cosmetics has been more limited and static than its 
+regulatory authority over other FDA-regulated products. However, 84 years after the passage of 
+the FFDCA, the enactment of MoCRA represents a significant expansion of FDA’s cosmetic 
+regulatory authority. MoCRA authorizes for appropriation funds through 2027 to accomplish its 
+goals.191 MoCRA’s full effect will be determined over the course of its future implementation. 
+
+ 
+
+ Author Information 
+
+ 
+Nora Wells 
+
+ 
+
+Analyst in Health Policy 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Acknowledgments 
+
+Hassan Z. Sheikh, Analyst in Health Policy, and Agata Bodie, Analyst in Health Policy, authored a prior 
+report (CRS Report R42594, FDA Regulation of Cosmetics and Personal Care Products ) that was partially 
+adapted for this report. 
+
+For assistance with legal issues on this topic, congressional clients may contact Jennifer Staman, 
+Legislative Attorney. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan 
+shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and 
+under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other 
+than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in 
+connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not 
+subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in 
+its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or 
+material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to 
+copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+191 Under MoCRA Section 3508, “[t]here is authorized to be appropriated $14,200,000 for fiscal year 2023, 
+$25,960,000 for fiscal year 2024, and $41,890,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2027.” 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+R47826 · VERSION 1 · NEW 
+
+22
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,1116 @@
+Order Code IB10134
+
+CRS Issue Brief for Congress
+
+Received through the CRS Web
+
+ Gasoline Prices: New Legislation and Proposals 
+
+ Updated May 19, 2006 
+
+Carl E. Behrens and Carol Glover
+
+Resources, Science, and Industry Division
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ CONTENTS
+
+SUMMARY
+
+MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
+
+BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
+
+Legislative Activities
+Why Are Prices So High?
+
+Crude Oil Prices
+How Oil and Gasoline Prices Are Determined
+Gasoline Prices
+
+Policy Options
+Oil-Related Legislation
+
+Reducing Impacts on Consumers
+Mid- to Long-Term Supply and Demand
+ANWR
+Savings Goals
+OCS Leasing
+Refinery Revitalization
+
+LEGISLATION
+
+FOR ADDITIONAL READING
+
+CRS Issue Briefs
+CRS Reports
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ IB10134 
+
+ 05-19-06 
+
+Gasoline Prices: New Legislation and Proposals
+
+SUMMARY
+
+The high price of gasoline was an impor-
+
+on oil and gas leasing on much of the Outer
+
+tant consideration during the debate on major
+
+Continental Shelf (OCS). Both the Senate
+
+energy legislation, which ended August 8 as
+
+Energy and Natural Resources Committee and
+
+the President signed the Energy Policy Act of
+
+the House Resources Committee included
+
+2005, H.R. 6 (P.L. 109-58). However, prices
+
+leasing ANWR in their reconciliation bill
+
+continued to surge, spiking at the end of
+
+sections. The House Resources Committee
+
+August when Hurricane Katrina shut down
+
+included provisions regarding OCS leasing,
+
+refining operations in the Gulf of Mexico.
+
+but the Senate Energy Committee did not.
+
+The continuing crisis renewed attention to
+
+ANWR leasing was included in the Senate bill
+
+some issues that were dropped or compro-
+
+that passed on November 3 (S. 1932), but the
+
+mised in the debate over P.L. 109-58, as well
+
+House leadership dropped both ANWR and
+
+as a number of initiatives to reduce the impact
+
+OCS provisions before its reconciliation bill,
+
+of high prices on consumers.
+
+H.R. 4241, was passed on November 18 by a
+vote of 217-215. The conference report on the
+
+A large number of factors combined to
+
+bill, approved by the House but amended in
+
+put pressure on gasoline prices, including
+
+the Senate, does not contain either measure.
+
+increased world demand for crude oil and U.S.
+refinery capacity inadequate to supply gaso-
+
+The gasoline price surge influenced the
+
+line to a recovering national economy. The
+
+debate over P.L. 109-58, but the urgency of
+
+war and continued violence in Iraq added
+
+previous energy crises was lacking. In part,
+
+uncertainty and a threat of supply disruption
+
+this may be due to the fact that there has been
+
+that added pressure particularly to the com-
+
+no physical shortage of gasoline or lines at the
+
+modity futures markets.
+
+pump. In addition, the expectation of former
+crises — that prices were destined to grow
+
+Among the issues that received new
+
+ever higher — has not been prevalent. 
+
+attention were vehicle fuel economy stan-
+dards, leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf,
+
+However, the persistence of high gaso-
+
+and refinery “revitalization” provisions. The
+
+line and oil prices into a second summer has
+
+Gasoline for America’s Security Act of 2005,
+
+raised alarms over the economic consequences
+
+H.R. 3893, was passed by the House on Octo-
+
+of the situation, heightened following the
+
+ber 7 by a vote of 212-210. A similar bill, S.
+
+disastrous effects of Hurricane Katrina. 
+
+1772, was defeated in the Environment and
+Public Works Committee on October 26 by a
+
+As gasoline prices surged to the $3.00
+
+tie vote of 9-9.
+
+per gallon level again in spring 2006, a new
+wave of legislative proposals was put forth in
+
+The budget reconciliation process was
+
+Congress, including strengthening measures
+
+the vehicle for two major energy initiatives:
+
+regarding price gouging and profiteering,
+
+the opening of part of the Arctic National
+
+temporarily refunding federal gasoline taxes,
+
+Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to oil and gas
+
+and windfall profits tax measures. 
+
+development and the lifting of the moratorium
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ IB10134
+
+05-19-06
+
+MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
+
+Gasoline prices surged toward $3.00 per gallon in April and stayed there during the first
+
+half of May. The approach of the summer driving season, and complications involving the
+phasing out of the gasoline additive MTBE, were cited by some observers as behind the latest
+runup.
+
+The price move stimulated a large number of new legislative initiatives and renewed
+
+interest in several that had been under consideration for some time. On May 3, the House
+passed the Federal Energy Price Protection Act (H.R. 5253) to prevent price gouging.
+
+The tentative schedule for the week of May 22 included possible House floor action on
+
+H.R. 5254, the Refinery Permit Process Schedule Act of 2006, and other energy legislation.
+
+BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
+
+ Legislative Activities 
+
+The continuing crisis of high gasoline prices has led to a broad spectrum of proposed
+
+new legislation. Despite passage of the major Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) last
+summer, many Members are exploring a variety of measures to increase supply and reduce
+demand in the short term, and to reduce the impact of high prices on consumers. Some are
+also proposing to revisit longer-term policies, some of which were passed up in the process
+of reaching agreement on P.L. 109-58.
+
+This issue brief reviews the major legislative initiatives to deal with the gasoline price
+
+issue. To put these proposals in perspective, it first describes some of the factors that have
+led to the high prices of both crude oil and gasoline.
+
+ Why Are Prices So High? 
+
+The run-up of gasoline prices that began in spring 2004 (see Figure 1 ) climaxed a
+
+period of almost five years during which gasoline prices demonstrated a great deal of
+regional volatility but less of an increase at the national level. In 2004 a large number of
+factors combined to exert pressure on gasoline prices in all parts of the country. Some of
+these factors have affected the price of crude oil, and others the cost of producing and
+marketing gasoline.
+
+ Crude Oil Prices. Past energy crises have demonstrated that oil is traded in a world
+
+market, in which events in remote areas affect the price of crude for almost everyone. In the
+12-18 months leading up to the crisis, these events included the following:
+
+! Decisions by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
+
+cartel, after having reduced production quotas in 2002, to raise them only
+slowly and reluctantly;
+
+! Unexpected demand growth in China;
+
+CRS-1
+
+ 
+ IB10134
+
+05-19-06
+
+! Disruptions in oil production in major exporters, including Venezuela, Iraq
+
+and Nigeria;
+
+! Decline in the value of the U.S. dollar, the currency in which oil is traded in
+
+the world market, compared to other major currencies, particularly the Euro.
+
+! Uncertainty and fear of major disruptions in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, in the
+
+context of the war in Iraq and the threat of terrorism.
+
+ Figure 1 . Average Daily Nationwide Price of Unleaded Gasoline, January 
+
+ 2002 - May 2006 
+
+3.20
+
+3.00
+
+2.80
+
+2.60
+
+ llon 
+
+2.40
+
+ a 
+
+2.20
+
+ per G 
+
+2.00
+
+ rs
+lla
+o 
+
+1.80
+
+ D 
+
+1.60
+
+1.40
+
+1.20
+
+1.00
+
+pr
+
+l
+
+t
+
+l
+
+r
+
+r
+
+l
+
+t
+
+Ju
+
+pr
+
+Ju
+
+ct
+
+'04
+
+Jul
+
+ct
+
+Ju
+
+ay
+
+n '02
+
+A
+
+Oc n '03 A
+
+O
+
+n 
+
+Ap
+
+O
+
+n '05 Ap
+
+Oc
+
+ '06
+
+M
+
+Ja
+
+Ja
+
+Ja
+
+Ja
+
+Jan
+
+ Note: Prices include federal, state and local taxes. Last date above is May 15, 2006. 
+
+ Source: Daily Fuel Gauge Report , American Automobile Association, [http://www.fuelgaugereport.com],
+compiled by CRS.
+
+ How Oil and Gasoline Prices Are Determined. The price of crude oil is set
+
+through the interaction of world demand and supply. World demand, at 83.6 million barrels
+per day in 2005, grew by 4% in 2004, moderated to 1.3% in 2005, and is forecasted to grow
+by 1.8% in 2006.1 World supply, at 84.5 million barrels per day, was less than 1 million
+barrels per day more than demand, leaving relatively little excess supply to draw on if the
+market was disrupted by natural or political disasters. When excess supply on the market is
+low, prices tend to rise and become more volatile. 
+
+Higher prices for crude oil translate directly into higher prices for gasoline. Crude oil
+
+accounts for about 55% of the cost of gasoline. Refining, distributing, and marketing
+
+1 International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report, April 12, 2006. pp.4-6.
+
+CRS-2
+
+ 
+ IB10134
+
+05-19-06
+
+account for about 26% of the cost of gasoline, and taxes account for about 19%.2 Whether
+the crude oil a refiner processes is purchased on the open market, or is produced by the oil
+company itself, higher costs for any element in the cost of gasoline are likely to be passed on
+to consumers. Gasoline prices have also increased due to limited refining capacity in the
+United States, the range of fuel blends required to meet air pollution requirements, and the
+mandated use of ethanol as an additive. 
+
+As often happens when commodity prices are volatile, speculation in futures contracts
+
+accentuated the upward price pressure and appeared to continue high prices longer than
+would be expected as market fundamentals push toward lower prices.
+
+ Gasoline Prices. Just as a number of factors led to increased crude prices, a
+
+combination of features in the U.S. refinery industry contributed to an increase in gasoline
+prices. 
+
+! U.S. demand for gasoline has increased as economic growth has continued
+
+(See Figure 2) .
+
+! Domestic refining capacity has declined, both in number of refineries —
+
+from 324 in 1981 to 153 in 2002 — and in total capacity — from 18.62
+million barrels per day (mbd) in 1981 to 16.78 mbd in 2002.
+
+! The structure of the refining industry has changed. In 1981 most refining
+
+capacity was owned and operated by integrated oil companies that supplied
+their own crude oil, refined it, distributed it, and marketed the products.
+Refining was only one part of the company’s profit-making operation, and
+frequently was not an important profit maker. Now the refining industry is
+characterized more by independently owned, nonintegrated firms. When
+refineries are the sole source of revenue to the owners, it becomes more
+important that the operation be profitable, leading to pressure to raise prices.
+
+! The refining industry has been operating with lower inventories of both
+
+crude oil and gasoline, as a means of cutting costs. The side effect has been
+reduced ability to meet unanticipated demand, leading to greater price
+pressure.
+
+! Gasoline markets are fragmented regionally because air quality requirements
+
+have led to numerous different formulations to meet varying standards. In
+meeting demand for these regional formulations, called “boutique fuels,”
+refiners lose flexibility to meet local variations in demand elsewhere,
+leading to increased price pressure.
+
+! With domestic refining capacity constraints, a greater proportion of gasoline
+
+demand is being met with imported products. Foreign refiners typically
+manufacture products designed to sell in the international market, not the
+
+2 Energy Information Administration data based on March 2006 data and a base price of gasoline of
+$2.43 per gallon. See [http://www.eia.doe.gov]. 
+
+CRS-3
+
+ 
+ IB10134
+
+05-19-06
+
+special product “boutique fuels” demanded by a significant share of the U.S.
+market.
+
+! Refiners have had increased costs in the past year to comply with new
+
+requirements to limit sulfur content and to switch from the oxygenate
+additive MTBE to ethanol.
+
+These various factors pushed the nationwide average price of gasoline over $2 per
+
+gallon in May 2004. By mid-June, Energy Information Administrator Guy Caruso was able
+to note a slight decline in prices, and tell a Senate Energy Committee hearing that, “absent
+major disruptions, oil and gasoline markets may be turning a corner.”3 However, persistent
+high crude prices pushed gasoline prices over $2 again in October, and yet again in March
+2005. By April 2005, Caruso was suggesting that increasing world demand for oil might
+keep the price of crude above $50 per barrel through 2006.4 In fact, in August the price
+surged close to $70.
+
+ Figure 2 . Consumption of Motor Gasoline, 2000 - April 2006 
+
+10
+
+9.5
+
+ay
+
+9
+
+r D
+e
+
+ls p
+rre 8.5
+
+a
+ B
+n
+io
+ill
+
+8
+
+M
+
+7.5
+
+7
+
+Jan
+
+Jul
+
+Jan
+
+Jul
+
+Jan
+
+Jul
+
+Jan
+
+Jul
+
+Jan
+
+Jul
+
+Jan
+
+Jul
+
+Jan Apr
+
+'00
+
+'01
+
+'02
+
+'03
+
+'04
+
+'05
+
+'06
+
+Monthly Averages
+
+Annual Averages
+
+ Source: EIA, Monthly Energy Review , April 2006, Table 3.4 and Weekly Petroleum Status Report , May 10,
+2006, Table 10.
+
+3 Guy Caruso, statement before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, June 15,
+2004.
+
+4 “EIA: Oil to remain above $50 through ‘06.” Oil Daily , April 8, 2005, p. 1. Report of a speech by
+Guy Caruso at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, April 7, 2005. 
+
+CRS-4
+
+ 
+ IB10134
+
+05-19-06
+
+The price surge intensified discussion of energy policy and led to further calls for
+
+passage of energy legislation. However, until the climax of the Katrina disaster, the urgency
+of previous energy crises has been lacking. Throughout the period, U.S. gasoline
+consumption continued to rise, although the usual summer peak in consumption appears to
+have been somewhat blunted in 2004, as shown in Figure 2 . In part this may be because,
+although the price of gasoline in nominal terms set a record, in real terms it did not appear
+to be reaching the level of the Iranian crisis years of the early 1980s (see Figure 3 ), again
+until Katrina pushed it toward the $3.00-per-gallon mark. Further, unlike the earlier crises,
+there was no physical shortage of gasoline, and no lines at the pump, except in local disaster-
+affected areas. Consumption of gasoline fell sharply after prices peaked. The drop was
+typical of the post-Labor Day decline but more steep than in previous years.
+
+As Figure 4 indicates, the proportion of consumer expenditures on oil and gasoline had
+
+declined from the high levels of the 1970s and early 1980s. Data are not yet available to
+indicate what effect the price run-up starting in 2004 has had on this measure. Perhaps most
+important, the common view during the earlier crises was that oil prices not only were high,
+but were destined to become ever higher in the coming years. This view is no longer
+prevalent, and the general expectation has been that the price increase is a temporary
+phenomenon, although lasting longer than expected. The current crisis has led to some
+analytical speculation that world oil production has peaked, but additions to proved world
+oil reserves seem to contradict that thesis. Oil industry analysts appear confident of a long
+life remaining for the resource and argue that if oil is replaced, it will be because of improved
+alternative technologies, not because the world is running out of oil.
+
+ Figure 3. Nominal and Real Price of Gasoline, 
+
+ 1973-2004 and March 2005 
+
+3
+
+2.5
+
+2
+
+1.5
+
+1
+
+0.5
+
+0
+
+1973
+
+1977
+
+1981
+
+1985
+
+1989
+
+1993
+
+1997
+
+2001
+
+Mar '05
+
+Nominal Price
+
+Real Price (2004 Dollars)
+
+ Source: EIA, Monthly Energy Review , May 2005, Tables 1.6 and 9.4, calculated by CRS.
+
+CRS-5
+
+ 
+ IB10134
+
+05-19-06
+
+ Figure 4. Consumer Spending on Oil as % of GDP, 1970 - 2001 
+
+10
+
+8
+
+6
+
+4
+
+2
+
+0
+
+1970
+
+1975
+
+1980
+
+1985
+
+1990
+
+1995
+
+2000
+
+ Source: Calculated by CRS with data from EIA, Annual Energy Review 2005, Table 3.5. GDP from Bureau
+of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce.
+
+As shown in Figure 5 , gasoline prices historically have increased less than the general
+
+rate of inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). After the surge in 1973,
+and again after the 1979-1980 run-up, gasoline prices grew very slowly and even declined,
+dropping sharply in 1986. A sudden increase in 2000 was similarly followed by slow or
+declining prices. During the current run-up, gasoline price increases have far outpaced the
+general CPI increase.
+
+CRS-6
+
+ 
+ IB10134
+
+05-19-06
+
+ Figure 5. Percent Change in Gasoline Prices Compared to the 
+
+ Consumer Price Index, 1973-2004 
+
+30
+
+20
+
+10
+
+0
+
+-10
+
+-20
+
+-30
+
+2004
+
+1973
+
+1976
+
+1979
+
+1982
+
+1985
+
+1988
+
+1991
+
+1994
+
+1997
+
+2000
+
+2003
+
+ Source: EIA, Annual Energy Review 2004, Table 5.24. CPI from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Calculated
+by CRS.
+
+ Policy Options 
+
+The several energy crises of the past led to major legislative action, twice in the 1970s
+
+and once following the 1991 Gulf War. The just-passed Energy Policy Act of 2005 differs
+from the previous actions because the Congress had been considering major energy
+legislation for three years before the situation became a nationwide concern. By the time the
+bill finally moved through the Congress, the major issues had already been fully debated, and
+the final version differed little from previous initiatives except for resolving a number of
+issues that had blocked passage before.
+
+As in previous legislative energy debates, a major policy divide existed between those
+
+who view the gasoline-fueled automobile as a temporary necessity to be tolerated only until
+a substitute fuel or alternative means of transportation can be developed, and those who
+expect oil to be the same dominant transportation fuel in the indefinite future that it is at
+present. Compromise agreements have been reached via a combination of measures that
+enhance the development of alternatives or restrain the growth in demand for oil, on the one
+hand, and those that increase production or reduce the cost of supplying that demand, on the
+other. However, individual measures often carry with them complicating features that make
+passage more difficult. In addition, major legislation often becomes the vehicle for measures
+that typically would not find enough support to pass as individual bills, or which may be
+added to gain support for the whole measure. In the legislative climate of the 108th Congress,
+balancing the various interests involved proved too difficult a task, despite the influence of
+
+CRS-7
+
+ 
+ IB10134
+
+05-19-06
+
+a nationwide energy crisis in an election year. Under the stimulation of continued high oil
+and gasoline prices, the 109th Congress pursued the goal again, this time successfully.
+However, as gasoline prices continued to surge, and damage to Gulf of Mexico oil and gas
+resources and facilities by Hurricane Katrina was assessed, calls for further measures to
+address the crisis were heard in Congress. Continued price pressure into the spring of 2006
+has solidified the calls into specific legislative proposals.
+
+ Oil-Related Legislation 
+
+ Reducing Impacts on Consumers. A number of proposals are aimed at easing
+
+the impact of high prices on consumers, or are aimed at the oil industry’s price-making
+policies.
+
+ Price Gouging. The rapid increase in gasoline prices following the Katrina disaster
+
+led to allegations of price gouging. P.L. 109-58 included a provision requiring the Federal
+Trade Commission (FTC) to conduct an investigation into price gouging in the recent
+increases in gasoline prices. H.R. 3893, as passed the House October 7, includes provisions
+requiring FTC to define price gouging and penalize violators.
+
+After gasoline prices surged again in April 2006, momentum increased for various
+
+price-gouging proposals. Several initiatives that would impose windfall profits taxes on
+crude oil profits were also introduced. On May 3, the House passed the Federal Energy Price
+Protection Act, H.R. 5253, by a vote of 389-34. The bill would require the Federal Trade
+Commission within six months after passage to issue rules defining price gouging in crude
+oil, gasoline, diesel, home heating oil, and biofuel, and would prohibit gouging so defined.
+
+ Tax Relief. On April 26, 2006, Senator Domenici proposed an amendment to the
+
+FY2006 emergency supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 4939) that included a $100 “Fuel
+Tax Holiday Rebate.” The proposal was cosponsored by Majority Leader Frist and other
+Senators. The amendment also contained provisions about price-gouging, easing restrictions
+on rebates for hybrid vehicles, and approving leasing of ANWR. However, the amendment
+was withdrawn May 2.
+
+ Suspending Import Duties on Ethanol. Because the latest gasoline price run-up
+
+was attributed in part to the need to increase use of ethanol, some Members, including Senate
+Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Lugar and House Energy and Commerce Chairman
+Barton, have proposed suspending temporarily duties on imported ethanol, particularly from
+Brazil. 
+
+ “Boutique” Fuels. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 had some provisions related to
+
+local requirements for specific blends of gasoline, but some proposed legislation is aimed at
+further reducing “boutique fuels” requirements that, according to some observers, make the
+national gasoline market less flexible. H.R. 3893, the Gasoline for America’s Security Act
+of 2005, passed by the House October 7, 2005, by a vote of 212-210, would among other
+provisions require EPA to develop a Federal Fuels List and to limit local gasoline blends to
+those on the list. (For details, see CRS Report RL31361, “Boutique Fuels” and
+Reformulated Gasoline: Harmonization of Fuel Standards , by Brent D. Yacobucci.) Other
+boutique fuels legislation has also been proposed.
+
+CRS-8
+
+ 
+ IB10134
+
+05-19-06
+
+ Windfall Profits Tax. Several bills introduced would impose taxes on oil companies
+
+in light of record profits recorded as a result of the crude and gasoline price run-up. The
+context of the proposals lies in the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act (P.L. 96-223) of 1980,
+as part of a compromise between the Carter Administration and the Congress over the
+decontrol of crude oil prices. (For details, see CRS Report RL33305, The Crude Oil
+Windfall Profit Tax of the 1980s: Implications for Current Energy Policy , by Salvatore
+Lazzari.)
+
+ Mid- to Long-Term Supply and Demand. Most proposals affecting supply and
+
+demand of crude oil and gasoline would not affect the current short-term crisis but would be
+aimed at longer term trends.
+
+ CAFE. Automobile fuel economy standards also have a long history of controversy,
+
+going back to their establishment in the 1970s. In the mid-1990s, the National Highway
+Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) was considering a rulemaking that would result in
+increased standards for light-duty trucks (including sport utility vehicles), but for several
+years, Congress included in its annual appropriation for NHTSA a measure prohibiting
+NHTSA from analyzing or undertaking such a ruling. That prohibition was dropped in the
+FY2004 NHTSA appropriations, and a final rule issued by NHTSA in April 2003 requires
+a boost in light-truck fuel economy to 22.2 miles per gallon by model year 2007. In the
+summer of 2005, the Bush administration proposed new fuel economy standards for light
+trucks, to take effect in the 2008 model year.
+
+During House floor debate on P.L. 109-58, an amendment to increase fuel economy
+
+standards to 33 miles per gallon over 10 years was defeated by a vote of 177-254. A more
+general amendment to the House bill, requiring the Administration to take “voluntary,
+regulatory, and other actions” to reduce oil demand in the United States by 1 million barrels
+per day from projected levels by 2013 was defeated 166-262. The measure was included in
+the bill passed by the Senate, but was dropped in conference.
+
+Continued high gasoline prices have raised congressional interest in higher mandated
+
+CAFE standards again. Among the proposals is H.R. 3762, which would require average
+fuel economy of 33 miles per gallon by 2016. Other proposals would give NHTSA authority
+to raise standards above the present level and would change the vehicle classifications to one
+based on weight. On May 10, the House Energy and Commerce Committee ordered reported
+a bill that would authorize the Secretary of Transportation to set fuel economy standards for
+passenger automobiles based on one or more vehicle attributes. 
+
+ ANWR. Oil and gas exploration and development of part of the Arctic National
+
+Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) have been controversial for many years. This was part of the early
+proposals for legislation that eventually became the Energy Policy Act of 1992, but was
+dropped in the face of strong opposition in both houses. Support for action grew gradually
+through the decade, along with technological developments that advocates claimed would
+reduce the environmental impact of development; the House included a development
+measure in its version of an omnibus energy bill in August 2001. A similar measure was part
+of the House-passed legislation in the 108th Congress. Opposition in the Senate kept the
+measure from the floor, however, and it was dropped in conference.
+
+CRS-9
+
+ 
+ IB10134
+
+05-19-06
+
+In the 109th Congress, Senate supporters of ANWR development moved the issue to the
+
+budget process, where it can be approved by a simple majority vote. On March 9, 2005, the
+Senate Budget Committee issued a FY2006 budget resolution that assumes $2.4 billion of
+revenue over five years from leases in ANWR. On March 16 the Senate rejected an
+amendment by Senator Cantwell to strike the ANWR provisions, by a vote of 49-51. The
+next day the Senate passed the budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 18). The measure was included
+in the package of provisions for the budget reconciliation bill approved by both the Senate
+Energy Committee and the House Resources Committee. However, the House leadership
+removed the ANWR provisions from its reconciliation bill (H.R. 4241) before it was passed
+on November 18 by a vote of 217-215.
+
+Despite the failure of the ANWR provision, the Administration’s FY2007 budget
+
+request for the Department of the Interior, submitted February 6, assumes that $8 billion can
+be raised in 2008 through leasing of oil and gas resources in ANWR.
+
+ Savings Goals. A number of legislative proposals would set goals for reducing oil
+
+consumption. An example is the Enhanced Energy Security Act of 2006 (S. 2747),
+introduced by Senator Bingaman May 4, 2006, which would require the Director of the
+Office of Management and Budget to develop an action plan to save 2.5 mbd in 2016, 7 mbd
+in 2026, and 10 mbd in 2031.
+
+ OCS Leasing. The moratorium on oil and gas leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf
+
+(OCS), except in the central and western Gulf of Mexico and some parts of Alaska, was
+subject to much controversy during consideration of P.L. 109-58. A proposal to allow states
+to voluntarily opt out of the moratorium was dropped under threat of filibuster, and even a
+measure to order the Department of the Interior to perform an inventory of OCS resources
+barely survived the debate. 
+
+Following the disruption of production by Katrina, momentum to lift the moratorium
+
+increased, and some supporters suggested it might be included in the budget reconciliation
+process. The House Resources Committee on September 28 marked up a bill that would
+have given states the option of allowing drilling for petroleum and natural gas. In approving
+the bill, the committee adopted an amendment that would lift the moratoriums on drilling the
+OCS for natural gas completely. In the face of opposition to the natural gas provision,
+Representative Pombo, Chairman of the Resources Committee, decided not to bring the bill
+to the floor as planned.
+
+On October 26, the Resources Committee, as part of its package of measures for the
+
+budget reconciliation bill, included provisions that would make statutory the current
+presidential moratorium on OCS leasing until 2012 but would allow individual states to opt
+out of the moratorium and would allow states close to 50% of the royalties from oil and gas
+production that resulted. It would also give states the option to extend the moratorium after
+2012. However, the provision was removed from the bill (H.R. 4241) before it was passed
+on November 18 by a vote of 217-215.
+
+On May 10, 2006, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior and the
+
+Environment voted to lift the congressional suspension of natural gas leasing for much of the
+OCS. The legislation, if approved, would leave in place the presidential moratorium on the
+same region, which operates until 2012.
+
+CRS-10
+
+ 
+ IB10134
+
+05-19-06
+
+ Refinery Revitalization. P.L. 109-58 contained some provisions to encourage
+
+construction of new oil refineries, but the destruction to refining facilities caused by Katrina
+in the Gulf of Mexico area led to calls for further measures. On September 28, 2005, the
+House Energy and Commerce Committee reported out H.R. 3893, the Gasoline for
+America’s Security Act of 2005, and the House passed the bill October 7 by a vote of 212-
+210. Among other measures, the bill would provide for presidential designation of potential
+refinery sites on federal lands and military bases that are closing, and set up a process for
+coordinating authorization and related environmental reviews for construction of new
+refineries, to be led by the Department of Energy. It would centralize judicial review of the
+process in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The bill as reported would
+also have amended the Clean Air Act regarding provisions for New Source Review for
+refineries and other facilities, but the measure was dropped before being brought to the
+House floor. (For details, see CRS Report RS21608, Clean Air and New Source Review:
+Defining Routine Maintenance, by Larry Parker.) The bill also contains measures concerning
+boutique fuels (see above).
+
+A similar bill was introduced in the Senate September 26, as the Gas Petroleum Refiner
+
+Improvement and Community Empowerment Act, S. 1772, but the bill was rejected October
+26 by the Environment and Public Works Committee by a vote of 9-9.
+
+On May 3, 2006, the House brought up under suspension of the rules the Refinery
+
+Permit Process Schedule Act (H.R. 5254), but the 237-188 vote was less than the two-thirds
+approval required under suspension. The bill, which would require the President to appoint
+a “federal coordinator” to organize the permitting of new refineries, is expected to come to
+the floor under regular rules the week of May 8.
+
+ Presidential Proposals: The Advanced Energy Initiative. In his January 31
+
+State of the Union message, President Bush set the goal of breaking the U.S. “addiction to
+foreign oil” and of “replacing” more than 75% of oil imports from the Middle East by 2025.
+In specifying the Middle East as the source, the proposal differed from provisions considered
+in the previous year to set a goal of reducing total imports.
+
+The main thrust of the presidential initiative is to increase funding for research in
+
+producing ethanol from plant fiber biomass (rather than from corn), for improved batteries
+for hybrid automobiles, and for hydrogen fuels. At the same time, the budget request for
+FY2007 for DOE, which includes these increases, would eliminate programs for oil and gas
+research.
+
+CRS-11
+
+ 
+ IB10134
+
+05-19-06
+
+LEGISLATION
+
+ 109th Congress 
+
+ P.L. 109-58, H.R. 6
+ Energy Policy Act of 2005. Introduced April 18, 2005. Passed by the House April 21,
+
+2005 (249-183). Passed the Senate June 28. Reported out of conference July 26 and passed
+by both houses July 28 and July 29. Signed into law August 8, 2005.
+
+ H.R. 3893 (Barton)
+ The Gasoline for America’s Security Act of 2005. Introduced September 26, 2005.
+
+Reported out by the House Energy and Commerce Committee September 28. Passed by the
+House October 7 by a vote of 212-210.
+
+ H.R. 5253 (Barton)
+ The Federal Energy Price Protection Act of 2006. Passed by the House May 3, 2006,
+
+under suspension of the rules by a vote of 389-34.
+
+ H.R. 5254 (Barton)
+ The Refinery Permit Process Schedule Act of 2006. Rejected by the House under
+
+Suspension of the Rules May 3, 2006, by a vote of 237 yeas to 188 nays.
+
+ H.R. 3762 (Boehlert)
+ To require higher standards of automobile fuel efficiency in order to reduce the amount
+
+of oil used for fuel by automobiles in the United States by 10% beginning in 2016, and for
+other purposes. 
+
+ S. 1772 (Inhofe)
+ The Gas Petroleum Refiner Improvement and Community Empowerment Act.
+
+Introduced September 26, 2005. Rejected by the Senate Environment and Public Works
+Committee October 26 by a vote of 9-9.
+
+ S. 555 (DeWine)
+ The No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartel (NOPEC) Act of 2005. Introduced March
+
+8, 2005. Adopted by voice vote as an amendment to H.R. 6 in the Senate, June 21. Not
+included in the final version of H.R. 6.
+
+ S. 2747 (Bingaman)
+ The Enhanced Energy Security Act of 2006. Introduced May 4, 2006.
+
+ S. 2748 (Bingaman)
+ The Enhanced Energy Security Tax Incentives Act of 2006. Introduced May 4, 2006.
+
+CRS-12
+
+ 
+ IB10134
+
+05-19-06
+
+FOR ADDITIONAL READING
+
+ CRS Issue Briefs 
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB10136, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): Controversies for the 
+
+ 109th Congress , by M. Lynne Corn, Bernard A. Gelb, and Pamela Baldwin.
+
+CRS Issue Brief IB10054, Energy Tax Policy , by Salvatore Lazzari.
+
+ CRS Reports 
+
+CRS Report RL31361, “Boutique Fuels” and Reformulated Gasoline: Harmonization of 
+
+ Fuel Standards , by Brent D. Yacobucci.
+
+CRS Report RS21608, Clean Air and New Source Reviews: Defining Routine Maintenance ,
+
+by Larry Parker.
+
+CRS Report RS22233, Oil and Gas: Supply Issues After Katrina , by Robert L. Bamberger
+
+and Lawrence Kumins.
+
+CRS Report RL33021, Oil Industry Profits: Analysis of Recent Performance , by Robert
+
+Pirog.
+
+CRS Report RL32248, Petroleum Refining: Economic Performance and Challenges for the 
+
+ Future , by Robert L. Pirog.
+
+CRS Report RS22236, Price Increases in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina: Authority to 
+
+ Limit Price Gouging , by Angie A. Welborn and Aaron M. Flynn.
+
+CRS-13
\ No newline at end of file
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8d5a6ca703a0c612b4a2111322c16b8bff2d99e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/politics/text/c9d2a07ee8df34ad.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,1232 @@
+Carbon Control in the U.S. Electricity Sector: Key Implementation Uncertainties
+
+ December 23, 2008
+ (R40103)
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Contents
+
+ 
+ Energy Efficiency and Conservation 
+
+ Electricity-Efficiency Potential 
+
+ Impacts from Electricity-Efficiency Initiatives 
+
+ Uncertainty about the Efficiency Opportunity 
+
+ Renewable Energy 
+
+ Wind Power 
+
+ Transmission Requirements 
+
+ Transmission Grid Uncertainty 
+
+ Biomass Power Generation 
+
+ Biomass Fuel Supply 
+
+ Biomass Fuel Uncertainty 
+
+ Nuclear Power Generation 
+
+ Nuclear Power Construction Uncertainty 
+
+ Advanced Coal-Fired Power Generation 
+
+ Uncertainty in Coal Plant Financing and Approval 
+
+ Carbon Capture and Sequestration 
+
+ CCS Technology Uncertainty 
+
+ Plug-in Electric Hybrid Vehicles 
+
+ Distributed Energy Resources 
+
+ Policy Issues for Congress 
+
+ Possible Outcomes for Carbon Control 
+
+ Underperformance of Individual CO 2 Measures 
+
+ Failure of the CO 2 Mitigation Portfolio 
+
+ Conclusion 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Figures
+
+ 
+ Figure 1 . Potential CO 2 Reductions in Electric Power 
+
+ Figure 2. Wind Power Resources in the United States 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Summary
+
+ Congress has been debating a range of potential initiatives for reducing atmospheric CO 2 from U.S. sources. Legislative proposals would seek to limit U.S. CO 2 emissions to historical levels through emissions caps, carbon taxes, or other mechanisms. In the 110 th Congress, the most prominent CO 2 proposals sought reductions of nationwide CO 2 emissions to 1990 levels or lower by 2030. President-elect Barack Obama has proposed cutting carbon CO 2 emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, and by an additional 80% by 2050.
+
+ A fundamental question arising from carbon control proposals is how the CO 2 reduction targets can be achieved in the electricity industry, which is responsible for nearly 40% of U.S. CO 2 emissions. It appears from the policy research and technical studies that substantially reducing CO 2 emissions in the U.S. electricity sector over the next few decades would likely require every key carbon mitigation measure at the nation's disposal. However, it is also clear that significant uncertainty exists about the potential of individual measures to achieve their hoped-for carbon impact:
+ Energy efficiency —Can the United States overcome socioeconomic barriers to achieve four times more potential savings than ever before?
+
+ Renewable energy —Will there be enough transmission for wind power? Is there enough land to grow the needed biomass?
+
+ Nuclear power —Could the United States build new plants fast enough to matter?
+
+ Advanced coal power —Will banks fund them and regulators approve them?
+
+ Carbon capture and sequestration —Will the technology be commercially deployable in 10 years, 25 years, or never?
+
+ Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles —How much "low carbon" electricity would be available to charge their batteries?
+
+ Distributed energy resources —Would carbon costs change distributed energy economics enough to spur deployment?
+ As the nation's CO 2 mitigation policies develop, the inherent uncertainty associated with specific carbon measures may be a critical concern. Commitments to specific carbon emissions targets over time, or to a specific schedule of carbon costs (whatever form they may take) may be greatly affected by the success of the underlying measures relied upon to achieve them. Notwithstanding the best efforts of federal policy makers, it is possible that, given the uncertainties each faces, few if any of the major measures proposed to moderate U.S. carbon emissions will achieve their anticipated impacts in a 20-year time frame. As Congress considers implementing CO 2 policies, keeping a close eye on the technology and market developments associated with every key measure could be a priority. Balancing responses to energy market volatility and unexpected structural changes against the need for a predictability in R&D and private capital investment may be essential to maintaining the nation on course to meaningful atmospheric CO 2 reduction.
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ Carbon Control in the U.S. Electricity Sector: Key Implementation Uncertainties
+
+ 
+ Federal policymakers have long been concerned about the impact of manmade carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions on global climate change. To address these concerns, Congress has been debating a range of potential initiatives for reducing atmospheric CO 2 from U.S. sources. Legislative proposals would seek to limit U.S. CO 2 emissions to specific (historical) levels through emissions caps, carbon taxes, or other regulatory mechanisms. Many of these proposals dictate or anticipate a declining long-term trajectory for annual U.S. carbon emissions. In the 110 th Congress, the most prominent CO 2 proposals sought reductions of nationwide CO 2 emissions to 1990 levels or lower by 2030. 1 President-elect Barack Obama has proposed carbon reduction targets as well, intending to cut CO 2 emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, and by an additional 80% by 2050. 2 
+
+ A fundamental policy question which arises from carbon control proposals is how the CO 2 reduction targets can be achieved. Numerous analysts have been examining this question and identifying specific measures to reach particular targets—especially in the electricity industry, which is responsible for nearly 40% of U.S. CO 2 emissions. In the electricity sector, these measures typically include some combination of energy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear power, advanced fossil-fuel power generation, carbon capture and sequestration, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and distributed energy resources. Figure 1 illustrates the CO 2 abatement potential of these measures in the electricity sector as estimated in a widely cited analysis by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). In the EPRI example, overall CO 2 emissions associated with the electricity sector would be reduced below 1990 levels by 2030. Other studies have generated their own projections, with alternative targets and assumptions leading to distinct trajectories for CO 2 emissions and different contributions from the various abatement measures. 3 
+
+ Analyses like that in Figure 1 are important for understanding the potential opportunities and limitations of specific technological measures which may be needed to meet CO 2 abatement goals. However, with their focus on technical potential, such studies often have difficulty conveying in a straightforward way the key infrastructural, environmental, regulatory, or operational uncertainties which might affect how much of that potential could practically be achieved. 4 These uncertainties, nonetheless, are of critical concern to legislators overseeing existing carbon-related programs or considering future CO 2 abatement policies. In addition to their technical aspects, Congress faces a need to gauge the overall viability of specific CO 2 abatement measures—what are their prospects for helping to achieve CO 2 targets in the electricity sector. Legislators also face a need to assess the time frame over which such measures could be expected to work, and how these measures may fit together to achieve overall CO 2 abatement goals under a national carbon policy.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Figure 1. Potential CO 2 Reductions in Electric Power
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Source: Adapted from Barbara Tyran, Electric Power Research Institute, "The Power to Reduce CO 2 Emissions: The Full Portfolio," Slide presentation (May 15, 2008): 7. http://www.iea.org/ Textbase/work/2008/roadmap/2a_Tyran_EPRI%20Roadmaps.pdf 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ This report examines key uncertainties associated with the CO 2 emissions abatement measures identified in Figure 1 . The report briefly describes each measure and discusses expectations for its potential in the context of past experience, technical challenges, infrastructure requirements, or other factors which may inform performance expectations. For each measure, it identifies and discusses a critical uncertainty which may influence its overall viability. The report concludes with a discussion of the implications of these uncertainties in the context of the congressional carbon control debate.
+ Energy Efficiency and Conservation
+
+ When an energy conversion device, such as a household appliance or automobile engine, undergoes a technical change that enables it to provide the same service (e.g, cooling, lighting, motor drive) while using less energy it is said to have increased "energy efficiency." The energy-saving result of the efficiency increase is often called "energy conservation." The energy efficiency of buildings can likewise be increased through the use of certain design changes such as more insulation, thermal windows, improved ventilation, and solar orientation. 5 Energy efficiency is often viewed as interchangeable with energy supply options like electric generation, oil, or natural gas. Energy efficiency can also reduce energy resource use and associated environmental impacts—like CO 2 emissions from power plants.
+ Electricity-Efficiency Potential
+
+ Baseline improvements in energy efficiency occur over time as an economic response to changes in energy prices, the availability of new technology, turnover in end-use equipment, and other factors. However, conservation studies since the OPEC oil embargoes of the 1970s have identified substantial potential for energy efficiency improvements above baseline levels. One seminal analysis in 1976 stated
+
+ technical fixes in new buildings can save 50 percent or more in office buildings and 80 percent or more in some new houses.... [B]y 1990, improved design of new buildings and modification of old ones could save a third of our current total national energy use—and save money too. 6 
+
+ A 1981 study by the Solar Energy Research Institute 7 likewise found that "through energy efficiency, the U.S. can achieve a full-employment economy and increase worker productivity, while reducing national energy consumption by nearly 25 percent." 8 The study further concluded that "the consumption of electricity can be reduced to a point where, on a national basis, demands through the end of the [twentieth] century can be met with generating equipment now operating or in advanced stages of construction." 9 
+
+ More recent studies continue to identify significant electricity conservation potential. The "Five Lab Study" in 1997 estimated a technical electricity savings potential of approximately 23%, and a maximum "achievable" potential of 15% among residential and commercial buildings, assuming aggressive policies promoting conservation and a $50/metric tons (1993 dollars) carbon cost. 10 A 2004 meta-analysis by the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy of several regional studies reported a technical electricity conservation potential of 33%, and an achievable potential of 24% over a 5 to 15 year time horizon, depending upon the study. 11 The U.S. Department of State's 2006 Climate Action Report concludes that "by using commercially available, energy-efficient products, technologies, and best practices, many commercial buildings and homes could save up to 30 percent on energy bills." 12 
+ Impacts from Electricity-Efficiency Initiatives
+
+ Both federal and state agencies have implemented a multitude of electricity efficiency initiatives over the last 40 years to capture energy efficiency potential in the electricity sector. These initiatives have included appliance, equipment, and building efficiency standards; electric utility-administered conservation incentives; 13 consumer information campaigns; and other initiatives. Notwithstanding these efforts, the levels of incremental electricity conservation actually achieved since the 1970s have been more modest than the 25%-30% suggested in conservation potential studies. A 2004 analysis examining a comprehensive range of both federal and utility-sponsored conservation and energy efficiency programs (including federal efficiency standards) administered through 2000 concluded as follows:
+
+ [P]rograms for which ex post quantitative estimates of energy savings exist are likely to have collectively saved up to 4.1 quads of electricity annually. These estimates typically reflect the cumulative effect of programs (e.g., all appliance efficiency standards, past and present) on annual energy consumption. This total energy savings represents about 6% of annual nontransportation energy consumption.... 14 
+
+ A study of California's 2001 energy demand reduction initiative (promoted heavily as an emergency measure to avoid blackouts during the state's electricity crisis) reported 6% reduced electricity usage compared to the prior year, although only 25%-30% of this reduction was "attributable to savings from energy efficiency or onsite generation projects ... likely to persist for many years." 15 Consistent with these studies, a 2008 analysis by EPRI projected a "realistic" U.S. electricity savings potential of 7% beyond baseline levels which would occur without additional market intervention. 16 
+ Uncertainty about the Efficiency Opportunity
+
+ Taken together, the studies of technical conservation potential and actual conservation impacts suggest a perpetual opportunity for incremental electricity conservation on the order of 25%—more than four times the savings such programs have actually realized. Moving beyond the 5% to 7% electricity savings range has been a persistent challenge to conservation proponents, primarily because of the diffuse nature of the efficiency opportunity and the economic complexity of decision making and capital investment by electricity consumers.
+
+ Students of end-use markets have long been puzzled by the lack of adoption of ostensibly cost-effective energy efficiency technologies. A rich literature has developed around this question, and evidence for various barriers to adoption of efficiency technologies is widespread. 17 
+
+ Among the barriers to energy efficiency analysts have identified are–
+ limited market availability of new efficiency measures,
+
+ incomplete consumer information about efficiency options,
+
+ insufficient capital for efficiency investments,
+
+ fiscal or regulatory policies discouraging efficiency investments,
+
+ builder focus on first costs vs. lifecycle costs,
+
+ lack of consumer focus on energy costs relative to other costs, and
+
+ energy prices not reflecting the full social costs of energy supply. 18 
+ Conservation advocates and federal policy makers have proposed a range of additional policy approaches to further overcome these barriers, but there is limited consensus on which policies would be effective and how much additional conservation they might achieve. As a study of conservation barriers from Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory concluded–
+
+ Although these rationales provide a basis for some type of intervention, we acknowledge that they do not justify any particular intervention.... [W]e suggest that differences of opinion about the appropriateness of public policies stem not from disputes about whether market barriers exist, but from different perceptions of the magnitude of the barriers and the efficacy and (possibly unintended) consequences of policies designed to overcome them.... 19 
+
+ There have been numerous legislative proposals to promote electricity efficiency and conservation. 20 The key uncertainty faced by all of them, and future conservation proposals, is whether, as a whole, they may cost-effectively capture much more of the "latent" electricity conservation potential than such programs have done in the past. Carbon control studies which project electricity efficiency savings on the order of 5% to 10% over a 20-year time frame appear consistent with U.S. conservation program experience, and may be aided by any future costs of CO 2 emissions if they are reflected in electricity prices. Unlike large physical infrastructure, however, such as power plants or electric transmission lines, conservation impacts do not necessarily "scale up" to achieve greater impacts simply by increasing the size or funding of a given conservation program. Efficiency potential is also extremely diffuse—existing literally at the individual light socket level in nearly every household. Consequently, policy makers seeking large conservation impacts may need to try alternative or more aggressive policies (e.g., very strict building efficiency codes) with little track record upon which to base projections of future effectiveness.
+ Renewable Energy
+
+ Renewable energy supplies in the electricity sector typically include the following types of power plants: geothermal, solar, wind, biomass, and municipal solid waste/landfill gas. 21 Many carbon control advocates and federal policy makers have high expectations for the potential of renewable generation to help reduce CO 2 emissions in the United States. The widely publicized Pickens Plan, for example, announced by T. Boone Pickens in July, 2008, envisions deploying enough wind generation in the Great Plains states to produce 20% of U.S. electricity by 2018. 22 The Obama-Biden presidential campaign similarly pledged to establish a federal Renewable Portfolio Standard requiring that 25 percent of electricity consumed in the U.S. be "derived from clean, sustainable energy sources, like solar, wind, and geothermal" by 2025. 23 Some groups have advocated even more aggressive targets for U.S. renewable power development. 24 Others are less optimistic. EPRI, for example, assumes renewable sources (excluding hydroelectric generation) could contribute 9% of electricity production in the electric power sector by 2030. 25 
+
+ According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), biomass and wind generation are the two types of renewable power with the greatest overall economic potential, and therefore, the greatest potential to reduce CO 2 emissions. 26 Biomass and wind power are inherently different technologies, however, so they face distinct uncertainties related to their potential expansion under a national program of carbon control. They are discussed, in turn, in the following sections.
+ Wind Power
+
+ Wind power does not consume fuel and produces no CO 2 , so it is an extremely attractive technology for CO 2 mitigation in the electricity sector. 27 Wind generation technology is also fairly mature. It has been deployed commercially throughout the United States—albeit with federal assistance in the form of renewable energy production tax credits and state renewable energy portfolio standards. 28 Wind plants accounted for just over 1% of U.S. electricity generation in 2008. 29 
+
+ A 1991 study of available U.S. wind resources by Pacific Northwest Laboratory concluded that "the wind electric potential that could be extracted with today's technology ... across the United States is equivalent to about 20% of the current U.S. electric consumption." 30 A 2003 analysis by the National Renewable Laboratory similarly concluded that "by 2050, wind could account for about 25 percent of all generation in the U.S." 31 Consistent with these technical assessments, the Department of Energy (DOE) recently examined the practical possibility of 20% wind power production in the United States by 2030 (a longer time frame than either the Pickens or Obama-Biden campaign proposals). The DOE report concluded that a "20% Wind Scenario in 2030, while ambitious, could be feasible." 32 
+ Transmission Requirements
+
+ Although studies have identified substantial untapped wind power potential for the United States, the rapid expansion of U.S. wind generation faces significant challenges. According to the DOE, these challenges are related to the integration of intermittent wind power into regional electricity control areas, cost reduction and efficiency improvement for wind turbine technology, and wind facility siting issues. 33 The principal challenge the DOE identifies, however—and, according to many experts, the principal uncertainty facing wind power—is "investment in the nation's transmission system." 34 
+
+ As Figure 2 shows, the nation's most abundant wind resources tend to be located far from population centers where the electricity is needed. Consequently, wind generators require a robust transmission grid to move power to the market. But the U.S. transmission network is constrained, significantly limiting the availability of transmission capacity to new wind farms. Transmission owners, in agreement with the DOE, have pointed to transmission grid constraints as the single greatest impediment to aggressive wind power expansion.
+
+ Although there is sufficient evidence showing that wind generation can be reliably integrated into the electricity system, ... obstacles to new generation sources continue to exist due to the lack of adequate transmission system access. The remoteness of wind sources, an underinvested transmission infrastructure, and lack of workable transmission investment policies all hinder the development of wind power in the US. 35 
+
+ The DOE study estimates that to achieve 20% wind energy in the United States would involve building "more than 12,000 miles of additional transmission, at a cost of approximately $20 billion in net present-value terms." 36 A similar conceptual transmission plan by the American Electric Power Company (AEP) to integrate 20% wind energy estimated that 19,000 miles of new 765 kV transmission lines would be needed, with a net present value of $26 billion. 37 While such plans put a needed focus on some of the specific requirements for a U.S. transmission upgrade, marshaling the level of investment to expand transmission capacity quickly could stress the supply and price of materials, labor, and other resources. Any wind power project requiring the construction of extensive new transmission infrastructure from remote to populated areas also could face concerted community opposition to the siting of those transmission lines. Public challenges to electric transmission projects have long been considered among the most serious and most intractable challenges in the U.S. energy sector. 38 With wind projects in mind, Congress included provisions increasing federal authority to approve interstate electric transmission projects in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 § 1221). Nonetheless, challenges continue to delay or prevent new transmission development in some regions.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Figure 2. Wind Power Resources in the United States
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ So u rce: National Renewable Energy Laboratory (2008).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ Transmission Grid Uncertainty
+
+ If U.S. wind power is beginning to face transmission constraints at only 1% of total U.S. electricity production, analysts raise concerns about the practicality of transmitting 20 times that amount of wind power in the near term. In its 2007 wind program plans, for example, the DOE itself states that large wind power deployment projections "seem too good to be true." 39 A 2008 New York Times assessment makes the point more strongly: "Experts say that without a solution to the grid problem, effective use of wind power on a wide scale is likely to remain a dream." 40 The key uncertainty for wind power then, is whether the electric grid, after decades of under-investment, will expand sufficiently to support a rapid expansion of wind power.
+ Biomass Power Generation
+
+ Biomass power plants are combustion power plants that effectively recycle the CO 2 they emit through carbon sequestration in the crops grown (continuously) for fuel. Crops take up carbon dioxide from the air via photosynthesis as they grow and release it to the air when they are burned, so they cause no net increase in atmospheric CO 2 . 41 Currently, most biomass power plants are fueled with waste materials from farming, forestry, and manufacturing (e.g., paper mill byproducts), although future expansion of biomass generation is expected to rely increasingly on dedicated fuel crops, such as poplar and switchgrass. Biomass power plants accounted for 1.3% of U.S. electricity generation in 2008. 42 
+ Biomass Fuel Supply
+
+ The principal factor which constrains the potential expansion of biomass power in the United States is the availability of biomass fuel. Biomass crops dedicated for power generation require land to grow—potentially in competition with food crops, lumber, and other traditional crops. Up to a point, such competition may not be a significant barrier to growth, since biomass power producers can use more waste from existing agricultural production (e.g., corn stalks) or grow fuel crops on U.S. lands not currently in agricultural production. A 2002 analysis by the Energy Information Administration concluded that U.S. biomass power generation capacity could increase by a factor of ten (from approximately 7 GW to 70 GW) through 2020 and not conflict with land requirements for existing crop production. 43 A 2005 analysis by the Department of Agriculture similarly concluded that forestland and cropland had the potential to support a seven-fold increase in the amount of biomass consumed for "bioenergy and biobased products." 44 
+ Biomass Fuel Uncertainty
+
+ While studies like those above seem to support the potential expansion of biomass power production, others contradict them, raising critical questions about the limits of biomass fuel supply in the United States. As a 2008 RAND report states, "the cost and supply of future biomass feedstocks are highly uncertain factors." 45 This uncertainty is exacerbated by the possible expansion of biomass demand for transportation fuels such as ethanol and biodiesel—also motivated by CO 2 abatement objectives, but in the transportation sector. To the extent that biomass for power and biomass for liquid fuels are pursued aggressively and concurrently, overall competition for U.S. agricultural resources may become a serious concern.
+
+ The significant resulting increase in biomass usage would require harvesting various energy crops at a scale that vastly exceeds current practice. Greatly increased biomass production could be accompanied by adverse environmental and economic impacts due to land conversion. 46 
+
+ Adverse impacts limiting biomass production for electric power could include increases in food prices. Some analysts, for example, have argued that corn price increases could be partly linked to the diversion of U.S. corn crops from food and feedstock supply to fuel ethanol production. 47 Biomass crops could also compete for land with forest carbon sequestration, the latter likely to increase in importance as a source of valuable CO 2 emissions offsets under future carbon control policies. 48 Some analysts have suggested that biomass fuel or food crops could be imported to alleviate domestic land constraints, but such imports would raise other concerns about U.S. energy and food supply independence. A 2007 MIT study concluded,
+
+ If we restrict USA biofuels to those produced domestically, as much as 500 million acres of land would be required in the USA for biofuels production.... The result would be that the USA would need to become a substantial agricultural importer. This suggests that the idea that biomass energy represents a significant domestic energy resource in the USA is misplaced. 49 
+
+ Carbon release from previously untilled lands and from agricultural processing are other factors which may reduce the life cycle CO 2 benefits, and therefore the economic potential, of rapid biomass crop expansion.
+ Nuclear Power Generation
+
+ Nuclear power has been a significant part of the U.S. electricity sector for decades. The U.S. nuclear power industry currently comprises 104 licensed reactors at 65 plant sites in 31 states and generates about 20% of the nation's electricity. 50 Although no nuclear power plants have been ordered in the United States since 1978, and more than 100 reactors (all ordered after 1973) have been canceled, nuclear power is receiving renewed interest, prompted by a spike in fossil fuel prices, new federal subsidies and incentives—and possible CO 2 mitigation policies. As of September 30, 2008, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had received, or anticipated receiving, license applications for 20 new nuclear reactor projects comprising 30 reactors in total. 51 
+
+ Because nuclear power generation is an established technology and produces virtually no direct CO 2 emissions, an expansion of U.S. nuclear power is viewed by many as essential for reaching long term CO 2 mitigation goals. 52 For example, in recent remarks before the Governor's Global Climate Summit, President-elect Obama stated that "we will tap nuclear power" as one way to help "build a clean energy future." 53 Likewise the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report states that "[n]uclear energy ... could make an increasing contribution to carbon free electricity and heat in the future." 54 EPRI proposes a 64% net increase in U.S. nuclear generating capacity, over four times the capacity addition in EIA's reference forecast, by 2030. 55 A 2003 study by MIT postulates a 300% net increase in U.S. nuclear power capacity by 2050. 56 
+ Nuclear Power Construction Uncertainty
+
+ Although nuclear energy proponents have high hopes for growth in this sector, not all groups concerned about climate change favor nuclear power as a key element of U.S. carbon control. The Natural Resources Defense Council, for example, argues that nuclear power may be too costly relative to clean energy alternatives, and may present unacceptable risks of nuclear proliferation and environmental damage from radioactive waste. 57 Other analysts raise questions about long-term nuclear fuel supply constraints, plant safety and security, and public acceptance. 58 These are all vital questions, any one of which could influence the viability of a U.S. nuclear resurgence. Perhaps a more fundamental uncertainty, however, even if these questions were resolved, is whether nuclear power plants could be constructed quickly enough to significantly reduce U.S. carbon emissions in a 20-year (or longer) time frame.
+
+ Uncertainty arises about the possible pace of U.S. nuclear expansion because nuclear power plants are large, complex, and must go through a lengthy and rigorous siting approval process. Furthermore, global capability to construct nuclear plants has diminished since the 1980s. A 2001 DOE analysis concluded that, because of limited growth in the nuclear sector over many years, there had been a "gradual erosion" in important nuclear infrastructure elements, such as qualified personnel in nuclear operations, qualified suppliers of nuclear equipment, and contractors with the necessary skills for nuclear design, engineering, and construction. 59 Little has changed since that report was released. Nuclear plant construction in the United States remains constrained by time, access to critical construction resources, and the availability of qualified engineering and construction firms.
+
+ Given the decline in U.S. nuclear infrastructure, there is ongoing debate among nuclear analysts about the prospect for rapid nuclear power expansion. A 2008 analysis by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) concluded that, based on historical experience from the 1970s and 1980s, and more recent growth in the world economy, "the capability could be rebuilt to construct 35-60 1000 GWe reactors per year" worldwide by 2030, and "[b]y 2050, capability could grow to 70-120 reactors per year." 60 Roughly consistent with this assessment, a 2008 study by the DOE's Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee concluded that, with additional infrastructure, it would be "plausible," albeit "a major challenge," to build 30 new U.S. reactors by 2030. 61 The latter rate of construction is substantially lower than that during the peak period of U.S. nuclear development, from 1963 to 1985, during which time 77 nuclear reactors were ordered, constructed, and began commercial operation. 62 
+
+ Others are more pessimistic about the potential for a rapid expansion of nuclear power in the United States. For example, one analyst concludes that "contrary to the public's perception and the industry's efforts, nuclear power will continue [a] long-term decline rather than move toward a flourishing future revival." 63 The debate is complicated by the need to replace U.S. nuclear plant capacity retiring in the near future simply to maintain nuclear power's current electricity supply contribution. Referring specifically to such construction limitations, another expert concludes that "nuclear energy will remain an option among efforts to control climate change, but given the maximum rate at which new reactors can be built, much new construction will simply offset the retirement of nuclear reactors built decades ago." 64 Observing that "the nuclear capability of the U.S. has atrophied in the 30 years since the last nuclear plant was ordered," Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman has remarked more bluntly: "let's not kid ourselves about the challenges here." 65 In its 2008 report, the National Intelligence Council likewise states–
+
+ expansion of nuclear power generation by 2025 to cover anywhere near the increasing demand would be virtually impossible. The infrastructure (human and physical), legal (permitting), and construction hurdles are just too big. Only at the end of our 15-20 year period are we likely to see a serious ramp up of nuclear technologies 66 
+
+ Faced with these divergent assessments, experts disagree on the ability of nuclear power to help meet CO 2 mitigation goals.
+
+ Members of the Nuclear Power Joint Fact Finding (NJFF) reached no consensus about the likely rate of expansion for nuclear power in the world or in the United States over the next 50 years. Some group members thought it was unlikely that overall nuclear capacity would expand appreciably above its current levels and could decline; others thought that the nuclear industry could expand rapidly enough to fill a substantial portion of a carbon-stabilization "wedge" during the next 50 years. 67 
+
+ Consequently, congressional policy makers face a key uncertainty as to the achievable pace of nuclear power industry expansion, and therefore, the potential contribution nuclear generation may make to near-term CO 2 reduction.
+ Advanced Coal-Fired Power Generation
+
+ One set of technologies that may help to reduce CO 2 emissions from coal power plants is advanced coal-fired power generation. Advanced coal technologies include ultra-supercritical pulverized coal plants and integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) units, the latter of which convert coal into a synthetic gas prior to combustion. Compared to conventional coal-fired power plants, which typically operate at around 33% efficiency, advanced technologies under development or demonstration could improve coal plant efficiency to 46% or more. 68 Because they use coal more efficiently, advanced coal plants could yield proportionate reductions in CO 2 emissions per unit of electricity output compared to conventional coal plants. If carbon capture and sequestration technology (discussed in the next section) could be added to these plants their CO 2 emissions could be further reduced.
+
+ Some analysts and policy makers anticipate that advanced coal generation, either in the form of new coal-fired plants or upgrades to certain existing plants, will make a significant contribution to U.S. carbon reduction goals. They argue that, until carbon capture and storage technology is commercialized, advanced coal plants will be a cost-effective option for meeting future electricity demand growth while limiting CO 2 emissions growth compared to its current rate of growth. EPRI, for example, proposes CO 2 reductions from advanced coal plants on par with those from customer energy-efficiency programs through 2030. 69 
+ Uncertainty in Coal Plant Financing and Approval
+
+ While power plants employing advanced coal-fired generation technology face important questions about technological readiness and cost-effectiveness, the key uncertainty is whether they can be built—that is, whether the capital markets will finance them and whether regulators will permit them. Although they are more efficient than traditional coal plants, advanced technology coal plants still burn coal and—absent carbon capture technology—still release large volumes of CO 2 to the atmosphere. Once constructed, they may remain in service for 40 years or more. Hence they may not satisfy regulatory objectives for carbon control and may face financial risks stemming from future policies imposing costs on CO 2 emissions. Furthermore, industry arguments that these plants will be retrofitted with carbon capture technology when it becomes available are assuming the availability of that technology, which faces uncertainties as discussed in the following section.
+
+ Due to the potential carbon-related risks faced by new coal generation projects, major financial institutions are imposing greater requirements on developers seeking capital for new coal plant investments. 70 Regulatory agencies also have begun withholding regulatory approval from advanced coal project proposals. For example, in August 2007, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission rejected a developer's proposal to construct a new IGCC power plant in the state as "not in the public interest." 71 The Sierra Club reports that at least 30 other proposed IGCC or supercritical coal generation projects have been cancelled across the country over the last several years due to financial and carbon emissions concerns. 72 In November, 2008, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Environmental Appeals Board ruled that an EPA region could not issue a permit for proposed coal-fired power plant without considering whether the "best available" CO 2 controls should be required for such a plant. 73 According to industry analysts, the EPA ruling would place a "freeze on the construction of as many as 100 new coal-fired power plants around the U.S." 74 The EPA Administrator has subsequently overruled the board's decision, apparently clearing the way for numerous coal plant permit applications to proceed, but raising new questions about future regulatory treatment of coal plant emissions under the next administration. 75 
+ Carbon Capture and Sequestration
+
+ Another approach to mitigating atmospheric carbon emissions is direct sequestration of carbon dioxide: capturing CO 2 at its source and storing it indefinitely to avoid its release to the atmosphere. Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is of great interest because potentially large amounts of CO 2 emitted from the industrial burning of fossil fuels in the United States could be suitable for sequestration. In theory, carbon capture technologies are seen as potentially removing 80%-95% of CO 2 emitted from an electric power plant or other industrial facility. Power plants are the most likely initial candidates for CCS because they are predominantly large, single-point sources, and they contribute approximately one-third of U.S. CO 2 emissions from fossil fuels.
+
+ Many analysts and policy makers have high hopes for CCS technology to help meet future CO 2 reduction goals in the U.S. electricity sector and worldwide. For example, one expert has testified before Congress that "[c]apturing and sequestering CO 2 emissions from coal-fired power plants and eventually all fossil combustion is a foundational technology component of any emissions reduction plan" seeking to stabilize atmospheric CO 2 . 76 In the International Energy Agency's 2007 forecast CCS is "widely-deployed" under global CO 2 stabilization assumptions and accounts for 21% of avoided CO 2 emissions by 2030. 77 In EPRI's analysis, CCS makes the single greatest contribution to reduced CO 2 emissions among all measures by 2030. 78 
+ CCS Technology Uncertainty
+
+ Developing technology to capture CO 2 in an environmentally, economically, and operationally acceptable manner—especially from coal-fired power plants—has been an ongoing interest of the federal government for a decade. Nonetheless, the technology on the whole is still under development: no commercial device is currently available to capture carbon from coal plants. (Technology is currently available for capturing CO 2 from certain industrial processes, such as ammonia production, or natural gas processing, but the volumes of CO 2 emitted from coal-fired power plants dwarf any current industrial process in use today.) Various new CCS technologies have been tested successfully in laboratories, and some are being demonstrated in limited capacity field trials, but they are costly and face technical challenges to reaching commercial scale. Consequently, analysts disagree as to whether, when, and how CCS technology might be widely available in the United States at a cost competitive with commercially available technologies for generating electricity—particularly natural gas turbines. 79 Policies that impose costs on generators for CO 2 emissions, such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade programs, presumably, would benefit CCS competitiveness, but they, too, are highly uncertain and constrained by other economic factors. As one study notes, "[t]he success of a cap-and-trade program in spurring widespread CCS deployment depends on a wide range of factors that cannot be controlled or even predicted in advance." 80 
+
+ A review of recent studies reveals a broad range of opinion as to how quickly CCS could be commercially deployed on large scale. An analysis from Imperial College, London, sees initial commercial deployment of CCS technology in the 2015-2020 period. 81 DOE officials reportedly have stated that the agency hopes to have carbon capture technology "in a deployable position within a decade." 82 A 2008 study by McKinsey & Company projected that early commercial CCS projects would be built "around 2020." 83 The World Business Council for Sustainable Development believes CCS technology will enter commercial deployment by 2025. 84 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2005 report on CCS technology states that "many integrated assessment analyses ... foresee the large-scale deployment of CCS systems within a few decades from the start of any significant regime for mitigating global warming." 85 A coalition including Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and other public interest groups asserts that "the best-case scenario is that [CCS] technology would be ready by 2030." 86 Referring to IEA's long term projections for carbon control, the OECD states that "there must be significant doubt as to whether or not it is feasible to achieve the assumed contribution from CCS by 2030." 87 
+
+ Given the range of expectations for CCS technology readiness, policy makers may not be able to establish to their satisfaction the contribution this technology may make to CO 2 emissions abatement. As one former DOE official reportedly has cautioned, "[p]eople's conception of how much [CCS] can deliver is probably wildly overrated. So I'm hopeful that carbon capture and storage could be part of the solution, but ... one just has to put a big question mark on it." 88 Echoing this view, Nobel laureate Steven Chu, Director of the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and nominee for Secretary of Energy, reportedly has remarked, "it's not guaranteed we have a solution for coal." 89 Accordingly, the key uncertainty for policy makers regarding CCS is if and when the technology might be available for widespread deployment.
+ Plug-in Electric Hybrid Vehicles
+
+ A recent development in advanced vehicle technologies is the potential introduction in the next few years of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs). PHEVs, like commercially available hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs), would combine an electric motor and battery pack with an internal combustion engine to improve overall fuel efficiency. PHEVs would use a much higher-capacity battery pack than a typical HEV, however, and would be able charge the vehicle on grid power rather than solely by the combustion engine during operation. With their larger batteries, PHEVs could achieve an all-electric range of 20 to 40 miles (the average commuting distance). By using grid electricity rather than gasoline in this way, PHEVs could lower overall fuel-cycle pollutant emissions—including CO 2 emissions—from vehicles. 90 Accordingly, many analysts and policy makers believe PHEV's offer substantial opportunities to reduce the nation's overall CO 2 emissions. A 2007 joint EPRI-Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) study, for example, concluded that, through the widespread adoption of PHEV technology, "cumulative [CO 2 ] savings from 2010 to 2050 can be large." 91 The Obama-Biden presidential campaign pledged to "[p]ut 1 million plug-in hybrid cars ... on the road by 2015." 92 
+
+ While PHEVs are an innovative technology, there are important questions about the impact PHEVs may have on CO 2 emissions over the next 20 ot 30 years. One key uncertainty is whether such vehicles would be purchased in sufficient numbers (approximately 50% of new car sales by 2025, according to the EPRI/NRDC study) 93 to have a significant carbon impact despite their high cost. PHEVs are projected to retail for over $40,000 per vehicle in the near-term compared to approximately $28,000 for an HEV and $23,000 for a conventional vehicle. 94 As a point of reference, conventional HEVs accounted for 2.4% of new vehicle sales in the United States through November 2008. 95 Of greater uncertainty, perhaps, are the projected carbon emissions of power plants operating to supply PHEV electricity. As a general rule, PHEVs only reduce net carbon emissions if the power plants supplying them produce relatively little carbon per kWh. But some studies show that, if the U.S. generation portfolio does not significantly reduce its overall carbon intensity, widespread adoption of PHEVs through 2030 may have only a small effect on, and might actually increase, net CO 2 emissions. 96 Thus, the carbon abatement potential of PHEVs is largely dependent upon the concurrent implementation of renewables, nuclear power, and CCS—each of which face great uncertainties of their own as discussed above.
+ Distributed Energy Resources
+
+ Distributed energy resources are small-scale power generation technologies located near homes or businesses to provide an alternative to, or an enhancement of, conventional grid power. Distributed resources include technologies such as rooftop photovoltaics, natural gas-fired microturbines, wind turbines, and fuel cells. The category also includes combined heat and power (CHP) systems, which make productive use of "waste" heat from electricity generation, thereby increasing the total useful energy extracted from electric generation fuels. 97 Distributed energy resources (DER) offer potential benefits to customers in terms of energy costs, power reliability, and power quality. DER technologies also can help mitigate CO 2 emissions because some use renewable energy sources, or, as in the case of CHP systems, they make more efficient use of fossil fuels than the utility power generation they displace. 98 
+
+ Among DER technologies, CHP is the most widespread, accounting for nearly nine percent of U.S. electric generating capacity in 2007. 99 CHP is also viewed as having the greatest near-term potential to reduce CO 2 emissions. A 2008 report from Oak Ridge National Laboratory concludes that, by achieving 20 percent generation capacity from CHP by 2030 (an "aggressive target"), the United States could avoid 60 percent of the projected increases in CO 2 emissions during that time. 100 A 2007 study by McKinsey & Company further concludes that much of this added capacity could be installed at negative marginal cost. 101 Nonetheless, CHP, along with other DER technologies, has not been implemented to its potential due to technical and utility infrastructure barriers.
+
+ CHP, or cogeneration, has been around in one form or another for more than 100 years; it is proven, not speculative. Despite this proven track record, CHP remains underutilized and is one of the most compelling sources of energy efficiency that could, with even modest investments, move the Nation strongly toward ... a cleaner environment. 102 
+
+ Other DER technologies, such as photovoltaics and fuel cells, likewise face barriers limiting their implementation. As a United Kingdom government study stated,
+
+ The complexity and novelty of some of the technologies, together with their need to be integrated into the built environment, often by players new to the energy business, means there is a significant gap between potential and delivery. Moreover, many of the technologies are not yet cost-competitive at their current state of development and with current fuel and carbon prices. 103 
+
+ Analysts also question whether policies imposing costs on CO 2 emissions would substantially increase DER adoption due to the existing alignment of carbon reduction and cost reduction objectives, even without carbon costs, and the fundamental economics of renewables. 104 Thus, DER faces a key uncertainty similar to that faced by energy efficiency. The key question is whether new programs and the imposition of carbon costs would enable the electricity sector to capture substantially more DER potential than it does today.
+ Policy Issues for Congress
+
+ Policy research and technical studies show that substantially reducing CO 2 emissions in the U.S. electricity sector over the next few decades likely requires successful deployment of every major carbon mitigation measure at the nation's disposal. However, it is also clear that significant uncertainties cast doubt on the potential of individual measures to achieve their hoped-for carbon impact. For the measures discussed in this report, the key uncertainties can be summarized as follows:
+ Energy efficiency —Can the United States overcome socioeconomic barriers to achieve four times more potential savings than ever before?
+
+ Renewable energy —Will there be enough transmission for wind power? Is there enough land to grow the needed biomass?
+
+ Nuclear power —Could the United States build new plants fast enough to matter?
+
+ Advanced coal power —Will banks fund them and regulators approve them?
+
+ Carbon capture and sequestration —Will the technology be commercially deployable in 10 years, 25 years, or never?
+
+ Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles —How much "low carbon" electricity would be available to charge their batteries?
+
+ Distributed energy resources —Would carbon costs change distributed energy economics enough to spur deployment?
+ Policy makers and interest groups recognize these uncertainties, and have put forth numerous proposals to address them. It is beyond the scope of this report to examine each of these proposals, but they include the broadest range of policy instruments at government's disposal: higher efficiency standards, new regulatory authorities, tax incentives, direct subsidies, research and development (R&D) grants, environmental rules, public information campaigns, and a host of other policy instruments. Specific examples include calls for more federally-funded CCS demonstration projects and proposals for federal preemption of state siting authority to promote new transmission development. 105 While they run the gamut, it remains to be seen which proposals may be pursued by Congress and what effects they would have. Consequently, the overall success of a multi-measure CO 2 mitigation scheme such as that proposed by EPRI in Figure 1 , and its economic underpinnings, is inherently unpredictable.
+
+ The cost of building and operating coal plants with and without CCS systems, the cost of natural gas, nuclear power and renewable sources of power, the cost of emissions offsets from outside the utility sector, and ultimately the market price of CO 2 itself are all variables that will dictate the decisions of future power plant developers. These variables are all highly uncertain from today's perspective and may create a set of economic drivers dramatically different from those anticipated by policymakers. 106 
+ Possible Outcomes for Carbon Control
+
+ Identifying key uncertainties for carbon abatement measures is not the same as predicting their ultimate success or failure. This report does not independently assess the likelihood of particular measures meeting any specific CO 2 reduction target. The whole point of this report's focus on uncertainty is that CO 2 outcomes are not known, and expert opinions vary as to what the future will be. It is, therefore, entirely possible that a portfolio of CO 2 measures such as those in Figure 1 , implemented under the optimum subset of policies currently under debate, could achieve the types of carbon reductions projected. Indeed, EPRI has characterized its CO 2 scenario as "very aggressive, but potentially feasible." 107 Other CO 2 abatement analyses have also been developed in good faith with a similar belief in their practicality. Successfully reducing U.S. carbon emissions to 1990 levels, say, by 2030 would validate the overall policy approach as well as the specific measures comprising it. Such an outcome would not be conclusive, as deeper CO 2 cuts would arguably need to follow, but the intervening years would probably provide greater clarity on the best policy options to 2050 and beyond.
+ Underperformance of Individual CO 2 Measures
+
+ Although successful implementation of all carbon abatement measures is the goal, it is also entirely possible that, under a multi-measure strategy like EPRI's, one or more measures would fall short of meeting expectations for CO2 reduction. Nuclear industry expansion, for instance, could easily fail to materialize, or the transmission grid could expand too slowly for sustained wind power development. In such a case legislators might need to revisit both the enabling policies for the underperforming measures and for the carbon strategy as a whole.
+
+ One obvious solution could be to rely on more successful measures to compensate for the underperforming ones. As the OECD study posits, "if CCS and/or end-use efficiency fail to achieve the required targets, it follows that other technologies, including nuclear power, will need to make bigger contributions to fill the gap." 108 But based on a review of the relevant research cited in this report, such an approach may simply not be realistic. Since the CO 2 targets of the individual measures are already viewed by some analysts as "ambitious," "aggressive," or " a major challenge," and there are questions as to whether the initial targets can be achieved, increasing those targets may stretch credibility and sharply increase the uncertainty of the overall CO 2 mitigation effort. Alternatively, legislators could revisit measure-specific policies to see if more intervention could improve their particular prospects. Larger tax credits for renewable energy, for example, could potentially improve the competitiveness of biomass generation, thereby encouraging biomass investment. Such an approach might still encounter difficulty making up for early underperformance of a measure in the out years, as CO 2 emissions are cumulative, but any improvement would arguably be helpful. A third option would be to increase the level of any future carbon costs with the expectation that an increase would benefit carbon-mitigating technologies across the board. Such an action, however, could have broad implications for energy prices, reliability, and availability.
+ Failure of the CO 2 Mitigation Portfolio
+
+ Notwithstanding the best efforts of federal policy makers, it is possible that, given the uncertainties they face, that few if any of the major measures proposed to moderate U.S. carbon emissions would achieve their anticipated impacts in a 20-year time frame. In its 2008 report, the National Intelligence Council suggests just such an outcome:
+
+ [A]ll current technologies are inadequate for replacing the traditional energy architecture on the scale needed, and new energy technologies probably will not be commercially viable and widespread by 2025.... Even with a favorable policy and funding environment for biofuels, clean coal, or hydrogen, the transition to new fuels will be slow. 109 
+
+ Under such a scenario, legislators may face different policy alternatives, each with distinct but potentially significant implications. Congress might increase future carbon emissions costs even higher than under the previous scenario—to a level that virtually guarantees the targeted CO 2 reductions—although the effects of very high carbon prices on electricity costs might be detrimental to specific industries (e.g., coal) or to the economy as a whole. Alternatively, Congress might refocus its efforts on a single measure (e.g., CCS or nuclear power) restructuring its policies to expand the implementation of that specific measure far beyond its original targets. Congress could also reset its national CO 2 targets, deferring reduction goals until they are more in line with the maturation and implementation of the key CO 2 reduction technologies. In this case, legislators would signal acceptance that near-term targets could not be met and hope for greater success later in the century. This alternative risks unacceptable implications, however, and might violate future international emissions treaties. Finally, Congress could abandon its focus on CO 2 reduction altogether, instead directing resources at mitigating the effects of global warming and adapting to a hotter climate.
+ Conclusion
+
+ Reducing U.S. emissions of manmade CO 2 is a priority of both the President elect and leaders in Congress. Comprehensive policies have been proposed to achieve these reductions. Most envision aggressive implementation of a portfolio of major carbon reduction measures, with the goal of reducing U.S. CO 2 emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 or 2030. Numerous studies support the potential of specific measures to lower CO 2 emissions, but also identify key implementation uncertainties which may impact their overall viability. Congress is considering policies to address these uncertainties, but which policies may be implemented and how effective they may be cannot be known at this time.
+
+ As the nation's CO 2 mitigation policies continue to develop, the inherent uncertainty associated with specific carbon measures may be a critical concern. Commitments, either domestic or international, to specific carbon emissions targets over time, or to a specific schedule of carbon costs (whatever form they may take) may be greatly affected by the success of the underlying measures relied upon to achieve them. The reverse is also true; a schedule of carbon costs may also influence the success of CO 2 abatement measures. Therefore, policy makers may benefit from a complete and integrated understanding of measure-specific uncertainties and the range of carbon outcomes they imply. As one study has concluded, "explicitly including uncertainty in both technical change and in climate damages is important for understanding the relationship between technical change, climate change, and policy.... [O]ptimal policy is different ... when uncertainty is taken into account. 110 
+
+ As Congress considers implementing CO 2 policies, keeping a close eye on the technology and market developments associated with every key measure may be an oversight priority. Success or failure of any particular measure may be apparent early on in its implementation, affording an opportunity through quick action to make policy adjustments to improve a measure's chances for success, or to abandon it in favor of more promising options. Perhaps more importantly, given the complexity and scale of the carbon control problem, Congress may also find it useful to expect the unexpected in the electricity sector. Apart from the measures discussed in this report, new technologies, consumer behavior, or infrastructure developments (e.g., a rush to natural gas) may emerge rapidly and unexpectedly to change fundamental aspects of the nation's carbon emissions trajectory. One way or another, electricity supply will balance with demand—but perhaps in unanticipated ways. The recent volatility in global oil prices is a relevant example of unexpected structural changes in energy markets. Balancing responses to energy market volatility and unexpected structural changes against the need for a predictability in R&D and private capital investment may be essential to maintaining the nation on course to meaningful atmospheric CO 2 reduction.
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ Footnotes
+
+ 
+ 
+ 1 .
+ 
+ 
+ World Resources Institute, "Comparison of Legislative Climate Change Targets," (Washington, DC: June 18, 2008): 3.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 2 .
+ 
+ 
+ President-elect Barack Obama, Remarks before the Governor's Global Climate Summit, Beverly Hills, California (November 18, 2008).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 3 .
+ 
+ 
+ For another prominent analysis, see also: S. Pacala and R. Socolow, "Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies," Science , Vol. 305, No. 5686 (August 13, 2004): 968 - 972.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 4 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example: Seung-Rae Kim, Klaus Keller, and David F. Bradford, "Optimal Technological Portfolios for Climate-Change Policy Under Uncertainty: A Computable General Equilibrium Approach," Presented at the 10 th International Society of Computational Economics Conference on Computing in Economics and Finance (Amsterdam: July 8-10, 2004).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 5 .
+ 
+ 
+ Strictly speaking, "conservation" means "avoiding waste," but the term is typically used interchangeably with "efficiency" in the energy policy context, as it is in this report. "Efficiency" and "conservation" contrast with "curtailment" or "load management" which decrease output (e.g., turning down the thermostat) or services (e.g., driving less) to decrease energy use at specific times. Curtailment is often employed as an emergency measure.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 6 .
+ 
+ 
+ Amory B. Lovins, "Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?" Foreign Affairs , Vol. 55 No. 1 (October 1976).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 7 .
+ 
+ 
+ Now the National Renewable Energy Laboratory.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 8 .
+ 
+ 
+ Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI), A New Prosperity: Building a Sustainable Energy Future , Brick House Publishing (Andover, MA: 1981): 1.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 9 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid: 2.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 10 .
+ 
+ 
+ Interlaboratory Working Group on Energy-Efficient and Low-Carbon Technologies, Scenarios of U.S. Carbon Reductions: Potential Impacts of Energy-Efficient and Low-Carbon Technologies by 2010 and Beyond , (1997) :3.3-3.4. http://enduse.lbl.gov/projects/5lab.html The five laboratories are Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 11 .
+ 
+ 
+ Steven Nadel, Anna Shipley and R. Neal Elliott, "The Technical, Economic and Achievable Potential for Energy-Efficiency in the U.S. – A Meta-Analysis of Recent Studies," Proceedings of the 2004 ACEEE Summer Study on Energy Efficiency in Buildings , American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (Washington, DC: 2004).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 12 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of State, U.S. Climate Action Report—2006 (July 2007): 40.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 13 .
+ 
+ 
+ Commonly referred to as "demand-side management" or "DSM" programs.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 14 .
+ 
+ 
+ Kenneth Gillingham, Richard G. Newell, and Karen Palmer, Retrospective Examination of Demand-Side Energy Efficiency Policies , Resources for the Future, RFF DP 04-19 REV (June 2004; revised September 2004): 63-64.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 15 .
+ 
+ 
+ Charles A. Goldman, Joseph H. Eto, and Galen L. Barbose, California Customer Load Reductions during the Electricity Crisis: Did they Help to Keep the Lights On? , Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, LBNL-49733 (May 2002): iii, 20.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 16 .
+ 
+ 
+ Michael Howard, Senior Vice President, "Electric Power Research Institute, Energy Efficiency: How Much Can We Count On?" Presented at the Edison Foundation Conference, Keeping the Lights On: Our National Challenge, (April 21, 2008): 14. http://www.edisonfoundation.net/events/2008-04-21/EPRIPresentation.pdf 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 17 .
+ 
+ 
+ J.G. Koomey, C.A. Webber, C.S. Atkinson, and A. Nicholls, "Addressing Energy-Related Challenges for the U.S. Buildings Sector: Results from the Clean Energy Futures Study," Energy Policy, Vol. 29, No. 14 (November 2001): 1211.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 18 .
+ 
+ 
+ Howard Geller and Sophie Attali, "The Experience with Energy Efficiency Policies and Programmes in IEA Countries: Learning from the Critics," International Energy Agency, IEA Information Paper (August 2005): 23.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 19 .
+ 
+ 
+ William H. Golove and Joseph H. Eto, Market Barriers to Energy Efficiency: A Critical Reappraisal of the Rationale for Public Policies to Promote Energy Efficiency , LBL-38059, UC-1322, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (March 1996): xii-xiii.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 20 .
+ 
+ 
+ For further analysis of conservation proposals, see CRS Report RL33831, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Legislation in the 110 th Congress , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 21 .
+ 
+ 
+ This report excludes hydroelectric power generation from the renewables category because of environmental constraints and associated limits on potential new hydro capacity.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 22 .
+ 
+ 
+ T. Boone Pickens, The Plan , Internet page (August 7, 2008). http://www.pickensplan.com/theplan 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 23 .
+ 
+ 
+ Obama-Biden, Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for America , Fact sheet (August 3, 2008). http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet_energy_speech_080308.pdf ; A 2004 Illinois state senate bill cosponsored by Senator Barack Obama (SB2321, 93 rd General Assembly) excluded new construction hydroelectric power from its proposed state RPS.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 24 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example: American Council On Renewable Energy, The Outlook on Renewable Energy in America Volume II: Joint Summary Report (Washington, DC: March 2007).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 25 .
+ 
+ 
+ Barbara Tyran, Electric Power Research Institute, (May 15, 2008): 7.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 26 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2008 (June 2008): 70.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 27 .
+ 
+ 
+ For a more comprehensive analysis of wind power, see CRS Report RL34546, Wind Power in the United States: Technology, Economic, and Policy Issues , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 28 .
+ 
+ 
+ Federal tax credits are provided for under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-486 § 1914) and subsequent statutes.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 29 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly , DOE/EIA-0226 (2008/10) (October 28, 2008): Tables 1.1 and 1.1a. This figure is year to date through July.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 30 .
+ 
+ 
+ D. L. Elliott, L. L. Wendell, G.L. Gower, An Assessment of the Available Windy Land Area and Wind Energy Potential in the Contiguous United States 1991 , Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL-7789 (August, 1991): iii.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 31 .
+ 
+ 
+ Walter Short and Nate Blair, The Long-Term Potential of Wind Power in the U.S., Solar Today (November/December 2003): 29.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 32 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Energy, 20% Wind Energy by 2030: Increasing Wind Energy's Contribution to U.S. Electricity Supply , DOE/GO-102008-2567 (July 2008): 1.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 33 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Energy (July 2008): 14.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 34 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ibid.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 35 .
+ 
+ 
+ National Grid Corp., Transmission and Wind Energy: Capturing the Prevailing Winds for the Benefit of Customers (Westborough, MA: September 2006): 9. http://www.nationalgridus.com/non_html/c3-3_NG_wind_policy.pdf 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 36 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Energy (July 2008): 95. This compares to 200,000 miles of existing transmission lines operating at 230 kV and above.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 37 .
+ 
+ 
+ AEP, "Interstate Transmission Vision for Wind Integration," Electricity Today (September 2007): 30-37.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 38 .
+ 
+ 
+ Shalini P. Vajjhala, "Siting Difficulty and Transmission Investment," IAEE Energy Forum (International Association for Energy Economics: 2 nd Quarter 2008): 5-7; North American Electric Reliability Council, 2006 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (October 2006): 22-23.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 39 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Dept. of Energy, Wind Energy Multiyear Program Plan For 2007–2012 , DOE/GO-102007-2451 (August 2007): 8.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 40 .
+ 
+ 
+ Matthew L. Wald, "Wind Energy Bumps into Power Grid's Limits," New York Times (August 27, 2008).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 41 .
+ 
+ 
+ Additional CO 2 is emitted by combustion of fossil fuels used to produce and process fuel crops, but those emissions are small compared to power plant combustion emissions.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 42 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly , DOE/EIA-0226 (2008/10) (October 28, 2008): Tables 1.1 and 1.1a. This value is year-to-date through July 2008.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 43 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Energy Information Administration, Biomass for Electricity Generation (2002). http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/biomass/ The study excludes biomass and coal co-firing.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 44 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Biomass as a Feedstock for a Bioenergy and Bioproducts Industry: The Technical Feasibility of a Billion-Ton Annual Supply , (April 2005): 34.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 45 .
+ 
+ 
+ Michael Toman, James Griffin, and Robert J. Lempert, Impacts on U.S. Energy Expenditures and Greenhouse-Gas Emissions of Increasing Renewable-Energy Use , RAND Corp. (2008): 38.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 46 .
+ 
+ 
+ Michael Toman, et al. (2008): xiii.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 47 .
+ 
+ 
+ For further analysis of renewable fuels issues, see CRS Report RL34265, Selected Issues Related to an Expansion of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) , by [author name scrubbed] and Tom Capehart.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 48 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Potential in U.S. Forestry and Agriculture , EPA 430-R-05-006 (November 2005): 4-12.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 49 .
+ 
+ 
+ John Reilly and Sergey Paltsev, "Biomass Energy and Competition for Land," MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report No. 145 (April 2007):16.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 50 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Digest 2008-20098 , NUREG-1350, Vol. 20 (August 2008): 32.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 51 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Energy Information Administration, S tatus of Potential New Commercial Nuclear Reactors in the United States (October 9, 2008): Table 1. http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/nuc_reactors/com_reactors.pdf 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 52 .
+ 
+ 
+ Processes related to nuclear generation, such as the mining, processing, and transportation of nuclear fuel, do generate CO 2 emissions. The levels of these emissions are the subject of debate. See Kurt Kleiner, "Nuclear Energy: Assessing the Emissions," Nature Reports: Climate Change (September 24, 2008).
+
+ http://www.nature.com/climate/2008/0810/pdf/climate.2008.99.pdf 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 53 .
+ 
+ 
+ President-elect Barack Obama (November 18, 2008).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 54 .
+ 
+ 
+ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press: 2007): 253.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 55 .
+ 
+ 
+ Barbara Tyran, Electric Power Research Institute, (May 15, 2008): 7.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 56 .
+ 
+ 
+ Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), The Future of Nuclear Power (2003): 3.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 57 .
+ 
+ 
+ Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Facts , (February 2007): 1. http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/plants/plants.pdf 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 58 .
+ 
+ 
+ IPCC (2007): 253; MIT (2003): 21-24.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 59 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Department of Energy, A Roadmap to Deploy New Nuclear Power Plants in the United States by 2010: Volume 1 Summary Report (October 31, 2001): 7.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 60 .
+ 
+ 
+ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Energy Outlook 2008 , NEA No. 6348(2008): 316. GWe=Gigawatt-electric.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 61 .
+ 
+ 
+ Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee, Nuclear Energy: Policies and Technology for the 21 st Century (November 2008): 8.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 62 .
+ 
+ 
+ Compiled from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) Reactor Status List, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/nuc_reactors/reactsum.html .
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 63 .
+ 
+ 
+ Mycle Schneider, "2008 World Nuclear Industry Status Report: Global Nuclear Power," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , Web edition (September 16, 2008). http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/reports/2008-world-nuclear-industry-status-report/2008-world-nuclear-industry-status-rep 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 64 .
+ 
+ 
+ [author name scrubbed], Nuclear Renaissance: Is It Coming? Should It? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (October 2008): 2.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 65 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman, Remarks before the Nuclear Energy Summit: Renewing America's Nuclear Power Partnership For Energy Security and Economic Growth , Convened at the U.S. Department of Commerce (October 8, 2008).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 66 .
+ 
+ 
+ National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World , NIC 2008-003 (November 2008): 45.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 67 .
+ 
+ 
+ Keystone Center, Nuclear Power Joint Fact-Finding (June 2007): 10.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 68 .
+ 
+ 
+ Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), The Future of Coal (2007): 115, 124.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 69 .
+ 
+ 
+ Barbara Tyran, Electric Power Research Institute, (May 15, 2008): 7.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 70 .
+ 
+ 
+ Citi, JPMorgan Chase and Morgan Stanley, "Leading Wall Street Banks Establish The Carbon Principles," Joint press release (New York: February 4, 2008).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 71 .
+ 
+ 
+ Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Order Resolving Procedural Issues, Disapproving Power Purchase Agreement, Requiring Further Negotiations, and Resolving to Explore the Potential for a Statewide Market for Project Power under Minn. Stat. § 216b.1694, Subd. 5 , Docket No. E-6472/M-05-1993 (August 30, 2007):15.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 72 .
+ 
+ 
+ Sierra Club, "Stopping the Coal Rush," Internet database (December 16, 2009). http://www.sierraclub.org/environmentallaw/coal/plantlist.asp 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 73 .
+ 
+ 
+ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Appeals Board, In re: Deseret Power Electric Cooperative PSD Permit No. PSD-OU-0002-04.00 , PSD Appeal No. 07-03 Order Denying Review in Part and Remanding in Part (Decided November 13, 2008).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 74 .
+ 
+ 
+ Kate Sheppard, "Is That a Bonanza in Your Docket?," Gristmill , Internet blog (November 14, 2008). http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2008/11/13/165551/28 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 75 .
+ 
+ 
+ Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA's Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered By Federal Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permit Program , Memorandum (December 18, 2008).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 76 .
+ 
+ 
+ Raymond J. Kopp, Director of the Climate Policy Program, Resources for the Future, Testimony before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee (June 25, 2008).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 77 .
+ 
+ 
+ International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2007 (2007): 208.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 78 .
+ 
+ 
+ Barbara Tyran, Electric Power Research Institute, (May 15, 2008): 7.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 79 .
+ 
+ 
+ For discussion of specific carbon capture technologies and analysis of the potential costs implications of carbon capture relative to other generation technologies, see CRS Report RL34621, Capturing CO2 from Coal-Fired Power Plants: Challenges for a Comprehensive Strategy , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 80 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ken Berlin and Robert M. Sussman, Global Warming and The Future of Coal , Center for American Progress (May 2007): 34.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 81 .
+ 
+ 
+ J. Gibbins and H. Chalmers, "Preparing for Global Rollout: a 'Developed Country First' Demonstration Programme for Rapid CCS Deployment," Energy Policy , Vol. 36, No. 2 (2008): 501-507.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 82 .
+ 
+ 
+ Acting Deputy Energy Secretary Jeffrey Kupfer quoted in "Bush DOE Transition Head Sees Commercial Carbon Capture In 10 Years," EnergyWashington (December 2, 2008).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 83 .
+ 
+ 
+ McKinsey & Company, Inc., Carbon Capture & Storage: Assessing the Economics (September 22, 2008): 18.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 84 .
+ 
+ 
+ World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Pathways to 2050: Energy and Climate Change (December 7, 2005): 5.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 85 .
+ 
+ 
+ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Special Report: Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage , 2005 (2005): 341
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 86 .
+ 
+ 
+ Greenpeace, "Tell Congress To Keep Carbon Capture and Storage Out Of Energy Legislation," Internet page (Washington, DC: May 6, 2008) http://members.greenpeace.org/action/start.php?action_id=189 ; "Public Interest Groups Oppose Carbon Capture Scam," It's Getting Hot in Here , Internet blog (May 6, 2008). http://itsgettinghotinhere.org/2008/05/06/public-interest-groups-oppose-carbon-capture-scam/ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 87 .
+ 
+ 
+ OECD (2008): 133.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 88 .
+ 
+ 
+ Joseph Romm, Center for American Progress, as quoted in "Coal's Carbon Capture in Question," Living on Earth , Public Radio International, audio transcript (February 8, 2008).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 89 .
+ 
+ 
+ Keith Johnson, "Steven Chu: 'Coal is My Worst Nightmare'," Wall Street Journal, Environmental Capital , Internet blog (December 11, 2008).
+
+ http://blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2008/12/11 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 90 .
+ 
+ 
+ While these emissions reductions, technically, affect the transportation sector, they are linked to emissions in the electricity sector and so are often assessed in both contexts.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 91 .
+ 
+ 
+ Electric Power Research Institute and Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Assessment of Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, Volume 1: Nationwide Greenhouse Gas Emissions (July 2007): 5-10.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 92 .
+ 
+ 
+ Obama-Biden, Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for America , Fact sheet (August 3, 2008). http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet_energy_speech_080308.pdf 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 93 .
+ 
+ 
+ Electric Power Research Institute and Natural Resources Defense Council (July 2007): 4-8. This value is for the "Medium PHEV fleet penetration case."
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 94 .
+ 
+ 
+ Andrew Simpson, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicle Technology , National Renewable Energy Laboratory, NREL/CP-540-40485 (November 2006): 10.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 95 .
+ 
+ 
+ Green Car Congress, US Sales of Hybrids Down 50% in November , Web page (December 9, 2008). http://www.greencarcongress.com/2008/12/us-sales-of-hyb.html#more 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 96 .
+ 
+ 
+ See, for example: Stanton W. Hadley and Alexandra Tsvetkova, Potential Impacts of Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles on Regional Power Generation , Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/TM-2007/150 (January 2008): 68; Constantine Samaras and Kyle Meisterling, "Life Cycle Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Plug-in Hybrid Vehicles: Implications for Policy," Environmental Science and Technology , Vol. 42, No. 9. (2008): 3170-3176.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 97 .
+ 
+ 
+ CHP systems are also commonly referred to as "cogeneration" systems.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 98 .
+ 
+ 
+ S.W. Hadley, J.W. Van Dyke, W.P. Poore, III, and T.K. Stovall, Quantitative Assessment of Distributed Energy Resource Benefits , Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/TM-2003/20 (May 2003): 23.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 99 .
+ 
+ 
+ Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Combined Heat and Power: Effective Energy Solutions for a Sustainable Future , ORNL/TM-2008/224 (December 1, 2008): 4.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 100 .
+ 
+ 
+ Oak Ridge National Laboratory, (December 1, 2008): 21.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 101 .
+ 
+ 
+ McKinsey & Company, Inc., Reducing U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: How Much at What Cost? , (December, 2007).
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 102 .
+ 
+ 
+ Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Combined Heat and Power: Effective Energy Solutions for a Sustainable Future , ORNL/TM-2008/224 (December 1, 2008): 3.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 103 .
+ 
+ 
+ United Kingdom, Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, UK Renewable Energy Strategy: Consultation Document (2007): 135.
+
+ http://renewableconsultation.berr.gov.uk/consultation/chapter-5/executive-summary/ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 104 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ryan Firestone and Chris Marnay, "Distributed Energy Resources for Carbon Emissions Mitigation," Conference paper for The European Council for an Energy Efficient Economy 2007 Summer Study, (La Colle sur Loup, France: June 4-9, 2007): 5.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 105 .
+ 
+ 
+ Union of Concerned Scientists, Coal Power in a Warming World (October 2008): 3-4; Testimony of Joseph Kelliher, Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee (July 31, 2008). http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20080731102123-Chairmantestimony.pdf 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 106 .
+ 
+ 
+ Ken Berlin and Robert M. Sussman (May 2007): 34.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 107 .
+ 
+ 
+ Barbara Tyran, Electric Power Research Institute, (May 15, 2008): 7.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 108 .
+ 
+ 
+ OECD (2008): 133.
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 109 .
+ 
+ 
+ National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World , NIC 2008-003 (November 2008).
+
+ http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 110 .
