Question: Wliat  is  the  distinction  between  liherty  and  ability?

Answer: Liberty consists in the power of the agent to will as he pleases, from the fact that the volition is determined only by the character of the agent willing. Ability consists in the power of the a^ent to change his own subjective state, to make him- self prefer what he does not prefer, and to act in a given case in opposition to the coexistent desires and preferences of the agent's own heart. Thus man is as truly free since the fall as before it, because he Avills as his evil heart pleases. But he has lost all ability to obey the law of God, because his evil heart is not subject to that law, neither can he change it. 21. Give Turretins and President Edwards' definitions of Liberty. Turretin, L. 10, Quaes. 1. — "As only three things are found in the soul besides its essence, namely, facidties, habits (habitus), acts, so will (arbitrium) in the common opinion is regarded as an act of the mind; but here it properly signifies neither an act nor a habit which may be separated from an individual man, and which also determines him to one at least of two contra- ries; but it signifies a faculty, not one which is vegetative nor sensuous, common to us and the brutes, in which there can be no place for either virtue or vice, but a rational faculty, the possession of which does not indeed constitute us either good or bad, but through the states of which, and actions, we are capable of becoming either good or bad." QufBS. 3. — " Since, therefore, the essential nature of liberty does not consist in indifference, it can not be found in any other principle than in {lubenfia rationcdi) a rational willingness or desire, whereby a man does what he prefers or chooses from a previous judgment of the reason (facit quod luhet ijravio rationis judicio). Hence two elements united are necessary to constitute tiiis liberty. (1.) ru npoaipEzixdv (the purpose), so that what is done is not determined by a blind, and certain brutish impulse, but en Ttpoaipi^Eooz, and from a previous illu- mination by the reason, and from a practical judgment of the intellect. (2.) t6 enovdiov (the spontaneous), so that what is done is determined spontaneously and freely and Avithout coaction." President Edwards " On the Will," Section 5, defines Liberty as being "the power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases." 290 MORAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SOUL. 22. Wliai are the two senses in which the loord motive, as influ- encing the ivill, is used ? and in which sense is it true that the volition is always as the strongest motive ? 1st. A motive to act may be something outside the sold itself, as the value of money, the Avislies of a friend, the wisdom or folly, the right or the wrong, of any act in itself considered, or the appetites and impulses of the body. In this sense it is evident that the man does not always act according to the motive. What may attract one man may rej)el another, or a man may repel the attraction of an outward motive by the su- perior force of some consideration drawn from within the soul itself. So that the dictum is true, "The man makes the motive, and not the motive the man." 2d. A motive to act may be the state of the man's own mind, as desire or aversion in view of the outward object, or motive in the first sense. This internal motive evidently must sway the volition, and as clearly it can not in the least interfere with the perfect freedom of the man in willing, since the internal motive is only the man himself desiring, or the reverse, accord- ing to his own disposition or character. 23. May tJiere not he several conflicting desires, or infernal motives, in the mind at the same time, and in such a case how is the ivill decided? There are often several conflicting desires, or impelling affections, in the mind at the same time, in which case the strongest desire, or the strongest group of desires, drawing in one way, determine the volition. That which is strongest proves itself to be such only by the result, and not by the intensity of the feeling it excites. Some of these internal motives are very vivid, like a thirst for vengeance, and others calm, as a sense of duty, yet often the calm motive proves itself the strongest, and draws the Avill its own way. This, of course, must depend upon the character of the agent. It is this inward contest of opposite principles which constitutes the warfare of the Christian life. It is the same experience which occasions a great part of that confusion of consciousness wdiich prevails among men wath respect to the problem of the will and the conditions of free agency. ]\Ian often acts against inotives, but never without motive. And the motive which actually determines the choice in a given case may often be the least clearly defined in the intellect, and the least vividly experienced in the feelings. Especially in sudden surprises, and in cases of trivial concernment, the volition is constantly determined by vague impulses, or by force of habit almost auto- CERTAINTY NOT INCONSISTENT WITH LIBERTY. 291 matically. Yet in every case, if the Avhole contents of the mind, at the time of the vohtion, be brought np into distinct consciousness, it will be found that the man chose, as upon the whole view of the case presented by the understanding- at the instant he desired to choose. 24. If the immediately preceding state of the mans mind cer- tainJij determines the act of his ivill, hoiv can thcd act he truly free if certainly determined ? This objection rests solely upon the confusion of the two distinct ideas of liberty of the will as an abstract faculty, and liberty of the man who wills. The man is never determined to will by any thing without himself He always himself freely gives, according to his own character, all the weight to the external influences which bear upon him that they ever possess. But, on the other hand, the mere act of volition, abstractly con- sidered, is determined by the present mental, moral, and emo- tional state of the man at the moment he acts. His rational freedom, indeed, consists, not in the uncertainty of his act, but in the very fact that his whole soul, as an indivisible, knowing, feeling, moral agent, determines his OAvn action as it pleases. 25. Prove that the certainty of a volition is in no degree incon- sistent with the liberty of the agent in thcd act. 1st. God, Christ, and saints in glory, are all eminently free m their holy choices and actions, yet nothing can be more certain than that, to all eternity, they shall always will accord- ing to righteousness. 2d. ]Man is a free agent, yet of every infant, from his birth, it is absolutely certain that if he lives he will sin. 3d. God, from eternity, foreknows all the free actions of men as certain, and he has foreordained them, or made them to be certain. In prophecy he has infallibly foretold many of them as certain. And in regeneration his people are made " his workmanship created unto good works, which God has before ordained that we should walk in them." 4th. Even we, if we thoroughly understand a friend's char- acter, and all the present circumstances under which he acts, are often absolutely certain how he will freely act, though absent from us. This is the foundation of all human faith, and hence of all human society. 26. What is that theory of moi'al liberty, styled ^'■Liberty of Indifference,''' ^'■Self-deiermirdng Poiver of the Will,'' '•'Power of Con- trary Choice" ^'Liberty of Contingency," etc., held by Arminians and otJters ? 292 MORAL COXSTITUTION OF THE SOUL. This theory mamtaiiis that it is essentially involved in the idea of free ag-ency — 1st. That the will of man in every volition may decide in opposition, not only to all outward inducements, but equally to all the inward judgments, desires, and to the whole coexistent inward state of the man himself. 2d. That man is conscious in every free volition, that he might have willed precisely the opposite, his outward circumstances and his entire inward state remaining the same. 3d. That every free volition is contingent, i. e., uncertain, until the event, since it is determined by nothing but the bare faculty of volition on the part of the agent. — Hamilton's " lieid," pp. 599-624. llie true theory of moral certainty, on the other hand, is that the soul is a unit; that the will is not self-determined, but that man, when he wills, is self-determined; and that his voli- tion is certainly determined by his own internal, rational, moral, emotional state at the time, viewed as a whole. In opposition to the former theory, and in favor of the lat- ter, we argue — 1st. That the character of the agent does cer- tainly determine the character of his free acts, and that the certainty of an act is not inconsistent with the liberty of the agent in his act. — See above. Question 12. 2d. The Christian doctrines of divine foreknowledge, fore- ordination, providence, and regeneration. For the Scriptural evidence of these, see their respective chapters. They all show that the volitions of men are neither uncertain nor in- determinate. 3d. We agree with the advocates of the opposite theory in maintaining that in every free act we are conscious that we had power to perform it, or not to perform it, as we chose. " But we maintain that we are none the less conscious that this intimate conviction that we had power not to perform an act is conditional. That is, we are conscious that the act might have been otherwise, had other views or feelings been present to our minds, or been allowed their due weight. A man can not prefer against his preference, or choose against his choice. A man n:iay have one preference at one time, and another at another. He may have various conflicting feelings or princi- ples in action at the same time, but he can not have coexisting opposite preferences." 4th. The theory of the "self-determining power of the will" regards the will, or the mere faculty of volition, as isolated from the other faculties of the soul, as an independent agent within an agent. Now, the soul is a unit. Consciousness and Script- ure alike teach us that the man is the free, responsible agent. By this dissociation of the volitional faculty from the moral dispositions and desires, the volitions can have no moral char- ULTIMATE SEAT OF RESPONSIBILITY. 293 acter. By its dissociation from the reason, the volitions can have no rational character. If they are not determined by the inward state of the man himself, they must be fortuitous, and beyond his control. He can not be free if his will is independent alike of his head and his heart, and he ought not to be held responsible. — See "Bib. Rep.," January, 1857, Article V. 27. Why is a man responsible for Ms outiuard actions; why for his volitions; why for his affections and desires; a'iid prove that he is responsible for his affections ? "A man is responsible for his outward acts, because they are determined by the will ; he is responsible for his volitions, because they are determined by his own principles and feelings (desires); he is responsible for his principles and feelings, be- cause of their inherent nature as good or bad, and because they are his own and constitute his character." — " Bib. Rep.," Jan- uary, 1857, p. 130. It is the teaching of Scripture and the universal judgment of men, that "a good man out of the good treasures of his heart bringeth forth that which is good," and that a "wicked man out of the evil treasures of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil." The act derives its moral character from the state of the heart from which it springs, and a man is respon- sible for the moral state of his heart, whether that state be innate, formed by regenerating grace, or acquired by himself, because — 1st. Of the obliging nature of moral right, and the ill desert of sin ; 2d. Because a man's affections and desires are himself loving or refusing that which is right. It is the judg- ment of all, that a profane or malignant man is to be repro- bated, no matter how he became so. 28. How does Dr. D. D. Whedon state and contrast the position of Arminian and Calvi)dstic philosophy? Dr. Whedon, in the " Bibliotheca Sacra," April, 18(32, says, " To this maxim, that it is no matter how we come by our evil volitions, dispositions, or nature in order to responsibility, pro- vided that we really possess them, we (the IMethodists) oppose the counter maxim that in order to responsihility for a given act or state., poiver in the agent for a contrary act or stcde is requisite. In other words j^oiver underlies respotvsihility." The only limit which he admits to this principle is the case of an inability in- duced by the free act of the agent himself. This, he says, is a fundamental maxim by which all the issues between Armin- ianism and Calvinism are determined. 294 MORAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SOUL. 29. Show that the Arminian vieiv leads to consequences incon- sistent ivith the gospel, and that the Calvinistic view is true. Dr. Wheclon admits that Adam after his fall lost all ability to obey the law of God, and was responsible for that inability and all its consequences, because, having been created with full ability, he lost it by his own free act. He also admits that every child of Adam is born into the world with a coiTnpt nature, and without any ability to obey the law of God. But no infant is responsible nor punishable for this want of ability nor for any sinfvd action which results from it, because it was entailed upon him, without any fault of his own, by the sin of another. In the way of just compensation, however, for this their great misfortune of being- innocent sinners, God gives to all men in Christ sufficient grace, and hence gracious ability to obey the gospel law. If a man uses this gracious ability he is saved, and faith and evangelical obedience is accounted for perfect righteousness ; (/' he does not use this gracious ability he is condemned as responsible for that abuse of ability, and con- sequently responsible for all the sinful feelings, actions, and subsequent inability which result from tliat abuse of power. We argue that it follows from this Arminian view — 1st. That salvation by Christ is not of free grace, but a tardy and incom- plete compensation granted men for undeserved evils brought upon them at their birth in consequence of Adam's sin. 2d. The " grace " given to all men is as necessary to render them pun- ishable sinners, as it is to save their souls. In fact, according to this principle, grace sends more souls to hell by making them responsible through the possession of ability, than it sends to heaven through f\iith in Christ. 3d. Those who die in infancy, not being punishable, because not responsible, for original sin, go to heaven as a matter of natural right. On the contrary we maintain that the responsibility of a man for his moral dispositions, affections, and desires, no matter how they may have originated, if he be a sane man, is an ultimate fact of consciousness, confirmed by Scripture, conscience, and the universal judgments of men. An act de- rives its moral character from the state of the heart from which it springs, but the state of the heart does not acquire its n}oral character from the action. But the moral quality of the state of the heart itself is inherent, and moral responsibility is insep- arable from moral quality. This is so — 1st. Because of the essential nature of right and wrong. The essence of right is that it otcght to be — that it obliges the will. The essence of wrong is that it ought not to be — that the will is under obligation to the contrary, and that ULTIMATE SEAT OF RESPONSIBILITY. 295 the doing of it involves iU desert. 2d. Because a man's moral affections or desires are nothing other tlian the man himself loving or abhorring goodness. It is the judgment of all men that a profane and malignant man is to be reprobated no matter how he became so. It is the character, not the origin, of the moral disposition of the heart which is the real question. Christ says, " A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good, and a wicked man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil." — Luke vi. 45


