{"input": "services or informal networks. The focus group discussions also underscored the precarious financial situation of many refugees, including those engaging in low-paid work below their qualifications, which creates a barrier for relocations to rented housing. 78% of respondents mentioned that they would not be able to cover costs of rented housing higher than CZK 5,000 (approximately USD 213) a month, which is well below market price. In addition to the individual factors affecting relocations to standard housing, key informant interviews and consultations with NGOs, representatives of local and regional governments, and experts in social housing outlined a number of structural factors impacting relocations. These include the need to clarify and strengthen institutional roles and responsibilities in relation to refugee assistance, the need to provide clear, understandable, and timely information on the upcoming housing changes, and the need to ensure unimpeded access of residents to social services and counselling. Furthermore, findings suggest that the current situation and oversaturation of the rental market in bigger cities should not be disregarded. Coordinated support _1 UNHCR-IOM: NEW BEGINNINGS: SUPPORTING THE DIGNIFIED RELOCATION OF UKRAINIAN TEMPORARY PROTECTION_ _HOLDERS TO STANDARD HOUSING. Report on the Relocation of Ukrainian Temporary Protection Holders from Collective_ _Accommodation Facilities to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "but concentrated in high-risk areas such as the coast or river basins. In this section we present flood exposure estimated disaggregated to subnational regions, the number of which can vary across countries. World Bank household surveys are sampled to be statistically representative at different subnational levels – in this study we adopt these statistically representative subnational units which enable us to compare flood exposure estimates with socio-economic characteristics, such as income levels and poverty (Section 3.4). The disaggregation of exposure estimates highlights several subnational regions with high risks (Figure 9). Punjab, Pakistan, with a population of 120 million people, frequently experiences heavy flooding and ranks highest in terms of the absolute population headcount exposed to significant flood risk; approximately 48 million people are exposed, which is 38% of the total population. Several of the populous regions in China and India are also among the world’s subnational regions with the highest number of people exposed to flood risk. In China for instance, high population exposure tends to be close to the coast and around the Yellow River valley. However, the sub-national region with the highest population exposure in China is Guangdong in the southeast, on the South China Sea, where 43", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank household surveys"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "World Bank household surveys"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank household surveys", "confidence": 0.7656503319740295}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "World Bank household surveys", "confidence": 0.16816510260105133}, {"text": "statistically representative subnational units", "confidence": 0.10320854187011719}], "vague_data": [{"text": "World Bank household surveys", "confidence": 0.15787693858146667}]}}}
{"input": "in Zambia, driven largely by the rapid growth in mining activities, which has seen the population of the district more than double in 10 years—from around 85,000 at the time of the 2010 census to 180,000 in the 2022 census. [23] The population of Meheba, which is predominantly youthful (75.9 percent ages below 35 years), embodies the potential of a highly productive age group looking for opportunities and livelihoods. [24] The settlement’s boundaries intersect with three adjoining wards of Kalumbila District— Shilenda, Mwajimambwe, and Matebo—that have a combined population of 61,000. [25] 33. **Infrastructure provision at the Meheba settlement and within the local community will enhance productivity** **and quality of life.** It is anticipated that the improvement of rural access road infrastructure will increase both mobility and trade to and from the settlement for refugees and host communities. Current electrical supply is poor, with households relying mostly on kerosene lanterns, candles, flashlights, and generators for lighting and cell phone charging. Enhanced transport and energy will also stimulate retail business and production. The upgrading and expansion of school infrastructure will improve learning outcomes, enhance teacher retention and new recruitment, and afford greater dignity to boarding pupils, especially girls, as many are", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "the 2010 census"}, {"text": "the 2022 census"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2022 census", "confidence": 0.8587632179260254}, {"text": "2010 census", "confidence": 0.6180046796798706}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Note:_ Figure 5 shows the main treatment coefficients ( _active*mine_ ) using the baseline estimation strategy (with DHS individual-level data; see table 4 for more information) in the top panel, but with different cutoffs (10 km, 20 km, 30 km, 40 km, and 50 km). *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. The bottom panel shows the result using a spatial lag model that divided the plane into different treatment bins (0–10, 10–20, 20–30, 40–50) and compares them with farther away. Panel A shows the result for nonmigrants, and panel B shows the result for migrants. **6.2 Access to infrastructure and health care** Another source of heterogeneity is asset ownership and access to infrastructure. Table 8 shows that fewer households have electricity in active mining communities, but they spend less time fetching water and are more likely to own a radio (all estimates are statistically insignificant, however). There is no change in the likelihood of having a flush toilet. Moreover, it seems that households are just as likely to have access to a pit toilet as not having a toilet (and instead use a bucket, bush, and so forth). **Table 8 OLS estimates for ownership of assets and access to infrastructure** water access", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS individual-level data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS individual-level data", "confidence": 0.7915923595428467}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "access to health care, and are less likely to accept domestic violence. In addition, infant mortality rates decrease with up to 50% in mining communities, from very high initial levels (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2019). In a study that focuses exclusively on Ghana, Aragón and Rud (2013) explore the link between pollution from mining and agricultural productivity. The results point toward decreasing agricultural productivity because of environmental pollution and soil degradation, which could have negative welfare effects on households that do not engage in mining activities or in indirectly stimulated sectors. Lower productivity in agriculture could potentially push households to engage in mining-related sectors, in addition to pull factors such as higher wage earnings in the stimulated sectors. We explore the effects of mining activity on employment, earnings, expenditure, and children’s health outcomes in local communities and in districts with gold mining. We combine the DHS and GLSS with production data for 17 large-scale gold mines in Ghana. We find that a new large-scale gold mine changes economic outcomes, such as access to employment and cash earnings. In addition, it raises local wages and expenditure on housing and energy. An important welfare indicator in developing countries is infant mortality, and we note a", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS and GLSS"}, {"text": "GLSS"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "production data for 17 large-scale gold mines"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.6866464018821716}, {"text": "GLSS", "confidence": 0.5245916247367859}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "production data for 17 large-scale gold mines", "confidence": 0.28398168087005615}], "vague_data": [{"text": "production data", "confidence": 0.4503149688243866}]}}}
{"input": "that the fact that M is chosen ex post (i.e., the country cannot commit not to borrow from the facility in period 1) simplifies the problem, which now boils down to the choice of period 0 borrowing, D0. Also note that, under the assumption that multilateral and private lending command the same interest rate, the actual composition of period 1 lending is immaterial for the current analysis. Then, without loss of generality, we can set D1 = 0. In the non default case, expected income can be expressed as - E(Y ) = x + (ρ 1) D0 [nd] π D0 [nd] (1 β) . (24) - - - However, the country can also borrow beyond the limit imposed by (23) and, after a shock, withdraw from the facility and default on the bond. In this case, expected income is given by - E(Y ) = (1 πγ) x + (ρ 1) D0 [d] + π (1 γ) (1 β) (25) - - - As before, the equilibrium can be characterized by income levels. In the case of rich countries (x > x [B] 1 [)] 16 The CAT DDO is a new financial product offered to middle-income country governments", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "CAT DDO", "confidence": 0.17048780620098114}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The sample is restricted to individuals living within 100 km of a deposit location ( _mine_ ), so many parts of Northern Ghana where there are few gold mines are not included in the analysis. The sample restriction is created by using the time-stable continuous distance measure that we calculate from each mine location to each DHS cluster. This is also the distance measure that we use to create the “mine” dummy, which captures whether the cluster lies within 20 km of a known gold deposit. Note that we only consider deposits that have been in production at some point until December 2012. All households are thus within 100 km of one, or several, gold deposits. To ascertain whether there is any gold production in these potential mining sites, we construct an indicator variable _active_, which takes a value of 1 if there is at least one mine within 100 km that was extracting gold in the year the household was surveyed, and 0 otherwise. While the _mine_ dummy captures some of the special characteristics of mining areas (for example, whether mines tend to open in less urban areas), the _active_ dummy captures long-range spillovers of mining. The treatment effect", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS cluster", "confidence": 0.13236486911773682}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "28 This morbidity assumption is based on proxy data used in other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for refugee camps and host communities (e.g., Somalia, Zimbabwe, South Sudan, Kenya). 29 Kip Viscusi, W., and Clayton J. Masterman. “Income Elasticities and Global Values of a Statistical Life.” [https://law.vanderbilt.edu/phd/faculty/w-kip-viscusi/355_Income_Elasticities_and_Global_VSL.pdf](https://law.vanderbilt.edu/phd/faculty/w-kip-viscusi/355_Income_Elasticities_and_Global_VSL.pdf) 30 O&M costs for infrastructure vary widely. These costs include water treatment, road resurfacing, building maintenance, cleaning, energy and staff costs. As such, the analysis uses a conservative assumption of five percent of the investment costs for annual O&M. Page 17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "proxy data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "proxy data", "confidence": 0.9643028974533081}]}}}
{"input": "we are back in the benchmark case.] [To ensure that] no default occurs, it is suffi cient to show that π(1 β)(1 γ) x ~~[I]~~ 3 [N] x ~~[B]~~ 4 [=] - γ (γρ (1 π) + πγ π γ) [>][ 0] - - which is always the case for suffi ciently small values of π. 7.3 Catastrophe lending facility As before, for high initial incomes (x x [M] 1 = [1][−][γ][(] γ [ρ][−][β][)] ≥ γ ), the borrowing constraint (22) does not bind and the country invests the optimum in both states. In turn, for x < x [M] 1 [,] [from] [(23)] D0 [nd] = [γ] 1 [ (] - [x][ + 1] γ (ρ [ −] - [β] 1) [)] [≤] [1][,] and M = D0 [nd] - (1 − β) = [γx][ −] 1 [(1][ −] γ ( [γρ] ρ [) (1] 1) [ −] [β][)] 1 [(1][ −] γ ( [γρ] ρ [) (1] 1) [ −] [β][)] - 0 ⇐⇒ x > x [M] 4 [≡] [(1][ −] [γρ] γ [) (1][ −] [β][)] - = x [IN] 3 [,] (47) γ Alternatively, a financially constrained country may choose to increase borrowing from private", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "contractors, including adherence to working hours, pay and legally mandated benefits, equal and fair recruitment, and employment, are also probable. To address these concerns, a Labor Management Procedures (LMP) document has been incorporated into the project’s ESMF, which is due by effectiveness. The LMP provides guidance on managing labor-related risks. The final ESMF will be disclosed on the MINEMA and World Bank websites. 85. **Community Health and Safety (ESS4).** Construction can generate risks to the community, including exposure to dust, noise, hazardous construction waste, and traffic-related incidents. These risks will be evaluated during the preparation of the ESMF, drawing on lessons from Phase I. Mitigation measures will be integrated into site-specific Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs). The government will be required to adhere to community health and safety standards outlined in the World Bank Environmental, Health, and Safety (EHS) guidelines, as well as incident reporting and management procedures in the event of accidents or incidents. Measures to address the risks of GBV, SEA and Sexual Harassment (SH) will also be implemented to ensure community safety. 86. **Land Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use, and Involuntary Resettlement (ESS5).** Component one activities are expected to result in land acquisition, restrictions on land", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**African migration to Israel** According to UNHCR, the Middle East and North Africa host a fifth of the world's refugees, excluding the considerable and growing population of Palestinian refugees. [5] Syria and Lebanon, Israel's northern neighbours, host a significant number. Syria is the third largest refugee hosting country in the world with, according to government figures, more than a million Iraqi refugees, while Lebanon hosts 50,000 refugees. To 3 A parliamentary inquiry found that between 2001-2005, an annual number of 1,000 women were trafficked through the border for prostitution (Lutski, 2005). Comprehensive enforcement has since significantly reduced the scale of women trafficked into Israel 4 It is reported that in the case of some Eritreans, initial payment was made already in Eritrea (Interview with a senior UNHCR official). 5Article 1D of the 1951 Convention exclude persons who receive assistance from other UN bodies. It intentionally excludes the Palestinians who were displaced as a result of the 1948 war, and were under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), an agency which was established prior to UNHCR. Palestinian refugees and their descendants are now estimated at 4.7 million (UNRWA 2009).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "World Bank online screening tool, the GBV/SEA/SH risk was determined as high. Civil works will attract workers and pose SEA/SH risks. weak reporting of these cases is a challenge across most communities. LIPW activities will involve women working and receiving cash under component 2. If partners are not well trained and agree on how to spend their income, it would lead to intimate partner violence. To mitigate this risk, a GBV Action plan will be prepared, a Gender Specialist hired to support implementation, and a service provider engaged to support the coordination and implementation of the GBV Action Plan. Page 24", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank online screening tool", "confidence": 0.13850149512290955}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "choice is influenced by climate (Mendelsohn & Dinar 2003). Further, there may be sample selection bias if we rely on farms that are observed to use dryland or irrigation. In this paper, we develop a new Ricardian model that examines dryland and irrigated land separately but treats the choice of irrigation as endogenous. A variety of factors influence the decision on whether to irrigate. Surface flows, soil types, and subsidies all play a role in making this choice. But perhaps more importantly to climate analyses, the choice is sensitive to climate. Studies that assume irrigation is exogenous fail to take into account how irrigation will change as climate changes and therefore provide biased estimates of the impact of climate change. Moreover, these analyses of only irrigated farms and only dryland farms rely on self-selected samples, not random samples. Studies that fail to account for this nonrandomness in the modeling framework will be biased (Heckman 1979; Lee 1983). In Section 2 we develop a theoretical model that improves on past efforts to model irrigation with the Ricardian approach by explicitly addressing farmer choice and selection bias. We tested this model empirically using a sample of over 8400 farmers from across 11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "sample of over 8400 farmers from across 11", "confidence": 0.20488519966602325}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "72. **Gender.** The project is aligned the with Gender strategy 2024-2030 and specifically responds to two priority areas of the strategy (i) expand and enable economic opportunities and (ii) advances in women’s participation in decision making [48] _._ Under Component 3, the project will directly increase the participation of women in economic opportunities and better enable their ownership and control of productive assets by providing technical and financial support to farmers and cooperatives owned or led by these segments. Beneficiary selection criteria and formulas will contain preferences in favor of these groups through a quota. The project will specifically address the gender gap with respect to access to financing and access to market-oriented skills as well as personal initiative training. [49] Tailored marketing campaigns will also help attract more female participation and dedicated trainings, mentoring support, and business management tools for women and other target groups will be featured. The component will measure the portion of female beneficiaries increasing income as a result of project livelihood interventions. The project will also reach women and girls at the community level through enhanced infrastructure and health and education services provision. For example, improved road infrastructure in the Meheba settlement will enhance ambulance", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "we have constructed the cyclone database to support research on household- and community-level adaptation to cyclone risks. These risks may affect coastal population dynamics in at least two ways. In the long run, the number and size of coastal communities may be affected by the long-run frequency and power of cyclone strikes. Other things equal, we would expect areas that have been largely cyclone-free for many years to be more populous than frequently-impacted areas. Shorter-term, if impact-intensive zones shift over time, 8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "the cyclone database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "cyclone database", "confidence": 0.9296110272407532}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "cyclone database", "confidence": 0.14873942732810974}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Socio-economic Inclusion of Refugees & Host Communities in Rwanda Project Phase II (P509677) **C. Disbursement Arrangements** 56. **To manage the World Bank funding, the project will maintain segregated Designated Accounts (DA) for** **each implementing agency (IA) at the Central Bank, denominated in US dollars.** In addition, BRD will open an operational account denominated in Rwandan Francs to facilitate local currency transactions. Disbursements will follow the Interim Financial Report (IFR)-based method. The project may also use direct payments, reimbursements and special commitments, depending on the case. The project is fully funded by IDA with no counterpart funding. The signatories of the DA will be communicated to the World Bank by MINECOFIN. Upon effectiveness, the project will submit to the World Bank a request for withdrawal of funds based on six months cash forecast. Detailed arrangements for disbursement are laid out in the Disbursement and Financial Information Letter (DFIL). Based on requests, the World Bank will transfer advances to the DAs. Subsequent replenishment of the DA will be based on the submission of application of withdrawal, accompanied by quarterly IFRs, which are reviewed and cleared by the World Bank. 57. **For activities implemented at the district level, MINEMA will", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "fastgini [15] in STATA). We do this for both the cluster and district level. None of the effects of mining are statistically significant, but they point to increased asset wealth. **Table 9 OLS estimates for wealth and inequality in the DHS individual-level analysis** Wealth Gini wealth cluster district index level level active*mine 7,290 -0.004 0.004 (12,849) (0.013) (0.018) mine 9,922 0.011 0.006 (8,676) (0.013) (0.016) active 7,854 -0.006 0.034** (9,016) (0.010) (0.017) Observations 4,909 4,909 4,909 R-squared 0.613 0.227 0.548 _Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and district fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. Active is active status of mine in the survey year. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS = ordinary least squares. **6.4 Bottom 40% of the population** To understand the welfare effects of the bottom 40 percent of the population in the income scale, we split the sample according to the wealth score provided by DHS. Given the data structure, which is repeated cross-section, we cannot follow a particular household that was identified as belonging to the bottom 40 percent in the initial time period. Instead, we identify the bottom 40 percent in four", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS individual-level analysis", "confidence": 0.38420411944389343}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "wealth score provided by DHS", "confidence": 0.13976718485355377}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Table 7: Land values and rental price by ownership status and region** **Region** **Tenure** Total Central Eastern Northern Western _Mailo_ / Customary Freehold **Parcels held under ownership** Self-assessed land value (USD/acre; median) 403.2 430.1 430.1 161.3 536.6 537.6 358.4 Self-assessed land rental (USD/acre; median) 21.5 26.9 21.5 16.1 26.9 26.9 21.5 Number of parcels 8619 1440 2522 2026 2631 1784 6835 **Parcels held under usufruct** Would like to buy full ownership (%) 37.3 42.1 41.0 18.1 45.3 42.5 34.7 If yes, willingness to pay (USD/acre; median) 215.1 215.1 215.1 107.5 322.6 268.8 215.1 Paid rent (%parcels with owner’s consent) 62.1 44.7 68.1 54.6 72.4 52.0 65.4 If yes, rent paid (USD/acre; median) 16.1 17.9 16.1 10.8 21.5 19.1 16.1 Number of parcels 4478 1219 1320 967 972 1519 2959 _Source:_ Own computation from 2005/06 UNHS III 23", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2005/06 UNHS III"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHS III", "confidence": 0.4324015974998474}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "safety nets were key recommendations from the Climate Change Development Report (2024) for Djibouti. 3. **Low human capital further constrains economic and climate resilience and limits opportunities for inclusive** **growth.** Djibouti’s LMIC status contrasts sharply with its poor human capital outcomes (World Bank, HCR, 2024). Deficiencies are evident throughout the lifecycle, starting with high rates of infant mortality and stunting. In later years, inadequate learning outcomes and skills, a lack of workforce-relevant skills, and low labor force participation – especially among women – present significant barriers to economic productivity. Additionally, poor health outcomes for women, including high rates of female genital mutilation and maternal health challenges, further impede human capital accumulation. Private sector surveys highlight a critical mismatch between labor market demands and the available skills. Women face even greater challenges due to entrenched social norms and structural barriers to self-employment and entrepreneurship, as reflected in Djibouti’s low ranking on the Women, Business, and the Law Index (World Bank 2022a). 4. **Djibouti’s vulnerability to climate-related disasters exacerbates these economic and social challenges.** The country frequently experiences heatwaves, droughts and floods, which take a heavy toll on the population by reducing productivity and disrupting economic activity. Between 1980 and 2019, Djibouti", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Women, Business, and the Law Index"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Private sector surveys"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Women, Business, and the Law Index", "confidence": 0.6936663389205933}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Private sector surveys", "confidence": 0.15674039721488953}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Private sector surveys", "confidence": 0.621907651424408}]}}}
{"input": "services are vital to ensure decent living conditions for some 120,000 people and peaceful coexistence with host communities. **Basic Needs and Livelihoods** With the growing refugee population in Morocco and limited resources, a growing number of refugees are in desperate need of assistance to meet their basic needs. Without additional funding, basic assistance for some 1,600 families will be reduced. Support to promote income-generating activities, vocational training and job placements will also be compromised, further increasing the number of refugees relying on cash assistance to cover their basic needs. **Education** Education assistance to some 1,200 refugee children registered in Moroccan public schools, which plays a key role in reducing school dropouts and negative coping mechanisms such as child labour and/or marriage, will also be compromised. **Health** Pending the inclusion of refugees in the ongoing social protection reform, UNHCR remains a main stakeholder supporting refugees’ access to secondary and tertiary healthcare. Lack of funding will impact UNHCR’s capacity to pay for critically needed medication and lifesaving specialized medical interventions for more than 500 vulnerable refugees. [www.unhcr.org](https://www.unhcr.org/) 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "85. **Inclusion and non-discrimination.** E&S documents include specific measures to mitigate the risk of discrimination against or exclusion of any affected individuals or groups in providing or receiving benefits under the project. These measures are described in detail in the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP), ESA, and Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP). The following are examples of the mitigation measures included in all the aforementioned documents: (a) strengthening the capacity of the PIST, workers, contractors, subcontractors, and service providers, which will include worker training and sensitization on the obligations of project participants to ensure non-discrimination of vulnerable and marginalized individuals or groups; (b) ensuring that contracts, codes of conduct, hiring procedures, whistle-blower protection protocols, and other measures, as needed, are in place to allow remediation of cases of discrimination; (c) designing and implementing a mechanism to receive and report grievances to the World Bank, proposing appropriate remediation, and following up on agreed actions to resolve cases of discrimination reported through a dedicated hotline; and (d) developing a strong data management system and process that secures personal data and information in a manner that is safe, ethical, and confidential. 86. **Furthermore, the ESA and SEP also refer to the GoU’s Circular", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "more frequent flooding rains. 42. **Implementation** . This component will be implemented by MINEMA, supported by the Ministry of Environment and the Rwanda Environment Management Authority. As activities will be in the camps, MINEMA will be responsible for long-term management and maintenance. The activities are expected to improve environmental conditions for 125,000 people (camp-based refugee population and people living in the surrounding villages). **Component 4: Project Management, M&E and Capacity-Building (US$4.02 million equivalent)** 43. This component will support the Single Project Implementation Unit (SPIU) at MINEMA and staff in the target districts to manage the project. [24] This will include project staff at the district level for coordination and oversight. M&E arrangements will include a baseline survey, annual surveys, and endline assessment and continued operation of the Management Information System (MIS). Other activities will include a communications strategy and funds for capacity-building for staff from all project implementing agencies on issues such as community development, fiduciary management, E&S risk management, financial inclusion, climate risk management and development responses to forced displacement. 23 The assessment also identified additional needs that will not be included in the Phase II design due to resource constraints and to avoid overcomplicating the design: (a) reforestation", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Management Information System", "confidence": 0.5212126970291138}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "baseline survey", "confidence": 0.3942010998725891}, {"text": "annual surveys", "confidence": 0.15965013206005096}]}}}
{"input": "specialists with experience with IDRD-financed operations. Given these constraints, the creation of a PIU dedicated to the implementation of the IBRD Project is the preferred option presented by MEP’s Financial Directorate. [29] . The assessment identified key FM actions that should be undertaken by the MEP that include: (i) the creation and maintenance of a PIU; (ii) recruitment of FM staff with appropriate skills and experience, no later than 6 months after effectiveness; (iii) the MoF granting the PIU with a license to use the SIGAF (Sistema Integral de Gestión Administrativa y Financiera for its name in Spanish); (iv) preparing an FM section in the project operational Manual (POM) satisfactory to the Bank. The creation of the PIU will be a condition of effectiveness (upon satisfactory implementation of the agreed fiduciary action plan, it is expected that MEP’s PIU will have the capacity to ensure adequate FM arrangements are in place for the proposed project implementation). 51. **The PIU to be established at the MEP is expected to undertake the FM aspects of the proposed Project.** These encompass the following main tasks: (i) budget formulation and monitoring; (ii) cash flow management (including processing payments and submitting loan withdrawal applications to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "displaced as a result of the 1948 war, and were under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), an agency which was established prior to UNHCR. Palestinian refugees and their descendants are now estimated at 4.7 million (UNRWA 2009). _Refugee Survey Quarterly_ has recently published a special issue which provides a detailed historical account of this multifaceted issue (RSQ 2009). 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "(Bonte) 1998 2003 Akrokeri-Ashanti Canada Konongo 1990 active LionGold Corp. Singapore Kwabeng 1990 1993 Akrokeri-Ashanti Canada Nzema 2011 active Endeavour Canada Obotan 1997 2001 PMI Gold Canada Obuasi 1990 active AngloGold Ashanti South Africa Prestea Sankofa 1990 2001 Anglogold Ashanti South Africa Tarkwa 1990 active Gold Fields Ghana Ltd. South Africa Teberebie 1990 2005 Anglogold Ashanti South Africa Wassa 1999 active Golden Star Resources USA _Source:_ InterraRMG 2013. _Note:_ Active is production status as of December 2012, the last available data point. 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**SUMMARY** Previous Ricardian analyses of agriculture have either omitted irrigation or treated irrigation as though it is exogenous. In practice, it is a choice by farmers that is sensitive to climate. This paper develops a choice model of irrigation in the context of a Ricardian model of cropland. We first examine how climate affects the decision to employ irrigation and then how climate affects the net revenues of dryland and irrigated land. This Ricardian ‘selection’ model, using a modified Heckman model, is then estimated across 8400 farmers in Africa. We explicitly model irrigation, but we control for the endogeneity of irrigation that plagues a recently suggested remedy. We find that the choice of irrigation is sensitive to both temperature and precipitation. Simulating the welfare impacts of several climate scenarios, we demonstrate that a model which assumes irrigation is exogenous provides a biased estimate of the welfare effects of climate change. If dryland and irrigation are to be estimated separately in the Ricardian model, irrigation must be modeled endogenously. The results also indicate that African agriculture is sensitive to climate change. Many farmers in Africa will experience net revenue losses from warming. We find that the elasticity of net revenue with", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the surveys of women will be the main source of data. However, we also use the surveys of men, which give us data from the same four survey years, but with a total number of 12,294 individuals, of which 7,491 men live within 100 km of a mine. In addition, the DHS data collect records of all children born within the five years prior to the surveying. Of the 12,174 children born to the surveyed women within the last five years, 6,888 were born to women currently residing within 100 km of a mine. See Appendix table 1 for definition of outcome variables. We complement the analysis with household data from the GLSS collected in the years—1998– 99, 2004–05, and 2012–13. These data are a good complement to the DHS data, because they 6 The first mines were opened in 1990, prior to the first household survey. Ten mines were opened after the first DHS in 1993. There is less variation in the data set using GLSS where the first households were surveyed in 1998, i.e. 8 years after the first mine opened. However, the DHS data include births recorded from 1987, which is prior to all mine openings. 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data"}, {"text": "household data from the GLSS"}, {"text": "GLSS"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "surveys of men"}, {"text": "household data from the GLSS"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "surveys of women"}, {"text": "surveys of men"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.7930640578269958}, {"text": "surveys of men", "confidence": 0.12271805852651596}, {"text": "household data from the GLSS", "confidence": 0.12023180723190308}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household data from the GLSS", "confidence": 0.7764490246772766}, {"text": "surveys of men", "confidence": 0.6448019742965698}, {"text": "surveys of women", "confidence": 0.43015724420547485}, {"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.10879658907651901}], "vague_data": [{"text": "surveys of men", "confidence": 0.2596052587032318}, {"text": "household data", "confidence": 0.2247428148984909}, {"text": "surveys of women", "confidence": 0.15105515718460083}]}}}
{"input": "normal good, then increased wealth would result in greater insurance demand. [18] Although the BASIX data set does not offer the opportunity to test the direct effects of a cash payment separately from an insurance payout, there are a number of reasons why it is unlikely that wealth or liquidity effects are driving the results. Most important, insurance payouts are given in the context of a rainfall shock, which would most likely result in a loss of income. It may help to recall that the empirical results are being driven by variation in rainfall across locations, not by levels of insurance within a village. Therefore, for wealth effects to be driving the results, one would need to think that experiencing an insurance payout in the context of a rainfall shock resulted in people becoming wealthier than those people who didn’t experience a shock at all. Given the fact that most buyers bought a relatively low amount of insurance coverage relative to their incomes, experiencing a rainfall shock, even when insured, would likely decrease future wealth. Therefore, wealth effects seem like a poor explanation as to why receiving payouts spurs future insurance sales. If people who received insurance payouts had a", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "BASIX data set"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "BASIX data set", "confidence": 0.9656819701194763}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Economics of Disasters and Climate Change Fig. 9 Relative exposure in the Red River Delta for historical 25-year flood (left) and 25-year flood with high climate impacts (right) 2012). For instance, comparing exposure of poor people to average exposure, poor households are 71% more exposed to flooding in the Mithi River Basin in Mumbai, India (Hallegatte et al. 2016). We examine these dynamics in HCMC, using high-resolution local-scale flood maps designed specifically for HCMC (Lasage et al. 2014) and a proxy for poverty using the spatial location of potential slums from the Platform for Urban Management and Analysis (PUMA) data set (World Bank 2015). The results we present below are for all districts in HCMC; results for only districts with slum areas are similar and thus not reported. We find that a relatively high percentage of the potential slum areas are exposed to floods, ranging from 68.9% (for a 10-year return period) up to 83.3% (for a 1000-year return period). When considering all urban areas of HCMC, exposure to flooding is lower: 63% (for a 10-year Fig. 10 Relative exposure in the Mekong Delta for historical 25-year flood (left) and 25-year flood with high climate impacts (right)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Platform for Urban Management and Analysis"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution local-scale flood maps"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Platform for Urban Management and Analysis", "confidence": 0.20335248112678528}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution local-scale flood maps", "confidence": 0.5161158442497253}], "vague_data": [{"text": "high-resolution local-scale flood maps", "confidence": 0.1485256850719452}]}}}
{"input": "The Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP) system will be used for all procurement activities; and g) The World Bank will carry out regular reviews of project-related procurement activities. 17. **Procurement oversight and monitoring arrangements.** The World Bank exercises its procurement oversight through a risk-based approach comprising prior and post reviews as appropriate. The World Bank sets mandatory thresholds for prior review based on the procurement risk rating of the project. The requirement for a prior or post review is specified in the Procurement Plan. The World Bank will carry out post reviews of procurement activities undertaken by the recipient to determine whether they comply with the requirement of the Financing and Project Agreements. 18. **Terms of reference** for all contracts will be cleared by the World Bank, regardless of whether the assignment is for prior or post review. 19. **Training and workshops** : The project will finance training and workshops, if required, based on an annual training plan and budget, which will be submitted to the World Bank for its prior review and approval. The annual training plan will identify, among other things: (a) the training envisaged; (b) the justification for the training; (c) the personnel to be", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "and feedback mechanism will also be established to enable individuals to report concerns or complaints if they feel unfairly treated or adversely impacted by the project. The SEP has been disclosed on the MINEMA and World Bank websites. 88. **To address these E&S risks, the applicable Environmental and Social Standards (ESSs) are** ESS1 (Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts), ESS2 (Labor and Working Conditions), ESS3 (Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention and Management), ESS4 (Community Health and Safety), ESS5 (Land Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement), ESS6 (Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources), ESS8 (Cultural Heritage), ESS9 (Financial Intermediaries), and ESS10 (Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure). 89. **To ensure compliance with the ESSs, the project will implement the following E&S instruments:** Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP), ESMF, LMP, Environmental & Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs), ESMPs, SEP and Environmental and Social Audits (ESAs). Measures to integrate E&S specifications in procurement and to manage contractual obligations with construction companies and suppliers will also be enforced. Dedicated, full-time E&S specialists from the MINEMA SPIU from Phase I will oversee these activities to minimize risks. BRD, BDF and RTDA will each appoint their own E&S", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Uganda Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project Phase II (P510476) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT (d) sustainable land management practices were adopted on 5,110 hectares of land area (target 4,500). A World Bank strategic review of the Uganda WHR-financed portfolio highlighted the substantial impact of the project, with notable achievements in strengthening the inclusiveness of district level development planning, strong community engagement, and efficient implementation through the community-driven development (CDD) approach and community procurement. The Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) for Phase I highlighted that other DRDIP countries drew inspiration from Uganda’s legal and policy framework and operational approaches on issues such as CDD, livelihood, and refugee inclusion in local planning and decision-making. [18] 20. **Phase I introduced innovations for forced displacement preparedness and social cohesion.** The project featured the world’s first displacement risk financing mechanism, the Displacement Crisis Response Mechanism (DCRM). The DCRM provided rapid contingency financing to build resilience in districts experiencing large refugee inflows. A pilot to reduce gender-based violence (GBV) and violence against children (VAC) also contributed to social cohesion. A 2022 World Bank study on forced displacement reinforced the value of projects such as DRDIP, concluding that ‘multi-sectoral development investments directed to refugees", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "if people consider insurance as an investment, as in Karni and Safra (1987). One might think that this type of bias would have spillover effects (which I do not observe), but may also be present at the individual level if people believe recent insurance payouts are a sign of individual luck. Another explanation could be that insurance purchasers behave as if they are “gambling with house money,” as in Thaler and Johnson (1990). If customers exhibit loss aversion, they may not view insurance premiums paid after receiving payouts as true losses, since they are still “in the red” in their relationship with the insurance company. If the assumption is that reference points adjust after receiving insurance payouts, the observed behavior is consistent with this theory. This explanation is bolstered by the fact that the data show negative effects of small payouts, with the effect of payouts becoming positive only 19 [This analysis is available in the supplemental appendix, table S.5. There is no correlation between payouts and a dummy](http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/wber/lhw045/-/DC1) for our “Marketing Restricted Sample.” However, BASIX is more likely to offer insurance in areas where there were insurance payouts in the previous year. Since all of this paper’s analysis is", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Marketing Restricted Sample", "confidence": 0.23147983849048615}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Marketing Restricted Sample", "confidence": 0.10698095709085464}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "for all implementing entities, including community-based organizations and seed grants for VRFs, will be described in the FM section of the PIM. The PIM will also include a Community Operations Manual that will detail all steps in the CDD process, including accountability arrangements. 75. **Audit** . The project will have two audit reports that will be submitted to the World Bank by OPM and IG within six months after the end of the financial year. The project will also have interim financial reports submitted to the World Bank within forty-five days after the end of the quarter by both OPM and IG. **Procurement** 76. **Procurement for the project will be carried out in accordance with the World Bank Procurement Regulations** **for IPF Borrowers, dated February 2025 (Procurement Regulations).** The project will be subject to the “Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants”, dated October 15, 2006, and revised in January 2011 and as of July 1, 2016 (Anti-Corruption Guidelines), and beneficiary ownership disclosure requirements. The project will use the Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP) system to provide data on planned procurement activities, establish benchmarks, monitor delays,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement", "confidence": 0.4215172827243805}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "just outside our 20 km cutoff distance may also be “treated” by the mine, and the investment phase of the mine that precedes initial production can generate substantial employment. Overall, the effects do not change much except making the cash earnings coefficient larger and more significant. The increase in cash earning opportunities is estimated at 7.5 to 7.8 percentage points compared with 5.4 in the baseline estimation. **6.6 Employment and wages using the GLSS** The DHS data do not provide detailed information regarding how much an individual earns for work, or her wage rate, but the GLSS does collect such data. First, we try to replicate the results estimated with the DHS data. Panel A of table 11 indicates that agriculture becomes less important in mining communities for women (statistically insignificant), who mainly shift into services and sales (statistically insignificant, except for strategy 2). Men are more likely to work as miners (statistically significant across all strategies). 29", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "DHS data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.8189637660980225}, {"text": "GLSS", "confidence": 0.47556304931640625}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.1519877165555954}]}}}
{"input": "maps, which have a spatial resolution of 20 m, represent the current conditions for five return periods: 10, 25, 50, 100, and 1000 years. Future conditions, again using the five return periods, include a sea level rise scenario of +30 cm in the year 2050 (consistent with the Blow^ sea level rise used for the maps produced for this study) in combination with current river discharge (FIM 2013). Potential peaks in precipitation events and/or river discharges due to climate change are not covered by this data set. The inundation layers for a 10, 25, and 50year return period under current climate conditions and given a sea level rise scenario of +30 cm are shown in Fig. 2. Socioeconomic Data District-Level Poverty and Population Data At the national-level analysis, we overlay the flood hazard maps developed for this study with spatial socioeconomic data. For Vietnam, the World Bank has produced estimates of the Table 2 Hazard map scenarios for which the modeling was conducted for Vietnam Scenario Coastal Fluvial/Pluvial 1 in 25 1 in 25 1 in 25 1 in 25 Future – Low 1 in 25 + 28 cm 1 in 50 1 in 25 Future – Medium 1 in", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "spatial socioeconomic data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "spatial socioeconomic data", "confidence": 0.28522396087646484}, {"text": "District-Level Poverty and Population Data", "confidence": 0.20723527669906616}, {"text": "flood hazard maps", "confidence": 0.10385304689407349}], "vague_data": [{"text": "maps", "confidence": 0.37720224261283875}, {"text": "spatial socioeconomic data", "confidence": 0.3055758774280548}]}}}
{"input": "Trafficking in Women in Israel. http://www.knesset.gov.il/committees/heb/docs/sachar_final2005.htm. (Hebrew) (Accessed 20.08.2010) MALKKI, L. H. (1995a) _Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu_ _Refugees in Tanzania_ . Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ——— (1995b) Refugees and Exile: From \"Refugee Studies\" to the National Order of Things. _Annual_ _Review of Anthropology_ 24, no. 1: 495-523. ——— (2002) News from Nowhere: Mass Displacement and Globalized `Problems of Organization'. _Ethnography_ 3, no. 3: 351-360. MAN, I. (2010) Refugees. _Maftech_ 1, no. 1. http://mafteakh.tau.ac.il/pdf/1-2010-08.pdf. (Hebrew) (Accessed 20.08.2010) MARKOWITZ, F. (1996) Living in limbo: Bosnian Muslim refugees in Israel. _Human Organization_ 55, no. 2: 127-132. MARTINS, B. O.(2009) Undocumented Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Israel. EuroMeSCo Paper 81. http://www.euromesco.net/images/paper81eng.pdf. (Accessed 20.08.2010) McCARTHY, R. (2010) Israel to Build Surveillance Fence along Egyptian Border. _The Guardian_, November 1. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/11/israel-fence-egypt. (Accessed 20.08.2010) MFA. (1948/2010) Israeli Declaration of Independence. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Decl aration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israel. (Accessed 20.08.2010) MORRIS, B. (1997) _Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the_ _Countdown to the Suez War_ . USA: Oxford University Press. 18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "their accommodation in the coming months should there be need for collective accommodation facilities to create additional space for newcomers. Participants also expressed significant financial strain in covering the costs of their accommodation. While only 4% of respondents (17 households) reside in accommodation provided by their employer, it is noteworthy that their information and other priority needs are heightened. While accommodation was indicated as a priority need by only 13% of respondents, employment and information needs were much higher for this group, mentioned by 53% and 27%, respectively, compared to 32% and 12% of respondents overall. This group also highlighted a much higher need for information on legal status (40%), Temporary Protection (27%) and how to claim asylum (20%) than the overall respondents (26%, 15% and 5% respectively). These findings may reflect that Ukrainian Temporary Protection respondents living in employer-provided housing face barriers to accessing information and may be seeking assistance in finding new employment and in relation to their legal status. Finally, out of those who do not have a rental contract (6%), the majority of respondents (92% in comparison to 75% in Q1) are in this situation because the unit is rented by another person or entity. This", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "rural development approach.** The region not only hosts a significant migrant population, primarily from Ethiopia, but also grapples with chronic underdevelopment, reflected in high poverty rates, limited access to basic services (including water, sanitation, healthcare, and education), and high levels of unemployment. The continuous inflow of migrants places additional strain on these already overstretched services, exacerbating the challenges faced by host communities. The region’s arid climate and vulnerability to climate change further intensify these challenges, restricting opportunities for sustainable livelihoods. Poverty in Dikhil is marked by multiple layers of deprivation – economic exclusion, poor social infrastructure, and environmental fragility – compounded by limited access to markets and essential infrastructure. As a result, the region’s socio-economic landscape requires a nuanced, multi-sectoral response that simultaneously addresses these interconnected issues. The project’s integrated approach will create sustainable livelihoods for both local residents and migrant communities while contributing to the 4 World Bank, Gender Portal. 5 UNHCR, African Development Bank Group, IGAD, EAC (2024), Regional Report Draft: Regional Program on Enhancing the Investment Climate for the Economic Empowerment of Refugee, Returnee and Host/Return Community Women in the East and Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region Page 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Gender Portal", "confidence": 0.24311862885951996}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "confirms that the coefficient for electricity access is negative using the treatment distance 20 km. However, with a treatment distance of 10 km, the effect is marginally positive and insignificant. If we use a treatment distance of 50 km, we no longer see a significant effect. In panel Ab, the results are replicated using a spatial lag model, meaning that we allow for nonlinear effects with distance. In reality, it seems like the electricity rate is much higher before a mine (dashed line) than with an active mine (the blue line). However, when the results are decomposed by migrant status in panel Ac of figure A1 (Annex) we find that migrants are driving the lower electricity rate. In fact, among nonmigrants, the electricity rate is higher 0–10 km from an active mine, although it is slightly lower 10–20 km away. [14] **6.3 Distributional effects on wealth and inequality** Table 9 presents the effects of mining on asset wealth and on asset wealth inequality. Wealth data are available in the form of a wealth index, but only for the two last DHS surveys. Following Fenske (2015) and Flatø and Kotsadam (2014), we calculate inequality by means of a Gini coefficient (recoding", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "the two last DHS surveys"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS surveys", "confidence": 0.8760965466499329}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Wealth data", "confidence": 0.10978704690933228}]}}}
{"input": "regions. However, all regions (particularly AFR and LCR) include countries that have no lending, despite significant environmental problems. **Figure 5.2: World Bank Environmental Lending by Region** **vs. Overall Environmental Problems (Log Scale)** The number of such zero-lending cases suggests that the Bank's interaction with these countries has been affected by other factors. We introduce broader considerations into our regressions by including the Bank's total country lending and countries' OED project success rates, as well as regional differences. The results in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5.1 suggest that the Bank's overall lending relationship with a country and the country's project success rate are both significant determinants of environmental lending. The results in column 3 also indicate a significant component of environmental lending to two regions (ECA, MNA) that is not accounted for by our environmental problem indicator, project success rates, or other Bank lending. 14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "environmental problem indicator", "confidence": 0.6461097002029419}, {"text": "OED project success rates", "confidence": 0.11333435028791428}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "environmental problem indicator", "confidence": 0.2660060524940491}]}}}
{"input": "renewable energy, that are now covered by other projects; and (b) government needs support to lead coordination of the development response across multiple operations. The project will have five components. **Component 1: Social and Economic Services and Infrastructure (US$191.5 million equivalent)** 23. **This component will support the construction, rehabilitation, upgrading, and maintenance of priority basic** **service infrastructure.** Infrastructure investments will benefit both refugees and host community members, supporting the transition roadmap goal of integrating refugees into national education, health, and water supply systems. Component activities will support improved access to services for three million people (66 percent host community members/34 percent refugees). 18 See ICR Report No. ICR00006388, December 3, 2024. 19 World Bank (2022). _Social Cohesion and Forced Displacement: a Synthesis of New Research_ . Washington DC: World Bank. Page 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Integrated Community Resilience Project (P506969) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT 13. **Refugee-hosting areas such as Obock, Ali Addeh, and Holl Holl, face difficulties in the delivery of key services,** **such as adequate water supply, sanitation, and electricity.** Access to reliable water sources is particularly limited, contributing to health vulnerabilities in both refugee sites and host communities. Carrying water from wells to houses imposes a heavy burden of work on women and children, reducing education opportunities. Similarly, electricity coverage remains inadequate, with many households and public facilities still dependent on unreliable power supply. Geographic isolation, especially in Obock, further compounds these issues, as the region's remote location and underdeveloped infrastructure inhibit service delivery, especially during extreme weather events. Refugees in Djibouti face high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition [12], and the World Food Program (WFP), in partnership with the MoI and UNHCR, provides unconditional food assistance to more than 22,200 people per month in refugee-hosting areas of Djibouti [13] . 14. **Women are disproportionately affected by socio-economic disadvantages in Djibouti, facing significant gaps** **across different dimensions, including access to basic services, education and employment opportunities** . Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is reported to be higher among women than men", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Multidimensional Poverty Index", "confidence": 0.7345957159996033}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "their surrounding environment. For example, it is expected that SLR will have its most pronounced effects on brackish and freshwater marshes in the coastal zone through alteration of hydrological regimes (Burkett and Kusler, 2000; Baldwin et al., 2001; Sun et al., 2002). Similarly, sea-level rise may not lead to loss of saltmarsh areas since these marshes accrete vertically and maintain their elevation relative to sea level where the supply of sediment is sufficient (Hughes, 2004; Cahoon et al., 2006). WMP indicates the potential for wetlands to migrate landward in response to a 1-meter rise in sea level. The migratory potential is based on a few geophysical characteristics of the coastline: coastal type, topography, tidal range, and other information when available (e.g., whether 14 GLWD coastal wetlands is a term used in this paper to distinguish coastal wetlands from the specific coastal wetlands type in the GLWD. GLWD coastal wetlands type is derived from a number of data sources and categories: ‘Lagoon’ from ArcWorld (ESRI, 1992: referenced in Lehner and Döll 2004); ‘Delta’, ‘Lagoon’, ‘Mangrove’, ‘Estuary’, ‘Coastal Wetland’, and ‘Tidal Wetland’ of WCMC wetlands map (Dugan, 1993; WCMC, 1993; referenced in Lehner and Döll 2004) - see Lehner and Döll (2004)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "WCMC wetlands map"}, {"text": "GLWD coastal wetlands"}, {"text": "ArcWorld"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "WCMC wetlands map", "confidence": 0.8552613854408264}, {"text": "14 GLWD coastal wetlands", "confidence": 0.5234223008155823}, {"text": "ArcWorld", "confidence": 0.19330556690692902}, {"text": "GLWD coastal wetlands", "confidence": 0.1178707703948021}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "### Protection Risk III **Access to work:** 10% of respondents who are unemployed reported challenges in accessing employment, mainly due to language barriers, a lack of opportunities, as well as a lack of education recognition, caring responsibilities for dependents, or a lack of information. Focus group discussions conducted by UNHCR [2] ## highlighted challenges with women accessing 61% employment due to a lack of childcare, Face language barriers in accessing kindergarten places and other childcare employment arrangements, including for school-age children. Given the large proportion of single female caregivers, addressing this challenge will be key to increase access to work for this group and to mitigate protection risks including gender-based violence, human trafficking and exploitation. Women also raised challenges related to language barriers in accessing employment. Specific challenges in accessing quality language courses at the correct level were also raised (high demand for quality B1-level courses). The lack of adequate language skills leads to the inability to upscale professional skills and to seek meaningful employment opportunities matching qualifications. When seeking employment through agencies, women reported cases of labour exploitation with jobs that often involve long working hours, no breaks, no social protection coverage, and no annual leave. From protection monitoring,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "no significant differences in either of them. 13 Information on crop output was collected at the crop level, separately for the two main agricultural seasons (July - December 2004 and January - June 2005). A diary was used for continuously harvested crops and prices, in addition to standard socio-economic information, were collected at the community level. 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "diary", "confidence": 0.16499976813793182}]}}}
{"input": "assistance in finding new employment and in relation to their legal status. Finally, out of those who do not have a rental contract (6%), the majority of respondents (92% in comparison to 75% in Q1) are in this situation because the unit is rented by another person or entity. This may indicate a prevalence of sublease schemes. During UNHCR’s focus group discussions with Ukrainian Temporary Protection holders in Brno and Prague in August, some participants highlighted having encountered challenges with sublease schemes, including facing higher than market-rate rent propositions. 3 Multiple responses were possible. UNHCR / September 2024 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "estimation strategy assumes similar trends over time across the treatment (close to mines) and control group (far away from mines), in absence of the gold mining expansion. While this assumption cannot be tested using our dataset, previous analyses have found evidence for parallel pre-trends in infant mortality and night lights (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2019) for gold mining countries in West and East Africa (including Ghana). The baseline differences in observable characteristics – in particular, lower levels of economic development preceding the mine opening - indicate that a cross sectional approach using only the post-period may not be sufficient to understand the impact of gold mining on socio-economic variables. **Table 2 Summary statistics for women’s survey** (1) (2) (3) (4) Before mining During Mining >20 km <20 km >20 km <20 km Mean Coefficient Mean Coefficient _Woman Characteristics_ Age 28.79 0.836 28.95 -0.352 Total children 2.18 0.417* 2.56 -0.035 Wealth 3.85 -0.619** 3.33 -0.028 Nonmigrant 0.32 0.123** 0.33 -0.028 Urban 0.62 -0.300** 0.49 -0.150** No education 0.17 -0.045 0.20 -0.042** <3 years education 0.77 0.035 0.74 0.045** 15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "women’s survey", "confidence": 0.5937976241111755}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "impact of property rights insecurity arising from overlapping land rights rather than comparing titled and untitled land. We do so for the case of Uganda, a country where overlapping property rights, many of them established a long time ago, are very common. This, together with the ability to rely on a large nationally representative household survey, allows us to go beyond the existing literature in three respects. First, while the historical genesis of overlapping rights makes it unlikely that such arrangements were chosen based on comparing the cost and benefits of different contractual forms, our ability to apply household level fixed effect estimation techniques to a large sample of (owner-cum-occupant) households who simultaneously operate own and usufruct parcels allows us to avoid many of the biases that have characterized cross sectional estimates in the past. Second, the existence of laws aiming to eliminate investment disincentives arising from overlapping property rights enables us to assess whether, and if yes to what extent, such laws have achieved their objective. This provides lessons on the scope to reduce underinvestment associated with insecure tenure through (legislative) means that stop short of changing the land ownership structure. Finally, information on tenants’ willingness to purchase residual", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "large nationally representative household survey"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "nationally representative household survey"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "nationally representative household survey", "confidence": 0.1346297413110733}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "large nationally representative household survey", "confidence": 0.2891058921813965}], "vague_data": [{"text": "nationally representative household survey", "confidence": 0.6241746544837952}]}}}
{"input": "scenario as given, and assess the _exposure_ of the present wetland stock for each of the 76 developing countries and five regions. Second, the digital elevation (90m DEM V2) data we use in our analysis gives altitude in 1-meter increments, preventing us from sub-meter SLR modeling. [13] Third, the lack of resolution of spatial data of the wetlands and digital elevation higher than 90 m prevented us from including small islands in our analysis. Fourth, our analysis does not estimate potential destruction of wetlands from 13 One can interpolate the elevation data we have used for sub-meter SLR modeling, but in that case, precision of the estimates would be difficult to justify. The potential use of LIDAR survey (laser-based elevation measurement from low-flying aircraft) was beyond the scope of our analysis. 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "spatial data of the wetlands"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DEM V2", "confidence": 0.4782596826553345}, {"text": "digital elevation", "confidence": 0.13298842310905457}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "spatial data", "confidence": 0.8726348876953125}, {"text": "elevation data", "confidence": 0.19272848963737488}]}}}
{"input": "Jun. (2020). Coastal Development between Opportunity and Disaster Risk: A Multisectoral Risk Assessment for Vietnam. Policy Research Working Paper; No. 9352. World Bank, Washington Bright, E. A., Rose, A. N. & Urban, M. L. _Landscan 2015 High-Resolution Global Population Data Set_ . (Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN, USA, 2016). Chakraborty, J., T. Collins, M. Montgomery, S. Grineski. (2014). Social and Spatial Inequities in Exposure to Flood Risk in Miami, Florida. Natural Hazards Review. Vol.15(3) Erman, A., M. Tariverdi, M. Obolensky, X. Chen, R. Vincent, S. Malgioglio, J. Rentschler, S. Hallegatte, N. Yoshida (2019), Wading Out the Storm: The Role of Poverty in Exposure, Vulnerability and Resilience to Floods in Dar Es Salaam. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8976, Facebook Connectivity Lab and Center for International Earth Science Information Network - CIESIN. (2018). Available at: http://ciesin.columbia.edu/data/hrsl/#acknowledgements. (Accessed: 15 [th] September 2020). Fielding, J. (2012). Inequalities in exposure and awareness of flood risk in England and Wales. Disasters. Vol. 36(3), pp.477-494 Freire, Sergio; MacManus, Kytt; Pesaresi, Martino; Doxsey-Whitfield, Erin; Mills, Jane (2016): Development of new open and free multi-temporal global population grids at 250 m resolution. Geospatial Data in a Changing World; Association of Geographic Information Laboratories", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Landscan 2015 High-Resolution Global Population Data Set"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "open and free multi-temporal global population grids"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "multi-temporal global population grids", "confidence": 0.13119660317897797}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "of Bengal** **3.2 Trend in Maximum Wind Speed, 1877-2016** Maximum wind speed is the consistently-reported measure of storm power in our database. We compute two measures for a trend analysis. First, we order all 525 storms by date and compute the 20-date moving average (MA) for maximum wind speed. This is similar to a conventional moving average, which uses evenly-spaced dates. Storm incidence in our database varies by season and year, but we believe that our MA measure is informative because year-to-year 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) **ANNEX 1: Implementation Arrangements** **Financial Management** 1. Financial Management tasks for the proposed project will be handled by the PIU to be created, which will be staffed with a seasoned Financial Management Specialist/budgetary an Accounting and Treasury Analyst for carrying out financial management tasks under the project which include: (i) a financial management specialist, (including processing payments and submitting loan withdrawal applications to the WB); (iii) maintenance of accounting records (including the administration and maintenance of an inventory of project assets); (iv) preparation of semi-annual reports and annual financial statements; (v) administration of adequate information systems; and (vi) arranging for execution of external audit. 2. The staff required for the FM positions referred above will be hired under Terms of Reference acceptable to the Bank. 3. **Planning and budgeting** . The PIU will be responsible for preparing and monitoring the annual operating plan and budget. The project’s annual operational plan will be the main input for budget formulation. Budget formulation and execution will follow local procedures and requirements. (i.e., approval of transactions, modifications, issuance of commitments) Its monitoring procedures will be established in the Project Operational Manual POM. The budget", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the radius-buffered storm track polygon at its first coastal intersection. **3. Aggregate Results** **3.1 Trend in Cyclonic Storm Incidence, 1877-2016** Although we focus on the northern coast of the Bay of Bengal, our database includes all recorded tracks for the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. This provides a very large regional sample: 525 cyclonic storms recorded from 1877 to 2016. For a trend analysis, we divide the data into seven periods: 1877-1900, 1901-1920, 1921-1940, 1941-1960, 1961-1980, 1981-2000 and 2001 2016. Table 1 and Figure 1 provide two trend measures for cyclonic storm frequencies since 1877: storms/year for each period, and the two-period moving average of storms/year. The first measure displays no trend through 1960, a large increase during the period 1961-1980, and a decline from 3 Some storm tracks that approach at oblique angles intersect the coastline two or more times. 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Despite the possible gains in wages for wage earners, we note a decrease in the regionally deflated total household expenditure (column 5), and a decrease in per capita expenditure on food and nonfood items (column 4). The increase in wages but decrease in total expenditure can possibly be explained by rising prices and wages in mining communities, where everyone has to pay the higher prices but only some (those who earn wages), benefit from a rise in wage rate. Columns 6 through 9 of table 12 look at nondeflated expenditure measures for food, housing, health and education, and household energy. [17] We confirm that total household expenditure on food decreases (compared with the per capita deflated measure in column (4)), but find that households spend more money on housing, transport, and communication, and household energy, such as electricity and gas. The electricity and gas expenditure is only for those who have any positive expenditure on these, and we saw earlier that electricity access changes with the mine. This confirms that, among those who spend anything on electricity, they spend more on it in mining communities. **Table 12 Using GLSS: Household income and expenditure** (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS", "confidence": 0.807606041431427}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "data section for details. 11 The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) projects increased SLR between 0.18m and 0.59m across various emission scenarios over the next 100 years. However, this range has been criticized by many experts as being too conservative and not sufficiently reflective of the large uncertainty pertaining to SLR (Krabill _et al_ ., 2004; Overpeck _et al_ ., 2006; Rahmstorf, 2007). The most recent evidence suggests that sea-level rise could reach 1 meter or more during this century (Hansen and Sato, 2011; Vermeer and Rahmstorf 2009; Pfeffer et al., 2008). The IPCC itself pointed out that its projections did not include changes within the polar ice sheets. The IPCC noted that the upper values of projected sea level rise presented in its report are not to be considered upper bounds and that higher rises in sea level cannot be ruled out. 12 These being the five regions used by the World Bank: East Asia and Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the efficiency of disbursement to communities, address payment delays, and improve the timeliness of financial reporting and accountability; (b) MoF and BoU are strengthening internal control mechanisms around TSA payments to ensure the correct beneficiaries are paid; and (c) MoFPED has set up regional centers for local governments to go to if they face network problems and unstable electricity to use the IFMIS to account for project funds. MoFPED has also provided budget to local governments to purchase fuel for generators to manage power cuts. The IFMIS, the use of a consolidated fund, and payments to beneficiaries using the TSA at BoU have significantly enhanced accountability at the local government level. This is reflected in the Auditor General’s report for 2022/23 and 2023/24, where all 22 local governments involved in project implementation had an unqualified (clean) audit opinion except for Ntoroko district, which had a qualified opinion. [24] Accountability measures for all implementing entities, including community-based organizations and seed grants for VRFs, will be described in the FM section of the PIM. The PIM will also include a Community Operations Manual that will detail all steps in the CDD process, including accountability arrangements. 75. **Audit** . The project will have", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**2024 CRITICAL FUNDING NEEDS IN EUROPE** ###### **South Eastern Europe** As of June 2024, some 3,000 refugees and asylum-seekers were present in South Eastern Europe, including 199 unaccompanied and separated children. [5] UNHCR’s [Strategy for engagement in mixed](https://reliefweb.int/report/world/strategy-unhcr-engagement-mixed-movement-western-balkans-revision-october-2021) [movements in the Western Balkans sets a foundation to work with partners to strengthen asylum systems](https://reliefweb.int/report/world/strategy-unhcr-engagement-mixed-movement-western-balkans-revision-october-2021) and identify viable solutions for refugees, as well as to eradicate statelessness, while fostering opportunities for integration and inclusion for those granted international protection. UNHCR is helping to build the capacities of local authorities to gradually assume greater responsibility for their asylum systems, while also improving protection-sensitive migration management across the region, including recognising the importance of effective return mechanisms for those not in need of international protection. **Funding is needed to support these efforts and ensure sustainable programming** for integration and inclusion, and to identify durable solutions for refugees, asylum-seekers and stateless people in the region – which is itself a region of emigration. # 30.7 % 5 Non-Ukrainian nationals; of these, 52 per cent were in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 25 per cent in Serbia; 7 per cent in Kosovo; 6 per cent each in Albania and Montenegro; and 4 per cent in North Macedonia.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "which calls for systematic mainstreaming of adaptation measures in project design and implementation. Jya Mbere II will also align with the GoR’s National Adaptation Plan of Action (2006), Third National Communications to the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 2018 and its Updated Nationally-Determined Contributions (NDC) 2020, in which it commits to mainstream environmental sustainability and climate change adaptation efforts. Rwanda’s Updated NDC includes a conditional commitment to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 16 percent by 2030 relative to a business as usual (BAU) scenario, and an unconditional commitment to reduce GHG by an additional 22 percent by 2030 relative to the BAU scenario. The project does not hinder this mitigation goal by ensuring that all infrastructure subprojects will be subject to climate risk assessments and will comply with climate-resilient standards. Finally, the project will support implementation of key recommendations from the 2022 Rwanda Country Climate and Development Report, such as investing in the water sector (including flood control and water storage), renewable energy sources and climate-smart agriculture. The results framework will track the number of infrastructure subprojects constructed/upgraded to climate-resilient standards. 71. _Assessment and reduction of mitigation risks_ . The project (Component 1) will invest in infrastructure, including", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "assessments, which will include (a) participatory focus groups and (b) semi-structured interviews with refugees and former refugees, host community members, farmers, cooperatives, and agribusinesses. Citizen engagement outcomes will be assessed through the indicator “Stakeholder consultations convened, and priority measures identified”. These beneficiary assessments will help assess the relevance and impact of project interventions. Each of the interventions will be assessed with respect to inclusion, productivity, climate resilience, jobs, incomes, and food security. 55. **The project’s M&E system will disaggregate results by gender and youth wherever possible and for refugee and** **host communities.** This will ensure that differential impacts on vulnerable groups are adequately recorded. **C. Sustainability** 56. **Investing in policy reform and legal identity for refugees will play a massive role in supporting long-term,** **sustained self-reliance for refugees and former refugees.** The project is aligned with the country’s National Refugee Policy and settlement modernization strategy, both of which seek long-term solutions to inclusion and self-reliance. The GRZ is actively promoting integration between refugees and local communities for economic advancement and is seeking enhanced partnerships with local stakeholders and international partners in addressing the issue of forced displacement. 57. **Appropriately assessing the sustainability risk of investment operations in refugee settlements in", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "As part of a regional Protection Profiling and Monitoring exercise, UNHCR collects and analyses on a quarterly basis data about the profiles, protection risks, and needs of refugees from Ukraine in Czechia, through individual interviews and focus group discussions with diverse groups. The key findings are highlighted below. #### Protection Risk I **Access to Temporary Protection (TP):** 98% of the respondents are holders of Temporary Protection in Czechia. Only 1% (five individuals) provided that their application for Temporary Protection was pending, whilst also 1% (four individuals) did not apply for Temporary Protection in Czechia. The reasons being, that they applied for refugee status, did not meet the eligibility criteria, did not stay in the country, or had since transitioned to a different legal status. Overall, access to Temporary Protection in Czechia continues to remain high. of respondents (55 individuals) reported facing some challenges with the Temporary ## 13% Protection application or extension process. In line with previous reports, the main challenges related to applying for Temporary Protection were long waiting times to receive a decision (44%), a lack of required documents (such as ID or proof of address) to complete the registration process (40%), and, despite its overall decrease in", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "###### **III.2 Country level analysis** The impacts of SLR on coastal wetlands were also estimated for individual countries. Table 2 summarizes our results by presenting the 10 most vulnerable countries. Estimates indicate large effects of SLR on coastal wetlands are much more concentrated in some countries than others. The 5 most vulnerable countries are: Viet Nam, Argentina, Iran, China and Mexico that represent 77% of the total freshwater marshes at risk from a 1 m SLR. Vietnam is by far the most vulnerable country with close to 65% of its freshwater marshes at risk. For vulnerable GLWD Coastal Wetlands, the top-ranked country China accounts for 56% of GLWD Coastal Wetlands” at risk. Of all vulnerable saline wetlands, Libya, Egypt, Mauritania, India and Argentina account for 93%, with Libya and Egypt representing 61%. Also within the regions, vulnerability is clearly far from balanced across countries. Viet Nam represents 85.1% of all vulnerable freshwater marshes and China represents 79.1% of all vulnerable GLWD Coastal Wetlands within EAP. Within MENA, 92.7% of all regional vulnerable saline wetlands are in Libya and Egypt. On the whole, our results suggest a significant asymmetry in the burden of SLR on wetlands: a small number of developing", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) in OECD countries, and few students enroll in tracks in high demand in the labor market, such as STEAM and digital skills. [13] Quality TVET could play a pivotal role in developing skills that are directly relevant to the labor market and in creating an adaptable workforce. 7. **Costa Rica is undergoing a TVET reform to better align it to the needs of the current and future labor market,** **emphasizing skills for the technology sector and green jobs** . The recently initiated reform includes efforts to revitalize entry into the labor market by targeting support for youth and adults. Participants complete their education certification, and a proposed program of micro-credentials promises further improvement on employability, seeking to align skills provision to labor demand through both the secondary level and vocational training courses and dual modality education offered by INA. As the global landscape shifts towards sustainability, there is likely to be a growing demand for a workforce equipped with expertise in green technologies, renewable energy, environmental sciences, and sustainable practices. Accessing skillsets in these areas requires strong foundational learning, cognitive and digital competencies. Possible green jobs in Costa Rica would", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the increasing influx (Kemp and Kritzman 2008). In the past, Israel has recognised groups of refugees and asylum seekers as a gesture of goodwill. Notable examples of such ̳humanitarian anomalies‘ are the decision to grant refuge to a few hundred Vietnamese boat-people in the end of the 1970s and to admit a group of Muslim Bosnian refugees during the 1990s. (Ben-Dor and Adut 2003, 21-22; Markowitz 1996). Following its withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, Israel admitted nearly 6,000 members (and their families) of the South Lebanese Army, a sectarian militia who collaborated with Israel during its occupation of South Lebanon. Such precedents, coupled with public pressure, led former Prime Minister (PM) Olmert to grant an exceptional temporary residency to approximately 500 Darfurian asylum seekers in September 2007 (Mualem 2007). Israel historically handled asylum requests by outsourcing the process to UNHCR, using the assistance of the agency‘s honorary correspondent in Israel, which later became an official representative office (UNHCR 2007) It was only in 2001, 50 years 6 Driven by the horrors of the Holocaust in Europe and aiming to protect the Jewish refugees from World War II the young state of Israel was among the first 26 states who", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "sources and vintages of imagery. To guide the identification of slums, previous work has provided information on the appearance and geographical extent of slums in HCMC. Surveys of poverty in the city find the appearance of slums in HCMC to be characterized as densely built small households and shelters that have predominantly semi-permanent character (Habitat for Humanity 2008). In terms of geographic extent, many slums are located in certain districts (districts 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 11, 12, Binh Thanh, Go Vap, Tan Phu) and along the Saigon River (e.g. Kenh Te, Rach Ben Nghe, Thi NgheNhieu Loc Canal, Kenh Doi, Thi Nghe Canal, Lo Gom, and Canala) (Horsley 2004; De Lay 2011; Habitat for Humanity 2008). Taking into account these spatial and geographic characteristics, the PUMA data set interprets Google Earth imagery to produce two layers of potential slum areas (PUMA 2013): areas with defined borders (polygon-data) and potential slum areas without (point-data) defined borders. In the latter case, we applied a circular buffer of 50 m around each", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PUMA data set"}, {"text": "PUMA 2013"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Surveys of poverty in the city"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Surveys of poverty in the city"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PUMA data set", "confidence": 0.8920446038246155}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "PUMA data set interprets Google Earth imagery", "confidence": 0.2458432912826538}], "vague_data": [{"text": "point-data", "confidence": 0.3768654763698578}, {"text": "polygon-data", "confidence": 0.2735627591609955}]}}}
{"input": "availability of fresh water and sediment, and the salinity of soil and groundwater (Belperio, 1993; Semeniuk, 1994; Blasco et al., 1996; Alongi, 2008). [8] Even though location-specific studies are needed to define the specific details, experts and scientists agree that adaptation of wetlands to future sea-level rise depends on its success in landward progression and is conditioned by the availability of adequate and suitable space for expansion/ migration, and a rate of sea level rise that is not greater than the rate at which wetlands can migrate. [9] This paper is an effort to quantify the coastal wetlands of different types [10] at risk from 1 m SLR [11] in 76 developing countries and territories in the five regions [12] of the world. Our estimates take into account the exposure of wetlands derived from the recent GLWD-3 database to 1 m SLR and the estimated capacity of the coastline to retreat and for coastal wetlands ecosystems to move (or migrate) inland as the coastline is receding. Attempts have also been made to estimate the economic loss, which may be associated with adversely impacted wetlands. Our estimates indicate that a 1 m rise in sea level would lead to a loss", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLWD-3 database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLWD-3 database", "confidence": 0.9755892157554626}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "associated with them will lose their services. Wetlands in WMP category 4 are at great risk, but may survive, depending on the effect of flooding behind the coastline. If the flooding is severe enough and persists long enough to seriously disrupt the trapping of the sediment or building upon the peat the sediment creates, the wetlands will be severely degraded and may perish. Hence, the wetlands in WMP categories 3 and 4 exposed to the inundation zone for 1 meter SLR are the estimates of wetlands at inundation risk in a changing climate. ##### **Results** For the 76 coastal developing countries and territories included in this analysis, estimates indicate more than 60% of freshwater marsh, GLWD Coastal Wetlands, and brackish/saline wetlands (henceforth saline wetlands for brevity) might be lost as a result of a 1m SLR. In terms of area estimates, this would translate to a loss of 16,492 square kilometer of freshwater marsh, 17,421 square kilometer of GLWD Coastal Wetlands and 10,969 square kilometer of saline wetlands. Among the four coastal wetland categories, only swamp forests appear less vulnerable to SLR and more capable of migrating as the coast line is receding and henceforth dropped from further analysis [19]", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "University of Kassel, Germany, and the World Wildlife Fund US (WWF-US), Washington DC, USA (Lehner and Döll, 2004). In the generation of the global map of lakes and wetlands from a grid at a spatial resolution of 30 seconds (approximately 1km by 1km at the equator), the GLWD-3 followed the definition of wetlands adopted at the Ramsar Convention, the International Union for Conservation of Nature. Our analysis focuses on freshwater marsh, swamp forests, GLWD Coastal Wetlands [14] and Brackish/ saline wetlands. _Response of wetlands to SLR_ . In order to assess the impact of SLR on wetlands and the potential for adaptation, the wetland migratory potential (WMP) characteristic in the Dynamic Interactive Vulnerability Assessment (DIVA) database from the DINAS-COAST project has been used (Vafeidis et al, 2008). Different types of wetlands are expected to have different migratory potential depending on their own natural characteristics as well as the characteristics of their surrounding environment. For example, it is expected that SLR will have its most pronounced effects on brackish and freshwater marshes in the coastal zone through alteration of hydrological regimes (Burkett and Kusler, 2000; Baldwin et al., 2001; Sun et al., 2002). Similarly, sea-level rise may not lead to loss", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Dynamic Interactive Vulnerability Assessment (DIVA)"}, {"text": "GLWD-3"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Dynamic Interactive Vulnerability Assessment (DIVA) database", "confidence": 0.4461411237716675}, {"text": "GLWD-3", "confidence": 0.14379799365997314}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "global map of lakes and wetlands", "confidence": 0.33354076743125916}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "US$ per month, [14] significantly below that by non-agriculturalists (45 US$ per month), pure owners are better off than the rest in terms of total land owned (9.5 vs. 3.2 acres for owner-cum-occupants), the value of own land, livestock, and non-land assets (US$ 4,011, 968 and 1733 vs. 1651, 227, and 1252, respectively), and overall welfare as measured by per capita income (US$ 226 vs. 193). Third, while crop productivity [15] for pure occupants is not significantly different from that for pure owners (US$ 95.3 vs. US$ 96.7 per acre) it is below that achieved by owner-cum-occupants (US$ 110.8/ac.). While pure owners have access to more land than owner-cum-occupants, there is no significant difference in the amount of land cultivated by the two groups during the 2004/5 agricultural season. Pure occupants cultivated significantly less land than any of the two other groups and, as a result, derived a much larger share of their income (42%) from wage employment, as compared to mixed farmers (24%) and pure owners (30%). Finally, with only 16.5% of households and 9.5% of women knowing about the 1998 Land Act, legal awareness remains low. **3.2 Parcel level characteristics** Tables 2 and 3 provide evidence on physical", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Chi Minh City In addition to the flood hazard maps developed for this study as described above, we use an additional set of maps produced specifically for HCMC. 2 These uncertainties largely arise from climate models; global climate models (GCMs) struggle to represent the physical processes that produce extreme rainfall. Indeed even in higher resolution regional climate models (RCMs), heavy rainfall events are poorly represented. As a result the modeled rainfall data must be ‘corrected’, in order to render it realistic. The fact that the underlying models themselves cannot represent flood driving rainfall means that there is little confidence in the projections that they produce. Moreover, at the national scale there is very little river gauge data available in Vietnam. Therefore rainfall-runoff models, required to transform rainfall projections into river discharge values, would be largely un-calibrated. This adds an additional source of significant modeling uncertainty to the model cascade. The combination of poorly represented extreme rainfall in climate models, coupled with uncalibrated rainfall-runoff models, would largely render any projections of future flood hazard impractical, owing to the significant uncertainties that arise.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps"}, {"text": "maps produced specifically for HCMC"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "river gauge data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps", "confidence": 0.13213394582271576}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "maps produced specifically for HCMC", "confidence": 0.350641131401062}, {"text": "flood hazard maps developed for this study", "confidence": 0.24746446311473846}], "vague_data": [{"text": "river gauge data", "confidence": 0.7602673768997192}, {"text": "modeled rainfall data", "confidence": 0.34825456142425537}]}}}
{"input": "the wealth of the farmers. If farmers become poorer because of bad rainfall, CRRA utility would suggest that they would be even more risk averse the next year as a second shock would cause greater disutility. I start by examining whether there is actual autocorrelation in the rainfall data. To test for autocorrelation, I create a panel of various rainfall indicators for the period 1961–2004 for each weather station. For each indicator, I run a regression of six lags of the variable on the current value, including weather", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "various rainfall indicators"}, {"text": "rainfall data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "panel of various rainfall indicators", "confidence": 0.1843966394662857}], "vague_data": [{"text": "rainfall data", "confidence": 0.9672119617462158}, {"text": "rainfall indicators", "confidence": 0.2532317042350769}]}}}
{"input": "between 132 million and 587 million poor people are exposed to flood risks (depending on which poverty definition is used). About 1.2 billion flood-exposed people live in lower- and uppermiddle-income countries. Taking into account the income levels of flood exposed populations is particularly important, as income is a relatively reliable proxy for people’s ability to mitigate, withstand, cope with, and recover from floods. For instance, while a large share of the Dutch population lives in flood risk areas, large-scale investments in flood protection infrastructure have enabled them to mitigate risks. Similarly, flood exposed populations in Canada or Japan are more likely to have access to rapid government support systems in post-disaster situations compared to people in Malawi or Bangladesh. Thus, action to strengthen disaster prevention and recovery capacity is most urgently needed in the hotspots where poverty and flood exposure coincide. References Braese, J., S. De Vries Robbe, J. Rentschler, Jun. (2020). Coastal Development between Opportunity and Disaster Risk: A Multisectoral Risk Assessment for Vietnam. Policy Research Working Paper; No. 9352. World Bank, Washington Bright, E. A., Rose, A. N. & Urban, M. L. _Landscan 2015 High-Resolution Global Population Data Set_ . (Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Landscan 2015 High-Resolution Global Population Data Set"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Economics of Disasters and Climate Change https://doi.org/10.1007/s41885-018-0035-4 # Exposure to Floods, Climate Change, and Poverty in Vietnam Mook Bangalore [1,2] & Andrew Smith [3] & Ted Veldkamp [4,5] Received: 16 February 2018 /Accepted: 4 October 2018/ # The Author(s) 2018 Abstract With 70% of its population living in coastal areas and low-lying deltas, Vietnam is highly exposed to riverine and coastal flooding. This paper conducts a Bstress-test^ and examines the exposure of the population and poor people in particular to current and future flooding in Vietnam and specifically in Ho Chi Minh City. We develop new high-resolution flood hazard maps at 90 m horizontal resolution, and combine this with spatially-explicit socioeconomic data on poverty at the country and city level, two datasets often kept separate. The nationallevel analysis finds that a third of today’s population is already exposed to a flood, which occurs once every 25 years, assuming no protection. For the same return period flood under current socioeconomic conditions, climate change may increase the number exposed to 38 to 46% of the population (an increase of 13–27% above current exposure), depending on the severity of sea level rise. While poor districts are not found to be more exposed to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "spatially-explicit socioeconomic data on poverty"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood hazard maps", "confidence": 0.27489450573921204}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "spatially-explicit socioeconomic data on poverty", "confidence": 0.5101525783538818}, {"text": "high-resolution flood hazard maps", "confidence": 0.2711685597896576}], "vague_data": [{"text": "socioeconomic data", "confidence": 0.10676565021276474}]}}}
{"input": "**1. Introduction** Recurrent cyclonic storms in the Bay of Bengal inflict massive losses on the coastal regions of Bangladesh and India. Extensive research has investigated the incidence, power and impacts of cyclones in Bangladesh (Ali 1999; Dasgupta et al. 2014; Hoque 1992; Khalil 1992), India (Mishra 2014; Srivastava et al. 2000) and the Bay of Bengal more generally (Bhaskar Rao 2001; Dash et al. 2004; Mandke and Bhide 2003; Mooley and Mohile 1983; Mooley 1980; Muni Krishna 2009; Rao 2002; Yu and Wang 2009). This paper attempts to extend the previous work in several ways. First, we focus on the historical frequency and locations of cyclone strikes to inform household- and community-level research on adaptation to past and expected future cyclones. Previous studies of coastal community adaptation in the region have focused on responses to specific cyclones or generally-defined coastal hazards (Brouwer et al. 2007; Khalil 1993; Khan et al. 2015; Mallick et al. 2011; Mallick and Vogt 2013; Shameem and Momtaz 2014; Siddiqui et al. 2013; Sultana and Mallick 2015). With the notable exception of Dasgupta et al. (2016), these studies have seldom used household-level data to assess the impacts of past cyclones on communities and households, as well", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "household-level data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "household-level data", "confidence": 0.9598575830459595}]}}}
{"input": "of which will be supported by Jya Mbere II. 9. **Climate change poses risks to Rwanda’s positive economic outlook and refugees are particularly vulnerable** **to climate shocks** . Ranked 112 out of 185 countries in the 2021 Notre Dame-Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN), Rwanda is vulnerable to flooding, heat, drought, and landslides, which are expected to increase in frequency and severity. The country has already experienced a temperature increase of 1.4°C since 1970, higher than the global average; and an increase of up to 2.0°C is expected by the 2030s. The need for urgent action to address climate change impacts was highlighted by severe flooding and landslides in May 2023 that claimed many lives, destroyed homes and infrastructure and affected livelihoods. Rwanda’s high dependence on rain-fed agriculture, as well as the need to improve road networks, health facilities and water resource management all contribute to climate vulnerability. [10] The location of Rwanda’s refugee camps on rural hilltops makes them vulnerable to extreme weather events such as flooding and associated landslides. High population density in the camps and the limited capacity of refugees to adapt to the impacts of climate change exacerbates their vulnerability. Despite the protracted nature of displacement, refugee camps", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2021 Notre Dame-Global Adaptation Index"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2021 Notre Dame-Global Adaptation Index", "confidence": 0.5240687131881714}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "(GSS). [2] Point coordinates (global positioning system [GPS]) for the surveyed DHS clusters [3] allow us to match all individuals to one or several mineral mines. We do this in two ways. First, we calculate distance spans from an exact mine location given by its GPS coordinates, and match surveyed individuals to mines. These are concentric circles with radiuses of 10, 20, and 30 kilometers (km), and so on, up to 100 km and beyond. In the baseline analysis where 2 The data was shared by Aragón and Rud (2013) 3 Both the DHS and GLSS enumeration area coordinates have a 1-5 km offset. The DHS clusters have up to 10km displacement in 1% of the cases. 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "surveyed DHS clusters"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "surveyed DHS clusters", "confidence": 0.10374701023101807}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "surveyed DHS clusters", "confidence": 0.1590067446231842}], "vague_data": [{"text": "GPS coordinates", "confidence": 0.2792429029941559}]}}}
{"input": "is the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) database, which rates environmental policies and institutions on a numerical scale of 1 (the lowest) to 6. For this exercise, we reverse the scaling (1 becomes the highest) and normalize the ratings so that countries with the greatest problems score 100. To proxy the scale of the problems confronted by environmental institutions, we compute the mean value of our five thematic indicators (global emissions, pollution, natural resource degradation, biodiversity threats, water-related problems). [5,6] To assure equal weighting 4 Our index of demand pressure also provides a useful proxy for economic damage from drought conditions. We are indebted to our colleagues in the Bank’s Middle East / North Africa region for this observation. 5 While the CPIA ratings provide useful information for comparing institutional needs, they are not sufficient for judging investment priorities because they do not account for differences in the scale of environmental problems faced by a country's institutions. If Brazil and Bhutan receive the same CPIA rating, for example, ignoring their scale difference will lead to assignment of identical lending in the optimization model. 6 We recognize that an equal-weighted index is only one of numerous plausible indicators", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Country Policy and Institutional Assessment", "confidence": 0.4466235339641571}, {"text": "index of demand pressure", "confidence": 0.16839765012264252}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "index of demand pressure", "confidence": 0.5715652704238892}], "vague_data": [{"text": "thematic indicators", "confidence": 0.25025370717048645}, {"text": "index of demand pressure", "confidence": 0.10789220035076141}]}}}
{"input": "26.9 percent in Markazi, and 46 percent in Djibouti-Ville. [10] Livelihood opportunities in refugee villages are scarcer than in the capital, exacerbating food security challenges, and even highly educated refugees struggle to find employment, without a command of French. Refugees’ **access to finance** is limited by their lack of inclusion in the national ID system; underdeveloped credit markets; and limited awareness of their right to work. Their self-sufficiency is limited by a lack of access to vocational training, business development support services, and decent jobs [11] . [6 UNHCR (2023), Republic of Djibouti - Country Summary as at 30 June 2023](https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/unhcr/2024/en/147860) 7 UNHCR (2025), Djibouti Education Statistics for Refugees; Ministry of Education and Vocational Training of the Republic of Djibouti (2024), [Annuaire Statistique 2023/2024; World Bank (2024),](http://www.education.gov.dj/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=631:annuaire-statistique-2023-2024&Itemid=784&lang=en) [Djibouti: Giving Refugee Children a Chance to Go To School](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2024/01/11/djibouti-giving-refugee-children-a-chance-to-go-to-school) 8 World Bank (2024), [Djibouti: Giving Refugee Children a Chance to Go To School](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2024/01/11/djibouti-giving-refugee-children-a-chance-to-go-to-school) 9 The Ministry of Health and UNHCR signed a cooperation agreement in 2018 for the inclusion of refugees in the national health system 10 Government of Djibouti (2024), Stratégie Livelihoods et Inclusion Economique Djibouti 2024 – 2028 11 UNHCR, African Development Bank Group, IGAD, EAC (2024), Regional Report Draft:", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Djibouti Education Statistics for Refugees"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Djibouti Education Statistics", "confidence": 0.5135201811790466}, {"text": "Annuaire Statistique 2023/2024", "confidence": 0.20388080179691315}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "in housing prices (Daniel, Florax, and Rietveld 2009). In Ho Chi Minh City, for instance, qualitative surveys suggest flood-prone areas can be much cheaper than non-flood-prone areas for the same quality of accommodation (World Bank and Australian AID 2014). Using a household survey in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Erman et al. (2019) find that flood-prone dwellings are valued at 30 percent less on average than safe ones. Reduced housing prices, then, make it possible for poor people to access housing opportunities that could be out of reach in the absence of risk (Husby et al. 2015). In developing countries with informal markets, land scarcity can be particularly acute and land markets function poorly (Durand-Lasserve, Selod, and Durand-Lasserve 2013). In these places, it may not be the prices that push poor people into risky places but simply the availability of land with appropriate access to jobs and services. Informal settlements are often located in hazard-prone locations such as on hillsides, close to riverbanks, or near open drains and sewers—Pune (India), Dhaka, Caracas, Rio de Janeiro, and Mumbai have many such settlements (Lall and Deichmann 2012; Lall, Lundberg, and Shalizi 2008). 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household survey in Dar es Salaam"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household survey", "confidence": 0.2831687927246094}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey", "confidence": 0.8108028173446655}, {"text": "qualitative surveys", "confidence": 0.549668550491333}]}}}
{"input": "farming, either for their own production or as hired workers or sharecroppers on host community land. 4 World Bank (2023). _World Development Report 2023: Migrants, Refugees, and Societies._ Washington, DC: World Bank at p. 208. 5 Poverty rates in refugee-hosting districts during the COVID-19 crisis ranged from 37.7 percent in rural areas to 20.5 percent in urban areas; the overall national poverty rate was 33.2 percent. Headcount poverty rates averaged 39.9 percent in the Northern Region, 26.6 percent in the Western Region, and 20.4 percent in the West Nile. (World Bank. 2022. _Uganda Poverty Assessment Overview – Strengthening Resilience to_ _Accelerate Poverty Reduction in Uganda)._ 6 A study commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council revealed that between 2016-2020, 40.3 percent of refugees self-settled in the urban centers of Adjumani, Koboko, Hoima and Mbarara. Steady flows have continued into these locations and Arua, another secondary city, over the last four years: see Office of the Prime Minister and UNHCR (2024) _Uganda Urban Response Strategy 2024-2029_ . 7 The definition used is canopy height >5m. Global Forest Watch 8 Compounded by the fact that refugee settlement population density is typically ten times the national average: World Agroforestry Center, 2024. 9 Gianvenuti, A.,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Economics of Disasters and Climate Change and can be identified from the results of this paper. An important constraint is that for such development to be feasible, they should be paired with transportation investments, which maintain access to the city center where opportunities are presented (World Bank 2015). Despite the potential of risk-sensitive land-use planning, resettlement is the major ex-ante hazard adaptation mechanism employed in Vietnam currently, especially in the Mekong Delta. While such policies can reduce exposure, policy design is critical to ensure the livelihoods of the poor are supported. For instance, surveys in Tan Chau district suggests the resettlement policy enacted in 2002 may have made households worse-off: inadequate financing resulted in households paying for their new settlements out-of-pocket; many households who were farmers and fishers did not have adequate land, transportation and market access, and inadequate livelihood support was provided to them (World Bank 2016). Where resettlement policies are enacted, it is imperative that such policies are paired with livelihood and financing support. Beyond strategies to reduce exposure, other policy options to reduce vulnerability to improve households’ ability to adapt may warrant increased attention. Strategies such as government subsidies for household-level flood protection (like raising of floors),", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "surveys in Tan Chau district", "confidence": 0.8236490488052368}], "vague_data": [{"text": "surveys in Tan Chau district", "confidence": 0.26203450560569763}]}}}
{"input": "To show the robustness of these results, we have tried three alternative strategies for each of the outcomes. In row 2, we drop the sample that lives 20 to 40 km away, since they might be affected by the mine; in row 3, we drop the sample that was surveyed two years prior to mine opening; in row 4, we add closest mine fixed effects; and in row 5 we cluster on the closest mine. The coefficients do not change much, even if some magnitudes become bigger and the estimates more significant. However, as in the results using DHS data, these estimates are not precisely measured – few are statistically significant because the standard errors appear large. Women are 7.4 to 10.4 percentage points more likely to work in service or sales if they live close to a mine (depending on the estimations in panel A columns 4, only one statistically significant estimate). Women close to mines are 2.5 to 2.6 percentage points more likely to work in mining (only one statistically significant estimate). Men, on the other hand, (results shown in panel B of table 12), are significantly more likely to work in mining, and insignificantly less in agriculture", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "DHS data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.9262790083885193}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Middle East & North Africa Latin America & the Caribbean South Asia Middle East & North Africa Latin America & the Caribbean East Asia & the Pacific South Asia Middle East & North Africa Latin America & the Caribbean **Figure 2. Distribution of lost wetlands by types of wetlands across regions, for a 1m SLR** We have also presented the percentage of wetland types at risk by region in Figure 2, which is revealing. Once again, it is apparent that among the various regions, EAP faces the greatest risk of overall loss of wetlands: for a 1 m SLR scenario, 61% and 71% of vulnerable freshwater marsh and GLWD Coastal Wetlands are in EAP. On the other hand, 65% of saline wetlands at risk is in MENA. After EAP, MENA represents the second largest proportion of GLWD Coastal Wetlands at risk (15%). LAC also represents a significant share (18%) of vulnerable freshwater marshes. 12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLWD Coastal Wetlands"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "1m SLR", "confidence": 0.1051425039768219}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The second distinctive feature of this exercise is its incorporation of compatible data from different sources. For the period since 1960, we use georeferenced track information on major cyclones striking Bangladesh from the Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD). Equivalent information for the Indian coastal region comes from the India Meteorological Department (IMD). For cyclones prior to 1960, we add information from the IBTrACS database maintained by the Global Data Center for Meteorology, operated by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The IBTrACS data for the Indian Ocean have been provided by meteorological institutions in the region. We also use them for a few post-1960 cyclones that are not included in the data available to us from BMD and IMD. We ensure cross-source compatibility by using WMO standards for the two commonly-available measures of storm strength: maximum wind speed (measured in knots (kt)) and radial distance from a storm’s center to its zone of maximum wind speed. We employ a standard IMD storm classification based on maximum wind speed intervals in kt: (Cyclonic Storm (CS) [34-47 kt]; Severe Cyclonic Storm (SCS) [48-63]; Very Severe Cyclonic Storm (VSCS) [64-119] and Super Cyclonic Storm (SuCS) [120+]. We have excluded all storms rated as", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "IBTrACS database"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "georeferenced track information on major cyclones striking Bangladesh"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "IBTrACS database", "confidence": 0.8904358148574829}, {"text": "IBTrACS data", "confidence": 0.23984819650650024}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "georeferenced track information", "confidence": 0.4478249251842499}], "vague_data": [{"text": "georeferenced track information", "confidence": 0.13455785810947418}]}}}
{"input": "of forced displacement, covering refugees and host communities. **III.** **PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION** **A.** **Institutional and Implementation Arrangements** 55. **The project will retain the same arrangements as Phase I**, but with enhanced coordination and collaboration mechanisms under OPM’s DoR. OPM will implement DRDIP II at the national level through a PIST, which will provide technical guidance and support to implementing districts and communities. The PIST will comprise technical experts who will be recruited or seconded from government agencies. Additional expertise can be contracted where necessary. In line with GoU objectives to streamline implementation units within IAs, the PIST will share some technical specialists to support DRDIP II and NUSAF IV. This will reduce costs and enhance coordination on the ground. 56. **The PIST will work in collaboration with OPM structures and under the guidance of an inter-agency PSC**, which will include representatives from the following agencies: Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development (MoFPED), IG, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, Ministry of Works and Transport, Ministry of Water and Environment, Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Gender, Labor, and Social Development, Ministry of Education and Sports, Ministry of Health, National Environment Management Authority, Private Sector Foundation of Uganda, DoR, CRRF Secretariat,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "reflect the same rank-order as the lending opportunities in Appendix 1. **9. Interpretation of Results: Ethiopia vs. Nigeria** We provide an illustrative interpretation of our results by comparing the cases of Ethiopia and Nigeria in Table 9.1. Both have been among the Bank’s top borrowers in Sub-Saharan Africa: From 1998-2003, Nigeria borrowed $912 million and Ethiopia borrowed $1,381 million. Among the 48 Sub-Saharan countries, Nigeria’s overall environmental problem indicator ranks first and Ethiopia’s second. Both countries are in the midrange for the OED project success rate (45% for Nigeria; 65% for Ethiopia). After adjusting for success rates, Nigeria’s optimal lending is $144 million and Ethiopia’s is $128 million. 25", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "environmental problem indicator", "confidence": 0.4991861879825592}, {"text": "OED project success rate", "confidence": 0.3807728886604309}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "assumptions of coastal protection, comparison of the prior research with our estimates proved to be difficult. ##### **Conclusion** Coastal wetlands will decline with rising sea level. In this paper, we have quantified the vulnerable freshwater marsh, swamp forest, GLWD Coastal Wetlands, and brackish/saline wetlands taking into account the exposure of wetlands to 1 m SLR and the estimated capacity of the coastline to retreat and for coastal wetlands ecosystems to migrate inland as the 25 Anthoff et al. (2010) has not reported exposure estimates of coastal wetlands to SLR. 20", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "fuel combustion (CO2), land-use change (CO2) and other sources (methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC’s), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)). We draw our emissions estimates from the World Resources Institute’s Climate Analysis and Indicators database. [3] Our estimate of pollution damage is total DALY (disability-adjusted life year) losses from air and water pollution. We draw our DALY estimates from recent research 2 The supporting database and an accompanying atlas can be downloaded from the Environment Department (lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/envext.nsf/41ByDocName/Environment), or from the Development Research Group (www.worldbank.org/nipr). 3 The World Resources Institute’s Climate Analysis and Indicators database is available online at http://cait.wri.org. 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Climate Analysis and Indicators database"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "the supporting database"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Climate Analysis and Indicators database", "confidence": 0.938783586025238}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "supporting database and an accompanying atlas", "confidence": 0.10729928314685822}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) days after the end of each semester. The IFRs will contain: a statement of sources and uses of funds (with expenditures classified by category of expenditures, source of funds) and cash balance; a statement of budget execution per component and subcomponent; and a reconciliation of the Designated Account. The formats of the IFRs and annual financial reports will be included in the POM. **Flow of Funds- Disbursement.** 6. The disbursement methods that may be used for the withdrawal of the proceeds of the loan will include reimbursement; advance; and direct payment. Under the advance method, the project will have access to a Designated Account (DA) to be used exclusively for deposits of loan proceeds in the Central Bank of Costa Rica for eligible expenditures. The deposits into the DA will flow to a specific account into the Borrower ́s Treasury Single Account - TSA ( _Sistema de Cuenta del Sector Publico, SCSP_, by its initials in Spanish), assigned to the Project and managed by MEP. As needed, the PIU will request the MoF to transfer funds from the DA to the project operational account which will be opened in the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "age migrant married cohabiting divorced fertility woman partner active*mine 0.263 0.028 0.025 0.018 -0.003 0.030 -0.036 -0.003 (0.510) (0.042) (0.027) (0.029) (0.017) (0.115) (0.031) (0.030) _Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and district fixed effects, urban dummy, age (not column 1), and years of education (not columns 6 and 7). Active is active status of mine in the survey year. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. **5.1 Employment outcomes** Using the difference-in-differences approach (equation 1), we estimate results on occupation, child health, and inequality. First, panel A of table 4 indicates that women in active mining communities ( _active*mine_ ) are insignificantly more likely to work in service and sales and less in agriculture, and 1.7 percentage points less likely to work as professionals (statistically significant). There is no change in the likelihood that she is not working. These 5 categories stem from the same occupational variable in the DHS data, and are mutually exclusive. The surveyed individual is told to report their main occupation. The coefficients can therefore be interpreted as relative increases of each specific sector. Women are more likely to earn cash for work, and the likelihood increases", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "DHS data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.5719742178916931}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "future ice-sheet instability and rapid sea-level rise. _Science_, 311,1747-1750. Pfeffer, W. T., Harper, J.T., and S. O’Neel. 2008: Kinematic constraints on glacier contributions to 21st-century sea-level rise. _Science_, 321, 1340-1343. Rahmsdorf, S. 2007. A semi-empirical approach to projecting future sea-level rise. _Science_, 308, 368-370. Semeniuk, V. 1994. Predicting the effect of sea-level rise on mangroves in Northwestern Australia. _Journal of Coastal Research_, 10, 1050-1076. Sun,G., McNulty, S.G., Amatya, D.M., Skaggs, R.W., Swift, L.W., Shepard, P., and H. Riekerk, 2002. A comparison of watershed hydrology of coastal forested wetlands and the mountainous uplands in the Southern US. _Journal of Hydrology,_ 263, 92-104. Titus, J.G. 1988. _Sea Level Rise and Wetland Loss: An Overview_ . [http://epa.gov/climatechange/effects/downloads/toc_wet_chap1.pdf](http://epa.gov/climatechange/effects/downloads/toc_wet_chap1.pdf) Tol, R.S.J. 2007. The Double Trade-off between Adaptation and Mitigation for Sea Level Rise: An Application of FUND. Mitigation Adaptation Strategy Global Change. 12:741-753. Vafeidis, A.T.; Nicholls, R.J.; McFadden L.; Tol, R.S.J.; Hinkel, J.; Spencer, T.; Grashoff, P.S.; Boot, G., and Klein, R.J.T. (2008) A new global coastal database for impact and vulnerability analysis to sea-level rise. Journal of Coastal Research, 24(4), 917–924. 24", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "global coastal database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "global coastal database", "confidence": 0.45188650488853455}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "global coastal database", "confidence": 0.16044270992279053}], "vague_data": [{"text": "global coastal database", "confidence": 0.16963797807693481}]}}}
{"input": "to implement the selected subprojects, together with capacity-building measures. 32. **The Phase II design responds to lessons learned from Phase I as follows** : (a) some activities, such as drip irrigation systems and fish ponds, are too technically complex for communities to manage, so they will be dropped; (b) due to sustainability concerns about community-managed woodlots, tree planting activities will only support pre-existing groups with proven management capacity; (c) IP contract payments will be restructured to provide incentives for quality and to ensure they facilitate community-led implementation rather than implement activities themselves; (d) the subproject budget ceiling will be increased to reflect inflation and ensure sufficient scale to generate environmental impacts; and (e) due to the major investments in electricity provision and clean cooking under the World Bank-financed Electricity Access Scale-up Project (P166685), including in RHDs, DRDIP II will discontinue support for access to renewable energy, except for the provision of renewable energy and/or improved cooking systems for public institutions, which will be incorporated into Component 1. Component 2 will be organized around two sub-components, as described below. 33. _Sub-component 2.1: Restoration of Degraded Ecosystems (US$20 million)._ The DRDIP II Environmental and Social Assessment (ESA) carried out in 2024 identified", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DRDIP II Environmental and Social Assessment", "confidence": 0.5468254089355469}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "large-scale operations may be geographically correlated. Assuming that the start of a large scale mine does not affect the likelihood or viability of artisanal and small-scale mining, it is not a threat to our identifying assumptions. However, should ASM respond to large-scale activities, either by increasing or decreasing activity in the close geographic area, we will end up estimating the impact of these sectors jointly. In a later stage, should the opportunity arise, we encourage researchers to try to disentangle the effects of small-scale and large-scale mining. **3 Data** To conduct this analysis, we combine different data sources using spatial analysis. The main mining data is a dataset from InterraRMG covering all large-scale mines in Ghana, explained in more detail in section 3.1. This dataset is linked to survey data from the DHS and GLSS, using spatial information. Geographical coordinates of enumeration areas in GLSS are from Ghana Statistical Services (GSS). [2] Point coordinates (global positioning system [GPS]) for the surveyed DHS clusters [3] allow us to match all individuals to one or several mineral mines. We do this in two ways. First, we calculate distance spans from an exact mine location given by its GPS coordinates, and match surveyed", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey data from the DHS and GLSS"}, {"text": "dataset from InterraRMG"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "dataset from InterraRMG", "confidence": 0.5577004551887512}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey data from the DHS and GLSS", "confidence": 0.5570024847984314}, {"text": "dataset from InterraRMG", "confidence": 0.3664250671863556}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data", "confidence": 0.5812522172927856}]}}}
{"input": "weather station in this .75°×.75° grid, the observation is given a weight of 1.5. If there is a rainfall station within the .25°×.25°grid, the observation is given a weight of 2. The weighted results do not differ significantly from the unweighted results. 12 Note that while it is reasonable to think that village-specific characteristics (such as village size) may have an effect on village-level insurance take-up, village-level covariates are not included in the regression. When the regressions are run with the village characteristics from the 2005 Indian census, the coefficients of interest do not change significantly. Also, most village-level characteristics had insignificant coefficients, with the exception that a more literate population was correlated with higher take-up. Since village-level coefficients were only available for around 50 percent of the villages, these variables are not included in the main specifications.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2005 Indian census"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2005 Indian census", "confidence": 0.9190312027931213}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "village characteristics from the 2005 Indian census", "confidence": 0.1131044402718544}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "analyses to improve their capacity to develop climateresilient business plans. Component 3 will also expand adaptation capacity by improving drainage and water harvesting to better manage flooding and landslide risks. It will also enhance septage management to reduce the risk of soil contamination and associated health risks in the event of flooding. 73. **Citizen Engagement (CE)** . The project design builds on existing district planning mechanisms. Component 1 subprojects will be identified through the regular DDS process, while strengthening stakeholder engagement through additional consultations with refugees, host community members and humanitarian partners. CE will be measured through results indicators that track whether Jya Mbere II investments align with the needs and priorities of beneficiaries. A new feature in Phase II will be Iterative Beneficiary Monitoring (IBM), whereby a large sample of project beneficiaries will be surveyed by phone to track, among other things, satisfaction with citizen engagement processes and the project as a whole. MINEMA conducted public and stakeholder consultations across the project target areas to gather feedback on the proposed activities, address concerns, and explore ideas to mitigate potential adverse impacts on socio-economic activities and livelihoods. The project’s stakeholder engagement plan, built on inclusive consultations, incorporates a comprehensive grievance", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "results indicators", "confidence": 0.29927751421928406}]}}}
{"input": "Policy Research Working Paper 8316 ### **Abstract** Recurrent cyclonic storms in the Bay of Bengal inflict mas sive losses on the coastal regions of Bangladesh and India. Information on occurrences and severities of cyclones is necessary for understanding household and community responses to cyclone risks. This paper constructs a georeferenced panel database that can be used to obtain such information for Bangladesh, West Bengal, and Odisha. Cyclone strike locations and impact zones are analyzed for several historical periods between 1877 and 2016. The findings indicate that although the median location has shifted eastward, there is a marked variability in location, especially after 1960. Impacts also have varied considerably within and across zones over time, with the highest-impact zones in northern Odisha and the Sundarbans region of West Bengal. The pronounced spatial and temporal variation in cyclone impacts will provide robust controls for comparative research on household and community adaptation to cyclones in the study region. The methodology developed in the paper is general and could be expanded to an arbitrarily large set of coastal locations. This paper is a product of the Environment and Energy Team, Development Research Group and the Environment and Natural Resources Global Practice Group. It is", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "georeferenced panel database"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "georeferenced panel database"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "georeferenced panel database", "confidence": 0.8440357446670532}], "vague_data": [{"text": "georeferenced panel database", "confidence": 0.25822868943214417}]}}}
{"input": "Japan (HIC) India (LMIC) Germany (HIC) Netherlands (HIC) Vietnam (LMIC) Indonesia (UMIC) Thailand (UMIC) Pakistan (LMIC) South Korea (HIC) 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 USD millions _Figure 13. Top 10 countries: Economic value at risk, computed as exposure headcount multiplied by_ _subnational income per capita. Note: no subnational income data are available for several countries,_ _including China._ 17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "subnational income data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "subnational income data", "confidence": 0.9466457962989807}]}}}
{"input": "quarter confirm that 38% of those having to leave their accommodation was on account of the accommodation closing, compared to only 22% in the last quarter of 2023. ## 39% Consider accommodation an urgent need facilities across seven regions [1] highlighted the challenges in accessing sustainable and affordable housing, including the psychological distress of a relocation to rented housing by some Ukrainian refugees. This was found to be a particular concern amongst elderly persons, persons with disabilities, single mothers, persons with serious medical conditions and their carers. Many expressed reluctance to relocate, citing fatigue and fear of the unknown; some also appreciated their current living conditions and sense of community support, which they prefer over individual housing. The motivation and/or possibility of refugees to relocate to standard housing varied significantly based on income and employment status, Czech language skills, vulnerabilities related to disabilities, age, family size and support from government services or informal networks. The focus group discussions also underscored the precarious financial situation of many refugees, including those engaging in low-paid work below their qualifications, which creates a barrier for relocations to rented housing. 78% of respondents mentioned that they would not be able to cover costs of rented", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "retreat and for coastal wetlands ecosystems to move (or migrate) inland as the coastline is receding. Attempts have also been made to estimate the economic loss, which may be associated with adversely impacted wetlands. Our estimates indicate that a 1 m rise in sea level would lead to a loss of present coastal wetland stocks of 60% or more, depending on wetland type. Human activity is generally 8 Further development in coastal areas may also close off wetland migration. 9 Historically, mangroves have shown considerable resilience to adapt to fluctuations in sea-level rise (Alongi, 2008; Erwin, 2009; Gilman et al., 2006). 10 Coastal wetlands in this analysis are defined as the following wetland types in a low elevation (with elevation 10 m or less from sea level) zone: freshwater marsh, swamp forest, GLWD coastal wetlands and brackish/saline wetlands, as delineated in the Global Lakes and Wetlands (GLWD-3) database. See the data section for details. 11 The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) projects increased SLR between 0.18m and 0.59m across various emission scenarios over the next 100 years. However, this range has been criticized by many experts as being too conservative and not sufficiently reflective of the large uncertainty pertaining to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Lakes and Wetlands (GLWD-3) database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Lakes and Wetlands (GLWD-3) database", "confidence": 0.6998382210731506}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "0.127 0.186 0.162 0.154 Organization done by village leaders 0.264 0.237 0.276 0.222 0.165 0.261 0.285 Organization done by village representatives 0.059 0.059 0.053 0.089 0.064 0.061 0.053 Organization done by village assembly 0.121 0.112 0.138 0.111 0.119 0.130 0.132 Organization done by village econ. organizations 0.083 0.059 0.099 0.096 0.064 0.096 0.093 Organization done by township or above 0.472 0.533 0.434 0.481 0.587 0.452 0.437 Actual measurement done by village leaders 0.085 0.086 0.093 0.059 0.111 0.078 0.080 Actual measurement by village representatives 0.554 0.517 0.583 0.615 0.407 0.609 0.567 Actual measurement done by village assembly 0.042 0.033 0.040 0.022 0.056 0.026 0.053 Measurement by village econ. organizations 0.227 0.192 0.252 0.267 0.241 0.209 0.247 Actual measurement done by township or above 0.093 0.172 0.033 0.037 0.185 0.078 0.053 **Disputes** Any disputes encountered 0.549 0.187 0.497 0.348 0.226 0.250 0.300 ... if yes, no. of disputes 14.850 6.429 10.987 9.745 6.292 9.759 8.111 ... disputes could not be resolved by village 1.248 0.074 0.724 0.894 0.042 1.690 0.933 leaders **Results** Contract now longer than 30 years 0.987 0.993 0.980 0.977 1.000 0.983 0.993 Contract now permanent 0.717 0.792 0.497 0.481 0.848 0.861 0.860 _Source:_ Own computation from 2014 Chengdu", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Economics of Disasters and Climate Change There is a significant amount of uncertainty with regard to how much sea level will rise. For that reason we model three future climate scenarios per return period: a low, medium, and high scenario (Table 1), using estimates from the IPCC (IPCC 2014; IPCC 2007). For the fluvial and pluvial hazards, future climate scenarios were not explicitly simulated owing to the complexity and considerable uncertainties that arise (Smith et al. 2014). [2] Although robust modeling of the magnitude of future extreme rainfall is not yet possible, heavy rainfall is expected to increase in a warmer climate, owing to the increased water holding capacity of the atmosphere. Therefore instead of a direct modeling approach, future climate scenarios were inferred by taking flood hazard maps derived under current climate conditions for different return periods, and using them as a proxy for future climate scenarios. The return period hazard maps used for each of the future scenarios are outlined in Table 2. Although simplistic, this method allows areas that may be impacted by increasing riverine and extreme rainfall driven flooding to be identified. Clearly there are some significant assumptions and uncertainties arising from this method. However, given", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps derived under current climate conditions", "confidence": 0.23693688213825226}, {"text": "return period hazard maps", "confidence": 0.19190505146980286}, {"text": "estimates from the IPCC", "confidence": 0.14580154418945312}], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps", "confidence": 0.8586550951004028}, {"text": "return period hazard maps", "confidence": 0.1389206498861313}]}}}
{"input": "financed under DRDIP II and ensure they are aligned with and incorporated in the District Development Plan. 59. **DRDIP II will be implemented using the CDD approach, whereby communities identify, prioritize, and** **implement subprojects themselves,** guided by the Sub-County Implementation Support Team, Sub-County Executive Committee, Sub-County Technical Planning Committee, Parish Development Committee, and Assistant Commandant. At the community level, implementation will be carried out by committees that the project will establish and train, including a Community Project Management Committee (CPMC), Community Procurement Committee (CPC), Community Monitoring Group, Grievance Redress Committee (GRC), and Refugee Welfare Committee (RWC) in the settlements. The project will ensure gender equity in the membership of the various committees. Implementing Partners (component 2) and TSPs (component 3) will be hired to support community capacity for subproject identification, planning and implementation. A Community Operations Manual will be incorporated into the PIM to detail all steps in the CDD process. 60. **The Inspectorate of Government (IG) will remain engaged in implementation arrangements** at the national and local government level to strengthen transparency and accountability and to prevent and respond to corruption. **B. Results Monitoring, Evaluation, and Verification Arrangements** 61. **M&E System.** OPM will have overall responsibility for M&E, including", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Socio-economic Inclusion of Refugees & Host Communities in Rwanda Project Phase II (P509677) 33. _Sub-component 2(c): Partial Credit Guarantee Scheme (US$860,000)._ Despite the financing provided through the MG scheme, many financial institutions in Rwanda remain hesitant to lend to creditworthy refugees due to the lack of an established credit history and insufficient collateral. The GoR’s Business Development Fund (BDF) has a partial credit guarantee (PCG) scheme to respond to the collateral challenge. While refugees are eligible for the scheme, few either access it or are aware that it exists. Building on the experience of the ongoing Access to Finance for Recovery and Resilience project (P175273) in Rwanda, which is partly implemented by BDF, the sub-component will support and facilitate the provision of individual PCGs to refugees to offset PFI collateral requirements or portfolio guarantees to cover credit losses associated with loans made to refugees. 34. **BDF will implement the sub-component.** A full Financial Intermediary Assessment of BDF was conducted as part of project preparation, full details of which will be included in the Project Implementation Manual. [22] Given that capital needs will be provided by BDF, funding from Jya Mbere II will only be required for BDF’s", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# **PROTECTION BRIEF** **CZECHIA** ### JULY- SEPTEMBER 2024 ## Operational Context Based on the number of Ukrainian refugees who applied for an extension of Temporary Protection in 2024 (320,000), the figures of Temporary Protection holders in Czechia, including new arrivals, were updated to **384,558** people as of **29 September 2024**, compared to 373,745 at the end of 2023 (source: Ministry of the Interior). This report presents an overview of refugees’ profiles as well as main findings regarding protection risks and priority needs of refugees from Ukraine in Czechia. The brief is based on the analysis of **438 Protection Monitoring interviews** conducted with refugees from Ukraine in all the 14 regions as well as findings from focus group discussions in the third quarter of 2024. ## Key Figures 384,558 71% Temporary Protection holders in Czechia as of 29 September 2024 [1] Temporary Protection holders in Czechia of Temporary Protection holders are women as of 29 September 2024 [1] and children [2] ## 98% 34% of Protection Monitoring respondents are Temporary Protection holders ## 34% of Protection Monitoring respondents are of respondents consider accommodation as Temporary Protection holders their highest priority need ## 67% 29% ## 29% of working age respondents are", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "438 Protection Monitoring interviews", "confidence": 0.11350179463624954}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "438 Protection Monitoring interviews", "confidence": 0.15966635942459106}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "UNHCR Czechia continued to conduct Protection Monitoring while also consulting different groups of refugees though focus group discussions on protection risks and priority needs. Specific challenges in accessing rights were reported. The key findings are highlighted below. ### Protection Risk I The number of respondents reporting a lack of critical documentation increased from 28% to 32% in the first quarter of 2024 compared to the last quarter of 2023. The increase was mainly in relation to obtaining or renewing biometric passports (85%) and internal passports (19%), which impacted the possibility to move freely, to access basic services as well as work and education. Various factors hinder refugees’ access to documentation, including associated processing fees, long waiting periods, unavailability of services or lack of information on procedures. 10% of the respondents also reported facing challenges in registering births, deaths, marriages, and divorces, and obtaining corresponding documents. UNHCR / March 2024 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1.7 **Labor inputs** Male family labor dummy 68.6 71.0 63.4 67.4 69.8 64.3 Female family labor dummy 92.1 92.0 92.3 94.1 94.3 93.7 Hired labor dummy 30.2 30.5 29.7 27.7 25.0 31.1 Exchange labor dummy 17.6 16.9 19.3 16.4 13.6 20.1 Number of male family labor days per acre 20.4 19.7 21.8 20.2 19.2 21.4 Number of female family labor days per acre 44.5 40.1 54.7 48.9 42.4 57.2 Total family labor days per acre 64.9 59.8 76.5 69.0 61.6 78.6 Total exchange labor days per acre 2.7 2.4 3.3 2.5 1.6 3.6 Total family and exchange labor days per acre 68.1 63.0 79.8 72.3 64.6 82.3 Hired labor days per acre 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.0 3.7 Total labor days per acre 70.8 65.4 83.2 74.8 66.2 85.8 Number of observations (parcels) 18220 12658 5562 6628 3720 2908 _Source:_ Own computation from 2005/06 UNHS III _Note:_ Unit of observation is a parcel (under crop) in a given season. Thus the same parcel could provide two observations if cultivated in both seasons in the reference period (July 2004 – June 2005). 19", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2005/06 UNHS III"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHS III", "confidence": 0.2232157588005066}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "from the national level to higher local governments (districts, cities, urban centers), to lower local governments (sub-counties), and to the communities. The FM assessment indicated that the arrangements satisfy the World Bank’s minimum requirements under Investment Project Financing (IPF) policies and directives. The FM residual risk rating is Substantial. 73. **Successful implementation of the project requires strong FM arrangements at the national, district, urban** **center (local government), and community levels.** CAOs and Town/City Clerks and CFOs are the key players for districts and urban centers in managing and disbursing funds to communities and ensuring accountability of project resources. DRDIP I established robust accountability mechanisms and operated a ring-fenced FM system. Phase II will use the same systems, including the existing MIS to record project data, processes, accounting, and reporting. Key risks identified Page 21", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MIS", "confidence": 0.25478166341781616}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "project data", "confidence": 0.13557961583137512}]}}}
{"input": "comments. All remaining errors are my own. A supplemental appendix to this article [is available at https://academic.oup.com/wber.](https://academic.oup.com/wber) 1 CIA World Factbook: India; Indiastat.com. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK. All [rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com](mailto:journals.permissions@oup.com)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "CIA World Factbook"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "infiltrators‖ ( _mistaneniavoda_ ) in an effort to associate refugees with a threat to the employment prospects of Israelis. As one academic interviewee observed, the ongoing primacy of this term demonstrates ―the success of agents within the [governmental] institutions to inject this discourse and create a sort of panic‖ characterised by a ―takeaway feeling – they will come here, take what we have, and change this place‖. This ―takeaway feeling‖ partly explains the urgency of an MK who suggested various security technologies that allowed Israel to act in a middle zone between violence and doing nothing: ―...preventing entrance, a fence, guard dogs, sensors...arrivals will not be answered and received, we will not let them in‖...‖Between killing and not acting there is prevention, [and the state should act upon it] if Israel wishes to survive‖. However, any discussion which touches upon security-related issues must also consider the close triangular relationships between African refugees, Palestinian refugees and Israeli security considerations. In the Israeli context, the term ̳refugee‘ is traditionally associated with two types of refugee: Jewish holocaust survivors who fled Europe and the Palestinian refugees who were displaced as a result of the 1948 War. The state fears that recognizing African asylum", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "accordance with the Ministry of Interior’s decision. So far, authorities have registered and issued 30,000 cards, but their resources have quickly depleted and they are running out of resources to continue registration. UNHCR has been requested to support this initiative, as resource shortages risk preventing further registration, exposing refugees to potential deportation and increased GBV risks. Approximately 40,000 vulnerable individuals will be directly impacted, including women, children, and other vulnerable groups among the Sudanese refugee population. **Shelter and Core Relief Items** Overcrowded and inadequate shelters heighten the risk of disease transmission and compromise the safety and dignity of refugees, with current shelter solutions falling below minimum humanitarian standards. In-kind support will be provided to Sudanese refugees with heightened risk and vulnerability if funding is available. **Education** Only one-third of primary school-aged children and 5% of secondary school-aged children in Mbera refugee camp are enrolled due to lack of financial means, documentation, and schools. The situation is equally dire outside of the camp in Hodh Chargui, where the enrolment rate is only 6%. School kits, capacity building and salaries for teachers, and support to transition from the Malian to Mauritanian curriculum will all increase access to education for some 45,000 refugee", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "limited understanding of the importance of climate adaptation for their livelihoods and there is a need for better government aid after flood events (Le Dang et al. 2014; McElwee et al. 2017). In urban areas, private adaptive capacity may be even lower, resulting in an increasing need for urban planning to incorporate climate risk dimensions (Liao et al. 2016). While adaptation is not a focus of this paper, the uncertain and growing impacts of flood risk found in this paper indicate more attention is warranted to design effective adaptation policies. Data To examine population and poverty-specific exposure to floods, we employ spatial data defining flood hazard and a number of socioeconomic characteristics representing poverty and population density. Flood Hazard Data Flood Hazard Maps for Vietnam Developed for this Study For this study, we developed flood hazard maps representing riverine, flash-flood and coastal flood hazards for Vietnam. These flood hazard maps estimate the inundation depth at a grid cell level of 3 arc-seconds, (~ 90 m) and provide coastal surge hazard layers, along with pluvial and fluvial layers. The maps provide information on the extent and depth of flood hazard for a specific location. For the coastal component, we explicitly model", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "spatial data defining flood hazard"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "spatial data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps", "confidence": 0.5625115633010864}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Flood Hazard Maps for Vietnam", "confidence": 0.10235679149627686}], "vague_data": [{"text": "spatial data", "confidence": 0.902058482170105}]}}}
{"input": "The audit reports for 2022/2023 that had an unqualified (clean) audit opinion were for Isingiro, Kamwenge, and Obongi districts. 2023/2024 audit reports were not available on the Auditor General’s website. The audit reports for 2023/2024 that had an unqualified (clean) audit opinion were for Adjumani, Kikuube, Kiryandongo, Koboko, Kyegegwa, Lamwo, Madi Okollo, Obongi, Terego, Yumbe, Amuru, Bundibugyo, Kanungu, Kisoro districts. Others were Arua City, Gulu City, Kitgum Municipality, Koboko Municipality, and Mbarara City. In the case of Ntoroko, this was due to understating value-added tax receivables, unrecognized prepayments to contractors, and not recognizing advance payments. Page 22", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Figure 21. Share of total population that is exposed to significant flood risk and living in poverty at_ _$5.50/day_ **Relationship between population exposure and other variables.** The relationship between poverty and flood risk exposure is driven by multiple partly opposing forces. As section 2 has outlined, country-level evidence has demonstrated that areas with higher flood risks (such as coastal zones) can offer economic opportunities, thus resulting in lower poverty rates; yet at the local level (e.g. within coastal towns), lowincome households can be driven into low-cost and high-risk neighborhoods. This means that – depending on the resolution of analysis and country-specific geographic and economic characteristics – the relationship between poverty and flood exposure could be either positive or negative. The global-level data used in this study only offer a limited view on this question. Figure 22 illustrates the relationship between average income levels and flood exposure rates for the 2,260 sub-national regions for which data are available. The figure suggests that regions with high flood-exposure tend to have lower income levels on average, only dedicated country-level analysis can assess this question conclusively – for instance based on household survey data. 22", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey data", "confidence": 0.9553861021995544}, {"text": "global-level data", "confidence": 0.17366939783096313}]}}}
{"input": "South Asia Middle East & North Africa Latin America & the Caribbean **Figure 3. Regional distribution of economic losses** ###### **III.4 Prior research on impacts of SLR on coastal wetlands** The papers most immediately related to this analysis are those of Nicholls at al. (1999), Nicholls (2004), McFadden et al. (2007) with estimates of exposure of coastal wetlands to SLR, and Tol (2007), Anthoff et al. (2010) on valuation of wetland losses due to SLR. It should be noted that Nicholls (1999) and Nicholls (2004) are based on wetland losses derived from the Global Vulnerability Analysis (Hoozemans et al. 1993) [23] - “a first-order perspective on wetland loss rates with incomplete coverage and wetland losses controlled only by tidal range and accommodation space” - as pointed out by McFadden et al. (2007). Nicholls et al. (1999) estimated that a 38 cm rise in global sea level from 1990 to the 2080s will lead to an approximate 22% loss of the coastal wetlands, [24] and 46% of the coastal wetlands would be lost if the sea level rises by 1 m. Nicholls (2004) further estimated losses of wetlands under various greenhouse emissions scenarios and found that a 34 cm rise in", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Vulnerability Analysis"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Vulnerability Analysis", "confidence": 0.8606090545654297}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "through the project grievance redress mechanism that are resolved (Percentage). **Economic and Financial Analysis** 69. **Results of Economic Analysis without Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Accounting.** The results of the economic analysis indicate that DRDIP II is economically viable, as it is projected to yield a baseline Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) of 22 percent, which is above the prevailing discount rate of 16.7 percent adopted for economic analysis. The Economic Net Present Value (NPV) is estimated at US$62.7 million, equivalent to UGX 231 billion. The benefit-cost ratio (BCR) is estimated at 1.12 percent. 70. **Results of Economic Analysis, with GHG Accounting.** The overall economic analysis has been rerun to assess the economic viability of the project taking into account benefits from reduction of carbon gas emissions. The GHG accounting analysis done using the Environmental Externalities Accounting Tool (EX-ACT) shows that over 20 years, the project will result in a carbon emission savings of 2,056,927 tCO2e (102,846 tCO2e per year). The savings in GHG emissions further enhance the viability of the project, as they contribute to overall net revenue and ultimately to the EIRR. After considering all project costs and benefits from reduction of carbon gas emissions, the overall EIRR is", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "financial statements which will be audited under terms of reference and by an external firm, both acceptable to the World Bank, will be produced for the project. Basic arrangements to ensure control, recording, and reporting are further described in Annex 1. 52. **Procurement** . Procurement for the Project will be carried out in accordance with the World Bank’s Procurement Regulations for IPF Borrowers for Goods, Works, Non-Consulting and Consulting Services, dated September 2023. The Project will also be subject to the World Bank’s Anticorruption Guidelines, dated October 15, 2006 (revised July 2016). The World Bank's Standard Procurement Documents will be used in World Bank-financed Open International Competitive Procurement. The World Bank completed a procurement capacity assessment of MEP in April 2024. The assessment reviewed the organizational structure for implementing the Project and assessed the experience of the existing staff. A Project Procurement Strategy for Development (PPSD) was prepared by the executing agency, which describes how procurement in this Project will support the PDOs and deliver value for money under a risk-based approach. The PPSD will provide adequate supporting market analysis for the selection methods detailed in the Procurement Plan. Mandatory 29 MEP implemented the Equity and Efficiency of Education Project", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "across competing priorities and are fully aligned with the Local Area Development plan for Meheba prepared by Kalumbila Town Council. The project’s three components will contribute to the building of a future policy framework and an operational model for use of WHR resources that could be extended to assist refugees and host communities in other parts of the country in potential future phases of the project. **Component 1. Strengthening the Enabling Environment (US$7 million)** 24. The objective of this component is two-fold. First, it is to build an enabling legal framework for refugees related to documentation, basic services, and livelihoods and self-reliance. Secondly, it aims to support the rollout of new national ID cards to refugees in all three of the refugee hosting district. _Subcomponent 1.1. Building an enabling legal framework (US$1 million)_ 25. In November 2023, the Cabinet approved Zambia’s new National Refugee Policy. The GRZ has set five key objectives for its revised Refugee Policy: (a) strengthened refugee protection, (b) improved access to basic services, (c) better livelihoods and self-reliance, (d) progress on long term solutions including local integration, and (e) enhanced government coordination of refugees and their inclusion in national development processes. Under this subcomponent, a national", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "national ID cards", "confidence": 0.4190622568130493}]}}}
{"input": "Single Account (TSA) to make payments. Subproject payments will be made to a community bank account in a commercial bank. The CFO of the local government will authorize the opening of community bank accounts in local governments and monitor payments made through the account to ensure they are used for project purposes. Each community will have a Community Project Management Committee, and the authorized signatories for their bank account will be the Chair, Secretary, and Treasurer. All payments by districts, cities, and urban centers will be accessible online in the IFMIS by MoFPED and OPM (that will have read on rights authorized by MoFPED) for monitoring, accountability, and audit purposes. **Figure 3: Funds flow overview** 63. **The report-based disbursement method will be used by OPM and IG to receive advances from the** **World Bank.** Advances to project’s Designated Accounts will be based on six-month cash flow forecasts supported by the Page 17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "IFMIS"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "six-month cash flow forecasts", "confidence": 0.14190149307250977}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "observed in PISA data. Looking at graduates of pre-university technical education (mainly technical stream secondary education) one finds an interesting pattern comparing three specializations (Figure 1b). Gender disparities are high in Electronics and Automation, less in Software Development and were recently eliminated in Network and Database Design. The final example of Network and Database Design in Figure 1b shows that gender disparity can be overcome in a short period of time. Two recent studies provide a detailed general analysis of policy options. [18] For STEAM courses, the causes relate to: (i) enjoyment of reading and preference for mathematics; (ii) self-efficacy or belief in own capabilities, often reinforced by teachers; (iii) parental support or lack thereof due to low socioeconomic status; (iv) teacher preparation to deal effectively with diversity. 16 Source: Government Budget for 2024 and MEP School Census data from 2023. 17 Program-Based budgeting at a government-wide level is being implemented under the Fiscal Management Improvement Project (P172352, Loan 9075-CR), known as _Hacienda Digital_ . Investing in readiness to implement program-based budgeting at MEP, the biggest Ministry (in terms of budget and staff) is a priority for the Government of Costa Rica. 18 [Desigualdades por género en Primaria y Secundaria,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PISA data"}, {"text": "MEP School Census data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PISA data", "confidence": 0.6234599351882935}, {"text": "MEP School Census data", "confidence": 0.6096779704093933}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "PISA data", "confidence": 0.12063612788915634}], "vague_data": [{"text": "PISA data", "confidence": 0.16823986172676086}]}}}
{"input": "of different tenure in cases where the same crop was grown on owned and occupied ones, we drop parcels if, in the same household, there is another parcel of different tenure devoted to the same crop, either as a pure or mixed stand. This implies that, for the case of output, our sample contains owner-cum-occupants who cultivated different types of crops on at least one of their owned and their occupied parcels. [12] **3. Data and descriptive evidence** Descriptive evidence from a large and nationally representative household survey at household and parcel levels illustrates the large number of owner-cum-occupants who differ from pure owners and, to a lesser degree, occupants, in few of the variables of interest. At the same time, it points towards presence of systematic differences in investment between owned and occupied parcels which provide the motivation for more detailed econometric analysis. **3.1 Data sources and household characteristics** The data for our study come from the 2005/2006 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS), fieldwork for which was conducted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics from May 2005 to April 2006. The survey collected information at the community, household, and parcel level for about 7,500 households in 753 EAs including", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2005/2006 Uganda National Household Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "large and nationally representative household survey"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2005/2006 Uganda National Household Survey", "confidence": 0.5999158620834351}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "large and nationally representative household survey", "confidence": 0.25163722038269043}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey", "confidence": 0.5309309959411621}]}}}
{"input": "sub-component includes US$1.69 million in operational costs for BRD to manage component activities. 28. _Sub-component 2(b): Access to finance (US$5.7 million)._ This sub-component will provide finance to Rwandan and refugee entrepreneurs. The MG scheme will be retained, though with refinements based on lessons from Phase I, including: (a) detailed communication strategy will be prepared with districts, PFIs, UNHCR and refugee representatives and will be launched before funds are released to beneficiaries; (b) linkages will be made to TVET graduates (including from TVET centers financed by Jya Mbere) to help them access financial support for their business ideas post-training; (c) BRD will have more autonomy in Phase II, with separate funds flow and decisionmaking capacity, which is expected to improve efficiency; and (d) performance agreements for BRD project staff will include incentives to improve TAT. Page 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "of renewable energy and/or improved cooking systems for public institutions, which will be incorporated into Component 1. Component 2 will be organized around two sub-components, as described below. 33. _Sub-component 2.1: Restoration of Degraded Ecosystems (US$20 million)._ The DRDIP II Environmental and Social Assessment (ESA) carried out in 2024 identified various types of sensitive and degraded ecosystems within the project area, including riverbanks, wetlands, bare and steep sloping hillsides, forest reserves, gully erosion sites, and other sites at risk due to climate change. Such areas serve as water catchments, biodiversity hotspots, and sources of ecosystem services to the communities and will inform the selection of watersheds for restoration activities. Subproject selection within those watersheds will be guided by local needs and community priorities that will respond to climate change impacts. Measures to be supported will include: (a) construction of soil and water conservation structures, such as terraces, bunds, check dams and trenches to build community resilience to climate change-induced water scarcity; and (b) planting of ground cover and indigenous trees to reduce run-off, tackle erosion and landslides, enrich the ecosystem, re-stabilize the environment, and strengthen resilience to drought. These time-limited interventions are expected to directly respond to climate change impacts", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DRDIP II Environmental and Social Assessment", "confidence": 0.18358898162841797}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Israel would ―open the gates...wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the comity of nations‖ (MFA 1948/2010). Established to express the right of the Jewish people to self-determination and grounded in the Zionist ideology, Israel‘s Jewish and democratic character is underlined by the 1950 Law of Return which constructs a distinctive migration regime. The law establishes the ―natural right‖ of every Jew to return to the homeland and become a citizen, based on ethno-religious ancestral ties which are represented in the modern nation, and in the ideological commitment to Jewish immigration (Sachar 2000; Shuval 1998). The law constructs a migration regime that defines the particularities of membership claims while excluding those who do not meet its demands, creating varying degrees of a much-debated structural discrimination against non-Jews, and in particular Palestinians (cf. Carmi 2003; Yiftachel 2006; Gavison 2010). The state actively seeks, via a range of institutions, to encourage Jewish ̳homecoming‘ and sustain a Jewish demographic majority. Israel‘s self-defined ―Jewish and democratic‖ character creates inherent tensions for non-Jewish migrants (amongst others) who are conceived by some as an existential threat (Kritzman-Amir 10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "years old) on off-farm work and similar shifts, though no change in aggregate labor supply, by females. 14 With a mean cultivated area of 3.45 mu, the estimated benefit per mu in terms of consumption and income is 3,150*0.077/3.45 and 4,928*0.067/3.45, respectively. . 15 As we have information on time use at individual level, analyzing this aspect also allows us to obtain gender- and age-differentiated estimates of reform impacts, in line with evidence that such differences could be important (Wang 2014). 16 The age brackets of 16-60 years (or 55 for females) are in line with the age for participation in formal labor markets. 12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "It should be noted that the choice of population density map is important for the purpose of this study. Smith et al. (2019) provide a sensitivity analysis for flood exposure assessments using different population density maps, including GHSL-POP 2015 (3-arc second, ~90 m resolution). They show that high-resolution population density maps perform best in capturing local exposure distribution, in particular the HighResolution Settlement Layer (HRSL) with 1 arc second, or ~30 m resolution, produced jointly by Facebook, Columbia University and the World Bank (2018). While HRSL is only available for a limited number of countries, GHSL-POP is shown to perform better than alternatives with global coverage, such as LandScan data (30-arc second, ~900 m resolution; Bright et al. 2016). **3.3.** **Administrative boundaries** The definition of national administrative boundaries follows the standard World Bank global administrative map. However, national boundaries are further disaggregated into subnational units for all countries where World Bank household surveys are available with subnational representativeness. These subnational units are typically provinces or states (i.e. admin1) but can also include custom groupings of subnational regions determined by the sampling strategy of household surveys. Overall, this study covers 189 countries, which are disaggregated into 2,260 subnational units. **3.4.** **Poverty", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GHSL-POP 2015"}, {"text": "HighResolution Settlement Layer (HRSL)"}, {"text": "LandScan data"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household surveys"}, {"text": "World Bank household surveys"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GHSL-POP 2015", "confidence": 0.8321734666824341}, {"text": "LandScan data", "confidence": 0.7802675366401672}, {"text": "HighResolution Settlement Layer", "confidence": 0.6695736646652222}, {"text": "World Bank global administrative map", "confidence": 0.4581725597381592}, {"text": "World Bank household surveys", "confidence": 0.19035694003105164}, {"text": "admin1", "confidence": 0.1146220713853836}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "World Bank household surveys", "confidence": 0.11678889393806458}], "vague_data": [{"text": "World Bank household surveys", "confidence": 0.4513111114501953}, {"text": "household surveys", "confidence": 0.13565070927143097}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Uganda Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project Phase II (P510476) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT World Bank GEMS system. Project results will be captured through baseline, annual, and endline surveys. Regular phone surveys will also be conducted for beneficiaries under the economic opportunity component to gather data on business sustainability and profitability to allow for real-time learning and course correction as necessary. Where appropriate, results indicators will be disaggregated by gender and by refugee/host community status. **C. Disbursement Arrangements** 62. **The project will receive disbursements from the World Bank in a holding account under the consolidated fund** **in United States Dollars (US$) in the Bank of Uganda (BoU) managed by the Office of the Accountant General under** **MoFPED.** Funds from the holding account will be transferred to two accounts for OPM and IG in US$ held at BoU. To implement the project, funds will be transferred from the US$ accounts for OPM and IG into the OPM operations and implementation account and IG’s operations account, both denominated in Uganda Shillings (UGX). Payments for eligible expenditure by OPM and IG can be made from either their US$ or UGX accounts. Transfers by OPM to districts, cities, and urban centers will", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank GEMS system", "confidence": 0.31844961643218994}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "phone surveys", "confidence": 0.39509254693984985}]}}}
{"input": "refugees have obtained residence permits enabling them to live in and around Lusaka, Ndola, and other urban centers. [11] **(** Figure 1). **Figure 1. Location of Refugees in Zambia** _Source:_ June 2024, Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal Security (MoHAIS). 10. **Socioeconomic conditions for refugees in the designated settlements are challenging.** Notwithstanding, the Government’s long-standing efforts to support the three main refugee settlements and adjacent areas, achieving selfreliance for refugees in these settlements has proven elusive. Refugees face restrictions on freedom of movement and, while by law they have the right to employment and education, the cost of residence and work and study permits places severe restrictions on their ability to attain self-reliance. While many refugees are in practice living outside the settlements, they are prone to arrest and extortion in the absence of legal identity and full mobility rights. Female refugees experience additional vulnerabilities to gender-based violence (GBV) and sexual exploitation both within and outside the settlements. The situation is compounded by the remote rural locations of settlements, underdeveloped local infrastructure and services, and limited opportunities to develop sustainable livelihoods. [12] Changing weather patterns are having a disproportionate impact on refugees and host communities as they struggle to adapt", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the following year), the balanced sample (where insurance was offered all years), and the balanced marketing sample (where insurance was purchased in all years). One may be concerned that the linear probability model may give biased estimates, especially since such a small percentage of the sample were repeat buyers. Therefore, the results from a probit model are also presented in the supplemental appendix and give similar results to OLS. As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable in this regression was generated by manually matching customers from one year to another, and therefore it is likely measured with some error. Although there is no reason to believe that this measurement error is correlated with any independent variables in the regression, since the dependent variable in the regression is a dummy variable, this can lead to downward bias on the estimated coefficients. In order to get a feel for the potential magnitude of this error, I run simulations where I assume that the BASIX data has been matched completely correctly and then induce “measurement error” by randomly changing the dependent variable of whether people purchased the following year or not. With the introduction of 10 percent matching errors (with an equal probability of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "BASIX data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "BASIX data", "confidence": 0.8776358962059021}, {"text": "OLS", "confidence": 0.12579770386219025}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "balanced marketing sample", "confidence": 0.1547800600528717}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "represent riverine and coastal flood hazard for Vietnam considering climate change. Second, we examine how exposure to floods differs based on socioeconomic characteristics, with an explicit focus on poverty. Our results indicate that climate change is likely to increase the number of people exposed to floods, especially in the Mekong and Red River Deltas. For the same return period flood under current socioeconomic conditions, climate change may increase the number exposed to 38 to 46% of the population (an increase of 13–27% above current exposure), depending on the severity of sea level rise. Regarding poverty and exposure, while we do not find evidence of a differential exposure at the national level, we find at the city level that poor people are relatively more exposed to floods. Within HCMC, potential slum areas are 10–20% more exposed to floods compared to the rest of the city, with the exposure differential increasing with climate change. Nevertheless, the findings presented in this paper should be interpreted considering a number of caveats. While we use current and future flood data, we only use current population and poverty data, as reliably projecting these socioeconomic trends spatially into the future is almost impossible. Changes in these trends", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "current population and poverty data"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "current and future flood data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "current and future flood data", "confidence": 0.3437584936618805}, {"text": "current population and poverty data", "confidence": 0.2620951235294342}], "vague_data": [{"text": "current population and poverty data", "confidence": 0.2871563136577606}, {"text": "current and future flood data", "confidence": 0.1743130087852478}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Zambia Refugee and Host Communities Project (P503941) **ANNEX 1: Implementation Arrangements and Support Plan** 1. **Overall project implementation will be managed by the MoHAIS.** As the lead implementing agency, the MoHAIS has both an important implementation role—specifically on Component 1—and a coordination role which includes mobilization of the PSC and PSG and monitoring the implementation performance of the devolved responsibility to the SPMU in Kalumbila District. MoHAIS will help resolve any technical or political bottlenecks which may arise across the project. The MoHAIS has already assumed an important leadership role in the development of the GRZ’s Refugee Policy and the MORHCSA. The implementation arrangement is presented below. **Figure 1.1. Project Implementation Arrangements** 2. **Project activities under Components 2 and 3 will require specialist technical service providers.** The SPMU will be responsible for contracting appropriate providers and overseeing implementation progress of selected providers. - **Component 2: Climate Resilient Community Infrastructure.** All designs and supervision activities will be undertaken by respective implementing government ministries, except for the road improvement activities which will be designed and supervised by a firm selected from the market. Construction activities will also be by private sector firms to ensure higher build and climate-resilient standards.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**are people with disabilities** and **17% are older people** . Among older people around 50% are persons with disabilities which exacerbate the risks that this category of refugees faces. This briefing note aims to provide an overview of the situation of older refugees in Moldova and the gaps and needs they face, as well as the current efforts being made by humanitarian stakeholders to address these challenges. From the **Socio-Economic Insights Survey** (SEIS) conducted by the IMPACT Initiative in1 August 2024, the following **four main areas** were identified as significantly impacting **older refugees** compared to other groups: **Access to Information:** Older refugees face significant challenges in accessing information compared to other refugee groups. Many lack the necessary devices to connect online, and the available information is often not presented in formats that accommodate their needs. **Healthcare Access:** Access to healthcare and to medicines emerged as urgent priorities for older refugees, with a significantly higher proportion identifying these needs as compared to younger refugee groups. **Support Channels:** Refugees aged 75 and above are less likely to have access to secure and private channels for seeking support, or reporting concerns, including sensitive community issues (only 75% reported access compared to an average", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Socio-Economic Insights Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Socio-Economic Insights Survey", "confidence": 0.9770365357398987}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "to control for time effects. Also, I only include purchasers who have weather insurance contracts available in their area in the following year. [9] These results are presented in table 3, and column 1 reports the baseline OLS results. It shows that receiving a payout is associated with a 9 percent increased chance of repurchasing insurance the following year, which means that those who receive an insurance payout are more than twice as likely to purchase insurance the following year than those who did not receive a payout. [10] However, this coefficient is not statistically significant at standard levels ( _p_ = .18). The effect on repurchasing may depend on the size of the payout as well. In column 2 I add two new continuous variables to the regression: the ratio of the payout received to the premium paid (which I will call the “payout ratio”) and the payout ratio squared. In this specification, the dummy on receiving 5 [APHRODITE’s water resources project; http://www.chikyu.ac.jp/precip.](http://www.chikyu.ac.jp/precip) 6 25° latitude equals about 27.5 kilometers. .25° longitude varies by latitude; over the range of latitudes in this survey it equals roughly 26 kilometers. 7 It is not clear if ICICI-LOMBARD used APHRODITE or another", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Note:_ Panel A shows the location of the gold mines that were active during the study period. Around each circle, a 20-km radius is marked. These 40-km-wide areas are the baseline treatment areas in the analysis. Panel B shows the 100-km treatment areas and the distribution of the DHS clusters. Road data is an alternative way of defining distance from mines, but time series data on roads is not available. **3.2 Household data** We use microdata from the DHS, obtained from standardized surveys across years and countries. We combine the respondents from all four DHS standard surveys in Ghana for which there are geographic identifiers. The total data set includes 19,705 women (of which 12,392 live within 100 km of a mine) aged 15–49 from 137 districts. They were surveyed in 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008, [6] and live in 1,623 survey clusters. Since the DHS surveys focus on women, the surveys of women will be the main source of data. However, we also use the surveys of men, which give us data from the same four survey years, but with a total number of 12,294 individuals, of which 7,491 men live within 100 km of a mine. In addition,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS standard surveys"}, {"text": "microdata from the DHS"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "surveys of men"}, {"text": "surveys of women"}, {"text": "microdata from the DHS"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "surveys of men"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS standard surveys", "confidence": 0.7149174213409424}, {"text": "surveys of men", "confidence": 0.1882788985967636}, {"text": "microdata from the DHS", "confidence": 0.1318240463733673}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "surveys of men", "confidence": 0.6342881321907043}, {"text": "microdata from the DHS", "confidence": 0.6214621663093567}, {"text": "surveys of women", "confidence": 0.28936707973480225}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Road data", "confidence": 0.2832326889038086}, {"text": "Household data", "confidence": 0.12253996729850769}]}}}
{"input": "estimated at US$57,000 at a 12 percent discount rate, with an ERR of 12 percent. **Gender** 67. **Building on the gender assessment conducted during the Phase I MTR, Phase II will address the gender** **gaps outlined in Table 10 below.** The project results framework will also track gender data. The key gaps identified in the MTR assessment are: (a) fewer women access loans from financial institutions to start their own businesses; (b) fewer women are starting businesses due to time poverty and capacity gaps; and (c) fewer women are in employment than men. Social gender norms and household dynamics play a critical role in causing these gaps. According to a 2022 study by Access to Finance Rwanda, deeply ingrained societal expectations shape how women participate in economic life and influence their capacity to leverage assets—particularly land and property—as collateral. _[34]_ One pervasive norm is that women should prioritize family and caregiving responsibilities over business activities. This norm restricts their time and engagement in income-generating pursuits and weakens their perceived legitimacy as entrepreneurs, reducing their chances of qualifying for credit. Additionally, women are often expected to rely on family support, especially from spouses, instead of seeking independent financial solutions, distancing them", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "gender data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "gender data", "confidence": 0.7932429909706116}]}}}
{"input": "System support, administration, and M&E (US$12 million)_ . This sub-component will support the operational costs of the PIST at the national, regional, district, and sub-county levels. These project structures will work in collaboration with the existing OPM structures at the various levels. The sub-component will also fund a robust M&E system that will include regular monitoring from the field using the World Bank GEMS system, as well as baseline, midline, and endline assessments. Beneficiary phone surveys will be conducted regularly to gather information from the field. The sub-component will support capacity building for the project IAs on issues such as financial management, procurement, project management, M&E, and environmental and social risk management. 48. _Sub-component 4.2: Strengthening Transparency, Accountability, and Anti-corruption (STAAC) (US$2.5 million)_ . Led by the IG, the GoU’s peak anti-corruption body, the sub-component will establish and build the capacity of Community Monitoring Groups in all DRDIP II locations to operate as frontline agents for corruption prevention, corruption risk monitoring, awareness raising and to receive corruption complaints. Project financing will also support the IG to respond to allegations of corruption made against the project. Page 13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank GEMS system"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank GEMS system", "confidence": 0.2889220416545868}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Beneficiary phone surveys", "confidence": 0.2549383342266083}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Beneficiary phone surveys", "confidence": 0.7554486989974976}]}}}
{"input": "Bank. [43] Multifaceted challenges such as refugee impacts on host communities and assisting of refugees to achieve self-reliance require a combination of policy and investment. The approach is aligned with lessons from the 2023 World Development Report which highlighted that “policies should be geared toward financial and social sustainability by means of internal mobility, self-reliance, and inclusion in national services.” [44] Durable solutions require a combination of both legal and development perspectives, which is precisely what this project does. Such an approach needs to be coupled with a long-term development horizon as the typical World Bank project life cycle is not well suited to addressing such massive development deficits over typically short project cycles. 47. **The viability of agribusiness is crucial for project sustainability beyond World Bank assistance.** The TA and financial support provided under the project will build on the successful World Bank financed Zambia Agribusiness and Trade Project (P156492) model. The aim will be to provide cooperatives and farmers sufficient TA and grant financing to 43 World Bank. 2022. _Social Cohesion and Forced Displacement: A Synthesis of New Research_ . 44 World Development Report 2023. Page 22", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Zambia Agribusiness and Trade Project"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "adolescent clubs, community community-based child protection structures volunteers, sports and the establishment of child (Children Clubs and Child Welfare Committees) friendly spaces, and life-skills education groups. through WhatsApp and other online platforms to Operations and partners map the community disseminate referral pathways updates and key actors to further facilitate and enhance their roles protection messages. vis-a-vis the aforementioned mechanisms to protect children and their communities. In Ukraine, UNHCR shared important information on its online refugee youth platform, including In Mexico, UNHCR, in collaboration with IOM and useful links for free online courses that was used UNICEF, developed child-friendly information for social interactions and peer-to-peer support. materials on COVID-19 and supported UNHCR / July 2020 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "online refugee youth platform", "confidence": 0.3273868262767792}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "online refugee youth platform", "confidence": 0.11219663172960281}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Uganda Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project Phase II (P510476) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT 7. **Degradation of the natural environment is placing refugees and host communities at higher risk from climate** **change effects.** Uganda’s economy is highly dependent on ‘climate-sensitive’ sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, tourism, and forestry. Ranked 163 [rd] out of 187 on the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative index, urgent action is required to address climate vulnerability in Uganda. Key trends over the last 60 years include temperature rises (1.3degree Celsius average temperature increase, expected to reach 1.8 degrees by 2050) and a statistically significant reduction in rainfall. Droughts have become more frequent and longer-lasting, especially in the western, northern, and north-eastern regions, which cover most of the DRDIP II target areas. [10] This is causing more frequent crop failure, threatening livelihoods, increasing food insecurity, and aggravating water scarcity. In the future, rainfall is expected to decrease further in the north and north-eastern regions and increase in the west. As the climate crisis intensifies, the country faces rising incidents of extreme weather, leading to disasters such as floods, droughts, and landslides. [11] Between 2018 and 2023, over 455,000 people were displaced due to weather-related disasters,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative index"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative index", "confidence": 0.6684069633483887}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the Women, Business, and the Law Index (World Bank 2022a). 4. **Djibouti’s vulnerability to climate-related disasters exacerbates these economic and social challenges.** The country frequently experiences heatwaves, droughts and floods, which take a heavy toll on the population by reducing productivity and disrupting economic activity. Between 1980 and 2019, Djibouti recorded ten major droughts, with the 2008-2011 drought alone shrinking GDP by four percent and affecting over 100,000 people, leading to the loss of half of Djibouti’s livestock. More recent flooding events between 2018 and 2020 caused substantial damage, impacting 250,000 people and requiring an estimated US$25 million for recovery and reconstruction. The increasing frequency and intensity of these extreme weather events place additional pressure on rural communities, which are already struggling with poverty, underdeveloped infrastructure, and limited access to essential services. In 2021, 89 percent of Djibouti’s population was exposed to climate hazards, with extreme heat affecting more people (82.8 percent) than any other 1 In Djibouti less than 1,000 square kilometers of land is arable and annual rainfall is extremely low (130 mm). Page 1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Women, Business, and the Law Index"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Women, Business, and the Law Index", "confidence": 0.5251752138137817}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "a broader range of interventions including the financial services and SBCCs. **C. Disbursement Arrangements** 65. **Given the high-risk environment, the report-based disbursement will not be applicable.** Therefore, upon project effectiveness, transaction-based disbursements will be used. An initial advance up to the ceiling of the Designated Account (DA) will be made into the DA and subsequent disbursements will be made monthly against submission of Statements of Expenditures or records as specified in the DFILs. The other methods of disbursing the funds (reimbursement, direct payment, and special commitment) will also be available to the project. The minimum value of applications for these methods is USD100,000 equivalent. The project will have the option to sign and submit withdrawal applications electronically using the eSignatures module accessible from the World Bank’s Client Connection website. The flow of funds arrangement chart is shown in Figure 1.1 here under. **Figure 1.1. Flow of Funds and Disbursement Arrangements** Page 18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DFILs", "confidence": 0.7765322923660278}, {"text": "flow of funds arrangement chart", "confidence": 0.11661995947360992}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Table 1: Sample of farms** **No. of** **Irrigated** **Dryland** **Country** **plots** **plots** **plots** Burkina Faso 1141 59 1082 Cameroon 1013 145 868 Egypt 1030 1030 0 Ethiopia 932 67 865 Ghana 1210 49 1161 Kenya 862 95 767 Niger 1133 52 1081 Senegal 1362 34 1328 South Africa 283 83 200 Zambia 1009 13 996 Zimbabwe 958 123 835 **Total** **10933** **1750** **9183** 14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) 35. **Component 4: Project Management and Operational Analytical Support (US$10 million).** Component 4 will finance project management costs and technical assistance. A PIU will be financed by the World Bank with adequate fiduciary procedures in place to ensure the efficient and transparent use of loan proceeds. Staff and activities financed under this Project will be clearly delineated in the Project Operations Manual. 36. _Subcomponent 4.1. Project Management_ (US$5 million). This subcomponent will support project management, through: (i) operating a PIU in MEP; (ii) strengthening MEP’s supervision, monitoring, and evaluation capacity for specific Project activities; (iii) carrying out technical and Project audits; and (iv) environmental and social management activities. The subcomponent will finance project operating costs and acquisition of goods and services related to overall project activities, such as impact evaluation studies and communication activities. 37. _Subcomponent 4.2. Operational Analytical Support_ (US$5 million). This subcomponent will finance just-in-time analytical work, as needed, in relation to the Project’s areas of activity. These include the preparation of analytical policy work and related policy and operational support activities regarding the following topics, _inter alia_ : (i) International Baccalaureate program; (ii) Non-University Colleges ( _Educación", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Integrated Community Resilience Project (P506969) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT 24. **The proposed PDO-level indicators are:** - Direct project beneficiaries, of which female, refugees, host community residents, and vulnerable to climate change (number); - Beneficiaries of cash for nutrition transfers under the project, of which female, refugees, host community residents (number); - People provided with improved access to basic infrastructure and services, of which female, refugees, host community residents (number); - People supported to enhance their livelihoods and income generation, of which female, refugees, host community residents (number **).** **C. Project Beneficiaries** 25. **The project will have a holistic approach that will benefit underserved communities in Dikhil region, two** **refugee-hosting regions of Obock** **and Ali Sabieh (including Ali Addeh and Holl Holl refugee villages), and expand across** **the country including Djibouti-Ville for the social safety nets.** The project is expected to reach 74,800 direct beneficiaries, including 12,860 refugees (39.4 percent of the total refugee population) and 35,900 host community residents (4.5 percent of the total host population). Beneficiary targets have been set in consideration of the size of the refugees and host community populations. 26. **Intervention areas.** Under component 1, safety net support will be provided across all regions", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "2019, nine safety net programs covered different groups), inadequacy, and unpredictability. Djibouti’s social protection system is currently inadequate to shield poor and vulnerable people from adverse lifecycle impacts or encourage desirable investment in human capital and provides limited coverage. In 2012, social safety net coverage was 9.5 percent, well below regional averages, with government social safety net spending 0.18 percent of GDP, compared with the Middle Eastern and North African average of one percent and the world average of more than 1.5 percent. Social safety net systems are critical in protecting and building the human capital of children threatened by adverse impacts on livelihoods such as environmental shocks. This support is particularly important for the 21 percent of Djiboutians who are extremely poor and have no capacity to smooth consumption and protect their human capital. 9. **Development indicators in Djibouti highlight significant service delivery challenges and multidimensional** **poverty, particularly in rural areas** . Maternal mortality remains high (234 deaths for 100,000 births) with rural areas driving the trend [4] . According to the **Human Capital Review for Djibouti (World Bank, 2024)**, access to basic services such as targeted social safety nets, education and healthcare remains limited, with rural areas experiencing", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Human Capital Review for Djibouti", "confidence": 0.3597874939441681}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Development indicators in Djibouti", "confidence": 0.23954583704471588}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Development indicators", "confidence": 0.30214762687683105}]}}}
{"input": "a setting that is more likely to mirror commercial-level insurance operations; therefore, it provides a higher level of external validity. The paper will proceed as follows: Section I explains the insurance policies and data that will be studied in the empirical section. Section II provides the main empirical evidence, and shows that recipients of insurance payouts are more likely to purchase insurance the following year. Section III searches for evidence of a number of mechanisms by which this could take place. Section IV discusses a number of behavioral explanations for the results. Section V concludes and offers policy recommendations. **I.** **Index Insurance and Customer Data** In this analysis I study monsoon rainfall index insurance policies underwritten by the insurance company ICICI-LOMBARD and sold by BASIX, a microfinance institution based in Hyderabad. The policies insure against excess or deficit rainfall; they are calculated based on rainfall measured at a stated weather station. By basing payoffs on just rainfall, the policies have low monitoring and verification costs and also should be free of adverse selection and moral hazard (Collier, Skees, and Barnett 2009). These attributes make policies inexpensive to create and administer, which allows them to be sold in small quantities and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "monsoon rainfall index", "confidence": 0.42839083075523376}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "invest in economic opportunity and access to services in the hosting districts; and (b) at the same time, facilitate refugee mobility out of the camps and rural areas into urban centers, where more opportunities are available and self-reliance is more achievable. 8. **Building on the ongoing Phase I of Jya Mbere, Phase II aims to assist refugees and host communities to** **achieve self-reliance.** Compared to when Phase I commenced, there is now greater understanding conceptually and in practical terms of what it takes to achieve self-reliance. The Rwanda RSRI has seven domains: education, health, labor, income, food security, ID/social capital, and housing, with the first four to be supported by Phase II (plus environmental management). Complementing the RSRI, the 2022 _National Graduation Strategy_ provides guidance on the characteristics of those who have “graduated” out of long-term poverty into self-reliance, including livelihood diversification, savings, and access to markets and services, all of which will be supported by Jya Mbere II. 9. **Climate change poses risks to Rwanda’s positive economic outlook and refugees are particularly vulnerable** **to climate shocks** . Ranked 112 out of 185 countries in the 2021 Notre Dame-Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN), Rwanda is vulnerable to flooding, heat, drought, and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2021 Notre Dame-Global Adaptation Index"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2021 Notre Dame-Global Adaptation Index", "confidence": 0.47670432925224304}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the basis for improved skills in a transition towards lower-carbon economies. On mitigation, the activities supported by the Project are expected to generate negligible Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, and as such, do not pose material risks of having a negative impact on the country’s low emission targets. **II.** **PROJECT DESCRIPTION** **A. Project Development Objective** **PDO Statement** 19. The Project Development Objective is to enhance MEP efficiency and improve foundational learning, digital competencies, and employability skills of students in MEP administered schools. **PDO Level Indicators** i. **PDO 1: Enhancing MEP Efficiency:** Indicator 1: Reduction in processing times for selected administrative and management processes within MEP. ii. **PDO 2: Improving foundational learning, digital competencies and employability skills** : Indicator 2: Percentage of Grade 3 students who surpass Basic level in National Assessments for Reading and Mathematics; Indicator 3: Percentage of students who have met the Intermediate achievement level of digital instruction corresponding to their Grade; Indicator 4: Percentage of technical stream secondary education students with micro-credentials registering English proficiency (all these indicators will be disaggregated by gender and by indigenous and refugee/migrant status). [23] 23 The Project will support block-chain backed micro-credentials (these are authenticated digital certificates, with the block-chain ensuring the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "National Assessments for Reading and Mathematics"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "block-chain backed micro-credentials", "confidence": 0.10225054621696472}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "registration plan that includes vulnerable people within the refugee and host population, for example, single women and people with disabilities. Specific activities to be supported include the following: (a) Procurement of approximately 150,000 paper-based cards or polycarbonate cards (out of the 20 million that the Government will buy for citizens) (b) Transfer of the UNHCR ProGres [22] database to the MoHAIS (separate servers and peripheral equipment) (c) IT upgrading at MoHAIS offices in the three refugee settlements to enable all future documentation requests to be done locally and digitally, eliminating the need for travel to Lusaka (d) Community-level customized campaigns for refugees in three districts, including mobile registration camps targeting women and girls (e) Biometric registration kits. 30. The project will uphold approved operating procedures applied by the Department of National Registration within the MoHAIS in safeguarding personal data, aligned with the GRZ’s Data Protection Act of 2021. MoHAIS officials will benefit 20 Refers to refugees, asylum-seekers, refugee returnees, stateless people, and the internally displaced. 21 Statelessness and Climate Change Factsheet, UNHCR, 2021. 22 UNCHR’s registration and case management system Page 15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR ProGres"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "registration and case management system", "confidence": 0.3473069965839386}, {"text": "UNHCR ProGres [22] database", "confidence": 0.109499990940094}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Biometric registration kits", "confidence": 0.11105825752019882}]}}}
{"input": "physical assaults, kidnappings, murders, sexual violence but also incidents related to explosive devices (ED). The security situation and military operations in neighboring countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria), the continuation of NSAG incursions into Niger, the intensification of operations by the Defense and Security Forces (DFS) are all factors that predict the persistence of ED threats in Niger. Indeed, since 2022, the threat of ED has continued to rage in the regions of Tillabery and Diffa. The Protection Cluster recorded approximately 55 ED-related incidents in 2022 (a 34% increase compared to 2021). From January to June 2023, 32 ED incidents were reported, representing more than half of the total number of incidents reported in 2022. It is also worth highlighting the problem of food insecurity which affects several departments, including those affected by ED threats. In fact, faced with the effects of food insecurity, communities could resort to negative coping strategies, in particular that of venturing into areas affected by ED in search of means of subsistence or even collecting scrap metal found on explosive remnants of war for resale. In the face of a growing threat from ED, mine action capacities remain limited in Niger. Considerable challenges exist both in", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "at the country level. Our overall environmental indicator is the mean of the five thematic indicators. [9] We use log values for the analysis because the size distributions of country indicators and resource allocations are extremely 8 For biodiversity, our data include only Bank lending. Grants by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for biodiversity conservation are not included in this analysis, but the GEF is currently conducting a parallel analysis of its own resource allocation. 9 All indicators are normalized to the range [0-100], so they have equal weight in determining the mean indicator. 11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Bank lending"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "thematic indicators", "confidence": 0.5464844107627869}]}}}
{"input": "in 2020 (only 49 percent of needs) to US$37 million in 2023 (41 percent of needs), despite almost no change in refugee numbers. 6. **Progress towards achieving refugee self-reliance is hampered by a lack of employment and income-** **generating opportunities.** A tailored Refugee Self-Reliance Index (RSRI) prepared by the GoR, the World Bank and UNHCR measures refugee self-reliance in Rwanda. As noted above, the 2022 census and the first round of RSRI data showed that most refugees have good access to basic services, but fare poorly with respect to employment and income. The employment to population ratio for refugees is 15 percent as against 46 percent for the total population. According to the RSRI survey, just 24 percent of refugees reported doing paid work in the previous seven days (though this increases to 45 percent for refugees living in Kigali) and only eight percent run a business or are engaged in farming. Low income is reflected in poor food security, with almost 60 percent of refugee households reporting that they typically eat only one meal per day. The main reasons provided for the low employment levels were lack of skills (44 percent) and lack of information about the local labor", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "tailored Refugee Self-Reliance Index"}, {"text": "2022 census"}, {"text": "RSRI survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "first round of RSRI data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "tailored Refugee Self-Reliance Index", "confidence": 0.5766234397888184}, {"text": "RSRI survey", "confidence": 0.5476163625717163}, {"text": "2022 census", "confidence": 0.29931119084358215}, {"text": "RSRI data", "confidence": 0.2534380555152893}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The choice of district – rather than cluster – fixed effect is informed by the understanding that meaningful time-invariant factors - such as mining laws, level of development, local political institutions, norms regarding environment, women’s participation in the labor market, etc. - that influence exploitation of the mine happens at the district level. Including district fixed effects, we control for various institutional and cultural factors at the district level that are stable over time. Including district fixed effects also ensures that we are not only capturing effects from transfers or the fiscal system as we compare individuals within the same districts. With this method we capture the geographic spillover effects in the vicinity of the mine. Moreover, cluster fixed effects are not possible because of clusters are not repeatedly sampled over time. However, since the estimation is at individual level, all standard errors are clustered at the DHS cluster level. The sample is restricted to individuals living within 100 km of a deposit location ( _mine_ ), so many parts of Northern Ghana where there are few gold mines are not included in the analysis. The sample restriction is created by using the time-stable continuous distance measure that we calculate", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.2535064220428467}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "this error, I run simulations where I assume that the BASIX data has been matched completely correctly and then induce “measurement error” by randomly changing the dependent variable of whether people purchased the following year or not. With the introduction of 10 percent matching errors (with an equal probability of a mismatch for buyer or nonbuyers), the coefficient on receiving a payout in the full sample (column 1) falls from .090 to an average of .072 over 1,000 simulations. For the marketing restricted sample in column 2, it drops from .222 to .178. In other words, if one assumes 10 percent matching errors, then the estimated coefficients are likely to be underestimated by around 20 percent. It also may be possible that most of the error came from being unable to identify positive matches, possibly due to different members of a household signing the insurance contract from year to year. Repeating the above simulation but assuming that only people who were found not to have bought the next year could have been errors, the coefficients become underestimated by around 10 percent. Although the exact form and structure of the matching errors cannot be known, it is possible that the reported", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "the BASIX data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "BASIX data", "confidence": 0.8298898339271545}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "prioritize on-farm value chains such as cassava, maize, soybeans, sunflowers, groundnuts, sorghum, sesame, as well as aquaculture. Off-farm livestock activities could consider trading, baked goods, agro-technology (milling), apiary, piggery, and cattle-rearing for milk and beef value chains. In refugee settings, where land access is relatively limited, non-farm enterprises and small livestock (e.g., poultry) will be encouraged. Utilizing existing diagnostics, a list of high potential value chain options by order of priority for the targeted regions has been developed. Each district will target two-three of these key value chains to ensure scale, impact, and synergy with ongoing investments. Priority value chains will inform group-based investments through the CDD model, where a positive list will be presented to beneficiaries for informed choice. 38. **For selected value chains, the sub-component will strengthen coordination efforts at the national and district** **levels to avoid duplication.** The project will support the development of a District Economic Opportunities Plan (DEOP) that will outline existing efforts in the chosen value chains, identify private sector players and off-takers, and compile a catalogue of assets and infrastructure requiring construction or maintenance. The DEOP will serve as a framework for DRDIP II investments to collaborate effectively with activities under the Uganda", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "with World Bank-funded projects applying the ESF; (b) multiplicity of stakeholders with a fragmented coordination mechanism, coupled with weak institutional capacity; (c) potential risk of exclusion, which could exacerbate existing tensions of inequality among refugees and host communities; (d) disproportionate impacts of planned activities on vulnerable groups, (e) risk of labor influx leading to increased incidences of GBV, sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), and sexual harassment (SH) based on the contextual environment; (f) lack of privacy in the use of personal data; and (g) potential physical and economic impacts. 71. To mitigate identified environment and social risks, an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) has been prepared, with guidelines for site-specific Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs), corresponding Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs), and other relevant instruments when applicable. A SEP has been prepared, which outlines the process of consultations to be conducted throughout the project cycle with identified stakeholders (particularly women, youths, persons with disability, and the elderly), using culturally appropriate methods for provision of accurate project information. The SEP also describes the grievance process which is responsive to GBV/SEA/SH. Agreed actions for monitoring project risks are specified in the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP). The ESCP,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "personal data", "confidence": 0.26919955015182495}]}}}
{"input": "in active mining communities are marginally older, more likely to never have moved, and more likely to be or have been in a cohabiting relationship or married. Given the women’s slightly higher age, it is not surprising to find that they have higher fertility and lower schooling (assuming that schooling has increased over time in Ghana). All these estimates are, however, insignificant. **Table 3 Observable characteristics in the DHS individual data** non- ever currently ever total any schooling 16", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS individual data", "confidence": 0.9284145832061768}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Policy Research Working Paper 9447 ###### **Abstract** Flooding is among the most prevalent natural hazards affecting people around the world. This study provides a global estimate of the number of people who face the risk of intense fluvial, pluvial, or coastal flooding. The findings suggest that 1.47 billion people, or 19 percent of the world population, are directly exposed to substantial risks during 1-in-100 year flood events. The majority of flood exposed people, about 1.36 billion, are located in South and East Asia; China (329 million) and India (225 million) account for over a third of global exposure. Of the 1.47 billion people who are exposed to flood risk, 89 percent live in low- and middle-income countries. Of the 132 million people who are estimated to live in both extreme poverty (under $1.9 per day) and in high flood risk areas, 55 per cent are in Sub-Saharan Africa. About 587 million people face high flood risk, while living on less than $5.5 per day. These findings are based on high-resolution flood hazard and population maps that enable global coverage, as well as poverty estimates from the World Bank’s Global Monitoring Database of harmonized household surveys. This paper is a product", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Monitoring Database of harmonized household surveys"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood hazard and population maps"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Monitoring Database of harmonized household surveys", "confidence": 0.38366571068763733}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood hazard and population maps", "confidence": 0.4676567614078522}, {"text": "Global Monitoring Database of harmonized household surveys", "confidence": 0.10221437364816666}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "9.745 6.292 9.759 8.111 ... disputes could not be resolved by village 1.248 0.074 0.724 0.894 0.042 1.690 0.933 leaders **Results** Contract now longer than 30 years 0.987 0.993 0.980 0.977 1.000 0.983 0.993 Contract now permanent 0.717 0.792 0.497 0.481 0.848 0.861 0.860 _Source:_ Own computation from 2014 Chengdu village survey for three counties inside Chengdu based on 153 villages. . 18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2014 Chengdu village survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2014 Chengdu village survey", "confidence": 0.8509932160377502}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Local 27 UNDP. 2022. _Needs Assessment Report for the Promoting Human Security through Sustainable Resettlement_ _Programme._ 28 UNHCR. 2023. _Socioeconomic Survey Report: Zambia_ . 29 UNHCR. 2022. _Working towards One Meheba - GAP Analysis_ . 30 The low population density, lack of any obvious farming activity, and absence of markets to the south of the Mwafwe River mean that upgrading the second portion of the road past the Mwafwe bridge is deemed not economically viable at this time and not a priority for the project. 31 The REA project involves electricity supply to Maheba C Primary School, Maheba D Primary School, Maheba D RHC, Maheba Markets 1 and 2, Maheba E Community School, Maheba F Primary school, Maheba F RHC, Maheba G Primary School, Brave Heart RHC, Kamiba Primary School, Kamiba RHC, and surrounding areas. The work involves construction a total of 36.471 km 33 kV of overhead lines (OHL) from an existing 33 kV OHL at Maheba B and 23.315 km of 400 V OHL. 32 There are a total of 15 schools in the settlement—2 secondary schools, 8 primary schools, and 5 providing early childhood education (ECE). 33 Ministry of General Education, Zambia, 2020. Page 17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "are at approximately 90m spatial resolution, the global wetlands data are compiled from a range of sources resulting in generalized areas. Also, the correspondence 20 Tol 2007 drew on the Global Vulnerability Analysis and other country studies for quantification of wetland loss from 1 m SLR for a global analysis including small island nations. 13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Vulnerability Analysis"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "the global wetlands data"}, {"text": "global wetlands data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Vulnerability Analysis", "confidence": 0.5566616058349609}, {"text": "global wetlands data", "confidence": 0.5483943819999695}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "global wetlands data", "confidence": 0.1552731841802597}], "vague_data": [{"text": "global wetlands data", "confidence": 0.5564241409301758}]}}}
{"input": "for CBI TWG meetings and participate in CBI TWG meetings on a regular basis. They are responsible for sharing programmatic information and updates, technical inputs, lessons-learnt, and actively participating in setting the strategic direction of the CBI TWG. **Secretariat:** UNHCR acts as secretariat and is responsible for information and knowledge management which includes gathering of information from partners, and publishing on the dedicated page of the interagency data portal managed by UNHCR for CBI TWG. **Information Management Officer (IMO):** This role is held by UNHCR, and it carries responsibility of managing and facilitating efficient data-related processes including overseeing the collection and analysis of data in the CBI Mapping process, as well as the production and dissemination of CBI TWG dashboards and relevant analyses to platform partners. The IMO is tasked with identifying the information needs of the platform and its partners, encouraging a culture of structured and secure information sharing among all stakeholders through well-defined sectoral mechanisms. Additionally, the IMO supports partners in continuously updating their CBIs on the Services Advisor. A key aspect of this role involves the development, collection, processing, analysis, storage, and sharing of data within the CBI TWG. **Technical Advisory Group:** Comprising a group of CVA", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "interagency data portal"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "interagency data portal", "confidence": 0.3938199579715729}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "interagency data portal", "confidence": 0.17822560667991638}], "vague_data": [{"text": "interagency data portal", "confidence": 0.19096262753009796}]}}}
{"input": "presents the effects of mining on asset wealth and on asset wealth inequality. Wealth data are available in the form of a wealth index, but only for the two last DHS surveys. Following Fenske (2015) and Flatø and Kotsadam (2014), we calculate inequality by means of a Gini coefficient (recoding the wealth variable to be positive only, and using the command 13 It is also possible that mining companies compete with households for electricity if supply cannot be increased in the short run. 14 In panels Ba, Bb, and Bc of Appendix figure A1, we analyze access to radio. We learn that access to radio is higher close to active mines, and that this seems true according to both the first method (Ba), according to the spatial lag model (Bb), and for both migrants and nonmigrants (Bc). The difference in effects between electricity and radio access might be due to electricity being more dependent on public infrastructure, and that electricity access may come with a time lag to other development indicators such as employment and access to radio, since a battery radio can be bought and used instantly, and easily moved. 26", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "the two last DHS surveys"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "a wealth index"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Wealth data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS surveys", "confidence": 0.8624652028083801}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Wealth data", "confidence": 0.47871068120002747}, {"text": "wealth index", "confidence": 0.11367089301347733}]}}}
{"input": "use two complementary geocoded household data sets to analyze outcomes in Ghana: the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS), which provide information on a wide range of welfare outcomes. The paper contributes to the growing literature on the local effects of mining. Much of the academic interest in natural resources is focused on country-wide effects, and this research discusses whether the discovery of natural resources is a blessing or a curse to the national economy. Natural resource dependence at the national level has been linked to worsening economic and political outcomes, such as weaker institutions, and more corruption and conflict (see Frankel 2012 and van der Ploeg 2011 for an overview). While all these effects can have household-level implications, fewer analyses have, thus far, analyzed the geographic dispersion of such impacts. A recent literature on the local and subnational effects of natural resources contributes to the understanding of such effects (for example Aragón and Rud 2013, 2015; Axbard et al., 2016; Benshaul-Tolonen 2018, 2019; Caselli and Michaels 2013; Corno and de Walque 2012; Fafchamps et al. 2016; Kotsadam and Tolonen 2016; Loyaza et al 2013; Michaels 2011; von der Goltz and Barnwal 2019; Wilson", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)"}, {"text": "Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data sets"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Ghana Living Standard Survey", "confidence": 0.8635206818580627}, {"text": "Demographic and Health Survey", "confidence": 0.8546252846717834}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data sets", "confidence": 0.5430799126625061}], "vague_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data sets", "confidence": 0.2390347719192505}]}}}
{"input": "this study, we consider hundreds of thousands of such locations. This means that, globally, hundreds of 1-in-100 year flood events happen every year. **3.2.** **Population density** This study estimates the location of people using the Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL), produced by the EC JRC. It offers global coverage and is available for the years 1975, 1990, 2000, 2015, and 2020. While GHSL provides several layers (including those specifying built-up areas, population, and settlements), this study uses the population density map (GHSL-POP 2020). In a raster format, this data set provides the number of inhabitants per cell, with a resolution of 3 arc seconds (approximately 90 by 90 meters), thus specifying the distribution of population. This information is based on administrative or census-based population data, which is then disaggregated to grid cells based on distribution and density of built-up area, which in turn is derived from satellite imagery. For details of the methodology, see Freire et al. (2016). 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL)"}, {"text": "population density map (GHSL-POP 2020)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "administrative or census-based population data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Human Settlement Layer", "confidence": 0.7057956457138062}, {"text": "population density map", "confidence": 0.5528872013092041}, {"text": "GHSL-POP 2020", "confidence": 0.16450205445289612}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "population density map", "confidence": 0.1493564248085022}], "vague_data": [{"text": "administrative or census-based population data", "confidence": 0.35456904768943787}, {"text": "satellite imagery", "confidence": 0.2509726881980896}]}}}
{"input": "and grievances management. By implementing these measures, the project aims to create a robust and dynamic social registry that will not only address current needs but also adapt to future challenges. **Component 2: Access to Socio-Economic Infrastructure and Development of Economic Opportunities (** _**total IDA**_ _**US$14 Million equivalent, including WHR US$4.5 Million**_ **)** 40. **This component will finance basic socio-economic infrastructure to increase access to services (e.g.,** **electrification, water and sanitation, renewable energy, health and education facilities, roads and utilities) for** **vulnerable communities, including refugees and hosts, in addition to productive economic assets (US$11 Million).** Additionally, it will provide targeted support to facilitate or enhance access to economic opportunities and sustainable livelihoods in target rural areas (US$3 Million). As such, activities under this component will aim to create social and economic development opportunities for the populations in underserved areas, and for refugees and host communities in refugee-hosting areas, and facilitating sustainable solutions to protracted refugee situations. 41. **Supporting an integrated service delivery platform to foster economic growth and jobs creation, the approach** **will leverage socio-economic infrastructure investments in underserved target locations.** It will support productive facilities and strengthen market access. The compounded effect of these investments – expanding access to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "A combination of geographical targeting, categorical targeting, ProxyMeans Targeting (PMT) and community-based targeting (CBT) mechanisms will be used in a complementary way to identify beneficiaries and minimize exclusion and inclusion errors that may arise from inadequate coverage of the social registry and biases that result from community beneficiary identification. The main basis for beneficiary targeting will be the PMT using information from the social registry. However, the CBT will be done in areas not covered by the social registry while enrolled beneficiaries will be validated through community visits and public meetings. Among the target households, C4N will specifically prioritize families with young children and pregnant women living in extreme poverty, recognizing that these households encounter significant barriers in accessing essential nutrition and health services. Female recipients will be disproportionately targeted (women to make up at least of 75 percent of cash transfers beneficiaries). 34. **With regard to the SBCC, the sessions will seek to empower mothers, including from households among** **refugees and host communities, with knowledge about proper nutrition and meal preparation, good hygiene practices,** Page 10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "the social registry"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "social registry", "confidence": 0.28426486253738403}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "social registry", "confidence": 0.507076621055603}]}}}
{"input": "wetland service and valuation methods used, with the average annual wetland value reported to be approximately USD 2,800 ha [-1] yr [-1] at 1995 USD (see Brander et al. 2006 for details). However, Brander et al. (2006) pointed out that the median value in their sample is USD 150 ha [-] 1 yr-1 at 1995 USD, thus suggesting a skewed distribution of values with a long tail of high values. The authors also found that higher values per hectare were observed in North America and Europe, all other things being equal. For the purpose of this analysis, we first assumed that a value of USD 150 ha [-1] yr [-1] at 1995 USD applies to all wetlands in all regions, as the median is a better measure of the central tendency for positively skewed distributions. We converted this number to USD 2000 [22] and used this number to estimate the economic value of the quantity of vulnerable wetlands presented in 21 Brouwer at al. (1999), in their analysis, selected their sample exclusively from studies using contingent valuation as the means of valuation. Woodward and Wui (2001) included 39 valuation studies in their analysis with of these studies from the United", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "direct and effective support to frontline schools; and (iii) Improving decision-making with a data-driven approach, improving information systems and planning, which requires more accurate cost estimation and resultsoriented strategic planning. These measures would allow the MEP to optimize its management and fulfil its mandate to ensure that resources are used effectively to support the learning and development of students throughout the country. [17] **Inclusion: Gender, Refugees and Migrants, and Indigenous Peoples** 11. **Gender parity between boys and girls to access STEAM related jobs is a challenge on which Costa Rica has made** **progress, but more policy action is needed.** PISA 2022 mean scores for Costa Rica in Reading are above LAC’s average (415 vs. 400), as well as mean scores in Mathematics (385 vs. 374) and Sciences (411 vs. 400). Figure 1a shows that there is a statistically significant gender gap in Mathematics but not in Reading and Science as observed in PISA data. Looking at graduates of pre-university technical education (mainly technical stream secondary education) one finds an interesting pattern comparing three specializations (Figure 1b). Gender disparities are high in Electronics and Automation, less in Software Development and were recently eliminated in Network and Database Design. The final example", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PISA 2022 mean scores"}, {"text": "PISA data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PISA data", "confidence": 0.683076024055481}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "PISA data", "confidence": 0.14207422733306885}], "vague_data": [{"text": "PISA data", "confidence": 0.10083840042352676}]}}}
{"input": "(l) annual external audits will be conducted and the Management Letters will be submitted to the World Bank within six months after the end of the financial year; (m) IAs will be responsible to take timely action on audit report findings and notify the same to the World Bank. With implementation of these actions, the FM assessment concludes that the current arrangements will provide reasonable assurance that the project resources will be used for the intended purposes. **Procurement** 77. **Procurement will be carried out in accordance with the World Bank Procurement Regulations for** **Borrowers under IPF**, dated July 2016, revised February 2025, sixth edition, hereafter referred to as the ‘Procurement Regulations’. The project will be subject to the World Bank’s Anticorruption Guidelines, dated July 2016, and beneficiary disclosure requirements. The project will use the Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP), a planning and tracking system that will provide data on procurement activities, establish benchmarks, monitor delays, and measure procurement performance. 78. **As per the requirement of the Procurement Regulations, a Project Procurement Strategy for Development** **(PPSD) sets out the selection methods to be followed** in the procurement of goods, works, non-consulting and consulting services financed by the World Bank.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement", "confidence": 0.5140432119369507}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "work was carried out in which 14 semi-structured interviews were conducted. Representatives of the key institutional bodies that deal with refugees and asylum seekers were interviewed; namely the state (officials and politicians); civil society (senior NGO staff and academics); and personnel at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It further draws on a multidisciplinary review of academic papers, key governmental documents and diverse media reports. [1] 1Three key newspapers are cited; _Haaretz –_ a central-left newspaper, _Jerusalem Post_ - a central-right newspaper and _Ynet,_ a news website, owned by Israel‘s most popular, politically-mainstream newspaper _Yedioth Aharonot_ 1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "are described in table 2. The average village has an area of about 7,500 mu (5 km [2] ) of which some 51% were 13 To test for presence of pre-reform trends for variable _Yit_ in household _i_ in year _t_, we use the pre-reform sample to estimate ��� ������� ����� �������� ����where _Ci_ is an indicator variable for location inside Chengdu and _Tit_ is a time. With _β2_ and _β2_ + _β3_ as the pre-reform trend for households outside and inside the Chengdu boundary, significance of _β3_ .implies that the parallel trends assumption can be rejected and we report the level of significance for this variable in table 1, col. 7. 10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "pre-reform sample", "confidence": 0.24928702414035797}], "vague_data": [{"text": "pre-reform sample", "confidence": 0.4404507279396057}]}}}
{"input": "group-based revolving funds and start-up grants to approximately 234,500 beneficiaries to enhance their economic investments and value chain engagement. PCM of US$10 million has been added to the financing table based on beneficiaries' monthly collective 10 Climate Risk Profile: Uganda (2021): The World Bank Group. 11 “Uganda’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution.” Ministry of Water and Environment, October 2015. 12 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Global Internal Displacement Database - Disasters. IDMC (2023). 13 UNHCR and partners are reporting increased rates of refugee suicide. Page 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Internal Displacement Database - Disasters"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Internal Displacement Database", "confidence": 0.6889473795890808}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR and partners worked to ensure that unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) continue_ _to receive on-going monitoring, while newly separated children are placed in appropriate temporary_ _care arrangements._ Restriction measures, and the subsequent impact operation has also been working with families and on the household income has had a significant individuals to identify caregivers for effect on families’ ability to continue to care for unaccompanied children. unaccompanied and separated children. In addition, these measures also prevent UNHCR In Ecuador and Jordan, UNHCR and partners, staff and partners from carrying out the together with the national child protection monitoring of alternative care arrangements, and systems have increased the capacity for the identification of new unaccompanied and community-level identification of unaccompanied separated children. The COVID-19 pandemic and separated children, and organised has also prevented the identification of temporary transportation to care facilities. Capacity-building care arrangements for children who are and support to the national system continues to separated from their parent(s) or caregiver(s) who be strengthened through the deployment of have been hospitalised – which continues to be UNHCR staff to the national system – one of an additional challenge and presents a significant many mechanisms of cooperation established protection risk to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "national child protection monitoring", "confidence": 0.12277860939502716}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "poverty. The project will provide C4N support to help vulnerable individuals cope during shocks in areas where the combined exposure to hazards and vulnerability is among the highest in the country. Indeed, hazard mapping shows that the share of population exposed to flooding in the Dikhil region is estimated to be a bit higher than one-third of the exposure level in Djibouti Ville. The financial inclusion subcomponent will further build communities’ resilience to these shocks. Resilient infrastructure supported by the project will contribute to the objectives of the NAP strengthening community resilience. **II.** **PROJECT DESCRIPTION** **A. Project Development Objective** 22. The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to improve access to basic services and safety nets, and enhance economic opportunities for vulnerable communities, including refugees and host communities in target areas. 23. This integrated approach combines investments in basic services, social protection, and economic opportunities to address the multifaceted needs of vulnerable communities, including refugees and host communities. By linking safety nets with livelihood opportunities and broader socio-economic development, the project aims to foster resilience, inclusion, and sustainable economic growth in target areas. These include underserved regions such as Dikhil and refugee-hosting locations facing pressures from population inflows, strained public services,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "hazard mapping", "confidence": 0.12489467859268188}]}}}
{"input": "to their Grade; Indicator 4: Percentage of technical stream secondary education students with micro-credentials registering English proficiency (all these indicators will be disaggregated by gender and by indigenous and refugee/migrant status). [23] 23 The Project will support block-chain backed micro-credentials (these are authenticated digital certificates, with the block-chain ensuring the authenticity). The information infrastructure and outreach to employers required to bring micro-credentials into regular use is an end in itself as a precursor to a digitally founded lifelong learning trajectory for students. While micro-credentials would be awarded for a number of employability related competency areas, the PDO choses English proficiency as central to the challenge of a Spanish-speaking population adopting to the needs of a globalized work force, especially important for Costa Rica, with trade accounting for 80 percent of the GDP. Page 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The World Bank Economic Review 705 One important clarification of these results is that most potential buyers living in a village that had experienced payouts would have also experienced uninsured rainfall shocks during the same season. Therefore, it may be possible that there are effects of trust and learning, but they are outweighed by opposite effects of the weather. As shown in the previous section, rainfall shocks tend to have a negative effect on insurance demand, so the (lack of) evidence of spillovers may be a result of a more complex interaction between trust/learning and direct effects of weather. Overall, these results do not support the hypothesis that trust, learning, or any other effects of simply witnessing insurance payouts are driving increased purchasing. Although it is possible that the measurements of spillovers are too crude and miss more subtle effects, the data simply does not provide evidence that there are strong spillover effects. The lack of visible spillover effects casts doubt on the theory that repurchases are being driven by increased trust in the insurance company or learning about insurance payouts. Notably, this result stands in contrast to recent results that do document spillover effects of insurance payouts (Cole, Stein,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "negative first-order autocorrelation in rainfall that appears to be driven by rains early in the season. The bottom two rows test for autocorrelation of rainfall shocks using the parameters of the 2005 insurance policy to determine shocks. “Would Have Been Payout” is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the insurance policy of 2005 would have given a payout; “Total Insurance Payout” is the size of this payout. By these measures, shocks do not appear to exhibit significant positive first-order autocorrelation. **Table 4.** Rainfall Autocorrelation **Fixed effects** **Arellano-Bond** **(1)** **(2)** Total rainfall −0.106*** −.086*** (.030) (.021) Phase 1 rainfall −.090*** −.075*** (.030) (.029) Phase 2 rainfall −.018 −.026 (.030) (.028) Phase 3 rainfall −.029 .007 (.030) (.028) Would have been payout .023 .017 (.030) (.022) Total insurance payout −.0353 .004 (.030) (.028) _Notes_ : Coefficients reported are from separate univariate regressions. The Fixed Effects specification is OLS with six lags of the dependent variable. The Arellano-Bond regression contains one lag of the dependent variable, with this lag instrumented by five previous lags. Observation are years 1967–2004 for the fixed-effects regression, and years 1962-2004 for the Arellano-Bond regression. All regressions contain weather station fixed effects. Robust standard errors", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2005 insurance policy", "confidence": 0.5202624201774597}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "increased from 27,993 in 2018 to 273,066 by December 2023. While the country offers public education to all children regardless of migratory status, more efforts are needed to ensure that enrollment requirements do not exclude migrant children from the classroom, and that learning environments are inclusive. As of September 2023, 64,455 students enrolled in the Costa Rican education system were foreigners (5.4 percent of the total student population). According to administrative registries, 38,870 migrant students (60.3 percent of the total migrant student population) are under irregular status or pending regularization. [20] The issue of disabilities is also a priority item for Government policies on inclusion. MEP statistics indicate 19,643 students with disabilities, with alternative solutions providing services to 81 percent of the disabled students and 2,672 students with a need gap that MEP intends to address. The Government policy includes the provision of tailored teaching methodologies and materials designed to facilitate the full participation, retention, and educational advancement of students with disabilities, as well as facilitation for their transition to the labor market. 13. **Indigenous students face additional educational challenges related to the low availability of educational** **materials in indigenous languages.** There are an estimated 16,000 indigenous students from eight", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "MEP statistics"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MEP statistics", "confidence": 0.4218428432941437}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "MEP statistics", "confidence": 0.389497309923172}], "vague_data": [{"text": "MEP statistics", "confidence": 0.2577418088912964}, {"text": "administrative registries", "confidence": 0.1466408669948578}]}}}
{"input": "accounts for OPM and IG into the OPM operations and implementation account and IG’s operations account, both denominated in Uganda Shillings (UGX). Payments for eligible expenditure by OPM and IG can be made from either their US$ or UGX accounts. Transfers by OPM to districts, cities, and urban centers will be done from the operations account to the consolidated fund (holding account) managed by the Office of the Accountant General. Each district, city and urban center fund will have a budget code for the project to account for the funds held in the holding account. The budget codes will be segregated for operations and subprojects. Payments to communities, suppliers, or other beneficiaries by the local governments will be approved by the CAO or City/Town Clerk and Chief Finance Officer (CFO) through the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS). Thereafter, MoFPED will transfer funds from the consolidated fund into the Treasury Single Account (TSA) to make payments. Subproject payments will be made to a community bank account in a commercial bank. The CFO of the local government will authorize the opening of community bank accounts in local governments and monitor payments made through the account to ensure they are used for", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Integrated Financial Management Information System", "confidence": 0.7682933211326599}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "B of table 4), the estimates point toward an increase in agriculture, services, and professional (all statistically insignificant estimates), but a decreased likelihood of working in manual labor. Results for men in panel B are largely insignificant, and it is worthwhile noting that the sample size is only slightly above 50% than the women sample size due to DHS sampling frame. **Table 4 OLS estimates women’s and men’s occupation in the DHS individual-level analysis** Occupation 9 Service sector jobs in the wake of structural transformation has been found important in increasing women’s work hours and reduce the gender wage gap (Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017). 17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DHS"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.33427903056144714}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "CRITICAL FUNDING NEEDS IN MENA / 10 OCTOBER 2024 **Health** Underfunding will severely limit UNHCR’s ability to provide essential health services for 35,000 members of Sudanese refugee and host communities - including vulnerable groups such as children, pregnant women, the elderly, and individuals with chronic health conditions - leading to increased morbidity and mortality rates. Without adequate funding, critical interventions such as medical supplies, vaccinations, maternal and child health services, and treatment for communicable diseases will be drastically reduced. This shortage will exacerbate existing health challenges, potentially leading to outbreaks of preventable diseases and worsening overall public health conditions. Moreover, the inability to support health facilities adequately will strain the local healthcare infrastructure, diminishing both the quality and accessibility of care for all populations involved. **Protection** Local authorities and ministries in the east are implementing a registration system and documentation to facilitate access to services and freedom of movement, in accordance with the Ministry of Interior’s decision. So far, authorities have registered and issued 30,000 cards, but their resources have quickly depleted and they are running out of resources to continue registration. UNHCR has been requested to support this initiative, as resource shortages risk preventing further registration, exposing refugees to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Vermeer, M. and S. Rahmstorf. 2009. Global sea level linked to global temperature. _Proceedings_ _of the National Academy of Sciences_ 106 (51), 21527-32. VLIZ. 2011. Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase, version 6.1. Available online at [http://www.vliz.be/vmdcdata/marbound. Consulted on 2011-05-12.](http://www.vliz.be/vmdcdata/marbound) Williams, M., 1990. Understanding Wetlands. In M. Williams (ed) _Wetlands: A Threatened_ _Landscape_ . Wiley-Blackwell. Woodward, R.T. and Y.S. Wui. 2001. The economic value of wetland services: A meta-analysis. _Ecological Economics_, 37, 257-270 World Bank, 2010. Boundaries of the World. Map Design Unit. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of the World Bank Group, any judgement on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 25", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase, version 6.1"}, {"text": "Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase", "confidence": 0.9052721261978149}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "selection model provides consistent, asymptotically efficient estimates for all parameters in the model (Dubin & McFadden 1984). **3. Empirical results** The empirical analysis is based on a household survey conducted of 11 countries across Africa: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe (for more information about the entire study, see Dinar et al. 2006). It was difficult to collect land values in this setting. We consequently relied on measures of net revenue per hectare. Net revenue is defined as gross revenue minus the cost of transport, packaging and marketing, storage, post-harvest losses, hired labor (valued at the median market wage rate), light farm tools (such as files, axes, machetes, etc.), rental on heavy machinery (tractors, ploughs, threshers and others), fertilizer and pesticide. Median district prices from the survey were used for both input and crop prices. Household labor costs are not included as a cost in net revenues because it was not clear what value to assign to wages. We controlled for household labor by using household size as a proxy. In each country, districts were chosen to get farms across a wide range of climate conditions in that country. In each chosen", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household survey"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey", "confidence": 0.9797468185424805}]}}}
{"input": "with the institutional rating, we normalize this mean indicator to the range [0 - 100]. Our composite indicator is the product of the normalized environmental index and CPIA rating. Table 2.1 illustrates the calculation of the policies and institutions indicator for four countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This indicator (row 8) equals the product of the indicator of institutional development problems (row 7) and the indicator of overall environmental problems (row 6). The latter is the average of problem indicator values for global emissions, pollution, fragile lands, biodiversity and water resources. The four country cases illustrate the contributions of separate components to the final indicator values. Chad has a low overall environmental indicator (.69) but a very high institutional indicator (5), yielding a product of 3.44. South Africa’s overall environmental indicator (4.24) is about six times Chad’s value, but its institutional indicator (2) is much lower because its institutions are more highly-developed. The resulting composite indicator for South Africa (8.49) is about 2.5 times Chad’s indicator value (3.44). Kenya has about the same composite indicator value as South Africa (8.35), but the indicator components are quite different. Kenya’s environmental indicator (2.39) is somewhat more than half of South Africa’s (4.24), but", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "policies and institutions indicator", "confidence": 0.5385611057281494}, {"text": "indicator of institutional development problems", "confidence": 0.5273791551589966}, {"text": "indicator of overall environmental problems", "confidence": 0.42263516783714294}, {"text": "normalized environmental index", "confidence": 0.24845823645591736}, {"text": "CPIA rating", "confidence": 0.15397341549396515}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "indicator of overall environmental problems", "confidence": 0.3765385150909424}, {"text": "indicator of institutional development problems", "confidence": 0.34064385294914246}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "efficiency of land use and leaving landlords as well as occupants worse off. The continued importance of agriculture for economic development and poverty reduction in Uganda implies that, in addition to exploring the magnitude of possible underinvestment on lands without clear property rights, finding ways to increase investment could have high social benefits. With more than 85% of the population still living in rural areas and agriculture accounting for 77% of employment and 50% of total output (Belshaw _et al._ 1999), land-related investment will be critical for growth and poverty reduction. Household survey data point towards a large and possibly widening gap between rural and urban levels of consumption and recent increases in poverty. After decreasing from 59.7% in 1992 to 37.4% in 1999/2000, rural poverty increased to 41.1% in 2002/2003. The fact that poverty among crop farmers is much above the rural average (Kappel _et al._ 2005), something that is often attributed to limited agricultural productivity growth (Republic of Uganda 2005), implies that ways to increase agricultural productivity will be critical to prevent widening of rural-urban income gaps. Land-related investments will be critical in this respect because the scope for expansion of cultivated area which, together with elimination of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Household survey data"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Household survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Household survey data", "confidence": 0.4277384579181671}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Household survey data", "confidence": 0.9348819851875305}]}}}
{"input": "compare results with the main specification in table 3, I again provide a dummy for whether there was a payout in the village along with a quadratic effect of the ratio of payouts to the premium. When aggregating the village data, I use the mean of the payout ratios in the village to create a payout ratio for the village. [16] The overall results of the table tell a consistent story: significantly sized payouts drive repeat buyers but not new purchasers, showing few spillover effects. Columns 1 and 2 shows how payouts affect the number of total and repeat buyers, respectively, the next year, and the results are very consistent with the baseline results from table 3. A dummy for whether there was any payout is negative, but the payout size has a positive effect. This suggests that low payouts have a marginally negative effect on the number of repeat purchasers, but this effect flips to positive as the size of the payout ratio increases above approximately 1. Column 3 shows the effect of payouts on new buyers in a village. Here, all the payout coefficients show a different pattern than for new buyers, but due to large standard errors", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "village data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "village data", "confidence": 0.8600665330886841}]}}}
{"input": "estimate the inundation depth at a grid cell level of 3 arc-seconds, (~ 90 m) and provide coastal surge hazard layers, along with pluvial and fluvial layers. The maps provide information on the extent and depth of flood hazard for a specific location. For the coastal component, we explicitly model four return periods - 25, 50, 100, and 200 year events, under current and future climate conditions.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "maps", "confidence": 0.4703810513019562}]}}}
{"input": "Bank's response. We begin by constructing an overall indicator of environmental problems from our thematic indicators. Using regression analysis, we find a strong relationship between countries’ general indicator values and the scale of their environmental borrowing, but a relatively weak relationship for AAA. At the thematic level, we find that problem indicators have relatively weak relationships with both lending and AAA. Adding country risk to the analysis, we test an optimal allocation model and find that it is consistent with the Bank’s actual lending and AAA since 1998. We conclude that our model’s assignment of lending and AAA to countries reflects the Bank’s actual experience with partner countries. The model’s explanatory power is relatively low, however, and when we compare model assignments to actual allocations, we find many large discrepancies for countries and environmental themes. Some gaps may reflect activity by other donor institutions, but many others may represent problems with efficient implementation of the Bank’s Environment Strategy. To promote further discussion of this issue, we use our optimal allocation model to develop measures of lending opportunity by environmental theme for the Bank's partner countries. 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "thematic indicators", "confidence": 0.9501707553863525}]}}}
{"input": "**A. Technical, Economic and Financial Analysis** 59. **The project is technically feasible and focused on enhancing the implementation of legislation and policies on** **refugees while ensuring service delivery to both host and refugee populations in Zambia.** The proposed design responds to gaps identified by the MoHAIS, district level officials in Meheba, various line ministries and the UNHCR. This was confirmed by information and data shared during project preparation. The project draws on analytical and operational work on refugees and host communities across World Bank operations in the region. Component 1 of the project is designed to focus on visible and practical changes in policies that tangibly improve the experiences of refugees while fostering longer term legislative reform. Component 2 on infrastructure adopts a multi-sectoral approach by working with both line ministries and local level district officials to achieve enhanced services for both refugees and host communities and in many cases, expand on existing objectives or scale up well tested designs. Component 3 builds on experiences from and synergies with the World Bank financed Zambia Agribusiness and Trade Project (P179507), as well as numerous national agri-business support programs in Meheba to: 1) foster strong participation among farmer cooperatives to ensure sustainable", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Act of 2010) that will enhance opportunities for protection and solutions for self-reliance. [16] To assist policy delivery, the Government has established an interagency National Steering Committee chaired by the Office of the Vice President. In March 2023, the MoHAIS launched a plan for the Modernization of Refugee and Host Community Settlement Areas (MORHCSA) which seeks to turn the new Refugee Policy into action on the ground. 15. **The World Bank Group, following consultation with the UNHCR, confirms that the protection framework for** **refugees continues to be adequate in Zambia.** Zambia meets the eligibility criteria for accessing the International Development Association replenishment (IDA20) Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR). The country currently hosts 101,837 refugees, exceeding the threshold of 25,000 required under the window. [17] The GRZ has signed and ratified the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. The Government has also ratified the African Union Convention for the Specific Problems of Refugee Populations in Africa. To 13 There are a total of 19 primary and 7 secondary schools and 10 health posts in the settlements. One Meheba Local Area Plan, Planning Survey and Issues Report, GRZ, 2023. 14 Consultations", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Planning Survey and Issues Report", "confidence": 0.3931933641433716}, {"text": "Meheba Local Area Plan", "confidence": 0.10164660215377808}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Access to decent work:** The key barrier to accessing work, according to respondents who are unemployed, is a lack of knowledge of the Czech language (59%). This finding was also reflected in focus group discussions conducted by UNHCR with Ukrainian refugee women and men in Brno, Ostrava in Prague in August and September, where refugees reported challenges in securing jobs that matched their qualifications due to language barriers. All participants in the focus group discussions emphasized the need for better language proficiency to improve their employment prospects. of Protection Monitoring respondents of working age are employed in host country Nevertheless, 67% of respondents reported being employed compared to 60% in Q1. . [4] Moreover, respondents’ access to earnings also increased from 87% to 93% during the same time period. Working excessively long hours also decreased from 24% to 16%. These findings ostensibly indicate an improvement in access to employment and in working conditions amongst Ukrainian Temporary Protection holders. Employment continued to be mentioned as one of the top two priority needs (32%) of households interviewed. Moreover, in terms of information, 29% of respondents indicated a need for more information about job opportunities; this continued to be the highest reported information", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Economics of Disasters and Climate Change Fig. 1 A visual of what the combined hazard maps (which include coastal and fluvial/pluvial) look like. The map presented here is the worse-case scenario we simulate, a 200-year return period flood with high sea level rise number of people within each district who live below the poverty line: this Bpoverty map^ is displayed in Fig. 3a, and the full methodology can be found in (Lanjouw et al. 2013). [3] In addition, we use gridded population density data with a 1 km resolution from Landscan (Geographic Information Science and Technology 2015). This Bpopulation map^ is displayed in Fig. 3b. While we are able to simulate current and future flood hazard, we are unable to project socioeconomic characteristics like poverty or population at the district level, as such an exercise is extremely challenging. Specifically for Vietnam, a recent paper models population and poverty in 2030 at national-level, but notes that examining how these dynamics is distributed spatially within the country is still not possible (Rozenberg and Hallegatte 2016). Nonetheless, as a stress test, a number of papers in the field have employed the same strategy we follow in this paper, of using current socio-economic characteristics", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Landscan (Geographic Information Science and Technology 2015)"}, {"text": "Landscan"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "gridded population density data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Landscan", "confidence": 0.478293776512146}, {"text": "Bpoverty map", "confidence": 0.2104400247335434}, {"text": "Bpopulation map", "confidence": 0.17403557896614075}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "gridded population density data", "confidence": 0.6225195527076721}, {"text": "Bpoverty map", "confidence": 0.18703800439834595}, {"text": "Bpopulation map", "confidence": 0.17074115574359894}], "vague_data": [{"text": "gridded population density data", "confidence": 0.1129966452717781}]}}}
{"input": "fixed effects, the two strategies are complementary. While the district-level analysis informs us about differences across and within districts over time, the local-level analysis gives us the additional impact at the very local level. This means that any differences in effects across district and local analysis should not be interpreted as inconsistencies, but rather as differential and additional impacts. In a difference-in-differences setting, it is important that the sample is balanced, assuming that the treatment and control groups are on similar trajectories. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the women’s surveys across four different groups, close and far away, and before and during the mine’s production phase. Columns 1 and 3 show mean values of the population that live far away from mines, before and during mining respectively. Columns 2 and 4, in 14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "the women’s surveys"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "women’s surveys", "confidence": 0.11915146559476852}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "women’s surveys", "confidence": 0.11177706718444824}], "vague_data": [{"text": "women’s surveys", "confidence": 0.31340184807777405}]}}}
{"input": "Policy Research Working Paper 7250 ### **Abstract** Ghana is experiencing its third gold rush, and this paper sheds light on the socioeconomic impacts of this rapid expansion in industrial production. Using a rich dataset consisting of geocoded household data combined with detailed information on gold mining activities, the authors conduct two types of difference-in-differences estimations that provide complementary evidence. The first is a local-level analysis that identifies an economic footprint area very close to a mine, and the second is a district-level analysis that captures the fiscal channel. The results indicate that men are more likely to benefit from direct employment as miners compared to men further away, and that women in mining communities may more likely gain from indirect employment opportunities and earn cash for work. Authors also find that infant mortality rates decrease significantly in mining communities, compared to the evolution in communities further away. This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data", "confidence": 0.8205620050430298}], "vague_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data", "confidence": 0.3997288942337036}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) **2024.** The Project is specifically aligned with CPF Objective 3: Supporting results-oriented management and quality for all in the education sector _._ Priorities for the education system described in the CPF include elements that inform the proposed Project: (i) quality of education; (ii) equity in educational opportunity; and (iii) relevance of education for success in the labor market. Finally, the CPF mentions that closing the digital skills gap is critical to reduce the illiteracy and income inequality divide. The inclusion of digital competencies as curricular content in the educational system will stimulate internet access and use. The Project will also support the CPF approach to foster skills for green jobs and employability in high value-added sectors. It is aligned with Outcome 2 regarding building and protecting human capital of the World Bank’s Gender Strategy 2024-2030. Further, the Project directly addresses global challenges related to the effects of situations of fragility, conflict, and violence as a global challenge, and contributes towards indicator 14 of the World Bank’s Scorecard by providing improved education services to displaced populations and people in host communities. 18. **The Project is consistent with Costa Rica’s Nationally Determined", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1 Zamstats.gov.zm. 2 Zambia Statistics Agency. 2023. _Highlights of the 2022 Poverty Assessment in Zambia_ . World Bank. 2023. _Zambia Gender Assessment_ . 3 Zambia: Selected Issues, IMF, 2023. 4 2022 Census of Population and Housing, GRZ 2023. 5 According to the 2021 Labour Force Survey Report by Zamstat, the working-age population (15 and older) is 10 million, of which only 3.1 million are employed. 6 Zambia: Selected Issues, IMF, 2023. 7 Zambia: Selected Issues, IMF, 2023. Page 8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2022 Census of Population and Housing"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2022 Census of Population and Housing", "confidence": 0.8010881543159485}, {"text": "2021 Labour Force Survey", "confidence": 0.734849214553833}, {"text": "2022 Poverty Assessment in Zambia_", "confidence": 0.504547655582428}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "devastating conflict in **Yemen** have left 18.2 million people dependent on humanitarian assistance. In **Iraq**, UNHCR also urgently needs resources to continue supporting the authorities in ensuring access to civil documentation and inclusion in the national social safety net for some 1 million internally displaced Iraqis. UNHCR is responding to two refugee situations in **Algeria** : a nearly 50-year-old displacement of Sahrawi refugees in five refugee camps near Tindouf in the south-west of the country, and an urban asylum-seeker and refugee population of diverse origin in Algiers and other governorates. **Mauritania** has hosted a significant number of refugees since 2012 and continues to face a large influx of Malian refugees; more than 100,000 people have arrived in 2024 alone. UNHCR is providing vital assistance to the most vulnerable refugees and invests in the resilience of more than 250,000 refugees as well as host communities in the Hodh Chargui region. The number of refugees and asylum-seekers registered with UNHCR in **Morocco** increased significantly in recent years. UNHCR works to ensure access to asylum and protection under the framework of the National Strategy for Immigration and Asylum (SNIA) and towards the inclusion of refugees and asylum-seekers in national social protection systems. Amid", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": ".77. One point of concern with these results is that there are many cases where there are multiple purchasers of insurance in a certain village in one year and then zero in the next year. Although this could be the result of people simply being unsatisfied with insurance, the large amount of villages that suddenly drop to zero purchasers is suspicious, especially since the BASIX data does not contain information about whether marketing activities took place in a given village in a given year. For all the villages that had purchasers in one year and then none in the next year, it is quite likely that no BASIX representative visited the village; therefore the customer did not really have a chance to purchase the insurance. If this was the case, it would make sense to exclude these villages from the analysis, as the previous year’s payout would have no way to possibly influence a customer’s purchase decision. In columns 3 and 4 I exclude villages that had no purchasers the following year from the analysis, creating what I call the “Marketing Restricted Sample.” Restricting the sample this way results in a drop of the number of observations from 10,977 to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "BASIX data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "BASIX data", "confidence": 0.8046044707298279}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "BASIX data", "confidence": 0.463316947221756}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) **Figure 1b: Technical education graduates by gender in strategic STEAM fields** 12. **By the end of 2022, Costa Rica was hosting 270,636 forcibly displaced and stateless people, and the uneven** **preparedness of these students strains the education system.** [19] Even if the influx of migrants and refugees acts as a positive factor for some schools that would be facing closure due to decline of the native-born population, the education system faces stress because of the differential quality of preparedness and disruptions faced by immigrant students. In recent decades, the country has seen the arrival of migrants and refugee applicants fleeing political and economic conditions in Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and administrative records from the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners, the number of asylum seekers in Costa Rica increased from 27,993 in 2018 to 273,066 by December 2023. While the country offers public education to all children regardless of migratory status, more efforts are needed to ensure that enrollment requirements do not exclude migrant children from the classroom, and that learning environments are inclusive. As of September 2023,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "administrative records", "confidence": 0.15403854846954346}]}}}
{"input": "has also ratified the African Union Convention for the Specific Problems of Refugee Populations in Africa. To 13 There are a total of 19 primary and 7 secondary schools and 10 health posts in the settlements. One Meheba Local Area Plan, Planning Survey and Issues Report, GRZ, 2023. 14 Consultations with health care workers and UNHCR at the Meheba settlement report a high number of unnecessary deaths of expectant mothers due to inadequate services and the poor quality of the access road. 15 Zambia National Statistical Report, Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal Security, May 2024. 16 They include, among others _,_ the Immigration and Deportation Act, Refugees Act No.1 of 2017 and amendments to other legislation, such as the Lands Act CAP 184, Higher Education Bursaries and Scholarships Act no.31 of 2016, Birth and Death Registration Act CAP 51, Citizenship Act of No 32 of 2016. 17 Zambia National Statistical Report, Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal Security, May 2024. Page 11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Zambia National Statistical Report", "confidence": 0.5978833436965942}, {"text": "Planning Survey and Issues Report", "confidence": 0.18494008481502533}, {"text": "Birth and Death Registration Act CAP 51", "confidence": 0.15191438794136047}, {"text": "Meheba Local Area Plan", "confidence": 0.12828657031059265}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "discussions with refugees from Ukraine across the country in the first quarter of 2024. ## Key Figures 338,736 320,000 ## 338,736 320,000 Temporary Protection holders in Czechia among whom have registered for an extension ## 92% of Protection Monitoring respondents are Temporary Protection holders ## 32% of respondents have at least one household member missing documentation or whose documents have expired ## 75% of respondents are women and children ## 39% Consider accommodation an urgent need", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "detail as to allow for regular and effective implementation and monitoring of all the activities to be funded. The budgets will be activity based and will be used to monitor performance during the implementation of activities. The project’s annual work plan and draft budget will be informed by the Grant Agreement. The total project cost and activity work plan will be agreed up front, and any variations will need prior approval by the World Bank. The annual work plan and budget will be submitted to the World Bank Task Team Leader for prior review and no-objection clearance no later than November 30 before the start of the coming financial year. Utilization of the budget will be monitored through quarterly Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) by analyzing overutilization and underutilizations and using the reports as management’s tool for decision-making. 5. **Disbursement and funds flow** . The project will be on statement of expenditure method of disbursement whereby the Designated Account (DA) will have a fixed allocation of funds. The project will report expenditures and request for monthly replenishment of the DA. The project will open two US$ DAs (DA-A for the MoHAIS and DA-B for the MoHAIS Kalumbila Town Council [KTC] -", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "quarterly Interim Financial Reports"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "quarterly Interim Financial Reports", "confidence": 0.10718249529600143}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "in farming. Low income is reflected in poor food security, with almost 60 percent of refugee households reporting that they typically eat only one meal per day. The main reasons provided for the low employment levels were lack of skills (44 percent) and lack of information about the local labor market (34 percent). Other reasons cited include the need for investments in roads and connectivity to strengthen market access for agricultural producers and traders. A 2024 African Development Bank (AfDB) study on forced displacement in the region concluded that priority needs for self-reliance are better road connectivity, access to water and energy, improved educational and 6 The GoR’s strategy is consistent with lessons from global experience in the 2023 World Development Report that a sustainable approach to managing forced displacement requires: (a) policies that provide freedom of movement and the right to work; (b) inclusion of refugees into national service delivery systems to shift away from expensive parallel systems; and (c) support for self-reliance through access to jobs. Page 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) **F. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design** 41. **Education technology policies and projects should be developed with a clear purpose, strategy, and vision of** **the desired educational change.** Costa Rica’s own long experience in the use of Education Technology (EdTech) and lessons from other countries such as Uruguay have provided valuable lessons on how to achieve expected results in a context of competing priorities. A key lesson is the importance of defining a common objective early on. This means that all stakeholders involved in the Project should have a clear understanding of what they are working towards. Another important aspect is the need for a specific team to drive the change. This team should consist of individuals with technological skillsets, such as engineers and developers, as well as education planners. This combination of expertise ensures that both the technical and educational aspects of the project are properly addressed. 42. **Understanding the key elements for success within the broader political economy is essential.** As highlighted in the Moldova Governance e-Transformation Project (P121231), it is crucial to establish reform at a high strategic level of government to ensure agreement among", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "there is an effect in neighboring districts. **3.1 Resource data** The Raw Materials Data are from InterraRMG (2013). The data set contains information on past or current industrial mines. All mines have information on annual production volumes, ownership structure, and GPS coordinates on location. We complete this data with exact geographic location data from MineAtlas (2013), where satellite imagery shows the actual mine boundaries, which allows us to identify and update the center point of each mine. The production data and ownership information are double-checked against the companies’ annual reports. For Ghana, this exercise results in 17 industrial mines tracked over time. We have annual production levels from 1990 until 2012. As mentioned, Table 1 shows the mining companies active in Ghana during recent decades, with opening and closing years (although some were closed in between, and are not presented in the table). Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of these mines. **Figure 2 Gold mines and DHS clusters in Ghana** **Panel A Gold mines and 20 km buffer zones Panel B Gold mines, DHS clusters, and 100 km buffer zones** 4 The distances are radii from mine center point, and form concentric circles around the mine. 5 The DHS", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MineAtlas (2013)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "InterraRMG", "confidence": 0.24441789090633392}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "exact geographic location data from MineAtlas", "confidence": 0.2929152548313141}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts, and the Case for Resilience [World Bank (2015) Platform for Urban Management and Analysis.^ http://puma.worldbank.org/](http://puma.worldbank.org/) World Bank (2016) Climate Change and Poverty in Vietnam. World Bank Internal Document World Bank, and GFDRR (2011) Vulnerability, Risk Reduction, and Adaptation to Climate Change - Vietnam World Bank, Australian AID (2014) ‘WHERE ARE WE DURING FLOODING?’ A Qualitative Assessment of Poverty and Social Impacts of Flooding in Selected Neighborhoods of HCMC", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Economics of Disasters and Climate Change Fig. 3 (a) Poverty map and (b) population density map for Vietnam at the district level. Sources: (Lanjouw et al. 2013; Geographic Information Science and Technology 2015) point indicating a potential slum location. Evidence suggests that slum areas exist in the northern districts of HCMC (Habitat for Humanity 2008), which we do not find in PUMA. For this reason, we ran the analyses for two samples – all the districts in the province, and only the districts with potential slums from PUMA. The potential slum locations are presented in Fig. 4. Methodology Exposure to Flooding at the National Level At the national level, we estimate per district the number of people exposed to each scenario of flooding, and the number of poor people exposed. In the flood data, we define exposed areas as those grid cells where the flood level is greater than zero; non-exposed areas are those grid cells where the flood level is zero. This is a measure of extent rather than depth, and has been used in previous studies to examine exposure to floods (Jongman et al. 2014; Winsemius et al. 2015; Ceola et al. 2014). Furthermore, while we lose information", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "population density map", "confidence": 0.1358329802751541}], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood data", "confidence": 0.8925102949142456}]}}}
{"input": "environmental degradation and deforestation are not new phenomena in Uganda, the large-scale and long-term presence of refugees has added to the existing pressure on the environment. From 2001 to 2023, Uganda lost 1.1 million hectares of tree cover, equivalent to a 14 percent decrease since 2000. [7] Wetlands decreased from 16 percent of the country’s land area in 1994 to an estimated 10 percent in 2021, according to the Ministry of Water and Environment. In a country where 89 percent of primary energy needs are met by biomass, land degradation is a multi-faceted crisis that has been deepened by the large refugee population. [8 ] While average woodfuel consumption per person in a refugee household is lower than that of a host household, demand still averages 660 kilograms per person per year, concentrated in and around settlement areas. [9] Refugees also open up new areas of bushland and woodland for farming, either for their own production or as hired workers or sharecroppers on host community land. 4 World Bank (2023). _World Development Report 2023: Migrants, Refugees, and Societies._ Washington, DC: World Bank at p. 208. 5 Poverty rates in refugee-hosting districts during the COVID-19 crisis ranged from 37.7 percent in", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "million people face high flood risk, while living on less than $5.5 per day. These findings are based on high-resolution flood hazard and population maps that enable global coverage, as well as poverty estimates from the World Bank’s Global Monitoring Database of harmonized household surveys. This paper is a product of the Climate Change Group and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, and a background paper for the 2020 Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at jrentschler@worldbank.org. _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development_ _issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the_ _names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those_ _of the authors. They do not necessarily represent", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Monitoring Database of harmonized household surveys"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood hazard and population maps"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Monitoring Database of harmonized household surveys", "confidence": 0.26013463735580444}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood hazard and population maps", "confidence": 0.4432750940322876}, {"text": "Global Monitoring Database of harmonized household surveys", "confidence": 0.1528034657239914}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "one hand, since 2010 urbanization and development in high-risk coastal zones has been occurring at rapid rates in many parts of the world. These trends are putting an increasing number of people in harm’s way. Human activities, such as ground water extraction, are exacerbating risks as land subsidence is increasing the extent and intensity of flooding. On the other hand, the increase in the estimated flood exposure headcount is methodological; the use of more accurate and higher resolution data, as well as the inclusion of pluvial flooding mean that this study captures flood risks more comprehensively than past studies. In addition, the Global Assessment Report (UNDRR 2017) offers estimates of risks from five major natural hazards (including flood risks), though it focuses on monetary quantifications of disaster risks. Besides such global assessments, the recent availability of high-resolution flood and population maps has enabled countless local and national risk assessments, for instance in Tanzania, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Vietnam (Chakraborty et al. 2014; Erman et al. 2019; Fielding 2012; Braese et al. 2020). **Flood risks and poverty.** Many analyses have explored the link between natural hazards – flood risks in particular – and poverty; a detailed review of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood and population maps"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Assessment Report", "confidence": 0.2854834198951721}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood and population maps", "confidence": 0.519790530204773}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "mine action. The analysis of the data resulting from this mapping combined with the analysis of the protection response monitoring data brought out the observation below: - Only two protection actors have interventions in MA which cover only a few localities of the 7 out of 11 departments affected by ED **(Ref Graph4 & Gaph2).** 4 out of 11 departments most affected by EE remain without any LAM intervention. - There is a **major gap in Explosive Device Risk Education** (EDRE) interventions in several regions affected by ED (Diffa, Tillabery, Dosso, Agadez and Niamey). - A critical lack of victim assistance is observed in all 11 affected departments ( **Ref Graph5)** . - Existing capacities have only made it possible to reach about 3,000 people [8] with EDRE [activities, representing only 2% of target set in the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).](https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/niger-plan-de-reponse-humanitaire-mars-2023) - 98% of the HRP LAM target is therefore not reached. In addition, 77% of the funding requirement MA interventions is not met. - There is also a **lack of human resources dedicated to coordination at national and regional** **level, prevention, and assistance to victims** . The MA Sub-Cluster has not been functional since the withdrawal of UNMAS in", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "protection response monitoring data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "protection response monitoring data", "confidence": 0.4376784861087799}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "protection response monitoring data", "confidence": 0.2026420533657074}], "vague_data": [{"text": "protection response monitoring data", "confidence": 0.5080808401107788}]}}}
{"input": "(Su _et al._ 2013), a figure that has risen further as fiscal decentralization reduced alternative revenue sources for local governments (Qun _et al._ 2015). [3] Revenue generated in this way provides a huge implicit subsidy to industrialization (Ding and Lichtenberg 2011), with negative impacts on availability of land for residential and housing purposes (Peng and Thibodeau 2012). This pattern of land development, which would be difficult to maintain without complementary restrictions in labor markets that in and of themselves may lead to considerable efficiency losses (Au and Henderson 2006b), has several consequences. First, as local governments compete to attract industry, prices for industrial land in China have remained very low (World Bank and DRC, 2014). Supplying land to industry below its real value led to inefficient use of a valuable resource; in fact a nation-wide survey in 2003 1 The average is for urban areas in East Asia with more than 5 million inhabitants in 2010 (World_Bank and DRC 2014). 2 Farmers’ residential land is often not expropriated, something that led to the spread of ‘urban villages’, i.e. unplanned neighborhoods that tend to provide shelter for migrants tend exert negative externalities on prices for neighboring properties (Song and Zenou 2009).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "nation-wide survey"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "nation-wide survey", "confidence": 0.21318641304969788}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "nation-wide survey", "confidence": 0.4932248294353485}], "vague_data": [{"text": "nation-wide survey", "confidence": 0.5005204081535339}]}}}
{"input": "eligible expenditures, and other details will be defined in an updated DCRM Manual for Phase II, approval of which by the World Bank is a disbursement condition. The sub-component will: (a) fund data collection to measure strains on schools, health facilities, and water points in the RHDs; and (b) finance approximately 41 infrastructure subprojects. Through ongoing analytical work, the World Bank has developed an Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based model that predicts refugee inflows before they occur. [21] If the World Bank is able to raise funds to run the AI model live, the GoU will undertake an assessment to consider using it for Phase II to facilitate the disbursement of DCRM funding to districts before large refugee inflows occur, supporting preparedness and minimizing stress on host populations and refugees in the RHDs. **Component 2: Integrated Natural Resource Management (US$30 million equivalent)** 30. **Component 2 will support investments in environmental restoration and protection to respond to ecosystem** **degradation in the RHDs and additional impacts caused by climate change and refugee presence.** The expansion of farming by refugees and host communities is driving rapid deforestation in the RHDs, reducing the extent of natural forests and woodlands. Refugees and hosts also harvest wood for", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**6. Summary and Conclusions** In this paper, we have constructed a spatial panel database of cyclone tracks and coastal landfalls in Bangladesh, West Bengal and Odisha. For 1960-2016, our tracking data come from the Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) for cyclones with Bangladesh landfalls and the India Meteorological Department (IMD) for cyclones with landfalls in West Bengal and Odisha. For storms before 1960, our data come from country reports in the global IBTrACS database maintained by the Global Data Center for Meteorology of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. We determine each storm’s landfall as its first intersection with an ordered line of coastline points, spaced at .001 decimal degrees (approximately 100 meters). We identify each cyclone’s primary coastal impact zone as the set of coastline points lying within the cyclone’s radial distance from its landfall point to its zone of maximum wind speed. Although we confine our exercise to Bangladesh and the two Indian coastal states, our methods are general and could be expanded to an arbitrarily-large set of coastal locations. We use the database for an analysis of cyclone strike locations and impact zones in seven historical periods: 1877-1900, 1901-1920, 1921-1940, 1941-1960, 1961-1980, 1981-2000 and 2001-2016. Although we", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "global IBTrACS database"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "spatial panel database of cyclone tracks and coastal landfalls"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "IBTrACS database", "confidence": 0.415997177362442}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "country reports in the global IBTrACS database", "confidence": 0.21287766098976135}], "vague_data": [{"text": "spatial panel database", "confidence": 0.20234905183315277}]}}}
{"input": "flood risks. Indeed, large coastal cities are likely to be risk hotspots. Hallegatte et al. (2013) estimate the flood risks in the world’s 136 largest coastal cities. They show that population and asset growth, climate change and subsidence are all likely to contribute to a drastic increase in global average flood losses – from $6 billion per year in 2005 to over $60 billion in 2050, assuming proactive adaptation actions in all cities. Kulp and Strauss (2019) conduct a global assessment of the potential impact of sea level rise on the world’s coastal population. The global scale of their study and the use of high-resolution flood and population data makes it the closest comparable analysis of flood risk. Their assessment suggests that today between 190 million and 630 million people (depending on the emissions scenario considered) live in areas that could be inundated by sea level rise by the year 2100. They also estimate that one billion people live on land that is less than 10 meters above current high tide lines. This present study complements the one by Kulp and Strauss (2019) in several ways: First, it considers not only the one billion people living near current high tide", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood and population data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood and population data", "confidence": 0.6002218127250671}], "vague_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood and population data", "confidence": 0.2620443105697632}]}}}
{"input": "conduct due diligence on the creditworthiness of the proposed borrowers. To minimize borrowers’ moral hazard, there will be no direct contact between the BDF and end borrowers; all information required by the BDF on borrowers and projects will be collected through the PFIs. Full details will be included in a PCG Manual, acceptance of which by the World Bank will be a condition of disbursement for this sub-component. 36. **Eligibility criteria.** The PCG will be open to creditworthy refugees. Detailed terms and conditions of the guarantees will be spelled out in the PCG manual and in a PCG Agreement to be signed between the BDF and PFIs. The BDF will be solely responsible for the selection of PFIs and monitoring of compliance with the eligibility criteria. 37. _Sub-component 2(d): Graduation for vulnerable groups (US$6.5 million)._ To support highly vulnerable refugees and host community members who are not bankable, graduation-style programming will be introduced in Phase II. Sub-component activities will target individuals living in extreme poverty who face barriers such as lack of collateral, limited financial literacy and social exclusion. MINEMA will contract an implementing partner to support at least 2,500 households (70 percent refugee/30 percent host community members/60 percent femaleheaded)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "90m x 90m pixel. The map shows a high concentration of flood-exposed populations in Hanoi, as well as urbanized areas along the Red River. The granularity offered by these pre-processed population exposure maps could be valuable for various applications; e.g. for the development of disaster mitigation plans prior to a flood event, or to estimate the number of affected people during flood events in order to prepare the scale-up of shock-responsive social protection systems. However, several limitations of these maps should be noted: First, poverty estimates are not available with the same resolution and are not incorporated in these maps. Second, while the maps can help to identify the scale of overall vulnerability and the location of pockets of vulnerability, they cannot replace detailed needs assessments for the targeting of post-disaster support or the evaluation of damages after specific events. 2 These maps will be made available publicly, and will be available upon request in the meanwhile. 23", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "pre-processed population exposure maps", "confidence": 0.27415549755096436}], "vague_data": [{"text": "population exposure maps", "confidence": 0.6129030585289001}]}}}
{"input": "0.183 0.076 0.107 0.104 Mean of dep var. 0.328 0.111 0.137 0.214 0.209 0.928 0.841 _Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and district fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. Active is active status of mine in the survey year. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Results for women’s partners also available upon request. OLS = ordinary least squares. The women and men samples have different sampling frames and therefore we are not analyzing these results jointly. Two further caveats should be noted: (i) with many variables tested, such evidence should not be given too much weight, (ii) number of sampled men in the treatment category is quite small. Out of 7,157 sampled med, only 484 men live close to active mines. A bigger treated sample would provide more reliable results. [10] **5.2 Child health** We explore effects on child health, such as size at birth, infant mortality, anthropometrics, and incidence of cough, diarrhea, and fever. Panel A and Panel B use different variable definitions 10 Results for sampled women’s partners are similar. 18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.10699871927499771}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "to establish or expand their operations. This will include improving the scale and quality of community tree nurseries, and the establishment of tree plantations with market orientation, based on locally appropriate and climate-resilient species with commercial demand and also adapted to future climate conditions. The use of indigenous tree species will be promoted where technically viable. Inter-cropping within plantations during the early years of growth will provide co-benefits to group members from food and cash crops. Groups will also be supported to establish wood fuel plantations in public institutions with kitchens (e.g., schools and health facilities) to provide a sustainable supply of fuel for mass catering. LIPW under this sub-component will be limited to these institutional woodlots, as the nursery and plantations are productive assets from which participants will draw Page 10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the marketing restricted sample, which is restricted only to villages where at least one person purchased insurance in the following year. The average ratio of payout to premium (for those who received payouts) for the full sample is 3.6; for those in the marketing restricted sample it is 4.5. All regressions contain state fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the weather station level. ***p _<_ 0.01, **p _<_ 0.05, *p _<_ 0.1. _Source_ : Authors’ analysis based on data from BASIX. a payout flips to negative and significant. However, the payout ratio is positive and significant while the payout ratio squared is negative and significant. Together, this suggests that people who receive very small payouts are less likely to purchase insurance, while those who have large payouts are more likely to purchase. The overall effect of receiving a payout switches from negative to positive when the payout ratio reaches around .77. One point of concern with these results is that there are many cases where there are multiple purchasers of insurance in a certain village in one year and then zero in the next year. Although this could be the result of people simply being unsatisfied with insurance, the large", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "marketing restricted sample", "confidence": 0.49139055609703064}, {"text": "data from BASIX", "confidence": 0.16360194981098175}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX", "confidence": 0.5597967505455017}], "vague_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX", "confidence": 0.15110282599925995}]}}}
{"input": "wetlands are associated with an island or mainland coast), as described in Hoozemans and Hulsbergen (1995). [15] Five possible responses to SLR corresponding to categories of wetland migratory potential were defined for the DIVA database: 1. No, or hardly any change; 2. A retreat of the coastline, combined with inland migration of coastal ecosystems; 3. A retreat of the coastline without the possibility of inland migration due to topography (e.g., coastlines with relatively high relief); 4. A possible retreat of the coastline but increase of flooding area behind the coastline (“ponding”); and 5. Total loss of the coastal ecosystem (Hoozmans et al. 1993). ###### **II.2 Methodology** The procedure used in this analysis followed several steps. First, the SRTM database was used to identify inundation zones. [16] Second, a country surface for wetlands was constructed from the polygons extracted from the Global Lakes and Wetlands database. Third, migratory potential of wetlands were assigned from the WMP classification of the coastline from the DIVA database. Fourth, the country surface of wetlands was overlaid with the inundation zone layer. The analysis then determined the area of wetlands that would be exposed to increased SLR and the area of wetlands that may be lost", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DIVA database"}, {"text": "SRTM database"}, {"text": "Global Lakes and Wetlands database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DIVA database", "confidence": 0.953382670879364}, {"text": "Global Lakes and Wetlands database", "confidence": 0.8934515714645386}, {"text": "SRTM database", "confidence": 0.775381863117218}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Development to Foster Private Sector and Growth_ _in Rwanda._ 14 A transit district hosts asylum-seekers in the immediate period after they have come across the border. They stay in Transit Centers while their refugee claims are assessed and while the government identifies a long-term site for their resettlement. Rubavu has experienced major inflows from the DRC in recent times, with many asylum seekers staying for months. The district is being included in the project for an Integrated Craft & Production Center (ICPC) so that asylum seekers can work and seek training opportunities immediately upon arrival. This is expected to expedite the process of socio-economic inclusion. The ICPC will also be used by host community members in the district. 15 The two roads are an exception. They have been pre-identified by the government. For other subprojects, the GoR has prepared an indicative list, which will be validated through additional consultations with refugees, host communities and other stakeholders. The list includes: (a) classroom construction for a school and TVET center in Gisagara; (b) health facilities in Gatsibo and Nyamagabe; (c) water systems in Kirehe and Nyamagabe; (d) markets in Kirehe and Karongi; and (e) ICPCs in Kirehe and Rubavu. 16 The only", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "women as of 29 September 2024 [1] and children [2] ## 98% 34% of Protection Monitoring respondents are Temporary Protection holders ## 34% of Protection Monitoring respondents are of respondents consider accommodation as Temporary Protection holders their highest priority need ## 67% 29% ## 29% of working age respondents are employed in Czechia 1 Ministry of the Interior, Czechia 2 Ministry of the Interior, Czechia of respondents need more information about job opportunities", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "language skills leads to the inability to upscale professional skills and to seek meaningful employment opportunities matching qualifications. When seeking employment through agencies, women reported cases of labour exploitation with jobs that often involve long working hours, no breaks, no social protection coverage, and no annual leave. From protection monitoring, 24% of respondents reported working excessively long hours. 12% indicated they did not have an employment contract, while 3% reported the confiscation of their documentation (e.g., passport) by their employer. ### Protection Risk IV **Access to adequate healthcare:** In focus group discussions conducted by UNHCR with elderly Ukrainian refugees [3], access to adequate healthcare emerged as the main concern. Participants highlighted significant barriers, including difficulties finding a general practitioner and understanding a medical insurance system that is new to them. Refugees highlighted a particular challenge in doctors neglecting to consider medical histories from Ukraine, resulting in misdiagnoses and incorrect treatment. Some instances, such as when prescribed medications conflicted with known conditions, illustrated a disconnect between patient backgrounds and treatment approaches in the Czech healthcare system. This forced some refugees to rely on bringing medications from Ukraine, exacerbated by difficulties obtaining longterm prescriptions. Language barriers also hinder effective communication of health", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "protection monitoring", "confidence": 0.3002989888191223}]}}}
{"input": "**1.** **Introduction** Natural disasters are estimated to cause an average of over $300 billion in direct asset losses every year; this estimate increases to $520 billion when considering the well-being (or consumption) losses experienced by people (Hallegatte et al. 2017). While each country faces its individual set of natural hazards – including cyclones, earthquakes, or wildfires – floods are one of the most common and severe hazards to disrupt people’s livelihoods around the world. Especially in lower income countries where infrastructure systems – including drainage and flood protection – tend to be less developed, floods often cause unmitigated damage and suffering. Recent events, ranging from Bangladesh and Nigeria to the United States and Vietnam, illustrate that the threat is a global reality. Not only rare and major floods, but also smaller and frequent events can revert years of progress in poverty reduction and development. In the coming years, land subsidence, rapid coastal urbanization, and climate change are bound to result in increasing exposure of people and their livelihoods. In this study we estimate the number of people who are directly exposed to the risk of intense flooding in 189 countries. We do so by using high-resolution flood and population data", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood and population data"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood and population data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood and population data", "confidence": 0.19473311305046082}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood and population data", "confidence": 0.6380946636199951}], "vague_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood and population data", "confidence": 0.1081286072731018}]}}}
{"input": "and gold production was booming. The first gold rush occurred between 1892 and 1901, and the second after World War I. Gold production decreased at the dawn of independence in 1957, and remained low until the 1980s. Over the last 20 years, Ghana has been experiencing its third gold rush. During this period, annual gold production has increased by 700 percent, as shown in Figure 1. It is the expansion that has happened during this recent gold rush that is used in this analysis to understand the socioeconomic effects of mining. The high international gold price was a driving factor in the expansion of small-scale mining, such as the 2,700% increase in gold mining territory around the Offin River between 2008 and 2012 (Hausermann et al., 2018). Between 2006 and 2012, two large-scale mines opened in Ghana, but no mine closed down (Table 1) possibly due to the high gold price increasing profitability and extending life length. The expansion across artisanal small-, medium-, and large-scale mining contributed to an increase in total production that rose from 541,147 oz in 1990 to 3,119,823 oz in 2009 according official Ghana statistics (Bloch and Owusu, 2012). This production increase led to an increased", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "official Ghana statistics"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "official Ghana statistics", "confidence": 0.7568313479423523}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "official Ghana statistics", "confidence": 0.17614860832691193}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "occupants and measures taken by the recently passed Land Act to restore such security, based on recognition of the importance of land-related investment and higher agricultural productivity for pro-poor growth that will help narrow the gaps between rural and urban well-being in Uganda. We use this to outline the estimation strategy to be utilized and discuss some of the associated econometric issues. **2.1 Origins and incidence of overlapping tenure in Uganda** The main reason for the prevalence of overlapping property in Uganda’s land tenure system dates back to colonial occupation. Under the 1900 Buganda agreement, [1] the British awarded large tracts of “ _mailo_ ” land, together with any smallholders occupying them, to the Buganda king and his notables (Brett 1973). Lands not covered under this agreement were declared Crown Land, allowing the government to alienate 1 In this agreement, the total area of Uganda, estimated at 19,600 square miles, was divided into three broad classes. The first class, comprising 958 square miles, was given to the Buganda king (kabaka), the second one, amounting to a total of 8,000 square miles, was distributed equally among 1,000 chiefs and private land owners. The remainder was declared Crown Land and vested in", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "relevant expertise. Accessed at [http://www.compassonline.org/pdf_files/EBM_Consensus_Statement_v12.pdf](http://www.compassonline.org/pdf_files/EBM_Consensus_Statement_v12.pdf) Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. 2005. _Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Wetlands and_ _Waters Synthesis_ . World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. Nicholls, R.J., Hoozemans, F.J.M. and M. Marchand. 1999. Increasing flood risk and wetland losses due to global sea-level rise: Regional and global analyses”. _Global Environmental_ _Change_, 9. S69-S87. Nicholls, R.J. 2004. Coastal flooding and wetland Loss in the 21 [st] century: Changes under the SRES climate and socio-economic scenarios. _Global Environmental Change_, 14, 69-86. Nicholls, R.J., Hanson, S., Herweijer, C., Patmore, N., Hallegatte, S., Corfee-Morlot, J., Chateau, J., and R. Muir-Wood. 2007. _Ranking Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to_ _Climate Extremes_ . OECD Environment Directorate, Environment Working Papers No. 1. Nicholls, R. J., and A. Cazenave. 2010. Sea-level rise and its impact on coastal zones. _Science,_ 328, 1517-20. Overpeck J., Otto-Bliesner B., Miller G., Muhs D., Alley R. and J. Kiehl. 2006. Paleoclimatic evidence for future ice-sheet instability and rapid sea-level rise. _Science_, 311,1747-1750. Pfeffer, W. T., Harper, J.T., and S. O’Neel. 2008: Kinematic constraints on glacier contributions to 21st-century sea-level rise. _Science_, 321, 1340-1343. Rahmsdorf, S. 2007. A semi-empirical approach to projecting future sea-level rise. _Science_, 308, 368-370. Semeniuk, V. 1994. Predicting the effect", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**3.1.** **Flooding hazard data** Floods can be caused by a variety of factors. The most common types are considered in this analysis: **Fluvial flooding** occurs when intense precipitation or snow melt causes rivers to overflow. **Pluvial flooding** occurs when rainwater builds up beyond the absorptive capacity of soil. Country-level pluvial and fluvial flood maps, developed by Fathom Ltd, are used in this analysis (Smith et al. 2015). The data sets provide information on flood extents and flood depth at an approximate spatial resolution of 90 meters and are available for all countries. The maps are based on a global hydrological and topographic model. The model simulates flood events with return periods of 5, 20, 50, 100, 250, and 500 years. This study considers flooding with a 100-year return period. A 1-in-100-year event, for example, is expected to occur once every 100 years on average (i.e. it has a probability of 1% of occurring in any given year). As with all global flood maps, the effects of artificial flood protection structures like dikes are not incorporated. Two editions of the Fathom global flood maps are available; 2016 and 2019. Wherever available, the newer version has been used. The 2019 version differs", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Fathom global flood maps"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Country-level pluvial and fluvial flood maps"}, {"text": "Flooding hazard data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Fathom global flood maps", "confidence": 0.8190125226974487}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Country-level pluvial and fluvial flood maps", "confidence": 0.3629465699195862}], "vague_data": [{"text": "global flood maps", "confidence": 0.160152405500412}]}}}
{"input": "financial and social sustainability by means of internal mobility, selfreliance, and inclusion in national services. The design of DRDIP II fully aligns with these lessons through its focus on selfreliance and integration of refugees into national service delivery systems. 54. **Multi-sectoral development investments directed to forcibly displaced populations and host communities can** **improve welfare, mitigate the negative effects of displacement, generate positive externalities, and promote social** **cohesion.** The 2022 World Bank report, _Social Cohesion and Forced Displacement,_ concludes that to pre-empt social tensions that can emerge in situations of forced displacement, governments and humanitarian and development agencies need to direct short- and long-term assistance to both the displaced and host communities. This can help reduce real and perceived inequalities and prevent host communities from forming negative attitudes about newly arriving displaced persons. DRDIP II will continue the area-based approach of Phase I, providing multi-sectoral support to respond to the impacts of forced displacement, covering refugees and host communities. **III.** **PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION** **A.** **Institutional and Implementation Arrangements** 55. **The project will retain the same arrangements as Phase I**, but with enhanced coordination and collaboration mechanisms under OPM’s DoR. OPM will implement DRDIP II at the national level through a PIST, which", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "models. By modeling changes in river discharge and inundation areas, they show that a high-concentration climate change scenario could lead to a large increase in flood frequencies in Southeast Asia, India, East and Central Africa, and large parts of Latin America. Yet, existing models are ill-suited to provide reliable long-term projections of climate change at the local level. The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment report shows that forecasts for average temperature and rainfall changes by mid-century vary significantly depending on which model and which assumptions are considered. However, it is not only the change in the mean that matters – already regions around the world are experiencing changes in the variability of climatic events; in the form of increased frequency of formally rare and extreme events, such as droughts and intense floods. In the meanwhile, the continued urbanization of high-risk areas will mean that more and more people will be exposed to flood risks. Indeed, large coastal cities are likely to be risk hotspots. Hallegatte et al. (2013) estimate the flood risks in the world’s 136 largest coastal cities. They show that population and asset growth, climate change and subsidence are all likely to contribute to a drastic increase in global average", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "and effectiveness of resource utilization, minimize duplicative efforts, support address unmet needs effectively, and foster programmatic coherence. Operating as an intersectoral platform, the CBI TWG, accountable to the 3RP coordination in Türkiye, focuses on managing both sector-specific and multipurpose cash assistance. This coordinated approach is designed to meet the basic and specific needs of vulnerable populations, ensuring that the assistance provided through CVA is both targeted and impactful. This approach has become increasingly relevant and critical, especially considering the challenging circumstances following the 2023 earthquake, which necessitated a broader and more targeted coordination of resources and assistance. 1 Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Interior, Presidency of Migration Management, Statistics (24/04/2025), _Temporary Protection_, [https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27](https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27) 2 Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Interior, Presidency of Migration Management, Press Release (20/08/2024) https://www.goc.gov.tr/ulkemizdeki-yabanci-sayilarina-iliskin-ortaya-atilan-gercek-disi-iddialar-hakkinda-basin-aciklamasi 1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "were assigned from the WMP classification of the coastline from the DIVA database. Fourth, the country surface of wetlands was overlaid with the inundation zone layer. The analysis then determined the area of wetlands that would be exposed to increased SLR and the area of wetlands that may be lost due to SLR. More specifically: 15 We acknowledge that the migratory potential of wetlands also depends on a wide range of additional factors that are site-specific and highly variable such as the continued flow of sediment and nutrients from inland stream as well as human activities. Such detailed information was not available on a global scale. 16 It should be noted that the SRTM database suffers from known limitation in urban as well as forested areas where the SRTM elevation data may capture the height of building or trees instead of ground level elevation. A similar limitation is noted by Nicholls et al. (2007). 8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DIVA database"}, {"text": "SRTM database"}, {"text": "SRTM elevation data"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "SRTM elevation data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DIVA database", "confidence": 0.9053623676300049}, {"text": "SRTM database", "confidence": 0.8567018508911133}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "SRTM elevation data", "confidence": 0.3547292649745941}], "vague_data": [{"text": "SRTM elevation data", "confidence": 0.37481045722961426}]}}}
{"input": "been conducted according to IPF policy and directives to verify that** **the current systems provide reasonable assurance of resource allocation for their designated purpose.** The assessment focuses on the capacities of the implementing agencies, leveraging insights from previous projects. Detailed arrangements for budgeting, accounting, staffing, internal controls, fund flow, reporting, and auditing have been outlined during project preparation, with measures to mitigate fiduciary risks. **B. Results Monitoring, Evaluation, and Verification Arrangements** 61. **The project’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) arrangements reflect the capacity constraints and operational** **challenges faced by a project with two implementing agencies, which lack an integrated management information** **system, including the M&E.** The project will be implemented with necessary oversight at the local level, where M&E capacities will be mobilized for the collection, organization and analysis of project-related data. The main instrument for M&E will be the Results Framework (Annex 1). The indicators at PDO and intermediate levels, as well as their respective baselines, midterm, and end-of-project targets, will serve as the basis for reporting progress. The indicators, data sources, and data collection methods take into account the limited institutional capacities in the project target locations. All relevant indicators are disaggregated by gender, and where applicable by refugees", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Socio-economic Inclusion of Refugees & Host Communities in Rwanda Project Phase II (P509677) **D. Project Components** 16. **Jya Mbere Phase II investments will support priority domains from the self-reliance index – education,** **health, labor and income – and implementation of the government’s graduation strategies for Rwandan** **nationals and refugees.** The strategic evolution to focus on self-reliance will drive design changes for Phase II compared to Phase I, including: (a) more funding will go to climate-resilient economic infrastructure and livelihood, including to address job skills gaps, which is a priority for the country as a whole and for refugees; [13] and (b) new economic opportunity activities will be added for vulnerable groups and people who cannot access finance from formal financial institutions. Project activities will be organized in five components, as described below. **Component 1: Access to Services and Socio-economic Investments (US$41.1 million equivalent, of which US$13.3** **million equivalent from the WHR)** 17. **Phase II will continue to support much-needed infrastructure in the five refugee-hosting districts, plus one** **transit district, Rubavu.** [14] As per Phase I, priority investments will be identified through the government’s District Development Strategy (DDS) process, which draws on consultations from the village, cell, sector", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "self-reliance index"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "self-reliance index", "confidence": 0.36371803283691406}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "climate change. Nevertheless, the findings presented in this paper should be interpreted considering a number of caveats. While we use current and future flood data, we only use current population and poverty data, as reliably projecting these socioeconomic trends spatially into the future is almost impossible. Changes in these trends – among many other factors – can lower socioeconomic 7 Disaggregated results per district, and results using depth as an indicator can be found in the online supplementary materials.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "current and future flood data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "current population and poverty data", "confidence": 0.42058065533638}, {"text": "current and future flood data", "confidence": 0.27721238136291504}], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood data", "confidence": 0.24348348379135132}, {"text": "current population and poverty data", "confidence": 0.11601494252681732}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Integrated Community Resilience Project (P506969) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT and seasonal rivers (wadi) are vital for supporting oases and recharging shallow aquifers. Projections indicate climate will intensify extreme heat, with the number of high heat index days nearly doubling from 66 to 123. This will severely affect livelihoods, particularly in rural areas where livestock rearing—a key source of income for 60 percent of the rural population—is projected to reduce revenues by up to 24 percent. Livestock also represents a form of savings and insurance for nearly one-third of poor households (30 percent), compared to just 11 percent among non-poor households [17] . Moreover, climate change will impact human productivity, with labor output expected to decrease by as much as 3.5 percent by mid-century due to heat stress. The poor, who rely heavily on natural resources, are the most vulnerable to these impacts. Additionally, climate-induced diseases such as malaria have increased significantly, with a 37-fold rise over the past two decades. Combined with heat-related health issues, this is expected to further reduce the labor supply by up to 1.5 percent. 17. **The project is fully aligned with the World Bank’s Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Djibouti (2022-** **2026), which", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "with effective stakeholder engagement, procurement, and contract management capabilities. **C. Project Beneficiaries** 38. There are two cohorts of primary beneficiaries under the project: (a) refugees and former refugees who will benefit from a more inclusive national policy regime and (b) refugee and host community members in and around the Meheba settlement and Kalumbila District, who will benefit from better infrastructure, services, and support to agribusiness. The total number of direct beneficiaries under the project is estimated to be 172,837. [38] 39. **Refugees and former refugees nationally.** There are currently 101,837 [39] refugees and former refugees in Zambia who will be direct beneficiaries under Component 1. Legislative and policy changes stemming from Zambia’s National Refugee Policy which will be implemented nationally will have a positively impact on their lives. This cohort will also benefit from the issuance of national ID cards which for the first time will place them on the Zambia national registry. 40. **Refugees and host communities in Kalumbila District.** They will benefit from infrastructure, health, and education services and support to farming activities and agribusiness. The estimated number of specific beneficiaries per project component together with total direct beneficiaries is detailed in Table 1. **Table 1. Project Beneficiaries", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Zambia national registry"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Zambia national registry", "confidence": 0.9177745580673218}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "national ID cards", "confidence": 0.1435050219297409}]}}}
{"input": "these interventions. **Sub-component 1.2.: Financial Inclusion Services (total IDA US$1 Million, including WHR US$0.3 Million)** 35. **This sub- component will support FIS activities for 1,500 beneficiaries who are members of households receiving C4N** **(including an estimated 500 refugees)** . This initiative aims to enhance financial inclusion and promote economic resilience by providing a one-off US$500 financial inclusion grant and technical support services for the poor and vulnerable households so they can try out household self-help activities. Eligible beneficiaries must meet key criteria, including (i) being part of a household benefiting from cash transfers, (ii) willingness to engage in small household self-help activities focused on improving their wellbeing, (iii) completing training on household self-help activities to be provided by a service provider that will be selected by the MASS, and (iv) presenting a concise action plan outlining their proposed self-help activity. Among refugee beneficiaries, it is expected that some households may opt for in-kind support from other development partners – and where this will be the case, their election into the FIS will not be constrained by not being participants into the C4N. 36. This subcomponent will also seek to achieve greater financial inclusion for women by promoting more women representation", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "of coverage turned out to be a multiple of the fair price (around three times in either case). [5] Why is insurance so costly? Several reasons are invoked, including supply-side constraints induced by either agency costs or adverse selection, problems of information opacity of tail events, coordination failures, [6] and oligopolistic practices. While the securitization [7] of catastrophic risk through the issuance of catastrophe bonds may in the future induce greater market discipline, until now it has fallen short of reducing the costs of insurance to actuarially fair levels. [8] If insurance is so expensive, why do countries still buy it? One reason could be risk aversion; another could be the presence of concavities in the production function and/or convexities in the borrowing cost function that create hedging opportunities as in Froot et al. (1993). While both these assumptions may play an important role for the demand of insurance, nonetheless we think that they only partially justify why a 1 By exposure we denote the probability of being hit by a natural disaster and by vulnerabilty the expected loss associated with any of such disasters. 2 See Elrich and Becker (1972). 3 See Hofman and Brukoff (2006) for a survey", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey", "confidence": 0.11211639642715454}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey", "confidence": 0.2880244255065918}]}}}
{"input": "affects civilians more than the military, especially in the 2nd quarter of 2023 **(Ref graph3).** In fact, the reported ED incidents resulted in a total of 132 victims [4] and survivors, most of whom (52%) were civilians (killed or injured). **The percentage** **of civilians killed is almost double that of military** **killed,** which puts the threat on civilians more than militaries and reflects the need to strengthen mine action within affected communities. The affected regions are those of Tillabery (areas of the 3 borders in the Sahel) and Diffa (region of the Lake Chad basin). **The Tillabery region has 7 affected** departments [5] **, and the Diffa region has 4** . A minimal number of ED incidents have also been reported in 3 other regions: Agadez, Dosso and Niamey ( **Ref graph2** ). This situation puts more than 200,000 people at risk of ED incidents in the affected areas. The prevalence of ED incidents related also leads to restrictions on the mobility of civilian populations on the roads to weekly markets, and the main cities of communities/departments. About 36% of those interviewed [6] say they encounter mobility constraints due to the activities of the NSAGs and military operations. This indicator", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "698 Stein the results could be biased. For instance, assume that there were a number of villages that experienced a rainfall shock but received very low payouts, making them unhappy with insurance. If the marketing teams knew this, they may have decided to not market to as many of these villages, therefore censoring villages that received a payout but were likely to have few repeat buyers. Regressions that use previous years’ payout characteristics to try to predict whether insurance is sold in a village the following year do not reveal any patterns that would suggest selection bias (shown in table S.5 in the supplemental [appendix, available at https://academic.oup.com/wber), but they may miss more subtle selection patterns.](https://academic.oup.com/wber) It is possible that the coefficient for the marketing restricted sample is upward biased and it therefore would be reasonable to regard the coefficients in columns 1 and 3 as lower and upper bounds, respectively. The payout ratio has a positive and strongly significant effect while the squared term is smaller and negative. This suggests that higher insurance payouts result in greater propensity to purchase the following year, but that the marginal effects flatten out for larger payouts. Also, the simple dummy of receiving", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "marketing restricted sample", "confidence": 0.241085484623909}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the scenarios presented in Table 2, and aggregate our results at the district level to estimate the number of people affected. To include the poverty dimension, we use the poverty headcount rate in each district to estimate the percentage of poor people exposed. For instance, if 20,000 people are exposed to floods in District X, and District X has a poverty headcount rate of 20%, 1000 poor people are exposed to floods in that district. [5] Slum Exposure in Ho Chi Minh City For the HCMC analysis, we estimate the general exposure to flooding, for the whole province of HCMC and in each of its 24 districts. The flood maps used here are based on a model of HCMC, and are not the same map as used in the figurative example in Section 4.1. 5 As evidenced in the HCMC analysis with slum data, poor people are often not evenly distributed but clustered in particular areas. However, due to data limitations across the country, we assume poverty is evenly distributed within a district when conducting the national-level analysis.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "slum data"}, {"text": "poverty headcount rate"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood maps", "confidence": 0.13931402564048767}], "vague_data": [{"text": "slum data", "confidence": 0.7441135048866272}, {"text": "flood maps", "confidence": 0.5367904305458069}, {"text": "poverty headcount rate", "confidence": 0.17473091185092926}]}}}
{"input": "order to look at the results of weather separately from the effects of insurance, I analyze how previous weather events affected insurance purchase decisions in the first year that insurance was offered to BASIX customers, which was 2005. To accomplish this, I first aggregate the purchasing data to the village level and then test to see whether villages that experienced a rainfall shock in 2004 had more insurance purchasers in 2005 than", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "purchasing data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "purchasing data", "confidence": 0.9388360381126404}]}}}
{"input": "Policy Research Working Paper 4310 #### **Abstract** The need for land-related investment to ensure sustainable land management and increase productivity of land use is widely recognized. However, there is little rigorous evidence on the effects of property rights for increasing agricultural productivity and contributing toward poverty reduction in Africa. Whether and by how much overlapping property rights reduce investment incentives, and the scope for policies to counter such disincentives, are thus important policy issues. Using information on parcels under ownership and usufruct by the same household from a nationally representative survey in Uganda, the authors find significant disincentives associated with overlapping property rights on short and long-term investments. The paper combines this result with information on crop productivity to obtain a rough estimate of the magnitudes involved. The authors make suggestions on ways to eliminate such inefficiencies. This paper—a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the group to assess the impact of land policies. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at kdeininger@worldbank.org. _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "nationally representative survey in Uganda"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "nationally representative survey", "confidence": 0.1772967427968979}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "nationally representative survey in Uganda", "confidence": 0.5346755981445312}], "vague_data": [{"text": "nationally representative survey", "confidence": 0.6271496415138245}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) Procurement Prior Review Thresholds detailed in Annex I of the Bank’s Procurement Procedure are to be observed. The Project will use the Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP) to plan, record, clear and track procurement transactions for the Project. An initial Procurement Plan has been prepared by the MEP in accordance with the results provided by the PPSD, including a timeline for implementation. **C. Legal Operational Policies** **D. Environmental and Social** 53. The Project will finance consulting services to design, develop and implement educational tools, information systems, platforms and other software, as well as to develop assessments, policies, plans and strategies for the educational sector. The Project will also finance the equipping of selected schools with internet connections and hardware (e.g., notebooks, tablets, smart boards, projectors, headphones, robotics, computational kits). The Project will not finance any type of civil works. The environmental and social risk rating is classified as Moderate. The Project is expected to have mostly positive social impacts through improved education quality, inclusion, and resilience. Impacts on vulnerable and systematically excluded groups are expected to be positive with limited negative social effects. **V.** **GRIEVANCE REDRESS SERVICES** 54.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Economics of Disasters and Climate Change Fig. 4 Location of slum areas and locations with urban expansion in the city of HCMC. Source: (PUMA 2013) We then overlay this flood layer with the population density data set, to estimate the number of people per population grid cell that are exposed to floods. As the population density data set is at a lower resolution (1 km) than the flood data (90 m), we estimate the percentage of the population grid cell which is flooded, and multiply this percentage by the population in that grid cell. For instance, if a population grid cell has 500 people, and 10% of that cell is flooded (based on the flood data), then we estimate 50 people to be exposed to floods in that cell. In doing so, we assume that the population is evenly distributed within a grid cell. We run this analysis for all the scenarios presented in Table 2, and aggregate our results at the district level to estimate the number of people affected. To include the poverty dimension, we use the poverty headcount rate in each district to estimate the percentage of poor people exposed. For instance, if 20,000 people are exposed", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "population density data set"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "poverty headcount rate"}, {"text": "flood data"}, {"text": "population density data set"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "population density data set", "confidence": 0.6955333352088928}, {"text": "poverty headcount rate", "confidence": 0.4137556254863739}, {"text": "flood data", "confidence": 0.15611042082309723}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "population density data set", "confidence": 0.27000802755355835}, {"text": "poverty headcount rate", "confidence": 0.21860302984714508}, {"text": "flood data", "confidence": 0.14707843959331512}], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood data", "confidence": 0.4970516860485077}, {"text": "poverty headcount rate", "confidence": 0.1934652179479599}, {"text": "population density data set", "confidence": 0.18619965016841888}]}}}
{"input": "large-scale gold mines in Ghana. We find that a new large-scale gold mine changes economic outcomes, such as access to employment and cash earnings. In addition, it raises local wages and expenditure on housing and energy. An important welfare indicator in developing countries is infant mortality, and we note a large and significant decrease in mortality rates among young children, at both the local and district levels. [1] We hypothesize that increased access to prenatal care is one of the mechanisms behind the increased survival rate. 1 In the 2010 Ghana population census average district size is 112,000 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2010 Ghana population census"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2010 Ghana population census", "confidence": 0.9770062565803528}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Economics of Disasters and Climate Change Fig. 2 Flood maps showing inundation depth (cm) in case of a: (a) 10-year return period flood under current conditions, (b) 25-year return period flood under current conditions; (c) 50-year return period flood under current conditions; (d) 10-year return period flood given a 30 cm sea level rise; (e) 25-year return period flood given a 30 cm sea level rise; and (f) 50-year return period flood given a 30 cm sea level rise Local-Level Data on Urban Areas and Potential Slums in Ho Chi Minh City The spatial socioeconomic data set used for HCMC is a data set of potential slum areas from 2000 to 2010, from the Platform for Urban Management and Analysis (PUMA), a city-level data set developed by the World Bank (World Bank 2015).This data was collected via satellite in the year 2012, through a combination of visual interpretation of various sources and vintages of imagery. To guide the identification of slums, previous work has provided information on the appearance and geographical extent of slums in HCMC. Surveys of poverty in the city find the appearance of slums in HCMC to be characterized as densely built small households and shelters that", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Platform for Urban Management and Analysis"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "spatial socioeconomic data set used for HCMC"}, {"text": "Surveys of poverty in the city"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Surveys of poverty in the city"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "spatial socioeconomic data set", "confidence": 0.7030344605445862}, {"text": "Platform for Urban Management and Analysis", "confidence": 0.23791511356830597}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Surveys of poverty in the city", "confidence": 0.2727552354335785}, {"text": "spatial socioeconomic data set", "confidence": 0.18756887316703796}, {"text": "data set of potential slum areas", "confidence": 0.14708130061626434}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Surveys of poverty in the city", "confidence": 0.10389581322669983}]}}}
{"input": "_Note:_ In panel A, active is status of mine in birth year; in panel B, active is active status of mine in survey year. Robust standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and district fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS = ordinary least squares. An active mine is associated with a decrease in cough among children under age five (panel B of table 5), and children are also (insignificantly) more likely to have a health card. An active mine is associated with insignificant decreases in the anthropometrics measures (World Health Organization measures in standard deviations), such as height-for-age and weight-for-age. However, the standard errors for these coefficients are very large relative to the estimated coefficients, which is why the effects are imprecisely estimated. **5.3 Spatial heterogeneity of results** Thus far we have used a cutoff distance of 20 km. Panel A of figure 4 shows that the largest treatment effect for services for women is found within 10 km of a mine, with an 8 percentage point increase in the probability that a woman works in the service sector. This is equivalent to a", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.13335265219211578}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "reduce the time lag it takes to deliver support given the evolution over the last five years. The duration of C4N will be 24 months (2 years) whereas SBCC will be phased throughout the implementation of the project. 32. A total of 2,860 refugees - including student refugees in Djibouti-Ville will benefit from the C4N. This support, which proved critical for children from rural vulnerable households during covid-19, will help refugee children remain in school longer and improve their educational outcomes, addressing barriers such as school fees and additional basic costs. 33. **The C4N will cover all six regions with beneficiary coverage in each region determined based on a** **predetermined set of targeting criteria.** In accordance with the principle of convergence which the project promotes, efforts will be made to achieve overlap of C4N and SBCC interventions with component 2 interventions in Dikhil by maximizing beneficiary coverage in the region. A combination of geographical targeting, categorical targeting, ProxyMeans Targeting (PMT) and community-based targeting (CBT) mechanisms will be used in a complementary way to identify beneficiaries and minimize exclusion and inclusion errors that may arise from inadequate coverage of the social registry and biases that result from community beneficiary identification. The", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "social registry"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "social registry", "confidence": 0.6688083410263062}]}}}
{"input": "high impact intensity and others have none. The first and second moments of the spatial impact distribution also change over time: The median landfall location shifts eastward from northern Odisha to the Bangladesh/West Bengal border area, while locational variance increases markedly after 1960. We also consider the overall distribution of impacts during the 140-year period covered by our database. Despite pronounced period-to-period shifts in impact locations, the overall distribution is far from uniform. We find the highest impact zones in northern Odisha and the Sundarbans region of West Bengal, with somewhat lower impacts in the zone between those two areas and a pattern of decline from the high-impact zones to the southern coastline boundaries of Odisha and Bangladesh. We should note that these boundary results are not artifacts of our methodology: We have also incorporated cyclone strikes in proximate areas south of the end points. Finally, despite the pronounced bimodality of the spatial distribution, we also find significant variation within zones. For example (Figure 8c), western coastal Bangladesh, generally a mid-impact zone, also has significant stretches of coast that have very low historical impacts. To summarize, our focal coastline area has witnessed highly-varied long- and short-term distributions of cyclonic storm", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Several important questions can be addressed with these data. The first relates to locational stability: What are the permanent and transient components of household and community responses to long- and short-run cyclone clustering, and to the power of recent cyclones? Outright relocation will be part of the response, but so will relocation of prime-age household members to less-impacted inland areas where their earnings and residence will offer financial insurance and a potential safe harbor from future cyclones. The size and speed of the response will depend critically on expectations about future cyclone strikes, which can be inferred from the highly varied data in our cyclone panel. Other questions of interest can also be explored once cyclone-related controls are introduced. For example, how much coastal outmigration reflects the “pull” of urban opportunities, and how much reflects the “push” of cyclone-related hazards? How do disaster mitigation policies affect responses to these hazards? Some coastal zones in our study area invest significant resources in damage prevention via polder construction and other measures, while others offer compensation once cyclone-related damage has occurred. Incorporation of controls from our cyclone panel database may permit more accurate estimation of the timing and magnitude of responses to these", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "cyclone panel"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "cyclone panel database", "confidence": 0.7962583303451538}, {"text": "cyclone panel", "confidence": 0.3441121280193329}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "since FY 1998, and all AAA since FY 2000. Using the appropriate thematic codes, we calculate total Bank lending and AAA by country and environmental theme. Our five environmental indicators and the institutional problem indicator are constructed to match the corresponding thematic categories in the project database. The seventh thematic 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "project database"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "project database", "confidence": 0.6231709122657776}, {"text": "institutional problem indicator", "confidence": 0.19991354644298553}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "institutional problem indicator", "confidence": 0.12510327994823456}], "vague_data": [{"text": "environmental indicators", "confidence": 0.3370790183544159}, {"text": "institutional problem indicator", "confidence": 0.1661490499973297}]}}}
{"input": "works. The environmental and social risk rating is classified as Moderate. The Project is expected to have mostly positive social impacts through improved education quality, inclusion, and resilience. Impacts on vulnerable and systematically excluded groups are expected to be positive with limited negative social effects. **V.** **GRIEVANCE REDRESS SERVICES** 54. _**Grievance Redress**_ . Communities and individuals who believe that they are adversely affected by a project supported by the World Bank may submit complaints to existing project-level grievance mechanisms or the Bank’s Grievance Redress Service (GRS). The GRS ensures that complaints received are promptly reviewed in order to address project-related concerns. Project affected communities and individuals may submit their complaint to the Bank’s independent Accountability Mechanism (AM). The AM houses the Inspection Panel, which determines whether harm occurred, or could occur, as a result of Bank non-compliance with its policies and procedures, and the Dispute Resolution Service, which provides communities and borrowers with the opportunity to address complaints through dispute resolution. Complaints may be submitted to the AM at any time after concerns have been brought directly to the attention of Bank Management and after Management has been given an opportunity to respond. For information on how to submit [complaints", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "a reliable, accurate, and timely manner; and (c) project assets will be appropriately safeguarded. 75. **Based on the assessment conducted, the FM risk is rated moderate.** Project arrangements will rely on the existing public FM system at the IAs and the districts, which is adequate. The IAs have experience managing World Bank-financed operations and have mostly complied with key FM deliverables. However, the following potential risks are identified that relate to all the IAs, unless otherwise specified: (a) the Rwanda Feeder Roads Development Project (P126498), implemented by RTDA and Phase I of Jya Mbere under MINEMA have experienced challenges, including low budget execution, and qualified audit opinions on the achievement of value for money; (b) inadequate preparation of the AWPB, which could lead to errors in financial reporting and potential misallocation of expenditure; (c) delayed and/or poor-quality financial reporting; (d) staff capacity constraints; (e) poor planning, budgeting and budget monitoring systems; (f) possible ineligible expenditure due to potential BRD non-compliance with the MG manual guidelines; (g) inadequate and delayed implementation of internal and external audit recommendations; and (h) lack of automated accounting system at BRD. 76. **FM risk mitigating measures include** : (a) MINEMA will update the FM guidelines in", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "we use a cutoff distance of 20 km, we assume there is little economic footprint beyond that distance. Of course, any such distance is arbitrarily chosen, which is why we try different specifications to explore the spatial heterogeneity by varying this distance (using 10 km, 20 km, through 50 km) as well as a spatial lag structure (using 0 to 10 km, 10 to 20 km, through 40 to 50 km distance bins). [4] Second, we collapse the DHS mining data at the district level. [5] The number of districts has changed over time in Ghana, because districts with high population growth have been split into smaller districts. To avoid endogeneity concerns, we use the baseline number of districts that existed at the start of our analysis period, which are 137. Eleven of these districts have industrial mining. Because some mines are close to district boundaries, we additionally test whether there is an effect in neighboring districts. **3.1 Resource data** The Raw Materials Data are from InterraRMG (2013). The data set contains information on past or current industrial mines. All mines have information on annual production volumes, ownership structure, and GPS coordinates on location. We complete this data with exact", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Raw Materials Data"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DHS mining data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS mining data", "confidence": 0.794472336769104}, {"text": "Raw Materials Data", "confidence": 0.16221851110458374}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Raw Materials Data are from InterraRMG", "confidence": 0.17294953763484955}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "project as a whole. MINEMA conducted public and stakeholder consultations across the project target areas to gather feedback on the proposed activities, address concerns, and explore ideas to mitigate potential adverse impacts on socio-economic activities and livelihoods. The project’s stakeholder engagement plan, built on inclusive consultations, incorporates a comprehensive grievance redress mechanism (GRM) that provides stakeholders with accessible channels to resolve project-related grievances and complaints promptly. **B. Fiduciary** **Financial Management (FM)** 74. **An FM assessment was carried out for the project in accordance with the World Bank policy and directives** **on Investment Project Financing (IPF).** The assessment was carried out on the IAs – MINEMA, RTDA, BRD, BDF and the six districts – during project preparation to determine whether they have acceptable FM arrangements, which will ensure that: (a) funds are used for the intended purposes in an effective, efficient and economical way; (b) financial reports will be prepared in a reliable, accurate, and timely manner; and (c) project assets will be appropriately safeguarded. 75. **Based on the assessment conducted, the FM risk is rated moderate.** Project arrangements will rely on the existing public FM system at the IAs and the districts, which is adequate. The IAs have experience managing", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "at national-level, but notes that examining how these dynamics is distributed spatially within the country is still not possible (Rozenberg and Hallegatte 2016). Nonetheless, as a stress test, a number of papers in the field have employed the same strategy we follow in this paper, of using current socio-economic characteristics to examine potential future trends, which is considered standard practice (Hirabayashi et al. 2013; Koks et al. 2015; Winsemius et al. 2015). 3 While we considered other metrics of poverty (e.g. the Multi-dimensional Poverty Index), the only available data that was spatially explicit was the headcount and headcount rate, which we use for the analysis. This headcount rate uses an income definition of poverty, with those earning less than $1.25 USD per day classified as poor.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Multi-dimensional Poverty Index"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "headcount and headcount rate"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Multi-dimensional Poverty Index", "confidence": 0.6350242495536804}, {"text": "headcount and headcount rate", "confidence": 0.20754091441631317}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "headcount and headcount rate", "confidence": 0.3599966764450073}], "vague_data": [{"text": "headcount and headcount rate", "confidence": 0.18590916693210602}, {"text": "headcount rate", "confidence": 0.18436598777770996}]}}}
{"input": "IGAs, small businesses and** **cooperatives all contribute to economic empowerment and development in target areas.** By aligning Sub-component 2.2 activities with the socio-economic infrastructure and productive facilities developed under Sub-component 2.1, the project aims to maximize productivity, improve market access, and bolster local economies. Together, these efforts will foster inclusive growth and resilience by ensuring that IGAs benefit from essential infrastructure, such as grain mills, seed centers, other productive facilities and local markets, creating a supportive environment that amplifies the economic impact across communities. The project will strengthen private sector linkages, drawing from good practices identified in the Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Program (ECRP) (2016-2022) (P159053), which used a community-driven approach to sector and business selection, and provided support to SMEs and MSMEs to finance productive investments and support financial inclusion for vulnerable communities. The World Bank’s Private Sector for Refugees (PS4R) initiative also offers good practice on how to create mutually beneficial relationships between the private sector and refugee communities on entrepreneurship, employment, investment, and products and services [23] . 52. **Technical expertise will be mobilized to identify key opportunities and effective strategies for catalyzing local** **economic initiatives** . This expertise will provide specialized guidance and advice, ensuring the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "provinces combined contribute the rest. By contrast, agriculture is high in labor intensity (24 percent of total employment) but with low productivity (the contribution to GDP was 3.4 percent in 2021). [7] 4. **Zambia’s economy and population are highly vulnerable to climate change.** The country’s dependence on rainfed agriculture, which employs two-thirds of the workforce, and on hydropower makes it particularly vulnerable to climate shocks, threatening food production, electricity supply, and economic growth. While the country experiences low exposure to natural disaster risks in general, resilience is hindered by social vulnerability. Adverse impacts of climate change include increased frequency and severity of seasonal droughts, higher temperatures, flash floods, occasional dry spells, and changes in the growing season. In agriculture, the key risk stemming from climate change is the projected lower maize yields, as this is the country’s staple crop. Zambia is currently experiencing drought conditions in 84 of its 116 1 Zamstats.gov.zm. 2 Zambia Statistics Agency. 2023. _Highlights of the 2022 Poverty Assessment in Zambia_ . World Bank. 2023. _Zambia Gender Assessment_ . 3 Zambia: Selected Issues, IMF, 2023. 4 2022 Census of Population and Housing, GRZ 2023. 5 According to the 2021 Labour Force Survey Report by Zamstat, the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2022 Census of Population and Housing"}, {"text": "2021 Labour Force Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2022 Census of Population and Housing", "confidence": 0.7733873724937439}, {"text": "2021 Labour Force Survey", "confidence": 0.6503279805183411}, {"text": "2022 Poverty Assessment in Zambia_", "confidence": 0.5102331638336182}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "activities to be implemented under DRDIP II in the 13 refugee settlements, 12 RHDs, refugee transit districts, and selected secondary cities. 82. **The potential E&S risks that may arise from component 1 civil works may include:** noise, dust, soil, water pollution, construction debris, sedimentation and deposition of fine materials in downstream watercourses during construction; soil and water pollution due to construction and occupational hazards. Some of the project activities under component 2 on INRM will also have positive environmental impacts. 83. **There are risks to sensitive ecosystems and biodiversity hotspots in the western and south-western RHDs.** The western region of the project falls within the Albertine Rift valley, considered one of the global biodiversity hotspots, with many tropical high forests remaining but under high pressure. The western region has a dense network of national parks, wildlife reserves, and natural forests. Kyangwali, Rwamwanja, and Kiryandongo refugee settlements are situated near Bugoma Central Forest Reserve, Katonga Wildlife Reserve, and Kibeka Central Forest Reserve, which have already been encroached upon. Likewise, the south-western region has Lake Nakivale and Mburo-Nakivale wetland system, which serves as a habitat for unique species of birds, animals, plants, and fish. Page 23", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "To construct a water-resource indicator, we draw on two sources of information. The first is an estimated geographic distribution of excess demand for water resources (surface and sub-surface) in Vörösmarty, et al. (2000). We use GIS to compute the total population residing in excess-demand areas identified by this research. The second information source is a database of deaths and injuries from floods maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, Université Catholique de Louvain). For each of the Bank's partner countries, we calculate the sum of deaths and injuries for all recorded floods since 1960. In constructing an indicator for flood damage, we weight deaths to injuries in the ratio 50:1. Using equal weights, we combine our indicators for demand pressure and floods into a composite indicator of water-related problems. [4] We derive our indicator for environmental policy and institutional problems from two sources. The first is the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) database, which rates environmental policies and institutions on a numerical scale of 1 (the lowest) to 6. For this exercise, we reverse the scaling (1 becomes the highest) and normalize the ratings so that countries with the greatest problems score", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) database"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "database of deaths and injuries from floods"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Country Policy and Institutional Assessment", "confidence": 0.22410354018211365}, {"text": "GIS", "confidence": 0.16670136153697968}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "database of deaths and injuries from floods", "confidence": 0.8187075257301331}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "will be served by health centers, resulting in 50 maternal lives saved per year and a 15 percent reduction in other causes of morbidity (baseline morbidity of 19 percent). [28] The NPV of these investments is estimated at US$1.3 million at a 12 percent discount rate, with an ERR of 29 percent. 61. _Communal WASH_ investments reduce morbidity from diarrhea and other waterborne diseases, along with time and cost savings to access water. The analysis assumes the mortality rate due to unsafe water will reduce by 10 percent (from 25 deaths per 100,000 to 22.5), along with time savings of two hours per week per beneficiary household in accessing clean water and US$20 in annual cost savings per household (CEIC data). The NPV of these WASH investments is estimated at US$1.1 million at a 12 percent discount rate, with an ERR of 28 percent. 62. Additional assumptions used in the analysis for this component include: (a) value of a statistical life: US$2,394; [29] and (b) annual O&M costs of five percent of total investment value. [30] 63. The results of the analysis for this component and the sensitivity analysis are summarized in the tables below: **Table 6: NPV and ERR", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "CEIC data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "CEIC data", "confidence": 0.9787417054176331}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "we would have liked a sample to include data from the same households before and after the reform. The fact that NBS changed its panel of households in 2011 makes this impossible. The ability to use two panel data sets, each with multiple observations per household before and after the reform, still allows us to control for time-invariant household characteristics. [10] This implies that we can use a triple-difference approach that focuses on changes between the first and second panel period for the same households between treated and non-treated households in pre- and post-reform periods. Given the involvement of supervisors resident in the sample villages and the use of detailed logbooks to record consumption on a daily basis (Chen and Ravallion 1996), NBS data on consumption are considered of exceptionally high quality (Jalan and Ravallion 1999). Beyond information on consumption, the survey includes (less precise) data on income and individual members’ labor supply to farm or off-farm activities, migration, income from different sources, and an account of agricultural output and inputs. We also have data on key village characteristics including total working age population, agricultural land, and distance to public health and education facilities to control for village level time-varying", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "NBS data on consumption"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "two panel data sets"}, {"text": "data on key village characteristics"}, {"text": "data on income"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "panel data sets", "confidence": 0.7090798616409302}]}}}