+ 
+ 
+ Erin Baker, Leon Clarke, Jeffrey Keisler, and Ekudayo Shittu, "Uncertainty, Technical Change and Policy Models," University of Massachusetts, Boston, College of Management, UMBCMWP 1028 (July 2007): 3-4.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/corpus/politics/text/d12024b1b1cd7822.txt b/corpus/politics/text/d12024b1b1cd7822.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..479f4488cdd9310d9777fbf0a1cbb9d95c061524
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/politics/text/d12024b1b1cd7822.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,410 @@
+Updated December 13, 2023
+
+ Bangladesh 
+
+Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) is a Muslim-majority 
+
+The United States and Bangladesh hold annual bilateral 
+
+South Asian nation bordering India and Burma (Myanmar) 
+
+Partnership Dialogues and Security Dialogues, and have 
+
+on the Bay of Bengal. The world’s eighth most populous 
+
+developed a cooperative security relationship to meet 
+
+country, with approximately 167 million people, it has a 
+
+shared concerns, including violent extremism and regional 
+
+land area about the size of Iowa. Its democratic system has 
+
+security. As part of these dialogues, the two governments 
+
+faced many serious challenges, including political violence, 
+
+have agreed to work closely together for a shared vision of 
+
+weak governance, corruption, poverty, demographic and 
+
+a free, open, inclusive, and peaceful Indo-Pacific. 
+
+environmental strains, and Islamist militancy. The United 
+States and Bangladesh have partnered on various issues and 
+
+ Figure 1. Bangladesh in Brief 
+
+worked together to promote shared interests in South Asia 
+and the Indo-Pacific region. 
+
+Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy that conducts 
+regular elections, though there are increasing concerns that 
+it is backsliding toward a one-party, hybrid regime that 
+includes elements of authoritarianism and democracy. The 
+ruling Awami League (AL), the party of Prime Minister 
+Sheikh Hasina, increasingly dominates national politics. 
+The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has been the main 
+opposition party. In opposition, both parties have at times 
+used demonstrations, labor strikes, and transport blockades, 
+as well as the ballot box, to regain government control. 
+Prime Minister Hasina, in office since 2009, won her third 
+consecutive term in December 2018. During that election, 
+observers reported vote rigging, voter intimidation, and 
+mass arrests of opposition activists. The next parliamentary 
+elections are scheduled for January 7, 2024. 
+
+ 
+
+The World Bank projects Bangladesh’s economic growth 
+
+ Sources: Economist Intel igence Unit, World Bank, Asian 
+
+rate fell from an estimated 7.1% in 2022 to 6% in 2023. 
+
+Development Bank, State Department, Census Bureau, World Atlas. 
+
+Readymade garments accounted for 85% of Bangladesh’s 
+exports in 2022. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects 
+
+ Rohingya 
+
+Bangladesh’s export growth to decelerate due to slowing 
+
+The predominantly Muslim Rohingya have faced 
+
+consumer spending in Europe and the United States. 
+
+persecution in Buddhist-majority Burma for years. The 
+
+Agriculture, previously the largest employment sector, 
+
+Burmese government has denied them citizenship and 
+
+accounted for 37% of total employment in 2021, second to 
+
+treated them as illegal immigrants. In FY2022, the United 
+
+the service sector’s 41%. The World Bank reported 
+
+States provided $265 million in humanitarian assistance for 
+
+remittances to Bangladesh of $21.5 billion in 2022. 
+
+Rohingya refugees from Burma, including in host 
+communities in Bangladesh. The State Department 
+
+ Relations with the United States 
+
+announced an additional $26 million in assistance in March 
+
+The United States has long-standing relations with 
+
+2023. Total U.S. assistance for the Rohingya since August 
+
+Bangladesh, and is among its largest export markets and 
+
+2017 is now almost $2.1 billion. Approximately one million 
+
+sources of foreign investment. The Obama, Trump, and 
+
+Rohingya currently reside in Bangladesh, testing the 
+
+Biden Administrations, and many Members of Congress, 
+
+government’s ability to provide adequate security, food, 
+
+have focused on issues relating to Rohingya refugees from 
+
+and sanitation. Bangladesh officials have criticized Burma 
+
+Burma, democracy, good governance, economic 
+
+for its failure to take steps to repatriate the Rohingya. 
+
+development, humanitarian concerns, labor rights, human 
+
+Bangladesh began relocating Rohingya from existing camps 
+
+rights, and counterterrorism. Some Members contend that 
+
+in Bangladesh to Bhashan Char, a remote island in the Bay 
+
+supporting democracy, rule of law, and human rights, 
+
+of Bengal, in December 2020, despite warnings that the 
+
+including in Bangladesh, is critical to advancing U.S. 
+
+island is vulnerable to sea level rise and storm surges. Press 
+
+interests. The State Department announced in May 2023 
+
+reports estimate that roughly 30,000 Rohingya refugees had 
+
+that it will restrict visa issuance for any Bangladeshis it 
+
+been relocated to the island as of January 2023. 
+
+finds to be undermining Bangladesh’s democratic election 
+process ahead of scheduled 2024 voting. 
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+ 
+ Bangladesh 
+
+ Human Rights and Religious Freedom 
+
+ Islamist Extremism 
+
+Some analysts and policymakers contend that human rights 
+
+The U.S. government generally views Bangladesh as a 
+
+and religious freedom are under threat in Bangladesh. The 
+
+moderate voice in the Islamic world, but the emergence of 
+
+State Department’s 2022 Country Report on Human Rights 
+
+some Islamist militancy in the country has concerned the 
+
+ Practices: Bangladesh highlights a number of concerns, 
+
+governments of both the United States and Bangladesh. 
+
+including “unlawful or arbitrary killings, including 
+
+Both governments identify a common interest in countering 
+
+extrajudicial killings; forced disappearance[s]; torture or 
+
+Islamist extremists. Both the Islamic State (IS) and Al 
+
+cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
+
+Qaeda have been active in Bangladesh. A 2016 terrorist 
+
+punishment by the government.” It also noted reports of 
+
+attack by IS-aligned militants killed over 20 people in 
+
+extrajudicial “crossfire” killings in 2022. Security forces are 
+
+Dhaka; fatalities included one American, along with several 
+
+rarely held accountable for such deaths. The constitution 
+
+other foreigners. Other militant groups, such as the 
+
+recognizes Islam as the state religion, but also officially 
+
+suspected IS-aligned Neo-Jama’atul Mujahideen 
+
+upholds secular principles. Despite the government’s public 
+
+Bangladesh, have also been active. Bangladesh authorities 
+
+espousal of tolerance, religious minorities face 
+
+have been largely effective in thwarting IS militants since 
+
+discrimination and violence. The State Department notes 
+
+the 2016 attack, the State Department assesses. 
+
+widespread communal violence against Hindu, Christian, 
+and Buddhist religious minorities in Bangladesh. 
+
+ External Relations 
+ Positioned at the intersection of India, China, Southeast 
+
+ Democracy 
+
+Asia, and the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh occupies a geo-
+
+Observers had long categorized Bangladesh as a democratic 
+
+strategically important location, and its foreign policy seeks 
+
+nation. However, some analysts now argue that Bangladesh 
+
+to promote trade, economic development, and diplomatic 
+
+is approaching, or has already become, a one-party state. 
+
+linkages with a range of countries. In February 2023, 
+
+The 2018 election, in which Sheikh Hasina won her most 
+
+Bangladesh abstained from a U.N. General Assembly vote 
+
+recent five-year term, was “not considered free and fair by 
+
+on a resolution reprimanding Russia for invading Ukraine. 
+
+observers,” the State Department reports. Freedom House 
+assesses that AL has consolidated political power through 
+
+The Bay of Bengal region is a focus of China’s Belt and 
+
+harassment of the opposition and its perceived allies, as 
+
+Road Initiative, which emphasizes global infrastructure, 
+
+well as of critical media and civil society voices. According 
+
+energy projects, trade, transit, and other linkages. China 
+
+to Human Rights Watch, authorities have jailed opposition 
+
+also has become Bangladesh’s primary supplier of military 
+
+members, violated freedom of speech, and suppressed AL 
+
+equipment, including two submarines, maritime patrol 
+
+critics. Transparency International, which measures levels 
+
+vessels, tanks, and fighter jets. By one estimate, China 
+
+of national corruption, ranked Bangladesh 147th of 180 
+
+supplied approximately 74% of Bangladesh’s weapons 
+
+countries in 2022; Bangladesh dropped to 163rd of 180 
+
+between 2010 and 2020. Bangladesh-China ties expanded 
+
+countries in Reporters Without Borders’ 2023 World Press 
+
+significantly following President Xi Jinping’s 2016 visit to 
+
+ Freedom Index . Freedom House designates Bangladesh as 
+
+Dhaka, where President Xi and Prime Minister Hasina 
+
+“partly free.” Following the announcement of new U.S. visa 
+
+agreed to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a “strategic 
+
+restrictions, Dhaka promised the 2024 elections will be free 
+
+partnership of cooperation.” Prime Minister Hasina traveled 
+
+and fair. Some observers remain concerned about 
+
+to China in 2019 to further strengthen bilateral cooperation. 
+
+democratic backsliding in Bangladesh in light of the 
+ongoing government crackdown on the BNP and other 
+
+Some Indian officials express concern that Bangladesh’s 
+
+opposition parties, which has sparked large-scale protests. 
+
+growing engagement with China could impact the close 
+
+The BNP and 14 other registered parties are boycotting the 
+
+Bangladesh-India relationship. Some consider China’s 
+
+election; this makes an overwhelming AL victory all but 
+
+“encroachment” in India’s neighborhood as a challenge to 
+
+guaranteed. Some analysts question whether the elections 
+
+Indian interests. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
+
+can be considered free and fair given these circumstances. 
+
+described Bangladesh as a significant pillar of India’s 
+“Neighborhood First” policy during a 2020 virtual summit 
+
+ Demographic and Environmental 
+
+with Hasina. In 2020, Bangladesh halted development of 
+
+ Concerns 
+
+what would have been its first deep-sea port at Sonadia 
+
+Bangladesh is one of the world’s most densely populated 
+
+after India opposed China’s involvement. Bangladesh and 
+
+countries, and some analysts assess that growing 
+
+India continue to maintain close relations, and Prime 
+
+demographic pressures and environmental problems may 
+
+Ministers Hasina and Modi signed several Memoranda of 
+
+result in millions of displacements. The World Health 
+
+Understanding in New Delhi in September 2022. 
+
+Organization estimates that climate change may displace as 
+many as one in seven Bangladeshis. World Bank data show 
+
+Bangladesh and Japan also have been developing closer 
+
+that Bangladesh’s population growth rate has slowed from 
+
+relations, with Japanese financing of infrastructure projects 
+
+an annual rate high of 3% in 1967 to 1.1% in 2021. Some 
+
+in Bangladesh. In August 2022, the Japan International 
+
+projections indicate the population will peak at 193 million 
+
+Cooperation Agency signed an investment agreement with 
+
+in 2053. If that happens, observers suggest many nationals 
+
+Bangladesh SEZ Ltd. to establish a Special Economic Zone 
+
+may migrate to already-overcrowded cities or to 
+
+Development Project. Japan is assisting with the 
+
+neighboring countries, such as India, straining social 
+
+construction of a deep-water port at Matabari. Some experts 
+
+services and, perhaps, contributing to regional instability. 
+
+see developing ties with Japan as reflecting Bangladesh’s 
+desire to balance its relations with external partners.
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+ 
+ Bangladesh 
+
+ 
+
+ IF10214 
+
+ Maria A. Blackwood , Analyst in Asian Policy 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to 
+congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. 
+Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has 
+been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the 
+United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be 
+reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include 
+copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you 
+wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+ 
+
+ https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10214 · VERSION 24 · UPDATED
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+Order Code RL33980
+
+ School and Campus Safety Programs and 
+
+ Requirements in the Elementary and Secondary 
+
+ Education Act and Higher Education Act 
+
+ April 27, 2007 
+
+Rebecca R. Skinner and Gail McCallion
+
+Specialists in Social Legislation
+
+Domestic Social Policy Division
+
+ 
+ School and Campus Safety Programs and
+
+Requirements in the Elementary and Secondary
+
+Education Act and Higher Education Act
+
+ Summary 
+
+In the United States, more than 72 million students are enrolled in elementary
+
+and secondary schools and institutions of higher education (IHEs). Safeguarding
+their security while they pursue an education is a paramount concern of federal, state,
+and local governments, as well as the school districts, schools, and institutions that
+enroll these students. Both the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
+(ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA; P.L. 107-
+110), and the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) contain requirements regarding
+crime and student safety. The ESEA also includes specific grant programs that
+support efforts to prevent school violence. 
+
+ESEA authorizes the federal government’s major programs to assist
+
+disadvantaged students, address teacher quality issues, provide support to limited
+English proficient and immigrant students, prevent school violence and drug abuse,
+and provide support for public school choice in elementary and secondary schools.
+While the prevention of school violence is not the primary focus of the ESEA,
+several ESEA programs could potentially contribute to this effort, most notably
+ESEA Title IV, Part A, the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act
+(SDFSCA). In addition, the ESEA contains specific provisions related to students
+attending unsafe schools — the Unsafe School Choice Option. 
+
+The HEA authorizes the federal government’s major student aid programs to
+
+support postsecondary education attendance, as well as other significant programs
+such as those providing aid to special groups of IHEs and support services to enable
+disadvantaged students to complete secondary school and enter and complete college.
+While the HEA does not authorize specific programs to address campus crime and
+security issues, Section 485(f) of Title IV of the HEA contains statutory requirements
+related to campus crime and security, known collectively as the Jeanne Clery
+Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (the Clery
+Act). Institutions must comply with these requirements to participate in the federal
+student aid programs and other programs authorized by Title IV (e.g., Pell Grants).
+Unlike funding for K-12 education, there are limited federal funds available through
+the U.S. Department of Education (ED) to support institutions of higher education
+in addressing campus crime and security issues.
+
+This report discusses these provisions and programs as they apply to elementary
+
+and secondary schools and institutions of higher education. It begins with a
+description of programs and requirements included in the ESEA, which is followed
+by a discussion of relevant requirements included in the HEA.
+
+This report will be updated as warranted by legislative action.
+
+ 
+ Contents 
+
+Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+
+Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+
+Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+
+Grants to States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+National Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+Reporting Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+
+Other Relevant ESEA Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+
+Innovative Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+Elementary and Secondary School Counseling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+Partnerships in Character Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+
+Unsafe School Choice Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+
+Higher Education Act (HEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+
+HEA Title IV Institutional Eligibility Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+Campus Crime and Security Requirements in the HEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+
+Enforcement of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+
+Funding and Related Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+Public Information Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+
+ 
+ School and Campus Safety Programs and
+
+Requirements in the Elementary and
+
+Secondary Education Act and
+
+the Higher Education Act
+
+ Overview 
+
+In the United States, more than 72 million students are enrolled in elementary
+
+and secondary schools and institutions of higher education.1 During the 2004-2005
+school year, elementary and secondary students aged 5-18 were victims of 28 school-
+associated violent deaths.2 In 2004, students aged 12-18 were victims of about 1.4
+million nonfatal crimes at school, including thefts, simple assault, rape, sexual
+assault, robbery, and aggravated assault. At institutions of higher education in 2003,
+nearly 44,000 criminal incidents were reported as having occurred on campus,
+including 10 incidents of murder and non-negligent manslaughter, 2,573 forcible sex
+offenses, 2,968 aggravated assaults, and 28,806 burglaries.3
+
+Safeguarding the security of students as they pursue an education is a paramount
+
+concern of federal, state, and local governments, as well as the school districts,
+schools, and institutions that enroll these students. Both the Elementary and
+Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind
+Act of 2001 (NCLBA; P.L. 107-110), and the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA)
+contain requirements regarding crime and student safety. The ESEA also includes
+specific programs that support efforts to prevent school violence. While the HEA
+does not authorize specific programs to address campus crime and security issues,
+Section 485(f) of Title IV of the HEA contains statutory requirements related to
+campus crime and security, known collectively as the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of
+Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act). Institutions
+must comply with these requirements to participate in the federal student aid
+programs and other programs authorized by Title IV (e.g., Pell Grants). Unlike K-12
+education, there are limited federal funds available through ED to support institutions
+of higher education in addressing campus crime and security issues.
+
+1 U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2006). Digest
+of Education Statistics: 2005 , Table 2. Available online at
+ [http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dt05_002.asp].
+
+2 U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2006).
+ Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2006 (NCES 2007-003). Available online at
+[http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2007003].
+
+3 Data compiled by the Chronicle of Higher Education based on reports by institutions of
+higher education to the U.S. Department of Education.
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+This report discusses these provisions and programs as they apply to elementary
+
+and secondary schools and institutions of higher education. It begins with a
+description of programs and requirements included in the ESEA, which is followed
+by a discussion of relevant requirements included in the HEA.
+
+This report will be updated as warranted by legislative action.
+
+ Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) 
+
+The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), whose programs are
+
+administered primarily by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), includes the
+federal government’s major programs to assist disadvantaged students, address
+teacher quality issues, provide support to limited English proficient and immigrant
+students, prevent school violence and drug abuse, and provide support for public
+school choice.4 While the prevention of school violence is not the primary focus of
+the ESEA, there are several ESEA programs that could potentially contribute to this
+effort, most notably ESEA Title IV, Part A, the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and
+Communities Act (SDFSCA). In addition, the ESEA contains specific provisions
+related to students attending unsafe schools. 
+
+This section focuses primarily on the SDFSCA and the state and national
+
+program activities it authorizes. It also includes a discussion of other ESEA programs
+that could support efforts to prevent violence in elementary and secondary schools.
+The section concludes with an examination of the Unsafe Schools Choice Option,
+with which all elementary and secondary schools receiving funds under the ESEA are
+required to comply.
+
+ Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act 
+
+As previously mentioned, the SDFSCA (Title IV-A) is the federal government’s
+
+major initiative to prevent drug abuse and violence in and around schools.5 The
+SDFSCA was initially enacted in 1994 (P.L. 103-382) in response to concerns about
+increased school violence and drug use among school-aged youth.6 The 1994
+legislation extended, amended, and renamed the Drug-Free Schools and
+Communities Act of 1988 (DFSCA; P.L. 100-297).7 Violence prevention was added
+to DFSCA’s original drug abuse-prevention purpose by incorporating the Safe
+Schools Act. Funding was authorized for federal, state, and local programs to assist
+
+4 For more information about programs authorized by the ESEA, see CRS Report RL33960,
+ The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as Amended by the No Child Left Behind
+Act: A Primer , by Wayne C. Riddle and Rebecca R. Skinner.
+
+5 For more detailed information about this program, see CRS Report RL30482, The Safe and
+Drug-Free Schools and Communities Program: Background and Context , by Edith Fairman
+Cooper. This report, however, is now being handled by Gail McCallion.
+
+6 On October 20, 1994, President Clinton signed into law the Improving America’s School
+Act (P.L. 103-382), which reauthorized the ESEA, and created the SDFSCA as Title IV.
+
+7 The Safe Schools Act was originally created by Title VII of the Goals 2000: Educate
+America Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-227).
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+schools in providing a disciplined learning environment free of violence and drug
+use, including alcohol and tobacco.
+
+The SDFSCA was subsequently reauthorized as part of the ESEA in P.L.107-
+
+110, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. Like all NCLBA programs, its
+authorization expires at the end of FY2008, and it is likely to be considered for
+reauthorization in the 110th Congress. The SDFSCA program supports two major
+grant programs — one for states and one for national programs. Grants are awarded
+to states based on a formula that incorporates poverty and population factors. States
+must use 93% of their allocation to make formula grants to local educational agencies
+(LEAs) based on poverty factors and each LEA’s share of student enrollment in
+public and private nonprofit elementary and secondary schools. State governors are
+permitted to use up to 20% of their state’s grant allocation for comprehensive
+activities that deter youth from using drugs and committing violent acts in schools.
+Governors award these funds as discretionary grants to LEAs, community-based
+organizations (CBOs), other private or public entities, or consortia thereof. National
+grants are used primarily for a variety of discretionary programs designed to prevent
+drug abuse and violence in elementary and secondary schools. In addition, the
+SDFSCA includes a provision requiring all states receiving ESEA funds to have a
+law requiring not less than a one-year expulsion for any student who brings a firearm
+to school.8 
+
+ Grants to States. To receive an allotment under the SDFSCA, a state must
+
+submit an application, providing extensive information to ED that includes, among
+other things, a comprehensive plan to provide safe, orderly, and drug-free schools
+and communities through activities that meet the “principles of effectiveness” under
+Section 4115 (a) of the SDFSCA. Funded activities must foster a safe and drug-free
+learning environment that supports academic achievement. States must develop their
+applications in coordination with all appropriate state officials, and must coordinate
+all funded activities with other relevant programs, including the governor’s drug and
+violence prevention programs. The application must also provide the results of a
+needs assessment for drug and violence prevention activities, including detailed
+information on illegal drug use and violence among youth, as well as other relevant
+data. The state must indicate how the needs assessment will be used to establish state
+performance measures, in consultation with LEAs, for funded programs; and how the
+state will provide technical assistance as needed, and will monitor, assess, and report
+on progress toward meeting performance goals.
+
+ Grants to LEAs. To receive an SDFSCA grant, all LEAs are required to
+
+submit an application to the state education agency (SEA).9 This application must
+include, among other things, a detailed explanation of the LEAs’ comprehensive plan
+for drug and violence prevention and an assurance that funded activities will meet the
+SDFSCA “principles of effectiveness” contained in section 4115(a). The application
+
+8 The chief administering officer of a local educational agency may modify this expulsion
+requirement on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the LEA may provide the student with
+educational services in an alternative setting (Section 4141).
+
+9 The Safe Schools Act was originally created by Title VII of the Goals 2000: Educate
+America Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-227).
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+must describe how the plan will be coordinated with other agencies and what
+performance measures will be put in place and evaluated. The application must be
+developed in consultation with experts, state and local officials, and representatives
+from the schools to be served. The LEA must also provide assurances that the LEA
+has, or the schools to be served have, appropriate policies in place that prohibit,
+among other things, the illegal possession of weapons and that the school has
+prevention activities designed to create and maintain a safe, disciplined, and drug-
+free environment. The LEA must provide an assurance that it will provide security
+procedures at school and while students are on their way to and from school, as well
+as an assurance that the LEA has, or schools to be served have, a crisis management
+plan for responding to violent or traumatic events on school grounds.10
+
+The programs and activities provided by the LEA must be designed to prevent
+
+or reduce violence. They must also create a well-disciplined environment, which
+includes consultation among school personnel to identify the early warning signs of
+violence. The statute permits LEAs to use funds for a wide variety of activities.
+While some activities, such as developing and implementing comprehensive school
+security plans, obtaining technical assistance regarding these plans, and the hiring
+and provision of mandatory training to school personnel in support of prevention
+activities implemented at the school, may be more directly relevant to the prevention
+of school violence issues, many if not all of the allowable activities could potentially
+contribute to these efforts. Below is a list of the authorized activities that are most
+closely related to prevention or amelioration of school violence:
+
+! Acquiring and installing metal detectors and related devices.
+! Reporting criminal offenses committed on school property. 
+! Developing and implementing comprehensive school security plans
+
+or obtaining technical assistance on such plans.
+
+! Supporting safe zones of passage for students to and from school. 
+! Violence prevention and education activities to reduce victimization
+
+due to prejudice and intolerance.
+
+! Alternative education programs for violent or drug-abusing students,
+
+particularly students who have been or are at risk of being suspended
+or expelled.
+
+! Developing and implementing character education programs as part
+
+of drug and violence prevention that takes into account the views of
+students’ parents.
+
+! Expanded and improved school-based mental health services,
+
+including early identification of violence and illegal drug use,
+assessment, and counseling services for students, parents, families,
+or school personnel by qualified providers.
+
+! Conflict resolution programs, including peer mediation programs
+
+and youth anti-crime and anti-drug councils and activities.
+
+10 ED maintains a website that provides links to resources of potential use to school leaders
+developing a crisis management plan. More information is available at [http://www.ed.gov/
+admins/lead/safety/emergencyplan/index.html].
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+! Counseling, mentoring, referral services, and other student
+
+assistance practices and programs, including assistance from
+qualified mental health service providers. 
+
+! Programs that encourage students to confide in and seek advice from
+
+trusted adults regarding violence and illegal drug use. 
+
+! Establishing and maintaining a school safety hotline.
+! Programs that respond to the needs of students who are faced with
+
+domestic violence or child abuse.
+
+! Professional development and training in prevention education, early
+
+identification and intervention, mentoring, or rehabilitation referral,
+for school personnel, parents and interested community members. 
+
+! Hiring and mandatory training of school security personnel. 
+! Conducting background checks on all school personnel and
+
+prospective employees to see whether they have been convicted of
+a crime that bears upon the employee’s fitness. 
+
+! Creating an action plan and providing training to school personnel
+
+to prevent youth suicide. 
+
+ National Programs. The SDFSCA provides general authority to the
+
+Secretary to award grants for a wide variety of national activities to prevent substance
+abuse and support violence prevention. Currently, funds are appropriated to support
+several national programs designed to prevent violence in elementary and secondary
+schools.11 National Program funds support, among other activities:
+
+! Emergency Response and Crisis Management Grant Program: 
+
+This competitive grant program provides funds to LEAs to
+strengthen and improve their emergency response and crisis plans at
+the district and school levels. LEAs are required to form
+partnerships and collaborate with community organizations, local
+law enforcement agencies, heads of local government, and offices of
+public safety, health, and mental health as they review and revise
+these plans. Plans are required to be coordinated with state or local
+homeland security plans and must support the implementation of the
+National Incident Management System (NIMS).12 Grants may be
+used for training school safety teams and students, conducting
+facility audits, informing families about emergency response
+policies, implementing an Incident Command System (ICS),13
+conducting drills and tabletop simulation exercises, preparing and
+distributing copies of crisis plans, and, to a limited extent, for
+purchasing school safety equipment. Grantees under this program
+may receive support in managing and implementing their projects
+
+11 National programs also provide financial and technical assistance to institutions of higher
+education for drug prevention and campus safety programs for students.
+
+12 For more information about NIMS, see [http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/index.
+shtm].
+
+13 For more information about ICS, see [http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is100.asp].
+
+ 
+ CRS-6
+
+and sustaining their efforts over time from the Emergency Response
+and Crisis Management Technical Assistance Center.14
+
+! Project SERV (School Emergency Response to Violence): This
+
+program provides education-related services to LEAs that have been
+disrupted by a violent or traumatic crisis. Project Serv funds may be
+used for a wide variety of activities, including mental health
+assessments, referrals, and services for victims and witnesses of
+violence; enhanced school security; technical assistance in
+developing a response to the crisis, and training for teachers and
+staff in implementing the response. Appropriations for this program
+are requested on a no-year basis, to remain available for obligation
+at the federal level until expended. Thus, funds can be carried over
+from year to year in the event that there are no school-related crises
+in a given year.
+
+! Safe Schools/Healthy Students (SS/HS) grant program: The
+
+SS/HS initiative is funded jointly by ED and the U.S. Department of
+Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health
+Services Administration (SAMHSA). The program is administered
+by ED, SAMHSA, and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The
+SS/HS initiative is a discretionary grant program that provides
+schools and communities with federal funding, via LEAs, to
+implement an enhanced, coordinated, comprehensive plan of
+activities, programs, and services that focus on healthy childhood
+development and the prevention of violence and alcohol and drug
+abuse. Grantees are required to establish partnerships with local
+law enforcement, public mental health, and juvenile justice
+agencies/entities.
+
+In addition, there are several specifically authorized activities within the
+
+National Grant Program — three of these have never received funding (Hate Crimes
+Prevention, the School Security and Resource Center, and the National Center for
+School and Youth Safety). Other specifically authorized national activities include
+data collection by the National Center for Education Statistics on the incidence and
+prevalence of illegal drug use and violence in elementary and secondary schools; the
+Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Advisory Committee; the National
+Coordinator Program; the Community Service Grant Program; Grants to Reduce
+Alcohol Abuse; and mentoring programs.15
+
+14 Additional information is available at [http://www.ercm.org/] and [http://www.ed.gov/
+programs/dvpemergencyresponse/resources.html].
+
+15 These activities have received funding for one or more fiscal years under the SFDSCA.
+
+ 
+ CRS-7
+
+ Reporting Requirements. The SDFSCA also requires states to establish a
+
+Uniform Management Information and Reporting System (UMIRS) for the collection
+and reporting of information related to school safety.16 Under this system, states
+must collect and make publicly available the following information:
+
+! truancy rates;
+! the frequency, seriousness, and incidence of violence and drug-
+
+related offenses resulting in suspensions and expulsions in
+elementary and secondary schools in the state;
+
+! the types of curricula, programs, and services provided by the state’s
+
+chief executive officer, the SEA, LEAs, and other recipients of funds
+under the act; and
+
+! the incidence and prevalence, age of onset, perception of health risk,
+
+and perception of social disapproval of violence and drug use by
+youth in schools and communities.
+
+The first two items for which states are required to collect and publish data must
+
+be reported on a school-by-school basis. The collected data are to include incident
+reports by school officials, anonymous student surveys, and anonymous teacher
+surveys. Additional reporting requirements related to schools identified as
+persistently dangerous are discussed in the unsafe school choice option section.
+
+In addition, states are required to submit biennial reports to ED on the
+
+implementation and outcome of state and LEA programs funded under the SDFSCA,
+including data on progress in reaching performance measures for drug and violence
+prevention. States must also include information on efforts that have been taken to
+inform and include parents in violence and drug abuse prevention efforts.
+
+ Funding. For FY2006, $569 million was appropriated for the SDFSCA.17 The
+
+same level of funding is appropriated for FY2007. The majority of these funds are
+provided for state grants ($345 million), with the remaining funds supporting national
+activities. For FY2008, the President requested $324 million for the SDFSCA.
+Under this proposal, appropriations for state grants would be reduced to $100
+million, and appropriations for national grants would be increased slightly from $222
+million in FY2006 and FY2007 to $224 million for FY2008. In justifying the
+requested reduction in state grant appropriations, the Administration has argued that
+the structure of the state grants program is flawed and spreads funding too broadly
+to support quality interventions.18
+
+16 Section 4112(c)(3). Additional information about the UMIRS is available from ED at
+[http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/unsafeschoolchoice.doc].
+
+17 Data for FY2006 and FY2007 appropriations and the FY2008 budget request were
+provided by the U.S. Department of Education, Budget Service, March 28, 2007.
+
+18 U.S. Department of Education. Justifications of Appropriation Estimates to the Congress:
+Fiscal Year 2008, Volume I , p. F-18.
+
+ 
+ CRS-8
+
+ Other Relevant ESEA Programs 
+
+In addition to the SDFSCA, there are several smaller ESEA programs that could
+
+potentially contribute to violence prevention efforts. A brief summary of the most
+relevant programs is included in this section.19
+
+ Innovative Programs. Innovative Programs, the only federal K-12 education
+
+block grant program, is authorized by Title V-A. Under this program, aid is provided
+to SEAs and LEAs for a wide range of educational services and activities. Formula
+grants are made to states on the basis of total population aged 5-17. States must
+subsequently distribute funds to LEAs using state-developed formulas that take into
+consideration various enrollment factors. LEAs may use their funds for any of 27
+different types of “innovative assistance programs.” Of these, one of the allowable
+uses of funds is for school safety programs. Funds may also be used to expand and
+improve school-based mental health services, including the early identification of
+violence. For FY2006, $99 million was appropriated for this program.20 The program
+is level funded for FY2007. In the FY2008 budget request, the President did not
+request funding for this program.
+
+ Elementary and Secondary School Counseling. The Elementary and
+
+Secondary School Counseling program is authorized by Title V-D-2. This program
+provides competitive grants to LEAs to help them establish or expand elementary and
+secondary school counseling programs. ED is to give priority to applicants that
+demonstrate the greatest need for counseling programs, propose to implement
+promising and innovative programs, and show potential for replication and
+dissemination. For FY2006, $37 million was appropriated for this program.21 The
+program is level funded for FY2007. In the FY2008 budget request, the President
+did not request funding for this program.
+
+ Partnerships in Character Education. The Partnerships in Character
+
+Education program is authorized by Title V-D-3. The program provides competitive
+grants to SEAs in partnership with LEAs or nonprofit entities, or to LEAs alone or
+in consortia with other entities (including institutions of higher education). The grants
+must be used for character education programs that are based on scientifically based
+research that can be integrated into classroom instruction, are consistent with state
+academic standards, and are carried out in conjunction with other educational reform
+efforts. Grantees are required to use a portion of their grant for program evaluation
+and information dissemination. For FY2006, $24 million was appropriated for this
+program.22 The program is level funded for FY2007. In his FY2008 budget request,
+the President did not request funding for character education as a distinct program,
+instead requesting that it be included as part of the SDFSCA program.
+
+19 Given the breadth of programs authorized by the ESEA, it is possible that other programs
+not covered in this report could also be used to support violence prevention programs. 
+
+20 Data for FY2006 and FY2007 appropriations and the FY2008 budget request were
+provided by the U.S. Department of Education, Budget Service, March 28, 2007.
+
+21 Ibid.
+
+22 Ibid.
+
+ 
+ CRS-9
+
+ Unsafe School Choice Option23 
+
+The Unsafe School Choice Option (USCO) policy is authorized under Title IX-
+
+E-2.24 Under the USCO policy, states are required to establish statewide policies
+under which any student who attends a persistently dangerous public elementary or
+secondary school,25 or who becomes a victim of a violent crime while in or on the
+grounds of the public elementary or secondary school the student attends, must be
+offered the opportunity to transfer to another public school located within the same
+LEA. To be considered in compliance with the USCO policy, states are required to
+do the following:
+
+! establish a state USCO policy (through consultation with a
+
+representative sample of LEAs within the state);
+
+! identify persistently dangerous schools;
+! identify types of offenses that are considered to be violent criminal
+
+offenses;
+
+! provide a safe public school option; and
+! certify annually compliance with the USCO. 
+
+ Higher Education Act (HEA) 
+
+The HEA, whose programs are administered by the U.S. Department of
+
+Education (ED), includes the federal government’s major student aid programs to
+support postsecondary education attendance, as well as other significant programs
+such as those providing aid to special groups of institutions of higher education
+(IHEs) and support services to enable disadvantaged students to complete secondary
+school and enter and complete college. Although important support from outside of
+the HEA is provided through multiple federal agencies for activities such as research
+and development, the federal government’s presence in postsecondary education is
+shaped to a substantial degree by the HEA.
+
+The core priorities of the HEA are the student aid programs authorized under
+
+Title IV. More specifically, Title IV authorizes programs that provide student
+financial aid (e.g., student loans, Pell Grants) to support attendance at a variety of
+IHEs nationwide.26 During the 2005-2006 academic year, a total of 6,441 public,
+
+23 A more detailed discussion of the Unsafe School Choice Option policy is included in CRS
+Report RL33506, School Choice Under the ESEA: Programs and Requirements , by David
+P. Smole.
+
+24 Section 9532.
+
+25 Most states establish some threshold number of violent offenses relative to school
+enrollment that must be exceeded for either two or three consecutive years in order for a
+school to be identified as persistently dangerous.
+
+26 For more information about federal student aid programs authorized by the HEA, see the
+following CRS reports: RL31668, Federal Pell Grant Program of the Higher Education
+Act , by Charmaine Mercer; RL33673, Federal Family Education Loan Program and 
+
+(continued...)
+
+ 
+ CRS-10
+
+private nonprofit, and private for-profit (proprietary) institutions were classified as
+Title IV IHEs.27 It is estimated that Title IV federal student aid programs made more
+than $80 billion available to students attending IHEs during the 2005-2006 academic
+year.28
+
+This section begins with an overview of institutional eligibility requirements
+
+that institutions must meet to participate in the Title IV programs. That is followed
+by a detailed discussion of the campus crime and security requirements included in
+the HEA, including provisions to enforce compliance with these requirements. The
+section concludes with an examination of funding and related support available for
+complying with these requirements and addressing campus crime and security issues,
+as well as a discussion about crime statistics and information made publicly
+available.
+
+ HEA Title IV Institutional Eligibility Requirements 
+
+To participate in the Title IV federal student aid programs, institutions must
+
+meet specific criteria, including requirements related to program offerings, student
+enrollment, and operations.29 For example, Title IV eligible IHEs must be licensed
+to operate in the state in which they are located, be accredited by an accrediting
+agency or association recognized by the Secretary of Education, and meet eligibility
+and certification requirements established by ED. Institutions that do not meet these
+requirements are ineligible to participate in the Title IV programs, meaning that
+students attending these institutions are unable to access federal student aid. While
+not all postsecondary institutions in the United States are Title IV-eligible
+institutions, the vast majority are, in order to ensure that their students will be eligible
+for federal aid.
+
+26 (...continued)
+ William D. Ford Direct Loan Program Student Loans: Terms and Conditions for Borrowers ,
+by Adam Stoll; RL33674, The Administration of the Federal Family Education Loan and
+William D. Ford Direct Loan Programs: Background and Provisions , by Adam Stoll; and
+RL31618, Campus-Based Student Financial Aid Programs Under the Higher Education Act ,
+by David P. Smole.
+
+27 This includes institutions in the United States and outlying areas. Due to natural disaster,
+22 Title IV-eligible IHEs did not respond to the data collection. These institutions are not
+included in the total number of institutions. (U.S. Department of Education, National Center
+for Education Statistics, 2006, Postsecondary Institutions in the United States: Fall 2005
+and Degrees and Other Awards Conferred: 2004-05 , NCES 2007-167, Table 1. Available
+online at [http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007167.pdf].)
+
+28 This includes federal loans, work-study, and grants. College Board, October 2006, Trends
+in Student Aid: 2006 , Table 1. Available online at [http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_
+downloads/press/cost06/trends_aid_06.pdf].
+
+29 For more information about institutional eligibility requirements, see CRS Report
+RL33909, Institutional Eligibility for Participation in Title IV Student Aid Programs Under
+the Higher Education Act: Background and Reauthorization Issues , by Rebecca R. Skinner.
+
+ 
+ CRS-11
+
+ Campus Crime and Security Requirements in the HEA 
+
+Campus crime and security requirements were first included in the HEA with
+
+the enactment of the Student Right to Know and Campus Security Act (P.L. 101-542)
+in 1990. Title II of this act, the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990,
+amended the HEA. HEA campus crime and security requirements were subsequently
+amended in 1992, 1998, and 2000.
+
+Under current law, Section 485(f) contains the statutory requirements related to
+
+campus crime and security. These requirements are collectively known as the Jeanne
+Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (the
+Clery Act).30 Institutions must comply with these requirements to participate in Title
+IV programs.
+
+As part of these requirements, each institution31 is required to provide an annual
+
+security report to all current students and employees and to any prospective students
+or employees, upon request, that provides information about campus security policies
+and campus crime statistics.32 The report must include, at a minimum, the following
+items:
+
+! Statement of current campus policies regarding procedures for the
+
+reporting of criminal actions or other emergencies occurring on
+campus and the institution’s response to these reports.
+
+! Statement of current policies concerning security and access to
+
+campus facilities, including residence halls.
+
+! Statement of current policies concerning campus law enforcement,
+
+including the relationship between campus law enforcement and
+state and local law enforcement agencies and policies to promote the
+accurate and prompt reporting of all crimes to campus police and
+appropriate law enforcement agencies.
+
+! Description of the type and frequency of programs designed to
+
+inform students and employees about campus security procedures
+and to encourage them to be responsible for their own security and
+the security of others.
+
+! Description of programs designed to inform students and employees
+
+about crime prevention.
+
+! Statistics on criminal offenses reported to campus security or local
+
+police agencies that occurred on campus, in dormitories or other
+student residential facilities on campus, in or on noncampus
+buildings or property, and on public property during the most recent
+
+30 The campus crime and security requirements were named for Jeanne Clery, a freshman
+at Lehigh University who was asleep in her residence hall before she was raped and
+murdered in 1986. The 1998 HEA amendments formally named the law in memory of Ms.
+Clery.
+
+31 An institution must comply with these requirements for each separate campus (34 CFR
+668.46).
+
+32 Regulatory requirements for the annual security report and reporting and disclosure of
+information are included in 34 CFR 668.41 and 34 CFR 668.46. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-12
+
+calendar year and two preceding calendar years for which data are
+available.33
+
+! Statement of policy concerning the monitoring and recording of
+
+criminal activity of off-campus student organizations that are
+recognized by the institution, including those organizations with off-
+campus housing.
+
+! Statement regarding the possession, use, and sale of alcoholic
+
+beverages and the possession, use, or sale of illegal drugs.
+
+! Statement indicating where information about registered sex
+
+offenders may be obtained.
+
+! Statement of policy regarding the institution’s sexual assault
+
+prevention programs and procedures that will be followed if a sexual
+offense has occurred.
+
+Institutions are also required to make timely reports to the campus community
+
+on crimes considered to be a threat to students or employees that have been reported
+to campus police or local law enforcement. Statutory language notes that these
+reports must be made in a manner that is “timely” and will aid in the prevention of
+similar occurrences.34
+
+Each institution that has a police or security department is also required to
+
+maintain a daily crime log that includes the nature, date, time, and general location
+of each crime, as well as the disposition of the complaint, if known. All entries,
+unless prohibited by law or where disclosure of the information would jeopardize the
+confidentiality of the victim, must be made public within two business days of the
+initial report. Information may also be withheld if there is evidence that releasing
+such information would jeopardize an ongoing investigation, cause a suspect to flee,
+or result in the destruction of evidence. The information must be released, however,
+once these factors are no longer a concern.
+
+ Enforcement of Requirements. As previously discussed, institutional
+
+compliance with the Clery Act is required for participation in Title IV programs. All
+institutions that are eligible to participate in these programs are required to sign a
+Program Participation Agreement (PPA), which conditions an institution’s initial and
+continued participation in any Title IV program on the institution’s compliance with
+the relevant statutory and regulatory requirements. The PPA also lists specific
+requirements with which an institution must comply. Included on this list is a
+
+33 Criminal offenses must be reported in the following categories: murder; sex offenses,
+forcible or nonforcible; robbery; aggravated assault; burglary; motor vehicle theft;
+manslaughter; arson; and arrests or persons referred for disciplinary action for liquor law
+violations, drug-related violations, and weapons possession. With the exception of the last
+category of criminal offenses, if the victim in any of the other types of crimes was
+deliberately selected due to the individual’s actual or perceived race, gender, religion, sexual
+orientation, ethnicity, or disability, the crime must be reported as a hate crime. The statistics
+must be compiled according to the definitions used in the uniform crime reporting system
+of the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the modifications of these
+definitions included in the Hate Crimes Statistics Act. These statistics must be submitted
+annually to ED. (See 34 CFR 668.46 for related regulatory requirements.)
+
+34 See 34 CFR 668.46 for related regulatory requirements.
+
+ 
+ CRS-13
+
+requirement that the institution certify that it has established a campus security policy
+and that it has complied with the disclosure requirements of the Clery Act.35
+
+While failure to comply with the requirements of the Clery Act or the PPA can
+
+result in a loss of Title IV eligibility, if it is determined that an institution has
+substantially misrepresented the number, location, or nature of crimes, the institution
+may be subject to civil penalties. For each violation or misrepresentation, the
+Secretary may impose a fine not to exceed $25,000.36
+
+ Funding and Related Support 
+
+IHEs do not receive specific funding from the federal government to aid in
+
+compliance with these requirements. However, to assist IHEs in meeting the
+requirements of the Clery Act, a series of seminars co-sponsored by the U.S.
+Department of Justice (DOJ)37 is being offered. The four regional seminars being
+offered in 2007 will focus on victim assistance policies, crime statistics, reporting
+through timely warnings and public crime logs, the annual security report, promising
+practices, and the development of collaborative partnerships.38
+
+Also available to aid IHEs in meeting the requirements of the Clery Act is the
+
+ Handbook for Campus Crime Reporting produced by ED.39 It provides procedures,
+examples, and references for IHEs to use in complying with the Clery Act
+requirements.
+
+The only financial support provided by ED for campus-based violence
+
+prevention is available through the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities
+(SDFSC) program authorized by Title IV of the Elementary and Secondary Education
+Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA;
+P.L. 107-110).40 The SDFSC program supports both formula grants to states and
+national programs. While the formula grants and most of the national programs are
+primarily focused on elementary and secondary schools, one national program
+provides support to IHEs. Grants to Prevent High-Risk Drinking and Violent
+Behavior Among College Students provide funds to develop, enhance, implement,
+and evaluate campus-based or community-based prevention strategies designed to
+
+35 Section 487(a) and 34 CFR 668.14.
+
+36 Section 487(c)(3)(B).
+
+37 The training seminars are being supported by DOJ and conducted in partnership with
+Security on Campus, Inc., and in collaboration with the International Association of Campus
+Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) and the International Association of Chiefs of
+Police (IACP).
+
+38 The first of the four seminars has already occurred. Additional information about these
+training seminars is available at [http://www.securityoncampus.org/cat/].
+
+39 The handbook is available online at [http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/handbook.
+pdf].
+
+40 U.S. Department of Education. Justifications of Appropriation Estimates to the Congress:
+Fiscal Year 2008, Volume I , p. F-31.
+
+ 
+ CRS-14
+
+reduce high-risk drinking and violent behavior among college students.41 Grants are
+made to consortia of IHEs and other public and private nonprofit organizations. For
+FY2006, the program received $4.3 million. In FY2006, 12 grants were awarded,
+primarily to IHEs, with awards ranging from about $120,000 to $160,000. Most of
+the grant recipients indicated the funds would be used to address high-risk drinking
+behaviors. The President’s FY2008 budget request included $7.3 million to continue
+to provide “financial and technical assistance” to IHEs for drug prevention and
+campus safety programs.42 
+
+ Public Information Availability 
+
+As previously discussed, the Clery Act requires IHEs to make information about
+
+crime public and to submit an annual report on campus security to ED. In addition
+to the measures taken by individual IHEs to provide this information to current and
+prospective students and their families, ED makes the data publicly available online.
+ED maintains a campus crime statistics website known as the Campus Security Data
+Analysis Cutting Tool (CSDACT).43 For each Title IV IHE, data are reported on the
+number of criminal offenses, hate crimes, and arrests over the most recent three-year
+period for which data are available. Information is provided to indicate whether the
+data include incidents occurring in residence halls and whether data include local
+statistics. ED also provides a link to these data from the College Opportunities On-
+Line (COOL) website, operated by the National Center for Education Statistics
+(NCES).44 COOL provides myriad information about all Title IV eligible IHEs such
+as enrollment data, tuition and fees, financial aid, and graduation rates. For each
+institution, it also includes information on campus security, which is linked to the
+CSDACT.45
+
+ED also makes summary crime statistics available on its website.46 Data are
+
+provided in four major categories — arrests, criminal offenses, hate crimes, and
+crimes involving drug arrests, illegal weapon possessions, and liquor law violations
+— which are subsequently broken into subcategories (e.g., aggravated assault, arson,
+
+41 Additional information about this program is available at [http://www.ed.gov/programs/
+dvphighrisk/index.html].
+
+42 Ibid. It is unclear, however, whether all the funding would be provided to the
+aforementioned program or whether some of the funds would be designated for another
+national program focused on college campus alcohol and drug prevention models, but not
+violence prevention on college campuses, or potentially for a new program.
+
+43 The CSDACT can be accessed at [http://ope.ed.gov/security/].
+
+44 The COOL website can be accessed at [http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/cool/].
+
+45 The major difference between these websites are that COOL focuses on multiple aspects
+of an institution, while CSDACT only provides data on campus security. If campus security
+data are accessed directly from CSDACT (as opposed to linking to the data through COOL),
+users have more options for analyzing the campus security data.
+
+46 These data are available at [http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/crime/summary.html].
+
+ 
+ CRS-15
+
+murder/non-negligent manslaughter), if appropriate.47 For each subcategory, data are
+available based on the reporting location of where the incident occurred (i.e., on
+campus, in a residence hall, at a non-campus location, and on public property) and
+are provided by institutional sector (e.g., public, four-year or above institutions).48
+Data are provided for the three most recent years for which data are available.
+
+47 Statistics on arrests are reported for drug arrests, illegal weapon possessions, and liquor
+law violations only.
+
+48 In higher education, institutions are divided into nine sectors based on institutional control
+(public, private nonprofit, and private for-profit) and institutional level (four-year or above,
+two-year, less than two-year).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/corpus/politics/text/d69fa6ce4b6f3078.txt b/corpus/politics/text/d69fa6ce4b6f3078.txt
new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+98-129 F
+
+February 17, 1998
+
+CRS Report for Congress
+
+Received through the CRS Web
+
+ Iraqi Chemical & Biological Weapons (CBW) 
+
+ Capabilities 
+
+Steve Bowman
+
+Specialist in National Defense
+
+Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
+
+ Summary 
+
+The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) has destroyed large amounts
+
+of CB weapons and materials in Iraq since 1991. UNSCOM has reported no firm
+evidence that Iraq still retains weapons or materiel, but the Iraqi government has not
+provided adequate evidence to support its claim all its CBW arsenal has been destroyed,
+nor has it accounted for CBW production materials known to have been in its
+possession. These factors, coupled with Iraqi obstruction of UNSCOM inspections has
+led to strong suspicions. U.S. and British intelligence agencies believe that Iraq still
+may possess tons of chemical warfare agents and the necessary materials to produce
+thousands of liters of biological agents. In addition, UNSCOM and U.S. intelligence
+believe Iraq may still have hidden from 2-10 warheads designed to deliver chemical or
+biological agents. UNSCOM and U.S. intelligence differ in their estimates of the
+number of missiles that may still be in Iraq. The Iraqi chemical warfare arsenal has
+included nerve agents (Sarin and VX), blister agents (“mustard gas”), and psychoactive
+agents (so-called Agent 15). Biological/toxin warfare agents produced by Iraq include
+anthrax, botulinum, aflotoxins, ebola virus, bubonic and pneumonic plague, ricin, and
+clostrdium perfringens. Reconstitution of militarily significant production capability
+using materials unaccounted for to UNSCOM could take only a matter of weeks.
+During the week of February 23, the Senate is scheduled to consider S.Con.Res. 71,
+calling on the President to take all necessary and appropriate actions in response to the
+threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its lethal weapons program.
+
+ Iraq's Chemical and Biological Arsenal 
+
+In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council established the ceasefire
+
+conditions for the conflict in the Persian Gulf. Iraq accepted Security Council Resolution
+687, which required the destruction or neutralization of 1) all nuclear, chemical, and
+biological weapons, and 2) all ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometers (90
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+miles). SCR 687 also prohibited Iraq from future development, production, or use of such
+weapons in the future. Subsequent Security Council Resolution 715 established the
+United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to monitor and verify Iraqi compliance
+with these disarmament requirements. (See CRS Issue Brief Iraqi Compliance with
+Ceasefire Agreements , 92117)
+
+Since 1991 UNSCOM inspectors in Iraq have overseen the destruction of :
+
+! 38,000 chemical munitions
+! 480,000 liters of chemical warfare agents and precursors
+! 48 ballistic missiles
+! 6 missile launchers
+! 30 CBW missile warheads
+
+During the last six years of inspections, the Iraqi government has made many
+
+declarations concerning the volume and deposition of chemical and biological weapons
+programs — all of which have been proven or judged to be inaccurate or incomplete. No
+admission, for example, of their extensive biological weapons program was made until
+Iraqi defectors forced acknowledgment. Iraq then claimed that all BW agents and
+materials had been destroyed — a claim rejected by both UNSCOM and Western
+intelligence agencies. As incomplete as they may be, Iraq declarations indicate a very
+extensive CBW program. UNSCOM guidelines require the confidentiality of its reports,
+and it is only recently that some details have been released by the U.S. and British
+governments. Information released so far indicates that prior to the Persian Gulf conflict
+Iraq produced (and claims to have destroyed):
+
+! 4 tons of VX persistent nerve agent
+! 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin
+! 8,400 liters of anthrax spores
+! unspecified amounts of the nerve agent Sarin and the blister agent “mustard gas”
+
+Iraq has also acknowledged that prior to the Persian Gulf conflict it manufactured
+
+100 botulinum bombs, 50 anthrax bombs, and 7 aflatoxin bombs. In addition, 16 missile
+warheads were filled with botulinum, five with anthrax bacillus, and four with aflatoxin.
+
+U.S. and British intelligence agencies believe that Iraq has hidden stores of CBW
+
+agents, production equipment, ballistic missiles, and missile warheads. UNSCOM has
+reported no firm evidence that Iraq still retains weapons or materiel, but the Iraqi
+government has not provided adequate evidence to support its claim that all its CBW
+arsenal has been destroyed, nor has it accounted for CBW production materials known to
+have been in its possession. These factors, coupled with Iraqi obstruction of UNSCOM
+inspections, have led to strong suspicions. U.S. and British intelligence agencies believe
+that Iraq still may possess tons of chemical warfare agents and the necessary materials
+to produce thousands of liters of biological agents. UNSCOM and U.S. intelligence differ
+in their estimates of the number of actual missiles that may still be in Iraq. Again
+information is sketchy. In part, this is because much is classified, but even the classified
+information is reportedly incomplete. A recent report issued by the British government,
+however, provided some information [Foreign and Commonwealth Office —
+[http://193.114.50.5/texts/1998/feb/04/iraqppr.txt].
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+! British intelligence believes that up to ten SCUD missiles capable of carrying
+
+CBW warheads remain hidden.
+
+! UNSCOM reports that between 40-70 CBW-capable missile warheads are
+
+unaccounted for.
+
+! Iraq possessed enough growth medium to produce over 16,000 liters more anthrax
+
+spores than has been acknowledged.
+
+! 4,000 tons of CW precursor chemicals are unaccounted for; enough to produce
+
+several hundred tons of CW agents.
+
+! 31,000 CW munitions remain unaccounted for.
+! Essential CW production equipment remains unaccounted for.
+! It is believed that Iraq may retain undetermined amounts of Ebola virus, bubonic
+
+and pneumonic plague bacteria, and the toxin ricin.
+
+The current debate over the advisability of airstrikes has highlighted two significant
+challenges in the efforts to eliminate Iraq's CBW arsenal: 1) the great difficulty of locating
+and destroying CBW stocks, if they exist, through air power alone, and 2) the relative ease
+of reconstituting a CBW production program after such attacks, particularly if the goal is
+relatively small amounts suitable for terror attacks. The estimates have ranged from
+weeks to months, unless a close monitoring regime is maintained. Recent press reports
+indicate that even under the UNSCOM regime and the U.N. embargo on CBW-related
+equipment, Iraq may have been able to acquire equipment that could be used to produce
+biological weapons in a clandestine purchase from Russia. Were such assistance t
+
+1
+
+o
+
+continue, reconstitution of a significant CBW capability would be relatively simple.
+Production of smaller amounts of CBW agents for terrorist use would be proportionately
+easier, and employment need not involve sophisticated delivery systems.
+
+Another concern regarding airstrikes is the probability and effect of releasing CBW
+
+agents into the air as a result of bombing. There is a high degree of unpredictability in any
+such estimate. This has been exemplified by the difficulties that those investigating the
+so-called Persian Gulf War Syndrome have experienced in determining how many U.S.
+troops may have been exposed to some level of nerve agent after the U.S. destruction of
+an Iraqi munitions depot shortly after the Persian Gulf conflict. A variety of factors would
+affect whether contamination would be localized or widespread, temporary or long-term.
+These include: type of CBW agent, type of munition, target location, population density,
+wind, humidity, level of sunlight, and temperature. There are U.S. munitions in the
+experimental stages intended specifically to reduce collateral contamination by
+penetrating bunkers before detonating or by destroying CBW agents through incineration
+rather than explosion. It is not clear, however, whether these weapons will be deployed
+to the Persian Gulf while still under development.
+
+For the purposeful use of chemical and biological weapons, predictive models of
+
+lethality do exist. In 1993, the Office of Technology Assessment developed the following
+estimate using the District of Columbia as the hypothetical target under three different
+weather conditions. The scenarios assumed aerosol agent distribution by an aircraft flying
+a line along the western city limit. Estimated fatalities resulting from the dispersal of
+approximately one ton of Sarin nerve agent or 220 lbs of anthrax spores were:
+
+1“Did Russia Sell Germ Warfare Equipment?”, Washington Post , February 12, 1998. P. 1.
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+ 
+
+Clear sunny day,
+
+Overcast or night,
+
+Clear calm night
+
+light breeze
+
+moderate wind
+
+Sarin
+
+300-700
+
+400-800
+
+3,000-8000
+
+Anthrax
+
+130,000-140,000
+
+420,000- 1.4
+
+1-3 million
+
+million
+
+Source: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, Office of Technology
+Assessment. 1993.
+
+Press reports and commentaries which carry even more distressingly high fatality
+
+estimates are generally calculated simply by determining how many lethal “doses” of
+agent could be supplied by the Iraqi stockpile. This type of estimate does not take into
+account any of the factors affecting actual employment.
+
+ Chemical and Biological Agent Characteristics 
+
+ Nerve Agents — These agents disrupt normal functioning of the central nervous
+system. They are colorless, tasteless, and odorless. Sarin is delivered as an aerosol and
+evaporates rather rapidly. Inhalation of 100 milligrams is lethal. VX is a persistent agent
+(effective for days or weeks depending upon climactic conditions) Absorbed through the
+skin, 5-10 milligrams are lethal. Exposure to nerve agents results in nausea, diarrhea,
+pulmonary edema, and convulsions leading to death by respiratory arrest in within one to
+fifteen minutes, depending on the concentration.
+
+ “Mustard Gas” — “Mustard gas” is actually an oily brownish liquid with a smell
+similar to garlic. It is a vesicant or blister agent. It is generally severely incapacitating
+rather than lethal, though intense or prolonged exposure can lead to fatal pulmonary
+edema. An incapacitating dose is about 200 milligrams, and 1,500 milligrams inhaled is
+sufficient to kill. Mustard gas damages any tissue it contacts, causing extensive and large
+blisters which last several weeks. Permanent damage to the lungs and eyes can result.
+
+ “Agent-15" — The British government recently asserted that Iraq developed large
+stocks of an incapacitant gas dubbed “Agent-15". It is apparently a glycollate similar in
+effect to the agent BZ , an incapacitant once produced by the United States. If this is
+correct, exposure to about 100 milligrams in aerosolized form would be sufficient to
+incapacitate. Symptoms, which begin within 30 minutes of exposure and may last several
+days, include dizziness, vomiting, confusion, stupor, hallucinations, and irrational
+behavior. The U.S. Army considered BZ to be too unpredictable in its effectiveness to
+be useful on the battlefield, and all U.S. stocks were destroyed.
+
+ Anthrax — Anthrax is a disease caused by the bacillus Anthracis . Infection can result
+from inhalation, ingestion, or absorption through the skin. Most effectively dispersed as
+an aerosol, anthrax spores decay in a matter of days in sunlight, but can contaminate soil
+for decades. 10,000 to 20,000 spores is a lethal dose — “something smaller than a speck
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+of dust,” according to a DOD biological warfare expert . Symptom onset occurs 3-4 days
+
+2
+
+after exposure, and initially resembles that of a common cold. Symptoms do not become
+identifiable as anthrax until the fatal phase of the disease, when vomiting, severe head and
+joint aches, and respiratory distress lead to death within 1-3 days. Vaccines are available
+against some forms of anthrax, but their efficacy against abnormally high concentrations
+of the bacteria is uncertain. Antibiotic treatment can be effective, but only if administered
+prior to the onset of symptoms, otherwise the fatality rate can exceed 90%.
+
+ Aflatoxin — Aflatoxins are toxins produced by the aspergillus flavis and aspergillus
+parasiticus fungi. They occur naturally on moldy grains and foodstuffs. The toxic dosage
+for humans has not been determined, but one type is considered a potent cause of liver
+cancer.
+
+ Botulinum Toxin — Botulinum, produced by the clostridium botulinum bacteria,
+causes the food-poisoning “botulism”. In pure form, it is a white crystalline substance,
+that is readily dissolvable in water, but decays rapidly in the open air. The symptoms of
+botulism begin 12-72 hours after exposure depending upon whether it is inhaled or
+ingested. Symptoms include nausea, diarrhea, paralysis of the throat, and convulsions,
+followed by death due to respiratory arrest. Vaccines are available, but again, their
+efficacy against abnormally high toxin dosages is uncertain. Early diagnosis and
+palliative treatment can prevent fatality.
+ 
+ Clostridium Perfringens — Clostridium Perfringens is a widespread bacterium
+which causes gas gangrene if allowed to grow in wounds or damaged tissue, The bacteria
+produce gases that cause intense swelling and toxins that kill muscle tissue. If not treated
+the bacteria enter the bloodstream causing fatal systemic illness. Early antibiotic
+treatment is effective, if undertaken before significant amounts of toxins have
+accumulated in the body.
+
+2Transcript, Department of Defense press conference, November 14, 1997.
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,7293 @@
+Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ William J. Krouse 
+ Specialist in Domestic Security and Crime Policy 
+
+August 3, 2012 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+7-5700 
+
+www.crs.gov 
+
+RL32842 
+
+ CRS Report for Congress
+ Pr 
+
+ epared for Members and Committees of Congress 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Summary 
+
+Congress has debated the efficacy and constitutionality of federal regulation of firearms and 
+ammunition, with strong advocates arguing for and against greater gun control. In the wake of the 
+July 20, 2012, Aurora, CO, theater mass shooting, in which 12 people were shot to death and 58 
+wounded (7 of them critically) by a lone gunman, it is likely that there will be calls in the 112th 
+Congress to reconsider a 1994 ban on semiautomatic assault weapons and large capacity 
+ammunition feeding devices that expired in September 2004. There were similar calls to ban such 
+feeding devices (see S. 436/H.R. 1781) following the January 8, 2011, Tucson, AZ, mass 
+shooting, in which 6 people were killed and 14 wounded, including Representative Gabrielle 
+Giffords, who was grievously wounded. 
+
+The 112th Congress continues to consider the implications of Operation Fast and Furious and 
+allegations that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
+and Explosives (ATF) mishandled that Phoenix, AZ-based gun trafficking investigation. On June 
+28, 2012, the House passed a resolution (H.Res. 711) citing Attorney General Eric Holder in 
+contempt of Congress for his failure to produce additional, subpoenaed documents related to 
+Operation Fast and Furious to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. On May 18, 
+2012, the House passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 
+(H.R. 4310), which amends a provision that limits the Secretary of Defense’s authority to regulate 
+firearms privately held by members of the Armed Forces off-base. On May 10, 2012, the House 
+passed a Commerce-Justice-State appropriations bill (H.R. 5326) that would fund ATF for 
+FY2013 and, on April 19, 2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported a similar bill 
+(S. 2323). 
+
+On April 17, 2012, the House passed the Sportsmen’s Heritage Act of 2012 (H.R. 4089), a bill 
+that would require agencies that manage federal public lands to facilitate access to and use of 
+those lands for the purposes of recreational fishing, hunting, and shooting with certain exceptions 
+set out in statute. Language to a similar effect was included in the FY2013 Interior, Environment, 
+and Related Agencies Appropriations bill (H.R. 6091), which the House Committee on 
+Appropriations reported on July 10, 2012. On November 16, 2011, the House passed a bill (H.R. 
+822) that would establish a greater degree of reciprocity between states that issue concealed carry 
+permits for handguns. On October 11, 2011, the House passed a Veterans’ Benefits Act (H.R. 
+2349) that would prohibit the Department of Veterans Affairs from determining a beneficiary to 
+be mentally incompetent for the purposes of gun control, unless such a determination were made 
+by a judicial authority based upon a finding that the beneficiary posed a danger to himself or 
+others. In May 2011, firearms-related amendments to bills reauthorizing the USA PATRIOT Act 
+were considered (H.R. 1800, S. 1038, and S. 990), but they were not passed. 
+
+This report also includes discussion of other salient and recurring gun control issues that have 
+generated past or current congressional interest. Those issues include (1) screening firearms 
+background check applicants against terrorist watch lists, (2) combating gun trafficking and straw 
+purchases, (3) reforming the regulation of federally licensed gun dealers, (4) requiring 
+background checks for private firearms transfers at gun shows, (5) more-strictly regulating certain 
+firearms previously defined in statute as “semiautomatic assault weapons,” and (6) banning or 
+requiring the registration of certain long-range .50 caliber rifles, which are commonly referred to 
+as “sniper” rifles. To set these and other emerging issues in context, this report provides basic 
+firearms-related statistics, an overview of federal firearms law, and a summary of legislative 
+action in the 111th and 112th Congresses. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Contents 
+
+Developments in the 112th Congress................................................................................................ 1 
+Background and Analysis ................................................................................................................ 5 
+
+Pro/Con Debate ......................................................................................................................... 5 
+Gun-Related Statistics ............................................................................................................... 6 
+
+How Many Guns Are in the United States?......................................................................... 7 
+How Often Are Guns Used in Homicides? ......................................................................... 8 
+How Prevalent Are Gun-Related Fatalities? ....................................................................... 9 
+How Often Are Guns Used in Non-Lethal Crimes?.......................................................... 11 
+How Often Are Firearms Used in Self-Defense? .............................................................. 11 
+What About the Recreational Use of Guns?...................................................................... 12 
+
+Federal Regulation of Firearms ..................................................................................................... 12 
+
+The National Firearms Act (NFA) ........................................................................................... 12 
+The Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA)...................................................................................... 12 
+
+Firearms Transfer and Possession Eligibility .................................................................... 13 
+Noncitizen Firearms Eligibility......................................................................................... 14 
+Licensed Dealers and Firearms Transfers ......................................................................... 15 
+Private Firearms Transfers ................................................................................................ 16 
+
+Gun Trafficking and Straw Purchases ..................................................................................... 16 
+
+ATF Compliance Inspections ............................................................................................ 17 
+Anatomy of a Firearms Straw Purchase ............................................................................ 18 
+Federal Prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §§922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(A) .............................. 20 
+Firearms-Related Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines .......................................... 22 
+
+Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act................................................................................ 23 
+
+Interim Provisions ............................................................................................................. 23 
+Permanent Provisions........................................................................................................ 23 
+National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP) ............................................ 27 
+NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP).......................................................... 29 
+Background Check Fee and Record Retention.................................................................. 32 
+
+Overview of Legislative Action in the 111th Congress .................................................................. 34 
+Emerging Issues in the 112th Congress .......................................................................................... 36 
+
+July 20, 2012, Aurora, CO....................................................................................................... 36 
+
+Smith & Wesson AR-15 and 100-Round Drum Magazine................................................ 37 
+Internet-Based Ammunition Transfers under Federal Law ............................................... 38 
+
+Concealed Carry and National Reciprocity ............................................................................. 39 
+Firearms on Public Lands........................................................................................................ 41 
+Armed Forces Members and Privately Held Firearms Off-Base............................................. 42 
+ATF Southwest Border Gun Trafficking Investigations .......................................................... 42 
+
+Multiple Rifle Sales Report Proposal................................................................................ 44 
+Operation Fast and Furious ............................................................................................... 49 
+ATF Firearms Tracing for Mexican Authorities ................................................................ 62 
+
+Veterans, Mental Incompetency, and Firearms Eligibility....................................................... 65 
+ATF FY2012 and FY2013 Appropriations .............................................................................. 66 
+
+FY2013 Request................................................................................................................ 67 
+FY2012 Request and Appropriation.................................................................................. 68 
+
+FISA Sunset Extensions and Firearms-Related Amendments ................................................. 71 
+January 8, 2011, Tucson Shootings ......................................................................................... 71 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+Mental Illness and Drug Use as Prohibiting Factors......................................................... 72 
+Large Capacity Ammunition Feeding Devices.................................................................. 73 
+Banning Firearms within the Proximity of Federal Officials............................................ 73 
+
+Other Salient Gun Control Legislative Issues................................................................................ 74 
+
+Terrorist Watch List Screening and Brady Background Checks.............................................. 74 
+
+Post-9/11 Modified NICS Procedures ............................................................................... 74 
+NICS Record Retention..................................................................................................... 76 
+Legislation in the 110th Congress and DOJ Draft Proposal............................................... 77 
+Legislation in the 111th Congress, GAO Follow-Up Report, and Senate Hearing ............ 78 
+Firearms-Related Terrorist Watch List Legislation in the 112th Congress......................... 80 
+
+Gun Trafficking-Related Proposals in the 112th Congress....................................................... 80 
+
+Stop Gun Trafficking and Strengthen Law Enforcement Act of 2011 (H.R. 2554) .......... 80 
+Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2011 (S. 1973) ........................................................... 81 
+Straw Purchaser Penalty Enhancement Act (H.R. 4190) .................................................. 83 
+Detectives Nemorin and Andrews Anti-Gun Trafficking Act of 2012 (H.R. 6195).......... 83 
+
+ATF Modernization Act........................................................................................................... 84 
+Gun Shows and Private Firearms Transfers ............................................................................ 85 
+Expired Semiautomatic Assault Weapons Ban........................................................................ 86 
+Long-Range .50 Caliber Rifles................................................................................................ 88 
+
+ 
+
+ Figures 
+
+Figure 1. Federal Defendants Charged and Convicted Nationally under 18 U.S.C. 
+
+§§922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(A)..................................................................................................... 21 
+
+Figure 2. Federal Sentences Imposed Nationally under 18 U.S.C. §§922(a)(6) and 
+
+924(a)(1)(A)................................................................................................................................ 22 
+
+Figure 3. ATF Appropriations, FY2001-FY2012........................................................................... 66 
+Figure 4. ATF Appropriations, FY2013 Request ........................................................................... 67 
+Figure 5. ATF Appropriations: FY2012 Requested and Enacted Compared ................................. 69 
+
+ 
+
+ Tables 
+
+Table 1. Firearms-Related Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter Victims, 1993-2010............. 8 
+Table 2. Firearms-Related Deaths for All Ages ............................................................................... 9 
+Table 3. Firearms-Related Deaths for Juveniles ............................................................................ 10 
+Table 4. Brady Background Checks for Firearms Transfers and Permits...................................... 26 
+Table 5. Estimated Brady Background Check Denials .................................................................. 27 
+Table 6. NCHIP Appropriations, FY1995 though FY2012............................................................ 28 
+Table 7. NICS Improvement Authorizations and Appropriations under P.L. 110-180 .................. 30 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendixes 
+
+Appendix A. Legislation in the 111th Congress.............................................................................. 89 
+Appendix B. Major Federal Firearms and Related Statutes......................................................... 105 
+
+ 
+
+ Contacts 
+
+Author Contact Information......................................................................................................... 107 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Developments in the 112th Congress 
+
+On July 20, 2012, a 24-year-old male entered a theater in Aurora, CO, and perpetrated what has 
+been described as one of the worst mass shootings in modern U.S. history.1 James Holmes 
+allegedly shot to death 12 people and wounded another 58 people, 7 of them critically.2 He was 
+armed with a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a 100-round drum magazine, a 12-gauge pump 
+shotgun, and at least one, possibly two .40-caliber handguns.3 He reportedly bought these 
+firearms legally from federally licensed gun dealers in Colorado.4 He also reportedly purchased 
+over 6,000 rounds of ammunition through Internet-based transactions.5 This shooting will likely 
+prompt some Members of the 112th Congress to reconsider proposals to reinstate a 1994 ban on 
+semiautomatic assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices, which expired in 
+September 2004.6 There were similar calls to ban such feeding devices (see S. 436/H.R. 1781) 
+following the January 8, 2011, Tucson, AZ, mass shooting, in which 6 people were killed and 14 
+wounded, including Representative Gabrielle Giffords, who was grievously wounded. 
+
+Since March 2011, much of the gun control debate in the 112th Congress has swirled around 
+allegations that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
+and Explosives (ATF) mishandled a Phoenix, AZ-based gun trafficking investigation known as 
+“Operation Fast and Furious.” In December 2010, two suspect firearms, and possibly a third, 
+linked to that investigation were found at the murder scene of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry. In 
+January 2010, ATF whistleblowers contacted Senator Charles Grassley with assertions that 
+suspected gun traffickers had not been arrested in a timely fashion and, as a result, a large number 
+of suspect firearms had not been interdicted and have reportedly passed into the hands of drug 
+traffickers and other criminals. The whistleblowers referred to this investigative tactic as “gun 
+walking.” According to one source, 665 of these firearms have been recovered by law 
+enforcement at crime scenes on both sides of the border.7 Another 1,355 suspect firearms 
+reportedly remain unaccounted for. 
+
+Senator Grassley, ranking minority Member on the Committee on the Judiciary, and 
+Representative Darrell Issa, chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
+have issued two joint staff reports on Operation Fast and Furious, and the House committee has 
+held four related hearings, the most recent on February 2, 2012. Representative Elijah Cummings, 
+the committee’s ranking minority Member, has also issued two reports related to this 
+controversial operation. On November 1, 2011, a high-ranking DOJ official testified before the 
+Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s Crime and Terrorism Subcommittee that he had identified 
+“gun walking” as a potentially risk laden investigative technique in April 2010 but failed to 
+inform the Attorney General about the potential risks. On November 8, 2011, the Senate 
+
+ 
+
+1 David A. Fahrenthold et al., “A Day of Tears and Twists in Colorado: As State Mourns, Account Suggests Toll Could 
+Have Been Worse,” Washington Post , July 23, 2012, p. A1. 
+2 Ibid. 
+3 Thom Patterson, “Source: Colorado Shooter Had 100-Round Rifle Magazine,” CNN Wire , July 21, 2012. 
+4 Ibid. 
+5 Thom Patterson, “Police Chief: Suspect Bought over 6,000 Rounds of Ammunition through Internet,” CNN Wire , July 
+21, 2012. 
+6 For further information, see CRS Report RL32585, Semiautomatic Assault Weapons Ban , by William J. Krouse. 
+7 Pete Yost, “Fast and Furious-Like ‘Gun-Walking’ Probe Mentioned In 2007 Bush Administration Memo,” Huffington 
+Post, November 4, 2011. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 1 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+Committee on the Judiciary held a DOJ oversight hearing, and Attorney General Eric Holder 
+fielded questions about Operation Fast and Furious. The Attorney General conceded that a 
+February 4, 2011, letter from DOJ to congressional investigators contained “inaccurate” 
+information regarding the depth of knowledge that departmental officials had of ATF’s use of the 
+“gun walking” tactic. On December 8, 2011, the House Committee held a hearing to explore, 
+among other things, whether senior departmental officials knew more about Operation Fast and 
+Furious than what was previously indicated in a May 3, 2011, hearing before that committee. 
+
+On November 18, 2011, the President signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing 
+Appropriations Act, 2012 (H.R. 2112; P.L. 112-55), following House and Senate passage on the 
+previous day. This act provides ATF with $1.152 billion for FY2012. In response to Operation 
+Fast and Furious, Congress included in that act a provision (§219) that reflects a Senate-passed 
+amendment sponsored by Senator John Cornyn to prevent the expenditure of any funding 
+provided under it to be used by a federal law enforcement officer to facilitate the transfer of an 
+operable firearm to a person known to be or suspected of being connected to a drug cartel without 
+that firearm being continuously monitored or controlled. The act, however, does not include an 
+amendment that was sponsored by Representative Denny Rehberg and adopted in House full 
+committee markup that would have prevented ATF from collecting multiple long gun sales 
+reports from federally licensed gun dealers in Southwest Border states. In addition, two ATF 
+funding provisos and one Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) funding proviso were made 
+permanent with the inclusion of “futurity” language, as opposed to temporary, annual 
+appropriations restrictions.8 These provisos essentially prohibit the consolidation or centralization 
+of firearm acquisition and disposition records. 
+
+In its FY2013 DOJ budget submission, the Administration proposed dropping the Cornyn 
+language prohibiting “gun walking,” arguing that the prohibition is unnecessary.9 The 
+Administration also proposed stripping the futurity language out of the ATF and FBI funding 
+provisions noted above, which were made permanent in the FY2012 appropriations cycle. In 
+addition, the Administration proposed stripping futurity language out of a long-standing but 
+controversial provision known as the Tiahrt amendment, which prohibits ATF from releasing 
+firearms trace data under a range of circumstances. Besides including futurity language, Congress 
+has altered the language of the Tiahrt amendment several times in recent years to clarify under 
+which circumstances and at what level of detail it is proper to release firearms trace data to law 
+enforcement and other governmental officials, as well as to researchers, the media, and the 
+general public. 
+
+Other legislative developments in the 112th Congress include the following: 
+
+• On July 31, 2012, Representative Darrell Issa, chairman of the Committee on 
+
+Oversight and Government Reform, and Senator Charles Grassley, ranking 
+
+ 
+
+8 In general, statutory provisions included in an annual appropriations act are usually only applicable to the covered 
+fiscal year, unless they include “futurity” language, in which case, those provisions are usually interpreted to be 
+permanent law. Examples of futurity language include “hereafter,” “after the date of approval of this act,” and 
+“henceforth.” See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law: Annual Update 
+of the Third Edition , GAO-11-210SP, March 2011, pp. 2-5 through 2-6. 
+9 “Gun walking” is alleged to have occurred when ATF agents did not act in a timely manner to arrest, or at least 
+confront, suspected “straw purchasers” and interdict the firearms they had purchased in multiple transactions from 
+federally licensed gun dealers, when the agents arguably had a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that 
+they, the straw purchasers, were trafficking firearms to known associates of Mexican drug trafficking organizations. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 2 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+minority Member of the Committee on the Judiciary, released a report entitled 
+ Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation .10 The first of three, this 
+report essentially chronicles how the ATF Phoenix Division and the U.S. 
+Attorney’s Office for the Arizona District ran a gun trafficking investigation from 
+October 2009 through January 2010, during which controversial “gun walking” 
+tactics were employed that—in Representative Issa and Senator Grassley’s 
+estimation—seriously compromised public safety and contributed to violent 
+crime and death on both sides of the international border. 
+
+• On June 28, 2012, the House passed a resolution (H.Res. 711) citing Attorney 
+
+General Eric Holder in contempt of Congress for his failure to produce 
+additional, subpoenaed documents related to Operation Fast and Furious by a roll 
+call vote of 255-67 (Roll no. 441). The Committee on Oversight and Government 
+Reform had previously approved a report (H.Rept. 112-546) that accompanied 
+this resolution by a vote of 23-17. Shortly before the committee took up the 
+resolution, President Barack Obama asserted executive privilege, rather than 
+disclose subpoenaed documents related to ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious. The 
+House also passed a related resolution (H.Res. 706) that authorizes the committee 
+to initiate or intervene in judicial proceedings to enforce certain subpoenas.11 
+
+• On May 18, 2012, the House passed the National Defense Authorization Act 
+
+(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 (H.R. 4310). This bill includes a provision that 
+would allow Department of Defense (DOD) mental health professionals and 
+commanding officers to inquire about privately owned firearms that a service 
+member might hold off-base, if he is considered to be a risk of suicide or a 
+danger to others. A provision included in the FY2011 NDAA (P.L. 111-383) 
+prohibits the Secretary of Defense from collecting information on privately 
+owned firearms held by service members, DOD civilian employees, or their 
+family members off-base. 
+
+• On May 10, 2012, the House passed a measure (H.R. 5326) that would fund ATF 
+
+for FY2013 at $1.151 billion. This measure includes the Cornyn anti-gun walking 
+provision, and would make several additional ATF appropriations riders 
+permanent law by including futurity language in those provisions, instead of 
+following the Administration’s proposal and stripping futurity language out of the 
+provisions that were made permanent law in the FY2012 appropriations cycle. 
+The House-passed bill also includes a provision that would prohibit ATF from 
+collecting long gun sales reports. This provision reflects a Rehberg amendment 
+that was successfully offered in full committee markup. 
+
+• On May 3, 2012, Representative Issa, chairman of the House Oversight and 
+
+Government Reform Committee, issued a staff briefing paper to committee 
+Members that included a draft resolution to cite the Attorney General with 
+
+ 
+
+10 U.S. Congress. Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation (Part I of III) , Joint Staff Report Prepared for 
+Representative Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, United States House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and 
+Government Reform, and Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, United States Senate, Committee on the 
+Judiciary, 112th Cong., July 31, 2012, http://oversight.house.gov/report/fast-and-furious-the-anatomy-of-a-failed-
+operation-part-1-of-3/. 
+11 For further information, see CRS Report RL34097, Congress’s Contempt Power and the Enforcement of 
+Congressional Subpoenas: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure , by Todd Garvey and Alissa M. Dolan. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 3 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+contempt for not fully complying with committee subpoenas for information 
+about Operation Fast and Furious and other matters. 
+
+• On April 19, 2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported a bill (S. 
+
+2323) that would fund ATF for FY2013 at $1.153 billion. This bill includes the 
+Cornyn provision, but it does not include any language similar to the Rehberg 
+amendment. Like the House bill, it does not address the Administration’s 
+proposal to strip futurity language out of the provisions that were made 
+permanent law in the FY2012 appropriations cycle, but it would not make any 
+additional provisos permanent law. 
+
+• On April 17, 2012, the House passed the Sportsmen’s Heritage Act of 2012 (H.R. 
+
+4089), a bill that would require agencies that manage federal public lands to 
+facilitate access to and use of those lands for the purposes of recreational fishing, 
+hunting, and shooting with certain exceptions set out in statute. Language to a 
+similar effect was included in the FY2013 Interior, Environment, and Related 
+Agencies Appropriations bill (H.R. 6091), which the House Committee on 
+Appropriations reported on July 10, 2012. 
+
+• On November 16, 2011, the House passed a bill (H.R. 822) that would establish a 
+
+greater degree of reciprocity between states that issue concealed carry permits for 
+handguns to civilians than currently exists under state law. The Senate considered 
+a similar amendment, which was narrowly defeated, in the 111th Congress. 
+
+• On October 11, 2011, the House passed a Veterans’ Benefits Act (H.R. 2349). 
+
+This bill includes a provision that would prohibit the Department of Veterans 
+Affairs from determining a beneficiary to be mentally incompetent for the 
+purposes of gun control, unless such a determination were made by a judge, 
+magistrate, or other judicial authority based upon a finding that the beneficiary 
+posed a danger to himself or others. Similar proposals were considered in either 
+the House or the Senate in the 110th and 111th Congresses, in the wake of the 
+enactment of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-180).12 
+
+• During May 2011, firearms-related amendments were offered to bills to extend 
+
+certain USA PATRIOT Act provisions related to national security investigations 
+(H.R. 1800, S. 1038, and S. 990), but those amendments were not passed. On the 
+one hand, Representative Mike Quigley’s amendment would have allowed 
+firearms transfers to be denied, if prospective transferees were the subject of a 
+FBI national security investigation. On the other hand, Senator Rand Paul’s 
+amendment would have specifically excluded firearms transfer records from the 
+business records that can be collected without a warrant during a national 
+security investigation. 
+
+The 112th Congress could also examine issues potentially arising from the tragic shootings in 
+Tucson, AZ, on January 8, 2011, in which 6 people were killed and 13 wounded, including 
+Representative Giffords. Armed with a 9mm Glock 19 semiautomatic pistol loaded with a 33-
+round extended magazine, the shooter reportedly fired 31 shots before bystanders were able to 
+subdue him while he was attempting to reload with another 33-round extended magazine. He also 
+carried two additional 15-round magazines.13 As discussed below, these magazines were 
+ 
+
+12 NICS stands for the National Instant Criminal Background Checks System, which is described below. 
+13 David von Drehle, “1 Madman and a Gun: 15 Seconds to Fire the Glock; 31 Bullets in One Clip; 19 Victims, with 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 4 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+previously defined under federal law as large capacity ammunition feeding devices (LCAFDs) 
+and were banned for 10 years, from September 13, 1994, through September 13, 2004, as part of 
+the larger semiautomatic assault weapons ban. Legislation has been introduced to reinstate the 
+LCAFD ban (H.R. 308 and S. 32) and to ban firearms within the proximity of certain high-level 
+federal officials (H.R. 367 and H.R. 496). Congressional interest could also focus on the shooter’s 
+mental illness and illegal drug use. 
+
+• On November 15, 2011, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee 
+
+on Crime and Terrorism held a hearing on the Fix Gun Checks Act of 2011 (S. 
+436/H.R. 1781). This proposal would amend P.L. 110-180 to advance certain 
+deadlines and apply deeper cuts to a wider array of federal law enforcement 
+assistance grant programs to incentivize the greater sharing of firearms-related 
+disqualifying records. Congress passed P.L. 110-180 in the wake of the tragic 
+April 16, 2007, Virginia Tech shootings. 
+
+ Background and Analysis 
+
+ Pro/Con Debate 
+
+Through the years, legislative proposals to restrict the availability of firearms to the public have 
+raised the following questions: What restrictions on firearms are permissible under the 
+Constitution? Does gun control constitute crime control? Can the nation’s rates of homicide, 
+robbery, and assault be reduced by the stricter regulation of firearms commerce or ownership? 
+Would restrictions stop attacks on public figures or thwart deranged persons and terrorists? Would 
+household, street corner, and schoolyard disputes be less lethal if firearms were more difficult and 
+expensive to acquire? Would more restrictive gun control policies have the unintended effect of 
+impairing citizens’ means of self-defense? 
+
+In recent years, proponents of gun control legislation have often held that only federal laws can 
+be effective in the United States. Otherwise, they say, states with few restrictions will continue to 
+be sources of guns that flow illegally into more-restrictive states. They believe that the Second 
+Amendment to the Constitution, which states that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to 
+the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed,” 
+is being misread in today’s modern society. They argue that the Second Amendment (1) is now 
+obsolete, with the presence of professional police forces; (2) was intended solely to guard against 
+suppression of state militias by the central government and is therefore restricted in scope by that 
+intent; and (3) does not guarantee a right that is absolute, but rather one that can be limited by 
+reasonable requirements. They ask why in today’s modern society a private citizen needs any 
+firearm that is not designed primarily for hunting or other recognized sporting purposes. 
+
+Proponents of firearms restrictions have advocated policy changes on specific types of firearms or 
+components that they believe are useful primarily for criminal purposes or that pose unusual risks 
+to the public. Fully automatic firearms (i.e., machine guns) and short-barreled rifles and shotguns 
+have been subject to strict regulation since 1934. Fully automatic firearms have been banned from 
+
+ 
+(...continued) 
+Six Killed,” Time , January 24, 2011, p. 26. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 5 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+private possession since 1986, except for those legally owned and registered with the Secretary of 
+the Treasury as of May 19, 1986. More recently, “Saturday night specials” (loosely defined as 
+inexpensive, small handguns), “assault weapons,” ammunition-feeding devices with capacities for 
+more than seven rounds, and certain ammunition have been the focus of control efforts. 
+
+Opponents of gun control vary in their positions with respect to specific forms of control but 
+generally hold that gun control laws do not accomplish what is intended. They argue that it is as 
+difficult to keep weapons from being acquired by “high-risk” individuals, even under federal laws 
+and enforcement, as it was to stop the sale and use of liquor during Prohibition. In their view, a 
+more-stringent federal firearms regulatory system would only create problems for law-abiding 
+citizens, bring mounting frustration and escalation of bans by gun regulators, and possibly 
+threaten citizens’ civil rights or safety. Some argue that the low violent crime rates of other 
+countries have nothing to do with gun control, maintaining instead that multiple cultural 
+differences are responsible. 
+
+Gun control opponents also reject the assumption that the only legitimate purpose of ownership 
+by a private citizen is recreational (i.e., hunting and target-shooting). They insist on the 
+continuing need of people for effective means to defend themselves and their property, and they 
+point to studies that they believe show that gun possession lowers the incidence of crime. They 
+say that the law enforcement and criminal justice system in the United States has not 
+demonstrated the ability to furnish an adequate measure of public safety in all settings. Some 
+opponents further believe that the Second Amendment includes a right to keep arms as a defense 
+against potential government tyranny, pointing to examples in other countries of the use of 
+firearms restrictions to curb dissent and secure illegitimate government power. The debate has 
+been intense. 
+
+To gun control advocates, the opposition is out of touch with the times, misinterprets the Second 
+Amendment, and is lacking in concern for the problems of crime and violence. To gun control 
+opponents, advocates are naive in their faith in the power of regulation to solve social problems, 
+bent on disarming the American citizen for ideological or social reasons, and moved by irrational 
+hostility toward firearms and gun enthusiasts. 
+
+ Gun-Related Statistics 
+
+Crime and mortality statistics are often used in the gun control debate. According to a recent 
+study, however, none of the existing sources of statistics provide either comprehensive, timely, or 
+accurate data with which to assess definitively whether there is a causal connection between 
+firearms and violence.14 For example, existing data do not show whether the number of people 
+shot and killed with semiautomatic assault weapons declined during the 10-year period (1994-
+2004) that those firearms were banned from further proliferation in the United States.15 Presented 
+below are data on the following topics: (1) the number of guns in the United States, (2) firearms-
+related homicides, (3) non-lethal firearms-related victimizations, (4) gun-related mortality rates, 
+(5) use of firearms for personal defense, and (6) recreational use of firearms. In some cases, the 
+data presented are more than a decade old but remain the most recent available. 
+
+ 
+
+14 National Research Council, Firearms and Violence: A Critical Review (Washington, DC: 2005), p. 48. 
+15 Ibid., p. 49. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 6 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ How Many Guns Are in the United States? 
+
+The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) reported in a national survey that in 1994, 44 million 
+people, approximately 35% of households, owned 192 million firearms, 65 million of which were 
+handguns.16 Seventy-four percent of those individuals were reported to own more than one 
+firearm.17 According to the ATF, by the end of 1996 approximately 242 million firearms were 
+available for sale to or were possessed by civilians in the United States.18 That total includes 
+roughly 72 million handguns (mostly pistols, revolvers, and derringers), 76 million rifles, and 64 
+million shotguns.19 By 2000, the number of firearms had increased to approximately 259 million: 
+92 million handguns, 92 million rifles, and 75 million shotguns.20 By 2007, the number of 
+firearms had increased to approximately 294 million: 106 million handguns, 105 million rifles, 
+and 83 million shotguns.21 
+
+In the past, most guns available for sale were produced domestically. In recent years, 1 million to 
+2 million handguns were manufactured each year, along with 1 million to 1.5 million rifles and 
+fewer than 1 million shotguns.22 From 2001 through 2007, however, handgun imports nearly 
+doubled, from 711,000 to nearly 1.4 million.23 By 2009, nearly 2.2 million handguns were 
+imported into the United States.24 From 2001 through 2007, rifle imports increased from 228,000 
+to 632,000, and shotgun imports increased from 428,000 to 726,000.25 By 2009, rifle imports had 
+increased to 864,000, but shotguns had decreased 559,000.26 By the same year, 2009, the 
+estimated total number of firearms available to civilians in the United States had increased to 
+approximately 310 million: 114 million handguns, 110 million rifles, and 86 million shotguns.27 
+
+Retail prices of guns vary widely, from $75 or less for inexpensive, low-caliber handguns to more 
+than $1,500 for higher-end, standard-production rifles and shotguns.28 Data are not available on 
+
+ 
+
+16 Jens Ludwig and Phillip J. Cook, Guns in America: National Survey on Private Ownership and Use of Firearms , 
+NCJ 165476, May 1999, http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/165476.pdf. 
+17 Ibid. 
+18 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Commerce in Firearms in the United 
+States , February 2000, pp. A3-A5. 
+19 Ibid., pp. A3-A5. 
+20 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Firearms Commerce in the United 
+States 2001/2002 , ATF P 9000.4, April 2002, pp. E1-E3. 
+21 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Annual Firearm 
+Manufacturing and Export Reports for 2002 through 2007 , along with firearms import data provided by the ATF 
+Firearms and Explosives Import Branch. 
+22 Ibid. 
+23 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Firearms and Explosives Import 
+Branch. 
+24 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Firearms Commerce in the 
+United States 2011 , August 2011, p. 15. 
+25 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Firearms and Explosives Import 
+Branch. 
+26 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Firearms Commerce in the 
+United States 2011 , August 2011, p. 15 
+27 Ibid., pp. 11, 13, and 15. 
+28 Ned Schwing, 2 005 Standard Catalog of Firearms: The Collector’s Price and Reference Guide , 15th edition (Iola, 
+Wisconsin, 2005). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 7 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+the number of “assault weapons” in private possession or available for sale, but one study 
+estimated that 1.5 million assault weapons were privately owned in 1994.29 
+
+ How Often Are Guns Used in Homicides? 
+
+As Table 1 shows, reports submitted by state and local law enforcement agencies to the FBI and 
+published annually in the Uniform Crime Reports 30 indicate that the firearms-related murder and 
+non-negligent manslaughter rate per 100,000 of the population decreased from 6.6 for 1993 to 3.6 
+for 2000. The rate held steady at 3.6 for 2001 and fluctuated thereafter between a high of 3.9 for 
+2006 and 2007, and a low of 3.2 for 2010. 
+
+ Table 1. Firearms-Related Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter Victims, 
+
+ 1993-2010 
+
+ Estimated Firearms- 
+
+ Related Murder and Non- 
+
+ Rate per 100,000 
+
+ negligent Manslaughter 
+
+ Rate per 100,000 
+
+ Year Murder 
+
+ Victims 
+
+ of the Population 
+
+ Victimsa 
+
+ of the Population 
+
+1993 24,526 
+
+9.5 
+
+17,073 
+
+6.6 
+
+1994 23,326 
+
+9.0 
+
+16,333 
+
+6.3 
+
+1995 21,606 
+
+8.2 
+
+14,727 
+
+5.6 
+
+1996 19,645 
+
+7.4 
+
+13,261 
+
+5.0 
+
+1997 18,208 
+
+6.8 
+
+12,335 
+
+4.6 
+
+1998 16,974 
+
+6.3 
+
+11,006 
+
+4.1 
+
+1999 15,522 
+
+5.7 
+
+10,117 
+
+3.7 
+
+2000 15,586 
+
+5.5 
+
+10,203 
+
+3.6 
+
+2001 16,037 
+
+5.6 
+
+10,139 
+
+3.6 
+
+2002 16,229 
+
+5.6 
+
+10,841 
+
+3.8 
+
+2003 16,528 
+
+5.7 
+
+11,037 
+
+3.8 
+
+2004 16,148 
+
+5.5 
+
+10,665 
+
+3.6 
+
+2005 16,740 
+
+5.6 
+
+11,363 
+
+3.8 
+
+2006 17,309 
+
+5.8 
+
+11,731 
+
+3.9 
+
+2007 17,128 
+
+5.7 
+
+11,631 
+
+3.9 
+
+2008 16,645 
+
+5.4 
+
+11,029 
+
+3.6 
+
+2009 15,399 
+
+5.0 
+
+10,301 
+
+3.4 
+
+2010 14,748 
+
+4.8 
+
+9,958 
+
+3.2 
+
+ Source: CRS compilation of FBI crime statistics reported annually in the Uniform Crime Reports , 1993-2010. 
+
+ 
+
+29 Christopher S. Koper, Updated Assessment of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban: Impacts on Gun Markets and Gun 
+Violence, 1994-2003 (Washington, DC: July 2004). 
+30 See http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 8 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+a. The number of firearms-related murder and non-negligent manslaughter victims was estimated by applying 
+
+the percentage of firearms-related murders for which the cause of death was known to the number of all 
+reported murder and non-negligent homicide victims for which the cause was known or unknown. 
+
+ How Prevalent Are Gun-Related Fatalities? 
+
+The source of national data on firearms deaths is the publication Vital Statistics , published each 
+year by the National Center for Health Statistics. Firearms deaths reported by coroners are 
+presented in five categories: homicides, legal interventions,31 suicides, accidents, and unknown 
+circumstances. For these categories, the data are presented below for 1993 through 2007 in two 
+tables, one for all deaths and the other for juvenile deaths. 
+
+ Table 2. Firearms-Related Deaths for All Ages 
+
+1993-2009 
+
+ Legal 
+
+ Total 
+
+ % 
+
+ Yeara Homicides 
+
+ Interventions Suicides Accidents Unknown 
+
+ Deaths 
+
+ Change 
+
+1993 18,253 
+
+318 18,940 1,521 563 39,596 
+
+ 
+
+1994 17,527 
+
+339 18,765 1,356 518 38,506 -2.8% 
+
+1995 15,551 
+
+284 18,503 1,225 394 35,958 -6.6% 
+
+1996 14,037 
+
+290 18,166 1,134 413 34,041 -5.3% 
+
+1997 13,252 
+
+270 17,566 981 367 32,437 -4.7% 
+
+1998 11,798 
+
+304 17,424 866 316 30,709 -5.3% 
+
+1999 10,828 
+
+299 16,599 824 324 28,875 -6.0% 
+
+2000 10,801 
+
+270 16,586 776 230 28,664 -0.7% 
+
+2001 11,348 
+
+323 16,869 802 231 29,574 3.2% 
+
+2002 11,829 
+
+300 17,108 762 243 30,243 2.3% 
+
+2003 11,920 
+
+347 16,907 730 232 30,137 -0.4% 
+
+2004 11,624 
+
+311 16,750 649 235 29,570 -1.9% 
+
+2005 12,352 
+
+330 17,002 789 221 30,695 3.8% 
+
+2006 12,791 
+
+360 16,883 642 220 30,897 0.7% 
+
+2007 12,632 
+
+351 17,352 613 276 31,224 1.1% 
+
+2008 12,179 
+
+326 18,223 592 273 31,593 1.1% 
+
+2009 11,493 
+
+333 18,735 554 232 31,347 -0.7 
+
+ Source: National Center for Health Statistics. 
+
+a. As of February 28, 2012, the last year for which data were available was calendar year 2009. 
+
+As Table 2 shows, firearms fatalities decreased continuously from 39,595 in 1993 to 28,664 in 
+2000, for an overall decrease of nearly 28%. Compared with firearms deaths in 2000, such deaths 
+increased by 3.2% in 2001 to 29,574, and increased again, by 2.3%, in 2002 to 30,243. They 
+decreased by 0.3% in 2003 to 30,137, and decreased again, by 1.9%, in 2004 to 29,570. Firearms 
+ 
+
+31 “Legal interventions” include deaths (in these cases by firearms) that involve legal uses of force (justifiable homicide 
+or manslaughter), usually by the police. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 9 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+fatalities increased by 3.8% in 2005 to 30,694, by 0.7% in 2006 to 30,897, and by 1.1% in 2007 
+to 31,224. They increased again by 1.1% in 2008, but decreased by 0.7% in 2009. Of the 2009 
+total, 11,826 were homicides or due to legal intervention, 18,735 were suicides, 554 were 
+unintentional (accidental) shootings, and 232 were of unknown causes.32 
+
+As Table 3 shows, there were 1,520 juvenile (younger than 18 years old) firearms-related deaths 
+in 2007. Of the juvenile total, 1,047 were homicides or due to legal intervention, 325 were 
+suicides, 112 were unintentional, and 36 were of unknown causes. From 1993 to 2001, juvenile 
+firearms-related deaths decreased by an average rate of 10% annually, for an overall decrease of 
+56%. From 2001 to 2002, such deaths increased slightly (by less than 1%), but declined by nearly 
+9% from 2002 to 2003. They increased from 2002 through 2006, by 5% to 7%, but decreased by 
+nearly 5% in 2007.33 Juvenile firearms-related fatalities decreased again by 3.0% in FY2008 and 
+nearly 6% in 2009. 