Question: In  loJiat  different  senses  is  the  term  covenant  used  in  Scripture?

Answer: 1st. For a natural ordinance. — Jer. xxxiii. 20. 2d. For an nnconditional promise. — Gen. ix. 11, 12. 3d. For a conditional promise. — Is. i. 19, 20. 4th. A dispensation or mode of administration. — Heb. viii. 6-9. For the usage with respect to the Greek term SiafJrjKrj, usu- ally translated in our version testament and covenant. — See Chap- ter XXII., on " Covenant of Grace," Question 1. In the theological phrases "covenant of works," and "cove- nant of grace," this term is used in the third sense of a promise suspended on conditions.


Question: What  are  the  several  elements  essential  to  a  covenant?

Answer: 1st. Contracting parties. 2d. Conditions. These conditions in a covenant between equals are mutually imposed and mutu- ally binding, but in a sovereign constitution, imposed by the Creator upon the creature, these " conditions " are better ex- pressed as (1) promises on the part of the Creator suspended upon (2) conditions to be fulfilled by the creature. And (3) an alternative penalty to be inflicted in case the condition fails. 3. Shoiv that the constitution under lohich Adam ivas placed by God at his creation may he rightly called a covenant. The inspired record of God's transactions with Adam pre- sents definitely all the essential elements of a covenant as co- existing in that constitution. 1st. The "contracting parties." — (1.) God, the moral Gov- ernor, by necessity of nature and relation demanding perfect conformity to moral law. (2.) Adam, the free moral agent, by necessity of nature and relation under the inalienable obliga- tion of moral law. 310 COVENANT OF WORKS. 2cl. The "promises," life and favor.— ]\Iatt. xix. 16, 17; Gal. iii. 12. 3d. The "conditions" upon which the promises were sus- pended, perfect obedience, in this instance subjected to a spe- cial test, that of abstaining from the fruit of the "tree of knowledge." 4th. The "alternative penalty." "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." — Gen. ii. 16, 17. This constitution is called a covenant. — Hosea vi. 7.


Question: How  is  it  defined  in  our  standards  ?

Answer: "Con. Faith," Chap, iv., Sec. 2; Chap, vii., Sec. 1 and 2; Chap, xix.. Sec. 1; " L. Cat.," Q. 20; "S. Cat.," Q. 12. 5. Why is it not absurd to apply the term " Covenant " to a sovereign constitution imposed hy the Creator upon the creature tvithout consulting Ms ivill ? 1st. Although it was a sovereign constitution imposed by God, there is no reason to suppose that Adam did not enter upon it voluntarily. He was a holy being, and the arrangement was pre-eminently to his advantage. 2d. We call it a Covenant because that is the proper word to express a conditional prom- ise made to a free agent. 3d. The term "Covenant" is constant- ly applied in Scripture to other sovereign constitutions of like character which the Creator has imposed upop men. If God could make covenants with fallen 'and guilty Noah, Gen. ix. 11, 12, and with Abraham, Gen. xvii. 1-21, why could he not make a covenant with unfallen Adam.


Question: By  what  titles  has  this  covenant  been  designated  and  why  ?

Answer: Ist. It has been called the Covenant of Nature, because it expresses the relations which man in his natural state as newly created and unfallen sustained to the Creator and Moral Gov- ernor of the universe. It is adjusted to the natural or unfallen man, just as the Covenant of Grace is adjusted to unnatural or fallen man. 2d. It has been called a legal covenant, because its " condition " is perfect conformity to^the law of absolute moral perfection. 3d. It has been called the Covenant of Works, because its demands terminate upon man's own being and doing. 4th. It has been called a Covenant of Life, because the promise attached to well-doing was life. It was also essentially a gracious covenant, because although every creature is, as such, bound to serve the Creator to the full extent of his powers, the Creator can not be bound as a mere matter of justice to grant the creature fellowship with himself, THE PARTIES AND PROMISE OF THE COVENANT. 311 or to raise him to an infallible standard of moral power, or to crown him with eternal and inalienable felicity. 7. Wlio were the parties to this covenant, and Jio7o may it he proved that Adam therein represented all his natural descendants ? The "parties" were God and Adam, and in him represen- tatively all his natural posterity. That he did thus represent his descendants is evident — 1st. From the parallel which is drawn in Scripture between Adam in his relation to his descendants, and Christ in his rela- tion to his elect. — Rom. v. 12-19, and 1 Cor. xv. 22, 47. 2d. From the matter of fact that the very penalty denounced upon Adam, in case of his disobedience, has taken effect in each individual descendant. — Gen. ii. 17; iii. 17, 18. 3d. From the Biblical declaration that sin, death, and all penal evil came into the world through Adam.-r-Rom. v. 12; 1 Cor. XV. 22. See Chapter XXI., on " Imputation of Adam's Sin."


Question: What  ivas  the  promise  attached  to  the  Covenant  ?