{"input": "direct and indirect human actions. Fifth, we have not estimated the net present value of the coastal wetland loss over a period of time. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the data sources and describes the methodology. Section 3 presents area estimates of wetlands at risk from sea-level rise (SLR) as well as the economic value of these projected losses. Section 4 briefly concludes. ##### **Data and Methodology** ###### **II.1 Data** In order to assess the exposure of wetlands at risk from SLR, we employed Geographic Information System (GIS) software to overlay the area of the wetlands with the inundation zones projected for 1m SLR. We have used the best available spatially-disaggregated global data sets from various sources, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the US Geological survey (USGS), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and the Dynamic and Interactive Assessment of National, Regional and Global Vulnerability of Coastal Zones to Climate Change and Sea-Level Rise (DINAS-Coast) project. In particular: _Country boundaries and regions and coastlines_ . Country coastlines were extracted from the World Vector Shoreline, a standard National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (formerly Defense Mapping Agency) product at a nominal scale of 1:250,000.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Vector Shoreline"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "the best available spatially-disaggregated global data sets"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Vector Shoreline", "confidence": 0.7584316730499268}, {"text": "Geographic Information System", "confidence": 0.38758423924446106}, {"text": "DINAS-Coast", "confidence": 0.211867094039917}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "spatially-disaggregated global data sets", "confidence": 0.47100740671157837}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "vulnerability to flooding, drought, and landslides and their adaptation and resilience priorities; (b) climate-sensitive planning; and (c) climate-resilient infrastructure standards for local government authorities and community institutions, including energy efficiency and renewable energy in schools and health facilities to respond to climate risks. Targeted capacity building will be provided for women in the community committees to strengthen their capacity to engage. 29. _Sub-component 1.3: Displacement Crisis Response Mechanism (DCRM) (US$10 million)._ The DCRM is a contingency financing mechanism for RHDs that experience large refugee inflows. Funds from this sub-component will be rapidly disbursed to districts that reach pre-agreed population triggers in terms of children per school classroom, patients per health facility, and people per water point. The DCRM financing will be used for infrastructure construction, upgrading or rehabilitation to expand education, health, and water service capacity in districts experiencing public service pressure caused by large refugee inflows. The DCRM triggers, eligible expenditures, and other details will be defined in an updated DCRM Manual for Phase II, approval of which by the World Bank is a disbursement condition. The sub-component will: (a) fund data collection to measure strains on schools, health facilities, and water points in the RHDs; and (b) finance", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the needs of communities to intensify their coping strategies including livelihood-seeking activities that may expose them to ED risks. The application of the [sanctions in progress following the coup in Niger could increase the cost of living](https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/COMMUNIQUE-FINAL-CINQUANTE-ET-UNIEME-SOMMET-EXTRAORDINAIRE-DE-LA-CONFERENCE-DES-CHEFS-DETAT-ET-DE-GOUVERNEMENT-DE-LA-CEDEAO-SUR-LA-SITUATION-POLITIQUE-AU-NIGER.pdf) and increase the vital needs of already vulnerable populations. This new situation would expose them to the risk of enrolment in NSAG for a salary and therefore increase the capacity of NSAG in the installation of ED. In addition, the population could intensify their survival strategies by engaging in several types of activities to adapt to the high cost of living, including the search for subsistence in areas potentially affected by ED. Consequently, an upsurge in ED incidents is very likely. ## **III. Major challenges in mine action interventions (MA)** Graph4. Mapping of MA activities, 30 juin 2023 In January 2023, the Protection Cluster launched a joint initiative of mapping protection interventions including mine action. The analysis of the data resulting from this mapping combined with the analysis of the protection response monitoring data brought out the observation below: - Only two protection actors have interventions in MA which cover only a few localities of the 7 out of 11 departments affected by", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "protection response monitoring data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "protection response monitoring data", "confidence": 0.12240608036518097}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "protection response monitoring data", "confidence": 0.5295655131340027}], "vague_data": [{"text": "protection response monitoring data", "confidence": 0.5082381963729858}]}}}
{"input": "The World Bank Economic Review 695 BASIX conducts marketing visits through village meetings and door-to-door visits. The first step is to hold a group meeting in the village, where potential customers are shown a marketing video that includes details about rainfall insurance (and other BASIX products). It then speaks with visitors and answers questions. The BASIX team then makes a follow-up visit where it goes door to door, trying to sell BASIX products, including rainfall insurance. Data The data set consists of the entire set of BASIX’s purchasers of rainfall index insurance from 2005 through 2007, which covers six states. [3] Though it ran small pilots in 2003 and 2004, BASIX began to mass-market rainfall insurance starting in 2005. The data contain limited personal information about each customer, including their location, how many policies they purchased, and what payouts they received during that season. The BASIX data covers 42 weather stations and includes a total of 19,882 customers during the period 2005–2007. [4] After numerous rainfall shocks in 2006, BASIX realized that many customers who had purchased only a small amount of insurance were disappointed that they received small payouts. In response, BASIX instituted a rule in 2007 that required", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "the BASIX data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "highly-developed. The resulting composite indicator for South Africa (8.49) is about 2.5 times Chad’s indicator value (3.44). Kenya has about the same composite indicator value as South Africa (8.35), but the indicator components are quite different. Kenya’s environmental indicator (2.39) is somewhat more than half of South Africa’s (4.24), but Kenya’s institutional problem indicator (3.5) is about 1.8 times South Africa’s. As a result, the products of the two indicators are nearly the same for the two countries. Of the four countries, Nigeria has by far the largest composite indicator value (25.29) because of the size of its overall environmental indicator (8.43). the equal-weighted index. Our results show that correlations among the indicators remain at .95 or higher, over a broad range of plausible definitions. 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "institutional problem indicator", "confidence": 0.4615667462348938}, {"text": "environmental indicator", "confidence": 0.3497096300125122}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "environmental indicator", "confidence": 0.2733365297317505}, {"text": "composite indicator", "confidence": 0.24520041048526764}, {"text": "institutional problem indicator", "confidence": 0.1380712389945984}]}}}
{"input": "that net receipts from these schemes were, if anything, lower to for households inside the prefecture boundary than outside. Treatment and control areas may already have followed different growth trajectories before reforms. The standard way to check whether may have been the case is to test for parallel trends. [13] As discussed in detail below, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no significant differences in pre-reform trends between households inside and outside the border for overall household welfare and the share of income derived from agriculture non-farm employment, migration, and local wages and, with one exception, individuals’ time use, and agricultural yields and profits. Some significant pre-reform trends exist, however, with respect to use of agricultural inputs and crop choice. They point towards marked declines in agricultural assets ( 18% in Chengdu vs. +35% in villages outside the prefecture boundary) and use of inputs (-38% vs. -16%). Output shares of wheat and other grains increased and those of oil crops decreased in Chengdu while the opposite was true for households in neighboring counties. Also, key interventions in place during the period of concern are a new rural pension scheme (Lei _et al._ 2013), cooperative medical scheme (Wagstaff _et al._ 2009),", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "price increasing profitability and extending life length. The expansion across artisanal small-, medium-, and large-scale mining contributed to an increase in total production that rose from 541,147 oz in 1990 to 3,119,823 oz in 2009 according official Ghana statistics (Bloch and Owusu, 2012). This production increase led to an increased sector contribution to GDP from 4,83% (1990) to 5,78% (2009), alongside export value of US$304m in 1990, US$702m in 2000, and US$2246 m in 2008, reaching 43% of national exports in 2008. Mining related foreign direct investment (FDI) also rose from US$165m to US$762m between 1995 and 2009. Mining was the dominating sector with between 48% and 94% of mining FDI to total FDI from 1995 to 2007, until the country saw an incredible increase in non-mining foreign direct investment (Bloch and Owusu, 2012), following the discovery of oil in 2007. 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "official Ghana statistics"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "official Ghana statistics", "confidence": 0.6362387537956238}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "official Ghana statistics", "confidence": 0.11805608123540878}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "counterfactual, and does not allow quantification of benefits in a way that can be compared to the cost of the intervention. To provide these and, in doing so, draw out the implications of the experiment in a more systematic manner, more systematic survey evidence is needed. **2.3 Analytical approach and data sources** We use panel data from the National Bureau of Statistics’ regular household survey in 7 counties adjacent to the border of Chengdu prefecture (3 counties inside and 4 outside the boundary), [9] as illustrated in figure 1 to assess household-level effects of Chengdu’s property rights reform on household welfare, time use, inputs into and productivity of agricultural production. A modified regression discontinuity design whereby reform effects are identified by comparing between counties located just inside the prefecture border who were affected by the reform and otherwise comparable ones just outside the border who were not is applied. Ideally, we would have liked a sample to include data from the same households before and after the reform. The fact that NBS changed its panel of households in 2011 makes this impossible. The ability to use two panel data sets, each with multiple observations per household before and after the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "National Bureau of Statistics’ regular household survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "regular household survey", "confidence": 0.6376288533210754}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "regular household survey", "confidence": 0.10529762506484985}], "vague_data": [{"text": "panel data", "confidence": 0.22187919914722443}, {"text": "systematic survey evidence", "confidence": 0.12558864057064056}]}}}
{"input": "Policy Research Working Paper 7388 ### **Abstract** As part of a national experiment in 2008, Chengdu pre fecture implemented ambitious property rights reforms, including complete registration of all land together with measures to ease transferability and eliminate migration restrictions. A triple difference approach using the Statistics Bureau’s regular household panel suggests that the reforms increased consumption and income, especially for less wealthy and less educated households, with estimated benefits well above the cost of implementation. Local labor supply increased, with the young shifting toward agriculture and the old toward off-farm employment. Agricultural yields, intensity of input use, and diversity of output also increased. Improving property rights in peri-urban China appears to have increased investment and diversification. This paper is a product of the Agriculture and Rural Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at kdeininger@worldbank.org. _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development_", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Statistics Bureau’s regular household panel"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Statistics Bureau’s regular household panel", "confidence": 0.26111671328544617}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Statistics Bureau’s regular household panel", "confidence": 0.10521749407052994}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household panel", "confidence": 0.1424032598733902}]}}}
{"input": "salinization, and pesticide exposure, which risk human and animal health. 77. **The Social risk is rated as Substantial.** Component 1 activities, such as Cash for Nutrition, Productive Inclusion, strengthening the social registry, and distributing community resilience kits, may present risks of elite capture, social conflict, and excluding vulnerable individuals like women, young mothers, and persons with disabilities due to inadequate beneficiary targeting. These activities might also increase risks of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse/Sexual Harassment (SEA/SH), corruption, fraud, and theft from households receiving benefits and kits. Additional risks include poor stakeholder engagement, weak grievance management, exclusion from beneficiary lists, payment delays, road safety especially of project workers, and insufficient enforcement and training for Codes of Conduct. 78. **Component 2.1 will finance developing and rehabilitating essential infrastructure in rural communities of Dikhil** **and refugee-hosting areas in Ali Addeh, Holl Holl, and Obock**, aiming to increase access to services like electrification, water and sanitation, renewable energy, health and education facilities, roads, and utilities. Risks related to land acquisition and physical and/or economic displacement are unknown, but activities causing these risks are expected to be ineligible for financing. Some key risks under this component include: SEA/SH from labor/project workers in remote areas; accidents from", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "the social registry"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "social registry", "confidence": 0.5683906078338623}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "social registry", "confidence": 0.2239072024822235}]}}}
{"input": "The data for our study come from the 2005/2006 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS), fieldwork for which was conducted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics from May 2005 to April 2006. The survey collected information at the community, household, and parcel level for about 7,500 households in 753 EAs including 30 IDP camps. Household level data cover demographics, main economic activities, education, health, assets, income levels and sources, as well as consumption and welfare indicators. The agricultural module provides information on ownership status, crop production, input use and land-related investment at the parcel level, complemented by other forms agricultural income. [13] The 2002 population census was used as a sample frame. Following stratification into urban (30%) and rural (70%) sub samples, enumeration areas (EAs) were chosen with the probability of selection being proportional to size. Based on a listing of households in each of the selected EAs, 10 households per EA were randomly sampled. As table 1 illustrates, 5,530 of the sample households were involved in agricultural activities. Of these, about 31%, or 1,728 with 5,448 parcels, are mixed owner/occupants who operated at least one parcel under full ownership and one under usufruct. This sub-sample forms the basis for our", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2005/2006 Uganda National Household Survey"}, {"text": "2002 population census"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2002 population census", "confidence": 0.8177517056465149}, {"text": "2005/2006 Uganda National Household Survey", "confidence": 0.8028669953346252}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "2024 CRITICAL FUNDING NEEDS IN EUROPE ###### **Ukraine Situation** As the full-scale war in Ukraine continues unabated, ongoing hostilities are heavily impacting civilians, with **3.7 million people currently internally displaced.** [1] UNHCR and partners are on the frontline providing lifesaving assistance to the newly displaced, including psychosocial support, legal assistance, core-relief items, cash assistance and emergency shelter support and repairs. Where conditions allow, UNHCR is supporting government-led early-recovery efforts including repairs to civilian housing and infrastructure. Heading into yet another winter—and with targeted attacks compromising energy infrastructure in parts of the country—additional funding is critical to help scale up assistance for millions of people to repair their damaged homes, afford electricity and heating costs, and ensure they have access to essential non-food items such as clothing, heaters, thermal kits, as well as cash assistance. Over **6.1 million refugees** from Ukraine have sought safety across Europe, where host countries have generously provided protection, access to services, and inclusion into national systems. However, host governments and communities need support to guarantee access to rights and services, provide dedicated support for the most vulnerable, foster greater inclusion and ensure social cohesion. UNHCR leads the **[Regional Refugee Response Plan](https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/105903)** (RRP) for the Ukraine Situation", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Regional Refugee Response Plan", "confidence": 0.3796873688697815}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "initiatives and ongoing strong political will in Europe remain promising, concrete efforts are needed to support those without legal recognition in the region. **UNHCR’S 2024 FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS** **FOR STATELESSNESS-RELATED ACTIVITIES** **IN EUROPE** **TOTAL FUNDED (as of 30 Sept 2024)** The breakthrough came early this year when with UNHCR’s support, Sadik’s wife Buqa obtained identity documents. This enabled the registration of their children in birth registries and paved the way for them to apply for identity documents. The new legal status has opened new frontiers for the family, granting them access to healthcare, education, social assistance, and more. © UNHCR/Igor Sljivancanin _* References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)._ Page 6 **U N H C R R E G I O N A L B U R E A U F O R E U R O P E,** O C T O B E R 2 0 2 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "birth registries"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "birth registries", "confidence": 0.9292868375778198}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Integrated Community Resilience Project (P506969) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT 62. **M&E teams will also be embedded in each of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU), MASS and ADDS** . These teams, in coordination with the community facilitators mobilized at local level, will be responsible for collecting data based on the results framework outlined in the M&E plan. They will transmit data on a regular basis, contributing to the periodic reports. Data to track key performance indicators will be collected from various sources: (a) project-specific surveys and questionnaires; (b) service providers; (c) local governments; (d) consultant reports; and (e) construction progress reports from supervising engineers/ engineering firm. 63. **A comprehensive midterm review of the project’s implementation and results will be conducted by the** **government and the World Bank in 2027, during which the target values will be assessed and any necessary adjustments** **to the project design will be made if needed.** The project will provide targeted support to strengthen M&E capacity within MASS and ADDS. Where feasible, the project will finance consultants to assist MASS and ADDS in developing a detailed M&E and reporting system plan. In addition, consultants will provide on-the-job training for M&E specialists across MASS, ADDS, and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "project-specific surveys and questionnaires"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "project-specific surveys and questionnaires"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "project-specific surveys and questionnaires", "confidence": 0.3250833749771118}], "vague_data": [{"text": "project-specific surveys and questionnaires", "confidence": 0.48052072525024414}, {"text": "construction progress reports", "confidence": 0.16492167115211487}, {"text": "consultant reports", "confidence": 0.10183080285787582}]}}}
{"input": "_Note:_ Figure 4 shows the main treatment coefficients using the baseline estimation strategy (with DHS individuallevel data; see table 4 for more information), but with different distance cutoffs (10 km, 20 km, 30 km, 40 km, and 50 km). *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. The results above suggest substantial heterogeneity in outcomes and highlights the importance to explore spatial heterogeneity in the results. In the following sections we explore plausible explanations for these outcomes. **5.4 Difference-in-differences at the district level** The results for female employment in the district-level analysis are shown in table 6. Agricultural work decreases for women in mining districts and manual work increases. Following from this, the likelihood that a woman is working year-round increases. [11] This is similar to what we saw in the individual-level regressions, but the results are now statistically significant. **Table 6 Effects of mine opening at the district level on female employment** (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) not agri- service profess- manual earns works working culture or sales ional work cash all year Active district 0.019 -0.085** 0.034 -0.018** 0.050** -0.021 0.054* (0.027) (0.042) (0.030) (0.008) (0.020) (0.049) (0.032) Observations 19,226 19,226 19,226 19,226 19,226 19,270 15,991 R-squared 0.207 0.327 0.128", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS individuallevel data"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DHS individual level data"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "DHS individual-level data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS individuallevel data", "confidence": 0.7798771262168884}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "only in conjunction with policies for local procurement. Moreover, some of the mining-related papers have focused on mining in an African context, exploring a range of outcomes, including HIV-transmission and sexual risk taking (Corno and de Walque 2012; Wilson 2012), women’s empowerment (Benshaul-Tolonen 2018), infant mortality (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2019) and labor market outcomes (Kotsadam and Tolonen 2016). Mining is also associated with more economic activity measured by nightlights (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2019; Mamo et al, 2019). Kotsadam and Tolonen (2016) use DHS data from Africa, and find that mine openings cause women to shift from agriculture to service production and that women become more likely to work for cash and year-round as opposed to seasonally. Continuing this analysis, Benshaul Tolonen (2018) explores the links between mining and female empowerment in eight gold producing countries in East and West Africa, including Ghana. Women in gold mining communities have more diversified labor markets opportunities, better access to health care, and are less likely to accept domestic violence. In addition, infant mortality rates decrease with up to 50% in mining communities, from very high initial levels (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2019). In a study that focuses exclusively on Ghana, Aragón and Rud (2013) explore the link between pollution from", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DHS data from Africa"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.8849641680717468}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DHS data from Africa", "confidence": 0.13584770262241364}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# **MOLDOVA** **OLDER REFUGEES** **BRIEFING NOTE** #### Disability & Age Task Force Refugee Coordination Forum Moldova ### **JANUARY 2025** The **Disability & Age Task Force (DATF)** was established in March 2022 with the support of the Refugee Coordination Forum and under the **Protection Working Group** . The Task Force is composed of humanitarian actors including Government authorities, United Nations Agencies, International and National NGOs, and Organizations of Persons with Disabilities (OPDs), providing specific services for people with disabilities and older people. Its objective is to improve the inclusion of older persons and persons with disabilities in the Ukrainian Refugee Response in the Republic of Moldova, ensuring access to mainstream services as well as guaranteeing the availability of specific services to respond to needs. ## **BACKGROUND** Almost three years have passed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, forcing millions of Ukrainians to flee the country in search of safety. Moldova in its turn is the country that has received **the largest numbers of** **refugees per capita** of the population of **2,4 million** . As of end December 2024, about 135,000 refugees from Ukraine still remained sheltered in Moldova, with about 76,000 having received asylum, temporary protection, or residence", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the project is counted towards Private Capital Enabling (PCE) and Private Capital Mobilization (PCM). Component 2 on Economic Opportunity & Self-Reliance is verified as both PCE and PCM by supporting a partial credit guarantee (PCG) scheme and matching grants. Sub-component 2(c) support to the Business Development Fund (BDF) PCG scheme is expected to facilitate access to finance for up to 3,000 7 African Development Bank, UNHCR, IGAD & EAC (2024) _Regional Report:_ _Regional Program on Enhancing the Investment Climate for the_ _Economic Empowerment of Refugee, Returnee, and Host/Return Community Women in the East and HoA and Great Lakes Region._ 8 Access to Finance Rwanda (2024) _FinScope 2024 Report_ . The report shows high levels of financial inclusion but low usage of financial services. 9 Non-monetary poverty for the other four host districts is: Nyamagabe (Kigeme camp) 39 percent, Gatsibo (Nyabiheke Camp) 37 percent, Kirehe (Mahama camp) 35 percent and Karongi (Kiziba camp) 34 percent. Data is from the 2022 Census. 10 World Bank (2021) _Climate Risk Profile: Rwanda_ . 11 Alex Hunns et al (2023) “Refugee Settlements are Highly Exposed to Extreme Weather Conditions.” Page 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2022 Census"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2022 Census", "confidence": 0.9298616051673889}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "before_ active*mines -0.013 0.025 -0.018* 0.002 0.003 0.075*** -0.028 (0.040) (0.030) (0.009) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.037) _Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and district fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Panel A is limited to bottom 40% in the income distribution, panel B uses urban interaction, and panel C has a count variable for active mines. Panel D1 drops sample between 20 and 40 km away, and D2 drops individual samples two years before mine opening. 151 women are sampled within 20 km from an active mine and in an urban area, and 246 women are sampled within 20 km from a mine regardless of its activity status and in an urban area. **Table A4 Spillovers on employment across districts** Panel A: Using production in the previous period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) not agri- service profess- manual earns works VARIABLES working culture or sales ional work cash all year gold period 0.004 -0.009** 0.003* 0.004*** -0.002 0.001 0.006 District (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) neighbor -0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.002*** 0.001 0.008* -0.002 gold production (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.149577796459198}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Preparing country boundaries and coastlines_ . Countries and regions were identified with data from the World Bank and Exclusive Economic Zones from VLIZ (2011). The coastlines are derived from the SRTM 90 meter digital elevation model (DEM) data files used as a mask for calculating country totals for wetlands. Information on WMP categories for the Coastline was downloaded from the DIVA GIS database. _Building coastal terrain models (DTM)_ . Coastal terrain models derived from the SRTM 90 meter DEM data files were converted into an ESRI ArcGIS data format, and merged to conform to country boundaries in the ArcGIS environment. The analysis includes SRTM tiles, which are 5 x 5 decimal degrees, with a coastline. _Identifying inundation zones:_ Inundation zones were derived from the DTM by setting the value to 1 for SLR equal to 1 m. _Calculating exposure indicators_ . Delineated inundation zones were overlaid with wetlands to calculate exposure of wetlands to a 1 m SLR. Low elevation wetlands are within the Low Elevation Coastal Zone [17] . For the area calculation, grids representing cell areas in square kilometers at different resolutions were created, using the length of a degree of latitude and longitude at the cell center.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DIVA GIS database"}, {"text": "SRTM 90 meter DEM data files"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Exclusive Economic Zones from VLIZ"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "data from the World Bank"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DIVA GIS database", "confidence": 0.7544446587562561}, {"text": "SRTM 90 meter digital elevation model", "confidence": 0.5466164946556091}, {"text": "ESRI ArcGIS data format", "confidence": 0.46817219257354736}, {"text": "SRTM 90 meter DEM data files", "confidence": 0.42360031604766846}, {"text": "SRTM tiles", "confidence": 0.34083738923072815}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from the World Bank", "confidence": 0.3881029486656189}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "caregiving responsibilities over business activities. This norm restricts their time and engagement in income-generating pursuits and weakens their perceived legitimacy as entrepreneurs, reducing their chances of qualifying for credit. Additionally, women are often expected to rely on family support, especially from spouses, instead of seeking independent financial solutions, distancing them from formal financial institutions and financial products. 31 Baseline failure rates by segment are extremely difficult to assess. As such, the analysis uses conservative assumptions based on extensive discussions with key stakeholders and potential beneficiaries. These assumptions have been tested for sensitivity. 32 CEIC data 33 In the absence of available survey data, the analysis uses proxies for these losses and repair costs from survey data from neighboring Burundi. Based on this data, annual flooding losses amount to ~US$89 per household and repair costs amount to US$25.60 per household. 34 [Gendered Social Norms Diagnostic and their Impact on Women’s Financial Inclusion in Rwanda, 2022, Access to Finance Rwanda](https://afr.rw/downloads/gendered-social-norms-diagnostic-and-their-impact-on-womens-financial-inclusion-in-rwanda/) Page 18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey data from neighboring Burundi"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "CEIC data", "confidence": 0.8487133383750916}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey data from neighboring Burundi", "confidence": 0.6868865489959717}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data", "confidence": 0.9529375433921814}]}}}
{"input": "with the notion that reduction of expropriation threats led to more effective use of agricultural land that created jobs for the less-skilled. **4.2 Impacts on time use** If, for example by promoting land-related investment or productivity-enhancing transfers of land to more efficient uses or users via rental markets, reforms increased productivity of land use and wages or changed certain activities’ relative productivity, we would expect corresponding shifts in overall labor supply or time allocation across sectors. [15] As we have individual level data on labor supply, we can use regressions for all individuals of working age (16-60 or 16-55 for males and females) in the sample to disaggregate estimated reform effects by gender. [16] Doing so suggests that reforms led to an expansion of labor market opportunities and a significant increase in total labor supply by males -with the young (16-40 years old) focusing on agriculture and the old (41-60 years old) on off-farm work and similar shifts, though no change in aggregate labor supply, by females. 14 With a mean cultivated area of 3.45 mu, the estimated benefit per mu in terms of consumption and income is 3,150*0.077/3.45 and 4,928*0.067/3.45, respectively. . 15 As we have information on time", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "individual level data on labor supply"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "individual level data on labor supply", "confidence": 0.6047635078430176}], "vague_data": [{"text": "individual level data on labor supply", "confidence": 0.4589730501174927}]}}}
{"input": "million people in Sub-Saharan Africa are estimated to live in both extreme poverty (using a $1.9 a day definition) and significant flood risk – thus making them particularly vulnerable to prolonged adverse impacts on livelihoods and well-being. The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of the existing evidence base, especially on flood risk and poverty. Section 3 summarizes the flood risk, population, and poverty data used in the analysis. Section 4 details the analytical methodology and computational process. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. [1] ##### **2. Existing evidence** Prior to the availability of high-resolution global flood hazard maps, studies relied on historical disaster catalogues to produce rough global exposure estimates. Peduzzi et al. (2009) use a global inventory of recorded flood events from EM-DAT to estimate an exposure indicator at the country level. Yet, the lacking data on the spatial distribution and coincidence of flood risk and population, this approach does not allow a robust estimation of exposure headcounts. Jongman et al. (2012) provide the first global flood exposure analysis that utilizes spatial hazard and population data, albeit at relatively coarse resolution by current standards (10 x 10 kilometers for population", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "EM-DAT"}, {"text": "high-resolution global flood hazard maps"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "spatial hazard and population data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "EM-DAT", "confidence": 0.9166174530982971}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "global inventory of recorded flood events from EM-DAT", "confidence": 0.39614978432655334}, {"text": "spatial hazard and population data", "confidence": 0.18792986869812012}, {"text": "historical disaster catalogues", "confidence": 0.1355772465467453}], "vague_data": [{"text": "historical disaster catalogues", "confidence": 0.4640344977378845}, {"text": "spatial hazard and population data", "confidence": 0.3350444436073303}]}}}
{"input": "**Calculate sums** - For each flood risk array, calculate the total number of people exposed and add the results to the World Bank global administrative map shapefile ##### **5. Results** For each of the countries analyzed, the results are available as raster files with a 90m spatial resolution and as shapefiles with data aggregated to the admin 1 (sub-national), admin 0 (national), regional, and global levels. In this section, we present visualizations of key findings as maps, using a variety of spatial scales, as well as graphs to highlight pertinent insights. **5.1.** **Global and regional flood exposure** Our estimates show that globally 2.2 billion people are exposed to some level of flood risk; 1.47 billion people, or 19 percent of the world population, are exposed to a significant level of flood risk (i.e. facing inundation depths of over 0.15 meter in the event of a 1-in-100 year flood, or _moderate_ risk or higher in Figure 2). In other words, considering a global population of 7.7 billion (World Bank, 2019), approximately one in five people in the world are exposed to substantial flood risk. 10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank global administrative map shapefile"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank global administrative map shapefile", "confidence": 0.7352646589279175}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "maps developed for this study allow for this potential in future work. For the HCMC analysis, the location of the slum areas in the PUMA data set are mainly restricted to the old town. Furthermore, slum areas are often difficult to define (with PUMA only identifying potential slums) and the data we have likely does not capture all slum areas within HCMC. In terms of the hazard, the flood maps for HCMC show flood depth and extent from the river and from sea (when looking at the sea level rise scenario). Pluvial flooding and possible ‘sink’-areas in the city are not taken into account. Moreover, the lowest return period we have flood maps for is not low, compared to what is experienced in the city. Some areas of HCMC are flooded every year. Since this analysis used a flood with a 10-year return period as the flooding scenario with the highest recurrence interval we were not able to capture the relative differences in exposure to these yearly/bi-annual flooding events (and we hypothesize that poor people are relatively more exposed to these types of flooding than the general population). Despite these limitations, the analysis presented at the country and city-level can", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PUMA data set"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood maps for HCMC"}, {"text": "flood maps"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PUMA data set", "confidence": 0.9113805294036865}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood maps for HCMC", "confidence": 0.36886605620384216}], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood maps", "confidence": 0.860747218132019}]}}}
{"input": "GRZ’s decentralization policy. This includes procurement and FM responsibilities. Given that the bulk of technical activities are at the district level, adherence with the ESF will rest with the SPMU. The staffing profile of the SPMU will include (a) project manager, (b) environmental specialist, (c) social specialist, (d) civil engineer, (e) agribusiness specialist, (f) project accountant, (g) procurement specialist, (h) admin assistant, and (i) driver. The TOR and eligibility criteria for the above staff will be detailed in the PIM. Detailed institutional and implementation arrangements are provided at annex 1. **B. Results Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements** 52. **The primary responsibility for overall project M&E will lie with the national PMU at the MoHAIS.** The PMU will have M&E capacity to support the establishment of a data platform to track project implementation across different Page 23", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "data platform", "confidence": 0.20390185713768005}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) 9. MEP/PIU should retain all records contracts, invoices, bills, receipts, and other documents) of expenditures related to the Project until at least either one year after the Bank has accepted the audited financial statements covering the period during which the last withdrawal from the loan account was made or two years after the closing date, whichever is later. MEP will give the Bank access to these records to examine them. 10. **FM Supervision** . Project supervision will review the implementation of FM arrangements and performance, identify corrective actions as necessary, and monitor fiduciary risks. Supervision missions will take place on an annual basis and will include desk review of project IFRs and audit reports, following-up on any issues raised by auditors, as appropriate; participation in project supervisions at least once a year, to look into the operation of the control systems and arrangements described in this assessment; and updating the FM rating in the Financial Management Implementation Support and Supervision Report, as needed. In addition, during the first year of execution, the Project will be closely monitored (biannually) to verify that the FM arrangements are working as intended and to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "to build resilience in districts experiencing large refugee inflows. A pilot to reduce gender-based violence (GBV) and violence against children (VAC) also contributed to social cohesion. A 2022 World Bank study on forced displacement reinforced the value of projects such as DRDIP, concluding that ‘multi-sectoral development investments directed to refugees and host communities can improve welfare, mitigate the negative effects of displacement, generate positive externalities for host communities, and promote social cohesion.’ [19] 21. **DRDIP II will be informed by lessons learned from Phase I and from other development responses in Uganda** **and the region over the last seven years.** Based on implementation experience and stakeholder consultations, key lessons include: (a) the CDD approach – particularly community-led procurement – is effective in the Uganda context for planning, community engagement, targeting, monitoring, and implementation; (b) the Labor-Intensive Public Works (LIPW) approach used for integrated natural resource management (INRM) subprojects based on the watershed approach has demonstrated encouraging results for environmental improvement, though with sustainability challenges for commercial assets such as tree plantations; (c) infrastructure investments have been of high quality and have improved basic services, including reported reductions in pupil-classroom, pupil-desk, and pupil-sanitation facility ratios. However, operations and maintenance (O&M) needs", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "of the spatial distribution, we also find significant variation within zones. For example (Figure 8c), western coastal Bangladesh, generally a mid-impact zone, also has significant stretches of coast that have very low historical impacts. To summarize, our focal coastline area has witnessed highly-varied long- and short-term distributions of cyclonic storm impacts during the past 140 years. Our database therefore incorporates three major elements that are important for research on expectations formation and adaptation: pronounced long-term impact clustering; highly-varied clustering over 20-year periods; and a pronounced west/east trend. As previously noted, such variation is necessary for using cyclone impacts as effective statistical controls in comparative adaptation studies. We conclude that our panel database can make a significant contribution to household- and community-level studies that also incorporate social, economic, demographic and political variables from the relevant regions of India and Bangladesh. 21", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "panel database"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "panel database", "confidence": 0.10937287658452988}], "vague_data": [{"text": "panel database", "confidence": 0.8356673717498779}]}}}
{"input": "with partner countries. We accept these overall preferences, and assume that future thematic lending shares will be identical to the lending shares for the period 1998 - 2003. **Table 7.1: Tests of the Cobb-Douglas Allocation Rule:** **Environmental Lending and AAA** (Standard errors in parentheses) Log Log Lending AAA Log Environmental Problem 1.136 1.265 Indicator (EPI) (0.18)** (0.21)** Log OED Success Probability (OSP) 2.602 1.143 (0.73)** (0.87) Constant -9.960 -5.099 (3.09)** (3.67) Observations 139 139 R-squared 0.28 0.21 Adj. R-Squared 0.27 0.20 **F [EPI = OSP = 1]** **2.65** **0.78** **Prob. > F** **0.07** **0.46** significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% _____________________________________________________________ We also use the lending shares as guidelines for AAA, since the Bank’s analytical and advisory activities are supposed to serve its lending program. Table 7.2 presents percent changes associated with movement from actual to optimal lending by sector and region. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the overall gap between actual and optimal environmental lending is small (+5%), but thematic gaps vary from around -40% for climate change and biodiversity to +64% for land. South Asia has a relatively large overall gap (+33%), and thematic gaps ranging from -60% or less for biodiversity and climate change to over", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "GoR has progressive laws and policies on forced displacement.** The World Bank, in consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), has confirmed that Rwanda’s refugee protection framework is adequate for the purposes of access to the Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR). [5] Rwanda is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). The 2014 _Law_ _Relating to Refugees_ complies with international law and entrenches the right to work and freedom of movement. At the policy level, Rwanda’s _Strategic Plan for Refugee Inclusion 2019-2024_ made commitments to: (a) provide all [1 Data is from April 30, 2025. There are also 14,936 asylum-seekers in Rwanda: see https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/rwa](https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/rwa) [2 Loschmann, C., Bilgili, O. & Siegel, M. (2019) “Considering the benefits of hosting refugees: evidence of refugee camps influencing local labour](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40176-018-0138-2) [market activity and economic welfare in Rwanda,” IZA Journal of Development & Migration, pp. 1-23.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40176-018-0138-2) 3 The self-reliance survey is part of the “Enhancing Self-Reliance and Preparedness for Forced Displacement in the Great Lakes Region” activity [(P500793) and draws on the global Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative index (www.refugeeselfreliance.org).](http://www.refugeeselfreliance.org/) 4 Phase I of Jya Mbere was approved on April 30, 2019, and will close", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "global Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative index"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "self-reliance survey"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "self-reliance survey", "confidence": 0.7836562991142273}, {"text": "global Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative index", "confidence": 0.7576558589935303}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "ship-to-shore radio after 1900, aircraft observation after 1940, and satellite observation after 1960. Measurement error has undoubtedly fallen over the years, but we cannot judge whether earlier technologies imparted any systematic bias to the recording of cyclone occurrences, track locations, wind speeds and storm radii. If historical observations have been unbiased estimates of storm characteristics, then the aggregative estimates in this paper should be also be regarded as unbiased, but with significantly-decreasing variance over the 140-year period. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a technical discussion of database construction. Section 3 employs the database to investigate trends in the incidence and power of Indian Ocean cyclonic storms from 1877 to 2016. Section 4 focuses on trends in the spatial distribution of cyclone landfalls in Bangladesh, West Bengal and Odisha, while Section 5 broadens the analysis to impact zones around cyclone landfalls. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper. **2. Georeferenced Database Construction** We combine data from BMD, IMD and IBTrACS to document all recorded cyclonic storms in the Indian Ocean region from 1877 to 2016. We construct a panel database; the component for each storm includes a unique identification number; year and month of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "IBTrACS"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "BMD"}, {"text": "IMD"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BMD, IMD and IBTrACS", "confidence": 0.32856279611587524}], "vague_data": [{"text": "panel database", "confidence": 0.2825346887111664}]}}}
{"input": "have any positive expenditure on these, and we saw earlier that electricity access changes with the mine. This confirms that, among those who spend anything on electricity, they spend more on it in mining communities. **Table 12 Using GLSS: Household income and expenditure** (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) ln ln ln ln household level ln expenditure wages wages wages pc total health hh all women men exp. exp. food housing education energy active*mine 0.520** 0.694*** 0.391 -0.178* -0.126 -0.069 0.316** -0.168 0.297** (0.226) (0.241) (0.238) (0.093) (0.089) (0.095) (0.139) (0.199) (0.119) Observations 6,226 2,914 3,312 7,522 7,522 7,396 7,420 6,541 4,752 R-squared 0.121 0.128 0.118 0.959 0.964 0.963 0.933 0.837 0.950 _controls_ individual Y Y Y hh head Y Y Y Y Y Y hh size Y Y Y Y Y district fe Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y year fe Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y deflated N N N Y Y N N N N mean (ln) 15.30 15.29 15.31 13.04 14.19 13.42 10.88 10.74 9.52 _Note:_ (1) Annual wages and salaries for individuals in all ages (nondeflated). (2) Annual wages and salaries for women in all ages", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS", "confidence": 0.8470591306686401}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Annexe 1 :** Some examples of ED incidents _(Sources : Protection Monitoring, CNCCAI, INSO)_ - _**20/03/23:**_ _around 8 a.m. the vehicle of a local authority jumped on an improvised_ _explosive device at Bougoum, Torodi-Niamey axis (Tillabery region)_ - _**25/05/23 :**_ _ED in Ngouba at the passage of shepherds. 3 dead and cows killed (Diffa region)_ - _**16/06/23**_ _: EE against a DFS vehicle in Chetima Wango. 7 dead / 4 injured (Diffa region)_ - _**6/06/23 :**_ _an explosive remnant of war (ERW) exploded against 03 children in the village of_ _Agali (department/municipality of Dosso). The victims who were looking for scrap metal_ _probably confused the device with a piece of iron that they hit with a hammer. The explosion_ _caused the death of a child and 02 injured. It should be noted that the CNCCAI Regional Branch,_ _which is supposed to coordinate EDRE activities at the regional level, does not exist in Dosso_ _due to a lack of resources._ - _**4/07/2023 :**_ _around 9 a.m., an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) allegedly exploded at the_ _passage of vehicle of the DFS Niyya operation, who were patrolling on the Torodi-Makalondi_ _axis, not far from the village of Niaktiré (Tillabéry region)._ **Annex 2:**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**(3)** **(4)** Would have been payout in 2004 −3.843*** −4.592*** −5.045** −3.788* (0.987) (1.039) (2.173) (1.898) Ratio of hypothetical 2004 payout to 2005 Premium 4.365 −0.755 (4.610) (5.543) Payout ratio squared −1.991 −0.279 (1.814) (2.064) Constant 8.001*** 0.651 7.985*** 1.015 (0.714) (6.341) (0.713) (6.494) Weather station constants NO YES NO YES Observations 733 733 733 733 R-squared 0.073 0.094 0.075 0.097 _Notes_ : The dependent variable is the number of buyers in 2005, which was the first year rainfall insurance was offered to our sample. The unit of observation is the village. Would have been Payout in 2004 is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if there would have been a payout in 2004 had the 2005 policy been offered in that year. This is calculated based on daily rainfall data from APHRODITE and each policy’s payout structure. The weather station constants are the premium in 2005, the average historical payout, the total number of historical payouts, and the standard deviation of rainfall. Historical variables are calculated for the period 1962-2004. Observations are weighted by the quality of rainfall data. If there are no rainfall stations contributing to the APHRODITE data in 2004 within a .75°x.75° grid around", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "daily rainfall data from APHRODITE"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "APHRODITE data", "confidence": 0.11885692179203033}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "daily rainfall data from APHRODITE", "confidence": 0.7079595327377319}], "vague_data": [{"text": "daily rainfall data", "confidence": 0.5080509185791016}]}}}
{"input": "spirit of a Bstress-test^ to examine the seriousness of the issue, this paper employs flood hazard maps and spatial socioeconomic data to examine the following questions in context of Vietnam: 1. How many people are exposed currently? How might this change under climate change? 2. Where is exposure highest currently? How might this change under climate change? 3. How many poor people are exposed currently? How might this change under climate change? Furthermore, given that the dynamics of poverty and natural disasters (and particularly, floods) occur at the local level, analyses at the national scale (or even at the province or district level) may miss important mechanisms and small-scale differences, from one city block to the next. To complement the country-level analysis, we also focus at the local level within Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), a city with high flood exposure. Here, we combine high-resolution flood hazard data with spatial data on slum location to examine the distribution of exposure across poor and non-poor locations. While prior studies have examined flood risk in Vietnam, this paper provides two main contributions. First, we develop new high-resolution flood hazard datasets, which incorporate both riverine and coastal flooding and consider climate change. [1]", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "spatial data on slum location"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps"}, {"text": "spatial socioeconomic data"}, {"text": "high-resolution flood hazard data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood hazard data", "confidence": 0.6378805041313171}, {"text": "high-resolution flood hazard datasets", "confidence": 0.30868425965309143}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood hazard data", "confidence": 0.21625764667987823}, {"text": "spatial data on slum location", "confidence": 0.2143964022397995}, {"text": "flood hazard maps and spatial socioeconomic data", "confidence": 0.1389215886592865}], "vague_data": [{"text": "spatial socioeconomic data", "confidence": 0.8518497347831726}, {"text": "flood hazard maps", "confidence": 0.47776028513908386}, {"text": "spatial data", "confidence": 0.26268208026885986}]}}}
{"input": "skewed. [10] As the scatter plot in Figure 5.1 suggests, the association between overall environmental problems and lending is very strong for those countries that have received environmental loans. **Figure 5.1: World Bank Environmental Lending vs.** **Overall Environmental Problems (Log Scale)** In a log-log regression of environmental lending on the overall environmental indicator (Table 5.1, column 1), the estimated response elasticity is .70, with an associated t-statistic of 10.3 and regression R [2] (adjusted for degrees of freedom) of .53. 10 Conventional regression and correlation analysis assume that variable distributions do not contain extreme “outlier” observations, because such outliers can sharply skew the results. In this case, both nominal and per-capita distributions are extremely skewed. Log measures, on the other hand, have regular, approximately-normal distributions with no outliers. 12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "overall environmental indicator", "confidence": 0.39474913477897644}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the IAs will, however, continue to coordinate with and report to MINEMA pursuant to the terms of MoUs they will sign; and (b) BRD will convene quarterly coordination meetings with other organizations supporting host community-refugee livelihood to identify synergies and opportunities for collaboration. **B. Results Monitoring, Evaluation, and Verification Arrangements** 54. **M&E System.** MINEMA will have overall responsibility for M&E, including the preparation of consolidated quarterly progress reports and an Annual Report to the World Bank. MINEMA, BRD, RTDA and BDF will have M&E specialists responsible for collecting and collating data on project outputs and outcomes. Reporting templates will be reviewed for Phase II and included in an updated M&E section in the PIM. The existing Project MIS will continue to be utilized. 55. **Project results will be captured through baseline, annual and endline surveys.** This will include surveys of users of project-financed infrastructure (schools, health facilities, water systems, markets, etc.) to directly track satisfaction with Jya Mbere II investments. Regular phone surveys will also be conducted for beneficiaries under component two to gather data on business sustainability and profitability to allow for real-time learning and course correction as necessary. Page 15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "baseline, annual and endline surveys"}, {"text": "surveys of users of project-financed infrastructure"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "surveys of users of project-financed infrastructure", "confidence": 0.5007989406585693}], "vague_data": [{"text": "phone surveys", "confidence": 0.13496416807174683}]}}}
{"input": "Bank household surveys are available with subnational representativeness. These subnational units are typically provinces or states (i.e. admin1) but can also include custom groupings of subnational regions determined by the sampling strategy of household surveys. Overall, this study covers 189 countries, which are disaggregated into 2,260 subnational units. **3.4.** **Poverty estimates** For each of the 2,260 subnational units, the World Bank’s Global Monitoring Database offers several poverty estimates, which are all derived from the latest available Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) for the respective country. For the purpose of this study, the standard World Bank definitions of poverty are used to determine the number of poor people in a given subnational administrative unit. Specifically, poverty is defined by the daily expenditure thresholds of $1.90, $3.20, and $5.50. ##### **4. Methodology** **4.1. Concept of analysis** To estimate the number of people who are exposed to intense flood risk, this study follows four main steps: **1.** **Generate a combined flood hazard map:** For each country and each subnational administrative unit, a single flood hazard layer is created by combining different flood types. The resulting flood map has a 90-meters resolution, with each pixel showing estimated inundation depths in meters. For pixels where", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank’s Global Monitoring Database"}, {"text": "Living Standards Measurement Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "household surveys"}, {"text": "Bank household surveys"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Living Standards Measurement Survey", "confidence": 0.7624380588531494}, {"text": "Global Monitoring Database", "confidence": 0.41887882351875305}, {"text": "admin1", "confidence": 0.19374044239521027}, {"text": "flood hazard map", "confidence": 0.10330647230148315}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Global Monitoring Database", "confidence": 0.12965723872184753}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Bank household surveys", "confidence": 0.631813108921051}, {"text": "household surveys", "confidence": 0.1551937758922577}]}}}
{"input": "**Table A2 Summary statistics for children’s surveys** (1) (2) (3) (4) far from a mine close to a mine before during before during _infant mortality_ first 12 months 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 _child health_ diarrhea 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.17 cough 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.18 fever 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.20 _child anthropometrics_ ht/age (st dev.) -94.43 -104.88 -127.04 -115.76 wt/age (st dev.) -90.80 -100.16 -114.28 -103.48 wh/ht (st dev.) -40.29 -45.24 -47.816 -40.52 Sample size (child at birth) 3709 2204 661 314 _Note:_ Column (1) is a sample at 20 to 100 km from a nonactive mine. Column (2) is a sample at 20 to 100 km from an active mine. Column (3) is a sample within 20 km of a nonactive mine. Column (4) is a sample within 20 km of an active mine. Infant mortality considers mine active status in birth year. ht/age = height-to-age; wt/age = weight-to-age; wh/ht = weight to height; st. dev. = standard deviation. **Table A3. Heterogeneous effects for bottom 40%, with urban locality interactions, intensity of** **mining, and timing of opening** Woman’s occupation agri- service profess- manual not earns works culture sales ional labor working cash all year PANEL A: Bottom 40% active*mine 0.033", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "As property rights and their links to rural-urban integration have recently been identified as key reform areas by China’s leadership, drawing the lessons from past reform experiments is important. Yet, beyond anecdotal accounts, few studies aim to assess either the magnitude of associated impacts or their incidence among different types of households. To provide a rigorous quantitative assessment, we use the fact that the experiment was implemented in Chengdu prefecture, with neighboring counties remaining unaffected. Panel data from NBS’ regular rural household survey for counties on both sides of the boundary allow us to assess reform impacts on household consumption and income, labor supply, incidence of land rental, crop choice, and productivity of agricultural land use. We use a triple difference strategy based on changes within the same household before and after the reform and inside vs. outside the boundary for identification, a choice justified by noting that sample counties on both sides of the border followed parallel trends before the intervention and we can control for a range of time variant public programs, in particular pension and medical schemes as well as agricultural subsidies that may have been implemented differently on both sides. Results suggest that about 3-4 years", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "NBS’ regular rural household survey"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "rural household survey", "confidence": 0.5563870668411255}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "countries, however, until very recently Israel did not have an asylum system, and its ongoing institutional evolution is partly a response to the recent influx. Although it carries distinctive features, Israel‘s asylum regime is guided by the prevalent exclusionary logic which dominates the policies of other developed countries. This has important implications for the asylum seekers. Their countries of origin and the scale of their influx challenge existing ̳humanitarian spaces‘. Once a critical threshold has been crossed, they are seen as a threat which can no longer be contained. Accommodating measures are being rejected for self-preservation considerations, spurred-on by Israel‘s ethnonational identity. Relatively little has been written about the meaning and significance of these developments (Willen 2010a, 2010b; Afeef 2009; Kritzman-Amir 2009; Yacobi 2009; Man 2010). This study seeks to complement the existing literature, drawing on a combination of primary and secondary sources. During July 2010, a period of field work was carried out in which 14 semi-structured interviews were conducted. Representatives of the key institutional bodies that deal with refugees and asylum seekers were interviewed; namely the state (officials and politicians); civil society (senior NGO staff and academics); and personnel at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "is derived from a number of data sources and categories: ‘Lagoon’ from ArcWorld (ESRI, 1992: referenced in Lehner and Döll 2004); ‘Delta’, ‘Lagoon’, ‘Mangrove’, ‘Estuary’, ‘Coastal Wetland’, and ‘Tidal Wetland’ of WCMC wetlands map (Dugan, 1993; WCMC, 1993; referenced in Lehner and Döll 2004) - see Lehner and Döll (2004) for a detailed description. 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "WCMC wetlands map"}, {"text": "‘Lagoon’ from ArcWorld"}, {"text": "ArcWorld"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "WCMC wetlands map", "confidence": 0.9031064510345459}, {"text": "ArcWorld", "confidence": 0.17977651953697205}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "a cost in net revenues because it was not clear what value to assign to wages. We controlled for household labor by using household size as a proxy. In each country, districts were chosen to get farms across a wide range of climate conditions in that country. In each chosen district, a random but clustered sample of farms was selected. The clustering helped to reduce survey expenses. The number of surveys in each country 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the ERR to 23 percent while increasing the estimated number of beneficiaries by 20 percent increased the ERR to 35 percent. **B. Fiduciary** **(i)** **Financial Management** 63. The FM assessments for the project implementing agencies were conducted using World Bank Guidance: FM Manual for World Bank Investment Project Financing Operations, reissued on September 7, 2021. The purpose of the assessment was to evaluate the adequacy of FM arrangements to support project implementation. The objectives of the assessment were to determine whether the MoHAIS has minimum FM arrangements, adequate to ensure that (a) funds are properly accounted for and used only for the intended purposes in an efficient and economical way; (b) capability exists for the preparation of accurate, reliable, and timely periodic financial reports; (c) internal controls exist which allow 45 A 15 percent discount rate is estimated as the risk-adjusted opportunity cost of capital. Additional NPV estimates at other discount rates have also been provided as a measure of the sensitivity of the analysis. 46 This corresponds to the average village population in similar areas according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This information can be accessed at Village Assessment Survey County Profiles. [https://iomsouthsudan.org/tracking/sites/default/publicfiles/documents/Lakes.pdf](https://iomsouthsudan.org/tracking/sites/default/publicfiles/documents/Lakes.pdf) _._ 47 Burden of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Village Assessment Survey", "confidence": 0.5561254620552063}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Village Assessment Survey County Profiles", "confidence": 0.12639497220516205}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Bangladesh and the two Indian coastal states, our methods are general and could be expanded to an arbitrarily-large set of coastal locations. We use the database for an analysis of cyclone strike locations and impact zones in seven historical periods: 1877-1900, 1901-1920, 1921-1940, 1941-1960, 1961-1980, 1981-2000 and 2001-2016. Although we believe that our results have independent interest, we highlight their implications for socioeconomic analysis of household and community responses to cyclonic storm risks. Episodic, short-run responses to some individual storms are well-documented. Such anecdotal evidence certainly provides many useful insights, but georeferenced panel data are required for systematic comparative research on coastal adaptation. In this context, robust assessment of causal factors requires significant variation in cyclone impacts, both across coastal areas and over time. The results of our seven-period analysis indicate that such variation characterizes the coastal zone. During each 20-year period, some areas have 20", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "georeferenced panel data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "georeferenced panel data", "confidence": 0.6721758842468262}, {"text": "database", "confidence": 0.12738671898841858}]}}}
{"input": "rural areas** . Maternal mortality remains high (234 deaths for 100,000 births) with rural areas driving the trend [4] . According to the **Human Capital Review for Djibouti (World Bank, 2024)**, access to basic services such as targeted social safety nets, education and healthcare remains limited, with rural areas experiencing the most pronounced deprivations. The widespread poverty in these regions is characterized by poor living conditions, inadequate access to clean water and sanitation, and substandard infrastructure, and limitations on the freedom of movement for camp-based refugees. [5] While this situation is aggravated for refugees, who can face discrimination and challenges related to documentation, members of the host community also live in precarity. These factors contribute to a lower quality of life and hinder economic opportunities. 10. **The Dikhil region, an arid and resource-constrained area in southern Djibouti, faces a unique and multifaceted** **challenge of poverty that requires a comprehensive, integrated rural development approach.** The region not only hosts a significant migrant population, primarily from Ethiopia, but also grapples with chronic underdevelopment, reflected in high poverty rates, limited access to basic services (including water, sanitation, healthcare, and education), and high levels of unemployment. The continuous inflow of migrants places additional strain", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "in working conditions amongst Ukrainian Temporary Protection holders. Employment continued to be mentioned as one of the top two priority needs (32%) of households interviewed. Moreover, in terms of information, 29% of respondents indicated a need for more information about job opportunities; this continued to be the highest reported information need. 4 As per the 2024 Socio-Economic Insights Survey conducted by UNHCR, this figure could be as high as 79% amongst working-age Ukrainian refugees. The data was collected in the period 15 May-16 July. UNHCR / September 2024 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 Socio-Economic Insights Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 Socio-Economic Insights Survey", "confidence": 0.8832820057868958}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Annex** **Table A1. Variable definitions** _Characteristics_ total children Total lifetime fertility wealth Household wealth index score non-migrant Respondent was born in the location and has never moved migrant Any respondent who has ever moved in their life urban The household lives in urban area _Woman’s occupation_ not working Was not working in last 12 months service & sales Works in services or sales professional Works as a professional agriculture Works in agriculture manual labor Works in manual labor earning cash Earns cash for work (0= not paid, in kind) works all year Works all year (0= seasonally, occasionally) _Woman’s education_ 3 years education At least 3 years of education no education No education _Child health_ first 12 months Child died within 12 months from birth diarrhea Child had diarrhea in last 2 weeks cough Child had cough in last 2 weeks fever Child had fever in last 2 weeks _Child anthropometrics_ ht/age (st dev.) Height for age (standard deviation) wt/age (st dev.) Weight for age (standard deviation) wh/ht (st dev.) Weight for height (standard deviation) 40", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "can make a large difference in the flood hazard particularly in well-protected areas. In these wellprotected areas, our flood maps may overestimate the flood hazard. This is a data limitation that affects many studies of flood exposure: even in high-income countries like the US, flood protection databases are incomplete and many areas are left undefended in national models when in reality they are defended (Wing et al. 2017). While recent work has tried to patch together a database of flood protection (Scussolini et al. 2016), the authors admit much remains unclear and this is a current state of the research. For most of the analyses, the Bcombined^ maps are used, which include both coastal and the fluvial/pluvial floods. For instance, the combined maps for the 25-year return period flood (under current conditions, and low, medium, and high future conditions) are presented in Fig. 1. Local Flood Hazard Maps for Ho Chi Minh City In addition to the flood hazard maps developed for this study as described above, we use an additional set of maps produced specifically for HCMC. 2 These uncertainties largely arise from climate models; global climate models (GCMs) struggle to represent the physical processes that produce extreme rainfall.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood protection databases"}, {"text": "flood hazard maps"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "maps produced specifically for HCMC", "confidence": 0.3625243306159973}, {"text": "combined maps for the 25-year return period flood", "confidence": 0.10618157684803009}], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood protection databases", "confidence": 0.7973578572273254}, {"text": "flood maps", "confidence": 0.5062662363052368}, {"text": "flood hazard maps", "confidence": 0.3802639842033386}, {"text": "database of flood protection", "confidence": 0.11687920987606049}]}}}
{"input": "**Figure A2 Using GLSS: Employment and wages** **Panel A Woman working in services** **Panel B Log wages (woman)** **Panel C Man working in mining** **Panel D Log wages (man)** _Note:_ The four panels show the regression results from four spatial lag models using the GLSS sample. The sample is restricted to women (top two) and men (bottom two) aged 15–49. The solid lines are the coefficient for _active*mine_ for 7 distance bins (0–10 km, 10–20 km, ... 60–70 km) compared with a control group (80–100 km) away. The regressions also control for mine location at the same distances. See table 11 for control variables. 45", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS", "confidence": 0.5351956486701965}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1% of occurring in any given year). As with all global flood maps, the effects of artificial flood protection structures like dikes are not incorporated. Two editions of the Fathom global flood maps are available; 2016 and 2019. Wherever available, the newer version has been used. The 2019 version differs from the 2016 version in the resolution of the digital elevation model that has been used to simulate event scenarios. The 2019 edition uses the newest DEM MERIT elevation model that corrects for multiple errors, including tree and building height adjustments. **Coastal flooding** is caused by storm surges and high tides in coastal areas. A commonly used global coastal flood risk map is used in this study: the Global Tide and Surge Reanalysis (GTSR) data set by Muis et al. 2016. As it uses a digital terrain model that does not account for common errors such as stripe noise and tree heights (unlike for instance DTM MERIT), this map is expected to provide a lower bound or conservative estimate of global coastal flood risk. In particular, resulting from coarse resolution in modeling elevation, bathymetry and meteorological forcing, the data set underestimates extreme sea levels. In addition, the largest tropical cyclone-induced", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Fathom global flood maps"}, {"text": "Global Tide and Surge Reanalysis (GTSR)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "global coastal flood risk map"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Fathom global flood maps", "confidence": 0.8301924467086792}, {"text": "DEM MERIT elevation model", "confidence": 0.6047084927558899}, {"text": "Global Tide and Surge Reanalysis", "confidence": 0.43267276883125305}, {"text": "DTM MERIT", "confidence": 0.23212239146232605}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "global flood maps", "confidence": 0.32629379630088806}, {"text": "global coastal flood risk map", "confidence": 0.14844588935375214}, {"text": "digital terrain model", "confidence": 0.12685400247573853}]}}}
{"input": "Our results for total Bank lending are uniformly significant at the 99% level, and the results for the OED ratings are significant at the 95% level or higher. The parameter estimates suggest that a 1% increase in Bank lending is associated with a .4% increase in environmental lending, and a 1% increase in the OED rating is associated with an environmental lending increase of about 1%. Once we control for these two factors, environmental problems retain a significant impact on environmental lending at the 99% level. However, the estimated response elasticity drops from .70 to around .45. The results for AAA in Figure 5.1 are quite different from the results for lending. The association with environmental problems is uniformly significant at the 99% confidence level, but we find no significance for environmental lending, non environmental lending, the OED success probability, or any regional dummies. R squares for the AAA regressions are much lower than R-squares for lending, suggesting a much greater random component in the allocation of AAA resources. **6. Allocation by Environmental Theme** From an institutional perspective, our overall results for lending are encouraging because they suggest that large, politically-difficult reallocations across countries would not generally be necessary to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "OED ratings", "confidence": 0.11976642161607742}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) 47. **The economic analysis suggests that this Project would yield positive benefits that outweigh its costs, with a** **Net Present Value estimated at US$383 million.** The internal rate of return is 21 percent, with a 5 percent discount rate. The analysis estimates the Project’s economic impact by projecting the increased earning potential of graduating cohorts as they participate in the labor market. Upon evaluating the anticipated effect size of the Project’s components on academic performance, the analysis converted these gains to additional years of schooling, and subsequently to increased income. The graduating student cohorts were disaggregated to those who entered the workforce immediately upon finishing secondary school and those who pursued tertiary education to account for the variance in workforce participation and the years in which they would enter the workforce. The analysis aggregated the effect on income until 2039, when the last cohort who benefit from the Project would graduate from the compulsory education system in Costa Rica. Annex 2 presents the Economic and Financial Analysis for the Project. **Paris Alignment** 48. **Assessment and reduction of mitigation risks.** Project activities are expected to have negligible GHG contributions, and as", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**______________________________________________________________________________** **Table 4.1: Trend Tests for Thematic Shares** Climate Pollution Land Biodiversity [8] Water Policy Other Time 0.318 -0.167 0.639 0.074 0.008 -1.071 0.199 (0.63) (0.19) (1.38) (0.37) (0.01) (1.65) (1.09) Constant 8.337 33.404 8.529 2.215 20.456 24.930 2.128 (2.44)* (5.54)** (2.72)* (1.61) (5.86)** (5.67)** (1.71) Obs. 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 R-squared 0.04 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.23 0.12 Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses - significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% **______________________________________________________________________________** Produced by thousands of interactions between the Bank and its partner countries, these results suggest very strong continuity in the relative valuation of thematic objectives. We will return to this point in Section 7, which develops a model for the optimal allocation of environmental resource allocation by the Bank. **5. How Has Environment Mattered in the Aggregate?** We begin our assessment by analyzing the match between environmental lending, AAA and environmental problems at the country level. Our overall environmental indicator is the mean of the five thematic indicators. [9] We use log values for the analysis because the size distributions of country indicators and resource allocations are extremely 8 For biodiversity, our data include only Bank lending. Grants by the Global Environment", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Bank lending"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "thematic indicators", "confidence": 0.4748649001121521}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Uganda Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project Phase II (P510476) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT include selected activities in the transit districts of Kisoro, Kanungu, Bundibugyo, and Ntoroko (Western Region) and Amuru and Lamwo (Northern Region). [14] The urban centers of Gulu, Mbarara, Arua, Koboko, and Kitgum will be included in some components. Geographic coverage can be expanded later if the government officially adds new RHDs or transit districts. Implementation will commence first in the 12 RHDs, where project structures from Phase I can be rapidly reestablished. Activities will commence in the transit districts and urban centers in year two, once needs assessments have been completed. DRDIP II’s largest footprint will be in the north, which has been most affected by the recent inflows. Planning and implementation will be informed by a clear understanding of the context of each district. 16. **Transit districts do not permanently host refugees, but field assessments have shown that population flows in** **those locations affect the delivery of basic services while asylum seekers wait to have their status assessed and be** **assigned to a host district.** Accordingly, project funds will be allocated to respond to the displacement impacts in the transit districts to expand", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "contain the marketing restricted sample, which is restricted only to villages where at least one person purchased insurance in the following year. All regressions contain state fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the weather-station level. ***p _<_ 0.01, **p _<_ 0.05, *p _<_ 0.1. _Source_ : Authors’ analysis based on data from BASIX. the year before. I then regress the number of each type of buyer on payout statistics and the total number of buyers in the previous year. When there was an insurance payout in the previous year, most of the repeat buyers received money from the insurance company while new buyers did not receive anything. [14] If there are similar effects of payouts on people who had not purchased insurance the year before, this would be evidence that insurance payouts are generating trust and/or learning about insurance. [15] These results are presented in table 7. In order to compare results with the main specification in table 3, I again provide a dummy for whether there was a payout in the village along with a quadratic effect of the ratio of payouts to the premium. When aggregating the village data, I use the mean of the payout ratios in", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "BASIX"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "marketing restricted sample", "confidence": 0.3759673833847046}, {"text": "data from BASIX", "confidence": 0.154296875}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX", "confidence": 0.6282528042793274}], "vague_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX", "confidence": 0.15608134865760803}, {"text": "village data", "confidence": 0.1260233074426651}, {"text": "payout statistics", "confidence": 0.10482048988342285}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Integrated Community Resilience Project (P506969) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT incorporate climate risk awareness and opportunities, covering areas such as sustainable livestock practices, waterefficient grazing, hydroponics, and solar-powered solutions. 49. **In addition to IGAs, support will be provided to cooperatives, family businesses and individual entrepreneurs,** **including those with existing business activities and potential for growth** . These interventions will help beneficiaries scale their operations, improve productivity, and access markets. Beneficiaries, including refugees and host communities, will collaborate on IGAs or business ventures, utilizing peer learning, skills-sharing, and value-chain integration to expand market access. Priority for business support will be given to sectors that generate jobs, particularly those that leverage value chains and cross-border economic opportunities. The project will strengthen market linkages and value chain integration, helping beneficiaries connect with local, national, and regional markets. This approach will include training on business development, understanding value chains, accessing new markets, and procurement, which will increase the sustainability of their activities and expand their reach. Finally, the sub-component will provide ongoing mentorship and technical assistance to ensure business sustainability. Animateurs will work closely with beneficiaries to provide tailored support in managing and growing their businesses, helping them overcome challenges and build resilience", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "National Adaptation Plan (NAP) (2019)**, aiming to reduce vulnerability to climate change and to facilitate integration of adaptation into all levels of development planning including (i) access to water for all; ii) the promotion of best practices in the agricultural, forestry, fishery, and tourism sectors and reduced vulnerability to the effects of climate change and increase the resilience of the most exposed socioeconomic or geographical sectors; iii) the protection of ecosystems and ecosystem services; and iv) the resilience of key strategic infrastructure. The project will contribute to the objectives of the NAP with climate adaptation activities outlined in component 2 and financial inclusion under component 1. 20. **The Project is also fully aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement** . The project is aligned with Djibouti’s commitment to combatting climate change as outlined in the 2023 revised Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). The government prepared a draft version of a revised NDC outlining both mitigation and adaptation measures aligned 17 World Bank (2024), Climate Change Development Report 18 World Bank (2023), [World Development Report 2023: Migrants, Refugees and Societies](https://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2023/06/29/wdr2023) Page 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Economics of Disasters and Climate Change Barrett A, McIntosh R, Pritchard M, Hannan M, Alam Z, Marks M (2013) Asset Values: Why Are Some Households Doing Better than Others? Chars Livelihood Program Ceola S, Laio F, Montanari A (2014) Satellite nighttime lights reveal increasing human exposure to floods [worldwide. Geophys Res Lett 41(20):7184–7190. https://doi.org/10.1002/2014GL061859](https://doi.org/10.1002/2014GL061859) Chinh DT, Dung NV, Gain AK, Kreibich H (2017) Flood loss models and risk analysis for private households in can Tho City. Vietnam Water 9:313 De Lay S (2011) Slums in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. Global Cities 2011. [http://hochiminhcity2011.jimdo.](http://hochiminhcity2011.jimdo.com/slums/) [com/slums/](http://hochiminhcity2011.jimdo.com/slums/) Del Valle, Alejandro et al. (2018) The Short-Term Economic Impact of Tropical Cyclones: Satellite Evidence from Guangdong Province. Econ Dis Climate Chang 1–11 DHI (2003) MIKE 11 - A Modelling System for Rivers and Channels. Short Introduction Tutorial. Water and Environment Fay M (2005) The Urban Poor in Latin America. Directions in Development - General. The World Bank. [http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/0-8213-6069-8](http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/0-8213-6069-8) FIM (2013) Final Report, Volume 2, Integrated Flood Management Strategy. Ho Chi Minh City Flood and Inundation Management Geographic Information Science and Technology (2015) Landscan Population Data. Oak Ridge National Laboratory [GFDRR (2015) Country Profile - Vietnam. https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr/files/region/VN.pdf](https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr/files/region/VN.pdf) Goeschl T, Managi S (2017) Public in-kind relief", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Landscan Population Data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Landscan Population Data", "confidence": 0.6069152355194092}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Landscan Population Data", "confidence": 0.24780945479869843}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "protection to respond to ecosystem** **degradation in the RHDs and additional impacts caused by climate change and refugee presence.** The expansion of farming by refugees and host communities is driving rapid deforestation in the RHDs, reducing the extent of natural forests and woodlands. Refugees and hosts also harvest wood for cooking, shelter, and fencing in excess of sustainable yields, causing additional degradation of tree cover and affecting fragile sites such as wetlands, hillsides, and riverine areas. In addition to the environmental impacts, this can be a source of tension between refugees and host community members. Climate change is exacerbating these challenges, as previously explained, with lower rainfall, longer and more frequent droughts, and more frequent extreme weather events. These factors are causing more crop failure, water scarcity and floods, droughts and landslides. The component will support 730,000 people (50 percent female/20 percent refugees) with enhanced resilience of terrestrial and aquatic systems, covering at least 11,200 hectares of land. 21 The AI Model was produced under the Enhancing Self-Reliance and Preparedness for Forced Displacement in the Great Lakes Region Advisory Services and Analytics (P500793). Data and analysis from the model, if rendered live, could also be used to support monitoring, evaluation,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "AI Model", "confidence": 0.5989602208137512}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Data and analysis from the model", "confidence": 0.10756339877843857}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "areas, our flood maps may over-estimate the flood hazard. When including climate change, this percentage increases by 13–27%, depending on the severity of sea level rise. This increase in exposure is due to the concentration of the population in coastal areas. For the 50-year flood, more than a third (38%) of today’s population is already exposed. Given climate change, this number is expected to increase by 7–21% (resulting in overall exposure of between 40 and 48%) for the same return period (50-year). For a 100- and 200-year flood under a high climate scenario, more than half of the population is exposed. Climate change impacts can be seen in these exposure numbers - for instance, a 50-year flood with medium climate change impacts has the same exposure of a 200-year historical flood (at 44%), while almost half the country’s population (48%) is exposed to a 50-year flood with high climate impacts. Full results are presented in Table 3. But these national results on exposure are not evenly be distributed across the country. The spatial analysis also allows us to examine which districts have the highest absolute and the highest relative exposure. We present results for the 25-year flood, for a historical", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "national results on exposure", "confidence": 0.2346244901418686}], "vague_data": [{"text": "national results on exposure", "confidence": 0.2847062647342682}]}}}
{"input": "more difficult. According to UNHCR’s protection monitoring, over 54% of families have at least one child without a birth certificate, and 71% have family members without national identity cards. Displaced populations are often unable to access or have lost civil documentation and face challenges getting replacements for reasons connected to their displacement. Often legal assistance is needed to resolve the issue and access to justice is inhibited by the lack of identity documents. Without additional funding, 12,780 IDPs and IDP returnees won’t be able to access identity documents or legal assistance. UNHCR’s protection monitoring found that 91% of IDP households have at least one member with a vulnerability. Without additional funding, 3,170 extremely vulnerable people will go without urgent tailored support to those processing trauma and living with mental health issues, survivors of gender-based violence, elderly individuals often living alone, and people with disabilities. [For more information, please contact the UNHCR MENA Regional Ofce in Amman (Jordan) at: MENAreporting@unhcr.org](https://www.unhcr.org/) [www.unhcr.org](https://www.unhcr.org/) ~~6~~", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Note:_ This figure shows the mine locations and the district in which the mines are located. The baseline specification is shown in the following equation: Y��� - β�active_district�� - ∝�� g� �λX�� �ε��� �3� The outcome for individual _i_ in district _d_ in time period _t_ is regressed on district and year fixed effects, an indicator for whether the individual lived in an active mine district at the time of the interview, and time varying individual-level factors. Even though the treatment is defined at the district level, we use individual-level data to be able to control for individual- level factors and explore heterogeneity at the individual level. The standard errors are, however, clustered at the district level to take into account the interdependence induced by the higher-level treatment. Since the treatment variable is at the same level as our district fixed effects, the _β1_ coefficients are directly interpretable as difference-in-differences estimates. That is, they capture the difference between mining districts and nonmining districts before and after mining starts. In estimating the district-level effects of mine openings on birth outcomes, we control for birth year fixed effects instead of survey-year fixed effects, as we are interested in the effect of mining", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "individual-level data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "individual-level data", "confidence": 0.9371232390403748}]}}}
{"input": "works with states to address the challenges of irregular and mixed movements at Europe’s borders through a comprehensive [route-based approach. This strategy focuses on](https://www.refworld.org/policy/strategy/unhcr/2024/en/148087) coordinated actions to protect refugees and migrants, uphold their rights and reduce dangerous journeys. It emphasizes cooperation among states, UN agencies and civil society to manage irregular movements and ensure responses align with international obligations. 2 Mediterranean Situation [Operational Data Portal](https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean) 3 8,500 arrivals to Italy; 6,900 to Greece; 6,500 arrivals to Spain (4,095 of whom arrived in the Canary Islands); and 216 to Cyprus. 4 As of 30 September 2024. Page 4 **U N H C R R E G I O N A L B U R E A U F O R E U R O P E,** O C T O B E R 2 0 2 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Operational Data Portal", "confidence": 0.6815322041511536}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "vulnerable communities, including refugees and host communities. By linking safety nets with livelihood opportunities and broader socio-economic development, the project aims to foster resilience, inclusion, and sustainable economic growth in target areas. These include underserved regions such as Dikhil and refugee-hosting locations facing pressures from population inflows, strained public services, and climaterelated vulnerabilities. Additionally, the social protection support will be expanded across all regions to ensure broader coverage. **B. Theory of Change and PDO Indicators** 19 World Bank, 2025, Djibouti Climate Change Development Report (CCDR) 20 Project’s activities are exposed to identified climate risks (extreme heat, droughts, floods), but each activity financed under this operation will integrate climate-resilient design to reduce material risks to an acceptable level. Page 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PDO Indicators", "confidence": 0.24118219316005707}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "gain from having full ownership as compared to only occupancy rights on customary land is expected to amount to 3.5% for coffee, 16.3% for fruits, and 20.0% for banana with correspondingly larger gains of 9.3%, 31.9%, and 39.1%, respectively, on freehold or _mailo_ land. To interpret these figures, note that they are very conservative estimates as they completely neglect the value of soil fertility investment which can be very large according to recent studies valuing annual nutrient loss due to lack of soil conservation at 20% of average household income (Pender _et al._ 2004). Given that in addition we also exclude any credit-related investment incentives due to clear land ownership, the coefficients estimated here points towards substantial economic effects of overlapping property rights. **4.3 Options to increase tenure security** Our results thus far imply that, despite legal provisions aiming to strengthen property rights to land that is only occupied but not owned, significant and quantitatively large investment disincentives persist and cause productivity losses of considerable magnitude. This makes it important to explore other ways of bringing investment levels on such land closer to the social optimum. To explore this, our survey asked households who occupied land under usufruct about their", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey", "confidence": 0.1946948617696762}]}}}
{"input": "members’ labor supply to farm or off-farm activities, migration, income from different sources, and an account of agricultural output and inputs. We also have data on key village characteristics including total working age population, agricultural land, and distance to public health and education facilities to control for village level time-varying effects. With 9-13 villages per county and a sample size of 10 households per village, the pre-reform sample comprises a total of 310 and 470 households inside and outside Chengdu, respectively. [11] The post-reform sample similarly includes 280 and 390 households inside and outside the prefecture boundary. After dropping some 5% of sample households who neither engaged in productive activities nor participated in labor markets due to old age or disability, we end up with a sample of 285 pre- and 259 post-reform 9 The NBS sample is drawn from a fixed set of counties. We compare outcomes of NBS households in counties from both sides of the Chengdu prefecture border with three counties in Chengdu and four counties in Meishan and Ziyang. 10 We use the years of 2005 and 2006 for the pre-reform and of 2011 and 2012 for the post-reform period. To avoid contamination as land reform", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "data on key village characteristics"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "NBS sample", "confidence": 0.1652967780828476}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data on key village characteristics", "confidence": 0.21160081028938293}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "resilience: learning from the ecological wisdom of living with floods in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta. Landsc Urban Plan 155:69–78 McElwee P et al (2017) Flood vulnerability among rural households in the red River Delta of Vietnam: implications for future climate change risk and adaptation. Nat Hazards 86(1):465–492 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (2009) Climate Change, Sea Level Rise Scenarios for Vietnam Patankar A (2015) The Exposure, Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity of Households to Floods in Mumbai. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7481 PUMA (2013) Interim Report Version 1.0.^ Platform for Urban Management and Analysis (PUMA) Software Development and Satellite Imagery Processing Consultants Rozenberg J, Hallegatte S (2016). Modeling the impacts of climate change on future Vietnamese households: a micro-simulation approach Scussolini, P., Aerts, J. C., Jongman, B., Bouwer, L. M., Winsemius, H. C., de Moel, H., & Ward, P. J. (2016). FLOPROS: an evolving global database of flood protection standards. Nat Hazards Earth Syst Sci, 16(5), 1049–1061 Smith A, Freer J, Bates P, Sampson C (2014) Comparing ensemble projections of flooding against flood estimation by continuous simulation. J Hydrol 511:205–219 Thoai TQ et al (2018) Determinants of farmers’ adaptation to climate change in agricultural production in the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "FLOPROS"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "FLOPROS", "confidence": 0.8279121518135071}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "provided protection, access to services, and inclusion into national systems. However, host governments and communities need support to guarantee access to rights and services, provide dedicated support for the most vulnerable, foster greater inclusion and ensure social cohesion. UNHCR leads the **[Regional Refugee Response Plan](https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/105903)** (RRP) for the Ukraine Situation in these efforts along with more than 300 partners. In 2024, UNHCR aims to assist over **850,000 refugees with protection support** including information and counselling, targeted cash for protection and socio-economic activities, including livelihoods support. For more on UNHCR's 2024 plans and financial requirements for the Ukraine Situation, see **[here.](https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/106081)** **UNHCR’S 2024 FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS** **FOR UKRAINE SITUATION COUNTRIES** US$ million # 993.3 **TOTAL FUNDED (as of 30 Sept 2024)** % # 52 **COUNTRY** **TOTAL** **BUDGET** **(USD)** **TOTAL FUNDED** **(%)** Bulgaria **$17.0M** 71% Czech Republic **$11.9M** 44% Estonia **$4.2M** 50% Hungary **$14.2M** 60% Latvia **$4.2M** 50% Lithuania **$4.2M** 50% Poland **$85.0M** 38% Rep. of Moldova **$102.8M** 60% Romania **$54.3M** 45% Slovakia **$20.3M** 53% Ukraine **$598.9M** 52% [1 IOM DTM - Ukraine](https://dtm.iom.int/ukraine) Page 3 **U N H C R R E G I O N A L B U R E A U F O R E U R O P E,**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Regional Refugee Response Plan", "confidence": 0.4461275637149811}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Some instances, such as when prescribed medications conflicted with known conditions, illustrated a disconnect between patient backgrounds and treatment approaches in the Czech healthcare system. This forced some refugees to rely on bringing medications from Ukraine, exacerbated by difficulties obtaining longterm prescriptions. Language barriers also hinder effective communication of health needs. Many focus group discussion respondents highlighted the need to rely on assistance during medical appointments. It was also observed that participants face uncertainty about obtaining disability certificates, with most participants unaware of the process. Notably, healthcare emerged as the fourth most important information need during protection monitoring. _2 UNHCR Focus Group Discussion with 10 Ukrainian refugee women 25-59 years of age in January 2024 in Prague._ _3 UNHCR Focus Group Discussions with 28 Ukrainian elderly refugees aged 60-79 (26 women, 2 men) in Prague and Plzen in March -_ _April 2024._ UNHCR / March 2024 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "of buyers 6,425 10,074 3,375 19,874 Total number of buyers (for whom insurance is available in following year) 5,579 5,418 NA 10,997 Total number of buyers (in villages where there was at least one buyer the following year) 2,462 1,739 NA 4,201 Number of buyers who repurchase in following year 453 364 NA 817 Buyers receiving payouts 351 1,346 529 2,226 Average Average sum insured (Rs) 3,055 1,612 3,547 2,738 Average payout (Rs) 11 60 88 53 Average payout (Rs, if payout _>_ 0) 195 360 553 370 _Notes_ : This table lists summary statistics for the individual sample. The sample only includes people who purchased rainfall insurance from BASIX in a given year. _Source_ : Authors’ analysis based on data from BASIX. For rainfall data, I use a historical daily grid of rainfall, which is interpolated based on readings from thousands of rainfall stations throughout India. The data are provided by the Asian Precipitation Highly 3 The states are, in descending order of number of buyers, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Jharkand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa. 4 Note that BASIX also sold many policies in the district of Deogarh in Jarkhand, and those buyers are omitted from this analysis. The", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "historical daily grid of rainfall"}, {"text": "data from BASIX"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Asian Precipitation", "confidence": 0.21536612510681152}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "historical daily grid of rainfall", "confidence": 0.647516131401062}, {"text": "data from BASIX", "confidence": 0.2302398830652237}], "vague_data": [{"text": "rainfall data", "confidence": 0.24403078854084015}]}}}
{"input": "the OECD, a highly skilled workforce, and a transformative digitalization and management agenda. **Foundational Learning** 5. **National assessments show weakness in foundational learning, and learning outcomes are strongly correlated** **to socioeconomic conditions, which points to the need for foundational learning with deeper attention to the education** **outcomes of students from poorer families.** Costa Rica reactivated standardized national assessments in 2023; the first results from 2023 were released in March 2024 and indicated that about a third of the students at the end of Primary schooling are at the “basic” level of learning. Internationally comparable Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) data for Costa Rica for 2018 shows that while 28 percent of children from families in the top quintile of the PISA index for economic, social and cultural status were below Level 2 on Reading in PISA (considered the minimum of adequate performance), 72 percent of children from families from the lowest quintile of the PISA index were below level 2. Foundational learning (literacy and numeracy) in early grades paves the way for future learning, and differences in educational attainment become magnified through youth and adult life in the acquisition of human capital. Without any claims regarding causation, it is", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Internationally comparable Programme for International Student Assessment"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "PISA index for economic, social and cultural status"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Internationally comparable Programme for International Student Assessment", "confidence": 0.25907185673713684}, {"text": "PISA index", "confidence": 0.22870391607284546}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Uganda Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project Phase II (P510476) **I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT** PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT **A.** **Project Strategic Context** 1. **The Government of Uganda’s (GoU’s) progressive refugee response model has generated a development** **dividend for hosting districts, but they still face major development challenges and refugees are well short of achieving** **self-reliance.** Increasing refugee inflows continue to place a strain on host communities at a time of declining humanitarian aid. Since Phase I of the Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP) in the Horn of Africa was approved in May 2016, the refugee population in Uganda has increased markedly from 220,000 to over 1.8 million. [1] More inflows are expected given the ongoing instability in the region. Most refugees are hosted in rural communities that are struggling with poverty and unemployment, human capital and service delivery deficits, limited basic infrastructure, and a degraded natural resource base. Despite the opportunities and rights afforded them, refugees in Uganda lack employment opportunities and suffer from poverty rates almost three times higher than Ugandan nationals. Given the huge population, self-reliance of refugees and host communities is an important development priority for Uganda. As a regional and global example of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "MEP reforms are geared towards sustainability** . [22] An important consideration of the reform program is that the planned interventions do not require a level of investment that would put inordinate fiscal pressure regarding the MEP budget. Expenditures such as the investments planned for the digitalization agenda of the MEP are expected to be absorbed into the MEP budget at the end of the proposed Project. Efficiency enhancement under the reform would enable enhancement of the quality of service delivery as well as aid sustainability overall - an example is the reform of the functioning of local school councils, supported better by MEP through modernized information systems. These reforms would result in better maintenance of the physical plant and enhance sustainability of investments. **C. Relevance to Higher Level Objectives** 17. **This Project is aligned with High-Level Outcome 2 (Strengthened and Preserved Human Capital) of the World** **Bank Group’s Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Costa Rica (FY24-FY28), discussed by the Board on April 30,** 22 [https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/04/12/pr-24112-costa-rica-6th-review-of-eff-arrangement-and-3rd-review-of-rsf-arrangement](https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/04/12/pr-24112-costa-rica-6th-review-of-eff-arrangement-and-3rd-review-of-rsf-arrangement) Page 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "weather station level. ***p _<_ 0.01, **p _<_ 0.05, *p _<_ 0.1. _Source_ : Authors’ analysis based on data from BASIX and APHRODITE. Column 1 presents the baseline regression, which shows that villages that experienced a rainfall shock in 2004 actually had an average of 3.8 _fewer_ purchasers in 2005. One worry with this regression may be that because the insurance policies and rainfall patterns of each location are different, the definition of a 11 The APHRODITE weather data provides information about how many local weather stations contributed to a certain rainfall reading. Since some of the rainfall observations are likely to be more accurate than others, I weight them according to accuracy. If there are no rainfall stations contributing to the APHRODITE data in 2004 within a .75°×.75° grid around the desired BASIX weather station, the observation is given a weight of 1. If there is a least one weather station in this .75°×.75° grid, the observation is given a weight of 1.5. If there is a rainfall station within the .25°×.25°grid, the observation is given a weight of 2. The weighted results do not differ significantly from the unweighted results. 12 Note that while it is reasonable to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "BASIX"}, {"text": "APHRODITE weather data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "APHRODITE weather data", "confidence": 0.8345730900764465}, {"text": "APHRODITE data", "confidence": 0.11571735888719559}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX and APHRODITE", "confidence": 0.4308854937553406}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The World Bank Economic Review 693 low rates of rainfall insurance uptake in Andhra Pradesh, India, Giné, Townsend, and Vickery (2008) suggest that “over time, lessons learned by insurance ‘early adopters’ will filter through to other households, generating higher penetration rates among poor households.” This paper seeks to understand how previous insurance payouts can affect future insurance purchasing decisions, and what mechanisms can explain this behavior. Using data on three years of insurance purchasers from the Indian microfinance institution BASIX, I find that customers who received an insurance payout are 9 to 22 percent more likely to repurchase in the following year than customers who did not receive any insurance payments. I show that this effect cannot be accounted for by neo-classical explanations, such as wealth effects, changing expectations about weather, or trust in the insurance company. Instead, I argue that it is caused by the behavioral effects of receiving an insurance payout. I test two main hypotheses as to why receiving payouts could increase insurance demand the following year. First, several studies have shown that weather shocks themselves could have an effect on insurance demand (Kunreuther, Sanderson, and Vetschera 1985; Eling, Pradhan, and Schmit 2014; Turner, Said, and Afzal", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data on three years of insurance purchasers", "confidence": 0.2559937536716461}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "exposure and vulnerability towards natural hazards: the Disaster Risk Index. Natural Hazards and Earth System Science. Vol. 9, pp. 1149–1159, Rentschler, J, de Vries Robbé, S, Braese, J, Huy Nguyen, D, van Ledden, M, and Pozueta Mayo, B. 2020. Resilient Shores: Safeguarding Vietnam’s Coastal Development in the Face of Disaster Risks. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Smith, A., C. Sampson, P. Bates (2015) Regional flood frequency analysis at the global scale. Water Resources Research. Vol.51, 539–553 Smith, A., P. Bates, O. Wing, C. Sampson, N. Quinn, J. Neal (2019) New estimates of flood exposure in developing countries using high-resolution population data. Nature Communications Vol.10, pp. 1814 UNDRR (2017) Global Assessment Report 2017. Geneva: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction World Bank and Australian AID, 2014. “’Where Are We During Flooding?’ A Qualitative Assessment of Poverty and Social Impacts of Flooding in Selected Neighborhoods of HCMC.” Washington, DC. 26", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Disaster Risk Index"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "high-resolution population data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Disaster Risk Index", "confidence": 0.10936551541090012}, {"text": "high-resolution population data", "confidence": 0.10132041573524475}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution population data", "confidence": 0.46570587158203125}], "vague_data": [{"text": "high-resolution population data", "confidence": 0.4794771373271942}]}}}
{"input": "process. 60. **The Inspectorate of Government (IG) will remain engaged in implementation arrangements** at the national and local government level to strengthen transparency and accountability and to prevent and respond to corruption. **B. Results Monitoring, Evaluation, and Verification Arrangements** 61. **M&E System.** OPM will have overall responsibility for M&E, including the preparation of consolidated quarterly progress reports and an Annual Report to the World Bank. The PIST will have a dedicated M&E specialist responsible for collecting and collating data on project outputs and outcomes. Reporting templates will be reviewed for Phase II and included in an updated M&E section in the PIM. The existing Project MIS will continue to be utilized, including use of the Page 16", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Project MIS", "confidence": 0.16361555457115173}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "During pre-testing of the survey instrument [4], it was determined that some African farmers cultivated at least two plots of land. Subsequently, the survey data collected crop data, including production quantities, amount sold, and sale receipts from crops for the largest single plot of cultivated land (referred to hereafter as the main plot) and all others (referred to as the secondary plot). In the following analysis we therefore contend with two plots. In the first stage of the analysis, we estimated a probit model of whether to irrigate or not (Table 2). We relied on the 10880 plots (out of a total of 10933) for which we have complete information for the regression. The explanatory variables in the first stage included seasonal climate variables, various soils, and flow (millions of m [3] ). We included only the linear climate variables in the first stage. We tested the inclusion of quadratic climate variables but found the linear model to be more reliable. (Log pseudolikelihood = -2340.59 and r-squared 0.51 versus -2187.4434 and 0.54, respectively, for the quadratic probit model.) The Chow test for determining the null hypothesis that the estimated parameters are jointly the same is rejected (chi [2] (30) =", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data collected crop data"}, {"text": "crop data, including production quantities, amount sold, and sale receipts from crops"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "crop data", "confidence": 0.7731302976608276}, {"text": "survey data", "confidence": 0.1670336276292801}]}}}
{"input": "Phase II. A minimum of US$50 million under the sub-component will be allocated to economic infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, markets, and storage facilities to support income generation and deepen integration with economic opportunity activities under Component 3. Economic infrastructure will also include the construction, upgrading, and/or rehabilitation of TVET centers and secondary schools to address limited access to job skills training and low school transition rates. DRDIP II will strengthen the administrative capacity and protection role of the Department of Refugees (DoR) by financing a new office building in Kampala, and the rehabilitation or upgrading of Refugee Settlement Commandant offices will also be included in the menu of options. Based on experience from DRDIP Phase I, investments in socioeconomic infrastructure are expected to account for approximately 80 percent of the sub-component's financing, while 20 percent will finance equipment. 26. **Subproject budget ceiling.** Sixty percent of the budget will be allocated to Community Investment Fund (CIF) subprojects, with a budget ceiling of US$300,000, an increase of US$50,000 over Phase I. The remaining 40 percent will be for larger Strategic Investment Fund (SIF) subprojects, the budget for which will range from US$300,000-US$900,000, compared to US$250,000-US$600,00 under Phase I. [20] The budget", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "we would expect accelerated outmigration from newly-impacted communities and, perhaps, deceleration in communities where cyclone strikes have declined. These changes would reflect both damage from actual impacts and revised expectations about future impacts. In this context, robust tests of expectations formation have two requirements. The first is a georeferenced panel database of the type assembled for this exercise. The second is significant temporal and spatial variation in cyclone impacts, which enable them to serve as effective statistical controls in multivariate analyses of household and community changes over time. To determine whether our data meet the second requirement, we perform an intertemporal assessment using the seven previously-defined periods for 1877-2016. Within each period, we consider the full set of spatially-ordered coastline points numbered 0 (the southernmost coastal point of Odisha) to 11,327 (the southernmost coastal point of Bangladesh). We register each coastal landfall at the closest point of initial strike and compute distribution statistics for spatial order numbers. Figures 3 and 4 display our results for the landfalls of 178 cyclonic storms from 1877 to 2016. Figure 3 provides a geographical perspective by mapping median landfall points for each period. Two conclusions are immediately clear. First, the locus of cyclone landfalls", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "georeferenced panel database"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "georeferenced panel database"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "georeferenced panel database", "confidence": 0.34902673959732056}], "vague_data": [{"text": "georeferenced panel database", "confidence": 0.7511409521102905}]}}}
{"input": "or extension process. In line with previous reports, the main challenges related to applying for Temporary Protection were long waiting times to receive a decision (44%), a lack of required documents (such as ID or proof of address) to complete the registration process (40%), and, despite its overall decrease in prevalence, a lack of interpretation (20%). Awareness of the process continues to be relatively high with only 16% of respondents reporting lack of information on the registration or extension of their status. **Access to documentation:** With respect to identity documents, 24% of respondents reported at least one household member not having documentation or holding expired documents. The main type of missing document was an international passport (88%) and the most common reason for the inability to renew or replace the missing or expired document was the unavailability of service (70%). 47% of households with missing documents indicated being impacted by this, most often by not being able to move freely or to access basic services. #### Protection Risk II **Access to adequate housing:** As for Q3 findings from Protection Monitoring interviews highlighted accommodation as the highest priority need for respondents (147 respondents, 34%). ## 34% reported accommodation as their highest", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "participation, few disputes, and at reasonable cost. Coverage was almost complete, allowing issuance of long-term or permanent contracts for most of the land. **3.1 Descriptive statistics** Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on household characteristics, welfare, agricultural production, and time use for the pre- and post-reform periods inside and outside Chengdu (col. 1-4), estimated pre-reform trends (cols. 5 and 6), and a test of the significance of differences in such trends between households inside and outside the Chengdu border. We note that households in the treatment and control are comparable with respect to basic characteristics: they comprise 3-4adults, had a head born in the late 1950s, education between junior high and high school, some 8% of female heads. At the same time, three sets of differences emerge. First, households in Chengdu had higher levels of assets, income, and consumption (Y16,063 and Y40,025, Y4,928 and Y8,549, and Y3,150 and Y6,078 in pre- and post-reform periods, respectively) than those outside (Y11,564 and Y29,752, Y3,770 and Y8,069, and Y2,668 and Y4,997). They also allocated labor differently across sectors, presumably due to proximity to urban income earning opportunities: with a time commitment of 43% and 50% in 2005/06, farming was the most important activity for", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Descriptive statistics", "confidence": 0.42064833641052246}]}}}
{"input": "traditional _mailo_ areas as well. The 1998 Land Act includes far-reaching steps to increase tenure security for occupants who had only use rights, customary land users, and women. Regarding the latter, the Land Act provides for formal recognition of customary land ownership and establishes procedures for customary owners to obtain a “certificate of customary ownership” that can be transferred through sale, rent, gift, or mortgage, and converted into freehold titles in an administrative process. It also aims to significantly strengthen women’s land rights. However, effectiveness of these progressive features, many of which are effective without any formal process or survey, is hampered by flaws in the institutional designs for implementation (Hunt 2004). As a consequence, almost a decade after the Act’s passage, hardly any implementation has happened, despite considerable grassroots demand (Rugadya _et al._ 2004). Inability to resist political demands for reinstating _mailo_ as a separate land ownership category or to abandoni _kibanjas_ outside of _mailo_ areas precluded award of full ownership to tenants, thus leaving overlapping land ownership structures intact. At the same time, attempts were made to attenuate disincentive effects from overlapping rights by granting far-reaching protection to tenants. _Bona fide_ occupants, defined as those who had peacefully", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "of the Table 2 Hazard map scenarios for which the modeling was conducted for Vietnam Scenario Coastal Fluvial/Pluvial 1 in 25 1 in 25 1 in 25 1 in 25 Future – Low 1 in 25 + 28 cm 1 in 50 1 in 25 Future – Medium 1 in 25 + 6 cm 1 in 75 1 in 25 Future – High 1 in 25 + 98 cm 1 in 100 1 in 50 1 in 50 1 in 50 1 in 50 Future – Low 1 in 50 + 28 cm 1 in 75 1 in 50 Future – Medium 1 in 50 + 6 cm 1 in 100 1 in 50 Future – High 1 in 50 + 98 cm 1 in 200 1 in 100 1 in 100 1 in 100 1 in 100 Future – Low 1 in 100 + 28 cm 1 in 200 1 in 100 Future – Medium 1 in 100 + 6 cm 1 in 250 1 in 100 Future – High 1 in 100 + 98 cm 1 in 500 1 in 200 1 in 200 1 in 200 1 in 200 Future – Low 1 in 200 + 28", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 **Share of population with flood exposure (percent)** _Figure 22. Scatterplot of share of population exposed by income (2011 PPP USD/day)_ **5.5.** **From global aggregates towards local flood risk assessments** The results in previous subsections that are presented at the subnational, national, regional and global scales are aggregates of flood exposure maps that were generated as part of this study for all countries. These exposure maps with higher spatial resolutions have been retained and can be used to derive more granular insights at the local level. [2] For illustration, Figure 23 shows the population flood exposure estimates for Vietnam in an aggregate form at the national and subnational scales, as well as in its high-resolution raster format for example areas. The raster displays the number of people exposed to flood risk of each 90m x 90m pixel. The map shows a high concentration of flood-exposed populations in Hanoi, as well as urbanized areas along the Red River. The granularity offered by these pre-processed population exposure maps could be valuable for various applications; e.g. for the development of disaster mitigation plans prior to a", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood exposure maps"}, {"text": "population flood exposure estimates"}, {"text": "population exposure maps"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "population exposure maps", "confidence": 0.18502140045166016}, {"text": "population flood exposure estimates for Vietnam", "confidence": 0.1532178372144699}, {"text": "flood exposure maps", "confidence": 0.11832526326179504}], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood exposure maps", "confidence": 0.7920293807983398}, {"text": "population exposure maps", "confidence": 0.7918272614479065}]}}}
{"input": "rapid coastal urbanization, and climate change are bound to result in increasing exposure of people and their livelihoods. In this study we estimate the number of people who are directly exposed to the risk of intense flooding in 189 countries. We do so by using high-resolution flood and population data that enable a global yet detailed analysis of flood risks. We find that 2.2 billion people, or 29 percent of the world population live in areas that would experience some level of inundation during a 1-in-100 year flood event. About 1.47 billion people, or 19 percent of the world population, are directly exposed to inundation depths of over 0.15 meter, which would pose significant risk to lives, especially of vulnerable population groups. While the largest number of exposed people live in East and South Asia (1.36 billion people), subnational poverty estimates highlight another regional hotspot of risk: At least 71 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa are estimated to live in both extreme poverty (using a $1.9 a day definition) and significant flood risk – thus making them particularly vulnerable to prolonged adverse impacts on livelihoods and well-being. The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 offers an", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood and population data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood and population data", "confidence": 0.7336426973342896}], "vague_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood and population data", "confidence": 0.2083827555179596}]}}}
{"input": "average historical payout, the total number of historical payouts, and the standard deviation of rainfall. Historical variables are calculated for the period 1962-2004. Observations are weighted by the quality of rainfall data. If there are no rainfall stations contributing to the APHRODITE data in 2004 within a .75°x.75° grid around the desired BASIX weather station, the observation is given a weight of 1. If there is a least one weather station in this .75°x.75°, the observation is given a weight of 1.5. If there is a rainfall station within the .25°x.25° grid, the observation is given a weight of 2. The weighted results to not differ significantly from the unweighted results. The number of observations is 733 out of a total of 949 villages in the sample in 2005, as APHRODITE data was available for only a subset of locations. All specifications include state fixed effects. Errors clustered at the weather station level. ***p _<_ 0.01, **p _<_ 0.05, *p _<_ 0.1. _Source_ : Authors’ analysis based on data from BASIX and APHRODITE. Column 1 presents the baseline regression, which shows that villages that experienced a rainfall shock in 2004 actually had an average of 3.8 _fewer_ purchasers in 2005.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "APHRODITE data"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX and APHRODITE"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "quality of rainfall data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "APHRODITE data", "confidence": 0.8531364798545837}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX and APHRODITE", "confidence": 0.36008432507514954}], "vague_data": [{"text": "rainfall data", "confidence": 0.7218924760818481}]}}}
{"input": "or _gold_period_district_, which equals total production for the years before the survey. For the 1993 survey, the period is 1990–93, for 1998 it is 1994–98, and so on. Using production levels instead of an indicator of having any production in the district has the advantage of capturing the intensity of mining production. Since it is somewhat unclear when mining production spills over to other types of employment, we use two measures of mining production. Panel A of table 13 shows the results of mining production in the period before the survey, including the survey year, on female employment, and we see that mining production leads to less agricultural employment but more employment in services and sales, as well as in professional work. Panel B shows that the effects are larger but not as precisely estimated for the yearly measure. That they are larger is not surprising, since a 10-ton increase one year is much more than a 10-ton increase over a longer time period. The precision is also probably lower since it is unclear what year the production spills over to other activities. In any case, we see that the effects are similar across these two specifications. [18] 18 The", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "1993 survey", "confidence": 0.5315082669258118}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "production levels", "confidence": 0.4228999614715576}]}}}
{"input": "old age was available (Ong 2014). Failure to capture the gains in land value from changing from rural to urban land use in a more sustainable way also undermines local governments’ ability to provide social services. A tax on land or capital gains could help to do so but can only be implemented if institutional preconditions are met, in particular if a proper cadastral database is in place (Nitikin _et al._ 2012). This suggests that viable reforms would need to pursue a multi-pronged approach, including (i) registration of all rural land; (ii) a possibility for migrants to get an urban _hukou_ that provides access to social services, especially if they give up part or all of their rural land rights; (iii) allowing rural collectives or individuals to enter into direct land transactions at freely negotiated prices, subject to compliance with planning standards; and (iv) taxation of land so as to generate the revenue to support urban welfare packages while also contributing to more efficient land use (Tao and Xu 2007). Several experiments were undertaken to explore available options. These include integration of construction and collective land markets in Shenzen, land security development in Chongqing, urban fringe redevelopment in Beijing, land", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "proper cadastral database"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "cadastral database", "confidence": 0.901780366897583}]}}}
{"input": "experience into composite strike intensities for 1877 2016. Over 140 years, the highest-intensity zones have been in West Bengal and northern Odisha, with a relatively clear pattern of incremental intensity decline in both directions. **5.4 Mean Maximum Wind Speed** Assessing the significance of a cyclone strike requires information about the storm’s power, which is measured by maximum wind speed in our database. Figure 6 shows that mean maximum wind speeds are generally highest in sections of the mid-coastal region during 1877-1900 and 1901-1920. Conditions vary considerably during the next three periods. During 1921-1940, higher wind speeds appear in Odisha, the mid-coastal region and Bangladesh’s eastern coast. Wind speeds generally decline in 1941-1960, with notable cyclone-free areas in southern Odisha, the central coastal region, and eastern Bangladesh. Conditions reverse during 14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "our database", "confidence": 0.21282309293746948}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "maximum wind speed in our database", "confidence": 0.1156049370765686}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "should direct short- and long-term assistance to both the displaced and host communities. This can help reduce real and perceived inequalities and prevent host communities from forming negative attitudes about newly arriving displaced persons. Phase II of Jya Mbere continues the area-based approach of Phase I, providing multi-sectoral support to respond to the impacts of forced displacement, covering refugees and host communities. The mid-term survey for Phase I indicated positive results from this approach for social relations between refugees and local residents, mirroring results from independent impact evaluations of the Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP) in Ethiopia (P152822) and Kenya (P161067). 47. **By creating new challenges and new opportunities, the presence of refugees transforms the environment** **in which host communities are pursuing their own development efforts.** This requires an approach that supports hosting areas rather than focusing on refugees alone. Investments are needed to mitigate the downside of hosting refugees – overcrowded basic services, environmental degradation, competition over natural resources and, sometimes, over employment opportunities – while taking advantage of the benefits their presence may generate through their human capital, financial resources and the humanitarian and development assistance they can Page 13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "mid-term survey", "confidence": 0.2198415845632553}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "mid-term survey for Phase I", "confidence": 0.4707401394844055}], "vague_data": [{"text": "mid-term survey", "confidence": 0.13308504223823547}]}}}
{"input": "place for the proposed project implementation). 51. **The PIU to be established at the MEP is expected to undertake the FM aspects of the proposed Project.** These encompass the following main tasks: (i) budget formulation and monitoring; (ii) cash flow management (including processing payments and submitting loan withdrawal applications to the Bank); (iii) maintenance of accounting records, including an inventory of fixed assets for the Project, (iv) administration of adequate information systems; (v) preparation of in-year and year-end financial reports; and (vi) contracting the external audit. The FM arrangements for the project will rely on country systems for budgeting, accounting and treasury, which are considered adequate [30] will be used as the project’s FM arrangements. Loan proceeds will be disbursed to an account in the Central Bank of Costa Rica named General Fund. Unaudited semi-annual financial statements will be submitted 45 days after the end of each calendar semester. Annual financial statements which will be audited under terms of reference and by an external firm, both acceptable to the World Bank, will be produced for the project. Basic arrangements to ensure control, recording, and reporting are further described in Annex 1. 52. **Procurement** . Procurement for the Project will be", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "take-up the following year. There is some evidence for this happening in developed markets; for example, Kunreuther, Sanderson, and Vetschera (1985) note that purchases of flood and earthquake insurance in the United States spike after a recent event, even if people were not insurance customers before. There are a number of theories that could explain this behavior. First, recent experiences with rainfall could change subjects’ beliefs about the probability of a rainfall shock the following year (this is proposed as “recency bias”in Karlan et al. [2014]). If there is actual autocorrelation of rainfall events or if the subject has limited knowledge about the effects of rainfall shocks, people may update their beliefs about shocks and therefore have more desire for insurance the following year. Alternatively, recently experiencing a rainfall shock could make shocks more salient, increasing the chance they will buy insurance the following year. Also, rainfall shocks may affect the wealth of the farmers. If farmers become poorer because of bad rainfall, CRRA utility would suggest that they would be even more risk averse the next year as a second shock would cause greater disutility. I start by examining whether there is actual autocorrelation in the rainfall data. To", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "rainfall data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "rainfall data", "confidence": 0.943016529083252}]}}}
{"input": "will include enhancing its operational framework, providing staff training on risk management and financial advisory services, and equipping CPEC with digital tools, building on multi-year technical assistance from the World Bank and other donors, to leverage CPECs proven capabilities and streamline advisory services to the C4N beneficiaries as well as those that will benefit from the FISs. **Sub-component 1.3: Strengthening the Social Registry (total IDA US$2 Million equivalent, including WHR US$0.3** **Million)** 38. **This sub-component will finance the scale-up of the SR among all Djiboutians, refugees and host communities,** **toward full coverage which will be a critical foundation for coordinating support across ministries and development** **partners.** The social registry will play a crucial role in coordinating existing funding and mobilizing additional resources to 22 Malaeb, B.; Duplantier, A., Maarraoui, G., Fluet, E. (2023). Towards a More Equitable Development: Constraints and Opportunities of Women in Djibouti. The World Bank, Washington Page 11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Social Registry", "confidence": 0.7098203897476196}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "and concludes the paper. **2. Georeferenced Database Construction** We combine data from BMD, IMD and IBTrACS to document all recorded cyclonic storms in the Indian Ocean region from 1877 to 2016. We construct a panel database; the component for each storm includes a unique identification number; year and month of occurrence [1] ; maximum wind speed (kt); radial distance (km) from storm center to zone of maximum wind speed; IMD storm classification derived from wind speed; time indices for successive observation points [2] ; and latitude/longitude for each point. We use ArcGIS to construct individual storm-track polylines by interpolation from time indexed latitude/longitude observations for each storm. Then we determine maximum-impact 1 The first month for storms that occur in two months. 2 Incommensurate day/time tracking in the three databases (BMD, IMD, IBTrACS) could be addressed in a more complete exercise. For our purposes, identifying successive observations by cardinal units [1,2,3, ...] is sufficient for constructing GIS polylines that trace individual storm tracks. 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "IBTrACS"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "IMD"}, {"text": "BMD"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BMD, IMD and IBTrACS", "confidence": 0.28511467576026917}], "vague_data": [{"text": "panel database", "confidence": 0.32904863357543945}]}}}
{"input": "have a stronger focus on all households’ members, rather than focusing only on women and young children. In addition, they provide more detailed information on labor market participation, such as exact profession (where, for example, being a miner is a possible outcome), hours worked, and a wage indicator. The data estimate household expenditure and household income. Wages, income, and expenditure can, however, be difficult to measure in economies where nonmonetary compensation for labor and subsistence farming are common practices. **4 Empirical Strategies** **4.1 Individual-level difference-in-differences** Time-varying data on production and repeated survey data allow us to use a difference-in differences approach. [7] However, due to the spatial nature of our data and the fact that some mines are spatially clustered, we use a strategy developed by Benshaul-Tolonen (2018). The difference-in-difference model compares the treatment group (close to mines) before and after the mine opening, while removing the change that happens in the control group (far away from mines) over time under the assumption that such changes reflect underlying temporal variation common to both treatment and control areas. We limit the data to include households within 100 km of a mine location and estimate the following: _Yivt = β0 + β1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "repeated survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "repeated survey data", "confidence": 0.4773346185684204}]}}}
{"input": "use, a shift in crop composition towards higher-value crops, and more active rental markets to transfer land from less to more productive users. This suggests removal of earlier threats of expropriation encouraged more effective use of highly productive peri-urban land to intensify agricultural production and, by doing so, increased job opportunities and resulted in changes of labor supply. Young individuals shifted from migration to agricultural activities while the old shifted from farming to off-farm activities. The paper is structured as follows. Section two provides context, discusses some of the salient features of the Chengdu experiment, and introduces analytical methodology and data sources. Section three presents descriptive statistics from the household survey as well the nature and cost of the land certification process in Chengdu. Section four discusses impacts on household welfare, individual labor supply, and agricultural productivity and crop composition. Section five concludes with implications for policy and future research. **2. Motivation and background** Between 2000 and 2010, rural-urban land conversion in China expanded at rates that are among the highest in East Asia. As such changes are not easily reversed, this poses vast challenges for China’s development for decades to come. While piecemeal efforts to change this pattern had", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household survey"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "household survey", "confidence": 0.7354443073272705}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "descriptive statistics from the household survey", "confidence": 0.10402591526508331}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey", "confidence": 0.14054112136363983}]}}}
{"input": "households inside Chengdu and 453 and 382 households in neighboring counties (Meishan and Ziyang) in the pre-and post-reform sample, respectively. Using a triple-difference approach, reform effects are identified based on difference between (i) years one and two within the same household; (ii) pre- and post-reform periods; and (iii) treated and non-treated households. The basic equation of interest can be written as ���� ��������� ���������� ������� ���������� ����������� ��������������� ������� ������� ��� �����(1) where _Yijt_ is the outcome of interest for household _I_ in village _j_ in year _t_ ; [12] _Xijt_ is a vector of time-varying household characteristics including the number of children, adults and old people, highest education, the head’s gender and age, and the amount from pension and medical schemes as well as crop subsidies received; _Vijt_ is a vector of time-varying village characteristics including total working age population, land area used for agriculture, distances to educational, health, and administrative institutions; _δij_ is a household fixed effect, _εijt_ is an error term; _Rijt_ is a binary indicator taking a value of 1 if the observation is post-reform (2011/12) and 0 otherwise; _Cij_ is an indicator that is 1 for households within Chengdu prefecture and 0 otherwise; _Tijt_ is", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "communities close to mines that have not started producing, evidenced by the fact that infant mortality is 8 percent compared to 7 percent farther away, and 6 percent in communities with active mines. The anthropometrics height-for-age (stunting or chronic malnutrition), weight-for-age (wasting or acute malnutrition), and weight-for-height (underweight) show that the children living in mining communities before the mine started operating have the lowest scores of all four groups. The outcomes seem to improve with mining, although not enough to offset the initial adverse situation. To test for exogeneity, we run regressions using baseline individual-level data to explore changes in observable characteristics among women (the main part of the sample). Table 3 shows that there are no significant effects of the mine opening on the age structure, migration history, marital status, fertility, or education, using the difference-in-difference specification with a full set of controls. If anything, it seems that women in active mining communities are marginally older, more likely to never have moved, and more likely to be or have been in a cohabiting relationship or married. Given the women’s slightly higher age, it is not surprising to find that they have higher fertility and lower schooling (assuming that schooling", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "baseline individual-level data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "baseline individual-level data", "confidence": 0.3711203932762146}], "vague_data": [{"text": "baseline individual-level data", "confidence": 0.22635705769062042}]}}}
{"input": "on industrial transformation and value-chain production. In 2023, the GRZ launched its National Adaptation Plan (NAP), a long-term strategic plan formulated to address identified risks and vulnerabilities in various sectors to enhance Zambia’s resilience to the impacts of climate change. **B. Sectoral and Institutional Context** 6. **Zambia has a long history of hosting refugees lasting over six decades.** Between 1985 and 2007, the country hosted more than 100,000 refugees and asylum seekers. The largest portion fled to Zambia from Angola during the longrunning civil war that occurred after the country’s achievement of independence in 1975. Other significant refugee populations have arrived following the civil conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. Following the end of Angola’s 27-year civil war in 2002, more than 74,000 Angolan refugees returned home under a voluntary repatriation program that concluded in 2007. 7. **There are currently approximately** **101,837 refugees, asylum seekers, and former refugees in Zambia.** **[10]** The majority of refugees and asylum seekers originate from the Democratic Republic of Congo; other significant refugee populations are from Burundi, Somalia, Angola, and Rwanda. Zambia continues to receive new arrivals of refugees and asylum seekers—approximately 600–800 refugees arrive each month from the South Kivu,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Integrated Community Resilience Project (P506969) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT enhance Djibouti’s responsiveness to shocks, such as economic crises and natural disasters. To achieve this, the project will expand interoperability between the social registry and other essential databases, including civil registries and public health systems, thereby improving the accuracy and efficiency of targeting vulnerable households while reducing errors of exclusion and inclusion. Based on the piloting undertaken under the PITCH and the Social Protection Emergency Crisis Response Project, inclusion of refugees will be enhanced with the objective of enrolling more refugees, facilitating their access to services. The MASS in collaboration with ANSIE are undertaking a comprehensive audit of the SR that will result into a comprehensive plan for revising its operational manual, a plan of action of which will inform key stakeholders. This initiative will also support better coordination with United Nations humanitarian agencies and development partners, ensuring that refugee populations are better documented and ascertained so that they can benefit from a wider range of integrated services. Interoperability with other databases will also enhance responsiveness in the event of a natural disaster. 39. **In addition to reinforcing the social registry, the sub-component will support enhancing the operational capacity**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "the social registry"}, {"text": "civil registries"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "social registry", "confidence": 0.6817853450775146}, {"text": "public health systems", "confidence": 0.3121340572834015}, {"text": "civil registries", "confidence": 0.2128755897283554}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "civil registries", "confidence": 0.20024517178535461}, {"text": "public health systems", "confidence": 0.15633727610111237}]}}}
{"input": "## Background ## OBJECTIVES Study a select number of protracted refugee populations in Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and DRC and assess their risk of statelessness arising from prolonged exile. Develop recommendations for local integration pathways that mitigate risks of statelessness and ensure the realization of the right to a nationality, including access to legal identity documentation, in support of durable solutions. Inform the development of a comprehensive durable solutions strategy for forcibly displaced persons, including refugees in the Great Lakes region. The Great Lakes sub-region is characterized by a number of protracted refugee situations. In some situations, several generations of refugees have been born in exile in their country of asylum. Statelessness canaarise as both a cause and consequence of displacement, particularly for forcibly displaced populations who have spent a prolonged time in exile. In some instances, refugees have lost their ties with their country of origin, are unable to prove their legal ties to their country of origin, or might no longer be considered citizens by their country of origin, and remain without guaranteed access to the citizenship of their country of asylum and thus might be at risk of statelessness. In the spirit of the 2019 Munyonyo Outcome Document", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Conversely, NGOs, the media and Israeli officials have held Israel accountable to the high standards of its international commitments. Thus, in parallel to employing harsh deterrence measures, Israel has also offered limited and differing degrees of protection. Over time, the government has issued a few thousand work permits to Sudanese and Eritreans, exercising a degree of tolerance and recognition of their needs, although these were exceptional permits that had to be renewed. But the majority of asylum seekers have not received such permits and have been forced to work illegally to survive. Such uneven, contradictory action exempts the state from declaring its allegiance either to deterrence or tolerance. 7UNHCR made the initial identification and interview of the asylum seeker. On the basis this process, a recommendation was given to the National Status Granting Body (NSGB), an inter-ministerial committee responsible for considering UNHCR recommendations. The final decision was taken by the MOI. 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "percent of students from lower secondary to short-cycle tertiary enroll in vocational education and training, compared to 32 percent 9 [https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/64e578cbeaa522631f08f0cafba8960e-0140062023/related/HCI-AM23-CRI.pdf](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/64e578cbeaa522631f08f0cafba8960e-0140062023/related/HCI-AM23-CRI.pdf) 10 OECD Education at A Glance, 2023, Table A4.2. The correlation (not causation) between socio-economic conditions, academic achievement and labor market outcomes is a global phenomenon. For the OECD countries as a whole in 2018, the percentage of below Level 2 performers from the top quintile of the PISA index for economic, social and cultural status, was 8%; while for the bottom quintile, the figure was 49%. For the labor market figures quoted in the text, 30% of 25-64 year olds for the OECD countries correspond to the 32% mentioned in the text for Costa Rica. [11 Encuesta de expectativas de empleo, Q1 2024, ManpowerGroup: https://go.manpowergroupcca.com/meos-cr.](https://go.manpowergroupcca.com/meos-cr) 12 OECD Economic Surveys - Costa Rica, February 2023. Page 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Encuesta de expectativas de empleo"}, {"text": "PISA index for economic, social and cultural status"}, {"text": "PISA index"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Encuesta de expectativas de empleo", "confidence": 0.9111144542694092}, {"text": "OECD Economic Surveys", "confidence": 0.7824334502220154}, {"text": "PISA index", "confidence": 0.3804333806037903}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Uganda Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project Phase II (P510476) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT interventions on anti-corruption and accountability, which will continue to play (as in DRDIP I) an important role in mitigating political and governance risks. 94. **Institutional capacity for implementation and sustainability (Substantial).** OPM implemented DRDIP I to a high standard, but the long gap between the closure of Phase I and commencement of Phase II means many project staff have moved on to new positions. The main project delivery mechanism is CDD, which means communities lead on planning, subproject identification, procurement, and FM. While this approach has proven effective, it requires extensive technical support to succeed. The success of the project also depends on intensive coordination across line agencies, districts, and humanitarian agencies, adding to complexity. The World Bank will provide hand-on support to the government teams on core project management functions, such as FM, procurement, and E&S management. At the community level, the project will contract partner organizations to build local implementation capacity. 95. **Fiduciary (Substantial).** The FM risk is Substantial and the procurement risk is Moderate. The major risks are delays in disbursing to communities and making payments as well as accounting for", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "policies, including a large-scale governmental deportation campaign targeted at authorised workers who overstayed their visas and became unauthorised (Willen 2007). The third transformation is the ongoing influx of African migrants. Against this backdrop, the 2006 refugee influx met heightened anxiety over the transforming ethnonational character of the Israeli nation-state. The idea that mass influx involves demographic change has deep roots and was tactically used by Jews themselves prior to establishment of the state and during the British mandate (Neuman 1999). This language was engaged again, intensified by these changing patterns of migration and the ongoing focus on state security, to represent asylum seekers as a serious threat to both social cohesiveness and security - conveyed through the transportable, easy-to-use refugee template. Politicians and public officials further inflamed the debate by releasing controversial statements. PM Netanyahu employed rejectionist rhetoric: ―infiltrators cause cultural, social and economic damage, and pull us towards the Third World‖ and, in a slip of tongue, he later referred to the infiltrators as ―surge of refugees who threaten to wash away our achievements and damage our existence as a Jewish democratic state‖ (Goldstein 2010). The head of the SCPFW has called for a stop to the ―illegal infiltration‖", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "##### **Introduction** Coastal wetlands, which are comprised of marshes, swamps, mangroves and other coastal plant communities, provide a large number of goods and services that contribute to the economic welfare of the local and global communities (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). [4] Examples of ecosystem services include the protection of shorelines from erosion, storm buffering, sediment retention, water quality maintenance, nutrient recycling, preservation of biodiversity, provision of natural environmental amenities, climate regulation, carbon sequestration, as well as cultural heritage and spiritual benefits (Larson et al., 1989; Barbier, 1991; Williams, 1990; Barbier et al., 1997; Brouwer et al., 1999; Woodward and Wui, 2001; McLeod et al., 2005; Brander et al., 2006). However, coastal wetlands are declining rapidly. Recent estimates indicate that approximately 1% of the global coastal wetland stock was lost each year in the late 20 [th] century (Nicholls, 2004; Hoozemans et al., 1993). The causes of wetland loss are numerous and often complex. [5] The rapid loss of the global coastal wetland stock in the 20 [th] century was primarily caused by direct land reclamation. While significant losses due to human actions are likely to continue in the future, it is projected that stresses on wetland areas may be further", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Millennium Ecosystem Assessment", "confidence": 0.26741132140159607}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Ukraine Emergency](https://www.unhcr.org/emergencies/ukraine-emergency) webpage **Operational data portals:** - [Ukraine Refugee Situation](https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine) - [Europe Sea Arrivals](https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/europe-sea-arrivals) webpage **Contact:** UNHCR Regional Bureau for Europe [rbeext@unhcr.org](mailto:rbeext%40unhcr.org?subject=) **[Join our mailing list](https://manage.kmail-lists.com/subscriptions/subscribe?a=VYAYG5&g=QZGRtb)** www.unhcr.org/europe Page 7 **U N H C R R E G I O N A L B U R E A U F O R E U R O P E,** O C T O B E R 2 0 2 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Europe Sea Arrivals", "confidence": 0.5473948121070862}, {"text": "Ukraine Refugee Situation", "confidence": 0.3743966817855835}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "robust results for Africa. This assumption in turn implies that the next three months would be spring, the three months after that would be summer, and August, September and October would be fall (in the north). These seasonal definitions were chosen because they provided the best fit with the data and reflected the mid-point for key rainy seasons in the sample. We adjusted for the fact that seasons in the southern and northern hemispheres occur at exactly the opposite months of the year. Soil data was obtained from FAO (2003). The FAO data provides information about the major and minor soils in each location. Data concerning the hydrology was predicted from a hydrological model for Africa (Strzepek & McCluskey 2006). The model calculated the water flow through each district in the surveyed countries. Data on elevation at the centroid of each district was obtained through GIS manipulation using data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS, 2004). The USGS data are derived from a global digital elevation model with a horizontal grid spacing of 30 arc seconds (approximately one kilometer). 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "data from the United States Geological Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "FAO data"}, {"text": "USGS data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "United States Geological Survey", "confidence": 0.4051216244697571}, {"text": "global digital elevation model", "confidence": 0.2130943238735199}, {"text": "hydrological model for Africa", "confidence": 0.2094452828168869}, {"text": "FAO", "confidence": 0.14608627557754517}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "global digital elevation model", "confidence": 0.42120274901390076}, {"text": "hydrological model for Africa", "confidence": 0.34580421447753906}, {"text": "data from the United States Geological Survey", "confidence": 0.15876907110214233}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "of 510 million square kilometers, which implies the processing of 63 billion pixels. **3.** **Assign flood risk categories to population headcounts at the pixel level and aggregate to the** **administrative unit:** As the flood hazard and population density maps are converted into the same spatial resolution, each population map cell can be assigned a unique flood risk classification – these cells can then be aggregated to the administrative unit level (e.g. province or district level). This allows the calculation of population headcounts for each flood risk category and for each (sub-)national administrative unit. A detailed description of how this process is implemented in practice is provided in Section 4.2. This process yields an estimate of the number and share of people exposed to no-, low, moderate, high, and very high flood risk during an intense flood event. These estimates are available globally with a resolution of 90 meters, but they are also aggregated to administrative units, including for each country and subnational unit. These estimates are also aggregated to yield regional and global estimates. **4.** **Compute the number of poor people exposed to flood risk:** While poverty estimates are not available at the pixel level, the World Bank’s GMD database", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GMD database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GMD database", "confidence": 0.9054291248321533}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "in particular that of venturing into areas affected by ED in search of means of subsistence or even collecting scrap metal found on explosive remnants of war for resale. In the face of a growing threat from ED, mine action capacities remain limited in Niger. Considerable challenges exist both in programmatic actions and in the coordination of interventions. No mine action coordination mechanism is functional either at the national level or in the regions affected by ED. This makes it difficult to strategically harmonize, target and prioritize mine action interventions. The objective of this note is to strengthen advocacy with state authorities, the various technical and donor partners in order to support mine action in Niger, protect communities and humanitarian actors against the risks associated with ED and enable them to enjoy their fundamental rights and freedoms. ## **II. Analysis of the evolution of ED incidents and their impact** From the last quarter of 2022 to the 2nd reported mainly in the regions of Tillabery **2023, which indicates a worrying increase** **in the threat of ED in Niger.** This threat 1 UNHCR Niger montlhy PoC statistics, Juin 2023 2 Population displacement statistics, Ministry of Humanitarian Action and Disaster Management, july", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Niger montlhy PoC statistics"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Population displacement statistics"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Population displacement statistics", "confidence": 0.5983572006225586}, {"text": "PoC statistics", "confidence": 0.3845842480659485}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Population displacement statistics", "confidence": 0.19731298089027405}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Population displacement statistics", "confidence": 0.21507665514945984}]}}}
{"input": "region – which is itself a region of emigration. # 30.7 % 5 Non-Ukrainian nationals; of these, 52 per cent were in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 25 per cent in Serbia; 7 per cent in Kosovo; 6 per cent each in Albania and Montenegro; and 4 per cent in North Macedonia. In North Macedonia, this number includes individuals outside government-run centres, with forcibly displaced and stateless people accommodated in government or IOM-run centres, asylum centres, and transit facilities. UNHCR utilises arrival data to estimate the numbers involved. Note: References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). Page 5 **U N H C R R E G I O N A L B U R E A U F O R E U R O P E,** O C T O B E R 2 0 2 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "arrival data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "arrival data", "confidence": 0.981031596660614}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Uganda Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project Phase II (P510476) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT Knowledge and technology transfer from TSPs to CRPs will be crucial for long-term sustainability at scale. Training content for CRPs and project beneficiaries will focus on climate resilience through adoption of improved inputs, technologies, and practices, while ensuring availability of information services on soil, weather, and markets for risk mitigation. Building on global lessons from World Bank-financed CDD projects, two-three specialized CRPs will be developed in each village in line with priority value chains under implementation. CRP networks will include refugees in the settlements. 44. **Collaboration with other World Bank-financed projects will be prioritized to maximize impacts.** DRDIP II will collaborate with INVITE and NUSAF IV to identify common economic infrastructure development and job creation opportunities. Several strategies will be implemented to prevent beneficiary overlap between NUSAF IV and DRDIP II in RHDs: (a) NUSAF IV will focus on the poorest individuals, while DRDIP II will target ‘active individuals’ identified through national wealth ranking data; (b) DRDIP II will concentrate on regions with a high refugee population, freeing up NUSAF IV to operate in other areas; (c) data sharing will be facilitated through interoperability", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "national wealth ranking data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "national wealth ranking data", "confidence": 0.2524121403694153}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "national wealth ranking data", "confidence": 0.33983737230300903}], "vague_data": [{"text": "national wealth ranking data", "confidence": 0.4863031506538391}]}}}
{"input": "in the country live in flood hazard zones. In other words, high-income provinces and districts tend to be more exposed to flood risks. However, a different study finds that in Ho Chi Minh City, the poor are disproportionally exposed to flooding (Narloch and Bangalore 2018). How do these results fit together? Indeed, at the local level the relationship between poverty and flood exposure can be inversed. Flood hazards tend to be highly localized, with some neighborhoods being at risk from frequent inundation, while other nearby neighborhoods may benefit from higher elevation or better drainage systems. Hallegatte et al. (2017) review the literature and conclude that land and housing markets often push poorer people to settle in these riskier areas, especially where land is scarce. Indeed, a meta-analysis of the literature suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the yearly probability of flooding is associated with a 0.6 percent decrease in housing prices (Daniel, Florax, and Rietveld 2009). In Ho Chi Minh City, for instance, qualitative surveys suggest flood-prone areas can be much cheaper than non-flood-prone areas for the same quality of accommodation (World Bank and Australian AID 2014). Using a household survey in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Erman et", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania"}, {"text": "household survey"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "household survey", "confidence": 0.12006498128175735}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household survey in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania", "confidence": 0.428717702627182}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey", "confidence": 0.6012845039367676}, {"text": "qualitative surveys", "confidence": 0.5079241394996643}]}}}
{"input": "# **PROTECTION** **BRIEF** **CZECHIA** ## Operational Context Based on the number of refugees who applied for an extension of Temporary Protection in 2024 (320,000), the figures of Temporary Protection holders in Czechia, including new arrivals, were updated to **338,736** people as of 31 March 2024, compared to 373,745 at the end of 2023 (source: Ministry of the Interior). In January 2024, _Lex Ukraine_ was amended to extend Temporary Protection until March 2025. Changes introduced include an adjustment of the initial level of humanitarian benefits, maintaining support for the most vulnerable individuals, and the reduction of cost-free accommodation for all new arrivals from 150 to 90 days. This report presents an overview of refugees’ demographic profiles and displacement patterns as well as main findings regarding protection risks, priority needs and intentions of refugees from Ukraine in Czechia. The analysis is based on 480 Protection Monitoring interviews and findings from focus group discussions with refugees from Ukraine across the country in the first quarter of 2024. ## Key Figures 338,736 320,000 ## 338,736 320,000 Temporary Protection holders in Czechia among whom have registered for an extension ## 92% of Protection Monitoring respondents are Temporary Protection holders ## 32% of respondents have at", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "are found in the Mekong Delta, the Red River Delta, and the Southeast Coast (Figs. 5, 6, and 7). But the relative exposure (that is, the percent of the district population which is exposed to floods) shows a larger spread (Figs. 8, 9, 10). Most areas in the country – including the North Central Coast and the Northeast – have high percentages of their populations residing in flood-prone areas (Fig. 8). Flood Exposure and Poverty To examine the question of how many poor people in Vietnam are exposed to flooding, we multiply the population exposure estimates by the district’s poverty headcount rate (the percentage of people living below USD 1.25 per day), as calculated in (Lanjouw et al. 2013). For a 25-year historical flood, 30% of today’s poor population is exposed. This number increases by between 16 and 28% given climate change impacts. For a 50-year return period under a high climate scenario, 40% of today’s poor people in Vietnam are exposed to flooding. For a 200-year return period under a high climate scenario, more than half of today’s poor are exposed. Similar to the population analysis, the impact of climate change on the number of poor people exposed is", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "district’s poverty headcount rate"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "population exposure estimates", "confidence": 0.5237191319465637}]}}}
{"input": "will be biased (Heckman 1979; Lee 1983). In Section 2 we develop a theoretical model that improves on past efforts to model irrigation with the Ricardian approach by explicitly addressing farmer choice and selection bias. We tested this model empirically using a sample of over 8400 farmers from across 11 African countries. The results reveal that the choice of irrigation is endogenous. Farmers select irrigation rather than dryland to maximize profits. As temperatures warm or precipitation declines, farmers turn to irrigation to keep their farms viable. As long as there is a sufficient flow of water, irrigation is an important adaptation strategy. We then used this empirical model to examine the welfare impacts of climate change on African agriculture. Using a mild and a severe climate scenario, we examined how irrigation and net revenues will be affected. We compared the results of our model with endogenous irrigation with a model that assumes irrigation is exogenous. We found evidence of selection bias but, more importantly, we found that treating irrigation as though it is exogenous leads to biased welfare estimates. The paper concludes by summarizing the results and discussing some policy implications. 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**REFERENCES** Basist A et al., 2001. Using the Special Sensor Microwave Imager to monitor surface wetness. _Journal of Hydrometeorology_ 2: 297–308. Cline WR, 1996. The impact of global warming on agriculture: Comment. _American_ _Economic Review_ 86: 1309–1312. Darwin R, 1999. The impacts of global warming on agriculture: A Ricardian analysis: Comment. _American Economic Review_ 89: 1049–1052. Dubin JA & McFadden DL, 1984. An econometric analysis of residential electric appliance holdings and consumption. _Econometrica_ 52(2): 345–362. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), 1997. Irrigation potential in Africa: A basin approach. _FAO Land and Water Bulletin,_ 4, FAO Land and Water Development Division, Rome. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), 2003. The digital soil map of the world: Version 3.6 (January), Rome, Italy. Heckman JJ, 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. _Econometrica_ 47: 153–161. Heltberg R & Tarp F, 2002. Agricultural supply response and poverty in Mozambique. _Food_ _Policy_ 27: 103–124. Kurukulasuriya P & Mendelsohn R, 2005. A regional analysis of the impact of climate change on African agriculture, Mimeo, Yale University. Lee LF, 1983. Generalized econometric models with selectivity. _Econometrica_ 51: 507–512. Mendelsohn R & Dinar A, 2003. Climate, water, and agriculture. _Land Economics_ 79(3): 328–341. Mendelsohn R & Nordhaus W,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "the digital soil map of the world"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "digital soil map of the world", "confidence": 0.6593154668807983}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "period hazard maps used for each of the future scenarios are outlined in Table 2. Although simplistic, this method allows areas that may be impacted by increasing riverine and extreme rainfall driven flooding to be identified. Clearly there are some significant assumptions and uncertainties arising from this method. However, given the impracticalities of modeling future flood hazard in Vietnam, this approach provides a plausible and practical attempt to estimate changing flood hazard at the national scale. For each of the four return periods, four scenarios are modeled (historical, future with low sea level rise, future with medium sea level rise, and future with high sea level rise), combining the coastal and fluvial/pluvial hazard layers (Table 2). For full details on the methodology used to produce these hazard maps, see the online supplementary materials. Importantly, the flood hazard models do not include flood protection (such as dikes and drainage systems), which can make a large difference in the flood hazard particularly in well-protected areas. In these wellprotected areas, our flood maps may overestimate the flood hazard. This is a data limitation that affects many studies of flood exposure: even in high-income countries like the US, flood protection databases are incomplete and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood protection databases"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood protection databases", "confidence": 0.8774583339691162}]}}}
{"input": "prevalence of ED incidents related also leads to restrictions on the mobility of civilian populations on the roads to weekly markets, and the main cities of communities/departments. About 36% of those interviewed [6] say they encounter mobility constraints due to the activities of the NSAGs and military operations. This indicator varies from one region to another. In the regions of Diffa and Tillabery, 56% of respondents say they encounter mobility constraints, one of the main reasons being the presence of ED. This considerably limits the periodic supply of households with means of subsistence and necessities in addition to the fear and psychological distress that the unpredictable presence of ED inflicts on communities. It is also important to highlight that of the 11 affected departments in the Diffa and Tillabéry regions, 9 (82%) are also affected by the food insecurity [7] . This could exacerbate 4 CNCCAI: The disaggregation by sex and age of the 2023 data for victims is not yet available. However, according to the Child Protection Sub-cluster, the Child Protection Working Group of the Diffa region recorded 18 child victims of ED in 2022, the majority of whom (74%) are girls who went to look for firewood. 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2023 data for victims"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2023 data", "confidence": 0.8494774103164673}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the last quarter of 2022 to the 2nd reported mainly in the regions of Tillabery **2023, which indicates a worrying increase** **in the threat of ED in Niger.** This threat 1 UNHCR Niger montlhy PoC statistics, Juin 2023 2 Population displacement statistics, Ministry of Humanitarian Action and Disaster Management, july 2023 3 Source : National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI in french)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Niger monthly PoC statistics"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Population displacement statistics"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Population displacement statistics", "confidence": 0.6096488237380981}, {"text": "PoC statistics", "confidence": 0.30339646339416504}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Population displacement statistics", "confidence": 0.1316143274307251}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Population displacement statistics", "confidence": 0.24171926081180573}]}}}
{"input": "already causes major problems in Vietnam, with some segments of the population more vulnerable than others (Adger 1999; World Bank 2010; World Bank and Australian AID 2014). In particular, evidence suggests poor people are more vulnerable than the rest of the population to natural disasters such as floods, as their incomes are more dependent on weather, their housing and assets are less protected, and they are more prone to health impacts (Hallegatte et al. 2016, Chapter 3). Poor people also have a lower capacity to cope with and adapt to shocks due to lower access to savings, borrowing, or social protection; and climate change is likely to worsen these trends (Hallegatte et al. 2016, Chapter 5). Therefore, it is important to quantify how many people are exposed to floods, how this distribution of exposure falls upon regions and socioeconomic groups, and how climate change may influence these trends. In the spirit of a Bstress-test^ to examine the seriousness of the issue, this paper employs flood hazard maps and spatial socioeconomic data to examine the following questions in context of Vietnam: 1. How many people are exposed currently? How might this change under climate change? 2. Where is exposure highest currently?", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps"}, {"text": "spatial socioeconomic data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps", "confidence": 0.20873290300369263}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps and spatial socioeconomic data", "confidence": 0.4851200580596924}], "vague_data": [{"text": "spatial socioeconomic data", "confidence": 0.8330804705619812}, {"text": "flood hazard maps", "confidence": 0.2968366742134094}]}}}
{"input": "Additionally, climate change exacerbates existing pressures, with rising temperatures and erratic rainfall further straining local resources and food security. 2. **These economic and climate constraints contribute to persistently high levels of inequality and social** **vulnerability** . Using the World Bank poverty line for Low Middle-Income Countries (LMIC) of US$3.65 a day (2017 purchasing power parity), the extreme poverty rate for 2022 is estimated at 39 percent (World Bank 2023a). Inequality in Djibouti is among the highest in the Middle East and North Africa, with an estimated Gini coefficient of 0.42 in 2017. The highest income decile of the population consumes approximately 16 times as much as the lowest decile and twice that of the ninth decile (World Bank 2019a). Extreme poverty is particularly severe in rural areas, where it reaches 62.6 percent, much higher than in urban Djibouti. Water management and planning performance, integrating cooling systems, diversifying livelihoods, and responsive safety nets were key recommendations from the Climate Change Development Report (2024) for Djibouti. 3. **Low human capital further constrains economic and climate resilience and limits opportunities for inclusive** **growth.** Djibouti’s LMIC status contrasts sharply with its poor human capital outcomes (World Bank, HCR, 2024). Deficiencies are evident throughout the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "World Bank poverty line for Low Middle-Income Countries"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank poverty line for Low Middle-Income Countries", "confidence": 0.32664668560028076}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "World Bank poverty line for Low Middle-Income Countries", "confidence": 0.11043507605791092}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "stem from the same occupational variable in the DHS data, and are mutually exclusive. The surveyed individual is told to report their main occupation. The coefficients can therefore be interpreted as relative increases of each specific sector. Women are more likely to earn cash for work, and the likelihood increases by 5.4 percentage points, which is equal to a 6 percent increase. While the directionality of the occupational outcomes is broadly in line with previous results (Kotsadam and Tolonen, 2016, for 29 African countries, and Benshaul-Tolonen, 2018, for 8 African gold-producing countries), the estimates are largely insignificant, potentially due to a limited sample size. Two categories have positive, albeit insignificant, coefficients: services and manual labor. The (insignificant) estimate for service jobs [9] is equivalent to 6.7% increased employment, and manual labor 10.2%, alongside which the likelihood that a woman earns cash for her work increases with 6%. For men (panel B of table 4), the estimates point toward an increase in agriculture, services, and professional (all statistically insignificant estimates), but a decreased likelihood of working in manual labor. Results for men in panel B are largely insignificant, and it is worthwhile noting that the sample size is only slightly above", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "DHS data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.7443523406982422}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.10098623484373093}]}}}
{"input": "these mines. **Figure 2 Gold mines and DHS clusters in Ghana** **Panel A Gold mines and 20 km buffer zones Panel B Gold mines, DHS clusters, and 100 km buffer zones** 4 The distances are radii from mine center point, and form concentric circles around the mine. 5 The DHS and the GLSS data are representative at the regional level, and not at the district level. Since the regional level is too aggregated, we do the analysis at the district level, but note that the sample may not be representative. 8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS data", "confidence": 0.47793740034103394}, {"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.12656643986701965}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "regions alike. Figure 10 especially highlights high-risk regions in coastal regions and large river basins – such as the Mississippi, Nile, Ganges, Brahmaputra, or Mekong basins. _Figure 10. Share of total subnational population that is exposed to significant flood risk (percent)_ Pool (Congo Republic) Pathum Thani (Thailand) N'djamna (Chad) Sing Buri (Thailand) Red River Delta (Vietnam) Unity (South Sudan) Mekong Delta (Vietnam) Phra Nakhon Si Ayu (Thailand) Vientiane (Laos) Nonthaburi (Thailand) _Figure 11. Top 10 countries: Share of total subnational population that is exposed to significant flood risk_ **5.4.** **Income levels, poverty, and flood exposure** **The flood exposure of economic production value.** By taking into account per capita income levels, it is possible to obtain estimates of the value of economic activity that is exposed to flood risks around the world. Specifically, we multiply flood exposure headcounts with subnational estimates of daily income per capita (in $PPP terms, as obtained from the World Bank household survey database, Section 3.4). This yields the estimate that $5.3 trillion of 16", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank household survey database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank household survey database", "confidence": 0.9369423389434814}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "43.7 60.5 24.5 Number of trees per acre 71.1 99.8 15.1 79.7 138.3 12.8 Planted coffee trees during the past 5 years 8.7 11.7 2.8 7.3 12.8 1.1 Planted fruit trees during the past 5 years 16.2 21.2 6.5 12.3 20.9 2.6 Planted soil fertility trees past 5 years 3.8 4.8 2.0 2.8 4.8 0.5 Planted (any) trees during the past 5 years 18.6 24.4 7.3 14.5 24.6 3.0 Number of trees planted past 5 years 16.6 22.4 5.3 17.8 28.1 6.1 Soil cons. (bunds, terracing, mulching) 20.5 24.7 12.3 19.9 27.6 11.0 Use of manure during the past year 7.8 9.6 4.2 7.2 11.2 2.7 Number of observations (parcels) 13130 8652 4478 5448 2904 2544 _Source:_ Own computation from 2005/06 UNHS III 18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHS III", "confidence": 0.777367889881134}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "based on data from BASIX. In panel B, I restrict the analysis to villages that had at least one buyer the year after insurance outcomes, creating a sample analogous to the “Marketing Restricted Sample” in table 3. The logic behind this is, if a village had zero buyers, it is likely that insurance was not marketed in the village that year, and therefore customers did not have an opportunity to purchase insurance. Restricting the data set in this way gives a much clearer pattern. Column 5 now shows much stronger effects of payouts on repeat buying, though the pattern is the same as in column 2. Small payouts have a negative effect, whereas increasing the payout ratio increases repeat buying. The squared term on the payout ratio is now negative and significant, indicating that high payout ratios have diminishing effects. The coefficients for new buyers in column 6 are now all significantly different from the coefficients for repeat buyers. In fact, the coefficients in column 5 flip signs, suggesting that payouts have the opposite effect on people who did not receive payouts. These results suggest that low payouts actually induce more new buyers, but that these effects decrease and then", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Marketing Restricted Sample", "confidence": 0.5233112573623657}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX", "confidence": 0.5604913830757141}], "vague_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX", "confidence": 0.21741096675395966}]}}}
{"input": "Based on requests, the World Bank will transfer advances to the DAs. Subsequent replenishment of the DA will be based on the submission of application of withdrawal, accompanied by quarterly IFRs, which are reviewed and cleared by the World Bank. 57. **For activities implemented at the district level, MINEMA will disburse funds directly to each district into a** **separate operational project account denominated in RWF opened at the Central Bank.** Funds will be disbursed as per modalities stipulated in the TDIAs, which will include at a minimum an approved annual work plan and cash flow plan. Subsequent requests will be based on modalities defined in the PIM and the TDIAs. **IV.** **PROJECT APPRAISAL SUMMARY** **A. Technical, Economic and Financial Analysis** **Economic Analysis** 58. Based on the economic and financial analysis, the net present value (NPV) is estimated at US$25.2 million at a 12 percent discount rate, and the economic rate of return (ERR) at 26 percent. [25] For the purpose of this analysis, we consider anticipated economic benefits as the income of the project investments—therein applying the discounted cash flow model for financial analysis of private investments within the context of a World Bankfinanced project. Key variables used as assumptions", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "quarterly IFRs"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "incorporate our long-run panel of cyclone data may contribute important insights about climate change adaptation on the coastal “front line”. 23", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "long-run panel of cyclone data"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "cyclone data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "long-run panel of cyclone data", "confidence": 0.5485782027244568}], "vague_data": [{"text": "cyclone data", "confidence": 0.8762446641921997}]}}}
{"input": "**Figure A1. Access to infrastructure: Varying the cutoff and spatial lag model** **Panel A Household has electricity** **Panel B Household has radio** **a. Varying cutoff** **a. Varying cutoff** **b. Spatial lag model** **b. Spatial lag model** **c. Spatial lag model by migration status** **c. Spatial lag model by migration status** _Note:_ The figure shows the main treatment coefficients ( _active*mine_ ) using the baseline estimation strategy (with DHS individual-level data; see table 4 for more information) in panel A, but with different distance cutoffs (10 km, 20 km, 30 km, 40 km, or 50 km). *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Panels Ab, Ac, Bb, and Bc show the result using spatial lag models, which divided the plane into different treatment bins (0–10, 10–20, 20–30, 40–50) and compares them with farther away distances. Panel B shows the result for all individuals, and panel C shows the main treatment result (active mine) when the sample has been split into migrants and nonmigrants. 44", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DHS individual-level data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS individual-level data", "confidence": 0.6931310296058655}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The World Bank’s Environment Strategy focuses on both the threat to biodiversity from human encroachment, and the value of biodiversity resources for human populations. Our indicator for this two-way relationship in each country is its total human population in critical biodiversity areas. For marine biodiversity, we draw on estimates of reef ecosystems at risk by Bryant, et al. (1998). Summing across all endangered reefs, we use each country's share of the total as our index of marine biodiversity threat. While terrestrial and marine threats are quite distinct geographically, we create a composite indicator to match the Bank's thematic category (biodiversity conservation). Since the two indices are weakly correlated (ρ = .27), assignment of relative weights has a significant impact on the result. We assign equal weights, because we have no scientific basis for a differentiated weighting scheme. 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "estimates of reef ecosystems at risk", "confidence": 0.42680126428604126}], "vague_data": [{"text": "composite indicator", "confidence": 0.3166983127593994}]}}}
{"input": "and good governance. Additionally, the project supports key findings from the World Development Report 2023 on Migrants, Refugees and Societies, [18] by enhancing the freedoms, self-reliance and inclusion of both refugees and host community within national delivery systems. Furthermore, each activity will integrate climate-resilient design to reduce material risks to an acceptable level, ensuring long-term sustainability in the face of the country’s exposure to identified climate risks (extreme heat, droughts, floods). 18. **The challenges faced by Djibouti are further highlighted in the Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR)** **(2024), which identifies key areas for intervention, including strengthening water management, integrating cooling** **systems, diversifying livelihoods, and enhancing responsive safety nets** . The Integrated Community Resilience Project (ICRP) aligns with these recommendations, supporting Djibouti’s efforts to build climate resilience while addressing urgent needs in rural areas, particularly through enhancing the adaptive capacity of vulnerable populations. 19. **The project is aligned with the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) (2019)**, aiming to reduce vulnerability to climate change and to facilitate integration of adaptation into all levels of development planning including (i) access to water for all; ii) the promotion of best practices in the agricultural, forestry, fishery, and tourism sectors and reduced vulnerability to the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "-0.094** -0.062 3.893 -0.064 -0.031 0.126*** (0.042) (0.040) (3.842) (0.066) (0.038) (0.042) _3. drop 2 years before_ active*mine -0.094** -0.062 3.708 -0.071 -0.026 0.125*** (0.041) (0.039) (3.459) (0.067) (0.036) (0.043) _4. mine FE_ active*mine -0.123** -0.094* 8.233 -0.068 -0.049 0.113** (0.057) (0.051) (5.425) (0.075) (0.044) (0.045) _5. mine clustering_ active*mine -0.086*** -0.055** 3.705 -0.058 -0.032 0.125** (0.025) (0.025) (2.898) (0.086) (0.032) (0.051) Mean dep var 0.715 0.705 45.71 0.491 0.259 0.028 _Note:_ The table uses GLSS data for Ghana for the survey years 1998, 2005, 2012. The sample is restricted to women and men aged 15–49. Robust standard errors clustered at the village or neighborhood level in parentheses (except if otherwise stated). All regressions control for year and district fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. Active is active status of mine in the survey year. The treatment distance is defined to 20 km. Rows 2 drop sample between 20 to 40 km of a mine, and rows 3 drop sample that was surveyed two years before mine opening. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. FE = fixed effects. 30", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS data for Ghana"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS data", "confidence": 0.8480467796325684}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "poor households’ productivity and resilience to lift their consumption permanently above the official poverty line. 4. **The government has embraced the long-term development approach to refugee management, aligning with** **international good practice.** [6] Important gains over the last five years include: (a) almost all refugee children now attend national schools rather than camp-based schools; (b) most urban refugees have access to the government’s national health insurance scheme; (c) plans are in place to transition camp-based health clinics to government management to lower costs and support integration of refugees into national service delivery systems; and (d) the government is implementing an economic inclusion strategy for refugees and host communities. Investments made over the last five years have addressed many of the impacts of the refugee presence that had created tensions with host community members. Survey data from the mid-term review (MTR) of Jya Mbere Phase I showed that this has strengthened social cohesion between refugees and host communities, creating a strong foundation for future economic progress. 5. **Building on the gains made, the government’s strategic aim for refugee management is now to promote** **self-reliance.** As one of the four objectives of the GCR, self-reliance is also central to both the National", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Survey data from the mid-term review", "confidence": 0.34551817178726196}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.31293830275535583}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Uganda Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project Phase II (P510476) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT of sub-project sites. Monitoring will be enhanced in Phase II, including regular beneficiary phone surveys and quarterly technical supervision missions, targeting infrastructure subprojects that are more complex and challenging. 52. **Importance of collaboration and partnerships across the humanitarian-development nexus.** The scale of the refugee presence and the scope of interventions required to bring about inclusion and self-reliance necessitates collaboration between various stakeholders, including government, non-governmental organizations, and international partners. Specific activities under DRDIP II to strengthen government-led coordination efforts are intended to build strong partnerships to create a holistic and integrated response framework. 53. **Refugee situations tend to last for years and managing them exclusively through emergency and humanitarian** **programs is ineffective** . The main conclusion of the World Development Report 2023 on _Migrants, Refugees, and_ _Societies_ is that policies should be geared toward financial and social sustainability by means of internal mobility, selfreliance, and inclusion in national services. The design of DRDIP II fully aligns with these lessons through its focus on selfreliance and integration of refugees into national service delivery systems. 54. **Multi-sectoral development investments directed to forcibly displaced populations and host", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "beneficiary phone surveys", "confidence": 0.833800196647644}]}}}
{"input": "u1 ~ N(0,1) u2 ~ N(0, σ2) u3 ~ N(0, σ3) corr(u1, u2) = ρ2 corr(u1, u3) = ρ3 Irrigation is observed only if it is more profitable than dryland farming. Thus, the observed dependent variable Y is: Y=1 if ΠI > ΠD Y=0 if ΠD > ΠI When ρ = 0, OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regression provides unbiased estimates, but when ρ ≅ 0 the OLS estimates are biased. We consequently employ the estimated Mills ratio from the selection model in both the irrigated and dryland conditional regressions in order to control for selection (Dubin & McFadden 1984). We expect the signs on the coefficient of the estimated Mills ratio to be opposite in each regression. With the estimated Mills ratios, the selection model allows us to use information on whether farms irrigate or not to improve the estimates of the parameters in the regression model. That is, the selection model provides consistent, asymptotically efficient estimates for all parameters in the model (Dubin & McFadden 1984). **3. Empirical results** The empirical analysis is based on a household survey conducted of 11 countries across Africa: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe (for", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household survey"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household survey conducted of 11 countries across Africa", "confidence": 0.30785462260246277}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey", "confidence": 0.9613690376281738}]}}}
{"input": "early numeracy, to respond to the learning diagnostic (iii) Deployment of these didactic resources to classrooms at the Preschool, Primary, and Secondary levels (within each level and articulation between levels), and through MEP’s digital platform; (iv) Digital platform of a professional development plan for teachers, school principals, and pedagogical advisors for the deployment of foundational learning; (v) Development and implementation of a national foundational learning campaign emphasizing the joy of reading, writing, and numerical competency to involve parents and the larger education community; and (vi) Public provision of six monthly reports regarding the school and grade level accomplishment of literacy and numeracy. Educational resources and professional development plans for teachers will include considerations of gender equity and promote supportive and inclusive learning environments where all students feel encouraged to read, with specific measures outlined in the foundational learning strategy to close the gender gap in reading and in mathematics. This subcomponent will finance consultancy firms and individuals and procurement of the digital tools and the development, production, and dissemination of curricular and didactic materials for teachers and students. 29. _Subcomponent 2.2. Support of Digital Competencies and Hybrid Learning_ (US$95 million). This subcomponent will support the digitalization of learning through two", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "social cohesion between refugees and host communities, creating a strong foundation for future economic progress. 5. **Building on the gains made, the government’s strategic aim for refugee management is now to promote** **self-reliance.** As one of the four objectives of the GCR, self-reliance is also central to both the National Strategy for Sustainable Graduation and the draft Refugee Sustainable Graduation Strategy. Through successful implementation of the two strategies, the government expects to: (a) reduce expenditure on social safety net programs for Rwandese and humanitarian aid for refugees; and (b) unlock the potential of refugees to support economic development. This will also contribute to key results in Rwanda’s _National Strategy for Transformation 2 (2024-2029)_ on creating jobs, improving education and the quality-of service-delivery. Shifting to a development approach to achieve self-reliance is increasingly urgent in light of dwindling humanitarian assistance. For instance, funding for UNHCR in Rwanda fell from US$49 million in 2020 (only 49 percent of needs) to US$37 million in 2023 (41 percent of needs), despite almost no change in refugee numbers. 6. **Progress towards achieving refugee self-reliance is hampered by a lack of employment and income-** **generating opportunities.** A tailored Refugee Self-Reliance Index (RSRI) prepared by the GoR,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "tailored Refugee Self-Reliance Index"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "tailored Refugee Self-Reliance Index", "confidence": 0.3803827464580536}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "we split the sample according to the wealth score provided by DHS. Given the data structure, which is repeated cross-section, we cannot follow a particular household that was identified as belonging to the bottom 40 percent in the initial time period. Instead, we identify the bottom 40 percent in four groups: far away, before mine or during mine, and close to mine, before mine or during mine. The summary statistics for selected main outcomes are presented in table 10. As the table shows, the bottom 40 percent in mining communities are more likely engaging in agriculture than the bottom 40 percent elsewhere. This could illustrate that agricultural workers are overrepresented among the less well-off in mining communities. However, women in this group still more often work in services than women did before in the same communities. 15 Fastgini is a user-written command in STATA that helps calculate the gini coefficient. 27", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DHS"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "wealth score provided by DHS", "confidence": 0.122690349817276}], "vague_data": [{"text": "wealth score", "confidence": 0.1811928153038025}]}}}
{"input": "2015; Mallick et al. 2011; Mallick and Vogt 2013; Shameem and Momtaz 2014; Siddiqui et al. 2013; Sultana and Mallick 2015). With the notable exception of Dasgupta et al. (2016), these studies have seldom used household-level data to assess the impacts of past cyclones on communities and households, as well as their role in the formation of expectations about future impacts. Such research requires construction of a georeferenced panel database that specifies the dates of cyclonic storms, their coastal landfall points, subsequent interior paths, and measures of relative power. Construction of an appropriate spatial panel has therefore been a primary objective of this exercise. To support ongoing research, we focus on the coastal regions of Bangladesh and two contiguous Indian states -- West Bengal and Odisha. However, our approach could easily be extended to cover an arbitrarily-large set of coastal regions. 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "georeferenced panel database"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household-level data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "georeferenced panel database", "confidence": 0.11324392259120941}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "georeferenced panel database", "confidence": 0.8503240346908569}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household-level data", "confidence": 0.923455536365509}]}}}
{"input": "**1 Introduction** The mining sector in Africa is growing rapidly and is the main recipient of foreign direct investment (World Bank 2011). The welfare effects of this sector are not well understood, although a literature has recently developed around this question. The main contribution of this paper is to shed light on the welfare effects of gold mining in a detailed, in-depth country study of Ghana, a country with a long tradition of gold mining and a recent, large expansion in capital intensive and industrial-scale production. A second contribution of this paper is to show the importance of decomposing the effects with respect to distance from the mines. Given the spatial heterogeneity of the results, we explore the effects in an individual-level, difference-in-differences analysis by using spatial lag models to allow for nonlinear effects with distance from mine. We also allow for spillovers across districts, in a district-level analysis. We use two complementary geocoded household data sets to analyze outcomes in Ghana: the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS), which provide information on a wide range of welfare outcomes. The paper contributes to the growing literature on the local effects of mining. Much of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Demographic and Health Survey"}, {"text": "Ghana Living Standard Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data sets"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Demographic and Health Survey", "confidence": 0.8531179428100586}, {"text": "Ghana Living Standard Survey", "confidence": 0.8400741219520569}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data sets", "confidence": 0.7031402587890625}], "vague_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data sets", "confidence": 0.18297135829925537}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Zambia Refugee and Host Communities Project (P503941) 9. **External audit.** The project audit will be carried out by the Office of the Auditor General who is mandated by law to do so. The implementing agencies will prepare annual financial statements for their operations, including for the project at the end of each financial year. The audit TOR will be prepared by the implementing agencies and cleared by the World Bank before each year’s audit. The auditors will produce an audit report and management letter highlighting areas/issues which will require addressing. The MoHAIS will be required to submit the audit report together with the management letter to the World Bank not later than six months after the end of the financial year. 10. **FM supervision and implementation support.** FM supervision support will be conducted on a semiannual basis and will include interviews and desk reviews such as the review of the IFRs, statements of expenditure, and audit reports **.** **PROCUREMENT** 11. Standard Procurement Documents (SPD). The World Bank’s SPDs will be used for procurement of goods, works, and non-consulting services under the open international competitive procurement approach. Similarly, selection of consultant firms will use the World Bank’s SPDs,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Migration, pp. 1-23.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40176-018-0138-2) 3 The self-reliance survey is part of the “Enhancing Self-Reliance and Preparedness for Forced Displacement in the Great Lakes Region” activity [(P500793) and draws on the global Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative index (www.refugeeselfreliance.org).](http://www.refugeeselfreliance.org/) 4 Phase I of Jya Mbere was approved on April 30, 2019, and will close on October 30, 2026. Of the total Phase I budget of US$84.41 million, US$68 million is from the IDA 18 Sub-window for Refugees & Host Communities and the IDA 19 Window for Host Communities & Refugees (WHR) and US$4.41 million was provided in co-financing by the Danish International Development Agency (Danida). 5 To meet WHR eligibility requirements, the Government submitted a Strategy Note on supporting refugees, which was discussed and agreed with the World Bank. Page 1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "global Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative index"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "self-reliance survey"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "global Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative index", "confidence": 0.809542179107666}, {"text": "self-reliance survey", "confidence": 0.7725282311439514}, {"text": "IDA 19 Window for Host Communities & Refugees", "confidence": 0.25767701864242554}, {"text": "IDA 18 Sub-window for Refugees & Host Communities", "confidence": 0.14618106186389923}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "over time difficult. Valuation of a future loss is also complicated due to ambiguity in the rate of time preference. In light of these uncertainties, we estimated the economic value of the wetlands at risk for a single scenario of 1 m SLR using the current literature on valuation of wetlands. The economic value of the wetlands at risk from 1 m SLR in the 76 developing countries considered in this analysis is around USD 630 million per year (in USD 2000). It is hoped that the estimates of wetlands at risk from SLR reported in this paper would offer insights into the extent to which countries may be willing to invest to protect coastal wetlands or facilitate their migration as sea level rises. At the outset, we acknowledge several important limitations of our analysis. First, we have not assessed the time profile of 1 m SLR. We take this scenario as given, and assess the _exposure_ of the present wetland stock for each of the 76 developing countries and five regions. Second, the digital elevation (90m DEM V2) data we use in our analysis gives altitude in 1-meter increments, preventing us from sub-meter SLR modeling. [13] Third, the lack", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "digital elevation (90m DEM V2) data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DEM V2", "confidence": 0.2898123264312744}, {"text": "digital elevation", "confidence": 0.15074342489242554}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "digital elevation (90m DEM V2) data", "confidence": 0.128384530544281}], "vague_data": [{"text": "digital elevation", "confidence": 0.12030142545700073}]}}}
{"input": "22,200 people per month in refugee-hosting areas of Djibouti [13] . 14. **Women are disproportionately affected by socio-economic disadvantages in Djibouti, facing significant gaps** **across different dimensions, including access to basic services, education and employment opportunities** . Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is reported to be higher among women than men (27 percent vs. 18 percent in the 15-24 age group and 27 percent vs. 23 percent in the 25-39 age group), as well as food insecurity is reported to be higher among female-headed households [FHHs] (51 percent vs. 45.5 percent) [14] . Women, who are generally the primary caregivers of infants and children, tend to lack information on beneficial practices related to child nutrition, parenting practices, and child stimulation (the proportion of women with children less than six months of age practicing exclusive breastfeeding stands at 12 percent [15] ). Women also experience higher unemployment rates (36 percent vs. 22 percent for men) and are more likely to hold vulnerable, informal, or part-time jobs (44.5 percent vs. 18.5 percent for men). In rural areas, the employment gaps widen further. Overall, men have better access to credit and financial services, productive inputs, and business opportunities with consequences on female entrepreneurship [16]", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Multidimensional Poverty Index", "confidence": 0.6844406127929688}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the CRRF, which is served by a small secretariat under the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). While the coordination structures are fully functional, more support is needed for operational coordination on the ground considering the growing refugee population and the increasing number of development projects supporting host-community-refugee inclusion. For instance, in 2016, DRDIP was the only World Bank-financed project on forced displacement in Uganda. By 2025, however, there are 11 projects funded by the IDA Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR), with a total budget of US$666 million. Continued strong government leadership from OPM will be required to facilitate effective coordination across these and related projects. 10. **The project is aligned with the World Bank Maximizing Finance for Development approach.** Private investment generated through Component 3 on Economic Opportunity counts as Private Capital Mobilization (PCM). Sub-component 3.1 on Resilient Value Chains and Enterprise Investments (US$77.5 million) will provide group-based revolving funds and start-up grants to approximately 234,500 beneficiaries to enhance their economic investments and value chain engagement. PCM of US$10 million has been added to the financing table based on beneficiaries' monthly collective 10 Climate Risk Profile: Uganda (2021): The World Bank Group. 11 “Uganda’s Intended Nationally Determined", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "beneficiaries' monthly collective", "confidence": 0.1413707435131073}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Integrated Community Resilience Project (P506969) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT cash transfers, financial and productive inclusion as well as social services delivery to maximize the resilience of communities and households. 57. **Additionally, the project will draw on insight from the Yemen Emergency Crisis (ECRP) (2016-2022)** . **which** **sought to provide short-term employment and access to selected basic services to the most vulnerable and preserve** **existing implementation capacity of service delivery.** The project will strengthen private sector linkages, drawing from good practices identified in the ECRP, which demonstrated how participatory planning processes enabled the identification and prioritization of local economic needs. Djibouti’s project will similarly be community-driven, ensuring that refugees, host communities, and local entrepreneurs/microenterprises are actively engaged in identifying their needs and priorities. Drawing from Yemen’s example, the project will align productive facilities and local markets with SME operations to strengthen supply chain linkages and create sustainable economic ecosystems in targeted regions. [24] **III.** **PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION** **A. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements** 58. **The Ministry of Social Affairs and Solidarity (MASS)** **will serve as the primary implementing agency for the** **project, leading the implementation** **of Component 1: Social Safety Nets Systems**, **while the** **Djiboutian Social** **Development Agency (ADDS)** **will take", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Integrated Community Resilience Project (P506969) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT support nutritional consumption needs - accompanied with SBCC to promote human development behavior change good practices; (ii) financial inclusion services (FIS) to strengthen the economic resilience of poor and vulnerable households; and (iii) support for strengthening the Social Registry (SR) so that it becomes a stronger underpinning for effective coordination of social programs, ensures better targeting of safety nets, and provides credible information for measurement of results and impacts for all vulnerable populations, including refugees and hosts. 30. **Sustainability of the social safety nets** . Sustainable financing is critical to building an effective and efficient safety net system in Djibouti that can mitigate the adverse impacts of the perennial crises on the poor and vulnerable. The government committed to making efforts to increasing government financing for social safety nets as project financing declines. This commitment is being renewed and related technical simulations will be mainstreamed into the technical assistance that is being provided by the World Bank under the Strengthening Adaptive Social Protection Systems (P166220). Recommendations from the Technical Assistance will be discussed with the MASS and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEFI) and be mainstreamed into the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Social Registry"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Social Registry", "confidence": 0.7020058631896973}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the European Union (EU). The World Food Programme (WFP) has provided food assistance to refugees in Mantapala refugee settlement since 2017. The project’s three components will contribute to the building of a future policy framework and an operational model for the use of WHR resources that could be extended to assist refugees and host communities in other areas across the country. 44. **The project is timely.** National ownership and political will are prerequisites both for successful implementation and sustainability. The GRZ has demonstrated a commitment to both, and it is important that momentum is maintained to prevent any possible backsliding on the reform agenda. The World Bank in Zambia is active in all the sectors proposed as interventions under this project, which is aligned with sector approaches and designed to leverage cooperation with larger sector investments. **F. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design** 45. **Several key lessons pertinent to the objectives of the Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR) in** **Zambia have emerged from implementation of the CPF 2019–2024.** They include the importance of a multisectoral approach, the importance of stakeholder engagement, the challenges faced by the Government in addressing institutional constraints, and the need for simpler", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "this, most often by not being able to move freely or to access basic services. #### Protection Risk II **Access to adequate housing:** As for Q3 findings from Protection Monitoring interviews highlighted accommodation as the highest priority need for respondents (147 respondents, 34%). ## 34% reported accommodation as their highest priority need UNHCR / September 2024 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Q3 findings from Protection Monitoring interviews", "confidence": 0.12066639214754105}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "to be implemented, activity implementers will submit the payment details of the payee for payment from an appropriate bank account. Transfers to the Zambian Kwacha operational account will be made only when there are local currency payments to be made to avoid exchange losses being incurred by holding Zambian Kwacha balances. Other disbursement methods such as reimbursement, direct payment, and special commitment will be available on this project. The operation of all disbursement methods will be described in the Disbursement and Financial Information Letter (DFIL) (Figure 1.2). Page 39", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the scale of environmental problems faced by a country's institutions. If Brazil and Bhutan receive the same CPIA rating, for example, ignoring their scale difference will lead to assignment of identical lending in the optimization model. 6 We recognize that an equal-weighted index is only one of numerous plausible indicators for general environmental problems. In Appendix 2, we develop alternative indices and analyze their association with 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "equal-weighted index", "confidence": 0.242117241024971}]}}}
{"input": "and maintaining ongoing dialogue with technical actors at national, regional, and global levels to bolster cash coordination. Additionally, they are responsible for developing and following a dynamic work plan that reflects the evolving priorities and discussions within the platform and across relevant sectors. This includes ensuring that the focus and deliverables of the platform remain relevant and contextually appropriate to the NIATF and the 3RP sectors. **Members:** The CBI TWG members are responsible to commit to fostering a transparent and cooperative environment by meaningful participation and sharing relevant operational delivery data (such as cash assistance delivered, beneficiaries assisted etc.). The members need to provide at least one focal point 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "operational delivery data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "operational delivery data", "confidence": 0.21135501563549042}], "vague_data": [{"text": "operational delivery data", "confidence": 0.7676824927330017}]}}}
{"input": "collaborative and communication abilities; Science Technology, Art and Mathematics (STEAM) skills; and awareness of the environmental issues, energy efficiency, and eco-friendly innovation for their immediate community and the nation. By aligning education with the requirements of a low-carbon economy, Costa Rica 13 OECD (2021), Education at a Glance 2021: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, [https://doi.org/10.1787/b35a14e5-en.](https://doi.org/10.1787/b35a14e5-en) 14 MEP Data 15 Annex 1 reproduces a graphic showing the 67 modules across Pre-School to 12 grades of education that comprises the PNFT curriculum. Page 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MEP Data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MEP Data", "confidence": 0.44116297364234924}, {"text": "OECD Indicators", "confidence": 0.3503156006336212}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "MEP Data", "confidence": 0.14194530248641968}], "vague_data": [{"text": "MEP Data", "confidence": 0.13089145720005035}]}}}
{"input": "## Regional Advisory Group refugees, statelessness, and citizenship. report. Lakes region. ## Regional Study Process Expected Outcomes and Impact The study will contribute to greater awareness of the causes, specific risk profiles and scale of statelessness arising from protracted refugee situations in countries of asylum in Great Lakes. The findings of the study will contribute to improve the overall situation of refugees in prolonged exile as part of finding durable solutions, by developing concrete recommendations for local integration with sustainable alternative legal status in host countries to mitigate risk of statelessness, realize the right to a [nationality and ensure access to proof of legal identity in line with S DG Target 16.9.](https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/files/Metadata-16-09-01.pdf) The analysis and recommendations will further inform the development of a comprehensive strategy on durable solutions for forcibly displaced persons including refugees in the Great Lakes,supporting the effortsof the ICGRL Member States to address protracted refugee situations and risks of statelessness, which arise from prolonged exile", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**APPENDICES** **Appendix A: Temperature normals (Sample means)** **`country`** **winter** **spring** **summer** **fall** `burkinafaso` 23.55 28.34 28.87 24.48 `cameroon` 19.38 21.38 19.97 18.87 `egypt` 11.67 13.17 24.11 23.38 `ethiopia` 18.64 21.53 19.71 18.07 `ghana` 21.79 24.81 22.63 21.16 `kenya` 18.75 19.72 18.36 19.12 `niger` 26.28 30.83 33.91 29.18 `senegal` 24.54 29.13 31.53 26.67 `south africa` 11.53 15.47 20.73 19.37 `zambia` 16.69 21.72 21.09 19.58 `zimbabwe` 16.58 21.29 22.49 20.63 **`total`** **19.82** **23.35** **24.52** **22.23** **Appendix B: Precipitation normals (Sample means)** **`country`** **winter** **spring** **summer** **fall** burkinafaso 2.6 15.83 113.78 133.12 cameroon 60.25 101.94 185.08 228.55 egypt 12.81 7.02 2.3 3.51 ethiopia 19.42 49.21 123.71 117.51 ghana 30.87 59.66 112.4 111.74 kenya 88.38 103.02 84.31 59.95 niger 0.75 3.15 64.05 70.55 senegal 2.23 1.05 47.93 112.72 south africa 31.79 54.96 86.38 68.79 zambia 48.26 57.7 108.58 100.67 zimbabwe 7.54 15.4 138.75 89.98 **total** **25.85** **39.83** **96.05** **102.4** 13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "refugee populations are better documented and ascertained so that they can benefit from a wider range of integrated services. Interoperability with other databases will also enhance responsiveness in the event of a natural disaster. 39. **In addition to reinforcing the social registry, the sub-component will support enhancing the operational capacity** **of existing social counters (** _**guichets sociaux**_ **) in urban areas and regions.** These social counters will be upgraded to reach a greater number of individuals, enabling the registration of additional households, as well as the regular updating of data. The enhanced social counters will be equipped to handle grievances, ensuring timely and effective responses. These centers will also serve as key points for connecting refugees with essential services, facilitating their inclusion in national programs for social protection and economic empowerment. The centers will evolve into fully integrated one-stop service hubs, serving as entry points for basic services, beneficiary monitoring and grievances management. By implementing these measures, the project aims to create a robust and dynamic social registry that will not only address current needs but also adapt to future challenges. **Component 2: Access to Socio-Economic Infrastructure and Development of Economic Opportunities (** _**total IDA**_ _**US$14 Million equivalent, including WHR", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "the social registry"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "social registry", "confidence": 0.36490002274513245}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "(1.805) (0.039) (0.054) (0.029) (0.021) (0.029) (0.021) Active 0.007 0.001 0.050** 0.034** -0.032 0.054** -0.023 (1.012) (0.026) (0.024) (0.017) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) Observations 9,790 9,790 12,226 12,216 12,227 12,227 12,227 R-squared 0.128 0.180 0.453 0.148 0.208 0.171 0.095 mean of dep var 0.407 14.84 0.565 0.652 0.151 0.732 11.6 _Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and district fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. Active is active status of mine in the survey year. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS = ordinary least squares. Overall, we estimated in table 8 that a household’s access to electricity decreased when a mine became active. This finding is surprising if we assume that electricity infrastructure is seldom destroyed, so that with time, access has generally been increasing. [13] Figure A1 (Annex) further decomposes the effect, and panel Aa of the figure confirms that the coefficient for electricity access is negative using the treatment distance 20 km. However, with a treatment distance of 10 km, the effect is marginally positive and insignificant. If we use a treatment distance of 50 km, we no longer see a significant effect. In panel Ab, the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.12218086421489716}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "exposure and awareness of flood risk in England and Wales. Disasters. Vol. 36(3), pp.477-494 Freire, Sergio; MacManus, Kytt; Pesaresi, Martino; Doxsey-Whitfield, Erin; Mills, Jane (2016): Development of new open and free multi-temporal global population grids at 250 m resolution. Geospatial Data in a Changing World; Association of Geographic Information Laboratories in Europe (AGILE). AGILE 2016. Daniel, V. E., R. J. G. M. Florax, and P. Rietveld. 2009. “Flooding Risk and Housing Values: An Economic Assessment of Environmental Hazard.” Ecological Economics 69 (2): 355–65. Durand-Lasserve, A., H. Selod, and M. Durand-Lasserve. 2013. “A Systemic Analysis of Land Markets and Land Institutions in West African Cities: Rules and Practices—The Case of Bamako, Mali.” Policy Research Working Paper 6687, World Bank, Washington, DC. [Hallegatte, S., A. Vogt-Schilb, J. Rozenberg, M. Bangalore, C. Beaudet (2020). \"From Poverty to Disaster](https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/ediscc/v4y2020i1d10.1007_s41885-020-00060-5.html) [and Back: a Review of the Literature,\" Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol.](https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/ediscc/v4y2020i1d10.1007_s41885-020-00060-5.html) 4(1), pages 223-247 Hallegatte, S., C. Green, R. Nicholls, J. Corfee-Morlot (2013). Future flood losses in major coastal cities. Nature Climate Change. Vol. 3, 802–806 25", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "open and free multi-temporal global population grids"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Geospatial Data", "confidence": 0.3178631067276001}]}}}
{"input": "The modeling of all coastal wetlands by McFadden et al. (2007) suggests that global wetland losses are 32% and 44% by the 2080s for a 50 cm and 1 m rise in sea level between 1990 and 2100 accounting for human impacts, such as dike construction or wetland nourishment. The estimates presented by McFadden at al. (2007) are not delineated by types of wetlands or by regions of the world. As for McFadden et al. (2007), the estimates of Nicholls (2004) and Nicholls et al. (1999) are also not disaggregated by types of wetlands. Furthermore, while Nicholls (2004) asserts the largest loss of coastal wetlands to be expected around the Atlantic coast of Central and North America, the small Caribbean islands, and most particularly the Mediterranean and the Baltic, the paper does not present estimates of lost wetlands by regions of the world. It should also be noted that neither of these analyses present estimates of the economic values, which may be associated to these lost wetland areas around the world. The valuation studies by Tol (2007) and Anthoff et al. (2010) are also based on wetland losses derived from the Global Vulnerability Analysis (Hoozemans et al. 1993). Wetland value", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Vulnerability Analysis"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Vulnerability Analysis", "confidence": 0.7879231572151184}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "needed.** The project will provide targeted support to strengthen M&E capacity within MASS and ADDS. Where feasible, the project will finance consultants to assist MASS and ADDS in developing a detailed M&E and reporting system plan. In addition, consultants will provide on-the-job training for M&E specialists across MASS, ADDS, and other implementing agencies, as well as any other support required to establish and maintain an effective M&E system. 64. **The MASS and ADDS have demonstrated capacity to undertake beneficiary assessments (BA) and technical** **audits (TA) to inform implementation and obtain stakeholder and beneficiary feedback as good practice** . Two BAs and TAs are anticipated to determine feedback and inform the pre and post MTR implementation. The BAs will provide feedback on satisfaction levels among key beneficiaries, identify challenges in implementation and make recommendations for improvements. The TAs which have been undertaken to ascertain delivery of cash transfers, will now cover a broader range of interventions including the financial services and SBCCs. **C. Disbursement Arrangements** 65. **Given the high-risk environment, the report-based disbursement will not be applicable.** Therefore, upon project effectiveness, transaction-based disbursements will be used. An initial advance up to the ceiling of the Designated Account (DA) will be made", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "(Eds.) _Climate Change 2007: The Physical_ _Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the_ _Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change_ [Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. Krabill, W, Hanna E., Huybrechts, P., Abdalati, W., Cappelen, J., Csatho, B., Frederick, E., Manizade, S., Martin, C., Sonntag, J., Swift, R., Thomas, R., and J. Yunge. 2004. Greenland ice sheet: increased coastal thinning. _Geophysical Research Letters_, 31: L24402 Larson, J.S., Adamus, P.R. and E.J. Clairain Jr. 1989. _Functional Assessment of Freshwater_ _Wetlands: A Manual and Training Outline_ . Glaud, Switzerland: WWF Publication 89-6: 62pp. Lehner, B. and P. Döll. 2004. Development and validation of a global database of lakes, reservoirs and wetlands. _Journal of Hydrology_, 296(1-4), 1-22 Maslanik, J. A., C. Fowler, J. Stroeve, S. Drobot, J. Zwally, D. Yi, and W. Emery, 2007: A younger, thinner Arctic ice cover: Increased potential for rapid, extensive sea-ice loss _Geophysical_ _Research Letters_ **34** : L24501 McFadden, L., Spencer,T. and R.J. Nicholls, 2007. Broad-scale modelling of coastal wetlands: What is required? _Hydrobiologia_, 577, 5-15. McLeod. K.L., Lubchenco, J., Palumbi, S.R. and A.A. Rosenberg. 2005. _Scientific Consensus_ _Statement on Marine Ecosystem-Based Management. The Communication Partnership for_ _Science", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "global database of lakes, reservoirs and wetlands"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "global database of lakes, reservoirs and wetlands", "confidence": 0.3177972137928009}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "global database of lakes, reservoirs and wetlands", "confidence": 0.5579424500465393}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Strzepek K & McCluskey A, 2006. District level hydroclimatic time series and scenario analysis to assess the impacts of climate change on regional water resources and agriculture in Africa. CEEPA Discussion Paper No 13, Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa, University of Pretoria. USGS (US Geological Survey), 2004. Global 30 Arc Second Elevation Data, USGS National Mapping Division, EROS Data Centre. (These data files are downloadable from http://edcdaac.usgs.gov/gtopo30/gtopo30.asp) Weng F & Grody N, 1998. Physical retrieval of land surface temperature using the Special Sensor Microwave Imager. _Journal of Geophysical Research_ 103: 8839–8848. World Bank, 2003. Africa rainfall and temperature evaluation system (ARTES). World Bank, Washington DC. 12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global 30 Arc Second Elevation Data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global 30 Arc Second Elevation Data", "confidence": 0.4511905610561371}, {"text": "Africa rainfall and temperature evaluation system", "confidence": 0.43473127484321594}, {"text": "Special Sensor Microwave Imager", "confidence": 0.10491767525672913}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Global 30 Arc Second Elevation Data", "confidence": 0.34566158056259155}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "its zone of maximum wind speed. We employ a standard IMD storm classification based on maximum wind speed intervals in kt: (Cyclonic Storm (CS) [34-47 kt]; Severe Cyclonic Storm (SCS) [48-63]; Very Severe Cyclonic Storm (VSCS) [64-119] and Super Cyclonic Storm (SuCS) [120+]. We have excluded all storms rated as tropical depressions because their maximum wind speeds are below 34 kt. The third distinctive feature of our exercise is use of the constructed database to explore temporal and spatial patterns in cyclone impacts that can provide the context for future household level research on adaptation by coastal communities. Our analysis is aggregative in this paper, but the source database can provide high-spatial-resolution cyclone incidence and impact measures for households and communities in both coastal and interior locations. We should introduce a cautionary note at the outset. During the past 140 years, technical support for cyclone tracking has evolved from land-based telegraphy in the 19th century, through 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "constructed database"}, {"text": "source database"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "constructed database", "confidence": 0.13223770260810852}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "constructed database", "confidence": 0.22933265566825867}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "and age of the 2023 data for victims is not yet available. However, according to the Child Protection Sub-cluster, the Child Protection Working Group of the Diffa region recorded 18 child victims of ED in 2022, the majority of whom (74%) are girls who went to look for firewood. 5 Departments of: Torodi, Say,Téra, Tillabéry, Gotheye, Bankilaré et, Ouallam (région de Tillabéry) et Diffa, Bosso, Mainé et N'Guingmi (region de Diffa) 6 According to protection monitoring data (P21) 1st semester 2023. 7 [Food security situation, june 2023](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FVzLNdVSeHdrZ0iNx0YUf2LNiWuO5gBS/view?usp=sharing)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "protection monitoring data (P21)"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "protection monitoring data", "confidence": 0.8322460055351257}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "protection monitoring data", "confidence": 0.18374015390872955}]}}}
{"input": "replace deteriorating reservoirs, extend the water distribution network, or enhance water storage and management. This would lead to increased risks of water shortages and contamination, endangering the health of the refugees. Substandard waste and sanitary management would also pose significant health hazards to the camp residents. Access to quality obstetric care and services as well as essential medicines will also be compromised. 1 _UN agencies use different points of reference for the population living in the Tindouf refugee camps. For example, UNHCR uses the number 90,000 to refer to the_ _‘most vulnerable refugees’ although recognizing that assistance needs are much higher. The Sahrawi Response Plan launched in November by the UN resident_ _coordinator in Algeria uses the higher 173,600 figure to ensure humanitarian assistance is comprehensive._ ### **EGYPT** **Health** As medical needs continue to rise among new arrivals from Sudan, public health services are overwhelmed, and many individuals face high out-of-pocket costs. Underfunding means UNHCR will not be able to support some 16,100 refugee patients, including those chronic diseases who depend on monthly medications. Without this support, many lives are at risk. **Education** Currently, around 54 per cent of all school-aged arriving from Sudan are out of school. Education grants", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "These flood risk categories are defined in line with an approximation of the risk to the lives of affected people. Up to 0.15 meter inundation depth, no significant risk to life is expected. Up to 0.5 meter, some risk to life must be expected, especially for vulnerable groups such as children and the disabled. Up to 1.5 meters, a significant share of the affected population could face risk to life, especially if flood waters have a current. Above 1.5 meters, most affected people could face substantial risk to life without rescue measures. Through this process, each 90 by 90 meter cell of a country will be assigned one of the five risk categories (e.g. a pixel that has an estimated inundation depth of 5 cm is classified as low risk, while a pixel with depth 4.3 meters is classified as very high risk). This is repeated for the world’s landmass of 510 million square kilometers, which implies the processing of 63 billion pixels. **3.** **Assign flood risk categories to population headcounts at the pixel level and aggregate to the** **administrative unit:** As the flood hazard and population density maps are converted into the same spatial resolution, each population map cell", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood hazard and population density maps"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "flood hazard and population density maps", "confidence": 0.22371630370616913}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood hazard and population density maps", "confidence": 0.25941091775894165}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "discount rates have also been provided as a measure of the sensitivity of the analysis. 46 This corresponds to the average village population in similar areas according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This information can be accessed at Village Assessment Survey County Profiles. [https://iomsouthsudan.org/tracking/sites/default/publicfiles/documents/Lakes.pdf](https://iomsouthsudan.org/tracking/sites/default/publicfiles/documents/Lakes.pdf) _._ 47 Burden of Road Injuries in Sub-Saharan African _,_ [htp://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/356861434469785833/Road-Safety-Burden-of-Injuries-in-Africa.pdf](http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/356861434469785833/Road-Safety-Burden-of-Injuries-in-Africa.pdf) _._ Page 26", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Village Assessment Survey", "confidence": 0.5895106792449951}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Village Assessment Survey County Profiles", "confidence": 0.16766823828220367}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Figure 14. Economic value at risk, computed as exposure headcount multiplied by subnational income_ _per capita. Note: no subnational income data are available for several countries, including China._ **Exposure headcounts by income groups.** To address the bias that high-income areas have higher flood exposure in monetary terms, we consider flood exposure headcount disaggregated by national income classifications. The results, presented in Figure 15, show that 710 million people (or 48 percent) of the world’s flood exposed population live in lower- or lower middle-income countries. About 159 million (11 percent) of flood exposed people live in high-income countries. Considering that the flood exposed population in high-income countries is more likely to benefit from flood protection systems, social post-disaster assistance, and other risk management support, these figures highlight that monetary exposure estimates (including GDP) offer a distorted account of the distribution of global flood risks. 0 500 1,000 1,500 Millions _Figure 15. Number of people exposed to significant flood risk, disaggregated by national income level_ _classification_ 18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "subnational income data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "subnational income data", "confidence": 0.6680434942245483}]}}}
{"input": "of the GoR’s strategy – together with support from humanitarian and development partners – research shows that the impact of refugees in Rwanda on basic services, the environment and livelihood can be mitigated. Indeed, the refugee presence is generally associated with improved local economic conditions and access to services, without creating major social tensions. [2] 2. **The government’s strategic goal for refugee management is to promote self-reliance, however, major gaps** **remain in achieving this aim.** Data from the 2022 national census (which included a refugee module for the first time) and from the first round of a World Bank-led survey on refugee self-reliance showed that refugees generally enjoy good access to basic services such as education, health and water, but remain well short of self-reliance with respect to employment and income. [3] High poverty rates, lack of economic opportunity and limited access to finance in the refugee-hosting districts (RHDs) constrain employment and income-generating prospects for refugees and host communities alike. Building on the success of the ongoing Phase I of the World Bank-financed Socio-economic Inclusion of Refugees and Host Communities in Rwanda Project (P164130) (known in Kinyarwanda as “Jya Mbere” or “move forward”), Phase II will support self-reliance for refugees", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2022 national census"}, {"text": "first round of a World Bank-led survey on refugee self-reliance"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2022 national census", "confidence": 0.8790897130966187}, {"text": "World Bank-led survey", "confidence": 0.2375306636095047}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "World Bank-led survey on refugee self-reliance", "confidence": 0.48816683888435364}, {"text": "Data from the 2022 national census", "confidence": 0.179625004529953}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) **D. Results Chain** **Assumptions** **Figure 3: Results Chain** i. Political and Governmental Support: The government of Costa Rica will continue to prioritize education. ii. Stability of the Project Implementation Unit: The Project Implementation Unit will remain stable, with consistent leadership and staffing levels, and will be able to effectively coordinate with the IDB, internal and external stakeholders. iii. Community and Stakeholder Engagement: There will be buy-in from key stakeholders, including educators, students, parents, and the community at large, for the education technology reforms. **E. Rationale for Bank Involvement and Role of Partners** 39. **The Bank has a long-standing partnership with the Government of Costa Rica on education and can leverage** **global experience in the implementation of education sector reforms.** This Project builds on and complements prior Bank support to Costa Rica on education, including the Costa Rica Higher Education Improvement Project (P123146, Loan 8194CR) and on governance under the Costa Rica Fiscal Management Improvement Project (P172352, Loan 9075-CR). 40. **Collaboration with development partners will be key for the preparation and implementation of this Project.** The Project is designed in parallel to an IDB financed project. Both projects are self-standing and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Costa Rica Higher Education Improvement Project"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "an economically viable area. Results from various studies such as the 23 Zambia 2022 Census of Population and Housing, Central Statistical Office Zambia, 2023. 24 One Meheba Local Area Plan, Planning Survey and Issues Report, GRZ, 2023. 25 One Meheba Local Area Plan, Planning Survey and Issues Report, GRZ, 2023. 26 “Many girls choose not to attend classes at certain times due to the lack of appropriate washing and hygiene facilities,” School headmaster, Kalumbila District, February 2024. Page 16", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "23 Zambia 2022 Census of Population and Housing"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "23 Zambia 2022 Census of Population and Housing", "confidence": 0.4930974841117859}, {"text": "One Meheba Local Area Plan", "confidence": 0.3106882870197296}, {"text": "Planning Survey and Issues Report", "confidence": 0.15926198661327362}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "strong spillover effects. The lack of visible spillover effects casts doubt on the theory that repurchases are being driven by increased trust in the insurance company or learning about insurance payouts. Notably, this result stands in contrast to recent results that do document spillover effects of insurance payouts (Cole, Stein, and Tobacman 2014; Karlan et al. 2014). Direct Effects of Payouts on Wealth and Liquidity The previous two sections discount the possibility that trust, learning, or weather effects are driving the result that receiving an insurance payout is correlated with purchasing insurance the following year. This points to the actual reception of money from the insurance company as being the driving force behind greater take-up. The most natural explanation for this phenomenon would be that receiving an insurance payout could directly affect choices the next year due to its effects on wealth and liquidity. For instance, if insurance is a normal good, then increased wealth would result in greater insurance demand. [18] Although the BASIX data set does not offer the opportunity to test the direct effects of a cash payment separately from an insurance payout, there are a number of reasons why it is unlikely that wealth or liquidity", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "BASIX data set"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "BASIX data set", "confidence": 0.9729530811309814}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "data on slum location to examine the distribution of exposure across poor and non-poor locations. While prior studies have examined flood risk in Vietnam, this paper provides two main contributions. First, we develop new high-resolution flood hazard datasets, which incorporate both riverine and coastal flooding and consider climate change. [1] When examining flood exposure, it is important to get as local as possible as impacts can vary widely across space - for instance, impacts can be different from one city block to the next (Patankar 2015). This 1 Prior use hazard data at a 1 km resolution and are restricted to a single district or city within Vietnam (Chinh et al. 2017; Apel et al. 2016). We develop new high-resolution flood hazard datasets on a 90 m × 90 m grid.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood hazard datasets"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "data on slum location"}, {"text": "flood hazard datasets"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "high-resolution flood hazard datasets", "confidence": 0.49018973112106323}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data on slum location", "confidence": 0.2402830719947815}, {"text": "high-resolution flood hazard datasets", "confidence": 0.1676769256591797}, {"text": "Prior use hazard data", "confidence": 0.14633704721927643}], "vague_data": [{"text": "hazard data", "confidence": 0.16220572590827942}, {"text": "data on slum location", "confidence": 0.14412786066532135}]}}}
{"input": "not owned, significant and quantitatively large investment disincentives persist and cause productivity losses of considerable magnitude. This makes it important to explore other ways of bringing investment levels on such land closer to the social optimum. To explore this, our survey asked households who occupied land under usufruct about their willingness to pay to acquire full ownership rights. Results, as reported in table 7, suggest that 40% of 2,804 owners were willing to pay for about 37% of the 4,478 occupied parcels overall or 43% of the 1,519 parcels under freehold or _mailo_ . The median willingness to pay, US$ 215/acre for customary and US$ 269 per acre for _mailo_ or freehold land is surprisingly large, both if compared to owners’ median self-assessed value of US$ 403/acre. It is also high in view of the fact that, at least in the case of _mailo_ or freehold, the economic value of landlords’ residual claims to a perpetual ground rent of about US$ 0.6 annually is minuscule. Although part of the stated willingness to pay could have its origin in non-economic values of land ownership, the fact that a large number of households are willing to spend large amounts of 19 As", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Needs Assessment, [27] UNHCR Socioeconomic Survey, [28] the UNHCR Gap Analysis, [29] and the outcome of a stakeholder consultation process revealed that rehabilitation of settlement roads is the priority development need across all communities. The project will improve the 38 km of rural road from the Meheba junction on the T5 Solwezi-Mwinilunga Road to the Mwafwe River located at the southern border of the settlement. Construction will be done to a climate-resilient standard, to withstand damage from flash flooding, including, for example, adopting a robust drainage and camber design and ensuring their periodic maintenance. The approach is in line with Zambia’s Climate Adaptation Plan which seeks to promote the application of climate-smart codes for roads development nationally. It will also provide a bridge over the Mwafwe River to facilitate access to communities in the Matebo Ward to the immediate south of the settlement [30] and improve their resilience to climate change impacts such as flash floods. An assessment will ensure that the bridge is engineered to withstand flooding and erosion risk. Rural road improvement will also contribute significantly to creating links—increasing the opportunity to access goods and services located in nearby Solwezi and other markets,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Socioeconomic Survey"}, {"text": "UNHCR Gap Analysis"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Socioeconomic Survey", "confidence": 0.8922401666641235}, {"text": "UNHCR Gap Analysis", "confidence": 0.2244495004415512}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Economics of Disasters and Climate Change paper contributes to the growing literature in economics on the assessment of local and disaggregated disaster impacts (e.g. Del Valle et al. 2018 using wind speed), and is the first to our knowledge examining flood risk at this scale in a developing country. Second, we analyze how flood exposure differs based on socioeconomic dimensions, in this case poverty, at the country and city-level. In both cases, we examine how flood exposure and poverty differs spatially across the country (at the district level) but also within HCMC (by identifying slums). The combination of these two datasets on hazard and poverty - typically kept separate in the literature – is another main contribution of this paper. The consideration of socioeconomic characteristics and the focus on the poor is an important one as not all segments of the population are equally exposed and vulnerable to floods. In some cases, people living in risky places may be richer than the average population: for instance, urban residents are on average wealthier than those living in rural areas (World Bank 2009). At a more local scale and especially within cities, land and housing markets often push poorer people to settle", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "datasets on hazard and poverty", "confidence": 0.14451323449611664}], "vague_data": [{"text": "datasets", "confidence": 0.14007142186164856}]}}}
{"input": "IDA Credits and Grants”, dated October 15, 2006, and revised in January 2011 and as of July 1, 2016 (Anti-Corruption Guidelines), and beneficiary ownership disclosure requirements. The project will use the Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP) system to provide data on planned procurement activities, establish benchmarks, monitor delays, and measure procurement performance. 77. **A Project Procurement Strategy for Development (PPSD) has been prepared by the Recipient.** The PPSD highlights the market, procurement risks, procurement options, and selection methods to be followed by the IAs during implementation of the Procurement Plan. The Procurement Plan for the first 18 months is annexed in the PPSD and will be updated at least annually or as required to reflect changes in the AWPB. 23 The Auditor General’s report for DRDIP I for the year ending June 30, 2024, identified network challenges and unstable electricity in Madi-Okollo, Obongi, Terego, and Kibuuke districts. 24 The audit reports for 2022/2023 that had an unqualified (clean) audit opinion were for Isingiro, Kamwenge, and Obongi districts. 2023/2024 audit reports were not available on the Auditor General’s website. The audit reports for 2023/2024 that had an unqualified (clean) audit opinion were for Adjumani, Kikuube, Kiryandongo, Koboko, Kyegegwa, Lamwo,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement", "confidence": 0.41173055768013}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Economics of Disasters and Climate Change vulnerability even as the climate change hazard increases (Hallegatte et al. 2016). Along these lines, while we examine which regions within Vietnam have the highest flood exposure, we do not examine the determinants of vulnerability (other than poverty). Recent analyses suggest that the Northwest, Central Highlands, and Mekong River Delta have the greatest socioeconomic vulnerability (World Bank 2010). In the flood hazard maps developed for this paper, we assume no protection due to a lack of data and as a result the hazard maps present an upper bound of flood exposure. Work is currently ongoing to develop a global database of flood protection, and this information can be mobilized for future work (Scussolini et al. 2016). For the national-level analysis, flooded areas are defined as any area with inundation higher than 0. We have not yet explored the depth dimension, although the flood hazard maps developed for this study allow for this potential in future work. For the HCMC analysis, the location of the slum areas in the PUMA data set are mainly restricted to the old town. Furthermore, slum areas are often difficult to define (with PUMA only identifying potential slums) and the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PUMA data set"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "global database of flood protection"}, {"text": "flood hazard maps"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PUMA data set", "confidence": 0.9220625758171082}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "global database of flood protection", "confidence": 0.32952964305877686}], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps", "confidence": 0.930298924446106}, {"text": "global database of flood protection", "confidence": 0.10584910213947296}]}}}
{"input": "zones by constructing a buffer around each storm polyline whose width is the storm’s radial distance from center to the zone of maximum wind speed. For high-resolution location of landfalls, we construct a coastal boundary polyline for Bangladesh, West Bengal and Odisha. Then we convert the coastal polyline into points spaced evenly at intervals of .001 decimal degrees (approximately 100 meters). The resulting set of ordered points along the coastline is numbered successively from 0 (southern tip of the Odisha coastline) to 11,327 (southern tip of the Bangladesh coastline). For each storm track, we identify the landfall as the closest ordered point where the track first intersects the coastline. [3] To guard against exclusion bias from regional bounding, we include intersecting storm tracks within 20 km of the southernmost coastal points in Odisha and Bangladesh. We identify a storm’s coastal impact zone as the set of ordered coastal points within the radius-buffered storm track polygon at its first coastal intersection. **3. Aggregate Results** **3.1 Trend in Cyclonic Storm Incidence, 1877-2016** Although we focus on the northern coast of the Bay of Bengal, our database includes all recorded tracks for the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. This provides a very", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "coastal boundary polyline", "confidence": 0.1510070413351059}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) **I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT** **A. Country Context** 1. **Costa Rica has been one of the most politically stable, progressive, and prosperous nations in the Latin America** **and the Caribbean (LAC) region.** Successive administrations have prioritized the social welfare and development of the Costa Rican people. Political stability, the social compact, and steady growth have resulted in one of the lowest poverty rates in LAC (2023 poverty headcount rate at upper middle-income poverty line was 12.7 percent). [1] The country of 5.33 million inhabitants became a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2021. The economy is diverse, and based mainly on services, tourism, and exports of products such as electronics and medical devices. Trade (Exports+Imports) formed 80 percent of Costa Rica’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2022 (compared to 57 percent for LAC) [2] and the country has also built a world renowned “Green Trademark” centered on conservation, reforestation, and protected areas. 2. **The country has recovered quickly from the COVID-19 shock on key macroeconomic indicators, but it faces new** **challenges such as heightened migrant and refugee flows** . The unemployment rate reached a high of 20", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "### **ALGERIA** **Protection** CRITICAL FUNDING NEEDS IN MENA / 10 OCTOBER 2024 Critical funding need: **$5.5 million** Refugee access to crucial legal and identity documents will be diminished, severely restricting their access to essential services and increasing their vulnerability. For instance, UNHCR has registered 2,455 individuals so far in 2024, but the average waiting time for the asylum-seeking process is currently 126 days, while registration takes around 156 days. Without additional funding, these delays could be prolonged, leaving people in legal limbo and unable to work or access rights. GBV survivors and others at risk will not have access to safe shelters, psychosocial support, medical care, or access to economic opportunities to facilitate their effective reintegration into the community. **WASH** UNHCR supports the entire refugee population in the five camps near Tindouf – more than 90,000 refugees [1] - with lifesaving health and WASH activities. UNHCR will be unable to replace deteriorating reservoirs, extend the water distribution network, or enhance water storage and management. This would lead to increased risks of water shortages and contamination, endangering the health of the refugees. Substandard waste and sanitary management would also pose significant health hazards to the camp residents. Access to quality obstetric", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "EA were randomly sampled. As table 1 illustrates, 5,530 of the sample households were involved in agricultural activities. Of these, about 31%, or 1,728 with 5,448 parcels, are mixed owner/occupants who operated at least one parcel under full ownership and one under usufruct. This sub-sample forms the basis for our analysis. Descriptive statistics point towards a number of interesting features. First, cultivation of land that is only occupied rather than owned is widespread; only some 49% of cultivators are pure owners, 20% cultivate only occupied land, and about 31% are owner-cum-occupants who cultivate owned and occupied land simultaneously. Second, although per capita expenditure by those in agriculture is, with about 19 12 To check whether this introduces any non-randomness, we compare total asset endowments and their composition, monthly consumption expenditure, and basic demographic characteristics between households who are included and those who have at least some parcels dropped. And find no significant differences in either of them. 13 Information on crop output was collected at the crop level, separately for the two main agricultural seasons (July - December 2004 and January - June 2005). A diary was used for continuously harvested crops and prices, in addition to standard socio-economic information,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The Regional Bureau for East and Horn of Africa, together with the Child Protection Unit at HQ, organised a series of regional webinars for UNHCR staff on increasing the quality of alternative care and responding to the needs of newly separated children in the region, in addition to engaging community volunteers in the development of Best Interests Procedures. The Refugee Child Protection Online Community of Practice has been updated by the Child Protection Unit at HQ to provide COVID-19 related news, guidance, tools and other information. The Community of Practice encourages child protection workers and managers to contribute questions, recommendations, field practices, and guidance so that, collaboratively, continually improving child protection responses during the COVID-19 pandemic can be shaped and better outcomes achieved. With global partners, and support from the Swiss Government, UNHCR’s Child Protection Unit developed a Massive Online Open Course (MOOC) on adapting child protection case management during the pandemic. Targeting frontline workers, the six-week course provides practical guidance and peer exchange on key approaches to responding to the protection needs of individual children at risk. As of mid-July, over 7,000 individuals were registered to participate in the course. UNHCR also provided input into the Alliance for Child", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the importance of: (i) investing in often underserved host communities to strengthen social cohesion; (ii) communicating project benefits and managing misinformation; and (iii) mitigating the risks of traditional livelihood activities, due to their long production cycles and exposure to externalities, such as climate change. The project will also build on lessons from **the Integrated Cash Transfer and Human Capital Project (PITCH)** (P166220), implemented in Djibouti from 2018 to 2023, which: (i) established the foundations of a social registry (SR), addressing challenges like data accuracy and inclusion errors; (ii) demonstrated the effectiveness of integrating cash transfers with social behavior change communication (SBCC) and community-based measures to enhance outcomes in nutrition, child health, and education; and (iii) highlighted the success of training advising mothers in improving behaviors such as exclusive breastfeeding and health service utilization. The PITCH further demonstrated Djibouti’s capacity to implement small community-driven infrastructures while revealing communities' need for larger and more sustainable infrastructure. The project will also learn from other operations currently under implementation, which are implementing in underserved and refugee-hosting areas, including: (i) Skills for Development (P175483), which seeks to improve the employability and employment outcomes of technical and vocational education and training graduates, as well as (ii)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "social registry", "confidence": 0.5787468552589417}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "systems, covering at least 11,200 hectares of land. 21 The AI Model was produced under the Enhancing Self-Reliance and Preparedness for Forced Displacement in the Great Lakes Region Advisory Services and Analytics (P500793). Data and analysis from the model, if rendered live, could also be used to support monitoring, evaluation, and analysis of change in public service pressure, forestry cover, poverty, and other social, economic and environmental issues. Page 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "AI Model", "confidence": 0.16864487528800964}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Data and analysis from the model", "confidence": 0.10431505739688873}]}}}
{"input": "Regional and Global Vulnerability of Coastal Zones to Climate Change and Sea-Level Rise (DINAS-Coast) project. In particular: _Country boundaries and regions and coastlines_ . Country coastlines were extracted from the World Vector Shoreline, a standard National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (formerly Defense Mapping Agency) product at a nominal scale of 1:250,000. World Bank (2010) information is used in the regional classifications and boundaries. In addition, Exclusive Economic Zone data from VLIZ (2011) identifies the maritime boundaries. _Elevation._ For elevation, all coastal tiles of 90m Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) data, which are 5 geographic degrees latitude and longitude (approximately 500 kilometers by 500 kilometers), were downloaded from http://srtm.csi.cgiar.org/. _Wetlands._ Data on wetlands were extracted from all wetlands Global Lakes and Wetlands Database (GLWD-3) produced by the Center for Environmental Systems Research (CESR), 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Vector Shoreline"}, {"text": "90m Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM)"}, {"text": "Global Lakes and Wetlands Database (GLWD-3)"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Exclusive Economic Zone data from VLIZ (2011)"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Vector Shoreline", "confidence": 0.8309133052825928}, {"text": "90m Shuttle Radar Topography Mission", "confidence": 0.5042808055877686}, {"text": "all wetlands Global Lakes and Wetlands Database", "confidence": 0.3880542814731598}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Exclusive Economic Zone data from VLIZ", "confidence": 0.48596346378326416}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Uganda Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project Phase II (P510476) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT savings and timely repayments, contributing to the growth of the revolving fund. Savings of up to US$1.20 per month per beneficiary are expected to be mobilized throughout the project's six-year lifespan, bringing the PCM to US$10 million. The same sub-component is also verified as Private Capital Enabling. It will strengthen Producer Organizations (POs) and establish Cluster Value Chain Facilities. It is expected to increase access to formal finance for project-supported institutions, including POs, Common Interest Groups (CIGs), and Village Revolving Funds (VRFs). This is captured under a non-monetary results indicator (Project-supported institutions that access formal finance (number)), which measures the capacity of group-based enterprises to engage with formal financial institutions. 11. **Uganda remains eligible to access financing from the IDA WHR** . The World Bank, following consultations with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), has determined that Uganda’s refugee protection framework remains adequate for the purposes of the WHR. The Refugees Act Cap 312 and the 2010 Refugee Regulations provide a strong legal and regulatory framework for refugee rights. However, UNHCR protection assessments have raised concerns that will need to be addressed", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "non-monetary results indicator", "confidence": 0.7204181551933289}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "exposure of wetlands to a 1 m SLR. Low elevation wetlands are within the Low Elevation Coastal Zone [17] . For the area calculation, grids representing cell areas in square kilometers at different resolutions were created, using the length of a degree of latitude and longitude at the cell center. [18] According to the GLWD-3 and the DTM, 76 countries and territories in five World Bank regions have coastal wetlands which are currently at 1 m from sea level. In the DIVA database, wetlands are not located within the most extreme responses: WMP1 or WMP5. If wetlands can migrate (WMP category 2), then they may survive in their current location to the extent that natural migration or wetland accretion keeps pace with sea-level rise (Titus, 1988). Wetlands in WMP category 3 cannot migrate, and the human resources 17 Coastal zone with elevation derived from SRTM which is 10 or less meters above sea level. 18 Latitude and longitude were specified in decimal degrees. The horizontal datum used is the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 1984). 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLWD-3"}, {"text": "DIVA database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DIVA database", "confidence": 0.8179990649223328}, {"text": "World Geodetic System 1984", "confidence": 0.5367018580436707}, {"text": "GLWD-3", "confidence": 0.5284126400947571}, {"text": "SRTM", "confidence": 0.32564467191696167}, {"text": "DTM", "confidence": 0.29671040177345276}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "(2024). _Rwanda Finscope 2024_ . 38 https://genderdata.worldbank.org/en/home 39 Republic of Rwanda (2024) _Labour Force Survey Q3 2024_ : file:///C:/Users/wb236615/Downloads/LFS%202024~Q3.pdf 40 In Rwanda, men on average carry out 12.8 hours of productive work and 11.6 hours of household work, for a total of 24.4 hours a week. Women, in contrast, carry out an average of 14.9 hours of productive work and 29.6 hours of household work per week, for a total of 44.5 hours a week. USAID/VOICE. Gender Analysis, 2015. Page 19", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Labour Force Survey Q3 2024"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "former refugees in Zambia.** **[10]** The majority of refugees and asylum seekers originate from the Democratic Republic of Congo; other significant refugee populations are from Burundi, Somalia, Angola, and Rwanda. Zambia continues to receive new arrivals of refugees and asylum seekers—approximately 600–800 refugees arrive each month from the South Kivu, Haut-Katanga, and Tanganyika provinces in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Women and children make up 58 percent of refugees, while 3 percent are elderly and persons living with disabilities. 8. **Former refugees are people who escaped civil war in Angola and Rwanda in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi** **who have lived in Zambia for several decades** . Their refugee status has ceased, making them effectively stateless and facing multiple barriers to accessing livelihood opportunities and services. The requirement to have national identification or residence documents has been an impediment for many former refugees. Many former Rwandan refugees fear returning to their home country while application fees for passports are unaffordable for many. The GRZ has offered to integrate former Angolan refugees who arrived between 1966 and 1986. However, most of those who arrived after 1986 do not have any form of identification. The risk of statelessness extends to children", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Integrated Community Resilience Project (P506969) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT **I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT** **A. Project Strategic Context** 1. **Djibouti, a small country of 23,200 square kilometers with a population of approximately 1 million,** **faces** **significant poverty challenges, particularly in rural areas, where 27.2 percent of the population resides** . Strategically located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, it acts as a bridge between Africa and the Middle East and hosts multiple foreign military bases supporting global anti-piracy. However, recent geopolitical tensions have reduced commercial ship traffic, leading to increased food prices and reduced availability of essential goods, disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable. These challenges are compounded by limited economic diversification, scarce arable land and low annual rainfall, which result in heavy reliance on imports for basic needs like water and food [1] . As a result, the economy remains highly vulnerable to external shocks, including market downturns. Additionally, climate change exacerbates existing pressures, with rising temperatures and erratic rainfall further straining local resources and food security. 2. **These economic and climate constraints contribute to persistently high levels of inequality and social** **vulnerability** . Using the World Bank poverty line for Low Middle-Income Countries (LMIC) of US$3.65 a", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "World Bank poverty line for Low Middle-Income Countries"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank poverty line for Low Middle-Income Countries", "confidence": 0.5369124412536621}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "not reached. In addition, 77% of the funding requirement MA interventions is not met. - There is also a **lack of human resources dedicated to coordination at national and regional** **level, prevention, and assistance to victims** . The MA Sub-Cluster has not been functional since the withdrawal of UNMAS in early November 2022, despite joint coordination efforts between CNCCAI and MA actors including Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Humanity and Inclusion (HI) 8 Dashboard des réalisations de protection, cluster Protection, Avril 2023", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Dashboard des réalisations de protection", "confidence": 0.19637422263622284}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "risk will primarily involve moderate-to-** **intermediate scale for the construction and/or rehabilitation of socio-economic infrastructure, a limited number of** **consultants for technical assistance, and some goods.** MASS and ADDS have prepared a dedicated Project Procurement Strategy for Development (PPSD) and a procurement plan detailing procurement-related activities. Both agencies have prior experience with World Bank financing handling procurement, though at varying scale. However, there have been recurrent delays in procurement processing and reporting for both agencies, leading to the assessment of procurement risk at this stage as substantial. To mitigate this risk, the procurement officers of each agency will receive close follow-up and support from the World Bank to ensure appropriate procurement planning and implementation. Page 24", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "of Infrastructure, etc.). The PSC will sign off on the Annual Work Plan and Budget (AWPB) and ensure consistency with national standards and policies across the different sectors, including the upcoming GoR Refugee Graduation Strategy. Complementing the PSC will be a Project Technical Committee, which comprises the same agencies as the PSC, but with technical level staff. The PTC will meet prior to PSC meetings to review progress reports and AWPBs in detail. **Figure 1: Implementation Arrangements** Page 14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Economics of Disasters and Climate Change Exposure to flooding was again evaluated using flood extent (we also evaluate flood depth, for full results, see online supplementary materials). We examine the flood extent both for all urban areas (the whole HCMC province) and for those areas defined as potential slums (from the PUMA data set) to examine how exposure to floods is different in slum areas. Again we use a number of events, from the case of regular flooding (10-year event) to more extreme flooding events (1000-year event). Moreover, we examine how this exposure changes due to climate change (proxied by sea level rise changes), by running the analysis with flood hazard maps taking into account a 30 cm sea level rise. In each district and across the whole city, we examine the percentage of area within each of the two categories (all urban areas, and potential slum areas) that is exposed to floods and the percentage which is not exposed to floods. We then compare these values across the two categories. Results National-Level Analysis for Poverty and Exposure to Floods Flood Exposure (with and without Climate Change) For the entire country of Vietnam, at the district level, we estimate the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PUMA data set"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PUMA data set", "confidence": 0.9664030075073242}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps", "confidence": 0.18244148790836334}], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood hazard maps", "confidence": 0.6916964054107666}]}}}
{"input": "Refugees (UNHCR), has determined that Uganda’s refugee protection framework remains adequate for the purposes of the WHR. The Refugees Act Cap 312 and the 2010 Refugee Regulations provide a strong legal and regulatory framework for refugee rights. However, UNHCR protection assessments have raised concerns that will need to be addressed through humanitarian and development financing, including poor water and sanitation conditions, social service deficits, cuts to food rations, and a reduction in activities promoting self-reliance. **II.** **PROJECT DESCRIPTION** **A. Project Development Objective** 12. To improve access to basic social and economic services, expand economic opportunities and enhance environmental management for host communities and refugees in the target areas. **B. Theory of Change and PDO Indicators** 13. The Project Development Objective (PDO) indicators are: - Displaced people and people in host communities provided with improved access to services (number, of which refugees, host community members, and women (percentage)) (corporate scorecard indicator); - Households benefiting from activities and actions that expand and enable economic activity (number, of which refugees, host community members, and women (percentage)); and - People benefitting from enhanced resilience of terrestrial and aquatic systems (number, of which refugees, host community members, women, and youth (number)) (corporate scorecard indicator). **Theory", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "corporate scorecard indicator", "confidence": 0.2777710556983948}, {"text": "Project Development Objective (PDO) indicators", "confidence": 0.2100178748369217}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "of these analyses present estimates of the economic values, which may be associated to these lost wetland areas around the world. The valuation studies by Tol (2007) and Anthoff et al. (2010) are also based on wetland losses derived from the Global Vulnerability Analysis (Hoozemans et al. 1993). Wetland value is assumed to be logistic in per capita income, with a correction for wetland scarcity, and a cap in these studies and the rate of pure time preference is assumed to be 1%. For a 1m SLR by 2100, Tol (2007) estimated annual costs of wetland loss as a percentage of GDP, per country and Anthoff et al (2010) assessed the net present value of global coastal wetland damage costs for the period 2005-2100 with dikes to protect against SLR can be as high as USD 160 billion. [ 25] Due to uneven coverage of the wetland stock and different assumptions of coastal protection, comparison of the prior research with our estimates proved to be difficult. ##### **Conclusion** Coastal wetlands will decline with rising sea level. In this paper, we have quantified the vulnerable freshwater marsh, swamp forest, GLWD Coastal Wetlands, and brackish/saline wetlands taking into account the exposure of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Vulnerability Analysis"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Vulnerability Analysis", "confidence": 0.7479112148284912}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Full results are presented in Table 3. But these national results on exposure are not evenly be distributed across the country. The spatial analysis also allows us to examine which districts have the highest absolute and the highest relative exposure. We present results for the 25-year flood, for a historical and a high 6 Results presented are similar to a previous study analyzing the exposure to a 100-year return period flood without climate change impacts, which finds 40 million people to be exposed to that event (Jongman et al. 2014). While we had planned to compare our simulated results with national statistics, these statistics were unavailable at the time of analysis. However, we consulted our findings with individuals familiar with the Vietnam context who ended to agree that the numbers were in the range of plausible estimates.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "national statistics", "confidence": 0.5833117961883545}, {"text": "national results", "confidence": 0.23621539771556854}]}}}
{"input": "In order to improve the situation, ideally information on (i) high spatial resolution of the coastal zone elevation, (ii) high spatial resolution of wetlands, (iii) clear delineation of current wetlands and (iv) location specific information on the wetland migratory potential are necessary. High spatial resolution of the coastal zone elevation will refine the estimates of exposed area to SLR. High spatial resolution wetlands information would allow a more accurate correspondence between the exposed area of SLR and wetland area. Precise delineation of wetlands is generally difficult from remotely sensed data and land cover data. Remotely sensed data measure the vegetation, but may not account for the soil type and the wetland plants may not be easily distinguished by remote sensing. Land cover products are often produced from composite imagery over a time period, so the frequency of the data or the smoothing of multiple observations may make the wetland delineation difficult. In addition, location specific information on the Wetland Migratory Potential would add accuracy to the areas where wetlands can migrate (e.g. excluding human altered landscapes such as urban areas). ###### **III.3 Economic losses** As indicated earlier, wetlands provide a flow of goods and services, which contribute to the welfare", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "land cover data"}, {"text": "remotely sensed data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "land cover data", "confidence": 0.8787198662757874}, {"text": "remotely sensed data", "confidence": 0.8433541059494019}, {"text": "composite imagery", "confidence": 0.1599442958831787}]}}}
{"input": "(5) Total annual regionally adjusted household expenditure (local currency, regionally deflated). (6) Total food expenditure (nondeflated). (7) Total housing expenditure (nondeflated). (8) Total health and education expenditure (nondeflated). (9) Total household energy expenditure (gas and electricity) (nondeflated). *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All regressions control for year and district fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. **7. Robustness for district-level estimations** **7.2 Using production levels** We continue by exploring the effects of mining intensity as proxied by district-level production volumes. The estimation will be similar to equation (2), but we replace the indicator variable for being an active mining district with annual gold production in the district: Y��� - β�gold_production�� - ∝�� g� �λX�� �ε��� �4� The measure of gold production is in 10 tons of gold produced, and gold_production�� is either _gold_year_district_, which equals the total production of all mines in a district in the different survey years, or _gold_period_district_, which equals total production for the years before the survey. For the 1993 survey, the period is 1990–93, for 1998 it is 1994–98, and so on. Using production levels instead of an indicator of having any production in the district has the advantage of capturing the intensity of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "1993 survey", "confidence": 0.7024092078208923}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "by the recipient (such as limited/restricted competitive bidding, request for quotations/shopping, direct contracting), will be consistent with the requirements set out in paragraphs 5.3 and 5.4 d. as appropriate. 13. **Publication (advertising).** The recipient is required to prepare and submit to the World Bank a General Procurement Notice. The World Bank will arrange for its publication in the United Nations Development Business online (UNDB online) and on the World Bank’s external website. Specific Procurement Notices for all procurement under international competitive procedures and requests for expressions of interest for all consulting services, estimated equivalent to US$300,000 and above, will be published in UNDB online and on the World Bank’s external website and at least one newspaper of national circulation in the recipient’s country or in the official gazette or on a widely used website or electronic portal with free national and international access. 14. **Procurement implementation arrangements.** The project does not foresee complex procurement activities. The hands-on experience gained under Government funded project will pave the way for improvements in organizing and performing the procurement functions more professionally to achieve the PDO. MoHAIS will delegate financial and Page 41", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "wetlands and GLWD Coastal Wetlands of SA amount to 900 and 840 square kilometers respectively. GLWD coastal wetlands Brackish / saline wetlands Square kilometers Square kilometers 10000 1969 SubSaharan Africa 938 Latin America & the Caribbean 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 1278 SubSaharan Africa Square kilometers 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 0 East Asia & the Pacific 691 Latin America & the Caribbean East Asia & the Pacific Freshwater marsh 10085 2217 4 7159 Middle East & North Africa 862 SubSaharan Africa 847 South Asia 12402 East Asia & the Pacific 2619 Middle East & North Africa 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 903 South Asia South Asia Middle East & North Africa 2908 Latin America & the Caribbean 2000 0 **Figure 1. Lost wetlands by types of wetlands and regions, for a 1m SLR** Freshwater marsh GLWD coastal wetlands Brackish / saline wetlands East Asia & the Pacific South Asia Middle East & North Africa Latin America & the Caribbean South Asia Middle East & North Africa Latin America & the Caribbean East Asia & the Pacific South Asia Middle East & North Africa Latin America & the Caribbean **Figure 2. Distribution of lost wetlands by types of wetlands across", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLWD Coastal Wetlands", "confidence": 0.19478954374790192}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "in Africa. The probability of adoption of irrigation increases in regions with lower temperatures (for example Egypt and South Africa), while it decreases in warmer regions. Irrigation in cooler regions is more profitable because it requires less water and the crops are more productive. Similarly, in regions of higher precipitation or available flow, the probability of adopting irrigation decreases. Irrigation is less profitable in wetter locations because the fixed cost of irrigation remains the same but the net increment to production declines. In the probit model, we controlled for water flow by including the log transformation of a long run average (30 years) of estimated mean flow. The coefficient on this variable is positive and significant. In the selection model, we also controlled for soils. The soil variables reflect the proportion of a district with a particular soil type. The inclusion of certain soils specific to a particular region or district results in the model not being full rank (thereby making the interpretation of the statistical significance of the coefficients unreliable). As a result, we included only those soils that are jointly significant for both irrigated and dryland farms. We then turned to estimating the second stage model of net", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "agricultural extension officers from MoA. (b) **Co-investments in subprojects.** While all eligible farmers and cooperatives will receive TA, only a subset will receive investment from the project for assets or working capital. Eligible farmers will be incentivized to apply for financing through well-organized cooperatives, common interest groups or producer groups. Eligibility criteria might include (i) businesses already operating with well-maintained financial records, (ii) climate-smart business plan, (iii) potential demand for products or services, (iv) financial viability and technical feasibility of business plan, (v) willingness to take up climate adaptation and mitigation measures, and (vi) preference for women and youth. Precise selection criteria will be developed by the service provider in consultation with local officials from the MoA, with proposals screened by a committee of local sector experts. Up to 70 percent of business proposals will be funded through the project. The co-investee farmers or cooperatives will receive additional technical support on the operation and maintenance of purchased assets. A grants’ manual will be developed. 36 World Bank. 2023. _Zambia Gender Assessment_ . 37 Finscope Survey 2020 and in-person consultations at Meheba settlement 2022/23. Page 19", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Finscope Survey 2020"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Finscope Survey 2020", "confidence": 0.8213547468185425}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "spent migrating. Finally, reforms contributed to higher agricultural yields and profits through three channels, namely (i) greater rental market activity that transferred land to more productive producers; (ii) substitution of purchased inputs for labor; and (iii) a shift out of grains towards vegetables, corn, and oilseeds, all of which offer higher levels of profitability. All of these findings are consistent with the notion that, without reforms, tenure insecurity and transaction cost in factor markets undermined investment and functioning of land and labor markets, preventing high value peri-urban land from being used most effectively and reducing job creation, especially for the less affluent and educated. As China considers how to build on what has been achieved, pilot results point to important substantive lessons in terms of key elements of reform implementation and elements of what has been done in Chengdu reform are thus likely to form an integral part of any future reform package. While we can only estimate impacts of the entire reform package rather than individual components, careful design of future reforms, with an emphasis on evaluation right from the start, could help to further enhance lessons 18 Reform-induced increases in supply of (young) own labor noted above are", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) according to the National Household Survey data for age cohorts from the National Institute for Statistics and the Census, while a little over 40 percent of individuals aged 55-59 in 2023 had completed at least lower secondary education (9 years of education), this number more than doubles to 85 percent of 20-24 year olds. The 2020 Human Capital Index shows that a child born in Costa Rica can expect to be 63 percent as productive with the current education and health services as he or she could be if he or she enjoyed complete education and full health, which is slightly higher than the LAC average of 60 percent. [9] Costa Rica aspires to go beyond being among the best in the LAC region, to be on the global vanguard of the digital age, with education outcomes on par with the OECD, a highly skilled workforce, and a transformative digitalization and management agenda. **Foundational Learning** 5. **National assessments show weakness in foundational learning, and learning outcomes are strongly correlated** **to socioeconomic conditions, which points to the need for foundational learning with deeper attention to the education** **outcomes of students from", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2020 Human Capital Index"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "National Household Survey data for age cohorts"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2020 Human Capital Index", "confidence": 0.7149730920791626}, {"text": "National Household Survey data", "confidence": 0.5589057803153992}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "National Household Survey data", "confidence": 0.22425960004329681}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "and often complex. [5] The rapid loss of the global coastal wetland stock in the 20 [th] century was primarily caused by direct land reclamation. While significant losses due to human actions are likely to continue in the future, it is projected that stresses on wetland areas may be further aggravated in the 21 [st] century due to climate change. Wetlands face a number of hazards including rise in sea-level, increased atmospheric 4 A precise and widely agreed upon definition of wetland is not available. RAMSAR convention, a UNESCO-based intergovernmental treaty on wetlands adopted in 1971, defines wetlands as (Article 1.1): areas of marsh, fen, peatland or water, whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of marine water with the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six meters, and highlights (in Article 2.1) that wetlands may incorporate riparian and coastal zones adjacent to the wetlands, and islands or bodies of marine water deeper than six meters at low tide lying within the islands. 5 These causes include sea-level rise, waves, erosion, subsidence, storms and biotic effects. Human actions include drainage for agriculture & forestry,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "#### **Impact of Property Rights Reform to Support China’s Rural-Urban** **Integration:** **Household-Level Evidence from the Chengdu National Experiment [¶]** Klaus Deininger [†], Songqing Jin [‡], Shouying Liu [♯], Fang Xia [♦] †World Bank, Washington DC ‡Michigan State University, East Lansing MI ♯Development Research Center of the State Council, Beijing ♦Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing **JEL Codes O1, O43, R14, R3** **Keywords: Urban development, land use change, China, financial development** - Email: kdeininger@worldbank.org; jins@anr.msu.edu; liusy@drc.gov.cn; xia.fang.fx@gmail.com. We thank NBS, in particular Pingping Wang, Wei Wu, Yilin Feng, and Jianliang Di, as well as the Chengdu Statistical office, especially Taixiang Zhao, Xiaoying Gu, Yuan Lin, Yufang Chen, Qiuyan Chen, and Shiming Ren for access to data and support, Ting Shao for communication with NBS and the Chengdu Statistical office, and Yihao Li for research assistance. Funding support from the Knowledge for Change Program is gratefully acknowledged.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Chengdu National Experiment"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Chengdu National Experiment", "confidence": 0.6463719606399536}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "(1.614) Effect of payout at average payout 3.46 1.68 1.75 4.17 3.55 0.63 Observations 1534 1534 1534 459 459 459 R-squared 0.061 0.118 0.047 0.084 0.285 0.069 _Notes_ : Observations are aggregated at the village level. The dependent variable is the number of insurance purchasers in a village. Panel A includes the sample of villages in 2005 and 2006 in which insurance coverage was offered in the village the following year. Panel B is restricted to villages in which at least on person purchased insurance the following year. The effect at average payout is the overall increase in purchasers estimated at the average payout level. In Panel A, the average ratio of payout to premium is 2.68; in Panel B it is 3.25. All regressions contain state fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the weather station level. ***p _<_ 0.01, **p _<_ 0.05, *p _<_ 0.1. _Source_ : Authors’ analysis based on data from BASIX. In panel B, I restrict the analysis to villages that had at least one buyer the year after insurance outcomes, creating a sample analogous to the “Marketing Restricted Sample” in table 3. The logic behind this is, if a village had zero buyers, it is", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "BASIX"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Marketing Restricted Sample", "confidence": 0.4493619501590729}, {"text": "data from BASIX", "confidence": 0.1030130609869957}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX", "confidence": 0.5087279081344604}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Socio-economic Inclusion of Refugees & Host Communities in Rwanda Project Phase II (P509677) health facilities and market-linked skills training. [7] The 2024 Rwanda FinScope survey also showed relatively low takeup of finance for investments or credit for productive purposes by Rwandese and refugees, limiting business and income-generating opportunities. [8] 7. **High poverty rates and minimal economic activity in the hosting districts constrain self-reliance prospects** **for refugees and host communities alike.** The national non-monetary poverty rate in Rwanda of 30 percent is exceeded in all five districts that host refugee camps. Gisagara, where the Mugombwa camp is located, ranked as the poorest district in the country in the 2022 Census at 45 percent. [9] By comparison, the City of Kigali has the lowest percentage of poor people (9.5 percent). Core elements of the non-monetary poverty index include health, education and living standards, highlighting the dual need to: (a) invest in economic opportunity and access to services in the hosting districts; and (b) at the same time, facilitate refugee mobility out of the camps and rural areas into urban centers, where more opportunities are available and self-reliance is more achievable. 8. **Building on the ongoing Phase I of Jya", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 Rwanda FinScope survey"}, {"text": "2022 Census"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 Rwanda FinScope survey", "confidence": 0.739612877368927}, {"text": "non-monetary poverty index", "confidence": 0.6084085702896118}, {"text": "2022 Census", "confidence": 0.45242923498153687}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "for expecting mothers and newborns. Component 2.1 will enhance women’s access to healthcare through improved infrastructure, including all-weather roads, clean energy, and water, as well as investments in maternity wards. These improvements will support reproductive health, prenatal care, and the treatment of issues related to FGM/C. Additionally, the project will foster women’s economic empowerment by supporting livelihoods for women-only Affinity Support Groups (GEAs) and female-led businesses. 16. **Climate change exacerbates the vulnerabilities of already underserved and rural communities in Djibouti** . The country’s harsh climate is characterized by high temperatures and extreme water scarcity. Djibouti has no perennial rivers, 12 [USAID (2024), Djibouti Assistance Overview](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/USAID-BHA_Djibouti_Assistance_Overview-August_2024.pdf) 13 WFP (2024), [WFP Djibouti Country Brief November 2024](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000163674/download/?_ga=2.195641900.1223889895.1738425185-377343974.1738425185) 14 Malaeb, B., Duplantier, A., Maarraoui, G., Fluet, E. (2023). Towards a More Equitable Development: Constraints and Opportunities of Women in Djibouti. The World Bank, Washington 15 Country Profiles for Early Childhood Development, 2023. 16 According to Malaeb B. et al. (2023), women-owned businesses have higher rates of using informal methods of financing (53 percent compared to 33 percent); women-owned enterprises are usually micro-sized (80 percent of women businesses are sole-proprietorships), informal (42 percent of women businesses are informal), and young (42 percent of women businesses", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "countries: Number of people exposed to significant flood risk (and as share of total_ _regional population)_ Considering the absolute population exposure figures above biases attention towards large and populous regions. Notably, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Bihar are the three most populous sub-national regions in the world. Instead, considering relative population exposure, i.e. the share of the overall population that is exposed to flood risks, can help identify regions in which flood risks are prevalent across large parts of the population. Figures 10 and 11 present relative flood exposure estimates, which demonstrate that in various regions the vast majority of the population is facing significant flood risks. The sub-national region with the highest relative exposure to flood inundation risk is the Pool region in the Republic of Congo. The region, home to Pool Malebo, has a population of approximately 360,000 people, 91% of whom are exposed to significant flood risk. In all of the top 10 subnational regions in terms of relative population exposure, over two-thirds of the population are estimated to face significant flood risks. Strikingly, regions with high flood exposure can be found in all regions, and in low- and high-income 15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "relative flood exposure estimates", "confidence": 0.15998920798301697}], "vague_data": [{"text": "relative flood exposure estimates", "confidence": 0.2943110167980194}, {"text": "relative population exposure", "confidence": 0.2434433251619339}]}}}
{"input": "the lowest quintile of the PISA index were below level 2. Foundational learning (literacy and numeracy) in early grades paves the way for future learning, and differences in educational attainment become magnified through youth and adult life in the acquisition of human capital. Without any claims regarding causation, it is useful to look at labor earnings, which are more closely related to human capital than earnings from other assets. OECD figures show that 32 percent of 25–64-year-olds in Costa Rica with low levels of educational attainment (below upper-secondary education) earned less than half of the median earnings for the country and were thus at risk of poverty, if not already poor. [10] **Employability** 6. **In addition to foundational learning, Costa Rica’s education system requires a renewed emphasis on** **competencies for employability, including cognitive, technical and digital skills, socioemotional competencies, and** **English language skills.** Costa Rica’s economy diversified from agricultural commodity exports in the 2000s to an economy centered on high-tech manufacturing and services. Costa Rica contributes to at least 5 major high-tech global value chains: electronics, medical devices, automotive, aeronautic/aerospace, and film/broadcasting devices. However, the education system has not been highly effective in keeping up to the changes by providing", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "the PISA index"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "OECD figures"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PISA index", "confidence": 0.5314438939094543}, {"text": "OECD figures", "confidence": 0.1320878118276596}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "OECD figures", "confidence": 0.2028222680091858}], "vague_data": [{"text": "OECD figures", "confidence": 0.11685807257890701}]}}}
{"input": "construction land (18.7% and 22.6% of villages with a mean of some 6 disputes). Even where disputes emerged, most cases were resolved by local institutions: in villages with conflict, a total of 1.2 cases required intervention by institutions above the village. After certification, contracts with a length exceeding 30 years were issued for all construction land and more than 95% of all other land use types. Permanent land use contracts were given in close to 72% of cases overall, from 85% of residential and construction land to 80% of collective land, and some 50% and 48% of arable and forest land. Survey data point toward a total cash cost for the program of about Y 8.6 per mu of which close to half (38%) was contributed by the village and the remainder from outside. Villagers contributed close to 2,000 man-days of labor (about 3 days per household) and, with somewhat more than 10 person-months of labor by outsiders, contributions from above the village remained limited. **4. Econometric results** The reform is estimated to have led to a significant increase of 7.7 percent in per capita consumption that was most pronounced for less educated and less wealthy households, and an increment", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Survey data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.9422786235809326}]}}}
{"input": "between Africa and Asia through Israel‘s southern border with Egypt. The asylum seekers originate mainly from Sudan and Eritrea, as well as other Sub-Saharan countries. At the time of writing, it is estimated that around 26,000 asylum seekers have entered Israel and a few hundred more continue to cross the border every month (Nathan 2010). _Sources: UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks. No data available for 2003. UNHCR has not yet published_ _data for 2010._ The Sinai desert serves as a geographical barrier between the countries and only short, 'sensitive' strips of the 260 kilometres are fenced. The asylum seekers often pay large sums to Bedouin smugglers (operating from both sides) who traffic them through the desert. In a border characterised by an active trade of drugs, tobacco, weapons and 2 As I demonstrate below the ̳refugee terminology‘ is contentious. In the interest of coherence I predominantly use the term ―asylum seekers‖, a term which does not tells us much about motivation but refers to the claim, which ought to stand evaluation. Thus, in this work, a person is considered an asylum seeker, until proven otherwise. 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks", "confidence": 0.7802888751029968}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "non-exposed areas are those grid cells where the flood level is zero. This is a measure of extent rather than depth, and has been used in previous studies to examine exposure to floods (Jongman et al. 2014; Winsemius et al. 2015; Ceola et al. 2014). Furthermore, while we lose information by using extent rather than depth (we have depths in our flood data), we decided to use extent since our flood data assumes no protection. Protection is more likely to impact the depth, rather than the extent, of the flood results. [4] 4 There is also a good reason for examining extent over depth, in terms of the hazard modeling; flood depths within a large scale flood model are very uncertain, and there is much more certainty about extents.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "flood data", "confidence": 0.9611272215843201}]}}}
{"input": "the east of Israel, Jordan hosts nearly 500,000 refugees, and to the South, Egypt (from which the majority of asylum seekers cross to Israel) hosts a population of more than 100,000 (UNHCR 2009; USCRI 2009). It is also known that Egypt has a vast population of unregistered foreign nationals who are not accounted for in refugee statistics. Estimates of their number vary considerably (Harrell-Bond and Zohry 2003; Nassar 2008). While such numerical and comparative analysis suggests that Israel‘s asylum seeker population is relatively small, this approach does not illuminate the social and political issues which give Israel‘s asylum seekers particular political and cultural weight. Surrounded by Arab and Muslim countries with weaker economies, Israel‘s prosperity and democratic structure act as significant pull factors for migrants. The country‘s decision to follow UNHCR guidelines and not to deport Eritreans and Sudanese while tolerating their unauthorised work must also function as an incentive. It is also important to consider the circumstances that prompt Sudanese and Eritreans, the two dominant groups of asylum seekers, to make Israel their first or second country of asylum (Afeef 2009, 9). While their circumstances significantly differ, Eritreans and Sudanese share a desire to seek better protection and to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "refugee statistics"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "refugee statistics", "confidence": 0.9569075107574463}]}}}
{"input": "and coincidence of flood risk and population, this approach does not allow a robust estimation of exposure headcounts. Jongman et al. (2012) provide the first global flood exposure analysis that utilizes spatial hazard and population data, albeit at relatively coarse resolution by current standards (10 x 10 kilometers for population data, and 1 x 1 kilometers for flood data). The authors estimate that in 2010, 805 million people worldwide were exposed to fluvial flooding with a 1-in-100 year return period; 271 million people to coastal flooding with the same return period. By accounting for overlap between coastal and fluvial flood risk zones, they further estimate that the global flood exposed population was 992 million in 2010, and project this number to reach 1.3 billion by 2050. In this study, we show that this projection has already been exceeded in 2020, with 1.47 billion living in high-risk flood zones. Several factors can explain this increase in estimated exposure headcount: On the 1 Disclaimer: The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on the maps in this study do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "flood data"}, {"text": "population data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "spatial hazard and population data", "confidence": 0.7018529176712036}, {"text": "population data", "confidence": 0.4952280819416046}, {"text": "flood data", "confidence": 0.1787833571434021}]}}}
{"input": "host in Africa, and among the five largest worldwide.** There are over 1.8 million refugees and asylum seekers in the country at present, most of whom originate from South Sudan (54 percent) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (32 percent). Uganda continues to experience significant inflows, with over 170,000 refugees having arrived during 2024. The refugees are formally settled in 12 of Uganda’s 146 districts, plus Kampala. 4. **Uganda is globally recognized for its refugee policy framework, which is closely aligned with the priorities of** **the GCR.** Uganda’s refugee policies deliver the shared international vision under the 2018 GCR, that allows refugees to 1 As of April 30, 2025, the exact number of refugees and asylum seekers in Uganda is 1,890,334. Source: Office of the Prime Minister and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2 Zhou, Yang-Yang, Grossman, Guy, and Ge, Shuning, 2023. \"Inclusive refugee-hosting can improve local development and prevent public backlash,\" World Development, Elsevier, vol. 166(C). 3 Phase I of DRDIP in Uganda was rated Satisfactory throughout implementation and exceeded all Project Development Objective indicator targets. Page 1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Project Development Objective indicator", "confidence": 0.3837132155895233}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "rural-urban integration reforms undertaken in Chengdu prefecture followed a more integrated approach that could hold broader lessons. We describe the nature of the reforms and our analytical approach to evaluating their impact. **2.1 The challenges of rural-urban land conversion in China** In the 2000-2010 period, the size of urban areas in China expanded enormously: use of satellite imagery to define ‘urban’ consistently across countries reveals that, with an average annual area expansion of 9.8% for Hangzhou, 8.1% for Shanghai, 6.1% for Chongqing, 5.9% for Chengdu, 4.5% for the Pearl River Delta and 4.0%, for Beijing, most Chinese cities expanded at a rate well in excess of the East Asian average of 2.8% (World Bank 2014). [1] At the same time, and despite numerous measures to the contrary, rural-urban income inequality widened. While clear causality is difficult to establish, most experts agree that high rates of land conversion make a key contribution to this and, in addition, give rise to factor market distortions and often inefficient and unsustainable land use. This can largely be attributed to structural factors, most importantly the fact that, as rural land is owned by village collectives and not tradable, conversion of land from agricultural to non-agricultural", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "satellite imagery", "confidence": 0.4880492389202118}]}}}
{"input": "696 Stein Resolved Observational Data Integration Towards Evaluation of Water Resources. [5] This data set has daily readings of rainfall for the period 1961–2004, at a precision of .25. [6] The data are extrapolated based on historical rainfall readings from weather stations primarily provided by the Indian Meterological Department. For each block, the data contain the amount of rainfall in millimeters and the number of stations within the grid that contributed to the data. These data are used to evaluate how the insurance policies would have paid out historically, which can be used as a proxy for past rainfall shocks. [7] The three individual years of BASIX customer data were converted into a panel by manually matching individual customers using available identifying data. Errors in matching customers from year to year create the possibility of introducing nonclassical measurement error into the analysis. In section I discuss the possible consequences of such errors and how they affect interpretation of the estimates. **II.** **Results: The Effect of Payouts on Take-Up** In this section I address the central question: is receiving an insurance payout correlated with repurchasing insurance the following year? To do this, I examine BASIX’s customers in 2005 and 2006, and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "historical rainfall readings from weather stations"}, {"text": "BASIX customer data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "BASIX customer data", "confidence": 0.507422924041748}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "BASIX customer data", "confidence": 0.37801334261894226}, {"text": "historical rainfall readings from weather stations", "confidence": 0.3451211750507355}, {"text": "daily readings of rainfall", "confidence": 0.20835435390472412}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Observational Data", "confidence": 0.3901427686214447}]}}}
{"input": "squared. In this specification, the dummy on receiving 5 [APHRODITE’s water resources project; http://www.chikyu.ac.jp/precip.](http://www.chikyu.ac.jp/precip) 6 25° latitude equals about 27.5 kilometers. .25° longitude varies by latitude; over the range of latitudes in this survey it equals roughly 26 kilometers. 7 It is not clear if ICICI-LOMBARD used APHRODITE or another source of historical rainfall data in order to price their policies because this information is proprietary. The APHRODITE data set is based on historical data provided primarily by the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD), but similar gridded data sets provided by IMD contain vast amounts of missing data over both time and space. It is very likely that the ICICI-LOMBARD products were priced using IMD data, but it is likely the ICICI-LOMBARD used different techniques to account for missing data. 8 It makes sense to assume that the error _εt,i_ is correlated for the same person across time as well as across people in a given year. Ideally, one would like to include individual fixed effects to account for individual heterogeneity. However, in order to exploit this variation one would need to look at customers who purchased insurance in both 2005 and 2006, and received payouts in only one of those", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "APHRODITE data set"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "similar gridded data sets"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "historical data"}, {"text": "historical rainfall data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "APHRODITE data set", "confidence": 0.48009681701660156}, {"text": "APHRODITE", "confidence": 0.20298875868320465}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "gridded data sets provided by IMD", "confidence": 0.15497155487537384}, {"text": "historical rainfall data", "confidence": 0.1254952847957611}], "vague_data": [{"text": "historical rainfall data", "confidence": 0.8086390495300293}, {"text": "gridded data sets", "confidence": 0.3079637885093689}, {"text": "historical data", "confidence": 0.1070018857717514}]}}}
{"input": "facilitate the full participation, retention, and educational advancement of students with disabilities, as well as facilitation for their transition to the labor market. 13. **Indigenous students face additional educational challenges related to the low availability of educational** **materials in indigenous languages.** There are an estimated 16,000 indigenous students from eight communities (NgäbeBugle, Cabécar, Bribri, Malecu, Chorotega, Huetar, Térraba, and Boruca) located in 24 indigenous territories recognized by the State. Education matters are managed by local indigenous education councils ( _Consejos Locales de Educación_ _Indígena_ ) under the aegis of MEP’s national system of indigenous education. Despite the existence of a decree from 2013 that aims to preserve indigenous languages and promote early grade learning in mother tongues, additional efforts are needed to train teachers and develop learning materials in indigenous languages. [21] Education and administrative boards continue to face a lack of training and supervision, hindering their ability to effectively fulfill their responsibilities. 19 UNHCR, Strategy 2024, Situation Analysis. 20 Data from MEP’s Saber, as of September 26, 2023. 21 Sistema Costarricence de Información Jurídica, Decreto Ejecutivo 37801, Reforma del Subsistema de Educación Indígena, [https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/Scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRM&nValor1=1&nValor2=75249&strTipM=FN](https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/Scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRM&nValor1=1&nValor2=75249&strTipM=FN) Page 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MEP’s Saber"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Sistema Costarricence de Información Jurídica", "confidence": 0.3470563292503357}, {"text": "MEP’s Saber", "confidence": 0.140744149684906}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Data from MEP’s Saber", "confidence": 0.3518267869949341}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "CRITICAL FUNDING NEEDS IN MENA / 10 OCTOBER 2024 **Basic Needs** UNHCR’s cash-based assistance targets only the most vulnerable; those who live hand to mouth in truly precarious and desperate situations. Multi-purpose cash assistance assists families to put food on the table, pay for medicines, and keep children in school. Emergency cash assistance is disbursed rapidly for urgent cases, such as for those at risk of eviction from their homes or in need of immediate and life-saving medical care. Cash for Protection works with refugees within a case management framework to address specific and often more complicated protection issues holistically. Around 46,000 IDPs and 3,100 refugee households are affected by the current funding shortfall. **Protection** Holding an identity document is one of life’s basics. Without an ID card, one cannot access basic services, freedom of movement is reduced, and risk of detention and arrest increased. Finding work is also made more difficult. According to UNHCR’s protection monitoring, over 54% of families have at least one child without a birth certificate, and 71% have family members without national identity cards. Displaced populations are often unable to access or have lost civil documentation and face challenges getting replacements for reasons connected to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "protection monitoring", "confidence": 0.21845947206020355}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "protection monitoring", "confidence": 0.10607830435037613}], "vague_data": [{"text": "protection monitoring", "confidence": 0.11898048967123032}]}}}
{"input": "2.8 Value of crop output during the second season of 2004 347.5 366.9 164.0 419.3 Area covered under crops during the first season of 2005 2.7 3.0 1.6 2.9 Value of crop output during the first season of 2005 190.2 194.2 140.9 212.2 Value of crop output per acre [a] 101.5 96.7 95.3 110.8 Number of observations (households) 5530 2726 1076 1728 _Source:_ Own computation from 2005/06 UNHS III _Notes:_ [a ] Plot area weighted average of the value of crop output per acre of the two agriculture seasons. 17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2005/06 UNHS III"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHS III", "confidence": 0.29748207330703735}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "PIU. If the authorization is obtained, there may be an additional risk that the MEP fails to obtain access to SIGAF. To mitigate these risks, efforts will be made to include in the same draft law seeking loan approval by the Legislative Assembly the creation of a PIU with access to SIGAF. In addition, once the PIU is created, the MEP will recruit staff with adequate qualifications and experience on terms of reference acceptable to the Bank as reflected in the POM. Training in FM and disbursement procedures will be provided to FM staff before starting implementation, and a Project operational manual satisfactory to the Bank will be prepared and will include a FM section detailing FM processes and procedures to ensure adequate internal controls, contract management and monitoring mechanisms over project funds, timely payments and issuance of financial report: Lastly, the Bank will undertake regular missions to support the implementation of the project. For Procurement. The procurement residual risk of delays in implementation is Substantial as MEP has limited experience implementing World Bank-financed projects, and no experience under the current Procurement Framework. These risks will be mitigated by training staff on Procurement Regulations, as well as through the inclusion", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "This dataset, created by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association’s Climate Prediction Center, is based on ground station measurements of precipitation over the period 1948–2001. The average temperatures and precipitation for each country in the sample are shown in Appendices A and B. Note that there is a wide range of climates across the 11 countries in the sample. It is not possible to use every month of climate in a Ricardian regression because of the high correlation between one month and the next. Consequently we must cluster the monthly data into seasons. However, it is not self-evident how to cluster monthly temperatures into a limited set of seasonal measurements. We explored several ways of defining three-month average seasons, starting with November, December, and January for winter. Comparing the results, we found that defining winter in the northern hemisphere as the average of November, December, and January provided the most robust results for Africa. This assumption in turn implies that the next three months would be spring, the three months after that would be summer, and August, September and October would be fall (in the north). These seasonal definitions were chosen because they provided the best fit with the data", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ground station measurements of precipitation"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ground station measurements of precipitation", "confidence": 0.36253949999809265}], "vague_data": [{"text": "ground station measurements", "confidence": 0.16439734399318695}]}}}
{"input": "experiences of their friends and neighbors. Evidence in the developed world shows that purchases of flood and earthquake insurance in the United States are greatly influenced by recent experiences with disasters and insurance payouts, that peoples’ insurance decisions are influenced by their friends and neighbors’ experiences with insurance (Kunreuther, Sanderson, and Vetschera 1985; Gallagher 2014). Reacting to Daniel Stein is a senior economist at IDinsight; his email address is [Daniel.stein@idinsight.org.](mailto:Daniel.stein@idinsight.org) This work would not have been possible without the assistance of the insurance staff at BASIX, especially Sridhar Reddy, for help in obtaining and understanding their customer database. Thanks to Tim Besley, Greg Fischer, Gani Aldashev, and Xavier Giné for giving helpful advice and commenting on earlier drafts. Thanks to participants at the Munich Re 6th Annual Microinsurance Conference, the Midwestern International Economic Development Conference, seminars at the London School of Economics, University of Namur, and KU Leuven for helpful comments. All remaining errors are my own. A supplemental appendix to this article [is available at https://academic.oup.com/wber.](https://academic.oup.com/wber) 1 CIA World Factbook: India; Indiastat.com. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK. All [rights reserved. For", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "customer database"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "customer database", "confidence": 0.19384698569774628}], "vague_data": [{"text": "customer database", "confidence": 0.4969556927680969}]}}}
{"input": "and sharing of technical and institutional analyses to help the project designs be closely aligned and synergistic; (ii) the administrative and legislative processes for project approval by the Government are expected to take place at the same time as the IDB-financed project; and (iii) project implementation will be carried out in close coordination with the IDBfinanced project. An example of complementarity is on the pedagogical reform, with the proposed Project focused on foundational learning, while the IDB financed project would deepen the impact with support to a wider curricular reform. The efforts of both projects in supporting MEP’s digitalization agenda are included as an operational core of an ongoing regional effort between the two Banks under the Memorandum of Understanding on strategic areas including reducing the digital access gap. 16. **Costa Rica recently received a positive IMF review of the overall Government program, which bodes well for** **MEP, especially as MEP reforms are geared towards sustainability** . [22] An important consideration of the reform program is that the planned interventions do not require a level of investment that would put inordinate fiscal pressure regarding the MEP budget. Expenditures such as the investments planned for the digitalization agenda of the MEP", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "School](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2024/01/11/djibouti-giving-refugee-children-a-chance-to-go-to-school) 9 The Ministry of Health and UNHCR signed a cooperation agreement in 2018 for the inclusion of refugees in the national health system 10 Government of Djibouti (2024), Stratégie Livelihoods et Inclusion Economique Djibouti 2024 – 2028 11 UNHCR, African Development Bank Group, IGAD, EAC (2024), Regional Report Draft: Regional Program on Enhancing the Investment Climate for the Economic Empowerment of Refugee, Returnee and Host/Return Community Women in the East and Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region. Page 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Some coastal zones in our study area invest significant resources in damage prevention via polder construction and other measures, while others offer compensation once cyclone-related damage has occurred. Incorporation of controls from our cyclone panel database may permit more accurate estimation of the timing and magnitude of responses to these differences. To conclude, we believe that the coastal cyclone experiences of Bangladesh, West Bengal and Odisha also offer potentially-valuable lessons for the global community. Our overall findings for the Indian Ocean are consistent with the view that ocean warming from climate change has increased the frequency and average power of regional cyclone storms. Since 1960, a composite index of cyclone frequency and power has increased by about 50%. Since our focal study area is one of the world’s most cyclone-prone, its experience can provide important clues for understanding the potential future of other cyclone-affected areas. In this context, studies that 22", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "cyclone panel database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "cyclone panel database", "confidence": 0.9673760533332825}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "of natural shocks, and historical data only offer limited guidance on the future. So, when taking long-term investment and planning decisions, selecting options that offer robust performance under a variety of scenarios is crucial (Hallegatte et al. 2019). This study considers a 1-in-100 year return flood intensity to reflect a relatively rare and intense disaster. However, the concept of return periods is easily misunderstood and the probability underestimated. A 1in-100 year flood has, on average, a 1% probability of occurrence in any given year. But this translates to or 10% probability in a decade, or 50% in a lifetime (68 years). These are significant probabilities that lie well within reasonable planning horizons of governments. For comparison, the Dutch flood protection system protects against events up to 1-in-10,000 years. In addition, it should be noted that these probabilities apply independently to a given river basin or microclimate. For the purpose of this study, we consider hundreds of thousands of such locations. This means that, globally, hundreds of 1-in-100 year flood events happen every year. **3.2.** **Population density** This study estimates the location of people using the Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL), produced by the EC JRC. It offers global coverage and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Human Settlement Layer"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "historical data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Human Settlement Layer", "confidence": 0.8293165564537048}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "historical data", "confidence": 0.6141717433929443}]}}}
{"input": "components. Progress on all project components will be through biannual progress reports submitted by the PMU to the World Bank and disclosed publicly. 53. **Progress on the implementation of Components 2 and 3 will be overseen by the district-level PMU.** Progress will be assessed on infrastructure and agribusiness activities and provide quarterly reports to the MoHAIS. 54. **Citizen engagement and social accountability will be promoted throughout the project cycle.** The project has prepared a Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP) which was disclosed in country and on the World Bank website on August 1, 2024, which provides guidance on ensuring effective project communication and consultation at different stages of implementation. It further sets out indicators that will be monitored in accessing the level of beneficiary engagement, feedback, and grievances. The policy stakeholder group will facilitate the exchange of information between policy makers and the public. Citizen engagement will be measured through beneficiary assessments, which will include (a) participatory focus groups and (b) semi-structured interviews with refugees and former refugees, host community members, farmers, cooperatives, and agribusinesses. Citizen engagement outcomes will be assessed through the indicator “Stakeholder consultations convened, and priority measures identified”. These beneficiary assessments will help assess the relevance and impact", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Loayza, N., A. Mier y Teran, and J. Rigolini. 2013. “Poverty, inequality, and the local natural resource curse.” Discussion Paper Series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zujunft der Arbeit, 7226, Bonn. Maldonado, S. (2017). The non-monotonic political effects of resource booms. Mamo, N., Bhattacharyya, S., & Moradi, A. (2019). Intensive and extensive margins of mining and development: evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. _Journal of Development_ _Economics_, _139_, 28-49. Michaels, G. 2011. “The Long Term Consequences of Resource-Based Specialisation.” _The_ _Economic Journal_ 121: 31–57. MineAtlas. 2013. https://mining-atlas.com/ Rhee, S., Nyanza, E. C., Condon, M., Fisher, J., Maduka, T., & Benshaul-Tolonen, A. (2018). Understanding environmental, health and economic activity interactions following transition of ownership in gold mining areas in Tanzania: A case of private to public. _Land use policy_, _79_, 650-658. Standing, A., and G. Hilson. 2013. “Distributing mining wealth to communities in Ghana: Addressing problems of elite capture and political corruption.” _U4_ issue 2013 (5). van der Ploeg, F. 2011. “Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?” _Journal of Economic_ _Literature_ 49 (2): 366–420. von der Goltz, J., & Barnwal, P. (2019). Mines: The local wealth and health effects of mineral mining in developing countries. _Journal of Development Economics_, _139_, 1-16. Wilson, N. 2012. “Economic Booms and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "This reliance on international trade – especially for essential imports such as water and food - leaves Djibouti vulnerable to climate-related shocks affecting both its own territory and its neighboring trading partners. 6. **As of January 15, 2025, Djibouti hosts 32,643 registered refugees** **[2]** **and asylum-seekers, constituting** **approximately three percent of the population, primarily from Somalia, Ethiopia, and Yemen** [3] **.** Eighty-five percent of refugees live in settlements (2,529 in Obock; 8,019 in Holl Holl; and 16,980 in Ali Addeh), while 15 percent reside in urban areas (5,115 in Djibouti-Ville). A majority of refugees are between the ages of 18-59, and the gender composition is 52 percent male and 48 percent female. The government’s proactive approach, aligned with the Global Compact on Refugees, includes efforts to integrate refugees into national systems while promoting social and economic inclusion, reinforced by the adoption of a National Refugee Law (NRL) in 2017 to strengthen institutional and legislative frameworks and ensure refugee access to services. Djibouti’s relative peace and economic growth in the region have made it a key destination for refugees and migrants, who seek sanctuary from conflict and climate-induced disasters. Additionally, Djibouti serves as a key transit corridor for migrants from the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**World** 0 2 4 6 8 Billions **Figure 2** _**. Global population headcounts exposed to different levels of flood risk**_ By regionally disaggregating global exposure headcounts, it becomes apparent that flood risks are particularly prevalent in certain regions. At 595.3 million people, the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region has the highest number of people exposed to significant flood risk – corresponding to about 25% of EAP’s total population. In all other regions, flood exposed people account for a smaller share of the overall population. In the South Asia region (SAR), 370 million people are exposed to significant flood risk – i.e. about 19.5 percent of the SAR population. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and the United States and Canada (USA & CAN), between 16.3 to 8 percent of the respective regional populations are exposed to high flood risk. Figure 4 provides a full breakdown of regional exposure estimates in absolute and relative terms. In several cases, regional exposure numbers are driven by single countries – like is the case for China in EAP, India in SAR, or Egypt in MENA. Section 5.2. presents", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Global population headcounts"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "wheat and other grains increased and those of oil crops decreased in Chengdu while the opposite was true for households in neighboring counties. Also, key interventions in place during the period of concern are a new rural pension scheme (Lei _et al._ 2013), cooperative medical scheme (Wagstaff _et al._ 2009), and agricultural subsidies (Huang _et al._ 2011; Meng 2012). While these are funded centrally, disbursements may vary by prefecture and we include information on the amounts received in such schemes, in addition for a wide range of household-level observables, in our regressions. **3.2 Nature and cost of the certification process** To quantify costs of the reform, we use the overlap between the counties in our sample and a village survey administered in May 2014 on either side of comparable stretches of the administrative border of Chengdu prefecture(Deininger _et al._ 2015). Characteristics of the certification process for different types of land are described in table 2. The average village has an area of about 7,500 mu (5 km [2] ) of which some 51% were 13 To test for presence of pre-reform trends for variable _Yit_ in household _i_ in year _t_, we use the pre-reform sample to estimate ��� �������", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "village survey administered in May 2014"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "village survey"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "village survey", "confidence": 0.10868889093399048}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "village survey administered in May 2014", "confidence": 0.3323321044445038}], "vague_data": [{"text": "village survey", "confidence": 0.7740190625190735}]}}}
{"input": "**Poverty and flood exposure.** By combining flood exposure estimates with survey-based sub-national data on poverty, we further estimate flood exposure among the world’s poor. Our estimates show that 132 million people living in extreme poverty (living on less than $1.90 per day) are directly exposed to flood risk; of these, 72.5 million (or 55 percent) are in Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 16). Approximately two out of ten people exposed to flood risk globally are living in extreme poverty. When poverty is defined using less extreme (i.e. higher) thresholds, the number of flood-exposed poor people increases significantly. Around 343 million are estimated to live in high-risk flood zones while living on less than $3.20 a day. The number increases to 587 million when considering incomes below $5.50 a day. Increasing the poverty threshold from $1.90 to $5.50 doubles the number of poor people exposed to floods in Sub-Saharan Africa from 73 million to 147 million. However, in South Asia the number of the poor and flood-exposed increases seven-fold from 41 million to 289 million; in East Asia the increase is nine-fold from 9 million to 80 million. but increases the poor people exposed in SAR by a factor of 6.55 to 286.8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey-based sub-national data on poverty"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey-based sub-national data on poverty", "confidence": 0.2550329267978668}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey-based sub-national data", "confidence": 0.6842010021209717}]}}}
{"input": "by the World Bank, in collaboration with WHO (Pandey, et al., 2004; Wang, et al., 2003). For natural resource degradation, we base our indicator on recent research that identifies the vulnerability of people on fragile lands (i.e., land that is steeply-sloped, arid, or covered by natural forest) as a major determinant of rural poverty and natural resource degradation in developing countries (World Bank, 2003). Our indicator, the total rural population living on fragile lands, has been constructed from a GIS (Geographic Information System) - based spatial overlay of demographic, topographical, climatic and natural resource information. We have developed our biodiversity threat indicator from a variety of sources. For terrestrial biodiversity, we use a GIS-based spatial overlay of human population with critical areas identified by Conservation International (CI), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and Birdlife International (BI). We also include freshwater lake areas, to capture the role of inland aquatic ecosystems. The World Bank’s Environment Strategy focuses on both the threat to biodiversity from human encroachment, and the value of biodiversity resources for human populations. Our indicator for this two-way relationship in each country is its total human population in critical biodiversity areas. For marine biodiversity, we draw on estimates of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "biodiversity threat indicator", "confidence": 0.5329435467720032}, {"text": "GIS", "confidence": 0.24915705621242523}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "GIS-based spatial overlay of human population", "confidence": 0.17816920578479767}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "up potential differential effects across urban compared to rural localities. None of the treatment effects are statistically significantly different between rural and urban areas. [16] In panel C, we have constructed a new treatment variable _#active*mines_ that counts the number of actively producing mines within 20 km. Women are sampled within 20 km of one mine (593 women), within 20 km of two mines (137 women), and within 20 km of three mines (64 women). The 16 Few of the other interaction coefficients are also statistically significant. The interaction between _urban*mine_ is significant, and women in urban localities with a future mine are 12 percentage points less likely to be working in agriculture. 28", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) 15. As per paragraph 5.9 of the Procurement Regulations, the World Bank’s Systematic Tracking and Exchanges in Procurement (STEP) system will be used to prepare, clear, and update Procurement Plans and conduct all procurement transactions for the Project. Page 35", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "see Office of the Prime Minister and UNHCR (2024) _Uganda Urban Response Strategy 2024-2029_ . 7 The definition used is canopy height >5m. Global Forest Watch 8 Compounded by the fact that refugee settlement population density is typically ten times the national average: World Agroforestry Center, 2024. 9 Gianvenuti, A., Bedijo, N. G., Jalal, R., Hitimana, L., Walter, S., Linhares-Juvenal, T., and Xia, Z. (2022). Woodfuel Consumption in Refugee Hosting Areas and Its Impact on the Surrounding Forests—The Case of Uganda. _Forests_, _13_ (10), 1676. Page 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Access to housing:** Protection monitoring findings and focus group discussions have highlighted that accommodation was the most urgently reported need (39% of respondents in first quarter of 2024 compared to 27% in the last quarter of 2023), followed by employment. Protection monitoring shows a positive trend in the percentage of respondents residing in rented accommodation with an increase from 46% in the last quarter of 2023 to 59% in the first quarter of 2024. In parallel to this, the percentage of residents in collective accommodation facilities decreased from 12% to 6% during the same period. It is likely that many refugees residing in collective accommodation facilities have already begun to relocate to rented housing as a result of the changes in the provision of cost-free accommodation. This applies also to vulnerable persons, who previously continued to benefit from cost-free accommodation beyond the 150 days. Findings from Protection Monitoring for this quarter confirm that 38% of those having to leave their accommodation was on account of the accommodation closing, compared to only 22% in the last quarter of 2023. ## 39% Consider accommodation an urgent need facilities across seven regions [1] highlighted the challenges in accessing sustainable and affordable housing, including", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "to their home country while application fees for passports are unaffordable for many. The GRZ has offered to integrate former Angolan refugees who arrived between 1966 and 1986. However, most of those who arrived after 1986 do not have any form of identification. The risk of statelessness extends to children born to refugees, because Zambian laws do not automatically grant citizenship to children born to foreign parents on Zambian territory. 9. **Most refugees and former refugees in Zambia live in designated refugee settlements** . Approximately 75 percent of refugees are in one of the three remote refugee settlements of Mantapala (8720 individuals), Meheba (41,762 individuals), and Mayukwayukwa (26,049 individuals), with 25 percent in Lusaka, Ndola, and other urban centers. Mayukwayukwa and Meheba are four to five decades old, with dilapidated and inadequate infrastructure. Around 16,000 8 National Adaptation Plan for Zambia, 2023. 9 The plan is the fourth of its series of five-year National Development Plans intended to achieve the National Vision 2030, which is aimed at transforming Zambia into ‘a prosperous middle-income nation by 2030’. 10 Zambia National Statistical Report, Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal Security, May 2024. Page 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Zambia National Statistical Report", "confidence": 0.5294468402862549}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "and so on), and nearby households. A key social infrastructure priority is schools, which are massively overcrowded and lack classroom capacity; teacher accommodation; and appropriate water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH). Energy for school infrastructure will allow uninterrupted learning, while new classroom designs will allow greater cooling and ventilation and the adoption of simple water harvesting will permit more handwashing. Through this component, the GRZ—specifically Kalumbila Town Council—will be provided with TA to improve capacity in climate-resilient design and construction standards for infrastructure. The project aims to pilot new climate-resilient classrooms designs that are cost-effective and sustainable. The project will also invest in sensitizing local communities on how better to adapt to climate risks, including appropriate water usage, farming techniques etc. 32. **Meheba falls within the Kalumbila District, one of the eleven districts of the North-Western Province in Zambia.** The district has become a new destination for domestic and foreign investment in Zambia, driven largely by the rapid growth in mining activities, which has seen the population of the district more than double in 10 years—from around 85,000 at the time of the 2010 census to 180,000 in the 2022 census. [23] The population of Meheba, which is predominantly youthful (75.9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "the 2010 census"}, {"text": "the 2022 census"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2022 census", "confidence": 0.8812442421913147}, {"text": "2010 census", "confidence": 0.6143145561218262}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "varied but a total of 9597 surveys were administered. After data cleaning, including removal of farms that did not grow crops, and surveys with field errors and missing information, the final number of useable surveys was 8463. We conducted the analysis at the plot level of each farm as the dataset was sufficiently detailed to extract and utilize information about whether or not a particular plot (from a set of three) was irrigated or not. Each farm provided plot specific data on whether or not irrigation was used, crop production (including crop type, amount harvested, quantity sold, quantity consumed and amount of sales receipt) and crop costs (fertilizer, pesticide and seed data). Using this data, prices per crop and yields per hectare of farmland and cropland were estimated, as well as plot specific crop revenues and farm level gross and net revenues. Net revenue estimates are at the farm level because the input data, including labor (both hired and household) and machinery, were available only at that unit of measurement. It was not possible to allocate most inputs to specific plots as much of it was applied to several plots at a time. The dataset we used contains 1750 irrigated", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "plot specific data", "confidence": 0.21209649741649628}], "vague_data": [{"text": "surveys", "confidence": 0.441388875246048}]}}}
{"input": "in table 1. **Table 1.** Insurance Policy Summary Statistics **Year** **2005** **2006** **2007** Number of weather stations 34 42 28 Average premium for three phases (Rs) 290 295 287 Expected payout (Rs, using rainfall 1961–2004) 119 73 80 Ratio of premium to expected payout 2.67 2.47 2.12 Mean percentage of years policy would have 22.9 15.6 13.9 paid out 1961–2004 _Notes_ : This table lists basic features of the insurance policies studied in this paper. Each policy offers three phases of coverage with different premiums, but customers are not required to purchase all three. However, as purchasing all three phases was the most common behavior, the average premium for purchasing all phases of coverage is listed. The expected payout is estimated using the APHRODITE dataset, for the period 1961–2004. As pricing strategies for ICICI-LOMBARD are proprietary, these estimates may not correspond to their internal estimates of expected payouts. However, the APHRODITE data set likely draws from the same historical data used to price the insurance policies. The ration of premium to expected payout is the average premium (averaged across all weather stations) divided by the average expected payout. _Source_ : Authors’ analysis based on data from BASIX and APHRODITE.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "APHRODITE data set"}, {"text": "APHRODITE dataset"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX and APHRODITE"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "APHRODITE dataset", "confidence": 0.9170846343040466}, {"text": "APHRODITE data set", "confidence": 0.19868622720241547}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX and APHRODITE", "confidence": 0.38018709421157837}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) can contribute meaningfully to environmental conservation and sustainable development while meeting the challenges posed by climate change. **MEP Management Structure and Efficiency** 10. **Reforming the organizational structure and management processes of MEP offers an opportunity to increase** **its efficiency, decision-making, and accountability to improve student learning and education trajectories in Costa Rica.** With 2,763 officials at the central level and 1,451 at the regional level, distributed in 4,810 schools, the educational system has the necessary infrastructure to implement significant changes. [16] A reform of MEP to increase effectiveness and alignment with educational objectives would include: (i) review and rationalization of the central organizational structure to eliminate redundancies and clarify roles and responsibilities, especially in units focused on educational quality; (ii) restructuring of MEP regional units to better respond to local needs and organizations, ensuring that these offices focus on providing direct and effective support to frontline schools; and (iii) Improving decision-making with a data-driven approach, improving information systems and planning, which requires more accurate cost estimation and resultsoriented strategic planning. These measures would allow the MEP to optimize its management and fulfil its mandate to ensure that resources are used", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "vulnerable freshwater marshes and China represents 79.1% of all vulnerable GLWD Coastal Wetlands within EAP. Within MENA, 92.7% of all regional vulnerable saline wetlands are in Libya and Egypt. On the whole, our results suggest a significant asymmetry in the burden of SLR on wetlands: a small number of developing countries is expected to bear the additional burnt of sea level rise, while many other coastal countries will experience little change. It should be noted that numerous studies on impacts of climate change have indicated that small island nations are particularly susceptible to the impacts of SLR (for example, see Anthoff et al 2010; Nicholls et al 2010; Anthoff et al 2006; Church et al 2006; Nicholls et al 1999). However, limitations of the resolution of the global spatial datasets make quantification of the vulnerability of wetlands of small island nations particularly difficult. [20] Even though the SRTM elevation data are at approximately 90m spatial resolution, the global wetlands data are compiled from a range of sources resulting in generalized areas. Also, the correspondence 20 Tol 2007 drew on the Global Vulnerability Analysis and other country studies for quantification of wetland loss from 1 m SLR for a global analysis", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SRTM elevation data"}, {"text": "Global Vulnerability Analysis"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "global spatial datasets"}, {"text": "global wetlands data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SRTM elevation data", "confidence": 0.6449426412582397}, {"text": "Global Vulnerability Analysis", "confidence": 0.4741101861000061}, {"text": "global wetlands data", "confidence": 0.20248951017856598}, {"text": "global spatial datasets", "confidence": 0.1263318508863449}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "global wetlands data", "confidence": 0.25583791732788086}, {"text": "global spatial datasets", "confidence": 0.13427603244781494}, {"text": "SRTM elevation data", "confidence": 0.10215049237012863}], "vague_data": [{"text": "global spatial datasets", "confidence": 0.7491654753684998}, {"text": "global wetlands data", "confidence": 0.44536682963371277}]}}}
{"input": "The World Bank Economic Review 701 villages that did not experience a rainfall shock. A shock is defined using each location’s insurance policies in 2005: If insurance would have paid out in 2004 based on the structure of the 2005 weather policy, this is deemed a rainfall shock. As the quality of the rainfall data is related to the amount of nearby weather stations, I weight the observations based on the number of nearby rainfall stations. [11] Also, I create a hypothetical payout ratio, similar to the “Ratio of Payout to Premium” variable presented in table 3. This is the ratio of the amount that the 2005 policy would have paid out in 2004 divided by the premium of the policy. The results of this regression are presented in table 5. [12] **Table 5.** Direct Effects of Rainfall on Purchasing **Dependent variable is number of buyers in 2005** **(1)** **(2)** **(3)** **(4)** Would have been payout in 2004 −3.843*** −4.592*** −5.045** −3.788* (0.987) (1.039) (2.173) (1.898) Ratio of hypothetical 2004 payout to 2005 Premium 4.365 −0.755 (4.610) (5.543) Payout ratio squared −1.991 −0.279 (1.814) (2.064) Constant 8.001*** 0.651 7.985*** 1.015 (0.714) (6.341) (0.713) (6.494) Weather station constants NO YES NO", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "rainfall data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "rainfall data", "confidence": 0.9595797657966614}]}}}
{"input": "more progressive approach to refugee inclusion.** There is a general recognition in Government that a shift to self-reliance and a move away from humanitarian support is required. Zambia’s Eighth National Development Plan (8NDP) has a vision for a more decentralized approach to economic and social development, which will support the greater inclusion of approximately 101,837 [15] refugees, asylum seekers, and former refugees that currently reside in the country. 14. **In August 2023, the GRZ endorsed a new National Refugee Policy, approved by the Cabinet in November 2023.** The Office of the Commissioner for Refugees, in close cooperation with the MoHAIS and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), developed the new policy to address existing legal gaps and enhance coordination within government. Its implementation is expected to ease reservations to the 1951 Convention and harmonize the 2017 Refugee Act with other national legislation (for example, the Immigration and Deportation Act of 2010) that will enhance opportunities for protection and solutions for self-reliance. [16] To assist policy delivery, the Government has established an interagency National Steering Committee chaired by the Office of the Vice President. In March 2023, the MoHAIS launched a plan for the Modernization of Refugee and Host", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "climate variables but found the linear model to be more reliable. (Log pseudolikelihood = -2340.59 and r-squared 0.51 versus -2187.4434 and 0.54, respectively, for the quadratic probit model.) The Chow test for determining the null hypothesis that the estimated parameters are jointly the same is rejected (chi [2] (30) = 3967.66; Prob > chi [2] =0.0000). The coefficients (which are highly significant) suggest that the probability of adoption of irrigation increases with higher temperatures and precipitation in each season except in spring. The reported standard errors in the paper are based on the Huber-White estimator of variance which are robust against many types of misspecification of the model (Heltberg & Tarp 2002). The annual marginal effects, which are more informative of the decision to irrigate or not, reflected in the probability response functions of choosing irrigation given delta temperature increments (holding all other variables constant), reflect the current irrigation landscape in Africa. The probability of adoption of irrigation increases in regions with lower temperatures (for example Egypt and South Africa), while it decreases in warmer regions. Irrigation in cooler regions is more profitable because it requires less water and the crops are more productive. Similarly, in regions of higher precipitation", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "information within the infrastructure module on repairs and upgrades and the integration of energyefficient and climate-smart features, such as improved drainage, natural ventilation, and use of climate-resilient materials in educational establishments; and (ii) strengthen the digitalization of MEP and the development of digital platforms and content delivery to enable remote instruction when extreme weather events make it unsafe for students to go to school for in-person learning. [28] The integration of digital platforms will be accompanied by the development of business continuity plans to ensure network connectivity and minimize downtime during extreme weather events. With these considerations, the Project is considered to have reduced risks to acceptable levels and to be aligned on adaptation. 27 These will consider the best available technology or match or surpass country benchmarks in energy efficiency performance. [28 In the past, extreme weather events have disrupted school continuity. For instance, in 2017, Hurricane Nate damaged 72 schools that remained](https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/educacion/tormenta-nate-dana-72-escuelas-y-colegios-en-todo-el-pais/42ZNMUM3BFA5BIWXJI3INJOBHA/story/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_content=2017-10-06&utm_campaign=rss-nacional) [closed for several days. More recently, in 2022, 234 schools lost access to electricity and water following storm Julia. The MSP contract will include](https://mep.go.cr/noticias/mep-reporta-234-centros-educativos-afectados-paso-huracan-julia) contingency measures so that remote instruction can continue in the event of outages. Page 17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "panel B shows the effects of increased production in the survey year. There is no evidence of spillovers in the sense that there is a similar effect in neighboring districts. In fact, most coefficients point in the opposite direction for mining and neighboring districts indicating, if anything, a shift in employment from neighboring districts to the producing ones. **8 Conclusions** Ghana has a long history of gold production and has recently been experiencing its third gold rush, during which annual gold production skyrocketed. It was the first gold rush the country has experienced as an independent nation, and it brings hope of improving the lives of its citizens. Natural resource extraction is often argued to have detrimental effects on countries, however, and the so-called natural resource curse may imply that resource wealth is harmful to social development and inclusive growth. We use rich geocoded data with information on households and mining production over time to evaluate the gold boom at the local and district levels in difference-in-differences analyses. Men benefit from direct job creation within the mining sector, and women seem to benefit from indirectly generated jobs in the service sector (statistically significant within 10 km from a mine). Women", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "rich geocoded data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "geocoded data", "confidence": 0.3996732831001282}], "vague_data": [{"text": "geocoded data", "confidence": 0.481939435005188}]}}}