+
+ Table 3. Firearms-Related Deaths for Juveniles 
+
+1993-2009 
+
+ Legal 
+
+ Total 
+
+ % 
+
+ Yeara Homicides Interventions 
+
+ Suicides Accidents Unknown Deaths 
+
+ Change 
+
+1993 1,975 
+
+16 
+
+832 392 
+
+76 
+
+3,292 
+
+ 
+
+1994 
+
+1,912 
+
+20 902 403 81 3,319 0.8% 
+
+1995 1,780 
+
+16 
+
+836 330 
+
+72 
+
+3,035 -8.6% 
+
+1996 1,473 
+
+9 
+
+720 272 
+
+49 
+
+2,524 -16.8% 
+
+1997 1,308 
+
+7 
+
+679 247 
+
+43 
+
+2,285 -9.5% 
+
+1998 1,045 
+
+17 
+
+648 207 
+
+54 
+
+1,972 -13.7% 
+
+1999 1,001 
+
+9 
+
+558 158 
+
+50 
+
+1,777 -9.9% 
+
+2000 819 
+
+15 537 150 23 1,545 
+
+-13.1% 
+
+2001 835 
+
+6 451 125 16 1,434 -7.2% 
+
+2002 872 
+
+7 423 115 26 1,444 0.7% 
+
+2003 805 
+
+8 377 102 25 1,318 -8.7% 
+
+2004 868 
+
+6 384 105 22 1,386 5.2% 
+
+2005 921 
+
+5 412 127 25 1,491 7.6% 
+
+2006 
+
+1,082 
+
+14 371 102 24 1,594 6.9% 
+
+2007 1,038 
+
+9 
+
+325 112 
+
+36 
+
+1,520 -4.6% 
+
+2008 984 
+
+6 361 98 26 1,475 -3.0% 
+
+2009 887 
+
+5 401 83 16 1,392 -5.6% 
+
+ Source: National Center for Health Statistics. 
+
+a. As of February 28, 2012, the last year for which data were available was calendar year 2009. 
+
+ 
+
+32 National Vital Statistics System data taken from the Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS), 
+http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/wisqars/default.htm. 
+33 Ibid. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 10 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ How Often Are Guns Used in Non-Lethal Crimes? 
+
+The other principal source of national crime data is the National Crime Victimization Survey 
+(NCVS) conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
+(BJS). The NCVS database provides some information on the weapons used by offenders, based 
+on victims’ reports. Based on data provided by survey respondents in calendar year 2009, BJS 
+estimated that, nationwide, there were 4.3 million non-lethal violent crimes (rape or sexual 
+assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault).34 Weapons were used in 22% of these 
+incidents, and firearms were used by offenders in 8% of these incidents.35 The estimated number 
+of firearms-related non-lethal violent crime incidents decreased from 428,670 in 2000 to 326,090 
+in 2009, and from 2.4 persons to 1.4 per 100,000 of the population ages 12 and older.36 
+
+ How Often Are Firearms Used in Self-Defense? 
+
+According to BJS, NCVS data from 1987 to 1992 indicate that in each of those years, roughly 
+62,200 victims of violent crime (1% of all victims of such crimes) used guns to defend 
+themselves.37 Another 20,000 persons each year used guns to protect property. Persons in the 
+business of self-protection (police officers, armed security guards) may have been included in the 
+survey.38 Another source of information on the use of firearms for self-defense is the National 
+Self-Defense Survey conducted by criminology professor Gary Kleck of Florida State University 
+in the spring of 1993. Citing responses from 4,978 households, Dr. Kleck estimated that handguns 
+had been used 2.1 million times per year for self-defense, and that all types of guns had been used 
+approximately 2.5 million times a year for that purpose during the 1988-1993 period.39 
+
+Why do these numbers vary by such a wide margin? Law enforcement agencies do not collect 
+information on the number of times civilians use firearms to defend themselves or their property 
+against attack. Such data have been collected in household surveys. The contradictory nature of 
+the available statistics may be partially explained by methodological factors. That is, these and 
+other criminal justice statistics reflect what is reported to have occurred, not necessarily the actual 
+number of times certain events occur. Victims and offenders are sometimes reluctant to be candid 
+with researchers. So, the number of incidents can only be estimated, making it difficult to state 
+with certainty the accuracy of statistics such as the number of times firearms are used in self-
+defense. For this and other reasons, criminal justice statistics often vary when different 
+methodologies are applied. 
+
+Survey research can be limited because it is difficult to produce statistically significant findings 
+from small incident populations. For example, the sample in the National Self-Defense Survey 
+
+ 
+
+34 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, Criminal 
+Victimization, 2009 , by Jennifer L. Truman and Michael R. Rand, p. 8. 
+35 Ibid. 
+36 Ibid. 
+37 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Guns and Crime: Handgun 
+Victimization, Firearm Self-Defense, and Firearm Theft , NCJ-147003, April 1994, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
+ascii/hvfsdaft.txt. 
+38 Ibid. 
+39 Gary Kleck, “Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun,” Journal of 
+Criminal Law and Criminology , vol. 86, issue 1, 1995, http://www.guncite.com/gcdgklec.html. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 11 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+might have been too small, given the likely low incidence rate and the inherent limitations of 
+survey research. 
+
+ What About the Recreational Use of Guns? 
+
+According to NIJ, in 1994 recreation was the most common motivation for owning a firearm.40 
+There were approximately 15 million hunters, about 35% of gun owners, in the United States, and 
+about the same number and percentage of gun owners engaged in sport shooting in 1994.41 The 
+U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) reported that there were more than 14.7 million persons 
+who were paid license holders in 200342 and, according to the National Shooting Sports 
+Foundation, in that year approximately 15.2 million persons hunted with a firearm and nearly 
+19.8 million participated in target shooting.43 The FWS reported that there were 14.4 million paid 
+license holders in 2010.44 
+
+ Federal Regulation of Firearms 
+
+Two major federal statutes regulate the commerce in and possession of firearms: the National 
+Firearms Act of 1934 (26 U.S.C. §5801 et seq.) and the Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended (18 
+U.S.C. Chapter 44, §921 et seq.). Supplementing federal law, many state firearms laws are stricter 
+than federal law. For example, some states require permits to obtain firearms and impose a 
+waiting period for firearms transfers. Other states are less restrictive, but state law cannot preempt 
+federal law. Federal law serves as the minimum standard in the United States. 
+
+ The National Firearms Act (NFA) 
+
+The NFA was originally designed to make it difficult to obtain types of firearms perceived to be 
+especially lethal or to be the chosen weapons of “gangsters,” most notably machine guns and 
+short-barreled long guns. This law also regulates firearms, other than pistols and revolvers, which 
+can be concealed on a person (e.g., pen, cane, and belt buckle guns). It taxes all aspects of the 
+manufacture and distribution of such weapons, and it compels the disclosure (through registration 
+with the Attorney General) of the production and distribution system from manufacturer to buyer. 
+
+ The Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) 
+
+As stated in the GCA, the purpose of federal firearms regulation is to assist federal, state, and 
+local law enforcement in the ongoing effort to reduce crime and violence. In the same act, 
+however, Congress also stated that the intent of the law is not to place any undue or unnecessary 
+
+ 
+
+40 Jens Ludwig and Phillip J. Cook, Guns in America: National Survey on Private Ownership and Use of Firearms , 
+NCJ 165476, May 1999, p. 2. 
+41 Ibid., p. 3. 
+42 U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Hunting License Report (December 2, 
+2004). 
+43 American Sports Data, Inc., The SUPERSTUDY of Sports Participation . 
+44 U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Hunting License Report (December 10, 
+2010). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 12 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+burdens on law-abiding citizens in regard to the lawful acquisition, possession, or use of firearms 
+for hunting, trapshooting, target shooting, personal protection, or any other lawful activity. 
+
+The GCA, as amended, contains the principal federal restrictions on domestic commerce in small 
+arms and ammunition. The statute requires all persons manufacturing, importing, or selling 
+firearms as a business to be federally licensed; prohibits the interstate mail-order sale of all 
+firearms; prohibits interstate sale of handguns generally and sets forth categories of persons to 
+whom firearms or ammunition may not be sold, such as persons under a specified age or with 
+criminal records; authorizes the Attorney General to prohibit the importation of non-sporting 
+firearms; requires that dealers maintain records of all commercial gun sales; and establishes 
+special penalties for the use of a firearm in the perpetration of a federal drug trafficking offense or 
+crime of violence. 
+
+As amended by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 1993 (P.L. 103-159), the GCA 
+requires background checks be completed for all non-licensed persons seeking to obtain firearms 
+from federal firearms licensees. Private transactions between persons “not engaged in the 
+business” are not covered by the recordkeeping or the background check provisions of the GCA. 
+These transactions and other matters such as possession, registration, and the issuance of licenses 
+to firearms owners may be covered by state laws or local ordinances. For a listing of other major 
+firearms and related statutes, see Appendix B . 
+
+ Firearms Transfer and Possession Eligibility 
+
+Under current law, there are nine classes of persons prohibited from shipping, transporting, 
+receiving, or possessing firearms or ammunition: 
+
+• persons convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
+
+exceeding one year; 
+
+• fugitives from justice; 
+• unlawful users or addicts of any controlled substance as defined in Section 102 of 
+
+the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §802)); 
+
+• persons adjudicated as “mental defective” or committed to mental institutions; 
+• unauthorized immigrants and most nonimmigrant visitors (with some exceptions 
+
+in the latter case); 
+
+• persons dishonorably discharged from the U.S. Armed Forces; 
+• persons who have renounced their U.S. citizenship; 
+• persons under court-order restraints related to harassing, stalking, or threatening 
+
+an intimate partner or child of such intimate partner; and 
+
+• persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.45 
+
+In addition, there is a 10th class of persons prohibited from shipping, transporting, or receiving 
+firearms or ammunition: 
+
+ 
+
+45 18 U.S.C. §922(g). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 13 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+• persons under indictment in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for 
+
+a term exceeding one year.46 
+
+Since 1994, moreover, it has been a federal offense for any non-licensed person to transfer a 
+handgun or handgun ammunition to anyone younger than 18 years old. It has also been illegal for 
+anyone younger than 18 years old to possess a handgun or handgun ammunition (there are 
+exceptions to this law related to employment, ranching, farming, target practice, and hunting).47 
+
+ Noncitizen Firearms Eligibility 
+
+Regarding immigration status, the GCA does not distinguish between citizens and legal 
+permanent residents (legal immigrants); both are eligible to receive, possess, and transfer firearms 
+and ammunition as long as they are not in one of the categories of prohibited persons. As shown 
+above, among prohibited categories are illegal immigrants and nonimmigrants (with exceptions 
+for the latter). Illegal immigrants are those noncitizens (aliens) who have either entered the 
+United States without inspection or have violated the terms of their nonimmigrant visas or entry 
+by overstaying or accepting unauthorized employment. Illegal immigrants are prohibited from 
+possessing firearms with no exceptions. 
+
+Nonimmigrant aliens are admitted for temporary stays—sometimes for several years. In general, 
+nonimmigrants are not eligible to purchase and take possession of firearms or ammunition in the 
+United States.48 There are limited exceptions, however, for certain nonimmigrants who 
+
+• have resided in a state for 90 days that they intend to make their home, in which 
+
+case they may purchase handguns in their state of residence, or purchase long 
+guns (rifles or shotguns) in any state; 
+
+and establish that they are either 
+
+• official representatives of a foreign government who are accredited to the United 
+
+States government or the nonimmigrant’s government mission to an international 
+organization that is headquartered in the United States and possession of a 
+firearm is necessary to their official capacity; 
+
+• officials of foreign governments or distinguished visitors who have been 
+
+designated by the State Department and possession of a firearm is necessary to 
+their official capacity; 
+
+• foreign law enforcement officers of a friendly foreign government entering the 
+
+United States on law enforcement business; or 
+
+• visitors admitted to the United States for lawful hunting or sporting purposes or 
+
+are in possession of a valid hunting license or permit lawfully issued in the 
+United States.49 
+
+ 
+
+46 18 U.S.C. §922(n). 
+47 18 U.S.C. §922(x). 
+48 18 U.S.C. §922(y). 
+49 For further information, see ATF brochure, “Nonimmigrant Aliens Purchasing Firearms and Ammunition in the 
+United States (ATF P 5300.18)” (Washington, July 2002). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 14 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+In two separate memoranda, dated October 28, 2011,50 and January 30, 2012,51 DOJ Office of 
+Legal Counsel (OLC) Assistant Attorney General Virginia A. Seitz provided ATF Chief Counsel 
+Stephen R. Rubenstein with formal opinions regarding nonimmigrant aliens and firearms 
+ineligibility in most cases and the separate, but related 90-day state residency requirement for 
+other noncitizens, who are lawfully present in the United States.52 In these opinions, which are 
+binding on ATF, the OLC has found these two long-standing ATF administrative interpretations to 
+be in error. While ATF is compelled to amend its regulations to conform to the OLC opinions, 
+such regulations have yet to be published as of the date of this memorandum. Consequently, 
+ATF’s administrative interpretations still carry the force of law, notwithstanding the OLC’s 
+opinions discussed above. 
+
+ Licensed Dealers and Firearms Transfers 
+
+Persons who are federally licensed to be engaged in the business of manufacturing, importing, or 
+selling firearms are known as “federal firearms licensees (FFLs).”53 Under current law, FFLs may 
+ship, transport, and receive firearms that have moved in interstate and foreign commerce. FFLs 
+are currently required to verify with the FBI through a background check that non-licensed 
+persons are eligible to possess a firearm before subsequently transferring a firearm to them. FFLs 
+must also verify the identity of non-licensed transferees by inspecting a government-issued 
+identity document (e.g., a driver’s license). 
+
+FFLs may engage in interstate transfers of firearms among themselves without conducting 
+background checks. Licensees may transfer long guns (rifles and shotguns) to out-of-state 
+residents, as long as the transactions are face-to-face and not knowingly in violation of the laws 
+of the state in which the unlicensed transferees reside. FFLs, however, may not transfer handguns 
+to unlicensed out-of-state residents.54 Transfer of handguns or handgun ammunition by FFLs to 
+anyone younger than 21 years old is also prohibited, as is the transfer of long guns or long gun 
+ammunition to anyone younger than 18 years old.55 Since 1986, there have been no similar 
+restrictions on the interstate transfer of ammunition. Furthermore, a federal firearms license is not 
+required to sell ammunition; however, such a license is required to either manufacture or import 
+ammunition. 
+
+ 
+
+50 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Nonimmigrant Aliens and Firearms Disabilities Under the Gun 
+Control Act: Memorandum Opinion for the Chief Counsel, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
+(October 28, 2011), p. 1. 
+51 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, State of Residence Requirements for Firearms Transfers: 
+Memorandum Opinion for the Chief Counsel, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (January 30, 
+2012), p. 1. 
+52 The OLC provides oral advice and written opinions in response to requests from executive branch agencies, as well 
+as the Counsel to the President. Formal opinions are prepared for and signed by the Attorney General. More frequently, 
+written legal opinions (formal advice) are prepared and signed by the OLC Assistant Attorney General or Deputy 
+Assistant Attorney General. The OLC also serves as the general counsel for DOJ and, in this role, reviews all 
+regulations promulgated under the Attorney General’s signature. The OLC only provides legal advice to the Executive 
+Branch and, within that branch, OLC opinions “are controlling on questions of the law.” See Memorandum for 
+Attorneys of the Office, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
+Counsel, Re: Best Practices for OLC Opinions (May 16, 2005), p. 1. 
+53 18 U.S.C. §923(a). 
+54 18 U.S.C. §922(b)(3). 
+55 18 U.S.C. §922(b)(1). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 15 
+
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+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+Also, FFLs are required to submit “multiple sales reports” to the Attorney General if any person 
+purchases two or more handguns within five business days. Furthermore, as described below, 
+FFLs are required to maintain records on all acquisitions and dispositions of firearms. They are 
+obligated to respond to ATF agents requesting firearms tracing information within 24 hours. 
+Under certain circumstances, ATF agents may inspect, without search warrants, their business 
+premises, inventory, and gun records. 
+
+ Private Firearms Transfers 
+
+Non-licensees are prohibited from acquiring firearms from out-of-state sources (except for long 
+guns acquired from FFLs under the conditions described above). Non-licensees are also 
+prohibited from transferring firearms to any persons who they have reasonable cause to believe 
+are not residents of the state in which the transaction occurs. In addition, since 1986 it has been a 
+federal offense for non-licensees to knowingly transfer a firearm or ammunition to prohibited 
+persons.56 It is also notable that firearms or ammunition transfers initiated through the Internet are 
+subject to the same federal laws as transfers initiated in any other manner.57 
+
+ Gun Trafficking and Straw Purchases 
+
+ATF has developed a nationwide strategy to reduce firearms trafficking and violent crime by 
+preventing convicted felons, drug traffickers, and juvenile gang members from acquiring firearms 
+from gun traffickers.58 These criminals often acquire firearms from a person who is not prohibited 
+to possess firearms through straw purchases or by buying firearms from corrupt dealers who sell 
+firearms off the books in an attempt to escape federal regulation. 
+
+Although there is no statutory definition for “gun trafficking” in the GCA, it essentially entails 
+the movement or diversion of firearms from legal to illegal markets.59 Therefore, it follows that 
+the entire GCA is arguably a statutory framework designed to combat gun trafficking 
+domestically, particularly interstate gun trafficking.60 For example, according to ATF, gun 
+trafficking cases include, but are not limited to, the following activities: 
+
+ 
+
+56 18 U.S.C. §922(d). 
+57 For further information, see CRS Report RS20957, Internet Firearm Sales , by T. J. Halstead. 
+58 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Office of Field Operations, 
+ Project Gunrunner: A Cartel Focused Strategy , September 2010, 28 pp. 
+59 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Project Gunrunner: The 
+Southwest Border Initiative , ATF P 3317.6, March 2009, available at http://www.atf.gov/pub/fire-explo_pub/
+p3317_6rev2.pdf. 
+It is noteworthy that in 2006 the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended its guidelines to include the following 
+definition: “firearms trafficking” occurred if an offender, “regardless of whether anything of value was exchanged,” 
+engaged in the following activities: (1) transported, transferred, or otherwise disposed of two or more firearms to 
+another individual, or received two or more firearms with the intent to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of 
+firearms to another individual; and (2) knew or had reason to believe that such conduct would result in the transport, 
+transfer, or disposal of a firearm to an individual (a) whose possession or receipt of the firearm would be unlawful; or 
+(b) who intended to use or dispose of the firearm unlawfully. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines 
+Manual , §2K2.1(b)(5) (November 2006). 
+60 With regard to Southwest Border gun trafficking, it is significant to note that the GCA does not include any 
+provisions that directly address smuggling firearms out of the United States, across international boundaries, to 
+countries like Mexico. However, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA; 22 U.S.C. §2778 et seq.) does include 
+provisions that directly address such cross-border illegal arms trafficking. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+
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+
+ 
+
+• Straw purchasers or straw purchasing rings; 
+• Trafficking in firearms by corrupt federally licensed gun dealers; 
+• Trafficking in firearms by unlicensed dealers (i.e., persons who deal in firearms 
+
+illegally as the principal source of their livelihood); 
+
+• Trafficking in secondhand firearms acquired from unlicensed persons at gun 
+
+shows, flea markets, and other private venues; and 
+
+• Trafficking in stolen firearms.61 
+
+Unlike other forms of contraband, almost all illegal firearms used criminally in the United States 
+were diverted at some point from legal channels of commerce.62 ATF works to reduce firearms-
+related crime with two approaches, industry regulation and criminal investigation. 
+
+ ATF Compliance Inspections 
+
+ATF regulates the U.S. firearms industry by inspecting FFLs to monitor their compliance with the 
+GCA and NFA, and to prevent the diversion of firearms from legal to illegal channels of 
+commerce. Despite its crime-fighting mission, ATF’s business relationships with the firearms 
+industry and larger gun-owning community have been a perennial source of tension, which from 
+time to time has been the subject of congressional oversight.63 Nevertheless, under current law, 
+ATF Special Agents (SAs)64 and Industry Operations Investigators (IOIs)65 are authorized to 
+inspect or examine the inventory and records of an FFL without search warrants under three 
+scenarios:66 
+
+• in the course of a reasonable inquiry during the course of a criminal investigation 
+
+of a person or persons other than the FFL; 
+
+• to ensure compliance with the record keeping requirements of the GCA—not 
+
+more than once during any 12-month period, or at any time with respect to 
+records relating to a firearm involved in a criminal investigation that is traced to 
+the licensee; or 
+
+ 
+
+61 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Following the Gun: Enforcing Federal 
+Laws against Firearms Traffickers , June 2000, p. 11. 
+62 Greg Ridgeway, Glenn L. Pierce, and Anthony A. Braga et al., Strategies for Disrupting Illegal Firearms Markets: A 
+Case Study of Los Angeles , RAND Corporation, 2008, p. 1. 
+63 For example, in the 109th Congress, the House Judiciary Crime subcommittee held two oversight hearings examining 
+ATF firearms enforcement operations at guns shows in Richmond, VA, in 2005. ATF agents reportedly provided state 
+and local law enforcement officers with confidential information from background check forms (ATF Form 4473s), so 
+that officers could perform residency checks on persons who had otherwise legally purchased firearms at those gun 
+shows. Questions were also raised as to whether ATF agents had profiled gun purchasers at those gun shows on the 
+basis of race, ethnicity, and gender. See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, 
+Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Oversight Hearing on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
+Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE) Parts I & II: Gun Show Enforcement , February 15 and 28, 2006. Also see 
+Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ 
+Investigative Operations at Gun Shows, I-2007-007, June 2007. 
+64 For FY2012, Congress has provided ATF with funding for 2,539 SA positions. 
+65 For FY2009, Congress has provided ATF with funding for 834 IOI positions. 
+66 18 U.S.C. §923(g)(1)(B). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
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+
+ 
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+
+ 
+
+• when such an inspection or examination is required for determining the 
+
+disposition of one or more firearms in the course of a criminal investigation. 
+
+By inspecting the firearms transfer records that FFLs are required by law to maintain, ATF SAs 
+and IOIs are able to trace crime guns from their domestic manufacturer or importer to the first 
+retail dealer that sold those firearms to persons in the general public, generating vital leads in 
+homicide and other criminal investigations. In addition, by inspecting those records, ATF 
+investigators sometimes discover evidence of corrupt FFLs dealing in firearms “off the books,” 
+straw purchases, and other patterns of illegal behavior. 
+
+ Anatomy of a Firearms Straw Purchase 
+
+A “straw purchase” occurs when an individual poses as the actual transferee, but he is actually 
+acquiring the firearm for another person. In effect, he serves as an illegal middleman. As part of 
+any firearms transfer from an FFL to a private person, the GCA requires them to fill out jointly an 
+ATF Form 4473. In addition, the FFL is required to verify the purchaser’s name, address, date of 
+birth, and other information by examining a government-issued piece of identification, most often 
+a driver’s license. Among other things, the purchaser attests on the ATF Form 4473 that he is not 
+a prohibited person, and that he is the “actual transferee/buyer.”67 Hence, straw purchases are 
+known as “lying and buying for the other guy.” Straw purchases are illegal under two provisions 
+of the GCA. 
+
+If the purchaser makes any false statement to a FFL with respect to any fact material to the 
+lawfulness of a prospective firearms transfer, it is a federal offense punishable under 18 
+U.S.C. 922(a)(6). This provision, however, also captures misrepresentations such as 
+presenting false identity documents. Violations are punishable by up to 10 years 
+imprisonment.68 
+
+It is also illegal for any person knowingly to make any false statement with respect to the 
+records that FFLs are required to maintain under 18 U.S.C. §924(a)(1)(A). This provision, 
+however, also captures misrepresentations related to licensure and other benefits under the 
+GCA. Violations are punishable by up to five years imprisonment.69 
+
+Straw purchases, however, are not easily detected, because their illegality only becomes apparent 
+when the straw purchaser’s true intent is revealed by a subsequent transfer to the actual buyer. In 
+many cases, the actual buyer may be a prohibited person, who would not pass a background 
+check. Under such a scenario, if the straw purchaser knew or had reasonable cause to know the 
+actual transferee was a prohibited person, he would also be in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(d), for 
+which the penalty is up to 10 years imprisonment.70 It would also be a violation for the prohibited 
+person to possess or receive the firearm under 18 U.S.C. §922(g), for which the penalty is also up 
+to 10 years imprisonment.71 
+
+ 
+
+67 On the ATF Form 4473, question 11a reads: “Are you the actual transferee/buyer of the firearm(s) listed on this 
+form? Warning: You are not the actual buyer if you are acquiring the firearm(s) on behalf of another person. If you are 
+not the actual buyer, the dealer cannot transfer the firearm(s) to you.” 
+68 18 U.S.C. §924(a)(2). 
+69 18 U.S.C. §924(a)(1)(D). 
+70 18 U.S.C. §924(a)(2). 
+71 Ibid. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
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+
+ 
+
+Alternatively, the actual buyer may not be a prohibited person, but may be seeking to acquire 
+firearms without any paper trail linking him to the acquisition of the firearm. Under such a 
+scenario, however, the straw purchase and subsequent illegal transfer would be even less apparent 
+for several reasons. Under federal law, it is legal for an unlicensed, private person to purchase 
+firearms and then resell them or give them away, as long as the 
+
+• transferees are not prohibited or underage persons; 
+• transferors do not deal in firearms in a volume that would require licensing; and 
+• transfers are intrastate , as generally only federally licensed gun dealers can 
+
+legally transfer firearms interstate . 
+
+Hence, individuals may buy several firearms at a time with the intention of giving those firearms 
+away as presents to anyone, as long as they do not present those firearms to persons who are 
+underage, out-of-state residents, or prohibited persons. They may also buy firearms and, then, sell 
+those firearms at any time, as long as selling firearms is not the principal objective of their 
+livelihood and profit, in which case they would be required to be federally licensed to deal in 
+firearms. Furthermore, no federal background checks are required for recipients of subsequent 
+intrastate firearms transfers. 
+
+On the other hand, if the suspected straw purchaser were observed departing the licensed gun 
+dealer’s place of business and traveling immediately to another locale, where he transferred the 
+firearm(s) to another person, there would be a reasonable suspicion that he was a straw purchaser. 
+However, the actual buyer would not have committed a crime unless it could be proven that he 
+had sponsored the straw purchase.72 Moreover, depending on the time that elapses between the 
+initial straw purchases and subsequent transfers to the actual buyer, the illegality of the transfers 
+may not become apparent until the actual buyer’s true intent is revealed, when he either transports 
+those firearms across state lines to be sold or bartered, attempts to smuggle them across an 
+international border, or engages in some other illegal act. 
+
+Sometimes, the behavior of the prospective transferee (straw purchaser) may raise reasonable 
+suspicions. For example, during a controversial ATF Phoenix-based investigation known as 
+“Operation Fast and Furious,” several of the individuals under indictment made multiple 
+purchases from the same FFL of multiple semiautomatic firearms. Raising suspicions further, 
+they paid for these firearms with thousands of dollars in cash. Indeed, FFLs contacted ATF about 
+these suspicious transfers, prompting the investigation. They did so, in part, because they realized 
+that these firearms might be traced back to their businesses and they probably wanted to avoid 
+any negative attention that those traces might bring back on them. It is notable that if an FFL 
+believes a firearms transfer to be suspicious, he may choose not to sell those firearms to the 
+individuals in question. If he should proceed with the transfer, however, as long as he had 
+conducted the required criminal background check on the prospective buyer, and he and the 
+prospective buyer had filled out the proper paperwork, his obligations under federal law would 
+have been fulfilled. 
+
+In summation, with regard to interstate transfers, it is unlawful for any person who is not federally 
+licensed to deal in firearms to transport or receive a firearm into his own state of residence that 
+was obtained in another state.73 In addition, it is unlawful for any person who is not federally 
+ 
+
+72 It is unlawful for any person to aid, abet, counsel, command, or solicit a criminal act (18 U.S.C. §2). 
+73 18 U.S.C. §922(a)(3). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+
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+
+ 
+
+licensed to deal in firearms to deliver a firearm to another unlicensed person who resides in a 
+state other than the transferor’s state of residence.74 Violations of either provision are punishable 
+by a fine and/or not more than five years imprisonment.75 It is also unlawful to smuggle firearms, 
+or any other merchandise contrary to U.S. law from the United States.76 Violations are punishable 
+by a fine and/or not more than 10 years imprisonment.77 
+
+ Federal Prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §§922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(A) 
+
+According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the largest percentage of Southwest 
+Border gun trafficking cases is comprised of multiple straw purchases.78 And, large-scale straw 
+purchasing schemes were at the center of several ATF Phoenix-based gun trafficking 
+investigations, including Operation Fast and Furious. Contributing to the controversy surrounding 
+Operation Fast and Furious, reportedly, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Arizona was reluctant to 
+prosecute straw purchasing cases, even though ATF conducted several investigations involving 
+dozens of firearms and multiple defendants from 2006 through 2010.79 Some of this reluctance to 
+prosecute referred cases may have stemmed from legal interpretations (and underlying case law) 
+made by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Arizona that “differed substantially from those of other 
+U.S. Attorney’s Offices.”80 Other considerations could have included allocation of scarce 
+resources and prosecutorial priorities. Nonetheless, as shown above, federal prosecutions for 
+straw purchasing and related offenses nationally appears to have fallen off significantly in recent 
+years, despite congressional efforts to increase ATF appropriations to combat gun trafficking. 
+
+In addition, at a hearing on Operation Fast and Furious, an ATF agent testified that the penalties 
+levied under current law are not harsh enough to deter gun trafficking to Mexican drug trafficking 
+organizations.81 He opined that the “statute doesn’t carry significant jail time,” and that straw 
+purchases were viewed as “paperwork violations.”82 To explore this assertion, CRS requested 
+criminal caseload data from the U.S. Attorneys Office for 18 U.S.C. §§922(a)(6) and 
+924(a)(1)(A) for FY2004 through FY2010. It is noteworthy, however, that the criminal cases 
+under these provisions include violations involving false identities and entries, in addition to 
+straw purchases. 
+
+ 
+
+74 18 U.S.C. §922(a)(5). 
+75 18 U.S.C. §924 (a)(1)(D). 
+76 18 U.S.C. §554. 
+77 Ibid. 
+78 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico 
+Face Planning and Coordination Challenges , GAO-09-709, June 29, 2009, p. 21. 
+79 U.S. Congress, Fatally Flawed: Five Years of Gunwalking in Arizona , House Committee on Oversight and 
+Government Reform, Minority Staff Report, 112th Cong., 2nd Sess., January 2012, p. 72, http://www.scribd.com/doc/
+79930290/%E2%80%9CFatally-Flawed-Five-Years-of-Gunwalking-in-Arizona-%E2%80%9D?tw_p=twt. 
+See also Colby Goodman and Michel Marizco, U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico: New Data and Insights Illuminate 
+Key Trends and Challenges , Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute and University of San 
+Diego Trans-Border Institute, September 2010, p. 29. 
+80 Ibid. 
+81 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Operation Fast and Furious: Reckless 
+Decisions, Tragic Outcomes , 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2012, p. 120. 
+82 Ibid. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 20 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+As Figure 1 shows, nationally, the defendants charged under §922(a)(6) declined from 459 for 
+FY2004 to 218 for FY2010, or by about half (-52.5%). Similarly, defendants convicted under 
+§922(a)(6) declined by more than half (-58.6%) for those years, even though they increased from 
+FY2007 to FY2008 (17.3%). The defendants charged under §924(a)(1)(A) also declined from 290 
+for FY2004 to 2009 for FY2010, but at a slower rate of change (-27.9%). Convictions under that 
+provision also declined through FY2008 (-22.3%), but increased for FY2009 (18.7%) and 
+FY2010 (2.4%). Under either provision, about two-thirds of defendants were convicted during 
+FY2004 through FY2010 cumulatively. 
+
+ Figure 1. Federal Defendants Charged and Convicted Nationally under 18 U.S.C. 
+
+ §§922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(A) 
+
+FY2004-FY2010 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: Data from U.S. Attorney’s Office. Figure created by CRS. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 21 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 2. Federal Sentences Imposed Nationally under 
+
+ 18 U.S.C. §§922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(A) 
+
+FY2004-FY2010 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: Data from U.S. Attorney’s Office. Figure created by CRS. 
+
+As Figure 2 shows, moreover, over a third of the individuals convicted under either provision 
+received no prison sentence. Over a third received a prison sentence of up to two years. The 
+remainder received prison sentences of greater than two years. Several individuals received life 
+sentences, but those individuals were likely career criminals who were convicted of additional 
+offenses. 
+
+ Firearms-Related Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 
+
+To provide federal judges and prosecutors with greater leverage, on January 19, 2011, the U.S. 
+Sentencing Commission (Commission) published proposed amendments to the sentencing 
+guidelines that potentially increase penalties under the GCA for cases involving cross-border 
+trafficking in small arms or ammunition, including straw purchases, and similar amendments to 
+the Arms Export Control Act (AECA; 22 U.S.C. §2778 et seq.).83 While the GCA amendments to 
+the Sentencing Guidelines Manual became effective on November 1, 2011, the Commission did 
+not adopt the AECA amendments. According to an April 6, 2011, press release, the Commission’s 
+chair, Judge Patty B. Saris, stated, “Firearms trafficking across our borders is a national security 
+issue. The Commission is aware of the view [shared] by some that firearms trafficking is fueling 
+drug violence along our southwest border.”84 
+
+ 
+
+83 United States Sentencing Commission, “Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts ,” 76 Federal Register 3193, 
+January 19, 2011. See also, CRS Report R41696, How the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Work: An Overview , by 
+Charles Doyle. 
+84 United States Sentencing Commission, “U.S. Sentencing Commission Promulgates Permanent Amendment to the 
+Federal Sentencing Guidelines Covering Crack Cocaine, Other Drug Trafficking Offenses; Also promulgates 
+amendments regarding firearms and other offenses,” press release, April 6, 2011. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 22 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act 
+
+After seven years of extensive public debate, Congress passed the Brady Handgun Violence 
+Prevention Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-159, the Brady Act)85 as an amendment to the Gun Control Act 
+of 1968, requiring background checks for firearms transfers between FFLs and non-licensed 
+persons. The Brady Act included both interim and permanent provisions. 
+
+ Interim Provisions 
+
+Under the interim provisions, which were in effect through November 1998, background checks 
+were required for handgun transfers, and licensed firearms dealers were required to contact local 
+chief law enforcement officers (CLEOs) to determine the eligibility of prospective customers to 
+be transferred a handgun. The CLEOs were given up to five business days to make such 
+eligibility determinations. Under the interim provisions, 12.7 million firearms background checks 
+(for handguns) were completed during that four-year period, resulting in 312,000 denials. 
+
+ Permanent Provisions 
+
+On November 30, 1998, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activated the National Instant 
+Criminal Background Check System (NICS) to facilitate firearms-related background checks, 
+when the permanent provisions of the Brady Act became effective. Through NICS, FFLs conduct 
+background checks on non-licensee applicants for both handgun and long gun transfers. The 
+objective of a Brady background check is to ensure that an unlicensed transferee is not a 
+prohibited person under the GCA. It is notable that federal firearms laws serve as the minimum 
+standard in the United States. States may choose, and have chosen, to regulate firearms more 
+strictly. For example, some states require set waiting periods and/or licenses for firearms transfers 
+and possession. 
+
+As part of a Brady background check, an FFL is required to submit a prospective firearm 
+transferee’s name, sex, race, date of birth, and state of residence through NICS. Social security 
+numbers and other numeric identifiers are optional, but the submission of such data is likely to 
+increase the timeliness of the background check (and reduce misidentifications).86 The 
+transferee’s information is crosschecked against three computerized databases/systems to 
+determine firearms transfer/possession eligibility. Those systems include the NICS index, 
+Interstate Identification Index (III), and National Crime Information Center (NCIC).87 If the 
+transferee indicates that he is foreign born, his information is also checked against the 
+immigration and naturalization databases maintained by the Department of Homeland Security, 
+Immigration and Customs Enforcement.88 
+
+ 
+
+85 107 Stat. 1536, November 30, 1993. 
+86 Querying Records in the System, 28 C.F.R. §25.7. 
+87 Accessing Records in the System, 28 C.F.R. §25.6. 
+88 Those databases include the Central Index System (CIS), Computer Linked Application Information Management 
+System (CLAIMS), Deportable Alien Control System (DACS), National Automated Immigration Lookout System 
+(NAIL II), Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS), Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), 
+Redesigned Naturalization Casework System (RNACS), Refugee, Asylum, and Parole System (RAPS), Enforcement 
+Case Tracking System (ENFORCE), and the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 23 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+According to the FBI, the NICS index contains disqualifying records not found in either the III or 
+NCIC on all the classes of prohibited persons enumerated in the GCA. It also includes records on 
+persons previously denied firearms transfers. As of May 2010, the NICS index included a little 
+over 6 million records.89 The III, or “Triple I,” is a computerized criminal history index pointer 
+system that the FBI maintains so that records on persons arrested and convicted of felonies and 
+serious misdemeanors at either the federal or state level can be shared nationally. All 50 states and 
+the District of Columbia participate in the III, and the system holds indices to nearly 70 million 
+criminal history records.90 The NCIC includes files on information that is of immediate 
+importance and applicability to law enforcement officials. Several NCIC files include over 4.4 
+million records on potentially prohibited persons. Hence, those files are pertinent to the Brady 
+background check process. They include files on 
+
+• wanted persons (fugitives), 
+• persons subject to domestic abuse restraining orders, 
+• deported alien felons, 
+• persons in the U.S. Secret Service protective file, 
+• foreign fugitives, and 
+• known or suspected terrorists. 
+
+While the FBI handles background checks entirely for some states, other states serve as full or 
+partial points of contact (POCs) for background check purposes. In POC states, FFLs contact a 
+state agency, and the state agency contacts the FBI for such checks.91 
+
+As part of the Brady background check process, NICS will respond to an FFL or state official 
+with a NICS Transaction Number (NTN) and one of three outcomes: (1) “proceed” with transfer 
+or permit/license issuance, because a prohibiting record was not found; (2) “denied,” indicating a 
+prohibiting record was found; or (3) “delayed,” indicating that the system produced information 
+that suggested there could be a prohibiting record. Under the last outcome, a firearms transfer 
+may be “delayed” for up to three business days while NICS examiners attempt to ascertain 
+whether the person is prohibited.92 At the end of the three-day period, an FFL may proceed with 
+the transfer at his discretion if he has not heard from the FBI about the matter. The FBI, 
+meanwhile, will continue to work the NICS adjudication for up to 90 days, during which the 
+transaction is considered to be in an “open” status. If the FBI ascertains that the person is not in a 
+ 
+
+89 U.S. Department of Justice, Report to Congress Pursuant to the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (P.L. 
+110-180) , July 1, 2010, Appendix C. 
+90 Ibid., Appendix A. 
+91 In 13 states, state agencies serve as full POCs and conduct background checks for both long gun and handgun 
+transfers. In four states, state agencies serve as partial POCs for handgun permits, whereas in another four states, state 
+agencies serve as partial POCs for handgun transfers only. In these eight partial POC states, checks for long gun 
+transfers are conducted entirely through the FBI. In the 30 non-POC states, the District of Columbia, and five territories 
+(Guam, American Samoa, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands), FFLs contact the FBI 
+directly to conduct background checks through NICS for both handgun and long gun transfers. For state agencies 
+(POCs), background checks may not be as expeditious, but they may be more thorough because state agencies may 
+have greater access to databases and records that are not available through NICS. According to the Government 
+Accountability Office (GAO), this is particularly true for domestic violence misdemeanor offenses and protective 
+orders. For further information, see GAO, Gun Control: Opportunities to Close Loopholes in the National Instant 
+Criminal Background Check System , GAO-02-720, July 2002, p. 27. 
+92 Accessing Records in the System, 28 C.F.R. §25.6. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 24 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+prohibited status at any time during the 90 days, then the FBI will contact the FFL through NICS 
+with a proceed response. If the person is subsequently found to be prohibited, the FBI will inform 
+ATF and a firearms retrieval process will be initiated. 
+
+Under no circumstances is an FFL informed about the prohibiting factor upon which a denial is 
+based.93 Under the Brady background check process, however, a denied person may challenge the 
+accuracy of the underlying record(s) upon which his denial is based.94 He would initiate this 
+process by requesting (usually in writing) the reason for the denial from the agency that 
+conducted the NICS check (the FBI or POC). The denying agency has five business days to 
+respond to the request. Upon receipt of the reason and underlying record for the denial, the denied 
+person may challenge the accuracy of that record. If the record is found to be inaccurate, the 
+denying agency is legally obligated to correct that record.95 
+
+As with other screening systems, particularly those that are name-based, false positives occur as a 
+result of Brady background checks, but the frequency of these misidentifications is unreported. 
+Nevertheless, the FBI has taken steps to mitigate false positives. In July 2004, DOJ issued a 
+regulation that established the NICS Voluntary Appeal File (VAF), which is part of the NICS 
+Index (described above).96 DOJ was prompted to establish the VAF to minimize the 
+inconvenience incurred by some prospective firearms transferees (purchasers) who have names or 
+birth dates similar to those of prohibited persons. So as not to be misidentified in the future, these 
+persons agree to authorize the FBI to maintain personally identifying information about them in 
+the VAF as a means to avoid future delayed transfers. Current law requires that NICS records on 
+approved firearm transfers, particularly information personally identifying the transferee, be 
+destroyed within 24 hours (see heading below, “Background Check Fee and Record Retention”). 
+
+Under the GCA, there is also a provision that allows the Attorney General (previously, the 
+Secretary of the Treasury) to consider petitions from a prohibited person for “relief from 
+disabilities” and have his firearms transfer and possession eligibility restored.97 Since FY1993, 
+however, a rider on the ATF annual appropriations for salaries and expenses has prohibited the 
+expenditure of any funding provided under that account on processing such petitions.98 While a 
+prohibited person arguably could petition the Attorney General, bypassing ATF, such an 
+alternative has never been successfully tested. As a result, the only way a person can reacquire his 
+lost firearms eligibility is to have his civil rights restored or disqualifying criminal record(s) 
+expunged or set aside, or to be pardoned for his crime. 
+
+ 
+
+93 Statement of Daniel D. Roberts, Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Information Services, Federal Bureau of 
+Investigation, Terrorists and Guns: The Nature of the Threat and Proposed Reforms: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
+Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs , 111th Cong., May 5, 2010. 
+94 Correction of Erroneous System Information, 28 C.F.R. §25.10. 
+95 Ibid. 
+96 Final Rule, National Instant Criminal Background Check System Regulation, 69 Federal Register 43892 (July 23, 
+2004) (codified at 28 C.F.R. §25.10(g)). 
+97 18 U.S.C. §925(c). See also Relief from Disabilities Under the Act, 27 C.F.R. §478.144. 
+98 For FY1993, see P.L. 102-393; 106 Stat. 1732 (1992). For FY2012, see P.L. 112-55; 125 Stat. 552, 609 (November 
+18, 2011). The FY2012 limitation provides: “That none of the funds appropriated herein shall be available to 
+investigate or act upon applications for relief from Federal firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. 925(c).” 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 25 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Table 4. Brady Background Checks for Firearms Transfers and Permits 
+
+1998-2009 
+
+ Total Annual 
+
+ S&L 
+
+ POC 
+
+ Year 
+
+ Checks Denials 
+
+ FBI 
+
+ Checks 
+
+ Checks FBI 
+
+ Denialsa 
+
+ Denialsb 
+
+1998 893,127 
+
+18,647 
+
+507,000 
+
+386,127 
+
+8,836 
+
+9,811 
+
+1999 8,621,315 204,455 
+
+4,538,000 
+
+4,083,315 81,000 
+
+123,455 
+
+2000 7,698,643 153,087 
+
+4,260,270 
+
+3,438,373 66,808 86,279 
+
+2001 7,957,926 150,500 
+
+4,291,926 
+
+3,666,000 64,500 86,000 
+
+2002 7,805,792 135,973 
+
+4,248,893 
+
+3,556,899 60,739 75,234 
+
+2003 7,831,146 126,181 
+
+4,462,801 
+
+3,368,345 61,170 65,011 
+
+2004 8,083,809 125,842 
+
+4,685,018 
+
+3,398,791 63,675 62,167 
+
+2005 8,277,873 131,916 
+
+4,952,639 
+
+3,325,234 66,705 65,211 
+
+2006 8,612,201 134,442 
+
+5,262,752 
+
+3,349,449 69,930 64,512 
+
+2007 8,658,245 135,817 
+
+5,136,883 
+
+3,521,362 66,817 69,000 
+
+2008 9,900,711 147,080 
+
+5,813,249 
+
+4,087,462 70,725 76,355 
+
+2009 10,764,237 150,013 
+
+4,680,809 
+
+4,987,459 67,324 82,689 
+
+Total 95,105,025 
+
+1,613,953 
+
+54,242,859 
+
+40,862,166 748,229 865,724 
+
+ Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, available at 
+http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=13. 
+
+ Notes: On November 30, 1998, the interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (P.L. 
+
+103-159) ended, and the permanent provisions were implemented when the FBI stood up the National Instant 
+Criminal Background Check System (NICS). 
+
+a. In non-point of contact (non-POC) states, federal firearms licensees contact the FBI directly to conduct 
+
+NICS background checks. 
+
+b. In point of contact (POC) states, federal firearms licenses contact a state agency and, in turn, the state 
+
+agency contacts the FBI to conduct NICS background checks. 
+
+As shown in Table 4 , under the permanent provisions of the Brady Act (December 1998 through 
+2009), more than 95.1 million checks were completed, resulting in more than 1.6 million denials, 
+or nearly a 1.7% denial rate. More than 54.2 million of these checks were completed entirely by 
+the FBI for non-point of contact (non-POC) states, the District of Columbia, and four territories. 
+Those checks resulted in a denial rate of nearly 1.4%. Nearly 40.9 million checks were conducted 
+by full or partial point of contact (POC) states.99 Those checks resulted in a higher denial rate of 
+2.1%. Table 5 shows breakouts for NICS denials by reasons and by denying agency. 
+
+ 
+
+99 Ibid. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 26 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Table 5. Estimated Brady Background Check Denials 
+
+(1999 through 2009) 
+
+ Total 
+
+ FBI 
+
+ State 
+
+ Local 
+
+ Reasons for denial 
+
+ Denials % Denials % Denials % Denials % 
+
+Felony 
+
+904,904 56.1 482,608 64.5 387,491
+
+52.8 34,806 26.4 
+
+indictment/conviction 
+
+State law prohibition 
+
+92,311 
+
+5.7 
+
+19,454 
+
+2.6 
+
+56,509
+
+7.7 
+
+16,348 
+
+12.4 
+
+Domestic violence 
+
+237,323 
+
+14.7 
+
+119,717 
+
+16.0 
+
+99,808
+
+13.6 
+
+17,798 
+
+13.5 
+
+Misdemeanor 
+
+176,210 10.9 86,795 11.6 74,122
+
+10.1 15,293 11.6 
+
+conviction 
+
+Restraining 
+
+order 61,113 3.8 32,922 4.4 25,686
+
+3.5 2,505 1.9 
+
+Fugitive 
+
+101,001 6.3 49,383 6.6 49,904
+
+6.8 1,714 1.3 
+
+Illegal 
+
+alien 
+
+13,322 0.8 9,727 1.3 2,936
+
+0.4 659 0.5 
+
+Mental illness or 
+
+28,637 1.8 4,489 0.6 18,347
+
+2.5 5,801 4.4 
+
+disability 
+
+Drug 
+
+user/addict 
+
+77,420 4.8 57,614 7.7 8,073
+
+1.1 11,734 8.9 
+
+Local law prohibition 
+
+6,724 
+
+0.4 
+
+0 
+
+ 
+
+0
+
+ 
+
+6,724 
+
+5.1 
+
+Other prohibitions 
+
+152,310 
+
+9.4 
+
+5,238 
+
+0.7 
+
+110,816
+
+15.1 
+
+36,256 
+
+27.5 
+
+Totalsa 1,613,953 
+
+100.0 
+
+748,229 
+
+100.0 
+
+733,884
+
+100.0 
+
+131,840 
+
+100.0 
+
+ Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Background Checks for 
+
+ Firearms Transfers, 2009—Statistical Tables , by Michael Bowling et al., available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
+index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2214. 
+
+a. Denials by reason subtotals are based upon percentages reported by BJS, which were applied to total 
+
+denials by the FBI and state and local officials. Consequently, denials by reason may not sum precisely to the 
+totals. 
+
+ National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP) 
+
+Under the Brady Act, Congress authorized a grant program known as the National Criminal 
+History Improvement Program (NCHIP), the initial goal of which was to improve electronic 
+access to firearms-related disqualifying records, particularly felony conviction records.100 DOJ’s 
+Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) administers this program, under which grants are made to states 
+to assist in updating and automating criminal history and other related records so that they are 
+able to participate effectively in key federal criminal justice systems.101 Besides the NICS Index, 
+III, and NCIC, these systems also include the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification 
+System (IAFIS) and the National Sex Offender Registry (NSOR).102 This grant program is 
+administered by BJS, which is part of the Office of Justice Programs. 
+
+ 
+
+100 For further information, see Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National 
+Criminal History Program (NCHIP): Improving Criminal History Records for Background Checks, 2005 , July 2006. 
+101 Ibid. 
+102 Ibid. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 27 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Table 6. NCHIP Appropriations, FY1995 though FY2012 
+
+(dollars in millions) 
+
+ Fiscal Year 
+
+ Appropriation 
+
+FY1995 100.000 
+
+FY1996 26.500 
+
+FY1997 51.750 
+
+FY1998 47.750 
+
+FY1999 45.000 
+
+FY2000 35.000 
+
+FY2001 35.000 
+
+FY2002 38.000 
+
+FY2003 42.721 
+
+FY2004 32.634 
+
+FY2005 27.577 
+
+FY2006 12.796 
+
+FY2007 12.805 
+
+FY2008 12.220 
+
+FY2009 13.000 
+
+FY2010 14.500 
+
+FY2011 9.500 
+
+FY2012 6.000 
+
+Total 562.753 
+
+ Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
+
+ Table 6 shows that over the last 18 years (FY1995-FY2012), Congress has appropriated nearly 
+$562.8 million for NCHIP, or an annual average of $31.3 million. Nevertheless, in 2007 
+congressional testimony following the April 16, 2007, Virginia Tech tragedy, DOJ reported that 
+approximately half of the 70 million criminal history records in the Interstate Identification Index 
+(III) were missing final dispositions—a circumstance that often results in delayed background 
+checks and firearms transfers.103 It was also reported that many states had not forwarded any 
+records on persons adjudicated mentally defective to the FBI. As of April 30, 2007, the FBI 
+reported that 22 states had contributed nearly 168,000 mental defective records to the FBI for 
+inclusion in the NICS index;104 however, other states had declined to report persons adjudicated 
+mentally defective to the FBI. In many cases, state mental health, patients’ rights, and privacy 
+laws prohibited the disclosure of those records.105 Other states may not have been able to report 
+ 
+
+103 Statement of Rachel L. Brand, Assistant Attorney General for Legal Policy, Department of Justice at the Committee 
+on Oversight and Government Reform Hearing on Lethal Loopholes in Gun Purchase Laws , May 10, 2007, p. 126. 
+104 Ibid, p. 138. 
+105 New York state, for example, had such a provision. See Section 33.13 of the Mental Health Law, which addresses 
+the rights of patients and confidentiality of mental health records. Since enactment of P.L. 110-180, however, the New 
+York State legislature addressed this issue and now provides mental defective records to the FBI for inclusion in the 
+NICS Index. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 28 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+such persons to the FBI because mental health “databanks” that would include such records are 
+not maintained.106 Following the Virginia Tech tragedy, the NICS mental defective file increased 
+from 175,000 to 400,000 individual records, with California contributing more than 200,000 of 
+those records.107 By May 2010, that number had increased to more than 859,000 records, due in 
+large part to NCIS Improvement Amendments Act (described below).108 However, about half of 
+the states had not contributed any records or had contributed only a handful of such records.109 
+
+For FY2012, the President’s budget request included $12.0 million for NCHIP. The House-
+reported FY2012 Commerce-Justice-Science (CJS) appropriations bill (H.R. 2596) would have 
+provided $6.0 million for NCHIP. The Senate-passed CJS appropriations bill (S. 1572) would 
+have provided $8.0 million for this program. S. 1572 was folded into the Senate-passed FY2012 
+Minibus appropriations bill (H.R. 2112). The House- and Senate-passed conference report version 
+of H.R. 2112 (H.Rept. 112-284), which the President has signed into law (P.L. 112-55), provides 
+$6.0 million for NCHIP. 
+
+For FY2013, the Senate-reported CJS appropriations bill (S. 2323) would provide $6 million for 
+NCHIP, the same amount as requested by the Administration. The House Committee on 
+Appropriations ordered reported a similar measure that would provide the same amount for 
+NCHIP. 
+
+ NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) 
+
+Under the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007,110 Congress authorized the Attorney 
+General to make additional grants to states to improve further electronic access to records, 
+including court disposition and corrections records, which are necessary to fully facilitate NICS 
+background checks. Under the act, the Attorney General is required to report annually to 
+Congress on federal department and agency compliance with the act’s provisions. Because BJS 
+administers this program, the BJS Director is required to report annually on the progress that 
+states are making in providing reasonable estimates of the number of firearms-related 
+disqualifying records that they have jurisdiction over, as well as the number of those records that 
+have been made accessible to the FBI for NICS background check purposes.111 BJS has 
+designated this grant program the “NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP),” although 
+congressional appropriations documents simply refer to it as “NICS improvement.” 
+
+As shown in Table 7 , Section 103(e) of the act included an authorization for appropriations for 
+FY2009 through FY2013. The act directs that the grants provided under this authorization be 
+made “in a manner consistent” with NCHIP. The act also requires that between 3% and 10% of 
+each grant be allocated for a relief from disabilities program for persons adjudicated mentally 
+
+ 
+
+106 Donna M. Norris, M.D. et al., “Firearms Laws, Patients, and the Roles of Psychiatrists,” American Journal of 
+Psychiatry, 163:8, August 2006, p. 1394. 
+107 Dan Eggen, “FBI’s Gun Ban Listing Swells: Thousands Added To File Marked ‘Mental Defective,’” Washington 
+Post , November 30, 2007, A01. 
+108 U.S. Department of Justice, Report to Congress Pursuant to Requirements of the NICS Improvement Amendments 
+Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-180) , July 1, 2010, Appendix C. Records Available in the NICS, as of May 10, 2010. 
+109 Ibid. 
+110 P.L. 110-180; January 8, 2008; 121 Stat. 2559. 
+111 See U.S. Department of Justice, Report to Congress Pursuant to the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 
+(P.L. 110-180) , July 1, 2010. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 29 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+defective. Also, as shown in Table 7 , Section 301(e) of the act included an additional 
+authorization for appropriations for the same fiscal years to improve state court computer systems 
+to improve timeliness of criminal history dispositions. Under both authorizations, up to 5% of all 
+grant funding may be set aside to provide assistance to tribal governments. 
+
+ Table 7. NICS Improvement Authorizations and Appropriations under P.L. 110-180 
+
+(dollars in millions) 
+
+ Fiscal Year 
+
+ Section 103(e) 
+
+ Section 301(e) 
+
+ Actual Appropriation 
+
+FY2009 125 
+
+62.5 10.000 
+
+FY2010 250 
+
+125.0 20.000 
+
+FY2011 250 
+
+125.0 16.567 
+
+FY2012 125 
+
+62.5 5.000 
+
+FY2013 125 
+
+62.5 
+
+ 
+
+Total 875 437.5 51.567 
+
+As an additional incentive, Section 102 of P.L. 110-180 also provides that on January 8, 2011, any 
+state that provides at least 90% of disqualifying records is eligible for a waiver of the 10% match 
+requirement under NCHIP for two years.112 To be eligible for the waiver, as well as Section 103 
+grants, states are required to provide BJS with a reasonable estimate of the number of NICS-
+related disqualifying records that they hold within 180 days of enactment (July 6, 2008). 
+
+To further encourage compliance, Section 104 of P.L. 110-180 includes a schedule of 
+discretionary and mandatory reductions in Byrne Justice Assistance Grants (JAGs)113 for states 
+that do not provide certain percentages of disqualifying records: 
+
+• for a two-year period (January 8, 2011, through January 8, 2013), the Attorney 
+
+General may withhold up to 3% of JAG funding from any state that provides less 
+than 50% of disqualifying records; 
+
+• for a five-year period (January 8, 2013, through January 8, 2018), the Attorney 
+
+General may withhold up to 4% of JAG funding from any state that provides less 
+than 70% of disqualifying records; and 
+
+• after January 8, 2018, the Attorney General is required to withhold 5% of JAG 
+
+funding from any state that provides less than 90% of disqualifying records. 
+
+The Attorney General’s assessments of a state’s progress is to be based upon the reasonable 
+estimates that the state itself is required to provide under the act for the purposes of implementing 
+the Section 103 grants and the Section 102 NCHIP waiver (discussed above).114 The act also 
+ 
+
+112 For FY2005-FY2010, BJS invoked its discretionary authority to increase the match requirement to 20%. For 
+FY2011, BJS reportedly reduced the match requirement to 10%, the percentage match requirement set out under the 
+Crime Identification Technology Act (CITA; P.L. 105-251); CRS conversation with BJS on March 7, 2011. 
+113 For further information, see CRS Report RS22416, Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) 
+Program , by Nathan James. 
+114 As of July 1, 2010, 41 states and 1 territory had provided estimates to DOJ. As of December 31, 2009, 68 federal 
+departments or agencies had also responded to a DOJ survey related to their obligations under P.L. 110-180. Twenty-
+two reported possessing no disqualifying information. Twenty-three reported possessing secondary disqualifying 
+information (e.g., employment background check investigative results). Ten agencies claimed to create and possess 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 30 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+allows the Attorney General to waive the mandatory 5% cuts if a state provides substantial 
+evidence that it is making reasonable compliance efforts. 
+
+Congress appropriated $10 million for NARIP in FY2009 and $20 million in FY2010. These 
+amounts were well below the authorized levels in P.L. 110-180. In FY2009, BJS awarded $2.5 
+million in NARIP grants to the following grantees (individual amounts in parentheses): 
+
+• Nevada Department of Public Safety ($798,000), 
+• New York Division of Criminal Justice Services ($937,000), and 
+• Oregon State Police ($771,000).115 
+
+In FY2010, BJS awarded $16.9 million in NARIP grants to the following grantees (individual 
+amounts in parentheses): 
+
+• Florida Department of Law Enforcement ($3.159 million), 
+• Idaho State Police ($1.950 million), 
+• Illinois State Police ($1.210 million), 
+• New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts ($860,000), 
+• New York Division of Criminal Justice Services ($5.995 million), 
+• Oregon State Police ($2.0 million), 
+• Texas Department of Public Safety ($752,000), and 
+• Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance ($981,000).116 
+
+In FY2011, BJS awarded $20.1 million in NARIP grants to the following grantees (individual 
+amounts in parentheses): 
+
+• Arizona Criminal Justice Commission ($582,930); 
+• Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, the Judicial Branch, and the 
+
+Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services ($3.250 million); 
+
+• Florida Department of Law Enforcement ($2.575 million); 
+• Idaho State Police and the Idaho courts system ($1.206 million); 
+• Kentucky Justice and Public Safety Cabinet ($1.390 million); 
+• New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts ($2.773 million); 
+• New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services ($3.199 million); 
+
+ 
+(...continued) 
+disqualifying information. And, ATF was reviewing those claims to determine whether that information was relevant to 
+a NICS background check. Fourteen agencies needed further clarification from DOJ. See U.S. Department of Justice, 
+ Report to Congress Pursuant to the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-180) , July 1, 2010, pp. 5-6. 
+115 U.S. Department of Justice, Report to Congress Pursuant to Requirements of the NICS Improvement Amendment 
+Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-180) , July 1, 2010, p. 10. 
+116 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, “NICS Improvement 
+Amendments Act of 2007,” http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=49. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 31 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+• North Dakota Office of Attorney General’s Bureau of Criminal Investigation and 
+
+Information Technology divisions ($205,973); 
+
+• Oregon State Police ($1.131 million); 
+• Texas Office of Court Administration ($547,039); 
+• Virginia State Police (VSP) and Supreme Court of Virginia ($764,100); and 
+• Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance, Department of Justice, Department of 
+
+Corrections, and Administrative Office of the Courts ($2.500 million).117 
+
+To be eligible for NARIP grants, states must certify that they have established a relief from 
+disabilities program for persons adjudicated to be mentally defective, whereby they can petition 
+to have their gun rights restored. For FY2009, only 14 states submitted certification applications 
+and only three were certified (Nevada, New York, and Oregon) and awarded grants. DOJ 
+suggested that one factor that might have inhibited states from applying for NARIP grants is 
+opposition at the state level to restoring firearm rights under any circumstance.118 Another factor 
+that might have influenced a state’s choice is that NARIP funding only became available in 
+March 2009, leaving little time to respond to the June 22, 2009, certification deadline.119 Other 
+factors included budget constraints and the need to pass implementing legislation.120 As shown 
+above, eight states were awarded grants for FY2010. As of September 30, 2010, nine states had 
+been certified.121 
+
+For FY2012, the President’s budget request included $12.0 million for this program. The House-
+reported FY2012 CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 2596) would have provided $5.0 million 
+for NARIP. The Senate-passed FY2012 CJS appropriations bill (S. 1572) would have provided 
+$10.0 million for this program. S. 1572 was folded into the Senate-passed FY2012 Minibus 
+appropriations bill (H.R. 2112). The House- and Senate-passed conference report version of H.R. 
+2112 (H.Rept. 112-284), which the President has signed into law (P.L. 112-55), provides $5.0 
+million for NARIP. 
+
+For FY2013, the Senate-reported CJS appropriations bill would provide $7.0 million for NARIP, 
+or $2.0 million over the $5.0 million requested by the Administration. The House Committee on 
+Appropriations ordered reported a similar measure that would provide $12.0 million for NARIP. 
+
+ Background Check Fee and Record Retention 
+
+Beginning in FY1999, Congress has prohibited the collection of any fee for firearms-related 
+background checks made through the FBI-administered NICS in DOJ appropriations.122 
+
+ 
+
+117 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, “State-by-State Summaries for 
+FY2011 NICS Improvement Amendments Act Grant Awards,” http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=
+491#funding. 
+118 U.S. Department of Justice, Report to Congress Pursuant to the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (P.L. 
+110-180) , July 1, 2010, p. 12. 
+119 Ibid. 
+120 Ibid. 
+121 CRS conversation with BJS on March 7, 2011. 
+122 In the 110th Congress, the House-passed H.R. 2640 and Senate-reported S. 2084 include provisions that would 
+permanently codify the NICS fee prohibition (see discussion of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 32 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+Beginning in FY2004, that provision also included language to require the next-day destruction of 
+approved background check records. The issue of approved Brady background check record 
+retention has been contentious since the inception of the FBI-administered NICS, because a 
+provision in the Brady Act (§103(i)) prohibits the establishment of any electronic registry of 
+firearms, firearms owners, or approved firearms transactions and dispositions. 
+
+Nevertheless, under Attorney General Janet Reno DOJ proposed a rule on October 30, 1998, that 
+would have allowed such records to be maintained for up to six months for audit purposes.123 The 
+NRA challenged this proposed rule in federal court, arguing that retaining the approved records 
+was tantamount to a temporary registry. On July 11, 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for 
+the District of Columbia found that nothing in the Brady Act prohibited the temporary retention 
+of information about lawful firearms transfers for certain audit purposes.124 On January 22, 2001, 
+DOJ promulgated a final rule that allowed such records to be maintained for up to 90 days.125 
+Attorney General John Ashcroft opposed this rule, however, and DOJ proposed another rule on 
+July 6, 2001, that called for the next-day destruction of those files.126 
+
+In July 2002, meanwhile, GAO reported that under Attorney General Reno, the FBI had 
+conducted “non-routine” searches of the NICS audit log for law enforcement agencies to 
+determine whether a person, whom subsequent information showed was a prohibited person, had 
+been transferred a firearm within the previous 90 days. The FBI informed GAO that such 
+searches were routinely conducted but were a “secondary benefit” given that the audit log was 
+maintained primarily to check for system “accuracy, privacy, and performance.” In addition, 
+GAO reported that the next-day destruction of records would “adversely affect” other NICS 
+operations, including firearms-retrieval actions, NICS audit log checks for previous background 
+checks, verifications of NICS determinations for federal firearms licensees, and ATF inspections 
+of federal firearms licensees’ record keeping.127 
+
+Despite those adverse affects, opponents of greater federal gun control viewed the non-routine 
+use of NICS records as being beyond the scope of authority given to the Attorney General under 
+the Brady Act. GAO reported that DOJ took steps to minimize the adverse affects of the next-day 
+destruction of those records. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, additional 
+issues regarding Brady background checks emerged (see heading below, “Terrorist Watch List 
+Screening and Brady Background Checks”). 
+
+The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 (H.R. 2112), which the 
+President has signed into law (P.L. 112-55), includes “futurity” language in the provision (§511) 
+requiring that NICS approved firearm transfer records be destroyed within 24 hours. This 
+“futurity” language makes the provision permanent law, as opposed to an annual appropriations 
+restriction. Similar language was included in the House-reported FY2012 CJS appropriations bill 
+
+ 
+(...continued) 
+above). For FY2012, such a prohibition is also included on an annual basis in the House-reported Commerce, Justice, 
+Science Appropriations bill (H.R. 2596). 
+123 63 Federal Register 58303. 
+124 NRA v. Reno (No. 99-5270, 216 F. 3d 122; 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 15906). 
+125 66 Federal Register 6470. 
+126 66 Federal Register 35567. 
+127 For further information on these issues, see GAO, Gun Control: Potential Effects of Next-Day Destruction of NICS 
+Background Check Records , GAO-02-653, July 2002. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 33 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+(H.R. 2596). Senator Orrin Hatch offered several related amendments during Senate 
+consideration of H.R. 2112, but the Senate ultimately did not vote upon those amendments. 
+
+ Overview of Legislative Action in the 111th Congress 
+
+During the 111th Congress, the gun control debate was colored by two key Supreme Court 
+decisions.128 In District of Columbia v. Heller , the Court found that the District of Columbia (DC) 
+handgun ban, among other regulations, violated an individual’s right under the Second 
+Amendment to lawfully possess a firearm in his home for self-defense. In McDonald v. City of 
+Chicago , the Court found that an individual’s right to lawfully possess a firearm for the purposes 
+of self-defense under the Second Amendment applied to the states by way of the Fourteenth 
+Amendment. Although the decision arguably limits a state’s, city’s, or local government’s ability 
+to prohibit handguns outright, it does not precisely delineate what would constitute permissible 
+gun control laws under the Second Amendment. Consequently, these delineations will likely be 
+developed in future cases. 
+
+In the 111th Congress, Members revisited several gun control issues that were previously 
+considered in the 110th Congress. For example, some Members in the House of Representatives, 
+who were dissatisfied with the District’s response to the Heller decision, passed a bill in the 110th 
+Congress that would have overturned provisions of the District’s revised gun laws. In the 111th 
+Congress, Members of the Senate amended and passed a DC voting rights bill (S. 160) with 
+similar language.129 When the House turned its attention to DC voting rights, the leadership 
+attempted to negotiate a compromise but ultimately tabled its version of the DC voting rights bill 
+(H.R. 157) rather than risk amendments to overturn DC guns laws. The DC gun amendments 
+were introduced as stand-alone bills (H.R. 5162/S. 3265). So far, the 112th Congress has not 
+revisited this issue. 
+
+In the 111th Congress, the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee reported stand-alone legislation 
+that would have revamped procedures by which veterans are adjudicated “mentally incompetent” 
+and, thus, lose their firearms possession and transfer eligibility (S. 669). This reported bill 
+reflected an amendment that Senator Richard Burr had offered and the Senate committee had 
+adopted in the 110th Congress during consideration of S. 2969. Also in the 111th Congress, the 
+House Veterans’ Affairs Committee considered a draft veterans’ benefits bill and adopted an 
+amendment offered by Representative John Boozman that included similar provisions. However, 
+when the House considered the reported bill (H.R. 6132) under suspension of the rules, it was 
+called to the floor without the Boozman provisions. As discussed below, this issue has reemerged 
+in the 112th Congress, when the House passed similar legislation (H.R. 2349). 
+
+In the 111th Congress, the Senate also considered an amendment offered by Senator John Thune to 
+the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (S. 1390) that was narrowly defeated and arguably would 
+have provided for national reciprocity between states regarding the concealed carry of firearms. 
+In the 112th Congress, the House has passed similar legislation (H.R. 822). In addition, the Senate 
+Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held a hearing on denying firearms 
+to persons watch-listed as known or suspected terrorists (S. 1317/H.R. 2159 and S. 2820). The 
+ 
+
+128 For a legal analysis, see CRS Report R41750, The Second Amendment: An Overview of District of Columbia v. 
+Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago , by Vivian S. Chu. 
+129 For further information, see CRS Report R40474, DC Gun Laws and Proposed Amendments , by Vivian S. Chu. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 34 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+112th Congress revisited related issues during consideration of legislation to reauthorize the USA 
+PATRIOT Act (H.R. 1800, S. 1038, and S. 990). 
+
+Several other legislative issues were considered in the 111th Congress that might remerge in the 
+112th Congress. For example, the House Financial Services Committee reported a bill (H.R. 3045; 
+H.Rept. 111-277) that included a provision that would have prohibited public housing authorities 
+from barring tenants from possessing legal firearms as a condition of their lease. This committee 
+approved another housing bill that included a similar provision (H.R. 4868). The House also 
+passed amendments (H.R. 5827) to federal bankruptcy law that would have allowed persons to 
+claim either a single firearm or a collection of firearms of up to $3,000 in value as a federal 
+exemption.130 And, on at least two occasions, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary scheduled a 
+hearing on a bill to reform federal statutes under which federally licensed firearms dealers are 
+regulated (S. 941/H.R. 2296). 
+
+In the 111th Congress, Members sponsored several proposals that were enacted. The Senate 
+adopted an amendment offered by Senator Tom Coburn to the Credit CARD Act of 2009 (H.R. 
+627) to allow people to carry firearms in national parks and wildlife refuges.131 The House voted 
+on the Coburn amendment as a separate measure and passed it as well (P.L. 111-24). The Senate 
+adopted an amendment offered by Senator Roger Wicker to the FY2010 Transportation-HUD 
+appropriations bill (H.R. 3288) that allows private persons to carry firearms in their checked 
+luggage on Amtrak trains. H.R. 3288 became the vehicle for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
+2010 (P.L. 111-117), which included the Wicker provision. Congress reconsidered and passed 
+amendments to the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA; P.L. 108-277) to clarify and 
+widen eligibility for certain qualified police officers to carry concealed firearms across state lines 
+(S. 1132; P.L. 111-272). Congress altered, but continued to make permanent, a funding limitation 
+on the release of ATF firearms trace data (P.L. 111-8 and P.L. 111-117), which is known for its 
+original sponsor, Representative Todd Tiahrt. 
+
+In addition, two firearms-related provisions were included in the Ike Skelton National Defense 
+Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (P.L. 111-383). One provision (§1062), sponsored by 
+Senator Jim Inhofe, prohibits the Secretary of Defense, and by implication base commanders, 
+from collecting any information on privately owned firearms kept by military personnel, 
+Department of Defense civilian employees, and their family members off-base. Another provision 
+(§346) sponsored by Senators Jon Tester and Max Baucus addresses the demilitarization of small 
+arms ammunition of several types and calibers, which is commonly sold as military surplus. 
+
+For the 111th Congress, gun trafficking across the Southwest border from the United States to 
+Mexico was also an ongoing concern, as it has been for the 112th Congress.132 The Consolidated 
+Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117), included increased funding for ATF to investigate 
+
+ 
+
+130 For further information, see CRS Report R41799, Exemptions for Firearms in Bankruptcy , by Carol A. Pettit and 
+Vastine D. Platte. 
+131 Regarding public lands, the 112th Congress might consider additional proposals related to firearms carrying on 
+public lands, such as water resources management projects (e.g., reservoirs at Corps-operated dams and inland 
+waterways) managed by the Army Corps of Engineers or federal lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management 
+(BLM). For related proposals in the 112th Congress, see the Recreational Self-Defense Act of 2011 (H.R. 1865/S. 1588) 
+and the Recreational Shooting Act (H.R. 3440 and H.R. 4089). As described below, the House passed H.R. 4089 on 
+April 17, 2012. 
+132 For further information, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border , by Vivian S. Chu and 
+William J. Krouse. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 35 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+additional gun trafficking cases.133 In addition, Congress provided ATF with an FY2010 
+supplemental appropriation to combat further Southwest border gun trafficking (P.L. 111-230). 
+For a fuller discussion of legislative action in the 111th Congress, see Appendix A . 
+
+ Emerging Issues in the 112th Congress 
+
+In the wake of the Aurora, CO, theater mass shooting, it is likely that there will be calls in the 
+112th Congress to reconsider a 1994 ban on semiautomatic assault weapons and the large capacity 
+ammunition feeding devices that expired in September 2004. There were similar calls to ban such 
+feeding devices (see S. 436/H.R. 1781) following the January 8, 2011, Tucson, AZ, mass 
+shooting. Notwithstanding Aurora, the 112th Congress has seen considerable attention paid to ATF 
+Southwest border gun trafficking operation. Revelations about ATF’s conduct of a Phoenix, AZ-
+based Project Gunrunner investigation known as “Operation Fast and Furious” were the impetus 
+for this language. The Attorney General has been questioned during several congressional 
+hearings about who among the departmental officials conceived of, knew about, and/or approved 
+this operation. It has led to the resignation of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona. The 
+House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform has held several hearings specifically 
+on matters related to this operation. When the President asserted executive privilege rather than 
+turn over additional, subpoenaed documents to the committee, the House passed a resolution 
+holding the Attorney General in contempt of Congress for his failure to produce subpoenaed 
+documents. 
+
+Several other gun control issues have emerged in the 112th Congress. For example, the House 
+passed a bill (H.R. 822) that would establish greater reciprocity between states with firearms 
+concealed carry statutes. The House also passed a Veterans Benefits bill (H.R. 2349) that would 
+prohibit the Department of Veterans Affairs from making mentally incompetent determinations 
+about beneficiaries for the purposes of gun control, unless such determinations were made by a 
+judge, magistrate, or other judicial authority. Firearms-related amendments were also offered to 
+bills that extended an expiring USA PATRIOT Act provision related to national security 
+investigations and FBI access to business records. 
+
+ July 20, 2012, Aurora, CO 
+
+On July 20, 2012, a 24-year-old male entered a theater in Aurora, CO, and allegedly shot to death 
+12 people and wounded another 58 people, 7 of them critically.134 He was armed with a 
+semiautomatic rifle equipped with a 100-round drum magazine, a 12-gauge pump shotgun, and at 
+least one, possibly two .40-caliber handguns.135 He reportedly bought these firearms legally from 
+federally licensed gun dealers in Colorado.136 He also reportedly purchased over 6,000 rounds of 
+ammunition and a 100-round magazine through online, interstate (mail order) transactions.137 
+ 
+
+133 For further information, see CRS Report RL34514, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
+(ATF): Budget and Operations for FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 , by William J. Krouse. 
+134 David A. Fahrenthold et al., “A Day of Tears and Twists in Colorado: As State Mourns, Account Suggests Toll 
+Could Have Been Worse,” Washington Post , July 23, 2012, p. A1. 
+135 Thom Patterson, “Source: Colorado Shooter Had 100-Round Rifle Magazine,” CNN Wire , July 21, 2012. 
+136 Ibid. 
+137 Thom Patterson, “Police Chief: Suspect Bought over 6,000 Rounds of Ammunition through Internet,” CNN Wire , 
+July 21, 2012. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 36 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+This shooting will likely prompt some Members of the 112th Congress to reconsider proposals to 
+reinstate a 1994 ban on semiautomatic assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding 
+devices, which expired in September 2004.138 
+
+So far, two questions have repeatedly been asked about the Aurora, CO, shooting: (1) Would the 
+shooter’s Smith & Wesson AR-15 and 100-round drum magazine have been prohibited under the 
+1994-2004 semiautomatic assault weapons (SAW) ban? and (2) What federal laws speak to the 
+interstate, mail order ammunition sales/transfers (particularly those initiated over the Internet)? In 
+addition, the shooter’s mental health could emerge as an issue, but little information has surfaced 
+to date about his state of mind. It is noteworthy that all accounts seem to indicate that the shooter 
+bought his firearms, magazines, and ammunition legally. 
+
+ Smith & Wesson AR-15 and 100-Round Drum Magazine 
+
+It is unclear at this time whether the Smith & Wesson AR-15 used by the Aurora, CO, shooter 
+would have been subject to the 1994 SAW ban. Under the ban, a rifle was a SAW if it were 
+semiautomatic and had an ability to accept a detachable (interchangeable) magazine, and had two 
+of the following features: 
+
+• a folding or telescoping stock, 
+• a pistol grip that protruded conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon, 
+• a bayonet mount, 
+• a muzzle flash suppressor or threaded barrel to accommodate one, or 
+• a grenade launcher. 
+
+The SAW ban specifically named the Colt AR-15 as prohibited, but it did not prohibit any Smith 
+& Wesson firearm specifically as a SAW. Immediately following the ban, Colt modified the 
+design of its rifle (“sporterized” it), and the post-ban version of the Colt AR-15 did not meet the 
+features test and was legal, because it did not include two of the five features listed above. 
+However, it definitely included a pistol grip and an ability to accept a detachable magazine—
+arguably the two hallmarks of a SAW rifle. 
+
+Under the SAW ban, the further production of high capacity ammunition feeding devices (over 10 
+rounds) was also banned, but such devices privately or commercially held at home or abroad prior 
+to enactment in 1994 were grandfathered in. (During the 10-year ban, imports of these devices 
+proved problematic, because they were not stamped with either a manufacturing date or serial 
+number. This is still the case today.) So, whether the shooter’s drum magazine would have been 
+banned is also unclear. 
+
+ 
+
+138 For further information, see CRS Report RL32585, Semiautomatic Assault Weapons Ban , by William J. Krouse. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 37 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Internet-Based Ammunition Transfers under Federal Law 
+
+The 1986 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act (FOPA)139 repealed certain restrictions on interstate 
+transfers of ammunition, including mail order transfers. As a result, since 1986, a person can deal 
+in ammunition as long as he is not a prohibited person. As described above, however, a person 
+must be federally licensed to manufacture or import ammunition. Unlike for firearms, moreover, 
+there are no restrictions on the interstate transfer of ammunition by federally licensed gun dealers 
+or unlicensed persons. Therefore, ammunition can be transferred interstate between unlicensed 
+persons. In addition, there are no recordkeeping requirements for either licensed dealers or 
+unlicensed persons with regard to ammunition transfers, except for transfers of “armor piercing 
+ammunition” made by licensed dealers to unlicensed persons. With regard to the Internet-based 
+firearms transfers, a CRS legislative attorney previously concluded in 2001 that “A review of 
+applicable federal law … establishes that internet-based firearm sales are not imbued with a 
+special character by virtue of their medium of transfer, and are in fact subject to the same degree 
+of regulation as any other type of firearm transaction.”140 
+
+The same could be said for Internet-based ammunition sales. In summary, it may be appropriate 
+to think of the Internet as a “means of communication,” because it allows individuals to search 
+for, contact, and communicate with others more efficiently than through the mail, want ads, 
+publications, or over the phone. As consequence, it facilitates equally those individuals who 
+would break the law as it does those who would obey the law. 
+
+By comparison, prior to FOPA, only licensed firearms manufacturers, importers, and dealers were 
+authorized to transfer ammunition to unlicensed persons. There was also a recordkeeping 
+requirement for any handgun ammunition transfers made by a licensed dealer to an unlicensed 
+person. While it was lawful for an unlicensed person to cross state lines and purchase ammunition 
+face-to-face from an out-of-state licensed dealer, if an unlicensed person wanted to acquire 
+ammunition from an out-of-state source, the ammunition had to be transferred from an out-of-
+state licensee to a licensee in the unlicensed person’s state of residence. Then, the ammunition 
+could be lawfully and subsequently transferred to the unlicensed person, who originally sought to 
+acquire it. (Under current law, there is a similar construct for out-of-state, face-to-face transfers of 
+long guns. Interstate handgun transfers are only lawful if they are conducted between licensees.) 
+
+On July 30, 2012, Senator Frank Lautenberg introduced the Stop Online Ammunition Sales Act 
+(S. 3458), a bill that would require ammunition dealers to be federally licensed and would 
+generally prohibit the sale of ammunition by unlicensed persons. The bill would require 
+unlicensed persons purchasing ammunition from a licensed dealer to do so in person and to 
+present a state-issued identification document at the point of purchase. In addition, the bill would 
+require federally licensed gun dealers to maintain records on ammunition transfers, and to report 
+to the Attorney General and to the area chief law enforcement officer whenever an unlicensed 
+person purchases more than 1,000 rounds of ammunition within five consecutive business days. 
+
+ 
+
+139 P.L. 99-308; May 19, 1986; 100 Stat. 449. 
+140 For further information, see CRS Report RS20957, Internet Firearm Sales , by T. J. Halstead. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 38 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Concealed Carry and National Reciprocity141 
+
+The 112th Congress has revisited the issue of concealed carry and national reciprocity. On October 
+25, 2011, the House Committee on the Judiciary ordered reported the National Right-to-Carry 
+Reciprocity Act of 2011 (H.R. 822) by a vote (19-11) that was nearly split down party lines 
+following several days of contentious markup. On November 10, 2011, the committee reported 
+H.R. 822 (H.Rept. 112-277). On November 16, 2011, the House considered and passed H.R. 822, 
+amended, by a recorded vote: 272-154 (Roll no. 852). 
+
+H.R. 822 would establish an increased level of reciprocity among states that have laws that allow 
+civilians to carry handguns in a concealed fashion. Under state law, 38 states, most recently 
+Wisconsin, have enacted “shall issue” concealed carry laws, meaning permits are issued to all 
+eligible applicants.142 Ten states have enacted more restrictive “may issue” laws, meaning state 
+and/or local authorities have discretion whether to issue permits.143 In those states, applicants 
+usually must demonstrate a need to carry a concealed handgun to the authorities. At one end of 
+the spectrum, Alaska, Arizona, Wyoming, and Vermont allow concealed carry without a permit.144 
+At the other end, Illinois and the District of Columbia allow no concealed carry of firearms by 
+civilians. 
+
+With regard to interstate reciprocity, a handful of states have “recognition” statutes that recognize 
+any state-issued concealed carry permit. Other states have “open” statutes that allow any resident 
+of the United States, without regard to state residency, to apply for a concealed carry permit. Still 
+other states have “hybrid” statutes that include elements of both the recognition and open statutes. 
+Contiguous “shall issue” states often extend reciprocity to one another. However, some “shall 
+issue” states have opted not to extend reciprocity to other “shall issue” states for a variety of 
+reasons, even though they might have extended reciprocity to arguably more restrictive “may 
+issue” states. The end result is a complicated array of state laws that arguably makes it very 
+challenging for any individual to discern his legal ability to travel interstate with a concealed 
+handgun. 
+
+Under H.R. 822, as ordered reported, a permit holder from state A would be able to travel to state 
+B with a concealed handgun as long as state B had a concealed carry law, no matter which type 
+(“shall” or “may” issue). The permit holder from state A would be required to comply with all 
+other laws in state B, with the exception of the laws governing eligibility for and issuance of 
+concealed carry permits. Several issues could arise, however. First, the bill makes no allowance 
+for the difference between more permissive “shall issue” and more restrictive “may issue” state 
+laws. Therefore, the bill could be viewed as an imposition by “shall issue” states over “may 
+
+ 
+
+141 For additional information, see CRS Report R42099, Federal Laws and Legislation on Carrying Concealed 
+Firearms: An Overview , by Vivian S. Chu. 
+142 Wisconsin’s concealed carry permit went into effect on November 1, 2011. “Shall issue” states include Alaska, 
+Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, 
+Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
+Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
+Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
+143 Alabama and Connecticut are “may issue” states that are considered to be more permissive than other “may issue” 
+states. Those states include California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and 
+Rhode Island. 
+144 Alaska and Arizona issue permits to residents who seek to carry concealed firearms in other states that extend 
+reciprocity to residents of Alaska. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 39 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+issue” states. Depending upon the circumstances, the bill could also be viewed as an imposition 
+by some “shall issue” states over other “shall issue” states, depending upon differences in their 
+respective concealed carry laws. For example, some “shall issue” states have good moral 
+character clauses as part of their eligibility requirements, others do not. Some require “live fire” 
+training prior to permit issuance, others do not. Some require a mental health evaluation, others 
+do not. Several states issue permits to persons 18 years of age, while most states require 
+applicants to be 21 years of age. 
+
+Another issue that has emerged is “forum shopping,” that is, one state’s residents going to another 
+state with an “open” statute so that they can return to their own state with a concealed carry 
+permit that they would not have otherwise been able obtain in their own state. While language has 
+been included in the bill, as ordered reported, that would arguably prevent individuals from forum 
+shopping among states, Representative Daniel Lungren offered an amendment that the committee 
+adopted that would require GAO to conduct a study of “open” state concealed carry laws and 
+their implications for public safety. 
+
+The committee also adopted a substitute amendment offered by Representative Trent Franks at 
+the outset of the markup. Twelve other amendments were offered, but all were defeated. Minority 
+Members offered amendments that would have denied concealed carry permits to categories of 
+persons on terrorist watch lists and several classes of misdemeanants, including sex offenders, 
+stalkers, drug traffickers to minors, and assailants of police officers. Other amendments addressed 
+the need for more secure and verifiable concealed carry documentation and interstate information 
+sharing on permittees for law enforcement and public safety purposes. Representative Louie 
+Gohmert offered an amendment that would have allowed concealed carry in the District of 
+Columbia, but it too was defeated. 
+
+Proponents argue that establishing reciprocity on such a basis would be similar to the mutual 
+recognition of out-of-state driver licenses. Opponents counter that most state driver license 
+eligibility requirements are remarkably similar, unlike concealed carry eligibility requirements. 
+Furthermore, states have opted to recognize the driver licenses of other states largely on their own 
+accord without congressional intervention. Proponents contend further that criminals are less 
+likely to victimize individuals who could be armed, thus leading to a reduction in crime. To 
+support this view, the chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Representative Lamar 
+Smith, noted during the markup that, according to the National Rifle Association (NRA), 
+concealed carry states on average had lower violent crime rates (22%) than states that did not 
+have such laws.145 Opponents argue that introducing more firearms into potentially life 
+threatening situations increases the likelihood that a firearm would be misused and innocent 
+persons wounded or killed. To support their view, they have cited data compiled by the Violence 
+Policy Center, which reported that from May 2007 through October 25, 2011, concealed carry 
+permit holders had killed 11 law enforcement officers and 375 private citizens, and had engaged 
+in 20 mass shootings and 29 murder/suicides.146 
+
+Several other concealed carry bills have been introduced in the House and the Senate. In the 
+House, for example, Representative Paul Broun introduced the Secure Access to Firearms 
+Enhancement Act (H.R. 2900), a bill that is similar in effect to the Thune bill (S. 2213) described 
+
+ 
+
+145 According to the NRA, this lower average violent crime rate is based upon the FBI’s 2004 Uniform Crime Reports 
+data for only that year. 
+146 Violence Policy Center, Concealed Carry Killers , http://www.vpc.org/ccwkillers.htm. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 40 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+below. Representative Timothy Johnson has introduced a bill (H.R. 3543) that has the same title 
+as H.R. 822 and reflects that bill as introduced. Senator Barbara Boxer introduced the Common 
+Sense Concealed Firearms Permit Act of 2011 (S. 176), which would facilitate concealed carry 
+reciprocity arguably by establishing minimum federal eligibility requirements. On the other hand, 
+elements of those eligibility requirements could be seen as being more restrictive than many 
+existing state laws—particularly state “shall issue” laws. For example, the bill would require a 
+concealed carry permit applicant to demonstrate (1) good cause for requesting the permit, and (2) 
+that he is worthy of the public trust to carry a concealed firearm in public. Such eligibility 
+requirements are arguably more closely aligned with state “may issue” laws. Senator Mark 
+Begich introduced the National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2012 (S. 2188), a companion 
+bill to H.R. 822. And, Senator John Thune has introduced the Respecting States’ Rights and 
+Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2012 (S. 2213). Under S. 2213, a resident of a state that 
+allows concealed carry without a permit (Alaska, Arizona, Wyoming, and Vermont) would be 
+allowed to do so in another state without a permit of any kind, arguably, as long as the host state 
+issues concealed carry permits. Under H.R. 822/S. 2188, a resident of one of those states would 
+have to acquire a permit from either his or another state. 
+
+ Firearms on Public Lands 
+
+The 112th Congress has revisited the issue of firearms carry and use on public lands. As described 
+above, Senator Coburn sponsored legislation in the 111th Congress that allows individuals to carry 
+firearms in national parks and wildlife refuges, as long as such firearms carry is in compliance 
+with state and local laws (P.L. 111-24). On April 17, 2012, the House passed the Sportsmen’s 
+Heritage Act of 2012 (H.R. 4089) by a vote of 274-146 (Roll no. 164). This bill would require 
+agencies that manage federal public lands to facilitate access to and use of those lands for the 
+purposes of recreational fishing, hunting, and shooting with certain exceptions set out in statute 
+(e.g., national security, public safety, or resource conservation). H.R. 4089 defines federal public 
+lands broadly and, arguably, would promote allowance for fishing, hunting shooting on most 
+federal public lands, with certain exceptions for national parks, national monuments managed by 
+the National Park Service, lands held in trust for Indian tribes, and Outer Continental Shelf lands. 
+(For a related bill, see also H.R. 3440.) In addition, Section 438 of the FY2013 Interior, 
+Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill (H.R. 6091), which the House Committee 
+on Appropriations reported on July 10, 2012, would provide that appropriated funding under the 
+bill could not be used to prohibit the use of or access to federal land for hunting, fishing, or 
+recreational shooting. 
+
+In addition, H.R. 4089 includes a provision that would prohibit the Environmental Protection 
+Agency (EPA) from promulgating regulations under the Toxic Substances Control Act to restrict 
+the lead content of ammunition and fishing tackle. The EPA was previously petitioned to address 
+this issue on three occasions, but had denied those petitions. The EPA has adopted the position 
+that it has no legal authority to regulate ammunition, and found that additional federal regulation 
+of lead in fishing tackle is not warranted. (See also H.R. 1558/S. 838 and H.R. 2834/S. 2066.) 
+Conversely, Representative Jim McDermott has introduced the Guns-Free National Parks Act of 
+2012 (H.R. 4063), a bill that would repeal the Coburn provision in P.L. 111-24 noted above. 
+
+On a related issue concerning firearms on public lands, Representative Bob Gibbs and Senator 
+Jim Webb introduced the Recreational Land Self-Defense Act of 2011 (H.R. 1865/S. 1588). This 
+bill would prohibit the Secretary of the Army from banning individuals from firearms possession, 
+including an assembled or functional firearm, while traveling through or visiting water resources 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 41 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+development projects (e.g., reservoirs at Corps-operated dams and inland waterways) managed by 
+the Army Corps of Engineers.147 It is noteworthy that although Corps staff is often charged with 
+maintaining order among boaters and other visitors at Corps-managed reservoirs and waterways, 
+and at adjoining campsites, they are not authorized to be armed, unlike National Park Service 
+rangers. Under the bill, however, firearms possession and carrying would still be subject to the 
+state and local laws in effect for the jurisdictions in which the Corps projects are located. In this 
+way, this bill is similar to the 2009 National Parks legislation (P.L. 111-24). Also, in the last 
+session on July 14, 2011, the House passed an amendment (H.Amdt. 653) offered by 
+Representative Paul Gosar to the FY2012 Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies 
+Appropriations bill (H.R. 2354) that would have prohibited the expenditure of any funding under 
+that bill to enforce any regulation to restrict firearms possession on corps projects or lands that 
+exceeded state law. 
+
+ Armed Forces Members and Privately Held Firearms Off-Base 
+
+On May 18, 2012, the House passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 
+(H.R. 4310). This bill includes a provision that would amend a provision enacted under P.L. 111-
+383 that prohibits base commanders from collecting information about firearms privately held by 
+military personnel off-base. The amending provision (§1071) in H.R. 4310 would clarify that a 
+military mental health professional or commanding officer may inquire about privately owned 
+firearms if that service member is considered to be a high risk for suicide or causing harm 
+to others. 
+
+Also, during House consideration of H.R. 4310, Representative Phil Gingrey successfully offered 
+an amendment (H.Amdt. 1124) that expresses a sense of Congress that active duty military 
+personnel who either live in or are stationed in the District of Columbia (DC) ought to be exempt 
+from DC firearms laws, which generally require the registration of firearms, both long guns and 
+handguns, as well as forbid the carrying of any firearm outside of the home. The amendment was 
+passed by voice vote. 
+
+ ATF Southwest Border Gun Trafficking Investigations 
+
+Under Project Gunrunner, ATF has increased its efforts to staunch the flow of illegal guns from 
+the United States to Mexico through stepped up enforcement of domestic gun control laws and 
+cooperation with Mexican authorities. For example, in its FY2013 budget submission to 
+Congress, ATF presented the following data to demonstrate its overall efforts in Southwest Border 
+states between FY2005 and FY2011: 
+
+• 1,471 cases involving 3,438 defendants recommended for prosecution; 
+• 2,376 defendants arrested; 2,338 indicted; 1,549 convicted; and 1,070 sentenced 
+
+to an average of 102 months in prison; 
+
+• 442 cases and 1,467 defendants recommended for prosecution involved gang-
+
+related offenses; 
+
+ 
+
+147 For further information, see CRS Report R42602, Firearms at Army Corps Water Resources Projects: Proposed 
+Legislation and Issues for Congress , by Nicole T. Carter. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 42 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+• 752 cases involved trafficking of an estimated 26,129 firearms, of which 244 
+
+cases and 8,564 firearms were related to gang-related activities; and 
+
+• over 10,500 firearms and 1,407,000 rounds of ammunition were seized as a result 
+
+of these investigations.148 
+
+To support these efforts, Congress appropriated $1.121 billion for ATF for FY2010. This amount 
+included about $60 million for Project Gunrunner according to both House and Senate report 
+language.149 For FY2011, ATF was appropriated $1.115 billion, but Congress had also 
+appropriated an additional $37.5 million for ATF in the FY2010/FY2011 Southwest border 
+supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-230). For FY2012, Congress appropriated $1.152 billion for 
+ATF (P.L. 112-55). The agency reports that approximately $68.9 million in direct funding has 
+been allocated to efforts related to addressing Southwest Border gun trafficking groups.150 
+
+Moreover, ATF has trained Mexican law enforcement officials to use its eTrace program, through 
+which investigators are sometimes able to trace the commercial trail and origin of recovered 
+firearms and, in the process, identify gun trafficking trends and develop investigative leads. As 
+described below, however, the interpretation of trace data has generated considerable debate. On 
+the one hand, several substantive methodological limitations preclude using trace data as a proxy 
+for the larger population of crime guns in Mexico or the United States. On the other hand, in 
+conjunction with investigative experience, trace data show that certain firearms—particularly 
+semi-automatic rifles with the ability to accept a detachable magazine that are greater than .22 
+caliber—are increasingly being used by the Mexican drug trafficking organizations and other 
+criminals. 
+
+In November 2010, the DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) released an evaluation of 
+Project Gunrunner.151 While the OIG was somewhat critical of ATF’s eTrace program for yielding 
+little “usable investigative leads,”152 the OIG recommended that ATF work with DOJ to develop a 
+reporting requirement for multiple long gun sales153 because Mexican DTOs have demonstrated a 
+marked preference for military-style firearms capable of accepting high-capacity magazines.154 
+The OIG also recommended that ATF focus its investigative efforts on more complex criminal 
+conspiracies involving high-level traffickers rather than on low-level straw purchasers. 
+
+In January/February 2011, ATF’s Southwest border efforts to deter cross-border gun trafficking 
+became controversial following the murder of a U.S. Border Patrol agent in December 2010. 
+Firearms found at the murder site were linked to a Phoenix, AZ-based Project Gunrunner 
+
+ 
+
+148 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives , Congressional Budget 
+Submission, Fiscal Year 2013 , February 2012, p. 5. 
+149 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies 
+Appropriations Bill, 2010 , H.Rept. 111-149, (To accompany H.R. 2847), 111th Cong., June 12, 2009, p. 66; and U.S. 
+Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
+Bill, 2010 , S.Rept. 111-34, (To accompany H.R. 2847), 111th Cong., June 25, 2009, p. 68. 
+150 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Office of Public and 
+Governmental Affairs, March 9, 2012. 
+151 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner , I-2011-001, 
+November 2010, http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf. 
+152 Ibid, p. 73. 
+153 Ibid, p. 40. 
+154 Ibid, p. 38. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 43 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+investigation known as “Operation Fast and Furious.” This operation was an attempt by ATF’s 
+Phoenix field office to conduct a more complex investigation. However, allegations of 
+misconduct on the part of DOJ’s and ATF’s upper-levels of management have been the topic of 
+four hearings conducted by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Those 
+allegations have also dominated the discourse at two DOJ oversight hearings held by the House 
+Committee on the Judiciary, as well as two hearings held by the Senate Committee on the 
+Judiciary and its Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism. 
+
+Several Members of Congress, including two House full committee chairs, have written letters to 
+the Attorney General urging him and the Administration to be more forthcoming about possible 
+missteps that were taken in the lead-up to Operation Fast and Furious. Besides the oversight 
+issues, at issue for Congress is how widespread were the gun walking tactics employed? And, 
+what can be done to prevent such gun walking tactics from being misused again, without unduly 
+encumbering federal law enforcement? 
+
+Another related issue for Congress could be the Administration’s arguably selective release of 
+ATF firearms trace data. In the past, ATF periodically released data on firearms traces performed 
+for Mexican authorities. Although substantive methodological limitations preclude using trace 
+data as a proxy for the larger population of “crime guns” in Mexico or the United States, trace 
+data have proven to be a useful indicator of trafficking trends and patterns.155 In June 2009, GAO 
+recommended to the Attorney General that he should direct ATF to regularly update its reporting 
+on aggregate firearms trace data and trends.156 For the next two years, nonetheless, only limited 
+and arguably selected amounts of trace data have been released by ATF. On April 26, 2012, ATF 
+released updated but limited data on firearms trace requests that were processed for 
+Mexican authorities. 
+
+ Multiple Rifle Sales Report Proposal157 
+
+On December 17, 2010, DOJ and ATF published a “60-day emergency notice of information 
+collection” in the Federal Register ,158 in which they requested that the Office of Management and 
+ 
+
+155 For FY2004 and every fiscal year thereafter, Congress has required ATF to include the following disclaimers in any 
+published firearms trace reports: (a) Tracing studies conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
+Explosives are released without adequate disclaimers regarding the limitations of the data; (b) The Bureau of Alcohol, 
+Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives shall include in all such data releases, language similar to the following that would 
+make clear that trace data cannot be used to draw broad conclusions about firearms-related crime: (1) Firearm traces are 
+designed to assist law enforcement authorities in conducting investigations by tracking the sale and possession of 
+specific firearms. Law enforcement agencies may request firearms traces for any reason, and those reasons are not 
+necessarily reported to the Federal Government. Not all firearms used in crime are traced and not all firearms traced are 
+used in crime. (2) Firearms selected for tracing are not chosen for purposes of determining which types, makes or 
+models of firearms are used for illicit purposes. The firearms selected do not constitute a random sample and should not 
+be considered representative of the larger universe of all firearms used by criminals, or any subset of that universe. 
+Firearms are normally traced to the first retail seller, and sources reported for firearms traced do not necessarily 
+represent the sources or methods by which firearms in general are acquired for use in crime; See §516 of the FY2012 
+Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) Appropriations Act, which was enacted as part of the 
+Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-55). 
+156 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico 
+Face Planning and Coordination Challenges , GAO-09-709, June 2009, p. 59. 
+157 This section was coauthored by the report’s author, William J. Krouse, and Vivian S. Chu and Vanessa K. Burrows, 
+CRS Legislative Attorneys. Questions on case law related to demand letters should be referred to Ms. Chu. Questions 
+on the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 should be referred to Ms. Burrows. 