Answer: The promise was "life" — 1st. Because it is necessarily im- plied in the penalty of "death," which is expressly denounced. If disobedience is linked to death, obedience is linked to life. 2d. It is clearly taught in other passages of Scripture. — Lev. xviii. 5; Neh. ix. 29; jMatt. xix. 16, 17; Gal. iii. 12; Rom. x. 5. This life was not a mere continuation of the existence with wdiich man was. endowed by creation as a fallible, moral agent, but it was an additional gift of infallible, moral excellence, and inalienable blessedness, conditioned upon obedience during a probationary period. 1st. This is evident because the reward suspended on " conditions " must involve something more than had been already granted. 2d. Because man was as created liable to sin, and tiiere could be no permanent and seciu'e bliss nor high excellence in that condition. 3d. Because the grant- ing of the reward necessarily closes the probation, supersedes the conditions, and secures inalienable blessedness. 4th.* Be- cause the angels who had not left their first estate had been rewarded with such a life. 5th. Because the life promised must correspond to the death threatened, and the death threatened involved eternal separation from God and irretrievable destruc- tion. 6th. Because the life secured to us by the "Second Adam" is of this nature. 9. What is a '■'■ p>rohation' ? and ivhen and ivhere had the hunum rojce, its probation under the Covenant of Works ? A probation is a trial. The word is variously used to express the state, or the time, or the act of trial. The time of probation 312 COVENANT OF WORKS. under such a constitution as the covenant of works must be a definitely hmited one, because it is self-evident that either the infliction of the penalty or the granting of the reward would, ipsofacio. close the probation forever, and the reward could not accrue until the period of probation Avas completed. The probation of the human race took place once for all in the trial of Adam in the garden of Eden. That trial resulted in loss, and since then the conditions of the covenant being impossible, and its penalty having been incurred, any proba- tion is of course impossible. Men are now by nature children of wrath. 10. What loas the condition of that covenant ? and icliy icas the command not to eat of the tree of knoivledge of good and evil selected as a test ? Perfect conformity of heart, and perfect obedience in act to the whole will of God as far as revealed. — Deut. xxvii. 26; Gal. iii. 10 ; James ii. 10. The command to abstain from eating the forbidden fruit was only made a special and decisive test of that general obedience. As the matter forbidden was mor- ally indifferent in itself, the command was admirably adapted to be a clear and naked test of submission to God's absolute will as such. Tiie forbidden tree Avas doubtless called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, because through the disobe- dient eating of it mankind came to the thorough experience of the value of goodness and of the infinite evil of sin. The obedience required by the law as a rule of duty is of course perpetual. But the demand of the law for obedience as a covenant condition of life must be limited to the period of probation. The term "perpetual" in "Conf F.," Ch. xix., § 1, and "L. Cat.," Q. 20, was admitted doubtless by inadvertence. 11. Whcd was the ncdure of the decdh threcdened in case of disobedience ? This word, "dying thou shalt die," in this connection evi- dently includes all the penal consequences of sin. These are — 1st, death, natural, Eccle. xii. 7; 2d, death, moral and spiritual, Matt. viii. 22; Eph. ii. 1; 1 Tim. v. 6; Rev. hi. 1; 3d, death, eternal, liev. xx. 6-14. The instant the law was violated its penalty began to ope- rate, although on account of the intervention of the dispensation of grace the full effect of the sentence is suspended during the present life. The Spirit of God was withdrawn the instant man fell, and he at once became spiritually dead, physically mortal, and under sentence of death eternal. This appears — 1st. From the nature of man as a spiritual MEANING OF THE WORD ''DEATHS 313 being. "This is life eternal to know the only true God," etc. — John xvii. 3. The instant the soul is cut off from God it dies, and his wrath and curse is incurred, and the entire per- son, body, and soul, involved in an endless series of evil condi- tions. 2d. The Scriptures everywhere declare that the wages of sin is death. — Rom. vi. 23; Ezek. xviii. 4. The nature of this death is to be determined. (1.) By the narrative of the effects produced in our first parents, e. (/., shame of nakedness, fear, alienation from God, unbelief, and after a time dissolution of body, etc. (2.) By the experience of its effects in their descendants, e. g., corruption of nature, mortality of body, miseries in this life, the second death. 12. What does C. F. Hudson and others hold to he the penalty of the Covenant of Works ? The annihilationists, of whom C. F. Hudson is one of the ablest, hold that the precise thing God said to Adam was "Thou, thyself, thine entire person art dust, and to dust thou shalt return." They quote Num. xxiii. 10; Judges xvi. 30, etc. They hold that death means precisely and only cessation of being. They say i\.dam could have had no other idea asso- ciated with the word. Death in this sense had pre-existed in the world for innumerable ages among the lower orders of creatures, and this was all Adam knew on the subject. It is idle for us to speculate as to what the original lan- guage God spoke to Adam was, or what the word he used, corresponding to our word death, precisely signified and sug- gested. Adam probably simply understood God to say that if he sinned he should be utterly and irretrievably cut off from the divine favor. That is precisely what happened. But the facts are clear. 1st. The word death in Scripture is used to express not cessation of being but a certain godless condition of being. — Rev. iii. 1 ; Eph. ii. 1-5, and v. 14 ; 1 Tim. v. 6 ; Rom. vi. 13; xi. 15; John v. 24; vi. 47. 2d. It will be shown below. Chapters XXXVII. and XL., that the Scriptures do not allow the notion either of the sleep of the soul during the inter- mediate state, or of the annihilation of the wicked after the judgment. 13. What is meant hy the seal of a covenant, and ivhat icas the seed of the Covenant of Works ? A seal of a covenant is an outward visible sign, appointed by God as a pledge of his faithfulness, and as an earnest of the blessings promised in the covenant. Thus the rainbow is the seal of the covenant made with Noah. — Gen. ix. 12, 13. Circumcision was the original seal of 314 COVENANT OF WORKS. the covenant made with Abraham (Gen. xvii. 9-11 ; Eom. iv. 11), in the place of which baptism is now instituted. — Col. ii. 11, 12; Gal. iii. 2(3, 27. The tree of life was the seal of the covenant of works, because it was the ontward sign and seal of that life which was promised in the covenant, and from which man was excluded on account of sin, and to which he is restored through the second Adam in the Paradise regained. — Compare Gen. ii. 9 ; iii. 22, 24, with Rev. ii. 7; xxii. 2-14. 14. Wliat according to IVitsius, in his great ivork ^^on the Cov- enants,'' are the seals or sacraments of the Covenant of Works ? In Vol. I., Ch. vi., Witsius enumerates four — 1st. Paradise. 2d. The tree of life. 3d. The tree of knowledge of good and evil. 4th. The Sabbath. These were all doubtless symbolical institutions connected with the original divine dispensation of which the Covenant of Works was the foundation. But there appears to be no rea- son for designating them as belonging to that particular class of symbolical institutions called sacraments under the New Testament. The tree of the knoAvledge of good and evil sealed death, and therefore could not have been a seal of the Covenant of Works which offered life. 15. In lohat sense is the Covenant of Woo'ks abrogated, and in what sense is it in force ? This Covenant having been broken by Adam, not one of his natural descendants is ever able to fulfil its conditions, and Christ having fulfilled all of its conditions in behalf of all his own people, salvation is offered now on the condition of faith. In this sense the Covenant of Works having been fulfilled by the second Adam is henceforth abrogated under the gospel. Nevertheless, since it is founded upon the principles of im- mutable justice, it still binds all men who have not fled to the refuge offered in the righteousness of Christ. It is still true that "he that doeth these things shall live by them," and "the soul that sinneth it shall die." This law in this sense remains, and in consequence of the unrighteousness of men condemns them, and in consequence of their absolute inability to fulfil it, it acts as a schoolmaster to bring them to Christ. For he having fulfilled alike its condition wherein Adam failed, and its penalty which Adam incurred, he has become the end of this covenant for righteousness to every one that believeth, who in him is regarded and treated as one who has fulfilled the covenant, and merited its promised reward.


Question: What  must  a  triie  definition  of  the  nature  of  sin  embrace  ?

Answer: A definition of sin must — 1st. Include all that either the Word of God or an enlightened conscience decides to be sin. 2d. It must include nothing else. Otherwise in either case it is false. 3. State the definitions of sin given by Turretin, and by our Standards, and by Vitringa. Turretin, Locus 9, QufBS. 1. — " Inclinatio, actio, vel omissio pugnans cum lege Dei, vel carens rectitudine legali debita in esse." 316 THE NATURE OF SIN AND THE SIN OF ADAM. " Conf. Faith," Ch. vi, § 6; " L. Cat," Q. 24; " S. Cat," Q. 14 " Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of the law of God." Campejus Vitringa, Prof Theo. in Franeker, died 1722. — " Forma peccati est disconvenientia, actus, habitus, ant status hominis cum divina lege." This last excellent definition embraces two constitutent prop- ositions.— Ist. Sin_i^_any and ey.ery want of conformity with the moral law of God, whether of excess or defect, whether of omission or commission. 2d. Sin is any want of conformity of the moral states and habits as well of the actions of the human soul with the law of God ?


Question: What  is  Laio  ?  And  what  is  tJie  Law  of  God  ?

