--- license: apache-2.0 pretty_name: MABench language: - en tags: - clinical-ai - llm-security - ai-agents - healthcare - haarf - quokkaguard - synthetic size_categories: - n<1K task_categories: - other --- # MABench **Signed agent registry, attenuable biscuit capability tokens, and k-of-n quorum for clinical agent fleets.** MABench is the benchmark corpus for *Who Is Calling? Cryptographic Agent Identity for Malicious Agents in Multi-Agent Clinical Systems*, the `quorum` module of the QUOKKAGUARD program. It ships with the [`quorum`](https://github.com/quome-cloud/quorum) repository, which contains the `qfire` gateway layer under test, the experiment harness, and the paper. 90 attack scenarios (18 each across T1 impersonation, T2 A2A injection, T3 confused-deputy escalation, T4 collusion/Sybil, T5 provenance forgery) and 58 legitimate handoffs over six fleet topologies (chain-2/3/5/8, star-3/5), deterministic seed 8, synthetic payloads cross-referencing the AgentDojo/InjecAgent/ASB taxonomy. **All data are synthetic.** No real patient data or protected health information (PHI) is included; clinical content is generated from templates with fixed seeds. ## Files | File | Size | Rows | |---|---|---| | `mabench/legit.jsonl` | 48 KB | 58 rows | | `mabench/scenarios.jsonl` | 66 KB | 90 rows | | `mabench/topologies/chain-2.yaml` | 164 B | | | `mabench/topologies/chain-3.yaml` | 233 B | | | `mabench/topologies/chain-5.yaml` | 357 B | | | `mabench/topologies/chain-8.yaml` | 574 B | | | `mabench/topologies/star-3.yaml` | 269 B | | | `mabench/topologies/star-5.yaml` | 404 B | | ### Record schemas - `mabench/legit.jsonl`: `id`, `attack`, `topology`, `issuer_seed`, `agents`, `fleet_budget`, `handoffs`, `expected` - `mabench/scenarios.jsonl`: `id`, `attack`, `topology`, `issuer_seed`, `agents`, `fleet_budget`, `handoffs`, `expected` ## How it was generated The corpus is produced by the generator in the paper repository. ## Intended use Evaluating the **identity** enforcement layer of a clinical-agent security gateway (HAARF control C5): In a fleet of triage, ordering, pharmacy, and documentation agents that hand tasks to each other, the forwarding agent's identity is just a header string, so any member can claim a peer's role or capabilities: with no identity layer, 100% (90/90) of cross-agent attacks succeed. The experiments that consume it (E-series in the paper) are reproduced from the repository: ```bash git clone https://github.com/quome-cloud/quorum cd quorum cargo build --release ``` then follow the *Reproduce the experiments* section of its README. ## Citation This benchmark was built to evaluate a control of the **Healthcare AI Agents Regulatory Framework (HAARF)**, the source framework for the QUOKKAGUARD program. Please cite both the paper and HAARF: ```bibtex @unpublished{schwoebel2026quorum, author = {Schwoebel, James}, title = {Who Is Calling? Cryptographic Agent Identity for Malicious Agents in Multi-Agent Clinical Systems}, note = {Preprint. Quome, QUOKKAGUARD program (quorum module)}, year = {2026}, url = {https://github.com/quome-cloud/quorum} } @unpublished{schwoebel2026haarf, author = {Schwoebel, Jim and Frasch, Martin and Spalding, Art and Sewell, Ed and Englert, Phil and Halpert, Ben and Overbay, Collin and Semenec, Ingrida and Shor, Joel}, title = {{HAARF}: Healthcare {AI} agents regulatory framework --- a comprehensive security verification standard for autonomous {AI} systems in clinical environments}, note = {medRxiv Preprint}, year = {2026}, month = {April}, doi = {10.64898/2026.04.09.26350519}, url = {https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.04.09.26350519v1} } ``` ## License Apache License 2.0. Copyright (c) 2026 Quome, Inc.