+158 Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “60-Day Emergency Notice of 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 44 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+Budget (OMB) review and clear a proposed information collection initiative by January 5, 2011, 
+on an emergency basis under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.159 While ATF was not 
+granted emergency approval, OMB eventually approved this initiative on July 11, 2011. While 
+opponents responded quickly and passed a provision to block ATF’s implementation of this 
+initiative, the blocking provision was not included in ATF’s enacted FY2012 appropriation and 
+ATF is currently collecting multiple rifle sales reports in Southwest Border states. 
+
+Under the initiative, ATF proposed to require federal firearms licensees (FFLs) to report to ATF 
+whenever they make multiple sales or other dispositions of more than one rifle within five 
+consecutive business days to an unlicensed person. Such reporting was to be limited to firearms 
+that are (1) semiautomatic, (2) chambered for ammunition of greater than .22 caliber, and (3) 
+capable of accepting a detachable magazine. While details underlying this initiative were not fully 
+revealed in the Federal Register , on December 20, 2010, acting ATF Director Kenneth Melson 
+later clarified that the proposed multiple rifle sales reporting requirement would be (1) limited to 
+FFLs operating in Southwest border states (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California) and (2) 
+confined initially to a one-year pilot project.160 
+
+On February 4, 2011, OMB informed ATF that it would not grant the emergency approval.161 
+Nevertheless, the notice’s 60-day comment period ran through February 16, 2011. ATF received 
+12,680 comments, of which ATF estimated that 8,928 comments (70%) were in support of the 
+program and 3,752 (30%) were opposed.162 Following DOJ and ATF consideration the initial 
+round of comments, a subsequent 30-day comment period was invoked on April 29, 2010, during 
+an additional 18,800 pages of comments were considered.163 On July 11, 2011, OMB approved 
+the information collection initiative for a three-year period (ending July 31, 2014).164 
+
+It appears that some of the impetus for the information collection initiative was a 
+recommendation made by the DOJ OIG in November 2010.165 As described above, in that review 
+the OIG reported that ATF criminal investigations and firearms trace data indicated that Mexican 
+drug trafficking organizations had demonstrated a marked preference for long guns (rifles and 
+shotguns) capable of accepting detachable ammunition feeding devices.166 As a consequence, the 
+
+ 
+(...continued) 
+Information Collection Under Review: Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Rifles,” 75 Federal 
+Register 79021, December 17, 2010. 
+159 For further information, see CRS Report R40636, Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA): OMB and Agency 
+Responsibilities and Burden Estimates , by Curtis W. Copeland and Vanessa K. Burrows. 
+160 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “Acting Director Announces Demand Letters for Multiple 
+Sales of Specific Long Guns in Four Border States,” News Release, December 20, 2010. 
+161 Mike Lillis, “House Dems Upset with Delay on Gun Proposal Along Border,” The Hill , February 9, 2011, p. 3. 
+162 These data were provided to CRS by ATF on July 9, 2012. 
+163 Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “Agency Information Collection 
+Activities; Proposed Collection Comments Requested: Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Rifles,” 
+76 Federal Register 24058, April 29, 2011. 
+164 Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Reviews Completed in the Last 
+30 Days, DOJ-ATF, Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Certain Semi-Automatic Rifles, OMB Control 
+Number: 1140-0100, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain;jsessionid=
+9f8e89cb30d6399089b4c8ac4da993b6c0e60ddbeff2.e34ObxiKbN0Sci0SbhaSa3aLchr0n6jAmljGr5XDqQLvpAe. 
+165 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, Review of ATF’s 
+Project Gunrunner , I-2011-001, November 2010. 
+166 Ibid, p. 40. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 45 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+OIG recommended that ATF work with DOJ to explore options for seeking a multiple long sales 
+reporting requirement.167 In response to the OIG’s recommendation, however, then Acting ATF 
+Director Melson initially suggested that such a requirement could be beyond the ATF’s and the 
+DOJ’s authority under current law, but that ATF would “explore the full range of options to seek 
+information regarding multiple sales of long guns.”168 
+
+Notwithstanding this concern about its authority, it appears that DOJ and ATF collectively 
+concluded that there is sufficient authority under current law for ATF to collect reports on 
+multiple sales of certain long guns from FFLs. Additional documentation posted on the OMB 
+website suggested that ATF was proposing the information collection under its authority to issue 
+“demand letters.”169 Since the enactment of the Gun Control Act (GCA) in 1968, the ATF and its 
+predecessor agencies at the Department of the Treasury170 have had the authority to issue 
+“demand letters” to FFLs in order to obtain information from the records that FFLs are required 
+by law to maintain at their places of business.171 Such letters have been primarily used to 
+investigate and bring non-compliant FFLs into line and to expedite the acquisition of trace data.172 
+
+ATF’s authority to issue demand letters to collect information under certain circumstances has 
+been challenged and upheld in the federal courts. In 2000, for example, ATF issued demand 
+letters to 41 FFLs who were deemed uncooperative because they had failed to comply with trace 
+request responses in a timely manner. In these demand letters, the ATF required the FFLs to 
+submit information concerning their firearm purchases and sales for the past three years and on a 
+monthly basis thereafter until told otherwise.173 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
+held that 18 U.S.C. Section 926(a), which prohibits the creation of a national registry of firearms, 
+firearms owners, and transactions, did not directly limit the defendant’s authority to issue demand 
+letters and was not violated because the ATF narrowly tailored the request to its tracing needs by 
+issuing the letter to the 0.1% of FFLs nationwide.174 
+
+ 
+
+167 Ibid. 
+168 Ibid, p. 108. 
+169 In a sample demand letter on the OMB website, ATF specified that it would be issuing such a letter under 18 U.S.C. 
+§923(g)(5). 
+170 ATF was transferred from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Justice, effective January 2003. 
+ATF was established in Treasury in 1972. Prior to that, it was a division within the Internal Revenue Service. 
+171 The original demand letter regulation appears to have been promulgated at the same time the Gun Control Act was 
+enacted in 1968. See Furnishing Transaction Information, 27 C.F.R. §478.126, issued 33 Federal Register 18555, 
+18571, December 14, 1968. When the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act (FOPA) was passed in 1986, Congress made 
+explicit in statute: “Each licenses shall, when required by letter issued by the [Attorney General], and until notified to 
+the contrary in writing by the [Attorney General], submit on a form specified by the [Attorney General], for periods and 
+at the times specified in such letter, all record information required to be kept by this chapter or such lesser record 
+information as the [Attorney General] may specify.” See 18 U.S.C. §923(g)(5)(A). 
+172 When considering FOPA, it seems that Congress made clear that although they would statutorily authorize the ATF 
+to collect information pursuant to its demand letter authority, such authority “to request tracing information for dealers 
+can never be used to establish any centralized or regional registration about §923(g)(5)(A) [in violation of §926(a)]” 
+and “Congress had no intent to require all law-abiding gun dealers to report all their firearms transactions” to BATF. 
+Statement of Senator Orrin Hatch, 131 Congressional Record S9129 (July 9, 1985). 
+173 See RSM, Inc. v. Buckles, 254 F.3d 61,65-66 (4th Cir. 2001). 
+174 Ibid, p. 68. The court in RSM noted that although FOPA prohibited the creation of a national registry of firearms, 
+Congress also envisioned some sort of collection of firearms records so long as it was incidental to some other statutory 
+function specifically delegated to ATF. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 46 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+In 1999, the ATF sent out another demand letter to approximately 450 FFLs who had 10 or more 
+crime guns traced to them with a “time-to-crime” of three years or less. The demand letter 
+required the FFLs to report the acquisition of secondhand firearms, including identification of the 
+firearm but not the identities of the person from whom the secondhand firearm was acquired or 
+the person to whom the firearm was transferred.175 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and 
+Ninth Circuits generally held that Section 926(a) was not violated176 and that the appropriations 
+rider that prohibits ATF from spending money in connection with consolidating or centralizing 
+records was also not violated because a demand letter sent to less than 1% of all FFLs for a 
+portion of record information does not constitute consolidating or centralizing record 
+information.177 
+
+Opponents of this initiative argue that (1) ATF does not enjoy sufficient authority to require 
+multiple rifle sales reports from FFLs; (2) such a reporting requirement would be unprecedented; 
+and (3) the data collection that would result would essentially constitute an illegal firearms 
+registry. Although this information collection initiative would require FFLs to provide ATF with 
+additional documentation on firearms transactions involving rifles, which has not previously been 
+required, it is not entirely unprecedented. On the other hand, an argument could be made that 
+ATF’s issuance of demand letters and the existing multiple handgun sales reporting requirement 
+are precedents for multiple rifle sales reports. In the past, as described above, ATF had 
+administratively required some FFLs to surrender firearms transaction records temporarily on a 
+much wider scale, when there were indications of noncompliance or illegal firearms trafficking. 
+
+Several Members of Congress, however, disagree with this decision and sent a letter to President 
+Obama voicing strong opposition to the proposed multiple sales report proposal.178 Those 
+Members maintain that if Congress authorized multiple handgun sales reporting in statute in 
+1986, then it is incumbent upon ATF to request that Congress provide it with similar statutory 
+authority for a multiple rifles sales reporting requirement.179 On February 18, 2011, the House 
+adopted an amendment by a roll call vote of 277-149 (Roll no. 115) offered by Representatives 
+Dan Boren and Denny Rehberg to the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1) 
+that would have prohibited ATF from implementing that requirement. While the House passed 
+H.R. 1, the Senate rejected this bill on March 9, 2011, for budgetary considerations that went well 
+beyond concerns about this policy rider. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense and Full-Year 
+Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1473; P.L. 112-10) does not include a similar rider. 
+Senator Jon Tester introduced a bill (S. 570) that would prohibit DOJ from collecting information 
+on multiple rifle or shotgun sales. 
+
+Following OMB’s approval of this information collection initiative, Representative Rehberg 
+successfully amended the FY2012 Commerce-Justice-Science (CJS) appropriations bill (H.R. 
+ 
+
+175 See Blaustein & Reich, Inc. v. Buckles, 365 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2004); J&G Sales Ltd., v. Truscott, 473 F.3d 1043 
+(9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied , 128 S. Ct. 208 (2007). 
+176 The Fourth Circuit in Blaustein & Reich noted that §926(a) has no bearing on the regulation that authorizes the use 
+of demand letters because that section only prohibits the promulgation of rules and regulations prescribed after 1986, 
+and the regulation on demand letters dates back to 1968. Furthermore, it stated that §926(a) has no bearing on 
+§923(g)(5)(A) because “the former provision pertains only to ‘rule[s]’ and ‘regulation[s]’ and the latter is a statute, not 
+a rule or regulation” (modification in the original). Blaustein & Reich, 365 F.3d at 288, 290. 
+177 Blaustein & Reich, 365 F.3d at 289. 
+178 Congressional Documents and Publications, “Rehberg Leads Bipartisan Letter to ATF Questioning New Firearm 
+Dealer Regulations,” Representative Denny Rehberg (R-MT) News Release, December 23, 2010. 
+179 Ibid. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 47 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+2596) in full committee markup with language that would have prohibited ATF from 
+implementing it by a vote of 25 to 16 on July 12, 2011. Meanwhile, the Senate folded its FY2012 
+CJS appropriations bill (S. 1572) into a minibus appropriations bill (H.R. 2112). Senator Dean 
+Heller offered an amendment (S.Amdt. 843) to H.R. 2112 that would have also blocked 
+implementation of the reporting requirement, but the Senate did not vote on the Heller 
+amendment. Language reflecting the Rehberg amendment was not included in the House- and 
+Senate-passed conference version of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations 
+Act, 2012 (H.R. 2112). Hence, it was not included into the bill that was signed into law (P.L. 112-
+55) by the President on November 18, 2011. According to ATF, from August 14, 2011, through 
+October 6, 2011, it collected 502 multiple rifle sales reports involving 1,276 firearms from FFLs 
+in Southwest Border states.180 
+
+In addition, complaints were filed in federal district courts challenging ATF’s ability to collect 
+such information under its demand letter authority (18 U.S.C. §922(g)(5)(A)).181 However, in 
+ National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc. v. Jones , the United States District Court for the 
+District of Columbia (DC District Court) held that it was within ATF’s demand letter authority to 
+collect information from FFLs on the multiple sales of rifles.182 The DC District Court found that 
+ATF’s demand letter to FFLs on Southwest border was still limited in scope, even though it was 
+“somewhat broader” than past demand letters that have been upheld by the federal courts.183 
+
+Nevertheless, opponents have renewed their efforts to end the multiple rifle sales reporting 
+requirement during the FY2013 appropriations cycle. On April 26, 2012, Representative Rehberg 
+successfully offered an amendment during full committee markup of the CJS appropriations bill 
+(H.R. 5326) with language that would prohibit ATF from collecting multiple long gun sales 
+reports. Representative Justin Amash and Senator Jon Tester have introduced similar proposals 
+(H.R. 3814/S. 570). 
+
+According to ATF, in the first nine months of the initiative, ATF has referred over 115 defendants 
+to the U.S. Attorneys for federal prosecution in 29 criminal cases in which leads were generated 
+from multiple rifle sales reports.184 As part of these cases, ATF has taken about 168 firearms into 
+evidence. As of May 22, 2012, approximately 1,045 FFLs had submitted 3,500 multiple rifle sales 
+reports, encompassing around 8,200 firearms.185 ATF estimates that the time burden on each FFL 
+was about one hour, seven minutes, costing an estimated $12 per year/per FFL.186 
+
+ 
+
+180 These statistics are available at http://www.atf.gov/statistics/. 
+181 Complaints were filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the United States District 
+Court for the District of New Mexico, and the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. See Nat’l 
+Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc. v. Jones, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101320 (D.D.C. 2011); Ron Peterson Firearms LLC 
+v. Melson, No. 1:11-cv-678, (D.N.M. filed August 3, 2011); 10 Ring Precision, Inc. v. Melson, No. 5:11-cv-663 (W.D. 
+Tex. filed August 5, 2011). 
+182 Nat’l Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc. v. Jones, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101320 (D.D.C. 2011); 
+183 Ibid. at *23. 
+184 These data were provided to CRS by ATF on July 9, 2012. 
+185 Ibid. 
+186 Ibid. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 48 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Operation Fast and Furious 
+
+In January/February 2011, ATF and Project Gunrunner came under congressional scrutiny for a 
+Phoenix, AZ-based investigation known as Operation Fast and Furious.187 ATF whistleblowers 
+have alleged that suspected straw purchasers were allowed to amass relatively large quantities of 
+firearms as part of long-term gun trafficking investigations.188 As a consequence, some of these 
+firearms are alleged to have “walked,” meaning that they were trafficked to gunrunners and other 
+criminals before ATF moved to arrest the suspects and seize all of their contraband firearms.189 
+Some of these firearms were smuggled into Mexico.190 Two of these firearms—AK-47 variant 
+rifles—were reportedly found at the scene of a shootout near the U.S.-Mexico border where U.S. 
+Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry was shot to death.191 Press accounts assert that ATF has 
+acknowledged that as many as 195 firearms that were purchased by persons under ATF 
+investigation as part of Operation Fast and Furious were recovered in Mexico.192 Questions, 
+moreover, have been raised about whether a firearm—an AK-47 variant handgun—that was 
+reportedly used to murder U.S. ICE Special Agent Jamie Zapata and wound Special Agent Victor 
+Avila in Mexico on February 15, 2011, was initially trafficked by a subject of a Houston, TX-
+based ATF Project Gunrunner investigation.193 
+
+As more information emerged, U.S. and Mexican policymakers expressed their dismay over the 
+circumstances surrounding Operation Fast and Furious.194 Taking the lead, Senator Charles E. 
+Grassley, the ranking minority Member on the Senate Judiciary Committee, wrote several letters 
+to then ATF Acting Director Kenneth E. Melson and U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder 
+voicing his concerns about Operation Fast and Furious and the whistleblower allegations that 
+were brought to him. For example, on January 27, 2011, Senator Grassley wrote Acting Director 
+Melson and requested a briefing on Project Gunrunner. He noted that 
+
+Members of the Judiciary Committee have received numerous allegations that the ATF 
+sanctioned the sale of hundreds of assault weapons to suspected straw purchasers, who then 
+allegedly transported these weapons through the southwestern border area and into 
+Mexico.195 
+
+On February 4, 2011, Assistant Attorney General Ronald Weich, DOJ Office of Legislative 
+Affairs, responded with a letter that included the following statement: 
+
+ 
+
+187 James V. Grimaldi and Sari Horwitz, “ATF Probe Strategy Is Questioned,” Washington Post , February 2, 2011, p. 
+A04. 
+188 Ibid. 
+189 Ibid. 
+190 John Solomon, David Heath, and Gordon Witkin, “ATF Let Hundreds of U.S. Weapons Fall Into Hands of 
+Suspected Mexican Gunrunners: Whistleblower Says Agents Strongly Objected to Risky Strategy,” Center for Public 
+Integrity . 
+191 Ibid. 
+192 Kim Murphy and Ken Ellingwood, “Mexico Demands Answers on Guns,” Chicago Tribune , March 11, 2011, p. 13. 
+193 Ibid. 
+194 Ken Ellingwood, “Mexico: U.S. Never Said Guns Came Across; Washington Didn’t Reveal Tracked Arms Were 
+Passing the Border, Agency Asserts,” Los Angeles Times , March 12, 2011. 
+195 Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on the Judiciary, to Acting 
+Director Kenneth E. Melson, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, regarding Project Gunrunner and 
+Whistleblower Allegations, January 27, 2011, http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/Judiciary-01-27-11-letter-
+to-ATF-SW-Border-strategy.pdf. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 49 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+At the outset, the allegation described in your January 27, letter—that ATF “sanctioned” or 
+otherwise knowingly allowed the sale of assault weapons to a straw purchaser who then 
+transported them into Mexico—is false. ATF makes every effort to interdict weapons that 
+have been purchased illegally and prevent their transportation to Mexico.196 
+
+Weich went on to say: 
+
+We also want to protect investigations and the law enforcement personnel who directly 
+conduct them from inappropriate political influence. For this reason, we respectfully request 
+that Committee staff not contact law enforcement personnel seeking information about 
+pending criminal investigations, including the investigation into the death of Customs and 
+Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry.197 
+
+On February 9, 2011, Senator Grassley wrote Attorney General Holder a letter in which he 
+presented documents that were provided to him by whistleblowers. They purported that a 
+federally licensed gun dealer, who was cooperating with ATF, was encouraged by ATF and the 
+Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office to continue transferring firearms to a suspected straw purchaser, 
+despite misgivings regarding civil and criminal liabilities that could follow from such transfers 
+for whom, he—the gun dealer—could possibly be found liable.198 As noted above, two of those 
+firearms were found at the murder scene of Agent Terry. Both firearms were AK-47 variants (with 
+serial numbers 1983AH3977 and 1971CZ3755).199 The accompanying documentation also 
+showed that ATF had entered these firearms into its National Tracing Center’s suspect gun 
+database.200 
+
+In response to the previous letter, Senator Grassley observed the following: 
+
+Unfortunately, the Justice Department’s letter suggested that my attempts to seek 
+information about these matters might be politically motivated. I understand the Department 
+needs to “protect … law enforcement personnel … from inappropriate political influence.” 
+However, there is a difference between inappropriate political influence and appropriately 
+holding officials accountable to the American people.201 
+
+These whistleblower allegations and related letter exchanges set off a chain of events that 
+culminated in the House approving a resolution that cited the Attorney General with contempt, 
+marking the first instance that Congress has ever thusly cited a sitting officer of a presidential 
+Cabinet. Described below are the major developments that led to this precedent-setting vote. 
+
+ 
+
+196 Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Minority Member, 
+Committee on the Judiciary, regarding January 27, 2011 Project Gunrunner and Whistleblower Allegations letter, 
+February 4, 2011, http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/Judiciary-ATF-02-04-11-letter-from-DOJ-deny-
+allegations.pdf. 
+197 Ibid. 
+198 Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley to Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., regarding ATF Whistleblower 
+Allegations and the Sale of Assault Weapons Found at the Scene of the Firefight in which Border Patrol Agent Brian 
+Terry Was Slain, February 9, 2011, http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/Judiciary-02-09-11-Letter-to-Holder-
+notifying-of-ATF-issues.pdf. 
+199 Ibid. 
+200 Ibid. 
+201 Ibid. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
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+
+ 
+
+As allegations of gun walking mounted, on March 4, 2011, Attorney General Holder instructed 
+the DOJ OIG to review ATF’s gun trafficking investigations.202 Dissatisfied with DOJ’s response 
+to date, on March 8, 2011, Senator Grassley called for an independent review of the related 
+allegations because the DOJ OIG had made recommendations about Southwest border gun 
+trafficking investigations in its November 2011 audit that might possibly influence its future 
+findings.203 On March 9, 2011, Representative Lamar Smith, chairman of the House Judiciary 
+Committee, wrote the Attorney General and commended him for tasking the OIG with a review 
+of ATF’s firearms trafficking investigatory methods. In addition, Representative Smith asked DOJ 
+to respond to the following questions by March 18, 2011: 
+
+• “How many weapons have been allowed to pass to Mexico under the program 
+
+known as “Fast and Furious”? Is the program still active? 
+
+• Who at ATF Headquarters approved the program? 
+• Who in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona approved the 
+
+program? On what authority did the office approve the program? 
+
+• Did ATF or the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Phoenix coordinate the “Fast and 
+
+Furious” program with the Department of Justice? Did the department approve 
+the strategy? 
+
+• What changes or improvements has ATF made to its eTrace program and its 
+
+ability to use intelligence to target gun trafficking organizations in general? 
+
+• Does ATF view the “Fast and Furious” program as a success?” 
+
+DOJ responded to Representative Smith to say that the matter was under investigation. 
+
+On March 31, 2011, Representative Darrell Issa, chairman of the Committee on Oversight and 
+Government Reform, issued a subpoena, the first of two, to DOJ and ATF for documents related 
+to Project Gunrunner following several unanswered requests for information related to ATF’s 
+anti-gun trafficking efforts on the Southwest Border.204 
+
+On May 3, 2011, Representative Issa questioned Attorney General Holder about Operation Fast 
+and Furious at a House Committee on the Judiciary hearing on DOJ oversight. The Attorney 
+General testified that he had only heard about Operation Fast and Furious “over the last few 
+weeks.” In turn, on May 4, 2011, Representative Issa released DOJ documents that arguably 
+supported allegations that DOJ officials knew more about Operation Fast and Furious than they 
+had previously admitted. These documents included the following: 
+
+• A January 8, 2010, memorandum from the ATF Phoenix Field Division Office on 
+
+Operation Fast and Furious noting the involvement of U.S. Attorney for the 
+District of Arizona Dennis Burke, who was in “full agreement with the current 
+investigative strategy.” The memo states that “currently our strategy is to allow 
+the transfer of firearms to continue to take place … in order to further the 
+investigation and allow for the identification of additional co-conspirators who 
+
+ 
+
+202 Pete Yost, “Justice IG to Look into Anti-Gun Efforts on Border,” Associated Press Online , March 4, 2011. 
+203 James V. Grimaldi, “ATF Faces Federal Review Over Tactics to Foil Gunrunning Rings,” Washington Post , March 
+10, 2011, p. A04. 
+204 Press Release, “Chairman Issa Subpoenas ATF for ‘Project Gunrunner’ Documents,” April 1, 2011. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+
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+
+ 
+
+would continue to operate and illegally traffic firearms to Mexican [Drug 
+Trafficking Organizations].” 
+
+• A March 10, 2010, memorandum from DOJ Criminal Division Assistant Attorney 
+
+General Lanny Breuer that authorized a wiretap application and arguably 
+revealed a high level of participation in and knowledge of Operation Fast and 
+Furious. 
+
+• A March 10, 2011, email referencing a directive from the Deputy Attorney 
+
+General ordering law enforcement agents not to “design or conduct undercover 
+operations which include guns crossing the border.” The email clarifies that this 
+includes “cases where we are working with the Mexican government to have 
+them follow the vehicles once they are in Mexico.”205 
+
+On June 13, 2011, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a hearing on the 
+department’s legal obligation to respond to congressional subpoena.206 On June 14, 2011, 
+Representative Issa and Senator Grassley issued a joint staff report on Operation Fast and 
+Furious,207 which chronicled that ATF line supervisors became increasingly concerned when they 
+witnessed hundreds of firearms being illegally transferred during surveillance operations, but they 
+were reportedly directed not to arrest the suspects and interdict those firearms. Those agents 
+contend that this was a questionable departure from past investigative practices. On June 15, 
+2011, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a hearing on these 
+matters. Representative Issa expressed his concern that DOJ had not been entirely cooperative 
+with his committee’s efforts to investigate how some of those firearms found their way to crime 
+scenes in Mexico and on the Southwest border.208 
+
+Following the hearing, on June 29, 2011, Representative Elijah E. Cummings, the committee’s 
+ranking minority Member, issued a report and held a forum during which the minority explored 
+issues raised by some of those same ATF line supervisors, who had suggested during the House 
+hearing that the penalties for firearm straw purchases under current law are arguably not stringent 
+enough. The minority also discussed other gun control proposals related to gun shows, 
+semiautomatic assault weapons, sniper rifles, and additional penalties for gun trafficking 
+offenses.209 
+
+ 
+
+205 Press Release, “What Attorney General Holder Won’t Tell on Controversial Gun Operation, Documents Do,” May 
+4, 2011. 
+206 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Obstruction of Justice: Does the Justice 
+Department Have to Respond to a Lawfully Issued and Valid Congressional Subpoena , 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 13, 
+2012, Serial No. 112-61 (Washington: GPO, 2012). 
+207 U.S. Congress, Joint Staff Report, Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Accounts of ATF Agents , 
+prepared for Representative Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, United States House of Representatives, Committee on 
+Oversight and Government Reform, and Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, United States Senate, 
+Committee on the Judiciary, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 2011, http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Reports/
+ATF_Report.pdf. 
+208 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Operation Fast and Furious: Reckless 
+Decisions, Tragic Outcomes , 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2012, Serial No. 112-64 (Washington: GPO, 2012). 
+209 U.S. Congress, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Minority Staff Report, Outgunned: Law 
+Enforcement Agents Warn Congress They Lack Adequate Tools to Counter Illegal Firearms Trafficking , 112th Cong., 
+1st sess., June 30, 2011, http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/
+OUTGUNNED%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf. On July 15, 2011, Representative Carolyn 
+B. Maloney introduced the Stop Gun Trafficking and Strengthen Law Enforcement Act of 2011 (H.R. 2554). Original 
+cosponsors included Representative Cummings and Representative Carolyn McCarthy. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
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+
+ 
+
+On July 26, 2011, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a follow-up 
+hearing entitled “Operation Fast and Furious: The Other Side of the Border.” As preceded the 
+earlier hearing, a joint staff report was issued.210 This report found that ATF and DOJ leadership 
+had not informed its own Attaché serving in Mexico City, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, nor 
+the Mexican authorities about the investigation.211 As recovered firearms in Mexico increased, the 
+ATF Attaché in Mexico City became more alarmed and contacted his superiors at ATF 
+headquarters to express his grave concerns about the implications that this increased flow of 
+illegal firearms could have for both Mexican and U.S. law enforcement officers as well as the 
+public on both sides of the border. He and others were told by both ATF and DOJ officials that the 
+investigation was under control and was having positive results.212 As noted above, however, 
+Border Patrol Agent Terry was killed in a firefight in December 2010, and firearms connected to 
+Operation Fast and Furious were found at the site of that firefight. 
+
+In July 2011, the Washington Post reported that Operation Fast and Furious ultimately involved 
+2,020 firearms, of which 227 had been recovered in Mexico and 363 had been recovered in the 
+United States.213 The investigation resulted in indictments of 20 individuals on multiple counts of 
+straw purchasing and other federal offenses.214 While ATF officials maintained that the 
+investigation had yet to be concluded and additional arrests of “high-level traffickers” might be 
+forthcoming,215 no additional arrests have been made. 
+
+As called for originally by Senator Grassley, the House Committee on Appropriations included 
+report language with the Commerce-Justice-Science (CJS) appropriations bill (H.R. 2596; 
+H.Rept. 112-169) that recommended the appointment of “an outside, independent investigator,” 
+who would be charged with conducting “a thorough investigation of the allegations against ATF 
+with respect to Operation Fast and Furious and policies guiding this and similar operations.” In 
+addition, the House committee called on both DOJ and ATF to cooperate fully with related 
+oversight investigations, whether they were conducted by congressional committees, the DOJ 
+OIG, or an independent investigator. Conversely, the Senate Appropriations Committee included 
+report language with the CJS appropriations bill (S. 1572; S.Rept. 112-78) that stated that the 
+OIG would fulfill its oversight duties, and that Operation Fast and Furious was but a small part of 
+ATF’s Southwest border operations, which should not detract from the agency’s efforts to protect 
+Americans from illegal gun trafficking and other forms of cross-border crime. Conference report 
+language accompanying the Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2012 (H.R. 2112; P.L. 
+112-55) does not call for an independent investigator, but it does call on both DOJ and ATF to 
+cooperate fully with congressional oversight efforts (H.Rept. 112-284, p. 240). 
+
+On August 30, 2011, among the fallout from Operation Fast and Furious, U.S. Attorney for the 
+District of Arizona Dennis K. Burke resigned216 and ATF Acting Director Melson was reassigned 
+ 
+
+210 U.S. Congress, Joint Staff Report, Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Fueling Cartel Violence , 
+prepared for Representative Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, United States House of Representatives, Committee on 
+Oversight and Government Reform and Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, United States Senate, 
+Committee on the Judiciary, 112th Cong., 1st sess., July 26, 2011. 
+211 Ibid, p. 27. 
+212 Ibid. 
+213 Sari Horwitz, “A Gunrunning Sting Gone Fatally Wrong: Operation Meant to Seize Firearms Bound for Cartels 
+Allows Weapons into the Streets,” Washington Post , July 26, 2011, p. A1. 
+214 Ibid. 
+215 Ibid. 
+216 Jerry Markon and Sari Horwitz, “ATF Head Removed Amid Furor Over Guns,” Washington Post , August 31, 2011, 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+
+ 
+
+to the DOJ Office of Legal Policy.217 In Melson’s place, U.S. Attorney for the District of 
+Minnesota B. Todd Jones was appointed interim acting ATF Director.218 However, Jones is not 
+President Obama’s nominee for ATF Director.219 The President’s nominee remains Andrew 
+Traver, the ATF Chicago Special Agent in Charge.220 
+
+On September 23, 2011, Representative Smith sent Attorney General Holder a second letter 
+expressing his continuing concerns about Operation Fast and Furious, as well as the appointment 
+of an acting ATF director who would be focused on both his duties as ATF acting director and 
+U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota. He noted a provision in the FY2010 Omnibus 
+Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117) requires each U.S. Attorney to reside in the district in which he 
+serves, and questioned how Jones would be able to serve simultaneously in Minnesota as U.S. 
+Attorney and Washington as ATF acting director. As a follow-up to his March 9 letter, 
+Representative Smith asked DOJ to respond to the following questions by October 21, 2011: 
+
+• “Is the Department considering additional staff changes at ATF in response to 
+
+ Fast and Furious ? 
+
+• How does the Department justify accepting the resignation of the U.S. Attorney 
+
+while the ATF’s managers in charge of Fast and Furious appear to have faced no 
+discipline? 
+
+• What role did the Department play in oversight of Operation Fast and Furious ? 
+• Does Todd Jones intend to maintain his residence in Minnesota while serving as 
+
+acting director of ATF? 
+
+ 
+(...continued) 
+p. A01. 
+217 U.S. Department of Justice, Department of Justice Announces New Acting Director of ATF and Senior Advisor in 
+the Office of Legal Policy, press release, August 30, 2011. 
+218 Ibid. 
+219 Sari Horwitz, “Trying to Steady a Shaken ATF: Acting Director Hopes to Rebuild Morale After Fury Over Tactics 
+in Gun-Trafficking Operation,” Washington Post , September 2, 2011, p. A16. 
+220 Section 504 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177; March 9, 2006; 
+120 Stat. 247) requires the ATF Director to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
+The position of ATF Director, however, has not been filled permanently since August 2006, after ATF Director Carl J. 
+Truscott resigned due to preliminary findings by the DOJ OIG that he had engaged in questionable expenditures and 
+management practices while serving as ATF Director. In September 2006, President George W. Bush appointed the 
+U.S. Attorney for the District of Boston, Michael J. Sullivan, acting ATF Director. Sullivan served in both posts 
+concurrently. In February 2008, his confirmation as ATF Director was blocked in the Senate, when several Senators 
+voiced their concern about ATF’s “overly aggressive” enforcement of gun laws and the nominee’s views on such 
+matters. Sullivan resigned as acting ATF Director on January 20, 2009. Ronnie Carter served as acting Director until 
+April 2009, when Kenneth Melson was appointed acting Director. In November 2009, Melson was appointed acting 
+Deputy Director, because the 210-day statutory limit on the acting Director’s tenure had expired. On November 17, 
+2010, the Obama Administration nominated Andrew Traver, the ATF Special Agent in Charge in Chicago, to be ATF 
+Director. Because the Senate did not act on this nomination in the 111th Congress, Traver was renominated by the 
+Administration on January 5, 2011. See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Oversight and 
+Review Division, Report of Investigation Concerning Alleged Mismanagement and Misconduct by Carl J. Truscott , 
+ Former Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (October 2006). Jonathan Saltzman, 
+“Sullivan ATF Confirmation Blocked; La. Senator Objects to Gun-License Stance,” Boston Globe , February 14, 2008, 
+p. B1. Jonathan Saltzman, “US Attorney To Resign Sooner Than Expected: List of Finalists for Post Not Yet Sent To 
+Obama,” Boston Globe , April 16, 2009, p. 2. Andrew Ramanos, “Senate Returns ATF Nomination to White House,” 
+ Main Justice: Politics, Policy and the Law , December 23, 2010. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
+“Presidential Nominations Sent to the Senate,” January 5, 2011. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
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+ 
+
+• Is the Department confident that the ATF can fulfill its mission with a part-time 
+
+director who is based in Minnesota? 
+
+• Have you issued a waiver of the residency requirement for Todd Jones under 28 
+
+U.S.C. §545? If so, for what period does the waiver extend?” 
+
+In addition, Representative Smith reiterated his concern about how the department had responded 
+to congressional inquiries about Operation Fast and Furious. He noted for the record that the 
+department had only answered one out of six questions he submitted in his March 9 letter. He 
+raised concerns about what appeared to be deliberate attempts by the department to obscure the 
+facts about Operation Fast and Furious. As an example, Representative Smith raised the 
+department’s description of the ballistic tests on the two semiautomatic rifles found at the site of 
+Border Patrol Agent Terry’s murder. The department apparently stated that the tests showed that 
+neither firearm was used to fire the fatal shot; however, Representative Smith countered that the 
+tests were inconclusive one way or another. Furthermore, Representative Smith raised an issue 
+about an audio recording on which a federal agent reportedly mentioned a third firearm linked to 
+Operation Fast and Furious that had been found at Agent Terry’s murder scene. 
+
+On October 12, 2011, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform issued a second 
+subpoena to DOJ for all departmental communications and documents “referring or related to 
+Operation Fast and Furious, the Jacob Chambers Case, or any Organized Crime Drug 
+Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) firearms trafficking cases based in Phoenix, Arizona.”221 
+According to a press release, Representative Issa said, “The documents this subpoena demands 
+will provide answers to questions that Justice officials have tried to avoid [answering] since this 
+investigation began eight months ago.”222 On October 16, 2011, Representative Issa and Sharyl 
+Attkisson—the CBS correspondent who broke the Operation Fast and Furious story 
+nationally223—appeared on Face the Nation with Bob Schieffer.224 Both Representative Issa and 
+Ms. Attkisson discussed the possibility that a third firearm had been found at Agent Terry’s 
+murder scene. According to Ms. Attkisson, audio recordings had surfaced on which the ATF 
+supervisory special agent in charge of Operation Fast and Furious made mention of a third 
+firearm, an SKS rifle, that was possibly linked to a confidential informant working for either the 
+FBI or DEA.225 Representative Cummings has called on the Committee on Oversight and 
+Government Reform to hear testimony again from former ATF Acting Director Melson as a 
+means of determining who is responsible for the conduct of this controversial gun trafficking 
+operation.226 
+
+ 
+
+221 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, “Oversight Committee 
+Subpoenas Attorney General for ‘Operation Fast and Furious’ Communications and Documents,” Press Release, 
+October 18, 2011, http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1479:oversight-
+committee-subpoenas-attorney-general-for-operation-fast-and-furious-communications-and-documents-&catid=
+22:releasesstatements. 
+222 Ibid. 
+223 Katie Pavlich noted in her book on Operation Fast and Furious that two bloggers, Mike Vanderboegh and David 
+Codrea, worked together and vetted information about the operation through a network of ATF insiders, who contacted 
+them independently. Through their efforts, “the story” moved from “blogs” to “mainstream media.” See Katie Pavlich, 
+ Fast and Furious: Barack Obama’s Bloodiest Scandal and Its Shameless Cover-up , 2012, p. 75. 
+224 CBS News, “Face the Nation” Transcript: October 15, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-20121072/
+face-the-nation-transcript-october-16-2011/. 
+225 Ibid. 
+226 “Cummings Responds to Issa’s Accusations of FBI Evidence Tampering,” States News Service , October 17, 2011. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+
+ 
+
+On October 18, 2011, Senator John Cornyn offered an amendment (S.Amdt. 775) to the FY2012 
+minibus appropriations bill (H.R. 2112), which included the Senate-reported FY2012 CJS 
+appropriations bill (S. 1572), to prohibit the expenditure of any funding provided under that bill, 
+if enacted, to conduct criminal investigations that allowed firearms to be transferred knowingly to 
+agents of drug cartels and U.S. law enforcement was unable to continuously monitor or control 
+such firearms at all times. This amendment passed 99-0 (Record Vote Number: 167). On 
+November 1, 2011, the Senate passed H.R. 2112. The conference report version of H.R. 2112 
+(H.Rept. 112-284), which both the House and Senate passed and the President signed into law 
+(P.L. 112-55), includes a modified version of the Senate-passed Cornyn amendment. The 
+modified provision (§219) prohibits the expenditure of any funding provided under P.L. 112-55 to 
+be used by a federal law enforcement officer to transfer an operable firearm to a person suspected 
+or known to be connected to a drug cartel without that firearm being continuously monitored or 
+controlled. 
+
+On November 1, 2011, Lanny Breuer, the Assistant Attorney General for DOJ’s Criminal 
+Division, testified before the Senate Judiciary’s Crime and Terrorism Subcommittee at a hearing 
+on International Organized Crime.227 During the hearing, Senator Grassley acknowledged a 
+statement made by Breuer on the previous day regarding a 2006-2007 Phoenix-based ATF 
+investigation known as Operation Wide Receiver. With regard to that operation, Breuer said he 
+first became aware of the “gun walking” strategy in April 2010, and it concerned him. However, 
+he did not take his concerns about “gun walking” directly to the Attorney General. Instead, his 
+subordinate spoke to “ATF leadership” about his concerns. Breuer testified that about 350 
+firearms were allowed to “walk” as part of Operation Wide Receiver, but he failed to make 
+possible connections between Operation Wide Receiver and Operation Fast and Furious with 
+regard to “gun walking.” Nevertheless, in his October 31, 2011, statement, Breuer characterized 
+“gun walking” as “unacceptable and misguided.”228 Breuer also testified that over the past nearly 
+five-year period, ATF had processed 94,000 firearm trace requests for Mexican authorities. Of 
+those firearms, 64,000 were “traced” to the United States. In addition, on November 4, 2011, the 
+ Huffington Post reported that nearly 700 firearms linked to Operation Fast and Furious had been 
+recovered: 276 in Mexico and 389 in the United States, according to ATF data through October 
+20, 2011.229 
+
+On November 8, 2011, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a DOJ oversight hearing, at 
+which Senators Grassley and Cornyn questioned Attorney General Holder at length about 
+Operation Fast and Furious. The Attorney General conceded that a February 4, 2011, letter from 
+DOJ to congressional investigators contained “inaccurate” information regarding the depth of 
+knowledge that departmental officials had of ATF’s use of the “gun walking” tactic.230 In addition, 
+the Attorney General qualified Breuer’s earlier statement about 64,000 firearms recovered in 
+Mexico having been “traced” back to the United States. As described below, only about a quarter 
+of the 94,000 firearms submitted for tracing were probably ever fully traced back to the first U.S. 
+ 
+
+227 Combating International Organized Crime: Evaluating Current Authorities, Tools, and Resources: Hearing before 
+the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism , 112th Congress, November 1, 2011 
+(CQ Congressional Transcripts). 
+228 U.S. Department of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer Issues Statement On ‘Operation Wide 
+Receiver’, October 31, 2011. 
+229 Pete Yost, “Fast and Furious-Like ‘Gun-Walking’ Probe Mentioned In 2007 Bush Administration Memo,” 
+ Huffington Post, November 4, 2011. 
+230 Jerry Jarkon, “Holder Amends remarks On Gun Sting: Attorney General Heard of ‘Fast and Furious’ Earlier Than 
+He First Said,” Washington Post , November 9, 2011, p. A2. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
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+
+retail owner of record. Consequently, the Attorney General stated that 64,000 of those firearms 
+were “sourced” to the United States, in that they were either originally manufactured in, or 
+imported into, the United States. However, no additional information was given about the 25,000 
+or so firearms that were eventually fully traced back to the United States, such as time-to-
+recovery or most frequently traced firearms (by type, make, model, and caliber). 
+
+On December 2, 2011, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole wrote both Representative Issa 
+and Senator Grassley and again conceded that the February 4 letter to Senator Grassley from 
+Assistant Attorney General Weich included inaccuracies arguably based upon responses that the 
+department had initially received from the ATF leadership and the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 
+Arizona.231 DOJ formally withdrew that letter.232 
+
+On December 8, 2011, the House Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on DOJ oversight 
+and heard testimony from Attorney General Holder. However, Operation Fast and Furious was 
+clearly the predominant issue before the committee.233 More specifically, at issue was who within 
+DOJ management had knowledge of and, by extension, responsibility for the operation. For 
+example, at a May 3, 2011, DOJ oversight hearing, Attorney General Holder testified that he had 
+only heard about Operation Fast and Furious “over the last few weeks.”234 On the other hand, 
+internal DOJ documents obtained by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee 
+suggest that several high-level managers within the department were aware of, and possibly 
+helped direct, ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious.235 There were also emails between William 
+Newell, the then-ATF Phoenix Special Agent in Charge, and at least one staff member of the 
+National Security Council in which “updates” on Operation Fast and Furious were provided.236 
+
+On January 31, 2012, Chairman Smith sent the Attorney General a third letter, in which he 
+admonished DOJ’s stalling tactics and selective releases of materials related to the operation. In 
+the letter, he surmised that “It is past time for the Department to provide a full and honest 
+accounting of Operation Fast and Furious with details about its conception, approval, and who 
+knew what when.”237 
+
+On February 2, 2012, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee held its fourth 
+hearing related to Operation Fast and Furious, during which Attorney General Holder was 
+questioned at length about possible false statements, and other questionable responses to repeated 
+ 
+
+231 Letter from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole to Representative Darrell E. Issa, Chairman of the Committee 
+on Oversight and Government Reform, and Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on the 
+Judiciary, regarding Drafting of DOJ February 4, 2011 Letter to Senator Grassley, December 2, 2011, 
+http://www.grassley.senate.gov/judiciary/upload/ATF-12-02-11-Cover-letter-from-Cole-on-Document-Drop.pdf. 
+232 Ibid. 
+233 Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary , 112th Congress, 
+December 8, 2011 (CQ Congressional Transcripts). 
+234 Oversight Hearing on the United States Department of Justice: Hearing before the House Committee on the 
+Judiciary , 112th Congress, May 3, 2011 (CQ Congressional Transcripts). 
+235 Press release, “Issa to Holder: ‘You Own Fast and Furious,” October 10, 2011, http://oversight.house.gov/
+index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1474&Itemid=29. See also, Jackie Hicken, “All Eyes on Holder as 
+Memos Suggest He Knew More About Guns Being Walked to Mexican Drug Cartels,” Desert Morning News , October 
+4, 2011. 
+236 Sharyl Attkisson, “ATF Investigation Expands to White House Staffers,” CBS News , September 9, 2011. 
+237 Letter from Representative Lamar Smith, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, to Attorney General 
+Eric H. Holder, Jr., regarding interviews with senior Department of Justice staff about Operation Fast and Furious, 
+January 31, 2012, http://judiciary.house.gov/news/pdfs/01312012%20Letter%20to%20ATG.pdf. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
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+
+congressional inquiries, that were made with regard to this operation by the department.238 As a 
+counterpoint, Representative Cummings noted that his staff had prepared a report that 
+documented that “gun walking” operations had been conducted by the ATF and U.S. Attorney’s 
+Arizona Office as part of several Southwest border gun trafficking investigations.239 In addition to 
+Wide Receiver (2006-2007), this report describes two other Phoenix-based ATF investigations 
+that involved gun walking: Hernandez (2007) and Medrano (2008). Representative Cummings 
+also argued that former Attorney General Michael Mukasey ought to be called before the 
+committee to testify, because the gun-walking tactics had originated during the Administration of 
+President George W. Bush. 
+
+Also of note, during the hearing, Representative Stephen Lynch questioned the Attorney General 
+about DOJ oversight of several sensitive investigative techniques, including gun walking, leading 
+him to observe the following: 
+
+The problem here is that this tactic actually authorized—it puts law enforcement, Federal law 
+enforcement in a position of authorizing criminal activity. They become complicit in it. 
+That’s very troubling, especially when it results in the death of a very brave, courageous 
+agent or to innocent American civilian citizens. 
+
+And what is especially troubling is that I believe that you didn’t know about it. I believe that 
+you didn’t know about it. But that’s not a comfort to me. It is unbelievable that either the 
+Phoenix field office or the Boston office of the FBI can authorize criminal activity,240 not 
+just a mere tactic, but a whole strategy of using that outside of the law, and then having 
+innocent civilians killed. 
+
+So I actually think that one of the solutions might be for Congress to pass a law that says, if 
+there are those limited occasions where we are going to authorize criminal activity to go on 
+in our society under the cover of law enforcement’s authority, then either yourself, as the 
+Attorney General, or the director of the FBI or the head of the ATF has to sign off on it 
+because here, everyone escaped responsibility because of plausible deniability. They can say, 
+I didn’t know about it.241 
+
+Attorney General Holder responded: 
+
+I think that’s a legitimate question. I think we don’t want to go too far in this sense in that 
+law enforcement will engage in illegal activity in an attempt to solve crimes. We engage in 
+illegal activity when we are—when we buy drugs from people who are selling drugs. We 
+engage in illegal activity when we pay corrupt public officials money, when we go into 
+
+ 
+
+238 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Operation Fast and Furious: 
+Management Failures at the Department of Justice , 112th Cong., 2nd sess., February 2, 2012, Serial No. 112-103 
+(Washington: GPO, 2012). 
+239 U.S. Congress, Fatally Flawed: Five Years of Gunwalking in Arizona , House Committee on Oversight and 
+Government Reform, Minority Staff Report, 112th Cong., 2nd Sess., January 2012, http://www.scribd.com/doc/
+79930290/%E2%80%9CFatally-Flawed-Five-Years-of-Gunwalking-in-Arizona-%E2%80%9D?tw_p=twt. 
+240 The reference to the Boston FBI office is in regard to the misuse of “high echelon” informants in the 1960s through 
+the 1990s. For further information, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, Everything Secret 
+Degenerates: The FBI’s Use of Murderers as Informants , committee print, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2 vols., February 3, 
+2004, H.Rept. 108-414 (Washington: GPO, 2004). 
+241 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Operation Fast and Furious: 
+Management Failures at the Department of Justice , 112th Cong., 2nd sess., February 2, 2012, Serial No. 112-103 
+(Washington: GPO, 2012), p. 158. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
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+
+undercover operations. But we have to have that ability. It is an extremely important law 
+enforcement technique. But I think the point that you raise is a good one, and that is, that the 
+approval to do these kinds of activities can’t rest at the line level. There has to be supervisory 
+responsibility. And the question is, where do you draw that line?242 
+
+In addition, Representative Gerald Connolly questioned Attorney General Holder about the need 
+for tougher gun laws. The Attorney General responded that the Obama Administration had 
+consistently favored reinstituting the semiautomatic assault weapons ban. Representative 
+Connolly remarked that there had been no congressional hearing held so far on that topic or any 
+other gun control proposal, yet the Attorney General had been questioned about Operation Fast 
+and Furious on at least six previous occasions before various congressional committees. 
+Chairman Issa countered that some of those hearings were appropriations hearings, at which 
+Operation Fast and Furious was not the predominant issue. He also noted that, to date, the Obama 
+Administration had not submitted any gun control-related legislative proposals to Congress. In 
+turn, Representative Connolly asked the Attorney General if that were so. While the Attorney 
+General did not comment upon any Administration-requested legislative proposals, he replied that 
+he would be happy to submit a proposal to Congress for consideration and added that he thought 
+that an anti-gun trafficking bill (H.R. 2554) introduced by Representative Carolyn Maloney 
+would make a good starting point.243 (H.R. 2554 is described below under “Gun Trafficking-
+Related Proposals in the 112th Congress”) 
+
+On February 14, 2012, Chairman Issa sent the Attorney General a follow-up letter, in which he 
+conveyed the committee’s increasing frustration with the department. He questioned, among other 
+things, why Patrick Cunningham, the former Criminal Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 
+Arizona, asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination rather than testify 
+before the committee. Regarding outstanding committee requests for documents and other 
+information related to the operation, Representative Issa emphasized that the committee’s 
+subpoena is not optional, and that a failure to produce the requested documents was a violation of 
+federal law. He went on to write that “By any measure, the Department has obstructed and slowed 
+our [the committee’s] work.”244 
+
+On May 3, 2012, Representative Issa, chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government 
+Reform, released a staff briefing paper and draft resolution to cite Attorney General Holder in 
+contempt of Congress for not complying with subpoenas issued by the committee for DOJ 
+documents related to Operation Fast and Furious. The staff briefing paper included the following 
+statement, alleging that “For over a year, the Department has issued false denials, given answers 
+intended to misdirect investigators, sought to intimidate witnesses, unlawfully withheld 
+subpoenaed documents, and waited to be confronted with indisputable evidence before 
+acknowledging uncomfortable facts.”245 
+
+ 
+
+242 Ibid., pp. 158-159. 
+243 Ibid., pp. 162-164. 
+244 Letter from Representative Darrell Issa, Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
+to Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., regarding an October 12, 2011, subpoena for Operation Fast and Furious-
+related documents and a February 1, 2012, departmental request for a deadline extension for those documents, February 
+14, 2012, http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Letters/2012-02-14_DEI_to_Holder-DOJ_-_Contempt.pdf. 
+245 Memorandum from Representative Darrell Issa, Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government 
+Reform, to Members of the Committee, regarding an “Update on Operation Fast and Furious,” May 3, 2012, p. 10. For 
+a copy of this staff briefing paper and draft resolution report, go to http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/
+05/Update-on-Fast-and-Furious-with-attachment-FINAL.pdf. 
+
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+
+On May 10, 2012, during House consideration of the FY2013 CJS Appropriations bill (H.R. 
+5326), two amendments were passed that also addressed Operation Fast and Furious. 
+Representative Trey Gowdy offered an amendment (H.Amdt. 1049) that reduced the DOJ General 
+Administration account by $1.0 million and applied it to the spending reduction account. 
+Representative Gowdy expressed his dissatisfaction with DOJ officials who have not complied 
+with a committee subpoenas for greater information about Operation Fast and Furious. The 
+Gowdy amendment passed by voice vote. Representatives Jason Chaffetz, Paul Gosar, and Blake 
+Farenthold offered an amendment (H.Amdt. 1068) that would prohibit the expenditure of any 
+funding provided under the bill in contravention to a criminal provision related to fraud and false 
+statements (18 U.S.C. §1001(a)). This amendment was passed on a recorded vote: 381-41 (Roll 
+no. 226). 
+
+On June 7, 1012, the House Committee on the Judiciary held a DOJ oversight hearing, in which 
+Attorney General Holder was questioned by the chairman and other Members about his and other 
+“high-level officials” knowledge about Operation Fast and Furious, and its underlying tactics that 
+allegedly allowed firearms to be transferred to known and suspected associates of Mexican drug 
+trafficking organizations. 
+
+On June 11, 2012, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform issued a press release 
+announcing that it would meet to consider a staff briefing paper and draft resolution (described 
+above) holding Attorney General Eric Holder in contempt of Congress for his failure to produce 
+subpoenaed documents related to Operation Fast and Furious.246 On June 20, 2012, the committee 
+approved a report (H.Rept. 112-546) and accompanying resolution (unnumbered) to hold 
+Attorney General Holder in contempt of Congress for his failure to produce subpoenaed 
+documents related to Operation Fast and Furious, prompted in part by the President’s assertion of 
+executive privilege rather than turning over additional documents to the committee. Following 
+consideration of several amendments, the committee approved the report by a vote of 23-17. 
+
+On June 28, 2012, the House approved a resolution (H.Res. 711) that accompanied the report 
+described above and cited the Attorney General with contempt by a vote of 255 to 67 (Roll call 
+no. 441). While over 100 Democrats boycotted the vote, the votes taken split down party lines, 
+with the exception of 17 Democrats who voted yea and two Republicans who voted nay. 
+Previously, a motion offered by Representative John Dingell to refer the measure back to 
+committee was defeated by a vote of 172-251 (Roll call no. 440). The House approved a related 
+resolution (H.Res. 706) that authorizes the committee to initiate or intervene in judicial 
+proceedings to enforce certain subpoenas by a vote of 258-95 (Roll call no. 442), with 21 
+Democrats voting yea and no Republicans voting nay.247 
+
+During floor debate, Members who favored the contempt resolution asserted that this measure is 
+about government transparency and accountability and is a good faith effort to help bring closure 
+to the grieving family of slain Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry. They noted that DOJ has provided 
+less than 8,000 of the 140,000 pages of documents that it has handed over to its Inspector General 
+regarding Operation Fast and Furious. Moreover, they underscored that it took 10 months for 
+DOJ to concede that guns had been allowed to “walk” across the border, and that DOJ did so only 
+after being confronted with a mass of internal documents provided to the committee largely by 
+
+ 
+
+246 http://oversight.house.gov/fastandfuriousinvestigation/. 
+247 For further information, see CRS Report RL34097, Congress’s Contempt Power and the Enforcement of 
+Congressional Subpoenas: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure , by Todd Garvey and Alissa M. Dolan. 
+
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+whistleblowers. They argued further that the Administration would not have asserted executive 
+privilege unless there was something to hide. They also argued that mounting evidence supports 
+the argument that high-level Administration officials purposefully embraced this risky and highly 
+inappropriate investigative technique—gun walking—in an ill-fated attempt to build a major gun 
+trafficking case that would net a cartel kingpin, a high-level plaza boss, or his enforcers. 
+
+Members who opposed the contempt resolution countered that it is nothing more than “election-
+year political theater” and a “witch hunt,” and that Attorney General Holder is being unjustly 
+disparaged. They countered that the Attorney General has been unprecedentedly open with the 
+committee by providing over 7,600 pages of documents and has been questioned at length about 
+Operation Fast and Furious at no less than nine congressional hearings. Furthermore, they 
+asserted that the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s majority did not honor any 
+requests made by the minority for witnesses or hearings related to “gun walking” and/or “gun 
+trafficking.” They submitted that a bipartisan, impartial investigation would have also examined 
+the investigative techniques employed during the previous Administration, which they contend 
+are examples of gun walking that possibly led to Operation Fast and Furious. Opponents also 
+noted for the record that the majority has not considered any proposals to strengthen gun laws and 
+address the criminal appetite for firearms in Mexico—particularly for assault weapons—that have 
+been illegally acquired from U.S. civilian gun markets. They further underscored that the political 
+nature of the contempt vote is borne out by the fact that, in their view, the committee’s majority 
+rushed to judgment by not holding a single hearing to examine possible merits of the President’s 
+assertion of executive privilege. 
+
+On July 31, 2012, Representative Issa and Senator Grassley released a joint staff report entitled 
+ Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation .248 The first of three, this report chronicles 
+how the ATF Phoenix Field Division and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona 
+adopted controversial “gun walking” tactics that—in Representative Issa and Senator Grassley’s 
+estimation—seriously compromised public safety and likely contributed to violent crime and 
+death on both sides of the international border. 
+
+This report, moreover, examines the culpability of several ATF supervisory officials, and it 
+includes allegations that the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office misread 9th Circuit case law regarding 
+firearms straw purchases and, consequently, failed to indict suspects in a timely manner, when 
+arguably ATF agents had sufficient probable cause to arrest them. While it is clear in hindsight 
+that hundreds of firearms had been trafficked to Mexico long before the death of Border Patrol 
+Agent Terry, no indictments were filed and no arrests were made until after this tragic case. 
+
+The next two reports will reportedly examine (1) the interaction of senior DOJ officials in the 
+Criminal Division and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General with ATF headquarters, the 
+Phoenix Field Division, and the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office, and (2) alleged obstruction of the 
+Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s investigation of Operation Fast and Furious 
+by senior DOJ officials, including the Attorney General himself. 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+248 U.S. Congress, Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation (Part I of III) , Joint Staff Report Prepared for 
+Representative Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, United States House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and 
+Government Reform and Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, United States Senate, Committee on the 
+Judiciary, 112th Cong., July 31, 2012, http://oversight.house.gov/report/fast-and-furious-the-anatomy-of-a-failed-
+operation-part-1-of-3/. 
+
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+ ATF Firearms Tracing for Mexican Authorities 
+
+Although the United States does not maintain a registry of firearms or firearm owners (except for 
+machineguns and destructive devices), as described above, ATF and federally licensed gun 
+dealers maintain a decentralized system of transaction records, through which ATF can sometimes 
+trace a firearm from its manufacturer or importer to its first private owner of record.249 Over the 
+years, successful firearm traces have generated leads in criminal investigations and have 
+generated data that illustrate wider trafficking trends and patterns. 
+
+To support Project Gunrunner, ATF developed and deployed a Spanish-language version of its 
+eTrace program for Mexican authorities to submit trace requests electronically to the United 
+States. However, it should be underscored that not all firearms seized by Mexican authorities are 
+traced, and trace submissions are more likely to be made for firearms believed to have originated 
+in the United States. Moreover, problems persist with regard to the quality, quantity, and 
+timeliness of firearms trace requests made by Mexican authorities and resultant data.250 Data on 
+some firearms, for example, were submitted several times. If previous tracing trends hold true, 
+moreover, about a quarter of trace requests would have failed because the firearm make, model, 
+or serial number was erroneously entered into the system.251 It is also probable that ATF was only 
+able to identify the first private firearm owner of record or other possible sources in the United 
+States in about a quarter of trace requests. 
+
+Nonetheless, trace data have proved to be a useful indicator of trafficking trends with regard to 
+the types of firearms being trafficked, their possible sources, and how recently trafficked firearms 
+were diverted from legal to illegal channels of commerce. Along these lines, GAO recommended 
+that the Attorney General should direct ATF to regularly update its reporting on aggregate 
+firearms trace data and trends in its June 2009 Project Gunrunner report. GAO also reported that 
+ATF had traced more than 23,159 firearms from FY2004 through FY2008 for Mexican 
+authorities.252 Approximately 86.6% of those firearms were determined to have originated in the 
+United States.253 For the last three years (FY2006 through FY2008) of that study period, over 
+90% of firearms recovered in Mexico and traced by ATF were found to have originated in the 
+United States.254 Of those firearms, 68% were manufactured in the United States and 19% were 
+
+ 
+
+249 The key identifying element associated with each firearm and its related record of manufacture, importation, or 
+transfer is the firearm’s serial number. Through the firearm’s serial number, ATF can identify the manufacturer or 
+importer, contact them, and find out the wholesale or retail dealer to whom they transferred the firearm in question. In 
+recent years, many firearms manufacturers and importers have given ATF electronic access to such records in order to 
+respond to ATF trace requests more efficiently and expeditiously. By contacting the wholesale/retail dealer, ATF can 
+then identify the first retail owner of record, assuming the dealer’s recordkeeping is complete and the purchaser of the 
+firearm did not misrepresent himself by adopting a false identity. However, while the GCA requires licensed gun 
+dealers to maintain records on both new and secondhand firearm transfers, the linkage between the 
+manufacturer/importer records and the wholesale/retail dealer records is broken after the first retail sale, because there 
+is no mechanism under current law, through which ATF is informed when a secondhand firearm reenters the public 
+course of commerce by being transferred from a private person back to a licensed gun dealer. 
+250 Colby Goodman, Update on U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico Report , Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
+Scholars, Mexico Institute, April 2011, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/
+Goodman%20Update%20on%20US%20Firearms%20to%20Mexico.pdf. 
+251 Ibid. 
+252 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico 
+Face Planning and Coordination Challenges , GAO-09-709, June 2009, p. 18. 
+253 Ibid., p. 15. 
+254 Ibid. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+ 
+
+manufactured abroad and imported into the United States.255 About 70% of traced firearms were 
+found to have come from Texas (39%), California (20%), and Arizona (10%). It is notable, 
+however, that Mexican authorities had submitted only a fraction of the firearms that had been 
+recovered in Mexico. In FY2008, for example, information on only about 7,200 of the nearly 
+30,000 firearms recovered by the Mexican Attorney General’s office was submitted to ATF for 
+tracing.256 
+
+In May 2010, Mexican President Felipe Calderon addressed a joint session of Congress and 
+revealed that Mexican authorities had seized 75,000 firearms, of which 80% had been traced back 
+to the United States.257 According to ATF, this higher than previously reported number of traces 
+reflected a batch submission of trace requests made by the Mexican Attorney General that 
+changed the trace totals for previous years, which are reported by year of recovery. 
+
+In April 2011, the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City reported that ATF processed 78,194 trace 
+requests for Mexican authorities from FY2007 through FY2010.258 Based on previous trace data, 
+a large percentage of these trace requests would have involved firearms that were either 
+manufactured in or imported into the United States for civilian markets, but such a percentage 
+was not released by the Embassy.259 However, a significantly smaller percentage would have been 
+successfully traced to the first private owner of record. Noticeably absent were any data on 
+firearms with a short “time-to-recovery,”260 that is, the time interval between the initial retail sale 
+of a firearm by a federally licensed gun dealer to a private person and the firearm’s recovery by 
+law enforcement. A short time-to-recovery is one possible indicator that the firearm had been 
+trafficked or stolen. Nor did the Embassy press release include any data on type, make, model, 
+and caliber of the most frequently traced firearms. For trend analysis, such data would have been 
+useful for total firearms traced, as well as for different time periods.261 
+
+In June 2011, ATF released limited trace data to the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics 
+Control.262 The Senate Caucus reported that ATF processed 29,284 trace requests on firearms that 
+were recovered by Mexican authorities in calendar years 2009 and 2010. Of those firearms, 
+20,504 (70%) were either manufactured in or imported into the United States. ATF did not 
+ 
+
+255 Ibid., p. 16. 
+256 Ibid. 
+257 Mary Beth Sheridan, “Mexico’s Calderon Tells Congress He Needs U.S. Help in Fighting Drug Wars,” Washington 
+Post , May 21, 2010, p. A02. 
+258 U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, “Fact Sheet: Combating Arms Trafficking,” April 2011. 
+259 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico 
+Face Planning and Coordination Challenges , GAO-09-709, June 2009, pp. 5-6. 
+260 ATF employed the term “time-to-crime.” Some view “time-to-crime” as a misnomer, because some traced firearms 
+may not have been directly linked to a crime. Furthermore, their time-of-recovery by law enforcement may not reflect 
+precisely when, if ever, traced firearms were used in a crime. In addition, traced firearms might have been legally 
+imported into Mexico for civilian or military purposes. It is unknown whether ATF has access to U.S. export data that 
+would allow for the exclusion of such firearms from their trace accounts. Nevertheless, “time-to-recovery” gives policy 
+makers a rough time interval, during which traced firearms were possibly stolen or trafficked. 
+261 In several conversations with ATF officials, the author was told that the agency was reluctant to release data on the 
+make of firearms, because the press and interest groups had focused on the firearm manufacturers as being corrupt 
+causing a public relations problem, because the manufacturers were engaged in lawful activities with regards to making 
+and selling of these firearms. 
+262 ATF released limited trace data to the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control in June 2011. See U.S. 
+Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Halting U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico: A Report by Senators 
+Dianne Feinstein, Charles Schumer, and Sheldon Whitehouse , 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 2011, p. 6. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+
+ 
+
+provide any data on successful traces that resulted in identifying the first private owner of record, 
+the time-to-recovery of traced firearms, or the most frequently traced firearms by type, make, 
+model, and caliber. These omissions, in part, prompted Senator Grassley to write then ATF Acting 
+Director Kenneth Melson with “questions about why ATF provided some select information, but 
+not a more detailed analysis that would help Congress, and the American people, better 
+understand the causes and sources of illegal firearms in Mexico.”263 Senator Grassley expressed 
+his concern that press accounts that focused exclusively on U.S. manufactured or imported 
+firearms as a percentage of total trace requests submitted by Mexican authorities were 
+misleading.264 Senator Grassley also cited an article that reported that a significant quantity of 
+firearms that had been recovered by or turned over to the Mexican Army, as opposed to the 
+Mexican Attorney General, had not been submitted to ATF for tracing.265 
+
+With the limited release of trace data, it became and probably remains less clear whether the flow 
+of illegal guns consists of an “ant run” that has trickled across the border over the decades as 
+individuals or small, independent organizations have smuggled firearms into Mexico for a variety 
+of purposes, or an “iron river of guns” that has surged in recent years as Mexican DTOs have 
+sought to arm themselves with firearms that are commonly available on the U.S. civilian market. 
+When available, trace data suggest that the majority of firearms submitted for tracing originated 
+in the United States, given that these firearms were either embossed with a U.S. manufacturer or 
+importer’s stamp. However, it is probable that a much smaller percentage of these firearms were 
+successfully traced to the first U.S. private owner of record. More importantly, several substantive 
+methodological limitations preclude using trace data as a proxy for the larger population of crime 
+guns in Mexico or the United States. While the United States could be the largest source of crime 
+guns in Mexico, trace data do not conclusively establish that assertion as fact. In addition, another 
+consideration could be the possibility that the 78,000 firearms that were submitted by Mexico’s 
+Attorney General for tracing represent a proverbial “pig in the python.” Unknown, but possibly 
+significant, percentages of these firearms could have been illegally smuggled into Mexico over 
+decades. Moreover, while there is little evidence to suggest that Mexican DTOs are acquiring 
+military grade firearms directly from sources within the United States, these organizations are 
+arguably capable of acquiring such firearms and other military armaments (e.g., recoilless rifles, 
+rocket launchers, and grenades) from other illicit, international sources given the profitability of 
+the illegal drug trade. 
+
+In the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-55; H.R. 2112), 
+conferees included report language (H.Rept. 112-284, p. 240) that requires ATF to provide the 
+Committees on Appropriations with annual data on the total number of firearms recovered by the 
+government of Mexico, and of those, the number for which an ATF trace is attempted, the number 
+successfully traced and the number determined to be manufactured in or imported into the United 
+States prior to being recovered in Mexico. 
+
+On April 26, 2012, in compliance with the provision described above, ATF released revised but 
+limited trace data for calendar years 2007 through 2011. ATF underscored that the government of 
+ 
+
+263 Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley to Acting ATF Director Kenneth Melson, regarding the selective release of 
+firearms trace data, June 16, 2011, http://grassley.senate.gov/judiciary/upload/Guns-06-16-11-signed-letter-to-Melson-
+incomplete-gun-data.pdf. 
+264 Ibid. 
+265 For example, Senator Grassley cited a news report in which it was reported that, in May 2009, the Mexican Army 
+held over 305,424 recovered weapons, the bulk of which had not been traced by ATF. See E. Eduardo Castillo, “AP 
+IMPACT: Mexico’s Weapons Cache Stymies Tracing,” Associated Press Online , May 7, 2009. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
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+
+ 
+
+Mexico did not and does not provide it with data on the total number of firearms seized in that 
+country, nor did the agency make any attempt to estimate the number of firearms seized in that 
+country. Nevertheless, of 99,691 firearms submitted by Mexican authorities to ATF for tracing for 
+those calendar years (2007-2011), 68,161 (68.3%) were considered to be U.S.-sourced, in that 
+those firearms were either originally manufactured in or imported into the United States. Of those 
+U.S.-sourced firearms, 27,825 (27.9%) were traced back to the initial purchaser, or the first retail 
+purchaser of record. And, another 1,461 (1.4%) of those U.S.-sourced firearms were legitimately 
+exported to Mexico from a U.S. gun dealer to a Mexican law enforcement or government agency. 
+While ATF did not provide any data on the make, model, or caliber of (1) U.S.-sourced firearms, 
+(2) firearms traced back to the initial purchaser, or (3) traced firearms with a short time-to-
+recovery, it did provide breakdowns by type of firearm. ATF noted that the percentage of firearms 
+submitted for tracing that were rifles had shifted markedly during those years. For example, for 
+2007 rifles accounted for 28.2% of firearms submitted for tracing. That percentage increased to 
+58.6% for 2010 and decreased somewhat to 43.3% for 2011.266 
+
+ Veterans, Mental Incompetency, and Firearms Eligibility 
+
+The 112th Congress has revisited the issue of veterans, mental incompetency, and firearms 
+eligibility. On July 22, 2011, the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs Subcommittee on 
+Disability and Memorials marked up and reported a veterans’ benefits bill (H.R. 2349). During 
+markup, Representative Denny Rehberg successfully offered an amendment to the bill that would 
+prohibit the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) from determining a beneficiary to be mentally 
+incompetent for the purposes of gun control, unless such a determination were made by a judge, 
+magistrate, or other judicial authority based upon a finding that the beneficiary posed a danger to 
+himself or others. As described below, similar amendments were considered in the 110th and 111th 
+Congresses. On October 6, 2011, the full committee approved this bill. On October 11, 2011, the 
+House passed H.R. 2349 by a voice vote. It includes the Rehberg amendment, which reflects a 
+bill (H.R. 1898) that Representative Rehberg previously introduced on May 13, 2011. Senator 
+Burr introduced a similar bill (S. 1707) on October 13, 2011. 
+
+Proponents of the Veterans Second Amendment Protection Act, like the NRA, view the current 
+VA policy as placing an unwarranted indignity on men and women, in many cases at the end of 
+their lives, who have previously served their country honorably in the Armed Forces. Arguably, 
+some of those veterans referred by the VA to the FBI as having been “adjudicated as mental 
+defective” may have only been mentally incapacitated due to age or other related infirmities, as 
+opposed to suffering from a severe mental illness or disability that caused them to behave in a 
+threatening or dangerous manner. Opponents of the proposal, like the Brady Campaign, have 
+countered that the VA has demonstrated due diligence by complying with the law and, by doing 
+so, has increased public safety. They could argue further that the VA’s current policy does not 
+diminish national recognition of those veterans’ honorable service; instead, it has been 
+implemented to protect those veterans and others from the harm that might occur if they acquired 
+a firearm and used it improperly. For a fuller discussion of underlying issues, see Appendix A . 
+
+ 
+
+266 For more information, ATF has posted trace data for Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean on its website, 
+http://www.atf.gov/statistics/. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+ 
+
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ ATF FY2012 and FY2013 Appropriations 
+
+The ATF enforces federal criminal law related to the manufacture, importation, and distribution of 
+alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives. ATF works independently and through partnerships 
+with industry groups; international, state and local governments; and other federal agencies to 
+investigate and reduce crime involving firearms and explosives, acts of arson, and illegal 
+trafficking of alcohol and tobacco products. 
+
+ Figure 3. ATF Appropriations, FY2001-FY2012 
+
+(dollars in millions) 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: Department of the Treasury and Department of Justice congressional budget submissions. 
+
+ Notes: *The FY2011 appropriation includes $37.5 million that was provided to ATF under the FY2010/FY2011 
+Southwest border supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-230), because most of that funding was obligated for 
+FY2011. 
+
+Congress usually funds ATF in the Commerce-Justice-Science (CJS) appropriations bill. In the 
+absence of an enacted bill for FY2012, Congress passed a continuing resolution (P.L. 112-36) that 
+funded ATF at its FY2011 level (less 1.503%) through November 18, 2011.267 As discussed 
+further below, Congress passed full-year CJS appropriations in the Consolidated and Further 
+Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 (H.R. 2112; H.Rept. 112-284), which the President signed 
+into law (P.L. 112-55) on November 18, 2011. For FY2012, this act provided ATF with $1.152 
+billion, or nearly $39.5 million more than the previous year. In part, the increased appropriation 
+for FY2012 reflects that the FY2010/FY2011 Southwest border supplemental appropriation was 
+annualized in that year’s appropriation. As reflected in Figure 3 , if the $37.5 million 
+FY2010/FY2011 Southwest border supplemental were included in ATF’s FY2011 appropriation, 
+the FY2012 appropriation would reflect a considerably smaller increase, $2.0 million. 
+
+ 
+
+267 For further information, see CRS Report RL30343, Continuing Resolutions: Latest Action and Brief Overview of 
+Recent Practices , by Sandy Streeter. 
+
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+ 
+
+ FY2013 Request 
+
+For FY2013, the Administration has 
+
+ Figure 4. ATF Appropriations, 
+
+requested $1.153 billion for ATF. Although 
+
+ FY2013 Request 
+
+this amount reflects a net increase of about 
+$1.3 million, the FY2013 request includes no 
+new budget enhancements for ATF. Instead, it 
+anticipates over $26.9 million in savings or 
+other offsets in either contract reductions 
+($24.8 million) or information technology 
+savings ($2.1 million). As Figure 4 shows, 
+the largest portion ($875.5 million, or 76%) 
+of the requested appropriation would be 
+allocated to the firearms budget decision unit. 
+The second-largest portion ($253.7 million, or 
+
+ 
+
+22%) would be allocated to the arson and 
+
+ Source: ATF Congressional Budget Submission, 
+
+explosives budget decision unit. The 
+
+FY2013. 
+
+remainder ($23.1 million, or 2%) would be 
+allocated to the alcohol and tobacco diversion budget decision unit. By percentage, these 
+allocations are comparable to those reported by ATF to correspond with the agency’s FY2012 
+enacted appropriation. 
+
+Also of significance, the Administration’s request includes proposals to strip out futurity language 
+that was attached to two ATF appropriations riders during the FY2012 appropriations cycle 
+making those riders permanent law. The first rider prohibits ATF from consolidating or 
+centralizing within DOJ the records of firearms acquisitions and dispositions (or any portion 
+thereof) that federally licensed gun dealers are required by law to maintain. When gun dealers go 
+out of business, however, those records are forwarded to ATF. And, the second rider prohibits 
+ATF from electronically searching those out-of-business records by name or any personal 
+identification code. For evidentiary purposes, those records are maintained on microform. For 
+retrieval and storage purposes, out-of-business records are maintained in a digital format, so those 
+records may be searched electronically by firearm serial number, but not by owner (first retail 
+buyer of record). In addition, the Administration’s request would strip out futurity language 
+(inserted for FY2008 and every year thereafter) included in a controversial ATF appropriations 
+rider known as the Tiahrt amendment. For a fuller discussion of underlying issues, see Appendix 
+A . 
+
+On April 19, 2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported an FY2013 funding 
+measure (S. 2323) that would provide ATF with the same amount as requested by the 
+Administration ($1.153 billion). The Senate bill, however, does not follow the Administration’s 
+request to strip the futurity language out of ATF appropriations riders that were made permanent 
+in the previous year’s appropriations act (P.L. 112-55). On the one hand, Senate report language 
+(S.Rept. 112-158, p. 73) noted that Operation Fast and Furious was only one part of ATF’s 
+Southwest border operations to reduce illegal gun trafficking to Mexico. On the other hand, 
+language was included in the departmental general provisions that would continue to prohibit the 
+expenditure of any funding under the bill from being used to facilitate the transfer of an operable 
+firearm to a known or suspected agent of a drug cartel (§217). Another provision would continue 
+to prohibit ATF from issuing regulations that would prohibit the importation of certain types of 
+shotguns (§538). Yet another provision, which may have implications for ATF, prohibits any U.S. 
+Attorney from holding multiple jobs outside of the scope of a U.S. Attorney’s professional duty 
+
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+ 
+
+(§213). As described above, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, B. Todd Jones, is 
+currently serving as the interim acting ATF Director. 
+
+On April 26, 2012, the House Committee on Appropriations approved a similar FY2013 funding 
+measure (H.R. 5326) that would also provide the same amount for ATF ($1.153 billion). This 
+measure also includes provisions that are similar to those included in the Senate-reported bill 
+described above (§§217, 536, and 213). In addition, the House measure includes futurity language 
+in three additional long-standing prohibitions (riders) included in the ATF salaries and expenses 
+appropriations language. These provisions would prohibit ATF from 
+
+• altering the regulatory definition of “curios and relics,”268 
+• requiring federally licensed gun dealers to conduct physical inventories,”269 or 
+• revoking a federal firearms license for lack of business activity. 
+
+In addition, during House full committee markup, Representative Rehberg successfully offered an 
+amendment that would prohibit ATF from requiring multiple long gun sales reports. As described 
+below, a similar Rehberg-sponsored amendment was included in the FY2012 House bill, but it 
+was not included in an enacted bill. On May 10, 2012, the House passed H.R. 5326, amended. 
+Two amendments reduced ATF funding for FY2013 to $1.151 billion, or $537,000 less than the 
+FY2012 appropriation.270 
+
+ FY2012 Request and Appropriation 
+
+For FY2012, the Administration requested $1.147 billion for ATF.271 This amount would have 
+funded 5,147 FTE positions and 5,181 permanent positions. Although it would have provided a 
+$34.8 million increase (3.1%) over ATF’s enacted FY2011 appropriation, nearly all of this 
+increase would have been for increases to the agency’s base budget, including the annualized 
+$37.5 million Southwest border supplemental appropriation.272 Correspondingly, the 
+ 
+
+268 See 27 CFR §478.11 for the definition of “curios and relics,” which generally include firearms that are 50 years old, 
+of museum interest, or derive a substantial amount of their value from the fact that they are novel, rare, bizarre, or 
+because they are associated with some historical figure, period, or event. For a list of “curios and relics,” go to 
+http://www.atf.gov/firearms/curios/index.htm. Federally licensed firearms collectors are authorized to engage in limited 
+interstate transfers of “curios and relics,” whereas in nearly all cases an unlicensed person must engage the services of a 
+federally licensed gun dealer to facilitate interstate firearms transfers to another unlicensed person. 
+269 This provision was also originally part of the Tiahrt amendment. 
+270 During House floor consideration, however, Representative Colleen Hanabusa offered an amendment (H.Amdt. 
+1046) to reduce the ATF appropriation by $1.9 million and increase the NOAA appropriation (described above) by 
+$1.6 million. In addition, the House considered another amendment (H.Amdt. 1090) to reduce the ATF appropriation 
+by $18,000. The House approved both amendments by voice votes. 
+271 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Congressional Budget 
+Submission, Fiscal Year 2012 , February 2011, http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2012justification/pdf/fy12-atf-
+justification.pdf. 
+272 Congress finalized ATF’s FY2011 appropriation in the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing 
+Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1473; P.L. 112-10). Under this act, Congress provided $1.113 billion for ATF for 
+FY2011, or $8.2 million less than the previous year’s appropriation. It is significant to note that neither amount, the 
+$1.121 billion for FY2010 or the $1.113 billion for FY2011, reflect an FY2010/FY2011 Southwest border 
+supplemental of $37.5 million, which was provided at the end of FY2010. Because of the timing of the supplemental, 
+for accounting purposes it arguably could be added to either fiscal year. However, it was largely obligated in FY2011. 
+Added to that year’s appropriation, ATF’s FY2011 appropriation increases to about $1.150 billion. And, instead of an 
+$8.2 million reduction, ATF had an additional $29.3 million in budget authority for FY2011. 
+
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+ 
+
+Administration anticipated offsets and savings of $27.3 million, as well as a program increase of 
+$1.5 million as a budget enhancement for ATF to participate in a DOJ-wide initiative to increase 
+law enforcement electronic surveillance capabilities nationally. Reductions included $10.0 
+million in the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN), $4.0 million in reduced 
+training opportunities for state and local law enforcement, and $1.0 in the alcohol and tobacco 
+program. According to the ATF, the remaining $12.3 million in reductions would be sustained 
+through other administrative efficiencies and cost reductions. As noted above and described 
+below, Congress appropriated ATF $1.152 billion for FY2012. 
+
+ Figure 5. ATF Appropriations: FY2012 Requested and Enacted Compared 
+
+(dollars in millions) 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: ATF Congressional Budget Submissions, Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013. 
+
+ Figure 5 shows budget decision unit allocations, as proposed in the FY2012 budget request and 
+as reported in the FY2013 budget request. Under the request, the firearms compliance and 
+investigations decision unit was to be allocated the lion’s share, 75%, of appropriated funding. 
+Under the enacted appropriation, it was allocated 76%. The arson and explosives investigations 
+decision unit and the alcohol and tobacco diversion decision unit were to be allocated 23% and 
+2%, respectively, of the requested appropriation. Under the enacted appropriation, however, the 
+arson and explosives investigations decision unit was allocated 22%. 
+
+On July 20, 2011, the House Committee reported an FY2012 CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 2596; 
+H.Rept. 112-169). This measure would have provided ATF with $1.111 billion, $1.1 million 
+(0.1%) less than the FY2011 enacted amount and $35.9 million (3.1%) less than the 
+Administration’s FY2012 request.273 In full committee markup, the bill was amended with two 
+firearms-related amendments. One, described above, would have prohibited ATF from 
+implementing an OMB-approved information collection initiative, under which federally licensed 
+gun dealers in Southwest border states are required to submit multiple sales reports for certain 
+semiautomatic rifles to ATF. As discussed below, this provision was not included in the enacted 
+FY2012 appropriation. The other would prohibit ATF from implementing additional restrictions 
+
+ 
+
+273 During full committee markup, Representative Sam Farr successfully offered an amendment that cut discretionary 
+accounts in the bill by 0.1%, and shifted that funding ($48 million) to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
+Administration’s Operations, Research, and Facilities program. 
+
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+
+on the importation of certain shotguns that include certain features (e.g., pistol grips, folding or 
+collapsible stocks, laser sights, and the ability to accept large capacity ammunition feeding 
+devices) that ATF has determined to be non-sporting.274 This prohibition was included in the 
+enacted FY2012 appropriation. Moreover, H.R. 2596 included language of “futurity” in several 
+firearms-related riders. As described below, similar language was included in three provisions in 
+the enacted appropriation. 
+
+On September 15, 2011, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported an FY2012 CJS 
+appropriations bill (S. 1572; S.Rept. 112-78) that would have provided $1.09 billion for ATF, 
+$22.3 million (2.0%) less than the FY2011-enacted amount, $57 million (5.0%) less than the 
+Administration’s request of $1.147 billion, and $21.1 million (1.9%) less than the House mark. 
+The Senate folded S. 1572 into a Minibus appropriations bill (H.R. 2112) and passed this 
+measure. In addition to the Senate-passed Cornyn amendment (S.Amdt. 775, discussed above), 
+several other firearms-related amendments were offered but not voted upon. For example, 
+Senators Mark Begich and Orrin Hatch offered an amendment to broaden the circumstances 
+under which handguns could be transferred legally in interstate commerce (S.Amdt. 786). Senator 
+Dean Heller offered an amendment to prohibit ATF from implementing its Southwest border 
+multiple rifle sales reporting requirement (S.Amdt. 843). Similar language, as described above, 
+has been included in the House-reported bill (H.R. 2596). Senator Hatch also offered three 
+amendments to include language of “futurity” into firearms-related riders accompanying the ATF 
+appropriation (S.Amdt. 745, S.Amdt. 770, and S.Amdt. 875). The House-reported and -passed 
+bill included similar futurity language. Senator Jon Tester offered an amendment that would 
+overturn an ATF ruling that persons who have medical marijuana prescriptions are ineligible to 
+possess firearms (S.Amdt. 882). 
+
+On November 14, 2011, House and Senate conferees reported H.R. 2112 (H.Rept. 112-284), 
+which has been enacted (P.L. 112-55). It provides ATF with $1.152 billion for FY2012. This 
+amount is $39.5 million (3.5%) greater than the FY2011 enacted amount, $4.7 million (0.4%) 
+greater that the FY2012 request, $40.6 million (3.7%) greater than the House-reported amount, 
+and $61.7 million (5.7%) greater than Senate-passed amount. As discussed above, this act 
+includes revised language that reflects the Cornyn amendment. This provision (§219) prohibits 
+any federal law enforcement officer from facilitating the delivery of an operable firearm to an 
+individual known or suspected of being connected to a drug cartel. It also includes “futurity” 
+language that makes three long-standing annual appropriation riders permanent law. For FY2012 
+and every year thereafter, these riders prohibit 
+
+• DOJ from consolidating or centralizing any records maintained by federally 
+
+licensed gun dealers related to the acquisition and disposition of firearms;275 
+
+• ATF from electronically retrieving firearm transfer records that have been 
+
+submitted to ATF, when federally licensed gun dealers go out business, by 
+searching those out-of-business records by any individual’s name or other 
+personal identification code;276 and 
+
+ 
+
+274 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Firearms and Explosives 
+Industry Division, ATF Study on the Importability of Certain Shotguns , January 2011, http://www.atf.gov/firearms/
+industry/january-2011-importability-of-certain-shotguns.pdf. 
+275 Proviso in ATF salaries and expenses language. 
+276 Ibid. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 70 
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+
+ 
+
+• the FBI from charging a fee in connection with a Brady background check for 
+
+firearms transfer and possession eligibility, and requires further that the FBI 
+destroy all Brady background check records related to approved firearm transfer 
+records within 24 hours (§511). 
+
+In addition, the act includes a provision (§541) that is similar to House language that would 
+prevent ATF from implementing additional restrictions on the importation of certain shotguns, as 
+well as report language requiring ATF to report to the House and Senate Appropriations 
+Committees annually on firearm trace requests processed for Mexican authorities. 
+
+ FISA Sunset Extensions and Firearms-Related Amendments277 
+
+On May 12, 2011, the House Judiciary Committee considered a bill, the FISA Sunsets 
+Reauthorization Act of 2011 (H.R. 1800), to extend certain expiring provisions of the Foreign 
+Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).278 In full committee markup, Representative Mike Quigley 
+offered an amendment that would have allowed the Attorney General to deny a firearms transfer 
+to any person about whom the Attorney General gathered information during the course of a 
+national security investigation (under FISA), if that information generated a “reasonable belief” 
+that the firearm(s) might be used by the prospective transferee in terrorism-related conduct.279 
+This amendment was defeated by a vote of 11 to 21.280 
+
+During Senate consideration of similar bill, the PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011 (S. 1038 
+and S. 990), Senator Rand Paul offered several versions of an amendment (S.Amdt. 328, S.Amdt. 
+363, and S.Amdt. 373) that would have exempted certain “firearms records” from the business 
+records that can be secretly obtained by FBI agents during a FISA national security investigation 
+(§215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, as amended).281 On May 26, 2011, during consideration of S. 
+990, the Senate tabled S.Amdt. 363 by a vote of 85 to 10. Therefore, the amendment was not 
+included in the enacted legislation (P.L. 112-14). 
+
+ January 8, 2011, Tucson Shootings 
+
+Following the Tucson shootings, issues were raised about the shooter’s mental illness and drug 
+use, as well as his use of large capacity ammunition feeding devices (LCAFDs). Another issue 
+that was raised was banning firearms within the proximity of certain high-level federal officials. 
+
+ 
+
+277 For information on FISA provisions that were due to sunset, see CRS Report R40138, Amendments to the Foreign 
+Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Extended Until June 1, 2015 , by Edward C. Liu. 
+278 50 U.S.C. §1801 et al. 
+279 To effect such a firearms transfer denial, the subject of the FISA investigation would most likely be placed on a 
+NICS-accessible terrorist watch list (NCIC-KST). For further information, see the heading below, Brady Background 
+and Terrorist Watch List Checks. 
+280 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, FISA Sunsets Reauthorization Act of 2011 , to accompany H.R. 
+1800, 112th Cong., 1st sess., May 18, 2011, p. 9. 
+281 P.L. 107-56; October 26, 2001; 115 Stat. 287, codified at 50 U.SC. §1861. Section 215 requires the Foreign 
+Intelligence Surveillance Court to approve all requests for such documents. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 71 
+
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+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Mental Illness and Drug Use as Prohibiting Factors 
+
+As described above, persons who have been “adjudicated mental defective”282 or who are 
+“unlawful users of or addicted to any controlled substance”283 are prohibited from possessing a 
+firearm or having one transferred to them. The FBI maintains files on those persons as part of the 
+NICS Index. According to the FBI, as of December 31, 2010, the NICS Index included 1,107,758 
+records on individuals who had been adjudicated mental defective.284 Although the NICS Index 
+included 2,092 records on individuals who are known to be drug users and addicts,285 arrest 
+records for drug offenses are also contained in the Interstate Identification Index (III). 
+
+Following the Virginia Tech mass shooting on April 16, 2007, Congress passed the NICS 
+Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA; P.L. 110-180), a law that established incentives 
+to prompt state, local, and tribal governments to transfer mental defective files to the FBI for 
+inclusion in the NICS Index. Although this act focused on mentally ill persons who were 
+adjudicated to be a threat to themselves or others, it did not focus on drug users. As a 
+consequence, Congress could revisit the NIAA to increase incentives for state, local, and tribal 
+governments to transfer records on both categories of prohibited persons. Along these lines, 
+Mayors Against Illegal Guns (MAIG) released a “plan to prevent further tragedies” like Tucson. 
+The MAIG plan calls for the following steps: 
+
+• fully funding the NICS Improvement Amendments Act (P.L. 110-180) to help 
+
+agencies and states cover the costs of gathering records on prohibited persons and 
+making them electronically available to the FBI; 
+
+• providing larger cuts (up to 50%) to a wider array of federal law enforcement 
+
+assistance grant programs286 for not providing such records than what is currently 
+provided for under P.L. 110-180; 
+
+• requiring every federal agency to certify to the Attorney General twice a year that 
+
+all disqualifying records, including those related to drug use or addiction, have 
+been electronically provided to the FBI; 
+
+ 
+
+282 For a definition of “adjudicated mental defective,” see the “Mental Defective Adjudications” section on p. 38. 
+283 Under 27 C.F.R. §478.11, an “unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” means a person who uses a 
+controlled substance and has lost the power of self-control with reference to the use of [a] controlled substance; and any 
+person who is a current user of a controlled substance in a manner other than as prescribed by a licensed physician. 
+Such use is not limited to the use of drugs on a particular day, or within a matter of days or weeks before, but rather 
+that the unlawful use has occurred recently enough to indicate that the individual is actively engaged in such conduct. A 
+person may be an unlawful current user of a controlled substance even though the substance is not being used at the 
+precise time the person seeks to acquire a firearm or receives or possesses a firearm. An inference of current use may 
+be drawn from evidence of a recent use or possession of a controlled substance or a pattern of use or possession that 
+reasonably covers the present time, e.g., a conviction for use or possession of a controlled substance within the past 
+year; multiple arrests for such offenses within the past five years if the most recent arrest occurred within the past year; 
+or persons found through a drug test to use a controlled substance unlawfully, provided that the test was administered 
+within the past year. For a current or former member of the Armed Forces, an inference of current use may be drawn 
+from recent disciplinary or other administrative action based on confirmed drug use, e.g., court-martial conviction, 
+nonjudicial punishment, or an administrative discharge based on drug use or drug rehabilitation failure. 
+284 See http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/nics-index. 
+285 Ibid. 
+286 According to MAIG, such programs could include the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program, Title II Juvenile 
+Justice Grants, Juvenile Accountability Block Grants, and Enforcing Underage Drinking Laws Block Grants. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+ 
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+
+ 
+
+• clarifying and expanding regulatory definitions related to mental health and drug 
+
+use; and 
+
+• safeguarding the rights of people who are listed in databases queried by NICS.287 
+
+Senator Charles Schumer introduced a bill that would amend P.L. 110-180 to advance certain 
+deadlines and apply deeper cuts to a wider array of federal law enforcement assistance grant 
+programs (S. 436). Representative Carolyn McCarthy introduced an identical measure (H.R. 
+1781). Representatives McCarthy and John Dingell have reportedly submitted a request to GAO 
+for an assessment of weaknesses in firearms-related background check procedures.288 On 
+November 15, 2011, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Crime and 
+Terrorism held a hearing on the Fix Gun Checks Act of 2011 (S. 436/H.R. 1781). 
+
+ Large Capacity Ammunition Feeding Devices 
+
+The Tucson shooter was reportedly armed with a 9mm Glock 19 semiautomatic pistol loaded with 
+31 rounds in a 33-round extended magazine.289 This pistol is normally equipped with a 15-round 
+magazine, two of which the shooter also had on his person. He also had another 33-round 
+extended magazine.290 He managed to fire at least 31 shots, emptying a single magazine. He 
+killed 6 people and wounded another 13, including Representative Giffords. Three bystanders, 
+one of whom was wounded, managed to subdue the shooter as he attempted to reload his second 
+30-plus round magazine. Representative McCarthy has introduced a bill to reinstate a ban on 
+magazines that are capable of accommodating more than 10 rounds (H.R. 308). Such a ban was in 
+effect from September 13, 1994, through September 13, 2004, as part of the larger semiautomatic 
+assault weapons ban (described below). Senator Frank Lautenberg has introduced a similar bill 
+(S. 32). 
+
+ Banning Firearms within the Proximity of Federal Officials 
+
+Representatives Laura Richardson and Peter King have introduced bills (H.R. 367 and H.R. 496) 
+that would prohibit most people from carrying a firearm within 1,000 feet of certain high-level 
+federal officials while those officials were holding a public event, campaigning for office, or 
+otherwise acting in an official capacity. Both bills arguably are modeled on the Gun Free School 
+Zone Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-647), which prohibits firearm possession in a school zone (on the 
+campus of a public or private school or within 1,000 feet of the grounds).291 
+
+ 
+
+287 Mayors Against Illegal Guns, “A Plan to Prevent Future Tragedies,” January 2011, 
+http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org. 
+288 James V. Grimaldi and Sari Horwitz, “Cuts Threaten ATF’s Efforts to Stem Flow of Guns South,” Washington Post , 
+January 31, 2011, p. 1. 
+289 David A. Fahrenthold and Clarence Williams, “Congresswoman Shot in Tucson Rampage,” Washington Post , 
+January 9, 2011, p. A1. 
+290 Most semiautomatic pistol magazines, or clips, are designed to be self-contained within the handle of the pistol. The 
+33 round extended magazines used by the shooter protrude well beneath the butt of the pistol handle. 
+291 For the statutory definition of a “school zone,” see 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(25). For the prohibition, see 18 U.S.C. 
+§922(q). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+
+ 
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+
+ 
+
+ Other Salient Gun Control Legislative Issues 
+
+Other salient firearms-related issues that continue to receive attention include (1) screening 
+firearms background check applicants against terrorist watch lists; (2) combating gun trafficking 
+and straw purchases; (3) reforming the regulation of federally licensed gun dealers; (4) requiring 
+background checks for private firearms transfers at gun shows; (5) more-strictly regulating certain 
+firearms previously defined in statute as “semiautomatic assault weapons”; and (6) banning or 
+requiring the registration of certain long-range .50 caliber rifles, which are commonly referred to 
+as “sniper” rifles. 
+
+ Terrorist Watch List Screening and Brady Background Checks292 
+
+On November 5, 2009, U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan shot 13 persons to death and 
+wounded over 30 at Fort Hood, TX. Prior to the shootings, Hasan had corresponded by email 
+with a radical Muslim imam, Anwar al-Aulaqi, who U.S. authorities had long suspected of having 
+substantial ties to al-Qaeda.293 Although FBI counterterrorism agents were aware of Hasan’s 
+communications with al-Aulaqi,294 it was unclear at what level Hasan was being scrutinized by 
+the FBI.295 If he had been the subject of a full counterterrorism investigation, FBI policy would 
+have required that he be watch-listed.296 Depending upon the sequence of events, had Hasan been 
+watch-listed, there is a possibility that his purchase of a pistol297 and the required Brady 
+background check could have alerted FBI counterterrorism agents to that transfer, and they might 
+have been able to take steps that would have prevented the shootings. The Fort Hood shootings 
+renewed interest in the U.S. government’s use of terrorist watch lists for firearms- and explosives-
+related background checks.298 
+
+ Post-9/11 Modified NICS Procedures 
+
+Before February 2004, terrorist watch list checks were not part of the Brady background check 
+process because being a suspected or known terrorist was and is not a disqualifying factor for 
+firearms transfer/possession eligibility under federal or state law. As is the case today, to 
+ 
+
+292 For further information, see CRS Report R42336, Terrorist Watch List Screening and Brady Background Checks for 
+Firearms , by William J. Krouse. 
+293 Carrie Johnson, Spencer C. Hsu, and Ellen Nakashima, “Hasan Had Intensified Contact with Cleric: FBI Monitored 
+E-mail Exchanges Fort Hood Suspect Raised Prospect of Financial Transfers,” Washington Post , November 21, 2009, 
+p. A01. 
+294 Philip Rucker, Carrie Johnson, and Ellen Nakashima, “Hasan E-mails to Cleric Didn’t Result in Inquiry; Suspect in 
+Fort Hood Shootings Will Be Tried in Military Court,” Washington Post , November 10, 2009, p. A01. 
+295 According to a November 11, 2009, FBI press release, Hasan’s communications with Anwar al-Aulaqi were 
+assessed by the FBI in connection with an investigation of another subject, and the content of those communications 
+was explainable by his research as a psychiatrist at the Walter Reed Medical Center and nothing else derogatory was 
+found that would have suggested that he was involved in terrorist activities or planning. U.S. Department of Justice, 
+Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Investigation Continues Into Fort Hood Shooting,” November 11, 2009. 
+296 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist 
+Watchlist Nomination Practices , Audit Report 09-25, May 2009, p. 11. 
+297 Hasan reportedly purchased the Fabrique Nationale 5.7mm pistol that he used in the shootings on August 1, 2009. 
+He also carried a .357 magnum revolver; however, it is unclear whether he fired the revolver. 
+298 Michael Bloomberg and Thomas Kean, “Enabling the Next Fort Hood? Congress’s Curbs on Gun Data Hurt 
+Investigations,” Washington Post , November 27, 2009, p. A23. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+
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+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+determine such eligibility, the National Instant Criminal Background Checks System (NICS) 
+queries three databases maintained by the FBI. They include the National Crime Information 
+Center (NCIC), the Interstate Identification Index (III), and the NICS index. The NICS index 
+includes disqualifying records on persons that would not be included in the III or NCIC, for 
+example, persons dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces, adjudicated as a mental 
+defective, or convicted of certain serious immigration violations, among others. The III contains 
+criminal history records for persons arrested and convicted of felonies and certain serious 
+misdemeanors. The NCIC contains law enforcement files on fugitives and persons subject to 
+restraining orders, among other persons. NCIC also contains a file known as the Violent Gang 
+and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF). Prior to the 9/11 attacks, this file included limited 
+information on known or suspected terrorists and gang members. NICS examiners were not 
+informed of VGTOF hits, as such information was not considered relevant to determining 
+firearms transfer/possession eligibility. 