Answer: The word law is used in a great many and in very different senses. It is used by natural philosophers often to express — 1st. A general fact, e. (/., the general fact that all matter at- tracts all matter inversely as the square of the distance. 2d. An established order of sequence in which certain events occur, as the order of the seasons, and any established order of nature. 3d. The mode of acting of a specific force, as the law of electri- cal induction, etc. 4th. A spontaneous order of development, as the internal self-acting law of the growth of animals and plants from the seed. The moral law of God, however, is not an internal, self-reg- ulating principle of man's moral nature, like the feigned inner light of the Quakers, but an imperial standard of moral excel- lence imposed upon mankind from without and from above them by the supreme authority of a personal moral Governor over personal moral subjects. It involves (a) a certain degree of enlightenment as to truth and duty, (/>) a rule of action reg- ulating the will and binding the conscience, (c) armed with sanctions, or imperative motives constraining to obedience. 5. Prove that sin is any icant ofconformity to '■'' Laio.'' 1st. Whenever we sin conscience condemns us for not com- ing up to a standard which we intuitivel}^ recognize as morally obligatory upon us. Conscience implies {a) moral accounta- bility, and hence subjection to a moral Governoi', and {Ij) a standard to which we ought to be conformed. The conscience itself, as the organ of God's law, contains the law written on the heart 2d. It is implied in all the language used by the Holy Ghost in Scripture to express the idea of sin \2t' D''pt:' from nob' to devi- SIN WANT OF CONFORMITY TO LAW OF GOD. 317 ate from the ivay. ^'^^ to miss the mark, djuaprdvoo to err, to miss the mark, jrapa/iadz? (Gal. iii. 19), a going aside from, a trans- gresssion. 3d. It is explicitly asserted in Scripture, " Every one tliat doetli sin, also doeth rtjr dvojuiav, and sin is dvojuia." — 1 John iii. 4. " For where no law is there is no transgression." — Rom. iv. 15. 6. Prove that sin is any ivant of conformity to the moral Law of God. As above shown this is implied in the action of conscience. It testifies to a law imposed upon us by an authority external to us, the supreme authority of God. In the absence of all supernatural revelation it has led all heathen nations to the recognition of the authority of God, or of gods exercising gov- ernment, to a belief in rewards and punishments administered by God, and hence to expiatory and propitiatory rites. It is also asserted by David that sin of any kind is disobe- dience and dishonor done to God. — See fifty-first Psalm. Hence sin is not a mere violation of the law of our own constitution, nor of the system of things, but an offence against a personal Lawgiver and moral Governor, who vindicates his law with penalties. The soul that sins is always conscious that his sin is (a) intrinsically vile and polluting, and {h) that it justly deserves punishment and calls down the righteous wrath of God. Hence sin carries with it two inalienable characters — (a) ill desert, guilt, reatus, (6) pollution, macula. 7. Shoio that this Laio, any tvant of conformity to which is sin, demands absolute moral perfection.* This is necessarily involved in the very essence of moral obligation. The very essence of right is thcd it ought to he. Tlie very essence of wrong is that it ought not to be. If any thing- be indifferent it is not moral, and if it be moral it is a matter of obligation. This being of the essence of right it is, of course, true of each consistent part as Avell as of the whole. Any degree short of full conformity with the highest right is there- fore of the natm-e of sin. "For whosoever shall keep the Avhole law and yet offend in one point is guilty of all." — -James ii. 10. The old maxim is true, Omne minus bonum habet rationem mali. It evidently follows from this principle that the Romish doc- trine of works of Supererogation is absurd as well as wicked, Bince if these works are obligatory they are not supererogatory, and if tliey are not obligatory they are not moral, and if not moral they can have no moral value. Hence also all those Perfectionists who admit that men are not now able to keep * Dr. C. Hodge's Unpublished Lectures. 318 THE NATURE OF SIN AND THE SIN OF ADAM. perfectly the law of absolute moral perfection, while they main- tain that Christians may in this life live without sin, obviously use incorrect and misleading langaiage. 8. Prove that any want of conformity ivith this Laiv in the states and permanent habit of soul, as well as in its acts, is sin. Ist. This is proved by the common judgments of all men. All jvidge that the moral state of the heart determines the moral character of the actions, and that the moral character of the actions discloses the moral state of the heart, and that a man whose acts are habitually profane, or malignant, or impure, is himself in the permanent state of his heart profane, or malig- nant, or impure. 2d. The same is proved by the common religious experience of all Christians. This experience alwa^'s involves conviction of sin, and conviction of sin involves as its most imiform and prominent element not merely a conviction that our actions fail to come up to the proper standard of excellence, but a sense that in the depths of our nature, below and beyond the reach of volition, we are spiritually dead and polluted, and im- potent and insensible to divine things, and worthy of condem- nation therefore. Every Christian has been brouglit with Paul to cry out, "0 wretched man that I am: who shall deliver me from the body of this death." — Rom. vii. 24 This finds expres- sion, and this principle for which we are contending finds proof in all the prayers, supplications, confessions, and in all the hjanns and devotional literature of Christians of all ages and denominations. 3d. The Scriptures explicitly call the permanent states of the soul "sin" Avhen they are not conformed to the law of God. Sin and its lusts are said to reign in the mortal body; the mem- bers are the instruments of sin; the unregenerate are the ser- vants of sin. — Rom. vi. 12-17. The disposition or permanent "tendency" to sin is called "flesh" as opposed to "spirit," Gal. V. 17; also "lust," James i. 14, 15; "old Adam," and "body of sin," "ignorance," "blindness of heart," "alienation from the life of God," and " a condition of being past feeling," Eph. iv. 18, 19. 9. Shoio that the very first spontaneous motions of concfiipiscence are sin ? 1st. The heart of the Christian often for the moment spon- taneously lusts for evil when the conscience promptly condemns and the will forbids and restrains and diverts the attention. Althcjugh the man does not consent to the sin that is present in him, nevertheless the Christian feels that such movements of ORIGIN OF SIN. 319 concupiscence are unholy, and worthy of condemnation, and he not only resists them but condemns and loathes himself because of them, and seeks to be purged Irom them at once by the atoning blood, and the sanctifying spirit of Jesus. 2d. Concupiscence is called " sin " in Scripture. " I had not known sin, but by the law, ibr I had not known kTuhvi-Uav (con- cupiscence) except the law had said thou shalt not kTtiOvi-a'jGEii.^^ Also rd TtaOrj/uaza rcSv djuapriaov, "the motions of sin," and "the law in the members," and "sin that dwelleth in me," that worketh without " my consent," which " works all manner of concupiscence," etc. — Kom. vii. 5-24. 10. What is the first great mystery connected with the origin of sin ? How or why was the existence of sin tolerated in the crea- tion of a God at once eternal, self-existent, and infinite in Avis- dom, power, holiness, and benevolence? All the attempted solutions of this enigma which have been entertained in our day have been summed up by Prof Haven of Chicago as follows : " Either God can not prevent sin, i. e., either (a) in any system, (b) in a moral system involving free agency. " Or for some reason God does not choose to prevent sin, i. e., either because («) its existence is of itself desirable, (b) or though not in itself desirable it is the necessary means of the greatest good, or (c) though not in itself tending to good it may be overruled to that result, or (d) because, in general terms, its permission will involve less evil than its absolute prevention. It is obvious (o.) that God has permitted sin, and (b) hence it was right for him to do so. But why it was right must ever remain a mystery demanding submission and delying solution.


Question: What  ivas  the  ^lanicJiwan  doctrine  as  to  the  origin  of  sin?

Answer: They held the opinion that sin had its ground in some eter- nal, self-existent principle independent of God, either matter or self-existent devil. This doctrine is inconsistent (a) with the independence, infinitude, and sovereignty of God; {b) with the nature of sin as essentially the revolt of a created free-will from God. Sin is an element of perverted moral agency. To con- sider it an attribute of matter is to- deny it. AH the Christian fathers united in opposing JManichasism and in maintaining that sin is the product of the free-will of man alone. 12. State the doctrine of St. Augustine ivith respect to the priva- tive nature of sin. St. Augustine held — 1st. That God is the creator of all 320 THE NATURE OF SIN AND THE SIN OF ADAM. entities • and the absolutely sovereign Governor of all moral agents and of all their actions; and 2d. That nevertheless God is in no sense either tlie author or the cause of sin. In order to reconcile tliese he held, 3d. That sin is not an entity, but is in its essence simply a defect. His dictum, which hence has passed into general currency with all classes of theologians, was Nihil est malum nisi privafio honi. They have properly distinguished between "negation" and "privation." Negation is the absence of that wliich does not belong to the nature of the subject, as sight to a stone. Privation is the absence of that Avhich belonging to the nature of the subject is necessary to its perfec- tion, as sight to a man. Sin therefore is privative because it originates in the absence of those moral qualities which ougld to be present in the states and actions of a free, responsible, moral agent. It is to be remembered, however, that the inherent depravity •which " comes from a defective or privative cause " instantly assumes a positive form, from the essentiall}^ active nature of the human soul. In a passive condition of being, a defect might remain purel}' negative. But in a ceaselessly active being, and one acting under ceaseless moral obligations, a moral defect must instantly become a positive vice. Not to love God is to hate him. Not to be in all things conformed to his will is to rebel against him, and to break his law at all points. — See Edwards, " Original Sin," pt. 4. sec. 2.


Question: What  is  the  Pelagian  doctrine  as  to  the  nature  of  sin?