{"input": "candles, flashlights, and generators for lighting and cell phone charging. Enhanced transport and energy will also stimulate retail business and production. The upgrading and expansion of school infrastructure will improve learning outcomes, enhance teacher retention and new recruitment, and afford greater dignity to boarding pupils, especially girls, as many are currently sharing beds due to the lack of capacity. The provision of modern WASH facilities will support greater school attendance—especially for girls whose attendance is often curtailed due to lack of access to hygiene services [26] —and improve the health of students who are at increased risk of waterborne diseases such as cholera in the rainy season given the current overreliance on pit latrines. (a) **Transport infrastructure: Meheba settlement main access road and Mwafwe bridge (US$3 million).** The overall state of rural roads within the Meheba settlement remains one of the main bottlenecks to the development of that settlement into an economically viable area. Results from various studies such as the 23 Zambia 2022 Census of Population and Housing, Central Statistical Office Zambia, 2023. 24 One Meheba Local Area Plan, Planning Survey and Issues Report, GRZ, 2023. 25 One Meheba Local Area Plan, Planning Survey and Issues Report, GRZ, 2023.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "23 Zambia 2022 Census of Population and Housing"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "23 Zambia 2022 Census of Population and Housing", "confidence": 0.6096975803375244}, {"text": "One Meheba Local Area Plan", "confidence": 0.12100140005350113}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "expand essential services, job creation and entrepreneurship to stimulate local economies, and the development of key sectors like agriculture, renewable energy, and small-scale industries. Addressing climate change, the vision emphasizes efficient water management and renewable energy to enhance resilience. Aligned with this vision, **the National Strategy for Non-** **Contributory Social Protection (NSPS, 2023-2027) integrates adaptive social protection systems, basic services,** 2 The WBG Scorecard FY24-FY30 Methodology Note defines a ‘ **refugee’** is a person who, ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country’, referencing the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. For the purposes of this PAD, the term ‘refugee’ will include both refugees and asylum-seekers. 3 UNHCR (2025), Djibouti: Refuge and Asylum-Seekers Locations, as of 15 Jan 2025; UNHCR (2024), Djibouti: Refuge and Asylum-Seekers Locations, as of 31 Dec 2025 Page 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Refuge and Asylum-Seekers Locations", "confidence": 0.14504216611385345}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "relationships between household wealth (excluding the value of owned land) and their willingness to pay in order to obtain full ownership rights on occupied parcels. The marginal elasticity of the reported amount that occupants’ are willing to pay with respect to wealth, though inelastic with 0.36, is positive and statistically different from zero. But wealth elasticity on the probability of willingness to pay is very negligible (0.03), implying that poorer tenants will possibly be over-bid even if they are equally willing to buy full ownership rights on occupied parcels. **5. Conclusion and policy implications** Although a large literature explores the effectiveness of titling interventions, and the impacts of tenure security on investment and productivity of land use, the African literature has not led to a consensus on whether insecurity should be of concern to policy makers or on how to most effectively address it. Our findings contribute to the methodological and the policy debate. Methodologically, the ability to use within household fixed effect estimates allows us to demonstrate that tenure insecurity has statistically very significant effects on investment and thus the productivity of land use. The fact that both our sample and the point estimates obtained are several times larger", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "after the 2005 floods, it was slow to arrive and the amount delivered was inadequate to support losses suffered (Patankar 2015). Given that poor people have consumption closer to subsistence, a substantial loss from floods in the absence of support can have high non-monetary costs in the form of irreversible impacts on children and distress sales of assets (de Janvry et al. 2006; World Bank and Australian AID 2014). In summary, livelihood shocks triggered by floods could keep people from escaping poverty and even push them into deeper poverty (Karim and Noy 2014). Despite this poverty-vulnerability relationship, previous quantitative studies on flood exposure in Vietnam have focused on the generation of losses rather than exposure across socioeconomic levels (Chinh et al. 2017; Apel et al. 2016; MONRE 2009). Nevertheless, insights from qualitative focus groups across the country (in An Giang, Kien Giang, Kon Tum, Hoa Binh, and Bac Nih) find that many poor households feel more vulnerable to floods due to their increased exposure (a result of living in flood prone areas, like along river banks or outside of protective dikes, and often having substandard quality of housing) are less likely to have sufficient assets to buffer the effects of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "quantitative studies", "confidence": 0.2938960790634155}]}}}
{"input": "executing agency, which describes how procurement in this Project will support the PDOs and deliver value for money under a risk-based approach. The PPSD will provide adequate supporting market analysis for the selection methods detailed in the Procurement Plan. Mandatory 29 MEP implemented the Equity and Efficiency of Education Project (P057857, 7284-CR). However, the project closed in 2013. 30 The PEFA 2022 concluded that overall Costa Rica PFM system is well aligned with good international practices, being budget reliability and transparency of public finances the foremost strengths. Page 18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "because the input data, including labor (both hired and household) and machinery, were available only at that unit of measurement. It was not possible to allocate most inputs to specific plots as much of it was applied to several plots at a time. The dataset we used contains 1750 irrigated plots and 9183 dryland plots. The distribution of surveys – irrigated and dryland plots by country – is shown in Table 1. In this study, we relied on monthly temperature data collected from US Department of Defense satellites (Basist et al. 2001). This set of polar orbiting satellites obtain measurements at a given location on earth at 6am and 6pm every day. The satellites are equipped with sensors that measure surface temperature by detecting microwaves that pass through clouds (Weng & Grody 1998). The monthly precipitation data comes from the Africa Rainfall and Temperature Evaluation System (ARTES) (World Bank 2003). This dataset, created by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association’s Climate Prediction Center, is based on ground station measurements of precipitation over the period 1948–2001. The average temperatures and precipitation for each country in the sample are shown in Appendices A and B. Note that there is a wide range", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Africa Rainfall and Temperature Evaluation System"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ground station measurements of precipitation"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "monthly temperature data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Africa Rainfall and Temperature Evaluation System", "confidence": 0.5431268811225891}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ground station measurements of precipitation", "confidence": 0.27779629826545715}, {"text": "monthly temperature data", "confidence": 0.2759953737258911}, {"text": "monthly precipitation data", "confidence": 0.14276838302612305}], "vague_data": [{"text": "monthly temperature data", "confidence": 0.12564609944820404}]}}}
{"input": "Nam Assessment Report on Climate Change IPCC (2007) Summary for Policymakers.^ In Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer (eds). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New [York, USA. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf](http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf) IPCC (2014) Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Barros, V.R., C.B. Field, D.J. Dokken, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press de Janvry, A., F. Finan, E. Sadoulet, and R. Vakis. 2006. BCan conditional cash transfer programs serve as safety nets in keeping children at school and from working when exposed to shocks?^ J Dev Econ 79: 349–373 Jongman B, Hochrainer-Stigler S, Feyen L, Aerts JCJH, Mechler R, Botzen WJW, Bouwer LM, Pflug G, Rojas R, Ward PJ (2014) Increasing stress on disaster-risk finance due to large floods. Nat Clim Chang 4(4):264–", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "shock of the same intensity occurs again. Using historical data and based on the statistical frequency of a shock of a certain intensity, it describes the probability of such an event. Figure 1 illustrates the extent of floods with two return periods: one with a 25-year return period (or a 1in-25-year flood) and one with a 100-year return period (or a 1-in-100-year flood). The 1-in-25-year flood has a 1/25 or 0.04 annual probability of occurring. In other words, each year there is a 4 percent chance of such an event occurring, regardless of when the last such event took place. The probabilistic nature of return periods means that there is a 63.9 percent probability that a flood of at least this intensity will occur once within a 25-year period. But this also leaves the possibility for this event to not occur at all, or to occur several times. In comparison, a 1-in-100-year flood is a more extreme event with a lower probability but higher intensity — that is, it affects a wider area and has a greater depth. As time passes, more climatic data become available, which will update the empirical probabilities associated with certain natural shocks. As the impacts", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "historical data"}, {"text": "climatic data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "climatic data", "confidence": 0.10334920138120651}], "vague_data": [{"text": "historical data", "confidence": 0.8527966737747192}, {"text": "climatic data", "confidence": 0.7708573937416077}]}}}
{"input": "optimal allocation model, with a brief review of the methodology developed in Buys, et al. (2003). Assuming continuity with the past scale and thematic composition of lending, Section 8 uses the model to estimate lending and AAA opportunities by country and environmental theme for the period 2004-2009. [2] Section 9 interprets our findings using two country cases, and Section 10 provides a summary and conclusions. **2. Environmental Indicators** Building on prior work by Buys, et al. (2003), we construct country indicators for six environmental problems: greenhouse gas emissions; health damage from air and water pollution; the threat of natural resource degradation on fragile lands; threats to biodiversity; problems related to water resources; and problems with environmental policies and institutions. All of our indices reflect recent research on the cross-country incidence of environmental problems. For global greenhouse gas emissions, our indicator is total metric tons of carbon equivalent in 2000 from fuel combustion (CO2), land-use change (CO2) and other sources (methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC’s), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)). We draw our emissions estimates from the World Resources Institute’s Climate Analysis and Indicators database. [3] Our estimate of pollution damage is total DALY (disability-adjusted life year) losses", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Resources Institute’s Climate Analysis and Indicators database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Climate Analysis and Indicators database", "confidence": 0.7910768389701843}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "country indicators", "confidence": 0.22969065606594086}]}}}
{"input": "NUSAF IV will focus on the poorest individuals, while DRDIP II will target ‘active individuals’ identified through national wealth ranking data; (b) DRDIP II will concentrate on regions with a high refugee population, freeing up NUSAF IV to operate in other areas; (c) data sharing will be facilitated through interoperability between the DRDIP II management information system (MIS) and related projects; (d) the Geo-Enabling initiative for Monitoring and Supervision (GEMS) at the portfolio level will provide mapping of different projects, offering timely information on subproject locations; and (e) bi-annual joint reviews and joint missions of the PIUs and World Bank will be explored for strategic stocktaking and alignment. DRDIP II will also coordinate with activities of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), ensuring at the very least not to crowd out private investment. 45. **As part of the portfolio level coordination, a common taxonomy across operations will be developed through** **project implementation manuals, building a shared understanding of graduation pathways at individual and group** **levels** . Livelihoods grants from NUSAF IV and economic opportunity grants from DRDIP II will form the foundational support to refugees and host communities, priming households to become economically active and participate in value chains. The DRDIP", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DRDIP II management information system (MIS)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "national wealth ranking data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DRDIP II management information system", "confidence": 0.38943228125572205}, {"text": "Geo-Enabling initiative for Monitoring and Supervision", "confidence": 0.10571150481700897}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "national wealth ranking data", "confidence": 0.2961825728416443}], "vague_data": [{"text": "national wealth ranking data", "confidence": 0.64491206407547}]}}}
{"input": "the planned procurement, the absence of a comprehensive project expenditure framework, and weak technical and procurement capacity at both the ministry and PMU levels. 16. The mitigation measures are as follows: a) A comprehensive expenditure framework including a Procurement Plan for the overall project for the first 18 months of implementation has been developed and will be updated periodically as necessary; b) Qualified staff will be assigned as focal persons to monitor, support, and report on procurement activities; c) Evaluation committee members will consist of a maximum of five members with three members from the concerned PMU/department and two members from the concerned ministry; d) Financial and administrative authority at the PMU/Department of Procurement level will be efficiently delegated to conduct procurement and manage contracts in compliance with the World Bank’s Procurement Regulations; e) Implementing agencies will start advance procurement to award a few critical contracts following Board approval; f) The Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP) system will be used for all procurement activities; and g) The World Bank will carry out regular reviews of project-related procurement activities. 17. **Procurement oversight and monitoring arrangements.** The World Bank exercises its procurement oversight through a risk-based approach comprising prior and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement", "confidence": 0.14871102571487427}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "possible, refugees and host communities will be provided with access to climate information, and to inform livelihood choices balanced against market demands. _Subcomponent 1.2. Issuing of ID cards to refugees and former refugees nationally (US$6 million)_ 27. **The GRZ plans to issue new biometric National Registration Cards (NRCs) to all citizens.** The process is led by the Department of National Registration, Passports and Citizenship under the MoHAIS through the Integrated National Registration Information System (INRIS) project. The overall objective of the project is to improve civil registration and identity management processes through digitization and automation. In line with the new Refugee Policy, the scheme will be extended to all refugees and former refugees, enabling them for the first time to be part of the national civil registry. Despite the historically high uptake of NRCs by Zambian citizens, women and girls still face several access challenges, attributed to time and mobility constraints due to domestic work and childcare commitments. 28. **The current system of documentation leaves persons of concern** **[20]** **vulnerable.** The GRZ, with the support of the UNHCR, has been registering persons of concern and issuing them with documents such as asylum seeker certificates, registration certificates, refugee identity cards, birth", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Integrated National Registration Information System"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "national civil registry"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Integrated National Registration Information System", "confidence": 0.6504719853401184}, {"text": "national civil registry", "confidence": 0.12291810661554337}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Africa has increased substantially over the past 18 months, with more than 700,000 people approaching UNHCR in **Egypt** since April 2023 and nearly 69,000 new arrivals to **Libya** . UNHCR is working with governments and humanitarian partners to sustain an emergency response to help those fleeing the horrors of war; however, the regional response to the Sudan situation continues to be severely underfunded. After more than 13 years, the **Syria Situation** remains one of the largest displacement crises in the world. Close to 6 million Syrian refugees are hosted in the neighbouring countries. Maintaining assistance to Syrian refugees in host countries in the region remains of paramount importance, particularly given the already heightened vulnerabilities among refugees in host countries and added pressure on host governments. A lack of adequate resources has exacerbated tensions between refugees and host communities, decreased opportunities for livelihoods and strained already overstretched national systems. Years of devastating conflict in **Yemen** have left 18.2 million people dependent on humanitarian assistance. In **Iraq**, UNHCR also urgently needs resources to continue supporting the authorities in ensuring access to civil documentation and inclusion in the national social safety net for some 1 million internally displaced Iraqis. UNHCR is responding to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Policy Research Working Paper 6277 #### **Abstract** Scientific evidence indicates that global warming could well lead to a sea-level rise of 1 meter or more in the 21 [st] century. This paper seeks to quantify how a 1-meter sea-level rise that would affect coastal wetlands in 76 developing countries and territories, taking into account how much of wetlands would be submerged and how likely the wetlands would move inland as the coastline recedes. It is estimated that approximately 64 percent of the freshwater marsh, 66 percent of Global Lakes and Wetlands Database coastal wetlands, and 61 percent of brackish/saline wetlands are at risk. A large percentage of this loss would be shouldered by two regions: East Asia and the Pacific, and the Middle East and North Africa. At the country level, the results are extremely skewed with a small number of countries being severely affected. In East Asia, China and Vietnam would bear the brunt of these losses. In the Middle East and North Africa, Libya and Egypt would see the most losses. A rough estimate of the economic value of the goods and services produced by wetlands at risk is approximately $630 million per year in 2000 U.S. dollars.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Lakes and Wetlands Database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Lakes and Wetlands Database", "confidence": 0.9602742195129395}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "are also aggregated to administrative units, including for each country and subnational unit. These estimates are also aggregated to yield regional and global estimates. **4.** **Compute the number of poor people exposed to flood risk:** While poverty estimates are not available at the pixel level, the World Bank’s GMD database provides them at the subnational level for most countries. These poverty shares are multiplied with the population headcount that is estimated to be exposed to flooding, in order to obtain an estimate of the number of poor people in each administrative unit exposed to flood risk. Similarly, exposure headcount estimates are multiplied with subnational GDP per capita figures to obtain estimates of flood exposed GDP in monetary terms. **4.2.** **Stepwise computational process** The following steps are repeated for each subnational region where data are available. **Merge coastal, pluvial, fluvial flood hazard maps** - Crop fluvial and pluvial flood rasters to subnational boundary - Crop then virtually warp the coastal flood raster, using a nearest neighbors resampling method, to perfectly match the resolution and extent of the fluvial and pluvial rasters - Merge fluvial, pluvial, and coastal rasters using a maximum value method 8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank’s GMD database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GMD database", "confidence": 0.8838165998458862}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Costa Rica Results in Education (CORE) (P181174) provision of hardware (notebook computers and tablets) and connectivity for primary and secondary schools; in addition to computers, the Project will provide other equipment such as smart boards, projectors, headphones, robotics and related physical computation kits, routers to enhance internal connectivity); [26] and (iii) support to the development and implementation of a hybrid learning policy, its operational plan, and a communication strategy. This last activity would include the development of a national learning platform for virtual learning; implementation of a monitoring mechanism, such as the World Bank’s Education and Technology Readiness Index (ETRI); and development of digital resources such as e-books, multimedia contents, simulation exercises, and educational applications, as part of a unified learning management and competency certification system. As with foundational learning, implementation of the PNFT as part of the curriculum (it is not optative) will ensure that equal opportunity will be provided for girls and boys for all modules, and that girls will not lag behind boys in digital competencies, including coding and robotics. Computer Science teachers would be specially trained to make sure that coding and robotics activities are gender inclusive (for example in the choice of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank’s Education and Technology Readiness Index (ETRI)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Education and Technology Readiness Index", "confidence": 0.8432941436767578}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Figure 3: Coastal cyclone landfalls in Bangladesh, West Bengal and Odisha:** **Median locations by period, 178 cyclonic storms, 1877-2016** **Sources: BMD, IMD, IBTrACS** **Figure 4: Coastal cyclone landfalls in Bangladesh, West Bengal and Odisha:** **Distribution of locations by period, 178 cyclonic storms, 1877-2016** **Sources: BMD, IMD, IBTrACS** 11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "from coefficients on dummies for longer-term possession (5-12 and > 12 years, respectively) as discussed earlier. Relevant regression results and tests for relationships between coefficients, presented in table 5, lead us to conclude that granting legal protection to _bona fide_ occupants attenuates investment disincentives in a way that goes beyond the mere passage of time. In the case of tree investment and soil conservation measures _γ_ _[2]_ _L_ [ is ] insignificant and _γ_ _[1]_ _L_ [significant, suggesting that what we find is a legal rather than just a time-effect. Still, ] while it is not surprising to find that tests consistently reject the hypothesis of _γ_ _[2]_ _L_ [ =] _[ γ]_ _T_ [ at the 1% level, ] pointing towards significant under-investment on parcels that were occupied for longer than 5 years, the same equivalent hypothesis (i.e. _γ_ _[1]_ _L_ [ =] _[ γ]_ _T_ [) is also rejected at 5% throughout. This implies that, compared to ] parcels they own, households invest significantly less in parcels to which by law they have been granted permanent and heritable occupancy rights. The magnitude of such under-investment remains large; according to the point estimates, _bona fide_ occupancy on customary land", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "coefficients on dummies", "confidence": 0.16173560917377472}], "vague_data": [{"text": "coefficients on dummies", "confidence": 0.15574103593826294}]}}}
{"input": "with six lags of the dependent variable. The Arellano-Bond regression contains one lag of the dependent variable, with this lag instrumented by five previous lags. Observation are years 1967–2004 for the fixed-effects regression, and years 1962-2004 for the Arellano-Bond regression. All regressions contain weather station fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p _<_ 0.01, **p _<_ 0.05, *p _<_ 0.1. _Source_ : Authors’ analysis based on data from BASIX and APHRODITE. This evidence casts doubt on the hypothesis that positive autocorrelation of weather events is driving increased insurance purchasing. It appears that total rainfall is actually negatively autocorrelated, whereas shocks (which are proxied by the insurance contract giving a payout) do not appear to be correlated at all. Even if there is no positive autocorrelation of rainfall, there may be other aspects about experiencing a shock that result in people having a higher propensity to purchase insurance. In order to look at the results of weather separately from the effects of insurance, I analyze how previous weather events affected insurance purchase decisions in the first year that insurance was offered to BASIX customers, which was 2005. To accomplish this, I first aggregate the purchasing data to the village", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX and APHRODITE"}, {"text": "BASIX and APHRODITE"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX", "confidence": 0.13429909944534302}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from BASIX and APHRODITE", "confidence": 0.4855961799621582}], "vague_data": [{"text": "purchasing data", "confidence": 0.5260984897613525}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank** Integrated Community Resilience Project (P506969) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT **productive inclusion and social behavior change communication (SBCC) to reduce poverty, enhance resilience to climate** **risks and support economic empowerment targeting the poor and vulnerable through financial inclusion** . Refugees and asylum-seekers, included in the 2024 census, are now part of the NSPS, and refugees were incorporated into the National Programme of Family Solidarity (PNSF) in 2023. Together, these strategies aim to build a sustainable, inclusive and shockresilient socio-economic landscape, conducive to long-term growth across the country. 8. **Over the last five years, Djibouti has made significant strides in social protection, but faces challenges in** **ensuring a comprehensive, effective and efficient social protection system that is adaptive and sustainable.** While the government has successfully piloted a targeted cash transfer program and laid the foundations for delivery mechanisms using the social registry, the NSPS highlights challenges of fragmentation (as of 2019, nine safety net programs covered different groups), inadequacy, and unpredictability. Djibouti’s social protection system is currently inadequate to shield poor and vulnerable people from adverse lifecycle impacts or encourage desirable investment in human capital and provides limited coverage. In 2012, social safety net coverage was 9.5 percent, well below", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 census"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "the social registry"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 census", "confidence": 0.7253486514091492}, {"text": "social registry", "confidence": 0.1325341761112213}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "social registry", "confidence": 0.5813369750976562}]}}}
{"input": "J. Cochrane and W. Kisamba-Mugerwa. 1994. \"Tenure Security, Credit Use, and Farm Investment in the Rujumbura Pilot Land Registration Scheme, Uganda.\" In Bruce, J. W. and S. E. Migot-Adholla, eds., _Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa_ . Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishers. Rugadya, M., E. Obaiko, and H. Kamusiime. 2004. \"Gender and the Land Reform Process in Uganda: Assessing Gains and Losses for Women in Uganda.\" Land Research Series No. 2. Kampala: Associates for Development. Shaban, R. A. 1987. \"Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping.\" _Journal of Political Economy_ _95_ (5): 893-920. West, H. W. 1972. _Land policy in Buganda_ . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. World Bank. 2003. \"Nicaragua Land Policy and Administration: Towards a More Secure Property Rights Regime.\" Report 26683NI. Washington, DC: World Bank. 26", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Rujumbura Pilot Land Registration Scheme", "confidence": 0.6031305193901062}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**pandemic, regional drought, inflation crisis and continuing global economic turbulence.** According to data from\n\nthe Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Survey (RRPS), the Shona community experienced significant job\n\nlosses during the pandemic, particularly between July and September 2020, when unemployment increased\n\ndramatically. [[9]] This period of economic disruption caused by the pandemic led to fluctuating employment rates, as\n\nseen in the figure below.\n\n_Figure 3: Labor force participation as a percentage of working age population, between 2019 and 2024_\n\n_Source: 2019 Shona socioeconomic survey,_ [[8]] _Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Surveys (RRPS),_ _[[9]]_ _and the authors’ calculation_\n\n_of 2024 survey data._\n\n**While employment has started to improve, it has not yet returned to pre-pandemic levels, especially for women.**\n\nThe employment rate for women decreased from 72 percent in 2019 to 61 percent in 2024, which can largely be\n\nattributed to the job losses incurred during the pandemic and slower recovery in female-dominated sectors that\n\nwere further setback by the food price crisis and global economic headwinds. Meanwhile, male employment\n\nincreased slightly from 74 percent to 76 percent during the same period, reflecting a quicker rebound in male\ndominated occupations.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Survey (RRPS)"}, {"text": "2019 Shona socioeconomic survey"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2024 survey data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2019 Shona socioeconomic survey", "confidence": 0.8379536867141724}, {"text": "Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Survey", "confidence": 0.7366926074028015}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2024 survey data", "confidence": 0.31866544485092163}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "24 25 Economic research on dispersal policies and labour market inclusion focuses on the strength of local labour markets and size of local ethnic networks. While some scholars find only the strength of local labour markets to be significant and not co-national networks (Foged, Hasager, and Peri, 2022), or inconsistent results for conational networks (Müller, Pannatier, and Viarengo, 2022), others find effects only for co-national networks (Damm, 2014).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\n# **Supporting \r Durable \r Solutions** **in \r South-­‐East \r Myanmar**\n\n## **A \r framework \r for \r UNHCR \r engagement**\n\n**1.** **INTRODUCTION**\n\nMyanmar \r is \r currently \r undergoing \r a \r process \r of \r significant \r and \r rapid \r change, \r which \r has\nalready \r generated \r a \r series \r of \r political, \r social \r and \r economic \r reforms \r affecting \r all \r aspects\nof \r life \r in \r the \r country. \r The \r reforms \r launched \r by \r the \r president \r Thein \r Sein \r and \r largely\nsupported \r by \r the \r opposition \r leader \r Aung \r San \r Suu \r Kyi \r have \r received \r strong \r and \r positive\nencouragements \r from \r abroad \r with \r the \r most \r immediate \r outcome \r reflected \r in \r increased\nforeign \r aid \r and \r the \r temporary \r suspension \r of \r a \r number \r of \r economic \r sanctions. \r Key \r legal\namendments \r have \r been \r adopted \r to \r ease \r restrictions \r on \r foreign \r investments, \r national\nmedia \r and \r political \r parties \r while, \r in \r addition, \r hundreds \r of \r political \r prisoners \r have \r been\nreleased \r from \r detention.\n\nIn \r late \r 2011, \r President \r Thein \r Sein’s \r Government \r pledged \r to \r make \r the \r ethnic \r issue \r a\nnational \r priority, \r offering \r dialogue \r with \r all \r armed \r groups \r and \r dropping \r preconditions\nfor \r talks. \r By \r early \r 2012, \r cease-­‐fires \r were \r agreed \r between \r the \r Government \r and \r a \r number\nof \r non-­‐state \r armed \r opposition \r groups, \r including \r the \r Democratic \r Karen \r Buddhist \r Army\n(DKBA), \r the \r Karen \r National \r Union \r (KNU), \r and \r the \r Karenni \r National \r Progressive \r Party\n(KNPP).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Regarding types of support received, most participants reported utilizing formal services with psychotherapy/counselling services being the most common (44%). Smaller numbers participated in creative psychosocial activities (19%), group or individual structured interventions designed to improve well-being (17%), psychiatry/medication management (8%), school-based services (4% overall; for children under 18, 13%), support gained from messaging materials (2%), and training for caregivers in how to support children in distress (1%). These formal services, provided by professionals or by trained specialists and nonspecialists, aim to address both clinical and subclinical mental health needs through structured, evidence-informed approaches.\n\nInformal support also played a significant role, with 33% of participants receiving support from family and friends, 12% accessing spiritual support, and 3% receiving support from their employer (e.g., flexible Regionally, 56% of participants reported receiving only formal services, 25% reported receiving only informal support, and 14% of participants reported receiving both formal and informal forms of support.\nForms of support varied across countries, with uptake of formal services ranging from 29% of participants in Hungary to 64% of participants in Poland. In some settings with lower use of formal services, participants appeared somewhat more likely to seek out or use informal supports.\n\n**21**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Investigating the district-level effects on children’s health and birth outcomes in table 7, we\n\nnote a higher number of prenatal visits and an increase in attendance of a midwife in panel A.\n\nThese results are highly statistically significant and the effects are economically significant. A\n\nmine opening increases the number of prenatal visits by 0.76 and increases the probability that\n\nthe birth was preceded by a prenatal visit supervised by a midwife by 12.5 percentage points.\n\nIn column 6 of panel A, we see that mine openings in a district reduce child mortality. The\n\nprobability of an infant dying before 12 months of age is reduced by 8.5 percentage points.\n\nGiven the importance of child mortality for human welfare, we strongly encourage future\n\nresearch to investigate the mechanisms behind these striking results. Since the share of prenatal\n\nvisits supervised by a midwife also increases with mine openings, the results potentially speak\n\nto the importance of midwives for reducing infant mortality.\n\n**Table 7 Effects of mine opening at the district level on birth outcomes and child health**\n\n(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "- Provide \r assistance \r to \r mine \r victims \r and \r support \r Mine \r Risk \r Education \r (MRE)\nwhile \r following \r up \r and \r advocate \r for \r the \r implementation \r of \r humanitarian \r mine\naction \r including \r survey, \r mapping, \r marking \r and \r clearance \r of \r contaminated \r areas,\nespecially \r in \r areas \r of \r potential \r and \r current \r return. \r Develop \r key \r advocacy\nmessages \r and \r co-­‐ordination \r mechanisms \r to \r ensure \r that \r displaced \r communities\nare \r aware \r of \r any \r landmine \r contamination \r in \r places \r of \r origin \r and \r transit.\n\n- Advocate \r for \r the \r recognition \r of \r education \r certificates \r received \r in \r country \r of\nasylum \r and \r the \r development \r of \r bi-­‐lingual \r educational \r programmes.\n\n- Conducting \r awareness-­‐raising \r on \r SGBV \r prevention \r and \r response, \r assisting \r SGBV\nvictims \r through \r established \r referral \r mechanisms \r for \r treatment \r and \r psycho-­‐\nsocial \r support, \r and \r supporting \r community-­‐based \r protection \r solutions.\n\n- Establish \r community \r based \r mechanisms \r for \r identifying \r EVIs \r and \r provide\ntailored \r assistance.\n\n13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "education \r certificates \r received \r in \r country \r of\nasylum", "confidence": 0.10255884379148483}], "vague_data": [{"text": "education \r certificates", "confidence": 0.19037160277366638}]}}}
{"input": "that is produced by labour alone. This can be estimated by assuming that it is equal to the labour compensation share of GDP (GDP can be divided into compensation of labour and capital), which in 2022 and 2023 stood in Poland at 48% according to the European Commission’s AMECO database.\nAccounting for that, gives a lower estimate of 0.7-1.0% GDP. Such calculations are very abstract, and do not account for other phenomena developing simultaneously in the economy, like the various effects of the war and energy shock. For this reason, we turn next to formal general equilibrium modelling, where equations of the model state explicitly every assumption about the workings of the economy and allow for a credible estimation of counter-factual scenarios.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "European Commission’s AMECO database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "AMECO database", "confidence": 0.9561376571655273}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "refugees, we have adjusted all the results proportionally to a 1.4-2.2% employment growth. First, Gradzewicz, Jabłon owski, Sasiela, and Żółkiewski (2021) use the NBP CGE model to estimate the economic impact of pre-2022 Ukrainian migrants over the 2015-2018 period, treating their inflow as a positive unskilled labour shock. If the Ukrainian refugee inflow had the same characteristics, it would yield a 0.5-0.8% higher GDP – the lower bound of our estimate. Second, Strzelecki, Growiec, and Wyszyński (2022) perform a growth accounting exercise to gauge the economic impact of the pre-2022 Ukrainian migrants over the 2014-2018 period, accounting for hours and worker characteristics to arrive at a productivityadjusted labour supply. If Ukrainian refugees had the same characteristics, they © UNHCR / Anna Liminowicz As such **4 scenarios** were calculated with options corresponding to different mixes of low and high estimation for employment and productivity while keeping stable impact on consumption: high or low employment level, similar (baseline) or lower (conservative) productivity. In the conservative productivity scenario, we assumed approximately 10% lower refugee productivity estimated based on incomes reported in MSNA Poland 2023 and data from Statistics Poland.\n\n**Table 2.** Cumulative changes in main indicators in 2023", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from Statistics Poland"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023", "confidence": 0.6075583696365356}, {"text": "NBP CGE model", "confidence": 0.11155771464109421}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from Statistics Poland", "confidence": 0.4478693902492523}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\nmake \r efforts \r towards \r an \r internal \r peace \r process \r with \r armed \r groups \r in \r the \r border \r areas,\nparallel \r debates \r emerged \r about \r the \r opportunity \r to \r return \r for \r over \r a \r hundred \r thousand\nrefugees \r from \r the \r “temporary \r shelters” [2] in \r Thailand.\n\nWhile \r the \r present \r and \r immediately \r expected \r environment \r in \r Myanmar \r does \r not \r meet \r all\nthe \r conditions \r or \r safeguards \r for \r an \r organized \r return, \r the \r changing \r environment \r makes\nit \r prudent \r that \r measures \r are \r initiated \r to \r prepare \r for \r any \r possible \r voluntary \r repatriation\nof \r refugees \r as \r well \r as \r the \r return, \r local \r integration \r or \r voluntary \r resettlement \r to \r another\npart \r of \r the \r country \r of \r IDPs \r in \r Myanmar. \r Any \r preparations, \r however, \r should \r be \r initiated\nwith \r due \r caution \r so \r as \r not \r to \r send \r the \r wrong \r “message” \r to \r the \r Government, \r non-­‐state\narmed \r groups, \r IDPs, \r refugees \r or \r partners \r that \r return \r is \r being \r encouraged \r or \r promoted\nat \r this \r stage.\n\nThis \r Discussion \r Paper \r seeks \r to \r articulate \r a \r broad \r framework \r which \r should \r guide\nUNHCR’s \r engagement \r in \r the \r South-­‐East \r in \r 2013-­‐2015, \r and \r in \r particular, \r to \r define \r the\nparameters \r of \r UNHCR’s \r role \r in \r supporting:\n\ni. durable \r solutions \r for \r IDPs; \r and\nii. the \r sustainable \r reintegration \r of \r returning \r refugees.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "treatment. District level is an additional interesting level of analysis, since it captures effects\n\nthrough the fiscal channel, and has previously been employed in, for example, Loyaza, Mier y\n\nTeran, and Rigolini (2013) to measure income inequality across mining districts in Peru. With\n\nGhana’s tax-sharing rules, district tax income and royalties increase with expansion in gold\n\nextraction (for more information, see section 2). In the district-level analysis, we first use mine\n\nopenings as the independent variable, and then we use a richer specification with production\n\nlevels. Given the spatial location of mines near district borders, we additionally analyze spatial\n\nspillovers from mining districts to neighboring districts.\n\n**4.2.1 Difference-in-differences at the district level**\n\nThe first approach is similar to the local-level approach, only an individual is defined as being\n\ntreated by a mine opening if she or he lives in a district with at least one active mine. In total,\n\nour mines are located in 11 mining districts (see figure 3). For districts with several mines, we\n\ndefine the whole district as active whenever at least one mine is active. Later, we will also\n\nconsider district total annual production (tons of gold extracted), and thereby the effect of the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "wages and reduced over-education for migrants working in licensed jobs, while producing worse labour market outcomes for those who did not gain licensure.\nAccording to Peterson et al. (2014), over the 1973–2010 period, U.S. states with more stringent occupational licensing for migrant physicians received fewer new migrant physicians and struggled more with staffing shortages in healthcare. Aleksynska and Tritah (2013) quoted data that migrants in France were denied legal access to approximately 30% of jobs in the country.\n\nUkrainian refugees Polish citizens Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on mid-2024 SEIS UNHCR survey (Ukrainian refugees’ educational attainment), 2023 Eurostat Labour Force Survey Eurostat (Polish citizens educational attainment), and mid-2024 ZUS administrative data (occupational groups).\n\n**Chart 21. Share of regulated professions by citizenship and legal status, Q2 2024**\n\n**The educational premium seems**\n\n**to be lower for Ukrainian refugees**\n\n**compared to the general workforce**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "mid-2024 SEIS UNHCR survey"}, {"text": "2023 Eurostat Labour Force Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "mid-2024 ZUS administrative data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ZUS administrative data", "confidence": 0.5481517314910889}, {"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey", "confidence": 0.5233088135719299}, {"text": "2023 Eurostat Labour Force Survey Eurostat", "confidence": 0.36718088388442993}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "and control groups being on similar trajectories before mine opening. This assumption is\n\ndiscussed below when we investigate the balance of treatment and control areas. In particular,\n\nwe test for differences in outcomes in areas where mining has not started and compare this to\n\nareas farther away.\n\nWhile we cannot show the exogeneity of the opening year to local socioeconomic variables,\n\nthis assumption has been made in previous literature (e.g. Aragon and Rud, 2015; Benshaul\n\nTolonen, 2018, 2019; Kotsadam and Tolonen, 2016, von der Goltz and Barnwal, 2019). In\n\naddition, Benshaul-Tolonen (2018, 2019) who explore gold mining, in particular, point to (i)\n\nthe rapid increase in large-scale gold mining that occurred during the recent mineral price\n\nsupercycle, (ii) the dominance of large multinational firms who are not relying on local labor\n\nmarket conditions, (iii) and their lower reliance on local infrastructure compared with bulkier\n\nmetals and minerals, as gold mining firms may fly out their resources. Despite this, the\n\nassumption of exogenous opening year or exact location remain untested.\n\nIn a second method, we use a spatial lag model. Such a model allows for nonlinear effects with", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**The only reliable timeseries of the**\n\n**number of Ukrainians in Poland over**\n\n**the past decade is social insurance**\n\n**data on insured Ukrainian nationals,**\n\n**though it accounts only for workers.**\nThe focus on workers rather than on the entire group does not change much in the data from before February 2022, as the previous influx consisted mainly of Ukrainians seeking employment in Poland. However, the actual number of employed Ukrainian nationals must have been higher. First, certain types of legal work often undertaken by temporary employees do not require Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Chart 4. Age and gender structure of Ukrainian refugees**\n\n**Most of the refugees from Ukraine**\n\n**currently living in Poland are women**\n\n**and children, though over half of**\n\n**the total population is of working**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data on insured Ukrainian nationals"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "social insurance", "confidence": 0.101639024913311}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "On 25 April 2023, in the midst of significant arrivals from Sudan, the Transition President promulgated\n[Decree No. 0648/PT/PM/MATDBG/2023 implementing the asylum Law (Decret d’application de la loi d’asile](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)\n[n°0648/PT/PM/MATDBG/2023 portant modalités d’application de la loi du 31 décembre 2020). This 2023](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)\nDecree establishes the measures to operationalize the provisions of the 2020 asylum Law. Henceforth, the\ncombined set of legal instruments, comprising the 2020 asylum Law and the 2023 Decree, is referred to as\nthe asylum legislation.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "UNHCR (2023). Poland: Multi-Sector Needs Assessment — Results Overview (MSNA 2023), October, https://data.unhcr.org/fr/documents/details/104427 UNHCR (2025a). Poland: Socio-Economic Insights Survey in Poland - Results Analysis (SEIS 2024). UNHCR, October, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/ details/115045 UNHCR (2025b). High employment rates, but low wages: a poverty assessment of Ukrainian refugees in neighboring countries, Regional Refugee Response for the Ukraine Situation, Regional Bureau for Europe, UNHCR.\n\nUNHCR (2025c). Ukraine Multi-year Strategy 2025 – 2027, UNHCR, November.\n\nUrban M. (2022). Refugees will lift economy's potential, but challenges remain, Research Briefing | Poland. Oxford Economics, https://www.oxfordeconomics.\ncom/resource/refugees-in-poland-will-lift-economys-potential-but-challengesremain/\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland 47", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Socio-Economic Insights Survey", "confidence": 0.6417995691299438}, {"text": "Multi-Sector Needs Assessment", "confidence": 0.2721242308616638}, {"text": "Ukraine Multi-year Strategy 2025 – 2027", "confidence": 0.14895132184028625}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "poverty assessment of Ukrainian refugees in neighboring countries", "confidence": 0.23537178337574005}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "but has negative labour market effects due to increased competition for jobs among workers. However, little of these theoretical negative labour market effects can be seen in empirical data. This is because immigrant workers encourage further specialisation among native workers and firms, which increases productivity and offsets the negative effects. The same effects can be expected in the case of refugees entering the Polish labour market – besides increasing labour supply and competing with Polish workers, they provide new skills, ideas, and allow Polish workers to specialize in higher value-added tasks. These effects were included in the estimates of the impact of Ukrainian refugees on Polish GDP by Monitor Deloitte (2022) and Oxford Economics (2022), but these estimates were based on literature rather than Polish empirical data. In Deloitte’s 2024 study, these effects were omitted due to a lack of empirical data with which to calibrate them specifically. This study uses available data, albeit limited, to create a conservative scenario that includes positive impacts on productivity.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Polish empirical data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Polish empirical data", "confidence": 0.14455901086330414}], "vague_data": [{"text": "empirical data", "confidence": 0.6840023398399353}]}}}
{"input": "As of September 2024, Indonesia is host to 11,735 refugees and asylum-seekers (6,548 families)\nresiding primarily in urban areas throughout the Indonesian archipelago. Almost half of all refugees\nand asylum seekers are from Afghanistan, followed by Myanmar, Somalia, and 49 other countries.\nUNHCR has a country office in Jakarta and field presence in Aceh, Medan, Makassar, Pekanbaru, and\nTanjung Pinang.\n\nWhile Indonesia is not signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, there are provisions for refugee\nprotection embedded within domestic law (including the 1945 Constitution, the 1999 Human Rights\nLaw, and the 2016 Presidential Regulation on the Handling of Refugees) and Indonesia generally\nrespects the right to seek asylum and the principle of non-refoulement. UNHCR continues to work to\nadvance opportunities for refugee inclusion and participation in Indonesia, including by seeking to\nimprove access to self-reliance and to national education, health, civil registration, and social systems.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Displaced \r people \r and \r their \r host \r communities \r in \r South-­‐East \r Myanmar \r currently \r face \r a\nnumber \r of \r protection-­‐related \r risks \r and \r problems \r such \r as \r the \r lack \r of \r civil \r documentation\n(including \r birth \r registration, \r family \r lists \r and \r identity \r documentation \r in \r remote \r areas),\nlandmines, \r access \r to \r land \r and \r livelihoods, \r forced \r labour, \r forced \r recruitment, \r forced\ncontribution \r or \r taxation, \r trafficking, \r gender-­‐based \r violence \r and, \r in \r some \r cases,\nrestrictions \r of \r movement. \r The \r protection \r concerns \r are \r often \r exacerbated \r for \r IDPs \r and,\npotentially, \r refugees \r upon \r return.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "birth \r registration", "confidence": 0.5837902426719666}, {"text": "identity \r documentation", "confidence": 0.5717580318450928}, {"text": "family \r lists", "confidence": 0.34527677297592163}]}}}
{"input": "A \r profiling \r exercise \r covering \r both \r the \r registered \r and \r unregistered \r refugee \r population\nresiding \r in \r the \r temporary \r shelters \r in \r Thailand, \r will \r be \r carried \r out \r by \r the \r Mae \r Fah \r Luang\nFoundation \r on \r behalf \r of \r UNHCR \r in \r 2013-­‐2014. \r The \r exercise \r will \r permit \r updating \r of \r data\non \r areas \r of \r origin \r (Regions/States, \r districts \r and \r townships, \r and \r village \r tracts/villages)\nand \r will \r assess \r the \r intentions \r of \r refugees, \r whether \r that \r would \r be \r for \r eventual \r voluntary\nreturn, \r resettlement \r to \r a \r third \r country \r or \r other \r durable \r solution \r possibilities. \r For \r those\nrefugees \r that \r intend \r to \r return, \r information \r about \r their \r desired \r or \r intended \r destination\nwill \r be \r captured \r in \r the \r survey \r (this \r may \r include \r places \r of \r origin \r or \r prior \r habitual\nresidence, \r or \r other \r locations \r in \r Myanmar). \r The \r major \r focus \r of \r the \r survey \r is \r about \r future\n\n5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data\non \r areas \r of \r origin", "confidence": 0.10068265348672867}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "[Furthermore, Article 65 of the 2023 Decree specifies that refugees or asylum-seekers with a (provisional)](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)\nresidence permit have the right to reside and move within the Chadian territory, like Chadian nationals. This\nlegislation aligns with previous practices, and there has been no change in the duration and legality of stay\nfor refugees and asylum-seekers in Chad. In practice, renewals of asylum-seekers’ certificates and refugee\nidentity cards by the authorities continue without difficulty. Over 80 per cent of consulted asylum-seekers in\n2021 reported no difficulties with the renewal of their asylum-seeker certificates.\n\nArticle 36 of the 2020 Asylum Law guarantees protection against refoulement. The 2023 Decree also\ndetails specific provisions to ensure effective respect to the non-refoulement principles including Articles\n51, 52 and 53. The Law also outlines legal provisions for cessation clauses, cancellation and revocation of\nrefugee status, adhering to international refugee law standards. Over the past three years, there has been\nno documented case of refoulement involving a refugee or asylum-seeker, nor has there been any reported\ncase of the unlawful termination of refugee status. Despite over half of arriving asylum-seekers lacking\nidentity or civil registry documentation, there have been no issues reported regarding their admission to\nthe territory.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "civil registry documentation", "confidence": 0.3721402883529663}]}}}
{"input": "A significant number of refugees are concentrated in the urban areas of Poland. For one, cities generally record lower unemployment rates and higher work productivity, though the costs of living remain higher than in rural areas.\nAccording to the active population in the PESEL database, over 30% of all PESEL UKR holders had them issued in the country’s 12 biggest cities. At the same time, the results for the MSNA Poland 2023 survey suggest that these 12 biggest cities are inhabited by over 35% of refugees.\n\nRefugees record higher levels of employment inclusion in European countries that have relatively better labour market situations. In countries with lower unemployment, refugees fare better in the labour market. Since women make up the majority of refugees of working age, the situation of women on the labour market is especially important. As such, female unemployment rates explain 36% of the variation in refugees from Ukraine employment rates in studies from 11 EU Member States [22]\n\n**Chart 10.** Female unemployment and refugees from Ukraine employment in Europe\n\n70%\n\n**Chart 11.** Education attainment of Poles and Ukrainians\n\n**Eurostat** Poland LFS 2022\n\n**UNHCR**\n\n**(2023)**\n\n**NBP**\n\n**(2022)**\n\n**Ukrstat**\n\n11% 56% 48% 46% 30% Refugees from Ukraine VII-VIII 2023\n\n---\n[22] After excluding Germany and Switzerland as outliers. 23 Due to possible differences in methodologies data from this surveys should not be directly compared", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL database"}, {"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey"}, {"text": "Poland LFS 2022"}, {"text": "Eurostat"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey", "confidence": 0.8804288506507874}, {"text": "PESEL database", "confidence": 0.8453828692436218}, {"text": "Ukrstat", "confidence": 0.42459675669670105}, {"text": "Eurostat", "confidence": 0.24897615611553192}, {"text": "Poland LFS 2022", "confidence": 0.13098107278347015}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Total of Incidents** **[5]**\n\n### Protection risks\n\n##### Protection Risk I\n\n**Discrimination and stigmatization.** Racism and xenophobia are mentioned by refugees and other\npeople in need of international protection as serious obstacles to their local integration into the\nBrazilian society. Adults report that discrimination hinders their access to dignified housing and\nthe formal labor market, [6] while children refer to being bullied in school because of their origin. [7] In\nRoraima state, the primary entry point for Venezuelans into Brazil, 44% of refugees and migrants\nreported experiencing discrimination due to their nationality. This was most prevalent in the\nworkplace (37%), during job searches (30%), and while attempting to access healthcare (24%),\neducation (21%) and also while looking for housing (20%). [8 ]", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**populations in responding to and**\n\n**shaping the assistance following a**\n\n**disaster in the Venezuelan context.**\n\nThe cluster’s participation in this space\n\nguarantees that affected populations are\n\nplaced at the heart of the emergency\n\nresponse. Additionally, the different\n\nneeds and capacities of all these groups\n\nwill shape the response plan and how\n\ncluster partners and affected populations\n\ninteract through all the phases of the\n\nHumanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC),\n\nguiding the necessary workplans.\n\nDuring the meeting of October, the new\n\nframework of AAP was presented, and it\n\nwas revised jointly by its members. This\n\nframework was created with the support\n\nand accompaniment of the Humanitarian\n\nCountry Team and the Resident and\n\nHumanitarian Coordinator. The WG\n\ncoordinator shared the minimum\n\ncommitments of the framework with\n\nthe members and opened the floor for\n\ndiscussions. The PC suggested some\n\n**coordinated the \"La Carnada\" play**\n\n**in Petare in collaboration with the**\n\n**Taller Experimental de Teatro/ Center**\n\n**for Artistic Creation (TET), IOM, and**\n\n**UNHCR on September 23rd and 24th.**\n\nThis The TET is a theatral group based\n\nin Caracas, Venezuela that was founded\n\non December 11, 1972, by Eduardo Gil\n\nunder the heart of the Central University\n\nof Venezuela (UCV) with the purpose", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "An inflow of migrants can constitute more than just an increase in the labour supply. Typically, in theoretical models an increase in the number of workers lowers the amount of capital per worker thus lowering productivity until firms invest to return the capital-worker ratio to normal, returning productivity to the previous level (Borjas, 2019). However, immigrants bring new skills to the workforce, extending the scope of specialisation and thus likely making workers more productive.\nPanel econometric studies from the past decade found, that immigration improves not just GDP or GDP per person (Ortega and Peri, 2014), but has also a causal positive impact for labour productivity (Jaumotte et al., 2016), GDP per capita growth rate (Aleksynska and Tritah, 2015), and total factor productivity (Peri, 2012).\n\n13 E.g. vice-president of Polish Development Found Bartosz Marczuk estimated it at around 16 billion PLN, but this estimation also included spending of NGOs which was combined with spendings of local governments [Polska pomoc dla Ukrainy 2022 - ile kosztowała? - Infor.pl.](https://www.infor.pl/prawo/nowosci-prawne/5635962,Polska-pomoc-dla-Ukrainy-2022-ile-kosztowala.html) 14 For example, found by Beerli and Peri (2017), Tabellini (2020), Cattaneo et al. (2015), Foged and Peri (2016), D’Amuri and Peri (2014), Ortega and Verdugo (2014), Peri and Sparber (2009).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Polska pomoc dla Ukrainy 2022", "confidence": 0.14087478816509247}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Data sources: UNHCR PRIMES.  For more information or to contribute, please contact UNHCR RBSA DIMA (rsarbdima@unhcr.org)\n\nThe boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR PRIMES", "confidence": 0.8928089737892151}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "7. The MSNA, which ran in 7 countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia 8. Equivalized as per [Eurostat methodology. Essentially income per person, but with household members beyond the first one](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Equivalised_income) assigned weights less than 1.\n9. With the poverty line defined as 50% of the median national equivalized income 10. This figure differs from the one reported in the [previous year’s publication due to changes to methodology, which includes a](https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/108068) different treatment of households that report zero income\n\n**4**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "the MSNA"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA", "confidence": 0.548759400844574}, {"text": "Eurostat methodology", "confidence": 0.3003289997577667}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In Chapter 3, we estimate the economic impact of refugees from Ukraine in Poland in general equilibrium Deloitte D.Climate model. This is the gold standard of economic modelling on the macro-level, which comprehensively accounts for the supply side of the economy including labour supply and productivity, and the demand side including consumption as well as taxation. Unfortunately, such macroeconomic models cannot account for how exactly refugees and other migrants enable native workers to specialise in better paid professions (occupational upgrading), or how firms allow for new skills by adapting different production technologies. As such, our estimates should be treated as a conservative lower bound of the effect.\n\nFurthermore, in Chapter 4, we move beyond theoretical modelling, to examine empirical studies on how immigrants and refugees impact not just output, but labour productivity as well. This effect comes not from traditional supply-demand analysis, but from increased specialisation.\nImmigrants enable occupational upgrading of residents, supply new skills to firms, enter household works services that allow highly productive native women to increase labour supply, and exhibit high rates of entrepreneurship.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Among the 23% of individuals reported to have mental health or psychosocial problems affecting daily functioning (such as the ability to get out of bed, care for oneself or others, or carry out daily activities such as cooking, going to school), 46% (47% of women and girls; 42% of men and boys) reported trying to access support. This means that more than half (54%) of individuals experiencing such problems did not try to access support, which may be due to multiple factors, including stigma, mental health awareness, or other access barriers.\n\n**20**\n\n(N=4,053) Of those individuals who reported trying to access support, almost all (96% overall; 97% of women, 94% of men) reported successfully accessing and receiving some sort of support. This high rate of access is partly explained by the inclusion of both formal services, such as psychotherapy, psychiatric care, or structured group interventions, and informal support, such as help from family, friends, employers, or spiritual leaders. By encompassing a broad spectrum of support mechanisms, the findings capture the diverse ways individuals seek and receive assistance, highlighting the importance of informal networks in complementing formal MHPSS services.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "rush. During this period, annual gold production has increased by 700 percent, as shown in\n\nFigure 1. It is the expansion that has happened during this recent gold rush that is used in this\n\nanalysis to understand the socioeconomic effects of mining. The high international gold price\n\nwas a driving factor in the expansion of small-scale mining, such as the 2,700% increase in gold\n\nmining territory around the Offin River between 2008 and 2012 (Hausermann et al., 2018).\n\nBetween 2006 and 2012, two large-scale mines opened in Ghana, but no mine closed down\n\n(Table 1) possibly due to the high gold price increasing profitability and extending life length.\n\nThe expansion across artisanal small-, medium-, and large-scale mining contributed to an\n\nincrease in total production that rose from 541,147 oz in 1990 to 3,119,823 oz in 2009 according\n\nofficial Ghana statistics (Bloch and Owusu, 2012). This production increase led to an increased\n\nsector contribution to GDP from 4,83% (1990) to 5,78% (2009), alongside export value of\n\nUS$304m in 1990, US$702m in 2000, and US$2246 m in 2008, reaching 43% of national\n\nexports in 2008. Mining related foreign direct investment (FDI) also rose from US$165m to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "official Ghana statistics"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "official Ghana statistics", "confidence": 0.763830304145813}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "official Ghana statistics", "confidence": 0.17398621141910553}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Securing \r durable \r solutions \r for \r displaced \r populations \r should \r be \r an \r integral \r component\nof \r the \r peace \r process, \r and \r the \r engagement \r of \r UNHCR \r and \r other \r actors \r in \r support \r to\ndurable \r solutions \r should \r be \r located \r within \r a \r broader \r peace-­‐building \r framework. \r In\naddition \r to \r advocating \r for \r the \r participation \r of \r IDPs \r and \r refugees \r in \r the \r peace\nnegotiations, \r activities \r in \r support \r of \r durable \r solutions \r should \r be \r grounded \r in \r sound\nconflict \r analysis. \r The \r provision \r of \r assistance \r should \r be \r conflict-­‐sensitive, \r minimizing\nunintended \r negative \r impact \r while \r maximising \r its \r peace-­‐building \r impact, \r and \r use \r “Do \r No\nHarm” \r approaches \r to \r contribute \r at \r building \r trust \r and \r supporting \r the \r peace-­‐building\nprocess. \r Co-­‐existence \r projects \r and \r other \r activities \r should \r be \r prioritised \r in \r support \r of\nreintegration. \r Activities \r such \r as \r peace \r education \r and \r conflict \r resolution \r training \r may \r be\nundertaken \r even \r prior \r to \r an \r organised \r voluntary \r return.\n\nRefugees \r and \r IDPs \r will \r frequently \r opt \r to \r spread \r risk \r and \r to \r cushion \r the \r impact \r of \r return\nby \r having \r some \r family \r members \r remaining \r outside \r the \r country, \r or \r move \r elsewhere\nwithin \r the \r country \r to \r pursue \r migration \r strategies. \r This \r should \r be \r facilitated \r and \r not\nviewed \r as \r a \r failure \r of \r the \r reintegration \r process.\n\n**6.** **NATIONAL \r OWNERSHIP \r AND \r CO-­‐ORDINATION**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Among adolescent girls aged 15- 17 who faced access barriers (N=13), the lack of knowledge took the lead ahead of the waiting times and financial barriers. Moreover, compared to women, adolescent girls reported lower levels of trust in local healthcare providers. For all young women aged 18-24 who reported barriers (N=30), the most significant were long waiting times and inability to make an appointment.\n\nAmong pregnant and breastfeeding women (N=441), 5% reported facing barriers in accessing SRH services. For those experiencing barriers, half lacked knowledge about where to access SRH services and one in five did not trust local healthcare providers, in addition to facing language barriers.\n\nWomen with a disability reported more barriers with 11% across the region (N=29) compared to those without disability (5%).\n\nAn in-depth assessment is needed to better understand sexual and reproductive health (SRH) needs, the role of SRH access barriers in decisions to visit Ukraine, and how these barriers vary among women of different age groups, pregnant and breastfeeding women, and women with disabilities.\n\n**Support services for survivors of gender-based**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "### **Verification Exercise**\n\nUNHCR is undertaking a country-wide verification exercise in 2024. The project enables UNHCR staff\nto systematically connect with and update registration data for every refugee and asylum seeker in\nIndonesia.  UNHCR protection/registration teams are updating family composition and recording\ninformation on specific needs and vulnerabilities, skills, work experience, education levels, and family\nconnections outside Indonesia. The information collected will provide a clean and accurate set of data\nthat will enable UNHCR to better develop and target programming for the refugee population and will\nassist in identifying individuals who may qualify for solutions outside Indonesia.\n\n©UNHCR/Amanda Jufrian\n\nUNHCR / 1 November 2024 10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "registration data", "confidence": 0.9739039540290833}]}}}
{"input": "_Sona Tahery, a young Afghan woman, found safety in Brazil after fleeing severe restrictions on women’s rights and access to work_\n_in her home country. After spending a year as a refugee in Iran, she arrived with her sister and brother-in-law, seeking a new_\n_beginning. Now, at Todos Irmãos Shelter in Guarulhos, she is rebuilding her life with dignity and hope._ © _UNHCR// Diego Baravelli_\n\n##### Protection Risk III\n\n**Gender equality and access to rights for refugee women and girls.** Refugee women and girls face\nsignificant barriers to the realization of their rights due to gender roles and power disbalances.\nRegardless of their nationality, women and girls face higher unemployment rates, less access to\neducation opportunities, greater exposure to gender-based violence and additional caregiving\nresponsibilities. [26] Members of the LGTBQIA+ community face discrimination and stigmatization\ndue to their sexual orientation and gender identity, and experience barriers in their access to\ndignified livelihoods with some of them, especially transgender women, resorting to survival sex\nas one of the few viable means to earn a living in the country. [27]", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "only statistically significant for boys at an effect size of 6.6 percentage points.\n\n**Table 5 OLS estimates of birth outcomes, infant survival, and child health in the DHS individual-**\n\n**level analysis**\n\nPANEL A                 size at birth            infant mortality (<12months)         antenatal visits\nsmall average large all boys girls # visits at least 1\nactive*mine 0.022 0.053 -0.075* -0.041* -0.066** -0.020 -0.151 -0.007\n(0.028) (0.041) (0.041) (0.022) (0.030) (0.035) (0.331) (0.028)\nmine -0.010 0.071** -0.061** 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.153 0.000\n(0.019) (0.028) (0.030) (0.015) (0.020) (0.024) (0.241) (0.019)\nactive -0.010 0.054** -0.044 0.002 0.014 -0.012 0.012 0.002\n(0.016) (0.026) (0.027) (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) (0.209) (0.012)\n\nObservations 6,771 6,771 6,771 5,356 2,718 2,638 5,704 5,704\nR-squared 0.031 0.054 0.059 0.135 0.160 0.152 0.186 0.062\nMean of dep var. 0.136 0.359 0.505 0.073 0.08 0.066 5.79 0.941\n\nPANEL B in the last 2 weeks, had: anthropometrics (WHO) in sd has\nfever     cough    diarrhea ht/a       wt/a      wt/ht health card\n\nactive*mine -0.035 -0.061* 0.042 -3.532 -5.208 -0.641 0.014\n(0.037) (0.033) (0.027) (11.472) (9.283) (8.948) (0.027)\n\nmine -0.002 -0.006 -0.038 -0.828 3.481 3.853 -0.006\n(0.031) (0.028) (0.024) (10.385) (8.574) (7.468) (0.022)\n\nactive 0.023 -0.003 -0.033** -1.904 5.265 9.433* 0.009\n(0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (5.942) (5.304) (5.183) (0.012)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.3139181137084961}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Macroeconomic modelling generally finds that immigration increases output, while cross-country econometric estimates find also positive impacts on labour productivity. The first approach builds a theoretical model of the economy calibrated to the particular circumstances, which allows us to simulate counterfactuals and observe all changes in the economy.\nThe second approach relies on empirical data, usually over many years and countries, trying to isolate the effect of immigration, but gives no information on the channels through which these effects operate. In the present case it would not be practical to follow anything else than the first approach. Unfortunately, it relies on the canonical labour market model.\nAs Peri (2014) elaborates, that model assumes that immigration is simply a shift in the labour supply for a given labour demand and given labour supply of native workers. It further assumes that immigrants are essentially identical to natives in that they enter the same 38", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "empirical data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "empirical data", "confidence": 0.9858875870704651}]}}}
{"input": "It \r builds \r upon \r a \r separate \r discussion \r paper \r dated \r 1 \r October \r 2012, \r which \r sets \r out \r a\nframework \r for \r voluntary \r repatriation \r for \r Myanmar \r refugees \r from \r Thailand. \r The \r papers\nshould \r form \r the \r basis \r of \r a \r more \r detailed \r operational \r strategy \r for \r 2013-­‐2015, \r and \r should\nalso \r serve \r as \r the \r first \r step \r towards \r a \r consultative \r multi-­‐stakeholder \r process, \r engaging\nGovernment, \r civil \r society, \r UN \r and \r NGO \r partners, \r donors \r and \r refugees \r and \r IDPs\nthemselves, \r to \r elaborate \r a \r shared \r vision \r and \r strategy \r for \r support \r to \r durable \r solutions \r in\nthe \r South-­‐East. \r The \r document \r outlines \r UNHCR’s \r general \r principles \r and \r standards \r as\nwell \r as \r context-­‐specific \r objectives \r and \r activities.\n\n**2.** **CONTEXT**\n\n**2.1. \r Political \r environment**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\nfrom \r the \r temporary \r shelters \r in \r Thailand \r to \r their \r place \r of \r origin, \r the \r majority \r of \r whom\nare \r single \r males \r who \r stated \r that \r they \r had \r returned \r to \r assess \r the \r security \r situation \r and\nstart \r re-­‐establishing \r their \r livelihood \r before \r the \r return \r of \r other \r family \r members. \r The\ndimensions \r of \r this \r spontaneous \r return \r movement \r have \r been, \r so \r far, \r negligible.\n\nWhile \r the \r dimensions \r of \r IDP \r return \r movements \r remain \r extremely \r difficult \r to \r assess,\nsome \r 37,000 \r IDPs \r are \r estimated \r by \r the \r The \r Border \r Consortium \r (TBC) \r to \r have \r returned\nhome \r or \r resettled \r in \r surrounding \r areas \r between \r August \r 2011 \r and \r July \r 2012 [3] .\n\nIf \r the \r current \r trend \r of \r political \r and \r socio-­‐economic \r reforms \r continues \r and \r as \r larger\npolitical \r events \r draw \r closer, \r such \r as \r the \r ASEAN/AEC \r agenda \r with \r Myanmar \r as \r Chair \r in\n2014, \r a \r national \r census \r in \r 2014, \r and \r national \r elections \r in \r 2015, \r then \r the \r momentum \r to\ntranslate \r cease-­‐fire \r negotiations \r into \r peace \r agreements \r may \r increase. \r This \r may \r lead \r to\nan \r increase \r in \r the \r number \r of \r spontaneous \r returns \r and \r the \r possibility \r of \r sudden\ndemands \r upon \r UNHCR \r to \r facilitate \r the \r voluntary \r repatriation \r of \r refugees.\n\n**2.2. \r Protection \r environment**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "national \r census", "confidence": 0.3066188395023346}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "national \r census", "confidence": 0.1838543564081192}], "vague_data": [{"text": "national \r census", "confidence": 0.750586211681366}]}}}
{"input": "Regionally, 6% of men aged 18–34 report a disability, compared to 2% of women in this age group. A similar trend is observed for the 35–59 age group, with 8% of men and 4% of women reporting a disability respectively. The higher prevalence among men is likely related to the fact that men without a disability are less likely to leave Ukraine.\n\n0-4 5-17 18-34 35-59 60+ years old (N=19,622) These findings suggest that health services should be tailored to address these gender and agerelated dynamics, as should the dissemination of information about available services.\n\n**9**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Chart 19. Tertiary education and corresponding** **Chart 20. Ukrainian refugees median net wages by**\n\n**occupational groups shares** **educational attainment**\n\n4,300 4,275\n\n**Addressing occupational downgrading**\n\n**could bring macroeconomic benefits.**\nTo demonstrate the potential impact, a simulation was conducted in which the underrepresentation of refugees in higher-paying occupations was reduced by half. It was not assumed that there would be no differences between refugees and Polish citizens, as some barriers (such as Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland country-specific knowledge and business networks) are more difficult to address than others (such as language skills and occupational licensing). However, if the gap was narrowed by half, the average wage of refugees would increase by approximately 10%. Assuming that the productivity increase is equivalent to the wage increase, this would result in PLN 3.5 billion of added 40% Tertiary education share 25-64 age group surveys Managers, professionals, and technicians ZUS-insured employment share", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ZUS-insured employment share", "confidence": 0.11164553463459015}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF HOUSING SUPPORT AND EMPLOYMENT FACILITATION IN ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n**Regular employment** **[11]** **- key for refugee household**\n\n**prosperity**\nThe income composition of refugee households above and below the poverty line is very different.\nRegular employment represents 74% of total income in the wealthier group compared to just 35% for lower earners. In part, this is explained by higher labor force participation [12] (68% vs 49%), which is tied to differences in household composition. The age dependency ratio [13], for example, stands at 52% in the higher earning group versus 77% for households with a lower income. Additionally, however, members of households above the poverty line are significantly more successful in finding work - their unemployment rate is twice as low at 10%, and half as many are working part time (14% vs 31%).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "age dependency ratio", "confidence": 0.25230321288108826}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "age dependency ratio", "confidence": 0.11941999942064285}], "vague_data": [{"text": "age dependency ratio", "confidence": 0.1088137999176979}]}}}
{"input": "To show the robustness of these results, we have tried three alternative strategies for each of\n\nthe outcomes. In row 2, we drop the sample that lives 20 to 40 km away, since they might be\n\naffected by the mine; in row 3, we drop the sample that was surveyed two years prior to mine\n\nopening; in row 4, we add closest mine fixed effects; and in row 5 we cluster on the closest\n\nmine. The coefficients do not change much, even if some magnitudes become bigger and the\n\nestimates more significant. However, as in the results using DHS data, these estimates are not\n\nprecisely measured – few are statistically significant because the standard errors appear large.\n\nWomen are 7.4 to 10.4 percentage points more likely to work in service or sales if they live\n\nclose to a mine (depending on the estimations in panel A columns 4, only one statistically\n\nsignificant estimate). Women close to mines are 2.5 to 2.6 percentage points more likely to\n\nwork in mining (only one statistically significant estimate).\n\nMen, on the other hand, (results shown in panel B of table 12), are significantly more likely to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.9272734522819519}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "to work, but only in a designated health care center, and for no longer than five years without the possibility of extension.\nIn February 2022, Ukrainian psychologists were allowed to provide services to other Ukrainian citizens, but only for 18 months.\nWhile such changes are likely to be extended, they do not motivate Ukrainian refugees – unsure, if they will be allowed to continue practice in the long term – to acquire the necessary skills, for instance to improve language fluency or invest in professional courses. Instead, the refugees may prefer to seek opportunities in other countries or change their line of work to one that will be more accessible, but less valuable for the Polish economy.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n# Non-technical summary\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Swift legal action facilitated labour market integration of refugees. After the beginning of the full-scale war on 26th February 2022, the European Union activated the Temporary Protection Directive on 4th March 2022, and the Polish parliament passed a special act to facilitate refugee integration on 12th March 2022. Ukrainian refugees in Poland were granted instant access to the job market, health care, and education. The authorities granted people escaping Ukraine legal residency for a period of eighteen months and enabled them to access digital services and basic administrative systems like PESEL.\nThus, the policies that have previously hampered job market integration of refugees in other contexts, such as temporary labour market bans (Fasani, Frattini, & Minale, 2021) and forced dispersals (Fasani, Frattini, & Minale, 2022), have been avoided.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_On World Refugee Day, refugees and local families in Porto Alegre's Sarandi neighborhood shared a meal and received support._\n_The event, organized by UNHCR partners, acknowledged the solidarity shown during recent floods and celebrated the rebuilding_\n_of lives by refugees from Venezuela, Haiti, Colombia, and Afghanistan, among others._ © _UNHCR/Ricardo Ara._\n\n### Challenges & Opportunities\n\nSince 2018, Brazil has supported refugees and migrants from Venezuela through a comprehensive\nhumanitarian federal initiative known as “Operacao Acolhida” . The Operation primarily focuses\non the northern State of Roraima, the main entry point for Venezuelans into Brazil, where\nreception, documentation, shelter, and other forms of humanitarian assistance are provided.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "and girls. Maternal and reproductive health services remain underdeveloped in some areas, struggling\nto be fully effective due to a lack of material and financial support.\n\n**5.2** **Social inclusion**\n\nThe most significant differences or restrictions in terms of socio-economic development affecting refugees\nwith particular characteristics are:\n\n**a.** **Access to biometric identity cards and unique identifier number:** The continued lack of access to\n\nlegally recognized identity cards for refugees issued by the competent authority in Chad, ANATS, and\nnational identification numbers, challenges their inclusion into national system and limits their socioeconomic integration in the country.\n\n**b.** **Access to civil registry civil status documents:** The low percentage of registered births, due to\n\nsignificant deficiencies in the Civil Registration and Vital Statistics (CRVS) system in Chad, especially in\nrural areas, exposes refugees born in Chad to the risk of statelessness.\n\nR E F U G E E P O L I C Y R E V I E W F R A M E W O R K > **R E P U B L I C O F C H A D** 13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Civil Registration and Vital Statistics (CRVS)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Civil Registration and Vital Statistics", "confidence": 0.8294779658317566}, {"text": "CRVS", "confidence": 0.11094751209020615}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "national identification numbers", "confidence": 0.13136222958564758}]}}}
{"input": "of human trafficking in different states of\n\nVenezuela through a service mapping\n\nexercise that was implemented.\n\n**IX. Protection Mainstreaming**\n\n**Training**\n\n**The PC in collaboration with the**\n\nof Performing Arts, over 140 people\n\nattended the play, including community\n\nmembers, representatives from NGOs\n\nand INGOs, and agency representatives.\n\nDrawing on testimonies and real\n\ndata, and with the technical support\n\nof UNHCR, IOM, and the Venezuela\n\nProtection Cluster, the authors of the\n\nplay have crafted an original and avant\ngarde dramaturgy that highlights the\n\nissue of TiP and its associated risks. Two\n\nadditional performances are scheduled\n\nfor the last week of November (in\n\nPetare) and another in December in\n\nChichiriviche de La Costa, La Guaira,\n\nin commemoration of the 16 days of\n\nactivism for the International Day for the\n\nEradication of Violence against Women.\n\n**VI. Annual TiP Bulletin 2022-2023**\n\n**After one year of the creation of the**\n\n**6**\n\n**WGTiP, an annual bulletin was pub-**\n\n**lished in October.** This document\n\nconsolidates information from the quar\nterly bulletins of 2022 and 2023 and\n\nprovides a context analysis of TiP in\n\nVenezuela, raising awareness on new\n\ninformation and dynamics and highlights\n\ncounter-trafficking efforts of members\n\nwith a specific focus on activities for the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "agri- service profess- manual not earns works\nculture sales ional labor working cash all year\nPANEL A: Women\n\nactive*mine -0.025 0.024 -0.017* 0.012 0.006 0.054** -0.013\n(0.039) (0.031) (0.009) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.033)\nmine -0.025 0.056* -0.001 -0.012 -0.018 -0.069*** -0.012\n(0.031) (0.029) (0.008) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024)\nactive 0.014 -0.000 -0.006 0.009 -0.016 -0.037** -0.007\n(0.015) (0.016) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016)\n\nObservations 12,176 12,176 12,176 12,176 12,176 9,262 7,085\nR-squared 0.350 0.103 0.124 0.024 0.234 0.095 0.042\nMean of dep var. 0.237 0.358 0.045 0.117 0.739 0.891 0.877\n\nPANEL B: Men\n\nactive*mine 0.050 0.020 0.027 -0.069* 0.006 -0.013 -0.015\n(0.051) (0.020) (0.026) (0.036) (0.023) (0.028) (0.051)\nmine -0.060 0.002 0.000 0.041 -0.018 -0.009 0.066*\n(0.042) (0.016) (0.020) (0.030) (0.020) (0.028) (0.039)\nactive 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.029 -0.016 -0.107*** -0.025\n(0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.012) (0.039) (0.028)\n\nObservations 7,157 7,157 7,157 7,157 7,157 4,374 2,794\nR-squared 0.290 0.415 0.084 0.183 0.076 0.107 0.104\nMean of dep var. 0.328 0.111 0.137 0.214 0.209 0.928 0.841", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The overlap between certain mental health problems, such as difficulties with memory, concentration, or self-care, and the criteria used to assess disability further demonstrates the complex interplay between these factors. The data also suggests that structural and systemic differences between countries may influence outcomes, as reflected in the varying rates reported. These findings highlight the critical need for inclusive MHPSS strategies that address the unique needs of individuals with disabilities and provide targeted interventions to reduce barriers and ensure equitable access to support. Additionally, further analysis of country-specific contexts could help uncover underlying factors driving these disparities.\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WHO REPORTED EXPERIENCING**\n\n**A MENTAL HEALTH OR PSYCHOSOCIAL PROBLEM BY**\n\n**DISABILITY STATUS AND COUNTRY**\n\nWith disability Without disability Regional Romania Hungary Poland Bulgaria Estonia Lithuania Slovakia Czechia Latvia Moldova (N=17,934)\n\n**25**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**positive impact on labour productivity.**\nIn the earlier report, the overall positive impact of refugees was reduced based on conservative assumptions, in the absence of available/clear data on the increased competition in the labour market. The model notably considered lower wages and higher unemployment among native workers. However, recent data indicates that these concerns did not materialize.\nInstead, Polish workers have moved on to better paid occupations, and the economy has benefited from a larger pool of talent, enabling deeper specialization and increased productivity growth.\n\n##### Remaining challenges\n\n**Despite significant progress in**\n\n**integrating refugees into the labour**\n\n**market, several challenges persist.**\nRefugees are half as likely to have an employment contract as Polish citizens and few of them achieve high incomes.\nAlthough refugees have been moving on to more desirable professions at a faster rate than other groups in the economy, their jobs continue to be disproportionately skewed towards elementary occupations.\nThese issues are most evident among those with university diplomas, but those with below university education also face obstacles. As of June 2024, there were several interconnected issues:\n\n**•** **There is a disparity between the**\n\n**educational attainment and labour**\n\n**market position of refugees,**\n\n**reflecting their significant over-**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "recent data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "recent data", "confidence": 0.6422783136367798}]}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n### **Contents**\n\n###### Executive summary\b 3 Context \b 5 Methodology \b 6 Limitations \b 7 Sample demographics \b 8 Health analysis \b 10 Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS)\b 19 Recommendations\b 28\n\n### **Acknowledgements**\n\nWe gratefully acknowledge the contributions of many individuals and organizations who contributed to this report. The regional analysis was facilitated by the Regional SEIS Health and Mental Health Sector Analysis Group, co-coordinated by Ardita Tahirukaj (WHO), Sandra Harlass (UNHCR), Monica Zikusooka (WHO) and Sofia Casas (UNHCR). The data analysis was conducted by Irma Sirutyte (UNHCR). Writing of the report was led by the co-coordinators along with Arianna Pearlstein (UN Women), Iuliana Gutu (UNFPA), Leah James (UNICEF), Liqun Gao (UNHCR), and Luna Mehrain (UNFPA).\n\nThanks to Jad Ghosn and the Regional Bureau for Europe (UNHCR) for their guidance, review and support on the regional SEIS analysis for health and MHPSS.\n\nAcknowledgements include also those who reviewed the report: Agron Gashi (UNICEF), Chiaki Ito (IOM), Erin Autumn Neale (IOM), Greisy Trejo (IFRC), Heide Rieder (IOM), Melita Murkom (WHO), Pieter Ventevogel (UNHCR), Ursula Wagner (IOM).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "would increase GDP by 0.9-1.3% – the mid to higher bound of our estimate.\nThird, Urban (2022) uses an Oxford Economics model to estimate the impact of Ukrainian refugees on the potential GDP by 2030 and 2050, including a positive shock to the total factor productivity growth. This yields GDP higher by 1.5-2.6% by 2030, significantly higher than our long-term estimate – the higher result is likely due to the increase in TFP that we do not include in our modelling. Fourth, Monitor Deloitte (2022) provided an early wide estimate of the economic impact of Ukrainian refugees.\nThis would translate into 0.9-2.4% higher GDP, also due to the possibility of a positive productivity shock. We review the relevant literature on the impacts of immigration on productivity in Chapter 4.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Monitor Deloitte", "confidence": 0.1263856142759323}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "mean value of the independent variable is 0.085 - that is, on average women are close to 0.085\n\nmines. Conditional on being close to a mine, the main independent variable is 1.33 - that is, a\n\nwoman sampled close to a mine is close to 1.33 mines on average. Panel C of table A3 shows\n\nthe effects on women’s labor market participation. We note that the estimates are similar in\n\ndirection as before, where mines are positively associated with service and sales jobs and with\n\ncash earnings, but negatively associated with agriculture and professional jobs.\n\nPanel D of table A3 shows the results if we drop the part of the sample that lives 20 km to 40\n\nkm away from a mine, and if we drop those that are sampled two years before mine opening.\n\nThe rationale for this is to have a cleaner control group, since those that live just outside our 20\n\nkm cutoff distance may also be “treated” by the mine, and the investment phase of the mine\n\nthat precedes initial production can generate substantial employment. Overall, the effects do\n\nnot change much except making the cash earnings coefficient larger and more significant. The", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on mid-2024 SEIS UNHCR survey (Ukrainian refugees’ educational attainment and median net wages), 2023 Eurostat Labour Force Survey Eurostat (Polish citizens educational attainment), and mid-2024 ZUS administrative data (occupational groups).\n\n**Widespread occupational licensing**\n\n**is a serious obstacle to an efficient**\n\n**use of Ukrainian refugees’ human**\n\n**capital.** Poland has the third highest\nnumber of regulated professions among the 28 European Union member states, according to European Commission’s Regulated Professions Database. This can be a problem, as occupational licensing is cited in the literature among the reasons for occupational downgrading of migrants.\nCassidy and Dacass (2021) found that in the United States, immigrants were significantly less likely to have a license than similar\n\n#### **4.2 Access to regulated professions**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2023 Eurostat Labour Force Survey"}, {"text": "European Commission’s Regulated Professions Database"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "mid-2024 ZUS administrative data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2023 Eurostat Labour Force Survey Eurostat", "confidence": 0.5166251063346863}, {"text": "mid-2024 SEIS UNHCR survey", "confidence": 0.49755558371543884}, {"text": "Regulated Professions Database", "confidence": 0.35041913390159607}, {"text": "ZUS administrative data", "confidence": 0.3435133397579193}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Expanding community-based MHPSS services that integrate formal services and promote the use of informal supports will enhance service delivery.\nPublic awareness campaigns, tailored to both refugees and host communities, should aim to reduce stigma and improve knowledge of available support. Gender-responsive and age-sensitive approaches are necessary, particularly for adult men and adolescent boys, to encourage help-seeking behaviours and ensure that services are tailored to the specific needs of children and adolescents.\nLastly, further research is required to gain a deeper understanding of unmet health needs—including SRH and MHPSS needs—and the barriers to access, to inform more effective, inclusive, and contextsensitive interventions.\n\n**4**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "increase in off-shore oil revenue accruing to municipalities, alongside increased illegal activity\n\nby mayors (Caselli and Michaels, 2010). We estimate district level effects on living standards\n\n(in mining districts, but no spillovers to adjacent districts, in line with Mamo et al, 2019), but\n\ndo not have further information on public spending by sector to put these effects in context to\n\nexpected changes. Political outcomes such as clientelism, corruption and reelection of local\n\n36", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Deloitte’s D.Climate general equilibrium model finds that refugees from Ukraine contributed 0.7-1.1% to GDP cumulatively in 2023. In the long-term this effect will grow to 0.9-1.35% as the economy fully adjusts.\nThe increases in government revenue from direct and indirect taxes due to wages and private consumption of refugees from Ukraine was likewise modelled.\nThese increases amounted to 0.8-1.0% higher general government revenues in 2022, 1.3-1.6% in 2023, and 0.95-1.13% in the long term. This implies that, while there are no precise public data on the government support to refugees from Ukraine, while a government official quoted cost figures of 15-20 billion PLN in 2022 and around 5 billion in 2023 [50] have been already offset by refugees via taxes of 12.3-15.2 billion PLN in 2022 and 18.2-22.5 billion PLN in 2023.\n\nAll the modelling results are conservative lower bound estimates, as econometric studies from other countries have found immigration to have additionally a positive impact on labour productivity that cannot be accounted for using the available data.\nThese effects could stem from the growth in specialisation due to additional workers with different skillsets appearing on the labour market, e.g., occupational upgrading of native workers.\n\n---\n[50] E.g. vice-president of Polish Development Found Bartosz Marczuk estimated it at around 16 billion PLN, but this estimation also included spending of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The regional analysis is grounded in consolidated data from the Socio-Economic Insights Survey (SEIS), conducted across ten countries: Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia. Data for the country-specific SEISs were collected through in-person interviews from May to July 2024.\n\nThe total sample size comprises **8,720 households** and **19,803 household members**, with respondents providing information on behalf of all individuals within their households.\n\n**COUNTRY** **SAMPLE SIZE 2023** **SAMPLE SIZE 2024**\n\nBulgaria 1,054 1,072 Czechia 1,218 1,215 Estonia - 600 Hungary 682 801 Latvia - 600 Lithuania - 638 Moldova 890 622 Poland 5,645 1,290 Romania 1,222 1,008 Slovakia 819 874\n\n**Total** **11,530** **8,720**\n\nEach country adopted a unique sampling approach, dependent on factors such as the availability of sampling frames and information regarding population distribution by geographic area and accommodation type. A combination of different sampling methods was used, typically incorporating multiple stages and blending convenience sampling, cluster random sampling, and simple random sampling (the latter being exclusive to Romania). It is important to highlight that Hungary and Moldova modified its sampling approach, which limits the comparability of its results across years.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Socio-Economic Insights Survey (SEIS)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Socio-Economic Insights Survey", "confidence": 0.8061858415603638}, {"text": "SEIS", "confidence": 0.15954141318798065}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland To account for refugees impact on economy shocks for economy were calibrated according to existing data.\nAs the refugees started coming to Poland by the end of February and in March 2022 it was assumed that their impact on the economy should be seen starting from the second quarter of 2022. As such their primary impact on yearly data was divided as between 2022 and 2023 setting 3⁄4 of it in 2022 and 1⁄4 in 2023. The total number of refugees was set according to the newest data from the PESEL registry (Chart 3. in Chapter 1). Their employment was calibrated to match data presented in Chapter 2. Changes in population and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL registry"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL registry", "confidence": 0.8623958230018616}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "newest data from the PESEL registry", "confidence": 0.43032607436180115}, {"text": "data presented in Chapter 2", "confidence": 0.18070030212402344}], "vague_data": [{"text": "existing data", "confidence": 0.3775874078273773}, {"text": "yearly data", "confidence": 0.3546461760997772}]}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Box 1.** Inflow of savings from Ukraine\n\n**Chart 13.** Income structure of Ukrainian refugee households\n\n**5%** **1%**\n\nWork (regular-, temporary-,and self-employment in Poland, remote employment in Ukraine Remittances from friends/relatives Polish government benefits (Family 500+, cash benefits, disability grants) Ukrainian government benefits (pensions, disability grants, parental benefits) Other (humanitarian organizations, other sources)\n\n**Source:** Deloitte elaboration based on the MSNA Poland 2023. The work category includes regular employment, temporary work, self-employment\nand remote work in Ukraine.\n\n31 [Cudzoziemcy w polskim systemie ubezpieczeń społecznych (zus.pl)](https://www.zus.pl/documents/10182/2322024/Cudzoziemcy+w+polskim+systemie+ubezpiecze%C5%84+spo%C5%82ecznych_2022.pdf/) 32 According to NBP (2023), there were few respondents in this situation, and they most likely had secured other sources of income.\n\n28 29", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023", "confidence": 0.9088730216026306}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The government of Chad continues to ensure the security of refugees and asylum-seekers through the\nHumanitarian Workers and Refugee Detachment (DPHR). Generally, refugees are not more exposed to\n[existing violence and crime. According to protection data collected through Project 21](https://response.reliefweb.int/west-and-central-africa/protection/projet-21) (‘regional protection\nmonitoring’) approximately 15 per cent of refugees and asylum-seekers claim to have been victims of\nphysical assault, but it is noteworthy that these cases occurred in the country of origin at the time of fleeing.\n\nWhile rape and child marriage remain prohibited by Law, other forms of gender-based violence (GBV)\nare insufficiently covered by existing Laws and policies to protect the Chadian and refugee populations.\nThe national policy to respond to GBV, in effect since 2011, applies in refugee camps and refugee hosting\nvillages but faces challenges due to limited resources (human and logistic) to fully implement this policy. The\nreferral mechanism for refugee victims for medical, legal and psychosocial support remains in place but its\neffectiveness depends on the human and financial resources available in the relevant hosting areas.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "protection data collected through Project 21"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Project 21", "confidence": 0.15641888976097107}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "protection data collected through Project 21", "confidence": 0.7200421690940857}], "vague_data": [{"text": "protection data", "confidence": 0.271390825510025}]}}}
{"input": "45 Based on number of economically active people in III quarter of 2023 according to labour market survey.\n46 E.g. vice-president of Polish Development Found Bartosz Marczuk estimated it at around 16 billion PLN, but this estimation also included spending of NGOs which was combined with spendings of local governments Polska pomoc dla Ukrainy 2022 - ile kosztowała? - Infor.pl.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "labour market survey"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "labour market survey", "confidence": 0.9165289402008057}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "labour supply in Poland were offset by equivalent changes for Eastern Europe region [41] . It was also assumed that refugees should have higher spending needs which means a lower saving rate than natives.\nMoreover, data shows that it is partially financed by savings they have in Ukrainian banks which was calibrated as them having negative saving rate while being offset by lowering investment levels in Eastern Europe [42] . Lastly, their productivity may differ from productivity of natives (Box 2) which also was taken into account.\nIn total there were three major sources of uncertainty: total level of employment, productivity, and impact on consumption.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The \r sustainability \r of \r IDP \r (and \r potentially, \r refugee) \r returns \r is \r also \r still \r hampered \r by\nlimited \r access \r to \r livelihood \r opportunities. \r At \r present, \r access \r to \r livelihood \r resources \r and\ntraining \r opportunities \r are \r scarce. \r Returning \r IDPs \r and \r refugees \r may \r have \r lost \r the\nproductive \r assets \r needed \r to \r restart \r agriculture, \r while \r homes \r have \r been \r destroyed \r by\nthe \r conflict \r or \r have \r fallen \r into \r disrepair.\n\nAdditionally, \r distances \r are \r substantial \r between \r the \r temporary \r shelters \r in \r Thailand \r and\npotential \r return \r areas. \r Many \r of \r the \r places \r of \r origin \r of \r registered \r refugees \r in \r Thailand \r are\nparticularly \r isolated \r and \r have \r received \r little \r investment \r in \r infrastructure. \r Investment \r in\nrepatriation \r infrastructure, \r including \r transit \r centres \r or \r way \r stations, \r will \r be \r required \r in\ncase \r of \r an \r organized \r repatriation \r movement.\n\n**3.** **POPULATION \r OF \r CONCERN \r IN \r SOUTH-­‐EAST \r MYANMAR**\n\n**3.1. \r Refugees \r in \r Thailand**\n\nUNHCR’s \r current \r area \r of \r operations \r in \r South-­‐East \r Myanmar \r covers \r Kayin, \r Kayah, \r and\nMon \r States, \r and \r Taninthayri \r Regions. \r These \r are \r the \r primary \r places \r of \r origin \r of \r the\nestimated \r 128,876 \r Myanmar \r refugees \r residing \r in \r the \r temporary \r shelters \r along \r the\nborder \r in \r Thailand, \r and \r are \r assumed \r to \r be \r the \r primary \r potential \r areas \r of \r return.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Note:_ Panel A shows the location of the gold mines that were active during the study period. Around each circle,\na 20-km radius is marked. These 40-km-wide areas are the baseline treatment areas in the analysis. Panel B shows\nthe 100-km treatment areas and the distribution of the DHS clusters. Road data is an alternative way of defining\ndistance from mines, but time series data on roads is not available.\n\n**3.2 Household data**\n\nWe use microdata from the DHS, obtained from standardized surveys across years and\n\ncountries. We combine the respondents from all four DHS standard surveys in Ghana for which\n\nthere are geographic identifiers. The total data set includes 19,705 women (of which 12,392\n\nlive within 100 km of a mine) aged 15–49 from 137 districts. They were surveyed in 1993,\n\n1998, 2003, and 2008, [6] and live in 1,623 survey clusters. Since the DHS surveys focus on\n\nwomen, the surveys of women will be the main source of data. However, we also use the\n\nsurveys of men, which give us data from the same four survey years, but with a total number of\n\n---\n[6] The first mines were opened in 1990, prior to the first household survey. Ten mines were opened after the first", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS standard surveys"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "microdata from the DHS"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "surveys of men"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS standard surveys", "confidence": 0.7227162718772888}, {"text": "surveys of men", "confidence": 0.14753960072994232}, {"text": "microdata from the DHS", "confidence": 0.11359887570142746}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "surveys of men", "confidence": 0.6051653623580933}, {"text": "microdata from the DHS", "confidence": 0.6043314933776855}, {"text": "surveys of women", "confidence": 0.1998562514781952}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Road data", "confidence": 0.2762554883956909}, {"text": "Household data", "confidence": 0.24963244795799255}]}}}
{"input": "emotional well-being, as well as local integration prospects. In this sense, some Afghan women\nhave reported a strict control exerted by male family members, which translates into their\nconfinement in the domestic realm.\n\n##### Protection Risk IV\n\n**Trafficking in persons, forced labor or slavery-like practices.** Although asylum seekers, refugees,\nand other forcibly displaced persons have the same labor rights as nationals in Brazil, they\nencounter several obstacles to their economic integration. The experience of displacement,\ncoupled with high levels of unemployment, informal labor, and poverty, heighten the risk of this\npopulation to fall prey of human traffickers. According to official data, between 2021 and 2023,\n355 refugees and migrants of all nationalities were rescued from forced labor or slavery-like\npractices in Brazil from various economic sectors, primarily in timber trade, cassava cultivation,\nclothing manufacturing, road transportation, and tobacco. [33 ]", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "official data", "confidence": 0.15430353581905365}], "vague_data": [{"text": "official data", "confidence": 0.6537014842033386}]}}}
{"input": "[The new asylum legislation - specifically Article 31 of the 2020 Law and Article 73 of the 2023 Decree](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)   provides for the issuance of refugee identity cards by the competent national authority. It outlines that the\nrefugee identity card is valid for five years, renewable and is issued for each refugee of 18 years old and\nabove. Despite this new asylum legislation, UNHCR continues to give substantial support to the Refugee\nGovernment counterpart, CNARR, including by issuing individual refugee cards to adults, family refugee\nattestations and household ration cards. There have been no changes in the documentation process for\nadult refugees and asylum-seekers. Additionally, UNHCR continue to support CNARR to issue asylumseeker certificates valid for six months and their renewal.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)      (7)       (8) (9)\nln ln ln ln household level ln expenditure\nwages wages wages pc total health hh\nall women men exp. exp. food    housing   education energy\n\nactive*mine 0.520** 0.694*** 0.391 -0.178* -0.126 -0.069 0.316** -0.168 0.297**\n(0.226) (0.241) (0.238) (0.093) (0.089) (0.095) (0.139) (0.199) (0.119)\n\nObservations 6,226 2,914 3,312 7,522 7,522 7,396 7,420 6,541 4,752\nR-squared 0.121 0.128 0.118 0.959 0.964 0.963 0.933 0.837 0.950\n\n_controls_\n\nindividual Y Y Y\n\nhh head Y Y Y Y Y Y\nhh size Y Y Y Y Y\ndistrict fe Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y\nyear fe Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y\n\ndeflated N N N Y Y N N N N\nmean (ln) 15.30 15.29 15.31 13.04 14.19 13.42 10.88 10.74 9.52\n\n_Note:_ (1) Annual wages and salaries for individuals in all ages (nondeflated).\n(2) Annual wages and salaries for women in all ages (nondeflated).\n(3) Annual wages and salaries for men in all ages (nondeflated).\n(4) Real per capita annual food and nonfood expenditure (regionally deflated).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\nreintegration \r of \r refugees \r as \r is \r the \r norm \r in \r repatriation \r operations \r across \r the \r world. \r The\nagreement \r would \r govern \r the \r procedures \r for \r entry \r into \r Myanmar \r and \r modalities \r for\nreception, \r registration, \r immediate \r humanitarian \r assistance, \r and \r travel \r to \r places \r of\ndestination. \r Another \r key \r aspect \r will \r be \r access \r and \r monitoring \r of \r returnee \r areas, \r as \r well\nas \r the \r immediately \r needed \r support \r to \r the \r reintegration \r process.\n\nUNHCR’s \r 2008 \r Policy \r on \r Return \r and \r Reintegration \r defines \r reintegration \r as \r the\nreduction \r and \r ultimately \r the \r disappearance \r of \r any \r factors \r that \r differentiate \r returnees\nfrom \r other \r members \r of \r their \r community \r in \r terms \r of \r both \r their \r legal \r and \r socio-­‐economic\nstatus. \r Therefore, \r reintegration \r is \r a \r comprehensive, \r gradual \r and \r dynamic \r effort \r that\ninvolves \r the \r establishment \r of \r conditions \r which \r enable \r returnees \r and \r their \r communities\nto \r exercise \r their \r social, \r economic, \r civil, \r political \r and \r cultural \r rights, \r and \r on \r that \r basis \r to\nenjoy \r peaceful, \r productive \r and \r dignified \r lives.\n\nThe \r definition \r of \r a \r comprehensive, \r multi-­‐year \r strategy \r for \r return \r and \r reintegration\nshould \r therefore \r be \r framed \r by \r and \r support \r development \r plans. \r Strategic \r plans \r should\ncover \r all \r key \r relevant \r sectors: \r legal, \r economic, \r social, \r and \r environmental, \r and \r guide \r the\ndivision \r of \r roles \r and \r responsibilities \r between \r relief, \r development, \r public \r and \r private\nstakeholders.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**ZUS** - Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, Polish social security administration, also known as Social Insurance Institution.\n\n44 Chart 1. Poland-Ukraine border movement balance and registered/active PESEL data\b 07 Chart 2. Ukrainians registered for social insurance\b 07 Chart 3. Number of Ukrainians registered in Poland for social insurance by sex\b 08 Chart 4. Age and gender structure of Ukrainian refugees\b 09 Chart 5. Ukrainian refugee households’ demographic composition\b 10 Chart 6. Local population shares of Ukrainian refugees\b 11 Chart 7. Income of Ukrainian refugee households by source\b 12 Chart 8. Ukrainian refugee household incomes from Poland and Ukraine in 2023 and 2024\b 12 Chart 9. Ukrainian refugee labour status 15 Chart 10. Ukrainian refugee median net wage 15 Chart 11. Main occupational groups of Ukrainian refugees, pre-war Ukrainians, other foreigners, and Polish citizens registered for social insurance, Q2 2022 and Q2 2024 (civilian, non-agricultural)\b 16 Chart 12. Ukrainian refugee wages relative to Polish citizens in the same employee-cells\b 17 Chart 13. Polish citizens and Ukrainian refugees’ employment rates by age group\b 18 Chart 14. Ukrainian refugee median net wage estimates in Q2 2024\b 19 Chart 15. Ukrainian refugees wages median net wage by age group\b 20 Chart 16. Median net wages of Ukrainian refugees median net wage by sector \b 21 Chart 17. Gross domestic product growth paths with and without Ukrainian refugees\b 23 Chart 18. Over-qualification rates by citizenship\b 27 Chart 19. Tertiary education and corresponding occupational groups shares\b 28 Chart 20. Ukrainian refugees median net wages by educational attainment\b 28 Chart 21. Share of regulated professions by citizenship and legal status, Q2 2024\b 29 Chart 22. Econometric model of determinants of Ukrainian refugees’ net wages\b 32 Chart 23. Average number of months since arrival of a Ukrainian refugee by Polish language fluency\b 33 Chart 24. What Ukrainian refugee groups have weakest Polish language fluency?\b 33 Chart 25. Ukrainian refugees’ employment rate in the 18-64 age group by previous status in Ukraine\b 34 Chart 26. Polish citizens employment rate \b 38 Chart 27. Polish citizens unemployment rate\b 38 Chart 28. Effect of a 1 pp. change in employment share of Ukrainian refugees on\b 39 Chart 29. Effect of a 1 pp. change in employment share of Ukrainian refugees on gross wage change\b 41 Chart 30. Polish citizens occupational distribution change by salary bracket, Q2 2022 and Q2 2024\b 41 Chart 31. Labour market activity rates \b 42 Chart 32. Average weekly hours in main job\b 42", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "registered/active PESEL data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL data", "confidence": 0.8401855826377869}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Income of Ukrainian refugee households by source", "confidence": 0.1378011852502823}, {"text": "Local population shares of Ukrainian refugees", "confidence": 0.11846043914556503}, {"text": "Age and gender structure of Ukrainian refugees", "confidence": 0.10723594576120377}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Death Rates, Adolescent Mothers, and\n\nChildren and Adolescents out of school\n\nusing primary data from the MSNA and\n\nsecondary data sources.\n\nCalculations were refined using qualita\ntive information obtained from experts\n\nduring needs assessments validation\n\nworkshops conducted in Miranda, Zulia,\n\nFalcón, Bolívar, Delta Amacuro, Sucre,\n\nAmazonas, Apure, Táchira, Lara, and\n\nthe Capital District. The overall PIN for\n\nthe Protection Cluster is 4,425,466.00,\n\nrepresenting a 5% increase compared\n\nto the calculation for the Humanitarian\n\nResponse Plan (HRP) 2022-2023.\n\nFurther, throughout October, the national\n\nProtection Cluster participated in the\n\nfacilitation of extended OCHA Local\n\nCoordination Fora meetings in the states\n\nof Miranda, Sucre, Bolivar, Delta Ama\ncuro, Apure, Amazonas, Táchira, Zulia,\n\nFalcón, and Lara. The primary objective\n\nof these workshops was to validate data\n\ncollected from the MNSA on the human\nitarian situation of the respective state\n\nand, to gather complementary informa\n\ntion to contribute to the narrative of the\n\nHNO. Finally, it helped to validate the\n\nprioritization of municipalities in collabo\nration with Cluster partners and OCHA.\n\n**II.** **Coordination** **with** **other**\n\n**platforms, subnational Clusters,**\n\n**ICCG, and Partners**\n\n**Coordination with the Response for**\n\n**Venezuela (R4V) continued through-**\n\n**out September and October through**\n\n**bilateral meetings and common work-**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "primary data from the MSNA"}, {"text": "MSNA"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "secondary data sources"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data\n\ncollected from the MNSA", "confidence": 0.4333397448062897}, {"text": "primary data from the MSNA", "confidence": 0.43080148100852966}], "vague_data": [{"text": "secondary data sources", "confidence": 0.4115902781486511}]}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\nAlso \r in \r 2012 \r UNHCR \r received \r authorization \r to \r open \r offices \r in \r Hpa-­‐an \r in \r Kayin \r State \r and\nLoikaw \r in \r Kayah \r State, \r although \r this \r is \r still \r to \r be \r formalised. \r Access \r remains \r restricted\nin \r certain \r areas \r and \r is \r dependent \r on \r Government \r authorization \r and \r restrictive \r advance\nclearance \r procedures, \r especially \r for \r international \r staff. \r However, \r there \r have \r been\nincremental \r improvements \r in \r access \r in \r areas \r close \r to \r the \r Thai \r border, \r particularly \r as \r the\ncease-­‐fire \r process \r has \r become \r embedded. \r Nonetheless, \r humanitarian \r access, \r and \r the\ndegree \r to \r which \r UNHCR \r is \r free \r to \r assess \r needs \r and \r to \r effectively \r target \r its \r support \r to \r the\nmost \r vulnerable \r displaced \r and \r host \r communities \r varies \r considerably \r from \r state \r to \r state.\n\n**5.** **LEGAL, \r INSTITUTIONAL \r AND \r POLICY \r FRAMEWORKS, \r AND \r KEY**\n\n**PRINCIPLES**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**time.** In the SEIS UNHCR survey, on\naverage, Ukrainian refugees who said they were fluent in Polish had stayed in Poland for 29 months, while those with an intermediate level – for only 22 months.\nThe results are interesting, especially the fact that the average time required to 32 33 progress from advanced to fluent language levels was longer than from intermediate to advanced, or beginner to intermediate (although not from zero to beginner). It is likely that the highest level of fluency, which may be required in some of the most attractive occupations, is also the hardest to achieve, and such language courses are not as readily available.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey", "confidence": 0.9248064160346985}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\nlivelihoods, \r household \r and \r family \r security \r issues, \r as \r well \r as \r about \r past, \r present \r and\npossibly \r future \r skill-­‐sets \r that \r will \r help \r the \r refugees \r to \r return \r to \r a \r normal \r life \r outside \r the\ncamp. \r This \r information \r will \r also \r help \r in \r identifying \r both \r the \r major \r return \r areas \r and \r all\nother \r locations \r along \r with \r indications \r of \r the \r possible \r number \r of \r refugees \r intending \r to\nreturn \r to \r those \r areas, \r and \r required \r programmatic \r interventions \r to \r help \r in \r preparing \r the\nconditions \r that \r would \r support \r a \r sustainable \r voluntary \r return \r and \r reintegration.\n\n**3.2. \r Internally \r Displaced \r Persons**\n\nIn \r its \r October \r 2012 \r report, \r TBC \r estimated \r that \r a \r total \r of \r about \r 400,000 \r individuals \r are\nstill \r internally \r displaced \r in \r the \r rural \r areas \r of \r 36 \r townships \r in \r South-­‐East \r Myanmar \r in\nKayin, \r Kayah, \r South \r and \r East \r Shan \r and \r Mon \r States, \r and \r Bago \r and \r Tanintharyi \r Regions.\nOf \r these, \r the \r number \r located \r in \r Kayin, \r Kayah, \r Tanintharyi \r and \r Mon \r combined \r is\nestimated \r at \r 230,400 \r individuals \r (89,150 \r or \r 38.7% \r in \r Kayin; \r 71,650 \r or \r 31.1% \r in\nTanintharyi; \r 35,000 \r or \r 15.1% \r in \r Mon \r and \r 34,600 \r or \r 15% \r in \r Kayah) [ \r 5] .", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "increase in cash earning opportunities is estimated at 7.5 to 7.8 percentage points compared\n\nwith 5.4 in the baseline estimation.\n\n**6.6 Employment and wages using the GLSS**\n\nThe DHS data do not provide detailed information regarding how much an individual earns for\n\nwork, or her wage rate, but the GLSS does collect such data. First, we try to replicate the results\n\nestimated with the DHS data. Panel A of table 11 indicates that agriculture becomes less\n\nimportant in mining communities for women (statistically insignificant), who mainly shift into\n\nservices and sales (statistically insignificant, except for strategy 2). Men are more likely to work\n\nas miners (statistically significant across all strategies).\n\n29", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "the GLSS"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DHS data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.817842423915863}, {"text": "GLSS", "confidence": 0.36076676845550537}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.3171398341655731}]}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF HOUSING SUPPORT AND EMPLOYMENT FACILITATION IN ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n**SHARE OF YOUNG UKRAINIANS (AGED 15 TO 24) WHO ARE NOT ENGAGED IN EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION, OR TRAINING**\n\n**(NEET) BY COUNTRY, %** **[1,2,3]**\n\nHost country Refugees, excluding online education Refugees Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia Region\n\n1. Data reported by the national statistics service was used as a\nreference for Moldova 2. With the exception of Poland and the Czech Republic, the reliability of data by country is hindered by a relatively low number of observations\n\n[3. Host country data is based on indicators reported by the OECD for](https://data.oecd.org/youthinac/youth-not-in-employment-education-or-training-neet.htm)\n[2022](https://data.oecd.org/youthinac/youth-not-in-employment-education-or-training-neet.htm)\n\n**UKRAINE REFUGEE YOUTH ACTIVITY BY AGE**\n\n**The gender divide: female – led households are**\n\n**more economically vulnerable than their male –**\n\n**led counterparts**\nThe share of households that are composed of female only adults with or without children constitute 65% of the total sample across the region. Compared to households with male only adults, the vast majority of which are without children, they are 51% more likely to find themselves below the poverty line.\n\n**DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY GENDER OF**\n\n**ADULTS, %**\n\nNEET 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "indicators reported by the OECD"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Data reported by the national statistics service", "confidence": 0.6565290093421936}, {"text": "indicators reported by the OECD", "confidence": 0.4562681317329407}], "vague_data": [{"text": "indicators reported by the OECD", "confidence": 0.10214068740606308}]}}}
{"input": "# **BRIEF** **BRAZIL**\n\n### Operational Context & Analysis\n\nBrazil has in place a progressive and inclusive protection and solutions framework for refugees\nand other forcibly displaced individuals, ensuring equal access to rights and services alongside its\nnational citizens. With an open-border policy, Brazil guarantees the admission, registration, and\ndocumentation of those in need of international protection. Brazil hosts the largest number of\nVenezuelans recognized as refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean.\n\nAs of July 2024, Brazil has recognized 144.463 refugees and provided alternative protection\npathways to 572.877 persons in need of international protection, the majority of whom are\nVenezuelan (474.217) and Haitian (89.455) nationals. Additionally, there are 75,998 pending\nasylum applications, primarily from individuals originating from Cuba (26.225), Venezuela (15.065)\nand Angola (8.696).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "host country weighted average [17] . Excluding such online schooling increases this indicator to 18%. The highest NEET rate by country was reported in Moldova at 26%, which is similar to the local population, and the lowest in Poland at just 11% (3 percentage points below the national metric).\nRegionally, the Ukraine refugee NEET rate tends to increase with age, as it becomes more affected by unemployment, which is high for the 15 – 24 cohort (at 17%).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "national metric", "confidence": 0.12218445539474487}]}}}
{"input": "19 The complete rationale for the productivity shock is outlined in the Appendix on modelling strategy, while further detailed results of econometric models are available in the Online Technical Appendix.\n\n20 As outlined in the Appendix on modelling strategy, the total number of refugees was set at 2.6% of the total population, while their share in total employment as growing from 1.5% in 2022 to 2.4% in 2024.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES Just like last year, employment rates demonstrated disparity by age group, gender, education level, the presence of a disability, and being in need of MHPSS. Disability was found to be associated with the largest drop in employment, with this factor halving the probability of working in 2024 when compared to the sample overall. Having MHPSS needs and being female were also associated with a lower employment likelihood, although to significantly smaller degrees.\n\nCompared to the host population, the refugee sample demonstrated higher employment rates at lower age brackets (15-19 and 20-24), which, considering the findings on poverty, can be interpreted as a coping strategy associated with low income. Higher age brackets (55-59 and 60-64) saw the highest gap in the employment rate compared to hosts, supporting the hypothesis that older age individuals have more difficulty integrating into the local labor market.\n\n**REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT RATE BY AGE AND POPULATION**\n\nRefugees (2023) Refugees (2024) Hosts (2023) 82% 79% 80% 52% 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 Source: Survey data, ILO\n\n**REGIONAL REFUGEE EMPLOYMENT RATE BY POPULATION**\n\n**GROUP (2024)**\n\n**EMPLOYMENT RATE BY EDUCATION LEVEL**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.9261319637298584}]}}}
{"input": "the bottom 40 percent in four groups: far away, before mine or during mine, and close to mine,\n\nbefore mine or during mine. The summary statistics for selected main outcomes are presented\n\nin table 10. As the table shows, the bottom 40 percent in mining communities are more likely\n\nengaging in agriculture than the bottom 40 percent elsewhere. This could illustrate that\n\nagricultural workers are overrepresented among the less well-off in mining communities.\n\nHowever, women in this group still more often work in services than women did before in the\n\nsame communities.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The choice of district – rather than cluster – fixed effect is informed by the understanding that\n\nmeaningful time-invariant factors - such as mining laws, level of development, local political\n\ninstitutions, norms regarding environment, women’s participation in the labor market, etc. - that\n\ninfluence exploitation of the mine happens at the district level. Including district fixed effects,\n\nwe control for various institutional and cultural factors at the district level that are stable over\n\ntime. Including district fixed effects also ensures that we are not only capturing effects from\n\ntransfers or the fiscal system as we compare individuals within the same districts. With this\n\nmethod we capture the geographic spillover effects in the vicinity of the mine. Moreover, cluster\n\nfixed effects are not possible because of clusters are not repeatedly sampled over time.\n\nHowever, since the estimation is at individual level, all standard errors are clustered at the DHS\n\ncluster level.\n\nThe sample is restricted to individuals living within 100 km of a deposit location ( _mine_ ), so\n\nmany parts of Northern Ghana where there are few gold mines are not included in the analysis.\n\nThe sample restriction is created by using the time-stable continuous distance measure that we", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.2548472583293915}, {"text": "continuous distance measure", "confidence": 0.11649264395236969}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Due \r to \r the \r size \r and \r remoteness \r of \r the \r operational \r area, \r compounded \r by \r access\nlimitation \r and \r sensitivities, \r reliable \r and \r disaggregated \r information \r on \r the \r profile \r and\nneeds \r of \r displaced \r populations \r remains \r scarce. \r UNHCR \r has \r recently \r strengthened \r its\ninformation \r management \r capacities \r with \r a \r view \r to \r working \r towards \r obtaining \r a \r more\nsystematic \r understanding \r of \r the \r locations \r and \r characteristics \r of \r populations \r of \r concern,\nand \r the \r protection \r risks \r affecting \r them. \r Additionally, \r the \r Joint \r IDP \r Profiling \r Service\n(JIPS), \r has \r recently \r completed \r a \r scoping \r mission \r aiming \r at \r assessing \r whether \r it \r is\nfeasible \r and \r desirable \r to \r conduct \r an \r IDP \r profiling \r that \r would \r inform \r the \r design \r of \r an\neffective \r strategy \r for \r support \r to \r IDPs \r durable \r solutions, \r as \r well \r as \r targeting, \r improved\nadvocacy \r and \r fundraising.\n\n**4.** **UNHCR’S \r CURRENT \r OPERATIONS \r IN \r THE \r SOUTH-­‐EAST**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Persons of concern in Southern Africa, Data as of 30 September 2022**\n\nNotes: *'Other' in the location refers to any known location other than camp or settlement sites, covering both urban and rural areas; **self-settled refers to the individuals without available information such as their names and locations, and their locations are categorised to be 'unknown'; those by location in Congo, Democratic Republic of\nthe Congo and Zimbabwe could be different from the numbers operation report due to inconsistency in proGres v4.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "proGres v4", "confidence": 0.7671151757240295}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "contrast, show the univariate regression coefficients using OLS, highlighting the difference\n\nbetween the population living close (e.g. Column 2) and far away (e.g. Column 1) before\n\nmining.\n\nIn the pre-period, women in communities that are close to mines are less urban, poorer, have\n\nmore children and are less likely migrants. In contrast, women are of similar age, have similar\n\neducation and occupation (but slightly more likely earning cash). Note that these are raw mean\n\nvalues not controlling for any regional and individual differences. Overall, these differences are\n\nin line with previous research finding that large-scale mines tend to open in more rural and less\n\ndeveloped communities (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2018; Kotsadam and Tolonen, 2016).\n\nIn active mining communities, women are still less likely to live in urban areas (although the\n\ngap between mining and non-mining areas may be smaller) than in non-mining communities,\n\nbut more likely to have some education. The difference-in-difference estimation strategy\n\nassumes similar trends over time across the treatment (close to mines) and control group (far\n\naway from mines), in absence of the gold mining expansion. While this assumption cannot be\n\ntested using our dataset, previous analyses have found evidence for parallel pre-trends in infant", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "CROSS BORDER MOVEMENTS KEY FIGURES\n\n200 61 118 21\n\nREGIONAL BUREAU FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA\n\n**PERSONS OF CONCERN INVOLVED IN CROSS BORDER MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**\n\nAs of 30 September 2022\n\nMAP OF THE CROSS BORDER MOVEMENTS WHERE THE FLOW INVOLVED 3 POCs AND MORE *\n\n**Inward movements**\n\n**into the region**\n\n**Total cross**\n\n**border**\n\n**movements**\n\n**Intra region**\n\n**movemens**\n\n**Outward**\n\n**movements from the**\n\n**region**\n\nInward\n\n31%\n\nOutward\nmovements\n\n34%\n\nBefore 2019 2019 2020 2021 2022\n\nexclusion.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "MAP OF THE CROSS BORDER MOVEMENTS", "confidence": 0.4042026996612549}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "table 7). Low weight-for-age is an indicator for acute malnutrition, whereas height-for-age is\n\nan indicator for chronic malnutrition. This could indicate that mining districts are less food\n\nsecure. [12] Table 7 shows that there are no effects on illness in the last two weeks.\n\n**6. Distributional effects, mechanisms and robustness**\n\n**6.1 Decomposing results by migration status**\n\nWe argue that one source of heterogeneity is to consider when exploring socio-economic\n\nimpacts and distributional effects of large-scale mining is migration status. First because mining\n\nmay cause inward migration of individuals that are different from the previous local population.\n\nWhile it has its limitations, disaggregating the effects between nonmigrants and migrants may\n\nshed some light on the effect on the initial population. Second, to understand the distributional\n\neffects of mining we argue that migration status may be an important factor.\n\nIn the analysis, we distinguish between nonmigrants (where the woman respondent report being\n\nborn in the locality) and migrants (born elsewhere). We note several caveats with this analysis,\n\nthe first being that we cannot follow migrant households before the migration decision.\n\nTherefore, we cannot make any causal claims on changes in this group over time. We compare\n\n---\n[12] In table 5 we saw very small insignificant changes in nutritional status.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "3 As of December 2023, according to UNHCR, based on governmental sources [Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation (unhcr.org)](https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine) 4 According to the active PESEL UKR database.\n5 According to the active PESEL UKR database in October 2023.\n6 Deloitte calculations based on Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data provided by UNHCR.\n\n06", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "active PESEL UKR database"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL UKR database", "confidence": 0.8054516315460205}, {"text": "Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data", "confidence": 0.6109305620193481}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data", "confidence": 0.11742911487817764}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1. A household classified as above or below the poverty line if household members are individually located above or below the poverty line\n\n2. Income shares represent the average for each group 11 Defined in the survey as working for an employer full- or part-time on a regular basis, opposed to temporary work or selfemployment 12 Here defined as the share of individuals aged 15+ who are either employed or unemployed. Unemployed is understood as having searched for work over the past 30 days and willing to start if an opportunity presents itself over the next 2 weeks 13 Ratio of people younger than 15 and older than 64 to the 15-64 cohort 14 The share of individuals aged 15+ that are either employed or unemployed (have looked for work over the past 30 days and are willing to start if an opportunity presents itself over the next 2 weeks)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "However, \r two \r serious \r internal \r conflicts \r still \r remain. \r Following \r two \r waves \r of \r inter-­‐\ncommunal \r violence \r in \r the \r western \r state \r of \r Rakhine \r in \r 2012, \r over \r 150 \r persons \r were\nkilled \r and \r over \r 115,000 \r people \r were \r displaced. \r In \r the \r northern \r states \r of \r Kachin \r and\nShan, \r the \r conflict \r with \r the \r Kachin \r Independence \r Army \r continues; \r fighting \r flared \r up \r in\nJune \r 2011 \r breaking \r a \r cease-­‐fire \r that \r held \r for \r 17 \r years. \r Despite \r repeated \r attempts \r to\nnegotiate \r a \r new \r cease-­‐fire \r agreement, \r no \r peace \r solution \r has \r been \r reached \r between \r the\nparties \r and \r the \r fighting \r has \r so \r far \r resulted \r in \r the \r displacement \r of \r an \r estimated \r of \r about\n85,000 \r persons \r scattered \r in \r more \r than \r 194 \r locations.\n\nAlthough \r the \r cease-­‐fire \r agreements \r have \r not \r led \r yet \r to \r durable \r peace \r accords, \r the\nsituation \r in \r the \r South-­‐East, \r where \r the \r number \r of \r Internally \r Displaced \r People \r (IDPs) \r in\nUNHCR’s \r area \r of \r operation [1] is \r estimated \r to \r be \r about \r 230,400 \r people, \r has \r started \r seeing\nchanging \r dynamics. \r From \r the \r moment \r when \r the \r new \r civilian \r Government \r started \r to\n\n---\n[1] UNHCR’s \r area \r of \r operation \r in \r the \r South-­‐East \r currently \r consists \r of \r Kayin, \r Kayah, \r and \r Mon \r States, \r and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "During the covered period, a National Development Plan spanning 2022-2026 has been prepared, to\nsupplant the National Development Plan document (2019-2021) which has lapsed, but it has not been\nadopted. The updated plan maintains provisions for establishing consensual mechanisms for the peaceful\nresolution of conflicts. This involves reinforcing the legal framework to foster trust between communities and\nsecurity forces, facilitating socio-security dialogue, promoting peaceful coexistence and fostering respect\nfor differences.\n\n2 R E F U G E E P O L I C Y R E V I E W F R A M E W O R K > **R E P U B L I C O F C H A D**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Deloitte D.Climate, [32 33] is a general equilibrium model that uses consumer and producer optimisation to calculate changes in the economy in response to shocks. This enables the impact of shocks to be assessed by considering supply and demand channels as well as connections between different sectors of the economy. It provides information on the total impact of shocks on various aspects of the economy, including the labour market, government revenue, as well as key economic aggregates. It is the most appropriate tool for accounting for the multi-layered impact of Ukrainian refugees. A counterfactual analysis was performed using the latest data on the Polish economy to account for the effects of other shocks in the economy. The model enabled a counterfactual analysis to be conducted by isolating the refugee influx from all other economic shocks, e.g. the other macroeconomic consequences of the war in Ukraine. The results were calculated for 2022, 2023 and 2024 with an additional long-term analysis up to 2030 to assess the economy’s long-term adaptation (assuming no new shocks, including no countershocks [34] ).\n\n32 Economics of climate change | Deloitte Australia\n\n**Chart 32. Average weekly hours in main job**\n\nWomen in 15-64 age group 68.4% 2023-Q2\n\n---\n[34] E.g. refugees keep having lower productivity rather than adapt to level of natives.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "latest data on the Polish economy"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "latest data on the Polish economy", "confidence": 0.7488773465156555}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "During the 2022-2023 school year, a total of 105,295 refugee children were enrolled in schools. This number\nincludes 7,520 in pre-primary, 75,205 in primary, 24,999 in secondary, and 571 in higher education and\nvocational training. The gross enrolment rates for refugees were as follows: 71 per cent in primary, 28 per\ncent in secondary, and less than 1 per cent in tertiary education. Refugee enrolment rates at the primary and\ntertiary levels remain below those of national students (71 per cent and 1 per cent compared to 91 percent\nand 3 per cent respectively), while they are higher than those of national students at the secondary level (28\npercent compared to 22 per cent).\n\nChad continues to have a government-led system to support the integration of refugee children coming\nfrom a different education system (Nigerian and Sudanese refugees) but funded by UNHCR. Local education\nauthorities organize placement tests and catch-up classes before integrating refugee children into the most\nappropriate Chadian school year according to their level, age and other criteria. With new arrivals from\nSudan since April 2023, Sudanese refugee children have been integrated into the existing programme with\nongoing recruitment of new teachers in the main refugee hosting areas.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland**\n\n**Economists have advanced an array of factors that could be causing these macro-level effects. While macro-level**\n\n**regressions show a positive impact of immigration on productivity, they cannot show the exact channels through which**\n\n**these effects come about. It is thus uncertain which are dominant. Among them are:**\n\n# Conclusions\n\n**Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "[8] F. N. P. Nimoh, T. P. Beltramo, J. R. Fix, F. K. Appler, U. J. Pape, and L. A. Rios Rivera, ‘Understanding the Socioeconomic Conditions of\nthe Stateless Shona Community in Kenya: Results from the 2019 Socioeconomic Survey’, Dec. 2020. Accessed: Apr. 02, 2024. [Online].\nAvailable: https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documentsreports/documentdetail/356511608745182603/Understanding-the-Socioeconomic-Conditions-of-the-Stateless-Shona-Community-inKenya-Results-from-the-2019-Socioeconomic-Survey\n\n[9] U. J. Pape _et al._, ‘How COVID-19 Continues to Affect Lives of Refugees in Kenya : Rapid Response Phone Survey - Rounds 1 to 5’, World\nBank Group, Washington, D.C., Policy Note 166098, Oct. 2021. Accessed: Oct. 10, 2024. [Online]. Available:\nhttps://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/202201637042522937/pdf/How-COVID-19-Continues-to-Affect-Lives-of-Refugeesin-Kenya-Rapid-Response-Phone-Survey-Rounds-1-to-5.pdf\n\n[10] Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and ICF, ‘Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2022. Key Indicators Report’, KNBS and ICF,\n\nNairobi, Kenya, and Rockville, Maryland, USA, 2023. Accessed: Oct. 10, 2024. [Online]. Available: https://www.knbs.or.ke/wpcontent/uploads/2023/08/Kenya-Demographic-and-Health-Survey-2022-Key-Indicators-Report.pdf", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2019 Socioeconomic Survey"}, {"text": "Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2022"}, {"text": "Rapid Response Phone Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2019 Socioeconomic Survey", "confidence": 0.923615038394928}, {"text": "Rapid Response Phone Survey", "confidence": 0.7989686727523804}, {"text": "Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2022", "confidence": 0.7562562823295593}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n### **Outcomes of** **Mental Health and** **Psychosocial** **Support**\n\nAmong those who accessed MHPSS, 33% answered “yes” when asked whether they experienced improvement, while 55% reported a “slight” improvement, resulting in a combined positive response rate of 88%.\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WHO RECEIVED MENTAL HEALTH**\n\n**AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT SERVICES AND REPORT**\n\n**IMPROVEMENT IN WELL-BEING BY COUNTRY**\n\nYes Slight No/No, worsening across gender, with older adults aged 60+ reporting the highest improvement rates (93% for women and 94% for men).\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WHO RECEIVED MENTAL HEALTH**\n\n**AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT SERVICES AND REPORT**\n\n**IMPROVEMENT IN WELL-BEING BY AGE AND GENDER**\n\nFemale Male Regional Bulgaria Czechia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia (N=1,662) 33% 35% 46% 41% 26% 41% 38% 29% 30% 28% 48% 55% 54% 48% 51% 67% 44% 44% 62% 57% 56% 49%", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**higher productivity.** In a simplistic\nsupply-demand framework, the influx of Ukrainian refugees should have caused some Polish workers to become unemployed or leave the labour force, or real wages to fall. This has not happened.\nFirst, among Polish citizens employment rates have grown, and unemployment rates have fallen. Second, poviats in which employment share of Ukrainian refugees has grown by 1 pp., saw 0.5 pp. higher employment rates among Polish citizens, and 0.3 pp. lower unemployment rates.\n\nThird, there is no evidence of lowered wages, in fact the limited available data suggests that Ukrainian refugees may have caused higher wage growth in poviats which they have moved to. These are common findings well documented in academic literature, that as immigrants enter the labour market, native workers specialize in complementary, higher value tasks, which we see empirically in Polish workers moving to more attractive occupational groups. This can be seen in the data, as Polish citizens are moving to better paid occupations. It constitutes a positive shock to productivity which is what counterbalances labour market pressures. [17] Source: Deloitte D.Climate estimates. For details see the Online Technical Appendix.\n\n**The main impact of Ukrainian refugees**\n\n**is expanding the economy and putting**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "limited available data", "confidence": 0.10017871111631393}], "vague_data": [{"text": "limited available data", "confidence": 0.7856112718582153}]}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE negative perceptions of Ukrainian refugees in some host communities including perceived overuse of health services and preferential treatment [6] . As the refugees stay longer, sustainable solutions to meeting health needs of refugees and host communities, including sustainable financing, refugee data integration, integration of the refugee health workforce, and enhanced service delivery including mental health services, are critical.\n\nThrough regional multi-agency collaboration, multisector needs assessments have been conducted in refugee-receiving countries since 2022 to collect information on the needs of refugees, including those related to health, nutrition and mental health and psychosocial support. These assessments support partners’ understanding of the level of access to essential services among refugees and outcomes enable governments and partners to identify priorities for the response. In 2024, a social-economic lens was added in assessing the needs of refugees in the SocioEconomic Insights Study (SEIS) conducted in ten countries (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia).\n\n# Methodology", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SocioEconomic Insights Study (SEIS)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SocioEconomic Insights Study", "confidence": 0.8166281580924988}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "refugee data", "confidence": 0.20844076573848724}]}}}
{"input": "_Source: Authors’ calculation of 2024 survey data._\n\n**Livelihood opportunities for the Shona community have improved significantly since gaining citizenship,**\n\n**particularly in terms of financial access and job prospects – as well as protection outcomes, such as reduction in**\n\n**harassment by law enforcement.** According to the survey data, over half of the Shona community reported that\n\ncitizenship has enhanced their access to banking and mobile wallet services, making it easier for them to save,\n\ninvest, and manage their finances. Increased job opportunities were cited by 47 percent of respondents, reflecting\n\nhow the ability to present formal identification has opened new avenues for employment and economic\n\nparticipation. Importantly, 46 percent of the Shona noted a reduction in harassment by law enforcement, which\n\nhad previously hindered their movement and limited their economic activities. This improvement has enabled more\n\nindividuals to seek employment and conduct business without fear of arbitrary detentions or fines.\n\n_Figure 6: Impacts on receiving citizenship on livelihood opportunities_\n\n_Source: Authors’ calculation of 2024 survey data._\n\n**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 survey data", "confidence": 0.7736591100692749}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2024 survey data", "confidence": 0.15209515392780304}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data", "confidence": 0.8949683308601379}]}}}
{"input": "Additionally, 22 private companies pledged to hire 1,200 refugees and to support 15,000 refugees\nwith trainings and job placement by 2027. Currently, Brazil formally employs around 200,000\nrefugees and people in need of international protection. Of these, more than 12 thousand are\nemployed by 55 companies and organizations that are part of the Companies with Refugees\nForum, an initiative started in 2021 by UNHCR and the UN Global Compact – Brazil Chapter. The\n\nUNHCR / October, 2024 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES\n\n# **Background**\n\nOver three years have elapsed since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an event which has led to the largest displacement crisis in Europe since World War II. As of the end of 2024, 6.3 million refugees from\n[Ukraine were recorded across Europe, close to 2 million of whom are located in ten Regional Refugee](https://www.unhcr.org/europe/publications/regional-refugee-response-plan-2025-2026)\n[Response Plan](https://www.unhcr.org/europe/publications/regional-refugee-response-plan-2025-2026) countries: Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia. This report aims to assess the livelihood situation of this population based on the 2024 round of data collected by the Socio-Economic Insights Survey (SEIS), which received responses from 8,723 households containing 19,803 individuals. Figures for 2023 are derived from a similar exercise [7] conducted in 2023.\n\n# **Key findings**\n\n**Refugee poverty rates remain high, albeit improved from 2023**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Socio-Economic Insights Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Socio-Economic Insights Survey", "confidence": 0.8899140954017639}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "pollution from mining and agricultural productivity. The results point toward decreasing\n\nagricultural productivity because of environmental pollution and soil degradation, which could\n\nhave negative welfare effects on households that do not engage in mining activities or in\n\nindirectly stimulated sectors. Lower productivity in agriculture could potentially push\n\nhouseholds to engage in mining-related sectors, in addition to pull factors such as higher wage\n\nearnings in the stimulated sectors.\n\nWe explore the effects of mining activity on employment, earnings, expenditure, and children’s\n\nhealth outcomes in local communities and in districts with gold mining. We combine the DHS\n\nand GLSS with production data for 17 large-scale gold mines in Ghana. We find that a new\n\nlarge-scale gold mine changes economic outcomes, such as access to employment and cash\n\nearnings. In addition, it raises local wages and expenditure on housing and energy.\n\nAn important welfare indicator in developing countries is infant mortality, and we note a large\n\nand significant decrease in mortality rates among young children, at both the local and district\n\nlevels. [1] We hypothesize that increased access to prenatal care is one of the mechanisms behind\n\nthe increased survival rate.\n\n---\n[1] In the 2010 Ghana population census average district size is 112,000", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS"}, {"text": "2010 Ghana population census"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DHS"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2010 Ghana population census", "confidence": 0.8796663880348206}, {"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.33592522144317627}, {"text": "GLSS", "confidence": 0.1962500363588333}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "production data for 17 large-scale gold mines", "confidence": 0.22282201051712036}], "vague_data": [{"text": "production data", "confidence": 0.39011433720588684}]}}}
{"input": "activities, either by increasing or decreasing activity in the close geographic area, we will end\n\nup estimating the impact of these sectors jointly. In a later stage, should the opportunity arise,\n\nwe encourage researchers to try to disentangle the effects of small-scale and large-scale mining.\n\n**3 Data**\n\nTo conduct this analysis, we combine different data sources using spatial analysis. The main\n\nmining data is a dataset from InterraRMG covering all large-scale mines in Ghana, explained\n\nin more detail in section 3.1. This dataset is linked to survey data from the DHS and GLSS,\n\nusing spatial information. Geographical coordinates of enumeration areas in GLSS are from\n\nGhana Statistical Services (GSS). [2] Point coordinates (global positioning system [GPS]) for the\n\nsurveyed DHS clusters [3] allow us to match all individuals to one or several mineral mines. We\n\ndo this in two ways.\n\nFirst, we calculate distance spans from an exact mine location given by its GPS coordinates,\n\nand match surveyed individuals to mines. These are concentric circles with radiuses of 10, 20,\n\nand 30 kilometers (km), and so on, up to 100 km and beyond. In the baseline analysis where\n\n---\n[2] The data was shared by Aragón and Rud (2013)\n[3] Both the DHS and GLSS enumeration area coordinates have a 1-5 km offset. The DHS clusters have up to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey data from the DHS and GLSS"}, {"text": "dataset from InterraRMG"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "dataset from InterraRMG", "confidence": 0.4911321699619293}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey data from the DHS and GLSS", "confidence": 0.5724177956581116}, {"text": "dataset from InterraRMG", "confidence": 0.43935084342956543}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data", "confidence": 0.5350764989852905}]}}}
{"input": "The new asylum legislation provides a robust legal framework for guaranteeing access to justice for\nrefugees and asylum-seekers. This includes outlining specific provisions regarding legal assistance and\njudicial assistance to permit access to justice, legal representation and enforcement of ruling. It is important\n[to consider this framework in conjunction with Law 021-PR-2019 on legal aid and judicial assistance, which](https://www.refworld.org/docid/609f00834.html)\nwas enacted in 2019, though not fully operational in absence of an implementing decree. Article 27 of the\n[2020 Asylum Law](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf) recognizes the refugee right to access Chadian Courts. The same provision also provides\nfor treatment regarding access to judicial assistance on par with nationals and exempts refugees from\nproviding a financial deposit to Courts (caution judicatum solvi) applicable to ordinary foreigners.\n\n[Article 65 of the 2023 Decree](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf) further outlines that refugees and asylum-seekers enjoy access to Court on par\nwith nationals. Additionally, the 2023 Decree outlines the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees to access judicial\nassistance and legal assistance in the conditions outlined by the law. A specific legal provision of the 2023\nDecree also details the different modalities composing legal aid accessible to refugees and asylum-seekers", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\n5. Returning \r refugees \r and \r IDPs \r and \r receiving/hosting \r communities \r have\n\nopportunities \r to \r (re-­‐)establish \r meaningful \r and \r productive \r lives, \r through \r access\nto \r livelihoods \r opportunities.\n6. IDPs \r and \r returned \r refugee, \r together \r with \r the \r communities \r receiving \r or \r hosting\n\nthem \r enjoy \r key \r socio-­‐economic \r rights, \r including \r access \r to \r shelter, \r education \r and\nhealth \r and \r other \r services \r and \r infrastructure.\n\n**9.** **KEY \r ASSUMPTIONS \r AND \r RISKS**\n\nWith \r the \r understanding \r that \r a \r more \r in-­‐depth \r analysis \r is \r needed, \r the \r following \r is \r a \r list \r of\nkey \r assumptions \r and \r risks \r that \r need \r to \r be \r taken \r into \r consideration \r prior \r to \r planning\ndurable \r solutions \r programming \r in \r the \r South-­‐East:\n\n- The \r peace \r process \r remains \r one \r of \r the \r Government’s \r main \r priorities \r including\nadequately \r addressing \r the \r current \r situations \r in \r Kachin \r and \r Rakhine. \r Much \r will\nalso \r depend \r on \r the \r agreements \r that \r are \r reached \r with \r the \r different \r armed \r groups\nand \r the \r level \r of \r political, \r economic \r and \r cultural \r autonomy \r they \r could \r retain. \r Any\non-­‐going \r armed \r clashes \r and/or \r protection \r incidents \r could \r derail \r progress \r made\nso \r far.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The \r proposed \r five \r phases \r reflect \r different \r stages \r in \r IDP \r operations, \r and \r in \r the \r refugee\nrepatriation \r and \r reintegration \r process, \r with \r each \r corresponding \r to \r incrementally\nincreasing \r resource \r requirements \r for \r UNHCR \r and \r its \r operational \r partners.\n\n- Phase \r 1: Strengthening \r of \r IDP \r operations \r and \r preparation \r for \r refugee \r return\nwhile \r providing \r integrated \r assistance \r to \r spontaneous \r returnees;\n\n- Phase \r 2: Expansion \r of \r integrated \r support \r to \r spontaneous \r returnees \r and \r their\ncommunities \r while \r enhancing \r preparedness;\n\n- Phase \r 3: Refugee \r repatriation \r and \r initial \r reintegration \r operations;\n\n- Phase \r 4: Consolidation \r of \r reintegration \r operations; \r and\n\n- Phase \r 5: Reintegration \r operations \r are \r scaled \r down \r and \r phased \r out.\n\n**8.** **OBJECTIVES**\n\nGeneral \r operational \r objectives \r are:\n\n1. Refugees \r are \r empowered \r to \r make \r an \r informed \r choice \r on \r whether \r to \r return, \r and\n\nif \r so, \r when \r and \r to \r where, \r including \r through \r the \r provision \r of \r accurate \r and \r up \r to\ndate \r information \r on \r the \r situation \r in \r areas \r of \r potential \r return.\n2. Refugees \r and \r IDPs \r have \r the \r opportunity \r to \r determine \r which \r solution(s) \r are\n\nmost \r appropriate \r for \r them, \r and \r to \r participate \r fully \r in \r the \r assessment, \r design \r and\ndelivery \r of \r durable \r solutions \r programmes, \r using \r an \r age, \r gender \r and \r diversity\nmainstreaming \r approach.\n3. Legal \r frameworks \r are \r in \r place \r that \r guarantee \r the \r rights \r of \r IDPs \r and \r returning", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "UNHCR Indonesia is working to expand access to complementary pathways for refugees in the country\nand provides information and guidance to refugees who may be eligible for these programs. Solutions\nthrough complementary pathways have increased in recent years, from no individual departures on\npathways in 2020 to over 300 departures in 2023. UNHCR recognizes and amplifies the link between\naccess to education, skills building, and empowerment activities in Indonesia with improved access to\neducation and labour mobility pathways in third countries. In this way, continued success with these\npathways also serves to reinforce and enhance advocacy with Indonesian authorities on the\nimportance of access to opportunities while in Indonesia. Since mid-2021, UNHCR has collaborated\nwith Talent Beyond Boundaries (TBB) on a project that matches refugee candidates in Indonesia with\nemployers in Australia and Canada to offer employment and a pathway to residency through labour\nmobility. In 2023, 328 individuals departed on a sponsorship pathway, eight refugees departed to a\nthird country on family reunification, and seven refugees departed to Canada and Australia on labour\nmobility programs.\n\n### **Solutions - Voluntary Repatriation**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Considering \r that \r decades \r of \r conflict, \r displacement \r and \r poverty \r have \r weakened\ntraditional \r community \r support \r and \r leadership \r structures \r will \r be \r important \r that \r the\ncapacities \r of \r communities, \r as \r well \r as \r local \r partners \r such \r as \r local \r NGOs, \r CBOs \r and\nborder-­‐based \r groups \r working \r out \r of \r Thailand, \r are \r effectively \r harnessed \r in \r support \r of\ndurable \r solutions. \r  \r In \r particular \r border-­‐based \r organisations \r represent \r critical \r assets\nthat \r are \r complementary \r to \r the \r traditional \r agencies. \r The \r networks \r and \r working\nrelationships \r that \r Thai-­‐based \r organisations, \r which \r have \r been \r working \r with \r the \r refugee\nand \r IDP \r communities \r for \r about \r 30 \r years, \r have \r developed \r with \r displaced \r communities\nwill \r be \r invaluable \r in \r building \r trust \r and \r providing \r services.\n\nThe \r scope \r of \r activities \r required \r is \r likely \r to \r be \r significant \r and \r will \r require \r prioritized\nattention \r and \r significant \r donor \r support. \r Early \r support \r to \r kick-­‐start \r the \r reintegration\nprocess \r that \r will \r address \r immediate \r needs \r (initial \r phases) \r should \r transition \r to \r medium\nand \r longer \r term \r development \r projects \r (consolidation \r phase) \r to \r ensure \r the \r achievement\nof \r sustainable \r reintegration \r and \r eventually \r lead \r to \r a \r measurable \r UNHCR \r disengagement.\n\n12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# **HIGH EMPLOYMENT** **RATES, BUT LOW** **WAGES: A POVERTY** **ASSESSMENT OF** **UKRAINIAN REFUGEES** **IN NEIGHBORING** **COUNTRIES**\n\n## **An inter-agency exploration of** **socio-economic data** March 2025", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "socio-economic data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "socio-economic data", "confidence": 0.9583883881568909}]}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n## Appendix: Modelling strategy\n\n##### Compared to refugees in other countries, Ukrainians in Poland show high employment rates, making their economic impact more positive and comparable to immigrants in general. Most of the migration economics literature quoted in this appendix refers to all immigrants, not just refugees.\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n#### **“Canonical model” and recent advances**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF HOUSING SUPPORT AND EMPLOYMENT FACILITATION IN ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n### **Summary of** **findings and** **recommendations**\n\nOverall, refugee households from Ukraine are facing a high degree of economic vulnerability, with half of them falling below the poverty line [1] based on reported income. Factoring in accommodation support (provided either via host governments, local homeowners, or other arrangements) as an indirect source of income, reduces the poverty rate to 32%, demonstrating the importance of such interventions.\nThe level of access to regular [2] employment is a key factor influencing the financial wellbeing of households, highlighting the significance of economic inclusion. Despite a predominantly vulnerable population profile (35% of families consist of a single adult woman with dependents, and the overall age dependency ratio [3] stands at 61%), labor force participation rates among refugees are comparable to those of host country nationals.\nHowever, unemployment rates remain alarmingly high at 14%. Additionally, gender gaps are\n\n---\n[1] Defined as being composed of members whose equivalized income is below 50% of the national median\n[2] Defined in the survey as working for an employer full- or part-time on a regular basis, as opposed to temporary work or selfemployment\n[3] Defined as the ratio of people younger than 15 and older than 64 to the 15-64 cohort", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Third, cross-section regression analysis shows that poviats with a higher number of Ukrainian refugees saw a greater increase in wages, which was caused by larger share of refugees in local employment.\nDue to limitations in the wage dataset, our calculations incorporated yearly data.\nCross-section models were estimated using a data sample for all 380 poviats in 2023.\nThe share of Ukrainian refugees among all employed, temporarily employed, and self-employed persons insured at ZUS in a given poviat was averaged across quarters to construct a yearly variable. The wage variable is the GUS data series on gross monthly wages and salaries [30], and taken as nominal change in 2023 from 2022.\nThe ordinary least squares cross-section model shows that in 2023, a 1 percentage point increase in the employment share of Ukrainian refugees was associated with an increase in wages of PLN 66. Given that in a mean poviat gross wage growth amounted to PLN 757 and the gross wage in the previous year was PLN 5,803, wages have grown by 13.1% in nominal terms (including inflation), of which 0.7 percentage points were associated with Ukrainian refugees (considering the fact that the employment share of the Ukrainian refugees in a mean poviat was 0.61%).\n\n---\n[30] Unfortunately, GUS data for these time periods and poviat level include the enterprise sector (firms that employ 10 or more persons) and public sector, which is", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "wage dataset"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GUS data series", "confidence": 0.6638994216918945}, {"text": "GUS data", "confidence": 0.18795228004455566}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "wage dataset", "confidence": 0.7225003242492676}, {"text": "yearly data", "confidence": 0.2730976939201355}]}}}
{"input": "**2. Support economic integration and empowerment of the Shona community through targeted financial inclusion**\n\n**programs and skills development initiatives.**\n\nThe Government of Kenya, in collaboration with development partners, is encouraged to implement tailored\n\nfinancial inclusion strategies to help the newly recognized Shona citizens access credit, savings, and insurance\n\nproducts that are crucial for business growth and household resilience. Establishing entrepreneurship training\n\nprograms, mentorship networks, and providing access to capital for small and medium-sized enterprises would\n\nempower the Shona community to leverage their skills in wood carving, basket weaving, and other economic\n\nactivities. Additionally, promoting employment opportunities in the formal sector for Shona individuals through job\n\nplacement services and partnerships with the private sector will ensure that the community’s transition to full\n\ncitizenship is accompanied by tangible improvements in income and welfare.\n\n**3. Reaffirm and expand Kenya’s commitment to eradicating statelessness by adopting a comprehensive national**\n\n**strategy.**\n\nBuilding on the success of granting citizenship to the Makonde, Shona, and Pemba communities, a National Action\n\nPlan to identify and resolve remaining cases of statelessness, including the estimated 9,800 individuals who remain\n\nstateless, offers many benefits. This strategy should include amending the relevant Sections of the Kenya", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "- The \r Government \r will \r abide \r by \r international \r standards \r for \r return \r namely, \r that\npeople \r have \r a \r right \r to \r return \r voluntarily \r to \r places \r of \r choice, \r based \r on \r their\nindividual \r and \r freely-­‐expressed \r wish \r to \r return, \r and \r that \r return \r and\nreintegration \r is \r carried \r out \r in \r conditions \r of \r physical, \r legal \r and \r material \r safety\nand \r dignity.\n\n- The \r Government \r and \r non-­‐state \r armed \r groups \r engage \r in \r addressing \r the \r problem\nof \r landmines \r as \r an \r early \r priority. \r Landmines \r are \r a \r particular \r threat \r in \r the \r South-­‐\nEast \r and \r a \r serious \r impediment \r to \r any \r possible \r return.\n\n- Land \r reform, \r including \r restoration \r of \r land \r rights \r and \r compensation, \r remains \r at\nthe \r centre \r of \r the \r country’s \r political \r debate \r and \r reform \r agenda. \r The \r current \r laws\nallow \r expropriation \r of \r land \r not \r utilised \r for \r a \r specific \r period \r of \r time. \r In \r addition,\nabandonment, \r widespread \r destruction \r and \r “land \r grabbing” \r may \r mean \r that \r some\nvillages \r of \r origin \r may \r not \r exist \r anymore, \r or \r may \r not \r be \r accessible.\n\n- Humanitarian \r and \r development \r actors \r are \r granted \r full \r access \r to \r return \r areas,\nparticularly \r allowing \r the \r opening \r of \r offices \r and \r regular \r monitoring \r capacity.\nDirect \r access \r to \r key \r areas \r of \r origin \r is \r still \r limited \r for \r many \r humanitarian \r and\ndevelopment \r actors \r in \r particular \r in \r conflict-­‐affected \r areas.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "5. Cross Sectors\n\n### **5. Cross Sectors**\n\n**5.1** **Gender**\n\nGender considerations can generally be enhanced in many sub-dimensions of overall policies, with the\nmost relevant being the national institutional framework for the management and coordination of refugees.\nAdditionally, the limited participation of refugee women in advisory committees often results in inadequate\nconsideration of the concerns and needs of women and girls. This hinders their inclusion in national plans\nand programs.\n\nThe most consequential policy sub-dimensions in terms of socioeconomic development remain therefore\nas follows:\n\n**a.** **Justice and Security:** Challenges remain in preventing and responding to gender-based violence.\n\n**b.** **Land, Housing, and Property:** Refugees in general still face difficulties in accessing and owning land.\n\n**c.** **Education:** Limited access to education for refugee girls, particularly due to high dropout rates. In\n\nthe 2022-2023 school year, girls’ enrolment rates were 47 per cent in primary, 17 per cent in middle\nschool and only 6 percent in high school nationwide. The drop in middle and high school attendance is\nlinked to socio-cultural pressures, leading to issues like child marriages, early marriages, child labour.\n\n**d.** **Healthcare:** Insufficient prioritization of the specific needs of women and girls, including refugee women", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The floods in 2022 had adverse effects in 18 out of the 23 provinces, including Lac, Mayo Kebbi Est, Mayo\nKebi Ouest, Logone Occidental, Logone Oriental, Tandjilé and Mandoul. These consequences resulted in\nthe loss of agricultural land and livestock, and heightened risks to food security. In October 2022, authorities\nresponded by declaring a state of emergency and offering financial assistance to affected individuals,\nincluding refugees hosted in these rural areas, to meet their shelter and essential needs. Specific sites were\nidentified to temporally accommodate the displaced individuals irrespective of their status.\n\n**1.4** **Preparedness for refugee inflows**\n\nThe National Commission for the Reception, Reintegration of Refugees and Repatriates (Commission\nNationale d’Accueil de Réinsertion des Réfugiés et des Rapatriés, CNARR) remains the national institutional\nbody to respond to new refugee inflows. The four-year strategy of CNARR (2019-2023), which includes\nmobilization provisions in case of emergencies, continues to be applied. The CNARR continues to work\nwith UNHCR and other United Nations organizations to support and guide its response to refugee inflows,\nparticularly in cases of emergency.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Note:_ In panel A, active is status of mine in birth year; in panel B, active is active status of mine in survey year.\nRobust standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and district\nfixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS = ordinary least\nsquares.\n\nAn active mine is associated with a decrease in cough among children under age five (panel B\n\nof table 5), and children are also (insignificantly) more likely to have a health card. An active\n\nmine is associated with insignificant decreases in the anthropometrics measures (World Health\n\nOrganization measures in standard deviations), such as height-for-age and weight-for-age.\n\nHowever, the standard errors for these coefficients are very large relative to the estimated\n\ncoefficients, which is why the effects are imprecisely estimated.\n\n**5.3 Spatial heterogeneity of results**\n\nThus far we have used a cutoff distance of 20 km. Panel A of figure 4 shows that the largest\n\ntreatment effect for services for women is found within 10 km of a mine, with an 8 percentage\n\npoint increase in the probability that a woman works in the service sector. This is equivalent to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.12638066709041595}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**productive native women to increase their labour supply.**\nA caveat in the case of refugees from Ukraine is that this could mean working below their qualifications or in the informal sector, making the overall effect for productivity unclear.\nNevertheless, as availability of care and housework services increases, it becomes easier for women mainly to combine family and professional lives and increase labour supply.\nSuch effects may be stronger for countries with less accessible childcare. Furtado (2015) reviews this literature, finding evidence from Australia, Hong Kong, Italy, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States.\nAdditionally, Furtado (2016) in the USA in the 1980-2000 period finds that married women and women with graduate degrees increase their fertility in response to low-skilled immigration.\nResults are causal, as the author exploits the role of ethnic network in immigrant location decisions.\n\n40 41\n\n**Firms respond to immigrant inflows by introducing**\n\n**production technologies complementary to their skills, thus**\n\n**making their skill-group and potentially firms themselves**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Vocational or lower Secondary Higher Data is limited, but it appears refugees found work in sectors where the labour market was particularly tight. Publicly available data does not give the numbers of social security registrations of native workers by NACE sector. For this reason, in the absence of administrative data, to approximate the share of Ukrainian workers in particular sectors it was necessary to use Statistics Poland survey data. The share of workers with Ukrainian citizenship grew more in sectors that were experiencing the highest wage and salaries growth before refugee displacement. This eased their entry into the labour market.\nThe refugees were also quick to set-up their own businesses or become self-employed.\nAccommodation and food, as a sector, has been experiencing a particularly large growth in wages and salaries in 2021, as it re-opened after the Covid-19 pandemic, and subsequently it recorded a particularly large growth in the share of Ukrainian workers. Transportation has been the only sector in which the share and number of Ukrainian workers declined.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Statistics Poland survey"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Statistics Poland survey data", "confidence": 0.876573920249939}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "administrative data", "confidence": 0.11799008399248123}]}}}
{"input": "Second, panel regression analysis shows that a larger influx of Ukrainian refugees at the poviat level was accompanied by a larger increase in employment rates for Polish citizens along with a larger decrease in registered unemployment rates. The data sample for all regressions encompassed quarterly data for all 380 poviats from Q1 2022 to Q2 2024.\nThe Ukrainian refugee share variable was constructed as the share of Ukrainian refugees among all employed, temporarily employed, and self-employed persons insured with ZUS in a given poviat at the end of the quarter. The employment rate of Polish citizens was constructed as the share of Polish citizens who are employed, Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "quarterly data for all 380 poviats"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "quarterly data for all 380 poviats", "confidence": 0.40399399399757385}], "vague_data": [{"text": "quarterly data", "confidence": 0.8963997960090637}]}}}
{"input": "temporarily employed, and self-employed and who are insured with ZUS, divided by the population from GUS in a given poviat in a given quarter (estimated based on halfyear population data). The unemployment rate is the registered unemployment rate series from GUS. Fixed effects panel regressions show that an increase in the employment share of Ukrainian refugees by 1 percentage point correlates with an increase in Polish citizens' employment rates by 0.5% and a decrease in the unemployment rate by 0.3%, in the preferred specification with dummy variables for all quarters. All results are statistically significant at a 0.01 level.\n\n**Chart 26. Polish citizens employment rate** **Chart 27. Polish citizens unemployment rate**\n\nEurostat survey data, 20-64 age group Eurostat survey data, 20-64 age group 3.6% 83.8% 83.6% 83.2%\n\n**Chart 28. Effect of a 1 pp. change in employment share of Ukrainian refugees on**\n\nPanel model of all 380 poviats quarterly data from Q1 2022 to Q2 2024. Results are statistically significant at a 0.01 level.\n\nPolish citizens employment rate Unemployment rate\n\n1.0 1.0\n\n0 0\n\n-1.0 -1.0\n\n-2.0 -2.0\n\nNo time Seasonal Quarterly No time Seasonal Quarterly dummies dummies dummies dummies dummies dummies", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "registered unemployment rate series from GUS"}, {"text": "Eurostat survey data"}, {"text": "halfyear population data"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "halfyear population data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Eurostat survey data", "confidence": 0.8696663975715637}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "halfyear population data", "confidence": 0.18219219148159027}], "vague_data": [{"text": "halfyear population data", "confidence": 0.5936260223388672}]}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland © UNHCR / Anna Liminowicz\n\n# **3.** Economic impact modelling\n\nSimple back-of-the-envelope calculations give the intuition behind how additional workers help to grow the economy.\nThe simplest estimate would be to assume that an increase of employment by 1.4-2.2% will grow the Gross Domestic Product by an equal percentage. In such a case, we would need to assume that labour is the only production factor, and thus all of GDP can be equally divided between workers.\nHowever, this is not the case, as GDP is not just a function of labour, but also of capital that workers have at their disposal – all the machines, computer programs, offices, and the like. As displacement is unexpected and refugee status (both legal and intent to stay long term) at first is uncertain, companies take time to increase their stocks of capital to the new workers. A more elaborate estimate would account for the part of GDP Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Economic impact modelling**\nEconomic impact of Ukrainian refugees has been estimated in the general equilibrium Deloitte D.Climate model that accounts for their labour, consumption, and tax inputs.\nSuch models are a gold standard in policy modelling used by central banks, academia, and other institutions, because they can simulate counterfactual scenarios.\nThus, we can distinguish the positive labour market shock from the inflow of refugees and analyse various scenarios independently of all other recent macroeconomic developments (Chapter 3).\n\nWe find that refugees from Ukraine as workers, entrepreneurs, consumers, and taxpayers had a positive impact on economic output, which will increase in the long run. The Deloitte D.Climate general equilibrium model finds that refugees from Ukraine in the long-term will contribute 0.9-1.35% to the Gross Domestic Product.\nIn our model, the long-term is defined as the period over which the economy fully adjusts to the shock of the initial refugee inflow; it does not include other aspects, e.g. refugee children growing-up and entering labour market. These results are 08 09", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**downgrading.** With the median wages\nof Ukrainian refugees estimated at 84% (SEIS survey) or 80% (NBP 2024 survey) of the national median (see chapter 2), the difference for average wages may be even larger. This is because medians are insensitive to high earners who typically inflate average earnings. Such high earners may suffer significant downgrading considering the unfavourable occupational structure of Ukrainian refugees. There are many reasons to this, from occupational licensing to a high level of language fluency required by high-skill jobs. [28] Ukrainian Pre-war Other Polish refugees Ukrainians foreigners citizens Drivers (truck, bus) Teachers Medical professions (physician, dentist, nurse, midwife) Legal professions (legal counsel, barrister, notary, bailiff) Taxi drivers Others Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on ZUS data on June 30th 2024.\n\n26 As described in chapter 2, SEIS measures incomes on the household level. Using it to estimate individual wages likely underrepresents lowest and highest incomes.\nDetails are available in the Online Technical Appendix.\n\n27 Note that the GUS (2024) data for the host population is not exactly comparable, as it does not include microenterprises, it covers an earlier period and focuses on gross and average wages.\n\n28\n\n---\n[28] Lessem and Sanders (2020) modelled immigrant wage growth in the United States, finding that in a counterfactual model eliminating barriers to occupational entry", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey"}, {"text": "GUS (2024) data"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "NBP 2024 survey"}, {"text": "ZUS data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey", "confidence": 0.8611622452735901}, {"text": "NBP 2024 survey", "confidence": 0.7793974280357361}, {"text": "ZUS data", "confidence": 0.6217589974403381}, {"text": "GUS (2024) data", "confidence": 0.4216364920139313}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Recently arrived Ukrainian refugees,**\n\n**those with below tertiary education**\n\n**and in older age group are most**\n\n**likely to communicate in Polish at**\n\n**intermediate and lower levels.** Based\non the SEIS UNHCR survey, a logistic regression has been performed to find out which categories of Ukrainian refugees may most require Polish language improvement. [29] Results show that the odds of only zero to intermediate Polish knowledge decrease with every month since arrival. Ukrainian refugees in the 18 to 29 age group have the lowest odds of having an intermediate or lower level of Polish. It translates into a 38% probability, even lower than the 41% for refugees with tertiary education. The group with the highest odds (70% probability) of zero to intermediate Polish are Ukrainian refugees aged 50 to 64. The results by employment sectors are not statistically significant, other than for manufacturing. The results are intuitive, with the best language skills among refugees working in health and education, and the lowest among those working in construction, other services, and trade.\n\n**Addressing the gap in language**\n\n**fluency would yield significant**\n\n---\n[29] A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in case of none, beginner, or intermediate language knowledge, and 0 for other levels has been regressed against a", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey", "confidence": 0.9631158709526062}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "With the exception of Republic of Moldova, the poverty line for each country was defined as 50% of the median\n[equivalized disposable income (after social transfers) as reported by](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Equivalised_disposable_income) [Eurostat for 2023. This figure was indexed](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat) towards 2024 using national annual wage inflation data for the third quarter of 2024. As the Republic of Moldova does not currently run the SILC survey, the absolute poverty line as reported by the country’s National Bureau of Statistics was used instead. Host poverty rates were based on the same poverty threshold. With the except of Republic of Moldova, these were equal to the at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) rate reported by Eurostat. On\n\n**14**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SILC survey"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "national annual wage inflation data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SILC survey", "confidence": 0.7329850196838379}, {"text": "Eurostat", "confidence": 0.14209985733032227}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "national annual wage inflation data", "confidence": 0.5776135921478271}, {"text": "absolute poverty line", "confidence": 0.11606959998607635}], "vague_data": [{"text": "national annual wage inflation data", "confidence": 0.11500062048435211}]}}}
{"input": "**taxpayers** . Currently between 225 and\n350 thousand refugees from Ukraine are estimated to be working in Poland. The lower bound is the number from social security data, while the higher bound is the product of employment rate from the surveys and working age population with active PESEL UKR numbers (Chapter 2).\n\nStructural worker shortages, one of the lowest unemployment rates in the European Union, record high vacancies, and high education attainment of refugees eased their labour market integration. The number of Polish citizens aged 20-64 has declined by 2.6 million from its peak in early 2010. [7] Despite COVID-19 and geopolitical shocks, the unemployment rate oscillated in recent years around 3% in Poland, and in February 2022 only Czechia exhibited a lower rate in the EU. [8] In Q4‘2021 the share of companies reporting vacancies stood at 49%, the highest level on record, and has been slowly declining since then. [9] In July-August 2023, 56% of refugees declared possessing tertiary education and their employment rate has been almost one-third higher than for others. [10]\n\n---\n[7] According to the Labour Force Survey data from Eurostat.\n[8] According to the harmonized unemployment rates from Eurostat.\n[9] According to the quarterly NBP survey.\n[10] According to the UNHCR (2023) survey.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR (2023) survey"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "quarterly NBP survey"}, {"text": "Labour Force Survey data"}, {"text": "harmonized unemployment rates from Eurostat"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "social security data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR (2023) survey", "confidence": 0.7164003252983093}, {"text": "harmonized unemployment rates", "confidence": 0.44575026631355286}, {"text": "Labour Force Survey data", "confidence": 0.4419644773006439}, {"text": "quarterly NBP survey", "confidence": 0.3885842561721802}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "social security data", "confidence": 0.2008642703294754}, {"text": "employment rate from the surveys", "confidence": 0.12548990547657013}], "vague_data": [{"text": "social security data", "confidence": 0.6254720091819763}]}}}
{"input": "The Ukrainian refugee population also faces financial barriers to access critical services: one in ten households have no health insurance and 22 % of those surveyed answered that they cannot afford fees at local health care clinics. Households that contain a member with a disability are also more likely to be below the poverty line. This group’s poverty rate stands at 59% versus 43% for households with no members with disabilities.\n\n**Support with accommodation expenses – an**\n\n**important vulnerability shield**\nOverall, almost half (48%) of refugee households in the region report receiving accommodation or housing assistance. Twenty percent are living in With accommodation rent support Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Region\n\n1. Calculations for Moldova were not conducted, as this country is not\nincluded into the [EU statistics on income and living conditions (SILC)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-statistics-on-income-and-living-conditions)\n[survey, which the OECD uses as the basis for host country poverty](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-statistics-on-income-and-living-conditions) assessments 2. Results for the Czech Republic not individually presented due to sampling limitations 3. Accommodation rent support has been calculated as the difference between the actual equivalized accommodation expense and the median equivalized market rent in the region", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "EU statistics on income and living conditions"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "EU statistics on income and living conditions", "confidence": 0.7669224143028259}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "With partners, UNHCR continues to advocate with the Indonesian government at all levels and works\nto strengthen collaboration with coastal communities to ensure boats in distress at sea are rescued\nand able to disembark in Indonesia with adequate sites designated to host those who arrive by sea.\nIn addition to arrivals by sea, UNHCR continues to advocate with competent authorities when\ncontacted by individuals arriving by air if their right to seek asylum was denied at the airport.\n\n### **Resettlement Expectations**\n\nRefugees and authorities consider Indonesia to be a “transit country” prior to the realization of a\nsolution in a third country. The refugee assistance models established by the Comprehensive Plan of\nAction for Indochinese Refugees and the Regional Cooperation Agreement, as well as\ndisproportionately high resettlement opportunities from Indonesia when compared to opportunities\nfrom many other host countries, have perpetuated this narrative. The pervasive and persistent\nmisconception regarding the extent to which refugees are entitled to resettlement and the belief that,\nwith time, resettlement will be accessible for all refugees in the country has a negative impact on the\nrefugee population and the protection space in Indonesia.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Voluntary \r return \r is \r guided \r by \r internationally \r recognized \r standards, \r which \r inter \r alia\nprovide \r that \r refugees \r have \r the \r right \r to \r return \r voluntarily, \r in \r safety \r and \r dignity, \r to \r their\nown \r countries. \r A \r freely \r expressed \r wish \r to \r return \r by \r those \r displaced \r is \r a \r pre-­‐condition \r to\nany \r voluntary \r return. \r Recognized \r principles \r also \r include: \r taking \r measures \r to \r address\nany \r root \r causes \r of \r displacement \r (cross-­‐border \r and \r internal) \r by \r all \r parties \r to \r the \r past\nconflict; \r that \r refugees \r and \r IDPs \r have \r the \r right \r to \r freedom \r of \r movement \r and \r the \r right \r to\nreturn \r to \r their \r place \r of \r former \r residence \r or \r another \r place \r of \r their \r choice \r in \r the \r country\nof \r origin; \r and \r that \r UNHCR \r and \r partners \r have \r access \r to \r returnee \r areas \r in \r order \r to\nmonitor \r their \r return.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\nA \r set \r of \r standards \r and \r qualitative \r and \r quantitative \r indicators \r should \r be \r developed \r to\nmeasure \r progress \r toward \r the \r achievement \r of \r the \r reintegration \r objectives.\n\nThis \r section \r proposes \r various \r activities \r that \r should \r be \r considered \r to \r address \r immediate\nas \r well \r as \r longer-­‐term \r needs. \r UNHCR \r could \r take \r the \r lead \r on \r these \r activities \r or \r provide \r a\nco-­‐ordination \r or \r advocacy \r role, \r depending \r on \r the \r specific \r activity.\n\n**10.1.** **Phase \r 1 \r (current \r phase): \r Strengthening \r of \r IDP \r operations \r and**\n\n**preparation \r for \r refugee \r return \r while \r providing \r integrated**\n\n**assistance \r to \r spontaneous \r returnees**\n\n- Build \r on \r previously \r established \r co-­‐ordination \r mechanisms \r -­‐ \r such \r as \r monthly\ninter-­‐agency \r meetings \r at \r state \r level, \r the \r South-­‐East \r Consultation \r and \r cross-­‐\nborder \r meetings \r -­‐ \r to \r strengthen \r co-­‐ordination \r on \r durable \r solutions. \r Co-­‐\nordination \r systems \r shall \r facilitate \r respect \r for \r key \r protection \r and \r assistance\nstandards \r and \r enable \r the \r development \r of \r a \r strategic \r vision \r for \r durable \r solutions.\n\n- Strengthen \r information \r management \r and \r analysis \r capacities, \r including \r the\ndevelopment \r of \r tools \r to \r capture \r and \r analyse \r patterns \r of \r spontaneous \r returns\nand \r carry \r out \r protection \r assessments \r and \r monitoring. \r  \r  \r  \r Information \r products\nwill \r also \r aim \r at \r supporting \r informed \r decision-­‐making \r by \r refugees \r in \r Thailand.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Power BI Desktop Access to Basic Services Guaranteeing that IDPs have sustained access to essential services such as healthcare, education, water, and sanitation is vital to preventing dependence on humanitarianassistance.\nSimultaneously, ensuring the internally displaced are included in developing national systems, including protection programmes and services and development strategies, is vital for improving the living conditions and well-being of communities.\nPathway #2:", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The structure of the Ukrainian population in Poland changed radically after 24th February 2022. Up until 2021, Ukrainians in Poland were mostly men (close to two-thirds) looking for work, often leaving their families back in Ukraine. After the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, refugees fleeing the war started to arrive.\nThey were primarily women and children.\nThis is consistent with a change in the nature of migration flows, from primarily economic migrants to forcefully displaced refugees.\n\n**Chart 2.** Number of Ukrainian men and women registered in Poland for social security.\n\n800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2021 Q42 022 Q4 2023 Q3 Number of insured men with Ukrainian citizenship Number of insured women with Ukrainian citizenship", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "4. Access to National Public Services\n\nIn practical terms, a formal State led system for recognizing foreign diplomas of refugees and foreigners does\nexist through an authentication mechanism led by the National Office for Higher Education Examinations\nand Competitions (Office National des Examens et Concours du Supérieur - ONECS). Regarding driving\nlicenses, only Chadian driving licenses can be obtained through ANATS after fulfilling ANATS requirements.\n\n### **4. Access to National Public Services**\n\nThe new asylum legislation guarantees the right to health, education, public assistance and public relief for\nrefugees and asylum-seekers in possession of their individual documentation on par with nationals of Chad.\n\n**4.1** **Education**\n\nArticle 21 of the [2020 Asylum Law](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf) specifies that every refugee or asylum-seeker in possession of individual\ndocumentation enjoys the right to education and vocational training under the same conditions as nationals.\n[The same is reiterated by Article 65 of the 2023 Decree. Despite not explicitly mentioning asylum-seekers](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)\nin its wording, Article 32 of the 2020 Law and Article 75 of the 2023 Decree should be interpreted in the\nspirit of Article 21 of the law and Article 65 of the Decree that asylum-seekers are equally entitled to the\nsame treatment as nationals regarding education.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The government of Brazil has taken steps towards the recognition of the central role played by\nlocal authorities in protecting and promoting local integration of forcibly displaced persons. In\nNovember 2023 the Ministry of Justice and Public Security has launched the \"National Network\nof Welcoming Cities - Red Nacional de Cidades Acolhedoras\" with the objective of strengthening\ndialogue and actions around public policies and programs for migrants, refugees and stateless\npeople. UNHCR has since 2020 being supporting the Cities of Solidarity initiative in Brazil helping\nsharing experiences among the network of cities forming part of initiative and has recognized best\npractices from 17 municipalities.\n\nIn recent year, Brazil has experienced an increasing number of climate disasters, which have been\nmore frequent and severe and have been affecting a growing number of people, including\npopulations already displaced in Brazil. The Government is developing a Climate Plan as well as\nrisk reduction, adaptation, and resilience plans, which takes into account displacement impact;\nwhile the legislative branch is discussing bills to regulate and respond to internal displacement.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland impacts of immigration reviewed in the This outcome is rather modest compared Appendix. [19 ] Because marginal productivity to a cross-country panel model estimated of capital remained the same and the in an IMF report, in which a 1.7% Ukrainian\n\n## 3. population of Poland increased more refugee share in the adult population of\n\nthan the number of workers (primarily by Poland should eventually result in about Ukrainian refugee children), the impact on 3.4% higher GDP per capita (Jaumotte GDP per capita has been smaller – at 0.2%. et al., 2016).\n\n## Economic impact of Chart 17. Gross domestic product growth paths with and without Ukrainian refugees\n\nDeloitte D.Climate model calibrated to the Ministry of Finance GDP growth forecast.\n\n140\n\n## Ukrainian refugees\n\nimpacts of immigration reviewed in the Appendix. [19 ] Because marginal productivity of capital remained the same and the population of Poland increased more than the number of workers (primarily by Ukrainian refugee children), the impact on GDP per capita has been smaller – at 0.2%.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Ministry of Finance GDP growth forecast", "confidence": 0.2926332652568817}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "cross-country panel model", "confidence": 0.19478870928287506}], "vague_data": [{"text": "cross-country panel model", "confidence": 0.40978431701660156}]}}}
{"input": "_Note:_ Figure 5 shows the main treatment coefficients ( _active*mine_ ) using the baseline estimation strategy (with\nDHS individual-level data; see table 4 for more information) in the top panel, but with different cutoffs (10 km,\n20 km, 30 km, 40 km, and 50 km). *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. The bottom panel shows the result using a\nspatial lag model that divided the plane into different treatment bins (0–10, 10–20, 20–30, 40–50) and compares\nthem with farther away. Panel A shows the result for nonmigrants, and panel B shows the result for migrants.\n\n**6.2 Access to infrastructure and health care**\n\nAnother source of heterogeneity is asset ownership and access to infrastructure. Table 8 shows\n\nthat fewer households have electricity in active mining communities, but they spend less time\n\nfetching water and are more likely to own a radio (all estimates are statistically insignificant,\n\nhowever). There is no change in the likelihood of having a flush toilet. Moreover, it seems that\n\nhouseholds are just as likely to have access to a pit toilet as not having a toilet (and instead\n\nuse a bucket, bush, and so forth).\n\n**Table 8 OLS estimates for ownership of assets and access to infrastructure**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS individual-level data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS individual-level data", "confidence": 0.7806753516197205}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "To facilitate trend monitoring, the questionnaires were standardized across all countries, ensuring consistency in the majority of indicators between 2023 and 2024. Since the 2023 regional survey did not include data from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, values for these countries were excluded from the 2023–2024 comparison. To maintain accuracy, only valid responses were included in the calculations, with responses such as ‘prefer not to answer’ or ‘do not know’ excluded. To facilitate interpretation, certain response options were consolidated into broader categorical variables.\n\nTo protect data privacy and maintain confidentiality, informed consent was obtained and documented from all participants, with clear explanations provided regarding the purpose and use of the data. The complete questionnaires, along with the consolidated anonymized dataset, are available in the [UNHCR Microdata Library.](https://microdata.unhcr.org/index.php/catalog/?page=1&from=2023&to=2024&region%5B%5D=3&ps=100)\n\n# Limitations\n\nThis analysis has several limitations that should be considered when interpreting the findings. First, due to sampling constraints (lack of complete sampling frame) and the non-probabilistic selection of respondents, the results may not fully represent the entire Ukrainian refugee population. Additionally, the choice of sampling locations may have introduced a bias toward more vulnerable segments of the population. Variations in sampling approaches and data collection periods across countries can also affect comparability.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2023 regional survey", "confidence": 0.5484582781791687}, {"text": "UNHCR Microdata Library", "confidence": 0.14031456410884857}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "consolidated anonymized dataset", "confidence": 0.2478436678647995}, {"text": "2023 regional survey", "confidence": 0.1688161939382553}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**in Poland.** According to the SEIS survey,\nUkrainian refugees with master’s and PhD degrees earn a 22% higher median net wage than those with only secondary education. This appears to be a small gain, even accounting for the fact that, generally, the differences between median wages are less pronounced than between average wages (which are pulled higher by top incomes) and that our method of wage estimation based on SEIS household incomes [26] flattens the distribution.\nAccording to the most recent estimate in October 2022, in the economy as a whole, the average gross wage of master’s and PhD degree holders was 84% higher than those with only secondary education. [27]\n\n**Most Ukrainian refugees work in**\n\n**a different sector than previously**\n\n**in Ukraine, which also points to**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey"}, {"text": "SEIS household incomes"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey", "confidence": 0.9022924900054932}, {"text": "SEIS household incomes", "confidence": 0.478899747133255}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "As of the end of 2023, 5.9 million refugees from Ukraine were recorded across Europe, close to 2 million of whom are in the countries covered by the\n[Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP)](https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/105903) [5] . To better understand their evolving situation, unpack risks and vulnerabilities and inform planning across sectors, Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessments (MSNA) were conducted under the RRP between June and September 2023 by UNHCR’s Regional Bureau for Europe and its Inter-Agency partners. This publication focuses on the results for livelihoods and socio-economic inclusion and attempts to draw conclusions based on survey data of 11,496 households (and 26,857 individuals) living in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.\n\n### **Socio-economic** **inclusion – key** **findings**\n\n**Refugee households demonstrate a high degree**\n\n**of economic vulnerability**\nThe MSNA survey data demonstrates that refugee households from Ukraine are characterized by a high degree of economic vulnerability. On an individual basis, half live with an equivalized disposable income [6] that falls below 50% of the host population median [7] (a commonly used poverty threshold). This contrasts with just 9% of nationals belonging to the same income bracket.\n\n**THE POVERTY RATE** **[1]** **OF REFUGEES VERSUS HOST**\n\n---\n[7] Based on [OECD data from 2021, which was indexed by the CPI for 2022 and 2023 for each respective country](https://stats.oecd.org/)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA survey data"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey data of 11,496 households"}, {"text": "OECD data from 2021"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA survey data", "confidence": 0.4877943992614746}, {"text": "OECD data", "confidence": 0.45470166206359863}, {"text": "Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessments", "confidence": 0.139517143368721}, {"text": "Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP)", "confidence": 0.1118914783000946}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "OECD data from 2021", "confidence": 0.4506484866142273}, {"text": "MSNA survey data", "confidence": 0.29621732234954834}, {"text": "survey data of 11,496 households", "confidence": 0.10023479163646698}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data", "confidence": 0.9244277477264404}]}}}
{"input": "The high employment rate of refugees in Poland covers not only employees, but also entrepreneurs. Five percent of Ukrainian refugees registered for social security have set up a business or work as freelancers. Similar results can be gleaned from the Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey results, which show that slightly more than 5% of respondent households receive income from selfemployment or similar activities.\n\nAll broad sectors of the economy saw an increase in the number of workers with Ukrainian citizenship and social insurance since 2021, apart from storage and transportation. The number increased the most in manufacturing (almost by 34 thousand), accommodation and food (more than 18 thousand), and wholesale and retail trade (more than 18 thousand). [11] While public data does not distinguish between refugees entering these sectors and pre-2022 Ukrainian workers changing jobs, it is largely consistent with the MSNA Poland 2023 survey, in which the most refugees are employed in manufacturing (14%), accommodation and food service (12%), and trade and repair (6%).\n\nUkrainian refugee households in Poland\n\n---\n[11] According to the social security data until 30th September 2023.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "social security data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey", "confidence": 0.8845961093902588}, {"text": "Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey", "confidence": 0.688778281211853}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "social security data until 30th September 2023", "confidence": 0.337862491607666}], "vague_data": [{"text": "social security data", "confidence": 0.2875707447528839}, {"text": "public data", "confidence": 0.2469949871301651}]}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n**BARRIERS TO ACCESSING SRH SERVICES**\n\nLong waiting times Could not afford transport Lack of knowledge Could not afford clinic fee Unable make appointment Language barrier Could not afford hospital Do not trust local provider Lack health insurance No means of transport (N=363) 33% 23% 22% 19% 18% 15% 12% 11% 10% 7% In urban areas, financial barriers, such as transportation costs and clinic fees, were the most reported obstacles to accessing SRH services. In contrast, women in rural settings faced challenges primarily related to knowledge of services, appointment-making and language barriers.\n\n**Barriers in accessing SRH care for different**\n\n**groups**\nThe number of respondents who faced barriers in accessing SRH services in the adolescent, youth, pregnant and breastfeeding women, and persons with disabilities categories was low, and data needs to be interpreted with caution. However, the findings offer valuable insights into the experiences of individuals in these categories.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Many of the refugees that settled in Poland remain in special needs or otherwise precarious households. According to the MSNA Poland 2023 survey, nearly half of all refugee households have a person with a chronic illness, while in nearly 10% there is a disabled person (Washington Group level 3 disability). In over a third of all households is a single parent and over a fifth houses an elderly person (10% of households are comprised of exclusively elderly people).\n\nhouseholds with persons with chronic ilness households with a single parent households with one or more older persons households with disabled individuals households exclusively with elderly", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey", "confidence": 0.9378558993339539}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1. Host Communities\n\nEven though the [Law 021-PR-2019 on legal aid and judicial assistance was enacted in 2019, its implementation](https://www.refworld.org/docid/609f00834.html)\nhas been stalled due to the absence of an implementing Decree. Chad is planning to commit to adopting\nthis Decree at the 2023 December Global Forum on Refugees.\n\nFurthermore, it also important to note that the new asylum legislation enacted during the prescribed period\nhas also incorporated a few provisions to promote peaceful coexistence including through securing the\nright of refugees and asylum-seekers to access State legal aid services to prevent and/or resolve conflict.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Citizenship and Immigration Act to remove the time-limitation for registration of stateless persons and align the\n\ndefinition of a stateless person with the definition in the 1954 Convention; acceding to the two UN statelessness\n\nconventions and ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Specific\n\nAspects of the Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa; enhancing birth registration\n\nsystems to prevent future statelessness; simplifying procedures for nationality application and documentation; and\n\nimplementing community outreach programs to raise awareness about the rights and entitlements of citizenship.\n\nThe Kenyan government is also encouraged to continue its leadership on this issue by advocating for regional and\n\ninternational cooperation to address statelessness, including sharing best practices and lessons learned from its\n\nnational experience.\n\n**4. Promote international collaboration and investment to support stateless populations in gaining nationality and**\n\n**legal identity and accessing essential services.**\n\nGovernments, international organizations, and development agencies should work together to ensure stateless\n\nindividuals receive the support needed to obtain nationality and legal documentation. This includes nationality law\n\nand policy changes enabling stateless people to acquire nationality, investing in robust and inclusive civil registration", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "birth registration\n\nsystems", "confidence": 0.15863026678562164}]}}}
{"input": "**violence**\nServices for survivors of gender-based violence encompass a range of functions, including safety and security, legal assistance, healthcare, mental health and psychosocial support. A critical component is access to clinical management of rape to ensure timely medical treatment and care.\nAs this service is provided by the health care sector, as part of SRH, it is included in this analysis.\n\nThe SEIS identified gaps in awareness about on available GBV services. In 2024, 38% of respondents were unaware of health services providing support to GBV survivors in their area, while 58% were unaware of available psychosocial support services. Respondents were less aware of health services in rural areas (45%) compared to urban areas (37%). Key barriers to accessing GBV-related services in general included lack of awareness (58%), language and cultural barriers (53%) and stigma/ shame (46%). This indicates that additional coordinated efforts between the health, protection and GBV working groups and partners are required to enable access to all lifesaving GBV-related services including clinical management of rape.\n\n**17**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Indonesia’s new president and vice president were inaugurated in October 2024. This new\ngovernment offers an opportunity to renew and expand Indonesia’s humanitarian leadership on\nrefugee issues. The country is a regional and global power – the fourth largest country by population\nin the world, the largest majority Muslim country in the world, the largest economy in southeast Asia,\nand recent leadership roles as the President of the G20 and the Chair of ASEAN. Advocacy efforts will\nseek to ensure Indonesia does not solely embrace political, economic, and military leadership, but that\nthe country also showcases independent humanitarian leadership – particularly on refugee issues.\n\n### **UN Common Pledge**\n\nThe UN Common Pledge offers new opportunities to strengthen the protection environment in\nIndonesia. At the 2023 Global Refugee Forum, several agencies in the UN Country Team (UNHCR, IOM,\nUNFPA, WHO, UNDP, ILO, UNICEF, FAO, and UNESCO) pledged to provide guidance, technical support,\nand advocacy to enable refugee inclusion in Indonesia in four key areas: education, health, selfreliance, and birth registration. UNHCR will work closely with these agencies in 2024 and beyond to\nsecure inclusive policies and an enabling protection environment in the country.\n\n### **Enhancing Engagement with Refugees**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In effect, immigrants increase not just the size of the economy, that is the gross domestic product, but its productivity as well. While this has been well documented on the macroeconomic level, showing the existence of the effect, the exact channels remain unclear. Jaumotte et al. (2016) in an IMF report show that an increase of 1 percentage point in the share of immigrants in the adult population increases GDP per capita by 2% in a sample of 18 developed OECD countries during the period from 1980 to 2010. It should be noted that this model would yield much higher estimates for Ukrainian refugees than those presented in this appendix, given that they currently constitute 2% of Poland’s adult population. Aleksynska and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**tant participated in a two-day MHPSS**\n\n**coaching organized by PAHO and led**\n\n**by an international IASC consultant.**\n\nThis coaching, held during the second\n\nweek of October, aimed to strengthen the\n\nMental Health and Psychosocial Support\n\nTechnical Working Group’s role by eval\nuating its work plan, achievements, and\n\nthe next steps. The coaching agenda\n\nintended to bring accompaniment and\n\nadvice to people with coordination\n\nfunctions for the implementation of an\n\nMHPSS strategy in their organizations,\n\nagencies, and clusters.\n\nThese efforts represent a significant\n\ninter-institutional initiative to empower\n\nprofessionals in the field, providing\n\nknowledge and tools essential for effi\ncient organizational functionality during\n\nhumanitarian emergencies. Following\n\nthese activities, the working group plans\n\nto implement its work plan, emphasizing\n\nMHPSS as a cross-cutting topic in the\n\nhumanitarian architecture.\n\n**XIV. Impact Stories of Series:**\n\n**September and October**\n\n_a. Premiere Urgence Internationale (PUI)_\n\n_(September):_ The subnational cluster of\n\nBolívar, in coordination with the national\n\nPC, visited PUI's activities in Casaco\nima, Delta Amacuro state. PUI's project\n\nfocuses on improving living conditions\n\nthrough mental health, physical health,\n\nand WASH. Beneficiaries of the project\n\nwere interviewed for a better under\nstanding of the projects’ impact. The\n\ninterviews confirmed how mental and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "While there have been some important advancements in refugee inclusion in Indonesia, the\ncharacterization of the refugee experience in Indonesia as a transient one creates little impetus for\npolicy makers to develop comprehensive and inclusive protection policies. For refugees, resettlement\nexpectations have discouraged engagement in constructive experiences in Indonesia, including\neducation, training, skills building, and self-empowerment opportunities; fostered a sense of\nunfairness, anxiety, and frustration; led to a deterioration in mental health; and eroded trust in UNHCR\nand partners.  UNHCR’s efforts to work with and for the refugee community are also undermined by\nthe unique focus on resettlement in the country, impacting outreach and communication efforts, the\nprioritization of human and financial resources, staff security, and programming.\n\n### **Lack of Access to Opportunities for Economic Empowerment**\n\nRefugees are unable to work legally in Indonesia, creating economic vulnerabilities and compounding\nprotection risks for the refugee population. In addition to economic insecurity, lack of access to work\nimpacts refugees in a number of ways: informal work experiences may render refugees vulnerable to\n\nUNHCR / 1 November 2024 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "UNHCR will continue to expand the ways in which we engage with refugees in 2024 and 2025. A\ncornerstone of these activities is the rollout of the Digital Gateway, a corporate self-service tool being\npiloted in Indonesia that will address many of the concerns of the refugee community, as well as the\ngeographic challenges in Indonesia, by providing a platform through which refugees can remotely\ncommunicate with UNHCR, view their bio-data, update contact information, book appointments for\nservices, and obtain updates on case processing status.\n\nIn addition to the Digital Gateway, UNHCR is strengthening tools of engagement and communication\nwith the refugee community following several years of more limited contact resulting from COVID\nrestrictions and security challenges in the field. These initiatives include re-instituting walk-in\ncounseling at the UNHCR reception center; revitalizing the UNHCR HELP website; expanding refugee\nTown Halls to respond to queries and share information; undertaking regular outreach missions to\n\nUNHCR / 1 November 2024 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "bio-data", "confidence": 0.25900861620903015}]}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS REPORTED WITH A CHRONIC ILLNESS**\n\n**AND THOSE WITH DISABILITY LEVEL 3 AND ABOVE**\n\nChronicle illness Disability level 3 and above\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITY BY AGE AND GENDER**\n\nFemale Male 23% 23% Regional Czechia Estonia Lithuania Latvia Poland Slovakia Hungary Bulgaria Moldova Romania 3% 3% 5-17 18-34 35-59 60+ years old (N=18,679) Regionally, 26% of individuals self-reported a chronic illness (5,384 individuals out of a sample of 19,622), with rates ranging from 17% in Czechia to 34% in Moldova and Romania, closely followed by Bulgaria at 32%. Chronic illnesses increase with age, with 77% of individuals over 60 reporting a chronic condition (78% of women, 72% of men).\nRegionally, women above the age of 35 selfreported a higher rate of chronic illness compared to men.\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WITH CHRONIC ILLNESS BY AGE AND**\n\n**GENDER**\n\nFemale Male (Chronic Illness N=19,622, Disability N=18,679)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## **HELPING HANDS** THE ROLE OF HOUSING SUPPORT AND EMPLOYMENT FACILITATION IN ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n#### An inter-agency exploration of socio-economic data April 2024", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "socio-economic data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "socio-economic data", "confidence": 0.9824448227882385}]}}}
{"input": "and other forms of violence. Beneficia\nries mentioned that they feel grateful for\n\nall the work of FPM and wish that more\n\ncommunities could benefit from such\n\nsensitizations and trainings, which are\n\nrelevant to the daily realities they expe\nrience.\n\n[Full access to the story through this link.](https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/publications/1689/reports/report/historias-de-impacto-de-socios-cluster-de-proteccion-octubre-2023)\n\n**XV. Protection Service Mapping**\n\n**Revisions and Edits**\n\n**In line with the Protection Cluster’s**\n\n**efforts to guarantee a functioning and**\n\n**updated service mapping, together**\n\n**with the UNHCR IM Unit, the Pro-**\n\n**tection Service Mapping database**\n\n**underwent a comprehensive review**\n\n**and** **update** **in** **September** **and**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**REFUGEE VS HOST EMPLOYMENT RATES BY COUNTRY**\n\nRefugee (2023) Refugee (2024) Host (2023) 76% 76% 76% 62% Bulgaria Czechia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia Region Note: For comparability, employment rates for host countries have been recalculated assuming a similar gender distribution to that of refugees Source: ILO, survey data 14. The employment rate is defined as the number of employed or self-employed individuals of working age (15-64) as a share of the total number of people in this age group 15. The labor force is defined as the number of people that are either employed or unemployed\n\n**10**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ILO, survey data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ILO, survey data", "confidence": 0.25909826159477234}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data", "confidence": 0.531215250492096}]}}}
{"input": "3. Economic Opportunities\n\ncountry, most Chadians traditionally obtain land through the family or lineage, following the principle of\nfirst occupancy and, for women, through marriage.\n\nIn practice, refugees have access to agricultural land through sharecropping, loans or leases.\n\nIt is important to note that before the enactment of the new asylum legislation and in the absence of clear\nrules, refugees theoretically had the right to purchase land. However, this was challenging due to the\nprevalence of the traditional ownership system, their inability to produce financial documents and other\nadministrative obstacles.\n\nIn practical terms, refugees continue to encounter greater challenges than nationals in accessing large,\nfertile land parcels due to their distance from the camps. When engaging in sharecropping agreements\n(métayage), refugees are required to share a portion of the harvest with the landowner or pay rent for\nthese lands, which can sometimes amount to 50,000 FCFA per hectare per year.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "surrounding communities. [ [3], [4]] Acquiring citizenship, brings the promise of improved employment and earnings, [[5]]\n\nespecially among women and the poorest, [[6]] while also offering broader social and economic benefits, as increases\n\nin talent, skills and taxation accompany legalization.\n\n**Since 2014, more than 500,000 stateless people have acquired a nationality globally.** Statelessness for many\n\nothers has been prevented as a result of efforts to improve birth registration and issuance of nationality documents\n\nto populations at risk of statelessness and legislative changes, including those that eliminate discrimination on the\n\nbasis of gender, allowing women to pass on nationality to their children on an equal basis as men, However,\n\nacceleration of efforts is needed to ensure that everyone can enjoy the fundamental right to a nationality, which\n\noften enables the enjoyment of other rights and full participation in the society.\n\n**Kenya has emerged as a global leader in the eradication of statelessness, setting an example for other nations**\n\n**through its continued efforts to reduce the number of stateless persons within its borders.** The country has made\n\nsignificant strides, beginning with the recognition of 1,496 members of the Makonde community as nationals of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "birth registration", "confidence": 0.43890658020973206}, {"text": "nationality documents", "confidence": 0.26813462376594543}]}}}
{"input": "Despite a historically enabling environment for refugees and other forcibly displaced in Chad, the lack of\na specific refugee legal framework has been a longstanding issue. The new 2020 asylum Law contributed\nto addressing this vacuum and enhances the existing national institutional framework for the protection\n[of refugees and asylum-seekers assumed by CNARR, as established by the 2011 Decree establishing the](https://www.refworld.org/docid/609efe754.html)\n[National Commission for the Reception, Reintegration of Refugees and Returnees](https://www.refworld.org/docid/609efe754.html) (Décret n°839/PR/PM/\nMAT/2011, CNARR). This latter remains in force given the role played by CNARR to supervise the refugee\nmanagement in the country. The new asylum Law clarifies the principles applicable to refugees and asylumseekers to ensure their protection and provides a legal basis for their civil and socio-economic rights, including\nfreedom of movement, access to justice, the right to work, healthcare, education and land. Additionally, the\nnew asylum Law grants refugees the same rights as Chadian citizens regarding education, healthcare and\nsocial protection. It also provides for the recognition of the refugee identity card as a residence permit.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "refugee identity card", "confidence": 0.42398467659950256}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "individuals in the East, Horn, and Great Lakes of Africa region, as well as the millions of stateless people globally,\n\ndemonstrating that resolving statelessness is not only a matter of human rights but also of inclusive economic\n\ndevelopment.\n\n## **Recommendations**\n\n**1. Develop holistic, long-term policy frameworks that address the socioeconomic and human rights dimensions of**\n\n**statelessness.**\n\nNational governments and international stakeholders should adopt inclusive development policies that go beyond\n\nlegal recognition to ensure the full social and economic integration of stateless and formerly stateless populations.\n\nThis entails ensuring equitable access to education, healthcare, employment, and social protection services for\n\nnewly recognized citizens. Governments should be encouraged to introduce targeted social safety nets and\n\nemployment support programs to reduce poverty and promote resilience among stateless and formerly stateless\n\ngroups. UNHCR and the World Bank, in partnership with national governments and NGOs, can provide technical\n\n**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "This communication contains general information only, and none of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited (“DTTL”), its global network of member firms or their related entities (collectively, the “Deloitte organization”) is, by means of this communication, rendering professional advice or services. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your finances or your business, you should consult a qualified professional adviser.\n\nNo representations, warranties or undertakings (express or implied) are given as to the accuracy or completeness of the information in this communication, and none of DTTL, its member firms, related entities, employees or agents shall be liable or responsible for any loss or damage whatsoever arising directly or indirectly in connection with any person relying on this communication. DTTL and each of its member firms, and their related entities, are legally separate and independent entities.\n\n© 2025. For information, contact Deloitte Poland.\n\n**Scan the QR code**\n\n**and download**\n\n**the report!**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "QR code", "confidence": 0.20668922364711761}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "QR code", "confidence": 0.15259619057178497}]}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES\n\n**REGIONAL REFUGEE EMPLOYMENT RATE BY LEVEL OF**\n\n**LOCAL LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE (2024)**\n\nEmployment rate Share of the refugee population (rhs) 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 35% Does not understand Beginner Intermediate Advanced Fluent Source: Survey data The 2024 survey introduced a new question on local language proficiency, reinforcing previous findings of a strong correlation between language skills and employment. Respondents with at least an intermediate level of local language proficiency reported nearly twice the employment rate compared to those with no knowledge (9% of respondents). Even Ukrainians with only a basic understanding—limited to a few words or phrases (28% of the sample)—experienced a notable increase in employment compared to those with no local language skills [16] .\n\nFinally, unlike for the host population, refugee employment rates were found to be practically the same for all education levels above technical or vocational [17], implying that local employment markets may not be valuing advanced degrees. Possible explanations include impediments to foreign qualifications recognition and other barriers that are preventing placement into high-skilled jobs (such as language, a mismatch between qualifications and local demand, etc.).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "The 2024 survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 survey", "confidence": 0.279422402381897}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.9384920597076416}]}}}
{"input": "# **Population** **Data Analysis**\n\n### **Regional Bureau** **for Southern Africa**\n\n**September 2022**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In 2023, the national utilization rate was 0.31 new consultations per inhabitant per year, while in the camps, it\nstood at 1.2 new consultations per refugee per year. This indicates that healthcare access is more favourable\nin the camps than host populations. The disparity can be attributed partially to improved geographical access\nin the camps, but more significantly, it is driven by financial factors. Notably, healthcare is provided free of\ncharge in refugee camps, whereas state facilities require fees for healthcare services. For refugees living\noutside the camps, UNHCR, through its health partner, has signed agreements with state health centers for\nfree access, with costs covered by partners under UNHCR’s budget.\n\nSexual and reproductive healthcare is integrated into the package of services offered in refugee camps\ncovered by UNHCR and partners’ budget. As of June 2023, the rate of assisted childbirth was 91% in the\nrefugee camps.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "While the majority of people were able to access health care services, 17% were unable to access needed care across the region. The unmet need was reported highest in Romania (28%), Hungary (22%), and Slovakia (21%).\n\nRegionally, unmet health needs were higher for individuals with chronic illnesses compared to those without chronic illnesses (21% vs 12%) and higher compared to 2023 (15% vs 10%). Similarly, unmet\n\n**11**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Attempts to access support differed by age, with caregivers of the youngest age group (5–11 years) being the most likely to seek support on their behalf, while older persons less often attempted to access support. In addition, in both 2023 and 2024, there were consistent gender differences in attempts to access support. In all age groups except children under 11, females attempted to access support more often than males. The gender gap in seeking support was most pronounced in the older age groups: among individuals aged 35-59, 47% of women tried to access services compared to only 31% of men, suggesting potential social and cultural", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**% OF INDIVIDUALS EXPERIENCED HEALTH PROBLEM IN**\n\n**LAST 30 DAYS BY GENDER AND AGE**\n\nFemale Male\n\n### **Access to care**\n\nRegionally, of the individuals who experienced health problems 30 days prior to the survey, 83% were able to obtain care, compared to 88% in 2023.\nWith host countries continuing to implement necessary legislation that allows refugees access to health care, reported access to health services has remained above 70% in all countries. However, after three years of the crisis, a steady improvement in access has been seen in only a few countries notably Bulgaria and Czechia. Notably, access to needed care was highest in Latvia and Czechia at 94%.\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WITH ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES**\n\n**(OUT OF THOSE WHO REPORTED A HEALTH PROBLEM IN**\n\n**THE LAST 30 DAYS)**\n\nObtained health services Unmet health care need Regional Latvia Czechia Estonia Bulgaria Moldova Poland Lithuania Slovakia Hungary Romania (N=6,108) 83% 94% 94% 88% 86% 85% 83% 83% 79% 78% 72% 17% 14% 15% 17% 17% 21% 22% 28% 6% 6% 12% 0-4 5-17 18-34 35-59 60+ years old (N=19,637)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "calculate from each mine location to each DHS cluster. This is also the distance measure that\n\nwe use to create the “mine” dummy, which captures whether the cluster lies within 20 km of a\n\nknown gold deposit. Note that we only consider deposits that have been in production at some\n\npoint until December 2012.\n\nAll households are thus within 100 km of one, or several, gold deposits. To ascertain whether\n\nthere is any gold production in these potential mining sites, we construct an indicator variable\n\n_active_, which takes a value of 1 if there is at least one mine within 100 km that was extracting\n\ngold in the year the household was surveyed, and 0 otherwise. While the _mine_ dummy captures\n\nsome of the special characteristics of mining areas (for example, whether mines tend to open in\n\nless urban areas), the _active_ dummy captures long-range spillovers of mining.\n\nThe treatment effect that we are mostly interested in is captured with the _active*mine_\n\ncoefficient. The coefficient for _β3_ tells us what the effect of being close to an actively producing\n\nmine is. Since the inclusion of the three dummies ( _active_, _mine_, and _active*mine_ ) captures the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.16502580046653748}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "work, and the likelihood increases by 5.4 percentage points, which is equal to a 6 percent\n\nincrease.\n\nWhile the directionality of the occupational outcomes is broadly in line with previous results\n\n(Kotsadam and Tolonen, 2016, for 29 African countries, and Benshaul-Tolonen, 2018, for 8\n\nAfrican gold-producing countries), the estimates are largely insignificant, potentially due to a\n\nlimited sample size. Two categories have positive, albeit insignificant, coefficients: services\n\nand manual labor. The (insignificant) estimate for service jobs [9] is equivalent to 6.7% increased\n\nemployment, and manual labor 10.2%, alongside which the likelihood that a woman earns cash\n\nfor her work increases with 6%.\n\nFor men (panel B of table 4), the estimates point toward an increase in agriculture, services,\n\nand professional (all statistically insignificant estimates), but a decreased likelihood of working\n\nin manual labor. Results for men in panel B are largely insignificant, and it is worthwhile noting\n\nthat the sample size is only slightly above 50% than the women sample size due to DHS\n\nsampling frame.\n\n**Table 4 OLS estimates women’s and men’s occupation in the DHS individual-level analysis**\n\nOccupation\n\n---\n[9] Service sector jobs in the wake of structural transformation has been found important in", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS\n\nsampling frame", "confidence": 0.2071949988603592}, {"text": "DHS individual-level analysis", "confidence": 0.17738452553749084}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Peri, G. (2012). The effect of immigration on productivity: Evidence from US states. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(1), 348-358.\n\nPeri, G. (2014). Do immigrant workers depress the wages of native workers? IZA World of Labor, 42.\n\nPeri, G. (2016). Immigrants, productivity, and labor markets. Journal of economic perspectives, 30(4), 3-30.\n\nPeri, G., & Sparber, C. (2009). Task specialization, immigration, and wages.\nAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(3), 135-169.\n\nPeterson, B. D., Pandya, S. S., & Leblang, D. (2014). Doctors with borders: occupational licensing as an implicit barrier to high skill migration. Public Choice, 160(1-2), 45–63. doi:10.1007/s11127-014-0152-8 Schmid, L. (2023). The impact of host language proficiency on migrants’ employment outcomes. American Economic Review: Insights, 5(4), 477-493.\n\nSohst, R., Tirado, T., Salgado, L., & Slootjes, J. (2024). Exploring Refugees’ Intentions to Return to Ukraine: Data Insights and Policy Responses.\nInternational Organization for Migration and Migration Policy Institute Europe.\n\nStrzelecki, P., Growiec, J., & Wyszyński, R. (2022). The contribution of immigration from Ukraine to economic growth in Poland. Review of World Economics, 158(2), 365-399.\n\nTokariuk, O. (2025). Ukraine’s fight for its people. Strategies for refugee and diaspora engagement, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House, February.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**4.2** **Health care**\n\n[Article 21 of the Asylum Law](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf) stipulates that every refugee or asylum seeker is entitled to the right to health\nunder the same conditions as nationals.\n\nDuring the prescribed period, Chad has developed a new [National Health Development Plan for 2022-](https://www.afro.who.int/fr/countries/chad/publication/plan-national-de-developpement-sanitaire-pnds-4-2022-2030#:~:text=PLAN%20NATIONAL%20DE%20DEVELOPPEMENT%20SANITAIRE%20(PNDS%204)%202022%2D2030,-Le%20Minist%C3%A8re%20de&text=Le%20PNDS4%20est%20le%20dernier,des%20Objectifs%20de%20D%C3%A9veloppement%20Durable.)\n[2030, aiming to establish an integrated, efficient, resilient, and person-centered health system. This plan](https://www.afro.who.int/fr/countries/chad/publication/plan-national-de-developpement-sanitaire-pnds-4-2022-2030#:~:text=PLAN%20NATIONAL%20DE%20DEVELOPPEMENT%20SANITAIRE%20(PNDS%204)%202022%2D2030,-Le%20Minist%C3%A8re%20de&text=Le%20PNDS4%20est%20le%20dernier,des%20Objectifs%20de%20D%C3%A9veloppement%20Durable.)\nincludes refugees and asylum seekers, ensuring their access to public health services on an equal basis with\nnationals. Refugees and asylum-seekers are also incorporated into national, provincial, and departmental\n\nR E F U G E E P O L I C Y R E V I E W F R A M E W O R K > **R E P U B L I C O F C H A D** 11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "productivity, which is the part of labour productivity coming from organisational and technological innovations, in a sample of U.S. states in the period 19602006. He finds that a 1 percentage point increase in the shares of immigrants raises labour productivity by 0.9% and TFP by 1.4%. These estimates are causal, as the author uses distance from the Mexican border and previous immigrant communities, which are both orthogonal to economic growth in host states.\nWhat is further interesting, is firms in reaction to immigration adapt production technologies directed to workers without college education. This is consistent with the idea, that firms make workers more productive by adapting technologies to their skill sets. It is also important that these positive effects for productivity have been achieved despite immigrant inflow comprised less educated workers.\n\n39", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "RESETTLEMENT KEY FIGURES\n\n**Submitted Cases**\n\n1,063 4,497\n\n**Cases** **Case Members**\n\n**Active Cases**\n\n986 4,219\n\n**Case** **Case Members**\n\n**Submitted Cases Member by**\n\n**Country of Submission**\n\nREGIONAL BUREAU FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA\n\n**PERSONS OF CONCERN INVOLVED IN RESETTLEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**\n\nAs of 30 September 2022\n\nMOVEMENTS OF GROUPS OF 10 OR MORE RESETTLEMENT CASE MEMBERS\n\n**Country of Origin** **Country of Submission** **Country of Resettlement**\n\nMAP OF THE DEPARTURES BY COUNTRY OF SUBMISSION\n\n**Departure Cases**\n\n337 2,067\n\n**Case** **Case Members**\n\n**Quota**\n\n6,483 69%\n\n**Allotcated Quota** **% of Submission vs Quota**\n\n**Balance (Quota/Submission) :** 1,986\n\n**Departure Cases by Age and Gender**\n\n**ZAM**\n\n**MLW**\n\n**RSA**\n\n**ZIM**\n\n**MOZ**\n\n**ANG**\n\n**BOT**\n\n**NAM**\n\n**COB**\n\n**COD**\n\n**USA**\n\n**SWE**\n\n**NZL**\n\n**FIN**\n\n**NOR**\n\n**CAN**\n\n**AUL**\n\n**FRA**\n\n**493**\n\n**303**\n\n**205**\n\n**28**\n\n**27**\n\n**13**\n\n**11**\n\n4%\n\n9%\n\n9%\n\n26%\n\n0%\n\n0-4\n\n5-11\n\n12-17\n\n18-59\n\n60+\n\n3%\n\n12%\n\n9%\n\n1%\n\n26%\n\n**Submitted Cases Members**\n\n**by Top 10 Country of Asylum**\n\n**MLW**\n\n**ZAM**\n\n**3,417**\n\n**1,438**\n\n**1,367**\n\n**Departure Cases Members**\n\n**by Top 10 Country of Asylum**\n\n**1,247**\n\n**464**\n\n**169**\n\n**122**\n\n**16**\n\n**15**\n\n**14**\n\n**12**\n\n**2**\n\n**2**\n\n**RSA**\n\n**ZIM**\n\n**NAM**\n\n**BOT**\n\n**MOZ**\n\n**MAD**\n\n**519**\n\n**487**\n\n**355**\n\n**157**\n\n**96**\n\n**36**\n\n**Submitted Cases Members**\n\n**by Top 10 Country of Origin**\n\n**Departure Cases Members**\n\n**by Top 10 Country of Origin**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MAP OF THE DEPARTURES BY COUNTRY OF SUBMISSION", "confidence": 0.11662892252206802}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "MAP OF THE DEPARTURES BY COUNTRY OF SUBMISSION", "confidence": 0.5101303458213806}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "[Article 24 of the Asylum Law accords refugees a treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event,](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)\nnot less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, concerning the\nacquisition of movable or immovable property, lease contracts and other associated rights. Article 67\nof the [2023 Decree](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf) adds that refugees lawfully staying in the country shall have the same treatment\nas foreigners in general concerning that right. Article 29 of the Asylum Law also accords refugees\nlawfully staying in Chad treatment as favourable as possible concerning housing which falls under\nnational legislation, or which is submitted to public control, and, in any event, not less favourable than\nthat accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances. Article 71 of the 2023 Decree specifies\nthat refugees lawfully staying in Chad should be accorded the same treatment as foreigners in general\nregarding housing subject to the laws and regulations in force. Key to note is that Article 61 of the 2023\nDecree, specifically addressing local integration as a durable solution, specifies that the Government\nprioritizes refugees’ right to access land and secure allocated land to achieve self-reliance.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**SCENARIO 1** **SCENARIO 2** **SCENARIO 3** **SCENARIO 4**\n\n**Low employment**\n\n**conservative**\n\n**productivity**\n\n**High employment**\n\n**conservative**\n\n**productivity**\n\n**Low employment**\n\n**baseline**\n\n**productivity**\n\n**High employment**\n\n**baseline**\n\n**productivity**\n\nThe main impact of refugees is in growth of the economy. Refugees increase both supply as workers and entrepreneurs as well as demand as consumers. Increase in GDP is not directly proportional to the increase in population or employment.\nNet benefits are lowered both due to a decrease in capital to labour ratio as well as an increase in competition on the labour market. Moreover, increase in demand in tight labour market conditions results in higher inflation and lower price competitiveness of Polish products which lower its overall positive impact.\nNevertheless, the positive impact of refugees on the economy is significant in every scenario considered.\n\nIn 2022 it amounts to real GDP being higher by 0.5-0.8% and in 2023 cumulatively by 0.7-1.1%.\nThis corresponds to GDP being higher by 24-36.9 billion PLN in 2023 [43] .\n\nIn the long term, total potential GDP should be higher by around 0.9-1.35% due to refugees contributions. [44]\n\n---\n[44] Note that long term refers to the time when the economy fully adjusts with no additional shocks. We do not model the current refugees from Ukraine", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In response to the recent arrival from Sudan from mid-April 2023 to the present, humanitarian agencies\nacted swiftly to support the government’s request. They coordinated a comprehensive, multisectoral\nhumanitarian response on the ground under the Refugee Coordination Model previously used during\nthe inflow of refugees from Cameroon and Central African Republic. This involved establishing sectoral\ngroups to ensure a consistent and comprehensive approach. While development actors were not directly\nengaged in formulating and financing emergency plans, they received regular updates on the implemented\nresponses by CNARR and UNHCR.\n\nR E F U G E E P O L I C Y R E V I E W F R A M E W O R K > **R E P U B L I C O F C H A D** 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "reach the north of the continent through the Darien jungle or Europe through the French Guyana.\nIn this context, Brazil plays a crucial regional role and has the potential to offer effective legal and\nsocio-economic integration opportunities for displaced populations, which will contribute to the\nreduction of secondary movements.\n\nTo this end, the Government is set to launch Brazil's first National Policy on Migration, Asylum and\nStatelessness. Developed through an extensive participatory process involving concerned\npopulations, the policy aims to streamline access to rights and services at federal, state, and\nmunicipal levels. This will support the effective reception and integration of these populations into\nthe Brazilian society. Additionally, the Government has also adopted a Plan of Action to address\nthe protection and integration challenges faced by the Haitian population.\n\nMoreover, Brazil is launching a Resettlement, Admission, and Humanitarian Reception Program\nfor Afghan refugees through Complementary Means and Community Sponsorship. Authorities,\nwith the active support of UNHCR, are now developing Standard Operating Procedures for its\nimplementation, and planning ways to identify and train the civil society organizations who will be\nresponsible to receive these refugees in Brazil and support them in their local integration journey.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Two theories have been put forward in the literature to explain this:\n\n**01.** Immigrants and natives differ in terms\nof skills, occupational experiences, contact networks and work tasks.\nHence, they are not in direct competition. Typically, immigrants take on tasks previously performed by natives, who move to higher-valueadded tasks in the process known as “ **occupational upgrading** ” (Beerli and Peri, 2018; Tabellini, 2020; Cattaneo et al., 2015; Foged and Peri, 2016; D’Amuri i Peri, 2014; Ortega and Verdugo, 2014; Peri and Sparber, 2009).\n\nTritah (2015) found that a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of immigration increased GDP per capita growth by 0.3 percentage point in a sample of 20 developed OECD countries during the 1960–2005 period. Peri (2012) in a seminal paper, estimates that a 1 pp increase in the immigrant share raises labour productivity by 0.9% and TFP by 1.4%, using a sample of U.S. states from 1960 to 2006.\n\n37", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "sample of U.S. states", "confidence": 0.2750023305416107}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In \r 2012 \r the \r programme \r expanded \r to \r cover \r capacity \r building \r of \r government \r officials \r and\nother \r partners \r in \r relation \r to \r IDP \r and \r refugee \r protection \r and \r the \r role \r and \r mandate \r of\nUNHCR. \r Additionally, \r support \r has \r been \r provided \r by \r UNHCR \r to \r the \r Moe \r Pwint \r Operation\nthrough \r a \r pilot \r project \r as \r well \r as \r the \r production \r of \r leaflets \r in \r the \r local \r language \r to\nincrease \r the \r Ministry \r of \r Immigration \r efforts \r in \r enhancing \r awareness \r of \r the \r Operation\nwithin \r the \r communities.\n\n5 \r TBC \r 2012, \r see \r note \r 3 \r above.\n\n6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**2.3** **Institutional framework for refugee management and coordination**\n\nAccording to Article 38 of the [2020 Asylum Law, the institutional framework for the protection of asylum-](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)\nseekers and refugees remains defined by [Decret n°839/PR/PM/MAT/2011, which establishes CNARR. In](https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/609efe754.pdf)\nessence, the introduction of the new asylum legislation in Chad has not altered the institutional framework for\nasylum. This legal reform has codified existing practices and brought clarity to the implementation of Decree\nNo. 11-839, which outlines the creation, organization and responsibilities of CNARR.\n\nIn practice, CNARR, which still operates under the Ministry of Public Security, Territorial Administration and\nLocal Governance (MSPARGL), remains responsible for coordinating the implementation of legal provisions\n\nR E F U G E E P O L I C Y R E V I E W F R A M E W O R K > **R E P U B L I C O F C H A D** 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**1 Introduction**\n\nThe mining sector in Africa is growing rapidly and is the main recipient of foreign direct\n\ninvestment (World Bank 2011). The welfare effects of this sector are not well understood,\n\nalthough a literature has recently developed around this question. The main contribution of this\n\npaper is to shed light on the welfare effects of gold mining in a detailed, in-depth country study\n\nof Ghana, a country with a long tradition of gold mining and a recent, large expansion in capital\n\nintensive and industrial-scale production.\n\nA second contribution of this paper is to show the importance of decomposing the effects with\n\nrespect to distance from the mines. Given the spatial heterogeneity of the results, we explore\n\nthe effects in an individual-level, difference-in-differences analysis by using spatial lag models\n\nto allow for nonlinear effects with distance from mine. We also allow for spillovers across\n\ndistricts, in a district-level analysis. We use two complementary geocoded household data sets\n\nto analyze outcomes in Ghana: the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and the Ghana\n\nLiving Standard Survey (GLSS), which provide information on a wide range of welfare\n\noutcomes.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data sets"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Demographic and Health Survey", "confidence": 0.8570517301559448}, {"text": "Ghana\n\nLiving Standard Survey", "confidence": 0.8373659253120422}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data sets", "confidence": 0.6796985268592834}], "vague_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data sets", "confidence": 0.1750498116016388}]}}}
{"input": "IT specialists and executives), and 28% of Polish citizens. Their shares increased in the past two years by 3 pp. among Ukrainian refugees and pre-war Ukrainians, 2 pp. among other foreigners, and 1 pp.\namong Polish citizens – this data shows that though Ukrainian refugees may be largely employed in the less attractive occupational groups, they are also the fastest to progress toward more attractive professions. [11]\n\n**Ukrainian refugees in Poland have**\n\n**clearly improved their economic**\n\n**situation over the past year.** As\nindicated in chapter 1, the share of Ukrainian refugee household incomes derived from work in Poland has increased from 74% in the July-August 2023 MSNA survey to 76% in the May-June 2024 SEIS survey. [7] This is not surprising, as the situation of Ukrainians in the Polish labour market has clearly improved. First, employment rate of working-age refugees\n\n---\n[11] Since 2021, ZUS has been requesting information about the occupation of non-agricultural workers who first join the social insurance system (most farmers have a", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "July-August 2023 MSNA survey"}, {"text": "May-June 2024 SEIS survey"}, {"text": "SEIS survey"}, {"text": "MSNA survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey", "confidence": 0.8196092247962952}, {"text": "MSNA survey", "confidence": 0.7791593074798584}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "While Article 28 of the Asylum Law permits refugees also to engage in self-employment, the lack of legally\nrecognized refugee identity cards is likely to remain a major obstacle to meeting administrative requirements\nto open a business and pay the necessary tax.\n\nInformation on the number of refugees owning businesses is also lacking.\n\n**3.3** **Land, housing, and property rights**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, the number of Ukrainian workers covered by social security insurance in Poland increased by 126 thousand. The true increase of insured refugees however is larger.\nBy checking previous insurance status, ZUS identified 228 thousand newly registered insured persons active on 31st March 2023. [31] Considering the number of Ukrainians with active PESEL UKR at the time, this would yield an employment rate of 43%. As this number does not take into account jobs not covered by social insurance and informal work, this can align with the over 60% employment rate noted in the surveys. This number does not take into account over 500 thousand Ukrainians that were paying social security contributions before the beginning of the full-scale war and remained in Poland after its outbreak.\n\nThe refugees present in Poland, while not without difficulties, are largely able to provide for themselves and their families. As reported in the Deloitte", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "surveys", "confidence": 0.15544044971466064}]}}}
{"input": "Shock to labour supply was calibrated to match data of working Ukrainians presented in chapter 2. As we didn’t have data of number of unemployed refugees, we calibrated it that an increase in the number of workers due to an increase in labour supply matched employment data in two variants: lower (around 225 thou.) and higher employment (around 350 thou.).\nTotal increase in labour supply in Poland was balanced by equal decrease of labour supply in Eastern Europe.\n\nShock to propensity to save was calculated in two steps. First and foremost, it was assumed that due to their precarious life situation refugees won’t save any income.\nAs such shock was set to match shock for the population [54] . Additionally, to account for spending of savings from Ukraine, data from the National Bank of Ukraine on cash withdrawals and retail transactions from Ukrainian bank cards in Poland was used [55] and then calibrated to data for private consumption in Poland. Additionally, the same data was used to calibrate the negative shock to investment in Eastern Europe.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "National Bank of Ukraine"}, {"text": "retail transactions from Ukrainian bank cards"}, {"text": "data for private consumption"}, {"text": "data for private consumption in Poland"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "employment data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from the National Bank of Ukraine", "confidence": 0.5375561118125916}, {"text": "data of working Ukrainians", "confidence": 0.44121262431144714}, {"text": "data for private consumption in Poland", "confidence": 0.35441961884498596}], "vague_data": [{"text": "employment data", "confidence": 0.7020652294158936}]}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n## **4.** Ukrainian refugees’ skill-job mismatch\n\n##### The disparity between education levels and the jobs performed by Ukrainian refugees indicates their significant over-qualification in comparison to Polish citizens (4.1). Widespread occupational licensing presents an obstacle to efficient use of Ukrainian refugees’ human capital, who – in comparison to Polish citizens – rarely work in regulated professions (4.2). The higher the level of Polish language competence, the higher the wage premium. Older refugees, those who have been in Poland for a shorter period of time or have below tertiary education tend to have poorer language skills (4.3). Refugees who back in Ukraine managed the household or were not employed, remain underemployed in Poland (4.4). Key factors to enhancing the status of Ukrainian refugees in Poland will be language courses, including advanced levels tailored for professionals, easing of occupational licensing restrictions, particularly those based solely on citizenship, and implementation of active labour market policies to help specific groups enter the workforce (4.5).\n\n26", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "UNHCR facilitates voluntary repatriation for refugees and asylum seekers who request to return to\ntheir countries of origin, with arrangements often made in close cooperation with IOM through its\nAssisted Voluntary Return (AVR) program. During the course of 2023, 95 refugees voluntarily\nrepatriated from Indonesia, primarily to Sri Lanka and Iraq. Voluntary repatriation is impacted by\nongoing conflicts and human rights violations in countries of origin, which renders many unable to\nsafely return home and limits interest in repatriation.\n\nUNHCR / 1 November 2024 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF HOUSING SUPPORT AND EMPLOYMENT FACILITATION IN ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE (selling house or land, using degrading sources of income, taking on high-risk or illegal jobs) and crisis-level (reducing essential health and education expenditures, selling productive assets) coping strategies. This statistic is even worse for those that fall below the poverty line [8], standing at 10% and 18% respectively. Female-led households (where all adult members are female) report having to engage in harmful coping strategies more often than their male-led counterparts.\n\n**SHARE OF REFUGEE HOUSEHOLDS ADOPTING HARMFUL**\n\n**COPING STRATEGIES ABOVE AND BELOW THE POVERTY**\n\n**LINE, %** **[1]**\n\nAbove the poverty line Below the poverty line 10% 10% housing fully subsidized by the government (notably, in Slovakia this share stands at 81%). Eight percent are being hosted free of charge by locals.\nSeventeen percent pay for rent only partially for various reasons, such as living with extended family, partially subsidized by the host government or employer. Those that fully pay rent report this being their number one expense, constituting 40% of the total household budget.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In terms of economic impact, refugees are treated as a subset of all immigrants.\nEconomic literature typically categorises immigrants by their country of birth, regardless of their legal status. Although refugees seek new homes out of necessity rather than for economic opportunity, economic research focuses on their employment rates and other measures of labour market integration, which are usually lower than those of other immigrants and natives (Brell et al., 2020).\nIn this respect, Ukrainian refugees in Poland resemble other immigrants and natives more closely than usual.\n\nThis appendix outlines a revised **Deloitte**\n\n**D.Climate** general equilibrium modelling\nstrategy compared to the previous Deloitte (2024) report, accounting for the impact of Ukrainian refugees on productivity.\nOver the past two decades, research by academic economists has shown that viewing immigration solely through the lens of supply and demand severely constrains our understanding of the process (Peri, 2016). Such a model suggests that immigration increases economic output 36", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Refugees (2023) Refugees (2024) Hosts (2023) Overall Male Female With severe psychological distress With a disability Source: Survey data, SAG estimates 64% 67% 63% 57% 86% 96% 92% 72% 49% Technical or Bachelor's Master's Doctoral Vocational 30% Lower secondary or below Source: Survey data, SAG estimates\n\n**11**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Survey data, SAG estimates", "confidence": 0.2084806263446808}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.9807711243629456}]}}}
{"input": "particularly when they are at risk of refoulement, arrest, and detention.\n\n### **Financial Assistance**\n\nUNHCR assists a small number of extremely vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers with cash support\nto help meet basic needs. Together with partners, UNHCR conducts a socio-economic assessment of\ncases that have been identified as requiring financial assistance. Those cases that have heightened\nneeds are presented to a Socio-Economic and Health Panel (comprised of YCWS, JRS, and UNHCR) for\na determination of inclusion in the cash program. Those who qualify receive up to six months of cash\nassistance, following which a re-assessment is required to determine continued needs.\n\n### **Economic Empowerment**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\n- Contribute \r to \r the \r CTFMR \r efforts \r in \r documenting, \r verifying, \r reporting \r and\nresponding \r to \r grave \r child \r rights \r violations, \r including \r recruiting \r and \r using\nchildren \r in \r armed \r conflict.\n\n- Conduct \r multi-­‐sector \r baseline \r assessments \r and \r identify \r proxy \r indicators \r for \r self-­‐\nreliance; \r establish \r monitoring \r and \r evaluation \r system \r in \r order \r to \r track \r progress\nmade \r on \r key \r indicators \r over \r the \r framework \r period.\n\n- Support \r and \r participate \r to \r multi-­‐sector \r need \r assessments \r and \r planning \r process,\nin \r particular \r in \r areas \r of \r current \r or \r potential \r return.\n\n- Provide \r an \r initial \r light \r rapid \r response \r to \r spontaneous \r IDP \r and \r refugee\nreturnees, \r identified \r through \r returnee \r monitoring, \r by \r providing \r NFIs \r and\nrelevant \r protection \r interventions \r on \r a \r needs \r basis, \r as \r well \r as \r community-­‐based\nassistance \r to \r receiving \r communities, \r with \r a \r view \r to \r building \r confidence \r in \r the\nreturn \r process.\n\n- Advocate \r with \r Government, \r donors \r and \r private \r sector \r in \r regard \r to \r rehabilitation\nof \r main \r roads \r to \r key \r potential \r returnee \r areas \r and \r establishment \r of \r facilities \r that\ncould \r eventually \r support \r an \r organised \r return.\n\n**10.2.** **Phase \r 2: \r Expansion \r of \r integrated \r support \r to \r spontaneous \r returnees**\n\n**and \r their \r communities**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "returnee \r monitoring", "confidence": 0.6393636465072632}]}}}
{"input": "Refugees are vulnerable and at risk of poor health outcomes due to disruptions in access to health care in their country of origin, experiences during their journey, and challenges in settling in a new country. For the Ukrainian refugee population, predominantly comprised of women, children and older persons, access to primary health care services, including mental health and psychosocial support, child health and nutrition, sexual and reproductive health, non-communicable diseases (NCDs), rehabilitation and health education to increase health literacy and empower health decision-making, is critical. Among older persons, NCDs are most prevalent, necessitating uninterrupted access to care for managing illnesses.\nCommunicable diseases are a concern as the movement of refugees in and out of host countries disrupts access to disease prevention, detection and treatment programmes, increasing the health risks.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**POPULATION PYRAMID**\n\nFemale Male 60+ years old 35-59 18-34 5-17 0-4 (N=19,803) 9% 25% 14% 13% 14% 3% 4% 9% 7% 3% In terms of other demographic characteristics, 6% of individuals self-reported a disability (1,435 individuals out of a sample of 18,679). Among the countries surveyed, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland reported the lowest percentage of refugees with disabilities at 5%, while Romania reported the highest at 12%.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "As per a recent assessment conducted in 21 Brazilian states, 15% of Venezuelan refugees and\nmigrants reported having suffered discrimination and stigmatization in the previous 12 months.\nOut of these, 80.4% were discriminated because of their nationality, 8.2% for their ethnicity, 5.2%\nfor their age, 3.5% for having a disability and 2.4% due to their sexual orientation and gender\nidentity. [9] On the other hand, according to the same source, 33% of indigenous Venezuelans\nexperienced discrimination and stigmatization, mainly due to their nationality (51.1%) but also for\ntheir ethnicity (31.9%), and to a smaller degree because of their age (6.3%). [10] This overlapping of\ndiscrimination causes not only affects the ability of these populations to access dignified\nlivelihoods, but also to exercise their fundamental rights, such as access to health and education.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "By refraining from any refugee dispersal policies, Poland and other EU Member States may have improved labour market inclusion. In many European countries refugees are geographically dispersed after arrival to spread the cost of hosting them, ease the stress on the housing market and public services, and to avoid creating ethnic enclaves. The effects, however, can be detrimental to labour market inclusion and may be contrary to other aims of the policy. Dispersal pushes at least some of the refugees into regions with weak labour markets and few co-nationals already settled, who otherwise could transmit important information about employment opportunities. Fasani, Frattini, and Minale (2022) conducted the first cross-country study of refugee dispersal policies.\nTheir LFS sample covers refugees who experienced dispersal policies in Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK (no data for Denmark). They find that non-EU15 refugees aged 25-64 who arrived when a dispersal policy was in place experience 4.5 percentage points lower employment rates than for those not exposed to such a policy. This may understate the effect, as for refugees who arrived 10 or less years before the survey, the effect is 17.5 percentage points, while it becomes statistically insignificant afterwards.\nFor the six countries for which data on residence is available, non-dispersed refugees show clearly stronger clustering in economically stronger regions (measured by GDP per capita).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "LFS", "confidence": 0.7747657895088196}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data on residence", "confidence": 0.2013292759656906}], "vague_data": [{"text": "data on residence", "confidence": 0.4780339300632477}]}}}
{"input": "this tool. This meeting marked the first\n\nunder the leadership of the new cluster\n\ncoordinator.\n\nFor more information request the\n\nmeeting minutes for any cluster member.\n\n**12**\n\n**XVIII. Second Allocation for Ven-**\n\n**ezuela Humanitarian Fund (VHF)**\n\n**The call for proposals for the second**\n\n**allocation of the Venezuela Human-**\n\n**itarian Fund (VHF) was opened on**\n\n**October 13th closing on November**\n\n**6th.** This allocation focuses on \"Multisec\ntoral assistance for the improvement of\n\nessential health services, strengthening\n\ncommunity resilience through livelihood\n\nsupport, gender equality and women's\n\nempowerment, supporting emergency\n\neducation activities, and the provision\n\nof assistance and protection services\n\nin complementarity with CERF funds in\n\n13 municipalities across 5 border states:\n\nBolivar, Delta Amacuro, Falcon, Sucre,\n\nand Zulia.\" The three key prioritized\n\nareas encompass enhancing essential\n\nhealth services (Mental Health and Psy\nchosocial Support (MHPSS), Women's\n\nand Adolescents Health, and Sexual &\n\nducted in 16 states, with the collaborative\n\nefforts of 9 partner organizations. This tool\n\nprovides valuable insights into the evolving\n\nprotection landscape and aids in tailoring\n\nresponses to the specific needs of affected\n\npopulations.\n\n_© FPM/ Franco Chramosta (2023)_", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "of refugees from Ukraine find themselves of all refugee households income above of refugees are unemployed, which\n\n**below the poverty line** [4] based on the poverty line **comes from regular work** **starkly contrasts with just a 3%**\nreported income - this figure stands at 35% for households **unemployment rate for host country** below the poverty line **nationals**\n\n# 32% 56% 14%\n\nof refugees live below the poverty if is the labor force participation rate of of refugee youth is not engaged in\n\n**support with accommodation expenses** refugees from Ukraine, which is **on par** employment, education, or training, which\nis factored in as an indirect income source **with host country nationals** is **comparable to host country national** of all refugee households income above the poverty line **comes from regular work**\n\n- this figure stands at 35% for households\nbelow the poverty line is the labor force participation rate of refugees from Ukraine, which is **on par**\n\n**with host country nationals**\n\nof refugee youth is not engaged in employment, education, or training, which is **comparable to host country national**\n\n**statistics**\n\n---\n[4] Defined as 50% of the median equivalized income in the host country", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "### Call(s) to Action\n\nThe Brazilian state is commendably recognized for its efforts in providing protection to refugees\nand other forcibly displaced populations, in line with international, regional, and national legal\nframeworks. Brazil stands as a beacon of hope for refugees in the region, demonstrating exemplary\ncommitment and leadership in humanitarian response, and striving to go ensure the successful\nlocal integration of displaced individuals.\n\nUNHCR calls upon the international community to boost the support for Brazilian authorities by\nincreasing financial and technical assistance to UNHCR and other humanitarian actors. This\nsupport is crucial for sustaining and expanding Brazil’s protection and assistance programs,\nensuring the rights and needs of refugees and other forcibly displaced people are met, and Brazil’s\nexemplary efforts in this field are fully supported and sustained.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES\n\n**Refugee employment rates significantly improved in 2024, moving closer to national levels**\n\nUkrainian refugee employment rates [14] have experienced a sizeable increase from 2023 in most countries, rising by 9 percentage points year-over-year at the regional level to 64%. This indicator now stands just 7 percentage points below the equivalently weighted mean for the host population (71%).\n\nRefugee employment grew both owing to a decrease in unemployment, which declined to 9% from 13% last year, as well as new individuals coming into the labor force [15] . In fact, the 2024 labor force participation rate amounted to 70%, which stands almost in line with the equivalent host country indicator of 73%.\n\n**EVOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE EMPLOYMENT RATE FROM 2023 TO 2024**\n\n70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Employment Decrease in Decrease in rate 2023 unemployment potential labor force Employment rate 2024 Unclear labor force status Expansion of the labor force Note: Only includes data from the 7 countries surveyed in both rounds (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) Source: Survey data, SAG estimates", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Survey data, SAG estimates"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.930060088634491}]}}}
{"input": "**in the literature is language training.**\nFoged et al. (2024) analysed labour market outcomes of language training, placement in strong labour markets, active labour market policies, cutting welfare benefits, and placement in co-ethnic networks that were directed at refugees in Denmark.\nThanks to unusually detailed Danish data, they could follow individual refugees who arrived in Denmark between 1987 and 2008, for at least 10 years, and in most cases for 15 years. They found intensive language training introduced in 1999 to be the most effective of all policies, accounting for a 5-6 pp. increase in the probability of employment and a USD 3,000 increase in annual earnings (2015 figures). While locating refugees in strong labour markets also had considerable positive effects, the report found only some evidence that Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) focused on matching refugees with deficit occupations improved their employment prospects and no evidence of positive effects of cutting benefits or placing refugees in co-ethnic networks. Heller and Mumma (2023) exploited randomized enrolment lotteries for a publicly-funded", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Danish data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "detailed Danish data", "confidence": 0.3291749060153961}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Danish data", "confidence": 0.20090726017951965}]}}}
{"input": "Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on GUS and ZUS data, as well as data for instrumental variables from Public Employment Services Portal and Open Data governmental portal. OLS is the standard Ordinary Least Squares model, IV are Instrumental Variables Two Stage Least Squares models with instrumental variables of the share of Ukrainian pupils in Polish schools, distribution of Ukrainians from declarations on entrusting work to a foreigner in Poland in 2019, or both. For details see the Online Technical Appendix.\n\nFurthermore, consistent with a positive productivity shock, Polish citizens have been moving to better-paid occupations – as predicted by the theory of occupational upgrading (e.g., Beerli and Peri, 2018; Foged and Peri, 2016; Peri and Sparber, 2009).\nDeloitte has acquired quarterly data on the occupational groups of Polish citizens who are insured with ZUS from Q1 2022 to Q2 2024. This data is not exhaustive as ZUS only began requiring such information in", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GUS and ZUS data"}, {"text": "Public Employment Services Portal"}, {"text": "Open Data governmental portal"}, {"text": "GUS"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Open Data governmental portal", "confidence": 0.4713468551635742}, {"text": "Public Employment Services Portal", "confidence": 0.3786894381046295}, {"text": "ZUS data", "confidence": 0.22157767415046692}, {"text": "GUS", "confidence": 0.12378014624118805}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "quarterly data", "confidence": 0.10209906846284866}]}}}
{"input": "In this scenario, 19% of Venezuelan households reported being at risk of evictions from rented\nhousing in the three months prior to their interview, with a higher incidence in Roraima (26%) and\nAmazonas (29%), the two states hosting the highest proportion of refugees and other forcibly\ndisplaced people in Brazil. As per the same study, 10% of the indigenous households surveyed\nwere evicted during the three months prior to the interview, which makes them almost five times\nmore likely to face actual eviction when compared to the total surveyed population (2%). [24] The\nrisk of eviction has been also systematically reported by refugees also of other nationalities,\nincluding Haitians, Colombians, and Cubans. [25]", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Data sources: UNHCR PRIMES, UNHCR Resettlement Statistics Report.   For more information or to contribute, please contact UNHCR RBSA DIMA (rsarbdima@unhc\n\n**1,729**\n\n**154**\n\n**57**\n\n**53**\n\n**34**\n\n**13**\n\n**12**\n\n**4**\n\n**3**\n\n**2**\n\n**COD**\n\n**BDI**\n\n**SOM**\n\n**RWA**\n\n**TUR**\n\n**ZAM**\n\n**ETH**\n\n**UGA**\n\n**ANG**\n\n**AFG**\n\n**COD**\n\n**BDI**\n\n**SOM**\n\n**RWA**\n\n**ETH**\n\n**PAK**\n\n**TUR**\n\n**CAR**\n\n**BOT**\n\n**ERT**\n\n**3,619**\n\n**263**\n\n**235**\n\n**220**\n\n**40**\n\n**36**\n\n**19**\n\n**14**\n\n**8**\n\n**8**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR PRIMES", "confidence": 0.8457646369934082}, {"text": "UNHCR Resettlement Statistics Report", "confidence": 0.7825651168823242}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "### **Access to Territory**\n\nIn 2023 and 2024, boats carrying nearly 3,000 Rohingya refugees (the majority of whom are women\nand children) have landed in Aceh and North Sumatra, Indonesia. According to information provided\nto UNHCR by the new arrivals, the increase in the number of individuals undertaking the sea journey\nhas been driven by a number of factors, including increasing insecurity in the camps in Bangladesh; a\ndecrease in the cost of the sea journey; continued instability in Myanmar; and a lack of progress in\ncreating conditions that would enable return to Myanmar, including addressing the root causes of\nRohingya displacement.\n\nWhile many Indonesians remain supportive of and sympathetic to the challenges facing Rohingya\nrefugees, the most recent boat arrivals have met unprecedented resistance in Indonesia. Some boats\nwere initially prevented from disembarking, many refugees were forced to relocate several times due\nrejection from local communities, and many of those who have disembarked have yet to be allocated\nan adequate shelter by Indonesian authorities. As a result, hundreds of refugees who have\ndisembarked in recent months are currently living in extremely perilous, overcrowded, and\nsubstandard conditions in which the protection and assistance response remained a challenge.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland much of the heterogeneity inside of these groups. Every two years, GUS publishes information about the average wages in 128 occupational groups, with the latest data for October 2022 (GUS, 2024a).\nWhen ZUS data is aggregated into these occupational groups with the assumption that wage structure remains the same as in October 2022, the rate at which Ukrainian\n\n**The occupational progress of**\n\n**Ukrainian refugees as compared to the**\n\n**host population may be faster than**\n\n**the nine main occupational groups**\n\n**above suggest.** What is particularly\nstriking is the similar pace of progress of Ukrainian refugees and pre-war Ukrainians in the nine main occupational groups presented above. However, it conceals\n\n**Chart 12. Ukrainian refugee wages relative to Polish citizens in the same employee-cells**\nEmployee cells are divided by poviat, sex, age group, and main occupational group 20 2022 Q2 2024 Q2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ZUS data"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ZUS data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ZUS data", "confidence": 0.20243342220783234}, {"text": "average wages in 128 occupational groups", "confidence": 0.17944125831127167}], "vague_data": [{"text": "ZUS data", "confidence": 0.26059478521347046}]}}}
{"input": "work in mining, and insignificantly less in agriculture or service and sales. The likelihood that\n\na man works in mining increases by 11.3 to 12.6 percentage points, which is more than a 400\n\npercent increase in likelihood from the mean value which is 2.8%. For both men and women,\n\nthe results are indicative of changes in labor force participation on the extensive and intensive\n\nmargin. Fewer people work, as indicated by columns (1) and (2) (significant for men), but those\n\nwho work, work more hours than before (column 3, albeit insignificant). It should be noted that\n\nthe sample sizes are limited and these estimates may suffer from lack of power.\n\nAnnex figure 2 presents the results graphically and shows the spatial structure for a subset of\n\nthe variables. The likelihood of a woman working in services decreases with distance from\n\nmine, and log wages are higher within 10 to 20 km of an active mine. Men are, intuitively, more\n\nlikely to work as miners if they reside close to an active mine, and the correlation decreases\n\nwith distance. Wages for men are also higher close to active mines (panel D). Beyond 40 km,\n\nthe estimated effects are close to zero.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Indonesia is host to a relatively small number of refugees and asylum seekers, but they reside over a\nwide geographical area in a country of over 17,000 islands. While approximately half of the refugee\npopulation lives in Jakarta and the surrounding areas, the other half is spread throughout the\narchipelago. The UNHCR operation in Indonesia is a small one, both in terms of staffing and resources,\nand the distribution of refugees across this large territory, coupled with complex protection concerns\nand emergency boat arrivals, creates unique operational challenges. UNHCR continually strives to\nprioritize efforts and resources to be as impactful as possible in supporting refugees who are most in\nneed and in advancing a sustainable protection environment in the country.\n\nUNHCR / 1 November 2024 8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The effects on child health are, however, not all positive. We note, particularly, a statistically\n\nsignificant decrease in weight-for-age, but the other two measures are also negative (panel B of\n\n22", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "panel B of\n\n22", "confidence": 0.14325498044490814}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Individuals \r and \r families \r often \r have \r no \r means \r to \r retain \r legal \r services \r and \r are \r often\nunaware \r of \r their \r rights \r to \r seek \r legal \r remedies \r under \r Myanmar \r law. \r Services, \r security\nand \r the \r rule \r of \r law \r are \r weak, \r and \r effective \r protection \r and \r response \r mechanisms \r to\naddress \r sexual \r and \r gender-­‐based \r violence \r (SGBV) \r or \r the \r specific \r needs \r of \r extremely\nvulnerable \r individuals \r (EVIs), \r are \r still \r rudimentary \r with \r a \r lack \r of \r appropriate \r core\nmechanisms \r and \r services \r available.\n\nCases \r of \r arbitrary \r arrest \r and \r detention \r in \r Myanmar \r continue \r to \r be \r reported. \r Pervasive\nproblems \r with \r the \r rule \r of \r law \r in \r Myanmar \r are \r well \r documented \r and \r detention \r and\nprison \r conditions \r remain \r extremely \r problematic.\n\nIn \r addition, \r under \r the \r 1947 \r Immigration \r (Emergency \r Provisions) \r Act \r (as \r amended),\nillegal \r departure \r or \r entry \r is \r punishable \r by \r a \r fine \r or \r imprisonment \r of \r up \r to \r five \r years.\nUNHCR \r is \r not \r aware \r of \r any \r prosecutions \r brought \r under \r this \r law, \r and \r the \r President \r has\nalso \r stated \r publically \r that \r he \r welcomes \r back \r Myanmar \r people \r who \r ‘for \r various \r reasons’\nleft \r the \r country. \r However \r there \r have \r not \r been \r any \r changes \r or \r amnesties \r pronounced \r in\nrelation \r to \r this \r law, \r and \r this \r would \r therefore \r need \r to \r be \r addressed \r prior \r to \r any \r organised\nvoluntary \r repatriation \r of \r refugees.\n\n**2.3. \r Socio-­‐economic \r environment**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The \r health \r infrastructure \r in \r the \r South-­‐East \r remains \r substantially \r underserved \r with \r a\n\nCommittee. \r The \r Myanmar \r Peace \r Centre \r is \r tasked \r to \r provide \r policy \r advice \r and \r strategic \r guidance \r as \r well \r as\nco-­‐ordinating \r Government \r activities \r in \r the \r key \r areas \r of: \r cease-­‐fire \r negotiations \r and \r implementation; \r peace\nnegotiations \r and \r political \r dialogue; \r co-­‐ordination \r of \r assistance \r in \r conflict \r affected \r areas \r and \r outreach \r and\npublic \r diplomacy.\n\n4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World\nBank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world.\nPolicy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted\nat andreas.kotsadam@econ.uio.no, anja.tolonen@economics.gu.se, and pchuhan@worldbank.org.\n\n_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development_\n_issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the_\n_names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those_\n_of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and_\n_its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._\n\nProduced by the Research Support Team", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**02.** Firms recognise changes in the\nabundance of skills in the labour force resulting from immigration and adjust their production technologies accordingly. They thereby increase the productivity of these skill groups and themselves (Peri, 2016; Lewis and Peri, 2015; Lewis, 2013; Peri, 2012). This theory is called “ **directed technical**\n\n**change** ” by Acemoglu (2002). Firms\nadopt production technologies that favour skills that have become abundant (and thus cheaper) in the labour force. This increases their productivity and offsets the negative effects of competition between workers. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, firms in English cities engaged in unskilled technical change in response to an influx of unskilled workers from the countryside and Ireland. In the postwar United States of the twentieth century, skilled technical change occurred as the proportion of collegeeducated workers grew rapidly.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Our results are consistent with the previous, similar studies. In estimating GDP impacts we take an approach that is most similar to the previous studies of the pre-2022 Ukrainian migrants by NBP economists (Gradzewicz, Jabłonowski, Sasiela, and Żółkiewski, 2021; Strzelecki, Growiec, and Wyszyński, 2022), but unlike the previous Oxford Economics and ours impact estimates of Ukrainian refugees (Urban, 2022; Deloitte, 2022) we do not allow for the possibility of a positive productivity shock, because there is little data to credibly estimate its size. Below, we summarise impacts yielded by these studies. As studies were done under different assumptions on the number of 41 Aggregate region in model consisting of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.\n42 In other words it was assumed that money that would be spent e.g. through credit action for investments in Eastern Europe were spent for consumption in Poland.\n\n34 43 Data from forecast of Ministry of Finance from October 2023, [Wytyczne dotyczące wskaźników makroekonomicznych - Ministerstwo Finansów - Portal](https://www.gov.pl/web/finanse/wytyczne-sytuacja-makroekonomiczna)\n[Gov.pl (www.gov.pl).](https://www.gov.pl/web/finanse/wytyczne-sytuacja-makroekonomiczna)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "forecast of Ministry of Finance", "confidence": 0.3408470153808594}], "vague_data": [{"text": "forecast of Ministry of Finance", "confidence": 0.12274930626153946}]}}}
{"input": "been of 33 % of the funding requested.\n\nAccording to the 345W reports, 478K\n\npeople were impacted until october, which\n\n65% are women and 35% men. 6,479\n\npeople with disabilities were reached\n\nduring the last period.\n\n**violence**\n\nThe states with the higher response\n\ninclude Tachira, Zulia, Bolivar, and\n\nMiranda. Some of the organizations with\n\nthe higher reach include ACNUR, DIOCE\nSIS SC, CODEHCIU, HIAS, ALIADAS EN\n\nCADENA A.C, TINTA VIOLETA and CAR\nITAS.\n\n**Figure 1. Summary of HRP 2022 - 2023 results, by Specific Objetive.**\n\n**Responding**\n\n**to protection**\n\n47% **risks associated** 45%\n\n**with violence of**\n\n**GbV**\n\n**children**\n\n# 47 4\n\n**Prevention,**\n\n**mitigation, and**\n\n13%\n\n# 13\n\n99%\n\n# 99\n\n**Figure 1. Summary of HRP 2022 - 2023 results, by Specific Objetive.**\n\n**Responding to**\n\n**protection risks**\n\n**associated with**\n\n47%\n\n# 47\n\n47%\n\n**Responding**\n\n**to protection**\n\n**risks associated**\n\n**with violence of**\n\n45%\n\n99%\n\n**Access to legal**\n\n**documentation***\n\n45%\n\n77% **Access to**\n\n**livelihoods**\n\n# 77\n\n**children**\n\n**Specialised**\n\n**protection services**\n\n_*Target does not consider birth certificates (EV-25)._\n\n77%\n\n**to people affected**\n\n**Access to** 13%\n\n**livelihoods**\n\n**response to**\n\n**protection risks**\n\n**by all forms of**\n\n36%\n\n36%\n\n# 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In order to compute refugee wages, household net employment income was divided by the total number of working hours reported by all employed members. This figure was then weighted by the total number of working hours and averaged overall all households within a given country (while also respecting poststratification weights). The result was then converted to a monthly wage assuming employment at 40 hours per week and 4.33 weeks in a month. For comparability with host population data, net wages were converted to their gross equivalent utilizing local tax regulations.\n\n# **Limitations**\n\nThe statistical significance of the SEIS results is limited by the non-probabilistic selection of respondents.\nMoreover, the use of convenience sampling likely led to a larger share of data being collected from more vulnerable households.\n\nThere was also a notably high non-response rate regarding questions related to income and expenditure, which likely resulted in non-response bias. The income module of the SEIS was also materially different from the one employed by the EU SILC and the Republic of Moldova’s Household Budget Survey, which may limit comparability of this data to that of host populations.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Republic of Moldova’s Household Budget Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "host population data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Household Budget Survey", "confidence": 0.7838872075080872}, {"text": "SEIS", "confidence": 0.35187214612960815}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "host population data", "confidence": 0.27849939465522766}]}}}
{"input": "(1.805) (0.039) (0.054) (0.029) (0.021) (0.029) (0.021)\nActive 0.007 0.001 0.050** 0.034** -0.032 0.054** -0.023\n(1.012) (0.026) (0.024) (0.017) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022)\n\nObservations 9,790 9,790 12,226 12,216 12,227 12,227 12,227\nR-squared 0.128 0.180 0.453 0.148 0.208 0.171 0.095\nmean of dep var 0.407 14.84 0.565 0.652 0.151 0.732 11.6\n\n_Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and\ndistrict fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. Active is active status of mine in the survey year.\n\n*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS = ordinary least squares.\n\nOverall, we estimated in table 8 that a household’s access to electricity decreased when a mine\n\nbecame active. This finding is surprising if we assume that electricity infrastructure is seldom\n\ndestroyed, so that with time, access has generally been increasing. [13]\n\nFigure A1 (Annex) further decomposes the effect, and panel Aa of the figure confirms that the\n\ncoefficient for electricity access is negative using the treatment distance 20 km. However, with\n\na treatment distance of 10 km, the effect is marginally positive and insignificant. If we use a", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS", "confidence": 0.12579047679901123}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Refugees are not legally permitted to work in Indonesia. UNHCR advocates for refugees to be given\naccess to livelihoods opportunities and works with partners to create community empowerment and\nself-reliance programs that benefit Indonesians and refugees. These programs include vocational\ntrainings and entrepreneurships that also promote economic development in Indonesia. At the first\nGlobal Refugee Forum (GRF) in December 2019, the Indonesian Government pledged support to\nrefugee productivity and empowerment activities. This commitment was confirmed in the second\nGlobal Refugee Forum in December 2023. In September 2023, the Ministry of Manpower issued a\nCircular Note allowing refugee participation in skills training programs at government training centers.\nThe Circular and GRF commitment serve as pivotal entry points to advance economic empowerment.\n\n### **Education**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**employed before their displacement.**\nIn the SEIS survey, employment rates among refugees aged 18-64 previously employed or self-employed in Ukraine, are 81% and 91% respectively. That is already very high and any further increase would be marginal. On the other hand, those who back in Ukraine managed the household have an employment rate in Poland of 38%. Even before becoming refugees, they would have required support to enter the workforce and now, in the host country, they would be likely to benefit from such help even more. Some of them may be discouraged by not having been able to find a job, others may be marginally attached workers who fell outside the labour force, but have some desire and ability to return to work.\n\n**Chart 25. Ukrainian refugees’ employment rate in the 18-64 age group by previous**\n\n**status in Ukraine**\n\n91% Household Others Studying Employed Self-employed responsibilities Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on SEIS UNHCR survey conducted in May and June 2024.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey"}, {"text": "SEIS survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey", "confidence": 0.8454124927520752}, {"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey", "confidence": 0.654776930809021}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n# Glossary List of charts and tables\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**GUS** - Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Polish statistical office, also known as Statistics Poland.\n\n**LFS** - Labour Force Survey, Eurostat labour market survey conducted by national statistical offices.\n\n**MSNA** - Multi-Sector Needs Assessment, a 2023 UNHCR survey of refugees from Ukraine.\n\n**PESEL/PESEL UKR** - Powszechny Elektroniczny System Ewidencji Ludności, Universal Electronic System for Registration of the Population.\nAn ID number of every Polish citizen. **PESEL UKR** is a version issued to Ukrainian citizens in connection with the armed conflict in the territory of that country.\n\n**Poviat** - a middle tier of sub-central government in Poland between voivodship (province) and gmina (commune) level.\n\n**Pre-war Ukrainian migrants** - persons who migrated from Ukraine, primarily for economic reasons, before the full-scale Russian\ninvasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\n**SEIS** - Socio-Economic Inclusion Survey, a 2024 UNHCR survey of refugees from Ukraine as a follow-up to MSNA from the year before.\n\n**Ukrainian refugees** - persons fleeing Ukraine after the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, covered by EU's Temporary\nProtection Directive.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Multi-Sector Needs Assessment"}, {"text": "Socio-Economic Inclusion Survey"}, {"text": "MSNA"}, {"text": "SEIS"}, {"text": "LFS"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Labour Force Survey, Eurostat labour market survey"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL/PESEL UKR", "confidence": 0.4802020788192749}, {"text": "MSNA", "confidence": 0.4677373766899109}, {"text": "SEIS", "confidence": 0.44398725032806396}, {"text": "Eurostat labour market survey", "confidence": 0.3017064332962036}, {"text": "LFS", "confidence": 0.1597585827112198}, {"text": "PESEL UKR", "confidence": 0.12064051628112793}, {"text": "Multi-Sector Needs Assessment", "confidence": 0.10733535885810852}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "employment, and unemployment rate of natives or other immigrants, except an actual slight positive impact on the wages of native women.\nDespite our conservative approach, additional government tax revenues trump the costs of refugee-connected expenditure.\nA larger wage pool, higher private consumption, and influx of capital from abroad result in larger tax revenue. In total, the general government revenue increased by 1.05-1.45% in 2023. In monetary terms, this amounts to 10.1-13.7 billion PLN in 2022 and 14.7-19.9 billion PLN in 2023.\nIf estimates quoted by a government official [2] of public expenses on refugees of around 15 billion PLN in 2022 and 5 billion in 2023 are accurate, we can conclude that they were more than offset by the additional tax revenue. In the long term, refugees should increase yearly government revenue by around 0.85-1.3%.\n\n---\n[2] E.g. vice-president of Polish Development Found Bartosz Marczuk estimated it at around 16 billion PLN, but this estimation also included spending of NGOs", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The government quickly granted refugees from Ukraine access to the labour market, healthcare, and schooling, facilitating the process of inclusion described in Chapter 2. Considering their psychological stress and needs in terms of child and elderly care, refugees began entering the labour market surprisingly quickly – attaining an employment rate of 28% in May 2022 and 65% in November 2022 (NBP, 2023).\nBy 30th September 2023 more than 10 thousand ran their own businesses according to the administrative social security ZUS data. Based on the MultiSector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey conducted in July-August 2023, we calculate that 80% of the income of refugee households is derived from employment, with an additional 5% coming from remittances and 2% from Ukrainian pension benefits. In economic terms, refugees from Ukraine in Poland are not receivers of social services and charity, but primarily consumers, employees, and entrepreneurs.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MultiSector Needs Assessment Poland 2023"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "administrative social security ZUS data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MultiSector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey", "confidence": 0.7896144986152649}, {"text": "ZUS data", "confidence": 0.694378674030304}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "administrative social security ZUS data", "confidence": 0.20851469039916992}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland © UNHCR / Anna Liminowicz Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Economists have advanced an array of channels through which immigration could be increasing productivity. Macro-level regressions demonstrate that immigration has a positive influence on productivity, but they are unable to identify the precise mechanisms behind these impacts.\nIn part this may stem from the fact, that immigrants and natives differ in important ways, which triggers complementary occupational upgrading of natives and investment in complementary production technologies by firms [15] . Immigrants often exhibit higher entrepreneurship rates from natives. [16] Furthermore, even when immigrants enter seemingly low productivity childcare, elderly care, and housekeeping services, this can allow highly educated and productive native women to increase their labour supply. [17]\n\n---\n[15] For example, found by Peri (2016), Lewis and Peri (2015), Lewis (2013), Peri (2012).\n[16] For example, found by Anelli, Basso, Ippedico, and Peri (2023), and OECD (2011).\n[17] For example, found by Furtado (2016, 2015).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Applying the same strategies to analyze child health and birth outcomes, we find both positive\n\nand negative effects of mining activity. Mining activity appears to marginally reduce the\n\nanthropometric status (short-term malnutrition) of children in mining districts, which could\n\npoint to less food security. These results are in sharp contrast to the improvements in birth\n\nattendance and the decrease in infant mortality observed in mining communities and mining\n\ndistricts. A child in a mining district born after a mine has become active has had more prenatal\n\nvisits and is less likely to die as an infant. This result is similar to what Benshaul-Tolonen\n\n(2019) finds for a larger sample of gold-producing countries in Africa. Despite substantial\n\nreductions in diarrheal diseases, the analysis highlights that migrant children are more likely to\n\nsuffer from diarrheal diseases. The effects on the migrant community should be interpreted with\n\ncare, however, since it may be that less-well-off people choose to migrate to mining\n\ncommunities and that the mine activities do not make them any less or better off. In addition,\n\nmine closure or downscaling could lead to deterioration in local employment conditions and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n### **Child health,** **vaccination and** **nutrition**\n\nTimely initiation of breastfeeding (within one hour of delivery) Exclusive breastfeeding under 6 months 0-23 153/274 57% months 0-5 15/38 37% months\n\n- Excluding Estonia, Hungary\n\nBreastfeeding practices for infants and young children directly influence their nutritional health during the first two years of life and play a crucial role in child survival. From the survey results, the proportion of children 0-23 months who had timely initiation of breastfeeding was 57% and the rate of exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months of life was 37% in the region. Data need to be interpreted with caution given the very low number of respondents.\n\nTwo doses of measles vaccine are recommended for optimal protection against measles; the survey assessed therefore first and second dose measles vaccination coverage in children aged 9 months to 5 years. In average, 83% of children received at least one measles vaccine, similar to results from 2023 when 84% of children had received at least one dose. Coverage was lowest in Romania with 71% where respondents reported also greater", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey results", "confidence": 0.139837846159935}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey results", "confidence": 0.7168974876403809}]}}}
{"input": "Substantial progress has been made by Brazil toward implementing the 2019 GRF pledges which\nfocused on the improvement of the asylum system and the provision of complementary forms of\nprotection, In 2023, the Government made 10 additional pledges at the GRF, covering the\nfollowing topics: improvement and facilitation of the right to family reunion; participation of\npeople in need of international protection in decision making and consultation processes; creation\nof resettlement and complementary pathways programs; strengthening of asylum systems and\nimprovement of refugee access to health, amongst others.\n\nIFC and UNHCR have been working together since 2018 to create innovative solutions to\novercome the challenges faced by refugees and migrants in Brazil. The two organizations sought\nto explore potential ways to engage the private sector in providing solutions with a primary focus\non employment, affordable housing and financial inclusion. IFC and UNHCR, in partnership with\nthe Brazilian Banking Association (FEBRABAN) and the Brazilian Central Bank, prepared a guide\nto inform financial institutions about the profiles and specific documentation of refugees and\nmigrants and their financial needs.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The approach to data collection in each of the countries included in the report differed depending on the availability of sampling frames and information on the distribution of the refugee population by geographic area and accommodation type. All interviews were conducted face to face. As a probabilistic selection of respondents could not be ensured, the primary goal was to collect a diverse sample that would reflect the population’s composition as closely as possible.\n\nFor the regional analysis, weights were applied based on the most up-to-date estimates of the number of refugees staying in each country. This allowed calculated indicators to more accurately represent the broader refugee population across the region.\n\nAppropriate measures were implemented to ensure the protection of personal data and to guarantee confidentiality in all data collection and processing activities. Consent was requested and recorded for all selected participants, providing clear information on the purpose, and expected use of the data.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Table 1.** Ukrainian employment rate in EU.\n\n**Employment rate** **Main sectors of employment** **Date** **Source**\n\n**Source:** Deloitte elaboration based on the aggregation in OECD International Migration Outlook 2023. The calculation methods of employment\nrates vary between the countries, the results for Poland, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic and Italy are based on surveys. Additionally, the different statistical offices and organisations may use different employment and working age definitions.\n\nCurrently, DIW Berlin data shows that the employment of refugees from Ukraine is much lower in Germany, although many aspire to find employment. In a weekly report from 12th July 2023 the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), a survey conducted in the first quarter of 2023 finds that only 18% of working age refugees were employed (Kollman, 2023). Among the non-employed, however, as many as 93% declare willingness to begin working, of which 71% as soon as possible or within a year.\nImportantly, many refugees are currently attending language courses in Germany", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DIW Berlin data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DIW Berlin data", "confidence": 0.6304507851600647}, {"text": "OECD International Migration Outlook 2023", "confidence": 0.5631676316261292}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DIW Berlin data", "confidence": 0.31606730818748474}, {"text": "survey conducted in the first quarter of 2023", "confidence": 0.10604193061590195}], "vague_data": [{"text": "surveys", "confidence": 0.444364994764328}]}}}
{"input": "The \r number \r of \r UN \r organisations \r and \r international \r and \r national \r NGOs \r as \r well \r as \r the\nscale \r of \r humanitarian \r and \r development \r activities \r in \r the \r South-­‐East \r are \r currently\nexpanding. \r At \r present \r UNHCR \r is \r reviewing, \r together \r with \r partners, \r how \r leadership \r and\nco-­‐ordination \r in \r support \r of \r durable \r solutions \r in \r the \r South-­‐East \r can \r be \r strengthened \r and\ncentred \r around \r a \r shared \r vision \r and \r strategy \r located \r within \r a \r broader \r protection\nframework \r incorporating \r key \r standards. \r UNHCR, \r in \r accordance \r with \r its \r mandate\nobligations, \r will \r play \r an \r active \r role \r in \r this \r process \r and \r in \r enhancing \r inter-­‐agency \r co-­‐\nordination \r on \r durable \r solutions \r at \r regional \r and \r State/Region \r levels.\n\nOne \r mechanism \r might \r be \r the \r establishment \r of \r a \r Working \r Group \r on \r Durable \r Solutions\nfor \r IDPs \r and \r Refugees \r to \r serve \r as \r a \r platform \r to \r co-­‐ordinate \r durable \r solutions \r related\nactivities \r from \r the \r preparatory \r phase. \r The \r working \r group \r could \r be \r co-­‐led \r by\nrepresentatives \r from \r the \r Government \r and \r UNHCR, \r and \r might \r consist \r of \r relevant \r UN\nagencies, \r NGOs, \r donors, \r civil \r society \r and \r representatives \r of \r parties \r involved \r in \r the \r peace\nprocess. \r In \r cease-­‐fire \r areas, \r all \r activities \r will \r have \r to \r be \r undertaken \r in \r close \r consultation\nwith \r non-­‐state \r armed \r groups \r operating \r in \r those \r areas.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "natives and this gap was largest for men, workers in the highest education level, and nonnaturalized immigrants. This has an important impact on wages, because, as showed in a seminal work by Kleiner and Krueger (2013) and confirmed in several analyses, working in a regulated profession comes with a significant wage premium.\nBrücker et al. (2021), who analysed German data, found that occupational recognition led to full convergence of immigrants’ earnings to those of their native counterparts. Tani (2020) found that in Australia, licensing raised hourly value to the economy. This estimate may underestimate the potential benefits, as the boost in productivity would most likely rise not just employee wages, but employer profits as well. Conversely, the overall impact on wages might be lower, if increased worker competition reduced the average individual premium.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "German data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "German data", "confidence": 0.12009363621473312}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "German data", "confidence": 0.2728365361690521}], "vague_data": [{"text": "German data", "confidence": 0.5520103573799133}]}}}
{"input": "the refugee inflow. Before the refugee influx, the share of companies reporting vacancies in the quarterly NBP survey stood at 49% in Q4 2021 – the highest level on record. This helps to explain the relative ease of the refugees' labour market inclusion in terms of employment rates.\nAfter refugee inflow, the share of firms reporting vacancies stopped growing and declined slightly to 45% in Q3 2023. This partly indicates the fact that many refugees entered the labour market, and partly a cyclical economic slowdown. Despite that, the labour market remains relatively strong.\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Chart 9.** Change in the number of workers registered for social security with Ukrainian citizenship by NACE sector between end of Q3\n2023 and 2021 Thousands Manufacturing Accommodation and food service activities Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles Human heatlh and social work activities Administrative and support service activities Education Information and communication Professional, scientific and technical activities Public administration and defense; compulsory social security Construction Financial and insurance activities Agriculture, forestry and fishing Real estate activities Water supply: sewerage, waste management and remediation activities", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "quarterly NBP survey"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "NBP survey", "confidence": 0.8736893534660339}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The number of workers with Ukrainian citizenship since the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine grew in all NACE [21] sectors apart from transportation and storage. Since 2021, just before the escalation of war in 2022 in Ukraine, the number of workers with Ukrainian citizenship and social security insurance grew the most in manufacturing (almost by 34 thousand), accommodation and food\n\n**Source:** Deloitte own elaboration based on estimated data from [https://nbp.pl/publikacje/cykliczne-materialy-analityczne-nbp/](https://nbp.pl/publikacje/cykliczne-materialy-analityczne-nbp/szybki-monitoring/) 21  Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (French Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la\n[szybki-monitoring/](https://nbp.pl/publikacje/cykliczne-materialy-analityczne-nbp/szybki-monitoring/) Communauté Européenne).\n\n18 19", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Statistical Classification of Economic Activities", "confidence": 0.10329077392816544}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "estimated data from", "confidence": 0.327389657497406}], "vague_data": [{"text": "estimated data", "confidence": 0.2611473798751831}]}}}
{"input": "3. Economic Opportunities\n\nIn accordance with Article 28 of the 2020 Asylum Law, the restrictions on the employment of foreigners,\nincluding the prerequisite of obtaining a work permit, should be considered not applicable to refugees.\nHowever, Decree No. 96-189 PR/MFPT, still requiring approval from the National Office for Employment\nProtection (ONAPE) for the employment of foreigners, remains silent on refugees. In addition, the decree\nstipulates that, before submission to ONAPE, contracts for foreigners must receive endorsement from\nimmigration authorities. It is unclear whether refugees should be exempted from this endorsement from\nImmigration Department.\n\nFurthermore, Article 11 of the 1996 Decree, which prohibits hiring foreigners for non-specialized jobs, may still\napply for refugees. Companies hiring foreigners are still obligated to pay fees ranging from FCFA 100,000\nto FCFA 250,000, and it is unclear whether these fees will also apply to refugees. The 2023 Asylum Decree\nhas not clarified the type of exemption of restrictive measures for foreigner employment that should benefit\nto refugees.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "##### **September/ October 2023 report**\n\n###### Venezuela\n\n**XII. Focal Group Discussions**\n\n**with LGBTIQ+ Organizations for**\n\n**Thematic Protection Analysis**\n\n**Update (PAU)**\n\n**In view of the preparation of a the-**\n\n**matic Protection Analysis Update**\n\n**(PAU) on the protection situation of**\n\n**LGBTQI+ persons, as part of the PC’s**\n\n**reporting efforts, with support from**\n\n**the Areas of Responsibility (AoRs)**\n\n**and the GenCap Gender Advisor,**\n\na hybrid focus group discussion was\n\norganized with LGBTIQ+ organizations\n\nand relevant actors on September 7th,\n\ncombining face-to-face and remote par\nticipation.\n\nThe focal group aimed to collect infor\nmation from key informants on the\n\nhumanitarian needs and protection\n\nrisks of LGBTIQ+ people, with a focus\n\non changes perceived in the last year.\n\n**10**\n\nThis information supported the drafting\n\nof the document that outlines the current\n\ncontext, main protection risks, affected\n\ngroups by geographical areas, and key\n\nrecommendations for humanitarian\n\nactors, government entities, donors, and\n\ncivil society organizations in Venezu\nela. The report's analytical conclusions\n\naim to provide an evidence base for\n\nprogramming, advocacy, and dialogue\n\nto influence behaviors and policies,\n\nfostering a more favorable protection\n\nenvironment.\n\n**XIII. Mental Health and Psychoso-**\n\n**cial Support (MHPSS) Coaching**\n\n**and Training of Trainers (ToT)**\n\n**The PC through the Protection Assis-**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**more productive.** Firms adjust their production technologies\nto the skill-mix prevalent in the economy, e.g., to the growing number of labour force with tertiary education (Acemoglu, 2002). Similarly, when immigrants arrive and make certain skills more prevalent in the labour force, firms adjust thus making the whole skill-group more productive and countervailing downward pressure on its wages, and possibly increasing overall efficiency (Peri, 2016). This is the mechanism found by previously described seminal paper by Peri (2012), in which immigration caused low-skill-biased technical change and increased productivity. An inflow of low-skilled immigrants can cause firms to adapt labour-intensive technologies or postpone automation, while expanding research and development departments in case of high-skilled immigrants (Lewis and Peri, 2015; Lewis, 2013).\n\n**Immigrants tend to have higher rates of entrepreneurship**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF HOUSING SUPPORT AND EMPLOYMENT FACILITATION IN ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n**SHARE OF HOUSEHOLDS BELOW THE POVERTY LINE BY**\n\n**GENDER OF ADULTS, %**\n\nFemale with children Mixed without children Female without children Mixed with children Male without children 56% 48% 40% 37% 32% Female-led households with children also demonstrate a significantly higher poverty rate, standing at 56%, than their mixed-gender [18] counterparts (37%). This pattern does not hold true for mixed households without children, likely due to the significantly higher median age of adults in this cohort with 53 years vs. a maximum of 45 for the other groups.\n\nCompared with their initial months in the host country, 42% of female-led households report a decrease in their ability to afford goods and services. This is the highest share among all gender groups.\n\n---\n[18] With both adult males and females present", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n# **4.** Unaccounted positive externalities\n\n##### Macroeconomic modelling underestimates the positive economic impacts of immigration, compared to econometric estimates.\n\n**Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland**\n\n**Immigration's impact on productivity**\n\n**•** Jaumotte et al. (2016) in an IMF taskforce report examine economic impacts of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The cost of care and language are still barriers among those seeking care, and regionally, when compared to 2023, the proportion of those who reported experiencing cost barriers has increased, while it has not changed for language barriers. In Romania where unmet needs are the highest, cost and language barriers were the most reported barriers after long waiting times. In Hungary, language is the most reported barrier (53%).\n\nWhile the primary barrier to accessing healthcare reported by both women and men was long wait times, women reported unaffordable transport costs (25%) and hospital fees (21%) as their next most significant barriers. In contrast, men reported language difficulties (22%) and the inability to make an appointment (22%) as their top barriers after long wait times.\n\n**BARRIERS TO ACCESSING HEALTH CARE**\n\n2023 2024 Long waiting times* Could not afford transport Unable make appt Could not afford hospital Language barrier Could not afford clinic fee Lack of knowledge Lack health insurance Do not trust local provider Spec med treatment serv unavailable Refused to provide care (2023 N=1071, 2024 N=1,040)\n\n- Included under Others in 2023 (Total Others 2023: 5%)\n\n**13**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "fastgini [15] in STATA). We do this for both the cluster and district level. None of the effects of\n\nmining are statistically significant, but they point to increased asset wealth.\n\n**Table 9 OLS estimates for wealth and inequality in the DHS individual-level analysis**\n\nWealth Gini\n\nwealth cluster district\nindex level level\n\nactive*mine 7,290 -0.004 0.004\n(12,849) (0.013) (0.018)\n\nmine 9,922 0.011 0.006\n(8,676) (0.013) (0.016)\n\nactive 7,854 -0.006 0.034**\n(9,016) (0.010) (0.017)\n\nObservations 4,909 4,909 4,909\n\nR-squared 0.613 0.227 0.548\n\n_Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and\ndistrict fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. Active is active status of mine in the survey year.\n\n*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS = ordinary least squares.\n\n**6.4 Bottom 40% of the population**\n\nTo understand the welfare effects of the bottom 40 percent of the population in the income\n\nscale, we split the sample according to the wealth score provided by DHS. Given the data\n\nstructure, which is repeated cross-section, we cannot follow a particular household that was\n\nidentified as belonging to the bottom 40 percent in the initial time period. Instead, we identify\n\n---\n[15] Fastgini is a user-written command in STATA that helps calculate the gini coefficient.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "wealth score provided by DHS"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS individual-level analysis", "confidence": 0.3701033890247345}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "wealth score provided by DHS", "confidence": 0.1355562061071396}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF HOUSING SUPPORT AND EMPLOYMENT FACILITATION IN ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n### **Background**\n\nOver two years have elapsed since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine leading to a protracted displacement and a humanitarian crisis. The response by the refugee-hosting countries continues to be overall characterized by a spirit of welcomeness and generosity and much has been done to make ensure that those fleeing the war are able to meet basic needs and have access to accommodation, healthcare, education, social assistance, and employment. Despite these efforts, the situation remains a source of deep concern, necessitating a continued and coordinated humanitarian response at the regional level.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**There are substantial barriers for**\n\n**those seeking entry into the teaching**\n\n**profession.** There are three career stages\nfor teachers working in Polish schools: teacher trainee, appointed teacher, and chartered teacher. Three-quarters of teachers in the 2023/2024 school year fell into the last two categories (GUS, 2024). However, to become promoted to an appointed or chartered teacher, a foreigner must possess Polish, EU, Swiss, or other EEA citizenship (Babakova et al., 2024). In effect, only 0.4% of Ukrainian refugees were teachers (ZUS-registered in mid-2024) compared to 2.2% of Polish citizens. There were more teachers’ assistants, who are not regulated, than actual teachers. Furthermore, the data presented in chapter 2 shows that the median net wages of Ukrainian refugees in the teaching profession are just PLN 3,500, constituting 66% of what the host population earns, the lowest earnings of all sectors.\n\n**Occupational licensing rules regarding**\n\n**citizenship have been relaxed for**\n\n**medical professions in the wake of**\n\n**the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and in**\n\n**February 2022, but those were often**\n\n**makeshift arrangements.** According to\nthe Babakova et al. (2024) report, during the COVID-19 pandemic, practicing medical professionals from Ukraine were allowed\n\n#### **4.3 Language wage premium**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data presented in chapter 2", "confidence": 0.3638293147087097}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland © UNHCR / Anna Liminowicz\n\n**Compared to Polish citizens, Ukrainian**\n\n**refugees rarely work in regulated**\n\n**professions** –3.6% of those insured at\nZUS compared to 10.6% of Polish citizens, as of mid-2024. This percentage was higher among pre-war Ukrainian migrants and other foreigners, because of a large share of truck and bus drivers. Overall, Ukrainian refugees are less likely to work in major regulated professions compared to Polish citizens. Among Ukrainian refugees, 0.7% work as truck or bus drivers, much less than among other migrants (4.7% prewar Ukrainians and 6.2% other migrants) or Polish citizens (2.3%). This may be partly attributed to a higher share of women among Ukrainian refugees. An exception is the taxi driving profession, which has lower entry barriers, offers flexibility and has a large share of migrants.\n\nDue to citizenship requirements, the difference is more clearly regulatorydriven in the case of teachers (school and preschool), who account for just 0.4% of Ukrainian refugees and even less of other migrants, but 2.2% of Polish citizens. In recent years, medical 30 Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\nhumanitarian \r mine \r action \r programme \r with \r local \r and \r international \r humanitarian\nagencies. \r Despite \r these \r positive \r developments \r there \r are \r still \r no \r activities \r related \r to\nsurvey \r and \r clearance, \r marking, \r or \r fencing \r being \r undertaken. \r Mine \r risk \r education\nprogrammes \r and \r assistance \r to \r mine \r victims \r remain \r still \r limited \r in \r scope.\n\nLand \r registration \r documents \r are \r held \r by \r township \r authorities \r in \r Myanmar. \r Land \r tenure\ndocuments \r and \r deeds \r are \r not \r always \r recorded \r or \r respected \r and \r there \r are \r frequent\nreports \r of \r land \r expropriation \r (or \r “land \r grabbing”) \r by \r the \r Government, \r the \r Myanmar\nArmy, \r non-­‐state \r armed \r groups, \r and \r private \r companies, \r often \r resulting \r in \r internal\ndisplacement \r without \r appropriate \r guarantees \r of \r compensation. \r Although \r the \r reforms\nintroduced \r by \r the \r Government \r in \r 2008 \r provide \r some \r additional \r security \r of \r land \r tenure,\nthey \r still \r fail \r to \r adequately \r recognise \r widely \r used \r customary \r rights.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Land \r registration \r documents", "confidence": 0.8453574776649475}]}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\n- Contribute \r towards \r a \r comprehensive \r livelihood \r support \r programme. \r As \r per\nlocal \r needs \r and \r opportunities, \r this \r may \r include \r skills \r and \r employment\npromotion; \r support \r to \r productive \r assets \r and \r community \r infrastructure;\nenterprise \r development; \r microfinance \r promotion.\n\n- Ensure \r the \r provision \r of \r mine \r risk \r education \r before \r return \r and \r upon \r arrival,\nensure \r the \r prioritization \r of \r mine \r marking \r of \r contaminated \r areas \r in \r areas \r of\nreturn \r and \r advocate \r and \r support, \r if \r required, \r punctual \r clearance \r of \r critical \r areas\nsuch \r as \r access \r roads \r to \r basic \r services \r (schools, \r hospitals, \r etc).\n\n- Capitalize \r on \r the \r experience \r and \r expertise \r developed \r by \r committees \r in \r the\ncamps, \r such \r as \r the \r GBV \r committees, \r and \r re-­‐mobilize \r their \r members \r in \r places \r of\nreturn \r to \r strengthen \r prevention \r and \r response \r networks.\n\n**10.4.** **Phase \r 4: \r Consolidation \r of \r reintegration \r operations**\n\nUNHCR \r will \r facilitate \r and \r support \r the \r reintegration \r process \r increasingly \r involving\nspecialized development organisations implementing long-­‐term area-­‐based\nprogrammes \r in \r support \r to \r the \r Government \r and \r in \r the \r framework \r of \r national\ndevelopment \r plans, \r ensuring \r appropriate \r delegation \r and \r follow \r up \r on \r commitments.\n\n**10.5.** **Phase \r 5: \r Reintegration \r operations \r are \r scaled \r down \r and \r phased \r out**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Total Population**\n\n**11,735 Individuals**\n\n**(6,548 Cases)**\n\n**Vulnerabilities***\n\nUnaccompanied or\n\nseparated child\n\nWoman at risk\n\nSingle parent\n\nChild at Risk\n\nDisability\n\nChronic Illness\n\n**136**\n\n_*One individual may have multiple specific needs_\n\n**2,288**\n\n2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\n\n_*Pre-registration data refers to a headcount upon arrival or at disembarkation sites. Some individuals departed prior to registration with UNHCR._\n\nUNHCR / 1 November 2024 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Pre-registration data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Pre-registration data", "confidence": 0.8920654654502869}]}}}
{"input": "_Figure 4: Labor force participation by gender as a percentage of working age population across 2019 and 2024_\n\n_Source: 2019 Shona socioeconomic survey_ [[8]] _and the authors’ calculation of 2024 survey data._\n\n**Household income**\n\n**Income from business is the primary source of livelihood for the Shona community, followed by wages and other**\n\n**minor sources.** 73 percent of household income in the Shona community comes from business activities like\n\ncarpentry, weaving baskets and hawking on the streets, indicating a strong reliance on entrepreneurship and self\nemployment. Wages from employment and daily labor activities constitute 25 percent of the income, while other\n\nsources like asset earnings or assistance contribute a mere total of 2 percent, showing limited diversification in\n\nincome streams. This heavy dependence on business shows that the Shona community still relies on their traditional\n\nincome sources and suggests that the community might face heightened vulnerability to market fluctuations and\n\neconomic shocks affecting their businesses.\n\n**A majority of households report that their income has remained stable since gaining citizenship, but a notable**\n\n**proportion has experienced an increase.** Half of the households indicated their income stayed the same, while 38", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 survey data", "confidence": 0.10043395310640335}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2024 survey data", "confidence": 0.541954517364502}], "vague_data": [{"text": "2024 survey data", "confidence": 0.19598720967769623}]}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE The survey also reviewed household coping mechanisms where households had insufficient funds to meet all basic needs. While more than a third of respondents reported spending their savings to meet basic needs, reducing essential health expenditures (including medicines) was the second most common coping mechanisms and used by 13% of the respondents.\n\nThis coping strategy is reported highest in Romania (36%), Hungary (23%), and Bulgaria (18%). Notably, in these countries, cost of care was the second most reported barrier to accessing care after long waiting times. Delaying care has negative implications on the health of individuals, including poorer health outcomes and an increased burden on health systems dealing with more complex and chronic conditions.\n\n**% OF HOUSEHOLDS WHO USED COPING MECHANISMS**\n\n**DUE TO LACK OF FUNDS IN THE LAST 30 DAYS**\n\n### **Reasons for visiting** **Ukraine**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey", "confidence": 0.28440171480178833}]}}}
{"input": "**The results are in line with the**\n\n**optimistic scenario from the**\n\n**previous Deloitte (2024) report.** The\ncurrent report is different from the one from 2024 in that we account for the positive productivity shock reflected in the labour market data, which further\n\n**The impact of Ukrainian refugees**\n\n**on the Polish economy is estimated**\n\n**with the Deloitte D.Climate general**\n\n**equilibrium model** **[18]** **in a modelling**\n\n**scenario that includes a productivity**\n\n**shock to account for the positive**\n\n**productivity impacts of migrants.**\nIn the model a marginal productivity of labour shock of a 1.5-2% dependent on the year is set, as to zero out the impact of Ukrainian refugees on the unemployment rate in the economy. This is in line with the lack of negative impacts of Ukrainian refugees on the Polish labour market in our econometric modelling, and empirical literature on productivity 17 For the literature review, underlying empirical evidence, and model calibration refer to the appendix on modelling strategy.\n\n18 Details on Deloitte D.Climate model calibration are outlined in the Appendix on modelling strategy, while further details on this CGE- class (Computable General Equilibrium) model are available in the Online Technical Appendix.\n\n22", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "labour market data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Deloitte D.Climate model", "confidence": 0.13387271761894226}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "labour market data", "confidence": 0.18122811615467072}], "vague_data": [{"text": "labour market data", "confidence": 0.8623564839363098}]}}}
{"input": "(5) Total annual regionally adjusted household expenditure (local currency, regionally deflated).\n(6) Total food expenditure (nondeflated).\n(7) Total housing expenditure (nondeflated).\n(8) Total health and education expenditure (nondeflated).\n(9) Total household energy expenditure (gas and electricity) (nondeflated).\n\n*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All regressions control for year and district fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and\nyears of education.\n\n**7. Robustness for district-level estimations**\n\n**7.2 Using production levels**\n\nWe continue by exploring the effects of mining intensity as proxied by district-level production\n\nvolumes. The estimation will be similar to equation (2), but we replace the indicator variable\n\nfor being an active mining district with annual gold production in the district:\n\n𝑌���        - 𝛽�𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑑_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛��        - ∝�� 𝑔� �𝜆𝑋�� �𝜀���      �4�\n\nThe measure of gold production is in 10 tons of gold produced, and 𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑑_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛�� is\n\neither _gold_year_district_, which equals the total production of all mines in a district in the\n\ndifferent survey years, or _gold_period_district_, which equals total production for the years\n\nbefore the survey. For the 1993 survey, the period is 1990–93, for 1998 it is 1994–98, and so\n\non.\n\nUsing production levels instead of an indicator of having any production in the district has the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "1993 survey", "confidence": 0.6545477509498596}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "production levels", "confidence": 0.1421920359134674}]}}}
{"input": "The primary needs identified within the Shona community include access to affordable housing, better integration\n\ninto the labor market, financial support for business development, and political representation. External support in\n\nthese areas, such as land allocation advocacy, education and skills training programs, and inclusion in national safety\n\nprograms, is essential for providing a foundation for sustained community growth and prosperity. Partnerships with\n\ngovernment agencies, NGOs, and international organizations could be instrumental in addressing these needs,\n\nensuring that the Shona community has the necessary resources and support to thrive in a post-citizenship era.\n\n## **Nationality as a tool for development**\n\n**Inclusive national identification systems are recognized as key enablers for development.** Allowing people to\n\nestablish and verify their identity is often a prerequisite for access to services and economic opportunities and\n\nexercising a range of rights, such as property ownership and public participation. For governments and businesses,\n\n**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "national identification systems", "confidence": 0.12968513369560242}]}}}
{"input": "Even with the increase in unemployment and lower real wages, an increase in labour force means a higher wage pool, which means higher tax income.\n\nMoreover, boosts in private consumption both due to increase in population as well as higher average spending rates means that refugees increased state income from taxation on consumption.\nThese effects will be strengthened by influx of capital from abroad. In total it is estimated that this increased the total income of the general government sector by 0.8-1.1% in 2022 and 1.05-1.45% in 2023.\nFinancially this respectively amounts to 10.1-13.7 billion PLN in 2022 and 14.7-19.9 billion PLN in 2023. Comparing this to government expenses on refugees (where although there are no accurate data about government spending on refugees, estimates quoted by a government official put it around 15 billion PLN in 2022 and around 5 billion in 2023 [46] ) we can conclude that the additional income from taxation more than offset the additional expenses [47] that were needed to accommodate them.\nIn the long term, refugees should increase yearly general government revenue by around 0.85-1.3%.\n\n---\n[47] Excluding spending of private households estimated as further 10 billion PLN.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "no accurate data about government spending on refugees", "confidence": 0.11483823508024216}]}}}
{"input": "##### **September/ October 2023 report**\n\n### **MONITORING THE PROTECTION RESPONSE**\n\n###### Venezuela\n\n### **PERFORMANCE AND FUNDING**\n\nThe PC continues to reinforce the impor\ntance of reporting, which allows it to\n\ntrack funding and conduct advocacy.\n\nThroughout the last years the number of\n\npartners that regularly report 5Ws (cur\nrenly 345ws), including the implementing\n\npartners of the lead agencies of the Clus\nter and AoRs, increased notoriously.\n\nThe activity monitoring dashboard co\nvering latest data collection in October\n\n2023 and other information products\n\n[can be accessed in the protection clus-](https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiYzg3NGFkM2EtYjZhMS00YWNkLWE1NjItMjg0OThlMTAzMDM1IiwidCI6ImU1YzM3OTgxLTY2NjQtNDEzNC04YTBjLTY1NDNkMmFmODBiZSIsImMiOjh9)\n\n[ter website, and currently 105 partners](https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiYzg3NGFkM2EtYjZhMS00YWNkLWE1NjItMjg0OThlMTAzMDM1IiwidCI6ImU1YzM3OTgxLTY2NjQtNDEzNC04YTBjLTY1NDNkMmFmODBiZSIsImMiOjh9)\n\nare supporting the 345W reports. Please\n\nnote the list of Specific Objectives in\n\nFigure 1 are aligned to the HRP 2022.\n\nThe percentage (%) in each chart (see\n\nfigure 1) represent the number of benefi\nciaries (individuals) reached against the\n\ntarget set in the HRP 2022 - 2023.\n\n**14**\n\n353, 037 million USD were received\n\nby the Venezuelan Republic so far in\n\n2023 through the HRP plan, accord\ning to the Financial Tracking Service\n\n(FTS). Requested funding for the Protec\ntion Cluster was 101.2 million USD and\n\n33,385,8929 million USD were granted.\n\nAccording to FTS, the total coverage has", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "activity monitoring dashboard", "confidence": 0.8607736825942993}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "malnutrition), and weight-for-height (underweight) show that the children living in mining\n\ncommunities before the mine started operating have the lowest scores of all four groups. The\n\noutcomes seem to improve with mining, although not enough to offset the initial adverse\n\nsituation.\n\nTo test for exogeneity, we run regressions using baseline individual-level data to explore\n\nchanges in observable characteristics among women (the main part of the sample). Table 3\n\nshows that there are no significant effects of the mine opening on the age structure, migration\n\nhistory, marital status, fertility, or education, using the difference-in-difference specification\n\nwith a full set of controls. If anything, it seems that women in active mining communities are\n\nmarginally older, more likely to never have moved, and more likely to be or have been in a\n\ncohabiting relationship or married. Given the women’s slightly higher age, it is not surprising\n\nto find that they have higher fertility and lower schooling (assuming that schooling has\n\nincreased over time in Ghana). All these estimates are, however, insignificant.\n\n**Table 3 Observable characteristics in the DHS individual data**\n\nnon- ever currently ever total any schooling\n\n16", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS individual data", "confidence": 0.8824076056480408}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "baseline individual-level data", "confidence": 0.20276381075382233}], "vague_data": [{"text": "baseline individual-level data", "confidence": 0.23704282939434052}]}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n# Executive summary\n\nThe war in Ukraine, now in its third year, continues to have devastating effects on the Ukrainian population, triggering one of the largest displacement crises in Europe since World War II. As of December 2024, over 6.2 million Ukrainian refugees have been recorded across Europe, the majority of whom are women, children, and older persons. The European Union extended the Temporary Protection Directive until March 2026, granting Ukrainian refugees access to essential health services, education, and other critical support. The Republic of Moldova followed this model and also introduced Temporary Protection for Ukrainian refugees.\n\nIn 2024, to assess the health and mental health situation of Ukrainian refugees, their access to services, and the barriers they face across countries, Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP) health and mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) partners conducted a regional analysis of the Socio-Economic Insights Survey (SEIS) data from 10 refugee-hosting countries: Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia. The analysis includes a comparison with key indicators collected in 2023.\n\nKey finding from the regional analysis include:\n\n**3**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Socio-Economic Insights Survey (SEIS)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Socio-Economic Insights Survey", "confidence": 0.866568922996521}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "mortality and night lights (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2019) for gold mining countries in West and East\n\nAfrica (including Ghana). The baseline differences in observable characteristics – in particular,\n\nlower levels of economic development preceding the mine opening - indicate that a cross\n\nsectional approach using only the post-period may not be sufficient to understand the impact of\n\ngold mining on socio-economic variables.\n\n**Table 2 Summary statistics for women’s survey**\n\n(1) (2) (3)         (4)\n\nBefore mining During Mining\n\n>20 km <20 km >20 km <20 km\n\nMean Coefficient Mean Coefficient\n\n_Woman Characteristics_\nAge 28.79 0.836 28.95 -0.352\nTotal children 2.18 0.417* 2.56 -0.035\nWealth 3.85 -0.619** 3.33 -0.028\nNonmigrant 0.32 0.123** 0.33 -0.028\nUrban 0.62 -0.300** 0.49 -0.150**\nNo education 0.17 -0.045 0.20 -0.042**\n<3 years education 0.77 0.035 0.74 0.045**\n\n15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "women’s survey", "confidence": 0.6166362762451172}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**COUNTRY NATIONALS, %** **[1,2,3,4]**\n\nHost country nationals Ukraine refugees Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Region\n\n1. The poverty rate is defined as the share of individuals with an\nequivalized disposable income that is less than 50% of the host country median 2. Calculations for Moldova were not conducted, as this country is not included into the [EU statistics on income and living conditions (SILC)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-statistics-on-income-and-living-conditions)\n[survey, which the OECD uses as the basis for host country poverty](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-statistics-on-income-and-living-conditions) assessments 3. Results for the Czech Republic not individually presented due to sampling limitations 4. The host country poverty rate was based on [OECD indicators for](https://stats.oecd.org/)\n[2021 that were indexed towards 2023 using consumer price index](https://stats.oecd.org/) (CPI) data Refugee households also report having to engage in harmful coping strategies to meet basic needs.\nSome 8% and 15% had to resort to emergency 5 Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia 6 Defined as the total after-tax income of the household (including wages, transfers, social protection benefits, etc.) divided by the square root of the household size", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "EU statistics on income and living conditions"}, {"text": "OECD indicators"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "consumer price index"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "OECD indicators for", "confidence": 0.6390200853347778}, {"text": "EU statistics on income and living conditions", "confidence": 0.6178051829338074}, {"text": "consumer price index", "confidence": 0.3385583460330963}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Had to skip a Adults had to meal eat less to feed small children Source: Survey data, SAG estimates\n\n**Employment remains closely associated with significantly lower poverty rates, but size of**\n\n**employment income is key**\n\nJust like in the case of 2023 data, the current survey round suggests a strong link between employment and poverty. Whereas for individuals living in households with no one employed the poverty rate stands at a staggering 62%, it drops to 10% for those with at least one person working. That said, after correcting for excessive housing costs, the poverty rate in the latter group grows to 25%, which is more than double the host country rate. This implies that while employment at refugee household level is important, it is not sufficient to ensure a decent living.\n\nHouseholds that are less financially vulnerable receive more of their income from employment. For those with very low income (below the poverty line), only 26% of their total income comes from work. This figure grows to 67% for those identified as having an income below the poverty threshold after correcting it for housing costs, and to 88% for those living above the poverty line.\n\n**8**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2023 data", "confidence": 0.7073130011558533}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.9871741533279419}]}}}
{"input": "A feature of our modelling approach is that the resulting GDP gains are reduced due to increased competition on the labour market, which slightly increases the unemployment rate by 0.18-0.3 pp. in 2023, corresponding to 33-54 thousand additional people being unemployed. This effect also slows down real wage growth by 0.65-1.15% in 2023.\nIn reality, these negative effects are likely to be compensated by positive productivity gains, in the form of adjustments on the part of native workers (by their occupational upgrading, see papers by Peri and Sparber, 2009; Foged and Peri, 2016) and firms (by skill-biased technical change, see papers by Lewis and Peri, 2015, or Lewis, 2013), as econometric studies find only small effects on native wages, clustered around zero (Peri, 2014). The case of refugees from Ukraine in Poland is studied in an early paper by Gromadzki and Lewandowski (2023), who find no effect on earnings,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "documentation has been a major contributor. The acquisition of citizenship has provided some new avenues,\n\nespecially for the youth, such as working in the hospitality industry and the ability to obtain driving licenses, which\n\nhas opened job opportunities in the transportation sector. However, most of the community still relies on traditional\n\ntrades such as carpentry and basket weaving. The competitive nature of these trades, coupled with a lack of\n\ndiversification in skills and economic opportunities, is prompting members to explore new economic avenues. This\n\nsituation highlights the need for economic development initiatives that are tailored to the community's unique\n\nneeds and skills, offering sustainable and diversified economic opportunities.\n\nThe youth within the Shona community demonstrate a keen interest in enhancing their skills and seeking\n\nopportunities beyond conventional trades. The improvement in access to education is a positive development, yet\n\nthe challenge of transitioning into the formal labor market remains significant. Citizenship has facilitated easier\n\nmobility and enabled traditional vending activities, but it has not led to substantial changes in long-term career\n\nprospects. This underscores the need for targeted youth development programs focusing on vocational training,\n\ncareer counseling, and job placement services to help bridge the gap between education and employment.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Co-nationals can provide important information to refugees about employment opportunities. In Germany, Battisti, Peri, and Romiti (2022) found that immigrants initially located in places with more conationals, as well as well as refugees and repatriated ethnic Germans dispersed to such places, are more likely to be employed in the first 3 years. It was found, however, that these groups had lower probability of investing in human capital. In Swiss data, Martén, Hainmueller, and Hangartner (2019) found that refugees dispersed to locations with more co-nationals are more likely to find work, especially in the first 3 years. In Danish data, Damm (2014) found that higher skill levels of non-Western immigrant men in an area raises employment probability of refugee men, while higher employment rates of their co-national men raises their earnings. Also in Danish data, Damm (2009) found that larger size of ethnic network in an area increases earnings of refugees.\nIn Swedish data, Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund (2003) found that refugees dispersed to areas with more co-nationals experience higher earnings.\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Danish data"}, {"text": "Swedish data"}, {"text": "Swiss data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Swedish data", "confidence": 0.16660602390766144}, {"text": "Swiss data", "confidence": 0.14996866881847382}, {"text": "Danish data", "confidence": 0.12648533284664154}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Swedish data", "confidence": 0.3744412660598755}, {"text": "Danish data", "confidence": 0.36867833137512207}, {"text": "Swiss data", "confidence": 0.2785855829715729}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Danish data", "confidence": 0.28334492444992065}, {"text": "Swedish data", "confidence": 0.1802346259355545}, {"text": "Swiss data", "confidence": 0.17864961922168732}]}}}
{"input": "systems, conducting community-based identification campaigns, and facilitating cross-border collaboration to\n\naddress statelessness among migrant populations. Providing technical and financial assistance to countries with\n\nhigh numbers of stateless individuals would further enable the implementation of comprehensive registration and\n\ncitizenship programs. The new Global Alliance to End Statelessness provides a multi-stakeholder platform to\n\nstrengthen these joint efforts.\n\n**5. Expand efforts to generate evidence on the impacts of statelessness and post-citizenship integration globally,**\n\n**with a focus on Kenya.**\n\nStakeholders should invest in continued, longitudinal studies to track the Shona community’s socioeconomic\n\nprogress over time and take advantage of the pre- and post-citizenship data that is already available, enabling a\n\nbetter understanding of post-citizenship outcomes. Additionally, research should be expanded to include the\n\nMakonde, Pemba, Rundi and other communities alongside the national population, providing comparative insights\n\n**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "pre- and post-citizenship data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "pre- and post-citizenship data", "confidence": 0.10832636058330536}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "pre- and post-citizenship data", "confidence": 0.46788713335990906}], "vague_data": [{"text": "pre- and post-citizenship data", "confidence": 0.21345137059688568}]}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n# Health analysis\n\n### **Health remains a** **priority need**\n\nAccess to health services has remained a priority need and is ranked among the top three priorities by 33% of households, second only to employment and livelihoods support. The identification of health as a priority is consistent with 2023, where 34% of households ranked health among their top three needs.\n\nVariations exist across countries, health care was the top priority need for respondents in half the countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, and Latvia). In 2024, health care became a top priority for 49% of households in Romania, a shift from 38% in 2023, potentially indicating barriers and changes in the level of access.\n\n(2023 N=9,466, 2024 N=7,140)\n\n- Not included in 2023 survey\n\n**TOP 10 PRIORITY NEEDS (OUT OF THOSE WHO REPORTED)**\n\n2023 2024 Employment, livelihoods Healthcare services Accommodation Language course Education for children Medicines Food Trainings, education adults Legal status* Registration, legal assistance", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2023 survey", "confidence": 0.779105007648468}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n## Literature\n\nAcemoglu, D. (2002). Directed Technical Change, Review of Economic Studies 69(4):781-80.\n\nAleksynska, M., & Tritah, A. (2015). The Heterogeneity Of Immigrants, Host Countries' Income And Productivity: A Channel Accounting Approach. Economic Inquiry, 53(1), 150-172.\n\nAleksynska, M., & Tritah, A. (2013). Occupation–education mismatch of immigrant workers in Europe: Context and policies, Economics of Education Review 36:229-244.\n\nBabakova, O., Gomon, T., Naranovich, K., & Oliński, P. (2024). Ułatwienia w zatrudnianiu cudzoziemców spoza UE, Kierunek Polska. Rekomendacje dla polskiej polityki migracyjnej, Forum Obywatelskiego Rozwoju, July, ISBN 978-83-63408-04-6.\n\nBeerli, A., & Peri, G. (2018). The labor market effects of opening the border: Evidence from Switzerland, NBER Working Paper No. 21319.\n\nBrell, C., Dustmann, C., & Preston, I. (2020). The labor market integration of refugee migrants in high-income countries. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 34(1), 94-121.\n\nBrücker, H., Glitz, A., Lerche, A., & Romiti, A. (2021). Occupational recognition and immigrant labor market outcomes. Journal of Labor Economics,39(2) Cassidy, H., & Dacass, T. (2021). Occupational licensing and immigrants. The Journal of Law and Economics, 64(1), 1-28.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "It is a general equilibrium model using consumer and producer optimalisation to calculate changes in the economy in response to shocks. This allows to assess the impact of shocks considering supply and demand channels as well as connections between different sectors of economy. This provides information about their total impact on many aspects of the economy including the labour market, government revenue as well as main economic aggregates. It is deemed the most appropriate tool to account for refugees’ multi-layered impact. To account for the effects of other shocks happening in the economy (such as the energy crisis) counterfactual analysis was performed using the newest data for the Polish economy. In other words, we were able to isolate the refugee inflow from all other shocks in the economy, like the other macroeconomic consequences of the war in Ukraine. The results were calculated for 2022 and 2023 with additional long-term analysis to check how the economy would adapt assuming no new shocks including no counter-shocks [35] .\n\n33 [Economics of climate change | Deloitte Australia](https://www.deloitte.com/au/en/services/economics/services/economics-climate-change.html)\n34 [Analiza ryzyk klimatycznych – badanie scenariuszy z modelem D.Climate | Deloitte](https://www2.deloitte.com/pl/pl/pages/risk/solutions/analiza-ryzyk-klimatycznych-badanie-scenariuszy-z-modelem-DClimate.html)\n\n---\n[35] E.g. refugees keep having lower productivity rather than adapt to level of natives.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "newest data for the Polish economy"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "newest data for the Polish economy", "confidence": 0.7288694381713867}], "vague_data": [{"text": "newest data for the Polish economy", "confidence": 0.10562626272439957}]}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\n**7.** **OPERATIONAL \r FRAMEWORK**\n\nWhile \r positive \r developments \r already \r undertaken \r by \r the \r Government \r point \r to \r an\neventual \r return \r of \r refugees \r from \r Thailand, \r the \r timing \r of \r the \r return \r remains \r difficult \r to\npredict. \r  \r The \r Government \r of \r Myanmar \r has \r indicated \r that \r its \r initial \r priority \r will \r be \r to\ncommence \r facilitating \r solutions \r for \r IDPs, \r followed \r by \r the \r voluntary \r repatriation \r of\nrefugees. \r The \r strategy \r for \r the \r South-­‐East \r shall \r therefore \r be \r phased \r in \r its \r approach\nstarting \r by \r strengthening \r involvement \r in \r IDP \r operations \r to \r be \r better \r positioned \r to\nreceive \r returning \r refugees \r under \r organized \r repatriation \r in \r the \r future. \r Beyond \r the\nplanned \r phases \r UNHCR \r and \r partners \r shall \r however \r remain \r alert \r to \r sudden \r changes \r in\nthe \r political \r environment \r and \r being \r ready \r to \r respond.\n\nThe \r decision \r to \r shift \r between \r phases \r will \r be \r dictated \r by \r the \r operational \r context,\nparticularly \r changes \r in \r peace \r and \r security, \r access, \r conditions \r in \r return \r areas, \r and\nindications \r of \r readiness \r of \r IDPs \r and \r refugees \r to \r return. \r It \r is \r expected \r that \r UNHCR \r and\npartners’ \r presence \r and \r activities \r in \r one \r phase \r could \r also \r contribute, \r for \r instance, \r to\nimprovements \r in \r return \r conditions, \r thereby \r catalysing \r a \r shift \r to \r the \r next \r phase.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**ranked lowest on both measures.**\nUkrainian refugees earn the highest wages in manufacturing, health, and accommodation and food service activities, while the lowest in education, other services, and construction. A comparison to median earnings in these sectors in the economy as a whole (after recalculation from gross to net earnings) changes that order, with Ukrainian refugees employed in accommodation and food service activities, and construction earning more than 100% of all workers median, and education, health services, and transportation and storage on the lowest ranks. Earnings relative to the total economy would be lower, if gross wages were compared, because Ukrainian refugees are less likely to have employment contracts and pay social contributions on their entire earnings. [16] Ukrainian refugees employed in education have the lowest median net wages when compared to other sectors. This is likely due to occupational regulations that prevent persons with nonEU citizenship from working as teachers in public schools, which is further discussed in chapter 4.\n\n4,198 4,216 Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on SEIS UNHCR survey and GUS data.\n\n© UNHCR / Anna Liminowicz\n\n---\n[16] As refugees more often than average in the Polish economy work based on civil law contracts or self-employment, they may not be covered by employee", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "GUS data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey", "confidence": 0.8360655903816223}, {"text": "GUS data", "confidence": 0.6538633704185486}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "2. Regulatory Environment and Governance\n\nthe introduction of accelerated procedures in the 2023 Decree, some asylum-seekers with vulnerabilities\nwait for a first-instance asylum decision for several months. It is crucial to note that asylum-seekers do not\nhave the same rights as recognized refugees, limiting their socio-economic integration. Additionally, the\nbudget of CNARR remains mostly funded by UNHCR.\n\nThe asylum legislation, available in French and Arabic, is not well-known among some local administrative\nauthorities and host communities. Despite ongoing information sessions and capacity development\nconducted by CNARR with UNHCR support, the impact is constrained by high personnel turnover in central\nand provincial administrations. CNARR, supported by UNHCR, has launched a campaign to disseminate\ninformation about the new refugee Law. Additional efforts are essential for effective dissemination, especially\nin remote areas hosting refugees and asylum-seekers, particularly with the recent release of the 2023\nDecree implementing the 2020 Asylum Law.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The 2023 Decree outlines the procedures for reception and registering asylum-seekers arriving in Chad. It\ndetails the individualized refugee status determination (RSD) procedure, covering interview modalities, RSD\nassessments, and final adjudication by the Sub Eligibility Commission. Additionally, the Decree introduces\nan accelerated RSD procedure for specific groups, including unaccompanied and separated children,\nvictims of torture and gender-based violence, and vulnerable asylum-seekers. It also addresses prima facie\nrefugee recognition for mass influxes due to violence or unrest, or for groups of asylum-seekers with similar\ncharacteristics. The Decree includes appeal procedures for first instance rejected asylum-seekers which is\ndealt with by a Sub-Commission of Appeal stipulating that the decisions taken by this body are reasoned\nand endorsed by an order taken by the Minister in charge of territorial administration. The same Decree also\nindicates that decisions of the Appeals Sub-Commission are subject to appeal before the administrative\nchamber of the Supreme Court. The Decree also outlines the processes for exclusion, cessation, revocation\nand cancellation of refugee status. Additionally, the Decree outlines the specific legal and judicial assistance\nthat asylum-seekers and refugees can benefit from in the national asylum procedure, but also for the any\nother matters/conflict.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Kleiner, M. M., & Krueger, A. B. (2013). Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market. Journal of Labor Economics, 31(2), S173–S202. https://doi.org/10.1086/669060 46 Lessem, R., & Sanders, C. (2020). Immigrant wage growth in the United States: The role of occupational upgrading. International Economic Review, 61(2), 941-972.\n\nLewandowski, P., Górny, A., Krząkała, M., & Palczyńska, M. (2025). The Role of Job Task Degradation in Shaping Return Intentions: Evidence from Ukrainian War Refugees in Poland. IBS working paper, 01/2025. https://ibs.org.pl/wp-content/ uploads/2025/03/Job_task_degradation_return_intentions_Ukrainian_refugees_ IBS_WP_202501.pdf Lewis, E. (2013). Immigration and production technology, Annual Review of Economics 5(1):165-191 Lewis, E., & Peri, G. (2015). “Immigration and the Economy of Cities and Regions”,\n\n[in] Duranton, G., Henderson, J.V., Strange, W., Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Volume 5A, North-Holland, Elsevier.\n\nMeager N., & Speckesser, S. (2011). Wages, productivity and employment: A review of theory and international data, Brussels: European Employment Observatory.\n\nMonitor Deloitte (2022). Refugees from Ukraine in Poland: Challenges and potential for integration. October.\n\nNBP (2024). Sytuacja życiowa i ekonomiczna migrantów z Ukrainy w Polsce w 2024 r. Raport z badania ankietowego, Departament Statystyki, Narodowy Bank Polski, Warszawa.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "High employment rate of Ukrainian refugees translates into more workers and thus additional economic growth. In July 2022, OECD estimated the contribution of Ukrainian refugees to the labour force and employment in European host countries, based on a 2014 Labour Force Survey adhoc module that includes refugee labour market outcomes and 2019 LFS with outcomes of recent non-EU migrants.\nThey estimated that Ukrainian refugees would increase employment in Poland by\n1.2-1.8% (Dumont & Lauren, 2022).\nAs refugee employment rates are higher than expected, the actual increase is higher, between 1.4% and 2.2% (estimates of 0,230,35 million relative to LFS employment).\n\n##### To assess the impact of refugees on the Polish economy, a simulation was performed using the Deloitte D.Climate model [33,34] .", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2014 Labour Force Survey adhoc module"}, {"text": "2019 LFS"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2019 LFS", "confidence": 0.6160106658935547}, {"text": "2014 Labour Force Survey", "confidence": 0.6154341697692871}, {"text": "Deloitte D.Climate model", "confidence": 0.4342365562915802}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2019 LFS with outcomes of recent non-EU migrants", "confidence": 0.1489553302526474}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "##### **September/ October 2023 report**\n\n###### Venezuela\n\nand Gender-Based Violence for officials\n\nof the Women's Secretariat of the State\n\nof Miranda. Conducted from September\n\n28th to October 11, 2023, the PA facil\nitated the first virtual session on key\n\nconcepts, receiving positive feedback\n\nfrom the 35 participating officials.\n\n**XVII.** **September’s** **Monthly**\n\n**Meeting with Partners**\n\n**On Thursday, September 28th, the PC**\n\n**convened its monthly meeting with**\n\n**53 members representing 41 partner**\n\n**organizations.** The agenda covered an\n\ninformation exchange between partners\n\nwhich expressed concerns on the way\n\nnational IDs are processed in light of the\n\nsoon elections; saw a presentation of\n\nthe New Accountability Framework for\n\nAffected Populations (AAP), its objectives\n\nand work plan; updates from the national\n\nsubcluster of Ciudad Guayana on their\n\n**11**\n\n**October.** The focus was on ensuring\n\nthe accuracy of registered services and\n\ncollaborating with partner organizations\n\nto edit or confirm the removal of inactive\n\nservices. The revised database is under\ngoing verification for coherence by the\n\nIM team before being uploaded onto the\n\nplatform. Considerations regarding the\n\nplatform itself and the inclusion of other\n\nsectors are also under review, and once\n\nfinalized, the PC will implement its com\nmunication strategy on Service Mapping.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "national IDs", "confidence": 0.5411425828933716}]}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE measles vaccination coverage for children stood at 83%, similar to 84% in 2023, falling short of the 95% target.\n\nInformal support also played a vital role, with 33% receiving help from family or friends and 12% accessing spiritual support. Overall, 88% of those who received support reported improved wellbeing, though there are notable differences depending on gender and age.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "differences are identified in 15-19 and 20-24 age groups, with much higher employment rates for Ukrainian refugees due perhaps to the fact that the Ukrainian school system ends at 17 while the Polish one at 19. [13] However, employment rates drop for Ukrainian female refugees in the 25-29, 30-34, and 35-39 age groups when compared to younger and older groups, as well as to Polish women, which may be due to insufficient access to childcare services.\nEmployment rates for Ukrainian female refugees are also substantially lower in the 55-59 age group, perhaps due to the fact that female retirement age in Ukraine has only recently (in 2021) become 60. [14]\n\n**With the current level of integration**\n\n**of Ukrainian refugees into the labour**\n\n**market and the jobs they perform,**\n\n**their median net earnings are about**\n\n**four-fifths of the national median**\n\n**– although likely lower in terms of**\n\n---\n[14] https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/Media.action;jsessionid=U1dm6XAPF38pPk5_pzhfaGoS_rOACMDDVv4w5uevMsKBeQEC5-_g!284293951?id=15680 15 Percentage calculated based on GUS average for the economy as a whole in the months of the SEIS survey.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey", "confidence": 0.9226125478744507}, {"text": "GUS average", "confidence": 0.13698123395442963}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The regional protection monitoring harmonization established a regional incident typology framework to efficiently\nanalyze the regional protection monitoring data. To this extent, 7,503 protection incidents with 106,673 victims were\nreported in September 2022 in both countries, which affected 10 provinces in the Democratic Republic of Congo\n(DRC) and 1 province in Mozambique. It is worth mentioning that of the protection incidents reported in September\n2022, some occurred in the same month, and some occurred before September 2022.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "regional protection monitoring data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "regional protection monitoring data", "confidence": 0.12373948842287064}], "vague_data": [{"text": "regional protection monitoring data", "confidence": 0.8365118503570557}]}}}