+
+In November 2002, DOJ initiated a NICS transaction audit to determine whether prohibited aliens 
+(non-citizens) were being improperly transferred firearms.299 As part of this audit, NICS 
+procedures were changed so that NICS examiners would be informed of VGTOF hits. Under 
+Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, moreover, the Administration initiated a broad-based 
+review of the use of watch lists, among other terrorist identification and screening mechanisms.300 
+In September 2003, the FBI-administered Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) was established and 
+work was begun to improve and merge several watch lists maintained by the U.S. government 
+into a consolidated Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB).301 Following those efforts, TSDB 
+lookout records from other agency watch lists were downloaded into VGTOF. By May 2007, 
+VGTOF contained more than 100,000 records.302 In 2009, the FBI created a separate file for 
+“known and appropriately suspected terrorists (KST)” by splitting VGTOF into separate gang and 
+terrorist files.303 As of March 31, 2010, the KST included 278,219 terrorist watch list records.304 
+
+In November 2003, DOJ directed the FBI to revise its NICS procedures to include measures to 
+screen prospective firearms transferees and permittees against terrorist watch list records (KST, 
+formerly VGTOF).305 Effective February 2004, the Brady background check process was altered 
+to include a terrorist watch list check and to alert NICS staff when a prospective firearms 
+transferee or permit applicant is potentially identified as a known or suspected terrorist.306 In the 
+case of a watch list hit, NICS sends a delayed transfer (for up to three business days) response to 
+the querying FFL or POC. If NICS examiners cannot find a prohibiting factor, they immediately 
+contact the TSC and FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD) to (1) validate the hit and (2) allow 
+
+ 
+
+299 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Gun Control and Terrorism: FBI Could Better Manage Firearm-Related 
+Background Checks Involving Terrorist Watch List Records , GAO-05-127, January 2005, p. 7. 
+300 For further information, see CRS Report RL32366, Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking Under 
+Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 , by William J. Krouse. 
+301 Ibid., p. 9. 
+302 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division, 
+“NCIC Marks 40 Years of Serving Law Enforcement,” The CJIS Link: Criminal Justice Information Services that 
+Connect Local, State, and Federal Law Enforcement , vol. 10, no. 1, May 2007, p. 2. 
+303 Daniel D. Roberts, Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Information Services, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
+Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, May 5, 2010, p. 1. 
+304 Statistics provided by the FBI Office of Congressional Affairs to CRS on May 11, 2010. 
+305 Ibid., p. 11. 
+306 Dan Eggen, “FBI Gets More Time on Gun Buys,” Washington Post , November 22, 2003, p. A05. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+
+ 
+
+FBI Special Agents in the field to check for possible prohibiting factors. If no prohibiting factors 
+are uncovered within the three-day period, a firearms dealer may proceed with the transaction at 
+his discretion, but FBI counterterrorism officials continue to work the case for up to 90 days, 
+during which time the background check is considered to be in an “open” status.307 
+
+If and when a transaction is approved, all identifying information submitted by or on behalf of the 
+transferee is destroyed within 24 hours.308 At the end of the 90-day period, if no prohibiting factor 
+has been reported to the NICS Center, all records related to the NICS transaction are destroyed 
+except for the NICS Transaction Number (NTN) and date of the transaction.309 If the FFL 
+proceeded with the transaction at his discretion following three business days and the applicant is 
+found to be disqualified, then the ATF will be notified and a firearms retrieval action will be 
+initiated in coordination with a JTTF. 
+
+ NICS Record Retention 
+
+When Congress passed the Brady Act in 1994, the use of terrorist watch lists during firearms-
+related background checks was not considered. As a consequence, the Attorney General has no 
+specific statutory authority to screen prospective gun buyers against terrorist watch list records. 
+Nevertheless, the FBI adopted procedures to do this because being on such a list suggests that 
+there may be an underlying factor that would bar a prospective background check applicant from 
+possessing a firearm. Hence, a possible issue for Congress could be whether terrorist watch list 
+checks should be incorporated statutorily into the Brady background checks for firearms. 
+
+In addition, a proviso attached to the FY2005 DOJ annual appropriation and every year thereafter 
+requires that NICS-generated approved firearms transaction records be destroyed within 24 
+hours.310 Nevertheless, as described above, the FBI has been retaining approved firearms 
+transaction records for up to 90 days, if those records are related to terrorist watch list hits. 
+Furthermore, information on the subjects of those checks are passed on to FBI investigators in the 
+field. While the NICS records are eventually destroyed for non-denials, it is unknown what 
+happens to the information generated by NICS-related terrorist watch list hits that are passed on 
+to the FBI CTD and Special Agents in the field, who are usually assigned to Joint Terrorism Task 
+Forces. Information about those firearms transactions is possibly recorded and stored 
+electronically in the FBI’s investigative case files. 
+
+In the Brady Act, however, there is a provision that prohibits the (1) transfer of any Brady system 
+record to any other federal or state agency, or (2) the use of the Brady system as a national 
+registry of firearms or firearms owners.311 In light of the former prohibition, a second issue for 
+ 
+
+307 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Gun Control and Terrorism: FBI Could Better Manage Firearm-Related 
+Background Checks Involving Terrorist Watch List Records , GAO-05-127, January 2005, p. 32. 
+308 28 C.F.R. §25.9(b)(1)(iii). 
+309 28 C.F.R. §25.9(b)(1)(ii). 
+310 For FY2009, see §511 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, (P.L. 111-8, 123 Stat. 596). For FY2010, see also 
+§511 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3151). For FY2011, the Department of 
+Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10) carried this requirement forward from 
+FY2010. For FY2012, The Minibus Appropriations Act (H.R. 2112) includes a §511 that not only includes the “24 
+hour” destruction requirement, but it also includes “futurity” language, which makes the provision permanent law, as 
+opposed to an annual appropriations restriction. The President has signed this bill into law (P.L. 112-55). 
+311 For example, subsection 103(i) of the Brady Act (P.L. 103-159; 107 Stat. 1542) includes the following provision: 
+PROHIBITION RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT OF REGISTRATION SYSTEMS WITH RESPECT TO 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
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+ 
+
+Congress could be whether to grant the FBI greater authority to maintain and access NICS 
+records for the purposes of counterterrorism, or should existing statutory limitations that were 
+arguably designed to prevent the maintenance of and access to such records be strengthened. In 
+light of the first two issues, it follows that a third issue for Congress could be whether the 
+Attorney General should be given explicit authority to deny firearms transfers to watch-listed 
+persons on a case-by-case basis, or should all known or suspected terrorists be statutorily 
+prohibited from possessing firearms and explosives.312 
+
+ Legislation in the 110th Congress and DOJ Draft Proposal 
+
+As described above, although watch-listed persons may be the subject of ongoing foreign 
+intelligence, national security, and criminal investigations, they may not be persons prohibited 
+from possessing firearms or explosives under current law. As subsequent events would indicate, 
+DOJ concluded that it was limited under current law in its authority to use terrorist watch lists as 
+part of the background check processes to deny firearms and explosives transfers to known or 
+suspected terrorists. In hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Attorney General 
+Alberto Gonzales was questioned several times by Members of Congress about NICS procedures 
+and terrorist watch list hits. 
+
+Representative Chris Van Hollen: “Does it make sense to you that we stop a person from 
+boarding the airline in order to protect the public safety, [but] that an individual can turn 
+around, get in their car, go to the local gun shop and buy 20 semiautomatic assault 
+weapons?” 
+
+Attorney General Gonzales: “I think we should be doing everything we can to ensure that 
+people [who] are in fact terrorists shouldn’t have weapons in this country, the truth of the 
+matter is. But unless they are disabled [disqualified] from having a weapon under the statute 
+there’s not much that we can do other than maybe try and get them out of the country or, by 
+
+ 
+(...continued) 
+FIREARMS. – No department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States may – (1) require that any record or 
+portion thereof generated by the system established under this section be recorded at or transferred to a facility owned, 
+managed, or controlled by the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof; or (2) use the system 
+established under this section to establish any system for the registration of firearms, firearm owners, or firearm 
+transaction or disposition, except with respect to persons, prohibited by section 922 (g) or (n) of title 18, United States 
+Code or State law, from receiving a firearm. 
+312 In the 109th Congress (2005-2006), several pieces of legislation were introduced that were related to NICS 
+background checks and terrorist watch lists. In March 2005, Senator Lautenberg and Representative John Conyers 
+introduced the Terrorist Apprehension and Record Retention Act of 2005 (S. 578/H.R. 1225), a bill that would have (1) 
+required that the FBI, along with appropriate federal and state counterterrorism officials, be notified immediately when 
+NICS background checks indicated that a person seeking to obtain a firearm was a known or suspected terrorist; (2) 
+required that the FBI coordinate the response to such occurrences; and (3) authorized the retention of all related records 
+for at least 10 years. 
+In addition, Representative Peter King introduced H.R. 1168, a bill that would have required the Attorney General to 
+promulgate regulations to preserve records of terrorist- and gang-related matches during such background checks until 
+they had been provided to the FBI. Representative Carolyn McCarthy introduced H.R. 1195, a bill that would have 
+made it unlawful to transfer a firearm to a person who was on the “No Fly” lists maintained by TSA. 
+In summation, two of those proposals (S. 578/H.R. 1225 and H.R. 1168) addressed the retention of approved firearm 
+background check records that are related to terrorist watch list matches. The other bill (H.R. 1195) addressed the issue 
+of whether a known or suspected terrorist on one government watch list in particular should be barred from possessing 
+firearms. Neither of these bills, however, addressed the other underlying issue of how long the total number of 
+approved firearm transfer records should be retained and, if retained, whether they should be searched to determine 
+whether known or suspected terrorists had previously obtained firearms. 
+
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+ 
+
+the way, to see if there’s any disability under the statute that would allow us to deny them a 
+firearm.”313 
+
+In 2005, then Attorney General Gonzales directed the DOJ to form a working group to review 
+federal gun laws—particularly in regard to NICS background checks—to examine whether 
+additional authority should be sought to prevent firearms transfers to known or suspected 
+terrorists.314 Nearly two years later, on April 25, 2007, DOJ proposed legislation that would give 
+the Attorney General authority to deny a firearm transfer, state-issued firearms permit, or 
+explosive license to any person found “to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in 
+preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.”315 In the 110th Congress (2007-2008), Senator 
+Lautenberg and Representative King introduced this proposal (S. 1237/H.R. 2074), but no further 
+action was taken on either bill. 
+
+ Legislation in the 111th Congress, GAO Follow-Up Report, and Senate Hearing 
+
+In the 111th Congress (2009-2010), several bills were introduced that would have addressed 
+firearms- and explosives-related background checks and terrorist watch list checks. Senator 
+Lautenberg and Representative King reintroduced their bill that was based on the DOJ draft 
+proposal (S. 1317 and H.R. 2159). Representative McCarthy reintroduced her bill, newly titled 
+the No Fly, No Buy Act of 2009, that would have allowed the Attorney General to deny firearms 
+to persons who are on the TSA’s No Fly terrorist watch list (H.R. 2401). And, Senator Lautenberg 
+introduced a bill that would have allowed the Attorney General to maintain NICS records on 
+approved transfers that were also related terrorist watch list hits (S. 2820). In addition, GAO 
+provided Congress with updated data on NICS-related terrorist watch list hits, lending renewed 
+impetus to the reintroduction of the DOJ draft proposal. And, the November 2009 Fort Hood 
+shootings renewed interest in terrorist watch list records and firearms-related background checks. 
+
+ GAO Follow-Up Report on NICS-Related Terrorist Watch List Hits (May 2009) 
+
+Nearly four years after the first GAO report, GAO issued a follow-up report on NICS-related 
+terrorist watch list hits in May 2009. GAO reported that from February 2004 through February 
+2009 there were 
+
+• 963 NICS background checks that resulted in terrorist watch list matches and, of 
+
+those checks, about 90% (865) were allowed to proceed and a firearms or 
+explosives transfer may have occurred; 
+
+ 
+
+313 USA Patriot Act: A Review for the Purpose of Reauthorization: Hearing Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary , 109th 
+Cong. 81-82 (Apr. 6, 2005) (Testimony of Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, Department of Justice). 
+ 314 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, Letter to the Honorable Richard B. Cheney, President, 
+United States Senate, from Richard A. Hertling Acting Assistant Attorney General, February 13, 2007, 
+http://lautenberg.senate.gov/assets/terrorgap/Feb_2007_DOJ_Reply.pdf; Letter to Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III, 
+Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Honrable Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, November 1, 2006, 
+http://lautenberg.senate.gov/assets/terrorgap/2006_Lautenberg_Biden_Letter.pdf. 
+315 This proposal was drafted by the Department of Justice for consideration by Congress. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
+Office of Legislative Affairs, Letter to the Honorable Richard B. Cheney, President, United States Senate, from 
+Richard A. Hertling Acting Assistant Attorney General, April 25, 2007, http://lautenberg.senate.gov/assets/terrorgap/
+Cheney_DOJ_Drafted_Bill_Re_Dangerous_Terrorists_Act_2007.pdf. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+
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+
+ 
+
+• however, only one explosives background check resulted in a proceed with 
+
+transaction; and 
+
+• of the 10% that resulted in denials (98), the denials were based on felony 
+
+convictions, illegal immigration status, fugitive from justice status, and the 
+unlawful use of, or addiction to, a controlled substance. All of these denials 
+involved firearms, as opposed to explosives.316 
+
+In this report, GAO also recommended that if Congress should move forward with legislation 
+providing the Attorney General with the discretionary authority to deny a firearms transfer or 
+permit, or an explosives license/permit, based on a terrorist watch list hit, then, consideration 
+should be given to including a provision in that legislation that would require the Attorney 
+General to promulgate guidelines that would delineate under what circumstances such authority 
+could be evoked. Following this report, Representative King and Senator Lautenberg 
+reintroduced the DOJ draft proposal as nearly identical bills (H.R. 2159 and S. 1317), which 
+supporters dubbed the “Terror Gap” proposal. 
+
+ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing 
+
+On May 5, 2010, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held a 
+hearing on “Terrorists and Guns: The Nature of the Threat and Proposed Reforms.” GAO testified 
+about measures taken by the FBI to improve firearms and explosives background checks for 
+counterterrorism purposes.317 GAO reported that from February 2004 through February 2010, 
+there were 1,228 positive encounters with individuals watch-listed as terrorists through NICS 
+related firearms or explosives transactions.318 These encounters involved 650 individuals because 
+450 of these individuals were involved in multiple transactions.319 Six of these individuals were 
+involved in 10 or more transactions.320 In 1,119 encounters, the transactions were allowed to 
+proceed.321 In 109 encounters, the transactions were denied.322 From March 2009 to February 
+2009, moreover, there were 272 positive encounters and all of the transactions were allowed to 
+proceed, including one that involved explosives.323 
+
+Senator Joseph Lieberman, chair of the committee, noted that firearms had been used in at least 
+two deadly terrorist plots perpetrated by Muslim extremists. Those incidents included the Fort 
+Hood shootings noted above and the June 2009 Little Rock, AR, recruiting center shootings, 
+where two U.S. servicemen were shot—one was killed and the other wounded. In several other 
+thwarted plots, conspirators were arrested for planning to use firearms to attack servicemen at 
+Fort Dix, NJ, in 2006 and the Quantico, VA, Marine base in 2009.324 Senator Lindsey Graham, 
+
+ 
+
+316 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-09-125R, Firearm and Explosive Background Checks Involving 
+Terrorist Watch List Records 8 (May 2009). 
+317 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Terrorist Watchlist Screening: FBI Has Enhanced Its Use of Information 
+from Firearm and Explosives Background Checks to Support Counterterrorism Efforts , GAO-10-703T, May 5, 2010. 
+318 Ibid. p. 5. 
+319 Ibid. 
+320 Ibid. 
+321 Ibid. 
+322 Ibid. 
+323 Ibid., p. 2. 
+324 U.S. Senate, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hearing on Terrorist Threat and 
+ (continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
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+ 
+
+however, voiced opposition to the Terror Gap proposal. He maintained that denying a firearms 
+transfer based upon a felony conviction in a lawful court was fundamentally different from doing 
+so based on a terrorist watch list record that was created by an investigator or intelligence 
+analyst.325 
+
+ Firearms-Related Terrorist Watch List Legislation in the 112th Congress 
+
+In the 112th Congress, Senator Lautenberg and Representative King have reintroduced the Terror 
+Gap proposal (S. 34 and H.R. 1506). As in the preceding two Congresses, these nearly identical 
+bills are based upon the April 2007 DOJ proposed legislative language. 
+
+ Gun Trafficking-Related Proposals in the 112th Congress 
+
+In the 112th Congress, four proposals that address gun trafficking have been introduced (H.R. 
+2554, S. 1973, H.R. 4190, and H.R. 6195). While no further action has been taken on any of these 
+proposals, as described above, several Members have voiced their support for such a proposal and 
+the Attorney General has indicated that the Administration would work with Congress to develop 
+such a proposal. 
+
+ Stop Gun Trafficking and Strengthen Law Enforcement Act of 2011 
+(H.R. 2554)326 
+
+On July 15, 2011, Representative Carolyn Maloney introduced the Stop Gun Trafficking and 
+Strengthen Law Enforcement Act of 2011 (H.R. 2554). This proposal would amend the GCA to 
+establish a new federal “trafficking in firearms” offense under two provisions. 
+
+Under the first proposed provision, it would be unlawful for any person to receive, transfer, or 
+otherwise dispose of two or more firearms that have been shipped or transported in interstate or 
+foreign commerce (regardless of whether anything of value is exchanged), while knowing, or 
+having reasonable cause to believe , that one or more of those firearms would be transferred 
+subsequently to another person whose receipt of a firearm would be unlawful, or who intends to 
+or will use, carry or possess, or dispose of the firearm unlawfully.327 
+
+Under the second proposed provision, it would be unlawful for any person knowingly to direct, 
+promote, or facilitate such conduct.328 Violations of either provision would be punishable by a 
+fine and/or not more than 20 years of imprisonment.329 Moreover, it would provide that any 
+person who acts in the capacity of an organizer, supervisory position, or any other management 
+
+ 
+(...continued) 
+ Guns , 111th Congress, 2nd Session, May 5, 2010 ( CQ Congressional Transcripts). 
+325 Ibid. 
+326 Vivian S. Chu, CRS Legislative Attorney, contributed to the analysis of this bill. 
+327 H.R. 2554, §2-proposed 18 U.S.C. §932(a). 
+328 H.R. 2554, §2-proposed 18 U.S.C. §923(b). 
+329 H.R. 2554, §2-proposed 18 U.S.C. §924(a)(8)(A). 
+
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+
+position, in concert with five or more other persons would be subject to not more than 25 years of 
+imprisonment.330 
+
+In addition, under H.R. 2554 it would also be unlawful to conspire to violate the first provision,331 
+and the proposal would make such a conspiracy punishable by a fine and/or not more than 10 
+years of imprisonment.332 
+
+ Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2011 (S. 1973) 
+
+On December 18, 2011, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand introduced the Gun Trafficking Prevention 
+Act of 2011 (S. 1973).333 This proposal would amend the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) and 
+establish a new federal “trafficking in firearms” offense.334 Under this provision, it would be 
+unlawful for any person knowingly to 
+
+• ship, transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of two or more firearms to another 
+
+person if he (the transferor/seller) knows or has reasonable cause to believe that 
+such actions would be, or would result in, a violation of any federal, state, or 
+local law that is punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year 
+(excluding misdemeanors punishable by two years or less of imprisonment); 
+
+• receive two or more firearms from another person if he (the transferee/buyer) 
+
+ knows or has reasonable cause to believe that such receipt would be, or would 
+result in, a violation of federal, state, or local law that is punishable by a term of 
+imprisonment exceeding one year (excluding misdemeanors punishable by two 
+years or less of imprisonment); 
+
+• make materially false statements to an FFL, and purchase, receive, or otherwise 
+
+acquire two or more firearms for, or on behalf of, any other person (a straw 
+purchase);335 and 
+
+• direct, promote, or facilitate the unlawful conduct described above. 
+
+Violations of any of the four subparagraphs described above would be punishable by a fine and/or 
+not more than 20 years of imprisonment for a violation.336 This provision would also establish an 
+affirmative defense to any prosecution under the subparagraphs described above if the firearm(s) 
+in question were transferred following a background check pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §922(t) that 
+showed that the “actual buyer” was not a prohibited person under either federal or state law.337 
+
+ 
+
+330 H.R. 2554, §2-proposed 18 U.S.C. §924(a)(8)(B). 
+331 H.R. 2554, §2-proposed 18 U.S.C. §923(c). 
+332 H.R. 2554, §2-proposed 18 U.S.C. §924(a)(8)(C). 
+333 Senator Gillibrand and Representative Carolyn McCarthy previously offered this proposal in the 111th Congress. 
+See the Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2009 (S. 2878/H.R. 4298). 
+334 S. 1973, §3-proposed 18 U.S.C. §932(a)(1). 
+335 NB: Unlike the current law statutory provisions related to straw purchases (18 U.S.C. §§922(a)(6) and 
+924(a)(1)(A)), this proposed provision does not include any evidentiary standard regarding the offender’s state of mind 
+(e.g., “knowingly” or “knows or has reasonable cause to believe”). 
+336 S. 1973, §3-proposed 18 U.S.C. §932(a)(2). 
+337 S. 1973, §3-proposed 18 U.S.C. §932(a)(3)(A). Arguably, the intent behind such a provision would be to encourage 
+background checks for private firearms transactions, for which there are no federal background checks or 
+corresponding recordkeeping requirements. Under federal law, private transactions between unlicensed persons are 
+(continued...) 
+
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+
+S. 1973 would also make it unlawful to conspire to commit such violations, and would make such 
+a conspiracy punishable at the same level as the actual criminal act(s), a fine and/or not more than 
+20 years of imprisonment. Regarding such conspiracies, the proposal would direct the U.S. 
+Sentencing Commission to recommend increased penalties for graduated offense levels for 
+violations that involve 
+
+• more than 4, but fewer than 15 firearms; 
+• more than 14, but fewer than 25 firearms; 
+• more than 24, but fewer than 100 firearms; or 
+• more than 100 firearms. 
+
+It is noteworthy that the federal Sentencing Guidelines since 1987 have included a graduated 
+table of sentencing enhancements based on the number of firearms involved.338 It was last 
+amended in 2001 so that an offense level, used to determine the sentencing range, could be 
+enhanced if the unlawful activity involved 3-7 firearms, 8-24 firearms, 25-99 firearms, 100-199 
+firearms, or 200 or more firearms.339 As the Sentencing Guidelines attempt to provide the most 
+appropriate sentencing range based on the severity of the crime and the extent of the offender’s 
+criminal record, this bill would possibly impose a more severe sentencing range on a first-time or 
+low-level offender because it would take a lesser number of firearms to trigger a sentence 
+enhancement.340 
+
+In addition, S. 1973 includes several provisions designed to “crack down” on corrupt gun dealers, 
+who knowingly violate certain provisions of the GCA, National Firearms Act (NFA), and Arms 
+Export Control Act (AECA). With regard to firearms trace data, the proposal would require the 
+Attorney General to annually identify certain FFLs who posed a “heightened risk of firearms 
+being diverted to criminal use.” Such determinations would be made based on a “specific criteria” 
+that would include the following elements: 
+
+• short “time-to-crime”341 for firearms traced to the dealer, 
+• incomplete crime trace results for firearms sold by a dealer, 
+• significant or frequent reports by a dealer of firearms losses or thefts, and 
+• other violations of federal firearms laws by a dealer. 
+
+ 
+(...continued) 
+only legal if they are conducted intrastate (within state lines). Interstate transfers between private persons must be 
+facilitated through at least one licensed dealer, that is, an FFL in the state of destination. 
+338 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual , §2K2.3(b)(1) (October 1987). 
+339 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual , §2K2.1(b)(1) (October 2001). 
+340 On November 1, 2011, sentencing enhancements adopted by the United States Sentencing Commission went into 
+effect. These sentencing enhancements address “straw purchases,” “semi automatic firearms capable of accepting large 
+capacity magazines,” and “cross-border trafficking in small arms or ammunition.” See 76 Federal Register 3193, 
+January 19, 2011; 76 Federal Register 24960, May 3, 2011; 76 Federal Register 58563, September 21, 2011; and 
+United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual , §2K2.1 (November 2011). 
+341 Time-to-crime is the time that elapses between the first retail sale of a firearm by an FFL to a private person (non-
+licensee) and the firearm’s recovery by authorities and the submission of a trace request by those authorities to the 
+ATF. 
+
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+
+Furthermore, it would increase penalties for certain recordkeeping violations from “not more 
+than” one year to “up to” three years of imprisonment. Finally, it would require GAO to conduct a 
+study on firearms that are either lost or stolen in transit between FFLs. 
+
+ Straw Purchaser Penalty Enhancement Act (H.R. 4190) 
+
+On March 8, 2012, Representative Adam Schiff introduced the Straw Purchase Penalty 
+Enhancement Act (H.R. 4190). This bill would amend the GCA to create a mandatory minimum 
+sentence of two years imprisonment for any person who makes a false statement in violation of 
+either 18 U.S.C. §§922(a)(6) or 924(a)(1)(A) in the firearms transfer records (ATF Form 4473) 
+that FFLs are required to maintain under current law, if the transferee 
+
+• knows or has reason to believe that the false statement will further the transfer of 
+
+two or more firearms to a prohibited person; and 
+
+• has the intent to conceal the identity of the prohibited person to whom the firearm 
+
+is to be transferred.342 
+
+ Detectives Nemorin and Andrews Anti-Gun Trafficking Act of 2012 
+(H.R. 6195) 
+
+On July 25, 2012, Representative Peter King introduced H.R. 6195, the Detectives Nemorin and 
+Andrews Anti-Gun Trafficking Act of 2012.343 This proposal would have amended the GCA by 
+creating a new subsection at 18 U.S.C §924—Penalties. This amendment would have created a 
+new separate “gun trafficking” crime punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment of not more than 
+20 years for committing a certain offense under the GCA under one of two sets of conditions. 
+
+The first set of conditions would have been the offering for sale, transfer, or barter of two or more 
+handguns, semiautomatic assault weapons,344 short-barreled shotguns, short-barreled rifles, or 
+machine guns, of which at least one was transported, received or possessed by that person and 
+stolen or had the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number removed. The second set of 
+conditions would have been the offering for sale, transfer, or barter of two or more handguns, 
+semiautomatic assault weapons, short-barreled shotguns, short-barreled rifles, or machine guns, 
+of which at least one was offered by sale, transfer, or barter to another who is either prohibited by 
+federal or state law from possessing a firearm, not 18 years of age, is in a school zone, or is not a 
+resident of the state in which he has attempted to acquire the firearms. 
+
+ 
+
+342 H.R. 4190; §2-proposed §924(q). 
+343 In the 110th Congress, Representative King introduced a nearly identical measure (H.R. 4818). 
+344 As previously mentioned, a statutory definition for “semiautomatic assault weapon” no longer exists. The 1994 
+Semiautomatic Assault Weapons (SAW) Ban, which expired in 2004, had defined, for example, a rifle as a 
+semiautomatic assault weapon if it was able to accept a detachable magazine and included two or more of the following 
+five characteristics: (1) a folding or telescopic scope, (2) a pistol grip, (3) a bayonet mount, (4) a muzzle flash 
+suppressor or threaded barrel capable of accepting such a suppressor, or (5) a grenade launcher. (Former 18 U.S.C. 
+§921(a)(30)). Similar definitions existed for semiautomatic pistols and shotguns. 
+
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+
+If someone committed one of the offenses already punishable by the GCA,345 each of which 
+carries its own penalty, under either of these conditions, such a person could be prosecuted under 
+this separate gun trafficking crime and face a fine and/or imprisonment of not more than 20 years. 
+This bill was silent as to whether the sentences for the proposed “gun trafficking” crime and the 
+individual predicate GCA offenses, if a person was prosecuted under both provisions, would have 
+been served consecutively or concurrently. It appears that such a matter would have likely been 
+influenced by the U.S. Sentencing Commission guidelines. 
+
+This bill also included numerous other provisions oriented toward gun trafficking. Among other 
+things, the bill would have (1) increased funding for Project Safe Neighborhoods; (2) required the 
+AG to give a biennial report to Congress on firearms tracing and prosecutions; (3) required the 
+FBI to give ATF access to its stolen gun files maintained in its National Crime Information 
+Center; (4) required the AG to establish a “national instant stolen gun check system”; and (5) 
+made it unlawful to transport, possess, or receive a firearm that had the importer’s or 
+manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated, or altered, regardless of one’s awareness of 
+this fact. 
+
+ ATF Modernization Act 
+
+On at least two occasions during the 111th Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee postponed 
+hearings on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Reform and Firearms 
+Modernization Act (S. 941). Senator Mike Crapo and Senator Patrick Leahy, chair of the 
+Judiciary Committee, introduced this bill on April 30, 2009. Representatives Steve King and Zack 
+Space introduced a companion bill (H.R. 2296). In regard to regulating federally licensed 
+firearms dealers, this proposal would have 
+
+• established a two tier, graduated penalty system for violations characterized as 
+
+being of a minor or serious nature; 
+
+• established a process by which ATF licensing decisions could be reviewed by an 
+
+administrative law judge; 
+
+• required the Attorney General to issue guidelines governing ATF investigations 
+
+of GCA violations; and 
+
+ 
+
+345 The GCA offenses in title 18 that would have been implicated in this new gun trafficking crime were (1) 
+§922(a)(1)(A), unlawful to willfully engage in business of dealing firearms without a license; (2) §922(a)(3), unlawful 
+for non-licensee to willfully transport or receive a firearm obtained in another state into his state of residence; (3) 
+§922(a)(6), unlawful to knowingly make a materially false statement to a FFL; (4) §922(b)(2), unlawful for an FFL to 
+willfully deliver a firearm to a person where the purchase or possession would violate state law; (5) §922(b)(3), 
+unlawful for an FFL to willfully deliver a firearm to a person residing in a state other than the FFL’s; (6) §922(b)(5), 
+unlawful for an FFL to willfully dispose of a firearm without making entries required by law; (7) §922(d), unlawful for 
+any person to knowingly dispose a firearm to a prohibited person; (8) §922(g), unlawful for any prohibited person to 
+knowingly receive or possess firearm or ammunition; (9) §922(i), unlawful for any person to knowingly transport or 
+ship a stolen firearm; (10) §922(j), unlawful for any person to knowingly receive, possess, conceal, store, barter, sell, or 
+dispose of stolen firearm; (11) §922(k), unlawful for any person to knowingly transport, ship, or receive a firearm that 
+has an obliterated or altered serial number; (12) §922(m), unlawful for an FFL to knowingly make a false entry in or 
+improperly maintain records required by law; (13) §922(n), unlawful for any person to willfully ship or receive 
+firearms or ammunition if under indictment for felony; (14) §924(c), unlawful for any person to use or carry a firearm 
+during or in relation to a federal crime of violence or drug trafficking crime; (15) §924(h), unlawful for any person to 
+transfer a firearm knowing it will be used to commit a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime. 
+
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+
+• defined the “willful” standard of intent to mean “knowingly and intentionally” 
+
+disregarding a “legal duty.” 
+
+Proponents for this proposal argue that these provisions would allow federal firearms licensees 
+greater opportunity to address non-substantive recordkeeping issues that under current law could 
+lead to the revocation of their licenses. Opponents argue that relaxing such provisions would 
+weaken ATF authority and efforts to reduce the number of “kitchen table top” dealers, who are 
+not substantively engaged in the business and, hence, are ineligible for such licenses, and “rogue” 
+dealers, who are not adequately controlling and accounting for their firearms inventories.346 
+Additional provisions in the bill would have addressed several other firearms-related issues 
+concerning machine guns, firearms parts, and handgun possession of a minor in the presence of a 
+parent or legal guardian. In the 112th Congress, Representative Steve King and Senator Mike 
+Crapo have reintroduced this proposal (H.R. 1093/S. 835). 
+
+ Gun Shows and Private Firearms Transfers 
+
+Federal law does not regulate gun shows specifically. Federal law regulating firearms transfers, 
+however, is applicable to such transfers at gun shows. Federal firearms licensees—those licensed 
+by the federal government to manufacture, import, or deal in firearms—are required to conduct 
+background checks on non-licensed persons seeking to obtain firearms from them, by purchase or 
+exchange. Conversely, non-licensed persons—those persons who transfer firearms but who do not 
+meet the statutory test of being engaged in the business—are not required to conduct such checks. 
+To some, this may appear to be an incongruity in the law. Why, they ask, should licensees be 
+required to conduct background checks at gun shows but not non-licensees? To those opposed to 
+further federal regulation of firearms, it may appear to be a continuance of the status quo (i.e., 
+non-interference by the federal government into private firearms transfers within state lines). On 
+the other hand, those seeking to increase federal regulation of firearms may view the absence of 
+background checks for firearms transfers between non-licensed/private persons as a loophole in 
+the law that needs to be closed. A possible issue for Congress is whether federal regulation of 
+firearms should be expanded to include private firearms transfers at gun shows and other similar 
+venues. 
+
+Among gun show-related proposals, there are two basic models. The first model is based on a bill 
+(S. 443) that was introduced in the 106th Congress by Senator Lautenberg, who successfully 
+offered this proposal as an amendment to the Senate-passed Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender 
+Act (S. 254). Several Members introduced variations of the Lautenberg bill in the 107th Congress. 
+In the 108th Congress, Representative Conyers—ranking minority Member of the Judiciary 
+Committee—introduced H.R. 260, which was very similar to the Lautenberg bill. In addition, 
+former Senator Daschle introduced the Justice Enhancement and Domestic Security Act of 2003 
+(S. 22), which included gun show language that was similar to the Lautenberg bill. The second 
+ 
+
+346 In the 109th Congress, Representative Howard Coble, chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, 
+Terrorism, and Homeland Security, and Representative Robert Scott, the subcommittee’s ranking minority Member, 
+introduced the ATFE Modernization and Reform Act of 2006 (H.R. 5092) on April 5, 2006. H.R. 5092 was approved 
+by the Crime subcommittee on May 3, 2006. The House Judiciary Committee ordered this bill reported on September 
+7, and a written report was filed on September 21 (H.Rept. 109-672). The House passed this bill on September 26, 
+2006, by a recorded vote of 277-131 (Roll no. 476), but no further action was taken on this bill. See also U.S. Congress, 
+House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, The Bureau of 
+Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (BATFE): Gun Show Enforcement (Parts 1 and 2) , 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 
+February 15 and 28, 2006, H.Hrg. 109-123 (Washington: GPO, 2006). 
+
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+
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+
+model is based on a bill (S. 890) introduced in the 107th Congress by Senators McCain and 
+Lieberman.347 In the 108th Congress, Senator McCain reintroduced this proposal as well (S. 
+1807). And, Representative Michael Castle introduced a similar gun show proposal (H.R. 3832). 
+
+Also in the 108th Congress, on March 2, 2004, during consideration of the Protection of Lawful 
+Commerce in Arms Act (S. 1805), the Senate passed a gun show-related amendment (S.Amdt. 
+2636) offered by Senator McCain by a yea-nay vote of 53-46 (Record Vote Number: 25). 
+However, the bill’s floor manager, Senator Larry Craig, pulled this bill from further floor 
+consideration before a final vote could be taken on the measure rather than risk passage of a bill 
+that included gun control and assault weapons ban provisions (the latter provision is described 
+below). 
+
+In the 109th Congress, Representative Castle reintroduced his proposal (H.R. 3540), but a similar 
+measure was not introduced in the Senate. In the 110th Congress, Representative Castle and 
+Senator Lautenberg reintroduced separate gun show proposals (H.R. 96 and S. 2577). Senator 
+Biden included similar provisions in the Crime Control and Prevention Act of 2007 (S. 2237). In 
+the 111th Congress, Senator Lautenberg and Representative Castle again reintroduced similar 
+measures that would have required background checks for private firearms transfers at guns 
+shows (S. 843 and H.R. 2324). In the 112th Congress, Senator Lautenberg has reintroduced this 
+measure (S. 35) and Representative McCarthy has introduced a companion measure (H.R. 591). 
+
+ Expired Semiautomatic Assault Weapons Ban 
+
+In 1994, Congress banned for 10 years the possession, transfer, or further domestic manufacture 
+of semiautomatic assault weapons (SAWs) and large-capacity ammunition feeding devices 
+(LCAFDs) that hold more than 10 rounds that were not legally owned or available prior to the 
+date of enactment (September 13, 1994). The SAW-LCAFD ban expired on September 13, 2004. 
+The SAW ban statute classified a rifle as a semiautomatic assault weapon if it was able to accept a 
+detachable magazine and included two or more of the following five characteristics: (1) a folding 
+or telescoping stock, (2) a pistol grip, (3) a bayonet mount, (4) a muzzle flash suppressor or 
+threaded barrel capable of accepting such a suppressor, or (5) a grenade launcher.348 There were 
+similar definitions for pistols and shotguns that were classified as semiautomatic assault 
+weapons.349 Semiautomatic assault weapons that were legally owned prior to the ban were not 
+restricted and remained available for transfer under applicable federal and state laws. Opponents 
+of the ban argue that the statutorily defined characteristics of a semiautomatic assault weapon 
+were largely cosmetic, and that these weapons were potentially no more lethal than other 
+semiautomatic firearms that were designed to accept a detachable magazine and were equal or 
+superior in terms of ballistics and other performance characteristics. Proponents of the ban argue 
+that semiautomatic military-style firearms, particularly those capable of accepting large-capacity 
+ammunition feeding devices, had and have no place in the civilian gun stock. 
+
+During and following World War II, assault rifles were developed to provide a lighter infantry 
+weapon that could fire more rounds, more rapidly (increased capacity and rate of fire). To 
+
+ 
+
+347 For further information, see out-of-print CRS Report RL32249, Gun Control: Proposals to Regulate Gun Shows , by 
+William J. Krouse and T.J. Halstead (available upon request). 
+348 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(30)(B). 
+349 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(30)(C) and (D). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
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+
+ 
+
+increase capacity of fire, detachable self-feeding magazines were developed. These rifles were 
+usually designed to be fired in fully automatic mode, meaning that once the trigger is pulled, the 
+weapon continues to fire rapidly until all the rounds in the magazine are expended or the trigger is 
+released. Often these rifles were also designed with a “select fire” feature that allowed them to be 
+fired in short bursts (e.g., three rounds per pull of the trigger), or in semiautomatic mode (i.e., one 
+round per pull of the trigger), as well as in fully automatic mode. By comparison, semiautomatic 
+firearms, including semiautomatic assault weapons, fire one round per pull of the trigger. 
+
+According to a 1997 survey of 203,300 state and federal prisoners who had been armed during 
+the commission of the crimes for which they were incarcerated, fewer than 1 in 50, or less than 
+2%, used, carried, or possessed a semiautomatic assault weapon or machine gun.350 Under current 
+law, any firearm that can be fired in fully automatic mode or in multi-round bursts is classified as 
+a “machine gun” and must be registered with the federal government under the National Firearms 
+Act of 1934. Furthermore, it is illegal to assemble a machine gun with legally or illegally 
+obtained parts. The population of legally owned machine guns has been frozen since 1986, and 
+they were not covered by the semiautomatic assault weapons ban. 
+
+In the 108th Congress, proposals were introduced to extend or make permanent the ban, whereas 
+other proposals were made to modify the definition of “semiautomatic assault weapon” to cover a 
+greater number of firearms by reducing the number of features that would constitute such 
+firearms, and expand the list of certain makes and models of firearms that are statutorily 
+enumerated as banned. A proposal (S. 1034) introduced by Senator Dianne Feinstein would have 
+made the ban permanent as would have a proposal (H.R. 2038/S. 1431) introduced by 
+Representative McCarthy and Senator Lautenberg. The latter measure, however, would have 
+modified the definition and expanded the list of banned weapons. Senator Feinstein also 
+introduced measures that would have extended the ban for 10 years (S. 2109/S. 2498). In 
+addition, on March 2, 2004, the Senate passed an amendment to the gun industry liability bill (S. 
+1805) that would have extended the ban for 10 years, but the Senate did not pass this bill.351 
+
+In the 109th Congress, Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced a bill that would have reinstated 
+previous law for 10 years (S. 620). Representative McCarthy and Senator Lautenberg 
+reintroduced their bills to make the ban permanent (H.R. 1312/S. 645). 
+
+In the 110th Congress, Representative McCarthy reintroduced a similar proposal (H.R. 1022) and 
+another measure (H.R. 1859) that would prohibit the transfer of a semiautomatic assault weapon 
+with a large-capacity ammunition feeding device, among other things. Representative Mark 
+Steven Kirk introduced the Assault Weapons Ban Reauthorization Act of 2008 (H.R. 6257). 
+Senator Biden included provisions to reauthorize the ban in the Crime Control and Prevention Act 
+of 2007 (S. 2237). 
+
+In the wake of the Tucson shootings, Representative McCarthy introduced a measure that would 
+reinstate the large capacity ammunition feeding device ban (H.R. 308). Senator Lautenberg 
+introduced a similar measure (S. 32). 
+
+ 
+
+350 For further information, see Caroline Wolf Harlow, Firearm Use by Offenders , at 
+http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=940. 
+351 For further information, see CRS Report RL32077, The Assault Weapons Ban: Legal Challenges and Legislative 
+Issues , by T. J. Halstead; and CRS Report RL32585, Semiautomatic Assault Weapons Ban , by William J. Krouse. 
+
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+
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+
+ 
+
+ Long-Range .50 Caliber Rifles352 
+
+In the 109th Congress, legislation was introduced to regulate more strictly certain .50 caliber 
+rifles. Some of these rifles are chambered to fire a relatively large round originally designed for 
+the Browning Machine Gun (BMG) and have been adopted by the U.S. military as long-range 
+“sniper” rifles. Gun control advocates argue that these firearms have little sporting, hunting, or 
+recreational purpose. They maintain that these rifles could be used to shoot down aircraft, rupture 
+pressurized chemical tanks, or penetrate armored personnel carriers. Gun control opponents 
+counter that these rifles are expensive, cumbersome, and rarely, if ever, used to commit crimes. 
+Furthermore, they maintain that these rifles were first developed for long-range marksmanship 
+competitions and then adopted by the military as sniper rifles. 
+
+The Fifty Caliber Sniper Weapons Regulation Act of 2005 (S. 935), introduced by Senator Dianne 
+Feinstein, would have amended the National Firearms Act (NFA)353 to regulate “.50 caliber sniper 
+weapons” in the same fashion as short-barreled shotguns and silencers by levying taxes on the 
+manufacture and transfer of such firearms and by requiring owner and firearms registration. In the 
+110th Congress, Senator Feinstein introduced a similar measure (S. 1331). 
+
+The other proposal introduced by Representative James Moran, the 50 Caliber Sniper Rifle 
+Reduction Act (H.R. 654), also would have amended the NFA to include those weapons, but it 
+would have also amended the Gun Control Act354 to effectively freeze the population of those 
+weapons legally available to private persons and to prohibit any further transfer of those firearms. 
+In other words, H.R. 654 would have grandfathered-in existing rifles but would have banned their 
+further transfer. Consequently, the proposal would have eventually eliminated those rifles all 
+together from the civilian gun stock. It would have been likely that covered .50 caliber rifles 
+would have had to be destroyed or handed over to the ATF as contraband when the legal firearm 
+owner died or wanted to give up the firearm. H.R. 654 included no compensation provision for 
+rifles destroyed or handed over to the federal government. 
+
+Furthermore, both proposals (S. 935 and H.R. 654) would have defined “.50 caliber sniper 
+weapon” to mean “a rifle capable of firing center-fire cartridge in .50 caliber, .50 BMG caliber, 
+any other variant of .50 caliber or any metric equivalent of such calibers.” Many rifles, and even 
+some handguns, are chambered to fire .50 caliber ammunition, meaning the projectile is about 
+one-half inch in diameter. Opponents of this legislation note that this definition was very broad 
+and would have likely covered .50 caliber rifles that would not be considered “long-range” or 
+“sniper” rifles. The .50 BMG caliber round, on the other hand, is an exceptionally large cartridge 
+(projectile and casing), which was once used almost exclusively as a heavy machine gun round. 
+Representative Moran also offered an amendment to the FY2006 Department of Commerce 
+appropriations bill (H.R. 2862) that would have prohibited the use of funding provided under that 
+bill to process licenses to export .50 caliber rifles, but that amendment was not adopted by the 
+House. 
+
+ 
+
+352 For further information, see CRS Report RS22151, Long-Range Fifty Caliber Rifles: Should They Be More Strictly 
+Regulated? , by William J. Krouse. 
+353 26 U.S.C., Chapter 53, §5801 et seq. 
+354 18 U.S.C., Chapter 44, §921 et seq. 
+
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+
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+
+ 
+
+ Appendix A. Legislation in the 111th Congress 
+
+The 111th Congress revisited several issues previously considered in the 110th Congress. For 
+example, Congress considered amendments to DC voting rights bills that would have further 
+overturned DC gun laws (S. 160 and H.R. 157). In addition, Congress passed several other gun-
+related provisions included in enacted legislation that address 
+
+• carrying firearms on public lands (P.L. 111-24), 
+• transporting firearms in passenger luggage on Amtrak trains (P.L. 111-117), 
+• widening law enforcement off-duty concealed carry privileges (P.L. 111-272), 
+• prohibiting higher health care premiums for gun owners (P.L. 111-148), and 
+• prohibiting the Department of Defense (DOD) from regulating firearms privately 
+
+owned but lawfully held by service members, DOD civilian personnel, and their 
+family members off-base (P.L. 111-383). 
+
+The 111th Congress also reconsidered or newly considered several other provisions that were not 
+enacted: 
+
+• gun rights restoration for veterans previously deemed to be mentally incompetent 
+
+(S. 669 and H.R. 6132), 
+
+• interstate reciprocity of concealed carry privileges (S. 1390 and S. 845), 
+• firearms possession in public housing (H.R. 3045 and H.R. 4868), and 
+• the treatment of firearms under bankruptcy proceedings (H.R. 5827/S. 3654). 
+
+ Constitutionality of DC Handgun Ban and Related Legislation 
+
+On June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court issued its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller on the 
+constitutionality of a DC law that banned handguns for 32 years, among other things. Passed by 
+the DC Council on June 26, 1976, the DC handgun ban required that all firearms within the 
+District be registered and all owners be licensed, and it prohibited the registration of handguns 
+after September 24, 1976. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found the handgun ban to be 
+unconstitutional because it violated an individual’s right under the Second Amendment to possess 
+a handgun in his home for lawful purposes such as self-defense.355 
+
+ DC Council Passes Emergency Law 
+
+On July 15, 2008, the DC Council passed a temporary, emergency law that allowed residents 
+through a registration/certificate process to keep a handgun in their home as long as that firearm 
+had a capacity of fewer than 12 rounds of ammunition and was not loadable from a magazine in 
+the handgrip, which in effect limited legal handguns under the temporary law to revolvers as 
+opposed to semiautomatic pistols. The emergency law also continued to require that handguns be 
+
+ 
+
+355 For legal analysis, see CRS Report R41750, The Second Amendment: An Overview of District of Columbia v. Heller 
+and McDonald v. City of Chicago , by Vivian S. Chu. 
+
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+ 
+
+kept unloaded and disassembled, or trigger locked, unless an attack in a home was imminent or 
+underway. Pro-gun groups immediately criticized the council’s emergency law for not being in 
+the “spirit” of the Supreme Court’s decision because it continued to ban semiautomatic pistols 
+and did not fully roll back the trigger lock requirement. Since the initial emergency law was 
+passed, the DC Council has passed several other pieces of similar temporary, emergency laws 
+related to the Heller decision. These laws include new firearms-related provisions that were also 
+included in permanent legislation passed by the DC Council that is described below. 
+
+ Legislation Related to DC Gun Laws356 
+
+Several Members of Congress were dissatisfied with the DC Council’s temporary law. On July 
+24, 2008, Representative Mike Ross filed a motion to discharge the Rules Committee from 
+consideration of H.Res. 1331, a resolution that would have provided for the consideration of a bill 
+to restore Second Amendment rights in the District of Columbia (H.R. 1399).357 This bill was 
+similar to previous bills introduced by Representative Mark Souder and Senators Kay Bailey 
+Hutchison and Orrin Hatch in previous congresses. Representative Ross introduced H.R. 1399 in 
+the 110th Congress for himself and Representative Souder on March 27, 2007, and Senator 
+Hutchison introduced a companion measure (S. 1001) on March 28, 2007. 
+
+In the 110th Congress, Representative Travis Childers introduced a similar bill (H.R. 6691) on 
+July 31, 2008. All three bills would have amended the DC Code to 
+
+• limit the Council’s authority to regulate firearms; 
+• remove semiautomatic firearms that can fire more than 12 rounds without 
+
+manually reloading from the definition of “machine gun”; 
+
+• amend the registration requirements so that they do not apply to handguns, but 
+
+only to sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, and short-barreled rifles; 
+
+• remove restrictions on ammunition possession; 
+• repeal requirements that DC residents keep firearms in their possession unloaded 
+
+and disassembled, or bound by a trigger lock; 
+
+• repeal firearms registration requirements generally; and 
+• repeal certain criminal penalties for possessing or carrying unregistered firearms. 
+
+Representatives John Dingell, John Tanner, and Mike Ross reportedly negotiated an agreement 
+with the House leadership to consider H.R. 6691 in early September.358 H.R. 6691 included 
+language that stated as a congressional finding that DC officials “have indicated their intention to 
+ 
+
+356 Foreshadowing the contentiousness of the DC gun ban issue, Representative Lamar Smith had previously scuttled 
+the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2007 (H.R. 1433) on March 22, 2007, when he offered a motion 
+to recommit the bill to the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee for consideration of an amendment to 
+repeal portions of the DC handgun ban. Rather than vote on the motion, debate on H.R. 1433 was postponed 
+indefinitely. Jonathan Allen, “Gun-Rights Gambit Sidetracks D.C. House Vote,” CQ Today , March 22, 2007; and for 
+further information on H.R. 1433, see CRS Report RL33830, District of Columbia Voting Representation in Congress: 
+An Analysis of Legislative Proposals , by Eugene Boyd. 
+357 Under the Home Rule Act (P.L. 93-198), Congress has reserved for itself the authority to legislate for the District. 
+358 Keith Perine and Seth Stern, “House Democrats Plan Vote To Roll Back D.C. Gun Laws,” CQ Today Online News , 
+August 5, 2008. 
+
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+
+continue to unduly restrict lawful firearm possession and use by citizens of the District.” H.R. 
+6691 also included a provision that would have allowed DC residents to purchase firearms from 
+federally licensed gun dealers in Virginia and Maryland. 
+
+On September 9, 2008, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee held a hearing 
+on the possible effects H.R. 6691 might have on the District. On the same day, Representative 
+Eleanor Holmes Norton introduced H.R. 6842, a bill that would have required the DC mayor and 
+Council to ensure that regulations were promulgated that would have been consistent with the 
+ Heller decision. On September 15, 2008, the House Oversight and Government Reform 
+Committee reported H.R. 6842 (H.Rept. 110-843). On September 17, 2008, however, the House 
+amended H.R. 6842 with the text of H.R. 6691 and passed the Childers’ bill. 
+
+ DC Council Passes Permanent Legislation 
+
+On December 16, 2008, the DC Council passed the Firearms Control Amendment Act of 2008 
+(FCAA; B17-0843) and the Inoperable Pistol Amendment Act of 2008 (IPAA; B17-0593).359 
+Mayor Adrian Fenty signed the FCAA into law on January 28, 2009 (L17-0372). This bill was 
+transmitted to Congress on February 10, 2009. From the day of transmittal, Congress had 30 
+legislative days to review this bill under the DC Home Rule Act (according to the District of 
+Columbia). Among other things, this law amends the DC Code to 
+
+• adopt the federal definition of “machine gun,” which does not include 
+
+semiautomatic pistols; 
+
+• prohibit the possession and registration of “assault weapons” and rifles capable 
+
+of firing .50 caliber Browning Machine Gun (BMG) rounds; and 
+
+• require that all firearms made after January 1, 2011, be microstamped.360 
+
+Many provisions of this law, including the assault weapons ban and the microstamping 
+provisions, were modeled after California state law. 
+
+Mayor Fenty signed IPAA into law on January 16, 2009 (L17-0388). It was transmitted to 
+Congress on February 4, 2009. Because the bill includes penalty provisions, Congress had 60 
+legislative days to review this bill under the DC Home Rule Act. Among other things, this 
+permanent legislation amends the DC Code to 
+
+• criminalize the possession of inoperable firearms; 
+• criminalize the discharge of firearms; 
+• prohibit carrying a rifle or shotgun; 
+• allow for the transportation of firearms under the same conditions as permitted 
+
+under federal law; and 
+
+ 
+
+359 For further information on these bills, as well as the Ensign amendment, see CRS Report R40474, DC Gun Laws 
+and Proposed Amendments , by Vivian S. Chu. 
+360 Microstamping is an emerging technology by which a firearm’s serial number is engraved microscopically with a 
+laser onto the breech face or firing pin of a firearm. When the firearm is fired, the serial number is “stamped” upon the 
+cartridge casing. If a microstamped cartridge is subsequently recovered at a crime scene, the firearm’s serial number 
+could potentially yield additional leads for law enforcement. 
+
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+ 
+
+• change the waiting period to purchase a firearm from 48 hours to 10 days. 
+
+ DC Voting Rights and Gun Laws in the 111th Congress 
+
+On February 26, 2009, Senator John Ensign successfully amended (S.Amdt. 576) the District of 
+Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009 (S. 160) by a yea-nay vote of 62-36 (Record Vote 
+Number 72) with language that would have overturned certain DC guns laws and prevent the 
+District from legislating in these areas in the future. The Senate passed this bill on the same day 
+by a yea-nay vote of 61-37 (Record Vote Number 73).361 This bill was tabled while the House 
+leadership attempted to negotiate an end to the impasse over the DC gun laws and bring its 
+version of the DC voting rights bill (H.R. 157) to the floor.362 In April 2010, efforts were made to 
+revive the voting rights bill, but some Members prepared amendments to overturn the city’s gun 
+laws. Consequently, Members managing the DC voting rights bill postponed further consideration 
+rather than risk passage of amendments that would overturn the city’s gun laws.363 Senator John 
+McCain and Representative Travis Childers introduced their amendments as stand-alone bills, the 
+Second Amendment Enforcement Act (S. 3265/H.R. 5162). In the 112th Congress, Representative 
+Mike Ross has introduced a proposal to restore Second Amendment rights in the District of 
+Columbia (H.R. 645). 
+
+ Constitutionality of the Chicago Handgun Ban 
+
+On June 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued its 5-4 decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago and 
+found that the individual right to lawfully possess a firearm for the purposes of self-defense under 
+the Second Amendment applied to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.364 Although 
+the McDonald decision arguably nullified the Chicago handgun ban by limiting a state, city, or 
+local government’s ability to prohibit handguns outright, it does not delineate what would 
+constitute permissible gun control laws under the Second Amendment. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
+remanded the Chicago handgun ban back to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for a rehearing. 
+Consequently, the delineation of permissible gun laws will likely be developed in future cases. 
+Nevertheless, the city of Chicago has reportedly adopted handgun regulations that are similar to 
+those adopted by the District of Columbia. These regulations allow eligible residents to register 
+one operable handgun per household, but in most cases that handgun must be locked and rendered 
+inoperable, and it cannot be carried outside of the home.365 
+
+ Public Lands and Firearms Possession and Use 
+
+In the 111th Congress, Senator Tom Coburn successfully amended the Credit CARD Act of 2009 
+(H.R. 627) with a provision (S.Amdt. 1067) that allows private persons to carry firearms in 
+national parks and wildlife refuges (effective February 22, 2010). This amendment passed by a 
+ 
+
+361 For more information, see CRS Report R40474, DC Gun Laws and Proposed Amendments , by Vivian S. Chu. 
+362 Edward Epstein and Michael Teitelbaum, “Hoyer Expresses Optimism About Chance D.C. Vote Bill Will Come to 
+Floor,” CQ Today , March 24, 2009. 
+363 Ann E. Marimow and Ben Pershing, “District Voting Rights Scuttled: ‘The Price Was Too High’ Amendment 
+Would Have Repealed D.C. Gun Laws,” Washington Post , April 21, 2010, p. B01. 
+364 For legal analysis, see CRS Report R41750, The Second Amendment: An Overview of District of Columbia v. Heller 
+and McDonald v. City of Chicago , by Vivian S. Chu. 
+365 Dave Workman, “Chicago Adopts New Gun Regs, Lawsuit Filed,” New Gun Week , August 1, 2010, p. 1. 
+
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+
+vote of 67 to 29 (Record Vote Number 188) on May 12, 2009. Under H.Res. 456, the House voted 
+on the Coburn amendment as a separate measure and passed it by a vote of 279 to 147. President 
+Barack Obama signed H.R. 627 into law on May 22, 2009 (P.L. 111-24). 
+
+Previously, in the 110th Congress during consideration of a public land bill (S. 2483), Senator 
+Coburn offered but later withdrew an amendment (S.Amdt. 3967) that would have overturned 
+federal regulations that prohibit visitors to parks and wildlife refuges managed by the National 
+Park Service (NPS)366 and Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)367 from possessing operable and 
+loaded firearms. While these regulations were last revised substantively in 1981 and 1983, similar 
+firearms restrictions were promulgated in the 1930s in an effort to curb poaching and other illegal 
+activities. There are exceptions for hunting and marksmanship under current law. Since the 1980s, 
+however, many states have passed laws that allow persons to carry concealed handguns for 
+personal protection. Although 48 states have “concealed carry” laws, only 24 of those states 
+reportedly allow concealed handguns to be carried in state parks.368 
+
+On April 30, 2008, in part at the urging of some Members of Congress, the Department of the 
+Interior (DOI) published proposed regulations that would authorize the possession of loaded and 
+concealed firearms, as long as carrying those firearms in that fashion would be legal under the 
+laws of the states where the public lands are located.369 While the initial comment period was 
+scheduled to end on June 30, 2008, it was extended until August 8, 2008.370 DOI reported 
+receiving approximately 90,000 comments on those proposed regulations. Final regulations were 
+issued on December 10, 2008.371 Those regulations took effect on January 9, 2009. However, on 
+March 19, a U.S. District Judge issued a preliminary injunction on the regulations in a lawsuit 
+brought by three groups: the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, the National Parks 
+Conservation Association, and the Coalition of National Park Service Retirees.372 On March 20, 
+the NRA filed a notice to appeal in Federal District Court in opposition to the preliminary 
+injunction. 
+
+Senator Coburn also introduced a bill, the Protecting Americans from Violent Crime Act of 2008 
+(S. 2619), that was very similar to his proposed amendment and DOI’s proposed regulations. 
+Supporters of those proposals pointed to a reported rise in illegal activities and violent crime on 
+public lands. Opponents argued that the risk of a violent crime encounter in National Parks and 
+Wildlife Refuges was negligible.373 They further argued that allowing others to carry loaded and 
+concealed handguns on their person would make them less safe. In the 111th Congress, similar 
+
+ 
+
+366 36 C.F.R. Part 2. 
+367 50 C.F.R. Part 27. 
+368 Warren Richey, “Bid to Allow Guns in National Parks,” Christian Science Monitor , August 19, 2008, p. 3. 
+369 73 Federal Register 23388. 
+370 73 Federal Register 39272. 
+371 Department of the Interior, National Park Service, “General Regulations for Areas Administered by the National 
+Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service,” 73 Federal Register 74966-74972, December 10, 2008. 
+372 Juliet Eilperin and Del Quentin Wilber, “Judge Blocks Rule Permitting Concealed Guns in U.S. Parks,” Washington 
+Post , March 20, 2009, p. A09. 
+373 CRS compilation of FBI Uniform Crime Reports data show that from 2002 through 2006, there were 15 murders 
+and non-negligent homicides reported by the FWS and 48 reported by the NPS. However, FWS reports all crimes 
+encountered by its agents, whether or not they occurred on refuge land. It is difficult to determine how many of the 15 
+murders occurred on refuges. 
+
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+
+measures were introduced by Representative Doc Hastings and Senator Mike Crapo (H.R. 
+1684/S. 816). 
+
+ Amtrak Passengers and Firearms 
+
+On September 16, 2010, Senator Roger Wicker amended the FY2010 Transportation-HUD 
+appropriations bill (H.R. 3288) with language to authorize private persons to carry firearms and 
+ammunition in their checked luggage on Amtrak trains. The Wicker amendment (S.Amdt. 2366) 
+passed by a yea-nay vote, 68-30 (Record Vote Number 279). On September 17, 2009, the Senate 
+passed this bill. Later, H.R. 3288 became the vehicle for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
+2010. Conferees retained the Wicker language in the conference agreement (H.Rept. 111-366), 
+and the President signed H.R. 3288 into law (P.L. 111-117) on December 16, 2009. Section 159 of 
+the act requires Amtrak, with the Transportation Security Administration, to report to Congress 
+(within six months of enactment—June 16, 2010) on proposed guidance and procedures to 
+implement a “checked firearms program.” The reported guidance and procedures are to be 
+implemented within one year of enactment. The act further requires that checked firearms be 
+placed in a locked, hard-sided container, and that passengers planning to carry firearms in their 
+luggage declare their intentions to Amtrak at the time they make their reservations or within 24 
+hours of departure. Similar requirements are set out for placing ammunition in checked luggage. 
+
+ Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act Amendments 
+
+The 111th Congress passed amendments to clarify and expand eligibility under the Law 
+Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA; P.L. 108-277). This law authorizes certain qualified 
+active-duty and retired law enforcement officers to carry concealed firearms across state lines, 
+while off duty. Senator Leahy, the Judiciary Committee chair, introduced the amendments as a 
+stand-alone bill (S. 1132). In the House, Representative J. Randy Forbes introduced a similar 
+measure (H.R. 3752). The Senate Judiciary Committee approved S. 1132 on March 11, 2010, and 
+the Senate passed the bill on May 13, 2010. The Senate Judiciary Committee filed a report on this 
+bill on July 27, 2010 (S.Rept. 111-233). The House passed S. 1132 on September 29, 2010. The 
+President signed S. 1132 into law on October 12, 2010 (P.L. 111-272). The 2010 LEOSA 
+amendments (1) clarify that certain Amtrak and executive branch law enforcement officers are 
+eligible for concealed carry privileges under P.L. 108-277, (2) reduce the length of service 
+criterion for eligibility under that law from 15 to 10 years, and (3) clarify other provisions of the 
+law related to certification and credentialing. 
+
+Previously, in the 110th Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported a similar bill (S. 376; 
+S.Rept. 110-150) on September 5, 2007. This bill was also introduced by Senator Leahy. 
+Representative Forbes introduced a similar bill (H.R. 2726). The language of S. 376 was 
+incorporated into S. 2084, the School Safety and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 2007, 
+when that bill was reported on September 21, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-183). In the 109th Congress, the 
+Senate amended H.R. 1751, the Court Security Improvement Act of 2006, with similar LEOSA 
+provisions and passed that measure. 
+
+ Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and Firearms 
+
+The 111th Congress included language in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; 
+P.L. 111-148) that prohibits data collection on gun ownership or higher premiums for gun owners 
+
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+
+under wellness program provisions. The catalyst for this language was an “action alert” that Gun 
+Owners of America (GOA) sent out, urging its membership to oppose a Senate health care reform 
+proposal released on November 18, 2009. The GOA argued that the Senate proposal, along with 
+other enacted provisions of law, would have required doctors to provide “gun-related health data” 
+to a computerized national health information network.374 With such information, the GOA 
+maintained that the federal government would deny individuals the ability to obtain a firearm or 
+firearms permit. Of particular concern for the GOA were mental health records. Another concern 
+raised by the GOA was the possibility that insurance providers under the Senate proposal would 
+have been required or prompted to raise premiums for persons who exhibited arguably “unhealthy 
+behaviors,” such as firearms ownership. 
+
+Although the Senate proposal included provisions to amend the Health Insurance Portability and 
+Accountability Act (HIPAA) that addressed electronic data transaction standards for national 
+health information sharing purposes to facilitate eligibility determinations and health care plan 
+enrollments, it did not include any provisions that would have directly required the national 
+collection of “gun-related health data.” Without a clear directive, it is debatable whether the 
+Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would have undertaken such data collection on 
+firearms ownership and possession given other provisions in current law, albeit in different 
+statutory contexts, that prohibit the establishment of a registry of privately held firearms or 
+firearms owners.375 Dr. David Blumenthal, the National Coordinator for Health Information 
+Technology at HHS, said that the current system does not include a database into which such 
+information could be fed, nor are there plans to create one.376 Blumenthal added that “we don’t 
+want to do it and it’s not authorized.”377 
+
+Nor did the Senate proposal include any provisions that would have required or prompted 
+insurance providers to raise premiums on gun owners. On the other hand, the Senate legislation 
+did include provisions that would have codified and amended HIPAA wellness program 
+provisions that would have addressed employer-based incentives for healthy behavior to reduce 
+health care costs. Arguably, these provisions would not have precluded the Secretary of Health 
+and Human Services from promulgating regulations that addressed risks associated with firearms 
+ownership, possession, use, and storage. However, such regulations, if proposed, would have 
+likely been tested in administrative and judicial review as to their impact on Second Amendment 
+rights. Nonetheless, Senate legislators included new language in their Patient Protection and 
+Affordable Care proposal, which the Senate passed as an amendment to H.R. 3590 on December 
+24, 2009.378 
+
+The Senate language, which was included in P.L. 111-148, prohibits any wellness and health 
+promotion activity sponsored under the act’s HIPAA amendments from requiring the disclosure or 
+collection of any information about the presence or storage of a lawfully possessed firearm or 
+
+ 
+
+374 Shalaigh Murray, “Public Option at Center of Debate; Democratic Dissent Reid Must Find Compromise to Pass 
+Health-Care Bill,” Washington Post , November 23, 2009, p. A01. 
+375 In the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (P.L. 103-159, November 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1542), Congress 
+included a provision (§103(i)) that prohibits any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States from 
+establishing a registration system with respect to firearms, firearms owners, or firearms transactions/dispositions that 
+would use records generated by the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). 
+376 Peter Overby, “A Vote For Health Care, A Vote Against Gun Rights?,” National Public Radio , November 25, 2009. 
+377 Ibid. 
+378 See proposed §2717 as included in §1001 and amended by §10101 in the Senate-passed H.R. 3590. 
+
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+ammunition in the residence or on the property of an individual, or the lawful use, possession, or 
+storage of a firearm or ammunition by an individual. The language also states that nothing in the 
+bill would be construed to authorize any data collection on the lawful ownership, possession, use, 
+or storage of firearms or ammunition, or to maintain records on individual ownership or 
+possession of a firearm or ammunition. In addition, with regard to any health insurance to be 
+provided under the act, this provision prohibits providers from increasing premium rates; denying 
+coverage; or reducing or withholding discounts, rebates, or rewards for participation in a wellness 
+program because of an individual’s lawful ownership, possession, use, or storage of a firearm or 
+ammunition. Finally, under the data collection activities authorized under the act, the language 
+states that no individual would be required to disclose any information relating to the lawful 
+ownership, possession, use, or storage of a firearm or ammunition. 
+
+ Guns Held Off-Base and Surplus Ammunition and Shell Casings 
+
+In addition, two firearms-related provisions were included in the Ike Skelton National Defense 
+Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (P.L. 111-383). One provision (§1062), sponsored by 
+Senator Jim Inhofe, prohibits the Secretary of Defense, and by implication base commanders, 
+from collecting any information on privately owned firearms kept by military personnel, 
+Department of Defense civilian employees, and their family members off-base. Another provision 
+(§346) sponsored by Senators Jon Tester and Max Baucus addresses the demilitarization of small 
+arms ammunition of several types and calibers, including spent shell casings, which is commonly 
+sold as military surplus. 
+
+ NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007379 
+
+In the wake of the Virginia Tech tragedy,380 the 110th Congress passed legislation to improve 
+firearms-related background checks. The Senate amended and passed the NICS Improvement 
+Amendments Act of 2007 (H.R. 2640) following lengthy negotiations, as did the House, on 
+December 19, 2007, clearing that bill for the President’s signature. President Bush signed the bill 
+into law on January 8, 2008 (P.L. 110-180). This law amends and strengthens a provision of the 
+Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act; P.L. 103-159) that requires federal agencies 
+to provide, and the Attorney General to secure, any government records with information relevant 
+to determining the eligibility of a person to receive a firearm for inclusion in databases queried by 
+NICS. 
+
+The act also includes provisions designed to encourage states, tribes, and territories (states) to 
+make available to the Attorney General certain records related to persons who are disqualified 
+from acquiring a firearm, particularly records related to domestic violence misdemeanor 
+convictions and restraining orders, as well as mental health adjudications. To accomplish this, the 
+act establishes a framework of incentives and disincentives, whereby the Attorney General is 
+authorized to either waive a grant match requirement or reduce a law enforcement assistance 
+
+ 
+
+379 As described in greater detail above, the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) is 
+administered by the FBI, so that federally licensed gun dealers can process a background check to determine a 
+customer’s eligibility to possess a firearm before proceeding with a transaction. 
+380 On April 16, 2007, a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University shot 32 people to death and 
+wounded many others. 
+
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+grant depending upon a state’s compliance with the act’s goals of bringing firearms-related 
+disqualifying records online. 
+
+The original proposal (H.R. 2640) was introduced by Representative McCarthy and co-sponsored 
+by Representative John Dingell. As passed by the House by a voice vote on June 13, 2007, H.R. 
+2640 reportedly reflected a compromise between groups favoring and opposing greater gun 
+control.381 The Senate Judiciary Committee approved similar, but not identical, NICS 
+improvement amendments as part of the School Safety and Law Enforcement Improvement Act 
+of 2004 on August 2, 2007, and reported this bill on September 21, 2007 (S. 2084; S.Rept. 110-
+183). The Senate Judiciary Committee included five other measures in S. 2084. With some 
+modification, those measures included the School Safety Enhancements Act (S. 1217), the Equity 
+in Law Enforcement Act (S. 1448), the PRECAUTION Act (S. 1521), the Terrorist Hoax 
+Improvements Act (S. 735), and the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2007 (LEOSA; S. 
+376). Support for the NICS improvement and the LEOSA amendments (described below) in S. 
+2084 was reportedly divided and uneven, however.382 Citing privacy and cost issues related to the 
+NICS amendments, Senator Coburn reportedly placed a hold on that legislation.383 
+
+In addition, some opposition to NICS improvement amendments had coalesced around an 
+assertion made by Larry Pratt of Gun Owners of America that, under these amendments, any 
+veteran who was or had been diagnosed with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)384 and was 
+found to be a “danger to himself or others would have his gun rights taken away ... forever.”385 
+Under current law, however, any veteran or other VA beneficiary who is adjudicated or 
+determined to be a mental defective, because he poses a danger to himself or others, or is 
+incapable of conducting his day-to-day affairs, is ineligible to possess a firearm. A diagnosis of 
+PTSD in and of itself is not a disqualifying factor for the purposes of gun control under the NICS 
+improvement amendments or previous law. Under the enacted NICS improvement amendments, 
+VA beneficiaries who have been determined to be mental defectives could appeal for 
+administrative relief and possibly have their gun rights restored if they could demonstrate that 
+they were no longer afflicted by a disqualifying condition. 
+
+ Veterans, Mental Incompetency, and Firearms Eligibility 
+
+In the 110th Congress, Senator Burr successfully amended the Veterans’ Medical Personnel 
+Recruitment and Retention Act of 2008 (S. 2969) in full committee markup on June 26, 2008. 
+The language of the Burr amendment would have provided that “a veteran, surviving spouse, or 
+child who is mentally incapacitated, deemed mentally incompetent, or experiencing an extended 
+
+ 
+
+381 Jonathan Weisman, “Democrats, NRA Reach Deal on Background-Check Bill,” Washington Post , June 10, 2007, p. 
+A02. 
+382 David Rogers, “Democrats Stall on Gun-Records Bill: Despite Support, Background-Check Measure Staggers in 
+Senate Amid Infighting,” Wall Street Journal , September 21, 2007, p. A6. 
+383 Seth Stern, “Coburn Blocks Gun Background-Check Bill, Citing Concerns About Privacy, Spending,” CQ Today , 
+September 25, 2007. 
+384 PTSD is an anxiety disorder that can occur after one has been through a traumatic event. Symptoms may manifest 
+soon after the trauma, or may be delayed. For further information, see U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, National 
+Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Fact Sheet, http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/ncdocs/fact_shts/
+fs_what_is_ptsd.html. 
+385 Larry Pratt, “Veterans Disarmament Act To Bar Vets From Owning Guns,” September 23, 2007, 
+http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/september2007/230907Disarmament.htm. 
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+loss of consciousness shall not be considered adjudicated as a mental defective” for purposes of 
+the Gun Control Act, “without the order or finding of a judge, magistrate, or other judicial 
+authority of competent jurisdiction that such veteran, surviving spouse, or child is a danger to him 
+or herself or others.” Senator Burr introduced a bill, the Veterans’ 2nd Amendment Protection Act 
+(S. 3167), that would have achieved the same ends as his amendment to S. 2969. 
+
+In the 111th Congress, Senator Burr reintroduced his bill as S. 669, and the Senate Committee on 
+Veterans’ Affairs reported this bill (S.Rept. 111-27) on June 16, 2009. Representative Jerry Moran 
+introduced a similar bill (H.R. 2547). The House Veterans’ Affairs Committee considered and 
+approved a similar provision that Representative John Boozman offered as an amendment to a 
+draft bill in full committee markup on September 15, 2010. This provision was included in the 
+reported version of the bill (H.R. 6132; H.Rept. 111-630). However, when the House considered 
+H.R. 6132 under suspension of the rules, an amended version of H.R. 6132 was called up that did 
+not include the Boozman provision. 
+
+ Mental Defective Adjudications 
+
+Under 27 C.F.R. Section 478.11, the term “adjudicated as a mental defective” includes a 
+determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that a person, as a result of 
+marked subnormal intelligence or a mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease, (1) is a 
+danger to himself or others, or (2) lacks the mental capacity to manage his own affairs. The term 
+also includes (1) a finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case and (2) those persons found 
+incompetent to stand trial or found not guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility pursuant 
+to articles 50a and 72b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. Sections 850a, 876(b). 
+
+This definition of “mental defective” was promulgated by the ATF in a final rule published on 
+June 27, 1997.386 In the final rule, the ATF noted that the VA had commented on the “proposed 
+rulemaking” and had correctly interpreted that “adjudicated as a mental defective” includes a 
+person who is found to be “mentally incompetent” by the Veterans Benefit Administration 
+(VBA). Under veterans law, an individual is considered “mentally incompetent” if he or she lacks 
+the mental capacity to contract or manage his or her own affairs for reasons related to injury or 
+disease (under 38 CFR §3.353).387 In a proposed rulemaking, the ATF opined that the inclusion of 
+“mentally incompetent” in the definition of “mental defective” was wholly consistent with the 
+legislative history of the 1968 Gun Control Act.388 Reportedly, the VA could have been the only 
+federal agency that had promulgated a definition like “mentally incompetent” that overlapped 
+with the term “mental defective.”389 
+
+ VA Referrals to the FBI 
+
+In November 1998, the VBA provided the FBI with disqualifying records on 88,898 VA 
+beneficiaries. VA rating specialists had determined based upon medical evidence that these 
+
+ 
+
+386 Federal Register , vol. 62, no. 124, June 27, 1997, p. 34634. 
+387 Federal Register , vol. 61, no. 174, September 6, 1996, p. 47095. 
+388 Ibid. 
+389 Personal communication with Compensation and Pension Program staff, Department of Veterans Affairs, July 9, 
+2008. 
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+beneficiaries were unable to manage their own financial affairs.390 The VA appointed a fiduciary 
+for purposes of receiving and managing each beneficiary’s VA benefits. According to the VA, 
+during the determination process beneficiaries were notified that VA proposed to rate them 
+“incompetent” and that they were able to request a hearing and submit evidence to the contrary if 
+they wished. VA also advised these beneficiaries regarding their right to appeal any final rating 
+regarding their ability to receive and manage their own VA benefits. Despite the resultant NICS 
+referral, however, the VA did not necessarily inform the beneficiary that he would lose his gun 
+rights as a consequence of this determination. As described above, under the P.L. 110-180 the VA 
+is required to inform the beneficiary of this outcome. 
+
+Interestingly, the Veterans Medical Administration has not submitted any disqualifying records on 
+VA medical care recipients to the FBI for inclusion in NICS for any medical/psychiatric reason 
+(like PTSD). While veterans with PTSD or any other condition, who have been involuntarily 
+committed under a state court order to a VA medical facility because they posed a danger to 
+themselves or others, are ineligible to ship, transport, receive, or possess a firearm or ammunition 
+under federal law, the Veterans Medical Administration would not make a related referral about 
+that ineligibility to the FBI. Instead, the state in which the court resides would submit the 
+disqualifying record to the FBI, if such a submission would be appropriate and permissible under 
+state law.391 
+
+Nevertheless, the decision by the VA to submit VBA records on “mentally incompetent” veterans 
+to the FBI for inclusion in the NICS mental defective file generated some degree of controversy 
+in 1999 and 2000.392 Critics of this policy underscored that veterans routinely consented to 
+“mentally incompetent” determinations so that a fiduciary (designated payee) could be appointed 
+for them. Those critics contended that to take away a veteran’s Second Amendment rights without 
+his foreknowledge was improper. They also pointed out that no other federal agencies were 
+providing similar disqualifying records to the FBI. This controversy subsided, but it re-emerged 
+when Congress considered the NICS improvement amendments (described above). 
+
+According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, as of May 1, 2011, there were 130,886 files in the 
+NICS mental defective file, which had been referred to the FBI by the VA. Those VA files 
+accounted for 99.2% of mental defective files (131,979) referred to the FBI by any federal 
+department or agency. In the view of some Members of Congress, it may be incongruous that 
+other federal agencies, such as the Social Security Administration, that provide similar disability 
+and income maintenance benefits to persons who are mentally incapacitated refer relatively few, 
+if any, firearms-related disqualifying records about beneficiaries whom they serve to the FBI. 
+Moreover, there are other individuals in the U.S. population who are similarly incapacitated due 
+to their age-related infirmities or mental disabilities, but in many cases there are no mechanisms 
+for state or local authorities to make similar referrals to the FBI. As a consequence, even with the 
+changes put in place by P.L. 110-180, those Members of Congress may view the VA’s continued 
+referral of firearms-related disqualifying records on veterans who have had a fiduciary appointed 
+ 
+
+390 Personal communication with the Office of Congressional Affairs staff, Department of Veterans Affairs, February 
+10, 2012. 
+391 For further information on the treatment of mental illness and substance abuse for the purposes of gun control, see 
+Donna M. Norris, M.D. et al., “Firearm Laws, Patients, and the Roles of Psychiatrists,” American Journal of 
+Psychiatry , August 2006, pp. 1392-1396. 
+392 John Dougherty, “VA Give FBI Health Secrets: Veterans’ Records Could Block Firearms Purchases,” WorldNet 
+Daily.com , June 22, 2000; and “VA Defends Vets’ Records Transfers to NICS System,” New Gun Week , vol. 35, issue 
+1650, July 10, 2000, p. 1. 
+
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+on their behalf but have not behaved in a threatening or dangerous manner to be an unjustified 
+indignity placed on individuals who have served their country honorably in the Armed Forces. 
+
+Other Members of Congress would maintain that the VA has faithfully complied with the law and 
+that public safety is enhanced by making those referrals to the FBI. They might also argue that 
+opposition to the VA policy waned between November 1998 and the 2007 congressional debate, 
+demonstrating that veterans who were “adjudicated mental defective,” rarely, if ever, sought to 
+acquire and were subsequently denied firearms in a manner that could be described as an 
+injustice. Those Members would likely underscore that, in their view, the VA’s current policy does 
+not diminish national recognition of those veterans’ honorable service. Rather, the VA’s policy has 
+been implemented to protect those veterans and others from the harm that might result if they 
+acquired a firearm and used it improperly due to reasons possibly related to their mental 
+incompetency. 
+
+ Public Housing and Firearms Possession and Use 
+
+In the 110th Congress, the House passed a bill (H.R. 6216) on July 9, 2008, that would have made 
+changes related to the administration of the public housing program administered by the 
+Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) through local public housing authorities 
+(PHAs). The bill includes a provision that would have prohibited the HUD Secretary from 
+accepting as reasonable any management or related fees charged by a PHA for enforcing any 
+provision of a lease agreement that requires tenants to register firearms that are otherwise legally 
+possessed, or that prohibits their possession outright. On the other hand, the bill would have 
+allowed PHAs to terminate the lease of any tenant who was found to be illegally using a firearm. 
+
+The gun-related provision in H.R. 6216 reportedly reflected a compromise.393 The original 
+language restricting fees for enforcing gun restrictions was included in a motion to recommit 
+offered during floor debate on a similar public housing bill (H.R. 3521). That bill was not 
+approved by the House, but was sent back to the House Financial Services Committee for further 
+consideration. A new version of the public housing bill (H.R. 5829) was introduced that included 
+language from the motion to recommit, but it did not include the lease termination proviso, and 
+the bill received no further consideration. 
+
+In the 111th Congress, the Financial Services Committee reported the Section 8 Voucher Reform 
+Act of 2009 (H.R. 3045; H.Rept. 111-277) on July 23, 2009. In committee markup, 
+Representative Price successfully amended the bill on July 9, 2009, with language that would 
+have prevented authorities from prohibiting firearms in public housing. The committee approved 
+another housing bill that included a similar provision (H.R. 4868) on July 27, 2010. 
+
+ Concealed Carry and Reciprocity (Thune Amendment) 
+
+On July 22, 2009, the Senate considered an amendment (S.Amdt. 1618) offered by Senator Thune 
+to the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (S. 1390) that would have arguably provided for 
+national reciprocity between states regarding the concealed carry of firearms. By agreement, the 
+amendment needed 60 votes to pass, but it was narrowly defeated by a recorded vote, 58-39. 
+
+ 
+
+393 Seth Stern, “House to Try Again on Public Housing Bill,” CQ Today , July 8, 2008. 
+
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+
+Senator Thune introduced a similar bill, the Respecting States Rights and Concealed Carry 
+Reciprocity Act of 2009 (S. 845). 
+
+As background, the issue of concealed carry under state law can be divided into four categories: 
+(1) no permit required, (2) mandatory or “shall issue,” (3) discretionary or “may issue,” and (4) 
+no concealed carry permitted. In Alaska and Vermont, state law allowed concealed carry without 
+a permit (no permit required), as is the case today. When the Thune amendment was debated, 35 
+states had “shall issue” laws, in that the state issues the permit as long as the applicant meets the 
+eligibility criteria.394 Eleven states were “may issue” states, in that the state had discretion in 
+whether to issue a permit.395 And, Wisconsin and Illinois state law prohibited the concealed carry 
+of firearms by civilians under any circumstances. 
+
+Many states with concealed carry laws have extended concealed carry privileges, or reciprocity, 
+to the residents of other states. According to the NRA, however, those concealed carry laws are 
+often very technical and subject to change. Moreover, there are no national eligibility criteria, or 
+training standards regarding concealed carry. Although the Thune amendment did not address the 
+issue of national standards, it arguably would have required “may issue” states to honor the 
+permits issued by “shall issue” states. By extension, it would also have required “shall issue” and 
+“may issue” states to honor the eligibility of all residents of Alaska and Vermont to carry 
+concealed firearms in their states, as long as those persons were not otherwise prohibited from 
+possessing firearms. 
+
+ Bankruptcy and Firearms 
+
+Representative John A. Boccieri and Senator Leahy introduced the Protecting Gun Owners in 
+Bankruptcy Act of 2010 (H.R. 5827/S. 3654). This proposal would have amended federal 
+bankruptcy law to permit an individual to exempt from the property of his estate a single rifle, 
+shotgun, or pistol, or any combination thereof, as long as the total value of the exemption did not 
+exceed $3,000. On July 28, 2010, the House passed H.R. 5827 by a roll call vote (two-thirds 
+required) of 307-113 (Roll no. 479). In the 112th Congress, Representative Tim Griffin has 
+introduced a similar measure (H.R. 1181). 
+
+ ATF Appropriations and Southwest Border Gun Trafficking 
+
+The 111th Congress considered legislation to either fund ATF or authorize increased 
+appropriations for the agency. The ATF enforces federal criminal law related to the manufacture, 
+importation, and distribution of alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives. ATF works both 
+independently and through partnerships with industry groups; international, state, and local 
+governments; and other federal agencies to investigate and reduce crime involving firearms and 
+explosives, acts of arson, and illegal trafficking of alcohol and tobacco products. 
+
+ 
+
+394 At the time of the Thune amendment, “shall issue” states included Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, 
+Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
+Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
+Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and 
+Wyoming. 
+395 “May issue” states included Alabama, Connecticut, and Iowa. The following states are restrictive may issue states: 
+California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. 
+
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+ ATF Appropriations for FY2011396 
+
+The President’s FY2011 budget request included $1.163 billion for ATF, an increase of $42.2 
+million, or 3.8%, compared to the FY2010-enacted appropriation. Proposed increases (over base) 
+included $11.8 million for Project Gunrunner397 and $1.2 million for Emergency Support 
+Function #13 (ESF-13), the Public Safety and Security Annex to the National Response 
+Framework (NRF).398 The NRF sets broad responsibilities and lines of authority for federal 
+agencies in the event of a national emergency or major disaster. Under the NRF, the Attorney 
+General is responsible for ESF-13, which entails all hazards law enforcement planning and 
+coordination for the entire United States and its territories. The Attorney General, in turn, has 
+delegated his responsibility for ESF-13’s implementation to the ATF. On July 22, 2010, the 
+Senate Appropriations Committee reported an FY2011 CJS appropriations bill (S. 3636; S.Rept. 
+111-229). This measure would have provided ATF with $1.163 billion for FY2011, matching the 
+Administration’s request. On July 22, 2010, the Senate Appropriations Committee marked up and 
+reported the FY2011 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations bill 
+(S. 3636). The Senate bill would have matched the Administration’s request. In the absence of an 
+enacted CJS appropriations bill, Congress passed several continuing resolutions.399 As described 
+above, the 112th Congress finalized the FY2011 ATF appropriation and provided the agency with 
+$1.113 billion. 
+
+ ATF Appropriations for FY2010400 
+
+For FY2010, the Administration requested $1.121 billion and 5,025 full-time equivalent (FTE) 
+positions for ATF, or $66.6 million and 68 FTE positions more than the amounts appropriated for 
+FY2009 ($1.054 billion and 4,957). Of the difference, $23.6 million and 22 FTE positions were 
+base adjustments. For Southwest border enforcement, the FY2010 request included a budget 
+enhancement of $18 million to support Project Gunrunner and $25 million for the new National 
+Center for Explosives Training and Research Center (NCETR). Compared to the enacted FY2009 
+level of funding, the FY2010 request would have provided a 4.9% increase. 
+
+For ATF, Congress appropriated $1.121 billion in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 
+(H.R. 3288). The President signed this bill into law on December 16, 2009 (P.L. 111-117).401 The 
+act provided an amount that was equal to the Administration’s request. This amount was $52.5 
+million more than the final FY2009-enacted amount, or an increase of 4.9%. Conference report 
+language (H.Rept. 111-366) indicated that the act included $18 million for Project Gunrunner, the 
+
+ 
+
+396 For further information, see CRS Report R41206, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF): 
+Budget and Operations for FY2011 , by William J. Krouse. 
+397 For further information on Operation Gunrunner, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest 
+Border , by Vivian S. Chu and William J. Krouse. 
+398 For more information, see CRS Report RL34758, The National Response Framework: Overview and Possible 
+Issues for Congress , by Bruce R. Lindsay. 
+399 For further information, see CRS Report RL30343, Continuing Resolutions: Latest Action and Brief Overview of 
+Recent Practices , by Sandy Streeter. 
+400 For further information, see CRS Report RL34514, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
+(ATF): Budget and Operations for FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 , by William J. Krouse. 
+401 The conference report on the bill includes provisions for six of the seven FY2010 appropriations: Transportation-
+HUD; Commerce-Justice-Science; Financial Services; Labor-HHS; Military Construction-VA; and State-Foreign 
+Operations. The Defense appropriations bill, H.R. 3326, was passed separately. 
+
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+same amount requested by the Administration. In addition, the act also included $10 million to 
+increase the Violent Crime Impact Team program, $6 million for construction (phase two) of the 
+NCETR, and $1.5 million to complete ATF headquarters construction projects. 
+
+On July 28, 2010, the House passed an FY2010 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 5875) that 
+included $39.1 million for ATF to increase Southwest border gun trafficking investigations. On 
+August 5, 2010, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 5875, which included $37.5 million for 
+ATF. On August 9, the House introduced a new border security supplemental bill (H.R. 6080), 
+which was subsequently passed by the House on August 10. This bill contained language 
+identical to Senate-passed H.R. 5875. Reportedly, the House took up the bill with a new number 
+to avoid a dispute related to its constitutional obligation to originate all revenue measures.402 This 
+dispute arose with the addition of funding provisions in Senate-passed H.R. 5875 that were not 
+included in the House-passed version. On August 12, the Senate passed H.R. 6080. On August 13, 
+the President signed H.R. 6080 into law (P.L. 111-230). It provides ATF with an additional $37.5 
+million for Project Gunrunner. 
+
+ Southwest Border Gun Trafficking 
+
+On the Southwest border with Mexico, firearms violence has spiked sharply in recent years as 
+drug trafficking organizations have reportedly vied for control of key smuggling corridors into the 
+United States. In March 2008, President Felipe Calderón called on the United States to increase 
+its efforts to suppress gun trafficking from the United States into Mexico. In the 110th Congress, 
+the House passed a bill (H.R. 6028) that would authorize a total of $73.5 million to be 
+appropriated over three years, for FY2008 through FY2010, to increase ATF resources dedicated 
+to stemming illegal gun trafficking into Mexico as part of the Mérida Initiative.403 Similar 
+authorizations were included in S. 2867, H.R. 5863, and H.R. 5869. In the 111th Congress, similar 
+authorizations were included in several bills (S. 205, H.R. 495, H.R. 1448, and H.R. 1867). 
+
+ Tiahrt Amendment and Firearms Trace Data Limitations 
+
+Representative Todd Tiahrt offered an amendment that placed several funding restrictions and 
+conditions on ATF and the FBI during full committee markup of the FY2004 DOJ appropriations 
+bill (H.R. 2799). While modified, those restrictions were included in the Consolidated 
+Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-199). Amended to the ATF appropriations every year since 
+(FY2005-FY2012), the Tiahrt restrictions 
+
+• prohibit the use of any funding appropriated for ATF to disclose firearms trace or 
+
+multiple handgun sales report data for any purpose other than supporting “bona 
+fide” criminal investigation or agency licensing proceedings, 
+
+• prohibit the use of any funding appropriated for ATF to issue new regulations that 
+
+would require licensed dealers to conduct physical inventories of their 
+businesses, 
+
+ 
+
+402 Theo Emery and Edward Epstein, “Border Security Bill Passes in House,” CQ Today , August 10, 2010, online 
+edition. 
+403 For further information, see CRS Report RS22837, Mérida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance 
+for Mexico and Central America , by Clare Ribando Seelke. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 103 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+• require the next-day destruction of approved Brady background check records, 
+
+and 
+
+• require ATF to include certain data disclaimers with any firearms tracing study it 
+
+releases. 
+
+Of these limitations, the first, dealing with disclosure of firearms trace or multiple handgun sales 
+report data, probably was and is the most contentious. A coalition of U.S. mayors, including New 
+York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, maintain that they should have access to such data in order 
+to identify out-of-state federally licensed gun dealers who wittingly or unwittingly sell large 
+numbers of firearms to illegal gun traffickers. 
+
+For FY2008, the Tiahrt limitation on firearms trace and multiple handgun sales report data was 
+the source of debate when the Senate CJS Appropriations Subcommittee did not include this 
+limitation in its draft bill. Senator Richard Shelby amended the FY2008 CJS appropriations bill 
+(which became S. 1745) with similar, but modified, limitations in full committee markup. Similar 
+language was included in the House-passed CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 3093), and was 
+included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161; H.R. 2764), into which the 
+CJS appropriations were folded.404 The modified FY2008 limitation included new language that 
+authorizes ATF to 
+
+• share firearms trace data with tribal and foreign law enforcement agencies and 
+
+federal agencies for national intelligence purposes; 
+
+• share firearms trace data with law enforcement agencies and prosecutors to 
+
+exchange among themselves; and 
+
+• release aggregate statistics on firearms traffickers and trafficking channels, or 
+
+firearms misuse, felons, and trafficking investigations. 
+
+The FY2008 limitation, however, continued to prohibit the release of firearms trace data for the 
+purposes of suing gun manufacturers and dealers. Moreover, the limitation includes the phrase “in 
+fiscal year 2008 and thereafter,” which made it permanent law according to the Government 
+Accountability Office (GAO).405 Despite the futurity language, Congress has modified the 
+limitation’s language and included it (with futurity language) in the FY2009, FY2010, FY2011, 
+and FY2012 Commerce, Justice, Science (CJS), and Related Agencies Appropriations Acts (P.L. 
+111-8, P.L. 111-117, P.L. 112-10, and P.L. 112-55). 
+
+ 
+
+404 For further information, see CRS Report RS22458, Gun Control: Statutory Disclosure Limitations on ATF Firearms 
+Trace Data and Multiple Handgun Sales Reports , by William J. Krouse. 
+405 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives—Prohibition in 
+the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act,” July 15, 2008, http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/316510.pdf. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 104 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendix B. Major Federal Firearms and 
+Related Statutes 
+
+The following principal changes to the Gun Control Act have been enacted since 1968. 
+
+• The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, McClure-Volkmer Amendments (P.L. 99-
+
+308, 1986), eases certain interstate transfer and shipment requirements for long 
+guns, defines the term “engaged in the business,” eliminates some recordkeeping 
+requirements, and bans the private possession of machine guns not legally owned 
+prior to 1986. 
+
+• The Armor Piercing Ammunition Ban (P.L. 99-408, 1986, amended in P.L. 103-
+
+322, 1994) prohibits the manufacture, importation, and delivery of handgun 
+ammunition composed of certain metal substances and certain full-jacketed 
+ammunition. 
+
+• The Federal Energy Management Improvement Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-615) 
+
+requires that all toys or firearm look-a-likes have a blazed orange plug in the 
+barrel, denoting that it is a non-lethal imitation. 
+
+• The Undetectable Firearms Act (P.L. 100-649, 1988, amended by P.L. 108-174, 
+
+2003), also known as the “plastic gun” legislation, bans the manufacture, import, 
+possession, and transfer of firearms not detectable by security devices. 
+
+• The Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-647), as originally enacted, 
+
+was ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court ( United States v. Lopez , 
+514 U.S. 549 (1995), April 26, 1995). The act prohibited possession of a firearm 
+in a school zone (on the campus of a public or private school or within 1,000 feet 
+of the grounds). In response to the Court’s finding that the act exceeded 
+Congress’s authority to regulate commerce, the 104th Congress included a 
+provision in P.L. 104-208 that amended the act to require federal prosecutors to 
+include evidence that the firearms “moved in” or affected interstate commerce. 
+
+• The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 1993 (P.L. 103-159), requires that 
+
+background checks be completed on all non-licensed persons seeking to obtain 
+firearms from federal firearms licensees. 
+
+• The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322) 
+
+prohibited the manufacture or importation of semiautomatic assault weapons and 
+large-capacity ammunition feeding devices for 10 years. The act also bans the 
+sale or transfer of handguns and handgun ammunition to, or possession of 
+handguns and handgun ammunition by, juveniles (younger than 18 years old) 
+without prior written consent from the juvenile’s parent or legal guardian; 
+exceptions related to employment, ranching, farming, target practice, and hunting 
+are provided. In addition, the act disqualifies persons under court orders related 
+to domestic abuse from receiving a firearm from any person or possessing a 
+firearm. It also increased penalties for the criminal use of firearms. The assault 
+weapons ban expired on September 13, 2004. 
+
+• The Federal Domestic Violence Gun Ban (the Lautenberg Amendment, in the 
+
+Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY1997, P.L. 104-208) prohibits 
+persons convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 105 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+firearms and ammunition. The ban applies regardless of when the offense was 
+adjudicated: prior to, or following enactment. It has been challenged in the 
+federal courts, but these challenges have been defeated.406 
+
+• The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act, 1999 (P.L. 105-
+
+277), requires all federal firearms licensees to offer for sale gun storage and 
+safety devices. It also bans firearms transfers to, or possession by, most non-
+immigrants and those non-immigrants who have overstayed the terms of their 
+temporary visa. 
+
+• The Treasury, Postal and General Government Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-58) 
+
+requires that background checks be conducted when former firearms owners seek 
+to reacquire a firearm that they sold to a pawnshop. 
+
+• The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) establishes a Bureau of 
+
+Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives by transferring the law enforcement 
+functions, but not the revenue functions, of the former Bureau of Alcohol, 
+Tobacco and Firearms from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of 
+Justice. 
+
+• The Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-277) provides that 
+
+qualified active and retired law enforcement officers may carry a concealed 
+firearm. This act supersedes state level prohibitions on concealed carry that 
+would otherwise apply to law enforcement officers, but it does not override any 
+federal laws. Nor does the act supersede or limit state laws that permit private 
+persons or entities to prohibit or restrict the possession of concealed firearms on 
+their property or prohibit or restrict the possession of firearms on any state or 
+local government property, installation, building, base, or park. 
+
+• The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (P.L. 109-92) prohibits certain 
+
+types of lawsuits against firearms manufacturers and dealers to recover damages 
+related to the criminal or unlawful use of their products (firearms and 
+ammunition) by other persons.407 This law also includes provisions that (1) 
+increase penalties for using armor-piercing handgun ammunition in the 
+commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking, (2) require the Attorney 
+General to submit a report (within two years of enactment) on “armor-piercing” 
+ammunition based on certain performance characteristics, including barrel length 
+and amount of propellant (gun powder), and (3) prohibits federally licensed gun 
+dealers from transferring a handgun to an unlicensed person without also 
+providing a secure storage or safety device. 
+
+• The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 
+
+2005 (P.L. 109-162) authorized to be appropriated for ATF the following 
+amounts: $924 million for FY2006, $961 million for FY2007, $999 million for 
+FY2008, and $1.039 billion for FY2009. 
+
+ 
+
+406 See CRS Report RL31143, Firearms Prohibitions and Domestic Violence Convictions: The Lautenberg 
+Amendment , by T. J. Halstead. 
+407 For further information, see CRS Report RS22074, Limiting Tort Liability of Gun Manufacturers and Gun Sellers: 
+Legal Analysis of P.L. 109-92 (2005) , by Henry Cohen. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 106 
+
+ 
+ Gun Control Legislation 
+
+ 
+
+• The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-
+
+177) includes a provision that requires that the ATF Director be appointed by the 
+President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
+
+• The Disaster Recovery Personal Protection Act of 2006, which was included in 
+
+the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295), 
+amended the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
+(42 U.S.C. §5207) to prohibit federal officials from seizing or authorizing the 
+seizure of any firearm from private persons during a major disaster or emergency 
+if possession of that firearm was not already prohibited under federal or state law. 
+It also forbids the same officials from prohibiting the possession of any firearm 
+that is not otherwise prohibited. Also, the law bans any prohibition on carrying 
+firearms by persons who are otherwise permitted to legally carry such firearms 
+because those persons are working under a federal agency, or under the control of 
+an agency, providing disaster or emergency relief. 
+
+ 
+
+ Author Contact Information 
+ 
+William J. Krouse 
+
+ 
+
+Specialist in Domestic Security and Crime Policy 
+wkrouse@crs.loc.gov, 7-2225 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 107
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,1303 @@
+Order Code 98-422 EPW
+
+CRS Report for Congress
+
+Received through the CRS Web
+
+Social Security and the Federal Budget:
+
+What Does Social Security’s Being
+
+“Off Budget” Mean?