Answer: The Pelagian view of sin, which has been rejected by all branches of the Christian Cliurch, is — 1st. That law can com- mand only volitions. 2d. That states of the soul can be com- manded only in so far as they are the direct effect of previous volitions. 3d. Hence that sin consists simply in acts of volition. 4th. That whatever a man has not plenary ability to do he is under no obligation to do. 5th. That there is no such thing, therefore, as innate depravity. 6th. That since a volition to be moral or the subject of approbation or of condemnation, must be a pure self-decision of the will, it follows that sin is beyond the absolute control of God. 14. In ivhat sense is the dictum that ^^all sin is voluntary" true, and in ivhat sense false?  It all turns upon the sense of the phrase "Voluntary." If it be in the Pelagian sense restricted to " acts of volition ; " then the dictum that "all sin is voluntary" is false. If, however, it is used so as to include the spontaneous dispositions, tenden- cies, and afiections which constitute the permanent character SIN OF ADAM. 321 of the soul, and Avhich prompt to and decide the nature of the voHtions, then all sin is voluntary, because all sin has its ground and spring in these spontaneous tendencies and dispositions, i. e., in the permanent moral states of the soul. 15. State the peculiarities of the Romish position upon this sub- ject, and also that of the Arminian Perfectionists. The Roman Church agrees with all Protestants in holding that all the habits and permanent dispositions as well as the actions of the soul which are not conformed to the law of God are sinful. But it is a prominent characteristic of their doc- trine that they hold that moral condition of soul which remains in the regenerate as the consequence of original sin, and the fomes or fuel of actual sin, is not properly of the nature of sin. They maintain tliat the first spontaneous movement of this concupiscence is not. sin in itself, and not to be treated as such — but that it becomes the cause of sin as soon as its solicita- tions are entertained and translated into action by the will. — "Cat. of Council of Trent," Pt. II., ch. ii., Q. 42. The Arminians avail themselves of the same positions when defending their doctrine of Christian Perfection. Wesley (in "Meth. Doc. Tracts," pp. 294-312) distinguishes between "sin properly so called, i. e., voluntary transgression of known law, and sin improperly so called, i. e., involuntary transgression of law, known or unknown," and declares, " I believe there is no such perfection in this life as excludes these involuntary trans- gressions, which I apprehend to be naturally consequent upon the ignorance and mistakes inseparable from mortality." The Sin of Adam. 16. What is the second g7xat mystery connected with tJie origin of sin ? How could sin originate in the will of a creature created with a positively holy disposition ? The difficulty is to reconcile understandingly the fact that sin did so originate — 1st. With the known constitution of the human will. If the volitions are as tlie prevalent affections and desires, and if the affections and desires excited by outward occasions are good or evil, according to the permanent moral state of the will, how could a sinful volition originate in a holy will ? or how could the permanent state of his soul become spontane- ously unholy? 2d. With universal experience. As it is impossible that a sinful desire or volition should originate in the holy will of 21 322 THE NATURE OF SIN AND THE SIN OF ADAM. God, or in the holj^ M-ill of saints and angels, or that a truly holy affection or volition should originate in the depraved wills of fallen men Avithout supernatural regeneration (Luke vi. 43-45), how could a sinful volition originate in the holy will of Adam ? That Adam was created with a holy yet fallible will, and that he did fall, are facts established by divine testimony. We must believe them, although we can not rationally explain them. This is for us impossible — 1st. Because there remains an inscrutable element in the human will, adopt whichever theory of it we may. 2d. Because all our reasoning must be based upon con- sciousness, and no other man ever had in his consciousness the experience of Adam. The origin of our sinful volitions is plain enough. But we lack some of the data necessary to ex- plain his case. In the way of approximation, however, we may observe— 1st. It is unsound to reason from the independent will of the infinite God to the dependent will of the creature. 2d. The infallibility of saints and angels is not inherent, but is a superinduced conjirmmg grace of God. They are not in a state of probation. Adam was — his will was free, but not confirmed. 3d. The depraved will of man can not originate holy affec- tions and volitions, because the presence of a positively holy principle is necessaiy to constitute them holy. But, on the other hand, there were already in the holy will of Adam many principles morally indifferent, in themselves neither good nor bad, and becoming sinful only wdien, in default of the control of reason and conscience, they prompt to their indulgence in ways forbidden by God; e. q., admiration and appetite for the fruit, and desire for knowledge. The sin coiumenced the moment that, under the powerful persuasion of Satan, these two motives were dwelt upon in spite of the prohibition, and thus allowed to become so prevalent in tlie soul as temporarily to neutralize reverence for God's authority, and fear of his threatening. 4th. Adam, although endowed with a holy disposition, was inexperienced in the assaults of temptation. 5th. He was assailed through the morally indifferent princi- ples of his nature by a vastly superior intelligence and char- acter, to whom, in the highest sense, the origin of all sin must be referred. 17. What appears from the history of the Fall to have been the precise nature of the first sin of Adam? THE EFFECT OF ADAM'S SIN ON HIMSELF. 323 It appears from the record (Gen. iii. 1-6) that the initial influences inducing our first parents, in their first transgression, were in themselves considered morally indifferent. These were — 1st. Natural appetite for the attractive fruit. 2d. Natural de- sire for knowledge. 3d. The persuasive power of Satan upon Eve, including the known influence of a superior mind and will. 4th. The persuasive power of both Satan and Eve upon Adam. Their dreadful sin appears to have been essentially — 1st. Unbelief, they virtually made God a liar. 2d. Deliberate disobedience, they set up their will as a law in place of his.


Question: What  relation  did  God  sustain  to  Adams  sin?

Answer: Concerning the relation sustained by God to the sin of Adam all we know is — 1st. God created Adam holy, with all natural powers necessary for accountable agency. 2d. He rightfully withheld from him, during his probation, any higher supernat- ural influence necessary to render him infallible. 3d. He neither caused nor approved Adam's sin. 4th. He sovereignly decreed to permit him to sin, thus determining that he should sin as he did.


Question: What  luas  the  effect  of  Adams  sin  upon  himself?

Answer: 1st. In the natural relation which Adam sustained to God as the subject of his moral government, his sin must have in- stantly had the effect of (1) displeasing and alienating God, and (2) of depraving his own soul. 2d. In the covenant relation which Adam sustained to God the penalty of the covenant of Avorks was incurred, i. e., death, including, (1) mortality of body, (2) corruption of soul, (3) sen- tence of eternal death. 20. In lohat sense did lie become totally depraved, and hoiv coidd total depravity result from one sin ? By the afiirmation that total depravity was the immediate result of Adam's first sin, it is not meant that he became as bad as he could be, or even as corrupt as the best of his unre- generate descendants ; but it is meant — 1st. His apostasy from God was complete. God demands perfect obedience. Adam was now a rebel in arms. 2d. That the favor and communion of God, the sole condition of his spiritual life, was withdrawal. 3d. A schism was introduced into the soul itself The pain- ful reproaches of conscience were excited, and could never be allayed wdthout an atonement. This led to fear of God, distrust, prevarication, and, by necessary consequence, to in- numerable other sins. 32-4 THE NATURE OF SIN AND THE SIN OF ADAM. 4th. Thus the whole nature became depraved. The will being at war with the conscience, the understanding- became darkened; the conscience, in consequence of constant outrage and neglect, became seared; the appetites of the body inordi- nate, and its members instruments of unrighteousness. 5th. There remained in man's nature no recuperative princi- ple ; he must go on from worse to worse, unless God interpose. Thus the soul of man being essentially active, although one sin did not establish a confirmed habit, it did alienate God and work confusion in the soul, and thus lead to an endless course of sin. The Consequences of Adam's sin to his posterity are — 1st. The judicial charging of the legal responsibility of that sin upon all at their creation whom he represented in the Covenant of Works. 2d. The consequent birth of each of his descendants in a state of exclusion from the life-giving communion of the divine Spirit. 3d. The consequent loss of original righteous- ness, and the inherent and prevailing tendency to sin which is the invariable moral condition of each of his descendants from birth. 4th. The absolute moral inability of men to change their natures or to fulfil their obligations. For reasons which will appear subsequently, the subjects connected with man's natural moral corruption and impotency, are discussed before the subject of Imputation, or the reason and method of the passing over of the consequences of Adam's sin from him to his descendants.


Question: Hoio  is  original  sin  to  he  defined  ?

Answer: See "Confession of Faith," Chapter vi. ; "L. Cat.," Questions 25, 26; "S. Cat," Question 18. The phrase, original sin, is used sometimes to include the , judicial imputation of the guilt of Adam's sin, as well as the iv'^ hereditary moral corruption, common to all his descendants, ' !?S which is one of the consequences of that imputation. ]More / strictly, however, the phrase original sin designates only the/y hereditary moral corruption common to all men from birth. |' In the definition of this doctrine we deny — 1st. That this corruption is in any sense physical, that it inheres in the essence of the soul, or in any of its natural fac- ulties as such. 2d. That it consists primarily in the mere supremacy of the sensual part of our nature. It is a depraved habit or bias of will. 3d. That it consists solely in the absence of holy dispositions, because, from the inherent activity of the soul, sin exhibits itself from the beginning in the way of a positive proneness to evil. On the other hand, wb affirm — 1st. That original sin is purely moral, being the innate proneness of the ^yil^ |o eyjl. 2d. That having its seat in the will averse to the holy law of God, it biasses the understanding, and thus deceives the conscience, leads to erroneous moral judgments, to blindness of mind, to deficient and perverted sensibility in relation to moral objects, to the inordinate action of the sensuous nature, and thus to corruption of the entire soul. 3d. Thus it presents two aspects: (1.) The loss of the original righteous habit of will. (2.) The presence of a positively un- righteous habit. 326 ORIGINAL SLY. 4th. Yet from the fact that this innate depravity does embrace a positive disposition to evil, it does not follow that a positive evil quality has been infused into the sonl. Because, from the essentially active nature of the soul, and from the essential nature of virtue, as that which obliges the will, it evidently follows that moral indifference is impossible; and so that depravity, which President Edwards says " comes from a defective or privative cause," instantly assumes a positive form. Not to love God is to rebel against him, not to obey virtue is to trample it under foot. Self-love soon brings us to fear, then to hate the vindicator of righteousness. — Edwards on "Original Sin," Part IV., sec. 2.


Question: Why  is  this  sin  called  original?