{"input": "### **Registration and Documentation**\n\nUNHCR Indonesia undertakes registration of persons seeking asylum in Indonesia on behalf of the\nGovernment of Indonesia and issues UNHCR identity documentation. Registration interviews are\nprimarily conducted in-person for verification of biometric data and relevant records. Most\nregistration interviews take place at the Reception Center in Jakarta or during accommodation\nvisits/missions by the respective field team for individuals residing outside the greater Jakarta area. In\n2023, 2,547 individuals (1,324 cases) were registered by UNHCR Indonesia, which includes 1,225\nRohingya refugees registered during emergency registration missions following boat disembarkations\nin Aceh in November and December 2023. UNHCR Indonesia provides continuous registration services\nto registered refugees and asylum-seekers and maintains updated personal data in our internal\ndatabase to ensure vulnerable refugees and asylum-seekers are identified and assisted with\nprotection interventions and solutions.\n\n### **Refugee Status Determination**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR identity documentation", "confidence": 0.37387028336524963}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "internal\ndatabase", "confidence": 0.2023080736398697}], "vague_data": [{"text": "internal\ndatabase", "confidence": 0.3593686819076538}, {"text": "biometric data", "confidence": 0.20903253555297852}]}}}
{"input": "# Appendix. Model Calibration\n\n##### D.Climate is CGE [51] model developed by Deloitte Economic Institute based on GTAP model [52] . If source of data is not specified it means that shocks were calibrated to data from the model database.\n\nIt was assumed that impact of refugees on the Polish economy was felt as combined four different shocks: to population, labour supply, average propensity to save, and productivity, with shocks to population and labour supply being balanced by equivalent shocks in Eastern Europe [53] .\nMoreover, as part of assumed increase in spending by Ukrainians in Poland was financed by savings from Ukraine this was balanced by equivalent negative shock on investment in Eastern Europe.\n\nShock to population was calibrated to match data for residents of Poland from Statistics Poland and number of refugees based on PESEL UKR. Equivalent shock in Eastern Europe was calculated using data for population in this region from World Population Prospects UN.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Population Prospects"}, {"text": "Statistics Poland"}, {"text": "PESEL UKR"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "data for residents of Poland from Statistics Poland"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Population Prospects UN", "confidence": 0.7666605710983276}, {"text": "PESEL UKR", "confidence": 0.7138465046882629}, {"text": "Statistics Poland", "confidence": 0.6213406920433044}, {"text": "GTAP model", "confidence": 0.20596502721309662}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data for residents of Poland from Statistics Poland", "confidence": 0.3907150328159332}, {"text": "data for population in this region", "confidence": 0.1104806438088417}], "vague_data": [{"text": "model database", "confidence": 0.10943136364221573}]}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n### **Disability and** **MHPSS**\n\nMental health and psychosocial problems were significantly more often reported by individuals with disabilities (51%, up from 42% in 2023) compared to those without disabilities (21%, up from 17% in 2023).\nThis highlights the heightened vulnerability of individuals with disabilities to mental health and psychosocial challenges, which are often exacerbated by social barriers such as limited accessibility, social exclusion, stigma, and a lack of support systems. There are clear variations across countries, with Romania (61%) and Hungary (60%) reporting the highest percentage of problems among individuals with disabilities, while Moldova (29%) and Latvia (31%) reported the lowest percentage.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "##### **September/ October 2023 report**\n\n###### Venezuela\n\nedits to some of the objectives and to the\n\ntimeline stipulated.\n\n**IV. GPC Townhall**\n\n**On October 18th a Townhall was**\n\n**organized by the Global Protection**\n\n**Cluster (GPC) with Field Operations.**\n\nHRP 2024 key messages/instructions\n\nwere discussed and a calendar of\n\nbi-monthly GPC Townhalls with field\n\noperations with planned key topics were\n\npresented. The meeting had the aim to\n\nunderstand the different timelines and\n\nongoing HPC processes in each field\n\noperation as well as provide support to\n\nwhom needed it.\n\n**V. La Carnada Play**\n\n**The Working Group on the Prevention**\n\n**and** **Response** **to** **Trafficking** **in**\n\n**Persons** **(WGTiP)** **organized** **and**\n\nFora for the HNO process are in line with\n\nProtection needs in their area.\n\nThe Protection Cluster assured partic\nipation in the weekly ICCG meetings\n\nwhere HPC ongoing activities have been\n\ndiscussed and planned.\n\nFinally, bilateral meetings have been\n\norganized with PC’s partners NRC and\n\nOHCHR. With both partners their protec\ntion programming has been discuss and\n\npossible coordination in the Cluster.\n\n**III. Accountability for Affected**\n\n**Populations (AAP) WG**\n\n**The PC has participated actively in**\n\n**the monthly meetings conducted by**\n\n**the AAP working group, which aimed**\n\n**at increasing the inputs of affected**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "lack of trust (3%), work commitments (3%), transportation (2%), and insecurity/safety concerns (2%) and other factors (5%). Results show that, despite reporting mental health problems that impede functioning, more than a third of respondents did not perceive a need for MHPSS, which may stem from a lack of mental health literacy, stigma or lack of confidence in services.\nInsufficient awareness about available resources is also a primary barrier across the region, with language barriers posing additional challenges in certain countries. Women were more likely to report lacking time to seek services (12%) than were men (4%), which may be linked to their multiple other responsibilities related to livelihoods, household responsibilities, and care work. Addressing these barriers requires tailored interventions to improve awareness, reduce stigma and increase confidence in services, enhance linguistic accessibility, and address logistical and availability constraints (especially among women), ultimately improving access to MHPSS services.\n\n**SELF-REPORTED BARRIERS TO ACCESSING MENTAL**\n\n**HEALTH AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT SERVICES BY**\n\n**GENDER AT REGIONAL LEVEL (TOP 5)**\n\nFemale Male 46%\n\n### **Barriers to** **accessing Mental** **Health and** **Psychosocial** **Support services**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "2021, so the sample size is still growing.\nHowever, it is large enough to allow for some cautious inference with 4.2 million Polish citizens in mid-2022 and 6.2 million in mid-2024. This has been combined with average salaries in 128 occupational groups in GUS data for October 2022 (the most recent data). Over the two-year period from Q2 2022 to Q2 2024, following the arrival of Ukrainian refugees, the occupational group distribution of Polish citizens shifted\n\n**Chart 30. Polish citizens occupational distribution change by salary bracket, Q2 2022 and Q2 2024**\nQ2 2022 distribution, Q2 2024 distribution, and percentage point changes between them\n\n-1.8 pp.\n\n<= 4,000 (4,000; 6,000] (6,000; 8,000] (8,000; 10,000] - 10,000 Q2 2022 Q2 2024 41", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "GUS data for October 2022"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GUS data", "confidence": 0.8081446886062622}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "to April 2022 on wages of native workers and other immigrants. They find no effect on wages, employment, or unemployment rate, except a very small positive impact on the wages of native women.\nUnderstanding how immigrants create positive productivity effects that counteract negative wage pressures and improve economic efficiency, requires moving beyond the canonical model of labour supply and demand.\nIn reality, immigrants and native residents differ in important ways, which triggers complementary occupational upgrading of natives (Beerli and Peri, 2017; Tabellini, 2020; Cattaneo et al., 2015; Foged and Peri, 2016; D’Amuri i Peri, 2014; Ortega and Verdugo, 2014; Peri and Sparber, 2009) and investment in complementary production technologies by firms (Peri, 2016; Lewis and Peri, 2015; Lewis, 2013; Peri, 2012).\nWe survey this literature in this chapter, underlying that our model should thus be treated as a conservative lower bound of the effect.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "wages of native workers and other immigrants", "confidence": 0.1827072948217392}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES the survey data side, only households that did not have any missing information on income (respondents were asked to provide both sources and amounts) were included in the calculation. For households claiming no or very little income an imputation was made based on expenses and the duration of stay in the host country.\n\nIt is important to note that while the poverty definition adopted in this assessment allows for comparisons across the countries covered (limitations apply to the Republic of Moldova), it may not be directly comparable to other studies, as approaches tend to vary quite significantly. The setup of the questionnaire, the sampling methodology, the processing of income data (including any imputations), the approach to equivalizing income, and finally the location of the poverty line itself in the income range all have a substantial impact on poverty indicators.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "the survey data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data", "confidence": 0.9315389394760132}]}}}
{"input": "Most of the refugees from Ukraine currently living in Poland are women and children, though over half of the total population is of working age.\nThe best population data available is the active PESEL database as of 10th October 2023. According to the registry, 63.7% of them are women and 36.3% are men.\nThe database also includes the age of the Ukrainian PESEL holders, which indicates that over half (56%) are of working age (18-64), which amounts to more than 536 thousand people. More precisely, women younger than 18 make up 19% of the population, women aged 18-64 account for around 41% of the population, while those aged 65 and above are around 3% of total population. The incoming men are mostly young, those younger than 18 stand for around 20% of all refugees, men aged 18-64 make up 15% of the population and men older than 64 account for only 1%.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "active PESEL database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL database", "confidence": 0.9585921168327332}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Kenya in 2016, followed by the provision of nationality to 1,659 Shona in 2020-21, and most recently, the\n\nrecognition as nationals of approximately 7,000 Pemba in 2023. These milestones underscore Kenya’s commitment\n\nto addressing statelessness, a commitment reaffirmed at the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) in December 2023\n\nthrough four strategic pledges aimed at the progressive eradication of statelessness. Despite these achievements,\n\nan estimated 9,800 individuals in Kenya remain stateless today, highlighting the need for sustained efforts to fully\n\nresolve this issue. Gaps in law continue to be a contributing cause of statelessness, due to Section 15(1) of the\n\nCitizenship and Immigration Act, which limits the scope of the definition of a stateless person to those who were\n\nin Kenya when it gained independence on 12 December 1963, excluding many individuals who arrived later, as well\n\nas their descendants. In addition, neither the Constitution nor the Citizenship and Immigration Act contain a legal\n\nsafeguard to ensure that a child born on the territory who would otherwise be statelessness is granted Kenyan\n\nnationality.\n\n**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply Mining and quarrying Transportation and storage\n\n**-1**\n\n**34**\n\n**Chart 8.** Share of companies reporting vacancies\n\n50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% C I G Q N P J M O F K A L E D B H\n\n**Source:** Deloitte own elaboration based on ZUS data.\n\n(more than 18 thousand), and wholesale and retail trade (more than 18 thousand).\nThe only sector that has seen a decline was transportation and storage (by more than 1 thousand). Unfortunately, public data does not report how much of this change is due to the refugees from Ukraine entering these sectors, or how much due to pre-2022 Ukrainian workers changing their jobs.\n\n2006\n-Q4\n\n2008\n\n-Q2\n\n2009\n\n-Q4\n\n2011\n\n-Q2\n\n2012\n-Q4\n\n2014\n-Q2\n\n2015\n\n-Q4\n\n2017\n-Q2\n\n2018\n\n-Q4\n\n2020\n-Q2\n\n2021\n-Q4\n\n2023\n-Q2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ZUS data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ZUS data", "confidence": 0.9395835995674133}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "public data", "confidence": 0.8637405037879944}]}}}
{"input": "- Enhance \r awareness, \r developing \r trust \r among \r stakeholders \r and \r building\ncapacities \r of \r central \r and \r local \r authorities, \r implementing \r and \r operational\npartners, \r civil \r society \r and \r local \r communities \r to \r support \r and \r deliver \r protection\nand \r assistance, \r including \r investing \r in \r support \r to \r community \r self-­‐management\nstructures \r and \r community \r mobilisation \r through \r training, \r awareness \r campaigns,\nand \r support \r to \r community \r committees.\n\n- Follow \r up \r and \r advocate \r with \r Immigration \r and \r National \r Registration \r Department\non \r expedited \r procedures \r for \r the \r issuance \r of \r CSCs \r for \r IDPs \r and \r returnees,\nincluding \r measures \r to \r prevent \r statelessness \r which \r properly \r address \r the \r specific\nsituation \r of \r refugees. \r Support \r authorities \r to \r ensure \r that \r internally \r displaced\npersons \r and \r returning \r refugees \r as \r well \r as \r former \r child \r soldiers \r do \r not \r miss \r the\nopportunity \r of \r obtaining \r CSCs.\n\n- Initiate \r negotiations \r for \r the \r removal \r of \r administrative \r and \r legal \r impediments\nwhich \r might \r inhibit \r sustainable \r return, \r such \r as \r taxation-­‐related \r issues.\n\n- Support \r a \r comprehensive \r evaluation \r of \r property \r laws \r and \r provide \r concrete\nproposals \r for \r revisions \r that \r will \r ensure \r the \r restoration \r or \r repossession \r of \r land\nrights \r by \r returnees.\n\n- Provide \r access \r to \r legal \r services \r through \r advocacy \r interventions \r and \r training \r in\nserving \r the \r legal \r needs \r of \r returnees \r and \r offering \r appropriate \r legal \r assistance.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF HOUSING SUPPORT AND EMPLOYMENT FACILITATION IN ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n### **Contents**\n\nAcknowledgements\b 2 Summary of findings and recommendations\b 3 Background\b 4 Socio-economic inclusion – key findings\b 4 Methodology\b 10 Limitations\b 11\n\n### **Acknowledgements**\n\nWe gratefully acknowledge the contributions of many individuals and organizations who contributed to this report. The regional analysis was facilitated by the Regional MSNA Livelihoods and Socio-Economic Inclusion Sector Analysis Group, co-coordinated by Konstantin Fastovets (UNHCR) and Susanne Klink (UNHCR). The data analysis was conducted by Marco Delogu (UNICEF), Konstantin Fastovets (UNHCR), Erin Neale (IOM), and Mihail Peleah (UNDP). Writing of the report was led by the co-coordinators along with Oxana Maicuca (UNDP), Erin Neale (IOM), Arianna Pearlstein (UN Women), and Alketa Zazo (UNICEF).\n\nAdditionally, we extend our appreciation to Erika Morishita Sarmiento (UNHCR) for her valuable graphic design contributions. Lastly, we express our thanks to Jad Ghosn, Milindi Illangasinghe, and the Data, Identity Management and Analysis team (UNHCR) for their guidance and support on the regional MSNA analysis for socio-economic inclusion and across all the sectors, and to Steven Bunce (UNHCR) for reviewing the report.\n\n**Cover photograph:**\n©UNHCR/Ioana Moldovan\n\n**2**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Poland**\nThe beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022 resulted in large flows of refugees, reaching more than 6 million globally. [3] Much of this exodus happened through the Polish border.\nAs of October 2023, almost 1 million Ukrainian refugees were living in Poland [4] (Chapter 1). In the past decade, Poland experienced large labour migration from Ukraine. The number of workers with Ukrainian citizenship that registered for social security (this data does not include those working in the shadow economy or some minor cases that do not require registration) grew from just 33 thousand in 2013 to 627 thousand in 2021. It has to be noted however, that short-term nature of most of these stays (6 months in a span 12 months), fact that one person could hold several permits (as a result of changing jobs or positions within the same company), legal changes, and decentralized nature of permits all hinder the reliability of these figures. Two-thirds of such migrants have been men, some of whom left families in Ukraine temporarily to bring or send money back. Migration has been primarily based on firm sponsorship, where companies provided job offers and handled formalities, which resulted in very high employment rates – 94% as of November 2022 according to NBP (2023) estimates.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Furthermore, on 1 June 2023, the Transitional National Council also enacted [Law No. 012/PT/2023](https://www.refworld.org/docid/648710104.html) relating to\nthe protection and assistance of internally displaced persons in the Republic of Chad. This Law establishes\nthe legal framework to assist internally displaced persons, serving as a guiding, preventive and assistance\ntool for both the state and other relevant actors in addressing internal displacement.\nThis has resulted in instances of arbitrary arrests and detentions of refugees and asylum-seekers.\n\n**2.2** **Security of legal status**\n\nThe new asylum legislation establishes predictable legal arrangements for the stay of refugees and asylum[seekers in Chad. Article 31 of the 2020 Law mandates the issuance of a refugee ID card by the competent](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)\nauthority. This card serves as both an authorization to stay in Chad and a residency permit, allowing freedom\nof movement for refugees within the conditions specified by Law. The second paragraph of Article 14 of the\n2020 asylum Law stipulates that an asylum-seeker certificate is valid for six months and equivalent to an\nauthorization to stay in Chad, is issued by CNARR and renewed until the Eligibility Sub Commission takes\na decision on his/her refugee status.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n### **Health** **expenditures and** **health insurance**\n\nRegionally health expenditures, on average, were 8% of all household expenditures in the 30 days preceding the survey, a slight reduction from 9% in 2023. In Latvia, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria, the share of health expenditures was more than 10% of the household expenditures.\n\n**AVERAGE SHARE OF HOUSEHOLDS’ EXPENDITURE**\n\n**ALLOCATED TO HEALTH**\n\nRegional Latvia Bulgaria Romania Moldova Hungary Poland Slovakia Lithuania Czechia Estonia (N=5,671) In households with a chronically ill member, the share of health expenditure was nearly double compared to those without (12% vs 5%), highlighting vulnerability and financial pressure in these households. The average share of health expenditure in households with children was 7%, while it was 9.5% in households without children.\n\n**AVERAGE SHARE OF HEALTH EXPENDITURE OF**\n\n**HOUSEHOLDS WITH/ WITHOUT MEMBERS WITH CHRONIC**\n\n**ILLNESS**\n\nHH with chronic illness member HH without chronic illness member Regional Latvia Moldova Romania Bulgaria Slovakia Poland Hungary Lithuania Estonia Czechia (N=5,671)\n\n**14**\n\n8% 12% 12% 12% 12% 9% 9% 9% 7% 5% 5%", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Policy Research Working Paper 7250\n\n### **Abstract**\n\nGhana is experiencing its third gold rush, and this paper\n\nsheds light on the socioeconomic impacts of this rapid\nexpansion in industrial production. Using a rich dataset consisting of geocoded household data combined\nwith detailed information on gold mining activities, the\nauthors conduct two types of difference-in-differences\nestimations that provide complementary evidence. The\nfirst is a local-level analysis that identifies an economic\nfootprint area very close to a mine, and the second is a\n\ndistrict-level analysis that captures the fiscal channel. The\nresults indicate that men are more likely to benefit from\ndirect employment as miners compared to men further\naway, and that women in mining communities may more\nlikely gain from indirect employment opportunities and\nearn cash for work. Authors also find that infant mortality rates decrease significantly in mining communities,\ncompared to the evolution in communities further away.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data", "confidence": 0.8078420758247375}], "vague_data": [{"text": "geocoded household data", "confidence": 0.39577698707580566}]}}}
{"input": "mining at birth. In investigating the effects on birth outcomes and infant mortality, we further\n\nclassify a child as treated if he or she is born in a district with active mining during the birth\n\nyear (in contrast to whether the mine is active when the mother was interviewed). We also\n\ninclude controls for the age of the child in the survey year in the child and birth outcome\n\nregressions (but, naturally, not in the infant mortality regressions).\n\n**5. Results using individual-level difference-in-differences strategy**\n\nIn this section, we present results using the two difference-in-differences strategies. Since the\n\nindividual analysis contains district fixed effects, the two strategies are complementary. While\n\nthe district-level analysis informs us about differences across and within districts over time, the\n\nlocal-level analysis gives us the additional impact at the very local level. This means that any\n\ndifferences in effects across district and local analysis should not be interpreted as\n\ninconsistencies, but rather as differential and additional impacts.\n\nIn a difference-in-differences setting, it is important that the sample is balanced, assuming that\n\nthe treatment and control groups are on similar trajectories. Table 2 shows the summary", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Despite the enactment of new asylum legislation, potential inconsistencies may persist with other laborrelated legislation that remain in force or have not been amended in the country. This lack of alignment\ncould create hesitancy among prospective employers when considering the hiring of refugees.\n\nFor instance, [Decree No. 96-189 PR/MFPT of 15 April 1996, and Deecree No. 1793/PR/PM/MECDT/2015 of 24](https://wwwex.ilo.org/dyn/natlex2/natlex2/files/download/97320/TCD-97320.pdf)\nAugust 2015, which address mandatory reporting of hiring, job offers and personnel in companies, as well\nas business-related procedures, are still applicable.\n\n8 R E F U G E E P O L I C Y R E V I E W F R A M E W O R K > **R E P U B L I C O F C H A D**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**population in Poland has changed**\n\n**radically after February 24, 2022.**\nUp until 2021, Ukrainians in Poland were mostly men (close to two-thirds), who came for work-related reasons, often leaving their families back in Ukraine. The onset of the full-scale conflict in Ukraine triggered the arrival of individuals displaced by the war.\nThose were primarily women and children, with men in Ukraine being mobilized for the war effort. Social insurance data does not reflect the full extent of the change, showing only workers, without children and adults outside of employment.\n\n**Chart 3. Number of Ukrainians registered in Poland for social insurance by sex**\n\n2021 Q4 2022 Q4 2023 Q4 2024 Q2 Number of insured men with Ukrainian citizenship Number of insured women with Ukrainian citizenship Number of insured with Ukrainian citizenship Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on ZUS data.\n\n3 Employed person is a person, who during the reference week worked for at least 1 hour for pay or profit, including contributing family workers; had a certain job attachment; or produced agricultural goods for sale or barter. A definition according to the Labour Force Survey: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ index.php?title=Glossary:Employed_person_-_LFS 08 Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on the PESEL database as of September 2024.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Labour Force Survey"}, {"text": "PESEL database"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ZUS data"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Social insurance data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL database", "confidence": 0.8836779594421387}, {"text": "ZUS data", "confidence": 0.8517237901687622}, {"text": "Labour Force Survey", "confidence": 0.7816932201385498}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Social insurance data", "confidence": 0.940666913986206}]}}}
{"input": "##### **September/ October 2023 report**\n\n###### Venezuela\n\nReproductive Health), reinforcing com\nmunity resilience through livelihoods\n\nand access to adequate food, women's\n\nempowerment, gender equality, and\n\nprovision of assistance and protection\n\nservices (including Gender-Based Vio\nlence (GBV), children and adolescents,\n\nand human trafficking), and supporting\n\nemergency education activities with a\n\nsocio-productive approach.\n\n**XIX. Protection Monitoring Tool**\n\n**(PMT)**\n\n**The outcomes of the Protection Mon-**\n\n**itoring Tool (PMT) were shared with**\n\n**cluster partners. The PMT contin-**\n\n**ues to measure primary protection**\n\n**risks, population needs, access to**\n\n**rights, and humanitarian assistance**\n\n**at the community level.** For the period\n\nof March to August 2023, the PMT\n\nrecorded a total of 674 interviews con\n\nprotection work and the advancements\n\nof their workplan along with areas of\n\nresponsibility (AoRs), and the response\n\nmonitoring for August, showing a total of\n\n385,000 people reached by 95 partner\n\norganizations.\n\nAdditionally, the Service Mapping tool\n\nwas shared with partners, and it was\n\ninformed that together with the UNHCR\n\nInformation Management Unit and the\n\nAoRs, a complete update of the services\n\nregistered in the tool was being made.\n\nOrganizations were invited to always be\n\non the lookout to update services and to\n\nbe able to support the dissemination of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Service Mapping tool", "confidence": 0.5298762917518616}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Service Mapping tool", "confidence": 0.1187371164560318}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Wages also improved but remain significantly below host levels**\n\nDespite a 28% increase in the regional weighted average wage of refugees in 2024, this figure still stands 30% lower than that of the local population. This means that, on average, Ukrainians earned roughly two-thirds of what their hosts did for the same number of working hours. The wage disparity is particularly striking considering the educational qualifications of Ukrainian refugees—more than half of the working-age population hold advanced degrees (Bachelor’s or higher), compared to the same being true for just 27% of hosts.\n\n16. The data also demonstrates that the employment rate of refugees fluent in the local language is lower than for those with an intermediate or advanced knowledge. The reason for this is that the former group is heavily concentrated in lower age brackets, with almost 30% being 15-19 years old 17. Equivalent to ISCED-11, level 4 (post-secondary non-tertiary education)\n\n**12**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "A stateless person is someone who is not considered as a national by any\n\nState under the operation of its law.\n\n- 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (Article 1).\n\n**Globally, an estimated 4.4 million people lack a nationality, leaving them stateless, according to statistics published**\n\n**by UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)** . [[1]] In the East, Horn, and Great Lakes of Africa (EHAGL) region, this includes\n\n97,591 stateless persons or persons of undetermined nationality, of whom 9,800 live in Kenya. Given the lack of\n\nuniversal reporting and other gaps in statelessness data, these figures are likely to be an underestimate. Stateless\n\npeople often live on the margins of society and remain invisible in national statistics and other government\n\npopulation databases due to the complexities of accurate registration and data collection.\n\n**Lack of identifying documents confirming nationality frequently precludes stateless persons from working in the**\n\n**formal economy, owning property, accessing basic services such as health and education, moving freely or**\n\n**accessing financial services, leaving them at an elevated risk of poverty.** [[2]] Children may face restrictions on\n\nattending school, while exclusion from public health services imposes costs on families and creates risks for", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "national statistics"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "government\n\npopulation databases", "confidence": 0.15122705698013306}], "vague_data": [{"text": "government\n\npopulation databases", "confidence": 0.6026406288146973}, {"text": "national statistics", "confidence": 0.3935635983943939}, {"text": "statelessness data", "confidence": 0.15272945165634155}]}}}
{"input": "Including a productivity shock will allow us to address the limitations of the “canonical model” of immigration. Peri (2016, 2014) refers to the framework that economists typically used to analyse migration in the 1980s and 1990s as the “canonical model”.\nIn this model, immigration is simply a shift in the labour supply for a given labour demand and given labour supply of native workers. It is also assumed that immigrants and natives are essentially identical in that they enter the same occupations and perform the same tasks, while firms do not adjust production technologies. In effect, immigrant workers have a positive impact on output, but a negative impact on wages, employment and activity of natives, and positive – on unemployment.\nHowever, this is difficult to reconcile with empirical evidence. Peri (2014) reviewed 27 empirical studies on the effect of immigration on natives’ wages, showing minimal impacts evenly distributed around zero. All estimates showed an adjustment to a 1 percentage point increase in the share of immigrants in a labour market of between -0.8% and +0.8% of the average native wage. In fact, 70% of estimates were between -0.1% and +0.1%.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Brazil stands as a regional leader, implementing _prima facie_ simplified refugee status determination\nprocedures under the regional refugee definition of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration\n(contemplated in its national legislation as those fleeing serious human rights violations) for\nindividuals from Venezuela, Burkina Faso, Iraq, Mali and Syria. The National Committee for\nRefugees (CONARE) has also granted refugee protection to individuals persecuted due to their\ndiverse sexual orientation and gender identity, as well as women and girls at risk of female genital\nmutilation.\n\nFurthermore, Brazil has established a humanitarian visa and temporary residence permit policy for\nnationals of Afghanistan, Haiti, Syria, and Ukraine. Temporary residence permits are also available\nfor Venezuelans who choose not to apply for asylum, ensuring access to protection and legal status\nfor a wide range of individuals in need.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Yivt = β0 + β1 ꞏ activet + β2 ꞏ mine + β3 ꞏ activet_ _* mine + αd + gt_ _+ λXi + εivt_, (1)\n\nwhere the outcome of an individual _i_ in cluster _v_, and for year _t_ is regressed on district and year\n\nfixed effects, a dummy for whether the respondent lives within 20 km of a mine (which is a\n\ncurrent or future mine [8] ), a dummy for whether the mine is active at the time of the survey\n\n(active), an interaction term between active mines and living close to a mine ( _activet * mine_ ),\n\nand a vector of individual-level control variables. _Mine_ is the terminology chosen to capture a\n\nknown gold resource in the ground, regardless of whether it is being extracted or not. In all\n\nregressions, we also control for living in an urban area, years of education, and age.\n\n---\n[8] A current or future mine could also be called a deposit. We have chosen against this terminology as there may", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "UNHCR \r will \r gradually \r phase \r down \r its \r direct \r assistance \r reviewing, \r together \r with\nstakeholders \r progress \r achieved \r on \r repatriation \r and \r reintegration, \r including \r analysing\nprospects \r for \r durable \r solutions \r and \r efforts \r to \r mainstream \r reintegration \r needs \r in\nnational \r policies \r and \r programmes. \r As \r key \r benchmarks \r are \r met, \r UNHCR \r will \r review \r and\nrefine \r its \r disengagement \r plan, \r including \r the \r timing \r and \r degree \r of \r phasing \r out \r from\nspecific \r projects \r and \r activities. \r A \r communication \r strategy \r will \r be \r designed \r to \r inform\nstakeholders \r of \r UNHCR \r progressive \r disengagement. \r The \r reintegration \r operation \r will \r be\nregularly \r reviewed \r and \r evaluated \r and \r lessons \r gathered \r for \r future \r application \r in \r other\noperations.\n\nUNHCR \r Myanmar\n15 \r June \r 2013\n\n15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "2. Regulatory Environment and Governance\n\nbiometric and individual data of asylum-seekers in the UNHCR-managed refugee management database,\nensuring that this process remains distinct from the registration of an asylum application carried out strictly\nby CNARR.\n\nArticle 31 of the 2020 Law and Article 73 of the 2023 Decree outline that refugees are entitled by the\ncompetent authorities to be issued with civil status documents including birth certificates, death certificates\nand marriage certificates on par with nationals. Furthermore, the specific legal framework on civil status\n[documents consists of the National Civil Status Code and Law No. 008/PR/2013 of 10 May 2013, governing](http://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Tchad-Loi-no-13-08-Etat-Civil-10-mai-2013.pdf)\ncivil status organizations in the Republic of Chad. Under Decree No. 660/PR/PM/MATSP/2015, establishing\nthe modalities of application of the Law of 10 May 2013, all births in Chad are subject to a mandatory\nregistration requirement. In line with this universal principle of civil registration, all foreigners, including\nrefugees and asylum-seekers to whom vital events have occurred in Chad, are allowed to benefit from civil\nregistry services on par with nationals. Additionally, [Ordinance No. 002/PR/2020](https://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Tchad-Ordonnance-002-PR-2020-Etat-Civil-14-fevrier-2020.pdf) on the organization of civil\nstatus in the Republic of Chad has extended the registration delay for births to three months.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "UNHCR-managed refugee management database"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR-managed refugee management database", "confidence": 0.6972358226776123}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "biometric and individual data of asylum-seekers", "confidence": 0.2380048930644989}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1000 500 0 65+ 55-64 45-54 35-44 25-34 18-24 <18 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%\n\n**Source:** Deloitte own elaboration based on the PESEL database as of October 2023\n\n**Chart 5.** Composition of refugee households in Poland\n\n60% 50% Total entries-exits of the Polish-Ukrainian border Pesel data\n\n**Source:** Deloitte own elaboration based on Polish Border Guard Headquarter and PESEL data.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL database"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Pesel data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL database", "confidence": 0.8876544833183289}, {"text": "PESEL data", "confidence": 0.5808515548706055}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Immigration can raise not only economic output (i.e., more workers equal more production), but more importantly labour productivity (i.e., more value added produced per worker). Such a result may appear counterintuitive to a simple supplydemand intuition, where an increase in the number of workers lowers the amount of capital per worker thus lowering productivity until firms invest to return the capital-worker ratio to normal, returning productivity to the previous level (Borjas, 2019). Even if that was the case, GDP per person (though not GDP per worker) would still rise because immigrants are typically younger than the native population, which improves the general worker to population ratio. However, an inflow of immigrants can be more than just an increase in labour supply, e.g., immigrants bring new skills to the workforce, extending the scope of specialisation and thus making workers more productive. In fact, economic research from the past decade has found, that immigration improves not just GDP or GDP per person (Ortega and Peri, 2014), but has a causal positive impact for labour productivity (Jaumotte et al., 2016), GDP per capita growth rate (Aleksynska and Tritah, 2015), and total factor productivity (Peri, 2012).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "68.8% 2024-Q2 2021-Q2 67.5% 2022-Q2 40.3 40.3 40.4 40.4 Source: Deloitte own elaboration based of Eurostat data (Labour Force Survey).\n\nSource: Deloitte own elaboration based of Eurostat data (Labour Force Survey).\n\nPart-time Full-time 31 Deloitte has not received data that would be detailed as to citizenship, poviat, sex, age group, occupational group, and ZUS insurance code that would be suitable for econometric approach.\n\n42", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Labour Force Survey"}, {"text": "Eurostat data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Labour Force Survey", "confidence": 0.6345970630645752}, {"text": "Eurostat data", "confidence": 0.5856529474258423}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "consistent with previous, similar studies.\nHowever, they should be treated as lowerbound estimates, as we do not allow for the possibility of an increase in the labour force triggering a positive productivity shock (e.g., due to increased specialisation), because there is little data to credibly estimate its size.\n\nA feature of our modelling approach is that the resulting GDP gains are reduced due to increased competition on the labour market. This slightly increases the unemployment rate, by 0.18-0.3 pp in 2023, which corresponds respectively 33-54 thousand additional people being unemployed. This effect also slowed down real wage growth by 0.65-1.15% in 2023.\nIn reality, these negative effects are likely to be compensated by positive productivity gains, in the form of adjustments on the part of native workers (by their occupational upgrading, see papers by Peri and Sparber, 2009; Foged and Peri, 2016) and firms (by skill-biased technical change, see papers by Lewis and Peri, 2015, or Lewis, 2013), as econometric studies find only small effects on native wages, clustered around zero (Peri, 2014).\nThe impact of refugees from Ukraine in", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE For the regional analysis, population weights were applied based on the most up-to-date refugee population figures for each country, ensuring the findings accurately represented the broader regional refugee population. To maintain comparability, the figures for 2023 presented in this report were also re-estimated using survey weights.\n\nThis report utilises the criteria of the Washington Group on Disability Statistics Short Set on Functioning (WG-SS) [7] . The assessment included a comprehensive set of questions covering mobility, vision, hearing, cognition, self-care, and communication. For the purpose of this report, disability is defined as level 3 and above, indicating significant limitations in functioning (‘a lot of difficulty’ or ‘cannot do at all’). For indicators related to chronic illness and vaccination, respondents self-reported whether they or any household members had a chronic illness and whether children in the household had received measles vaccine.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Washington Group on Disability Statistics", "confidence": 0.1712430715560913}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey weights", "confidence": 0.36343592405319214}]}}}
{"input": "- 65% in early 2023 with a further 10%\nalready having completed a course. 87% also took part in inclusion courses that were offered. Per the report, since the beginning of the full-scale war,, around one million people have fled to Germany, while Eurostat data on beneficiaries of temporary protection show that there were around 1.17 million Ukrainians under such schemes in Germany [30] .\n\nAmong working refugees there is a significant number of entrepreneurs.\nThe high employment rate of refugees in Poland covers not only employees, but also the self-employed. The available data also shows that refugees from Ukraine in Poland are likely to start their own businesses. ZUS (social security) statistics on insured refugees indicate that around 5% of them have set up a business or are freelancers. Similar results can be gleaned from the MSNA Poland 2023 survey results, which show that slightly more than 5% of respondent households receive income from self-employment or similar activities.\nThis percentage appears to be slightly higher for men, at over 6%, than women.\n\n---\n[30] Eurostat data, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asytpsm/default/table?lang=en", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey results"}, {"text": "ZUS (social security) statistics"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Eurostat data on beneficiaries of temporary protection"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Eurostat data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey results", "confidence": 0.7505677342414856}, {"text": "Eurostat data", "confidence": 0.6411117315292358}, {"text": "ZUS (social security) statistics", "confidence": 0.21753646433353424}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Eurostat data on beneficiaries of temporary protection", "confidence": 0.42047038674354553}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE health needs were regionally reported higher among those with disabilities (23%) and higher compared to 2023 (14%). Notably, respondents with a disability in Latvia, Czechia, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia reported a similar level of access to health care as those without a disability.\n\nUnmet health needs are higher among recent arrivals. Of those who arrived in 2024, 28% reported difficulties in accessing care, compared to 19% of those who arrived in 2023 and 16% of those who arrived in 2022.\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WITH CHRONIC ILLNESS THAT ARE**\n\n**ABLE TO ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE**\n\nWith chronic illness Without chronic illness\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WITH A DISABILITY THAT ARE ABLE TO**\n\n**ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE**\n\nWith disability Without disability Regional Czechia Latvia Moldova Estonia Poland Bulgaria Hungary Lithuania Slovakia Romania (N=6,052)\n\n**12**\n\nRegional Latvia Czechia Estonia Moldova Bulgaria Poland Lithuania Hungary Slovakia Romania (N=5,695)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In practice, access to these financial services is still hindered by the type of identification documents issued by\nCNARR and UNHCR to refugees. The refugee identity cards, not issued by the national competent authority,\nANATS, is often considered an unofficial document in most cases. Efforts to expand the legally recognized\ndocumentation through the provision of biometric identification and a national identification number by\nANATS for refugees would be the solution to these recurring challenges. Other practical challenges persist\nfor refugees in accessing credit, stemming from their inability to meet the financial guarantees and the\nperception that they pose a high risk profile as borrowers. Some refugees, mainly living in the South of\nChad continue to ably access bank accounts, mainly saving accounts, based on the prior recognition of their\nidentity cards by certain financial institutions.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "refugee identity cards", "confidence": 0.37567010521888733}, {"text": "national identification number", "confidence": 0.12737274169921875}]}}}
{"input": "1. Compared to the [2023 MSNA data](https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/108068)\n2. For the purposes of this analysis defined as 50% of the host country median equivalized disposable incomed. This approach is equivalent to Eurostat’s at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) methodology 3. Defined as the share of the population with an income below the poverty line 4. The poverty rate for the host communities was defined to be equal to Eurostat’s at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) rate calculated for the 50%-of-median-equivalized-income threshold 5. Equivalent to living being at risk of poverty (as per Eurostat) when setting the at-risk-of-poverty threshold at 50% of the national median disposable income after social transfers 6. MHPSS stands for mental health and psychological support\n\n**3**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2023 MSNA data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2023 MSNA data", "confidence": 0.8599535822868347}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "- Co-­‐existence \r activities \r in \r areas \r of \r return, \r including \r through \r working \r with \r CBOs\nfor \r the \r identification \r of \r key \r points \r of \r current/potential \r tensions, \r designing \r of\njoint \r reintegration \r projects, \r and \r conducting \r cultural \r activities \r that \r foster\ntraditional \r values \r of \r consideration \r and \r peace.\n\n- Constructing/rehabilitating \r basic \r facilities, \r such \r as \r health, \r safe \r drinking \r water\nsystems \r and \r sanitation \r as \r well \r as \r improving/expanding \r services.\n\n14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Note: Data are based on average social security contributions bases in employee-cells, each cell for a specific poviat, sex, age group, and main occupational group. All data are for the 01XX ZUS insurance code (employees). Data for Q2 2022 encompass 6945 employee-cells of Ukrainian refugees joined with likewise cells for Polish citizens, while for Q2 2024 13477 such cells. Ukrainian refugees have been identified by PESEL UKR and Ukrainian citizenship, Poles by Polish citizenship.\n\nSource: Deloitte own elaboration based on ZUS data.\n\nrefugees move to better-paid occupations becomes clearer. Between June 30, 2022, and June 30, 2024, Ukrainian refugees gained an estimated 7% in earnings having shifted towards better paid occupations, pre-war Ukrainians 5%, non-Ukrainian foreigners 4%, and Polish citizens 1%.\n\n**Ukrainian refugees have been slowly**\n\n**closing their wage gap to Polish**\n\n**citizens across all wage levels.** Once\nZUS administrative data on Ukrainian refugees with employment contracts is divided into employee cells based on 380 poviats, 2 sexes, 7 age groups, and 10 main occupational groups (including", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ZUS data"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ZUS administrative data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ZUS data", "confidence": 0.1764620542526245}, {"text": "ZUS administrative data", "confidence": 0.13283991813659668}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "average social security contributions bases in employee-cells", "confidence": 0.24458517134189606}, {"text": "ZUS administrative data", "confidence": 0.17028026282787323}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Mental health is a significant concern, with particularly high needs in populations fleeing conflict. WHO estimates that one in five people affected by conflict (22.1%) have a mental health condition, including 13.0% with mild, 4.0% with moderate, and 5.1% with severe conditions [4] .\nRefugees may have experienced conflict-related violence and other adversities prior to displacement and likely face current stressors associated with adapting to new environments, languages, and cultures, economic and housing instability, limited social support networks and uncertainties about their future and those left behind in Ukraine. These factors may contribute to mental health and psychosocial problems that can persist for many years if left unaddressed.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**decreases it.** Some evidence shows that\nwhen refugees from Ukraine have access to education, healthcare, and social services, they may be more likely to consider returning home, precisely because they feel more stable and have the resources to make plans. Sohst et al. (2024) found that short-term return intentions were higher in countries offering strong public services and with healthier economies (lower poverty and higher GDP). In short, when people aren’t just surviving but have some breathing room, they’re better positioned to think about going back.\nOn the other hand, host country labour market integration decreases the chances that refugees will be returning to their country of origin. Personal circumstances clearly play a major role. Refugees who are formally employed in their host countries are 12 percentage points less likely to plan a return in the near future than those who aren’t (Sohst et al., 2024). Furthermore, Lewandowski et al. (2025) find that refugees who underwent greater task degradation were more likely to plan to return to Ukraine by 2023, particularly those who initially, in 2022, did not plan to return. So, while public services seem to increase the likelihood of return, employment has the opposite effect, it gives people a reason to stay. Families with children or elderly dependents are also more hesitant, which makes sense given the ongoing uncertainty in Ukraine and school continuity in host country. Refugees with disabilities are even less likely to return, often because of healthcare needs or limited support options. Return is often less about ‘desire’ and more about 'capacity', what in development terms includes social capital, human capital (like education and skills), and even psychological readiness. That capacity is shaped by a combination of public policies and personal circumstance. [6]\n\n---\n[6] Crucial will also be the ‘pull’ factors in Ukraine, which will be determined by the conditions of future peace. The longer the full-scale war continues, the smaller will", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**•** Aleksynska and Tritah (2015) look for economic impacts of immigration in a\n\nsample of 20 developed OECD countries at 5-year intervals during the 19602005 period. They find that a higher rate of immigration by 1 percentage point increases GDP per capita growth rate by 0.3 percentage point. They try to disaggregate this effect in further regressions, finding positive effects for the growth of income per capita, output per worker, and total factor productivity for higher rate of immigration among prime-age workers (25-54 years old), but negative or statistically insignificant for the young (15-24 years old).\nThese estimates are causal, as authors similarly to Jaumotte at al. (2016) quoted above instrument the immigrant shares by estimating them beforehand based on a separate model, which is orthogonal to subsequent GDP growth.\n\n**•** Peri (2012) in a seminal paper models the impact of immigration on total factor", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "3. Economic Opportunities\n\nwhich aims at preventing conflict, enabling resolution and improving the understanding of law and justice.\n\nIn practice, the availability of judicial services, including Court, remains scarce or too distant from refugee\nhosting areas, including camps. The nascent state legal aid services remain constrained in scale and scope,\nfurther exacerbated by the lack of implementation. In addressing the legal and justice needs of refugees\nand asylum-seekers, despite the support provided by UNHCR and its partners for legal aid services, the\npredominant option remains traditional arrangements made under the auspices of local and traditional\nauthorities.\n\n### **3. Economic Opportunities**\n\n**3.1** **Freedom of movement**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Additionally, insights were drawn from the Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Surveys (RRPS), [[9]] conducted\n\nbetween 2020 and 2022, which included the Shona as a distinct stratum. The RRPS monitored the impact of the\n\npandemic on vulnerable groups, capturing critical data on employment disruptions, income losses, and food\n\ninsecurity during the crisis.\n\n**The Shona community in Kenya has faced significant socioeconomic challenges, exacerbated by their stateless**\n\n**status and the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.** Before acquiring citizenship, Shona households faced a 24\n\npercent higher likelihood of living in poverty compared to the urban Kenyan population and were more likely to\n\nreside in larger, overcrowded households. Although primary school enrollment rates were similar to those of their\n\nKenyan counterparts, many Shona children struggled to transition to secondary education. Limited access to formal\n\nemployment, driven by a lack of legal documentation, has forced many Shona individuals into self-employment or\n\ninformal work. Even with high employment rates within the community, this does not translate into reduced\n\npoverty, as most of the employment is low-income and lacks stability. [[8] ]\n\n**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Surveys"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Surveys", "confidence": 0.8635222911834717}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Chart 15. Ukrainian refugees wages median net wage by age group**\n\nMonthly net wage (PLN) Percengate of all workers total economy average Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Chart 16. Median net wages of Ukrainian refugees median net wage by sector**\n\nin PLN Percentage of total economy average 126% 15 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 54 55 to 64 15 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 54 55 to 64 Ukrainian refugees All workers Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on SEIS UNHCR survey and GUS data.\n\n**The Ukrainian refugee groups to earn**\n\n**the highest wages compared to the**\n\n**wages in the economy as a whole are**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey"}, {"text": "GUS data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey", "confidence": 0.8588511347770691}, {"text": "GUS data", "confidence": 0.6834408640861511}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The \r ongoing \r presence \r of \r armed \r actors \r in \r places \r of \r displacement \r and \r potential \r return\nremains \r a \r key \r concern. \r Communities \r have \r been \r subject \r to \r protection \r risks \r associated\nwith \r the \r presence \r of \r military \r units \r including \r forced \r labour, \r forced \r recruitment \r and \r the\npayment \r of \r “taxes.” \r In \r addition, \r Myanmar \r is \r believed \r to \r have \r a \r large \r number \r of \r children\nin \r armed \r conflict, \r including \r child \r soldiers, \r with \r both \r the \r Government \r and \r various \r non-­‐\nstate \r armed \r actors \r having \r been \r responsible \r for \r the \r recruitment \r of \r minors. \r On \r 27 [th] June\n2012, \r the \r United \r Nations \r Country \r Task \r Force \r on \r Monitoring \r and \r Reporting \r (CTFMR)\nand \r the \r Government \r signed \r a \r Plan \r of \r Action \r with \r regards \r to \r underage \r recruitment \r in \r the\nMyanmar \r Army. \r Procedures \r are \r underway \r for \r the \r systematic \r identification \r and\ndischarge \r of \r verified \r minors \r from \r the \r national \r forces. \r However, \r plans \r of \r action \r with\nnon-­‐state \r armed \r groups \r in \r the \r South-­‐East \r have \r not \r yet \r been \r agreed \r and \r it \r remains \r to \r be\nseen \r whether \r the \r Plan \r of \r Action \r with \r the \r Government \r will \r be \r comprehensively\nimplemented.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "While \r all \r the \r conditions \r and \r safeguards \r for \r an \r organized \r voluntary \r return \r to \r South-­‐East\nMyanmar \r are \r not \r yet \r in \r place, \r positive \r political \r and \r economic \r reforms \r and \r security\ndevelopments \r have \r increased \r momentum \r for \r preparing \r for \r a \r possible \r voluntary \r return\nof \r refugees \r from \r Thailand \r and \r durable \r solutions \r for \r people \r internally \r displaced \r as \r a\nresult \r of \r protracted \r conflict. \r A \r small \r number \r of \r refugees \r are \r reported \r to \r have \r returned\n\n2 ‘Temporary \r shelters’ \r is \r the \r Royal \r Thai \r Government \r term \r used \r to \r identify \r the \r refugee \r camps \r along \r the\nborder.\n\n2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Access to services**\n\n**Since 2020, the Shona community has made significant strides in the enjoyment of rights and access to essential**\n\n**services and social, economic, and financial opportunities.** The acquisition of citizenship has enabled the\n\ncommunity to access critical documentation, with 86 percent of individuals now holding a national ID, citizenship,\n\nor birth certificate. This remarkable progress has facilitated their inclusion in various social and economic\n\nopportunities.\n\n**Access to financial services has also improved significantly.** The proportion of community members with bank\n\naccounts increased from 9 percent in 2019 to 35 percent in 2024, while mobile wallet usage saw a surge from 52\n\npercent to an impressive 97 percent. This suggests that the community has leveraged citizenship to integrate more\n\nfully into the formal financial system, enhancing their economic participation.\n\n**Health insurance coverage has nearly tripled over the past five years.** The percentage of Shona individuals with\n\nhealth insurance rose from 4 percent in 2019 to 11 percent in 2024, compared to 24 percent nationally _._ [[10]] Although\n\nthe current coverage rate remains low, this growth indicates an increasing awareness and ability to access\n\nhealthcare services, possibly due to better employment prospects and social benefits associated with citizenship.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "national ID", "confidence": 0.10498405247926712}]}}}
{"input": "2. Regulatory Environment and Governance\n\n### **2. Regulatory Environment and Governance**\n\n**2.1** **Normative framework**\n\n[Chad, already a state party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,](https://www.unhcr.org/fr/media/convention-et-protocole-relatifs-au-statut-des-refugies)\nand the [1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specifc Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, enacted](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36400-treaty-0005_-_oau_convention_governing_the_specific_aspects_of_refugee_problems_in_africa_e.pdf)\n[a new asylum Law on 31 December 2020 (Loi No. 027/PR/2020 Portant Asile en République du Tchad).](https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/606334e04.pdf)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Consistent with the recent legislation consolidating past practices, CNARR, through its Eligibility Sub\nCommission, remains the primary authority for asylum at first instance. Over the past three years, CNARR\nhas employed prima facie refugee recognition during the registration phase for asylum-seekers from Central\nAfrican Republican hosted in the South of Chad, those from Nigeria hosted in the Western Chad, and equally\nfor those fleeing Sudan, including for non-Chadian persons forcibly displaced since the outbreak of 15 April\n2023. Other asylum-seekers have undergone an individualized RSD procedure handled by CNARR. While\nthere have been some enhancements in asylum legislation, notably with the recent promulgation of the\n2023 Decree aiming to improve the efficiency of individualized RSD procedures, implementation challenges\npersist. Issues include permanent rotation of CNARR staff, inadequate training for CNARR eligibility officers\nin interview techniques, legal assessments and the use of country-of-origin information. Non-compliance\nwith first-instance asylum processing delays stipulated in the asylum legislation is also observed. Despite", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "mine). Women are more likely to earn cash and less likely to work in agriculture after mine\n\nopenings. We find similar results when we analyze the effects at the district level and when we\n\nuse production levels instead of openings and closings of mines. We interpret this as there being\n\nadditional effects of being very close to a mine (within 20 km), beyond the effects from being\n\nin a mining district. No spillovers into neighboring districts are detected.\n\nThe results are in accordance with the results in Kotsadam and Tolonen (2016), who find similar\n\neffects on occupation in mining communities across the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa, and with\n\nAragón and Rud (2013), who find that agricultural productivity in Ghana is reduced by mining\n\nproduction nearby. We find no statistically significant results on wealth and inequality, although\n\nthe results point toward increases in both. The effects on infrastructure are ambiguous; we\n\ncannot detect any better access to flush toilets and radios, and the effects on electricity access\n\nare negative. Further decomposing these effects, we learn that migrant households are less\n\nlikely to have access to electricity (compared with the change among migrant households living", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Net primary school enrolment shows a slight decline but is attributed to changes in the education system rather**\n\n**than reduced access.** The enrolment rate decreased from 81 percent in 2019 to 75 percent in 2024. However, this\n\nis likely due to the adjustment in the age bracket for primary school in Kenya under national education reforms\n\nlaunched in in 2022, which has led to a temporary underestimation of the enrollment rate. Despite this, the Shona\n\ncommunity's access to primary education remains strong and stable.\n\n_Figure 2: Access to essential services, pre- and post-citizenship_\n\n_Source: 2019 Shona socioeconomic survey_ [[8]] _and the authors’ calculation of 2024 survey data._\n\n**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2019 Shona socioeconomic survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 survey data", "confidence": 0.16520823538303375}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2024 survey data", "confidence": 0.4869311451911926}], "vague_data": [{"text": "2024 survey data", "confidence": 0.16929662227630615}]}}}
{"input": "**Immigrants could possess complementary skills that**\n\n**make native workers more productive as they specialise.**\nThese skills do not even need to be advanced to be complementary. Natives are likely to deal better with communications-intensive tasks and have better networking, all of which may be better paid and not easily transferable between countries. OECD (2016) gives an example of a native carpenter, who employs an immigrant to do his previous manual tasks and himself focuses on marketing and business development.\nSuch occupational upgrading has been first shown in a seminal paper by Peri and Sparber (2009) in the USA data, but has been quickly extended to other countries. From this perspective Foged and Peri (2016) look at refugees in Denmark in the 19912008 period. They find that inflow of low-skill refugees caused less educated native workers to pursue less manual-intensive tasks - improving their wages, employment, and occupational mobility. These effects are causal, as the authors exploit the refugee dispersal system, which is orthogonal to economic opportunities.\n\n**Immigrants could enter childcare, elderly care, and**\n\n**housekeeping services, allowing highly educated and**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "USA data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "USA data", "confidence": 0.8405537605285645}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Despite the possible gains in wages for wage earners, we note a decrease in the regionally\n\ndeflated total household expenditure (column 5), and a decrease in per capita expenditure on\n\nfood and nonfood items (column 4). The increase in wages but decrease in total expenditure\n\ncan possibly be explained by rising prices and wages in mining communities, where everyone\n\nhas to pay the higher prices but only some (those who earn wages), benefit from a rise in wage\n\nrate.\n\nColumns 6 through 9 of table 12 look at nondeflated expenditure measures for food, housing,\n\nhealth and education, and household energy. [17] We confirm that total household expenditure on\n\nfood decreases (compared with the per capita deflated measure in column (4)), but find that\n\nhouseholds spend more money on housing, transport, and communication, and household\n\nenergy, such as electricity and gas. The electricity and gas expenditure is only for those who\n\nhave any positive expenditure on these, and we saw earlier that electricity access changes with\n\nthe mine. This confirms that, among those who spend anything on electricity, they spend more\n\non it in mining communities.\n\n**Table 12 Using GLSS: Household income and expenditure**\n\n---\n[17] Additional results for recreation and transport and communication are available upon request. The expenditure", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS", "confidence": 0.8177744746208191}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\nlack \r of \r skilled \r personnel, \r facilities, \r basic \r equipment \r and \r supplies, \r including \r in \r terms \r of\npotentially \r life-­‐saving \r reproductive \r health, \r malaria \r prevention \r and \r control \r and \r HIV\nservices.\n\nThe \r education \r sector \r is \r also \r substantially \r underserved \r and \r not \r of \r adequate \r standards,\nwith \r a \r shortage \r of \r teachers \r and \r an \r inadequate \r number \r of \r primary \r schools \r within\nreasonable \r distance \r of \r many \r communities. \r Regular \r school \r attendance \r is \r hampered \r by\neducation \r costs, \r distances, \r illness, \r work \r requirements, \r insecurity \r in \r conflict-­‐affected\nareas \r and, \r for \r ethnic \r minority \r children, \r “language \r barrier”. \r Most \r children \r have \r limited\nopportunity \r to \r continue \r their \r education \r beyond \r primary \r school.\n\nAccess \r to \r safe \r drinking \r water, \r particularly \r in \r rural \r areas \r and \r during \r the \r dry \r season \r is\nuneven \r and \r in \r many \r locations \r insufficient, \r with \r those \r water \r sources \r available \r during \r the\ndry \r season \r located \r far \r away \r from \r human \r dwellings. \r Standards \r of \r sanitation \r are \r very \r low,\nwith \r open \r defecation \r common \r and \r household \r latrines \r less \r than \r international \r standards.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Sample distribution by geographical strata, Poland 5,645 13,420 Jul-Aug UNHCR, IOM followed by random selection of districts, and convenience sampling for household selection.\n\nCSCM, IOM, Romania 1,222 3,485 Jul-Sep UNHCR UNHCR, IOM, Slovakia 819 1,853 Jul-Aug WHO, UNICEF, SHC\n\n**Total** **11,530** **27,302** **Jun-Sep**\n\nSample distribution by geographical strata, and simple random selection of households from cash enrolment lists.\n\nTwo strata (collective sites vs. private accommodation); random selection of districts and convenience sampling for household selection.\n\n### **Limitations**\n\nThe statistical significance of the MSNA results is limited by the non-probabilistic selection of respondents. Moreover, the use of convenience sampling likely led to a larger share of data being collected from more vulnerable households.\n\nThere was also a notably high non-response rate regarding questions related to income and expenditure, which likely resulted in non-response bias. The income module of the MSNA was also materially different from the one employed by EU SILC, which may limit comparability of this data to that of host populations.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "cash enrolment lists", "confidence": 0.3357419967651367}]}}}
{"input": "dropping from 33 percent to 21 percent.  The literacy rate has remained constant at 93 percent, reflecting sustained\n\naccess to education. Overall, the Shona community's demographic profile suggests stability and gradual socio\neconomic integration following their acquisition of citizenship.\n\n_Table 1: Demographic characteristics of Shona community in Kenya._\n\n_Source: 2019 Shona socioeconomic survey_ [[8]] _and the authors’ calculation of 2024 survey data._\n\n**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2019 Shona socioeconomic survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 survey data", "confidence": 0.489926815032959}, {"text": "2019 Shona socioeconomic survey_", "confidence": 0.1029784306883812}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2024 survey data", "confidence": 0.39274275302886963}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Many \r people \r do \r not \r possess \r a \r Citizenship \r Scrutiny \r Card \r (or \r “CSC”) \r either \r because \r they\nlive \r or \r used \r to \r live \r in \r conflict \r areas \r controlled \r by \r ethnic \r armed \r groups \r with \r no\nGovernment \r representation, \r or \r simply \r because \r they \r do \r not \r have \r access \r to \r the\nadministrative \r mechanisms \r that \r issue \r these \r documents. \r Furthermore, \r the \r Government\nin \r the \r past \r limited \r distribution \r of \r CSCs \r in \r border \r areas \r to \r contain \r movement \r of \r people\nlinked \r to \r ethnic \r armed \r groups. \r Very \r few \r IDPs \r held \r CSCs \r before \r their \r displacement, \r and \r it\nmay \r be \r extremely \r difficult \r for \r people \r who \r have \r been \r displaced \r as \r refugees \r or \r IDPs,\nparticularly \r from \r areas \r controlled \r by \r ethnic \r armed \r groups, \r to \r provide \r the \r necessary\ndocumentation \r to \r obtain \r CSCs. \r Additionally, \r persons \r not \r belonging \r to \r one \r of \r the\nofficially \r recognized \r “ethnic \r groups” \r face \r difficulty \r in \r acquiring \r CSCs, \r despite \r the \r fact\nthat \r there \r are \r relevant \r provisions \r available \r for \r them \r under \r the \r Myanmar \r Citizenship\nLaw. \r In \r July \r 2011, \r the \r Immigration \r and \r National \r Registration \r Department \r of \r the\nMinistry \r of \r Immigration \r and \r Population \r initiated \r the \r Moe \r Pwint \r Operation, \r which \r is \r an\naccelerated \r procedure \r to \r issue \r CSCs, \r especially \r in \r areas \r that \r were \r remote \r and/or\ndifficult \r to \r access \r in \r the \r past \r because \r of \r the \r presence \r of \r non-­‐state \r armed \r groups.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Moe \r Pwint \r Operation", "confidence": 0.19326385855674744}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Indonesia’s National Refugee Task Force, established in 2019, remains an important Government entity\nin the management of refugee affairs. Deputy V in POLHUKAM is the head of the National Refugee\nTask Force and members include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a wide range of security-focused\nactors. Several local refugee task forces operate in provinces hosting refugees and remain active and\nimportant counterparts. UNHCR also works with a range of partners in Indonesia, particularly IOM,\nYCWS, and YKMI in several areas of protection and assistance. In addition, UNHCR works with nongovernmental, civil society and refugee-led organizations, as well as other UN agencies working with\nand advocating for the rights of the refugee population in Indonesia.\n\n**Locations of Persons Registered with UNHCR**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Locations of Persons Registered with UNHCR", "confidence": 0.5080026388168335}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "can promote reconciliation and a sense of national unity and identity. [[11]]\n\n**Acquiring Kenyan citizenship has significantly improved the socioeconomic conditions of the Shona community,**\n\n**enabling them to access essential services, economic opportunities, and social benefits.** Before gaining citizenship\n\nin 2020, the Shona faced numerous barriers due to their stateless status, which excluded them from formal\n\nemployment, financial services, and government programs. Following the acquisition of nationality, the Shona now\n\nenjoy access to legal identity documents, increased livelihood opportunities, better health insurance access, and\n\nfinancial inclusion. These positive changes align with findings in the academic literature, which highlight the\n\nimportance of citizenship in reducing poverty and enhancing human capital by allowing individuals to leverage\n\ngovernment services, engage in formal employment, and contribute more productively to society.\n\n**Citizenship has also enhanced the Shona community’s labor market potential, though employment rates are still**\n\n**recovering from the adverse impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.** Legal identity has granted many Shona\n\nindividuals the ability to seek formal employment and broaden their economic activities beyond informal self\nemployment. This has enabled the community to slowly rebuild their livelihoods post-pandemic. Nevertheless,\n\nemployment levels remain below pre-pandemic rates, especially for women, reflecting challenges in labor market", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Moreover, Chad developed a national strategic plan for the progressive implementation of universal health\ncoverage from 2017 to 2019, starting with vulnerable populations. Eventually, it should cover all individuals\nresiding in Chad, including refugees. However, the implementation of this plan was disrupted by the\nCOVID-19 pandemic. As of June 2023, its implementation was not yet effective.\n\n**4.3** **Social protection**\n\nState social protection programmes are guaranteed to refugees and asylum-seekers under Article 21 of the\n[2020 Asylum Law. Article 33 of the Law specifies that refugees and asylum-seekers are entitled to the same](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)\n[treatment as nationals regarding assistance and public relief. Article 77 of the 2023 Decree reiterates the](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)\nsame.\n\nThe 2016-2020 National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS) faced implementation challenges. Subsequently,\na new SNPS for 2022-2026, developed with support from UNICEF, the World Bank, UNFPA, WFP and FAO,\nis now awaiting validation and government approval. This strategy, distinct from its predecessor, prioritizes\naddressing financial and livelihood security for the most vulnerable, managing risks, reducing vulnerability\nand ensuring access to basic social services for all residents in Chad, including refugees. Notably, it aligns\nwith the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). The forthcoming strategy will be accompanied by a priority\naction plan.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In terms of economic violence, only 21% of Venezuelan women of working age access the formal\njob market, compared with 42% of men, and the situation is even worst for young women aged\n18 to 26 who are single head of household (13%). [28] Moreover, women in the formal job market\nearn an average salary that is 7% lower than men, a gap that widens up to 32% at higher and post\ngraduate levels. [29]\n\nAs far as physical and sexual violence is concerned, 18% of Venezuelan women and girls do not\nfeel safe in their communities, a proportion that is three times higher in Roraima and Amazonas\nstates, compared with the rest of the country. [30] Among the places that are perceived as most\ninsecure, respondent mentioned: the way to school (44%), community and religious spaces (44%),\nshelters (35%) and their own homes (28%). [31] A recent study also found that in the state of Roraima,\n9% of key informants witnessed some form of sexual violence against children. [32]\n\n_26_ ACNUR (2023), cit. p. 14\n\n_27_ Idem, p.17\n\n_28_ R4V (2024), cit.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The top 5 protection incidents reported in the region are homicide (30 per cent), assault and battery (29 percent),\nextortion of property (16 per cent), destruction of properties (13 per cent), and looting (12 per cent). Also, those\nprotection incidents affected 99.88 percent of Internally displaced persons (IDPs), 0.11 percent of refugees, and 0.01\nper cent of asylum-seekers. The protection incidents affected more males (53 per cent) than females (47 per cent),\nand the protection incidents affected the age group (0 to 17), children, who represent 44 percent of all victims\nreported in September 2022. In addition, the perpetrators of those protection incidents are armed groups (46 per\ncent), host communities (26 per cent), others (23 per cent), and unknown (5 per cent). It is worth mentioning that 1.3\npercent of the regional population, compared to September 2022 regional data, was affected by the protection\nincidents reported in September 2022.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "September 2022 regional data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "September 2022 regional data", "confidence": 0.7752718925476074}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "have a stronger focus on all households’ members, rather than focusing only on women and\n\nyoung children. In addition, they provide more detailed information on labor market\n\nparticipation, such as exact profession (where, for example, being a miner is a possible\n\noutcome), hours worked, and a wage indicator. The data estimate household expenditure and\n\nhousehold income. Wages, income, and expenditure can, however, be difficult to measure in\n\neconomies where nonmonetary compensation for labor and subsistence farming are common\n\npractices.\n\n**4 Empirical Strategies**\n\n**4.1 Individual-level difference-in-differences**\n\nTime-varying data on production and repeated survey data allow us to use a difference-in\n\ndifferences approach. [7] However, due to the spatial nature of our data and the fact that some\n\nmines are spatially clustered, we use a strategy developed by Benshaul-Tolonen (2018). The\n\ndifference-in-difference model compares the treatment group (close to mines) before and after\n\nthe mine opening, while removing the change that happens in the control group (far away from\n\nmines) over time under the assumption that such changes reflect underlying temporal variation\n\ncommon to both treatment and control areas.\n\nWe limit the data to include households within 100 km of a mine location and estimate the\n\nfollowing:\n\n---\n[7] We have not done a synthetic control approach because of limited ability to explore pretreatment trends.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "repeated survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "repeated survey data", "confidence": 0.43522220849990845}]}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n#### **Model calibration**\n\nWe introduce a positive productivity shock into the Deloitte D.Climate model, reflecting empirical findings that refugee inflows coincided with stronger labour-market outcomes, to offset any potential adverse effects. Although higher employment rates among Ukrainian refugees correlate with improved job and wage outcomes for Polish citizens, we take a deliberately conservative approach in our general equilibrium simulations. While descriptive statistics and econometric estimates point in a positive direction, the available data remain too sparse for firm\n\n**Chart 31. Labour market activity rates**\n\nWomen in 15-64 age group conclusions. [31] On the other hand, a default Deloitte D.Climate model estimation is in line with the previously mentioned canonical model. This yields a 1.35% decrease in wages and a 0.4 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, which is implausible. Therefore, a positive marginal productivity of labour shock has been added to the model and calibrated to eliminate the impact on the unemployment rate throughout the simulation years of 2022, 2023, and 2024. While it is possible that the unemployment rate could fall despite the influx of Ukrainian refugees due", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "available data", "confidence": 0.1036703959107399}]}}}
{"input": "health care access, as has been observed in Tanzania (Rhee et al., 2018).\n\nThe analysis shows that mining has created structural shifts in labor markets, and that it has\n\nreduced infant mortality rates. However, along with increased wage rates, we find that\n\nhousehold level expenditure on housing and energy increases. In addition, the migrant\n\npopulation may have lower living standards with less electricity and a higher disease burden\n\namong children. We have no information where the migrant population moved from, and we\n\ncannot tell whether they have migrated to the area to benefit from the industry, or whether they\n\nwere part of a relocation program due to the mining. One caveat is that these observed\n\ndifferences among migrant households in mining communities and non-mining communities\n\ncould stem from untestable selection, as we do not observe the migrant households before the\n\nmigration. Regardless of the motivation behind the migration decision, the policy\n\nrecommendation is to ensure policies are in place to ensure sustainable living conditions in this\n\ngroup.\n\nThese district level findings should be placed in the context of seminal work by Caselli and\n\nMichaels (2010) who found weak increases in living standards in Brazilian municipalities after", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The Indonesian Ministry of Education, Culture, Research and Technology issued a Circular Note in\n2019, with amendments in 2022, allowing refugees and asylum seekers to access primary and\nsecondary formal and informal education in the national education system. Enrollment in local schools\nrequires a valid UNHCR document and competency in Indonesian language. UNHCR and our partners\nprovide preparation classes, covering Indonesian language and basic skills (reading, writing, and\nmath), as well as additional support (tuition fees, transport allowance and school supplies) to assist\nchildren to access local schools. IOM similarly supports refugee children living in IOM\naccommodations. Challenges to increase enrolment rates among refugee children include limited\ninterest on the part of refugee children to learn Indonesian, financial barriers, resettlement\nexpectations, the inability to obtain official documentation certifying completion of school (due to the\nlack of an Indonesian identification number), and inadequate physical space within classrooms to\naccommodate non-Indonesian children. As a result of these and other challenges, as of September\n2024, only 769 refugee children (of approximately 3,000 school age children) are enrolled in\naccredited national schools.\n\n### **Health**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES\n\n**TOP 5 REFUGEE EMPLOYMENT SECTORS SPLIT BY**\n\n**EMPLOYEE BACKGROUND (2024)**\n\n**TOP EMPLOYMENT BARRIERS FOR EMPLOYED REFUGEES**\n\n**(2024)**\n\nEmployed in the same sector in Ukraine Manufacturing Hospitality Construction Wholesale IT Lack of local language knowledge Cannot find a job with decent pay Few jobs for my skills or experience Lack of jobs with a suitable schedule Degree or skills recognition issues Source: Survey data 17% 15% 35% 5% 2% 4% Employed in a different sector in Ukraine 16% 9% 5% 24% 6% 4% 1% Note: Percentages are based on the distribution of relevant responses in the survey Source: Survey data Moreover, in the latest survey round, nearly 35% of employed refugees identified inadequate pay, a lack of positions that match their skill set, and challenges in having their qualifications recognized as barriers to employment. All of these answers also suggest a mismatch between qualifications and job placement.\nConsistent with the findings on having to shift to jobs outside of previous employment backgrounds, working women reported the above employment barriers more frequently than men, supporting the hypothesis that they may be facing underemployment more often.\n\n# **Methodology**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.9895761013031006}]}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE The survey methodology relied on a single household member (the respondent) answering health and MHPSS questions on behalf of all household members, which may have limited the ability to fully capture the unique needs and experiences of each individual. Furthermore, the questionnaire itself was constrained to a limited range of questions, which may have restricted the depth of data collected on complex and multifaceted topics, such as mental health and psychosocial well-being. Additionally, sensitive topics such as mental health and sexual and reproductive health may have been underreported, depending on the respondent’s comfort level and the presence of others during the interview.\n\n**8**\n\n# Sample demographics\n\nThe sample comprises 8,720 households, encompassing 19,803 individual household members. The population pyramid for this sample indicates that the majority of individuals are women aged 35–59 (25%), followed by women aged 18–34 (14%). To minimize potential biases due to gender imbalances, indicators were disaggregated by gender and age, allowing comparisons within consistent age groups. No significant gender disparity is observed in the sample in children; consequently, indicators related to child health were not impacted. The sample included 194 pregnant women and 247 breastfeeding women.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey methodology", "confidence": 0.28740164637565613}]}}}
{"input": "Power BI Desktop Solutions Pathways Action Plan Protection and Conflict Sensitivity\n-\nBaardheere: A high occurence of violence and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) perpretrated by non-state actors as well as private individuals, highlighting a complicated conflict landscape. There is a need for strengthened protection services and provision of basic services.\n-\nBaydhaba: Findings suggest high rates of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) took place, and were mostly perpretrated by non-state actors and private individuals. There is a need for enhanced protection from violence, and provision of basic services such as food and shelter.\n-\nBerdaale: Notably high incidents of violence and SGBV were recorded, mostly by non-state actors and private individuals, highlighting localized conflict dynamics. There is a need for strengthened protection for vulnerable groups.\n-\nDoolow: Escalating conflict was highlighted, with a high occurrence of violence and SGBV perpetrated by non-state actors, alongside private individuals.\nThere is a need for strengthened security services.\n-\nKismayo: A high level of violence and killings were reported, perpetrated by private actors, which suggests the prevalence of opportunistic violence with unaffiliated private groups exploiting insecurity. There is a need for strengthened law enforcement capacity, and community-based protection mechanisms.\n-\nBanadir (including Daynile and Kahda): Very high displacements were recorded due to violence, SGBV, and killings with a combination of actors involved - predominantly unaffiliated private individuals and non-state actors.\nThere is a need for strengthened law enforcement capacity and a prioritization of basic services as well as livelihoods support to meet the needs of displaced communities.\n-\nXudur: High rates of SGBV, exploitation and child protection violences were recorded, with penetrators identified as unaffiliated private actors, suggesting a limited state presence. There is a need to strengthen community mechanisms which are commonly relied upon by affected populations. There is also a need to improve access to food and shelter, and address exploitation through targeted protection measures.\nIn 2024, UNHCR conducted several assessment and analysis activities focused on protection and conflict sensitivity analysis. Key findings from these activities in the eight locations referred to in this report are detailed below. Note that analysis from the whole year is summarised.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**situation over the past year.** In\nthe 15-59/64 age group, employment rate of Polish citizens stood at 75% in Q2 2024 according to Eurostat, slightly more than the 69% for Ukrainian refugees in the SEIS 2024 survey and 73% when adjusted for a different sex and age structure. In the 15-64 age group, the employment rate of Ukrainian male refugees was 67% while that of Polish citizens in Q2 2024 was 77%. For women, the rates for Ukrainian refugees and Polish citizens are closer in the 15-59 age group (female retirement age in Poland is 60) with 70% for refugees and 72% for Poles. Visible", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS 2024 survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS 2024 survey", "confidence": 0.9375113844871521}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "### TABLE OF CONTENTS September/ October 2023 report Venezuela\n\n**Operational highlights**\n\n4 Humanitarian Program Cycle 2024: Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) Process\n\n4 Coordination with other platforms, subnational Clusters, ICCG, and Partners\n\n5 Accountability for Affected Populations (AAP) WG\n\n5 GPC Townhall\n\n5 La Carnada Play\n\n6 Annual TiP Bulletin 2022-2023\n\n6 Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) and Trafficking in Persons (TiP)\n\n6 Monthly Meetings of the WGTiP\n\n6 Protection Mainstreaming Training\n\n8 Training on Mixed Migration and Durable Solutions\n\n8 Reporting Transition to 345W\n\n8 Focal Group Discussions with LGBTIQ+ Organizations for\n\nThematic Protection Analysis Update (PAU)\n\n10 Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS)\n\nCoaching and Training of Trainers (ToT)\n\n10 Impact Stories of Series: September and October\n\n11 Protection Service Mapping Revisions and Edits\n\n11 Participation in the Gender ToT for Government Officials\n\n11     September’s Monthly Meeting with Partners\n\n12 Second Allocation for Venezuela Humanitarian Fund (VHF)\n\n12 Protection Monitoring Tool (PMT)\n\n**14** **Protection response: performance and funding**\n\nHumanitarian Response\n\n**3**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Protection Monitoring Tool", "confidence": 0.6535057425498962}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "2. Regulatory Environment and Governance\n\nrelated to refugees. CNARR continues to be responsible for coordinating the protection of refugees. Its tasks\ninclude safeguarding the well-being of refugees and asylum-seekers, managing issues related to them (such as\nidentification and registration, document issuance and camp administration), and maintaining communication\nwith relevant ministries. These ministries encompass Foreign Affairs, Security, Defence, Justice, Finance, Social\nAffairs, Human Rights, Economy, Education, Health and Water. CNARR also provides advice to the MSPARGL\non sustainable solutions. Challenges faced by CNARR in coordinating efforts among various stakeholders and\ndonors persist, mainly due to a shortage of stable, qualified human resources and limited financial capacity. In\nthese circumstances and as specified by Article 55 of the [2023 Decree, UNHCR continues to support CNARR](http://2023 Decreehttps://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)\nfor the refugee response coordination using the established refugee coordination model. Coordination\nmeetings with external partners are jointly chaired by the government counterpart (CNARR or prefect) and\nUNHCR. CNARR maintains a presence in all refugee camps and most refugee hosting areas.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Power BI Desktop Climate Change & Resilience Enhancing the climate adaption and resilience of IDPs and host communities is a priority.\nStrengthening their ability to cope with and recover from current and future shocks, such as conflicts or climate change disasters, is essential for sustainable development and reducing the risk of further displacement.\nPathway #5:", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "UNHCR conducts case management for survivors of gender-based violence and refers them to support\nservices with their consent. Assistance may include medical care, psychosocial support, temporary\nsafe accommodation, assistance to report to police and in any legal process, and interventions to\nprotect impacted children, if required. UNHCR and YCWS run a GBV hotline that can be accessed by\nsurvivors of GBV 24 hours/day.  Since July 2023, UNHCR has conducted a GBV prevention program\nthat seeks to increase awareness of the root causes of GBV and to build the capacity of the community\nto prevent and respond to GBV by Engaging Men in Accountable Practices (EMAP).\n\n### **Legal Support**\n\nUNHCR provides support to refugees and asylum seekers experiencing legal protection concerns,\nincluding individuals seeking international protection at air and sea borders who are unable to access\n\nUNHCR / 1 November 2024 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Note:_ This figure shows the mine locations and the district in which the mines are located.\n\nThe baseline specification is shown in the following equation:\n\n𝑌���         - 𝛽�𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡��         - ∝�� 𝑔� �𝜆𝑋�� �𝜀���      �3�\n\nThe outcome for individual _i_ in district _d_ in time period _t_ is regressed on district and year fixed\n\neffects, an indicator for whether the individual lived in an active mine district at the time of the\n\ninterview, and time varying individual-level factors. Even though the treatment is defined at the\n\ndistrict level, we use individual-level data to be able to control for individual- level factors and\n\nexplore heterogeneity at the individual level. The standard errors are, however, clustered at the\n\ndistrict level to take into account the interdependence induced by the higher-level treatment.\n\nSince the treatment variable is at the same level as our district fixed effects, the _β1_ coefficients\n\nare directly interpretable as difference-in-differences estimates. That is, they capture the\n\ndifference between mining districts and nonmining districts before and after mining starts.\n\nIn estimating the district-level effects of mine openings on birth outcomes, we control for birth\n\nyear fixed effects instead of survey-year fixed effects, as we are interested in the effect of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "individual-level data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "individual-level data", "confidence": 0.9368836283683777}]}}}
{"input": "Children from households with members living below the poverty line were also found to significantly less frequently attend school. The enrollment rate in local schools for 5–17-year-olds in this group amounted to 72% as opposed to 84% for households with a higher income. Moreover, close to 20% of these children did not participate in online learning either, thus being completely disengaged from formal education.\n\nFinally, one in five refugee households in the poverty group reported having to reduce the number of meals eaten per day over the last week to cope with a lack of food or money to buy it. Roughly the same proportion had to borrow money or rely on friends and relatives at least once over the same period for sustenance. Almost one in three households resorted to reducing food intake for adults, so that small children could eat. When asked to assess their income level qualitatively, 26% of respondents living in poverty indicated that this amount is insufficient to cover their food needs as opposed to just 3% in the higher income group.\n\n**7**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "reintegration. The employment rate for women dropped from 72 percent in 2019 to 61 percent in 2024, suggesting\n\na slower recovery in sectors traditionally dominated by women. Overall, the Shona community’s gradual\n\nemployment recovery indicates the value of citizenship in building economic resilience and highlights the need for\n\ncontinued support to ensure inclusive recovery for all members of the community.\n\n**The Shona experience provides valuable lessons for addressing statelessness and promoting inclusive**\n\n**development for other stateless communities globally.** Gaining citizenship has been transformative for the Shona,\n\ngranting them access to a range of socioeconomic benefits and reducing their vulnerability to poverty and exclusion.\n\nThis case underscores the importance of grant of nationality to stateless populations and its potential to unlock\n\neconomic and social opportunities that drive sustainable development. As more countries around the world seek\n\nto address statelessness through legislative changes and the expansion of citizenship rights, the Kenyan experience\n\nwith the Shona can serve as a model. By providing legal identity and addressing structural barriers, policymakers\n\ncan empower stateless communities to participate more fully in their economies and societies, leading to improved\n\nlivelihoods, social cohesion, and economic growth. These findings have broader implications for the many stateless", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The paper contributes to the growing literature on the local effects of mining. Much of the\n\nacademic interest in natural resources is focused on country-wide effects, and this research\n\ndiscusses whether the discovery of natural resources is a blessing or a curse to the national\n\neconomy. Natural resource dependence at the national level has been linked to worsening\n\neconomic and political outcomes, such as weaker institutions, and more corruption and conflict\n\n(see Frankel 2012 and van der Ploeg 2011 for an overview). While all these effects can have\n\nhousehold-level implications, fewer analyses have, thus far, analyzed the geographic dispersion\n\nof such impacts. A recent literature on the local and subnational effects of natural resources\n\ncontributes to the understanding of such effects (for example Aragón and Rud 2013, 2015;\n\nAxbard et al., 2016; Benshaul-Tolonen 2018, 2019; Caselli and Michaels 2013; Corno and de\n\nWalque 2012; Fafchamps et al. 2016; Kotsadam and Tolonen 2016; Loyaza et al 2013;\n\nMichaels 2011; von der Goltz and Barnwal 2019; Wilson 2012). A growing number of papers\n\nexplore the mining industry, in particular, see Aragón, Chuhan-Pole, and Land (2015) for an\n\noverview. We contribute to this literature by showing the importance of analyzing local level", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "to credit, which is critical for expanding small businesses or starting new ventures. These changes underscore the\n\ntransformative role of citizenship in enabling the Shona community to overcome previous barriers to economic\n\nparticipation and build sustainable livelihoods.\n\n**Moreover, citizenship has also led to increased access to training and educational opportunities, while reducing**\n\n**discrimination in the workplace.** Over a third of the Shona noted that they have had more opportunities for training\n\nor education since becoming citizens, helping them to build skills and enhance their employability. Another 30\n\npercent reported experiencing less discrimination at work, which has contributed to more positive employment\n\noutcomes and a more inclusive work environment. Overall, these improvements indicate that legal recognition has\n\nbeen pivotal in unlocking the economic potential of the Shona community, setting the stage for greater\n\nsocioeconomic mobility and long-term development.\n\n- **Box 2: Findings from focus group discussions**\n\nMany of the survey results are consistent with findings from qualitative focus group discussions, including\n\nchallenges associated with securing economic opportunities. The Shona community faces challenges predominantly\n\nstemming from low education levels and the absence of formal qualifications to which the lack of nationality and", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey results", "confidence": 0.27032411098480225}]}}}
{"input": "of intent to employ foreign workers. The results are similar to the OLS estimation; however, when the second instrument is used without the first one, it gives a higher result. Instrumental variables regressions show that in 2023, a 1 percentage point higher employment share of Ukrainian refugees caused a PLN 70 higher wage growth (0.7 pp.) when instrumented by school pupils' share, PLN 132 (1.4 pp.) when instrumented by 2019 Ukrainian workers distribution, and PLN 75 (0.8 pp.) when both instruments were used. That said, the results should be treated with caution, as the instruments used may not be sufficiently exogenous to allow for fully credible causal inference.\n\nThe early analysis by Gromadzki and Lewandowski (2023), mentioned previously also found a statistically significant effect of Ukrainian refugees on earnings. In their estimation, the share of the Ukrainian refugee population had a small positive and statistically significant relationship with the earnings of Polish women at a 0.1 level.\nTheir results for foreign women were also positive, albeit smaller and lacking statistical significance.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2019 Ukrainian workers distribution"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2019 Ukrainian workers distribution", "confidence": 0.4613516330718994}, {"text": "OLS estimation", "confidence": 0.2331039160490036}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "English for Speakers of Other Languages programme in Massachusetts. The policy targeted all immigrants, including those who had lived in Massachusetts for several years, with data for 2008–2016 and 4,700 individual lottery applicants. Authors found a causal effect, with annual earnings increasing by USD 2,400. These earnings gains generated additional tax revenue that produced a 6% return for taxpayers.\nSchmid (2023) studied African refugees who applied for asylum in Switzerland between 2008 and 2017. He exploited the random assignment of refugees to French, German, and Italian cantons, as well as their prior language knowledge (e.g. French speakers placed in French or German speaking cantons). The results showed that language proficiency more than doubled the employment level in the first five years after arrival.\n\n**The econometric model estimated**\n\n**in the SEIS UNHCR survey shows**\n\n**substantial wage gains from Polish**\n\n**language proficiency for Ukrainian**\n\n**refugees.** Deloitte has estimated an\neconometric model incorporating individual income determinants of Ukrainian refugees. Our study has", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey", "confidence": 0.9144777655601501}, {"text": "English for Speakers of Other Languages programme", "confidence": 0.3543354272842407}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "REGIONAL BUREAU FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA\n\n**2022 VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION**\n\nAs of 30 September 2022\n\nMAP OF VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION WHERE THE FLOW INVOLVE 5 POCs OR MORE\n\nKEY FIGURES\n\n15,042\n\nTotal Individuals\nrepatrieted since\n\nJanuary 2022\n\nIndividuals repatrieted\n\n**within Southern Africa**\n\n**Region** since January\n\n2022\n\n6,786 8,256\n\nIndividuals repatrieted\n\n**from Southern Africa**\n\n**Region** to other countries\noutside of the region since\n\nJanuary 2022\n\nVOLREP* WHERE THE FLOW INVOLVE 5 POCs OR MORE\n\nTRENDS\n\nMONTHLY REPATRIATION SINCE JANUARY\n\n**3,874**\n\nANNUAL REPATRIATION SINCE 2019\n\n*VolRep = Voluntary Repatriation  PoCs = Persons of Concern Source : UNHCR PRIMES   Author : DIMA/RBSA    Data sources: UNHCR PRIMES.  For more information or to contribute, please contact UNHCR RBSA DIMA (rsarbdima@unhcr.org)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR PRIMES"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR PRIMES", "confidence": 0.8922746777534485}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "MAP OF VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION", "confidence": 0.1975756585597992}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Ultimately, refugees provide the Polish economy an additional boost both in total product and demand. That allowed for an increase in real GDP. This situation was especially beneficial for public finance.\nAlthough the influx of refugees was costly at the start, the additional revenue they provided was more than enough to compensate for this [48] . The cost for local labour force due to increased competition was in most part mitigated due to a tight labour market.\n\nAs such, the increase in unemployment was much lower than increase in employment.\nTo maximise the positive impact of refugees on economy, policies helping their integration into the labour market that both allow their maximal employment as well minimise market mismatch between demand for specific skills and their abilities are crucial. The second part of this recommendation, achieved either through improvements in utilisation of skills of refugees or trainings giving them abilities demanded by the labour market, is integral as it should lower costs for the local labour force.\n\n---\n[48] Model treats general government sector as a whole, as such cost and income internal structure may differ creating institutions with financial loses while", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The 2024 SEIS equivalized [8] disposable income data indicates that just over one in five refugees (23%) residing in the region are living in poverty [9] . This figure is almost double that of host country nationals (12%), implying a large gap in economic vulnerability. Compared to 2023, poverty rates have decreased substantially (from 36% [10] ), suggesting an overall improvement in the economic well-being of Ukrainian refugees over time.\n\n**REFUGEE VERSUS HOST POVERTY RATES BY COUNTRY**\n\nUkrainian refugees (2024) Host country nationals (2023) Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Region Note: Poverty rates for all countries apart from the Republic of Moldova are based on a calculation that follows Eurostat’s at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) methodology with the at-risk-of-poverty threshold set at 50% of the national median disposable income after social transfers. Refugee disposable income has been computed based on survey data. For the Republic of Moldova, the poverty threshold was taken to be the 4Q23 absolute poverty line reported by the National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova.\n\nSource: Survey data, [Eurostat,](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat) [National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova, SAG estimates](https://statistica.gov.md/en)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2024 SEIS equivalized disposable income data"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SAG estimates", "confidence": 0.21775828301906586}, {"text": "Eurostat’s at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) methodology", "confidence": 0.11641737818717957}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.9567466378211975}]}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE Respondents who faced constrains in accessing care were more likely to identify seeking health care as reason for visiting Ukraine in all countries, with the exception of Latvia.\n\n**REASONS SEEKING HEALTHCARE FOR VISIT TO UKRAINE**\n\n**BY OBTAINED CARE STATUS**\n\nUnable to access health care Able to access health care Hungary Poland Czechia Bulgaria Romania Estonia Slovakia Lithuania Moldova Latvia (N=3,596) Respondents with a chronic illness were more likely to cite accessing health care as reason for visiting compared to those without (33% vs 23%). Among households with a member who has a disability, healthcare access was the primary reason for visiting (38%), compared to 26% for households without a member with disability. There were no immediate gender differences concerning the prevalence of healthcare as a reason for women and men to visit Ukraine.\n\n**16**\n\n### **Access to sexual** **and reproductive** **health services**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Poland is studied in an early paper by Gromadzki and Lewandowski (2023), who find no effect on earnings, employment, and unemployment rate of native or other immigrants, except an actual slight positive impact on the wages of native women.\nEven in a conservative scenario that assumes negative effects of labour market competition in the form of higher unemployment and slower real wage growth, an increase in the labour force translates into larger personal incomes and higher private consumption, which results in a larger tax revenue. These effects were strengthened by an influx of capital from abroad.\n\n###### In total, the general government revenue increased by 0.8-1.1% in 2022 and 1.05-1.45% in 2023. In monetary terms, this amounts to 10.1-13.7 billion PLN in 2022 and 14.7-19.9 billion PLN in 2023.\n\nIf estimates quoted by a government offical of public expenses on refugees of around 15 billion PLN in 2022 and 5 billion in 2023 [13] are accurate, we can conclude that they were more than offset by the additional tax revenue. In the long-term, refugees should increase yearly government revenue by around 0.85-1.3%.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n## **1.** Ukrainian refugees in Poland\n\n##### The large influx of refugees since February 2022, added to a hefty and growing Ukrainian migrant population in Poland (1.1). Refugees have changed the demographics of the local Ukrainian residents, with most of them being women and children and many households led by women alone (1.2). In the past year, refugee household income sources have become more Poland-based (1.3).\n\n#### **1.1 Influx since February 2022**\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Chart 1. Poland-Ukraine border movement balance and registered/active PESEL data**\n\n**Prior to the 2022 conflict in Ukraine,**\n\n**the population of Ukrainians in**\n\n**Poland was already significant and**\n\n**on the rise, but the exact number of**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "registered/active PESEL data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL data", "confidence": 0.9465874433517456}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**GDP.** This is the amount that would be\nlost, should refugees “disappear” from the Polish economy. It is mainly driven by a higher number of workers in the economy, but also accounts for increased productivity brought about by more specialization. Considering all aspects, the overall impact of the refugees has been predominantly positive, and it moved the Polish economy to a higher growth path.\nRefugees contribute to the economy slightly more than their employment share – they increase the labour supply as both workers and entrepreneurs and expand demand as consumers. The rise in productivity due to more specialization across the labour force further boosts the economy. The impact of refugees is lowered by a temporary decrease in the capital-to-labour ratio (companies need time to invest in equipment and machines to match the rise in the number of workers), as well as an increase in competition on the labour market.\n\n**The figures are higher than those in**\n\n**the previous Deloitte (2024) report,**\n\n**which – due to scant data available**\n\n**at the time – did not account for the**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "scant data", "confidence": 0.3725125193595886}]}}}
{"input": "**the most in the last two years.** The\ndata as of June 30, 2024 shows that 38% of Ukrainian refugees worked in elementary occupations, much more than pre-war Ukrainians (25%), non-Ukrainian foreigners (18%), and Polish citizens (10%).\n\nMSNA Jul-Aug 2023 SEIS May-Jun 2024 MSNA Jul-Aug 2023 SEIS May-Jun 2024 Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on MSNA and SEIS UNHCR surveys conducted in July-August 2023 and May-June 2024.\n\nWhile the share seems least favourable among Ukrainian refugees, their situation improved the most in the two years since June 30, 2022 (by 10 pp. compared with 9 pp. for the pre-war Ukrainians, 2 pp. for non-Ukrainian foreigners and 1 pp. for Polish citizens). On the other hand, in Q2 2024, managers and specialists, the two highest paid occupational groups, comprised 8% of both Ukrainian refugees and pre-war Ukrainians, 22% of nonUkrainian foreigners (who include many", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "MSNA and SEIS UNHCR surveys"}, {"text": "MSNA"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR surveys", "confidence": 0.5994755029678345}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "UNHCR surveys", "confidence": 0.13336126506328583}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The standard of living of refugees from Ukraine may be significantly lower than natives, even at similar incomes due to their lack of housing capital. 87% of the population in Poland resided in owneroccupied housing in 2021 and 2022, according to Eurostat. As most refugees from Ukraine do not possess housing of their own in Poland, they need to rent in a relatively tight market, especially when they reside in large metropolitan areas that offer the most opportunities. Initially, in the first month after the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the number of renting offers in the OLX and Otodom portals dropped by approximately 60%, though it later returned to previous levels.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Eurostat", "confidence": 0.1026129499077797}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "widespread among Shona households, and access to external support was minimal. Although employment levels\n\nbegan to recover a year later, they remained below pre-pandemic levels, underscoring the prolonged adverse\n\nimpact of the pandemic on this already vulnerable community. [[9]]\n\n_Figure 1: Labor force status after the COVID-19 outbreak (18-64 years)_\n\n_Source: Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Surveys (RRPS)_ _[[9]]_\n\n**Two rounds of household surveys taking place over five years before and after the transition of the Shona in**\n\n**Kenya from statelessness to citizenship help us to understand this community – and present one of the first**\n\n**socioeconomic pictures of the impact of citizenship on the welfare of stateless persons.** Between 2019 and 2024,\n\nthe median age of Shona household members remained unchanged at 18 years, underscoring a predominantly\n\nyouth demographic profile. Gender distribution is even, showing only a marginal change, with the female population\n\nincreasing slightly from 49 percent to 50 percent. Average household size has risen modestly from 4.9 to 5.4\n\nmembers, which may reflect greater household consolidation or socio-economic stability following their\n\nnaturalization. The most notable shift is the significant reduction in the proportion of female-headed households,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Surveys"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "household surveys"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Surveys", "confidence": 0.8843644261360168}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "household surveys", "confidence": 0.7001508474349976}]}}}
{"input": "For productivity two options were tested.\nFirstly, neutral impact: no shock to productivity. Secondly, lower productivity of workers from Ukraine negatively impacting total labour productivity. These shocks were calibrated to match the difference in data between refugees income from labour in UNHCR survey and average wage in Poland from Statistics Poland weighted by refugees share in total workforce.\n\nAs one period in the model is set to one year and refugees started coming to Poland by the end of February 2022 it was assumed that their impact on economy started being felt starting from II quarter of the year.\nAs such shocks were set so that 3⁄4 of shocks were calibrated to data from 2022 and 1⁄4 to data for 2023 [56] .\n\n51 Computational General Equilibrium.\n52 Global Trade Analysis Project, [GTAP Models: Current GTAP Model (purdue.edu).](https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/models/current.asp) 53 Region combined from: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.\n54 All shocks are percent deviations.\n55 [Oversight of fnancial market infrastructures (bank.gov.ua)](https://bank.gov.ua/en/payments/oversite)\n\n---\n[56] E.g. for total increase in number of workers of 350 thousand around 262.5 thou. was set to have happened in 2022 while rest in 2023.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR survey"}, {"text": "Statistics Poland"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR survey", "confidence": 0.7549395561218262}, {"text": "Statistics Poland", "confidence": 0.754547655582428}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "average wage in Poland from Statistics Poland", "confidence": 0.17352965474128723}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**macroeconomic benefits.** To illustrate\nthe macroeconomic impact of public intervention, we have assumed that half of the current language gap is addressed, so that the share of working refugees not speaking Polish fluently falls from 82% to 41%. Assuming that the productivity Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n#### **4.5 Recommendations**\n\n##### Language courses\n\n**Ukrainian refugees in Poland earn higher wages when they**\n\n**have higher language skills.** There is substantial scientific evidence\nthat language courses improve labour market outcomes of refugees and other migrants. Financing language courses for refugees would generate positive impacts for them and the economy. Courses should be available not just at beginner to intermediate levels, but also for advanced speakers who want to become proficient and gain access to high-skill jobs.\n\n##### Occupational licensing deregulation\n\n**While some occupational licensing rules with regard to**\n\n**Ukrainian citizens were relaxed, further and permanent easing**\n\n**would benefit both the Polish economy and the inclusion of**\n\n**refugees.** The low-hanging-fruit are the restrictions referring to\ncitizenship only – rather than actual expertise or language skills – which could be scrapped altogether.\n\n##### Active Labour Market Policies\n\n**Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) should focus on**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\n- Assistance \r is \r co-­‐ordinated \r and \r complies \r with \r principles \r of \r neutrality \r and\nimpartiality \r as \r well \r as \r humanitarian \r standards. \r  \r Donor \r support \r also \r converges\nwith \r co-­‐ordination \r efforts.\n\n- A \r valid \r Letter \r of \r Understanding \r (LOU) \r between \r UNHCR \r and \r appropriate \r line\nministries \r will \r remain \r in \r effect \r for \r the \r duration \r of \r UNHCR’s \r activities \r and \r could\nbe \r amended \r as \r necessary \r should \r an \r organized \r voluntary \r repatriation \r operation\nbe \r launched.\n\n**10. \r PROPOSED \r ACTIVITIES**\n\nRecognizing \r and \r emphasizing \r the \r need \r for \r all \r durable \r solutions \r decisions \r to \r be \r designed\nand \r implemented \r with \r affected \r communities, \r and \r in \r consultation \r with \r relevant\nauthorities \r and \r non-­‐state \r actors, \r UNHCR \r will \r ensure \r that \r displaced \r populations \r as \r well\nas \r communities \r of \r origin \r and \r return \r are \r equipped \r to \r participate \r fully \r in \r the \r assessment,\ndesign \r and \r implementation \r of \r all \r interventions \r in \r support \r of \r durable \r solutions, \r using \r an\nage, \r gender \r and \r diversity \r mainstreaming \r approach.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "instance, report significantly more instances of racism compared to other South American refugees\nand migrants. [12] This exacerbates barriers to accessing a broad range of rights and services [13] and\nleads to greater vulnerability to both low skilled and temporary jobs, particularly when compared\nto Venezuelans who arrived in Brazil under similar circumstances. [14]\n\n##### Protection Risk II\n\n**Access to dignified housing.** In Brazil, a significant proportion of refugees and other forcibly\ndisplaced people can only afford precarious and overcrowded dwellings, located in impoverished\nand marginalized communities, often controlled by organized crime. [15] According to UNHCR´s\ndata, only 15% of refugees have secured tenure right to housing and\\or land, 27% live in physically\nsafe and secure settlements with access to basic facilities, and 54% feel safe walking alone in their\nneighborhood after dark. [16] In comparison, 65% of the Brazilian population owns the house in\nwhich they live - although 14% lacks the documentation to prove tenure rights [17] - 72% lives in\nphysically safe and secure settlements, [18] and 52% feels safe walking alone in their neighborhood\nafter dark. [19]", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Two per cent of surveyed Venezuelan households reported that at least one member had been\ndeceived, manipulated, coerced into debt, or received false promises intended to force them to\ntravel or migrate. [34] Additionally, one per cent of households reported at least one of its members\nbeing held against his\\her will by someone other than the country´s authorities, which may\nsuggest the possibility of human trafficking. [35]\n\nWomen and girls are particularly vulnerable to exploitation for various purposes of human\ntrafficking, including sexual exploitation, domestic forced labor, illegal adoption, and organs\nremoval. [36] Refugee women and girls in Brazil sometimes have to resort to survival sex, or cash-inhand domestic labor to make a living in Brazil, which increases their exposure to human trafficking\nnetworks. [37] In addition to these risks, domestic workers face numerous safety and health hazards\nrelated to their tasks and the environment they work in. These include chemical and ergonomical\nhazards, but also psychosocial risks, including violence and harassment, which are pervasive in the\nsector. The impact of these risks is amplified when domestic workers provide their services in the\ninformal economy, which is the case for most refugees and other forcibly displaced populations in\nBrazil. [38]", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The refugee inflow had a different demographic composition than the pre2022 economic migration. It primarily included working age women (41%) and children (40%). [5] Refugees from Ukraine did not plan to move, and many had special needs. In October 2023, nearly half of all refugee households included a person with a chronic illness, and some 10% included one with a Washington Group level 3 disability. Over a third included a single parent and a fifth an elderly person. [6] Despite these difficulties, refugees began entering the labour market surprisingly quickly – attaining an employment rate of 28% in May 2022 and 65% in November 2022 among working age persons (NBP, 2023) –\n\n##### **753 thousand** Ukrainian workers, including 225 thousand refugees, had registered for social security by September 30, 2023.\n\n**Situation of Ukrainian refugees on the**\n\n**labour market in Poland**\nUkrainian refugees, despite war trauma and other difficulties, have quickly become a part of society as **consumers,**\n\n**employees, entrepreneurs, and**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "NBP", "confidence": 0.1642313003540039}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Table 10 Summary statistics for bottom 40% of women**\n\n(1)          (2) (3)        (4)\n\nfar from a mine close to a mine\nbefore        during before       during\n\nnot working 0.188 0.183 0.200 0.162\nservice & sales 0.340 0.203 0.179 0.222\nprofessional 0.018 0.005 0.014 0.006\nagriculture 0.362 0.530 0.490 0.539\nmanual labor 0.091 0.079 0.117 0.072\nearning cash 0.876 0.855 0.879 0.901\nwork all year 0.852 0.859 0.879 0.838\n\n_Note:_ Column (1) is bottom 40% of sample at 20 to 100 km from a nonactive mine.\nColumn (2) is bottom 40% of sample at 20 to 100 km from an active mine.\nColumn (3) is bottom 40% of sample within 20 km of a nonactive mine.\nColumn (4) is bottom 40% of sample within 20 km of an active mine.\n\nRegression results comparing these four groups are presented in panel B (urban) of Annex table\n\n3. The results suggest that women in the bottom 40 percent are more likely agricultural workers\n\nin mining communities than elsewhere, but also more often service sector workers. They are\n\nless likely to work in manual labor, less likely to work all year, but more likely to earn cash for", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "panel B shows the effects of increased production in the survey year. There is no evidence of\n\nspillovers in the sense that there is a similar effect in neighboring districts. In fact, most\n\ncoefficients point in the opposite direction for mining and neighboring districts indicating, if\n\nanything, a shift in employment from neighboring districts to the producing ones.\n\n**8 Conclusions**\n\nGhana has a long history of gold production and has recently been experiencing its third gold\n\nrush, during which annual gold production skyrocketed. It was the first gold rush the country\n\nhas experienced as an independent nation, and it brings hope of improving the lives of its\n\ncitizens. Natural resource extraction is often argued to have detrimental effects on countries,\n\nhowever, and the so-called natural resource curse may imply that resource wealth is harmful to\n\nsocial development and inclusive growth. We use rich geocoded data with information on\n\nhouseholds and mining production over time to evaluate the gold boom at the local and district\n\nlevels in difference-in-differences analyses.\n\nMen benefit from direct job creation within the mining sector, and women seem to benefit from\n\nindirectly generated jobs in the service sector (statistically significant within 10 km from a", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "geocoded data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "geocoded data", "confidence": 0.3975811302661896}], "vague_data": [{"text": "geocoded data", "confidence": 0.4979631304740906}]}}}
{"input": "Altogether 42% of respondents have visited Ukraine at least once since February 2022. Regionally, the second most common reason for visiting was to access healthcare services (28%), following visits to relatives (57%). The proportion of those visiting for healthcare varied significantly by country, with respondents in Hungary (40%), Slovakia (37%), and Romania (36%) showing the highest rates, while it was lower in Lithuania (19%), Latvia (13%), and Moldova (10%). These findings align with previously reported higher unmet healthcare needs in Hungary (22%), Slovakia (21%), and Romania (28%), suggesting that seeking healthcare in Ukraine serves as a coping strategy to address these unmet needs.\n\n**% OF HOUSEHOLDS WHO CITED SEEKING HEALTH CARE AS**\n\n**REASON TO VISIT UKRAINE**\n\nSpent savings Reduced essential health expenditure Reduced essential education expenditure Purchased food on credit Migrated / became displaced Sold household assets Engage in high risk job Sold productive assets Sold house or land School-aged children labour Withdraw children from school (N=8,720) 37% 13% 7% 6% 5% 4% 4% 3% 2% 2% 1% Hungary Romania Slovakia Bulgaria Poland Estonia Czechia Lithuania Latvia Moldova (N=3,596) 18% 11% 11% 41% 37% 35% 33% 29% 29% 27%\n\n**15**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "advantage of capturing the intensity of mining production. Since it is somewhat unclear when\n\nmining production spills over to other types of employment, we use two measures of mining\n\nproduction. Panel A of table 13 shows the results of mining production in the period before the\n\nsurvey, including the survey year, on female employment, and we see that mining production\n\nleads to less agricultural employment but more employment in services and sales, as well as in\n\nprofessional work. Panel B shows that the effects are larger but not as precisely estimated for\n\nthe yearly measure. That they are larger is not surprising, since a 10-ton increase one year is\n\nmuch more than a 10-ton increase over a longer time period. The precision is also probably\n\nlower since it is unclear what year the production spills over to other activities. In any case, we\n\nsee that the effects are similar across these two specifications. [18]\n\n---\n[18] The effects for infant health and infant mortality are also stronger when we add production levels (results", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Power BI Desktop Legal Documentation, Housing, Land, & Property (HLP), and Access to Justice Providing necessary documentation and ensuring access to justice, housing, land, and property rights are essential for IDPs. Legal documentation is often necessary to access basic and financial services and secure employment, whilst tenure security and housing and land rights are critical for achieving permanent housing solutions to displacement.\nPathway #4:", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "It is also important to highlight that there were slight differences in the questionnaire across countries.\nNot all questions were consistently included in all country-level surveys, and some answer options were individually adjusted. To mitigate the impact of these differences, the regional analysis focused on data that could be matched. Certain indicators that may have been available by country have thus been excluded from this assessment.\n\nLastly, the survey was conducted during the summer months, coinciding with both host country and Ukraine school holidays. This period often sees many households temporarily visiting Ukraine, which impacted the accessibility of households and posed challenges in meeting targets, particularly in certain countries and geographic locations.\n\n**11**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "country-level surveys", "confidence": 0.435628741979599}]}}}
{"input": "The most common reported barrier to accessing MHPSS services was not believing that one needed support (36% in women, 34% in men), followed by not knowing where to go (31% in women; 29% in men). One in six (16%) of respondents reported adopting a “wait-and-see” approach. Other barriers included language barriers (14%), lack of time (10%), inability to afford services (7%), lack of service availability (5%), stigma (4%), long waiting time (4%),\n\n**24**\n\nDid not believe need support Did not know where to go Wait and see Language barrier Lack of time (N=1,682)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The findings on disability, chronic illness, and vaccination are based on self-reports and were not verified against medical records, which may impact their accuracy.\n\nA high non-response rate was observed for sensitive questions related to mental health, psychosocial well-being, protection, income and expenditure which could affect the completeness of the data. Additionally, the survey results for certain indicators, such as infant and young child feeding and SRH barriers, should be interpreted with caution due to the small sample size or low response rates. As a result, some indicators could not be further analyzed to assess how factors such as gender, age, disability, or place of residence impact access to health and MHPSS services.\n\nIt is also important to note that there were slight differences in the questionnaire across countries and years, such as adjustments to answer options.\nTherefore, the regional trend analysis was limited to questions that were consistently used across all participating countries and years to ensure comparability. Furthermore, certain indicators were excluded from the regional analysis due to insufficient sample size or the unavailability of data across all countries.\n\n7. [https://www.washingtongroup-disability.com/question-sets/wg-short-set-on-functioning-wg-ss/](https://www.washingtongroup-disability.com/question-sets/wg-short-set-on-functioning-wg-ss/)\n\n**7**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey results", "confidence": 0.18958018720149994}]}}}
{"input": "Despite the improved legal framework and the free issuance of birth certificates within the stipulated period,\nchallenges in physically accessing civil registration centres, along with a persistent lack of awareness\nregarding legal obligations surrounding births, contribute to the overall low rates of birth registration in\nChad.\n\nIt is worth noting that there has been an increase in the birth registration rate from 15 per cent in 2020 to\n26 per cent in 2023. The strategic partnership between UNHCR and government agencies responsible for\nissuing birth certificates, specifically the Directorate of Political Affairs and Civil Status (APEC until 2020) and\nANATS since 2021, has facilitated the issuance of birth certificates to over 150,000 refugee children and\nchildren from host communities in refugee hosting areas.\n\n**2.5** **Justice and security**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on GUS and ZUS data. All continuous variables have been regressed in first differences to account for non-stationarity Polish citizens employment rates and registered unemployment rates. For details see the Online Technical Appendix.\n\n39 2021-Q2 2022-Q2 2023-Q2 2024-Q2 2021-Q2 2022-Q2 2023-Q2 2024-Q2 Males Males Source: Deloitte own elaboration based Source: Deloitte own elaboration based of Eurostat data (Labour Force Survey). of Eurostat data (Labour Force Survey).\n\nFemales of Eurostat data (Labour Force Survey). Females 38", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Eurostat data (Labour Force Survey)"}, {"text": "Labour Force Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ZUS data"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Eurostat data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Eurostat data", "confidence": 0.7307443022727966}, {"text": "Labour Force Survey", "confidence": 0.2923293709754944}, {"text": "ZUS data", "confidence": 0.2504518926143646}, {"text": "GUS", "confidence": 0.21115542948246002}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "A steady inflow of migrants could be observed in the last decade since 2014, when armed conflict erupted in Eastern Ukraine. As the Ukrainian economy suffered and its currency lost value, many Ukrainians came to Poland looking for work. Most of them came on a guest worker basis, enabled by a law from 2011, that allowed Ukrainians and five other nations to work in Poland for 6 months during a year without a work permit, based on employers' declaration. This was a circular migration, in which they returned to Ukraine once the 6 month period expired.\nIn effect most stayed in Poland for less than twelve months and therefore were not included in the resident population or other national population estimates.\nA National Bank of Poland research paper estimates that between 2014 and 2018, between one and two million Ukrainian workers arrived in the country (Strzelecki, Growiec and Wyszyński, 2022).\nHard data on the number of Ukrainian workers in Poland before 2022 are limited 12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**XVI. Participation in the Gender**\n\n**ToT for Government Officials**\n\n**As part of the efforts of the Gender**\n\n**Technical Working Group of Miranda**\n\n**(“Mesa** **de** **Genero”)** **to** **support**\n\n**strengthening of local government,**\n\n**the Protection Cluster through the**\n\nProtection Assistant, supported the\n\ndelivery of a ToT on Gender Equality\n\n_b.Fundación Proyecto Maniapure (FPM)_\n\n_(October):_ FPM, a PC partner, imple\nments integrated protection, and WASH\n\nstrategies in Amazonas and Bolivar. The\n\nPC, in coordination with FPM staff, vis\nited the state of Amazonas to showcase\n\nFPM's impactful work in the monthly\n\nimpact stories series.\n\nThe main axis of the organization\n\nrevolves around a community model that\n\ncenters the mental and physical health\n\nas a human right. Their work has been\n\ndistinctive and their projects of great\n\nimpact to the most vulnerable groups,\n\nsuch as the indigenous communities of\n\nthe Venezuelan Amazonia.\n\nThe PA visited the community of Valle\n\nLindo in the municipality of Atures in the\n\nstate of Amazonas, where he was able to\n\ninterview several persons of interest who\n\nparticipate in the foundation's programs,\n\nand in particular those people who were\n\nparticipating in community sensitizations\n\nand trainings on the prevention of TiP", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ToT on Gender Equality", "confidence": 0.12166927754878998}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "5. Cross Sectors\n\n**c.** **Land:** Access to land for sustainable agricultural activities, which is crucial for fostering refugee’s self\nreliance remains challenging.\n\n14 R E F U G E E P O L I C Y R E V I E W F R A M E W O R K > **R E P U B L I C O F C H A D**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "migrant households in mining communities with migrant households elsewhere, and the null\n\nhypothesis would be similar trajectory over time. If we reject the null, we cannot distinguish\n\nbetween selective migration to mining communities and the impact of the mining. The\n\nnonmigrant analysis can plausibly reflect similar households over time, with the limitation of\n\nselective outward migration. We believe inward migration to mining areas to be more common\n\nthan outward migration (in line with Fafchamps et al., 2016).\n\nDiarrhea is a major concern in many developing countries. Diarrheal diseases are, in part, a\n\nmatter of infrastructure, where access to clean water and proper sanitation are important\n\ndeterminants. To further understand the effects on diarrhea, we look at the difference between\n\nmigrants and nonmigrants and the effects by distance (Figure 5). There are, in fact, large\n\ndifferences between the migrant and the nonmigrant populations. Among nonmigrants, a mine\n\nopening is associated with large decreases in incidence, whereas for migrants, the opposite is\n\ntrue. Considering all children between 0 km and 20 km of an active mine, children born to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Alongside the large-scale, capital-intensive mining industry in Ghana, there is an artisanal and\n\nsmall-scale mining sector (ASM). ASM activities were legalized in 1984, when the state\n\nloosened its monopoly on gold mining. In Ghana, as in many other African countries, the sector\n\nis an important employer (ILO 1999). It is estimated that around 1 million people in Ghana\n\nsupport themselves with revenues from ASM activities.\n\nThe sector is associated with several hazardous labor conditions, however. This includes child\n\nlabor, mercury exposure, and risk of mine collapse (Hilson 2009). The ASM and the large-scale\n\nmining sector sometimes thrive side by side, but sometimes competing interests lead to conflict\n\nbetween the two sectors, such as around Prestea, where domestic _galamsey_ miners (informal\n\nsmall-scale miners) have been in conflict with the multinational concession owner (Hilson and\n\nYakoleva 2007).\n\nIn this analysis, we focus solely on large-scale mining. We understand, however, that small\n\nand large-scale operations may be geographically correlated. Assuming that the start of a large\n\nscale mine does not affect the likelihood or viability of artisanal and small-scale mining, it is\n\nnot a threat to our identifying assumptions. However, should ASM respond to large-scale", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1. [Ukraine Refugee Situation ( accessed 12 Dec 2024)](https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine)\n2. [Ukraine Situation: Regional Refugee Response Plan 2025](https://www.unhcr.org/europe/publications/regional-refugee-response-plan-2025-2026) 3. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/25/ukrainian-refugees-council-extends-temporaryprotection-until-march-2026/ 4. Charlson, F., van Ommeren, M., Flaxman, A., Cornett, J., Whiteford, H. and Saxena, S., 2019. New WHO prevalence estimates of mental disorders in conflict settings: a systematic review and meta-analysis. The Lancet, 394: 240-248.\n5. Eurofound (2024), Social impact of migration: Addressing the challenges of receiving and integrating Ukrainian refugees, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg\n\n**5**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "WHO prevalence estimates", "confidence": 0.1895895004272461}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "age migrant married cohabiting divorced fertility woman partner\nactive*mine 0.263 0.028 0.025 0.018 -0.003 0.030 -0.036 -0.003\n(0.510) (0.042) (0.027) (0.029) (0.017) (0.115) (0.031) (0.030)\n\n_Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and\ndistrict fixed effects, urban dummy, age (not column 1), and years of education (not columns 6 and 7). Active is\nactive status of mine in the survey year. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.\n\n**5.1 Employment outcomes**\n\nUsing the difference-in-differences approach (equation 1), we estimate results on occupation,\n\nchild health, and inequality. First, panel A of table 4 indicates that women in active mining\n\ncommunities ( _active*mine_ ) are insignificantly more likely to work in service and sales and less\n\nin agriculture, and 1.7 percentage points less likely to work as professionals (statistically\n\nsignificant). There is no change in the likelihood that she is not working. These 5 categories\n\nstem from the same occupational variable in the DHS data, and are mutually exclusive. The\n\nsurveyed individual is told to report their main occupation. The coefficients can therefore be\n\ninterpreted as relative increases of each specific sector. Women are more likely to earn cash for", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DHS data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.5840611457824707}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "of establishing a theater group with an\n\nexperimental line of work.\n\nLa Carnada, an immersive and\n\ndocumentary-style theatre production,\n\naims to raise awareness about victims\n\nof Trafficking in Persons (TiP), focusing\n\non sexual and labour exploitation. It\n\nsheds a light on contexts where digital\n\nmedia, domestic violence, and deceptive\n\nopportunities pose significant risks,\n\nparticularly for women and girls. As\n\npart of the French-Venezuelan Festival\n\n**5**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In 2022, 15,402 persons have been repatriated voluntarily thus far, with 2,805 persons repatriated in September.\nThe largest group of returns was from Zambia to the DRC, with 2,159 persons repatriated in September. Further,\nthere has been notable movements from Angola to the DRC in September, where, 47 families of 143 persons were\nrepatriated to destinations in the DRC such as Kassai Province, Kinshassa, Kwilu Province and Goma.\n\nFrom January to September 2022, 4,497 individuals of 1,063 cases were submitted for resettlement consideration.\nAmong these cases, half were male and the other half were female with 57 per cent being children under age 18.\n\nIn the same period, 2,067 individuals departed for resettlement. A half of the departed cases were male and another\nhalf were female, similarly to submitted cases. Most persons have been considered for resettlement to the United\nStates (3,417). The highest number of those departed also headed to the United States (1,285). In terms of country of\nasylums, the highest number of submitted applications were from Malawi (1,438) and Zambia (1,367). Congolese\n(DRC) is the nationality with the highest number of submissions (3,618) and departures (1,729).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "antenatal at least 1 doctor midwife has health died\nPANEL A. # visits antenatal attended attended card 12 months\n\nactive\n0.759*** 0.026 0.055 0.125*** 0.039 -0.085***\ndistrict\n(0.244) (0.022) (0.115) (0.033) (0.059) (0.031)\n\nN 9,245 9,245 9,462 9,462 11,047 9,270\n\nR-square 0.242 0.121 0.160 0.154 0.161 0.138\n\nsmall\n\nat birth, the child was\naverage\nlarge height weight weight\n\nPANELB. size size size for age for age for height\n\nactive\n0.066 0.078 -0.148 -6.333 -23.676** -20.080\ndistrict\n(0.057) (0.085) (0.090) (18.753) (9.364) (13.428)\n\nN 11,837 11,007 11,007 9,646 9,646 9,851\n\nR-square 0.041 0.061 0.060 0.199 0.163 0.073\n\nin the last 2 weeks, had\nPANEL C. fever cough diarrhea\n\nactive\n0.016 0.010 0.058\ndistrict\n(0.057) (0.035) (0.036)\n\nN 10,849 10,883 10,887\n\nR-square 0.052 0.046 0.055\n\n_Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and\ndistrict fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. Active is active status of mine in the survey year.\nPanel b, columns 1, 2, and 3 show size at birth. Panel B, columns 4, 5, and 6 show anthropometrics (new WHO)\nin standard deviations. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "migrant mothers are 6.9 percentage points more likely to have suffered from diarrheal diseases\n\nin the two weeks prior to the start of the survey.\n\nTo further understand these effects, we decompose them by distance bins in a spatial lag model\n\n(bottom two graphs in figure 5). It becomes evident that, from a high-level incidence (dashed\n\nline) among the original local population (panel A of figure 5), the mine has brought substantial\n\nreductions in diarrheal incidence (as shown by the blue line). In the migrant population, the\n\nincidence is actually higher after mine opening than before, and the likelihood increases by 6.9\n\npercentage points. The spatial lag model in panel B of figure 5 reveals that much of the effect\n\nis driven by a spike in incidence 10 to 20 km away from the mine center point. If more migrants\n\nmove to the area because of the mine, they will be less settled, and health outcomes can\n\ndeteriorate, on average, within that population. Nevertheless, we should be careful in\n\ninterpreting the effects this way. The mine-induced migration, which we partly capture here,\n\ncould be different from the migration happening further away. The deteriorating status of", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The data also shows that poverty [5] has a very tangible effect on living conditions and protection risks. This group feel less safe, less secure in term of accommodation tenure, more frequently misses out on needed healthcare, more often has children out of school, and is much more frequently forced to resort to skipping meals because of lack of funds. In addition, vulnerable populations, such as older adults and individuals with disabilities or MHPSS [6] needs exhibit significantly higher poverty rates when compared to the refugees overall.\nThese connections are important to bear in mind when designing government, development, and humanitarian support programs.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "We suggest interpreting the local effects as being additional to the district-level effects; that is,\n\nthe mine affects the mining district predominantly through the fiscal channel, and local mining\n\ncommunities mainly through employment generation, and other localized factors. Overall, the\n\nresults are more robustly estimated at the district level than at the individual level, and we find\n\nno indications of positive spillover effects across districts. This is in line with a public spending\n\nhypothesis, where mining districts benefit more than adjacent non-mining districts through the\n\nfiscal revenue channel, since 10 percent of mining royalties are redistributed to mining districts.\n\n**2 Gold mining in Ghana**\n\nGhana has a long tradition of gold mining and has produced a substantial portion of the world’s\n\ngold for over 1,000 years (see Hilson [2002] for an extensive overview of gold production in\n\nGhana). During colonial British rule, the country was named the Gold Coast Colony, and gold\n\nproduction was booming. The first gold rush occurred between 1892 and 1901, and the second\n\nafter World War I. Gold production decreased at the dawn of independence in 1957, and\n\nremained low until the 1980s. Over the last 20 years, Ghana has been experiencing its third gold", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "employer sponsorship (immigrants come following a job offer – popular in Poland), family reunions (immigrants have family ties to a citizen abroad – like often in the USA) or point systems (immigrants fulfil certain characteristics judged by the state as valuable – like in Australia), refugees as involuntary migrants may not possess any such characteristics. Additionally, they may suffer from war trauma and be subject to policies that impede their labour market integration (like temporary labour bans or dispersals described in the previous chapter). This translates into lower employment and wages of refugees, which are key characteristics in terms of economic impacts. Moreover, their spending needs due to a sudden shift in living situation may be disproportionally higher, while their propensity to save lower as their future situation is more uncertain, resulting in the need to finance their consumption using capital generated outside the country e.g.\nsavings from their home countries.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Most Ukrainian refugee households**\n\n**are led by women alone.** According\nto the 2024 Socio-Economic Inclusion Survey (SEIS), 67% of Ukrainian refugee households are led by women without adult partners. When changes are compared to the 2023 edition, the MultiSector Needs Assessment (MSNA) survey, 5% of households include a person with disability, down from 10% previous year, and 48% include a chronically ill person, compared to 49% in 2023. Furthermore, average household size is 2.4 persons (compared to 2.7 previous year), 57% include children (compared to 52%), and 6% include a pregnant or breastfeeding mother (same as previously; UNHCR, 2025a). Only 15% of households are nuclear families with a working age man and woman with children.\n\n**Chart 5. Ukrainian refugee households’ demographic composition**\n\nwith one child with two or more children Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Table 1. 10 poviats with most Ukrainian refugees** **Chart 6. Local population shares of Ukrainian refugees**\n\n**1. Warsaw** 109,705\n\n**2. Wroclaw** 53,901\n\n**3. Cracow** 33,057\n\n**4. Poznan** 23,991\n\n**5. Gdansk** 17,829\n\n**6. Lodz** 15,902\n\n**7. Szczecin** 14,318\n\n**8. Poznanski** 14,028\n\n**9. Pruszkowski** 12,206", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 Socio-Economic Inclusion Survey"}, {"text": "MultiSector Needs Assessment"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 Socio-Economic Inclusion Survey", "confidence": 0.7318242788314819}, {"text": "MultiSector Needs Assessment (MSNA) survey", "confidence": 0.536642849445343}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "From Roraima, the Government implements a voluntarily internal relocation program\n(interiorização) to facilitate the socio-economic integration of refugees and migrants. As of\nOctober 2024, over 141,000 Venezuelans have been relocated to some 1,000 municipalities\nacross other Brazilian states. The continued influx of Venezuelans into Brazil – which have been\non the rise since 2023 – has required the Government and the humanitarian community to\ncontinue focusing on the humanitarian response in Roraima, while moving toward the integration\nof “Operacao Acolhida” within the regular national protection system, reducing duplications and\nensuring the sustainability of the response.\n\nIn addition to Venezuelans refugees and migrants, Brazil hosts individuals from various countries,\nincluding from Cuba, Haiti, India, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Nepal and Bangladesh; which places\nadditional strain on local protection networks, particularly in border states and cities with\ninternational airports, in the absence of a national response mechanism beyond “Operacao\nAcolhida”.\n\nUNHCR / October, 2024 8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "UNHCR is committed to ensuring that refugees and asylum seekers have access to lifesaving and lifesustaining health services. To achieve this, UNHCR continues to advocate with the Ministry of Health\nfor the inclusion of refugees in the national health system, including enabling access to national health\ninsurance, working towards the achievement of SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-Being). All registered\nasylum seekers and refugees have access to low-cost primary health care at the local Community\nHealth Centers (PUSKESMAS), managed by the Government of Indonesia. Individuals requiring\nemergency or advanced health treatment may be financially supported by UNHCR through our health\npartner YCWS, within the parameters of established guidelines and budgetary restrictions. UNHCR\ncoverage is limited to critical interventions, mental health services, immunization, natal care, and\n\nUNHCR / 1 November 2024 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "professions (physicians, dentists, nurses, and midwives) have opened to migrants and refugees to reduce shortages, and while the shares for all of them stand at just 0.9% compared to 1.9% for Polish citizens, the gap is actually very narrow for physicians and dentists, who constitute 0.7% of Ukrainian refugees and 0.8% of Polish citizens. In legal professions (legal counsels, barristers, notaries, and bailiffs), the gap remains wide, although in addition to occupational licensing, the likely causes may be the differences between the Polish and Ukrainian legal systems as well as new entrants’ struggles with attracting clients due to advertising restrictions. In effect, just 0.02% of Ukrainian refugees work in legal professions, compared to 0.4% of Polish citizens. There are also high contrasts across the remaining regulated professions, which employ 0.8% of Ukrainian refugees and 3.3% of Polish citizens. These are construction engineers (0.02% Ukrainian refugees), pharmacists (0.01%), and psychologists (0.09%), compared to the following shares for Polish citizens: 0.26%, 0.19%, and 0.18%, respectively.\n\n**One of the most effective forms**\n\n**of support offered to refugees**\n\n**and other immigrants in terms of**\n\n**employment and earnings to be found**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The primary data for this report come from a comprehensive 2024 socioeconomic survey conducted by UNHCR\n\nwhich recontacted households which were initially surveyed in 2019, prior to the Shona acquiring nationality. The\n\nfollow-up survey aimed to capture the transformative impact of citizenship on the Shona community in terms of\n\nemployment, education, income, and access to essential services, while also incorporating new modules on social\n\ncohesion, community engagement, and civic participation to better understand the broader integration of the Shona\n\ninto Kenyan society. The 2024 survey provides rich insights into the Shona’s post-citizenship journey and the\n\nchallenges and opportunities they face as newly recognized citizens of Kenya.\n\nThe findings are complemented by the 2019 household survey of the Shona community, conducted jointly by\n\nUNHCR and the World Bank [[8]] establishing a baseline of the Shona community’s socioeconomic conditions while\n\nthey were still stateless. This study revealed significant disparities in access to services and opportunities compared\n\nto Kenyan nationals, highlighting the detrimental effects of statelessness on employment, financial inclusion, and\n\neducational attainment. These findings informed policy recommendations that ultimately contributed to the\n\nrecognition of the Shona as Kenyan citizens in 2020-21, providing a crucial foundation for evaluating their post\ncitizenship outcomes.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2019 household survey of the Shona community"}, {"text": "2024 socioeconomic survey"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 socioeconomic survey", "confidence": 0.8890695571899414}, {"text": "2019 household survey", "confidence": 0.8693056106567383}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2019 household survey of the Shona community", "confidence": 0.10240264981985092}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Mobile network operators still accept refugee identity cards issued by CNARR as valid proof of identity.\nRefugees without an identity card must still be vouched for by those who possess one to enable SIM card\nregistration. Through their phone numbers, refugees have access to payment and money transfer facilities\noffered by telecommunications operators. Asylum-seekers still do not have the right to acquire a SIM card\nwith the asylum-seeker certificate.\n\n10 R E F U G E E P O L I C Y R E V I E W F R A M E W O R K > **R E P U B L I C O F C H A D**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "asylum-seeker certificate", "confidence": 0.11316899955272675}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In the absence of comprehensive national refugee laws and national RSD processes, UNHCR\nundertakes refugee status determination (RSD) in Indonesia. As asylum-seekers have access to the\nsame rights and services as refugees in Indonesia, UNHCR uses RSD strategically for individuals with\nan immediate third country solution which requires refugee recognition (resettlement and some\ncomplementary pathways), cases with heightened protection concerns, and cases presenting with\nissues that need to be clarified through the RSD process. UNHCR also conducts RSD as part of its\nemergency response in the context of boat arrivals to identify those in need of international\nprotection.\n\n### **Child Protection**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Gender disparities are also evident in labor force metrics. The labor force participation rate [19] for women is notably lower at 59% compared to 71% for men. Furthermore, 35% of women not in the labor force cite household responsibilities as their primary engagement, a stark contrast to the 6% reported by men. Although the difference in the unemployment rate is less significant, a gender gap is still discernible – this indicator stands at 15% for women versus 12% for men.\n\n### **Methodology**\n\nEach country adopted a unique sampling approach to their respective surveys, dependent on factors such as the availability of sampling frames and information regarding population distribution by\n\n---\n[19] Also defined here for the 15+ age group", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "occupations and perform the same tasks, the native workers do not change their occupations and tasks, while firms do not adjust (at least in the short term).\nIn effect, immigrants grow output, but slightly lower wages. This is the case in the modelling performed (Chapter 3), as well as in the NBP general equilibrium modelling exercise for the pre-2022 Ukrainian workers 2013-2018 performed by Gradzewicz, Jabłonowski, Sasiela, and Żółkiewski (2021). Conversely, Peri (2014) surveys 270 econometric estimates from 27 studies published over the 1982-2013 period on the impact of immigration on native wages. He shows that effects for a very large immigrant inflow of 10 percentage points (five-times larger than the refugees from Ukraine share in Poland) on native wages range from -1% to +1%, with most estimates clustered around zero, from -0.1% to +0.1%. Similarly, Gromadzki and Lewandowski (2023) examine econometrically the monthly impact of refugees from Ukraine inflow from January", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "NBP general equilibrium modelling exercise", "confidence": 0.3645564019680023}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "270 econometric estimates from 27 studies", "confidence": 0.23876038193702698}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**General SRH Services Access**\nAcknowledging that 63% of the Ukrainian refugees are women and girls, with 34% of the total refugee population being women in reproductive age between 15- 49 of age, the survey added a focus to explore access and barriers to sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services for women. SRH services include family planning; prenatal and postnatal care, safe delivery including Emergency Obstetric and Newborn Care (EmONC); clinical management of rape; prevention, detection and treatment of reproductive tract infections, sexually transmitted infections and HIV; and referrals to higher level obstetric care or specialized SRH services.\n\nAcross the region, 5% of women reported to have faced barriers in accessing SRH services, though access level varies by country. In Latvia and Bulgaria, only 1 % and 2% of women respectively reported barriers, indicating good access to SRH services. However, in Lithuania and Romania 9% and 6% of women respectively reported barriers in accessing SRH services.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey", "confidence": 0.10810508579015732}]}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n# Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS)\n\n### **Reported mental** **health and** **psychosocial** **problems**\n\nRegionally, 23% of individuals reported experiencing mental health and psychosocial problems that affect their daily functioning, with 36% of households reporting at least one member affected. This is an increase compared to 2023, when 19% of individuals and 30% of households reported mental health and psychosocial problems. There are notable regional variations in reported MHPSS needs, with the percentage of individuals with such needs ranging between 13% (Czechia) and 33% (Romania). In 2023, Czechia also had the lowest and Romania the highest percentage of mental health or psychosocial problems on individual and household level. Stigma surrounding the disclosure of mental health challenges within the Ukrainian community likely means that the actual prevalence of mental health and psychosocial problems may be underreported.\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS EXPERIENCING MENTAL HEALTH OR**\n\n**PSYCHOSOCIAL PROBLEMS BY COUNTRY**\n\nRegional Romania Lithuania Poland Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia Estonia Moldova Latvia Czechia 23% 33% 27% 26% 25% 24% 21% 20% 18% 17% 13% (N=8,540)\n\n**% OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH AT LEAST ONE MEMBER WITH**\n\n**MENTAL HEALTH OR PSYCHOSOCIAL PROBLEMS BY YEAR**\n\n**AND COUNTRY**\n\n2023 2024 Regional Romania", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES\n\n**Living in a vulnerable household is associated with higher poverty risks**\n\nJust like last year, members of households with vulnerabilities were found to more likely be living in poverty than the general refugee population. Almost half of individuals living with an older adult (age 65+) reported an equivalized disposable income below the poverty threshold. For individuals living with household members with a disability or members with MHPSS needs [11] these rates stood at 41% and 27%, respectively. Gender of the head of household, however, was not found to have a significant impact on the poverty rate. Mixed gender (at least one male and one female head) was associated with higher income, though likely due to increased chances of multiple breadwinners being present in the household.\n\n**REFUGEE POVERTY RATES BY VULNERABILITY CHARACTERISTIC AND GENDER OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD**\n\nNo Yes Female Male Mixed Head of household gender Older adult Household (65+) present member with a disability present Source: Survey data, SAG estimates Household member with MHPSS needs present\n\n**Refugee housing expenses are on average much higher than for nationals, which implies an**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SAG estimates", "confidence": 0.1350424736738205}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Survey data, SAG estimates", "confidence": 0.1542351096868515}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.8029335141181946}]}}}
{"input": "Deloitte (2024). Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland, UNHCR Reports and Assessments, March, https://data.unhcr.org/en/ documents/details/106993 Foged, M., & Peri, G. (2016). Immigrants' effect on native workers: New analysis on longitudinal data. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 8(2), 1-34.\n\nFoged, M., Hasager, L., & Peri, G. (2024). Comparing the effects of policies for the labor market integration of refugees. Journal of Labor Economics, 42(S1), S335-S377.\n\nGromadzki, J., & Lewandowski, P. (2023). Refugees from Ukraine on the Polish labour market. Social Insurance. Theory and Practice, 155(4), 29-40.\n\nGUS (2024a). Structure of wages and salaries by occupations for October 2022, Statistical Office in Bydgoszcz, https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/labour-market/ working-employed-wages-and-salaries-cost-of-labour/structure-of-wages-andsalaries-by-occupations-for-october-2022,4,8.html GUS (2024b). Education in the school year 2023/2024 (preliminary data), Statistical Office in Gdańsk, https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/education/education/ education-in-the-school-year-20232024-preliminary-data,13,2.html Heller, B. H., & Mumma, K. S. (2023). Immigrant integration in the United States: the role of adult English language training. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 15(3), 407-437.\n\nJaumotte, M. F., Koloskova, K., & Saxena, M. S. C. (2016). Impact of migration on income levels in advanced economies. International Monetary Fund.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Education in the school year 2023/2024", "confidence": 0.18808376789093018}], "vague_data": [{"text": "longitudinal data", "confidence": 0.661832869052887}, {"text": "preliminary data", "confidence": 0.2210777997970581}]}}}
{"input": "UNHCR supports CNARR in the popularization of the asylum law and its implementing decree, including\ntowards ONAPE with the aim to develop a Memorandum of Understanding that would lift the challenges met\nby refugees while accessing the job market including in the private sector.\n\nIn the private sector, practical experience shows that some employers still hire refugees without the approval\nof ONAPE and may treat them less favorably in terms of wages and social benefits. There has been no\nlegislative or policy change regarding child labor.\n\nThere is no reliable data on the percentage of refugees employed in the formal sector.\n\nMany refugees work in the informal sector, but data on this is equally unavailable. Most refugees engage\nin independent work, particularly in agriculture, which remains the backbone of the Chadian economy.\nHowever, agricultural value chains are very weak in the country, affecting both refugees and host populations.\nThe main constraints, even more pronounced for women, relate to difficulties in accessing agricultural land,\ninfrastructure, agricultural inputs such as certified inputs, and financial services.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Woman occupation_\nEarns cash 0.90 0.059** 0.89 0.007\nWorks all year 0.88 -0.047 0.88 0.023\nNot working 0.25 -0.021 0.24 -0.015\nAgriculture 0.19 0.055 0.25 0.011\nService & sales 0.39 0.057 0.35 0.016\nProfessional 0.05 -0.028 0.04 -0.010\nManual 0.11 -0.063*** 0.12 -0.003\n\n_Note:_ Column (1) is a sample at 20 to 100 km from a nonactive mine.\nColumn (2) difference for sample at 0-20 km from an nonactive, compared with column (1)\nColumn (3) is a sample within 20 to 100 km of an active mine.\nColumn (4) difference for sample at 0-20 km of an active mine, compared with Column (3)\n\n*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Univariate regression model.\n\nAppendix Table A2 also shows selected child health outcomes as summary statistics across the\n\nfour treatment groups. We note that, once again, the sample looks quite balanced in the first\n\nthree columns, although children seem to be worse off in communities close to mines that have\n\nnot started producing, evidenced by the fact that infant mortality is 8 percent compared to 7\n\npercent farther away, and 6 percent in communities with active mines. The anthropometrics\n\nheight-for-age (stunting or chronic malnutrition), weight-for-age (wasting or acute", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "selected child health outcomes", "confidence": 0.11870872229337692}], "vague_data": [{"text": "child health outcomes", "confidence": 0.19935941696166992}]}}}
{"input": "**The Shona originally came from Zimbabwe and migrated to Kenya as missionaries majorly between the 1950s and**\n\n**1970s, settling in the Greater Nairobi area.** According to community elders, the Shona were issued certificates of\n\nregistration under the Alien Restriction Act upon arrival. However, a change in the Registration of Persons Act of\n\n1978 prevented them from accessing identity cards. As a result, most of those who were among the first wave of\n\narrivals do not hold valid legal identity documents. At the same time, Zimbabwe and Zambia do not consider them\n\nas nationals since many of those who were born there did not have their births registered and lost all traces of their\n\nancestry since they never returned, hence rendering them stateless. [[8]] Subsequently, they settled and assimilated\n\nwith the local Kikuyu community which welcomed them. Since their arrival, they have practiced wood carving for\n\nmen and basket weaving for women as their primary economic activity outside of preaching activities. Ten\n\nindividuals from the Shona community were granted Kenyan citizenship on 12 December 2020 and a further 1,649\n\nwere recognized as Kenyan citizens and issued with registration certificates on 29 July 2021.\n\n- **Box 1: Data Sources**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "UNHCR [1] supports the Government of Indonesia by undertaking core refugee protection functions,\nincluding registration, refugee status determination, gender-based violence prevention and response,\nchild protection, legal protection, and the pursuit of durable solutions. Approximately 48% of the\nrefugee population in Indonesia is residing in IOM-managed accommodation centers, established as\npart of the Regional Cooperation Agreement (RCA) between Indonesia, the Government of Australia,\nand IOM in 2000. 42% of the refugee population – largely those who arrived in Indonesia after 2017\n\n- are living independently and, with the exception of the most vulnerable, do not receive financial\nsupport for food, rent, and basic needs. Approximately 10% of the refugee population is comprised of\nRohingya refugees who arrived by boat in recent years and who are residing primarily in temporary\nshelters in Aceh and North Sumatra.\n\n---\n[1] The Government of Indonesia-UNHCR host country agreement has been in place since 1979.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n### **Barriers in** **accessing care**\n\nFor individuals who experienced challenges in accessing care, the main barriers were long wait times (33%), unaffordable transport costs (23%), and inability to make an appointment (21%), indicating a shift in barriers compared to 2023. With the health worker shortage in Europe long waiting times are renowned and potentially exasperated by the increase in the refugee population. Although challenges in making an appointment remain among the top three barriers, the percentage of those experiencing this difficulty has decreased to 21% from 38% in 2023, when it was the topmost challenge. For those who arrived in 2024, challenges in making an appointment remained however the top barrier (34%). This points to improvements in navigating the host country’s health systems for those who arrived before 2024, supported by the extensive information and awareness efforts of health authorities and RRP health partners. At the same time, it highlights the continuous need for information sharing to ensure effective access to care.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n# Context\n\nIn its third year, the war in Ukraine continues to have a devastating impact on the people in Ukraine and causes massive displacement of populations into the European region and beyond. As of 12 December 2024, 6.2 million refugees from Ukraine were recorded in Europe [1] . Approximately 81% of the refugees are women and children and 13% of the population is older than 60 years [2] . The refugee population includes other vulnerable groups such as persons with disabilities, stateless persons, sexual and gender diverse minorities, and ethnic minorities. In June 2024, the European Council adopted a decision to extend the European Union (EU) Temporary Protection Directive until 4 March 2026 [3], granting Ukrainian refugees in the EU access to benefits, including health.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Temporary Protection Directive", "confidence": 0.14135229587554932}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "International \r Refugee \r Law \r governs \r the \r protection \r of \r refugees, \r including \r the \r realisation\nof \r solutions \r to \r their \r plight. \r UNHCR’s \r mandate \r is \r to \r provide \r protection \r to \r refugees \r and\nseek \r durable \r solutions \r for \r them \r and \r UNHCR’s \r Statute \r and \r numerous \r Executive\nCommittee \r Conclusions \r provide \r the \r legal \r framework \r for \r its \r lead \r role \r in \r voluntary\nrepatriation \r operations [6] . \r UNHCR’s \r Statute \r provides \r for \r key \r activities \r in \r this \r regard,\nincluding \r promoting \r with \r Governments \r measures \r to \r improve \r the \r situation \r of \r refugees\nand \r to \r assist \r Governmental \r and \r other \r efforts \r to \r promote \r voluntary \r repatriation.\n\nIn \r its \r involvement \r with \r durable \r solutions \r for \r IDPs \r UNHCR \r is \r committed \r to \r contributing\nto \r an \r inter-­‐agency \r approach \r framed \r by \r the \r standards \r set \r out \r in \r the \r Guiding \r Principles\non \r Internal \r Displacement \r and \r the \r Framework \r for \r Durable \r Solutions [ \r 7] .", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Over 11,000 indigenous Venezuelans currently residing in Brazil have been identified by UNHCR\nand partners. Compared to the overall Venezuelan population, they face compounded challenges\naccessing basic rights and services, including higher rates of food insecurity (58% vs 52%), health\ncare needs (75% vs 59%) and out of school children (21% vs 15%). [3] Language barriers and limited\nformal education of adults (indigenous refugees are 5 times more likely to have no formal\neducation when compared to the general Venezuelan population in Brazil), significantly affect their\nprospects for successful integration. [4]\n\n### Protection brief in graphics\n\nPopulation category Population category\n\nBreakdown by nationality\n\n_2 World Bank and UNHCR (2021), Integration of Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants in Brazil,_\n\n_[https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/498351617118028819/pdf/Integration-of-Venezuelan-Refugees-and-Migrants-in-Brazil.pdf;](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/498351617118028819/pdf/Integration-of-Venezuelan-Refugees-and-Migrants-in-Brazil.pdf)_\n_ACNUR & Ministerio do Trabalho e Emprego (2024), Informe sobre o mercado de trabalho formal para Haitianos no Brasil,_\n_[https://www.acnur.org/br/sites/br/files/2024-11/informe-mercado-trabalho-formal-haitianos-brasil-jun-2024.pdf](https://www.acnur.org/br/sites/br/files/2024-11/informe-mercado-trabalho-formal-haitianos-brasil-jun-2024.pdf)_\n_ACNUR & Ministerio do Trabalho e Emprego (2024), Informe sobre o mercado de trabalho formal para pessoas refugiadas afegãs no Brasil_\nhttps://www.acnur.org/br/sites/br/files/2024-11/informe-mercado-trabalho-formal-pessoas-afegas-no-brasil-junho-2024.pdf\n\n---\n[3] R4V (2023), Refugee and Migrant Needs Analysis, https://rmrp.r4v.info/rmna2023/](https://rmrp.r4v.info/rmna2023/) p. 85", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Refugee and Migrant Needs Analysis"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "R4V", "confidence": 0.28334319591522217}, {"text": "Refugee and Migrant Needs Analysis", "confidence": 0.21939286589622498}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "School feeding programs are largely implemented by the World Food Programme, reaching a total of 13,000\nrefugees in 14 schools in the provinces of Lake Chad and Logone Oriental.\n\nThe Unified Social Registry (RSU), launched in 2019, has made limited progress in capacity, governance and\nfinancing, despite continuous support from WFP and NGOs.\n\n**4.4** **Protection for vulnerable groups**\n\nIn practical terms, the national protection system for the most vulnerable has not undergone any changes\nand the measures in place to support victims of human trafficking are still insufficient. This holds true for\nvictims of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and at-risk children. The national protection services aimed at\nthese vulnerable groups continue to be underdeveloped and underfunded.\n\n12 R E F U G E E P O L I C Y R E V I E W F R A M E W O R K > **R E P U B L I C O F C H A D**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Unified Social Registry (RSU)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Unified Social Registry", "confidence": 0.9245391488075256}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The number of people of working age in Poland is shrinking and is expected to keep declining. Although substantial migrations from Poland after EU accession in 2004 [19] distort population data, the domestic working age population is declining. According to the Labour Force Survey, which better accounts for emigration than the prevalent population definition, the number of Polish citizens aged 20-64 peaked in early 2010, with 23.5 million people. Since then, it has declined by 2.6 million. This trend is set to continue. According to the latest Eurostat projections, without migration, the population (counting all nationalities) aged 20-64 years would decrease by 4.8 million by 2050. [20] © UNHCR / Anna Liminowicz 19 Statistics Poland data, [https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/population/internationa-migration/information-on-the-size-and-directions-of-emigration-for-](https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/population/internationa-migration/information-on-the-size-and-directions-of-emigration-for-temporary-stay-from-poland-between-2004-2020,8,14.html)\n[temporary-stay-from-poland-between-2004-2020,8,14.html](https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/population/internationa-migration/information-on-the-size-and-directions-of-emigration-for-temporary-stay-from-poland-between-2004-2020,8,14.html)\n\n---\n[20] Eurostat data, [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/proj_23np__custom_8710248/bookmark/table?lang=en&bookmarkId=97472dd3-3dd2-](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/proj_23np__custom_8710248/bookmark/table?lang=en&bookmarkId=97472dd3-3dd2-4aca-a51f-15c98be37466)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Labour Force Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Statistics Poland data"}, {"text": "Eurostat data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Labour Force Survey", "confidence": 0.8476184010505676}, {"text": "Statistics Poland data", "confidence": 0.5557434558868408}, {"text": "Eurostat data", "confidence": 0.43892791867256165}, {"text": "Eurostat projections", "confidence": 0.3630686402320862}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "population data", "confidence": 0.11146403104066849}]}}}
{"input": "Interestingly, while women and girls and younger men and boys were more likely to access formal services than informal supports, older men (age 35 and older) were more likely to access informal supports than formal services. These results may suggest that while older men are less likely to access formal MHPSS services, perhaps due to stigma or other factors, some may turn to informal means, such as support from friends, family and spirituality.\n\n**22**\n\n60+ years old 35-59 18-34 12-17 5-11 (N=360) 28% 37% 56% 71% 71% 18% 11%\n\n### **Location of** **Received MHPSS**\n\nMHPSS services were most commonly accessed in community centres (38%), followed by online platforms (18%), reception hubs such as Blue Dots (14%), healthcare settings (13%), religious settings (11%), schools (8%), workplaces (4%), and through phone or hotlines (4%). Additionally, 11% indicated “other” locations. This distribution underscores the importance of diverse and accessible service locations to meet varied needs and preferences, leveraging both formal and informal support systems.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# **From Stateless to Citizens: the journey** **of the Shona community in Kenya**\n\nPreliminary results from a socioeconomic study on the impact of citizenship on socioeconomic and living conditions.\n\n\" _Getting a national ID has really helped me. I can now move freely without fear of getting arrested. I have access to better job_\n\n_opportunities too because of the access the ID has been able to give me. My kids can now pursue their education comfortably because_\n\n_I know I can support them with access to more work opportunities._ \" - Azariah Samuel, 27-year-old father of two during a follow-up\n\nsocioeconomic study on the Shona community in Kenya. © UNHCR/Charity Nzomo.\n\n**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "national ID", "confidence": 0.1387401819229126}]}}}
{"input": "confirmed the results found in international literature presented above. The most important result is that Ukrainian refugees who are fluent in Polish earn a net wage premium of about PLN 700 (+16% relative to refugee net median wage, PLN 1,000 gross wage) when compared to those with beginner language skills. This result is stable across different model specifications. Note that such an earnings gain would bring the median net wage of a Ukrainian refugee (estimated based on the SEIS UNHCR survey in chapter 2) from 80% to 98% of the median in the economy as a whole (or from 80% to 93% according to Ukrainian refugee’s median in the NBP’s 2024 survey), almost closing the gap to the economy as a whole in these terms. It is in fact higher than the PLN 500 median net wage premium of the pre-war Ukrainian migrants over Ukrainian refugees in the NBP (2024) survey, even though 68% of the former and only 28% of the latter said they had a high level of fluency in Polish.\n\n31", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey"}, {"text": "NBP’s 2024 survey"}, {"text": "NBP (2024) survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey", "confidence": 0.9133352637290955}, {"text": "NBP (2024) survey", "confidence": 0.5495020151138306}, {"text": "NBP’s 2024 survey", "confidence": 0.45658639073371887}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "##### **September/ October 2023 report**\n\n###### Venezuela\n\n**ProCap Senior Protection Advisor**\n\n**have provided the WASH, Shelter,**\n\n**Logistics, Health, Education, Food**\n\n**Security, Nutrition Cluster as well as**\n\n**Venezuelan Humanitarian Fund (VHF)**\n\n**partners a Protection Mainstreaming**\n\n**in-person training.** The training com\nprised a theoretical component covering i)\n\nhumanitarian and protection principles, ii)\n\nfundamental protection concepts and the\n\nrisk equation, iii) the distinction between\n\nintegrated protection and protection\n\nmainstreaming and their definitions. The\n\nsecond part involved a practical exercise\n\nwhere participants selected an activity\n\nwithin their sector, analyzed the context,\n\nidentified three primary protection risks,\n\nand applied the protection equation.\n\nThis dynamic and participative exercise\n\nallowed participants to present their\n\nactivities and benefit from constructive\n\nfeedback. Overall, the positive feedback\n\ngiven by participants shows the need to\n\n**8**\n\nstrengthen humanitarian organizations'\n\nunderstanding on Protection Main\nstreaming to guarantee the Centrality of\n\nProtection is in place in the humanitarian\n\nresponse.\n\n**X. Training on Mixed Migration**\n\n**and Durable Solutions**\n\n**A full-day training session on Mixed**\n\n**Migration and Durable Solutions took**\n\n**place on October 19th. The session**\n\n**began with a review of basic protec-**\n\n**tion concepts, followed by an analysis**\n\n**of strategies to mitigate threats and**\n\n**vulnerabilities, and enhance capabil-**\n\n**ities through practical exercises with**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Instrumental variables regressions were performed with the Two Stage Least Squares technique. In the first stage, it adjusts for the non-random distribution of Ukrainian refugees across poviats, and in the second stage, it calculates the models. These results can be interpreted causally. The two previously mentioned instruments were used and yielded statistically significant results, as well as passed statistical tests on their appropriateness for instrumenting the employment share of Ukrainian refugees.\nOne instrument is the share of Ukrainian children in Polish schools, and the other is the distribution of Ukrainian citizens across Poland in 2019, as recorded in declarations", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "distribution of Ukrainian citizens across Poland in 2019", "confidence": 0.22318190336227417}, {"text": "share of Ukrainian children in Polish schools", "confidence": 0.2160108983516693}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "by Information Management (IM) per\nsonnel in the Protection Cluster and the\n\nAreas of Responsibility. The cluster's IM\n\nautomated data transformations to con\nsolidate information for the year 2023.\n\nThe pilot phase for the migration to 345W\n\nhas concluded, and final refinements are\n\nunderway. These refinements aim to\n\nestablish a more automated process for\n\nreporting, validation, and consolidation\n\nof partners' responses.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "World Day Against Trafficking in Persons\n\n2023. The document can be downloaded\n\n[here link.](https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/publications/1586/reports/annual-report/boletin-anual-trata-de-personas-agosto-2022-agosto-2o23)\n\n**VII. Food Security and Liveli-**\n\n**hoods (FSL) and Trafficking in**\n\n**Persons (TiP)**\n\n**Under the Food Security and Live-**\n\n**lihoods (FSL) Cluster consultancy,**\n\n**research has been done to under-**\n\n**stand the connection between food**\n\n**insecurity, lack of livelihoods and**\n\n**the likelihood of being recruited into**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Ukraine Refugee Pulse, which is based on a survey carried out between October and December 2022, 40% of respondents have enough income to meet basic needs or are able to support the same lifestyle they had in Ukraine, while 60% say they do not have enough income or have to rely on savings and welfare. At the same time 62% reported staying in accommodation for which they pay themselves.\nMSNA Poland 2023 survey also shows that when asked whether they faced any challenges obtaining enough money to meet their needs, the refugees were nearly equally split (around 0.5% more reported no difficulties), with an additional 8% not knowing or refusing to answer. According to the National Bank of Poland survey carried out in November 2022, 28% of refugees said they spend less than half of their income on daily expenses, most spend between 50% and 80%, and 19% spend 80100% of their income.\n\n###### Currently between 225 and 350 thousand of refugees from Ukraine are working in Poland. The lower bound is the number from social security, while the higher bound is the product of employment rate from the surveys and working age population with PESEL numbers.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey"}, {"text": "Ukraine Refugee Pulse"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "National Bank of Poland survey"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey", "confidence": 0.8327644467353821}, {"text": "National Bank of Poland survey", "confidence": 0.8135856986045837}, {"text": "Ukraine Refugee Pulse", "confidence": 0.7806291580200195}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey carried out between October and December 2022", "confidence": 0.11706554889678955}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey", "confidence": 0.11829681694507599}]}}}
{"input": "**it on a higher growth path.** According\nto the Deloitte D.Climate model, economic impact of Ukrainian refugees amounted to a higher real GDP by 1.5% in 2022, as they initially entered the labour market.\nWith more refugees finding employment, their impact grew to 2.3% GDP in 2023, and further to 2.7% GDP in 2024. This corresponds to GDP being higher by PLN 98.7 billion in 2024. In the long term, as the refugees acquire more country-specific skills and firms invest to restore their capital-to-labour ratio, the impact will grow to 3.2% GDP by 2030. Refugees contribute to the economy by increasing the labour supply as both workers and entrepreneurs, and by boosting demand as consumers.\nThe increase in GDP is not directly proportional to the increase in population or employment. [20] On the one hand, increase in productivity further boosts the economy, on the other net benefits are lowered both due to a decrease in the capital-to-labour ratio, as well as an increase in competition in the labour market. Moreover, the increase in demand in tight labour market conditions work in the direction of higher inflation and lower price competitiveness of Polish products which decrease its overall positive impact.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "physical health of the members of the\n\ncommunity was improved thanks to the\n\nwork of PUI, which translates in the need\n\nof the PC to keep supporting partners\n\nimplementing such relevant projects in\n\ncommunities of difficult access.\n\n[Full access to the story through this link.](https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/publications/1658/reports/report/historias-de-impacto-cluster-de-proteccion-venezuela-septiembre)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The Polish government introduced a Special Act [26] that facilitated refugees’ inclusion. The work on the Act started when the activation of TPD was not certain, but later it was used for transposition of TPD. As a result, the Polish framework is very similar to the TPD, though the scope of the Act is wider than the TPD.\nHowever, it only covers those that arrived in Poland after 24th February 2022.\nThis legal framework gave access to the job market, health care and education.\nThe authorities allowed those fleeing Ukraine to access basic administrative systems like PESEL and “Trusted Profile”, and legalised residency for 18 months.\nThe government's solutions allow refugees to get a job, run a business or register as unemployed or seeking work.\nOn top of that, due to constitutional guarantee of access to education for everyone, refugee children were allowed to access schools and kindergartens.\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Chart 12.** Structure by occupational group of all employed persons and refugees from Ukraine\n\nAll employed persons Ukrainian refugees 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%\n\n**Source:** Deloitte own elaboration based on Statistics Poland and ZUS data.\n\n---\n[26] Act of March 12, 2022 on assistance to citizens of Ukraine in connection with the armed conflict on the territory of the country", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Statistics Poland"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ZUS data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ZUS data", "confidence": 0.6859102249145508}, {"text": "Statistics Poland", "confidence": 0.5342792868614197}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "As of 30 June 2023, only 1.6 per cent of Chad’s population is covered by the social protection framework,\nand the country spends 0.1 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product on social protection (excluding health\nand education expenses). After a lengthy process, the document for the new National Social Protection\nStrategy (SNPS) 2022-2026 has been finalized and is awaiting validation and signature by the transitional\ngovernment. The new SNPS spanning four years aims to gradually establish a comprehensive, effective\nand efficient social protection system that addresses financial needs, livelihood security, risk management,\nvulnerability reduction and access to basic social services for all individuals residing in Chad, including\nrefugees.\n\n**1.2** **Social cohesion**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Labor force participation [14] is almost on par with the host country weighted average for the region, with just 2 percentage points difference between the two. This is surprising, considering that the distribution of refugee household members is heavily skewed towards women and dependents.\n(73% of working age [15] individuals are female and the age dependency ratio stands at 63%, which is 10 percentage points above the regional weighted average). The most common activities reported by respondents who are out of the labor force are retirement (30%) and engagement in household responsibilities (31%). Across countries labor force participation looks uneven – it stands at a staggering 66% in Hungary (6 percentage points above the national indicator), and at just 36% in\n\n**REFUGEE HOUSEHOLD INCOME SOURCES ABOVE AND BELOW THE POVERTY LINE, %** **[1,2]**\n\nRegular employment Above the poverty line Below the poverty line Temporary work Self employment 35% Host country social protection payments 74% 12% Ukraine social protection pensions 34% Ukraine social protection other 9% 4% 6% 10% Other sources 3% 4% 7% Almost half of income of households below the poverty line depends on social protection\n\n---\n[15] In this context defined as individuals that are 15 or more years old", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "national indicator", "confidence": 0.25548630952835083}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "national indicator", "confidence": 0.14354541897773743}]}}}
{"input": "This contrasts with the government’s promotion of free land access which apply to all people involved\nin agriculture. The current arrangements have led to a seasonal migration of refugees from the camps\nto fields located in cantons up to 50 or 70 km away, where they establish temporary settlements. These\nsharecropping agreements offer the advantage of fostering close relationships between refugees,\nlandowners and entire villages, because refugees set up tents with their families throughout the growing\nseason. Furthermore, refugees often do not receive documents confirming their right to sustained access\nto the land used. Between 2020 and 2023, approximately 15,000 hectares of agricultural land have been\nmade available to refugees in Chad for exploitation purposes, under written or verbal agreements lasting\nfrom one to three years.\n\nIn the current Ministry of Social Affairs, there is still no housing assistance program for vulnerable Chadian\nnationals. Furthermore, the temporary support system for relocating populations affected by floods in the\ncapital, primarily backed by the humanitarian actors, does not extend its coverage to refugees.\n\n**3.4** **Financial and administrative services**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "main shareowner in the mine. Most of these 17 mines have foreign ownership, such as\n\nAustralian, Canadian, or South African, sometimes in partnership with Ghanaian firms or the\n\nGhanaian state. Most are open-pit mines, although a few consist of a combination of open-pit\n\nand underground operations.\n\n**Table 1 Gold Mines in Ghana**\n\n**Name** **Opening** **Closing year** **Company** **Country**\n\n**year**\n\nAhafo 2006 active Newmont Mining Corp. USA\nBibiani 1998 active Noble Mineral Resources Australia\nBogoso Prestea 1990 active Golden Star Resources USA\nChirano 2005 active Kinross Gold Canada\nDamang 1997 active Gold Fields Ghana Ltd. South Africa\nEdikan (Ayanfuri) 1994 active Perseus Mining Australia\nIduapriem 1992 active AngloGold Ashanti South Africa\nJeni (Bonte) 1998 2003 Akrokeri-Ashanti Canada\nKonongo 1990 active LionGold Corp. Singapore\nKwabeng 1990 1993 Akrokeri-Ashanti Canada\nNzema 2011 active Endeavour Canada\nObotan 1997 2001 PMI Gold Canada\nObuasi 1990 active AngloGold Ashanti South Africa\nPrestea Sankofa 1990 2001 Anglogold Ashanti South Africa\nTarkwa 1990 active Gold Fields Ghana Ltd. South Africa\nTeberebie 1990 2005 Anglogold Ashanti South Africa\nWassa 1999 active Golden Star Resources USA\n_Source:_ InterraRMG 2013.\n\n_Note:_ Active is production status as of December 2012, the last available data point.\n\n6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The overall decline in total employment from 74 percent in 2019 to 70 percent in 2024 is indicative of the sum of**\n\n**these shocks.** Although men have re-entered the labor force at a faster rate, the community as a whole is still in\n\nthe process of economic recovery. The proportion of unemployed individuals has remained relatively low,\n\nsuggesting that many are still re-entering the labor market or seeking labor market opportunities. Only 13 percent\n\nof the Shona working wage-earners have some form of employment contract, demonstrating a high prevalence of\n\ninformal work arrangements.\n\n**The increase in the number of individuals out of the labor force, especially among women, underscores the**\n\n**difficulties of returning to the labor market and securing timely employment.** The pandemic's effects have pushed\n\n**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Data Sources: proGres v4 (PRIMES) hosts the data of refugees and asylum-seekers in 11 countries. In South Africa, the data are managed by the\ngovernment. In Angola, DRC, Zambia and Zimbabwe, some portions of the data are external. For IDP data, the source of DRC’s IDP figure is the OCHA;\nthe sources in Mozambique and Zimbabwe are the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of the IOM; and the source in the Republic of Congo is the\ngovernment, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Humanitarian Action (MASAH).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "proGres v4 (PRIMES)"}, {"text": "Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "IDP data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)", "confidence": 0.6796624064445496}, {"text": "proGres v4 (PRIMES)", "confidence": 0.3988928496837616}, {"text": "OCHA", "confidence": 0.24244385957717896}, {"text": "Ministry of Social Affairs and Humanitarian Action", "confidence": 0.1396160125732422}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n### **Chronic illness and** **MHPSS**\n\nAmong individuals with chronic illnesses, 41% reported experiencing mental health and psychosocial problems in 2024 (44% of women, 36% of men), up from 33% in 2023 (36% of women, 28% of men). In contrast, only 16% of individuals without chronic illnesses reported such problems in 2024 (20% of women and 11% of men), compared to 13% in 2023 (15% of women and 9% of men). These findings reinforce the strong interplay between chronic health conditions and mental health challenges, emphasizing the need for integrated care models that holistically address both physical and mental health to provide effective and comprehensive support for those managing chronic illnesses.\n\n**26**\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WHO REPORTED EXPERIENCING**\n\n**A MENTAL HEALTH OR PSYCHOSOCIAL PROBLEM BY**\n\n**CHRONIC ILLNESS STATUS AND COUNTRY**\n\nWith chronic illness Without chronic illness Regional Romania Hungary Lithuania Poland Bulgaria Latvia Slovakia Estonia Czechia Moldova (N=17,867)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Migrants dispersed to weaker labour markets experience poorer inclusion outcomes in subsequent years, and vice versa. These outcomes can pertain to employment, earnings, or human capital accumulation, and have been shown in Denmark (Foged, Hasager, and Peri, 2022; Azlor, Damm, and Schiltz-Nielsen, 2020), Germany (Aksoy, Giray, Poutvaara, and Schikora, 2020), Norway (Godøy, 2017), Sweden (Åslund, Östh, and Zenou, 2010; Åslund and Rooth, 2007), and Switzerland (Müller, Pannatier, and Viarengo, 2022), as well as the previously described crosscountry study. This could in principle stem from scarring on an individual level from weak initial opportunities, or persistently weak local labour market combined with imperfect geographic mobility. The effects are hard to disentangle, while Åslund and Rooth (2007) find some indication that both phenomena are at play, Godøy (2017) finds evidence only for persistently weak local labour markets.\n\n##### Migrants and refugees dispersed away from ethnic enclaves experience weaker labour market inclusion outcomes, and vice versa.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "crosscountry study", "confidence": 0.10736894607543945}], "vague_data": [{"text": "crosscountry study", "confidence": 0.6015691757202148}]}}}
{"input": "Given that the refugee population is up to three or four times larger than the local population in certain\nareas hosting refugees, mainly in Eastern Chad, there is an increased risk of tensions due to already limited\nresources. Nevertheless, on a broader scale and across the entire territory, refugees continue to peacefully\ncoexist with the local population, facilitated by strong ethnic and cultural bonds, along with shared common\ntraditions. Mixed committees, comprising both refugees and members of the host community, remain active\nin all refugee camps and sites. Their objective is to promote peaceful coexistence and proactively address\nconflicts. Women continue to play a crucial role in conveying messages of peace and social cohesion,\ncontributing significantly to dispute resolution efforts.\n\n**1.3** **Environmental management**\n\nThere has been no significant change in national environmental protection and resource management\npolicies. The existing policies continue to lack clarity concerning their application to refugees and/or host\ncommunities.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "prominent in refugee households in terms of poverty and employment. The same holds true for households that contain members with disabilities. It is somewhat encouraging that the share of refugee youth (age 15 to 24) not engaged in employment, education or training stands at just 14% (18% if distance learning is excluded), which is in line with host country national indicators.\n\n**Based on the above findings it is recommended**\n\n**that:**\n\n- Any transitions from subsidized accommodations\nare handled with extreme care. Almost 20% of all refugee households depend on this aid to stay out of poverty\n\n- Labor market inclusion efforts continue and\ninterventions target the removal of the most commonly reported barriers (local language proficiency, lack of decent work opportunities, a mismatch in skills).\n\n- A special focus is put on addressing the needs of\nfemale only led households or members with disabilities. Both groups are more likely to find themselves below the poverty line.\n\n# 50% 74% 14%\n\nof refugees from Ukraine find themselves of all refugee households income above\n\n**below the poverty line** [4] based on the poverty line **comes from regular work**\nreported income - this figure stands at 35% for households\n\n---\n[4] Defined as 50% of the median equivalized income in the host country", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "host country national indicators", "confidence": 0.16827884316444397}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "host country national indicators", "confidence": 0.29803115129470825}], "vague_data": [{"text": "host country national indicators", "confidence": 0.3330002725124359}]}}}
{"input": "towards higher-paid occupational groups.\nThe share of Poles in the two lowest salary brackets (earning less than gross PLN 4,000 and PLN 4,000-6,000 in 2022) decreased by 0.4 and 1.8 percentage points, respectively, while the subsequent higher salary brackets increased by\n1.4 pp. (PLN 6,000-8,000), 0.6 pp.\n(PLN 8,000-10,000), and 0.3 pp. (above PLN 10,000) (see Chart 30).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland © UNHCR / Anna Liminowicz Dispersing refugees to weaker labour markets can also have negative social outcomes. Albarosa and Elsner (2022) report more anti-immigrant incidents during the European refugee crisis (2015/2016) in areas of Germany with high unemployment rates and shares of right-wing voters. Damm and Dustmann (2014) show that immigrant men dispersed to areas of Denmark with more convicted criminals, experience higher future crime conviction probabilities, but not overall neighbourhood crime rate.\n\nThe estimated employment rate of refugees from Ukraine in Poland is above 60% and was among the highest in the OECD [27] .\nAlthough there is uncertainty around employment rate in different countries due to uncertainty regarding refugee numbers while MSNA Poland 2023 gives a slightly lower figure of 61%. In comparison, the employment rate equalled 61% in the United", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023", "confidence": 0.6681502461433411}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "REGIONAL BUREAU FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA\n\n**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO REFUGEES SITUATION**\n\nAs of 3 0 September 2022\n\n**Author: UNHCR DIMA - RSA** Contact : rsarbdima@unhcr.org **Source:** UNHCR Primes, Government, UNHCR", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Primes", "confidence": 0.90605229139328}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Poland 2023 assess that around 56% [23] of refugee arrivals had completed higher education. This means that Ukrainians with higher education were more likely to relocate to Poland or leave Ukraine in general, having the necessary means to achieve this. On average refugees with a bachelor’s degree or higher had an over 30% higher employment rate than peers without a degree, according to MSNA Poland 2023 survey.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey", "confidence": 0.9386496543884277}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Table 12 shows that log annual wages are higher close to mines (column 1), and that most of\n\nthe increase is driven by the increase in wage rates for women (column 2). Women, however,\n\nhave lower wages before the mine, and a smaller share of women earn wages. Globally, it is\n\nconsidered that the historic expansion in service sector employment (which in this context\n\nincreased significantly within 10 km) has played a pivotal role in reducing the gender wage and\n\nhour gap (Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017).\n\n31", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "UNHCR \r first \r established \r an \r operational \r presence \r in \r South-­‐Eastern \r Myanmar \r in \r 2004\nwith \r the \r objective \r of \r assisting \r communities \r affected \r by \r armed \r conflict \r in \r Kayin \r and \r Mon\nStates \r and \r in \r Tanintaryi \r Region. \r Between \r 2004 \r and \r 2012, \r UNHCR, \r in \r partnership \r with\nlocal \r and \r international \r organizations, \r has \r delivered \r over \r 3,000 \r humanitarian \r projects \r to\nensure \r that \r displaced \r and \r host \r families \r in \r affected \r areas \r have \r access \r to \r proper\nsanitation, \r primary \r health \r care \r facilities, \r safe \r and \r clean \r water, \r livelihood \r activities \r and\nother \r training \r including \r technical \r support \r to \r community \r management \r capacities,\nparticularly \r in \r relation \r to \r small \r infrastructure \r management.\n\nUNHCR \r also \r undertakes \r protection \r assessment, \r legal \r awareness \r training, \r and \r provides\nassistance \r to \r extremely \r vulnerable \r individuals \r (including \r land \r mine \r victims \r and\nsurvivors \r of \r sexual \r and \r gender-­‐based \r violence). \r The \r extent \r and \r capacity \r of \r protection\nmonitoring \r and \r referral \r networks \r in \r the \r South-­‐East \r nonetheless \r remain \r extremely\nlimited.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "politicians that have been linked to mining activities in other countries such as Peru\n\n(Maldonado, 2017) and India (Asher and Novosad, 2018), such as clientelism, corruption and\n\nreelection of local politicians were not analyzed within the context of Ghana. We encourage\n\nfuture analysis along similar lines.\n\nA few caveats should be noted. As the gold mining industry in Ghana matures further, it will\n\nbe important to determine the long sustainability of these economic effects. This paper does not\n\ntease out the effect of mine closure on local socio-economic conditions, an aspect that warrants\n\nfuture focus. Moreover, lack of clearly estimated effects both in the individual level and district\n\nlevel analysis could stem from limited sample sizes. We encourage future analysis to use more\n\nrounds of data to ensure consistent results. Lastly, for the health and employment effects that\n\nwe observe, we cannot determine if they stem from changes in the market-based economy, from\n\ncorporate social responsibility policies or public spending. Future studies should try to carefully\n\ndisentangle the mechanisms at play.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n# **2.** Situation of refugees from Ukraine on the labour market in Poland\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Chart 7.** Unemployment rate\n\n12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0%\n\n**Source:** Harmonized data, Eurostat, [Statistics | Eurostat (europa.eu)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/une_rt_m/default/table?lang=en)\n\n##### Refugees from Ukraine fit well into the needs of the Polish labour market.\n\nUkrainians arrived on a labour market that structurally needs more workers, as the domestic population is ageing rapidly, while the economy is growing. High levels of education, cultural proximity and previous connections to Poland helped refugees adapt to the labour market. Furthermore, Poland made an important and strategic policy decision by promptly opening the labour market and supporting their inclusion.\n\n16 17\n\n**Chart 6.** Working age population with Polish citizenship (20-64 years old)\n\n25 24 23 22 21 20", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Harmonized data, Eurostat"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Harmonized data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Harmonized data", "confidence": 0.27101147174835205}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "UNHCR and partners provide case management assistance to support children who are\nunaccompanied or separated from traditional caregivers or who are suffering from violence,\nexploitation, and neglect. UNHCR works with partners, including government partners, to assist\nchildren with heightened protection needs by providing legal assistance, safety and security, and\npsychological and health interventions as needed. UNHCR works with YCWS, our implementing\npartner, to provide assistance to unaccompanied children (UAC) in a Semi-Independent Living Care\nArrangement (SILCA) through which UAC are accommodated in a rented room and their basic needs\nare covered. In response to the emergency situation in Aceh, UNHCR is undertaking Best Interest\nAssessments (BIA) for the large number of UAC, child spouses, and other children at risk to better\nunderstand their needs and determine a protection approach that best addresses those needs.\n\n### **Gender-Based Violence (GBV)**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## **NAVIGATING HEALTH** **AND WELL-BEING** **CHALLENGES FOR** **REFUGEES FROM** **UKRAINE**\n\n#### An Inter-Agency Exploration of Data 2nd edition January 2025", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Average monthly gross earnings in enterprise sector in poviat of employment in 2022**\n\nNatives and other immigrants 36 Note that these percentages are only indicative, as Ukrainian refugee educational attainment is assumed on the basis of November 2022 NBP (2023) survey for 18+ age group and July-August 2023 UNHCR (2023) survey for 15+ age group, while the general population is taken from the 2022 Labour Force Survey for 15-74 (broadest available) age group, and earnings by educational attainment are taken from the GUS (2022) “Structure of wages and salaries by occupations in October 2020”.\n37 Note that the numbers of Ukrainian refugees and all workers numbers by poviats are taken from ZUS Statistical Portal on 30th September 2023 from the universe of workers registered for social security (this does not cover the informal sector and some jobs that do not require social security). Ukrainian refugees are identified by PESEL UKR. Salaries and wages are taken from Statistics Poland BDL GUS database for 2022, but cover only the enterprise sector (firms with 10 or more employees).\n38 Note that there is no publicly available administrative data on the sectoral distribution of Ukrainian refugees. We proxied their sectors by taking the difference in workers with Ukrainian citizenship registered for social security between H1 2023 and end of 2021 in A-Q 1-letter NACE sections. For the general population we used employment in the 15+ age group in Q2 2023 from the Eurostat Labour Force Survey. Earnings by NACE section have been taken from Statistics Poland Statistical Bulletin wages and salaries for the enterprise sector and public sector in Q2 2023.\n39 Note that Ukrainian refugees have been allocated to firm sizes based on the July-August 2023 UNHCR (2023) survey, while general workers from the GUS (2023) “Employment in the national economy in 2022”. Productivity of firms by size is based on gross value added per person employed in industry, construction, and market services sectors (broadest available) in 2021 from Eurostat Structural Business Statistics.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2022 Labour Force Survey"}, {"text": "Statistics Poland BDL GUS database for 2022"}, {"text": "Eurostat Labour Force Survey"}, {"text": "Eurostat Structural Business Statistics"}, {"text": "July-August 2023 UNHCR (2023) survey"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "November 2022 NBP (2023) survey"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Eurostat Labour Force Survey", "confidence": 0.8525090217590332}, {"text": "2022 Labour Force Survey", "confidence": 0.8029831647872925}, {"text": "Statistics Poland BDL GUS database", "confidence": 0.7468845844268799}, {"text": "ZUS Statistical Portal", "confidence": 0.7177774906158447}, {"text": "Eurostat Structural Business Statistics", "confidence": 0.6618298292160034}, {"text": "November 2022 NBP (2023) survey", "confidence": 0.49726080894470215}, {"text": "July-August 2023 UNHCR (2023) survey", "confidence": 0.47731587290763855}, {"text": "PESEL UKR", "confidence": 0.12985213100910187}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Population Data Analysis – September 2022\n\nOverview\n\nAs of the end of September 2022, Southern Africa hosts around **8.6 million persons of concern (PoCs) to UNHCR** .\nThis includes 1.1 million refugees and asylum-seekers and 6.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as\nothers of concern, refugee returnees and IDP returnees. **The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) represents 77**\n\n**per cent of the regional data.**\n\nRefugees, Asylum-Seekers and Others of concern\n\nThe region hosts **785,000 refugees, 278,000**\n\n**asylum-seekers** **and** **36,000** **others** **of**\n\n**concern** . Among those 1.1 million PoCs, 74 per\ncent of them are from the countries outside of\nthe Southern Africa region. [1] The top five\ncountries of origin are Central African Republic\n(243,000), Rwanda (242,000), DRC (228,000),\nBurundi (84,000) and Ethiopia (61,000).\n\nInternally Displaced Persons\n(IDPs)\n\nIn Southern Africa, there are **6.9 million**\n\n**internally displaced persons (IDPs)** . Most of\nthem are conflict-induced, 6.4 million, but there\nare also natural disaster-induced IDPs, 0.5\nmillion. The data on IDPs are reported in DRC,\nCongo, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (see\nFigure 1).\n\nDurable Solutions\n\nFigure 1. Number of IDPs in RBSA by Cause as of 30 September 2022\n\n---\n[1] The Southern Africa region refers to the 16 countries covered by the Regional Bureau for Southern Africa of UNHCR including Angola,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data on IDPs", "confidence": 0.4639227092266083}], "vague_data": [{"text": "data on IDPs", "confidence": 0.13962320983409882}]}}}
{"input": "active*mine -0.086*** -0.055** 3.705 -0.058 -0.032 0.125**\n(0.025) (0.025) (2.898) (0.086) (0.032) (0.051)\n\nMean dep var 0.715 0.705 45.71 0.491 0.259 0.028\n\n_Note:_ The table uses GLSS data for Ghana for the survey years 1998, 2005, 2012. The sample is restricted to\nwomen and men aged 15–49. Robust standard errors clustered at the village or neighborhood level in parentheses\n(except if otherwise stated). All regressions control for year and district fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years\nof education. Active is active status of mine in the survey year. The treatment distance is defined to 20 km. Rows\n2 drop sample between 20 to 40 km of a mine, and rows 3 drop sample that was surveyed two years before mine\nopening. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. FE = fixed effects.\n\n30", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS data", "confidence": 0.8329868316650391}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF HOUSING SUPPORT AND EMPLOYMENT FACILITATION IN ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE requirements and differences in location-specific regulations. On the other hand, individuals with experience in construction found it easier to secure employment in the same sector, with an unemployment rate at just 5%. Lower language requirements and fewer issues with skill recognition are likely to be the main reasons. This possibly explains why 53% of former construction sector employees from Ukraine were able to find work in the same sector.\n\n**REFUGEE EMPLOYMENT TRANSITION MAP FOR SELECTED SECTORS**\n\nPast sector of employment in Ukraine Current sector of employment in Host country Education and support service activities Construction\n\n**Accounting for those engaged in Ukrainian**\n\n**distance learning, the share of youth not in**\n\n**employment, education or training for refugees**\n\n**from Ukraine is comparable to that of host**\n\n**countries**\nIf distance learning, which follows the Ukrainian curriculum, is taken into account, the share of young Ukrainians (aged 15 to 24) who are not engaged in employment, education, or training (NEET) stands at 14% [16] across the region, which is fully in line with the Other No longer employed Construction Education Administrative and support service activities\n\n---\n[16] Likely to be a bit overstated, as the survey did not inquire about activities of 15-year-olds outside of school enrollment. Also,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "REFUGEE EMPLOYMENT TRANSITION MAP", "confidence": 0.22701086103916168}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "statistics for the women’s surveys across four different groups, close and far away, and before\n\nand during the mine’s production phase. Columns 1 and 3 show mean values of the population\n\nthat live far away from mines, before and during mining respectively. Columns 2 and 4, in\n\n14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "the women’s surveys"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "women’s surveys", "confidence": 0.12375983595848083}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "women’s surveys", "confidence": 0.3641827702522278}]}}}
{"input": "**ing grounds for the next months**\n\n**have been set.** Further, meetings have\n\nbeen held with the 6 subnational Pro\ntection Clusters in Zulia, Táchira, Apure,\n\nAmazonas, Barinas, and Bolivar. Coor\ndination with these coordinators will be\n\nstrengthened to assure decision taking\n\nis guaranteed also from the field, and\n\ntheir support in the implementation of\n\nthe extended OCHA Local Coordination", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE stigma limiting help-seeking behaviors among adult men. Conversely, for children aged 5–11, caregivers sought support for 76% of boys and 64% of girls.\nThese findings highlight the complex interplay of gender and societal norms in influencing helpseeking behaviours, warranting further investigation.\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WHO TRIED TO ACCESS MENTAL**\n\n**HEALTH SUPPORT BY AGE AND GENDER**\n\nFemale Male work arrangements). These informal mechanisms, while less structured, complement formal services by fostering emotional connection and practical assistance through personal relationships and community networks.\n\n**TYPE OF MENTAL HEALTH AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT**\n\n**RECEIVED BY GENDER**\n\nFemale Male Psychotherapy/counseling Support from family or friends Creative psychosocial activities Structured wellbeing intervention Spiritual support Psychiatry/medication management School-based services Workplace support Other Messaging materials Caregiver training (N=1,715) 5-11 12-17 18-34 35-59 60+ years old (N=4,052)\n\n### **Types of Support**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "##### 4. Ukrainian refugees’ skill-job mismatch\b 26 4.1 Over-qualification\b 27 4.2 Access to regulated professions\b 29 4.3 Language wage premium\b 31 4.4 Persons not previously in employment\b 34 4.5 Recommendations\b 35 Appendix: Modelling strategy\b 36 Glossary                                                      44 List of charts and tables\b 45 Literature\b 46\n\n02 Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "##### **September/ October 2023 report**\n\n###### Venezuela\n\n**Protection Cluster September/ October 2023 activity report**\n\nThis report has been prepared by the Protection Cluster in Venezuela\n\n_Cover photo: © UNHCR / Kimberly Sarkis (2023)_\n\nThe Protection Cluster is a broad-based participatory forum of protection partners which brings\ntogether United Nations agencies, human rights and development organisations and actors, as well\nas local and international non-governmental organisations. The Protection Cluster is led by UNHCR.\n\nAll our information products, including reports, maps and factsheets are available on the Venezuela\n\nProtection Cluster website:\n[https://ven.protectioncluster.org](https://ven.protectioncluster.org)\n\nContacts:\n\nProtection Cluster Coordinator, **Alice Contini**, continia@unhcr.org\n\nProtection Associate, **Patricia Bosco**, boscoleo@unhcr.org\nCounter-Trafficking in Crisis Specialist, **Norma Ferrer**, noferrer@iom.int\n\nProtection Assistant, **Kimberly Sarkis**, sarkisne@unhcr.org\nProtection Specialist, **Giuliana Inturrisi**, giuliana.inturrisi@drc.ngo\n\n**2**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "boosts the economic impact of Ukrainian refugees. To arrive at results that would be comparable to the previous report, economic impact has been additionally simulated in a scenario without the productivity shock. This brought the results down to 1.3% GDP in 2024, which is in line with the Deloitte (2024) most optimistic of the four outlined scenarios of 1.1% GDP in 2023 and 1.4% GDP in the long term. [21] The Ukrainian refugees and the economy turned out to have adapted better than expected last year. Moreover, the fact that the previously modelled mild adverse effects on the labour market have not materialized reflects a stronger increase in labour productivity than was assumed. As a result, the positive impact of Ukrainian refugees on the economy is greater than previously expected.\n\n**As Ukrainian refugees entered the**\n\n**labour market, the economy adapted,**\n\n**resulting in more specialization and**\n\n---\n[21] Full results of a modelling scenario with no shock to productivity are available in the Online Technical Appendix.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The recommendations drawn from this analysis focus on addressing the health and mental health and psychosocial needs and barriers identified in the SEIS, tailoring them to the specific data and context of each country. To enhance policy development, it will be crucial to improve monitoring of refugees’ health, including sexual and reproductive health and mental health, through inclusion of disaggregated refugee data into national data systems. This will require effective collaboration among health organizations, statistical offices, and partners. Addressing capacity issues in national health systems, such as workforce shortages and long wait times, can be supported through telemedicine and temporarily integrating Ukrainian healthcare workers. Refugees with chronic illnesses and disabilities require targeted interventions to meet their health and MHPSS needs, including through health financing mechanisms. Continued efforts are also required to address persistent access barriers through contextspecific strategies, including providing refugees with information on navigating health systems and preventive health services such as vaccination.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "the SEIS"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "disaggregated refugee data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS", "confidence": 0.4173351228237152}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "disaggregated refugee data", "confidence": 0.3094612658023834}], "vague_data": [{"text": "disaggregated refugee data", "confidence": 0.40194037556648254}]}}}
{"input": "Among the 5% who reported access constraints, the primary barrier to accessing SRH services was long waiting times, affecting 33%. Financial barriers also posed challenges, with 23% of women reporting difficulties covering transportation costs, 19% struggling with clinic fees, and 12% with hospital fees. Additionally, 21% lacked knowledge of where to access SRH care and 19% were unable to make appointments, reflecting both informational and administrative barriers to SRH services.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Activities \r – \r whether \r delivered \r by \r UNHCR \r or \r partners-­‐ \r should \r be \r conflict-­‐sensitive \r and\naddress \r key \r issues \r of \r concern \r of \r both \r returning \r refugees \r and \r IDPs \r and \r their\ncommunities. \r A \r community-­‐based \r programme \r that \r builds \r on \r existing \r systems \r and\nstructures \r and \r supports \r local \r development \r plans \r should \r be \r planned \r and \r implemented\nbased \r upon \r comprehensive \r needs \r assessments \r and \r consultations \r with \r the \r populations\nconcerned \r as \r well \r as \r government \r and \r non-­‐government \r actors.\n\nActivities \r and \r project \r delivery \r should \r be \r flexible \r and \r context-­‐specific \r so \r as \r to\naccommodate \r complexities \r and \r respond \r to \r any \r changes \r that \r may \r occur \r throughout \r the\nprocess. \r Activities \r range \r from \r food \r assistance \r to \r essential \r health \r care \r facilities \r and\nservices, \r primary \r and \r secondary \r education \r support, \r and \r community-­‐level \r infrastructure\nrehabilitation \r or \r construction \r and \r livelihoods. \r Livelihood \r opportunities \r will \r be \r a \r key\ncomponent \r in \r ensuring \r the \r sustainability \r of \r the \r reintegration \r process \r and \r cash \r and\nvoucher \r modalities \r to \r boost \r the \r local \r economy \r should \r be \r actively \r considered \r where\nthese \r are \r appropriate \r and \r effective \r ways \r of \r meeting \r identified \r needs.\n\nUNHCR \r will \r seek \r innovative \r solutions, \r in \r particular \r for \r self-­‐reliance, \r education, \r shelter,\nand \r domestic \r energy \r solutions. \r Poverty \r graduation \r models \r will \r be \r explored, \r combining\nrelief \r assistance \r with \r capacity \r building \r measures, \r to \r enable \r the \r poorest \r individuals \r and\nhouseholds \r to \r move \r out \r of \r poverty.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "### **Improved Protection Environment**\n\nWhile it is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention, Indonesia generally respects international and\ndomestic refugee law, particularly the principle of non-refoulement, and has demonstrated critical\nhumanitarian leadership in the region by consistently stepping forward to disembark boats carrying\nRohingya refugees. 2024 and 2025 present important opportunities to further advance the protection\nenvironment in the country, including the planned revision of a key domestic refugee law and the new\npolicies and priorities of recently elected national leaders.\n\nThe National Refugee Taskforce has initiated inter-ministry discussions on the revision of Presidential\nRegulation 125 of 2016. This Regulation provides the foundation for ensuring access to asylum and\nassigns UNHCR a key role in the management of asylum claims and solutions. UNHCR’s\nrecommendations for consideration in the revision have focused on the need for clarifying and\nexpanding the decree’s scope to ensure a strong refugee protection framework in Indonesia, including\nprotection safeguards that ensure entry to safe territory through channels other than the sea;\nincreasing joint activities with the Government, particularly in registration and documentation; and\nadvancing inclusion efforts in the country.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Kingdom, 56% in Sweden, 53% in Lithuania and 51% in the Czech Republic. The estimate for Poland was based on November 2022 National Bank of Poland survey data.\nThis relatively high value is supported by a UNHCR Assessment from 2nd November, in which survey results show that 72% of refugees are in the labour force, with 61% employed and 11% unemployed.\nThe most refugees are employed in manufacturing – 14%, accommodation and food service – 12%, and trade and repair – 6%. 89% of the survey respondents were women [29] .\n\n27 Deloitte elaboration based on the aggregation in OECD International Migration Outlook 2023 28 After the closing date for our report, NBP (2024) published new data, showing a slight drop in Ukrainian refugees employment rate to 62% that does not change our general conclusions.\n\n---\n[29] UNHCR Multi Sectorial Needs Assessment October 2023", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "November 2022 National Bank of Poland survey data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "OECD International Migration Outlook 2023", "confidence": 0.4092223346233368}, {"text": "UNHCR Assessment", "confidence": 0.36936280131340027}, {"text": "National Bank of Poland survey data", "confidence": 0.276572048664093}, {"text": "UNHCR Multi Sectorial Needs Assessment", "confidence": 0.21481318771839142}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "November 2022 National Bank of Poland survey data", "confidence": 0.12863047420978546}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF HOUSING SUPPORT AND EMPLOYMENT FACILITATION IN ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE Bulgaria (20 percentage points below the domestic figure). While differences in the typical household composition do explain some of the variation Bulgaria, for instance, has the largest share of retirees - the local context probably plays a more substantial role.\n\n**LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION BY COUNTRY (AGE 15+), %** **[1]**\n\nHost country Ukraine refugees\n\n**UNEMPLOYMENT: REFUGEE POPLUATION VERSUS HOST**\n\n**COUNTRY, %** **[1]**\n\nHost country Ukraine refugees Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia Region\n\n1. Host country data based on indicators reported by the [ILO for 2022](https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/)\n\n**TOP EMPLOYMENT BARRIERS REPORTED BY UNEMPLOYED**\n\n**REFUGEES, % OF RESPONDENTS** **[1]**\n\nMoldova Bulgaria Romania Slovakia Poland Czechia Hungary Region\n\n1. Host country data based on indicators reported by the World Bank\n[(modeled ILO estimates for 2023)](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.ZS)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "indicators reported by the World Bank"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "indicators reported by the World Bank", "confidence": 0.6297946572303772}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "percent reported an increase, and 12 percent experienced a decrease since December 2020. This distribution\n\nsuggests that while citizenship has had a stabilizing effect for many households, it has not yet resulted in broad\nbased economic gains. However, the increase in income for nearly 4 out of every 10 households is a positive sign\n\nof economic progress and potential for further growth as the community continues to integrate more fully into the\n\nKenyan economy.\n\n**[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/)** 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The newly enacted asylum legislation does not include a specific legal provision governing access to financial\nservices nor access to administrative documents and certifications, including recognition of educational\nattainments received outside of the national system. However, within the context of local integration and\nself-reliance, Article 61 of the [2023 Decree](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf) outlines that the Government of Chad prioritizes actions for\nrefugees, among others, to access credits, microcredits and subsidies, as well as to obtain the recognition\nof documents issued by competent authorities.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**benefits.** Although the employment rate\nof Ukrainian refugees in Poland is already high when compared to other countries, there is still room for improvement.\nIncreasing the employment of refugees by 15 thousand people, which would close half of the gap between the employment rate of refugees and Poles, would yield at least PLN 1 billion of value added in the economy. This calculation is made under an assumption that those newly hired would be paid minimum wage and should be considered a lower-bound estimate, as it understates potential benefits. In part, the higher productivity of workers might boost the profits for employers, further enhanced by increased investment.\n\n#### **4.4 Persons not previously in employment**\n\n**Employment rates among Ukrainian**\n\n**refugees are exceptionally high, with**\n\n**only a minority requiring targeted**\n\n**assistance to enter the labour market,**\n\n**in particular those who were not**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "3% 2% 1% 0% 4000 10% 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% 4000 Ukrainian refugee educational attainment implies from 18% (assuming refugees’ educational attainment from November 2022 survey) to 19% (July-August 2023) higher earnings than the general population. [36] Poviat-level geographical distribution of Ukrainian refugees is more concentrated in high productivity agglomerations, implying 7% higher earnings than for other workers registered for social security. [37] There is no publicly available hard data on the sectoral distribution of Ukrainian refugees, which we proxy by the growth in employees with Ukrainian citizenship registered for social security since the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine (unfortunately this to some extent will be Ukrainian workers previously present in Poland who changed jobs) – this imperfect proxy implies 7% lower earnings than general workers. [38] Smaller firm sizes of employers of Ukrainian refugees imply their 8% lower productivity (and thus earnings) from the general population. [39] Most of all, occupational distribution of Ukrainian refugee workers from ZUS implies 21% lower earnings from the general population when measured by nine large occupational groups and 23% lower by detailed occupations. [40] 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000\n\n---\n[40] Note that data on occupations of Ukrainian refugees is for persons with PESEL UKR registered for social security on 30th September 2023. It", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "November 2022 survey"}, {"text": "data on occupations of Ukrainian refugees"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "November 2022 survey", "confidence": 0.9076000452041626}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data on occupations of Ukrainian refugees", "confidence": 0.42569467425346375}], "vague_data": [{"text": "data on occupations of Ukrainian refugees", "confidence": 0.1084035336971283}]}}}
{"input": "**The unemployment rate, however, is very high**\nIn contrast to labor force participation, the estimated unemployment rate of refugees from Ukraine is notably high when compared to that of host country nationals. At the regional level, the former stands at 14%, which starkly contrasts with the 3% weighted average for locals. In certain countries, such as Romania, the unemployment level exceeds 30%.\nAccording to unemployed respondents, challenges for securing employment include (1) local language proficiency (cited by over 50% of those surveyed), (2) lack of decent employment opportunities, (3) lack of opportunities matching the candidate’s skillset, (4) lack of age-appropriate opportunities, and (5) lack of childcare services. When queried about services that could enhance economic prospects of their families, the top two requests were for language training (33% of respondents) and job matching assistance (27% of respondents).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "constraints in accessing health services. Vaccine coverage increased notably in Moldova, Czechia and Bulgaria compared to 2023. In comparison, measles vaccination coverage within Ukraine reached 92% for the 1st dose of measles vaccine and 87% for second dose [8] (WHO, 2023).\n\nRegionally, only 54% of all children received the recommended second measles vaccine.\nVaccination coverage is below the 95% target required to interrupt community transmission of measles.\n\n**% OF CHILDREN RECEIVED AT LEAST ONE MEASLES**\n\n**VACCINE**\n\n2023 2024 Data need to be interpreted with caution as they rely on recall and were not verified against individual vaccination records.\n\nBulgaria Czechia Hungary Moldova Slovakia Poland Romania (2023 N=1,539, 2024 N=1,320) 8. [https://immunizationdata.who.int/dashboard/regions/european-region/UKR accessed on 06.11.2024](https://immunizationdata.who.int/dashboard/regions/european-region/UKR)\n\n**18**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES\n\n# **Contents**\n\nAcknowledgements\b 2 Summary of findings and recommendations\b 3 Background\b 4 Key findings\b 4 Methodology\b 13 Limitations\b 14\n\n# **Acknowledgements**\n\nWe extend our sincere appreciation to the numerous individuals and organizations whose contributions have been instrumental in the development of this report. The data analysis and writing was conducted by the interagency SEIS Livelihoods and Socio-Economic Inclusion Sector Analysis Group (SAG), led by Konstantin Fastovets (UNHCR). The team also consisted of David Mosler (ILO), Erin Neale (IOM), Arianna Pearlstein (UN Women), Yaroslav Smirnov (IOM), Elif Sucu (IOM), and Idil Yildiz (ILO).\n\nWe also express our gratitude to Jad Ghosn and the Regional Bureau for Europe (UNHCR) for their invaluable guidance and support in coordination, data preparation, and analysis.\n\n**Cover photograph:**\n\nAntonina (center) is at a CV support point, receiving assistance with preparing her resume.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Chart 7. Income of Ukrainian refugee households by source**\n\n**2%**\n\n**0.1%**\n\n**In 2024, Ukrainian refugee households**\n\n**increasingly sourced their income from**\n\n**Poland, rather than from Ukraine.** This\ncan be seen when comparing the MSNA survey conducted in July-August 2023 and SEIS in May-June 2024 (UNHCR, 2024, 2023).\n\nWhile some methodological differences apply, we can see that incomes earned in Poland grew from 81% in 2023 to 90% in 2024. Conversely, incomes from Ukraine declined from 18% to just 9%. This change demonstrates that Ukrainian refugees Work (regular, part-time, self-employment, remote, other, remote in Ukraine) Remittances from Ukraine Polish social benefits Ukrainian social benefits Other (capital, loans, other) Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on SEIS (May-June 2024) UNHCR (2024) survey.\n\nNote: Deloitte worked with disaggregated household-level data, ensuring comparability (converting all Ukrainian hryvnia incomes into Polish zloty based on daily exchange rates in the time of the interview, and 3-month into 1-month remittance incomes).\n\ncontinue to integrate economically.\nIt comes as no surprise, given that employment rates and wages of Ukrainian refugees in Poland increased during that time, which is the focus of the next chapter.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA survey"}, {"text": "SEIS"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "disaggregated household-level data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS", "confidence": 0.8957406878471375}, {"text": "MSNA survey", "confidence": 0.8237070441246033}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "disaggregated household-level data", "confidence": 0.21024151146411896}], "vague_data": [{"text": "disaggregated household-level data", "confidence": 0.6308239102363586}]}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n## **2.** Ukrainian refugees in the Polish labour market\n\n##### In the past year, as far as labour market integration is concerned, refugees from Ukraine improved in terms of employment and wages, yet they continue to be disproportionately skewed towards elementary occupations. They are also the group to see the fastest improvements, with the gap towards Polish citizens visibly closing across the entire wage distribution (2.1). The current refugee employment rates are only slightly lower than those for Polish citizens, and median net wages are at about four-fifths of the economy as a whole, which may nevertheless be overly optimistic when compared to gross or average wages (2.2).\n\n#### **2.1 Improving economic situation**\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Chart 9. Ukrainian refugee labour status** **[9]** **Chart 10. Ukrainian refugee median net wage** **[10]**\n\nWorking age (women 15-59, men 15-64) PLN, 18-64 age group 4,000 69%\n\n**Ukrainian refugees are more likely**\n\n**to be employed in elementary**\n\n**occupations than pre-war Ukrainian**\n\n**migrants, non-Ukrainian foreigners,**\n\n**and Polish citizens, but they are**\n\n**also the group to have improved**\n\n---\n[10] See the note on median wage estimation method in the Online Technical Appendix.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "from abroad (e.g. savings of refugees in Ukrainian banks) further strengthens that effect. In total, general government revenue increased by 2.0% in 2022, 2.75% in 2023, and 2.94% in 2024. In monetary terms this amounts to PLN 25.0 billion in 2022, PLN 39.1 billion in 2023, and PLN 47.0 billion in 2024 [22] . In the long term, refugees should increase annual general government revenue by around 2.7%.\n\n**Ultimately, Ukrainian refugees**\n\n**generate additional output and**\n\n**demand.** This results in an increase in real\nGDP, and is especially beneficial for public finance. Although the influx of refugees was costly at the start, the additional general government revenue they provided was more than enough to compensate for the expense [23] . Tight labour market helped absorb the increase in labour force, mitigating negative impacts of increased competition on the native workforce. Over time, increased productivity should benefit native workers, as it is the primary driver of long-term wage growth. [24]\n\n---\n[24] For a discussion on the stable long-term relationship between wages and labour productivity, see for example Meager & Speckesser (2011).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**refugees.** Although language skills\nimprove over time, still only 18% of refugees speak Polish fluently, usually those who arrived in Poland 29 months ago. On average, those at the beginner level have been in the country for only 18 months.\n\n**•** **Lack of work experience negatively**\n\n**affects the labour outcomes of older**\n\n**refugees.** Refugees who back in Ukraine\nmanaged the household or were not employed remain underemployed in Poland. The employment rate among the most enterprising refugees, who were self-employed back in Ukraine, is 91%. In contrast, those who did not work, study or train in Ukraine, have an employment rate in Poland of approximately 35%.\n\nlabour market, native workers increasingly shift to complementary, higher value and better paid tasks. This can be seen in the data, as Polish citizens are moving to better paid occupations. It constitutes a positive shock to productivity, which is what counterbalances labour market pressures.\n\n##### Macroeconomic impact\n\n**In 2024, Ukrainian refugees’ net**\n\n**impact amounted to 2.7% of the Polish**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The government of Chad has committed to providing refugees with access to quality education by integrating\nthem into the national education system. This integration allows all refugees and asylum-seekers to enrol in\nprimary, secondary, and higher education institutions, follow the Chadian curriculum, and obtain recognized\ndiplomas. The process of integrating refugees into the national education system has seen significant\nprogress since 27 November 2020, including the adoption of the ten-year refugee education strategy by\nthe government. In line with this, since 2018, the government has recognized and integrated 94 schools\nin camps and reception sites into the national system and opened seven examination centres in camps to\nensure that all students can take national exams under proper conditions.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "difference between close and far, and before and after mine opening, we have created a\n\ndifference-in-differences estimator.\n\nPanel B of figure 2 shows this strategy in a map, where the small blue circles show the treatment\n\nareas, and the 100-km-radius green circles show the geographic areas that constitute the control\n\ngroup. As is common in difference-in-differences analysis, the estimation relies on treatment\n\n11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In these vulnerable conditions, any shock to the household economy -such as job loss, illness, or\nclimate related events- significantly impacts on refugees’ ability to cover the rent and utility costs\n(water, electricity), leaving them at heightened risk of eviction. [20] Climate related incidents are\nbecoming recurrent in the Brazilian context, such as floods and landslides in the south, as well as\ndroughts and wildfires in the center and the north of the country. [21] For instance, southern Brazil\nhas seen an increase of up to 30% in average rainfall over the last three decades [22] and, as of\nSeptember 2024, 59% of the Brazilian territory was affected by the most severe drought since\nnationwide measurements. [23]\n\n---\n[22] Presidência da Republica, « Southern Brazil has seen an increas of up to 30% in average annual rainfall over the last three decades »,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "nationwide measurements", "confidence": 0.6890982389450073}]}}}
{"input": "**occupational downgrading.** The SEIS\nsurvey indicates that 34% of Ukrainian refugees currently employed in Poland work in the same sector as back in Ukraine, while 48% – in a different one. There is no data for 18% of workers – mostly made up of the youngest refugees who might not have worked back in Ukraine. Employment in one’s pre-displacement sector appears to boost the median net wage by about 6%, when compared to those who switch fields – a back-of-the-envelope calculation puts their median net earnings at 89% of the overall median. However, this likely overstates the true effect of staying in the same sector, since the higher-paid groups (for example, the majority of IT specialists) were more likely to remain in their original industry.\n\n**Highly skilled Ukrainian refugees**\n\n**are likely to suffer from significant**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS\nsurvey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS\nsurvey", "confidence": 0.9387149214744568}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "While refugees and asylum-seekers have the right to reside in Chad, as enshrined in Article 21 of the law, and\nthere are no legislative restrictions on their choice of residence, multisectoral assistance is only provided\nby UNHCR and its partners in camps. Consequently, this assistance remains a decisive factor in refugees’\ndecision to stay in the camps. Refugees with the financial means to support themselves or engaged in\neconomic activities outside the camps are free to choose their place of residence in Chad.\n\n**3.2** **Right to work and rights at work**\n\nArticle 28 of the [Asylum law](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf) in the Republic of Chad grants refugees the most favourable treatment afforded\nunder similar circumstances to foreign nationals regarding the pursuit of gainful employment, whether\nsalaried, non-salaried and/or self-employed. The same provision pursues that refugees shall be exempted\nfrom certain restrictive measures imposed by the prevailing regulations on the employment of foreigners.\nAdditionally, Article 70 of the 2023 Decree stipulates that a refugee legally residing in Chad enjoys the same\nrights and standards of treatment as foreign nationals. Article 61 of the [2023 Decree specifically addressing](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)\nlocal integration also guarantees the refugee right to access salaried or non-salaried employment to reach\nself-reliance.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "social insurance. Second, the statistical definition of an employed person is wider than just being registered with the Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, ZUS) on a certain day [3] . Third, some Ukrainians work in the shadow economy. The number of workers with Ukrainian citizenship and social insurance increased from only 33 thousand at the end of 2013 to 627 thousand at the end of 2021 – just before the refugee influx. Some of this increase reflects the transitioning of Ukrainians to more regular work arrangements and securing work permits. Following February 2022, the numbers further increased with the arrival of Ukrainian refugees. The data for mid-2024 shows 771 thousand workers with Ukrainian citizenship registered for social insurance, including 247 thousand refugees. Ukrainian refugees in Poland have been given PESEL UKR numbers\n\n- a version of an ID number assigned to\nevery Polish national – which made high quality data on their demographics easily available, though they may still be missing from most of the statistics compiled by the Polish statistical office.\n\n20% 19% Men Women 1% 1% 2% 3% 4% 7% 8% 4% 4% 9% 12% 7%\n\n#### **1.2 Households characteristics**\n\n**The structure of the Ukrainian**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL UKR numbers"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL UKR numbers", "confidence": 0.779871940612793}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n# Recommendations\n\nHost countries and communities have made commendable and continuous efforts to support refugees in accessing essential health and MHPSS services. While most respondents reported adequate access, barriers to services changed and increased for some refugees. These changes do not take the same form for all refugees, and intersectional factors related to gender, age, disability, and chronic illness continue to impact the experiences and needs of refugees from Ukraine in this regard. The recommendations below highlight key priorities and actions for governments and RRP partners to address these challenges and enhance refugees’ access to care in host countries.\n\nThese actions aim to support governments and local communities in strengthening health and MHPSS systems in areas impacted by refugee arrivals and advancing the integration of refugees into national systems. Achieving these goals will require long-term planning and sustained funding commitments.\n\n9. [Integraton of migrant and refugee data in health informaton systems in Europe: advancing evidence, policy and practce](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanepe.2023.100744)\n\n**28**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "migrant and refugee data", "confidence": 0.2873048782348633}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "migrant and refugee data", "confidence": 0.1532016545534134}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "treatment distance of 50 km, we no longer see a significant effect. In panel Ab, the results are\n\nreplicated using a spatial lag model, meaning that we allow for nonlinear effects with distance.\n\nIn reality, it seems like the electricity rate is much higher before a mine (dashed line) than with\n\nan active mine (the blue line). However, when the results are decomposed by migrant status in\n\npanel Ac of figure A1 (Annex) we find that migrants are driving the lower electricity rate. In\n\nfact, among nonmigrants, the electricity rate is higher 0–10 km from an active mine, although\n\nit is slightly lower 10–20 km away. [14]\n\n**6.3 Distributional effects on wealth and inequality**\n\nTable 9 presents the effects of mining on asset wealth and on asset wealth inequality. Wealth\n\ndata are available in the form of a wealth index, but only for the two last DHS surveys.\n\nFollowing Fenske (2015) and Flatø and Kotsadam (2014), we calculate inequality by means of\n\na Gini coefficient (recoding the wealth variable to be positive only, and using the command\n\n13 It is also possible that mining companies compete with households for electricity if supply cannot be increased\nin the short run.\n\n---\n[14] In panels Ba, Bb, and Bc of Appendix figure A1, we analyze access to radio. We learn that access to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS surveys"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS surveys", "confidence": 0.8738015294075012}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "wealth index", "confidence": 0.11722884327173233}]}}}
{"input": "## Introduction\n\n##### Nearly two years after the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the positive impact of the refugees on the Polish economy becomes clearly visible.\n\nOn their arrival, the impact of refugees on the economy primarily manifested through higher consumption, that was financed mainly by increased governmental spending, civil society, international organisations, and savings brought from Ukraine. While these added to a significant initial increase in consumption, multiple sources of financing and a lack of aggregated data (particularly on general government expenses) make its magnitude uncertain. Although in the short term it stimulated the economy, drawing just on savings was not sustainable. Over time, however, refugees started to work as employees and entrepreneurs, adding not only to the demand, but also to the supply of the economy, contributing to its long-term growth. The focus of this report is this structural impact of refugees on the economy as consumers, employers, entrepreneurs, and taxpayers.\n\nThe beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine resulted in a large inflow of refugees into Poland outlined in Chapter 1.\nThis cohort differs from the pre-2022 Ukrainian economic migrants, most notably in its demographic makeup which primarily comprises children and working age women.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "aggregated data", "confidence": 0.6430305242538452}]}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES\n\n**SHARE OF POPULATION PAYING FOR RENTED HOUSING: HOSTS VS REFUGEES**\n\nShare of hosts living in rented housing (2023) Share of refugees fully paying for rent (2024) Share of refugees partially paying for rent (2024) 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Bulgaria Czechia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia Region Source: Eurostat, survey data, SAG estimates\n\n**HOUSING COST AS A SHARE OF HOUSEHOLD DISPOSABLE INCOME**\n\nRefugees (2024) Hosts (2022) Bulgaria Czechia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia Region Source: Eurostat, survey data, SAG estimates\n\n**REFUGEE POVERTY RATES WITH AND WITHOUT CORRECTION FOR EXCESSIVE HOUSING COSTS**\n\nRefugees (2024) Refugees with housing expense correction (2024) Hosts (2023) 65% 40% 52% 31% 46% 43% 37% Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Region Source: Eurostat, survey data, SAG estimates\n\n**6**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Eurostat, survey data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data", "confidence": 0.27042949199676514}]}}}
{"input": "Skills-job mismatching also becomes evident when analyzing the current employment of refugees compared to their pre-war employment in Ukraine, as nearly 60% have transitioned to entirely different economic sectors.\nThis phenomenon is more pronounced among women, with 63% having shifted to roles outside their previous employment background, compared to 50% of men. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is the higher proportion of men employed in sectors like construction and IT prior to displacement. These fields often demand fewer country-specific qualifications, such as proficiency in the local language, thereby facilitating easier integration into similar roles in the host country.\n\n**DISTRIBUTION OF WORKING AGE POPULATION BY**\n\n**HIGHEST EDUCATION LEVEL ATTAINED**\n\nTechnical or Vocational Bachelor Master's Doctoral\n\n**WAGE PREMIUMS FOR EDUCATION LEVEL GAINS: HOSTS**\n\n**VERSUS REFUGEES, %**\n\nRefugee eduction wage premium (mean, 2024) Bachelor's or above Hosts (2023) Refugees (2024) Source: Survey data, ILO 1% Host education wage premium (median, 2022) Technical or vocational Note: Wage premiums computed with lower secondary education as the baseline Source: Survey data, Eurostat, SAG estimates", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data, ILO"}, {"text": "Survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Survey data, Eurostat, SAG estimates", "confidence": 0.19795559346675873}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.9494045376777649}]}}}
{"input": "Employment continues to be closely associated with lower poverty rates, though ultimately, it’s the size of income that is generated by working household members that makes the biggest difference. Considering that the share of working-age refugees that are employed is nearing host population levels after rising further in 2024, attention should now turn to wages. Data on the latter, which was derived from household level indicators, demonstrates that refugees on average make two-thirds of what the local population does per hour of work. Low wage premiums for higher education levels and the fact that some 60% of current refugee employees have a background in an entirely different sector of the economy, suggest the presence of underemployment and skills mismatching. This assertion is corroborated by nearly 35% of employed refugees in the region reporting few available jobs with adequate pay, lack of positions that match their skills, or issues with getting their qualifications recognized. Moreover, almost the same percentage indicate lack of local language knowledge to be a problem, a well-acknowledged barrier to skilled employment.\n\n**Based on the above findings it is recommended that:**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "household level indicators"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household level indicators", "confidence": 0.24145404994487762}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household level indicators", "confidence": 0.87630295753479}]}}}
{"input": "##### **September/ October 2023 report**\n\n###### Venezuela\n\n**trafficking networks.** After bilateral\n\nmeeting between the Protection Cluster,\n\nthe WGTiP and the FSL Cluster, a focal\n\ngroup was organized on October 10th.\n\nA total of 7 participants from UN Agen\ncies, AoRs, and local NGOs participated.\n\nWG members actively participated by\n\nsharing field experiences and proposing\n\nrecommendations to address challenges\n\nraised during the discussion.\n\n**VIII. Monthly Meetings of the**\n\n**WGTiP**\n\n**The WGTiP convenes monthly to**\n\n**review its working plan and provide**\n\n**a platform for members to discuss**\n\n**trends and activities related to TiP. In**\n\n**the last meeting, the WG collectively**\n\n**decided to establish a Task Force to**\n\n**draft a guide on security for orga-**\n\n**nizations working with Victims of**\n\n**Trafficking (VoT).** Additionally, members\n\nhave developed standardized training\n\nand sensitization activities/workshops to\n\nimplement in communities on the topic of\n\nTiP. These trainings will be beneficial to\n\nother organizations addressing human\n\ntrafficking issues. In October’s monthly\n\nmeeting, the WG hosted the office of UN\n\nSpecial Rapporteur for Trafficking in Per\nsons. The meeting involved discussions\n\non potential collaboration with WG mem\nbers and how the UN Rapporteur's office\n\ncan support advocacy efforts.\n\nMember organizations also shared infor\nmation on available services for victims", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the DHS cluster level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and\ndistrict fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. Active is active status of mine in the survey year.\n\n*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Results for women’s partners also available upon request. OLS = ordinary least\nsquares. The women and men samples have different sampling frames and therefore we are not analyzing these\nresults jointly.\n\nTwo further caveats should be noted: (i) with many variables tested, such evidence should not\n\nbe given too much weight, (ii) number of sampled men in the treatment category is quite small.\n\nOut of 7,157 sampled med, only 484 men live close to active mines. A bigger treated sample\n\nwould provide more reliable results. [10]\n\n**5.2 Child health**\n\nWe explore effects on child health, such as size at birth, infant mortality, anthropometrics, and\n\nincidence of cough, diarrhea, and fever. Panel A and Panel B use different variable definitions\n\n---\n[10] Results for sampled women’s partners are similar.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "those people fell outside the definitions of population used by Statistics Poland (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, GUS, Poland’s statistical office). The National Bank of Poland estimated that between 2014 and 2018, there were approximately one to two million Ukrainian workers in Poland at a time (Strzelecki, Growiec and Wyszyński, 2022). According to the 2021 Polish National Census, one year before the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine there were about one million Ukrainian citizens residing in Poland, almost all of them on a temporary basis.\n\nAfter the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland experienced a massive influx of refugees – with more than 27 million border crossings from Ukraine and more than 1.9 million applications for protection submitted by April 7, 2025 [1] . Not all of those people stayed in Poland. Many of them later returned to Ukraine or moved to other countries. By February 14, 2025, PESEL UKR [2] holders who remained in Poland stood at less than 1 million, while the border movement balance between Poland and Ukraine was slightly below 2 million.\n\n---\n[1] UNHCR data, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine\n[2] PESEL UKR is a version of Polish national ID number for Ukrainian citizens in connection with the armed conflict in the territory of that country.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2021 Polish National Census"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "UNHCR data"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "UNHCR data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2021 Polish National Census", "confidence": 0.9004567265510559}, {"text": "UNHCR data", "confidence": 0.3346351683139801}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The escalatation of war 2022 in Ukraine caused a large inflow of refugees into Poland. While some refugees from Ukraine have since returned to Ukraine or gone further to Germany or other countries, in October 2023 close to 957 thousand remained in Poland (identified by active PESEL UKR numbers). They consist primarily of children and working aged women. Despite the forced nature of displacement, war trauma, and caregiving responsibilities, refugees from Ukraine very quickly entered the labour market as employees and entrepreneurs. The precise number of refugees from Ukraine working in Poland remains uncertain, with our estimates ranging from 225 to 350 thousand. The lower bound is the number of social security registrations and understates the actual figure, as some jobs may not require social contributions or remain in the informal sector. The higher bound is the product of employment rates from surveys of refugees from Ukraine, and their working age population from the active PESEL UKR database. By JulyAugust 2023 Ukrainian refugee households supported themselves, with 80% of their incomes coming from work. [49]\n\n---\n[49] Deloitte calculations based on Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data provided by UNHCR.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "active PESEL UKR database"}, {"text": "PESEL UKR numbers"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data"}, {"text": "surveys of refugees from Ukraine"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "surveys of refugees from Ukraine"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data", "confidence": 0.6577480435371399}, {"text": "PESEL UKR database", "confidence": 0.4275082051753998}, {"text": "PESEL UKR numbers", "confidence": 0.12662886083126068}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "surveys of refugees from Ukraine", "confidence": 0.47631439566612244}, {"text": "Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data", "confidence": 0.14964714646339417}], "vague_data": [{"text": "surveys of refugees from Ukraine", "confidence": 0.14267471432685852}]}}}
{"input": "**Figure 1 Ghana’s annual gold production and world price of gold**\n\nGhana is the second-largest gold producer in Africa after South Africa, with gold production\n\naveraging 77 tons per year (Gajigo, Mutambatsere, and Mdiaya 2012). In 2011, Ghana’s\n\nmineral sector accounted for about 14 percent of total tax revenues and 5.5 percent of the gross\n\ndomestic product (GDP) (Bermúdez-Lugo 2011), as well as 44 percent of Ghanian exports\n\n(Gajigo, Mutambatsere, and Mdiaya 2012). This makes the gold mining industry one of the\n\ncountry’s most important industries, and an essential industry to study.\n\nSimilar to gold mining in other African countries (see Gajigo, Mutambatsere, and Mdiaya", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In conclusion, the protection incidents evidenced in the analysis partially overview the situation in both countries\nwhere the data were collected. The number of protection incidents and victims is higher than what is represented\nin this report for September 2022. In DRC, the new protection monitoring platform still needs to be fully deployed\ncountrywide, and efforts are underway to have data that will reflect the real situation. In Mozambique, the data\nreported in this report concerns only one province, Cabo Delgado, where the protection monitoring is implemented.\nEfforts are also underway to have functioning protection monitoring in the rest of the affected provinces.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "REGIONAL BUREAU FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA\n\n###### **POPULATION OF CONCERN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION**\n\n30 September 2022\n\n**PoCs IN SOUTHERN** **AFRICA REGION***\n\n**521,512** **REF**\n\n**41,283** **REF**\n\n**13,762** **ASY**\n\n**1,291** **ASY**\n\n**5,526,022** **IDP**\n\n**REF**\n\n**ASY**\n\n**OOC**\n\n**RET**\n\n**KEY FIGURES**\n\n## **8,572,919**\n\nTotal Population of concern\n\n###### **1,099,585**\n\nRefugees, asylum-seekers, other\nof concern & returnees**\n\n**785,119**\n\n**278,090**\n\n**36,165**\n\n**211**\n\n###### **7,473,334**\n\nConflict induced and Natural Disaster IDPs\n\nNatural Disaster IDPs\n\n**528,466**\n\n**7%**\n\n**6,419,356**\n\n**86%**\n\nIDPs RET\n\n**525,512**\n\n**7.0%**\n\ndo not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations\n\n**Author: UNHCR DIMA - RSA** Contact : rsarbdima@unhcr.org **Source:** UNHCR Primes, Government, IOM, OCHA, UNHCR\n\n**Author: UNHCR DIMA - RSA** Contact : rsarbdima@unhcr.org **Source: REF, ASY, OOC, RET** (UNHCR PRIMES, Government); **IDP DRC** (OCHA); IDP Zimbabwe & Mozambique (IOM); **IDP ROC** (Government, Ministry of Social Affairs and Humanitarian Action (MASAH).\n\n*PoCs = Persons of Concern   ** REF = Refugee; ASY = Asylum-seeker; OOC = Other person of concern; RET = Returnee. DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo  ROC = Republic of the Congo Date of creation : 30 September\n2022\n\nFor more information visit: UNHCR Data Portal", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR PRIMES"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR PRIMES", "confidence": 0.9126532077789307}, {"text": "UNHCR Data Portal", "confidence": 0.2001226395368576}, {"text": "IDP ROC", "confidence": 0.16658958792686462}, {"text": "IDP DRC", "confidence": 0.1020367220044136}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "### **OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHT**\n\n##### **September/ October 2023 report**\n\n###### Venezuela\n\n**Some key achievements**\n\n- Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO)\n\nProcess\n\n- Coordination with other platforms,\n\nsubnational Clusters, ICCG, and Partners\n\n- Accountability for Affected Populations\n\n(AAP) WG\n\n- GPC Townhall\n\n- La Carnada Play\n\n- Annual TiP Bulletin 2022-2023\n\n- Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) and\n\nTrafficking in Persons (TiP)\n\n- Monthly Meetings of the WGTiP\n\n- Protection Mainstreaming Training\n\n- Training on Mixed Migration and Durable\n\nSolutions\n\n- Reporting Transition to 345W\n\n- Focal Group Discussions with LGBTIQ+\n\nOrganizations for Thematic Protection\n\nAnalysis Update (PAU)\n\n- Mental Health and Psychosocial Support\n\n(MHPSS) Coaching and Training of Trainers\n\n(ToT)\n\n- Participation in the Gender ToT for\n\nGovernment Officials\n\n**4**\n\n**I. Humanitarian Program Cycle**\n\n**2024: Humanitarian Needs**\n\n**Overview (HNO) Process**\n\n**September was dedicated to identi-**\n\n**fying and define indicators and the**\n\n**local adjustment of severity scales**\n\n**for People in Need (PIN) and Needs**\n\n**Severity Calculation as part of the**\n\n**Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO)**\n\n**process.** The indicators defined for the\n\nProtection Cluster (PC) Severity and PIN\n\ncalculation are Protection Risks, Protec\ntion Risks linked to trafficking in person,\n\nAccess to Documentation, Access to\n\nthe Justice System, Negative Coping\n\nMechanisms in Protection, Violent", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**than native workers.** There may be different reasons for this\nas perhaps immigrants have character traits that make them more inclined towards entrepreneurial activity (unclear in the case of refugees), or maybe it is a way to avoid occupational downgrading as immigrants find it difficult to prove their educational and professional credentials from home countries.\nNotwithstanding the reason, such effects are observed across the OECD countries (OECD, 2011). In a recent paper, Anelli, Basso, Ippedico, and Peri (2023) look at Italian data, finding that one standard deviation increase in emigration rate generates 4.8% decline of business formation in the municipality of origin.\nThe authors use existing migration networks to ensure causality of the results. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether immigrantcreated businesses are more successful from the native ones, but one could speculate that a higher rate of trying new business ideas spurs more successes.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Italian data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Italian data", "confidence": 0.40104907751083374}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Italian data", "confidence": 0.7102057933807373}]}}}
{"input": "Outcomes were relatively consistent across types of support. Those who accessed only formal support (e.g., psychotherapy or structured group interventions) reported improvement in 88% of cases (with 34% stating “yes” and 54% reporting “slight” improvement). Individuals relying on only informal support (e.g., help from friends, family, or employers) reported improvement in 91% of cases, with slightly fewer reporting “yes” (29%) and a higher percentage indicating “slight” improvement (62%). Meanwhile, those who accessed both formal and informal support were slightly more likely to state “yes” regarding improvement (40%), with 51% indicating “slight” improvement (for a total of 91% of cases reporting some improvement). Although differences are small, results imply that a combination of support types may be associated with enhanced perceived effectiveness. Further research is needed to explore this potential relationship.\n\nThese findings demonstrate that, overall, those who accessed support perceived this support to be beneficial. Results reinforce the importance of integrating both formal and informal support mechanisms to maximize positive outcomes, as well as tailoring interventions to demographic and country-specific needs to enhance the well-being of individuals receiving MHPSS services. The data also\n\n**23**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Deloitte refers to one or more of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited (DTTL), its global network of member firms, and their related entities (collectively, the “Deloitte organization”). DTTL (also referred to as “Deloitte Global”) and each of its member firms and related entities are legally separate and independent entities, which cannot obligate or bind each other in respect of third parties. DTTL and each DTTL member firm and related entity is liable only for its own acts and omissions, and not those of each other. DTTL does not provide services to clients. Please see www.deloitte.com/about to learn more.\n\nDeloitte provides industry-leading audit and assurance, tax and legal, consulting, financial advisory, and risk advisory services to nearly 90% of the Fortune Global 500® and thousands of private companies. Our people deliver measurable and lasting results that help reinforce public trust in capital markets, enable clients to transform and thrive, and lead the way toward a stronger economy, a more equitable society, and a sustainable world. Building on its 175-plus year history, Deloitte spans more than 150 countries and territories. Learn how Deloitte’s approximately 457,000 people worldwide make an impact that matters at www.deloitte.com.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES\n\n**Republic of Moldova: the case for housing costs corrections in income-based poverty metrics**\n\nData from the Republic of Moldova highlights the limitations of poverty metrics that rely solely on disposable income, as they fail to account for vulnerability related to asset ownership. Based on income alone, the 2024 poverty rate suggests that Ukrainian refugees are able to attain a higher standard of living than their hosts, with only 10% living in poverty compared to 32% of Moldovans. This apparent disparity is largely driven by the sizeable financial support that Ukrainians received from humanitarian organizations in 2024, which amounted to 44% of their total household income. While the above comparison could suggest that the provided aid is excessive, such an interpretation overlooks an important factor – namely that only 5% of Moldovans incur rental expenses compare to 41% of refugees. In fact, including utilities, housing costs were estimated to consume 46% of refugees’ disposable income (inclusive of humanitarian aid), whereas they account for just 14% for Moldovan households. In essence, these findings indicate that refugees are using the entirety of their aid to cover accommodation needs. Adjusting disposable income at the household level to reflect these additional housing expenses raises the poverty rate for refugees to 43%, surpassing that of Moldovans.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 poverty rate", "confidence": 0.125665545463562}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Data from the Republic of Moldova", "confidence": 0.8344789743423462}], "vague_data": [{"text": "income-based poverty metrics", "confidence": 0.15057463943958282}, {"text": "poverty metrics", "confidence": 0.12142779678106308}]}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n#### **2.2 Current occupational situation**\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Administrative ZUS data can be used as a proxy for both average and _gross_ earnings percentages. On June 30, 2024, average bases for social contributions of Ukrainian refugees accounted for just 64% of those of Polish citizens. However, this is only relative to Polish citizens not all workers in the economy as a whole, and comes with other caveats of administrative instead of survey data sources – data given on a particular day instead of period average, the shadow economy unaccounted for, different contributions based on the type of contract, no data for farmers who belong to a separate social insurance scheme.\nAlso, the ZUS data, that is available, is much more limited that the SEIS survey data primarily used in this report.\n\n**Ukrainian refugees in Poland have**\n\n**clearly improved their economic**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey data"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Administrative ZUS data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey data", "confidence": 0.7440298795700073}, {"text": "ZUS data", "confidence": 0.6235147714614868}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Administrative ZUS data", "confidence": 0.31535470485687256}, {"text": "SEIS survey data", "confidence": 0.1138986349105835}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data sources", "confidence": 0.24682237207889557}, {"text": "survey data", "confidence": 0.1563333123922348}]}}}
{"input": "**age.** The best population data available\nis the regularly updated active PESEL database. [4] According to the registry, 61.5% of the registered are women and 38.5% are men. The database also includes the age of PESEL UKR holders, which indicates that over half (57.4%), i.e. more than 560 thousand people, are of working age (18-65). While the male and female shares of people below 18 years of age (20% and 19%, respectively) and 66+ (1% and 3%) are similar, there is a large difference among productive-age individuals, with women 18-65 making up 40% and men only 18% of Ukrainian refugee population. This is largely due to the conscription of military aged men in Ukraine.\n\n66+ 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 18-25 <18\n\n---\n[4] Available in the repository maintained by the government https://dane.gov.pl/pl/dataset/2715 as well as UNHCR data portal https://app.powerbi.com/", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "active PESEL database"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "UNHCR data portal"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL database", "confidence": 0.9112342000007629}, {"text": "UNHCR data portal", "confidence": 0.5525516271591187}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "repository maintained by the government", "confidence": 0.12734650075435638}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES\n\n**HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY SOURCE AND POVERTY CATEGORY**\n\nEmployment Family support Social protection (host country) Old age pension (Ukraine) 12% 67% Social protection (Ukraine) 35% Humanitarian cash 8% 13% 23% 6% Other 5% 3% 3% 5% Below the poverty line Below the poverty line after housing cost correction Above the poverty line after housing cost correction Source: Survey data, SAG estimates 26% 88%\n\n**Higher employment earnings were the main driver behind the drop in poverty rates from**\n\n**2023**\n\nThe mean monthly equivalized household income [12] of Ukrainian refugees across the seven countries surveyed in both rounds increased by 38% from last year, to an equivalent of EUR 763. This increase was much higher than the 4% rise in the regional poverty threshold over the same time.\n\nApproximately 90% of the increase in refugee household income can be attributed to higher employment earnings, driven by a combination of rising employment rates and wage growth. A significantly smaller, though still notable, contribution came from increased financial support from families in Ukraine, although this finding may partially be an artifact of adjustments to the survey questionnaire [13] .", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Survey data, SAG estimates", "confidence": 0.1858016550540924}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.9399892687797546}]}}}
{"input": "_UNHCR \r Discussion \r Paper \r –15 \r June \r 2013_\n\nengagement \r of \r key \r partners, \r including \r relevant \r development \r actors \r and \r the \r private\nsector \r since \r the \r early \r stage \r will \r be \r a \r crucial \r component \r of \r UNHCR’s \r strategy.\n\nCurrent \r co-­‐ordination \r fora \r include \r the \r South-­‐East \r Consultation \r Platform, \r led \r by \r UNHCR,\nconsisting \r of \r UN, \r NGO, \r donors, \r Government \r and \r other \r partners, \r including \r the \r Myanmar\nPeace \r Centre \r (MPC) [9] . \r This \r currently \r meets \r every \r 2-­‐3 \r months \r in \r Yangon. \r The \r objective \r of\nthe \r Platform \r is \r to \r maintain \r a \r common \r understanding \r of \r the \r operational \r environment\nand \r challenges \r in \r the \r South-­‐East \r and \r to \r forge \r strategic \r partnerships. \r UNHCR \r also \r chairs\nthe \r National \r Protection \r Working \r Group.\n\nMonthly \r inter-­‐agency \r co-­‐ordination \r meetings, \r chaired \r by \r UNHCR \r and \r attended \r by\nhumanitarian \r partners, \r are \r currently \r held \r in \r Mawlamyine \r (Mon \r State), \r Taungoo \r (Bago\nRegion), \r and \r Myeik \r and \r Dawei \r (Tanintharyi \r Region). \r Inter-­‐agency \r meetings \r also \r take\nplace \r in \r Loikaw \r (Kayah \r State), \r chaired \r on \r a \r rotational \r basis \r amongst \r agencies.\n\nIn \r January \r 2013, \r UNHCR \r also \r initiated \r cross-­‐border \r meetings \r between \r UNHCR\nMyanmar \r and \r UNHCR \r Thailand.\n\n---\n[9] The \r Myanmar \r Government \r draft \r Framework \r for \r Economic \r and \r Social \r Reform \r 2012-­‐2015 \r tasks \r the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**WEIGHTED AVERAGE MONTHLY EQUIVALIZED INCOME EVOLUTION, EUR**\n\n800 600 400 200 0 Equivalized income 2023 Employment Family Host country income support social protection Ukraine social protection (inc.\npensions) Humanitarian Other Equivalized cash income 2024 Note: Only includes data from the 7 countries surveyed in both rounds (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) Source: Survey data, SAG estimates 12. Household disposable income adjusted for size, as per Eurostat’s methodology 13. The 2024 survey probed for income from family in Ukraine more explicitly\n\n**9**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2024 survey", "confidence": 0.18607740104198456}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.9221009612083435}]}}}
{"input": "The established mechanisms in refugee camps and in N’Djamena to ensure substantial refugee participation\nat local levels remain functional. This includes elected committees representing refugees, along with separate\ncommittees for men, women and children/young individuals. Sectoral committees such as those for livelihoods,\nchild protection, education and healthcare are also still active. Additionally, inclusive and mixed committees\nof leaders or sectoral representatives in refugee hosting villages continue to facilitate interaction between\nmembers of both communities, addressing both general and specific issues. During the COVID-19 pandemic,\nwhen physical access to refugees became difficult due to government restrictions, alternative communication\nmethods (e.g. posters, banners, radio announcements, phone calls and SMS), and mobile protection teams,\nwere utilized by CNARR to stay in touch with refugee communities.\n\n**2.4** **Access to civil registration and documentation**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "civil registration", "confidence": 0.18869172036647797}]}}}
{"input": "Similarly to the above results, an early analysis by Gromadzki and Lewandowski (2023) found no impact on the employment rate or unemployment rate. In a peerreviewed scientific article, they examined the impact of Ukrainian refugees on the labour market outcomes of Polish women from January to April 2022 (as most Ukrainian refugees are female). They found that the proportion of Ukrainian refugees in a given poviat had no statistically significant impact on the employment rate or unemployment rate of Polish women.\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Chart 29. Effect of a 1 pp. change in employment share of Ukrainian refugees on gross wage change**\nCross-section model of all 380 poviats in 2023. Results are statistically significant at a 0.01 level.\n\n200 150 100 50 0 OLS IV (pupils) IV (2019) IV (both)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "because of the nature of the data. Panel A uses three variables that reflect conditions around the\n\nyear of birth of the child. Note that women report their birth history, in what year the child was\n\nborn, and the baby’s health. She reports this information in the survey year, but retroactively,\n\nrecollecting the year of birth. Therefore, we deem that the birth year mining activity is more\n\nrelevant than the survey year mining activity for the outcomes in Panel A. In particular, we test\n\nif an active mine nearby in the birth year of the child influences the baby’s size at birth, infant\n\nmortality, and the number of antenatal visits. In Panel B we use the main specification of mining\n\nactivity in the survey year, as these variables are more reflective of current conditions in the\n\nsurvey year than past conditions around the time of the birth.\n\nPanel A of table 5 shows that infants in active mine communities are less likely to be born large,\n\nand that the mother had insignificantly fewer prenatal visits. However, infant mortality\n\ndecreases by 4 percentage points. Splitting the sample by gender, we note that this decrease is", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# Abstract\n\nThe beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022 resulted in a large outflow of refugees, reaching more than 6 million globally.\n\nMuch of this exodus happened through the Polish border. As of October 2023, almost 1 million Ukrainian refugees were living in Poland. While in the past decade Poland experienced large labour migration from Ukraine, the refugee inflow had a different demographic composition.\nIt primarily included working age women (41%) and children (40%). These refugees from Ukraine did not plan to move, and many had special needs. Despite these difficulties, refugees began entering the labour market surprisingly quickly – attaining an employment rate of 28% in May 2022 and 65% in November 2022 (NBP, 2023). By July-August 2023 Ukrainian refugee households supported themselves, with 80% of their incomes coming from work. [1]\n\n---\n[1] Deloitte calculations based on Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data provided by UNHCR.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data", "confidence": 0.6316989660263062}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Poland 2023 survey data", "confidence": 0.1772402822971344}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Power BI Desktop Somalia’s Solutions Pathways The Department of Poverty Reduction and Durable Solutions of the Ministry of Planning, Investments, and Economic Development (MoPIED) in Somalia continues to play a leading role in overseeing and addressing solutions to internal displacement in the country.\nIn 2024, the department conducted a series of durable solutions pathways consultations across all federal member states and the Banadir Regional Administration (BRA), resulting in the National Solutions Pathways Action Plan. These consultations aimed to identify key approaches to facilitate the durable solutions pathways of one million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from their displacement situations, in alignment with the National Durable Solutions Strategy, the National Development Plan and the United Nations Secretary-General’s Action Agenda on Internal Displacement, emphasising three interconnected goals: achieving durable solutions, ensuring protection and assistance, and preventing future displacement.\nBaseline Analysis This document presents key quantitative data under each of the six Solutions Pathways: 1) Government leadership, 2) Access to Basic Services, 3) Employment and Livelihood Opportunities, 4) Legal Documentation, HLP and Access to Justice, 5) Climate Change and Resilience. Pathway 6 refers to Data for Solutions, which is cross-cutting and covers MoPIED's Durable Solutions Progress (DSP) Survey, was supported by IOM Somalia in 2024. Data from this survey is presented under each of the six pathways in this document. Data collected by UNHCR related to protection and conflict sensitivity is also presented, highlighting key cross-cutting issues to consider in implementing the plan.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Durable Solutions Progress (DSP) Survey"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Data collected by UNHCR"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Durable Solutions Progress (DSP) Survey", "confidence": 0.6547641754150391}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Data collected by UNHCR", "confidence": 0.4213966429233551}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "While \r UNHCR \r has \r been \r present \r and \r operational \r in \r South-­‐East \r Myanmar \r since \r 2004, \r the\nUNHCR \r framework \r for \r co-­‐operation \r with \r the \r Government \r of \r the \r Union \r of \r Myanmar \r in\nthe \r South-­‐East \r is \r defined \r by \r a \r draft \r Letter \r of \r Understanding \r (LOU) \r with \r its \r line \r Ministry,\nthe \r Ministry \r of \r Border \r Affairs \r (NaTaLa). \r The \r LOU \r articulates \r UNHCR \r and \r NaTaLa’s\nresponsibilities \r in \r regard \r to \r the \r implementation \r of \r programmes \r aimed \r at \r improving\nlivelihoods \r in \r communities \r affected \r by \r displacement, \r reducing \r the \r risk \r of \r further\ndisplacement, \r and \r specifically \r creating \r the \r appropriate \r conditions \r for \r return \r for \r IDPs\nand \r refugees. \r The \r current \r LOU, \r which \r includes \r Kayin, \r Mon, \r Kayah, \r Shan \r and \r Chin \r States,\nand \r Bago \r and \r Tanintharyi \r Regions, \r was \r signed \r on \r 10 \r June \r 2013.\n\nOnce \r the \r required \r safeguards \r are \r in \r place \r for \r the \r return \r of \r refugees \r and \r an \r organized\nprogramme \r is \r to \r be \r launched, \r a \r tripartite \r agreement \r between \r Myanmar, \r Thailand \r and\nUNCHR \r should \r form \r the \r main \r legal \r framework \r for \r the \r voluntary \r repatriation \r and\n\n6 \r Executive \r Committee \r Conclusion \r 29 \r of \r 1983 \r calls \r upon \r Governments \r to \r facilitate \r the \r work \r of \r UNHCR \r “in\ncreating \r conditions \r favourable \r to \r and \r promoting \r voluntary \r repatriation, \r which \r whenever \r appropriate \r and\nfeasible \r is \r the \r most \r desirable \r solution \r for \r refugee \r problems.” \r Also \r refer \r to \r Executive \r Committee \r Conclusions", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n### **Social cohesion and** **MHPSS**\n\nAn association between perceived hostility and mental health challenges remains evident across the region, with households experiencing hostility in their social environment more likely to report mental health and psychosocial problems (44%) compared to those not experiencing hostility (31%). Perceived hostility may increase vulnerability to distress, while distress may in turn influence individuals to perceive their environments as more hostile, creating a reinforcing cycle. This trend is consistent across countries, with notable between-country differences: Romania continues to report the highest percentage of problems both for households experiencing hostility (64%) and those not experiencing hostility (49%), while Czechia consistently reports the lowest percentages in both categories (24% and 20%, respectively). Significant differences also emerged between countries such as Hungary and Moldova, where the prevalence of mental health and psychosocial problems in households experiencing hostility is relatively high (63% and 56%, respectively), but the prevalence among those not experiencing hostility diverges dramatically (32% in Hungary versus 16% in Moldova). These findings highlight the importance of addressing perceived hostility and its impact on mental health, through targeted, country-specific MHPSS and social cohesion interventions.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "UNHCR \r ProGres \r data \r on \r the \r 83,044 \r registered \r refugees \r in \r Thailand \r indicates \r an\nestimated \r 84 \r per \r cent \r are \r ethnic \r Karen \r and \r 12 \r per \r cent \r are \r ethnic \r Karenni. \r The\nremaining \r 4 \r per \r cent \r are \r of \r Burman, \r Shan, \r and \r Mon \r descent, \r and \r other \r groups. \r The\nmajority \r of \r registered \r refugees \r come \r from \r Kayin \r State \r (65.3 \r per \r cent), \r followed \r by\nKayah \r (14.6 \r per \r cent), \r Tanintharyi \r (7.3 \r per \r cent), \r Bago \r (5.2 \r per \r cent) \r and \r Mon \r (5 \r per\ncent). \r (Annex: \r Myanmar \r Thailand \r Border \r – \r Refugee \r Overview, \r as \r of \r end \r of \r March \r 2013)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR \r ProGres \r data"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "UNHCR \r ProGres \r data"}, {"text": "UNHCR ProGres data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR \r ProGres \r data", "confidence": 0.7532981634140015}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Securing \r durable \r solutions \r is \r fundamentally \r linked \r to \r the \r restoration \r of \r national\ncapacity \r to \r provide \r for \r the \r protection \r and \r welfare \r of \r formerly \r displaced \r communities,\nand \r UNHCR’s \r role \r should \r be \r designed \r to \r support \r such \r an \r outcome, \r through \r systematic\nengagement \r with \r key \r Government \r counterparts, \r civil \r society \r and \r other \r national\nstakeholders.\n\nNational \r authorities \r have \r primary \r responsibility \r to \r secure \r durable \r solutions \r for \r those\nwho \r have \r been \r formerly \r displaced, \r while \r UNHCR \r and \r other \r humanitarian \r and\ndevelopment \r actors \r have \r a \r complementary \r role.\n\nCo-­‐ordination \r and \r multi-­‐sector \r engagement \r is \r also \r critical \r to \r the \r sustainable\nreintegration \r of \r refugees \r and \r durable \r solutions \r for \r IDPs [8] . \r Therefore, \r mobilising \r the\n\n---\n[8] See \r UNHCR’s \r 2008 \r Policy \r on \r the \r Return \r and \r Reintegration \r of \r Refugees \r and \r IDPs, \r and \r the \r 2011 \r Secretary-­‐", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Table 13 Effects of gold production at the district level on employment**\n\nPanel A: Using production in the previous period\n(3) (4)\nnot agriworking culture\n\n(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2)\nnot agri- service or profess- manual earns works all\nworking culture sales ional work cash year\n\ngold period 0.003 -0.009** 0.003* 0.004*** -0.002 -0.001 0.008**\ndistrict (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)\n\n(4)\nagriculture\n\n(5)\nservice or\nsales\n\n(6)\nprofessional\n\n(7)\nmanual\nwork\n\n(1)\nearns\ncash\n\nobservations 19,175 19,175 19,175 19,175 19,175 19,270 15,991\nR-squared 0.207 0.327 0.127 0.137 0.037 0.213 0.278\nPANEL B. Using production in the same year\n(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2)\nnot agri- service profess- manual earns works\nworking culture or sales ional work cash all year\n\ngold year 0.012 -0.033 0.020 0.019* -0.018 -0.010 0.041***\ndistrict (0.022) (0.025) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008)\n\nobservations 19,175 19,175 19,175 19,175 19,175 19,270 15,991\nR-squared 0.207 0.327 0.128 0.137 0.037 0.213 0.278\n\n_Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and\ndistrict fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.\n\n**7.3 Investigating spillovers**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "During the 2019 Global Refugee Forum, the Government of Chad committed, among other things, to\nissuing biometric Refugee Identity Cards and Machine-Readable Refugee Convention Travel Documents\n(MRCTDs) to meet international standards. A study by the National Agency for Secure Documents (Agence\nNationale des Titres Sécurisés, ANATS), the only competent authority for issuing biometric identity and\ntravel documents, outlined a technical proposal released in March 2023 for the project’s implementation,\nbut financial resources are currently lacking to operationalize this pledge. As of 30 June 2023, no biometric\nidentity card neither CTD has been delivered by the competent national authorities (ANATS) to refugees.\n\nThe 2023 Decree specifies that CNARR and UNHCR collaboratively handle the reception and pre-registration\nof new arrivals at the international border, following the completion of police formalities. The pre-registration\nspecifically pertains to situations involving arrivals in groups. In practice, the entire registration of newly\narrived asylum-seekers remains jointly conducted by CNARR and UNHCR. This involves collecting all the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "migrants can thus in part be because a less-well-off part of the population chooses to migrate to\n\nmining areas, not that they are made worse off because of the mine activities.\n\nWe also explored a decomposition of the anthropometric results along the migration division,\n\nbut we found no important differences.\n\n**Figure 5 Diarrheal incidence among children under 5 by migration status**\n\n**Panel A Nonmigrants** **Panel B Migrants**\n\n24", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "9 These employment rates are very close to the ones from the Polish central bank surveys of Ukrainian refugees, which showed 62% in July 2023 and 68% in July 2024 (NBP, 2024). NBP (2024) age group was slightly different, describing adults as 18 years or older.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Polish central bank surveys of Ukrainian refugees"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Polish central bank surveys", "confidence": 0.6159536242485046}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Polish central bank surveys of Ukrainian refugees", "confidence": 0.11911633610725403}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "only in conjunction with policies for local procurement. Moreover, some of the mining-related\n\npapers have focused on mining in an African context, exploring a range of outcomes, including\n\nHIV-transmission and sexual risk taking (Corno and de Walque 2012; Wilson 2012), women’s\n\nempowerment (Benshaul-Tolonen 2018), infant mortality (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2019) and labor\n\nmarket outcomes (Kotsadam and Tolonen 2016). Mining is also associated with more economic\n\nactivity measured by nightlights (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2019; Mamo et al, 2019).\n\nKotsadam and Tolonen (2016) use DHS data from Africa, and find that mine openings cause\n\nwomen to shift from agriculture to service production and that women become more likely to\n\nwork for cash and year-round as opposed to seasonally. Continuing this analysis, Benshaul\n\nTolonen (2018) explores the links between mining and female empowerment in eight gold\n\nproducing countries in East and West Africa, including Ghana. Women in gold mining\n\ncommunities have more diversified labor markets opportunities, better access to health care,\n\nand are less likely to accept domestic violence. In addition, infant mortality rates decrease with\n\nup to 50% in mining communities, from very high initial levels (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2019). In\n\na study that focuses exclusively on Ghana, Aragón and Rud (2013) explore the link between", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data from Africa"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.8905313611030579}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DHS data from Africa", "confidence": 0.12834976613521576}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Land ownership remains a complex issue in the absence of a codified land law, and the general regime\nof land ownership, encompassing both formal and traditional rights, has not undergone any changes in\nthe past three years. Customary and Islamic laws continue to govern access to and control of land and\nnatural resources in urban and rural areas. While these customary systems vary considerably across the\n\nR E F U G E E P O L I C Y R E V I E W F R A M E W O R K > **R E P U B L I C O F C H A D** 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**qualification compared to Polish**\n\n**citizens.** While the proportion of\nindividuals with tertiary education among refugees is slightly higher than among Polish citizens (40% vs 38%), only 12% of refugees work as managers, professionals, and technicians (occupational groups usually requiring higher education) compared to 37% of Poles. Consequently, the wage premium for individuals with tertiary education is much lower among refugees than among Poles (22% vs 84%).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "mining companies in Ghana was 3 percent until 2010, which was the average rate for gold\n\nproduction in Africa (Gajigo, Mutambatsere, and Mdiaya 2012), but increased to 5 percent in\n\n2010 (Standing and Hilson 2013). Of this money, 80 percent goes to the general government\n\nbudget, 10 percent goes to the administration of mining oversight, and 10 percent supports\n\ndistrict administration (Garvin et al. 2009). Between 1993 and 1998, about US$17 million was\n\ndistributed to local mining communities (Aryee 2001). While considered a model of best\n\npractice, there is still a worry that the beneficial effects of allocations to the districts are\n\nundermined by elite capture and corruption at the district level (Standing and Hilson 2013). For\n\nour analysis, the scheme implies that it may be necessary to conduct a district-level analysis in\n\naddition to the more local-level analyses.\n\n12 currently active mines dominate the sector, and there are an additional five suspended mines\n\nthat have been in production in recent decades. Table 1 presents a full list of the mines, the year\n\nthey opened, and their status as of December 2012. Company name and country are for the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Refugees from Ukraine are not yet utilising their full potential in the Polish labour market. In May 2022, 46% of arriving refugees declared that they had no knowledge of the Polish language (NBP, 2023). Over time, this percentage improved, with data from November 2022 showing a result of 21%, though this still represents a large group of people who do not know the local language [24], placing them at risk of limiting possible jobs to those below their educational level. Nearly 40% of Refugees from Ukraine insured at ZUS on 30th June 2023 in Poland were employed in elementary occupations [25], while for all employed persons in Q2 2023 this percentage was only 5%. Furthermore, the Deloitte Ukraine Refugee Pulse report indicates that 50% of respondents point to language barriers as an obstacle to accessing services to meet basic needs (Deloitte, 2023). Meanwhile, in the MSNA Poland 2023 survey, when asked about encountered barriers for accessing the labour market, 34% of respondents pointed to lack of language knowledge.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey", "confidence": 0.8948134183883667}, {"text": "Deloitte Ukraine Refugee Pulse report", "confidence": 0.49681177735328674}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**migrants was challenging to quantify.**\nSince the onset of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014, there was a consistent influx of Ukrainians into Poland.\nMany of them sought work as Ukraine’s economy declined and the currency devalued. Most of the migrants came as guest workers, a status brought in by a 2011 law enabling Ukrainians and five other nations to work in Poland for six months Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on Polish Border Guard Headquarter and PESEL data.\n\nPESEL-UKR data Total entries-exits of the Polish-Ukrainian border during a year without a work permit, based on an employer’s declaration. This was a circular migration, with Ukrainians coming to Poland for half of the year, then returning to Ukraine for another six months, and coming back to Poland. The data on employers’ declarations do not reveal the actual number of Ukrainian citizens who followed this system – a single person could hold several declarations, because with every change of employer or promotion at the same employer they had to ask for a new declaration. What is more, with stays shorter than one year,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "PESEL-UKR data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL data", "confidence": 0.864730954170227}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "data on employers’ declarations", "confidence": 0.15071897208690643}]}}}
{"input": "Increased competition on the labour market could partially offset benefits from refugees. Although (due to a tight labour market) increase in labour force is almost entirely absorbed into working force, there should be slight increase in unemployment rate. Ultimately, it is estimated that it was higher by 0.14-0.25 pp. in 2022 and by 0.18-0.3 pp in 2023 which corresponds to respectively 24-42 thousand and 33-54 thousand additional people being unemployed [45] . In the long run, the unemployment rate should remain higher by 0.15-0.3 pp. Because of that, it is estimated that growth of real wages was slower in 2022 and 2023. It is estimated that due to the influx of refugees, real wages were lower in 2022 by 0.45-0.85% and in 2023 by 0.65-1.15%. Although in effect this is negative, it also means lower inflationary pressure from the labour market in the short term. Long-term real wages should be around 0.55-1.0% lower than in a scenario without refugees.\nThat said, the actual labour market effect is likely to be null as evidenced by econometric studies (Gromadzki and Lewandowski, 2023; Peri, 2014), which are elaborated on in Chapter 4. Gromadzki and Lewandowski (2023) in the early months of 2022 find no effect of Ukrainian refugees on earnings, employment, and unemployment rate of natives and other immigrants, except an actual slight positive impact on the wages of native women.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n# **1.** Inflow of refugees from Ukraine into Poland\n\n##### Even before the 2022 full-scale war in Ukraine the number of Ukrainians in Poland was substantial and growing, although their precise number is difficult to measure.\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Chart 1.** Ukrainian workers with social insurance.\n\nRate of change (right axis) Number (left axis)\n\n**Source:** Deloitte own elaboration based on ZUS data.\n\n1000 750 500 250 0 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%\n\n-20%", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ZUS data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ZUS data", "confidence": 0.9532240629196167}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**higher productivity.** In a simplistic\nsupply-demand framework, the influx of Ukrainian refugees would have had a negative impact on Polish workers employment or caused a decline in real wages. However, this has not occurred.\nFirst, Polish citizens employment rates have grown, and unemployment rates have fallen. Second, poviats in which the employment share of Ukrainian refugees has grown by 1 pp. saw 0.5 pp. higher employment rates among Polish citizens, and 0.3 pp. lower unemployment rates.\nThird, there is no evidence of lowered wages, in fact the limited available data indicates that a higher share of Ukrainian refugees in a poviat may have caused local wages to rise. Such findings are in line with academic literature, which documents a positive impact of migrants on native workers. With foreigners entering the 04 Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Addressing the remaining issues of**\n\n**refugee integration into the labour**\n\n**market would improve their situation**\n\n**and further benefit the Polish**\n\n**economy.** The key measures to improve\nrefugees' standing include advanced language courses for professionals, easing of occupational licensing, especially requirements based on citizenship, and active labour market policies to help specific groups enter the labour market.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "limited available data", "confidence": 0.7933400869369507}]}}}
{"input": "## **Works cited**\n\n[1] UNHCR, ‘Global Report 2023 - Executive Summary’, UNHCR, Geneva, Jun. 2024. Accessed: Jul. 13, 2024. [Online]. Available:\nhttps://reporting.unhcr.org/global-report-2023-executive-summary\n\n[2] UNHCR, ‘This is our home: stateless minorities and their search for citizenship’, 2017, [Online]. Available:\nhttps://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/UNHCR_EN2_2017IBELONG_Report_ePub.pdf\n\n[3] D. S. Weissbrodt and C. Collins, ‘The Human Rights of Stateless Persons’, _hrq_, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 245–276, Feb. 2006, doi:\n10.1353/hrq.2006.0013.\n\n[4] E. Abuya, ‘Out of the Shadows: towards ensuring the rights of stateless persons and persons at risk of statelessness in Kenya’, Kenya\nNational Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) and UNHCR, Nairobi, Jul. 2010. [Online]. Available:\nhttps://www.unhcr.org/media/out-shadows-towards-ensuring-rights-stateless-persons-and-persons-risk-statelessness-kenya\n\n[5] B. Blitz and M. Lynch, ‘Statelessness and the Benefits of Citizenship: A Comparative Study.’, _Statelessness and Citizenship: A Comparative_\n_Study on the Benefits of Nationality_, Jan. 2011.\n\n[6] S. W. Goodman, ‘Citizenship Studies: Policy Causes and Consequences’, _Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci._, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 135–152, Jun. 2023, doi:\n10.1146/annurev-polisci-051921-102729.\n\n[7] UNHCR, ‘High-Level Segment on Statelessness: Results and Highlights’. Accessed: Oct. 10, 2024. [Online]. Available:\nhttps://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/high-level-segment-on-statelessness-results-and-highlights/", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "REGIONAL BUREAU OF SOUTHERN AFRICA\n\nPROTECTION MONITORING DASHBOARD ON INCIDENTS IN DRC AND MOZAMBIQUE\n\nAs of 30 September 2022\n\nMAP SHOWING THE NUMBER OF REPORTED PROTECTION INCIDENTS PER\n\nProvince in Mozambique\n\n(MOZ) covered by\nprotection monitoring", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PROTECTION MONITORING DASHBOARD", "confidence": 0.3359244763851166}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland An ageing population coupled with a growing economy causes labour shortages. Despite falling number of available workers, the Polish economy is growing steadily, as it modernises and converges to the level of development of old EU Member States. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, real GDP growth averaged 3.7% during the last decade. As a result, due to steady demand for labour since 2019, the harmonised unemployment rate in Poland has not exceeded 4%, oscillating around 3% in recent years. According to Eurostat data, in September 2023, harmonized unemployment in Poland reached 2.8%, the same level as Malta. In the entire EU, only the Czech Republic reached a lower level: 2.7%.\nVacancies stood at record heights before", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Eurostat data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Eurostat data", "confidence": 0.9545435309410095}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE For households with a member with disability, health was the top priority with 56% of households reporting this as priority need compared to 30% of those without disability. Likewise, 45% of households with chronic illnesses identified healthcare access as their top priority, whereas households without chronically ill members ranked it fourth, with only 22% considering it a priority need. This indicates a modest decrease compared to 2023 when 58% of households with a member with disability and 48% of those with individuals with a chronic illness cited health as their top priority.\n\n### **Need to access** **health care**\n\nRegionally, 31% of individuals experienced health problems 30 days prior to the survey and needed to access health care. The reported experience of health problems was higher among under-fives (37%) and those over the age of 60 (60%), and it was higher among women above 18 years (36%) compared to men (31%). The discrepancies between women and men in terms of experiencing a health problem is particularly pronounced in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, where the rates of experiencing a health problem are 10% higher among women compared to men.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "a 22 percent increase in service sector participation. However, this effect is only statistically\n\nsignificant at the 10 percent level, possibly due to the small sample size within that distance.\n\nThis is in contrast to the dummy for 0-20 km which is insignificant, pointing highly localized\n\neffects on service sector employment for women. Using distance bin of 30 km, we estimate\n\nzero treatment effect on the probability of service sector employment. Panel B of figure 4 shows\n\nthe results for cash-earning opportunities, and similarly, we estimate positive treatment effects\n\nwithin 20 km.\n\nIn panel C of Figure 4, infant mortality is re-estimated using different distance spans. The\n\ndecrease in child mortality decreases almost linearly with the increase in distance bins, an\n\nindication that the effects are only found close to a mine. The largest drop, and the only\n\nsignificantly negative drop, is found for the distance bin 0–20 km.\n\n**Figure 4 Varying the cutoff distance: Service sector employment, cash earnings, and infant**\n\n**mortality**\n\n**Panel A Service and sales** **Panel B Cash earnings            Panel C Infant mortality**\n\n20", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "distance bin", "confidence": 0.32857367396354675}]}}}
{"input": "to factors other than productivity growth, this is unlikely. Any negative impact could only arise if other workers left the labour force or reduced their working hours. No evidence of this is seen in recent Eurostat’s Labour Force Survey data for the Polish economy, where activity rates continued to grow, while the average number of usual weekly hours worked in full- and parttime employment remained fairly stable, particularly for women (who should be closer substitutes for Ukrainian refugees, most of whom are also women; see charts below).\n\nAnalysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Eurostat’s Labour Force Survey data for the Polish economy"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Labour Force Survey", "confidence": 0.23603084683418274}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Eurostat’s Labour Force Survey data", "confidence": 0.12458965927362442}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Labour Force Survey data", "confidence": 0.15283221006393433}]}}}
{"input": "At 44, she arrived in Poland from Kyiv on March 9, 2022, with her 7-year-old daughter, Viktoria, and 5-year-old son, Timur. “I came to the job fair to find a position in my field of expertise. I’m not afraid of physical work, but as the sole provider for my family of three, I need a more stable and better-paying job,” she explains.\n\n© UNHCR/Anna Liminowicz\n\n**2**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "from Ukraine has increased from 61% to 69%, while their unemployment rate has halved from 15% to 8%. Second, median net wage of Ukrainian refugees grew from PLN 3,100 to PLN 4,000, i.e. by 29%. While half of this wage growth came from the overall high earnings growth in the country due to high inflation (gross wages in the general economy grew by 15% [8] ), it was still a major improvement. Gross wage gains appear lower, with ZUS social insurance contributions data for the period from June 30, 2023 and June 30, 2024 showing an increase of 18% (compared to 15% for Polish citizens). As of June 30, 2024, only 44% of ZUS-insured Ukrainian refugees had an employment contract (compared to 82% of Polish citizens). Many may opt for civil law contracts and self-employment to limit their social insurance contributions to the level of minimum wage.\n\n7 Together with refugees working remotely in Ukraine, their income from work would add up to 80% in the SEIS survey.\n\n8 From Q2 2023 to Q2 2024, https://stat.gov.pl/en/latest-statistical-news/communications-and-announcements/list-of-communiques-and-announcements/averagegross-wage-in-the-second-quarter-2024,281,43.html 14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ZUS social insurance contributions data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey", "confidence": 0.9089257717132568}, {"text": "ZUS social insurance contributions data", "confidence": 0.6408759355545044}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ZUS social insurance contributions data", "confidence": 0.39269575476646423}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Importantly, support with accommodation expenses reduces the calculated poverty rate of refugees from Ukraine to 32% (from 50%) if it is considered to be an indirect source of income [9] . This essentially means that rental aid, in whatever form it is provided, allows over a third of low-income [10] households to de facto live above the poverty line.\nIn Slovakia this effect is the most dramatic – subsidized housing allows an additional 46% of the refugee population to escape poverty.\n\n**DECREASE IN THE REFUGEE POVERTY RATE AS A RESULT**\n\n**OF ACCOMMODATION RENT SUPPORT, %** **[1,2,3]**\n\nNot adoping coping strategies Stress coping Crisis coping Emergency strategies strategies coping strategies Without accommodation rent support\n\n1. The statistic on emergency strategies may have been affected by\nthe survey wording on illegal work\n\n---\n[10] Those that are below the poverty line", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey wording on illegal work", "confidence": 0.43458396196365356}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey wording on illegal work", "confidence": 0.10598625987768173}]}}}
{"input": "**Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland** **Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland**\n\n# Table of contents\n\nAbstract 04 Non-technical summary 06 Introduction 11\n\n**1.** Inflow of refugees from Ukraine into Poland 12\n\n**2.** Situation of refugees from Ukraine on the labour market in Poland 16\n\n**3.** Economic impact modelling 30\n\n**4.** Unaccounted positive externalities 38\n\nConclusions 41 Appendix. Model Calibration 42 Bibliography 44 This publication has been produced in cooperation with UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency.The content of this publication is the sole responsibility of Deloitte and may not reflect the views of UNHCR.\n\n02 03", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "22 Deloitte own calculations based on Informacja kwartalna o stanie fnansów publicznych - Ministerstwo Finansów - Portal Gov.pl for respective years. The general government income share in GDP in 2024 was calculated based on the data for Q1–Q3 and based on that total general government income was calculated using forecast for GDP from Wytyczne dotyczące wskaźników makroekonomicznych - Ministerstwo Finansów - Portal Gov.pl.\n\n23 Model treats general government sector as a whole, as such cost and income internal structure may differ creating institutions with financial loses while other may have disproportionate increase of income.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "wskaźników makroekonomicznych", "confidence": 0.15651343762874603}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data for Q1–Q3", "confidence": 0.39482951164245605}, {"text": "forecast for GDP from Wytyczne dotyczące wskaźników makroekonomicznych", "confidence": 0.20028437674045563}, {"text": "Informacja kwartalna o stanie fnansów publicznych", "confidence": 0.12030094861984253}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "4. Access to National Public Services\n\nhealth planning documents.\n\nThe 2019 agreement between the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the Ministry of Health, regarding the\nprogressive integration of camp health centres into the national health system, has facilitated the inclusion\nof all camp health centres in the national system, with the assignment of a healthcare worker to each of\nthese centres, who is included on the Government payroll. The remaining personnel are still supported\nby UNHCR through its partners. This support from UNHCR remains necessary because access to quality\nGovernment led healthcare is still limited due to a shortage of healthcare professionals, medication, health\ninfrastructure, and equipment, as well as high costs.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Certain employment barriers naturally become more pronounced when singling out certain demographics. Some 17% of adults living in households with young children (aged 0 to 11) report lack of childcare as a difficulty with peaks when the youngest child is between 3 and 4. Fifteen percent of those previously employed in the health sector and 14% in the education sector report skills recognition as a barrier.\n\nGenerally, analyzing employment in the host country through the lens of prior work experience offers valuable insights. Estimated unemployment is highest, at 33%, for those who were not employed in Ukraine prior to relocation. Among those who were employed, individuals working in administrative work faced the greatest challenge in transitioning, likely due to elevated local language\n\n**7**\n\nDo not know the local language Lack of decent employment opportunities Lack of employment opportunities for my skills Lack of employment opportunities for my age Lack of childcare services Lack of education/skills recognition Need to take care of others\n\n1. Multiple answers were possible\n\n52% 41% 27% 14% 11% 11% 10%", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "distance. We divide the plane into 10-km distance bins and estimate the model with a full set\n\nof distance bin dummies.\n\n𝑌��� - 𝛽� �� 𝛽�𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒�� 𝛽�𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒� ∙𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒� ∝�� 𝑔� �𝜆𝑋� �𝜀���\n\n�𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒�� 𝛽�𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒� ∙𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒� ∝�� 𝑔� �𝜆𝑋� �𝜀��� �2�\n\n-\n\nfor d ∈ {0–10, 10–20, …, 80–90}.\n\nThis method, in addition to varying the cutoff point in the baseline estimation strategy, allows\n\nus to identify in more detail the spatial structure of the data. Using this method, we can support\n\nour choice of baseline cutoff distance.\n\nTwo limitations to both individual level analysis are that (i) clusters are not repeatedly sampled,\n\nso cluster fixed effects cannot be included, (ii) the data is not representative below the regional\n\nlevel and no weighting can be undertaken to ensure representability.\n\n**4.2 District-level analysis**\n\nWhile the estimation strategy in (1) captures some spillovers beyond the 20 km, and strategy\n\n(2) maps the economic footprint of the mine up to 100 km, it does not capture district-level\n\n12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "distance bin dummies", "confidence": 0.15126390755176544}]}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE underscores the need to further explore how combinations of support types contribute to better outcomes and how service accessibility and quality can be optimized across different settings.\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WHO RECEIVED INFORMAL VS FORMAL**\n\n**MENTAL HEALTH AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT SERVICES**\n\n**AND REPORT IMPROVEMENT**\n\nYes Slight No No worsening Only formal Only informal Both None Other (N=1,662) 34% 29% 40% 33% 46% 54% 62% 51% 57% 11% 9%", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Table 11 Using GLSS: Employment on extensive and intensive margin and wages**\n\n(6)\nminer\n\n(5)\nservice\nand sales\n\n(4)\nagriculture\n\n(3)\nhours\nworked\nper week\n\n(1)\nworked\nlast year\n\n(2)\nwork 7\ndays\n\nPanel A: Women\n_1. baseline_\n\nactive*mine -0.067* -0.032 3.565 -0.075 0.074 0.025\n(0.040) (0.038) (3.140) (0.064) (0.054) (0.016)\n\n_2. drop 20-40 km_\n\nactive*mine -0.062 -0.039 3.849 -0.076 0.094* 0.026*\n(0.040) (0.039) (3.359) (0.064) (0.057) (0.015)\n\n_3. drop 2 years before_\n\nactive*mine -0.067* -0.031 3.565 -0.087 0.080 0.024\n(0.040) (0.038) (3.140) (0.065) (0.055) (0.016)\n\n_4. mine FE_\n\nactive*mine -0.067 -0.012 8.560* -0.084 0.104 0.025*\n(0.051) (0.048) (5.125) (0.075) (0.065) (0.015)\n\n_5. mine clustering_\n\nactive*mine -0.067* -0.032 3.565 -0.075 0.074 0.025\n(0.032) (0.036) (3.521) (0.081) (0.080) (0.022)\n\nMean dep var. 0.727 0.673 40.39 42.32 0.391 0.005\nPanel B: Men\n_1. baseline_ -0.086** -0.055 3.705 -0.058 -0.032 0.125***\nactive*mine (0.041) (0.039) (3.460) (0.066) (0.036) (0.043)\n\n_2. drop 20-40 km_\n\nactive*mine -0.094** -0.062 3.893 -0.064 -0.031 0.126***\n(0.042) (0.040) (3.842) (0.066) (0.038) (0.042)\n\n_3. drop 2 years before_\n\nactive*mine -0.094** -0.062 3.708 -0.071 -0.026 0.125***\n(0.041) (0.039) (3.459) (0.067) (0.036) (0.043)\n\n_4. mine FE_\n\nactive*mine -0.123** -0.094* 8.233 -0.068 -0.049 0.113**\n(0.057) (0.051) (5.425) (0.075) (0.044) (0.045)\n\n_5. mine clustering_", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GLSS", "confidence": 0.8793226480484009}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**average or gross earnings.** The median\nnet earnings of Ukrainian refugees in Q2 2024 were PLN 4,000 in SEIS, and PLN 3,767 in NBP (2024) surveys. This is 84% and 79% of the national median, respectively. This estimate would be most likely lower, if data allowed us to look at average or gross earnings. First, a comparison of average instead of median earnings would show a larger gap between Ukrainian refugees and all workers in the economy, as the national average is inflated by top incomes, which are less often earned by Ukrainian refugees than", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS surveys"}, {"text": "NBP (2024) surveys"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "NBP (2024) surveys", "confidence": 0.7109332084655762}, {"text": "SEIS", "confidence": 0.6706416010856628}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1. Host Communities\n\n### **RPRF Policy Dimensions**\n\n(as of 30 June 2023)\n\n### **1. Host Communities**\n\n**1.1** **Support for communities in refugee-hosting areas**\n\nThere has been little change since June 2020 in this domain and no specific national fiscal or budget policy\nis yet in place to provide additional financial transfers to areas most affected by the presence of refugees.\nFinancial contributions for these areas still rely on projects and programs funded by external donors.\n\nThe government’s priorities remain focused on: (i) Defence and security, peace, social cohesion and national\nreconciliation; (ii) Good governance and the rule of Law; and (iii) Return to constitutional order. In practice,\nregarding transfers from central to local level, the Government of Chad continues to allocate twenty\npercent of its budget to security, excluding other social sectors, amid ongoing challenges from conflicts in\nneighboring countries, and economic and climatic crises.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Refugees access Indonesia through the air and sea. Many refugees in Indonesia, particularly Rohingya\ntraveling by boats, are facilitated in their travel and arrive in the country with the assistance of agents.\nIn previous years, many Rohingya who arrived in Indonesia by sea – approximately 80% - departed\nsoon after arrival to Malaysia, where a large Rohingya community resides and more robust\nemployment opportunities, albeit informal opportunities, exist. UNHCR is extremely concerned about\ncredible reports that refugees in Indonesia – particularly Rohingya in Aceh and North Sumatra – are\nbeing victimized by traffickers during their journey to Indonesia or during onward movement after\narrival in the country.  Refugees have reported numerous protection incidents that took place during\ntheir movement to, through, and from Indonesia, including gender-based violence, physical abuse,\nexploitation, harassment, intimidation, forced movement, and extortion. UNHCR monitors the\nmovement of refugees to assess trends and identify protection risks, to engage with Indonesian\nauthorities to respond to reports of trafficking, and to counsel on the risks of onward movement.\n\n### **Ensuring Protection with Resource Limitations**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Preparedness \r activities \r will \r continue \r and \r will \r be \r strengthened, \r including \r assistance \r to\nspontaneous \r return. \r As \r patterns \r of \r spontaneous \r returns \r to \r specific \r locations \r emerge, \r in\nparticular \r with \r the \r return \r of \r entire \r households, \r UNHCR \r will \r enhance \r its \r assistance \r to\nreturnees \r and \r their \r communities \r though \r an \r integrated \r multi-­‐sector \r package \r of\ninterventions \r with \r the \r aim \r of \r building \r confidence \r without \r creating \r an \r artificial \r ‘pull’\nfactor. \r UNHCR \r will \r aim \r to \r play \r a \r leading \r role \r in \r bringing \r partners \r together \r to \r address\nthe \r identified \r needs, \r in \r the \r area \r of \r legal, \r physical \r and \r material \r safety, \r collectively \r and \r in\nan \r integrated \r manner.\n\n**10.3.** **Phase \r 3: \r Refugee \r repatriation \r and \r initial \r reintegration \r operations**\n\nPrevious \r phases \r activities \r will \r be \r further \r strengthened \r and \r operationalized \r with \r a\nfocus \r on \r providing \r immediate \r relief \r assistance \r to \r newly \r returned \r refugees \r while\nenhancing \r early \r recovery \r and \r development \r partnerships. \r Activities \r specific \r to \r this\nphase \r will \r include:\n\n- Provision \r of \r immediate \r relief \r assistance \r such \r as \r food, \r non-­‐food \r items \r and\nshelter \r in \r accordance \r with \r international \r standards \r and \r any \r nationally \r agreed\nhumanitarian \r standards. \r Particular \r support \r will \r be \r provided \r to \r the \r most\nvulnerable \r previously \r identified \r through \r a \r referral \r mechanism \r with \r the \r country\nof \r asylum.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "we use a cutoff distance of 20 km, we assume there is little economic footprint beyond that\n\ndistance. Of course, any such distance is arbitrarily chosen, which is why we try different\n\nspecifications to explore the spatial heterogeneity by varying this distance (using 10 km, 20 km,\n\nthrough 50 km) as well as a spatial lag structure (using 0 to 10 km, 10 to 20 km, through 40 to\n\n50 km distance bins). [4]\n\nSecond, we collapse the DHS mining data at the district level. [5] The number of districts has\n\nchanged over time in Ghana, because districts with high population growth have been split into\n\nsmaller districts. To avoid endogeneity concerns, we use the baseline number of districts that\n\nexisted at the start of our analysis period, which are 137. Eleven of these districts have industrial\n\nmining. Because some mines are close to district boundaries, we additionally test whether there\n\nis an effect in neighboring districts.\n\n**3.1 Resource data**\n\nThe Raw Materials Data are from InterraRMG (2013). The data set contains information on\n\npast or current industrial mines. All mines have information on annual production volumes,\n\nownership structure, and GPS coordinates on location. We complete this data with exact\n\n---\n[4] The distances are radii from mine center point, and form concentric circles around the mine.\n[5] The DHS and the GLSS data are representative at the regional level, and not at the district level. Since the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Raw Materials Data"}, {"text": "DHS mining data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "GLSS data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS mining data", "confidence": 0.8373991250991821}, {"text": "GLSS data", "confidence": 0.2760985493659973}, {"text": "Raw Materials Data", "confidence": 0.16649341583251953}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Raw Materials Data are from InterraRMG", "confidence": 0.138898104429245}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "work. This indicates, possibly, that the economy becomes more reliant on cash as a mine starts\n\nproducing. It is possible that the difference from the main results presented in table 4 indicates\n\nthat agricultural workers are overrepresented among the bottom 40 percent in mining\n\ncommunities. However, given the issues associated with doing this analysis with repeated cross\n\nsection, we should be cautious in interpreting these results.\n\n**6.5 Heterogeneous results, sensitivity and intensity of mining**\n\nIn panel B (urban) of table A3 (Annex), we interact our treatment variables ( _active*mine_, _mine_,\n\n_active_ ) with an indicator variable for whether the locality is urban. This allows us to pick up\n\npotential differential effects across urban compared to rural localities. None of the treatment\n\neffects are statistically significantly different between rural and urban areas. [16] In panel C, we\n\nhave constructed a new treatment variable _#active*mines_ that counts the number of actively\n\nproducing mines within 20 km. Women are sampled within 20 km of one mine (593 women),\n\nwithin 20 km of two mines (137 women), and within 20 km of three mines (64 women). The\n\n---\n[16] Few of the other interaction coefficients are also statistically significant. The interaction between _urban*mine_", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "18-59 female and male 60+ female and male two 18-59 or 60+ females other households 18-59 female with one or more 60+ individuals two 18-59 females 18-59 female and male other households 0.3% 7.4%\n\n**10. Katowice** 11,591\n\nNote that poviat-level population does not include Ukrainian refugees, who were added to calculate their appropriate shares.\n\nSource: Deloitte own elaboration based on the PESEL database as of September 2024 and GUS population data as of mid-2024.\n\n#### **1.3 Households income sources**\n\nNote: Some groups that constituted less than 2% of households have been omitted.\n\nSource: Deloitte own elaboration based on SEIS (May-June 2024) UNHCR (2024) survey.\n\n**The majority of refugees settled in**\n\n**major cities, especially Warsaw and**\n\n**Wroclaw, and their vicinities.** Eight most\npopulous poviats in Poland [5] comprising 16% of the host population, are also the top eight poviats in terms of the number of Ukrainian refugees, 29% of whom reside there. This shows that Ukrainian refugees are more concentrated in the largest cities than the host population, as they migrated to the most attractive\n\n---\n[5] Seven cities and Poznański poviat.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL database"}, {"text": "GUS population data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PESEL database", "confidence": 0.8897783756256104}, {"text": "GUS population data", "confidence": 0.6694628596305847}, {"text": "SEIS", "confidence": 0.293415904045105}, {"text": "UNHCR (2024) survey", "confidence": 0.11175128072500229}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "GUS population data", "confidence": 0.12840178608894348}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "geographic location data from MineAtlas (2013), where satellite imagery shows the actual mine\n\nboundaries, which allows us to identify and update the center point of each mine. The\n\nproduction data and ownership information are double-checked against the companies’ annual\n\nreports.\n\nFor Ghana, this exercise results in 17 industrial mines tracked over time. We have annual\n\nproduction levels from 1990 until 2012. As mentioned, Table 1 shows the mining companies\n\nactive in Ghana during recent decades, with opening and closing years (although some were\n\nclosed in between, and are not presented in the table). Figure 2 shows the geographic\n\ndistribution of these mines.\n\n**Figure 2 Gold mines and DHS clusters in Ghana**\n\n**Panel A Gold mines and 20 km buffer zones Panel B Gold mines, DHS clusters, and 100 km buffer zones**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MineAtlas (2013)"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "geographic location data from MineAtlas", "confidence": 0.2656596601009369}, {"text": "production data and ownership information", "confidence": 0.12305887043476105}], "vague_data": [{"text": "geographic location data", "confidence": 0.10042062401771545}]}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n#### **Productivity shock rationale**\n\nAs Ukrainian refugees entered the labour market, the economy adapted in line with expectations based on scientific literature, resulting in greater specialisation and higher productivity. In a simplistic supply-demand framework akin to the “canonical model”, the influx of Ukrainian refugees should have caused some Polish workers to become unemployed or leave the labour force, or real wages to fall.\nEven in the Deloitte D.Climate model, Ukrainian refugees add 0.4 percentage points to the unemployment rate and lower real wages by 1.35% in 2024 when it is not counterbalanced by an additional positive productivity shock. However, this is not what we observe in empirical data. First, Polish citizens employment", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Deloitte D.Climate model", "confidence": 0.11772298067808151}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "empirical data", "confidence": 0.9644951820373535}]}}}
{"input": "**Ukrainian refugees who were outside the labour force before**\n\n**coming to Poland.** We have demonstrated that Ukrainian refugees\nwho managed the household or engaged in other non-workrelated tasks before arriving in Poland, are much more likely to be unemployed. ALMPs could be targeted at supporting this group and increasing its employment opportunities.\n\nincrease corresponds to wage increase, this intervention would add PLN 2.5 billion in value to the economy. This should be considered a lower-bound estimate, as it understates potential benefits. In part, the higher productivity of workers may boost employer profits, further enhanced by increased investment. As far as improved language skills are concerned, we do not anticipate a significant negative impact on wages due to increased competition.\nEnhancing language fluency is one way to address occupational downgrading. To avoid double counting, we estimated that around PLN 1 billion has been already included in the previously estimated gains from reduced downgrading.\n\n**A further increase in labour**\n\n**participation of refugees would**\n\n**yield significant macroeconomic**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "and might understate their presence.\nThe only hard data on these flows is the number of Ukrainian workers with social insurance, which nevertheless understates the numbers, as certain kinds of legal work often undertaken by temporary employees did not require it, and some Ukrainians worked in the shadow economy.\nThe number of workers with Ukrainian citizenship and social insurance increased from just 33 thousand at the end of 2013, to 500 thousand on 30th September 2019, and 627 thousand at the end of 2021. Some of this increase reflects the transitioning of Ukrainians to more regular work arrangements and securing of work permits. The yearly rate of the number of registrations peaked at 106% at the end of 2015, and even with the recent refugee inflow never reached such a high pace again. The most recent data from 30th September 2023 counts 753 thousand workers with Ukrainian citizenship registered for social security, including 225 thousand refugees.\n\n**Source:** Deloitte own elaboration based on ZUS data. Quarter 3 2023 shows the most recent\ndata available.\n\n13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ZUS data", "confidence": 0.9154132604598999}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "country before the full-scale war began.\nThe document primarily includes residency rights and housing access, labour market access, social welfare and medical assistance, as well as access to education and legal guardianship for unaccompanied children and teenagers. Additionally, Ukrainian nationals that become admitted to EU territory are free to move across it for 90 days and are able to choose any EU country where they will make use of the temporary protection. The directive was initially introduced for one year – until 4th March 2023, however in September 2023 it was extended for a second time to remain active until 4th March 2025.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Power BI Desktop Government Leadership Ensuring a whole of governmental approach with oversight and involvement is crucial for successfully identifying and implementing solutions. Effective leadership and coordination at the national and local levels are necessary to ensure systematic inclusion of displacement-affected communities (DACs) across government priorities and planning processes, as well as successfully implementing durable solutions programs.\nPathway #1:", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Systematic \r engagement \r with \r key \r actors \r facilitating \r and \r supporting \r the \r peace \r process,\nsuch \r as \r MPC, \r is \r also \r required. \r This \r will \r ensure \r that \r issues \r affecting \r the \r rights \r and\nwelfare \r of \r IDPs \r and \r returning \r refugees \r are \r appropriately \r addressed \r in \r peace\nnegotiations \r and \r peace-­‐building \r programmes \r and \r initiatives \r such \r as \r the \r MPC-­‐led \r Joint\nPeace-­‐building \r Need \r Assessment \r (JPNA), \r and \r that \r displaced \r populations, \r including\nwomen, \r have \r the \r opportunity \r to \r participate \r in \r these \r processes.\n\nEfforts \r will \r also \r be \r required \r to \r ensure \r that \r durable \r solutions \r are \r mainstreamed \r in \r the\nimplementation \r of \r the \r UN \r Strategic \r Framework \r for \r Myanmar \r for \r 2013 \r to \r 2015, \r and\nnational \r development \r plans \r and \r programmes \r as \r means \r of \r catalysing \r interventions \r by\ndevelopment \r agencies. \r Relevant \r funding \r opportunities, \r such \r as \r the \r Peace \r Building \r Fund\n(PBF), \r should \r also \r be \r pursued.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Gender analyses revealed that 90% of women and 84% of men reported improvement. Respondents reported that, among children under 18, 85% demonstrated some form of improvement, 13% no improvement, and 2% worsening. Outcomes for children varied by age and gender, with 98% of adolescent girls (12-17 years) showing improvement compared to 78% of boys in the same age group, while among younger children (5-11 years), 83% of girls and 77% of boys showed improvement. Among adults, positive outcomes were relatively consistent 5-11 12-17 18-34 35-59 60+ years old (N=1,661)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Poverty is associated with tangibly inferior living conditions, worse healthcare coverage,**\n\n**more frequently children being out of school, and having to skip meals**\n\nRefugee households with members living in poverty were found to more often not report feeling safe when walking alone in their neighborhood after dark (18% vs 10% for those not at risk), to significantly more frequently live in collective housing (27% vs 8%), and to feel under pressure to leave their accommodation (29% vs 11%).\n\nSimilarly, those with an income below the poverty line were substantially more likely to report lacking separate showers or toilets, having insufficient privacy, being unable to cook or store food in their dwelling.\n\nTwenty percent of respondents in the poverty group said they were unable to access needed medical services over the last 30 days and roughly the same percentage said they were forced to reduce essential health expenditures (including buying drugs) because of lack of funds. Almost half of those missing out on medical support cited unaffordable fees at their clinic or hospital as one of the main reasons.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Note:_ Figure 4 shows the main treatment coefficients using the baseline estimation strategy (with DHS individuallevel data; see table 4 for more information), but with different distance cutoffs (10 km, 20 km, 30 km, 40 km, and\n50 km). *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.\n\nThe results above suggest substantial heterogeneity in outcomes and highlights the importance\n\nto explore spatial heterogeneity in the results. In the following sections we explore plausible\n\nexplanations for these outcomes.\n\n**5.4 Difference-in-differences at the district level**\n\nThe results for female employment in the district-level analysis are shown in table 6.\n\nAgricultural work decreases for women in mining districts and manual work increases.\n\nFollowing from this, the likelihood that a woman is working year-round increases. [11] This is\n\nsimilar to what we saw in the individual-level regressions, but the results are now statistically\n\nsignificant.\n\n**Table 6 Effects of mine opening at the district level on female employment**\n\n(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)\n\nnot agri- service profess- manual earns works\n\nworking culture or sales ional work cash all year\n\nActive district 0.019 -0.085** 0.034 -0.018** 0.050** -0.021 0.054*\n(0.027) (0.042) (0.030) (0.008) (0.020) (0.049) (0.032)\n\n---\n[11] Working year-round is derived from a question if the woman works occasionally, all year or seasonally.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS individuallevel data"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DHS individual-level data"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "DHS individual level data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS individuallevel data", "confidence": 0.789184033870697}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In the model, shocks were calibrated using data for 2022-2024. In the case of 2022, we adjusted the data to reflect refugee arrivals after February, fixing their share at roughly 2.6 percent of the population per PESEL registry figures. We then calibrated refugee employment to match the NBP’s 2022 survey (NBP, 2024), the UNHCR’s 2023 MSNA, and the 2024 SEIS survey - implying their employment share rose from 1.5 percent to 2.4 percent of total employment in Poland. To keep the regional labour supply balance, equivalent offsets were applied in the broader Eastern Europe aggregate. [35] Furthermore, it was assumed that refugees have higher spending needs and thus a lower saving rate than other earners in Poland for 2022 and 2023. Moreover, according to National Bank of Ukraine data, the consumption of Ukrainian refugees has been partially financed by savings in Ukrainian banks in 2022 and 2023, which was modelled as them having a negative saving rate, while being offset by lowering investment levels in Eastern Europe. [36] By 2024, it was assumed that their situation on the labour market had stabilised and that there had been no further changes in their savings.\n\n---\n[35] Aggregate region in the D.Climate model, that consists of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.\n[36] In other words, it was assumed that money that would be spent e.g. through credit action for investments in Eastern Europe were spent for consumption in Poland.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "NBP’s 2022 survey"}, {"text": "2024 SEIS survey"}, {"text": "UNHCR’s 2023 MSNA"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "PESEL registry figures"}, {"text": "National Bank of Ukraine data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "NBP’s 2022 survey", "confidence": 0.4775845408439636}, {"text": "2024 SEIS survey", "confidence": 0.4141823649406433}, {"text": "National Bank of Ukraine data", "confidence": 0.39670228958129883}, {"text": "PESEL registry figures", "confidence": 0.3028288781642914}, {"text": "UNHCR’s 2023 MSNA", "confidence": 0.21223217248916626}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "National Bank of Ukraine data", "confidence": 0.4353240728378296}], "vague_data": [{"text": "National Bank of Ukraine data", "confidence": 0.10717839747667313}]}}}
{"input": "First, the employment rate of Polish citizens has been growing since the Ukrainian refugee influx, while the unemployment rate has been falling. This is particularly evident among women, who make up the majority of refugees. The employment rate for women aged 20-64 has grown consistently from 68.2% in Q2 2021 to 70.2% in Q2 2022, 71.7% in Q2 2023, and 72.2% in Q2 2024 (see Chart 26). The unemployment rate for women aged 20-64 has consistently fallen, from 3.5% in Q2 2021 to 3.0% in Q2 2022, 2.6% in both Q2 2023 and Q2 2024.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "unallocated), the gap in social contributions bases towards Polish citizens narrows.\nThe largest group (16%) is positioned between 90% and 100% of Polish citizens (median 93%). This is an improvement over two years, when the majority (13%) situated between only 80% and 90% (median 82%). [12]\n\n---\n[12] Unfortunately, the data is available in a format that is not suitable for econometric modelling and thus these are only comparisons between thousands of employee", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "In Brazil, refugees can choose between accessing the asylum system or applying for a residency\nas a complementary form of protection. Both options ensure freedom of movement, access to\nformal employment, education, healthcare, and social assistance. However, only those who apply\nfor asylum are explicitly safeguarded against refoulement, eligible to obtain travel documents,\ngranted expedite access to naturalization, and exempt from presenting documents from their\ncountry of origin in various civil procedures. These additional safeguards significantly ease their\nintegration into Brazilian society.\n\nDespite an overall favorable environment, the proportion of those living below the national\npoverty line is still considerable, especially if compared with host communities (40% vs 30%). [1]\nResearch conducted by UNHCR and other institutions indicates that refugees in Brazil experience\n\n_1_ _[https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/?Text=&Goal=10&Target=10.7](https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/?Text=&Goal=10&Target=10.7)_\n\nUNHCR / October, 2024 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "It is also important to highlight that there were slight differences in the questionnaire across countries. Not all questions were consistently included in all country-level surveys, and some answer options were individually adjusted.\n\nLastly, the survey was conducted during the summer months, coinciding with both host country and Ukraine school holidays. This period often sees many households temporarily visiting Ukraine, which impacted the accessibility of households and posed challenges in meeting targets, particularly in certain countries and geographic locations.\n\n**15**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "country-level surveys"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "country-level surveys", "confidence": 0.7672207951545715}]}}}
{"input": "rates have grown, and unemployment rates have fallen. Second, poviats in which the employment share of Ukrainian refugees has grown by 1 percentage point, experienced higher by 0.5 percentage point Polish citizens employment rates, and 0.3 percentage point lower unemployment rates. Third, there is no evidence of lowered wages; in fact, the limited available data suggests that Ukrainian refugees may have caused higher wage growth in poviats to which they have moved. These are common findings in the scientific literature quoted in the previous section, that as immigrants enter the labour market, native workers tend to specialise in higher-value, complementary tasks.\nThis is evident in Polish workers moving to more attractive occupational groups. This constitutes a positive productivity shock, counterbalancing labour market pressures.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "limited available data", "confidence": 0.8138977289199829}]}}}
{"input": "Regional protection monitoring harmonization outcomes\n\nIn line with the outcomes of the Regional IDP Stocktaking held on 25 February 2022, the Regional Bureau for\nSouthern Africa undertook an ambitious project to harmonize the protection monitoring activities conducted in the\nregion. The envisioned regional harmonization aims to enable an environment that increases persons we serve\nempowerment, inclusion, and protection while strengthening accountability and efficiency in humanitarian and\ndevelopment programs. The regional protection monitoring harmonization focuses to:\n\n§ **Set common definitions of the incident, minimum standards, and objectives of the protection**\n\n**monitoring.**\n§ **Standardize questionnaires to collect data but be flexible enough for field operations to add and amend**\n\n**questions depending on the context and needs.**\n§ **Develop reporting/product templates with a standard design and branding for UNHCR.**\n§ **Develop a narrative to explain externally why and how UNHCR does protection monitoring and identify**\n\n**common indicators for regional reporting.**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Source: Deloitte own elaboration based on SEIS survey, NBP (2024) survey. Monthly GUS median wage in the general economy has been recalculated to reflect the specific time periods of SEIS UNHCR and NBP (2024) surveys.\n\nSource: Deloitte own elaboration based on Eurostat Labour Force Survey data SEIS UNHCR survey conducted in May and June 2024. For Polish citizens reference period is Q2 2024.\n\nPolish citizens Ukrainian refugees\n\n**The wages of Ukrainian refugees are**\n\n**higher for men than women, but the**\n\n**gap is not wider than in the economy**\n\n**as a whole.** The median net wage of\nfemale Ukrainian refugees is 6% lower than in the male group (compared to 7% in the economy as a whole), however, the gap may be different due to the fact that there are fewer men in the Ukrainian refugee population.\n\n13 Children in Ukraine start school at 6 years of age, while in Poland at 7. School system lasts for 11 years in Ukraine and 12 years in Poland. After recent reform, Ukrainian children who started school in or after 2018 will receive 12 years of schooling.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey", "confidence": 0.695939838886261}, {"text": "SEIS UNHCR survey", "confidence": 0.6027200818061829}, {"text": "Eurostat Labour Force Survey data", "confidence": 0.481000691652298}, {"text": "NBP (2024) survey", "confidence": 0.40782099962234497}, {"text": "NBP (2024) surveys", "confidence": 0.3049621880054474}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Eurostat Labour Force Survey data", "confidence": 0.10829885303974152}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE problems, and in each age group females reporting more problems than males, except among children under the age of 11, where boys reported slightly more problems than girls.\n\nThese overall upward trends underscore that, even in the third year of the Ukraine response, mental health and psychosocial needs remain a significant and growing challenge requiring sustained support, attention, and increased financing to ensure adequate care and resources are available.\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL HEALTH OR**\n\n**PSYCHOSOCIAL PROBLEMS BY AGE GROUP AND GENDER**\n\nFemale Male\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WHO REPORT EXPERIENCING MENTAL**\n\n**HEALTH AND PSYCHOSOCIAL PROBLEMS AND TRIED TO**\n\n**ACCESS SUPPORT BY COUNTRY**\n\n46% 58% 57% 51% 50% 48% 45% 43% 35% 34% 32% Regional Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Czechia Estonia Bulgaria Moldova Romania Slovakia 5-11 12-17 18-34 35-59 60+ years old (N=17,972)\n\n### **Access to Mental** **Health and** **Psychosocial** **Support**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The districts are small, and some mines are located in border regions. We thus expect there to\n\nbe spillovers across district borders. For example, a mine can change demand for labor,\n\nagricultural produce, and services across the district border, and induce reallocation of work\n\nacross districts. We explore neighbor spillovers by estimating the following equation:\n\n𝑌���  - 𝛽�𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑑_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑��  - 𝛽�𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟_𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑑_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑��  - ∝�� 𝑔� �𝜆𝑋�� �𝜀���      �5�\n\nThat is, we add gold production for the mining districts to their neighbors, and _β2_ measures the\n\neffects of gold production in these districts, as well. That is, if _β2_ is statistically and\n\neconomically significant, it would imply that increased production in a neighboring district has\n\nspillover effects on the district in question.\n\nIn Annex table 4, we have added the gold production of the mining areas to their neighbors and\n\nwe estimate the spillover effects of mining production in a district on employment in adjacent\n\ndistricts. As before, panel A shows effects of increasing production in the previous period, and\n\n34", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "24 Due to possible differences in methodologies data from this surveys should not be directly compared 25 Elementary occupations include: Cleaners and helpers; Agricultural, forestry and fishery labourers; Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport; Food preparation assistants; Street and related sales and services workers; Refuse workers and other elementary workers.\n\n22 23", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "surveys", "confidence": 0.46326735615730286}]}}}
{"input": "Refugee receiving and hosting countries have shown generosity and kept borders open while adapting to a protracted stay of the refugees as the situation in Ukraine remains volatile and prospects for refugees returning home remain grim. Under the Temporary Protection Directive or other protection mechanisms implemented in most countries, refugees have access to health care benefits, but certain groups may be left out according to country-specific practices – for example, those who do not apply for temporary protection and those who temporarily return to Ukraine or move from one location to another and are deregistered [5] .\n\nHealth systems in refugee-receiving countries have made substantial efforts to meet the needs of Ukrainian refugees. However, challenges in host country health systems, such as health workforce shortages, long waiting lists, and language barriers affect access to care and may discourage healthseeking among refugees. Refugees’ movement within and out of countries present challenges for local health providers to register and provide required services. At the same time, there are", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_5_ For the purpose of this analysis, the category that refers to “basic and essential services” regards denial of, or unequal access to basic\nservices, the category “family life” is linked to family separation or inability to exercise family unit, and “life incidents” are linked to\nenforced disappearance.\n_6_ [ACNUR (2023), Diagnosticos Participativos, https://www.acnur.org/portugues/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Diagnosticos-](https://www.acnur.org/portugues/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Diagnosticos-Participativos-2023-.pdf)\n[Participativos-2023-.pdf](https://www.acnur.org/portugues/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Diagnosticos-Participativos-2023-.pdf) pp. 7; 9.\n_7_ Idem, p. 13\n_8_ [Cáritas-REACH (2022), Avaliação Baseada em Área (ABA) em Boa Vista, Roraima, https://caritas.org.br/storage/arquivo-de-](https://caritas.org.br/storage/arquivo-de-biblioteca/March2023/Ir3dz5ULhRAzNV4wqkwi.pdf)\n[biblioteca/March2023/Ir3dz5ULhRAzNV4wqkwi.pdf, p.14](https://caritas.org.br/storage/arquivo-de-biblioteca/March2023/Ir3dz5ULhRAzNV4wqkwi.pdf)\n_9_ [R4V (2024), Microsoft Power BI](https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiMWJhN2UzOWMtZWFlZC00MzZiLWI0OWQtNGZlMDIzN2Y3Zjg5IiwidCI6ImU1YzM3OTgxLTY2NjQtNDEzNC04YTBjLTY1NDNkMmFmODBiZSIsImMiOjh9&pageName=f271143c36cbd9a6b0ee)\n\n_10_ Idem.\n\nUNHCR / October, 2024 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Diagnosticos Participativos", "confidence": 0.6733145713806152}, {"text": "Avaliação Baseada em Área", "confidence": 0.3012787401676178}, {"text": "Microsoft Power BI", "confidence": 0.11962218582630157}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**the younger age groups.** Ukrainian\nrefugee incomes from employment are highest in the 25–34 and 35–44 age groups. However, relative to the economy as a whole, the wages of Ukrainian refugees are the highest in the youngest age groups and decrease with age. This can be explained by three facts. First, wages in the youngest age groups are most compressed, because they diverge with time and accumulated professional experience. Second, younger persons have less experience and so lose least from migration. Third, younger persons often find it easier to learn the language of the host country.\n\n**The earnings of Ukrainian refugees**\n\n**differ across sectors in nominal**\n\n**terms and as a percentage of the**\n\n**economy as a whole – only education**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "8 A household is defined to fall below the poverty line if its members fall below the poverty line on individual basis (the equivalized income of all household members is the same) 9 Its magnitude can be computed as the difference between the median equivalized market rent in the region and the actual equivalized accommodation expense", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "12,294 individuals, of which 7,491 men live within 100 km of a mine. In addition, the DHS\n\ndata collect records of all children born within the five years prior to the surveying. Of the\n\n12,174 children born to the surveyed women within the last five years, 6,888 were born to\n\nwomen currently residing within 100 km of a mine. See Appendix table 1 for definition of\n\noutcome variables.\n\nWe complement the analysis with household data from the GLSS collected in the years—1998–\n\n99, 2004–05, and 2012–13. These data are a good complement to the DHS data, because they", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "household data from the GLSS"}, {"text": "DHS data"}, {"text": "DHS\n\ndata"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household data from the GLSS"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.8238315582275391}, {"text": "DHS\n\ndata", "confidence": 0.7491294145584106}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household data from the GLSS", "confidence": 0.8266571760177612}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household data", "confidence": 0.26044604182243347}]}}}