+
+Updated July 20, 2000
+
+David Stuart Koitz
+
+Specialist in Social Legislation
+
+Domestic Social Policy Division
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ Social Security and the Federal Budget:
+
+What Does Social Security’s Being “Off Budget” Mean?
+
+ Summary 
+
+As a result of a series of laws enacted in 1983, 1985 and 1990, Social Security
+
+is considered to be “off budget” for federal budget purposes. While the meaning of
+this might seem obvious — that Social Security is not to be considered as part of the
+federal budget — many people are confused by the continued use of aggregate budget
+figures that include Social Security’s receipts and expenditures.
+
+Budget policymakers often talk about these aggregates, or what is commonly
+
+referred to as the unified budget, because they summarize the government’s overall
+impact on the economy — particularly the extent to which it is borrowing money from
+the financial markets or paying off debt it has incurred in the past. Social Security
+may be viewed as “different,” but it is still part of the government and helps to form
+this overall impact. Its taxes like all other federal funds flow into the U.S. Treasury
+and its benefit payments flow out of the U.S. Treasury. The Treasury Department
+issues federal securities to the Social Security trust funds to reflect receipt of these
+taxes, and redeems securities from the trust funds to reflect Social Security
+expenditures, but the money itself flows to and from the Treasury.
+
+While unified budget figures are often at the center of budget debates, “taking
+
+Social Security off budget” has changed the way the budget is formally presented.
+Annual congressional budget resolutions, for instance, do not show unified totals.
+They show Social Security’s income and outgo separately. In addition, while budget
+projections prepared by the Congressional Budget Office and the Office of
+Management and Budget display unified totals, they also show so-called “on-budget”
+totals, which exclude Social Security and the postal service, and “off budget” totals,
+which count only the operations of Social Security and the postal service. A major
+effect of this has been to highlight that Social Security has been running annual
+surpluses and the rest of the government, until recently, had been running deficits.
+
+Perhaps as significant, but less understood, is how taking Social Security “off
+
+budget” has changed the way budget measures and Social Security legislation are
+handled in Congress. A provision enacted in 1985, for instance, permits Members to
+object to (or raise a “point of order” against) bills designed to achieve budget goals
+— so-called reconciliation bills — if they contain Social Security measures. In the
+House, a simple majority can override such an objection, but in the Senate it takes
+approval by three-fifths of its Members. In addition, Social Security is largely exempt
+from budget rules enacted in 1990 designed to discourage future tax reductions or
+spending increases that would increase budget deficits. Key elements of these rules
+include setting specific dollar limits on discretionary spending (i.e., on programs
+requiring annual appropriations) and creation of a “pay-as-you-go” rule for direct
+spending (i.e., entitlement programs) and revenues requiring that any new spending
+increases or revenue reductions be offset by other changes. If the discretionary
+spending limits or the “pay-as-you-go” rule are violated, the President may be
+required to cut spending. With the exception of administrative expenses, Social
+Security is exempt from such cuts. Congress also adopted new rules designed to
+discourage bills that would erode the balances of the Social Security trust funds.
+
+ 
+ Contents 
+
+Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+
+Social Security Is Now Considered to Be “Off Budget” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+
+Taking Social Security Off Budget Has Changed the Way the Budget is 
+
+Presented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+
+Taking Social Security Off Budget Has Changed How Budget-Related Measures 
+
+and Social Security Legislation Are Handled in the Congress . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+
+The Financial Operations of the Social Security System Have Not Been Altered 
+
+by Taking it Off Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+
+Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+
+Social Security’s Budget Treatment Under the Social 
+
+Security Amendments of 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+
+Social Security’s Budget Treatment Under the 1985 
+
+Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+
+Social Security’s Budget Treatment Under The 1990 Budget 
+
+Enforcement Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+
+Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
+
+ List of Figures 
+
+Figure 1. Social Security’s Share of Federal Spending and Receipts, FY1999 . . 2
+
+Figure 2. CBO Projections of Surpluses Under Unified Budget and 
+
+“On-Budget” Arrays, FY 2000-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+
+Figure 3. Comparison of Surplus Social Security Taxes to Unified Budget 
+
+Surpluses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+
+ List of Tables 
+
+Table 1. CBO Projections of Surpluses Under Unified Budget, “On-Budget,” 
+
+and “Off-Budget” Arrays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+
+Table 2. Comparison of Projections of Surplus Social Security Taxes to 
+
+Unified Budget Surpluses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+
+Table 3. Projected Federal Debt, Including Debt Held by the Social Security 
+
+Trust Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+
+ 
+ Social Security and the Federal Budget:
+
+What Does Social Security’s Being
+
+“Off Budget” Mean?
+
+ Introduction 
+
+Social Security and other federal programs that operate through trust funds were
+
+counted officially in the federal budget beginning in FY1969. Their inclusion in the
+budget, instituted by President Johnson, followed a recommendation by an expert
+panel that all the financial operations of the government be consolidated into a single
+budget.1 It was implemented administratively under broad authority granted to the
+President by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 to devise the form in which the
+federal budget was to be presented. In 1974, with passage of the Congressional
+Budget and Impoundment Control Act (P.L. 93-344), Congress adopted a process
+of its own for developing budget goals through passage of annual budget resolutions.
+Up to that point, spending and revenue measures were adopted piecemeal through
+appropriations laws and periodic entitlement and tax legislation. Like the budgets
+then prepared by the President, the budget resolutions required under the new
+congressional procedures were to reflect a “unified budget” approach that included
+trust fund programs such as Social Security in the budget totals.
+
+Beginning in the 1970s, financial problems plaguing Social Security and concern
+
+over the program’s growing costs gave impetus to measures to curtail benefits.
+Social Security cutbacks were included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts
+of 1980 and 1981 and the Social Security Amendments of 1983. However, despite
+passage of these measures, resolution of the program’s financial problems, and the
+buildup of surpluses in the Social Security trust funds, interest in curbing Social
+Security expenditures continued because of the large federal budget deficits that arose
+in the 1980s.
+
+This routine consideration of Social Security constraints raised concerns that the
+
+public’s confidence in the program was being eroded and gave impetus to proposals
+to remove Social Security from the budget. The result was that although the program
+continued to be counted in the budget throughout the decade, measures were enacted
+in 1983, 1985, and 1987 explicitly stating that it was not to be included in the budget,
+making it a separate part of congressional budget resolutions, and imposing potential
+procedural hurdles for budgetary bills containing Social Security changes.
+
+1 Report of the President’s Commission on Budget Concepts . Washington, GPO, October
+1967.
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+Then, in 1990, reacting to criticism that surplus Social Security taxes were
+
+masking the size of budget deficits, Congress enacted further measures to separate
+Social Security from formulation of the budget and from procedures designed to
+discourage tax reductions or spending increases that would increase the size of the
+deficits. This was done as part of changes to the budget process included in a $500
+billion deficit-reduction package enacted at the end of the 101st Congress. In addition,
+in recognition that removing Social Security from budget would also take away
+implicit fiscal constraints that protected the Social Security trust funds, Congress
+adopted new procedural hurdles for bills that would erode the trust fund balances.
+The underlying concern was that lifting the constraints of the budget would encourage
+proposals (i.e., Social Security tax reductions or new spending measures) that could
+weaken the system’s financial condition.
+
+ Figure 1. Social Security’s Share of Federal 
+
+ Spending and Receipts, FY1999 
+
+ Spending 
+
+ Receipts 
+
+ 7 7 % 
+
+ 76% 
+
+ Rest of Government 
+
+ Rest of Government 
+
+ Social Security 
+
+ 23% 
+
+ Social Security 
+
+ 24% 
+
+ Social Security Is Now Considered to Be “Off Budget” 
+
+If loosely defined, one could say that Social Security has been removed from the
+
+federal budget at least three times since the early 1980s, as part of:
+
+1.
+
+the Social Security Amendments of 1983;
+
+2.
+
+the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget act changes in 1985; and
+
+3.
+
+the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.
+
+While the meaning of Social Security being “off budget” might seem obvious —
+
+that it is not to be considered as part of the federal budget — many people are
+perplexed by the continued use of aggregate budget figures that count the program’s
+receipts and expenditures. Official budget documents do display budget totals
+differently than they did before this legislation was enacted. While they continue to
+show aggregate or unified budget totals, they also show the financial flows of Social
+Security and the postal service separately as well as the financial operations of the
+government when these two functions are excluded. In addition, a number of
+procedural changes have been put in place affecting how Congress deliberates and
+acts on budget-related bills and Social Security legislation. All these changes were
+designed to differentiate Social Security from other government activities.
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+The continued reflection of aggregate budget figures in these documents is
+
+largely driven by economic considerations. Those who are interested in the aggregate
+financial flows of the Treasury and the impact those flows have on the economy —
+particularly the extent to which the government is borrowing money from the financial
+markets or paying off publicly-held debt it has incurred in the past — continue to
+examine the financial affairs of the government on a unified budget basis, which means
+they count Social Security in computing revenue and spending totals. It is the
+difference between the government’s total receipts and total spending, including
+Social Security’s, that determines how much the government needs to borrow from
+the markets or can repay. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) states it this way:
+
+Social Security benefits alone account for more than one-fifth of federal spending,
+and its payroll taxes account for about one-fourth of government revenues.
+Therefore, most economists, credit market participants, and policymakers, when
+they seek to gauge the government’s role in the economy and its drain on the credit
+markets, look at the total budget figures — including Social Security.2
+
+The Administration’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) takes a similar
+
+view:
+
+The unified budget is the most useful display of the Government’s finances; it is
+vital in calculating how much the Government has to borrow.3
+
+OMB also takes the position that the additional budget displays its documents
+
+provide — that show Social Security and the postal service separately and what the
+rest of the budget looks like without them — satisfy the legal requirements enacted
+in the 1983 to 1990 period that Social Security be treated off budget.
+ 
+
+Hence, while Social Security is legally and officially considered off budget and
+
+does have certain procedural protections in the congressional budget process, in
+practice and largely because it is a federally-operated and financed program, it is
+considered as part of the federal budget for economic purposes.
+
+ Taking Social Security Off Budget Has Changed the Way 
+
+ the Budget is Presented 
+
+Taking Social Security off budget has changed the way the budget is presented
+
+to a limited extent. For instance, annual congressional budget resolutions do not
+ show unified budget totals. However, among the various tables presented in reports
+from the Budget Committees to their respective chambers, the budget summaries are
+unified (and thereby include Social Security). In addition, annual and semi-annual
+budget summaries of CBO and OMB show, and in fact highlight, what the overall
+budget looks like with Social Security. Their documents show (1) unified budget
+
+2 The Economic and Budget Outlook, Fiscal Years 1999-2008 , CBO, January 1998,
+Washington, GPO, p. 34.
+
+3 A Citizen’s Guide to the Federal Budget, FY1999 , OMB, Washington, GPO, p. 15.
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+totals which display the financial flows of the entire federal government as a single
+entity, and (2) “on-budget” totals which exclude Social Security and the postal
+service. They also frequently show “off-budget” totals which count only the
+operations of Social Security and the postal service. A major effect of this over the
+past decade has been to highlight that the Social Security system has been running
+surpluses and the rest of the government, until recently, had been running deficits (the
+postal service has a minor effect on the “off budget” surplus).
+
+Using one of CBO’s latest sets of projections for the FY2000-2010 period,
+
+Figure 2 below and Table 1 on the following page show the growing surpluses that
+result from using the unified budget array and the notably smaller ones that result
+when Social Security and the postal service are excluded (i.e., under the so-called
+“on-budget” array).
+
+ Figure 2. CBO Projections of Surpluses Under Unified 
+
+ Budget and “On-Budget” Arrays, FY 2000-2010 
+
+$s in billions
+
+$700
+
+$600
+
+ Unified budget 
+
+$500
+
+$400
+
+$300
+
+ Budget excluding Social 
+
+ S e cu rity & Postal Service 
+
+$200
+
+$100
+
+$0
+
+2000
+
+2001
+
+2002
+
+2003
+
+2004
+
+2005
+
+2006
+
+2007
+
+2008
+
+2009
+
+2010
+
+ Note about Figure 2 : Data from CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update , July 2000.
+The unified budget surpluses include all programs of the government, including Social Security and
+the postal service. The bottom half of the graph reflects the smaller “on-budget” surpluses resulting
+from including all programs except Social Security and the postal service. The reader should note
+that the figure represents only one of three alternative sets of projections made by CBO. It reflects
+a scenario under which federal discretionary spending would rise with inflation after the FY 2000.
+Two other CBO scenarios show larger unified and on-budget surpluses by assuming either (1) that
+discretionary spending would be frozen after the year 2000 at the level provided in that year, or (2)
+that discretionary spending would be held to levels prescribed by budget limits enacted in 1997 after
+which it would be allowed to rise with inflation. The differences are significant, with larger
+projected unified budget surpluses and Social Security surpluses that represent considerably smaller
+shares of the totals (albeit the actual dollar amounts of the Social Security surpluses stay the same
+as shown above and in the following table).
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+ Table 1. CBO Projections of Surpluses Under Unified Budget, 
+
+ “On-Budget,” and “Off-Budget” Arrays 
+
+(by fiscal year, dollars in billions)
+
+2000
+
+2001
+
+2002
+
+2003
+
+2004
+
+2005
+
+2006
+
+2007
+
+2008
+
+2009
+
+2010 2001-
+
+2010
+
+Unified budgeta
+
+232
+
+268
+
+312
+
+345
+
+369
+
+402
+
+469
+
+523
+
+565
+
+625
+
+685 4,561
+
+“On-budget”b
+
+84
+
+102
+
+126
+
+143
+
+154
+
+169
+
+222
+
+260
+
+288
+
+332
+
+377 2,173
+
+“Off-budget”c
+
+149
+
+165
+
+186
+
+202
+
+215
+
+232
+
+247
+
+263
+
+278
+
+293
+
+307 2,388
+
+ Source: Congressional Budget Office baseline projections, July 2000. Baseline assumes aggregate
+discretionary spending rises with inflation after FY2000. See note at the bottom of Figure 2 .
+a Includes all programs of the government, including Social Security and postal service.
+b Includes all programs except Social Security and postal service.
+c Includes only the income and outgo of Social Security trust funds and the postal service.
+
+It is important to recognize that the smaller “on-budget”surpluses shown in the
+
+previous table and chart are not caused by simply ignoring surplus Social Security
+taxes. Rather, they are caused by ignoring those taxes and, as well, by counting
+interest paid to the Social Security trust funds as budget outlays. These interest
+payments are not outlays from the government — they are internal transactions
+between government accounts (i.e., from the government’s general fund to the Social
+Security trust funds). Since Social Security is classified as “off-budget,” these
+payments show up as budget outlays in the “on-budget” array even though they do
+not cause an expenditure from the government. And while they represent payments
+owed to the Social Security trust funds, the smaller “on-budget” surpluses resulting
+from showing them as outlays do not represent surplus money that the government
+must use to make payments to the Social Security trust funds.
+
+If only surplus Social Security tax receipts (and those resulting from the taxation
+
+of Social Security benefits) were ignored in calculating the budget totals, the “on-
+budget”surpluses would be larger than currently shown. Table 2 on the next page
+compares the surpluses resulting from ignoring these taxes to the official “on-budget”
+line (compare lines 3 and 4 in the table).
+
+ Table 2 also compares these surplus Social Security receipts to surplus
+
+governmental receipts. In this case only the portion of Social Security trust fund
+surpluses due to payroll taxes and income taxes on Social Security benefits are
+counted. (Compare the first and second lines in the table. It also is shown in Figure
+3 on the next page.) Basically, this presents a cash-flow view of Social Security, i.e.,
+how much receipts and expenditures it generates for the government. Said another
+way, it addresses the question of how much of the projected unified budget surpluses
+are due to surplus or excess Social Security receipts. Under the projections, surplus
+Social Security receipts are initially projected to account for almost 40% of the
+unified budget surpluses (e.g., $89 billion of the estimated $232 billion unified budget
+surplus in FY2000). However, as time passes Social Security’s contribution to the
+positive unified budget outlook diminishes. By FY2010, its surplus receipts would
+account for only 18% of the unified budget surplus for that year.
+
+ 
+ CRS-6
+
+ Table 2. Comparison of Projections of Surplus Social Security Taxes to 
+
+ Unified Budget Surpluses 
+
+(by fiscal year, dollars in billions)
+
+2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2001-
+
+2010
+
+Unified budget
+
+232
+
+268
+
+312
+
+345
+
+369
+
+402
+
+469
+
+523
+
+565
+
+625
+
+685 4,561
+
+surplusesa
+
+Surplus Social
+Security taxes
+
+89
+
+96
+
+105
+
+110
+
+112
+
+117 
+
+120
+
+122
+
+123
+
+122
+
+120 1,147
+
+Budget surpluses
+ignoring surplus
+Social Security taxesb
+
+143
+
+172
+
+207
+
+235
+
+257
+
+285
+
+349
+
+401
+
+442
+
+503
+
+565 3,416
+
+“On-budget”
+
+84
+
+102
+
+126
+
+143
+
+154
+
+169
+
+222
+
+260
+
+288
+
+332
+
+377 2,173
+
+Surplusesc
+
+ Source: Congressional Budget Office baseline projections, July 2000. Baseline assumes aggregate
+discretionary spending rises with inflation after FY2000. See note at the bottom of Figure 2 .
+ a Includes all programs of the government, including Social Security and postal service.
+b Includes all programs of the government, but excludes surplus Social Security taxes. 
+c Includes all programs except Social Security and postal service.
+
+ Figure 3. Comparison of Surplus Social Security Taxes to Unified 
+
+ Budget Surpluses 
+
+$s in billions
+
+$700
+
+ Unified Budget Surpluses 
+
+$600
+
+ Progressively Exceed 
+
+ Surplus Social Security Taxes 
+
+$500
+
+$400
+
+ Unified Budget Surpluses 
+
+$300
+
+$200
+
+ Surplus Social Security Taxes 
+
+$100
+
+$0
+
+2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
+
+ 
+ CRS-7
+
+ Taking Social Security Off Budget Has Changed How 
+
+ Budget-Related Measures and Social Security Legislation 
+
+ Are Handled in the Congress 
+
+Perhaps as significant, but less understood, is how “taking Social Security off
+
+budget” has changed the way budget-related measures and Social Security legislation
+are handled in Congress. In 1990, Congress passed budget process reforms as part
+of a $500 billion deficit-reduction package. They were designed largely to discourage
+future tax reductions or spending increases that would erode the deficit-reduction
+impact of the $500 billion package. Key elements of the reforms included setting
+specific dollar limits on discretionary spending (i.e., mostly on programs requiring
+annual appropriations)4 and creation of a “pay-as-you-go” requirement for direct
+spending (mostly entitlement programs) and revenues. This “pay-as-you-go” rule
+generally requires that any new spending increases or revenue reductions be offset by
+other changes.5
+
+For the most part, the discretionary spending limits and the “pay-as-you-go” rule
+
+took the place of deficit-reduction targets established under the former Gramm-
+Rudman-Hollings (GRH) procedures. Under the GRH procedures, Social Security’s
+income and outgo were included in the budget totals for estimating budget deficits.
+In contrast, under the 1990 procedures, Social Security’s income and outgo were
+largely exempted. Although classified as an “entitlement” program, its taxes and
+benefits were excluded from the “pay-as-you-go” rule for direct spending. The only
+exception involves the system’s administrative expenses, which are counted as
+discretionary spending. If the discretionary spending limits are exceeded or the “pay-
+as-you-go” rule is violated, the President may be required to issue sequestration
+orders to bring spending into compliance with the limits or rules. With the exception
+of administrative expenses, Social Security is exempt from such sequestration orders.
+
+Concerned that exempting Social Security from these procedures would
+
+encourage new spending proposals or tax cuts that could weaken the system’s
+financial condition, Congress also adopted procedures in 1990 intended to discourage
+bills that would erode the balances of the trust funds. These are known as the Social
+Security firewall rules. Different rules apply in the House and Senate.
+
+In the House these rules permit points of order to be raised against bills that (1)
+
+propose more than $250 million in Social Security spending increases or revenue
+reductions over a 5-year period beginning with the year the legislation is to become
+effective, or (2) would increase the average cost or reduce the average income of the
+program over the long run (considered to be 75 years) by at least 0.02 % of taxable
+payroll. In the Senate, budget resolutions must specify separate amounts for Social
+Security income and outgo for a 5-year period covered by each budget resolution and
+points of order can be raised against measures that would cause income to be lower
+
+4 Notably, the limit does not apply to certain entitlement programs whose funding is subject
+to annual appropriations.
+
+5 Failure to do so can result in an end of the session sequestration of funds from programs
+subject to the rule.
+
+ 
+ CRS-8
+
+or outgo to be higher than these amounts. Three-fifths of the Senate would have to
+agree to override any objection. These procedures took effect in FY1991.
+
+The 1990 law also continued a provision enacted in 1985 that permits points of
+
+order to be raised against reconciliation bills or resolutions that contain Social
+Security measures. In the House, a simple majority can override the objection; in the
+Senate it takes approval by 3/5ths of its Members.
+
+The rules enacted in 1990 have largely been extended through FY2002 with
+
+passage of budget reconciliation legislation in 1993 and 1997. It should be noted that
+these rules were not affected by legislation enacted in 1994 making the Social Security
+Administration an independent agency.
+
+ The Financial Operations of the Social Security System 
+
+ Have Not Been Altered by Taking it Off Budget 
+
+Taking the Social Security trust funds “off budget” has not changed how Social
+
+Security funds are handled. They are treated the same way today as they were in
+1937 when Social Security taxes were first levied — the tax receipts flow into the
+U.S. Treasury and benefit payments flow out of the U.S. Treasury. The Treasury
+Department issues federal securities to the Social Security trust funds to reflect the
+receipt of these taxes, and redeems securities from the trust funds to reflect Social
+Security expenditures, but the money itself flows to and from the Treasury.
+
+While the trust funds have an important role in monitoring the finances of the
+
+program and maintaining its fiscal discipline, they are basically accounting devices.
+The federal securities they hold are not assets for the government. When an
+individual buys a government bond, he or she has established a claim against the
+government. When the government issues a bond to one of its own accounts, it
+hasn’t purchased anything or established a claim against some other entity or person.
+It is simply creating a form of IOU from one of its accounts to another. It certainly
+establishes legal claims against the government for the Social Security system (i.e., it
+is a legal form of government indebtedness and does count as part of the federal debt;
+see Table 3 on the next page), but the system is part of the government. Those
+claims are not resources the government has at its disposal to pay for future Social
+Security claims. Simply put, the trust funds do not reflect an independent store of
+money for the program or the government, and taking Social Security “off budget”
+did not change this.
+
+ 
+ CRS-9
+
+ Table 3. Projected Federal Debt, Including Debt Held by the 
+
+ Social Security Trust Funds 
+
+(End of fiscal year, dollars in billions)
+
+2000
+
+2001
+
+2002
+
+2003
+
+2004
+
+2005
+
+2006
+
+2007
+
+2008
+
+2009
+
+2010
+
+Debt held
+by the
+
+3409
+
+3158
+
+2854
+
+2522
+
+2165
+
+1774
+
+1315
+
+800a
+
+242a
+
+-376a
+
+-1054a
+
+public
+
+Debt held
+by the
+Social
+
+1005
+
+1171
+
+1358
+
+1560
+
+1775
+
+2007
+
+2254
+
+2517
+
+2795
+
+3087
+
+3394
+
+Security
+trust funds
+
+Debt held
+by other
+
+1202
+
+1287
+
+1384
+
+1481
+
+1573
+
+1662
+
+1762
+
+1858
+
+1954
+
+2050
+
+2145
+
+gov’t.
+accounts
+
+Gross
+Federal
+
+5617
+
+5616
+
+5596
+
+5563
+
+5513
+
+5444
+
+5331
+
+5456
+
+5737
+
+6024
+
+6370
+
+debt
+
+ Source: Congressional Budget Office baseline projections, July 2000. Baseline assumes aggregate
+discretionary spending rises with inflation after FY2000. See note at the bottom of Figure 2 .
+
+a Figures reflect (or include) the net publicly-held debt of the government after subtracting excess
+cash held in depository accounts from debt still outstanding at end of fiscal year. Assumes portion
+of debt is not redeemable with the budget surplus of that year.
+
+ 
+ CRS-10
+
+ Appendix 
+
+ Social Security’s Budget Treatment Under the Social Security Amendments 
+
+ of 1983. The Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21) required that
+beginning with the federal budget for FY1993, income and expenditures for Social
+Security — Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) — and the
+Hospital Insurance (HI) portion of the medicare program would be excluded from the
+totals of the budget formulated by the President and Congress and would be “exempt
+from any general budget limitation imposed by statute on expenditures ... .”6 The
+Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) portion of medicare, although remaining a
+component of the official budget figures, was to be more prominently displayed in the
+budget as a separate functional category.
+
+The provision also required that for FY1985-FY1992 the Social Security and
+
+medicare programs be displayed more prominently in both the President’s and
+congressional budgets as separate major functional categories of the budget.
+Previously, Social Security was displayed in the category labeled income security ,
+which included civil service retirement and disability, railroad retirement,
+unemployment insurance, food stamps, and other public assistance programs.
+Medicare was displayed in the category for health activities, which included such
+programs as medicaid, health block grants to the States, biomedical research, and
+medical education and health training grants.
+
+ Social Security’s Budget Treatment Under the 1985 Gramm-Rudman- 
+
+ Hollings Procedures. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
+1985 (Title II of P.L. 99-177) included several measures further altering Social
+Security’s budget treatment. This was the original enabling legislation for the
+Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) deficit-reduction provisions, the purpose of which
+was to bring the federal budget into balance by FY1991. Among the changes it made
+to the budget process, the act accelerated the “off-budget” treatment of Social
+Security to FY1986 (from FY1993, as prescribed by the Social Security Amendments
+of 1983).7 However, for the purpose of setting a schedule for eliminating the deficits,
+it stipulated that the receipts and expenditures of the Social Security trust funds be
+counted in calculating the budget deficits and enforcing the deficit goals established
+under the Act. In effect, the 1985 law appeared to make contradictory statements
+about how Social Security was to be viewed in the federal budget.
+
+The only notable manifestation of the off-budget status of the program was that
+
+the President’s budget and other tabulations of the budget began to show what the
+figures would be with and without Social Security.
+
+Congress altered the GRH procedures and extended the time period over which
+
+the budget deficits would be eliminated to FY1993 (instead of FY1991) in passing
+
+6 This provision became Section 710 of the Social Security Act.
+
+7 The measure did not accelerate the “off-budget” treatment of HI (i.e., under the 1983 Social
+Security Amendments, HI was not to be taken “off-budget” until FY1993).
+
+ 
+ CRS-11
+
+Title I of P.L. 100-119, cited as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
+Reaffirmation Act of 1987. Except for the 2-year extension in arriving at a balanced
+budget, the treatment of Social Security under the budget process was not altered.8
+
+ — Sequestration and Reconciliation To Enforce the Budget Targets: A key
+
+element of the GRH procedures was a requirement that the President reduce (or
+sequester) expenditures if projected budget deficits exceeded the targets set in the
+law. The idea was that if economic or legislative developments did not lead to
+meeting the targets, across-the board spending cuts would be triggered. Social
+Security’s income and outgo were counted in determining the deficits; however,
+Social Security benefits were exempt from any spending cuts that the President was
+required to make. Social Security administrative expenses were not exempt.9
+
+Congress could take action on its own to bring overall spending and receipts in
+
+line with the targets (and avoid sequestration) by enacting budget reconciliation
+legislation. As part of budget resolutions, specific outlays and/or revenue targets
+were given to each Committee, and if it could not meet the targets under present law,
+it was expected to recommend changes in its programs. The recommended changes
+from the various committees would then be joined together and passed in one or more
+budget reconciliation acts.10 Social Security benefits were again protected from
+potential cutbacks through rules that made it out of order for either the House or
+Senate to take up Social Security changes in a reconciliation bill, resolution, or
+conference report thereon. If an objection were raised (a so-called Section 310(g)
+objection), a separate vote, suspending the rules under which the respective bodies
+operate, was required to consider a reconciliation measure containing proposed Social
+Security changes. In the Senate, this required approval by three-fifths of its Members.
+
+ — Maintenance of Budget Discipline on New Legislation: Restrictions also
+
+were enacted with the GRH procedures on bringing up legislative changes that would
+violate budget resolution totals (including, with respect to the Senate, the GRH deficit
+target) or the separate spending and revenue allocations made to each committee.
+Social Security was affected by these restrictions in the same way as other programs;
+points of order (so-called Sections 302 and 311 objections) could be raised against
+
+8 The law also contained a provision that stated that no legislation enacted after December 12,
+1985, could authorize payments from the General Fund of the Treasury to the Social Security
+and HI trust funds and vice versa (with the exception of appropriation measures for which
+authority existed on or before that date). This item did not create any practical changes in the
+process. Basically, it was a statement of principal that no new provisions should be enacted
+in the future that would authorize new forms of interfund “payments” between the
+government’s General Fund and the Social Security and HI trust funds.
+
+9 Interest earned on the holdings of the Social Security trust funds, and appropriated
+“payments to the Social Security trust funds” for military wage credits and benefits paid to
+certain uninsured recipients were exempted from sequestration along with regular benefits.
+
+10 Special procedures also existed in the Senate under which a reconciliation bill could be
+initiated to alter a sequestration order issued by the President.
+
+ 
+ CRS-12
+
+Social Security legislation that violated the resolution totals or committee allocations.
+These, too, could be overridden only by a vote of three-fifths of the Senate.11
+
+ Social Security’s Budget Treatment Under The 1990 Budget Enforcement 
+
+ Act. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508) made
+substantial changes in the budget process (under Title XIII, entitled the Budget
+Enforcement Act of 1990). Among them was a statement again prescribing the
+removal of the income and outgo of the Social Security trust funds from calculations
+of the federal budget, including the budget deficit or surplus. This exclusion applied
+to the budgets prepared by the President, to the federal budgets formulated by the
+Congress (e.g., budget resolutions), and to the budget process provisions designed
+to reduce and control the budget deficits. Originally written to cover the period from
+FY1991 to FY1995, these budget “enforcement” rules now apply through FY2002
+(as a result of provisions in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, P.L.
+103-66, and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, P.L. 105-33). The 1990 law also
+included provisions creating new floor procedures for considering Social Security
+legislation intended to protect the balances of the Social Security trust funds.
+
+ — Exclusion of Social Security Benefits From Spending Limits and Deficit- 
+
+ reduction Targets: A key element of the budget process was the establishment of a
+set of specific limits or “caps” on discretionary spending (encompassing most
+programs requiring annual appropriations) and a “pay-as-you-go” requirement for
+direct spending (mostly entitlement programs) and revenues. The discretionary
+spending caps and the pay-as-you-go requirement, for the most part, took the place
+of the overall deficit-reduction targets established under the former Gramm-Rudman-
+Hollings procedures. Under the old procedures, the income and outgo of Social
+Security were included in estimating the budget totals to determine if the deficit was
+expected to fall within the targets set under the law. In contrast, under the procedures
+established in 1990, Social Security’s income and outgo were to be excluded from
+calculations of the new budget enforcement rules, with the exception of administrative
+expenditures, which were incorporated under the discretionary spending caps.
+
+As under the old law, if any of the discretionary spending caps or the “pay-as-
+
+you-go” rule were violated (i.e., exceeded), the President was required to issue
+sequestration orders to bring spending down to the prescribed limits. Social Security
+was to be exempt from such sequestration orders as it was under the old law (again,
+with the exception of administrative expenses).
+
+The 1990 law also continued the old law provision (section 310 (g)) that permits
+
+points of order to be raised against reconciliation bills or resolutions that contain
+Social Security measures.
+
+ — Inclusion of Social Security Administrative Expenses Under the Spending 
+
+ Limits and Deficit-Reduction Targets: Under the prior law Social Security
+administrative expenses were subject to sequestration if the deficit targets were
+exceeded. The 1990 law stated that Social Security “shall not” be counted as budget
+
+11 A Section 311 objection existed under the original budget act for violations of the budget
+resolution totals.
+
+ 
+ CRS-13
+
+authority or outlays for purposes of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
+Control Act of 1985. The accompanying explanatory statement of the conferees
+reiterated that Social Security benefits would be exempt from sequestration, but made
+no mention of administrative expenses. However, Social Security was listed among
+the programs subject to the limit on discretionary spending with a footnote stating
+that portions of the Social Security accounts are “non-appropriated mandatory.” One
+interpretation was that the only reason to list Social Security in the discretionary
+domestic category was to subject its administrative expenses to the limit, since
+benefits payments, interest, and payments to the trust funds were all explicitly
+excluded. An alternative interpretation was that the provision in the new law stating
+that Social Security was not to be counted for purposes of the Balanced Budget and
+Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (which the new law amended) was sufficient
+language to exempt all aspects of Social Security from the limit. The lack of
+specificity gave the Office of Management Budget latitude to make either
+interpretation, and OMB decided it should be counted as discretionary spending.
+
+ — Procedures To Protect the Social Security Trust Funds: The 1990 law also
+
+made changes in House and Senate procedures intended to protect the Social Security
+trust funds from benefit liberalizations or revenue reductions that would erode their
+balances. Under the old law, Social Security’s inclusion in the budget had the
+potential effect of thwarting attempts to increase Social Security spending or cut its
+revenue base. Points of order could be raised against such actions for violating the
+budget resolution totals or spending and revenue allocations, if they would be
+effective in the year of the budget resolution. Moreover, these violations would have
+potentially threatened other programs with sequestration and posed difficulty for
+Congress and the President in reaching subsequent budget targets. In effect, the
+former process imposed a fiscal discipline on Social Security.
+
+Since under the 1990 law, Social Security benefits were not to be part of the
+
+budget, the fiscal constraints of the budget process technically no longer applied. In
+their place, the 1990 law established separate rules for the House and Senate that
+attempt to make it difficult to bring up measures for a vote in the respective chambers
+that would weaken the financial condition of the program by reducing revenue or
+increasing spending without offsetting changes.
+
+ — House firewall : In the House a point of order can be raised against a bill that
+
+proposes more than $250 million in Social Security spending increases or revenue
+reductions over the 5-year period consisting of the fiscal year in which the legislation
+becomes effective and the following 4 years, unless the bill also contains other
+offsetting spending reductions or tax increases that bring the net impact of the
+measures within the $250 million limit. In calculating the impact, any costs from prior
+legislation (i.e., enacted in the current or previous 4 years) that fall within the 5-year
+period would be counted in calculating whether the pending legislation falls within the
+$250 million limit. A point of order also can be raised against a measure that would
+increase long-range (75 years) average costs or reduce long-range revenues by 0.02%
+of taxable payroll or more. Hence, a bill whose financial impact fell within the 5-year
+$250 million limit could still be subject to a point of order if its long-range costs were
+equal to or greater than 0.02 % of taxable payroll.
+
+ 
+ CRS-14
+
+ — Senate firewall: In the Senate, budget resolutions must set specific amounts
+
+for Social Security income and outgo for the first fiscal year and 5-year period
+(cumulatively) covered by the resolution. (They are separate in the sense that they are
+not counted in the budget resolution totals themselves). These amounts cannot reflect
+a narrowing in the surplus of income (or a larger deficit) from what is projected under
+current law. Recommended resolutions or amendments that do so could draw an
+objection that can be overridden only by approval of three-fifths of the Senate.12
+Simply stated, Senate rules preclude consideration of budget resolutions that would
+erode the near term balances of the Social Security trust funds. In addition, once a
+conference agreement on the budget resolution is reached, allocations of the Social
+Security amounts included in the resolution must be made to the Finance Committee
+and budget act points of order (under Sections 302 and 311) can then be brought up
+against subsequent Social Security measures that would cause outlays to be increased
+or revenues to be reduced (without offsetting changes) from those reflected in the
+allocations to the Committee. To override these objections requires approval by
+three-fifths of the Senate.
+
+ — Report to Congress on the Actuarial Balance of the Trust Fund by the 
+
+ Trustees: The 1990 law also added a provision requiring the Social Security board
+of trustees to include in its annual report a statement as to whether the OASI and DI
+trust funds are in “close actuarial balance.” Traditionally, close actuarial balance is
+said to exist if projected average income over the trustees’ estimating period as a
+whole (which extends 75 years into the future) falls within 95% and 105% of the
+projected average cost of the program. Over the years, it has been considered a
+primary indicator of the long-range soundness of the Social Security program.
+Although trustees’ reports routinely have made a statement about the program’s
+actuarial balance, the practice of doing so was not required by law. In their 1989
+report, the trustees declined to make such a statement (the projections themselves
+showed that the program was slightly outside the lower limit of actuarial balance with
+average income projected to be 94.9% of average costs). Its absence drew an
+objection from the chief actuary of the Social Security Administration in his
+legislatively-required certification of the report. The 1990 law required a statement
+by the trustees about close actuarial balance to be included in each trustees’ report
+(but left discretion with the trustees to define the concept).
+
+All reports issued since enactment of this provision have included a substantive
+
+analysis of whether the system was projected to be in close actuarial balance and a
+statement about it by the trustees.
+
+12 In its original form this provision only precluded the Senate Budget Committee from
+recommending a budget resolution that would reduce the current law balances of the trust
+funds. It was not out of order to subsequently consider floor amendments to modify a pending
+budget resolution to reflect measures that would reduce the trust funds’ balances. Such
+amendments could be passed by a simple majority. In enacting the FY1992 budget resolution,
+the Senate adopted a rule making it out of order to consider measures (including amendments
+to a budget resolution) that would erode the balances of the trust funds during the period
+covered by the resolution (and requiring approval of three-fifths of the Senate to suspend the
+rules to do so). In enacting the FY1993 budget resolution, the Senate made this a permanent
+rule.
+
+ 
+ CRS-15
+
+ — Display of Retirement Trust Fund Balances: The 1990 law further required
+
+that budget resolutions display the balances of federal retirement trust fund programs,
+presumably including Social Security. This display was to show the amount of the
+securities expected to be recorded to the trust funds.
+
+ Chronology 
+
+ 1990 —- Congress enacted P.L. 101-508, which included among its titles,
+
+ the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 . This law established new
+budgeting rules to enforce a 5-year $500 billion deficit-reduction
+package. It included provisions (1) largely exempting Social
+Security from these rules, (2) officially taking Social Security out
+of all calculations of the budget totals, and (3) creating new floor
+procedures for considering Social Security legislation intended
+to protect the balances of the Social Security trust funds.
+Originally written to cover the period from FY1991 to FY1995,
+the new budget rules now apply through FY2002 (as a result of
+provisions in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ,
+P.L. 103-66, and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, P.L. 105-
+33).
+
+ 1987 —- Congress enacted P.L. 100-119, which included among its titles,
+
+ the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
+Reaffirmation Act of 1987 . This law made changes to the GRH
+procedures including extending the point at which a balanced
+budget would be reached to FY1993. The financial operations
+of the Social Security trust funds remained part of the budget
+calculations for purposes of estimating the overall deficits.
+
+ 1985 —- Congress enacted P.L. 99-177, which included among its titles,
+
+ the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
+1985 , better know as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH)
+deficit reduction law. Although technically removing Social
+Security from the budget totals effective for FY1986, this law
+included Social Security in the budget totals through FY1991 for
+purposes of estimating the overall deficits.
+
+ 1983 —- Congress enacted P.L. 98-21, the Social Security Amendments 
+
+ of 1983 , which included a provision calling for removal of the
+Social Security and Medicare HI trust funds from the budget
+totals beginning in FY1993.
+
+ 1974 —- Congress enacted P.L. 93-344, the Congressional Budget and 
+
+ Impoundment Control Act of 1974 , establishing new procedures
+to formulate and control the budget that encompasses a “unified”
+approach to the budget that includes Social Security and other
+trust fund programs in the budget totals.
+
+ 
+ CRS-16
+
+ 1968 —- President Johnson issued a “unified” federal budget for FY1969.
+
+This was done administratively (i.e., not as a result of
+legislation).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/corpus/politics/text/e682c8cb5f3e324f.txt b/corpus/politics/text/e682c8cb5f3e324f.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8cf7d48ff1f1a996aa505af0f85a0c574508213e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/corpus/politics/text/e682c8cb5f3e324f.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,14362 @@
+Order Code RL31389
+
+Report for Congress
+
+Received through the CRS Web
+
+ Afghanistan: Challenges and Options for 
+
+ Reconstructing a Stable and Moderate State 
+
+ May 10, 2002 
+
+Richard P. Cronin
+
+Specialist in Asian Affairs
+
+Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
+
+ Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress 
+
+ 
+ Afghanistan: Challenges and Options for
+
+Reconstructing a Stable and Moderate Afghan State
+
+ Summary 
+
+The U.S.-led effort to end Afghanistan’s role as host to Osama bin Laden and
+
+other anti-western Islamic terrorists requires not only the defeat of the Taliban but
+also the reconstruction of a stable, effective, and ideologically moderate Afghan
+state. Otherwise, the country could continue to be a potential base for terrorism and
+a source of regional instability. An important beginning was made with the
+December 22, 2001, installation of a multi-ethnic interim Afghan administration
+under Hami Karzai, following U.N.-sponsored negotiations in Bonn, Germany. An
+ethnic Pushtun with ties to the former royal family, Karzai has gained the nominal
+support of major regional warlords, but his leadership remains dangerously
+dependent on his status as a compromise figure. who can attract foreign assistance
+while not posing a threat to the warlords and other armed contenders for power.
+Moreover, the viability of the process set in motion in Bonn has yet to be established,
+especially the outcome of an Emergency Loya Jirga (“Grand Council”) which is to
+appoint a Transitional Authority in June 2002, with the task of drafting a new
+constitution, and the holding of national elections by about December 2003.
+
+The Bush Administration and the Congress have indicated strong support for
+
+humanitarian relief and reconstruction, but the precise nature of the U.S. role remains
+to be determined. As of late April 2002, the Bush Administration was focusing on
+the military campaign and rhetorically opposed to deep involvement in “nation
+building.” U.S. forces reportedly have been deeply involved in checking conflict
+among competing local warlords, an informal peacekeeping role that puts American
+troops at risk of embroilment in local power struggles and also involved with Afghan
+forces that potentially are a threat to the Interim Administration.
+
+Major obstacles to establishing a stable and ideologically moderate Afghan state
+
+include: the competing power aspirations of Afghanistan’s several tribal and ethnic
+groups; a power shift towards the Tajiks and other minority groups and away from
+the once-dominant Pushtuns; the steady, long-term decline of Afghan state
+institutions that began with the Communist/Soviet occupation decade of 1979-89,
+and accelerated under the Taliban; the recent rapid increase in opium production and
+local power struggles for control over the lucrative drug trade; and, last but not least,
+the resiliency of politicized Islam, as promoted both by the Taliban and other radical
+Islamist parties who have been defeated militarily but retain influence in some areas.
+
+ A stable Afghanistan is unlikely to be constructed without significant near-term
+aid to reestablish security and relieve immediate economic distress, and extensive
+and long-term reconstruction support from the World Bank and the Asian
+Development Bank, the United States, Japan, and the European countries. In
+particular, Afghanistan badly needs economic development of the kind that will
+absorb into the workforce millions of undereducated youth – the Afghan equivalent
+of a lost generation – whose only outlets to date have been religious fundamentalism
+and warfare. Stability will also require that neighboring countries play a constructive
+role, or – at a minimum – avoid interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.
+
+ 
+ Contents 
+
+Focus and Scope of This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+
+Current Framework for the Reconstruction of a Stable and Moderate Afghan 
+
+State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+
+Development of the Afghan State under the
+
+Durrani Pushtun Monarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+Long-Standing Pattern of Violent Leadership Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+
+Growth of National Institutions Under Zahir Shah (1933-1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+
+Political Tensions Arising Out of Modernization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+
+Rise of Marxist and Radical Islamist Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+
+Zahir Shah’s Counterproductive Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+
+Chronically Strained Relations with Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+Rising Soviet and Declining U.S. Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+
+Mohammad Daoud and the Afghan Republic, 1973-1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+
+Destruction of the Traditional Social Fabric: PDPA Rule and Soviet 
+
+Occupation, 1978-89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+
+Anti-Soviet War and the Rise of Islamic Extremism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+
+Collapse of the Afghan State, 1989-1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+
+Failure of a U.N. Brokered Power Transfer In 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+Three-Cornered Ethnic Power Conflict in the 1992-1996 Islamic Republic 
+
+of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
+
+Rise and Fall of the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
+
+Prospects for Recreating a Stable and Moderate Afghan State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
+
+Past Elements of Stability and Current Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
+
+Sources of Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
+Acceptable Ethnic Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
+Positive Center-Provincial Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
+Harmony Between the State and Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
+Critical Role of Foreign Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
+
+Negotiating the Multi-Layered Afghan Power Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
+
+Ethnicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
+Warlords and Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
+Ideologically-Oriented Political Party Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
+Rural-Based Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
+Economic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
+
+Dynamic Interaction of Individual Actors and Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
+
+Potential Swing Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
+Stakes for the Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
+
+Four Scenarios for the Future Afghan State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
+
+ 
+ Democratic Pluralism – A Necessity, Not a Luxury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
+1. Transitional Regime Leading to Pluralistic Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
+2. Northern Alliance-Dominated State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
+3. Disappearance of a Unified Afghan State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
+4. Caretaker Ward of the International Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
+
+Factors Affecting the Outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
+
+Resolution of Disputes on Power Sharing in the Central Government . . . . 26
+Economic Development and the Issue of Jobs or Guns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
+Economic Development and The Future Role Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
+
+Issues for U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
+
+1. Support for the Political Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
+2. Close Engagement with Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
+3. Bilateral Assistance and Participation in International Assistance 
+
+and Development Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
+
+Conclusion: Issues for Congressional Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
+
+Issues of Special Congressional Interest: Narcotics Production and 
+
+Women’s Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
+Narcotics or Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
+Future Status of Women in Afghan Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
+
+Three Policy Issues for Possible Congressional Consideration . . . . . . . . . . 31
+
+Tension between Dual U.S. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
+Response to Calls for Expanded International Peacekeeping . . . . . . . 32
+Possible Benefits of a More Transparent U.S. Military Role on the 
+
+Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
+
+Appendix I: Bonn Agreements on Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
+
+ List of Figures 
+
+Figure 1. Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
+Figure 2. Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
+
+ List of Tables 
+
+Table 1. Afghan Kings and Rulers Since 1901: 
+
+A Record of Violent Regime Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+
+ 
+ Afghanistan: Challenges and Options for
+
+Reconstructing a Stable and Moderate State
+
+ Focus and Scope of This Report 
+
+The U.S.-led effort to end permanently Afghanistan’s role as a base for anti-
+
+western Islamic terrorists requires not only the defeat of the Taliban–which has been
+achieved through American, allied, and Afghan military action, but also the
+reconstruction of a stable, effective and ideologically moderate Afghan state.
+Otherwise, the country could again become a base for terrorism. Additionally, unless
+some means is found to organize a relatively stable, multi-ethnic society, the current
+sharp divisions between the Pushtuns in the South and the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and
+Hazaras in the North, West, and central Hazarajat region, are likely to have wider
+repercussions for the stability of Pakistan and the Central Asian states.
+
+ Figure 1. Afghanistan 
+
+ 
+ CRS-2
+
+Unlike 1989, when the U.S. Government closed its embassy in Kabul only ten
+
+days after the withdrawal of the last Soviet forces, the Bush Administration has
+concluded that the United States has a major stake in the creation of a stable
+Afghanistan, and that it cannot be left to the armed Afghan contenders for power
+alone to decide the country’s future. The Administration has not yet given a detailed
+indication of what role it envisions for the United States in the political, economic,
+and social reconstruction of Afghanistan beyond current plans for emergency food
+and agricultural assistance, assistance in the formation of a new national army, and
+anti-narcotics aid. However, both the President and the Congress have declared that
+the United States will play a major role, in conjunction with NATO allies and Japan,
+the United Nations, and international financial institutions, to promote economic
+development and encourage political stability in Afghanistan.1
+
+The stakes for the United States include denying sanctuary and support for
+
+terrorists, maintaining positive influence with a nuclear-armed and politically
+unstable Pakistan, curtailing the massive flow of opium-based drugs from
+Afghanistan, and, possibly, facilitating the creation of an alternative to Iran and
+Russia as routes for the export of Central Asian oil and gas. For all of these reasons,
+the future U.S. role in Afghanistan and the adjacent region is likely to be an
+important focus of interaction between the Administration and Congress in
+considering foreign assistance and defense budget priorities and policy issues during
+the Spring of 2002. 
+
+In terms of action by Congress, H.R. 3994 (Hyde), the Afghanistan Freedom
+
+Support Act of 2002, which was marked up by the House International Relations
+Committee on March 20 and reported (amended) on April 25 (H.Rept. 107-420),
+addresses the overall direction and focus of U.S. policy towards humanitarian relief
+and refugee repatriation, economic reconstruction, the suppression of narcotics
+production, and support for a democratic and market-oriented Afghanistan. The bill
+would authorize about $1.05 billion in appropriations for assistance to Afghanistan,
+subject to certain conditions, from FY2002 to FY2005.
+
+ This report provides information on and analysis of the current situation in
+
+Afghanistan, taking into consideration the country’s essential characteristics and
+political developments since about the time of the overthrow of the last Afghan King,
+Zahir Shah, in 1973, and sketches out four possible scenarios for Afghanistan’s
+future. The scenarios incorporate the profound effects of the collapse of the Afghan
+Republic, the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation, subsequent civil war, and the rise and
+fall of the Taliban. Finally, the report identifies and analyzes factors that will
+influence Afghanistan’s political future, and discusses three policy areas in particular
+in which actions by the United States could be crucial to the achievement of the U.S.
+goal of a peaceful, stable, democratic, and terrorist-free Afghanistan. An appendix
+
+1 Among other sources, see comments of Senators and testimony by Administration
+witnesses at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, The Political Future of
+Afghanistan , Dec. 6, 2001; and comments of Members and official and unofficial witnesses
+at a House International Relations Committee hearing, America’s Assistance to the Afghan
+People , Nov. 1, 2001.
+
+ 
+ CRS-3
+
+contains key documents relating to the December 2001 Bonn Agreement, which is
+the framework for current efforts to create a stable and democratic Afghanistan.
+
+This report will be updated in response to major political developments, but it
+
+is not intended to track issues concerning Afghanistan on a regular basis. Broader
+and more frequently updated coverage of issues concerning Afghanistan and U.S.
+policy is contained in CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S.
+Policy Concerns , by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Electronic Briefing Book,
+ Terrorism, page on “Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Bin Laden,” by Kenneth Katzman,
+[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter68.html]. For information and analysis
+concerning U.S. and other international humanitarian and reconstruction assistance
+to Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL31355, Afghanistan’s Path to Reconstruction:
+Obstacles, Challenges, and Issues for Congress , by Rhoda Margesson.
+
+ Current Framework for the Reconstruction of a 
+
+ Stable and Moderate Afghan State 
+
+ Achieving the goal of a stable and moderate Afghanistan depends on the
+
+establishment of a political process that has at least the tacit support of the major
+contenders for power and the Afghan people. A beginning was made at an
+international conference near Bonn, Germany, during December 2001, when
+representatives of various parties and ethnic groups agreed to the creation of an
+Interim Administration, and a procedure, with timetables, for drafting a new
+constitution and establishing, within two years, an elected government. The Bonn
+agreement offers hope that the various Afghan factions and forces may finally bridge
+their differences, but a number of indicators suggest that the path will be difficult.
+ 
+
+As in the case of a U.N.-backed effort in 1992, which failed, the composition
+
+of the delegation was more representative on paper than in reality. The 23 signatories
+to the agreement represented four anti-Taliban groups: The Northern Alliance ,
+representing the ethnic Tajik and Uzbek forces then occupying Kabul and other
+northern cities; The Rome Process , representing largely Pushtun exile followers of
+former King Zahir Shah; the Cyprus Group , representing largely Shi’a Muslim
+groups supported by Iran; and the Peshwar Group , consisting largely of Pushtun
+exile factions with headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan. Of these four groups, only
+the Northern Alliance commanded significant military power. The composition of
+the Rome and Peshawar groups was heavily tilted towards Western-educated
+“technocrats” and other members of the former urbanized Pushtun elite.2 Pushtun
+commanders and local shura (governing councils) in Southern Afghanistan, the home
+base of the Taliban, were not directly represented.
+
+As agreed, the parties to the negotiations inaugurated a multi-ethnic interim
+
+Afghan administration on December 22, 2001, headed by Hamid Karzai, a prominent
+Pushtun tribal leader with a modern, democratic, outlook and a record of good
+relations with the Northern Alliance. The 28-member interim governing council also
+
+2 Bonn Talks: Who is Being Heard? BBC News (online), Nov. 28, 2001, 18:33 GMT.
+
+ 
+ CRS-4
+
+includes two women, both medical doctors, who head the ministries of women’s
+affairs and health, respectively. Indicative of the fragile nature of the bargaining to
+date, an agreed-upon roadmap for the achievement of a democratic political structure
+leaves most of the details for the future. (See Appendix I for the terms of the
+agreement, or [http://www.uno.de/frieden/afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm].)
+
+As of Spring 2002, the Karzai-led Interim Administration continues to be
+
+described as beleaguered, dependent largely on Karzai’s personal popularity with
+ordinary Afghans, especially urbanites, and the support of the United Nations,
+Western governments, and foreign aid agencies. Karazi’s standing with his fellow
+ministers, the powerful regional warlords, and other influential rivals remains shaky.
+
+ Development of the Afghan State under the 
+
+ Durrani Pushtun Monarchy 
+
+The establishment of Afghanistan as a nation state dates essentially from 1747,
+
+when Ahmad Shah Durrani, a tribal Pushtun chief of the Sadozai line of the Abdali
+tribe, gained election by his tribe as the ruler (Amir) of territories approximating the
+present boundaries of Afghanistan. Under the Durrani ascendancy, Afghanistan
+experienced all the vicissitudes of dynastic chance and survived as a political entity
+largely as a buffer state whose northern and southern boundaries conformed to the
+high water line of the expanding British and Russian empires, and the periodically
+resurgent Iranian empire.
+
+In the 20th century Afghanistan teetered between bursts of Western and Soviet-
+
+aided modernization and recurrent reaction spearheaded by the twin sources of rural
+power in the Pushtun heartland: secular leaders, including tribal chieftains, local
+notables, or commanders, and Muslim clerics of various kinds, including mullahs and
+influential pirs (spiritual leaders) of the mystical Sufi Islamic sects, which
+predominate in Afghanistan and Southern Asia. In many respects the traditional local
+power structure, outside of Kabul and a few other population centers, approximated
+that in the rural, pre-industrial West, with men of property or learning exercising
+governmental power and clergy providing spiritual guidance, moral authority, and
+often local political influence. 
+
+In general, modernization fared better in the north, among the Tajiks and
+
+Uzbeks, who practiced settled agriculture or carried on commerce, the Persianized
+Residents of Kabul of various ethnic roots, and urbanized, detribalized Pushtuns.
+The Pushtun tribes, many of whom are or were nomadic, have been more resistant
+to centralization and modernization, but nonetheless have long thought of themselves
+as the “real” Afghans. 
+
+Pushtun dominance has long been a source of resentment among Afghanistan’s
+
+minority groups: the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. Both the Afghan Tajiks and those
+in Tajikistan have linguistic and cultural connections, but usually not religious
+affiliations with Iran. Dari, the main language of the Tajiks and most “Kabulis,”is
+a variant of Farsi–a modern form of Persian. In matters of religion, the Tajiks, like
+the Pushtuns, follow the Sunni school of Islam, the larger of the two main Islamic
+
+ 
+ CRS-5
+
+divisions. The Uzbeks have ethnic and linguistic connections to Uzbekistan and
+Central Asia, and are also Sunn i Muslims. The Hazaras are a Shi’a Muslim minority
+with ethnic ties to Central Asia and religious ties to Iran. 
+
+ Long-Standing Pattern of Violent Leadership Change 
+
+The still-incomplete conversion of Afghanistan from a largely tribal society to
+
+a nation state has been a process of slow advance and frequent periods of violent
+traditionalist reaction. Every Afghan king during the past century was either
+assassinated or deposed (Table 1). The first modernizing King, Habibullah Khan
+(1901-1919), was assassinated, possibly for being viewed as a tool of Britain.3 The
+most ambitious modernizer, Amanullah Khan (1919-1929), was deposed. His far-
+reaching economic and social modernization policies–especially the emancipation
+of women–engendered a violent reaction on the part of mullahs , tribal leaders, and
+tribes opposed to the Durrani confederation, especially those of the larger Gilzai
+confederation. Among other innovations inspired by travel to Europe, Turkey, and
+Iran, Aminullah created the Afghan Royal Air Force, outlawed polygamy, instituted
+compulsory education for both sexes, separated secular and religious authority, and
+created the first national assembly.
+
+Durrani rule was broken briefly by a bandit Tajik interloper, Bacha-i Saqqo
+
+(“Son of the Water Carrier”), who took power initially with support from dissident
+Gilzai tribes. His rule lasted only nine months, but Pushtuns still consider the brief
+rule by a Tajik as a humiliation–sentiments that have been resurrected by the
+dominance of the current Interim Administration by Tajiks.4
+
+3 Going against popular opinion, Habibullah declined to use Britain’s preoccupation with
+fighting World War I to regain control of territories lost after the Second Afghan War (1878-
+1880), which now form the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. 
+
+4 Harvey H. Smith, et al., Area Handbook for Afghanistan . Fourth Edition. U.S.
+Government Printing Office. Washington, 1973. p. 50-54.
+
+ 
+ CRS-6
+
+ Table 1. Afghan Kings and Rulers Since 1901: 
+
+ A Record of Violent Regime Change 
+
+ Royalist Period 
+
+ Period 
+
+ Circumstances 
+
+ Ruler 
+
+ in 
+
+ Achievements 
+
+ of Loss of 
+
+ Power 
+
+ Power 
+
+ Habibullah 
+
+1901-
+
+Established a Council of State to
+
+ Assassinated ,
+
+ Khan (Durrani
+
+1919
+
+manage tribal affairs; founded first
+
+perhaps for
+
+Pushtun)
+
+college; founded first military
+
+being seen as
+
+academy; coopted mullahs with
+
+too much under 
+
+state support and constraints;
+
+British
+
+promoted trade.
+
+influence.
+
+ Amanullah 
+
+1919-
+
+Fought Third Anglo-Afghan War
+
+ Deposed and 
+
+ Khan 
+
+1929
+
+(1919) ending British control over
+
+ exiled , due to
+
+(Durrani Pushtun)
+
+foreign policy. Ambitious
+
+revolt by
+
+modernizer: created first national
+
+Gilzais and
+
+parliament; outlawed polygamy,
+
+opposition to 
+
+instituted education for both sexes;
+
+modernization.
+
+established secular civil law
+separate from Islamic law.
+
+ Bacha-i Saqqo 
+
+1929
+
+Tajik interloper, took power with
+
+ Overthrown 
+
+(Tajik “Son of the
+
+support of Gilzai Tribes, rivals of
+
+ and killed . 
+
+Water Carrier”)
+
+Durranis.
+
+ Mohammad 
+
+1929-
+
+Widely regarded as a tyrant, but
+
+ Assassinated 
+
+ Nadir Shah 
+
+1933
+
+built transportation and
+
+by relatives of
+
+(Durrani Pushtun)
+
+communications infrastructure,
+
+an executed
+
+suppressed uprisings, and
+
+opposition
+
+revitalized the national army.
+
+figure.
+
+ Mohammad 
+
+1933-
+
+Promulgated 1964 Constitution,
+
+ Deposed and 
+
+ Zahir Shah 
+
+1973
+
+including reduced privileges for the
+
+ exiled by his
+
+(Durrani Pushtun)
+
+royal family, an elected, but weak
+
+cousin and
+
+and party-less national legislature,
+
+former Prime
+
+partly freed the press, promoted
+
+Minister (1953-
+
+education, including for females,
+
+1963),
+
+released women from the veil, and
+
+Mohammad
+
+obtained large-scale foreign aid
+
+Daoud.
+
+from the U.S. and U.S.S.R., but his
+rule saw growing socioeconomic
+fissures and left the merging middle
+class unsatisfied.
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ CRS-7
+
+ Republican/Revolutionary/Taliban Period 
+
+ Period 
+
+ Circumstances 
+
+ Ruler 
+
+ in 
+
+ Achievements 
+
+ of Loss of 
+
+ Power 
+
+ Power 
+
+ Mohammad 
+
+1973-
+
+Dictatorial first republican ruler
+
+ Overthrown 
+
+ Daoud 
+
+1978
+
+who seized power with leftist Army
+
+ and killed in
+
+(Durrani Pushtun) 
+
+support, promulgated one-party
+
+coup d’état led
+
+Constitution of 1977, promoted
+
+by leftist Army
+
+state-centered economic
+
+officers.
+
+development and social reforms,
+repaired relations with Pakistan and
+Iran, but created bitter enemies
+among leftists, Islamists, and
+advocates of Pushtun irredentism
+(vis-Ã -vis Pakistan).
+
+ Nur Mohammad 
+
+1978
+
+Part of triumvirate of factionalized
+
+ Killed in 
+
+ Taraki (Gilzai
+
+People’s Democratic Party of
+
+ shootout with
+
+Pushtun)
+
+Afghanistan (PDPA), issued
+
+rival faction
+
+decrees favoring women’s rights
+
+leader, Foreign
+
+and land reform that antagonized
+
+Minister
+
+Islamists and rural leadership,
+
+Hafizullah
+
+generating revolt.
+
+Amin.
+
+ Hafizullah Amin 
+
+1978-
+
+Repressed rival “Parchimite”
+
+ Overthrown 
+
+(Gilzai Pushtun)
+
+1979
+
+(“banner”) faction of PDPA and
+
+ and killed by
+
+angered Soviets by policies seen as
+
+invading Soviet
+
+too radically Marxist-Leninist.
+
+military forces.
+
+ Babrak Karmal 
+
+1980-
+
+Embattled, beset by Kalqi
+
+ Replaced by
+
+(Dari-speaking
+
+1986
+
+opposition and rising mujahidin 
+
+Najibullah and
+
+Pushtun)
+
+movement.
+
+exiled to
+U.S.S.R. Died
+in Moscow in
+1996.
+
+ Najibullah 
+
+1986-
+
+Promoted National Reconciliation
+
+ Overthrown by
+
+(Gilzai Pushtun)
+
+1992
+
+program in 1986 and promulgated
+
+ mujahidin in
+
+quasi-parliamentary constitution in
+
+1992 and
+
+1987, strengthened army and tribal
+
+brutally killed 
+
+militia forces. 
+
+in 1996
+
+ Mujajidin 
+
+1992-
+
+Severe fighting between largely
+
+Tajik leaders
+
+ Interregnum 
+
+1996
+
+Tajik and Uzbek Northern Alliance
+
+Rabbani and
+
+(Mainly Tajik)
+
+and mainly non-Durrani Pushtuns
+
+Masud evicted
+
+ended by victory of Pushtun
+
+from Kabul,
+
+ Taliban .
+
+ retreat to
+extreme
+Northeast .
+
+ 
+ CRS-8
+
+ Period 
+
+ Circumstances 
+
+ Ruler 
+
+ in 
+
+ Achievements 
+
+ of Loss of 
+
+ Power 
+
+ Power 
+
+ Mullah Omar 
+
+1996-
+
+Repressive regime based in
+
+ Fled in face of
+
+(Gilzai Pushtun
+
+2002
+
+Kandahar, with a strong streak of
+
+U.S. bombing
+
+but close aides
+
+Pushtun ethnic nationalism.,
+
+and attacks by
+
+mainly Durrani-
+
+enforced puritanical version of
+
+anti-Taliban
+
+Pushtuns)
+
+Islam and relied on assistance from
+
+forces. 
+
+ Al Qaeda and other foreign
+supporters.
+
+ Growth of National Institutions Under Zahir Shah 
+
+ (1933-1973) 
+
+The modern Afghan state reached its apogee, in a manner of speaking, under
+
+King Zahir Shah, who ascended the throne in 1933 after the assassination of his
+father, King Mohammad Nadir Shah. Mindful of the fate of his predecessors who
+were perceived as having sacrificed the country’s interests to obtain foreign support,
+or as having too aggressively challenged the power of the tribal chiefs and mullahs,
+Zahir Shah attempted a cautious modernization program while keeping a judicious
+distance (or so it seemed at the time) from both the United States and the Soviet
+Union, while accepting aid from both.
+
+During the four decades of Zahir Shah’s rule, Afghanistan experienced a growth
+
+of national political, economic, and social institutions, but the government still
+consisted of a thin and generally resource-absorbing military and bureaucratic layer
+imposed over the underlying tribal and ethnic structure.5 Nonetheless, the country
+developed many of the trappings of a modernizing nation state, including various
+foreign-supported economic infrastructure development schemes and a nascent
+system of public education from primary school through higher education, but with
+low levels of enrollment and few educational opportunities for females. This process
+accelerated with Zahir Shah’s promulgation of a new constitution in 1964, which
+provided for the nominal separation of the King and royal family from direct
+participation in governmental functions, a party-less parliamentary system, universal
+suffrage, and a civil law code (with only secondary reliance on Hanafi Muslim
+jurisprudence) and nominally independent judiciary.
+
+5 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . New
+Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2001.
+
+ 
+ CRS-9
+
+ Political Tensions Arising Out of Modernization 6 
+
+As in the case of the former Shah of Iran, Zahir Shah’s efforts to promote
+
+modernization inadvertently fostered the creation of new social and political forces
+which ultimately undermined his rule. Zahir Shah was and remains something of an
+enigma. He ascended the throne at age 19, and for thirty years largely left the
+government in the hands of relatives–first by uncles until about 1953, and later by his
+cousin, Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud. Perhaps too late, Zahir Shah finally took
+charge of the government in 1963, after Daoud’s policy of hostility towards Pakistan
+(see below) led that country to close the common border, cutting of Afghanistan’s
+southern trade links and devastating the economy. Despite his effort to reduce the
+role of the royal family and his promulgation of a new constitution with some limited
+democratic features, notably an elected, but party-less bicameral parliament, with
+limited powers to check and balance the executive authority, Zahir Shah’s
+liberalization program was still-born. This outcome generally has been attributed to
+the King’s lack of assertiveness and the fear of the country’s social and economic
+elite of being displaced by popularly elected leaders.
+
+Among other accomplishments, Zahir Shah and his new advisors and officials
+
+extended the reach of the central government by expanding the army and the national
+police system, enlarging the functions of the civilian bureaucracy, expanding the
+national educational system, and bringing a central government presence down to the
+local level. Although these developments helped to strengthen the state and weaken
+tribalism, their net effect was not wholly positive. The army and police were widely
+regarded as repressive, and the bureaucracy and local governmental apparatus were
+said to be corrupt, grasping, incompetent, and dominated, at the upper levels, by the
+King’s relatives.
+
+The latter years of Zahir Shah’s reign brought significant economic
+
+modernization, but not enough to take Afghanistan out of the ranks of the least
+developed countries. On the positive side, the middle class in Kabul and other cities
+swelled from an estimate of fewer than a thousand at the end of World War II to
+almost 100,000 by the early 1970s. But public frustration grew over the fact that the
+government bureaucracy was not up to the task of managing and maintaining the
+economic and physical infrastructure provided by aid donors.7 
+
+ Rise of Marxist and Radical Islamist Conflict. The political opening
+
+provided by the 1964 constitution boosted the aspirations of both a small leftist
+
+6 The following account of developments during Zahir Shah’s era are drawn largely from
+the Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Area Handbook series. For the latest
+online version, see [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/aftoc.html]. This is an incomplete update
+of the 1986 edition. Unlike previous editions, it gives little coverage of U.S.-Afghan
+relations during the Zahir Shah era.
+
+7 Politically, it has been said that new educated and professional classes had failed to see
+that they had a stake in the reforms, having been “given too little responsibility to develop
+self-discipline and too little power to be totally committed.” Nancy Peabody Newell and
+Richard S. Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan . Ithaca and London: Cornell University
+Press, 1981. p. 44.
+
+ 
+ CRS-10
+
+intelligentsia and radical Islamic counterparts. The Marxist People’s Democratic
+Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded on January 1, 1965, with the explicit goal
+of contesting the elections held that year under the new constitution–elections that
+were officially party-less. The radical leftists tended to dominate parliamentary
+proceedings, while moderates remained cowed by political repression. Most of the
+major figures who later served in the Soviet-backed Marxist regime, notably Nur
+Mohamad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, and Babrak Karmal, were active in the first
+elected parliament.8
+
+The emergence of the radical left was paralleled by the growth of a radical
+
+Islamist movement, starting with the foundation of the Organization of Muslim
+Youth at Kabul University in the mid-1960s. The Islamists reacted not only to the
+rise of the left but also rebelled against the long tradition of co-option of Muslim
+clerics by the government. 
+
+Soon after emerging, both the Marxists and the Islamic right split along
+
+primarily ethnic lines. The PDPA was divided between a largely Pushtun Kalq
+ (“masses”) movement under Taraki and Amin, and a more urban and moderate
+ Parcham (“flag”) wing under Karmal. The split in the Islamist ranks was both ethnic
+and generational–between the followers of Professor Burnhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik
+religious scholar who founded the Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society), and those
+attracted to “Engineer” Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pushtun Kabul University
+engineering student. Hekmatyar became the leader in an even more radical
+organization, the Hezb-i-Islami .(Islamic Party). Both the leftists and the Islamists
+adopted similar authoritarian, Leninist-style, forms of party organization.9
+
+ Zahir Shah’s Counterproductive Foreign Policy 
+
+Afghan foreign policy under Zahir Shah was characterized by two mutually
+
+reinforcing policy pillars that greatly influenced Afghanistan’s subsequent political
+history. The first was the dogged pursuit of the cause of “Pushtunistan” (or
+“Paktunistan” in the dialect of Southeast Afghanistan and among Pakistani
+Pushtuns), a popular campaign for the return of ethnic Pushtun territories previously
+ceded to British India. These territories became part of Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier
+Province after Pakistan and India gained independence in 1947, but remained loosely
+tied to Afghanistan through trade, nomadic grazing, and family connections.10 The
+second foreign policy pillar was the effort to reap maximum gains from the East-
+West Cold War by playing one superpower off against the other.
+
+ Chronically Strained Relations with Pakistan. The Paktunistan
+
+campaign was pursued with particular intensity during the period 1953 to 1963, when
+the King’s cousin, Mohammad Daoud, served as prime minister. The diplomatic
+
+8 Ibid ., p. 45.
+
+9 David B. Edwards, Before the Taliban: Geneologies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley: Univ.
+of California Press, 2002), p. 177-209, 235-244.
+
+10 Because Afghan Pushtuns regard their country as the Pustun homeland, there was no
+counterpart Pushtun separatist movement within Afghanistan.
+
+ 
+ CRS-11
+
+agitation and frequent border incidents led to chronic strains in Pakistan-Afghan
+relations, including periodic closures by Pakistan of the common border, driving
+Afghanistan deeper into dependence on the Soviet Union for aid, trade, and military
+support. Ultimately, Daoud’s policies so harmed the Afghan economy that the King
+sought and received his cousin’s resignation. (As noted below, a decade later Daoud
+would overthrow the monarchy and make himself President of an Afghan republic.)11
+
+ Rising Soviet and Declining U.S. Influence. The conjunction of Afghan
+
+irredentism and the U.S. Cold War alliance with Pakistan caused friction in U.S.-
+Afghan relations and led Kabul to drift into the Soviet orbit. U.S. arms assistance
+to Pakistan under the Mutual Security Program of 1954, which was aimed at
+checking Soviet expansion, had unintended consequences in the case of Afghanistan.
+Partly to placate Islamabad, the Eisenhower Administration and its successors
+rejected Kabul’s requests for military aid, causing the U.S.S.R. to become
+Afghanistan’s main supplier of arms and military training. Soviet weapons and the
+presence of Soviet advisors gave Moscow extensive influence within the Afghan
+army and air force. The Soviets also constructed important military airfields at
+Bagram, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Shindand, a gas pipeline to Soviet Central Asia, and a
+network of surfaced roads linking Afghanistan to the U.S.S.R. The northern road
+network and Bagram air base played key roles in the 1979 Soviet invasion of
+Afghanistan.12 
+
+The United States actively contested for influence with the U.S.S.R., but was
+
+handicapped by geography and geopolitics. Vice-President Richard M. Nixon visited
+the country in 1953, at the outset of the Eisenhower Administration, and President
+Dwight D. Eisenhower visited Kabul in 1959. King Zahir Shah, likewise, visited
+Washington in 1963, about the time that he began taking a more active role in
+governing the country. The United States continued to provide economic assistance
+for projects such as the Helmand River irrigation project in southern Afghanistan,
+and the construction of an international airport at Kandahar that became a classic
+foreign aid “white elephant” project, but Moscow’s influence became dominant.13
+
+11 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Afghanistan: A Country Study . Online
+version, published in 1977 [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/aftoc.html]. See Daoud as Prime
+Minister, 1953-63.
+
+12 Nancy Peabody Newell and Richard S. Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan . Ithaca and
+London: Cornell University Press, 1981. p. 40-43.
+
+13 Beginning in 1956,U.S. AID began construction of an “international” airport at Kandahar
+for use by piston-engine planes transiting from the Indian Subcontinent to the Middle East.
+The airport was completed in 1963, just in time for the introduction of long-distance jets,
+causing the intended role of the Kandahar airport to fall to the international airport in
+Karachi, Pakistan. During the 1960s U.S. AID also constructed regional airports in Kunduz,
+Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, and Jalalabad. In addition, the U.S. Government encouraged the
+former U.S. flag carrier Pan American World Airways to take a 49% share in the Afghan
+government-owned Airiana Airlines, in support of which, the U.S. Export-Import Bank
+financed the purchase of two Boeing 727 passenger aircraft.
+
+ 
+ CRS-12
+
+ Mohammad Daoud and the Afghan Republic, 1973-1979 
+
+In 1973 Daoud emerged from the political wilderness to overthrow the
+
+monarchy and establish the Republic of Afghanistan, using younger, Soviet-trained
+army officers who were members of the Parcham (“Banner”) wing of the Marxist
+PDPA to carry out a relatively bloodless coup. King Zahir Shah, who was in Rome
+for medical treatment, remained there permanently. Daoud became president of a
+new Afghan Republic, which featured a presidential system and a single-party
+government. The new constitution was approved by a Loya Jirga (“Grand Council”),
+the traditional mechanism for giving assent to the ruler by representatives of tribes,
+ethnic groups, and other interests, in January 1977.
+
+To the consternation of his supporters, Daoud as president reversed a number
+
+of policies from his days as prime minister. After using leftist allies to repress
+Islamic militants during the first two years of his rule, Daoud turned on them in the
+mid-1970s, purging leftists from the army and cracking down on the PDPA. He also
+began slowly to distance himself from the Soviet Union and cultivate relations with
+the Shah of Iran and the Saudi monarchy, and improve ties with Pakistan.
+
+On the domestic front, Daoud did little to move Afghanistan towards modernity
+
+or democracy. Afghanistan remained one of the poorest countries in the world, with
+little in the way of industry or economic infrastructure. At the same time, his
+repression of both the Islamists and the leftists, his tactical withdrawal of support for
+Paktunistan, and disregard for parliament, created a host of enemies. The murder of
+a prominent Afghan communist in early 1978, allegedly by government agents, set
+in motion the April 27, 1978, coup against Daoud led by leftist army officers and the
+PDPA. Daoud and his family were shot to death after rebellious troops stormed the
+Presidential palace, bringing to an end more than 230 years of Durrani Pushtun rule.
+
+ Destruction of the Traditional Social Fabric: PDPA 
+
+ Rule and Soviet Occupation, 1978-89 
+
+Daoud’s overthrow and the Soviet invasion caused a diaspora of Afghanistan’s
+
+small educated and professional elite and the families associated with the rule of
+Zahir Shah, leading to the collapse of most vestiges of the old order. The Afghan
+communists attempted a number of social changes that under other circumstances
+would have been viewed as progressive, including measures to promote secular
+education and liberate women, but the PDPA leaders, who came mainly from urban
+areas, had little understanding of the countryside or respect for rural traditions. Their
+clumsy efforts to overturn the social and political order in the tribal areas provoked
+widespread rebellion. Equally important, a long-standing, bitter, and unresolvable
+split between the Kalq faction of the PDPA, led by President Nur Mohammad Taraki
+and Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, and Parcham faction, led by Babrak Karmal,
+a Soviet protégé, brought the government to the point of collapse. 
+
+In addition to the basic Parcham-Kalq conflict, the Afghan revolution spawned
+
+a number of violent radical groups, both leftist and Islamist. In early 1979, under
+circumstances still described as “murky” by the State Department, U.S. Ambassador
+
+ 
+ CRS-13
+
+Adolph “Spike” Dubs was kidnaped by a group of men whose identities remain a
+matter of speculation and dispute, but who were alleged to be Maoist opponents of
+the regime. Dubs was killed in a fusillade of fire when Afghan interior ministry
+forces, reportedly at the urging of Soviet advisors, stormed the building in which he
+was being held.14 
+
+The more nationalistic Chalcis gained the upper hand in the summer of 1978
+
+and sent Babrak Karmal and a number of other prominent Parchamites, who tended
+to have pro-Soviet leanings, into exile as ambassadors to Soviet Bloc countries. By
+early 1979 the renewed split in the PDPA and the reckless policies of Prime Minister
+Amin, the most energetic of the governing duo, had sparked widespread rebellions.
+Taraki visited Moscow in September 1979, where he was elaborately feted, and
+returned probably with orders to get rid of Amin. In October 1979, however, Amin
+moved first, organizing the murder of Taraki and seizing power.
+
+ Amin’s ruthless power grab and the emergence of an anti-Marxist tribal revolt
+alarmed the Soviet Union, which feared that Amin would single-handedly destroy the
+revolution. In December 1979, Leonid Brezhnev gave the fateful order for the
+invasion and occupation of Afghanistan to keep PDPA government from collapsing.
+The spearhead forces of the Soviet invasion stormed the presidential palace and
+killed Amin, replacing him with Babrak Karmal, the Parcham leader who had been
+in exile in Moscow.15 
+
+ Anti-Soviet War and the Rise of Islamic Extremism 
+
+U.S. policymakers and supporters of the Afghan resistance movement expected
+
+that the anti-Soviet campaign by the Afghan mujahidin would contribute to the
+forging of a new sense of Afghan nationhood, but the war actually had the opposite
+effect. Instead of coalescing around a common cause, the particular circumstances
+of the conflict intensified the existing ethnic, tribal, religious, and ideological
+divisions of the society, and related power rivalries among individual leaders.
+
+Several aspects of the anti-Soviet war period were particularly divisive, and
+
+continue to impede national reconciliation today. One was the boost given to
+Islamic extremism, which developed in a context of ideological conflict with
+Western-educated secularists and personal power rivalries. At bottom, the rise of
+radical versions of Islam had roots in a reaction against modernization and rising
+Western influences associated with what some Islamists viewed as a corrupt and
+decadent monarchy, and against the Marxists. 
+
+Although the anti-Soviet mujahidin often were perceived as backward, albeit
+
+admirably dedicated tribesmen, most of the principal Islamist political leaders in the
+
+14 Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet
+Invasion, and the Consequences . Boulder: Westview Press, 1984: 64-65.
+
+15 By this point in time the Soviets already had 4,500 troops in country and controlled
+Bagram Airport. Ibid ., 80-101.
+
+ 
+ CRS-14
+
+anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan were men of education and social position. More than
+half of the seven leaders of the so-called Peshawar Alliance that was headquartered
+in Peshawar, Pakistan, during the anti-Soviet conflict, were university educated.16
+By and large, however, real power in the anti-Soviet resistance tended to flow to
+younger leaders with an Islamist orientation but a secular background, such as
+Gulbuddin Hekyatyar and Ahmad Shah Masud, who had organizational and military
+skills, and who could command, or at least support, mujahidin in the field.
+
+Last, but not least among the sources of division, and increasingly important
+
+after the PDPA coup in 1978, was meddling by a number of foreign powers, most
+notably Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, each of which backed ethnic and
+ideological favorites, and private promoters of radical ideologies. Pakistan favored
+Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Saudi Arabia backed Professor Rasul Sayyaf, and Iran
+supported several small Shi’a Hazara groups. Osama bin Laden’s role dates from
+late 1980s, when he and a number of other private Saudis attempted to promote their
+radical version of Sunni Islam among the Afghan mujahidin .
+
+ Collapse of the Afghan State, 1989-1996 
+
+The Soviet withdrawal set in motion a power struggle that in turn set the stage
+
+for the rise of the Taliban. The initial round involved rival mujahidin groups
+headquartered in Peshawar, who were members of the so-called Alliance and, until
+1992, the remaining supporters of the communist government headed by Najibullah,
+including a reduced but still intact Afghan army. Despite several promising
+negotiations, neither the seven Alliance parties headquartered in Peshawar, nor the
+commanders in the countryside, who met separately in a meeting organized by the
+late Abdul Haq, one of the most prominent field commanders, were able to agree on
+a division of power. 
+
+ Failure of a U.N. Brokered Power Transfer In 1992 
+
+The regional power rivalries and unbridled ambitions of the principal political
+
+leaders and field commanders did much to turn victory over the Soviets into a new
+period of misery for the country. The chain of events following the Soviet
+withdrawal may provide some lessons for the present, especially the effort during
+1991 and 1992 of Benon Sevan, the representative of the U.N. Secretary General, to
+broker a peace settlement between the Najibullah regime in Kabul and the mujahidin .
+The final version of the plan, which had been accepted by most of the parties and
+commanders and their foreign backers, especially Pakistan and Iran, provided for a
+peace settlement on lines very similar to the Bonn Accord of December 2001:
+
+16 Burnhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the Jamiat-i-Islami , the political organization of the
+largely Tajik Northen Alliance, earned a degree in Islamic theology at Cairo’s prestigious
+Al Azhar University. Saudi Arabia’s favorite, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, with close ties to the
+radical international Muslim Brotherhood, earned a Master’s Degree from Al Ahzar.
+Sebghatullah Mojaddidi, head of the traditionalist Jabba-e-Nejat-e-Milli Afghanistan
+ (Afghan National Liberation Front), was a professor of theology and a Pir (sufi religious
+leader.) Summarized from a variety of sources.
+
+ 
+ CRS-15
+
+! the early (within weeks) formation of “pre-transition council”
+! a transitional authority to govern the country, leading to
+! “free and fair elections” within about two years 
+
+Sevan reportedly came close to gaining full agreement among the Afghan parties
+
+and their international supporters on the outlines of a proposed settlement, only to
+have the effort effectively torpedoed by dissension among the mujahidin parties and
+the decision of Najibullah, on March 18, 1992, to retract his prior commitment to
+resign the presidency as part of a settlement. 
+
+The negotiating deadlock was broken militarily by the General Dostum, an
+
+Uzbek and former “hero” of the Marxist government, who abandoned the Kabul
+regime and joined forces with Masud, a Tajik. Militarily, Dostum’s move resolved
+a three-cornered power struggle between the Tajiks under Rabbani and Masud, the
+Uzbeks under Dostum, and non-mainstream Pushtuns, under Pakistan’s favorite,
+Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in favor of the Tajiks. Dostum also blocked Najibullah’s
+attempted flight to the Soviet Union. Instead, Najibullah fled to the United Nations
+compound, where he received political asylum. (One of the first acts of the Taliban
+after taking Kabul in September 1996, was to drag Najibullah from the U.N.
+compound and brutally execute him.)
+
+ Three-Cornered Ethnic Power Conflict in the 1992-1996
+Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
+
+With Hekmatyar on the outside – literally and figuratively – the new Islamic
+
+Republic of Afghanistan, like the current Interim Administration, was largely a non-
+Pushtun affair. The original plan was that the presidency would rotate among the
+ mujahidin leadership, but after the first president, Sibghatullah Mojadedi, a moderate
+Islamist with no significant military forces, gave way to Rabbani, the latter refused
+to give it up. The right to control Kabul became the object of a three-cornered free-
+for-all among the well-armed, ethnically-aligned factions. The Uzbek Dostum
+switched sides once more, aligning with the Pushtun Hekmatyar against the Tajiks
+led by Rabbani and Masud. During 1993 and 1994 Hekmatyar’s forces pounded
+much of Kabul to rubble with rockets, reducing the population from about 2 million
+at the end of the Soviet occupation period to less than 500,000. In May 1996
+Rabbani and Masud made a deal with Hekmatyar, giving him the Presidency, but all
+of them were routed by the Taliban in September 1996. Hekmatyar fled ultimately
+to Iran, and Rabbani and Masud to their redoubt in the Panjsher Valley, where they
+were sustained by limited assistance from their old enemy, Russia. Rabbani, who in
+the interim had reclaimed the presidency, took the credentials of the internationally
+recognized Afghan Islamic Republic of Afghanistan with him.17 
+
+17 Afghanistan: Events of 1994. Book of the Year, 1994. Encyclopedia Britannica , 1994.
+[http://www.jawanan.com/afg1994.html]
+
+ 
+ CRS-16
+
+ Rise and Fall of the Taliban 
+
+ 
+
+The story of the rise of the Taliban (plural of Talib , an Islamic student) has been
+
+well covered in the press and other media since the terrorist attacks of September 11
+and the onset of the anti-terrorist war in Afghanistan. Several aspects of the
+Taliban’s rise to power have continuing relevance as cautionaries to the United States
+and other international supporters of the Interim Administration under Mohammad
+Karzai:
+
+! First, the Taliban were widely welcomed, especially in the Pushtun
+
+areas, for putting an end to endemic petty warfare and disorder,
+including especially the disruption of trade and commerce. This is
+still a goal of great importance to commercial interests and ordinary
+Afghans.
+
+! Second, the Taliban recruited numerous tribal leaders who were
+
+motivated mainly by personal self-interest–the maintenance of their
+personal power. Many of these same leaders and their followers
+continue to be a major factor in the countryside.
+
+! Third, the Taliban represented a Pushtun resurgence in the reaction
+
+to the rising power of the non-Pushtun minorities, and completed the
+near total polarization of the country on Pushtun/non-Pushtun lines.
+This conflict is by no means resolved and may come to a head in the
+formation of the Loya Jirga , scheduled to meet in June 2002.
+
+! Finally, the preference of the Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad
+
+Omar, to rule from his southern home base of Kandahar, symbolized
+starkly the cultural alienation of Pushtun conservatives from the
+Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, which militarily controlled
+Kabul, Bagram, and adjacent areas during the period 1992-1996, and
+earned a reputation for oppression and misrule.
+
+ Prospects for Recreating a Stable and Moderate 
+
+ Afghan State 
+
+Achieving the goal of the United States, its allies, and the international
+
+community of a stable and moderate Afghan state will depend on many factors, both
+internal and external. Most of these factors cannot now be predicted with any
+certainty, but if past is prologue, it may be possible to achieve a rough understanding
+of the requirements for ending Afghanistan’s steady disintegration and recreating a
+stable and moderate state. The following section evaluates the prospects of achieving
+this goal by considering the main contributing factors in past periods of comparative
+stability, the status of these factors at present, the comparative strength of various
+claimants to power, and four possible scenarios that might result from the actions of
+internal forces and external actors.
+
+ 
+ CRS-17
+
+ Past Elements of Stability and Current Status 
+
+Although many Afghans now tend to look back to the rein of Zahir Shah with
+
+somewhat rose colored lenses, Afghanistan did in fact enjoy a kind of stability during
+most of the reign of Zahir Shah (1933-1973). Even if the conditions that facilitated
+past stability cannot be recreated, it is useful to understand what they were, if only
+as an indicator of their presence or absence in the current situation. Also, the factors
+that allowed stability under Zahir Shah proved temporary, and ultimately led to
+political instability and the overthrow of the monarchy. Moreover, after three
+decades of brutal civil war, Afghanistan today retains few of its characteristics under
+the Afghan monarchy or even under Daoud’s Republic.
+
+ Sources of Legitimacy. In modern times the king and most senior officials
+
+have been members of the Durani Pushtun tribe. The 1964 constitution, which
+imposed some formal limits on royal authority, nonetheless provided that the
+succession “shall continue in the House of His Majesty Mohammad Nadir Shah.”18
+For most of his reign, Zahir Shah’s legitimacy was perhaps accepted by most of the
+Pushtuns and others who counted politically, both in Kabul and in the countryside.
+By the end of his reign, however, the legitimacy of the King and his officials was
+increasingly contested by university students both on the left and the Islamic right,
+and by members of the growing middle and professional classes, who were frustrated
+at being denied a meaningful role in national affairs. Since the overthrow of Zahir
+Shah, each turn of the political wheel has reduced the legitimacy of the state. 
+
+Currently, the main sources of legitimacy of the Interim Administration with
+
+ordinary Afghans are Karzai’s personal acceptability to disparate elements, his ability
+to attract international support, and the promise of a future democratic political order.
+Opponents of the current government, especially current or former Taliban, radical
+Islamists, and warlords, do not accept the government’s legitimacy, though they may
+cooperate or avoid openly challenging it out of self-interest. Karzai’s connection to
+the former royal family does not by itself convey legitimacy, but may appeal to some
+Afghans, especially Kabul residents and Pushtuns in southern Afghanistan, who
+remember better times past.
+
+ Acceptable Ethnic Balance. Ethnic and tribal conflict has long been the
+
+bane of Afghanistan. The main fault line has been between the Pushtuns, who form
+a plurality of something less than 40 percent of the population, and the minority
+Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and others. In the best of times the ethnic balance was
+preserved through a kind of informal social compact that provided for Pushtun
+control over the main levers of power but with considerable space for the Tajiks in
+particular to participate in the middle levels of the administration and the army, and
+to dominate the commercial life of Kabul and other cities.
+
+18 The “House” refers to the Mohammadzai line within the Barakzai branch of the Durani
+confederation. Smith, et al., Area Handbook for Afghanistan , op. cit., p. 66-67, 194.
+
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+CRS-18
+
+ Figure 2. Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan 
+
+The benefits of the arrangement generally did not extend to the Hazaras, who
+
+faced considerable discrimination and geographical isolation in their mountainous
+homeland around Bamiyan and elsewhere in the Central Hazarajat, or to the Uzbeks
+and other minorities. During the past two decades the Hazaras have become armed
+and mobilized, but still lack power to decide their own future. The Uzbeks, who
+occupy relatively prosperous lands around Mazar-i-Sharif, have gained in economic
+and military strength under the leadership of General Dostum.
+
+ Positive Center-Provincial Relations. The third element in past periods
+
+of stability has been comparative harmony between the state, whose officials staffed
+the central government ministries and the provincial administrations, and the tribal
+leaders, Muslim clerics, and other notables who constituted the local power centers
+outside the capital. This relationship was aided by the fact that relatively few
+demands were imposed by the central government, which carried out limited
+functions. Relations between the state and local forces had become progressively
+more difficult with the increase of modernization and economic development. The
+complete breakdown of any semblance of a functioning administration, starting with
+the Marxist coup in 1978, including the destruction of the central bureaucracy and
+the complete disappearance of the Kabul’s involvement in provincial affairs, will
+make it very difficult to reestablish the structure of a functioning nation state.
+
+ Harmony Between the State and Islam. Last, but not least, stability
+
+depended heavily on the maintenance of a balance between the spheres of the state
+and Islam. For much of the country’s history, the state managed provincial and tribal
+affairs through the aid of the mullahs and other clerics, who also enjoyed state
+patronage. By the 1970s, these relations had become strained owing to the rise of
+various ideologically Islamist movements and parties. The Taliban successfully
+
+ 
+ CRS-19
+
+avoided this conundrum by creating a theocratic system that largely eliminated the
+apparatus of the state. Resistance from the Islamists and traditionalists could create
+a serious challenge to the objectives of the United States, the United Nations, and the
+international community, all of which support in one way or another a modernist
+development agenda, including emphasis on matters such as women’s rights and
+universal secular education.
+
+ Critical Role of Foreign Powers. Interaction with foreign powers has been
+
+a critical dimension of Afghan history. In the distant past, Afghanistan was both a
+well-spring of empires and a corridor through which conquerors passed to the richer
+lands of what are now India and Pakistan. The Afghan Lodhi Dynasty ruled parts of
+what is now Pakistan and northern India from the mid-tenth century until being
+displaced by the Moghul Empire in the mid-16th century–a muticultural construction
+which included a large admixture of Afghans in the military ranks. In modern times
+Afghanistan has generally been the object of foreign conquest–especially by Persia,
+British India, and Russia. The Durrani Dynasty established and maintained its
+dominance by fighting off British and Russian incursions. The collapse of Durrani
+rule led to extreme foreign intervention in the form of invasion and occupation by the
+Soviet Union and support to the anti-Soviet resistance by a host of powers, including
+especially the United States, Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The Taliban came to
+power with critical Pakistani and Saudi Arabian support, while Russia and Iran
+sought to bolster the Alliance forces of Rabbani and Masud.
+
+Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the effort to get rid of the
+
+Taliban brought the United States, Russia, Uzbekistan and other former Soviet
+Central Asian republics into an uneasy common cause. The anti-Taliban campaign
+appeared initially to draw Iran into a more cooperative relationship with the United
+States, albeit only tacitly, but Tehran’s objectives became less clear with the defeat
+of the Taliban and the growing presence of U.S. and other Western military forces
+in the country. Iran’s reported reinvolvement in Afghan affairs, including alleged
+support to both Ismail Khan in Herat and the Uzbek leader, General Dostum, in
+Mazar-i-Sharif, have deeply troubled U.S. and allied officials.19 Pakistan appears
+largely to have lost its former ability to influence Afghanistan by manipulating the
+Pushtuns and supporting Islamic radicalism.
+
+ Negotiating the Multi-Layered Afghan Power Matrix 
+
+Resolving the ethnic problems and constructing a government with recognized
+
+legitimacy will be a daunting task that requires reconciling a wide array of competing
+interests and personalities. Rather than a two-dimensional schematic the Afghan
+political matrix has the appearance of a Rubik’s Cube, with numerous layers of
+independent actors, many of whom have the potential to interact with each other in
+various combinations.
+
+19 John F. Burns, Moscow Stakes Claim to Afghan Role with High-Level Visit. New York
+Times , Feb. 5, 2002: A13; Peter Baker, Warlord Gets Money, Arms from Iran, Afghan Aides
+Say. Washington Post , Feb. 7, 2002: A9.
+
+ 
+ CRS-20
+
+ Ethnicity. The country’s ethnic divisions lie at heart of the problem of
+
+achieving national unity, and constitute the first layer. Even personal ambition, the
+most overt driving force of disunity, operates within an ethnic context. Since the
+Soviet withdrawal in 1989 ethnicity has been the main common denominator of civil
+strife. At present, Tajik-Pushtun rivalry is the core issue affecting Afghan politics,
+with the Pushtuns viewing the Interim Administration as Tajik-dominated. 
+
+ Warlords and Commanders. The second layer consists of warlords and
+
+commanders, whose ranks include the Panjsheri Tajik commanders of the of the
+Northern Alliance, such as General Mohammad Fahim ; the Uzbek leader General
+Rashid Dostum , who holds the nominal post of Deputy Defense Minister in the
+Interim Administration; Ismail Khan , a Tajik leader who controls five provinces in
+the area around Herat who often acts independently from the Northern Alliance, with
+whom he is affiliated; and numerous rival tribal leaders and warlords of the Pushtun
+belt, such as Kandahar Governor Gul Agha Shirzai , a Durrani Pushtun, and various
+commanders among the Eastern Shura (“governing council”), an influential body
+centered around Jalalabad, including the current regional governor, Haji Abdul
+Qadir , elder brother of Abdul Haq, who was killed by the Taliban last October in a
+vain attempt to generate a uprising by local Pushtun tribes; and, last but not least,
+remnants of the Taliban , some of whom undoubtedly will seek to regain influence
+under some guise.
+ 
+
+ Ideologically-Oriented Political Party Leaders. These leaders constitute
+
+a third layer. They range from a few modernist politicians affiliated with ex-King
+Zahir Shah, such as Sayyid Ahmad Gailani , an urbane hereditary leader ( pir) of the
+moderate sufi Islamic sect, through “moderate Islamists” like Cairo-educated
+ Sabghatullah Mojadiddi , and a range of Islamic radicals. 
+
+The more intensely anti-Western political aspirants include, most notably,
+
+ Burnhanuddin Rabbani and his predominantly Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami , and
+ Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-i-Islami) , once the favorite of Pakistan’s Inter-
+Services Intelligence (ISI) and reportedly the largest recipient of CIA arms and
+assistance during the anti-Soviet war. The New York Times reported on May 9,
+2002, that the CIA targeted Hekmatyar in an attack on a convoy near Kabul in order
+to preempt anticipated attacks on U.S., coalition, and Afghan government forces and
+figures, including interim leader Karzai. Hekmatyar is said to have survived a strike
+on his convoy by a Hellfire missile fired from a Predator drone reconnaissance
+aircraft. 
+
+Rabbani, a native of Badakhshan Province in the extreme Northeast, is more of
+
+a traditionalist than a radical, but has shown strong hostility to Western influence and
+secularization. Ideologically, the closest Pushtun counterpart to Rabbani may be
+ Yunis Khalis , who heads his own faction of the Hezb-i-Islami and was one of the
+few mujahidin political leaders to lead men in combat. A remarkably vigorous 87
+year old who reportedly once exercised influence over Mullah Omar before breaking
+with the Taliban, Khalis may still command support among the Eastern Pushtun
+tribes in the region around Jalalabad.
+
+ 
+ CRS-21
+
+Rabbani, still viewed as the political “Godfather” of the Northern Alliance, now
+
+finds his authority challenged by younger leaders of his party, General Mohammad
+Fahim and Younis Qanooni (who are also military commanders, as noted above)
+and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah . This “Panjsheri Tajik triumvirate” overrode his
+objections and assumed the key ministries of defense, interior, and foreign affairs.
+Rabbani may still may wield considerable influence with the rank and file of the
+party.
+
+The most pan-Islamic members of the ideological layer (and hence most
+
+inclined towards cooperation with Islamic terrorists) include Saudi-backed Abdul
+Rasoon Sayyaf and his Ittehad-e-Islami , and the aforementioned Gulbuddin
+Hekmatyar Both have been mentioned in an alleged plot against the Interim
+Administration that resulted in hundreds of arrests in Kabul early April 2002.20
+Hekmatyar, a consummate power-seeker who reportedly enjoys qualified support
+from Iran, recently has sought to make common cause with former Taliban
+opponents.21 
+
+ Rural-Based Leadership. A fourth layer incorporates the main social and
+
+political fabric of rural Afghanistan – the patchwork of local tribal headers,
+commanders, petty warlords, and mullahs, with various connections to higher layers.
+In the absence of a firm Afghan government or international peacekeeper presence,
+these forces can be expected to engage in endless maneuvering for local dominance
+and control over “tax” collections on roads and the opium trade. 
+
+ Economic Interests. Layer Five is composed of a variety of economic
+
+interests with countrywide influence, most notably the “ transport mafia ”, drug
+kingpins , and networks smugglers , some of whom play all three roles. A more
+positive component of this economic interest layer would include exiles , ranging
+from businessmen, technocrats, and former civil servants, most of whose ties are to
+Kabul and a few other cities.