Answer: Not because it belongs to the original constitution of our nature as it came forth from the hand of God, but because, 1st, it is derived by ordinary generation from Adam, the original root of the human race ; and 2d, it is the inward root or origin of all the actual sins that defile our lives. This sin is also technically styled Peccatum Hahituale, or the sin which consists in a morally corrupt habit or state of soul, in distinction from imputed sin and actual sin. 3. Hoiv may it he jyroved that the doctrine of original sin does not involve the corruption of the suhstance of the soul ? It is the universal judgment of men that there are in the soul, besides its essence and its natural faculties, certain habits, innate or acquired, which qualify the action of those faculties, and constitute the character of the man. Those habits, or inhe- rent dispositions which determine the affections and desires of the will, govern a man's actions, and, when good, are the sub- jects of moral approbation, and, when evil, the subjects of moral disapprobation on the part of all men. An innate moral habit of soul, €. g., original sin, is no more a physical corruption than any acquired habit, intellectual or moral, is a physical change. Besides this, the Scriptures distinguish between the sin and the agent in a way which proves that the sinful habit is not something consubstantial with the sinner, Rom. vii. 17; "sin that dwelleth in me," Heb. xii. 1, etc. 4. Hoio can it be shoivn that original sin does not consist in dis- ease, or merely in the szipremacy of the sensuous part of our nature? While it is true that many sins have their occasions in the inordinate appetites of the body, yet it is evident the original or root of sin can not be in them — 1st. From the very nature of sin it must have its seat in the CORRUPTION OF THE WHOLE NATURE. 327 moral state of the voluntary principle. Disease, or any form of physical disorder, is not vohmtary, and therefore not an element of moral responsibility. It is, moreover, the obligation of the will to regulate the lower sensuous nature, and sin must orig- inate in the failure of those moral affections which would have been supreme if they still continued to reign in the will. 2d. From the fact that the most heinous sins are destitute of any sensuous element, e. (/., pride, anger, malice, and aversion FROM God. 5. How can it he proved that this innate disposition or habit of soul, which leads to sinfid action, is itself sin ? 1st. This innate habit of soul is a state of the will, and it is an ultimate principle that all the states as Avell as acts of the will related to the law of conscience are moral, i. c, either virtuous or vicious. — See above. Chapter XV., Questions 9 and 10. 2d. These permanent habits or states of the will constitute the moral character of the agent, which all men regard as the proper subject of praise or blame. 3d. This inherent disposition to sinful action is called "sin" in Scriptm^e. — Rom. vi. 12, 14, 17; vii. 5-17. It is called "flesh" as opposed to "spiritual," Gal. v. 17, 24; also "lust," James i. 14, 15; and "old Adam" and "body of sin," Eom. vi. 6; also " ignorance," " blindness of heart," " alienation from the life of God," and a condition of " being past feeling," Eph. iv. 18, 19. 6. Hoio can it he shown that original sin does not consist simply in the luant of original righteousness ? 1st. It follows from the inherent activity of the human soul, and from the inherently obliging power of moral right, that the absence of right dispositions immediately leads to the formation of positively sinful dispositions. Not to love God is to hate him, not to obey him is to disobey. Disobedience leads to fear, to falsehood, and to every form of sin. — See above. Question 1. 2d. As a matter of fact, innate depravity exhibits its pos- itive character by giving birth to sins, involving positive vi- ciousness in the earliest stages of accountable agency, as pride, malice, etc. 3d. The Scriptures assign it a positive character, when they apply to it such terms as "flesh," "concupiscence," "old man," " laAV in the members," "body of sin," "body of death," "sin taking occasion," " deceived me," and " wrought all manner of concupiscence." — Rom. vii. / 7. Hoio may it he shown that it affects the entire man / p Original sin has its seat in the will, and primarily consists 328 ORIGINAL SIN. in that proneness to unlawful dispositions and affections which is the innate habit of the human soul. But the several facul- ties of the human soul are not separate agents. The one soul acts in each function as an indivisible agent, its several facul- ties or powers after their kind mutually qualifying one another. When the soul is engaged in 'understanding an object, or an aspect of any object, e. r/., mathematics, with which its affec- tions are not concerned, then its action has no moral element. But when it is engaged in understanding an object with respect to which its depraved affections are perversely interested, its action must be biassed. The consequence, therefore, of the sinful bias of the will in its controlling influence over the exercises of the soul, in all its functions, will be — 1st. The understanding, biassed by the perverted affections, acting concurrently with the moral sense in forming moral judgments, will lead to erroneous judgments, to a deceiving conscience, and to general "blindness of mind" as to mora"l subjects. 2d. The emotions and sensibilities which accompany the judgments of conscience in approving the good and in con- demning the wrong, by repeated outrage and neglect, will be rendered less lively, and thus lead to a seared conscience, and general moral insensibility. 3d. In a continued course of sinful action the memory will become defiled with its stores of corrupt experiences, from which the imagination also must draw its materials. 4th. The body in its turn w^ill be corrupted. (1.) Its natural appetites will become inordinate in the absence of proper con- trol. (2.) Its active powers will be used as "instruments of unrighteousness unto sin." 5th. The Scriptures teach — (1.) That the understanding of the " natural man " is depraved as well as his affections. — 1 Cor. ii. 14; 2 Cor. iy. 4; Eph. iv. 18; Col. i. 21. (2.) That regeneration involves illumination as well as renewal of the heart.— Acts xxvi. 18; Eph. i. 18; v. 8; 1 Pet. ii. 9. (3.) That truth addressed to the understanding is the great instrument of the Spirit in regenex'ation and sanctification. — John xvii. 17; James i. 18. 8. Wlxat is meant by the affirmation that man by nature is totally dej^raved ? By this orthodox phrase it is not to be understoo]), 1st, that the depraved man has not a conscience. The virtuousness of an agent does not consist in his having a conscience, but in the conformity of the dispositions and affections of his wdll'to the law of which conscience is the or<»-an. Even the devils TOTAL DEPRAVITY, ITS NATURE AND EVIDENCE. 329 and lost souls retain their sense of right and wrong, and those vindicatory emotions with which conscience is armed. Or, 2d, that nnregenerate men, possessing a natural con- science, do not often admire virtuous character and actions in others. Or, 3d, that they are incapable of disinterested affections and actions in their various relations with their fellow-men. Or, 4th, that any man is as thoroughly depraved as it is pos- sible for him to become, or that each man has a disposition inclined to every form of sin. But IT IS MEANT — Ist. That virtue consisting in the con- formity of the dispositions of the will with the law of God, and the very soul of virtue consisting in the allegiance of the soul to God, every man by nature is totally alienated in his governing disposition from God, and consequently his every act, whether morally indifferent, or conformed to subordinate principles of right, is vitiated by the condition of the agent as a rebel. 2d. That this state of will leads to a schism in the soul, and to the moral perversion of all the faculties of soul and body (see preceding question.) 3d. The tendency of this condition is to further corruption in endless progression in every department of our nature, and this deterioration would, in every case, be incalculably more rapid than it is, if it were not for the supernatural restraints of the Holy Ghost. 4tli. There remains no recuperative element in the soul. Man can only and forever become worse without a miraculous recreation. 9. Wliat 'proof of the doctrine of original sin may be derived from the history of the Fall ? God created man in his own image, and pronounced him as a moral agent to be veiy good. He threatened him with death in the veiy da}'- that he should eat the forbidden fruit, and only in the sense of spiritual death was that threat literally fulfilled. The spiritual life of man depends upon communion with God; but God drove him at once forth in anger from his presence. Consequently the present spiritual state of man is declared to be " death," the very penalty threatened. — Eph. ii. 1 ; 1 John iii., 14. 10. What is the aecount ivhicli the Scriptures give of human nature., and hoio can the existence of an innate hereditary depravity he thence inferred ? The Scriptures represent all men as totally alienated from God, and morally depraved in their understandings, hearts, wills, consciences, bodies, and actions. — Rom. iii. 10-23; viii. 7; 330 ORIGINAL SIN. Job xiv. 4; xv. 14; Gen. vi. 5; viii. 21; Matt. xv. 19; Jer. xvii. 9; Is. i. 5, 6. This depravity of man is declared to be, 1st, of the act, 2d, of the heart, 3d, from birtli and by nature, 4th, of all men without exception. — Ps. li. 5; John iii. 6; Eph. ii. 3; Ps. Iviii. 3. 11. State the evidence for the truth of this doctrine afforded hy Ptom. V. 12-21. Paul here proves that the guilt, — legal obligation to suffer the penalty, — of Adam's sin is imputed to us, by the imquestion- able fact that the penalty of the law which Adam broke has been inflicted upon all. But that penalty Avas all penal evil, death physical, spiritual, eternal. Original sin, therefore, to- gether with natural death, is in this passage assumed as an undeniable fact, upon which the apostle constructs his argu- ment for the imputation of Adam's sin. 12. Hoio is the truth of this doctrine estahlished hy the fact of the general prevalence of sin ? All men, under all circumstances, in every age of the world, and under whatever educational influences they may be brought up, begin to sin uniformly as soon as they enter upon moral agency. A universal effect must have a universal cause. Just as we judge that a man is by nature an intelligence, because the actions of all men involve an element of intelligence, so we as certainly judge that man is by nature depraved, because all men act sinfully. 13. If Adam sinned, though free from any corruption of nature^ how does the fact that his posterity sin prove that their nature is corrupt ? The fact that Adam sinned proves that a moral agent may be at once sinless and fallible, and that such a being, left to himself, may sin, but with respect to his posterity the question is, what is the universal and uniform cause that every indi- vidual always certainly begins to sin as soon as he begins to act as a moral agent? The question in the one case is, Hoio could such cm one sin ? but in the other. Why do cdl certainly sin from the beginning ? 14. B]i ivhat other ohjections do Pelagians and others attempt to avoid the force of the argument from the universality of sin ? 1st. Those who maintain that the liberty of indifference is essential to responsible agency, and that volitions are not de- termined by the precedent moral state of the mind, attribute DOCTRINE PROVED. 331 all sinful actions to the fact that the will of man is uncondi- tioned, and insist that his acting as he acts is an ultimate fact. In answer, we acknowledge that a man always wills as he pleases, but the question is, Why does he always certainly please to will wrong ? An indifferent cause can not account for a uni- form fact. The doctrine of original sin merely assigns the de- praved character of the will itself as the uniform cause of the uniform fact. 2d. Others attempt to explain the facts by the universal influence of sinful example. We ansAver: (1.) Children uniformly manifest depraved dispositions at too early a period to admit of that sin being rationally attributed to the influence of example. (2.) Children manifest depraved dispositions who have been brought up from birth in contact with such influences only as would incline them to holiness. 3d. Others, again, attempt to explain the facts by referring to the natural order in the development of our faculties, e. g., first the animal, then the intellectual, then the moral : thus the lower, by anticipating, subverts the higher. For answer, see above. Question 4. Besides, while this is an imperfect explanation, it is yet a virtual admission of the fact of innate hereditary depravity. Such an order of devel- opment, leading to such uniform consequences, is itself a total corruption of nature. 15. What argument for the doctrine of original sin may he derived from the universality of death? The penalty of the law was death, including death spiritual, physical, and moral. Physical death is universal ; eternal death, temporarily suspended for Christ's sake, is denounced upon all the impenitent. As one part of the penalty has taken effect, even upon infants, who have never been guilty of actual trans- gression, we must believe the other part to have taken effect likewise. Brutes, who also suffer and die, are not moral agents, nor were they ever embraced in a covenant of life, and there- fore their case, although it has its own peculiar difficulties, is not analogous to that of man. Geology affirms that brutes suffered and die.d in successive generations before the creation and apostasy of man. Tliis is at present one of the unsolved questions of God's providence. — See Hugh Miller's "Testimo- nies of the Rocks." 16. Hoio may it he proved hy luhat the Scri'ptures say concern- ing regeneraiion ? The Scriptures declare — 332 ORIGINAL SIN. 1st. That regeneration is a radical change of the moral char- acter, wrought by the Holy Ghost in the exercise of supernat- ural power. It is called "a new creation"; the regenerated are called " God's workmanship, created unto good works," etc. Ezek. xxxvi. 2(3; Eph. i. 19; ii. 5, 10; iv. 24; 1 Pet. i. 23; James i. 18. 2d. Regeneration is declared to be necessary absolutely and universally. — John iii. 3; 2 Cor. v. 17. 17. Hoio may it he j)roved from ivliat the Scrijjtures say of redemption ? The Scriptures assert of redemption — 1st. As to its nature, that the design and effect of Christ's sacrifice is to deliver, by means of an atonement, all his people from the poiver as well as from the (luilt of sin. — Eph. v. 25-27; Titus ii. lf;"'Reb. ix. 12-14; xiii. 12. " 2d. As to its necessity, that it was absolutely necessary for all — for infants who never have committed actual sin, as well as for adults. — Acts iv. 12; Eom. iii. 25, 26; Gal. ii. 21 and iii. 21, 22; Matt. xix. 14; Eev. i. 5; v. 9. Some have essayed to answer, that Christ only redeemed infants from the "liability to sin." But redemption being an atonement by blood, the "just for the unjust," if infants be not sinners they can not be redeemed. A sinless liability to sin is only a misfortune, and can admit of no redemption. — See Dr. Taylor's " Concio ad Clerum" (New Haven, 1828), pp. 24, 25; also Harvey's Review of the same (Hartford, 1829), p. 19. 18. State the evidence afforded by infant baptism. Baptism, as circumcision, is an outward rite, signifying the inward grace of spiritual regeneration and purification. — Mark i. 4; John iii. 5; Titus iii. 5; Deut. x, 16; Rom. ii. 28, 29. Both of these rites were designed to be applied to infants. The ap- plication of the sign would be both senseless and profane if infants did not need, and were not capable of the thing signified. 19. If God is the author of our natm^e, and our nature is sinful, how can ive avoid the conclusion that God is the author of sin ? That conclusion would be unavoidable if, 1st, sin was an essential element of our nature, or if, 2d, it inhered in that na- ture originally, as it came from God. But we know, 1st, that sin originated in the free act of man, created holy, yet fallible; 2d, that entire corruption of nature sprang from tliat sin ; and, 3d, that in consequence of sin God has justly withdrawn the conservative influences of his Holy SIN AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST. 333 Spirit, and left men to the natural and penal consequences of their sin. — See Calvin's "Instit:," Lib. II., Chap. I., sees. 6 and 11. 20. Hoio can this doctrine he reconciled luitli the liberty of man and his responsibility for his acts? Ist. Consciousness affirms that a man is always responsible for his free actions, and tha.t his act is always freewlien he wills as, upon the whole, he prefers to will. 2d. Original sin consists in corrupt dispositions, and, therefore, in every sin a man acts freely, because he acts precisely as he is disposed to act. 3d. Consciousness affirms that inajaility is not inconsistent with responsibility. The inherent habit or disposition of the will determines his action, but no man, by a mere choice or volition, can change his disposition. — See Chap. XVUi., Ques- tions 4 and 25. 21. ffoio is this corruption of nature propagated? n ^«^ *■<-"-'*''"' See below, under Chapter XXL