{"input": "Furthermore, the Ministry of Education continues to collect data on refugee and asylum-seekers students for the\neducation management information system. The same applies with the Ministry of Health; data on refugee and\nasylum-seekers are included in the national health information system. The government is working on releasing\nbreakdowns of pupils by legal status (nationals and refugees). Additionally, the Government continues to work\nto include refugees in the national civil registry database. However, the technical and financial prerequisites\nfor this are not yet in place. Furthermore, UNHCR has long been advocating for refugees and asylum-seekers\nto be included in the future national population and household census, and there is now apparent agreement\nfrom the government on this principle.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "national population and household census"}, {"text": "national civil registry database"}], "vague_data": [{"text": "education management information system"}, {"text": "national health information system"}, {"text": "national civil registry database"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "national population and household census", "confidence": 0.8509881496429443}, {"text": "national civil registry database", "confidence": 0.8389953970909119}, {"text": "national health information system", "confidence": 0.8102097511291504}, {"text": "education management information system", "confidence": 0.8053979873657227}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "breakdowns of pupils by legal status", "confidence": 0.14015090465545654}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES\n\n**ACCOMMODATION QUALITY BY POVERTY GROUP**\n\nIncome above the poverty line Income below the poverty line\n\n**LIVING CONDITIONS BY POVERTY GROUP**\n\nIncome above the poverty line Income below the poverty line Living in collective housing Not reporting feeling safe walking in neighbourhood after dark Unable to store or cook food Insufficient Lacking privacy separate showers or toilets Feeling under pressure to leave accommodation Source: Survey data, SAG estimates\n\n**POVERTY EFFECTS ON HEALTHCARE ACCESS**\n\nIncome above the poverty line Income below the poverty line Source: Survey data, SAG estimates\n\n**FOOD COPING STRATEGY OVER LAST 7 DAYS BY POVERTY**\n\n**GROUP**\n\nIncome above the poverty line Income below the poverty line Had to reduce essential health expenditures in last 30 days (including drugs) Unable to obtain needed healthcare in the last 30 days Could not afford hospital or clinic fee in last 30 days Had to borrow money for food Note: Percentages of those that could not afford clinic fees are as share of those not able to access healthcare in the last 30 days Source: Survey data, SAG estimates", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Survey data, SAG estimates", "confidence": 0.15387703478336334}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.8628891706466675}]}}}
{"input": "**Potential macroeconomic benefits**\n\n**from the further integration of**\n\n**refugees into the labour market**\n\n**are considerable.** Addressing even\nhalf of the existing gaps can generate significant macroeconomic gains of at least PLN 6 billion value added annually.\nSuch an increase in GDP would contribute more than PLN 2.5 billion to public sector revenue through taxes and social security contributions. These estimates are conservative, as they consider only the direct gains for workers. As the economy adjusts to a more skilled workforce, additional growth would result from increased company investments necessary to meet needs of more advanced workforce. While increased competition might reduce overall gains, deeper specialization can mitigate such effects, as suggested by the experience with refugee integration into the labour market.\n\n05\n\n**•** **Widespread occupational licensing**\n\n**is an obstacle to efficient use of**\n\n**refugees' human capital.** Only 3.6% of\nUkrainian refugees insured at ZUS work in regulated professions compared to 10.6% of Polish citizens. Many barriers on entry to a profession apply to foreign citizenship rather than skill or exam requirements. This is relevant in education, medical professions, and even fire service.\n\n**•** **Lack of fluent Polish negatively**\n\n**affects the labour situation of**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Observations 19,226 19,226 19,226 19,226 19,226 19,270 15,991\nR-squared 0.207 0.327 0.128 0.137 0.037 0.213 0.278\n\n_Note:_ Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. All regressions control for year and\ndistrict fixed effects, urban dummy, age, and years of education. Active is active status of mine in the survey year.\n\n*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland Importantly, most of the income of Ukrainian nationals living in Poland, both refugees and pre-2022 migrants, comes from their work. Our calculations based on the UNHCR MSNA Poland 2023 survey results show that 80% of refugee income comes from employment, with other sources on average playing a much lesser role. The income brackets presented in the survey show that 20% of households earn less than 3000 PLN, 41% earn between 3,000 and 6,000 PLN and 12% earn more than 6,000 PLN, while 27% of respondents preferred not to answer. Meanwhile, in the NBP (2023) survey conducted in November 2022 the net income of refugees oscillated between 2,000 and 3,000 PLN, while the net income of pre-2022 migrants was closer to between 3,000 and 4,000 PLN.\nIn the case of Ukrainians that were out of work, the monthly income was more varied, especially because there were fewer previous migrants in this situation.\nThe median income for non-employed prewar immigrants was around 2,500 PLN [32] .\nAmong refugees from Ukraine remaining out of work at the time of the survey, the median income equaled around 600 PLN.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR MSNA Poland 2023 survey"}, {"text": "NBP (2023) survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "NBP (2023) survey", "confidence": 0.8118613958358765}, {"text": "UNHCR MSNA Poland 2023 survey", "confidence": 0.7222375869750977}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES\n\n**UKRAINE REFUGEE VS HOST GROSS MONTHLY WAGES, EUR/MONTH**\n\nMinimum wage (2024) Refugee mean wage (2023) Refugee mean wage (2024) Host mean wage (2024) 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 Bulgaria Czechia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia Region Note: Mean wages have been estimated by dividing household employment income by the total number of working hours and then computing a weighted average across households with weights proportional to total working hours. As the survey asked for net income, weighted means were then converted to gross amounts for comparability based on host country tax rates.\n\nSource: Survey data, Eurostat, SAG estimates Similar to its impact on employment status, education seems to have a much less pronounced effect on wage premiums for refugees compared to hosts, also suggesting the presence of underemployment. While, according to Eurostat data and SAG estimates, a local with an advanced degree can expect to earn nearly 80% more than someone with only lower secondary education [18], the same wage gap [19] for Ukrainians stands as just 16% based on survey data.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Eurostat data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data"}]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Eurostat data", "confidence": 0.25711798667907715}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Survey data, Eurostat, SAG estimates", "confidence": 0.15541674196720123}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Survey data", "confidence": 0.9244179725646973}]}}}
{"input": "We find that refugees from Ukraine who remain in Poland as workers, entrepreneurs, consumers, and taxpayers have a positive impact on economic output, which will increase in the long run. Results of our general equilibrium Deloitte D.Climate model show that refugees from Ukraine contributed 0.7-1.1% to the Gross Domestic Product in 2023. In the long-term this effect will grow to 0.9-1.35%. In our model, the long-term is defined as the period over which the economy fully adjusts to the shock of the initial refugee inflow; it does not include other aspects, e.g. refugee children growing-up and entering employment.\nThese results are consistent with previous, similar studies. However, they should be treated as lower-bound estimates, as we do not allow for the possibility of an increase in the labour force triggering a positive productivity shock (e.g., due to increased specialisation), because there is little data to credibly estimate its size.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "NAVIGATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING CHALLENGES FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ACCESSED FORMAL AND**\n\n**INFORMAL SUPPORT BY COUNTRY**\n\nOnly formal Only informal Both None Other\n\n**% OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ACCESSED FORMAL AND**\n\n**INFORMAL SUPPORT BY AGE AND GENDER**\n\n**GENDER = FEMALE**\n\nOnly formal Only informal Both None Other Regional Bulgaria Czechia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Moldova Poland Romania Slovakia (N=1,716) 56% 34% 47% 37% 29% 33% 49% 59% 64% 44% 59% 14% 31% 23% 24% 28% 17% 17% 43% 58% 61% 52% 71% 34% 32% 38% 25% 26% 15% 29% 23% 12% 15% 17% 45% 26% 32% 30% 21% 23% 25% 21% 27% 13% 12% 13% 12% 60+ years old 35-59 18-34 12-17 5-11 (N=1,355)\n\n**GENDER = MALE**\n\nOnly formal Only informal Both None Other 44% 36% 10% 17% 21% 25% 9% 14% 11%", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n**Table 2. Deloitte D.Climate model results for Ukrainian refugees’ influx**\n\n**Current estimate** **Long-run estimate**\n2024 2030\n\n**Gross Domestic Product** +2.71% +3.21%\n\n**Unemployment rate** - -0.10 pp.\n\n**Real wages** 0.00% +0.24%\n\n**General government income** +2.94% +2.73%\n\nSource: Deloitte D.Climate estimates.\n\n**The positive shock to the marginal**\n\n**productivity of labour stabilized the**\n\n**current impact on the labour market**\n\n**and should turn positive in the long**\n\n**run.** In the model, additional influx of\nemployees increases labour market competition, creating an upward pressure on unemployment rate and downward pressure on real wages. This increase almost completely offsets the additional positive shock to the marginal productivity of labour. While the assumed increase in productivity stabilizes unemployment rate and real wage impacts in the 2022-2024, in the long-term, in 2030 the cumulative impact of Ukrainian refugees should lower the unemployment rate by 0.1 pp. and increase real wages by 0.24%.\n\n**Ukrainian refugees increase general**\n\n**government revenue as workers,**\n\n**entrepreneurs, and consumers.** First,\na larger number of employees increases the wage pool. Second, a larger population increases private consumption. Both streams are taxed. Also, an inflow of capital", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF HOUSING SUPPORT AND EMPLOYMENT FACILITATION IN ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY OF REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE It is important to note that while the poverty definition adopted in this assessment allows for comparisons across the countries covered (both regarding the refugee and local populations, though limitations need to be taken into account), it may not be directly comparable to other studies, as approaches tend to vary quite significantly. The setup of the questionnaire, the sampling methodology, the amount of non-response bias (and whether any corrections for it were done), the process adapted to equivalize income, and finally the location of the poverty line itself in the income range can have a substantial impact on the calculated indicators.\n\nRandom selection of settlements and convenience Bulgaria 1,054 2,255 Jul-Aug Global Metrics Ltd sampling for household selection.\n\nCzech Sample distribution by geographical strata and 1,218 2,648 June-Jul SocioFactor Republic convenience sampling for household selection.\n\nTárki Social Hungary 682 1,511 Jun-Aug Research Institute, IOM, UNHCR Random selection of districts and convenience sampling for household selection.\n\nSample distribution by geographical strata and Moldova 890 2,130 Aug-Sep REACH, UNHCR convenience sampling for household selection.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Metrics Ltd", "confidence": 0.14421315491199493}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**PC partners.**\n\nThe morning session focused on explain\ning the concept of mixed migration and\n\nvarious migratory profiles, emphasiz\ning the distinctions between the causes\n\nand consequences of migration through\n\ngroup dynamics. In the latter part of the\n\nsession, the meaning of durable solu\ntions and the criteria for achieving them\n\nwere presented in relation to migratory\n\nprofiles and the Venezuelan context.\n\nFinally, together with IOM, a session on\n\nreturns and reintegration was included\n\nto discuss practical implementation\n\nof durable solutions. A total of 20 local\n\nand international organizations, part of\n\nthe PC, participated, and the feedback\n\nreceived was positive. Finally, to assure\n\nthat this information reaches colleagues\n\nin the field, an online session was orga\nnized on November 7th. Despite the\n\nchallenges posed by virtual sessions,\n\n28 people attended the session, showed\n\ninterest in the topic, and actively par\nticipated during the organized group\n\ndynamics.\n\n**XI. Reporting Transition to 345W**\n\n**During September and October, two**\n\n**training sessions were conducted**\n\n**with Protection Cluster Partners to**\n\n**facilitate the transition from the 5W**\n\n**system to the 345W reporting plat-**\n\n**form.** Adjustments were made in the\n\nplatform to reinforce quality controls, and\n\nAreas of Improvement were identified", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Despite \r the \r positive \r developments \r outlined \r above, \r considerable \r uncertainty \r remains\naround \r whether \r the \r cease-­‐fire \r agreements \r will \r lead \r to \r durable \r peace \r accords. \r There\nwere \r a \r number \r of \r clashes \r between \r armed \r groups \r and \r the \r Myanmar \r army \r reported \r in\n2012 \r in \r Shan, \r Kayah \r and \r Kayin. \r Trust \r in \r the \r Government \r is \r yet \r to \r be \r built \r in \r cease-­‐fire\nareas, \r after \r a \r long \r history \r of \r human \r rights \r abuses. \r Developments \r in \r relation \r to \r the\nconflict \r in \r Kachin \r will \r also \r play \r a \r role \r in \r influencing \r the \r prospects \r for \r peace \r elsewhere.\nPeace \r agreements \r will \r involve \r decisions \r on \r how \r best \r to \r share \r revenues \r from \r the \r natural\nresources \r in \r cease-­‐fire \r areas, \r how \r much \r to \r devolve \r political \r and \r economic \r authority \r to\nthe \r regional \r level, \r as \r well \r as \r how \r to \r maintain \r ethnic \r culture \r and \r language. \r Negotiations\nhave \r been \r and \r will \r continue \r to \r be \r extremely \r complex \r and \r the \r trajectory \r of \r the \r process\ntherefore \r remains \r uncertain.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Refugees’ impact on the economy manifests in a multi-layered fashion. An influx of refugees means first and foremost an increase in population. As such, they enter the economy boosting the labour market as new workers, increase demand as new consumers, and stimulate business by creating market niches catering to their needs and as potential new business owners. However, their characteristics differ from the local population (in terms of gender, age, education, skills etc.) meaning their impact as both workers as well as consumers would not be proportional to increases in population. Refugees also differ in their characteristics with other migrants. Although their economic impact in the literature is modelled similarly to the impact of other migrant groups, they also differ from them due to life circumstances.\nWhile immigration systems generally rely on 30", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "On 27 June 2023, Chad’s National Transitional Council (CNT) officially adopted the proposed new\nConstitution. This Constitution aims to restore constitutional order and conclude the transition initiated\nafter the passing of former President Idriss Déby on 19 April 2021. Drawing from the 1996 Constitution,\nthe document incorporates recommendations from the national dialogue. Notably, the reinstatement\nof institutions such as the Senate, the High Court of Justice and the Supreme Court occurs, preserving\nthe decentralized unitary state. Half of the cross-cutting recommendations from the Sovereign National\nInclusive Dialogue (DNIS) concentrate on fostering social cohesion. The primary focus of the Post-DNIS\nTransition Specifications’ initial strategic axis revolves around Defence, Security, Peace, Social Cohesion\nand National Reconciliation. Consequently, the Ministry of National Reconciliation and Social Cohesion has\nbeen established.\n\n[As part of the RESILAC project funded by the European Union (EU) and the French Development Agency](https://www.urd.org/fr/publication/rapports-de-capitalisation-du-projet-resilac-2020-2022/)\n[(AFD), the capitalization report on the implementation of social cohesion activities in the Lake Chad basin](https://www.urd.org/fr/publication/rapports-de-capitalisation-du-projet-resilac-2020-2022/)\n[(2022)](https://www.urd.org/fr/publication/rapports-de-capitalisation-du-projet-resilac-2020-2022/) recommended strengthening social cohesion at various levels (community members, groups,\ninstitutions) and adopting a cross-cutting approach coupled with economic recovery and institutional\nsupport activities.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "including physical and sexual abuse and neglect; children are kept from school due to difficulties\npaying for incidental school expenses; refugees have limited opportunities to productively engage in\nIndonesia by developing and utilizing skills and capacities in an employment setting, impacting both\nthe quality of their experience in the host country and opportunities to access a third country solution\nthrough labor mobility; barriers to accessing the workplace limit opportunities to meaningfully\ninteract with Indonesians, impacting social cohesion between refugees and their hosts; refugees are\nunable to make positive contributions to the Indonesian economy while residing in the country; etc.\n\n### **Smuggling and Trafficking**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "There \r are \r no \r mine \r maps \r currently \r available \r and \r the \r extent \r of \r the \r threat \r is \r impossible \r to\naccurately \r assess. \r However, \r it \r is \r suspected \r that \r Myanmar \r is \r one \r of \r the \r most \r highly\nlandmine-­‐contaminated \r countries \r in \r the \r world, \r with \r these \r devices \r continuing \r to \r claim\nseveral \r hundred \r civilian \r victims \r each \r year. \r Myanmar \r has \r not \r acceded \r to \r the \r Mine \r Ban\nTreaty \r but \r has \r recently \r set \r up \r a \r Myanmar \r Mine \r Action \r Centre, \r under \r the \r Myanmar\nPeace \r Centre \r (MPC) [4] to \r co-­‐ordinate \r and \r oversee \r the \r implementation \r of \r a \r national\n\n3 _Changing \r Realities, \r Poverty \r and \r Displacement \r In \r South \r East \r Burma/Myanmar_, \r The \r Border \r Consortium, \r 31\nOctober \r 2012, http://www.tbbc.org/resources).\n\n---\n[4] The \r Myanmar \r Peace \r Centre \r (MPC) \r was \r established \r in \r October \r 2012 \r by \r a \r Presidential \r Decree \r to \r serve \r as", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Unaccounted positive externalities**\nAll our theoretical economic modelling results are conservative lower bound estimates, as econometric studies from other countries have found immigration to have additionally a positive impact on labour productivity that cannot be accounted for using the available data.\nAccording to these econometric studies, immigration can not only raise economic output (i.e., more workers equal more production), but more importantly labour productivity (i.e., more value added per worker). Such results are unfortunately too aggregated to disentangle the constituent effects (Chapter 4).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "available data", "confidence": 0.5813528299331665}]}}}
{"input": "immigration in a sample of 18 developed OECD countries during the 1980-2010 period. Authors find that increase of immigrant share in the adult population by 1 percentage point raises labour productivity and GDP per capita in the longterm by about 2%. They also examine impacts for the population in top 10% and bottom 90% of income distribution of tertiary and non-tertiary educated immigrants. Effects are similarly 2-3%, apart from the impact of tertiary educated immigrants on population in the top 10%, which are about 6%. These are not just correlations, but causal estimates, as authors carefully address potential problems of reverse causality (i.e., that immigrants may migrate to countries with better growth prospects, instead of improving them). They want to estimate the impact of immigrant shares on GDP per capita, but these could be correlated (biasing the result) as GDP per capita is a pull factor for immigrants. To resolve this, they first create an “instrument” for immigrant shares by estimating a model that predicts them based on country-of-origin push factors and bilateral migration costs determined by geography and culture. In effect they can now control for reverse causality.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Smooth inclusion of refugees on labour market thus far was enabled by proper policies. In response to the war escalation in Ukraine and the influx of refugees into the EU, prompt actions were taken both at EU and national level.\n\nRefugees from Ukraine in the European Union are covered by the Temporary Protection Directive TPD, which was activated on 4th March 2022 (European Council, 2022). The regulation aims to support EU Member States’ asylum schemes and to ensure harmonised rights for the incoming Ukrainian refugees throughout the EU. It also includes citizens who fled Ukraine not long before 24th February and those who were outside the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Lower income households are, on the other hand, much more dependent on social protection benefits. These comprise almost half of all earnings.\nTwo thirds of the income provided by social protection is generated by the host country, with the remainder mostly coming from pensions paid by Ukraine (13% of all adults below the poverty line are of pension age as opposed to 5% above it).\n\n**The overall employment rate of refugees from**\n\n**Ukraine is almost in line with host country**\n\n**nationals**\nAcross the region, employment stands out as the largest source of income for refugee households by far (64% of all earnings). In some countries – such as Hungary and Poland this share is even larger (at 74% and 68%, respectively). Moldova appears to be an outlier, with employment representing only 32% of respondent household income, but this figure may have been affected by sampling limitations.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "- Refugees \r and \r IDPs \r are \r provided \r with \r accurate \r and \r up-­‐to-­‐date \r information \r that \r is\nobjectively \r presented \r and \r consistent \r with \r humanitarian \r protection \r and \r human\nrights \r principles \r and \r a \r wide \r range \r of \r representatives \r are \r allowed \r to \r visit \r places\nof \r origin \r or \r intended \r return.\n\n- All \r stakeholders \r at \r all \r level \r have \r a \r clear \r understanding \r and \r commitment \r to \r the\nprinciples \r and \r standards \r underpinning \r durable \r solutions.\n\n- The \r Government \r includes \r local \r integration/reintegration \r needs \r of \r IDPs \r and\nreturning \r refugees \r in \r its \r long \r term \r development \r plans.\n\n- Sufficient \r resources \r are \r available \r to \r increase \r UNHCR \r and \r partners’ \r operational\ncapacity \r in \r the \r immediate \r to \r longer \r term. \r Investments \r are \r made \r by \r development\nactors \r in \r long-­‐term \r reconstruction \r and \r development \r projects. \r Many \r places \r of\norigin \r of \r refugees \r are \r isolated \r and \r have \r received \r little \r investment \r in\ninfrastructures \r or \r in \r the \r creation \r of \r livelihood \r opportunities \r that \r can \r support \r the\nsustainability \r of \r the \r return \r process.\n\n11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**even greater disparity in financial wellbeing**\n\nAt the regional level, the weighted average share of the host population living in rented housing was calculated at 13% based on Eurostat data. This figure is dwarfed by 60% of refugee households fully paying rent for their accommodation and 21% partially paying, as per the SEIS survey. Likewise, accommodation expenses as a share of disposable income were estimated at 17% for hosts, including mortgages, compared to 32% for refugees. This essentially implies that refugees, on average, have a much smaller share of their disposable income remaining for other needs. To estimate the magnitude of this effect, poverty rates were recalculated after subtracting the portion of housing expenses that exceed the national average directly from disposable income. This calculation almost doubled the poverty rate, bringing it to 40%.\n\n11. Defined as someone feeling so upset, anxious, worried, agitated, or depressed that it affects daily functioning\n\n**5**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey"}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Eurostat data"}], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey", "confidence": 0.9118874669075012}, {"text": "Eurostat data", "confidence": 0.8940059542655945}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the general population. UNHCR (2025b), using a different method than the one in this report, estimated average instead of median net wages based on the SEIS data. The average net wage of a Ukrainian refugee they arrived at was PLN 4,214, only slightly higher than calculated above. This would yield 72% of the national average net wage. [15] Average is not used here, because median is more relevant for discussing economic impact, as it is not disrupted by bottom or top earnings. Furthermore, there are no outside estimates to compare it to. Second, as discussed previously, there are much fewer Ukrainian refugees with employment contracts than Poles, and this lowers their social contributions and thus gross earnings. Unfortunately, there is no such data available, as both SEIS and NBP (2024) measure only net earnings.\n\n**Chart 13. Polish citizens and Ukrainian refugees’ employment rates by age group**\n\nMale Female\n\n**Chart 14. Ukrainian refugee median net wage estimates in Q2 2024**\n\nMonthly net wage (PLN) Percengate of all workers total economy average 84% UNHCR NBP UNHCR NBP 15 May - 24 June 2024 6 May - 5 July 2024 15 May - 24 June 2024 6 May - 5 July 2024", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS data"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS data", "confidence": 0.8971874713897705}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "[In addition to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of movement, Article 21 of the Asylum Law](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf) confirms\nthat refugees and asylum-seekers in possession of their identification documents enjoy the right to circulate\nand to reside in Chad in the same conditions as nationals. Furthermore, Article 73 of the [2023 Decree](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2091861/645b938a4.pdf)\noutlines that the refugee identity card allows the free movement of refugees in the conditions specified\nby the law. Additionally, Article 61 of the 2023 Decree specifically addressing local integration of refugees\nrecognizes, as part of the perquisite to achieve self-reliance, among others, the freedom of movement and\nthe right to settle in places favourable to their self-reliance.\n\nHowever, regarding asylum-seekers, it is important to note that Article 20 of the 2020 Law, incorporating\nthe principle of non-penalization for illegal entry, specifies in its second paragraph that the movement of\nasylum-seekers is restricted only if necessary and as long as their refugee status is not determined or until\nthey have been admitted to another host country.\n\nRefugees and asylum seekers continue to have access to a free travel permit issued by CNARR (saufconduits). This document specifies the intended destination and the duration of absence from the camp.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "requests.\n\n### **Solutions - Resettlement**\n\nUNHCR Indonesia continues to identify and submit refugees for resettlement consideration. In 2024,\n950 resettlement spaces have been made available for refugees in Indonesia. UNHCR seeks to ensure\nthe most vulnerable refugees are prioritized for resettlement consideration, assessing heightened\nspecific needs and protection concerns, as well as length of stay in the country, when identifying cases\nfor submission.\n\n### **Solutions - Complementary Pathways**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "to the MSNA Poland 2023 survey, 20% of Ukrainian refugee households earn less than 3 000 PLN, 41% earn between 3 000 and 6 000 PLN, and 12% earn more than 6 000 PLN, while 27% of respondents preferred not to answer. That said, the standard of living of Ukrainian refugees may be significantly lower than that of native residents, even at similar incomes, due to their lack of housing, which in Poland is usually occupant-owned.\n\n**Inflow of Ukrainian refugees into**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MSNA Poland 2023 survey", "confidence": 0.9350464940071106}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "- Governments, development and humanitarian actors take into account poverty levels when designing their\nsupport programs for Ukrainian refugees. The quality of day to day life, safety, and level of access to key services are directly tied to household income.\n\n- Poverty measures account for differences in housing costs between refugees and host populations.\n\n- A special focus is placed on supporting refugee employment at their skill level, including transition from\ncurrent low-level jobs. The difference between refugee and local population wages could be an important metric to monitor on an ongoing basis", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland\n\n## Executive summary\n\n##### Progress in market integration\n\n**Ukrainian refugees have been**\n\n**increasingly successful in terms of**\n\n**labour market integration.** The large\ninflux of refugees since February 2022, has further increased and changed the demographics of the already significant Ukrainian migrant population in Poland.\nRefugees from Ukraine are primarily women and children, with over 67% of female-headed households. Poland was quick to open its labour market to refugees from Ukraine, who – despite difficulties\n\n- surprisingly promptly began their\neconomic integration and soon supported themselves primarily from employment.\nIn the past year, refugees’ employment rate grew from 61% to 69%, with the median net wage rising from PLN 3,100 to PLN 4,000 and narrowing the gap to the median net wage in the entire economy.\n\n**As Ukrainian refugees entered the**\n\n**labour market, the economy adapted,**\n\n**resulting in more specialization and**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "HIGH EMPLOYMENT RATES, BUT LOW WAGES: A POVERTY ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES\n\n# **Summary of findings and** **recommendations**\n\nThe 2024 round of the SEIS survey indicates that while the financial vulnerability of refugees from Ukraine residing in neighboring countries - specifically those included in the [Regional Refugee Response Plan - has](https://www.unhcr.org/europe/publications/regional-refugee-response-plan-2025-2026) declined over the past year [1], one in five still live with an income below the poverty line [2] . When factoring in the disproportionately high accommodation costs refugees face, largely due to the region’s high homeownership rates among locals, the poverty rate [3] rises to 40%, more than three times that of host communities [4] .", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "the 2024 round of the SEIS survey"}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SEIS survey", "confidence": 0.9542007446289062}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland The above results do not distinguish between Ukrainian refugees improving the labour market outcomes in the poviats they arrived in and Ukrainian refugees disproportionately moving to the poviats with better performance, which continued to perform better in subsequent quarters. This distinction is mostly academic, as causality is always uncertain in social sciences, as effects can run both ways. However, instrumental variable regressions have been performed to ascertain causal effects. This approach is widely used in studies focused on the impact of migration on socio-economic outcomes. This econometric technique additionally uses variables that correlate well with Ukrainian refugees’ employment shares, but do not directly cause changes to the Polish citizens' employment rate or to the unemployment rate. Two variables have been used: the first was the share of Ukrainian children in Polish schools, and the second was the pre-war distribution of Ukrainian citizens based on notifications of entrusting work to a foreigner. Unfortunately, panel fixed effects regressions with quarterly dummies showed statistically insignificant results for either instruments or both. In addition, regressions using only the instrumental variable for the distribution of pre-war Ukrainian citizens reveal only a modest link to the employment share of Ukrainian refugees.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**HAUT COMMISSARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LES REFUGIES**\n**UNITE CHARGEE DE L’EVALUATION ET DE L’ANALYSE DE LA**\n**POLITIQUE GENERALE**\n\n# Modes de subsistance des réfugiés en milieu urbain _Etude en cas Bogota,_ _Colombie_\n\n\nEric Levron, consultant\nCourriel: elevron@hotmail.com\n\n\n\nEPAU/2006/03-4\n\nfévrier 2006", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Unité chargée de l’évaluation et de l'analyse de la politique générale**\n\nL'Unité chargée de l'évaluation et de l'analyse de la politique générale du HCR est\nchargée de l'examen et de l'évaluation systématiques des politiques, programmes,\nprojets et pratiques du HCR. Cette unité encourage également une recherche\nrigoureuse sur les questions liées aux activités du HCR ainsi qu'un échange de vues\net d'informations dynamique entre les personnels humanitaires, les décideurs\npolitiques et les chercheurs. Toutes ces activités sont conduites en vue de renforcer\nl'efficacité opérationnelle du HCR en dotant l'organisation des capacités nécessaires\npour s'acquitter de son mandat en faveur des réfugiés et des autres personnes\ndéplacées. Le travail de cette unité est guidé par les principes de transparence,\nd'indépendance, de consultations, de pertinence et d'intégrité.\n\nUnité chargée de l'évaluation et de l'analyse de la politique générale\nHaut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés\nCase postale 2500\n1211 Genève 2\nSuisse\n\nTél.: (41) 22 739 8249\nTélécopie : (41) 22 739 7344\n\nCourriel : hqep00@unhcr.org\n\nInternet : www.unhcr.org/epau\n\nTous les rapports d'évaluation de l'unité sont du domaine public. Les versions électroniques\nsont placées sur le site du HCR et les copies papier peuvent être obtenues sur demande. Ils\npeuvent être cités et reproduits, à condition d'en mentionner la source. Les vues exprimées\ndans les publications de cette unité ne sont pas nécessairement celles du HCR. La\nterminologie et les cartes utilisées n'impliquent en aucune façon une quelconque prise de\nposition ou reconnaissance du HCR quant au statut juridique d'un territoire ou de ses\nautorités.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## Partie 1: Présentation de l’étude\n\n**Méthodologie**\n\n\n1. Les recherches effectuées pour cette étude ont été réalisées entre 2002 et 2003. Les\ndonnées concernent donc cette période et ne sont pas actualisées. Il est important de signaler\nque le phénomène du déplacement en Colombie est largement sous-évalué et ce pour des\nraisons tant structurelles que politiques.\n\n\n2. Un travail de recherche bibliographique a été réalisé, associé aux informations et à\nl’étude de quartiers urbains initiées par différents groupes de recherche, ainsi que le HCR.\n\n\n3. Cette étude est basée sur une approche comparative entre deux territoires administrés\npar des autorités locales distinctes: à Ciudad Bolivar – dépendant de l’administration - de\nBogota et à Los Altos de Cazuca –administré par la ville Soacha.\n\n\n**Mise en perspective historique et géographique**\n\n\n4. Le déplacement de population est un phénomène massif et quotidien en Colombie. Il\nest une des conséquences du conflit qui déchire le pays depuis plus de 50 ans et qui va en\ns’aggravant depuis les années 1980.\n\n\n5. Le territoire est le nœud de ce conflit, et la population est devenue l’instrument de\nconquête de ce territoire. En effet, si auparavant les groupes de guérilla pouvaient se\nprévaloir d’idéologies diverses (marxiste léniniste pour les Farc, guévariste pour l’ELN),\ndéfendant le paysan et plaidant en faveur de la réforme agraire, le fondement idéologique est\naujourd’hui beaucoup plus imperceptible. Plus que des idéologies, ce sont des stratégies de\ndomination qui priment. Le levier central du conflit est devenu la population civile. C’est sur\nelle que s’appliquent toutes les pressions, c’est vers elle que convergent les convoitises.\n\n\n6. On considère aujourd’hui que 80% des municipalités rurales sont touchées par ces\nphénomènes. Les violations des Droits de l’homme se multiplient. Ce sont les paramilitaires\nqui se voient attribuer le grand nombre d’exactions (50% leurs sont attribuées [1] . Ils réalisent\ndes assassinats et des massacres à l’encontre de guérilleros « présumés », ou de\nsympathisants présumés. Au moyen des assassinats collectifs et de la terreur, ils opèrent le\ndéplacement forcé des survivants et le contrôle militaire territorial. Ils imposent de nouvelles\nnormes de régulation politique et sociale, et dans de nombreux cas, ces actions se traduisent\npar une recomposition de la propriété de la terre. Les groupes de guérilla attaquent aussi de\nfaçon croissante la population civile dans leurs zones d’influence, où dans les zones occupées\npar les paramilitaires qu’ils tentent de récupérer. Ils séquestrent des civils à des fins\npolitiques et d’extorsion et promeuvent le recrutement forcé ou volontaire des mineurs.\nCette tendance à la dégradation progressive des règles de la guerre suit son cours, dans une\nsituation où la position de l’Etat laisse de moins en moins de place à la négociation vis à vis\ndes groupes armés. Entre janvier et septembre 2002, 3 141 personnes ont été assassinées pour\n\n\n1 Selon les études du CODHES, Senderos, rastros invisibles del desplazamiento en Bogotá, Bogotá, Edition\nKimpres, 2001, pp 15 à 23, 81 à 108.\n\n\n3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "rastros invisibles del desplazamiento en Bogotá", "confidence": 0.16515479981899261}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "des motifs politiques [2] . Mais on estime qu’il est difficile de déterminer parmi les 25 000\nhomicides annuels de droit commun. Les enlèvements sont également nombreux parmi la\npopulation civile, que l’on dresse habituellement en moyenne à 3 000 par an.\n\n\n7. Une fois ces personnes parties, les terres sont accaparées par d’autres. Le droit de\npropriété est souvent perdu de fait. Le sort de ces terres est mal connu, par manque de\nrecherche à ce sujet. On remarque cependant que l’appropriation de la terre constitue\nsouvent un ressort des mécanismes d’expulsion et de déplacement. Les grandes zones\nd’expulsion sont souvent des zones où se développent des activités lucratives, de grands\nprojets agricoles d’exportation, de grands centres d’exploitation des richesses naturelles…\nLes entreprises, entrepreneurs et promoteurs privés sont également responsables des\ndéplacements de population et en profitent [3] . Les liens qu’ils entretiennent avec les guérillas\nou les trafiquants s’ils ne sont pas affirmés sont tout de même fortement suggérés par les\nvictimes de ces expropriations.\n\n\n8. Beaucoup de Colombiens accordent aux villes une représentation de lieux de refuge.\nCette représentation est à interroger, au regard de la nouvelle stratégie des groupes armés\nqui se centre chaque fois plus sur elles. La ville devient maintenant un enjeu du conflit alors\nque c’était un territoire relativement épargné jusqu’à ces dernières années. En effet les\ngroupes armés s’y installent et tentent d’accentuer leur domination dans les quartiers\npauvres où l’Etat est peu présent voire totalement absent. Les cas d’embrigadements dans les\ngroupes armés et dans les gangs sont fréquents, ceux-ci profitant des difficultés économiques\net de la situation d’exclusion pour engager contre rémunération de nombreux jeunes dans\ndifférentes activités. Ce sont maintenant de véritables guerres qui se font dans les quartiers\nles plus reculés, avec le lot de morts quotidiens que ces combats de rue impliquent. A cela se\nrajoutent les victimes de la « limpieza social [4] », ces groupes payés par les propriétaires et\nentrepreneurs afin de protéger les biens et commerces dans les zones que la police ou l’armée\nne surveillent plus.\n\n\n2 Rapport Amnesty International, Violencia política en Colombia, Mito y realidad, 1994, 92 p.\n\n3 Manuel PEREZ, sociologue de l’Université Javeriana de Bogotá. Entretien dans le cadre du travail de mémoire\nde Agnès Geoffroy sur les déplacés à Soacha et à Ciudad bolivar.\n\n4 Opérations de « nettoyage social »\n\n\n4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## Partie 2: Les résultats de l’étude\n\n**Le phénomène du déplacement à Bogota**\n\n\n9. Au-delà des définitions légales, le statut de déplacé interne est particulièrement\ndifficile à déterminer. En effet :\n\n\n   - Les questions juridiques ont une grande place et que de nombreuses lois régissent\nla question des déplacés et des réfugiés. Ces lois sont directement inspirées des\ncodes internationaux (Deng laws) rédigées par les Nations unies et ont été adaptées\nà la situation du pays. Ceci est un fait exceptionnel puisque c’est l’un des uniques\npays touché par le déplacement qui se soit pourvu d’un cadre juridique précis. On\nconsidérera en particulier la loi 387 de 1997 régissant leur statut : « _est appelée déplacé_\n_toute personne qui s'est vue forcée à migrer à l'intérieur du territoire national,_\n_abandonnant sa localité de résidence ou ses activités économiques habituelles, parce que sa_\n_vie, son intégrité physique, sa sécurité ou ses libertés personnelles ont été rendues_\n_vulnérables ou se trouvent directement menacées, à l’occasion d’une des situations_\n_suivantes quelle qu’elle soit : conflit armé interne, troubles et tensions intérieurs, violence_\n_généralisée, violations massives des droits de l’homme, infractions au droit international_\n_humanitaire ou toutes autres circonstances qui émaneraient des situations antérieures et_\n_qui pourraient altérer ou altèrent de façon drastique l’ordre public_ ».\n\n\n   - En premier lieu, le déplacement est une modalité normale du processus de\npeuplement en Colombie. Au fur et à mesure que les latifundia se sont\ndéveloppées, les paysans se sont déplacés, s’installant toujours plus aux marges des\nzones fertiles.\n\n\n   - Au XXe siècle, un exode rural très rapide se réalise entraînant une urbanisation tout\naussi rapide. De rurale, la société devient majoritairement urbaine entre les années\n1950 et 1970. Bogota est passée de 715.220 habitants en 1951 à 1,6 millions en 1964,\net à plus de 3 millions en 1973. A partir de 1973, les migrations des campagnes vers\nles plus grandes villes diminuent. Ce sont les villes moyennes qui attirent le plus\nles flux migratoires.\n\n\n   - Cependant, la croissance de Bogota se poursuit, alimentée par le croît naturel et\nplus encore par des arrivées de populations. Au recensement de 1993,\nl’agglomération compte 6,2 millions d’habitants. En 1938, la société colombienne\nest à 69% rurale, en 1993, elle est à 69% urbaine.\n\n\n   - Au processus historique de déplacement et d’exode, est venu s’ajouter le\nphénomène plus récent des déplacés par la violence et sous la pression des forces\narmées.\n\n\n10. Le nombre des déplacés par la violence est difficile à déterminer, et cela pour plusieurs\nraisons :\n\n\n   - Le migrant économique ne peut pas prétendre au même niveau d’aide économique\net humanitaire, il est donc beaucoup plus profitable de se déclarer déplacé par la\n\n\n5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "recensement de 1993", "confidence": 0.2350449115037918}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "violence, sachant qu’au milieu du chaos que traverse le pays, il sera certainement\ndifficile aux institutions de prouver le contraire. C’est donc une variable à étudier\navec une attention toute particulière [5] .\n\n\n   - D’autre part, les déplacements provoqués par les fumigations de cultures illicites\ndans le cadre du Plan Colombie [6], ne sont pas considérés par l’Etat comme des\ndéplacements provoqués par la violence. Les 75 600 paysans ainsi déplacés en 2001\net 2002 sont considérés comme des migrants volontaires et n’ont droit à aucune\naide de l’Etat [7] . On considère que ce chiffre doit être majoré de 50 000 personnes en\n2004 car le phénomène s’est amplifié depuis cette année.\n\n\n   - Il arrive que des familles déjà arrivées à Bogotá depuis plus d’un an revendiquent\nd’un coup le statut de déplacé, réalisant que ce statut peut leur permettre d’accéder\nà certains avantages.\n\n\n   - D’autres au contraire, arrivés depuis peu mais encore poursuivis par le souvenir\ndes menaces et de la violence, ou de fait encore soumis à elles, refusent de se\ndéclarer comme déplacés et cherchent au contraire l’anonymat le plus complet.\n\n\nFig 1 : Tableau des chiffres du déplacement soulignant les fortes différences entre différents\norganismes :\n\n\n**Année** **Codhes** **SUR** **[8]** **INDH** **[9]** **CICR** **[10]**\nJusqu’à 1998 1.555.000 45.800 194.107\n\n1999 288.000 25.216 133.568\n\n2000 317.375 266.605 123.651\n\n2001 341.925 322.104 107.572\n\n2002 412.553 365.961 179.142\n\n2003 (jan-avr) nd 53.332 34.833\n\n**Total** **2.914.853** **1.079.080** **850.000** **772.873**\n\n\n11. Plus de 2,9 millions de personnes sont déplacées par la violence depuis 1985 en\nColombie. Pour la seule année 2002, on compte 412 000 nouveaux déplacés [11] . A ces déplacés\n\n\n5 Daniel PECAUT, introduction « El desplazamiento por la violencia », collectif, édité en collaboration avec le\nComitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo Popoli, l’Union Européenne, Echo, l’Acnur, et la Pastoral Social,\nColombie, 1999.\n\n6 Plan Colombie : plan d’aide voté par le Congrès des Etats-Unis et entré en application en 2000. Il est centré\nautour de plusieurs axes : lutte contre la drogue, renforcement de l’Etat colombien et politique sociale. La\npolitique antidrogue consiste principalement en la fumigation des cultures illicites, ce qui pose des problèmes au\nniveau environnemental et ce qui produit des déplacements de population. Pour le renforcement de l’Etat\ncolombien, l’accent est mis sur deux éléments : renforcer sa branche juridique et augmenter sa puissance militaire\ndans le but de vaincre les groupes insurgés. Les Etats-Unis apportent aide financière et technique pour ces deux\nvolets. L’Union Européenne fournit pour sa part un soutien en matière de politique sociale. Elle finance à ce titre\ndes projets d’aide humanitaire, de développement et de coopération.\n\n7 Mabel GONZALEZ BUSTELO, Desterrados, Desplazamiento forzado en Colombia, site internet de Medicos Sin\nFronteras.\n\n8 SUR : Sistema Unico de Registro, Système Unique d’Enregistrement qui contient les déplacés inscrits au Réseau\nde Solidarité depuis 1995, condition pour obtenir la carte de déplacé, et donc pour recevoir l’aide de l’Etat qui\ns’adresse aux déplacés.\n\n9 INDH : Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano, Rapport National sur le Développement Humain en 2003.\n\n10 CICR : Comité International de la Croix Rouge, nombre de cas traités par an.\n\n\n6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Sistema Unico de Registro", "confidence": 0.5422429442405701}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "internes, il faut ajouter les réfugiés. Plus d’un million et demi de Colombiens vivent hors du\nterritoire national. Cela représente en tout 5% de la population. Sur les quinze dernières\nannées, plus de 500.000 personnes se sont installées à Bogotá, en situation de déplacés par la\nviolence. Dans cette métropole de plus de 7 millions d’habitants, cela représente une source\nde migrations extrêmement importante.\n\n\n12. Pour l’année 2000, le CODHES estime que 43 000 personnes, soit environ 8 600 foyers,\nsont arrivées à Bogotá, en situation de déplacés par la violence. Cela représente 3 580\npersonnes par mois, 120 par jour. En moyenne, cela signifie qu’une famille par heure arrive à\nBogotá si l’on s’en tient aux chiffres de 2000 (il semblerait que cette tendance se soit\naccentuée après la crise politique qui a suivi les élections présidentielles de 2001 et la fin des\npourparlers avec les guérillas).\n\n\n13. Les déplacés arrivent à Bogota au terme de pérégrinations à travers le pays. Le profil le\nplus répandu de migrants est celui d’une famille de paysans forcée à quitter ses terres qui se\ndéplace vers le bourg le plus proche, puis si les menaces persistent vers la capitale régionale.\nLes villes de Carthagène, Medellin et Santa Marta sont de grands foyers récepteurs de\ndéplacés. Enfin, c’est en dernier recours que les populations se déplacent vers Bogota. C’est\naussi un point de non-retour : plus le déplacé s’éloigne de chez lui et plus le temps qui s’est\nécoulé depuis le déplacement du lieu d’origine est long, plus le retour est difficile et\nimprobable.\n\n\n14. Les zones rurales ou les petits centres de peuplement à forte influence rurale sont les\nprincipaux foyers d’origine des exilés par la violence vers Bogotá. En 2000, 78% des déplacés\nqui arrivent à Bogotá proviennent de ces zones et sont des paysans confrontés à\nl’apprentissage de la vie en milieu urbain dans des conditions extrêmement précaires [12] .\n\n\n15. C’est un déplacement que l’on dit « au compte goutte ». Les déplacements se font en\ngénéral de manière individuelle ou familiale. Les déplacements massifs, c’est-à-dire de plus\nde 50 personnes sont assez rares.\n\n\n16. Malgré leurs divergences, les statistiques permettent de dégager quelques\ncaractéristiques communes à une majorité de déplacés :\n\n\n   - Dans plus de 25% des foyers en situation de déplacement, c’est une femme qui tient\nle rôle de chef de famille, ce qui est supérieur à la moyenne nationale.\n\n\n   - 58% des personnes arrivant à Bogota, déplacées par la violence, sont des femmes et\ndes filles.\n\n\n   - 54% du total de la population déplacée à Bogota a moins de 18 ans.\n\n\nLa population déplacée est donc une population particulièrement jeune qui génère de gros\nbesoins en matière d’éducation et de santé.\n\n\n17. L’hétérogénéité du monde des déplacés est à l’image de la violence elle-même. Se\nretrouvent pêle-mêle ex-guérilleros, paramilitaires, sympathisants, anciens paysans effrayés\n\n\n11 Chiffres tirés des études réalisées par le CODHES, Observatoire pour les Droits de l’Homme et pour le\nDéplacement, en collaboration avec l’Archidiocèse de Bogotá. CODHES est l’organisation la plus reconnue et la\nplus fiable en matière d’études sur les déplacés. Les chiffres qu’elle avance sont ceux communément acceptés et\nutilisés, dans la presse nationale colombienne par exemple.\n\n12 Senderos, Rastros invisibles del Desplazamiento en Bogotá, Arquidiócesis de Bogotá, CODHES, septembre\n2001.\n\n\n7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Chiffres tirés des études réalisées par le CODHES", "confidence": 0.19205546379089355}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "par l’arrivée annoncée de la guérilla ou ayant fui sous la répression de l’armée parce qu’ils\navaient auparavant cédé à l’injonction brutale des narcotrafiquants de faire, sur leurs\nchamps, des cultures de coca ; etc. [13] . On distingue généralement les déplacés de la façon\nsuivante :\n\n\n   - les populations indigènes\n\n\n   - les agriculteurs et villageois\n\n\n   - les classes moyennes des petites villes\n\n\n18. Le déplacé à son arrivée à Bogotá est bien souvent quelqu’un qui a tout perdu :\n\n\n   - 47% des déplacés qui arrivent à Bogotá possédaient des terres avant le\ndéplacement.\n\n\n   - Dans 75% des cas, ce sont des propriétés de 1 à 20 hectares, qui ont été\nabandonnées.\n\n\n   - 91% vivaient dans une maison, alors que 68% une fois à Bogotá logent dans une\npièce.\n\n\n   - 81% étaient propriétaires de leur logement avant le déplacement et 66% vivent en\nlocation à Bogotá [14] .\n\n\n19. Les antécédents historiques en termes d’hétérogénéité de la population de Bogota\napportent à la population déplacée des avantages et des inconvénients pour son insertion\nurbaine.\n\n\n   - D’une part, ils entravent la construction et la reconstruction des identités collectives\navec des référents territoriaux, tels que le quartier.\n\n\n   - D’autre part, ils ont doté les déplacés d’une extraordinaire capacité pour faire face\net déployer des stratégies d’amélioration des conditions de vie.\n\n\n20. Néanmoins, pour les déplacés par la violence, les capacités individuelles pour refaire\nleur vie trouvent rapidement leur limites, non seulement en raison d’un contexte urbain\ncaractérisé par des services déficients et une conjoncture économique de récession mais aussi\ndans la condition subjective associée au fait de se sentir déplacé.\n\n\n13 Michel AGIER, « Perte de lieux, dénuement et urbanisation. Les desplazados de Colombie », in Autrepart, n°14,\nLa Tour d’Aiguës/Paris, Editions de l’Aube/IRD, 2000.\n\n14 Archidiocèse de Bogotá, CODHES, Desplazados, Huellas de Nunca borrar, Bogotá, ed. Kimpres, juin 1999.\n\n\n8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fig. 2 : Carte de la population déplacée à Bogota**\n\n\n9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Carte de la population déplacée à Bogota", "confidence": 0.14788126945495605}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Carte de la population déplacée à Bogota", "confidence": 0.30321571230888367}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Les stratégies de survie et d’adaptation**\n\n\n21. L’arrivée diffuse des familles déplacées fait que les processus d’insertion en milieu\nurbain sont individuels et multiples. Les familles cherchent des contacts auprès de parents\nproches ou de compatriotes. Ces derniers se sont établis dans la ville comme migrants\néconomiques au cours des précédentes décennies ou déplacés par la violence dans les\npériodes récentes.\n\n\n22. D’autres déplacés arrivent sans aucun contact. Dès lors, ces derniers ne peuvent que\ncompter sur l’appui de quelques organismes [15] pour subvenir à leurs besoins les premiers\ntemps. Les Eglises jouent un rôle important pour l’intégration dans de nouveaux quartiers et\napparaissent souvent comme l’un des uniques pôles de reconstruction pour les vies des\narrivants. Il arrive généralement que les migrants originaires d’une même région se\nretrouvent et développent des stratégies communes, les liens (si ténus fussent-ils) sont\nrenforcés dans l’exode vécu.\n\n\n23. La recherche d’un abri est la première préoccupation des migrants. Lorsqu’il s’agit\nd’hébergement là où des proches s’étaient établis depuis quelques décennies, le lieu peut être\nplus central. Cependant, la très grande majorité des déplacés s’installent dans les quartiers\nles plus défavorisés de la périphérie de la capitale, n’ayant pas les moyens de vivre dans le\ncentre. Ces quartiers, dont l’origine a été en règle générale l’invasion ou la vente illégale de\nterrain, sont situés majoritairement dans le sud, sur les collines qui enclavent la ville et dans\nles proches municipalités, notamment à Soacha. L’installation est souvent précaire, limitée\npar des contraintes de moyens, d’espace ainsi que de la disponibilité de matériaux. Les\ndéplacés vont généralement grossir les quartiers de peuplements informels, au sud de la\nmétropole, dans les entrées de ville le long des grandes infrastructures routières.\n\n\n24. Dans les quartiers périurbains, les familles déplacées se logent à leur compte, c’est à\ndire moyennant paiement d’un loyer. Cette situation dure environ deux ou trois ans. Ensuite,\npour environ un tiers des ménages, la construction d’un logement, souvent très précaire, se\nfait, généralement à partir de l’invasion d’un terrain.\n\n\n25. Dès l’arrivée en ville, la quête d’un emploi ou d’une activité permettant de survivre\ncommence. Les femmes parviennent plus facilement à trouver un travail que les hommes.\nElles sont plus promptes à déployer toutes sortes d’initiatives pour s’en sortir : vente\nambulante, lavage du linge, emploi domestique, etc. Ces activités confèrent aux femmes plus\nqu’aux hommes une certaine garantie de survie et apportent un minimum de stabilité à la\nfamille tout au long des premiers mois de leur séjour urbain.\n\n\n26. Les hommes se trouvent confrontés au chômage dans une plus grande mesure. En\neffet, avant leur exil, la plupart des hommes avaient travaillé dans des emplois agricoles, peu\nutiles en milieu urbain. La formation pour accéder à un emploi dans le secteur de la\nconstruction ou dans la surveillance prend du temps. De plus, les hommes, dans leurs\nlabeurs à la campagne, sont habitués à réaliser des tâches bien définies demandant force\nphysique et occupation à plein temps. En ville, ils peinent à s’adapter aux petits emplois de\nservice, souvent irréguliers, qui servent à survivre.\n\n\n15 Ce sont les organismes de quartier comme la JAC, Junta de Acción Comunal, Conseil d’Action Communale.\nComité d’élection populaire au niveau du quartier ou la JAL, Junta de Administración Local, Conseil\nd’Administration Locale. Ce Conseil est composé de personnes élues au suffrage universel au niveau de la localité\n(arrondissement).\n\n\n10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "27. L’origine rurale de ces déplacés crée de nombreux traumatismes supplémentaires lors\nde l’arrivée dans la ville et ajoute aux problèmes d’intégration des déplacés aux populations\nurbaines. L’univers dense et minéral des villes, où il est impossible de pratiquer des activités\nagricoles, pose des problèmes d’adaptation.\n\n\n_Relations entre déplacés et population locale_\n\n\n28. L’accueil des populations déplacées est complexe. La solidarité des proches est de\ncourte durée. Les populations déplacées viennent s’insérer au sein de population déjà très\npauvre et qui connaît une crise forte en matière de logement et de sécurité alimentaire. La\nconcurrence et les conflits sont latents entre ceux qui sont surnommés « pauvres\nhistoriques » et déplacés. Après quelques jours, parfois une semaine, les familles d’accueil\nfont pression sur les déplacés afin qu’ils cherchent un autre endroit pour vivre et qu’ils\napprennent à se débrouiller par leurs propres moyens.\n\n\n29. Traiter le problème des déplacés serait leur réserver un traitement de faveur par\nrapport aux résidents pauvres. Les résidents tolèrent très mal ces populations qui viennent,\nselon eux, leur voler le peu d’argent que L’Etat met à la disposition des défavorisés. Cette\nsituation les rend très vulnérables, surtout le fait d’être stigmatisé comme ex-guérilleros ou\ntrafiquants. De nombreux entretiens révèlent ainsi que déplacés n’ayant plus rien ni\npersonne se tournent vers les groupes ou milices afin de travailler et de survivre dans les cas\nextrêmes.\n\n\n_Les vulnérabilités urbaines_\n\n\n30. La dispersion, la diversité et l’individualisation des démarches et stratégies pour\nsurvivre entraîne plusieurs conséquences pour le processus d’insertion urbaine :\n\n\n   - Dans ce climat de méfiance généralisée, le mélange de populations mobiles rend le\nstigmate d’être « déplacé pas la violence » moins important que dans d’autres\ncontextes.\n\n\n   - Pourtant, la méfiance s’impose quand même, en raison de la présence des acteurs\nde la violence dans les quartiers de la ville, et entraîne des situations d’isolement\nsocial. Ainsi, les évènement de solidarité et d’échange sont très rares.\n\n\n   - De ce fait, l’intégration dans le tissu social se réalise par des canaux restreints\n(personnes de même origine, proches, etc.). La nostalgie, le sentiment d’être\ndéplacé persistent très longtemps et constituent des freins à la construction d’un\nprojet de vie dans la ville.\n\n\n31. Les expériences traditionnellement différenciées des hommes et des femmes avant leur\nexil ont dotés les déplacés de potentialités et de vulnérabilités nouvelles une fois en ville :\n\n\n   - La tradition de mobilité des hommes les a aidés à supporter le déracinement, mais\nelle a eu des effets défavorables au moment de mettre en œuvre leurs capacités\npotentielles de construction de nouveaux réseaux sociaux.\n\n\n   - En revanche, l’expérience de participation des femmes dans des réseaux informels\nde soutien quotidien a donné à celles-ci plus d’endurance vis à vis de leur nouveau\nmilieu urbain.\n\n\n11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "- Les enfants quant à eux sont à la fois victime du manque d’équipements scolaires et\nde la nécessité d’appuyer leurs familles dans la recherche de moyens pour\nsurvivre. Près de 60% des jeunes de moins de 18 ans ne vont pas à l’école et tentent\nd’aider d’une façon ou d’une autre leurs parents et de participer à l’amélioration\ndes conditions de vie du foyer.\n\n\n32. Il est très difficile pour les déplacés de se trouver un emploi stable dans les zones dans\nlesquelles ils s’installent à leur arrivée. Dans un premier temps, l’obtention d’un emploi\ndépend de la qualité des réseaux d’information et de soutien dont dispose la famille\ndéplacée. Néanmoins, le taux de chômage parmi la population déplacée est beaucoup plus\nélevé que la moyenne nationale (après plus de cinq années en ville, environ 50% des chefs de\nfamille n’ont pas d’emploi). La localisation périurbaine des quartiers de migrants et le déficit,\nvoire l’absence de réseaux de transport : les déplacés doivent faire de longs trajets pour y\naccéder (une moyenne de 2 heures de transports quotidiens, qui sont coûteux).\n\n\n33. Afin de faire face à la vulnérabilité économique et à l’exclusion, les déplacés se voient\nproposer par les trafiquants et les groupes armés des emplois journaliers rémunérés bien\ndessus des salaires hebdomadaires.\n\n\n34. Les vulnérabilités structurelles, telles que l’accès et la topographie accidentée du site\nont plusieurs incidences sur les conditions de vie des populations :\n\n\n   - L’accès rend l’implémentation de services très coûteux. Par exemple, certains\nservices alternatifs (camions citernes) ne peuvent amener de l’eau dès lors qu’il\npleut.\n\n\n   - Parfois ces zones sont même très dangereuses avec les glissements de terrain et les\npluies torrentielles.\n\n\n   - Difficiles d’accès, ces quartiers d’invasion sont devenus des sanctuaires pour les\ngroupes armés. L’insécurité et les combats de rue qui s’y déroulent régulièrement.\n\n\n35. De façon plus générale, l’accès aux services de base pose de réels problèmes. Des\ndifférences notables sont à noter selon l’autorité municipale qui administre le quartier. Ainsi,\nCiudad Bolivar, district appartenant à la muncipalité de Bogota, offre de bien meilleures\nconditions de vie que la zone voisine, Los Altos de Cazuca, qui elle dépend de la ville de\nSoacha. Plusieurs raisons expliquent ces inégalités territoriales :\n\n\n   - Bien que très pauvre, Ciudad Bolivar est un quartier d’invasion moins récent (1960)\nqui s’est a déjà vu peuplé par plusieurs vagues de migration. Le processus de\nconsolidation a débuté depuis longtemps et les nouveaux arrivants se voient plus\nfacilement intégrés.\n\n\n   - Le district de Ciudad Bolivar a bénéficié de l’appui des organisations de solidarité\npendant plusieurs années afin d’améliorer les services et infrastructures mais aussi\npallier aux vulnérabilités des ménages ( _cf. infra_ ).\n\n\n12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Les relations avec les autorités locales et nationales**\n\n\n_Les difficultés rencontrées par les déplacés internes face aux politiques nationales et au cadre juridique_\n\n\n36. Le déplacement prive les personnes de leurs droits fondamentaux, et la loi fixe comme\nobjectif à l’Etat de rétablir les droits de ces citoyens. Selon la loi 387 de 1997, la question des\ndéplacés devrait trouver sa solution au niveau national, le Réseau de Solidarité Sociale (RSS)\nétant chargé de gérer cette question. Il existe également un Système Unique\nd’Enregistrement, donnant droit par là même aux aides de l’Etat et accès aux programmes\nhumanitaires.\n\n\n37. La loi prévoit deux phases, celle de l’aide humanitaire et celle de la stabilisation socioéconomique. Les différentes formes d’aide promues par l’Etat et les acteurs humanitaires\nconcernent généralement la phase de l’urgence. La phase de stabilisation socio-économique\nfait moins l’objet de l’attention des acteurs de l’aide.\n\n\n38. En ce qui concerne l’aide humanitaire d’urgence, la responsable de l’unité d’Aide et\nd’Orientation de Bogotá explique qu’« une fois le déplacé inscrit sur le Registre, il faut\ncompter plusieurs mois pour recevoir l’aide humanitaire d’ « urgence » : aliments, kits de\npropreté, matelas, aide pour loyer. Il faut attendre entre 3 et 6 mois ».\n\n\n39. Au delà des problèmes de retard, l’aide d’urgence n’est pas accessible à tous ceux qui\nsont inscrits. En effet, les fonds attribués aux institutions chargées du problème des déplacés\nne sont pas suffisants, et la loi stipule que l’aide est distribuée dans les limites permises par\nle budget. Certains déplacés, après avoir parcouru le marathon administratif pour obtenir le\ncertificat s’entendent répondre qu’il n’y a plus de fonds, donc plus d’aide. L’insuffisance du\nbudget qui y est consacré reflète un manque de volonté politique évident à affronter le\nproblème.\n\n\n40. De plus, la UAO de Bogotá est située en plein centre de la capitale. La majorité des\ndéplacés est située dans la périphérie de la métropole et il faut de longues et coûteuses\npérégrinations en bus à travers la ville pour arriver jusqu’à la UAO.\n\n\n41. En raison des dysfonctionnements du système national, entre 50 et 60% des déplacés\npar la violence s’inscrivent au registre.\n\n\n42. La deuxième phase prévue par la loi est celle de la stabilisation socio-économique des\ndéplacés. « La condition de déplacé forcé par la violence prend fin quand est atteinte la\nconsolidation et la stabilisation socio-économique, que ce soit dans son lieu d’origine ou\ndans les zones de réinstallation. Le déplacé coopérera à l’amélioration, au rétablissement, à la\nconsolidation et à la stabilisation de sa situation [16] ». Le décret 2569 précise que la condition de\ndéplacé prend fin :\n\n\n   - Par le retour, la réinstallation ou la relocalisation de la personne en situation de\ndéplacement. Dans ce cas, il s’agit de solution à plus long terme, cherchant non\nplus à résoudre l’urgence dans laquelle se trouvent les déplacés, mais à procurer\ndes solutions à long terme d’intégration et de réinsertion, et à mettre fin à la\n\n\n16 Loi 387 de 1997, chap.2, section 7, art. 18, “La condición de desplazado forzado por la violencia cesa cuando se\nlogra la consolidación y estabilización socioeconómica, bien sea en su lugar de origen o en las zonas de\nreasentamiento”.\n\n\n13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "situation de déplacé. Cette phase est cependant la plus faiblement soutenue par le\nRSS. Les politiques et les investissements à ce niveau sont extrêmement réduits.\n\n\n   - Par exclusion du Registre unique de la population déplacée ou suite à la demande\nde l’intéressé.\n\n\n43. La structure politique du pouvoir a évolué en Colombie avec les lois de\ndécentralisation de 1991. Dans ce cadre, les pouvoirs publics locaux sont alors en mesure\npour une bonne part de gérer eux-mêmes la question des déplacés qui s’installent sur leur\nterritoire. Une dichotomie apparaît alors entre pouvoir central et pouvoir local qui se\nrevoient tour à tour la responsabilité du problème.\n\n\n44. Les municipalités de Bogota et de Soacha sont deux administrations locales qui optent\npour des choix radicalement différents quant à l’intégration des déplacés :\n\n\n   - Dans les décennies 1980 et 1990, et notamment avant les lois de décentralisation,\nl’administration de Bogota a laissé les organisations internationales et ONG\nrenforcer les programmes étatiques. D’importants progrès ont été réalisés en\ntermes de logement, de voies de communication, de services publics et de gestion\ncommunautaire.\n\n\n   - A présent, dans un nouveau contexte législatif, l’arrondissement de Ciudad Bolivar\ndispose de plus d’autonomie mais de peu de capacités budgétaires. La politique\nactuellement en cours est de chercher à tirer profit des avantages d’appartenir à la\ncapitale et cherche à faire oublier son image de parent pauvre de la municipalité de\nBogota. De la part de la municipalité de Bogota, aucun programme spécifique n’est\nmis en place pour les déplacés. Ils doivent ainsi s’adresser aux dispositifs d’aide de\nla municipalité déjà existants (dont les fonds sont très peu souvent abondés) et\nsolliciter un appui ponctuel. Le financement de bons d’alimentation, la\nréhabilitation de bâtiments ou la mise à disposition de matériaux de construction\npour les déplacés se réalise par l’intermédiaire du UAO. Cela est cohérent avec les\nintérêts de la Municipalité de Bogota : actuellement, les différents acteurs sociaux\ns’accordent pour parler d’une « politique du silence » à Bogotá, autour du\nproblème des déplacés. Il s’agit de ne pas ternir l’image de la capitale, ville la plus\nmoderne et développée du pays.\n\n\n   - Du coté de Soacha, le déplacement est un problème impossible à dissimuler. La\nmunicipalité utilise ce quartier pour attirer les regards de la communauté\ninternationale et drainer des fonds (subventions et investissements). Cependant,\nmalgré les effets d’annonce et les dispositifs ad hoc [17] dans les faits, la municipalité\nde mène pas de politique effective pour ce quartier.\n\n\n45. Enfin, si l’intégration des déplacés à Bogota se solde souvent par un échec, les\npolitiques étatiques de retour et de réinstallation se montrent guère plus fructueuses et elles\ns’accompagnent par de nouvelles violations des droits des déplacés (fragilisation des lieux\nde réception, méfiance et rejet des déplacés de la part des populations réceptrices, pressions\net enrôlement forcé dans les groupes armés, etc.).\n\n\n17 Le Conseil Municipal de Soacha a élaboré un Plan Intégral Unique d’Aide à la Population Déplacée en 2002\n\n\n14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "RSS", "confidence": 0.10889432579278946}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Registre unique de la population déplacée", "confidence": 0.3149773180484772}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Registre unique de la population déplacée", "confidence": 0.22420373558998108}]}}}
{"input": "**L’implication du HCR et des autres acteurs dans le renforcement des stratégies de**\n**subsistance des populations déplacées.**\n\n\n46. Seul 39% des foyers à Bogota affirme avoir reçu des aides [18] . Par ordre décroissant\nd’importance, ces aides sont :\n\n\n   - L’aide alimentaire, qui correspond en général à la phase d’aide d’urgence. Ce sont\ndes distributions de paniers de nourriture ou de bons d’alimentation à l’arrivée.\n\n\n   - L’aide en matière d’éducation relève généralement de politiques publiques. La\nConstitution affirme la gratuité de l’école pour tous. Dans les faits, l’inscription à\nl’école est souvent payante car il faut au moins pouvoir payer le matériel scolaire et\nl’uniforme. L’état et le District peuvent attribuer des places dans les écoles aux\nenfants déplacés. Les ONG, l’Eglise ou des personnes privées peuvent procurer le\nmatériel, l’uniforme ou subventionner l’achat, mais ces systèmes et formes\nd’entraide ne peuvent non plus prendre en charge toute la population dans le\nbesoin.\n\n\n   - En matière de logement, il s’agit en général des aides pour payer les premières\nsemaines ou les premiers mois de loyer qui suivent l’arrivée en ville. Les politiques\nde logements sociaux sont très rares et ne s’adressent quasiment jamais aux\ndéplacés.\n\n\n   - Les aides en matière de santé s’adressent aux personnes qui n’appartiennent pas au\nsystème de santé national. Nombreuses sont les personnes parmi la population\ndéfavorisée qui n’y ont pas accès. Les personnes qui ne travaillent pas dans le\nsecteur formel de l’économie, comme c’est souvent le cas pour les déplacés, ont\ndroit au régime subsidiaire. L’affiliation aux centres de santé est possible pour les\ndéplacés mais elle prend environ un an [19] . Les déplacés n’ont plus droit à un régime\nspécial et se retrouvent souvent sans accès aux soins, sauf s’ils peuvent prouver que\nle mal dont ils souffrent a été engendré par ou pendant le déplacement. Les frais\ndoivent alors être payés par la caisse de santé du département d’origine du\ndéplacé. Autant dire que les déplacés n’ont plus accès aux soins gratuits. Avant la\nréforme, les déplacés qui n’avaient pas le certificat de déplacé, soit plus du tiers des\ndéplacés, n’avaient pas accès aux soins. C’est aujourd’hui le cas pour la quasitotalité des déplacés [20] . Médecins Sans Frontières et Médecins du Monde ont par\nexemple mené des projets d’unités de soin mobiles (camions itinérants ou brigades\nde santé). Cependant, ces programmes ne sont pas suffisants devant le nombre de\npersonnes qui ne reçoivent aucune aide et symbolisent bien les vides laissés par le\ngouvernement.\n\n\n47. Le reste des aides concerne les soutiens ponctuels pour l’ouverture d’un commerce ou\nle démarrage d’une petite entreprise. L’Etat a mis en place des programmes de « projets\nproductifs », par l’intermédiaire du RSS. La UAO, ou d’autres institutions publiques,\nproposaient aux déplacés des programmes spéciaux consistant à favoriser la petite entreprise\n\n\n18 Estado de situación del desplazamiento y retos para el año 2001, Groupe thématique du déplacement, Reunión\nd’information sur le déplacement, vendredi 19 janvier 2001, 16p.\n\n19 Pour lutter contre ce problème, l’Etat central, avait mis en place un système de fonds communs, servant à\nfinancer les frais médicaux des personnes ayant le certificat de déplacé. Les déplacés bénéficiaient d’un régime\nspécial, pouvant se présenter dans n’importe quel hôpital et y recevoir des soins mais de nombreux abus ont été\ncommis et le fonds commun a été supprimé.\n\n20 Le décret définitif sur l’accès des déplacés à la santé n’a pas encore été rendu public.\n\n\n15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## **NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH**\n\n**Research Paper No. 205**\n\n# **Ordered disorder:** **African asylum seekers in Israel** **and discursive challenges to** **an emerging refugee regime**\n\n**Yonathan Paz**\n\nE-mail: yonathan.paz@alumni.lse.ac.uk March 2011\n\n**Policy Development and Evaluation Service**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Policy Development and Evaluation Service**\n**United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees**\n\n**P.O. Box 2500, 1211 Geneva 2**\n\n**Switzerland**\n\n**E-mail: hqpd00@unhcr.org**\n\n**Web Site: www.unhcr.org**\n\nThese papers provide a means for UNHCR staff, consultants, interns and associates, as well as external researchers, to publish the preliminary results of their research on refugee-related issues. The papers do not represent the official views of UNHCR. They are also available online under ̳publications‘ at <www.unhcr.org>.\n\nISSN 1020-7473", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "''Let nothing be called natural in an age of bloody confusion, ordered disorder, planned caprice, and dehumanized humanity, lest all things be held unalterable!'' Bertolt Brecht, dramatist, poet and a refugee.\n\n_The Exception and the Rule_, 1937\n\n**Introduction**\n\nThis paper analyses Israel‘s response to a recent influx of African asylum seekers, a phenomenon whose nature and scale are unprecedented in Israel‘s history. It addresses three intertwined questions. What are the discursive challenges to the construction of an Israeli refugee regime? What dynamics foster their development?\nAnd how can those challenges be explained and deconstructed?\n\nSince early 2006 Israel has become a destination country for thousands of Africans who are willing to take a long and risky journey to Israel. As with other industrialized countries, Israel has responded with a range of exclusionary and at times contradictory policies which aim to control and limit entrance to its territory. Unlike other such countries, however, until very recently Israel did not have an asylum system, and its ongoing institutional evolution is partly a response to the recent influx.\n\nAlthough it carries distinctive features, Israel‘s asylum regime is guided by the prevalent exclusionary logic which dominates the policies of other developed countries. This has important implications for the asylum seekers. Their countries of origin and the scale of their influx challenge existing ̳humanitarian spaces‘. Once a critical threshold has been crossed, they are seen as a threat which can no longer be contained. Accommodating measures are being rejected for self-preservation considerations, spurred-on by Israel‘s ethnonational identity.\n\nRelatively little has been written about the meaning and significance of these developments (Willen 2010a, 2010b; Afeef 2009; Kritzman-Amir 2009; Yacobi 2009; Man 2010). This study seeks to complement the existing literature, drawing on a combination of primary and secondary sources.\n\nDuring July 2010, a period of field work was carried out in which 14 semi-structured interviews were conducted. Representatives of the key institutional bodies that deal with refugees and asylum seekers were interviewed; namely the state (officials and politicians); civil society (senior NGO staff and academics); and personnel at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It further draws on a multidisciplinary review of academic papers, key governmental documents and diverse media reports. [1] 1Three key newspapers are cited; _Haaretz –_ a central-left newspaper, _Jerusalem Post_ - a central-right newspaper and _Ynet,_ a news website, owned by Israel‘s most popular, politically-mainstream newspaper _Yedioth Aharonot_ 1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The paper consists of two parts. The first provides a historical overview that aims to situate the influx within a regional geo-political context. The second suggests a threefold evaluative typology of discourses; security, ethnonationalism and the gravity of the holocaust – societal pillars which critically influence both the state and the asylum seekers.\n\nBy critically presenting the evolution of Israel‘s responses to the influx, it argues that a pattern of ̳ordered disorder‘ governs a spectrum of rejectionist responses, underpinned by the fundamental role of the ̳asylum-migration nexus‘. The ordered disorder also explains the degree of accommodating measures, provided by all actors.\nThe disordered relationship between the nation-state and the asylum seekers becomes the Israeli ―national order of things‖ (Malkki 1995a).\n\n**African asylum seekers in Israel**\n\nSince the end of 2006 Israel has experienced an increasing influx of African refugees and asylum seekers. [2] The majority surreptitiously cross the continental border between Africa and Asia through Israel‘s southern border with Egypt. The asylum seekers originate mainly from Sudan and Eritrea, as well as other Sub-Saharan countries. At the time of writing, it is estimated that around 26,000 asylum seekers have entered Israel and a few hundred more continue to cross the border every month (Nathan 2010).\n\n_Sources: UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks. No data available for 2003. UNHCR has not yet published_ _data for 2010._ The Sinai desert serves as a geographical barrier between the countries and only short, 'sensitive' strips of the 260 kilometres are fenced. The asylum seekers often pay large sums to Bedouin smugglers (operating from both sides) who traffic them through the desert. In a border characterised by an active trade of drugs, tobacco, weapons and 2 As I demonstrate below the ̳refugee terminology‘ is contentious. In the interest of coherence I predominantly use the term ―asylum seekers‖, a term which does not tells us much about motivation but refers to the claim, which ought to stand evaluation. Thus, in this work, a person is considered an asylum seeker, until proven otherwise.\n\n2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks", "confidence": 0.8285929560661316}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "women [3] (Lutski 2005; Levenkron and Dahan 2003; Goldschmidt 2006), the asylum seekers have become yet another valuable commodity in the border‘s thriving political economy. [4] The journey is arduous and there are frequent reports of violence and starvation en route. Since 2007, 250 cases have been reported of women who have been raped by Bedouin smugglers, and it is estimated that many more go unreported (Wurgaft 2010; STW 2010). After surviving this journey, asylum seekers arrive at a border patrolled by Israeli and Egyptian troops where Egyptian policy has made the crossing a deathdefying task. The UN and human rights organisations have documented more than 60 fatal shootings of unarmed individuals since the summer of 2007 (UN 2010; HRW 2008; AI 2008). While the frequency of such reports has decreased, shootings continued to occur in 2010 (Reuters 2010).\n\nThe scale and scope of this phenomenon is unprecedented in Israel. For the first time in its history, the country has become a destination for African migration. Moreover, the plight of the refugees cannot be solely understood by traditional explanatory factors such as conflict, violence and violations of human rights. Although these factors drive refugees from Sudan and Eritrea, they are also intimately intertwined with the ―globalisation of asylum seeking‖ (Gibney 2003, 23; 2004), underdevelopment and economic incentives which often explain secondary movements.\n\nThis ̳asylum-migration nexus‘ notion recognizes the blurring of the traditional distinction between economic and forced migrants (Castels 2007, 26), creating practical and rhetorical difficulties to differentiate these categories (Richmond 1995; Hear 1998; Nyberg–Sørensen, Hear, and Engberg–Pedersen 2002; Crisp 2003). The relationship reshapes and stratifies the refugee label, allowing developed countries to design restrictionist refugee regimes in which an array of deterrence measures serve to protect sovereign territories from the invasion of ̳bogus, opportunistic aliens‘ (Zetter 2007; Chimni 1998).\n\n**African migration to Israel**\n\nAccording to UNHCR, the Middle East and North Africa host a fifth of the world's refugees, excluding the considerable and growing population of Palestinian refugees. [5] Syria and Lebanon, Israel's northern neighbours, host a significant number. Syria is the third largest refugee hosting country in the world with, according to government figures, more than a million Iraqi refugees, while Lebanon hosts 50,000 refugees. To 3 A parliamentary inquiry found that between 2001-2005, an annual number of 1,000 women were trafficked through the border for prostitution (Lutski, 2005). Comprehensive enforcement has since significantly reduced the scale of women trafficked into Israel 4 It is reported that in the case of some Eritreans, initial payment was made already in Eritrea (Interview with a senior UNHCR official).\n5Article 1D of the 1951 Convention exclude persons who receive assistance from other UN bodies. It intentionally excludes the Palestinians who were displaced as a result of the 1948 war, and were under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), an agency which was established prior to UNHCR. Palestinian refugees and their descendants are now estimated at 4.7 million (UNRWA 2009). _Refugee Survey Quarterly_ has recently published a special issue which provides a detailed historical account of this multifaceted issue (RSQ 2009).\n\n3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the east of Israel, Jordan hosts nearly 500,000 refugees, and to the South, Egypt (from which the majority of asylum seekers cross to Israel) hosts a population of more than 100,000 (UNHCR 2009; USCRI 2009). It is also known that Egypt has a vast population of unregistered foreign nationals who are not accounted for in refugee statistics. Estimates of their number vary considerably (Harrell-Bond and Zohry 2003; Nassar 2008).\n\nWhile such numerical and comparative analysis suggests that Israel‘s asylum seeker population is relatively small, this approach does not illuminate the social and political issues which give Israel‘s asylum seekers particular political and cultural weight. Surrounded by Arab and Muslim countries with weaker economies, Israel‘s prosperity and democratic structure act as significant pull factors for migrants. The country‘s decision to follow UNHCR guidelines and not to deport Eritreans and Sudanese while tolerating their unauthorised work must also function as an incentive.\n\nIt is also important to consider the circumstances that prompt Sudanese and Eritreans, the two dominant groups of asylum seekers, to make Israel their first or second country of asylum (Afeef 2009, 9). While their circumstances significantly differ, Eritreans and Sudanese share a desire to seek better protection and to pursue new economic opportunities. They leave behind violence, poverty, difficult asylum procedures, the dangers of forced return, a lack of durable solutions and social exclusion (HRW 2008).\n\nUntil 2006 the issue of asylum seekers in Israel did not constitute a dramatic policy concern. Their small numbers and the limited institutional capacity to deal with them partially explain the significant gap that appeared between Israel‘s historic role in contributing to the strengthening of the international refugee regime and its domestic policies. [6] No Israeli refugee law was drafted, leaving a space which was filled by patchy and often inadvertent responses to the increasing influx (Kemp and Kritzman 2008).\n\nIn the past, Israel has recognised groups of refugees and asylum seekers as a gesture of goodwill. Notable examples of such ̳humanitarian anomalies‘ are the decision to grant refuge to a few hundred Vietnamese boat-people in the end of the 1970s and to admit a group of Muslim Bosnian refugees during the 1990s. (Ben-Dor and Adut 2003, 21-22; Markowitz 1996).\n\nFollowing its withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, Israel admitted nearly 6,000 members (and their families) of the South Lebanese Army, a sectarian militia who collaborated with Israel during its occupation of South Lebanon. Such precedents, coupled with public pressure, led former Prime Minister (PM) Olmert to grant an exceptional temporary residency to approximately 500 Darfurian asylum seekers in September 2007 (Mualem 2007).\n\nIsrael historically handled asylum requests by outsourcing the process to UNHCR, using the assistance of the agency‘s honorary correspondent in Israel, which later became an official representative office (UNHCR 2007) It was only in 2001, 50 years 6 Driven by the horrors of the Holocaust in Europe and aiming to protect the Jewish refugees from World War II the young state of Israel was among the first 26 states who participated, alongside other Jewish organisations in drafting the Convention, to which it became an official signatory in 1954. The state‘s commitment was further strengthen when the Convention‘s 1967 protocol was signed in 1968.\n\n4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["refugee statistics"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "refugee statistics", "confidence": 0.9184419512748718}]}}}
{"input": "after the Refugee Convention was established, that Israel formulated an internal directive which outlined procedures for the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers.\nThis procedure maintained the pre-existing hybrid nature of the RSD process; both the state and UNHCR were involved (Ben-Dor and Adut 2003; Kemp and Kritzman 2008). [7] An updated version of the directive was intended to come into force in January 2011.\n\nThis status quo has been under immense pressure since 2006. The influx has focused public attention on the issue and vividly demonstrated through the response of various institutions that a critical threshold has been crossed. The presence of 26,000 asylum seekers in dispersed urban centres is particularly visible in a small country such as Israel and is generating considerable tensions.\n\n**Ordered disorder**\n\nThe government‘s incorporation of a range of deterrence measures alongside some accommodating procedures cannot be simply dismissed as stemming from Israel‘s inexperience in dealing with asylum seekers. The tension between Israel‘s democratic structures, backed by its international commitments, and the state‘s attempts to shape technologies of power which control and limit entrance to its territory, is expressed in a response to asylum seekers that can be understood as ̳ordered disorder‘ _._ The pattern of ̳ordered disorder‘ is guided by a consistent logic intended to make asylum claims unsustainable. The state‘s trial-and-error measures for dealing with refugees have shaped the sense of non-policy which has been described by others as chaotic bureaucratic ambiguity (Afeef 2009, 11) and governmental unruliness (Willen 2010b).\n\nHowever, behind this ostensible chaos or unruliness lies an ordering principle which aims to deliver a clear and unwelcoming message. Ultimately, the range of measures employed to send a ̳no-entry‘ signal, and the array of deterrence signals used to reduce the numbers of future arrivals, establish the temporariness of asylum claims in Israel.\n\nConversely, NGOs, the media and Israeli officials have held Israel accountable to the high standards of its international commitments. Thus, in parallel to employing harsh deterrence measures, Israel has also offered limited and differing degrees of protection.\n\nOver time, the government has issued a few thousand work permits to Sudanese and Eritreans, exercising a degree of tolerance and recognition of their needs, although these were exceptional permits that had to be renewed. But the majority of asylum seekers have not received such permits and have been forced to work illegally to survive. Such uneven, contradictory action exempts the state from declaring its allegiance either to deterrence or tolerance.\n\n7UNHCR made the initial identification and interview of the asylum seeker. On the basis this process, a recommendation was given to the National Status Granting Body (NSGB), an inter-ministerial committee responsible for considering UNHCR recommendations. The final decision was taken by the MOI.\n\n5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "A senior Ministry of Interior (MOI) official demonstrated the logic of non-policy when he was asked about employment issues in a session of the ̳Special Parliamentary Committee on the Problem of Foreign Workers‘ (SCPFW, 2010): ―In principle the law is there, on the other hand there is a decision not to enforce [it]‖.\nRealising that enforcement of unlawful employment may force the government to provide care for the tens of thousands of asylum seekers, the state tolerates their work, and nurtures the general disorder.\n\n̳Ordered disorder‘ can also be perceived as a response to the challenges the refugees pose to what anthropologist Lisa Malkki (1995a; 1995b) calls the ―national order of things‖. Issues of sovereignty and nationalism constitute the ―regime of order and knowledge‖ (Malkki 1995a, 5) that make-up the Israeli nation-state, are challenged by the subversion that asylum seekers create. Their liminal status threatens the perceived national order of things as they confront the state with their refugeehood.\n\nAs Agamben (1995) puts it (in reference to Arendt (1978)), refugees represent ―a disquieting element...by breaking up the identity between man and citizen, between nativity and nationality, the refugee throws into crisis the original fiction of sovereignty‖. In the face of this symbolic threat, Israel has employed a range of ―specialised correctives‖ (Malkki 1995a, 8) to restore the ̳real‘ national order of things.\n\nWhile this politically useful framework of ̳ordered disorder‘ has consistently overarched the state‘s rejectionist policies, a pattern of evolution should also be acknowledged, especially in the implementation of Israel‘s ̳corrective‘ impulses.\nAfeef (2009) fruitfully cites three examples of the contradictory policies which began to unfold as the influx increased.\n\nFirst, the policy of detention, a key deterrence measure, was exercised even prior to 2006. As citizens of an ̳enemy state‘ the early arrivals from Sudan were held in detention for long periods, because they were identified as a potential security threat, which effectively debarred them from the asylum procedure (Tal 2007). This arrangement was increasingly applied to the majority of the asylum seekers who arrived in Israel (including minors), regardless of their nationality. [8] Second, the equally hostile response of ̳hot return‘, whereby asylum seekers were immediately returned to Egypt after crossing the border. Israel forcibly returned to Egypt an estimated 220 asylum seekers who were caught crossing the border, denying their right to claim asylum, in spite of the state‘s knowledge of Egyptian policies which sometimes breached the Convention‘s non-refoulement principle. Following a petition to the Israeli Supreme Court it seems that this policy is no longer practiced, but human rights organisations claim that it continues to periodically occur (RRF 2008, 2009).\n\nFurthermore, in attempting to address concerns regarding over-crowding and employment pressures the government initiated the ̳Hadera-Gedera Provision‘, named after the two cities which geographically delineated a ̳no-go‘ area for 8 The functions of the prison system deserve further research. They arguably operate as ̳revolving doors‘ centres (although at different periods Sudanese asylum seekers were in prison for more than a year).\n\n6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "refugees. This provision attempted to legally secure and isolate the Tel-Aviv metropolitan area, Israel‘s economic heart from being ̳hijacked‘ by the asylum seekers‘ low-cost labour.\n\nThis policy created economic-political pressures on smaller more desolate towns and prevented refugees from accessing UNHCR offices and NGOs‘ services in Tel-Aviv.\nFollowing a petition to the Supreme Court and strong public pressure from NGOs, Members of Knesset (MK) and officials in the local authorities, the MOI cancelled this ̳corrective provision‘, more than a year after it was announced (Afeef 2009, 13).\n\nMore recently, driven by its dependence on UNHCR, the government established a new RSD Unit within the newly formed Population, Immigration and Border Authority (Ilan 2008; Wurgaft 2009). From July 2009 this unit was given the role of undertaking the RSD process.\n\nThis transition followed a comprehensive preparatory process which involved training by UNHCR and other organisations, who commended the government for its efforts. [9] Although ostensibly a positive step of taking responsibility for refugee protection — or at least as one interviewee observed: ―a work in progress‖ heading in this direction\n\n- the RSD unit exists within ongoing institutional disorder, which severely\nundermines its capabilities.\n\nUNHCR‘s head in Israel has stated: ―They are quite serious in how they approach it, but the biggest drawback ... is that there is no legal framework in place. There are no published procedural guidelines on their work‖ (Friedman 2010a). A patchwork of administrative decisions and political strategy block access to refugee status.\n\nAt present Sudanese and Eritreans, who constituting 85 per cent of the refugee population, do not go through the RSD process. Instead, they receive temporary group protection which indicates the government‘s recognition that that they are likely to suffer persecution. This status, however, strategically delays the RSD process and the potential convention status (Kritzman-Amir 2009). Moreover, it was recently reported that out of 3,000 applicants of other nationalities, only two were granted refugee status (Weiler-Polak 2010).\n\nLastly, and perhaps most dramatically, PM Netenyahu recently approved the government‘s long-lasting intention to erect a surveillance fence along parts of the Egyptian border. Stating that Israel will remain open to refugees from conflict zones he framed the fence as a ―strategic decision to secure Israel's Jewish and democratic character‖, arguing that \"We cannot let tens of thousands of illegal workers infiltrate Israel through the southern border and inundate our country with illegal aliens\" (McCarthy 2010).\n\nThe following sections demonstrate how three core preoccupations ̳discursively dress‘ the bare lives of refugees in Israel and illuminate the ―chronic tension between\n\n[the refugees‘] presence as bare life and as political actors, subject of history‖ (Malkki 2002, 359). They are: (a) securitisation and its relations to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, (b) ethnonationalism and (c) the legacy of the holocaust. These discourses 9 The government‘s serious attempts were repeatedly mentioned in the interviews.\n\n7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "have developed as Israel‘s ideological ̳containment threshold‘ for the presence of asylum seekers has been crossed.\n\nIn reality, the three discourses are closely intertwined as key pillars of Israeli identity and society. Yet analytically distinguishing between them highlights how each creates particular problems for the construction of an Israeli asylum regime and how asylum seekers serve as a template in the discourses‘ formation.\n\n**Security discourse**\n\nThe gravity of the security prism in Israel cannot be overstated. Officially managed under a legal ̳state of emergency‘ since its establishment 62 years ago, Israel has fought eight major wars, exercised countless military operations, experienced vicious terror attacks and continues to engage in the intricate Israeli-Palestinian conflict while dealing with threats of destruction.\n\nUnder these conditions, security in Israel cannot be dismissed only as a social construct, but should rather be seen as a pivotal ̳societal pillar‘ that has psychological and social elements, based in Israel‘s geo-political reality. It is not surprising that asylum seekers (some of whom are citizens of hostile states to Israel) entering illegally through the notorious Egyptian border are conceived as a security threat.\n\nThe inability of the asylum seekers to voice their agency has become a fertile ground for a campaign which used vilifying rhetoric to construct a number-oriented, securitycentred discourse. As Gibney (2002, 41) has pointed out, despite fleeing from terror and persecution, refugees often unwillingly become representatives of such violent and repressive phenomena in refugeedom.\n\nFollowing the 2006 influx, discussions about asylum seekers were gradually securitised, culminating with the recent decision to erect the surveillance fence. The head of the Egyptian-Israeli fence project is a high ranking army officer who was defined by one military correspondent as the ―father and mother of the separation wall‖ between Israel and the West Bank (Buhbut 2006). Such presence serves as a useful reminder of the close connection between managing Israel‘s new security concerns about asylum seekers and its control over the Occupied Palestinian Territories.\n\nThe Israeli state began to frame the influx of asylum seekers as a security concern from early 2006, in parallel to the establishment of the ̳hot returns‘ procedure. In a special meeting in early 2008 former PM Olmert employed a disturbing ̳natural disaster‘ terminology to describe the situation, stating: ―This is a tsunami that can grow and we need to take every measure to stop it\". This threatening imagery helped him to argue that security officials should \"prevent the refugee infiltrations, even if the matter requires the use of force\" (JP 2008).\n\nThe ̳asylum-migration nexus‘ was strategically used to give a security dimension to what Willen (2010a, 508) calls ―the epistemological and classificatory confusion‖ that accompanied the state‘s refusal to describe the arrivals as refugees or asylum seekers.\nInstead, it denounced them as ̳infiltrators‘ ( _mistanenim)_ and later, fuelled by rejectionist rhetoric by politicians and others, coined the neologism – ―labour 8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "infiltrators‖ ( _mistaneniavoda_ ) in an effort to associate refugees with a threat to the employment prospects of Israelis.\n\nAs one academic interviewee observed, the ongoing primacy of this term demonstrates ―the success of agents within the [governmental] institutions to inject this discourse and create a sort of panic‖ characterised by a ―takeaway feeling – they will come here, take what we have, and change this place‖.\n\nThis ―takeaway feeling‖ partly explains the urgency of an MK who suggested various security technologies that allowed Israel to act in a middle zone between violence and doing nothing: ―...preventing entrance, a fence, guard dogs, sensors...arrivals will not be answered and received, we will not let them in‖...‖Between killing and not acting there is prevention, [and the state should act upon it] if Israel wishes to survive‖.\n\nHowever, any discussion which touches upon security-related issues must also consider the close triangular relationships between African refugees, Palestinian refugees and Israeli security considerations. In the Israeli context, the term ̳refugee‘ is traditionally associated with two types of refugee: Jewish holocaust survivors who fled Europe and the Palestinian refugees who were displaced as a result of the 1948 War.\n\nThe state fears that recognizing African asylum seekers as refugees will open the Pandora‘s Box of Palestinian refugees‘ claims for territory, compensation and most importantly, right of return. Combined, these demands are perceived as a threat for the country‘s ethnonational character and its very existence as a Jewish and democratic state (cf. Shafir and Peled 1998; Yiftachel 2000; 2006; Gavison 1999).\n\nAlthough article 1D of the 1951 Convention excludes the Palestinian refugees, the resolution concerning their fate has remained amongst the key intricate issues in the negotiations between the sides (e.g. Peters and Gal 2009). Although the two ̳refugee issues‘ are not legally or practically related, the primordial/contemporary presence of the Palestinian refugees shapes immigration debate in Israel. As one interviewee claimed, the issue of Palestinian refugees accompanies any discussion about African refugees.\n\nThe ―labour infiltrators‖ terminology serves three key functions. First, it portrays the refugees as a threat to Israeli employment. Second, this neologism enables the state to de-link the contemporary influx from the contentious tensions associated with the ̳Palestinian refugee‘ as a symbol for territorial claims.\n\nFinally, it draws on an emotionally freighted term and set of events that suggest grave danger to Israeli identity and individuals. Infiltration is associated with a specific historical episode, (and in many ways a contemporary one too); 'infiltrators'\n\n[ _mistanenim_ ] are associated with the Palestinian _Fedayeen_ [10] movement which emerged as a response to the 1948 war and the establishment of Israel.\n\nImmediately after the war thousands of Palestinian refugees began to cross the border back to their houses. At first, they were motivated by socio-economic concerns 10Arabic for self-sacrificer.The term refers to different groups, in different times. It is cited here to address the post 1948 period throughout the 1950s.\n\n9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "regarding their families, property, crops and houses. These returns were perceived by the Israeli side as an act of infiltration that did not only involve trespassing but also constituted a threat to the new state.\n\nAs the post-war tensions increased, the infiltration changed its purpose, and developed into a national struggle. Throughout the 1950s (arguably with the support of the neighbouring states) groups of Palestinian guerrilla fighters attacked Israeli civilian and military targets. These acts were followed by retaliation by the Israeli army, leading to many causalities on both sides (for a detailed account see Morris 1997; Benvenisti 2002).\n\nOne NGO worker highlighted the state‘s intention to take the issue ―to a place that connects [the refugees] to the Palestinian struggle and security dilemmas...but it is a manipulation of the discourse‖. Other interviewees highlighted important nuances, as a different NGO worker argued: ―the phobia from the [African] refugees began with the phobia from the Palestinian refugees, but it has received a life of its own‖.\n\nReferring to the legal aspects of the emerging asylum regime, a third interviewee touched on this evolution: ―a ten years process has taken place, and the Palestinian issue has not really succeeded to enter the asylum regime because they have succeeded in creating deterrence...they suddenly realised however, that the refugee convention can be a serious explosive even without the Palestinian refugees...even though every Israeli has the Palestinian issue here [pointing at her nape], it is no longer at the forefront. The demographic issue is – and demography is not only the\n\n[Israeli-Palestinian] conflict, demography is a few more things including [the question]: ̳do you want Israel to become Africa?‘‖ [A3].\n\n**The ethnonational discourse**\n\nIsrael‘s Declaration of Independence refers to the state as ―the birthplace of the Jewish people‖ and their \"ancient homeland‖. It states that Israel would ―open the gates...wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the comity of nations‖ (MFA 1948/2010). Established to express the right of the Jewish people to self-determination and grounded in the Zionist ideology, Israel‘s Jewish and democratic character is underlined by the 1950 Law of Return which constructs a distinctive migration regime.\n\nThe law establishes the ―natural right‖ of every Jew to return to the homeland and become a citizen, based on ethno-religious ancestral ties which are represented in the modern nation, and in the ideological commitment to Jewish immigration (Sachar 2000; Shuval 1998). The law constructs a migration regime that defines the particularities of membership claims while excluding those who do not meet its demands, creating varying degrees of a much-debated structural discrimination against non-Jews, and in particular Palestinians (cf. Carmi 2003; Yiftachel 2006; Gavison 2010).\n\nThe state actively seeks, via a range of institutions, to encourage Jewish ̳homecoming‘ and sustain a Jewish demographic majority. Israel‘s self-defined ―Jewish and democratic‖ character creates inherent tensions for non-Jewish migrants (amongst others) who are conceived by some as an existential threat (Kritzman-Amir 10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "2009), not only demographically but ―...one or a combination of biological dilution ...cultural downgrading, security danger, subversion and political instability‖ (Smooha 2002, 478 cited in Afeef 2009, 3).\n\nWhile these tensions were arguably contained for decades, from the 1990s onwards three patterns of migration to Israel challenged the state‘s definitional features. First, Israel absorbed more than one million Jewish and non-Jewish migrants from the collapsing Soviet Union who were primarily driven by economic considerations. [11] Second, the government encouraged labour migration from overseas to replace Palestinian workers from the West Bank and Gaza who were gradually rejected due to the deterioration in the security situation following the 1987 first _Intifada._ [12] From the state‘s prism, these labour migrants were not perceived as immigrants but only as authorised workers who met the booming economy‘s needs (Kemp and Reijman 2008; Reijman 2009; Kemp 2010). Accordingly, government policy towards them consisted of differing policies, including a large-scale governmental deportation campaign targeted at authorised workers who overstayed their visas and became unauthorised (Willen 2007). The third transformation is the ongoing influx of African migrants.\n\nAgainst this backdrop, the 2006 refugee influx met heightened anxiety over the transforming ethnonational character of the Israeli nation-state. The idea that mass influx involves demographic change has deep roots and was tactically used by Jews themselves prior to establishment of the state and during the British mandate (Neuman 1999). This language was engaged again, intensified by these changing patterns of migration and the ongoing focus on state security, to represent asylum seekers as a serious threat to both social cohesiveness and security - conveyed through the transportable, easy-to-use refugee template.\n\nPoliticians and public officials further inflamed the debate by releasing controversial statements. PM Netanyahu employed rejectionist rhetoric: ―infiltrators cause cultural, social and economic damage, and pull us towards the Third World‖ and, in a slip of tongue, he later referred to the infiltrators as ―surge of refugees who threaten to wash away our achievements and damage our existence as a Jewish democratic state‖ (Goldstein 2010).\n\nThe head of the SCPFW has called for a stop to the ―illegal infiltration‖ and defined it as an immediate ―demographic, cultural, religious and social threat―...―[as] the Jewish people have spent 100 years building a Jewish state and in 10 years the infiltrators can wash it all down the drain\" (Katz 2010).\n\nSuch pronouncements were followed by a semi-xenophobic media campaign organised by the mayor of Eilat, Israel‘s resort city and the nearest city to the southern border, who complained about the municipal burden associated with the number of African asylum seekers in his city. He called Israel‘s inaction ―national suicide‖ (Friedman 2010b), while comfortably failing to mention the economic benefits of the asylum seekers‘ low-cost labour in the city‘s hotels, tolerated by both government and 11 This was enabled by a 1970 amendment to the Law of Return which expanded its scope to include the spouses and close relative of any Jew.\n12Arabic for uprising.\n\n11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "his municipality. Another example of a religious-ethnonational discourse was the call of local rabbis in South Tel-Aviv‘s deprived neighbourhoods (in which many asylum seekers and migrant labourers reside) not to rent flats to the ―dangerous infiltrators‖ (Harkov 2010).\n\nOne academic interviewee has argued that the state‘s ―remarkable consistency in its overall rejection of the refugees can be understood through its core concerns with ―their ̳otherness‘, the state does not want both the Muslim [refugee] and the Christian\n\n[refugee]...but the basic logic is simple, and it has to do with their increasing numbers and the nature of the Jewish state‖...[something] ―which cannot be overridden as a paranoia per se‖.\n\nAs a few civil society and academic interviewees pointed out, these base fears are enacted by the ̳socialisation‘ of public officials who feel they are ―the Jewish democratic state‘s gatekeepers‖, bearing responsibility to limit the non-Jewish immigration to Israel as much as possible. One NGO worker argued that these officials see their role as ―preventing drastic demographic deterioration... similarly to that of the Dutch boy who plugs a dike with his finger‖.\n\nIn contrast, one NGO worker argued that civil society organisations ―advocate a perception of ̳universalistic citizenship‘, where everyone should have rights...they do not see the nationality issue as relevant, but publicly, it is not stated. In today‘s public atmosphere, we will not say it out loud because it does not serve the struggle and the strategy‖. As the same NGO worker argued: ―the central issue here is [one that addresses] the nature of Israeli civil society, the struggle is about the character of Israel as a state, and the refugees are not really sharing this struggle, they are rather disempowered by it‖.\n\nBoth security and ethnonational discourses have intensified as the numbers of asylum seekers have risen sharply, crossing a critical threshold beyond which refugee issues can no longer be ignored as ̳out of sight, out of mind‘. The next section highlights a third challenge which complements the ethnonational, security-conscious image: the experience of the holocaust.\n\n**The holocaust/genocide discourse**\n\nThe holocaust is a fundamental social component of the Israeli society - its legacy is deeply rooted in past and contemporary Israeli identity (Zertal 2005). The aforementioned decision of former PM Olmert to give temporary residence to 500 Darfurians can be seen as an exceptional ̳humanitarian anomaly‘, akin to those granted by Israel in the past. While it has a humanitarian dimension, granting recognised survivors of genocide protection in Israel inherently relates to Jews‘ and Israelis‘ own experiences of genocide.\n\nThis ̳holocaust discourse‘ has an ongoing role in shaping policies and attitudes towards asylum seekers. It creates a degree of accommodating space for asylum seekers vis-à-vis Israel‘s commitment to human rights. The influx heightened the tension between ethnic nationalism, embedded in the state‘s identity, and an array of humanitarian responses which followed the initial arrival of Sudanese (and later other) refugees. These humanitarian responses were partially (and arguably) motivated by 12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the shared ̳intimacy‘ of the genocide experience between Israelis and Sudanese from Darfur.\n\nThe centrality of this issue was highlighted in 2006-7 which saw a significant increase in the numbers of asylum seekers. Analogies to the holocaust as the Israeli/Jewish ̳moral barometer‘ were commonly drawn by politicians (Knesset Discussion 2007), academics - including a leading holocaust scholar who compared Israel‘s policies to Switzerland‘s and Britain‘s policies towards Jews in the Second World War (TAU 2007; Bauer 2008), reserve soldiers who served at the border and witnessed Egyptian shootings (Bereshkovsky 2007) and even senior religious figures (Ynet 2007).\n\nOne newspaper‘s editorial explicitly defined the linkage: ―The first moral commandment of the state of the Jews is that it does not have the right to slam the door in the face of refugees fleeing genocide‖ (Haaretz 2007). Such calls led many other Israelis to express their moral commitment by providing donations or food products, or by hosting asylum seekers in their houses or settlements.\n\nAs Willen (2010a) has pointed out, the ―kinship of genocide‖ between Jewish experiences of the holocaust and Darfurian survivors shaped accommodating humanitarian responses but it also led to the creation of a hierarchy of suffering in which Darfurian Sudanese received a special humanitarian primacy over others. Their specific, ̳right‘ kind of suffering could be better accommodated than others forms of suffering.\n\nWith the rise in the numbers of Eritrean asylum seekers who gradually and significantly outnumbered the Sudanese (and particularly that of Darfurians), the influx reached its critical threshold. The kinship of genocide towards asylum seekers has eroded and the short-span of this episodic golden-era (if indeed there was ever one) has reached its end. This made room for the deeper tensions between humanitarianism and ethnonationalism. The migration side of the asylum-migration nexus undermined the asylum side as the ―labour infiltrators‖ terminology took primacy.\n\nIn the words of some interviewees, the moral obligations of holocaust survivors were balanced with more pragmatic concerns. A government official stated: ―the people of Israel are merciful in their nature, and the experience of the holocaust hovers above – those who will be recognised as refugees will be treated with all due respect, but those who are not recognised – people need to understand that this becomes a heavy financial burden‖. An MK argued that the kinship of genocide is not the issue: ―people do not know what is Eritrea, what kind of state, at most they will tell you ̳something in Africa‘, they do not know...Sudan, Darfur, Ethiopia, Africa, Muslims – everything in one parcel – only few are really aware of the details‖.\n\nCivil society workers however, were intently aware of the way this balance had tipped away from the cultural weight of genocide, partially because they instrumentally attempted the holocaust discourse to support their advocacy and fund-raising campaigns, an endeavour most referred to as a mistake. One academic highlighted the early success of this technique as it ―paved the way for many people to understand and identify with the situation experienced by other people, through their collective history, and it was genuine personal identification‖.\n\n13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Yet while the ―story of the Darfurians ... enabled doing things for the rest‖, this interviewee also identified the ―constricting‖ results of focusing on such a ―particularistic experience‖ to generate empathy and support for refugees: ―Israelis find it difficult to identify with something they are not familiar with, but it does not mean we should not respond to it‖.\n\nLikewise, an NGO worker highlighted the Eritreans‘ subsequent problem: ―to market their refugehood‖...it was much easier to mobilise public opinion...[regarding] genocide refugees. The political salience of language and carefully selected appellations was highlighted by many interviewees as they traced the transformations in the discourse from ―Auschwitz, and Israel‘s legacy of the holocaust‖ to deep concerns with regard to the ―the faith of Israel if this influx will continue‖.\n\nThe kinship of genocide sheds light on the salience of the security and ethnonationalist discourses. Moreover, it created a window of opportunity to see the asylum seekers as purposive actors. While the kinship has eroded, holocaust discourse, as a fundamental pillar of the Israeli society will continue to shape people‘s interpretative readings and the state‘s responses to asylum seekers.\n\n**Conclusion**\n\nDrizzle, trickle, flow, surge, flood, tidal-wave and even tsunami. Water metaphors are commonly used to refer to asylum seekers and refugees. Turton (2003b) points out three common features of such forced migration metaphorical language. First, the language is shaped in inescapable but unpredictable terms as something which must be resisted. Second, it dehumanises its subjects while shaping their presence as a threat. Third, it relies on an ̳us versus them‘ dichotomy.\n\nThese features are central to this paper‘s quest to explain and deconstruct the discursive challenges surrounding African asylum seekers and refugees in Israel. It has sought to establish ̳calmer waters‘ in which these discourses and their political implications can be analytically evaluated. The exclusionist measures which have constituted Israel‘s patchy policy responses highlight its strategy to cement asylum claims as unsustainable, in the hope the surge of refugees will one day dry up.\n\nIsrael‘s ̳refugee problem‘, albeit new, is not going to suddenly disappear. Far from being a local problem, critical analysis reveals the issue‘s developing salience. The future of Israel‘s asylum regime will be shaped by the discourses which were identified in this study and others which will probably emerge and re-emerge.\n\nThe paper presented two intertwined arguments. First, the discursive formations which developed as a response to the influx are underlined by the reduction of the asylum seekers to the level of ̳bare life‘, a form of depoliticised existence (Agamben 1998). The asylum seekers serve, on a conceptual level, a convenient and an agencylimited template for these discourses to form, essentially affecting the treatment they receive, which often serve the political interests of others. Second, the asylummigration nexus has a fundamental role in shaping debates over the ̳correct‘ or ̳accurate‘ definition of the asylum seekers – a category which cannot be distinctively conceptualised from economic migrants.\n\n14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Drawing on such overlaps, Israel has constructed its own ―national order of things‖ (Malkki, 1995): an ordered disorder which serves the evolutionary pattern through which it responds to asylum seekers. This ordered disorder progresses through ostensibly contradictory and confused policies, but a vivid exclusionary principle governs its overall execution. Essentially, the exclusionary logic is not radically different from the spectrum of measures used by other countries that limit the entrance of unwanted individuals to their territory.\n\nInstigating this spectrum of responses, asylum seekers are shaped and perceived by the state as a blank slate, open to discursive turns supported by the strategic choices of actors from across the political spectrum. While anathema to many, and provided that the current influx continues at its current rate, it is not impossible to envisage the establishment of Israel‘s first ̳infiltrators city‘ or refugee camp.\n\nServing a multiplicity of functions this ostensible ̳city of infiltrators‘ would become a detention centre for the asylum seekers, a deterrence measure for future arrivals and simultaneously, a humanitarian space where their physical needs would be met (SCPFW 2010). Widely rejected and criticised, such considerations continue to live as a potential policy resolution in the mind of decision makers, and may indeed materialise if the numbers of refugees continue to rise at current rates.\n\nBut another route can also be contemplated. Israel may develop legislation which transforms the ̳kinship of genocide‘ into a more inclusionist ̳kinship of refugees‘ which will respond to Israel‘s unique ethnonational character and past legacies while accommodating others‘ unique circumstances and history. Either way, as Foucault (cited in Campbell 1998, 515) has stated in support of the Vietnamese boat people: ―People‘s misfortune must never be the silent remainder of politics‖ – this paper attempted to reflect on a process which may allow exactly that.\n\n15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**REFERENCES**\n\nAFEEF, K.F. ( 2009) A Promised Land for Refugees? Asylum and Migration in Israel. _New Issues in_ _Refugee Research_ Working Paper No. 183 Geneva: UNHCR.\n\nAGAMBEN, G. (1995) We Refugees. _Symposium_ 49, no. 2: 114-119.\n\n——— (1998) _Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life_ . Stanford: Stanford University Press.\n\nAI(2008) Amnesty International. Egypt: Deadly Journeys through the Desert.\n\nhttp://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE12/015/2008/en. (Accessed 20.08.2010) ARENDT, H. (1978) We Refugees. In _The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern_ _Age_ . New York: Grove Press.\n\nBAUER, Y. (2008) What Do We have in Common With Them Anyway? _Haaretz_, June 13.\n\nhttp://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/what-do-we-have-in-common-with-them-anyway1.247743. (Accessed 20.08.2010) BEN-DOR, A. and ADUT R.(2003) _Israel - A Safe Haven? Problems in the Treatment Offered by the_ _State to Refugees and Asylum Seekers_ . Tel-Aviv: Physicians for Human Rights & Tel-Aviv University.\n\nBENVENISTI, M.(2002) _Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948_ .Berkeley: University of California Press.\n\nBERESHKOVSKY, A. (2007) IDF Reserve Soldiers Act on Behalf of Refugees. _Ynet_, June 19.\n\nhttp://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3414994,00.html. (Accessed 20.08.2010) BUHBUT, A. (2006) The Father and Mother of the Separation Wall. _NRG_, December 5.\n\nhttp://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/421/172.html.(Hebrew) (Accessed 20.08.2010) CAMPBELL, D. (1998) Why Fight: Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post-structuralism. _Millennium -_ _Journal of International Studies_ 27, no. 3: 497 -521.\n\nCARMI, N. (2003) _The Law of Return: Immigration Righs and their Limits_ . Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press. (Hebrew) CASTELS, S. (2007) The Migration-Asylum Nexus and Regional Approaches. In _New Regionalism and_ _Asylum Seekers: Challenges Ahead._ KNEEBONE, S. and RAWLINGS-SANAEI, F.(eds.).pp.2542. USA: Berghahn Books.\n\nCHIMNI, B. S. (1998) The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South. _Journal of Refugee_ _Studies_ 11, no. 4: 350-374.\n\nCRISP, J. (2003) A New Asylum Paradigm? Globalization, Migration and the Uncertain Future of the International Refugee Regime. _New Issues in Refugee Research_ Working Paper No. 100 Geneva: UNHCR.\n\nFRIEDMAN, R. (2010a) World Refugee Day goes unmarked in Israel. _The Jerusalem Post_, June 21.\n\nhttp://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=179029. (Accessed 20.08.2010) ——— (2010b) Mayor of Eilat Launches Anti-Migrant Campaign. _The Jerusalem Post_, July 8.\n\nhttp://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=180757. (Accessed 20.08.2010) 16", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "GAVISON, R. (1999) Jewish and Democratic? a Rejoinder to the \"Ethnic Democracy\" Debate. _Israel_ _Studies_ 4, no. 1: 44-72.\n\n———. 2010. _The Law of Return at Sixty Years: History, Ideology, Justification_ . The Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Tought.\nhttp://www.metzilah.org.il/webfiles/fck/File/ShvutENG.pdf. (Accessed 20.08.2010) GIBNEY, M. (2002) Security and the Ethics of Asylum after 11 September. _Forced Migration Review_ 13: 40-42.\n\n——— (2003) The State of Asylum: Democratization, Judicialisation and the Evolution of Refugee Policy. In _The Refugees Convention 50 Years on: Globalisation and International Law._ KNEEBONE, S. (ed.) pp. 19-47. UK:Ashgate.\n\n——— (2004) _The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees_ .\n\nCambridge University _Press_ .\n\nGOLDSCHMIDT, R. (2006) Smuggling the Egyptian-Israeli Border. The Knesset Research and Information Center. http://www.knesset.gov.il/MMM/data/pdf/m01667.pdf.(Hebrew) (Accessed 20.08.2010) GOLDSTEIN, T. (2010) PM: Infiltrators Pull Us towards Third World. _Ynet_, January 21.\n\nhttp://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3837667,00.html. (Accessed 20.08.2010) HAARETZ. (2007) Refugees Against Refugees. _Haaretz_, April 2. http://www.haaretz.com/print edition/opinion/refugees-against-refugees-1.211959. (Accessed 20.08.2010) HARKOV, L. (2010) Rabbis: 'Don't Rent to Foreign Workers'. _The Jerusalem Post_, July 8.\n\nhttp://www.jpost.com/LocalIsrael/TelAvivAndCenter/Article.aspx?id=180812. (Accessed 20.08.2010) HARRELL-BOND, B. and ZOHRY. A. (2003) _Contemporary Egyptian Migration: An Overview of_ _Voluntary and Forced Migration_ . American University in Cairo, Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Programme, Working paper C3.\nhttp://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/working_papers/WP-C3.pdf. (Accessed 20.08.2010) HEAR, N. V.(1998) _New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant_ _Communities_ . London: UCL Press.\n\nHRW. (2008) Human Rights Watch. _Sinai Perils: Risks to Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers in_ _Egypt and Israel_ . http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/11/12/sinai-perils. (Accessed 20.08.2010) ———(2009) _Service for Life: State Repression and Indefinite Conscription in Eritrea_ .\n\nhttp://www.hrw.org/en/node/82280/section/8. (Accessed 20.08.2010) ILAN, S. (2008) Interior Minister Sets Up Unit to Grant Refugee Status. _Haaretz_, October 6.\n\nhttp://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/interior-min-sets-up-unit-to-grant-refugee-status1.247502. (Accessed 20.08.2010) JP. (2008) Olmert: Infiltrators Must be Stopped. _The Jerusalem Post_, March 23.\n\nhttp://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=95863. (Accessed 20.08.2010) KATZ, Y. (2010) Crawling Demographic Threat from the Egyptian Border. _Ynet_ .\n\nhttp://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3904206,00.html. (Accessed 20.08.2010) 17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "KEMP, A. (2010) Reforming Policies on Foreign Workers in Israel. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No.103.\nhttp://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf?cote=DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM%2 82010%293&doclanguage=en. (Accessed 20.08.2010) KEMP, A. and KRITZMAN, T. (2008) Between State and Civil Society: The Formation of a Refugee Regime in Israel. In _Law, Society and Culture_, 55-90. (Hebrew) KEMP, A. and REIJMAN, R. (2008) _Migrants and Workers: The Political Economy of Labor Migration_ _in Israel_ . Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and Hakibbutz Hameuchad. (Hebrew) Knesset Discussion.(2007) The Government's Failure in Solving the Problem of Refugees from Darfur and Sudan.http://www.knesset.gov.il/Tql//mark01/h0023126.html#TQL.\n\nKRITZMAN-AMIR, T. (2009) ―Otherness‖ as the Underlying Principle in Israel‘s Asylum Regime.\n\nhttp://works.bepress.com/tally_kritzman_amir/3. (Accessed 20.08.2010) LEVENKRON, N, and DAHAN, Y. (2003) _Women as Commodities: Trafficking in Women in Israel_ .\n\nHotline for Migrant Workers, Adva Center, Isha L'Isha - Haifa Feminist Center.\nhttp://www.hotline.org.il/english/pdf/Women_as_Commodities_Trafficking_in_women_in_Isra el_2003_Eng.pdf. (Accessed 20.08.2010) LUTSKI, M. (2005) Final Report by the Parliamentary Inquiry on the Struggle on Trafficking in Women in Israel. http://www.knesset.gov.il/committees/heb/docs/sachar_final2005.htm. (Hebrew) (Accessed 20.08.2010) MALKKI, L. H. (1995a) _Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu_ _Refugees in Tanzania_ . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.\n\n——— (1995b) Refugees and Exile: From \"Refugee Studies\" to the National Order of Things. _Annual_ _Review of Anthropology_ 24, no. 1: 495-523.\n\n——— (2002) News from Nowhere: Mass Displacement and Globalized `Problems of Organization'.\n\n_Ethnography_ 3, no. 3: 351-360.\n\nMAN, I. (2010) Refugees. _Maftech_ 1, no. 1. http://mafteakh.tau.ac.il/pdf/1-2010-08.pdf. (Hebrew) (Accessed 20.08.2010) MARKOWITZ, F. (1996) Living in limbo: Bosnian Muslim refugees in Israel. _Human Organization_ 55, no. 2: 127-132.\n\nMARTINS, B. O.(2009) Undocumented Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Israel. EuroMeSCo Paper 81. http://www.euromesco.net/images/paper81eng.pdf. (Accessed 20.08.2010) McCARTHY, R. (2010) Israel to Build Surveillance Fence along Egyptian Border. _The Guardian_, November 1. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/11/israel-fence-egypt. (Accessed 20.08.2010) MFA. (1948/2010) Israeli Declaration of Independence.\n\nhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Decl aration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israel. (Accessed 20.08.2010) MORRIS, B. (1997) _Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the_ _Countdown to the Suez War_ . USA: Oxford University Press.\n\n18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "MUALEM, M. (2007) Israel to Grant Citizenship to Hundreds of Darfur Refugees. _Haaretz_, May 9.\n\nhttp://www.haaretz.com/news/israel-to-grant-citizenship-to-hundreds-of-darfur-refugees1.228881. (Accessed 20.08.2010) NASSAR, H. 2008. _Irregular Migration in Egypt_ . CARIM - Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration. http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/handle/1814/10102.\n(Accessed 20.08.2010) NATHAN, G. (2010) The Treatment of Infiltrators from the Egyptian Border. The Knesset Research and Information Center. http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m02524.pdf. (Hebrew) (Accessed 20.08.2010) NEUMAN, S. (1999) Aliyah to Israel: Immigration Under Conditions of Adversity. _IZA Discussion_ _Paper No. 89_ . http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=219872. (Accessed 20.08.2010) NYBERG–SØRENSEN, N., HRAR N.V. and ENGBERG–PEDERSEN, P. (2002)The Migration– Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options. _International Migration_ 40, no. 5: 49-73.\n\nPETERS, J, and GAL, O. (2009) Israel, UNRWA, and the Palestinian Refugee Issue. _Refugee Survey_ _Quarterly_ 28, no. 2: 588-606.\n\nREIJMAN, R. (2009) Immigration in Israel: A Map of Trends and Empirical Research: 1990-2007.\n\n_Israeli Sociology_ 10, no. 2: 339-379. (Hebrew) REUTERS (2010) Egyptian Police Shoot Eritrean Migrant at Border.\n\nhttp://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE66S23V.htm. (Accessed 20.08.2010) RICHMOND, A. H. (1995) _Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism and the New World Order_ . Toronto: Oxford University Press.\n\nRRF (2008) Refugees' Rights Forum. Principles for the Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees.\n\nhttp://www.phr.org.il/uploaded/articlefile_1213881917718.pdf. (Hebrew) (Accessed 20.08.2010) ——— (2009) Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Israel: August 2009 Update.\n\nhttp://www.hotline.org.il/hebrew/pdf/Forum_Refugees_Background_Paper_Heb.pdf. (Hebrew) (Accessed 20.08.2010) RSQ (2009) _Refugee Survey Quarterly_ 28, no. 2-3.\n\nSACHAR, A. (2000) Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Polity. In _From Migrants to Citizens:_ _Membership in a Changing World._ KLUSMEYER, D. and ALEINIKOFF, T.A. (eds.)pp. 386434 US: Brookings Institution Press SCPFW(2010) Protocol 18: Establishing a Site for Infiltrators from the Egyptian Border. February 3.\n\nhttp://www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx?ComId=15.\n(Hebrew) (Accessed 20.08.2010) SHAFIR, G, and PELED, Y.(1998) Citizenship and Stratification in an Ethnic Democracy. _Ethnic and_ _Racial Studies_ 21, no. 3: 408-427.\n\nSHUVAL, J. T. (1998) Migration To Israel: The Mythology of Uniqueness. _International Migration_ 36: 3-26.\n\n19", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "STW (2010) Subcommittee on Trafficking in Women.\n\nhttp://www.knesset.gov.il/spokesman/heb/Result.asp?HodID=8454. (Hebrew) (Accessed 20.08.2010) TAL, O. (2007) Infiltrators and Asylum Seekers from Sudan in Israel. The Knesset Research and Information Center. http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m01790.pdf. (Hebrew) (Accessed 20.08.2010) TAU. (2007) Darfur, Israel and the Jewish People. Conference at Tel-Aviv University.\n\nhttp://spirit.tau.ac.il/government/downloads/DarforEventEng.pdf. (Accessed 20.08.2010) TURTON, D. (2003) Conceptualising Forced Migration - RSC Working Paper No.12. Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford.\n\nUN. (2010) UN Rights Chief Deplores Egypt‘s use of ̳Lethal Force‘ against Migrants in Sinai.\n\nhttp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33934&Cr=&Cr1=. (Accessed 20.08.2010) UNHCR (2007) Growing Caseload of Asylum Seekers for UNHCR Offices in Israel: Interview with Micky Bavly. http://www.unhcr.org/469797404.html. (Accessed 20.08.2010) ——— (2009) _2009 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and_ _Stateless Persons_ . http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html. (Accessed 20.08.2010) UNRWA (2009) Numbers of Registered Palestinian Refugees. http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/reg ref%282%29.pdf. (Accessed 20.08.2010) USCRI (2009) World Refugee Survey 2009: U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants.\n\nhttp://www.refugees.org/article.aspx?id=2324&subm=179&area=About%20Refugees&.\n(Accessed 20.08.2010) WEILER-POLAK, D. (2010) The People who Decide who is a Refugee: 'Difficult on the Outside, Easy on the Inside'. _Haaretz_, July 16. (Hebrew) http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1180034.html.\n\nWILLEN, S. S. (2007) _Transnational Migration to Israel in Global Comparative Context_ . Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.\n\n——— (2010a) ―Citizens, ̳Real‘ Others, and ̳Other‘ Others: Governmentality, Biopolitics, and the Deportation of Undocumented Migrants from Tel Aviv. In _The Deportation Regime:_ _Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement._ DE GENOVA, N.andPEUTZ N.(eds.) Durham: Duke University Press.\n\n——— (2010b) Darfur through a Shoah Lens: Sudanese Asylum Seekers, Unruly Biopolitical Dramas, and the Politics of Humanitarian Compassion in Israel. In _A Reader in Medical Anthropology:_ _Theoretical Trajectories, Emergent Realities._ GOOD, B.,DELVECCHIO, M. _,_ WILLEN _,_ S.\nandFISCHER, M. (eds.) Malden, MA: Blackwell.\n\nWURGAFT, N. (2009) Closing the Holes and the Loopholes. _Haaretz_, June 21.\n\nhttp://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/closing-the-holes-and-the-loopholes-1.278503.\n(Accessed 20.08.2010) ———(2010) Halotzot: Refugee Women in Israel. Unpublished manuscript (copy with the author).\n\n20", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["World Refugee Survey 2009"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Refugee Survey 2009", "confidence": 0.8477402925491333}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "YACOBI, H. (2009) _African Refugees‘ Influx in Israel from a Socio-Political Perspective_ . CARIM Research Reports. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute.\nhttp://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/10790/1/CARIM_RR_2009_04.pdf. (Accessed 20.08.2010) YIFTACHEL, O. (2000) \"Ethnocracy\" and Its Discontents: Minorities, Protests, and the Israeli Polity.\n\n_Critical Inquiry_ 26, no. 4: 725-756.\n\n———(2006) _Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine_ . Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.\n\nYNET (2007) Rabbi Lau urges PM to release Darfur refugees - Israel Jewish Scene, Ynetnews.\n\nhttp://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3403374,00.html. (Accessed 20.08.2010) ZERTAL, I. (2005) _Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood_ . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\n\nZETTER, R. (2007) More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization. _Journal of Refugee Studies_ 20, no. 2: 172-192.\n\n21", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## Lebanon Baalbek-Hermel Governorate Profile (June 2015)\n\n#### **GENERAL OVERVIEW**\n\nThe Bekaa valley was split into two governorates in May 2014; Baalbek/Hermel and Bekaa. Bekaa hosts Lebanon’s largest official border crossing with Syria in Masnaa. The Baalbak-Hermel Governorate is predominantly Shiite with pockets of Christians and Sunnis. Several UN agencies and NGOs have offices across the valley and regular inter-agency and sector coordination meetings are held in Zahle. Localized coordination structures are also established for Aarsal and the Hermel district.\n\n#### **POPULATION OVERVIEW**\n# 416,427 [People are living in Baalbek-Hermel ]\n#### Governorate\n\n##### **Location Map**\n\nNorth Akkar Al Qaa Hermel Aarsal Baalbek/El-Hermel Baalbek/ Hermel 63.3% 2.5% 33%\n\n1.1%\n\n0.1%\n\n##### 4,725     Palestine refugees in Lebanon 392  Palestine refugees from Syria\n\n**POPULATION COHORTS** **Baalbek** **El Hermel**\n\n##### 263,450  Lebanese\n\nBaalbek\n\n**3.6%**\n**11.1%**\n\n**29.5%**\n**5.4%**\n\n(0 – 5 Years) (6 – 17 Years) (18 – 59 Years) (60+ Years)\n\n**3.9%**\n**12.5%**\n\n**28.2%**\n**5.8%**\n\nP Wavel Mount Beirut Lebanon Bekaa South [El Nabatieh] Masnaa P Palestinian Camps Major Towns Open official border crossing (0 – 5 Years) (6 – 17 Years) (18 – 59 Years) (60+ Years) 26% _**109,068**_ Deprived Lebanese\n\n##### 10,072 Lebanese returnees\n\nGovernorate boundaries Capital Closed official border crossing Unofficial crossing\n\n#### **SOCIO ECONOMIC OVERVIEW**\n\n##### 54.5% of Syrian refugees living in substandard\n\nshelter (inc. **37.4%** in informal settlements) in Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel governorates\n##### 532 Informal Settlements, hosting 53,585\n\nregistered Syrian refugees\n##### 2.5% refugees living in collective shelters 130 public schools. Second shift programs are\n\nsupported in 20 schools in Central Bekaa, West Bekaa and Rashaya\n##### 13 public hospitals; 8 are supported 4% unemployment rate (MICS 2009) 17 SDCs 74  Municipalities/ 7 Union of municipalities $1,859,491 multipurpose cash distributed\n\n(Jan-May)\n\n##### 137,788 registered Syrian refugees\n\nDEC 2014 136,863 JUN 2014 127,506 JUN 2015 137,788 Lebanese above poverty line Deprived Lebanese Lebanese returnees Registered Syrian Refugees Palestine Refugees 133,310 94,180 5,048 131,074 5,117 21,073 14,887 2,976 6,714 0\n\n#### **CHANGES IN CONTEXT JANUARY TO JUNE**\n\nThe northeastern border region remained highly volatile with consistent infiltration attempts by Islamist Armed Opposition Groups and recurrent LAF shelling along the outskirts of Aarsal, Fakiha and Ras Baalbak. A new round of Qalamoun battles was launched in the first week of May and is ongoing. Access to Aarsal continued to be inhibited by the security context. While some assistance has trickled in through local partners, UN agencies have been denied access since August 2014.\n\nRestrictions on access were formalized in January with the imposition of specific entry criteria. In addition, the Government of Lebanon requested the suspension of UNHCR registration. As a result, the number of new arrivals substantially diminished and the number of registered refugees remains consistent.\n\nLike in the rest of the Bekka, the number of Syrian refugees living in informal settlements has continued to increase with 196 new informal settlements since December 2014 and 5,058 refugees newly accommodated there.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR registration", "confidence": 0.24352730810642242}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "#### **HUMANITARIAN AND STABLIZATION TRENDS**\n\nLack of access to Aarsal remains a challenge. Activities are ongoing, monitoring is undertaken remotely which is challenging; however new techniques have been adapted to respond to this situation. Agencies have been able to provide relatively consistent services and respond to emergency situations through local staff members and partner organizations.\n\nSince the August 2014 hostilities, the LAF has tightened its security cordon around Aarsal, limiting movement of refugees to and from the town.\n\nAccess to services has been of concern in Aarsal given that almost 50 per cent of the registered Syrian refugees are without documentation and have feared crossing checkpoints along the way. Some restrictions imposed by the LAF between the outskirts and Aarsal town have impacted the approximately 3,000 individuals remaining. Fuel, food and other materials for the numerous businesses have been restricted. There is one formal transit site managed by DAF and 93 informal settlements inside Aarsal town.\n\nA total of 8,900 households in Aarsal benefited from $200 worth of winter fuel support (and a hygiene kit covering the first quarter of 2015).\n\nLike in the Bekka, innovative institutional support includes the Municipal Support Assistant (MSA) Programme where some international NGOs have seconded staff to several municipalities to support the work of the municipality staff and provide information to refugees. Eleven Mapping of Risk and Resources programmes are being implemented.\n\n#### **MOST VULNERABLE LOCALITIES**\n\nThere are 26 vulnerable localitie ~~s in Baalbeck/Hermel, fve of which are classifed~~ as most vulnera ~~ble. Sixteen of the 26 localities are also considere~~ d as substantial and high pressu ~~re where the ratio of refugees to deprived Leb~~ anese is at least three to one or ~~more.~~ Hermel !( El Hermel\n\n**Informal Tented**\n**Settlements**\n\n!\n\n!!!!!! [!] !! **!!** ! **!** ! [!] !!!\n\n!!!!!\n\n~~!!~~ ! ~~!~~ ~~!!!~~ ~~!~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~!!!!!~~ ! ~~!!!!!!!~~ ~~**!!!**~~ ! ~~**!**~~ ~~!!!!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!!!!!~~ ~~!!!!~~ ~~!~~ ~~!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~!!!~~ ~~!!!!!!~~ ~~!!~~ ~~!~~ ~~!!!!~~ ~~!~~ ~~!!!!~~ ~~!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!!!!!!~~ ~~!!!!~~ ~~**!!!**~~ ! ~~!!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!!!!!~~ ~~!!~~ **!** ~~**!!**~~ ~~!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~**!!**~~ ! ~~!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!!!!~~ ~~High Pressure~~ ~~(5 Cadastres)~~ ~~Substantial Pressure~~ ~~(9 Cadastres)~~ ~~Most Vulnerable~~ ~~2nd Most Vulnerable~~ ~~3rd Most Vulnerable~~ ~~4th Most Vulnerable~~ 5th Most Vulnerable ~~(~~ ~~Major cities~~ ~~Hermel~~ ~~!!~~ !!\n\n~~!~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~!~~ ~~!!!~~ **!** ~~!~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~!!!~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~!~~ ! ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ! ~~!!~~ ! ~~[!]~~\n\n**!** ~~!~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~!!!~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~!~~ ! ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ! ~~!!~~ ! ~~[!]~~\n\n~~!!~~ ~~!!!~~ ~~!~~ ~~!!~~ ~~!~~ ~~!~~ ~~!!!~~ ~~!!!~~\n\n**!** ~~!~~ ! **!** ~~!~~ !!!!!! ~~!!~~ [!] ~~!~~ !! ~~!~~ !! **!!** !!! **!** ! **!** ~~!!~~ !!!! ~~**[!]**~~ !! **!!** !! ~~!~~ **!!** !!\n\n!! ! !!!! ~~!~~ !! ~~!~~ !! **!!** !!! **!** ! **!** ~~!~~ !!\n\n~~!~~ **!** ~~Laboué~~ ~~!(~~ ~~Aarsal~~ ~~!(~~\n\n**!** ~~!~~ ! **!** ~~!~~ !!!!!!! ~~!!~~ [!] ~~!~~ !! ~~!~~ !! **!!** !!!! **!** !!!!! **!** ~~!~~ !!!!!! **!!** !! ~~!~~ **!!** !!\n\n! !!!!!!!! **!!** !!! **!** ! **!** !!!!! **!!** !! ~~!~~ **!!** !!\n\n~~!~~ ! **!** ~~!~~ !!!!!! ~~!!~~ [!] ! **!** !!!! **!** ~~!~~ !!!!! **!!!** !\n\n**!** ~~!~~ !\n\n!!\n\n!!\n\n!! !! **!** !!! **!** ! **!** !!! [!] **!** !! **!** !! **!** !! **!** ! **!** !!! [!] **!** !! **!** !! **!** !!!!!! !! **!!!** ! [!] ! [!] ! **!** !! **!** ! **!** ! [!] **!** !! **!** !! **!** !!!\n\n!! **!** !! **!** !!! [!] **!** ! **!** !! **!** !!! **!** ! **!!!!** ! [!] !!! ! **!!** ! **!** !!! **!** ! **!** !!!!!! **!** Baalbek ~~#~~ ~~Palestinian Camp~~ !!!!! [!] ~~Baalbek~~ ~~Baalbek~~ !!!!!!!\n\n!!!!!\n\n!!!!! !\n\n!!\n!\n\n!!!! [!] !\n\n!!!\n\n!!!! **!** !! **!** !!!!! **!** ! **!** !!!!!!! **!** !! [!!] !\n\n**!** !!!!!! [!!]\n\n!\n\n!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!\n\n!!!! **!** !\n\n!! !!!!\n\n!!!!!!!!!!\n\n!!!!!!!\n\n!\n\n[!] ! !!!!!!! [!] !!\n\n!!!!!!!!!!!!!! [!] !!! [!] !!!!!!! **!** !!\n\n!!!!!!\n\n!!!! [!] !!! !!! [!] !!!! [!] !!! !!\n\n! [!] P Informal Settlements !\n\n!!! [!] **!** !!\n\n!!!!!!!!!!!\n\n!!!! [!] !\n\n**!**\n\n!!!!\n\n!!! **!!** !!!\n\n~~Chmistar~~ ~~!(~~ ~~!(~~ ~~Douris~~ ~~Brital~~ ~~#~~ !!!!!! **!** !!!!! **!** !!!!!! [!] ! [!] ! **!** ! **!** ! **!** !\n\n!!!!! **!** ! **!**\n\n**!**\n\n**!** !!!\n\n**!**\n\n!\n\n!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!\n\n!\n\n!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!\n\n!\n\n#### **HUMANITARIAN ACTORS**\n\nBaalbek El Hermel Key contacts\n\n**UNHCR** Maeve Murphy, murphym@unhcr.org **UNDP** George Akl, george.akl@undp.org\n**Ministery of Social Affairs (MoSA)** Hussein Salemm, hussein.salemm@hotmail.com\n\n**Baalbek-Hermel Governor** Mr. Bashir Khodr\n\n7 15 5 14 7 15 5 8 5 3 7 5 8 5 813 6 3 5 3 1 4 2 3 2 3 4 1\n\n**41 UN Agencies and NGOs operating in Baalbek-Hermel**\n\nACF, Al Masjed Com, AMEL, ARCPA, Beyond, CCP JAPAN, CLMC Lebanon, Danish Red Cross, DRC, EPL, FAO, GVC, HI, HOOPS, IMC, Intersos, IOCC Lebanon, IOM, IQRAA, IRC, ISAD, Lebanese Red Cross, LOST, MAP-UK, MDM, MEDAIR, Mercy Corps, MoSA, NRC, OXFAM, SCI, SFCG, TdH - It, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNRWA, URDA, Welfare Association, WHO, Arab Puppet Theatre\n\n**Disclaimer:** The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.\n**Data Source:** Lebanese Population - Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) year 2002 dataset,   Poverty data: CAS, UNDP and MoSA Living Conditions and Household Budget Survey 2004-5,\nSyrian Refugee Population - UNHCR as of 30/06/2015, Humanitarian Intervention Data - Activity Info as of 30/06/2015, Palestinian Refugee Population- UNRWA, Lebanese Returnees data IOM as of 30/06/2015", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Living Conditions and Household Budget Survey", "confidence": 0.407906711101532}, {"text": "Humanitarian Intervention Data - Activity Info", "confidence": 0.23446963727474213}, {"text": "Palestinian Refugee Population- UNRWA", "confidence": 0.11944672465324402}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Humanitarian Intervention Data - Activity Info", "confidence": 0.14579299092292786}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## Lebanon North Governorate Profile (June 2015)\n\n#### **GENERAL OVERVIEW**\n\nNorth Lebanon, which previously constituted one governorate with seven districts, was split into two governorates in 2014: Tripoli and five surrounding districts (T5) maintained the denomination of North Governorate, while the district of Akkar became a governorate by itself. Tripoli Governorate is composed of six districts; Tripoli, El Koura, El Batroun, Bcharre, Zgharta, and El Minnie-Dennie.\nIt has a mixed confessional population of Sunnis, Alawites, and Christians. Tripoli is the capital of the north Governorate and the second largest city in the country. Inter-agency coordination and sector coordination meetings for the North take place in Tripoli.\n\n#### **POPULATION OVERVIEW**\n\n# 787,709 People are living in North Governorate\n\n##### **Location Map**\n\nP TripoliP Naher EL Bared Akkar Beddawi 70.2% 0.1% 22% 7% 0.5%\n\n##### 553,637  Lebanese\n\n##### 55,080    Palestine refugees in Lebanon 4,235  Palestine refugees from Syria\n\n**3.6%**\n**11.1%**\n\n**29.5%**\n**5.4%**\n\n(0 – 5 Years) (6 – 17 Years) (18 – 59 Years) (60+ Years)\n\n**3.9%**\n**12.5%**\n\n**28.2%**\n**5.8%**\n\nNorth Batroun Bcharreh Baalbek/El-Hermel Mount Lebanon Beirut Bekaa Governorate boundaries El Nabatieh Capital South Major Towns (0 – 5 Years) (6 – 17 Years) (18 – 59 Years) (60+ Years) 25% _**193,900**_ Deprived Lebanese\n\n##### 1,001 Lebanese returnees 173,756 Registered Syrian refugees\n\nDEC 2014 JUN 2014 176,325 JUN 2015 173,756 P Palestinian Camps\n#### **SOCIO ECONOMIC OVERVIEW**\n\n##### 39.8% of Syrian refugees living in substandard\n\nshelter (inc. **37.4%** in informal settlements) in North and Akkar governorates\n##### 122 Informal Settlements, hosting 9,419\n\nregistered Syrian refugees\n##### 3.4% refugees living in collective shelters 286 public schools. 21 public hospitals; 8 are supported 8.2% unemployment rate (MICS 2009) 26 SDCs 140  Municipalities/ 7 Union of municipalities $2,660,630 multipurpose cash distributed\n\n(Jan-May) 171,730\n\n**POPULATION** **El Minieh-**\n**Tripoli** **El Batroun** **Bcharre** **El Koura** **Zgharta**\n**COHORTS** **Dennie**\n\nLebanese above poverty line Deprived Lebanese Lebanese returnees Registered Syrian Refugees Palestine Refugees 184,412 80,168 767 61,077 9,289 34,049 12,025 11 16,791 0 15,680 5,538 4 2,988 0 35,590 12,569 52 17,368 0 49,313 69,227 96 61,995 50,026 40,694 14,372 71 13,537 0\n\n#### **CHANGES IN CONTEXT JANUARY TO JUNE**\n\nAlthough a double-PBIED attack on 10 January threatened to trigger a resumption of armed conflict in Tripoli, this reporting period provided further evidence that the implementation of the security plan has continued to successfully limit organized armed activity between Jabal Mohsen and Bab Tabbaneh. The security plan has been in effect in Tripoli since 1 April 2014 to prevent the resurgence of armed clashes between the Beb El Tebbeneh (Sunnis) and Jabal Mohsen (Alawites) communities. These are historically divided along sectarian lines and political affiliation against and pro the Syrian regime.\n\nSince its implementation, the security plan has been challenged by some sporadic incidents including clashes among groups, targeted actions against some individuals and confrontation. Meanwhile search operations continue resulting in the arrest of 919 individuals residing in various locations in the North allegedly due to individuals overstating their visa or in some instances crime related activities/ suspicions. While Syrians, Lebanese and Palestinians are temporarily arrested, the majority is released after a few hours of verification while other are detained for longer periods for investigations purposes. Also, 299 individuals were arrested on terrorism related activities/ suspicions.\n\nCrime continued at the same rates and was not affected by the implementation of the security plan while an increase in civil unrest such as demonstrations, sit-ins and roadblocks were noted during the reporting period. Other reported incidents included road blockages caused by snow and armed interpersonal and interfamily disputes.\n\nThe number of people in need in the North has remained stable since the introduction of new registration procedures.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "#### **HUMANITARIAN AND STABLIZATION TRENDS**\n\nAt the onset of the Syrian emergency, refugee started fleeing neighboring Syria through Lebanon’s northern borders, settling first along the border in Wadi Khaled, where relief efforts were initially focused. However, many continued further south to arrive in Tripoli from where they often dispersed to its five adjacent districts, with a total Lebanese population of over 550,000 persons.\n\nAs of late May, Syrian refugees were spread in over 289 villages and lived mainly in very challenging urban and semi-urban contexts.\nApproximately 81 per cent of them are living in rented accommodation; however, refugees who are unable to cover the high rents resort to living in substandard accommodation including non-residential dwellings such as garages and unfinished buildings.\nPartners are working to rehabilitate these to improve the standard of living. There are 16 fewer informal settlements with 4,339 less people living in them compared to December 2014.\n\nAn outreach system through Community Development Centers (CDCs), Social Development Centers (SDCs) and Refugee Outreach Volunteers (ROVs) is in place to provide support and identify vulnerable refugees with specific needs and refer them to existing services. Access to healthcare facilities remains a challenge with only 8 public hospitals which are supported – with limited bed capacity- and 5 primary health care centers in the governorate, in addition to the high costs of secondary health care.\n\nThe MRR (Map of Risks and Resources) is piloted in Minieh and Dedde municipalities as a coordination tool among all actors to link the risks and needs of the community with the actual and planned interventions. The outcome of the exercise was presented to mayor of Minieh and a dedicated coordination body was set-up to strengthen the coordination among partners and with the municipality. This exercise is still on-going.\n\nA study conducted with northern citizens, including a majority of Lebanese, reported a continuous increase of positive relations between Lebanese and Syrians by 23 per cent and a ~~decrease in tensi~~ ons between December 2014 and March 2015, while people reporting that tensions remained t ~~he same are still the majority, with 66 per cent. This m~~ ay be due to the expanded presence of the Lebanese Army in the North follo ~~wing the late October clashes with militants in Tripo~~ li and the inclusion of vulnerable affected Lebanese and host community in the service delivery by the agencies.\n\nDespite all the efforts put in the area ~~, overall needs remain very high especially in the mos~~ t vulnerable localities indicated in the below map, while funds are decreasing. M ~~ost public institutions are considered very weak in No~~ rth Governorate.\n\n#### **MOST VULNERABLE LOCALITIES**\n\nThere are 31 vulnerable localities in the North, nine of which are classified as most vulnerable. Seventeen of the 31 localities are also considered as sub ~~stantial and high pressure where the ratio of refugees to deprived Lebanese is at least three to one or mor~~ e ~~Minie~~ ~~#~~ Zouq Bhannine ~~El Minié~~\n\n**Informal Tented**\n**Settlements**\n\n~~!!~~ ~~**!!!!**~~ ! ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ! ~~!~~ ! ~~!~~ ~~**!!**~~ ! ~~[!]~~ ~~!!~~ ! ~~**[!]**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!!~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ! ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ **!** ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ **!** ! ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ! ~~!!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ **!** ~~!~~ ! ~~!!!~~ **!** ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ! ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ !! ~~!~~ **!** ~~**!**~~ ~~!!~~ ~~**!!!!**~~ ! ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ! ~~!~~ ! ~~!~~ ~~**!!**~~ ! ~~[!]~~ ~~!!~~ ! ~~**[!]**~~ ~~!~~ ~~!!~~ ~~Tripoli et Tabbaneh~~ ~~Tripoli El Qobbe~~ ~~!(~~ ~~Beddaoui~~ ~~!(~~ ~~!!~~ ~~!!! !!!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!!!~~ ! ~~**!**~~ ~~!!!~~ ~~**!!**~~ ~~!!~~ **!** ~~**!**~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~**!!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~**!!**~~ ~~!!!!!!~~ ~~**!!!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ! ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ **!** ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ **!** ! ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ! ~~!!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!!~~ **!** ~~!~~ !!! ~~!!!~~ **!** ~~!~~ ~~**!!!**~~ ! ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ !! ~~!~~ **!** ~~**!**~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ **!** ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~[!]~~ ! ~~!~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ! ~~!!!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~Mejdlaiya Zgharta~~ P !\n\n~~Tripoli et Tell~~ ~~Tripoli~~ ~~!(~~ ~~#~~ ~~!!!~~ ~~**!**~~ **!** ~~!~~ ~~**!!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ **!** ! ~~**!**~~ ~~!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ! ~~!!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ! ~~**!!**~~ ~~!!~~ **!** ~~!~~ !!! ~~!!!~~ **!** ~~!!!!~~ ~~**!!!!!**~~ ! ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ !! ~~!!~~ **!** ~~**!**~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!!~~ **!** ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ **!** ~~**!**~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!!~~ ~~[!]~~ ! ~~!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ! ~~!~~ ~~[!]~~ ~~**!!**~~ ~~!!!!!!!~~ ~~**!!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~#~~ Informal Settlements ~~!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!~~ ~~!!!!~~ ~~!~~ ~~!!~~ ~~**[!]**~~ !\n\n!\n\n~~Tripoli~~ ~~!~~ !\n\n#!!!!! ~~[!]~~ ~~!!~~\n\n!\n\n~~!~~ !! ~~!!~~ ~~**!**~~ ~~!!~~ ~~!!!~~ ~~!(~~ ~~Zgharta~~\n\n**!**\n\n~~!~~ ~~!~~ ! ~~[!]~~ ~~!~~ !! ! **!** !!!!!!!!!!!! **!** !! **!** !!! **!** !\n\n!\n\n!!! !!\n\n!!\n\n! ! ! **!** ! **!** ! **!** ! !!!!\n\n~~Miniyeh-D~~ anniyeh !!!! **!** !! **!** ! **!** !\n\n!\n\n!!\n\n! **!** ! !!!!!\n\n!!! **!!** !! **!!** !!!!! **!** ! **!** !\n\n! [!] !\n\n!!!!\n\n!\n\n!\n\n!\n\n~~High P~~ ressure ~~(5 Cadastres)~~ ~~Substantial Pressure~~ ~~(9 Cadastres)~~ ~~Most Vulnerable~~ 2nd Most Vulnerable ~~3rd Most Vulnerable~~ ~~4th Most Vulnerable~~ 5th Most Vulnerable ~~(~~ ~~Major cities~~ ~~Mina N~~ Tripoli el Haddadine ~~Tripoli ez Zeitoun~~ Enfé ~~!(~~ ~~!(~~ ~~Chekka~~ ~~Zgharta~~ ~~Koura~~ !\n\n!!!\n\n!!!!!!!\n\n! [!] !\n\n**!**\n\n~~Amioun~~ !( Batroun\n\n#\n\nPalestinian Camps !( Bcharreh Batroun Bcharré !(\n\n#### **HUMANITARIAN ACTORS**\n\n86 2 Tripoli El Minieh Dennie El Koura El Batroun Zagharta Bcharre Key contacts 9 6 12 2 7 3 3 2 7 86 6 12 2\n\n**UNHCR** Monica Noro, noro@unhcr.org **UNDP** Alain Chatry, alain.chatry@undp.org\n**Ministery of Social Affairs (MoSA)** Ziad Nadri, ziadnadri@gmail.com\n\n**North Governor** Mr Ramzi Nohra\n\n3 8 4 11 1 5 5 3 6 3 6 3 6 2 5 1 3 4 3 8 4 1 3 3 3 1 1 2 1 3 80 3 5 3 3 1 6 1 2 1 3 80 4 4 5 1 5 2 2 1 3 2 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 4 4 0 1\n\n**54 UN Agencies and NGOs operating in North**\n\nABAAD, AJEM Lebanon, Al Fayha'e, ANERA, ARCPA, Beddawi Pop Com, Beddawi Popular Committee, Beyond, CARE, CCP JAPAN, CISP, CLMC Lebanon, COOPI, Danish Red Cross, DRC, FAO, HDC, Heartland, HI, Himaya, HOOPS, HWA, IA, IMC, IOCC Lebanon, IOM, IQRAA, IR Lebanon, IRC, IRD, Lebanese Red Cross, MAP-UK, Mercy Corps, MoSA, MS Lebanon, MSL Lebanon, NRC, OXFAM, Pal_Scouts, Palestinian Scouts & Guides Association, PU-AMI, RESTART Lebanon, RET, RI, SCI, SFCG, Solidarités, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNRWA, URDA, WCH, WHO\n\n**Disclaimer:** The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.\n**Data Source:** Lebanese Population - Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) year 2002 dataset,   Poverty data: CAS, UNDP and MoSA Living Conditions and Household Budget Survey 2004-5,\nSyrian Refugee Population - UNHCR as of 30/05/2015, Humanitarian Intervention Data - Activity Info, Palestinian Refugee Population- UNRWA", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["MRR (Map of Risks and Resources)"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Living Conditions and Household Budget Survey", "confidence": 0.3588354289531708}, {"text": "MRR (Map of Risks and Resources)", "confidence": 0.2686000168323517}, {"text": "Humanitarian Intervention Data", "confidence": 0.13223782181739807}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Humanitarian Intervention Data - Activity Info", "confidence": 0.2038709968328476}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**\n# FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN\n\n_Afghans have been enduring the adverse consequences of forced displacement for decades, way before_ _the current “refugee crisis” gained the international spotlight with the surge of asylum seekers trying_ _to escape conflict in Syria. Afghanistan is not only the country with the largest number of refugees_ _in protracted exile, but it is also facing a sharp increase in displacement trends due to the escalation_ _of internal conflict. It is estimated that 2.5 million registered Afghan refugees remain in neighboring_ _countries, with a possibly equal number of undocumented migrants with similar protection needs in_ _Iran and Pakistan_ _[1]_ _. Internal displacement is no less of a problem, with an estimated 1.2 million IDPs’_ _population potentially in need of humanitarian assistance._ _Despite the continuous deterioration of the security situation within Afghanistan, a shrinking asylum_ _space within the international community and changes in the geopolitical equilibrium at the regional_ _level have recently spurred the return (mostly involuntary) of thousands of refugees and asylum from_ _Pakistan and, in lower numbers, from Iran and Europe. As of September 7th, returns from Pakistan_ _alone account for 98,000 registered and 135,000 undocumented Afghans; additional 400,000 are_ _expected to return by the end of the year joining the growing stock of IDPs._ _The need for managing and protecting displaced populations is taking place in a country lacking a_ _system of safety nets and suffering from a severe economic crisis that has pushed at least 1.3 million_ _additional Afghans into poverty, and triggered a three-fold increase in unemployment between 2012_ _and 2014. Can Afghanistan manage the ongoing displacement challenge? Can the country absorb and_ _successfully reintegrate displaced populations under the current security and economic circumstances?_ _What priorities should the government and the international community address?_ _To answer these questions it is necessary to assess Afghanistan’s past experience with conflict and_ _displacement, as well as the main structural challenges that shape the country’s future._\n\n## **LEARNING FROM THE PAST**\n\n**Afghanistan has a long history of protracted international displacement.** Afghans\nfled by the millions—mostly towards Iran and Pakistan—in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of 1979; some returned to Afghanistan in the early 1990s following tightening of asylum conditions in receiving countries, while Afghanistan’s civil war and the advent of the Taliban reignited a new exodus to neighboring countries. The toppling of the Taliban regime in 2001 marked the beginning of a massive wave of returning Afghans. Between 2001 and 2015, UNHCR assisted the return of 4.8 million Afghans, and many more returned without official assistance. An estimated 20 percent of the total population currently residing in Afghanistan is made up of returnees.\n\n### Afghanistan has a long history of displacement.\n\n1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**\n\n**Figure 1** **Assisted returns to Afghanistan**\n\nn [ Nr. returnees ] **—** [ Cumulative distribution] 2,000 120% 1,800\n\n**Figure 2** **Share of returns up to 2007, by district**\n\n**Takhar**\n\n**K unduz**\n\n**B aghlan**\n\n**Parwan**\n\n**K abul**\n\n**K apis a**\n\n**Laghman**\n\n**B adakhs han**\n\n1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%\n\n**Herat**\n\n**Farah**\n\n**Nimroz**\n\n**J awzjan**\n\n**S ar-e-P ul**\n\n**Daykundi**\n\n**Urozgan**\n\n**K andahar**\n\n**B alkh**\n\n**S amangan**\n\n**B amyan**\n\n**Wardak**\n\n**Ghazni**\n\n**Logar**\n\n**Paktya** **K hos t**\n\n**Faryab**\n\n**Ghor**\n\n**Panjs her**\n\n**Nooris tan**\n\n**K unarha**\n\n**B adghis**\n\n**Helmand**\n\n**Nangarhar**\n\n**QUANTILES OF**\n**RETURNEES/POP**\nn [Missing] n [Low] n [Medium Low] n [Medium] n [Medium High] n [High]\n\n**Paktika**\n\n**Zabul**\n\n2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Source: UNHCR Assisted Returns Source: UNHCR; CSO population statistics\n\n**Returns were concentrated in time and space,** thus posing a disproportionately large challenge to\nthe absorption capacity of some districts and provinces (Figure 1 and 2) [2] . While the local impact of a massive influx of refugees, and the capacity to reintegrate, depends on a range of factors [3], one thing is clear: **local absorption capacity certainly has a limit.** Once the limit—which could vary by time and area depending on local circumstances—is reached, competition over resources could trigger or reinforce\n\n### Local absorption capacity has a limit.\n\npre-existing causes of conflict, especially since institutions are weak. In 2007, districts that had received the largest influx of returnees relative to the local population were more likely to suffer higher insecurity (Figure 3) [4] . Over time, intensification of conflict and saturation of local absorption capacity have also determined the **progressive**\n**increase in secondary displacement among returnees.** Tellingly, the incidence of\ninternal displacement among the returnees who came back in 2013 is twice as high compared to those who returned in 2002, despite the fact that returnees in 2002 were almost 50 times more than in 2013 (Figure 4).\n\n**Figure 3** **\u0007Incidence of returns and severity of**\n\n**conflict at the district level, 2007**\n\n**Figure 4** **\u0007Share of secondary displacement,**\n\n**by year of return**\n\n30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Low Medium 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 Medium Medium High High 25 20 15 10 5 0 Low YEAR OF RETURN CONFLICT SEVERITY Source: Authors’ calculation based on UNHCR and SIOCC-UNDSS data 2 Source: Authors’ calculation based on ALCS 2013–14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["ALCS 2013", "UNHCR Assisted Returns"], "descriptive_data": ["CSO population statistics"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Assisted Returns", "confidence": 0.48744630813598633}, {"text": "CSO population statistics", "confidence": 0.45563453435897827}, {"text": "ALCS", "confidence": 0.42470619082450867}, {"text": "SIOCC-UNDSS data", "confidence": 0.1200282871723175}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**\n\nThe increase in secondary displacement among returnees is a strong sign that the country’s capacity to absorb and reintegrate additional inflows of returnees was already overstretched before the surge of recent months’ returns. While no data are currently available on the incidence of secondary displacement among post-2013 returns, there is no reason to believe trends will be reversed: **a higher**\n**number of returns from abroad will likely result in an increase of internal displacement.** In particular,\nthe continued deterioration of the security situation and the economic crisis in Afghanistan are likely to further challenge the reintegration of more recent returns. Moreover, the increased competition for humanitarian assistance at the global level, together with a shrinking space for asylum internationally are likely to further complicate the management of Afghanistan’s current displacement crisis.\n\n## **RECOGNIZING STRUCTURAL AND PRESENT** **CHALLENGES**\n\nAfghanistan’s capacity to manage displacement has to be appraised in relation to the country’s structural and present challenges.\n\n**Fragility and conflict** are Afghanistan’s first structural challenge. If peace and\nstability are pre-requisite for development to take place, Afghanistan is (still) missing both. According to the Global Peace Index, in 2016 the country ranks the fourth less peaceful after Syria, South Sudan and Iraq. Moreover, decades of conflict have had a destabilizing effect on the social cohesion of the country, exacerbating ethnic divisions and weakening government institutions and rule of law. Similarly, decades of conflict have depleted Afghanistan’s physical and human capital which, despite the progress achieved since 2001, will constrain its growth prospects for decades to come.\n\n### A higher number of returns from abroad will likely result in an increase of internal displacement.\n\nSecond among its structural challenges is **Afghanistan’s demographic profile.** With a total fertility rate of about 5.3 children per woman in 2014, [5] and a population growth rate of approximately 3 percent per year between 2010 and 2015, Afghanistan has the youngest population in South Asia: **48 percent of**\n**Afghans are below the age of 15.** Equally, Afghanistan has the highest youth bulge [6] of any country in\nthe region, and the third highest youth bulge worldwide after Uganda and Chad: **more than one fifth**\n**of the adult population in Afghanistan is aged between 15 and 24.** A young and growing population\ncan be both a challenge and an opportunity, depending on a country’s ability to invest in human capital and productively employ its growing labor force.\n\n**Figure 5** **Youth Dependency ratio and youth bulge in Central and South Asian Countries**\n\n50 40 30 20 10 n [ (0–15)/(Total Pop.) ] n [ (15–24)/(15+)] 47.5 37.8 35.0 34.8 31.0 [32.7] 31.1 31.4 30.6 25.9 26.4 [28.2 ] 26.5 [27.5] [26.9] [26.9 26.7] [26.7] 26.7 29.4 28.8 27.6 28.5 20.4 24.6 23.6 20.0 20.8 0 Afghanistan Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan India Turkmenistan Bhutan Sri Lanka Pakistan Nepal Bangladesh Uzbekistan Maldives Kazakhstan Iran Sources: ALCS 2013–14 and UNDESA (2015) 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Global Peace Index"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ALCS", "confidence": 0.31119072437286377}, {"text": "Global Peace Index", "confidence": 0.28555169701576233}, {"text": "UNDESA", "confidence": 0.16987885534763336}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**\n\nIn the case of Afghanistan, a young and growing population poses tremendous challenges to its public finances, already stretched by limited revenues potential and massive security spending needs. Fiscal analysis shows that, with the current population growth, Afghanistan will need to increase human capital investments by 12 percent every year just to maintain current (inadequate) education outcomes.\nSimilarly, a growing labor force requires the labor market to absorb approximately 400 thousands new entrants per year. Labor demand strong enough to be able to accommodate this many workers requires sustained economic growth, which, at the moment, is beyond the country’s capacity given its fragility and security constraints [7] .\n\n### Afghanistan is currently facing a deteriorating conflict and a severe economic crisis.\n\n**Afghanistan is currently facing a deteriorating conflict and a severe economic**\n**crisis** which further limits the fiscal space for development spending and targeted\nsocial assistance. Violence increased to a post-2001 high of 18,414 incidents and 6,791 civilian casualties in 2015, while an increasing proportion of Afghanistan’s territory either fell under control of the anti-government elements or is currently affected by conflict. Decline in international spending due to the drawdown of international military forces, together with the deterioration of the security situation, led to severe contraction in growth. GDP growth rate was 1.3 percent in 2014 and 0.8 percent in 2015 compared to an average of 9.8 percent per year from 2003 to 2012.\n\n**Figure 6** **\u0007Evolution of conflict and real per**\n\n**capita GDP growth**\n\nn [ Incident ] n [ Civilian casualties]\n\n**—** [ GDP growth   ] [Linear (GDP growth)]\n\n2,000 25\n\n**Figure 7** **\u0007Youth unemployment**\n\nn [ Rate ] **—** [ Number] 56.3 1,600 1,200 800 400 200 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 20 60 50 40 41.0 1,000 900 800 700 600 34.3 37.1 15 30 27.9 500 26.4 30 27.9 26.0 22.5 21.3 400 300 200 100 10 5 20 10 Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female 0 0 0 0 National Urban Rural Source: Authors’ calculation based on UNHCR and SIOCC-UNDSS data Sources: Authors’ calculation based on ALCS 2013–14\n\n**A sharp increase in poverty has accompanied the slowdown in growth.** Lacking any safety net system\nable to help households manage the economic downturn, the poverty rate increased from 36 percent in 2011–12 to 39 percent in 2013–14. Similarly, labor market indicators deteriorated markedly, with a threefold increase in the unemployment rate over the same period. In 2013–14, the national unemployment rate was 22.6 percent and youth unemployment was 28 percent, representing one-half million male youth unemployed, two-thirds of which were living in poor rural areas. **High male-youth unemployment**\n**is a concern because of its potential to increase poverty and conflict.** A growing body of literature\nrecognizes the direct correlation between youth bulges, lack of socio-economic inclusion and conflict.\nAn in-depth analysis of the effects of youth bulges on a variety of conflicts between 1950 and 2000 shows that youth bulges can cause conflict. Further, the risk of domestic armed conflict from a youth bulge becomes more severe when combined with economic stagnation and institutional fragility [8] .\n\n4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ALCS", "confidence": 0.5380131006240845}, {"text": "UNHCR and SIOCC-UNDSS data Sources", "confidence": 0.1418578028678894}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**\n\n## **BROADEN THE PERSPECTIVE**\n\n**Conflict and narrow economic opportunities are familiar to Afghans.** For decades,\nAfghans have coped with shocks from protracted conflict, insecurity, and the inherent uncertainty associated with agricultural livelihoods [9] . Faced with frequent shocks and uncertainty, Afghan households have developed a set of risk management strategies and risk coping mechanisms. **Traditionally, migration is at the core of**\n**the risk management strategies adopted by Afghan households.** Approximately\ntwo in three Afghans have changed residences during their lifetimes [10] . Over the past decades, millions of households have moved internationally to seek shelter from conflict. In the process, they established a complex network of socio-economic ties with neighboring countries, notably within Iran and Pakistan. Whole Afghan households have also abandoned rural areas in favor or urban areas in search of greater security, better employment opportunities, and access to services. This has contributed to exponential growth of major urban centers, especially Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital city. Young, productive men have also migrated on their own— either within Afghanistan or internationally—to diversify income sources and support their households through remittances.\n\nGiven the complex and intertwined set of challenges faced by the Afghan population, motives of migration are hardly univocal. **Migration is part of a**\n**broader livelihood strategy at the household level aimed at counterbalancing**\n**insecurity and the lack of local employment opportunities.** Analysis shows [11] that\nhouseholds who feel more insecure in their district of residence are more likely to have economic migrants abroad; but increase in real violence actually decreases the likelihood to have a single member migrate, possibly due to increased need for protection, or due to the fact that the entire households decides to move.\nHouseholds with better economic outcomes are less likely to rely on economic migration; on the other hand, households with higher labor market vulnerability or with excess labor are more likely to diversify income sources through the migration of a male household member.\n\n### Migration is at the core of the risk management strategies adopted by Afghan households. Afghan households rely on migration to counterbalance insecurity and lack of local employment opportunities.\n\nResults of the analysis also confirm that **economic migration is a strategy more easily accessible to**\n**households who can “afford its costs”.** In particular, having access to migration networks—which is\nlikely for returnee households or households who have directly experienced economic migration— reduces the costs of migration and increases the probability of household members working abroad.\nSimilarly, relatively richer households are more likely to have individual migrants as they are more likely to have resources to support the costs of sending migrants abroad.\n\nThese findings suggest that, despite overall benefits, **migration might have less positive outcomes**\n**for the poorest and most vulnerable segments of the population.** International evidence shows that\nwhile migration reduces poverty, the poor tend to migrate less or to migrate to low-return destinations because they lack opportunities or resources (monetary or human capital) to take advantage of better paying jobs [12] . Moreover, **migration outcomes are likely to differ depending on the forced**\n**versus voluntary nature of the decision to move.**\n\nPoverty and protection needs are widespread and largely unmet in Afghanistan. With 39 percent of the population unable to satisfy basic food and non-food needs (that is, are “poor”), and in the absence of formal safety nets to help households cope with shocks, migration is seldom the result of voluntary choice. Rather, migration is primarily the result of “ _push factors_ ” related to insecurity and lack of socio-economic opportunities. In this context, mobile households are not the only vulnerable segments of the population, and the structural factors that cause poverty in the general population overlap with those afflicting migrants.\n\n5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**\n\n## **TAKE STOCK OF THE EVIDENCE**\n### Displaced populations\n\nForced displacement has been a tragic consequence of past decades of conflict in Afghanistan and it is likely to connote its immediate future due to deteriorating security and regional equilibrium. Assessing the welfare and integration of displaced households that are currently living in Afghanistan provides important insights on the challenges that future IDPs and prospective returnees might face.\n\n### Household mobility— irrespective of its forced and/ or economic motives—is associated with urbanization.\n\n**Household mobility—irrespective of its forced and/or economic motives—**\n**is associated with urbanization** (Figure 8). IDP and returnee households\npredominantly settle in urban centers, joining a throng of economic migrants escaping rural areas in search for jobs and better access to health and education.\nIDP and returnee households are also more likely to have a literate household head compared to households who did not move and to households who have moved for economic reasons, reflecting better access to education returnees might have had in asylum [13] . However, **IDPs—similar to non-mobile households—**\n**have very limited labor market outcomes.** Heads in IDP households are in fact\nmore likely to be either engaged in vulnerable forms of employment or to be unemployed and/or underemployed. Returnee households are more likely to have a member working abroad and sending remittances, possibly taking advantage of networks established while in asylum.\n\n**Figure 8** **\u0007Urbanization rate by households’**\n\n**migration status**\n\n**Figure 9** **\u0007Poverty rate by households’**\n\n**migration status**\n\n60 50 45 50 40 30 20 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 10 5 0 0 No Move Returnee IDP Economic No Move Returnee IDP Economic Migrant Migrant Notes: Vertical bar indicates the 95% confidence interval Sources: Authors’ calculation based on ALCS 2013–14 Sources: Authors’ calculation based on ALCS 2013–14 Poverty and vulnerability are widespread in Afghanistan. **Mobility—irrespective of its forced and/or**\n**economic motives—is associated with a lower risk of poverty** (Figure 9); returnee households have\na significantly lower poverty risk compared to non-mobile households [14] . The poverty rate among returnee households is 29.4 percent compared to 40.5 percent among non-mobile households. This lower poverty risk, however, is entirely explained by differences in literacy and in urbanization, with refugee households being more likely to have a literate household head and to live in an urban area compared to non-mobile households.\n\n6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ALCS", "confidence": 0.8141192197799683}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**\n\nEvidence suggests that **literacy and human capital of mobile households are the**\n**main determinants of their socio-economic inclusion.** Further, the risk of poverty\nfor mobile households—irrespective of the motives for migration—depends on the same factors that affect the risk of poverty in the Afghan population as a whole. As a matter of fact, nearly 70 percent of the working age population in Afghanistan is illiterate, with illiteracy being widespread among the poorest segments of the population. Abysmally low literacy and overall poor human capital of the adult population are impediments to poverty reduction in Afghanistan. With conflict and displacement likely to continue in the near future, the relevant policy question is:\n**how does mobility, and forced displacement in particular, affect human capital**\n**accumulation?**\n\n### The risk of poverty for Afghan households - irrespective of their mobility status - depends on literacy and human capital.\n\nThere is no a priori answer to this question, as the effects depend on balance between improved access to services as mobile households settle in urban areas [15] and the _migration’s costs_ (economic, social, psychological among them) that decrease investment in human capital. Available evidence from the study of former refugees residing in Afghanistan in 2013–14 shows that **mobility during the decades before the fall of the Taliban**\n**had a positive effect on returnee literacy.** Despite progress during the last decade, Afghanistan’s\neducation supply and quality lag—that of neighboring countries. As a result, Afghans who were born abroad had better access to education than same-aged Afghans who did not move, particularly for older returning Afghans.\n\n**Figure 10** **Afghans’ literacy rate, by age and country of birth**\n\n~~n~~ [ Iran ] ~~n~~ [ Pakistan ] ~~n~~ [Afghanistan] 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0\n\n[0–4] [5–19] [10–14] [15–19] [20–24] [25–29] [30–34] [35–39] [40–44] [45–49] [50–54] [55–59] [60–64] [65+] Sources: Authors’ calculation based on ALCS 2013–14\n\n**On the other hand, internal displacement has a negative impact on children’s**\n**human capital accumulation.** In particular, regression analysis shows that children\naged six to 15 in IDP households are 8.5 percent less likely to be enrolled in school, and that such disadvantage is particularly severe for the first two years of residence in a new destination [16] . Such result is in line with findings of previous analysis [17] showing that poorest and most vulnerable households in Afghanistan are more likely to adopt harmful coping strategies, such as selling their productive assets or taking children out of school, when hit by a shock. In this sense, displaced households might be more vulnerable to the risk of engaging in harmful coping strategies in the years immediately following displacement while adjusting their livelihoods to the new destination.\n\n### Internal displacement has a negative impact on children’s human capital accumulation.\n\n7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["ALCS 2013–14"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ALCS", "confidence": 0.8648113012313843}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**\n\n### Individual economic migration\n\nThere is a paucity of data to study the importance of individual economic migration as a livelihood strategy [18] . In line with anecdotal evidence and prevailing cultural norms, **economic migration is an**\n**exclusively male, and mostly youth, phenomenon.** The incidence of economic migration has varied\nover time, in line with the overall performance of the Afghan economy and its labor market (Figure 11).\nInterestingly, while migration has been increasing in recent years, the number of economic migrants in 2013–14 was 40 percent less than that in 2007–08. This may be due to increased difficulty in accessing resources for leaving the country, or due to deterioration of economic opportunities in Iran [19], which nevertheless remains the most likely destination for Afghans seeking work abroad (Figure 12).\n\n**Figure 11** **\u0007Trends in individual economic**\n\n**migration**\n\nn [ # Migrant workers TOTAL ] n [ # Migrant workers ABROAD ] ~~n~~ [ Unemployment rate, male [25–50]] 300,000 20 250,000 15 200,000\n\n**Figure 12** **\u0007Destination of migrant workers,**\n\n**by survey year**\n\nn [ Afghanistan ] n [ Pakistan ] n [ Iran] n [ Arabian Peninsula ] n [ Other] 7 2 62 18 14 5 73 5 12 2 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 2007–08 2011–12 2013–14 2007 2011 2013 10 5 0 0 11 4 68 13 4 Source: Authors’ calculation based on ALCS 2013–14, ALCS 2011–12 and NRVA 2007–08 Source: Authors’ calculation based on ALCS 2013–14, ALCS 2011–12 and NRVA 2007–08 The number of migrants choosing to migrate to “Other” farther away destinations (mainly Europe and Australia) is much higher in 2013 than it was in 2007, increasing from ten to almost 19 thousand, reflecting the deteriorating economic and political environment in neighboring countries and possibly the availability of new migration routes spurred by the Syrian refugee crisis. **Afghans**\n**choosing to seek employment opportunities abroad come predominantly from rural areas,** a\ntendency that has been strengthening along with deterioration of economic and security conditions outside urban centers.\n\n### Economic migration is a male-youth phenomenon.\n\n8\n\n**The education profile of migrants reflects the predominance of “push factors”**\n**in migration choices, with no evidence of positive self-selection** [20] . In particular,\nusing the male population aged 15–35 as a reference, migrants have less education whether they come from rural or urban areas. Such findings could also suggest that migration options and networks are more broadly available for low-skilled occupations [21], particularly in neighboring Iran and Gulf Countries. **Migrants choosing**\n**farther destinations are more likely to be educated.** Sorting into destinations based\non migrants’ education is likely to reflect higher costs associated with the journey (transport, smugglers, time...) as well as the skills and connections necessary to obtain", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ALCS", "confidence": 0.6923032402992249}, {"text": "NRVA", "confidence": 0.353351354598999}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**\n\nthe information needed to complete the journey and settle/find employment once the destination is reached. In 2007–08, 44 percent of migrants choosing destinations other than Iran, Pakistan, or the Arabian Peninsula had secondary or tertiary education. Such results are in line with data collected in the recent _Joint IDP Profiling Services_ initiative, according to which male Afghans arriving in Greece in early 2016 were mostly single youth possessing higher education.\n\n**Table 1** **\u0007Monthly labor income in Afghanistan**\n\n**and remittances from abroad**\n\n**MEAN** **MEDIAN**\n\n**Agriculture** 5930 4800\n\n**Manufacturing** 7496 7000\n\n**Construction** 6516 5600\n\n**Services** 9927 8000\n\n**Public sector** 14368 12000\n\n**Health and Education** 9402 7000\n\n**Remittances** 8581 5833\n\n**Total (excl. remittances)** **8529** **7000**\n\nNotes: labor income has been computed for male workers aged [14,35] Source: Authors’ calculation based on ALCS 2013–14\n\n**Figure 13** **\u0007Distribution of remittances,**\n\n**by sending country**\n\nAfghanistan Pakistan Iran UAE Other Gulf Europe Australia Other 0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 MONTHLY REMITTANCES, AFS Note: The figure shows a box and whiskers plot. The box ranges from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile. The line in the middle of the box shows the median. The two lines on either side of the box extend to minimum and maximum values, excluding outliers. The dots indicate outliers.\nSource: Authors’ calculation based on ALCS 2013–14 The importance of individual economic migration in Afghan households’ livelihood strategy is confirmed by data on remittances. **The vast majority of economic**\n**migrants send remittances.** In 2013–14, 80 percent of Afghans who left the\nhousehold seeking employment opportunities abroad had sent remittances, contributing on average about 70 percent of total labor income to their household.\nSuch numbers are striking, especially when considering that the information on remittances is collected on household members who left just during the year preceding the survey. This implies that over a very short period of time the vast majority of migrants were able to find employment and contribute to the welfare of their households in Afghanistan. **Remittances’ amounts vary by destination**\n**country,** reflecting differences in the education profile of migrants and in local\nwages. On average, remittances are approximately 8600 Afs per month, in line with the average monthly income of a male worker below the age of 35 in Afghanistan.\nHowever, the median value of remittances is 20 percent lower, confirming the prevalence of low-skilled workers among migrants.\n\n### The vast majority of economic migrants send remittances. Remittances’ amounts vary by destination country.\n\n9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["ALCS 2013–14"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ALCS", "confidence": 0.5149282217025757}, {"text": "IDP Profiling Services_", "confidence": 0.10107415169477463}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data on remittances", "confidence": 0.395708829164505}], "vague_data": [{"text": "data on remittances", "confidence": 0.4031245708465576}]}}}
{"input": "**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**\n\n## **MAIN MESSAGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS**\n\nAfghanistan is facing a severe security and economic crisis. This crisis is taking place in a context already complicated by an explosive mix of population growth, excess labor supply, widespread poverty, poor governance and lack of government capacity and financial resources to respond to the needs of its citizens. While Afghans have traditionally relied on migration to navigate times of distress, their options are shrinking at a time when needed the most; Iran is slowly recovering from an economic crisis, Pakistan is imposing strict border controls, and Europe is struggling with a political backlash resulting from the large mixed-migratory flows from Syria, Afghanistan and SubSaharan Africa.\n\nThe available evidence suggests that “push factors” are the primary motivators for migration both within and outside Afghanistan. While migrants might choose where to go depending on available opportunities, leaving is more of a necessity, rather than a choice. With rampant unemployment and escalating conflict, security and economic motives are two sides of the same coin. Can these flows be contained or reversed? The past history of displacement and returns to Afghanistan indicates the potential destabilizing effects of increasing population pressure on limited local resources. Given the increase in secondary displacement among more recent waves of returnees, local absorption capacity appears already overtaxed. Additional returns from Pakistan, Iran, or Europe are likely to result in further secondary displacement, unemployment, and instability. _In such context, the_ _**international**_ _**community should increase its advocacy to ensure voluntary, safe, dignified, and phased returns**_ _as further population shocks could undermine civilian and military aid efforts and further escalate_ _conflict. Peace and stability in Afghanistan are not only a pre-requisite for its development but also_ _a global public good. If no country or institution alone has the capacity to help Afghanistan manage_ _its displacement issues,_ _**the international community as a whole should mobilize resources to assist**_ _**those countries such as Pakistan and Iran who have shared the burden for decades, conditioned**_ _**on continued willingness to host refugee populations.**_ _Similarly, the international community as a_ _whole should support the development of_ _**legal channels for temporary economic migration and**_ _**more effective management of asylum requests**_ _which could help Afghanistan overcome its current_ _crisis and ease its structural challenges._ Second, evidence suggests that factors affecting poverty risks among mobile households are the same as the one observed in the general population. As Afghanistan’s context is characterized by widespread poverty and the degree of destitution among mobile households is not dissimilar from the rest of the population, _**targeting needs should be preferred to targeting categories,**_ _not to_ _create perceptions of unequal treatment that may exacerbate social fragmentation._ Such approach might be particularly important as the government and international community move towards a developmental approach in the management of displacement issues. As the fiscal space for social spending shrinks, _**consolidation of interventions should contribute to the development of a**_ _**nationwide safety net system**_ aimed at helping household cope with risk and, possibly, at reducing some of the causes of displacement.\n\n10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**\n\nThird, _**particular attention should be devoted to minimizing any possible negative impact of**_ _**displacement on human capital investments for future generations.**_ Evidence suggests that the lack human capital is the main determinants of the risk of poverty and that households are likely to respond to negative shocks by pulling children out of school. While a comprehensive safety net system could help mitigating such negative consequences, bureaucratic barriers such as residency status and transferability of school records could negatively impact displaced or, more generally, mobile populations. Moreover, given the prevalence of mobility and displacement in Afghanistan, greater focus should be devoted to investing in functional literacy and skill-development programs that display greater portability and provide displaced individuals with greater access to economic opportunities, wherever they end up being.\n\nLastly, evidence suggests that migrants will likely continue to converge towards Afghanistan’s urban centers as they seek better security, jobs, and services. _Urbanization trends require immediate_ _intervention by local authorities to increase shelter capacity and access to services. National and_ _provincial authorities should further recognize that, in the medium and long term,_ _**local integration in**_ _**urban and semi-urban areas is inevitable and it requires adequate planning**_ _to maximize the returns_ _from urban agglomeration, for example by investing in connectivity and accessibility, while ensuring_ _access to basic services and a minimum standard of living._\n\n## **ENDNOTES**\n\n1. UN Population Movement Bulletin, Issue 5, 7 Sept, 2016.\n\n2. Based on UNHCR assisted returns data, 78 percent of returns occurred between 2002 and 2006. Districts with “high” intensity of returns in 2007 had an average share of returnees over the population of 70 percent.\n\n3. Returnee households are considered to have “reintegrated” successfully if they were able to return to the place where they used to live before displacement, and if they were able to achieve—on average—socio-economic outcomes and legal protection in line with those of the local/host population. Household ability to reintegrate successfully might depend on several factors related to the social, economic and institutional conditions prevailing in the host community, as well as on the physical, human and social capital accumulated by returnee households while in asylum, and on their returns “on arrival”.\n\n4. According to NRVA 2007–08 data, approximately 85 percent of Afghan households reported to have been negatively affected by a “large influx of returnees” during the 12 months preceding the survey.\n\n5. Demographic and Health Survey (2014).\n\n6. The youth bulge is defined as the share of youth aged 15–24 to the adult population aged 15+.\n\n7. Growth is expected to remain slow over coming years, reflecting weak demand, increasing output gap and the lack of fiscal space for increasing social transfers in order to boost short-term economic growth (World Bank, 2016; _Navigating Risk and Uncertainty in Afghanistan_ ).\n\n8. Urdal, Henrik. 2004. _The devil in the demographics: The effect of youth bulges on domestic armed conflict,_ 1950–2000. Social Development Papers: Conflict and Reconstruction Paper 14.\n\n9. Low-technology, rain-fed agriculture remains the country’s primary sector of employment, especially for its poorest and more vulnerable people.\n\n10. ALCS 2013–14.\n\n11. Probability of having a household member abroad was estimated using a Linear Probability model and ALCS 2013–14 data. Controls include a dummy indicating whether the household feels insecure in the district of residence; the number of security incidents per thousand inhabitants in the district of residence; composition and employment outcomes at the household level; dummy variables identifying returnee households, IDP households and households migrating for economic reasons; a dummy indicating urban residence and quintiles of a wealth index to proxy for household welfare.\n\n11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Demographic and Health Survey", "NRVA 2007–08 data", "ALCS 2013–14 data"], "descriptive_data": ["UNHCR assisted returns data"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Demographic and Health Survey", "confidence": 0.7873840928077698}, {"text": "NRVA 2007–08 data", "confidence": 0.6387001276016235}, {"text": "ALCS 2013–14", "confidence": 0.4209410846233368}, {"text": "ALCS 2013–14 data", "confidence": 0.3973367214202881}, {"text": "UNHCR assisted returns data", "confidence": 0.3687880337238312}, {"text": "UN Population Movement Bulletin", "confidence": 0.1601107269525528}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "UNHCR assisted returns data", "confidence": 0.3990544378757477}, {"text": "NRVA 2007–08 data", "confidence": 0.1803734004497528}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**\n\n12. The World Bank, 2011. _Migration and poverty. Towards better opportunities for the poor._ Washington DC.\n\n13. The share of literate household heads in IDP households decreases to 43 percent when excluding secondary displacement, i.e. returnees who have been internally displaced upon return and that were IDPs at the time of the survey.\n\n14. Due to a relatively small sample size, the poverty rates of IDP and economic migrant households are estimated with lower precision, and therefore the difference in poverty rate compared to non-mobile households is not statistically significant.\n\n15. Afghanistan is characterized by sizeable differences in access to education between rural (low) and urban areas (high). As detailed in the 2015 _Poverty Status Update_ report, urban/rural differences account for approximately one-third of differences in education opportunities for Afghan children.\n\n16. Probability of being in school was estimated using a Probit model and ALCS 2013–14 data. Controls include sex and age of the child; composition and employment outcomes at the household level; dummy variables identifying returnee households and IDP households; whether the household has migrants and receives remittances; quintiles of a wealth index; urban residence and quintiles of an index indicating the severity of conflict in the district of residence.\n\n17. Ministry of Economy, World Bank (2015): _Afghanistan Poverty Status_ Update.\n\n18. Some useful information can be obtained from the three available and comparable rounds of the Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS) conducted in 2013–14, 2011–12 and 2007–08 which collect information about household members who have left the household in the 12 months preceding the survey and about their reason for migrating.\n\n19. The collapse in oil prices had a strong impact on Iran’s economy, further magnified by international sanctions imposed in 2011. Limited employment opportunities, a weaker exchange rate, and progressive reduction in universal subsidies (notably electricity) might have affected the returns of economic migrants choosing Iran as a destination, and possibly the choice of trying to reach Europe.\n\n20. Unfortunately, information on the education and employment outcomes of individual migrants was only collected in 2007–08, so it is not possible to assess any changes in migrants’ profiles.\n\n21. In 2007–08, migrants abroad were mostly employed as day laborers (82 percent) and salaried employees in the private sector (12 percent).\n\n12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey", "ALCS 2013–14 data"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey", "confidence": 0.7676092982292175}, {"text": "ALCS 2013–14 data", "confidence": 0.3750436007976532}, {"text": "ALCS", "confidence": 0.20651593804359436}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "ALCS 2013–14 data", "confidence": 0.1248789131641388}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION\n\n\nPROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT\n\n\n\nReport No: PAD4830", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS\n\n\n(Exchange Rate Effective April 30, 2022)\n\n\nCurrency Unit =  Ethiopian Birr\n\n\n51.86 Ethiopian Birr = US$1\n\n\nUS$1.34 = SDR 1\n\n\nGOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA FISCAL YEAR\n\nJuly 8 – June 7\n\n\nRegional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem\n\n\nCountry Director: Boutheina Guermazi\n\n\nRegional Director: Catherine Signe Tovey\n\n\nPractice Manager: Helene Monika Carlsson Rex\n\n\nTask Team Leaders: Matthew Stephens, Esayas Nigatu Gebremeskel", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS\n\n3R-4-CACE Response-Recovery-Resilience for Conflict-Affected Communities in Ethiopia Project\nBoA Bureau of Agriculture\nBoF Bureau of Finance\nAWPB Annual Work Plan and Budget\nCAC Community Audit Committee\nCBO Community-Based Organization\nCDD Community-Driven Development\nCERC Contingent Emergency Response Component\nCFT Community Facilitation Team\nCHS Community Health and Safety\nCIF Community Investment Fund\nCIG Common Interest Group\nCOVID Coronavirus Disease\nCPC Community Procurement Committee\nCPF Country Partnership Framework\nCPMC Community Project Management Committee\nCRRF Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework\nDA Designated Account\nDRDIP Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project\nE&S Environment and Social\nEHS Environmental Health and Safety\nEIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return\nERM Emergency Response Manual\nESCP Environmental and Social Commitment Plan\nESF Environmental and Social Framework\nESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework\nESRM Environmental and Social Risk Management\nESRS Environmental and Social Risk Summary\nESS Environmental and Social Standards\nETB Ethiopian Birr\nEU European Union\nFA Financing Agreement\nFAO Food and Agriculture Organization\nFCV Fragility, Conflict and Violence\nFLID Farmer-Led Irrigation Development\nFM Financial Management\nFPCU Federal Project Coordination Unit\nFSC Federal Steering Committee\nFTC Federal Technical Committee\nFTC Farmers Training Center\nFY Financial Year\nGBV Gender-based Violence\nGCR Global Compact on Refugees\nGEMS Geo-enabling initiative for Monitoring and Supervision", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "GoE Government of Ethiopia\nGP Global Practice\nGRF Global Refugee Forum\nGRM Grievance Redress Mechanism\nGRS Grievance Redress Service\nHoA Horn of Africa\nHoAI Horn of Africa Initiative\nHROC High Risk of Ongoing Conflict\nIBEX Integrated Budget and Expenditure\nIBM Iterative Beneficiary Monitoring\nIBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development\nIDA International Development Association\nIDP Internally Displaced Person\nIFMIS Integrated Financial Management Information System\nIFR Interim Financial Report\nIGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development\nIPF Investment Project Financing\nIPV Intimate Partner Violence\nIWUA Irrigation Water Users Association\nM&E Monitoring and Evaluation\nMoA Ministry of Agriculture\nMoF Ministry of Finance\nMOU Memorandum of Understanding\nNBE National Bank of Ethiopia\nNPV Net Present Value\nNRM Natural Resource Management\nNROC Non-High Risk of Ongoing Conflict\nOFAG Office of the Federal Auditor General\nOP Operational Policy\nPCU Project Coordination Unit\nPDO Project Development Objective\nPFM Public Financial Management\nPIM Project Implementation Manual\nPP Procurement Plan\nPPSD Project Procurement Strategy for Development\nPTC Pastoralist Training Center\nPWDs Persons with Disabilities\nRCC Refugee Central Committee\nRF Resettlement Framework\nRMEAL Results Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning\nRPCU Regional Project Coordination Unit\nRRS Refugees and Returnees Service\nRSW IDA 18 Sub-window for Refugees and Host Communities\nSA Social Assessment\nSACCO Savings and Credit Cooperative\nSEA/SH Sexual Exploitation and Abuse/Sexual Harassment", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Integrated Financial Management Information System", "confidence": 0.7651557922363281}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "SEP Stakeholder Engagement Plan\nSIF Strategic Investment Fund\nSOP Series of Projects\nSORT Systematic Operations Risk-Rating Tool\nSRAMP Security Risk Assessment and Management Plan\nSSI Small-scale Irrigation\nSTEP Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement\nTPM Third-Party Monitoring\nTPMA Third-Party Monitoring Agent\nUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees\nUNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services\nUSD United States Dollar\nWBG World Bank Group\nWHR IDA 19 Window for Host Communities and Refugees\nWNCCA Woreda Needs, Conflict and Capacity Assessment\nWoFED Woreda Office of Finance and Economic Development\nWPCU Woreda Project Coordination Unit", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nDevelopment Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)\n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\n**DATASHEET ........................................................................................................................... 1**\n\n\n**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT ...................................................................................................... 7**\n\n\nA. Country Context................................................................................................................................ 8\n\n\nB. Sectoral and Institutional Context .................................................................................................. 10\n\n\nC. Relevance to Higher Level Objectives ............................................................................................. 14\n\n\n**II.** **PROJECT DESCRIPTION .................................................................................................. 15**\n\n\nA. Project Development Objective ..................................................................................................... 15\n\n\nB. Project Components ....................................................................................................................... 16\n\n\nC. Project Beneficiaries ....................................................................................................................... 33\n\n\nD. Results Chain .................................................................................................................................. 33\n\n\nE. Rationale for Bank Involvement and Role of Partners ................................................................... 34\n\n\nF. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design .................................................................... 35\n\n\n**III.** **IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS ............................................................................ 36**\n\n\nA. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements .......................................................................... 36\n\n\nB. Results Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements......................................................................... 37\n\n\nC. Sustainability ................................................................................................................................... 38\n\n\n**IV.** **PROJECT APPRAISAL SUMMARY ................................................................................... 39**\n\n\nA. Technical, Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................................... 39\n\n\nB. Fiduciary .......................................................................................................................................... 40\n\n\nC. Legal Operational Policies ............................................................................................................... 43\n\n\nD. Environmental and Social ............................................................................................................... 43\n\n\n**V.** **GRIEVANCE REDRESS SERVICES ..................................................................................... 47**\n\n\n**VI.** **KEY RISKS ..................................................................................................................... 47**\n\n\n**VII.** **RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND MONITORING ................................................................... 50**\n\n\n**Annex 1 : Implementation Arrangements and Support Plan .......................................... 70**\n\n\n**Annex 2: Map ............................................................................................................... 80**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nDevelopment Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)\n\n\nDATASHEET\n\n\n**BASIC INFORMATION**\n~~BASIC~~ ~~INFO~~ ~~TABLE~~\n\n\nCountry(ies) Project Name\n\n\nDjibouti, Ethiopia,\nDevelopment Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II\nKenya, Uganda\n\n\nProject ID Financing Instrument Environmental and Social Risk Classification\n\n\nInvestment Project\nP178047 High\nFinancing\n\n\n**Financing & Implementation Modalities**\n\n\n[ ] Multiphase Programmatic Approach (MPA) [✓] Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC)\n\n\n[✓] Series of Projects (SOP) [✓] Fragile State(s)\n\n\n[ ] Performance-Based Conditions (PBCs) [ ] Small State(s)\n\n\n[ ] Financial Intermediaries (FI) [ ] Fragile within a non-fragile Country\n\n\n[ ] Project-Based Guarantee [ ] Conflict\n\n\n[ ] Deferred Drawdown [ ] Responding to Natural or Man-made Disaster\n\n\n[ ] Alternate Procurement Arrangements (APA) [ ] Hands-on Enhanced Implementation Support (HEIS)\n\n\nExpected Approval Date Expected Closing Date\n\n\n06-Jun-2022 31-Dec-2027\n\n\nBank/IFC Collaboration\n\n\nNo\n\n\n**Proposed Development Objective(s)**\n\n\nTo improve access to basic social and economic services, expand livelihood opportunities and enhance\nenvironmental management for host communities and refugees in the target areas.\n\n\nPage 1 of 80", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nDevelopment Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)\n\n\n**Components**\n\n\n**Component Name** **Cost (US$, millions)**\n\n\nSocial and Economic Services and Infrastructure 83.60\n\n\nSustainable Environmental Management 13.60\n\n\nLivelihoods Program 64.80\n\n\nProject Management, Monitoring and Evaluation and Learning 18.00\n\n\nContingent Emergency Response 0.00\n\n\n**Organizations**\n\n\nBorrower: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia\n\n\nImplementing Agency: Ministry of Agriculture\n\n\n**PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)**\n\n\n**SUMMARY-NewFin1**\n\n\n**Total Project Cost** 180.00\n\n\n**Total Financing** 180.00\n\n\n**of which IBRD/IDA** 180.00\n\n\n**Financing Gap** 0.00\n\n\n**DETAILS-NewFinEnh1**\n\n\n**World Bank Group Financing**\n\n\nInternational Development Association (IDA) 180.00\n\n\nIDA Grant 180.00\n\n\n**IDA Resources (in US$, Millions)**\n\n\n**Credit Amount** **Grant Amount** **Guarantee Amount** **Total Amount**\n\n\n**Ethiopia** 0.00 180.00 0.00 180.00\n\n\nPage 2 of 80", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PROJECT FINANCING DATA", "confidence": 0.48987558484077454}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "PROJECT FINANCING DATA", "confidence": 0.2325945943593979}], "vague_data": [{"text": "PROJECT FINANCING DATA", "confidence": 0.18937769532203674}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nDevelopment Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)\n\n\nNational PBA 0.00 34.07 0.00 34.07\n\n\nRegional 0.00 45.93 0.00 45.93\n\n\nRefugee 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00\n\n\n**Total** **0.00** **180.00** **0.00** **180.00**\n\n\n**Expected Disbursements (in US$, Millions)**\n\n\n**WB Fiscal Year** 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028\n\n\n**Annual** 0.00 18.00 40.00 65.00 41.00 16.00 0.00\n\n\n**Cumulative** 0.00 18.00 58.00 123.00 164.00 180.00 180.00\n\n\n**INSTITUTIONAL DATA**\n\n\n**Practice Area (Lead)** **Contributing Practice Areas**\n\nAgriculture and Food, Environment, Natural Resources & the\nSocial Sustainability and Inclusion\nBlue Economy, Fragile, Conflict & Violence, Water\n\n\n**Climate Change and Disaster Screening**\n\n\nThis operation has been screened for short and long-term climate change and disaster risks\n\n\n**SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL (SORT)**\n\n\n**Risk Category** **Rating**\n\n\n1. Political and Governance ⚫ High\n\n\n2. Macroeconomic ⚫ High\n\n\n3. Sector Strategies and Policies ⚫ Moderate\n\n\n4. Technical Design of Project or Program ⚫ Substantial\n\n\n5. Institutional Capacity for Implementation and Sustainability ⚫ Substantial\n\n\n6. Fiduciary ⚫ Substantial\n\n\n7. Environment and Social ⚫ High\n\n\n8. Stakeholders ⚫ Moderate\n\n\nPage 3 of 80", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL", "confidence": 0.17649126052856445}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "INSTITUTIONAL DATA", "confidence": 0.6150755882263184}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nDevelopment Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)\n\n\n9. Other ⚫ Substantial\n\n\n10. Overall ⚫ High\n\n\n**COMPLIANCE**\n\n\n**Policy**\nDoes the project depart from the CPF in content or in other significant respects?\n\n[ ] Yes   [✓] No\n\n\nDoes the project require any waivers of Bank policies?\n\n[ ] Yes   [✓] No\n\n\n**Environmental and Social Standards Relevance Given its Context at the Time of Appraisal**\n\n\n**E & S Standards** **Relevance**\n\n\nAssessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts Relevant\n\n\nStakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure Relevant\n\n\nLabor and Working Conditions Relevant\n\n\nResource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention and Management Relevant\n\n\nCommunity Health and Safety Relevant\n\n\nLand Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement Relevant\n\n\n\nBiodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural\nResources\n\n\nIndigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional\nLocal Communities\n\n\n\nRelevant\n\n\nRelevant\n\n\n\nCultural Heritage Relevant\n\n\nFinancial Intermediaries Not Currently Relevant\n\n\n**NOTE** : For further information regarding the World Bank’s due diligence assessment of the Project’s potential\nenvironmental and social risks and impacts, please refer to the Project’s Appraisal Environmental and Social Review\nSummary (ESRS).\n\n\nPage 4 of 80", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nDevelopment Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)\n\n\n**Legal Covenants**\n\n\nSections and Description\n\nThe Recipient shall no later than three (3) months after the Effective Date, appoint a Third-Party Monitoring Agent\n(“TPMA”), with terms of reference, mandates, staffing, and other resources satisfactory to the Association, to\nmonitor the implementation and supervision of Project activities in high risk of conflict areas.\n\n\n**Conditions**\n\n\nType Financing source Description\nEffectiveness IBRD/IDA The Recipient has adopted an updated Project Implementation\nManual in accordance with the provisions of Section I.B.1 of\nSchedule 2 to the Financing Agreement.\n\n\nType Financing source Description\nEffectiveness IBRD/IDA The Recipient, through its Ministry of Agriculture, has contracted an\nimplementing agency with terms of reference, mandate, staffing,\nand other resources satisfactory to the Association, to be\nresponsible for implementing Project activities in high risk of\nongoing conflict areas.\n\n\nType Financing source Description\nEffectiveness IBRD/IDA The Association is satisfied that the Recipient has an adequate\nrefugee protection framework.\n\n\nType Financing source Description\nDisbursement IBRD/IDA No withdrawal shall be made for payments made prior to the\nSignature Date.\n\n\nType Financing source Description\nDisbursement No withdrawal shall be made for Emergency Expenditures under\nCategory (2), unless and until all of the following conditions have\nbeen met in respect of said expenditures:\n(i) (A) the Recipient has determined that an Eligible Crisis or\nEmergency has occurred, and has furnished to the Association a\nrequest to withdraw Financing amounts under Category (2); and (B)\nthe Association has agreed with such determination, accepted said\nrequest and notified the Recipient thereof; and\n(ii) the Recipient has adopted the CERC Manual and Emergency\nAction Plan, in form and substance acceptable to the Association.\n\n\nType Financing source Description\nEffectiveness IBRD/IDA The Recipient has adopted and disclosed: (i) a resettlement\n\n\nPage 5 of 80", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nDevelopment Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)\n\n\nframework; (ii) an environmental and social management\nframework; (iii) a social assessment; (iv) labor management\nprocedures; (v) gender-based violence/sexual exploitation and\nabuse/sexual harassment action plan; and (vi) a security risk\nassessment and management plan, all in accordance with the\nprovisions of the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan.\n\n\nPage 6 of 80", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nDevelopment Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)\n\n\n**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT**\n\n\n1. **Any engagement in Ethiopia at present must consider the fluid conflict-related developments in the country**\n\n**and the rapid pace at which these developments could lead to changes in the country’s context.** The proposed\nDevelopment Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP) in the Horn of Africa (HoA) Phase II (DRDIP II) was\nprepared with this understanding, with a flexible design that can be adapted to the country’s evolving needs. DRDIP\nII includes several important new design features compared to the ongoing Phase I, as follows: (a) refugees are\nincluded as direct beneficiaries; (b) the geographic scope is expanded to cover all communities in the country that are\naffected by the refugee presence; (c) deeper support to help the government of Ethiopia implement its policies for\nrefugee inclusion; (d) integration of refugee concerns into local development planning; and (e) enhanced focus on\nwomen’s economic and social empowerment. Furthermore, the Government has agreed to third-party\nimplementation and third-party monitoring in areas at high risk of ongoing conflict.\n\n2. **Global forced displacement presents significant humanitarian and development challenges.** Over 84 million\n\npeople are now forcibly displaced because of conflict, persecution, and natural disasters. This includes 26.6 million\nrefugees – the highest number ever recorded – and 51 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). [1] Forced\ndisplacement remains largely concentrated in low- and middle-income countries. The HoA and the Great Lakes\nRegions in Africa host 20 percent of the world’s refugees and asylum-seekers (five million) and 25 percent of the IDPs\n(12.4 million). [2] This is an increase of two million refugees and 500,000 IDPs since DRDIP in the HoA (P152822)\ncommenced in 2016. Displacement is protracted in the HoA and is driven by natural events and human actions, with\nclimate change and environmental degradation acting as threat multipliers.\n\n3. **Displacement has emerged as a regional phenomenon in the HoA, with spillover effects in neighboring**\n\n**countries, posing major challenges for poverty reduction, stability and community resilience.** Despite its rich\nendowment in human, social and natural capital, the HoA is affected by a complex history of marginalization, pockets\nof poverty and insecurity and increasing environmental degradation. Conflict remains endemic, compounded by\ndemographic shifts because of population growth and movement of people; imbalanced service provision; increasing\ncompetition for scarce natural resources; and harsh climatic conditions, including frequent droughts and floods.\n\n4. **In line with the growing importance of regional integration goals to combat fragility, five countries (Djibouti,**\n\n**Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia) launched the Horn of Africa Initiative (HoAI) in 2019 to forge closer economic**\n**ties in the sub-region. Subsequently, Sudan also joined the HoAI.** Highlighting the importance of regional\ncooperation in resilience building, the initiative includes four pillars: (i) Regional Infrastructure Networks; (ii) Trade\nand Economic Integration; (iii) Resilience; and (iv) Human Capital. Developed with support from the African\nDevelopment Bank, the European Union (EU) and the World Bank, the HoAI agreed on priority projects and programs\nfor the region requiring financing of up to US$15 billion. Responding in part to requests at the October 2021 HoAI\nMinisterial meeting to increase support for resilience considering the heightened fragility risks faced by the region\nthat spill over national boundaries, this project supports the Resilience Pillar.\n\n\n5. **The proposed project is the second phase of an ongoing operation benefiting Ethiopia and is part of a series of**\n\n**ongoing regional projects—also covering Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda.** Designed as a series of projects (SOP), DRDIP\naddresses the regional spillover effects of conflict and forced displacement. DRDIP supports a development response\n\n\n1 _[https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/mid-year-trends.html](https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/mid-year-trends.html)_ .\n2 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/rbehagl\n\n\nPage 7 of 80", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nDevelopment Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)\n\n\nthat helps refugee-hosting countries to overcome the negative impacts of forced displacement, while maximizing the\npositive opportunities it can also present, thus creating a refugee space contributing to a regional “public good”. The\nfirst phase of DRDIP commenced in 2016, supporting Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda, with Kenya joining in 2017. Both\nprojects include grants to the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for regional coordination and\nlearning. DRDIP II follows the World Bank’s people-centric approach for the HoA. The project will support\napproximately 2.5 million people, of whom 1.76 million are host community members and 740,000 are refugees. The\nSOP allows for other countries in the HoA to opt into the program at a later date, or for second phases and Additional\nFinancing for existing DRDIP countries, as in the case of this operation.\n\n**A. Country Context**\n\n\n6. **With a population of over 115 million people (2020), Ethiopia is the second most populous nation in Africa**\n\n**after Nigeria, and one of the most diverse** . Ethiopia’s location in the center of the HoA and close to the Middle East\ngives it high strategic importance. It is physically connected to six other countries, namely Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia,\nSouth Sudan, Sudan and – essential in terms of global trade – to Djibouti and its deep-sea port. Ethiopia hosts about\n86 ethnic groups and 90 spoken languages and is also religiously and geographically diverse. [3]\n\n\n7. **Consistent economic growth and poverty reduction have underpinned significant development progress in**\n**Ethiopia over the last two decades** . Driven by average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of more than ten percent\nannually over the last 15 years, Gross National Income per capita increased from US$140 in 2004 to an estimated\nUS$890 by 2020. Poverty reduced from 38.4 percent in 2004 to 23.5 percent in 2016. This sustained growth has,\nhowever, exacerbated inequality, with the Gini coefficient increasing from 29.8 in 2004 to 35 in 2015. The rise in\ninequality is largely due to increasing urban-rural disparity, with 88 percent of the country’s poor living in rural areas. [4]\n\n8. **Ethiopia’s development gains are being challenged by a combination of the global pandemic, natural disasters**\n**and violent conflict.** The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has had severe impacts on the country’s economy. [5]\nGrowth slowed to 6.3 percent in 2020/21 and is expected to decline to 3.3 percent in 2021/22. World Bank projections\nestimate that the pandemic has caused a significant increase in the poverty headcount – particularly in urban areas –\nand has also exacerbated inequality. [6]\n\n9. **Flooding and a locust infestation over the past two years have seriously affected food security** **and livelihoods**\n**and highlighted the risks of climate change.** The number of people requiring food assistance has increased to as many\nas 13.2 million. [7] Ethiopia is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate variability and climate change due to its\nhigh dependence on rain-fed agriculture and natural resources. The country’s relatively low adaptive capacity to deal\nwith current and expected changes amplifies resource scarcity and the risk of instability.\n\n\n10. **Climate change is expected to cause severe damage to infrastructure, increase the risk of water scarcity and**\n**increase crop land exposure to drought** . This will increase demand for water, raising the potential for conflict and\n\n\n3 According to Ethiopia’s 2007 Census.\n4 World Bank Poverty and Equity Brief for Ethiopia, October 2021.\n5 As of May 11, 2022, Ethiopia had registered 470,760 COVID cases and 7,510 fatalities: _[https://covid19.who.int/region/afro/country/et](https://covid19.who.int/region/afro/country/et)_\n6 World Bank analysis suggests that the poverty headcount in the 23.5th percentile (the national poverty rate) increased by 11.2 percent\nand for the bottom 40 [th] percentile by 7.7 percent between 2018/19 and October 2020. Inequality is estimated to have increased, with\nthe Gini coefficient rising to 42 in October/November 2020. See Christina Wieser et al (2021) “Poverty projections and profiling based on\nEthiopia’s High Frequency Phone Surveys of households using a SWIFT-COVID-19 package” World Bank: Washington DC.\n7 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan. _[https://www.wfp.org/countries/ethiopia](https://www.wfp.org/countries/ethiopia)_\n\n\nPage 8 of 80", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Ethiopia’s 2007 Census"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Ethiopia’s 2007 Census", "confidence": 0.37777167558670044}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nDevelopment Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)\n\n\nforced displacement. [8] Higher temperatures, which will cause increased aridity, may also lead to livestock stress and\nreduced crop yields. This is likely to result in significant economic losses, damage to agricultural lands and\ninfrastructure, as well as human casualties. [9] Investments will be needed in climate-resilient infrastructure such as\ntransport networks and public institutions for basic services.\n\n11. **The war in Ukraine is exacerbating economic and food security challenges** . Russia and Ukraine account for close\nto 30 percent of the global wheat market. As a result of anticipated shortages due to the war, the Food and Agriculture\nOrganization (FAO) global Food Price Index reached an historical high in March 2022. While the index dropped slightly\nin April 2022, it remains 30 percent higher than one year previously. [10] In Ethiopia the latest official data shows that\nthe price of food has increased by 43 percent over the past year. [11] Across the HoA, the impact of the price increases\nand food shortages will be felt acutely by the poor, particularly refugees, who are highly dependent on dwindling\nhumanitarian aid for livelihood and food security. [12]\n\n12. **The last five years have seen an increase in violent conflict which has carried a major human and economic cost**\n**to Ethiopia** . The most significant recent manifestation of conflict is the Northern Ethiopian Crisis, which began in Tigray\nin November 2020 and has since spilled over to the adjoining regions of Amhara and Afar. The current wave of conflict\nhas been triggered by a complex web of drivers and grievances, including political rivalries, contestation over natural\nresources, and perceptions of regional and historical inequalities. These triggers have been aggravated by unfulfilled\nemployment expectations among youth, shrinking availability of land, and the impacts of climate change. [13] Some of\nthese conflicts have long histories (for instance, between different ethnic groups over control of local resources such\nas water or pasture) and have re-emerged during the recent political transition. Political competition and rivalry\nbetween elites has intensified over this period – locally, and at the national and regional levels. These tensions have\nmanifested across both rural and urban areas and have largely been organized along ethnic lines. Conflict is affecting\nvarious parts of the country, complicating access to several refugee-hosting areas, raising risks for both humanitarian\nand development programming and affecting social cohesion in different regions. It has also forced refugees to move\nto new areas, creating a new set of humanitarian and development needs for displaced populations.\n\n13. **The conflict has triggered a humanitarian crisis, particularly in northern Ethiopia.** The United Nations estimates\n\nthat 5.2 million people in the north, or more than 75 percent of the region’s population, need humanitarian\nassistance. [14] There are now more than four million IDPs in the country, 50 percent of whom have been displaced in\nthe past six months alone. Overall, half are female and 18 percent are children. [15] Approximately 60,000 Ethiopians\n\n\n8 Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) “Climate Change Amplifies Instability in Africa”, April 21, 2021. See also German Federal\nMinistry for Economic Cooperation and Development “Climate Risk Profile: Ethiopia”.\n9 Average temperatures in Ethiopia have increased by an average of 1°C since 1960s, increasing evapotranspiration and reducing soil\nmoisture. The incidence of drought has increased and the rains in central and northern areas occurring in February to May have become\nless predictable. Projections of future change indicate increased temperatures, and as much as a 20 percent decline in spring and summer\nrainfall in southern and central regions and an increase in southwest and southeast areas. Projected warming trends for the entire\ncountry are expected to exacerbate observed declines in rainfall, leading to increased water stress.\n10 https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/\n11 https://www.statsethiopia.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/7.CPI-Mar-2022-HB.pdf\n12 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2022) The Impact on Trade and Development of the War in Ukraine.\n13 ‘Across Africa, the effects of climate change are shaping conflict patterns, in particular the pattern of violence arising from forced\n[migration into contested space…’: https://aoav.org.uk/2021/how-is-climate-change-driving-conflict-in-africa/](https://aoav.org.uk/2021/how-is-climate-change-driving-conflict-in-africa/)\n[14 OCHA https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia](https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia)\n15 IOM. 2021. Ethiopia National Displacement Report 10 (August-September 2021), published 13 December 2021:\n[https://dtm.iom.int/ethiopia](https://dtm.iom.int/ethiopia)\n\n\nPage 9 of 80", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "global Food Price Index", "confidence": 0.3215307891368866}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# **NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH**\n\n**Research Paper No. 143**\n\n# **Protracted displacement and remittances:** **The case of Somalis in Eastleigh, Nairobi**\n\n**Anna Lindley**\n\nESRC Postdoctoral Fellow Centre on Migration, Policy and Society University of Oxford, United Kingdom\n\n[E-mail: anna.lindley@compas.ox.ac.uk](mailto:anna.lindley@compas.ox.ac.uk) August 2007\n\n**Policy Development and Evaluation Service**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Policy Development and Evaluation Service**\n**United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees**\n\n**P.O. Box 2500, 1211 Geneva 2**\n\n**Switzerland**\n\n**E-mail: hqpd00@unhcr.org**\n\n**Web Site: www.unhcr.org**\n\nThese papers provide a means for UNHCR staff, consultants, interns and associates, as well as external researchers, to publish the preliminary results of their research on refugee-related issues. The papers do not represent the official views of UNHCR. They are also available online under ‘publications’ at <www.unhcr.org>.\n\nISSN 1020-7473", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Introduction**\n\nThere are more than 5.5 million people around the world struggling in situations of protracted and unresolved exile (UNHCR 2006). [1] These people are allowed to remain in the country where they have sought asylum, but lack basic rights. They often receive meagre - and dwindling – levels of international aid, and must therefore find alternative and additional ways to provide for themselves and their households (Jacobsen 2006).\n\nRemittances from family members in other countries appear to be one way that some people cope with protracted displacement: the money can alleviate poverty and can provide possibilities for improving recipients’ situations, within their considerable constraints (Crisp 2003; Jacobsen 2006). On a global scale, remittances are a significant source of income for developing countries: officially recorded flows totalled $160 billion in 2004, compared with $166 billion Foreign Direct Investment and $79 billion Official Development Assistance (World Bank 2006). Most research explores the remittances of labour migrants and the effects in their countries of origin.\nIn contrast, very little is known about the dynamics and effects of remittances in displacement settings (relevant research includes Dick 2002; Horst 2006; Riak Akuei 2005; Savage and Harvey 2007; Van Hear 2002).\n\nThis paper explores experiences of the remittance process among Somali refugees living in Nairobi. Hundreds of thousands of people have fled to Kenya since 1991 as a result of the civil war in Somalia. Many people still live in refugee camps, mainly dependent on international aid, but over time many others have defied the host government’s attempts to contain them in camps and sought a living in urban areas.\nThe paper focuses on Eastleigh, a bustling suburb of Nairobi with a large Somali population. Known in Swahili as _Mogadishu ndogo_ (little Mogadishu), Eastleigh has a reputation for thriving business activity, dilapidated infrastructure and crime. Many Somali refugees in this district receive cash remittances from relatives overseas through the Somali money transfer system popularly known as _xawilaad_ . As we shall see, this money has complex effects on their lives.\n\nThe research was conducted in January - April 2005, during which time the researcher lived in Eastleigh with a Somali host. The paper is based on informal conversations, observations, and interviews (with residents of various socio-economic and demographic characteristics and clans, conducted with the support of a local researcher). [2] The paper also draws on consultations and interviews with people professionally knowledgeable about the politico-legal and socio-economic situation of Somalis in Kenya, including UNHCR. [3] While a comprehensive quantitative survey 1 This estimate excludes Palestinian refugees under UNRWA’s mandate, and is based on national groups of refugees of 25,000 living for five years or more in the same country of asylum.\n2 Thanks go to the research participants for their time; Abdullahi Mohamed Qambi for his excellent research assistance; and Nafisa Nur Osman for her warm hospitality.\n3 A total of 24 interviews were conducted with recipients and others. All names have been changed and some details have been altered to preserve interviewees’ anonymity. The research was part of a broader multi-sited project also involving research in Hargeisa and London (Lindley 2006, 2007a and 2007b).\n\n1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["comprehensive quantitative survey"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "comprehensive quantitative survey", "confidence": 0.38314738869667053}], "vague_data": [{"text": "quantitative survey", "confidence": 0.5016711354255676}]}}}
{"input": "was not feasible, the data collected paint a broadly indicative picture of remittance experiences among Somali refugees in Eastleigh.\n\nThe next section gives a brief account of the refugee situation, and the changes in the Eastleigh district of Nairobi as it became a major hub for Somali people in Kenya.\nThe third section explores the patterns of remittances and roles in people’s livelihoods. The fourth section explores how remittances intertwine with regional and global mobility, and the final section outlines repercussions in the wider urban economy. The paper concludes by summarising the findings and discussing their policy implications.\n\n**Somalis in Kenya: from the northern frontier to Nairobi**\n\nKenya has a substantial indigenous Somali Kenyan population, particularly in the North Eastern Province (NEP, known as the Northern Frontier District under British rule). Somali pastoralists have long lived in this harsh, semi-arid area, with its troubled history of political unrest and state repression. Other Somali Kenyans trace their families back to colonial employees or independent traders who settled in Kenya’s towns and cities (Anderson 2005; Turton 1972; Goldsmith 1997; Lewis 2002).\n\nWhen civil war broke out in southern Somalia and the state collapsed in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees sought safety in Kenya, initially mainly Marehan (the clan of the former president Siyad Barre) and other Darod clans, but as the violence intensified, people of other clans joined them. They fled on foot or crammed into vehicles over the border into the NEP; by _dhow_ from Somalia’s coastal towns to Mombasa; and by plane to Nairobi. After initial attempts to block arrivals, Kenya allowed them in: around 400,000 refugees arrived from Somalia in 1991 and 1992 (Milner 2005).\n\nLarge numbers of people were registered by UNHCR and sent to camps at Mombasa on the coast, Thika near Nairobi, Liboi and Dadaab in the NEP, and Kakuma in the North West (Crisp 1999). Since the peak of the early nineties, the refugee population decreased. Some refugees returned voluntarily to Somalia (although not always permanently) [4] and others travelled independently or were formally resettled overseas.\nSince 1999, the camp population has remained relatively stable in the region of 150,000, although the numbers for 2007 may be higher as a result of developments in the war in southern Somalia.\n\nKenya has signed and ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Refugee Convention.\nBut until late 2006, when the Refugee Act was passed, there was no national legislation for refugees in Kenya. In contrast to the more open and accommodating refugee policy of earlier years, Milner (2005) characterises Kenya’s refugee policy 4 Some of my interviewees in 2005, who were mainly of Darod and Hawiye clans and grew up in the central and southern Somali regions, had tried going back and had traumatic and discouraging experiences. None of the interviewees were contemplating returning to live in southern Somalia while there is still no effective government.\n\n2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "after 1990 as effectively one of ‘abdication and containment’. [5] First, the government abdicated to UNHCR the responsibility of determining the status of asylum seekers and ensuring their protection. Most refugees were designated _prima facie_ refugees as often occurs when refugees flee generalised insecurity and conflict in large numbers and it is not feasible to conduct individual status determinations. Second, the government tried to contain the problem by only allowing Somali refugees to reside and work in these designated camps, restricting their movements and not giving them the right to take up employment. UNHCR only gave UN Travel Letters for people to travel to Nairobi for resettlement interviews, to university students, to people needing medical treatment and people with particular security problems (Crisp 1999). [6] The Refugees Act 2006 represents a step forward, translating the 1951 and the OAU Convention into national law for the first time. Yet, at this early stage it seems likely that the freedom to work and the freedom of movement of refugees in Kenya will remain considerably restricted. Since the act came into force, further upheaval in Somalia has prompted more people to seek refuge in Kenya, and there have been border closures and evidence of some forcible returns. [7] There is a clear risk now that the will to deal with the problems of protracted displacement will be subsumed by the emergency response to recent arrivals.\n\nThe deep material deprivation and physical insecurity of life in the refugee camps is well-documented (Crisp 1999; Horst 2006; Hyndman 2000; Milner 2005). Indeed, life outside the camps in the NEP is also often difficult: considerable numbers of Kenyan Somali pastoralists were so poor that they joined their co-ethnics in the camps; others bought ration cards from refugees heading for the city (Hyndman 2000).\n\nIt has been suggested, that given their size, population, permanence and other features, camps like the Dadaab group (Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley) might better be thought of as cities than camps (Pérouse de Montclos and Kagwanja 2000). Of particular relevance to this paper, Horst’s (2006) critique of the common depiction of refugee camps as isolated places highlights the connections between Somali refugees in Dadaab and relatives elsewhere in the Horn of Africa and beyond. She found that a minority – she estimates roughly 15 per cent – of refugees received regular remittances which, given the meagre international aid and limited local income opportunities, greatly affected their lives and the wider economy of the refugee camps.\n\nHowever, despite the government’s attempts to contain them in remote regions, many refugees end up in Nairobi and other towns or cities. A minority of those Somalis 5 Milner (2005) suggests that a combination of factors contributed to this shift in policy in the early 1990s, including the large numbers and protracted nature of the Somali refugee situation; weakened government capacity in Kenya due to the suspension of international aid in 1991 (based on donor concerns regarding human rights and democracy); the failure of humanitarian aid to keep up with the needs of the refugees; the history of _shifta_ wars and an attempted coup against President Moi in 1982; and security concerns over the alleged Somali involvement in small arms proliferation and the 1998 US Nairobi Embassy attack.\n6 The latter two groups are eligible for assistance from UNHCR during their stay in the city.\n7 Jesuit Refugee Service briefing, Nairobi, 23 April 2007, _Kenya: border remains closed to asylum_ _seekers_ . See also UNHCR press release, Geneva, 3 January 2007, _UNHCR calls on Kenya to halt_ _Somali returns._ 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "UN Travel Letters", "confidence": 0.25828924775123596}]}}}
{"input": "arriving in the 1990s had the wherewithal to set up home in Nairobi or Mombasa, or stayed with relatives, and never declared themselves to UNHCR (Farah 1996; Goldsmith 1997). When the Mombasa camps closed in the mid-1990s, many refugees took themselves to Nairobi instead, relocating to other camps or voluntarily repatriating to Somalia. Some refugees from Dadaab and Kakuma also moved to Nairobi. The numbers of displaced Somali people living informally in urban areas are obviously uncertain – estimates in the mid 1990s ranged up to 100,000 (Hyndman 2000; Moret _et al._ 2005; USCR 1997). In general much less is known about the situation of urban refugees, possibly because they can be harder to locate (compared with the ‘captive population’ in the camps), and are generally not entitled to assistance, and also because the containment policy encouraged politicians to play down the existence of refugees in urban areas (Campbell 2005).\n\nMost of these people have ended up in Nairobi’s Eastleigh district. Located to the far east of the Central Business District, Eastleigh used to be a lower middle class suburb (Goldsmith 1997; Sirola 2001). Eastleigh was formerly a predominantly Asian residential estate, with some shops and businesses, then over the years Kenyan Kikuyu landlords began to buy up property there. There was a small Somali community prior to the civil war - some of the Kenyan Somali shopkeepers in Eastleigh grew up on the estate. The precise population size is unknown: some hazard guesses of 300,000-500,000. Some have suggested that there may be as many at 60,000 displaced Somali people living informally in Nairobi, mainly in Eastleigh (African Population and Health Research Center 2002; Campbell 2005; Moret _et al._ 2005).\n\nSince 1990, Eastleigh has developed dramatically, shaped by its growing population – rural Kenyans, Sudanese, Eritreans, Ethiopians, but above all, in the largest numbers, Somalis. Their presence is closely linked with four key areas of change during the 1990s and since: business activity, housing and public infrastructure, crime, and social relations.\n\nSince 1991, Eastleigh has become a major business and shopping district in Nairobi.\nBusinesspeople, including incoming refugees, invested in import and export businesses, retail outlets (from small-scale hawking and street stalls to large shopping malls), chemists, property letting and real estate development, hotels, lodges, _miraa_ (khat / _qaad_ ) outlets, cafés and restaurants, long-distance transport companies and taxi-drivers, phone and internet bureaux, and international money transfer and exchange services. The shopping area attracts customers from all over Nairobi and further afield. According to one commentator, “Eastleigh is ‘openly informal’, neither hidden from authorities nor entirely consistent with an official, public place of business. At the same time it is integral to the service economy of Nairobi and its 2.5+ million residents.” (Little 2003: 164) A second key change in Eastleigh in the 1990s was the effect of the influx of refugees in the local property and housing market. Increased demand from Somalis, as Eastleigh became known as a Somali enclave, raised the cost of accommodation: the rent for single rooms after the influx in the early 1990s was five or more times the previous levels, pushing many Kenyans tenants out into other areas of Eastlands, while the refugees often lived in over-crowded conditions, sharing and sub-letting (Goldsmith 1997; Sirola 2001; Campbell 2005; Hyndman 2000).\n\n4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Commercial development, particularly in the district known as Section Two, also accelerated, pushing up the price of land for redevelopment as shopping malls. The centrepieces of Eastleigh’s commercial development are its large shopping malls, such as Garissa Lodge and Amal Plaza. The largely unregulated expansion of business and the increasingly overcrowded population long outpaced repairs and improvements to public infrastructure. Drains, sewers and rubbish collection are very visibly inadequate. Roads are in a dilapidated condition, with deep mud during the rainy season and rising dust when it is dry.\n\nThird, Eastleigh became strongly associated with crime, which has been on the rise in the wider area of Eastlands, and in Nairobi in general, often associated with the increased hardship created by structural adjustment (Anderson 2002). Muggings and street thefts of mobile phones and cash are common, and _matatus_ (buses) to Eastleigh are held up and robbed fairly frequently, particularly at night. Refugees in particular have suffered from police harassment. Some Somali refugees had obtained a Kenyan or Alien ID card through various means, but the majority just had their UNHCR letter saying that they are a _prima facie_ refugee, which was of little use due to their ambiguous politico-legal situation outside the camps (Hyndman 2000; Verdirame 1999). Threatened with arrest for being in Kenya illegally, many Somalis would pay bribes to be released. According to the refugees, such extortion has varied over time, reportedly reaching particular heights of openness and impunity in 2001-2002. Many people remain cautious, sticking to their area, not venturing into town or out at night. [8] The last of the changes in Eastleigh explored here is the effect on social relations of the arrival of the new Somalis. Somali Kenyan families were an important source of assistance for their close relatives and clanspeople (Goldsmith 1997; Horst 2006).\nAlthough there are some tensions between people of different clans, some more generalized solidarity is derived from being Somali and Muslim in Kenya.\n\nFor their part, Kenyans in Eastleigh generally appear to have come to terms with the obvious fact that ‘Somalis are our neighbours’. Kenyans, Somalis and other refugee nationalities share washing lines and cramped stairways, their children go to school together; they truck and barter (Goldsmith 1997; Campbell 2005). However, when times are tough, the history of rebel activities in the NEP, Somalia’s present disarray and the large numbers of refugees in the capital, make Somali nationals a convenient ideal scapegoat for urban ills (Gimode 2001; Verdirame 1999).\n\n**Remittance traffic and livelihood strategies in Eastleigh**\n\nLivelihoods are conventionally defined as the capabilities, assets (natural, physical, human, social and financial capital) and activities required for a means of living (DFID 1999; Jacobsen 2006). Several types of livelihoods were evident among Somali refugees in Eastleigh. The most obvious strategies were running small businesses or working in local businesses and homes. [9] _Prima facie_ refugees were considered irregular migrants in the city and were largely confined to working in the 8 It is still early days to tell how much the new Refugee Act will affect this.\n9 Wages vary: in 2005 _matatu_ drivers were earning around KSh600 per day, and touts half this; cyber café assistants might earn KSh6,000 a month; shop assistants KSh4,000-5,000. Those working in Somali homes may be casual domestic workers, or younger female relatives who are given bed and board but may not be paid for their work.\n\n5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR letter", "confidence": 0.13501955568790436}, {"text": "Kenyan or Alien ID card", "confidence": 0.12313511222600937}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "UNHCR letter", "confidence": 0.1444891393184662}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "informal economy, although some businesses already gradually began to move into the formal economy, by registering with the relevant authorities and paying taxes.\n\nOutside the camps, a minority of refugees - only those in the city formally for health or security reasons - receive on-going assistance from UNHCR. Less obvious livelihood strategies involved people mobilizing social capital to meet their needs.\nReceiving overseas remittances are a clear example of people using their social capital to obtain financial capital, but there are other examples of people drawing on social capital, with some people being taken in or provided for by better-off families or assisted by the Mosque or other charitable contributions. Of course, some people use more than one of these livelihood strategies at once, or use different strategies over time.\n\nAlthough some people never received remittances, many of the refugees in Eastleigh have had the experience at some point of receiving some money from relatives overseas. Recipients are demographically mixed and, like many refugees gravitating towards urban areas in Africa, often lived relatively comfortable urban lives before their displacement (Jacobsen 2005). The assistance commonly came from husbands, siblings and adult children – although other relatives also remit – living mainly in Europe and North America, and in some instances, the Middle East, South Africa or elsewhere. There were varying patterns of remittance traffic into Eastleigh. Some recipients get a set sum of money on a regular, usually monthly basis, commonly $150-$250 per month. [10] Others receive variable amounts on an ad-hoc basis. It follows that the role of remittances in recipients’ livelihoods varies considerably. The examples of Rhoda, Abdi, Abdiwali and Mahamoud help illustrate this. [11] Rhoda is a mother of seven in her early forties. When the war broke out in the Central Region, the family businesses and home were looted. The militia killed her father and two brothers. She fled with her husband, children, mother and three sisters to Mogadishu, then Kismayo, then Liboye refugee camp in Kenya. In 1992, some relatives overseas sent $1,000 and she and her husband, children and two sisters moved to Nairobi. But after their money ran out, they went to Thika camp, then the Mombasa camps, where their home was set on fire three times. They received little international aid, so she began selling charcoal and food stuffs.\n\nWhen the camps closed they were relocated to Kakuma, where life was really tough: there were more fires, plus it was dangerous as there were armed men and killings, and there was less water. A relative there arranged for Rhoda’s husband to go to Canada on a spouse’s visa, as the relative’s husband. As soon as he arrived in Canada, he and his relatives sent $500 to Rhoda to move the family to Nairobi - they were worried about the risks in the refugee camp for a woman and children alone. He found work immediately and now he sends to her $350 each month, $200 for living expenses and school fees at the beginning of the month and $150 for the rent later on.\nIn addition to her seven, she looks after two of her sisters’ children. Her husband cannot send more as his job does not pay very well, but according to Rhoda, ‘he’s 10 Sometimes the money for one month is sent in two instalments, either to help the recipient to budget or because this suits the sender.\n11 Please note that all names have been changed and some details have been altered to preserve interviewees’ anonymity.\n\n6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "very good, he’s someone who is dedicated, he’s stable, he’s a father... Life could be much worse.’ It remains uncertain how, indeed if, the family will be reunited.\n\nAbdi, who was born in Mogadishu is now a successful wholesaler. He was born in the early 1980s, his father worked in the military and his mother used to sell groceries in a small shop. When the war broke out his father was killed and the fighting was very violent so his mother sent him to Ethiopia with some friends. He went to Kenya in 1994 and made great efforts to locate his dispersed relatives, travelling to the various refugee camps, sending messages through personal contacts and the BBC Somali Service programme, _Baafin_ . He finally located, though a _xawilaad_ (money transfer) agent, an uncle and sister in Norway and two cousins in the UK: ‘I got the contact telephone numbers... They were very shaken... it was a giant cry, when they found me they were very happy and they sent me an express money of happiness.’ That sum allowed him to leave Kakuma and go to Eastleigh, where he earned his living by hawking dead stock that large stores needed to shift. He bought the stock at cost price and retained any profit.\n\nA year later, once he had proved that he was working hard, his uncle and sister decided to send a substantial sum. He received around $2,400 in instalments over the course of two years. He developed a wholesale business, sourcing goods from the Middle East, Asia and the Far East and supplying stores in Eastleigh. His relatives sometimes ask him for particular items, usually traditional crafts or gold, so he often sends goods when people he knows travel to Europe. His relatives there support his mother in Somalia, but he sometimes also helps out.\n\nAbdiwali, a former teacher, lived in the camps for many years before coming to Nairobi. With his monthly income of KSh 8,000 (about $105) [12], he could not afford to bring his wife and six children to join him, so they remain in Dadaab. He tries to send around $25 a month to his wife to supplement their rations and her KSh 3,000 teacher’s incentive. He also tries to bring money, clothes and other items that they need when he goes back to the camps. Very occasionally, he or his wife receive some money from relatives overseas. He found that “if I have a problem today, for example road accident or maybe I’m arrested, then people will contribute money to solve my problems...Not only in Nairobi. These people will communicate to those who are outside, they will say this person has that problem, he’s admitted to hospital, he’s [in] a very serious condition. Then they collect money... The first people who will support me is my sub-clan in Nairobi. Then if they are not able to solve at home, then they contribute outside...” Mahamoud is a shopkeeper in Eastleigh with a young family. He was born in the late 1970s in Beled Weyne. The family was comfortably off and after the war broke out he ran a café with his mother and brothers. His uncle was by that time living in Nairobi, but maintained close contact with Mahamoud’s mother, via the _taar._ She told him how badly things were going in Somalia.\n\nThe uncle paid for Mahamoud and his younger brother to come to live with him in Eastleigh. Mahamoud was happy to go, as he wanted to help his mother and ‘take some of the load’. At that time his uncle was doing well; he had a retail business and was receiving assistance from relatives abroad, but in the mid-1990s this assistance 12 Exchange rate: 0.01322 US$ to 1 KSh (1 March 2005) 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "dried up and the business was deteriorating. Mahamoud and his brother turned the business around and he is now pretty comfortably off, although he does not receive any remittances. He is able to send $50-$100 to his mother and brothers in Beled Weyne whenever business is bad or a relative falls sick.\n\nThese cases exemplify four key points. First, for people like Rhoda, receiving remittances is their primary or only livelihood strategy. For example, Saad, a former civil servant, received $250 from his sons and daughters in the United States each month to look after his wife and other children while he waited to be resettled in the US. These were regular stipends to cover living expenses. Within family groups it is not unexpected that some members rely on others to provide for them. Most regular stipends come from close relatives, reflecting a traditional relationship of support, for example, husbands supporting wives and children, or adult children supporting elderly parents. Thus, often emigration and remitting can be seen as the main livelihood strategy for the family unit in question. [13] Second, for other recipients, remittances are combined with other livelihood strategies. As Abdiwali’s case illustrated, some refugees solicit remittances in response to particular crises, for example, to help pay living expenses when other livelihood strategies collapsed, or to address health or legal crises. Other people have jobs or ran their own business, but also received remittances, or another member of the family did.\n\nFor example, Hussein, a father of ten, worked in the mornings in a friend’s shop for KSh100-300 each day, but his family’s main source of income was the $300 per month that they received in remittances. However, in general it was not common for people with regular income to receive regular remittances as well: even if they had relatives overseas, funds would be directed to more needy family members.\n\nHashi, a scholarship student in his twenties, had a sister in Canada, three aunts and three uncles in the US, an uncle in the UK, and many cousins abroad, but explained that he did not receive any regular support. “It’s nonsense to support someone who can support himself so I wasn’t really getting regular money... But... if I ask them, if I tell them there is this or that issue, in that case they send... I said that I wanted to start a course, in that case I asked. Such cases... You don’t need from them regularly... So when you need support they will support you very happily.” In other instances remittances were not expected to fulfil any narrowly economic function, but rather were gifts, either sent on a special occasion (for example, Ramadan, a wedding or a birth), or as a spontaneous act of kindness.\n\nThird, remittances were also often triggered to finance a particular livelihood-related project. The major example here was when people ask for money to establish a business. Some of the more wealthy Somalis arrived in Eastleigh with cash in hand or saved in foreign bank accounts and made investments. But most people lost assets in the civil war – homes and their contents, land and crops, businesses, money in accounts (when the banking system collapsed), cash (robbed or used up in the course of displacement), and gold (sold by women to raise funds). Moreover, in the camps they were deprived of gainful employment and in Eastleigh informal sector wages 13 This is commonly the perspective brought to bear in labour migration contexts, although here too, the sedentarist bias of development studies can tend to obscure this (Bakewell 2007).\n\n8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "were usually low. It was hard to save up money to invest. Thus loans or gifts from local and overseas relatives are a key part of the history of many of the businesses in Eastleigh.\n\nAbdi’s case illustrates several points regarding diaspora support for businesses in Eastleigh. There is often more than one ‘investor’, and the group may include local as well as overseas relatives. Remittances for investment are usually sent in instalments and distinguished from regular subsistence transfers. People do not usually ‘save up’ remittances. A hard-working independent reputation helps to mobilize contributions as two businessmen explained: You know... people [are] going out [to other countries], maybe I’m going there and I meet his relative [points to his friend], and they say, what’s he doing that guy, and I say, he’s a good man, he’s working, so they will be happy. Even the people outside is looking for information... so they trying to add some money to establish him....\nThey like the person who normally works, they don’t like somebody they are giving _biil_ [14] ... _Friend:_ Endless _biil_ ! _Interviewee:_ Yeah, endless. So they like somebody who’s working. So they normally look in the family, who is very active. And they pick up the person who is very active who can generate a business and then they give some money.\n\nLike I tell them I want to start a business, I ask them for support...\nNow, the relatives over there will consult each other and contribute some money, each one some amount... Maybe you are sent about $2,000, $3,000, you start the business. If you are seen to be hardworking, they might even send you more.\n\nAs these speakers hint, starting a business is seen by those overseas as an alternative to sending regular remittances, a way to help people provide for themselves and, quite possibly, as time goes on, help out other family members too. Hashi explained: One thing that is becoming quite common these days is that relatives instead of sending you regular money decide to engage you in an activity. They get together some resources and they ask if there is anything you can do, if you can do tailoring, anything, work in a shop. Once they see what you can do, they’ll send you a good amount to start that business... So we’ve moving away from this dependency, it’s not really going to be around much longer...\n\nLast but not least, despite this expectation, many business attempts – diaspora-backed and otherwise - flounder, leading to relapsed reliance on remittances, other family assistance, or aid. Alternatively, the business may not be successful immediately, and they may continue to call on support from overseas to supplement their earnings.\nMuch depends on the resources available to invest, the economic viability of the activity, entrepreneurial skill and luck, and the personal and clan connections of the individual.\n\n14 _Biil_ is a catch-all term for living expenses, which is often used as a term for a regular remittance.\n\n9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Thus, incoming remittances may be a primary or supplementary livelihood strategy, and they may be used to deal with particular crises or to fund specific projects. But the fourth key point illustrated by the cases above is that there is also _outgoing_ remittance traffic: a minority of Somalis in Eastleigh also send money to Somalia and to the refugee camps. While smaller than international flows, regional remittances are important, particularly for the turbulent southern Somali region, which still has a substantial regional refugee diaspora. Some people remit out of their wages, or business income, like Mohamed, Abdiwali and Abdi. Other people receive money from relatives overseas or from other household members and send it on to relatives in the camps or in Somalia. For example, Saad, who relied on regular remittances from his children in the US, would send around $100 every two to four months to his parents and siblings who are nomads in Sanaag. Maryan, a housewife, explained that sometimes her husband, an import-export trader, gives her $50 to send to her mother in Kismayo and she tries to send perfume or clothes whenever someone she knows goes there.\n\nBefore turning to the issue of mobility patterns, it is important to mention that some interviewees felt that relying mainly on remittances was negative, for example: ‘it takes away the feeling of... the need to be self-sufficient. It takes away your pride to be dependent on someone abroad for all your needs.’ But it is also important to remember, as illustrated above, that in many cases remitting occurred between close family members where co-reliance was seen as entirely normal – and to bear in mind that the strong Somali tradition of mutual support in extended families and clans means that a wider circle of relatives may be reasonably called on for assistance than in many other contexts.\n\nBesides, what constitutes ‘normal’ relationships and patterns of economic reliance is affected by protracted exile, the fluid and unpredictable patterns of refugee resettlement and the fact that many people working overseas are able quite easily to send what are substantial amounts by Nairobi standards. Moreover, many recipients found it hard to see alternatives, given the policy of containing refugees and giving them such limited economic rights. Finally, people often saw their reliance as a temporary phase, explaining that the remittances were to tide them over while finding work; that they were being supporting while studying; or that they were waiting to emigrate.\n\n**Remittances and mobility patterns**\n\nBeyond shaping people’s livelihoods in Eastleigh, remittances often intertwine with mobility to and from Nairobi, as the cases above illustrated. Interviewees’ decisions to leave Somalia were commonly prompted by the killing of relatives, often parents or siblings, in the early 1990s. During displacement, families were often split up, with parents allocating children to the care of relatives, particularly their siblings, aunts and uncles, where this seemed best for their security and welfare. This is quite common in Somali culture, but in the process of displacement the shuttling of people between households (in Somalia, in the refugee camps, and in urban areas) became a more urgent and frequent strategy for survival.\n\nThis regional mobility is often facilitated by someone sending money from abroad.\nPeople still leave Somalia, largely in response to the insecurity in the south. Leaving 10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "overland is hazardous and where possible people prefer to travel on _qaad_ or commercial flights, in which case the flight and necessary documents have to be paid for. People also have good reasons for wanting to leave the refugee camps for Nairobi: to avoid the harsh conditions (heat, scarce rations, recurrent sickness among their children, risk of rape and violence); to access better educational opportunities and health facilities; to find work and build a different future for themselves and their families; and to get in contact with relatives abroad with a view to resettlement.\nTravelling from the camps to Nairobi can be a costly and risky trip for those without proper documents. As there is the risk of ambush and attack by bandits, most refugees prefer to travel by the main road, but are frequently subjected en route to police detention and extortion or return to the camps, incurring extra costs that sometimes trigger requests to relatives overseas for assistance.\n\nOnce in Nairobi, it can take a while to start earning your living: in the interim, relatives often help out – those overseas with cash and those locally by providing somewhere to stay, food and sometimes work. There is a group of people whose presence in Eastleigh is contingent on receiving remittances, otherwise they could not afford to live there and would have to return to the camps. Thus, Rhoda moved to the city with money from her husband overseas, motivated by a mixture of health and security concerns. Conversely, some come to Nairobi intending to contact relatives overseas in order to secure assistance – as telephone, internet and money transfer services are more widely available in the city, at competitive rates.\n\nMoreover, households receiving remittances are often less likely to fragment, with parents able to provide for all their children rather than sending them away to relatives, and able to expand, by taking in relatives, from the camps, and from Somalia, particularly siblings or their children, and often subletting rooms to others.\nIn a fluid and sometimes hazardous economic setting, such solidarity is an important cultural and economic asset.\n\nThe second key point is that remittances also intertwine with mobility beyond the region. Many people come to Nairobi to try to arrange resettlement in the West, often with the heartfelt wish to be reunited with much-missed children, husbands and wives, and parents resettled overseas. The circumscribed legal and economic existence of Somali refugees in Kenya is another major motivation: Many people were supposed to make money here, but the government... Even me myself, if I get a permit to stay in Nairobi...\nthen I can make money, I can try to sustain my own life... [but] there is no way... my last incentive was $50 per month... When I was _teaching_ ... Not enough for myself alone, not enough for the family.\n\nI would love to export myself! Otherwise, you know the suffering here. You can’t find jobs, you can’t find any other opportunities...\npersonally, the only thing I can do is... community service. But that will not pay me much to take care of the family. It is difficult.\n\nWhile idealized images of the West certainly abound, the basic material inequalities are staggering and undeniable. Indeed, remittances seem to have a potent ‘demonstration effect’ for the benefits of migration: 11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Once they are here, they are not very useful, they are not very productive, they’re just consumers, because there’s no source of employment, there’s no way they can find money, so they have to ask for money every time... So, it is better for us to go to the countries where there are opportunities, the greener grasses, so we eat that grass and send some of it to our relatives back home!\n\nThere are three main channels of onward migration to the West. First, there is family reunion or sponsorship. Conditions for family reunion vary across countries, but it is generally an option for spouses and children under 21, but often requires a financial guarantee of some kind. The second channel is through official resettlement programmes aimed at resettling individuals or groups deemed to face particular persecution. There were around 4,000 refugees resettled through UNHCR in 2006 (UNHCR 2007).\n\nThird, there are other channels often termed ‘irregular’, sometimes piggy-backing on elements of the two ‘official’ methods outlined above, sometimes involving brokers ( _mukhalis_ ). Sperl (2001) points out that originally UNHCR used ‘irregular’ only to describe unlawful methods of entry, but the term ‘irregular mover’, carrying pejorative overtones, is increasingly applied to all refugees leaving a first country of asylum. He challenges this: ‘What is “irregular” about people who seek to leave an often de facto hopeless situation in a camp or a slum, in order to seek a better future through education, employment or resettlement?’ (Sperl 2001: 26).\n\nAlthough viewed by governments as illegal, ‘irregular’ migration has a rather everyday quality when viewed from the streets of Eastleigh. Against the background of the constraints of life as refugees in Kenya, arranging to be smuggled to a richer country is seen by those involved as entirely acceptable behaviour. In contrast, going abroad and earning a good living but failing to help relatives back in Kenya or Somalia is seen as unacceptable behaviour. According to UNHCR, ‘irregular secondary movement... may... be a symptom of protracted hopelessness among longstanding refugee populations,’ (UNHCR 2004: 5). Put another way, this onward movement can be part of a quest for self-reliance and rights.\n\nThe diaspora often plays a key role in facilitating and financing resettlement in the West. First, they provide information, are sometimes able to request reunion, and deal with paperwork or other arrangements from abroad, and assist on arrival. Second, they often meet the costs of emigration, which can range from nil – on some resettlement programmes - to around $5,000+ for alternative arrangements. In both official and informal emigration arrangements, Nairobi is a key location –where people can meet, make arrangements through social networks, access brokers, and attend interviews at the UNHCR and the Joint Voluntary Agency (JVA) which resettles refugees in the US. A third common element is to send money so that relatives can come and stay in Nairobi while making their arrangements.\n\nYet while many people come to Eastleigh with _buufis_ (longing for resettlement, explored in detail by Horst 2006), those doing successful business are less likely to be affected. Moreover, many people come to Nairobi to arrange resettlement, but months gradually turn into years.\n\n12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "For example, Fadumo, a young woman originally from the north east of Somalia, now has a business in a market in Eastleigh. When the civil war broke out and the relatives she was living with fled, she was forced into a marriage at a young age for protection. Later her husband subsequently left for Europe and cut off contact with her and her first child. An aunt helped her to come to Nairobi, so that she could be resettled in the US with the aunt’s family. But she was rejected during the screening process and was left high and dry in Eastleigh with her daughter, with no resources and few contacts. She made friends with women working in the market and began selling clothes for them on credit to other women she knew, gradually building up the funds for her own business. She keeps in touch with her parents, who are pastoralists, via the _taar_ (radio operator), and every four months or so, when she is able, she sends them $50 or $100. She is not a registered refugee and has no prospects of resettlement.\n\n**Repercussions in the wider urban economy**\n\nBeyond the direct effects on those receiving remittances and their immediate families, which was the main focus of the fieldwork, remittances have some indirect effects in the wider urban economy, in terms of social differentiation and economic activity.\n\nFirst, remittances can affect relative socio-economic statuses. The task of assessing the impact of remittances on social differentiation in Eastleigh is particularly complex both because the Somali refugee presence is relatively new and transient, and for some their presence in Eastleigh is entirely contingent on remittances. Moreover, their fortunes are likely to be particularly fluid compared with a more established population. The socio-economic status of individual refugees has anyway changed dramatically since 1991 as many were dispossessed of assets in Somalia, and, in the words of one interviewee: ‘Up till now, we have not regained the life we had in Somalia.’ Thus, both the reference group and the baseline for comparison are unclear.\n\nHowever, on the whole, refugees in Nairobi are more likely to be from urban than rural backgrounds, and those benefiting from remittances mainly come from originally comfortable families able to finance long-distance emigration of a close relative to the West. People who receive regular remittances, although often living frugally, are visibly more comfortable than those eking out a living at the harder end of the informal economy. According to one resident: “You see a difference between those who receive remittances and those who do not – even in simple terms, those who receive usually dress better. They can afford to send their children to good schools. Other people live in much more critical situations.” While it is a place of both deprivation and entrepreneurial wealth, Eastleigh is a long way from being the poorest district in Nairobi, and there are other parts of Eastlands and the slum settlements where people live much harder lives. Remittances undoubtedly make a difference by providing for a number of families who might otherwise be competing for low-wage jobs in the informal economy. Moreover, the benefits of receiving remittances are to a degree re-circulated through local family and social family networks, building the social capital of recipients.\n\nA second wider repercussion of remittances involves the effects of the spending and investment of this money by recipients in the local economy. In contrast with the 13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "outward-bound traffic of remittances by Kenyan city residents to rural relatives and investment in their rural homes, Somali remittances are largely in-bound traffic.\nMoney transfer operators usually pay remittances and trade transfers out to recipients in hard currency, which is then converted into Kenyan Shillings. They are spent in the city economy, indeed mainly in Eastleigh as many refugees tend to avoid going into town, contributing to high levels of local demand for goods and services, fuelling business expansion on a considerable scale.\n\nMany of the businesses meeting this demand are Somali businesses, initiated with the help of relatives overseas. By 2005, a total of 2,800 business people, mainly Somalis, were registered with Eastleigh Business Community (EBC), which was established in 1999. Eastleigh is increasingly attracting customers from all over Nairobi, and becoming an important part of the wider city economy.\n\nMore specifically, there is a thriving business in providing services specifically of use to Somali and other refugees, including money transfer and exchange, travel agencies, telephone and internet bureaux, language schools, many of which are meeting a primarily remittance-driven demand. Money transfer is the most obvious example: there are numerous money transfer operators, popularly known as _xawilaad_ in Eastleigh.\n\nIn Kenya, officially only banks or money transfer operators in partnership with banks are licensed to transfer money. Western Union offices are everywhere, but it has made little headway with the Somali refugees who tend to use Somali operators, some of whom have forex licences and others operate entirely in the informal market. [15] Money exchange is also in great demand in Eastleigh, in part because many remittances are collected in dollars and may then be exchanged into Kenyan Shillings.\nThere is a large informal market with numerous small-scale operators.\n\nAnother example of making business out of recipients is language schools. For example, Yusuf came to Kenya as a boy and grew up in the camps. He then came to Eastleigh and borrowed money from relatives living locally to establish one of the district’s many one-room private schools for adults. By the third month he had 50 students, learning English, Arabic, and Maths while trying to arrange onward migration to the West or the Middle East. He had also begun to repay his relatives: ‘So life’s not now bad, it’s moving. To me, I get no other help from like, UK or from America, but I get indirectly because the students I have at school, they get assistance from their relatives in the UK, Europe or America or elsewhere.’\n\n**Conclusions**\n\nMany people displaced from Somalia and living a protracted exile in Kenya have selfsettled in Nairobi’s Eastleigh district, defying the Kenyan government’s attempts to contain the refugee population in remote areas, not content to wait for elusive durable solutions. The newcomers have had a significant impact on the urban landscape and social and economic relations in Eastleigh.\n\n15 Consultations with businesspeople and international agencies (February 2005) and\n[www.centralbank.go.ke](http://www.centralbank.go.ke/) 14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "While Nairobi is a distant outpost from the regions of the Horn of Africa that they have historically occupied, it has become a crossroads for displaced people from Somalia. It is an important hub in Somalis’ increasingly global information, trade, finance and family networks. For many, Eastleigh is a staging post to an uncertain future. It is a place where, by connecting into wider social networks, opportunities might arise. A minority, it seems – and generally people with secure status in Kenya or business interests - actually make a conscious decision to settle there. For many, though, a few months turn into a few years, passing the time working, strategizing, or simply waiting.\n\nWhile many of the uses of remittances in this context were similar to those in the countries of origin, remittances were also used by people to deal with the specific problems of protracted and unresolved displacement. For example, people are moving from Somalia and the camps to Nairobi, often with the help of funds from relatives in the region or overseas. Women with children sometimes receive money from relatives overseas to relocate from the camps to the city because of fears for their safety.\n\nOnce in Nairobi, some people’s living expenses are covered by people overseas. By investing larger remittances in businesses, some refugees are able to provide for themselves and often subsequently assist others locally, in the camps or in Somalia.\nBut interviewees’ investment of remittances was limited to the informal sector and constrained by their ambiguous politico-legal status in Nairobi. Sometimes people requested money to secure release from police detention. Remittances and other forms of diaspora support are also intertwined with patterns of onward movement whereby refugees seek a new life overseas.\n\nAll this has consequences in terms of reducing reliance on international aid in the refugee camps. An unknown number of displaced people from Somalia never registered with UNHCR sometimes because they received diaspora assistance and were able to stay in the city. Receiving remittances allowed many people to leave the camps. It is well-known that those leaving the camps routinely give their cards to another family, so that they can benefit from the rations, before the card is eventually cancelled (Hyndman 2000; Kibreab 2004). It seems likely that a portion of Eastleigh’s refugee population would have to return to the camps if they did not receive remittances to cover their living expenses. Thus, remittances in many cases partially or fully release refugees from the aid relationship.\n\nYet there is a strong sense of contingency about remittances as a livelihood strategy among recipients in Eastleigh. They tended to be incorporated into the remittance process in a secondary or supplementary role. A minority of Somali people in Eastleigh - often those occupied in successful trading activities or those who themselves receive remittances – send remittances to Somalia or to the refugee camps.\nBut they are less often able to completely cover the recipients’ needs, and if there are relatives _dibadaha_ (outside), these are usually the main port of call for assistance.\n\nTurning to recipients in Eastleigh, if there are other relatives in serious need in Somalia, then their needs may be prioritised. Most regular recipients in Eastleigh did not expect to continue to receive remittances in the long term. Even people relying on remittances as a primary source of income, whose sender had a strong social responsibility to support them, usually had a plan to emigrate, or find a job, or start a 15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "business. Few people saw their current situation – in Eastleigh, relying on remittances\n\n- as a feasible long-term status quo.\n\nWhile undoubtedly greatly ameliorating the living conditions of many refugees, the extent to which remittances, in this context, are generating sustainable livelihoods is in doubt. The general view is that ‘a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capability and assets both now and in the future’ (DFID 1999: 1). Although remittances clearly responded to crises experienced by recipients in many instances, often the transfers left people no more capable of dealing with future crises themselves than they were before. The major exception was when remittances were invested in providing an independent livelihood, by establishing a business.\n\nThere is a growing recognition of the role played by resettled refugees and labour migrants in the welfare of refugees affected by protracted displacement (Jacobsen 2006; Sperl 2001; UNHCR 2006; Van Hear 2003). Van Hear asks whether ‘...transnationalism may in itself be a “durable solution” for conditions of displacement – or at least an “enduring” solution. This might mean considering the encouragement or promotion of transnationalism,’ (Van Hear 2003:15). According to UNHCR’s 2006 report _The State of the World’s Refugees_, UNHCR has been considering the possibility of encouraging migration for work as a means for refugees to provide for themselves.\n\nIt is important to underline, as Van Hear does, that refugees engaging in transnational activities have not necessarily found a ‘durable solution’ to their original displacement. For example, a Somali man working in the Gulf, with a permit to work as a labourer may send money back to help maintain his family who are _prima facie_ refugees in Kenya.\n\nWhile this can certainly improve the welfare of the recipients, and the arrangement may indeed be ‘enduring’, it is clear this is not a solution to their legal predicament in the way that repatriation, local integration or resettlement in a third country can be.\nNeither party has regained in their countries of residence the rights denied them in their country of origin. Indeed, the remittance economy is in some respects maintained by immigration and asylum restrictions that can separate close family members.\n\nMoreover, in contexts of protracted and unresolved displacement, it is hard for refugees to maximize the potential value of any remittance funds that they receive.\nFurthermore, the capacity of resettled refugees and labour migrants to offer support to family back home may be greatly limited (Lindley 2007b; Riak Akuei 2005). In sum, while remittances are an important aspect of refugees’ livelihoods, it is critical that we continue to campaign for better legal security and recognition of the rights of displaced people in Kenya and elsewhere.\n\n16", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**REFERENCES**\n\nAfrican Population and Health Research Center (2002) _Population and Health_ _Dynamics in Nairobi’s Informal Settlements,_ Nairobi: African Population and Health Research Center.\nAnderson, D.M. (2005) ‘‘Yours in Struggle for Majimbo’. Nationalism and the Party Politics of Decolonization in Kenya, 1955-64’, _Journal of Contemporary_ _History_, 40(3): 547-564.\nAnderson, D.M. (2002) ‘Vigilantes, violence and the politics of public order in Kenya’, _African Affairs_, 101: 531-555.\nBakewell (2007) ‘Keeping Them in Their Place: the ambivalent relationship between development and migration in Africa’, African Studies Seminar, University of Oxford, 10 [th] May 2007.\nCampbell, E.H. (2005) _Formalizing the informal economy: Somali refugee and_ _migrant trade networks in Nairobi_, Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration Global Migration Perspectives No. 47.\nCrisp, J. (1999) _A state of insecurity: a political economy of violence in refugee-_ _populated areas of Kenya_ Geneva: UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No.16.\nCrisp, J. (2003). No Solution in Sight: the Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa. Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper No.\n68. San Diego: University of California.\nDFID (1999) Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets. London: DFID Dick, S. (2002) ‘Liberiatns in Ghana: living without humanitarian assistance’ _UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research_ No. 57. Geneva: UNHCR Farah, N. (2000) _Yesterday, tomorrow: voices from the Somali diaspora_, London: Cassell.\nGimode, E.A. (2001) ‘An Anatomy of Violent Crime and Insecurity in Kenya: The Case of Nairobi 1985-1999’, _Africa Development_, 26(1 & 2): 295-335.\nGoldsmith, P. (1997) ‘The Somali Impact on Kenya 1990-1993: The View From Outside the Camps’, in H.M.Adam and R.Ford (eds.) _Mending Rips in the Sky:_ _Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century_, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press: 461-483.\nHorst, C. (2006). _Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope with Refugee Life in_ _the Dadaab Camps of Kenya_ . Oxford: Berghahn Books.\nHuman Rights Watch (2002) _Hidden in Plain View: Refugees Living Without_ _Protection in Nairobi and Kampala_, New York: Human Rights Watch.\nHyndman, J. (2000) _Managing Displacement. Refugees and the Politics of_ _Humanitarianism_, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.\nJacobsen, K. (2005) _The Economic Life of Refugees_, Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.\nKibreab, G. (1993) ‘The Myth of Dependency among Camp Refugees in Somalia 1979-1989’, _Journal of Refugee Studies_ 6(4):321-349.\nLewis, I.M. (2002) A Modern History Of Somalia - Nation And State In The Horn of Africa, London: Longman, 4th Edition.\nLindley, A. (2006a) The dynamics and effects of remittances in insecure settings: the Somali case, DPhil Thesis, Department of International Development, University of Oxford.\n\n17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Lindley, A. (2007a) ‘Remittances in Fragile Settings: A Somali Case Study,’ Households in Conflict Network Working Paper No. 27. Brighton: University of Sussex.\nLindley, A. (2007b) ‘The Early Morning Phonecall: Remittances from a Refugee Diaspora Perspective,’ Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper No.47. Oxford: University of Oxford.\nMilner, J. (2006) ‘Somali refugees in Kenya: Abdication and containment’, in _The_ _politics of asylum in Africa: the cases of Kenya, Tanzania and Guinea_, DPhil Thesis, Department of International Development, University of Oxford.\nMoret, J., S. Baglioni and D. Efionayi-Mäder (2005) _The Path of Somali Refugees_ _into Exile: A Comparative Analysis of Secondary Movements and Policy_ _Responses_ . SFM Studies No. 46. Geneva: Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies Pérouse de Montclos, M and P. Kagwanja (2000) ‘Refugee Camps of Cities? The Socio-economic Dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma Camps in Northern Kenya.’ _Journal of Refugee Studies_, 13(2): 205:222 Riak Akuei, S. (2005) _Remittances as unforeseen burdens: the livelihoods and social_ _obligations of Sudanese refugees_, Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration, Global Migration Perspectives No.18 Savage, K. and Harvey, P. (Eds.) (2007) _Remittances during crises: Implications for_ _humanitarian response_ . Humanitarian Policy Group Report No.25. London: Overseas Development Institute.\nSirola, S. (2001) ‘A Comparative Study of the Psychosocial Situation of the East African Refugees in Kenya and Finland’, in M.S.Lilius (ed.) _Variations on the_ _Theme of Somaliness_, Turku: Centre for Continuing Education, Åbo Akademi University: 336-345.\nSperl, S. (2001) Evaluation of UNHCR’s policy on refugees in urban areas. A case study review of Cairo. Geneva: UNHCR Evaluation Policy Analysis Unit Turton, D. (1972) ‘Somali Resistance to Colonial Rule and the Development of Somali Political Activity in Kenya 1893-1960’, _Journal of African History_, 13(1): 119-143.\nUNHCR (2004) Protracted Refugee Situations Standing Committee 30 [th] Meeting, 10 [th] June 2004. EC/54/SC/CRP/14.\nUNHCR (2006). _The State of the World’s Refugees: Human displacement in the new_ _millennium._ Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nUNHCR (2007) _2006 Global Trends_, Geneva: UNHCR.\nUSCR (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants) (1997) _World Refugee Survey_ _1997_ . Washington DC: USCR.\nVan Hear, N. (2002) ‘Sustaining societies under strain: remittances as a form of transnational exchange in Sri Lanka and Ghana’, in N.Al-Ali and K.Koser (eds.) _New Approaches to Migration?_ London: Routledge.\nVan Hear, N. (2003) From durable solutions to transnational relations: home and exile among refugee diasporas. New Issues in Refugee Research No. 83.\nGeneva: UNHCR.\nVerdirame, G. (1999) ‘Human Rights and Refugees: The Case of Kenya’, _Journal of_ _Refugee Studies_, 12(1): 54-77 World Bank (2006) _Global Economic Prospects. Economic Implications of_ _Remittances and Migration_, Washington: World Bank.\n\n18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**\n\nReport No: PAD5029 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective April 27, 2022) Currency Unit = Jordanian dinar (JOD) JOD 1 = US$1.41 US$ 1 = JOD 0.71 FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 Regional Vice President: Ferid Belhaj Country Director: Saroj Kumar Jha Regional Director: Ayat Soliman Practice Manager: Marianne Grosclaude Task Team Leader(s): [Svetlana Edmeades, Mohamed Hassan Abdulkader, ] Tobias Baedeker", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ACG Anti-Corruption Guidelines ARDI Agriculture Resilience, Value Chain Development and Innovation Program CBJ Central Bank of Jordan CCDR Country Climate and Development Report COVID Coronavirus disease CPI Consumer Price Index DA Designated Account DFIL Disbursement and Financial Information Letter E&S Environmental and Social ECT Emergency Cash Transfers EHS Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines ESF Environmental and Social Framework ESCP Environmental and Social Commitment Plan ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework ESIA Economic and Social Impact Assessment EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FM Financial Management FO Financial Officer GDP Gross Domestic Product GFMIS Government Financial Management Information System GFRP Global Food Crisis Response Program GIIP Good International Industry Practice GOJ Government of Jordan GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism IFRs Interim Financial Reports INT Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) IMF International Monetary Fund JACPA Jordan Association of Certified Public Accountants LMP Labor Management Plan MENA Middle East and North Africa MOA Ministry of Agriculture MOF Ministry of Finance MOITS Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply MOPIC Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation MOSD Ministry of Social Development mVAM mobile Vulnerability, Analysis and Monitoring NAF National Aid Fund OHS Occupational Health and Safety OP/BP Operational Policies/Bank Procedures PCT Project Coordination Team PDO Project Development Objective PforR Program for Results", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Government Financial Management Information System", "confidence": 0.6468312740325928}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "POM Project Operations Manual PPSD Project Procurement Strategy for Development SEA/SH Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment SEP Stakeholder Engagement Plan SMEs Small- and Medium Enterprises SSN Social Safety Net STEP Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement TA Technical Assistance TOR Terms of Reference UN United Nations UNHCR The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees US United States US$ United States Dollar WA Withdrawal Application WBG World Bank Group WFP World Food Programme yoy Year-on-year", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n**DATASHEET ........................................................................................................................... 1**\n\n**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT ...................................................................................................... 6**\n\nA. Country Context................................................................................................................................ 6 B. Sectoral and Institutional Context .................................................................................................... 8 C. Relevance to Higher Level Objectives ............................................................................................. 12\n\n**II.** **PROJECT DESCRIPTION .................................................................................................. 15**\n\nA. Project Development Objective ..................................................................................................... 15 B. Project Components ....................................................................................................................... 15 C. Project Beneficiaries ....................................................................................................................... 20 D. Results Chain .................................................................................................................................. 20 E. Rationale for Bank Involvement and Role of Partners ................................................................... 22 F. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design .................................................................... 22\n\n**III.** **IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS ............................................................................ 24**\n\nA. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements .......................................................................... 24 B. Results Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements......................................................................... 24 C. Sustainability ................................................................................................................................... 25\n\n**IV.** **PROJECT APPRAISAL SUMMARY ................................................................................... 25**\n\nA. Technical, Economic and Financial Analysis (if applicable) ............................................................ 25 B. Fiduciary .......................................................................................................................................... 27 C. Legal Operational Policies ............................................................................................................... 31 D. Environmental and Social ............................................................................................................... 31\n\n**GRIEVANCE REDRESS SERVICES ............................................................................................ 33**\n\n**KEY RISKS ............................................................................................................................ 33**\n\n**RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND MONITORING .......................................................................... 36**\n\n**ANNEX 1: Implementation Arrangements and Support Plan .......................................... 44**\n\n**ANNEX 2: Financial Management .................................................................................. 45**\n\n**ANNEX 3: Summary of Wheat and Barley Value Chains ................................................. 53**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) DATASHEET\n\n**BASIC INFORMATION**\n~~BASIC~~ ~~INFO~~ ~~TABLE~~ Country(ies) Project Name Jordan Emergency Food Security Project Environmental and Social Risk Project ID Financing Instrument Process Classification Investment Project P178936 Substantial Financing\n\n**Financing & Implementation Modalities**\n\nUrgent Need or Capacity Constraints (FCC)\n\n[ ] Multiphase Programmatic Approach (MPA) [ ] Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC)\n\n[ ] Series of Projects (SOP) [ ] Fragile State(s)\n\n[ ] Performance-Based Conditions (PBCs) [ ] Small State(s)\n\n[ ] Financial Intermediaries (FI) [ ] Fragile within a non-fragile Country\n\n[ ] Project-Based Guarantee [ ] Conflict\n\n[ ] Deferred Drawdown [✓] Responding to Natural or Man-made Disaster\n\n[ ] Alternate Procurement Arrangements (APA) [ ] Hands-on Enhanced Implementation Support (HEIS) Expected Approval Date Expected Closing Date 13-May-2022 31-Dec-2024 Bank/IFC Collaboration No\n\n**Proposed Development Objective(s)**\n\nTo ensure the availability of basic grains and mitigate the impact of high commodity prices in Jordan Page 1 of 54", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936)\n\n**Components**\n\n**Component Name** **Cost (US$, millions)**\n\nSecuring food and feed to reduce short term vulnerability to supply shocks 460.00 Addressing food security to mitigate commodity risks 30.00\n\n**Organizations**\n\nBorrower: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) Implementing Agency: Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply (MoITS)\n\n**PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)**\n\n**SUMMARY-NewFin1**\n\n**Total Project Cost** 490.00\n\n**Total Financing** 490.00\n\n**of which IBRD/IDA** 490.00\n\n**Financing Gap** 0.00\n\n**DETAILS-NewFinEnh1**\n\n**World Bank Group Financing**\n\nInternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 490.00\n\n**Expected Disbursements (in US$, Millions)**\n\n**WB Fiscal Year** 2022 2023 2024 2025\n\n**Annual** 0.50 480.00 8.00 1.50\n\n**Cumulative** 0.50 480.50 488.50 490.00\n\n**INSTITUTIONAL DATA**\n\n**Practice Area (Lead)** **Contributing Practice Areas**\n\nPage 2 of 54", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "PROJECT FINANCING DATA", "confidence": 0.18776777386665344}], "vague_data": [{"text": "INSTITUTIONAL DATA", "confidence": 0.35463035106658936}, {"text": "PROJECT FINANCING DATA", "confidence": 0.34705275297164917}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) Agriculture and Food Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation\n\n**Climate Change and Disaster Screening**\n\nThis operation has been screened for short and long-term climate change and disaster risks\n\n**SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL (SORT)**\n\n**Risk Category** **Rating**\n\n1. Political and Governance ⚫ Moderate\n\n2. Macroeconomic ⚫ Substantial 3. Sector Strategies and Policies ⚫ Substantial 4. Technical Design of Project or Program ⚫ Moderate 5. Institutional Capacity for Implementation and Sustainability ⚫ Substantial 6. Fiduciary ⚫ Substantial 7. Environment and Social ⚫ Substantial 8. Stakeholders ⚫ Substantial 9. Other 10. Overall ⚫ Substantial\n\n**COMPLIANCE**\n\n**Policy**\nDoes the project depart from the CPF in content or in other significant respects?\n\n[ ] Yes [✓] No Does the project require any waivers of Bank policies?\n\n[✓] Yes [ ] No Page 3 of 54", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL", "confidence": 0.2627715766429901}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) Have these been approved by Bank management?\n\n[✓] Yes [ ] No Is approval for any policy waiver sought from the Board?\n\n[ ] Yes [✓] No\n\n**Environmental and Social Standards Relevance Given its Context at the Time of Appraisal**\n\n**E & S Standards** **Relevance**\n\nAssessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts Relevant Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure Relevant Labor and Working Conditions Relevant Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention and Management Relevant Community Health and Safety Relevant Land Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement Not Currently Relevant Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities Not Currently Relevant Not Currently Relevant Cultural Heritage Relevant Financial Intermediaries Not Currently Relevant\n\n**NOTE** : For further information regarding the World Bank’s due diligence assessment of the Project’s potential\nenvironmental and social risks and impacts, please refer to the Project’s Appraisal Environmental and Social Review Summary (ESRS).\n\n**Legal Covenants**\n\nSections and Description The Borrower, through MoITS, shall prepare by May 31, 2022 an interim Project Operations Manual (POM) for Component 1, which will also constitute a condition for disbursement of proceeds from Component 1.\n\nSections and Description Page 4 of 54", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) The Borrower shall by no later than two (2) months after the Effectiveness Date prepare a complete Project Operations Manual for both components.\n\nSections and Description The Borrower shall by no later than two (2) months after the Effectiveness Date designate a Project Steering Committee that includes representatives of MOPIC, MOF, MOITS, and Ministry of Agriculture.\n\nSections and Description The Borrower shall by no later than two (2) months after the Effectiveness Date prepare an annual work plan and budget acceptable to the World Bank.\n\n**Conditions**\n\nPage 5 of 54", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936)\n\n**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT**\n\n**A. Country Context**\n\n**1.** **Over the past decade, Jordan has faced a number of external shocks that directly affected economic**\n**growth and the economy’s ability to create enough productive jobs for its young and fast-growing population.**\nHeadwinds started with the global financial crisis in 2008 leading to a dampening of economic activity in 2009, while the accompanying policy response—including lower taxes and debt accumulation— was not enough to stimulate growth. Second, regional conflicts erupting in 2011 disrupted trade routes to key trade partners, including Turkey and the European Union (EU). For example, exports have been adversely affected by the closure of the border with Iraq in 2014. World Bank estimates show that the Syrian conflict alone has led to a 1.6 percentage point lower growth during 2010-18. [1] Moreover, Jordan experienced a large refugee influx and is currently hosting almost 1.3 million Syrians (representing almost 13 percent of the total population, of which 674,268 are registered refugees with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) [2], which has put tremendous pressure on public services, and on food security [3] . Third, the disruption of favorably priced natural gas supplies from Egypt (also in 2011), created another major shock and had a serious implication for Jordan’s energy intensive manufacturing sector, negatively impacting competitiveness [4], economic growth and public debt. [5] Fourth, the economic slowdown in Gulf countries (following depressed oil prices in 2014) led to a significant drop in external inflows. These external shocks have dampened Jordan’s growth momentum leading to persistently sluggish growth dynamics along with increased macroeconomic vulnerability.\n\n**2.** **The COVID-19 pandemic has had significant economic impact on Jordan, given the country’s small and**\n**open economy with strong linkages with the rest of the world.** Jordan’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)\ncontracted by 1.6 percent in 2020, compared to 2.0 percent growth in 2019. The pandemic has had particularly profound impacts on key sectors for the Jordanian economy, such as the service sector, including travel and tourism. Jordan’s unemployment rate, which marginally increased from 18.3 percent to 19.1 percent between 2017 and 2019, rose significantly as a result of the pandemic shock, reaching 23.2 percent in 2020. Female unemployment, which had been declining between 2017 and 2019, from 31.2 percent to 27 percent, rose sharply to 30.7 percent in 2020. Moreover, youth unemployment (15-24 years) soared from 40.6 percent in 2019 to an unprecedented high of 46.0 percent in 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic has also had severe impacts on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), which provide 52 percent of private sector employment in the country, [6] including a decline in demand, reduced supply, tightening credit conditions, and a fall in investment.\n\n**3.** **Jordan’s economy nonetheless has weathered the COVID-19 shock better than many peers.** In global\ncomparison, Jordan’s GDP contraction in 2020 remained relatively muted, in part due to the Government of Jordan 1 World Bank. 2020. _The Fallout of War: The Regional Consequences of the War in Syria_ . Washington, DC: World Bank.\n_[https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/fallout-of-war-in-syria.](https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/fallout-of-war-in-syria)_ 2 As of 31 March 2022.\n3 Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. (World Food Summit, 1996) 4 By 2015, although, the balance between NEPCO revenues and the generation cost has been restored but electricity cost had become the binding constraint to growth and product diversification. (Hausmann, R., et al., 2019. \"Jordan: The Elements of a Growth Strategy,\" CID Working Papers 346, Center for International Development at Harvard University.).\n5 Government of Jordan caped the tariff response to spare the bulk of the population from large tariff increases and produced an accumulated energy sector debt of about 18 percent of GDP, held by the Central Government and NEPCO (World Bank, 2018: “Jordan First Equitable Growth Job Creation Programmatic Development Policy Financing Project”).\n6 Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation (JLGC). June 2019.\n\nPage 6 of 54", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) (GOJ)’s timely fiscal and monetary stimuli, efficient management of the health crisis as well as a substantial improvement in terms of trade (as a result of the decline in international oil prices during 2020). In 2021, real GDP grew by 2.2 percent reflecting reasonably strong bounce back. Nevertheless, despite this turn around, high unemployment rates and unresolved structural challenges remain a concern. According to the World Bank’s Jobs Diagnostic (2019) [7] the economy needs at least six percent growth to make a dent in the unemployment rate, which is three times the level experienced since 2010. Thus, the current rate of unemployment at 23.3 percent (last quarter of 2021) and of labor force participation rate (33.5 percent total, 53.8 percent for men and 13.6 percent for women), present a sizeable challenge for Jordan. Furthermore, Jordan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have notably declined over the past decade, from 6.1 percent of GDP in 2010 to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2019—foregoing a potential source for productivity gains, dynamism, and external funding for the economy. [8]\n\n**4.** **Jordan’s economy is facing increased price pressures.** Even before the war in Ukraine, significant\ndisruptions to global supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have further affected trade, increasing the economic vulnerability of Jordan. Being an import-dependent small open economy, unfavorable changes in Jordan’s terms-of-trade have negatively impacted domestic price settings during 2021. This trend was further accentuated by the rise in global transportation costs. [9] Consequently, headline CPI inflation clocked in at an average 1.3 percent in 2021 - the highest rate in 3 years. However, in regional comparison, inflation in Jordan remained low. In 2021, the central government’s overall fiscal deficit (including grants) reached 5.7 percent of GDP, or 1.6 percent of GDP lower than 2020 and 0.4 percent of GDP below the budget target. Timely donor support, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program [10] (including program augmentation as well as front loading) have helped alleviate pressure from the external sector. At end 2021, the Central Bank of Jordan’s gross official foreign reserves reached US$19 billion or almost US$2 billion higher than the previous year.\n\n**5.** **The war in Ukraine has caused a major shock to global commodity markets and poses a major threat to**\n**global food security** . With Ukraine and the Russian Federation being major global producers of basic agricultural\ncommodities (wheat, maize, oilseeds), fertilizer and fuel, the war in Ukraine has introduced significant instability and uncertainty in global agricultural commodity, energy and fertilizer markets. The disruptions in production and trade caused by the war have pushed international prices in these markets to new all-time highs in recent months.\nThe most recent World Bank Food Security Update (April 7, 2022) highlighted that since January 2021 the agricultural price index is up 29 percent, the cereals price index 11 percent, and the export price index 64 percent.\nWheat prices retreated somewhat from the peak reached on March 7, 2022, but they are still nearly 36 percent higher than in early February 2022, before the war in Ukraine, and 60 percent higher since January 2021. Maize prices are about 20 percent above the early February level and 48 percent higher than in January 2021, while rice prices have continued to remain remarkably stable. Meanwhile, fertilizer prices surged in March 2022, up nearly 20 percent since January and almost 3 times higher compared to a year ago, whereas energy prices had surged 63.4 percent year on year.\n\n7 Winkler, Hernan; Gonzalez, Alvaro. 2019. “Jordan Jobs Diagnostic.” Jobs Series; No. 18. World Bank, Washington, DC.\n8 In 2019, FDI inflows fell to the lowest point over the past two decades, accounting for only 1.5 percent of GDP.\n9 International freight charges peaked around US$11,109 in September 2021 from US$1,500 pre-pandemic. These currently stand around US$ 9,430 (source: Bloomberg).\n10 Jordan’s fiscal adjustment remains supported by the IMF. The Third Review of the IMF EFF program was completed on December 20, 2021. This allowed IMF to disperse almost US$335 million (or cumulatively US$1.23 billion) under the program). According to the IMF, sound policies have helped maintain macroeconomic stability, while the government remains on track to narrow its fiscal deficit, and reserves remain at a comfortable level.\n\nPage 7 of 54", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Jobs Diagnostic", "confidence": 0.1055736243724823}, {"text": "World Bank Food Security Update", "confidence": 0.10479182004928589}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936)\n\n**6.** **Jordan’s fragility to external shocks and internal factors can exacerbate food security in the country.**\nJordan’s structural impediments in a context of needs for regional stability and response to imminent global risk factors arising from the war in Ukraine represent key challenges for immediate recovery. Jordan is positioned at the epicenter of one of the most volatile regions in the world. The government has consistently preserved its stability, drawing from its unique geopolitical positioning and socio-political resilience. The country has been highly exposed to exogenous shocks, particularly the spillovers from regional conflicts, including Syria, Iraq and the West Bank and Gaza, dependency on foreign aid and inflow of capital, and shifts in geopolitical relations, all of which have compounded the country’s existing vulnerabilities. Regional insecurity and any subsequent displacement of refugees into Jordan coupled with the pandemic pose a risk for the food security of the country and stress its food system. Although direct trade links with Ukraine and the Russian Federation are limited, a continuous and accelerated surge in commodity prices (especially those of wheat and barley) and stronger slowdown in global growth represent imminent downside risks to the economy and food security.\n\n**B. Sectoral and Institutional Context**\n\n**7.** **Globally and in the region, Jordan is one of the most import dependent countries for covering its**\n**national grains consumption needs.** The country is highly vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruptions in\nglobal markets for basic agricultural commodities. Jordan does not produce significant volumes of basic agricultural commodities domestically. For example, annual domestic wheat and barley production averaged 21,499 tons and 54,234 tons respectively between 2018 and 2020 compared to monthly domestic consumption levels of 90,000 tons of wheat and 80,000 tons of barley [11] . In the period 2018-2020, total annual import volumes of wheat and barley averaged 913,334 tons and 770,068 tons respectively, which amounted to an average annual import bill of US$ 227 million for wheat and US$ 177 million for barley (UN Comtrade, 2022). The Black Sea region is the principal origin for the bulk of Jordan’s grain imports (given lower freight costs compared to other origins), with the region representing 98 percent of Jordanian wheat imports and 78 percent of barley imports. Yet the supply shock caused by the war in Ukraine has changed the geopolitics and economics of grain trade where small buyers, like Jordan, are competing in a tight market with large countries and fewer suppliers, that are geographically farther from the region, and where not only price, but also grain quality play an important role in the purchasing decisions of the GOJ, further reducing market options for the country. This could further exacerbate the ability of the GOJ to secure the required grain purchases on time to meet domestic consumption levels at socially acceptable prices.\n\n**8.** **Jordan’s vulnerability to shocks in global commodity markets is further compounded by the**\n**demographic pressures facing the country** . In addition to the structural challenges of sluggish growth, growing\ndebt, high unemployment, declining FDI and trade disruptions due to regional conflicts, Jordan is confronted with growing demographic, climate and environmental pressures. Between 2000 and 2020 the Jordanian population (excluding refugees) grew at rates between 1.37 and 5.00 percent. When adding the influx of 1.3 million refugees from Syria into Jordan since the start of the civil war, Jordan’s effective population growth in 2020 amounted to 14 percent.\n\n**9.** **Moreover, climate change is significantly reducing the opportunities to respond to growing domestic**\n**consumption and improve resilience to external shocks through increased domestic production of grains** .\nClimate change poses a serious challenge to the Jordanian agriculture sector. Not only is Jordan endowed with limited natural resources (Jordan is the second most water scarce country in the world with only 97 cubic meters 11 As a result, Jordan is entirely dependent on global markets to meet domestic consumption needs for basic commodities such as cereals (95 percent overall and more than 95 percent for wheat and barley), vegetable oil (79 percent), rice (100 percent) and sugar (100 percent).\n\nPage 8 of 54", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) of water available per capita per year – well below the absolute water scarcity threshold of 500 cubic meters per capita per year), but those resources are increasingly vulnerable to climate-related hazards (Jordan ranks 72 out of 182 countries in the ND-GAIN index for climate vulnerability in 2019), including droughts [12], extreme temperature, storms, landslides and flash floods [13] . These changes are likely to have negative effects on crop production as they will decrease the availability of water for irrigation, diminishing the suitability of key crops and increase the vulnerability of smallholder farmers who are already extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change due to their low-incomes, poor access to technical capacities and lack of technology to increase productivity under extreme weather conditions [14] . In the livestock sub-sector, rising drought risks reduce the carrying capacity of rangelands and increase the dependency on grains for fodder, thereby contributing to import dependency and vulnerability to external price shocks. Finally, adaptation options to reduce vulnerability along grain import supply chains and the grain import system and physical grain storage will need to be pursued to reflect increasingly hot and dry conditions, as well as heavy precipitation events.\n\n**10.** **High and volatile food prices due to shocks in global commodity markets disproportionately impact**\n**poor and vulnerable households in Jordan.** In February 2022, annual food price inflation trended at 2.7 percent\n\n- the highest rate recorded over the past 12 months. Growing inflationary pressures as a result of higher food\nprices pose a significant threat to vulnerable households. Importantly, short-term demand for wheat products, which account for the largest share in the food basket, is relatively inelastic in Jordan as in the Arab world in general (World Bank, 2012). Many Jordanian households hover around the national poverty line making poverty numbers very sensitive to even small increases in the cost of living (Figure 1). [15] Moreover, households are affected by higher food prices in different ways, with women, including female-headed households resorting to harmful coping strategies, such as reducing their own nutrition consumption to feed members of their family, or taking on risky jobs to acquire food as a result of having limited access to assets and markets, and fewer pathways out of the crisis as compared to their male counterparts (Oxfam, 2019). Furthermore, poor and near-poor households in Jordan tend to spend a larger share of their income on food. Food purchases account for over one-third of poor and near poor Jordanian household budgets and a quarter among the richest 20 percent of the population (Figure 2). Similarly, food purchases account for over one-third of refugee household budgets. Within Jordanians’ food basket basic agricultural commodities account for most of the caloric intake, in particular wheat products (28 percent), sugar (14 percent), rice (8 percent), sunflower seed oil (7 percent) and soybean oil (4 percent) (Department of Statistics of Jordan, 2022).\n\n12 In 2021, Jordan experienced one of the most severe droughts in its history.\n_13_ [Jordan - Vulnerability | Climate Change Knowledge Portal (worldbank.org)](https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/jordan/vulnerability#:~:text=Climate%2Drelated%20hazards%20in%20Jordan,include%20periodic%20earthquakes%20and%20epidemics.)\n14 IPCC projections for the future indicate that by 2030 temperatures are projected to increase by 1–2oC and that there will be a significant\nincrease in the number of crop heat stress days throughout Jordan. Climate models from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase\n5 (CMIP5) ensemble project a decline in future precipitation rates of 6 percent, 11.5 percent, and 19 percent by 2030, 2050, and 2070,\nrespectively (RCP 8.5). The whole country is expected to experience a decrease in precipitation. The northern region and King’s Highway\nare projected to experience the largest precipitation declines by 2030: 12.5 percent and 10.4 percent respectively. Rainfall decreases in the\nEastern and Southern desert are projected to be 9.4 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively. Jordan’s Eastern and Southern Desert regions,\nwhich are primarily rangelands, are likely to experience more warming than the Northern region and the King’s Highway, which currently\nrely mostly on rainfed and irrigated agriculture.\n15 World Bank analysis indicates that if food prices were to increase by 10 percent in Jordan (a smaller increase than in the 2007-2008 food\nprice crises), poverty would increase by an additional 1.3 percentage points and the poverty gap would rise by half a percentage point,\nwhile a 20 percent increase in food prices would increase the poverty rate from 15.7 percent to 19.4 percent (43,000 new poor families).\n\nPage 9 of 54", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["ND-GAIN index for climate vulnerability"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ND-GAIN index", "confidence": 0.311846524477005}, {"text": "Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase\n5", "confidence": 0.10846078395843506}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936)\n\n**Figure 1: Jordan 2017-18 household per capita consumption**\n**distribution relative to the national poverty line**\n\n**Figure 2: Share of food expenditure in total expenditure p.c. (%)**\n\nSource: 2017-18 HEIS and World Bank calculations. Source: World Bank\n\n**11.** **Existing food insecurity levels are particularly high among Jordan’s refugee population.** According to the\nmost recent mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (mVAM) [16] completed by the World Food Program (WFP) in Jordan, 7 percent of Jordanian households (representing 535,559 individuals) were found to be food insecure as of February 2021 and another 51 percent of households (representing 3,843,701 individuals) were vulnerable to food insecurity, meaning that they were very likely to experience an acute decline in food access or consumption levels below minimum survival needs. WFP’s mVAM also found that food insecurity levels among Jordan’s refugee community (which are not covered by Jordan’s social security net system) are significantly higher than those registered at the level of Jordanian households. Of the more than 750,000 refugees [17] registered in Jordan (89 percent of whom came from Syria), an estimated 17 percent live in the Za’atari and Azraq refugee camps, while the remaining 83 percent are mostly in Jordan’s urban areas. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, food security has been a key concern for refugees in both camps and in host communities mainly due to the loss of income from temporary and informal labor activities. More than 80 percent of labor activities performed by non-Jordanians are estimated to take place in the informal economy versus 40 percent for Jordanian citizens (MOSD, 2019). February 2021 mVAM data showed that 23.3 percent of refugee households in host communities are food insecure (over 154,777 individuals), while another 63.7 percent of refugee households (equivalent to approximately 423,344 individuals) are vulnerable to food insecurity.\n\n**12.** **Ensuring food security and social stability are at the core of the urgent need to ensure availability of**\n**and access to staple food** . Bread is an essential part of the diet in Jordan and represents the main caloric source\nfor the poorest Jordanians and the many refugees in the country. Similarly, barley import dependent livestock herding is the mainstay of the rural economy and the livelihoods of about 200,000 people in traditional nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin tribal communities. While trade in basic food commodities (such as sugar, rice, cooking oil, milk powder) is managed mainly by the private sector in Jordan, the GOJ maintains full control of grain reserves by directly managing the purchase, import, storage and domestic sales of wheat and barley. In 2021, the GOJ discontinued the bread subsidy and, as a response to the COVID-19 outbreak, it fixed the domestic price of bread to ensure its affordability (at 0.32 JOD per kilogram) for the entire population of Jordan. This intervention model (in combination with the effective appreciation of the Jordanian dinar) has helped control inflationary pressures.\nHowever, maintaining this status quo in a context of all time high international grain prices is costly, also coinciding with Bond maturity obligations of the GOJ, further reducing the availability of financial resources at a critical time.\n\n**13.** **Public procurement of strategic agricultural commodities is at the core of Jordan’s food security strategy**\n**as rising food prices pose a significant threat to social stability** . Historically, Jordan has played a key role as an\n\n_16_ [WFP | Jordan: Mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Dashboard | As of June 2021 (arcgis.com)](https://unwfp.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=7210a3ee33b14c5b9a989590345cb49a)\n_17_ _As of July 2021_\n\nPage 10 of 54", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping", "confidence": 0.8046895861625671}, {"text": "Mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping", "confidence": 0.3790385127067566}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## Secondary Data Review\n# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods\n\nAPRIL 2019\n\n### CRISIS OVERVIEW\n\nTropical Cyclone Idai made landfall on 14 March, in Beira city (Sofala province), Central Mozambique. As of 15 April, over 600 people are confirmed to have died in the cyclone and subsequent events. A total 1.5 million people are affected, and over 140,000 people are displaced in more than 120 accommodation centers, public buildings and schools in the affected provinces. Sofala province has the highest number of displaced\n[population, followed by Manica province (INGC, 4/2019).](https://cycloneidai.onalabs.org/)\n\n### CRISIS IMPACT\n\n_Source: OCHA_ _SitRep No.6 (as of_ _13 April 2019)_\n\n#### KEY TAKEAWAYS\n\nThis document consolidates information of the pre-crisis context and vulnerability of women and girls in Mozambique, and reviews all main post-disaster assessment results, field reports and other sources available on the disaster impact, needs and risks of the vulnerable groups.\n\n**Key Priorities**\n\n- Past lessons as well as assessment reports both highlight that women and girls and\ntheir families have been adopting negative mechanisms to cope with basic needs and economic hardship, including being exposed to sexual exploitation, sex work, early and forced marriage. Reviving livelihood and income generating activities are key to mitigate GBV risks.\n\n- The displaced population living in sites are under stressed conditions, overcrowding\nand lack of wash facilities increase the risk of GBV. With sporadic ongoing relocation, women and girls are exposed to less safe and dignified environment.\n\n- Living conditions are more severe and needs are largely unfulfilled in the\ncommunities outside the camps, especially in areas that are hard to reach. In these communities, a lack of basic needs including food and shelter has been reported, which increases risks of vulnerable population.\n\n- The number of female-headed households as well as widowed women has\nincreased in the aftermath of the disaster. Accompanied by a high number of pregnant women who are estimated to give birth, it is critical to ensure access to functional Sexual and Reproductive Health services and social care.\n\n- Community-based referral and psychosocial support by local partners have been\noperational prior to the cyclone. As they act as the main first contacts for vulnerable groups in the communities, more resources and capacity building on GBV in emergencies are needed to scale up the existing community-based services.\n\n**Key Vulnerable Groups:**\n\nFemale-headed households; single women, adolescents 1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## Secondary Data Review\n# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods\n\nAPRIL 2019\n\n### Operating Environment - Contextual Review LEGAL SYSTEM AND JUSTICE\n\nSince independence in 1975, Mozambique has put in efforts to make strides in gender equality. Systems have been put in place, and achievements have been made, for example in political representation. Since 1994 the ruling party implemented a quota on the representation of women in the government. This has ensured that women have approximately one third of seats in the National Assembly. However, a lot of progress still needs to happen to reach gender equality – not just in systems and institutions, but\n[also at a community level (Tvedten 2008).](https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3326-)\n\n**Rule of law:** After the civil war (1984–1992), which had a large impact on the Central\n[Provinces, turnover in the government has been democratic (Tvedten 2008).](https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3326-)\n\n**Women’s rights:**\n\n- The 2004 constitution upholds the principle of gender equality and prohibits\ndiscrimination based on sex.\n\n- Mozambique has ratified CEDAW, as well as the Protocol to the African Charter\non Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa [(Government of](http://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/-/media/files/un%20women/vaw/full%20text/africa/mozambique%20%20nap%20to%20combat%20and%20prevent%20vaw%2020082012.pdf?vs=5313)\n[Mozambique 2012).](http://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/-/media/files/un%20women/vaw/full%20text/africa/mozambique%20%20nap%20to%20combat%20and%20prevent%20vaw%2020082012.pdf?vs=5313)\n\n- Polygamy has been prohibited by the Family Law (2004), yet is commonly\npracticed. In effect, polygamous unions are not legally recognized, but there are no legal restrictions against the practice itself (CARE [29/03/2019).](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Regional-RGA-Cyclone-Idai-29032019.pdf)\n\n- The Act on Domestic Violence Perpetrated Against Women was passed in 2009,\ncriminalizing domestic violence including physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional and psychological abuse, stalking, harassment, intimidation, damage\n[to property, and other controlling or abusive behavior (UNWOMEN 2009).](http://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/fr/countries/africa/mozambique/2009/law-on-domestic-violence-perpetrated-against-women--2009-)\n\n- The Multisectoral Mechanism for Integrated Assistance to Women Victims of\nViolence (2012) outlines the roles of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Action [(USAID](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Floriza_Gennari/publication/293491456_Lessons_from_the_Gender-Based_Violence_Initiative_in_Mozambique/links/56b9311908ae3b658a88c87e/Lessons-from-the-Gender-Based-Violence-Initiative-in-Mozambique.pdf) 2016).\n\n- The Land Laws of 1997 specifies that, although land belongs to the state, legal\nmeasures can help communities and individuals (men and women) to obtain land without requiring written proof of use. However, in reality the gender equality in land ownership is not reflected as patriarchal cultures still favor land\n[ownership for men (SIDA 2006).](https://www.sida.se/contentassets/80caaf7d1aaf48738b7b70386574b59e/towards-gender-equality-in-mozambique_693.pdf)\n\n**Access to justice:** Although the Mozambican government has put into place efforts to\ncombat violence against women, women have difficulty accessing courts for various reasons (details in below content “GBV PROTECTION NEEDS”). Instances of GBV including rape, are more often settled through informal local/community courts, or privately\n[through financial renumeration (Slegh 2010;](http://medanthrotheory.org/site/assets/files/3123/slegh.pdf) [US Department of State 2017).](https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277271.pdf)\n\n#### SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC ENVIRONMENT\n\n**Female-headed households:** As of 2015 approximately 36% of households in\n[Mozambique are female-headed (DHS 2015).](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf)\n\n**Economy:** In 2008, a study found that approximately 79% of women were economically\nactive. Women are largely responsible for the household. This may also be included into the high percentage for economic activity – although returns on this are low. Furthermore, employed women mostly work in the agricultural sector (89%), a sector in which they form a large share of unskilled labor (59%). This shows that, though women may take up a large part of economic activity, they may not take home a large amount of money.\nWomen active in agriculture work an estimated average of 14 hours per day, which also\n[leaves them little time for partaking in public participation or education (Tvedten 2008; SIDA](https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3326-) 2006).\n\nWhen employed, women are often performing unskilled jobs, which are low-paid. In addition, in 2008 only around 4% of women were employed in the government, public, or private sector. These jobs entail a fixed monthly salary with predictability and more\n[certainty (Tvedten 2008).](https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3326-)\n\n**Education:** Literacy rates in Mozambique stand at 70.5% for the population aged 15–\n24. When only looking at the population over 15, the literacy rate stands at only 56%.\nWomen are significantly less literate than their male counterparts. High discrepancies in literacy rates among men and women can point to inequality, where girls tend to be the first who are denied access to education, or taken out of school as their education is not prioritized.\n\n2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## Secondary Data Review\n# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods\n\nAPRIL 2019 LITERACY RATE (%) TOTAL MALE FEMALE\n**15–24 years** 70.5 79.1 62.3\n**15 years and older** 56.0 70.8 43.1\n**65 years and older** 26.0 46.3 8.8\nUNCESCO 2015 The DHS data from Mozambique further shows that improving access to education for girls, particularly following the completion of primary school, can be an important determinant of the use of health facilities (or at least correlates with facility use). Higher levels of education for mothers is associated with declining under-five mortality rates, i.e.\nthe higher the education level of the mother, the lower the mortality levels in under-five[year-olds (ODI, 6/2014).](https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9073.pdf)\n\n#### COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT\n\nDespite changes at an institutional level, Mozambique remains a highly patriarchal society where men dominate power positions in communities and the household.\n\n**GBV perception:** While more updated data is not available, in 2009 an estimated 70%\nof perpetrators of GBV against their partners never faced charges. The reasons for this included that the survivor has to deal with the case alone or through the family (47%), the act was not deemed serious (15%), the act was considered a private issue (9%), or the survivor feared retaliation and reprisal (11%) [(UNIFEM 2009).](https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/violence_against_women_mozambique%5b1%5d.pdf) This indicates that in Mozambique, GBV is being normalized, and a GBV case is considered a family or private affair without much institutional and systematic support. However, the Multisectoral Mechanism for Integrated Assistance to Women Victims of Violence was established in 2012 and strives to provide accessible and integrated services for vulnerable people and more systematic fighting against GBV.\n\nIn addition, an anthropological study found that generally in Mozambique, a ‘good woman’ submits to her husband, other male relatives, and the husband’s family. Male dominance in the household is seen as a given, and maltreatment of women is often seen as a result of their own behavior. These socio-cultural explanations about women’s role\n[in society justify acts of gender-based violence as natural and private matters (Slegh 2009).](http://medanthrotheory.org/site/assets/files/3123/slegh.pdf)\n\n**Gender roles:** Generally, men are still seen as the power-holders and the culture in\nMozambique is patriarchal and male-dominated. This may be rooted in historical influences when political powerholders were men in charge of chieftainships. On top, Central Mozambique knew a more patrilineal system, meaning a woman belongs to the husband’s family – which has been symbolized through dowry ( _lobolo)_ . Though at times women can be in influential positions (e.g. in clans) – these are usually not formalized\n[positions of power (Tvedten 2008).](https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3326-) _Division of labor:_ Generally, men and boys are responsible for working outside the home while women and girls take care of domestic issues. These include taking care of children and older people, as well as cooking, fetching water, and cleaning [(CARE 29/03/2019).](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Regional-RGA-Cyclone-Idai-29032019.pdf) Reduced accessibility and availability of water and other household items are likely to put women and girls more at risk when performing domestic tasks.\n\n_Household decision-making:_ Despite women’s large participation in the household, their\n[decision-making is described as limited (FHI 360 2015). This is backed up by data from the](https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/resource-spt-cap-mozambique-gbv-integration.pdf) Demographic Health Survey [(2015), which shows that men generally tend to take the](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf) decisions in the household regarding health expenditures and groceries. In Sofala, over 80% of men solely took the decisions in these areas.\n\n_Political participation_ : Mozambique has the 14th highest level of women’s participation in\n[parliament in the world (World Bank).](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?view=chart)\n\n**Traditional marriage practices:** Dowry, or _lobolo_ still plays a large role in the central\n[provinces including Sofala (Tvedten 2008). Though polygamy is not legalized in the Family](https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3326-) Law (2004), it is still practiced. In these cases, the husband is only legally married to the first wife, but has multiple relationships outside the marriage. Polygyny is often recommended when the first wife is infertile – but is generally common in the patrilineal\n[cultures (Arnaldo 2003). In the same Family Law, the age for marriage is set at 18.](http://www.bioline.org.br/pdf?ep04008)\n\n**Harmful practices:** In some instances, widowhood can be seen as needing ‘purification’.\nThis purification practice is common among the Sena ethnic group in Sofala. A woman, upon the death of her husband, needs to be purified by having sex with his male relative three times a day for a week. This practice called _pita-kufa_ (or _khupita-_ khufa) increases the risk of HIV and may cause unwanted pregnancy [(IRIN 2008; Vera Cruz 2018).](http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/243963) 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Demographic Health Survey"], "descriptive_data": ["DHS data from Mozambique"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Demographic Health Survey", "confidence": 0.8366616368293762}, {"text": "DHS data", "confidence": 0.18478330969810486}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "DHS data from Mozambique", "confidence": 0.2804611921310425}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## Secondary Data Review\n# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods\n\nAPRIL 2019\n\n#### Crisis Impact and Pre-Crisis Baseline BASIC NEEDS\n\nGBV does not happen in a silo and is never a standalone incident. Disasters, conflicts, pre-crisis vulnerabilities, stressed living conditions, and a lack of resources are all exacerbating factors for the manifestation of GBV and related negative coping mechanisms. Reduced availability and accessibility of basic services (source of income; health facilities, food, market etc.) as a result of the cyclone and floods increase the vulnerabilities of women and girls.\n\n**Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene:** According to the Demographic Health Survey [(2015),](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf)\napproximately 23.7% of people in Sofala did not have access to an improved water source. A further 23.1% used a hand pump. In previous years, during periods of drought, it was noted that during the water collection activities, girls faced increased risk of\n[confrontations with wild animals and GBV (CARE, 2016).](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/southern-eastern-africa/document/ares-rapid-gender-analysis-commitment-addressing-gender) _Water_\n[Over 50% of displacement sites assessed have water sources on site (DTM R2, 4/2019). As](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) women and girls are responsible for fetching water, they are exposed to more GBV risks when looking for alternative water sources. The post-disaster multi-sectoral assessment (MRA) in six affected districts further noted that the availability of potable/drinking water has decreased significantly, particularly in Nhamatanda (MRA, 4/2019).\n\n_Sanitation and hygiene_ Wash conditions are stretched and overcrowding is observed in sites in Beira. Wash facilities cannot be installed or completed and prepared in time with sporadic and rapid ongoing relocations (Protection cluster, 4/2019). In 20% of the sites assessed in DTM it is reported that nobody has access to bathing and shower facilities. Less than half of sites have gender-segregated latrines and bathing facilities [(DTM R2, 4/2019).](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) At new accommodation sites women are reported to be showering inside the latrines (Protection cluster, 4/2019). Recent research also shows that over 40% of women do not use latrines\n[provided (CARE, 3/2019).](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/southern-eastern-africa/document/ares-rapid-gender-analysis-commitment-addressing-gender) The MRA further noted that almost all assessed communities in Buzi, Gondola, Nhamatanda and Sussundenga districts are facing a major deterioration in the quality of sanitation facilities. Whereas previously all communities mostly used household latrines, they now have to resort to open defecation. It is reported that privacy for washing and defecating is an issue for women and girls, especially in Dondo and Nhamatanda (MRA, 4/2019).\n\nThe lack of safe and quality hygiene and sanitation facilities, latrines and bathing facilities that are not safely lit all lead to worsened hygiene condition and higher the risk to GBV. In addition, women and girls who cannot access safe facilities might face additional burdens as they may aim to limit their use of facilities, which can lead to reduced food and water intake.\n\n**Health:** According to the existing referral mechanism in place by the Ministry of Gender,\nChildren and Social Action (MGCAS), there are three entry points of services for any vulnerable groups and potential GBV survivors: health facilities, social action and the police. Health facilities with trained staff and post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) kits for rape survivors to perform clinical management of rape (CMR), and specialized psychosocial intervention are only available at district or provincial hospital.\n\nAs social workers can be the first point of entry for many GBV survivors, they need to be trained to deliver psychosocial support. Pre-crisis reports further point out that specialized knowledge on treating survivors of GBV is often not sufficient in the health facilities: women who seek help after physical violence are not always properly consulted prior to being sent back home [(Slegh 2010).](http://medanthrotheory.org/site/assets/files/3123/slegh.pdf) Therefore, there is also a need to train personnel in health facilities.\n\nCyclone and floods have caused major damage to at least 93 health centers (Health cluster, 4/2019). More complete assessment on health facilities are ongoing, however field visits suggested that district level hospitals in Nhamatanda, Dondo, Buzi and Beira districts are functional, despite some structural damages. However information on the overall availability of stocks and supplies of PEP kits remains a gap [(HeRAM, 2019).](http://www.herams.org/) The administration of PEP within 72 hours of a reported rape case is vital to save lives of survivors, especially considering the high prevalence rate of HIV in the population.\nPreliminary health facility assessments have showed that around 55% of assessed health facilities in Sofala province do not have PEP kits available (FHI360, preliminary data on health facility assessments, 4/2019).\n\nIn the majority of displacement sites people reportedly have no problem accessing health facilities, and in more than 70% it is reported that health facilities have female staff.\n80% key informants reported that women are seeing health professionals during pregnancy [(DTM R2, 4/2019). The MRA findings in six districts show that in more than half of](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) communities women have access to sexual and reproductive health care. In Gondola and Sussendenga districts, the nearest health facilities in most locations are reportedly very 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Demographic Health Survey"], "descriptive_data": ["post-disaster multi-sectoral assessment", "FHI360, preliminary data on health facility assessments"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Demographic Health Survey", "confidence": 0.8140698671340942}, {"text": "post-disaster multi-sectoral assessment", "confidence": 0.5351169109344482}, {"text": "FHI360", "confidence": 0.43233543634414673}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "preliminary data on health facility assessments", "confidence": 0.13467518985271454}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## Secondary Data Review\n# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods\n\nAPRIL 2019 difficult to access. As a result of the cyclone and floods, people in remote affected areas face challenges accessing district hospitals.\n\nTo ensure a private and protective environment, there is a need to refurbish the maternity wards, where the survivors are treated. Further, the administrative offices of the Women and Children’s Protection desk need to be rehabilitated, so a private and protective environment can be restored for women and girls to report confidentially.\n\n**HIV:** It is estimated that almost 1.6 million people, including more than 90,000 children,\nare infected with HIV in Mozambique. More than half of those infected are women, and\n[15% of pregnant women aged 15–49 are HIV-positive (ODI, 2014). The prevalence rate](https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9073.pdf) of HIV in the population aged 15-49 is 13.2% (15.4% in women and 10.1% in men).\nSofala has a higher rate (16.3%) than other affected districts [(DHS, 2015). Furthermore,](https://www.dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12_SP.pdf) women and girls are particularly affected by the epidemic because they usually lack the\n[power to refuse unsafe sex, choose their partners or influence sexual behavior (ODI 2014).](https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9073.pdf)\n\n**Sexual and Reproductive Health:** According to the latest estimation, about 438,000\nwomen affected by the cyclone are of reproductive age (15-49). Among those, 64,000 women are estimated to be pregnant and more than 37,000 women in affected areas are estimated to give birth in the next three months. Among those giving birth, up to 9,600 may be at risk of complications during their pregnancy in the next three months.\nThey will they will need access to functioning health facilities and care (UNFPA, 4/2019).\n\n**Shelter:** According to the Demographic Health Survey some 28% of people in Sofala did\nnot have electricity. A further 28.9% of people lived in a cement house, 36.9% in an earthen mud-house [(DHS, 2015).](https://www.dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12_SP.pdf) According to the latest DTM there are currently over 13,600 people hosted in 24\n[displacement sites in Beira (DTM R2, 4/2019). This includes five planned sites, the remainder](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) are temporary transit sites including schools and public buildings. Site plans of the five accommodation centers suggest that currently up to 5–6 families are sharing one tent,\n[and averagely 12m2 space is available per person (calculated based on CCCM site plans](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/mozambique/infographic/temporary-relocation-sites-layout) and\n[DTM Round 2, 4/2019). The SPHERE standards prescribe a minimum of 30m2 for camp-like](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) settlements. Overcrowding and inadequate privacy for women and girls are observed, which is a risk to GBV.\nWhile the site plans are designed to follow minimum standards and provide suitable living conditions, many elements have contributed to increased vulnerabilities and overstretched capacity on site: ad-hoc relocation plans, lack of sensitization among surrounding communities, lack of communication to the population, and a lack of systematic allocation of tents (Protection Monitoring, 4/2019). It is also reported that more than half of the sites do not have adequate lighting in any common place; which is considered a major risk to GBV and can hamper the freedom of movement of women and girls [(DTM](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e)\n[R2, 4/2019). The MRA in Dondo district shows that in more than half surveyed locations,](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) people have been sleeping in open areas. In Buzi all but one location there were surveyed families who reported they were sleeping outside (MRA, 4/2019). Sleeping out in the open is unsafe and can increase the risk of GBV to women and girls.\n\n**Documentation:** The affected population have lost most or all of their documents during\nthe cyclone. This include identity documentation and other vital certificates. An estimated 19% of people in Sofala already did not have birth certificates or registration in 2015\n[(DHS 2015). The lack of mechanisms to facilitate attainment of these documents is likely to](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf) hinder access to services, including enrolment in schools and engagement in some livelihood activities (Protection cluster, 4/2019). A lack of basic needs, or possibility to engage in livelihood activities, will lead to faster depletion of coping mechanisms of the affected population. This means that negative coping mechanisms including those that pose a higher risk to GBV will be adopted faster. A lack of engagement in school for children also increases the risk of child labor and exploitation.\n\n**Eviction** : Assessments in the displacement sites suggested that 11 (3 in Nhamatanga\n[district and 8 in Beira district) out of 41 sites reported there is an eviction threat (DTM R2,](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e)\n[4/2019). However the answer is perception-based and it is likely to indicate the lack of](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) communication and sensitization to the displaced population. In multiple reports the importance for communities to get timely and clear information on relocation processes is emphasized (Protection cluster, 4/2019).\n\n**Child Protection:** Over 28% of households in Mozambique have adopted children [(DHS](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf)\n[2015).](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf) Almost 50% of young Mozambican women aged 20-24 years were married\n[before the age of 18, while 14% were married before the age of 15 (CARE, 3/2019).](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Regional-RGA-Cyclone-Idai-29032019.pdf) According to MRA in Dondo, among children under 14 years old, a total of 22.3% were orphan by father (13.2%), by mother (6%) or both parents (3%). The assessment further showed that in six affected districts, helping out the family by doing chores and other work are among the main reason children (both boys and girls) are not attending schools.\nIn about 10% of locations assessed, communities reported that they have noticed there are children disappearing (or being trafficked). In almost 40% of assessed locations communities reported having come across children who are forced to work to provide 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Demographic Health Survey", "CCCM site plans"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Demographic Health Survey", "confidence": 0.891363799571991}, {"text": "CCCM site plans", "confidence": 0.39582744240760803}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "CCCM site plans", "confidence": 0.16701574623584747}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## Secondary Data Review\n# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods\n\nAPRIL 2019 food and other goods (MRA, 4/2019). Being out of school and engagement in other livelihood activities increase the exposure to GBV risks.\n\n#### GBV PROTECTION NEEDS\n\nAffected population, displaced population and estimated affected women at reproductive age who could be at risk of GBV in all affected provinces Affected districts in Sofala Province – affected, displace population and estimated women at reproductive age\n\n**Affected District**\n\nAffected Population (INGC Ponto de Situacao, 10 April) Total Displaced Population (INGC Novo Centro Update, 4 April) Estimated affected women at Affected reproductive age (15 – 49)\n\n**Affected** Population Total Displaced (*Calculated based on two\n**Province** (INGC Ponto de Population sources: Affected\n\nSituacao, 10 (INGC Novo Centro population[INGC] * % of April) Update, 4 April) women at reproductive age\n\n[2017 census]) Zambezia 6,035 5,235 1,417\n\n**Affected**\n**Province**\n\nAffected Population (INGC Ponto de Situacao, 10 April) Total Displaced Population (INGC Novo Centro Update, 4 April) Tete 54,721 2,655 12,021 Manica 262,890 13,115 60,040 Sofala 1,190,594 120,995 288,480 Inhambane 422 - 103\n\n**Grant Total** **1,514,662** **142,000** **362,061**\n\n*Note on different data sources:\n1. According to the latest DTM (round 2, 10 April) assessments in 41 displacement sites, there are\na total 13,616 people who are displaced in 24 sites in Beira. The table above uses the INGC source for a more complete presentation of the displaced population across whole Safala province.\nHowever the INGC displacement data is dated 4 April for all provinces.\n\n2. The number of estimated women at reproductive age (WRA) is based on a calculation of the affected population [INGC] * % of WRA [2017 census]. The total number is different than the UNFPA estimated figures in above paragraph, because the methodology of calculation and sources are different (INGC figures are not used in the latter calculation).\n\nGorongoza 28,460 550 6,338 Marínguè 26,900 6,085 Caia 12,040 2,751 Cheringoma 7,060 490 1,544 Chibabava 3,975 4,134 1,008 Machanga 2,335 552 Chemba 330 74\n\n**TOTAL** **1,190,594** **120,995** **288,480**\n\n**Gender based violence:** The post disaster multi-sectoral assessment (MRA) in Dondo and\nBuzi districts reported that families are resorting to negative coping strategies to meet their most basic needs and risks of GBV was reported (MRA, 4/2019). There were also cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by people in positions of power in the community and village chiefs when assigning relief items. This entailed forcing women and girls into\n[sex in exchange for food and other relief items (Jornal de Noticias, 4/2019).](https://observador.pt/2019/04/14/mocambique-mulheres-forcadas-a-ter-sexo-em-troca-de-ajuda-humanitaria/) 6 Estimated affected women at Affected reproductive age (15 – 49) Population Total Displaced (*Calculated based on two\n\n**Affected District** (INGC Ponto de Population sources: Affected population\n\nSituacao, 10 (INGC Novo Centro\n\n[INGC] * % of women at April) Update, 4 April) reproductive age [2017 census]) Beira 436,640 15,393 114,073 Nhamatanda 273,676 56,342 61,766 Dondo 166,511 19,737 39,880 Búzi 154,332 16,714 37,196 Marromeu 41,810 9,344 Muanza 36,525 7,635 7,869", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["DTM", "2017 census", "INGC displacement data"], "descriptive_data": ["post disaster multi-sectoral assessment"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2017 census", "confidence": 0.3918493092060089}, {"text": "post disaster multi-sectoral assessment", "confidence": 0.21763566136360168}, {"text": "INGC displacement data", "confidence": 0.10822001844644547}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "INGC displacement data", "confidence": 0.12529799342155457}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## Secondary Data Review\n# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods\n\nAPRIL 2019 In times of disaster the prevalence of GBV increases and new forms of violence emerge.\nRape, trafficking, early marriage and other forms of violence against women tend to\n[increase in times of conflict and natural disasters (CARE, 3/2019). GBV happens everywhere](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Regional-RGA-Cyclone-Idai-29032019.pdf) in all contexts and is recognized as one of the most pervasive yet most under-reported forms of violence in the world. Any GBV prevalence data needs to be treated with extreme caution. Field visits to district hospitals suggest that the functional hospitals have received less cases in comparison to the pre-crisis situation, which can be an indication of increased challenges in access to services or increased reporting barriers for the affected population.\n\nStressed living conditions and tensions in communal living spaces expose people to a higher risk of GBV as people live in crowded and less safe environments. Economic hardship and loss of livelihood are likely to trigger negative coping strategies, like early and forced marriage, in the need to engage in survival sex or sex work for food and money etc.\n\nPrior to the cyclone, women and girls already faced GBV protection needs: According to the latest Demographic Health Survey [(2015),](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf) 24% of women aged 18 – 49 are estimated to have suffered physical violence since the age of 15. A further 6% of women aged 18–49 are estimated to have experienced sexual violence. 12% of women report having been forced to have sex in their lives. Those who experience physical violence _only_ are more likely to seek help than those who only experience sexual violence. Among those who are survivors of physical violence within the marriage, an estimated 13% suffered from eye injuries, burns, or sprains. A further 23% is estimated to have suffered sexual violence as well [(DHS 2015).](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf) In Sofala, 6.5% of women aged 15–49 thought it was acceptable for a husband to beat his wife. [1] When posed the same question, 13% of men in Sofala thought it was acceptable to beat their wife. In particular, arguing and refusing to have sex were seen\n[as legitimate reasons to beat a wife (DHS 2015). Within this environment, keeping silent is](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf) the most adopted way for women to cope and is considered to increase their individual\n[chance to survive (Slegh, 2009).](http://medanthrotheory.org/site/assets/files/3123/slegh.pdf) 1 Thought it was acceptable for a husband to beat his wife in one or more of the following instances: burning food, arguing with husband, leaving the house without informing the husband, not taking care of the children, when hitting the children.\n\nThe challenges of survivors to seek help include but are not limited to access constraints to service providers, fear of stigmatization, and ostracization. With limited presence of district level services, most GBV cases are settled through traditional courts by community committees. It is critical to take into account the power dynamics of the households in any community engagement and programme design, survivors are not serviced properly when\n[they need to risk their family’s protection in order to stand up for their rights (Slegh, 2009).](http://medanthrotheory.org/site/assets/files/3123/slegh.pdf)\n\n#### INFORMATION GAPS AND NEEDS\n\n- Critical demographic data disaggregated by sex and age remains a gap for\nmost vulnerable population groups, e.g. female headed households.\n\n- More complete data on damage and impact is still to be obtained with\nimprovement of humanitarian access.\n\n- More granular level information needed at community level on GBV protection\nneeds\n\n- Assessment/survey data using different data collection methods that are not\nlimited to key informants are needed. Surveys, FGD with women groups, community committee are recommended.\n\n#### LESSONS LEARNED\n\n- Adolescent girls are often at high risk of GBV, yet not always specifically\ntargeted for provision of reproductive healthcare. Specific attention should be paid to adolescent girls who often do not access healthcare due to their age,\n[lack of decision-making power, and limited access to care (UNFPA GBViE Minimum](https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/GBVIE.Minimum.Standards.Publication.FINAL_.ENG_.pdf)\n[Standards 2015)](https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/GBVIE.Minimum.Standards.Publication.FINAL_.ENG_.pdf)\n\n- The GBV prevalence rate in Sofala province is high. Strong evidence exists\nregarding the risks GBV poses for HIV, specifically among women, and numerous studies have highlighted the benefits of tackling GBV and HIV as twin epidemics [(WHO, 2004). GBV integration into HIV prevention programmes that](https://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/pht/InfoBulletinIntimatePartnerViolenceFinal.pdf) address social and cultural norms that support inequalities in the family, 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Demographic Health Survey"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["GBV prevalence data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Demographic Health Survey", "confidence": 0.8968815207481384}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "GBV prevalence data", "confidence": 0.25490260124206543}, {"text": "demographic data", "confidence": 0.12660421431064606}]}}}