+
+ Dynamic Interaction of Individual Actors and Forces 
+
+These individual actors and forces are capable of considerable flexibility of
+
+alignment; the strongest operate across multiple layers. The Tajik component of the
+ Northern Alliance is the strongest because it combines the second largest ethnic
+group, military power on the ground, a political-ideological party structure –
+ Rabbani’s Jamiat – and powerful foreign patrons–Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, and,
+more recently, the United States. The Uzbek chief, General Dostum , controls a
+vital road connection with Central Asia and has made and broken several different
+governments and alliances, and has no apparent Uzbek rivals. The Pushtuns , on the
+contrary, are divided by tribal and personal loyalties, and weakened by the historical
+
+20 Pamela Constable, Afghans Arrest Hundreds, Citing Threat of Plots. Washington Post ,
+Feb. 25, 2002: A9.
+
+21 Reportedly, Hekmatyar is the force behind an alleged plot to carry out a dramatic series
+of bombings in Kabul in early April 2002. Dexter Filkins, Afghan Officials Arrest
+Hundreds in Bombing Plot. New York Times , April 4, 2002 (internet edition).
+
+ 
+ CRS-22
+
+divisions among the Durrani Confederation and Gilzais, in the west, and between
+both of them and the unaffiliated Eastern Pushtun tribal groupings. The Hazaras ,
+a long repressed Shi’a minority of mongol stock, have gained in assertiveness as a
+consequence of their role in the anti-Soviet campaign and their struggle against
+ethnic cleansing by the Taliban. Organized under the banner of the Hizb-e-
+Wahadat , and led by Karim Khalili , the Hazaras are not strong enough to bid for
+power in their own right, but they will fight for their autonomy if they feel
+threatened.22
+
+ Potential Swing Groups. The muddled matrix is complicated further by the
+
+unpredictable behavior of “swing” groups who historically have played the spoiler’s
+role. In addition to Dostum, noted above, these include especially the Shinwari
+tribes , centered around Jalalabad and the Kyber Pass. Traditionally the Shinwaris
+and other eastern Pushtun tribes have been bandits, preying on Khyber Pass goods
+traffic, and smugglers, and have rejected Durrani supremacy. They often have allied
+with Tajik and dissident Pushtun challengers to Durrani rule. During the anti-Soviet
+war, the Shinwaris and other eastern Pushtuns provided the main base of support for
+competing radical mujahidin groups led by Yunis Khalis and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
+both of whom belong to non-mainstream Pushtun tribes. These are the tribes who
+assisted U.S. forces in the assault on the Tora Bora, some of whom also may have
+facilitated the escape of Al Qaeda forces.23 
+
+Recognizing the potential swing value of the Shinwaris, Karzai and senior Tajik
+
+leaders in the Northern Alliance-dominated Interim Administration shrewdly
+appointed Haji Abdul Qadir as governor of Nangahar Province, but his ties to the
+Interim Government remain tenuous. The older brother of the late Abdul Haq, who
+was killed trying to start an anti-Taliban revolt among Eastern Pushtun tribes in the
+days after September 11, 2001, Qadir is a former mujahidin commander who held the
+same governorship during 1992-1995.
+
+ Stakes for the Participants. The participants are driven by a variety of
+
+largely anti-national motives–especially ethnic nationalism, personal power
+aspirations, vanity, and greed. Principal among the more concrete stakes is control
+and taxation of transportation routes and nodal points, and control of the drug trade.
+Several other considerations, however, have the potential for promoting cooperation.
+First, despite the depth of ethnic and tribal divisions, all of the contenders for power
+continue to regard themselves as Afghans, although Pushtun-Tajik antipathy remains
+high, and Pushtuns are especially angry that Tajiks hold most of the power in Kabul.
+Second, as it did with the Taliban, the powerful transportation mafia will strongly
+support the establishment of a government that can secure the highways and confine
+the collection of taxes and customs duties to the border crossings. Third, the
+
+22 The plight of the Hazaras at the hands of the Taliban is best illustrated by massacres and
+the deliberate destruction of the giant statues of the Buddha in Bamiyan. Pamela Constable,
+Return to a Battered Homeland. Washington Post , April 10, 2002: A14, A19. 
+
+23 Barton Gellman and Thomas E. Ricks, U.S. Concludes Bin Laden Escaped at Tora Bora
+Fight. The Washington Post , April 17, 2002: Al, A10; Philip Smucker, After Tora Bora, US
+Hunts Alone. Christian Science Monitor (internet edition), January 28, 2002
+[http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0128/p01s05-wosc.html].
+
+ 
+ CRS-23
+
+prospect of $10-15 billion in international aid has provided substantial incentives for
+Afghans to cooperate, at least minimally, with the Interim Administration. Last but
+not least, is awareness among the current contenders for power, especially within the
+ranks of the Tajiks of the Northern Alliance, of the costs of the internecine conflict
+that followed the Soviet withdrawal. Many of the main figures in the Interim
+Administration appear to be eager not to repeat this mistake.
+
+ Four Scenarios for the Future Afghan State 
+
+Because more than two decades of conflict have largely destroyed the old
+
+Afghan polity and economy, the past offers no reliable “roadmap” to constructing a
+politically stable and economically viable Afghan state. This conclusion is strongly
+suggested by two particular developments of the past two decades–the collapse of the
+Durrani ascendancy, which started with Daoud’s coup in 1973, and the rise of Tajik
+power and, to a lesser extent, that of other ethnic minorities. Durrani political
+dominance is not likely to be reestablished because of the scattering of the Afghan
+elite numbering perhaps 100,000, largely to North America and Europe, and the
+polarization of Pushtun society by internal conflict and the rise of the predominantly
+Pushtun Taliban. The return of King Zahir Shah to his country after more than 30
+years of exile, may lend some support to the political process but cannot restore the
+previous status quo–nor is it intended to under the Bonn Accord. For better or worse,
+the Tajiks, who are less divided than the Pushtuns, now appear firmly established in
+Kabul, elsewhere in the North, and in Herat. General Dostum, the Uzbek warlord,
+also appears in firm control of Mazar-i-Sharif. On the other hand, Kandahar,
+Jalalabad, and other important population centers in the South and Southeast show
+no similar coalescence under one leader or group of leaders.
+
+ Democratic Pluralism – A Necessity, Not a Luxury 
+
+The breakdown of the royalist governing structure and the subsequent inability
+
+of either the mujahidin or the Taliban to establish a stable government suggests
+strongly that for Afghanistan, some form of democratic pluralism is a necessity, not
+a luxury. Both at the provincial and central levels, stability, if it is possible, seems
+most likely to come from some form of democratic process. The traditional practice
+of appointing provincial governors, or allowing the rule of local warlords, by default,
+appears particularly dangerous to stability in the absence of a strong central
+government and a national army and police force. 
+
+Depending on a number of factors, especially the actions of the main Afghan
+
+contenders for power, neighboring countries with the capacity to intervene in Afghan
+affairs, and the United States and the international community, several different
+outcomes could result from current developments. Four of the most likely ones are
+described below, in descending order of desirability for the Afghans and for U.S.
+interests.
+
+ 
+ CRS-24
+
+ 1. Transitional Regime Leading to Pluralistic Democracy 
+
+Under present circumstances the most desirable outcome would be the
+
+formation of a broadly representative transitional authority leading ultimately to the
+establishment of a pluralistic democracy, as envisioned by the agreement reached at
+Bonn in early December 2001. The next pending phase is the convening of an
+Emergency Loya Jirga scheduled for June 2002, which is to choose members of a
+broad-based Transitional Authority. The Emergency Loya Jirga is to be opened by
+the ex-King, who returned from exile under tight security on April 18, 2002. 
+
+Both the negative lessons of recent history and the attraction of major
+
+international aid may constitute sufficient incentives for cooperation among the
+forces which will constitute the interim administration in Kabul. It is much more
+questionable whether such an administration can gain the adherence of warlords and
+commanders in the provinces, or even in Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif.
+Certainly the basic problem of the collapse of Pushtun political cohesiveness cannot
+be solved by this process. So long as Pushtuns continue to view themselves as the
+“real Afghans,” the Pushtun-minority divide will remain a major source of instability.
+
+ 2. Northern Alliance-Dominated State 
+
+The most obvious consequence of the rise and fall of the Taliban is the stronger
+
+position of the minority ethnic groups of the Northern Alliance. Controlling Kabul,
+Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, and Herat, the constituent elements of the Northern Alliance
+effectively hold sway over more than half of the country and all its six international
+borders except the one with Pakistan. Whether the main Alliance ethnic
+components–Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras – have adequately absorbed the lesson of
+their previous internecine conflict and self-serving opportunism remains to be seen.
+Some Alliance leaders clearly understand that the revival of Pushtun power under the
+banner of the Taliban occurred because of past Alliance excesses. Others, notably
+General Dostum, still appear to seek to create a local fiefdom, and will cooperate
+with the other Alliance components only to the extent that it serves their interest.
+
+Absent strong pressure by the United States, other powers, and the international
+
+community, the Northern Alliance may be tempted to seek to become the dominant
+force in a future Afghan government–possibly by promoting the candidacy of
+Rabbani or another Northern Alliance leader in the elections that are planned for
+2003 under the Bonn Agreement. Such a government probably would result in the
+defacto partition of the country, as in Scenario 3, below, since the Alliance stands
+little chance of establishing effective sway over the southern Pushtun heartland. 
+
+ 3. Disappearance of a Unified Afghan State 
+
+Scenario 2 could possibly descend into the complete disappearance of a unified
+
+Afghan state, though this still seems unlikely. Partition might seem like the most
+realistic solution if current divisions become unresolvable, but the regional
+consequences would be severe. It is doubtful whether neighboring countries would
+be able to avoid competing for control or influence over adjacent areas on the Afghan
+side of the border. Among other considerations, countries challenged by Islamic
+
+ 
+ CRS-25
+
+extremism or ethnic revolts, such as in the case of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, would
+not want to allow a “no man’s land” on their borders. Russia would have the same
+interest, both to prevent the overthrow of friendly central Asian states or the
+establishment of havens for Chechens and other armed independence movements.
+Iran would be tempted to extend its influence over vast parts of western Afghanistan
+that had historically been part of the Persian empire, and also to protect the interests
+of co-religionists in the central Hazarajat.
+
+Pakistan has foresworn any intent to interfere in Afghan affairs as part of its
+
+current cooperation with the United States, but if chaos should ensue, Islamabad
+likely would once again deem it necessary to find and support Afghan allies who
+might be able to stabilize the Pushtun belt and contest for power in Kabul with the
+Northern Alliance. Such potential allies are not now apparent, but could emerge out
+of remnants of the Taliban or even in the person of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Pakistan’s
+old ally against Mohammad Daoud’s Republic, the PDPA regime, and the Soviet
+invaders.
+
+In its most benign form, the bifurcation of the country could nominally have the
+
+appearance of a unified government, but with little real power or resources at its
+command. Meanwhile, local warlords and shuras (councils of commanders, mullahs,
+and elders) would attempt to govern smaller cities and the countryside. Since very
+little of Afghanistan is without significant numbers of minorities, “ethnic cleansing”
+and voluntary population realignments could create a major humanitarian crisis.
+Some human rights abuses have already been inflicted on Pushtuns living in Tajik-
+majority areas of the North, creating thousands of additional internally displaced
+persons (IDPs) in refugee camps for internal refugees.24 The temptation of neighbors
+to secure their borders and promote the interests of ethnic and religious counterparts
+would be strong.
+
+The descent of Afghanistan into chaos once again would jeopardize a number
+
+of important U.S. interests. These include access to the oil and gas resources of
+Central Asia, instability that could spread to the Persian Gulf, a further expansion of
+opium production in Afghanistan, and the continued use of Afghan territory by
+terrorist groups. The already difficult task of maintaining Pakistani cooperation
+against terrorism might become impossible.
+
+ 4. Caretaker Ward of the International Community 
+
+The potential negative consequences of failure to recreate a stable Afghanistan
+
+could conceivably impel the United States, its allies, important neighbors such as
+Russia, and the international community, to seek to set up an Afghan-staffed
+caretaker government backed with foreign advisors and enough international
+peacekeepers to maintain security in Kabul and other cities. This approach, by which
+international peacekeeping and nation-building would become quasi-permanent,
+rather than transitional, could only work if the Afghans themselves–and the warlords
+in particular–decided that accepting such an effort by the international community
+
+24 Briefing by international agency personnel, April 4, 2002, for House International
+Relations Committee Staff. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-26
+
+was preferable to unending civil strife or undesired political outcomes. In theory, if
+basic security, services, and reconstruction could be provided to more densely
+populated areas, Afghans outside the reach of the immediate caretaker authority
+would gravitate to secure areas to seek the benefits of international support. 
+
+This scenario likely would require an interim government composed of figures
+
+who are acceptable to the major ethnic and other interest groups but who would not
+themselves be contenders for power.25 
+
+The most acceptable candidates are likely to
+
+be found among the ranks of Afghans with technocratic qualifications, including
+former senior civil servants, Afghan nationals currently or previously with
+multilateral banks, and other professionals–including current exiles. Some of these
+are already in the interim cabinet. Undoubtedly the government would benefit from
+the assistance of foreign advisors, either from donor governments or international
+organizations. Especially weighing against this option is that given Afghanistan’s
+history and current situation, such a prolonged foreign role could easily become a
+military and political quagmire.
+
+ Factors Affecting the Outcome 
+
+Which, if any, of these scenarios prevails likely will be determined by a number
+
+of key factors. Some of these are susceptible to external influence, others can only
+be decided by the Afghans themselves.
+
+ Resolution of Disputes on Power Sharing in the Central
+Government 
+
+Little progress can be achieved on other necessary steps until the parties and
+
+groups that have the ability to disrupt the process agree on how to share power. The
+next critical phase will be the selection of delegates to the Loya Jirga that is to be
+held in June. It still is not clear that those with the power to disrupt the interim
+government will cooperate. Even if a stable power balance is achieved at the national
+level, the basic instinct of most of the Afghan leaders and warlords still is to compete
+for “turf” and the opportunities to extract cash from the population in the form of
+taxes and other levies. This will make it very hard to establish effective centralized
+institutions and extend the reach of the government into the countryside.
+
+ Economic Development and the Issue of Jobs or Guns 
+
+Up to a certain point the reestablishment of normal life will allow armed fighters
+
+to return to peaceful civilian pursuits, but the traditional economy will not provide
+enough jobs or the right kinds of jobs to fully absorb the ranks of the former
+
+25 One model could be the caretaker administration in Pakistan during 1993, headed by a
+respected Pakistani World Bank economist. The administration headed by Moeen Qureshi
+restored stability and prepared the country for new elections after the army had forced the
+resignation of the President and Prime Minister, owing to a power struggle that had created
+a deadlocked government. Once normal politics resumed so did instability, however,
+leading, eventually, to military takeover led by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.
+
+ 
+ CRS-27
+
+combatants, whether anti-Taliban or Taliban. Without jobs, and without a public
+educational system, young Afghan men are likely to gravitate to the service of
+warlords and/or to study in the Islamic madrassas, both in Afghanistan and
+Pakistan.26 One significant problem is that the families of Afghan emigres have
+grown in the intervening years, and in many cases will be too large to be supported
+by the family farmstead, even if it is reclaimed and brought back into production.
+Some level of industrial development, even rudimentary activities such as food
+processing, textile manufacturing, and the production of basic farm and household
+implements, would appear necessary to absorb surplus workers and farm labor.
+
+ Economic Development and The Future Role Islam 
+
+ Because most of the Afghan combatants have mobilized on the basis of an
+
+appeal to Islamic sentiment, often of a radical fundamentalist nature, progress
+towards economic modernization is likely to encounter strong resistance, especially
+with regard to education and the employment of women in the workforce.
+Nonetheless, reconstruction based on the revitalization and modernization of the
+Afghan economy may be the only way to overcome tendencies towards internecine
+warfare and chaos.
+
+Unless the economy becomes more dynamic, politicized Islam is likely to
+
+remain the single most powerful ideological force, even if radical fundamentalism
+does not appeal to the majority of Afghans. Assuming that the Taliban remain
+dispersed and do not play a visible political role, and that other Islamist forces remain
+marginalized, religion may not necessarily reemerge as the main rallying cry of anti-
+government forces. These are big “ifs,” however. The central government may face
+difficult choices in attempting to promote modernization and development along
+secular lines, while not stirring up an Islamist reaction. 
+
+ Issues for U.S. Policy 
+
+Inevitably U.S. policy will have a significant influence on the outcome of the
+
+current effort to reconstruct a stable Afghan state. In addition to playing a key role
+in driving the Taliban from power, in concert with Afghan forces on the ground, the
+United States has been the largest donor by far to the feeding programs of the United
+Nations World Food Program (WFP), and it is certain to be the among the leading
+contributors to economic reconstruction.27 
+
+26 In the words of a noted expert on the Taliban, young men who had grew up in the camps
+and war zones “admired war because it was the only occupation they could possibly adapt
+to. Their simple belief in messianic, puritan Islam which had been drummed into them by
+simple village mullahs, was the only prop they could held [sic] on to, and which gave their
+lives some meaning.” Rashid, Taliban , op. cit ., p. 32.
+
+27 For information on the U.S. humanitarian role, see CRS Report RL31355, Afghanistan’s
+Path to Reconstruction: Obstacles, Challenges, and Issues for Congress , by Rhoda
+Margesson.
+
+ 
+ CRS-28
+
+For the future, three roles on the part of the United States would appear
+
+extremely critical, over and above humanitarian assistance:
+
+ 1. Support for the Political Process 
+
+The creation of a moderate Afghan state requires the establishment of a stable
+
+political order, the creation of effective state institutions, and the reconstruction of
+the country’s economic infrastructure and rural economy. All of these must take
+place simultaneously, and should be mutually reinforcing, but the creation of a stable
+and moderate political settlement is the sine qua non .
+
+The fragile transitional governing coalition will likely remain vulnerable to
+
+disruption for the foreseeable future, with regional warlords giving or withholding
+support depending on the degree that their power aspirations are satisfied. Dissident
+warlords and commanders, such as General Dostum in the North and Ismail Khan in
+the West, will likely long retain the ability to assert their autonomy and disrupt key
+communications routes.
+
+Many other countries and international organizations can provide aid, technical
+
+assistance, and even security for Kabul and other important cities, but most observers
+believe that only the United States has the international prestige and influence, the
+logistical capabilities, and the military power to influence decisively the internal
+Afghan political process. The inability of the United Nations and humanitarian
+NGOs to stave off Afghanistan’s descent into chaos after the withdrawal of the
+Soviet Union, makes clear that the reconstruction of a moderate Afghan state cannot
+be accomplished without strong U.S. engagement. 
+
+ 2. Close Engagement with Pakistan 
+
+Close U.S. engagement with Pakistan, the country with the greatest capacity for
+
+good or ill, will also be critical to the creation of a stable Afghanistan. Pakistan,
+which by far has the greatest capacity to influence developments in the Pushtun
+South, is also the country whose perceived interests are the most threatened by the
+collapse of the Taliban and the rising power of the Tajik and Uzbek-dominated
+Northern Alliance. Islamabad sees several potential sources of danger, the primary
+ones being the possibility of ongoing conflict and chaos in the Pushtun belt and
+heightened Indian, Russian, and Iranian influence in Kabul.
+
+The Bush Administration and the Congress appear to recognize that Pakistan’s
+
+military president, General Musharraf, has crossed the Rubicon in committing to
+cooperate closely in the U.S.-led anti-terrorist campaign. The decision, which was
+largely dictated by extreme U.S. pressure, was not without a number of benefits for
+Pakistan, dramatically displayed during Musharraf’s February 2002 visit to
+Washington. Apart from various kinds of new assistance and debt relief, Musharraf’s
+crackdown on his own Islamic radicals showed that these groups generally lacked
+strong public support, and strengthened his hold on power. On the other hand,
+increasing tensions with India over Kashmir, fueled by Pakistan’s own alleged
+support of local terrorist groups, has intensified Islamabad’s perception of being
+
+ 
+ CRS-29
+
+squeezed between a potentially hostile or unstable Afghanistan and a demonstrably
+hostile India. 
+
+Especially because of the possession of nuclear weapons by both India and
+
+Pakistan, the United States would appear to have a compelling interest in pressuring
+both Pakistan and India to act responsibly on the Kashmir issue, while also making
+sure that Pakistan continues to play a positive role in Afghanistan and in the anti-
+terrorist fight. All of these interests would appear to mandate the closest possible
+engagement with Pakistan, including efforts to promote support for U.S. viewpoints
+among parties and leaders who are likely to play a major role when military rule
+gives way to elections and the restoration of civilian government. 
+
+ 3. Bilateral Assistance and Participation in International
+Assistance and Development Efforts 
+
+Both the Bush Administration and the Congress have made clear their intention
+
+to provide substantial aid to Afghanistan, but the actual amount and kind of
+assistance that the United States provides could prove highly important to the
+prospects for recreating a stable Afghan government. The Tokyo meeting of aid
+donors in January 2002, which was co-hosted by Japan, the United States, the
+European Union, and Saudi Arabia, generated nearly $1.5 billion in near-term aid
+pledges, including a U.S. commitment of $296 million.28 The Bush Administration
+has allocated about $311.3 million for humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan for FY
+2002, which began October 1, 2001. 
+
+U.S. aid provided through the WFP and NGOs clearly will be important in
+
+preventing famine, reconstructing agriculture, and restoring basic infrastructure, but
+visible bilateral American aid would also appear to be critical to promoting the U.S.-
+desired political outcomes. In this respect, many argue that if the Bonn process is to
+be viable, warlords and others who are calculating whether to cooperate with the
+Bonn process or carve out permanent fiefdoms arguably need to see that the Interim
+Administration, and the arrangements for creating a new, pluralistic democratic
+order have the backing of the United States and other aid donors. 
+
+ Conclusion: Issues for Congressional 
+
+ Consideration 
+
+A number of recent incidents of political violence and the recent rounding up
+
+of alleged plotters associated with the former black sheep of the anti-Soviet
+resistance, Gulbudding Hekmatyar, underscore that events in Afghanistan may be
+coming to a head sooner rather than later. The issue-forcing event is the impending
+Emergency Loya Jirga , scheduled for June 2002. The Karzai-headed Interim
+Administration already is in the process of negotiating the composition of the
+assembly, which will include about 2,600 Afghans from various walks of life. Those
+
+28 CNNfyi.com, Nations Pledge Billions to Rebuild Afghanistan. January 21, 2002.
+
+ 
+ CRS-30
+
+who do not want this process to go forward, at least not on current terms, appear to
+be looking for a way to derail it and even to overturn the current interim government.
+
+The United States and other international supporters of a stable and moderate
+
+Afghanistan have reason for caution about the viability and outcome of the Bonn
+process, but failure is all but guaranteed if the Karzai administration does not have
+the financial resources and security capability with which to gain the support of
+enough Afghans with the requisite social and political influence who can take the
+process successfully to the next stage. From all accounts, the Karzai-headed
+government continues to live from hand-to-mouth, and international agencies such
+as the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), only have funds on hand for
+a few weeks of operations.
+
+ Issues of Special Congressional Interest: Narcotics
+Production and Women’s Rights 
+
+In hearing statements, speeches, and in proposed legislation, Members of
+
+Congress have stressed their concerns particularly about Afghanistan’s status as a
+major opium production area and about the status of women. Both of these are
+extremely complicated issues given Afghanistan’s social and economic traditions. 
+Progress on both issues, if it is to occur, clearly depends on fundamental economic
+and social modernization, which is most likely to occur under a government that has
+both a progressive outlook and popular support based on participatory politics.
+
+ Narcotics or Development. The U.S. stake in economic development in
+
+Afghanistan is even more clear with regard to Afghan’s status as the world’s leading
+producer of opium. Many of the poppy-growing areas are the fiefdoms of tribal
+leaders whose tribes which have for centuries depended on illicit sources of income,
+including drugs and smuggling. Nangahar Province, near the eastern border with
+Pakistan, is a major center of opium production. In the recent past, before the Taliban
+takeover, international agencies reportedly had some success in gaining cuts in poppy
+production in Nangahar and other poppy-growing areas of southeastern Afghanistan,
+in exchange for economic assistance, but such gains tend to be inconsistent, at best.
+
+The Karzai administration has announced an ambitious U.S.-backed program
+
+to make one-time payments to farmers to destroy their opium crops or face
+destruction by government agents without compensation. The payments are said to
+amount to something more than for a wheat crop, but much less than the value of an
+opium crop. Reportedly, the United States, the U.K., and other Western countries
+have agreed to finance the program, but U.S. officials are also said to despair of
+having any major impact for three major reasons: (1) the Kabul government simply
+does not have the staff or reach to have an impact on many of the most important
+producing areas; (2) the crop is nearly ready for harvest; and (3) the poppy growers
+and their affiliated smugglers and warlords may fight against any effort to forcefully
+destroy the crops. A decree signed by Chairman Karzai on behalf of the interim
+
+ 
+ CRS-31
+
+government, which would make illegal the collection of loans to opium growers, is
+widely viewed as unenforceable.29
+
+ Future Status of Women in Afghan Society. The issue of the rights of
+
+women in Afghan society has been at the center of the struggle between
+modernization and tradition. The same political conditions that have created support
+for reactionary religious ideas have fostered retrogression in the status of women.
+Both in the refugee camps and in conflict areas, young men were separated from the
+company of even their female relatives. Some analysts believe the lack of ordinary
+contact with women in the refugee camps across the border in Pakistan has
+heightened sex discrimination in Afghanistan beyond traditional levels. Also,
+because of the concerns of women about their safety in a male-dominated society,
+they sometimes themselves embrace the veil and burka out of self-protection.30 
+
+The picture is not uniformly bleak, however. Especially in urban areas, even
+
+socially conservative Afghans have recognized the importance of female education.
+Young women have flocked enthusiastically to Kabul University and other
+educational institutions since they have reopened. The real rate of progress in this
+area, however, probably will depend on the pace of economic revival and
+modernization.
+
+ Three Policy Issues for Possible Congressional
+Consideration 
+
+Congress may wish to consider several issues in particular that bear on the
+
+ability of the United States to provide timely and effective assistance and support to
+the interim government and the Bonn process. The first is the seeming inability of
+U.S. representatives in Kabul to provide reliable expectations regarding the deliveries
+of various forms of assistance. One source of delay in the delivery of U.S. support
+to the Interim Administration is that funding is scattered over at least six different
+departments and agencies, all of which have their own bureaucratic procedures. This
+reality has been a persistent problem in a number of situations, including U.S.
+assistance to Bosnia.31 It may be possible to bring more order and cohesion to this
+process without altering basic lines of department and agency authority and
+responsibility, which have evolved over a long period of time and would be difficult
+to change. 
+
+ Tension between Dual U.S. Objectives. From the point of view of
+
+Afghan politics, an even more important issue may be a significant level of tension
+between the objectives of U.S. military operations against Taliban and Al Qaeda
+remnants and the goal of bolstering the power of the Kabul administration vis-Ã -vis
+regional warlords. By nearly all accounts, U.S. military forces made brilliant use of
+
+29 Dexter Filkins, Afghanistan to Pay Farmers for Uprooted Poppies. New York Times , April
+5, 2002: A13.
+
+30 Rashid, Taliban, op. cit ., p. 105-114.
+
+31 See CRS Report RL30831, Balkan Conflicts: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance and Issues
+for Congress , by Rhoda Margesson.
+
+ 
+ CRS-32
+
+local Afghan militias and other irregular forces, thereby advancing the date for the
+replacement of the Taliban government by the Interim Administration, as well as
+saving many lives–American and allied, as well as Afghan. Unfortunately, U.S.
+military strategy, including on-going operations, has inadvertently bolstered the
+power of warlords who wish to resist the imposition of Kabul’s authority, and also
+increased the possibility that any renewal of internal conflict will be more intense and
+deadly. A start was made in resolving this contradiction by the recent “graduation”
+of the first contingent of a new, multi-ethnic national army, but as noted above, this
+will long remain a negligible force when compared to those of the regional warlords
+– even those in Kabul itself.
+
+ Response to Calls for Expanded International Peacekeeping. 
+
+Especially because U.S. forces are already engaged as de facto arbiters and
+peacekeepers, often at risk to the forces themselves, Congress may wish to consider
+further the Bush Administration’s opposition to calls for increasing the numbers and
+dispersion of international peacekeepers, possibly including U.S. forces. The
+Defense Department has argued that the presence of international peacekeeping
+forces could complicate the coordination of their ongoing military operations. On
+the other hand, international aid agencies and aid workers are almost universal in
+declaring that they cannot function without the security provided by international
+peacekeepers. Also, aid agencies note that international peacekeepers have been a
+“draw” factor in attracting hundreds of thousands of refugees back to their homes,
+but thus far mainly in the neighborhood of Kabul. International relief officials argue
+that much more rapid progress could be made in returning both external and internal
+refugees to their homes if the size of the peacekeeping force could be enlarged and
+deployed to other population centers.
+
+ Possible Benefits of a More Transparent U.S. Military Role on the 
+
+ Ground. One potential benefit of making the current U.S. role more transparent
+would be to defuse Afghan suspicions that the United States is seeking to convert the
+ongoing hunt for Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants into an indefinite military
+occupation. Afghanistan has a history of reacting harshly to the presence of foreign
+military forces and interference in Afghan politics. Every local conflict that U.S.
+forces may defuse has the potential for creating enemies. This is an inevitable
+consequence of peacekeeping, but since many ordinary Afghans welcome an
+international presence and the security it provides, operating under U.N. or other
+international auspices may provoke less of a backlash. Whether the time is right for
+reconsidering the nature and modalities of the U.S. military role may be an issue
+which Congress may wish to engage.
+
+ 
+ CRS-33
+
+ Appendix I: Bonn Agreements on Afghanistan 
+
+AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN
+
+PENDING THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT GOVERNMENT
+
+INSTITUTIONS
+
+The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan,
+
+In the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
+
+Afghanistan,
+
+Determined to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national
+
+reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country,
+
+Reaffirming the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
+
+Afghanistan,
+
+Acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their
+
+own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism
+and social justice,
+
+Expressing their appreciation to the Afghan mujahidin who, over the years, have
+
+defended the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the country and
+have played a major role in the struggle against terrorism and oppression, and whose
+sacrifice has now made them both heroes of jihad and champions of peace, stability
+and reconstruction of their beloved homeland, Afghanistan,
+
+Aware that the unstable situation in Afghanistan requires the implementation
+
+of emergency interim arrangements and expressing their deep appreciation to His
+Excellency Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani for his readiness to transfer power to an
+interim authority which is to be established pursuant to this agreement,
+
+Recognizing the need to ensure broad representation in these interim
+
+arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population, including groups that have
+not been adequately represented at the UN Talks on Afghanistan, 
+
+Noting that these interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward the
+
+establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully
+representative government, and are not intended to remain in place beyond the
+specified period of time,
+
+Recognizing that some time may be required for a new Afghan security force
+
+to be fully constituted and functional and that therefore other security provisions
+detailed in Annex I to this agreement must meanwhile be put in place,
+
+Considering that the United Nations, as the internationally recognized impartial
+
+institution, has a particularly important role to play, detailed in Annex II to this
+
+ 
+ CRS-34
+
+agreement, in the period prior to the establishment of permanent institutions in
+Afghanistan,
+
+Have agreed as follows: 
+
+THE INTERIM AUTHORITY
+
+I. General provisions
+
+1) An Interim Authority shall be established upon the official transfer of power
+
+on 22 December 2001.
+
+2) The Interim Authority shall consist of an Interim Administration presided
+
+over by a Chairman, a Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the
+Emergency Loya Jirga , and a Supreme Court of Afghanistan, as well as such other
+courts as may be established by the Interim Administration. The composition,
+functions and governing procedures for the Interim Administration and the Special
+Independent Commission are set forth in this agreement.
+
+3) Upon the official transfer of power, the Interim Authority shall be the
+
+repository of Afghan sovereignty, with immediate effect. As such, it shall, throughout
+the interim period, represent Afghanistan in its external relations and shall occupy the
+seat of Afghanistan at the United Nations and in its specialized agencies, as well as
+in other international institutions and conferences.
+
+4) An Emergency Loya Jirga shall be convened within six months of the
+
+establishment of the Interim Authority. The Emergency Loya Jirga will be opened
+by His Majesty Mohammed Zaher [sic], the former King of Afghanistan. The
+Emergency Loya Jirga shall decide on a Transitional Authority, including a
+broad-based transitional administration, to lead Afghanistan until such time as a fully
+representative government can be elected through free and fair elections to be held
+no later than two years from the date of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga .
+
+5) The Interim Authority shall cease to exist once the Transitional Authority has
+
+been established by the Emergency Loya Jirga .
+
+6) A Constitutional Loya Jirga shall be convened within eighteen months of the
+
+establishment of the Transitional Authority, in order to adopt a new constitution for
+Afghanistan. In order to assist the Constitutional Loya Jirga prepare the proposed
+Constitution, the Transitional Administration shall, within two months of its
+commencement and with the assistance of the United Nations, establish a
+Constitutional Commission. 
+
+II. Legal framework and judicial system
+
+1) The following legal framework shall be applicable on an interim basis until
+
+the adoption of the new Constitution referred to above:
+
+ 
+ CRS-35
+
+i) The Constitution of 1964, a/ to the extent that its provisions are not
+inconsistent with those contained in this agreement, and b/ with the
+exception of those provisions relating to the monarchy and to the executive
+and legislative bodies provided in the Constitution; and
+
+ii) existing laws and regulations, to the extent that they are not inconsistent
+with this agreement or with international legal obligations to which
+Afghanistan is a party, or with those applicable provisions contained in the
+Constitution of 1964, provided that the Interim Authority shall have the
+power to repeal or amend those laws and regulations.
+
+2) The judicial power of Afghanistan shall be independent and shall be vested
+
+in a Supreme Court of Afghanistan, and such other courts as may be established by
+the Interim Administration. The Interim Administration shall establish, with the
+assistance of the United Nations, a Judicial Commission to rebuild the domestic
+justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule
+of law and Afghan legal traditions.
+
+III. Interim Administration
+
+A. Composition
+
+1) The Interim Administration shall be composed of a Chairman, five Vice
+
+Chairmen and 24 other members. Each member, except the Chairman, may head a
+department of the Interim Administration.
+
+2) The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan have invited His Majesty
+
+Mohammed Zaher [sic], the former King of Afghanistan, to chair the Interim
+Administration. His Majesty has indicated that he would prefer that a suitable
+candidate acceptable to the participants be selected as the Chair of the Interim
+Administration.
+
+3) The Chairman, the Vice Chairmen and other members of the Interim
+
+Administration have been selected by the participants in the UN Talks on
+Afghanistan, as listed in Annex IV to this agreement. The selection has been made
+on the basis of professional competence and personal integrity from lists submitted
+by the participants in the UN Talks, with due regard to the ethnic, geographic and
+religious composition of Afghanistan and to the importance of the participation of
+women. 
+
+4) No person serving as a member of the Interim Administration may
+
+simultaneously hold membership of the Special Independent Commission for the
+Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga .
+
+B. Procedures
+
+1) The Chairman of the Interim Administration, or in his/her absence one of the
+
+Vice Chairmen, shall call and chair meetings and propose the agenda for these
+meetings. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-36
+
+2) The Interim Administration shall endeavour to reach its decisions by
+
+consensus. In order for any decision to be taken, at least 22 members must be in
+attendance. If a vote becomes necessary, decisions shall be taken by a majority of the
+members present and voting, unless otherwise stipulated in this agreement. The
+Chairman shall cast the deciding vote in the event that the members are divided
+equally. 
+
+C. Functions
+
+1) The Interim Administration shall be entrusted with the day-to-day conduct
+
+of the affairs of state, and shall have the right to issue decrees for the peace, order and
+good government of Afghanistan.
+
+2) The Chairman of the Interim Administration or, in his/her absence, one of the
+
+Vice Chairmen, shall represent the Interim Administration as appropriate.
+
+3) Those members responsible for the administration of individual departments
+
+shall also be responsible for implementing the policies of the Interim Administration
+within their areas of responsibility.
+
+4) Upon the official transfer of power, the Interim Administration shall have full
+
+jurisdiction over the printing and delivery of the national currency and special
+drawing rights from international financial institutions. The Interim Administration
+shall establish, with the assistance of the United Nations, a Central Bank of
+Afghanistan that will regulate the money supply of the country through transparent
+and accountable procedures.
+
+5) The Interim Administration shall establish, with the assistance of the United
+
+Nations, an independent Civil Service Commission to provide the Interim Authority
+and the future Transitional Authority with shortlists of candidates for key posts in the
+administrative departments, as well as those of governors and uluswals, in order to
+ensure their competence and integrity.
+
+6) The Interim Administration shall, with the assistance of the United Nations,
+
+establish an independent Human Rights Commission, whose responsibilities will
+include human rights monitoring, investigation of violations of human rights, and
+development of domestic human rights institutions. The Interim Administration may,
+with the assistance of the United Nations, also establish any other commissions to
+review matters not covered in this agreement. 
+
+7) The members of the Interim Administration shall abide by a Code of Conduct
+
+elaborated in accordance with international standards.
+
+8) Failure by a member of the Interim Administration to abide by the provisions
+
+of the Code of Conduct shall lead to his/her suspension from that body. The decision
+to suspend a member shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the membership of
+the Interim Administration on the proposal of its Chairman or any of its Vice
+Chairmen.
+
+ 
+ CRS-37
+
+9) The functions and powers of members of the Interim Administration will be
+
+further elaborated, as appropriate, with th assistance of the United Nations.
+
+IV. The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency
+
+ Loya Jirga 
+
+1) The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency
+
+ Loya Jirga shall be established within one month of the establishment of the Interim
+Authority. The Special Independent Commission will consist of twenty-one
+members, a number of whom should have expertise in constitutional or customary
+law. The members will be selected from lists of candidates submitted by participants
+in the UN Talks on Afghanistan as well as Afghan professional and civil society
+groups. The United Nations will assist with the establishment and functioning of the
+commission and of a substantial secretariat. 
+
+2) The Special Independent Commission will have the final authority for
+
+determining the procedures for and the number of people who will participate in the
+Emergency Loya Jirga . The Special Independent Commission will draft rules and
+procedures specifying (i) criteria for allocation of seats to the settled and nomadic
+population residing in the country; (ii) criteria for allocation of seats to the Afghan
+refugees living in Iran, Pakistan, and elsewhere, and Afghans from the diaspora; (iii)
+criteria for inclusion of civil society organizations and prominent individuals,
+including Islamic scholars, intellectuals, and traders, both within the country and in
+the diaspora. The Special Independent Commission will ensure that due attention is
+paid to the representation in the Emergency Loya Jirga of a significant number of
+women as well as all other segments of the Afghan population.
+
+3) The Special Independent Commission will publish and disseminate the rules
+
+and procedures for the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga at least ten weeks
+before the Emergency Loya Jirga convenes, together with the date for its
+commencement and its suggested location and duration. 
+
+4) The Special Independent Commission will adopt and implement procedures
+
+for monitoring the process of nomination of individuals to the Emergency Loya Jirga
+ to ensure that the process of indirect election or selection is transparent and fair. To
+pre-empt conflict over nominations, the Special Independent Commission will
+specify mechanisms for filing of grievances and rules for arbitration of disputes. 
+
+5) The Emergency Loya Jirga will elect a Head of the State for the Transitional
+
+Administration and will approve proposals for the structure and key personnel of the
+Transitional Administration. 
+
+V. Final provisions
+
+1) Upon the official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and
+
+armed groups in the country shall come under the command and control of the
+Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the requirements of the new
+Afghan security and armed forces.
+
+ 
+ CRS-38
+
+2) The Interim Authority and the Emergency Loya Jirga shall act in accordance
+
+with basic principles and provisions contained in international instruments on human
+rights and international humanitarian law to which Afghanistan is a party.
+
+3) The Interim Authority shall cooperate with the international community in
+
+the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime. It shall commit itself to
+respect international law and maintain peaceful and friendly relations with
+neighbouring countries and the rest of the international community.
+
+4) The Interim Authority and the Special Independent Commission for the
+
+Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga will ensure the participation of women as
+well as the equitable representation of all ethnic and religious communities in the
+Interim Administration and the Emergency Loya Jirga .
+
+5) All actions taken by the Interim Authority shall be consistent with Security
+
+Council resolution 1378 (14 November 2001) and other relevant Security Council
+resolutions relating to Afghanistan.
+
+6) Rules of procedure for the organs established under the Interim Authority will
+
+be elaborated as appropriate with the assistance of the United Nations.
+
+This agreement, of which the annexes constitute an integral part, done in Bonn
+
+on this 5th day of December 2001 in the English language, shall be the authentic text,
+in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the United Nations.
+Official texts shall be provided in Dari and Pashto, and such other languages as the
+Special Representative of the Secretary-General may designate. The Special
+Representative of the Secretary-General shall send certified copies in English, Dari
+and Pashto to each of the participants.
+
+For the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan:
+
+Ms. Amena Afzali
+Mr. S. Hussain Anwari
+Mr. Hedayat Amin Arsala
+Mr. Sayed Hamed Gailani
+Mr. Rahmatullah Musa Ghazi
+Eng. Abdul Hakim
+Mr. Houmayoun Jareer
+Mr. Abbas Karimi
+Mr. Mustafa Kazimi
+Dr. Azizullah Ludin
+Mr. Ahmad Wali Massoud
+Mr. Hafizullah Asif Mohseni
+Prof. Mohammad Ishaq Nadiri
+Mr. Mohammad Natiqi
+Mr. Yunus Qanooni
+Dr. Zalmai Rassoul
+Mr. H. Mirwais Sadeq
+Dr. Mohammad Jalil Shams
+Prof. Abdul Sattar Sirat
+
+ 
+ CRS-39
+
+Mr. Humayun Tandar
+Mrs. Sima Wali
+General Abdul Rahim Wardak
+Mr. Pacha Khan Zadran
+
+Witnessed for the United Nations by:
+
+Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi
+Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan
+
+ 
+ CRS-40
+
+ANNEX I
+
+INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCE
+
+1. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan recognize that the
+
+responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides
+with the Afghans themselves. To this end, they pledge their commitment to do all
+within their means and influence to ensure such security, including for all United
+Nations and other personnel of international governmental and non-governmental
+organizations deployed in Afghanistan.
+
+2. With this objective in mind, the participants request the assistance of the
+
+international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment
+and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.
+
+3. Conscious that some time may be required for the new Afghan security and
+
+armed forces to be fully constituted and functioning, the participants in the UN Talks
+on Afghanistan request the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing
+the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force. This force
+will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such
+a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other urban centres and
+other areas.
+
+4. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan pledge to withdraw all
+
+military units from Kabul and other urban centers or other areas in which the UN
+mandated force is deployed. It would also be desirable if such a force were to assist
+in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan’s infrastructure.
+
+ 
+ CRS-41
+
+ANNEX II
+
+ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD
+
+1. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General will be responsible for
+
+all aspects of the United Nations’ work in Afghanistan.
+
+2. The Special Representative shall monitor and assist in the implementation of
+
+all aspects of this agreement.
+
+3. The United Nations shall advise the Interim Authority in establishing a
+
+politically neutral environment conducive to the holding of the Emergency Loya
+Jirga in free and fair conditions. The United Nations shall pay special attention to the
+conduct of those bodies and administrative departments which could directly
+influence the convening and outcome of the Emergency Loya Jirga .
+
+4. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General or his/her delegate may
+
+be invited to attend the meetings of the Interim Administration and the Special
+Independent Commission on the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga .
+
+5. If for whatever reason the Interim Administration or the Special Independent
+
+Commission were actively prevented from meeting or unable to reach a decision on
+a matter related to the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga , the Special
+Representative of the Secretary-General shall, taking into account the views
+expressed in the Interim Administration or in the Special Independent Commission,
+use his/her good offices with a view to facilitating a resolution to the impasse or a
+decision. 
+
+6. The United Nations shall have the right to investigate human rights violations
+
+and, where necessary, recommend corrective action. It will also be responsible for the
+development and implementation of a programme of human rights education to
+promote respect for and understanding of human rights. 
+
+ 
+ CRS-42
+
+ANNEX III
+
+REQUEST TO THE UNITED NATIONS BY THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE
+
+UN TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN
+
+The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan hereby
+
+1. Request that the United Nations and the international community take the
+
+necessary measures to guarantee the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and
+unity of Afghanistan as well as the non-interference by foreign countries in
+Afghanistan’s internal affairs;
+
+2. Urge the United Nations, the international community, particularly donor
+
+countries and multilateral institutions, to reaffirm, strengthen and implement their
+commitment to assist with the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of
+Afghanistan, in coordination with the Interim Authority;
+
+3. Request the United Nations to conduct as soon as possible (i) a registration
+
+of voters in advance of the general elections that will be held upon the adoption of
+the new constitution by the constitutional Loya Jirga and (ii) a census of the
+population of Afghanistan.
+
+4. Urge the United Nations and the international community, in recognition of
+
+the heroic role played by the mujahidin in protecting the independence of
+Afghanistan and the dignity of its people, to take the necessary measures, in
+coordination with the Interim Authority, to assist in the reintegration of the mujahidin
+into the new Afghan security and armed forces;
+
+5. Invite the United Nations and the international community to create a fund
+
+to assist the families and other dependents of martyrs and victims of the war, as well
+as the war disabled;
+
+6. Strongly urge that the United Nations, the international community and
+
+regional organizations cooperate with the Interim Authority to combat international
+terrorism, cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs and provide Afghan farmers with
+financial, material and technical resources for alternative crop production.
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+link to page 1 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+Updated February 25, 2021
+
+ Weather and Climate Change: What’s the Difference? 
+
+and snow cover. Weather conditions can vary rapidly or last 
+
+ Weather is day-to-day temperature, precipitation, and 
+
+up to a few days in the mid-latitudes. NOAA compiles 
+
+other conditions. 
+
+observations from weather stations around the United 
+States, in the oceans, from international sources, and from 
+
+ Climate is weather observed over multidecadal periods 
+
+other federal agencies. NOAA analyzes historical weather 
+
+for a defined location. For example, the National 
+
+data and provides multiday forecasts or seasonal outlooks. 
+
+Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
+
+measures a climate normal over specific 30-year 
+
+ Climate is defined by the long-term statistics of weather 
+
+periods for locations in the United States. 
+
+compiled for a specified place ( Figure 1 ), including the 
+globe. For example, climate would include the maximum 
+
+ Climate variability is how weather may vary for multiple 
+
+hourly precipitation in July in a particular county over 30 
+
+weeks or years from the long-term average. 
+
+years or the global mean surface temperature from 1981 to 
+
+ Climate change occurs when the long-term climate 
+
+2010. The availability of long-term data varies by location, 
+
+shifts, without an apparent return to previous 
+
+making climate analysis for some locations challenging. 
+
+normals. 
+
+NOAA’s National Centers for Environmental Information 
+
+With much discussion of climate change in Congress, in the 
+
+defines U.S. climate normals as “three-decade averages of 
+
+news, and among constituents, some commonly used words 
+
+climatological variables including temperature and 
+
+may be misunderstood or misused. Below are explanations 
+
+precipitation” for defined locations. The most recent 
+
+of several key terms: weather , climate , climate variability , 
+and climate change , as well as some associated concepts. 
+
+climate normal for a defined location uses weather 
+observations for 1991-2020. People use climate normals for 
+a wide array of purposes, such as placing daily weather into 
+
+ Weather is the state of the atmosphere at a specific place 
+
+a historical context or determining technical specifications 
+
+and time, described by such conditions as temperature, 
+
+for the resilience of buildings and infrastructure against 
+
+precipitation, humidity, cloudiness, and wind speed. 
+
+extreme weather. 
+
+Weather can include conditions of the Earth’s water and 
+land surfaces as well, with such variables as wave height 
+
+ Figure 1. Illustration of How Weather Makes Up the Long-Term Climate, Using Temperature 
+
+Daily Maximum Temperature in Topeka, Kansas, 1981-2010, the Most Recent Climate Normal 
+
+`
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS, using data from NOAA, National Climate Data Center, Climate Data Online. Extracted February 26, 2020. 
+ Notes: The highest temperature on any given day and place is its daily maximum temperature , which is one aspect of weather. In this figure, 
+each yellow dot represents the daily maximum temperature in Topeka, Kansas, per day in the most recent 30-year climate normal from 1981 to 
+2010. Overal , the statistics of this figure show aspects of Topeka’s recent climate. The darkest line, in the center, is the normal daily maximum 
+temperature in NOAA’s climate normal . The smooth pink lines above and below it represent one (statistical) standard deviation from the 
+average (about 18 percentage points above and below). The two yel ows lines, above and below, represent the 5th and 95th percentiles, 
+computed by CRS to show extreme daily maximum temperatures. (CRS used rol ing three-day averages of these values to smooth the lines and 
+better show instances of extreme weather—those dots above the 95th percentile or below the 5th.) About 90% of the time, the daily maximum 
+temperature could be expected to fal between the 5th and 95th percentile lines. CRS selected Topeka because it is roughly in the center of the 
+continental United States.
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+ 
+ link to page 2 link to page 1 
+
+Weather and Climate Change: What’s the Difference? 
+
+ Climate variability can include several different concepts. 
+
+gas emissions, are external forcings . Each factor has its own 
+
+Generally, it means the differences from the long-term 
+
+rhythm and pattern, temporally ranging from less than a 
+
+averages (or other statistics) of climate-related variables, 
+
+year to tens of thousands of years. Geographically, some 
+
+such as precipitation, over longer time or wider areas than 
+
+forcings have stronger regional or hemispheric effect, while 
+
+individual weather events. Climate variability may describe 
+
+others are global. The temporal and geographical 
+
+how a season is above or below the climate normal average 
+
+characteristics of each is like a fingerprint on the climate 
+
+for, say, temperature or snowfall. Climate variability may 
+
+system. Using such “fingerprints,” with sufficient 
+
+also describe longer, multiyear patterns that are not average, 
+
+observations and powerful computing systems, the 2017 
+
+such as when certain large-scale weather patterns occur. An 
+
+U.S. National Climate Assessment (NCA4) concluded: 
+
+example is the so-called El Niño/La Niña (ENSO) cycle, 
+
+It is extremely likely [>95%] that human influence 
+
+with cycles of warm and cool periods in the Pacific Ocean 
+and the atmosphere. ENSO phases typically last from nine 
+
+has been the dominant cause of the observed 
+
+to 12 months and on average occur every two to seven 
+
+warming since the mid-20th century. For the 
+
+years. With only climate variability, scientists would expect 
+
+warming over the last century, there is no 
+
+the climate to reflect historically average conditions. 
+
+convincing alternative explanation supported by the 
+extent of the observational evidence. 
+
+When the climate continues to change over longer times, 
+
+For more information about scientific assessments of 
+
+climatologists discern climate change . In effect, this means 
+
+climate change, see CRS Report R45086, Evolving 
+
+that what was “normal” has shifted. See Figure 2 . 
+
+ Assessments of Human and Natural Contributions to 
+Climate Change , by Jane A. Leggett. 
+
+ Climate change may be discerned when the statistics of the 
+climate (e.g., the climate normal) continue to shift over 
+
+ Extreme Weather and Climate Change 
+
+multiple decades. Distinguishing climate change from 
+
+Some extreme weather can lead to emergencies or disasters. 
+
+climate variability can be challenging. Detecting climate 
+
+Not all extreme weather events can be attributed to climate 
+
+change requires multiple decades of consistently collected 
+
+change. Nonetheless, climate models project that some 
+
+measurements. The greater the climate change relative to 
+
+events that would be extreme in the current climate—such 
+
+the variability, the more rapidly scientific detection can 
+
+as daily maximum temperatures higher than 92oF in July in 
+
+occur. Observers have pointed to this as one reason that 
+
+Topeka ( Figure 1 ) —would occur more and more 
+
+scientists did not reach consensus until the 1990s that the 
+
+frequently as the Earth’s climate warms with continued 
+
+Earth’s climate had changed over the 20th century. Global 
+
+greenhouse gas emissions. Extremely cold days are 
+
+ warming is one aspect of climate change; it is a sustained 
+
+expected to become less frequent with global warming. 
+
+increase of global average temperature, usually measured at 
+the surface of the Earth, though it may also be measured at 
+
+According to the 2017 NCA4, since the mid-20th century 
+
+specific altitudes in the atmosphere. 
+
+“[s]ome extremes have already become more frequent, 
+intense, or of longer duration, and many extremes are 
+
+ Figure 2.Illustration of Climate Variability and Change 
+
+expected to continue to increase or worsen.” As examples, 
+
+ in Global Mean Surface Temperatures, 1880-2019 
+
+“what in the past have been considered to be extreme 
+
+Anomalies (differences) from average 1901-2000 in oCelsius 
+
+precipitation events are becoming more frequent” on most 
+continents, and “[t]he annual minimum and maximum sea 
+
+ice extent have decreased over the last 35 years.” However, 
+“[w]hether global trends in high-intensity tropical cyclones 
+are already observable is a topic of active debate.” 
+
+So while not all extreme weather experienced today can be 
+attributed to climate change, climate change may make 
+some of today’s extreme events more likely (especially 
+those related to high temperatures, hydrological drought, or 
+heavy precipitation). Scientists use complex attribution 
+studies, such as “fingerprinting,” to draw such conclusions. 
+
+ Global Change Is Broader Than Climate Change 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS, using data from NOAA, Climate at a Glance. 
+
+Another concept, broader than climate change, is that of 
+
+ Notes: The blue dots represent each year’s annual average 
+
+ global change . The Global Change Research Act of 1990 
+
+temperature and, as a set, il ustrate interannual variability of 
+
+(P.L. 101-606) defined it as “changes in the global 
+
+temperature. The yel ow line shows climate variability as a rol ing 
+
+environment (including alterations in climate, land 
+
+seven-year average of annual temperatures. The red line depicts 
+
+productivity, oceans or other water resources, atmospheric 
+
+climate change as increasing annual temperature, averaged over 
+
+chemistry, and ecological systems) that may alter the 
+
+rol ing 30-year periods. 
+
+capacity of the Earth to sustain life.” 
+
+ Attributing Climate Variability and Climate 
+
+ Jane A. Leggett , Specialist in Energy and Environmental 
+
+ Change to Different “Forcings” 
+
+Policy 
+
+A number of factors drive climate variability and climate 
+
+ IF11446 
+
+change. Some factors are internal to the climate system, and 
+some, such as solar variability or human-related greenhouse 
+
+https://crsreports.congress.gov 
+
+ 
+ Weather and Climate Change: What’s the Difference? 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to 
+congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. 
+Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has 
+been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the 
+United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be 
+reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include 
+copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you 
+wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+ 
+
+ https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11446 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED
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+Measuring the Impact of Immigration Enforcement on Labor Markets: Quasi-Experimental Studies of §287(g) Agreements and the Secure Communities Program
+
+ 
+
+ March 12, 2026
+ (IF13188)
+ 
+
+ 
+ In 2025 and 2026, the Trump Administration has issued numerous executive actions and initiatives related to the enforcement of federal immigration laws (some are discussed in CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11299, Recent Executive Branch Actions on Immigration (Part 1) ). The 2025 budget reconciliation act ( P.L. 119-21 ) provides increased resources for interior immigration enforcement programs. 
+
+ This In Focus summarizes seven studies of the effects of two previous immigration enforcement programs on domestic labor markets. For research purposes, a key aspect of both of these programs is that they affected different parts of the United States at different times during the period studied. 
+
+ Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) permits the delegation of certain immigration enforcement functions to state and local law enforcement agencies. Agreements entered pursuant to INA Section 287(g) (referred to as §287(g) agreements ) enable specially trained state or local officers to perform certain functions relating to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of noncitizens under federal oversight by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The first §287(g) agreement was implemented in 2002. The number of §287(g) agreements fluctuated over time before expanding in 2025 . For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11898, The 287(g) Program: State and Local Immigration Enforcement . 
+
+ Secure Communities was an information sharing program between local law enforcement, DHS, and the Department of Justice that used biometric data to screen for removable aliens as people were being booked into jails. Such people were non-US citizens who had either been convicted of a crime or had violated immigration laws ( such as by entering the country illegally or by overstaying a visa). Secure Communities was initiated in about a dozen jurisdictions in late 2008, with more added over time. Secure Communities was replaced in late 2014 with the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). It was restored during the first Trump Administration; a decision reversed by the Biden Administration. During 2008–2014, about 21% of the 454,000 people deported from the United States through this program had not been convicted of any crime, 19% had been convicted of violent crimes, and 61% had nonviolent criminal convictions.
+
+ The authors of the studies presented below argue §287(g) agreements and Secure Communities programs could have reduced the number of people working without work authorization in three possible ways. First, these programs led directly to deportations. Second, evidence suggests they affected where people without work authorization chose to live by influencing locational choices within the United States , international migration to the United States, or return migration to countries of origin. Third, study authors hypothesize that immigration enforcement programs may have had a chilling effect on employment for people in these locations without work authorization because the programs increased the likelihood that any interaction with local police—even being pulled over for a traffic stop on the way to or from work—could have led to deportation. 
+
+ Challenges in Measuring Impacts
+
+ The fundamental challenge of measuring the labor market impacts of immigration enforcement is untangling these impacts from other factors happening at the same time. For example, in 2025 and 2026 many changes in immigration enforcement were/are taking place at the same time other federal policies and new technologies may also be affecting labor markets. This makes it difficult to attribute current changes in labor markets to individual policy changes.
+
+ Quasi-Experimental Studies
+
+ The §287(g) agreements and the Security Communities program were implemented in different parts of the United States at different times. This allows researchers to compare areas where §287(g) agreements or the Secure Communities program were implemented with areas in which they had not (or had not yet) been implemented, as if they were experiments with treatment and control areas. Studies using such variation, which was not intended to be an experiment, are called quasi-experimental studies .
+
+ The reliability of such studies rests on showing that the treatment and control areas were similar before the treatment began. The studies summarized below show that the areas they compare were similar before the implementation of the immigration enforcement programs. 
+
+ Overall, these studies find immigration enforcement programs implemented during 2004-2014 were associated with increases in wages in low-wage labor markets, and with mixed results on whether employment for U.S.-born people increased or decreased in low-wage labor markets. The studies generally find these immigration enforcement programs were associated with decreases in employment for U.S.-born people in higher-wage labor markets. 
+
+ Studies of Overall Labor Impacts
+
+ East, Hines, Luck, Mansour, and Velásquez (2023)
+
+ This study examines the impact of the rollout of Secure Communities during 2008-2013 on employment patterns of foreign-born people aged 20-64 with a high school or less education (the authors argue many such people did not have work authorization) and U.S.-born people aged 20-64 of all education levels. 
+
+ For U.S.-born people, the authors find the local implementation of Secure Communities was associated with small declines in employment and wages overall. The impacts they find for U.S.-born workers vary by education level and occupation: employment increased only for U.S.-born workers with a high school degree or less who worked in the very lowest-paid occupations. The authors find no impact or declines in employment for all other U.S.-born workers, with particularly negative employment impacts for U.S.-born workers in higher-paid occupations, even those with low educational requirements such as construction managers and food service and lodging managers. They find no impact or declines in wages for U.S.-born workers of all education levels in all occupations, with the largest declines in wages among U.S.-born workers with a high school degree or less in higher paid occupations.
+
+ Bohn and Santillana (2017)
+
+ This study uses employer-reported payroll tax data to examine industry-level employment and average wages by county during 2004-2010 in 55 counties that signed local §287(g) agreements during 2005-2009, compared with patterns in neighboring counties. It finds no overall county-level employment or wage impacts of implementing §287(g) agreements, but some differences for certain industries. Employment was 7%-10% lower and wages were 3%-4% percent higher in services such as landscaping, janitorial work, and maintenance. Employment in manufacturing was 4% higher, with little difference in wages.
+
+ Studies of Caregiver Labor Impacts
+
+ Kreider and Werner (2025)
+
+ This study uses the rollout of Secure Communities during 2008-2013 to examine impacts on long-term home-based eldercare. It finds that the implementation of Secure Communities reduced the size of the home care workforce by 7.5%, largely from geographic areas with larger numbers of foreign-born Hispanic residents with less than a high school education. The number of U.S.-born home care workers did not increase in these areas. 
+
+ East and Velásquez (2024)
+
+ This study uses the rollout of Secure Communities during 2008-2014 to examine impacts on labor market outcomes for Hispanic foreign-born women with less than a high school education (many of whom had no legal work authorization in the United States) and the U.S.-born people who may be most willing to pay for household help: U.S.-born college-educated women with children under age five. 
+
+ The authors find that after the implementation of Secure Communities in their county of residence, the number of hours per week that Hispanic foreign-born women with less than a high school education worked in household services declined by 0.4 hours per week, on average, relative to similar women in other counties, while the wages earned by women with less than a high school education working in household services increased. Among U.S.-born college-educated mothers, those who lived in counties that were part of Secure Communities were working 0.4 hours fewer per week, on average, than similar mothers in other counties, with declines in the probability of working full-time and increases in the probability of working part-time or not working for pay at all. As further evidence that this change was due to the reduced availability of childcare, the authors find no similar patterns of changes for U.S.-born college educated women without children or U.S.-born college educated fathers of young children. 
+
+ Studies of Agricultural Labor Impacts
+
+ Ifft and Jodlowski (2022)
+
+ This study uses measures of pre-existing local unoccupied jail capacity to predict which jurisdictions chose to sign §287(g) agreements during 2007-2012. It finds that §287(g) agreements predicted by unoccupied jail capacity were associated with significant increases in labor expenditures in agriculture, declines in the number of farmworkers employed per acre, declines in the number of farms, and declines in the amount of land being farmed. These effects were driven by the task force-type of §287(g) agreements, which allowed local officials to check immigration status during any police encounter, including routine traffic stops. 
+
+ Kostandi, Mykerezi, and Escalante (2014)
+
+ This study examines the impact of signing §287(g) agreements on the share of foreign-born noncitizens in larger counties during 2005-2010 and on agricultural outcomes during 2002-2007 in all counties. It finds signing §287(g) agreements was associated with declines in the share of foreign-born non-citizens, particularly three or more years after the agreements were signed, as well as decreases in the number of agricultural workers hired and in the number of acres planted with vegetables (a labor-intensive crop). Expenditures per agricultural worker increased.
+
+ Study of Construction Labor Markets
+
+ Howard, Wang, and Zhang (2025)
+
+ This study uses the rollout of Secure Communities during 2008-2013 to examine impacts in the construction sector. It finds the implementation of Secure Communities was associated with no increase in the U.S.-born construction workforce overall (with some evidence of increased U.S.-born construction employment appearing after two years). In lower-skilled construction occupations, employment of U.S.-born workers increased, but U.S.-born workers did not fully replace the declining number of foreign-born workers with less than a high school education. In higher-skilled occupations, employment of U.S.-born workers declined. Neither group of U.S.-born workers reported higher wages.
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+A Legal Analysis of S. 968, the PROTECT IP 
+Act 
+
+ Brian T. Yeh 
+ Legislative Attorney 
+
+ Jonathan Miller 
+ Legal Intern 
+
+July 7, 2011 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+7-5700 
+
+www.crs.gov 
+
+R41911 
+
+ CRS Report for Congress
+ P 
+
+ repared for Members and Committees of Congress 
+
+ 
+ A Legal Analysis of S. 968, the PROTECT IP Act 
+
+ 
+
+ Summary 
+
+The global nature of the Internet offers expanded commercial opportunities for intellectual 
+property (IP) rights holders but also increases the potential for copyright and trademark 
+infringement. Piracy of the content created by movie, music, and software companies and 
+counterfeiting of goods such as pharmaceutical drugs and consumer products negatively impacts 
+the American economy and poses risks to the health and safety of U.S. citizens. Although rights 
+holders and law enforcement agencies currently have some legal tools to pursue domestic 
+infringers, they face difficult challenges in enforcing IP laws against actors located abroad. Many 
+websites trafficking in pirated copyrighted content or counterfeit goods are registered and operate 
+in foreign countries. These foreign “rogue sites” sell or distribute subject matter protected by 
+federal IP laws to people located within the United States—without the authorization of the IP 
+rights holders—yet the operators of the sites remain beyond the reach of U.S courts and 
+authorities. 
+
+Some believe that legislation is necessary to address this jurisdictional problem. In 2010, the 
+Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (COICA) was approved by the Senate 
+Judiciary Committee, but the full Senate took no action on the bill before the end of the 111th 
+Congress. On May 12, 2011, Senator Leahy introduced S. 968, the Preventing Real Online 
+Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act (PROTECT IP Act), which 
+is similar to COICA in several respects. The act would allow the Attorney General to seek an 
+injunction from a federal court against a domain name used by a foreign website that promotes 
+infringement or the sale of counterfeit goods; such court order may then be served on U.S.-based 
+domain name servers, Internet advertisers, search engines, and financial transaction providers, 
+which would be required to take certain appropriate actions such as preventing access to the 
+website or suspending business services to the site. The Senate Judiciary Committee voted to 
+report S. 968 to the full Senate on May 26, 2011. 
+
+There has been considerable public debate about the PROTECT IP Act. Critics claim it is an 
+“internet censorship” bill and that it tramples on free speech rights. There are also concerns that 
+focusing on intermediary services, such as non-authoritative domain name servers, will disrupt 
+the technical integrity of the Internet. Opponents of the bill believe that these problems will be 
+exacerbated by the legislation’s inclusion of a private cause of action allowing content owners to 
+sue intermediate service providers. Supporters of the legislation, however, argue that in order to 
+reduce digital piracy and online counterfeiting committed by foreign websites, new enforcement 
+mechanisms are vital for U.S. economic growth and needed to protect public health and safety. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ A Legal Analysis of S. 968, the PROTECT IP Act 
+
+ 
+
+ Contents 
+
+Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 
+
+Legislative History of COICA (111th) and PROTECT IP (112th)................................................... 2 
+
+Summary of PROTECT IP Provisions ......................................................................................... 3 
+
+Concerns Raised About the PROTECT IP Act ............................................................................. 5 
+
+Impact on Free Speech ..........................................................................................................5 
+Technical Integrity of the Internet.......................................................................................... 6 
+Private Cause of Action......................................................................................................... 7 
+
+ 
+
+ Contacts 
+
+Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 8 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ A Legal Analysis of S. 968, the PROTECT IP Act 
+
+ 
+
+ Introduction1 
+
+The Internet has become a central part of the American economy, delivering innovative products 
+while eliminating the need for inefficient middlemen. However, the free flow of information 
+facilitated by the Internet has also created problems with copyright and trademark infringement. 
+The problem is significant; as much as 6% of the U.S. gross national product is generated by 
+industries supported by intellectual property laws.2 A recent report contends that nearly 24% of all 
+Internet traffic worldwide is infringing.3 Piracy of the content created by movie, music, and 
+software companies, and counterfeiting of goods such as clothing, pharmaceutical drugs, and 
+consumer electronics, negatively impacts the American economy.4 Although the Government 
+Accountability Office cautions that it is difficult to precisely quantify the economy-wide impacts 
+of piracy, it is believed to be a serious problem.5 
+
+To combat problems with online copyright and trademark infringement, U.S. Immigration and 
+Customs Enforcement (ICE) began a new initiative called “Operation In Our Sites.” Between 
+June 30, 2010, and February 14, 2011, ICE seized 112 domain names6 associated with Internet 
+piracy.7 Domain name seizures are an innovative use of civil forfeiture proceedings authorized 
+under criminal copyright law.8 Domain name registrars redirected traffic from the seized domains 
+to a government website explaining that the domain name had been seized by ICE pursuant to a 
+warrant issued by a federal court. However, the sites remain online and accessible through their 
+Internet protocol addresses.9 
+
+ 
+1 This report was prepared by Jonathan H. Miller, Legal Intern, American Law Division, under the general supervision 
+of Brian T. Yeh, Legislative Attorney. 
+2 Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Parasites, Part II: Hearing Before the 
+Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) 
+(written statement of Frederick Huntsberry, Chief Operating Officer Paramount Pictures Corp.). 
+3 See Targeting Websites Dedicated To Stealing American Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
+Judiciary , 112th Cong. (2011) (written statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman S. Comm. on the Judiciary, citing a 
+report commissioned by NBC Universal, available at http://documents.envisional.com/docs/Envisional-Internet_Usage-
+Jan2011.pdf). 
+4 As used in this report, the term “piracy” refers to the unlawful reproduction and distribution of copyrighted content, 
+and “counterfeiting” refers to the manufacture and distribution of products that bear (without authorization) a 
+trademark that is identical to a trademark validly registered for those goods, or that cannot be distinguished in its 
+essential aspects from such a trademark, and that, thereby, infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in 
+question. These definitions are adapted from those used in the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s Agreement on 
+Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), Section 4, Article 51, footnote 14, available 
+at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm4_e.htm#Footnote14. 
+5 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Observations on Efforts to Quantify the Economic Effects of Counterfeit and 
+Pirated Goods , 10-423, April 2010, p. 2, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10423.pdf. 
+6 A domain name can be typed into a web browser to access an Internet address; it usually consists of a “top level 
+domain” and a “second level domain”—for example, in the domain name “amazon.com,” “.com” is a top level domain, 
+and “amazon” is the second level domain. A domain name registry operates top level domains, and a domain name 
+registrar manages the registration of domain names. See S.Rept. 111-373 at 6 (discussing a predecessor bill). 
+7 Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Parasites, Part II: Hearing Before the 
+Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) 
+(written statement of Hon. John Morton, Dir. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.). 
+8 See 18 U.S.C. § 2323 (allowing civil forfeiture for “Any property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part 
+to commit or facilitate the commission of [criminal copyright infringement].”). 
+9 An Internet protocol address is a series of numbers assigned to a device attached to a network. These numbers are 
+(continued...) 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 1 
+
+ 
+ A Legal Analysis of S. 968, the PROTECT IP Act 
+
+ 
+
+The global nature of the Internet presents problems to the civil forfeiture approach. Only domain 
+names registered within the United States and subject to ICE’s jurisdiction may be seized. 
+However, many websites trafficking in copyrighted content or counterfeit goods are registered 
+and operate entirely in foreign countries. These foreign “rogue sites” often provide content 
+protected by U.S. intellectual property law to people located within the United States. S. 968, the 
+Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act 
+(PROTECT IP Act), is a legislative response to this jurisdictional problem. The act restricts 
+access to foreign sites promoting infringement or the sale of counterfeit goods by targeting 
+domain name servers, Internet advertisers, and financial transaction providers located in the 
+United States. There has been considerable public debate about this approach. 
+
+ Legislative History of COICA (111th) and PROTECT 
+IP (112th) 
+
+On September 20, 2010, Senator Leahy with Senator Hatch introduced the Combating Online 
+Infringement and Counterfeits Act (COICA). COICA is a predecessor to the PROTECT IP Act 
+and follows a similar legislative approach, though with some significant differences. The Senate 
+Judiciary Committee voted to report COICA favorably to the Senate, with an amendment in the 
+nature of a substitute. However, no public hearing was held to consider COICA before the end of 
+the 111th Congress, and the full Senate did not act on the legislation before the end of the 
+congressional term. 
+
+At the request of Senator Coburn, the Senate Judiciary Committee in the 112th Congress held a 
+hearing February 16, 2011, on the topic of “Targeting Websites Dedicated To Stealing American 
+Intellectual Property.” This hearing considered the scope of intellectual property theft over the 
+Internet and the problem of “rogue websites” that exclusively traffic in infringing material, issues 
+that COICA was designed to address.10 
+
+On May 12, 2011, Senator Leahy introduced the PROTECT IP Act. On May 26, 2011, the Senate 
+Committee on the Judiciary voted to report the legislation to the full Senate, with an amendment 
+in the nature of a substitute and without written report.11 Senator Wyden then placed a hold on the 
+bill, indicating his intent to object to any unanimous consent request to proceed.12 The Senate 
+Judiciary Committee held a hearing on June 22, 2011, entitled “Oversight of Intellectual Property 
+Law Enforcement Efforts” that included testimony from ICE and other agencies charged with 
+enforcement of intellectual property laws online. 
+
+ 
+
+(...continued) 
+
+used to indicate where the device is located on the network. For example, when a user visits http://www.google.com the 
+user’s computer is communicating with 74.125.93.147, the Internet protocol address of google.com’s webserver. 
+10 Nathan Pollard and Amy E. Bivins, Leahy Vows to Offer Tough Anti-Piracy Bill; Senator Demands ‘Accountability’ 
+From ISPs , 16 Electronic Commerce & Law Report 257 (Feb. 23, 2011). 
+11 Sen. Leahy, Report of the Sen. Judiciary Committee, Congressional Record , May 26, 2011, p. S3426. 
+12 Sen. Wyden, Intent to Object, Congressional Record , May 26, 2011, p. S3419. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 2 
+
+ 
+ A Legal Analysis of S. 968, the PROTECT IP Act 
+
+ 
+
+ Summary of PROTECT IP Provisions 
+
+The following is a brief summary of the key provisions of S. 968, as reported in the Senate. 
+
+• The act focuses on Internet sites “dedicated to infringing activities.” An “Internet 
+
+site dedicated to infringing activities,” as defined by the bill, is an Internet site 
+that has no significant use other than engaging in, enabling, or facilitating 
+copyright infringement, circumvention of copyright protection systems, or 
+trademark dilution. The term also encompasses websites which facts or 
+circumstances suggest are used primarily as a means for engaging in or enabling 
+those activities.13 The act also defines “Nondomestic domain name” as a domain 
+name for which the domain name registry is not located in the United States.14 
+
+• The Attorney General may bring suit against a person who registers or owns a 
+
+nondomestic domain name used by an Internet site dedicated to infringing 
+activities.15 This provision is unlikely to be invoked often because registrants of 
+nondomestic domain names are rarely located in the United States and are 
+therefore difficult to prosecute domestically. 
+
+• The Attorney General is authorized to initiate civil forfeiture proceedings against 
+
+a nondomestic domain name used by an Internet site dedicated to infringing 
+activities. In response, a federal court may issue an injunction against the domain 
+name if the domain name is used within the United States and the Internet site 
+harms holders of U.S. intellectual property rights.16 Should the court grant the 
+injunction, a federal law enforcement officer (with prior court approval) may 
+serve a copy of the court order to the following entities that would be required to 
+take the specified actions: 
+
+• Operators of non-authoritative domain name servers: Non-authoritative 
+
+domain name servers are intermediary servers used to resolve a domain name 
+to its Internet protocol address. They do this by retaining a copy of 
+information stored on an authoritative domain name server. Operators of 
+these servers, generally Internet service providers, are directed to prevent 
+access to seized domain names through the least burdensome technically 
+feasible means.17 
+
+• Financial transaction providers: Companies that facilitate online 
+
+transactions, such as credit card companies, are required to prevent their 
+service from completing transactions between customers located within the 
+United States and the Internet site.18 
+
+ 
+13 S. 968 as reported, §2 (7). 
+14 S. 968 as reported, §2 (9). 
+15 S. 968 as reported, §3 (a) (1). 
+16 The injunction proceedings must conform with Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See S. 968 as 
+reported, §§ 3 (a) (2) – (b). 
+17 S. 968 as reported, §3 (d) (2). 
+18 Id. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 3 
+
+ 
+ A Legal Analysis of S. 968, the PROTECT IP Act 
+
+ 
+
+• Internet advertising services: Internet advertising services are required to 
+
+stop selling advertising to and providing advertising for the Internet site.19 
+
+• Information location tools: Search engines such as Google and Yahoo must 
+
+take technically feasible measures to remove or disable access to the Internet 
+site.20 
+
+• A qualifying plaintiff21 may bring suit against a person who registered a domain 
+
+name used by an Internet site dedicated to infringing activities. This provision 
+gives a private right of action to rights holders against registrants of domestic and 
+nondomestic domain names.22 
+
+• A qualifying plaintiff may also bring suit against a nondomestic domain name 
+
+used by an Internet site dedicated to infringing activities. In response, a federal 
+court may issue an injunction against the domain name if the domain name is 
+used within the United States to access the Internet site and the site harms holders 
+of U.S. intellectual property rights.23 Should the court grant the injunction, the 
+qualifying plaintiff (with prior court approval) may serve a copy of the court 
+order to the following entities, which would then be responsible for taking the 
+specified actions: 
+
+• Financial transaction providers: Companies that facilitate online 
+
+transactions, such as credit card companies, are required to prevent their 
+service from completing transactions between customers located within the 
+United States and the Internet site.24 
+
+• Internet advertising services: Internet advertising services are required to 
+
+stop selling advertising to and providing advertising for the Internet site.25 
+
+• To encourage financial transaction providers and Internet advertising services to 
+
+“self-police,” the act makes them immune from liability for voluntarily taking 
+action against an Internet site, so long as they act in good faith on credible 
+evidence that the Internet site is dedicated to infringing activities.26 
+
+• The act provides immunity from liability to more actors when they refuse to 
+
+provide services to “infringing Internet sites that endanger the public health.” An 
+“infringing Internet site that endangers the public health” is an Internet site that 
+sells, dispenses, or distributes counterfeit prescription medicine. Domain name 
+registries, domain name registrars, financial transaction providers, search 
+
+ 
+19 Id. 
+20 Id. 
+21 A qualifying plaintiff is defined by the bill as (1) the U.S. Attorney General or (2) “an owner of an intellectual 
+property right ... harmed by the activities of an Internet site dedicated to infringing activities occurring on that Internet 
+site.” See S. 968 as reported, §2 (11) (B). 
+22 S. 968 as reported, §4 (a). 
+23 The injunction proceedings must be in accordance with Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See S. 968 
+as reported, §4 (b) (1). 
+24 S. 968 as reported, §4 (d) (2). 
+25 Id. 
+26 S. 968 as reported, §5 (a). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 4 
+
+ 
+ A Legal Analysis of S. 968, the PROTECT IP Act 
+
+ 
+
+engines, and Internet advertising services may refuse to provide services to such 
+Internet sites when they have a good faith belief that the site is infringing.27 
+
+• Finally, the bill requires reports to Congress regarding the effectiveness of the act 
+
+and its effect on Internet technologies, from the following government entities: 
+the Attorney General, the Register of Copyrights, the Secretary of Commerce, 
+and the Government Accountability Office. 
+
+ Concerns Raised About the PROTECT IP Act 
+
+Numerous concerns have been raised by consumer groups and privacy advocates about the 
+provisions of the PROTECT IP Act. These concerns, and the responses by the legislation’s 
+supporters, can be organized broadly into the following three categories. 
+
+ Impact on Free Speech 
+
+Some commentators are concerned that the broad definition of an Internet site dedicated to 
+infringing activity could encompass speech protected by the First Amendment.28 A New York 
+Times editorial opined that “the broadness of the definition is particularly worrisome.”29 Others 
+claim that it will give owners of copyrighted content “broad censorship powers.”30 These 
+concerns are heightened by fears that the act provides insufficient legal process prior to seizure. 
+
+Opponents of the bill argue that repressive foreign regimes could cite U.S. domain name seizures 
+to justify online suppression of speech. Eric Schmidt, executive chairman of Google, compared 
+the domain name seizure approach to China’s attempts to stifle free speech. He warned that the 
+act could set a disastrous precedent if done the wrong way.31 There is concern that backing away 
+from an open and global Internet could set “a precedent for other countries ... to use DNS 
+mechanisms to enforce a range of domestic policies, erecting barriers on the global medium of the 
+Internet. Non-democratic regimes could seize on the precedent to justify measures that would 
+hinder online freedom of expression and association.”32 
+
+Supporters of the bill note that “[a]ll existing copyright protections are applicable to the Internet” 
+and that “injunctions are a longstanding, constitutionally sanctioned way to remedy and prevent 
+copyright violations.”33 The Register of Copyrights does not believe that seizing an infringing 
+
+ 
+27 S. 968 as reported, §5 (b). 
+28 Letter from Mark Lemley, Professor, Stanford Law School, et al. to Sen. Judiciary Comm. (June 27, 2011) available 
+at http://volokh.com/2011/07/04/and-speaking-of-the-inalienable-right-to-the-pursuit-of-happiness. 
+ 29 Editorial, “Internet Piracy and How to Stop It,” New York Times , June 9, 2011, p. A26. 
+30 Mike Masnick, Son of COICA , Techdirt, May 10, 2011, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110510/13285714230/. 
+31 Nathan Olivarez-Giles, “Google’s Eric Schmidt: Blocking File-sharing Sites Would Make U.S., Britain like China,” 
+ Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2011, available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/05/google-eric-
+schmidt-says-blocking-filesharing-sites-would-make-u-s-u-k-ike-china.html. 
+32 Letter from Center for Democracy and Technology et al. to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman Sen. Judiciary Comm. 
+(May 25, 2011) available at http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/20110525_public_interet_968_ltr.pdf. 
+33 Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Parasites, Part II: Hearing Before the 
+Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) 
+(written statement of Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 5 
+
+ 
+ A Legal Analysis of S. 968, the PROTECT IP Act 
+
+ 
+
+domain name would violate the First Amendment or that it constitutes censorship.34 Supporters 
+also point to Supreme Court precedents in favor of injunctions for copyright infringement, even 
+when the copyrighted material is a matter of public debate.35 However, it is probable that a 
+narrowly tailored definition of an infringing site is less likely to implicate First Amendment 
+concerns. 
+
+ Technical Integrity of the Internet 
+
+Opponents of the PROTECT IP Act have raised concerns that the bill may affect the integrity of 
+the Internet.36 “DNS blocking itself could affect the Internet’s reliability, security, and 
+performance.”37 Other commentators have called the domain name blocking approach 
+ineffective.38 They argue that the Internet sites will remain available through their Internet 
+protocol addresses: 
+
+[D]omain name address resolution takes place throughout the Internet, not just by larger ISPs 
+and registries. Indeed, there are as many as a million worldwide domain names “resolvers,” 
+and it is unlikely U.S. courts could or would order all of them to comply with a blocking 
+order. But incomplete blocking could seriously undermine the integrity of this key feature of 
+the Web’s architecture, incentivizing truly rogue Web site operators to use shadow 
+registration systems or simply forgo domain names and rely solely on IP addresses.39 
+
+Supporters respond that taking down infringing Internet sites is akin to “whac-a-mole” and that 
+the law must provide sufficient authority to combat this problem.40 Furthermore, supporters 
+believe the DNS blocking provisions of the bill are key to preventing foreign sites from infringing 
+American intellectual property rights: 
+
+Reaching sites originating outside the U.S. is critical to fighting a worldwide epidemic that is 
+destroying the ability of the [content owners] to obtain the financing needed to produce 
+future [content]. ... Internet sites that steal and distribute American intellectual property are 
+
+ 
+34 Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Parasites, Part I: Hearing Before the 
+Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) 
+(written statement of Maria Pallante, Acting Register of Copyrights). 
+35 Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Parasites, Part II: Hearing Before the 
+Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) 
+(written statement of Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP citing Harper & Row v. Nation Enters. , 
+471 U.S. 539 (1985) (finding an injunction against a magazine’s infringing publication of portions of Gerald Ford’s 
+memoir valid)). 
+36 Letter from Internet Engineers Opposed to COICA, to Sen. Judiciary Comm. (Sept. 28, 2010) available at 
+ http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/COICA_internet_engineers_letter.pdf (discussing similar provisions in a 
+preceding bill). 
+37 Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Parasites, Part II: Hearing Before the 
+Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) 
+(written statement of Kent Walker, Senior Vice President, Google). 
+38 See e.g. Editorial, “Internet Piracy and How to Stop It,” New York Times , June 9, 2011, p. A26; Editorial, “Policing 
+the Internet”, Los Angeles Times, June 7, 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/07/opinion/la-ed-
+protectip-20110607. 
+ 39 Larry Downes, Leahy’s Protect IP Bill Even Worse than COICA, CNET News (June 20, 2011 2:46 p.m.), 
+http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20062419-38.html. 
+40 The references to “whac-a-mole” are ubiquitous. See e.g. Targeting Websites Dedicated To Stealing American 
+Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary , 112th Cong. (2011) (written statement of Tom 
+Adams, Chief Executive Officer, Rosetta Stone). 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 6 
+
+ 
+ A Legal Analysis of S. 968, the PROTECT IP Act 
+
+ 
+
+often foreign-owned and operated, or reside at domain names that are not registered through 
+a U.S.-based registry or registrar, setting them outside the scope of U.S. law enforcement. 
+The Justice Department and rights holders are currently limited in their options for legal 
+recourse, even when the website is directed at American consumers and steals American-
+owned intellectual property.41 
+
+ Private Cause of Action 
+
+There is considerable consternation from opponents of the bill that these problems will be 
+exacerbated by including a private cause of action. They worry that content owners will use the 
+private right of action to stifle Internet innovation and protect outdated business models.42 “[T]he 
+Internet and digital technologies can be highly disruptive of traditional business models for 
+reasons having nothing to do with infringement.”43 Additionally, technology companies are 
+concerned that they will be unable to cope with thousands of suits from content owners. They 
+argue that these suits will overwhelm their ability to handle requests and ultimately increase costs 
+for consumers.44 “We believe that the currently proposed private litigation-based process will, 
+however unintentionally, become a one-sided litigation machine with rights owners mass- 
+producing virtually identical cases against foreign domain names for the purpose of obtaining 
+orders to serve on U.S. payment and advertising companies.”45 Instead, some technology 
+companies have proposed a system of legal safe harbors similar to the notice and takedown 
+provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.46 
+
+Proponents of the act argue that online infringement is rampant and that law enforcement lacks 
+the resources to deter infringing activities. Additionally, they pointed out that remedies in private 
+actions are limited to payment processors and online advertisers; only the Attorney General can 
+bring suit against domain name servers and search engines. These limitations, they argue, are 
+sufficient to prevent an explosion of litigation. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+41 Press Release, The Motion Picture Association of America, Broad Creative Industry Coalition Praises Senate 
+Introduction of Bipartisan Legislation to fight Online Theft (May 12, 2011) available at http://mpaa.org/resources/
+e62fa607-8234-4120-97f2-aa4082cd691a.pdf. 
+42 See Abigail Phillips, The “PROTECT IP” Act: COICA Redux, The Electronic Frontier Foundation (June 20, 4:31 
+p.m.), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/05/protect-ip-act-coica-redux (wondering whether Viacom would have 
+quashed YouTube had the bill been law at the time). 
+43 Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Parasites, Part I: Hearing Before the 
+Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) 
+(written statement of David Sohn, Senior Policy Counsel, Center for Democracy and Technology). 
+44 See Targeting Websites Dedicated To Stealing American Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
+Judiciary , 112th Cong. (2011) (written statement of Thomas Dailey, General Counsel, Verizon). 
+45 Letter from American Express et al. to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Sen. Judiciary Comm. (May 25, 2011) 
+available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/letter-opposing-PIPA-privaterightofaction. 
+46 See Targeting Websites Dedicated To Stealing American Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
+Judiciary , 112th Cong. (2011) (written statement of Kent Walker, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Google). 
+For more information regarding this system, see CRS Report RL32037, Safe Harbor for Service Providers Under the 
+Digital Millennium Copyright Act , by Brian T. Yeh and Robin Jeweler. 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 7 
+
+ 
+ A Legal Analysis of S. 968, the PROTECT IP Act 
+
+ 
+
+ Author Contact Information 
+
+ 
+Brian T. Yeh 
+
+ Jonathan Miller 
+
+Legislative Attorney 
+
+Legal Intern 
+
+byeh@crs.loc.gov, 7-5182 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 8
\ No newline at end of file
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+Demographic and Socioeconomic 
+
+October 18, 2021 
+
+ Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ Patrick A. Landers 
+
+More than 9.7 million parents in the United States did not live with one or more of their children 
+
+Analyst in Social Policy 
+
+under age 21 in 2018. Policymakers have expressed interest in these nonresident parents out of 
+
+ 
+
+concern for the wellbeing of the parents and the important emotional, time, financial, and other 
+contributions they can make to their children’s lives. Research finds that many nonresident 
+
+ 
+
+parents and their children are economically vulnerable, and government policies often have 
+substantial impacts on their lives. In light of congressional interest, this report reviews demographic, relationship, and 
+economic characteristics of nonresident parents, with additional focus on the low-income subset of such parents. The report 
+also presents data on nonresident parents’ child support payments, and concludes by discussing potential implications for 
+policymaking. The report uses data from the 2018 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP); depending on the 
+topic, this survey provides information as of the interview month (in 2018) or the prior calendar year (2017). 
+
+In comparison to parents who report residing with each of their children under age 21 for a majority of nights (resident-only 
+parents), nonresident parents showed the following selected characteristics: 
+
+ They were disproportionately male, older, non-Hispanic Black (though a majority were non-Hispanic 
+
+White), and reported less formal education (typically possessing a high school diploma or its equivalent but 
+no college degree) in 2018. 
+
+ A majority were married or divorced, had had one childbearing union, had no resident children, or had one 
+
+nonresident child as of 2018. However, sizable shares of nonresident parents had never married, had had 
+children with more than one partner, had resident children, or had multiple nonresident children. 
+
+ They (particularly nonresident fathers) were less likely to report working than resident-only parents 
+
+(particularly resident-only fathers) in 2017. Nonresident parents also reported less personal and family 
+income. 
+
+Figure S1. Differences in Selected Characteristics Between Nonresident Parents and Resident-Only Parents, 2018 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both nonresident and resident 
+children. m = mil ions of parents. For additional no tes, see Figure 4 and Figure 9 . 
+
+More than one-third of nonresident parents (3.4 million) reported having low income, defined in this report as a family 
+income that was less than 200% of the official poverty thresholds in 2017. Relative to moderate- and higher-income 
+nonresident parents, low-income nonresident parents were 
+
+ more likely to be female, younger, non-Hispanic Black, and report less formal education; 
+ more likely to have never married, report two or more childbearing unions, and have more resident and 
+
+nonresident children under age 21; 
+
+ less likely to have worked in 2017, particularly full-time, year-round; and 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ link to page 18 link to page 20 link to page 20 link to page 26 
+
+ 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ for the subset without any resident children, less likely to report receiving need-tested benefits or having 
+
+health insurance coverage for the year than either low-income nonresident parents who have resident 
+children or low-income resident-only parents in 2017. 
+
+Figure S2. Differences in Selected Characteristics Between Low-Income Nonresident Parents and Moderate- and Higher-
+
+Income Nonresident Parents, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. m = mil ions of parents. For additional notes, s ee Figure 11 and Figure 
+13 . 
+
+A majority of nonresident parents (5.4 million) reported paying child support in 2017. Among nonresident parents who paid 
+anything in child support, the median payment was $4,785, the mean payment was $6,271, and the estimated total amount 
+paid in child support was $33.8 billion. Figure S3 shows that while low-income nonresident parents were less likely to pay 
+child support (and their payments were also smaller in absolute terms), their payments were more likely to be large relative to 
+their income. 
+
+Figure S3. Difference in Child Support-to-Income Ratio Between Low-Income Nonresident Parents and Moderate- and 
+
+Higher-Income Nonresident Parents, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. m = mil ions of parents. For additional notes, s ee Figure 18 . 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 10 link to page 13 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 20 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 24 link to page 26 link to page 26 link to page 27 link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 19 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 20 link to page 22 link to page 22 link to page 23 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Contents 
+
+ Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
+ Characteristics of Nonresident Parents ............................................................................................ 2 
+
+ Demographics of Nonresident Parents ...................................................................................... 3 
+ Relationships of Nonresident Parents ....................................................................................... 5 
+ Economic Circumstances of Nonresident Parents..................................................................... 8 
+
+ Characteristics of Low-Income Nonresident Parents ..................................................................... 11 
+
+ Demographics of Low-Income Nonresident Parents .............................................................. 12 
+ Relationships of Low-Income Nonresident Parents ................................................................ 13 
+ Economic Circumstances of Low-Income Nonresident Parents ............................................. 15 
+
+ Child Support Payments ................................................................................................................ 17 
+
+ Child Support Payments of Nonresident Parents .................................................................... 18 
+ Child Support Payments of Low-Income Nonresident Parents ............................................... 19 
+
+ Policy Considerations .................................................................................................................... 21 
+
+ Employment and Earnings ...................................................................................................... 21 
+ Child Support-Related Policies ............................................................................................... 22 
+ Access to Need-Tested Benefits .............................................................................................. 24 
+Likelihood of Nonresident Parenthood ................................................................................... 24 
+
+ 
+
+ Figures 
+ Figure 1. Distribution of Parents by Residency of Children, 2018 ................................................. 3 
+Figure 2. Sex of Parents, by Residency of Children, 2018 .............................................................. 3 
+ Figure 3. Race/Ethnicity of Parents, by Residency of Children, 2018 ............................................ 4 
+ Figure 4. Educational Attainment of Parents, by Residency of Children, 2017 .............................. 5 
+ Figure 5. Fertility and Number of Children of Nonresident Parents, 2018 ..................................... 7 
+ Figure 6. Frequency of Visitation with Youngest Nonresident Child of Nonresident 
+
+ Parents, 2017 ................................................................................................................................ 8 
+
+ Figure 7. Employment of Parents and Fathers, by Residency of Children, 2017 ............................ 9 
+ Figure 8. Ratio of Family Income-to-Poverty of Parents, by Residency of Children, 2017 ......... 10 
+ Figure 9. Distribution of Nonresident Parents by Family Income-to-Poverty Level in 
+
+ 2017 ............................................................................................................................................. 11 
+
+ Figure 10. Race/Ethnicity of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to-Poverty Level, 
+
+ 2017 ............................................................................................................................................ 12 
+
+ Figure 11. Educational Attainment of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to-Poverty 
+
+ Level, 2017 ................................................................................................................................. 13 
+
+ Figure 12. Marital Status of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to-Poverty Level, 
+
+ 2017 ............................................................................................................................................ 14 
+
+ Figure 13. Employment of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to-Poverty Level, 
+
+ 2017 ............................................................................................................................................ 15 
+
+ Figure 14. Receipt of Need-Tested Benefits and Health Insurance Coverage Among Low- 
+
+ Income Parents, by Residency of Children, 2017 ...................................................................... 17 
+
+ Figure 15. Child Support Payments of Nonresident Parents, 2017 ............................................... 18 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+ link to page 24 link to page 25 link to page 25 link to page 26 link to page 26 link to page 34 link to page 35 link to page 36 link to page 37 link to page 37 link to page 38 link to page 38 link to page 39 link to page 39 link to page 40 link to page 40 link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 42 link to page 43 link to page 43 link to page 31 link to page 34 link to page 44 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 16. Child Support-to-Income Ratio of Nonresident Parents [and Payors], 2017 ............... 19 
+ Figure 17. Child Support Payments of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to-Poverty 
+
+ Level, 2017 ................................................................................................................................. 20 
+
+ Figure 18. Child Support-to-Income Ratio of Nonresident Parents [and Payors], by 
+
+ Family Income-to-Poverty Level, 2017 ..................................................................................... 21 
+
+ 
+
+ Tables 
+ 
+
+ Table B-1. Demographic Characteristics of Parents, by Residency of Children, 2018 ................. 29 
+ Table B-2. Relationships and Fertility of Parents by Residency of Children, 2018 ...................... 30 
+ Table B-3. Employment of Parents by Residency of Children, 2017 ............................................ 31 
+ Table B-4. Income, Need-Tested Benefit Receipt, and Health Insurance Coverage of 
+
+ Parents, by Residency of Children, 2017 ................................................................................... 32 
+
+ Table B-5. Demographic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to- 
+
+ Poverty Level, 2017 ................................................................................................................... 33 
+
+ Table B-6. Relationships and Fertility of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to- 
+
+ Poverty Level, 2017 ................................................................................................................... 34 
+
+ Table B-7. Economic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to- 
+
+ Poverty Level, 2017 ................................................................................................................... 35 
+
+ Table B-8. Need-Tested Benefit Receipt and Health Insurance Coverage of Low-Income 
+
+ Parents, by Residency of Children, 2017 ................................................................................... 36 
+
+ Table B-9. Child Support Payments of Nonresident Parents, 2017 ............................................... 37 
+ Table B-10. Child Support Payments of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to- 
+
+ Poverty Level, 2017 ................................................................................................................... 38 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendixes 
+ Appendix A. Data and Analysis Used in This Report ................................................................... 26 
+ Appendix B. Data Tables ............................................................................................................... 29 
+
+ 
+
+ Contacts 
+ Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 39 
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+ link to page 31 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Introduction 
+ In the United States, there were more than 9.7 million parents who were not living with one or 
+more of their children under age 21 in 2018.1 Federal policymakers have expressed interest in 
+these nonresident parents out of concern for the wellbeing of the parents and the impacts for 
+children who live apart from one or more of their parents.2 (For the purposes of this report, a 
+nonresident parent is a person 15 years or older who does not reside for a majority of nights in the 
+same household as one or more of his or her biological, adopted, or stepchildren under age 21.3) 
+About 21.9 million (26%) children under age 21 had a parent who lived outside their household 
+in 2018.4 Like all parents, nonresident parents can make important emotional, time, financial, and 
+other contributions to their children’s lives. 
+
+Nonresident parents are also of interest to federal policymakers because many are directly 
+affected by one or more government policies. For example, some nonresident parents are eligible 
+for or receive need-tested benefits such as Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
+Program (SNAP), and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).5 Some nonresident parents also 
+receive services from fatherhood initiatives that seek to encourage greater family well-being.6 The 
+Child Support Enforcement program strives to ensure children receive financial support from 
+their parents, even when the children and parent(s) live apart.7 Additionally, criminal justice 
+policies such as incarceration affect a sizable number of nonresident parents.8 
+
+This report uses data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to describe a 
+broad population of nonresident parents in the United States.9 The most recent, publicly available 
+data that meet the Census Bureau’s Statistical Quality Standards are from interviews conducted in 
+2018. Depending on the topic, the survey asked respondents for their information as of the time 
+they were surveyed (in 2018) or reflecting their status during the prior calendar year (2017). The 
+values presented in this report are estimates with a margin of error. Unless otherwise noted, the 
+differences in values between groups highlighted in this report are statistically different from zero 
+
+ 
+1 The Congressional Research Service (CRS) tabulated this estimate based on data from the 2018 Survey of Income and 
+Program Participation (SIPP). This estimate likely undercounts the number of nonresident parents for reasons discussed 
+in more detail in Appendix A . 
+
+2 The term nonresident as used in this report does not refer to parents’ residency status in the United States or any other 
+country (e.g., for immigration or tax purposes). The term noncustodial parents is sometimes used to refer to the same 
+group of parents labeled as nonresident parents in this report. 
+
+3 For additional detail on determining household membership in the SIPP, see U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 Survey of 
+Income and Program Participation Users’ Guide , August 2020, pp. 14-18 (hereinafter, “U.S. Census Bureau, 2020”). 
+4 Timothy Grall, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2017 , U.S. Census Bureau, May 2020, p. 15 
+(hereinafter, “Grall, 2020”). 
+5 For more information, see CRS Report R46823, Need-Tested Benefits: Who Receives Assistance? . 
+6 For more information, see CRS Report RL31025, Fatherhood Initiatives: Connecting Fathers to Their Children . 
+7 For more information, see CRS Report RS22380, Child Support Enforcement: Program Basics . 
+8 For example, an analysis of data from the Survey of Prison Inmates estimates that there were 0.7 million nonresident 
+parents (with a biological or adopted child age 17 or younger) residing in a federal or state prison in 2016; see Laura M. 
+Maruschak, Jennifer Bronson, and Mariel Alper, Parents In Prison And Their Minor Children , U.S. Department of 
+Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, March 2021. 
+
+9 For recent reviews of potential data sources on nonresident parents, see Kye Lippold, Estimating the Nonresident 
+Parent Population in National Surveys , Urban Institute, April 2017 (hereinafter, “Lippold, 2017”); and J. Bart Stykes, 
+Wendy D. Manning, and Susan L. Brown, “Nonresident Fathers and Formal Child Support: Evidence from the CPS, 
+the NSFG, and the SIPP,” Demographic Research, vol. 29 (December 2013), pp. 1299-1330 (hereinafter, “Stykes, 
+Manning, and Brown, 2013”). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+1 
+
+ 
+ link to page 31 link to page 34 link to page 8 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+at the 10% significance level. This analysis does not identify causal relationships between 
+nonresident parenthood and other characteristics (e.g., education), as that would require more 
+rigorous methodology and detailed data than are presented here. Additional discussion of the data 
+and analysis used in this report is included in Appendix A . 