Question: In  lohat  sense  may  sin  he  the p>un{shment  of  sin?

Answer: 1st. In the way of natural consequence (1) in the interior W'Orking of the soul itself, in the derangement of its powers; (2) in the entangled relations of the sinner with God and his fellowmen. . 2d. In the way of judicial abandonment. Because of sin God withdraws his Holy Spirit, and further sin is the conse- quence.— Rom. i. 24-28. 23. What do the Scriptures teach concerning tlw sin against the Holy Ghost? See Matt. xii. 31, 32; Mark iii. 29, 30; Heb. vi. 4-6; x. 26, 27; 1 John V. 16. These passages appear to teach that this sin consists in the malicious rejection of the blood of Christ, and of the testimony of the Holy Ghost against evidence and conviction. It is called the sin against the Holy Ghost because he is immediately pres- ent in the heart of the sinner, and his testimony and influence is directly rejected and contemptuously resisted. It is unpar- donable, not because its guilt transcends the merit of Christ, or the state of the siinier transcends the renewing power of the Holy Ghost, but because it consists in the final rejection of these, and because at this limit God has sovereignly staid his grace. 24. What are the main positions involved in the Pelagian doc- trine of original sin ? 334 ORIGINAL SIN. The system called Pelagian originated with Pelagins in his controversies with St. Angustine in the beginning of the fifth century, and was afterwards completely developed by the disci- ples of Faustus and La^lius Socinns in the sixteenth century, is embodied in the Racovian Catechism, and prevails among the English and American Unitarians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It embraces the following points : 1st. Adam's sin affected himself alone. 2d. Infants are born in the same moral state in Avhich Adam was created. 3d. Every man possesses plenary ability to sin or to repent and obey whenever he will. 4th. Re- sponsibility is in exact proportion to ability ; and God's demands are adjusted to the various capacities (moral as well as consti- tutional) and circumstances of men. 25. Wliat are tlue main positions involved in the Semipelagian doctrine ? According to the critical estimate of Wiggers in his " Hist. Present, of Augustinianism and Pelagianism," Pelagianism re- gards man as morally and spiritually well. Semipelagianism regards him as sick. Augustinianism regards him as dead. The current positions of Semipelagianism during the middle ages were — 1st. Denial of the imputation of the guilt of Adam's sin. 2d. Acknowledgment of a morbid condition of man's moral nature from birth by inheritance from Adam. 3d. Which mor- bid condition is not itself sin but the certain cause of sin. 4th. | It involves the moral powers of the soul to such an extent that no man can fulfil the requirements either of the law or of the gos]Del without divine assistance. Man, however, has the power to hexjin to act aright, when God seeing his eftbrt, and knowing that otherwise it would be fruitless, gives him the gracious help he needs. The doctrine of the Arminians, and the " Synergism " of ]\Ielanchthon amount practically to very much the same thing with the statements just made. The main difference is that the Semipelagians held that man can and must begin the work of repentance and obedience when God instantly co-operates with him. While the Arminians and Synergists held that man is so far depraved that he needs grace to dispose and enable him to begin as well as to continue and to succeed in the work, but that all men as a matter of fact have the same common grace acting upon them, which grace eftects nothing until the rnan voluntarily co-operates witii it, when it becomes effica- cious througli that co-operation. The Greek Church, which occupies the same general posi- tion as to original sin and grace, holds — 1st. Original sin is r^' VARIOUS VIEWS. 335 not voluntary and therefore not true sin. 2d. The influence of Adam extends only to the sensuous, and not to the rational nor moral nature of his descendants, and hence it extends to their will only through the sensuous nature. 3d. Infants are guiltless because they possess only a physical propagated na- ture. 4th. The human will takes the initiative in regeneration but needs divine assistance. This is Semipelagianism. While the corresponding Arminian position is that grace takes the in- itiative in regeneration but depends for its effect upon human co-operation.


Question: What  is  the  Neio  Haven  view  on  this  subject  ?