{"input": "## Secondary Data Review\n# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods\n\nAPRIL 2019 community and institutions [(FHI360, 2015)](https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/resource-spt-cap-mozambique-gbv-integration.pdf) should be included as a response strategy in the medium and long term.\n\n- With the onset of the drought in Mozambique (2016), many families have used\nchild marriage as a coping mechanism to raise income (through dowry) or to reduce the number of dependents per household [(CARE, 3/2019).](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Regional-RGA-Cyclone-Idai-29032019.pdf) Girls are at increased risk of GBV as they are married off for dowry. As described above, many families have lost documentation as a result of the cyclone and subsequent floods. This makes it more difficult for children to attend school. In addition, many communities observed children who had to work. Being out of school exposes children to higher risks of GBV and may also contribute to more child marriage.\n\n#### LIMITATIONS\n\n- Prevalence of GBV or number of GBV cases reported are never an indication\nof needs or risks. Numbers should be interpreted in close reference to the context and it should be considered that GBV is underreported in most contexts.\n\n8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## Secondary Data Review\n# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods\n\nAPRIL 2019\n\n#### Response Capacity\n\nThe response capacity to protection needs of women and girls are threefold in the aftermath of the emergency: government institutions which provide specialized health care, psychosocial support, social care, legal and judicial assistance; community-based organization, who work closely with relevant line ministries, and perform communitybased case management and referral for vulnerable people in need; humanitarian partners (UN, INGOs etc.) who are providing support to disaster-affected population.\n\nHumanitarian partners\n\n- Currently provide limited and scattered services on prevention and\nmainstreaming, not response.\n\n- Service provision is concentrated in Beira cities and evolved around\naccommodation centers/displace sites, non-specialized psychosocial support, psychosocial first aid is the most common service provided in and near sites.\n\n- Community engagement through NFI distribution (dignity kits) is the main\nintervention for risk mitigation and has highest number of locations and beneficiaries reached, even still very limited in terms of quantity.\n\n- Efforts are made towards strengthening and reinforcing the government-led\nintegrated GBV services, including bringing government social workers to major sites for referral and case management.\n\n- There is a need to provide more psychosocial support, more training on\npsychosocial first aid for community activities/volunteers and more specialized capacity in providing psychosocial intervention.\n\n- With the unfold of the crisis and scale up of humanitarian response, more than\n180 organizations and agencies are providing humanitarian assistance. More constant GBV mainstreaming and risk mitigation through all cluster response and humanitarian partners is required, especially when carrying out distributions, through site planning and programme designs.\n\n- Many humanitarian agencies’ operations are time-bound and are subjected to\nfunding status, which poses challenges on continuity and consistency. More capacity building of government counterparts and community-based organizations are needed for more sustainable and long term recovery.\n\nGovernment Response Source: [MGCAS, Mecanismo Muntisectorial de Atendimento a Mulher Vitima de Violencia, 2012](http://www.wlsa.org.mz/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/MecanismoMultisectorial.pdf) Community based organizations\n\n- Based in communities, with networks of trained community volunteers /activists\nfor referral and case follow-up\n\n- Depends on which line ministry CBOs are working with, some has focuses on\nSRH, some on GBV and others provide integrated services i.e. nutrition services, health, legal counselling.\n\n- These CBOs train and maintain the activists network covering whole Safala\nprovince, however the resources are limited, some have chosen to focus on building capacity of government counterpart (health staff etc.) 9\n\n- The Multisectoral Mechanism for Integrated Assistance to Women Victims of\nViolence in 2012 outlines the three pillars of services/points of entry for integrated GBV response: specialized health services, social action and police.\nThe system also encompasses further legal assistance if required by the victim/survivor.\n\n- Within this integrated mechanism, the victim/survivor can seek help by\ncontacting either of these services. Regardless of the service point of entry (health, social action or police), the respective service provider must ensure the victim/survivor/vulnerable individuals is referred to all other pillars of the service provision.\n\n_Specialized health_ _service provider_ _National level_ Ministry of Health (MoH) _Social Action, GBV_ _service provider_ Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action (MGCAS) _Police_ Ministry of Interior _Provincial level_ DPS Serviços de Urgência nas Unidades Sanitárias; _Provincial level_ DPS DPGCAS Police Serviços de Centro de Gabinete de Urgência nas Atendimento Atendimento à Unidades Integrado (CAI) Mulher e Criança Sanitárias; (GAMC) _District level_ DDS DMCAS Police GAMC _Community level_ Health posts, Community clinics committees, CBOs DPGCAS Centro de Atendimento Integrado (CAI) Community committees, CBOs", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## Secondary Data Review\n# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods\n\nAPRIL 2019", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Secondary Data", "confidence": 0.33429214358329773}]}}}
{"input": "# **NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH**\n\n**Research Paper No. 127**\n\n# **Land conflicts and their impact on refugee women’s** **livelihoods in southwestern Uganda**\n\n**Kalyango Ronald Sebba**\n\nDepartment of Women and Gender Studies Makerere University Uganda E-mail kalyango@infocom.co.ug July 2006\n\n**Policy Development and Evaluation Service**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Policy Development and Evaluation Service**\n**United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees**\n**CP 2500, 1211 Geneva 2**\n**Switzerland**\n\n**E-mail: hqep00@unhcr.org**\n**Web Site: www.unhcr.org**\n\nThese papers provide a means for UNHCR staff, consultants, interns and associates, as well as external researchers, to publish the preliminary results of their research on refugee-related issues. The papers do not represent the official views of UNHCR. They are also available online under ‘publications’ at <www.unhcr.org>.\n\nISSN 1020-7473", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Introduction**\n\nThis paper presents the preliminary findings of a study on land conflicts between refugees and host communities in southwestern Uganda and their impact on refugee women’s livelihoods. Uganda has a long history of hosting refugees that dates back to the 1940s, when it hosted Polish refugees; Rwandese and Sudanese in the 1950s (Holborn 1975:1213-1225). Refugees were placed in gazetted areas in close proximity to the local populations such as in the settlements of Nakivale, Oruchinga, Kyaka 1 and II in Southwestern Uganda; Rhino Camp, Imvepi and Ikafe in the West Nile region; Achol Pii, Parolinya and Adjumani settlements in Northern Uganda; and Kiryandongo and Kyangwali settlements in Central Uganda.\n\nOn the whole, placement in rural settlements was based on an assumption that the refugee problem was temporal and would end as soon as the circumstances that led to their flight had ceased (Pincwya, 1998:8-25). However, this has not been the case and the government was not prepared for a protracted refugee situation exacerbated by an increase in the population of both refugees and nationals.\n\nLand conflicts between refugees and nationals are a result of government policy of settling refugees in gazetted areas (Kalyango & Kirk, 2002). Placement in rural settlements is based on the assumption that majority of refugees are of a rural background and can support themselves through agriculture until their repatriation (Kibreab, 1989; UNHCR, 2000, Jacobsen, 2001). Host populations first welcomed refugees as those in need of protection and also as would-be beneficiaries of infrastructure to be left behind on their repatriation (Harrell-Bond, 1986; 2002).\n\nHowever, as the refugee situation became protracted, hospitality gave way to a competition for resources such as agricultural and grazing land, water and forest resources (Pirouet, 1988; Bagenda et al, 2002; Jones, 2002). This has not been helped by persistent refugee flows from Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Somalia, Burundi and Ethiopia resulting in increased xenophobia against refugees and a call for them to repatriate.\n\nLand is central to the sustainable livelihoods of rural households. For them it is not just land per se but arable and grazing land on which they depend for their livelihood.\nAs a result, any conflict over land impacts the households directly, and this impact is gender differentiated (Verma, 2001:3-4). The impact of land conflicts on refugee women’s livelihoods has to be situated in the larger context of land problems in Sub Saharan Africa.\n\nThese include but are not limited to growing land concentration and scarcity; competition over land use and environmental and land degradation. Other problems include corruption in land markets, indeterminate boundaries of customarily held lands, a weak land administration system, and a lack of equity in land systems (Tshikaka, 2004). Women’s interests in land were eroded by colonial policies and agrarian change that never addressed the core issues of gendered accessibility and equity. For instance, processes of differentiation and individualisation of land rights and land shortages have resulted in the concentration of land rights in men (Tshikaka, 2004; Verma, 2001).\n\n1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Research focus and aims**\n\nGender inequalities persist in refugee situations and limit the extent to which women and girls can attain sustainable livelihoods. According to the World Bank (2003), gender inequalities tend to lower productivity and intensify unequal distribution of resources. They also contribute to non-monetary aspects of poverty, such as lack of security, opportunity and empowerment, which lower the quality of life for both men and women (Ibid.; Tinker 1990). Whereas refugee women and girls face the brunt of these factors, protection and assistance has largely focused on men. This resonates through almost all refugee policies and practices, which focus on men as household heads (Kalyango, forthcoming).\n\nRefugee women have complained against the status quo because it discriminates them in asylum claims, acquisition of identity documents and food ration cards, limits their freedom of movement and makes them dependent on men (UNHCR 2001). Despite several attempts to address this anomaly, such as in the Convention for the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and in the UNHCR guidelines for refugee women and for Sex and Gender Based Violence, wide gender disparities between women and men in refugee situations remain common (UNHCR, 2000; 2003; UNIFEM, 2003; ).\n\nThe overall objective of the study was to establish the gendered impact of land conflicts on livelihoods of refugee women. Specifically, the paper takes a special focus on the gender dimensions of the land conflicts and their impact on household livelihoods. Gender is construed to refer to the socially constructed differences between men and women. Differences are embedded in social relations and therefore differ between cultures; they are constituted through and also help to constitute the exercise of other forms of social difference such as those of age, race or class (Kabeer, 1994).\n\nIn identifying the gender impacts of the land conflicts, analysis was based on the concepts of identity and agency. Identity concerns the social process whereby individuals come to identify themselves with a particular configuration of social roles and relationships and agency describes the strategies used by individuals to create a viable and satisfying life for themselves in the context of or in spite of these identities (El Bushra, 2000). These concepts, as El-Bushra (Ibid.) noted, enable an understanding of the nature of violent conflicts and also an interrogation of the motivations of different actors in a conflict.\n\n**Area of study**\n\nThe study was carried out in southwestern Uganda, Nakivale refugee settlement established in the early 1960s to cater for Rwandese refugees fleeing a bitter Tutsi/Hutu ethnic conflict in 1959. It spreads over 21,756 hectares and is located in a semi arid zone with limited arable land. The main economic activity is animal rearing and agriculture by both refugees and host populations. Nakivale is found in one of the remotest areas of Mbarara district with poor transport and social infrastructure which make it not easily accessible.\n\n2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Today, the settlement is home to over 15,000 refugees of different nationalities (see table 1) and administered by a camp commandant under the government ministry of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees. UNHCR through its implementing partner the Uganda Red Cross provides humanitarian assistance to the refugees. Unlike the host population, refugees have access to adequate social services provided by UNHCR.\nThis in itself has been a cause of xenophobia against refugees who are seen as more privileged by the local population.\n\n**Table 1:** **Nakivale refugee population at 30 September 2004**\n\n**Age Group** 0-4 5-17 18-59 60 **Total**\n**Nationality** M F M F M F M F\nRwandan 2596 2347 2009 1796 1967 1814 57 49 12,635 Kenyan 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 Somali 70 65 137 138 230 233 8 3 884 Ethiopian 4 4 7 5 38 15 0 0 73 Congolese 188 201 199 203 238 229 17 19 1,294 Burundi 39 36 59 41 88 63 0 0 326 Sudanese 6 6 15 25 19 18 0 0 89\n**Total** 2903 2659 2426 2209 2581 2373 82 71 15,304\n\n_Source: Camp commandant’s office, Nakivale_ Ever since its establishment, the settlement has been a centre of controversy as regards its size and original boundaries. Located in central Ankole [1], it has been prone to encroachment by the populace who saw it as an area for expansion of their grazing activities. Encroachment was of two types: extension of national land holdings into gazetted land and land loans given to nationals by refugees. This was also precipitated by the fact that there was a shrink in land availability for settlement and grazing in surrounding areas especially after gazetting of Lake Mburo National Park in 1983 and out migration from neighbouring districts of Bushenyi and Ntugamo.\n\nLand conflicts are fuelled by the fact that large expanses of settlement land are unutilised land since the refugee population is small. This has resulted in a limitation on expansion of refugee agricultural activities especially women in other parts of the settlements; limited access to natural resources such as fuel wood and water and grazing land.\n\n**Land conflicts between refugees and host populations**\n\nGenerally, it is vital to place refugee - host population conflict over land in the context of Uganda’s land tenure system. Land tenure is the mode of land holding, together with terms and conditions of occupancy. It is about ‘the bundle of rights’ held and enjoyed in the land resource. The relative degree to which individuals can profit from land resources is influenced by three factors: utilisation, duration of occupancy and relocation rights (Nuwagaba et al, 2002). It is important to note that ambiguities exist in land tenure systems in Uganda as a result of its colonial history. For instance, at independence in 1962, there were three land tenure systems: Mailo tenure, a system that was exclusive to the kingdom of Buganda and traced its origins in the Buganda 1 The people of Ankole are both pastorists and agriculturalists.\n\n3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "agreement of 1900; Freehold tenure, a system created under the Crown Land Ordinance of 1903; the native freeholds, where the community control over land was woven into a number of land rights (Nuwagaba et al, 2002).\n\nThe degree of enjoyment of the land resource has become a point of contention between host populations and refugees. At first, refugees were settled in sparsely populated areas and enjoyed good relations with the host populations (Holborn, 1975:1212). However, population increase and the advent of a cash economy increased the value of land, leading to strained social relations between refugees and nationals (Kasfir, 1988:158). Moreover, refugees are regarded as non-citizens who should not have any rights over land.\n\nLand conflicts between refugees and host population can be attributed to two main factors, that is, exceeding of field or residential boundaries (encroachment) and acquisition by nationals (sometimes in the form of land loans). Land conflicts in the refugee hosting areas are partly attributed to lack of clear refugee settlement boundaries (Mugerwa, 1992; Nuwagaba, 2002; Bagenda, 2003). According to the chairman of the district land board in Mbarara, there are no clear demarcations between refugees’ and host population’s land [2] .\n\nThe lack of clarity can be traced to reluctance of the Ankole kingdom [3] to favour permanent settlement of refugees in 1962 when they were first given land to settle (Holborn, 1974:1223). As a result there has been increased encroachment on refugee land by nationals, a practice exacerbated by weak administration systems. For instance, some encroachers have even acquired land tittles on gazetted land, since the procedure of acquiring a land title is very simple and open to abuse. All one needs is to fill out an application form from the district land board and take them to Local Council 1 (LC1) and have a ‘neighbour’ sign for confirmation.\n\nAfter the District Land Board has confirmed, land is surveyed and a land title issued.\nThe system has also been exploited by refugees, especially those of the 1959 caseload who have acquired land tittles [4] on settlement land. For instance, there is a case of a Rwandan refugee with a title for seven square kilometres of settlement land.\nInterestingly, it was also found out that the camp commandant of Nakivale refugee settlement has had to appear in court on charges of distributing land to refugees in the settlement [5] .\n\nFurthermore, there have also been disagreements between Mbarara district administration officials and the government over land in refugee settlements. Part of the disagreements are because the government has refused nationals to use refugee land. One district official interviewed said that government has not always agreed with the district on matters pertaining to land conflicts in refugee settlement. The findings of the study revealed that in fact, some of the district officials are themselves encroachers on settlement land. Institutional responses are further hindered by migration of nationals from other areas, such as Nyabushozi and Bushenyi, because of land shortages. This migration is caused by anticipation that refugees will repatriate 2 The settlement boundary was determined by ridges that surround it.\n3 These were the original owners of the land in Nakivale and Oruchinga before government gazetted the settlement.\n4 Under the Ugandan law, refugees are not supposed to own land.\n5 Interviews camp commandant Nakivale and Refugee Desk officer Mbarara, October 2004.\n\n4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "1959 caseload", "confidence": 0.5253868699073792}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "especially to Rwanda and leave vacant land in the settlements. On the other hand, refugees from Rwanda are coming to Uganda because there is land for settlement (Bagenda et al, 2002). In response, government is in the process of resurveying the land and cancelling all land titles acquired on refugee land.\n\nTo further analyze the land conflicts, one also needs to understand the land problem in Rwanda. According to Hajabakiga (2004:1-3) Rwanda has a population of 8.1 million and a population density of 308 inhabitants per square kilometre. On a whole, this places pressure on land leading to landlessness. Limited access to land in Rwanda has also had an influence on the repatriation of Rwandese in that they prefer to stay in areas where they have access to land for their own livelihoods. For instance, it is this lack of land in Rwanda that has partly led to secondary refugee movements from Tanzania to Uganda.\n\nEven some of the refugees who had repatriated after the genocide in 1994 returned to Uganda to repossess their land holdings in refugee settlements. When asked about their repatriation, Rwandan refugees indicated that they had no land to return to in Rwanda [6] . Indeed, Hajabakiga (2004) observed that between the 1950s and 1980s many people in Rwanda lost their land rights for politically and ethnically motivated reasons. This, according to her, caused a problem when Rwandese repatriated after 1994 since they had no lands to repossess, and some of them ended up taking up the lands of those who had fled that same year.\n\nGenerally, conflicts over land in Nakivale can be perceived as ‘livelihood clashes’ between refugees and nationals, since land is a critical resource for supporting livelihoods (Mugerwa, 1992, Verma, 2001:79). Hence it is important to understand the interplay of various factors that influence access to and utilisation of land by both host communities and refugees. For instance, despite settlement size, each refugee household is given 0.04 hectares (20m x 20m) of land for homestead establishment and 0.15 as agricultural plots. This leaves a large part of the land under–utilized providing room for encroachment by nationals in need of grazing land.\n\nQuite often, animals stray into refugees’ agricultural plots leading to a conflict between refugees and local populations. Usually, conflicts arise when livelihoods are threatened and this threat can be internal (within the households or communities) or external-from outside the households or communities (Mugerwa, 1992:23; Verma, 2001:97). At the centre of land conflicts are questions of ownership, access to and control over natural resources. Land is regarded by locals as belonging to Ugandans with refugees having no rights whatsoever. Regarding their interests in land, locals accuse the government of placing refugees’ above those of the national population [7] .\nFor refugees, access is determined by legislation, as land is allocated for a settlement.\nParadoxically, settlements are sometimes established in non-agricultural productive areas, limiting livelihood opportunities. Furthermore, the government confines the refugees in the settlement, allowing them only limited freedom of movement.\nRefugees have had to devise survival strategies such as spontaneous movement out of settlements with no permission to do so.\n\n6 Fc Group Discussion Kigali zone, Nakivale (July 2004).\n7 Refugee Desk Officer, Mbarara October 2004.\n\n5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Women’s livelihood strategies_ According to DFID (2001), a livelihood comprises the capabilities and assets (both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is said to be sustainable when it can recover from shocks, stresses and trends and maintain and enhance its capabilities both now and in the future while not undermining the natural resource base for future generations (Ibid).\n\nAccess to and control of land to a greater extent determines refugee women’s access to livelihood assets such as physical capital, natural capital, human capital, financial capital and social capital. Unfortunately, as Wengi (1998) points out, access and control are limited by their lack of resource rights. For instance, in most of Sub Saharan Africa, women do not own land and even what they produce on the land, is controlled by the men (World Bank, 2000; Verma, 2001). Paradoxically, women through their labour are the major contributors to household livelihoods especially in refugee situations (Mulumba, 2002).\n\nWomen and men negotiate access and maintain control over land as a productive and material resource differently and inequitably within local relations of power (Verma, 2001:79).Land conflicts influence women’s access to resources such as cultivable land, water and firewood. Given their domestic responsibilities, refugee women negotiate access to natural resources such as land for cultivation, firewood and water vital for the survival of their families.\n\nBecause of land conflicts and depletion of resources such as trees and arable soils women have been forced to look beyond the settlement for other sources. For instance, interviews with refugee women revealed that they collect firewood and water five to seven kilometres away from the settlement. Travelling such long distances makes them vulnerable to sexual exploitation and gender based violence from both refugees and host populations. The distances also take away their valuable time to engage in income generating activities or to participate in skills training.\n\nIt was also established that women do not control proceeds from surplus food sold in the markets nor independently use the surplus from other household income generating activities. As a result, they are dependent on men for their daily needs a fact that greatly disadvantages them. For instance, because of their low income, women are denied access to dispute settling mechanisms in the settlements. For example in the case of land conflicts, Refugee Welfare Committees [8] demand fees before they can settle a dispute.\n\nAccording to the Refugee Welfare Committee chairman, this is to ‘facilitate’ their work in settling cases in the form of stationary. This requirement has become a hindrance to women who wish to seek assistance and adjudication of their cases.\nFurther to that, at times, police posts in the settlements also demand money from refugees to address their complaints. For instance in cases where women report cases of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV), the police request ‘fees’ to arrest 8 Refugee Welfare Committees are not facilitated by the government or UNHCR to carry out their day to day activities.\n\n6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "perpetrators [9] . Since women often lack money to pay such fees, they at times fail to report cases.\n\nRefuge women’s vulnerability is also partly due to men who migrate out of the settlements to seek for work opportunities in urban centres leaving their wives behind to maintain a presence in the settlement. As observed in a study of urban refugees in Kampala (Kalyango, 1999) some refugees have ended up with a dual settlement, that is, some live in urban centres such as Mbarara and Kampala and only return to the settlement when there is food distribution or a census.\n\nThe majority of refugee women respond to these hindrances in their attempts to establish a livelihood by building up their social capital. For instance, they respond to the lack of labour in the households as a consequence of the absence of men, by forming groups through which they harness their joint labour. Women for example cooperate in cultivating each other’s gardens as a group. They also participate in community activities such as women’s groups, or as volunteers with humanitarian agencies operating in the settlement.\n\nSome refugee women work as social workers for the Uganda Red Cross Society or as Community Volunteers for the International Medial Corps (IMC). Social capital is developed through vertical (patron/ client) or horizontal (between individuals with shared interests) networks that increase people’s trust and ability to work together and expand their access to wider institutions (DFID, 2001). Social capital helps to increase women’s productivity, improves their access to income generating activities and facilitates the sharing of knowledge (Ibid.).\n\nFurthermore, some women have devised survival strategies such as the use of sex and marriage to achieve livelihood goals. For instance, they either exchange sex for services they need or engage in outright prostitution. Joseph (not real name), who runs a drug shop in the settlement, revealed that at times women request to exchange sex for drugs in case they have no money.\n\nAnother livelihood strategy of women is that of marriage as agency to access livelihood resources. Women seek marriage [10] to either nationals or refugee men. In the absence of role models and evident benefits from formal education, marriage has remained as the only option for many. Girls are married off as early as 16 years to acquire income or dowry and or extra labour for the household. Refugees reported that if a girl reaches puberty then she is ready for marriage as in the case of Esther: Esther lost her husband in 1994 in Rwanda while fleeing the genocide with her under-aged daughter Doris. When she arrived in Nakivale refugee settlement, she got involved with a Rwandan man in order to secure social support and survival. She gave away Doris to another man to marry her. The man was later arrested for defilement which is illegal in Uganda after a marriage ceremony attended by the Refugee Welfare Committee members. Doris’s mother refused to give evidence against her son-in-law arguing that Doris was of age and that the man had been wrongly arrested.\n\n9 The request for fees arises out of the poor facilitation of the police units in the settlements.\n10 At times they cohabit with men with no formal marriage ceremonies.\n\n7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "study of urban refugees in Kampala", "confidence": 0.14389865100383759}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Early marriages arise out of the communities’ view that women’s place in society is in the home (Obbo, 1990:210). Early marriages however have a negative impact on girls’ access to education and building up their human capital. Human capital represents the skills, knowledge, ability, labour and good health that together enable people to pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve their livelihood objectives (DFID, 2001).\n\nThe study concurs with the World Bank (2000:152) which observed that when girls reach adolescence, they are generally expected to spend more time on household activities such as cooking, cleaning, collecting fuel and water and caring for children.\nMoreover, quite often men marry young girls not for companionship but as extra labourers in households.\n\nSuch attitudes have partly led to high school drop out rate for girls in higher classes (secondary school level) despite high enrolment rates in lower classes (primary school level). Education policies have emphasised the enrolment of girls in both primary and secondary school and not their retention in school. Whereas girls are encouraged to attend school, nothing much has been done to provide an enabling environment for their retention in school. According to the Government of Uganda’s Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) policy, refugees need more education facilities to ensure that children are able to access primary education (GoU, 2004:12).\n\nA closer look at the government strategy shows that it does not address the quality of education and the retention of the girl child in school. For instance, in one of the secondary schools in the settlement, of the 300 students, 200 are boys and 100 are girls. The head teacher said that girls have a high drop out rate because of early marriages, pregnancy and neglect of parents. Mulumba (1998:35-40) noted that there is little motivation to educate daughters and further observed that in the refugee settlements, it is not uncommon for girls as young as 13 and 14 years to marry.\n\nA limited number of women are involved in the informal sector within the settlement instead of only relying on land resources. Some women operate kiosks that sell basic necessities such as sugar, salt, paraffin; others provide services operating hair saloons and restaurants. This concurs with research by Deepa Narayan (2000:45), who observed that poor people try to diversify their sources of income and food by carrying out different income generating activities.\n\nDespite their hard work, it was found that women rarely participate in decisionmaking processes at both the household and community level. This is a result of cultural expectations that perceive women as belonging to the ‘home’ (Tinker, 1990:17) and their preoccupation in care activities that limit their time to actively participate in decision-making.\n\nRefugee women with some form of formal education seek employment in the settlements, although the opportunities are limited. A few semi-skilled women are employed as social workers, community volunteers, teachers or midwives in the health units. In all these activities, they earn incentives that are not commensurate to the work they do, as according to the government of Uganda, refugees are not 8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "supposed to work. Hence, humanitarian agencies cannot sign a contract with them, give them terms of reference and pay them a salary [11] .\n\nAnother livelihood strategy is that of engaging in Functional Adult Literacy (FAL) programs. The majority of the refugees who attend these classes seek to learn English in order to improve their (economic and social) integration into the Ugandan community.\n\nIt is also a strategy of those who hope to be resettled in other countries such as the United States of America, Australia and Canada. Enrolment in English language classes reveals that refugee women have a long-term view of their livelihood beyond the parameters of their households and domestic work. Whereas they thus search for opportunities that can get them and their families out of poverty, at the same time it is important to realize that they are constrained by having to juggle their studying with care and livelihood activities in the households.\n\n**Conclusion**\n\nIn all, conflicts over land between refugees and host populations have had negative impact on the way refugee women access livelihood goals. Land, for the majority of refugee women is central to their survival. In order to overcome the predicaments of land conflicts and inequitable access to resources, refugee women have devised other livelihood strategies to ensure their survival and that of their children. For instance marriage, Functional Adult Literacy and building up of their social capital are seen as agency in this regard.\n\nThe extent to which refugee women can attain livelihood goals is however limited by restrictions on their freedom of movement. As a result, refugees fail to fully utilize livelihood opportunities even when they sneak out of the settlement. Ideally, for a way forward, refugees should be given an opportunity to build their livelihoods outside the framework of the settlement approach which is prone to conflicts with the local population and greatly limits achievement of sustainable livelihoods.\n\n11 Interview with program officer, Uganda Red Cross October 2004 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "REFERENCES Bagenda E, Naggaga A and Smith E (2003), Land problems in Nakivale refugee settlement and implications for refugee protection in Uganda, Refugee Law Project working paper No. 8, Makerere University, Kampala Uganda.\n\nCrisp Jeff (2002) ‘No solution in sight: the problem of protracted refugee situations in Africa,’ paper prepared for a symposium on the multidimensionality of displacement in Africa, Kyoto Japan.\n\nDFID (2001), Sustainable livelihoods guidance sheets, London, United Kingdom.\n\nHarrell-Bond, B (1986), Imposing aid: Emergency assistance to refugees New York: Oxford University press.\n\nHajabakiga Patricia (November, 2004), “Addressing land issues in post conflict settings: the case of Rwanda”, paper presented at a conference on a theme Land in Africa: market asset or secure livelihood, London.\n\nHarrell-Bond, B (2002) ‘Towards the economic and social ‘integration’ of refugee populations in host countries in Africa’, paper presented at an International conference on protracted refugee situations in Africa, Entebbe Uganda.\n\nHolborn W. Louise (1975) Refugees a problem of our time: the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951-1972, Vol. II Metuchen N.J: The Scarecrow Press, Inc pp 1213-1258 Jacobsen, K (2001) ‘The forgotten solution: local integration for refugees in developing countries’, New issues in refugee research, working paper no. 45, UNHCR, Geneva Johns Richard (2003), Participatory Poverty Assessment of Nakivale and Oruchinga Refugee Camps in Southern Uganda: Livelihood Characteristics, Economic Constraints and Recommendations for Change, UNHCR and the Economic and Social Research Council, UK.\n\nKabeer Naila (1994) Reversed realities: Gender hierarchies in Development thought, London: Verso.\n\nKalyango Ronald and Huff Kirk (2002) Refugees in the city: status determination, resettlement and the changing nature of forced migration in Uganda, Refugee Law Project Working paper No. 6, Kampala Uganda.\n\nKasfir Nelson (1988), ‘Land and peasants in Western Uganda: Bushenyi and Mbarara Districts.’ In Hansen Holger B and Twaddle Michael (Eds.) Uganda Now: between decay and development, London: James Carrey Limited.\n\nKalyango Ronald (forth coming), Interfaces of care, institutional policies and livelihood strategies of refugee women in Uganda.\n\nKibreab, G (1989), ‘Local settlements in Africa: a misconceived option?’ Journal of Refugee Studies 2(4):468-490.\n\n11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Mugerwa Kisamba W (1992) ‘Rangeland tenure and resource management: an overview of pastoralism in Uganda’, Makerere Institute of Social Research and the Land Tenure Centre, Kampala Uganda pp 1-35 Mulumba Deborah (2002) ‘Refugee economy and livelihood in East Africa, upbl.\nStudy report, Centre for Refugee Studies Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya.\n\nNuwagaba (2002) ‘Land tenure and administrative issues in Kampala city and their effect on urban development’, a research report by Makerere University and SIDA, Makerere University, Kampala. pp 26-40 Pincwya Ginyera (1998), Uganda and the problem of refugees, Kampala: Makerere University Press. pp 8-25 Pirouet Louise, (1988) ‘Refugees in and from Uganda in the post independence period.’ In Hansen Holger B and Twaddle Michael (Eds.) Uganda Now: between decay and development, London: James Carrey Limited. pp 158-174 UNHCR (2000) The state of the world refugees Fifty years of Humanitarian Action, New York: Oxford University Press inc. pp 275-287 Tshikaka Dzodzi (November, 2004) “Securing women’s land rights: approaches prospects and challenges,” paper presented at a conference on a theme Land in Africa: market asset or secure livelihood, November.\n\nVerma Ritu (2001) Gender, Land and Livelihoods in East Africa: through farmer’s eyes, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. pp. 79-114 Wengi Okumu Jennifer (1996), Dispossession and management of common property: Women and inheritance in East Africa, in Gibson C, Banana A, Ntabirweki J (Eds.) Common property resources management in East Africa, Kampala: Makerere Institute of Social Research.\n\nWorld Bank (2001), Engendering development through gender equality in Rights, Resources, and voice, a World Bank policy research report, New York: Oxford University Press.\n\n12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# **UNHCR Monitoring Visit to Manus Island, Papua New Guinea** **11-13 June 2013**\n\n_UNHCR undertook a visit to Manus Island on 11-13 June 2013 to assess progress by_ _Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) in implementing their obligations under the_ _1951 Refugee Convention since UNHCR’s January 2013 visit and to review the_ _reception conditions at the Regional Processing Centre (RPC)._\n\n**Summary Findings**\n\nUNHCR acknowledges a number of positive developments since its January visit, including the transfer of children and their families back to Australia, and was also impressed by the obvious sensitivity, dedication and good will of staff and officials on site.\n\nDespite these efforts, conditions remain below international standards for the reception and treatment of asylum-seekers. Physical living conditions remain harsh, in particular for asylum-seekers living in the single adult males’ compound.\n\nWhile the ongoing development of excursions and activities available to asylumseekers is welcomed, freedom of movement remains extremely limited.\n\nThe current PNG policy and practice of detaining all asylum-seekers at the closed Centre, on a mandatory and indefinite basis without an assessment as to the necessity and proportionality of the purpose of such detention in the individual case, and without being brought promptly before a judicial or other independent authority amounts to arbitrary detention that is inconsistent with international human rights law.\n\nTransfer arrangements remain problematic and do not appear to reflect the required procedural safeguards under international law, or under the bilateral agreement between Australia and PNG.\n\nPre-transfer assessments do not appear to assess the individual needs of children or persons of heightened vulnerability, or the nature of the facilities and services that would be available to them at the RPC.\n\nUNHCR welcomes the commencement of refugee status determination (RSD) processing, but notes the shortcomings in the legal framework, including PNG laws and regulations. UNHCR considers changes to these laws and regulations need to be implemented to ensure that a fair and efficient process, which meets international standards and is accessible to all asylum-seekers in PNG, regardless of their means of arrival, is put in place.\n\nUNHCR also reiterates the need for durable solutions for those found to be refugees or otherwise in need of international protection, within a reasonable time, consistent with both States’ obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention.\n\nUNHCR Regional Office Tel: +61 2 6281 9104 3 Lyons Place Mob: +61 (0)407 971 686 Lyons ACT 2606 Fax: +61 2 6260 3477 Australia www.unhcr.org.au", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Recommendations**\n\n**Refugee Status Determination**\n\n**A. The Government of PNG should amend the Migration Act and Regulation**\n\n**governing the RSD of asylum-seekers to:**\n\n**I.** **ensure consistency of the domestic legal framework with the**\n**provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, in accordance with the**\n**detailed comments provided by UNHCR;**\n**II.** **set out in detail the asylum processes and procedures in PNG,**\n**including to ensure an independent merit review process and to**\n**incorporate** **complementary** **protection** **and** **non-refugee**\n**statelessness claims to align the procedures with international**\n**standards to which Australia and PNG are party; and**\n**III.** **ensure that the same regime applies to all asylum-seekers**\n**regardless of where they are from or their mode of arrival in PNG.**\n\n**B. The Governments of PNG and Australia should finalize and disseminate**\n\n**as a matter of urgency clear information to asylum-seekers about their**\n**legal rights and entitlements, and provide counselling on the procedures**\n**which will be followed to assess their claims for refugee status including**\n**the legal basis, the decision-making authority and the indicative time**\n**frames for these various steps.**\n\n**C. Additional and specific support should be provided to vulnerable**\n\n**persons, including children, to ensure that they are able to fully**\n**understand and benefit from the RSD processes and procedures. In the**\n**case of unaccompanied or separated children, an independent and**\n**qualified guardian as well as a legal adviser should be appointed and**\n**claims should be prioritized for early attention.**\n\n**D. The Government of PNG should proceed, as a matter of priority, to**\n\n**implement its pledge to lift the seven reservations to the 1951 Refugee**\n**Convention.**\n\n**Reception of Asylum-Seekers**\n\n**E. The need for detention of an asylum-seeker should be based on an**\n\n**assessment in the individual case of risk to public order, public health or**\n**national security.**\n\n**F. In the absence of reasonable and proportionate limitations arising from**\n\n**each individual case, asylum-seekers should be provided with freedom of**\n**movement as a matter of priority and the Centre on Manus Island should**\n**be made an open centre.**\n\n**G. The Government of PNG should establish a legal framework which**\n\n**outlines the permissible bases for detention, which should be consistent**\n**with international law and in line with UNHCR’s Detention Guidelines.**\n**Such a legal framework would ensure that asylum-seekers be given**\n**reasons for their detention in writing and be allowed to challenge the**\n**decision to detain, with periodic reviews thereafter to ensure no one is**\n\n2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**detained longer than necessary, with express maximum periods for such**\n**detention.**\n\n**H. The consideration of alternatives to detention, as well as improvements in**\n\n**the physical living conditions for asylum-seekers on Manus Island, are**\n**urgent and should be undertaken as soon as possible.**\n\n**Children**\n\n**I.** **UNHCR recommends that children and their families not be transferred to**\n**Manus Island under these arrangements.**\n\n**J. If children are to be transferred, PNG should develop specific legal**\n\n**measures and administrative guidance to ensure that children are treated**\n**in full respect of their rights under the Convention on the Rights of the**\n**Child.**\n\n**K. In the event that, exceptionally and as a last resort, a child is detained, the**\n\n**safety, security and well-being of that child needs to be assured.**\n\n**L. As a matter of principle, the refugee claims of children and other**\n\n**vulnerable groups should be prioritised for assessment and these should**\n**be carried out by suitably qualified officials who are also able to conduct**\n**‘best interest determinations’ (BIDs).**\n\n**Mental Health**\n\n**M. Against a background of deteriorating mental health on the part of the**\n\n**asylum-seekers, the recommendations contained in this report should be**\n**addressed as a matter of urgency.**\n\n**Oversight and Monitoring**\n\n**N. Australia and PNG should continue to ensure that appropriate**\n\n**independent oversight bodies are able to gain access to asylum-seekers**\n**at the Centre on Manus Island.**\n\n**O. Australia and PNG should consider establishing an Advisory Committee**\n\n**to provide advice to the respective Governments on issues arising out of**\n**the implementation of the arrangement and be a body to which the**\n**Governments might refer issues for guidance and advice.**\n\n**Pre Transfer Assessments**\n\n**P. Pre-transfer assessments conducted in Australia should fully take into**\n\n**account the individualized needs of vulnerable individuals, including**\n**children, the elderly, survivors of torture or trauma, disabled persons and**\n**persons with specific health needs.**\n\n**Q. Pre-transfer assessments should also contain a realistic assessment of**\n\n**the actual quality of support and capacities of service providers on PNG,**\n**within the legal, operational and physical conditions currently prevailing.**\n\n3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_**I.**_ _**Introduction**_\n\n1. On 11-13 June, a three-person UNHCR team visited Manus Island. The visit\nfollowed the earlier visit by UNHCR on 15-17 January 2013. [1] 2. UNHCR undertook both visits pursuant to its supervisory role under Article 35 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and Article II of the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (collectively referred to as ‘the 1951 Refugee Convention’), to which Papua New Guinea (PNG) is a party.\n\n3. The terms of reference were to: assess the extent to which Australia and PNG were implementing their obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and other related international obligations; review the reception conditions for asylum-seekers and refugees at the temporary ‘Regional Processing Centre’ (RPC) located at Lombrum Naval Base, Manus Island; and meet with officials, service providers and asylum-seekers to hear any concerns they might have in relation to their situation.\n\n4. During its 11-13 June visit, UNHCR met with senior officials from the Governments of Papua New Guinea (PNG Immigration and Citizenship Services Authority – PNG ICSA) and Australia (Department of Immigration and Citizenship – DIAC), as well as senior staff of the key service providers: G4S (security and logistics); International Health and Medical Services (IHMS) (health and medical services); Salvation Army (case management and welfare); and, Save the Children (education and child welfare).\n\n5. UNHCR also met with the majority of the asylum-seekers resident in the RPC at the time of the visit, all of whom were invited to come to meetings in linguistic groupings. UNHCR inspected the facilities and observed a ‘transferee interview’ undertaken by a PNGICSA official who had received mentoring from experienced DIAC officers to undertake such interviews.\n\n6. UNHCR appreciates the assistance of the PNG Government for facilitating this visit and giving full access to all areas and persons at the Manus Island RPC.\nUNHCR also appreciates assistance provided by Australian officials and staff of the service providers, all of whom were helpful in ensuring that UNHCR was able to achieve the objectives of the visit.\n\n7. UNHCR acknowledges the significant efforts being made to ensure the treatment of asylum-seekers, refugees and stateless persons is progressively improved in what continue to be extremely challenging conditions, in a remote and isolated location.\n\n8. At the time of the 11-13 June 2013 visit, there were 302 asylum-seekers at the temporary RPC facility at Lombrum Naval Base. Some 200 of the asylumseekers were single adult males. The breakdown by country of origin for the single adult males was as follows: Vietnamese (59), Afghan (50), Iranian (39), Iraqi (36) and Pakistani (16). The remaining 102 asylum-seekers consist of 1 UNHCR Report on its 15-17 January 2013 visit was published on 4 February 2013 and is available online at: www.unhcr.org.au 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "family groups, including 26 children. [2] The breakdown of the family groups by country of origin was as follows: Sri Lankan (64), Iranian (32), Iraqi (4), Afghan (1) and Pakistani (1).\n\n9. The team reviewed progress in relation to recommendations made in February 2013, in light of major developments.\n\n_**II.**_ _**Legal framework for transfer arrangements**_ 10. UNHCR maintains its view that the transfer of asylum-seekers from Australia to PNG, as an arrangement agreed by two Convention States, does not extinguish the legal responsibility of the transferring State for the protection of the asylum-seekers affected by the arrangements.\n\n11. UNHCR assessed the current conditions and treatment of transferees against the following standards and agreed principles, which must be guaranteed for each asylum-seeker transferred: (i) be individually assessed as to the appropriateness of the transfer, subject to procedural safeguards, prior to transfer. Pre-transfer assessments are particularly important for vulnerable groups, including unaccompanied and separated children. The best interests of the child must be a primary consideration; (ii) be admitted to the proposed receiving State; (iii) be protected against _refoulement_ ; (iv) have access to fair and efficient procedures for the determination of refugee status and/or other forms of international protection; (v) be treated in accordance with applicable international refugee and human rights law standards, for example, appropriate reception arrangements; access to health, education and basic services; safeguards against arbitrary detention; identification and assistance of persons with specific needs; and (vi) if recognized as being in need of international protection, be able to enjoy asylum and/or access a durable solution within a reasonable time. [ 3] 12. Furthermore, in addition to these standards against which the transfer arrangements are assessed, UNHCR is of the view that, at the time of the visit, the terms of the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) relating to the transfer of asylum-seekers had also not been met. These terms included the commitment by PNG to make an assessment, or allow an assessment to be made, of claims for refugee status, and the commitment by both Governments to ensure that relevant human rights standards would be met. [4] 2 As of 11 May 2013, there were 26 children, though, at the time of the visit, UNHCR understands that one child had turned 18, leaving 25 children.\n\n3 UNHCR, _Guidance Note on bilateral and/or multilateral transfer arrangements of asylum-seekers_, May 2013, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/51af82794.html 4 Clauses 14, 15, 16 and 18 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the Government of Australia, relating to the transfer to and assessment of persons in Papua New Guinea, and related issues, signed 8 September 2012.\n\n5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_**III.**_ _**Refugee Status Determination**_ _Regulatory framework_ 13. Since January 2013, the Government of PNG has passed Migration (Amendment) Regulation No. 1 of 2013 to provide the Immigration Minister of PNG with guidance in respect of determining refugee status of non-citizens who are transferred to PNG under the MOU between the Governments of PNG and Australia.\n\n14. Several provisions of the Regulation are inconsistent with PNGs commitments under the 1951 Refugee Convention, including that it: (i) reinforces differential treatment of asylum-seekers depending on manner of arrival, which could amount to discrimination; (ii) incorrectly applies the limited exclusion provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention to ordinary criminal matters more properly dealt with under PNG criminal law, which could lead to wrongful denial of refugee status for certain categories of persons; (iii) incorrectly allows for exclusion on the basis of ‘a demeanour incompatible with a person of good character and standing’ in relation to behaviour carried out at or after arrival in PNG; and (iv) does not provide for adequate procedural safeguards, such as independent merits review of first instance decisions.\n\n15. UNHCR encourages PNG to further amend the law and regulations to cover both complementary protection and non-refugee statelessness claims to align the treatment of transferees more closely to applicable international standards and commitments made by the two Convention States respectively.\n\n16. UNHCR provided the Government of PNG with comments on the new Regulation, which should be further reviewed to reflect PNG’s international obligations.\n\n17. In particular, UNHCR recommends that the Government of PNG develop a legal framework for assessing the international protection needs of all asylumseekers arriving in PNG, by whatever means.\n\n_Capacity building_ 18. The Government of PNG has recruited a number of officials who will undertake refugee status determination (RSD) in PNG, and UNHCR understands that, while these will initially be focusing on assessing the claims for refugee status of those asylum-seekers transferred from Australia to PNG, the intention is that they will also, in the future, undertake RSD for other asylum-seekers arriving in PNG.\n\n19. UNHCR agreed to provide an introductory capacity-building session to officials of the Government of PNG, in keeping with its broader capacity-building activities in the Pacific region, to outline the key elements of the international 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "protection system. This training was completed in Sydney in the period following the visit, on 24-26 June 2013, and formed part of a broader threeweek training programme being undertaken by the officials.\n\n20. UNHCR understands that, subsequent to the three-week training programme, RSD officers will commence RSD with experienced DIAC officials mentoring them for a period of six months. In parallel, experienced DIAC decision makers will be seconded to the Government of PNG to increase its decision making capacity.\n\n21. UNHCR welcomes these developments to improve capacity, but assesses that it will take a period of at least six months’ before PNG officials are able to undertake RSD with any degree of self-sufficiency and that - even then - some ‘quality oversight’ mechanism could usefully be established, including ongoing mentoring support from the Australian Government.\n\n22. It is also noteworthy that at the time of the capacity-building training, final procedural guidelines were not yet available. Although UNHCR notes that progress on drafting has been made, the final details of the process, including review mechanisms, were still to be finalized and promulgated.\n\n_Progress on Manus Island towards establishing RSD_ 23. During its visit to Manus Island, UNHCR held discussions with the Centre Manager (PNG Government) and the senior DIAC official (Australian Government) about progress towards establishing the RSD process for the asylum-seekers, some of whom have been at the temporary centre since 21 November 2012.\n\n24. A team of Australian lawyers was to arrive on Manus Island to provide asylumseekers with assistance in their refugee claims in the week beginning 24 June 2013. Eligibility interviews were to commence not long afterwards.\n\n25. Initial interviews – described as ‘transferee interviews’ – that are designed to elicit details about the asylum-seekers, their families, the route they took to Australia and some basic information about why they came to Australia have commenced, with only 63 such interviews said to be outstanding at the time of the visit. Initially transfer interviews were undertaken by experienced DIAC officers with PNGICSA officers observing. As at the time of the visit, the interviews were being undertaken independently by PNGICSA officers.\n\n26. UNHCR observed two half interviews (the second half of one, followed by the first half of another). They appear to be very similar in nature to ‘entry interviews’ conducted by the Government of Australia and observed by UNHCR in Australia.\n\n27. UNHCR observed that the interviews were undertaken with professionalism, consistency and attention to detail. The interviews, however, were rigidly directed by use of a detailed template and script, leaving little scope for capture of information relating to individual circumstances of the applicant in his country of origin, or protection problems experienced in transit countries. In some instances, the observer noted that the nature of the interview template forced the interviewer to record information at variance from that being communicated by the applicant. A heavy focus on collection of information relating to routes, 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "methods and persons involved in irregular migration was evident. In light of this focus, it was of concern that applicants were informed that details may be shared with law enforcement agencies as appropriate, but were not offered access to legal advice or counselling.\n\n28. Asylum-seekers who met with UNHCR continued to express confusion over the processing arrangements that would apply to them in PNG. As during UNHCR’s 15-17 January 2013 visit, many advised that the information they received on arrival about the process was limited and confusing. Many were somewhat reassured by indications that processing would commence imminently, though most expressed severe anxiety and unhappiness about indications they continued to receive from RPC staff that the asylum-seekers were likely to remain on Manus Island anywhere from two to five years. Many expressed a deep sense of injustice about why such a small number of them had been selected for transfer to Manus Island out of the 20,000 or so who had arrived by boat to Australia. This sense of injustice was compounded by the harsh conditions, their likely protracted stay, and uncertainty about their eventual fate.\n\n29. UNHCR understands information fact sheets about the process have been drafted but not yet finalized. UNHCR is keen to see these finalized and deployed, especially in view of the uncertainty and confusion expressed by asylum-seekers.\n\n30. Some asylum-seekers expressed concern that they would be denied refugee status on the basis of having been charged with certain minor offences under PNG law. There are 18 asylum-seekers in this situation, all of whom remain on bail at the RPC, and regarding whom court cases are pending.\n\n31. While UNHCR acknowledges that all asylum-seekers are subject to the laws of the country in which they find themselves, the 1951 Refugee Convention sets out exhaustive bases on which someone may be excluded from refugee status or expelled. The 1951 Refugee Convention does not allow for denial of status on the basis of minor criminal offences and to do so would be disproportionate to the potential harm resulting. Such matters can and should be properly dealt with under the ordinary criminal law of PNG, and not lead to the denial of refugee status.\n\n32. UNHCR received positive indications from officials in PNG, including at the international Ministerial Meeting on 10 December 2011, that it would lift the seven reservations to the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, UNHCR notes that despite the positive pledges made, 18 months has elapsed without any apparent progress in having the reservations lifted.\n\n33. UNHCR welcomes progress made towards the establishment of an RSD system to allow for processing of asylum-seekers transferred from Australia to PNG. UNHCR also appreciates the efforts made by PNG, in cooperation with Australia, to ensure there is sufficient capacity and expertise among officials to process all refugee claims fairly and expeditiously.\n\n34. UNHCR reiterates its concerns that procedural guarantees, including access to fair and efficient RSD procedures, were not in place at the time of transfer, and that a significant period of time has elapsed between arrival of asylum-seekers in PNG and the establishment of an appropriate RSD process. Progress has 8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "been made, but it remains to be seen how and when final RSD decisions will be made and handed down.\n\n35. UNHCR notes that there has been progress on drafting the procedural guidelines which decision makers will be required to follow, and welcomes consultation on these, as well as on the procedures for merit review.\n\n**Recommendations: Refugee Status Determination**\n\n**A. The Government of PNG should amend the Migration Act and Regulation**\n\n**governing the RSD of asylum-seekers to:**\n\n**I.** **ensure consistency of the domestic legal framework with the**\n**provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, in accordance with the**\n**detailed comments provided by UNHCR;**\n**II.** **set out in detail the asylum processes and procedures in PNG,**\n**including to ensure an independent merit review process and to**\n**incorporate** **complementary** **protection** **and** **non-refugee**\n**statelessness claims to align the procedures with international**\n**standards to which Australia and PNG are party; and**\n**III.** **ensure that the same regime applies to all asylum-seekers**\n**regardless of where they are from or their mode of arrival in PNG.**\n\n**B. The Governments of PNG and Australia should finalize and disseminate**\n\n**as a matter of urgency clear information to asylum-seekers about their**\n**legal rights and entitlements, and provide counselling on the procedures**\n**which will be followed to assess their claims for refugee status including**\n**the legal basis, the decision-making authority and the indicative time**\n**frames for these various steps.**\n\n**C. Additional and specific support should be provided to vulnerable**\n\n**persons, including children, to ensure that they are able to fully**\n**understand and benefit from the RSD processes and procedures. In the**\n**case of unaccompanied or separated children, an independent and**\n**qualified guardian as well as a legal adviser should be appointed and**\n**claims should be prioritized for early attention.**\n\n**D. The Government of PNG should proceed, as a matter of priority, to**\n\n**implement its pledge to lift the seven reservations to the 1951 Refugee**\n**Convention.**\n\n_**IV.**_ _**Reception conditions**_ _Progress to permanent facility_ 36. At the time of the visit, all asylum-seekers remained at the temporary RPC at Lombrum Naval Base pending the future construction of a permanent facility.\nPNGICSA confirmed to UNHCR that a site had been identified for the new permanent RPC, and advised UNHCR that the permanent facility will provide asylum-seekers with better conditions and greater freedom of movement.\n\n9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "37. This proposed site will be very close to Lorengau (the capital of Manus Island), which could be expected to allow for significantly greater opportunities for interaction with the local population and activities outside the RPC. [5] UNHCR viewed the designated site from the road and noted the site’s close proximity to the Manus Island capital and secondary school.\n\n38. UNHCR understands that the tender process sought a design which would accommodate 600 asylum-seekers in three blocks of 200 each. The design would be ‘family friendly’ with the possibility of conversion in part or in whole to accommodate single adult males.\n\n39. Clearing and surveying the new site has commenced and it was anticipated by DIAC and PNGICSA officials that construction work would commence in July.\nAlthough UNHCR understands there is a rough estimate of seven months to completion of the new RPC, there was no clear time frame for the completion of the permanent facility and associated improvements in the conditions provided to asylum-seekers.\n\n_Progress at temporary facility_ 40. In the six months since UNHCR’s 15-17 January 2013 visit, asylum-seekers have remained at the temporary facility at Lombrum Naval Base.\n\n41. The facility is broadly divided into three sectors: a compound housing single adult males; a compound housing families; and operational, administrative and staff quarters. The single adult males are accommodated in tents, whilst the families are accommodated in demountable ‘dongas’.\n\n42. Although the facility remains essentially unchanged since January, some progress was observed in a number of areas. During the visit, UNHCR was able to observe the playing field in use as a recreational area for volleyball, soccer and other exercise, and a clearer separation between the single adult males and family groups has been created, introducing a narrow ‘no man’s land’ space between the two compounds. Additionally, provision of excursions has increased and connections with local schools allow for some exchanges between local students and asylum-seeker children. Consultative groups with asylum-seekers have been instituted.\n\n43. Nevertheless, UNHCR overall found the living conditions for all asylum-seekers to be harsh, as outlined below. Many of the service providers who spoke with UNHCR agreed with this assessment.\n\n44. The single adult males are accommodated in canvas tents, some with tarpaulins over them to prevent leakage in the often heavy rains. Many of them were in need of repair. The tents are close together; the different ethnic groups are close together; the tents contain between four and six men in each.\nThe temperature generally on Manus Island is high and inside the tents it is extremely high. All the tents have fans, but they only provide limited relief from the heat.\n\n5 The current, temporary RPC is located over 30 minutes drive from Lorengau, within the Lombrum naval base on Los Negros Island (though generally referred to as part of ‘Manus Island’).\n\n10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "45. During interviews with UNHCR, many of the single adult men expressed the following concerns about living conditions: (i) cramped conditions and need for more space; (ii) hygiene issues in relation to ablutions block; (iii) heat, especially late afternoon and at night in the tents; (iv) desire for greater space between ethnic groups; (v) the nature of the food being served (in terms of hygiene); and (vi) the desire to be able to do their own cooking 46. The Family Compound houses asylum-seekers in ‘dongas’, similar to shipping containers, which are around three metres by three metres. Each of these is home to either a couple (two persons) or a couple with a child/minor relative (three persons). The dongas in which three persons were housed contain one camp bed and one pair of bunk beds, with limited space to store belongings.\n\n47. For their part, the families expressed many of the same issues (though the actual living conditions are not quite as harsh as those of the ‘tent city’ experienced by the single adult men).\n\n48. In addition, the families were particularly concerned about: (i) the close proximity of the children and young women to the single adult males, who are separated visually and physically by a narrow ‘no man’s land’ and colorbond fences; (ii) children continued to hear angry outbursts, fighting and other frightening sounds from the single adult male compound; (iii) young women felt threatened by the close presence of so many single adult men; and (iv) the proximity of the men was of general concern to the family groups who said they did not feel safe living so close to the large number of single adult males.\n\n_Freedom of movement_ 49. Progress has been slow to achieve greater freedom of movement and access to local schools. The lack of a clear legal framework for freedom of movement is compounded by the remoteness of the location and slow negotiations with the local community.\n\n50. At the time of the visit, all but four asylum-seekers had cleared security and health requirements and were therefore able to take part in organized excursions. The health and quarantine requirements include inoculations, which have posed some issues for the four remaining asylum-seekers, which UNHCR understands are in the process of being resolved.\n\n51. At the time of the visit, two excursions by bus were arranged each day, each of which catered for about thirty asylum-seekers. The asylum-seekers are able to register their interest and thereafter take it in turns to participate in excursions.\nCurrent capacity allowed for approximately two excursions per week per asylum-seeker. Excursions allowed asylum-seekers to alight from the bus in some locations around the island, under close escort, but there was limited scope for specific activities during these excursions on Manus Island.\n\n52. Efforts were being made to introduce more meaningful activities, such as art or cultural awareness-raising activities, and options for allowing asylum-seekers to 11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "undertake voluntary work in the community were, similarly, being explored.\nUse of the playing field within the RPC was provided to asylum-seekers for a couple of hours each afternoon to play sports and undertake other activities.\nAsylum-seekers were allowed to cook their own meals on two nights per week, with use of communal cooking facilities allocated by roster.\n\n53. UNHCR welcomes the efforts officials and service providers working in the Centre have made to ameliorate the asylum-seekers’ difficult living conditions, to organize excursions and to provide meaningful activities for the asylumseekers.\n\n54. Nevertheless, UNHCR was deeply concerned by the ongoing deprivation of freedom of the asylum-seekers in the Centre, especially in the harsh and crowded conditions. While the physical limitations of the Centre appear to be fairly low-security, there is a significant presence of security guards and no one is allowed to enter or leave without explicit permission.\n\n55. The remoteness of the location, the nature of the facility (on a naval base) and the difficult living conditions appear to contribute to the all-pervasive sense of frustration and despondency which, if left unresolved for a protracted period, is likely to lead to increased levels of psycho-social and physical harm of those affected.\n\n56. This is particularly serious for children (who are dealt with separately below).\n\n57. Overall, UNCHR concludes that the current arrangement for the housing of asylum-seekers at the RPC constitutes detention under applicable international law. According to UNHCR’s Detention Guidelines, ‘detention’: _...refers to the deprivation of liberty or confinement in a closed place_ _which an asylum-seeker is not permitted to leave at will, including, though_ _not limited to, prisons or purpose-built detention, closed reception or_ _holding centres or facilities._ [6] 58. Most asylum-seekers have been detained for protracted periods, without processing or assessment of their claims to international protection, in difficult conditions.\n\n59. Since UNHCR’s last visit, there continues to be: (i) no adequate domestic regulatory framework for detention; (ii) no adequate process by which the necessity of detention of an individual is made or reviewable; (iii) no clearly defined process in place to consider claims for refugee status, although such a process is imminent; and (iv) no time limit on the period which detention will last.\n\n60. The current PNG policy and practice of detaining all asylum-seekers at the closed Centre, on a mandatory and indefinite basis without an assessment as to the necessity and proportionality of the purpose of such detention in the individual case, and without being brought promptly before a judicial or other independent authority amounts to arbitrary detention that is inconsistent with international human rights law.\n\n6 UNHCR Detention Guidelines: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/503489533b8.pdf 12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Recommendations: Reception of Asylum-Seekers**\n\n**E. The need for detention of an asylum-seeker should be based on an**\n\n**assessment in the individual case of risk to public order, public health or**\n**national security.**\n\n**F. In the absence of reasonable and proportionate limitations arising from**\n\n**each individual case, asylum-seekers should be provided with freedom of**\n**movement as a matter of priority and the Centre on Manus Island should**\n**be made an open centre.**\n\n**G. The Government of PNG should establish a legal framework which**\n\n**outlines the permissible bases for detention, which should be consistent**\n**with international law and in line with UNHCR’s Detention Guidelines.**\n**Such a legal framework would ensure that asylum-seekers be given**\n**reasons for their detention in writing and be allowed to challenge the**\n**decision to detain, with periodic reviews thereafter to ensure no one is**\n**detained longer than necessary, with express maximum periods for such**\n**detention.**\n\n**H. The consideration of alternatives to detention, as well as improvements in**\n\n**the physical living conditions for asylum-seekers on Manus Island, are**\n**urgent and should be undertaken as soon as possible.**\n\n_**V.**_ _**Children**_ 61. At the time of the visit, UNCHR observed that: (i) there were 25 children housed at the Centre; (ii) educational and child welfare services were provided by Save the Children Australia; (iii) children were provided with formal education programmes in a classroom on site, and the education programme was coupled with extra-curricular activities; and (iv) negotiations to send children to local schools had not been successful, for a number of reasons, including the fact that local schooling is conducted in the Tok Pisin language.\n\n62. Asylum-seekers expressed particular concerns about: (i) the deprivation of liberty for children; (ii) the deteriorating mental health of children in the RPC, which was impacting on their ability to engage in educational activities; (iii) the trauma caused to the children by being in close proximity to the single adult male compound, notwithstanding the additional measures taken at the Centre to provide a visual and greater physical barrier between the two groups; (iv) the uncertainty associated with the length of time the children and youth were expected to spend on Manus Island, during their formative years; (v) the lack of tertiary education for those children entering adulthood; 13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "(vi) the health issues associated with the Centre, including fear of malaria as well as fear of the measures being taken to prevent malaria (medication and spraying); (vii) inadequacy of educational facilities; (viii) the unsuitability of the terrain for children to play (including areas of rocky ground, with glass shards and other debris); and, (ix) lack of access to human rights institutions and lawyers.\n\n63. Service providers also indicated that while all efforts were being made to organize excursions and other meaningful activities, the nature of detention and the conditions at the Centre, especially the proximity to the single adult males and the lack of adequate space, had caused significant distress to the families and huge stress on the children. This stress was only likely to increase with time.\n\n64. Since the visit, the Governments of PNG and Australia began to transfer children and their families back to Australia from Manus Island. At the time of writing, UNHCR understands all family groups, including children, have been returned to Australia from PNG.\n\n65. In view of the current shortcomings at the temporary facility, UNHCR welcomes this development and encourages the Governments of Australia and PNG to end the transfer and detention of children at the Manus Island RPC.\n\n66. Under international law, children should only be held in immigration detention facilities as a ‘last resort’ and for the ‘shortest appropriate period of time’. [7] 67. A child’s best interest is a primary consideration in all decisions made in relation to children, [8] and refugee children are entitled to special protection and assistance. [9] 68. While the children’s rights to education, to rest and leisure, to engage in play and recreational activities are actively promoted at the Centre, UNHCR is deeply concerned by the transfer of children to a closed detention facility with no time limit for when freedom of movement may be achieved. An overall ethic of care – and not of enforcement – is the appropriate response for all interactions with asylum-seeking children. [10] 7 CRC, art. 37 (b); UNHCR Detention Guidelines, guideline 9.2.\n8 CRC, art. 3; UNHCR Detention Guidelines, guideline 9.2 [51]; UNHCR Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests of the Child; UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment 6 [31].\n9 CRC, art. 22.\n\n10 UNHCR Detention Guidelines, guideline 9.2.\n\n14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Recommendations: Children**\n\n**I.** **UNHCR recommends that children and their families not be transferred to**\n**Manus Island under these arrangements.**\n\n**J. If children are to be transferred, PNG should develop specific legal**\n\n**measures and administrative guidance to ensure that children are treated**\n**in full respect of their rights under the Convention on the Rights of the**\n**Child.**\n\n**K. In the event that, exceptionally and as a last resort, a child is detained, the**\n\n**safety, security and well-being of that child needs to be assured.**\n\n**L. As a matter of principle, the refugee claims of children and other**\n\n**vulnerable groups should be prioritised for assessment and these should**\n**be carried out by suitably qualified officials who are also able to conduct**\n**‘best interest determinations’ (BIDs).**\n\n_**VI.**_ _**Mental health**_ 69. Many of the asylum-seekers UNHCR met with expressed a profound sense of injustice and perceived discrimination arising from their selection for transfer to Manus Island while the vast majority of asylum-seekers who had arrived in Australia remained on Australian territory and, in many cases, had been released with freedom of movement into the Australian community.\n\n70. All asylum-seeker groups expressed deep anxiety and said their mental health was deteriorating.\n\n71. Despite the concerns voiced by asylum-seekers, UNHCR understands that there have been no incidents of self-harm recorded at the Manus Island facility in the period between its visits. It was clear that significant efforts of the Salvation Army and Save the Children, and the positive and empathetic approach of numerous G4S staff and officials on site are helping to defuse tensions and mitigate, as far as possible, the mental health effects of long term detention.\n\n72. However, a number of officials and service providers to whom UNHCR spoke, expressed concerns over the likely deterioration of mental health of asylumseekers at the facility if certainty and progress was not made in processing and case resolution. UNHCR welcomed advice that a torture and trauma counselling team was expected to arrive on Manus Island in early July, to have a permanent presence.\n\n73. While UNHCR’s Team did not include a medical officer, it noted that all asylumseekers on Manus Island displayed apparent signs of anxiety and depression.\nWhile action to respond to this is welcome, it is regrettable that this action is remedial rather than preventative. UNHCR is left with the overall impression in the temporary RPC of a volatile environment in which otherwise minor disagreements or misunderstandings had the potential to spark significant 15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "tensions or self-harm as pressure, uncertainty and feelings of vulnerability increased among the asylum-seekers.\n\n**Recommendations: Mental health**\n\n**M. Against a background of deteriorating mental health on the part of the**\n\n**asylum-seekers, the recommendations contained in this report should be**\n**addressed as a matter of urgency.**\n\n_**VII.**_ _**Physical health**_ 74. UNHCR inspected the medical facilities in the Centre. These appeared small, but well-equipped and well managed by professional and sensitive service providers. The fact that asylum-seekers had to be driven to the medical centre, rather than having direct access continued to be an issue for many.\n\n75. At the time of the visit, there were only limited dental services available on Manus Island.\n\n76. IHMS advised that the pre-transfer screenings which take place in Australia are very thorough and the PNG Government is very strict in requiring asylumseekers to be in good health prior to transfer, due to the tropical conditions and remote location of Manus Island.\n\n77. Nonetheless, UNHCR noted that many asylum-seekers expressed concern about: (i) their deteriorating physical as well as mental health; (ii) the limited medical services available; (iii) the time it took to access medical treatment; (iv) the limited medication they were issued with; (v) the need for tranquillizers and sleeping pills to sleep; and (vi) the need for more specialized gynaecological resources.\n\n_**VIII.**_ _**Assisted voluntary returns**_ 78. UNHCR was informed that recently 19 Vietnamese nationals and one Iraqi had volunteered for assisted voluntary returns (AVR) to their countries of origin. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) had spent two weeks on Manus Island to discuss the possibility of assisted voluntary returns for asylum-seekers who expressed an interest.\n\n79. In addition, asylum-seekers were able to access IOM by telephone at any time.\nICSA and DIAC officials gave assurances that asylum-seekers were fully counselled and the voluntariness of any returns was fully explored and assured.\n\n80. While UNHCR fully supports the need for a functional AVR programme to help any asylum-seeker return home at any time, it is concerned that some asylumseekers who may be bona fide refugees might contemplate a return to a country of origin as a result of the uncertainty around processes in PNG, and the prospect of lengthy delays in accessing a permanent solution, in onerous detention conditions. This may be particularly prevalent where asylum-seekers 16", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "are reduced to a psycho-social state of hopelessness and despondency.\nUNHCR considers it essential that any returns are fully informed and consensual, and not prompted by uncertainty and protracted detention.\n\n_**IX.**_ _**Oversight and monitoring**_ 81. Within the RPC, there is a complaints mechanism accessible to asylumseekers and managed by the Salvation Army. Any complaints are referred to DIAC (as the manager of the service providers) for written response and delegated follow up as required. In this regard, UNHCR notes that in the environment of the RPC, there are few available spaces for staff to meet with asylum-seekers to discuss sensitive issues in private.\n\n82. UNHCR recommends the Governments of PNG and Australia consider establishing an Advisory Committee which could advise them on issues arising out of the implementation of the arrangement and be a body to which the Governments might refer issues for consideration. Such an Advisory Committee has been established in the case of the Australia-Nauru transfer arrangements, and were contemplated in the Australia-Malaysia transfer arrangements. A similar advisory body would be of assistance to both States in addressing the challenges of processing in this location.\n\n83. Such an Advisory Committee could allow the Governments to have the benefits of the advice of independent experts in various aspects of the reception, treatment and processing of claims for refugee status of asylum-seekers. It would also increase the transparency of the arrangements.\n\n84. UNHCR appreciated full access to all areas and asylum-seekers at the RPC during its visit. It was grateful also, that the Centre Manager and senior DIAC officials indicated that they would be happy to put up posters informing asylumseekers of the contact details for UNHCR. It also understands that the ICRC also has access to the Centre, which it welcomes.\n\n**Recommendations: Oversight and Monitoring**\n\n**N. Australia and PNG should continue to ensure that appropriate**\n\n**independent oversight bodies are able to gain access to asylum-seekers**\n**at the Centre on Manus Island.**\n\n**O. Australia and PNG should consider establishing an Advisory Committee**\n\n**to provide advice to the respective Governments on issues arising out of**\n**the implementation of the arrangement and be a body to which the**\n**Governments might refer issues for guidance and advice.**\n\n_**X.**_ _**Pre-transfer assessments**_ 85. As related in its 4 February 2013 Report, “special procedures for vulnerable individuals with clear pre-transfer assessments by qualified staff (including best interests determination for children, especially unaccompanied and separated 17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "children)” [17] form an integral part of the suite of measures to be agreed by the transferring States and implemented in practice by those States.\n\n86. In the period following its 4 February Report, UNHCR has reviewed a further sample of pre-transfer assessments conducted by DIAC prior to the transfer of asylum-seekers, including Best Interest Assessments (BIAs) where undertaken by Australian officials regarding the situation of children.\n\n87. UNHCR remains concerned by a number of aspects of the pre-transfer assessment process, including the limited scope allowed by the assessment template for analysis of individual needs and vulnerabilities. The sample assessments reviewed continue to indicate that the assessment process does not appear to make a comprehensive analysis of the physical and mental characteristics (physical or mental health of the persons, special needs identified, fitness to travel, and other vulnerabilities), nor, apparently, are the actual resources at the RPC given adequate weight and consideration.\n\n88. In the case of children, UNHCR considers a BIA should result in an individualized assessment of the situation of the child and include recommendations on protection and care interventions. [11] 89. UNHCR remains of the view that the legal framework and detention environment at the Manus Island facility fall short of international standards of protection, it is difficult to see how a determination of the best interests of transferee children, appropriately weighed, could lead to a conclusion that adequate and appropriate levels of care and support are currently available on the island. The recent transfer of children and their families to Australia, which UNHCR welcomes, appears to support this finding.\n\n**Recommendations: Pre Transfer Assessments**\n\n**P. Pre-transfer assessments conducted in Australia should fully take into**\n\n**account the individualized needs of vulnerable individuals, including**\n**children, the elderly, survivors of torture or trauma, disabled persons and**\n**persons with specific health needs.**\n\n**Q. Pre-transfer assessments should also contain a realistic assessment of**\n\n**the actual quality of support and capacities of service providers on PNG,**\n**within the legal, operational and physical conditions currently prevailing.**\n\n90. UNHCR stands ready to provide technical advice or assistance to the Governments of PNG and Australia in effecting the changes recommended in this report.\n\nUNHCR Regional Representation Canberra, 12 July 2013 11 UNHCR, Field Handbook for the Implementation of UNHCR BID Guidelines (November 2011), 7.\n\n18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# **The 2014 Afghanistan Refugee and Returnee Overview**\n\n**Mandated lead agency: UNHCR**\n**Contact information: Clare Askew, Assistant Programme Officer askew@unhcr.org**\n\nPEOPLE IN NEED\n\n# 515,600\n\n(Pakistani refugees, Afghan returnees and undocumented vulnerable returnees)\n\n# OF PARTNERS\n(NOTE: UNHCR lead refugee response working with 16 partners) PEOPLE TARGETED\n\n# 30,000 Pakistani\n\nrefugee families\n\n# 245,600 Afghan\n\nrefugee returnees\n\n# 45,000 Afghan\n\nundocumented vulnerable returnees REQUIREMENTS (US$)\n# 62.82 million\n\n**Key objectives**\n\n- Provide 30,000 refugee families with protection and essential services in Khost and Paktika;\n\n- Facilitate informed, voluntary repatriation of refugees as a key humanitarian focus for Afghan\nrefugees from Pakistan, Iran and other non-neighbouring countries;\n\n- Deliver humanitarian and return assistance to 45,000 vulnerable undocumented Afghan\nreturnees from Iran and Pakistan consisting of deportees and returnees including those displaced from North Waziristan Agency.\n\n**Chapter** **Core Activities**\n\nPakistani Refugees - Improve or maintain quality of registration and profiling\n\n- Ensure uniform treatment and standards of protection and services for all refugees\n\n- Foster security from violence and exploitation: protection of children strengthened, risk of SGBV is\nreduced and quality of response improved\n\n- Provide food assistance to meet immediate food needs\n\nAfghan refugee returnees - Respond to immediate protection needs on return, with particular focus on cash grants to facilitate travel and short term integration needs, and referrals where appropriate\n\n- Identify persons with specific needs\n\n- Broaden scope of Returnee Monitoring to identify protection concerns in return areas and address\ngaps\n\n- Promote peaceful coexistence between returnees and local communities by identifying tensions or\nscarce resources and advocating for interventions with relevant actors to mitigate potential repeated displacement Afghan undocumented vulnerable returnees\n\n- Provide immediate protection services including screening, identification of Persons with Specific\nNeeds and first hand humanitarian assistance.\n\n- Provide transportation to final destination\n\n- Support the most vulnerable groups with flexible short term reintegration support\n\n1 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Humanitarian Needs Overview: District vulnerability ranking matrix for refugees**\n\n**Absorption**\n\n**Capacity**\n**Vulnerability**\n\n**District**\n**Province** **District**\n\n**ID**\n\n**Refugee**\n**Population**\n**Vulnerability**\n\n**Unmet Needs**\n\n**Vulnerability**\n\n**Access**\n**Vulnerability**\n\n**Wash**\n**Vulnerability**\n\n**Overall**\n**Ranking**\n\n**Khost** Gurbuz 2607 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.21 1.00 # 0.79\n\nSpera 2611 0.52 0.56 0.94 0.95 0.76 0.74 Tere Zayi (Alishir) 2608 0.27 0.16 0.22 0.74 0.84 0.44 Shamal-Lakan 2610 0.26 0.50 0.14 0.21 0.87 0.39 Mando Zayi 2605 0.21 0.10 0.09 0.53 0.84 0.35 Sabari 2602 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.79 0.33 Tani 2606 0.18 0.08 0.05 0.53 0.64 0.29 Khost (Matun) 2601 0.37 0.07 0.35 - 0.57 0.27 Nadir Shah Kot 2604 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.53 0.79 0.16 Jaji Maydan 2613 - - - - - 0.00 Musa Khel 2603 - - - - - 0.00 Qalandar 2609 - - - - - 0.00 Bak 2612 - - - - - 0.00\n\n**Total Khost**\n\n**Paktika** Barmal 2515 0.85 0.64 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.86\n\nUrgoon 2510 0.02 0.01 0.04 1.00 0.79 0.37 Wazakhwah 2513 0.00 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.79 0.36 Surubi 2509 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.79 0.36 Paktika Center (Sharan) 2501 - - - - Mata Khan 2502 - - - - Yosuf Khel 2503 - - - - Yahya Khel 2506 - - - - Sar Rawza 2504 - - - - Omna 2507 - - - - Zarghun Shahr 2505 - - - - Gomal 2508 - - - - Jani Khel 2512 - - - - Ziruk 2517 - - - - Nika 2511 - - - - Giyan 2516 - - - - DilaWa Khushamand 2518 - - - - Wormamay 2514 - - - - Turwo 2519 - - - - -\n\n**Total Paktika**\n\n**Calculation of Coefficients**\n\n- Families in Need = Refugee Families - Families that Received NFIs\n\n- Refugee Population Vulnerability = Refugee Population / Highest district Refugee Population;\n\n- Absorption Capacity Vulnerability = Refugee Population / Local Population\n\n`o` (The coefficients thus obtained were normalized, so that they would all be in the range from 0 to 1)\n\n- Unmet Needs Vulnerability = Refugee Families / Highest district Refugee Families\n\n- Overall ranking = Unweighted average of specific rankings\n\n2 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Humanitarian Needs Overview: Provincial vulnerability ranking matrix for all returnees**\n\n**Returnees from**\n**Pakistan, Iran and**\n\n**other countries**\n\n**(Individuals)**\n\n**Vulnerable**\n**Undocumented**\n**Migrant Returnees**\n\n**Total returnee**\n**population (refugee**\n**and undocumented)**\n\n**Province**\n\n**Last 3 years** **Last 3 years** **Total**\n\nBadakhshan 279 1,409 1,688 935,327 0.0018 0.01 0.09 0.05 Badghis 180 972 1,152 487,838 0.0024 0.01 0.12 0.07 Baghlan 7,032 4,155 11,187 894,838 0.0125 0.25 0.66 0.45 Balkh 6,012 2,836 8,848 1,298,247 0.0068 0.21 0.36 0.28 Bamyan 513 670 1,183 439,899 0.0027 0.02 0.14 0.08 Daykundi 182 1,694 1,876 417,476 0.0045 0.01 0.24 0.12 Farah 1,835 4,853 6,688 498,951 0.0134 0.06 0.70 0.38 Faryab 1,636 2,799 4,435 981,197 0.0045 0.06 0.24 0.15 Ghazni 1,497 1,888 3,385 1,208,559 0.0028 0.05 0.15 0.10 Ghor 78 1,863 1,941 679,085 0.0029 0.00 0.15 0.08 Hilmand 4,762 1,532 6,294 909,395 0.0069 0.17 0.36 0.27 Hirat 7,599 5,356 12,955 1,852,790 0.0070 0.27 0.37 0.32 Jawzjan 2,718 1,014 3,732 530,751 0.0070 0.10 0.37 0.23 Kabul 24,397 4,971 29,368 4,227,261 0.0069 0.86 0.36 0.61 Kandahar 8,262 764 9,026 1,200,929 0.0075 0.29 0.39 0.34 Kapisa 655 1,224 1,879 433,867 0.0043 0.02 0.23 0.13 Khost 1,313 32 1,345 565,211 0.0024 0.05 0.12 0.09 Kunar 8,159 945 9,104 443,272 0.0205 0.29 1.08 0.68 Kunduz 15,024 6,703 21,727 990,937 0.0219 0.53 1.15 0.84 Laghman 5,357 1,967 7,324 438,346 0.0167 0.19 0.88 0.53 Logar 4,600 670 5,270 385,638 0.0137 0.16 0.72 0.44 Nangarhar 28,406 10,389 38,795 1,489,787 0.0260 1.00 1.37 1.18 Nimroz 180 20,842 21,022 162,135 0.1297 0.01 6.80 3.40 Nuristan 264 4 268 145,574 0.0018 0.01 0.10 0.05 Paktika 183 232 415 427,692 0.0010 0.01 0.05 0.03 Paktya 5,255 118 5,373 542,896 0.0099 0.18 0.52 0.35 Panjsher 276 98 374 151,004 0.0025 0.01 0.13 0.07 Parwan 2,241 1,205 3,446 653,362 0.0053 0.08 0.28 0.18 Samangan 645 378 1,023 381,459 0.0027 0.02 0.14 0.08 Sar-e-Pul 2,392 2,193 4,585 550,238 0.0083 0.08 0.44 0.26 Takhar 2,378 3,336 5,714 966,576 0.0059 0.08 0.31 0.20 Uruzgan 95 254 349 380,469 0.0009 0.00 0.05 0.03 Wardak 939 911 1,850 586,623 0.0032 0.03 0.17 0.10 Zabul 573 231 804 299,125 0.0027 0.02 0.14 0.08\n\n**Total** **145,917** **88,508** **234,425**\n\n3 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS**\n**Refugees and undocumented vulnerable migrant returnees displaced to Khost and Paktika**\n\n**I. MOST LIKELY SCENARIO**\nKey assumptions: 1) Military operations and fighting in Pakistan (North and South Waziristan agencies) may cease but the population will probably gradually return to Pakistan after March/April due to destruction of infrastructure, winter and reduced opportunities for livelihood in the area of origin. If the fighting continues, it is expected that there will be limited population movements towards Afghanistan as it will be difficult to travel during the winter months.\nThus, refugee population is expected to stabilize.\n2) Absorption capacity of the host families will decrease during winter and as resources are exhausted, thus, the population figure in the camp may increase.\n\nOperational Assumptions: 1) Humanitarian access will continue to be limited, it is estimated that national and international organizations, including Government have 60% access in Khost and 20% access in Paktika.\n2) Humanitarian community and local authorities will continue to receive sufficient resources from donors.\n\nRefugee Response Plan 1) Planning Figure: 30,000 families ( _planning figure is subject to verification_ *).\n2) Area of Operation: Khost and Paktika (limited reach/access in Paktika) Operational Priorities 1) Registration and provision of international protection (*verification exercise is planned in the course of the 2014/15) 2) Provision of humanitarian assistance, with a focus on moving away from emergency towards stabilization, including sectors such as shelter, education and health/WASH 3) Humanitarian assistance to focus on supporting host communities to continue providing assistance to the influx 4) Assistance to the host communities is on a community-basis and not individual-basis, with a focus on integrating development actors as early as possible 5) Switch to durable solutions, with a focus on facilitation of voluntary return, in second half of the year (May to October) 6) Monitoring with specific focus on Protection issues\n\n**II. WORST CASE SCENARIO**\nKey Assumptions: 1) Military Operations continue outside NW/SW and more refugees arrive in Afghanistan 2) Host communities lose all absorption capacity and large numbers of refugees need to be hosted in additional camps Operational assumptions: 1) Security worsens: No access to Paktika and more restricted access in Khost 2) Lack of donor interest Population Figures: 1) 40,000 families: 30,000 families in Khost and 10,000 in Paktika, of which 15,000 in camps in Khost.\n\n4 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Afghan refugee returnees**\nWhile there are fewer returnees as compared to the peak years (2002-2008), Afghanistan is still the largest repatriation operation in the world. Refugees surveyed in Pakistan cited increased insecurity and economic concerns as the two biggest reasons for their continued stay in exile, in particular due to the uncertainty and heightened risk of tensions over the election period in 2014.\n\nFor 2015, and based on regional consultations, UNHCR anticipates that refugees will continue to return to Afghanistan from Pakistan, Iran and other countries, with a possible slight increase on 2014 election year figures. The validity of the Proof of Registration cards (PoR) for Afghans in Pakistan has been extended until December 2015 and it is unclear what status refugees in Pakistan will have after this date.\n\nFor 2015 planning purposes, UNHCR will use the figure of 172,000 Afghan refugee returnees. While there may be progress towards the planning figure of 172,000 returnees- during 2015, UNHCR Afghanistan shall channel prioritized operating level resources towards a more realistic figure of 50,000 refugees returning. However, of those returning the vulnerability figures are expected to be higher than previous years, with refugees repatriating who may be facing increasing intimidation, deteriorating economic opportunities or the possibility of camp closure in countries of asylum.\nTherefore an increase of people with specific needs is anticipated, identified on their return.\n\nThe total number of refugee returnees receiving UNHCR reintegration assistance in 2015 is estimated at 245,600, including both those arrivals in 2015, and those having returned during 20122014.\n\n**Undocumented vulnerable returnees**\nAfghanistan is expected to continue through a series of transitions: political, economic and security.\nThe uncertainty associated with these transitions will continue to impact population movement in and surrounding Afghanistan. In addition, the flow of deportations and voluntary return is largely contingent on a combination of regional political dynamics between Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries, which may impact their policies towards undocumented Afghans. As it is almost unpredictable to ascertain what could affect the migration trend and what would be the result, it is important to maintain the post-arrival assistance mechanism at the border points to be the base of collective response for possible mass return from Iran or Pakistan. The sudden displacement from North Waziristan Agency following military operations in Pakistan since June 2014 is a good example.\n\nSince 2007, there were 200,000-300,000 Afghans deported per year from Iran and Pakistan. Every year since 2012, IOM has assisted between 30,000 and 40,000 identified vulnerable Afghan returnees who crossed through Islam Qala in Herat, Milak in Nimroz and Torkham in Nangarhar province. Since May 2014, IOM has also assisted over 500 identified Afghan undocumented families displaced from North Waziristan Agency in Pakistan to Khost and Paktika province. In 2015, based on above observations as well as previously assisted numbers, IOM predicts that the flow of movement from the three border crossing points with Iran and Pakistan will remain at a similar level as in 2014.\nRegarding the undocumented Afghan families from North Waziristan Agency arriving in Khost/Paktika, under the most likely scenario, the flow is expected to stabilize. However, in 2014 undocumented Afghan families are still leaving Pakistan due to ongoing insecurity and will require assistance in 2015.\n\n5 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["Refugees surveyed in Pakistan"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Proof of Registration cards", "confidence": 0.6715040802955627}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**1.** **IDENTIFIED NEEDS**\n\n**Pakistani Refugees**\nBased on Focus Group Discussions conducted with both refugees and members of host communities, UNHCR has sought to identify the immediate needs and protection risks faced by Pakistani refugees, as well as the impact on host communities since the beginning of the displacement in June 2014. The most urgent need that has emerged is shelter: while the host communities have been very welcoming and have readily opened their homes to refugees, in some districts the number of refugees is very close to the local population. Available accommodation (as well as other resources) is therefore very limited, particularly as winter approaches and sleeping in open air is no longer possible. Other priority needs emerging from the focus group discussions included NFIs, health care, and water. Refugees also cited poverty, lack of job opportunities, and limited resources in Afghanistan as increasing existing vulnerabilities.\n\nWhile the displaced population tends to share close family, tribal, and friendship ties amongst themselves and with the host community, there have nonetheless been identified cases of women, elderly, and children without support, though these are limited in number. UNHCR plans to conduct interventions for these and other vulnerable categories through the persons with specific needs (PSN) programming. Other planned protection interventions include camp management, mine clearance and mine risk education, emergency education, identifying and addressing gender based violence issues, identification and necessary interventions on behalf of unaccompanied and separated children, family tracing, and protection monitoring. It is also anticipated that the lack of resources and livelihood opportunities will make it difficult for refugees to return to Pakistan when the security situation stabilizes sufficiently to allow for voluntary repatriation. Therefore, it is anticipated that UNHCR will provide assistance when refugees decide that conditions have improved sufficiently to allow them to return home.\n\n**Returnees**\nThe prioritised focus of UNHCR’s operations in Afghanistan will remain the implementation of the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees in cooperation with the Government. UNHCR will continue to provide assistance to refugee returnees at all stages of the return process, including providing information in the countries of asylum and facilitation of joint ‘go-and-see’ visits, as specified in the quadripartite agreement. UNHCR will work to ensure that return is informed, voluntary, and sustainable.\n\nThe absorption capacity in Afghanistan remains challenging. Despite some progress in the health, education, construction, trade and agriculture sectors since 2001, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. The deteriorating security situation and withdrawal of international security forces, high levels of unemployment, landlessness, limited access to basic services (particularly in areas of high return and disputes over property rights will continue to present impediments to return and reintegration.\n\nReintegration of refugee returnees cannot be viewed as being facilitated solely by humanitarian interventions. Humanitarian assistance must be complemented with development interventions to ensure sustainability of interventions. Therefore building partnerships with development actors is a key priority for the operation, which must be closely monitored. In large urban settings and provincial capitals, development actors have been reluctant to engage despite the obvious need. The lack of development contributes to growing insecurity and the presence of insurgents. This cycle of poverty and insecurity in turn results in continuously increasing displacement both inside and outside these provinces. Returnees are particularly vulnerable to forced internal displacement.\n\n6 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The primary focus of all UNHCR interventions, both immediate humanitarian assistance and longerterm integration, is to advance protection principles. In some cases, this will involve addressing protection concerns directly, for instance, through SGBV support projects, or legal assistance programmes. In others, it may involve undertaking activities that will lead to a future protection dividend, for instance, livelihood projects that result in a reduced risk of secondary displacement.\nAssistance that is able to bring about a protection dividend shall be prioritized: for example, building a well in a location where it is likely to create a more harmonious relationship between IDPs and the host community. UNHCR will strengthen the capacity of communities to integrate and protect returnees and IDPs, as well as increase the incentives and reduce the cost for communities. At the same time, UNHCR will encourage returnees and IDPs to contribute to local communities through participation in local governance.\n\nReliable information on the numbers, location and condition of returnees – disaggregated by age, gender and other key indicators – is essential for improving the protection of returnees. Thus, Information Management forms a keystone of the protection strategy. In order to gather information and ensure that programmes are sensitive to the specific protection needs and capabilities of different groups, UNHCR aims to undertake regular rights-based, participatory assessments and monitoring visits to both IDPs and returnees, engaging Age, Gender and Diversity mainstreaming principles.\n\nSecondly, UNHCR will reach out to government and development actors to encourage them to mainstream returnees into their existing programmes. The aim is to bridge the humanitarian / development divide, thus ensuring persons of concern continue to receive protection after the immediate “humanitarian” phase has passed and are ultimately able to achieve a durable solution.\nUNHCR recognizes that many returnees wish to live in urban areas, which poses specific challenges to both humanitarian and development responses. In light of this trend, UNHCR’s pursuit to the right to freedom of movement is essential, particularly to ensure that no returnee should be forced to return to their place of origin, or be resettled to another place where their lives or safety are threatened.\n\n**Undocumented vulnerable returnees**\nMany deportees and spontaneous returnees arrive in Afghanistan in a highly vulnerable physical and mental state and are unprepared for the process of reintegrating into their home communities.\nHumanitarian support continues to be required to prevent vulnerable undocumented returnee families and individuals from being at risk of death, secondary displacement, sexual abuse, kidnap and other kinds of violation of human rights upon their return. Recently conducted surveys confirm that short-term, post-arrival assistance continues to be a key need upon return as 73% of respondents from Herat, Nangarhar and Nimroz listed it as one of the top three concerns followed by shelter/housing (44%) and financial support (30%).\n\nFor Afghan families displaced from North Waziristan into Khost and Paktika, the largest need in 2015 will continue to be non-food items, food, tents and medical assistance. In addition, families have indicated the need for transport and reintegration assistance as many are not able to return back to Pakistan.\n\nFor many returning Afghan migrants, reintegration remains a challenge. In 2011, an IOM survey of returned migrants found that only 23.3% of respondents had been able to find paid employment. As described above for refugee returnees, for undocumented returnees there is also a need to integrate long term reintegration support within humanitarian assistance. In particular, IOM has identified an urgent need for direct reintegration support for specific, highly vulnerable PSN groups of non-refugee returnees with high protection risks, which includes unaccompanied minors and single female returnees.\n\n7 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["IOM survey of returned migrants"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "IOM survey", "confidence": 0.6541650295257568}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "IOM survey of returned migrants", "confidence": 0.2768807113170624}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Unaccompanied migrant children continue to be the largest single group of vulnerable non-refugee returnees assisted by IOM since 2009. Minors move primarily due to lack of employment opportunities in Afghanistan, and because the heads of their families had no form of income or were not producing sufficient income. While in the country of exile (Iran) and in the process of deportation, many report facing treatment which is concerning from a protection standpoint. There is an urgent need to intervene and avoid secondary displacement by providing minors and their families with means of generating income while providing minors primarily with education and a practical skill set.\n\nAnother vulnerable group are single female returnees who face particularly high protection risks and reintegration challenges. A majority of these women were in need of shelter and vocational training to resume their lives in Afghanistan. Other groups include non-refugee returnee families who were displaced from North Waziristan Agency due to military operations who are unable to return back to their homes as well as drug-addicted individuals.\n\n2. **RESPONSE STRATEGY**\n\n**Registration**\nGiven its centrality to understanding the refugee population, profile, and vulnerabilities, all of which are crucial to designing appropriate and effective interventions, registration is a priority activity for 2015. Due to significant logistical challenges, mostly linked to large numbers of new arrivals and a lack of access due to insecurity, assessments of refugee families have until now been conducted at the household level on the basis of emergency verification. These assessments are being conducted for the purpose of fixing population figures and assistance distribution, and are not intended for refugee status determination purposes or the issuance of documentation.\n\nAt this point in time, transitioning to individual registration will help to stabilize the numbers and facilitate planning further assistance targeting the most vulnerable among the population. The exact modalities of the registration exercise are being discussed with the Government of Afghanistan, and a mission from Geneva is planned to identify the feasible registration options for this context. The authorities may consider the issuance of documentation for refugees, while UNHCR will continue to maintain and update a database system for all refugees in Khost and Paktika.\n\nThe registration campaign will require significant resources, both in terms of human resources and logistics. It is estimated that it will be carried out in the first three months of 2015 in all districts of Khost and Paktika with refugee presence. The exercise will pave the way for the development of targeted longer-term strategies for durable solutions, facilitate voluntary repatriation when appropriate and help to identify vulnerable individuals.\n\n**Protection Interventions**\nIn coordination with relevant partners, UNHCR will undertake core protection activities additional to registration in all districts, including assistance to vulnerable cases under the PSN programme (nonfood items and cash assistance of up to USD 500 over one year for chronic and very vulnerable cases), legal assistance, child protection and gender/GBV interventions. The humanitarian community will also continue to carry out focus group discussions along an AGDM (Age, Gender and Disability Mainstreaming) approach with refugee men, women, and young people both in the communities and in the camp. The purpose of these discussions will be to highlight protection and assistance needs of refugees. Separate focus group discussions will be conducted with the host communities.\n\n8 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The entry point for child protection is primarily through the provision of educational services, which include psychosocial support. In Khost, emergency education is being implemented in a partnership between the provincial Department of Education, NRC and UNICEF, and includes both children in Gulan Camp and children living in communities. In Paktika, where the only implementing partner is the Department of Education, teachers in the refugee population have been hired by the DoE to run temporary learning centres, and will receive training and support to provide psychosocial services to children as part of the educational programme. Additional child protection activities will focus on the identification of unaccompanied minors (UAMs) and separated children (SC). Cases involving UAMs will be sent to the Best Interest Determination (BID) committee for identification of appropriate care arrangements, while SCs will be monitored and referred to the BID committee in cases in which neglect, abuse, or other problems in existing care arrangements are identified. Cases will be referred to ICRC for family tracing as appropriate.\n\nGender Based Violence (GBV) work will focus in identification of cases at risk through awarenessraising and establishment of effective communication networks through which GBV incidents or risk factors can be reported. Participation by refugee women in focus group discussions and recentlyestablished women’s _shuras_ in Gulan Camp and host communities will help to give voice to protection risks and concerns, which can then be mitigated through appropriate interventions.\nUNHCR will also seek to establish an effective referral system, ensure coordination with relevant national authorities and provide vocational training and educational opportunities to vulnerable female and male groups.\n\nThe provision of services to the local population is essential to avoid the perception amongst host communities that the refugees constitute a burden on the community or existing local services.\nAccordingly, it is important to ensure that services and activities are provided for both the hosting communities and the refugees\n\n**Afghan Refugee Returnees**\nAfghanistan is the largest repatriation operation in the world, despite the fact that rates of return are much lower compared to the peak years between 2002 and 2008. In total, more than 5.8 million Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan in the last 12 years; over 4.7 million returned with UNHCR and MoRR support. This figure represents over 20% of the current population in Afghanistan. This poses considerable challenges to the country’s absorption capacity.\n\nFor 2015 planning purposes, this plan will use the conservative figure of 50,000 Afghan refugee returnees, in need of life-saving assistance to return to their place of origin/intended destination in Afghanistan.\n\nPrioritized activities include immediate return assistance needs (cash grants, travel assistance, and short-term integration needs and shelter assistance), protection activities (including legal representation), and community-based interventions promoting peaceful co-existence. Activities include the following:\n\n- Ensuring provision of immediate return assistance (repatriation cash grants, travel assistance,\nprovision of non-food items and shelter assistance), protection and basic assistance at point of entry; supporting education registration, lifesaving healthcare, and essential vaccinations for children under 5 years of age; basic mine awareness and transit facilities;\n\n- Cross-border monitoring, returnee tracking, profiling and an annual multi-functional\ncomprehensive needs assessment;\n\n- Providing legal assistance to help obtain security of land tenure to reduce the threat of forced\nevictions;\n\n- Promoting targeted community-based interventions in areas of high return, including in urban\nsettings where increasing numbers of returnees are settling; 9 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "- Awareness-raising for the purpose of reducing the risk of GBV and strengthening reporting\nmechanisms; providing appropriate referrals and assistance to GBV victims; strengthening national capacity for sustainable reintegration through an integrated approach aimed at facilitating the transition from humanitarian assistance to long-term development.\n\nThe most vulnerable returnees, including female-headed households and unaccompanied minors will be prioritized for the provision of shelter and access to basic services on arriving at their place of return.\n\nIn 2015, UNHCR will conduct an annual needs assessments through a multi-functional team involving both humanitarian and development actors to assess refugee returnee needs across Afghanistan, within all sectors. Focus group discussions will be conducted according to the principles of the AGDM/Gender Marking approach. The multi-functional team consists of Protection and Shelter Cluster regional coordinators in all regions, with Health, WASH and FSAC Cluster members in respective regions. Focus group discussions will be conducted separately for returnee women, girls, boys and men.\n\nHousing, land and property disputes are problematic due to limited availability of land (including agricultural land, pasture, and 'high value' land in cities), water, firewood and fodder and aggravated by environmental degradation. Some of these disputes also result in displacement, which has historical social, environmental, economic and political contexts. Therefore, UNHCR and partners will ensure that all assessments, programming and advocacy efforts will adhere to a 'Do No Harm' framework and that conflict-sensitive solutions provided by UNHCR and other partners are grounded in environmental protection and sustainability.\n\nShelter and basic services assistance will be provided through a community-based approach, which will strengthen resilience through self-help programmes contributing to promoting peaceful coexistence within the communities. The community takes primary responsibility for identifying eligible beneficiaries to receive shelter assistance, while the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MORR), other local authorities, implementing partners, and multi-functional team members play advisory and coordination roles.\n\nThe shelter Beneficiary Selection Committee must include members of the Community Development Councils (CDCs) where present or the provincial, district, village shura, (committee of elders and trustees), or local authorities (district authorities, provincial representatives of MORR). Joint monitoring will be carried out through established communication channels with beneficiaries, including on land and property issues such as land disputes, ownership, women’s access and control of land, engaging with government for relocation sites, social and housing issues. The shelter package includes one latrine per family, thereby increasing environmental hygiene in beneficiary communities. The shelter programme seeks to contribute to local economies wherever possible by using skilled and unskilled labour in the local market, and by local procurement of raw materials.\n\nUNHCR will continue supporting the Afghan Government’s efforts to develop the role of women and has a strong commitment to the participation of women in decision making and project implementation. Recognising the challenges of facilitating female participation, all interventions strive to involve women in selection, implementation, monitoring, and management to the greatest extent possible within regionally and culturally appropriate contexts.\n\n**Undocumented vulnerable returnees**\nThe planned target group in 2015 are 45,000 of the most vulnerable undocumented Afghan returnees from Iran and Pakistan including those families displaced from North Waziristan Agency who are in need of live-saving assistance and return assistance to their province of origin.\n\n10 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Under the framework of its post-arrival humanitarian assistance, IOM will provide a comprehensive set of services starting with initial screening and referral of identified vulnerable undocumented Afghan returnees according to its established vulnerability criteria in coordination with the Directorate of Refugees and Repatriation (DoRR). This will be followed by provision of non-food item (NFI) kits, food packages for families in need, health screening and referral, and provision of overnight accommodation and services at a transit centre. If needed, family tracing will be carried out for vulnerable individuals including unaccompanied minors. Protection screening and psycho-social counselling will also be provided in light of observed trend of some beneficiaries suffering from experiences while in detention or deportation procedures. Legal counselling, including facilitating registration for E-Tazkira at transit centres will also be made available for returnees.\n\nThe above humanitarian actions will be complemented by direct reintegration support to specific highly vulnerable groups of non-refugee returnees with high protection risks. For these groups, IOM plans to respond to their needs by providing different forms of direct reintegration support through a flexible reintegration package. As an example, single female returnees will receive shelter and reintegration and educational training support at the transit centre in Herat. IOM will most importantly conduct a local market assessment of which income generating activities they could carry out in light of their vulnerable socio-economic status (e.g. home-based activities) after which they will be provided with literacy and other educational training. For UAMs, IOM plans to provide educational and skills training for the minors while providing vocational trainings/business development package to heads of households which are suited to labour market demands. These activities will involve DoRR as well as Directorate of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled in order to strengthen their capacity in return and reintegration assistance.\n\nProvision of vocational training or educational assistance to these groups will not only support their sustainable reintegration but also support to mitigate various risks such as; becoming a victim of human trafficking or engaging in irregular migration, increasing their vulnerability to a host of other protection risks.\n\n11 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The following sectors are solely in response to the Pakistani Refugees**\n\n**Protection**\nThe provision of services to the local population is essential to avoid the perception amongst host communities that the refugees constitute a burden on the community, or on existing local services and the environment, potentially inflaming feelings of resentment. Accordingly, it is important to ensure that services and activities are provided for both the hosting communities and the refugees, such as maintaining or improving the local infrastructure (roads, hospitals, and schools) and ensuring access to resources including water.\n\nRegistration is a priority activity and will help UNHCR and partners to better understand the refugee population, profile and vulnerabilities. This exercise will pave the way for development of longerterm strategies, design effective interventions and facilitate voluntary repatriation and. Other protection concerns include access to social services, particularly health care; family separation, including unaccompanied or separated children; presence of single women and elderly without support within the population; access and mobility for disabled; the risk of human trafficking; access to assistance by all community members, particularly women and girls; and the risk of mines and unexploded ordnances both in the camp and in communities.\n\n**Camp Management**\nCurrently, there is only one camp and it is located in Gurboz District, Khost Province. No provision is being made for additional camps, however if the Government decides to open more refugee camps, additional funding will be required. Approximately 3,500 families live in Gulan Camp and it is expected to reach at least 4,000 by January, climbing to 5,000 families by spring. The overall objectives are to provide life-saving assistance and support refuges in organizing themselves to better their conditions in the camp and provide a safe and secure environment where refugees can exercise their rights. In particular, UNHCR will continue to undertake basic site planning and infrastructure work in the camp, security measures in coordination with the authorities, as well as shelter.\n\nCamp Governance: UNHCR foresees the following community services as essential in order to promote representation and good governance in Gulan Camp: i) In order to allow community feedback, weekly meetings are held with the camp _shura_, a structure of elders, each representing an average number of 50 families; ii) Dialogue with refugee _Jirga_ and linkage to local _Jirga_ system as appropriate, as well as referrals to formal justice system; iii) Dialogue and activities with female refugees, within a very traditional and conservative context that generally prevents women from moving outside the confines of the family compound; iv) Display of information on services and announcements Site planning and infrastructure: The importance of preserving and promoting a sense of community within the camp is paramount, and will reflect existing community structures. Camp planning is ongoing and should see further developments once the number of refugees is stabilized (with the possibility of a harsh winter, it may be expected that the refugee population currently in the mountainous areas south and south-east of Gulan, in Gurboz district, may decide to settle in Gulan camp). Some of the activities that will take place in the first half of 2015 include: comprehensive drainage system, access roads, construction of four community centres, improvement of warehousing and distribution facilities and construction of basic support services. In parallel, each extended family will be assigned a plot, in a way that preserves the existing settlement pattern in the camp (extended families, sub-tribes, tribes). Site planning will take into consideration possible 12 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "further extension of the camp to the south and west. Site planning and basic infrastructure will be done to the extent possible using refugees and local communities, thus providing Cash-for-Work opportunities.\n\nShelter: Winterization of tents is likely to be largely finished by January 2015. Given the average life expectancy of a tent, the humanitarian community expects to have to replace tents or provide alternative shelter for 5,000 families in the camp in the second quarter of 2015. Decisions on shelter strategy (tents or emergency to transitional shelter) will be taken towards the end of the first quarter based on assessments of refugees’ intentions of returning to Pakistan.\n\nSecurity: The humanitarian community will continue to support the local authorities, who are planning to deploy an additional 53 ANP to provide security surrounding the perimeter of Gulan Camp on a 24-hour basis. Within the camp, support is also required for the deployment of local guards on a 24-hour basis, as well as helping refugees to organize a community watch system.\n\n**Shelter and infrastructure/NFIs for hosted communities**\nWith the exception of protection activities, Quick Impact Projects (QIPS) for peaceful co-existence and shelter, the humanitarian community does not plan to have large-scale interventions for refugees in host communities, but instead encourages an approach that incorporates refugees into development assistance of the communities. As part of the transitional strategy, advocacy efforts will ensure that the local government includes refugees in service delivery and development plans.\n\nIn coordination with other partners with a strong track record in shelter as a durable solution, the shelter operational organisations will develop a strategy to begin in the second half of 2015, after a re-assessment of the situation in the spring. The strategy will be influenced by refugees’ intentions regarding return and will support local communities hosting large number of refugees. In the first half of 2015, shelter will continue to be handled within the emergency response framework, taking into account the need for additional protection against the elements during the first months of the year.\n\nThe humanitarian community will continue to provide basic non-food items for all new arrivals as well as replacing part of the non-food items package (plastic sheets, jerry cans and blankets) on a needs basis for up to 4,000 families in Khost and Paktika; as well as on an emergency basis for persons with specific needs. A total of 2,500 tents will be distributed also on a needs basis.\nOperational partners are revising distribution modalities in order to make them more effective in ensuring predictable and equitable distribution in all communities, as well as Gulan Camp.\n\n**Water, sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)**\nIn 2015, the WASH partners will continue to support both refugees and host communities in Khost and Paktika. Emergency WASH response will continue to focus on life-saving activities including rehabilitation/disinfection of water points (WP), rehabilitation of pipe schemes, water disinfection, distribution of hygiene kits and provision of sanitation infrastructure. The construction of new WPs and sustainable sanitation infrastructures will also be considered as an option in the districts that are under-covered.\n\nBased on refugee’s figures and results of the assessments conducted in 2014, nine districts were identified as priority targets for WASH. In Khost province, in order of priority: (1) Gurboz, (2) Khost Center/Lakan, (3) Mandozayi, (4) Terezayi, (5) Spera, (6) Tani and (7) Matoon Shamal. In Paktika province, the priorities are Barmal and Urgun districts. Barmal is poorly accessible for security reasons. In Khost province, the needs of 128,137 individuals were assessed (29,200 refugees and 98,937 individuals in the host community), using a Rapid Assessment Form to collect quantitative 13 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Rapid Assessment Form", "confidence": 0.1758331060409546}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Rapid Assessment Form", "confidence": 0.22306297719478607}]}}}
{"input": "data at village/community level. In Paktika province, the survey was carried out in two districts (Barmal and Urgun) using qualitative data collection methods (key informant interview and FGD).\n\nBased on the assessments results, the partners in Khost and Paktika have started to respond to acute needs in 2014 and will pursue their efforts in 2015 to reach the selected targets. The activities foreseen in 2015 are detailed in the annex and will cover the acute WASH needs of the affected population where accessibility is granted.\n\nTo prepare for a possible additional refugee crisis in 2015, the WASH cluster will reinforce its operational capacity, among others in developing standard assessment forms, strengthening its contingency plan and training key resources at decentralized levels. Under the oversight of the WASH cluster, partners will be supported in conducting Rapid Assessment and data processing within two weeks following onset of a crisis. Additional decision-making tools will be made available such as a standard WASH Comprehensive Assessment Tool (CAT) and technical guidelines to implement rapid live saving activities\n\n**Emergency Health and Nutrition**\nThe 2014 Humanitarian Needs Overview shows both provinces were among the 13 high-risk provinces identified, to which additional resources from the Common Humanitarian Fund are being used. There was no allocation for emergency primary healthcare services in inaccessible areas, nor treatment of malnutrition in 2014 but it is estimated that the refugees will require substantial nutrition services in 2015. Khost also ranked high with regard to the prevalence of malnutrition with 18.2%; well above the emergency threshold of 15%. In Paktika, the overall malnutrition rates stand at 8.7%. The targets for the Nutrition cluster are calculated using the overall need for the refugees and assuming 50% coverage due to insecurity in many parts of Paktika as well as partner capacity to scale up in the two provinces.\n\nUtilizing existing resources, the Nutrition cluster is currently working on a modality to conduct nutrition surveys in the area in order to assess the nutritional status of the refugee population. It will also determine whether the additional burden for hosting communities may further exacerbate the already high malnutrition rates, particularly in Khost. If the situation worsens, additional funds will be required in order to adequately respond to the need.\n\nThe spread of contagious but preventable diseases, such as measles, polio and Pertussis are high due to very low vaccination coverage of the refugee population. Outbreak of diarrhoeal disease, including cholera is a major concern for both the refugee population and hosting communities, due to the water scarcity in the summer season, endemic prevalence of such diseases and increased population with poor hygiene practices. The health system in both provinces has no capacity to handle a major cholera outbreak, thus cholera treatment centres are urgently required.\n\nIn addition to communicable diseases, the situation merits scaling up of routine primary healthcare services, particularly with regard to maternal and child health and mental health care. It is known that refugee populations in a camp or among host community suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. The large influx has overburdened the health service providers; as such there is a dire need for additional support to meet the increased demand.\n\n**Food Security**\nSince the onset of refugees entering Khost and Paktika in mid-2014, assessments have indicated food assistance to be a top priority. WFP began its emergency food assistance to Pakistani refugees with an initial caseload of 1,500 households. The total number of families supported by WFP has now reached nearly 23,000 households, with an expectation that this may increase to at least 30,000 households in the coming months, based on the current, most-likely scenario. Food distributions will 14 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "nutrition surveys", "confidence": 0.31638410687446594}]}}}
{"input": "at all times focus on most vulnerable populations, who are scattered in 12 districts in Khost and Paktika provinces. The majority are concentrated in Khost centre, Matun, Gulan camp in Gurboz and Bermal district in Paktika. To date, WFP has distributed a total of 4,100 metric tons of mixed food.\n\nAt the field level, WFP has worked closely with the local authorities, UNHCR and other UN agencies, as well as NGO partners. WFP currently has agreements with two NGOs (MEHR & ORCD) for food distribution, and out-sourced monitors who are able to verify that distributions have been completed according to agreed protocols, and help identify any gaps and challenges. An agreement under which UNHCR takes over responsibility for secondary transport and distribution, as per corporate protocols, is due to be in place by November.\n\nHost communities have played an important role in helping refugees meet their basic needs, mainly achieved through depletion of food stocks, selling and consumption of poultry products, and selling of crop seeds set aside for plantation. This had a negative impact on the food security and livelihoods of host communities. In order to address this, the local communities require support with agriculture inputs, certified wheat, maize, mung bean, vegetable seeds, small-scale poultry production, as well as training in livelihood protection. This will bolster their capacity to continue hosting refugees and help compensate for their depleted food and seed stocks.\n\n**Education**\nSafeguarding the right to education is an essential strategy to ensure the protection of children and adolescents and to fulfil its commitment towards the Education for All Framework. Children and adolescents should have access to child-friendly spaces, where recreational and learning activities, as well as psycho-social support, will be provided. Educational activities should be safe enough to provide effective protection to refugee children, adolescents, boys and girls. Prevention and response mechanisms to violence in school should also be established.\n\nAs per initial estimates, 58% of the refugee population are children. Initial educational services and psychosocial support are being are being provided for 2,800 refugee children in grades 1-6 in Khost in a partnership between DoE, NRC and UNICEF. This needs to be expanded to cover all children, including older children, and children need to be provided with Pakistani text books (while both the Pakistani refugees and the host population speak Pashto, the Pakistani children are taught in Urdu and English, and generally do not read Afghan Pashto). In addition, DoE and UNICEF are establishing 100 temporary learning places in Paktika. DoE is providing funding for additional teachers while UNICEF is providing teaching and learning materials as well as tents. UNICEF will provide capacity building support to DoE in Paktika as well as continuing to provide TLM supplies.\n\n**Partnership and Coordination**\nAt the national level, issues with regard to the displacement are dealt with under the National Security Council (NSC). Under the leadership of the NSC, and chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor, a task force monitors ongoing humanitarian activities in Khost and Paktika and provides support to the provincial committees. Members of this task force include representatives from key ministries and the Afghan Red Crescent Society. UNHCR, as the mandated UN agency for refugee response, is represented at the NSC Taskforce meetings. The purpose of the taskforce is to provide regular reports to the President and the National Security Advisor via the task force Chair.\n\nOn the basis of recommendations made by this task force, the GoIRA – in coordination with UNHCR – will lead the refugee response as part of the overall humanitarian response under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator. A Task Force has been set up in Kabul by UNHCR to facilitate the coordination of the response to the refugee and displaced families in Khost and Paktika.\nThe task force includes humanitarian partners directly involved in responding to the arrivals and with current experience from the region. The members include the following UN agencies: FAO, IOM, 15 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "UNFPA, UNICEF, UNMAS, WFP and WHO, as well as national and international NGOs: CARE International, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR), Health Net International (HNI-TPO), International Medical Corps (IMC), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Solidarites International, and The Liaison Office (TLO), as well as the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS).\n\nA task force has also been established in Khost, co-chaired by the Governor of Khost and UNHCR.\nThe Governor of Khost has also set up eleven committees in districts affected by the refugee influx.\nThese committees are headed by various active heads of departments and are aimed at helping with registration, coordination of humanitarian organisations and the facilitation of distribution of humanitarian assistance. These 11 committees report to a central secretariat at the provincial level.\nThis secretariat is responsible for ensuring coherence, setting priorities and monitoring performance to mitigate corruption and enhance transparency and receives direct support from UNHCR. The secretariat reports directly to the Governor of Khost.\n\nThere are a limited number of humanitarian actors in Khost who were able to cover the most essential needs during the emergency phase. The number of actors is slowly increasing and GoIRA, in collaboration with UNHCR, is coordinating the assistance and repartition of coverage by sectors.\nAssistance in areas of WASH, health, shelter and food security is being dealt with by the partners already on the ground, while the Cluster Coordinators are kept informed in Kabul, in order to utilize existing expertise and resources available in-country. Once the emergency phase moves into a more stable response, UNHCR will remain responsible for all protection issues, in coordination with relevant partners.\n\nIn Paktika, assistance and support will be coordinated by the Governor’s office – in cooperation with UNHCR – from Bermal district centre. Remote support to the provincial and district governing authorities will be provided. Regular coordination meetings, co-chaired by the Governor’s office and UNHCR, and national non-governmental organizations on the ground take place and have facilitated the coordination of distribution of assistance to refugee families residing mainly in Bermal and Urgun districts of Paktika. Coordination and liaison between the Governor’s office, UNHCR and national and international organizations also takes place at the Kabul level.\n\n16 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**STRATEGIC PRIORITY THREE: TIMELY RESPONSE TO AFFECTED POPULATIONS**\n\n**OUTCOME THREE: 3.3 TIMELY PROVISION OF LIFESAVING ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES, AFGHAN REFUGEE**\n**RETURNEES AND UNDOCUMENTED VULNERABLE RETURNEES**\n\n**Objective 1:** Provision of protection to Pakistani refugees\n\nOUTPUTS Locations Indicators Target 80-100% of refugees 12,000 children 12,000 children 2,000 families 20,000 vulnerable families 5,000 families 100% Quality of registration and profiling improved Khost and Paktika (including Gulan camp) or maintained % of persons of concern registered on an individual basis Extent children of concern have non-discriminatory access to national child protection and social services school-age children have access to educational and psychosocial services\n\n# of elderly persons of concern who\nreceive services for their specific needs Extent persons of concern are represented in leadership management structures Extent camp coordination mechanisms working effectively % of camp population who received M/ERW Security from Violence and Exploitation: protection of children strengthened, risk of SGBV is reduced and quality of response improved Khost and Paktika (including Gulan camp) Services for persons with specific Khost and Paktika (including Gulan camp) needs strengthened Community-based approach, including participatory assessments, in the emergency operation to ensure that the Khost and Paktika (including Gulan camp) follow-up phase supports communities to regain control of their lives as quickly as possible Camp management and coordination refined Gulan camp and improved Mine and ERW risk education Gulan camp\n\n**Objective 2:** Essential services to Pakistani refugees, while pursuing durable solutions\n\nActivities Locations Indicator Target 5,000 families 5,000 families 5,000 families 5,000 families 5,000 families 5,000 families 17 |\n\nUniform treatment and standards of protection and services for all refugees Gulan Camp Proportion of household with access to a functioning toilet Proportion of household possessing soap Proportion of household with emergency tents Preventative and life-saving health care services provided Supply of potable water increased or maintained Perimeter of the refugee camp secured", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Locations Indicators", "confidence": 0.3072938919067383}]}}}
{"input": "Activities Locations Indicator Target Comprehensive needs assessment 2,500 tents/families 3,000 NFI kits/families 80% of refugees hosted Ensure Refugees have adequate protection from the weather in order to create the necessary privacy, psychological comfort, and emotional safety through provision of emergency shelter and NFI's Khost and Paktika To re-assess post-spring the emergency shelter situation on the ground in order to revise the approach and develop a transitional solutions according Procurement and distribution of emergency tents Population has sufficient basic and domestic items Proportion of households within intervention areas with access to safe drinking water Number of jerry cans distributed 1,142 jerry cans WASH services are provided to refugees Khost and Paktika and the host communities Reduce incidence of maternal and child mortality and morbidity in targeted Khost and Paktika areas\n\n# of children vaccinated 136,221\nvaccinated Proportion of households within intervention areas with soap available at hand washing area Proportion of households within intervention areas with access to a functioning toilet Case fatality rate during epidemics are maintained within internationally agreed standards Case fatality rate during epidemics are maintained within internationally agreed standards 80% of refugees hosted 80% of refugees hosted Measles CFR <5% Cholera <1% Measles CFR <5% Cholera <1% % of new unforeseen emergencies responded to with adequate supplies 100% To provide Food assistance to meet their immediate food needs Khost and Paktika To provide Food assistance to meet # of families supplied with adequate 30,000 most their immediate food needs Khost and Paktika and nutritional food vulnerable refugee families\n\n**Objective 3:** Immediate humanitarian needs for refugee returnees and undocumented vulnerable migrant\nreturnees, are met\n\n# of families supplied with adequate\nand nutritional food Activities Locations Indicator Target 50,000 refugee returnees Voluntary repatriation: protection and basic assistance upon arrival, supporting education registration, lifesaving healthcare, and essential vaccinations for children under 5 years of age, as well as basic mine/ERW awareness, transit facilities and how to access legal aid Undocumented vulnerable returnees: provision of humanitarian assistance and return assistance upon arrival.\n\nThe most vulnerable returnees will be prioritized for the provision of shelter, access to basic services and reintegration assistance UNHCR and DoRR Encashment/ reception centres in Nangarhar, Paktya, Kandahar, Kabul and Herat provinces Herat, Nangarhar, Nimroz, Khost and Paktika Herat, Nangarhar, Kandahar, Kabul, Nimroz, Gardez, Khost and Paktika Areas of highest return with most vulnerable\n\n# of Afghan refugee returnees\nreceiving assistance upon arrival\n\n# of returnees identified\nas People with Specific Needs provided assistance\n\n# of returnees\nassisted at place of return\n\n# of returnee families covered 5,000\nunder UNHCR Protection refugee returnee monitoring (through H/H returnees surveys and tracking interviews, follow up, physical visit of families in their places of return\n\n# of PSNs assisted 45,000\nUndocumented migrant returnees 1,360 returnees (refugee and undocumented 245,600 refugee returnees 18 |", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "returnees surveys", "confidence": 0.5805453658103943}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Pelagea, 73, fled Donetsk in August 2014\u0003** after life under\nshelling in her village became unbearable. She is one of 25,000 internally displaced persons who have sought safety in Mariupol. Life in a collective centre is not easy, with cramped quarters and communal bathrooms and kitchens, but “we help each other,” she says. The IDPs rely on the generous support of the local Ukrainian community, which donates food, clothing and blankets.\n\n**2** UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.5714231729507446}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "I\n\n**INTRODUCTION**\n\nConflict, persecution, generalized violence and violations of human rights continued to cause forced displacement around the world during the first six months of 2015. Fighting across parts of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa have continued into the first half of the year, resulting in millions of individuals being forced to flee either within or outside their country.\n\ny the end of 2014, 59.5 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or human rights violations. **[(1)]** An updated figure on global forced displacement was not available at the time of writing this\n# **B**\nreport. As the number of refugees, asylum-seekers, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) worldwide continued to grow in 2015, it is likely that this figure has far surpassed 60 million. **[(2)]** During the first half of 2015, UNHCR offices reported that at least five million individuals were newly displaced. Some 4.2 million were newly displaced within their own country, while 839,000 were displaced across international borders. This compares to 5.5 million newly displaced persons during the same period in 2014.\nIn addition, in 2015 Europe has experienced exceptionally large numbers of refugees and migrants arriving via the Mediterranean Sea, a majority of whom are from the Syrian Arab Republic and other conflict-affected countries and regions. As most of these arrivals have occurred since June 2015, their numbers are only partly captured in this report.\n\nPopulation of concern to UNHCR By mid-2015, the total population of concern to UNHCR stood at an unprecedented 58.0 million persons. This includes persons who are forcibly displaced (notably refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs), those who have found a durable solution (returnees), as well stateless persons, most of whom have never been forcibly displaced.\nThis categorization is neither identical to nor synonymous with the global number of forcibly displaced persons worldwide (59.5 million by the end of 2014). It not only includes refugees and IDPs beyond UNHCR’s mandate but also excludes returnees and stateless persons.\nA detailed breakdown of UNHCR’s population of concern by category and country is provided in Annex Table 1 on page 16.\n\nThis report analyses displacement trends during the first half of 2015, based on statistics collected by UNHCR, governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Unless otherwise specified, figures are limited to events occurring up to 30 June 2015. The statistics included in this report should be considered provisional and subject to change, especially with regard to asylum trends. n\n\n**(1)** Some 19.5 million persons were refugees: 14.4 million under UNHCR’s mandate and 5.1 million Palestinian refugees registered by UNRWA. The global figure\nincluded 38.2 million IDPs and 1.8 million asylum-seekers. See 2014 Statistical Yearbook at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02afce6.html.\n\n**(2)** An updated figure on global forced displacement will be available in June 2016, on the occasion of the release of the 2015 Global Trends report.\n\nUNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 **3**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2014 Statistical Yearbook", "confidence": 0.7064830660820007}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "statistics collected by UNHCR", "confidence": 0.20893849432468414}], "vague_data": [{"text": "statistics collected by UNHCR", "confidence": 0.1238832101225853}]}}}
{"input": "II\n\n**REFUGEES**\n\nFig. 1 **Refugee population under UNHCR’s**\n**mandate \u0003** | 1990 - 2015*\n\n20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 (in millions) ‘90 ‘95 ‘00 ‘05 ‘10 ‘15\n\n***** 1990-2014 (end-year); 2015 (mid-year)\n\nThe total number of refugees **[(3)]** has increased significantly and consistently over the past four years.\nStarting from 10.4 million at the end of 2011, the number increased to 10.5 million in 2012, to 11.7 million in 2013, and finally to 14.4 million by the end of 2014. By mid-2015, it had reached an estimated 15.1 million, its highest level in 20 years.\nWithin three and a half years, then, the global refugee population grew by 4.7 million persons – some 45 per cent.\nThe main contributing factor to this trend has been the war in the Syrian Arab Republic. Excluding that country, the increase from the end of 2011 to mid-2015 would have been only half a million refugees (+5%). Clearly, the devastating effect of the Syrian conflict is being felt far beyond its neighbouring countries.\nIn addition to the Syrian crisis, the outbreak of armed conflicts or deterioration of ongoing ones in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine, among others, have contributed to prevailing trends. Meanwhile, the number of refugees able to return to their country of origin has trended downward, indicating that many refugees will continue to reside in exile for years to come.\nAs a result of observed trends, sub-Saharan Africa is host to the largest number of refugees (4.1 million), followed by Asia and Pacific (3.8 million), Europe (3.5 million), and the Middle East and North Africa (3.0 million). The Americas hosted 753,000 refugees at mid-2015 [ _see_ **Table 1** _below_ ].\n\nBy Origin The top 10 source countries of refugees recorded at mid-2015 remained unchanged compared to the beginning of the year. However, individual rankings within these top 10 did change during the reporting period.\nThe Syrian Arab Republic remained the largest source country of refugees, with a refugee population of 4.2 million by mid-2015. This figure has increased dramatically, rising from below 20,000 at the end of 2010. As such, starting in mid-2014, the Syrian Arab Republic replaced Afghanistan as the main source country of refugees worldwide, a rank Afghanistan had previously held for more than three decades.\nThe Syrian refugee population grew by more than 300,000 people during the reporting period. Surrounding countries continue to be impacted heavily by the crisis, with the number of registered Syrians in Turkey (1.8 million), **[(4)]** Lebanon (1.2 million), Jordan (628,800), Iraq (251,300), and Egypt (131,900) remaining high.\nOutside the immediate region, Germany was hosting 66,000 Syrian refugees at mid-2015, up from 41,000 six months earlier.\nThe Afghan refugee population remained relatively stable at about 2.6 million. The process to renew Proof of Registration cards for Afghans in Pakistan ended in March 2015. This exercise led to a net increase in the number of Afghan refugees recorded of about 80,000 persons, including some 10,000 new-borns, though this was partly offset by the voluntary return of some 46,000 Afghan refu\n\n**(3)** For the purposes of this report, unless otherwise stated, the term “refugees” refers to refugees under UNHCR’s mandate, and does not include Palestinian\nrefugees registered with UNRWA.\n\n**(4)** At the time of writing this report (December 2015), the number of Syrians registered in Turkey was approaching 2.2 million.\n\n**4** UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Proof of Registration cards", "confidence": 0.12248287349939346}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Map 1\n\n**Who is hosting the world’s refugees? \u0003** | end-2010\n\n**Germany**\n\n**Syrian Arab Rep.**\n\n**Jordan**\n\n**Pakistan**\n\n**Islamic Rep.**\n**of Iran**\n\n1,000,000 500,000 100,000\n\n**Who is hosting the world’s refugees? \u0003** | mid-2015\n\n**Turkey**\n\n**Lebanon**\n\n**Pakistan**\n\n**Islamic Rep.**\n**of Iran**\n\n**Ethiopia**\n\n1,000,000 500,000 100,000 The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.\nA country is listed if it featured among the top-5 per year.\n\nUNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 **5** Map 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.2687951326370239}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "TABLE 1 **Refugee populations by UNHCR regions \u0003** | 2015\n\nStart-2015 Mid-2015 Change (total) People in People in refugee-like refugee-like UNHCR regions Refugees situations Total refugees Refugees situations Total refugees Absolute %\n\n- Central Africa and Great Lakes 625,000 37,600 662,600 865,100 13,700 878,800 216,200 32.6%\n\n- East and Horn of Africa 2,568,000 33,400 2,601,400 2,713,700 33,600 2,747,300 145,900 5.6%\n\n- Southern Africa 174,700 - 174,700 179,800 - 179,800 5,100 2.9%\n\n- West Africa 252,000 - 252,000 258,900 - 258,900 6,900 2.7%\nTotal Africa * 3,619,700 71,000 3,690,700 4,017,500 47,300 4,064,800 374,100 10.1% UNHCR regions Refugees People in refugee-like situations Total refugees Refugees Americas 509,300 259,700 769,000 501,000 251,900 752,900 -16,100 -2.1% Asia and Pacific 3,568,500 280,100 3,848,600 3,506,600 278,400 3,785,000 -63,600 -1.7% Europe 3,095,000 18,200 3,113,200 3,475,300 14,300 3,489,600 376,400 12.1% Middle East and North Africa 2,898,500 65,400 2,963,900 2,941,100 64,200 3,005,300 41,400 1.4%\n**Total** **13,691,000** **694,400** **14,385,400** **14,441,500** **656,100** **15,097,600** **712,200** **5.0%**\n\nNote\n\n- Excluding North Africa.\n\ngees from Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran.\nBoth countries continued to host the majority of Afghan refugees, with 1.5 million and 951,000 persons, respectively. As such, Afghanistan remained the second-largest source country for refugees.\nSomalia was the third-largest source country of refugees worldwide and the largest in sub-Saharan Africa, with the number of Somali refugees remaining stable at 1.1 million. Kenya (418,900), Yemen (249,000), and Ethiopia (247,300) were the main host countries of these refugees.\n\nFig. 2 **Where do the world’s refugees**\n**come from?**\n\n(in millions) Syrian Arab Rep.\n\nAfghanistan Somalia South Sudan Sudan The ongoing conflict in South Sudan forced tens of thousands of individuals to flee to neighbouring countries during the first half of the year. As a result, the estimated number of South Sudanese refugees grew from 616,200 at the beginning of 2015 to 744,100 at the end of June 2015. This made South Sudan the fourth-largest source country of refugees worldwide. Ethiopia (275,400), Sudan (190,700), and Uganda (179,600) were hosting the largest populations of South Sudanese refugees.\nThe number of Sudanese refugees dropped from 665,900 at the beginning of the year to 640,900 at mid-2015, making this the fifth-largest source country of refugees at mid-2015. This decline is largely due to a biometric verification exercise undertaken in Chad, where records of many refugees have either been closed or deactivated, assuming these refugees had left Chad.\nOther important source countries of refugees included the Democratic Republic of the Congo (535,300), the Central African Republic (470,600), Myanmar (458,400), Eritrea (383,900), and Iraq (377,700).\n\nBy Country of Asylum By mid-2015, refugees resided in 169 countries or territories. Sudan now features among the top 10 refugee-hosting countries, having replaced China.\n\n**mid-2015** This is largely due to the conflict in South Sudan,\n\n**end-2014** which forced tens of thousands to flee to Sudan, as\n\n**mid-2014** outlined above. With this inclusion, half of the top\n\n**end-2013** 10 refugee-hosting countries are now located in\n\nsub-Saharan Africa, with four of them being least developed countries.\nWith 1.84 million refugees in its territory, 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 Turkey remained the country hosting the largest Dem. Rep.\nof Congo Central African Rep.\n\nMyanmar Eritrea\n\n**mid-2015**\n\n**end-2014**\n\n**mid-2014**\n\n**end-2013**\n\nIraq\n\n**6** UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "biometric verification exercise", "confidence": 0.12927792966365814}], "vague_data": [{"text": "biometric verification exercise", "confidence": 0.21569783985614777}]}}}
{"input": "number of refugees at mid-2015. This is a significant turnaround, as until 2012, Turkey did not feature among even the top 20 refugee-hosting countries. At the end of the reporting period, Syrians accounted for 1.81 million or 98 per cent of all registered refugees in the country, most of them located in urban agglomerations. In addition, the number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR in Turkey stood at 20,600.\nPakistan hosted the second-largest number of refugees worldwide with 1.5 million individuals, virtually all of them from Afghanistan. The renewal of some 80,000 Proof of Registration cards for Afghan refugees was partly offset by the voluntary return of around 44,700 Afghans from Pakistan to their country.\nLebanon remained the third-largest refugeehosting country, with 1.2 million refugees under UNHCR’s mandate. As in Turkey, the overwhelming majority (99%) of refugees in Lebanon originated from the Syrian Arab Republic. This was in addition to 7,300 Iraqi refugees.\nThe number of refugees in the Islamic Republic of Iran remained virtually unchanged from the beginning of 2015, at 982,000 at mid-year. This figure included 951,000 Afghan refugees and 28,300 Iraqi refugees. As such, the Islamic Republic of Iran remained the fourth-largest refugee-hosting country worldwide.\nThe refugee population in Ethiopia continued to grow in 2015, reaching 702,500 by mid-year. This compares to 659,500 six months earlier and is the result of an influx of South Sudanese and Eritrean refugees, among others. Ethiopia remained the fifth-largest refugee-hosting country worldwide, with the largest such populations originating from South Sudan (275,400), Somalia (247,300), Eritrea (139,300), and Sudan (36,500).\nThe number of refugees in Jordan under UNHCR’s mandate increased by about 10,000 persons to 664,100 at mid-year, most of whom originated from the Syrian Arab Republic. The refugee population in Kenya remained virtually unchanged at 552,300. As such, Jordan and Kenya remained the sixth- and seventh-largest refugee-hosting countries, respectively.\nWith renewed conflicts in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, tens of thousands of individuals fled these two countries to Uganda during the first part of the year. As a consequence, Uganda hosted a new all-time high for the country of 428,400 refugees.\n\n0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0\n\n***** Refugee figure for Syrians in Turkey is a Government estimate.\n\nOther important refugee-hosting countries at mid-year were Chad and Sudan, with 420,800 and 356,200 refugees, respectively. The top 10 refugee-hosting countries combined hosted close to 8.7 million or 57 per cent of all refugees under UNHCR’s mandate.\n\nNew Refugee Arrivals More than 839,000 persons were newly displaced across international borders during the first half of 2015, the overwhelming majority of whom found refuge in neighbouring countries or elsewhere in the immediate region. This figure refers to refugees who have been recognized on a _prima facie_ basis as well as those who have been newly registered and granted temporary protection. An additional 221,000 persons were granted refugee status or a complementary form of protection following refugee status determination during the reporting period.\nArmed conflict in both the Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine predominantly accounted for this new displacement, as half of the 839,000 persons originated from one of these two countries. While more than 318,000 Syrians were newly registered during the first half of 2015, UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 **7** Fig. 3 **Major refugee-hosting countries** (in millions)\n\n*Turkey\n\nPakistan Lebanon Iran (Islamic Rep. of) Ethiopia Jordan Kenya\n\n**mid-2015**\n\nUganda Chad Sudan\n\n**end-2014**\n\n**mid-2014**\n\n**end-2013**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Proof of Registration cards", "confidence": 0.12215456366539001}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Proof of Registration cards", "confidence": 0.17107199132442474}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Fig. 4 **Number of refugees per 1 USD GDP (PPP)**\n**per capita \u0003** | mid-2015\n\nEthiopia 469 Pakistan Uganda Dem. Rep.\nof Congo Chad Kenya South Sudan Afghanistan Cameroon Turkey 322 216 208 193 186 135 117 102 94 mostly in neighbouring countries, more than 97,000 Ukrainians were granted temporary protection in the Russian Federation.\nExcluding the Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine, the vast majority of newly displaced persons originated from countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The outbreak of violence in Burundi combined with renewed and ongoing fighting in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Nigeria, and the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have contributed most significantly to the high level of new displacement during the first half of the year.\n\nFig. 5 **Number of refugees per 1,000**\n**inhabitants \u0003** | mid-2015\n\nLebanon 209 More than 140,400 Burundians were recognized as refugees on a _prima facie_ basis during the reporting period, notably in the United Republic of Tanzania (69,400), Rwanda (58,700), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (11,700). Similarly, an estimated 118,800 South Sudanese sought refuge in neighbouring countries during the first half of 2015, mainly in Sudan (72,500), Ethiopia (23,800), and Uganda (17,500). Other countries in sub-Saharan Africa affected by armed conflict or violence\n\n- and thus source countries of new displacement\n\n- during the reporting period included the Central\nAfrican Republic (56,200), Nigeria (31,200), and Sudan (22,100).\n\nContributions of Host Countries Two main measures – economic and non-economic **[(5)]**\n\n- are used as a proxy to evaluate the contributions\nof host countries with respect to refugee burdensharing. Using both measures, developing countries appeared to be shouldering a significant proportion of this burden.\nAccording to the economic measure, the top 10 countries are all located in developing regions. **[(6)]** Similarly, according to the non-economic measure, of the top 10 countries, the first eight are developing nations, while those ranked 9 [th] and 10 [th] are industrialized countries.\nEvaluating the impact of refugees by per capita **[(7)]** Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), **[(8)]** Ethiopia ranked at the top with 469 refugees per 1 USD. This indicates that Ethiopia is the largest refugee-hosting country in sub-Saharan Africa in both absolute and relative terms. With 322 refugees per 1 USD GDP (PPP) per capita, Pakistan ranked second, followed by Uganda (216), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (208), Chad (193), and Kenya (186) [ _see_ **Figure 4** ].\nExamining the number of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants changes the rankings. Under this criterion, the impact of the Syria crisis is more visible, with Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey among the top five countries. With 209 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants, Lebanon ranked at the top of the list, followed by Jordan with 90 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants, Nauru (51), Chad (31), Turkey (24), and South Sudan (22) [ _see_ **Figure 5** ]. n\n\n**(7)** Source for national populations: United Nations, Population Division, World\nPopulation Prospects: The 2015 Revision, New York, 2015. For the purpose of this analysis, the 2014 estimates have been taken into account.\n\n**(8)** Source for GDP (PPP): International Monetary Fund, World Economic\nOutlook Database, October 2015 (accessed 10 November 2015).\n\nJordan Nauru Chad Turkey South Sudan Mauritania Djibouti Sweden Malta 90 51 31 24 22 19 17 15 15\n\n**(5)** That is the size of a refugee population compared to the Gross Domestic\nProduct (Purchasing Power Parity) – the GDP (PPP) – per capita or to the national population size.\n\n**(6)** See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm for a list\nof countries included under each region.\n\n**8** UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["World Economic Outlook Database"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Economic\nOutlook Database", "confidence": 0.8221879601478577}, {"text": "World\nPopulation Prospects", "confidence": 0.1780669093132019}, {"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.11918064951896667}, {"text": "Population Division", "confidence": 0.10355164110660553}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Children play video games in a makeshift arcade in the Arbat camp\u0003** for internally displaced persons near\nSulaymaniya, Iraq in June 2015. The Arbat IDP camp is one of the most overcrowded in Iraq. Initially designed as a transit centre for only 700 families, the camp now houses close to 3,000 people. Solutions are nowhere in sight, water is in short supply, electricity is intermittent and the sanitation is inadequate.\n\nIII\n\n**ASYLUM-SEEKERS**\n\nClose to one million individual asylum applications were registered in 155 countries or territories during the first half of 2015, significantly more than during the corresponding period of 2014 (558,000). **[(9)]** An estimated 12 per cent of these claims were registered at ‘second instance’, including with courts and other appellate bodies. UNHCR offices registered 115,200 individual asylum applications, out of the provisional total of 993,600 (12%).\n\nNew Individual Asylum Applications Registered During the first half of the year, persons of at least 190 nationalities submitted new asylum applications in 155 asylum countries or territories around the world.\n\n**(9)** The 2014 figure excludes asylum applications registered with South Africa’s\nDepartment of Home Affairs, in the absence of such data provided by the Government.\n\nUNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 **9**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.1388433426618576}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Asylum statistics in Europe: a word of caution The asylum figures for Europe quoted in this report should be treated with caution. The statistical picture of the number of people seeking international protection in Europe is partially distorted because of the reported instances of the same individual being registered as asylumseeker multiple times across the continent. The actual number of individuals lodging asylum applications in Europe is thus likely to be lower than described in this section.\n\nAt 159,900, Germany received the highest number of new asylum applications worldwide during the first six months of 2015. This compares to 173,100 asylum applications registered by the German authorities for the whole of 2014. At current trend, Germany is very likely to hit an all-time high in 2015. Historical data available since 1953 show that the previous record dates back to 1992, when 432,100 asylum applications were recorded by Germany [ _see_ **Figure 6** ]. **[(10)]** The sharp increase during the reporting period is attributable mainly to a higher number of individuals from Albania, Afghanistan, Iraq, Serbia and Kosovo (S/RES/1244 (1999)), **[(11)]** and the Syrian Arab Republic requesting international protection. Syrian asylum applications in Germany more than doubled from 12,100 in the first half of 2014 to 32,500 one year later. On average, one out of every five asylum claims in Germany was made by a Syrian national.\n\nGermany was followed by the Russian Federation, which registered 100,000 asylum applications.\nThis figure includes 720 applications for refugee status and 99,300 for temporary asylum. The outbreak of conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014 continued to have a major impact on these figures, with 98,500 or 98 per cent of claims in the Russian Federation being lodged by Ukrainians.\nThe United States of America was the third-largest single recipient of new asylum claims during the first six months of 2015, with an estimated 78,200 **[(12)]** asylum claims. This constituted a 44 per cent increase (+23,800 claims) compared to the same period the previous year. Asylum-seekers from Honduras (+209%), El Salvador (+125%), Guatemala (+102%), and Mexico (+12%), among others, accounted for this increase – half of all asylum claims in the country were lodged by nationals of these countries, compared to 42 per cent for the whole of 2014. This proportion has consistently increased in recent years, reflecting the deteriorating situation as a result of violence generated by transnational organized crime, gang activity, and drug cartels in some parts of the region. Overall, El Salvador was\n\n**(10)** The 1992 and earlier figures include a sizeable number of repeat\napplications registered in Germany.\n\n**(11)** References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security\nCouncil Resolution 1244 (1999) and henceforth will be referred to in this document as Kosovo (S/RES/1244 (1999)).\n\n**(12)** Estimated number of individuals based on the number of new cases\n(40,963) and multiplied by 1.393 to reflect the average number of individuals per case (Source: US Department of Homeland Security), and the number of new defensive asylum requests lodged with the Executive Office of Immigration Review (21,136 individuals).\n\nFig. 6 **New asylum applications registered in Germany \u0003** | 1953-2015\n\n450,000 400,000 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0\n\n***** First half 2015. The 1992 and earlier figures include a sizeable number of repeat applications.\n\n**10** UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Historical data", "confidence": 0.17746970057487488}]}}}
{"input": "**Sisters Salma, 10 and Saima 7, look after baby Moustafa\u0003** while their\nparents arrange their long-awaited return home to Afghanistan. Their family fled to Pakistan 35 years ago, and the children have never seen Afghanistan. They have big hopes for the future.\n\nUNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 **11**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.1868835836648941}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Fig. 7 **Main destination countries for new**\n**asylum-seekers \u0003** | First half 2015\n\n300 250 200 150 100 50 (x1,000) **2014 (total)** **First half 2015** 0\n\n***** Serbia and Kosovo (S/RES/1244 (1999))\n\nthe main country of origin of asylum-seekers to the United States of America with 8,700 applications, followed by Guatemala (7,700), Mexico (7,500), Honduras (7,400), and China (7,300).\nHungary ranked fourth with 65,400 new asylum applications registered during the first half of 2015.\nThis constituted a 13-fold increase compared to the first semester of 2014 (4,800 new applications) and a 79 per cent increase compared to the second (36,500). A large number of those applying for asylum in Hungary move onward to other countries in the European Union, where they are typically registered again as asylum-seekers.\nA sharp shift in the composition and dynamics of registered asylum applications in Hungary was observed during the reporting period. The first quarter of 2015 was dominated by asylum applicants originating from Serbia and Kosovo (S/RES/1244 (1999)), with more than 22,800 persons lodging such a claim, yet this figure dropped to less than 500 during the second quarter.\nIn contrast, the second quarter in Hungary witnessed a soaring number of asylum applicants from Afghanistan (13,600 claims, up from 4,000 during the first quarter) and the Syrian Arab Republic (8,400, up from 2,400). These two countries together accounted for two-thirds of all asylum applications in Hungary during the second quarter.\nOverall, Serbia and Kosovo (S/RES/1244 (1999)) was the main place of origin for asylum applicants in Hungary during the reporting period (23,300\n\n**12** UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015\n\napplications), followed by Afghanistan (17,600), the Syrian Arab Republic (10,800), and Iraq (3,200).\nAs of December 2015, close to 2.2 million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey benefitted from the Government’s Temporary Protection Regime. In addition, Turkey continued to witness high numbers of individual asylum applications registered with UNHCR. In Turkey, the Office registered 87,800 new asylum applications during 2014, the highest figure on record and almost double that of 2013 (44,800 claims). During the first half of 2015, more than 43,600 asylum applications were registered by UNHCR, making Turkey the fourthlargest recipient of individual asylum applications worldwide. **[(13)]** With 25,700 asylum claims, Iraqis accounted for more than half of these applications.\nOther important source countries of asylum applications were Afghanistan (12,100 claims) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (4,300).\nOther places receiving large numbers of asylum applicants were South Africa (37,800 new asylum claims), Serbia and Kosovo (S/RES/1244 (1999)) (37,400), Italy (30,100), and France (29,800).\nDuring the first half of 2015, UNHCR’s offices registered 110,000 new individual applications for refugee status and another 5,200 on appeal or for review. The office in Turkey received the largest number of new requests (43,600), followed by Jordan (14,100), Lebanon (10,400), Egypt (8,800), and Malaysia (8,800). Of all UNHCR offices receiving asylum applications during the period under review, these five operations registered 78 per cent of new claims recorded by the organization.\n\nBy Origin As the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic entered its fifth year, Syrians remained the main group of asylum-seekers worldwide, with 114,500 new asylum applications registered during the first six months of 2015. This compares to 59,600 new asylum applications registered during the corresponding period of 2014. Syrians lodged asylum claims in 104 countries or territories worldwide, compared to 96 a year earlier. About two-thirds (67%) or 76,700 of these claims were registered in five places: Germany (32,500), Serbia and Kosovo (S/RES/1244 (1999)) (18,400), Hungary (10,800), Austria (7,700), and Sweden (7,200). Provisional data indicate that recognition rates for Syrians in most countries are\n\n**(13)** This figure excludes the more than 250,000 Syrians who were registered by\nthe Government of Turkey during the first half of the year.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "around or above 90 per cent, reflecting this group’s significant need for international protection.\nAs the conflict in eastern Ukraine continued into 2015, Ukrainians became the second-largest group of asylum-seekers, with 111,900 new asylum applications registered during the first half of 2015.\nMost of these claims were recorded in the Russian Federation (98,500), Germany (2,600), and Italy (2,400). This compares to 20,300 new asylum applications one year earlier.\nAfghanistan was the third-largest country of origin for asylum-seekers in the first half of 2015.\nAfghans lodged some 72,100 asylum claims during the reporting period, significantly more than during the first half of 2014 (26,500). Hungary became an important recipient of Afghan asylum applications, with 17,600 new claims registered during the first half of 2015, an almost ninefold increase over the first half of 2014 (2,000 applications) and roughly triple the number registered during the second halfof 2014 (6,500). While Turkey remained an important destination for Afghans, with 12,100 asylum claims registered during the reporting period, Serbia and Kosovo (S/RES/1244 (1999)) became a major hotspot, as the Serbian authorities registered 10,900 Afghan asylum applications, compared to 420 one year earlier. Similar to Hungary, a large number of those applying for asylum in Serbia and Kosovo (S/RES/1244 (1999)) move onward to other European countries, where they are typically registered again as asylum-seekers.\nOther important places of origin of asylumseekers were Serbia and Kosovo (S/RES/1244 (1999)) (70,200), Iraq (65,800), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (29,300), Albania (26,100), and Eritrea (22,300).\nSome 2.3 million asylum applications were pending by mid-2015, about 219,100 more than at the beginning of the year. The largest backlog of registered asylum applications by June 2015 was in South Africa, with an estimated 798,100 applications. South Africa was followed by Germany (311,600 pending asylum applications), the United States of America (224,500), Turkey (145,300), and Sweden (56,100). n IV\n\n**INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS**\n\nUpdated information on the global number of IDPs due to armed conflict, generalized violence, or human rights violations was not available at the time of writing this report. **[(14)]** The IDP populations reported in this document are limited to conflict-generated IDPs or persons in an IDP-like situation, to whom the agency extends protection or assistance.\nHence, UNHCR’s statistics do not provide a comprehensive picture of global internal displacement.\nAccording to UNHCR offices in 26 countries, the number of IDPs protected/assisted by UNHCR, including those in IDP-like situations, **[(15)]** stood at an estimated 34.0 million at mid-2015. This compares to 32.2 million at the start of the year.\nDuring the first half of the year, at least 4.2 million persons were newly displaced by conflict and violence within their countries, compared to 4.1 million in the corresponding period of 2014.\nYemen reported the largest number of newly displaced persons (933,500), **[(16)]** followed by Ukraine (559,000), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (558,000), Nigeria (378,500), Iraq (366,500), and Pakistan (309,200).\nThe number of newly displaced persons within the Syrian Arab Republic was not available for the first six months of 2015. However, with 7.6 million IDPs, the Syrian Arab Republic remained the country with the highest such number worldwide. Despite security concerns, UNHCR was able to assist an estimated 1.3 million of these individuals by mid-2015.\nAccording to the Government, 6.5 million individuals were registered as IDPs in Colombia at mid-year. Other countries where significant IDP populations were protected or assisted by UNHCR included Iraq (4.0 million), Sudan (2.3 million),\n\n**(14)** The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimated the global number\nof persons displaced by armed conflict, generalized violence, or human rights violations at the end of 2014 to be some 38.2 million.\n\n**(15)** As in Myanmar (35,000), South Sudan (105,000), and Sudan (77,300).\n\n**(16)** The estimated number of IDPs in Yemen had reached 2.3 million at the\ntime of writing this report.\n\nUNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 **13**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Fig. 8 **IDPs protected/assisted by UNHCR**\n| 2000-2015 (end-year)\n\nPakistan (1.6 million), South Sudan (1.5 million), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1.5 million), **[(17)]** Nigeria (1.4 million), and Ukraine (1.4 million).\nAfghanistan too has seen a surge in internal displacement of some 50 per cent compared to 18 months ago as conflict intensified, reaching a figure of 948,000 IDPs by mid-2015.\nAn estimated 1.4 million IDPs returned to their areas of origin during the first half of 2015, about 200,000 fewer than the corresponding period in 2014. Important IDP returns were reported by Pakistan and the Philippines with 336,600 and 334,900 individuals, respectively. Other countries that reported significant numbers of returned IDPs during the reporting period included the Democratic Republic of the Congo (193,800), South Sudan (148,500), the Central African Republic (138,800), and Nigeria (122,700). n\n\n**(17)** Source: OCHA\n\n35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 (in millions)\n\n***** Mid-2015\n\nV\n\n**STATELESS PERSONS**\n\nThe collection of accurate statistics on stateless persons has been and continues to be a challenge for all stakeholders. While the global number of stateless persons is estimated to be at least 10 million, available data in this report are limited to some 3.9 million persons in 78 countries or territories. This compares to the 3.5 million individuals reported at the end of 2014. This increase is mainly the result of the newly reported figure of around 300,000 persons in Zimbabwe, an estimation that largely concerns a migrant population that arrived from neighbouring countries as farm and mine workers during the colonial period. Multiple changes in the nationality legislation of Zimbabwe have negatively impacted the nationality status of this population.\nIn contrast, a downward revision in the stateless ness figure was reported in the Dominican Republic. This revised estimate of 133,770 stateless persons includes only individuals born in the country to parents who were both born abroad, and it does not include individuals born in the country to one foreign-born and one Dominican-born parent, as the previously reported figure of 210,000 did. This estimate does not include subsequent generations of individuals of foreign descent, as there is no reliable population data available on groups other than first-generation individuals. As such, this estimate does not include all persons without nationality in the country. It will be adjusted as official data becomes available on the number of individuals who have found an effective nationality solution under Law 169-14. n VI\n\n**RESETTLEMENT**\n\nDuring the first six months of the year, UNHCR assisted some 33,400 refugees in 76 countries or territories to depart for resettlement. This is a decline of about 3,600 individuals compared to the\n\n**14** UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015\n\ncorresponding period of 2014 (37,000). The top five countries that reported significant UNHCRassisted resettlement departures were Malaysia (5,700), Turkey (3,800), Thailand (3,100), Nepal", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "stateless ness", "confidence": 0.1640491634607315}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "(2,600), and Lebanon (2,400). These five countries combined accounted for about half of all assisted resettlement departures during the reporting period.\nIndividuals holding some 62 different nationalities benefited from UNHCR’s resettlement programme during the first half of 2015. Refugees originating from Myanmar constituted the largest number (8,600), followed by those from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (4,700), the Syrian Arab Republic (4,000), Iraq (3,700), and Somalia (3,500). Combined, persons from these five countries accounted for 73 per cent of all UNHCRassisted resettlement departures. n VII\n\n**REFUGEE RETURNS**\n\nTo some extent, voluntary returns of refugees to their country of origin can be an indication of stability and safety in those countries. Following this logic, it is tempting to assume that the number of refugee returns is proportional to the level of safety prevailing in their country of origin, as refugees are expected to return under conditions of safety and in dignity. This is not always the case, however.\nThe number of returning refugees has remained fairly low in recent years. An estimated 84,400 individuals returned during the first half of 2015, compared to 107,000 during the same period in 2014. While the overall number of refugee returns in 2014 (126,800) was already the lowest in more than three decades, current trends indicate that 2015 figures may even be lower. Some 63,800 of those who had returned by mid-2015 did so with UNHCR assistance.\nUNHCR offices in 28 countries reported the return of refugees, with the largest numbers returning to Afghanistan (46,100), Somalia (19,000), Sudan (3,900), and Iraq (3,300). Together, these four countries of origin accounted for 85 per cent of all returnees. Countries with the highest number of refugee departures, meanwhile, included Pakistan (44,700), Yemen (16,500), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (5,100), and Chad (4,900). n UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 **15**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.11853522807359695}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "annex TABLE 1 **Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs),**\n**stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by country/territory of asylum \u0003**\n| mid-2015 (or latest available estimates)\nAll data are provisional and subject to change.\n\nREFUGEES Others of concern to UNHCR **[9]** Of whom assisted by UNHCR Returned refugees **[5]** Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations Asylumseekers (pending cases) **[4]** Country/ territory of asylum **[1]** People in and people in Of whom seekers UNHCR, incl. UNHCR’s Others of Total refugee-like refugee-like assisted by (pending Returned people in IDP- Returned statelessness concern to population Refugees **[2]** situations **[3]** situations UNHCR cases) **[4]** refugees **[5]** **[6]** IDPs **[7]** mandate **[8]** UNHCR **[9]** of concern People in refugee-like situations **[3]** Persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate **[8]** IDPs protected/ assisted by UNHCR, incl.\npeople in IDPlike situations **[6]** Returned IDPs **[7]** Afghanistan 205,558 20,156 225,714 _225,714_ 101 46,148 947,872 300 - 201,284 1,421,419 Albania 154 - 154 _154_ 501 - - - 7,443 - 8,098 Algeria **[10]** 94,144 - 94,144 _90,139_ 5,892 - - - - - 100,036 Angola 15,572 - 15,572 _54_ 30,086 2,887 - - - - 48,545 Antigua\n\n-                    -                    - _-_ 10                    -                    -                    -                    -                    - 10\nand Barbuda Argentina 3,523 - 3,523 _113_ 897 - - - - - 4,420 Armenia 3,240 12,450 15,690 _7,297_ 114 - - - 238 - 16,042 Aruba - - - _-_ 2 - - - - - 2 Australia **[11]** 35,582 - 35,582 _-_ 22,837 - - - - - 58,419 Austria **[12]** 60,747 - 60,747 _-_ 30,900 - - - 570 - 92,217 Azerbaijan 1,357 - 1,357 _1,357_ 262 - 622,892 - 3,585 - 628,096 Bahamas 7 - 7 _7_ 19 - - - - 30 56 Bahrain 277 - 277 _277_ 78 - - - - - 355 Bangladesh **[13]** 32,975 200,000 232,975 _32,975_ 11 - - - - - 232,986 Barbados 1 - 1 _1_ - - - - - - 1 Belarus 1,369 - 1,369 _617_ 257 - - - 6,302 - 7,928 Belgium 31,115 - 31,115 _-_ 9,396 - - - 5,267 - 45,778 Belize - - - _-_ 146 - - - - - 146 Benin 488 - 488 _488_ 84 - - - - - 572 Bolivia (Plurinational 767 - 767 _153_ 8 - - - - - 775 State of) Bonaire, Saint\n\n-                    -                    - _-_                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    Eustatius and Saba\nBosnia and 6,805 - 6,805 _6,805_ 11 19 84,500 - 79 52,437 143,851 Herzegovina Botswana 2,164 - 2,164 _2,164_ 248 - - - - - 2,412 Brazil 7,762 - 7,762 _708_ 17,902 - - - 2 40,336 66,002 British Virgin Islands - - - _-_ - - - - - - Brunei Darussalam - - - _-_ - - - - 20,524 - 20,524 Bulgaria **[14]** 11,046 - 11,046 _11,046_ 7,840 - - - 67 - 18,953 Burkina Faso 34,027 - 34,027 _34,027_ 180 - - - - - 34,207 Burundi 54,126 - 54,126 _54,126_ 2,733 11 78,948 - 1,302 590 137,710 Cabo Verde - - - _-_ - - - - 115 - 115 Cambodia 80 - 80 _76_ 33 - - - - 131 244 Cameroon 288,552 13,741 302,293 _289,806_ 7,835 - 81,693 - - - 391,821 Canada **[14]** 149,163 - 149,163 _-_ 14,481 - - - - - 163,644 Cayman Islands 6 - 6 _6_ 1 - - - - 100 107 Central African Rep. 7,906 - 7,906 _7,170_ 394 1,220 368,859 138,825 - - 517,204 Chad 420,774 - 420,774 _420,774_ 2,749 - - - - 50,000 473,523 Chile 1,798 - 1,798 _55_ 719 - - - - - 2,517 China **[15]** 301,057 - 301,057 _150_ 564 - - - - - 301,621 China, 151 - 151 _151_ 9,940 - - - 1 - 10,092 Hong Kong SAR China, Macao SAR - - - _-_ 6 - - - - - 6 Colombia 219 - 219 _33_ 56 22 6,520,270 - 12 - 6,520,579 Comoros - - - _-_ - - - - - - Congo, Republic of 61,492 - 61,492 _61,492_ 3,248 1 - - - 1,069 65,810 Costa Rica 3,475 - 3,475 _3,469_ 1,819 - - - 2,613 - 7,907 Côte d’Ivoire 1,972 - 1,972 _1,972_ 667 74 24,000 - 700,000 57 726,770 Croatia 669 41 710 _710_ 90 24 - - 2,886 13,774 17,484 Cuba 313 - 313 _172_ 12 - - - - - 325 Curaçao 44 - 44 _44_ 41 - - - - - 85 Cyprus **[16]** 5,763 - 5,763 _-_ 2,339 - - - - 6,000 14,102 Czech Rep. **[14]** 3,137 - 3,137 _-_ 409 - - - 1,502 - 5,048 Dem. Rep. of 160,271 - 160,271 _131,686_ 1,124 3,230 1,491,769 193,841 - 150,771 2,001,006 the Congo **[17]** Denmark **[14]** 17,785 - 17,785 _-_ 4,566 - - - 4,984 - 27,335 Djibouti 14,787 - 14,787 _14,787_ 2,586 - - - - - 17,373 Dominica - - - _-_ - - - - - - Dominican Rep. **[18]** 609 - 609 _609_ 752 - - - 133,770 - 135,131 Ecuador **[12]** 53,378 68,344 121,722 _53,378_ 11,583 - - - - - 133,305 Egypt 226,344 - 226,344 _226,344_ 30,019 - - - 21 - 256,384 El Salvador 48 - 48 _13_ - - - - - - 48 Equatorial Guinea - - - _-_ - - - - - - Eritrea 2,944 - 2,944 _2,944_ 1 1 - - - 21 2,967 Estonia **[19]** 117 - 117 _-_ 117 - - - 86,522 - 86,756 Ethiopia 702,467 - 702,467 _702,467_ 2,871 2 - - - 346 705,686 Fiji 12 - 12 _12_ 8 - - - - - 20 Finland **[14]** 11,798 - 11,798 _-_ 2,622 - - - 1,928 - 16,348 ... /...\n\n**16** UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.5465146899223328}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "annex TABLE 1\n\n**Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs),**\n**stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by country/territory of asylum \u0003**\n| mid-2015 (or latest available estimates) (ctnd)\nAll data are provisional and subject to change.\n\nREFUGEES Others of concern to UNHCR **[9]** Of whom assisted by UNHCR Returned refugees **[5]** Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations Asylumseekers (pending cases) **[4]** Country/ territory of asylum **[1]** People in and people in Of whom seekers UNHCR, incl. UNHCR’s Others of Total refugee-like refugee-like assisted by (pending Returned people in IDP- Returned statelessness concern to population Refugees **[2]** situations **[3]** situations UNHCR cases) **[4]** refugees **[5]** **[6]** IDPs **[7]** mandate **[8]** UNHCR **[9]** of concern People in refugee-like situations **[3]** Persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate **[8]** IDPs protected/ assisted by UNHCR, incl.\npeople in IDPlike situations **[6]** Returned IDPs **[7]** France 264,972 - 264,972 _-_ 53,827 - - - 1,290 - 320,089 Gabon 1,008 - 1,008 _1,008_ 1,886 - - - - - 2,894 Gambia 11,773 - 11,773 _11,773_ 2 - - - - - 11,775 Georgia 1,060 599 1,659 _1,659_ 587 - 265,267 - 793 - 268,306 Germany 250,299 - 250,299 _-_ 311,551 - - - 11,978 - 573,828 Ghana 18,476 - 18,476 _18,476_ 2,855 - - - - - 21,331 Greece 7,304 927 8,231 _-_ 29,157 - - - 214 - 37,602 Grenada - - - _-_ - - - - - - Guatemala 202 - 202 _87_ 73 - - - - - 275 Guinea 8,704 - 8,704 _8,704_ 293 - - - - - 8,997 Guinea-Bissau 8,684 - 8,684 _8,684_ 123 - - - - - 8,807 Guyana 11 - 11 _11_ 1 - - - - - 12 Haiti 5 - 5 _-_ 5 - - - - - 10 Honduras 23 - 23 _11_ 19 - - - - - 42 Hungary 4,192 - 4,192 _-_ 24,431 - - - 128 - 28,751 Iceland 104 - 104 _-_ 225 - - - 119 - 448 India 200,383 - 200,383 _26,799_ 5,381 - - - - - 205,764 Indonesia 5,277 - 5,277 _5,277_ 7,911 - - - - - 13,188 Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 979,441 - 979,441 _979,441_ 42 8 - - - - 979,491 Iraq **[20]** 288,035 - 288,035 _288,035_ 7,420 3,318 3,962,142 716 50,000 29 4,311,660 Ireland **[14]** 5,853 - 5,853 _-_ 4,300 - - - 99 - 10,252 Israel 361 38,139 38,500 _5,348_ 6,591 - - - 88 - 45,179 Italy **[14]** 93,715 - 93,715 _-_ 48,307 - - - 606 - 142,628 Jamaica 15 - 15 _15_ 3 - - - - - 18 Japan **[21]** 2,419 - 2,419 _412_ 10,705 - - - 631 - 13,755 Jordan **[22]** 664,102 - 664,102 _664,102_ 20,693 - - - - - 684,795 Kazakhstan 662 - 662 _662_ 149 - - - 7,038 - 7,849 Kenya 552,272 - 552,272 _552,272_ 40,341 1,231 - - 20,000 - 613,844 Kuwait 593 - 593 _593_ 1,040 - - - 93,000 - 94,633 Kyrgyzstan 433 - 433 _433_ 168 - - - 13,678 - 14,279 Lao People’s\n\n-                    -                    - _-_                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    Dem. Rep.\n\nLatvia **[23]** 195 - 195 _-_ 171 - - - 262,802 - 263,168 Lebanon 1,172,388 - 1,172,388 _1,172,388_ 10,851 - - - - 5,813 1,189,052 Lesotho 44 - 44 _-_ 1 - - - - - 45 Liberia 38,904 - 38,904 _38,904_ 18 6 - - 1 1,479 40,408 Libya 27,948 - 27,948 _27,948_ 8,904 - 434,869 - - - 471,721 Liechtenstein 107 - 107 _-_ 75 - - - 2 - 184 Lithuania 1,055 - 1,055 _-_ 54 - - - 3,583 - 4,692 Luxembourg 1,192 - 1,192 _-_ 831 - - - 81 - 2,104 Madagascar 10 - 10 _10_ 9 - - - - - 19 Malawi 8,963 - 8,963 _8,963_ 13,669 - - - - - 22,632 Malaysia 97,385 188 97,573 _97,573_ 54,400 - - - 40,000 80,000 271,973 Mali 14,970 - 14,970 _14,486_ 386 740 90,218 41,995 - - 148,309 Malta 6,095 - 6,095 _-_ 425 - - - - - 6,520 Mauritania 50,851 26,000 76,851 _50,851_ 407 - - - - - 77,258 Mauritius - - - _-_ - - - - - - Mexico 2,158 - 2,158 _212_ - - - - 13 55 2,226 Micronesia (Federated - - - _-_ 34 - - - - - 34 States of) Monaco 33 - 33 _-_ - - - - - - 33 Mongolia 11 - 11 _11_ 5 - - - 16 - 32 Montenegro 6,203 - 6,203 _6,203_ 7 - - - 3,284 10,318 19,812 Montserrat - - - _-_ - - - - - - Morocco 2,144 - 2,144 _2,144_ 2,216 - - - - - 4,360 Mozambique 4,552 - 4,552 _2,482_ 14,257 - - - - 7 18,816 Myanmar **[24]** - - - _-_ - 1 368,500 8,000 1,090,000 - 1,466,501 Namibia 1,659 - 1,659 _1,468_ 1,100 5 - - - 1,679 4,443 Nauru 506 - 506 _-_ 816 - - - - - 1,322 Nepal **[25]** 36,287 - 36,287 _21,287_ 57 - - - - 409 36,753 Netherlands **[14]** 82,494 - 82,494 _-_ 8,097 - - - 1,951 - 92,542 New Zealand **[14]** 1,349 - 1,349 _-_ 251 - - - - - 1,600 Nicaragua 361 - 361 _81_ 25 2 - - 1 2 391 Niger 82,064 - 82,064 _82,064_ 122 - 50,000 - - 70,000 202,186 Nigeria 1,279 - 1,279 _1,279_ 909 - 1,385,298 122,719 - - 1,510,205 Norway **[14]** 47,043 - 47,043 _-_ 5,885 - - - 1,997 - 54,925 Oman 122 - 122 _122_ 268 - - - - - 390 Pakistan 1,540,854 - 1,540,854 _1,540,854_ 6,103 2 1,556,400 336,606 - - 3,439,965 ... /...\n\nUNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 **17**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.1925027221441269}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "annex TABLE 1\n\n**Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs),**\n**stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by country/territory of asylum \u0003**\n| mid-2015 (or latest available estimates) (ctnd)\nAll data are provisional and subject to change.\n\nREFUGEES Others of concern to UNHCR **[9]** Of whom assisted by UNHCR Returned refugees **[5]** Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations Asylumseekers (pending cases) **[4]** Country/ territory of asylum **[1]** People in and people in Of whom seekers UNHCR, incl. UNHCR’s Others of Total refugee-like refugee-like assisted by (pending Returned people in IDP- Returned statelessness concern to population Refugees **[2]** situations **[3]** situations UNHCR cases) **[4]** refugees **[5]** **[6]** IDPs **[7]** mandate **[8]** UNHCR **[9]** of concern People in refugee-like situations **[3]** Persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate **[8]** IDPs protected/ assisted by UNHCR, incl.\npeople in IDPlike situations **[6]** Returned IDPs **[7]** Palau 1 - 1 _1_ - - - - - - 1 Panama 2,303 15,000 17,303 _330_ 2,038 - - - 2 - 19,343 Papua New Guinea 4,929 4,581 9,510 _-_ 400 - - - - - 9,910 Paraguay 161 - 161 _24_ 39 - - - - - 200 Peru 1,407 - 1,407 _39_ 366 - - - - - 1,773 Philippines 254 - 254 _17_ 163 - 42,171 334,888 8,619 68 386,163 Poland **[14]** 15,741 - 15,741 _-_ 2,470 - - - 10,825 - 29,036 Portugal **[14]** 699 - 699 _-_ 641 - - - 14 - 1,354 Qatar 133 - 133 _133_ 100 - - - 1,200 - 1,433 Rep. of Korea 1,313 - 1,313 _394_ 5,102 - - - 200 - 6,615 Rep. of Moldova 389 - 389 _389_ 164 - - - 6,233 - 6,786 Romania 2,426 - 2,426 _156_ 138 - - - 294 - 2,858 Russian Federation **[26]** 315,313 - 315,313 _3,596_ 2,423 - - - 113,474 - 431,210 Rwanda 132,743 - 132,743 _132,743_ 253 2,196 - - - 361 135,553 Saint Kitts and Nevis 1 - 1 _1_ - - - - - - 1 Saint Lucia 2 - 2 _2_ 2 - - - - 60 64 Saint Vincent and\n\n-                    -                    - _-_                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    the Grenadines\nSao Tome and\n\n-                    -                    - _-_                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    Principe\n\nSaudi Arabia 184 27 211 _211_ 93 - - - 70,000 - 70,304 Senegal 14,304 - 14,304 _14,304_ 2,956 - - - - - 17,260 Serbia and Kosovo 35,309 - 35,309 _7,360_ 464 73 220,227 159 3,490 - 259,722 (S/RES/1244 (1999)) Sierra Leone 1,371 - 1,371 _458_ 16 - - - - - 1,387 Singapore - - - _-_ - - - - - 1 1 Sint Maarten 3 - 3 _3_ 5 - - - - - 8 (Dutch part) Slovakia **[14]** 799 - 799 _-_ 61 - - - 1,523 148 2,531 Slovenia 283 - 283 _-_ 43 - - - 4 - 330 Solomon Islands 3 - 3 _3_ - - - - - - 3 Somalia 3,582 - 3,582 _3,582_ 9,320 19,004 1,133,000 - - 69 1,164,975 South Africa 114,512 - 114,512 _11,451_ 798,080 - - - - - 912,592 South Sudan **[27]** 265,887 - 265,887 _265,887_ 632 - 1,643,484 148,530 - - 2,058,533 Spain **[14]** 5,798 - 5,798 _-_ 11,020 - - - 440 - 17,258 Sri Lanka **[28]** 848 - 848 _848_ 461 231 50,268 - - - 51,808 State of Palestine - - - _-_ - 3 - - - - 3 Sudan **[29]** 322,638 33,553 356,191 _268,262_ 11,448 3,896 2,342,979 50,105 - 3,290 2,767,909 Suriname 1 - 1 _1_ - - - - - - 1 Swaziland 539 - 539 _127_ 321 - - - - 4 864 Sweden **[14]** 142,207 - 142,207 _-_ 56,135 - - - 27,167 - 225,509 Switzerland 69,390 - 69,390 _-_ 17,085 - - - 76 - 86,551 Syrian Arab Rep. **[30]** 149,200 - 149,200 _26,527_ 4,839 - 7,632,500 - 160,000 - 7,946,539 Tajikistan **[31]** 1,782 - 1,782 _1,350_ 79 - - - 10,051 31 11,943 Thailand **[32]** 56,947 53,425 110,372 _110,372_ 8,166 - - - 506,197 521 625,256 The former Yugoslav Republic 584 244 828 _828_ 43 - - - 717 - 1,588 of Macedonia Timor-Leste - - - _-_ - - - - - 5 5 Togo 21,877 - 21,877 _13,414_ 687 - - - - - 22,564 Tonga - - - _-_ - - - - - - Trinidad and Tobago 121 - 121 _121_ 59 - - - - - 180 Tunisia 824 - 824 _822_ 156 - - - - 3 983 Turkey **[33]** 1,838,848 - 1,838,848 _1,838,848_ 145,335 - - - 780 306 1,985,269 Turkmenistan 27 - 27 _27_ - - - - 7,144 - 7,171 Turcs and 4 - 4 _4_ 4 - - - - - 8 Caicos Islands Uganda 428,397 - 428,397 _428,397_ 38,068 - - - - 180,000 646,465 Ukraine 3,232 - 3,232 _459_ 6,169 - 1,382,000 - 35,179 - 1,426,580 United Arab 424 - 424 _424_ 378 - - - - - 802 Emirates United Kingdom **[14]** 117,234 - 117,234 _-_ 37,829 - - - 16 - 155,079 United Rep. of 159,014 - 159,014 _136,787_ 1,150 - - - - 168,019 328,183 Tanzania United States of 267,222 - 267,222 _-_ 224,508 - - - - - 491,730 America **[34]** Uruguay 289 - 289 _73_ 68 - - - - - 357 Uzbekistan **[35]** 118 - 118 _118_ - - - - 86,703 - 86,821 Vanuatu - - - _-_ 1 - - - - - 1 ... /...\n\n**18** UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.3350829780101776}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "annex TABLE 1\n\n**Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs),**\n**stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by country/territory of asylum \u0003**\n| mid-2015 (or latest available estimates) (ctnd)\nAll data are provisional and subject to change.\n\nREFUGEES Others of concern to UNHCR **[9]** Of whom assisted by UNHCR Returned refugees **[5]** Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations Asylumseekers (pending cases) **[4]** Country/ territory of asylum **[1]** People in and people in Of whom seekers UNHCR, incl. UNHCR’s Others of Total refugee-like refugee-like assisted by (pending Returned people in IDP- Returned statelessness concern to population Refugees **[2]** situations **[3]** situations UNHCR cases) **[4]** refugees **[5]** **[6]** IDPs **[7]** mandate **[8]** UNHCR **[9]** of concern People in refugee-like situations **[3]** IDPs protected/ assisted by UNHCR, incl.\npeople in IDPlike situations **[6]** Returned IDPs **[7]** Persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate **[8]** Venezuela (Bolivarian 5,647 168,544 174,191 _34,164_ 704 - - - - - 174,895 Republic of) Viet Nam - - - _-_ - - - - 11,000 - 11,000 Yemen 263,047 - 263,047 _118,338_ 9,902 - 1,267,590 - - - 1,540,539 Zambia 25,737 - 25,737 _25,737_ 2,606 - - - - 23,415 51,758 Zimbabwe **[36]** 6,085 - 6,085 _6,085_ 123 10 - - 300,000 1,873 308,091\n**Total** **14,441,674** **655,959** **15,097,633** **11,482,891** **2,343,919** **84,365** **34,047,716** **1,376,684** **3,944,474** **1,064,911** **57,959,702**\n\nUNHCR-Bureaux ~~- Central Africa-~~ 865,112 13,741 878,853 _814,818_ 18,623 6,658 2,021,269 332,666 1,302 320,810 3,580,181 Great Lakes ~~- East and Horn~~ 2,713,748 33,553 2,747,301 _2,659,372_ 108,016 24,134 5,119,463 198,635 20,000 233,726 8,451,275 of Africa\n\n- Southern Africa 179,837 - 179,837 _58,541_ 860,500 2,902 - - 300,000 26,978 1,370,217\n\n- Western Africa 258,893 - 258,893 _249,033_ 9,298 820 1,549,516 164,714 700,116 71,536 2,754,893\nTotal Africa 4,017,590 47,294 4,064,884 _3,781,764_ 996,437 34,514 8,690,248 696,015 1,021,418 653,050 16,156,566 Asia and Pacific 3,506,644 278,350 3,784,994 _3,044,957_ 133,894 46,390 2,965,211 679,794 1,801,802 282,450 9,694,535 Middle East and 2,941,121 64,166 3,005,287 _2,674,746_ 109,847 3,321 13,297,101 716 374,309 5,845 16,796,426 North Africa Europe 3,475,270 14,261 3,489,531 _1,887,484_ 827,374 116 2,574,886 159 610,532 82,983 7,585,581 Americas 501,049 251,888 752,937 _93,940_ 276,367 24 6,520,270 - 136,413 40,583 7,726,594\n**Total** **14,441,674** **655,959** **15,097,633** **11,482,891** **2,343,919** **84,365** **34,047,716** **1,376,684** **3,944,474** **1,064,911** **57,959,702**\n\nUN major regions Africa 4,419,845 73,294 4,493,139 _4,180,012_ 1,044,031 34,514 9,125,117 696,015 1,021,439 653,053 17,067,308 Asia 7,853,396 324,984 8,178,380 _7,170,600_ 320,437 49,711 16,715,602 680,510 2,181,486 294,598 28,420,724 Europe 1,625,002 1,212 1,626,214 _38,323_ 678,737 116 1,686,727 159 605,136 76,677 4,673,766 Latin America and 84,664 251,888 336,552 _93,940_ 37,378 24 6,520,270 - 136,413 40,583 7,071,220 the Caribbean Northern America 416,385 - 416,385 _-_ 238,989 - - - - - 655,374 Oceania 42,382 4,581 46,963 _16_ 24,347 - - - - - 71,310\n**Total** **14,441,674** **655,959** **15,097,633** **11,482,891** **2,343,919** **84,365** **34,047,716** **1,376,684** **3,944,474** **1,064,911** **57,959,702**\n\nUNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 **19**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.11342886090278625}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Notes**\nThe data are generally provided by Governments, based on their own definitions and methods of data collection.\nA dash (“-”) indicates that the value is zero, not available or not applicable.\n\n**1** Country or territory of asylum or residence.\n\n**2** Persons recognized as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention/1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU\nConvention, in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, persons granted a complementary form of protection and those granted temporary protection. In the absence of Government figures, UNHCR has estimated the refugee population in many industrialized countries based on 10 years of individual asylum-seeker recognition.\n\n**3** This category is descriptive in nature and includes groups of persons who are outside their\ncountry or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.\n\n**4** Persons whose application for asylum or refugee status is pending at any stage in the asylum\nprocedure.\n\n**5** Refugees who have returned to their place of origin during the first half of 2015. Source:\ncountry of origin and asylum.\n\n**6** Persons who are displaced within their country and to whom UNHCR extends protection\nand/or assistance. It also includes people in IDP-like situations. This category is descriptive in nature and includes groups of persons who are inside their country of nationality or habitual residence and who face protection risks similar to those of IDPs but who, for practical or other reasons, could not be reported as such.\n\n**7** IDPs protected/assisted by UNHCR who have returned to their place of origin during the first\nhalf of 2015.\n\n**8** Refers to persons who are not considered as nationals by any State under the operation\nof its law. This category refers to persons who fall under the agency’s statelessness mandate because they are stateless according to this international definition, but data from some countries may also include persons with undetermined nationality.\n\n**9** Refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of the other groups but to\nwhom UNHCR may extend its protection and/or assistance services. These activities might be based on humanitarian or other special grounds.\n\n**10** According to the Government of Algeria, there are an estimated 165,000 Sahrawi refugees in\nthe Tindouf camps.\n\n**11** Australia’s figures for asylum-seekers are based on the number of applications lodged for\nprotection visas. Refugee figure refers to the end of 2014.\n\n**12** All figures relate to the end of 2014.\n\n**13** The refugee population includes 200,000 persons originating from Myanmar in a refugeelike situation. The Government of Bangladesh estimates the population to be between\n300,000 and 500,000.\n\n**14** Refugee population relates to the end of 2014.\n\n**15** The 300,000 Vietnamese refugees are well integrated and in practice receive protection\nfrom the Government of China.\n\n**16** UNHCR’s assistance activities for IDPs in Cyprus ended in 1999. Visit the website of the\nInternal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) for further information.\n\n**17** The number of Rwandan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is subject to\nchange based on a registration exercise carried out in 2014 that resulted in a figure of 243,000 identified Rwandans, as well as a biometric registration exercise. UNOCHA revised the IDP figure in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from more than 2.7 million at the end of 2014 to 1.5 million at mid-2015.\n\n**18** A previous estimate of 210,000 individuals was based on a national survey released by the\nNational Bureau for Statistics in 2013 concerning individuals born in the country to foreign parents. According to official information released by the Dominican Government in 2015, this estimate actually included a significant number of individuals born in the country to a Dominican-born parent (i.e., a parent who may be a Dominican national). The revised estimate includes only individuals born in the country where both parents were born abroad. This estimate does not include subsequent generations of individuals of foreign descent, as there is no reliable population data available concerning those other than first generation individuals, and as such it does not include all persons without nationality. Finally, it should be noted that the revised estimate will be adjusted as official data becomes available on the number of individuals who have found an effective nationality solution under Law 169-14.\n\n**20** UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015\n\n**19** Almost all people recorded as being stateless have permanent residence and enjoy more\nrights than foreseen in the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.\n\n**20** Pending a more accurate study into statelessness in Iraq, the estimate of stateless persons\nin Iraq has been adjusted to reflect the reduction of statelessness in line with Law 26 of 2006, which allows stateless persons to apply for nationality in certain circumstances.\n\n**21** Figures are UNHCR estimates.\n\n**22** Includes 32,800 Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR in Jordan. The Government estimated\nthe number of Iraqis at 400,000 individuals at the end of March 2015. This included refugees and other categories of Iraqis.\n\n**23** The figure of stateless persons includes persons covered by two separate Laws. 180 fall\nunder the Republic of Latvia’s Law on Stateless Persons on 17 February 2004, which replaced the Law on the Status of Stateless Persons in the Republic of Latvia of 18 February 1999, and which determines the legal status of persons who are not considered as citizens by the legislation of any State and whose status is not determined by the 25th April 1995 Law (quoted below). 262,622 of the persons reported in this table fall under the Republic of Latvia’s 25 April 1995 Law on the Status of Those Former USSR Citizens who are not Citizens of Latvia or of Any Other State, and are granted a transitional legal status to permanently residing persons (non-citizens) entitling them to a set of rights and obligations beyond the minimum rights prescribed by the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. According to the Latvian authorities, “Non-citizens of Latvia is the only category of residents who are not Latvian citizens, but who enjoy the right to reside in Latvia ex lege (all others require a resident permit) and an immediate right to acquire citizenship through registration and/or naturalisation (depending on age).”\n\n**24** This figure is an estimate of persons without any citizenship in Rakhine state derived from\nthe 2014 census. It does not include an estimated 175,000 IDPs, persons in an IDP-like situation and IDP returnees who are also of concern under the statelessness mandate because they are already included among the IDP figure.\n\n**25** Various studies estimate that a large number of individuals lack citizenship certificates\nin Nepal. While these individuals are not all necessarily stateless, UNHCR has been working closely with the Government of Nepal and partners to address this situation.\n\n**26** Stateless persons refers to census figure from 2010 adjusted to reflect the number of\npeople who acquired nationality in 2011-2014.\n\n**27** IDP figure in South Sudan includes 105,000 people who are in an IDP-like situation.\n\n**28** The statistics of the remaining IDPs as at mid-2015, while provided by the Government\nauthorities at the district level, are being reviewed by the central authorities. Once this review has been concluded, the statistics will be changed accordingly.\n\n**29** IDP figure in Sudan includes 77,300 people who are in an IDP-like situation.\n\n**30** Refugee figure for Iraqis in the Syrian Arab Republic is a Government estimate. UNHCR has\nregistered and is assisting 23,500 Iraqis at mid-2015.\n\n**31** Figure refers to a registration exercise in three regions and 637 persons registered as\nstateless by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan.\n\n**32** Figure of stateless persons in Thailand refers to 2011.\n\n**33** Refugee figure for Syrians in Turkey is a Government estimate.\n\n**34** The refugee figure for the United States of America is currently under review, which may\nlead to an adjustment in future reports. Refugee figure relates to the end of 2014.\n\n**35** Figure of stateless persons refers to those with permanent residence reported in 2010 by\nthe Government. Information on other categories of stateless persons is not available.\n\n**36** The figure is an estimate and currently under review.\nSource: UNHCR/Governments.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["2014 census"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2014 census", "confidence": 0.7387981414794922}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "national survey", "confidence": 0.2814745306968689}], "vague_data": [{"text": "national survey", "confidence": 0.14289167523384094}]}}}
{"input": "annex TABLE 2 Origin **[1]**\n\n**Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs),**\n**stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by origin\u0003**\n| mid-2015 (or latest available estimates)\nAll data are provisional and subject to change.\n\nREFUGEES Returned IDPs **[7]** of whom: UNHCRassisted Others of concern to UNHCR **[9]** People in and people in of whom: seekers people in UNHCR’s Others of Total refugee-like refugee-like UNHCR- (pending Returned IDP-like Returned statelessness concern to population Refugees **[2]** situations **[3]** situations assisted cases) **[4]** refugees **[5]** situations **[6]** IDPs **[7]** mandate **[8]** UNHCR **[9]** of concern People in refugee-like situations **[3]** Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations Asylumseekers (pending cases) **[4]** Returned refugees **[5]** IDPs protected/ assisted by UNHCR, incl.\npeople in IDP-like situations **[6]** Persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate **[8]** Afghanistan 2,632,534 - 2,632,534 _2,514,874_ 106,972 46,148 947,872 300 - 201,315 3,935,141 Albania 10,463 - 10,463 _6_ 34,550 - - - - - 45,013 Algeria 3,541 - 3,541 _68_ 6,259 - - - - 18 9,818 Andorra 7 - 7 _-_ 1 - - - - - 8 Angola 9,550 - 9,550 _1,122_ 2,226 2,887 - - - 62,413 77,076 Anguilla 1 - 1 _-_ - - - - - - 1 Antigua and Barbuda 53 - 53 _-_ 16 - - - - - 69 Argentina 312 - 312 _3_ 131 - - - - - 443 Armenia 11,891 - 11,891 _72_ 6,834 - - - - 12 18,737 Australia 18 - 18 _-_ 9 - - - - - 27 Austria 9 - 9 _-_ 12 - - - - - 21 Azerbaijan 10,579 - 10,579 _1,590_ 4,845 - 622,892 - - 1 638,317 Bahamas 215 - 215 _-_ 58 - - - - - 273 Bahrain 373 - 373 _17_ 107 - - - - 7 487 Bangladesh 11,108 1 11,109 _212_ 28,150 - - - - 12 39,271 Barbados 86 - 86 _-_ 32 - - - - - 118 Belarus 4,299 - 4,299 _16_ 1,108 - - - - 1 5,408 Belgium 76 - 76 _-_ 14 - - - - - 90 Belize 45 - 45 _-_ 38 - - - - - 83 Benin 352 - 352 _1_ 873 - - - - - 1,225 Bermuda - - - _-_ 3 - - - - - 3 Bhutan 21,392 - 21,392 _20,818_ 194 - - - - - 21,586 Bolivia 593 - 593 _11_ 291 - - - - - 884 (Plurinational State of) Bosnia and 19,587 41 19,628 _3,111_ 6,284 19 84,500 - - 52,438 162,869 Herzegovina Botswana 236 - 236 _-_ 116 - - - - - 352 Brazil 971 - 971 _5_ 1,472 - - - - - 2,443 British Virgin Islands - - - _-_ - - - - - - Brunei Darussalam 1 - 1 _-_ 1 - - - - - 2 Bulgaria 1,631 - 1,631 _2_ 248 - - - - 1 1,880 Burkina Faso 1,862 - 1,862 _21_ 2,049 - - - - 1 3,912 Burundi 217,360 - 217,360 _185,057_ 24,157 11 78,948 - - 163,497 483,973 Cabo Verde 27 - 27 _-_ 90 - - - - - 117 Cambodia 12,939 9 12,948 _174_ 272 - - - - - 13,220 Cameroon 10,854 - 10,854 _406_ 6,116 - 81,693 - - 4 98,667 Canada 87 - 87 _1_ 67 - - - - 6 160 Cayman Islands 6 - 6 _-_ - - - - - - 6 Central African Rep. 469,314 1,254 470,568 _468,913_ 10,157 1,220 368,859 138,825 - 15,049 1,004,678 Chad 14,809 33,553 48,362 _12,511_ 3,275 - - - - 35,000 86,637 Chile 604 - 604 _11_ 87 - - - - - 691 China 210,815 - 210,815 _295_ 52,598 - - - - 1 263,414 China, Hong Kong SAR 25 - 25 _-_ 33 - - - - - 58 China, Macao SAR 5 - 5 _-_ 20 - - - - - 25 Colombia 95,237 250,888 346,125 _89,223_ 6,030 22 6,520,270 - - - 6,872,447 Comoros 562 - 562 _1_ 377 - - - - - 939 Congo, Republic of 14,745 - 14,745 _2,024_ 4,079 1 - - - 78 18,903 Cook Islands 1 - 1 _-_ - - - - - - 1 Costa Rica 418 - 418 _2_ 155 - - - - - 573 Côte d’Ivoire 72,158 - 72,158 _59,583_ 14,396 74 24,000 - - 41 110,669 Croatia **[10]** 33,669 - 33,669 _12,021_ 460 24 - - - 13,774 47,927 Cuba 6,058 1,000 7,058 _726_ 1,760 - - - - 130 8,948 Curaçao 35 - 35 _-_ - - - - - - 35 Cyprus **[11]** 6 - 6 _-_ 6 - - - - - 12 Czech Rep. 1,311 - 1,311 _-_ 162 - - - - - 1,473 Dem. People’s Rep.\n1,079 - 1,079 _70_ 294 - - - - - 1,373 of Korea Dem. Rep. of 535,115 208 535,323 _464,691_ 75,350 3,230 1,491,769 193,841 - 116,289 2,415,802 the Congo Denmark 11 - 11 _-_ 7 - - - - - 18 Djibouti 921 - 921 _85_ 494 - - - - 31 1,446 Dominica 38 - 38 _-_ 25 - - - - - 63 Dominican Rep. 358 - 358 _11_ 1,439 - - - - - 1,797 Ecuador 807 - 807 _19_ 6,330 - - - - - 7,137 Egypt 16,105 - 16,105 _267_ 10,415 - - - - 48 26,568 El Salvador 11,120 - 11,120 _385_ 21,885 - - - - 24 33,029 Equatorial Guinea 173 - 173 _13_ 104 - - - - - 277 Eritrea 352,309 31,560 383,869 _233,050_ 60,157 1 - - - 64 444,091 ... /...\n\nUNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 **21**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.13314151763916016}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "annex TABLE 2 Origin **[1]**\n\n**Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs),**\n**stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by origin\u0003**\n| mid-2015 (or latest available estimates) (ctnd)\nAll data are provisional and subject to change.\n\nREFUGEES Returned IDPs **[7]** of whom: UNHCRassisted Others of concern to UNHCR **[9]** People in and people in of whom: seekers people in UNHCR’s Others of Total refugee-like refugee-like UNHCR- (pending Returned IDP-like Returned statelessness concern to population Refugees **[2]** situations **[3]** situations assisted cases) **[4]** refugees **[5]** situations **[6]** IDPs **[7]** mandate **[8]** UNHCR **[9]** of concern People in refugee-like situations **[3]** Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations Asylumseekers (pending cases) **[4]** Returned refugees **[5]** IDPs protected/ assisted by UNHCR, incl.\npeople in IDP-like situations **[6]** Persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate **[8]** Estonia 340 - 340 _1_ 39 - - - - - 379 Ethiopia 88,149 - 88,149 _42,844_ 72,278 2 - - - 367 160,796 Fiji 924 - 924 _6_ 732 - - - - - 1,656 Finland 7 - 7 _-_ 7 - - - - - 14 France 93 - 93 _-_ 62 - - - - - 155 Gabon 173 - 173 _3_ 173 - - - - - 346 Gambia 5,136 - 5,136 _58_ 11,899 - - - - - 17,035 Georgia 6,719 - 6,719 _541_ 7,759 - 265,267 - - - 279,745 Germany 174 - 174 _2_ 87 - - - - 2 263 Ghana 22,182 - 22,182 _10,040_ 9,883 - - - - 2 32,067 Gibraltar 2 - 2 _-_ - - - - - - 2 Greece 112 - 112 _-_ 84 - - - - - 196 Grenada 324 - 324 _-_ 51 - - - - - 375 Guadeloupe - - - _-_ - - - - - - Guatemala 7,467 - 7,467 _52_ 19,587 - - - - 5 27,059 Guinea 16,009 - 16,009 _185_ 17,496 - - - - - 33,505 Guinea-Bissau 1,321 - 1,321 _16_ 2,117 - - - - - 3,438 Guyana 703 - 703 _-_ 198 - - - - - 901 Haiti 37,092 - 37,092 _689_ 7,933 - - - - 40,336 85,361 Holy See (the) - - - _-_ - - - - - - Honduras 4,312 - 4,312 _187_ 13,678 - - - - 26 18,016 Hungary 1,303 - 1,303 _2_ 1,645 - - - - 3 2,951 Iceland 1 - 1 _-_ 4 - - - - - 5 India 10,359 - 10,359 _14_ 22,414 - - - - 363 33,136 Indonesia 9,690 4,739 14,429 _788_ 2,529 - - - - 3 16,961 Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 83,507 - 83,507 _16,180_ 39,876 8 - - - 22 123,413 Iraq **[12]** 377,747 - 377,747 _127,650_ 141,913 3,318 3,962,142 716 - 45 4,485,881 Ireland 10 - 10 _-_ 50 - - - - - 60 Israel 962 - 962 _-_ 356 - - - - - 1,318 Italy 68 - 68 _1_ 137 - - - - - 205 Jamaica 1,696 - 1,696 _13_ 570 - - - - - 2,266 Japan 190 - 190 _-_ 79 - - - - - 269 Jordan 1,767 - 1,767 _114_ 1,539 - - - - 114 3,420 Kazakhstan 2,242 - 2,242 _16_ 1,187 - - - - - 3,429 Kenya 7,474 - 7,474 _2,974_ 3,278 1,231 - - - 3 11,986 Kiribati 3 - 3 _-_ 1 - - - - - 4 Kuwait 978 - 978 _31_ 248 - - - - - 1,226 Kyrgyzstan 2,423 - 2,423 _259_ 1,988 - - - - - 4,411 Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 7,420 - 7,420 _3_ 123 - - - - - 7,543 Latvia 215 - 215 _4_ 90 - - - - - 305 Lebanon 4,329 - 4,329 _111_ 4,270 - - - - - 8,599 Lesotho 17 - 17 _-_ 969 - - - - - 986 Liberia 13,543 27 13,570 _8,882_ 2,355 6 - - - 9 15,940 Libya 4,317 - 4,317 _53_ 5,219 - 434,869 - - 7 444,412 Liechtenstein - - - _-_ - - - - - - Lithuania 186 - 186 _2_ 82 - - - - - 268 Luxembourg 2 - 2 _-_ 1 - - - - - 3 Madagascar 286 - 286 _2_ 183 - - - - 5 474 Malawi 363 - 363 _4_ 5,368 - - - - - 5,731 Malaysia 467 - 467 _-_ 1,958 - - - - - 2,425 Maldives 34 - 34 _3_ 10 - - - - - 44 Mali 146,667 - 146,667 _135,554_ 10,919 740 90,218 41,995 - - 290,539 Malta 5 - 5 _-_ - - - - - - 5 Marshall Islands 3 - 3 _-_ 6 - - - - - 9 Mauritania 34,121 - 34,121 _26,591_ 7,134 - - - - 4 41,259 Mauritius 93 - 93 _-_ 190 - - - - - 283 Mexico 10,664 - 10,664 _16_ 35,276 - - - - - 45,940 Monaco 3 - 3 _-_ - - - - - - 3 Mongolia 2,177 - 2,177 _-_ 2,622 - - - - - 4,799 Montenegro 615 - 615 _4_ 2,745 - - - - - 3,360 Morocco 1,559 - 1,559 _46_ 3,860 - - - - 15 5,434 Mozambique 59 - 59 _6_ 2,049 - - - - 2 2,110 Myanmar **[13]** 204,949 253,432 458,381 _250,241_ 55,639 1 368,500 8,000 - 526 891,047 Namibia 1,185 - 1,185 _912_ 147 5 - - - 13 1,350 Nepal 8,562 2 8,564 _30_ 6,605 - - - - - 15,169 Netherlands 64 - 64 _-_ 48 - - - - 1 113 ... /...\n\n**22** UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.5224508047103882}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "annex TABLE 2 Origin **[1]**\n\n**Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs),**\n**stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by origin\u0003**\n| mid-2015 (or latest available estimates) (ctnd)\nAll data are provisional and subject to change.\n\nREFUGEES Returned IDPs **[7]** of whom: UNHCRassisted Others of concern to UNHCR **[9]** People in and people in of whom: seekers people in UNHCR’s Others of Total refugee-like refugee-like UNHCR- (pending Returned IDP-like Returned statelessness concern to population Refugees **[2]** situations **[3]** situations assisted cases) **[4]** refugees **[5]** situations **[6]** IDPs **[7]** mandate **[8]** UNHCR **[9]** of concern People in refugee-like situations **[3]** Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations Asylumseekers (pending cases) **[4]** Returned refugees **[5]** IDPs protected/ assisted by UNHCR, incl.\npeople in IDP-like situations **[6]** Persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate **[8]** New Zealand 16 - 16 _-_ 19 - - - - 1 36 Nicaragua 1,434 - 1,434 _502_ 863 2 - - - - 2,299 Niger 1,172 - 1,172 _438_ 733 - 50,000 - - 70,000 121,905 Nigeria 107,816 12,487 120,303 _89,803_ 40,640 - 1,385,298 122,719 - 13 1,668,973 Niue 18 - 18 _-_ - - - - - - 18 Norfolk Island 1 - 1 _-_ - - - - - - 1 Norway 13 - 13 _-_ 3 - - - - - 16 Oman 31 - 31 _4_ 23 - - - - - 54 Pakistan 241,973 20,163 262,136 _228,023_ 52,409 2 1,556,400 336,606 - 2 2,207,555 Palau 1 - 1 _-_ 2 - - - - - 3 Palestinian **[14]** 97,241 - 97,241 _87,473_ 3,923 3 - - - 3,241 104,408 Panama 72 - 72 _3_ 52 - - - - - 124 Papua New Guinea 288 - 288 _-_ 251 - - - - - 539 Paraguay 94 - 94 _1_ 61 - - - - - 155 Peru 4,129 - 4,129 _196_ 1,202 - - - - - 5,331 Philippines 668 1 669 _18_ 1,540 - 42,171 334,888 - 80,055 459,323 Poland 1,401 - 1,401 _4_ 340 - - - - - 1,741 Portugal 31 - 31 _1_ 49 - - - - - 80 Qatar 21 - 21 _-_ 9 - - - - - 30 Rep. of Korea 483 - 483 _-_ 316 - - - - - 799 Rep. of Moldova 2,242 - 2,242 _26_ 2,348 - - - - 1 4,591 Romania 1,929 - 1,929 _3_ 1,274 - - - - 2 3,205 Russian Federation 71,497 - 71,497 _961_ 23,605 - - - - 310 95,412 Rwanda **[15]** 76,898 - 76,898 _38,166_ 10,541 2,196 - - - 5,292 94,927 Saint Kitts and Nevis 23 - 23 _-_ 19 - - - - - 42 Saint Lucia 922 - 922 _-_ 217 - - - - - 1,139 Saint-Pierre\n-                      -                      - _-_ 1                      -                      -                      -                      -                      - 1\net-Miquelon Saint Vincent and 1,736 - 1,736 _-_ 170 - - - - - 1,906 the Grenadines Samoa 1 - 1 _-_ 483 - - - - - 484 San Marino 1 - 1 _-_ 1 - - - - - 2 Sao Tome and Principe 22 - 22 _19_ 8 - - - - - 30 Saudi Arabia 629 - 629 _20_ 483 - - - - 15 1,127 Senegal 23,404 - 23,404 _19,928_ 11,599 - - - - - 35,003 Serbia and Kosovo 44,648 244 44,892 _6,660_ 55,253 73 220,227 159 - - 320,604 (S/RES/1244 (1999)) Seychelles 25 - 25 _-_ 16 - - - - - 41 Sierra Leone 4,962 - 4,962 _816_ 3,377 - - - - 1,479 9,818 Singapore 59 - 59 _-_ 34 - - - - - 93 Sint Maarten\n\n-                      -                      - _-_                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      (Dutch part)\n\nSlovakia 305 - 305 _-_ 498 - - - - - 803 Slovenia 24 - 24 _-_ 22 - - - - - 46 Solomon Islands 70 - 70 _1_ 30 - - - - - 100 Somalia 1,105,460 158 1,105,618 _826,556_ 49,990 19,004 1,133,000 - - 74 2,307,686 South Africa 426 - 426 _6_ 840 - - - - - 1,266 South Sudan **[16]** 744,034 68 744,102 _720,660_ 3,885 - 1,643,484 148,530 - 12 2,540,013 Spain 60 - 60 _4_ 87 - - - - - 147 Sri Lanka **[17]** 122,533 - 122,533 _2,234_ 15,504 231 50,268 - - 15 188,551 Sudan **[18]** 634,612 6,307 640,919 _620,493_ 40,109 3,896 2,342,979 50,105 - 6 3,078,014 Suriname 17 - 17 _-_ 48 - - - - - 65 Swaziland 162 - 162 _3_ 170 - - - - 3 335 Sweden 18 - 18 _-_ 10 - - - - - 28 Switzerland 17 - 17 _-_ 3 - - - - - 20 Syrian Arab Rep. 4,180,920 13,634 4,194,554 _4,023,972_ 90,751 - 7,632,500 - - 8,001 11,925,806 Tajikistan 741 - 741 _70_ 1,021 - - - - - 1,762 The former Yugoslav 1,813 - 1,813 _5_ 9,780 - - - - - 11,593 Republic of Macedonia Thailand 225 2 227 _15_ 682 - - - - - 909 Tibetan 15,069 - 15,069 _3_ 10 - - - - 46 15,125 Timor-Leste 13 - 13 _1_ 4 - - - - - 17 Togo 9,226 - 9,226 _3,128_ 1,874 - - - - - 11,100 Tonga 22 - 22 _-_ 78 - - - - - 100 Trinidad and Tobago 371 - 371 _-_ 172 - - - - - 543 Tunisia 1,484 - 1,484 _44_ 2,052 - - - - 11 3,547 Turkey 63,004 - 63,004 _16,761_ 10,302 - - - - 15 73,321 Turkmenistan 498 - 498 _28_ 1,021 - - - - - 1,519 ... /...\n\nUNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 **23**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.37055397033691406}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "annex TABLE 2 Origin **[1]**\n\n**Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs),**\n**stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by origin\u0003**\n| mid-2015 (or latest available estimates) (ctnd)\nAll data are provisional and subject to change.\n\nREFUGEES Returned IDPs **[7]** of whom: UNHCRassisted Others of concern to UNHCR **[9]** People in and people in of whom: seekers people in UNHCR’s Others of Total refugee-like refugee-like UNHCR- (pending Returned IDP-like Returned statelessness concern to population Refugees **[2]** situations **[3]** situations assisted cases) **[4]** refugees **[5]** situations **[6]** IDPs **[7]** mandate **[8]** UNHCR **[9]** of concern People in refugee-like situations **[3]** Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations Asylumseekers (pending cases) **[4]** Returned refugees **[5]** IDPs protected/ assisted by UNHCR, incl.\npeople in IDP-like situations **[6]** Persons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate **[8]** Turks and 15 - 15 _-_ 3 - - - - - 18 Caicos Islands Tuvalu 2 - 2 _-_ 1 - - - - - 3 Uganda 7,185 - 7,185 _916_ 6,123 - - - - 180,000 193,308 Ukraine 318,606 180 318,786 _933_ 20,754 - 1,382,000 - - 5 1,721,545 United Arab Emirates 93 - 93 _5_ 90 - - - - - 183 United Kingdom 141 - 141 _2_ 114 - - - - - 255 United Rep.\n859 - 859 _98_ 1,395 - - - - - 2,254 of Tanzania United States 4,949 - 4,949 _13_ 235 - - - - 16 5,200 of America **[19]** Uruguay 125 - 125 _1_ 57 - - - - - 182 Uzbekistan 4,762 - 4,762 _311_ 2,293 - - - - 2 7,057 Vanuatu 1 - 1 _-_ - - - - - - 1 Venezuela 7,954 - 7,954 _195_ 7,420 - - - - 2 15,376 (Bolivarian Rep. of) Viet Nam **[20]** 313,332 1 313,333 _231_ 4,745 - - - - 198 318,276 Wallis and\n\n-                      -                      - _-_ 1                      -                      -                      -                      -                      - 1\nFutuna Islands Western Sahara **[21]** 90,538 26,000 116,538 _90,116_ 1,100 - - - - - 117,638 Yemen 5,832 - 5,832 _3,619_ 5,618 - 1,267,590 - - 14 1,279,054 Zambia 318 - 318 _12_ 414 - - - - - 732 Zimbabwe 22,210 - 22,210 _1,352_ 52,992 10 - - - 121 75,333 Stateless 30,196 - 30,196 _955_ 10,082 - - - 3,944,474 - 3,984,752 Various/unknown 113,101 - 113,101 _465_ 756,240 - - - - 13,831 883,172\n**Total** **14,441,674** **655,959** **15,097,633** **11,482,891** **2,343,919** **84,365** **34,047,716** **1,376,684** **3,944,474** **1,064,911** **57,959,702**\n\nUNHCR-Bureaux\n\n- Central Africa1,325,513 1,462 1,326,975 _1,159,390_ 132,080 6,658 2,021,269 332,666                - 300,209 4,119,857\nGreat Lakes\n\n- East and Horn\n2,954,953 71,646 3,026,599 _2,460,089_ 239,589 24,134 5,119,463 198,635 - 215,557 8,823,977 of Africa\n\n- Southern Africa 35,492 - 35,492 _3,420_ 66,057 2,902 - - - 62,557 167,008\n\n- Western Africa 425,837 12,514 438,351 _328,453_ 130,300 820 1,549,516 164,714 - 71,545 2,355,246\nTotal Africa 4,741,795 85,622 4,827,417 _3,951,352_ 568,026 34,514 8,690,248 696,015 - 649,868 15,466,088 Asia and Pacific 3,923,643 278,350 4,201,993 _3,034,918_ 404,755 46,390 2,965,211 679,794 - 282,561 8,580,704 Middle East and North 4,822,588 39,634 4,862,222 _4,360,201_ 285,369 3,321 13,297,101 716 - 11,540 18,460,269 Africa Europe 609,208 465 609,673 _42,735_ 191,816 116 2,574,886 159 - 66,566 3,443,216 Americas 201,143 251,888 453,031 _92,265_ 127,631 24 6,520,270 - - 40,545 7,141,501 Various/Stateless 143,297 - 143,297 _1,420_ 766,322 - - - 3,944,474 13,831 4,867,924\n**Total** **14,441,674** **655,959** **15,097,633** **11,482,891** **2,343,919** **84,365** **34,047,716** **1,376,684** **3,944,474** **1,064,911** **57,959,702**\n\nUN major regions Africa 4,893,460 111,622 5,005,082 _4,068,537_ 604,065 34,514 9,125,117 696,015 - 649,971 16,114,764 Asia 8,685,396 291,984 8,977,380 _7,296,891_ 682,219 49,711 16,715,602 680,510 - 294,025 27,399,447 Europe 517,009 465 517,474 _23,771_ 162,068 116 1,686,727 159 - 66,538 2,433,082 Latin America and 196,107 251,888 447,995 _92,251_ 127,326 24 6,520,270 - - 40,523 7,136,138 the Caribbean Northern America 5,036 - 5,036 _14_ 306 - - - - 22 5,364 Oceania 1,369 - 1,369 _7_ 1,613 - - - - 1 2,983 Various/Stateless 143,297 - 143,297 _1,420_ 766,322 - - - 3,944,474 13,831 4,867,924\n**Total** **14,441,674** **655,959** **15,097,633** **11,482,891** **2,343,919** **84,365** **34,047,716** **1,376,684** **3,944,474** **1,064,911** **57,959,702**\n\n**24** UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.23188041150569916}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Notes**\nThe data are generally provided by Governments, based on their own definitions and methods of data collection.\nA dash (“-”) indicates that the value is zero, not available or not applicable.\n\n**1** Country or territory of origin.\n\n**2** Persons recognized as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention/1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU\nConvention, in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, persons granted a complementary form of protection and those granted temporary protection. In the absence of Government figures, UNHCR has estimated the refugee population in many industrialized countries based on 10 years of individual asylum-seeker recognition.\n\n**3** This category is descriptive in nature and includes groups of persons who are outside their\ncountry or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.\n\n**4** Persons whose application for asylum or refugee status is pending at any stage in the asylum\nprocedure.\n\n**5** Refugees who have returned to their place of origin during the first half of 2015. Source:\ncountry of origin and asylum.\n\n**6** Persons who are displaced within their country and to whom UNHCR extends protection\nand/or assistance. It also includes people in IDP-like situations. This category is descriptive in nature and includes groups of persons who are inside their country of nationality or habitual residence and who face protection risks similar to those of IDPs but who, for practical or other reasons, could not be reported as such.\n\n**7** IDPs protected/assisted by UNHCR who have returned to their place of origin during the first\nhalf of 2015.\n\n**8** Refers to persons who are not considered as nationals by any State under the operation\nof its law. This category refers to persons who fall under the agency’s statelessness mandate because they are stateless according to this international definition, but data from some countries may also include persons with undetermined nationality.\n\n**9** Refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of the other groups but to\nwhom UNHCR may extend its protection and/or assistance services. These activities might be based on humanitarian or other special grounds.\n\n**10** UNHCR has recommended on 4 April 2014 to start the process of cessation of refugee\nstatus for refugees from Croatia displaced during the 1991-95 conflict. The Office suggests that cessation enters into effect latest by the end of 2017.\n\n**11** UNHCR’s assistance activities for IDPs in Cyprus ended in 1999. Visit the website of the\nInternal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) for further information.\n\n**12** Refugee figure for Iraqis in the Syrian Arab Republic is a Government estimate. UNHCR has\nregistered and is assisting 23,500 Iraqis at mid-2015. The refugee population in Jordan includes 32,800 Iraqis registered with UNHCR. The Government of Jordan estimated the number of Iraqis at 400,000 individuals at the end of March 2015. This included refugees and other categories of Iraqis.\n\n**13** The figure of stateless persons refers to persons without citizenship in Rakhine State only\nand does not include an estimated 170,000 IDPs and persons in an IDP-like situation who are included under the IDP population but who are not considered nationals. The total stateless population in Rakhine State is estimated to be approximately one million.\n\n**14** Refers to Palestinian refugees under the UNHCR mandate only.\n\n**15** The number of Rwandan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is subject to\nchange based on a registration exercise carried out in 2014 that resulted in a figure of 243,000 identified Rwandans, as well as a biometric registration exercise.\n\n**16** An unknown number of refugees and asylum-seekers from South Sudan may be included\nunder Sudan (in absence of separate statistics for both countries). IDP figure in South Sudan includes 105,000 people who are in an IDP-like situation.\n\n**17** The statistics of the remaining IDPs as at mid-2015, while provided by the Government\nauthorities at the district level, are being reviewed by the central authorities. Once this review has been concluded, the statistics will be changed accordingly.\n\n**18** Figures for refugees and asylum-seekers may include citizens of South Sudan (in absence of\nseparate statistics for both countries). IDP figure in Sudan includes 77,300 people who are in an IDP-like situation.\n\n**19** A limited number of countries record refugee and asylum statistics by country of birth\nrather than country of origin. This affects the number of refugees reported as originating from the United States of America.\n\n**20** The 300,000 Vietnamese refugees are well integrated and in practice receive protection\nfrom the Government of China.\n\n**21** According to the Government of Algeria, there are an estimated 165,000 Sahrawi refugees in\nthe Tindouf camps.\nSource: UNHCR/Governments.\n\nUNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 **25**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "biometric registration exercise", "confidence": 0.1922229677438736}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Annex tables 3 through 14**\n**can be downloaded from**\n**the UNHCR website at:**\n\n[http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/mid2015stats.zip](http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/mid2015stats.zip)\n\n**26** UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015", "confidence": 0.23253166675567627}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "© 2015 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees All rights reserved. Reproductions and translations are authorized, provided UNHCR is acknowledged as the source.\n\nFor more information, please contact: Field Information and Coordination Support Section Division of Programme Support and Management Case Postale 2500 1211 Geneva, Switzerland\n[stats@unhcr.org](mailto:stats%40unhcr.org?subject=Global%20Trends%202012) This document along with further statistical information on global displacement is available on UNHCR’s website:\n[http://www.unhcr.org/statistics](http://www.unhcr.org/statistics) Cover page: **This young Syrian refugee carries his little brother\u0003** across the border between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The number of refugees and migrants arriving by boat in Greece and travelling long distances over land to reach Western Europe is on the rise. Many face violence, extortion and robbery along the way.\n\n© U N H C R | A . M cCo n n e l l\n\npro duc ed an d printed by u n h c R .\n[L ayout: www.julieschneider.ch](http://www.julieschneider.ch)\n\n###### **www.unhcr.org**\n\nUNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015 **27**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "###### Who are included in UNHCR statistics?\n\nRefugees include individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, individuals granted complementary forms of protection, [(1)] and those enjoying temporary protection [(2)] . The refugee population also includes persons in refugee-like situations. [(3)] Asylum-seekers (with ‘pending cases’) are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined. Those covered in this report refer to claimants whose individual applications were pending as at 30 June 2015, irrespective of when those claims may have been lodged.\n\nInternally displaced persons (IDPs) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border. [(4)] For the purposes of UNHCR’s statistics, this population only includes conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and/or assistance. The IDP population also includes persons in an IDP-like situation. [(5)] Returned IDPs refers to those IDPs who were beneficiaries of UNHCR’s protection and assistance activities, and who returned to their area of origin or habitual residence between January and June 2015.\nIn practice, however, operations may assist IDP returnees for longer periods.\n\nReturned refugees (returnees) are former refugees who have returned to their country of origin, either spontaneously or in an organized fashion, but are yet to be fully integrated. Such returns would normally take place only under conditions of safety and dignity.\nFor the purposes of this report, only refugees who returned between January and June 2015 are included, though in practice operations may assist returnees for longer periods.\n\nPersons under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate are defined under international law as those not considered as nationals by any State under the operation of its law. In other words, they do not possess the nationality of any State. UNHCR statistics refer to persons who fall under the agency’s statelessness mandate as those who are stateless according to this international definition, but data from some countries may also include persons with undetermined nationality.\n\nUNHCR has been given a global mandate by the United Nations General Assembly to contribute to the prevention and reduction of statelessness and the protection of stateless persons. The agency also performs a specific function, under Article 11 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, in receiving claims from persons who may benefit from the statelessness safeguards contained in that Convention, and in assisting them and the States concerned to resolve these claims.\n\nOther groups or persons of concern refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of these groups but to whom UNHCR has extended its protection and/or assistance services, based on humanitarian or other special grounds.\n\n**(1)** ‘Complementary protection’ refers to protection provided under national, regional, or international law to persons who do not qualify for protection under refugee law\ninstruments but are in need of international protection because they are at risk of serious harm.\n\n**(2)** ‘Temporary protection’ refers to arrangements developed to offer protection of a temporary nature, either until the situation in the country of origin improves and allows\nfor a safe and dignified return or until individual refugee or complementary protection status determination can be carried out.\n\n**(3)** This term is descriptive in nature. It includes groups of persons who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to refugees but\nfor whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.\n\n**(4)** See: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission\nresolution 1997/39. Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 11 February 1998.\n\n**(5)** This term is descriptive in nature. It includes groups of persons who are inside their country of nationality or habitual residence and who face protection risks similar to\nIDPs but who, for practical or other reasons, could not be reported as such.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["UNHCR statistics"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "UNHCR statistics", "confidence": 0.49595096707344055}]}}}
{"input": "**Gender-Based Violence Sub-Working Group (GBV SWG)**\n\n**In Response to Syrian Crisis, Humanitarian Setting**\n\n**Gaziantep- Turkey**\n\n**I.** **Background/Justification**\n\nDuring conflicts and natural disasters, civilians are at significant risk of harm through violence, abuse or deliberate deprivation. Much of violence is hidden and goes underreported, particularly domestic violence or intimate partner violence, and GBV survivors may fear the repercussions of reporting incidents, such as forms of stigmatization that could jeopardize their future. Under-reporting of GBV makes it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain an accurate measurement of the magnitude of the problem. In emergency situations, often characterized by instability, insecurity, fear, dependence, loss of autonomy, the breakdown of law and order, and widespread disruption of community and family support systems, women may be even less likely to disclose incidents of GBV. Until there are services in place that GBV survivors can safely access there is little reason for them to put themselves at risk by disclosing their experience of GBV.\n\nAs of 18 May 2015, 259.788 Syrians reside in 25 camps in 10 cities and as of 4 May 2015, there are 1.759.846 registered Syrians in total in Turkey. Although Turkey has a system to respond gender-based violence (GBV) cases, it’s overloaded with the high number of Syrian population in the country. There is an increasing need for a sensitive, highly coordinated and systematic approach to handle GBV cases within the Turkey context. Therefore strong interagency coordination is needed to achieve the required multi-sectoral approach for an effective humanitarian response to GBV. UN agencies have been supportive with the government institutions on combating GBV and this support is planned to continue with the activities of GBV Sub-Group.\n\n[Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/equality/03themes/violence-against-women/Conv_VAW_en.pdf)\n[domestic violence, also known as the Istanbul Convention that is one of the legally](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/equality/03themes/violence-against-women/Conv_VAW_en.pdf) binding instrument for Turkey as one of the signatory countries, provides specific guidance for migration and asylum, integrating policies against multiple sectors and promoting international cooperation as written below:\n**Article 60. “** 1. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that\ngender based violence against women may be recognized as a form of persecution within the meaning of Article 1, A (2), of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and as a form of serious harm giving rise to complementary/subsidiary protection.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "2. Parties shall ensure that a gender-sensitive interpretation is given to each of the Convention grounds and that where it is established that the persecution feared is for one or more of these grounds, applicants shall be granted refugee status according to the applicable relevant instruments.\n\n3. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to develop gender sensitive reception procedures and support services for asylum-seekers as well as gender guidelines and gender-sensitive asylum procedures, including refugee status determination and application for international protection. **”** In order to respond the need in this area, as one of the standards mentioned in many international guidelines such as IASC, IAWG, and MISP, planning and coordination is aimed with the establishment of the GBV Sub-Group.\n\n**II.** **Definition of Gender-Based Violence**\n\n_Gender-based violence_ as defined in the IASC Guidelines for Addressing Gender-Based Violence in Humanitarian Settings “is an umbrella term for any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s will, and that is based on socially ascribed (gender) differences between male and females”. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental, sexual harm or suffering, as well as threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.\n\nGBV shall be understood to comprise, but not be limited to:\n\n1. Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring **in the family**, including\nbattering, sexual exploitation, sexual abuse of children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation.\n\n2. Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring **within the general community**, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, as well as trafficking in women, girls, boys and men, and forced prostitution.\n\n3. Physical, sexual and psychological violence **perpetrated or condoned by the State**\n**and institutions**, wherever it occurs.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**1.** **Objectives of the GBV Sub-Working Group**\n\n1. To establish a multi-sectoral sub-group which focus on all GBV related issues in and\n\nout of camp population at humanitarian settings 2. To consolidate, coordinate, improve and support the activities of all relevant stakeholders in the prevention of and response to GBV within the context of humanitarian action in Turkey.\n3. To improve access to relevant information to support operations, advocacy and awareness raising needs through different trainings and workshops.\n4. To promote best practice in the emergence of a shared vision and strategic framework, integrated strategies, coordinated activities, and common protocols used nationally and globally in humanitarian crises in GBV.\n5. To support/assist the establishment of referral mechanisms and Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) for GBV cases in collaboration with all actors including the NGOs and government institutions and to make sure that these procedures are in place.\n6. To build/enhance the capacity of GBV partners by ensuring processes and procedures are clearly explained and understood, providing standard GBV resources, translating key guidelines if not available, conducting mapping of partners’ capacity to identify skills.\n\n**III.** **The structure and membership of the GBV Sub-Working Group**\n\n**1.** **Leadership**\n\nThe GBV Sub-Working Group will be chaired by UNHCR, co-chaired by UNFPA.\nGeneral Directorate of Women’s Status of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies as the key government institution to combat GBV in Turkey will support both UNHCR and UNFPA through their national and regional capacity.\n\n**2.** **Membership**\n\na. In order to ensure a holistic and multi-sectoral approach in the prevention of and response to GBV, membership of the GBV Working Group will be extended to national and local government representatives, international and national NGOs, international organizations, and other entities providing services in the health, psychosocial, legal and security sectors.\n\nb. Membership of national NGOs and entities shall be encouraged, in order to ensure sustainability of the sub-Working Group. Membership of national NGOs", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "providing services in provinces, districts and/or at community level will be particularly encouraged.\n\n**3.** **Meetings**\n\na. The GBV Sub-Working Group meetings will be held on Wednesdays of the second week of every month, after the Protection/Community Services Working Group meeting held in Gaziantep.\nb. A draft agenda will be circulated to members of the Sub-Working Group at least five days before the regular monthly meeting, giving the members the opportunity to suggest additional items for discussion.\nc. Draft minutes will be circulated within one week of the meeting.\n\n**4.** **Reporting**\n\na. Members of the Sub-Working Group will submit a monthly brief report to the Chair, at the latest one week before the regular meeting.\nb. The reports will highlight the GBV issues the members and their field counterparts are addressing, the challenges they are facing and highlight any issues that require action by the GBV Sub-Working Group. These issues will be discussed at the monthly meeting of the Sub-Working Group.\nc. The reports will be shared with the relevant national and regional government institutions and NGOs for their future interventions.\n\n**IV.** **(ToRs)/functions of the GBV Sub-Working Group**\n\n1. In line with the TORs of the identified responsibilities, the Sub-Working Group will\nconsolidate, coordinate, improve and support the efforts and activities of all relevant stakeholders in the prevention of and response to GBV, within the context of humanitarian action in Turkey through: a. Mapping and updating relevant GBV prevention and response actors in focus areas (who, what, where); b. Liaising with national actors working in the sector to strengthen the coordination, information sharing, management/analysis of cases, data and referrals within the context of relevant national framework.\nc. Ensuring that analyses are carried out on the GBV situations in focus areas and documented for all actors to use;", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "d. Monitoring the established reporting and monitoring mechanisms to ensure coordination of efforts and activities of members and relevant stakeholders; e. Providing a forum for sharing information on activities, identifying needs and gaps in prevention and response, as well as for planning GBV inter-agency activities; f. Engaging in inter-agency, multi-sectoral field missions to assess programming successes and challenges and identify gaps in GBV programming; g. Facilitating and supporting awareness-raising initiatives, targeting government bodies and community structures for the prevention of GBV; h. Strengthening the capacity of governmental institutions, NGOs and humanitarian staff to prevent and respond to GBV by organizing trainings, providing technical support and tapping into existing training/capacity development opportunities; i. Active liaising with relevant cluster working groups (health, mental health etc.) to ensure that GBV issues are integrated into all humanitarian response efforts.\nj. Liaising with the national level GBV group which is co-lead by MoFSP and AFAD in Ankara.\nk. Developing national and international advocacy strategy on the issues of GBV to put the issue on the agenda of the local, regional and int’l institutions and donors.\n\n2. The work of the GBV Sub-Working Group will be guided by the following principles:\n\n**Confidentiality** : ensuring that survivors, witnesses and information sources are protected.\nNo identifying information will be revealed in data resources, nor during coordination or other public meetings, when reference is made to (specific) GBV cases;\n\n**Neutrality** : a non-partisan approach in providing services to survivors - not taking sides;\n\n**Impartiality** : non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, religious belief,\npolitical views, sexual orientation, social or other status;\n\n**Safety and security** : all actors will prioritize the safety of the survivor, family, witnesses\nand service providers at all times;\n\n**Participatory approach** : ensuring, to the extent possible, consultation with all members\nof the community (women, girls and boys and men) throughout the GBV programming cycle;\n\n**Independence** : working without influence of States, government bodies, parties to a\nconflict or other political entities;\n\n**Respect** : actions and responses of all actors will be guided by respect for the choices,\nwishes, rights and the dignity of the survivor.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "data resources", "confidence": 0.16917486488819122}]}}}
{"input": "**Further Contact**\n\nTayba Sharif, UNHCR, Protection Officer (Gaziantep) Meltem Ağduk, UNFPA Gender Programme Coordinator and GBV Humanitarian Consultant (Ankara)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**\n\nReport No: PCBASIC0178487 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective February 29, 2020) Currency Unit = Turkish Lira 5. 96 TL = US$1 US$0.17 = TL 1 6.62 TL = EURO 1 EURO 0.15 TL 1 Euro 1.0 US$0.9096 FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 Regional Vice President: Cyril E. Muller Country Director: Auguste Tano Kouame Regional Director: Steven N. Schonberger Practice Manager: David Michaud Task Team Leader(s): Sanyu Lutalo, Canan Yildiz", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**\n\nAF Additional Financing AFAD Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (in Turkish) AFD French Development Agency (in French) ASA Advisory Services and Analytics ASKI Adana Su Ve Kanalizayson Idaresi (Adana General Directorate of Water and Wastewater Administration) BRSA Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency CAB Community Ablution Block CBA Cost-Benefit Analyses CPF Country Partnership Framework DGMM Directorate General of Migration Management DMA District Metering Area DSI Devlet Su Isleri EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EC European Commission ESF Environmental and Social Framework ESCP Environmental and Social Commitment Plan ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan EU European Union EUD European Union Delegation FCV Fragility, Conflict and Violence FIRR Financial Internal Rate of Return FM Financial Management FRIT Facility for Refugees in Turkey FY Fiscal Year GHG Green House Gas GoT Government of Turkey GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism GRS Grievance Redress Service GWSP Global Water Sector Partnership ILBANK Iller Bankasi Anonim Sirketi IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA International Development Association IDP Internally Displaced Person IFI International Financial Institution IPF Investment Project Financing IRR Internal Rate of Return ISKUR Turkish Employment Agency (in Turkish)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "ISP Implementation Support Plan KASKI Kayiseri Su Ve Kanalizayson Idaresi (Kayiseri General Directorate of Water and Wastewater Administration) KFW Credit Institute for Reconstruction (in German) KOSGEB Small and Medium Industry Development Organization (in Turkish) M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MoFLSS Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services (in Turkish) MoTF Ministry of Treasury and Finance MoNE Ministry of National Education (in Turkish) MSP Municipal Services Project MSP-AF Municipal Services Project – Additional Financing NEP New Economic Program NGO Non-Governmental Organization NWMP & AP National Waste Management Plan and Action Plan NRW Non-Revenue Water O&M Operational and Maintenance PCN Project Concept Note PDO Project Development Objective PIAP Performance Improvement Action Plan PID Project Identification Document PIU Project Implementation Unit PMU Project Management Unit POM Project Operational Manual PPSD Project Procurement Strategy Document SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SCP Sustainable Cities Program SDG Sustainable Development Goal SKI Su Ve Kanalizayson Idaresi (General Directorate of Water and Wastewater Administration) SOE Statement of Expenditure SUTP Syrians under Temporary Protection SCD Systematic Country Diagnostic SWM Solid Waste Management TA Technical Assistance TURKSTAT Turkish Statistical Institute (in Turkish) UN United Nations UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UOTF Utility of the Future WASH Water Sanitation and Hygiene WBG World Bank Group WSS Water Supply and Sanitation WWTP Wastewater Treatment Plant", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project(P169996) TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n**DATASHEET ........................................................................................................................... 1**\n\n**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT ...................................................................................................... 7**\n\nA. Country Context................................................................................................................................ 7 B. Sectoral and Institutional Context .................................................................................................... 8 C. Relevance to Higher Level Objectives ............................................................................................. 12\n\n**II.** **PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE .............................................................................. 13**\n\n**III.** **PROJECT DESCRIPTION .................................................................................................. 14**\n\nA. Project Components ....................................................................................................................... 14 B. Results Chain................................................................................................................................... 19 C. Rationale for Bank Involvement and Role of Partners ................................................................... 20 D. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design .................................................................... 21\n\n**IV.** **IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS ............................................................................ 22**\n\nA. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements .......................................................................... 22 B. Results Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements......................................................................... 24 C. Sustainability ................................................................................................................................... 24\n\n**V.** **PROJECT APPRAISAL SUMMARY ................................................................................... 25**\n\nA. Technical, Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................................... 25 B. Fiduciary .......................................................................................................................................... 27 C. Legal Operational Policies ............................................................................................................... 28\n\n**VI.** **GRIEVANCE REDRESS SERVICES ..................................................................................... 34**\n\n**VII.** **KEY RISKS ..................................................................................................................... 34**\n\n**VIII.** **RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND MONITORING ................................................................... 37**\n\n**ANNEX 1: Implementation Arrangements and Support Plan .......................................... 47**\n\n**ANNEX 2: Detailed Project Description .......................................................................... 55**\n\n**ANNEX 3: Economic and Financial Analysis .................................................................... 67**\n\n**ANNEX 4: Procurement ................................................................................................. 77**\n\n**ANNEX 5: Communications and Visibility Plan ............................................................... 88**\n\n**ANNEX 6: Team List ...................................................................................................... 93**\n\n**ANNEX 7: Project Map .................................................................................................. 94**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project(P169996) DATASHEET\n\n**BASIC INFORMATION**\n~~BASIC~~ ~~INFO~~ ~~TABLE~~ Country(ies) Project Name Turkey Municipal Services Improvement Project Project ID Financing Instrument Environmental and Social Risk Classification Investment Project P169996 Substantial Financing\n\n**Financing & Implementation Modalities**\n\n[ ] Multiphase Programmatic Approach (MPA) [ ] Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC)\n\n[ ] Series of Projects (SOP) [ ] Fragile State(s)\n\n[ ] Disbursement-linked Indicators (DLIs) [ ] Small State(s)\n\n[✓] Financial Intermediaries (FI) [ ] Fragile within a non-fragile Country\n\n[ ] Project-Based Guarantee [ ] Conflict\n\n[ ] Deferred Drawdown [✓] Responding to Natural or Man-made Disaster\n\n[ ] Alternate Procurement Arrangements (APA) Expected Approval Date Expected Closing Date 31-Mar-2020 31-Dec-2024 Bank/IFC Collaboration No\n\n**Proposed Development Objective(s)**\n\nThe Project Development Objective (PDO) is to improve host and refugee communities access to safely managed water supply, sanitation and solid waste services in selected municipalities affected by the influx of Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey.\n\nPage 1 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Disbursement-linked Indicators", "confidence": 0.8257574439048767}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996)\n\n**Components**\n\n**Component Name** **Cost (US$, millions)**\n\nEnvironmental Infrastructure Investments 280.34 Technical Assistance for Project Management and Supervision, Capacity Building, 16.04 Communication and Citizen Engagement\n\n**Organizations**\n\nBorrower: ILLER BANKASI ANONIM SIRKETI (ILBANK) Implementing Agency: ILLER BANKASI ANONIM SIRKETI (ILBANK)\n\n**PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)**\n\n**SUMMARY-NewFin1**\n\n**Total Project Cost** 296.76\n\n**Total Financing** 148.80\n\n**of which IBRD/IDA** 148.80\n\n**Financing Gap** 147.96\n\n**DETAILS-NewFinEnh1**\n\n**World Bank Group Financing**\n\nInternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 148.80\n\n**Expected Disbursements (in US$, Millions)**\n\n**WB Fiscal Year** 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025\n\n**Annual** 0.00 8.30 15.00 25.00 40.00 60.50\n\n**Cumulative** 0.00 8.30 23.30 48.30 88.30 148.80\n\n**INSTITUTIONAL DATA**\n\nPage 2 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "PROJECT FINANCING DATA", "confidence": 0.1862473487854004}, {"text": "INSTITUTIONAL DATA", "confidence": 0.12583422660827637}], "vague_data": [{"text": "PROJECT FINANCING DATA", "confidence": 0.2942219376564026}, {"text": "INSTITUTIONAL DATA", "confidence": 0.2393404245376587}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996)\n\n**Practice Area (Lead)** **Contributing Practice Areas**\n\nWater Urban, Resilience and Land\n\n**Climate Change and Disaster Screening**\n\nThis operation has been screened for short and long-term climate change and disaster risks\n\n**SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL (SORT)**\n\n**Risk Category** **Rating**\n\n1. Political and Governance ⚫ Moderate\n\n2. Macroeconomic ⚫ Substantial 3. Sector Strategies and Policies ⚫ Moderate 4. Technical Design of Project or Program ⚫ Moderate 5. Institutional Capacity for Implementation and Sustainability ⚫ Moderate 6. Fiduciary ⚫ Moderate 7. Environment and Social ⚫ Substantial 8. Stakeholders ⚫ Substantial 9. Other ⚫ Substantial 10. Overall ⚫ Substantial\n\n**COMPLIANCE**\n\n**Policy**\nDoes the project depart from the CPF in content or in other significant respects?\n\n[ ] Yes [✓] No Does the project require any waivers of Bank policies?\n\n[ ] Yes [✓] No Page 3 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL", "confidence": 0.32664674520492554}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996)\n\n**Environmental and Social Standards Relevance Given its Context at the Time of Appraisal**\n\n**E & S Standards** **Relevance**\n\nAssessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts Relevant Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure Relevant Labor and Working Conditions Relevant Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention and Management Relevant Community Health and Safety Relevant Land Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement Relevant Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities Relevant Not Currently Relevant Cultural Heritage Relevant Financial Intermediaries Relevant\n\n**NOTE** : For further information regarding the World Bank’s due diligence assessment of the Project’s potential\nenvironmental and social risks and impacts, please refer to the Project’s Appraisal Environmental and Social Review Summary (ESRS).\n\n**Legal Covenants**\n\nSections and Description Schedule 2, Section I.A.1(a). The Borrower shall maintain, until the completion of the Project, a Project Management Unit (“PMU”), established within its International Relations Department, and responsible for coordinating and supervising Project implementation, and for providing implementation support to Selected Municipalities and SKIs.\n\nSections and Description Schedule 2, Section I.A.1(b). The Borrower shall ensure that the PMU functions at all times in a manner and with staffing, budgetary resources, and authority necessary and appropriate for satisfactory Project implementation, and all of which shall be acceptable to the Bank (said staffing shall include (i) an environmental expert, (ii) a social expert, and (iii) a communications and stakeholder specialist).\n\nSections and Description Page 4 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) Schedule 2, Schedule 1, Section I.A.2. By no later than ninety (90) days after the Effective Date, the Borrower shall execute and deliver the Grant Agreement, and shall fulfill all conditions precedent to the effectiveness of, or to the right of the Borrower to make withdrawals under, said Grant Agreement.\n\nSections and Description Schedule 2, Section I.A.3. By no later than thirty (30) days after the signing of the first Sub-loan Agreement or Subgrant Agreement between the Borrower and a Selected Municipality or SKI, the Borrower shall: (a) ensure that the Selected Municipality or SKI establishes a Project implementing unit to carry out its respective Sub-project activities; and (b) cause the respective Selected Municipality or SKI to ensure that its Project implementing unit functions at all times during Project implementation in a manner and with staffing, budgetary resources, and authority necessary and appropriate for satisfactory Project implementation, and all of which shall be acceptable to the Bank.\n\nSections and Description Schedule 2, Section I.B.1. The Borrower shall maintain, throughout Project implementation, a Project Operational Manual (“POM”), in substance and manner acceptable to the Bank.\n\nSections and Description Schedule 2, Section I.B.2. The Borrower shall carry out the Project, and cause the Project to be carried out, in accordance with the arrangements, procedures and guidelines set forth in the POM.\n\nSections and Description Schedule 2, Section I.C.1. With respect to Part 1 of the Project, the Borrower shall make Sub-loans to Selected Municipalities and SKIs for the carrying out of Sub-projects, all in accordance with eligibility criteria and procedures, and on terms and conditions, acceptable to the Bank and as set forth in the Loan Agreement’s Schedule 2, Section I.C, the Loan Agreement’s Annex to Schedule 2, and the POM.\n\nSections and Description Schedule 2, Section I.C.2. Unless otherwise agreed to between the Bank and the Borrower, the eligibility of any said Sub-project investment proposed for financing under Part 1 of the Project shall be appraised and selected in accordance with standards, criteria and procedures acceptable to the Bank, which shall include determining that the proposed investment: (a) is aligned with the Project objective; (b) serves an area or areas that has/have a significant presence of SuTP; (c) is technically feasible; (d) is economically and financially viable; (e) is demand and needs driven; (f) demonstrates substantial readiness; (g) is environmentally and socially sustainable; and (h) is in compliance with, and can be designed and implemented in a manner in compliance with the Bank’s fiduciary requirements, Bank’s Environmental and Social Standards, the Loan Agreement’s Schedule 2, Section I.D, the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan, and the Environmental and Social Instruments, and all other relevant terms of the Loan Agreement, including the exclusion of Excluded Activities.\n\nSections and Description Schedule 2, Section I.C.3. The Borrower shall obtain the Bank’s approval of a proposed Sub-project and Sub-loan prior to the execution of a Sub-loan Agreement with the Selected Municipality or SKI concerned.\n\nPage 5 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) Sections and Description Schedule 2, Section I.C.4. The Borrower shall extend each Sub-loan under a Sub-loan Agreement with the respective Selected Municipality or SKI on terms and conditions approved by the Bank, including, without limitation, the terms and conditions set forth in the Loan Agreement’s Annex to Schedule 2 and the POM.\n\nSections and Description Schedule 2, Section D.1 and 2. The Borrower shall, and shall cause the Selected Municipalities and SKIs to, ensure that the Project is carried out in accordance with the Environmental and Social Standards, and implemented in accordance with the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan, in a manner acceptable to the Bank.\n\nSections and Description Schedule 2, Section E. The Borrower shall prepare and furnish to the Bank not later than April 15 of each year during the implementation of the Project, a proposed Annual Work Plan and Budget, afford the Bank a reasonable opportunity to exchange views on each such proposed Annual Work Plan and Budget, and ensure that the Project is implemented with due diligence during said following year, and not make or allow to be made any change to the approved Annual Work Plan and Budget without the Bank’s prior written approval.\n\n**Conditions**\n\nType Description Effectiveness The Borrower has adopted a Project Operations Manual acceptable to the Bank (Article IV: Section 4.01 (a)).\n\nType Description Effectiveness The Borrower has properly staffed its Project Management Unit, with positions, terms of reference, and staff qualifications acceptable to the Bank (Article IV: Section 4.01 (b)). .\n\nType Description Effectiveness The Borrower has properly adjusted its existing grievance redress mechanism for the purposes of the Project, and operationalized said mechanism, all in manner and form acceptable to the Bank (Article IV: Section 4.01 (c)).\n\nPage 6 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996)\n\n**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT**\n\n**A. Country Context**\n\n1. **Turkey has high growth potential, but recent shocks have affected the sustainability of its economic gains since**\n\n**the early 2000s.** After the Global Financial Crisis in 2008-2009, growth has been increasingly fueled by credit booms\nand rapid accumulation of (mostly foreign exchange) private sector debt, together with short-term stimulus policy.\nThese led to declining productivity and growing macroeconomic imbalances in late 2017/early 2018. The situation was compounded by exogenous factors including multiple election cycles, regional conflict, and difficult international relations. The ensuing volatility in growth has affected the sustainability of Turkey’s economic gains.\n\n2. **Economic vulnerabilities that had accumulated over the past 4 years came to a head in mid-2018.** Policy stimulus in the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup attempt led to economic overheating. Though growth accelerated to 7.4 percent in 2017, this came at a cost of double-digit inflation and a large current account deficit. A hardening of external economic conditions in mid-2018, together with tense international relations, led to a collapse in the Lira.\nThis profoundly affected the real and financial sectors. Corporations and banks suffered due to high foreign exchange debt, annual inflation peaked at 25 percent in October 2018, the economy went into recession in 2018, and unemployment spiked from 10 percent in January 2018 to 14 percent in June 2019 (World Bank 2019a, 2019b).\n\n3. **The Turkish economy over the past 12 months has experienced major adjustments.** Current account imbalances have declined, banks have reduced their external exposure and portfolio flows have started to recover. These adjustments have lessened external vulnerabilities that had accumulated in the run up to the August 2018 currency shock. They have also contributed to a more stable Lira, notwithstanding bouts of currency volatility. There has also been steady disinflation over this period. These developments were supported by selected policy responses and accommodative global monetary conditions. Even so, foreign exchange reserves have gotten eroded over the past two years, exposing Turkey to external market pressure.\n\n4. **Stagnating output, high costs of production, and high consumer prices have led to significant job losses and falling**\n\n**real wages.** Unemployment among the youth is particularly high, jumping from 19 percent to 25 percent between\nMay 2018 and May 2019. Average real wages declined by 2.6 percent between 2017 and 2018, though have picked up more recently due to adjustments to the minimum wage. Poorer households have been most impacted because many low-income workers are employed in construction and agriculture – the sectors that saw the biggest decline in jobs. Moreover, the long-term impact of the real wage effects is greater for the poorest households since they have limited coping mechanisms.\n\n5. **Turkey now faces a two-fold challenge:** in the near-term to extricate itself from a downturn while inflation is high (albeit declining), the external environment is uncertain, and firms are struggling with debt; and to put in place appropriate policy and institutional settings to support a shift to a sustainable-medium term growth model. The pace and sustainability of Turkey’s recovery will depend on reducing economic uncertainty backed by consistent policy mix. The economy has stabilized in the short-term. GDP is projected to rebound to 3 percent and 4 percent in 2020 and 2021, respectively. However, given the high degree of uncertainty in the global outlook, restoring confidence and reducing domestic risk premia with appropriate monetary stance and effective fiscal policy would be key for sustaining recovery. Rigorous progress in advancing structural reforms such as deepening financial markets and completing overdue labor market reforms will help to mitigate vulnerabilities, and support growth in the medium term.\n\nPage 7 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) 6. **Turkey is both a transit and reception country for migrants and refugees and, globally, the country hosts the**\n\n**highest number of refugees.** **[1]** As a result of the crisis in its southern border with Syria, Turkey has been hosting an\nincreasing number of refugees and foreigners seeking international protection. In addition to hosting more than 3.6 million Syrians [2], who are under temporary protection, there are an estimated 400,000 asylum seekers and refugees from other nationalities. The country’s refugee response has been progressive and provides a model to other countries hosting refugees. However, the magnitude of the refugee and migrant influx continues to pose substantial development consequences for not only the displaced but also the communities into which they settle, contributing to the expansion and overcrowding of settlements, increased demands for urban services (including water supply, sanitation and solid waste services), additional pressure on infrastructure and the urban environment, conflicts over land, and increased competition for employment, housing, and social services. These stresses stretch the limited capacity of urban local governments, including municipalities and other service providers. Apart from the large cities such as Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, many of the cities hosting a high concentration of Syrians are already located in the more vulnerable or disadvantaged provinces in Turkey, which exacerbates the development challenges.\n\n7. **The Government of Turkey (GT) spent an estimated EUR 31 billion to meet the needs of refugees and hosting**\n\n**communities from the beginning of the Syrian crisis to 2017.** **[3]** This includes the provision of free healthcare and\neducation possibilities, as well as allowing legal access to the labor market. The international community has also provided over EUR 4 billion since 2016, of which 95 percent is from the European Union (EU). [4] This includes the first tranche of the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT), which is an EUR 3 billion fund launched in 2016, designed to support the GoT hosting refugees, EUR 600 million EU support outside of the FRiT, and over EUR 400 million in bilateral support from EU countries. Other donors, UN agencies, international, national and local civil society organizations, as well as International Financial Institutions (IFIs), have also been playing an important role in Turkey’s refugee response, implementing a diverse range of programs and projects, accounting for over EUR 200 million.\nThese efforts have been geared primarily towards facilitating refugee access to existing public services while strengthening the capacity and responsiveness of state institutions at the national and local levels.\n\n**B. Sectoral and Institutional Context**\n\n8. **A legal framework was established to tackle challenges due to the influx of refugees in Turkey by issuing Law No.**\n\n**6458 on Foreigners and International Protection in 2013 and Regulation No. 29153 on Temporary Protection of**\n**Syrians in 2014.** While the primary responsibility for emergency response and coordinating humanitarian needs,\nincluding management of the refugee camps, are fulfilled by the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), relevant ministries and local authorities, depending on their respective area of jurisdiction, assume responsibility to provide registered refugees with access to municipal services, education, healthcare, social services, and labor markets.\n\n1 DGMM. 2019. This PAD uses the term refugee regardless of country of origin, although Syrians are under temporary protection status, and non-Syrians under international protection law.\n_[http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik](http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik)_ 2 The terms “Syrians” and “refugees” are used in terms of sociological context and widespread daily use, and independent of the legal context in Turkey and Turkish Law. Turkey is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. Turkey retains a geographic limitation to its ratification of the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, which means that only those fleeing as a consequence of “events occurring in Europe” can be given refugee status. Syrian nationals, as well as stateless persons and refugees from Syria, who came to Turkey due to events in Syria after 28 April 2011 are provided with temporary protection.\n3 European Commission (2018): Technical Assistance to the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Updated EU Needs Assessment. October 2018.\nRefer to: _[https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/updated_needs_assessment.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/updated_needs_assessment.pdf)_ 4 Ibid.\n\nPage 8 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) 9. **The scope of the current project is primarily limited to infrastructure and technical assistance relating to water**\n\n**supply and sanitation (WSS) and solid waste management, even though municipal services in general** **cover a**\n**broader range of sub-sectors** **[5]** **, based on priority action areas identified under the FRiT Municipal Infrastructure**\n**Window in the 2018 Needs Assessment** **[6]** **prepared by the EU.** Four out of five priority action areas focused on\nactivities in the mentioned environmental infrastructure sub-sectors, while the fifth area focused on other municipal services which included transport, recreational area needs and migrant information and coordination centres, and community and culture centres. The Bank in its proposal to the EU to access the grant made a strategic choice to limit the focus areas to the WSS and solid waste sub-sectors to reduce the complexity of the project scope given the limited implementation period and available resources. Other development partners were subsequently invited by the GoT through ILBANK to address the other municipal services under the fifth priority area.\n\n10. **The WSS sector has undergone several reforms over the years and roles are currently distributed among several**\n\n**institutions.** The 1926 Water Law places the overall responsibility for water resources management at the state level.\nThis was confirmed in the Constitution of 1982 that provided that the state owns the right to explore and operate these natural resources but can transfer this right to private institutions for a defined period. Municipalities are responsible for WSS services in their respective areas. In 1984, starting with Istanbul, Turkey created 16 “metropolitan municipalities [7] ” (MM) by consolidating the municipalities in the main urban areas. The _Su Ve_ _Kanalizayson Idaresi_ (General Directorate of Water and Wastewater Administration) “SKI” is established in every metropolitan municipality to manage water supply and sanitation (WSS) services in accordance with the provisions of Law No 2560. SKIs are public entities or utilities that are affiliated with the metropolitan municipality and have an autonomous budget. A new law that came into effect on March 31, 2014, created 14 new metropolitan municipalities and SKIs and extended the service area of all metropolitan municipalities to cover the entire province. As a result, there are 30 SKIs responsible for providing WSS services to about 77 percent of the population. Other smaller municipalities provide WSS services through municipal departments. Special provincial administrations (SPAs) provide services in non-municipal areas. Responsibility for solid waste management rests with the respective municipalities.\n\n11. **Goal 6 of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 6) calls for** _**Ensuring Availability and**_ _**Sustainable Management of Water and Sanitation for All**_ **.** The goal addresses water supply, sanitation and hygiene (SDG Targets 6.1 and 6.2), treatment, recycling and reuse of wastewater (Target 6.3), increasing efficiency and ensuring sustainable withdrawals (Target 6.4), and protection of water-related ecosystems (Target 6.6) as part of an integrated approach to water resources management (Target 6.5). It also focuses attention on the links between development outcomes and means of implementation (6a and 6b). The Goal specifically seeks to achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all by 2030. While Turkey is considered to be advanced in terms of availability of water and sanitation services for most of its population in terms of overall access, sustainable management [8] of these services remains a challenge in many municipalities. Moreover, climate change is expected to compound this challenge. [9] 5 [Municipal services may cover a broad range of basic services that include, inter alia, sanitation (both wastewater/excreta management](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_services)\n[and solid waste), water supply, recreational facilities, street cleaning services, public libraries, schools, food inspection, fire services, law](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Water)\n[enforcement, ambulance and other health department services, and transportation..](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambulance) 6 EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey - Updated Needs Assessment 2018: _[https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/updated_needs_assessment.pdf)_ _[enlargement/sites/near/files/updated_needs_assessment.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/updated_needs_assessment.pdf)_ 7 Metropolitan municipalities represent municipalities with population in excess of 750,000 people.\n8 Sustainable WSS services are able to effectively deliver adequate consumer needs and are economically and financially viable, socially acceptable, technically and institutionally appropriate, and protect the environment and natural resources.\n9 A 2016 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) for Turkey, prepared by the World Bank, concluded that, given its large population and high Page 9 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) 12. **The sixth target under SDG 11 focuses on reducing the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including**\n\n**by paying special attention to air quality and municipal and other waste management by 2030.** Progress towards\nthis target is to be monitored though measurement of the proportion of urban solid waste regularly collected and with adequate final discharge. Municipal solid waste is one of the major environmental problems in Turkey. While most of the population receives waste collection services, the majority of solid waste is not disposed in accordance with the relevant legal requirements and standards, and about 44 percent of the collected municipal waste is disposed to dump sites. Uncontrolled and illegal disposal methods like dumping and discharge into rivers and lakes also occur in several parts of the country.\n\n13. **A World Bank Sector Note on Sustainable Urban Water Supply in Turkey** **[10]** **cited increasing water demand and**\n\n**scarcity in Turkey, with the cumulative water demand for domestic, industrial, and irrigation uses expected to**\n**exceed the water available before the end of the century.** Water demand is expected to increase from 43 billion m [3]\nin 2015 to 54 billion m [3] by 2020 and to 62 billion m [3] by 2100, with models predicting that the decrease in water availability will be more severe in central provinces and provinces located on the southern and western shores of Turkey. There is therefore a need for increased efficiency in the use of water resources especially in these regions.\n\n14. **While piped water coverage is relatively high in Turkey, more than 40 percent of water is distributed untreated,**\n\n**which increases risks linked to poor water quality, including to public health.** According to Municipal Water\nStatistics prepared by TURKSTAT in 2018, 99 percent of the population living in municipalities has access to piped water supply, however only 60 percent are served by a water treatment plant. The municipalities targeted in this project face significant water supply service challenges, including poor quality water due to inadequate water treatment facilities. Thus, based on the SDG definition of a safely managed drinking water service as one located on premises, available when needed and free from contamination, the municipalities are out of compliance with these service requirements, putting Turkey at risk of not fulfilling the SDG goal if not addressed. Service efficiency is also an issue, with utilities having high Non-Revenue Water (NRW), in some cases with over 50 percent losses, due to ageing or sub-optimally maintained transmission and distribution infrastructure. NRW in utilities averages about 36 percent country-wide.\n\n15. **Similarly, while access to sewage networks is relatively high, a significant proportion of wastewater is discharged**\n\n**untreated into the environment.** According to TURKSTAT Municipal Wastewater Statistics for 2016, 90 percent of\nthe population living in municipalities are served with a sewage network. However, only 70 percent of the population is served with a wastewater treatment plant. In individual municipalities coverage is lower, and the quality of sewerage infrastructure is inadequate, resulting in sewage leakages. These conditions not only impact the environment, but also lead to significant increases in operation and maintenance costs of the systems. With higher populations, impacts on the environment are increased. The current situation in the areas with no wastewater treatment puts the affected municipalities out of compliance with the SDGs, which define safely managed sanitation, as the use of an improved sanitation facility which is not shared with other households and where excreta is safely disposed in-situ or is transported and treated off-site. Access to safely managed [11] water supply and sanitation services at the neighborhood level in individual municipalities, especially in the lower income neighborhoods in urban level of water consumption, the country faces a significant water security threat from climate change—to manifest itself as potential droughts associated with the rising temperatures, changes in precipitation patterns, and reduced seasonal snow storage.\n10 Republic of Turkey - Sustainable Urban Water Supply and Sanitation, World Bank, 2016.\n11 According to the definition from the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a safely managed drinking water service is defined as one located on premises, available when needed and free from contamination. Goal: By 2030 achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all.\n\nPage 10 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["TURKSTAT Municipal Wastewater Statistics", "Municipal Water\nStatistics prepared by TURKSTAT"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Municipal Water\nStatistics", "confidence": 0.5982640385627747}, {"text": "TURKSTAT Municipal Wastewater Statistics", "confidence": 0.5677250027656555}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Municipal Water\nStatistics", "confidence": 0.2698253095149994}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Municipal Water\nStatistics", "confidence": 0.13261467218399048}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) areas and peri-urban agricultural areas, which are inhabited by both Turkish citizens and SUTPs is a major issue.\n\n16. **In addition to those challenges, the rapid influx of refugees has generated a significant additional burden on**\n\n**already strained WSS services.** While the Government has embarked on an extensive rehabilitation and\ndevelopment process nationwide to improve water quality nationally and to ensure that all rural and urban residential and industrial areas have access to safe drinking water, the sizeable population increase due to the refugee influx in many municipalities is further exacerbating pressure on existing infrastructure, requiring additional investments in water treatment and distribution systems. The provinces located in the South Eastern part of Turkey in particular, which remain the prime target of the Turkish Government’s development program, have seen the greatest negative impact in this regard. In individual municipalities, access to safely managed [12] water supply services at the neighborhood level is an issue, especially in the lower income neighborhoods and settlements which are inhabited by both Turkish citizens and refugees or SUTPs.\n\n17. **There is evidence that existing solid waste disposal capacities in some affected municipalities are being strained**\n\n**due to the refugee influx in affected areas.** This increase in waste generation has an impact on the lifetime of waste\ncollection vehicles and equipment, as well as disposal sites. While solid waste collection rates in Turkey are relatively high, a significant proportion of the waste is not disposed properly in landfills. According to the 2016 National Waste Management Plan and Action Plan (NWMP&AP) data, just over 60 percent of the municipal waste is sent to sanitary landfills, 28 percent is dumped into municipal dumpsites, and 11 percent was reported as recycled, composted or disposed of by other methods.\n\n18. **Turkey’s rapid industrialization and urbanization growth during the last two decades has caused its environmental**\n\n**footprint to increase rapidly, with total GHG emissions rising from 208 MtCO2e (in 1990) to 526 MtCO2e (in 2017)** **[13]** **.**\nAt the same time, climate change is further exacerbating already observed vulnerabilities and environmental risks, such as the intense flash floods in the Marmara region in September 2009, with 32 human losses and more than US$100 million of economic damage, as well as the recent floods in July-August 2019 in Northeastern Turkey. While there are no detailed climate change assessments that reflect conditions at each individual municipality level, Turkey has the highest risk of water safety in the arid and semi-arid regions including the Southeast, Central Anatolia, Aegean and Mediterranean. Most of the projections suggest a temperature increase of 3–4 °C on average across Turkey (from 2041 to 2070) [14] and uneven changes in the precipitation patterns, which are in turn expected to impact a number of sectors, including the availability of water resources across the country and the incidence of floods, associated with intense precipitation and coastal storms. Climate change impacts are expected to lead to more frequent and severe climate extreme events, including droughts (as highlighted in footnote 9), which could result in a disruption of critical municipal services and pose additional challenges to the existing urban infrastructure and well-being of the urban population. In addition, water pollution (caused by untreated industrial wastewater being discharged in rivers, among 12 According to the definition from the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a safely managed drinking water service is defined as one located on premises, available when needed and free from contamination. Goal: By 2030 achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all.\n13 Sources: _[http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=30627 and OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Turkey 2019](http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=30627)_ _(_ [https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/oecd-environmental-performance-reviews-turkey-2019_9789264309753-en](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/oecd-environmental-performance-reviews-turkey-2019_9789264309753-en) _)_ 14 Sources: _[OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Turkey 2019 ); (https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/oecd-environmental-](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/oecd-environmental-performance-reviews-turkey-2019_9789264309753-en)_ _[performance-reviews-turkey-2019_9789264309753-en](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/oecd-environmental-performance-reviews-turkey-2019_9789264309753-en)_ ; Turkey’s National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan, T.R. Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, November 2011, Ankara (1st edition) and T.R. Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, August 2012, Ankara (2nd edition) ( _[http://www.dsi.gov.tr/docs/iklim-degisikligi/turkeys-national-climate-change-adaptation-strategy-](http://www.dsi.gov.tr/docs/iklim-degisikligi/turkeys-national-climate-change-adaptation-strategy-and-action-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=2)_ _[and-action-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=2](http://www.dsi.gov.tr/docs/iklim-degisikligi/turkeys-national-climate-change-adaptation-strategy-and-action-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=2)_ ) ; Page 11 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2016 National Waste Management Plan and Action Plan", "confidence": 0.3936270475387573}, {"text": "OECD Environmental Performance Reviews", "confidence": 0.2675810158252716}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) other things) could significantly reduce in water quality. Against this background, conserving the quantity and quality of water resources is essential for the country’s long-term growth and sustainability.\n\n19. **Turkey’s Climate Change Action Plan (2011–2023) identified actions aimed at increasing national preparedness and**\n\n**capacity to avoid the adverse impacts of climate change and to adapt to its impacts.** In 2015, Turkey submitted its\nIntended Nationally Determined Contribution to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, committing to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by up to 21 percent by 2030 compared to the business-asusual scenario, to be achieved through several new policies and measures, including those related to energy efficiency improvements.\n\n20. **Currently, municipalities have limited financial capacity to design and implement climate- and resilience-related**\n\n**investments, which is recognized as one of the key constraints for climate action in Turkey.** The Project provides\nthe opportunity to build capacity for screening, preparing, and implementing sub-projects which consider climate and disaster resilience, particularly in terms of addressing increasing risks of extreme weather events such as floods and droughts, and increasing difficulties in managing urban water resources during more intense and lengthy drought periods. It also provides the means to invest in mitigation and strengthening a range of such climate adaptation measures in municipalities, which are increasingly susceptible to climate change risks.\n\n21. **Given the strain that the refugee influx has generated on water, wastewater and solid waste services, grant**\n\n**financing has been extended in the amount of EUR 139,812,400** **[15]** **by the European Development Fund (EDF) under**\n**the Municipal Infrastructure Window of the FRiT and the ILBANK has requested an IBRD loan in the amount of EUR**\n**135,355,000 for a project to support municipal services improvements in several municipalities impacted by**\n**refugees.** The targeted municipalities were selected from a list of ten affected areas identified through the 2018 EU\nNeeds Assessment, based on criteria such as the number of refugees and the magnitude and scope of municipal infrastructure needs. At the time of appraisal, sub-projects in five municipalities: Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye, Kayseri and Konya, were identified to participate in the project based on eligibility criteria described under Section III below (Project Description). These municipalities had a total population of about 7.4 million people in 2018, including about 540,000 registered refugees. They already suffer from significant operational problems such as high water losses, inadequate water treatment facilities, ageing WSS infrastructure, inadequate solid waste management, and lack of wastewater treatment.\n\n**C. Relevance to Higher Level Objectives**\n\n22. **The World Bank Group views the development challenge of forced displacement as a corporate priority and a long-**\n\n**term challenge that must be addressed to attain the Bank’s twin goals of reducing poverty and achieving shared**\n**prosperity.** The project would leverage the important partnership with the European Union which is providing grant\nsupport from the EU FRIT to be blended with proposed IBRD to support targeted municipalities in Turkey in addressing the increased pressure from Syrian refugees. Other development partners, such as the French 15 The project is expected to receive grant funding from the second tranche of the European Commission’s Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT), in the amount of about Euro 134,219,904, excluding World Bank fees, remuneration and Bank executed operational costs. An application for the grant financing was submitted by the World Bank on March 15, 2019, and the EC through a letter dated May 27, 2019 authorized the Bank to formally negotiate the details of the project with the EU delegation in Turkey, to lead to a formal Contribution Agreement. Signing of the Administration Agreement (AA) between the World Bank and the EC for the Grant is subject to finalization of an update to the 2016 World Bank Group-EU Framework Agreement, which is under discussion by the parties. Accordingly, the grant financing is reflected as a financing gap in the Project documentation until the AA has been signed.\n\nPage 12 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["2018 EU Needs Assessment"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2018 EU\nNeeds Assessment", "confidence": 0.6376253962516785}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) Development Agency (AFD), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and European Investment Bank (EIB) will also engage in supporting implementation of municipal infrastructure projects in other municipalities not covered by the World Bank.\n\n23. **The proposed project is consistent with the World Bank Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Turkey for the**\n\n**FY 2018-2021** **[16]** **period, discussed by the Board on August 29, 2017 (Report No. 11096-TR), and is aligned with the**\n**objectives of Turkey’s 11th Development Plan (2019–2023).** The CPF is based on the findings of the Systematic\nCountry Diagnostic (finalized in 2016) that highlighted water availability and sustainable use as being key challenges for Turkey’s future development. The CPF has three focus areas: (1) Growth; (2) Inclusion; and (3) Sustainability.\nUnder Focus Area 2 (“Inclusion”) the WBG support in this area aims to consolidate Turkey’s success towards achieving the twin goals while also supporting efforts to reach those who are left behind. An important evolution of the WBG program in this CPF area has been and will continue to be the introduction of new investment operations financed by the EU’s FRiT which specifically sets the target to improve the situation of Syrians under Temporary Protection (SuTPs) (or refugees [17] ) in Turkey. Under Focus Area 3 (“Sustainability”) the Project will support the Strategic Objective 8 to improve sustainability and resilience of cities, specifically against the climate change-related risks of floods and droughts, and Strategic Objective 9, to increase sustainability of infrastructure assets and natural capital.\n\n**II.** **PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE**\n\n**.Project Development Objective**\n\n24. The project development objective is to improve host and refugee communities access to safely managed [18] water supply, sanitation [19] and solid waste services in selected municipalities affected by the influx of Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey.\n\n**B. PDO Level Indicators**\n\n25. The key results (PDO level indicators) are presented below:\n\n- Total number of people benefitting from safely managed drinking water services in the selected municipalities as\na result of the project (out of which female (%); host population (number); refugees (number))\n\n- Total number of people benefitting from safely managed sanitation services in the selected municipalities as a\nresult of the project (out of which female (%); host population (number); refugees (number))\n\n- Total number of people benefitting from safely managed solid waste services in the selected municipalities as a\nresult of the project (out of which female (%)); host population (number); refugees (number)) 15 Refer to Report No. 11096-TR: _[http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/585411504231252220/pdf/Turkey-CPF-08072017.pdf](http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/585411504231252220/pdf/Turkey-CPF-08072017.pdf)_ 17 Refugees in this context include both SUTPs and other refugees from other countries living among host communities includes Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and others, who are under the status of international Protection.\n18 Safely managed water supply focuses on ‘accessibility’, ‘availability’, and ‘quality’, and is defined as drinking water from an improved water source which is located on premises, available when needed and free of faecal and priority contamination. ‘Improved’ sources are those that are potentially capable of delivering safe water by nature of their design and construction, including piped water, boreholes or tube wells, protected dug wells, protected springs, and rainwater.\n19 Safely managed sanitation refers to the use of improved facilities which are not shared with other households and where excreta are safely disposed in-situ or transported and treated off-site before disposal. Sanitation in this context mainly refers to wastewater and excreta management services.\n\nPage 13 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Systematic\nCountry Diagnostic", "confidence": 0.27016493678092957}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "PDO level indicators", "confidence": 0.14052368700504303}], "vague_data": [{"text": "PDO level indicators", "confidence": 0.4306935667991638}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996)\n\n**C. Project Beneficiaries**\n\n26. A total of about 3.3 million people, including refugees and host communities in the municipalities targeted under this project (out of which about 50 percent are women) are expected to benefit from the project. Of these, approximately 301,890 refugees (or 9 percent of the total beneficiaries) and 3,021,000 of the host population are expected to benefit directly from the municipal investments. Other beneficiaries will include the municipalities and municipal service providers (water and wastewater utilities) in the project areas, who will benefit from capacity building efforts financed through Component 2 to improve their capacity to more effectively manage the operation and maintenance of the environmental infrastructure, as well as commercial operations such as handling all their customers in an equitable and socially sensitive manner, in order to provide sustainable services that take into consideration climate change mitigation and adaptation aspects. ILBANK will also benefit from training in overall project management of operations involving refugee affected areas. The project is an opportunity for continued learning to the Government of Turkey, the World Bank, and other key stakeholders on an adequate business model for improving municipal service interventions in the context of situations of urgent need due to forced urban migration or displacement.\n\n**III.** **PROJECT DESCRIPTION**\n\n**A. Project Components**\n\n27. The Project will finance environmental infrastructure investments and technical assistance (TA) through the provision of sub-loans and/or grants to support selected municipalities in dealing with the increased pressure on the defined municipal services, in particular water supply, sanitation and solid waste management, in a sustainable [20] and equitable manner, taking into account the needs of the entire population including the most vulnerable among host and SUTP populations. The activities will also aim to enhance the resilience of the infrastructure, as well as that of the targeted communities to climate change–exacerbated risks such as droughts, floods, and degraded water quality, and also raise awareness of the mitigation measures to be derived from improved efficiency of the water supply and sanitation service delivery and improved solid waste management. The Project design ensures that careful attention is paid to gender and citizen engagement corporate priorities in the World Bank, both of which are central to the development of an inclusive and responsive approach to development among the host and SUTP communities.\n\n28. **Municipality and Sub-project eligibility.** The Project funds will be channeled through a public, national-level financial intermediary banking institution, ILBANK, which will in turn on-lend or on-grant it, as applicable to a number of municipalities or utilities (SKIs) based on a framework approach for sub-projects that meet eligibility criteria for participating in the project. Eligible municipalities were identified in the EU Needs Assessment. At appraisal, subprojects in five municipalities: Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye, Kayseri and Konya, meeting the above criteria were identified to participate in the project. The eligibility criteria for sub-projects will be defined in the Project Operational Manual (POM), and include, _inter alia_ : (a) a significant presence of SUTP in the host municipality as identified in the EU Needs Assessment; and (b) municipal investments aligned with the PDO that are: (i) technically feasible; (ii) economically and financially viable; (iii) demand and needs driven, and that demonstrate substantial readiness, including having approved feasibility studies, detailed designs and draft safeguards documentation in line with World Bank ESF requirements; (iv) environmentally sustainable and in compliance with, and can be designed and implemented in manner incompliance with the Bank’s fiduciary (including financial and procurement) 20 Sustainability in this case addresses technical, environmental, economic/financial, and social dimensions of the project.\n\nPage 14 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "EU Needs Assessment", "confidence": 0.15923772752285004}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) requirements, and the Bank’s Environmental and Social Standards, consistent with the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan for the project (ESCP), and the Environmental and Social Instruments; (v) that do not trigger World Bank Operational Policy (OP) 7.50 (Projects on International Waterways); and (iv) that involve no new dams or dams under construction. All sub-projects to be financed from the grant and loan are subject to approval by ILBANK and the World Bank and EUD, as applicable [21] . ILBANK follows the financial eligibility criteria in accordance with the existing _Law on Regulating Public Finance and Debt Management (Law No. 4749)_ which restricts borrowing by any institution if it has overdue payments to Treasury for its on-lending to each municipality. Municipalities/utilities would be required to provide a Municipal Resolution/Utility Board decision stating that project financing would be sought for the proposed subprojects. Where the sub-borrower is a utility/SKI, a guarantee from the metropolitan municipality is also required. In the solid waste management sector, the grant beneficiary/ loan sub-borrower will be the municipality in line with existing institutional roles, while the beneficiary / sub-borrower for the WSS sectors will either be the municipality or utility /SKI with a guarantee provided by the municipality. Proposed activities are summarized below and the indicative breakdown of activities by financing source is presented in Table 2.1 (Annex 2).\n\n29. **The IBRD loan and EU FRIT grant will co-finance** **[22]** **the project as a single project, although each financier will finance**\n\n**separate individually identifiable activities as indicatively detailed in Annex 2 (Table A 2.1).** An indicative list of\nactivities to be financed from the loan and the grant was provided by ILBANK at appraisal. Activities financed from both sources will be implemented seamlessly in parallel under a single Procurement Plan prepared by ILBANK and approved by the World Bank during appraisal, and a single Project Implementation Plan to be prepared by ILBANK no later than 30 days after loan effectiveness. Both Plans will be reviewed and updated annually as needed. The Procurement Plan will identify the source of funding for each activity with prior approval by the Bank, although the rules for implementation will be exactly the same for both sources of funds.\n\n30. **Component 1. Environmental Infrastructure Investments (Euro 254.98 million (US$280.34 million equivalent), of**\n\n**which EU Grant is Euro 132.33 million** **[23]** **(US$145.49 equivalent) and IBRD loan is Euro 122.65 (US$134.83**\n**equivalent):** This component will finance environmental infrastructure investments through the provision of subloans and/or grants to selected municipalities for goods, works, non-consulting and consulting services required to\ncarry out construction and rehabilitation works for water supply, sanitation, and solid waste management infrastructure in those municipalities to achieve improvements in access, service quality and continuity of municipal services; as well as smaller scale critical facilities to address immediate municipal service needs of vulnerable SUTP and host communities at the neighborhood or settlement level, to be identified in a participatory manner by the beneficiaries. Individual infrastructure facilities will, where appropriate, consider adaptive designs that would allow for a scaling up or down of capacity in the event of unanticipated changes in the refugee population or climate change-related extreme weather events. An indicative program of proposed sub-projects with investments to be financed through this component was pre-identified in the selected municipalities at appraisal (see Table 1 in Section V, A) of this document). Envisaged investments in water supply, sanitation, and solid waste management are described below.\n\na) **Water Supply Investments (Estimated Cost Euro 145.93 million of which IBRD loan is Euro 104.65 million**\n\n**and EU Grant is Euro 41.28 million).** This activity will finance water supply investments, including for the: (i)\n\n21 EUD approval will be required for grant financed sub-projects 22 Please see footnote 15 which is applicable for all further references to the grant financing in this document.\n23 An additional contingency amount for investments in the amount of about Euro 984,904 is allowed for in the grant amount, bringing the total grant amount to Euro 134,219,904. A front-end fee for the IBRD loan in the amount of US$372,040 is included in the project cost.\n\nPage 15 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) construction and/or rehabilitation of water treatment plants; (ii) construction or rehabilitation of water transmission and distribution networks; (iii) expansion of water reservoir capacities; (iv) Non-Revenue Water (NRW) reduction activities such as installation of SCADA systems and development of district metering areas (DMAs), leakage control measures; and (v) provision of priority people-facing public hygiene facilities or interventions at the individual settlement/neighborhood level to ensure that all people, including the most vulnerable, have access to safely managed water supply services; and (vi) other demand-driven water supply investments as approved by the Bank. All these activities will increase the supply of (treated) water and, combined with sanitation investments, will decrease the volume of untreated wastewater discharged into water bodies, thereby raising the targeted communities’ resilience to droughts and poor-quality water. The priority interventions at the household or neighborhood level under (v) above will be identified in a participatory manner with the beneficiary communities and the respective municipalities early on during implementation to respond to specific people-facing priorities in terms of spatial or facility targeting, and could include facilities such as provision of additional access points, laundry facilities, etc. Investments under this component are expected to contribute to improved access to safely managed water supply in the targeted areas by augmenting existing capacities, improving quality of services among host and refugee populations, and raising the targeted communities’ resilience to droughts and poor-quality water. Water supply and sanitation investments will be designed to address climate change adaptation and mitigation through measures aimed at increased energy efficiency, such as: installation of energy-efficient pumping systems; reduction of non-revenue water (NRW); and system monitoring and regulation, with automation through SCADA systems. All three of these activities are expected to result in energy efficiency gains.\n\nb) **Sanitation investments (Estimated Cost Euro 91.07 million of which IBRD loan is Euro 18.00 million and EU**\n\n**Grant Euro 73.07 million)** . This activity will finance sanitation investments in selected municipalities, including\nfor the: (i) construction of new wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) or interventions to increase their capacity; (ii) construction of new or rehabilitation or extension of existing sewerage collection networks; or (iii) targeted priority sanitation/or related public hygiene facilities to address immediate needs such as toilets in the most vulnerable settlements among host and refugee communities, to be identified in consultation with the communities, municipalities and SKIs; and (iv) other demand-driven sanitation investments as approved by the Bank. Extension or construction of the wastewater collection network is expected to decrease the amount of uncontrolled discharges to receiving bodies and the construction of wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) to improve the quality of discharges to receiving bodies. These activities will thus not only reduce the volume of contaminated floodwaters in case of flooding but also reduce the likelihood of wastewater infrastructure becoming overwhelmed or damaged during a flood, thereby increasing the targeted communities’ resilience to floods. Priority sanitation facilities at the neighborhood level will be identified in a participatory manner with the beneficiary communities and the municipalities early during implementation, and appropriate designs will be prepared in an adaptive manner to respond to specific people-facing priorities in terms of spatial or facility targeting, use of appropriate technologies such as semi-permanent structures that respond to land tenure constraints, etc. Investments under this component are expected to contribute to improved access to safely managed sanitation resulting in reduced environmental degradation and improved living conditions and environment in the targeted areas.\n\nc) **Solid waste Investments (Estimated Cost Euro 17.00 million of which IBRD loan is Euro 0 and EU Grant is**\n\n**Euro 17.00 million).** Identified investments under this component will include construction of a new solid\nwaste landfill in one municipality, closing of existing dumpsites, and provision of waste collection and transfer equipment and construction of two transfer stations in targeted municipalities, and other demand driven solid Page 16 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) waste management investments as approved by the Bank. At appraisal solid waste activities were mainly envisaged in Kahramanmaraş Municipality, however other municipalities may identify limited investments in solid waste management, such as waste containers and collection vehicles as prioritized.\n\n31. **Component 2. Technical Assistance for Project Management and Supervision, Capacity Building, Communication**\n\n**and Citizen Engagement (Euro 14.59 million (US$16.03 million equivalent), of which EU Grant is Euro 1.885 million**\n**(US$2.07 million equivalent) and IBRD Loan is Euro 12.71 million (US$13.97 million equivalent).** This component\nwill finance goods and consultancy services for the following activities: a) **Project Management (Euro 2,605,000; Euro 780,000 from the EU Grant and Euro 1,825,000 from the IBRD**\n\n**loan).** This activity will finance: **(i) Incremental operating costs** **(Euro 500,000 from the loan)**, including goods\nand non- consulting services required to support ILBANK for day to day project coordination and supervision, and implementation of procurement, financial management, monitoring and evaluation, and safeguards functions and project audits; it will also finance workshops and other events such as steering committee meetings required to facilitate project management; **(ii) Consulting services for project management (Euro**\n**780,000 from the grant)**, including consultant services required to support implementation of procurement\nand financial management aspects, management of social and environmental safeguards and climate changerelated aspects, including dam safety requirements associated with the project, technical and contract management, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and project reporting and communications, as agreed with the Bank; **(iii) Procurement of Video Conference System/s for ILBANK HQs and Regional Directorates (Euro**\n**1,325,000 from the Loan)** .\n\nb) **Consultancy services for design review and supervision of environmental** **infrastructure (Euro 10,250,000**\n\n**financed from the IBRD loan).** This activity will finance consultancy services for design review and preparation\nof bidding documents, taking into account climate change considerations, and supervision of construction and rehabilitation works for proposed environmental infrastructure investments under Component 1.\n\nc) **Institutional Capacity Building activities targeting the participating municipalities, utilities and ILBANK (Euro**\n\n**630,000 financed from the IBRD loan).** This activity will finance capacity building activities, including interalia, training, workshops and other learning events targeted at ILBANK, Municipalities and SKIs. Capacity\nbuilding activities will be aimed at, inter alia, improving performance efficiency, and increasing capacity within municipalities and SKIs/utilities to further modernize their operations to optimize efficiency and effectiveness in municipal service delivery while embracing principles such as resilience, financial and environmental sustainability, and inclusion. These activities will also seek to contribute to increased water security through more efficient delivery, and thus increased resilience to climate change. This activity will leverage World Bank tools and resources as well as synergies with other FRIT projects managed by the Bank to identify and prioritize capacity building needs in a participatory manner and identify and agree on selected actions to be implemented and monitored during the project’s lifetime. An Institutional Capacity Development Plan will be prepared for the project in consultation with relevant institutions at the start of the project, and an Action Plan, including specific capacity building activities will be developed and updated annually defining planned actions, to be confirmed on a no objection basis with the Bank. Agreed actions by the SKIs and municipalities to improve their performance will be defined in Performance Improvement Action Plans (PIAPs) comprising a set of feasible actions identified in a participatory manner by the relevant participating institutions at the start of the project. Relevant Bank activities and resources to be leveraged may include: a _Utility for the Future_ _(UOTF)_ initiative with support from the Global Water Security Partnership (GWSP) Multi-donor trust fund.\n\nPage 17 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) d) **Citizen/Community engagement activities and trainings to facilitate effective two-way engagement among**\n\n**stakeholders, including Turkish citizens and SUTPs, Municipalities and SKI’s to identify the needs and**\n**priorities for enhancing service delivery to all people in the beneficiary communities (Euro 370,000 financed**\n**from the EU Grant)** . Detailed activities will be planned and implemented in a participatory manner and will\nseek to identify and respond within the context of the current project to grievances and concerns relating to planning, implementation, and delivery of municipal services; affordability and other pertinent issues. The Bank will take advantage of the outcome of the citizen engagement activities of ILBANK under the relevant FRIT funded activities of the Bank.\n\ne) **Public Communication and Visibility activities (EURO 735,000 fully financed from the EU Grant).** This activity will finance Communications and Visibility activities for the project, including preparation of a detailed communication and visibility plan, information and outreach campaigns; brochures, promotional and audiovisual materials, and awareness-raising events. The objectives of project communications and visibility activities are to: (i) facilitate outreach and engagement of refugees and host communities in project activities; and (ii) share results and disseminate project lessons with key audiences for broader impact. Communications and visibility activities are also intended to communicate to project beneficiaries and stakeholders information about the EU’s financial contribution to support refugees and host communities in Turkey. [24] Activities will be detailed in a Communications and Visibility Plan that will be included in the POM.A detailed Communication and Visibility Plan will be developed at the start of implementation, in line with EU Communications and Visibility Manual for EU External Actions [25], as well as the World Bank’s external communications guidance.\nCommunications activities will also seek to target critical public education messaging to different stakeholder groups, including children and youths, and adults in relevant languages, specifically Turkish, English and Arabic.\n\n32. **The project has significant potential to enhance the resilience of environmental infrastructure and services, and of**\n\n**the targeted communities, to climate change-exacerbated risks, and to increase climate change mitigation from**\n**improved efficiency of WSS service delivery and SWM.** Efficiency gains, including NRW reduction and energy savings\n(which are both considered climate-smart activities through their potential to reduce emission), as well as the modernization/rehabilitation of WSS infrastructure under Component 1, are expected to result in large mitigation benefits, while the management of waste via a sanitary landfill rather than the current disposal sites that typically lack environmental controls is expected to have strong climate benefits. NRW reduction is expected to support utilities better withstand climate shocks to water supply, including water scarcity and drought, while reducing GHG emissions from pumping and treatment activities. Given the existing and future climate vulnerabilities, including the risk river and urban floods, and water scarcity, all project investments will account for climate aspects in their design.\nThe WSS activities, especially those addressing wastewater, will be designed in a flood-resilient manner to ensure environmentally sound and safe transport and treatment of wastewater. For the SWM activities, a regional solid waste management approach creates a more resilient solid waste management system since transport and waste disposal will be streamlined, following the operations and maintenance manual, and will follow safe, environmentally-sound practices to withstand rain and natural disasters. By transitioning from non-sanitary landfills to sanitary landfills, the waste system is expected to significantly improve how heavy storms and flooding affect the 24 The Delegation of the European Union to Turkey will be consulted on communications and visibility activities during implementation to ensure that the Communications and Visibility Plan is implemented in accordance with the Communications and Visibility Manual for EU External Actions as well as EU FRiT Visibility Guidelines.\n\n25 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/visibility/_en Page 18 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) surrounding environment. The leachate collection and treatment systems in the sanitary landfills will be designed to prevent contamination of surrounding areas during periods of heavy rain.\n\n33. **GHG Emissions:** The total net emissions of the project based on defined investments at appraisal were estimated at -1,139,559 tCO2-eq over the 30-year economic lifetime of the project. The average annual net emissions are 37,983 tCO2-eq. The total lifetime gross emissions are 671,988 tCO2-eq. The net emissions for the water supply investments in Osmaniye under subcomponent 1a are -990,458 tCO2-eq due to a reduction in tanker use as beneficiaries are switched to a piped potable water supply system. The wastewater collection and treatment investments in Osmaniye under subcomponent 1b are expected to see net emissions of -95,643 tCO2-eq due to a net reduction in methane and nitrous oxide emissions from introducing wastewater treatment. The wastewater system improvements in Kayseri under subcomponent 1b are expected to see net emission reductions of -53,458 tCO2-eq due to improved treatment standards leading to a net reduction in methane missions, greater energy efficiency for treatment, and a partial switch to gravity-based systems for collection. The solid waste investments under subcomponent 1c are estimated to have net emissions of -63,962 tCO2-eq leading to to a reduction in net emissions with a shift from unmanaged to managed landfills.\n\n**B. Results Chain**\n\n34. The results chain is presented in Figure 1. _Theory of Change_ below. Although the Theory of change diagram indicates the linkage with envisaged impacts, the project impacts will not be assessed under the project.\n\n**Figure 1. Theory of Change** **[26]**\n\n26 As highlighted through the patterned background, the ‘Impact level’ outcomes will not be measured as part of the project.\n\nPage 19 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996)\n\n**C. Rationale for Bank Involvement and Role of Partners**\n\n35. **The Bank has substantial global experience in supporting programs and managing policy dialogue to improve**\n\n**service delivery in situations of urban forced displacement.** The Bank has successfully mobilized new financing to\nsupport situations involving conflict-induced forced displacement and crowded-in funding from other donors, recognizing that forced displacement creates specific vulnerabilities for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), who often lose rights, assets, livelihoods, and social capital when they flee their homes. Bank support has been in the form of financial support, Advisory Services and Analytics (ASA) services, and operational support towards implementation of multi-donor funded programs. Globally, the Bank has supported the preparation of needs assessments for refugee host countries, ASA on affected communities, and implementation of activities for provision and expansion of basic services to accommodate the increased pressure on existing systems due to refugees.\n\n36. **The Bank’s comparative advantage in involvement in interventions in situations of forced displacement also stems**\n\n**from its strong partnerships with a wide range of actors in this space** . The Bank has partnered with various host\nstates, UN agencies, donor countries, regional organizations and the private sector, providing grant or loan resources to support critical operations in several countries. It has also used its convening power to bring together different stakeholders to share lessons across sectors. As the Bank gets more involved in refugee contexts, it is increasingly supporting the application of development approaches to nationally-led responses such as the proposed. Globally, the Bank has implemented projects tackling socio-economic challenges for very vulnerable populations, as well as displaced and refugee populations, including in Turkey, Romania, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. The Bank is also working in the socio-economic space in countries affected by conflict such as Uganda, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, Chad, Rwanda, Burundi, Myanmar, Pakistan, Yemen, and West Bank and Gaza. The World Banks’ concessional funding [27] portfolio (of US$7 billion in 2017) targeted to help conflict affected countries with large displaced and refugee populations to tackle the integration of refugees and displaced populations while also benefiting host communities.\n\n37. **In Turkey, the Bank is currently managing a diverse US$4 billion IBRD loan portfolio of investment and ASA work,**\n\n**with strong synergies to the proposed project, and is preparing five other new operations in various sectors**\n**including employment, agriculture and social cohesion to be financed under the EU FRIT 2** **[28]** . The Bank intends to\nleverage geographical and thematical synergies between these projects to develop an integrative and innovative approach, especially in municipalities which will have interventions from multiple Bank administered FRIT projects.\nSome of the relevant activities include: (a) Projects in the municipal sector with a focus on urban sustainability and resilience such as the ongoing Sustainable Cities Series of Projects 1, 2, and the Additional Financing (SCP 1, SCP 2 and SCP1-AF); (b) Analytical Work such as the Turkey Urbanization Review (April 2015), the City Creditworthiness Academy (April 2016), and Sustainable Urban Water Supply and Sanitation (June 2016); (c) the Education Infrastructure for Resilience Project (Euro 150 million) financed under FRIT I, which is working with the construction and real estate department of MoNE to construct and equip schools in provinces with a large presence of Syrian refugees; (d) technical assistance to DG Migration Management, Ministry of Interior (DGMM), on the design and implementation of the harmonization strategy for migrants; preparation of a project concept to establish harmonization centers that can serve as one-stop service centers for Syrian refugees and migrants to access legal 27 International Development Association (IDA) 28 The other four Bank projects that have been approved by the EUD for financing under FRIT II: 1. Financing to enterprises conditional on employment creation for Refugees and Turkish Citizens (P171766); 2. Employment Support and Activation of Work-Able Refugees and Turkish Citizens; 3. Agricultural Employment Support for Refugees and Turkish Citizens through Enhanced Market Linkages (P171543); 4.\nPromoting Economic Opportunities and Social Cohesion through Social Enterprises for Refugees and Host Communities (P171456) Page 20 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) services and get referrals to other services; and work with DGMM and Turkish Red Crescent to provide inclusion support services targeting the refugees residing in temporary accommodation centers; (e) Bank collaboration with MoFLSS and İŞKUR implementing an EU financed operation (under FRIT I) aimed to improve employment outcomes for Syrian refugees and Turkish Citizens in select localities affected by the influx of Syrian refugees; (f) the Bank’s Social Development and Labor and Skills teams piloting social entrepreneurship as a model to help women who are locality bound but want to be economically active; (g) the Bank’s Finance and Competitiveness team implementing a lending project that facilitates access to credit to enterprises in localities that experienced a large influx of Syrian refugees, to catalyze job creation; and (h) the Bank’s Labor and Skills team working with MoFLSS and İŞKUR on demand-side analytics, to identify critical occupations and skills in demand in the 10 provinces with the largest influx of Syrian refugees.\n\n38. **The Bank has established good collaboration with development partners working in Turkey, including the EU,**\n\n**which is co-financing the current operation, the French Development Agency (AFD), which is preparing to**\n**implement similar projects in different affected municipalities, and several international and locally based NGOs,**\n**and will work in close collaboration with these partners throughout project implementation.** The EUD has allocated\na total of Euro 6 billion in two tranches over a period of six years (2016-2023) to Turkey to support the country in managing the influx of SUTPs, with about Euro 380 million allocated to improvement of municipal infrastructure services, to be administered by various development partners including the Bank.\n\n**D. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design**\n\n39. The project will incorporate important lessons captured from the implementation of World Bank-financed projects across the globe and in Turkey. Lessons learned that are reflected in the project design are described in the following paragraphs.\n\n- **Having a strong pre-identified investment pipeline ensures project readiness that is critical for successful**\n**implementation.** The project included 15 sub-projects at appraisal stage, for which the majority of the feasibility\nstudies and technical designs for entire municipal investments were available.\n\n- **An integrated approach that targets both host communities and refugees and combines** _**place-based**_ **and**\n_**people-based**_ **methods is critical when designing an emergency response, which in this case spills over into the**\n**development stage given increasing integration of refugees with host communities.** Given the integration of\nmost of the refugees among host communities and the shift in locating refugees from dedicated camps to regular urban settlements, the project has adopted a development-oriented ‘place-based’ response for improving services and infrastructure in the urban areas that are most affected by the forced displacement crisis. Thus, it will specifically identify and prioritize in consultation with municipalities the most affected neighborhoods or settlements, combined with ‘people-facing’ interventions in environmental infrastructure facilities and services that will be identified by host and refugee populations to address the most pressing priorities.\n\n- **Defining the scope of projects clearly while allowing for some flexibility in design by involving stakeholders in**\n**decisions concerning their needs has facilitated achievement of better results in implementing local solutions**\n**in similar situations.** While the project has a pre-defined scope of activities for the larger environmental\ninfrastructure based on the municipal investment priorities of participating municipalities, it will include a consultative decision-making approach to identify the specific needs and priorities of host and refugee communities at the neighborhood level, as well as for capacity building activities.\n\nPage 21 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996)\n\n- **Both quick wins and mid-/long-term improvements are necessary to restore trust and the social contract.** Based\non experience from similar contexts in countries such as Lebanon where there was mounting pressure and perceived competition over resources and services, quick visible improvements in municipal services were critical for building trust in local authorities. On the other hand, mid-size, developmental solutions, though taking longer time to prepare, provided larger, more lasting impacts. The project will seek to adopt this two-pronged approach to improving services combining the larger infrastructure investments with the more immediate people-facing activities identified with municipalities and communities in a participatory manner.\n\n- **Social interventions engaging both host communities and refugees are as important as physical infrastructure**\n**interventions for ensuring the socio-economic recovery of communities affected by refugees.** Some social\ninterventions focusing on behavior change and public education will therefore be included in the project design, along with those targeted at improving service delivery to increase sustainability and reduce social tensions. The project is also exploiting synergies with other FRIT projects that more directly address some of the key drivers of social issues, such as skills training and learning programs that would help in mitigating such tensions.\n\n**IV.** **IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS**\n\n**A. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements**\n\n**Project Implementation Arrangements**\n\n40. **ILBANK.** ILBANK is the Borrower for the IBRD loan and intermediary recipient of the grant, and the project implementing agency, serving as a Financial Intermediary to municipalities and SKIs. ILBANK is a state-owned development and investment bank based in _[Ankara](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ankara)_ [, relevant to the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Environment_and_Urban_Planning_(Turkey)) _._ The Government of Turkey represented by the Ministry of Treasury and Finance is the guarantor of the loan **.** The project will be implemented by an existing Project Management Unit established under ILBANK’s International Relations Department, as is the case under the ongoing SCP series of projects at the central level, and by Project Implementing Units (PIUs) to be set up within the participating municipalities and/or SKIs at the local level. ILBANK has a long experience with managing implementation of municipal infrastructure investments as a financial intermediary and has demonstrated its capacity for managing World Bank loans through the Municipal Services Project (2004-2016) and the ongoing Sustainable Cities Series of Projects. ILBANK establishes the creditworthiness of all local governments in Turkey, provides loans (or grants for small municipalities and local governments) and guarantees, channels funding from International Finance Institutions (IFI), and carries out all required due diligence. ILBANK’s performance on past and ongoing operations has consistently been rated in the ‘satisfactory’ range by the Bank in its Implementation Status reports (ISRs) and its Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs).\n\n41. ILBANK PMU shall be responsible for day-to-day management and implementation of the Project, in accordance with the provisions of the POM, including the responsibility for financial management, procurement, disbursement, monitoring of environmental and social safeguards, reporting, monitoring and evaluation of the Project activities.\nThe existing PMU has qualified staff responsible for management of core project management functions, including procurement, financial management, safeguards in line with ESF requirements [29], and M&E. At least one additional 29 Responsibilities for management of safeguards are further outlined in relevant ESF documents, and will also include the municipal level Page 22 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) designated individual consultant/staff will be hired by ILBANK to support specific core functions, including procurement and financial management, as well as safeguards given the large portfolio. The PMU will also be supported by several specialized departments in ILBANK including the Project department, Investment Appraisal department, Infrastructure Implementation department, as well as the four regional directorates covering the proposed municipalities. The PMU is led by a department head and unit managers, and it has staff capacity in procurement, financial management, safeguards, and technical sectors such as water supply, wastewater, and transport. ILBANK PMU staff have been beneficiaries of intensive training sessions on World Bank procurement, safeguard implementation and other topics. The experience gained during implementation, together with the efforts of the GoT to reform ILBANK have made it a more attractive institution for other International Financing Institutions (IFIs) and laid the groundwork for harmonizing development financing in the sector.\n\n42. **Municipality Project Implementation Units (PIUs)** . At the local level, the project will be implemented by PIUs at the municipal/utility level to manage subproject implementation. A total of six PIUs will be established for the project at the local level, including PIUs in the Water and Wastewater utilities/SKIs in all five selected municipalities, to be responsible for implementation of the WSS sub-projects at the local level and one PIU in Kahramanmaras Municipality to be responsible for implementation of the solid waste sub-project. The PIUs will be primarily staffed by designated municipal/utility employees with the skills and qualifications to carry out fiduciary functions, as well as technical/contract management supervision with support from the supervision consultants. The local PIUs will have designated staff responsible for the core functions, including procurement, financial management, environmental and social safeguards, with minimum requisite qualifications as will be defined in the POM. In general, municipalities/utilities have staff on hand who can manage all aspects of sub-project implementation, and these may be assigned to the respective PIUs. However, where specific skills are required if not locally available, the PIUs could be supplemented by individual consultants as deemed necessary. The PIU staff will benefit from capacity building activities to enhance relevant skills as deemed necessary.\n\n43. The PIUs, which will be responsible for effective management of the subprojects as described in the various sub project financing agreements, will be established within no later than 30 (thirty) calendar days after the respective municipality or utility has signed its first Sub-financing Agreements with ILBANK. ILBANK PMU will prepare and evaluate the tender documents for the investment and TA components, with representation from the respective municipalities on the evaluation committees. However, the municipalities/utilities will be the contracting authorities for relevant sub-projects. While most of the Metropolitan and many Provincial municipalities in Turkey have experienced and dedicated departments to run capital projects financed by IFIs, institutional capacities for sustaining outcomes through sound operations and maintenance will require further strengthening. The project therefore includes institutional strengthening activities to build their capacity during implementation under Component 2.\n\n44. **Feasibility studies, designs, and construction supervision.** The feasibility reports of the proposed investments will be reviewed and approved by ILBANK and the Strategy and Budgeting Presidency (SBP). Design review and construction supervision will be performed by independent consultancy firms financed through the project. ILBANK’s regional offices will monitor the sub-project implementation progress monthly and will prepare monitoring reports.\nConsequently, Regional Directorates will support the PMU by providing relevant information on time and coordinating with the municipalities/ utilities.\n\n45. **Project Operations Manual (POM).** ILBANK will develop by project effectiveness a detailed POM for purposes of project implementation setting out: (i) policies and procedures relating to implementation of project components PIUs and contractors.\n\nPage 23 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) and eligibility of sub-projects; (ii) Financial management and procurement arrangements and procedures; and (ii) safeguards obligations and procedures.\n\n**B. Results Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements**\n\n46. ILBANK PMU will be responsible for Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) under the project at the central level, and it will coordinate all M&E activities with the PIUs. ILBANK has experience in M&E through the previous and ongoing projects. The ILBANK PMU will collect data on results indicators from the participating municipalities/utilities. Project Progress reports will be prepared and submitted quarterly by ILBANK. M&E activities, including monitoring of implementation progress and results, will be reviewed by the World Bank as part project supervision missions to be carried out at least twice a year. The incremental costs for the project M&E arrangements will be covered under Component 2 Project Management.\n\n47. A mid-term review of the project will be carried out around two years after commencement of the project to assess overall implementation progress and identify and resolve any key issues affecting implementation. An evaluation will also be carried out at the end of the project as an input to the Implementation Completion and Results Report to evaluate final results, assess overall performance, and capture key lessons.\n\n**C. Sustainability**\n\n48. **Sustainability of the municipal investments and service delivery will depend on the utilities ability to mobilize the**\n\n**necessary technical and financial resources to manage the new assets effectively.** The financial sustainability of\nutilities and/or municipalities in Turkey is underpinned by their ability to: (a) report positive operating balances (recurring operating revenues – recurring operating expenditures > 0); and (b) fund at least part of their capital expenditure from their own funds (positive operating balance). The four SKIs that will receive loans under the project all reported positive operating margins in FY2018: 15.6 percent for Adana SKI, 32.2 percent for Kahramanmaraş SKI, 33.7 percent for Kayseri SKI, and 20 percent for Osmaniye Municipality. The dialogue concerning SKI or municipality performance and the Performance Improvement Action Plans to be supported through the TA Component of the project will seek to ensure that issues of sustainability, including financial aspects are addressed through specific actions identified by the respective institutions.\n\n49. **Institutionally, sustainability will also be enhanced through implementation of the proposed technical assistance**\n\n**measures aimed at targeted performance improvement for municipalities/utilities under the project.** The TA\ncomponent will seek, inter-alia, to: (i) promote more effective and efficient utility management in line with good practices; (ii) provide support to the ILBANK Project Management Unit (PMU) and municipalities/utilities in embedding local-level actions that link with EU policy directives on climate change, energy efficiency, water, solid waste management, and in building awareness on international best practices to promote and implement sustainable utility operations; and (iii) support provision of training and capacity building to municipalities; with an aim to improve operational efficiency, financial sustainability and customer satisfaction. The Bank will also draw upon additional resources in line with initiatives such as the proposed _Utilities for the Future_ Technical Assistance Program financed by GWSP to support utilities in improving their overall performance. Under the proposed project, the participating utilities will attend trainings on utility performance improvement and financial management to improve their knowledge capacity to improve recovery of Operational and Maintenance (O&M) and investment costs.\n\nPage 24 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "results indicators", "confidence": 0.377903550863266}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) 50. **Technical sustainability of the physical assets will also depend on quality assurance provided through effective**\n\n**management of the design review taking into account climate change considerations and construction supervision**\n**process.** Since all the proposed investments and technical assistance measures have been developed in line with the\nrelevant national policies and international best practice, expected results of the proposed project will contribute to sustainability of the actions at policy level.\n\n**V.** **PROJECT APPRAISAL SUMMARY**\n\n**A. Technical, Economic and Financial Analysis**\n\n51. **Technical Analysis.** At appraisal stage it was expected that the project will finance a total of fifteen environmental infrastructure sub-projects in the five municipalities, spanning three environmental infrastructure sub-sectors, water supply, wastewater management and solid waste management, in addition to the Technical Assistance activities. A summary of the status of identified sub-project interventions by municipality at appraisal is provided in Table 1 below.\nWhile feasibility studies and technical designs were prepared for nine of the municipal sub-projects identified at appraisal, design studies are ongoing for the additional six subprojects. The scope of investments and respective project footprints may change as part of a design review process to be carried out for all sub-projects prior to bidding for the construction works. The design review will, among other things, ensure that individual infrastructure facilities where appropriate consider adaptive designs that would allow for a scale up or scale down of capacity in the event of changes in the refugee population. The design review will be carried out by independent consultancy firms to be commissioned by ILBANK in each municipality on behalf of the municipalities. The same consultants will also be responsible for preparation of the bidding documents and construction supervision to ensure works quality control.\nMost of the available engineering designs have been reviewed and conform to good practice, first by ILBANK and by the World Bank technical team and comments have been provided where gaps have been identified. Terms of reference for the design review and supervision consultants have been prepared by ILBANK and the selection process for the consultants will be initiated as soon as the terms of reference are cleared by the World Bank. Although the consultants will be procured by ILBANK, the respective municipalities shall be invited into the evaluation process and will sign the contracts once the sub-financing agreements are signed between ILBANK and the municipalities/utilities.\nA summary of the status of each sub-contract is given below. ILBANK may also request the Bank’s no objection to pre-finance the consultants and be reimbursed through retroactive financing with the World Bank if deemed necessary.\n\n**Table 1. Indicative List of Environmental Infrastructure Sub-Projects identified at appraisal**\n\n**Est. Financing**\n**Sub-Project Description**\n**Need (m EUR)**\n\n**Target**\n**Municipality**\n\n**Sub-Project**\n\n**No.**\n\n**Status of technical**\n\n**designs (at**\n\n**appraisal)**\nAdana A.1 Kozan İmamoğlu Yedigöze Drinking Water 21.85 Available with Transmission Line sufficient quality A.1 Kozan İmamoğlu Yedigöze Drinking Water 21.85 Available with Transmission Line sufficient quality A.2 Yedigöze Water Treatment Plant 13.15 Ongoing A.3 Kozan Pınargözü Drinking Water 28.07 Available with Transmission Line and Network sufficient quality B.1 Kahramanmaraş Northern Districts 17.00 Available with Integrated Solid Waste Project sufficient quality B.2 Kahramanmaraş (Centrum) Drinking Water, 17.00 Available with Sewerage and Stormwater Project West Part sufficient quality A.3 Kozan Pınargözü Drinking Water 28.07 Available with Transmission Line and Network sufficient quality Kahramanmaraş B.1 Kahramanmaraş Northern Districts 17.00 Available with Integrated Solid Waste Project sufficient quality 17.00 Available with sufficient quality Page 25 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996)\n\n**Est. Financing**\n**Sub-Project Description**\n**Need (m EUR)**\n\n**Target**\n**Municipality**\n\n**Sub-Project**\n\n**No.**\n\n**appraisal)**\nB.3 Ceyhan Basin Wastewater Treatment Plants 8.40 Available for 3 WWTPs; Ongoing for\n\n**Status of technical**\n\n**designs (at**\n\n1 WWTP B.4 Elbistan Drinking Water Network Project 8.00 Ongoing B.5 Kahramanmaraş (Centrum) Drinking Water, 18.80 Available Sewerage and Stormwater Project East Part with sufficient quality B.6 Elbistan Drinking Water Transmission Line 25.00 Ongoing review Kayseri C.1 Kayseri Wastewater Treatment Plant 25.00 Available Konya D.1 Akşehir Water Supply Project 4.71 Available but needs improvement D.2 Ilgin Wastewater Treatment Plant 3.90 Available and under revision D.3 Cumra Wastewater Treatment Plant 4.56 Available and under revision Osmaniye E.1 Osmaniye (Centrum) Drinking Water Project 27.65 Available with sufficient quality E.2 Osmaniye (Centrum) Sewerage Project 29.91 Ongoing review\n\n**Economic and Financial Analysis**\n\n52. The financial and economic analyses focus on sub-projects in the municipalities that will benefit from the loan proceeds, namely: Adana: for drinking water transmission lines and network; Kahramanmaras solid waste system, wastewater treatment plants (WWTP) and sewerage network projects; Kayseri WWTP project; and Osmaniye drinking water and sewerage network projects. Konya Aksehir water supply project and wastewater treatment plants have been left out as they are to be fully grant financed. The integrated solid waste management (ISWM) project in Kahramanmaras is justified based on financial and economic returns.\n\n53. Financial Internal Rates of Return (FIRR) were estimated for the productive subprojects resulting generally in negative Financial Net Present Values (NPV) thus reflecting non-viability on solely commercial basis. Nonetheless, Component 2, TA component includes capacity building activities to utilities to improve operational efficiency in order to operate and maintain investments and deliver services in a sustainable manner. Such support will create conditions to move towards commercial viability. The Bank will also support the utilities in identifying and implementing performance improvements through other initiatives such as the Utilities for the Future Trust Program financed through a GWSP TF and implemented by the Water Global Practice and the ECA Water team. These types of support will foster better management practices for enhanced performance in the future of these utilities.\n\n54. The economic Net Present Values (NPV) of the entire project’s lifetime is estimated at EUR 19.4 million on the basis of the present values of costs and benefits produced by the project. Economic IRR (E-IRR) was 11 percent with benefits to cost ratio of 1.09 for A) Adana Drinking Water and Transmission Sub-project, 10.4 percent and 1.02 for B) Kahramanmaras Wastewater Treatment Plants and 15.5 percent and 1.56 for Kahramanmaras solid waste, 12.2 percent and 1.64 for C) Kayseri WWTP project 23.82 percent and 9.17 for E) Osmaniye drinking water and sewerage network projects. Although estimated E-IRRs are slightly above the discount rate of 10 percent, they are comfortably Page 26 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) above the recommended discount rate of 6 percent per WB guideline [30] .\n\n55. Sensitivity analyses have been carried out measuring change in the E-NPV due to changes in critical parameters including investment costs, personnel costs and power costs. Avoided GHG emissions improving economic benefits to the project due to more efficient wastewater collection, lower energy use for wastewater treatment, shift in solid waste management to a sanitary landfill from current disposal sites and energy efficiency gains from NRW reductions, were also considered as part of economic assessment. The benefits from estimated net emissions of the project based on defined investments at appraisal were estimated at EUR 57.5 million over the 30-year economic lifetime of the project [31] .\n\n56. As the investments will be implemented under affiliated water utilities and/or municipalities, a baseline assessment of their financial position has been carried, to ensure financial sustainability based on 2018 and past three years’ trend data. Financial sustainability of utilities and/or municipalities are underpinned by their ability to: (a) report positive operating balances (recurring operating revenues – recurring operating expenditures > 0); and (b) fund at least part of their capital expenditure from their own funds (positive operating balance as explained above). Current margin reported in FY2018 by Adana SKI was 15.6 percent, 32.2 percent for Kahramanmaras SKI and 33.7 percent for Kayseri SKI. Osmaniye Municipality closed FY2018 with an operating margin of 20 percent. With increased capital investments, utilities are projected to report balanced overall budget results, supported with debt financing and grant contribution as foreseen under the sub-projects. Results of financial baseline assessments are provided in the Annex 3, Financial Estimate section. Detailed financial management and creditworthiness analyses for sub-borrower water utilities and municipalities incorporating projections on fiscal performance, expenditure coverage and indebtedness indicated that sub-borrowers will have capacity to meet their financial commitments while remaining exposed to adverse economic conditions.\n\n**B. Fiduciary**\n\n**Financial Management**\n\n57. The financial management arrangements for the project are satisfactory. The PMU established under the International Relations Department of ILBANK will be responsible for the financial management arrangements for the Project. The PMU has satisfactory arrangements for the Sustainable Cities Project I, II and its AF and the same arrangements will be adopted for Municipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas.\n\n58. ILBANK will on-lend proceeds of the IBRD loan and on-grant the grant proceeds to the participating municipalities/utilities and will provide technical support to these municipalities/utilities in overseeing implementation of the investments. The procurements of the project will be conducted centrally by ILBANK with the participation of the Municipalities/utilities in the bid evaluation committees and concluded contracts will be signed by the relevant Municipalities/utilities. Payments to the suppliers will be registered directly by ILBANK upon submission of acceptable approval documents. The PMU in ILBANK will be responsible for the management of the Designated Accounts and project accounting and reporting. The project accounts will be subject to independent audit on an annual basis by the Treasury Controllers of the Ministry of Treasury and Finance of independent auditors. The 30 Additionally, there are other components that would generate tangible and intangible benefits not measured because of i) inability due to methodological reasons and ii) limited data to estimate benefits at the time of drafting the analysis into the PAD.