+
+This report first presents selected demographic, relationship, and economic characteristics of 
+nonresident parents. These results are compared to the characteristics of all other parents, who 
+exclusively have resident children. Next, the report focuses on similar characteristics for low-
+income nonresident parents, a subpopulation of particular interest to policymakers. The report 
+then presents estimates of the child support payments of nonresident parents, as child support can 
+be a significant expense for these parents and source of income support for their nonresident 
+children. The final section discusses several potential implications of this report’s analysis for 
+Congress. Report findings are presented in more detail in the data tables in Appendix B . 
+
+ Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+ Among the civilian, noninstitutionalized population in 2018, there were an estimated nearly 9.7 
+million nonresident parents who were living apart from one or more of their children under age 
+21. This includes over 5.6 million parents who were living apart from all of their children under 
+age 21 and more than 4.0 million who had both nonresident and resident children.10 Another 67.0 
+million parents reported they were living with all of their children under age 21. Combined, this 
+totals to an estimate of 76.7 million parents in 2018. Figure 1 illustrates how the population of 
+nonresident parents was fairly large in absolute terms but accounted for a relatively small 
+proportion (13%) of the total parent population. 
+
+There are no reliable data on long-term trends in the share of parents who have nonresident 
+children. The share of children living apart from one or more of their parents does not appear to 
+have changed much between 2004 and 2018,11 although it may have increased modestly between 
+1996 and 200912 and more substantially between 1968 and the mid-1990s.13 These findings might 
+indicate that the share of parents who have nonresident children increased between 1968 and the 
+mid-1990s or early 2000s, but changed little in more recent years. 
+
+ 
+10 The figures for these subgroups do not sum to the total of 9.7 million nonresident parents because of rounding. 
+11 Grall, 2020, p.15; Timothy Grall, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2003 , U.S. Census 
+Bureau, July 2006, p. 12; and Krista K. Payne, Children’s Family Structure, 2019 (Family Profiles, FP-19-25), 
+National Center for Family & Marriage Research at Bowling Green State University, 2019. 
+
+12 Wendy D. Manning, Susan L. Brown, and J. Bart Stykes, “Family Complexity among Children in the United 
+States,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , vol. 654, no. 1 (July 2014), p. 57. 
+13 Paul Hemez and Chanell Washington, “Number of Children Living Only With Their Mothers Has Doubled in Past 
+50 Years,” America Counts: Stories Behind the Numbers, U.S. Census Bureau, April 2021. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+2 
+
+ 
+ link to page 8 
+
+ 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 1. Distribution of Parents by Residency of Children, 2018 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both nonresident 
+and resident children. m = mil ions of parents. Groups may not sum to totals or 100% due to rounding. 
+
+ Demographics of Nonresident Parents 
+ Nonresident parents were disproportionately 
+likely to be male, as displayed i n Figure 2 . 
+
+ Figure 2. Sex of Parents, by Residency of 
+
+An estimated 75% (7.2 million) of 
+
+ Children, 2018 
+
+nonresident parents were fathers and 25% 
+(2.5 million) were mothers. For comparison, 
+fathers made up 43% (28.6 million) of parents 
+who exclusively had resident children. While 
+fathers’ direct involvement in childrearing has 
+increased in recent decades in the United 
+States, and custody laws have generally 
+shifted from maternal preference to the best 
+interests of the child, mothers are still much 
+
+ 
+
+more likely to be awarded sole or primary 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+
+custody over children following a divorce, 
+
+ Notes: Parents with children under age 21. 
+
+“Nonresident parents” includes parents who had 
+
+separation, or nonmarital birth.14 
+
+both nonresident and resident children. m = mil ions 
+
+More than two-thirds of nonresident parents 
+
+of parents. Groups may not sum to 100% due to 
+
+were between the ages of 30 and 49 in 2018, 
+
+rounding. 
+
+including 30% (2.9 million) who were in their 30s and 38% (3.6 million) who were in their 40s. 
+An estimated 12% of nonresident parents (1.1 million) were young persons between the ages of 
+15 and 29, and the remaining 20% (1.9 million) were age 50 or older.15 A greater share of 
+nonresident parents than resident-only parents were age 40 or older. The typically older age of 
+nonresident parents likely reflects a number of factors, including that they were more often male 
+(on average, fathers are older than mothers at the time of childbirth16) and that the probability of a 
+
+ 
+14 See Grall, 2020, p. 2; Daniel R. Meyer, Marcia J. Carlson, and Md Moshi Ul Alam, 2018–2020 Child Support Policy 
+Research Agreement Task 12: Changes in Placement after Divorce and Implications for Child Support Policy , Institute 
+for Research on Poverty (IRP) for Wisconsin Department of Children and Families (WI DCF), December 20, 2019, p. 
+1; and Yiyu Chen, “Does a Nonresident Parent have the Right to Make Decisions for his Nonmarital Children?: Trends 
+in Legal Custody Among Paternity Cases,” Children and Youth Services Review , vol. 51 (April 2015), pp. 55-56. 
+15 Age was reported as of the survey date in 2018. 
+16 See Table II in Yash S. Khandwala et al., “The Age of Fathers in the USA is Rising: An Analysis of 168,867,480 
+births from 1972 to 2015,” Human Reproduction , vol. 32, no. 10 (October 2017), pp. 2110-2116. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+3 
+
+ 
+ link to page 9 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+parent living apart from his or her child is generally cumulative and increases as the child (and 
+parent) ages.17 
+
+ Figure 3 shows that in 2018 the majority of parents were White, non-Hispanic, including 54% 
+(5.2 million) of nonresident parents. An estimated 19% (1.8 million) of nonresident parents were 
+Black, non-Hispanic, a disproportionate share when compared with resident-only parents (12%). 
+An additional 20% (2.0 million) of nonresident parents were Hispanic and 7% (0.6 million) had 
+other racial backgrounds. (In terms of race, the designation “other” used in this analysis refers to 
+persons who did not identify exclusively as White or Black—for example, it includes persons 
+who identified as Asian, Native American, or mixed race/multiracial. Persons who identified as 
+Hispanic origin/ethnicity comprise the fourth category. The level of detail presented for 
+race/ethnicity reflects the available SIPP data and sample size limitations.) One factor that may 
+contribute to the elevated share of nonresident parents who were Black may be the higher 
+prevalence of early (in life), unintended,18 and nonmarital (increasingly cohabiting) childbearing 
+among Black parents,19 as research finds that these relationship forms are more likely to dissolve 
+and result in a parent living apart from their child(ren) than other forms of childbearing 
+relationships in the United States.20 (Childbearing and the intimate relationships that 
+contextualize it are themselves influenced by many factors.21) 
+
+ Figure 3. Race/Ethnicity of Parents, by Residency of Children, 2018 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident” includes parents who had both nonresident and 
+resident children. The designation “other” refers to persons who did not identify exclusively as White or Black 
+in terms of race—for example, it includes persons who identified as Asian, Native American, or mixed 
+race/multiracial. m = mil ions of parents. Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
+
+ 
+17 Marcia J. Carlson and Sara S. McLanahan, “Fathers in Fragile Families,” in The Role of the Father in Child 
+Development , 5th ed., ed. Michael E. Lamb (John Wiley & Sons, 2010), pp. 254, 256. 
+
+18 “Unintended pregnancies and births are those that occur earlier than desired [‘mistimed’] or among those who want 
+no [more] children [‘unwanted.’]”; see Karen Benjamin Guzzo and Sarah R. Hayford, “Pathways to Parenthood in 
+Social and Family Contexts: Decade in Review, 2020,” Journal of Marriage and Family , vol. 82, no. 1 (February 
+2020), p. 119 (hereinafter, “Guzzo and Hayford, 2020”). 
+
+19 Huijing Wu, “Trends in Births to Single and Cohabiting Mothers, 1980-2014” (Family Profiles, FP-17-04), National 
+Center for Family & Marriage Research at Bowling Green State University, 2017; and Guzzo and Hayford, 2020, p. 
+123. 
+
+20 Susan L. Brown, J. Bart Stykes, and Wendy D. Manning, “Trends in Children’s Family Instability, 1995–2010,” 
+ Journal of Marriage and Family , vol. 78, no. 5 (October 2016), pp. 1173-1183; and Guzzo and Hayford, 2020, p. 120. 
+
+21 Guzzo and Hayford, 2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+4 
+
+ 
+ link to page 10 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 4 illustrates that nonresident parents had lower levels of formal educational attainment 
+than resident-only parents in 2018.22 An estimated 15% (1.5 million) of nonresident parents had 
+not completed high school, 35% (3.4 million) had a high school diploma or its equivalent, and 
+22% (2.1 million) had some postsecondary experience but no college degree. In contrast, an 
+estimated 10% (6.7 million) resident-only parents had not completed high school, 24% (16.1 
+million) had a high school diploma or its equivalent, and 16% (10.7 million) had some 
+postsecondary experience but no college degree. While 19% (1.8 million) of nonresident parents 
+had a Bachelor’s degree or higher level of education, 39% of resident-only parents had achieved 
+the same. Many factors are relevant to the formal education levels observed among nonresident 
+parents. For example, less formal education is associated with a higher rate of early, unintended, 
+and nonmarital childbearing,23 which, as previously noted, are in turn associated with a greater 
+likelihood of living apart from one’s children. Educational attainment is itself influenced by many 
+factors,24 and education is just one factor that may influence the likelihood of becoming a 
+nonresident parent. 
+
+ Figure 4. Educational Attainment of Parents, by Residency of Children, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident” includes parents who had both nonresident and 
+resident children. Education reflects a person’s highest level of attainment as of December 2017; some parents 
+may have stil been enrol ed in school. The category “some col ege” includes any postsecondary education short 
+of a degree. m = mil ions of parents. Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
+
+ Relationships of Nonresident Parents 
+ An estimated 36% (3.5 million) of nonresident parents were currently married, compared with 
+76% of resident-only parents, in 2018.25 Another 6% (0.6 million) of nonresident parents were 
+separated and 32% (3.1 million) were divorced.26 Nearly 25% (2.4 million) of nonresident parents 
+had never married, which was greater than the rate of 14% for resident-only parents. As discussed 
+ 
+22 Education as reported in this analysis reflects a person’s highest level of attainment as of December 2017; some 
+parents may have still been enrolled in school. 
+
+23 Pamela J. Smock and Christine R. Schwartz, “The Demography of Families: A Review of Patterns and Change,” 
+ Journal of Marriage and Family , vol. 81, no. 1 (February 2020), p. 16; and Guzzo and Hayford, 2020, pp. 119-120. 
+
+24 See, for example, Greg J. Duncan and Richard J. Murnane, eds., Whither Opportunity? Rising Inequality, Schools, 
+and Children’s Life Chances (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011). 
+
+25 Marital status is reported as of the survey date in 2018. 
+26 Results for the widowed are not presented because the estimate for this category among nonresident parents is less 
+reliable due to a small sample size and large standard error. As a result, the values for marital status groups presented in 
+this report will not sum to 100%. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+5 
+
+ 
+ link to page 12 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+previously, nonmarital childbearing is associated with a greater likelihood of nonresident 
+parenthood. 
+
+ Figure 5 presents the fertility27 and child residency relationships of nonresident parents.28 The 
+majority of nonresident parents, 59% (5.7 million), had biologically fathered or given birth to a 
+child in one relationship. A large minority of nonresident parents had had children with more than 
+one partner, including 31% (3.0 million) with two partners and 8% (0.8 million) with three or 
+more partners. For comparison, 82% of resident-only parents had had children with one partner, 
+13% had two childbearing unions, and 3% had three or more childbearing unions. (A small 
+proportion of parents, including some nonresident parents, solely have children as the result of 
+step or adoptive relationships.29) The number of childbearing unions (e.g., multi-partner fertility) 
+is analyzed here because it may have important policy implications, as parents may find it more 
+challenging to allocate emotional, financial, and other forms of support to children involving 
+different households or caregiving partners (e.g., co-parenting).30 Research finds that unstable and 
+serial romantic relationships, unintended childbearing, and the social norms and elevated status 
+associated with being a parent may contribute to multi-partner fertility.31 
+
+The majority of nonresident parents, 58% (5.6 million), did not have any of their children under 
+age 21 living with them. Still, many nonresident parents were living with one or more of their 
+biological, step, or adopted children under age 21.32 An estimated 20% (1.9 million) of 
+nonresident parents had one resident child, 13% (1.3 million) had two resident children, and 8% 
+(0.8 million) had three or more resident children under age 21. 
+
+A majority of nonresident parents, 58% (5.6 million), reported living apart from only one of their 
+children under age 21. Another 29% (2.8 million) of nonresident parents had two nonresident 
+children, and 13% (1.3 million) had three or more nonresident children. 
+
+ 
+27 This report uses the term fertility to refer to reproductive outcome or performance (a definition associated with the 
+social science discipline of demography). In this report, fertility is not a reference to the capability to bear children. 
+
+28 Fertility and children (number, residency) were reported as of the survey date in 2018. 
+29 Results for “zero” (biological) childbearing unions are not presented because the estimate for this category among 
+nonresident parents is less reliable due to a small sample size and large standard error. As a result, the values for the 
+groups of parents by number of childbearing unions presented in this report will not sum to 100%. 
+
+30 See Lawrence M. Berger et al., “Do Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers Trade Families? Economic Contributions to 
+Children in Multiple Families,” Social Service Review , vol. 93, no. 2 (June 2019), pp. 183-217; and Laura Tach et al., 
+“The Family-Go-Round: Family Complexity and Father Involvement from a Father’s Perspective,” The ANNALS of the 
+American Academy of Political and Social Science , vol. 654, no. 1 (July 2014), pp. 169-184 (hereinafter, “Tach et al., 
+2014”). 
+31 For additional discussion, see Tach et al., 2014; and Karen Benjamin Guzzo, “New Partners, More Kids: Multiple-
+Partner Fertility in the United States,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , vol. 654, 
+no. 1 (July 2014), pp. 66-86. 
+
+32 In some cases, adults may be identified as the stepparent of a resident child even though they are not married to a 
+biological parent of the child. Correspondence between CRS and Shelley Irving, SIPP Coordination and Outreach Staff, 
+U.S. Census Bureau, December 23, 2019. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+6 
+
+ 
+ link to page 13 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 5. Fertility and Number of Children of Nonresident Parents, 2018 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. Fertility and children (number, residency) were reported as of the survey date 
+in 2018. For the number of childbearing unions, a relatively small number of parents may have had “zero” (no 
+biological children, exclusively step or adopted children); this estimate is not presented because it may be less 
+reliable due to a small sample size. Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding, and because an estimate for 
+zero childbearing unions is not presented. 
+
+ Figure 6 shows that nonresident parents frequently reported seeing their youngest nonresident 
+child in the year preceding the survey. (The SIPP exclusively collects information on child 
+contact for parents’ youngest nonresident child.) Thirty-two percent (3.0 million), of nonresident 
+parents saw their youngest nonresident child several times a week. Another 12% (1.2 million) saw 
+their youngest nonresident child about once a week, 17% (1.7 million) saw their youngest 
+nonresident child one to three times a month, and 22% (2.2 million) of saw their youngest 
+nonresident child one to several times a year. Finally, 17% (1.6 million) of parents did not see 
+their youngest nonresident child during the previous year. Nonresident parents vary in their desire 
+to interact with some or all of their nonresident children, and in their success in acting upon any 
+intentions to see them.33 The costs to interact with a nonresident child may outweigh the value a 
+parent places on continued contact. Interested nonresident parents may face barriers to contact 
+with their child, including legal access to the child, their relationship with the child’s other parent 
+or caregivers, new family obligations, physical distance, mental and behavioral health challenges 
+(e.g., depression, substance use), and constrained economic circumstances.34 There are also many 
+reasons why a child’s caregiver(s) may seek to restrict a nonresident parent’s access, including 
+
+ 
+33 Tach et al., 2014, pp. 178-181. 
+34 Robin Dion et al., Parents and Children Together: The Complex Needs of Low-Income Men and How Responsible 
+Fatherhood Programs Address Them , U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for 
+Children and Families (ACF), Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation, March 2018, pp. 5-8, 16-19; Kathryn Edin 
+and Timothy Nelson, Doing the Best I Can: Fatherhood in the Inner City (University of California Press, 2013); and 
+Jennifer M. Randles, Essential Dads: The Inequalities and Politics of Fathering (University of California Press, 2020). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+7 
+
+ 
+ link to page 14 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+concern for the child or caregiver’s safety35 and the nonresident parent’s competence with 
+childrearing responsibilities.36 
+
+ Figure 6. Frequency of Visitation with Youngest Nonresident Child of Nonresident 
+
+ Parents, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. Visitation data were reported for the previous calendar year (2017). Groups 
+may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
+
+ Economic Circumstances of Nonresident Parents 
+ Figure 7 illustrates that nonresident parents (particularly nonresident fathers) had lower levels of 
+employment than parents (particularly fathers) with resident-only children in 2017. Panel A 
+presents the employment distribution for all parents in 2017, showing that nonresident parents 
+had modestly lower levels of employment than resident-only parents. The majority of nonresident 
+parents, 57% (5.5 million), worked full-time, year-round. Another 25% (2.4 million) of 
+nonresident parents worked either part-time or part-year. Finally, 19% (1.8 million) of 
+nonresident parents did not work at all. 
+
+However, the comparison of employment by child residency in Panel A is limited because 
+nonresident parents are more likely than resident-only parents to be male and men are more likely 
+to be employed than women in the United States.37 Panel B restricts the analysis of employment 
+to fathers, highlighting that nonresident fathers had substantially lower levels of employment than 
+resident-only fathers in 2017. Sixty-two percent (4.5 million) of nonresident fathers worked full-
+time, year-round, which was less than the 78% (22.4 million) of resident-only fathers who 
+worked as much. Sixteen percent (1.2 million) of nonresident fathers did not work at all, which 
+was a greater proportion than the 7% (2 million) of resident-only fathers without employment. 
+(By comparison, nonresident mothers and resident-only mothers had rates of employment that 
+were similar to one another in the SIPP data, results which are not presented here.) 
+
+ 
+35 Maureen R. Waller and Raymond Swisher, “Fathers’ Risk Factors in Fragile Families: Implications for ‘Healthy’ 
+Relationships and Father Involvement,”” Social Problems , vol. 53, no. 3 (August 2006), pp. 392-420. 
+36 Yoshie Sano, Leslie N. Richards, and Anisa M. Zvonkovic, “Are Mothers Really ‘Gatekeepers’ of Children? Rural 
+Mothers’ Perceptions of Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement in Low-Income Families,” Journal of Family Issues , vol. 
+29, no. 12 (December 2008), pp. 1714-1715. 
+
+37 In 2018, the employment rate was 86% for males aged 25-54 and 73% for females aged 25-44; see CRS Report 
+R45330, Labor Market Patterns Since 2007 . 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+8 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 7. Employment of Parents and Fathers, by Residency of Children, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. “Ful -time” is defined as working 35 or more hours a week for 50% or more 
+of the weeks worked in 2017. “Year-round” is defined as working 50 weeks or more in 2017. m = mil ions of 
+parents. Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
+
+The most common reason nonresident parents who did not work in 2017 reported not working for 
+pay was because of a chronic health condition or disability; this was reported by 41% (0.8 
+million) of these parents.38 Nonresident parents also commonly reported that they were not 
+working because of caregiving responsibilities (13%), they were unable to find work (12%), or 
+they were retired (10%).39 Resident-only parents were less likely to report not working because of 
+a chronic health condition or disability, inability to find work, or retirement, and more likely to 
+report not working because of caregiving responsibilities. Part, but not all, of the differences 
+between nonresident parents and resident-only parents in reported reasons for not working can be 
+explained by differences in the sex composition of these groups. For example, nonresident 
+
+ 
+38 Reasons for not working presented here were for not working in December 2017. Information is unavailable about 
+reasons for not working for a small number of persons categorized as nonworkers in the analysis underlying Figure 7 
+because the SIPP classifies these persons as employed even though they worked zero hours during the year. For 
+example, a person may report that they were absent from a job or personal business without pay for the entire year. 
+Because the SIPP considers this person employed, albeit at a job that did not involve any hours of work, the SIPP 
+would not ask this person why they were not working for pay. 
+
+39 SIPP respondents can agree to more than one reason for not working. Less frequently reported reasons are not 
+presented here because smaller sample sizes make those estimates less reliable. Other reasons for not working that SIPP 
+respondents can agree to include temporarily unable to work because of injury or illness, not interested in working, 
+going to school, layoff, and working without pay for a family business. In addition, the reason “other” is not presented 
+here because there is no clear interpretation for this response. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
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+
+9 
+
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+ link to page 15 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+parents are more likely than resident-only parents to be male, and men are consistently more 
+likely than women to report not working for health or disability reasons and less likely to report 
+not working because of caregiving responsibilities.40 
+
+A sizable minority of nonresident parents (and a higher percentage than resident-only parents) 
+reported having little or no personal or family income, which may constrain some of these 
+parents’ ability to support themselves and their children financially. (The data reported here 
+reflect income in 2017 from a broad range of sources, including business income, investments, 
+social insurance programs, and need-tested programs, not just employment income.) Over a third 
+(3.4 million) of nonresident parents reported receiving less than $20,000 annually in personal 
+income,41 while 23% (2.2 million) reported receiving $60,000 or higher. Resident-only parents 
+were less likely than nonresident parents to report receiving an income between $1 and $59,999, 
+and 31% of resident-only parents reported receiving $60,000 or higher. 
+
+ Figure 8 shows how nonresident parents also have lower family income-to-poverty ratios than 
+resident-only parents. Nearly 18% (1.7 million) of nonresident parents reported a family income 
+that was less than the official poverty thresholds in 2017, and an additional 18% (1.7 million) 
+reported a modestly higher family income that was still less than 200% of the official poverty 
+thresholds. Thirty-four percent (3.3 million) of nonresident parents reported a family income 
+greater than 400% of the official poverty thresholds. In comparison, resident-only parents 
+reported higher levels of income, with 12% reporting a poverty-level family income and 43% 
+reporting a family income that was greater than 400% of the official poverty thresholds. The next 
+section of the report examines low-income nonresident parents in more detail. 
+
+ Figure 8. Ratio of Family Income-to-Poverty of Parents, by Residency of Children, 
+
+ 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident” includes parents who had both nonresident and 
+resident children. Income data were reported for the previous calendar year (2017). m = mil ions of parents. 
+Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
+
+ 
+40 For data on differences in reasons for not working between men and women, see Steven F. Hipple, “People Who Are 
+Not in the Labor Force: Why Aren't They Working?,” Beyond the Numbers: Employment and Unemployment , vol. 4, 
+no. 15 (December 2015), pp. 8-15. 
+
+41 This includes individuals with negative personal income. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+10 
+
+ 
+ link to page 16 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Characteristics of Low-Income Nonresident Parents 
+ In recent years, observers have expressed concern that some nonresident parents are economically 
+vulnerable and struggling to support themselves and their children.42 The children of low-income 
+nonresident parents are disproportionately likely to be economically vulnerable as well.43 This 
+report defines low income as a family income-to-poverty ratio of less than 200% of the official 
+poverty thresholds.44 Figure 9 shows there were an estimated 3.4 million low-income nonresident 
+parents in 2017, with the remaining 6.2 million nonresident parents having a family income at or 
+above 200% of the official poverty thresholds (referred to as moderate- and higher-income 
+nonresident parents in this report). In light of policymaker interest in low-income populations, 
+this section compares the circumstances of low-income nonresident parents relative to moderate- 
+and higher-income nonresident parents. (Many factors affect income, regardless of whether a 
+person is a nonresident parent. Discussing the causes of low income, why certain characteristics 
+such as race or education are associated with low income in the United States, and the extensive 
+literature related to these topics is beyond the scope of this report.) This section concludes by 
+comparing the receipt of need-tested benefits and the health insurance status of low-income 
+nonresident parents to low-income, resident-only parents. 
+
+ Figure 9. Distribution of Nonresident Parents by Family Income-to-Poverty Level in 
+
+ 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. “Low income” is defined as having a family income that is less than 200% of 
+the official poverty thresholds in 2017. 
+
+ 
+42 For example, see Ronald B. Mincy, Monique Jethwani, and Serena Klempin, Failing our Fathers: Confronting the 
+Crisis of Economically Vulnerable Nonresident Fathers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); and American 
+Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Brookings Institution Working Group on Poverty and Opportunity, Opportunity, 
+Responsibility, and Security: A Consensus Plan for Reducing Poverty and Restoring the American Dream , December 
+2015, pp. 38-39. 
+
+43 Marilyn Sinkewicz and Irwin Garfinkel, “Unwed Fathers’ Ability to Pay Child Support: New Estimates Accounting 
+for Multiple-Partner Fertility,” Demography , vol. 46, no. 2 (May 2009), p. 259. 
+
+44 In 2020, an income less than 200% of the official poverty thresholds would have bene equivalent to less than $26,929 
+for a single person under age 65 living with no related children under age 18. Poverty thresholds vary by family size 
+and composition; see U.S. Census Bureau, “Poverty Thresholds,” at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/
+demo/income-poverty/historical-poverty-thresholds.html. Analyzing persons with income less than 200% of the official 
+poverty thresholds is a common practice in the research literature. For example, below 200% is one of the ratios of 
+income to poverty reported by the Census Bureau in its annual poverty reports; see Jessica Semega et al., Income and 
+Poverty in the United States: 2019 , U.S. Census Bureau, September 2020, pp. 18-19 (hereinafter, “Semega et al., 
+2020”). Households with income below 200% of poverty reported relatively higher rates of material hardship than 
+more well-off households; see Table 2 of John Iceland, Claire Kovach, and John Creamer, “Poverty and the Incidence 
+of Material Hardship, Revisited,” Social Science Quarterly , vol. 102, no. 1 (January 2021), pp. 585-617. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+11 
+
+ 
+ link to page 17 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Demographics of Low-Income Nonresident Parents 
+ While most low-income nonresident parents were male, nonresident mothers comprised a 
+relatively large share (35%) of this group in 2017. A little over 65% (2.2 million) of low-income 
+nonresident parents were male, compared with nearly 80% (5.0 million) of moderate- and higher-
+income nonresident parents. Prior research finds that nonresident mothers are disproportionately 
+likely to be low-income.45 
+
+Most low-income nonresident parents were in their 30s or 40s, though they were more likely to 
+be relatively younger than moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents. About 16% (0.6 
+million) of low-income nonresident parents were under age 30, compared with 9% (0.6 million) 
+of moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents. Thirty-three percent (1.1 million) of low-
+income nonresident parents were in their 40s, compared with 40% (2.5 million) of moderate- and 
+higher-income nonresident parents. The shares of nonresident parents who were in their 30s or 
+were 50 or older were similar across low-income and other nonresident parents. 
+
+About 50% (1.7 million) of all low-income nonresident parents were White, non-Hispanic, as 
+illustrated i n Figure 10 . Black, non-Hispanic parents made up another 23% (0.8 million) of low-
+income nonresident parents, a relatively disproportionate share. By comparison, 56% (3.5 
+million) of moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents were White, non-Hispanic, and a 
+relatively smaller share of 17% (1.0 million) were Black, non-Hispanic. The percentage of low-
+income and moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents who were Hispanic or other, non-
+Hispanic were similar. The differences in income by racial and ethnic category are not unique to 
+nonresident parents; low income is more common for Black people and less common for White, 
+non-Hispanic people among the overall U.S. population as well.46 
+
+ Figure 10. Race/Ethnicity of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to-Poverty 
+
+ Level, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. “Low income” is defined as having a family income that is less than 200% of 
+the official poverty thresholds in 2017. The designation “other” refers to persons who do not exclusively identify 
+as White or Black in terms of race—for example, it includes persons who identify as Asian, Native American, or 
+mixed race/multiracial. m = mil ions of parents. Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
+
+ 
+45 Kate Stirling and Thomas Aldrich, “Economic Inequities in Child Support: The Role of Gender,” Journal of Divorce 
+& Remarriage , vol. 53, no. 5 (July 2012), pp. 330-333. 
+
+46 Semega et al., 2020, p. 59. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+12 
+
+ 
+ link to page 18 link to page 19 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 11 presents the education distribution of low-income and moderate- and higher-income 
+nonresident parents in 2017, which demonstrates that education and income are positively 
+associated with one another among nonresident parents (just as they are among the overall U.S. 
+population).47 Low-income nonresident parents were approximately twice as likely to have not 
+completed high school, with 23% (0.8 million) having less than a high school education, 
+compared with 11% (0.7 million) of moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents. While 9% 
+(0.3 million) of low-income nonresident parents had a Bachelor’s degree or higher, nearly 25% 
+(1.5 million) of moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents had a Bachelor’s degree or 
+higher. 
+
+ Figure 11. Educational Attainment of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to- 
+
+ Poverty Level, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. “Low income” is defined as having a family income that is less than 200% of 
+the official poverty thresholds in 2017. Education reflects a person’s highest level of attainment as of December 
+2017; some parents may have stil been enrol ed in school. The category “some col ege” includes any 
+postsecondary education short of a degree. m = mil ions of parents. Groups may not sum to 100% due to 
+rounding. 
+
+ Relationships of Low-Income Nonresident Parents 
+ Similar to race/ethnicity and education, marital status is strongly associated with income among 
+nonresident parents (just as it is among the overall U.S. population).48 As shown i n Figure 12 , 
+ 34% (1.2 million) of low-income nonresident parents in 2017 had never married, compared with 
+20% (1.2 million) of moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents. Twenty-seven percent 
+(0.9 million) of low-income nonresident parents were currently married, compared with 42% (2.6 
+million) of moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents. 
+
+ 
+47 See, for example, Semega et al., 2020, p. 18. 
+48 See, for example, Marianne Cooper and Allison J. Pugh, “Families Across the Income Spectrum: A Decade in 
+Review,” Journal of Marriage and Family , vol. 82, no. 1 (February 2020), p. 275 (hereinafter, “Cooper and Pugh, 
+2020”). 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+13 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 12. Marital Status of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to-Poverty 
+
+ Level, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. “Low income” is defined as having a family income that is less than 200% of 
+the official poverty thresholds in 2017. Marital status was reported as of the survey date in 2018. m = mil ions of 
+parents. Groups may not sum to 100% because an estimate for the widowed is not presented here (it may be 
+less reliable due to a small sample size) and due to rounding. 
+
+Low-income nonresident parents had, on average, more childbearing unions and children, 
+resident or nonresident, than moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents.49 
+
+ Forty-nine percent (1.7 million) of low-income nonresident parents had two or 
+
+more childbearing unions, compared with 35% (2.2 million) of moderate- and 
+higher-income nonresident parents. 
+
+ Twenty-five percent (0.9 million) of low-income nonresident parents had two or 
+
+more resident children under age 21, compared with 20% (1.2 million) of 
+moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents. (The share of nonresident 
+parents with zero resident children was similar between the two groups at about 
+58%, while a smaller share of low-income nonresident parents than moderate- 
+and higher-income nonresident parents had one resident child.) 
+
+ Nearly 18% (0.6 million) of low-income nonresident parents had three or more 
+
+nonresident children under age 21, compared with 11% (0.5 million) of 
+moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents. A larger proportion of 
+moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents had either one or two 
+nonresident child(ren), relative to low-income nonresident parents. 
+
+The finding that low-income nonresident parents tended to have more childbearing unions and 
+children than moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents aligns with previous research 
+finding that multi-partner fertility is more prevalent among low-income adults50 and that there is a 
+
+ 
+49 One qualifier to these results is that the presence of more resident children—while holding all other factors 
+constant—will often mechanically increase measured poverty, as the official poverty thresholds are partly based on 
+family size and children typically do not earn income. Therefore, it may not be surprising to find that there was a higher 
+proportion of nonresident parents with two or more resident children among the low-income group. 
+
+50 Lindsay M. Monte, “Multiple-Partner Fertility in the United States: A Demographic Portrait,” Demography , vol. 56, 
+no. 1 (February 2019), pp. 115, 118. 
+
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+
+ 
+
+14 
+
+ 
+ link to page 39 link to page 20 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+negative association between the number of children and income-to-poverty ratios among the 
+overall U.S. population.51 
+
+Low-income nonresident parents reported seeing their youngest nonresident child at lower levels 
+than moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents in 2017 (see Table B-6 ) . However, prior 
+research on the relationship between nonresident parent income and parent-child contact has 
+produced mixed findings, so the results for 2017 from SIPP data should be interpreted with 
+caution.52 
+
+ Economic Circumstances of Low-Income Nonresident Parents 
+ Low-income nonresident parents were more likely not to be working compared with moderate- 
+and higher-income nonresident parents in 2017, as illustrated i n Figure 13 . Thirty-eight percent 
+(1.3 million) of low-income nonresident parents were not working, compared with 8% (0.5 
+million) of moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents. Twenty-seven percent (0.9 million) 
+of low-income nonresident parents worked full-time, year-round, substantially less than the 73% 
+(4.6 million) of moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents who worked with this 
+regularity. Low-income nonresident parents who did not work for pay in 2017 were similar to 
+nonresident parents overall in that they were most likely to report not working because of a 
+chronic health condition or disability (30%), an inability to find work (10%), or caregiving 
+responsibilities (9%). 
+
+ Figure 13. Employment of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to-Poverty Level, 
+
+ 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. “Low income” is defined as having a family income that is less than 200% of 
+the official poverty thresholds in 2017. “Ful -time” is defined as working 35 or more hours a week for 50% or 
+more of the weeks worked in 2017. “Year-round” is defined as working 50 weeks or more in 2017. m = mil ions 
+of parents. Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
+
+ 
+51 U.S. Census Bureau, “Current Population Survey Detailed Tables for Poverty: Table POV-04,” at 
+https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/cps-pov/pov-04.html. 
+
+52 For a literature review and original findings, see Angela Guarin and Daniel R. Meyer, “Are Low Earnings of 
+Nonresidential Fathers a Barrier to their Involvement with Children?,” Children and Youth Services Review , vol. 91, 
+(August 2018), pp. 304-318. 
+
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+
+ 
+
+15 
+
+ 
+ link to page 22 link to page 40 link to page 22 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 14 compares the receipt of select need-tested benefits and year-round health insurance 
+coverage among low-income nonresident parents and low-income resident-only parents in 2017. 
+(In results presented in Table B-7 , low-income nonresident parents were more likely to receive 
+need-tested benefits and less likely to have health insurance coverage than moderate- and higher-
+income nonresident parents. However, this finding is not particularly revealing, as need-tested 
+refers to the practice of limiting benefits to those meeting a test of low income or other financial 
+resources,53 and because it is already well-documented that low income is associated with a 
+greater lack of health insurance coverage in the United States.54) The analysis in this report 
+compares low-income nonresident parents to low-income resident-only parents to explore the 
+less-examined phenomenon of how different parent-child relationships affect benefit receipt and 
+health insurance coverage. The need-tested benefits included in this analysis are the EITC,55 
+SNAP,56 and Medicaid.57 Other need-tested benefits are excluded either because they were 
+received less frequently58 or not measured by the SIPP.59 Panel A i n Figure 14 shows that low-
+income nonresident parents were less likely to report receiving the EITC (21%; 0.7 million) or 
+having year-round health insurance coverage (68%; 2.3 million) than low-income resident-only 
+parents. In contrast, low-income nonresident parents reported receiving SNAP (33%, 1.1 million) 
+and Medicaid (39%, 1.3 million) at rates comparable to low-income resident-only parents. 
+
+However, the comparison in Panel A of benefit receipt by whether parents had nonresident 
+children is limited because the major need-tested programs often restrict eligibility by whether 
+adults have qualifying relationships with resident children.60 This report previously showed that 
+42% of nonresident parents also have resident children. Panel B distinguishes between low-
+income nonresident parents without resident children and low-income nonresident parents with 
+resident children, highlighting that low-income nonresident parents without resident children 
+were substantially less likely to report receiving benefits or having health insurance coverage than 
+either low-income nonresident parents with resident children or low-income resident-only 
+parents. Among low-income nonresident parents without resident children, 13% (0.3 million) 
+reported receiving the EITC, 26% (0.5 million) reported receiving SNAP, 33% (0.7 million) 
+reported receiving Medicaid, and 64% (1.3 million) reported having health insurance coverage for 
+the entire year in 2017. By comparison, among low-income nonresident parents who also had 
+resident children, 32% (0.5 million) reported receiving the EITC, 43% (0.6 million) reported 
+receiving SNAP, 46% (0.7 million) reported receiving Medicaid, and 73% (1.1 million) reported 
+having year-round health insurance coverage. 
+
+ 
+53 For more information, see CRS Report R46823, Need-Tested Benefits: Who Receives Assistance? . 
+54 Katherine Keisler-Starkey and Lisa N. Bunch, Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2019 , U.S. Census 
+Bureau, September 2020, p. 18. 
+
+55 For more information, see CRS Report R43805, The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC): How It Works and Who 
+Receives It . 
+
+56 For more information, see CRS Report R42505, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): A Primer on 
+Eligibility and Benefits . 
+
+57 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10322, Medicaid Primer . 
+58 Limited receipt results in small sample sizes that are insufficient for reliable estimation of these benefits for a 
+modest-sized sub-population such as low-income nonresident parents. 
+
+59 Notably, the SIPP does not ask about receipt of the additional child tax credit. 
+60 For more information, see CRS Report R46823, Need-Tested Benefits: Who Receives Assistance? . 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+16 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 14. Receipt of Need-Tested Benefits and Health Insurance Coverage Among 
+
+ Low-Income Parents, by Residency of Children, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Low-income parents with children under age 21. “Low income” is defined as having a family income that 
+is less than 200% of the official poverty thresholds in 2017. In Panel A, “nonresident” includes parents who had 
+both nonresident and resident children; in Panel B, this group is split into two subgroups defined by presence of 
+resident children. Reported benefit receipt data are for 2017. EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit; SNAP = 
+Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; and Health Insurance = possessing health insurance coverage for the 
+entire year. m = mil ions of parents. Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
+
+ Child Support Payments 
+ Policymakers have traditionally been interested in ensuring children with a nonresident parent 
+receive a level of support, including financial contributions, from both parents that is similar to 
+what they would have been expected to receive if they were living with both parents in a single 
+household. This is one of the primary purposes of the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) 
+program.61 In light of policymaker interest, this section analyzes the amount of child support paid 
+and the size of these payments relative to nonresident parents’ income, with a particular focus on 
+the child support payments of low-income nonresident parents. 
+
+This report does not compare nonresident parents’ reported payment of child support to data on 
+ custodial families’ reported receipt of child support income in the SIPP. (Custodial families or 
+parents refers to those individuals living with children who have one or more nonresident 
+
+ 
+61 For more information, see CRS Report RS22380, Child Support Enforcement: Program Basics . 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+17 
+
+ 
+ link to page 23 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+parents.) The report also does not cover data from alternative sources on child support payments, 
+including data from other surveys such as the Current Population Survey-Child Support 
+Supplement62 or administrative data63 from the CSE program. 
+
+ Child Support Payments of Nonresident Parents 
+ Figure 15 illustrates that nonresident parents displayed considerable variation in their child 
+support payments in 2017. A majority of nonresident parents (56%; 5.4 million) reported paying 
+child support. The remaining 44% (4.3 million) did not report making child support payments. In 
+some cases, parents who were not making payments may have had no formal or informal 
+agreement to pay child support. In other cases, parents had obligations for which they were not 
+making payments. The SIPP asks nonresident parents about their payments, not their child 
+support obligations. The questions are framed around child support paid through any means, as 
+opposed to just payments made through the CSE program. 
+
+Nonresident parents reported paying an estimated $33.8 billion in child support in 2017. The 
+median nonresident parent paid a total of $696 annually in child support; the mean payment was 
+$3,499. (Among nonresident parents who paid anything in child support, the median payment was 
+$4,785 and the mean payment was $6,271.) Some nonresident parents made relatively large 
+payments, including 11% (1.1 million) who reported paying $10,000 or more. 
+
+ Figure 15. Child Support Payments of Nonresident Parents, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. Nonresident parents making no payment may have had no legal obligation or 
+informal expectation to pay child support. Child support payments were reported for the previous calendar year 
+(2017). The U.S. Census Bureau topcodes child support payment amounts to protect the confidentiality of 
+respondents. For about 2% of nonresident parents in the 2018 SIPP public-use files, the respondent-reported 
+
+ 
+62 For example, see Grall, 2020. 
+63 For example, see Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), FY2020 Preliminary Data Report , HHS, ACF, June 
+2021 (hereinafter “OCSE, 2021”). 
+
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+
+ 
+
+18 
+
+ 
+ link to page 24 link to page 25 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+amounts were replaced by an average of the values being topcoded ($23,800). Topcoded values are not 
+displayed in this figure. 
+
+ Figure 16 presents the ratio of nonresident parents’ child support payments relative to their total 
+personal income in 2017. Child support-to-income ratios for nonresident parents ranged from the 
+44% making no payment, to 10% (1.0 million) who reported paying 35% or more.64 The 
+equivalent percentages when solely counting the subgroup of nonresident parents who paid 
+anything in child support (payors) are presented in brackets. (In other words, nonresident parents 
+making no payment are excluded from consideration when calculating the child support-to-
+income rations for payors, the figures presented in the brackets. The bracketed values present the 
+range of child support-to-income ratios, conditional on a nonresident parent having paid anything 
+in child support.) For example, 18% of nonresident parents paying child support reported paying 
+a sum equivalent to 35% or more of their income.65 
+
+ Figure 16. Child Support-to-Income Ratio of Nonresident Parents [and Payors], 
+
+ 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. Child support payments and income were reported for the previous calendar 
+year (2017). “Payors” are the subset of nonresident parents who paid any child support. Nonresident parents 
+making no payment may have had no legal obligation or informal expectation to pay child support. The “child 
+support-to-income ratio” is the child support payment amount relative to total personal income. The U.S. 
+Census Bureau topcodes child support payment and income data to protect the confidentiality of respondents; 
+the respondent-reported amounts are replaced by an average of the values being topcoded. The category of 
+“35% or more” includes 6% of nonresident parents [10% of payors] who reported paying more in child support 
+than they received in income, including those who reported having zero or negative income. Groups may not 
+sum to 100% due to rounding. 
+
+ Child Support Payments of Low-Income Nonresident Parents 
+ Low-income nonresident parents were more likely to pay little or no child support than moderate- 
+and higher-income nonresident parents in 2017 . Figure 17 shows that 54% (1.9 million) of low-
+income nonresident parents did not make a child support payment, compared with 39% (2.4 
+
+ 
+64 The category of “35% or more” includes the 6% of nonresident parents who reported paying more in child support 
+than they received in income in 2017, including those who reported having zero or negative income. 
+
+65 The category of “35% or more” includes the 10% of nonresident parents paying child support (payors) who reported 
+paying more in child support than they received in income in 2017, including those who reported having zero or 
+negative income. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+19 
+
+ 
+ link to page 26 link to page 31 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+million) of moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents. The median annual child support 
+payment among low-income nonresident parents was $0 (as more than half paid nothing) and the 
+mean annual payment was $1,964, leading to a total of $6.7 billion in child support payments. In 
+comparison, the median annual payment for moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents 
+was $2,342, the mean annual payment was $4,344, and the payments totaled $27.1 billion.66 
+
+ Figure 17. Child Support Payments of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to- 
+
+ Poverty Level, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+
+nonresident and resident children. Nonresident parents making no payment may have had no legal obligation or 
+informal expectation to pay child support. Child support payments and income were reported for the previous 
+calendar year (2017). “Low income” is defined as having a family income that is less than 200% of the official 
+poverty thresholds in 2017. The U.S. Census Bureau topcodes child support payment amounts to protect the 
+confidentiality of respondents. For about 2% of nonresident parents in the 2018 SIPP public-use files, the 
+respondent-reported amounts were replaced by an average of the values being topcoded ($23,800). Topcoded 
+values are not displayed in this figure. 
+
+Although low-income nonresident parents pay smaller amounts on average, the sums they paid in 
+2017 were more likely to represent a larger share of their income than the sums paid by moderate- 
+and higher-income nonresident parents, as displayed i n Figure 18 . For example, 19% (0.7 
+million) of low-income nonresident parents reported paying child support that represented 35% or 
+more of their total personal income,67 while 5% (0.3 million) of moderate- and higher-income 
+nonresident parents reported a child support burden as large relative to their income. 
+
+ 
+66 The differences in median and total payments between low-income nonresident parents and moderate- and higher-
+income nonresident parents were not tested for statistical significance. Se e Appendix A for discussion. 
+
+67 The category of “35% or more” includes 12% of low-income nonresident parents and 2% of moderate- and higher-
+income nonresident parents who reported paying more in child support in 2017 than they received in income, including 
+those who reported having zero or negative income. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+20 
+
+ 
+ 
+
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Figure 18. Child Support-to-Income Ratio of Nonresident Parents [and Payors], by 
+
+ Family Income-to-Poverty Level, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. “Payors” are the subset of nonresident parents who paid any child support. 
+Child support payments and income were reported for the previous calendar year (2017). “Low income” is 
+defined as having a family income that is less than 200% of the official poverty thresholds. The “child support-to-
+income ratio” is the child support payment amount relative to total personal income. The U.S. Census Bureau 
+topcodes child support payment and income data to protect the confidentiality of respondents; the respondent-
+reported amounts were replaced by an average of the values being topcoded. The category of “35% or more” 
+includes 12% of low-income nonresident parents and 2% of moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents 
+who reported paying more in child support in 2017 than they received in income, including those who reported 
+having zero or negative income. Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
+
+ Policy Considerations 
+ This section reviews potential implications of the preceding findings, taking into consideration 
+policymakers’ expressed interests in the wellbeing of nonresident parents and the important 
+emotional, time, financial, and other contributions these parents can make to their children’s 
+lives. The reviewed findings highlight a number of topics (e.g., employment, poverty, parent-
+child contact, financial support) where some nonresident parents have different outcomes than 
+might be preferred by many policymakers, as well as nonresident parents themselves, their 
+children, and other caregivers responsible for children. This section briefly discusses some of the 
+policy issues related to influencing the circumstances and relationships of nonresident parents, 
+with potential spillover effects on their children living elsewhere as well as other family 
+members. This section does not attempt to provide a comprehensive review of every potentially 
+relevant policy issue, but instead highlights notable examples from recent legislation or research. 
+
+ Employment and Earnings 
+ Nonresident fathers had a lower level of employment, particularly full-time, year-round 
+employment, compared to resident-only fathers in 2017. Low employment and earnings 
+contribute to many nonresident parents having low incomes, which limits their ability to support 
+themselves and provide financial support to their nonresident children and other family members. 
+This report also identifies nonresident parents’ lower level of educational attainment and higher 
+rate of work-limiting chronic health conditions or disabilities as two contributing factors to their 
+lower level of employment. Research has identified other significant employment barriers some 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+21 
+
+ 
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+nonresident parents may face, including labor market conditions, lack of transportation or 
+housing, discrimination, and contact with the criminal justice system.68 
+
+The federal government supports many policies designed to increase employment or earnings that 
+may impact some nonresident parents, including the federal minimum wage and other labor 
+standards,69 employment and earnings subsidies such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),70 
+and monetary policy relating to maximizing employment.71 There is also federal support for 
+education, training, and other employment-related services provided through secondary career 
+and technical education, non-degree and degree-granting postsecondary training and education 
+programs, major components of the workforce development system, need-tested benefits 
+programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and the Supplemental 
+Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), social insurance programs like Unemployment Insurance, 
+and programs targeting specific populations such as Native Americans, veterans, youth, people 
+with disabilities, and individuals involved in the criminal justice system.72 With respect to the 
+employment of people with low income, federal spending is substantially greater on the EITC or 
+higher education than it is for predominantly short-term, non-degree employment and training 
+programs.73 Changes to these kinds of employment policies might impact nonresident parents. 
+
+ Child Support-Related Policies 
+ This report highlights that most nonresident parents reported paying child support in 2017, and 
+program administrative data indicate that many of them did so through the public Child Support 
+Enforcement (CSE) program.74 However, a sizable minority of nonresident parents did not report 
+paying child support in 2017. The number of custodial families with child support cases through 
+the CSE program has declined in recent years.75 In addition, many nonresident parents who paid 
+something in child support paid a small amount relative to their income in 2017. Meanwhile, 
+many custodial families had limited income to support raising a child.76 However, many 
+nonresident parents also had limited income and a sizable percentage reported paying a child 
+support amount that was large relative to their income in 2017 (e.g., 35% or more of their 
+income). Balancing the economic capacity and basic subsistence needs of jointly low-income 
+nonresident parents and custodial families, within the context of existing public benefits, may be 
+
+ 
+68 For relevant research, see footnote 10 of CRS Report R46365, Child Support Enforcement-Led Employment Services 
+for Noncustodial Parents: In Brief . 
+
+69 See, for example, CRS In Focus IF10975, Major Functions of the U.S. Department of Labor . 
+70 See, for example, CRS Insight IN11610, The “Childless” EITC: Temporary Expansion for 2021 Under the American 
+Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2) ; and CRS Report R43805, The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC): How It 
+Works and Who Receives It . 
+
+71 For more information, see CRS Insight IN11499, The Federal Reserve’s Revised Monetary Policy Strategy 
+Statement . 
+
+72 For more information on many of these programs, see CRS Report R46306, Direct Federal Support of Individuals 
+Pursuing Training and Education in Non-degree Programs ; CRS Report R44252, The Workforce Innovation and 
+Opportunity Act and the One-Stop Delivery System ; and U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Employment 
+and Training Programs: Department of Labor Should Assess Efforts to Coordinate Services Across Programs , March 
+2019 (hereinafter, “GAO, 2019”). 
+73 For more information, see CRS Report R46214, Federal Spending on Benefits and Services for People with Low 
+Income: FY2008-FY2018 Update ; and GAO, 2019, pp. 12-16. 
+
+74 OCSE, 2021, p.7. 
+75 Asaph Glosser, Carly Morrison, and Justin Germain, Building the Next Generation of Child Support Policy Research , 
+HHS, ACF, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), August 2018, p. 3. 
+
+76 Grall, 2020, p. 5. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+22 
+
+ 
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+a particularly challenging issue for the CSE program and policymakers.77 In response, observers 
+have proposed a variety of child support-related policy changes to better achieve this balance. 
+While assessing these is outside the scope of this report, some examples of approaches that have 
+received recent attention in the federal context include 
+
+ accounting for the nonresident parent’s ability to pay in calculating the amount of 
+
+the child support order,78 
+
+ automatically reviewing and modifying child support orders in cases where the 
+
+nonresident parent is unemployed or underemployed,79 
+
+ allowing programs the option to reduce or forgive child support debt that is not 
+
+owed to the family (i.e., child support debt that is state- and federal-owed) in 
+cases where that successfully incentivizes nonresident parents to regularly pay 
+the current support,80 
+
+ allowing programs the option of funding work-oriented programs for 
+
+noncustodial parents who are unable to meet their child support obligations,81 and 
+
+ revisiting requirements that families receiving assistance under certain programs 
+
+(e.g., TANF, Medicaid) cooperate with the CSE program.82 
+
+This report also shows that most nonresident parents reported seeing their youngest nonresident 
+child in the preceding year, but some parents rarely or never saw their child. Historically, federal 
+law primarily dealt with child support enforcement and treated child access as a separate issue.83 
+In light of evidence that parental absence is associated with negative long-term consequences for 
+children84 and contact between a nonresident parent and their child can increase child support 
+compliance,85 policymakers in recent years have promoted efforts to address the potential 
+connection between child support and child access. CSE Access and Visitation Grants provide 
+financial support for activities such as mediation, counseling, education, development of 
+
+ 
+77 Maria Cancian and Daniel R. Meyer, “Reforming Policy for Single-Parent Families to Reduce Child Poverty,” RSF: 
+The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences , vol. 4, no. 2 (February 2018), pp. 91-112. 
+
+78 Maria Cancian and Molly A. Costanzo, “Comparing Income-Shares and Percentage-of-Income Child Support 
+Guidelines,” Children and Youth Services Review , vol. 96 (January 2019), pp. 451-462; and Leslie Hodges and Lisa 
+Klein Vogel, “Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right? Recent Changes to State Child Support Guidelines for Low-Income 
+Noncustodial Parents,” Journal of Policy Practice and Research , vol. 2, no. 3 (September 2021), pp. 146-177. 
+79 OCSE, Providing Expedited Review and Modification Assistance , Project to Avoid Increasing Delinquencies, Child 
+Support Fact Sheet No. 2, HHS, ACF, June 2012; and Yoonsook Ha, Maria Cancian, and Daniel R. Meyer, 
+“Unchanging Child Support Orders in the Face of Unstable Earnings,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management , 
+vol. 29, no. 4 (Fall 2010), pp. 799-820. 
+
+80 Ascend at the Aspen Institute and GOOD+ Foundation, Child Support Policy Fact Sheet: Reducing Arrears , August 
+2020. 
+
+81 For more information, see CRS Report R46365, Child Support Enforcement-Led Employment Services for 
+Noncustodial Parents: In Brief . 
+
+82 Rebekah Selekman and Pamela Holcomb, Child Support Cooperation Requirements in Child Care Subsidy 
+Programs and SNAP: Key Policy Considerations , HHS, ASPE, October 2018; Robert Doar, “Empowering Child 
+Support Enforcement to Reduce Poverty,” in A Safety Net That Works: Improving Federal Programs for Low-Income 
+Americans , ed. Robert Doar (Washington, DC: AEI, 2017), pp. 63-86; and Vicki Turetsky, “Why Forcing Food Stamp 
+Participants to Receive Child-Support Services Is a Bad Idea,” Governing , May 15, 2018, https://www.governing.com/
+gov-institute/voices/col-forcing-food-stamp-recipients-receive-child-support-services.html. 
+
+83 OCSE, Essentials for Attorneys in Child Support Enforcement , 4th ed. (Washington, DC: ACF, HSS, 2021), p. 15-1. 
+84 See review of research in Cooper and Pugh, 2020, p. 276. 
+85 OCSE, Child Access and Visitation – Employment and Training – Fatherhood – Incarceration and Re-Entry – 
+Projects In Progress , HHS, ACF, July 2009, pp. 28-29. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+23 
+
+ 
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+parenting plans, and visitation enforcement.86 In addition, some have proposed increasing federal 
+financial support for parenting time initiatives through the CSE program.87 
+
+ Access to Need-Tested Benefits 
+ Many nonresident parents reported relatively low levels of income and elevated rates of poverty 
+in 2017. Besides income from work (and the social insurance benefits usually tied to work 
+history),88 need-tested benefits are typically the other major income source for low-income 
+individuals.89 However, low-income nonresident parents without resident children are less likely 
+to receive major need-tested benefits than either low-income nonresident parents who also have 
+resident children or low-income resident-only parents. In some cases, nonresident parents may 
+have shared legal custody to their children and even physical custody of their children for much 
+of the time (even without an official custody agreement), yet fail to qualify for child-related 
+benefits under existing program rules.90 Contemporary family arrangements may pose unique 
+challenges and trade-offs for designing and administering government programs. 
+
+Providing need-tested benefits to nonresident parents directly can have significant effects on 
+them, as well as their nonresident children and other family members. Medicaid, SNAP, and the 
+EITC are the three largest need-tested spending programs that have seen recent changes in and 
+continued debate over eligibility rules for adults without dependent children (affecting many 
+nonresident parents).91 When nonresident parents have access to more resources, they may be 
+more capable of addressing their own basic needs while also providing support to their children.92 
+However, some policymakers have historically expressed concern that need-tested benefits may 
+reduce people’s reliance on work and family for supporting themselves and their children.93 
+
+ Likelihood of Nonresident Parenthood 
+ Federal policy may seek to affect the share of children being born and principally raised by co-
+residing parents, relative to separated parents living apart or other arrangements. The share of 
+children living apart from one or more of their biological parents, a proxy measure for 
+nonresident parenthood, has substantially increased since the 1960s (though the level has held 
+
+ 
+86 OCSE, “Access and Visitation (AV),” at https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/grants/current-grants/access-and-visitation-
+mandatory-grants. 
+
+87 For more information, see CRS Insight IN11744, S. 503, the Parents Act of 2021 . 
+88 U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), The Distribution of Household Income, 2018 , August 2021, p.7. 
+89 For more information, see CRS Report R46823, Need-Tested Benefits: Who Receives Assistance? . 
+90 Daniel R. Meyer and Marcia J. Carlson, “Family Complexity: Implications for Policy and Research,” The Annals of 
+the American Academy of Political and Social Science , vol. 654, no. 1 (July 2014), pp. 259-276. 
+
+91 For more background on these programs’ rules for adults without qualifying children, see CRS Report R43357, 
+ Medicaid: An Overview ; CRS Report R42505, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): A Primer on 
+Eligibility and Benefits , and CRS Insight IN11610, The “Childless” EITC: Temporary Expansion for 2021 Under the 
+American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2) . 
+
+92 For example, research has found that changes in Medicaid policy (e.g., the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid 
+expansion) that increased (or decreased) the public health insurance eligibility of low-income populations 
+encompassing many nonresident parents also increased (or decreased) the child support income received by custodial 
+families. See Lindsey R. Bullinger, “Child Support and the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansions,” Journal of 
+Policy Analysis and Management , vol. 40, no. 1 (Winter 2021), pp. 42-77; and Lindsey R. Bullinger and Sebastian 
+Tello-Trillo, “Connecting Medicaid and Child Support: Evidence from the TennCare Disenrollment,” Review of 
+Economics of the Household , vol. 19, no. 3 (September 2021), pp. 785-812. 
+
+93 For more information, see CRS Report R43731, Poverty: Major Themes in Past Debates and Current Proposals . 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+24 
+
+ 
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+steady in recent years). Scholars have advanced many explanations for the changes in children’s 
+typical living arrangements, with some of them leading to suggested or enacted policy 
+interventions with the intention of influencing family composition.94 Comprehensively assessing 
+the hypothesized explanations for family change lies outside the scope of this report, but some of 
+the federal policy strategies that have been pursued or proposed are listed below to illustrate the 
+potential breadth of this topic. 
+
+ Improve people’s current or prospective socio-economic circumstances, 
+
+potentially for young males from disadvantaged backgrounds in particular (e.g., 
+expand or reform federal policies that seek to boost education, employment, and 
+earnings, as well as reduce substance use disorder and contact with the criminal 
+justice system95). 
+
+ Change social policies to increase financial incentives and support for family 
+
+stability (e.g., make tax and spending program benefits significantly more 
+generous for two-parent families than the benefits for single-parent families96). 
+
+ Promote the value of stable relationships for raising children and providing 
+
+relationship skills training (e.g., increase federal support for the Healthy 
+Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood programs, which seek to promote strong, 
+healthy family formation and responsible parenting97). 
+
+ Expand family planning services (e.g., increase federal support for family 
+
+planning services through Medicaid, the Title X Family Planning program, and 
+other policies98). 
+
+There is often limited research on these strategies or the findings to date are mixed or null—more 
+experimentation and rigorous research might help identify what changes in federal policy, if any, 
+can increase the share of children being born and principally raised by co-residing parents (in 
+conjunction with other caregivers). 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+94 For relevant research, varying viewpoints, and potential policy options, see Andrew J. Cherlin, Labor’s Love Lost: 
+The Rise and Fall of the Working-Class Family in America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2014); Ron Haskins, 
+“The Family Is Here to Stay—or Not,” The Future of Children , vol. 25, no. 2 (Fall 2015), pp. 129-153; National 
+Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, A Roadmap to Reducing Child Poverty (Washington, DC: The 
+National Academies Press, 2019), pp. 195-203; and Rachel Sheffield and Scott Winship, The Demise of the Happy 
+Two-Parent Home , Joint Economic Committee – Republicans Social Capital Project, July 2020. 
+
+95 For more information, see CRS Report RL33975, Vulnerable Youth: Background and Policies . 
+96 For varying perspectives and policy options, see individual chapters in Robert A. Moffitt, ed., The Economics of 
+Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, Volume 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016); 
+and Bradford Wilcox, Chris Gersten, and Jerry Regier, Marriage Penalties in Means-Tested Tax and Transfer 
+Programs: Issues and Options , HHS, ACF, Office of Family Assistance (OFA), October 2019. 
+
+97 For more information, see CRS Report RL31025, Fatherhood Initiatives: Connecting Fathers to Their Children . 
+98 For more information, see CRS Report R46785, Federal Support for Reproductive Health Services: Frequently 
+Asked Questions . 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+25 
+
+ 
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendix A. Data and Analysis Used in This Report 
+ The Congressional Research Service (CRS) used data from the Survey of Income and Program 
+Participation (SIPP) to characterize nonresident parents because of the SIPP’s breadth in terms of 
+population surveyed and depth in terms of information collected. The SIPP is a nationally 
+representative, household-based survey designed by the U.S. Census Bureau and conducted as a 
+continuous series of national panels.99 Each panel sample is interviewed multiple times (known as 
+interview waves , conducted annually in recent panels100) over a multiyear period lasting 
+approximately four years. The survey collects extensive information on individuals and 
+households, including their income and economic wellbeing, participation in government 
+programs, household composition, and other characteristics. Much of this information is detailed 
+at the monthly level. 
+
+While the SIPP has many advantages as a data source for the analysis in this report, it also has 
+several limitations.101 First, the survey samples the civilian, noninstitutionalized population. As a 
+result, the SIPP does not cover persons, including parents, who are unsheltered (homeless), 
+institutionalized (e.g., correctional inmates, nursing home residents), members of the military 
+living in barracks, or living abroad. As a result, estimates produced using the SIPP most likely 
+underestimate the total nonresident parent population of the United States. In addition, 
+nonresident parents in the population sampled by the SIPP may have different characteristics than 
+nonresident parents from the population excluded from the SIPP. 
+
+Second, the SIPP (like other surveys) produces estimates for the survey-eligible population that 
+are subject to a variety of potential errors.102 For example, research indicates that the SIPP may 
+underestimate the prevalence and imperfectly describe the composition of survey-eligible 
+nonresident parents (i.e., those in the civilian, noninstitutionalized population).103 There are two 
+reasons for this possibility. First, the SIPP and many other household surveys often under-observe 
+persons from certain demographic groups along dimensions such as sex (male), race/ethnicity 
+(Black, Hispanic), and age (young adults).104 Survey under-coverage (inadequate representation 
+
+ 
+99 For more information on the survey, see U.S. Census Bureau, “Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),” 
+at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp.html. 
+
+100 For an independent evaluation of the recent reengineering of the SIPP, see National Academies of Sciences, 
+Engineering, and Medicine, The 2014 Redesign of the Survey of Income and Program Participation: An Assessment 
+(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2018) (hereinafter, “National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
+Medicine, 2018”). 
+
+101 Potential issues not highlighted here include sample attrition and underrepresentation of new entrants to the survey-
+eligible population. Though the SIPP’s panel design is valuable for allowing researchers to follow the same group of 
+individuals and households over time, longitudinal surveys can suffer from sample attrition and loss of 
+representativeness. When respondents are no longer observed by a survey, it reduces available sample size and 
+estimates can be biased if those leaving the sample are systematically different from those who remain. Similarly, new 
+entrants to the population such as births, immigrants from abroad, and people moving from group quarters to household 
+residences may not be adequately reflected in the panel in later waves. This report’s analysis relies on data from the 
+first wave (year) of the 2018 panel, so these factors are not applicable. 
+
+102 See Chapter 7 of U.S. Census Bureau, 2020; and Section 2 of Faith Nwaoha-Brown et al., Source and Accuracy 
+Statement for Calendar Year 2018 Data Collection of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) , U.S. 
+Census Bureau, January 2021 (hereinafter, “Nwaoha-Brown et al., 2021”). 
+103 Lindsay M. Monte and Jason M. Fields, “Where’s Daddy? Challenges in the Measurement of Men’s Fertility,” in 
+Analyzing Contemporary Fertility, ed. R. Schoen (Springer Nature Switzerland AG, 2020), pp. 257-284; Lippold, 
+2017; and Stykes, Manning, and Brown, 2013. 
+
+104 For relevant 2018 SIPP-specific findings, see Julia Yang et al., Nonresponse Bias Analysis for Calendar Year 2018 
+Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) , U.S. Census Bureau, March 2021, pp. 10-14 (hereinafter, Yang et 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+26 
+
+ 
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+of demographic subgroups) and nonresponse bias (the result of differences between those who 
+participate in a survey and those who do not) may be particularly germane to this report because 
+young Black men are disproportionately likely to be nonresident parents.105 Another reason the 
+SIPP may mischaracterize the nonresident parent population is that some research suggests 
+nonresident parent status is underreported by respondents in many surveys.106 
+
+Comparing estimates from the SIPP with those from the National Survey of Family Growth 
+(NSFG) may partially illustrate the potential scope of these issues. The NSFG is focused on 
+gathering information on pregnancy and births, marriage and cohabitation, infertility, use of 
+contraception, family life, and general and reproductive health.107 Currently, the NSFG sample 
+universe is restricted to noninstitutionalized men and women ages 15-49 (ages 15-44 in earlier 
+samples), and only men are asked detailed questions about nonresident parenthood. Scholars 
+hypothesize that the NSFG’s individual-level survey design (rather than being household-based), 
+direct reporting (other individuals in the household cannot serve as proxies and provide answers 
+for sample members), more extensive set of questions related to these topics, and order of content 
+asked by the survey are better suited for identifying nonresident fathers than other survey 
+designs.108 For example, one study estimated using the 2008 SIPP that there were 3.9 million or 
+5.9 million nonresident fathers aged 15-44, depending on which set of questions was used to 
+identify nonresident parents.109 By comparison, the same study estimated using the 2006-2010 
+NSFG that there were 6.9 million nonresident fathers aged 15-44. The larger number of 
+nonresident fathers observed in the NSFG were also more likely to be Black or Hispanic and have 
+less than a high school diploma compared with those observed in the SIPP, which corresponds 
+with the previously discussed concerns about under-coverage and nonresponse in the SIPP.110 
+
+Respondents may provide inaccurate information in response to additional topics beyond 
+nonresident parenthood. For example, the detailed income and program participation information 
+measured in the SIPP appears to be underreported compared with aggregate national totals from 
+more reliable data sources. While the SIPP typically performs better at income measurement than 
+other household surveys, it still misses a substantial share of income from earnings, pensions, 
+assets, need-tested transfers, and unemployment and workers’ compensation.111 
+
+The Census Bureau takes many steps to mitigate some of these issues. For example, it frequently 
+imputes survey responses for sample members with missing or inconsistent data.112 It also adjusts 
+sample weights to address a variety of concerns, including adjustments to compensate for 
+
+ 
+al., 2021”); and Nwaoha-Brown et al., 2021, pp. 11-12. 
+105 Stykes, Manning, and Brown, 2013, p. 1302. 
+106 Lippold, 2017, p. 2. 
+107 For more information on the NSFG, see HHS, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for 
+Health Statistics, “National Survey of Family Growth,” at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nsfg/index.htm. 
+108 Stykes, Manning, and Brown, 2013, p. 1306-1309. 
+109 Lippold, 2017, p. 10. 
+110 Lippold, 2017, p. 24; and Stykes, Manning, and Brown, 2013, p. 1306-1313. 
+111 See Yang et al., 2021, pp. 17-20; Chapter 7 of National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018; 
+and Bruce D. Meyer, Wallace K. C, Mok, and James X. Sullivan, “Household Surveys in Crisis,” Journal of Economic 
+Perspectives , vol. 29, no. 4 (Fall 2015), pp. 199-226. 
+
+112 For example, 7% of persons categorized as nonresident parents in the 2018 SIPP had that status imputed for them, 
+rather than being reported by a sample member. The Census Bureau uses a variety of imputation procedures, including 
+logical inferences from other data that has been provided for a person or statistical models that predict values for 
+persons with missing data. For more background on the imputation procedures applied to SIPP data, see Chapter 6 of 
+U.S. Census Bureau, 2020. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+27 
+
+ 
+ link to page 35 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+differences between the interviewed sample and independently derived population targets 
+(nonresponse adjustments). However, these efforts may not fully eliminate the potential for bias 
+in a survey-based estimate. 
+
+The SIPP is also subject to sampling error, which is the potential difference between an estimate 
+based on a sample and the corresponding value that would be calculated using information on the 
+entire population (if such information were available by census or other means). With limited 
+exceptions, the comparisons presented in this report have been tested for statistical significance to 
+reduce the risk of interpreting potential random sampling variation as real differences. Unless 
+otherwise noted, the differences in values between groups highlighted in this report are 
+statistically different from zero at the 10% significance level. Differences in mean annual child 
+support payment amounts were assessed using a two-sided t-test. Otherwise, differences in 
+characteristics across groups were assessed for statistical significance using a Rao-Scott second-
+order (Satterthwaite) chi-square test.113 The chi-square test results indicate whether there is a 
+statistically significant difference in the overall distribution of a characteristic (e.g., race/ethnicity 
+categorized into four levels) between groups (e.g., nonresident parents and resident-only parents). 
+
+Several results were not tested for statistical significance: 
+
+ The difference between nonresident and resident-only parents in terms of the 
+
+number of resident children under age 21 was not tested for statistical 
+significance. These groups of parents cannot take on the same range of possible 
+values for this variable (i.e., by definition, resident-only parents must have some 
+number of resident children, while some nonresident parents have no resident 
+children). As a result, these groups’ distributions for this characteristic are 
+intrinsically different.114 To limit misinterpretation, the only estimates of the 
+number of resident children included in the body of this report are for 
+nonresident parents. Estimates of the number of resident children among 
+resident-only parents can be found in Table B-2 . 
+
+ The difference in median annual child support payments between low-income 
+
+nonresident parents and moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents was 
+not tested because doing so requires making additional analytic assumptions 
+(e.g., about the mathematical distributional form of annual child support 
+payments). 
+
+ The difference in total annual child support payments between low-income 
+
+nonresident parents and moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents was 
+not tested because total child support payments are a simple function of the 
+number of nonresident parents comprising a group multiplied by the group’s 
+mean annual child support payment, and the difference in the mean payment 
+between groups was itself tested for statistical significance separately. 
+
+ 
+113 Note that receipt of the EITC, SNAP, Medicaid, and health insurance coverage for the entire year counts as four 
+distinct characteristics that were each tested separately. For example, the chi-square test for the EITC evaluates whether 
+there is a statistically significant difference in the distribution in people who are either (1) receiving the EITC or (2) not 
+receiving the EITC, between groups (e.g., low-income nonresident parents compared to low-income resident-only 
+parents). 
+
+114 Relatedly, no results are presented in this report (or are available for significance testing) for resident-only parents in 
+terms of the number of nonresident children under age 21 and contact with the youngest nonresident child because, by 
+definition, resident-only parents cannot take on any values for these variables. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+28 
+
+ 
+ link to page 31 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Appendix B. Data Tables 
+
+ Table B-1. Demographic Characteristics of Parents, by Residency of Children, 2018 
+
+ 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ Resident-Only Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+Weighted total 
+
+9,669,243 
+
+ 
+
+67,514,447 
+
+ 
+
+Sex 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Male 
+
+ 7,218,346 
+
+74.7 
+
+ 28,622,112 
+
+42.7 
+
+Female 
+
+ 2,450,897 
+
+25.3 
+
+ 38,385,209 
+
+57.3 
+
+Age 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+15-29 
+
+ 1,134,042 
+
+11.7 
+
+ 8,671,311 
+
+12.9 
+
+30-39 
+
+ 2,941,835 
+
+30.4 
+
+ 22,763,777 
+
+34.0 
+
+40-49 
+
+ 3,645,518 
+
+37.7 
+
+ 23,507,292 
+
+35.1 
+
+50 or older 
+
+ 1,947,848 
+
+20.1 
+
+ 12,064,941 
+
+18.0 
+
+Race and Hispanic origin 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+White, non-Hispanic 
+
+ 5,212,379 
+
+53.9 
+
+ 38,215,340 
+
+57.0 
+
+Black, non-Hispanic 
+
+ 1,839,164 
+
+19.0 
+
+ 7,855,117 
+
+11.7 
+
+Hispanic 
+
+ 1,978,586 
+
+20.5 
+
+ 14,427,157 
+
+21.5 
+
+Other, non-Hispanic 
+
+ 639,113 
+
+6.6 
+
+ 6,509,707 
+
+9.7 
+
+Education 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Less than high school 
+
+ 1,457,821 
+
+15.1 
+
+ 6,915,529 
+
+10.3 
+
+High School 
+
+ 3,376,355 
+
+34.9 
+
+ 16,011,970 
+
+23.9 
+
+Some col ege 
+
+ 2,083,112 
+
+21.5 
+
+ 11,040,999 
+
+16.5 
+
+Associate’s degree 
+
+ 905,008 
+
+9.4 
+
+ 6,627,660 
+
+9.9 
+
+Bachelor’s degree or 
+
+ 1,846,947 
+
+19.1 
+
+ 26,411,162 
+
+39.4 
+
+higher 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both nonresident 
+and resident children. Age was reported as of the survey date in 2018. The designation “other” refers to persons 
+who do not exclusively identify as White or Black in terms of race—for example, it includes persons who 
+identify as Asian, Native American, or mixed race/multiracial. Education reflects a person’s highest level of 
+attainment as of December 2017; some parents may have stil been enrol ed in school. The category “some 
+col ege” includes any postsecondary education short of a degree. Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
+
+There are statistically significant differences in the distribution of presented characteristics between nonresident 
+parents and resident-only parents; s ee Appendix A for more details. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+29 
+
+ 
+ link to page 31 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Table B-2. Relationships and Fertility of Parents by Residency of Children, 2018 
+
+ 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ Resident-Only Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+Weighted total 
+
+ 9,669,243 
+
+ 
+
+67,514,447 
+
+ 
+
+Marital status 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Married 
+
+ 3,511,138 
+
+36.3 
+
+ 50,907,394 
+
+76.0 
+
+Separated 
+
+ 576,006 
+
+6.0 
+
+ 1,408,140 
+
+2.1 
+
+Divorced 
+
+ 3,110,846 
+
+32.2 
+
+ 4,890,246 
+
+7.3 
+
+Never married 
+
+ 2,377,241 
+
+24.6 
+
+ 9,189,474 
+
+13.7 
+
+Number of childbearing unions 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+One childbearing union 
+
+ 5,699,919 
+
+58.9 
+
+ 55,236,430 
+
+82.4 
+
+Two childbearing unions 
+
+ 3,044,655 
+
+31.5 
+
+ 8,683,129 
+
+13.0 
+
+Three or more childbearing unions 
+
+ 798,692 
+
+8.3 
+
+ 1,775,657 
+
+2.6 
+
+Number of resident children under age 21 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Zero 
+
+ 5,624,017 
+
+58.2 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+One child 
+
+ 1,943,801 
+
+20.1 
+
+ 27,540,846 
+
+41.1 
+
+Two children 
+
+ 1,282,975 
+
+13.3 
+
+ 24,901,549 
+
+37.2 
+
+Three or more children 
+
+ 818,449 
+
+8.5 
+
+ 14,564,926 
+
+21.7 
+
+Number of nonresident children under age 21 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+One child 
+
+ 5,582,979 
+
+57.7 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+Two children 
+
+ 2,783,108 
+
+28.8 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+Three or more children 
+
+ 1,303,155 
+
+13.5 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+Amount of time spent with youngest 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+nonresident child 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+None 
+
+ 1,607,534 
+
+16.6 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+One to several times a year 
+
+ 2,154,851 
+
+22.3 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+One to three times a month 
+
+ 1,684,996 
+
+17.4 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+About once a week 
+
+ 1,175,085 
+
+12.2 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+Several times a week 
+
+ 3,046,776 
+
+31.5 
+
+NA 
+
+NA 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both nonresident 
+and resident children. Marital status, number of childbearing unions, and children (number, residency) were 
+reported as of the survey date in 2018. For the number of childbearing unions, a relatively small number of 
+parents may have had “zero” (i.e., no biological children, exclusively step or adopted children). Results for the 
+marital status “widowed” and the “number of childbearing unions” category “zero” are not presented because 
+the sample size is insufficient to produce a reliable estimate. Visitation data were reported for the previous 
+calendar year (2017). Certain characteristics and potential values are not applicable (“NA”) for resident-only 
+parents. Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding and estimates for certain statuses/categories not being 
+presented. There are statistically significant differences in the distribution of marital status and number of 
+childbearing unions between nonresident parents and resident-only parents. Differences in the number of 
+resident children, number of nonresident children, and amount of time spent with the youngest nonresident child 
+were not tested for statistical significance; see Appendix A for more details. 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+30 
+
+ 
+ link to page 31 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Table B-3. Employment of Parents by Residency of Children, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ Resident-Only Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+Weighted total 
+
+ 9,669,243 
+
+ 
+
+67,514,447 
+
+ 
+
+Employment 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Did not work 
+
+ 1,824,740 
+
+18.9 
+
+ 12,023,977 
+
+17.9 
+
+Part-time, part-year 
+
+ 456,059 
+
+4.7 
+
+ 2,945,111 
+
+4.4 
+
+Ful -time, part-year 
+
+ 1,098,507 
+
+11.4 
+
+ 6,156,223 
+
+9.2 
+
+Part-time, year-round 
+
+ 814,604 
+
+8.4 
+
+ 6,292,806 
+
+9.4 
+
+Ful -time, year-round 
+
+ 5,475,332 
+
+56.6 
+
+ 39,589,204 
+
+59.1 
+
+ Employment, among fathers only: 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Did not work 
+
+ 1,161,921 
+
+ 16.1 
+
+ 1,952,335 
+
+ 6.8 
+
+ Part-time, part-year 
+
+ 275,400 
+
+ 3.8 
+
+ 526,015 
+
+ 1.8 
+
+ Full-time, part-year 
+
+ 824,005 
+
+ 11.4 
+
+ 2,330,860 
+
+ 8.1 
+
+ Part-time, year-round 
+
+ 483,972 
+
+ 6.7 
+
+ 1,365,027 
+
+ 4.8 
+
+ Full-time, year-round 
+
+ 4,473,048 
+
+ 62.0 
+
+ 22,447,874 
+
+ 78.4 
+
+ Common reasons for not working for pay in 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ December, among year-long nonworkers only: 
+
+ Chronic health condition or disability 
+
+ 734,679 
+
+ 40.6 
+
+ 1,848,627 
+
+ 15.5 
+
+ Caregiving (including pregnancy or 
+
+ 241,100 
+
+ 13.2 
+
+ 7,005,736 
+
+ 58.3 
+
+ childbirth) 
+
+ Unable to find work 
+
+ 221,471 
+
+ 12.2 
+
+ 661,415 
+
+ 5.5 
+
+ Retired 
+
+ 175,030 
+
+ 9.7 
+
+ 534,885 
+
+ 4.5 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both nonresident 
+and resident children. Employment-related information was reported for the previous calendar year (2017). 
+“Ful -time” is defined as working 35 or more hours a week for 50% or more of the weeks worked. “Year-round” 
+is defined as working 50 weeks or more. Certain estimates are italicized because they are results for subgroups 
+(i.e., fathers, year-long nonworkers) of the overall populations of nonresident parents and resident-only parents. 
+Data on reasons for not working for pay are presented for the month of December (respondents are asked for 
+this information at the monthly level). Information is unavailable about reasons for not working for a small 
+number of persons categorized as year-long nonworkers because the SIPP classifies these persons as employed 
+even though they worked zero hours during the year. SIPP respondents can agree to more than one reason for 
+not working. Less frequently reported reasons are not presented here because smaller sample sizes make those 
+estimates less reliable. Other reasons for not working that SIPP respondents can agree to include temporarily 
+unable to work because of injury or il ness, not interested in working, going to school, layoff, and working 
+without pay for a family business. In addition, the reason “other” is not presented here because there is no clear 
+interpretation for this response. Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding. There are statistically significant 
+differences in the distribution of presented characteristics between nonresident parents and resident-only 
+parents; see Appendix A for more details. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+31 
+
+ 
+ link to page 31 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Table B-4. Income, Need-Tested Benefit Receipt, and Health Insurance Coverage of 
+
+ Parents, by Residency of Children, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ Resident-Only Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+Weighted Total 
+
+ 9,669,243 
+
+ 
+
+67,514,447 
+
+ 
+
+Personal Income 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Zero 
+
+ 903,517 
+
+9.3 
+
+ 6,745,547 
+
+10.1 
+
+$1 to $9,999 
+
+ 1,176,162 
+
+12.2 
+
+ 8,032,577 
+
+12.0 
+
+$10,000 to $19,999 
+
+ 1,272,327 
+
+13.2 
+
+ 6,684,880 
+
+10.0 
+
+$20,000 to $39,999 
+
+ 2,551,873 
+
+26.4 
+
+ 14,410,166 
+
+21.5 
+
+$40,000 to $59,999 
+
+ 1,557,007 
+
+16.1 
+
+ 10,099,959 
+
+15.1 
+
+$60,000 or higher 
+
+ 2,208,357 
+
+22.8 
+
+ 21,034,193 
+
+31.4 
+
+Family income-to-poverty ratio 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Less than 50% 
+
+ 926,149 
+
+9.6 
+
+ 3,953,696 
+
+5.9 
+
+50% to 99% 
+
+ 774,313 
+
+8.0 
+
+ 4,368,945 
+
+6.5 
+
+100% to 199% 
+
+ 1,731,309 
+
+17.9 
+
+ 10,802,085 
+
+16.1 
+
+200% to 399% 
+
+ 2,984,089 
+
+30.9 
+
+ 19,126,789 
+
+28.5 
+
+400% or higher 
+
+ 3,253,383 
+
+33.6 
+
+ 28,755,806 
+
+42.9 
+
+Public benefit receipt 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Earned Income Tax Credit 
+
+ 1,451,439 
+
+15.0 
+
+ 10,777,484 
+
+16.1 
+
+Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
+
+ 1,434,251 
+
+14.8 
+
+ 7,958,817 
+
+11.9 
+
+Program 
+
+Medicaid 
+
+ 1,762,495 
+
+18.2 
+
+ 10,960,367 
+
+16.4 
+
+Health insurance for the year 
+
+ 7,510,399 
+
+ 77.7 
+
+ 59,800,370 
+
+ 89.2 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both nonresident 
+and resident children. Income, need-tested benefit receipt, and health insurance coverage were reported for the 
+previous year (2017). The personal income category “zero” includes individuals with a negative personal income. 
+Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding. There are statistically significant differences in the distribution of 
+
+presented characteristics between nonresident parents and resident-only parents, except for the EITC 
+(difference is not statistically significant); see Appendix A for more details. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+32 
+
+ 
+ link to page 31 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Table B-5. Demographic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income- 
+
+ to-Poverty Level, 2017 
+
+ Low-Income 
+
+ Moderate- and Higher-Income 
+
+ 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+Weighted total 
+
+ 3,431,771 
+
+ 
+
+ 6,237,472 
+
+ 
+
+Sex 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Male 
+
+ 2,241,774 
+
+65.3 
+
+ 4,976,571 
+
+79.8 
+
+Female 
+
+ 1,189,996 
+
+34.7 
+
+ 1,260,901 
+
+20.2 
+
+Age 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+15-29 
+
+ 560,280 
+
+16.3 
+
+ 573,761 
+
+9.2 
+
+30-39 
+
+ 1,090,232 
+
+31.8 
+
+ 1,851,603 
+
+29.7 
+
+40-49 
+
+ 1,125,287 
+
+32.8 
+
+ 2,520,230 
+
+40.4 
+
+50 or older 
+
+ 655,971 
+
+19.1 
+
+ 1,291,877 
+
+20.7 
+
+Race and Hispanic origin 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+White, non-Hispanic 
+
+ 1,717,662 
+
+50.1 
+
+ 3,494,717 
+
+56.0 
+
+Black, non-Hispanic 
+
+ 797,092 
+
+23.2 
+
+ 1,042,072 
+
+16.7 
+
+Hispanic 
+
+ 683,889 
+
+19.9 
+
+ 1,294,697 
+
+20.8 
+
+Other, non-Hispanic 
+
+ 233,127 
+
+6.8 
+
+ 405,986 
+
+6.5 
+
+Education 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Less than high school 
+
+ 781,230 
+
+22.8 
+
+ 676,591 
+
+10.8 
+
+High school 
+
+ 1,286,262 
+
+37.5 
+
+ 2,090,094 
+
+33.5 
+
+Some col ege 
+
+ 780,564 
+
+22.7 
+
+ 1,302,548 
+
+20.9 
+
+Associate’s degree 
+
+ 269,674 
+
+7.9 
+
+ 635,333 
+
+10.2 
+
+Bachelor’s degree or 
+
+ 314,041 
+
+9.2 
+
+ 1,532,907 
+
+24.6 
+
+higher 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. “Low income” is defined as having a family income that is less than 200% of 
+
+the official poverty thresholds in 2017. Age was reported as of the survey date in 2018. The designation “other” 
+refers to persons who do not exclusively identify as White or Black in terms of race—for example, it includes 
+persons who identify as Asian, Native American, or mixed race/multiracial. Education reflects a person’s highest 
+level of attainment as of December 2017; some parents may have stil been enrol ed in school. The category 
+“some col ege” includes any postsecondary education short of a degree. Groups may not sum to 100% due to 
+rounding. There are statistically significant differences in the distribution of presented characteristics between 
+low-income nonresident parents and moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents; see Appendix A for 
+more details. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+33 
+
+ 
+ link to page 31 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Table B-6. Relationships and Fertility of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to- 
+
+ Poverty Level, 2017 
+
+ Moderate- and 
+
+ Low-Income 
+
+ Higher-Income 
+
+ 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+Weighted total 
+
+ 3,431,771 
+
+ 
+
+ 6,237,472 
+
+ 
+
+Marital status 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Married 
+
+ 910,573 
+
+26.5 
+
+ 2,600,565 
+
+41.7 
+
+Separated 
+
+ 255,306 
+
+7.4 
+
+ 320,701 
+
+5.1 
+
+Divorced 
+
+ 1,045,360 
+
+30.5 
+
+ 2,065,486 
+
+33.1 
+
+Never married 
+
+ 1,159,580 
+
+33.8 
+
+ 1,217,661 
+
+19.5 
+
+Number of childbearing unions 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+One childbearing union 
+
+ 1,711,965 
+
+49.9 
+
+ 3,987,954 
+
+63.9 
+
+Two childbearing unions 
+
+ 1,270,223 
+
+37.0 
+
+ 1,774,431 
+
+28.4 
+
+Three or more childbearing unions 
+
+ 405,839 
+
+11.8 
+
+ 392,853 
+
+6.3 
+
+Number of resident children under age 21 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Zero 
+
+ 1,972,956 
+
+57.5 
+
+ 3,651,061 
+
+58.5 
+
+One child 
+
+ 604,939 
+
+17.6 
+
+ 1,338,862 
+
+21.5 
+
+Two children 
+
+ 496,007 
+
+14.5 
+
+ 786,968 
+
+12.6 
+
+Three or more children 
+
+ 357,868 
+
+10.4 
+
+ 460,581 
+
+7.4 
+
+Number of nonresident children under age 21 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+One child 
+
+ 1,902,081 
+
+55.4 
+
+ 3,680,898 
+
+59.0 
+
+Two children 
+
+ 924,557 
+
+26.9 
+
+ 1,858,551 
+
+29.8 
+
+Three or more children 
+
+ 605,133 
+
+17.6 
+
+ 698,022 
+
+11.2 
+
+Amount of time spent with youngest 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+nonresident child 
+
+None 
+
+ 760,813 
+
+22.2 
+
+ 846,721 
+
+13.6 
+
+One to several times a year 
+
+ 709,755 
+
+20.7 
+
+ 1,445,096 
+
+23.2 
+
+One to three times a month 
+
+ 538,503 
+
+15.7 
+
+ 1,146,493 
+
+18.4 
+
+About once a week 
+
+ 452,161 
+
+13.2 
+
+ 722,924 
+
+11.6 
+
+Several times a week 
+
+ 970,539 
+
+28.3 
+
+ 2,076,237 
+
+33.3 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. “Low income” is defined as having a family income that is less than 200% of 
+the official poverty thresholds in 2017. Marital status, number of childbearing unions, and children (number, 
+residency) were reported as of the survey date in 2018. Results for the marital status “widowed” and the 
+“number of childbearing unions” category “zero” are not presented because the sample size is insufficient to 
+produce a reliable estimate. Visitation data were reported for the previous calendar year (2017). Groups may 
+not sum to 100% due to rounding, and estimates for certain statuses/categories not being presented. There are 
+statistically significant differences in the distribution of presented characteristics between low-income 
+nonresident parents and moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents; s ee Appendix A for more details. 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+34 
+
+ 
+ link to page 31 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Table B-7. Economic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to- 
+
+ Poverty Level, 2017 
+
+ Low-Income 
+
+ Moderate- and Higher-Income 
+
+ 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+Weighted Total 
+
+ 3,431,771 
+
+ 
+
+ 6,237,472 
+
+ 
+
+Employment 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Did not work 
+
+ 1,304,256 
+
+38.0 
+
+ 520,483 
+
+8.3 
+
+Part-time, part-year 
+
+ 284,082 
+
+8.3 
+
+ 171,977 
+
+2.8 
+
+Ful -time, part-year 
+
+ 490,778 
+
+14.3 
+
+ 607,729 
+
+9.7 
+
+Part-time, year-round 
+
+ 426,663 
+
+12.4 
+
+ 387,941 
+
+6.2 
+
+Ful -time, year-round 
+
+ 925,990 
+
+27.0 
+
+ 4,549,342 
+
+72.9 
+
+Personal income 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Zero 
+
+ 694,485 
+
+20.2 
+
+ 209,032 
+
+3.4 
+
+$1 to $9,999 
+
+ 927,005 
+
+27.0 
+
+ 249,156 
+
+4.0 
+
+$10,000 to $19,999 
+
+ 978,914 
+
+28.5 
+
+ 293,413 
+
+4.7 
+
+$20,000 to $29,999 
+
+ 631,676 
+
+18.4 
+
+ 747,446 
+
+12.0 
+
+$30,000 or higher 
+
+ 199,691 
+
+5.8 
+
+ 4,738,426 
+
+76.0 
+
+Public benefit receipt 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Earned Income Tax Credit 
+
+ 723,054 
+
+21.1 
+
+ 728,385 
+
+11.7 
+
+Supplemental Nutrition 
+
+ 1,145,831 
+
+33.4 
+
+ 288,420 
+
+4.6 
+
+Assistance Program 
+
+Medicaid 
+
+ 1,324,008 
+
+38.6 
+
+ 438,487 
+
+7.0 
+
+Health insurance for the year 
+
+ 2,335,489 
+
+68.1 
+
+ 5,174,910 
+
+83.0 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who had both 
+nonresident and resident children. Employment, income, need-tested benefit receipt, and health insurance 
+coverage were reported for the previous year (2017). “Low income” is defined as having a family income that is 
+less than 200% of the official poverty thresholds. “Ful -time” is defined as working 35 or more hours a week for 
+
+50% or more of the weeks worked. “Year-round” is defined as working 50 weeks or more. Groups may not sum 
+to 100% due to rounding. There are statistically significant differences in the distribution of presented 
+characteristics between low-income nonresident parents and moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents; 
+ see Appendix A for more details. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+35 
+
+ 
+ link to page 31 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Table B-8. Need-Tested Benefit Receipt and Health Insurance Coverage of Low- 
+
+ Income Parents, by Residency of Children, 2017 
+
+ Low-Income 
+
+ Low-Income 
+
+ 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ Resident-Only Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+Weighted total 
+
+ 3,431,771 
+
+ 
+
+ 19,124,725 
+
+ 
+
+Public benefit receipt 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Earned Income Tax Credit 
+
+ 723,054 
+
+21.1 
+
+ 6,158,032 
+
+32.2 
+
+Supplemental Nutrition 
+
+ 1,145,831 
+
+33.4 
+
+ 6,502,683 
+
+34.0 
+
+Assistance Program 
+
+Medicaid 
+
+ 1,324,008 
+
+38.6 
+
+ 7,996,103 
+
+41.8 
+
+Health insurance for the year 
+
+ 2,335,489 
+
+68.1 
+
+ 14,932,128 
+
+78.1 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Low-Income 
+
+ Low-Income 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ without Resident Children 
+
+ with Resident Children 
+
+ 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+Weighted total 
+
+ 1,972,956 
+
+ 
+
+ 1,458,814 
+
+ 
+
+Public benefit receipt 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Earned Income Tax Credit 
+
+ 256,923 
+
+13.0 
+
+ 466,131 
+
+32.0 
+
+Supplemental Nutrition 
+
+ 521,364 
+
+26.4 
+
+ 624,467 
+
+42.8 
+
+Assistance Program 
+
+Medicaid 
+
+ 660,178 
+
+33.5 
+
+ 663,830 
+
+45.5 
+
+Health insurance for the year 
+
+ 1,269,896 
+
+64.4 
+
+ 1,065,593 
+
+73.0 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” consists of two types of parents, parents 
+with only nonresident children and parents with both nonresident and resident children. Estimates for the 
+combination and both components are presented in this table and compared to results for resident-only parents. 
+Income, need-tested benefit receipt, and health insurance coverage were reported for the previous year (2017). 
+“Low income” is defined as having a family income that is less than 200% of the official poverty thresholds. 
+Differences between low-income nonresident parents and low-income resident-only parents in the percentage 
+receiving the EITC or having health insurance coverage for the year are statistically significant; the differences for 
+SNAP and Medicaid are not statistically significant. The differences between low-income nonresident parents 
+without resident children, low-income nonresident parents with resident children, and low-income resident-only 
+parents are all statistically significant. For more details on statistical significance testing, see Appendix A . 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+36 
+
+ 
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Table B-9. Child Support Payments of Nonresident Parents, 2017 
+
+ 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+Weighted total 
+
+ 9,669,243 
+
+ 
+
+Annual child support payment 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+No payment 
+
+ 4,274,493 
+
+44.2 
+
+Less than $2,000 
+
+ 1,107,221 
+
+11.5 
+
+$2,000 to $3,999 
+
+ 1,099,408 
+
+11.4 
+
+$4,000 to $5,999 
+
+ 1,070,254 
+
+11.1 
+
+$6,000 to $7,999 
+
+ 708,324 
+
+7.3 
+
+$8,000 to $9,999 
+
+ 319,472 
+
+3.3 
+
+$10,000 or more 
+
+ 1,090,070 
+
+11.3 
+
+Median 
+
+$696 
+
+ 
+
+Mean 
+
+$3,499 
+
+ 
+
+Total 
+
+$33.8B 
+
+ 
+
+Child support-to-income ratio 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+No payment 
+
+ 4,274,493 
+
+44.2 
+
+0% to 9% 
+
+ 2,136,447 
+
+22.1 
+
+10% to 19% 
+
+ 1,514,930 
+
+15.7 
+
+20 to 34% 
+
+ 782,040 
+
+8.1 
+
+35% or more 
+
+ 961,333 
+
+9.9 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who have both 
+nonresident and resident children. Nonresident parents making no payment may have had no legal obligation or 
+informal expectation to pay child support. Child support payments and total personal income were reported for 
+the previous calendar year (2017). The U.S. Census Bureau topcodes child support payment and income data to 
+protect the confidentiality of respondents; the respondent-reported amounts are replaced by an average of the 
+values being topcoded. The “child support-to-income ratio” is the child support payment amount relative to total 
+personal income. The category of “35% or more” includes 6% of nonresident parents who reported paying more 
+in child support than they received in income, including those who reported having zero or negative income. 
+Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+37 
+
+ 
+ link to page 31 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Table B-10. Child Support Payments of Nonresident Parents, by Family Income-to- 
+
+ Poverty Level, 2017 
+
+ Low-Income 
+
+ Moderate- and Higher-Income 
+
+ 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+ Number 
+
+ Percentage 
+
+Weighted total 
+
+ 3,431,771 
+
+ 
+
+ 6,237,472 
+
+ 
+
+Annual child support payment 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+No payment 
+
+ 1,862,423 
+
+54.3 
+
+ 2,412,070 
+
+38.7 
+
+Less than $2,000 
+
+ 537,437 
+
+15.7 
+
+ 569,784 
+
+9.1 
+
+$2,000 to $3,999 
+
+ 410,073 
+
+11.9 
+
+ 689,335 
+
+11.1 
+
+$4,000 to $5,999 
+
+ 263,130 
+
+7.7 
+
+ 807,125 
+
+12.9 
+
+$6,000 to $9,999 
+
+ 182,957 
+
+5.3 
+
+ 844,839 
+
+13.5 
+
+$10,000 or more 
+
+ 175,750 
+
+5.1 
+
+ 914,320 
+
+14.7 
+
+Median 
+
+$0 
+
+ 
+
+$2,342 
+
+ 
+
+Mean 
+
+$1,964 
+
+ 
+
+$4,344 
+
+ 
+
+Total 
+
+$6.7B 
+
+ 
+
+$27.1B 
+
+ 
+
+Child support-to-income ratio 
+
+ 1,862,423 
+
+54.3 
+
+ 2,412,070 
+
+38.7 
+
+No payment 
+
+ 395,865 
+
+11.5 
+
+ 1,740,581 
+
+27.9 
+
+0% to 9% 
+
+ 313,754 
+
+9.1 
+
+ 1,201,175 
+
+19.3 
+
+10% to 19% 
+
+ 203,819 
+
+5.9 
+
+ 578,220 
+
+9.3 
+
+20 to 34% 
+
+ 655,908 
+
+19.1 
+
+ 305,425 
+
+4.9 
+
+35% or more 
+
+ 1,862,423 
+
+54.3 
+
+ 2,412,070 
+
+38.7 
+
+ Source: CRS analysis of data from the 2018 SIPP. 
+ Notes: Nonresident parents with children under age 21. “Nonresident parents” includes parents who have both 
+nonresident and resident children. Child support payments and income were reported for the previous calendar 
+year (2017). “Low income” is defined as having a family income that is less than 200% of the official poverty 
+thresholds. Nonresident parents making no payment may have had no legal obligation or informal expectation to 
+pay child support. The U.S. Census Bureau topcodes child support payment and income data to protect the 
+confidentiality of respondents; the respondent-reported amounts are replaced by an average of the values being 
+
+topcoded. For “annual child support payment,” the category “$6,000 to $9,999” is presented (rather than being 
+broken into “$6,000 to $7,999” and “$8,000 to $9,999”) to maintain an adequate sample size for a reliable 
+estimate. The “child support-to-income ratio” is the child support payment amount relative to total personal 
+income. For “child support-to-income ratio,” the category of “35% or more” includes 12% of low-income 
+nonresident parents and 2% of moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents who reported paying more in 
+child support than they received in income, including those who reported having zero or negative income. 
+Groups may not sum to 100% due to rounding. There are statistically significant differences in the distribution of 
+annual child support payments and child support-to-income ratios, as well as mean child support payments, 
+between low-income nonresident parents and moderate- and higher-income nonresident parents. Differences in 
+median and total child support payments were not tested for statistical significance; s ee Appendix A for more 
+details. 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+ 
+
+38 
+
+ 
+ Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Nonresident Parents 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Author Information 
+
+ 
+Patrick A. Landers 
+
+ 
+
+Analyst in Social Policy 
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ 
+
+ Disclaimer 
+
+This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan 
+shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and 
+under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other 
+than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in 
+connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not 
+subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in 
+its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or 
+material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to 
+copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
+
+ 
+
+Congressional Research Service 
+
+R46942 · VERSION 1 · NEW 
+
+39
\ No newline at end of file