Answer: Dr. Nathaniel W. Taylor, of New Haven, the prince of American new school theology, taught that sin consists solely in acts of the will. That " original sin is man's own act, con- sisting in a free choice of some object rather than God as his chief good." He includes in this definition the permanent gov- erning preference of the will, which determines special and transient acts of choice; Avhich preference is formed by each human being as soon as he becomes a moral agent, and is uni- formly a preference of some lesser good in place of God. He maintains also that the nature of man, in the condition in which it comes into being, in consequence of Adam's fall, is the occasion, not the cause, of all men invariably making a wrong moral preference, and consequently original sin is by nature in the sense that the will enacts it freely though uni- formly as occasioned by nature, yet that the nature itself, or its inherent tendency to occasion sin, is not itself sin, or ill- deserving. — See "Concio ad Clerum," New Haven, 1828, and Harvey's Review thereof. 27. What is the Romish doctrine as to the change effected in the moved mdure of man by the fall ? See below the public statements of the various churches. 28. Whcd distinction do the Romanists make betiveen mortal and venial sins ? By mortal sins they mean those that turn away the soul from God, and forfeit baptismal grace. By venial sins they mean those which only impede the course of the soul to God. See below Bellarmin, quoted under "Authoritative Statement of Church Doctrine," etc. The objections are — 1st. This distinction is never made in the Scriptures. 2d. Except for tlie sacrifice of Christ, every sin is mortal. — James ii. 10; Gal. iii. 10. 336 ORIGINAL SIN. The Authokitative Statements of Chuech Docteine. EosnsH DocTKiNE. — "■Council of Trenl," Sess. v. Can. 2. — "If any one shall assert tliat tlie apostasy of Adam injured himself alone and not his posterity; and that he lost the sanctity and righteousness received from God, for himself alone and not also for us, his posterity; or that the stain which results from the sin of disobedience, death, and physical evils only have overflowed over the whole human race, and not also sin which is the disease of the soul — anathema sit." lb., Sess. vi. CajD. 1. "The Holy Synod declares that in order properly to understand the doctrine of justification it is necessary that every one should acknowl- edge and confess that since all men lost their innocency in the apostasy of Adam, so that .... they are servants of sin, under the power of the devil and of death . . . nevertheless in them free ■will is by no means extinct, although it is weakened as to its strength and biassed. " lb., Sess. vi. Can. 5. — "If any one shall say that the free-Avill of man has been lost and extinguished in consequence of the sin of Adam anathema sit." Can. 7. — "If any one shall say that all works performed by a man anterior to justification (regeneration), from whatever reason performed, are true sins which merit the hatred of God, or that the more vehemently one may strive to dispose himself to grace, only the more grievously he sins — anathema sit." BellaDnin, ''Amiss. Grati<t," iii. 1. — "The penalty which properly stands over against the first sin, is the loss of original righteousness and of the supernatural gifts with which God had furnished our nature. "Z)e Gh'atia primi horn.," 1. — "They (the Catholics) teach that, through the sin of Adam the whole man was truly deteriorated, but that he has not lost free will nor any other of the dona naturalia, but only the dojia siiper- naturalia." Ih., c. 5. — "Wherefore the state of man since the fall of Adam does not differ more from his state in pur is naturalibus {i. e., as created and antecedent to his endowment with the dona su/jernaiura/ia, see Statement of Bomish Doctrine end of Ch. XVI.) than a man robbed of his clothes differs from one originally naked, neither is human nature any worse (if you subtract original guilt) nor does it labor under greater ignorance and infirmity, than it was and did as created in pur is natural- ibus. Whence it follows that corruption of natvire does not result from the loss of any gift, nor from the accession of any evil quality, but only from the loss of the supernatural gift because of the sin of Adam." "Amiss. Gra.," v. 5. — " The question between us and our adversaries is not whether human nature has been grievously depraved through the sin of Adam. For that we freely confess. Neither is the question whether this depravity pei'taius in any manner to original sin, so that it may be spoken of as the material of that sin. But the whole contro- versy is whether that corruption of nature and especially concupiscence per se and of its own nature, as it is found in the baptized and justified, is properly original sin. This the Catholics deny." Ltjthekan Doctbine. — ''Formula Concordia^" p. 640. — " (It is to be believed) — 1st. That this hereditary evil is fault or guilt (ill-desert) by which on account of the disobedience of Adam and Eve, we all are made subject to the Avrath of God, and are by nature children of wrath, as the Apostle testified (Rom. v. 12, sqq., Ejih. ii. 3). 2d. That there is through all a total want, defect, and i)rivation of that original righteousness con- created in Paradise, or of that image of God in Avhich man in the be- ginning was created in truth, holiness, and righteousness ; and there is at the same time that inipoteucy and incapacity, that weakness and AUTHORITATIVE CREED STATEMENTS. 337 stupidity, by wliich man is rendered utterly incapable of all things divine or spiritual. . . . 3d. Moreover that original sin in human nature does not only involve the total loss and absence of all good in matters spiritual and xjertaiuing to God; but that also in the place of the lost likeness to God there is in man an inward, most evil, profound (like an abyss), inscrutable, and ineffable corruption of the whole nature and of all the ijowers, and primarily in the principle and superior faculties of the soul, in the mind, intellect, heart, and will. Ih., p. 645. — "But although this original sin infects and corrupts the whole nature of man, as a kind of sj)iritual poison and leprosy (as Dr. Luther says), so that now in oiar corruj^ted nature it is not possible to show to the eye these two apart, the nature alone, or the original sin alone; nevertheless that corruiJt nature, or substance of the corrujit man, the body and soul, or the man himself as created by God in whom the original sin dwells, is not one and the same with that original sin which dwells in the nature or essence of man and corrui^ts it; just as in the body of a leper, the leprous body and the lejjrosy itself, wliich is in the body, is not one and the same. Eefoemed Doctbine. — '■'■Bdgic Confession" Art. 15. — " (Peccatum originis) is that corruption of the whole nature and that hereditary vice, by which even themselves in their mothers' wombs are polluted, and which, as a root, produces every kind of sin in man, and is therefore so base and execrable in the sight of God, that it suffices to the condem- nation of the human race." ''Gallic Gonf.,'" Ai't. 11. — "We believe that this vice (originis) is true sin, which makes all and every man, not even excepting little infants, hitherto hiding in the womb of their mothers, deserving (reos) before God of eternal death." "■Thirty-nine Articles of Gh. of Eng." Art. 9. — " (Original or birth sin) is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the olfspring of Adam; whereby man is very far gone from original righteoiisuess, and is of his own nature inclined to evU, so that the llesh lusteth always contrary to the sjiirit; and therefore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation. " Remonstrant DocTKiNE. — '■'Apol. Gonf. Remonstrcmt., j). 84. — "They (the Eemonstrants) do not regard original sin as sin jDroperly so called, nor as an evil which as a penalty, in the strict sense of that word, passes over from Adam upon his posterity, but as an evil, infirmity, or vice, or whatever name it may be designated by, which is propagated from Adam, deprived of original righteousness, to his posterity. Limborch '■'Tlieol. Christ.," iii. 3, 4. — "We confess also that infants are born less pure than Adam was created, and with a certain propensity to sinning, but this they receive not so much from Adam, as from their immediate parents, since if it were from Adam, it ought to be equal in aU men. But now it is in the highest degree unequal, and ordinarily childi'en are inclined to the sins of their parents. SociNiAN DoGTKiNE. — ''Rdcovion Giitechism," -p. 294. — "And the fall of Adam, since it was one act, could not have had the power of corrupt- ing the nature of Adam himself, much, less that of his posterity. We do not deny, however, that from the constant habit of sinning, the nature of man has become infected with a certain fall and excessive proclivity to sinning. But we deny that this is per se sin, or of that nature."


Question: What  is  the  Arminian  explanation  of  this  fact?

Answer: 1st. They admit that all men inherit from Adam a corrupt nature predisposing them to sin, but they deny that this innate condition is itself properly sin, or involves guilt or desert of punishment. 2d. They affirm that it was consistent with the justice of God to allow this great evil to come upon all men at birth, only in view of the fact that he had determined to introduce an adequate compensation in the redemption of Christ, impartially intended for all men, and the sufficient influences of his grace which all men experience, and which restores to all ability to do right, and therefore full personal responsibility. Hence, in- fants are not under condemnation. Condemnation attaches to no man until he has abused his gracious ability. In the gift of Christ, God redresses the wrong done us by allowing Adam to use his fallen nature as the medium for the propagation CHURCH DOCTRINE STATED. 353 of sinful children. — Dr. D. D. Whedon, "Bibliotlieca Sacra," April, 1862, "Conf Rem.," vii. 3, Liinborcli, "Theol. Christ," iii., 3, 4, 5, G7. We object to this doctrine. — (1.) Tliat our condemnation in Adam is of jitstice, and our redemption in Christ of Grace. (2.) The remedy of the compensatory system is not applied to many heathen, etc. (3.) The view is inconsistent with Script- ural doctrines as to sin, inability, regeneration, etc., etc. 8. What has been the prevalent ansiver given hy New England Theologians since the days of Dr. Hojjhins ? Dr. Hopkins taught the doctrine of divine efficiency in the production of sin. This, of course, dissolves the question as to the justice of God in bi-inging Adam's descendants into the world as sinners, since he is the ultimate cause of all sin. Later New England divines discard the doctrine of divine efficiency, but they agree with Hopkins in denying imputation, and in referring the law which entails the corruption of Adam upon each of his descendants to a sovereign divine constitution. If this view, while acknowledging that this divine consti- tution is infinitely just and righteous, simply disclaims clear knowledge of its grounds and reasons, we have only to answer, that while in part we sympathize with it, we dare not refuse the partial light thrown upon the problem in Scripture, and exhibited below. But if the design of these theologians be to assert, either (1) that this constitution is not just, or (2) that God's bare will makes it to be just, and that its being sovereign is the ground of its being righteous, Ave protest against it as a grievous heresy. 9. What is the orthodox ansiver to the above question in iclnch the Romish Lutheran and Reformed Theologians as a body concur ? It is certain that while there has been difference of opin- ion and looseness of statement as to the grounds of our just i accountability for Adam's first sin, the whole Church has always / regarded our loss of original rigliteousness and innate moral ' corruption to be a just and righteous, not sovereign, penal ', consequence of Adam's apostatizing act. This is the doctrine, ' agreement with which is alike accordant with Scripture, honor- ing to the moral attributes of God and the equity of his moral government, and conformable to historical ortliodoxy. In the explanation of this doctrine the orthodox have often differed. It is a simple fact that God as a just judge condemned the Avhole race on account of Adam's sin, and condemnation by God, the soiu'ce of life, involves and is justly followed by spir- itual and moral death. 23 35-4 IMPUTATION OF ADAM'S FIRST SIN. 10. Where is the/act asserted in Scripture that God condemned the ivhole race because of Adams apostasy ? Rora. V. 17-19. — "For if by one man's offence death reigned by one;" "Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation ; " " For as by one man's disobe- dience many were made sinners."