\n31 Using World Bank GHG Accounting Tool for Water sector lending projects average shadow price of carbon converted to Euro using EUR/US$ conversion rate of 0,90 for calculation in monetary terms.\n\nPage 27 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Bank GHG Accounting Tool", "confidence": 0.22202032804489136}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2018 and past three years’ trend data", "confidence": 0.19302982091903687}], "vague_data": [{"text": "trend data", "confidence": 0.3607703447341919}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) project audit report will be made publicly available according to the World Bank’s Access to Information Policy.\n\n**Procurement**\n\n59. ILBANK as the financial intermediary, as well as the beneficiary municipalities are public entities. Thus, the World Bank Procurement Regulations for IPF Borrowers – July 2016 revised in November 2017 and August 2018 (“Procurement Regulations”) will apply to the proposed Project. The World Bank's Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants, dated October 15, 2006 and revised in January 2011 and as of July 1, 2016 (“Anti-Corruption Guidelines”) will also apply to the proposed project. A General Procurement Notice will be published on the World Bank’s external website and United Nations Development Business online.\n\n60. A draft Project Procurement Strategy for Development (PPSD) has been prepared by ILBANK as required by the Procurement Regulations to determine the optimum procurement approach to deliver the right procurement result under the proposed project. The PPSD was agreed between ILBANK and the World Bank. The PPSD proposed that all procurements will be conducted by the PMU with the support of ILBANK Investment Coordination Department as needed. The relevant municipalities/utilities will be invited to participate in the bid evaluation committees, sign the contracts and they will be responsible from the contract implementation through their PIUs supported with experts in the procurement and contract management. Considering four years project implementation period, the PPSD proposed to initiate procurements as early as possible for the timely implementation of the contracts.\n\n61. The selection of the “Design Review and Supervision Consultant(s)” has been identified as the strategically important procurement although their contract values are relatively low. It is envisaged that the consultants will support the PMU for the preparation of the bidding documents for the infrastructure investments and consultants’ timely input is very critical for the initiation of the relevant procurements planned in the procurement plan. Following the Bank’s guidance for procurements in situations of urgent need of assistance, the selection of the consultants will be accelerated by adapting fit-for-purpose principle, and accordingly higher thresholds will be applied for the “consultant’s qualification-based selection” method to deliver the project development objectives within the duration of the project. All other infrastructure contracts are “strategic critical” for the municipalities. Hence, the selected consultant will also provide services to relevant municipalities/utilities for the quality assurance of the works and goods and timely completion of the contracts within their original contract prices. More details on the findings of the procurement assessment, the proposed procurement supervision arrangements, risks and relevant mitigation measures to address them are provided in Annex 4.\n\n~~.~~ **C. Legal Operational Policies** .\n\n**Triggered?**\n\nProjects on International Waterways OP 7.50 No Projects in Disputed Areas OP 7.60 No ~~.~~ Page 28 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996)\n\n**D. Environmental and Social**\n\n**Environment**\n\n62. The project is categorized as “ _Substantial Risk_ ” within the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework (ESF), given that at appraisal stage it consisted of 15 identified infrastructure investments (subprojects) in 5 municipalities and target provinces which are host to among the largest numbers of refugees in urban settlements. The project is expected to have positive impacts on improving environmental infrastructure and hence, contributing to resilience in communities impacted by refugee influx. It is not expected that sub-projects will have significant adverse effects to human health and/or the environment. The project will not result in significant adverse cumulative and does not include activities that might involve transboundary impacts. Moreover, the areas likely to be affected by the project are not of high value and sensitivity.\n\n63. Environmental and Social Standards (ESS) 1-10, with the exception of ESS 7 (the standard does not apply, as there are no indigenous or SSAHUTLC in Turkey) apply to the Project. The project also does not necessitate the application of OP 7.50: Projects on International Waterways [32] and OP 7.60: Projects in Disputed Areas. However, the urgent need for assistance to support the Government of Turkey's efforts to mitigate rising pressures on service delivery from the continual influx of people across the border and from camps to cities has required the Bank policy OP 10, para 12 – Projects prepared in a Situation of Urgent Need of Assistance or Capacity Constraints to be applied.\n\n64. The water supply subprojects will include the construction of water treatment plants, construction of new and extension of existing water distribution networks and transmission line, expansion of water reservoir capacities, and non-revenue water reduction activities such as installation of SCADA systems and development of water metering areas. Wastewater investments will include construction of new wastewater treatment plants or expanding their capacity, construction of new and extension of existing sewerage collection networks. Solid waste facilities will include new waste collection and transfer equipment, construction of two transfer stations and a landfill (including composting and mechanical separation facilities) in Afsin District of Kahramanmaraş, and rehabilitation or closure of existing dumpsites. These subprojects have potential environmental risks both during construction and operation phases.\n\n65. In line with E&S standards that apply to the project, potential environmental and social risks associated with the construction and operation of the wastewater treatment plants and solid waste landfills are: (i) generation of noise, dust, wastewater, excess material and other waste in the construction phase; (ii) emission of dust, bio-aerosols, odors, and vehicle exhaust during waste collection and transportation; (iii) contaminated runoff, leachate generation and landfill gas emissions; groundwater contamination; (iv) noise and vibration from the operation of waste processing equipment; (v) fire and explosion risks due to landfill gas; (vi) community health and safety impacts such as visual, dust and odor problems, as well as scavenging related impacts and physical, chemical and biological hazards; (vii) occupational health and safety impacts such as accidents and injuries, chemical exposure, noise and vibration exposure and exposure to pathogens and vectors; (viii) closure and post-closure management of the landfills; (ix) discharge of treated wastewater to receiving bodies; (x) sludge and solids generation from wastewater treatment plants; (xi) emissions of hydrogen sulfide, methane, ozone, gaseous or volatile chemicals associated with WWTPs; and (xii) ecological impacts on the nearby receptors. Although ILBANK - the project implementing entity - has extensive experience in applying the Bank’s safeguard policies under MSP 1 and 2 and SCP 1 and 2, it lacks experience in managing complex and substantial-risk projects in Fragility-Conflict-Violence (FCV) contexts.\n\n32 Based on sub-project selection criteria, projects triggering OP 7.50 are not eligible for participation under this project.\n\nPage 29 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) 66. The World Bank and ILBANK teams have agreed on the environmental and social risk categorization and assessment requirements of each subproject as presented in Table 2 below.\n\n67. ILBANK has prepared an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) for managing environmental and social impacts and risks of subprojects, and an Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP). The ESMF was consulted with stakeholders on November 26, 2019 and was disclosed on December 4, 2019. Subproject and sitespecific environmental impacts will be discussed in detail in the subproject specific environmental assessment documents (such as Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP)) to be prepared by ILBANK, on behalf of related municipalities, during the project implementation phase.\nILBANK already completed the selection of Environmental and Social Consultancy Company for the preparation of subproject specific environmental and social assessment documents and initiated the preparation of documents accordingly. One of the key actors in the implementation of the ESMF will be ILBANK Project Management Unit (PMU). ILBANK will recruit additional environmental and social specialists (at least one environmental and one social) to increase PMU capacity during project preparation and implementation.\n\n**Table 2. E&S Risk Categorization of Proposed Subprojects**\n\n**E&S** **Risk**\n**No** **Subproject**\n**Categorization**\n\n**E&S** **Risk** **E&S Assessment Requirements at**\n**No** **Subproject**\n**Categorization** **appraisal**\n\n1-1 Kozan Imamoglu Yedigoze Drinking Water Substantial ESIA; SEP; Dam safety assessment; ExTransmission Line Post Social Audit for subproject 1-2 1-1 Kozan Imamoglu Yedigoze Drinking Water Substantial ESIA; SEP; Dam safety assessment; ExTransmission Line Post Social Audit for subproject 1-2 1-2 Yedigoze Water Treatment Plant 1-3 Kozan Pinargozu Drinking Water Transmission Line and Network 2-1 Kahramanmaras Northern Districts Integrated Solid Substantial ESIA; SEP; LARAP Waste Project Substantial Substantial ESIA; SEP; LARAP 2-2 Kahramanmaraş (Centrum) Drinking Water, Sewerage and Stormwater Project West Part 2-2 Kahramanmaraş (Centrum) Drinking Water, Moderate ESMP; SEP _(covering subprojects 2-2,_ Sewerage and Stormwater Project West Part _2-3, 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6)*_ ; Ex Post Social 2-3 Kahramanmaraş (Centrum) Drinking Water, Audit for subproject 2-2 Sewerage and Stormwater Project East Part 2-4 Ceyhan Basin Wastewater Treatment Plants Substantial ESIA; SEP _(covering subprojects 2-2,_\n\n- Ekinozu WWTP and Collectors _2-3, 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6)*_ ; LARAP\n\n- Caglayancerit WWTP\n\n- Andirin WWTP and Collectors\n\n- Goksun WWTP and Collectors\n\n2-5 Elbistan Drinking Water Network Project Moderate ESMP; SEP _(covering subprojects 2-2,_ 2-6 Elbistan Drinking Water Transmission Line _2-3, 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6)*_ ; LARAP 3-1 Extension of Kayseri Wastewater Treatment Plant Substantial ESIA; SEP Substantial ESIA; SEP _(covering subprojects 2-2,_ _2-3, 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6)*_ ; LARAP 2-5 Elbistan Drinking Water Network Project Moderate ESMP; SEP _(covering subprojects 2-2,_ 2-6 Elbistan Drinking Water Transmission Line _2-3, 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6)*_ ; LARAP 3-1 Extension of Kayseri Wastewater Treatment Plant Substantial ESIA; SEP 4-1 Aksehir Water Supply Project Moderate ESMP; SEP 4-2 Ilgin Wastewater Treatment Plant _Assessment pending at appraisal_ 4-3 Cumra Wastewater Treatment Plant _Assessment pending at appraisal_ 5-1 Osmaniye (Centrum) Drinking Water Project Moderate ESMP; SEP 5-2 Osmaniye (Centrum) Sewerage Project _* For subprojects in Kahramanmaras, 2 SEPs will be prepared in total; one for No 2-1, and one for No 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6._ 68. **Safety of Dams.** One sub-project in Adana includes the 34 km long Kozan İmamoğlu Yedigöze Drinking Water Page 30 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) Transmission Line, which will be fed by the Yedigöze reservoir on the Yedigoze dam/hydropower plant. The Yedigöze hydropower plant was built on the Seyhan River in Adana province between 2006 and 2010. The main purposes of the plant are hydropower and irrigation. It is owned and operated by SANKO, a private Turkish company, under a Build-Operate-Transfer project licensed by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR). The Bank Dam Safety Expert visited Adana to conduct a due diligence on dam safety aspects for Yedigöze dam as part of project preparation. Yedigoze dam and its appurtenant works were built 10 years ago, and they are well operated and maintained by SANKO, which is responsible for the safety of its facilities. Devlet Su Isleri (DSI) the State agency responsible for water resources management and irrigation ensures the state supervision in accordance with the applicable legislation, and was directly involved in all project stages, from the feasibility study to the reservoir impoundment, and it ensures that the operator implements all required safety measures. In this context, DSI examines all reports related to dam operation and safety and carries out regular dam inspections (twice a year).\n\n69. DSI confirmed the sound state and behavior of the dam and its appurtenant structures. Moreover, the board of experts under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forest carried out an inspection in December 2015 and issued a positive opinion regarding the safety conditions of the Yedigöze dam. This report, which confirms the general good conditions and performance of the dam, can be accepted by the WB as previous dam safety assessment, this is in accordance with OP4.37 requirements. SANKO personnel in charge of the surveillance of the dam are well organized and perform daily routine inspections and maintenance checks. The dam and its appurtenant structures are equipped with 272 monitoring instruments divided into 15 different categories; measurements are automatic and/or manual. Analysis and interpretation of the measurements are made by both SANKO and DSI, and dam surveillance reports are issued quarterly. The instrumentation Plan, the Operation & Maintenance Plan and the Emergency Preparedness Plan are regularly updated by SANKO and submitted to DSI for approval. Overall, the Bank expert’s general impression was positive, with both the operator and the state supervisory authority aware of the importance of the safety and the maintenance of its facilities. The project will finance technical assistance under Component 2 to have independent dam safety specialists, including competent dam safety specialists of DSI, acceptable to the Bank carry out a safety inspection of the above-mentioned dams, based on terms of reference acceptable to the Bank, at intervals of not less than once every five years according to Good International Industry Practice, during the implementation and after completion of the Project. The first of said safety inspections shall be carried out not later than December 2020.\n\n**Social**\n\n70. **Social risk is rated as Substantial.** Social risks and impacts intrinsic to the project are comparable to other municipal investments carried out under the Bank financed Sustainable Cities Projects 1 and 2 with ILBANK, which are assessed as Moderate. Contextual risks are rated Substantial because the sub-projects to be financed under the project are designed in such manner to enable broad population to benefit, regardless of their nationality or any vulnerability.\nSuch approach should allow the management of contextual risks, which may otherwise be considered High. Main social impacts are expected to be manageable and limited to stakeholder engagement with various host communities and refugees, economic displacement with limited livelihood impacts, limited labor influx impacts expected during construction phase, and community health and safety impacts caused by investments in wastewater treatment and solid waste facilities. The ESMF and site – specific ESMPs will address such impacts and propose mitigation measures.\nMajor civil works are expected in association with the construction of water and solid waste treatment plans, while other investments will mainly include the construction of linear structures. SEA (sexual exploitation and abuse) risks are assessed as Low. The project will carry out a set of training activities on SEA prevention, which will target ILBANK and participating municipalities/utilities staff and civil works construction contractors. Project workers will be subject to the Code of Conduct, which will be included in the contracts for the civil works and project labor management Page 31 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) procedure. ILBANK prepared a project labor management procedure (LMP), which applies to project workers, including ILBANK staff and workers engaged in sub-projects including civil works contractors. Civil works contractors shall adopt the project LMP, which includes proposed Code of Conduct.\n\n71. ILBANK prepared a Resettlement Framework (RF) as required by ESS5, which was disclosed on November 26, 2019 and consulted in conjunction with the ESMF and SEF on December 2, 2019. The majority of the sub-projects requiring land acquisition have already completed acquisition works. However, designs are currently still under review and revision, and may change the project footprint and thus the scope of land acquisition. Ex-post social audits of previous land acquisitions will identify any gaps with ESS 5 which need to be addressed and will be completed before the start of civil works of relevant sub projects. Resettlement Plans, and any other site-specific E&S documents will be finalized and approved by the Bank and disclosed prior to the beginning of tendering of works of each sub-project.\n\n72. **Stakeholder Engagement and Citizen Engagement:** In line with ESS 10, ILBANK prepared a Stakeholder Engagement Framework, outlining general principles and a collaborative strategy to identify stakeholders and plan for an engagement process in accordance with ESS10. In addition, the SEPs for each municipality will be prepared. The borrowing municipalities and utilities will implement SEPs including timely information disclosure in accessible manner, engaging stakeholders across host and refugee communities in the project areas, with an overall aim to prevent any social tensions and perceptions of unequal access to project benefits. Before project implementation, Municipalities will develop information booklet/leaflets in Turkish and Arabic describing subproject intended outcomes including the need of land expropriation, which will be shared among the project affected parties (PAPs) during resettlement plan preparation work. The SEF/SEP includes a two-level project level Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM): the first at the municipal level and the second at ILBANK level. Municipalities will ensure that the GRMs are functional and accessible to the refugee and host communities in the languages they speak for any issues that they would like to address. Municipalities will report on the percentage of grievances resolved within a stipulated time frame and the project will utilize Citizen Report Cards at the beginning and end-term to assess if the municipal investments improved the cities’ current infrastructure and addressed the prior needs of both host and refugee communities. Additional citizen engagement activities are described under Component 2 c (ii).\n\n73. **Additionally, citizen engagement activities to facilitate effective two-way engagement among stakeholders,**\n\n**including Turkish citizens and refugees, municipalities, and SKIs, will seek to identify the needs and priorities of**\n**beneficiary groups to improve access to effective municipal services.** These activities will be planned and\nimplemented by ILBANK in a participatory manner with the support of non-governmental organizations (NGO)’s selected by ILBANK. They will be identified through the project and be described in the Project Operations Manual.\nThe activities will seek to address concerns on issues relating to planning, implementation, and delivery of municipal services, particularly environmental infrastructure services covered under the project, as well as any related issues affecting social cohesion among host and refugee communities. Citizen engagement activities will where possible leverage and be carried out in close collaboration with other World Bank managed activities, such as the proposed _Social Entrepreneurship, Empowerment, and Cohesion Project_ (P171456), which will develop and apply a set of participatory citizen engagement tools to facilitate engagement with host and refugee populations, and the proposed _State Building Fund (SPF) Project’s Information, Counseling and Referral Support Program,_ which will cover, inter-alia, referral to municipality-run support activities, as appropriate. Leveraging of citizen engagement activities with the mentioned activities will be carried out in selected municipalities where there is an overlap between the individual projects, such as Adana, Kahramanmaras, and Osmaniye. Experience from these activities will however help to inform activities in other areas. Activities under the SPF will, inter alia, include information related to municipal services. The specific interactions between these operations will be further defined and agreed in close collaboration with the Page 32 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Citizen Report Cards", "confidence": 0.34591352939605713}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) respective projects early during implementation. The Bank will facilitate collaboration on the FRIT projects as possible with the citizen engagement activities of ILBANK.\n\n74. **Gender:** Turkey ranks 130th out of 149 countries in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report [33] . As part of project preparation, gender analysis was undertaken, together with a detailed literature review and focus group discussions with women from both refugee and host communities, to identify specific gender gaps among host and refugee populations in the project areas. While individual living conditions of SUTPs vary with factors such as socioeconomic status and location of settlements, evidence from the analysis suggests that the poor housing conditions, including overcrowding and associated access to services such as safely managed water and sanitation for a large proportion of the lower income refugee communities is an issue.\n\n75. The project scope narrows down to three specific gender gaps that could be addressed through project implementation. First, there is a clear lack of voice for both Turkish and refugee women. Research on women’s representation in local level governance shows one of the lowest rates in the world. In 2014, women constituted 2.8 percent of the Mayors and 10.7 percent of the municipal Councilors. [34] According to the Urban Refugee Network [35], many Syrian refugee women lack a forum to discuss needs, share information and exercise community leadership. A UN Needs Assessment of Syrian women refugees carried out in 2018 found that nearly half of the refugee women in Adana had no social relationships with the Turkish host community due to seclusion (15 percent did not leave their homes), and the lack of social ties was greater for women with less education [36] . Second, refugee women have limited economic opportunities. According to the gender analysis, only 15 percent of refugee women are engaged in income generating jobs [37] . The same assessment indicated that only a small number of women (7 percent) have taken part in vocational training, and when they do take part the most popular areas of study are hairdressing (30 percent) and needlework (27 percent), which are closely related to traditional gender roles and provide limited opportunity for formal employment. And finally, there is lack of access to information that also includes language barriers. While women are mainly responsible for management and use of services such as water, sanitation, hygiene and waste management at the household level, they have limited interaction with host communities if they do not work outside.\nFrom the UN Women’s Needs Assessment, Syrian women are unaware of various support services: for example, 68 percent of women do not know about free legal counselling; 63 percent about home care, 59 percent about psychosocial support and 57 percent about childcare services. This applies to the project areas. In Kahramanmaraş, for example, the Municipality has introduced a subsidized water-use scheme for families in need. However, women seem to have insufficient knowledge and awareness of such schemes, which highlight a need for enhanced communication and information sharing in a manner and language accessible to them.\n\n76. While there are other on-going projects in the country that promote female employment [38], this project will promote three main actions to improve gender outcomes. First, the project will encourage refugee women to engage more actively with host communities and participate in decision-making to identify their priorities for support through the 33 World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report for 2018. _[http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf)_ 34 Savas-Yavuzchere, P. and Cigeroglu-Oztepe, Misra 2016. “the Representation of Women in Turkish Local Governments.\n[http://journals.euser.org/files/articles/ejis_jan_apr_16/Pinar.pdf](http://journals.euser.org/files/articles/ejis_jan_apr_16/Pinar.pdf) 35 Urban Refugee Women’s Network – Turkey. _[https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5a38e20a4.pdf](https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5a38e20a4.pdf)_ 36 UN Women. 2018 Needs Assessment of Syrian Women and Girls. https://www2.unwomen.org/[/media/field%20office%20eca/attachments/publications/country/turkey/the%20needs%20assessmentengwebcompressed.pdf?la=en&vs=](https://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/field%20office%20eca/attachments/publications/country/turkey/the%20needs%20assessmentengwebcompressed.pdf?la=en&vs=3139)\n[3139](https://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/field%20office%20eca/attachments/publications/country/turkey/the%20needs%20assessmentengwebcompressed.pdf?la=en&vs=3139) 37 Source: United Nations Needs Assessment of Syrian Women and Girls under Temporary Protection Status in Turkey, June 2018 38 For example, the Social Entrepreneurship. Empowerment and Cohesion In refugee and Host communities in Turkey Project Page 33 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UN Needs Assessment of Syrian women refugees", "confidence": 0.33352845907211304}, {"text": "UN Women’s Needs Assessment", "confidence": 0.12034335732460022}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "UN Needs Assessment of Syrian women refugees", "confidence": 0.2335347980260849}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) project at the neighborhood level. This will include specific actions to promote women voices and empower them to make decisions concerning their needs and priorities within the scope of the project. The project will specifically encourage adequate women’s representation at the community level decision-making forum under component 2d).\nThe project will help create a safe space for refugee and host country women to share their views, needs, and suggestions by setting-up of separate meetings for women only to respect existing cultural norms. Decisions made will be recorded and shared with the participating municipalities to be reflected in further planning, decision-making and implementation of the project throughout the project implementation. Staff of the participating municipalities and utilities are trained to be sensitized for existing gender bias and norms, so that they could respond to these gender-disaggregated specific needs and requests from the community level decision-making forums. Second, the project will encourage municipalities to provide information for decision-making on their policies, plans, investments and available services in a format and language (Arabic and Turkish) that is user-friendly and accessible to women and the organizations that represent them. In addition, the project will undertake an education and awareness campaign, support WASH initiatives that are sensitive to household gender inequalities and promote behavior change. Third, the project will support and promote the formation of women-led community level groups, where possible, to manage operation and maintenance for hygiene and sanitation infrastructure at the neighborhood level in the selected low-income communities with significant refugee and host populations, and will provide training to empower them to do so. This will extend women’s household role as water managers to the neighborhood and give them voice. The project will encourage monitoring and management of municipal services to be identified in collaboration with relevant municipalities. Combining Turkish and refugee women on the committees could support social cohesion as well enabling them to better understand each other’s cultures.\n\n77. These actions will be measured through the following indicators: (i) percentage of women’s needs and investment choices that were implemented by selected municipalities and SKIs (baseline 0%; target 70%); and (ii) The satisfaction rate of female users of WSS services and facilities provided by the project and their perception of responsiveness of the project to their needs and preferences (baseline 0%; target 70%). A survey will be conducted for a sample of communities at the baseline stage and at the end of project to assess the satisfaction with project outcomes by host and refugee communities.\n\n**VI.** **GRIEVANCE REDRESS SERVICES**\n\n78. Communities and individuals who believe that they are adversely affected by a World Bank (WB) supported project may submit complaints to existing project-level grievance redress mechanisms or the WB’s Grievance Redress Service (GRS). The GRS ensures that complaints received are promptly reviewed in order to address project-related concerns.\nProject affected communities and individuals may submit their complaint to the WB’s independent Inspection Panel which determines whether harm occurred, or could occur, as a result of WB non-compliance with its policies and procedures. Complaints may be submitted at any time after concerns have been brought directly to the World Bank's attention, and Bank Management has been given an opportunity to respond. For information on how to submit complaints to the World Bank’s corporate Grievance Redress Service (GRS), please visit _[http://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/products-and-services/grievance-redress-service](http://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/products-and-services/grievance-redress-service.%20For)_ . For information on how to submit complaints to the World Bank Inspection Panel, please _[visit www.inspectionpanel.org.](http://www.inspectionpanel.org/)_\n\n**VII.** **KEY RISKS**\n\nPage 34 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey", "confidence": 0.31618422269821167}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) 79. **The overall project risk is rated as Substantial** and risks in this category are briefly described below.\n\n80. **Political and Governance risks are rated Moderate.** These risks are primarily related to the overall political context of the Syrian refugee crisis and its broader implications on stability in Turkey and the broader region. Specific political risks relate to the possibility of changes in the refugee population in form of either further increase or reductions depending on prevailing conditions, and potential impacts on project design. Water and sanitation investments will as far as possible be designed to accommodate different populations using phased or modular systems where appropriate. Further political risks are linked to local political and social cohesion risks associated with the refugee influx and potential implications on support for the project. The project through the citizen engagement component will seek to promote dialogue among host and refugee communities to improve social cohesion.\n\n81. **Macroeconomic risk is rated as Substantial.** The Turkish economy experienced instability between 2018-2019, following a period of growing macro imbalances and economic overheating in 2017-2018. The economy has stabilized more recently thanks to important external adjustments: a reversal in current account imbalances, declining external debt of banks, and a gradual recovery in forex reserves. These have contributed to currency stability. There are a priori three possible macroeconomic risks to the project. The first is currency risk for municipalities. Though the Lira has been more stable recently, uncertainty in global markets, including from the recent Coronavirus outbreak pose risks for all emerging markets. Some of the risk could be offset by trade diversion from China that benefits Turkey.\nThe second relates to the authorities’ fiscal consolidation path, which assumes a sharp decrease in capital expenditure. This may or may not affect public investment plans under the project as some of this risk may be mitigated by external project financing. Thirdly, the construction sector is among the most severely hit in the current downturn – leverage and exposure to forex debt will affect construction companies’ ability to respond to an increase in specialized construction investment under the project. Some of this risk may be mitigated by the availability of spare capacity in the construction sector, that may allow construction companies to respond quickly.\n\n82. **Technical design of project risk.** There is a moderate potential risk that the implementation of activities financed from one source is given priority by certain municipalities over activities from another source. ILBANK and the selected municipalities will be required to clearly reflect in the Project Implementation Plan the concurrent parallel implementation of project activities financed from both sources, and to report on this aspect of implementation s as part of progress reporting to the Bank, as will be defined in the Project Operations Manual.\n\n83. **Institutional Capacity for Implementation and Sustainability risk:** There is an increased implementation capacity risk given ILBANK’s expanding project portfolio with currently about US$730 million for Sustainable Cities series of project alone. This risk is to be mitigated through strengthening of ILBANK’s PMU capacity with additional staff in accordance with a Staffing Plan proposed by ILBANK. The list of additional staff and timing for their appointments was agreed with the Bank during appraisal and timeframes have been included as effectiveness conditions even though most of the staff are expected to be appointed before this date. ILBANK has requested retroactive financing from the IBRD loan to finance appointment of the additional PMU staff prior to effectiveness.\n\n84. **Stakeholder risk is rated as Substantial.** This risk reflects past history where municipalities/utilities have withdrawn from similar projects either immediately before negotiations or subsequent to loan signing due to internal political and financial considerations. To mitigate this risk, municipalities/utilities are required to provide Municipal Executive Board/Utility Executive Board Decisions in support of their participation in the project and are also required to prepare feasibility studies that include a financial assessment of the sub-project and the municipality. The risk rating also reflects possible community resistance to certain investments. To mitigate this risk, required Environmental and Page 35 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": ".\n\n**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project (P169996) Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) or Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs) will be prepared for each sub-project investment and a grievance redressal mechanism will be set up within the project. In addition, other citizen engagement mechanisms will also be exploited during the implementation period.\n\n85. **The project’s Environmental risk has been rated Substantial.** The environmental risk has been downgraded to Substantial following the Concept stage after site visits carried out by Bank team. It is not expected that sub-projects will have significant adverse effects to human health and/or the environment and that the project will not result in transboundary impacts since there are no sub-projects in transboundary basins. Moreover, the areas likely to be affected by the project are not of high value and sensitivity. Appropriate mitigation measures for identified risks are highlighted in the relevant Safeguards documents.\n\n86. **The Social Risk Rating has been rated Substantial.** The project will have overall positive social impacts on improving environmental infrastructure in provinces known to host the largest numbers of refugees in urban settlements. Social risks and impacts intrinsic to the project are comparable to other municipal investment carried out under the Bank financed Sustainable Cities Projects 1 and 2 with ILBANK which are assessed Moderate. Social risks are rated Substantial because the sub projects to be financed under the project are designed to benefit a broad population regardless of nationality or any vulnerability, which is considered to allow management of contextual risks which may otherwise be High. Risks related to the capacity of implementation agency (ILBANK) to manage social impacts is considered Substantial because ILBANK will be applying ESF for the first time. This will be mitigated by the hiring of an additional social specialist in the PMU as well as training of staff on the ESF.\n\n87. **Other risks rated as substantial pertain to the following.** 88. **Timeframe for EU grant approval and associated financing gap.** The signing of the Administrative Agreement (AA) between the World Bank and the EU for the grant is subject to finalization of an update to the 2016 World Bank Group-EU Framework Agreement, which is under discussion by the parties. Accordingly, the project is presented to the Board with a financing gap for the grant, subject to signature of the AA. The European Commission (EC), in May 2019, invited the World Bank to enter into formal discussions with the EU Delegation in Turkey on the project design, to lead to a Contract between the Parties in the form of the AA. The Bank team has conducted such discussions with the EUD throughout the project preparation process and has reflected key aspects in the project design. To mitigate the risk of a potential delay in finalizing the update of the WBG-EU Framework Agreement, Technical Discussions for the grant were conducted along with the negotiations for the IBRD loan, to reduce the timeframe for Grant approval and signature once the Administration Agreement is signed. The Technical Discussions involved a full discussion and agreement between ILBANK and the World Bank on the terms and conditions of the draft Grant Agreement.\nConclusion of the grant negotiations, based on the Technical Discussions, will be done after signing of the AA. ILBANK has indicated its preference to sign the loan and grant agreements with the Bank at the same time. However, should there be a significant delay in signing the grant, or non-approval of the grant, ILBANK would be able to sign the loan agreement and access IBRD funds prior to accessing the grant. Project activities have been structured to separate loan and grant financed activities in the Procurement Plan to allow implementation of the former to proceed while waiting for the AA to be signed, should it become necessary.\n\nPage 36 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**VIII.** **RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND MONITORING**\n\n**Results Framework**\n\n**COUNTRY: Turkey**\n**Municipal Services Improvement Project**\n\n**Project Development Objectives(s)**\n\nThe Project Development Objective (PDO) is to improve host and refugee communities access to safely managed water supply, sanitation and solid waste services in selected municipalities affected by the influx of Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey.\n\n**Project Development Objective Indicators**\n\n**RESULT_FRAME_TBL_PDO**\n\n**Indicator Name** **DLI** **Baseline** **End Target**\n\n**To improve host and refugee communities access to environmental infrastructure services**\n\nPeople benefitting from safely managed drinking water services 0.00 1,950,193.00 in the selected municipalities as a result of the project (Number) People benefitting from safely managed drinking water services in the selected municipalities (out of which female) (Percentage) People benefitting from safely managed drinking water services in the selected municipalities (out of which host community) (Number) People benefitting from safely managed drinking water services in the selected municipalities (out of which refugees) (Number) 0.00 51.00 0.00 1,728,142.00 0.00 222,051.00 People benefitting from safely managed sanitation services in 0.00 2,402,023.00 the selected municipalities as a result of the project (Number) Page 37 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**RESULT_FRAME_TBL_PDO**\n\n**Indicator Name** **DLI** **Baseline** **End Target**\n\nPeople benefitting from safely managed sanitation services in 0.00 50.00 the selected municipalities (out of which female) (Percentage) People benefitting from safely managed sanitation services in the selected municipalities (out of which host community) (Number) 0.00 2,165,834.00 People benefitting from safely managed sanitation services in 0.00 236,189.00 the selected municipalities (out of which refugees) (Number) People benefitting from safely managed solid waste services in 0.00 320,685.00 the selected municipalities as a result of the project (Number) People benefitting from safely managed solid waste services in the selected municipalities (out of which female) (Percentage) People benefitting from safely managed solid waste services in the selected municipalities (out of which host community) (Number) People benefitting from safely managed solid waste services in the selected municipalities (out of which refugees) (Number)\n\n**PDO Table SPACE**\n\n**Intermediate Results Indicators by Components**\n\n0.00 49.00 0.00 288,616.00 0.00 32,069.00\n\n**RESULT_FRAME_TBL_IO**\n\n**Indicator Name** **DLI** **Baseline** **End Target**\n\n**Environmental Infrastructure Investments**\n\nWater supply network constructed, rehabilitated and/or 0.00 2,062.00 extended (Kilometers) Page 38 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**RESULT_FRAME_TBL_IO**\n\n**Indicator Name** **DLI** **Baseline** **End Target**\n\nWater treatment plants constructed or rehabilitated (Number) 0.00 1.00 Water reservoirs constructed or rehabilitated (Number) 0.00 43.00 Water pumping stations constructed or rehabilitated (Number) 0.00 16.00 Sewerage network constructed, rehabilitated and/or extended 0.00 495.00 (Kilometers) Wastewater treatment plants constructed or rehabilitated 0.00 7.00 (Number) Landfills constructed or rehabilitated (Number) 0.00 1.00 Satisfaction rate of female users of environmental infrastructure 0.00 70.00 services and facilities provided by the project (Percentage)\n\n**Technical Assistance**\n\nNumber of municipal authorities and SKIs provided with capacity 0.00 5.00 building support through the Project (Number) Number of municipal authorities and SKIs that have prepared a Performance Improvement Action Plan through the project (Number) 0.00 4.00 Grievances registered related to delivery of municipal services 0.00 90.00 that are actually addressed and recorded (Percentage) Percentage of women’s needs and investment choices that were 0.00 70.00 implemented by selected municipalities and SKIs (Percentage)\n\n**IO Table SPACE**\n\n**UL Table SPACE**\n\nPage 39 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Monitoring & Evaluation Plan: PDO Indicators**\n\n**Methodology for Data**\n**Indicator Name** **Definition/Description** **Frequency** **Datasource**\n**Collection**\n\n**Responsibility for Data**\n**Collection**\n\nMunicipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Page 40 of 94 People benefitting from safely managed drinking water services in the selected municipalities as a result of the project People benefitting from safely managed drinking water services in the selected municipalities (out of which female) People benefitting from safely managed drinking water services in the selected municipalities (out of which host community) People benefitting from safely managed drinking water services in the selected municipalities (out of This indicator measures the cumulative number of people benefitted from safely managed drinking water services in the selected municipalities that have been provided through this Project.\n\nThis indicator measures the percentage of female benefitted from safely managed drinking water services in the selected municipalities that have been provided through this Project.\n\nThis indicator measures the percentage of host community benefitted from safely managed drinking water services in the selected municipalities that have been provided through this Project.\n\nThis indicator measures the percentage of refugees benefitted from safely Semiannually Semiannually Semiannually Semiannually Reports from PMU Reports from PMU Reports from PMU Reports from PMU Data to be compiled by municipal PIUs and recorded in PMU progress reports, based on updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs.\n\nData to be compiled by municipal PIUs and recorded in PMU progress reports, based on updated beneficiary’s connection records from respective SKIs.\n\nData to be compiled by municipal PIUs and recorded in PMU progress reports, based on updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs.\n\nData to be compiled by municipal PIUs and recorded in PMU", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) which refugees) managed drinking water services in the selected municipalities that have been provided through this Project.\n\nMunicipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Page 41 of 94 People benefitting from safely managed sanitation services in the selected municipalities as a result of the project People benefitting from safely managed sanitation services in the selected municipalities (out of which female) People benefitting from safely managed sanitation services in the selected municipalities (out of which host community) People benefitting from safely managed sanitation services in the selected municipalities (out of which This indicator measures the cumulative number of people benefitted from safely managed sanitation services in the selected municipalities that have been provided through this Project.\n\nThis indicator measures the percentage of female benefitted from safely managed sanitation services in the selected municipalities that have been provided through this Project.\n\nThis indicator measures the percentage of host community benefitted from safely managed sanitation services in the selected municipalities that have been provided through this Project.\n\nThis indicator measures the percentage of refugees benefitted from safely Semiannually Semiannually Semiannually Semiannually Reports from PMU Reports from PMU Reports from PMU Reports from PMU progress reports, based on updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs.\n\nData to be compiled by municipal PIUs and recorded in PMU progress reports, based on updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs.\n\nData to be compiled by municipal PIUs and recorded in PMU progress reports, based on updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs.\n\nData to be compiled by municipal PIUs and recorded in PMU progress reports, based on updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs.\n\nData to be compiled by municipal PIUs and recorded in PMU", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs", "confidence": 0.1093992069363594}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) refugees) managed sanitation services in the selected municipalities that have been provided through this Project.\n\nMunicipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Page 42 of 94 People benefitting from safely managed solid waste services in the selected municipalities as a result of the project People benefitting from safely managed solid waste services in the selected municipalities (out of which female) People benefitting from safely managed solid waste services in the selected municipalities (out of which host community) People benefitting from safely managed solid waste services in the selected municipalities (out of which This indicator measures the cumulative number of people benefitted from safely managed solid waste services in the selected municipalities that have been provided through this Project.\n\nThis indicator measures the percentage of female benefitted from safely managed solid waste services in the selected municipalities that have been provided through this Project.\n\nThis indicator measures the percentage of host community benefitted from safely managed solid waste services in the selected municipalities that have been provided through this Project.\n\nThis indicator measures the percentage of refugees benefitted from safely Semiannually Semiannually Semiannually Semiannually Reports from PMU Reports from PMU Reports from PMU Reports from PMU progress reports, based on updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs.\n\nData to be compiled by municipal PIUs and recorded in PMU progress reports, based on updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs.\n\nData to be compiled by municipal PIUs and recorded in PMU progress reports, based on updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs.\n\nData to be compiled by municipal PIUs and recorded in PMU progress reports, based on updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs.\n\nData to be compiled by municipal PIUs and recorded in PMU", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs", "confidence": 0.10895711183547974}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) refugees) managed solid waste water services in the selected municipalities that have been provided through this Project.\n\n**ME PDO Table SPACE**\n\nprogress reports, based on updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs.\n\n**Monitoring & Evaluation Plan: Intermediate Results Indicators**\n\n**Methodology for Data**\n**Indicator Name** **Definition/Description** **Frequency** **Datasource**\n**Collection**\n\n**Responsibility for Data**\n**Collection**\n\nMunicipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Page 43 of 94 Reports from PIUs Reports from PIUs Reports from PIUs Reports from PIUs Reports from PIUs Water supply network constructed, rehabilitated and/or extended Water treatment plants constructed or rehabilitated Water reservoirs constructed or rehabilitated Water pumping stations constructed or rehabilitated Sewerage network constructed, rehabilitated and/or extended Length of water supply network constructed, rehabilitated and/or extended due to project activity.\n\nNumber of water treatment plants constructed or rehabilitated due to project activities.\n\nNumber of water reservoirs constructed or rehabilitated due to project activities.\n\nNumber of water pumping stations constructed or rehabilitated due to project activities.\n\nLength of sewerage network constructed, rehabilitated and/or extended due to project activities.\n\nSemiannually Semiannually Semiannually Semiannually Semiannually", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "updated beneficiary’s records from respective SKIs", "confidence": 0.18966476619243622}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) Reports from PIUs Reports from PIUs Targeted beneficiary satisfaction survey Reports from PIUs Reports from PIUs Wastewater treatment plants constructed or rehabilitated Landfills constructed or rehabilitated Satisfaction rate of female users of environmental infrastructure services and facilities provided by the project Number of municipal authorities and SKIs provided with capacity building support through the Project Number of municipal authorities and SKIs that have prepared a Performance Improvement Action Plan through the project Number of wastewater treatment plants constructed or rehabilitated due to project activities.\n\nNumber of landfills constructed or rehabilitated due to project activities.\n\nSatisfaction rate of female users of environmental infrastructure services and facilities provided by the project and their perception of responsiveness of the project to their needs and preferences.\n\nThis indicator measures the number of municipal authorities and SKIs benefitted from capacity building activities in the selected municipalities that have been provided through this Project.\n\nThis indicator measures the number of municipal authorities and SKIs that have prepared a Performance Improvement Semiannually Semiannually Start and end of the project.\n\nSemiannually Annually A targeted beneficiary satisfaction survey will be carried out among the targeted community groups at the start of the project and at an appropriate time after the services have been provided, towards the close of the project.\n\nMunicipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU The survey will be carried out by selected NGOs and consultants supported through the project, and results will be reported to the municipalities and ILBANK and the World Bank and EU.\n\nMunicipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Municipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Page 44 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Targeted beneficiary satisfaction survey", "confidence": 0.8804221153259277}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) Action Plan through this Project.\n\nSemiannually Before the hygiene and sanitation facilities are selected and after the facilities are implement ed.\n\nGrievances registered related to delivery of municipal services that are actually addressed and recorded Percentage of women’s needs and investment choices that were implemented by selected municipalities and SKIs\n\n**ME IO Table SPACE**\n\nThis indicator measures the number of grievances registered related to delivery of municipal services that are actually addressed and recorded in the selected municipalities through the Project.\n\nMeasuring women’s needs or investment choices regarding the hygiene and sanitation facilities under Component 2d that were implemented by selected municipalities and SKIs (baseline 0%; target 70%).\n\nReports from PIUs Needs assessment, Post-survey.\n\nA survey will be conducted among women who participated in needs assessment activities after facilities are constructed. The survey will measure if their needs or investment choices are reflected in decisions made by municipality and SKI, and the built facilities are constructed in the way that they requested.\n\nMunicipal PIUs and ILBANK PMU Ilbank PMU and Municipalities/SKIs.\n\nPage 45 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey", "confidence": 0.2381574958562851}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) Page 46 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**ANNEX 1: Implementation Arrangements and Support Plan**\n\n**Project Implementation Roles and Responsibilities**\n\n**1.** The roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the project are outlined below:\n\n2. **The Government of Turkey**, represented by the Ministry of Treasury and Finance, is the Guarantor of the loan.\n\n3. **ILBANK** . ILBANK is the Borrower for the IBRD loan and will also be the primary recipient of the EU FRIT grant when it is approved. ILBANK is a state-owned development and investment bank, subordinated to the _[Ministry of](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Environment_and_Urban_Planning_(Turkey))_ _[Environment and Urbanization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Environment_and_Urban_Planning_(Turkey))_ . ILBANK, as the national development and investment bank providing financial intermediary services for municipal infrastructure in Turkey, will also be the implementing agency for the Project.\n\n4. ILBANK will carry out its roles as implementing agency through an existing Project Management Unit (PMU), under the bank’s International Relations Department. The PMU was originally established in 2005 for a Bank financed Municipal Services Project (MSP). It has since been responsible for implementing subsequent operations, including MSP-II (Additional Loan), Sustainable Cities Project (SCP), and SCP-II and SCP-II Additional Loan, and it has demonstrated its capacity for managing World Bank loans through these operations. Relevant technical and financial departments of ILBANK, as well as the regional directorates supporting the targeted municipalities will support the PMU in project implementation. ILBANK will procure or support municipalities/utilities to procure works, TA services and goods as required and will manage the implementation of project activities. The PMU has professional staff responsible for various aspects of project management, including procurement, financial management, social and environmental safeguards, communications, technical/engineering and monitoring and evaluation. Detailed operational modalities will be described in the Project Operational Manual. The PMU’s existing capacity will however be strengthened through hiring of additional staff and/or consultants in line with a staffing plan agreed with the Bank before project effectiveness.\n\n5. **Local/Municipal Level PIUs.** The selected municipalities and utilities/SKIs as applicable based on the specific sub project will be responsible for sub-project investment implementation and will set up municipal project implementation units (PIUs) at local level to ensure effective implementation. The local PIUs will comprise competent staff responsible for technical, procurement, financial and safeguards aspects of the sub-project activities. The staff may be seconded from the respective local institutions or may include individual consultants hired by these entities if existing capacity is not sufficient.\n\n6. **World Bank:** The World Bank, as the EDF Trust Fund administrator, and IBRD lender, will be responsible for monitoring the implementation of project activities and will ensure compliance with the former`s procedures and guidelines. World Bank’s fiduciary arrangements, including its procurement and FM procedures, as well as its Environmental and Social Framework will apply. Detailed fiduciary and safeguards arrangements will be agreed with the implementing institutions, namely ILBANK and the municipalities/ water and wastewater utilities and will be reflected in the relevant legal documents and the Project Operations Manual.\n\nPage 47 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Figure 1.1: Project implementation roles and responsibilities**\n\n7. **European Union Delegation:** The EDF will co-finance the project through the FRIT Grant. The World Bank will enter into an Administration Agreement (AA) with the EUD to set up a Recipient-Executed Trust Fund. The AA will provide for the establishment of a Trust Fund to be administered by the World Bank, in the amount of EUR 139.8 million, which the World Bank will provide as a grant to ILBANK. After the AA is signed, the World Bank will enter into a Trust Fund Grant Agreement with ILBANK, which will be the recipient of the funds. ILBANK will be responsible for implementing the funds in accordance with overall project design, including fiduciary and safeguard arrangements, as set out in the POM. The implementation time frame of the EU grant is 48 months from AA signing.\n\n8. **Contractors:** Qualified contractors will be competitively selected to implement sub-projects as per the needs of construction and/or rehabilitation works described within the activities.\n\n9. **Design Review and Supervision Consultants:** A design review and supervision consultant will be awarded to provide supervision services for the construction and rehabilitation works. These Consultants will also support review of existing design documents and preparation of tender documents.\n\n10. **Capacity Building Consultants:** Consultants will be hired to provide trainings and other capacity building activities as required for target groups. Capacity Building events will be organized for the staff of target Page 48 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) municipalities/utilities to develop required skills in the municipalities to ensure the sustainability of project outcomes.\n\n**Financial Management and Disbursement**\n\n11. Banks in Turkey are subject to strict regulations and supervision by the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA). BRSA’s regulatory and supervisory framework meets modern standards preserving the solidity of the system. Banks in Turkey are required to prepare financial statements in compliance with the Turkish Accounting Standards which are based on and correspond to IFRS. The BRSA also issues rules governing the external audit of bank financial statements, and only auditors approved by the BRSA may carry out such audits. The external auditor is required to report to the BRSA on the internal control and risk management systems of banks as well as being obliged to report directly to the BRSA with respect to certain issues which may threaten the going concern nature of a Bank.\n\n**Implementing Entity**\n\n12. ILBANK first established as Belediyeler Bankasi in 1933 to finance the reconstruction activities of municipalities.\n\nILBANK law (Law 4759) was updated in 2011 making it a joint stock development and investment bank that is subject to the banking law. Its objectives are meeting the financing needs of special provincial authorities, municipalities and their affiliated organizations and of local administrative associations and to provide consultancy services to these organizations on urban projects. ILBANK is a related establishment of Ministry of Environment and Urbanization of Turkey. The shareholders of the bank are the municipalities and special provincial administrations. Law 5779 on Allotments of General Budget Revenues to be allocated to Special provincial Authorities and Municipalities (2008) requires 2 percent of total tax allotment revenues distributed by the Ministry of Treasury and Finance through ILBANK to be deducted to contribute as capital to Iller Bank.\n\n**Implementation Arrangements**\n\n13. ILBANK has a Project Management Unit (PMU) under its International Relations Department responsible for foreign financed projects including SCP I, SCP II and SCP II Additional Financing (SCP II AF). The PMU is organized according to functions and its financial management department is responsible for such arrangements under SCP I, II and II AF. They will continue with this responsibility under the FRIT MSP. ILBANK will provide technical support to qualifying municipalities and utilities in identifying and appraising investments. ILBANK will also provide funding for the eligible investment projects both from the EU grant and WB loan. ILBANK will be responsible for the procurement of all activities under component 2 including the consultancy services for design review, support for preparation of bidding documents and supervision of construction and rehabilitation works under Component 1.\nProcurement of investments will also be done by ILBANK with the representatives from the beneficiary municipalities and utilities in the bid evaluation committees and the contracts will be signed by the municipality/utility and the firm. Payments to the suppliers will be registered directly by ILBANK upon submission of acceptable approval documents. PMU in ILBANK will be responsible for the management of the Designated Accounts and project accounting and reporting.\n\n**Staffing**\n\n14. The PMU at the ILBANK has a dedicated financial management unit responsible for FM functions of all foreign financed projects. There are currently 11 staff working in this department and ILBANK will assign at least one Page 49 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) financial management specialist to work solely on the financial management aspects of the MSP FRIT Project.\nILBANK has the option to hire consultants to enhance its implementation capacity since Component B of the FRIT MSP has funding available for this purpose. The qualifications and experience of the current staff are satisfactory to the Bank. They have worked in the implementation of the Municipal Services project, its additional financing and currently working for SCP I, II and AF. The experience they have gained in the implementation of these projects will be utilized in conducting the financial management arrangements of the FRIT MSP.\n\n**Accounting Policies and Procedures**\n\n15. ILBANK has a web-based information system (IL_BIS) that links all departments of the institution, allowing them to execute, monitor and report using the same data source. All the regional offices are also connected to the central IL_BIS system. Project accounting for the SCP I and II are integrated into this system using sub-accounts that were created under the Bank`s main chart of accounts. The PMU staff prepares the payment orders and the accounting entries into the Bank`s main accounting system are made by the Accounting Department`s staff. Financial Interim Unaudited Financial Reports are also generated automatically through the system. FRIT MSP will also rely on the same systems and the accounting and reporting for the project will also be fully integrated into the IL_BIS system.\nILBANK will conduct the necessary modifications/additions to the IL_BIS system and these arrangements are expected to be in place before project effectiveness.\n\n16. ILBANK has robust systems, manuals and guidelines regulating the internal controls environment. The accounting and reporting systems at ILBANK are geared toward producing statements and information as required by Turkish laws and regulations. Additionally, lLBANK has developed and executed specific internal control procedures for the implementation of the foreign financed projects including the SCP Program and these procedures are clearly defined in the project financial management manual which is available in the ILBANK web-site.\n\n**17.** FRIT MSP will disburse through sub-loans and grant agreements that will be made between ILBANK and qualifying\n\nmunicipalities and utilities. The municipalities will submit the payment requests to the PMU after verifying completeness of all documentation is complete will prepare the payment order through its financial management department. The payment will be made directly from the designated accounts to the constructer’s bank account.\n\n18. The PMU has been utilizing detailed checklists that are completed and signed by the relevant staff before processing the payments. Those checklists include financial controls on advance payments made for works in progress, financial controls on payments to individual consultants and corporate consultants, financial controls on works progress payments, financial controls on goods purchases. These checklists with a few modifications to enable funding source identification will also be utilized for MSP FRIT.\n\n**Internal** **Audit**\n\n19. ILBANK has an Internal Controls Department, Risk Management Department and an Inspection Department. All three departments report directly to the Board of Directors. The Internal Controls Department has identified “standard control points” for foreign financed loans. This is standard for all departments and controls points are defined for each function of ILBANK. The International Relations Department, like other departments of ILBANK, is required to complete the form monthly and provide assurance through self-declaration that all control points have been complied with. As a part of its normal procedures, the Department conducts quarterly on-site review of compliance with the control points. There have not been any irregularities observed in foreign financed loans as a part of the internal control review. MSP FRIT will also be a part of regular review of internal controls department.\n\nPage 50 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) The Risk management Department reviews loans before they are granted and through their effectiveness. ILBANK, through its special status, is required to provide provisions for its loan portfolio. The Risk management Department conducts continuous monitoring and reports to the Board on the status of ILBANK`s loan portfolio. Loans that will be granted to municipalities /utilities under MSP FRIT will be monitored by the Risk Management Department. The Inspection Department is responsible for investigating irregularities, as well as conducting regular reviews of ILBANK systems.\n\n**External Audit**\n\n20. Annual project financial statements (integrating both sources of financing) for the project, as well as ILBANK financial statements will be subject to independent audit by auditors that are acceptable to the Bank. ILBANK has been submitting audited entity and project financial statements to the Bank for MSP and SCP. ILBANK`s entity financial statements prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have been audited by private sector auditors in accordance with International Auditing Standards. The entity audited financial statements had unqualified (clean) audit opinions for the last three years. ILBANK additionally prepares financial statements for the projects it is implementing, and these financial statements are audited by the Treasury Controllers who are the government auditors who are responsible for the audit of World Bank financed projects implemented by government institutions. The project financial statements for SCP (separately prepared for the loan and the EU grant) have been received on time and include unqualified (clean) audit opinions as well. (SCP II audit report has not yet been submitted as ILBANK did not utilize any funds from the project in 2018 which is the year with the most recent audit reports available). No material issues were identified in the management letter either.\n\n21. Under the MSP FRIT project ILBANK will be required to submit its audited entity financial statements prepared in accordance with Turkish Accounting Standards (which are fully compatible with International Financial Reporting Standards) and project financial statements to the Bank within 6 months following the end of year. The project financial statements are required to be made publicly available in accordance with the World Bank guidelines. The following chart identifies the audit reports and their due dates:\n\n**Table 1.1 Audit Reporting Requirements**\n**Audit Report** **Due Date**\nEntity financial statements (FI) prepared in accordance with Turkish Accounting Standards and also at the closing of the project.\n\nEntity financial statements (FI) prepared in accordance Within six months after the end of each calendar year with Turkish Accounting Standards and also at the closing of the project.\n\nProject financial statements (PFS) for the loan part Within six months after the end of each calendar year including SOEs and the designated accounts. and also at the closing of the project.\n\nProject financial statements (PFS) for the loan part Within six months after the end of each calendar year including SOEs and the designated accounts. and also at the closing of the project.\n\nProject financial statements (PFS) for the grant part Within six months after the end of each calendar year including SOEs and the designated accounts. and also at the closing of the project.\n\nProject financial statements (PFS) for the grant part Within six months after the end of each calendar year including SOEs and the designated accounts. and also at the closing of the project.\n\n22. Currently the financial statements prepared by the municipalities are not subject to independent external audit except the annual audit conducted by the Turkish Court of Accounts (TCA), the supreme audit institution in Turkey.\nAnnual TCA audit reports will be reviewed by the project team as a part of project supervision.\n\n**Reporting and Monitoring**\n\n23. ILBANK will prepare Interim Unaudited Financial Statements (IFRs) for the project following the same format utilized for the SCP I and II. The agreed formats of the IFRs are attached to the negotiations and technical discussion Page 51 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) minutes. ILBANK will also ensure that the reports with financial content are automatically generated from IL_BIS system.\n\n**Disbursement Arrangements**\n\n24. The project will be disbursing on the traditional disbursement techniques. Two Designated Accounts will be created for the project (one for EU grant and one for the WB loan). ILBANK will open the designated accounts at a commercial bank that is acceptable to the World Bank. Designated accounts for SCP I and SCP II are at Ziraat Bankasi. Two authorized signatures who will be specified in the project FM manuals will sign the withdrawal applications. The minimum application size for payments directly from the loan account for the issuance of Special Commitments, as well as the Statement of Expenditure (SOE) limits, will be described in the disbursement letters.\nFull documentation in support of SOEs, including completion reports and certificates, would be retained by the ILBANK for at least two years after the World Bank has received the audit report for the fiscal year in which the last withdrawal from the loan account was made. This information will be made available for review during supervision visits by World Bank staff and for annual audits. Disbursements for expenditures above the SOE thresholds will be made against presentation of full documentation of the expenditures.\n\n**Figure 1.2. Funds Flow**\n\n**World Bank Project Implementation Support Plan**\n\n25. The Implementation Support Plan (ISP) is tailored to the specific context and characteristics of the project, based on the dispersed geographic scale of investments, and existing capacity of the implementing agencies and arrangements. The ISP will be reviewed periodically to ensure that it remains fit for purpose and responsive to the project’s implementation support needs over its lifetime.\n\nPage 52 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "IL_BIS system", "confidence": 0.2980453372001648}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) 26. **Project Launch Workshop.** A project launch workshop will be held soon after project approval. It will bring all project stakeholders together to ensure that the project scope, design, process and responsibilities are understood.\n\n27. **Implementation support missions.** The project would be supervised at least twice a year and the recommendations of such supervisions would be presented to ILBANK and recorded in an Aide Memoire. The World Bank would be represented by a task team leader, supported by a team of experts with various skills as needed, including fiduciary (Procurement and financial management), safeguards (Social and environmental), monitoring and evaluation, and technical specialists. The goal would be to: (a) undertake required policy dialogue with the Government of Turkey, ILBANK, and local governments, related to the project and the sector; and (b) coordinate with other donors.\n\n28. The semiannual supervision missions and short/ follow-up technical missions as needed in specific areas, will focus on the following areas: a) **Strategic support.** Supervision missions will meet with ILBANK PMU and relevant municipality PIU representatives to: (i) review progress on the project’s activities; (ii) discuss strategic alignment of the project’s different activities, especially at the planning level, between the relevant stakeholders; and (iii) evaluate progress on cross-cutting issues such as M&E, training, communication, knowledge exchange, innovation, dissemination of project results and experiences, and coordination between the relevant stakeholders.\n\nb) **Technical support.** Supervision will concentrate on ensuring the technical quality of bidding documents, TORs, evaluation reports, construction plans, products delivered by consultants, and investment activities/targets, working in close collaboration with ILBANK and the design review and construction supervision consultants.\nDuring construction and commissioning, technical supervision will be provided to ensure that technical contractual obligations are met. Regular site visits will be carried out during project implementation and will involve technical specialists from the World bank, ILBANK and consultant teams as needed.\n\nc) **Fiduciary support.** Periodic supervision of procurement and FM support will be carried out by the World Bank semiannually to (i) perform desk reviews of project interim financial reports and audit reports, following up on any issues raised by auditors, as appropriate; (ii) assess the performance of control systems and arrangements; (iii) update the FM rating in the FM Implementation Support and Status Report as needed; (iv) provide training and guidance on carrying out procurement processes in compliance with the Procurement and Anticorruption Guidelines and the POM; (v) review procurement documents and provide timely feedback to the PIU; (vi) carry out the post review of procurement actions; and (vii) help monitor project progress against the Procurement Plan and identified performance indicators of the contracts.\n\nd) **Safeguards support.** The coordination that began during preparation will continue throughout project implementation, especially to ensure that the relevant safeguards concerns are included in the works financed under the project through due diligence from applications of the site-specific ESIAs, ESMPs, and RAPs and effective mitigation measures. Supervision from the World Bank safeguard specialists will take place at least twice a year.\n\n29. **Mid-term review.** A mid-term review of the project will be carried out about two years into implementation to assess overall progress towards meeting the development objective, and to address any changes to project design or implementation required to meet the objectives.\n\n30. **Implementation Resource Requirements.** Table 1.2 below reflects estimates of skill requirements, timing, and resource requirements over the life of the project. these projections are subject to modification as needed over the course of implementation.\n\nPage 53 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Table 1.2. Implementation Support Resource Estimates**\n\n**Resource Estimates**\n**Time** **Focus** **Skills Needed**\n\n**(Staff Weeks)**\nFirst 12 Project rollout, management, and implementation Task team leads 6 per task team leader months support coordination per year Project rollout, management, and implementation support coordination Project rollout, management, and implementation Task team leads 6 per task team leader support coordination per year Refine subcomponent activities and ensure quality Task team leads/technical 2 per task team leader of detailed designs specialists per year Refine subcomponent activities and ensure quality Task team leads/technical 2 per task team leader of detailed designs specialists per year Social and environmental safeguards, including risk Social and environmental 4 per year mitigation measures specialist Task team leads/technical specialists Social and environmental specialist 4 per year Technical and procurement review of TORs and bidding document Task team leads, technical specialists, procurement specialists 6 per year Fiduciary arrangements and FM systems FM specialist 3 per year Promoting innovation in the project Task team leads/technical 3 per year specialists 12 to 72 months Procurement review and feedback of bidding documents and consultant contracts Technical review of TORs, technical reports, and bidding documents Non-lending TA, capacity and institutional strengthening efforts Procurement specialist 6 per year Task team leads, technical specialists Task team leads, technical specialists 6 per year 4 per year FM supervision FM specialist 3 per year Social safeguards – supervision Social Development specialist 4 per year Environmental safeguards – supervision Environmental specialist 4 per year Project management, M&E, and project Task team leads, technical 8 per year supervision coordination specialists Task team leads, technical specialists 8 per year Operational support, M&E, lessons learned, progress and final reporting.\n\nTechnical specialists and operations officer 6 per year\n\n**Table 1.3. Skill Mix Requirements**\n**Skill Needs for Supervision** **Comment**\nTask team leader Headquarters based Co-Task team leader Region based Co-Task team leader Country based WSS/technical specialist Country based (including consultant) Solid Waste Management Specialist Region based (including consultant) FM specialist Region based Procurement specialist Region based Social Development specialist Country based Gender Specialist Country/HQ based Environmental specialist Country based Lawyer Region based Disbursement officer Region based Page 54 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**ANNEX 2: Detailed Project Description**\n\n1. **Background.** The Project aims to improve host and refugee communities access to safely managed water supply,\n\nsanitation and solid waste services in targeted municipalities affected by the influx of Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey. The project focuses on five municipalities or provinces (i.e. Adana, Kahramanmaras, Kayseri, Konya and Osmaniye) out of the ten most impacted by the refugee influx in Turkey as identified in the EU Needs Assessment. The selection of the five municipalities to be supported through the current project was based on not just the identified needs, but also eligibility for World Bank financing of sub-projects that do not trigger _World Bank_ _OP 7.50 Projects on International Waterways_ . Sub-projects triggering this policy are to be supported by other development partners, including AFD.\n\n2. **Target Group and Final Beneficiaries.** The final beneficiaries comprise the populations in the affected municipalities, including the refugees and host populations. Only a small share (less than 10 percent) of the refugee population resides in camps, while the majority live outside camps, mostly in urban areas. There are two designated camps in the targeted provinces: Kahramanmaras' Merkez Container Camp which hosts about 14,811 refugees, and Adana Sancam Container Camp which hosts about 26,700 refugees. The primary project beneficiaries include both the refugees and host communities in the five municipalities of Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye, Kayseri and Konya targeted under this project and is estimated to be more than 3.3 million.\nApproximately 301,890 refugees (or 9 percent of the total beneficiaries) and 3,021,000 of the host population will be direct beneficiaries of the environmental infrastructure investments under Component 1.\n\n3. **Project Components and Estimated Costs** **[39]** **.** The Project will comprise two components (i) **Component 1. Environmental Infrastructure Investments:** This component will finance the construction and rehabilitation works for water supply, sanitation, and solid waste management infrastructure in the targeted municipalities to achieve improvements in access, service quality and continuity of municipal services; and smaller scale critical facilities to address immediate municipal service needs of vulnerable SUTP and host communities at the neighborhood or settlement level, to be identified in a participatory manner by the beneficiaries. Individual infrastructure facilities will, where appropriate, consider adaptive designs that would allow for a scale up or down of capacity in the event of unanticipated changes in the refugee population. The component may finance goods, works, non-consulting and consultant services towards these activities.\n\n(ii) **Component 2. Technical Assistance for Project Management and Supervision, Capacity Building,**\n\n**Communication and Citizen Engagement.** This component will finance goods and consultancy services for\nthe following activities: a) **Project Management.** This activity will finance goods and consulting services required for coordination and day-to-day project management, including management of procurement and financial management aspects, management of social and environmental safeguards, including dam safety requirements associated with the project, technical and contract management, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and project reporting and communications.\n\nb) **Consultancy services for design review and supervision of environmental infrastructure investments.** This 39 Please see footnote 15, which is applicable for all references to the grant in this Annex.\n\nPage 55 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) activity will finance consultancy services for design review and preparation of bidding documents, taking into account climate change considerations, and supervision of construction and rehabilitation works for proposed environmental infrastructure investments under Component 1.\n\nc) **Citizen Engagement, Public Communication and Visibility activities.** This activity will finance: (i) **Communications and Visibility activities for the project.** A detailed Communication and Visibility Plan will be developed at the start of implementation, in line with EU Communications and Visibility Manual for EU External Actions [40], as well as the World Bank’s external communications guidelines.\nCommunications activities will also seek to target critical public education messaging to different stakeholder groups, including children and youths, and adults in relevant languages.\n\n(ii) **Citizen/Community engagement activities** to facilitate effective two-way engagement among stakeholders, including Turkish citizens and SUTPs and municipalities and SKIs to identify the needs and priorities for enhancing service delivery to all people in the beneficiary communities.\n\nd) **Institutional Capacity Building activities targeting the participating municipalities, utilities and ILBANK.** This activity will finance capacity building activities, including inter-alia, training and workshops aimed to improve performance efficiency, positively change behavior, and increase capacity within municipalities and SKIs/utilities to further modernize their operations to optimize efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery while embracing principles such as resilience, financial and environmental sustainability, and inclusion. These activities will also seek to contribute to increased water security through more efficient delivery, and thus increased resilience to climate change.\n\nA breakdown of detailed cost estimates for activities to be financed under the project, as tentatively agreed at appraisal stage, is presented in Table 2.1 below.\n\n**Table 2.1 Indicative Detailed Activities and Cost Estimates** **[41]**\n\n**FRIT Grant**\n**Category**\n\n**FRIT Grant (%**\n**IBRD (EUR)**\n**(EUR)** **of total (EUR))**\n\n**Total Cost**\n\n**(in EUR)**\n\n**Total Cost**\n\n**(EUR)** **of total (EUR))** **(in EUR)** **(in US$)**\n\n**Component 1: Environmental**\n**Infrastructure**\n\n**1a. Water Supply Investments**\n**Adana**\nKozan İmamoğlu Yedigöze Drinking Water Transmission Line 0 21,850,000 0 21,850,000 24,253,500 Yedigöze Water Treatment 0 13,150,000 0 13,150,000 14,596,500 Plant Kozan Pınargözü Drinking Water Transmission Line and Network\n\n**Kahramanmaras**\nKahramanmaraş (Centrum) Drinking Water, Sewerage and Stormwater Project West Part 28,070,000 0 100 28,070,000 31,157,700 0 17,000,000 0 17,000,000 18,870,000 40 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/visibility/_en 41 The US$ amounts are subject to changes due to exchange rate changes.\n\nPage 56 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**FRIT Grant**\n**Category**\n\n**FRIT Grant (%**\n**IBRD (EUR)**\n**(EUR)** **of total (EUR))**\n\n**Total Cost**\n\n**(in EUR)**\n\n**Total Cost**\n\n**(EUR)** **of total (EUR))** **(in EUR)** **(in US$)**\n\nElbistan Drinking Water 8,000,000 0 100 8,000,000 8,880,000 Network Project Elbistan Drinking Water 0 25,000,000 0 25,000,000 27,750,000 Transmission Line\n\n**Konya**\nAkşehir Water Supply Project 4,710,000 0 100 4,710,000 5,228,100\n**Osmaniye**\nOsmaniye (Centrum) Drinking 0 27,650,000 0 27,650,000 30,691,500 Water Project\n\n**Priority public hygiene**\n**investments at neighbourhood**\n**level**\n\n500,000 0 100 500,000 555,000\n\n**1a. TOTAL Water Supply**\n**41,280,000** **104,650,000** **28** **145,930,000** **161,982,300**\n**Investments**\n\n**1b. Sanitation Investments**\n**Kahramanmaras**\nCeyhan Basin Wastewater Treatment Plants (Goksun & Ekinozu) Ceyhan Basin Wastewater Treatment Plants (Caglayancerit & Andirin) Kahramanmaraş (Centrum) Drinking Water, Sewerage and Stormwater Project East Part 0 5,500,000 0 5,500,000 6,105,000 2,900,000 0 100 2,900,000 3,219,000 18,800,000 0 100 18,800,000 20,868,000\n\n**Kayseri**\nKayseri Wastewater Treatment 12,500,000 0 100 12,500,000 13,875,000 Plant - Phase 1 Kayseri Wastewater Treatment 0 12,500,000 0 12,500,000 13,875,000 Plant - Phase 2\n\n**Konya**\nIlgin Wastewater Treatment 3,900,000 0 100 3,900,000 4,329,000 Plant Çumra Wastewater Treatment 4,560,000 0 100 4,560,000 5,061,600 Plant\n\n**Osmaniye**\nOsmaniye (Centrum) Sewerage 29,910,000 0 100 29,910,000 33,200,100 Project\n\n**Priority public hygiene**\n**investments at neighborhood**\n**level**\n\n500,000 0 100 500,000 555,000\n\n**1b. TOTAL Sanitation**\n**73,070,000** **18,000,000** **80** **91,070,000** **101,087,700**\n**Investments**\n\n**1c. Solid Waste Investments**\nKahramanmaraş Northern Districts Integrated Solid Waste Project 17,000,000 0 100 17,000,000 18,870,000\n\n**Category** **FRIT Grant** **IBRD (EUR)** **FRIT Grant (%** **Total Cost** **Total Cost**\n\nPage 57 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**(EUR)** **of total (EUR))** **(in EUR)** **(in US$)**\n**1c. TOTAL Solid Waste**\n**17,000,000** **0** **100** **17,000,000** **18,870,000**\n**Investments**\n\n**Sub-total (Component 1:**\n**131,350,000** **122,650,000** **52** **254,000,000** **279,230,000**\n**Environmental Investments)** **[42]**\n\n**Component 2: Technical**\n**Assistance for Project**\n**Management, Supervision,**\n**Capacity Building,**\n**Communication and Citizen**\n**Engagement**\n\n**2a. Project Management**\ni) Operating Costs 0 500,000 0 500,000 550,000 ii) Consultancy services for 780,000 0 100 780,000 857,500 PMU iii) Procurement of Video Conference System/s for ILBANK HQs and Regional Directorates 0 1,325,000 0 1,325,000 1,456,600\n\n**2b. Design Review and**\n0 10,250,000 0 10,250,000 11,268,000\n**Supervision**\n\n**2c. Institutional capacity**\n0 630,000 0 630,000 692,600\n**building activities**\n\n**2d. Citizen and Community**\n370,000 0 100 370,000 407,000\n**Engagement Activities**\n\n**2e. Communications and**\n735,000 0 100 735,000 808,000\n**Visibility activities**\n\n**Sub-total (Component 2:**\n**Technical Assistance for**\n**Project Management,**\n**Supervision, Capacity Building,**\n**Communication and Citizen**\n**Engagement)**\n\n**1,885,000** **12,705,000** **52** **14,590,000** **16,039,700**\n\n**TOTAL** **133,235,000** **[43]** **135,355,000** **[44]** **50** **268,590,000** **295,269,700**\n\n**Detailed description of sub-project investments at Appraisal Stage**\n\n**A: Adana Municipality**\n\n4. **Adana context.** During the Syrian war Adana became one of the most preferable arrival points for Syrian refugees.\n\nThe refugee population in Adana mostly includes Syrians and Iraqis majority of whom are living in central districts of Adana. Adana province has a total population of about 2,220,125 people out of which 238,556 (or 10.8 percent of the total population) are SuTP’s [45] . There is one refugee camp, the Saricam Container Camp, in the province of 42 A contingency amount for investments in the amount of about Euro 984,904 will be included in the grant amount for component 1 bringing the total grant amount for the entire project to Euro 134,219,904.\n43 See 42 above i.e. total Grant amount includes the contingency will add up to Euro 134, 219, 904.\n44 This amount includes the front-end fee of US$372,040 shall be included in the project cost.\n45 As per the address-based census45 for 2018 Page 58 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) Adana which hosts about 20,700 SuTP’s [46] . The increased population due to the high influx of refugees resulted in additional demand for municipal and infrastructural services including water systems.\n\n5. The water supply and sanitation services are provided by Adana Water and Sewerage Administration General Directorate (ASKİ). The service provision area of ASKI has increased considerably with the change of Adana to a metropolitan municipality. Majority of the settlements in the region use well water. In drought years and seasons, well yields significantly reduces. The use of groundwater wells and associated pumping in these areas have caused high energy expenditures and operational costs for ASKI. The ageing water supply and distribution networks in the service areas are characterized by high NRW (61.6 percent) and water losses (57.7 percent) [47] . In order to solve water deficiency problems in some settlements of Adana, ASKI has initiated a design for Yedigöze Drinking Water Transmission Line and Water Treatment Plant Project.\n\n6. **Adana Sub-Project.** This Sub-Project aims to supply water to 141 settlements from Yedigöze Dam Reservoir which will eliminate well usage in these settlements. The total project beneficiaries are estimated at 506,636 people out of which 49,423 (or 10 percent of the total population) are SuTP’s. Investments in Adana cover:\n\n- Kozan Imamoglu Yedigoeze Drinking Water Transmission Line (35.4 km transmission line),\n\n- Yedigoeze Water Treatment Plant (capacity: 115,776 m3/day), and\n\n- Kozan Pinargoezu Drinking Water Transmission Line and Network (28.12 km transmission line and 310 km\nnetwork).\n\n7. Through the Project, water will be taken from the existing Yedigöze Dam reservoir (in Ceyhan Basin) and transferred to a new Water Treatment Plant (with a planned capacity of 115,776 m3/day) which will be constructed through the project. The treated water from the Yedigöze WTP will be used to supply safe drinking water to the 4 districts of Imamoglu, Kozan, Ceyhan and Yumurtalik and 137 neighborhoods in the Ceyhan basin. The new system is expected to eliminate the existing use of groundwater wells. Energy costs of the system are expected to decrease significantly as the water from the reservoir will be distributed by gravity. In Kozan, existing asbestos pipes will be replaced with ductile iron and high-density polyethylene (HDPE) pipes which will lead to significant decrease in water losses. The proposed investments in Adana metropolitan municipality are summarized in table below.\n\n**Table A2.2: Adana investment components**\n**No** **Investment name** **Scope** **Budget (million**\n\n**EUR)**\nA-1 Kozan İmamoğlu Yedigoeze - 35.4 km transmission line to Kozan (Ø700 mm-Ø1,400 21.85 Drinking Water Transmission mm ductile iron pipes) with auxiliary structures Line (washout and air relief valve chambers, etc.) 21.85 A-2 Yedigoeze Water Treatment Plant A-3 Kozan Pınargoezue Drinking Water Transmission Line and Network\n\n- 35.4 km transmission line to Kozan (Ø700 mm-Ø1,400\nmm ductile iron pipes) with auxiliary structures (washout and air relief valve chambers, etc.)\n\n- Construction of a new WTP with a capacity of 115,776\nm3/day (1,340 l/s)\n\n- Renewal of existing 28.12 km transmission line;\n\n- 310 km water distribution network including\n\n- 8 Pumping stations, water reservoirs (4 new), 2\ncollection tanks and auxiliary structures 13.15 28.07\n\n**TOTAL** 63.07\n\n**B: Kahramanmaraş Municipality**\n\n46 UNHCR Turkey: Syrian Refugee Camps and Provincial Breakdown of Syrian Refugees Registered in South East Turkey (January 2020): _[https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/73300](https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/73300)_, accessed on January 15, 2020 47 According to PID for Adana Page 59 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) 8. **Kahramanmaraş context.** Kahramanmaraş is one of the 10 provinces in Turkey with the highest Syrian refugee population. The Syrian population in the Province has increased by 78 percent in the last six years, 2012-2018. In 2018, Kahramanmaraş province had a total population of about 1,144,851 people out of which 92,630 (or 8.1 percent of the total population) were SuTP’s [48] . There is one refugee camp, the Merkez Container Camp, in the province of Kahramanmaraş which hosts about 10,859 SuTP’s [49] . Kahramanmaraş became a Metropolitan Municipality following the administrative reforms, and the water supply and wastewater service utility, Kahramanmaraş Water and Sewerage Administration General Directorate (KASKİ) was established in 2014. In accordance with the changes in municipal legislation, the service area of the Metropolitan Municipality and KASKI is defined by provincial boundaries. Accordingly, the personnel, assets, investments, liabilities, and receivables related to the provision of water and wastewater services carried out before 2014 by the sub-provincial municipalities, the Special Provincial Administration (SPA) and other service providers within the provincial boundaries, were transferred to KASKİ. The provision of solid waste services in terms of waste collections remains with sub-province municipalities, while the disposal and/or recovery of the collected municipal waste is the responsibility of the Metropolitan Municipality.\n\n9. **Kahramanmaraş Sub-Projects** . The proposed subprojects are aimed to improve access to safely managed water supply, sanitation and solid waste services in the proposed project areas in Kahramanmaraş metropolitan municipality. At appraisal stage, six investment sub-projects were identified:\n\n- Kahramanmaraş Northern Districts Integrated Solid Waste Project\n\n- Kahramanmaraş (Centrum) Drinking Water Project\n\n- Kahramanmaraş (Centrum) Sewerage and Storm Water Project\n\n- Elbistan Drinking Water Network Project\n\n- Elbistan Drinking Water Transmission Line\n\n- Ceyhan Basin Wastewater Treatment Plants\n\n10. **Kahramanmaraş Northern Districts Integrated Solid Waste Project.** The sub-project is composed of construction of a sanitary landfill (including a mechanical separation facility of 757 tons/day and a composting plant of 410 tons/day), two transfer stations (in Goksun and Elbistan) and rehabilitation of 24 wild dumpsites. Rehabilitation of 22 wild dumpsites (mainly of former small towns) will be done mainly by transferring dumped wastes to the new landfill site and 2 wild dumpsites (Afsin and Elbistan) will be rehabilitated on site.\n\n11. **Kahramanmaraş (Centrum) Drinking Water Project.** The sub-project includes rehabilitation and construction works in water distribution network including establishment of pressure zones, DMAs, SCADA system and installation of flow meters and pressure reduce valves. Within the scope of this sub-project, there are 59 water reservoir areas of which 38 are planned to be constructed. For the remaining, some of them will be abandoned or rehabilitated. Currently, varying pressure in the distribution network cause problems and the NRW in city is above 60 percent.\n\n12. **Kahramanmaraş (Centrum) Sewerage and Storm Water Project.** The sub-project includes rehabilitation and construction of 400 km sewerage network and 100 km storm water network. The sub-project aims to solve the problematic areas in terms of sewerage and storm water networks in the city center, specifically Onikişubat and 48 As per the address-based census48 for 2018 49 Calculations based on PID for Adana and projected estimates for the year 2020 Page 60 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) Dulkadiroğlu neighborhoods. The city center is located to foothill of Ahır Mountain. The rainwater from the high slopes of the mountain arrives to city center and causes flooding in streets since the closed storm water boxes are not capable of carrying the surface water flow. Recently in June 2018, a storm disaster, caused 3 losses in the city center besides the economic losses. It is reported that some of the storm water manhole lids and grids are covered or remain under roads which also prevents storm water entering through these grids/lids.\n\n13. **Ceyhan Basin Wastewater Treatment Plants.** Ceyhan basin is one of the 25 basins in Turkey extends from İskenderun Bay to inner Anatolia region. Ekinözü, Çağlayancerit, Andırın and Göksun are sub-provinces of Kahramanmaraş and part of Ceyhan basin. According to the Ceyhan Basin Pollution Prevention Plan prepared in 2016, the wastewater treatment plants for Ekinözü, Çağlayancerit, Andırın and Göksun are parts of the measures required to prevent pollution in the basin. The increased population with the addition Syrian refugees increases the pressure on the river basin due to untreated wastewater discharges. The project aims to enable KASKI (General Directorate of Kahramanmaraş Water and Sewage Administration) to provide local population and Syrian refugees with improved wastewater services. The project will also contribute to the prevention of pollution in Ceyhan River Basin.\n\n14. The following 4 WWTPs and relevant collector line constructions are included under the sub-project:\n\n- Ekinoezue WWTP and Collectors: 0.95 km of Ø400 Concrete Pipes, 1.1 km of Ø200 Concrete Pipes, 23\nManholes, 1 pumping station, 1 WWTP\n\n- Çağlayancerit WWTP: 1 WWTP\n\n- Andırın WWTP and Collectors: 4.23 km of Ø400 Concrete Pipes, 3.51 km of Ø200 Concrete Pipes, 163\nManholes, Pumping Station and 600 m Pressure Line (600 m), 1 WWTP\n\n- Goeksun WWTP and Collectors: 4.617 km of (Ø600) HDPE Pipes, 107 Manholes, 1 WWTP\n\n15. **Elbistan Drinking Water Network Project.** Under this sub-project, rehabilitation of 255 km water distribution network, 4,128 km house connections, 3 km pressure lines, six new water reservoirs and five pumping stations will be rehabilitated/constructed. Elbistan city centre’s water is supplied by a group of caisson wells drilled near Ceyhan River. Water from these wells are pumped to 5 existing reservoirs that feed 5 pressure zones. The existing drinking network was first constructed in 1956-1957, then in 1984-1987 and finally in 2009. The pipeline constructed before 2009 is in poor condition. The water losses are high, estimated as 50 percent. Thus, some of the lines need to be renewed and new pipes need to be constructed for extending the distribution network to new developing areas.\n\n16. **Elbistan Drinking Water Transmission Line.** Elbistan Drinking Water Transmission Line includes 120 km water transmission line and 6 water reservoirs (volumes between 100-2000 m3). First part of the transmission line will be constructed by DSI.\n\n17. The proposed investments in Kahramanmaraş are summarized as follows (Table 2.3):\n\n**Table 2.3: Kahramanmaraş investment components**\n**No** **Investment name** **Scope** **Budget**\n\nPage 61 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**(million EUR)**\nB-1 Kahramanmaraş Northern - Construction of a new landfill in Afşin. A composting facility 17.00 Districts Integrated Solid and collection and separation facility in landfill site. Two Waste Project transfer stations in Elbistan and Goeksun.\n\n- Construction of a new landfill in Afşin. A composting facility\nand collection and separation facility in landfill site. Two transfer stations in Elbistan and Goeksun.\n\n- Provision of waste collection equipment (container and pickup trucks).\n\n- Rehabilitation or closure of existing dumpsites.\n\n17.00 B-2 Kahramanmaraş (city centre) Drinking Water Project B-3 Kahramanmaraş (city centre) Sewerage Project B-4 Ceyhan Basin Wastewater Treatment Plants B-5 Elbistan Drinking Water Network Project B-6 Elbistan Drinking Water Transmission Line\n\n**Kayseri Municipality**\n\n- Rehabilitation and construction of water distribution network\nincluding:\n\n- Establishment of pressure zones and DMAs; introduction of\nSCADA systems, installation of flow meters and pressure reduce valves;\n\n- Rehabilitation of water reservoirs and pumping stations;\n\n- Construction of one new water reservoir.\n\n- Rehabilitation and construction work of sewerage network\n(400 km)\n\n- Construction of stormwater network (100 km)\n\n- Ekinözü WWTP and Collectors: 0.95 km of Ø400 Concrete\nPipes, 1.1 km of Ø200 Concrete Pipes, 23 Manholes, 1 pumping station, 1 WWTP (for 12,350 people; in 2037 capacity 889 m3/day, 14,750 people in 2052 capacity 1,062 m3/day)\n\n- Çağlayancerit WWTP: 1 WWTP (for 15,000 people; in 2038\ncapacity 1,650 m3/day, 17 600 people in 2053 capacity 1,936 m3/day)\n\n- Andırın WWTP and Collectors: 4.23 km of Ø400 Concrete\nPipes, 3.51 km of Ø200 Concrete Pipes, 163 Manholes, Pumping Station and 600 m Pressure Line (600 m), 1 WWTP\n\n- Goeksun WWTP and Collectors: 4.617 km of (Ø600) HDPE\nPipes, 107 Manholes, 1 WWTP (for 25 000 people; in 2037 capacity 5 508 m3/day, 30 000 people in 2052 capacity 6480 m3/day)\n\n- Rehabilitation of water distribution network (255 km) and\nhouse connections (4128), Pressure lines (3 km), Construction of water reservoirs (6 new), 5 Pumping stations\n\n- Construction of water transmission line (120 km) and 6 water\nreservoirs (volumes b/w 100-2000 m3) 10.80 25.00 8.4 8.00 25.00 18. **Kayseri context.** The refugee population in Kayseri consists mainly of Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis. Most of the refugees are living in Melikgazi district. In 2018, Kayseri province had a total population of about 1,389,680 people out of which 79,758 (or 5.74 percent of the total population in Kayseri province) were SuTP’s. There are no refugee camps in Kayseri province [50] .\n\n19. The existing WWTP (with a capacity of 110,000 m3/day) in Kayseri started operation in 2004 and was designed to 50 UNHCR Turkey: Syrian Refugee Camps and Provincial Breakdown of Syrian Refugees Registered in South East Turkey (January 2020): _[https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/73300](https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/73300)_, accessed on January 15, 2020 Page 62 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) serve the central districts of Kayseri, namely Kocasinan and Melikgazi, until 2025. However, three more districts (Talas, Hacilar and Incesu) were connected to the WWTP which led to an additional population of 160,000. In addition, the increased population in the city center with refugees, the capacity of the WWTP became insufficient.\nIn 2016, the average wastewater received to the WWTP was 163,200 m3/day [51] .\n\n20. **Kayseri Sub-Project.** Under this proposed sub-project, the capacity of the existing WWTP will be increased and improved through the installation of screens, aeration tanks, and primary and secondary sedimentation tanks. The sludge dewatering unit will also be renewed by replacement of the existing belt filter press with decanters. Through the added units, the capacity of the WWTP is planned to increase up to 183,000 m3/day for a PE of 1.4 million. In addition, a solar sludge drying facility will be constructed. The expected beneficiaries are 1,330,500 people out of which 79,830 (or 6 percent of the total population) are SuTP’s.\n\n21. The proposed investments in Kayseri are summarized as follows (Table 2.4):\n\n**Table 2.4: Kayseri province investment components**\n**No** **Investment name** **Scope** **Budget**\n**(million EUR)**\nC-1 Extension of Kayseri - Extension of existing WWTP (2nd phase) and installation of solar sludge 25 Wastewater drying facility; replacement of existing belt filters with decanter units.\nTreatment Plant\n\n- Extension of existing WWTP (2nd phase) and installation of solar sludge\ndrying facility; replacement of existing belt filters with decanter units.\n\n25\n\n**.Konya Municipality**\n\n22. **Konya context.** The refugee population in Konya consists mainly of Syrians and Afghans. In 2018, Konya province had a total population of about 2,205,609 [52] people out of which 109,124 (or 4.95 percent of the total population) were SuTP’s [53] . There are no refugee camps in Konya [54], refugees are mainly living in the central districts of Konya.\nSince 2014, water supply and sanitation services for the metropolitan municipality of Konya are provided by Konya Water and Sewerage Administration General Directorate (KOSKİ). Due to high seasonal variations in the availability of water resources and the high NRW (57 percent) [55], KOSKİ has developed the following investment project for Akşehir district.\n\n23. **Konya Sub-Project.** The proposed Akşehir Water Supply Project will finance the construction of:\n\n- 29 km of water transmission lines,\n\n- 97 km of distribution network including house connections,\n\n- three water reservoirs (3,000, 1,000 and 500 m3) and pressure reducing chambers.\n\n24. Existing water distribution network was constructed in 1990 and the capacity of the system is already reached.\n\nThus, the project aims to renew the existing water system for the city of Aksehir in order to provide healthier and sustainable water services to customers. In Aksehir, drinking water is currently supplied from groundwater wells.\n\n51 According to PID for Kayseri.\n52 As per the address-based census for 2018 53 Calculations based on PID for Konya and projected estimates for the year 2020.\n54 UNHCR Turkey: Syrian Refugee Camps and Provincial Breakdown of Syrian Refugees Registered in South East Turkey (January 2020): _[https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/73300](https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/73300)_, accessed on January 15, 2020 55 According to PID for Konya Page 63 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "dress-based census f", "confidence": 0.18614277243614197}, {"text": "D for Konya a", "confidence": 0.11524561047554016}, {"text": "D for Konya P", "confidence": 0.1095687597990036}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "dress-based census for 2018 5", "confidence": 0.3659513294696808}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) Through the project, spring waters in Gemen (15 lt/s), Sucikan (50 lt/s) and Ilica (20 lt/s) will be transmitted and distributed to Aksehir for drinking water purposes. The Project is expected to lead to a significant decrease in energy consumption as spring water will be transmitted by gravity. The total project beneficiaries are estimated at 134,524 people out of which 16,270 (or 12.1 percent of the total population) are SuTP’s [56] .\n\n25. At appraisal stage, two further sub-projects in Konya metropolitan municipality were identified:\n\n- Ilgin Wastewater Treatment Plant\n\n- Cumra Wastewater Treatment Plant\n\n26. The proposed investments for Konya are summarized as follows (Table 2.5):\n\n**Table 2.5 Konya province investment components**\n**No** **Investment name** **Scope** **Budget (million**\n\n**EUR)**\nD-1 Akşehir Water Supply - Construction of water transmission lines (29 km). 4.71 Project - Rehabilitation/construction of 3 water reservoirs (3000, and\n\n- Construction of water transmission lines (29 km).\n\n- Rehabilitation/construction of 3 water reservoirs (3000, and\n500 m3) and installation of pressure reducing chambers construction of network pipelines (97 km) including house connections will be prioritized according to available budget.\n\n4.71 D-2 Ilgin Wastewater Treatment Plant Project D-3 Cumra Wastewater Treatment Plant Project\n\n- Construction of Ilgin Wastewater Treatment Plant Project 3.85\n\n- Construction of Cumra Wastewater Treatment Plant Project 5.38\n\n**Osmaniye Municipality**\n\n27. **Osmaniye context.** In 2018, the total population in Osmaniye province was 534,415 people out of which 51,160 (or 9.6 percent of the total population) are SuTP’s. There is one refugee camp, the Cevdetiye Container Camp, in the province of Osmaniye which hosts about 12,610 SuTP’s [57] .\n\n28. The city center of Osmaniye municipality receives drinking water from three main sources, which are: Zorkun Springs (400 l/s; by gravity), Yenikoey Wells (360 l/s; by pump) and 7 groundwater wells (270 l/s; by pump). The design report indicates that the existing resources are only capable to meet water demand until 2026. For this reason, Osmaniye Municipality has contacted DSİ and 786 l/s water allocation from Aslantaş Dam is received.\n\n29. The existing water distribution network has high NRW (56 percent) and real losses (49 percent) in the system [58] .\n\nThere are no ‘as built drawings’ of the existing water distribution network available, hence, the Municipality receives around 200 system failure calls per month due to failure of pipes (mainly PCV, asbestos and cast-iron pipes exist) in the system or house connections. As there are no ‘as built’ drawings the site operations are carried as trial and error actions. Most of the cast iron pipes have corrosion problems and collapse. These issues extend the repair times and create secondary contamination risks to the system.\n\n56 Calculations based on PID for Konya and projected estimates for the year 2020.\n57 UNHCR Turkey: Syrian Refugee Camps and Provincial Breakdown of Syrian Refugees Registered in South East Turkey (January 2020): _[https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/73300](https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/73300)_, accessed on January 15, 2020 58 According to PID for Osmaniye Page 64 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ID for Konya", "confidence": 0.6320722103118896}, {"text": "ID for Osmaniye", "confidence": 0.3521520495414734}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) 30. The existing wastewater system has a length of around 400 km and consists of concrete and reinforced concrete pipes with diameters ranging from 200 to 1000 mm. The wastewater collection network was mainly constructed in 1985 therefore it is aged, and the pipe material and connection type used are reported in the Project Identification Document (PID) as not suitable to the area specific soil characteristics. Due to the high groundwater level in the project area, most of the existing pipes are full of groundwater and soil granules brought by groundwater infiltration. The Municipality receives 250 failure calls monthly as a result of sediments causing pipe clogging or failures/collapses of the pipes. The municipality cleans annually 250 km of wastewater pipelines by vacuum trucks from sediments and clogging. These problems make operation of the system inefficient due to economic circumstances and staff capacity.\n\n31. **Osmaniye Sub-Project.** The two proposed sub-projects aim at improving the existing water supply and sewerage systems in the city center of Osmaniye. The total project beneficiaries in the proposed project area are estimated at 334,298 people out of which 57,109 (or 17.1 percent of the total population) are SuTP’s [59] .\n\n32. **Osmaniye Centrum Drinking Water Project.** Osmaniye drinking water project will focus on the distribution network and will include construction of approximately 598 km water distribution network (pipe diameters changing from 110 to 900 mm), 5 water reservoirs, pressure release valves, DMAs and auxiliary infrastructure.\nThese activities seek to address critical water supply service constraints faced by the municipalities in delivering effective and efficient services, including: (a) frequent pipe breakage and subsequent contamination of water due to severe corrosion of existing pipes (cast iron, asbestos cement), and high pressure fluctuations – water utility records show about 200 calls per month, with about 30 percent of these related to the main network and 60 percent to customer connections; and (b) non-revenue water is very high at 56 percent, of which 49 percent are real losses.\n\n33. **Osmaniye Centrum Sewerage project.** Osmaniye sewerage project aims renewal of 403 km of wastewater collection network. The existing collection network was mainly constructed in 1985 and is prone to deficiencies due to aging and connection types used at that time. The high groundwater level also creates problems such as high amount of infiltration to the pipes and entrance of soil granules to network, which creates additional costs for operation. It is stated that approximately 100 failure calls are received from customers due to failure and/or collapse of pipes.\n\n34. The project is expected to lead to significant efficiency improvements for the operation of water distribution network and wastewater collection system for Osmaniye Municipality. The investments in the water distribution network will decrease energy consumption, water losses and non-revenue water. This will also allow the Municipality to meet water demand until water is received from Aslantaş dam. Also, failure calls received for both water and wastewater pipelines will be decreased. The improvement in wastewater collection network is also expected to reduce possible groundwater infiltration to the system thus may reduce the wastewater flow to the WWTP. The proposed investments for Osmaniye are summarized as follows (Table 2.6):\n\n**Table 2.6: Osmaniye investment components**\n**No** **Investment name** **Scope** **Budget**\n\n59 Calculations based on PID for Adana and projected estimates for the year 2020.\n\nPage 65 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["water utility records"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "PID for Adana", "confidence": 0.3718148171901703}, {"text": "Project Identification Document", "confidence": 0.1885378509759903}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "water utility records", "confidence": 0.12204597145318985}], "vague_data": [{"text": "water utility records", "confidence": 0.3368414640426636}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**(million EUR)**\nE-1 Osmaniye (Centrum) Drinking Water Project - Construction of water distribution network (598 27.65 km; 110-900 mm) to be prioritized, 5 water reservoirs, pressure release valves, DMAs and auxiliary structures E -2 Osmaniye (Centrum) Sewerage Project - Wastewater collection network (403 km) will be prioritized according to available budget.\n\n29.91\n\n**Priority Water Supply and Sanitation Investments**\n\n35. Priority water and sanitation investments at neighborhood or settlement level in low income areas most affected by vulnerable SUTPS and host communities may range from facilities such as, inter alia, household water facilities, including taps and laundry facilities, and appropriate toilet facilities, which may be introduced semi-permanent solutions in informal settlements that can be relocated if desired. The following paragraphs conceptually describe one form of potential priority investments that have been used in other countries in similar situations where environmental infrastructure services are urgently required in informal settlings. In this case, priority investments are required to address kay concerns such as risks to public health, high levels of environmental degradation and pollution due to grey water run-off or lack of toilets, and social risks to the most vulnerable, including women and children who are often most impacted by lack of access to safe water and sanitation services.\n\n36. **Non-permanent or movable Community Ablution Blocks (CABs) for informal settlements.** CABs comprise blocks of water and sanitation facilities such as toilets and showers that can be made out of lower cost but durable materials such as refurbished shipping containers to provide services in informal low-income settlements. Various CAB models have used successfully elsewhere in similar situations in countries such as South Africa. The project will support the development of a conceptual design for CABs made from locally available facilities, to be piloted in selected low-income settlements in collaboration with municipalities.\n\n37. Required considerations to implement CABs shall include: (i) land availability to implement a CAB project, with landownership needs to be formally agreed on with municipalities; (ii) space consideration; ideally sites or plots must be greater than 250 m2; (iii) ideally the average slope of the ground must be less than 1:3 for the ease of installation; (iv) environmental considerations, including connection to the main sewer and further treatment etc.; and (v) site having a basic level of water supply. Containers may be designed or tailor-made for the local context and may be equipped with water meters to monitor. They should also be designed in a gender sensitive manner with separated male and female units in different blocks, and fitted with other gender appropriate facilities such as menstrual hygiene facilities for females, facilities for disabled people, and women with small children.\n\n38. Development and introduction of CABs will require engagement of both municipalities and selected recipient communities with vulnerable SUTP and host communities, to be identified by the municipalities, initially on a pilot scale with potential to scale up the model. Community members will continue to be involved in operating and maintenance of the CABs to ensure their proper use and management. Management of such facilities may provide employment / income generating activities for local community members, including women. However, appropriate design of the operation and maintenance arrangements will be determined in collaboration with the respective municipalities and communities during development of the facilities. Below is an example of a conceptual layout of CABs.\n\nPage 66 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**ANNEX 3: Economic and Financial Analysis**\n\n**Rationale for Public Sector Investment**\n\n1. The rationale for public sector financing under the proposed project is mainly linked to the important social\n\nand political goals of the Government of Turkey and the EU to address the impacts of the Syrian refugee crisis in the most affected parts of the country. Direct fiscal impact depends on what the state would have done in the absence of the project financing for the subprojects. In this case the fiscal savings are direct and significant given cost savings arising from the reduced state and local governments financing to provide certain services, owing to project investments. Limited capacity to attract private sector financing by the municipalities in the targeted investment areas due to the overall perceived risks, necessitates public sector financing.\n\n**Rationale for Bank’s Involvement**\n\n2. The World Bank has been a long-term partner of Turkey in the water and sanitation, and water resources management sectors. In this instance, the Bank’s involvement occurs at the backdrop of severe service pressures on the municipal services due to the refugee situation, providing contingent funding for critical works to preserve adequate service provision. In this context the knowledge and global experiences of the Bank are highly valuable to the GoT. The Bank has substantial global experience in supporting programs and managing policy dialogue to improve service delivery in areas affected by refugees. Bank support has been provided in form of financial support, Advisory Services and Analytics (ASA) services, and operational support towards implementation of multi-donor funded programs. Globally, the Bank has supported the preparation of needs assessments for refugee host countries, AAA on affected communities, and implementation of activities for provision and expansion of basic services in various sectors to accommodate the increased pressure on existing systems due to refugees. The Bank has also used its convening power in the past to bring together different stakeholders, including municipalities affected by refugees and others to share lessons across sectors.\n\n**Cost Benefit Analysis**\n\n3. The financial and economic analysis focus on the project’s subcomponents with specific investments that materialize direct or indirect economic benefits and costs. The economic viability of subprojects will assess the value from project infrastructure investments without considering sub-project’s benefits from technical assistance aimed at building capacity or improving knowledge and technical expertise.\n\n**Methodology**\n\n4. Costs and benefits are estimated at constant prices for 2018. All benefits and costs were appraised measuring their flow of costs and benefits for the lifetime of the sub-projects, ranging from 25 to 33 years. Costs and benefits were expressed in constant prices as of 2018 at an exchange rate of 5.4852 TL per Euro. The discount recommended by the World Bank guideline is 6 percent, and the analysis used a higher discount rate of 10 percent to weigh in economic risks in discounting flows to present values. The main approach used for this economic analysis is to compare the costs and benefits with and without project scenarios using European Commission CBA Guide.\n\nPage 67 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "European Commission CBA Guide", "confidence": 0.12713180482387543}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**A) Adana Sub-projects**\n\n5. Kozan Drinking Water and Transmission Line Project: This activity includes the renewal of water network pipes including house connections, construction of 28 km gravity and pressure transmission lines, pump stations, reservoirs, collection tanks and auxiliary structures. These investments will ensure effective operation of the whole water supply system, contribute to the reduction of non-revenue water to regulation limits and increase service delivery quality levels.\n\n6. A Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) was carried out as part of the Feasibility Study in line with the Guide to Cost Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects, EC Directorate General Regional Policy, 2014. This reflected an ENPV of EUR1.9 million and EIRR of 11.0 percent. The financial analysis resulted in a FRR/C of -3.29 percent and a FRR/K of 18.36 percent. The social affordability analysis showed that no affordability constraints will be faced throughout the analysis period as the full cost recovery tariffs (EUR 0.96/m3) are below maximum affordable tariff which is set at 2.5 percent of median household income equating to EUR 1.05/m3 (both figures are excluding VAT).\n\n7. Sensitivity analysis has been carried to see the impact of the variations of the critical variables including investment, personnel and power costs as well as health benefits on the economic performance of the project. Accordingly, 1 percent change in investment costs and health benefits led to a change above 1 percent in the ENPV in absolute terms at -1.98 percent and 2.41 percent respectively.\n\n8. Proposed Kozan Drinking Water Project will significantly contribute to the reduction of non-revenue water (app. 61 percent) to the Regulation limits and provide benefits for the efficient operation of the whole network afterwards. Pınargözü Transmission Line Project will ensure safe gravity water supply to District centrum in the short term. Both investments will increase service delivery quality levels of the consumers, which suffer from frequent water interruptions and low pressure.\n\n9. Yedigöze Drinking Water Transmission Line and Yedigöze Treatment Plant Project will serve 141 settlements of Adana city. These settlements include 4 sub-provinces (Kozan, İmamoğlu, Ceyhan and Yumurtalık districts) and 137 surrounding neighborhoods on the route of the transmission line.\n\n10. Specific objectives of these two proposed projects are; Construction of a treatment plant with a capacity of 115K m3/day introducing a conventional treatment process including coagulation, flocculation, filtering and disinfection, construction of 35.4 km ductile iron transmission line with auxiliary structures (washout and air relief valve chambers, etc.). Therefore, lack of safe water sources problem for 4 Sub-provinces and 137 neighborhoods (total 141 settlements) shall be solved. It will eliminate well usage in these settlements and so contribute reduction of the energy costs. Improvement of the underground water levels shall be achieved which also suffer from high withdrawal rates caused from irrigation and water supply activities.\n\nPage 68 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) 11. The financial analysis resulted in an FNPV of EUR -23.1 million an economic analysis was performed taking into account pollution reduction benefits, health benefits, GHG emission savings and resource cost savings, resulting in ENPV of EUR -24.5. million and an EIRR of 6.4 percent.\n\n**B) Kahramanmaras Sub-projects**\n\n12. 12.Construction of Andırın and Göksun (Ceyhan Basin) WWTPs is developed as part of the plan to prevent pollution in Ceyhan Basin and alleviate the extra pressure due to the increased population as a result of the Syrian refugee population influx on the infrastructure services in the province.\n\n13. WTP (Willingness to Pay) is used to estimate shadow price of project output, or in the absence of WTP data, the commonly accepted practice is to take a conservative assumption for the monetization of the project benefits due to uncertainties of the estimation and also to calculate avoided costs for users to get this service from an alternative source. The feasibility classified the benefits of Kahramanmaras WWTP Project into 3 categories detailed below:\n\n- Monetarization of project benefits: A per capita benefit value estimated by the consultants has been\nset over the reference period of the project yielding an economic benefit of EUR 29.671.122.\n\n- Disposable income for new employment: According to the TURKSTAT data, Marginal Propensity to Save\nin January 2019 in Turkey is 19.40 percent which means Marginal Propensity to Consume is 80,60 Page 69 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["TURKSTAT data"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "TURKSTAT data", "confidence": 0.9289575219154358}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "WTP data", "confidence": 0.2555621266365051}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) percent. The direct economic benefit is calculated as EUR 1.457.517 over the operational period (20222052) of the project.\n\n- Avoided Cost of Opening Septic Wells: The connection ratio to sewer system of Kahramanmaras\nhouseholds is 80 percent which, by assumption, means that 20 percent of the households should open a septic tank to get rid of wastewater they generate. At the first year of operation period the consultant assumes that 20 percent of not connected households avoid investing in septic tanks for the wastewater generated by themselves which in return if the cost of opening a septic tank is assumed to be EUR 500 per household then the total saving will be calculated as EUR 9.500 in the first year, 2022. For the following years of project reference period, 20 percent of additional subscribers will do the same saving and at the end of project’s reference period, total savings from avoided costs of opening sewer wells become EUR 382.100.\n\n14. The Economic NPV of the Project is EUR 170.145,97 and Economic IRR is 10.43 percent which is greater than the social discount rate of 10 percent which is used in economic analysis. Benefit-Cost ratio is calculated as 1,02 at 10 percent of social discount rate.\n\n**Table 3.1: Kahramanmaras Andırın and Göksun WWTP**\n\n**Economic Benefit, NPV and IRR Calculation** **EUR**\n\nNPV of Monetization of Direct Benefit (Instead of WTP) Per Inhabitants 6.851.827 NPV of Avoided Cost of Opening Septic Wells 84.817 NPV of Disposable Income Addition 368.324 NPV of Total Economic Benefits 7.304.967 NPV of Investments 4.061.870 NPV of O&M and Replacement Costs 3.072.952 NPV of Total Economic Costs 7.134.821 Economic NPV (EUR) 170.145,97 Economic IRR 10,43% Benefit/Cost Ratio 1,02 15. The Project will contribute to the prevention of pollution in Ceyhan River Basin comprising several water resources. The project will lead to increasing the overall effectiveness and efficiency of wastewater management in the region. The health standards of the public will be improved. Project is expected to have a positive impact on the environment by protecting natural resources.\n\n16. Kahramanmaraş Northern Districts Integrated Solid Waste Management (ISWM) System Project intends to upgrade the existing waste management practices through the implementation and operation of a sanitary landfill incorporating optimal routing to minimize transport and emissions, and safe recovery and disposal of Page 70 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) waste with environmental controls for the collection and treatment of leachate and landfill gas. ISWM system project is justified based on financial and economic returns through generation of benefits by closing the existing non-sanitary landfill and switching to a coordinated regional system with collection, separation and composting facilities.\n\n17. In calculating the tariffs for the future ISWM system, the average tariff has been set to comply with the polluter pays principle within the limit of household affordability. The maximum affordable tariff has been defined as 1 percent of disposable income for an average household. Evaluation period has been taken as 2017- 2047 coinciding with the bulk of the planned operational lifetime of the landfill – the largest component of the proposed project.\n\n**Table3. 2: Kahramanmaras ISWM Project**\n\n**Value**\n**Financial Analysis**\n**Discounted (NPV)**\n\nFinancial discount rate (%), real 10% Total investment cost (in EUR, discounted) (*) 21,407,525 Residual value (in EUR, not discounted) (**) 2,909,431 Residual value (in EUR, discounted) (**) 166,735 Revenues (in EUR, discounted) (**) 27,941,825 Operating costs (in euro, discounted) (**) 22,809,183 Net revenue (in euro, discounted) = (7) - (8) + (6) 5,299,377 18. The social discount rate of 10 percent is assumed when considering the economic welfare implications of the proposed investment for the provision of ISWM services for society in the Kahramanmaraş Metropolitan area. In order to convert the project costs from financial costs – both investment and operating costs – based on market prices to economic costs based on the impacts to society, the following steps were made:\n\n- Taxes and subsidies are removed from the cost estimates. Transfer payments (such as social security\ntaxes) are also removed from cost estimates (both investment and operating costs)\n\n- Costs based on domestic prices are converted to be comparable with costs based on international prices\nas internationally traded goods are assumed to reflect actual economic value, whereas domestic prices can be distorted by market imperfections.\n\n**Table 3.3 Kahramanmaras ISWM Project**\n**Economic Cost Benefit Analysis** **Values**\n\n1. Social discount rate (%) 10.0%\n\n2. Economic rate of return (%) 11.5% 3. Economic NPV (in Euro) 3,832,084 4. Benefit-cost ratio 1.15 19. Due to collection and (future) utilization of landfill gas, the negative effects of greenhouse gases will be Page 71 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) reduced. Using the World Bank GHG accounting tool Climate Action for Urban Sustainability (CURB), it was estimated that the project avoided about 63,962 tCO2 of being emitted into the atmosphere over the next 30 years. Using data on the waste production, it was found that the GHG emission reduction was positive because of the shift from open dumping to management of waste in a landfill with landfill gas capture.\nEmissions decreased because of landfill gas capture, which prevents the methane generated by waste within landfills from entering the environment. Using the market price of EUR 24.6/tCO2, the social benefits of the avoided GHG are worth about EUR 1.6 million for the entire project life.\n\n**Table 3.4 Methane Emissions**\n\n**Methane emissions impact calculation*** **2017** **Project�Life**\n\n**30�years**\nWith�action For�Managed�landfill�(tons�CO2e)=�A 19.189 Baseline For�Unmanaged�landfill�-�less�than�5m�deep�(tons�CO2e)=�B 21.321 Avoided�methane�emissions�(CO2e)=�B-A 2.132 63.962 Avoided�GHG�Monetary�Benefits�(EUR)** 52.470 1.574.107\n\n*World�Bank�Climate�Action�for�Urban�Sustainability�GHG�Accounting�Tool\n**Price�data�from�https://origin.markets.businessinsider.com/commodities/co2-european-emission-allowances\n\n**C) Kayseri Sub-project**\n\n20. Kayseri WWTP Capacity Extension Project 21. Kayseri WWTP project is designed to meet the needs of the city with increasing population and expanding industrial facilities. Year of 2025 is selected as target year as of when all the wastewater will be discharged after being treated. Kayseri has a reported Syrian guest percentile at 4.3 percent of its local population. Over its lifetime of 30 years, project will have a FNPV of EUR3,545,000 with an FIRR of 12.2 percent.\n\n22. The project will yield an E-NPV of 10,918,408 with an ERR of 25.6 percent and has a cost/benefit ratio calculated as 1.62. According to the World Bank Water GP GHG Calculation Model, project’s gross emissions were 369,064 tons CO2e, net emissions were 118,894 tons CO2e and net average annual emissions were 3,963 tons CO2e.\n\n**E) Osmaniye Sub-project**\n\n23. Osmaniye (Centrum) Drinking Water and Sewerage Network Projects 24. Osmaniye needs to enlarge its sewerage and drinking water networks to meet the legislative requirements for the collection of urban wastewaters and for the supply of good quality water. In accordance with Turkey’s physical planning guidelines for water and wastewater infrastructure, the Osmaniye wastewater collection system is designed using a 35-year horizon in order to respond to the needs of increasing population with an over 20 percent ratio of Syrian guests.\n\n25. The project will produce a negative FNPV of -EUR10.6 million with an FIRR of 7.5 percent. Economic analysis yields ENPV of EUR 65,019,026 with an ERR of 23.82 percent and benefit/cost ratio of 9.17 thus justifying the project on economic basis. Using World Bank Water GP GHG Calculation Model, project’s gross emissions were 244,082 tons CO2e, net emissions were 990,958 tons CO2e and net average annual emissions were Page 72 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data on the waste production", "confidence": 0.5882191061973572}], "vague_data": [{"text": "data on the waste production", "confidence": 0.4419930875301361}]}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) 28,299 tons CO2e.\n\n**Financial Estimates of Utilities and Municipality**\n\n26. Financial budget results for the last three years covering 2016-2018 and estimates for the next three years of the water utilities and for Adana, Kahramanmaras and Kayseri together with Municipality of Osmaniye are provided below. These constitute a baseline assessment of their financial position reflecting level of financial sustainability. Based on their past budget results all three utilities have generated positive current balances enabling them to finance part of their capital expenditure after debt interest payment. Municipality of Osmaniye has also been reporting positive current balances though with narrow margins reflecting its relatively limited revenue potential due to its non-metropolitan status.\n\n27. For three-year projections operating revenue from water services and other tax related central government transfers are assumed to increase at least by consumer inflation rate with some real tariff adjustments in 2020 and 2021 above expected inflation. These would amount to a combined tariff increase of 30 percent over the three-year period still enabling the affordability rates remaining below 2.5 percent of median household income.\n\n**Table 3.5 Adana SKI Budget Results**\n\n**Adana Water and Sewerage Entity**\n**Budget Results (TRY/EUR ave. rate)**\n**(EURm)**\nWater and Other Tariffs Other Revenues Transfers Grants Received\n**Total revenues**\n\nPersonnel Expenditure Other operating expenditure\n\n**Operating balance**\n\nInterest paid\n\n**Current balance**\nCapital Expenditure\n**Surplus/(Deficit) Before Debt**\nNew Borrowing Debt repayment\n\n**Overall results for the year**\nDebt (EUR equivalent) Source: Budget results and consultant calc **u** 0,2691 0,2211 0,1652 0,1652 0,1652 0,1652\n**2016** **2017** **2018** **2019F** **2020F** **2021F**\n91,9 93,3 81,6 91,4 105,1 113,5 0,0 0,0 2,4 2,7 3,1 3,4 23,0 21,5 16,7 18,7 21,6 23,3\n**114,9** **114,7** **100,8** **112,9** **129,8** **140,2**\n\n-20,0 -17,4 -14,0 -15,6 -18,0 -19,4\n\n-73,8 -74,6 -66,4 -74,4 -85,5 -92,3\n\n**21,1** **22,7** **20,5** **22,9** **26,3** **28,5**\n\n-1,5 -1,1 -4,7 -5,5 -6 -7,5\n\n**19,6** **21,6** **15,7** **17,4** **20,3** **21,0**\n-20,3 -35,8 -40,3 -35 -58 -65\n**-0,7** **-14,2** **-24,6** **-17,6** **-37,7** **-44,0**\n0,0 0,0 31,0 35 42 30 0,0 0,0 -6,1 -8 -9,5 8\n\n**19,6** **21,6** **40,6** **44,4** **52,8** **59,0**\n44,3 47,7 58,7 85 110 130 lations Page 73 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Table 3.6 Kahramanmaras SKI Budget Results**\n\n**Kahramanmaras Water and Sewerage Entity**\n**Budget Results (TRY/EUR ave.rate)** 0,2691 0,2211 0,1652 0,1652 0,1652 0,1652\n**(EURm)** **2016** **2017** **2018** **2019F** **2020F** **2021F**\nWater and Other Tariffs 27,1 26,7 21,9 24,5 28,2 30,5 Other Revenues 7,4 9,6 5,1 5,7 6,6 7,1 Transfers Grants Received 10,3 9,7 8,1 9,1 10,5 11,3\n**Total revenues** **44,8** **46,0** **35,1** **39,4** **45,3** **48,9**\n\nPersonnel Expenditure -7,6 -7,1 -5,2 -5,8 -6,7 -7,2 Other operating expenditure -18,7 -20,1 -17,4 -19,5 -22,5 -24,3\n\n**Operating balance** **18,5** **18,7** **12,5** **14,0** **16,1** **17,4**\n\nInterest paid -1,7 -1,1 -1,2 -2,0 -3,0 -5,0\n\n**Current balance** **16,8** **17,6** **11,3** **12,0** **13,1** **12,4**\nCapital Expenditure -20,8 -23,7 -26,1 -30,8 -31,5 -35,2\n**Surplus/(Deficit) Before Debt** **-4,1** **-6,1** **-14,9** **-18,9** **-18,4** **-22,9**\nNew Borrowing 0,0 12,0 29,5 22,0 34,0 27,0 Debt repayment -2,8 -9,4 -11,4 -14,0 -16,4 -17,0\n\n**Overall results for the year** **14,0** **20,2** **29,3** **20,0** **30,7** **22,4**\nDebt (EUR equivalent) 24,5 23,2 24,6 35,1 52,7 62,7 Source: Budget results and consultant cal **c** ulations\n\n**Table 3.7 Kayiseri SKI Budget Results**\n\n**Kayseri Water and Sewerage E**\n**Budget Results**\n**(EURm)**\nWater and Other Tariffs Other Revenues Transfers Grants Received\n**Total revenues**\n\n**ntity**\n\nPersonnel Expenditure Other operating expenditure\n\n**Operating balance**\n\nInterest paid\n\n**Current balance**\nCapital Expenditure\n**Surplus/(Deficit) Before Debt**\nNew Borrowing Debt repayment\n**Before Debt**\n**Overall results for the year**\nDebt (EUR equivalent) Source: Budget results and consult **a** 0,2691 0,2211 0,1652\n**2016** **2017** **2018** **2019F** **2020F** **2021F**\n47,3 44,1 38,2 42,8 49,2 53,2 1,5 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,8 2,0 14,2 14,3 11,8 13,2 15,1 16,4\n**63,0** **59,6** **51,4** **57,6** **66,2** **71,5**\n\n-11,6 -9,6 -8,0 -9,0 -10,3 -11,2\n\n-32,9 -29,5 -24,0 -26,9 -31,0 -33,4\n\n**18,4** **20,4** **19,3** **21,6** **24,9** **26,9**\n\n-1,5 -2,6 -2,1 -2,4 -3 -3,2\n\n**16,9** **17,9** **17,3** **19,2** **21,9** **23,7**\n-24,4 -25,7 -23,6 -27,8 -28,4 -31,8\n**-7,5** **-7,8** **-6,3** **-8,6** **-6,5** **-8,1**\n31,4 31,1 45,3 35 42,5 28\n-6,0 -7,4 -9,8 -10 -12 -14\n\n**17,9** **15,9** **29,2** **16,4** **24,0** **5,9**\n51,6 51,1 45,2 70 100 114 nt calculations Page 74 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Table 3.8 Osmaniye SKI Budget Results**\n\n**Municipality of Osmaniye**\n\n**Budget Realizations**\n\n**(EUR million)**\n\nTRY/EUR Taxes Transfers received Fees, fines and other operating revenue\n\n**Operating revenue**\n\n**ACTUAL** **ACTUAL** **ACTUAL** **PROJECT** **PROJECT** **PROJECT**\n\n**2016** **2017** **2018** **2019** **2020** **2021**\n\n0,2691 0,2211 0,1652 0,1652 0,1652 0,1652 4,1 3,4 4,1 4,5 5,1 5,7 29,6 29,1 34,0 36,7 41,1 46,0 7,8 7,1 6,8 7,8 8,7 9,4\n\n**41,5** **39,5** **44,9** **49,0** **54,9** **61,1**\n\nOperating expenditure -37,5 -32,6 -35,8 -38,7 -43,4 -48,6\n\n**Operating balance**\n\n**Operating Margin**\n\nFinancial revenue Interest paid\n\n**Current balance**\n\nCapital revenue Capital expenditure\n\n**4,0** **7,0** **9,0** **10,3** **11,5** **12,6**\n\n_**10%**_ _**18%**_ _**20%**_ _**21%**_ _**21%**_ _**21%**_ 0,6 0,6 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4\n\n-6,6 -4,0 -8,3 -6,6 -5,3 -5,7\n\n**-** **1,9** **3,5** **1,1** **4,1** **6,7** **7,3**\n\n0,8 5,3 0,1 0,2 1,8 2,7\n\n-7,2 -24,5 -17,7 -8,8 -14,4 -24,3\n\nCapital balance -6,4 -19,2 -17,6 -8,6 -12,6 -21,7\n\n**Surplus (deficit) before debt variation** **-8,4** **-15,7** **-16,5** **-4,5** **-5,9** **-14,4**\n\n28. Further detailed financial management assessments and creditworthiness analysis have been carried out for sub-borrowers Adana, Kahramanmaras and Kayseri water utilities along with municipalities of Kahramanmaras Metropolitan and Osmaniye. These have covered qualitative financial management areas as well as fiscal performance, expenditure coverage and indebtedness for the last five years and a projection period of five years.\n\n29. The capacity of Adana SKI to clear its debts using the operating surplus is 1.1 years in 2014 and increased to 2.2 years in 2018 with an average of 2 years over the period from 2014 to 2018. The number of years for the 2019 – 2021 budget period is expected to be less than a year. The capacity of Kahramanmaras SKI to clear its debts using the operating surplus is 3.5 years in 2014 and decreased to 0.9 years in 2018 with an average of\n1.2 years. The number of years for the 2019 – 2021 budget period is expected to be 1.5 years. The capacity\nof Kayseri SKI to clear its debts using the operating surplus is 1.4 years in 2014 and increased to 2.3 years in 2018 with an average of 2.1 years over the period from 2014 to 2018. The number of years for the 2019 – 2021 budget period is expected to be 1.96 on the average.\n\n30. Financial projections for the water utilities and municipalities have indicated that these entities will incur additional debt in the project implementation period with debt outstanding to current revenue peaking at 32 percent for Adana SKI, 45 percent for Kahramanmaras SKI, and 21 percent for Kayseri SKI. For the municipalities debt service burden will increase and self-funding ability from current balance will be stretched with debt service to current revenue reaching 43 percent for Kahramanmaras MM and 42 percent for Osmaniye. Sub-borrowers are forecast to maintain ability to meet financial commitments nonetheless remain exposed to adverse economic conditions.\n\nPage 75 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Table 3.9: Summary Economic Analysis Results**\n\nNPV of Total Costs NPV of Total Benefits E-IRR (%) (EUR) Adana Kozan Drinking Water and Transmission Line Adana Yedigöze Drinking Water Transmission and WWTP Kahramanmaras Ceyhan Basin (Andırın&Goksun) WWTP Kahramanmaras Northern Districts Integrated Solid Waste Management Kayseri WWTP Expansion Osmaniye Water and Sewerage Network\n\n**Conclusion**\n\nEconomic NPV 1,913,523 22,009,027 23,922,550 11.0\n\n-24,497,839\n\n170,146 3,832,084 10,918,408 65,019,026 44,492,053 7,134,821 26,118,978 20,369,926 7,956,038 19,994,214 7,304,967 29,951,062 30,955,334 72,975,064 6.4 10.4 11.5 25.6 23.8 31. The influx of Syrian guests to several Municipalities of Turkey over the past years has led to an increase in infrastructural requirements caused by increasing water demands, wastewater generation and solid waste generation. This has burdened Municipalities’ ability to provide effective level of service both to their local residents, as well as to the guest population.\n\n32. The entire project comprising various sub-projects by different implementing authorities will not produce commercially profitable results in each instance. Nonetheless, it will create viable results underpinned by net economic benefits to be accrued in total. With the implementation of the proposed projects, the capacity of the water entities (SKI) and their municipalities will be strengthened in terms of infrastructure and technical capacities, enabling them to better respond to the significant increase in demands for municipal services.\nThrough the technical assistance components, SKIs are also expected to prepare Performance Improvement Action Plans, which will, among other things focus on improving their performance efficiency and financial viability through appropriate actions targeting results such as improved revenue collection, cost reduction, non-revenue water reduction, etc.\n\nPage 76 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**ANNEX 4: Procurement**\n\n1. **Applicable regulations.** The World Bank Procurement Regulations for IPF Borrowers – July 2016 revised in November\n\n2017 and August 2018 (“Procurement Regulations”) will apply to the proposed Project. A General Procurement Notice will be published on the World Bank’s external website and United Nations Development Business online immediately after the project negotiations.\n\n2. **Anti-Corruption Guidelines** . The World Bank's “Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants”, dated October 15, 2006 and revised in January 2011 and as of July 1, 2016 (Anti-Corruption Guidelines)” will apply to the proposed Project.\n\n3. **Project Procurement Strategy for Development (PPSD).** The Procurement Regulations requires the Borrower to develop a PPSD for the Project. Since ILBANK and targeted municipalities are considered urgent need of assistance described under paragraph 12 of OP10.00, a simplified Project Procurement Strategy for Development (PPSD) a has been prepared by ILBANK. The draft PPSD describes how procurement activities will support project operations for the achievement of the PDOs and deliver value for money. The PPSD is linked to the overall project implementation strategy by ensuring proper sequencing of procurement activities. It provides information on institutional arrangements for procurement, roles and responsibilities, appropriate procurement methods, procurement duediligence, and other requirements needed for carrying out procurement. The PPSD also includes a detailed description of the procurement capacity needed by the executing agencies for carrying out procurement with specific focus on managing contract implementation, governance structure, and accountability framework. In addition, PPSD is supported with a market research and analysis assesses market-related risks and opportunities that will affect the preferred procurement approach to market strategy.\n\n4. PPSD confirmed that the selection of “Design Review and Supervision Consultant(s)” are located as “ **strategic**\n\n**security** ” procurement in the supply positioning matrix. It is envisaged that these consultants will support ILBANK\n(PMU)/municipalities for the preparation of the bidding documents for the infrastructure investments, and therefore, consultants’ timely input is very critical for the initiation of the relevant procurements planned in the procurement plan. Considering the limited time for the implementation project and urgent need of the services, PPSD proposed to use “consultant’s qualification-based selection” method in the procurement of the six consultant’s contracts in line with the guidance on fit-for-purpose principle. Accordingly, use of higher thresholds proposed for the “consultant’s qualification-based selection” method. It was envisaged that the proposed approach will accelerate the selection of “Design Review and Supervision Consultant(s)” and will support to deliver the project development objectives. The selected consultant will also provide services to relevant municipalities/utilities for the quality assurance of the works and timely completion on the contracts within their original contract prices.\n\n5. In the selection of six “Design Review and Supervision Contract(s)”, a streamlined procedure of single simultaneous international advertisement has been foreseen to collect the interests of the consultants. The firms with best qualifications and relevant experience determined, and based on their capacity and interest, eligible firms will be invited to submit their technical and financial proposals for the relevant contracts. In order to mitigate risks attributable to the perception of integrity matters, PPSD proposed ILBANK to engage independent Probity Assurance Providers to be present during the contract negotiation stages of the relevant contracts.\n\n6. PPSD discussed that contracting of individuals in accordance with the Procurement Regulations will give flexibility in decision making to the project implementation teams in ILBANK and in the beneficiary municipalities in addition to Page 77 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) maintaining uniformity in the followed selection procedures under the project. Therefore, PPSD proposed to hire the individual experts required for ILBANK PMU and municipal project implementation units in accordance with the individual consultant selection procedures as specified in the Procurement Regulations. These include but not limited to Procurement Specialist, Contract Management Consultant, Financial Management Specialist, Environmental Specialist, Social Specialist, Monitoring and Evaluation Expert and Communication Specialist.\n\n7. The PPSD further analyzed the risks against the size of the proposed infrastructure contracts and thus all works procurements were positioned as “ **strategic critical** ” in the supply positioning matrix. And thus, the procurements of these contracts were packaged carefully considering the outcome of the market sounding i.e. availability of the capable contractors in the market who may respond to the ILBANK needs. As a conclusion, PPSD proposed to use National Procurement Procedures as specified in the Procurement Regulations by increasing the thresholds normally used in Turkey for similar contracts. The market sounding concluded that there are more than 50 national firms in each of the water, waste-water and solid waste sectors who may be qualified alone or in association with others for the proposed contracts. Also, it has been observed in the procurements of Bank financed MSP-I, MSP-II and SCP projects that the interest of the foreign bidders was very limited especially in city water and wastewater network construction works.\n\n8. **Procurement Plan and Procurement Tracking.** The Procurement Regulations require the Borrower to use the Bank’s Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP) online procurement tracking tool to prepare, clear and update its procurement plans, and conduct all procurement transactions. ILBANK will create the procurement plan through STEP prior to initiating any procurement. The PPSD and the underlying Procurement Plan will be updated at least annually or as required to reflect actual project implementation needs. Only ILBANK will be given STEP access in the Project portal to safeguard confidentiality of the contract information recorded by different municipalities/utilities. All the procurement related complaints will be recorded in the STEP complaint module by ILBANK.\n\n9. The contracts agreed by the Bank for financing and included in the approved procurement plan are listed in Table 4.1 below:\n\n**Table 4.1: Contracts Agreed by the Bank**\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Contract**\n**Completion**\n**Date (including**\n**defects liability**\n\n**period)**\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Contract**\n\n**Signing**\n\n**Date**\n\n4-Jan-21 20-Dec-23 1-Feb-21 17-Jan-24 Page 78 of 94\n\n**Activity**\n**Description**\n\nConstruction of Kozan İmamoğlu Yedigöze Water Transmission Line Construction of Yedigöze Water Treatment Plant\n\n**Reference**\n\n**No.**\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Amount**\n**(in EUR) (*)**\n\nIBRD 21,850,000 Loan IBRD 13,150,000 Loan RFB – Single ADANA-W1 Works Stage RFB – Single ADANA-W2 Works Stage\n\n**Market**\n**Approach**\n\nOpen National Procurement Procedure (NPP) Open National Procurement Procedure (NPP)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Contract**\n**Completion**\n**Date (including**\n**defects liability**\n\n**period)**\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Contract**\n\n**Signing**\n\n**Date**\n\n**Activity**\n**Description**\n\nConstruction of Kozan Water Network Project and Pınargözü Transmission Line Construction of Kahramanmaraş Northern Districts Integrated Solid Waste Project Construction of Elbistan Water Network Project Construction of Elbistan Water Transmission Line\n\n**Reference**\n\n**No.**\n\nRFB – Single ADANA-W3 Works Stage\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Amount**\n**(in EUR) (*)**\n\n28,070,000 EU Grant 14,000,000 EU Grant 8,000,000 EU Grant IBRD 25,000,000 Loan IBRD 17,000,000 Loan RFB – Single KMARAS-W1 Works Stage RFB – Single KMARAS-W2 Works Stage RFB – Single KMARAS-W3 Works Stage\n\n**Market**\n**Approach**\n\nOpen National Procurement Procedure (NPP) Open National Procurement Procedure (NPP) Open National Procurement Procedure (NPP) Open National Procurement Procedure (NPP) 1-Mar-21 14-Feb-24 7-Feb-21 19-Sep-24 14-Jul-21 25-Dec-24 15-May-21 26-Sep-24 Kahramanmaraş (Centrum) Water Supply and Sewerage and Stormwater Project - West Part (Lot 1) RFB – Single KMARAS-W4 Works Open National Procurement KMARAS-W4 Works Procurement 7-Feb-21 23-Jan-24 Kahramanmaraş Stage Procedure (Centrum) Water (NPP) Supply and Sewerage and 18,800,000 EU Grant Stormwater Project - East Part (Lot 2) Stage Procedure (NPP) 18,800,000 EU Grant Construction of Ceyhan Basin Wastewater Treatment Plants (Goksun & Ekinozu) Construction of Ceyhan Basin Wastewater Treatment Plants (Caglayancerit & Andirin) Construction of Kayseri Wastewater Treatment Plant RFB – Single KMARAS-W5 Works Stage 7-Mar-21 25-Feb-23 7-Mar-21 25-Feb-23 12-Jul-21 26-Jun-24 Page 79 of 94 RFB – Single KMARAS-W6 Works Stage RFB – Single KAYSERİ-W1 Works Stage Open National Procurement Procedure (NPP) Open National Procurement Procedure (NPP) Open National Procurement Procedure IBRD 5,500,000 Loan 2,900,000 EU Grant 12,500,000 EU Grant", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Contract**\n**Completion**\n**Date (including**\n**defects liability**\n\n**period)**\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Contract**\n\n**Signing**\n\n**Date**\n\n**Activity**\n**Description**\n\n**Reference**\n\n**No.**\n\n**Market**\n**Approach**\n\n(Phase 1) (Lot 1) (NPP) Construction of Kayseri Wastewater Treatment Plant (Phase 2) (Lot 2)\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Amount**\n**(in EUR) (*)**\n\nIBRD 12,500,000 Loan 4,710,000 EU Grant 3,900,000 EU Grant 4,560,000 EU Grant IBRD 27,650,000 Loan Construction of Akşehir Water Supply Project Construction of Ilgin Wastewater Treatment Plant Construction of Cumra Wastewater Treatment Plant RFB – Single KONYA-W1 Works Stage RFB – Single KONYA-W2 Works Stage RFB – Single KONYA-W3 Works Stage Open National Procurement Procedure (NPP) Open National Procurement Procedure (NPP) Open National Procurement Procedure (NPP) 4-Apr-21 25-Mar-23 4-Apr-21 19-Mar-24 4-Apr-21 19-Mar-24 Construction of Osmaniye (Centrum) Water Supply and Sewerage and Stormwater Project - West Part (Lot 1) OSMANİYE RFB – Single Works W1 Stage Open National Procurement Procedure Works Procurement 6-Mar-21 23-Aug-23 Construction of W1 Stage Procedure Osmaniye (NPP) (Centrum) Water Supply and 29,910,000 EU Grant Sewerage and Stormwater Project - East Part (Lot 2) Stage (NPP) 29,910,000 EU Grant Minor Works for Incidental Infrastructure Investments (Mobile toilets, small water and sewerage network/s, septic tanks and etc.) (Multiple Contracts) 1,000,000 MW 1, 2.... Works RFQ National EU Grant TBD TBD Page 80 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Contract**\n**Completion**\n**Date (including**\n**defects liability**\n\n**period)**\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Contract**\n\n**Signing**\n\n**Date**\n\n14-Jul-21 12-Oct-21 14-Jul-21 12-Oct-21\n\n**Activity**\n**Description**\n\nKahramanmaraş Northern Districts Integrated Solid Waste Project Vehicle Supply Kahramanmaraş Northern Districts Integrated Solid Waste Project Container Supply Procurement of Video Conference System/s for ILBANK HQs and Regional Directorates (Multiple Contracts) Review of Existing Designs, Preparation of Bidding Documents and Construction Supervision Services Review of Existing Designs, Preparation of Bidding Documents and Construction Supervision Services Review of Existing Designs, Preparation of Bidding Documents and Construction Supervision Services Review of Existing Designs, Preparation of Bidding Documents and Construction Supervision Services\n\n**Reference**\n\n**No.**\n\nRFB – Single KMARAS-G1 Goods Stage KMARAS-C2 1,800,000 3-Aug-20 15-Jan-24 KAY-C1 1,450,000 3-Aug-20 10-Dec-24 Page 81 of 94\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Amount**\n**(in EUR) (*)**\n\n2,000,000 EU Grant 1,000,000 EU Grant RFB – Single KMARAS-G2 Goods Stage\n\n**Market**\n**Approach**\n\nOpen National Procurement Procedure (NPP) Open National Procurement Procedure (NPP) 1,325,000 ILBANK G1 Goods RFQ National IBRD Loan 15-Sep-20 9-Nov-21 ADANA-C1 2,000,000 13-Jul-20 23-Feb-24 KMARAS-C1 2,250,000 3-Aug-20 10-Dec-24 CS CQS International IBRD Loan", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Contract**\n**Completion**\n**Date (including**\n**defects liability**\n\n**period)**\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Contract**\n\n**Signing**\n\n**Date**\n\n**Activity**\n**Description**\n\nReview of Existing Designs, Preparation of Bidding Documents and Construction Supervision Services Review of Existing Designs, Preparation of Bidding Documents and Construction Supervision Services Project Visual Design and Social Media Management\n\n**Reference**\n\n**No.**\n\n**Market**\n**Approach**\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Amount**\n**(in EUR) (*)**\n\nKON-C1 1,000,000 5-Oct-20 18-Mar-24 OSMANİYE 1,750,000 21-Sep-20 6-Sep-23 C1 ILBANK C1 CS CQS National 120,000 EU Grant Public Awareness ILBANK C2 CS CQS National 300,000 EU Grant Campaign Individual consultants (in the fields of procurement, finance, technical and environment etc.) and Probity Assurance Providers for ILBANK, Municipalities and Utilities (Multiple Contracts) Project Printed Materials Production Producing the Project Visual Production & Materials ILBANK C3, National CS INDV C4.........\n\n780,000 EU Grant 7-Dec-20 27-Mar-23 7-Dec-20 1-Apr-22\n\n-\n\n24-Jan-21 24-Apr-21 24-Jan-21 24-Apr-21 Page 82 of 94 ILBANK NCS 1 NCS RFQ National 40,000 EU Grant ILBANK NCS 2 NCS RFQ National 150,000 EU Grant", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Contract**\n**Completion**\n**Date (including**\n**defects liability**\n\n**period)**\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Contract**\n\n**Signing**\n\n**Date**\n\n**Activity**\n**Description**\n\nLogistical & Organizational Services for Capacity Building Activities for ILBANK and Final Beneficiaries (Workshops, seminars, symposiums, and trainings); and citizen satisfaction, baseline and endline surveys (Multiple Contracts) Logistical & Organizational Services for Capacity Building Activities for ILBANK (Multiple Contracts) Logistical & Organizational Services for Project Opening/Mid Term//Closing Events and etc.\n(Multiple Contracts)\n\n**Reference**\n\n**No.**\n\n**Market**\n**Approach**\n\n**Estimated**\n\n**Amount**\n**(in EUR) (*)**\n\nILBANK NCS 3 NCS RFQ National 370,000 EU Grant IBRD ILBANK NCS 4 NCS RFQ National 630,000 Loan ILBANK NCS 5 NCS RFQ National 125,000 EU Grant\n\n-\n\n-\n\n-\n\n(*) VAT included in Loan financing 10. **Advance Procurement.** Procurement Regulations Paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 (Advance Contracting and Retroactive Financing) permits that the Borrower may wish to proceed with the procurement process before signing of the Legal Agreement. In such cases, if the eventual contracts are to be eligible for Bank financing the procurement procedures, including advertising, shall be consistent with Sections I, II and III of the Procurement Regulations which cover the _Bank’s Core Procurement Principles of economy, efficiency, transparency, fairness, fit-for purpose, value-for-money_ _and integrity._ With this understanding, ILBANK will initiate the selection of the PIU consultants and design review and supervision consultants’ selection upon publication of the General Procurement Notice in the UN Development Business online.\n\n11. **Procurement Methods and Standard Procurement Documents.** While comprehensive selection methods and use of Bank’s Standard Procurement Documents will be applicable, due to emergency response nature of the project, arrangements will be used in the project procurements. Higher thresholds will be used for the national streamlined procurement procedures and simple selection procedures will apply for the selection consultants as specified in the Page 83 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) approved procurement plan. Determined thresholds and selection methods will be reviewed by the Bank during the project supervisions and/or when the Bank decides and will be updated as appropriate.\n\n12. **National Procurement Procedures.** When approaching the national market, as agreed in the Procurement Plan, Turkey's national procurement procedures will be used by ILBANK in accordance with the provisions in paragraphs 3.21-3.23; 3.30; 3.32; 5.3; 5.4; 5.5 and 5.7(a) of the Procurement Regulations. In such procurements, bidding documents agreed by the Bank in Turkish language including mandatory provisions specified in the procurement plan will be used.\n\n13. **Procurement Risk Assessment.** The World Bank has conducted a procurement assessment for the project, with a focus on ILBANK in terms of: (i) procurement regulatory framework and management capability; (ii) integrity and oversight; (iii) procurement process and market readiness; and (iv) procurement complexity. The assessment concludes that: (a) applicable procurement policies and the regulatory system are designed broadly to meet Core Procurement Principles of value for money, economy, efficiency, effectiveness, integrity, transparency and fairness and accountability; (b) ILBANK has a clear system of accountability with clearly defined responsibilities and delegation of authority on who has control of procurement decisions; (c) there is a clear identified target market for all procurements; and (d) ILBANK/Municipalities effectively manages contracts to ensure delivery as per the contract conditions. The assessment is recorded in the Procurement Risk Assessment and Management System of the Bank.\n\n14. ILBANK will undertake the overall responsibility of the project implementation and coordination through its Project Management Unit (PMU) located under the International Relations Department. PMU was originally established in 2005 for the Bank financed MSP-I project and has been continuously operational throughout MSP-II, SCP-I, SCP-II, and SCP-II additional financing projects. Hence, PMU is experienced in Bank financed projects and familiar with World Bank procurement procedures and contract management. All the procurements under the proposed project will be conducted by ILBANK/PMU centrally. The technical requirements in the selection documents will be agreed by the municipalities/utilities. The beneficiary municipalities/utilities will attend the bid evaluation committees and sign the respective contracts.\n\n15. ILBANK PMU is linked to three separate units namely Contract Management Unit, Financial Management Unit and Technical Management Unit. The procurement management is under the responsibility of the Contract Management Unit. Considering fast track urgent response nature of the project, and heavy work load of existing PMU staff due to other Bank financed SCP-I, SCP-II and SCP-II additional financing projects, and also from projects of other IFIs, a dedicated procurement team will be established under the PMU with minimum 2 procurement experts who are familiar with the Bank procurement procedures. This dedicated procurement team (FRIT procurement team) will be supported by several specialized departments within ILBANK including Investment Coordination Department and Technical Management Team. The FRIT procurement team will be mainly responsible for the implementation and coordination of the procurement activities within the scope of the project. In case of need, Investment Coordination Department with vast experience in procurement under the public procurement procedures will bring additional capacity to the FRIT procurement team. When needed, PMU will be supported by Project Department responsible for review and approval of feasibility studies under the project. In addition, Infrastructure Implementation Department will provide support to the review of technical specifications; and several other administrative departments such as Accounting and Financial Affairs, IT, and Banking Services will be ready provide support when needed.\n\n16. The beneficiary municipalities/utilities have certain technical and procurement capacity to operate their regular services with varying staff capacity depends on the size of the city. For example, while there are 78 technical and Page 84 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Procurement Risk Assessment and Management System", "confidence": 0.7942039966583252}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) procurement staff exists in Osmaniye, similar staff number reaches to 554 in KOSKA (Konya Water and Wastewater Utility) including 433 technicians and 5 procurement experts. Some of the municipalities have experience to work with IFIs in their investment projects financing but in most of the cases experienced staff may not be available for the proposed project. Considering limited implementation duration of the project, the participating municipalities/utilities will establish dedicated project implementation units comprised of procurement and technical experts. These experts will be involved in the selection process of the design review and supervision consultants, works contractors, good suppliers and management of concluded contracts. The participating municipalities/utilities will hire experts experienced in the procurement and management of the contracts in the Bank financed projects, if such staff already not exist in their teams.\n\n17. Given the emergency nature of the project and limited implementation time; and taking into account the existing work load of ILBANK; and procurement and contract management capacity of beneficiary municipalities/utilities; the overall procurement risk for the project is assessed as “substantial”. The risk rating can be lowered to “Moderate” when the agreed actions in Table 4.2 below have been put in place. The assessment will be recorded in the Procurement Risk Assessment and Management System of the Bank.\n\n**Table 4.2: Identified Risks and Agreed Action Plan**\n**Action**\n**Identified Risk** **Mitigation Measure** **Responsible Party** **Time Frame**\n**No.**\n\nThroughout the ILBANK project procurement process.\n\nPage 85 of 94\n\n1.\n\n2.\n\nILBANK has been implementing three World Bank financed projects and the projects financed by other IFIs simultaneously. The teams in the PMU are overloaded. PMU may not be able to meet the procurement deadlines.\n\nProject implementation duration is relatively short and beneficiary municipalities has no WB procurement experience. If the procurement schedules are not met the contracts may not be completed on time. To accelerate the project implementation all the procurements will be conducted centrally by ILBANK.\nThis arrangement requires parallel implementation of procurement activities including establishment A dedicated PMU team established to implement the project activities and at least 2 experienced procurement specialists will be employed in this unit.\n\nILBANK PMU will be supported by the ILBANK’s Investment Coordination Department, as needed.\n\nILBANK TORs will be prepared by ILBANK and the positions will be advertised in advance before the project effectiveness.\n\nContracts will be signed within first month after the project effectiveness.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Procurement Risk Assessment and Management System", "confidence": 0.8512152433395386}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Action**\n**Identified Risk** **Mitigation Measure** **Responsible Party** **Time Frame**\n**No.**\n\nof various bid evaluation committees.\n\nBeneficiary municipalities/utilities will employ a staff knowledgeable in procurement and contract implementation.\n\nThis staff will be trained by PMU Procurement Specialists.\n\nILBANK to engage independent probity assurance providers in the contract negotiations.\n\nContracts will be signed within first month after the project effectiveness.\n\nSelection of independent probity assurance providers will be completed before inviting the consultants to submit their technical and financial proposals.\n\n3.\n\n4.\n\n5.\n\n6.\n\n7.\n\nBeneficiary municipalities/ utilities staff are unfamiliar with the World Bank Procurement Regulations and contract provisions. It may cause misinterpretation of procurement provisions and contract implementations.\n\nStakeholder perception on the integrity of the contract negotiation process in CQS selection.\n\nDifferentiation of procurement implementations among the implementation entities. It may create unnecessary questions from the procurement stakeholders.\n\nIncomplete environmental and social safeguard studies may delay commencement of the contract implementation.\n\nMisinterpretation of the Procurement Regulations and terms and conditions of the contracts. It may cause noncompliance and also time and cost overruns in the contract implementation.\n\nIf applicable, all safeguard studies will be completed before signing of the contracts.\n\nWork closely with World Bank Procurement Specialist.\n\nILBANK/ Municipalities/Utilities ILBANK Throughout the ILBANK/PMU Project.\n\nThroughout the ILBANK Project.\n\nDevelop a Project Before the Project ILBANK Operations Manual. effectiveness.\n\n18. **Procurement supervision frequency.** The World Bank will review the procurement arrangements performed by the implementing agencies, including contract packaging, applicable procedures, and the scheduling of the procurement processes, for their conformity with the Legal Agreement. Those procurements did not have ex-ante due diligence by the World Bank will be subject to ex-post due diligence on a sampling basis in accordance with the procedures set forth in Paragraph 4 of the Annex II to the Procurement Regulations. A post review of the procurement documents Page 86 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) will normally be undertaken annually during the World Bank’s supervision mission, or the World Bank may request to review any particular contract at any time. In such cases, the PMUs shall provide the World Bank the relevant documentation for its review.\n\n19. **Complaint review.** The procurement complaints other than covered under Annex III of the Procurement Regulations are to be handled by the ILBANK in accordance with the procedures agreed by the Bank and stipulated in the POM.\nImmediately upon received, the complaints will be recorded in the STEP complaint module by PMU. ILBANK will not proceed with the next stage/phase of the procurement process, including with awarding a contract without satisfactory resolution of the complaint(s).\n\n20. **Operational costs** will not be considered under procurement implementation which could be the incremental expenses, including office supplies, vehicles operation and maintenance cost, maintenance of equipment, communication costs, rental expenses, utilities expenses, consumables, transport and accommodation, per diem, cost for procurement advertisements, and salaries of locally contracted support staff.\n\nPage 87 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**ANNEX 5: Communications and Visibility Plan**\n\n1. A project Communications and Visibility Plan will be developed by the Project Management Unit (PMU) in\n\nİlBank for inclusion in the Project Operations Manual (POM), and the EU Delegation to Turkey will be consulted on it in advance, ahead of project launch. The following annex presents preliminary guidelines, principles, and indicative objectives/activities for communications efforts under the project.\n\n2. The final plan will be aligned with the European Union Communications and Visibility Manual for External Actions [60] as well as FRiT Facility Visibility Guidelines. [61] Communications and visibility activities under the project will be implemented in coordination with the EU Delegation in Turkey, [62] including visibility requirements. [63]\n\n**5.1 Initial Project Communications Objectives**\n\n3. The objectives of communications activities are to: help manage expectations and mitigate against local political and governance risks; facilitate outreach and engagement of refugees and host communities in project activities; and share results and disseminate project lessons learned with key audiences for broader impact. Activities will also seek to inform and communicate to project beneficiaries and project stakeholders, the EU’s financial contribution to support refugees and host communities in Turkey.\n\n4. **Indicative objectives and messages for each target group.** The Communications and Visibility activities set out in this Plan will target the following groups of beneficiaries:\n\n[60 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/visibility/documents/ communication_and_visibility_manual_en.pdf.](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/visibility/documents/%20communication_and_visibility_manual_en.pdf) 60 Communications and Visibility Manual for EU External Actions Projects funded under the EU Facility for Refugees in\n[TurkeyVisibilityGuidelines_May2017_FRIT_EN_20170605_Final.docx http://avrupa.info.tr/eu-funding-in-turkey/visibility-guidelines.html.](http://avrupa.info.tr/eu-funding-in-turkey/visibility-guidelines.html) 60 The EU Delegation will be informed about the events at least 10 days prior to allow for participation. Designs of all visibility materials, publications, promotional items, and videos will be submitted to the EU Delegation for review and approval before production.\n60 The EU-Turkey joint logo should be accompanied by the following text in English, Turkish, and Arabic (and any other language where needed).\n“This project is funded by the European Union”. Illustrations will be provided in the POM. The materials, items for beneficiary usage, and office supplies to be used by the partners and procured under EU funds should display the EU flag accompanied by the following text in English, Turkish, and Arabic (and any other language where needed): “Funded by the European Union.” Illustrations will be provided in the POM. The following disclaimer will be used in relevant materials: “This leaflet/brochure/video... has been produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its content is the sole responsibility of the Ministry of Industry and Technology and Turkish Development Agencies and may not reflect the views of the European Union.” Page 88 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Table 5.1 Indicative Objectives for Communications and Visibility Plan**\n**Target Group** **Indicative Objectives**\n**Overall population** **including both**\n**refugees and host**\n**community members** and solid waste facilities.\n**living in the 5** **provinces** decision-making mechanisms.\n\n**Overall population** - To raise awareness of the residing population including both refugees and host\n**including both** community members regularly on project progress and results, particularly on\n**refugees and host** interventions related to construction and rehabilitation works for water, sanitation\n**community members** and solid waste facilities.\n**living in the 5** - To promote participation to the public meetings to integrate communities into\n**provinces** decision-making mechanisms.\n\n- To make improvements visible for communities by acknowledging the work done\nand role of project partners in making it.\n\n- To inform communities well in advance about any type of temporary\nenvironmental impacts such as wastewater discharge, generation of dust and noise during construction and operation.\n**İlBank PIU’s,** - To launch a series of information meetings in the 5 provinces to engage PIU’s,\n**municipalities, SKI’s** municipalities, SKI’s and local stakeholders into dialogue on the project objectives\n**and local** and future activities.\n**stakeholders** - To inform and raise awareness of PIU’s municipalities, SKI’s and local stakeholders\n\n**İlBank PIU’s,** - To launch a series of information meetings in the 5 provinces to engage PIU’s,\n**municipalities, SKI’s** municipalities, SKI’s and local stakeholders into dialogue on the project objectives\n**and local** and future activities.\n**stakeholders** - To inform and raise awareness of PIU’s municipalities, SKI’s and local stakeholders\n\non the issues about sustainability, resource efficiency, climate change mainstreaming, gender and integrated approaches.\n\n- To update PIU’s, municipalities, SKI’s and local stakeholders about the project\nprogress and results regularly.\n**Media, national** - Increase awareness on the project’s progress and results; particularly promoting\n**authorities, and** project’s impact on:\n**communities/general** - Environment (decreased water loss, quality discharged water, closure of existing\n**public** dumpsites, increased energy efficiency, reduced non-revenue water...) and\n\n**Media, national** - Increase awareness on the project’s progress and results; particularly promoting\n**authorities, and** project’s impact on:\n**communities/general** - Environment (decreased water loss, quality discharged water, closure of existing\n**public** dumpsites, increased energy efficiency, reduced non-revenue water...) and\n\n- People’s everyday lives (improved access to safely managed water, improved\nservice delivery and related health) as a result of services provided to overall population (host population and refugees).\n\n**Indicative project implementation activities**\n\n_**(a)**_ _**Launch a series of information meetings in 5 provinces to engage PIU’s, municipalities, SKI’s and local**_ _**stakeholders into dialogue on the project objectives and roadmap.**_ 5. To increase the ownership among municipalities and build the bridges between project implementation units and management teams, it is important to organize a series of meetings in the beginning of project implementation. The meetings will set the ground for understanding the project objectives, agreeing collectively on a roadmap, addressing potential challenges on the way ahead. It will also become an effective platform to enable two-way communication where municipalities can raise operational bottlenecks during implementation. Close involvement of municipalities, sewerage utilities and other stakeholders to the entire process is key, particularly during strategic decision-making processes in which accurate background data and information is needed for effective project execution.\n\n**(b)** _**Raise awareness of the residing population regularly on project progress and results.**_\n\n6. The communities residing in selected provinces will benefit from the improved water, sanitation and solid Page 89 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) waste facilities at the end of the project. This will require a set of actions aiming at informing the residents at critical points where they will be aware on: (i) what happens in their neighborhood; (ii) why it is needed; (iii) when the construction work will start and how long it will take to complete it; and (iv) by whom it is led.\n\n7. Main project information and critical dates need to be shared in public information meetings and other online platforms (website and social media of municipalities, NGOs, governorate). In addition to that, construction parapets are functional and visible spaces to illustrate the planned work and inform community in the neighborhood about the expected results and start/end dates of operational work. Providing timely, relevant and life-enhancing information about the work carried out under the project would address some risks and underlying vulnerabilities. It would also avoid negative reactions rooting from ongoing construction and its temporary environmental impacts. Stressing the benefits (eg: “X amount of water will be saved with the rehabilitation of the pipelines.”) could be accompanied to the key project information content in the signboards surrounding the construction area.\n\n8. One way to address misinformation risks could be achieved by involving community leaders of affected groups and maintain a continuous dialogue with them via public information meetings on their questions and concerns. Updated FAQ sheets in print and visual format would be useful to reach target communities via social media, SMS, hand-outs and videos. It is also crucial to acknowledge project’s contribution once the operation work is completed in constructed or rehabilitated facilities via signboards and temporary outdoor ads. (eg: “With this water treatment plant, x amount of water was treated and provided as safe drinking water to X number of households in the municipality).\n\n_**(c)**_ _**Increase awareness on the project’s results; particularly promoting project’s impact on environment and**_ _**people’s everyday lives.**_ 9. Project opening and closing ceremonies, local information meetings, on-site ceremonies of completed works, workshops and trainings will be timely opportunities to inform public and local actors on the project results and progress. These events, as well as dissemination materials including posters, brochures, reports, training materials and all other project documents will be prepared in line with EU visibility guidelines. Any refurbishment, equipment and technology infrastructure will acknowledge EU’s financial support, providing an explanation on project’s contribution to water, wastewater and solid waste infrastructure in the provinces and EU’s financial support on construction sites such as new water reservoirs, pressure release chambers, rehabilitated pipelines, water reservoirs and pumping stations.\n\n10. News releases, event announcements, human-interest stories, audio-visual materials will be published on websites of municipalities and/or separate project website with clear acknowledgment of EU contributions.\nPress releases and success stories marking project achievements, updates and progress will be disseminated through local and national media outlets. Exclusive interviews and op-eds will be facilitated through the local and national TV/radio networks.\n\n11. For audio-visual materials, it would be possible to build a narrative around a group of people who have experienced a positive change that comes with the improved conditions in water facilities. Project’s impact in the areas of sanitation, provision of drinking water, waste water and solid waste management will be told through human stories. The stories could be coupled with before/after conditions of a project site (e.g: rehabilitated dumpsite) or improved access of a Turkish/refugee household to drinkable water etc.\n\nPage 90 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996) 12. It is key to have an online platform where all project information and audio-visual documents are shared and displayed for public and project stakeholders. This could be achieved either through launching a project website or creating project-dedicated webpages under each municipality website. Social media accounts of municipalities and their established connections (number of followers) will help reach target audience effectively and quickly.\n\n**Table 5.2 Indicative budget for Communications and Visibility activities**\n**Indicative** **Indicative Scope/Tools**\n**Activity**\n\n**Indicative** **Indicative Scope/Tools** **Indicative**\n**Activity** **Budget**\n\n**(Euro)**\n**Launch a series** - 5 provinces – ILBANK PIU’s, municipalities, SKI’s and local stakeholders 185,000\n**of information** - Local information meetings to facilitate information exchange ideas among local\n**campaigns in** stakeholders and municipalities.\n**the 5 provinces**\n\n185,000\n\n**Awareness-**\n**raising events**\n**for both host**\n**community and**\n**refugee**\n**population on**\n**project**\n**progress and**\n**results**\n\n**Increase**\n**awareness on**\n\n- 5 provinces – ILBANK PIU’s, municipalities, SKI’s and local stakeholders\n\n- Local information meetings to facilitate information exchange ideas among local\nstakeholders and municipalities.\n\nIndicative communication tools:\n\n- Information brochures, leaflets and posters calling stakeholders to take urgent\naction and featuring project objectives and interventions while raising awareness on the themes such as climate change, sustainability, water availability, current environmental constraints and project’s action points to address them. (social media, printed and online dissemination)\n\n- Infographic posters that will illustrate where/why/how the interventions take\nplace.\n\n- Dissemination of information materials in municipalities, SKI’s and local governing\nbodies.\n\n- Utilizing existing media channels of municipalities to provide information about the\nproject (Periodicals of ILBANK, Union of Municipalities of Turkey, Belediye TV)\n\n- Project promotional materials targeting local stakeholders and municipalities to\nincrease their ownership\n\n- 5 provinces – broad outreach to host community and refugee population\n\n- Organize a series of public information meetings that bring together local\ncommunity members to engage them in dialogue.\n\nIndicative communication tools:\n\n- Printed materials to be disseminated in public information meetings on project’s\ninterventions\n\n- Active use of social media channels of municipalities and their established\ncommunication networks to promote participation of communities to the meetings.\n\n- Clear infographics/FAQ sheets illustrating when, why and what will happen in the\nneighborhood.\n\n- Construction parapets providing information about ongoing work and clear\nmessages.\n\n- SMS messages and activation of existing WhatsApp groups to inform people about\nupcoming project activities.\n\n- Signboards and outdoor ads on-site and in streets, buses, metro stations once the\nrehabilitation and construction works are completed.\n\n- 5 provinces – ILBANK PIU’s, municipalities, SKI’s and local stakeholders 250,000\n\nPage 91 of 94 300,000", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**Indicative**\n**Activity**\n\n**Indicative** **Indicative Scope/Tools** **Indicative**\n**Activity** **Budget**\n\n**(Euro)**\n**the project’s** - Organization of opening and closing ceremonies and on-site completion ceremony\n**results** of a major work item.\n\n**the project’s** - Organization of opening and closing ceremonies and on-site completion ceremony\n**results** of a major work item.\n\nIndicative communication tools:\n\n- Press releases on project progress, announcements, and results. TV and radio\ninterviews of representatives from municipalities, community leaders through local and national media networks. Op-eds and interviews on sectoral periodicals.\n\n- Infographic videos describing project contribution to energy and water efficiency.\n\n- Human-interest stories (video) that narrate the change in people’s lives and\nhouseholds living around an area rehabilitated by solid waste management.\n\n- Photo stories that illustrate before/after conditions of the project sites with stories\nfrom people living/working in the neighborhood.\n\n- Visibility materials displayed in events, workshops and meetings (rollups, flags,\nbackdrops, banners)\n\n- Effective use of webpages under Municipality websites/ standalone project\nwebsites and social media channels of the municipalities.\n**TOTAL** **EUR 735,000**\n\nPage 92 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**ANNEX 6: Team List**\n\n1. Sanyu Lutalo, Senior Water Supply and Sanitation Specialist, Team Leader\n\n2. Canan Yildiz, Infrastructure Specialist, Co-Team Leader 3. Lisa Lui, Lead Counsel 4. Joanna Mclean Masic, Senior Urban Specialist, Co-Team Leader 5. Salih Bugra Erdurmus, Senior Procurement Specialist 6. Salih Kemal Kalyoncu, Senior Procurement Specialist 7. Ayse Seda Aroymak, Senior Financial Management Specialist 8. Arzu Uraz Yavas, Social Development Specialist 9. Esra Arikan, Senior Environmental Specialist 10. Gulana Hajiyeva, Senior Environmental Specialist 11. Christian Borja-Vega, Senior Economist 12. Ahmet Kindap, Urban Development Specialist 13. Toyoko Kodama, Water Supply and Sanitation Specialist 14. Felipe Vicente Lazaro, Senior Dam Specialist 15. Verena Schaidreiter, Junior Professional Officer 16. Ntombie Z. Siwale, Operations Analyst 17. Sylvie Ngo-Bodog, Senior Program Assistant 18. Ulker Karamullaoglu, Program Assistant 19. Turda Ozmen, Financial and Economic Consultant 20. Emre Tokcaer, Technical Consultant 21. Burcu Ergin, Social Safeguards Consultant 22. Merve Ayse Kocabas Yurtkuran, Environmental Consultant 23. Ibrahim Sirer, Procurement Consultant 24. Tomris Oksar, Procurement Consultant 25. Ayse Ozge Bayram, Communications Consultant 26. Turgrul Cem Icten, Environmental Consultant Page 93 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**The World Bank**\nMunicipal Services Improvement Project in Refugee Affected Areas (P169996)\n\n**ANNEX 7: Project Map**\n\nPage 94 of 94", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "## **_sustainability_**\n\n_Article_\n# **Exploring Carbon Pricing in Developing Countries:** **A Macroeconomic Analysis in Ethiopia**\n\n\n**Andualem Telaye Mengistu** **[1]** **, Pablo Benitez** **[2]** **, Seneshaw Tamru** **[3]** **, Haileselassie Medhin** **[1,4,]** *** and**\n**Michael Toman** **[2]**\n\n\n1 Policy Studies Institute, 2479 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia\n2 World Bank, Washington, DC 20433, USA\n3 LICOS—Center for Institutions and Economic Performance, University of Leuven, 3000 Leuven, Belgium\n4 Environment for Development (EfD), University of Gothenburg, 40530 Gothenburg, Sweden\n\n***** Correspondence: haileselassie.medhin@gu.se\n\n\n\nReceived: 2 July 2019; Accepted: 8 August 2019; Published: 14 August 2019\n\n\n\n[���������](http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/16/4395?type=check_update&version=1)\n**[�������](http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/16/4395?type=check_update&version=1)**\n\n\n\n**Abstract:** This study uses a Computable General Equilibrium model to analyze policy scenarios for a\ncarbon tax on greenhouse gas emissions from petroleum fuels and kerosene in Ethiopia. The carbon\ntax starts at $5 per ton of carbon dioxide in 2018 and rises to $30 per ton in 2030; these rates are\ntranslated into taxes on the different energy types covered, depending on their carbon contents.\nDifferent scenarios examine the impacts with revenue recycling through a uniform sales tax reduction,\nreduction of labor income tax, reduction of business income tax, direct transfer back to households,\nand use by the government to reduce debt. Because petroleum fuels and kerosene are a relatively\nsmall part of the Ethiopian economy, the carbon tax has small impacts on overall economic activity and\ngreenhouse gas emissions. In proportional terms, however, the impact on greenhouse gas emissions\nfrom these energy sources is notable, depending on the recycling scenario. The assumed carbon tax\ntrajectory also can raise significant revenue—up to $800 million per year by 2030. The impacts on the\npoor through increased cost of living are not that large, since the share of the poor in total use of the\ntaxed energy types is small. In terms of induced income effects through employment changes, urban\nhouseholds tend to experience more impacts than rural households, but the results also depend on\nthe household skill level and the revenue recycling scenario.\n\n\n**Keywords:** carbon tax; Ethiopia; CGE model; distributional impacts\n\n\n**JEL Classification:** Q54; Q66; O44\n\n\n**1.** **Introduction**\n\n\nNationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) lay out the actions countries intend to take to limit\ngreenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) under the Paris Agreement at the 2015 Conference of Parties to the\nUN Framework Convention on Climate Change. A very large body of analytical work indicates that\nputting some kind of price on GHG emissions—“carbon pricing”—can be an effective tool for GHG\nmitigation, although practical experience with carbon pricing is still evolving [1]. The NDCs of more\nthan 90 countries refer to carbon pricing in one form or the other [2]. Carbon pricing also can yield\ncollateral benefits including air pollution reduction and efficiency-increasing fiscal restructuring. So far,\nhowever, carbon pricing has been applied almost exclusively in high- and middle-income countries.\nThis paper addresses that gap by examining the impacts of a carbon tax applied to petroleum\nfuels and kerosene in Ethiopia. The core objective is to get a quantitative estimate of the environmental,\neconomic, and distributional impacts of carbon taxes in Ethiopia. Implementing carbon pricing\npolicy, of course, requires a through political economy analysis and development effective institutional\n\n\n_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_ [, 4395; doi:10.3390/su11164395](http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11164395) [www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability](http://www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 2 of 21\n\n\napproaches that work for context in consideration. Our study should therefore be taken as a first but\ncrucial step for exploring the potential for carbon pricing in a developing-economy context.\nOver the past decade, the government of Ethiopia has prioritized low-carbon growth and poverty\nreduction. (Ethiopia also has taken several actions to better manage adverse impacts and risks of\nclimate change and variability [3,4]) For example, fossil fuel subsidies have been removed, with both\neconomic benefits and limited social impacts, since studies show that fossil fuel subsidies benefit\nmainly the richer segments of the population [5]. Ethiopia has laid out ambitious GHG mitigation\n[commitments in its NDC (The text of Ethiopia’s NDC can be accessed at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/](https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Ethiopia%20First/INDC-Ethiopia-100615.pdf)\n[ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Ethiopia%20First/INDC-Ethiopia-100615.pdf).](https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Ethiopia%20First/INDC-Ethiopia-100615.pdf) Those commitments\nin turn are based on its Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) Strategy [6]. Figure 1 summarizes the\napproach to national GHG mitigation in the CRGE Strategy. The country aims to limit its net annual\ngreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2030 to 145 Mt CO2e or lower, which would constitute a 255 Mt\nCO2e (64 percent) reduction from projected BAU emissions in that year. Ethiopia’s NDC commitments\nare _conditional_, in the sense that they depend on receipt of technological and financial support. Ethiopia\nhas estimated the need for US$7.5 billion in expenditures annually until 2030 on initiatives that will\ncontribute to GHG emissions reductions while also supporting economic advancement [6].\n\n\ntCo2.e per capita\n\n\n\nPower\n\n\nTransport\n\n\n\n**Emissions per year, Mt Co2e**\n\n\n185\n\n\n90\n\n\n75 ~~5~~\n40\n\n\n\n90\n\n\n\nAgriculture\n\n\nForestry\n\n\n130\n\n\n\n10\n20\n~~5~~\n\n\n\nIndustry\n\n\nOthers\n\n\n-64%\n\n\n145\n\n\nGreen\neconomy\n2030\n\n\n\n55\n\n\n\n70\n\n\n\n5\n5 55 10\n\n2030\n2010 BAU\n\n\n\n1.8 3.0 1.1\n\n\n**Figure 1.** The CRGE Strategy’ targes for Low-Carbon Development. Source: [6].\n\n\nTo assess the various impacts of carbon pricing in Ethiopia, we use a Computable General\nEquilibrium (CGE) model to analyze various policy scenarios using a carbon tax. We focus on\nscenarios that apply the carbon tax to petroleum fuels and kerosene, for reasons we explain below.\nMore specifically, we analyze the implication of a price that starts at $5 per ton of CO2 in 2018 and rises\nto $30 per ton in 2030. It is worth to note that direct emissions from electricity production in Ethiopia\nare minimal because of reliance on hydroelectricity. There are also efforts underway to introduce\nintermittent sources of renewable electricity, such as solar, whose costs have been declining significantly\nover time.\nThe policy scenarios differ in terms of what is done with the revenue generated through the carbon\ntax. Previous research shows that a carbon tax can raise considerable, and that the economic impacts of\na carbon tax depend significantly on what is done with that revenue. In particular, “recycling” revenue", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 3 of 21\n\n\nby cutting other taxes can soften negative effects of the carbon tax on overall economic activity and on\nthe distribution of income. Accordingly, we study the differences in impacts of the carbon tax with\nrevenue recycling through a uniform sales tax reduction, reduction of labor income tax, reduction of\nbusiness income tax, direct transfer back to households, and use by government to reduce debt.\nOne obvious question is the rationale for focusing on a carbon tax applied only to petroleum\nfuels and kerosene. GHG emissions from livestock and from land use and forest change, including\nunsustainable harvesting of fuelwood, represent 93 percent of Ethiopia’s national emissions (see Figure 2\nbelow). Petroleum fuels and kerosene, on the other hand, account for less than 6.5 percent of\nnational emissions.\n\n\n\nCarbon emission by source\n(in millions of tons)\n\n\n\nCarbon emission by source\n(in %)\n\n\n\nFuels Kerosene Firewood Livestock Forestry\n\n\n**Figure 2.** The sources of carbon emission in Ethiopia. Source: The livestock and fertilizer data are sourced\nfrom FAO (www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/GT). The forestry and firewood data are from the Environment,\nForests and Climate Change Commission (MEFCC) (Mefcc.gov.et/Ethiopia-forest-sector-ghg-emissions,\n2017). The data on fuels and kerosene are from the International Energy Agency (IEA) [(https:](https://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?country=Ethiopia&product=oil)\n[//www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?country=Ethiopia&product=oil).](https://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?country=Ethiopia&product=oil) Emission factors are\nfrom FAO [(http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data,](http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data) 2017b), and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate\n[Change (IPCC) (http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/vol4.html).](http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/vol4.html)\n\n\nA carbon tax to fossil fuels is easy to design and implement, based on the amounts of GHG emitted\nper unit of energy of the different fuels. Carbon taxes also are relatively easy to implement, since most\ncountries (including Ethiopia) already apply excise taxes to energy. Moreover, fuel taxes are less prone\nto problems of tax evasion than other forms of taxes [7,8]. In contrast, pricing carbon emissions that\noccur as a consequence of land-use change and agriculture is more difficult technically and politically,\nso we do not consider such options in this paper.\nIn principle, it would be possible to track forest removal on different patches of land and levy a fee\non the landholder based on an estimate of the resulting emissions. In practice this would be difficult\nto enforce, especially for land clearing in the informal sector on land without clear title. Similarly,\nit would be possible to tax extracted timber to the extent that the resulting loss of carbon sequestration\nwas not offset by replanting. However, calculating the net emissions from timber harvesting is quite\ncomplicated, especially if different land holdings have different rates of harvest and replanting. For this\nreason, the focus in mitigating GHG emissions from land clearing and forestry has been on “payment\nfor environmental services” initiatives like REDD, and in reducing other tax distortions that give\nadvantages to land clearing for agriculture [9]. Finally, while it would be possible to tax food products\nbased on relative GHG emissions (including methane emissions from beef cattle, and emissions based\non fertilizing practices), this too would give rise to technical and political problems. Nevertheless,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "livestock and fertilizer data", "confidence": 0.30114322900772095}, {"text": "forestry and firewood data", "confidence": 0.27756720781326294}, {"text": "data on fuels and kerosene", "confidence": 0.1626119762659073}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 4 of 21\n\n\nit is clear that for many countries in addition to Ethiopia, there is need for additional well-functioning\nincentive policies to curb emissions from sources other than fossil fuels. This remains an important\ntopic for further research.\nOne other important caveat concerns the CGE model used in this study for evaluating different\ncarbon tax policy options. A key finding in our analysis is that the impacts of the assumed carbon tax\non GDP and its growth are negative, though quite small, across the policy scenarios. The model we use\nis very much representative of current practice for this kind of analysis. Nevertheless, there are some\nimportant limitations of the model for capturing fully the impacts of a carbon tax. Specifically, the model\ndoes not explicitly differentiate between employment and output from informal and formal sectors of\nthe economy. The model also does not include the possibility of lasting structural unemployment for\npart of the labor force.\nIncorporating these factors can in some cases reduce or even eliminate the negative GDP effects of\na carbon tax. However, the methods for accomplishing this are still very much a work in progress.\nWe return to these points in the concluding section of the paper.\nIn Section 2 of the paper we provide additional information about the Ethiopian economy and its\nsources of GHG emissions. Section 3 through Section 5 describe the CGE model, the policy scenarios,\nand the results of the simulation analyses. Concluding remarks are in Section 6.\n\n\n**2.** **The Structure of the Ethiopian Economy and Its Carbon Emissions**\n\n\nThe Ethiopian economy has been largely agricultural for several decades. The last two decades,\nhowever, witnessed a structural shift away from the agriculture sector. (See Table A1 in the Appendix B)\nWhile most of the shift in the first decade has been towards the service sector, the latter decade has\nseen substantial growth in the industry sector’s share of the economy. This has been stimulated by an\never-expanding construction subsector.\nBefore analyzing the impact of carbon taxation on the economy, the sources of carbon emission in\nthe country and their direct and indirect uses by economic activity and household are examined in the\nnext subsection. This will provide a reference framework for the carbon taxation simulation.\n\n\n_Carbon Emission by Source_\n\n\nMost carbon emissions in Ethiopia emanate from the agriculture sector, land-use change and\nforestry, as shown in Figure 2. Most of the emissions from the agriculture sector come from livestock.\nThis includes enteric fermentation, manure left on pasture, and manure applied on soil. Emissions\nfrom land-use change and forestry include emission due to forest clearance and land-use conversion\nfor smallholder agricultural expansion, promotion of large-scale agriculture, human settlement\nand authorized and unauthorized logging. Emissions from unsustainable extraction of fuelwood\nalso are typically included within forestry; however, in the subsequent analysis, fuelwood will be\nconsidered separately.\nFigure 2 shows that livestock accounts for 74.86 million tons (54.53 percent of total emissions),\nand forestry and firewood together emit 52.8 tons of carbon (38.46 percent of total carbon emissions),\nrespectively. In contrast, the use of petroleum (fuel and kerosene) accounts for only 6.28 percent\n(i.e., 8.62 million tons of carbon) of overall emissions. Emissions from fertilizer use in the agriculture\nsector are based on 650,000 tons of fertilizer used in 2012 [10].\nEach of the carbon emission sources mentioned above results from either direct consumption\nby households or use of intermediate inputs in the production of other goods and services. Using\nstatistics on total outputs and inputs of different sectors in the Ethiopian economy, we can compute the\ndirect and indirect carbon intensities and emissions shown in Table 1 that result from the different\nsources of carbon emissions. (The mathematical formula used to arrive at the figures presented in\nTable 1 is given in Appendix C.) Table 1 shows that firewood, coal, and livestock have respectively the\nhighest carbon intensity as measured by tons per million birr of final demand. Kerosene, petrol and\nfertilizer are a second set of product groups with significant carbon intensity.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "statistics on total outputs and inputs", "confidence": 0.18027102947235107}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 5 of 21\n\n\n**Table 1.** Carbon Intensity by Group of Products.\n\n\n**Product Group** **Carbon Intensity (Tons of CO2) Per**\n**Millions of Birr of Final Demand**\n**Crops and vegetables** 21.7\n**Livestock** 1231.6\n**Forestry** 15.8\n**Firewood** 1937.7\n**Fishery** 9.7\n**Coal** 1725.8\n**Other mining** 6.5\n**Food processing** 183.0\n**Textile and leather** 44.0\n**Wood and paper products** 2.6\n**Fuels (petroleum other than Kerosene)** 196.7\n**Kerosene** 262.0\n**Chemicals** 7.4\n**Fertilizer** 184.0\n**Non-metal minerals** 23.8\n**Metals and metal products** 20.5\n**Machinery and Equipment** 2.2\n**Vehicles** 2.3\n**Other manufacturing** 4.3\n**Electricity** 33.5\n**Water** 36.5\n**Construction and real estate** 12.4\n**Trade** 2.7\n**Transport** 47.5\n**Hotel** 106.1\n**Communication** 11.4\n**Financial and business services** 0.6\n**Public administration, education, health, and other services** 12.7\n\n\nSource: Authors’ calculation based on the 2010/11 Ethiopian Social Accounting Matrix.\n\n\nThe incidence of carbon price on households depends on the carbon content of their consumption,\namong other factors. Figure 3a describes the carbon emission due to indirect consumption of petroleum\nfuels, not including kerosene. Petroleum fuels consumption and the resulting emissions are higher as\na proportion of a given consumption for richer and urban households. However, as can be seen in\nFigure 3b the pattern becomes less clear if we consider the consumption of kerosene. Because urban\nhouseholds tend to be more dependent on modern transport, they are more intensive consumers of\npetroleum fuels. They utilize electricity in addition to kerosene for cooking and lighting purposes.\nRural households, on the other hand, lack adequate access to electricity. As a result, they rely more on\nkerosene for lighting and cooking purposes. The overall fuel (petroleum and kerosene) intensity of\nconsumption of households tends to be similar across categories of households.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Ethiopian Social Accounting Matrix"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Ethiopian Social Accounting Matrix", "confidence": 0.7954681515693665}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 6 of 21\n\n\n**Figure 3.** Carbon intensity of household consumption in Ethiopia due to petroleum fuels. ( **a** ) Carbon\nintensity of consumption: fuel not including kerosene; ( **b** ) Carbon intensity of consumption: fuel including\nkerosene. Source: Authors’ calculation based on the 2010/11 Ethiopian Social Accounting Matrix.\n\n\n**3.** **Methodology for Assessing the Impacts of Carbon Pricing in Ethiopia**\n\n\n_3.1._ _Modeling Framework_\n\n\nThis study relies on a recursive dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. It is\nan extension of the Computable CGE model developed by the International Food Policy Research\nInstitute (IFPRI). The model is formulated as a set of simultaneous linear and non-linear equations\nthat simulate the behavior of consumers and producers across the economy, as well as the functioning\nof the economy in which these agents operate. (More details about the model are included in\nAppendix A.) The model can be used to assess the impacts of carbon pricing by tracking, in detail,\nvarious transmission mechanisms within and across sectors. The model describes market equilibrium\nconditions, macroeconomic balances, and dynamic updating equations. Given the nature of our input\ndata, we run all the model scenarios over a period starting in 2018 and ending in 2030.\n\n\n_3.2._ _Baseline Scenario_\n\n\nAnalyzing the impacts of a carbon tax requires a comparison of the performance of the economy\nwith the carbon tax vis-à-vis a Business-As-usual (BAU) case without the carbon tax. Ethiopia’s current\ntax system has direct taxes (income tax, profit tax, rental tax, etc.) and indirect taxes in the form\nof Value Added Tax (VAT) (which is 15%), Excise tax, Turn-over tax, and customs duty. There are\ncurrently no carbon taxes. Moreover, electricity and kerosene are exempt from VAT and Turn-Over\ntaxes. Our baseline scenario is based on the growth plan embedded in GTP II [11]. We assume that the\ninvestment programs, tax policy, and environmental policies in GTP II will take place. This includes all\nenvironmental polices embedded in the CRGE Strategy [6]. The economic growth rate under the BAU\nscenario that we utilize is recorded in the first two years of the GTP II period (i.e., a GDP growth rate\nof 7.6 percent).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Ethiopian Social Accounting Matrix"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Ethiopian Social Accounting Matrix", "confidence": 0.5557729005813599}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 7 of 21\n\n\n_3.3._ _Policy Scenarios_\n\n\nThe policy scenarios included in the current study differ from the BAU not only due to the\nimposition of a carbon tax but also due to a set of decisions regarding (i) what sources of carbon to tax,\n(ii) the time path of carbon prices, and (iii) how to use money that is raised through the carbon tax.\nDecisions taken on each of these elements will imply different policy impacts on the economy vis-à-vis\nthe baseline.\n\n\n3.3.1. What Sources of Carbon to Tax\n\n\nAs shown in Figure 2, most of the carbon emission in the country comes from the agriculture\nsector. This implies that any tax that will put a significant dent on emission would have to address\nthe agriculture sector. However, there are two reasons why this would be undesirable and difficult to\nimplement. The sources of emissions from agriculture and forest land use are diverse and diffuse. This\nmakes these sources difficult to tax without extensive, costly, and untested measurement, reporting,\nand verification (MRV). Note that imposing a carbon tax merely on agricultural and forest outputs\nis not possible because the carbon intensity of outputs may substantially differ across suppliers and\nregions of the country. In addition, most of the agricultural activity in the country is undertaken by\nsmallholder farmers engaged in subsistence agriculture. Burdening them with a carbon tax, even if it\ncould be figured out how to do so, would have adverse distributional consequences.\nIn contrast, taxing fossil fuels has the inverse pros and cons of taxing agricultural emissions.\nIt can easily be administered by imposing a tax on fuel importers. In other words, it does not involve\nsignificant levels of MRV measures. Moreover, it is an effective approach for taxing the informal sector.\nIn addition, it can easily be linked with other existing taxes in the overall fiscal system. Therefore,\nalthough fossil fuels make only a small contribution to total GHG emissions in Ethiopia (a bit more\nthan 6 percent, as noted in Section 3), this study focuses on putting a price on the carbon emitted\nfrom fossil fuels. An important follow-up task beyond the scope of this study is to give much deeper\nconsideration to what policies, beyond carbon pricing, can effectively mitigate GHG emissions from\nagriculture and forestry.\nHow kerosene is factored in carbon tax analysis has important implications due to two seemingly\ncountervailing reasons. On the one hand, kerosene is an alternative cooking energy to fuelwood; taxing\nit may backfire by increasing consumption of fuelwood which could result in more GHG emissions as\nwell as worse indoor air pollution. On the other hand, exempting kerosene from a carbon tax could\nlead to tax evasion through reclassification of other fuels as kerosene. We have carried out our policy\ncomparisons both with and without kerosene. However, in this report, we include only results from\nthe analysis with kerosene taxed. The results with kerosene exempted are available on request.\n\n\n3.3.2. The Time Path of Carbon Prices\n\n\nAnother important factor is deciding what level of tax to impose and how the tax rate evolves\nover time. The range of carbon prices being used is from $1 per ton to over $125 per ton, there are many\nexamples in the range of $5 to $30 per ton [1]. Accordingly, we have analyzed three possible cases.\nThe first entails imposing a low tax of about $5 per ton throughout the time period of the analysis\n(2018–30). The second entails imposing a higher tax rate of $30 per ton initially and maintaining that\nrate throughout 2018–30. In the third case, the tax rate starts at $5 per ton and then steadily grows\nover the study period until it reaches $30 per ton in 2030. Although we have run our model based on\nall three tax design cases, in this report, we include only the results from the third case “starting low\nand steady growth” for various reasons: (i) it is a realistic assumption of how carbon pricing might be\nimplemented in practice; (ii) a carbon price of $5 per ton has little relevance by 2030 when countries’\nNDCs targets need to be met; and (iii) a carbon price of $30 per ton now can be considered excessive if\ncompared with other developing economies.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 8 of 21\n\n\nWhile the carbon price is to function as a tax on carbon emissions, in practice it needs to be imposed\non the fossil fuels themselves; therefore, it is necessary to convert the carbon tax rate to fuel-specific\ntaxes based on their respective carbon contents. Imposing a $5 price on carbon is equivalent to a 2.23\npercent tax on petroleum fuels, based on the fuel prices utilized in the study. ($5 per ton of CO2* 3.5\nton of CO2 per ton of fuel = $17.5 per ton of fuel. Since 1176 L is equal to 1 ton of oil, this is equivalent\nto $0.015 per liter of fuel. Using the current price of $0.67 L of fuel, then $5 price is equivalent to 2.23%\ntax.) Similarly, a $30 price on carbon is equivalent to a 13.4 percent tax on petroleum fuels given the\nassumed prices.\nAs of 2015, 2.68 million tons of various oils were used in the country, according to the International\nEnergy Agency. Using the average conversion factor of 3.5 tons of CO2 per ton of oil, the CO2 emissions\nin 2015 from use of fossil fuels was 9.54 million tons. Consequently, in 2015, a $5 price on carbon would\nhave raised $47.7 million, while a $30 price on carbon would have raised $286 million.\n\n\n**4.** **How to Use the Increased Carbon Revenue**\n\n\nThe structure of the model we employ is such that the equilibrium in the economy is consistent\nwith the government budget constraint. The revenue from carbon tax increases government revenue.\nThe government has to use the money to reduce borrowing, reduce debt, increase spending, or reduce\nother taxes. Consequently, how to utilize the increased government revenue becomes a relevant policy\nissue. After discussions with many policy-making units and other relevant stakeholders, we decided\nto evaluate five options for how to use the money that is raised through the carbon tax:\n\n\n1. **STAX** —A scenario where we adopt uniform reduction of sales taxes for intermediate and\nfinal commodities.\n2. **TRANS** —A scenario where the increased government revenue is used as a lump-sum transfer\npayment to all households. Lump-sum transfer payments follow the same pattern of existing\nallocation of government transfers to each type of household. The proportion of transfers to\nhousehold types is maintained. (As indicated in Appendix A, the Social Accounting Matrix\nhas 15 types of households. The initial share refers to the government transfer to each type\nof household relative to overall government transfer to households. The basic premise in this\nscenario is that the current transfer scheme reflects the weight the government puts on the welfare\nof each type of household.)\n3. **SAVINGS** —A scenario where the money from carbon tax is directed to the overall saving pool\nwhere it can then be invested in the most profitable sectors.\n4. **DTAX** —A scenario where the money from carbon tax is transferred to taxpaying households\nin the formal sector. This is done in the form of uniform reduction of direct taxes (personal\nincome tax).\n5. **CORPOR** —A scenario where the money is used to encourage investment by firms. This is\nachieved by uniform reduction of business income tax.\n\n\nWe compare the results from imposing the specified carbon tax with these different uses of\nrevenues to the BAU scenario.\n\n\n**5.** **Modeling Results**\n\n\n_5.1._ _Impact on Emissions_\n\n\nFigures 4 and 5 present summary results of changes in emissions across the different scenarios.\nThe figures show that, as expected, emission reductions increase over time as the price on carbon\nincreases. Depending on the recycling scenario, the reduction ranges from 1.1 million tons to 1.5 million\ntons relative to BAU in 2030, when the carbon tax reaches its maximum value. The differences across\nscenarios are due to the differences in growth of the economy due to the different revenue recycling\nmechanisms considered, which in turn influence the demands for fossil fuels.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 9 of 21\n\n\n**Figure 4.** Reduction in fossil fuel emission (millions of tons of CO2) from tax on fuel and kerosene\ncompared to the base case.\n\n\nPercentage change reduction in fossil fuel from tax on fuel and kerosene compared to the base case\n\n\n**Figure** **5.** Percentage (%) change reduction in fossil fuel emission from tax on fuel and kerosene\ncompared to base case.\n\n\nComparing across the scenarios, the least emission reduction is achieved in the sales tax (STAX)\nreduction scenario. This is because its effect on the general economy results in the least growth impact.\nDirect tax reduction (DTAX), on the other hand, leads to more significant reductions in emissions.\nSimilar comparisons follow when we compare the resulting reductions in emissions from all\nemission sources. These will be larger than the reductions in emissions in fossil fuels, because the\nchanges in fuel prices will have effects on the quantities of other emissions-producing activities in the\neconomy. By 2030, as compared to the base case, the STAX reduction scenario will lead to a reduction\nof total emission by 1.7 million tons while the DTAX reduction scenario will lead to a reduction of total\nemission by about 3.8 million tons (see Figures 6 and 7).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 10 of 21\n\n\nReduction in total emission (from all sources) from tax on fossil fuel compared to base case (millions\n\n\nof tons of CO2\n\n\n**Figure 6.** Total emission reduction in millions of tons from base case.\n\n\nTotal emission reduction as % from base case\n\n\n**Figure 7.** Total emission reduction as % from base case.\n\n\n_5.2._ _Impacts on the Economy_\n\n\nThe assumed time path of carbon prices has a fairly modest effect on the growth of GDP (Figures 8\nand 9). In BAU, GDP is much higher in 2030 than in 2015 given the assumed growth rates for the\neconomy. The same is true in the policy scenarios; the different tax and recycling combinations only\nslow growth by a little over the study period. GDP in 2030 is about 1 percent lower compared to BAU\nin almost all scenarios. Average GDP growth is from 0.38 to 0.52 percentage points lower with the\ncarbon pricing than under BAU, depending on the chosen scenario. This is a small decrease in the\ngrowth rate of 7.6 percent per year in BAU.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 11 of 21\n\n\nAverage change (%) from Base Case\n(2018-2030) (5-30 USD/ton)\n\n\nDTAX STAX SAVINGS CORPOR TRANS\n\n0.0%\n\n\n-0.1%\n\n\n\n-0.2%\n\n\n-0.3%\n\n\n-0.4%\n\n\n-0.5%\n\n\n\n-0.4%\n\n\n\n-0.4%\n\n\n\n-0.5%\n\n\n\n-0.5%\n\n\n\n-0.6% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5%\n\n\n\n**Figure 8.** Changes from base case average GDP growth rate (2018–2030).\n\n\nChanges from Base Case GDP in 2030 (30\nUSD/ton)\n\n\nDTAX STAX SAVINGS CORPOR TRANS\n0.00%\n\n\n\n-0.20%\n\n\n-0.40%\n\n\n-0.60%\n\n\n-0.80%\n\n\n-1.00%\n\n\n\n-0.74%\n\n\n\n-0.83%\n\n\n\n-1.06%\n\n\n\n-1.06%\n\n\n\n-1.06% -1.06% -1.07%\n\n-1.20%\n\n\n\n**Figure 9.** Changes from base case GDP in 2030.\n\n\nA cut in either sales or corporate tax leads to smaller negative effects on GDP compared to the other\npolicy scenarios. The reason is that lower sales tax reduces cost of goods and services and stimulates\ndemand across income groups. Lower business tax reduces the cost of capital which encourages\ninvestment and therefore employment and production. Both tax reductions end up reducing existing\ndistortions in the economy. That, in turn, will lessen the amount of emission reduction from the\ncarbon tax.\nThe scenario in which personal income tax is reduced leads to a larger decrease in the growth of\neconomic activity. The reason is that professional and educated labor—the types of workers paying\nthe personal income tax—is assumed to be fully employed. Reducing income tax therefore increases\nneither labor supply nor economic activity.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 12 of 21\n\n\n_5.3._ _Fiscal Impacts_\n\n\nBecause the government account should balance, and government expenditures are treated as\nfixed in the analysis, the government recycles the entire change in revenues in each of the five policy\nscenarios. To assess the amount of revenue raised through carbon pricing in each scenario, we first\ncalculate the amount of fuel imported each year. We then multiply the fuel import by the emission\nfactor (i.e., emission per unit of fuel) to arrive at a figure for total emissions, and then use the assumed\ncarbon tax rate to calculate total carbon tax revenue.\nThe revenue generated in 2030 ranges from $786 million under the direct tax scenario to $798\nmillion under the sales tax reduction scenario (Figure 10). The differences in revenue among scenarios\nare due to the differences in economic growth which, in turn, affect the demand for fuel.\n\n\nGovernment revenue from carbon tax\n\n900\n\n\n800\n\n\n700\n\n\n600\n\n\n500\n\n\n400\n\n\n300\n\n\n200\n\n\n100\n\n\n0\n\n2018 2022 2026 2030\n\n\nDTAX STAX SAVINGS CORPOR TRANS\n\n\n**Figure 10.** Government revenue from carbon tax.\n\n\n_5.4._ _Distributional Impacts_\n\n\nAlthough the impact of the carbon tax on overall economic growth is one indication of the\neconomic consequences of the policy, a much clearer understanding of the full implications for\neconomic well-being comes from looking at the impacts across heterogeneous households based on\nfactors such as their location (urban, rural) and their abilities (skilled, unskilled). Households receive\nincome from wages (employment), returns on land for which they have the right of use, returns on\ncapital they own, and income transfers. The implication of a carbon tax on a household’s welfare,\ntherefore, depends on how it affects each of these sources of household income.\nIn this subsection, we highlight the heterogeneous impacts on labor demand (employment) and\nhousehold consumption. Figures 11 and 12 provide the difference in employment trend of low-skilled\nindividuals located in the urban and rural sector. The carbon tax on fuels increases the price of\ngoods reliant on fuel-using transport. As a result, it shifts demand away from those goods towards\nothers. Sectors that are transport and thus fuel dependent include the service and manufacturing\nsectors. Both sectors are overwhelmingly concentrated in urban areas. As a result, there will be a\ndecrease in urban unemployment (Figure 11) among low-education workers. Because we assume full\nemployment for high-skill individuals, they adjust to the carbon tax through a wage decrease rather\nthan an employment decrease.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 13 of 21\n\n\nChange in labor supply/demand (as % change from base case)- for\n(Uneducated)-Urban\n\n\n\n2018 2022 2026\n~~(5.0 USD/ton)~~ ~~(13.3 USD/ton)~~ ~~(21.7 USD/ton)~~\n\n\n\n2030\n~~(30.0 USD/ton)~~\n\n\n\n0.0%\n\n\n-0.2%\n\n\n-0.4%\n\n\n-0.6%\n\n\n-0.8%\n\n\n-1.0%\n\n\n-1.2%\n\n\n-1.4%\n\n\n-1.6%\n\n\n0.1%\n\n\n0.0%\n\n\n-0.1%\n\n\n\nDTAX STAX SAVING CORPORATE TRANS\n\n\n**Figure 11.** Changes in labor supply/demand for urban uneducated.\n\n\nChange in labor supply/demand (as % change from base case)- for\n(Uneducated)-Rural\n\n\n\n~~2018~~ ~~2022~~ ~~2026~~\n(5.0 USD/ton) (13.3 USD/ton) (21.7 USD/ton)\n\n\n\n~~2030~~\n(30.0 USD/ton)\n\n\n\n-0.1%\n\n\n-0.2%\n\n\n-0.2%\n\n\n-0.3%\n\n\n-0.3%\n\n\n-0.4%\n\n\n-0.4%\n\n\n-0.5%\n\n\nDTAX STAX SAVING CORPORATE TRANS\n\n\n**Figure 12.** Changes in labor supply/demand for rural uneducated.\n\n\nThe agriculture sector, on the other hand, does not rely as heavily on transportation. Therefore,\nit benefits from an increase in demand relative to other goods. This, in turn, increases the employment\npotential of rural unskilled labor compared to their urban counterparts. Figure 12 indicates that there\nis almost no effect on employment across scenarios in rural areas compared to the base case scenario.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 14 of 21\n\n\n(Note that in the base case scenario, employment of low-skilled individuals in urban areas is assumed\nto be 4,186,322 in 2018 and 6,290,527 in 2030. Similarly, employment of low-skilled individuals in rural\nareas is assumed to be 38,516,966 in 2018 and 54,301,218 in 2030.)\nThe tax has differing impacts on the consumption of the lowest quintile households in urban and\nrural areas. In urban areas (Figure 13), the main source of income for poor households is employment\nincome (wages). As the sectors that poor households work in (services and industry) are affected\nmore by the carbon tax, their income decreases due to either increased unemployment or a decrease in\nwage. The implication for economic welfare depends on the scenario: revenue recycling under STAX\nand CORPOR leads to smaller decline in consumption than others because there is less impact on the\neconomy. TRANS, on the other hand, limits the decline in consumption by transferring resources to\npoorer households.\n\n\nChange in Urban-HH consumption (as % change from base\ncase) for poorest quintile (Q1)\n\n\n\n2018 2022 2026\n(5.0 USD/ton) (13.3 USD/ton) (21.7 USD/ton)\n\n\n\n2030\n(30.0 USD/ton)\n\n\n\n0.0 ~~%~~\n\n\n-0.5%\n\n\n-1.0%\n\n\n-1.5%\n\n\n-2.0%\n\n\n-2.5%\n\n\n-3.0%\n\n\n-3.5%\n\n\n-4.0%\n\n\nDTAX STAX SAVING CORPORATE TRANS\n\n\n**Figure 13.** Urban household consumption (poorest quintile Q1).\n\n\nIn rural areas, the ‘almost non-existent’ effect of the carbon tax on agriculture means that\nemployment is not really affected (Figure 14). In addition, the tax slightly increases the return to land\nowned by rural households. The combination of these two effects implies that the impact of the carbon\ntax on the consumption of poor rural households is minimal. It is worth noting that, ex ante, one would\nexpect that the poor will fare better under the transfer scenario. However, the result shows the opposite.\nThere are a couple of reasons for this. First, the transfer scenario does not restrict transfers to poor\nhouseholds. Since a large share of transfers are made to urban/richer households, it limits the extent to\nwhich the aggregate transfer can reduce poverty and inequality. Second, the slowdown in economic\nactivity under the transfer scenario introduces unemployment/wage reduction that affects welfare\ndirectly. Another way to understand the result under the transfer scenario is that one needs to restrict\nthe transfer to poor households in order to achieve a meaningful reduction in poverty and inequality.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Sustainability_ **2019**, _11_, 4395 15 of 21\n\n\nChange in Rural-HH consumption (as % change from base case)\nfor poorest quintile (Q1)\n\n\n\n2018 2022 2026\n(5.0 USD/ton) (13.3 USD/ton) (21.7 USD/ton)\n\n\n\n2030\n(30.0 USD/ton)\n\n\n\n0.3%\n\n\n0.2%\n\n\n0.1%\n\n\n0.0%\n\n\n-0.1%\n\n\n-0.2%\n\n\n-0.3%\n\n\n-0.4%\n\n\n-0.5%\n\n\n-0.6%\n\n\n-0.7%\n\n\nSTAX DTAX SAVING CORPORATE TRANS\n\n\n**Figure 14.** Rural household consumption (poorest quintile Q1).\n\n\n**6.** **Concluding Remarks**\n\n\nOver 90 percent of Ethiopia’s GHG emissions comes from sources other than fossil fuels. This is\nbecause (a) energy use in general is relatively low, including in transport, although it is expected to grow\nas the economy expands; (b) most of Ethiopia’s electricity comes from hydro; and (c) biomass remains\nthe overwhelming choice of energy source for cooking. Consequently, application of carbon pricing to\nfossil fuels use in Ethiopia necessarily will have a somewhat limited effect on total GHG emissions.\nNevertheless, since motorization increases as incomes rise, the carbon price on fuels can contribute\nto mitigating a “lock-in” of high levels of individual vehicle use and high demand for road expansion\nby limiting vehicle use and creating support for expanding well-performing public transit and smaller,\nefficient cars in more densely populated areas. The carbon price on fossil fuels limits fuel use and\nassociated GHG emissions cost effectively compared to what might result from a patchwork of different\nregulatory standards on various emissions sources. It creates incentives for increasing energy efficiency\nincluding in transport choices. By moving away from carbon, Ethiopia may benefit in the long run from\nenergy efficiency and relatively cheaper sources of energy, providing a competitive advantage over\nthose countries that did not make the transition and have locked-in inefficient technologies. In addition,\nrevenue-neutral reductions in other taxes can be made to spur investment and productivity gains.\nRegarding economic impacts, GDP continues to grow substantially, albeit at a modestly lower rate.\nThe direct effect of the carbon price is likely to be felt more by higher-income households since they\nare more intensive consumers of fossil fuels. Indirect effects through adjustments in the economy to\nhigher fuel prices can lead to modestly slower growth for the urban poor, but the size of that effect will\ndepend on how carbon revenues are recycled. Because the rural poor are not intensive users of fossil\nfuels, and the economic adjustments to carbon pricing may have limited impact on the agriculture\nsector, the rural poor are likely to face little impact from it. As we have shown, some portion of carbon\ntax revenues can be used to soften impacts on the poor.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**CIVILIAN IMPACT MONITORING PROJECT**\n**THEMATIC REPORT: THE AL-HUDAYDAH CEASEFIRE, ONE YEAR ON**\n\n**DATE OF PUBLICATION: JANUARY 2020**\n\nThe Al-Hudaydah Agreement was signed in Stockholm on 13 December 2018. Shortly after, on 18 December, a ceasefire in Al-Hudaydah entered into force.\n\nOne of the instant achievements of the agreement was a halt to an offensive that threatened to engulf the critical port city of Al-Hudaydah, fixing the warring sides to their respective positions, while also leading to a significant reduction in airstrikes across the governorate. However, Al-Hudaydah did not see an absolute ceasefire.\n\nAlong all main frontlines, on the outskirts of the city and in southern districts, hostilities continued between the opposing forces, as other elements of the Al Hudaydah Agreement stalled into a political stalemate. Although the frontlines remained static over the past year, the number of civilian impact incidents actually increased, and while the total number of civilian casualties was reduced, casualty rates in the governorate were still the highest in the country. The post-agreement period has also seen a shift in the nature of the impact of armed violence on civilians, with an uptick in direct fire on residential areas, resulting in more incidents directly impacting on civilian households than before the ceasefire.\n\n**OVERALL FIGURES: 12 MONTHS BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE, COMPARED TO 12 MONTHS AFTER**\n\nThe total number of civilian casualties fell 62% in the 12 months after the ceasefire compared to the previous 12-month period, from 2,115, from 18 December 2017 to 17 December 2018, to 811, from 18 December 2018 to 17 December 2019. The rate of civilian casualties per month as a direct result of armed violence fell from an average of 176 in the 12 months prior to the start of the ceasefire, driven largely by high casualties from airstrikes, to 68 civilian casualties per month in 2019. The rate of civilian fatalities also decreased, from 47% in the 12 months before the ceasefire to 25% in the past year.\n\nCivilian casualty rates steadily decreased throughout 2019. The final quarter of the year saw the lowest civilian casualty toll since CIMP began monitoring at the start of 2018. This is likely caused in large part by the deployment of joint observation posts on frontlines around Al-Hudaydah city in October 2019, which resulted in a significant reduction in hostilities in the city, as discussed below. However, despite significant decreases in civilian casualty rates, the number of incidents of armed violence reported with a direct civilian impact increased, from 686 in the 12 months prior to 978 in the 12 months since.\n\n**Number of incidents**\n\nl **250** Civilian fatalities Civilian injuries 2000 1500 1000 500 0 1122 993 Civilian impact incidents 607 686 204 978\n\n**Number of incidents** **Civilian casualties**\n\n12 months before 12 months after\n\n**500**\n\n**400**\n\n**300**\n\n**200**\n\n**100**\n\n**0**\n\n**250**\n\n**200**\n\n**150**\n\n**100**\n\n**50**\n\n**0**\n\n**INCIDENTS IN AL-HUDAYDAH CITY IN 2019 COMPARED TO SOUTHERN AL-HUDAYDAH DISTRICTS**\n\nDespite a slow start to the ceasefire, a particularly notable reduction in hostilities was recorded in Al-Hudaydah city from October 2019, when joint observation posts were deployed across the main frontlines around the city. Accompanying this, the downward trend in civilian casualties that started in August continued in the city through October and November. However, while the city saw a reduction in hostilities, which drove an overall decrease in the governorate, incident and casualty rates remained high in the southern districts.\n\nThe graph to the right compares civilian impact incidents by district, showing those in the two city districts of Al-Hali and Al-Hawak compared to the four main hotspot southern districts of Al-Tuhayat, Al-Durayhimi, Bayt Al-Faqih, and Hays.\nWhile both showed a decrease in incident rates from mid-2019, after the five joint observation posts were established in October, incident rates in AlHudaydah city continued to fall, but those in the southern districts increased, as it appeared combat efforts re-focussed to the governorate's southern frontlines.\n\n**70**\n\n**60**\n\n**50**\n\n**40**\n\n**30**\n\n**20**\n\n**10**\n\n**0**\n\n**Southern frontline districts** **City frontline districts**\n\n_**17 OCT: JOINT OBSERVATION POSTS DEPLOYED**_\n\n**1**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM ARMED VIOLENCE BEFORE AND AFTER THE CEASEFIRE**\n\n**12 months before** **12 months after**\n\n**12 months after** There has been an overall decrease in civilian\n\ncasualties since the start of the ceasefire. This was\n\n**- 99%** most notable in the number of civilian casualties\n\ncaused by airstrikes, which fell 99% in 2019 compared to the 12 months prior to the ceasefire. Casualties from\n\n**- 47%** shelling and explosive ordnance also decreased.\n\nHowever, civilian casualties caused by fire from small arms and light weapons, including sniper fire,\n\n**+**\n\n**450%** increased more than 400% as direct clashes\n\ncontinued in close proximity to residential areas.\n\n**- 39%** Casualties as a result of sniper fire at civilians\n\nincreased from 10 to 58, of whom 19 were children, up from 4 during the 12 months prior to the ceasefire.\n\n**GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF AIRSTRIKE INCIDENTS**\n\n**AIRSTRIKES**\n\n**EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE**\n\n**SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT**\n\n**WEAPONS**\n\n**SHELLING**\n\n**1035**\n\n**15**\n\n**195**\n\n**108**\n\n**30**\n\n**165**\n\n**855**\n\n**523**\n\n**- 99%**\n\n**- 47%**\n\n**+**\n\n**450%**\n\n**- 39%**\n\nThe maps show the distribution and density of airstrike incidents reported to have directly impacted on civilians in AlHudaydah in the 12 months before the ceasefire compared to the 12 months since.\n\nIn the 12 months before the ceasefire, 363 airstrike incidents were reported to have had a direct civilian impact, resulting in 1,035 civilian casualties. Since 18 December 2019, just 9 airstrike incidents were reported to have impacted on civilians in the governorate, resulting in 15 civilian casualties, just 1% of those seen in the year prior.\n\n**THE PROPORTION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN HARMED HAS INCREASED SINCE THE CEASEFIRE COMMENCED**\n\nWhile the overall rates of civilian casualties decreased in the 12 months since the start of the ceasefire, a greater proportion of civilian casualties have been women and children. Before the ceasefire, 25% of civilian casualties was a woman or a child, in the 12 months since this has doubled to almost half (49%). Of the 2,115 civilian casualties in the 12 months prior to the ceasefire, 334 were children and 186 were women, a quarter of the total.\nIn the 12 months after the ceasefire entered into force, almost half (49%) of the 811 civilian casualties were children (259) and women (140).\n0 Women and children casualties Unspeci�ed casualties 0 0 Before **520** **1595** 0 0 0 After **399** **412** 0 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 0 0 Despite overall decreases, the number of casualties among women and children as a result of fire from small arms and light weapons increased from 17 before the ceasefire to 87 in the 12 months after. There has also been a slight increase in women and children casualties as a result of explosive ordnance (EO). Furthermore, increasing incidents impacting directly on houses correlated with an increase in injuries among women and children.\n\nBefore After Women and children casualties Unspeci�ed casualties In 2018, 220 incidents of armed violence impacted on homes and/or farmsteads in Al-Hudaydah, resulting in 666 civilian casualties, of whom 268 (40%) were women and children. In 2019, this rose to 578 incidents impacting on homes and/or farmsteads, a 62% increase, resulting in 383 civilian casualties, of whom 206 (54%) were women and children. Due to the repeated encroachment of armed violence on domestic civilian spaces, the effects of psychosocial trauma are likely to be made more acute, while women and children, who are increasingly reported to be household heads, especially among displaced families, are likely to be particularly vulnerable when residential spaces are impacted.\n\n700 Before\n\n**520** **1595**\n\nAfter\n\n**399** **412**\n\n0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 ~~**398**~~\n\n**268**\n\n**177**\n\n**206**\n\nIncidents impacting on civilian houses and/or farmsteads Women and children harmed as a result of houses being impacted Unspeci�ed civilian casualties as a result of houses being impacted\n\n**2**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**AL-HUDAYDAH CONTINUES TO SEE THE MOST CIVILIAN IMPACT INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES COUNTRY-WIDECORRELATION BETWEEN IMPACT FROM REMNANT ORDNANCE AND OTHER TYPES OF ARMED VIOLENCE**\n\n**AL-HUDAYDAH CONTINUES TO SEE THE MOST CIVILIAN IMPACT INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES COUNTRY-WIDECORRELATION BETWEEN IMPACT FROM REMNANT ORDNANCE AND OTHER TYPES OF ARMED VIOLENCE**\n\nDespite the cease�re, Al-Hudaydah continued to be the governorate with the highest number of incidents of armed violence with a direct civilian impact in 2019. With 951 civilian impacts reported, this was 43% of the country-wide total; a signi�cantly higher proportion than during 2018, when 705 civilian impact incidents in the governorate accounted for 30% of the country-wide total. By comparison, Sa’ada governorate saw the second-highest civilian impact incident total in 2019, 484 incidents, half the number in Al-Hudaydah.\n\nAl-Hudaydah also saw the highest number of civilian casualties in the country, 767, 24% out of a countrywide total of 3,200 in 2019. Unlike with civilian impact incidents, this was a smaller proportion than in 2018, when Al-Hudaydah saw 41% of the country’s civilian casualties as a direct result of armed violence. This did, however, start to change towards the end of 2019, as civilian casualty �gures continued to fall. For the �rst time since the �rst quarter of 2018, during the �nal quarter of 2019 the civilian casualty rate in Al-Hudaydah was superseded by Sa’ada, where several mass casualty incidents were reported in November and December 2019.\n\n1,662 70% 2,894 59%\n\n# ■ AL-HUDAYDAH\n\n**41%**\n\n# ■ REST OF COUNTRY\n\n2018 2019 1,251 57%\n\n**951**\n\n**43%**\n\n**767**\n\n**705**\n\n**30%**\n\n**24%**\n**2,040**\n\n2,433 76%\n\n**CIVILIAN IMPACT INCIDENTS IN 2019 IN AL-HUDAYDAH COMPARED TO OTHER GOVERNORATES**\n\n120 100 80 60 40 20 0\n\n# ■ AL-HUDAYDAH ■ OTHER GOVERNORATES\n\nJanuary February March April May June July August September October November December\n\n**CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN 2019 IN AL-HUDAYDAH COMPARED TO OTHER GOVERNORATES**\n\n200 150 100 50 0\n\n# ■ AL-HUDAYDAH ■ OTHER GOVERNORATES\n\nJanuary February March April May June July August September October November December\n\n**THE IMPACT OF ARMED VIOLENCE ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN AL-HUDAYDAH HAS REDUCED**\n\n**Case study 1: Restricted access to food and education**\n\nThere was an increased impact on education and food infrastructure in the past 12 months. 7 incidents reportedly impacted food infrastructure, all of which were repeat instances of shellfire hitting the Red Sea Flour Mills, in one of the main contested areas on the outskirts of Al-Hudaydah city. The incidents potentially pose continued restricted access to crucial food supplies for as many as 500,000 households. Similarly, 16 incidents were reported to have impacted on education facilities in the past year. 5 of these were schools, while 11 were incidents impacting on Al-Hudaydah University medical and engineering faculties, which have been commandeered by military forces as defensive and firing positions.\n\n**Case study 2: Fishing communities in Al-Hudaydah**\n\nAl-Hudaydah’s fishing community saw a significantly reduced impact from incidents of armed violence since the ceasefire commenced. In 2018, 77 fishermen were reportedly killed, 37 injured, and another 17 reported missing as a result of incidents of armed violence, the majority of which were as a result of airstrikes, along with three instances of naval shelling and three seamine incidents. Over 25 boats were reportedly destroyed.\n\nFishing ports in Al-Hawak and Al-Tuhayat, fishing huts on Kamaran island, and the Ministry of Fisheries in Al-Luheyah were also reportedly hit by airstrikes last year. The Al-Hawak fish market was also hit by shellfire on 2 August 2018 which, together with a follow-up attack outside the Al-Thawra hospital gates, was reported to have resulted in 55 civilian fatalities and 170 civilian injuries. Since the ceasefire entered into force, airstrikes are reported to have hit 5 fishing boats, killing 9 fishermen and injuring 6.\n\nOn the whole, the introduction of the cease�re resulted in a decrease in incidents impacting on civilian infrastructure in Al-Hudaydah. In the 12 months prior to the cease�re, 139 incidents impacted on civilian infrastructure, while in the 12 months after, this almost halved, dropping to 73. The most frequently impacted types of infrastructure are shown in the chart below by number of incidents. The 2 infrastructure types to have seen an increase in the past 12 months were education and food, explained in case study 1, to the left.\n\nThe Civilian Impact Monitoring Project is a service under the United Nations Protection Cluster for the collection, analysis and dissemination of open source data on the civilian impact from armed violence in Yemen, to inform and complement protection programming.\n\nFor further information, please visit www.civilianimpactmonitoring.org.\n\n**3**\n\n50 40 30 20 10 0\n\n# ■ 12 MONTHS PRIOR ■ 12 MONTHS AFTER", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Civilian Impact Monitoring Project"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Civilian Impact Monitoring Project", "confidence": 0.7014850974082947}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "open source data", "confidence": 0.1884763091802597}]}}}
{"input": "# **At a crossroads** **Unaccompanied and separated** **children in their transition** **to adulthood in Italy**\n\n## **November 2019**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# **At a crossroads** **Unaccompanied and separated** **children in their transition** **to adulthood in italy**\n\n## **Novembre 2019**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n### Disclaimer\n\nThe opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNICEF, UNHCR and IOM concerning legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries. This joint report reflects the activities of individual agencies around an issue of common concern.\n\nThe principles and policies of each agency are governed by the relevant decisions of its governing body. Each agency implements the interventions described in this document in accordance with these principles and policies and within the scope of its mandate. This publication was made possible through the support provided by UNICEF and UNHCR in collaboration with IOM. The text has not been edited or fact checked to official publications standards and UNICEF, UNHCR and IOM accept no responsibility for errors.\n\nCover photo: E., 18 years old, cames from South Sudan, stands on the cliffs overlooking the sea of Duino, Italy, where he likes to do his homework (October 2017) © UNHCR/Fabio Bucciarelli © 2019 UNICEF, UNHCR and IOM Suggested citation: ISMU Foundation (2019), _At a Crossroad._ _Unaccompanied and Separated Children in their Transition to_ _Adulthood in Italy._ UNICEF, UNHCR e IOM, Roma.\n\nISBN: 9788894432473\n\n### Research partners\n\nThis research was designed and coordinated by ISMU Foundation - Initiatives and Studies on Multiethnicity and carried out in collaboration with the University of Roma Tre and the University of Catania.\n\n**Scientific Committee of the research:**\n\nRita Bichi (Coordination, ISMU Foundation), Carmelina Canta (University of Roma Tre), Ennio Codini (ISMU Foundation), Liana Daher (University of Catania), Mariagrazia Santagati (ISMU Foundation), Giulio Valtolina (ISMU Foundation), Laura Zanfrini (ISMU Foundation).\n\n**Research coordination:**\n\nRita Bichi (ISMU Foundation), Emanuela Bonini (ISMU Foundation).\n\n**Local research team managers:**\n\nEmanuela Bonini, Carmelina Canta, Liana Daher.\n\n**Research Team:**\n\nAlessandra Barzaghi, Lavinia Bianchi, Chiara Carbone, Andrea Casavecchia, Claudia D'Antoni, Marina D’Odorico, Augusto Gamuzza, Anna Maria Leonora, Giorgia Mavica, Giulia Mezzetti, Davide Nicolosi, Danilo Palmisano, Giorgia Papavero, Alessandra Scieri.\n\n**Research support:**\n\nRoberta Davino, Martina Lippolis, Viola Lavinia Malingri Di Bagnolo, Sara Vitale.\n\n**Interviewers:**\n\nOssama Ramadan Karim Amin, Bassirou Dembele, Nouha Diallo, Ibrahima Diallo, Muslim Din, Benjamin Halilaj, Rimon Karam Mahfouz Wisily Hanin, Ibrahim Jalloh, Khaleghi Morteza, Mohamed Keita.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nThe authors would like to express their thanks to the representatives of the Ministries for their contribution to this research, and in particular for their indications on the research protocol and for their comments on the preliminary findings. The Ministries involved are the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policies, the SIPROIMI - System of Protection for the Holders of International Protection and foreign unaccompanied minors, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Education, Research and University, the AGIA – National Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents.\n\nWe also wish to thank all the local authorities involved in the research in the three regions for their cooperation: Prefettura – Ufficio Territoriale del Governo di Milano; Dipartimento Politiche Sociali – Prefettura di Roma; Prefettura – Ufficio Territoriale del Governo di Catania; AGIA – Regione Lombardia; AGIA – Regione Lazio; AGIA – Regione Sicilia; Consiglio Regionale – Regione Lazio; Tribunale per i minorenni di Palermo; Tribunale minorenni di Catania; Direzione politiche Sociali – Comune di Milano; Direzione Famiglia e Politiche sociali – Comune di Catania; Comune Di Latina – UO Minori; USR – Ufficio Scolastico Regionale Lazio; USR – Lombardia; USR – Sicilia; all the CPIA of Lombardy, Latium and Sicily.\n\nWe would also like to thank Civil society organizations based in the areas of Milan and Como, Rome and Latina, Catania, Palermo, Messina and Syracuse who supported research: La Cordata, Impresa e Valore Sociale – Case Saltatempo (Milano); Comunità Il Sicomoro (Milano); Comunità per Minori La Soglia di Casa (Milano); Associazione Villa Amantea (Milano); La Fanciullezza Onlus (Milano); Cooperativa Comunità Progetto (Milano); Fondazione Casa del Giovane la Madonnina (Milano); Caritas Ambrosiana (Milano); Associazione Sheb Sheb (Milano); Istituto Milanese Martinitt e Stelline e Pio Albergo Trivulzio (Milano); Associazione Fermata San Leonardo – Comunità e Famiglia (Milano); CivicoZero Onlus – Save the Children Italia (Milano); Parrocchia S.Martino, Rebbio (Como) CPIA 4 – Roma; CivicoZero Onlus – Save the Children Italia (Roma); Associazione Virtus Italia – Consorzio Solidarietà Sociale (Roma); MaTeMù – CIES onlus (Roma); Associazione No Working (Roma); Associazione Baobab Experience (Roma); Organizzazione Umanitaria Intersos (Roma); Il Tetto\n\n- Casal Fattoria – Onlus (Roma); Associazione Borgo Amigò (Roma); ALI – Accoglienza Libera Integrata Onlus (Roma); Comunità\n\ndi Accoglienza Valmontone Onlus (Roma); Cooperativa Centro minori \"Cooperativa La Pergola\" (Cisterna di Latina); Cooperativa Casa Margherita, casa famiglia per Msna (Latina Scalo); Cooperativa Casa Gardenia, casa di accoglienza per donne e bambini (Latina Scalo); Associazione Casa dell’adolescente - Casa famiglia Rosetta (Caltanissetta); Associazione Penolope (Roma); Centro d'accoglienza a bassa soglia \"Casa Najma Catania\" Salesiani di Sicilia, Progetto \"M'interesso di Te\" (Catania); Cooperativa Futura 89' (Catania); Cooperativa Prospettiva (Catania); Consorzio Il Nodo (Catania); Cooperativa San Francesco (Caltagirone); Cooperativa San Francesco (Mirabella Imbaccari); Cooperativa San Francesco (San Michele di Ganzaria); CPIA 1 – Catania; Fondazione Cirino la Rosa (Catania); Ufficio supporto e monitoraggio tutori Unicef (Catania); Associazione \"Padre Don Luigi Monti\" (Siracusa); Associazione “l’Albero della vita” (Pachino); Associazione Onlus “La Pineta” (Canicattini Bagni); Comunità Fatebenefratelli (Siracusa); Comunità Oreb Augusta (Siracusa); Cooperativa Sociale “San Giovanni Don Bosco” (Noto); Cooperativa Sociale Onlus “Si può fare” (Noto); La Casa di Sarah (Avola); Associazione \"A braccia aperte\" (Palermo); Associazione Asante-Cas Azad (Palermo); Associazione Asante Cas Elom (Palermo); Comunità \"Arcobaleno\" (Palermo); Comunità \"Casa dei Mirti\" (Palermo); Comunità \"La Mimosa\" (Palermo); Comunità \"La Violetta\" (Palermo); Sprar Msna di Via Roma (Palermo); Sprar Adulti Granatiere (Palermo); Sprar Adulti di Via Chopin, 16 (Palermo); UNICEF (Palermo); Casa Noemi (Faro Superiore Messina); Comunità Ismaele (Messina); Cooperativa Medihospes Casa Michelle (Messina); Sprar Adulti Milazzo (Messina); Sprar Adulti Pace del Mela (Messina); Sprar AironeTorre Faro (Messina).\n\nThe warmest, most sincere and important thank you goes to all the boys and girls who accepted to share their life histories and experiences, pains, joys and hopes.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n# **Contents**\n\nAcronyms and abbreviations 7 Executive Summary 8\n\n**1. Introduction** **12**\n\n**2. Research methodology and tools** **14**\n\n2.1 Research questions 14 2.2 Methodological approach and research tools 14 2.3 Description of the sample 16 2.4 Data analysis and validation of draft findings 16 2.5 Selection of research sites 17 2.6 The research team: Working with peer researchers 17 2.7 Ethical considerations 18 2.8 Limitations 18\n\n**3. Context** **19**\n\n3.1 Considerations on, and approaches to, migration and the transition to adulthood 19 3.2 The normative framework and the reception system for UASC in Italy: Opportunities and protection 22 3.3 UASC in Italy 24\n\n**4. Expectations, aspirations and the future** **27**\n\n4.1 UASC aspirations and family expectations 27 4.2 Desires and expectations in the transition to adulthood 31\n\n**5. The transition to adulthood: Pathways and factors for success** **33**\n\n5.1 Characteristics and factors that facilitate or constrain UASC’s transition pathways 33 5.1.1 UASC's rights 33 5.1.2 The first step: The pathways in the reception system 36 5.1.3 UASC’s education and training pathways 37 5.1.4 The role of the guardian in the transition to adulthood 40 5.1.5 Becoming adults by building meaningful relationships 40 5.2 Transition to adulthood: What changes when UASC become adults 41 5.2.1 The rights of former UASC 41 5.2.2 Access to employment pathways 44 5.2.3 Housing independence 46 5.2.4 Friendly and supportive relations 47 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n**6. Obstacles, risks and vulnerabilities in the transition to independence** **51**\n\n6.1 Obstacles and vulnerabilities **51** 6.1.1 Timing and obstacles related to the legal status of UASC and former UASC 51 6.1.2 Support when leaving the reception facilities 54 6.1.3 Trauma and psychological distress 55 6.2 Sexual and gender-based violence: Between vulnerability and resilience 56 6.3 The risks of exploitation and exclusion, and the importance of local reception networks 59 6.4 Risks associated with onward movements 60 6.5 Experiences of discrimination affecting the lives of UASC 61\n\n**7. Promising practices** **64**\n\n7.1 Lombardy: supervised independent living and housing solutions for UASC and former UASC 64 7.2 Latium: Experiences of formal and informal relations in support of UASC and former UASC 65 7.3 Sicily: A structured support to volunteer guardians 68\n\n**8. Conclusions** **71**\n\n8.1 Factors that favour a good transition 71 8.2 Obstacles to a good transition 72 8.3 Constraints and gaps of the system 73 8.3.1 Normative framework and its application 73 8.3.2 Governance and reception 73 8.3.3 Social inclusion 74 8.3.4 Data availability 74\n\n**9. Recommendations** **75**\n\n**References** **82**\n\n**Glossary** **84**\n\n**Annexes** **86**\n\n**Endnotes** **90**\n\n**List of figures and tables**\n\n**Figure 1** . UASC registered in the reception system as at 30 June 2019 by main nationality, gender and age   25\n\n**Figure 2.** UASC’s rights 33\n\n**Figure 3.** Changes in entitlements of former UASC upon turning 18 41\n\n**Table 1.** UASC present and registered in the reception system in Italy, by gender, December 2013–2018 24\n\n**Table 2.** UASC asylum seekers: First instance decision, by gender and age group,\n\nand total no. of adults, 2018. 26 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**R., 16 years old, is an unaccompanied and separated child from Afghanistan. He is living in Genova**\n\n**(Liguria, Italy) as he waits to be reunited with his siblings who already live in the UK (May 2019)**\n\n© UNHCR/Dario Bosio", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n# **Acronyms and abbreviations**\n\nAGIA National Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents ALI Accoglienza Libera e Integrata (Networked grassroot solidarity) AMIF European Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund ANCI National Association of Italian Municipalities CPIA Adult Learning Centre CSO Civil society organization DID Declaration of Immediate Availability to Work D.Lgs Legislative Decree EU European Union FGDs Focus group discussions GBV Gender-based violence IOM International Organization for Migration ISMU Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità (Initiatives and Studies on Multiethnicity) L.D. Law Decree MDM Médecins du Monde MFAEA Movimento Famiglie Affidatarie e Accoglienti (Host and foster families network) MoE Ministry of Education MLSP Ministry of Labour and Social Policies MoI Ministry of the Interior MoJ Ministry of Justice NGO Non-governmental organization PEI Piano Educativo Individualizzato (Personal Education Plan) SGBV Sexual and gender-based violence SIM Sistema Informativo minori (Information System for UASC) SIPROIMI Protection system for holders of international protection and UASC SPRAR Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees UASC Unaccompanied and separated children UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund USMT Unità di Supporto e Monitoraggio dei Tutori (Guardian Support and Monitoring Unit) 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Sistema Informativo minori", "confidence": 0.6388211250305176}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n# **Executive Summary**\n\nBetween 2014 and 2018, more than 70,000 unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) arrived in Italy by sea, 90 per cent of whom were between 15 and 17 years old. The significant presence of UASC (7,272 in June 2019) and the growing number of UASC who have turned 18 (around 60,000 over the last five years) have highlighted the need to better understand the measures and opportunities for the protection and social inclusion of this specific population group in their transition to adulthood.\n\nThis research, commissioned by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), provides an overview of trends and possible pathways of transition to adult life of UASC in Italy. The main objective of the research, which has focused on the three regions hosting the highest number of UASC (Sicily, Lombardy and Latium), is to provide evidence on the factors that are facilitating or constraining this transition, both at the individual and structural level. To understand these multiple factors, the research has examined seven areas that are influenced by the legal status and residence permits of UASC and UASC who have turned 18: (i) access to education, vocational and on-the-job training, (ii) access to the job market and the risks related to informal labour and exploitation, (iii) access to adequate housing solutions, (iv) experiences with volunteer guardians; (v) the role of formal and informal relationships; (vi) relationships with families of origin and the possibilities of family reunification; and (vii) the risk of onward movements.\n\nThe research is framed around the concept of ‘triple transition’: the transition from adolescence to adulthood, with its biological-physical, socio-emotional and cognitive changes that are common to all human beings; the transition related to migration that leads to detachment from one's context of origin and the need to build a new life in a different cultural and social environment; and the transition related to overcoming traumas experienced during or after the journey. Adopting this ‘triple transition’ approach allows to shed some light on the limits of an artificial age-based distinction between ‘children’ (UASC) and ‘adults’ (UASC who turned 18, henceforth ‘former UASC’), because it does not take due account of the transitional process of becoming adults, the cultural and social differences of this process, and the specific vulnerabilities of this category of migrants and refugees.\n\nThe process of personal growth and development of these young people is thus affected by the concept of chronological age and its implications in Italian legislation, which in the application of the best interests of the child, [1] focuses on the differences in legal status and especially on the recognition of the rights of children (under 18 years) compared to those of adults (over 18 years).\n\nThe research has shown that the formulation of aspirations and expectations plays a crucial role in this triple transition, from a pre-departure phase characterized by personal circumstances and desires (e.g. finding better opportunities, studying, fleeing violence), and by one's own expectations and those of the family of origin to work and contribute to the family economy, to a renegotiation once settled in the country of arrival.\n\nFactors that positively or negatively influence the transition to adulthood include the contextual, subjective 8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nand relational variables related to the personal resources, agency and resilience of the adolescents, as well as the networks of formal and informal relationships that they are able to initiate once they arrive in Italy.\n\nThe presence or absence of such conditions determines the range of perspectives and opportunities that open up for UASC, both when they arrive and start the inclusion process, and once they have become adults.\n\nThe innovative aspect of this research also lies in the adoption of a participatory biographical approach, based on the recognition of the right of children and adolescents to express their opinion on and to be heard concerning decisions that affect their lives. This approach has put UASC and former UASC who turned 18 firmly in control as they narrate their life histories, each with their different pathways, profiles, legal status and backgrounds. The aim is to reveal the complex situations that children face, tell their stories, explore the structural bottlenecks and identify the factors that can help them in their transition to adulthood. In line with this approach and to ensure the protection of the best interests of UASC and promote a comfortable peer-to-peer interview setting, a group of former UASC were assigned the role of interviewers.\n\nThe methodological framework is based on a mixed-methods approach, which integrates qualitative and quantitative approaches. Together with the literature review, primary and secondary data were collected from national or regional official sources on the socio-demographic characteristics of UASC and former UASC and their presence in the Adult Learning Centres (CPIAs). These data were also based on online polls (U-Report on the Move) on the opinions UASC and former UASC on education and training courses received in Italy. Qualitative data draw from interviews and Focus group discussions (FGDs) with 185 UASC and former UASC, 46 interviews with key social and institutional informants (educators, social workers, teachers, volunteer guardians, and local institutional representatives), nine interviews with representatives of the relevant Ministries and United Nations agencies. In addition, three case studies were used, one for each region: supervised independent living and housing solutions in Lombardy; experiences of formal and informal relationships in Latium; structured support to volunteer guardians in Sicily.\n\n### **Key Findings**\n\nFACTORS THAT **FACILITATE** UASC'S TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD\n\n**••** **Legislation:** with the Law 47/2017, Italy has an advanced legal framework with regard to the recognition\n\nof UASC's rights and their protection;\n\n**••** **Reception:** the possibility of social inclusion, transition and of overcoming past traumas and problems,\n\nis closely linked to the reception experience, which when it works plays a positive role although strongly influenced by the local context;\n\n**••** **Relations:** formal and informal relationships, both with adults and between peers, represent an\n\nimportant support for UASC's and former UASC's pathways. In particular the educator's role in the reception facility and the role of the volunteer guardians is recognized by UASC as crucial;\n\n**••** **Education:** school and vocational training are recognized by UASC and former UASC as fundamental\n\n9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["U-Report on the Move"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "U-Report on the Move", "confidence": 0.4243795871734619}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "online polls", "confidence": 0.5372699499130249}]}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\nmilestones of their inclusion pathway;\n\n**••** **Home:** in the achievement of independent living, the importance of transitory solutions emerges, such\n\nas family-related hosting or of supervised semi-independent living.\n\nFACTORS THAT **HINDER** UASC'S TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD\n\n**••** **Legislation:** the slow and complex procedures for obtaining documents (and additional bureaucratic\n\nbottlenecks) are real obstacles to the lives of UASC;\n\n**••** **Time-frame:** the very short time most UASC have because of their age (16–17 years old) at arrival is\n\nvery limited to equip themselves with the necessary tools for autonomy and inclusion;\n\n**••** **Access to information:** some limitations emerge with respect to information and guidance provided\n\nto UASC on the opportunities and on the potential pathways concering both the normative framework and training and labour insertion;\n\n**••** **Work:** the difficulty in obtaining a regular work contract is an obstacle that affects every other aspect\n\nof the transition (residence permits, access to housing, etc);\n\n**••** **Discrimination:** forms of discrimination and racism in accessing the job and housing markets represent\n\nan additional obstacle in autonomy and social inclusion pathways and affect the personal well-being of UASC and former UASC;\n\n**••** **Trauma:** traumatic or particularly complex experiences in the country of origin or during the journey\n\nare difficult to overcome making social inclusion more difficult;\n\n**••** **Violence:** the dynamics of violence, including gender-based violence, experienced in particular by girls\n\neven when they are not victims of trafficking, has a strong impact on their transition to adulthood.\n\nBOTTLENECKS AND GAPS IN THE SYSTEM\n\n**••** **Lack of the implementation decrees of Law 47/2017** two years after its approval, which, together\n\nwith the lack of budgetary allocation, significantly limits its impact;\n\n**••** **Slowness and complexity of the current family reunification system** pursuant to the Dublin III\n\nRegulation, which drives many UASC or former UASC to prefer to transit through Italy and to try and cross the Northern borders, taking great risks;\n\n**••** **Abolition of humanitarian protection** (l.d.113/2018 then converted into Law 132/2018), a form of\n\nprotection previously existing in Italian law, which was granted to many UASC seeking asylum in Italy who did not satisfy the criteria for international protection;\n\n**••** **Fragmentation of the procedures for age assessment;**\n\n**••** **Fragmentation of the reception system,** both in terms of organization and type of facilities, and the\n\nquality of the services provided, where the local context has a significant impact in this regard; 10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n**••** **Lack of homogeneity and adequacy of training and skills of the reception system** staff linked to\n\nthe fragmentation of the reception system, particulary in the identification and timely protection and care of children with specific vulnerabilities;\n\n**••** **Disparities of treatment and uncertainty of being hosted in reception facilities after turning**\n\n**18,** which depends on the combination of three factors: legal status and having a residence permit;\n\nreception in SIPROIMI centres before they turned 18, benefiting or not from continued protection by the social services until the age of 21 pursuant to Article 13 of Law 47/2017 (Prosieguo Amministrativo);\n\n**••** **Lack of assessment** of literacy and numeracy skills and/or of the recognition of the schooling completed\n\nand of professional skills acquired in the country of origin or during the journey.\n\nLACK OF DATA\n\n**•**    - Data on **work permits for UASC** issued by the police stations and data on the conversion of these\n\npermits when they turn 18;\n\n**•**    - Data on **other types of residence permits issued** to UASC (e.g. for special cases or for medical\n\ntreatment);\n\n**•**    - Data on **the number of UASC enrolled in the Adult Learning Centres (CPIAs)**\n\n**•**    - Data on **Volunteer Guardians;**\n\n**•**    - Data on **UASC benefiting from foster care;**\n\n**•**    - Data on **the number of UASC in reception facilities;**\n\n**••** **Absence of an administrative body responsible for the collection of data on former UASC**\nas regards the reception system, their socio-economic inclusion, the continuity of their education pathways when they turn 18 and on those who are granted continued protection by social services until age 21 pursuant to Article 13 of Law 47/2017;\n\n**••** **Difficulties in comparing available data from different authorities** due to, inter alia, different\n\ndefinitions applied, levels of disaggregation, and frequency in collection and dissemination.\n\n11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "UASC benefiting from foster care", "confidence": 0.14509929716587067}, {"text": "work permits for UASC", "confidence": 0.14318734407424927}, {"text": "number of UASC in reception facilities", "confidence": 0.11958467960357666}, {"text": "other types of residence permits", "confidence": 0.11840049922466278}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n# **1. Introduction**\n\nLarge numbers of migrant and refugee children have arrived in Europe in recent years via the Mediterranean route, many of whom were Unaccompanied and Separated Children (UASC). Since 2014, around 70,000 UASC have arrived in Italy, the majority of whom (93%) are boys. Almost all of them (83.4%) are aged 16 to 17.\n\nDriven from their homes by conflict, poverty or disaster or simply in search of opportunities, on their journeys many faced danger and experienced detention, violence, exploitation and abuse.\n\nThe increase in UASC arrivals in Italy over the past few years has prompted the implementation of a response by the Italian Government, United Nations agencies, international humanitarian organizations and civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on supporting their reception and social inclusion and on the processing of international protection and resident permit requests. Among the encouraging developments and commitments made was the adoption of a new law (Law n.47, 7 April 2017), to date considered one of the most progressive pieces of legislation on migrant and refugee children’s rights and their protection.\n\nYet in transit and at destination, UASC continue to face many challenges and many gaps remain in the realisation of their rights. The significant presence in Italy of UASC (7,272 in June 2019, Ministry of Labour and Social Policies) and the growing number of former UASC who have turned 18 (around 60,000 since 2014) are a growing cause for concern and call for a broader and more comprehensive understanding of the challenges and opportunities for their protection and social inclusion.\n\nThe aim of this research, which was commissioned by three United Nations agencies – UNICEF, UNHCR and IOM – is to provide an overview of trends and possible pathways to adult life for UASC in Italy. Specifically, the research aims to provide evidence on the factors that affect the transition to adulthood of UASC, and that either facilitate or constrain a successful transition, both individually and structurally.\n\nThe research examines seven areas: (i) access to education, vocational and on-the-job training; (ii) access to the job market and the risks related to informal labour and exploitation; (iii) access to adequate housing solutions; (iv) experiences with volunteer guardians; (v) the role of formal and informal relationships; (vi) relationships with families of origin and the possibilities of family reunification; and (vii) the risk of onward movements. Each of these seven areas is explored taking into consideration the influence of the legal status and residence permits of UASC and UASC who have turned 18.\n\nRecognizing the right of children to express their opinion on decisions that affect them personally, [2] this report presents the findings of the first comprehensive participatory research on children and young people on the move in Italy. It is based on the stories of 185 boys and girls who followed different migration pathways, with different profiles, legal statuses and backgrounds. This approach has enabled the reconstruction of a broader and more comprehensive understanding of the multiplicity of situations, subjective difficulties, structural bottlenecks and support factors that determine and have determined their transition to adulthood.\n\nMore specifically, the report starts by presenting the methodological approach of the research (Chapter 2) and by providing an overview of the conceptual framework related to the ‘triple transition’ of UASC to adulthood, 12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Y., 17 years old, migrated to Italy from Côte d’Ivoire, at the reception centre where he stays in Naro,**\n\n**in Sicily, Italy. Y. was transferred without a choice, to this very small village (December 2018)**\n\n© UNICEF/UN0264443/Stefano De Luigi VII Photo", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\ndemographic trends and normative framework (Chapter 3). The fourth chapter describes the expectations, desires and aspirations related to the migration project; the fifth and sixth chapters highlight the factors that favour or constrain the process of transition to adulthood, starting from the conditions related to the legal status and residence permit of UASC and former UASC. Chapter 7 analyses some good or promising practices related to the role of volunteer guardians, to independent living and to formal and informal relationships with potential for replication and scale-up. The final part of the report summarizes the main results of the research (Chapter 8) and concludes with recommendations.\n\nThe present report is part of a broad ongoing inter-agency efforts by UNICEF, UNHCR and IOM to strengthen collaboration around evidence generation on the situation of refugee and migrant children and young people towards more informed policy and decision making to fulfil refugee and migrant children’s rights, improve their protection and support their social inclusion into host communities. The findings presented here thus aim to inform and recommend strategic and operational choices for consideration by UN agencies, Italian and European institutions and civil society organizations (CSOs) in order to maximize the chances for UASC and former UASC of a smooth transition to adulthood, reaching autonomy and integrating effectively into their communities.\n\n# **2. Research methodology and tools**\n\n**2.1 Research questions**\n\nThe main objective of the research was to analyse the transition to adulthood of UASC in Italy and to provide empirical evidence of the factors that facilitate or constrain this transition. The key questions are:\n\n**•**    - What are the trends in UASC's transition to adulthood?\n\n**•**    - How do transition pathways to adulthood meet their expectations and aspirations?\n\n**•**    - What are the factors that make UASC more vulnerable, and at risk of exclusion, abuse and exploitation?\n\n**•**    - Which good practices or positive experiences can be replicated to facilitate their transition to adulthood\n\nin Italy and promote their social inclusion?\n\n**2.2 Methodological approach and research tools**\n\nThe methodological framework is based on a mixed-methods approach, which enables qualitative and quantitative approaches to be combined and integrated (Amaturo and Punziano, 2016) in order to more thoroughly investigate the research topics than each approach can do individually (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011). The literature review has enabled the phenomenon of the transition to adulthood of UASC in Italy to be 14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nframed within the conceptual framework of the ‘triple transition’. For each thematic focus of the research, the literature review also provided key information on the normative framework and on the consequent current pathways of UASC in Italy to better frame both qualitative and quantitative methods.\n\nThe quantitative approach is based on the collection of primary and secondary data from official national or regional sources on specific issues:\n\n**•**    - the demographic characteristics of UASC, the condition linked to their legal status and their geographical\n\npresence in the three regions where the research was carried out;\n\n**•**    - a questionnaire addressed to the 39 Adult Learning Centres (CPIAs) (19 in Lombardy, ten in Latium and\n\nten in Sicily), with questions on the number of UASC students divided by age, gender and nationality;\n\n**•**    - the opinions of UASC on their education and training pathways and internship experiences through\n\ntwo U-Report on the Move polls. [3] The qualitative approach [4] is based on: (i) interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) with UASC and former UASC (166 males and 19 females); (ii) 46 interviews with key social and institutional informants at the regional and national levels (educators, social workers, teachers, volunteer guardians, institutional representatives); and (iii) nine interviews with representatives of ministries [5] and of the United Nations agencies that commissioned the research. In order to investigate UASC pathways, the biographical interview was identified as the most suitable among several alternatives in order to record the experiences, perceptions, time scale of the processes and the life experiences of boys and girls, leaving the interviewees ample scope to express themselves freely (Bichi, 2002; O’Leary, 2004). Three specific themes (see below) were then examined through FGDs, which enabled the analysis of the scenarios both from individual and group viewpoints, with a focus on the opportunities and the choices that have been made (Morgan and Kruger, 1998).\n\nIn addition to the interviews, a case study was carried out in each of the three regions with the aim of identifying promising practices in the following: (i) supervised independent living and housing solutions in support of UASC in Lombardy; (ii) formal and informal relationships supporting the transition to adulthood of UASC in Latium; and (iii) monitoring and support to volunteer guardians in Sicily. The three case studies identified experiences with a positive impact on the life pathways of UASC and former UASC, i.e. those that facilitate their transition to adult life. The qualitative tools used for the collection of data in the case studies were chosen on the basis of each case study: semi-structured interview with the Coordinator of the UASC Social Service of the Municipality of Milan for the Lombardy case study; semi-structured interviews with stakeholders for the Palermo and Lombardy case studies; FGDs with stakeholders for the Latium case study; and biographical interviews with UASC and former UASC (in all regions).\n\nThe research protocol was reviewed externally by Health Media labs and presented to key stakeholders in March 2019 – Ministry of the Interior (MoI), Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (MLSP), Ministry of Education (MoE), Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the Protection system for holders of international protection and foreign unaccompanied minors (SIPROIMI) and the National Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents.\n\n15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["U-Report on the Move polls"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "U-Report on the Move polls", "confidence": 0.65240877866745}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n**2.3 Description of the sample**\n\nThe sampling of UASC and former UASC was carried out according to a purposive sampling technique and stratified by gender, age, legal status and absconded status, and using a snowball [6] method. The research collected a total of 185 interviews (78 in Sicily, 55 in Lombardy and 52 in Latium), 147 of which were biographical interviews and 38 contributions from UASC and former UASC who participated in thematic FGDs. The interviewed young people were composed of 85 UASC and 100 former UASC, of which three were ‘absconded UASC’ and 19 were females (of which nine were UASC), in line with their numbers in Italy. [7] Most interviewees were 17 years old (39 cases), and 18 years old (one out of five, 31 young people), while one-third of interviewees were between 19 and 25 years old. The main nationalities were Gambian (28 cases), Egyptian (24) and Albanian (17).\n\nGuinean, Malian and Nigerian followed, with between 12 and 15 interviews each. A quarter of interviewees had a residence permit for UASC, and nine had turned 18 but were still benefiting from continued protection of social services (Prosieguo Amministrativo). There were 17 holders of international protection (ten refugees and seven with subsidiary protection), 28 holders of humanitarian protection, 17 holders of a permit for special cases and 22 had applied for asylum.\n\nUASC interviewees were contacted firstly through the reception facilities that hosted them, and some former UASC were contacted through key informants with whom they were still in touch. In particular, for the organization of FGDs, participants were contacted through the facilities where they were involved in activities (such as Italian classes or training workshops of various kinds) and not from the reception facilities in which they lived, in order to ensure a greater variety in the composition of the group – i.e. to take into consideration different inclusion pathways. Interviews with key informants (46 in total) were divided between those who perform institutional roles (13 cases) and those with social functions (33 cases). [8] Among the institutional representatives there are four representatives of the National Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescence (AGIA) at regional or municipal levels, two presidents of the Juvenile Courts, three representatives of the regions, two social workers of the municipalities and two representatives of the prefectures. Key actors with social roles included educators and social workers (14 cases), volunteer guardians (seven cases), psychologists (three cases) and teachers (two cases). In addition, interviews were carried out (nine in total) with the representatives of the relevant Ministries and of the National Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescence and with the representatives of the United Nations agencies that commissioned the research.\n\n**2.4 Data analysis and validation of preliminary findings**\n\nData analysis was carried out through the following procedure (for all types of data): data coding; management, input and organization of primary data; data processing; and analysis of results. For the analysis of biographical interviews with the target group of the research and of semi-structured interviews with key informants, the NVivo software was used, which allows to create a qualitative database, even a large one, as in this specific case, and to share it with other research teams. The interpretative analysis of the FGDs followed a thematic approach comparing the three concerned regions, aimed at highlighting the specificities of the analysed cases and good practices.\n\nIn June 2019, research findings were presented and discussed with key institutional stakeholders – Ministry 16", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "biographical interviews", "confidence": 0.11508908867835999}]}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nof the Interior (MoI), Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (MLSP), Ministry of Education (MoE), Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Protection system for holders of international protection and foreign unaccompanied minors (SIPROIMI). Draft recommendations were shared with each line ministry, and bilateral consultations were held for further inputs and validation purposes.\n\n**2.5 Selection of research sites**\n\nThe research areas were identified as being the three Italian regions with the highest number of UASC hosted in recent years and for their geographical diversity: Sicily, Lombardy and Latium. Within these three regions, the criteria for selecting the research sites took into account the distribution of UASC in the regions and the possibility of having access to the reception facilities. The following research sites were identified:\n\n**••** **Lombardy:** province of Milan (52 interviews) and province of Como (three interviews);\n\n**••** **Latium:** province of Rome (44 interviews) and province of Latina (eight interviews);\n\n**••** **Sicily:** province of Catania (22 interviews), Messina (18 interviews), Syracuse (18 interviews)\n\nand Palermo (20 interviews).\n\n**2.6 The research team: Working with peer researchers**\n\nIn order to ensure the protection of the best interests of UASC and to promote a comfortable interviewing context through peer-to-peer relationships, especially during the biographical interviews with UASC with particularly sensitive and traumatic stories, the research teams included former UASC among the interviewers.\n\nThe experience of the research conducted together with the interviewers as active subjects and “go-betweens” was an innovation of great methodological interest. Indeed, the use of the peer research approach minimizes the negative effects and related limitations of research involving children and young people, such as low motivation to participate and the power disparity with the adult researcher (Lushey and Munro, 2014).Excerpts of their reflections are presented in the boxes below.\n\n**\"It was the first time I asked direct questions**\n**about another person's private life, I'm**\n**not used to it, it was a challenge for me, I**\n**learned so many things. Actually it was a**\n**very important and enriching experience,**\n**I think it made me much more attentive to**\n**the details of a person's history and taught**\n**me not to judge people by their origin and**\n\n**social status. \"**\n\n**(M.)**\n\n**\"These people also told you about their**\n**personal** **secrets** **and** **emotions,** **so** **the**\n**interview became a private and delicate place**\n**to be protected. It helped me to grow more**\n**and compare myself with other people who**\n**have experienced migration like myself. I**\n**have understood other points of view, I have**\n**collected many different stories, but all united**\n**by two strong feelings: the pain and the desire**\n**to start again. \"**\n\n**(I.)**\n\n17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n**2.7 Ethical considerations**\n\nFor the purpose of the research, an ethical protocol was defined for the protection of UASC, consisting in policy documents for the protection of UASC and documentation for collecting informed consent and assent of the research participants. Policy documents adopted by ISMU Foundation include: the Code of Conduct for researchers; the Child Protection Policy; and the ISMU Guidelines for researchers, which comprise the procedures and Code of Conduct at each stage of the research, both with respect to contact with UASC and to the processing of their data on the basis of current legislation. Consent and assent documentation include formal and legal consent forms of interviewed adults and of the guardians of UASC and assent forms of UASC in order to ensure that they freely accepted to be interviewed.\n\n**2.8 Limitations**\n\nThere are a number of limitations related to the research, as summarized below:\n\n**••** **‘Absconded’ UASC:** The number of absconded UASC interviewed was lower than what had been\n\nplanned prior to the definition of the research protocol. This was due to the difficulty in identifying the guardian in order for them to sign the consent form, as well as the legal obligation to refer identified absconded UASC to the authorities, which contradicted the research ethical protocol with regard to confidentiality and anonymity. As a result, research participants for this specific category were limited to former UASC who had absconded prior to turning 18 and who had subsequently re-entered the reception system, thereby limiting to three the number of former UASC who met these criteria and who were interviewed as part of the research.\n\n**•**    - **Language skills:** in order to facilitate and ensure the timely collection of data, i.e. to enable the\n\ninterview to be carried out without the need for a translator, interviewees were selected on the basis of their knowledge of the Italian language. Therefore, with the exception of a few cases, interviewees who did not speak Italian were excluded from the research.\n\n**••** **Holders of international protection:** Some difficulties were experienced in identifying UASC and\n\nformer UASC with international protection (asylum or subsidiary protection).\n\n18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n# **3. Context**\n\n**3.1 Considerations on, and approaches to, migration and the transition to adulthood**\n\nThe reflection on UASC and former UASC pathways to adulthood can only start from the concept of the ‘triple transition’ that these girls and boys undergo: the transition from adolescence to adulthood that characterizes every human being; the transition from countries of origin to countries of arrival; and finally, the transition regarding overcoming trauma experienced prior to, during or after the journey (UNICEF and MDM, 2018).\n\nThe transition to adulthood, for all adolescents including UASC, is a complex period from a biological, psychological and social point of view. Moreover, it is widely recognized that the experience and the concept of adolescence may differ between and within cultures, with significant variations in the age at which one is still considered a child or treated as an adolescent rather than a young adult. In addition to these differences, there is the weight of factors related to the socio-economic context and to differences in gender, class and status, and to their cross-cutting nature (Demaria, 2016).\n\nAccording to many studies, growing up in adversity is associated with an early transition to adult roles and behaviours (PAHO, 2005: 267). Indeed, migration is experienced by these boys and girls as an undertaking that establishes the full entry into adult life and the journey as a rite of passage. In addition, there are the different aspects of the migration project that they must incorporate in the process of building their own identity (Terres des Hommes, 2017; UNICEF and MDM, 2018), such as redeeming the economic and social fate of their family or community. The person who has left his or her country is soon characterized by a ‘double absence’ (Sayad, 2002) by not belonging to either of the two contexts, the country of origin and the country of destination. This situation is likely to be devastating for the child, because he or she defines his or her identity in the transition to adulthood (Erickson, 1998). Finally, there is the difficult transition from a traumatic experience to the activation of their resilience capacities, traumas that can result from situations that occurred prior to departure, to the violence suffered during the journey (UNICEF and IOM, 2017), or from culture shock upon arrival (UNICEF and MDM, 2018).\n\nOn the basis of these considerations, the artificiality of a distinction between ‘UASC’ and ‘adults’ is evident, as it does not take due account of the process of becoming an adult, of the cultural and social differences that concern this process, and of the vulnerabilities to which this category of migrants is exposed.\n\nConsidering the difficulties inherent in the triple transition that UASC experience, the complexity and sensitivity of the assessment of the best interests of the child emerge, the best interest of the child being the cornerstone of all measures to protect boys and girls. Therefore, addressing them must entail the difficult search for a balance between infantilizing and abandoning them and providing them with the necessary tools for full autonomy in the host society. It then seems more appropriate to consider UASC as ‘young people’ [9] and to understand, by this term, the process and cultural differences in the various stages of growth. This qualitative leap implies 19", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**O. (left) with his housemate Y., both 17 years old, migrated from Senegal and has been in Italy for about**\n\n**a year. Here they play football at a piazza in the small village of Naro in Sicily, Italy (December 2018)**\n\n© UNICEF/UN0264441/Stefano De Luigi VII Photo", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\na concept of enhanced participation, which not only foresees their involvement but real empowerment, as reiterated in the United Nations by its Youth Strategy 2030. [10] In particular, there are some key areas where this triple transition – and the consequent caretaking, together with listening and understanding what the UASC or former UASC have to say – are particularly crucial: the legal status attributed to the adolescent and the possibility of accessing educational and training opportunities; accessing the job market; achieving housing independence; and of establishing or maintaining formal and informal relationships.\n\n**3.2 The normative framework and the reception system for UASC in Italy:**\n**Opportunities and protection**\n\nThe principle of the best interest of the child, established in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, [11] is the basis for the adoption of any decision concerning children, including determining which Member State of the European Union (EU) is responsible for examining applications for international protection or verifying the possibility of family reunification within the Dublin system, [12] which has been strengthened in the Italian legal system by the recent legislation for the protection of UASC (Law 47/2017).\n\nIn addition, Law 47/2017 introduced a number of new elements, including:\n\n**•**    - a unique procedure for the identification of UASC: this identification, which must be completed\n\nwithin ten days, requires that the qualified staff of the first-level reception facility, with the help of an intercultural mediator, conducts an interview with the child aimed at examining his or her personal and family history, and at drawing out any other element that could be useful for his or her protection;\n\n**•**    - an age assessment procedure to be followed when, during identification there is a well-founded doubt\n\nconcerning the age declared by the UASC or whoever is assumed to be an UASC. If it is not possible to ascertain the identity with personal documents, a multidisciplinary approach will be adopted by conducting socio-medical tests that respect the principle of gradual invasiveness for UASC [13] (this method of ascertaining age aims to prevent the risk that UASC approaching the age of 18 are identified as adults);\n\n**•**    - the role of the guardian, whose added value has been recognized by law and whose role has been\n\nstandardized at the national level, [14] regulating the scheduling and the competent authority for his/her appointment, the scope of his/her legal responsibilities and the number of UASC per guardian; [15]\n\n**•**    - the compilation of the cartella sociale (social file), drawn up by the reception facility staff. This is a key\n\ntool in assessing the best interests of the child.\n\nUASC in Italy have access to two types of residence permits: a permit for UASC (granted on the grounds of the child being unaccompanied and/or separated) and a permit for family [16] reasons. At the age of 18, a residence permit for UASC may be converted into a residence permit for study, work or job seeking. The application for conversion, depending on the situation in which the person concerned finds himself or herself, is conditional 22", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "cartella sociale", "confidence": 0.9334664344787598}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\non obtaining the approval of the Directorate-General for Immigration and Integration Policies of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (MLSP). [17] Also, a child may apply at the same time for both international protection and for a residence permit for UASC or have access to other residence permits governed by the law under the same conditions as other third country nationals. [18] When applying for international protection, UASC are granted certain procedural guarantees, including the right to a priority examination of their application, to be heard and to legal assistance.\n\nMoreover, the legislation provides that the conditions of being a child applying for international protection and holding a permit for UASC or for family reasons may coexist.\n\nLaw Decree 113/2018, converted into Law 132/2018 (hereinafter l.d. 113/2018), introduced an important change with the repeal of the residence permit for humanitarian reasons [19] (see Glossary) as this measure was widely used by the Territorial Commissions [20] to protect UASC or former UASC asylum seekers who did not meet the conditions for the recognition of international protection in the form of asylum or subsidiary protection. With the same law, the Territorial Commission now has the possibility of recognizing a new residence permit for special protection of one year – renewable in case of continued eligibility, but not convertible on expiry – for cases in which the foreigner cannot be rejected, expelled or extradited.\n\nWith reference to the right to reception, Law 47/2017 (the Zampa Law) has set the principle of non-differentiation among UASC by virtue of their legal status. This legislation requires local authorities to give priority to family foster care over placement in a reception facility (Article 7). In October 2017, the National Integration Plan for holders of international protection also highlighted the measures needed to increase the reception system capacity and improve socio-economic integration through the full application of existing legislative instruments.\n\nTo date, the reception system therefore includes:\n\n1. governmental first-level reception facilities for the needs of rescue and immediate protection of all\n\nUASC (known as AMIF or FAMI) [21], in which UASC are received for the time strictly necessary (30 days) for identification, age assessment, the provision of information on his or her rights, including that of applying for international protection; 2. SIPROIMI second-level reception facilities, where all UASC regardless of their legal status are entitled to stay. UASC who have applied for international protection can remain until the conclusion of the procedure on status determination, even after turning 18. UASC who benefit from continued protection until the age of 21 can also remain within the SIPROIMI system; [22] 3. other types of reception facilities managed by the municipal authorities or the Prefectures where the child is located, when the former two types are unavailable. Depending on where the research was carried out, these forms of reception have a different name (e.g. educational communities, community housing, CAS), but they all meet the accreditation criteria defined at the regional or municipal levels.\n\nAdditionally, for UASC who have been identified as victims of trafficking, the Zampa law establishes that special protection must be guaranteed to them and provides a specific programme of assistance that ensures 23", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\nadequate reception conditions and psychosocial, health and legal assistance, providing for their continued protection even after they turn 18. [23] On living conditions in Italy and recognized rights, the new law has further consolidated the recognition of the right to health and education to UASC (Article 14).\n\n**3.3 UASC in Italy**\n\nBetween 2014 and 2018, 625,009 refugees and migrants arrived in Italy by sea, of whom 70,547 were UASC.\n\nAlthough the trend of arrivals by sea is declining, in 2018, a total of 3,536 UASC arrived in Italy. In the first half of 2019, the proportion of UASC alone was still significant: 365 out of 2,779 UASC, or 13 per cent, arrived by sea. The data on arrivals by sea must be compared with those of UASC present and registered in the reception system by the MLSP. Table 2 shows the overall reduction between 2017 and 2018, with a stable gender distribution.\n\n**Table 1. UASC present and registered in the reception system in Italy, by gender, December 2013–2018**\n\n**Year** **Males (%)** **Females (%)** **Total (absolute values)**\n\n31/12/2013 93.8 6.2 6 319 31/12/2014 94.5 5.5 10 536 31/12/2015 95.4 4.6 11 921 31/12/2016 93.3 6.7 17 373 31/12/2017 93.2 6.8 18 303 31/12/2018 92.7 7.3 10 787 Source: ISMU calculations based on data from the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies.\n\nSince 2015 most children arriving are 17 (54% and 60.2% of the total), followed by 16-year-olds (between 23.4% and 28.7% of the total). Most UASC who came between 2013 and 2015 were Egyptians, yet in recent years their number has decreased, while simultaneously there has been an increased trend (20%) of children arriving from West African countries reaching 41% of the total presence of UASC in 2018. Albania, the Gambia and Eritrea present steady trends, with a maximum fluctuation of Albanian children of 5 percentage points in these years (1,677 at the end of 2017; 1,550 at the end of 2018), while UASC from the Gambia and Eritrea since 2014 register numbers varying between 7% and 13%.\n\nAs of June 2019, 4,700 children were registered as absconded [24] since they have left formal reception facilities or care arrangements; it is not possible to know if they are still present in Italy. The trend of absconded UASC shows an overall decrease that is due to, at least in part, to them turning 18 and thus ceasing to be registered as UASC in the reception system.\n\n24", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["data on arrivals by sea"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data on arrivals by sea", "confidence": 0.33333006501197815}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nThe aforementioned drop in arrivals from the central Mediterranean route and the consequent reduction of UASC with African origins further highlights the consistent and substantially stable presence of Albanian UASC, who have been among the first nationalities in percentage terms in recent years (22% in June 2019). Overall (figure 1), there is confirmation of the main countries of origin of UASC compared with the trend of previous years (Egypt, the Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea), with the exception of Eritrean UASC, for whom the numbers have halved and – concerning age - a slight increase in the number of children aged 17. Females represent 6.8%, with 31.8% coming from Nigeria, followed by Albania (13.4%) and Eritrea (11.6%). To a lesser extent than their male counterparts, females are also mostly 17 (44.7%) and 16 (22.7%) years old.\n\n**Figure 1. UASC registered in the reception system as at 30 June 2019 by main nationality, gender and age**\n\nFirst 5 UASC nationalities Gender Females 7% 0-6 years old 1% Age 7-14 years old 6% 15 years old 7% Guinea Gambia Côte d'Ivoire Egypt Albania Other origin 5,2% 6,5% 6,7% 8,7% 22,9% 50% 16 years old 17 years old 23% 63% Males 93% Source: MLSP data (UASC Monthly Report in Italy, updated on 30 June 2019).\n\nDespite the aim of the Italian authorities to achieve a more equitable geographical distribution of reception facilities for UASC across the country, to date, Sicily continues to host the largest number of UASC. At the end of 2018, it hosted 38 per cent of the total number of UASC registered, mostly from the Gambia and Eritrea, which decreased to 28.4 per cent in June 2019 as a result of the decline in arrivals. Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna and Lazio follow with Egyptian and Albanian nationalities (the number of young Egyptians is particularly significant in Lazio, equal to 39 per cent at the end of 2018).\n\nBetween 2013 and 2017, [25] there was a steady increase in the issuance of residence permits for UASC, followed by a slight drop in 2017, at 30 per cent of those present that year. In addition to the residence permits for UASC, there are also permits for foster care, family reasons and the integration of UASC, which have not been, however, consistently recorded over the years and therefore do not allow to determine the trends. After the progressive increase in asylum applications from 2014, with a peak in 2017 of 9,782 applications, there was a sudden decline in 2018. With the decrease in applications, there was also a 62.4 per cent decrease in 2017 in absolute terms of UASC asylum seekers, (from more than 9,700 in 2017 to 3,676 in 2018). The 377 UASC who applied for asylum in January and June 2019 make up only 2 per cent of the total number of applicants. During 2018, 8,554 UASC asylum applications were examined, of which 5.8 per cent obtained refugee status; 2.6 per 25", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["MLSP data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "MLSP data", "confidence": 0.7790300250053406}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "UASC Monthly Report in Italy", "confidence": 0.25640830397605896}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\ncent, subsidiary protection; and 61 per cent, humanitarian protection, a reduction of 10 per cent compared to 2017 (Ministry of the Interior, 2018), but three times higher than the 20.9 per cent of foreign adults to whom it was granted (Table 2). In 2018, more than a third of the examined paperwork concerned young Gambians and Nigerians, with the recognition of refugee status for 2 per cent and 17 per cent of applications, respectively, and humanitarian protection for 67 per cent and 52 per cent (Ministry of the Interior, National Commission for Asylum).\n\n**Table 2. UASC asylum seekers: First instance decision, by gender and age group, and total no. of adults, 2018.**\n\n**Gender/age** **Refugee** **Humanitari-** **Another** **Total no.**\n**Subsidiary** **Not granted** **Absconded**\n**group** **status** **an protection** **outcome** **examined****\n\nprotection 280 209 5.088 2 184 198 94 8 053 Female 215 10 162 73 22 19 501\n\n**Total** **495** **219** **5 250** **2 257** **220** **113** **8 554**\n\n0–13 years old 6 1 5 4 1 5 22 14–17 years old 145 63 986 417 56 67 1 734 18+ years old (*) 344 155 4 259 1 836 163 41 6 798\n\n**Total** **495** **219** **5 250** **2 257** **220** **113** **8 554**\n\n**Total % UASC** **5.8** **2.6** **61.4** **26.4** **2.6** **1 .3** **100.0**\n\n% total adults 7.4 4.5 20.9 58.6 8.1 0.4 100.0 Not recognized = e.g. negative reply, absent/not-eligible, etc (*) at the time of the decision.\n\n(**) examined during the year irrespective of the date of application for asylum.\n\nFonte: ISMU calculations based on data from the Ministry of the Interior, National Commission for Asylum.\n\n26", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["data from the Ministry of the Interior"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data from the Ministry of the Interior", "confidence": 0.17436009645462036}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n# **4. Expectations, aspirations and the future**\n\nThe desires and aspirations of UASC often concern the sphere of opportunities that are denied or impeded by the economic and social context in the country of origin due, amongst other factors, to conflict or economic deprivation. While individual expectations relate to the possibility of realizing one's own desires in a relatively short time, family expectations relate to the capacity to respond to external expectations, which are often complex, such as being able to send economic remittances in a short time. [26] Desires and expectations, therefore, become indicators of adolescents’ ability to influence the present and to project themselves into the future (Bell, 1966). Their choices, like their desires and their potential for building their lives, vary in relation to their age and their ability to imagine themselves in the future, and in relation to their gender and the social and cultural expectations attributed to them.\n\n**4.1 UASC aspirations and family expectations**\n\nA plurality of desires and aspirations have emerged from the biographical interviews with UASC. Individual desires before departure can be thus identified, albeit mixed with their complex life experiences:\n\n**••** **to find opportunities for a better life:** _“I would like to have a beautiful life, a better future, for me,_\n\n_also for my future generation”_ (Congolese [27], male, 17 years old);\n\n**••** **to pursue education:** _“For me, dreaming of going to school led to taking the boat from Egypt [...] I_\n\n_had the chance, now I cannot give up”_ (Egyptian, male, 17 years old). This desire often clashes with the need for self-sufficiency at the time of leaving the reception system: _“I wanted more: to go to_ _school, finish my studies, but it will be a bit difficult to study with nothing in hand, without money,_ _because I want to go to university“_ (Congolese, male, 17 years old);\n\n**••** **to make Italy only a leg of my journey:** _“I knew nothing, not even the language ... because I have_\n\n_never studied Italian and therefore I wanted to go to England”_ (Eritrean, male 17 years old);\n\n**••** **to escape from violence,** an aspiration that concerns those who flee from situations of conflict,\n\npersecution and violence in their country of origin: _“It was also very hard for me to come; my family_ _is in Africa. You understand [...] my country is also at war_ ” (Somalian, male, 19 years old);\n\n**••** **to flee from family abuse and the risk of early marriage,** in particular for girls: “ _When you are there_\n\n_you are 17 years old, they find you a husband and you go”_ (Albanian, 16 years old, female);\n\n**••** **to reunite with one's family**    - the dream is often to reach Northern European countries: _“When the_\n\n_documents arrive I'll go to Holland, because my father is there”_ (Eritrean, female, 17 years old). This desire also emerged for the UASC ‘in transit’, who stay for some time in Rome or in border areas, as confirmed by the educators of some civil society organizations (CSOs):\n\n**••** **to have a family of their own in the future:** _“first of all, my dreams, [...] have my own family, get_\n\n_married, and have children”_ (Ivorian, male, 16 years old), mentioned by both males and females: _“to work, have a house and do something good, later a husband and a child who goes to school”_ 27", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**M., 17 years old, originally from the Gambia, sits by a pond in a park in Pozzallo, Sicily, Italy (May 2016)**\n\n© UNICEF/UN020027/ Gilbertson VII Photo", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n(Somalian, female, 17 years old). They often prefer Italy for this project: _“I would like to continue to_ _stay here and have a job, then I bring them and we live here in Italy together”_ (Gambian, male, 17 years old);\n\n**••** **not having precise desires:** _“when I left my country I had no direction”_ (Gambian, male, 18 years old)\n\nBoth girls and boys highlighted the need to maintain a relationship with relatives of the country of origin and the desire to build a family in the future, often preferring Italy for this project. Studying, working, being self supporting and seeking stability underlie the emerging desire to bring a family member to Italy, the younger brother, the sister or the mother: _“[...] to be a nurse, bring my mother here, I would like to study and then work,_ _have a house, a husband, buy food”_ (Somalian, female, 17 years old).\n\nThe research also highlighted the need to pay particular attention to the influence of the family of origin on the formulation of expectations. Once in Italy, many children want to work for themselves and to send money home, often coming with previous work experience. Once they arrive, however, they discover that they have to wait to obtain a residence permit, to learn Italian, attend school and be trained through an internship, and that they actually have to wait until they turn 18 in order to work. Goals are thus adapted, and an awareness soon emerges of the need to complete an education and training pathway, and to undertake multiple activities to build one’s own path: _“They told me that it's early; there are no jobs; you still have to learn the language; at the_ _beginning I went crazy, because I have always earned money since I was a child”_ (Tunisian, male, 24 years old).\n\nFinally, departure is not always voluntary or planned, especially for some girls and young women who arrived following a decision taken by their adult husband or family, while others were deceived by family members or trusted friends. In these cases, the migration project emerges later, once they have entered the reception and protection system.\n\n30", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n**4.2 Desires and expectations in the transition to adulthood**\n\nFor those who have just turned 18, the prospect of a better quality of life, which takes the form of a satisfactory work activity, is a common objective. Their stories are striking for their acquired capacity to nurture their dreams and their capacity to have aspirations and to project themselves into the future (Appadurai, 2011), albeit with a certain flexibility in the choices of a desirable future (Masini, 2000), susceptible to changes and adaptations in relation to the place where they will live.\n\nThe desire that most frequently emerges is to build a future in Italy and specifically where they have experienced the most significant stages of their process of growth towards adulthood. Expectations and desires become a springboard for a pathway that starts in Catania, Palermo, Syracuse, Rome, Latina and Milan, and that will make them citizens of these cities: _“Certainly, I live in Italy because I’m comfortable here[...], my family has educated_ _me, but here I have been taught to grow”_ (Egyptian, male, 19 years old). In this change of mentality experienced by girls and boys, some positive role models of adults they met during their journey in Italy were crucial.\n\nIn most of the interviews with UASC, the expectations regarding work are focused, at this stage, on specific jobs: blacksmith, hairdresser, cook, mechanic, waiter, plumber and electrician. The girls dream of being a policewoman, an engineer, a doctor, a lawyer, but they adapt their expectations to any job opportunity, often oriented towards occupations having traditionally higher numbers of female workers (hairdresser, waitress, beautician), thus reproducing traditional roles that persist both in the culture of origin and in the culture of arrival: _“What kind of work? Cleaning, working in a restaurant, caring for the elderly, whatever there is”_ (Nigerian, female, 20 years old).\n\nEveryone’s future is built step by step, from one experience to another, finding a way to satisfy, as close as possible, one’s aspirations and aware that these can change. Among UASC who turned 18, at times there is the desire to return to their country of origin, to put into practice the professional experience acquired or to start a business, at times because they feel a sense of responsibility towards their own country: _“I am Congolese and_ _I must return to my country to invest, build [...] if I have the ability to do so, I will do so “_ (Congolese, male, 17 years old).\n\nThe desire for a satisfactory housing solution is key, especially for former UASC, which often means having a room in an apartment on their own, where they can live together with other friends and/or fellow compatriots ‘chosen as roommates’. Similarly, to the desires expressed by UASC, those who turned 18, especially some girls and young women who already have a child to take care of, expressed the dream of building a family of their own, marrying and having children: _“I want to work a lot to help my family. He is here, he is small (referring_ _to the child)”_ (Gambian, female, 18 years old). This represents an important step towards the transition to adult life and the affirmation of one’s own achievement, proving to oneself and also to others in the country of origin and in Italy that one has ‘made it’.\n\n31", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n**Life history of M. – Albanian, 20 years old: Benefiting from continued care and protection until age 21**\n\n**M. has been in Italy for four and a half years and, from the very beginning, has followed a positive**\n\n**path of social inclusion in Italy. He arrived in Italy at the age of 15, pushed by his parents, although**\n\n**he did not agree with his family’s decision. Upon his arrival in Milan, he was immediately placed**\n\n**in a reception facility where the stay is structured in several steps that gradually guides them to**\n\n**autonomy. M. has followed all the steps within the reception facility and is now in an apartment**\n\n**under supervised independent living arrangements. After the first Italian courses and the middle**\n\n**school exam, he was able to enrol in an evening school (chartered accountant and surveyor**\n\n**specialization course), having expressed a clear desire to continue studying, even if he says he had to**\n\n**‘fight’ to be able to continue doing so. Attending evening classes, he had the opportunity to obtain a**\n\n**five-month work grant in a design studio, which he says was a very good experience, where he was**\n\n**appreciated. When he turned 18, the social services granted him continued protection until age 21.**\n\n**In addition, because of this internship, M. was ready to move into supervised independent living. He**\n\n**then obtained a scholarship that allows him to continue attending an evening school for surveyors,**\n\n**without having to work, because the scholarship is conditional on school results. M. is in his final**\n\n**year of schooling and until then will enjoy the continued protection by social services, at the end**\n\n**of which he feels ready to enter the job market. M. has been able to achieve what he wanted and is**\n\n**following a pathway in which he is guided towards gradual independence, which will allow him to**\n\n**have freedom and responsibility without feeling abandoned.**\n\n32", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n# **5. The transition to adulthood:** **pathways and factors for success**\n\n**5.1 Characteristics and factors that facilitate or constrain UASC’s transition**\n**pathways**\n\n**5.1.1 UASC's rights**\n\n**Figure 2. UASC’s rights**\n\n**UASC rights**\n\nNon Non Right to have refoulment expulsability a guardian Unconditional accommodation (priority to family-foster care, when possible) Social rights recognized for all children (education, health, etc.) Procedural guarantees for asylum applications The principle of the best interests of the child and the importance of the inclusion of the child in a long-term project are at the core of the biographies collected. As shown in Figure 2, the rights granted to UASC protect their stay in Italy, their legal status and their social life. However, there is a gap between the rights and guarantees provided for by law and their actual implementation in accordance with the principle of the best interests of the child. Good practices of multidisciplinary, best interest assessment consistent with international standards are still limited due to inadequate and heterogenous regulations.\n\nThe legal status influences UASC pathways because it impacts on the choices available to them. This is even more significant following the abolition of the residence permit for humanitarian protection. Hence, looking at the precariousness linked to the legal status, prospects differ based on whether the UASC: a. have a form of international protection (refugee status or subsidiary protection, which is the most stable legal status enabling to develop a social inclusion pathway); b. hold a residence permit for special cases, which can be converted into another residence permit [28] and which can extend after the age of 18. This includes UASC who have been granted humanitarian protection under the previous legal framework; [29] 33", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**B., 18 yeasr old, a refugee from war-affected South Sudan in class at the United World College,**\n\n**near Trieste, where he has won a full scholarship to complete the international baccalaureate,**\n\n**October 2017.**\n\n© UNHCR/Fabio Bucciarelli", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\nc. have a residence permit for UASC, which lasts until they turn 18 and can be converted into a residence permit for job seeking, or study or work purposes; d. are waiting for the outcome of their asylum application and live in the greatest precariousness, especially given that there is a risk that they will receive a negative decision when they turn 18.\n\nIn all cases, the legal status affects the process of social inclusion and labour insertion, consequently leading to frustration due to the feeling of not progressing and of precariousness. The legal status, therefore, is the first factor that positively or negatively affects the pathway of transition to adulthood.\n\n**5.1.2 The first step: The pathways in the reception system**\n\nAcross all regions, common trends have been observed with regard to reception procedures and pathways, with positive and negative cases being equally distributed. There are many factors that affect reception pathways, that are both structural, such as local opportunities, and interpersonal, such as the people with whom UASC interact.\n\n_**The role of the educator**_ The educator [30] plays a crucial role in the reception pathway and in guiding UASC’s choices. In particular, for girls, in particular, the need to build positive relationships with adult women is observed: _“She asks me what I_ _think is right for me [...] Yes, I get on well. She told me that when I want to talk, when I have a problem, ‘call me,_ _I can help you’. She is a good person”_ (Albanian, female, 16 years old). From the biographies, an ambivalence emerges regarding the role of the educator as someone who both builds a privileged relationship with the UASC but who is also the guarantor of the organizational rules of the reception facilities in which they operate.\n\n_**The educational importance of the rules**_ The interviewees stated that the rules of the reception facility have to be respected and cannot not be waived, even if, in reality, some of them reluctantly tolerate a systematic limitation in the freedom they have to manage the time they spend in the facility, their free time, and their belongings. The quality of the services and the opportunities offered by the reception facility are crucial in the acceptance of this reduced freedom, whilst at the same time facilitating adaptation to the new context.\n\nThree UASC profiles emerge that outline three types of actions and relationships based on the rules of the reception facility:\n\n1. **Adaptive**    - recognizes the value of the rules for personal and common well-being: _“When something_\n\n_is not right, okay I understand that I shouldn’t do it, and if I want to do again [laughs], they tell me_ _you cannot do this; sometimes I get angry, afterwards I understand that it was right and I say okay”_ (Albanian, female, 16 years old).\n\n2. **Rebel** - misinterprets the rules and does not acknowledge their usefulness: _“If the carabinieri are_ 36", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n_called in, I tell you, they won’t not let me out, I swear [...] in Tunisia it never happened that I wasn’t_ _allowed out for months. Never, and I come to this community and they do this to me”_ (Tunisian, male, 13 years old).\n\n3. **Resigned** - although not acknowledging the rules, opts for living peacefully: _“[...] so as to avoid_ _problems because I know how I am, so to avoid them I prefer to be on that side”_ (Ivorian, male, 16 years old).\n\nUASC, therefore, often struggle to understand the educational value of the rules of the reception facilities in which they live, and at times, particular attention is not given by reception facility staff to their understanding of this value, but rather, the focus is on the need for them to adapt. In addition, there are specific situations, such as reception facilities for victims of trafficking, where the rules are even stricter for the protection of the girls hosted there; but even here, it is neither simple nor clear for them to understand and accept these rules, including from a psychological point of view, especially those regarding control and freedom of movement.\n\nUASC also mentioned a particularly positive aspect regarding the services offered by the reception facilities, i.e. sports and recreational activities. In general, the boys and girls mentioned that there were opportunities to become involved in exciting and fun activities.\n\n**5.1.3 UASC’s education and training pathways**\n\nThe public education and training system is uniform throughout the country and is compulsory for ten years for all children from the age of six to 16. The differences in the three observed regions are therefore attributable to the school and training courses available at the local level and to the choices of the actors involved in the development of the child's personal education plan (PEI). [31] With the increase in the number of UASC, the provision of Italian courses has expanded and is now divided into Italian language workshops within the reception facilities, courses offered by the CPIAs, [32] and Italian language schools run by CSOs and/or universities. In particular, the CPIAs are the main hub for UASC – and for migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers in general – for Italian courses and the attainment of the compulsory middle school certificate, as shown by the census carried out in the CPIAs of the three regions involved in the research. The data collected by the CPIAs shows that 84 per cent of students are citizens of a third country, of whom 10 per cent are UASC. [33] With regards to vocational training, there are two different types of training courses for UASC: short courses (from three to six months) provided by the accredited bodies of the Vocational Education and Training (VET) [34] regional system, and longer courses (from two years to five years) carried out by training institutions accredited by the regions or by the professional institutes and the CPIAs as part of their regular courses for the adult population.\n\nThe integration of UASC into the educational system is significantly difficult in the early stages, especially in early literacy, due to their disorientation upon arrival in Italy and in the early stages of their integration into the reception system (Augelli, Lombi and Triani 2018). Moreover, it is not uncommon for UASC to have low levels 37", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["data collected by the CPIAs"], "vague_data": ["census"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "census carried out in the CPIAs", "confidence": 0.1993785798549652}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "census carried out in the CPIAs", "confidence": 0.6201142072677612}, {"text": "data collected by the CPIAs", "confidence": 0.12076069414615631}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\nof schooling [35] upon arrival, even if they often have the advantage of knowing several languages and of being aware of the importance of learning Italian as a fundamental step in their path to inclusion (D’Agostino: 2018).\n\nOne of the main problems relates to access to the education system for UASC who are 15 years old and who can be admitted either exceptionally to the CPIA or to regular secondary schools. [36] Alongside language difficulties, UASC are often faced with the challenge of building trust and developing relationships with peers, teachers and other adults at school. The Personal Education Plan (PEI), therefore, becomes fundamental in the UASC’s transition towards their social inclusion, which can only be achieved together with the contribution of all the individuals involved in supporting them: educators, social workers and volunteer guardians. [37] Many interviewed UASC want to go to school because they believe that their future depends on the acquisition of educational and professional skills. Responses to the U-Report on the Move poll also confirm this trend, with 77 per cent of respondents reporting that they were very satisfied with their school experience. [38] School and vocational training courses are experienced as strongly geared towards job insertion or as an opportunity for emancipation and growth: _“The school inspires ideas. If you don't go to school, you can't know everything_ _that's going on in the world”_ (Nigerian, female, 21 years old).\n\nFrom the analysis of the information gathered, three enabling factors have been identified in facilitating their school-training pathways: a. **the quality of the support** offered by the reception facility, in particular, the educators and the other staff who spend the day with the UASC. This support plays a central role in the choice of the educational path that best responds to the greatest interests of the child, assessed in a multidisciplinary way. In the specific cases of young women with children, the support of childcare organizations and services becomes crucial to enable them to continue their studies: _“In the morning I go to Civico Zero, and she_ _goes to the kindergarten at nine”_ (Eritrean, female, 17 years old); b. opportunities that are built in the school-training context through **the network of relationships** that are established; c. the type of **guidance and orientation in the choices** that UASC make to either continue training or access employment. Some interviewed educators and social workers confirm that most UASC are oriented towards professional pathways or quickly enrolled in job internships to support them in their job placement. In both cases, the importance of guiding the adolescent to understand his or her aspirations, abilities and possibilities has a decisive effect on the success of his or her pathway.\n\nThe positive trend of school experiences is confirmed by the U-Report on the Move poll, with 89 per cent of respondents stating that what they are learning is very useful. In addition, both boys and girls seem to be clear about what could be changed in their education paths in order to improve them, i.e. 30 per cent of U-Reporters stated they would like a more practical method to learn Italian, which was also confirmed by UASC and former UASC who participated in the FGDs.\n\n38", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["U-Report on the Move poll"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "U-Report on the Move poll", "confidence": 0.9661992788314819}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n**Life history of K. – Ivorian, 17 years old: Residence permit for UASC**\n\n**K. says that he applied for international protection but that he then withdrew his application**\n\n**because the “Commission in Italy became difficult”. He arrived in Milan with the initial intention**\n\n**of going to France to join a friend, but he gave up this plan when he was placed in a facility in the**\n\n**Milan area. He has negative memories of this place, because “there were no rules; you don't study**\n\n**and you don't do anything.” After spending around five months there, he was transferred to a facility**\n\n**for UASC in Milan, where he has been living for a year. He attended and obtained the middle school**\n\n**certificate during his stay at the reception facility. Although he expressed the desire to continue**\n\n**studying, his educators suggested that he set out on a path ensuring access to employment, so as**\n\n**to become autonomous, since he was approaching the age of 18. K. says he is willing to take any**\n\n**job. At the time of the interview, however, K. mentioned problems with his documents for reasons**\n\n**he cannot understand. This situation – the impossibility of studying and working, the uncertainty**\n\n**about the future, like the traumas he experienced during the journey (he mentions the painful loss**\n\n**of a friend in the desert) – has thrown him into a state of distress, so he is assisted by a psychologist,**\n\n**whom he sees once a week and with whom he talks about “his dream” that “is now ruined forever”.**\n\n39", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n**5.1.4 The role of the guardian in the transition to adulthood**\n\nThe system of guardianship for UASC takes three forms: public-institutional, voluntary and pro tempore. Law 47/2017 values in particular volunteer guardians (see box 3 in Annex), who appear as a key reference person in the UASC’s transition to adult life, as joint actors in the choices that the child makes. The importance of the volunteer guardian and his/her task to support in the UASC’s process of transition to adult life is also internationally recognized (see FRA and AGIA, 2018 [39] ). The guardian ensures the child’s overall well-being, safeguards the child’s best interests, exercises legal representation and complements the child’s limited legal capacity. [40] He or she facilitates the personal growth of UASC in the host society, supervises the protection of their rights, and supports them in understanding their duties.\n\nAs revealed by the interviews, volunteer guardians define their role in practice rather than on the basis of legal provisions, and in a significantly different way from the past and from institutional guardians. The mainstreaming of the new role of the volunteer guardian within the protection and reception system has also varied between locations and in its duration. Sicily represents a good practice, although there are differences across the different provinces involved in the research; Palermo and Syracuse offer positive experiences and successful cases due to the very active presence of support networks [41] and associations.\n\nIn general, the role of the volunteer guardian is positive and effective when he or she succeeds in forging and guiding the particular relationship that is established between the UASC and the surrounding social context.\n\nMuch depends on the skills and personal talent of the guardian, and his or her availability in terms of time and presence in the daily life of the UASC to identify, in a timely manner, signs of discomfort or calls for help in crucial moments of UASC’s pathways towards maturity nand relational and economic autonomy. A serious shortcoming of the current system, which is also not regulated by Law 47/2017, is the lack of permanent support mechanisms for volunteer guardians, in addition to training. [42] As the interviewees testify, the role they play is highly relational and involves the social and emotional dimension of protection: _“The guardian for me_ _here in Italy is like a parent, a big brother. I tell him, ‘This is my problem, can you help me?’ I also have his_ _WhatsApp number“_ (Albanian, male, 16 years old). Within this relationship, the expectations of the guardian as well as that of the child towards him or her also play an important role, which, if not mediated or if unrealistic, are at risk of leading to frustration.\n\n**5.1.5 Becoming adults by building meaningful relationships**\n\nIn the transition to adulthood, UASC build formal and informal relationships to support their social inclusion in Italy. These relationships can be categorised as follows:\n\n**••** **formal relationships,** which are mediated by the processes of institutionalization and inclusion;\n\n**••** **informal relationships,** which are the spontaneous relationships that arise and develop through links\n\nwith the communities from home countries and friendships between peers groups;\n\n**••** **relationships that are built in the formal sphere** (the school or the reception facility) but that go\n\nbeyond their formal function.\n\n40", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nThe first relationships of trust are established with the educators of the reception facilities, who contribute towards the definition of a positive model of support and guidance to adulthood. Building positive bonds with adults helps to build openness to society, attributing to adults a positive image, whereas previously these same adults may have been a source of exploitation, violence or deception: _“I was deceived by my cousin who told_ _me that I had to go with him to Lagos, and by chance, I found myself in Libya”_ (Nigerian, female, 17 years old).\n\nSome interviewed UASC maintain significant relationships with the family of origin, or part of it. Some have even expressed the desire to be able to bring their relatives to Italy, often younger brothers or sisters: _“I still_ _do not know if I will live here in Italy or England, but I would like to take my family with me”_ (Eritrean, male, 17 years old), or join a part of their family in other European countries. This legitimate aspiration often becomes difficult to realize due to procedural difficulties and lack of harmonization among EU countries, particularly with regard to age assessment and family links: _“Yes, when my documents arrive I will go to the Netherlands,_ _because my father is there. I'm going there”_ (Eritrean, female, 17 years old).\n\nWithin the informal relations built by UASC, relations with peers are of particular importance. In the context of reception facilities, UASC are in close contact with other UASC on similar paths and in similar situations; although this helps mutual understanding, it may limit them to ghettoized relationships.\n\n**5.2 Transition to adulthood: What changes when UASC become adults**\n\n**5.2.1 The rights of former UASC**\n\n**Figure 3. Changes in entitlements of former UASC upon turning 18**\n\n**Changes to entitlements upon turning 18**\n\nLoss of rights and guarantees linked to being a child (guardianship, procedural guarantees in asylum applications, etc.) Loss of the right of Loss of the right of non refoulement non explusability Loss of the right to unconditional accomodation Becoming an adult is a fundamental turning point for those who arrived in Italy alone and as UASC. The borderline is clearly defined from a legal and reception point of view. For children approaching the age of 18, different scenarios are envisaged according to their legal status: for those who hold international protection status, although they lose rights and safeguards granted to them as children, the moment of transition to adulthood has a relatively minor impact since the international protection status provides a broad protection of rights and reception facilities; those with a residence permit for UASC will be in a critical situation regarding 41", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**M. (left), 15 years old, from Côte d’Ivoire, M. L. B (centre, their volunteer guardianship) and K.,**\n\n**16 years old, from Guinea-Bissau, pose for a photo in Palermo, Sicily, Italy (December 2018)**\n\n© UN/0264460/Stefano De Luigi VII Photo", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\nboth their residence permit and right to reception: they may apply for a permit for job seeking, study purposes or work purposes [43] but in all cases, they have to leave the reception facility in which they are living and become self-supporting unless they are granted continued protection by social services until age 21, which enables them to continue to benefit from reception services. [44] UASC who have obtained recognition of humanitarian protection before the entry into force of l.d. 113/2018 are in a transitional situation in which, for a limited period of time of two years, they can still enjoy a form of protection. After this period, their case is re-assessed by the competent Territorial Commission, with the possibility of being granted special protection or, in certain cases, international protection. If the necessary requirements are not met, they may not be granted any form of protection. As an alternative, they can proceed with the conversion to a residence permit for job seeking, or study or work purposes but accommodation in SIPROIMI facilities is not guaranteed. The prospects for those who are granted special protection (as defined by l.d.113/2018 and therefore not convertible into work permits) [45] is even more uncertain. Those who, at the age of 18, are asylum-seekers remain in a legal limbo where the guarantees of protection are still valid until the outcome of the Territorial Commission; however, it is more difficult for them to begin and build a pathway of transition to adulthood, because their condition could radically change with a negative outcome that would put them in an irregular situation in the event that even the appeal would end in a negative ruling.\n\n**5.2.2 Access to employment pathways**\n\nJob placement is a crucial phase of UASC and former UASC pathways. Achieving full economic independence is indeed their greatest challenge. There are many factors that affect former UASC’s entry into the job market: their legal status, as illustrated above; the availability of adequate professional training; the opportunities offered by the local job market; and finally, the possibility of having a social network supporting them with job opportunities and language skills.\n\nWhile taking into account some regional differences in labour policies and forms of job seeking support, the analysis of interviews with former UASC and key informants shows that the pathways and phases in accessing the job market are similar in the three regions, [46] they are based on the capacity of the reception facility and the local network in which it operates to offer integrated services, and on the offer of the local job market.\n\nThe urgent need to enter the job market is a recurring theme in the stories of former UASC, who often find it difficult to fully understand the reasons for waiting and the importance of following the educational and training steps indicated by educators and/or guardians. Moreover, UASC and former UASC can rarely choose jobs according to their abilities and aspirations. [47] The path is often random and/or guided by need, which has been further exacerbated by the restrictions of Law 132/2018.\n\nThe research also revealed that many of the interviewees have already had work experience in their countries of origin (even at a very young age), or during the long journeys to reach Europe, as farmers, welders, carpenters, shop assistants or bricklayers: _“In my country I didn't go to school [...] I had to work and help my family, when I_ _was six, seven years old [...] because we arrive a little... let's say we’re poor [...]. I did a little bit of everything”_ (Egyptian, male, 16 years old), and a girl said: _“I worked as a hairdresser for three years, since I was 14 until I_ _arrived here”_ (Egyptian, female, 17 years old).\n\nAmong the types of employment pathways most frequently accessed by those who have just turned 18 is 44", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nthe work grant, which combines economic support with temporary employment in ‘protected’ circumstances.\n\nSimilar evidence also emerges from statements by trainees participating in the Percorsi I and II projects funded by the MLSP and implemented by Anpal services. [48] Both Percorsi projects have implemented internship courses with a work grant for the recipient and a contribution to the employer for the tutoring and coaching activities. [49] Even outside this type of pathway, it is possible to find cases of UASC who have recently turned 18 who have successfully integrated into the job market as a result of the assistance and support of reception facilities and CSOs. The characteristics of a successful job insertion pathway are similar to the above-mentioned structural factors, but the availability of a social network is also crucial, as well as the ability of the former UASC to “draw from it and nurture it”, as well as a certain amount of proactivity and desire to learn: _“It was great because_ _there were many of us working together, all the girls [...] and they also helped me a lot [...], and before I did not_ _understand Italian”_ (Milan, Gambian, 19 years).\n\n**Life history of N. – Senegalese, 18 years old: Job-seeking permit**\n\n**N. arrived in Italy at the age of 16, in 2016. An application for a residence permit for UASC was**\n\n**submitted and not an application for asylum. Immediately after landing in Sicily, he was transferred**\n\n**to a reception centre for UASC in the Marche region, where he stayed for three months. N. found the**\n\n**rules of this centre too strict, for example, regarding the use of a mobile phone, which was restricted**\n\n**to a few hours a day, and going out. He did not want to wait for a transfer to another facility, so**\n\n**he left. With the vague idea of moving to another country, he arrived in Milan, where the police**\n\n**stopped him and identified him. N. was placed in a reception facility near Milan, where he remained**\n\n**for a year attending Italian courses, starting the third grade of middle school (without being able to**\n\n**finish it because he left the reception facility when he turned 18 years old), practising sports such**\n\n**as boxing, and taking part in artistic activities such as theatre and training (e.g. vegetable gardening**\n\n**and general gardening) organized by the reception facility. As his 18th birthday was approaching,**\n\n**the reception facility could not ask for his continued protection by social services until the age of**\n\n**21, since the municipality that had jurisdiction over him tended not to grant them at that particular**\n\n**point in time. An application for conversion of the residence permit for UASC into a job seeking**\n\n**permit was then sent on his behalf to the MLPS, which granted it. However, the application process**\n\n**was rendered more complicated by the fact that N. had to apply for the issue of his passport at the**\n\n**Senegalese consulate. Upon turning 18 years old, N. had to leave the reception facility, and the only**\n\n**solution he found was a dormitory for the homeless and for people without fixed abode. Since then,**\n\n**N. has obtained a one-year job-seeking residence permit. Although holding a job-seeking permit has**\n\n**given him psychological peace of mind by “being okay with his papers” for at least some time, he is**\n\n**constantly looking for job opportunities. He has already completed two work grant internships in**\n\n**two metalworking companies (a sector in which he would like to work). Previously, he had a small**\n\n**job as a gardener and obtained a licence to operate a forklift. In the meantime, he continues to attend**\n\n**an evening Italian course to improve his skills. At the moment, his main concern is finding stable**\n\n45", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n**work and possibly, obtaining a work permit. N. is well aware of the real risk of falling into an illegal**\n\n**situation should he not get a work permit, which he might have obtained more easily if he had had**\n\n**a little more time available.**\n\n**5.2.3 Housing independence**\n\nUASC who have turned 18 and have concluded or are about to conclude their stay in a reception facility struggle to find physical and relational spaces that meet their need for freedom and independent living.\n\nUnderlying this is an ambivalence relating to the balance between independence and abandonment at the time of leaving the facility.\n\nThe renting of a house creates anxiety and concern among the young people interviewed, since they are aware that it is necessary to have an employment contract in order to be able to rent a house. The theme of the connection between employment and independent living emerges in many interviews: _“The first thing they say_ _is whether you work. If you work, yes, they tell you, here is a friend who has a room or a bed [...] if you do not_ _work, it is too difficult to find a house”_ (Senegalese, male, 21 years old).\n\nFor some, especially girls, although they are aware that renting a house with others can be an advantage for cost sharing reasons, they want to rent an independent accommodation to build an independent life or live with their partner: _“a house of my own, a job I can do, that I'm happy with my boyfriend, I think that in the future_ _I'm closer to him”_ (Gambian, female, 19 years old).\n\nIt is often difficult to rent a place to live due to owners’ lack of trust, in which case, mediation by social networks can assist. The search for a home is a team effort involving many actors, voluntary organizations, religious associations, informal networks or planned projects with the social services of the municipalities.\n\nAnother aspect that also emerged from the interviews with social and institutional key informants is the presence of networks of fellow compatriots who, at the moment of leaving the reception system, represent a form of support and the possibility of finding a shared housing solution with others, even if often with irregular rental contracts. In addition to these forms, there is also supervised independent accommodation, such as boarding houses or forms of ‘protected’ apartments managed by CSOs and assisted by the occasional presence of an educator. [50] Among the positive experiences family foster care remains a form of alternative care, [51] which goes far beyond the housing solution and can continue after former UASC turn 18, although its use is still limited in Italy: _“I have been living with my foster family for about five years; luckily, everything is fine and we_ _have grown fond of each other and we immediately understood each other [...] they simply thought of helping_ _this boy and welcoming him into their home, so I can say that I'm really lucky”_ (Egyptian, male, 19 years old).\n\nThe boys’ and girls’ satisfaction with regards to their successful pathways is common to all the positive experiences of housing independence; some study and work in the evening or during the weekend, and proudly emphasize being able to pay the rent and live with dignity, without being a burden on anyone.\n\n46", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n**5.2.4 Friendly and supportive relations**\n\nFormal and informal relationships play a key role in supporting social inclusion of former UASC in Italy. In this phase, those who have already turned 18 become more aware of the role that relationships can play and begin to make choices with regard to both the improvement of formal relationships and the selection of informal ones. The first points of reference are the formal relationships of trust (with the educators of the reception facilities, the guardians, with the foster families and, in some cases, with the teachers) established when they were still UASC. Those relationships have been ‘put to the test’ for a certain period and can represent the baggage that children who turn 18 can carry with them in their path as young adults: _“I have become very_ _fond of them, maybe even they [the educators] have, I have been to their home. We go out, we also went_ _on vacation together”_ (Albanian, male, 20 years old). The interviews make repeated mention of the network created in support to the young migrant’s or refugee’s growth pathway and of which, at a certain point, he or she becomes a conscious and active actor in the construction of his or her own social capital.\n\nWith regard to informal relations, in particular those developed with peers, the acquisition of greater autonomy is directly connected to increased capacity and opportunities of making choices which are in turn influenced by personal opportunities. The selection of friendships can go either in the direction of keeping away or coming closer to situations deemed unsuitable, _“Some people smoke hashish, a mess [...]. I've seen so many bad_ _things; I do not want them for me”_ (Somalian, male, 19 years old).\n\nBoth boys and girls talk about wanting to marry and build a family in the future when they will have achieved the goals they are pursuing today. In some cases, ongoing love relationships are highlighted as central. In other cases, affective and loving relationships are postponed to focus on more urgent matters. A decisive relationship that affects some girls and young women is the one with children, which modifies in many ways their relationships, including how they are perceived by other girls: _“I am everyone's mother”_ (Gambian, female, 18 years old).\n\n47", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**M., 17 years old, from the Gambia, bumps fists with a local Italian man he had been chatting with**\n\n**during an outing in Pozzallo, Sicily (May 2016)**\n\n© UNICEF/UN020030/Ashley Gilbertson", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n**Life history of H. – Afghan, 24 years old: A refugee**\n\n**H. has been in Italy since 2012 after a long and difficult journey. H. left Afghanistan at the age of**\n\n**13, without his family, together with other fellow compatriots on their way to Pakistan. He worked**\n\n**there for a year in a carpet factory, but the money he earned was too little, just enough to eat and**\n\n**sleep and buy clothing. He decided to continue his journey and moved to the mountains to work**\n\n**in a mine. He worked there for a fairly long time, but the work was very difficult, so he decided**\n\n**to leave again and move to the Islamic Republic of Iran. This crossing was also more difficult than**\n\n**expected; he tried to cross the border three times but was sent back to Afghanistan. H. did not give**\n\n**up; he decided to continue his journey, return to Pakistan and try to enter the Islamic Republic of**\n\n**Iran again. He then worked in a slaughterhouse for the time needed to earn the money to pay the**\n\n**traffickers. This way he could enter Europe from the Greek border when he was still an UASC and**\n\n**then arrive in Italy. But his journey was not over. His dream was to go to Germany, where he arrived**\n\n**shortly after, but he was sent back to Italy where he had already undergone the identification and**\n\n**registration process.**\n\n**In Italy, H. was recognized as a UASC and so granted a place in a reception facility. However, the first**\n\n**facility where he was assigned to was very crowded, with few opportunities for training. But H.**\n\n**wanted to study and asked his guardian to be moved to a smaller town. It is only here that he could**\n\n**finally start school and learn Italian. And it is in this facility that he was helped to find a job. After a**\n\n**few months of searching, he found a job in a restaurant, where he has been working for several years**\n\n**on a permanent employment contract. Now H. is living in a house with a friend. He applied for Italian**\n\n**citizenship. In the future he would like to join his brothers in Denmark and work together to help**\n\n**their family in Afghanistan and the other brothers and sisters who are still living with their parents.**\n\n50", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n# **6. Obstacles, risks and vulnerabilities** **in the transition to independence**\n\n**6.1 Obstacles and vulnerabilities**\n\nThe biographies trace the obstacles that might hinder UASC's and former UASC’s pathways to social inclusion in the host society to three sets of interlinked factors. First, the complexity of the system for issuing residence permits makes the process for obtaining documents complex and tortuous. Second, the age of UASC upon their arrival in Italy (mostly 16–17 years old) affects the time available to complete a successful pathway to social inclusion and a full transition to independence. To this end, effective support through the different available pathways becomes crucial. Third, the effects of traumas and difficult experiences that UASC have brought from the country of origin or have lived through during the journey affects their ability to pursue a successful social inclusion pathway. A factor that influences, in a cross-cutting manner, all of the above-mentioned elements is the clear distinction in the legal framework between UASC under 18 and UASC over 18, resulting in little attention paid to specific vulnerabilities of this latter age group. As underlined with respect to the framing of the rights of UASC over 18, the category of “youth” often excludes them from humanitarian programmes as a social group recognized as having specific needs based on age, and their capacities are often ignored. [52]\n\n**6.1.1 Timing and obstacles related to the legal status of UASC and former UASC**\n\nThe first and most important obstacle in the transition to adulthood relates to the difficulties in obtaining the necessary documents to be able to remain legally in Italy, and specifically, the very long waiting times and the numerous steps required to obtain a residence permit. This was common in the three regions and across different types of residence permits.\n\nThe difficulties are partially mitigated for UASC, because for both those who hold a residence permit for UASC and for those who apply for international protection, the start of the application procedure guarantees them access to a formal pathway to social inclusion, unless bureaucratic complications arise (e.g. in cases in which the child does not have a passport and it is therefore necessary to obtain it) or the system malfunctions (e.g.\n\nin the case of poorly managed facilities that force UASC to wait even six months before starting a pathway to social inclusion).\n\nFor those who apply for international protection, difficulties arise when they are not recognized international protection status and, as children, they have little time to apply for a residence permit for UASC. This is because, in practice, the two legal processes do not start simultaneously. [53] This risk has been exacerbated, as already pointed out, by the entry into force of l.d.113/2018, which abolished the residence permit for ‘humanitarian protection’.\n\nMore generally, age assessment procedures are an obstacle that affects many UASC, regardless of the type of permit they are issued. The stories pointed out that, at times, these procedures are long and complex, and 51", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Survivors of the Mediterranean boat crossings in the Lampedusa reception facility, Sicily, Italy**\n\n© UNHCR/RF27969/Unknown", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nnot always compliant with existing legislation. In some cases, reception in facilities remains ‘suspended’, causing a “loss of precious time” in the process of social inclusion into the Italian context and in the transition to autonomy. In general, the delay or, worse, an error in the prompt, appropriate and accurate identification of a child can lead to serious violations of their rights and expose them to irreversible damages.\n\nThe various factors that extend the administrative time required to obtain the necessary documentation are also a major obstacle. First, the ‘limbo’ condition in which UASC remain constitutes a significant and harmful loss of opportunities since they cannot work or access employment programmes such as internships or work grants: _“I started working on my internship, but when I had just finished my internship, the permit expired [sighs], and_ _in order to renew it, they asked me for my passport before renewing my residence permit. So that's what I'm_ _waiting for before I start the work grant”_ (Ivorian, male, 18 years old). One girl stated, _“I had many opportunities_ _to work with a contract, but I could not work because I had no documents”_ (Nigerian, female, 18 years).\n\nAs the interviews show, the impossibility of seeking and accessing employment due to slow and complex bureaucratic procedures generates anxiety, fear and frustration. The frustration caused by this ‘stalemate’ condition, as also pointed out by the interviewed educators, is a result of a difficult and tortuous administrative process and procedures, which UASC struggle to understand.\n\nThe research has also shown that there are social services that tend not to regularly apply for continued protection until age 21 due to a restrictive internal ‘policy’ or to lack of funds (the responsibility falls on the social services of the municipality that has jurisdiction over the child); this is the case of some municipalities in the Milan metropolitan area. For those who do not make this type of request, long waiting times have been recorded for converting of the residence permit into a permit for job seeking, or study or work purposes.\n\nAt the time of the transition to adulthood, the question of legal status is a problem that can be caused by the loss of rights when turning 18, and that can be exacerbated by long waiting times for the conversion of the permit into a permit for job seeking, or study or work purposes. These long periods are not so much caused by how quickly the MLSP processes applications, but rather, by the difficulty of acquiring UASC documents (such as passports) issued by their countries of origin and by the slow transmission of applications for conversion by the social services of the competent municipalities. Small Sicilian municipalities, in particular, complain about a low number of social workers compared to the high number of UASC, which puts them under particular pressure and often extends the length of time needed to convert the residence permits.\n\nThere are even greater difficulties among former UASC who hold other permits, in particular among those who hold or held a residence permit for humanitarian reasons. Since this is no longer renewable but only convertible into a residence permit for work purposes (whether self-employed or employees), the risks linked to becoming irregular on the Italian territory are even greater. It is therefore not surprising that papers appear to be at the top of the concerns of many of those interviewed.\n\n53", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n**6.1.2 Support when leaving the reception facilities**\n\nA broader issue, which is linked to the problem of obtaining residence permits, is that of leaving the reception facilities. The research shows a lack of a fully structured support process for this sensitive exit phase.\n\nThe efforts of the reception facilities focus on learning Italian and on obtaining a middle school diploma as necessary first steps in the social inclusion process. However, the reception facilities and UASC must also deal with what services are available at a local level. For example, in Sicily, especially outside the main cities, “literacy courses are not continuously running, but only once or twice a year” (Catania, social key informant). [54 ] The basic need for education, therefore, risks paradoxically of becoming an obstacle that slows the transition to autonomy, if delayed or if it requires too much time. Literacy and numeracy skills assessment methods for the recognition of completed studies, at least for UASC who have completed higher education in their countries of origin, could accelerate the completion of compulsory schooling, thus facilitating job placement, but are not foreseen.\n\nObstacles also exist with regards to guidance and job orientation. With the exception of young people who have links with local networks of fellow nationals (such as those from North Africa or Eastern Europe) who can offer employment in their small businesses, many of them seem to depend completely on the reception facilities when looking for and choosing a job. In these cases, therefore, both UASC and former UASC do not have the means to orient themselves autonomously in the job market. Constraining factors include the lack of an information system for reception facility staff and guardians as well as for UASC and former UASC, the lack of guidance on available opportunities, the complex bureaucratic process (request for Declaration of Immediate Availability to Work, or DID) and the difficulty in meeting the requirements (e.g. A2 level Italian and middle school diploma). The lack of structured support becomes particularly evident in the case of children who leave the reception facility with a job seeking residence permit. Although the permit provides them with peace of mind to legally reside in the country, it does not protect them from a situation of imminent precariousness, given its short duration.\n\nAmong the most problematic aspects in the transition to adulthood is the abrupt transfer to reception facilities for adults with the related interruption of the support that was provided in reception facilities for UASC, as well as at times, the uprooting that occurs in the case of transfers to another location or region and the problems related independent living. It is difficult for the young people who leave the reception facility to enter the housing market, due to insufficient economic resources and the risk of being discriminated against by property owners, who are highly reluctant to rent their homes to foreigners. For former UASC, the support offered by informal reception facilities such as parishes or voluntary associations can play a fundamental role in the transition between leaving the reception facility and stabilizing their work and housing situations, as pointed out by key informants interviewed in Rome and a male former UASC interviewed in one of these informal centres in Como.\n\nIn this light, it is clear that the most protective legal form for former UASC who are not entitled to international protection is that of continued protection by social services (prosieguo amministrativo), so as to be able to 54", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nremain within a facility until the age of 21 and be able to equip themselves, in the meantime, with all the means they need for a successful transition to independence.\n\nThe level of organization, efficiency and specialization of the reception facility that hosts UASC plays a fundamental role in accompanying them towards autonomy. This is evident in two extreme cases: when the internal organization appears too restrictive or when it appears too lax. On the one hand, an organizational structure that is too rigid and, above all, does not pay much attention to the specific needs of each UASC could result in loss of opportunities that capitalize on the skills and abilities of the UASC. On the other hand, in facilities with poor organization or few proposed activities, there is the risk that the UASC stay idle, or fail to manage their time, expectations and skills. At times, some former UASC decided to leave and re-enter reception facilities elsewhere in Italy, where they thought they would access better services or have more opportunities, as had been recommended by various acquaintances.\n\n**6.1.3 Trauma and psychological distress**\n\nA particularly critical aspect liable to compromise the full transition to autonomy is linked to the traumatic experiences that UASC have often undergone. [55] The biographies reveal potential vulnerabilities linked to individual distressful events that range from experiences of torture, sexual violence and exploitation in Libya, to the dangerous journey along the Mediterranean route, to anger and disappointment at having been pushed by parents to migrate or deceived by known individuals, as often occurs to girls and young women who are victims of trafficking. In the case of UASC who have been pushed by parents to leave, the interviews reveal a true feeling of abandonment, even where there is still a relationship with the parents (this is the case of several Albanian interviewees). The violence suffered before leaving, during the journey and also in Italy, in some cases leaves serious consequences on the mental and physical health of young people, particularly adolescents.\n\nThe reception facilities, in some cases, can provide psychological support that helps young people process the experienced trauma, but educators point out that they sometimes refuse the service because they do not understand the type of help they can receive. In addition, the interviews revealed general inadequacy of service providers, due to insufficient material and human resources to address this type of need, with the result that only those children who show more worrisome and apparent forms of psychological distress are entrusted to the care of specialized staff, whereas other less obvious forms of psychological distress are likely to remain concealed.\n\nIn general, the lack of psychological support can pose a further constraint to the smooth transition to autonomy, since unaddressed traumas risk preventing UASC and former UASC from building and imagining their future.\n\nAs suggested by a key informant interviewed in Palermo, the entire pathway seems to rely too much on the resilience and capabilities of these young people.\n\n55", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n**6.2 Sexual and gender-based violence: Between vulnerability and resilience**\n\nIn recent years, a number of studies conducted on the conditions experienced by migrants along the central Mediterranean route have uncovered the level of widespread violence suffered by all those who undertake the journey to Europe and especially by those crossing through Libya (United Nations, 2018; UNHCR, 2018; Oxfam, 2017; UNICEF, 2017; IOM, 2017).\n\nThe biographies collected from female respondents show that the theme of GBV perpetrated by families or husbands in the country of origin is often one of the reasons for leaving. Some girls escaped from child marriages or abuse experienced therein: _“My husband [...] sometimes beat me on the belly and made me take_ _the medication [...] I went to the doctor [...] who told me that if I gave birth to him, he will be born sick because_ _I had already taken the medication”_ (Tunisian, female, 17 years old).\n\nIn the case of victims of trafficking, the journey itself is a core component of the violence, which often begins with a total loss of trust in a known person: _“With this woman, we also go to church to pray and all that,_ _so I trusted her, or I would not have left my country”_ (Nigerian, female, 21 years old). Sexual and physical violence persists throughout the journey: _“I too was raped before arriving in Libya”_ (Nigerian, female, 20 years old), before reaching its peak in Libya. Even when the young migrants have not been trafficked for sexual exploitation, as is the situation for most of the interviewees, they suffered similar forms of violence: _“Once I_ _was beaten because he wanted [to have sex]. When I said no, he beat me”_ (Gambian, female, 18 years old).\n\nThe biographies highlight that the girls who want to leave are often deceived, especially if they are forced to rely necessarily on someone else in order to face the long journey. Although the arrival in Italy seems to guarantee a minimum of security, the psychological consequences of violence persist. In this scenario, the investment in specialized services becomes even more crucial, and the reception facilities can offer either support or recovery, or represent an additional risk factor.\n\nA common theme that emerged from the different biographies was young women’s desire to overcome violence and improve their condition or that of their family. This theme emerges both in cases in which young women were forced to escape from a family situation, and when the family relationship is strong and positive and their desire is to make their family proud: _“[...] a good person in the future, I wanted to go to school but_ _without money it is difficult. I think I'll work hard to make my mother proud”_ (Nigerian, female, 17 years old).\n\nThe biographies reveal young women’s determination to make it; they want to study, _“My point is that I want_ _to go to school [...] it's the only thing I want to do now. I want to learn the language quickly”_ (Albanian, female, 17 years old), and They want to work and be independent, even though, for many, it is the first time they can choose what to do: _“Either as a waitress or an assistant cook. These two things inspire me right now. I don't_ _know why in my country [...] when you finish middle school ... you only stay at home, so you could not think_ _that job to do, your parents do not allow you [...]”_ (Albanian, female, 17 years old).\n\nThe research confirms that the coercion and the violence that girls and women have experienced, although presenting significant challenges, do not hinder their resilience and agency [56] (Abbatecola, 2018). Recognizing 56", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "biographies collected from female respondents", "confidence": 0.47502732276916504}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nthe full agency of girls in vulnerable conditions means starting a process of de-victimization that obviously does not diminish the gravity and the need for institutional and social condemnation of violence, but supports them in the pathway towards recognition of their abilities and potential: _“I lost two years. [...] but I like what I study,_ _when they practice it's easier, I'm the best there”_ (Albanian, female, 16 years old).\n\nMoreover, as revealed from interviews with social key informants, the risk of representing the narratives of violence experienced by migrant and refugee women as ‘barbaric episodes’ belonging to other cultures (Bimbi, 2011) places them in a subordinate position, as sometimes occurs to victims of trafficking. This risk hindering their pathway towards transition to adult life.\n\n**Life history of E. – Nigerian, 21 years old: A refugee victim of trafficking**\n\n**E. arrived in Italy in 2015. After facing a long and difficult journey, particularly in Libya, where she**\n\n**was beaten, tortured and raped, she arrived in Italy and was included in a protection programme for**\n\n**‘victims of trafficking’. When she arrived in Catania, while still a child, she was initially entrusted**\n\n**to an Italian family (although she continued to be assisted by the relevant services). Through these**\n\n**services, she had the opportunity to gain language skills, learn the Italian culture and how to interact**\n\n**with people in different contexts.**\n\n**The programme in which E. was included had very strict rules, in particular, she was forbidden to**\n\n**be in touch with relatives. It was only after about a year that she was able to contact her family**\n\n**of origin. Once she had completed this programme and with support from her guardian, she was**\n\n**granted international protection. She was thus able to build the foundations for her future.**\n\n**Before embarking on her schooling, she began a formal literacy course to learn Italian. She is presently**\n\n**attending a hotel management school and loves cooking and Italian cuisine, especially Sicilian cuisine.**\n\n**Now she has become fully autonomous and lives in a rented house together with other Italian girls,**\n\n**with whom, despite normal misunderstandings, she has established a good friendship. E. is an intern**\n\n**with the Italian civil service, which enabled her to be sufficiently economically independent and**\n\n**acquire housing independence. Today, she works as a cultural mediator for the CSO that welcomed**\n\n**and helped her. She is very proud and happy about the person she has become and the people she**\n\n**has met, but she still has a dream: to continue her studies, work as a coast guard or become a chef.**\n\n57", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**S., from Nigeria, studying Italian at Figlie del Divino Zelo Giardini Naxos (The Daughters of Divine**\n\n**Zeal) in Messina, Sicily, Italy, April 2018.**\n\n© UNHCR/Jordi Matas", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n**6.3 The risks of exploitation and exclusion, and the importance of local**\n**reception networks**\n\nExisting research has shown that young migrants and refugees travelling along the central Mediterranean route are more likely to experience exploitation and abuse in transit countries, including labour and sexual exploitation, than migrants over 25 years of age (UNICEF and IOM, 2017; IOM, 2017; Women's Refugee Commission, 2019). These incidents, in addition to the urgent need to earn money for themselves and send remittances home to the family may have long-term psychological, emotional and social impacts on those arriving in Italy by sea, and can sometimes play a role in the way in which young migrants perceive and react to the risks of labour and/or sexual exploitation to which they may be exposed in Italy. This exposes young people to the risk of illegal work, or even of being pushed into illegal activities. The research reveals that young people may experience three different scenarios while in Italy: small jobs in legal activities that are also ‘off the books’; actual labour exploitation; and exploitation by criminal networks leading to illegal activities.\n\nWith regard to the first scenario, many of the young people interviewed stated that they had worked in some small jobs ‘off the books’, casual jobs as waiters, dishwashers, gardeners or as assistants of people they know in transport companies, and so on. Their experience reveals their ability to exercise agency through which they show that they know how to leverage networks of acquaintances and to transform opportunities that arise even by chance into small, positive opportunities, turning them into a small source of income and for learning the basics of a trade. Nevertheless, the young people are often aware of the consequences they may face working without a regular employment contract: _“As soon as I knew they didn't give me a contract and didn't regularize_ _me, I would run away from the restaurant or the place”_ (Egyptian, male, 18 years old).\n\nWith regard to the second scenario, the research reveals several incidents of widespread exploitation, especially in agriculture, construction and catering industries. In the Sicilian context, for example, the desire to earn some money can push young people to work in agriculture, which is often the first job they are offered, and where they are exploited: “I went to collect peaches, as well as apples and tomatoes from 5 a.m. in the morning until 2.30 p.m. in the afternoon [...] little, but if there is no money [...] I did not have a contract” (Gambian, male, 18 years old). For girls, these experiences are often linked to caretaking, which can turn into exploitation: _“I was in_ _a house where the elderly were staying, [...] we were promised a salary, but at the end of the month, we were_ _not paid”_ (Nigerian, female, 20 years old).\n\nThis can also lead to the third scenario, exploitation by criminal networks, with the risk of committing offences.\n\nEducators interviewed confirm the risk that many young people, even if they are still hosted in reception facilities, begin to engage with drug-dealing networks: _“I worked in a restaurant and pizzeria, and then stopped_ _[...] after stealing and selling hash”_ (Egyptian, male, 18 years old). Although they do not always speak openly about it, most interviewed UASC show that they are aware of the existence of criminal networks and the possibility that they may be recruited (see also UNICEF and CNR, 2017). As previously mentioned, former UASC face the greatest danger of finding themselves excluded and without appropriate support to successfully become self-sufficient and may therefore adopt illegal survival strategies, such as the example of North African boys in Rome who are pushed into prostitution in some areas of the city after they leave reception facilities.\n\nGirls and young women also face this risk, in particular for those who are less aware of it and who have not experienced sexual exploitation and violence in the past.\n\n59", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\nIn all three regions for this research, informal voluntary-based reception facilities, supported by private social actors and charitable organizations (such as parishes or associations to defend the rights of migrants) that do not receive public funding, help former UASC by offering them shelter. This is the case, for example, of a young male interviewed in Como, who cannot renew his residence permit because he does not have a passport, and when he turned 18, was almost ‘handed over’ by the reception facilities where he was living to a parish that welcomes young people in similar conditions in a completely informal way and at no cost. Similarly, the Association ‘Baobab’ in Rome and other private or religious entities in Rome and Sicily offer informal shelter to many former UASC.\n\n**6.4 Risks associated with onward movements**\n\nOnward movements refer to when migrants, refugees and asylum seeker move from the territory and/or the country of first arrival, often irregularly, to go elsewhere in search of better opportunities or to reunite with acquaintances or relatives. [57] In the case of the UASC and former UASC in this research, two types of secondary movements can be distinguished: the movement from southern regions to reach the Centre-North of Italy, with the hope of finding more job opportunities; and the movement to another European country, especially Germany, often to reunite with family members or to join acquaintances. The first of the two cases is common to most of the respondents who are now in Milan and Latium, coming from North Africa or sub-Saharan Africa, and who have reached the southern regions after travelling the Central Mediterranean route. It is important to note that the conditions of the reception facilities, in particular of the first line reception facilities, can drive onward movement. In the specific case of females, overcrowding and lack of separation between males and females are also contributing factors.\n\nThe second case was recorded during interviews with young absconders, or those who have left the protection system, who have tried to move abroad and, failing to do so, have been made to return or are re-entering the reception system. Due to the intrinsic difficulties in identifying these types of respondents, only three absconded former UASC were interviewed. In two cases, the former UASC left the reception system before obtaining the outcome of an asylum application due to reception facility conditions. The long waiting times and the lack of homogeneity in the reception conditions on the Italian territory and between different types of reception facilities affect the social inclusion of these young people. Long waiting times are also major obstacles for applicants awaiting family reunification, an option that would guarantee a safe and non-risky movement to other countries. However, they may give up and decide to leave for the desired destination, exposing themselves to the risks of an illegal journey. As reported by the stakeholders interviewed in Rome, the illegal networks for moving to other countries are very attractive for young people because they offer the possibility of travelling immediately and quickly.\n\n60", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n**Life history of I. – Guinean, 19 years old: Humanitarian protection**\n\n**I. arrived in Italy crossing the Mediterranean in 2016. After landing in Lampedusa, he was placed in**\n\n**a reception facility for UASC in Calabria and started the asylum application procedure. I. denounced**\n\n**the poor conditions in this reception facility: In his and his peers’ opinion, the managers of the centre**\n\n**do not organize enough activities for the UASC, such as Italian courses or sports activities, but above**\n\n**all, they do not adequately support or take care of the children (e.g. “When you say that you are sick,**\n\n**they just give you paracetamol. You have a headache, you have a stomach ache ... only paracetamol”).**\n\n**I. remained in the facility for eight months and then decided to leave it with other peers, even though**\n\n**he had not yet known the outcome of his asylum application from the Territorial Commission, thus**\n\n**absconding. I. and his friends wanted to go to Germany, crossing the border with Switzerland from**\n\n**Como. However, while his friends managed to cross the border, I. was stopped by the police, who sent**\n\n**him to the Red Cross Centre. During his stay in this centre, he was granted humanitarian protection**\n\n**from the Commission where he had applied in Calabria. Following the closure of this centre, I., now**\n\n**an adult over 18 years old, found hospitality in a parish-run informal centre.**\n\n**Despite this critically precarious situation, I. showed a great desire and ability to attend training**\n\n**courses as a waiter and welder (and obtaining the relevant certifications). He also obtained a licence**\n\n**to operate a forklift using his previous skills gained in Algeria before coming to Italy. He is currently**\n\n**working as an assistant cook, a position he obtained by presenting his curriculum vitae and passing**\n\n**an interview without assistance, and by attending Italian courses, but he continues to be a guest of**\n\n**the parish-run informal centre.**\n\n**6.5 Experiences of discrimination affecting the lives of UASC**\n\nDiscrimination has been well-documented against children coming from sub-Saharan Africa along the migration routes towards and within Libya. These children continue to face discrimination, exclusion and racism even once in Italy. Well-rooted and recurring episodes risk undermining any efforts made by the UASC and by the social and institutional stakeholders who work to promote and achieve social inclusion in Italy.\n\nSocial inclusion takes place at the local level and involves different dimensions (cultural, social, economic, etc.) and therefore different places, including schools. Respondents pointed out that, despite widespread positive attitudes of peers, there is also evidence of discriminatory or racist behaviour: _“Sometimes they tell me this_ _[...] they say that I have not understood anything”_ (Malian, female, 18 years old). Migrants, for example, tend to be associated with certain types of work and therefore also with low-level training: _“They have never seen_ _a black man studying as a computer engineer here, in Catania, it can't be true; there are none”_ (Ivorian, male, 20 years old).\n\n61", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\nThere are many incidents characterized by this type of discriminatory or racist attitude: _“...colleagues who have_ _problems because they don't want you there; if you go to the boss, the boss doesn't want to hear anything. I_ _haven't felt well. They haven't treated me well until now”_ (Liberian, male, 22 years old). For some, the work is made harder because of the hostility against them, but discrimination and racism also characterize the housing market, from which migrants seem to be increasingly excluded (CIRDI, 2014). Economic aspects are the main concerns of property owners because they are convinced that the former UASC will not pay the rent, followed by cultural dimensions (different cuisine and lifestyles) and finally, the issue of security (i.e. migrants are seen as people who do not respect the rules and who are dangerous.\n\nIn addition to stereotypes, there is a tendency to generalize the behaviour and quality of a single person to a whole group. As can be seen from some of the biographies, such behaviours have a strong negative impact on the lives of these young people: acts of racism and discrimination undermine their trust in their surrounding context and compromise the possibility of their developing formal and informal supportive relationships, thus hindering, more generally, the process of social inclusion within Italian society. _“People outside refuse to rent_ _me a house because I am black”_ (FGDs, male, former UASC).\n\nThese experiences are exacerbated in the case of institutional discrimination, i.e. when discrimination is carried out by representatives of bodies that should play a protective role. Most of the interviewees expressed their positive relationship with the institutions, also as a result of the support offered by the adults of reference (educators, cultural mediators, guardians). However, incidents of discrimination do occur and need to be properly monitored: _“When they took me to the police station, ... they put me on a chair and they all slapped_ _me [...], then a nice girl came by and told them to stop”_ (Tunisian, male, 24 years old).\n\n62", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**F., 17 years old, sets a table in the café where she works in Palermo, Sicily, Italy. The café is run**\n\n**by migrants and refugees and is very popular, frequented by local Italians and foreigners alike**\n\n**(December 2018)**\n\n© UNICEF/UN0264430/Stefano De Luigi", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n# **7. Promising practices**\n\nA case study was carried out in each of the three regions object of the research to identify and analyse promising practices related to three crucial processes in UASC's transition to adult life and their potential for replication and scale-up: supervised independent living and housing solutions (Lombardy);formal and informal relationships (Latium); and structured support to volunteer guardians (Sicily).\n\n**7.1 Lombardy: supervised independent living and housing solutions for UASC**\n**and former UASC**\n\nThe case study in Milan addressed the issue of access to supervised independent living, which is crucial, not only for UASC. [58] In order to offer effective solutions, it is necessary that all those dealing with migrant, refugee and asylum-seeking children, including local authorities, take into account their specific characteristics and problems (Segatto, Di Masi and Surian, 2018).\n\nThe case study focused on three experiences for UASC and former UASC in supervised independent living arrangements which is characterized by a limited presence of educators and by an increased responsibility of the young guests compared to accommodation in reception facilities: the Social Cooperative ‘La Cordata’, the Social Cooperative ‘Comunità Progetto’ and ‘Pio Albergo Trivulzio’. In these cases, accommodation is offered in apartments located in various areas of Milan where continued protection is granted to UASC, together with a gradual acquisition of autonomy and responsibility. The examined experiences present the following promising practices that can be considered for replication in other contexts: a. **Size and location of the houses:** The choice of small apartments that accommodate a limited number of young people and that are placed in blocks of flats of different neighbourhoods not only in suburban/ disadvantaged areas, but also distributed throughout the municipality gives the possibility for young adults to learn to manage their autonomy by interacting with flatmates and other residents of the same building, avoiding ghettos that prevent social inclusion and favour conflict (Cesareo and Bichi, 2010).\n\nb. **Limited presence of an adult:** The role of a reference person for the apartment is crucial even if limited in terms of hours of presence, tasks and responsibility towards the young guests. He or she creates a positive environment in the group and in the apartment by acting as a mediator if necessary, and by helping to manage conflicts among and between guests and neighbours.\n\nc. **Flexibility of pathways:** Non-rigid rules for leaving the apartment and the possibility of using local support networks to increase the supply of both work and housing solutions. These help young people feel that they can pursue their own goals without facing additional obstacles, even if they decide to continue their education.\n\n64", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nd. **Economic independence:** The young guests pay rent, although at a special rate, and hence need to manage their economic revenues independently.\n\n**Case study on supervised independent living and housing solutions (Lombardy)**\n\n**The practices covered by this study are:**\n\n**1.** **Since 1989, the social cooperative ‘La Cordata’ has been working with vulnerable people,**\n\n**providing them with support and social inclusion services. Since 2008, it has run the ‘Case**\n\n**Saltatempo’ project, which is based on a reception model organized in several apartments**\n\n**located in different districts of Milan, each of which accommodate four to six young people.**\n\n**2.** **The social cooperative ‘Comunità Progetto’ has 13 apartments for the temporary reception of**\n\n**people in need. Active since 1999, it has hosted dozens of people in various projects of social**\n\n**housing and support to housing independence.**\n\n**3.** **As part of the experience of Pio Albergo Trivulzio e Museo Martinitt e Stelline, the Protected**\n\n**Housing Service has been active since 2000 for young people aged 17 to 21 who are under the**\n\n**responsibility of Social Services. Since 2003, it has been transformed into a male hostel for men**\n\n**and then into social housing for 18–26-year olds. Several apartments are managed in different**\n\n**areas of Milan.**\n\n**The experiences differ mainly in terms of organization of the service: number of hours of presence**\n\n**of professional staff, internal rules, and the relationship with the surrounding context. Yet, they do**\n\n**have some aspects in common: they all consider that support staff must be present, particularly from**\n\n**a psychological point of view, to provide guidance in the pathway towards autonomy. One factor**\n\n**deserves special attention in terms of effective scalability of these practices: that of working in the**\n\n**local context, in particular, the involvement of the neighbourhood and/or the local community is**\n\n**essential for implementing effective practices and facilitating their transfer to other territories.**\n\n**7.2 Latium: Experiences of formal and informal relations in support of UASC and**\n**former UASC**\n\nThe case study carried out in Rome focused on formal and informal relationships with the aim of understanding how they support UASC in their transition to adulthood. The entire network of relations is fundamental in the migratory journey, in particular for children who experience it alone, because it constitutes their social capital. [59] The research analysed the dynamics of formal relationships in two youth centres, Civico Zero and Matemù, frequented by UASC who live in reception facilities, in independent homes or on the streets. In these youth centres, an informal first meeting introduces UASC to the legal support services, job orientation, language courses, theatre activities, and music and photography workshops. In particular, they are introduced to the 65", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\npossibility of engaging in social activities with peers coming from different parts of the world. These spaces play an important role in building the network of relationships for UASC and former UASC, because they help them in the production of social capital that can support their process of social inclusion. Some of the most promising practices that emerge include: a. **Youth centres situated half way between the children and young people and the reception**\n\n**system:** This position allows social workers to identify the critical areas for which support is needed,\n\nso as to direct UASC and former UASC towards professional support. In addition, negotiation and mediation for the resolution of conflicts with the institutional sphere and in bureaucratic processes generates trust in social workers, and ensures personalized attention focused on each individual path.\n\nb. **Activation of outreach units in 'hot' spots of the city:** These units are an effective, first point of contact with UASC and former UASC arriving from other areas of Italy, in particular from Sicily and Calabria. In this first contact, the social workers assess the needs of the adolescents and are able to direct them to institutional structures or to informal shelters in the case of former UASC in transit.\n\nc. **The variety of activities offered by these centres:** These allow young people to experiment with artistic activities (music, theatre, photography, etc.) and to share experiences that strengthen friendships and networks with other peers. In particular, workshops of the Theatre of the Oppressed [60] organized by Civico Zero allow UASC and former UASC to express their fears and traumas, coming to terms with their own experiences in a collective and group process, an effective tool to build relationships of trust, especially between peers with similar experiences.\n\nd. **Volunteering, civil service and civic engagement activities** proposed to UASC and former UASC: They are **a means for integrating** into a wider network of contacts to support the construction of social networks, especially for young people who find it difficult to build them on their own.\n\nWith regard to informal relationships, the case study delved into two types of CSOs: Accoglienza Libera e Integrata (ALI) and Movimento Famiglie Affidatarie e Accoglienti (MFAEA). The main objective of both CSOs is to support social inclusion for UASC by identifying personal needs, including school and professional guidance and support, and assistance in bureaucratic procedures and medical examinations. But even more important are the family environment, the friendly relationships created (between young people, children, parents, foreigners and Italians) and the emotional support that UASC and former UASC can receive. These experiences foster family relationships, providing the opportunity to build emotional ties, which can offer emotional support in addition to concrete support. Moreover, the possibility of building relationships with other family members (often the children who are of the same age as the young people hosted) favours relationships with same-age natives.\n\nThe development of the networks of individuals and organizations that the CSOs set up in a structured manner provides UASC with full access to local public services and with a wider network of resources to draw on.\n\nInformal, grassroots experiences such as those described can emerge as a reaction to the lack of (or perceived lack of) effectiveness of institutional interventions. For this reason, the eventual scaling up of such interventions is possible when pre-existing forms of active citizenship are present, from where groups/networks/families with adequate relations and social capital can engage in activities such as those described above for the benefit of UASC and former UASC.\n\n66", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n**Case study on the experiences of formal and informal relationships in support of**\n**UASC and former UASC (Latium)**\n\n**The four experiences described in this case study are:**\n\n**1.** **Civico Zero, a daytime meeting centre that welcomes UASC in order to offer support services**\n\n**to basic needs (laundry, shower, food), legal assistance, psychosocial support, orientation and**\n\n**temporary protection for those who find themselves in situations of social marginalization,**\n\n**contributing to building positive pathways.**\n\n**2.** **Matemù, a Youth Centre and School of Art run by the non-profit organization CIES. The youth**\n\n**centre mainly serves as a place for youth to meet. Matemù’s activities are aimed at a mixed**\n\n**target where it is possible for young Italians and foreigners to meet, thus fostering relationships**\n\n**between peers in an intercultural setting.**\n\n**3.** **Accoglienza Libera e Integrata (ALI), an association founded in 2017 by families and singles**\n\n**who decided to concretely provide emotional and relational support to former UASC, as well as**\n\n**support in seeking a job, when completing and/or in obtaining their degree/diploma, looking**\n\n**for a house, etc. The aim of the association is not to replace the institutions responsible for**\n\n**the reception of former UASC, but rather, to offer support by building informal and friendly**\n\n**relationships, for solidarity and exchange.**\n\n**4.** **Movimento Famiglie Affidatarie e Accoglienti – Casa Salesiana Borgo Ragazzi Don Bosco**\n\n**(MFAEA) deals with foster care families, a network of families who have expressed the desire to**\n\n**initiate a path of fostering or reception. The general objective is to create a welfare community**\n\n**that combines public services with family support.**\n\n67", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n**7.3 Sicily: A structured support to volunteer guardians**\n\nThis case study focused on the Palermo Model, designed and implemented before the entry into force of Law 47/2017 through the collaboration between the Office of the Ombudsman for Children and Adolescents of the Palermo municipality and the UNICEF-sponsored Unità di Supporto e di Monitoraggio dei Tutori (USMT), Volunteer Guardians Support and Monitoring Unit) with a view to promoting, supporting and developing this system of volunteer guardianship for UASC across Sicily. As pointed out by the coordinator of the UMT, each individual UASC’s project of social inclusion and integration is treated as a specific case. Some strategic features of the Palermo Model can be summarized as follows: a. **A tailor-made solution to be found for each boy/girl** as opposed to providing more general assistance”.\n\nb. **A** **participatory process** designed for the main institutional stakeholders involved in the reception and care of the UASC to find these appropriate and tailor-made solutions.\n\nc. **Monitoring** recognized as the instrument to drive the mechanism, which arises from the fundamental need to collect information in order to highlight positive and critical elements to be brought to the attention of the responsible institutional bodies.\n\nd. **Access to ethno-psychological services** that meet the needs of survivors of traumatic experiences.\n\nAll the interviewees acknowledged the importance of the monitoring and support of the unit in enabling the system to function combined with the creation of the network of all stakeholders involved in the process of inclusion of the UASC. The USMT is the reference point for finding a solution to problems, receiving information and building networks.\n\nThe volunteer guardian can then count on a network, which supports him or her in referring critical issues to the competent bodies maintaining the objectivity of a super partes (an impartial) entity. The development of the Palermo model is based on triggering a virtuous path, enabled by the time and dedication of numerous persons.\n\nNevertheless, the model has several features that constitute important elements of replicability, given some basic conditions:\n\n**•**    - the possibility for a volunteer guardian to refer to **a competent network for resolving emerging**\n\n**problems,** which is crucial to creating a virtuous mechanism; the network begins and ends with the\n\nneeds and desires of the child;\n\n**••** **mediation and problem-solving abilities,** which suggest that external support can be crucial\n\nto finding solutions and solving conflicts. The proposed monitoring approach is a comprehensive approach in this regard;\n\n**••** **institutional commitment** that provides viability, accountability and credibility to the model;\n\n**••** **inter-institutional coordination** over time;\n\n**•**    - the successful coexistence of actors with diverse areas of action/competencies and, within each\n\ninstitution, the strong **multidisciplinary skills** of the people involved 68", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nThe Palermo model has been effectively replicated in other Sicilian contexts, in particular in Messina and Catania, although its implementation has been slowed down by the different levels of institutional coordination of all stakeholders.\n\n**Case study on structured support to volunteer guardians (Sicily)**\n\n**The responsibilities, actions and methods of intervention of each institutional entity have been**\n\n**identified through an institutional working group, which initiated a process that lasted almost a**\n\n**year and a half.** **[61]** **The group defined the role of the volunteer guardian, and drafted and signed a**\n\n**protocol on the care and reception of UASC. The protocol outlines the process, its basic elements,**\n\n**tools and objectives, such as: (i) implementation of tailor-made projects; (ii) establishment of a list of**\n\n**volunteer guardians; and (iii) identification of critical issues and their solutions.**\n\n**To support these objectives, a technical group was set up, composed of one member from each**\n\n**institution involved, which is responsible for: (i) verifying the implementation of the protocol;**\n\n**(ii) planning actions to achieve the objectives; (iii) evaluating the initiatives to be taken in the**\n\n**development phase; and (iv) verifying and analysing the achieved results. The technical group**\n\n**prepared and shared a profile of the volunteer guardian, drafted the tender for interested citizens,**\n\n**agreed on the selection procedures, and prepared the contents of the training.**\n\n**The selection was aimed at identifying the “right people, who are capable of assuming the role”, as**\n\n**stated by the municipal Ombudsman during his interview, noting both the great responsibility that**\n\n**this role will have and the risk of quitting during the mandate. He believed that this risk would**\n\n**be reduced during the selection process, which was not provided for by Law No. 47/2017, but was**\n\n**delegated to the guidelines of the national Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents.**\n\n**The Guardian support and monitoring unit was subsequently created at the office of the Municipal**\n\n**Ombudsman to mainstream the process, highlight the critical issues and propose appropriate**\n\n**solutions for UASC based on the acquisition of skills, autonomy and respect of their rights.**\n\n69", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Young refugees and local youth take part in a “FutbolNet” event to mark World Refugee Day**\n\n**in Catania, Sicily, Italy (June 2018)**\n\n© UNHCR/Alessio Mamo", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n# **8. Conclusions**\n\nThe research has shed some light on the importance of understanding UASC’s transition to adulthood as a triple transition process that goes beyond age-based definitions: from the complex interweaving of biological, cognitive and socio-emotional changes that characterize adolescence, to the recognition of the evolving identity and choices that characterize a young person who migrates, and the management of the traumas caused during the journey or prior to the departure. Thus, the research has highlighted that it can be difficult and thus inappropriate to always maintain a straight line in terms of an age-based distinction between the rights and entitlements of UASC and UASC who have turned 18. From the study, a category of persons emerged who do not identify themselves either as children or as adults, but who have specific needs, requirements and profiles that must be considered through listening and direct involvement in the decisions that affect their lives (Art.\n\n12 and 13 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child), a fundamental corollary of the principle of the best interests of the child (Art. 3 of the Convention).\n\nDesires and expectations play a decisive role in this triple transition both before departure, when one's own expectations (finding better life opportunities, studying, escaping from violence) are often influenced by those of the family of origin, and upon arrival in Italy, when it is necessary to redefine them in order to adjust to the new situation (waiting for a residence permit and for the possible recognition of international protection, learning Italian, the fulfilment of the obligations to education and training). Girls and young women are more often pushed to leave the place of origin by circumstances beyond their control through deception and/or the choices of others, such as husbands and families.\n\nFrom the analysis of the factors that facilitate the transition paths, what emerges is the prevalence of contextual, subjective and relational variables related to personal resources, agency and resilience of the UASC, and to formal and informal networks that are triggered – above all the ones that they are capable of triggering – once they arrive in Italy. The presence or absence of such conditions determines the range of opportunities available for them, in terms of social inclusion processes and once they have become adults.\n\n**8.1 Factors that favour a good transition**\n\nLaw 47/2017 equips Italy with an advanced normative framework for the recognition of the rights and protection of UASC. This law reaffirms the absolute principle of non-refoulement of UASC, introduces new provisions on identification measures, provides for the creation of a social file for each UASC, and introduces the new role of the volunteer guardian as well as provisions to facilitate the realization of the right to education and health.\n\nArticle 13 is particularly important for the purposes of this research because it introduced the possibility for Juvenile Courts to place former UASC under continued protection by the social services until the age of 21, in order to allow them to complete the inclusion pathways already begun.\n\nA successful transition to adulthood, social inclusion and recovery from past traumas are closely connected with the reception experience, whose benefits can be positively accrued. In the case of girls and young women, the inclusion in specific protection pathways and the strict rules attached to them may open up 71", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\nor hinder many opportunities for social inclusion. Formal and informal relationships – both with adults and between peers – play a fundamental role in UASCs’ and former UASC’s transition to adulthood. Since the beginning of the inclusion process, educators in the reception facilities (or teachers in the Italian language schools or CPIAs) are key. Also, volunteer guardians have a positive role, since they can help UASC liaise with the social context in which they are defining their transition pathway and continue to act as a reference person, also when the UASC turns 18. The Rome case study shows that the more adolescents create their own peer and family networks and contacts, the more possibilities they have to achieve positive pathways to a successful social inclusion.\n\nUASC consider school and vocational training as a key step in their process of social inclusion. They demonstrate strong awareness and willingness to complete the educational and training courses, and the personal education plan (PEI) is a fundamental tool to build such pathways. Similarly, work grants are viewed positively as a bridge to access employment, which is crucial for both UASC and former UASC. With regard to the transition to independent living arrangements, the Milan case study highlights the importance of solutions linked to family contexts or to supervised or supported independence.\n\n**8.2 Obstacles to a good transition**\n\nThe slow and complex procedures for obtaining documents are first crucial obstacle to a smooth transition for UASC asylum seekers. The long waiting time for a hearing by the Territorial Commission for the recognition of the international protection and to receive the outcome increase distrust as well as the risks associated with a possible drop-out from the reception system.\n\nThere is a very limited window of time for most UASC due to their age (16–17 years old) upon arrival in Italy to equip themselves with the necessary tools (literacy, obtaining a middle school certificate, technical and professional training) to become independent. The problem of non-recognition of professional skills acquired in the country of origin clearly emerges.\n\nThere are also limits to information and guidance on potential training and labour opportunities that would fulfil the rights of UASC and respect the best interests of the child. Young people are aware of the difficulties often related to the lack of a regular employment contract or to forms of discrimination in access to both labour and housing markets. Their confidence is also undermined, especially when they have experienced violence, exploitation, discrimination and racism. Regardless of the quality of the services provided by the reception facilities and the opportunities offered at the local level, these interlinked factors generate fears and frustrations, and even thwart all efforts and progress. There is the greatest risk of labour exploitation, irregular and/or illegal work when UASC leave the reception centres. When girls and boys drop out of the official system, they are at risk of becoming ‘invisible’ and hence more exposed to violence and abuse. In these cases, the research highlighted the importance of the informal support networks. The results show that the experiences of girls and young women are characterized by a strong dynamic related to GBV, even when not victims of trafficking. Yet, most of them show great resilience, fuelled by their desire and ability to overcome any difficulties. This can be facilitated by effective support networks and services, but may be limited when they are absent or inadequate.\n\nIn general, the research calls for a deeper analysis of gender issues in order to formulate a comprehensive view 72", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nof the experience and needs of female UASC and former UASC. Moreover, it would be important to delve deeper into aspects that have only been marginally addressed by the research, such as knowledge of one’s own body and of hygiene principles, and the ability to manage relational and sexual dimensions in order to facilitate a more complete understanding of the needs and experiences of these girls and boys.\n\n**8.3 Constraints and gaps of the system**\n\nThe following constraints and shortcomings have been found with regard to the legislation, governance and reception system concerning UASC’s path to social inclusion.\n\n**8.3.1 Normative framework and its application**\n\nLaw 47/2017, two years after its approval, still lacks its implementing decrees as well as funding, which severely limits its impact. Some provisions remain to be defined, for example, on the UASC interview process, on the definition of residence permits and on age assessment procedures, and there are differences in application between and within regions. UASC and guardians are often not aware that UASC can access continued protection by social services until the age of 21, as per Art. 13 of the same law. With regard to this possibility, there might be issues related to a conflict of interest since it is the municipality that has to cover the costs of the continued protection, which can also include forms of reception. This limitation in its application is significant because it is the only measure foreseen by the Italian legislation to accompany UASC’s transition to adulthood.\n\nMany UASC and former UASC leave their reception facilities to reach family members in other EU countries. Due to the slow and cumbersome system of family reunification under the Dublin III Regulation, in addition to the lack of clear information on the issue, some UASC prefer to transit through Italy and attempt to cross the northern borders, thus exposing themselves to risks related to irregular migration and relying, in some cases, on criminal networks. With the abolition of the residence permit for humanitarian protection (l.d.113/2018), UASC asylum seekers in Italy have been additionally negatively impacted since they lost one of the protections measures formerly provided by the Territorial Commissions. Finally, fragmented age assessment procedures also affect the proper protection of UASC.\n\n**8.3.2 Governance and reception**\n\nDue to the fragmented and territorially diverse system of governance and functioning of the reception system, UASC are kept in a state of uncertainty and experience difficulty in identifying and realizing their own pathways of transition to adulthood. The research highlights the fragmented nature of the reception system in terms of organization and type of facilities, as well as of the quality of the services provided. Difficulties also emerge in scaling up well-established positive experiences such as that of the AMIF first-level reception facilities for UASC. The impact of the local context on UASC's transition to adulthood is significant, both in terms of the quality of the services offered by the reception facility and of what is offered at the local level once the transition to semi- or complete autonomy has taken place (e.g. in terms of work, housing and socio 73", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\neconomic opportunities). The lack of a central system for the distribution of UASC throughout the country that takes into account their needs and geographical disparities in the quality of the provided assistance is one of the factors that can lead to their dropping out from reception facilities in the most isolated areas in the southern regions of Italy and move to the large cities of central and northern Italy.\n\n**8.3.3 Social inclusion**\n\nWith regard to educational and training courses, a major issue relates to the time available to reach a number of milestones, such as the attainment of level A2 in Italian, or a middle school degree before turning 18. It emerges that the fundamental need for education may paradoxically become an obstacle that slows down the transition to autonomy if delayed. In addition, due to significant geographical differences, the school system is not always able to guarantee the rights to equal access and attendance to education provided for by relevant national regulations and guidelines. The lack of assessment of literacy and numeracy skills as well as the lack of recognition of the studies completed and of the professional skills attained in the country of origin clearly also emerge; together with the unequal geographical distribution in professional paths and of orientation services available negatively affects the interests and needs of UASC across Italy.\n\nUpon turning 18, becoming legal becomes an essential requirement not only for job placement, but also for housing independence. The limits in accessing the housing market related to the phenomenon of prejudice or discrimination or to lack of a regular work contract, creates a state of uncertainty that generates anxiety among UASC who have just turned 18 and even forces them to opt for housing solutions that are not completely legal or are not conducive to social inclusion.\n\n**8.3.4 Data availability**\n\nThe research revealed a number of gaps in the availability and management of data on UASC and former UASC, which prevents a comprehensive overview of the paths of this category of young people as they arrive in Italy.\n\nAlthough there is a systematic and centralized data collection on UASC through the Central Information System for UASC (SIM), important gaps remain regarding, inter alia _:_\n\n**••** **residence permits for UASC** issued by local police stations and their conversion into other forms of\n\npermits when they turn 18;\n\n**••** **applications and outcomes of asylum applications** made by UASC, the granting of other types of\n\nresidence permits (such as for special cases or medical treatment);\n\n**••** **the presence of UASC in the catch-up schools (CPIA);**\n\n**•**    - the new **system of volunteer guardians** that can complement the information already collected\n\nwithin the SIM;\n\n**••** **UASC benefiting from foster care;**\n\n**•**    - and the **presence of UASC in reception facilities.**\n\nMoreover, there is currently no authority responsible for collecting data on former UASC.\n\n74", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Central Information System for UASC"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Central Information System for UASC", "confidence": 0.28196120262145996}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n# **9. Recommendations**\n\n_**For the Italian authorities**_ GOVERNANCE AND COORDINATION\n\n**•**    - Ensure that greater **attention is focused on the specific needs** of young people who arrived in Italy\n\nas UASC, and **especially former UASC who turned 18 after 2016,** by adopting relevant policies that reflect the multiplicity and complexity of the processes of triple transition to adulthood beyond the age definitions (see EU Youth Strategy 2030);\n\n**•**    - Ensure effective **coordination at the national and local levels between institutions** that are\n\nresponsible for issues regarding UASC and young people, inter alia _,_ youth policies, training and education, social policies, employment, health, equal opportunities and justice, allowing for harmonious planning and proper implementation of legislation and standards;\n\n**•**    - Develop an **inter-sectoral strategy** with the involvement of CSOs, which includes multi-year planning,\n\nand human, technical and financial resources required to increase the opportunities for social inclusion of former UASC, and ensures attention to the bearers of specific needs, and strengthen resources and capabilities.\n\nNORMATIVE FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATION\n\n**•**    - Ensure the **effective and full enactment of Law 47/2017 and the adoption of its implementation**\n\n**decrees,** in line with European and international standards, and involving United Nations agencies and\n\ncivil society actors in the process;\n\n**•**    - Adopt explicit exemptions for UASC related to the security measures introduced by Law 132/2018,\n\nwith a view to facilitating their transition to adulthood;\n\n**•**    - Ensure full respect for the **best interests of the child** through the adoption of procedures that respect\n\ninternational standards and that are uniform throughout the country, taking into consideration gender differences;\n\n**•**    - Fully implementing Article 9 of Law 47/2017, for the systematic and effective **adoption the cartella**\n\n**sociale** (social file); [62]\n\n**•**    - Ensure a smooth transition to adulthood starting from a prompt and correct identification of UASC,\n\nthrough the use of, if necessary, a multi-disciplinary and **holistic procedure for age assessment** that meets international standards and the principles set out in Law 47/2017 and DPCM 324/2016, including gender considerations. In addition, resume the process of consultation with CSOs and United Nations agencies regarding the relevant standard protocol; 75", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "social file", "confidence": 0.16113704442977905}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n**•**    - Ensure the full implementation of Article 17 of Law 47/2017 through the definition of a specific **assistance**\n\n**programme for UASC victims of trafficking** that ensures adequate conditions of reception and\n\npsychosocial, health and legal assistance, providing long-term solutions, even after they reach adulthood;\n\n**•**    - Ensure every UASC has a **volunteer guardian** and that the guardian is adequately trained and able\n\nto respond to his/her specific needs, even during the phase of transition to adulthood. Replicate the Palermo Model as a good practice of support and monitoring for volunteer guardians;\n\n**•**    - Ensure the prompt issuance of the **residence permit for UASC** in order to allow immediate access to\n\nthe rights and services recognized by law.\n\nRECEPTION AND SERVICES\n\n**•**    - Ensure that the current phase of **transition to the new SIPROIMI reception system** is carried out so\n\nas to guarantee uniformity throughout the national territory, respect for international standards, and care of young migrants and refugees in the transition phase. This will be achieved both by ensuring the reception of former UASC placed under the continued protection by social services in accordance with Article 13 of Law 47/2017 and by assessing the situations of persons with specific needs;\n\n**•**    - Guarantee a similar level of **standards in the reception facilities** that are not part of the SIPROIMI\n\nsystem, both for UASC and former UASC, in order to avoid unequal treatment and to offer similar opportunities, by, inter alia, creating the conditions for mitigating any risks, including gender-related risks that may arise from leaving the reception facility;\n\n**•**    - Ensure consistent and adequate **training of professionals involved in the reception system,** including\n\ncultural mediators, to effectively respond to the needs of UASC and those turning 18, deepening their knowledge in areas of specific expertise, such as the right to participation, and intercultural skills, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and reproductive health;\n\n**•**    - Guarantee a **monitoring system of international and Italian standards** in order to ensure their\n\ncompliance within the entire reception system, irrespective of the type of accommodation;\n\n**•**    - Consolidate and disseminate the **good practices** recorded and achieved during the course of the AMIF\n\nfirst-line reception design;\n\n**•**    - Ensure that UASC, their guardians and the social services are **aware** of the possibility of requesting\n\nfrom the Judicial Authority **continued protection by the social services up to the age of 21** in accordance with Article 13 of Law 47/2017. In addition, ensure that these services are provided with adequate human, technical and financial resources to protect the former UASC;\n\n**•**    - Ensure that all UASC and former UASC at risk of – or vulnerable because they have experienced –\n\nsituations of violence, including sexual violence, torture or other traumas related to travel or the reasons behind departure, victims of trafficking and people with mental distress can benefit from **psychosocial**\n\n**intervention measures of prevention or response,** appropriate to their age, gender and cultural\n\nspecifity. It is recommended that these measures – whether within special reception facilities or at specialized external services – be aimed at the social inclusion of young people and be maintained for the period necessary for a full recovery to avoid the risk of re-exploitation or re-victimization. It is therefore 76", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nrecommended that these measures not be interrupted for any reason when they turn 18;\n\n**•**    - Promote safe and appropriate **family or community-based alternative care** arrangements, as well as\n\nsupervised independent housing solutions, as highlighted by the case study in Lombardy. Municipalities must be provided with adequate human, technical and financial resources to raise awareness and promote and implement these initiatives;\n\n**•**    - Ensure that, in choosing to continue benefiting from reception after the age of 18, adequate\n\nconsideration is given to the need to guarantee **geographical proximity** in order to maintain existing social and community links UASC may have already established where they have lived until age 18;\n\n**•**    - Ensure young people’s **access to all relevant information** relating to, inter alia, their rights and\n\nobligations, including all available legal channels, opportunities for social inclusion, and ways of accessing services. This information should take into account specific age, gender, maturity and developmental needs as well as cultural references.\n\nSOCIAL, EDUCATIONAL AND EMPLOYMENT INCLUSION\n\n**•**    - Standardize and expand procedures for the **assessment of** professional **skills,** literacy and numeracy\n\nskills and ‘soft skills’ acquired in the countries of origin, including introducing and adopting of user friendly tools that enable regular updating of these skills by young migrants and refugees themselves.\n\n**•**    - Accelerate the procedures for the **recognition of qualifications obtained abroad** through the Ministry\n\nof Foreign Affairs and Embassies for the subsequent assessment of qualifications;\n\n**•**    - Ensure **access to training and vocational courses and opportunities** such as work grants, internships\n\nand apprenticeships for former UASC, and to local opportunities, including through the provision of effective information;\n\n**•**    - Facilitate the **access** of UASC and young migrants and refugees who turned 18 **to the job market** by\n\nstrengthening the **cooperation** between the reception system and employment offices;\n\n**•**    - Take into due consideration the specific needs for gender-related support and assistance in employment\n\nand education; for example, parenting responsibility that girls and young women often have to assume.\n\nThis includes access to comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services;\n\n**•**    - Combine training and professional **opportunities with life skills-building courses,** improvement of\n\nItalian language skills and continuous job market guidance;\n\n**•**    - Promote opportunities to **work related learning** and **first-level apprenticeship** pathways as envisaged\n\nby the law in view of the challenges posed by the obligation to complete schooling;\n\n**•**    - Clarify that a child holding a residence permit for UASC is **authorized to work** within the limits set out\n\nby the law;\n\n**•**    - Promote preventive interventions, including adequate **information** provision, for former UASC\n\n**regarding labour legislation** in Italy and the risks associated with inclusion in informal and illegal\n\ncircuits, including trafficking and sexual exploitation;\n\n**•**    - Re-introduce the participation of former UASC in the **civic service** pathways and enhance or expand\n\nother volunteering opportunities; 77", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n**•**    - Ensure participation in social and recreational activities, which are fundamental for personal development\n\nand interaction within the local context, such as **sports and artistic and entertainment activities;**\n\n**•**    - Increase the opportunities for **meetings and exchanges between young migrants and refugees**\n\n**and their peers,** through strengthening of support to youth centres. Promote peer support in access\n\nto rights, basic services and knowledge of the area where they live;\n\n**•**    - Develop a new **National Action Plan against Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination,**\n\nstrengthening the networks of anti-discrimination centres, paying specific attention to gender dynamics, promoting interreligious dialogue at the community level and including these issues in civic education teaching in schools.\n\nDATA COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT\n\n**•**    - **Improve the data collection system,** harmonizing existing databases and ensuring that all information\n\nis collected and manageable, as recently noted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its Concluding Comments to Italy in 2019. This will be achieved by, inter alia, disaggregating data by age, gender, disability, geographical location, ethnic and national origin, legal status, protection and socio economic status in order to facilitate the analysis of the situation of all UASC and thus improve the protection system;\n\n**•**    - **Link the social files and the data collection system (SIM)** so as to optimize resources and information\n\nin order to better protect the child;\n\n**•**    - Create a mechanism for **collecting data on former UASC** that complements the information already\n\ncollected within UASC data collection systems and that involves:\n\n-- the MOI, ANCI and SIPROIMI, which are responsible for the reception system, for both UASC and\n\nadults;\n\n-- the MLSP, which is responsible for the census and monitoring of the presence of UASC and for\n\npolicies the pertaining to the socio-economic inclusion of UASC and former UASC;\n\n-- the Juvenile Courts, particularly with regard to the implementation of Article 13 of Law 47/2017;\n\n-- the Department of Equal Opportunities at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, particularly\n\nwith regard to the anti-trafficking plan;\n\n-- the National Ombudsman for Childhood and Adolescence;\n\n-- the MOE on the continuity of schooling upon reaching adulthood.\n\n_**For the European Union**_\n\n**•**    - Ensure **rapid and effective procedures for family reunification** starting from a systematic, timely\n\nand correct implementation of the Dublin Regulation, through the adoption of uniform and appropriate procedures, particularly with regard to age assessment and family reunification;\n\n**•**    - Ensure effective cooperation between Member States securing **full and effective respect of the**\n\n**principle of the best interests of the child** by, inter alia, adopting harmonized and appropriate\n\n78", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["social files and the data collection system"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "data collection system", "confidence": 0.15615293383598328}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nprocedures in line with the General Comment of the Committee of the Rights of the Child, No. 14;\n\n**•**    - Set up a harmonized and exhaustive **data collection system** that **strengthens protection mechanisms**\n\n**for UASC,** for example, by facilitating their tracing within the EU, and enables continuity in protection\n\ninterventions across European states, maintaining all procedural safeguards, including the informed consent of the child. This may help to mitigate the risks of prolonged exposure to violence and abuse inherent in onward movements;\n\n**•**    - Ensure that Member States **safeguard the rights and opportunities of young refugees** in transition\n\nto adulthood through improvement of their legal framework and promotion of comprehensive interdisciplinary co-operation between institutions in areas such as child protection, youth, health, education, social protection or welfare, migration, justice and gender equality, taking into consideration, drawing from and providing effective implementation to the Recommendation CM/Rec (2019)4 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on supporting young refugees in transition to adulthood, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 24 April 2019, at the 1344th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies. [63] _**For civil society**_\n\n**•**    - Continue to foster and increase the **opportunities for meeting and interaction between UASC**\n\n**and former UASC, the resident population and their peers** in order to nurture formal and informal\n\nrelationships in the transition to adulthood and to combat discrimination, racism and xenophobia;\n\n**•**    - Continue to experiment – by documenting, monitoring and evaluating – **innovative and alternative**\n\n**interventions** for young migrants and refugees (former UASC) such as supervised independent living,\n\nfamily or community housing solutions. Also promote and expand activities promoting UASC and former UASC participation, such as those carried out in various kinds of youth centres;\n\n**•**    - Continue to provide **support to UASC and former UASC,** with a focus on those with special needs,\n\nincluding survivors of SGBV, through the management of specialized services and in collaboration with the public authorities;\n\n**•**    - Promote the **participation of young migrants and refugees,** by, inter alia, encouraging the active\n\ninclusion of girls in associations in order to contribute actively to society, defend their rights, and make their voices and opinions heard by influencing decisions on policies that affect them.\n\n79", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**O. (left), 17 years old, from Senegal, jokes around with one of his housemates at a piazza**\n\n**in the small village of Naro, in Sicily, Italy. He has been in Italy for about two years (December 2018)**\n\n© UNICEF/UN0264446/Stefano De Luigi", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n# **References**\n\n**Abbatecola E.** (2018) Trans-migrazioni. Lavoro, sfruttamento e violenza di genere nei mercati globali del sesso,\n\nRosenberg&Sellier, Torino.\n\n**Action for the rights of children** (n.d.) Foundations: Child and Adolescent Development, disponibile a: https://www.unhcr.\n\norg/protection/children/3bb81bad4/action-rights-children-arc-foundations-child-adolescent-development.html\n\n**Amaturo E., Punziano G.** (2016) I mixed methods nella ricerca sociale, Carocci Editore, Roma.\n\n**Ambrosini M.** (2011) Sociologia delle migrazioni, il Mulino, Bologna.\n\n**Ambrosini M.,** (2004) Reti e dinamiche migratorie. Il ruolo degli attori informali, in La Rivista delle Politiche Sociali, 1(3), pp.\n\n161-174.\n\n**Appadurai A.** (2011) Le aspirazioni nutrono la democrazia, Et Al, Milano.\n\n**Augelli, A.,** **Lombi, L., Triani, P.** (2018) Unaccompanied Minors: Exploring Needs and Resources to Plan Socio-educational\n\nPrograms into School Settings. Italian Journal of Sociology of Education, 10(1), pp. 43-61.\n\n**Bell D.** (1966) Prospettive del XXI secolo, Mondadori, Milano.\n\n**Besozzi E.,** **Colombo M.** (1998) Metodologia della ricerca sociale nei contesti socioeducativi, Guerini e Associati, Milano.\n\n**Bichi R.** (2002) L’intervista Biografica. Una proposta metodologica, Vita e Pensiero, Milano.\n\n**Bimbi F.** (2011) Genere e violenza al tempo delle migrazioni globalizzate, in Balsamo F., World Wide Women: Globalizzazione,\n\nGeneri, Linguaggi, Vol.2, CIRSDe, Università degli Studi di Torino, Torino.\n\n**Bourdieu P.,** **Wacquant L. J. D.** (1992) Risposte per un’antropologia riflessiva, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino.\n\n**Buzzi C.,** **Cavalli A., de Lillo A.** (a cura di) (2002) Giovani del nuovo secolo. Quinto rapporto Iard sulla condizione giovanile in\n\nItalia, il Mulino, Bologna.\n\n**Cedefop** (2014) Vocational Educational Training in Italy. Cedefop. Luxemburg publication Office of the European Union.\n\n**Cesareo V., Bichi R.** (2010) Per un'integrazione possibile. Periferie urbane e processi migratori, FrancoAngeli, Milano.\n\n**CIRDI Centro di Informazione su Razzismo e Discriminazioni in Italia – COSPE** (2014) La discriminazione nell’accesso\n\nall’alloggio. Analisi del settore pubblico e privato, disponibile a: http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Documenti-e-ricerche/ Ricerca-accesso-allalloggio-CIRDI.pdf\n\n**Creswell J. W.,** **Plano Clark V. L.** (2011) Designing and conducting mixed methods research, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, CA.\n\n**D’Agostino M.** (a cura di) (2018) La Forza delle lingue, nella migrazione e nella inclusione. Strumenti e Ricerche Scuola di\n\nLingua Italiana per Stranieri dell’Università di Palermo, Palermo.\n\n**Demaria C.** (2016) Intersezionalità e femminismo transnazionale tra costruttivismo, post-strutturalismo e ‘performance’\n\nepistemologiche, in Scienza & Politica, vol. XXVIII, 54, pp. 71-85, disponibile a https://scienzaepolitica.unibo.it/article/ download/6219/5987\n\n**Erickson H. E.** (1998) The life cycle completed, W. W. Norton e Company, New York.\n\n**Ferri G. et al.** (2017) Abitare Collaborativo: percorsi di coesione sociale per un nuovo welfare di comunità, in Techne, 14, pp.\n\n125-138, disponibile a: http://www.fupress.com/techneDOI: 10.13128/Techne-20804.\n\n**Fondazione ISMU** (2019) Alunni con background migratorio in Italia. Emergenze e traguardi, disponibile a: http://www.ismu.\n\norg/alunni-con-background-migratorio-in-italia-emergenze-e-traguardi\n\n**FRA and AGIA** Fundamental Rights Agency & Agenzia Garante Infanzia e Adolescenza (2018) Guardianship for Unaccompanied\n\nChildren in Italy, disponibile a: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-it-guardianship-legal-update_en.pdf\n\n**Garante Infanzia Adolescenza** (2018) Il Modello Palermo. La presa in carico delle ragazze e dei ragazzi stranieri non\n\naccompagnati, Comune di Palermo.\n\n**Giddens A.** (1992) Central Problems in Social Theory: Actions, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis, Berkeley,\n\nUniversity of California Press.\n\n**Hansen T.H, McIntire W.G.** (1989) Family Structure Variables as Predictors of Educational and Vocational Aspirations of High\n\nSchool Seniors, in Research in Rural Education, 6(2), pp. 39-49.\n\n**IOM** (2017a) Migrant Vulnerability to Human Trafficking and Exploitation: Evidence from the Central and Eastern Mediterranean\n\nMigration Routes, Ginevra, disponibile a: http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migrant_vulnerability_to_human_ trafficking_and_exploitation.pdf\n\n**IOM** (2017b) La tratta di esseri umani lungo la rotta del Mediterraneo Centrale - dati, storie e informazioni raccolte\n\ndall’Organizzazione Internazionale per le Migrazioni, Roma, disponibile a: https://italy.iom.int/sites/default/files/documents/ OIM_Rapporto%20tratta_2017.pdf 82", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n**IOM (2019)** Profiles and reported vulnerabilities of migrants along the Eastern, Central and Western Mediterranean routes,\n\ndisponibile a: https://migration.iom.int/europe?type=arrivals\n\n**Lushey C.J., Munro E.R.** (2014) Participatory peer research methodology: an effective method for obtaining young people’s\n\nperspectives on transitions from care to adulthood?, in Qualitative Social Work, 14(4), pp. 522-537.\n\n**Masini E.** (2000) Penser le Futur, Dunod, Paris.\n\n**MLPS** (2019) Report mensili Minori Stranieri Non Accompagnati in Italia, disponibili a: https://www.lavoro.gov.it/temi-e\npriorita/immigrazione/focus-on/minori-stranieri/Pagine/Dati-minori-stranieri-non-accompagnati.aspx\n\n**MIUR, AGIA** (2017) Linee Guida per il diritto allo studio degli alunni e delle alunne fuori dalla famiglia di origine.\n\n**Morgan D.L.,** **Kruger R.A.** (eds) (1998) The Focus Group Kit, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, CA.\n\n**O’Leary Z.** (2004) Guide to Doing Research, SAGE, London.\n\n**OXFAM** (2017) You aren’t human any more. Migrants expose the harrowing situation in Libya and the impact of European\n\npolicies, disponibile a https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/mb-migrants-libya-europe-090817-en.pdf\n\n**PAHO - Pan American Health Organization** (2005) Youth: Choices and Change. Promoting Healthy Behaviors in Adolescents,\n\ndisponibile a http://iris.paho.org/xmlui/handle/123456789/708\n\n**Save the Children** (2019) Children Come First. Intervento in Frontiera. Dossier I Minori Migranti In Arrivo Via Mare. Dossier\n\nI-VII, 2017-19.\n\n**Sayad A.** (2002) La doppia assenza. Dalle illusioni dell’emigrato alle sofferenze dell’immigrato, Raffaello Cortina Editore,\n\nMilano.\n\n**Segatto B., Di Masi D., Surian A** . (2018) L’ingiusta distanza. I percorsi dei minori stranieri non accompagnati dall’accoglienza\n\nalla cittadinanza, FrancoAngeli, Milano.\n\n**SPRAR, ANCI, MdI** (2017) Atlante SPRAR In Migrazione. Accoglienza e Rifugiati: un’ordinaria emergenza, disponibile a:\n\nhttps://www.sprar.it/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Atlante-Sprar-2017_Light.pdf\n\n**Terres des Hommes** (2017) Guida al Modello Faro: Salute Mentale e Supporto Psicosociale a minori migranti non accompagnati\n\ne a famiglie con bambini in prima accoglienza, disponibile a https://terredeshommes.it/dnload/GuidaFARO-2017.pdf\n\n**UNHCR** (2018) Desperate journey Refugees and migrants arriving in Europe and at Europe's borders, disponibile a: https://\n\ndata2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/65373#_ga=2.230793311.1765494779.1537607900-1572128613.1533314743\n\n**UNICEF** (2011) The State of The World’s Children 2011. Adolescence. An age of opportunity, disponibile a https://www.\n\nunicef.org/sowc2011/pdfs/SOWC-2011-Main-Report_EN_02092011.pdf\n\n**UNICEF** (2017a) The Adolescent Brain: A second window of opportunity. A Compendium, disponibile a https://www.unicef\nirc.org/publications/pdf/adolescent_brain_a_second_window_of_opportunity_a_compendium.pdf\n\n**UNICEF** (2017b) A deadly journey for children. The Central Mediterranean Migration Route, disponibile a https://www.unicef.\n\norg/publications/files/EN_UNICEF_Central_Mediterranean_Migration.pdf\n\n**UNICEF & CNR** (2017) Sperduti. Storie di minorenni arrivati soli in Italia, disponibile a https://www.unicef.it/Allegati/Bambini_\n\nSperduti.pdf\n\n**UNICEF & IOM** (2017) Harrowing Journeys. Children and youth on the move across the Mediterranean Sea, at risk of\n\ntrafficking and exploitation, disponibile a https://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Harrowing_Journeys_Children_and_youth_ on_the_move_across_the_Mediterranean.pdf\n\n**UNICEF & MDM** Médecins du Monde (2018) Enea. Manuale operative per la presa in carico psicosociale dei minori stranieri\n\nnon accompagnati, disponibile a https://issuu.com/medecinsdumonde/docs/enea-manuale_operativo\n\n**UNICEF & REACH** (2017) Children on the move in Italy and Greece. Report June 2017, disponibile a https://www.unicef.org/\n\neca/media/921/file/REACH%20report%202017.pdf\n\n**United Nations** (2018) Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya,\n\ndisponibile a: https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/libya-migration-report-18dec2018.pdf\n\n**U-Report on the Move** (2018) Conoscenza e servizi sulla violenza sessuale, disponibile a: https://onthemove.ureport.in/\n\npoll/3293/\n\n**Women’s Refugee Commission** (2019) More Than One Million Pains: Sexual Violence Against Men and Boys on the\n\nCentral Mediterranean Route to Italy, disponibile a https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/images/zdocs/Libya-Italy Report-03-2019.pdf For all of the references, 4 July 2019 was the latest access.\n\n83", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n# **Glossary**\n\n**Absconded** - the MLSP defines the term ‘absconded’ as an UASC who was registered as such upon arrival and insertion in the\n\nreception system of a given country, but who subsequently left the reception facility in which he or she are hosted. UASC are reported as absconded, competent authorities inform Directorate General for Immigration and Integration Policies of the MLSP.\n\nThey remain absconded until they are found in Italy or reach the age of 18.\n\n**Adolescent** - According to the United Nations, an adolescent is defined as any individual between the ages of 10 and 19. [64]\n\n**Best interests of the child** - The best interests of the child is one of the fundamental values of the United Nations Convention\n\non the Rights of the Child (CRC). Article 3(1) of the CRC, states “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration”. [65]\n\n**Child/children** - The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) defines a child as every human being below\n\nthe age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier (Article 1). [66]\n\n**Former UASC** - For the purposes of this study, former UASC are individuals who, at the time of the interview, had already\n\nreached the age of 18, but who came to Italy as children and were registered as UASC upon their arrival in Italy. This definition was developed for the specific purposes of the research.\n\n**Gender-based violence** - Term that includes any harmful act perpetrated against the will of the person and based on socially\n\nascribed differences between men and women (such as gender). It includes acts inflicted physically, sexually, mental harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other forms of deprivation of liberty. These acts may occur in public or private.\n\nThe term ‘GBV’ is most commonly used to emphasize how the systemic disparity between males and females, which exists in every society in the world, acts as a unifying and fundamental feature of many forms of violence perpetrated against women and girls. [67]\n\n**Sexual and gender-based violence** refers to any act perpetrated against the will of the person and based on gender norms and\n\nan asymmetrical relationship of power. It includes threats of violence and coercion. It may be physical, emotional, psychological or sexual in nature and may take the form of a denial of resources or access to services. It is inflicted on women, girls, boys and men. [68]\n\n**Humanitarian protection** - This form of protection was governed by the previous Article 5(6) of Legislative Decree no. 286/1998\n\nto respond to protection needs based on serious reasons “particularly of a humanitarian nature or arising from constitutional or international obligations of Italy as a State” (www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/98286dl.htm) and subsequently repealed by l.d. 113/2018.\n\n**Participation** - The right to participate and to be heard is one of the fundamental principles affirmed by the United Nations\n\nConvention on the Rights of the Child, Article 12, which states that the State Parties “shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to freely express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial or administrative proceedings affecting the direct, either directly or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law”. [69]\n\n**Prosieguo Amministrativo** - Term commonly used to refer to the possibility governed by Article 13 of Law 47/2017\n\nunder which when UASC, at the age of majority, despite having undertaken a pathway of social inclusion, needs continued protection until age 21. The Juvenile Court may order, even at the request of social services, with a motivated decree, that he/she is to be placed in the custody of the social services, however not later than the age of 21 (www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/ id/2017/04/21/17G00062/sg).\n\n**Refugee status** - The term ‘refugee’ applies to any person who, as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and\n\nowing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside his country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of such protection; or who, having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 84", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nevents, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Article 1A of the Geneva Refugee Convention https://www.\n\nunhcr.org/3b66c2aa10)\n\n**Residence permit for family reasons** - Governed by Article 10 (1), letter b) of Law 47/2017 under which the Questore (Chief\n\nof Police) issues a residence permit for family reasons for a child of 14 years of age who is entrusted, also pursuant to Article 9(4) of Law 184/1983 and subsequent amendments, or who is subject to the protection of an Italian citizen living with him/her, or for a child over 14 years of age who is entrusted, also pursuant to the same Article 9(4), of Law 184/1983 and subsequent amendments, or subject to the protection of a foreigner residing legally in the national territory or of an Italian citizen living with him/her.\n\n**Residence permit for UASC** - Governed by Article 10(1), letter a) of Law 47/2017 under which the Questore issues a residence\n\npermit for minor age in the case of UASC, found in the national territory and reported to the competent authorities. The residence permit for UASC is issued, at the request of the minor himself/herself, directly or through those who exercise parental responsibility, even before the appointment of a guardian pursuant to Article 346 of the Civil Code, and is valid until the age of majority. [70]\n\n**Secondary movements** - The phenomenon of migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, who for various reasons\n\nmove from their first country of arrival to seek protection or permanent resettlement elsewhere. This movement takes place without the prior consent of the national authorities, without an entry visa, without or with insufficient travel documents among those normally required, or with false documents. [71]\n\n**Special cases** - Residence permits governed by the Testo Unico sull’ Immigrazione (Legislative Decree 286/1998) to meet the\n\ntemporary needs for the protection of foreigners in humanitarian need. Some residence permits for special cases – residence permits for medical treatment (Article 19, para.2, letter d-bis TUI), for disasters (Article 20) and for acts of particular civic value (Article 42) – were introduced by l.d.113/2018, while the other permits were already provided for by the previous regime, and the new legislation has only changed the name and/or completed the discipline. [72]\n\n**Special protection** - The residence permit was introduced by Article 1(2) of l.d.113/2018 to protect foreigners who cannot be\n\nrejected, expelled or extradited to a State if there are reasonable grounds for considering that that person risks being subjected to torture, also taking into account the existence in that State of systematic and serious violations of human rights under Article 19(1.1) of Legislative Decree 286/1998.\n\n**Subsidiary protection** - One of the forms of international protection from which non-EU foreigners, including UASC, may\n\nbenefit, who has applied for international protection, governed by EU law (Directive 2011/95/EC – Qualification Directive – Recast). Persons eligible for subsidiary protection are all third-country nationals or stateless persons who do not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom there are substantive reasons to believe that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm. For this purpose, ‘serious harm’ consists of: (i) the death penalty or execution; or (ii) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (iii) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.\n\n**Territorial Commission** - These are Commissions for the recognition of international protection, administrative authorities\n\ntasked with examining applications for international protection submitted by foreigners. The composition, tasks and procedures of the Territorial Commissions are regulated by Legislative Decree 25/2008.\n\n**Trafficking** - Article 3(a) of the United Nations Additional Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,\n\nEspecially Women and Children supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) defines trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud of deception of the abuse of power or a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.” Trafficking in persons may take place within the borders of a State or may be transnational.\n\n**Unaccompanied and separated children (UASC)** - According to Article 2 of Law 47/2017, an UASC is a minor who does not\n\nhave Italian nationality or the nationality of a European Union Member State, who is for any reason present on the territory of the state or otherwise under Italian jurisdiction, who is without care and representation by his or her parents or other adults legally responsible for him or her according to Italian legislation. [73] 85", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n**Young people/youth** - According to the United Nations, “young people” are individuals between the ages of ten and 24,\n\nwhile “youth” are those between the ages of 15 and 24 (see A/36/215 and resolution 36/28, 1981). Depending on the context of reference, broader age ranges up to 30 years are taken into account. For example, to produce comparative statistics for all Member States, the European Commission uses an age range between 15 and 29 years (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/ youth). For the purpose of the report the term young people was used.\n\n# **Annexes**\n\n**Box 1 – Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) first-level reception facilities**\n\nEstablished by the Ministry of the Interior by Ministerial Decree 1.09.2016 and financed by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) 2014–2020, the highly specialized governmental facilities – the FAMI centres in Italian – for the needs of immediate protection and assistance, provide adequate child-friendly reception services to UASC through socio educational activities and participation activities, information, protection and legal and socio-psychological advice. FAMI's design follows the reform of the reception system, which began in 2014 and was regulated and formalized by Legislative Decree 142/2015 and subsequent amendments, to respond to the constant increase in arrivals of UASC, and to better and more holistically respond to their needs, with a first piloting phase of the system.\n\nFAMI's design is innovative in several respects: it includes important criteria, such as a multidisciplinary approach and coordinated and complementary support provided by specialized agents, and has introduced and experimented good practices, testing and consolidating innovations introduced by Law No. 47/2017, such as, for example, the social file. The first phase of the reception process, scheduled for a maximum of 30 days (as provided by the Legislative Decree 142/2015, amended by Law 47/2017), is carried out by multidisciplinary teams with the support of partner agencies (IOM, UNHCR, Save the Children, INMP, ANCI – Central Service), in the first-line reception of the UASC, ensuring the respect of his/her fundamental rights, with particular reference to the principle of the best interests of the child and through a holistic approach of ad hoc protection and coordination with local institutions and entities. Initially tasked to provide reception in 27 reception projects for a total of 1,350 locations across the country, to date there are eight operational projects located in Sicily and Molise for a total of 200 places.\n\nDespite this recent reorganization following the decrease in arrivals, over the years the system has been able to guarantee protection and support of children in their choice of the most suitable legal status or inclusion process. This includes the application for international protection, family reunification or family fostering aimed at his/her protection and at achieving autonomy and self-awareness in line with his/her higher interest, needs and wishes. Actions include the involvement of the guardian, the application for a residence permit and support for age assessment, the referral of particularly vulnerable cases to specific institutions and local authorities and the multidisciplinary use of the social file. Several operational tools were developed and tested during project implementation, such as the Guidelines for first-line reception facilities containing Standard Operating Procedures for the assessment of the best interests of the child and the Standard Operating Procedures concerning information and legal support for the application for international protection of UASC hosted in first reception facilities. Particular attention was paid to the participatory activities for UASC, with for example, the participatory development of information tools for UASC, and to the sustainability of project actions through the creation of training for trainers within the system.\n\n86", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n**Box 2 – Legal framework on education and training**\n\nThe right to education, enshrined in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and reaffirmed by the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 (Articles 18, 28 and 29), is harmonized in Article 38 of Legislative Decree 286/1998 (Testo unico sull’immigrazione), which states that “foreign children in the territory are subject to compulsory schooling; they are subject to all the provisions in force on the right to education, access to educational services, participation in the life of the school community”. In addition, the right to the completion of studies is reiterated for those who have reached 18 years of age by the following legislation: namely, Law 47/2017, the resulting Guidelines for the Right to Study of Pupils Outside their Home Families (MIUR-AGIA December 2017) [Ixxv] and the Memorandum of Understanding between the National Ombudsperson (AGIA) and the Ministry of Education, University and Research to promote and guarantee the rights of pupils (October 2018). [Ixxvi] In addition, Law 183/1984 establishes the right to education for children in foster care or who have been adopted.\n\nCompulsory education of all children lasts ten years, from the age of six to 16. It also covers the first two years of upper secondary education. In this period of time, UASC must be admitted to the class that corresponds to their age, unless the teachers decide otherwise (Article 45 of the Regulation Implementing the Consolidated Text – Presidential Decree 394/1999). Nevertheless, the “Guidelines for the reception and integration of foreign students” (MIUR 2014) state that, in these cases, the child can be enrolled in the class that is immediately above or below, in order to limit as much as possible the age difference between pupils in the same class.\n\nFrom 16 to 18 years of age, all children have the right and duty to education and training, which is fulfilled by obtaining a secondary school certificate or a professional qualification, or through apprenticeship. Children over the age of 16 who have not taken the middle school exam can prepare for it and take it by registering with the CPIA.\n\n**Box 3 – Volunteer guardians (Law No. 47/2017)**\n\nThe guardian is the person who has the willingness and is able to legally represent a UASC. The guardian is a volunteer (Article 379 cc). Each volunteer guardian may be called upon to assist up to three unaccompanied UASC, unless there are special reasons (e.g. a group of siblings greater than three). As defined by the National Ombudsperson for Childhood and Adolescence, the guardian’s tasks are to:\n\n**•**    - ensure that the individual under the age of 18 is guaranteed access to rights without any discrimination;\n\n**•**    - promote the psychophysical well-being of individual under the age of 18;\n\n**•**    - follow the education and integration pathways, verifying that his/her abilities, natural inclinations and\naspirations are taken into account;\n\n**•**    - monitor reception conditions, security and protection;\n\n**•**    - administer any assets of the person under the age of 18.\n\nPursuant to Article 11 of Law 47/2017, lists of volunteer guardians have been established. The procedure for the selection of guardians is defined within the guidelines issued by the National Authority for Childhood and Adolescence.\nThe individual interested in assuming the role of volunteer guardian can participate in the call for applications issued by the Local Authority for Children and Adolescents.\nAfter verifying that the applicants meet all the requirements of the law, the competent office contacts them for an interview aimed at selecting the candidates who participate in the compulsory training course. During the training course, topics related to child development and immigration law are discussed in depth. The course addresses how to recognize the needs of a child and the behaviours to be adopted. At the end of the course, the selected and trained candidate is enrolled in the list of volunteer guardians at the Juvenile Court.\n\n87", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n**Box 4 – Possibility of family reunification for UASC**\n\nThe Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, in accordance with the DPCM 535/99, is proactive and carries out search activities in for the identification of family members of UASC present on the Italian territory. To this end, the Ministry has entered into an agreement with IOM for tracing family members in the countries of origin or in third countries where they reside. With specific reference to UASC asylum seekers who intend to reunite with a family member residing in a country of the European Union (EU), procedures can be activated under the Dublin Regulation III, as implemented by Legislative Decree 142/2015. To ensure that family reunification is line with the best interest of the child, the child is listened to, taking into account his or her age, degree of maturity and personal development, in order to verify the possibility of family reunification. All actions aimed at tracing family members wherever they reside are carried out in the best interests of the child and with the obligation of absolute confidentiality, so as to protect the safety of the UASC and his/her family members. IOM works closely with the social services of the municipalities where the UASC reside, the CSOs and organizations that manage the reception centres, and with the judges of the juvenile courts. This collaboration between separate bodies is further strengthened by partnerships established with institutions and other actors involved in the countries of origin or residence of the families of the UASC. 111 family surveys were completed and transmitted by IOM to the MLPS in 2018, and a further 45 in the first half of 2019. In total, 21 of these were carried out in EU countries and one in the United States. The main UASC nationalities for which they were conducted are Albania, Tunisia, Nigeria, Kosovo*, Morocco, Pakistan and the Gambia.\n\n- References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).\n\n**Box 5 – Access to work opportunities**\n\nWith regard to employment, the same rules apply to foreign UASC as to Italian minors. According to the Law on the Protection of Children from Labour [Law 977/67], combined with the School Reform Law [L. 52/2003 as amended by Law 296/2006], children may be allowed to work only after the age of 16 and upon completion of ten years compulsory schooling. Compulsory training, in contrast, is envisaged until the age of 16, and can be fulfilled in the school system, in the vocational training system or through apprenticeship. Therefore, a child may only enter into a contract other than an apprenticeship if this is compatible with school attendance or vocational training. According to the Reform of Article V of the Constitution [Constitutional Law 3/2001], labour law and policies are determined by the Regions following guidelines established at the national level. This gives rise to a complex and diversified framework at the local level. In most regions, in the absence of local legislation, national legislation determines which residence permits are valid for employment and access to the relevant services. Hence, all the residence permits for UASC allow them to work [Article 33, Testo unico sull’immigrazione d.lgs. 286/1999.], including permits for international protection (after 60 days from the request) [Article 22, d.lgs. 142/2015], except the residence permit for UASC [Article 10, L. 47/2017], with regards to which there is a normative gap on the issue. This gives rise to heterogeneous practices in different regional contexts.\n\nNotwithstanding the definition of a regulatory framework at national level, rules regarding labour insertion, such as extracurricular internships, are also different between regions.\n\n88", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "111 family surveys", "confidence": 0.19645479321479797}], "vague_data": [{"text": "family surveys", "confidence": 0.8390084505081177}]}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\n**Box 6 – Gender-based Violence**\n\nAs widely documented, women, girls, men and boys face numerous risks related to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in their country of origin, along migration routes and in Italy (United Nations, 2018; UNHCR, 2018; Oxfam, 2017; UNICEF, 2017b; IOM, 2017; Women's Refugee Commission, 2019). Studies and reports show that almost all women and female adolescents who travel along the central Mediterranean route have experienced sexual violence. Other forms of GBV also affect women and girls, such as forced marriage, domestic violence and female genital mutilation, as well as human trafficking. Moreover, a recent report by the Women's Refugee Commission (2019) points out that men and boys are also subjected to sexual violence during their journey to Italy, particularly in Libya as the main transit country to Italy. Refugees and migrants experience sexual violence at borders and checkpoints, during random arrests by armed groups and when kidnapped and imprisoned. Sexual violence, including sexual torture, against refugees and female and male migrants appears widespread in Libya. Moreover, fewer arrivals on the Italian coast mean longer periods spent in Libya and therefore an increase in the risks and consequences of violence. It is also clear that the risks do not end when migrants and refugees arrive in Italy. In particular, sexual harassment and sexual exploitation continue to be a problem. Although little information is available on domestic violence, it will inevitably continue to be a problem for women and children in Italy, due to, among other reasons, to the fact that asylum applications are submitted by the family, which may unwillingly cause women to remain in situations of violence.\n\nThe short- and long-term psychosocial and health impacts of SGBV are wide-ranging. They include depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, unwanted pregnancies, sexually transmitted infections including HIV, and genital and rectum trauma. Despite all this, with appropriate support and assistance, the survivors can recover and overcome them. Recently, the Women’s Refugee Commission (WRC) found that there was a surprising difference between survivors living in good quality shelters, who therefore had access to care and support, and those outside the formal care system or who had more limited access to care. Survivors show a remarkable resilience and “had the ability to look ahead, while young unsupported men struggled and some of them had adopted negative coping mechanisms, including drug and alcohol abuse and petty crime” (WRC, 2019).\n\nWhile a number of organizations and institutions provide comprehensive, people-centred services for male and female survivors, the need is far from being met. The Italian and anti-violence reception systems are characterized by limited decentralization and coordination; hence, survivors could fall through the cracks of the system. Despite the efforts of the Italian Government, the institutions and civil society, there are many shortcomings: an unaccountable and highly fragmented system, lacking any monitoring system, characterized by geographical disparities in the availability of assistance. While the protection system in Italy is promising, dealing with highly vulnerable UASC also entails addressing issues related to their specific conditions and challenging the knowledge, attitudes and beliefs of those who care for them.\n\n89", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\n# **Endnotes**\n\n1 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.\n\n2 Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.\n\n3 Available in Annex 2 of the full report in Italian.\n\n4 Ibid 5 Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, Ministry of Education, University and Research, Ministry of Justice, Central Service of SIPROIMI (Protection System for Beneficiaries of International Protection and for Unaccompanied Foreign Minors), AGIA (National Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents).\n\n6 Snowball sampling (also known as chain-referral sampling) is a non-probability (non-random) sampling method, used when sample characteristics are rare and difficult to find. This sampling method involves primary data sources nominating another potential primary data source to use in the research. In other words, the snowball sampling method is based on referrals from initial subjects in order to generate additional subjects. Therefore, when applying this sampling method, members of the sample group are recruited via chain referral.\n\n7 This is approximately 10 per cent of the sample against around 7 per cent of the total number of UASC hosted in reception facilities.\n\n8 For details see Annex 4 in the full report in Italian.\n\n9 See Glossary.\n\n10 See the website of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Office of the Envoy: www.un.org/youthenvoy/wpcontent/ uploads/2018/09/18-00080_UN-Youth-Strategy_Web.pdf 11 Italy ratified and implemented the Convention with Law 176/1991.\n\n12 The Dublin system, currently governed by Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection submitted in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (the Dublin III Regulation). With regard to family reunification within the Dublin system, see also Article 18(1) of Legislative Decree 142/2015.\n\n13 According to Article 10 of Law 47/2017, the child must be informed of the procedure, which the Juvenile Court must authorize; this procedure ends with the adoption of an age determination measure, which is conveyed to the child and to the guardian. However, the interaction between this procedure and the procedure governed by Prime Ministerial Decree 234/2016 used for victims of trafficking in human beings (UASC) has not been clarified to date.\n\n14 The model outlined both at the normative level and in practice can be classified as ‘mixed’, with both volunteer and institutional guardians.\n\n15 Each guardian may assume the protection of up to three UASC (unless there are specific needs that require an increase of this number). For further information on the role and functions of the guardian, see the corresponding Information box in the Annex.\n\n16 See Article 10 of Law 47/2017.\n\n17 See Article 32(1a) of Legislative Decree 286/1998.\n\n18 For example, residence permits for special cases introduced or modified by l.d.113/2018.\n\n19 L.d.113/2018 provides for a transitional regime both for holders of residence permits for humanitarian reasons, who are deprived of the possibility of renewing such permits after the expiration date, but without prejudice to the power to convert them into residence permits for job seeking, or study or work purposes, and for those who have submitted an application for international protection before its entry into force, who may still be granted a two years residence permit for special cases under the transitional regime which is convertible into a residence permit for employment or self-employment after its expiration.\n\n20 The Territorial Commission (Commissione Territoriale) is the entity responsible for the assessment of and recognition of international protection following an audition with the asylum seeker. It consists of: a president, who is a deputy Prefect; Ministry of Interior caseworkers; and a representative of UNHCR who sits in the decision-making panel.\n\n21 AMIF reception facility: first-level reception facility funded by the EU Asylum Migration Integration Fund (AMIF) 22 Irrespective of legal status, at the age of 18, each child may be entrusted to the continued care and protection of social services until the age of 21 at the latest, including when the Juvenile Court considers that the person, despite having embarked on a process of social inclusion, needs this continued care and protection to ensure the full success of the pathway towards autonomy.\n\n23 See Article 17 of Law 47/2017, which amended Article 13 of Law 228/2003.\n\n24 The MLSP defines the term ‘absconded’ as minors who leave the reception facilities in which they are hosted.\nMinors are defined as absconded until they are found in Italy or reach the age of 18.\n\n25 At the time of completing the report, the 2018 data were not yet available.\n\n26 Aspirations are defined as the individual’s desire to achieve certain goals, whereas expectations relate to the 90", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2018 data", "confidence": 0.10669336467981339}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "2018 data", "confidence": 0.17735370993614197}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**At a crossroads. Unaccompanied and separated children in their transition to adulthood in Italy**\n\nindividual’s considerations about the possibility or probability of achieving them (Hansen and McIntire, 1989).\n\n27 All the Congolese’s UASC interviewed come from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.\n\n28 The regulation governing the various residence permits for special cases differs in terms of the possibility of conversion into another residence permit for work and/or study purposes. Hence, there is a distinction between forms of protection that allow, in principle, a longer-term integration (former residence permit for social protection pursuant to Article 18 of Legislative Decree no. 286/1998) and those that, on the contrary, meet a need for contingent protection and do not allow a stabilization of the regular presence on the territory (former residence permit for medical care pursuant to Article 19 of Legislative Decree no. 286/1998).\n\n29 For further details, see section 3.2 30 The profile of the professional educator is defined in the Ministerial Decree of 8 October 1998, n. 520: “Regulation laying down rules for the identification of the role and the relative professional profile of the professional educator, pursuant to Article 6(3), of the legislative decree of 30 December 1992, no. 502.” With some regional differences, in order to work with minors, a professional educator with a university degree is often required, while generally, to work with adult migrants, a professional social worker is required. For this reason, these terms have been used in this report.\n\n31 Personal Education Plan which defines the social inclusion pathway for UASC, and is prepared together with reception facility staff and the Social Worker municipal social services.\n\n32 CPIA: Adult Learning centres or catch up schools. Over the last few years, with the influx of migrants and refugees, and especially of UASC, CPIAs provide Italian language courses and courses for the attainment of middle school compulsory schooling. Upper secondary level schooling is also offered.\n\n33 The total number of UASC counted in the CPIAs was 3,347 (30 out of 39 CPIAs provided data for the purpose of the research). However, it should be noted that, at the time of the UASC course enrolment, their status of ‘unaccompanied’ or not was not recorded; the registration forms require the signature of a parent or legal representative, and this information is then reconstructed by the CPIAs on the basis of their direct knowledge of the children enrolled in their schools. For details, see Annex 1 in the full report in Italian.\n\n34 See Cedefop, 2014.\n\n35 In this regard, the UNICEF and REACH report (2017) provides timely data on the illiteracy rates of UASC in Sicily, where 48 per cent stated that they had completed lower secondary school; more than half that they could read (58 per cent) and write (54 per cent), and the remaining that they could read a little (29 per cent) and write a little (32 per cent) or were illiterate (13 per cent and 14 per cent).\n\n36 According to the D.M. MIUR 139/2007, Article 3 (3), UASC can be enrolled in the CPIAs from the age of 16, but some local protocols and agreements allow for the enrolment of 15-year-olds provided that certain conditions are met (MIUR, Autorità Garante dell'Infanzia e l'Adolescenza, Guidelines for the right to study of students outside their families of origin, 2017).\n\n37 See Intersos and UNICEF, Vademecum per l’inserimento lavorativo. Tutor e operatore. Version 2.0, Intersos, Unicef http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/Notizie/Documents/intersos_vademecum_tutor.pdf 38 For details on the target group and survey respondents, see Annex 2 of the full report.\n\n39 FRA and AGIA (2018). Guardianship for Unaccompanied Children in Italy, April, available at: https://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2018/innovative-italian-legislation-updates-approach-guardianship 40 FRA (2015).\n\n41 In this regard, reference should be made to the Palermo Model, which was studied in depth in the case study in Sicily.\n\n42 An important reference in this respect is the recommendations issued by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child as part of its observations on the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.\n\n43 After requesting the MLPS to decide on the conversion of the permit for minor age, for cases where it is possible.\n\n44 The Circular of the Ministry of the Interior – Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration, of 3 January 2019, stresses that UASC who, as a result of the provisions introduced by Law no. 47/ 2017, are granted the opportunity to continue their pathway of reception and integration until the age of 21, remain within the SIPROIMI system.\n\n45 The special protection is short, and the renewal is conditional on the persistence of legal claims to be established by the Commission. It can never be converted.\n\n46 See Intersos and UNICEF, Vademecum per l’inserimento lavorativo. Tutor e operatore. Version 2.0, Intersos, Unicef http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/Notizie/Documents/intersos_vademecum_tutor.pdf. See also the Pathways for the social and job integration of UASC and young migrants on the website of the MLSP and the related integration policies in the related link (http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Progetti-e-azioni/Pagine/Percorsidi-integrazione-socio-lavorativa-per-minorinon-accompagnati-e-giovani-migranti-.aspx) as an example of possible pathways supported at the institutional level.\n\n47 This is also the case for 9.8 per cent of the 2017 Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) projects (see the 2017 SPRAR Annual Report).\n\n48 Specifically, Percorso I funded 960 social and work integration pathways for UASC’s transition to adulthood (from 91", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "UNICEF and REACH report", "confidence": 0.21876166760921478}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "illiteracy rates of UASC in Sicily", "confidence": 0.102958083152771}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU**\n\nthe age of 16) and young migrants (up to 22 years of age). Subsequently, Percorso II funded 850 work integration pathways followed by a third phase, which, with a new notice, provides for the financing of a further 170 pathways.\nThese pathways are supported by the Protezione Unità a Obiettivo Integrazione (PUOI, Protection Unit for Integration) project for 4,500 additional beneficiaries, currently in the start-up phase. See https://www.anpalservizi.it/home 49 With respect to the traineeships carried out under Percorso I, “the entire pathway and, in particular, the traineeship experience is generally considered positive by the recipients, since they allow an improvement in living conditions, not only in economic terms; they increase the technical-professional knowledge and skills” (Report of Evaluation of the Percorso Action I by MLSP-Anpal services, 2017, p. 29 et seq.).\n\n50 For further information on these forms of semi-independence, see the Lombardy case study in chapter 7.\n\n51 Family foster care is one of the forms of alternative care provided for by the United Nations Guidelines on Alternative Care for Children, but it is not limited to this. The Guidelines aim to improve the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the protection and welfare of children without parental care, or at risk of losing it, defining the desirable guidelines for policy.\n\n52 For further details, see: Youth, ExCom 66th meeting, 31 May 2016, www.refworld.org/pdfid/5800cdea4.pdf 53 The data that emerged from the research were not clear as to whether these procedures are mainly determined by the lack of requests to initiate these procedures at the same time, or rather, as a legal procedure of the individual police stations.\n\n54 The difficulties faced in Sicily in particular have also been evidenced by recent studies (Save the Children, 2017– 2019), where it emerged that reception facilities sometimes struggle to cope with a lack of resources to ensure logistics in transporting UASC to schools or CPIAs. Another problem arises with the transfer from one facility to another (from the first to the second level of reception, upon turning 18) in which school enrolment is not always guaranteed or the attended hours recognized.\n\n55 For an overview of the phenomenon, see WRC (2019).\n\n56 ‘Agency’ refers to the ability of an agent (natural person or other subject) to act independently in the world and to make free choices (Giddens, 1992).\n\n57 See the definition in the Glossary.\n\n58 For further information on the issue of social housing, see: Ferri et al. 2017.\n\n59 Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) define social capital as “the sum of the resources, both real and virtual, that come from an individual or a group through a solid network of relationships, partly institutionalized, of mutual acquaintance and identification”. For further information on the concepts of formal and informal relations in the field of migration, see Ambrosini (2014: 171–174; idem 2011).\n\n60 The central idea of this theatre methodology, conceived over 50 years ago in Brazil by the pedagogue Paulo Freire, is to use the language of drama to understand and transform the daily oppressive, realities, small and large, towards liberation. This theatre method has also been adopted by Matemù and other meeting centres in Rome, such as Laboratorio 53 and Asinitas.\n\n61 The institutional working group was composed of: the Civil Court of Palermo, the Guardianship Judge, the Prosecutor's Office at the Juvenile Court of Palermo, the Police Headquarters of Palermo, the University of Palermo, the Provincial Health Authority of Palermo, and the Regional Education Authority for Sicily.\n\n62 The cartella sociale, or social file, records information related to the reception and social inclusion path of UASC in Italy. It is included in the national database of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies.\n\n63 Council of Europe, Ministers’ Deputies, CM/Rec(2019)4, Recommendation CM/Rec(2019)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on supporting young refugees in transition to adulthood.\n\n64 https://data.unicef.org/topic/adolescents/overview/0/ 65 https://www.unicef.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/UN-Convention-Rights-Child-text.pdf 66 Ibid 67 https://gbvguidelines.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2015-IASC-Gender-based-Violence-Guidelines_lo-res.pdf 68 www.unhcr.org/sexual-and-gender-based-violence.html<www.unhcr.org/sexual-and-gender-based-violence.html> 69 https://www.unicef.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/UN-Convention-Rights-Child-text.pdf 70 (www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2017/04/21/17G00062/sg) 71 www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/608728/EPRS_BRI(2017)608728_EN.pdf 72 (https://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/98286dl.htm) 73 (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-it-guardianship-legal-update_en.pdf); www gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2017/04/21/17G00062/sg)(www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2017/04/21/17G00062/sg.\n\nIxxv https://www.garanteinfanzia.org/sites/default/files/linee_guida_per_il_diritto_allo_studio_delle_alunne_e_degli_ alunni_fuori_dalla_famiglia_di_origine.pdf Ixxvi See: www.miur.gov.it 92", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["cartella sociale"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "cartella sociale", "confidence": 0.7357314229011536}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Fondazione ISMU is an independent research centre**\n\n**promoting research and training activities on**\n\n**migration, integration and diversity in multicultural**\n\n**and multiethnic contemporary societies.**\n\n**www.ismu.org**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Sébastien Desbureaux, Jorge Escurra, Aude-Sophie Rodella, and Esha Zaveri\n\n## Quantifying the Impact of Water Salinity on Global Agricultural Productivity", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "this model generates more firepower for transformational solutions to help countries grow sustainably.\n\nPlease visit us at www.worldbank.org/water or follow us on Twitter at @WorldBankWater.\n\n#### About GWSP\n\nThis publication received the support of the Global Water Security & Sanitation Partnership (GWSP). GWSP is a multidonor trust fund administered by the World Bank’s Water Global Practice and supported by Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Switzerland’s State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, U.K. Department for International Development, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.\n\nPlease visit us at www.worldbank.org/gwsp or follow us on Twitter #gwsp.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# Salt of the Earth\n\n## Quantifying the Impact of Water Salinity on Global Agricultural Productivity\n\nJason Russ, Richard Damania, Sébastien Desbureaux, Jorge Escurra, Aude-Sophie Rodella, and Esha Zaveri", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "© 2019 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent.\n\nThe World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.\n\n**Rights and Permissions**\n\nThe material in this work is subject to copyright. Because The World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given.\n\nPlease cite the work as follows: Russ, Jason, Richard Damania, Sébastien Desbureaux, Jorge Escurra, Aude-Sophie Rodella, and Esha Zaveri. 2019. “Salt of the Earth: Quantifying the Impact of Water Salinity on Global Agricultural Productivity.” World Bank, Washington, DC.\n\nAny queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications,\n\n[The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: pubrights​](mailto:pubrights​@­worldbank.org)\n\n[@­worldbank.org.](mailto:pubrights​@­worldbank.org) _Cover photos_ _(left to right)_ : A'Melody Lee / World Bank, Wietze Brandsma from Pixabay, Bishnu Sarangi from Pixabay.\n\n_Cover design:_ Jean Franz, Franz and Company, Inc.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "### Contents\n\nAbstract 1 Introduction 1 Data 3 Empirical Strategy 7 Main Results 8 Robustness Tests 9 Simulating Global Impacts of Water Salinity On Agricultural Production 13 Conclusions 18 Notes 18 References 19\n\n**Figures**\n\n1. Mekong River Basin Commission Monitoring Station Locations 5\n\n2. CWC Monitoring Stations and Irrigated Districts in India 7 3. Location of Gemstat Monitoring Stations 14 4. Yield Loss When Electrical Conductivity Exceeds 100mS/M 15 5. Flexible Estimation of Yield Losses Due To Electrical Conductivity 15 6. Global Predicted Levels of EC, 1992-2010 16 7. Estimated Mean Annual Kilocalorie Equivalent Loss Due To Saline Water, 2001-2013 17 8. Estimated Mean Losses in Agricultural Production Due To Saline Water, 2001-2013, by Country 17\n\n**Tables**\n\n1. Summary Statistics of Major Datasets 3\n\n2. Water Quality Datasets 4 3. Impact of Electrical Conductivity on Net Primary Productivity, Mekong River Basin 10 4. Impact of Electrical Conductivity on Net Primary Productivity, India 11 5. Impact of Electrical Conductivity on Net Primary Productivity, Global 12 6 Impact of Electrical Conductivity on Net Primary Productivity, Alternative Thresholds, Mekong River Basin 13 7. Impact of Electrical Conductivity on Net Primary Productivity, Alternative Thresholds, India 14 Salt of the Earth iii", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["Water Quality Datasets"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Gemstat Monitoring Stations", "confidence": 0.3087700605392456}, {"text": "CWC Monitoring Stations", "confidence": 0.15442615747451782}, {"text": "Mekong River Basin Commission Monitoring Station Locations", "confidence": 0.1461462527513504}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Water Quality Datasets", "confidence": 0.1844671070575714}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Water Quality Datasets", "confidence": 0.575752317905426}]}}}
{"input": "**Abstract**\n\nSalinity in surface waters is on the rise throughout much of the world. Many factors contribute to this change including increased water extraction, poor irrigation management, and sea-level rise. To date no study has attempted to quantify impacts on global food production. In this paper we develop a plausibly causal model to test the sensitivity of global and regional agricultural productivity to changes in water salinity. To do so, we utilize several local and global datasets on water quality and agricultural produc tivity and a model which isolates the impact of exogenous changes in water salinity on yields. We then train a machine learning model to predict salinity globally in order to simulate average global food losses from 2000-2013. These losses are found to be high, in the range of the equivalent of 124 trillion ­kilocalories, or enough to feed over 170 million people every day, each year. Global maps building on these results show that pockets of high losses occur on all continents, but can be expected to be partic ularly problematic in regions already experiencing malnutrition challenges.\n\n**Introduction**\n\nPolicy discussions surrounding agricultural water use tend to revolve around water scarcity and vari ability, and its impact on agricultural productivity. While these are indeed critical areas of focus, partic ularly in the context of climate change induced rainfall variability, challenges from water quality constitute an equally important threat that is currently underappreciated. Over extraction of surface and groundwater, sea-water intrusion, rainfall variability, and poor irrigation water management all contribute to increased salinization of water supplies and in many regions, with deleterious effects on crop production.\n\nAlthough the harm that saline soil and water can have on agricultural productivity is well known, and indeed has a long history, to date there has been no attempt to quantify this impact globally. In this paper, we take advantage of several regional and global datasets on agricultural productivity, land use, and water quality and estimate the average impact of high levels of salinity in surface water on crop production. We start with regional analyses in the Mekong River Basin and river basins of India where high-quality data exists. Using hydrological models and data on surface water irrigation, we link agricul tural productivity to upstream water quality monitoring stations which indicate the levels of water salinity that is flowing onto downstream fields for irrigation. By controlling for confounding factors which also impact agricultural productivity (such as rainfall, temperature, and geographic factors), and carefully accounting for the direction of stream flow, we isolate the impact of plausibly exogenous changes in electrical conductivity (EC), the most commonly used measure of salinity in water, on ­downstream agricultural yields. We then expand the sample and conduct the same analysis using ­monitoring stations from the GEMStat database, which covers regions in 36 countries around the world.\n\nThese estimates are then used to simulate the average annual fall in yields due to saline waters.\n\nImpacts on crop production are seen at relatively low levels of salinity and tend to rise at a near linear rate as water salinity rises. A satellite-based measure of agricultural productivity, combined with ­estimated elasticities of agricultural yields to saline surface water, and globally modeled data on water salinity reveal significant annual losses in food production. A simulation of global food losses due to Salt of the Earth 1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["GEMStat database"], "descriptive_data": ["globally modeled data on water salinity", "satellite-based measure of agricultural productivity"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GEMStat database", "confidence": 0.9333162307739258}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "satellite-based measure of agricultural productivity", "confidence": 0.4605594575405121}, {"text": "globally modeled data on water salinity", "confidence": 0.38218367099761963}, {"text": "regional and global datasets", "confidence": 0.23659969866275787}, {"text": "local and global datasets", "confidence": 0.22950515151023865}, {"text": "upstream water quality monitoring stations", "confidence": 0.21852944791316986}, {"text": "monitoring stations from the GEMStat database", "confidence": 0.10888347774744034}], "vague_data": [{"text": "local and global datasets", "confidence": 0.143462672829628}, {"text": "regional and global datasets", "confidence": 0.1276005059480667}]}}}
{"input": "salinity is performed by training a predictive model of EC at a 0.5 degree between 1992 and 2013, and by combining these predictions with the elasticities we estimated. It is estimated that water salinity reduces global agricultural production by 124 trillion kilocalories per year, the equivalent annual food budget of 170 million people. These results suggest that saline surface and irrigation water are a global concern for food security that is underappreciated and deserves greater attention.\n\nThe relationship between saline water and agricultural production is well known and documented as far back as ancient Sumer (Thompson 2004). Salt can interfere with crop growth in a variety of ways; by displac ing other important nutrients like nitrogen and phosphorus, interfering with photosynthesis and chloro phyll production, withdrawing water from surrounding soil, and increasing plant energy requirements for extracting water from soil (Warrence, Bauder, and Pearson 2002). Crops are not universally or uniformly impacted by salinity. Plants which have higher Na [+] and Cl [− ] concentrations in their leaves tend to be more salt-tolerant as it reduces the amount of salt ions that enter plant cells through osmosis (Munns and Gilliham 2015). Recently it has been estimated that approximately 1,125 million hectares of land are salt-affected, of which approximately 76 million hectares have been salinized by human-induced activities (Sanower 2019).\n\nTo our knowledge, there has been no global study attempting to estimate the impact of salinity on crop production. The literature on this topic is composed primarily of regional estimates based on crop production models or crop specific analyses which examine sensitivity to salinity for specific crops.\n\nRecent regional estimations include Dam et al. (2019) which finds that in central Vietnam, for each 1 percent increase in EC levels, yields of paddy rice decline by 0.24 percent. Clarke et al. (2015) estimates that in coastal Bangladesh, irrigating with saline surface and groundwater will reduce crop yields by at least 25 percent by the end of the century. Similarly, Dasgupta et al. (2014) estimates that rice yields will fall by 15.6 percent in by 2050 in 9 coastal districts in Bangladesh due to climate induced increases in salinity. Genua-Olmedo et al. (2016) finds that in the Ebro Delta in Northeast Spain, rice productivity will fall by up to 50 percent by 2100 due to the effects of sea-level rise on soil salinity.\n\nA deep scientific literature exists on the sensitivity of specific crops to salinity. A thorough review of this literature was conducted by Tanji and Kielen (2002) where threshold and slope values for 81 crops in terms of EC are collected and listed ~~.~~ [1] Similarly, Machado and Serralheiro (2017) review the literature on salt tolerate of vegetables. In table 2 they compare soil salinity and irrigation water salinity tolerance thresholds (i.e. the EC at which yields begin to decline) for 19 common vegetables. They find that vege tables generally have a soil salinity tolerance below 250 mS/m, and that irrigation water tolerances are generally around 30-50 percent less than soil salinity tolerances. Several more recent studies examine specific crops. For example, Rameshwaran et al. (2016) find that sweet peppers become sensitive to water salinity at levels exceeding 143 mS/m and decline by a slope of 11 percent thereafter. Arslan et al.\n\n(2015) found that yields of chickpeas, lentils, and faba beans fell by 50 percent when EC in irrigated water exceeded 420, 440, and 520 mS/m, respectively. This implies that based on the staple diet of coun tries, salinity may have an amplified impacts on countries relying on agricultural production that is more salinity sensitive. While crop based studies are informative they do not provide an indication of the global loss of food production due to salinity. To address this issue this paper provides estimates of the average impacts on yields across all crops using a variety of recently available data sources and finds a remarkably stable yield response function that holds across wide geographies.\n\n2 Salt of the Earth", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Data**\n\nTo estimate the impact of water salinity on global agricultural productivity, we use several georefer enced datasets related to water quality, agricultural yields, land cover, and weather. A description of these datasets can be found below and summary statistics are provided in Table 1.\n\nWater Quality Data on electrical conductivity (EC) was used to measure salinity in water. EC measures the ability of an electrical charge to pass through water. Distilled, or deionized water is a very poor conductor of electric ity and as dissolved ions in water increase, it becomes a better conductor. In surface and groundwaters, these ions are generally dissolved salts which is why EC is a widely used indicator of water salinity\n\n**TABLE 1. Summary Statistics of Major Datasets**\n\n**Variable** **Obs** **Mean** **Std. Dev.** **Min** **Max**\n\n**Mekong River Basin**\n\nΔlog(NPP) 3227 −0.00256 0.146958 −0.52872 0.573803 Electricial Conductivity 3784 127.8139 442.9442 3.2 3598.75 Electrical Conductivity > 100 mS/m 3784 0.075317 0.263937 0 1 Precipitation (m/year) 3784 1.545724 0.423054 0.4649 3.0135 Precipitation^2 (m/year) 3784 2.56819 1.433598 0.216132 9.081182 Temperature (C) 3784 27.31999 1.070222 21.225 29.70833 Temperature^2 (C) 3784 747.5272 57.06304 450.5006 882.5851 Distance to station (km) 3784 40.70026 23.44734 1.501745 99.66087\n\n**India**\n\nΔlog(NPP) 23,786 0.022225 0.281151 −2.70913 3.197244 Electricial Conductivity 26,830 405.1288 311.6987 48.43333 2230 Electrical Conductivity > 100 mS/m 26,830 0.061014 0.23936 0 1 Precipitation (m/year) 26,830 1.156739 0.59924 0.1696 4.8393 Precipitation^2 (m/year) 26,830 1.697122 2.267632 0.028764 23.41882 Temperature (C) 26,830 26.36198 1.755244 15.13333 29.66667 Temperature^2 (C) 26,830 698.0349 90.26891 229.0178 880.1112 Distance to station (km) 26,830 54.64403 24.02906 0.783259 99.94202\n\n**Global**\n\nΔlog(NPP) 55,358 0.014986 0.276158 −3.8473 4.766428 Electricial Conductivity 68,984 596.4569 1666.453 0 41914.29 Electrical Conductivity > 100 mS/m 68,984 0.100792 0.301055 0 1 Precipitation (m/year) 68,984 1.199992 0.657942 0.0005 5.1165 Precipitation^2 (m/year) 68,984 1.872862 2.244765 0.00 26.17857 Temperature (C) 68,984 21.59153 6.87379 2.333333 31.1 Temperature^2 (C) 68,984 513.4423 267.854 5.444445 967.21 Distance to station (km) 68,984 50801.36 29429.34 0 99997.37 _Notes:_ Table summarizes the main datasets use in each of the three models employed in this paper.\n\nSalt of the Earth 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["Water Quality Data on electrical conductivity"], "vague_data": ["georeferenced datasets"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "georefer enced datasets", "confidence": 0.7963568568229675}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "(Miller, Bradford, and Peters 1988). EC as a measure of salinity has the added benefit of being easily measured at monitoring stations or with handheld monitors, making it a very widely available water quality indicator.\n\nThree distinct datasets were used to measure surface water quality. These datasets are from the Mekong River Basin Commission (MRC), the Central Water Commission (CWC) of India, and GEMStat of the United Nations Global Environmental Monitoring system for freshwater (UNGEMs). Table 2 ­summarizes these datasets. The MRC data spans four countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam) and covers the main tributaries of the Mekong River. Of the 121 stations with data on EC, 23 are in Cambodia and Lao PDR, 21 are in Thailand, and 54 are in Vietnam (figure 1).\n\nIn India, the Central Water Commission or CWC (under the umbrella of the Ministry of Water Resources) maintains a network of 375 river monitoring stations throughout India that cover almost all major river basins in the country. Water samples are taken at specific time intervals (monthly or quarterly), and then sent to regional laboratories for analysis.\n\nFinally, the GEMStat data from UNGEMS is used for the global analysis. This data is collected by the United National Environmental Programme (UNEP) and is self-reported by participating countries. It contains over 3 million observations for 224 water quality parameters in 71 countries. EC is one of the most documented pollutant in GEMstats with 167,914 observations of EC in 1,719 stations and 71 coun tries. As with the Indian CWC data, frequency of observations varies significantly across countries and monitoring stations. Some monitoring stations have multiple observations per month while others have seasonal or annual observations (e.g., one station in Japan has 1,721 observations of EC only). For all datasets, observations at a single monitoring station are collapsed at the annual level. This leaves us with a panel dataset of year/station observations.\n\nAgricultural Productivity and Land Use To measure changes in agricultural productivity, we use a satellite- based estimate of net primary ­production (NPP). NPP is linearly related to the amount of solar energy that plants absorb over a ­growing season (Running _et al_ . 2004). There is substantial evidence that there is a strong positive ­correlation between satellite-derived estimates of NPP and crop yields (Lobell _et al_ . 2002; Lu and Zhuang, 2010; Tum and Gunther 2011), and for this reason it is a frequently used proxy of yields in the economics literature (Strobl and Strobl, 2011; Blanc and Strobl, 2013; Blanc and Strobl, 2014; Zaveri, Russ, and Damania 2019). [2]\n\n**TABLE 2. Water Quality Datasets**\n\n**Location**\n\n**Mekong River Basin (Cambodia, Lao**\n\n**PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam)** **India**\n\nSource Mekong River Basin Commission Central Water Commission for India\n\n**Global (36**\n\n**countries)**\n\nGEMStat Number of Monitoring Stations Included 121 425 1,124 Frequency of Observations Approximately monthly, with gaps Varies by station Varies by station Years of Observations 2000-2013 2000-2013 2000-2013 4 Salt of the Earth", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["GEMStat", "GEMstats"], "descriptive_data": ["GEMStat data from UNGEMS", "datasets from the Mekong River Basin Commission (MRC)", "Indian CWC data"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GEMStat data from UNGEMS", "confidence": 0.3625986576080322}, {"text": "GEMStat", "confidence": 0.14097273349761963}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FIGURE 1. Mekong River Basin Commission Monitoring Station Locations**\n\n_Notes:_ Map shows location of water quality monitoring stations in Mekong River Basin Commission dataset.\n\nOur time-varying NPP data comes from the moderate resolution imaging spectroradiometer (MODIS), whose data starts in 2000. We use the annual MOD17A3 measures from 2000-2013 generated by the Numerical Terradynamic Simulation Group (NTSG) at the University of Montana (Zhao _et al_ ., 2005) which corrects for cloud contamination prevalent in MODIS land products ~~.~~ [3] Our interest is in estimating NPP from cropland, as opposed to natural forests or vegetation. To do so, we make use of a new and unique land cover dataset developed by the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Salt of the Earth 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Mekong River Basin Commission dataset", "moderate resolution imaging spectroradiometer (MODIS)"], "descriptive_data": ["land cover dataset"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Mekong River Basin Commission dataset", "confidence": 0.6771991848945618}, {"text": "MOD17A3 measures", "confidence": 0.36557644605636597}, {"text": "moderate resolution imaging spectroradiometer (MODIS)", "confidence": 0.313806414604187}, {"text": "land cover dataset", "confidence": 0.24187853932380676}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "land cover dataset", "confidence": 0.20632369816303253}], "vague_data": [{"text": "land cover dataset", "confidence": 0.22402822971343994}]}}}
{"input": "Climate Change Initiative. This dataset provides information on 37 land cover classes based on the United Nations Land Cover Classification System at a 300m resolution. The data relies on state-of-art reprocessing of four different satellite missions (MERIS, SPOT-VGT, AVHRR, and PROBA-V) [4] ~~.~~ We use a cross-walking table from Poulter _et al_ . (2015) that characterizes plant functional types across the ESA classes to guide the grouping of classes into a single cropland category ~~.~~ [5] Our final data measures changes in NPP for each 0.1-degree gridcell (approximately 11x11 km at the equator) which contains a minimum level of cropland in the year 2000 (the first year of our dataset).\n\nThere are tradeoffs when choosing the minimum level of cropland for a gridcell to contain to be included the analysis. Too low of a threshold and the analysis will include gridcells which are dominated by nat ural vegetation or urban land, and thus of no interest to the study, potentially biasing the results. Too high of a threshold and the analysis becomes too restrictive, where only agriculture situated in large farming communities is included. For this reason, we test a range of thresholds, with the main analysis using a 30% cropland minimum threshold to be included in the analysis, and robustness checks using a 75% and 90% threshold.\n\nIrrigation Data Gridcells included in this analysis are restricted to those where it is believed that agriculture is irri gated. This ensures that the EC measured in the surface water is like the EC in the water which is feeding the crops. In India, data on irrigation by district was obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture and the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. Only districts for which greater than 50 percent of agricultural land is irrigated by surface irrigation is included in the analysis (see Figure YY).\n\nFor the Mekong River basin analysis, as well as the global analysis, data on irrigation was obtained from Food and Agriculture Organization’s Global Map of Irrigated Areas (GMIA) version 5.0 ~~.~~ [6] GMIA gives a global raster of area equipped for irrigation for the year 2005 at a resolution of 0.083 degrees.\n\nThis data was aggregated up to the 0.1-degree gridcell described in the previous section, and gridcells are only included if some land area is equipped for irrigation according to GMIA. GMIA does not ­distinguish between groundwater irrigation and surface water irrigation. For the Mekong analysis, this is not a concern as surface water irrigation comprises 91 percent of total irrigation in Thailand, 99 percent in Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Vietnam, and 100 percent in Cambodia (FAO 2016).\n\nThus, we can be reasonably confident that nearly all of the NPP included in the analysis is irrigated using surface waters.\n\nFor the wider, global study, there is unfortunately no way to distinguish between ground and surface irrigated crops. However, tt is well-known that ground and surface-water bodies interact with each other. Various studies in the hydrological literature have begun to show that groundwater can be a major and potentially long-term contributor to contamination of surface water ((e.g. Yu et al. 2018; Delsman et al., 2015; De Louw et al., 2010; Holman et al., 2008). The interactions between river water and ground water are determined by the relative difference between groundwater level and river stage (Mukherjee et al., 2018). In regions that are exposed to over-extraction of groundwater, the resulting lower dis charge can reduce groundwater’s contribution to the baseflow and can substantially decrease the stream 6 Salt of the Earth", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Global Map of Irrigated Areas", "United Nations Land Cover Classification System", "Global Map of Irrigated Areas"], "descriptive_data": ["data on irrigation by district", "Irrigation Data Gridcells"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Global Map of Irrigated Areas", "confidence": 0.5674667358398438}, {"text": "United Nations Land Cover Classification System", "confidence": 0.2237725406885147}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data on irrigation by district", "confidence": 0.1690879762172699}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Irrigation Data Gridcells", "confidence": 0.4830615222454071}]}}}
{"input": "**FIGURE 2. CWC Monitoring Stations and Irrigated Districts in India**\n\n_Notes:_ Figure shows districts in blue where at least 50 percent of agriculture is irrigated using surface irrigation. Black dots show the location of the CWC monitoring stations.\n\nflow of rivers (Mukherjee, 2018). This in turn can enhance salt concentrations in rivers because of lower dilution capacity. Excessive irrigation can also raise water tables from saline aquifers and cause seep age of saline groundwater into freshwater (Mateo-Sagasta et al., 2010).\n\nWeather Data Our weather data comes from Matsuura and Willmott (2001). This gridded dataset contains monthly observations of precipitation and average temperature at the 0.5 degree gridcell level. We transform this data into average monthly temperature, and total precipitation (mm), per year, for each gridcell.\n\n**Empirical Strategy**\n\nTo determine the impact of saline water on crop productivity, we estimate a crop production function.\n\nSpecifically, we estimate the following equation: D log( _NPPit_ ) = α + λ * _g_ ( _WQit_ ) + d * f( _climateit_ ) + s _i_ + ry + q _c_ - _Y_ + e _it_ (1) Salt of the Earth 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["Weather Data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Weather Data", "confidence": 0.5483419299125671}]}}}
{"input": "where _NPPit_ is net primary productivity in gridcell i of year t; _g_ ( _WQit_ ) is a measure of water quality; ­ _f_ (­ _climateit_ ) are measures of temperature and rainfall; s _i_ are gridcell fixed effects, which account for time invariant factors which impact agricultural productivity; ry are year fixed effects; and qc* _Y_ are region specific time trends, to account for local changes in economic or political structures which may impact agricultural production.\n\nAs discussed in the prior section, several restrictions are placed on the dataset to ensure accuracy.\n\nFirst, only gridcells with at least 30 percent cropland according to the ESA dataset are included. In robustness checks, this threshold is changed to 75 percent and 90 percent. Agriculture in gridcells must also be irrigated, as described in section 2.3. Gridcells must be no more than 100 kilometers from their matched monitoring station, to ensure that water quality at the station accurately reflects irrigation water quality. This threshold is somewhat arbitrary and chosen to balance two competing factors: higher distance thresholds reduce the average relationship between measured upstream water quality and actual water quality in the gridcell, while lower distance thresholds reduce the number of observations in our study. In section 5 we present results where this threshold is varied for robustness.\n\nIn order to avoid bias caused by reverse causality, gridcells are carefully matched to monitoring sta tions which are strictly upstream from them. It is well known that if drainage is not carefully managed, irrigated agriculture can impact the salinity of discharged water. Thus, downstream water salinity can be impacted by upstream agricultural production. In addition, water extractions for agriculture or other uses can also impact downstream salinity levels. Thus, to ensure that the impact of water salinity on agricultural production is properly identified and that salinity levels are entirely exogenous, a careful matching of gridcells to upstream monitoring stations was done. In the Mekong and India analyses, this was done through the use of a hydrological connectivity approach, where the streamflow from each gridcell was traced upstream until a monitoring station was found. The hydrological connectivity approach is a process in which areas of land (such as districts or grid cells) are connected to water quality stations though the drainage network based on the direction of surface run off. To achieve this process, the following steps were taken: (i) delineation of the drainage network of the study area; (ii) connecting the areas of land (districts in India and grid cells in the Mekong) with the drainage network; (iii) identi fying the areas of land which are being impacted by the water quality stations following the drainage path; (iv) obtaining the distance between water quality station and each of the districts and grids. For tractability, this process was changed for the global analysis. Here, given the wide geographic range of monitoring stations across the world, tracing streamflows was deemed infeasible. Thus instead, grid cells were matched the nearest monitoring station that is at a higher elevation than the gridcell itself.\n\nSince water can only flow from higher elevations to lower elevations, this still ensures water can only flow from the monitoring station into the gridcell, and not the other way around.\n\n**Main Results**\n\nBeginning with the Mekong analysis, results for estimating equation 1 are shown in 4a. A threshold of 100 millisiemens per meter (mS/m) is used to test for impacts. This threshold is where the Mekong River Commission and other sources estimate that one should start seeing impacts on irrigated crops (Kongmeng and Larsen 2014; Tanji and Kielen 2002). The figure plots of the coefficient of the binary variable indicating 8 Salt of the Earth", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["ESA dataset"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "ESA dataset", "confidence": 0.8897362947463989}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "observations where electrical conductivity in the upstream monitoring station exceeds 100 mS/m. Each plotted coefficient is from a different regression where the restriction on cropland within each gridcell is varied from 30 percent, 75 percent, and 90 percent. Results show that when EC exceeds 100 mS/m, there is a reduction in agricultural productivity of 5.7-8.2 percent. As the cropland requirements become more restrictive, the point estimate increases slightly, though it is not very sensitive. 4b shows the similar results for the India dataset. Like the Mekong region, productivity falls by 5.5-6.6 percent when EC exceeds this threshold. This threshold is exceeded by approximately 5 percent of observations in both India and the Mekong River basin. Results using the GEMStat data are shown in 4c. Globally, it is found that when EC exceeds 100 mS/m, yields decline by 11.0 to 13.5 percent.\n\nNext, we estimate a more flexible model. 5 shows results from creating six bins of EC, each 40mS/m wide, with the 0-40mS/m bin as the comparison group. The line graph displays the change in yields (left axis) due to a corresponding EC value shown on the x-axis. Results show a nearly linear decline in yields as EC rises. Even when EC is in the lowest bin, at 40-80 mS/m, the decline in yields is statistically detect able, and significant in magnitude at between 5.2 and 7.4 percent, relative to the omitted bin. Further, the regression is not sensitive to changing the cropland land use restriction, as all point estimates are within a tight range and all 95 percent confidence intervals overlap. The bar graphs display the percent age of observations falling into each of the buckets and correspond to the right-axis. Across all 3 sam ples, non-impacted observations (0-40 mS/m) represent about 50-60 percent of the sample. The next bin (40-80 mS/m) is about 30 percent of the sample, and all subsequent bins are less than 10 percent.\n\n**Robustness Tests**\n\nIn this section we present results from two additional specifications that have been tested to corrobo rate the main results presented in section 4. First, we show results where we vary the distance threshold to each upstream monitoring station. Then we show results where we control for other water quality parameters in the same regression.\n\nHere we present results from all three regional analyses for thresholds of 50km and 150km, alongside the main results. Tables 3-4 present results for the Mekong River Basin, India, and global results, respec tively. In each table, results from 9 regressions are shown. The specification across all regressions are the same, with the only variation coming from the distance to monitoring station threshold and the share of cropland threshold. By changing the distance threshold, the station that each gridcell is matched to does not change, as gridcells are always matched to their nearest upstream station. Rather, what is changed is the sample of gridcells that are included in the regression, with more gridcells included as the threshold increases. Note that in each table, columns 2, 5, and 8 are the regressions depicted in 4 for cropland thresholds of 30, 75, and 90 percent, respectively. In all regions, the coefficient on EC is not sensitive to changes in the monitoring station distance threshold. Similarly, weather control variables as not sensitive as well, implying that changes to the sample to not have a significant effect on estimates.\n\nWe next test different thresholds of high EC tested for in the Mekong River Basin and India regions. In the main results, we use 100mS/m. The true sensitivity of agriculture to EC varies by crop. The original threshold was chosen as this is the recommendation made by the Mekong River Commission and other sources as to where one should start seeing impacts on irrigated crops (Kongmeng and Larsen 2014; Tanji Salt of the Earth 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["GEMStat data"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GEMStat data", "confidence": 0.8909919261932373}, {"text": "India dataset", "confidence": 0.5632585287094116}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**TABLE 3. Impact of Electrical Conductivity on Net Primary Productivity, Mekong River Basin**\n\n**Dep Var:** Δ **log(net primary**\n\n**productivity)** **(1)** **(2)** **(3)** **(4)** **(5)** **(6)** **(7)** **(8)** **(9)**\n\nElectrical Conductivity\n\n- 100 mS/m\n\n−0.0550 (0.0138)*** −0.0605 (0.0137)*** −0.204 (0.0226)*** 0.0501 (0.00647)*** 0.175 (0.0572)** −0.00260 (0.00106)* −0.0764 (0.0149)*** −0.182 (0.0352)*** 0.0427 (0.00964)*** 0.131 (0.116) −0.00187 (0.00213) −0.0793 (0.0146)*** −0.199 (0.0293)*** 0.0461 (0.00799)*** 0.109 (0.0966) −0.00144 (0.00177) −0.0834 (0.0140)*** −0.200 (0.0282)*** 0.0452 (0.00782)*** 0.0949 (0.0889) −0.00112 (0.00163) −0.0801 (0.0163)*** −0.196 (0.0469)*** 0.0433 (0.0132)** 0.117 (0.149) −0.00160 (0.00271) −0.0820 (0.0151)*** −0.234 (0.0404)*** 0.0513 (0.0112)*** 0.138 (0.121) −0.00199 (0.00220) −0.0851 (0.0143)*** −0.240 (0.0387)*** 0.0521 (0.0108)*** 0.166 (0.111) −0.00248 (0.00203) Precipitation (m/year) −0.207 (0.0282)*** Precipitation^2 (m/year) 0.0519 (0.00783)*** Temperature (C) 0.268 (0.0826)** Temperature^2 (C) −0.00437 (0.00153)** −0.0578 (0.0138)*** −0.202 (0.0236)*** 0.0508 (0.00667)*** 0.223 (0.0628)*** −0.00352 (0.00116)** Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Gridcell Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Geographic Time Trends Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Distance to nearest station 50km 100km 150km 50km 100km 150km 50km 100km 150km Cropland Threshold >30% >30% >30% >75% >75% >75% >90% >90% >90% N 2623 3784 4367 1746 2576 2986 1224 1821 2144 R-sq 0.647 0.674 0.689 0.610 0.645 0.657 0.588 0.620 0.630 _Notes:_ Table shows results from estimating equation 1 for the Mekong River Basin sample via ordinary least squares. Each column is from a separate regression. Specifications across regressions remain constant, with only the sample of gridcells included differing. Columns 1-3 include gridcells where land area is at least 30 percent cropland. Columns 4-6 restrict the sample to gridcells to those with at least 75 percent cropland, and columns 7-9 restrict to sample to gridcells with at least 90 percent cropland. Gridcells are also restricted based on the distance to the nearest upstream monitoring station. Columns 1, 4, and 7 include gridcells less than 50km from the nearest upstream station, columns 2, 5, and 8 include gridcells less than 100km from the nearest upstream station, and columns 3, 7, and 9 include gridcells less than 150km from the nearest upstream station. Standard errors clustered at the gridcell level are in parentheses. Stars denote level of statistical significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**TABLE 4. Impact of Electrical Conductivity on Net Primary Productivity, India**\n\n**Dep Var:** Δ **log(net primary**\n\n**productivity)** **(1)** **(2)** **(3)** **(4)** **(5)** **(6)** **(7)** **(8)** **(9)**\n\nElectrical Conductivity\n\n- 100 mS/m\n\n−0.0968 (0.0095)*** −0.0651 (0.0047)*** 0.346 (0.02)*** −0.0881 (0.0063)*** −0.327 (0.0529)*** 0.00403 (0.00102)*** −0.103 (0.0107)*** 0.372 (0.04)*** −0.104 (0.0147)*** −0.715 (0.110)*** 0.0113 (0.00209)*** −0.0564 (0.00634)*** 0.334 (0.03)*** −0.0911 (0.00962)*** −0.599 (0.0701)*** 0.00892 (0.00135)*** −0.0558 (0.00505)*** 0.351 (0.0248)*** −0.102 (0.00857)*** −0.506 (0.0632)*** 0.00711 (0.00122)*** −0.121 (0.0143)*** 0.402 (0.06)*** −0.111 (0.0203)*** −0.762 (0.130)*** 0.0125 (0.00245)*** −0.0554 (0.00777)*** 0.347 (0.03)*** −0.0924 (0.0123)*** −0.724 (0.0829)*** 0.0115 (0.00159)*** −0.0532 (0.0061)*** 0.353 (0.03)*** −0.102 (0.0113)*** −0.663 (0.0755)*** 0.0102 (0.00145)*** Precipitation (m/year) 0.310 (0.03)*** Precipitation^2 (m/year) −0.0706 (0.00853)*** Temperature (C) −0.494 (0.0927)*** Temperature^2 (C) 0.00740 (0.00176)*** −0.0656 (0.0060)*** 0.325 (0.02)*** −0.0776 (0.0068)*** −0.407 (0.0592)*** 0.00563 (0.00114)*** Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Gridcell Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Geographic Time Trends State State State State State State State State State Distance to nearest station 50km 100km 150km 50km 100km 150km 50km 100km 150km Cropland Threshold >30% >30% >30% >75% >75% >75% >90% >90% >90% N 11655 26830 35074 8720 20663 26865 6516 15698 20558 R-sq 0.473 0.476 0.474 0.469 0.478 0.474 0.463 0.467 0.471 _Notes:_ Table shows results from estimating equation 1 for the India sample via ordinary least squares. Each column is from a separate regression. Specifications across regressions remain constant, with only the sample of gridcells included differing. Columns 1-3 include gridcells where land area is at least 30 percent cropland. Columns 4-6 restrict the sample to gridcells to those with at least 75 percent cropland, and columns 7-9 restrict to sample to gridcells with at least 90 percent cropland. Gridcells are also restricted based on the distance to the nearest upstream monitoring station. Columns 1, 4, and 7 include gridcells less than 50km from the nearest upstream station, columns 2, 5, and 8 include gridcells less than 100km from the nearest upstream station, and columns 3, 7, and 9 include gridcells less than 150km from the nearest upstream station. Standard errors clustered at the gridcell level are in parentheses. Stars denote level of statistical significance: + _p_ <0.1, * _p_ <0.05, ** _p_ <0.01, *** p<0.001.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**TABLE 5: Impact of Electrical Conductivity on Net Primary Productivity, Global**\n\n**Dep Var:** Δ **log(net primary**\n\n**productivity)** **(1)** **(2)** **(3)** **(4)** **(5)** **(6)** **(7)** **(8)** **(9)**\n\nElectrical Conductivity\n\n- 100 mS/m\n\n−0.0917*** (0.0156) −0.112*** (0.0131) 0.552*** (0.02) −0.114*** (0.00501) 0.141*** (0.00744) −0.00420*** (0.000199) −0.112*** (0.0131) 0.552*** (0.02) −0.114*** (0.00501) 0.141*** (0.00744) −0.00420*** (0.000199) −0.0814*** (0.0224) 0.834*** (0.06) −0.221*** (0.0211) 0.219*** (0.0187) −0.00570*** (0.000500) −0.114*** (0.0197) 0.777*** (0.04) −0.206*** (0.0147) 0.222*** (0.0128) −0.00609*** (0.000326) −0.114*** (0.0197) 0.777*** (0.04) −0.206*** (0.0147) 0.222*** (0.0128) −0.00609*** (0.000326) −0.116*** (0.0304)\n\n1.14***\n\n(0.09) −0.345*** (0.0329) 0.359*** (0.0413) −0.00866*** (0.000929) −0.135*** (0.0247) 0.992*** (0.06) −0.308*** (0.0200) 0.292*** (0.0245) −0.00758*** (0.000543) −0.135*** −0.0247 0.992*** (0.06) −0.308*** −0.02 0.292*** −0.0245 −0.00758*** −0.000543 Precipitation (m/year) 0.568*** (0.03) Precipitation^2 (m/year) −0.117*** (0.00714) Temperature (C) 0.121*** (0.0103) Temperature^2 (C) −0.00337*** (0.000276) Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Gridcell Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Geographic Time Trends State State State State State State State State State Distance to nearest station 50km 100km 150km 50km 100km 150km 50km 100km 150km Cropland Threshold >30% >30% >30% >75% >75% >75% >90% >90% >90% N 33236 68984 68984 16550 35070 35070 9110 20002 20002 R-sq 0.243 0.237 0.237 0.281 0.275 0.275 0.325 0.314 0.314 _Notes:_ Table shows results from estimating equation 1 for the global sample using the GEMStat database via ordinary least squares. Each column is from a separate regression. Specifications across regressions remain constant, with only the sample of gridcells included differing. Columns 1-3 include gridcells where land area is at least 30 percent cropland. Columns 4-6 restrict the sample to gridcells to those with at least 75 percent cropland, and columns 7-9 restrict to sample to gridcells with at least 90 percent cropland. Gridcells are also restricted based on the distance to the nearest upstream monitoring station. Columns 1, 4, and 7 include gridcells less than 50km from the nearest upstream station, columns 2, 5, and 8 include gridcells less than 100km from the nearest upstream station, and columns 3, 7, and 9 include gridcells less than 150km from the nearest upstream station. Standard errors clustered at the gridcell level are in parentheses. Stars denote level of statistical significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["GEMStat database"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GEMStat database", "confidence": 0.953376054763794}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "and Kielen 2002). However, as shown in 5, impacts globally are found at lower values of EC. While the Mekong River Basin and India datasets do not offer enough variation to precisely estimate a semi-­ parametric model like that in 5, we do use alternative cut offs of 75 and 125 mS/m. Results are shown in Tables 6 and 7 for the Mekong River Basin and India, respectively. In both cases we do see that impacts are found at all thresholds. In both cases, results are monotonic and scale with the threshold that is used.\n\n**Simulating Global Impacts of Water Salinity On Agricultural Production**\n\nThe results of this paper demonstrate just how sensitive global agricultural production is to salinity in water. Using this information, we perform a simulation to quantify the magnitude of agricultural losses that saline water causes. The GEMStat database, though having wide global coverage, does not cover all land where there is agricultural production. Notably, big gaps in the data are present in China and Sub Saharan Africa, two major agricultural areas where high salinity might be a problem (Figure 3).\n\nTo fill gaps in the GEMS data, we train a machine learning model to predict continuous values of EC globally at a 0.5-degree scale between 1992 and 2013. More specifically, we construct a dataset covering the drivers of salinity identified in the scientific literature and use a Random Forest algorithm which finds the best fit between observed and predicted values over other commonly used algorithms (linear regressions, support vector machines etc). To estimate the model we proceed as followed. First, we combined EC data\n\n**TABLE 6: Impact of Electrical Conductivity on Net Primary Productivity, Alternative Thresholds, Mekong**\n**River Basin**\n\n**(1)** **(2)** **(3)**\n\n**Dep Var:** D **log(net primary productivity)**\n\n**EC > 75ms/m** **EC > 100ms/m** **EC > 125ms/m**\n\nElectrical Conductivity exceeds threshold −0.0409 (0.0125)** Precipitation (m/year) −0.201 (0.0236)*** Precipitation^2 (m/year) 0.0507 (0.00668)*** Temperature (C) 0.224 (0.0628)*** Temperature^2 (C) −0.00353 (0.00116)** −0.0578 (0.0138)*** −0.202 (0.0236)*** 0.0508 (0.00667)*** 0.223 (0.0628)*** −0.00352 (0.00116)** −0.0578 (0.0138)*** −0.202 (0.0236)*** 0.0508 (0.00667)*** 0.223 (0.0628)*** −0.00352 (0.00116)** Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Gridcell Fixed Effects Y Y Y Geographic Time Trends Country Country Country Distance to nearest station 50km 50km 50km Cropland Threshold >30% >30% >30% N 3784 3784 3784 R-sq 0.674 0.674 0.674 _Notes:_ Table shows results from estimating equation 1 for the Mekong River Basin sample via ordinary least squares. Each column is from a separate regression, and regressions vary by the threshold of EC used in the EC indicator variable. Standard errors clustered at the gridcell level are in parentheses. Stars denote level of statistical significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.\n\nSalt of the Earth 13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["GEMStat database"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GEMStat database", "confidence": 0.8445806503295898}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "dataset covering the drivers of salinity", "confidence": 0.16812966763973236}], "vague_data": [{"text": "EC data", "confidence": 0.26308611035346985}]}}}
{"input": "**TABLE 7. Impact of Electrical Conductivity on Net Primary Productivity, Alternative Thresholds, India**\n\n**(1)** **(2)** **(3)**\n\n**Dep Var:** D **log(net primary productivity)**\n\n**EC > 75 mS/m** **EC > 100 mS/m** **EC > 125 mS/m**\n\nElectrical Conductivity exceeds threshold −0.0315 (0.00477)*** Precipitation (m/year) 0.329 (0.0212)*** Precipitation^2 (m/year) −0.0779 (0.00682)*** Temperature (C) −0.419 (0.0590)*** Temperature^2 (C) 0.00587 (0.00113)*** −0.0656 (0.00600)*** 0.325 (0.0212)*** −0.0776 (0.00682)*** −0.407 (0.0592)*** 0.00563 (0.00114)*** −0.0752 (0.0102) *** 0.326 (0.0212)*** −0.0771 (0.00679)*** −0.392 (0.0585)*** 0.00540 (0.00112)*** Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Gridcell Fixed Effects Y Y Y Geographic Time Trends State State State Distance to nearest station 100km 100km 100km Cropland Threshold >30% >30% >30% N 26830 26830 26830 R-sq 0.475 0.476 0.476 _Notes:_ Table shows results from estimating equation 1 for the India sample via ordinary least squares. Each column is from a separate regression, and regressions vary by the threshold of EC used in the EC indicator variable. Standard errors clustered at the gridcell level are in parentheses. Stars denote level of statistical significance: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.\n\n**FIGURE 3. Location of Gemstat Monitoring Stations**\n\n_Notes:_ Figure shows the location of GEMStat monitoring stations with data on EC from 2000-2013. The size and color of the dots denotes the number of years for which there is EC data at each station during this time period.\n\n14 Salt of the Earth", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GEMStat monitoring stations", "confidence": 0.2684175670146942}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**FIGURE 4. Yield Loss When Electrical Conductivity Exceeds 100mS/M**\n\na. Mekong river basin 0 –2 –4 –6 –8 –10 –12 –14 –16 –18 –20 30 percent 75 percent 90 percent Cropland threshold b. India 0 –2 –4 –6 –8 –10 –12 –14 –16 –18 –20 30 percent 75 percent 90 percent Cropland threshold c. Global 0 –2 –4 –6 –8 –10 –12 –14 –16 –18 –20 30 percent 75 percent 90 percent Cropland threshold _Notes:_ Figure shows results from estimating equation 1 in 3 different regions. Figure a (left) if in the Mekong River Basin, figure b (center) is in India, and figure c (right) is global using GEMStat data. In each region, coefficients from three different regressions are shown. The three regressions vary the restrictions on the share of cropland within a gridcell needed to be included in the regression. The left estimate includes all gridcells with at least 30 percent cropland in the year 2000. The mid and right estimate include gridcells with at least 75 percent and 90 percent cropland, respectively. The point estimate shown is the coefficient on a binary variable indicating observations where electrical conductivity in the upstream monitoring station exceeds 100mS/m. Error bars show the 95 percent confidence interval based on standard errors clustered at the gridcell level.\n\n**FIGURE 5. Flexible Estimation of Yield Losses Due To Electrical Conductivity**\n\n0 –5 –10 –15 –20 –25 –30 –35 –40 –45 –50 0-40 40-80 80-120 120-160 160-200 >200 EC (mS/m) 30 percent 75 percent 90 percent 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 _Notes:_ Figure shows results from estimating equation 1 using water quality data from GEMStat. The three regressions vary the restrictions on the share of cropland within a gridcell needed to be included in the regression. The blue line includes all gridcells with at least 30 percent cropland in the year 2000. The red and green lines include gridcells with at least 75 percent and 90 percent cropland, respectively. The point estimate shown is the coefficient on an indicator variable which indicates if EC is within the range given on the x-axis. Error bars show the 95 percent confidence interval based on standard errors clustered at the gridcell level.\n\nSalt of the Earth 15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["GEMStat data"], "descriptive_data": ["water quality data from GEMStat"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "GEMStat data", "confidence": 0.8747879862785339}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "water quality data from GEMStat", "confidence": 0.4029976427555084}], "vague_data": [{"text": "water quality data", "confidence": 0.22731831669807434}]}}}
{"input": "**FIGURE 6. Global Predicted Levels of EC, 1992–2010**\n\n_Notes:_ Figure shows average predicted EC from 1992-2010 for each gridcell from Désbureaux et al (2019).\n\nfrom India, the Mekong Basin and GEMStat to have the broadest geographical coverage as possible.\n\nSecond, we randomly split our dataset between a training sample (80% of the observations) and a testing sample (20% of the observations). Third, we train the model on the testing sample and assess the predic tive power on the testing sample. Fourth, we choose the best model as the one that maximizes the correla tion coefficient between observed and predicted values in the testing sample. Finally, we use the best model to predict EC for every years between 1992 and 2013 globally at a 0.5 degree scale. More information on the covariates used and the estimation procedure can be found in Desbureaux et al (2019) which extended the approach to more parameters. The correlation coefficient between observed and predicted values of EC in the testing sample is of 88 percent. 6 shows the average predicted EC for each gridcell from 1992-2013. Where values are poorly predicted, the predicted EC tend to be lower than observed EC.\n\nConsequently, the results can be interpreted as conservative predictions of the risk of high salinity.\n\nUsing the coefficients shown in 5 (based on 30 percent cropland), annual changes in NPP, and the EC dataset described above, we estimate annual losses in agricultural productivity due to EC for each 0.5x0.5-degree gridcell where cropland exceeds 30 percent of landcover, globally. We then convert the resulting loss of NPP to kilocalorie equivalents, following Strobl and Strobl (2011) and Imhoff et al.\n\n(2014). Globally, average annual losses from 2001-2013 due to saline water total 124 trillion ­kilocalorie-equivalents. In total, assuming 2,000 calories/person/day, these calories represent enough food to cover the food budgets of 170 million people, annually.\n\nThe distribution of these losses is shown in Figure 7. With the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, where most food production is rain fed, all continents have large hotspots. Very wet regions, such as the Amazon basin, Southeast Asia, and the southeastern United States also avoid losses from salinity, despite being important agricultural zones. Figure 8 aggregates losses by countries and shows further 16 Salt of the Earth", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["EC dataset"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "EC dataset", "confidence": 0.5512357354164124}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "EC dataset", "confidence": 0.13174718618392944}], "vague_data": [{"text": "EC dataset", "confidence": 0.10953831672668457}]}}}
{"input": "**FIGURE 7. Estimated Mean Annual Kilocalorie Equivalent Loss Due To Saline Water, 2001–2013**\n\n_Notes:_ Figure shows estimated average annual kilocalorie equivalent losses across space for the years 2001-2013. Losses are estimated based on the coefficients in 5, predicted EC from Désbureaux et al (2019) and net primary productivity data from Zhao et al., 2005.\n\n**FIGURE 8. Estimated Mean Losses in Agricultural Production Due To Saline Water,**\n**2001–2013, by Country**\n\nUnited States Argentina India Ukraine France Poland China Russia Canada Spain Germany Australia Romania Turkey Mexico Italy Hungary Morocco Pakistan Belarus 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 Calories lost per year, 2001–2013 (billions) _Notes:_ Figure aggregates estimated average annual losses based on the country which the centroid of each gridcell lies.\n\nSalt of the Earth 17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["net primary productivity data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "net primary productivity data", "confidence": 0.5845178365707397}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "net primary productivity data", "confidence": 0.19044706225395203}], "vague_data": [{"text": "net primary productivity data", "confidence": 0.21189680695533752}]}}}
{"input": "that the impact is generally not correlated with development level. The United States is the country with the largest loss of agricultural production, losing the equivalent of 32 trillion calories per year, more than double that of Argentina, the country with the next largest losses.\n\n**Conclusions**\n\nAddressing water quality needs for agriculture is a tremendous challenge. With agriculture responsible for 70 percent of freshwater abstractions globally, and the need for an additional 20 percent increase in water withdrawals by 2050 to feed a population of 9 billion, the problems of water scarcity often over shadow those of water quality. Nevertheless, the results in this paper demonstrate that yield losses due to saline water are significant and deserve more attention.\n\nThere is no one-size-fits-all solution to reducing salinity in irrigation waters. Solutions vary greatly by location and context. In some regions, it will require better irrigation management, to ensure that the salt balance remains low and steady. Well-designed irrigation drainage systems can accomplish this while also preventing waterlogging, which can also be harmful to crop productivity.\n\nStill, drainage systems must be carefully designed to ensure that they do not remove _too much_ salt from soil layers. If draining systems do not specifically target the root layer of the soil, they may end up removing more salt from the soil than was applied by irrigation. This will cause an increase in the salt load of the water leaving the field, and impact downstream water users (Christen, Ayars, and Hornbuckle 2001).\n\nDealing with over-extraction is also important for reducing the occurrence of salinity in water. Over extraction can exacerbate water salinity through reduced dilution of downstream water. Salt, at low levels of concentration, can be benign—it is only once those concentration levels become too high that productivity declines. Removing less water out of the system is therefore the easiest way to prevent concentrations from becoming too high. The link between over-extract and salinity also has the poten tial to lead to a vicious cycle of salinization if higher salinity levels lead to increased extraction, and therefore increased salinity. The urgency is particularly acute for countries already exposed to malnutri tion and climate variability, as in the case of South Asia.\n\nAdaptation through crop choice decisions becomes necessary when reducing salinity in water is too difficult or costly. As discussed above, crops have different tolerance levels to saline water, with some crops experiencing large yield declines at relatively low levels of EC, and others tolerant of EC levels in excess of 1,000 mS/m. The costs and benefits of switching crop varieties, relative to other salt-mitigation strategies must be weighted at a local level to determine the best course of action for ensuring a healthy agricultural economy, as well as ensuring food security.\n\n**Notes**\n\n1. See Table A1.1 for values and list of studies.\n\n2. A closely related measure to NPP is the normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI). NDVI when combined with growing season data of different crops can also provide a measure of plant health and physical productivity that is directly related to NPP. For instance, MODIS-NPP is determined using NDVI along with other factors (Running et al. 2004), and in general, NDVI is considered a good predictor for NPP.\n\nHowever, without knowing the time-varying distribution of crops underlying the global land cover data, we cannot accurately estimate the corresponding growing season data and therefore, cannot measure the maximum NDVI during the growing season.\n\n18 Salt of the Earth", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["growing season data of different crops"], "vague_data": ["normalized difference vegetation index", "global land cover data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "normalized difference vegetation index", "confidence": 0.5168068408966064}, {"text": "global land cover data", "confidence": 0.2789824306964874}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "global land cover data", "confidence": 0.45649248361587524}, {"text": "growing season data of different crops", "confidence": 0.29572758078575134}, {"text": "growing season data", "confidence": 0.2101176381111145}], "vague_data": [{"text": "growing season data", "confidence": 0.509336531162262}, {"text": "global land cover data", "confidence": 0.3034948706626892}]}}}
{"input": "3. The improved MOD17 by the NTSG is a post-reprocessed dataset that corrects for cloud-contamination in NASA’s MOD17 dataset\n\n[4. https://www.esa-landcover-cci.org/](https://www.esa-landcover-cci.org/) 5. We aggregate land cover categories 10 through 30 to a single cropland class. This is also consistent with the widely-used global vegetation classification scheme of the International Geosphere Biosphere Programme (IGBP).\n\n[6. The surface irrigation dataset is available here: http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/irrigationmap/index10.stm.](http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/irrigationmap/index10.stm)\n\n**References**\n\nArslan, A., Majid, G. A., Abdallah, K., Rameshwaran, P., Ragab, R., Singh, M., & Qadir, M. (2016). Evaluating the productivity potential of chick pea, lentil and faba bean under saline water irrigation systems. _Irrigation and drainage_, _65_ (1), 19-28.\n\nBlanc, E., & Strobl, E. (2013). The impact of climate change on cropland productivity: evidence from satellite based products at the river basin scale in Africa. _Climatic change_, _117_ (4), 873–890.\n\nBlanc, E., & Strobl, E. (2014). Is small better? A comparison of the effect of large and small dams on cropland productivity in South Africa. _The_ _World Bank Economic Review_, _28_ (3), 545–576.\n\nClarke, D., Williams, S., Jahiruddin, M., Parks, K., & Salehin, M. (2015). Projections of on-farm salinity in coastal Bangladesh. _Environmental_ _Science: Processes & Impacts_, _17_ (6), 1127–1136.\n\nChristen, E.W., J.E. Ayars, and J.W. Hornbuckle. 2001. “Subsurface Drainage Design and Management in Irrigated Areas of Australia.” _Irrigation_ _Science_ 21 (1): 35–43.\n\nDam, T. H. T., Amjath-Babu, T. S., Zander, P., & Müller, K. (2019). Paddy in saline water: Analysing variety-specific effects of saline water intru sion on the technical efficiency of rice production in Vietnam. _Outlook on Agriculture_, 0030727019850841.\n\nDelsman, J. R.: Saline Groundwater – Surface Water Interaction in Coastal Lowlands, PhD thesis, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2015.\n\nDesbureaux, S., van Vliet, M., Zaveri, E., Damania, R., Russ, J., Ribeiros, G., Rodella, A.S., and Mortier, F. (2019) _A Global Assessment of Water_ _Quality Hotspots between 1992 and 2010 for the SDGs_ .\n\nDasgupta, S., Hossain, M. M., Huq, M., & Wheeler, D. (2014). _Climate change, soil salinity, and the economics of high-yield rice production in_ _coastal Bangladesh_ . The World Bank.\n\nDe Louw, P. G. B., Oude Essink, G. H. P., Stuyfzand, P. J., and van der Zee, S. E. A. T. M.: Upward groundwater flow in boils as the dominant mechanism of salinization in deep polders, the Netherlands, J. Hydrol., 394, 494–506, 2010.\n\n[FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2016. AQUASTAT Main Database, FAO, Rome. http://www.fao.org/nr/water​](http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/index.html)\n\n[/­aquastat/data/query/index.html.](http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/index.html) Genua-Olmedo, A., Alcaraz, C., Caiola, N., & Ibáñez, C. (2016). Sea level rise impacts on rice production: The Ebro Delta as an example. _Science_ _of The Total Environment_, _571_, 1200-1210.\n\nHolman, I. P., Whelan, M. J., Howden, N. J. K., Bellamy, P. H., Willby, N. J., Rivas-Casado, M., and McConvey, P.: Phosphorus in groundwater\n\n- an overlooked contributor to eutrophication, Hydrol. Process., 22, 5121–5127, 2008\n\nImhoff, M. L., Bounoua, L., Ricketts, T., Loucks, C., Harriss, R., & Lawrence, W. T. (2004). Global patterns in human consumption of net ­primary production. _Nature_, _429_ (6994), 870.\n\nLobell, D. B., Hicke, J. A., Asner, G. P., Field, C. B., Tucker, C. J., & Los, S. O. (2002). Satellite estimates of productivity and light use efficiency in United States agriculture, 1982–98. _Global Change Biology_, _8_ (8), 722–735.\n\nLu, X., & Zhuang, Q. (2010). Evaluating climate impacts on carbon balance of the terrestrial ecosystems in the Midwest of the United States with a process-based ecosystem model. _Mitigation and adaptation strategies for global change_, _15_ (5), 467–487 Machado, R., & Serralheiro, R. (2017). Soil salinity: effect on vegetable crop growth. Management practices to prevent and mitigate soil salini zation. Horticulturae, 3(2), 30.\n\nMateo-Sagasta, J., & Burke, J. (2011). Agriculture and water quality interactions: a global overview. SOLAW Background Thematic Report-TR08, 46.\n\nMiller, R. L., Bradford, W. L., & Peters, N. E. (1988). _Specific conductance: theoretical considerations and application to analytical quality control_ .\n\nUS Government Printing Office.\n\nSalt of the Earth 19", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["AQUASTAT Main Database", "MOD17 dataset", "MOD17 by the NTSG"], "descriptive_data": ["surface irrigation dataset"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "AQUASTAT Main Database", "confidence": 0.7539052367210388}, {"text": "MOD17 dataset", "confidence": 0.4167827367782593}, {"text": "surface irrigation dataset", "confidence": 0.2726554870605469}, {"text": "MOD17", "confidence": 0.25813403725624084}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "surface irrigation dataset", "confidence": 0.4127449691295624}], "vague_data": [{"text": "surface irrigation dataset", "confidence": 0.23713703453540802}]}}}
{"input": "Mukherjee A, Bhanja SNand Wada Y 2018 Groundwater depletion causing reduction of baseflow triggering Ganges river summer drying Sci.\n\nRep. 8 12049 Munns, R., & Gilliham, M. (2015). Salinity tolerance of crops–what is the cost?. _New phytologist_, _208_ (3), 668-673.\n\nPoulter, B., MacBean, N., Hartley, A., Khlystova, I., Arino, O., Betts, R., ... & Hagemann, S. (2015). Plant functional type classification for earth system models: results from the European Space Agency’s Land Cover Climate Change Initiative. Geoscientific Model Development, 8, 2315–2328.\n\nRunning, S. W., Nemani, R. R., Heinsch, F. A., Zhao, M., Reeves, M., & Hashimoto, H. (2004). A continuous satellite-derived measure of global terrestrial primary production. _Bioscience_, _54_ (6), 547–560.\n\nSanower, Hossain (2019). Present Scenario of Global Salt Affected Soils, its Management and Importance of Salinity Research. International Research Journal of Biological Sciences, 1: 1–3.\n\nStrobl E, Strobl RO (2011) The distributional impact of large dams: Evidence from cropland productivity in Africa. _Journal of Development_ _Economics_ 96(2): 432–450.\n\nTanji, K. K., and N. C. Kielen. 2002. _Agricultural Drainage Water Management in Arid and Semi-arid Areas._ Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.\n\nThompson, W.R. 2004. “Complexity, Diminishing Marginal Returns, and Serial Mesopotamian Fragmentation.” _Journal of World-Systems_ _Research_ 10 (3): 613–52.\n\nTum, M., & Günther, K. P. (2011). Validating modelled NPP using statistical yield data. _biomass and bioenergy_, _35_ (11), 4665-4674.\n\nWarrence, N. J., Bauder, J. W., & Pearson, K. E. (2002). Basics of salinity and sodicity effects on soil physical properties. _Departement of Land_ _Resources and Environmental Sciences, Montana State University-Bozeman, MT_, 129.\n\nYu, L., Rozemeijer, J., Van Breukelen, B. M., Ouboter, M., Van Der Vlugt, C., & Broers, H. P. (2018). Groundwater impacts on surface water quality and nutrient loads in lowland polder catchments: monitoring the greater Amsterdam area. _Hydrology & Earth System_ _Sciences_, _22_ (1).\n\nZaveri, E., Russ, J., & Damania, R. (2018). Drenched fields and parched farms: Evidence along the extensive and intensive margins. _Available_ _at SSRN 3104224_ .\n\nZhao, M., Heinsch, F. A., Nemani, R. R., & Running, S. W. (2005). Improvements of the MODIS terrestrial gross and net primary production global data set. _Remote sensing of Environment_, _95_ (2), 164–176.\n\n20 Salt of the Earth", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["statistical yield data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "statistical yield data", "confidence": 0.10264559090137482}], "vague_data": [{"text": "statistical yield data", "confidence": 0.5651875138282776}]}}}
{"input": "_American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2013, 5(2): 122–150_ _[http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.5.2.122](http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.5.2.122)_\n\n### The Demand for, and Consequences of, Formalization among Informal Firms in Sri Lanka [†]\n\n_By_ Suresh de Mel, David McKenzie, and Christopher Woodruff* _A field experiment in Sri Lanka provides informal firms incentives to_ _formalize. Information about the registration process and reimburse-_ _ment of direct costs does not increase registration. Payments equiva-_ _lent to one-half to one month_ _alternatively, two months_ _of the median_ ( ) _firm’s profits leads to registration of around one-fifth_ _alternatively,_ ( _one-half_ _of firms. Land ownership issues are the most common rea-_ ) _son for not registering. Follow-up surveys 15 to 31 months later show_ _higher mean profits, but largely in a few firms that grew rapidly. We_ _find little evidence for other changes in behavior, but formalized firms_ _express more trust in the state._ _JEL_ C93, D22, L25, L26, O14 ( ) he majority of firms in most developing countries are informal. In Sri Lanka, for example, only one-fifth of firms operating without paid workers are registered\n# **T**\nwith any government agency. Even among firms employing paid workers, the majority are unregistered with one or more pertinent agencies. Policymakers are concerned about high levels of informality for two reasons. First, informality is associated with lower tax collection, restricting the government’s ability to finance public services Levy 2008 . Second, the coexistence of formal and informal firms means that firms ( ) competing in the same industry face different marginal production costs e.g., labor ( costs and taxes, leading to an inefficient allocation of resources in the economy Hsieh ) ( and Klenow 2009; Levy 2008 . How can informal firms be induced to formalize?\n) A firm’s decision to become formal depends on the costs and benefits of formality. There are two prevailing views of informality, dubbed by Perry et al. 2007 ( ) as _exclusion_ and _exit_ . The exclusion view focuses on the costs of registering. This view is most notably associated with the work of de Soto 1989, who argued that ( )\n\n- de Mel: Department of Economics, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya 20400, Sri Lanka [e-mail: demel.](mailto:demel.suresh@gmail.com)\n(\n[suresh@gmail.com](mailto:demel.suresh@gmail.com) ; McKenzie: Lead Economist, Development Research Group, The World Bank, 1818 H Street ) N.W., MSN MC3-307, Washington, DC 20433 [e-mail: dmckenzie@worldbank.org](mailto:dmckenzie@worldbank.org) ; Woodruff: Department of ( ) Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK [e-mail: c.woodruff@warwick.ac.uk](mailto:c.woodruff@warwick.ac.uk) . We thank the ( ) World Bank, the Knowledge for Change Program Trust Fund, DFID, and the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation for funding for this project. We thank Bill Maloney, Dina Pomeranz, Russell Toth, and seminar participants at Cambridge, London School of Economics, the National Bureau of Economic Research summer institute, University of California-Berkeley, the University of Washington-St Louis, and the World Bank for helpful comments. Kandy Consulting Group provided excellent service in carrying out the baseline and follow-up surveys and assisting with the registration intervention. All opinions offered represent those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent.\n\n- To comment on this article in the online discussion forum, or to view additional materials including the author\ndisclosure statement s [, visit the article page at http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.5.2.122.](http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.5.2.122) ( ) _122_", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _123_ ­burdensome entry regulations prevent small firms from becoming formal. These firms suffer a loss in productivity as a result of remaining informal. The natural policy response is then to remove the burdensome regulations. Spurred in part by the World Bank IFC _Doing Business_ project, governments around the world have / in recent years streamlined the process of becoming formal. Indeed, since 2004, 75 percent of the countries included in the _Doing Business_ survey have adopted at least one reform making it easier to register a business IFC 2009 .\n( ) But is streamlining the registration process sufficient to spur formality? An alternative view, associated with Levy 2008, Maloney 2004 and others, posits that ( ) ( ) firms rationally exit the formal sector when the benefits provided by formality are outweighed by the costs of being formal. That is, the formality decision is comparable to any other investment decision taken by the firm. Each firm compares its perceived costs of being formal—including initial registration and ongoing costs e.g., tax payments —with its perceived benefits of being formal e.g., a reduced ( ) ( chance of being fined, and access to banks, courts and government contracts . More ) able firm owners with larger efficient scales rationally become formal as they grow large enough to benefit from the formal institutions of civil society. Smaller, less productive, firms do not find formality desirable because they receive no benefit from access to these formal institutions. [1] We conduct a field experiment in Sri Lanka de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff ( 2012 with the goal of generating data to test whether the exclusion or the exit view ) of informality better reflects reality. Working with a sample of informal firms with 1 to 14 paid employees, we reduce the information costs and increase the monetary benefits of formalizing for a random subset of the sample. The experiment allows us to measure both the latent demand for and the consequences of formalization.\nWe divided the sample into four treatment groups and a control group. The first treatment group was given information about the costs and benefits of, and procedures for, registering their firm with the Divisional Secretariat DS —the relevant ( ) registration for tax purposes. Additionally, they were reimbursed for the modest ( ) direct cost of registration if they registered. The second, third, and fourth treatment groups were provided the same information and also offered a payment of 10,000 Sri Lankan rupees Rs, Rs 20,000, and Rs 40,000 approximately US $88, $175, ( ) ( and $350, respectively to register.\n) We find that providing information and reimbursing the cost of registration did not induce firms to register. In contrast, 17–22 percent of eligible firms registered when offered Rs 10,000 or Rs 20,000, just under half a month’s and one month’s profits for the median firm, respectively, and 48 percent register when offered Rs 40,000.\nFew of those who did not register when offered Rs 40,000 registered when given additional time or when offered Rs 80,000.\nThe experiment sheds light not only on the demand for informality, but also on the nature of barriers to formal registration. An important share of the firms not ­registering 1 Levy 2008 discusses the cost-benefit calculus in the context of worker benefits. Firms choose whether to hire ( ) formal or informal workers, and may hire some of each. In our setting, owners choose whether or not to register the firm rather than choosing the formality of individual workers. However, the thrust of Levy’s argument applies to our setting, even if some of the details—formality is not assumed to affect the productivity of a given worker in Levy’s context, while formality may affect the productivity of the firm in ours—differ.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Doing Business survey"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_124_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_ after receiving the largest incentive report that issues related to land ­tenancy prevented them from doing so. These firms operated with informal leases or agreements— ironically, often on government-owned land—and hence were unable to provide authorities with the required proof of ownership of the land on which the firm operated.\nThree follow-up surveys of these same firms were conducted at 15, 22, and 31 months after the intervention, enabling us to examine whether and how the firms benefited from formalization. Firms that formalized are found to have higher profits, although this impact seems largely due to the experiences of a few firms experiencing substantial growth, with the distribution of profits almost identical for treatment and control firms over most of the distribution. Examining the channels through which formalization might benefit firms, we find increased advertising and use of receipt books, but no increases in receipt of government contracts, use of bank accounts or loans, or participation in government programs. Consistent with the effect of formal land titling reported in Di Tella, Galiani, and Schargrodsky 2007, ( ) we also find impacts in terms of attitudes. Firms that formalize are more likely to trust local government and agree that paying taxes is a civic duty, but are also more likely to agree that small businesses are taxed too much.\nThe results provide more support for the exit view than for the exclusion view of informality. The fact that firms remain informal even when the direct costs of registering are reimbursed suggests these firms are not being excluded. Using the reported profit data and the Sri Lankan tax code, we estimate the demand for formality, relating the percentage of firms choosing to register to the present value of tax payments net of the benefit from our one-time payment. We find a steeply downward sloping demand curve, providing support for the view that firms are making rational benefit-cost calculations as Levy and others claim.\nThis study is the first to experimentally induce informal firms to register for tax purposes. [2] It builds on an existing literature that has largely focused on the impact of entry regulations at both the macro and micro levels and on new firm creation, rather than formalization of existing informal firms. At a cross-country level, countries with more burdensome entry regulations have larger informal sectors Djankov 2002, ( ) and costly entry regulations are also associated with the creation of fewer limited liability companies Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan 2006 . [3] But the endogeneity of regu( ) latory choices complicates any claim of causation based on the cross country patterns. Several micro studies have therefore examined the impact of regulatory reforms.\nBruhn 2011 and Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira 2011 study a reform in Mexico which ( ) ( ) reduced the time required to register at the municipal level from 30 to 2 days for firms operating in specified sectors. Both find some increase in the number of formal firms, although Bruhn concludes this increase is largely ­coming from new entry rather than formalization of existing firms, while Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira 2011 use different ( ) 2 An unpublished study that took place over a similar time frame to our experiment by Alcázar, Adrade, and Jaramillo 2010 in Lima, Peru also tries to formalize firms through subsidizing the cost of registration, although ( ) they focus on municipal-level registration. While their study has very high attrition levels over half their sample ( attrits, the preliminary results we have seen suggest the results of our study may generalize to other contexts. We ) discuss this study in more detail in Section V.\n3 There is also firm-level evidence for an impact of entry regulations. Bertrand and Kramarz 2002 find that ( ) entry regulations are associated with significantly slower employment growth among French retail firms.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Sri Lankan tax code", "confidence": 0.630755603313446}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "reported profit data", "confidence": 0.2620210349559784}], "vague_data": [{"text": "reported profit data", "confidence": 0.22100333869457245}]}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _125_ data to reach the opposite conclusion. Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas 2011 ( ) analyze a simplification program in Brazil and find that the firms that open just after a reform are larger and more likely to operate in a permanent location—a finding which they interpret as evidence that formalization improves firm performance, but could also be the result of selection into firm entry. Monteiro and Assunção 2012 examine ( ) the same reform and find that new retail firms created after the reform were more likely to be formal than firms in sectors not affected by the reform. Finally, in one of the few published studies to examine the impact of formalizing on existing informal firms, McKenzie and Sakho 2010 use distance to the registration office as an instru( ) ment for registration costs, and find that some firms in Bolivia facing high costs of formalizing would gain on net from registering for taxes, but that other firms would lose from doing so, and so appear to be rationally informal.\nThe remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section I describes the process of becoming formal as a small firm in Sri Lanka, and gives evidence as to the extent of formality by firm size. Section II describes our intervention. Section III describes the results on the demand for formalizing, and Section IV describes the consequences of formalizing. Section V discusses the extent to which these results may generalize, and Section VI concludes.\n\n**I. Becoming Formal in Sri Lanka**\n\nThe process of registering a business in Sri Lanka is similar to that in many other developing countries, with multiple levels of registration. Two levels are required of all firms, regardless of size. First, firms are required to obtain a municipal license.\nDepending on whether the firm is located in a rural, urban, or semi-urban area, this implies registration with the Pradeshiya Saba, Municipal Council or Urban Council P.S. or UCMC . In some sectors, obtaining this license requires a site visit from a ( ) revenue officer and or a public health inspector, or approval by a police officer and / the municipal chairman. Firms must also pay an annual license fee that depends on the sector, but typically ranges from Rs 500 to Rs 5,000. The main benefit of registration at this level is being able to operate without fear of being harassed by local officials, who typically monitor the most visible enterprises since these license fees are an important local revenue source.\nSecond, all firms must register at the division level with the Divisional Secretariat. [4] The one-time registration with the DS establishes the business as a legal entity for tax purposes and provides a Business Registration Certificate BRC . The BRC serves ( ) as legal proof of the enterprise’s existence and is needed, for instance, for the firm to be able to sell to government institutions and to larger firms that require formal transaction receipts. The BRC is also needed to open a bank account in the name of the business, and to obtain a loan from most commercial banks. Registration at the DS Division level involves payment of a modest fee, but does not, by itself, imply the 4 There are four administrative levels in Sri Lanka: Provinces 9, Districts 25, Divisions 324, and Grama ( ) ( ) ( ) Niladaris GNs, 14,008 . Political councils are elected at both the Provincial and local levels. The local councils are ( ) called by different names depending on the area they cover, with Municipal Councils in the 18 largest urban areas, Urban Councils in a further 42 urban semi-urban areas, and Pradeshiya Sabhas in rural areas. Rural Sri Lanka is / divided into 270 Pradeshiya Sabhas. Registration of enterprises thus takes place both at the local and divisional level.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_126_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_ firm is liable for taxes. Taxes need to be paid only if annual net profits are in excess of Rs 300,000, and theoretically, are payable regardless of the registration status of the firm. In practice, registration makes the firm more visible to tax authorities, and hence increases the expected tax payments for firms with incomes exceeding this threshold.\nOnline Appendix 1 provides details on the actual process experienced by firms registering with the DS during our experiment. The process was easier in Colombo, where firm owners were generally not asked to provide any documents other than their national identity card, and could choose to pay an extra Rs 500 express service fee to get their BRC in one day. For the firms in our study the registration process typically involved a total of two days and two visits to the DS. In contrast, firms in Kandy were required to also provide proof of business existence, proof of municipal registration, and a letter of no objection from the property owner. The median firm spent three days getting these other documents processed, and waited six additional days after submitting all documents to receive their BRC.\nLarger firms are subject to two additional registrations. Firms with paid workers are required to register these workers with the Ministry of Labour for the Government Social Security Schemes: the Employee’s Provident Fund EPF and ( ) the Employee’s Trust Fund ETF . EPF consists of a monthly payment of 20 percent ( ) of the employee’s earnings consisting of a 12 percent employer contribution and ( an 8 percent employee contribution, and ETF a further 3 percent employer contri) bution. Formal employers with more than 14 workers also face high severance pay costs if they lay workers off. Finally, firms with revenues exceeding Rs 500,000 per quarter or Rs 1.8 million per year must also register for VAT. The VAT tax rate is 20 percent of value-added for most goods, with producers of some goods paying a lower 10 percent rate and others exempt entirely.\n\nA. _Formality Levels in Practice_ Figure 1 summarizes the percentage of firms that reported being registered with each of the four government entities according to the number of paid employees in the firm. The data come from the baseline of the Sri Lanka Longitudinal Survey of Enterprises SLLSE, collected by the authors between January and March 2008.\n( ) The survey contains 2,865 enterprises, and is representative of enterprises in the 31 largest cities and towns outside the Northern province, which was inaccessible ( due to civil conflict . A door-to-door listing exercise of households was carried out, ) to ensure the survey was able to detect both formal and informal firms. The vast majority of enterprises have zero paid workers, and we see that only 23 percent of these nonemployers are registered at the local P.S. UCMC level, and only 20 per( / ) cent are registered at the DS Division level. Less than 1 percent of the nonemployers report being registered for VAT. Registration at all four levels rises quickly with firm size, so that 75 percent of those with 5 paid employees are registered with the P.S. or UCMC and 68 percent with the DS. However, the percent registered then appears to plateau, with approximately 70 to 80 percent registered with the DS for firms with 6 to 20 employees. The SLLSE sample becomes thinner as the ­number of paid workers grows, making the point estimates more variable at larger firm sizes. Registration of at least some of the workers of the firm with EPF ETF is less ­common in firms with /", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["the Sri Lanka Longitudinal Survey of Enterprises"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Sri Lanka Longitudinal Survey of Enterprises SLLSE", "confidence": 0.8802182674407959}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _127_ 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 DS VAT EPF ETF / PS or UCMC 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11–14 15–20 Number of paid employees Figure 1. Percentage of Firms Registered with Different Government Entities by Firm Size fewer than five workers, but also increases rapidly with firm size, so that 87 ­percent of firms with 10 employees have registered at least some of their workers. VAT registration is the least common, but also grows with firm size, so that about half of firms with 10 or more workers are registered for VAT.\nAmong those firms with 1–10 paid workers who were not registered with any of the four government entities, only 23 percent said they had ever considered registering their business. The majority of the remainder said they felt their businesses were too small to have to register. There is often a presumption that the informal sector faces a high level of de facto fees in terms of fines, penalties, and bribes which arise from operating without a license. However, this does not appear to be the case in Sri Lanka, where fewer than 0.5 percent of unregistered firms with 1–10 paid workers reported paying a fine, penalty, or bribe in the last year because of their unregistered status. Indeed, most informal firms report having little interaction with officials at all. Only 5 percent reported receiving a visit from a Pradeshiya Saba official, 2 ­percent from a DS official, and 1 percent from a tax official in the past year.\n\nB. _Focusing on DS Registration_ Figure 1 shows that registration at all levels increases markedly with the number of employees. While most firms with one or two workers are entirely unregistered, a majority of firms with ten or more workers are registered with each of the relevant agencies. Our goal is to understand the demand for formality among firms in this size range. We focus on one particular dimension of formalizing, registering with the DS. This DS registration most closely corresponds to the concept of formalizing underlying much of the discussion of formalization in the literature, because it establishes a legal and tax presence, and is the prerequisite for selling to the ­government and other firms that require registration, as well as for applying for most bank loans.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_128_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_\n\n**II. The Experiment**\n\nA. _Selection of the Sample_ We chose to carry out our study in the two largest cities in Sri Lanka: Colombo and Kandy. Since the goal of our intervention is to gauge the demand for formality among informal firms, we needed to construct a sample of firms not registered with the DS at the time of the baseline survey. There was no existing sample frame that could be used for this, so we carried out our own screening exercise. [5] We randomly selected five Divisional Secretariat Divisions in each city. In December 2008, we had research assistants go door-to-door in these areas to screen firms, with the goal of surveying approximately 50 unregistered firms in each selected DS. Firms were selected for the baseline survey if they were not registered with the DS, were not in seasonal agriculture or fisheries, had 1–14 paid employees, and had an owner aged 20 to 55 who worked at least 20 hours in the enterprise each week. Few firms of this size are owned by women, and so we chose to restrict the sample to male owners and to businesses jointly owned by a husband and wife. A sixth DS Division was added in Kandy due to difficulty finding enough informal firms that satisfied these criteria.\nThere are lots of informal firms without paid workers, but fewer with paid workers.\nAn obvious concern in attempting to construct a sample of the unregistered is whether firms will reveal that they are not registered and hence that they are breaking ( the law . We used university students to carry out the surveying, and they presented ) firm owners with a letter from the University of Peradeniya investigator emphasizing that this was a research study. In an environment where informality is commonplace among smaller firms, we believe that most unregistered firms did tell the truth.\nIndeed, as we will discuss in more detail, our sample contains a nontrivial fraction of firms that were “quasi-registered,” but answered that they were not registered, suggesting that there were not strong incentives for firms to pretend to be registered.\nThe resulting baseline sample consists of 520 firms evenly split between Colombo and Kandy. Although our screening criteria allowed firms to have up to 14 paid employees, in the population there are more firms with 1–5 employees than with 6–14, and a larger percentage of the smaller firms are informal. As a result, 90 ­percent of firms in the baseline sample have five or fewer paid employees, with a median of three paid employees. Although all of the firms said they were not ­registered with the DS, 68 percent reported being registered with the ­municipal council or Pradeshiya Saba, so they are only partially informal. However, only 5 percent have registered any of their workers with EPF ETF. The firms cover a range of industries, / with 44 percent in services e.g., motor vehicle repair, restaurants, 32 percent in ( ) manufacturing e.g., manufacturing fabricated metal products and glass products, ( ) and 23 percent in retail. Mean median monthly profit for the firms in our sample ( ) was Rs 33,886 Rs 25,000, approximately US $300 $220 at market exchange ( ) ( ) rates at the time of the survey, with a 10–90 percentile range of Rs 9,000 –75,000 5 We decided against using the sample from our previous survey, the SLLSE, since logistically it was infeasible for us to implement the experiment island-wide, and there were too few firms in the SLLSE that were in Kandy and Colombo, and were not part of a separate experiment.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SLLSE", "confidence": 0.8042153120040894}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _129_ US $79–$658 . The median firm had been in business for six years, 80 percent of ( ) the firms were more than three years old. Most of the businesses were stand-alone enterprises, with only 8 percent located inside the home.\n\nB. _What Do Firms See as the Costs and Benefits of Formalizing?_ Firm owners were asked open-ended questions about the possible costs and benefits of registering with the DS. The most common perceived cost or disadvantage was having to pay taxes and being more likely to receive visits from tax authorities, mentioned by 46 percent of the owners. The next most common concern, mentioned by 37 percent of the owners, was that the process of ­registration was burdensome and time consuming. A third common concern was that DS registration would require the firm to pay EPF ETF, or subject the firm to a greater risk of visit from / labor inspectors, which was mentioned by 24 percent of owners. [6] Only 13 percent believed the initial cost of registration was high.\nWith regard to the benefits of registration, more than half of the owners 58 ­percent ( ) mentioned being able to get a bank account in the business name or apply for a bank loan. The second most common response to this question 23 percent of owners ( ) was that there is no particular advantage of registering with the DS. Approximately 10 to 15 percent of firms mentioned a number of other advantages, such as being able to operate on a larger and more visible scale, qualifying for participation in government programs, being able to sell to the government and firms that require registration, and having a lower risk of being fined. As with the nationwide sample, less than 1 percent reported actually having had to pay any fines or bribes in the last year for operating informally. So the risk of being fined is already low.\nThese responses suggest that firms have at least somewhat accurate information about some of the advantages and disadvantages of registering. They have much less knowledge of the specifics of how to register. Only 17 percent knew the correct cost of registering at the DS. The most common response when asked how long it takes to register—given by 22 percent of the owners—was “don’t know.” The next most common responses were 30 days, 60 days, and 90 days. Firms also lacked knowledge of their income tax responsibilities. Firm owners were asked how much a business owner would have to pay as income tax if their annual income was Rs 100,000.\nOnly 2 percent got the correct answer of 0, with 55 percent saying “don’t know.” The median answer among those professing to know was Rs 2,000. When asked the same question with respect to an annual income of Rs 400,000, again 50 ­percent said they didn’t know, and 88 percent of those answering with a number gave an answer higher than the true rate of Rs 3,400, with the median answer Rs 8,000.\nFinally, firm owners were asked in the baseline a hypothetical question of whether they would register with the DS if someone would pay the fixed cost of registration.\nSixty-one percent of firm owners answered yes to this question, suggesting some willingness to formalize if the costs were reduced.\n\n6 We note that this perception is not accurate—the ETF EPF registration is separate, and there is no formal / communication between the two agencies.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "nationwide sample", "confidence": 0.12713369727134705}], "vague_data": [{"text": "nationwide sample", "confidence": 0.25965026021003723}]}}}
{"input": "_130_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_ C. _The Intervention_ The baseline survey and hypothetical questions suggest that the informal firms are not perfectly informed about the process of registration or its costs and benefits, and that many express a willingness to register if someone pays the upfront costs. We therefore designed an intervention that provided information about the costs, benefits, and process of registration, and promised to reimburse firms for the direct costs of registering. If the stylized de Soto _Doing Business_ view is true, and firms want / to formalize but for the costs, then we should expect to see a large response from this intervention. Likewise, if firms really want to formalize but ­time-inconsistency means they have never gotten around to it, a limited time offer to reimburse registration costs and a nudge from an outsider might be expected to spur registration. In contrast, if firms have decided not to formalize because they don’t think the benefits outweigh the costs, we would expect few firms to be at the margin where just the upfront registration cost alone was enough to change this calculus. Such firms would need additional incentive to register, and so we experiment by seeing how much we need to pay firms to get them to find it worthwhile to formalize.\nWe therefore designed the following four treatments: _Treatment 1_ .—Information and Reimbursement. We designed an information brochure in consultation with the chamber of commerce and local Divisional Secretariat which clearly set out the advantages and disadvantages of registering with the DS, and explained the steps required to register. This information brochure was given to firm owners. Trained research assistants were available to answer any questions the firm owner had about how to register. Firm owners were also told that we would pay a reimbursement of Rs 1,000, slightly more than the average level of fees paid to register, if they registered within one month and mailed us a copy of their business registration certificate. This offer was presented in person and written on official project letterhead to increase credibility.\nThe information brochure was entitled “Could Business Registration Lead to the Success of Your Enterprise?” Issues covered included: what is meant by business registration, the reasons a business should be registered, the reasons some owners do not register, and myths about registration. The brochure also gave details of where to register, and the cost, time, and documents required for registration.\n\n_Treatments 2, 3, and 4_ .—Information and Payments. The other three treatment groups also received the information brochure, but instead of reimbursement owners were offered a larger monetary payment if they registered within one month of the offer. The amounts offered were Rs 10,000, Rs 20,000, and Rs 40,000, respectively approximately US $88, US $175, and US $350 at the time of treatment . This ( ) offer was delivered on a certificate that specified the name of the owner offered the treatment and the last date the registration could be submitted to us to qualify for payment. The certificate came with the signature of Dr. de Mel, and a project seal to increase credibility. We conducted an open house in both Colombo and Kandy, where firm owners could come to ask any questions. The open house also served to reassure the owners that the offer of payment was credible. To receive their ­payment,", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "baseline survey", "confidence": 0.7191562652587891}]}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _131_ firm owners had to return to the same location during a window of time and present their new business registration certificate along with their national identity card.\nTo guard against false registrations, we required the nature of the business and the address on the BRC to be the same as on the baseline survey. Where the two differed for a legitimate reason, the owner had to inform us in advance. In that case, they received payment only after we had verified the new address.\nThe payments offered are quite sizable relative to the size of the firms and to the time required to complete the registration process. As noted above, the median profit for the firms in our sample was Rs 25,000, so treatments 2, 3, and 4 were approximately half a month’s, one month’s, and two months’ profits, respectively. A firm earning Rs 25,000 per month faces no income tax, so the payments are also very large relative to the direct cost of formalizing the roughly Rs 1,000 fee for these ( ) firms. The ninetieth percentile of monthly profits in our data was Rs 75,000, which would require an annual income tax of Rs 33,000 3.7 percent of income . So our ( ) larger treatment exceeds the annual income tax cost of formalizing if they were to report their entire income. [7] One immediate question is whether firms could easily register to take the payment offered, and then deregister the business to continue operating informally. If this were the case, our experiment would be less informative about the incentives needed to get firms to formalize. However, in practice, this does not appear easy to do. Canceling of business registration can occur if the enterprise ceases to operate. The enterprise needs to notify the DS office within three months of closing the business, and provide certification from the local G.N. official to verify that the business is closed. Therefore, for a firm to accept our payment and then revert back to unregistered status, they would have to actually close their business, and have this verified, before reopening it again.\nOur sample size of 520 was randomly assigned by computer into these four treatment groups and a control group as follows. Firms were first stratified by province Colombo or Kandy, industry retail, manufacturing, or services, whether or not they ( ) ( ) had more than two paid employees, and whether or not in the baseline survey they had said they would register if someone were to pay the costs, and had also said they perceived some benefit to registration. Then within each of these 24 strata we sorted firms according to their sales rank and formed matched quintuplets. Where the number of firms in a strata was not perfectly divisible by five, the additional firms were randomly assigned within strata to one of the five treatment groups with equal probability. This method of randomization was based on the recommendations of Bruhn and McKenzie 2009 with the aim of increasing baseline balance and power, given that we only have ( ) 102–105 firms in each treatment group. The stratification variables were chosen on the basis that local regulations make the process of registration slightly different in Colombo and Kandy, while the incentives to register were a priori believed to possibly differ by industry, firm size, and self-professed desire to register.\n\n7 de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2009 estimate that micro-enterprise owners underestimate reported profits ( ) by as much as 30 percent. If firms in our sample are underreporting profits by a similar amount, then the median firm would be liable for annual taxes of Rs 3,000, implying that our smallest payment would compensate for three years of tax payments. If firms underreport profits in the survey, they might also do so in tax reports.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "baseline survey", "confidence": 0.6217644810676575}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "baseline survey", "confidence": 0.10193853080272675}], "vague_data": [{"text": "baseline survey", "confidence": 0.23536525666713715}]}}}
{"input": "_132_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_ Aug.\n\n2010 Round 2 survey _n_ 465 ( = ) Dec.\n\n2008 baseline _n_ 520 ( = ) Feb.–July 2009\n\n**Formalization**\n\n**treatments**\n\n**offered**\n\nin person proxy reports + Dec.\n\n2011 Round 4 survey _n_ 424 ( = March 2011 Round 3 survey _n_ 445 ( = ) on 59 ) Figure 2. Timeline The initial offers were given to treatment groups 1 and 2 in late February early / March 2009 see timeline in Figure 2 . Firms in these two treatment groups were ( ) given until the end of March start of April to provide their business registration / certificates and receive payment. Given budget constraints and the desire to map out as much of the demand curve for formality as possible, we waited to decide on the amount to offer treatment groups 3 and 4 until observing the take-up rates of these first groups. Treatment groups 3 and 4 were then given their offers in late April, with a deadline of late May to show their paperwork. However, on May 18 the Sri Lankan Government declared victory in the 25-year civil conflict, leading to a national holiday and making it difficult for paperwork to get processed toward the end of May.\nWe therefore decided to give all four treatment groups an extra month to carry out their registration if they desired, with a new deadline of the end of July 2009. Any firm that had completed its registration between the previous deadline and the new deadline was also eligible to receive the payment.\n\nD. _Quasi-Registration and Actually Receiving the Treatment Offer_ Owners of the firms assigned to treatment were asked to confirm their registration status on a follow-up visit in which we made the offer corresponding to their treatment group. We were surprised to learn that a nontrivial number of the firms were already registered with the DS. Recall that all of the firms stated they were not registered with the DS in the baseline survey. A handful of these firms had registered in the three to four months since the baseline survey this was confirmed by examining ( the BRC, which shows the date of registration, but the majority of those registered ) had either misunderstood the question in the baseline survey or were what we term “quasi-registered.” The latter refers to a number of cases where the business had been registered in some form, but the registration did not match the current circumstances of the business. For example, in some cases the business had been registered by another family member, who was no longer running it. In other cases the registration had been for another location. The firm thus had a BRC, but it didn’t match the firm in all details. This BRC could still presumably be used to access government contracts or in dealing with a bank. We therefore chose not to offer the treatment to firms in this category. We subsequently also revisited the control group firms to determine which of them also fell into this quasi-registered status.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Round 2 survey", "confidence": 0.729762613773346}, {"text": "baseline survey", "confidence": 0.4147712290287018}, {"text": "Round 4 survey", "confidence": 0.223134845495224}, {"text": "March 2011 Round 3 survey", "confidence": 0.11658606678247452}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _133_ In total, 152 out of the 415 firms that were assigned to 1 of the 4 treatment groups did not receive the registration offer. The majority of the time 106 cases this was ( ) because the firm was already registered or quasi-registered at the time of the baseline survey, as just described. In 14 cases, the business had closed since the baseline survey, in 18 cases, the owner could not be found in the follow-up, and in 14 cases the business had registered on its own between the baseline survey and the intervention. Five of the owners rejected the offer outright. We count these cases as having received the offer. Follow-up visits with the control group revealed 30 firms that were already registered, and a further 12 had closed or moved or couldn’t be located.\nTable 1 reports summary statistics for the full sample according to assignment to treatment, and also for the subsample that actually received the treatment offer or was ( eligible to do so after rechecking in the control group . The randomization succeeded ) in achieving statistical balance for both the variables explicitly stratified or matched on, and for other key variables. The coefficients of variation are 1.18 for profits and 2.01 for sales, which are in line with or lower than those found in business training experiments around the world. A consequence of the heterogeneity in firm performance is that power to detect differences across treatment groups is lower than it would be if the sample were more homogeneous. We employ several methods to improve power, which we discuss below. With the possible exception of treatment group 1 the infor( mation and reimbursement only group, there is also balance in the share of the group ) already registered or quasi-registered. As a result, we cannot reject balance for any of the variables in the subsample for which the offers were actually made.\n\n**III. The Demand for Formalization**\n\nA. _Which Treatments Increased Formalization?_ We estimate both the intention-to-treat effect effect of being randomized into one ( of the four different treatment groups, and treatment effect on the treated effect of ) ( being randomized into one of the four different treatment groups and actually being offered the treatment . The intention-to-treat effect is obtained by means of the fol) lowing regression: 1 _Registered In Intervention Windo​w​i​_ TREATMEN​T​ _i_ ​ STRAT​A​ _i_ ​ _​i_ ​, ( ) = α+β′ + γ′ + ​ε where TREATMEN​T​ _i_ ​ is a vector of dummies for each of the four treatment groups, and STRAT​A _​i_ ​ is a vector consisting of dummies for each of the strata used in the randomization. To estimate the treatment effect on the treated, we replace TREATMENT with dummies for actually being offered the treatments, and then instrument these with assignment to treatment.\nTable 2 shows the results. Only 1 of the 104 firms in the information and reimbursement group registered during our intervention window, compared to 16 in the Rs 10,000 treatment group, 13 in the Rs 20,000 treatment group, and 30 in the Rs 40,000 treatment group. The large majority of firms registered during the initial month given to them—only eight registered during the extra time provided by the extended July deadline. During the intervention time window, two firms in the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_134_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_ Table 1—Summary Statistics by Treatment Group _F_ -test of Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment equality group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 Control _p_ -value _Panel A. Assignment to treatment_ Variables stratified or matched on Retail 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.998 Manufacturing 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.993 Services 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.996 Colombo 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.49 0.993 More than two paid workers 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.60 0.971 Says would register and sees benefit 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.999 to doing so Sales in last month 218,570 153,184 180,691 160,159 213,310 0.497 62,816 17,064 25,761 22,376 35,700 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Median of sales last month 90,000 92,500 100,000 100,000 90,000 Variables not stratified or matched on Doesn’t keep records 0.49 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.47 0.649 Years of education of owner 11.07 10.68 10.89 11.43 10.54 0.082 0.29 0.30 0.20 0.22 0.26 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Number of paid employees 2.93 3.13 3.10 3.00 3.15 0.905 0.16 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.20 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Registered at the Pradeshiya Saba 0.71 0.66 0.71 0.67 0.62 0.572 Profits in last month 29,679 32,822 32,634 36,705 37,585 0.662 3,196 3,290 2,485 5,082 5,167 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Given treatment offer or eligible for 0.75 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.61 0.070 ( it if control ) Sample size 104 104 105 102 105 _Panel B. Given treatment offer_ _or eligible for it if control_ ( ) Retail 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.941 Manufacturing 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.997 Services 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.998 Colombo 0.42 0.43 0.33 0.39 0.39 0.790 More than two paid workers 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.41 0.53 0.707 Says would register and sees benefit 0.56 0.45 0.61 0.54 0.59 0.379 to doing so Sales in last month 138,985 136,883 146,917 150,559 196,391 0.780 28,001 21,490 25,547 31,000 41,127 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Doesn’t keep records 0.54 0.60 0.56 0.64 0.52 0.609 Years of education of owner 10.81 10.38 10.65 11.19 10.19 0.241 0.36 0.41 0.28 0.29 0.37 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Number of paid employees 2.64 2.98 3.05 2.61 2.77 0.695 0.18 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.21 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Registered at the Pradeshiya Saba 0.64 0.60 0.62 0.54 0.59 0.834 Profits in last month 26,449 31,270 30,945 30,759 33,754 0.800 3,210 4,480 3,364 4,203 7,359 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Sample size 78 65 66 59 64 _Notes:_ Treatment group 1 is the information and reimbursement only group. Groups 2, 3, and 4 were offered Rs 10,000, Rs 20,000, and Rs 40,000, respectively. Standard errors for means of continuous variables shown in parentheses.\n\n­control group registered. Columns 1 and 2 show the treatment effects as proportions of those in each treatment group, while the TOT effects in columns 3 and 4 are effectively these numbers as a proportion of firms actually offered the treatment. Thus for the information and reimbursement of costs group, there is no significant effect, with more firms from the control group registering. This is a reasonably precise zero", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _135_ Table 2—Treatment Effects Intention-to-treat Treatment on the treated Dependent variable: registered OLS OLS IV IV during intervention window 1 2 3 4 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Information and reimbursement treatment 0.00943 0.0101 0.0126 0.0138\n\n-                 -                 -                 0.0165 0.0254 0.0219 0.0286\n( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Rs 10,000 treatment 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.216*** 0.214*** 0.0380 0.0380 0.0576 0.0515 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Rs 20,000 treatment 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.0350 0.0387 0.0534 0.0508 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Rs 40,000 treatment 0.275*** 0.273*** 0.476*** 0.471*** 0.0473 0.0453 0.0691 0.0598 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strata quintuplet dummies No Yes No Yes / Observations 520 520 520 520 _​R_ [2] ​​ 0.102 0.284 _p_ -values for testing Rs 10,000 treatment 20,000 treatment 0.5320 0.5264 0.4993 0.4470 = Rs 10,000 treatment 40,000 treatment 0.0152 0.0086 0.0021 0.0002 = _Notes_ : Robust standard errors in parentheses. Treatment on the treated instruments whether people actually received the offer of this treatment with whether they were assigned to receive this offer.\n_***_ Significant at the 1 percent level.\n_**_ Significant at the 5 percent level.\n_*_ Significant at the 10 percent level.\n\neffect, with a 95 percent confidence interval for the ITT being 6 percent, 4 per(− + cent . We can therefore reject that information and reimbursement alone results in ) more than a tiny fraction of firms formalizing.\nThe Rs 10,000 and Rs 20,000 offers have effects similar to one another we can’t ( reject equality, with 17 to 22 percent of firms registering in response to the offer.\n) Meanwhile, 48 percent of those offered Rs 40,000 registered in response. The effect of the Rs 40,000 treatment differs from either the Rs 10,000 or Rs 20,000 treatment at standard significance levels. Controlling for the strata dummies increases slightly the precision of the estimates and the share of variation in registration explained by the regression, but does not change the magnitude of the coefficients—as one would expect given baseline balance.\nIn August 2009, we followed up with all of the 29 firms in the Rs 40,000 treatment group that were offered the payment but chose not to register. We asked why they had not done so. The firms can be divided into three groups. The ­largest number, 14, said they had started the process of registering, only to learn that because they did not own the land they operated on, they would need to obtain the land owner’s permission to register. In many of these cases, the land was owned by the government or a temple, and owners told us that obtaining formal permission was impossible. With this group we therefore made no further offers, concluding that land issues were the reason for lack of registering. Six of the firms told us they were willing to register at Rs 40,000, but had either needed more time or had not understood the offer. We therefore gave them one more month for the offer at Rs 40,000, during which only one business registered. The final group of 9 firms had not completed the registration process because they felt the benefits did not", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_136_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_ outweigh the costs, even with the Rs 40,000 payment. We told these firms that we had some money left over from the project, and would increase the offer for a final offer of Rs 80,000. Only two of the nine firms registered when given this higher offer. It therefore seems that these remaining informal firms are resolutely informal, with extra time or extra money not getting many more to register.\n\nB. _Which Owners Formalized?_ Table 3 presents the results of probit estimation of the likelihood of registration for each of the three treatment groups given monetary incentives. This allows us to examine which characteristics of firms are correlated with greater demand for formalization. The base specification in column 1 contains dummies for the Rs 20,000 and Rs 40,000 treatment offers, controls for the variables we stratified on, and an indicator of whether the business operates on public land. We see the demand for formalization is higher in Colombo, where the process is easier, although not significantly so at standard levels _p_ 0.108, and is 27 percentage ( = ) points lower for businesses that operate on publicly owned land, an effect that is significant at the 1 percent level. There is no significant difference in demand to formalize by industry, pre-expressed willingness to register, or baseline size in terms of employment or sales, although the standard errors are relatively large for some of these dimensions of heterogeneity.\nThe remaining columns examine alternative explanations that may enter into a firm owner’s decision to formalize. Column 2 tests whether less knowledgeable and less informed owners are more likely to register, perhaps because the information is more useful to them. We see no statistically significant effects, and the point estimate suggests that, if anything, it may be _more_ knowledgeable owners who register when given monetary treatments. Column 3 examines factors associated with the likely future costs of formalizing—these costs are expected to be higher for firms with higher profits that would face more taxes and expect to have more ( ) ­workers and thus face labor taxes . We see a negative and significant associa( ) tion with expecting to grow to 15 or more workers, where the costs of formalizing become greater due to labor regulations. Column 4 looks at the role of risk and time preference factors. We find no significant impact of being a hyperbolic discounter or of individuals saying they are risk seeking. [8] The final column uses business assets at baseline as a proxy for wealth, as a test of liquidity constraints.\nThe coefficient is positive and statistically insignificant, suggesting that it is not the case that poorer firms are more likely to respond to the incentives. Overall we view the results as indicating that most of those becoming formal are informed owners who rationally weigh the costs and benefits of formalizing.\n\n8 Risk preferences are measured on an 11-point scale taken from the German Socioeconomic Survey, which asks “are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try and avoid taking risks.” Hyperbolic discounting is measured by asking firms hypothetical questions about how much they would be prepared to take today compared to Rs 10,000 in one month, and similarly for five months versus six months. Twenty percent of the firms in our sample are classified as hyperbolic.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["the German Socioeconomic Survey"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "German Socioeconomic Survey", "confidence": 0.9715684056282043}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _137_ Table 3—Among Firms Offered Money, Which Ones Formalized?\nMarginal Effects from Probit Estimation of Registration among Sample Offered Rs 10,000, Rs 20,000, or Rs 40,000 Treatments 1 2 3 4 5 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Rs 20,000 treatment 0.0216 0.0240 0.00650 0.0169 0.0490\n\n-           -           -           -           0.0886 0.0892 0.0877 0.0886 0.0937\n( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Rs 40,000 treatment 0.307*** 0.311*** 0.302*** 0.311*** 0.312*** 0.0901 0.0908 0.0917 0.0903 0.0924 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Colombo 0.132 0.0859 0.143* 0.127 0.162* 0.0831 0.0859 0.0833 0.0844 0.0914 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Retail 0.00266 0.0370 0.0204 0.00226 0.0403\n\n-                   0.102 0.105 0.101 0.100 0.100\n( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Manufacturing 0.0361 0.0241 0.0296 0.0294 0.105\n\n-           -           -           -           0.0813 0.0822 0.0816 0.0819 0.0844\n( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) More than two paid workers 0.0515 0.0867 0.0744 0.0694 0.0112 0.0795 0.0804 0.0805 0.0808 0.0859 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Says would register and sees benefit to 0.0377 0.0609 0.0444 0.0450 0.0434 doing so 0.0769 0.0779 0.0775 0.0766 0.0794 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) log monthly sales in December 2008 0.0259 0.0255 0.00358 0.288 0.0377\n\n-           -           -           0.0421 0.0417 0.0531 0.0415 0.0462\n( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Operate on publicly owned premises 0.269*** 0.278*** 0.265*** 0.270*** 0.234***\n\n-           -           -           -           0.0744 0.0716 0.0754 0.0737 0.0849\n( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Education of owner years 0.0126 ( ) 0.0132 ( ) Digitspan recall of owner 0.0388 0.0303 ( ) Owner knows cost of registering 0.118 0.0792 ( ) Expects to have 15 or more employees 0.156** 0.0748 ( ) Profits in December 2008 exceed 0.0805 income tax threshold 0.0993 ( ) Hyperbolic discounter 0.0422 0.0952 ( ) Risk seeker 0.0284 0.0185 ( ) log business assets in December 2008 0.0499 0.0305 ( ) Observations 181 181 181 181 163 _Note:_ Robust standard errors in parentheses.\n_***_ Significant at the 1 percent level.\n_**_ Significant at the 5 percent level.\n_*_ Significant at the 10 percent level.\n\nC. _A Demand Curve for Formalizing_ With a few more assumptions, we can back out a firm’s demand curve for formalization. The main private costs to a firm of formalizing are the upfront registration cost of Rs 1,000 and annual income taxes paid on firm profits. [9] Assuming that firms 9 In addition, firms also face time costs of registering that we do not include here given uncertainty about what these costs would be for the firms who do not register and the costs involved in fulfilling other requirements needed to register such as moving to new premises if they are located on publicly owned land .\n( )", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_138_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_ 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 Presented discounted cost of formalizing over 10 years Density Take-up of formalization offer Figure 3. Demand Curve for Formalizing _Notes:_ Density shows a histogram indicating the underlying distribution of the data. Take-up line is a lowess line of take-up of the formalization offer fitted against the estimated net cost of formalizing. This net cost includes the registration cost and the present discounted value of tax payments over 10 years, assuming a 5 percent discount rate, and 10 percent per year profits growth less the value of any incentive payments offered as a treatment in our experiment.\n\nwould report the same amount of profit income to the tax authorities as they report to us, nominal profits grow at 10 percent per year, and firms discount the future at a 5 percent discount rate, we calculate the net present value of 10 years of tax payments. Twenty percent of firms would pay no taxes, 35 percent would pay less over 10 years than our Rs 10,000 treatment, and 48 percent less than our Rs 40,000 treatment. Figure 3 then plots a lowess line of fitted take-up of formalization during our offer period against the net cost of formalizing. The demand curve slopes down, with a relatively steep slope when net costs are negative, and a much flatter slope when net costs are positive. The demand curve can then be viewed as an approximation of the proportion of firms who believe the benefits of ­registering exceed these costs at each net cost. Given the assumptions required to obtain this curve, we view this as mainly illustrative, but it does suggest that most firms do not view the benefits as exceeding the costs.\nIn sum, we interpret the evidence on registration as providing support for the exit view of informality supported by Levy and others over the exclusion view of de Soto. The fact that there is no effect of providing information and reimbursement of direct costs, even in Colombo, where the registration process is very streamlined, suggests that most informality in this environment is not driven by costs of registering a firm. A demand curve that falls very steeply around the zero net cost point also suggests that few firms perceive large positive benefits of being formal. However, we do find support for the de Soto view in a minority of firms that face legal barriers", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _139_ to registration because, for example, they operate on public property. These firms may be thought of as excluded from the formal sector in the de Soto sense.\n\n**IV. What Are the Consequences of Formalizing?**\n\nWe carried out three follow-up surveys to measure the impact of formalizing on firms Figure 2 . The first follow-up was in August 2010, corresponding to a period ( ) of between 12 and 18 months after firms were induced to register. We were able to reinterview 465 of the original 520 firms 89 percent, with the most common ( ) reasons for attrition being not being able to find the owner 20 out of the 55 cases, ( ) the owner being abroad 9 out of 55 cases, and firm owners refusing to be reinter( ) viewed 9 out of 55 cases . We cannot reject the null hypothesis that attrition is unre( ) lated to treatment status at conventional significance levels _p_ 0.17 . The second ( = ) follow-up survey was conducted in March 2011, at a period averaging 22 months after the start of the intervention. We reached 445 firms in this round, with attrition again unrelated to treatment status _p_ 0.35 . The final follow-up survey was ( = ) conducted in December 2011, an average of 31 months after treatment. In this last survey, 424 firms were interviewed with attrition again unrelated to treatment status _p_ 0.40 . In addition, proxy reports were used to determine whether the business ( = ) was still open for a further 59 firms. The remaining 37 firm owners were unable to be located, largely due to their having moved out of the study areas.\nThe follow-up surveys collected data on both the intermediate channels through which formalization is often hypothesized to increase profitability, as well as firm profits, sales, capital stock, and employment. Our key outcome of profitability is measured via a direct question, following years of study of how to collect profits from firms in Sri Lanka summarized in de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2009 . [10] ( ) Table 4 examines whether any of the treatments is significantly associated with firm survival in the fourth round survey, or with reporting profits in any survey round. It does this by estimating equation 1 with survival or reporting profits as ( ) the dependent variable. In all cases, we find no significant relationship between treatment and the likelihood of survival or reporting profits in our follow-up surveys. Moreover, online Appendix Table 2 shows that treatment does not appear to be associated with which firms survive. The online Appendix reports the same characteristics as in Table 1, and shows balance on baseline characteristics for the firms surviving to the final survey. As a result we ignore attrition in what follows.\n\nA. _What Do Firms Say the Consequences of Formalizing Are?_ The August 2010 survey asked the firms that formalized as a result of our intervention how they had benefited from being formal. The most common response, 10 A potential concern one might have is whether firms directly count the cash given to them as “profits.” Our measure of profits is based on total income earned in the past month after paying all expenses. This does not include cash on hand or money in a bank account and, since our direct question asks about the last month, would not include any money the firm earned as a windfall payment from registering. Moreover, the fact that the treatment impact on profits does not change significantly over the three follow-up rounds also helps rule out a temporary blip due to firm owners counting the treatment amount as profits in the first follow-up wave.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "follow-up surveys", "confidence": 0.2597561478614807}, {"text": "proxy reports", "confidence": 0.21218976378440857}]}}}
{"input": "_140_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_ Table 4—Does Treatment Status Predict Survival or Reporting Profits in Survey?\n\nIn business at R4 1 ( ) Report profits in R2 2 ( ) Report profits in R3 3 ( ) Report profits in R4 4 ( ) Information and reimbursement treatment 0.000653 0.0556 0.0266 0.0531 0.0408 0.0569 0.0543 0.0618 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Rs 10,000 treatment 0.00231 0.00747 0.0600 0.0719\n\n-                       0.0428 0.0567 0.0592 0.0682\n( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Rs 20,000 treatment 0.0203 0.0190 0.0667 0.0571 0.0399 0.0559 0.0517 0.0632 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Rs 40,000 treatment 0.00114 0.0425 0.0462 0.0140\n\n-                       0.0428 0.0572 0.0591 0.0649\n( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Observations 483 520 520 520 _F_ -test _p_ -value that jointly zero 0.9849 0.8262 0.1049 0.2751 _Notes_ : All regressions include controls for randomization strata. Robust standard errors in parentheses.\n_***_ Significant at the 1 percent level.\n_**_ Significant at the 5 percent level.\n_*_ Significant at the 10 percent level.\n\ngiven by 36 percent of firms, was that they had yet to see any benefit from registering. The next most common response, given by 20 percent of firms, was an answer related to improvements in the image of the business. This encompasses answers like “it is good publicity,” “customers trust the business more,” and “social validity.” Other common responses refer to feeling more secure and protected 12 percent ( ) and to being able to use the registration to help obtain business loans 10 percent .\n( ) Very few firms claimed to have obtained a loan or to have received a government contract as a result of formalizing.\n\nB. _Econometric Estimation of the Consequences of Formalizing_ We use the follow-up data to estimate the impact of formalizing on firm outcomes, intermediate channels, and attitudes of firm owners. For outcome _Y_ and firm _i_ in randomization strata _s_, we estimate 2 _Yi_, _t​_ _i_, _s​_ _Forma​li​_ _Yi_,0​ **​** ( ) ​ ​ = ​α​ + β ​ + γ​ ​ + ​\n## Σ\n\n**​** _t​_ _i_, _t​_,\n\n​ ​δ​ + ​ε​ where ​ _i_, _s​_ are randomization strata fixed effects; ​ _Yi_,0​ is the baseline value of the α​ ​ dependent variable; and ​ _t​_ are survey wave effects. Our main object of interest is δ​ in estimating, the causal impact of becoming formal defined in terms of being β ( registered with the DS on the outcome of interest.\n) A key concern given our limited take-up of the formalization treatments is whether we have the power to detect impacts of formalizing, especially on outcomes like sales and profits, which are relatively noisy. We employ several methods to try and maximize power. First, we use stratified randomization and include randomization strata dummies to boost power relative to a pure random draw. Second, the ANCOVA specification we employ, which includes the lagged dependent variable as a regressor, increases power relative to difference-in-differences or analysis using only the follow-up data, and helps control for any selective attrition based", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "follow-up data", "confidence": 0.10799653828144073}], "vague_data": [{"text": "follow-up data", "confidence": 0.7126882076263428}, {"text": "survey wave effects", "confidence": 0.11841928213834763}]}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _141_ on the outcome of interest. [11] Third, we pool together all rounds of follow-up data McKenzie 2012 . Online Appendix Table 3 shows we cannot reject equality of ( ) impacts on profits across our three follow-up rounds _p_ 0.90 . Fourth, for the ( - ) key outcomes of firm profits and firm sales, the March and December 2011 survey asked for data on each of the past three months. We then run the specification in 2 ( ) with seven months of observations per firm for these outcomes. Finally, to counter the possibility that low power is driven by a few outliers, we also consider truncated profits and sales as outcomes.\nStandard errors are clustered at the firm level. We instrument for formalization with three variables indicating assignment to the Rs 10,000, Rs 20,000, and Rs 40,000 treatments, respectively. Since information and reimbursement only did not lead to changes in registration, this treatment does not serve as an instrument, and we drop this group from this part of the analysis.\nThe treatments are valid instruments for being formal under the assumption that they affect the outcomes of interest only through changing registration status, and not through any other channel. An obvious concern with this assumption is that the grants given to the firm owner may have had independent impacts on the business through alleviating credit constraints. If such impacts are positive, using the ­treatment assignment as an instrument will overstate the gains to formalizing, providing us with an upper bound of the consequences of formalizing.\nAn alternative approach is to control for capital stock in regression 2, and thereby ( ) attempt to identify the impact of formalizing through channels other than changing capital stock. We use log capital stock as the control, given the skewness of this variable. This will net out any impact of the grants on capital stock. But the inclusion of capital stock as a control also removes the effect of changes in capital stock that come from formalizing. If formalizing increases access to credit, for example, firms might invest more. This specification should therefore serve as a lower bound for the impact of formalizing. For this approach to be valid, we have to assume that the cash grant affects profits directly only through investments in capital, [12] and then make what Imai et al. 2011 refer to as a sequential ignorability assumption. In our ( ) context, this amounts to assuming that—conditional on treatment assignment, the lagged dependent variable, and the strata randomization controls—capital stock is independent of the outcome of interest. Given the rich set of controls used here, this appears reasonable.\n\nC. _Impact on Major Firm Outcomes_ Table 5A presents the results of estimating equation 2 for the key outcomes ( ) of firm profits, sales, employment, and capital stock. Consider first the impact on firm profits. Column 1 shows an upper bound estimate of a Rs 13,706 increase in monthly profits from formalizing, which is large relative to the mean profits in the 11 Recall that we can not reject that attrition is unrelated to treatment status.\n12 Our measure of capital stock includes inventories and raw materials. Given that few firms hire workers, and that firms do not hire consultants or pay for skills training, investments in capital seems the most likely channel for cash to directly influence profits.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "March and December 2011 survey", "confidence": 0.7329154014587402}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "follow-up data McKenzie 2012", "confidence": 0.28628650307655334}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_142_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_ Table 5A—Effect of Formalizing on Firm Outcomes Truncated profits Log Monthly Truncated 95th profits sales sales 99th ( ) ( ) Monthly profits Truncated profits 99th ( ) _Full effect_ _upper bound_ ( ) Registered with the DS 13,706* 10,834 5,923 0.357* 122,295 99,073 8,241 6,847 4,774 0.202 85,196 72,440 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) _Effect after controlling for log capital stock_ _lower bound_ ( ) Registered with the DS 8,996 7,054 2,544 0.168 61,868 44,438 8,074 6,474 4,462 0.187 85,602 71,944 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Observations 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,123 2,139 2,139 Mean for control group in sample 30,537 28,662 25,048 9.87 237,185 211,399 Recruited a new worker Log capital stock Log sales Number of paid workers _Full effect_ _upper bound_ ( ) Registered with the DS 0.460 0.525 0.102 0.396 0.319 0.426 0.0902 0.258 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) _Effect after controlling for log capital stock_ _lower bound_ ( ) Registered with the DS 0.174 0.431 0.106 N A / 0.298 0.437 0.0925 ( ) ( ) ( ) Observations 2,088 1,017 1,017 1,009 Mean for control group in sample 11.42 2.35 0.36 12.278 _Notes:_ Registration with the DS instrumented with offer of the Rs 10,000, Rs 20,000, or Rs 40,000 registration treatments. Information only treatment group excluded from these regressions. All regressions include controls for randomization strata and for the baseline value of the dependent variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.\n_***_ Significant at the 1 percent level.\n_**_ Significant at the 5 percent level.\n_*_ Significant at the 10 percent level.\n\ncontrol group of Rs 30,537, and significant at the 10 percent level. The lower bound estimate, controlling for capital stock, is one-third smaller 8,996, and not signifi( ) cant at standard levels _p_ 0.265 . These point estimates are sizable relative to both ( = ) the upfront costs of registering Rs 1,000 and the annual income taxes for a typical ( ) firm of this level Rs 3,000 . They are also sizable relative to the incentives provided ( ) to register. Columns 2 and 3 show the results of truncating profits at the ninety-ninth and ninety-fifth percentiles, respectively. The latter more than halves the point estimate of the impact on profits. In contrast, log profits are also significant column 4 .\n( ) Columns 5–7 show large positive coefficients for sales, which are not statistically significant in levels, and which halve when we control for capital stock. The remaining columns show positive, but insignificant, impacts on ­employment and capital stock. It should be noted that the standard errors on the sales, employment, and capital stocks imply that we only have power to rule out very large improvements or ( declines from formalization. For example, the 95 percent confidence interval for ) the impact on profits truncated at the ninety-fifth percentile level after controlling for capital stock is 6,201, 11,289, which encompasses a 24.7 percent decline (− + ) and a 45.0 percent increase in profits.\nTo see where this statistically significant increase in profits is coming from, Figure 4 plots the cumulative distribution function of profits in our final round", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _143_ 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 Real monthly profits LKR ( ) Control Assigned to treat in 10, 20, or 40K Figure 4. Distribution of Final Round Real Profits by Treatment Status ­survey for the combined monetary treatment groups and for the control group.\nThe distributions are extremely similar to one another right up until the very top tail, where they diverge. The significant mean effect is thus being driven by this handful of firms which formalized and experienced large increases in profits, whereas for most of the distribution the treatment does not influence profits.\nAn obvious question is whether these large profits in the upper tail represent genuine changes or measurement error and or idiosyncratic shocks for a few firms.\n/ To address this question, in June 2011 we conducted open-ended discussions with a set of firms experiencing large increases in profits after registering. We wanted to see whether they had taken specific actions following registration and whether they appeared to benefit from doing so. Although small in number, these more detailed case studies provide support for the idea that a few firms did benefit substantially from formalizing. For example, two of the firms were in the vehicle repair business—one automobiles and one autorickshaws. Both said that an important consequence of registration was the ability to become an official parts distributor for an auto parts manufacturer. Previously, they had purchased parts from another dealer, i.e., at higher than the wholesale price. Both had also undertaken expansions of the physical facilities, with one adding an auto lift and a customer waiting room, while increasing employment from two to eight workers. A saw mill that registered said the key was to be able to put the forest service stamp on the receipts he issued. The stamp allows customers to transport the wood across municipal boundaries without obtaining further permissions. His estimate was that he had previously lost 25 percent of sales to other mills that could provide this stamp. Finally, a grocery store and tea snack shop had used the license to obtain a loan to purchase a delivery truck.\n( ) The truck was used in the business, but also leased out. On his own, the owner had gone to the health department to request a health inspection for his tea shop. He was intent on obtaining a health sticker he could display, which would allow him to open", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_144_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_ a bakery. A final case was of a fish market vendor, who had used the Rs 40,000 grant to buy a freezer which he used to increase his stock. The owner also used his registration to print a receipt book to give receipts to restaurants.\nIn all these cases, there were clear changes in the business operation, and in the attitude and vision of the owners. Given the small number of cases we are examining, it is possible that these tail events are just the result of luck, which owners ­ex post attribute instead to formalizing. We therefore view this as only suggestive, but do at least believe this growth at the top tail of the distribution is genuine and not measurement error. But such firms were rare. Most firms that had formalized saw no such improvements.\n\nD. _Impact on Mediating Channels_ The above analysis suggests that formalization has not had significant impacts on key outcomes for most firms that formalized, but that it has helped a handful of firms grow substantially. Our follow-up surveys span a period of 15 to 31 months after treatment. This should be a sufficient period to detect effects for most firms.\nNevertheless, one concern is that the standard errors in Table 5A are relatively large, reflecting relatively low power to detect effects. The CDF in Figure 4 is comforting in this regard, as it shows strikingly similar distributions of profits for treatment and control for most of the distribution. However, a further approach to determining whether formalization benefits firms is to look for evidence on the mediating channels through which advocates claim formalization works. Impacts through these intermediate channels may materialize more quickly. The intermediate channels also suffer from less variation, enabling more precision.\nTable 5B presents the impact of formalizing on channels through which formalization might be expected to influence firm outcomes. The assumption that the grants do not independently affect these channels is more plausible here than for profits or capital stock, and consistent with this, we find that the upper and lower bounds are quite close to one another. We therefore just present the upper bound estimates, which do not control for capital stock.\nThe results show little evidence that formalizing has impacts on the main channels through which formalization is often hypothesized to work. We find no significant effect on relationships with the financial sector applying for business or personal ( loans or having a business bank account, or on relationships with the government ) having an electricity connection in the business name, applying for a government ( contract, making sales to the government, or participating in any government SME program . Moreover, the point estimates on most of these variables are close to zero, ) with relatively small confidence intervals in most cases. The point estimates also suggest businesses are not any more likely to pay taxes, and the point estimate is actually negative on the amount of taxes paid. We do not find any evidence that businesses change location after formalizing.\nThe only intermediate channels that show significant impacts are the use of receipt books _p_ 0.007 and an increase in advertising _p_ 0.003 . Both out( = ) ( = ) comes retain significance at standard levels, even if we conservatively control for multiple hypothesis testing of 14 intermediate channels by multiplying each by 14 to", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "CDF", "confidence": 0.12627261877059937}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "follow-up surveys", "confidence": 0.27475205063819885}], "vague_data": [{"text": "follow-up surveys", "confidence": 0.46986833214759827}]}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _145_ Table 5B—Effect of Formalizing on Different Channels Has receipt book Business bank a c.\n/ Applied for business loan Applied for personal loan Paid taxes Amount of taxes Formal paid accounting Registered with the 0.0643 8,865 0.103 0.352** 0.0239 0.00421 0.0451\n\n-       -       -       -       DS 0.142 6,670 0.0763 0.130 0.0812 0.0770 0.0690\n( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Lag included No No Yes No Yes No No Observations 1,036 1,036 1,016 1,049 1,059 1,059 724 Survey rounds R2, R3, R4 R2, R3, R4 R1–R4 R2, R3, R4 R1–R4 R2, R3, R4 R2, R3 question asked Mean for control 0.66 6,800 0.141 0.31 0.14 0.10 0.056 group in sample Share of sales made to government % ( ) Electric connection in bus.\nname Applied for govt.\ncontract Advertised in last six months Participate in govt.\nSME program Business has clear and visible Changed sign location Registered with the 3.543 0.152 0.000453 0.0535 0.261*** 0.0895 0.0504\n\n-          -          DS 2.285 0.116 0.0540 0.0449 0.0892 0.130 0.0870\n( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Lag included No No No No Yes Yes No Observations 1,020 724 724 724 1,036 1,030 1,016 Survey rounds R2, R3, R4 R2, R3 R2, R3 R2, R3 R1–R4 R1–R4 R2, R3, R4 question asked Mean for control 0.96 0.40 0.022 0.033 0.16 0.56 0.18 group in sample _Notes:_ Registration with the DS instrumented with offer of the Rs 10,000, Rs 20,000, or Rs 40,000 registration treatments. Information only treatment group excluded from these regressions. All regressions include controls for randomization strata, and for the lagged dependent variable if it is collected. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.\n_***_ Significant at the 1 percent level.\n_**_ Significant at the 5 percent level.\n_*_ Significant at the 10 percent level.\n\nobtain Bonferroni _p_ -values. This is consistent with the nonexperimental evidence in McKenzie and Sakho 2010 who suggest the main effect of formalizing in Bolivia ( ) is to expand sales through increasing the use of receipts. However, the evidence from Figure 4 and Table 5A suggests that for most firms this channel has not yet resulted in significantly higher profitability.\n\nE. _Impacts on Attitudes_ The tea shop owner who contacted the health department about an inspection raises the question of whether formalization may have changed attitudes about the government and market regulations more generally. Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky 2007 study formalization in a different domain—formal titles ( ) among land squatters—and find very large effects of obtaining formal property title on beliefs that favor the workings of the market. Motivated partly by this, in the first follow-up survey we asked a number of questions on trust and attitudes that enable us to examine the impact of formalizing on the attitudes that firm owners have toward government, the courts and police, and taxation.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_146_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_ Table 5C—Effect of Formalizing on Attitudes in August 2010 Follow-up Survey Trust in provincial government Trust in municipal government Trust in national government Trust in the courts Trust in the police Confident in police & courts to settle bus.\ndispute Registered with the DS 0.634*** 0.559** 0.227 0.0387 0.0993 0.0267\n\n-                     0.234 0.234 0.221 0.188 0.238 0.203\n( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Lag included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Observations 369 369 369 369 369 369 Mean for control group 0.360 0.310 0.620 0.811 0.567 0.744 Agrees being good citizen means paying taxes Thinks govt.\ncharges business too much tax Feels govt.\nspends revenue on important items Registered with the DS 0.511** 0.517** 0.0410 0.188 0.238 0.232 ( ) ( ) ( ) Lag included No No No Observations 369 369 369 Mean for control group 0.767 0.444 0.378 _Notes:_ Registration with the DS instrumented with offer of the Rs 10,000, Rs 20,000, or Rs 40,000 registration treatments. Information only treatment group excluded from these regressions. All regressions include controls for randomization strata, and for the lagged dependent variable if it was collected. Robust standard errors in parentheses.\n_***_ Significant at the 1 percent level.\n_**_ Significant at the 5 percent level.\n_*_ Significant at the 10 percent level.\n\nTable 5C shows the results. We find very strong positive effects of formalizing on trust in the provincial government and trust in the municipal government, the two levels of government that business owners interact with during the registration process.\nThe _p_ -value on trust in the provincial government is 0.007, so it remains significant even after controlling for multiple hypothesis testing over the nine outcomes in the table. In contrast, we find no significant impact on trust in the national government, trust in the courts, or trust in the police, and formalizing does not make firms any more likely to be confident in the police and courts to resolve business disputes.\nOne interpretation of the increase in trust is that those firms that formalized had to deal with the DS and municipal governments in the registration process, and may have been surprised to find the process less burdensome and less subject to bribes than they had imagined. That is, the _process_ of formalizing might be the lever for attitude change, by demonstrating that these levels of government can be trusted. An alternative potential explanation is that the change in attitudes is a consequence of being formalized. That is, if firm owners no longer worry about the provincial and municipal governments shutting them down for lack of compliance, they may be more trusting of these levels of government.\nWe also see formalizing leads to changes in attitudes toward taxes. Firms that formalize are much more likely to agree that part of being a good citizen means paying taxes. However, they are no more likely to think the government spends its revenue on items important to these firm owners, and also significantly more likely to agree that the government charges businesses too much in terms of taxes. Recall", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "August 2010 Follow-up Survey", "confidence": 0.5663979649543762}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _147_ that actual taxes are quite low for most businesses in this sample, so this perception contrasts with the reality facing most firms.\n\n**V. Discussion and External Validity**\n\nOur baseline sample was a random sample of informal firms in the two largest cities in Sri Lanka. As with all microeconomic studies, there is a question of external validity. We present evidence here to suggest that our results from Sri Lanka are likely informative of constraints to formalizing firms in other countries.\nFirst, we note that the pattern of informality with regard to firm size, and what firms say are the potential advantages and disadvantages of formalizing are similar to those we see in other countries for which data exist. Online Appendix Figure 1 compares municipal government and tax authority registration rates by firm size in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Mexico. In all three countries, the data are representative of firms in the largest urban areas. [13] Sri Lanka has tax registration rates that lie between those in Mexico and Bangladesh. The figure shows that in these other countries, registration also typically occurs over the size range considered in our study—not with the smallest microenterprises.\nThe Bangladesh survey asked firm owners what they saw as the main advantages of being formal. Owners give responses that are similar to those in the Sri Lanka survey: links to bank financing, better reputation for the business, a lower chance of being fined, and the ability to operate visibly at a large scale without fear of being caught. Smaller and more informal firms in Bangladesh are more likely to say they see no potential benefits and all firms say the main disadvantages were paying taxes and having to deal with the cost and process of registering McKenzie 2010 . These ( ) same channels also appear in discussions of the costs and benefits of formalizing in different Latin American countries Perry et al. 2007; World Bank 2009 .\n( ) As a result, it seems reasonable to believe that our results are informative outside Sri Lanka about the number of firms at the margin that will be induced to formalize by relatively small changes in the costs and benefits, and also about the characteristics of those firms. Our results suggest that taking the costs of registering from the levels in Sri Lanka to zero induces few firms to formalize. However, increasing the benefits further in our case by paying firms induces more firms to formalize. This is consis( ) tent with recent cross-country panel data, in which Klapper and Love 2010 find that ( ) only changes in business environment reforms, which involve more than a 40 percent reduction in costs, are associated with changes in firm entry. [14] 13 The Sri Lankan data come from the Sri Lankan Longitudinal Survey of Entrepreneurs, which draws a random sample of 2,255 firms from household listings in 31 cities outside the northern province. In Mexico, the data are from the 2002 version of the National Microenterprise survey, conducted in urban areas with a sample drawn from a household-based nationally representative labor survey. The Bangladesh survey data come from a census of 55,817 firms in randomly selected sampling areas from 19 districts conducted by the World Bank in 2009–2010.\n14 Our results are also consistent with evidence from an unpublished parallel experiment in Lima, Peru, which randomly encouraged firms to obtain a municipal license Jaramillo 2009; Alcázar, Adrade, and Jaramillo 2010 .\n( ) About one-quarter of firms offered information and reimbursement of direct costs obtained the municipal license.\nOne-third of those who didn’t register reported problems with other regulations, such as zoning, consistent with our finding that land issues prevent many firms from registering. A follow-up survey 18 months after baseline failed to find any significant impact of registration obtaining the municipal license on firm size, access to credit, or profitability, but their power to detect an effect is low. Moreover, since banks and the government typically require a tax", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Sri Lankan Longitudinal Survey of Entrepreneurs", "the National Microenterprise survey"], "descriptive_data": ["a household-based nationally representative labor survey"], "vague_data": ["recent cross-country panel data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Sri Lankan Longitudinal Survey of Entrepreneurs", "confidence": 0.7827085852622986}, {"text": "National Microenterprise survey", "confidence": 0.46744489669799805}, {"text": "Bangladesh survey", "confidence": 0.4257429838180542}, {"text": "Sri Lanka survey", "confidence": 0.1450846791267395}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household-based nationally representative labor survey", "confidence": 0.41772016882896423}, {"text": "census of 55,817 firms", "confidence": 0.17254304885864258}, {"text": "cross-country panel data", "confidence": 0.13674567639827728}], "vague_data": [{"text": "cross-country panel data", "confidence": 0.5502405166625977}]}}}
{"input": "_148_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_\n\n**VI. Conclusions**\n\nPrior to the intervention, owners of unregistered firms were either ignorant of, or vastly overestimated the costs of registration. We might therefore have expected that simply informing firms about the costs of registration would be sufficient to induce registration. Such a finding would have been consistent with the view, often attributed to de Soto, of informal firms being excluded from the formal sector by the perception, if not the reality, of high entry barriers. But in fact we find that information and reimbursement for the modest direct costs do not result in any increase in registration. Instead, registration is spurred only when the information is combined with incentive payments.\nThe incentive required to induce registration is modest compared to reported profit levels of the sample enterprises. A payment of two month’s profit is sufficient to induce half of the firms to register. The willingness of firms to register for a modest payment suggests that they perceive modest costs but even more modest benefits from being formal. The relatively high rates of registration induced by these payments are consistent with firms taking a rational cost-benefit approach to the decision to formalize, as suggested by Levy 2008 . Among those not registering after receiving ( ) an offer of this magnitude, more than half took some steps toward registering. They stopped only when learning that issues of land ownership would prevent them from registering without paying significant fees to landlords, temples, or the government.\nThus, in the absence of land issues, the net costs of formality appear to be modest for almost all of the informal firms represented by our sample—though the minority of firms affected by land issues may be seen as excluded from the formal sector.\nThe net benefit of formality also appears modest for most firms. While we do find an increase in profits after formalization, the mean treatment effect seems to be driven by a successful upper tail. Firms that formalize begin advertising and using receipt books more often, but don’t appear to get the more touted benefits of formalizing, such as increased access to credit, obtaining government contracts, or participating in government programs. Most firms seem therefore to be rationally refraining from formalizing, while a few seem to be suboptimally informal.\nThis finding is important for two reasons. First, while governments clearly should not mimic our experiment with a policy of direct payments, the results do suggest that modest increases in the perceived benefits of being formal could be expected to dramatically increase the demand to formalize among firms currently operating informally. Whether tax collections increase enough to pay for these increased benefits or, alternatively to pay for increased enforcement efforts is beyond the scope ( ) of this paper. Our data do suggest, though, that given the current tax code, the additional tax collections would not be large among this sample of firms. This, combined with the fact that the spillovers to growth are modest, suggests that near-term gains to the government of increased formality are limited. Second, despite the pervasive interest of governments around the world in trying to increase the size of their formal sector, our results overall suggest little in the way of pent-up demand to become license rather than municipal license as proof of formality in many countries, there may be less ex ante reason to expect a positive impact on firms of municipal registration.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_Vol. 5 No. 2\b_ _de Mel et al.: Demand for and Consequences of Formalizing_ _149_ formal among existing firms. Nevertheless, our results do show an increase in trust in the government as a result of formalizing. It is possible that formalizing a large number of firms would offer broader benefits to society in terms of trust.\nFinally, it should be noted that our study measures the benefits of formalizing for firms already in business. There may well be benefits from the simplification of registration at the extensive margin, if high-ability entrepreneurs not currently operating a business are induced to enter. Measuring such impact remains a key area for future research.\n\nReferences\n\n**Alcázar, Lorena, Raúl Andrade, and Miguel Jaramillo.** 2010. “Panel Tracer Study on the Impact of\n/ Business Facilitation Processes on Enterprises and Identification of Priorities for Future Business Enabling Environment Projects in Lima, Peru–Report 5: Impact Evaluation after the Third Round.” Unpublished.\n**Bertrand, Marianne, and Francis Kramarz.** 2002. “Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation?\n\n­Evidence from the French Retail Industry.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 117 4 : 1369–1413.\n( )\n**Bruhn, Miriam.** 2011. “License to Sell: The Effect of Business Registration Reform on Entrepreneurial Activity in Mexico.” _Review of Economics and Statistics_ 93 1 : 382–86.\n( )\n**Bruhn, Miriam, and David McKenzie.** 2009. “In Pursuit of Balance: Randomization in Practice in\nDevelopment Field Experiments.” _American Economic Journal: Applied Economics_ 1 4 : 200–232.\n( )\n**de Mel, Suresh, David J. McKenzie, and Christopher Woodruff.** 2009. “Measuring Microenterprise\nProfits: Must We Ask How the Sausage Is Made?” _Journal of Development Economics_ 88 1 : ( ) 19–31.\n**de Mel, Suresh, David J. McKenzie, and Christopher Woodruff.** 2012. “Sri Lanka–Formalization\nExperiment Data 2008–2011.” World Bank Microdata Catalog. LKA_2008_SLFED_v01_M.\n[http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1063](http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1063) accessed February 11, 2013 .\n( )\n**de Mel, Suresh, David McKenzie, and Christopher Woodruff.** 2013. “The Demand for, and Consequences of, Formalization among Informal Firms in Sri Lanka: Dataset.” _American Economic Jour-_\n_nal: Applied Economics_ [. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.5.2.122.](http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.5.2.122)\n**De Soto, Hernando.** 1989. _The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism_ . New York: Harper and\nRow Publishers.\n**Di Tella, Rafael, Sebastian Galiani, and Ernesto Schargrodsky.** 2007. “The Formation of Beliefs: Evidence from the Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 122 1 :\n( ) 209–41.\n**Djankov, Simeon.** 2002. “The Regulation of Entry.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 117 1 : 1–37.\n( )\n**Fajnzylber, Pablo, William F. Maloney, and Gabriel V. Montes-Rojas.** 2011. “Does Formality Improve\nMicro-firm Performance? Evidence from the Brazilian SIMPLES Program.” _Journal of Develop-_ _ment Economics_ 94 2 : 262–76.\n( )\n**Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Peter J. Klenow.** 2009. “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and\nIndia.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 124 4 : 1403–48.\n( )\n**Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele, Dustin Tingley, and Teppei Yamamoto.** 2011. “Unpacking the Black Box\nof Causality: Learning about Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and Observational Studies.” _American Political Science Review_ 105 4 : 765–89.\n( )\n**International Finance Corporation.** 2009. _Doing Business 2010: Reforming through Difficult Times_ .\nInternational Finance Corporation IFC . Washington, DC, September.\n( )\n**Jaramillo, Miguel.** 2009. “Is There Demand for Formality among Informal Firms? Evidence from\nMicrofirms in Downtown Lima.” German Development Institute Discussion Paper 12 2009.\n/\n**Kaplan, David S., Eduardo Piedra, and Enrique Seira.** 2011. “Entry Regulation and Business StartUps: Evidence from Mexico.” _Journal of Public Economics_ 95 11–12 : 1501–15.\n( )\n**Klapper, Leora, Luc Laeven, and Raghuram Rajan.** 2006. “Entry Regulation as a Barrier to Entrepreneurship.” _Journal of Financial Economics_ 82 3 : 591–629.\n( )\n**Klapper, Leora, and Inessa Love.** 2010. “The Impact of Business Environment Reforms on New Firm\nRegistration.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5493.\n**Levy, Santiago.** 2008. _Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes: Social Policy, Informality and Economic_\n_Growth in Mexico_ . Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Sri Lanka–Formalization Experiment Data 2008–2011", "Sri Lanka–Formalization Experiment Data 2008–2011"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Sri Lanka–Formalization\nExperiment Data", "confidence": 0.4282800257205963}, {"text": "World Bank Microdata Catalog", "confidence": 0.25656670331954956}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_150_ _American Economic Journal: applied economics\b_ _april 2013_\n\n**Maloney, William F.** 2004. “Informality Revisited.” _World Development_ 32 7 : 1159–78.\n( )\n**McKenzie, David.** 2010. “Dimensions of Informality in Bangladesh.” Unpublished.\n**McKenzie, David.** 2012. “Beyond Baseline and Follow-up: The Case for More T in Experiments.”\n_Journal of Development Economics_ 99 2 : 210–21.\n( )\n**McKenzie, David, and Yaye Seynabou Sakho.** 2010. “Does It Pay Firms to Register for Taxes? The\nImpact of Formality on Firm Profitability.” _Journal of Development Economics_ 91 1 : 15–24.\n( )\n**McKenzie, David, and Christopher Woodruff.** 2012. “What are we learning from business training and\n[entrepreneurship evaluations around the developing world?” http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/papers/](http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/papers/working/358.pdf)\n[working/358.pdf.](http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/papers/working/358.pdf)\n**Monteiro, Joana and Juliano Assunção.** 2012. “Coming Out of the Shadows? Estimating the Impact\nof Bureaucracy Simplification and Tax Cut on Formality in Brazilian Microenterprises.” _Journal of_ _Development Economics_ 99 1 : 105–15.\n( )\n**Perry, Guillermo E., William F. Maloney, Omar S. Arias, Pablo Fajnzylber, Andrew D. Mason, and**\n**Jaime Saavedra-Chanduvi.** 2007. _Informality: Exit and Exclusion_ . Washington, DC: World Bank.\n**World Bank.** 2009. _Increasing Formality and Productivity of Bolivian Firms_ . World Bank. Washington DC, July.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**This article has been cited by:**\n\n1. Miriam Bruhn, David McKenzie. 2013. Using administrative data to evaluate municipal reforms:\nan evaluation of the impact of Minas Fácil Expresso. _Journal of Development Effectiveness_ **5** :3,\n[319-338. [CrossRef]](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19439342.2013.813959)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["administrative data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "administrative data", "confidence": 0.9656977653503418}]}}}
{"input": "World Development Vol. 34, No. 7, pp. 1287–1300, 2006\n\n- 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved\n0305-750X/$ - see front matter www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.12.004\n\n# The Role of Opinion Leaders in the Diffusion of New Knowledge: The Case of Integrated Pest Management\n\nGERSHON FEDER and SARA SAVASTANO [*] Development Research Group, The World Bank, USA Summary. — The paper reviews the literature on the characteristics and impact of opinion leaders on the diffusion of new knowledge, concluding that there is no clear evidence on whether opinion leaders are more effective if they are similar in socio-economic attributes to the other farmers rather than superior to would-be followers. A multivariate analysis of the changes in integrated pest management knowledge in Indonesia among follower farmers over the period 1991–98 indicates that opinion leaders who are superior to followers, but not excessively so, are more effective in transmitting knowledge. Excessive socio-economic distance is shown to reduce the effectiveness of diffusion.\nThe paper then derives operational implications of the empirical results.\n\n- 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.\n\nKey words - Asia, Indonesia, opinion leaders, diffusion, innovations\n\n1. INTRODUCTION\n\nThe subject of the diffusion of innovations received much attention in a variety of professional disciplines over the past few decades: Sociologists, economists, communications specialists, and education researchers proposed various theories on the factors and processes which underpin the observed patterns of information diffusion and the adoption of innovations (Rogers, 1995; Sunding & Zilberman, 2001). The interest in this topic stems from the importance of innovative technologies, organizations, and contractual arrangements in improving the well being of societies and the environment. A better understanding of the processes by which new knowledge diffuses within and across societies and communities can suggest actions and investments that can be undertaken by governments and firms that aim to promote innovations. The large volume of empirical evidence that accumulated over the years clarified many aspects of diffusion processes and their characteristics in various contexts.\nOne key observation highlighted in many studies is the role of social links and community structure in the diffusion process. Communications and information relating to new knowledge were shown to be embedded within the more general fabric of social interactions among individuals. The pattern of information flows received and transmitted by individuals is thus related to their social environment, the network of their contacts, and their status within that network (see the literature cited in Brock & Durlauf, 2001; Rogers, 1995). Recent empirical works by economists focused on a more precise definition of the social and communication networks of individuals whose technology decisions were analyzed (e.g., Bandiera & Rasul, 2003; Conley & Udry, 2003). The purpose of the present paper is to provide insights on\n\n- Gershon Feder and Sara Savastano are, respectively, Research Manager and consultant, Development\nResearch Group, The World Bank. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors only, and do not necessarily represent the World Bank and its affiliated organizations. The first author had supervisory authority, on the World Bank’s behalf, over the implementation of the IPM training project in Indonesia in the years 1995–97. Final revision accepted: December 8, 2005.\n\n1287", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1288 WORLD DEVELOPMENT an issue that is still not fully resolved in the empirical innovation diffusion literature, namely, the extent to which the attributes that make opinion leaders stand out in a community (social status, wealth, skills) can hamper or enhance their ability to disseminate information to an audience that is of a lesser status, lesser wealth, and lesser skills. The analysis utilizes data describing changes in knowledge regarding integrated pest management (IPM) among farmers in three provinces of Java, Indonesia, to demonstrate that leadership properties actually help in the diffusion of knowledge, but as the social and wealth disparity between leaders and would-be followers increases, the ability to disseminate knowledge diminishes at the margin, and may in fact decline.\nThe program of the paper is as follows: The next section reviews the relevant literature and derives the conceptual framework underpinning the empirical work in the paper. This is followed by descriptions of the promotion of IPM in Indonesia, and the data. A subsequent section outlines the analytical methodology followed by the empirical analysis. The last section provides conclusions and implications.\n\n2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK The seminal work of Rogers (1995) provides a coherent theory, as well as empirical evidence, of many aspects of innovations diffusion. One of the themes elaborated upon is the role and characteristics of ‘‘opinion leaders.’’ Such individuals have the status, expertise, links to external sources of knowledge, or experience that enable them to provide information and advice about innovations to others within their community.\nOpinion leadership is thus reflected in the ability to influence others’ attitudes and knowledge (Chatman, 1987; Valente & Davis, 1999). Such leadership may be informal rather than formal, but many scholars observed that opinion leaders tend to have higher social status than ‘‘followers’’ (Bandura, 1986, p. 151). Researchers also noted that opinion leaders are often more exposed to external sources of information, such as mass media or change agents (e.g., extension workers), have higher formal education, higher levels of literacy, a more cosmopolitan orientation, and higher income and wealth (Chatman, 1987; Rogers, 1995, p. 92; Valente, 1996; Weimann, 1994, p. 217).\n\nThe notion that opinion leaders, who stand out within the community in terms of their socio-economic and human capital characteristics, are key to information diffusion contrasts with the common observation (verified empirically) that most people tend to have communication networks composed mostly of individuals who are like them in social status and other respects. Sociologists and communications scholars define the tendency for communications to flow mostly among similar individuals as homophily, which is contrasted with heterophily, whereby individuals communicate with those who are different from them.\nThe prevalence of homophily in communication networks leads to an alternative characterization of opinion leaders as being similar in their socio-economic characteristics to the followers. Thus, Weimann’s (1994) comprehensive study of opinion leadership concludes that ‘‘The almost single possible generalization on the socio-demographic level is the tendency towards similarity of the influential–influencee dyad. The trickledown model, suggesting a vertical flow from upper classes to lower classes, from more educated to less educated, or from higher income groups to lower income groups, was rejected in almost all domains. The more frequent flow was from leader to follower from the same social group. This tendency resulted in a homogeneity of the leader–followers groups in terms of most socio-demographic measures. People turn to seek advice from their peers, from individuals of the same background, interests, and values. The flow of information and influence is likely to be rather horizontal.’’ (p. 88) Rogers (1995) offers a possible middle ground between the two views. He observes that homophily may act as a barrier to the diffusion of new knowledge because ‘‘new ideas usually enter a system through higher status and more innovative members’’ (Rogers, 1995, p. 288). But while he identifies a general tendency for followers to seek information and advice from opinion leaders who are perceived as more technically competent than themselves, he emphasizes that those leaders are selected so that they are not too much better. Thus, according to Rogers (1995, p. 294), ‘‘a follower typically seeks an opinion leader of somewhat higher status.’’ Similarly, Valente and Davis (1999, p. 59) argue that ‘‘learning occurs most efficiently when individuals are trained by their ‘‘near peers,’’ whom they have chosen as their models.’’ These views reflect the notion of ‘‘optimal heterophily’’ (Alpert & Anderson, 1973; Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971),", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF OPINION LEADERS IN THE DIFFUSION 1289 implying that excessive similarity, or excessive differences among individuals, could hinder the effectiveness of communication flows between them.\nThe measurement of capacity for opinion leadership attracted considerable attention in the literature. Early work by Rogers and Cartano (1962) describes three approaches: (i) the sociometric approach, whereby many members of a group are asked to identify those whose opinions are influential; (ii) a key informant approach, whereby a selected small group of individuals who are perceived as knowledgeable about the community are asked to identify the group’s opinion leaders; (iii) the self-designating approach, where respondents are asked questions to determine the degree to which they perceive themselves to be opinion leaders. More complex approaches labeled as ‘‘network analysis’’ were developed in subsequent years, relying on formal methods for measuring who talks to whom in a community (Valente & Davis, 1999; Valente & Foreman, 1998). All these approaches allow a score-based continuous index of leadership, but require access to respondents who can be interviewed directly on matters of opinion leadership, provide information on the groupings and channels of communications, and serve as a basis for counts of the number of ‘‘nominations’’ a presumed opinion leader received from community members.\nThe empirical evidence on the impact of opinion leaders’ socio-economic traits, as compared to the traits of other community members, on their effectiveness in diffusing information is not conclusive. For example, several studies highlight difficulties in the flow of information from higher status rural groups to lower strata (e.g., Roling, Ascroft, & Wa Chege, 1976; Van de Fliert, 1993). Similarly, Weimann (1994) cites studies indicating that opinion leaders are similar in socio-demographic characteristics to followers. Yet the study by Gibbons, de Koninck, and Hasan (1980) documents the effective role of prominent and wealthier leaders as sources of information about innovations in rural settings. Sen (1969, p. 26) notes that ‘‘the direction of influence from leaders to followers is then vertical, from high to low strata of the village society.’’ Similarly, Bose and Saxena (1966) found that rural opinion leaders, who were identified by other farmers as the most important source for agricultural information, were more literate, more competent, and superior in socio-economic standing.\n\nFor the purposes of framing the analysis in this paper, we formulate, based on the discussion in the literature, three alternative propositions that can be tested empirically: (a) People are more likely to seek and acquire information from those who are similar to them in various socio-economic respects.\n(b) People are more likely to seek and acquire information from those who have a higher status as opinion leaders, and who are thus superior to them in socio-economic attributes.\n\nA third proposition reflects the ‘‘optimal heterophily’’ concept and its implication that effective opinion leaders will tend to be superior to others, but within bounds.\n\n(c) People are more likely to learn from opinion leaders who are superior to them in socio-economic aspects, but who are not too different.\n\nThese propositions will be tested using data pertaining to the introduction of IPM knowledge in Indonesia through an intensive training program to selected farmers. As will be argued, these farmers were typically selected for their opinion leadership status or potential. Analyzing the extent to which other farmers’ knowledge of IPM relates to the opinion leaders (who received intensive IPM training) in their communities will allow insights on the veracity of the three propositions.\n\n3. THE INTRODUCTION OF IPM KNOWLEDGE IN INDONESIA IPM in agriculture is an ecologically based approach to pest management. It aims to minimize the use of chemical pesticide by enhancing the abilities of natural enemies of pests, the crop itself, and various factors in the field environment, to control pests presence and reduce the loss that they can cause. IPM was introduced intensively in 1985 following a severe outbreak of pests in rice (a key strategic commodity in a country where rice is the staple food). The pest problem was traced to excessive use of chemical pesticides, which destroy pests and their predators alike, but following which certain pests can reemerge in much larger numbers in the absence of natural enemies. Following the government’s acceptance of IPM as a desirable objective, training to farmers in IPM concepts was introduced in the 1990s through a large scale and intensive training program for farmers called the ‘‘Farmer Field School’’", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data pertaining to the introduction of IPM knowledge", "confidence": 0.3556688129901886}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1290 WORLD DEVELOPMENT (FFS) that was first piloted in 1989. This program utilizes participatory methods ‘‘to help farmers develop their analytical skills, critical thinking, and creativity, and help them learn to make better decisions’’ (Kenmore, 1997).\nThe typical FFS enhances participating farmer’s knowledge on agroecosystems dynamics, within a framework of integrated pest and crop management. A great emphasis of the program has been on sensible pest management, safety with regard to chemical pesticides, and understanding of the interactions between pest insects and beneficial insects that limit the numbers and the impact of pests. With the knowledge gained in the FFS training, it was expected that a lower and safer use of chemical pesticides would be practiced by farmers.\nParticipatory training and hands-on experimentation are a key principle of the FFS, and the purpose of the training is to make the graduates ‘‘confident pest experts, self-teaching experimenters, and effective trainers of other farmers’’ (Wiebers, 1993). The group of trainees includes 20–25 participants from the village.\nThe duration of an FFS is about 12–14 weeks within a full crop-growing season. A facilitator trainer leads the program, conveying knowledge on, and facilitating discussion of, ecologically based approaches in pest management, and overall good crop management decision procedures and practices. The training aims not only to sharpen the participants’ decisionmaking abilities, but also to empower them for leadership and community activism (Scarborough, Killough, Johnson, & Farrington, 1997, p. 102).\nThe selection of farmers for FFS training was not random, and sought to purposely include those with agricultural expertise, as well as others with high social status such as rich farmers and religious leaders (Winarto, 1994, p. 153). A detailed study from the early 1990s points out that those selected tended to be more affluent farmers, better educated and informed, who enjoyed higher status in the community. A relatively significant proportion of these selected farmers served also as official and semi-official village leaders (Van de Fliert, 1993, pp. 130– 132). In fact, presumed or proven ability to spread information was a specific selection consideration at the local level, where selection was done by farmer group leaders in consultation with extension workers and village officials (Scarborough et al., 1997, p. 105; Van de Fliert, 1993, p. 203). Of course, there were situations where relatively young, lower status farmers were selected, although they needed to be perceived by the organizers of the training as being of high farming expertise (Winarto, 1994, 2004).\nThe cultural context certainly has an impact on the direction of communication flows and the perception of opinion leadership. The Javanese farming communities in the study areas are all Moslem, and tend to be hierarchical, and male dominated, with respect typically accorded to older and wealthier men, particularly if they achieved religious merit through pilgrimage to Mecca. [1] While the donor-funded program attempted to purposefully select a larger number of women than would otherwise be proposed by local officials and village leaders, the actual proportion of women trained was rather small, and in many cases nonfarming women were included in the training simply to satisfy gender targets (World Bank Implementation Completion Report, 2000, p. 5). As there are no women in the sample, the study pertains to diffusion of knowledge among men only.\n\n4. DATA The data underlying this study were obtained through a panel survey of Javanese farm households conducted by the Indonesian Center for Agrosocio-economic Research (CASER) in April/May 1991 and again in June 1999. The baseline sample included rice-growing villages that had already been covered by the program, as well as villages that were not yet covered by the program, but were in areas where the program was planned to be implemented. All villages were visited in the repeat survey in 1999, but our analysis focuses only on those villages that had not yet been exposed to an FFS at the time of the baseline survey in 1991. In most of these villages, the village sample contains randomly selected farmers who participated in the training in various years throughout the period covered, as well as farmers from the same village who did not participate. Of the 268 sample households from the 22 sample villages where a field school had been implemented during 1991–99, only 112 had actually participated in the training while the remaining 156 households had not attended a program, but had been potentially exposed to some of its (new knowledge) benefits through informal communications and joint activities with graduates of the program who lived in their village.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["panel survey of Javanese farm households"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "panel survey of Javanese farm households", "confidence": 0.8439967632293701}], "vague_data": [{"text": "panel survey", "confidence": 0.28244104981422424}]}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF OPINION LEADERS IN THE DIFFUSION 1291 The 1991 survey collected information on households’ farm operations and characteristics for the 1990–91 wet rice season and on their household attributes, activities, and assets. It also documented the farmers’ knowledge of specific aspects of pest management that were to be included in the training program, through a set of questions on specific curriculum components. The 1999 survey repeated the same questions and collected additional data regarding the household and the village participation in FFS training, and more information about the community. The farmers’ responses to the identical knowledge questions in both 1991 and 1999 were scored, and the number of correct answers relative to the total number of pest management questions serves as an indicator of pest management knowledge. [2] More detailed information on the construction of the knowledge score is provided in Appendix A.\n\n5. ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY The data do not contain information on the specific communication patterns, self-perceptions on leadership status, or numbers of nominations from peers received by farmers selected for training. It is thus not feasible to develop measures of opinion leadership for these farmers along the lines of work by Chatman (1987) or Valente and Davis (1999). However, it is possible to rely on the fact that the selection of farmers by program officers and village leaders to participate in the intensive IPM training was related to their observed or presumed opinion leadership potential, and on the availability of a number of socio-economic indicators related to opinion leadership for every farmer in the sample. In support of this approach, it is noted that studies of FFS training programs indicated that trained farmers were expected to proactively disseminate the knowledge gained in the course of the training to other members of the community (Scarborough et al., 1997, p. 105; Simpson & Owens, 2002; Van de Fliert, 1993; Winarto, 1994). Obviously, not all potentially strong opinion leaders were selected for training. Similarly, some people with low opinion leadership capacity were included in the training in some villages. But it is reasonable to expect that persons with higher opinion leadership capacity had a higher probability of being selected for training. While the capacity for opinion leadership is not observable to the researcher, the literature suggests that such capacity is related to observed or measurable characteristics of the farmers, such as education, pre-training pest management knowledge, and wealth. One can thus utilize a dichotomous choice model such as probit to estimate, based on a sample of program-trained and untrained farmers, the parameters associated with observable indicators associated with opinion leadership: P 1⁄4 f ðb [0] X Þ; ð1Þ where P is the probability of being selected, X is a vector of observed leadership characteristics, and b is a vector of parameters. The imputed value of the probability of selection [P [b] 1⁄4 f ðb [^][0] ; X Þ where b [^] is an estimate of b] can be viewed as an index of opinion leadership capacity, as it reflects this unobserved (to the researcher) capacity. This index can be calculated for every farmer in the sample, whether actually selected or not, once the parameter vector b is estimated.\nBecause the data contain for each community in the sample several randomly selected trained farmers, these selected farmers may be viewed as a representative sample of the group of trained farmers in the specific village community. The average imputed index of opinion leadership capacity of the trained (selected) farmers of a given village (say, P j) is an indica\n[b] tor of the extent of the IPM-trained opinion leadership available to disseminate the knowledge gained in the training in that village.\nThe difference in the imputed probability of selection of any two farmers is a measure of how different these farmers are in terms of their capacity for opinion leadership. A farmer with a lower probability is more likely to be a follower, compared with a farmer who has a higher probability. The ability to calculate the difference in capacities for opinion leadership provides us with a means for clarifying the effects of Rogers’ concepts of homophily and heterophily on the communication of new knowledge between trained farmers and untrained farmers. If farmers tend to learn more from those better than themselves (i.e., from those who have a higher capacity for opinion leadership than themselves), then measurable changes in knowledge about IPM among farmers who did not attend the training will be positively related to the differences in capacities for opinion leadership (as represented by differences in the imputed probabilities for selection for training) between themselves and those", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["1991 survey", "1999 survey"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "1999 survey", "confidence": 0.7822409272193909}, {"text": "1991 survey", "confidence": 0.7571685314178467}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1292 WORLD DEVELOPMENT who actually did attend the training. Given that in each community several farmers attended the training, the relevant reference in a given village j is the average capacity for opinion leadership among the trained farmers in that village, as represented by P j. That is, for any farmer i\n\n[b] (in village j) who did not attend training, the degree of similarity (homophily) with the trained group (denoted by Dij) is approximated as Dij 1⁄4 P j � f ðb [^][0] X ijÞ; ð2Þ\n\n[b] where f ðb [^][0] X ijÞ is the imputed probability of selection of untrained farmer i in village j. If Dij is very close to zero, then the untrained farmer i of village j is very similar to the trained group from that village in the attributes that reflect capacity for opinion leadership. If Dij is positive, then the group of trained farmers of village j is ‘‘better’’ (has on average a higher capacity for opinion leadership) than the untrained farmer i of the same village.\nUsing the variable Dij as a measure of dissimilarity (socio-economic ‘‘distance’’) between the untrained farmers and the trained farmers in their villages enables the testing of the three alternative hypotheses formulated in Section 2: If untrained farmers are more likely to seek and learn IPM knowledge from opinion leaders who are similar to them (hypothesis (a)), then the gains in IPM knowledge by any farmer i from village j during the period 1991–98 covered by the two surveys will be negatively related to the absolute value of Dij (or to transformations of Dij which increase in value; the larger is the absolute value of Dij, such as the square of Dij). If untrained farmers are more likely to seek advice and learn from farmers who have strong opinion leadership characteristics and who are of higher socio-economic standing (hypothesis (b)), then the gains in untrained farmers’ IPM knowledge during 1991–98 would be positively related to Dij. If untrained farmers tend to learn from opinion leaders who are better than themselves, but not too much better (hypothesis (c)), then the relationship between gains in IPM knowledge and Dij will follow a nonlinear pattern such as a quadratic, where the linear term is positive, but the square term is negative (implying that at the margin, as the opinion leaders become too dissimilar to the followers, their impact on knowledge diffusion diminishes). Because hypothesis (b) is nested within hypothesis (c), the empirical formulation will test both hypotheses simultaneously.\n\nMore formally, if we denote the level of IPM knowledge in 1991 and 1999 as K(0) and K(1), respectively, then the following multivariate equations will facilitate the testing of hypothesis: K ijð1Þ � K ijð0Þ 1⁄4 a þ cjDijj þ d [0] Zij þ l [0] V jþeij; ð3aÞ K ijð1Þ� K ijð0Þ 1⁄4 a þ cDij þ gD [2] ij [þ] [d][0][Z][ij][ þ] [l][0][V] [j][þ][e][ij][;] ð3bÞ where Zij is a vector of characteristics of untrained farmer i from village j which may affect knowledge acquisition aside from interactions with the trained farmers, and Vj is a vector of village characteristics which can affect changes in knowledge of residents of that village. The parameter a is a constant, while the parameters k, g, d, and l are associated with the various explanatory variables. The term eij is a stochastic error. Eqn. (3a) is associated with hypothesis (a), while Eqn. (3b) is associated with hypotheses (b) and (c).\n\n6. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ANALYSIS (a) Factors affecting the selection of participants in IPM training The parameters of Eqn. (1) can be estimated as a probit, where, while the probability of selection is not observed, we define a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the data pertain to a farmer selected for training, and zero otherwise. The variables comprising the vector X are suggested by the literature cited in Section 2, and include the following: (i) Total rice land owned in 1991: The area of land owned is an indicator of wealth, and is related to status. Therefore, this indicator is expected to increase the probability of selection for training.\n(ii) Area of unirrigated rice land owned in 1991: While holding total area owned constant, larger amounts of unirrigated land are negatively related to wealth and status and, therefore, will affect negatively the probability of selection.\n(iii) Spending on pesticide per hectare of rice in 1991 (measured in natural logarithm): The volume of spending on pesticides is related to wealth, as well as to the potential interest", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF OPINION LEADERS IN THE DIFFUSION 1293 in IPM. The probability of selection is, therefore, expected to be positively related to this indicator.\n(iv) Number of household members in 1991: Larger households imply lower land per person (holding land area constant), and thus less wealth per capita, and lower status. It is, therefore, expected that household size will be negatively related to the probability of selection for training.\n(v) Rice yield per hectare in 1991 (measured in natural logarithm): The yield is taken as an indicator related to farming skills. Higher yields are, therefore, expected to contribute positively to the probability of selection.\n(vi) Education of household head in 1991: Farmers’ education has been shown to positively affect their productivity (Jamison & Lau, 1982) and is, therefore, another indicator of farming skills and status affecting the probability of selection positively.\n(vii) Highest education level in the household in 1991: Families with more highly educated members are typically of higher status even if the selected farmer himself is not the most educated in the household.\n(viii) Score on knowledge of IPM in 1991: The level of familiarity with IPM concepts is an indicator of a farmer’s knowledge and skill in farming, and it is hypothesized to affect the probability of selection positively.\nBecause all variables reflected values in 1991, prior to the actual training (which took place in the 7 years after 1991), there is no endogeneity in the values observed. The means and standard deviations of the variables used in the analysis of the probability of selection are displayed in Table 1.\nWhile the means of the two groups are not statistically different due to large standard er rors, the data suggest that farmers selected for training tended to be larger landowners, with more irrigated land, higher spending on pesticides, higher yields, from families with more formal education, and better initial knowledge of IPM. These characteristics are all consistent with the profile of opinion leaders who are wealthier, better educated, and more skilled in farming. The probit analysis results presented in Table 2 essentially confirm these observations.\nAll variables have the expected sign and all, except for household size and farmer education, are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. About two-thirds of the observations would be correctly predicted using the estimated parameters (i.e., the sum of the percentage of trained farmers with imputed probability higher than 50%, and untrained farmers with imputed probability of less than 50%).\nThe parameters presented in Table 2 were used to impute the probabilities of selection for each farmer in the sample. An important issue is whether the factors affecting the selection of farmers into the training program have changed over time, in light of the observations on difficulties in horizontal communications made by early observers such as Van de Fliert (1993).\nTo examine this hypothesis, the sample of trained farmers was subdivided into two groups: (i) early trained (those who were trained prior to the initiation of the large-scale World-Bank-funded program in 1994), and (ii) those who were trained later, starting in 1994 (there were 57 and 55 farmers, respectively, in the two groups). A probit analysis was applied to the sample of 112 trained farmers, in which those selected later received the value 1, while those selected early received the value zero.\nThe explanatory variables were those used in Table 1. Variables used in the analysis of the probability of selection for IPM training [a] Variable Unit Untrained farmers Trained farmers Sample size persons 156 112 Total rice land (1991) ha .60 .93 Unirrigated rice area (1991) ha .19 .07 Spending on pesticides ’000 Rp/ha 93 111 Size of household persons 4.7 4.7 Rice yield kg/ha 5757 6116 Education of farmer years 5.1 5.7 Highest education in family years 7.9 9.0 Score on IPM knowledge in 1991 1–6 2.52 2.65 a Training took place after 1991.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1294 WORLD DEVELOPMENT Table 2. Probit analysis of factors affecting selection of IPM training Variable (1991 values) Estimated parameter [a] Total rice land (ha) .112 [*] (1.93) Unirrigated rice land (ha) �1.054 [***] (2.60) Spending on pesticides .087 [*] (1.77) (1998 ’000 Rp/ha) Size of household (persons) �.067 (1.27) Rice yield (kg/ha) .884 [**] (2.19) Education of farmer (years) .040 (1.51) Highest education .081 [**] (2.15) in family (years) Score on IPM .196 [*] (1.71) knowledge (integer 1–6) Constant �9.232 [***] (2.64) Sample size 268 % Predicted correctly 66% Pseudo-R [2] .11 Log. likelihood �162.99 a Numbers in parentheses are Z values. Standard errors were corrected for clustering in villages.\n\n- Significant at 10%.\n** Significant at 5%.\n*** Significant at 1%.\n\nTable 2. None of the explanatory variables (nor the constant term) had statistically significant coefficients, implying that there is no significant difference in the actual selection criteria for the program between the earlier and later years.\nThese probabilities serve as indicators of farmers’ opinion leadership capacity. For each village, the imputed probabilities for the subsample of trained farmers were summed up and divided by the number of trained farmers, yielding an estimate of the average opinion leadership capacity of IPM-trained farmers in that village (P [b] j). [3] Because in four villages the sample included only untrained farmers (no trained farmers from these villages were interviewed, although the training program was implemented in these villages), the subsample of untrained farmers from villages for which there was an estimate of P j was reduced to\n\n[b] 117. For each one of these 117 farmers, the value of Dij was calculated following Eqn. (2).\nAs explained in Section 5, the Dij values represent the extent of difference between the opinion leadership profile of the 117 untrained farmers and the average opinion leadership profile of the selected farmers from the same village who actually received intensive IPM training. The trained farmers could potentially serve as nodes of knowledge diffusion to the untrained farmers.\n\n(b) Analysis of the role of opinion leadership in IPM knowledge diffusion The diffusion of knowledge about IPM can be inferred by comparing the scores on IPM-related questions in 1991, before the implementation of the training program, and in 1999. By that time, the training program had already been administered to selected farmers in the villages covered under the present study, and the knowledge that the trained farmers gained was expected to diffuse to their neighbors and friends. The data indicate that the mean knowledge score of the 117 nonparticipants increased only slightly during 1991–99 from 2.59 to 2.72.\nThis figure masks a considerable degree of variation, and further analysis can clarify the role of opinion leadership in the different villages in explaining the variation. However, farmers have various sources of information, and the analysis needs to account for variation among farmers in terms of their exposure to alternative sources of information, as well as differences among them in the effort that they exert to proactively seek information (Feder & Slade, 1984). To account for these differences, the analysis needs to include variables representing such differences, in addition to the variable Dij, which represents the interaction between the untrained farmers and those who have received intensive training.\nOne set of farmer-specific attributes, which may be related to differences in inclination to search for knowledge, are the indicators used to characterize opinion leadership, as displayed in Table 1. These variables, which are related to wealth, farming skills and education, can be hypothesized to relate also to general proclivity to seek information, regardless of the implementation of the intensive IPM training in the village.\nAdditional sets of variables, which can characterize the access to other sources of information, are defined at the village (rather than individual) level. These include the following: (i) The number of sales kiosks in the village (1991): Kiosks are points of informal interactions among farmers, where inputs and household goods are bought and information can be exchanged. A larger number of such gathering spots can increase the opportunities for information acquisition.\n(ii) Whether there is an active agricultural cooperative in the village (1991): Cooperatives played a role in pesticide distribution, and their employees may have promoted", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF OPINION LEADERS IN THE DIFFUSION 1295 the use of pesticides in contravention of IPM concepts (Van de Fliert, 1993, pp. 203, 233).\nOn the other hand, the cooperative office is also a place where farmers meet and information is exchanged. The impact of this indicator on knowledge diffusion is, therefore, uncertain.\n(iii) The change in travel time to subdistrict townships, 1991–99: Subdistrict townships are the local market centers where farmers buy and sell products, and where they are exposed to additional sources of information. The longer the travel time to the township, the larger the transaction cost of accessing the market, and the less frequent are the trips to the market. This indicator is, therefore, negatively related to information diffusion.\n(iv) Change in availability of Pest Observers in the village: Pest Observers are officials of the Plant Protection Department, assigned to monitor pest attacks and coordinate responses. With the advent of the intensive IPM training program, the number of Pest Observers was increased, and their role as sources of IPM information was enhanced (in fact, many of them functioned also as trainers in Farmer Field Schools). By 1999, each of our sample villages reported the presence of such an Observer. The change in this presence compared to the situation in 1991 is expected to be positively related to the diffusion of IPM knowledge.\n(v) Change in the extent of village irrigation: This variable is a proxy to village overall level of wealth, and hence it is also an indicator of other village infrastructure and access to mass media. It is expected, therefore, that this variable is positively related to the diffusion of knowledge.\nIn addition to these village level variables, the analysis includes dummy variables for the three Java provinces (one of which serves as reference) where study villages are located, to reflect any aggregate differences in infrastructure changes such as transportation and communication that could affect diffusion.\nThree different specifications of Eqns. (3a) and (3b) are used in order to verify that the results are not dependent on arbitrary formulations. The first two specifications, two-sided tobit and ordered probit, are standard methods of analyzing dependent variables which are censored and discreet. The dependent variable in the ordered probit specification is a categorical variable where three possible outcomes are de fined: (i) ‘‘no improvement in knowledge score;’’ (ii) ‘‘small improvement in knowledge score (one point);’’ and (iii) ‘‘large improvement in knowledge score (two or more points).’’ One additional specification utilizes a transformation of the knowledge data into a continuous variable, through a logistic specification. The transformation entails conversion of the knowledge scores (which are integers in the range 0–6) into fractions by dividing them into 6 (the maximum number of correct answers). Denoting this fraction by k, one can define the logarithm of the odds ratio ln[k/ (1 - k)], which is a variable in the range (�1, 1). The higher the knowledge score, the larger the odds ratio. The difference in the logarithms of the odds ratio during 1991–99 is similarly in the range (�1, 1). If it is assumed that the logarithm of the odds ratio is dependent linearly on the set of explanatory variables defined above, the analysis can be carried out by means of ordinary least squares. [4] Table 3 presents alternative estimates of Eqn.\n(3a), allowing a test of hypothesis (a). As is evident from the results, the parameter associated with the absolute difference between the opinion leadership capacity of the untrained farmers and that of the trained farmers is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, the results provide no support to the hypothesis that farmers tend to learn more from those who are very similar to them. Alternative estimates of Eqn. (3b), designed to test hypotheses (b) and (c), are presented in Table 4.\nBoth the OLS estimate of the difference in logarithms of odds ratio and the ordered probit estimate confirm hypothesis (c) that both the linear term and the quadratic term are statistically significant. [5] The two-sided tobit estimate is similar in magnitude, except that the quadratic term is not significant even at a 10% level. However, while the standard errors for the ordered probit and the OLS estimate were corrected for clustering of observations at the village level, such a correction is not feasible in the tobit procedure. It is possible, however, that the estimates of the standard errors in the tobit equation are biased upwards in the absence of the clustering correction, as it is observed that most of the test statistics (z and t) in the other equations have higher values. The three alternative estimates yield a fairly similar critical value of Dij beyond which any additional superiority of the opinion leaders detracts from their communication effectiveness: such a critical value maximizes the terms", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "knowledge data", "confidence": 0.1368035525083542}]}}}
{"input": "1296 WORLD DEVELOPMENT Table 3. Test of the hypothesis that diffusion is faster if opinion leaders are similar to other farmers Variable [a] Two-sided tobit Ordered probit [b] (N = 117) (N = 117) probit [b] OLS of log. odds ratio [b] (N = 117) (N = 117) (N = 117) Absolute difference in opinion �0.062 (0.05) [c] 0.377 (0.52) [d] �0.058 (0.08) [c] leadership capacity jDijj Total rice land (ha) �0.007 (0.05) �0.006 (0.04) �0.005 (0.06) Unirrigated rice area (ha) �0.357 (1.14) �0.335 (0.75) �0.243 (0.85) Spending on pesticides (’000 Rp/ha) �0.013 (0.20) 0.010 (0.18) �0.008 (0.16) Size of household (persons) 0.111 (1.59) 0.103 [**] (1.97) 0.081 [*] (1.71) Rice yield (kg/ha) 0.420 (0.89) 0.009 (0.02) 0.306 (1.22) Education of the farmer (years) �0.012 (0.25) 0.049 (0.91) �0.009 (0.28) Highest years of education (years) 0.016 (0.35) 0.031 (0.75) 0.018 (0.70) No. of sale kiosks (numbers) 0.482 [***] (2.87) 0.274 [**] (2.03) 0.334 [***] (3.13) Cooperative (numbers) 0.342 (0.86) 0.064 (0.18) 0.196 (0.58) Change in travel time to town (time) �0.062 [***] (2.71) �0.040 [**] (2.24) �0.046 [***] (3.81) Change in availability of pest observer (numbers) 0.609 [*] (1.96) 0.447 [*] (1.90) 0.431 [***] (2.95) Change in village irrigation (%) �0.078 (0.16) 0.031 (0.07) �0.019 (0.07) Observations 117 117 117 R [2] /pseudo-R [2] 0.06 0.07 0.18 a Regressions also include constant and dummy variables for province.\nb Standard errors adjusted for clustering at village level.\nc Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.\nd Numbers in parentheses are Z-statistics.\n\n- Significant at 10%.\n** Significant at 5%.\n*** Significant at 1%.\n\nTable 4. Test of the hypothesis of diffusion through opinion leaders who are superior to the followers Variable [a] Two-sided tobit Ordered probit [b] (N = 117) (N = 117) probit [b] OLS of log. odds ratio [b] (N = 117) (N = 117) (N = 117) Difference in opinion leadership capacity (Dij) 4.788 [***] (4.28) [c] 4.311 [***] (3.48) [d] 3.503 [***] (4.51) [c] Square of the difference in opinion �4.700 (1.56) �4.998 [**] (2.34) �3.492 [**] (2.20) leadership capacity ðD [2] ij [Þ] Total rice land (ha) 0.145 (1.02) 0.116 (0.97) 0.106 [*] (2.00) Unirrigated rice area (ha) �1.082 [***] (3.26) �0.907 [**] (1.98) �0. 773 [**] (2.67) Spending on pesticides (’000 Rp/ha) 0.104 (1.60) 0.106 [*] (1.83) 0.077 (1.66) Size of household (persons) �0.013 (0.18) �0.002 (0.04) �0.010 (0.21) Rice yield (kg/ha) 1.523 [***] (3.03) 0.925 [*] (1.93) 1.113 [***] (3.72) Education of the farmer (years) 0.030 (0.64) 0.083 (1.59) 0.022 (0.64) Highest years of education (years) 0.101 [**] (2.13) 0.102 [**] (2.20) 0.080 [**] (2.72) No. of sale kiosks (numbers) 0.501 [***] (3.20) 0.346 [**] (2.22) 0.348 [***] (3.78) Cooperative (numbers) 0.423 (1.14) 0.214 (0.59) 0.252 (1.00) Change in travel time to town (time) �0.057 [***] (2.66) �0.043 [**] (2.07) �0.042 [***] (3.26) Change in availability of pest observer (numbers) 0.965 [***] (3.23) 0.819 [**] (2.47) 0.691 [***] (3.77) Change in village irrigation (%) 0.370 (0.79) 0.471 (0.93) .308 (0.81) Observations 117 117 117 R [2] /Pseudo-R [2] 0.11 0.11 0.29 a Regressions also include constant and dummy variables for province.\nb Standard errors adjusted for clustering at village level.\nc Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.\nd Numbers in parentheses are Z-statistics.\n\n- Significant at 10%.\n** Significant at 5%.\n*** Significant at 1%.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF OPINION LEADERS IN THE DIFFUSION 1297 cDij þ gD [2] ij [, and is calculated as the value of][ D][ij] where the first derivative of the latter term is zero. The parameter estimates of c and g in Table 4 indicate that the critical value is in the range .43–.50, and thus when the leadership capacity index exceeds that range, the ability to diffuse information declines.\nThe estimation results for other factors contributing to knowledge diffusion are mostly as expected, and quite consistent regardless of the estimation specification. In particular, higher yield levels, larger irrigated areas, and higher education in the household are farmer characteristics significantly related to knowledge gains. Farmers located in villages with more sales kiosks, closer to market towns, and with increased presence of pest protection government officials were more likely to increase their knowledge of IPM, in part through access to alternative sources of information, that is facilitated by these characteristics.\n\n7. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS The results in the preceding section confirm that differences in the opinion leadership capacity of farmers who were trained intensively in IPM field schools explain, among other factors, the variation in IPM knowledge gains among farmers who did not participate directly in the training. The effectiveness of opinion leaders in diffusing knowledge that was specifically targeted to them through intensive training was shown to depend positively on the extent of leaders’ superiority compared to the socioeconomic and farming skill attributes of the would-be followers. However, the results indicate that if the selected opinion leaders are excessively superior to the others in the community, their effectiveness actually diminishes and they may become essentially irrelevant to the diffusion of knowledge beyond a small circle of those higher status individuals who are closely associated with them.\nThese conclusions have implications for the operations of extension and information programs seeking to spread new knowledge widely across large populations, particularly in areas where mass media sources are not accessible to the majority of the population. Such programs have traditionally focused the direct interactions of change agents (extension work ers, trainers) on selected individuals, as budget and manpower constraints would not allow for direct interaction with every member of the target population. For example, the Training and Visit extension program instructed extension agents to select permanent groups of ‘‘contact farmers’’ for their bi-weekly village visits (Benor & Harrison, 1977). The Farmer Field School training approach focused similarly on selected groups of participants in intensive training. Several other knowledge enhancement programs described in Scarborough et al. (1997) followed similar selection and diffusion strategies.\nAs is evident from the results of the present analysis, it is possible to err in two opposite directions: (i) selecting diffusion agents who are too ‘‘average’’ to the point that they are not much respected as leaders, and (ii) selecting opinion leaders who are too prominent and atypical to the point that most members of the community do not interact with them, or view their knowledge as being likely irrelevant.\nObviously there are circumstances where programs include representatives of the latter group for political reasons, but the analysis suggests that such representation should not be excessive. Similarly, there may be circumstances where lower-status members of the community who are not currently opinion leaders should be included for purposes of empowerment and development of their potential leadership capacity. In such cases, one needs to recognize that these are the main purposes of such individuals’ inclusion, rather than the diffusion of knowledge.\nStriking the right balance in the selection of program participants, as implied by the results of the present paper, is conceptually appealing, but not easy to implement in practice, as a combination of attributes (with unknown aggregation weights) is relevant, and some of the traits may not be readily observed by outsiders and researchers (although often known to members of the communities involved).\nCommunity participation in selecting those to be targeted for roles as opinion leaders can overcome some of the challenges (Valente & Davis, 1999). It is likely that different types of programs may require different types of leaders (e.g., reflecting gender or ethnic aspects), and additional analysis is required to clarify the contextual factors that need to be considered.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1298 WORLD DEVELOPMENT NOTES\n\n1. A detailed description of the cultural aspects\nof communication flows in Indonesia, in the context of the IPM training program, is provided in Winarto (2004).\n\n2. While the pest management questions asked (six in number) cover only part of the pest management training, they are viewed as a good indicator of the IPM knowledge gained in the course of training. This is confirmed by Feder, Murgai, and Quizon (2004) who reported an analysis of the relation between pest management knowledge scores in this dataset and the utilization of chemical pesticides by the farmers. Their results indicated that farmers with higher IPM knowledge scores utilized statistically significantly less pesticides, although the extent of the change was modest.\n\n3. As explained in Appendix B, data limitations compel us to conduct the analysis at the village level, while the ideal case would focus on the hamlet (sub-village) level.\nThis implies strong assumptions spelled out in Appendix B.\n\n4. One can show that this formulation is consistent with a model whereby the knowledge score is related to the household and village characteristics through a logistic equation K t=6 1⁄4 1=1⁄2e [�][h][�][k][0][Q] �, where h and k are parameters, and Q is the vector of explanatory variables.\n\n5. The possibility of time effects was checked by including an interaction term between the variable Dij and the length of time since training was provided in the village. The parameter of the interaction term was not statistically significant.\n\nREFERENCES Alpert, M., & Anderson, T. (1973). Optimal heterophily and communication effectiveness: Some empirical findings. Journal of Communication, 23(3), 328– 343.\nBandiera, O., & Rasul, I. (2003). Complementarities, social networks, and technology adoption in Mozambique. Unpublished manuscript, London School of Economics.\nBandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.\nBenor, D., & Harrison, J. (1977). Agricultural Extension: The Training and Visit System. Washington, DC: World Bank.\nBrock, W., & Durlauf, S. (2001). Interaction based Models. In J. Heckman, & E. Leomer (Eds.).\nHandbook of econometrics (Vol. 5, pp. 3297–3380).\nAmsterdam: North Holland.\nBose, A. B., & Saxena, P. C. (1966). Opinion leaders in a village in Western Rajasthan. Man in India, 46(2), 121–129.\nChatman, E. (1987). Opinion leadership, poverty, and information sharing. RQ, 26(3), 341–353.\nConley, T., & Udry, C. (2003). Learning about new technology: Pineapple in Ghana. Unpublished Manuscript, Yale University.\nFeder, G., & Slade, R. (1984). The acquisition of information and the adoption of new technology.\nAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66(3), 312–320.\nFeder, G., Murgai, R., & Quizon, J. (2004). The acquisition and diffusion of knowledge: The case of pest management training in farmer field schools, Indonesia. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 55(2), 217–239.\nGibbons, D., de Koninck, R., & Hasan, I. (1980).\nAgricultural modernization, poverty and inequality: The distributional impact of the green revolution in regions of Malaysia and Indonesia. Westmead, Farnborough: Teakfield LTD.\nJamison, D., & Lau, L. (1982). Farmer education and farm efficiency. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.\nKenmore, P. (1997). A perspective on IPM. Center for Information on Low External Input and Sustainable Agriculture, Newsletter, 13(4).\nRogers, E. (1995). Diffusion of innovations (4th ed.). New York, NY: The Free Press.\nRogers, E., & Cartano, D. (1962). Methods of measuring opinion leadership. Public Opinion Quarterly, 26(4), 435–441.\nRogers, E., & Shoemaker, F. (1971). Communication of innovations: A cross cultural approach. New York: The Free Press.\nRoling, N., Ascroft, J., & Wa Chege, F. (1976).\nDiffusion of innovations and the issue of equity in rural development. Communications Research, 3(2), 155–171.\nScarborough, V., Killough, S., Johnson, D., & Farrington, J. (1997). Farmer-led extension: Concepts and practices. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.\nSen, L. K. (1969). Opinion leadership in India: A study of interpersonal communication in eight villages. Hyderabad: National Institute of Communication Development.\nSimpson, B., & Owens, M. (2002). Farmer field schools and the future of agricultural extension in Africa.\nSustainable Development Dimensions, Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome.\nSunding, D., & Zilberman, D. (2001). The agricultural innovation process: Research and technology adoption in changing agricultural sector. In B. Gardner, &", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "THE ROLE OF OPINION LEADERS IN THE DIFFUSION 1299 G. Rausser (Eds.). Handbook of agricultural economics (Vol. 1a, pp. 207–226). Amsterdam: North Holland.\nValente, T. (1996). Social network thresholds in the diffusion of innovations. Social Networks, 18(1), 69–89.\nValente, T., & Davis, R. (1999). Accelerating the diffusion of innovations using opinion leaders.\nAnnals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 566(1), 55–67.\nValente, T., & Foreman, R. (1998). Integration and radiality: Measuring the extent of an individual’s connectedness and reachability in a network. Social Networks, 20(1), 89–105.\nVan de Fliert, E. (1993). Integrated pest management: Farmer field schools generate sustainable practices.\nA case study in Central Java evaluating IPM training (304 pp). Wageningen Agricultural University Paper No. 93-3. Wageningen, The Netherlands: PUDOC.\nWeimann, G. (1994). The influentials. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.\nWiebers, U. C. (1993). Integrated pest management and pesticide regulation in developing Asia. World Bank Technical Paper No. 211. Asia Technical Department Series, Washington, DC.\nWinarto, Y. (1994). Encouraging knowledge exchange: Integrated pest management in Indonesia. In I.\nScoones, & J. Thomson (Eds.). Beyond farmers first: Rural people’s knowledge, agricultural research, and extension practice (pp. 150–154). London: Intermediate Technology Publications.\nWinarto, Y. (2004). Seeds of knowledge: The beginning of integrated pest management in Java. New Haven, CT: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph 53.\nWorld Bank (2000). Implementation completion report for the Indonesia integrated pest management training project, June 2000.\n\nAPPENDIX A. CONSTRUCTION OF THE KNOWLEDGE VARIABLE The farmer interviews held in 1991 and in 1999 sought to establish farmers’ familiarity with key elements of the pest management principles promoted in the FFS curriculum.\nThe questions were not necessarily posed in a direct ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No’’ format, and often involved some preliminary conversation on the topic and clarifications. After the farmer responded to themes brought up by the interviewer, the latter was in a position to judge whether the farmer was ‘‘knowledgeable’’ or not regarding the specific theme.\nThe six themes that were the specific focus of the interview on pest management were: (i) Whether it is advisable to have a pre-set schedule of spraying against rice pests or to spray at the early stage of plant growth, if insects are observed or if insect damage is noticed. IPM principles suggest that preset spraying schedules, and spraying in reaction to pest or pest damage in the early phases are not useful.\n(ii) Whether there are nonchemical measures (biological or mechanical) that can be utilized to minimize the presence of, or vulnerability to, pests. The training establishes a number of nonchemical alternatives.\n(iii) Whether the respondent could identify correctly at least 70% of pests from a list of candidates.\n(iv) Whether the respondent could identify at least 70% of beneficial insects and living organisms, which actually suppress pests.\n(v) Whether the respondent is aware of the benefits of synchronized planting of crops so as to minimize the opportunities for pest damage and proliferation.\n(vi) Whether the respondent is aware of the benefits of practicing crop rotations so as to minimize pest resurgence and proliferation.\nThe number of correct answers relative to the total (i.e., the proportion of correct responses) defines the score of knowledge for each farmer.\nFarmers with a higher knowledge score are expected to be less vulnerable to pest attacks or pest damage, and are likely to use less chemical pesticides.\n\nAPPENDIX B. DATA LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL In the Indonesian context, a distinction needs to be drawn between the term village (desa), which is an administrative unit, and hamlet (dusun), which is a social community. A desa typically contains several geographically proximate or adjacent dusuns. The sample was drawn from 22 villages containing 42 hamlets.\nIn eight of the hamlets, the sample contained only untrained farmers, while in six hamlets the sample contained only trained farmers.\nTherefore, while the analysis of the selection of trained farmers pertains to all 22 villages and their 42 hamlets, the analysis of diffusion pertains to 17 villages (and their 29 hamlets) in which the sample contains both trained and untrained farmers. In four villages, there was", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "1300 WORLD DEVELOPMENT only one hamlet each in the sample. The number of sampled trained farmers from any given hamlet is in most cases too small (sometimes only two or three) to form a unit of observation for the present paper’s diffusion analysis, as the model requires the calculation of a mean leadership profile for each communication network.\nThe hamlet is a much more cohesive, social, and communication network than the village, and ideally one would conduct the analysis at the hamlet level. The analysis in the present paper uses the village, rather than the hamlet, as the communication network frame, under the strong assumptions that the social structure in all the hamlets of one village is similar, and the selection process of opinion leaders for training was similar in these hamlets. Under such assumptions, the aggregated samples drawn randomly from the hamlets of a given village are unbiased representations of the social profiles of trained and untrained farmers, within each hamlet of that village, and the estimated average opinion leadership index at the village level represents the type of opinion leadership that an untrained farmer from a hamlet in that village was exposed to.\nAn analysis that utilized data at the hamlet level (omitting all hamlets where there were only three or less graduates or three or less untrained farmers) yielded results that were qualitatively similar, but because a smaller sample (only 84 untrained farmers compared to 117) could be utilized, the statistical significance of several of the variables was low, although the signs and the magnitudes of the key parameters were similar to that of the analysis at the village level, and the key result of the paper holds. That is, even with the smaller sample, the parameter of Dij in Table 4 is significant, although the parameter of the square of Dij is not significant (t = 1.51), but negative.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# Growing together or growing apart? A village level study of the impact of the Doha round on rural China\n\nMarijke Kuiper & Frank van Tongeren Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) – Wageningen UR Paper prepared for the 7 [th] Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, _Trade, Poverty and the Environment_, Washington D.C. June 17-19, 2004 First draft, May 2004 Abstract Most studies of the opening of the Chinese economy focus on the national level. The few existing more disaggregated analyses are limited to analyzing changes in agricultural production. In this paper we employ an innovative village equilibrium model which accounts for nonseparability of household production and consumption decisions. This allows us to analyze the impact of trade liberalization on household production, consumption and off-farm employment, the interactions among these three aspects of household decisions, as well as the interactions among households in a village economy. Analyzing the impact of trade liberalization we find changes in relative prices of inputs and outputs and outside village employment to have opposite impacts on household decisions. Price changes affect the labor intensity of rice production as households switch between intensive two-season and on-season rice in response to changes in their shadow wages. Outside village employment opportunities induce a less labor intensive rice cropping. The consequent drop in demand for traction services reduces cash income for those households that do not have access to migration and thus economic growth in coastal areas affects them indirectly through the village factor market. In terms of aggregate village agricultural supply response we find the impact of the increase in employment to dominate aggregate response. As a result the marketed surplus of case study village is found to be shifting from rice to livestock.\n\nA gradual integration in the global economy, combined with far-reaching domestic reforms, has led China to be a showcase of attaining rapid economic growth through market reforms. The rapid economic growth during the past decades, however, has been accompanied by an increasing disparity between coastal and interior regions and between rural and urban areas. The coastal cities benefited most from the increasing export opportunities, due to a combination of geographical factors and deliberate policies (Démurger _et al._, 2002).\n\nThe extent of reform in combination with the size of the Chinese economy, has resulted in a body of literature with a growth rate rivaling China’s GDP growth. Most studies of the opening of the Chinese 1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "economy to the rest of the world focus at the national level. One exception is a study by Diao _et al._ (2003) on the regional impact of China’s recent WTO accession. As in other national level studies, they find a positive aggregate effect for China as a whole. This aggregate effect obscures differences across regions. Reflecting past trends of diverging growth between coastal and inland provinces (see for example Démurger _et al._, 2002; Jones _et al._, 2003), income gaps between provinces are found to widen following WTO accession. They also find rural-urban migration providing an important mechanism for transmitting urban growth to the rural areas. Especially central provinces bordering the booming coastal provinces (Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei and Hunan), benefit from an increase in ruralurban migration.\n\nA second exception to the common use of a national level analysis is a study by Huang _et al._ (2003) analyzing the impact of WTO accession on farm households. They find that despite a small positive aggregate impact of the WTO, the distribution of benefits gives cause for concern. Households in richer coastal areas benefit most, having higher yielding lands and cultivating internationally competitive crops. Another interesting finding of their household level analysis is an increase in agricultural production, despite a decrease in the agricultural price index. Farmers respond to the changes in relative prices induced by the WTO by shifting to more competitive activities (livestock, fish, vegetables and rice), resulting in a net increase in agricultural production.\n\nThese two studies show that a disaggregated analysis of the impact of trade reform yields insights that cannot be attained from national level studies. Our objective in this paper is to contribute a village level perspective on trade reform in China. Adjustment responses of different household types and within-village interactions are central to this analysis. This study complements earlier studies by zooming in on the differential impact of trade liberalization on households within a village. A new methodology that accounts for family-farm production specifics in a village-economy setting gives us a unique perspective on the impact of trade reform. Going beyond the household level study of Huang _et al_ . (2003) we account in addition for the impact of farm income on rural household consumption.\nWe furthermore account for the impact of rural-urban migration, thus not limiting the analysis to developments in the agricultural sector.\n\nIn this study we combine a macro level analysis of trade reform, with a village level general equilibrium model of a rice-producing village in Jiangxi Province. To be able to combine the macro and village level analysis of trade reform, we need to ascertain how trade reform affects households.\nPrices and labor demand form the key transmission mechanisms through which macro level trade reform affects rural households (Winters, 2002). We therefore focus on changes in prices for agricultural inputs and outputs, and on the increased demand for labor by labor-intensive sectors in which China has a comparative advantage.\n\nOur analyses of further trade reform builds on a baseline that encompasses China’s recent WTO accession, phasing out of export quota for textiles under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. We use the GTAP model to generate macro-level impacts of further reform under a WTO –Doha round and feed these into the village-level model.\n\nThe village equilibrium model incorporates farm-household models, allowing us to analyze the impact of changes in farm production, off-farm employment and household consumption, as well as the interactions among these three components of household decisions. Since households differ in their 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "endowments and access to off-farm employment, household response to changes in the socioeconomic environment differ.\n\nAnalyzing the impact of changing in agricultural input and output prices we find an increased village supply of rice and other livestock, which corresponds with the findings of national level studies and with the results of the household analysis in Huang _et al._ (2003). This increased supply of rice, however, is the net result of two household groups increasing rice production, and two household groups reducing rice production. Analyzing the impact of an increase in outside village employment following trade liberalization, we find it matters whether economic growth is limited to the coastal areas or spread more evenly throughout the country because of differential access to outside province migration. The net impact of an evenly spreads increase in employment on supply response is a decrease in rice supply, caused by an increasing scarcity of labor. Again we find diverging household response, with some households increasing rice production due to lower costs of animal traction rented within the village. The combined impact of price and employment changes following trade liberalization is a decrease in rice supply from the village. In terms of the village supply response, the impact of the increased employment thus dominates the impact of the change in prices.\n\nWhen analyzing the income effects of trade liberalization we find it matters considerably whether we account for reduced household consumption due to migrants. Ignoring the consumption of migrants, trade liberalization would reduce within-village income inequality; accounting for the consumption impact we find that trade liberalization worsens within-village income distribution.\n\nThis paper is structured as follows. We start by providing some background on non-separability of household decisions and how this affects the structure of the village equilibrium model. The second section discusses the data and models used in this study. The third section focuses on the impact of price changes, employment and the combination of these two aspects of trade liberalization on household agricultural production decisions. Section four then analyzes the aggregate village supply response as well as the income and welfare impact of trade liberalization. Section five concludes.\n\n1 A household perspective on general equilibrium modeling As illustrated above, a disaggregated perspective can lead to new insights in the impact of trade reform. Analyzing the household level impact of trade reform, the study of Huang _et al._ (2003) comes closest to the approach taken in this study. Due to data limitations their analysis is limited to analyzing changes in agricultural production, ignoring both changes in household consumption decisions and off-farm employment. Separating farm production decisions from household consumption decisions is standard in general equilibrium models, both macro as well as existing village general equilibrium models. Ignoring the interdependency of household production and consumption decisions, however, can be misleading when market imperfections render these two aspects of household decisions nonseparable.\n\nNonseparability of household production and consumption decisions occurs when the effective price of a commodity used both in production and consumption is not exogenous to the household, but is determined endogenously by household demand and supply. In this case decisions at the production 3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "side will affect demand and supply of the commodity, which affects consumption decisions, and vice versa. Such nonseparability occurs if households are not price-takers in a market, if markets are missing, or if there is a gap between buying and selling prices (Löfgren and Robinson, 1999). The seminal work of de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991) shows how rational behavior of farmers in combination with market failures may give rise to sluggish or counterintuitive household responses.\n\nTo illustrate a number of points regarding nonseparable household models a simple model is postulated. The household is assumed to maximize utility derived from the consumption of an agricultural commodity _Ca_ ( _e.g._ a food crop produced by the household) and leisure _Cl_ . The household faces a production technology producing the food crop ( _Qa_ ) with family labor ( _Lf_ ), hired labor ( _Lh_ ), and a fixed input ( ~~_q_~~ ). The household may also work off-farm ( _Lo_ ), but total labor use cannot exceed the family time-endowment ( _T_ ). The cash constraint provides a third constraint on utility maximization; goods can only be bought if money is earned. In this simple model without savings and transfers this constraint translates to requiring the inflow of money to equal to the outflow.\n\nThis very basic household model can mathematically be described as: max _u_ ( _Ca_, _Cl_ ) utility function (1) _Ca_, _Cl_, _L_ _f_, _Lh_ subject to, _Qa_ [=] _f_ ( _L_ _f_, _Lh_, ~~_q_~~ ) production function (2a) _L_ _f_ + _Lo_ + _Cl_ = _T_ time constraint (2b) _pQa_ + _wLo_ = _pCa_ + _wLh_ cash constraint (2c) where, in addition to the variables defined before, _p_ denotes the price of the food crop and _w_ the wage rate. The three constraints may be collapsed into a single full income constraint, by substituting the production function and time constraint in the cash constraint, and rearranging: _p_ [ _f_ ( _L_ _f_, _Lh_, _q_ ) - _Ca_ ] = _w_ [ _Lh_ - ( _T_ - _L_ _f_ - _Cl_ )] full income constraint (2) Maximization of the utility function (1) subject to the full income constraint (2) yields input demand, output supply and consumption decisions of the household.\n\nIn the mathematical description the interaction between production and consumption decisions is not immediately obvious. Due to its simplicity the model can also be solved graphically, which does allow a direct view on (non-)separability of household decisions (Taylor and Adelman, 2003). The mathematical description assumes perfect markets for food and labor, which can be purchased and sold at fixed prices _p_ and _w_ . No distinction is made between own produced and purchased food, nor between family and hired labor. Due to the fixed prices, production and consumption decisions can be separated, as is illustrated in Figure 1.\n\nThe household faces a trade-off between producing food crop and leisure, depicted by the production possibility frontier (PPF). The optimal production level with perfect markets (PM [P] ) is at the point where the slope of the PPF equals the price-ratio between labor and food. Optimal consumption with perfect markets (PM [C] ) is at the point where the marginal rate of substitution equals the price ratio.\nThese are standard micro-economic results from producer and consumer theory, reflecting the 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "production possibility frontier", "confidence": 0.2601168751716614}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "neoclassical nature of the model. The graphical representation illustrates that first the production problem is solved (moving the line representing the price-ratio until it just touches the PPF), after which the solution to the consumption problem is found (finding the highest indifference curve (I) still touching the relative price line).\n\n**Food crop**\n( _Qa_, _Ca_ ) _Qapm_ _Qanm_ = _Canm_ _Capm_\n\n**PM** **[P]**\n\n**NM**\n\n**PM** **[C]**\n\n**I** _**[pm]**_\n\n**I** _**[nm]**_\n\n_-w/p_ _Clnm_ _Clpm_ _Lpm_ = _Lhpm_ + _T_ - _Clpm_\n\n- ω / ρ\n\n**PPF**\n\n_T_ **Leisure** ( _Cl_ ) Source: adapted from Taylor and Adelman (2003)\n\n**Figure 1:** **Household production and consumption decisions with perfect markets (pm) and no markets (nm)**\n**for food and labor**\n\nThe opposite extreme from perfect markets is an absence of all markets. In this case prices are no longer given, but determined by the interplay of production and consumption decisions. In terms of Figure 1 this implies finding the point (NM) where the indifference curve I [nm] touches upon the PPF.\nIn this point the household consumes all the output it produces, and the amount of labor it uses equals the time-constraint minus leisure. In this case the prices of food and labor are no longer exogenous.\nInstead they are endogenous shadow prices ( ω and ρ) that cannot be observed in the absence of trade 5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "with the outside world. The graphical representation illustrates the nonseparability: the optimal point is now found by simultaneously dealing with consumption decisions represented by the indifference curve and production decisions represented by the production possibility frontier.\n\nThis basic household model and its graphical solution illustrate a number of points that are essential to farm household modeling. First, standard economic rules for production and consumption remain valid. Differences with a separate analysis of production and consumption decisions occur because of endogenous prices, not because of different behavior by the household. This result implies that standard approaches to modeling production and consumption decisions may be also followed.\nAlthough the analytical framework remains the same, endogenous household prices complicate the development of an applied model. The household shadow prices are an analytical construct and thus cannot be directly observed. This complicates the estimation of demand and supply functions for nonseparable household models.\n\nSecond, household models tend to generate ambiguous result and easily become analytically intractable. Ambiguous results may already occur with perfect markets. In the graphical example given above, assume that prices for food increase The price-ratio line will flatten and the point of tangency to the PPF will be at a higher level of food production. The increase in production and prices increases income of the household. The household will be able to shift to a higher indifference curve and increases its food consumption. The increase in food consumption may outweigh the increase in food production, depending on the preferences of the household. The food price increase then does not lead to an unequivocal increase in marketed surplus. If an analytical solution of the household model can be derived, it will generally be difficult to sign because of counteracting effects on the production and consumption sides of the household. In models with multiple missing markets interdependencies between variables will prevent derivation of an analytical solution. Problems in deriving an analytical solution and ambiguous results of analytical solutions, if they can be derived, are important reasons for the development of quantitative household models.\n\nThird, accounting for different levels of market integration of households has clear policy relevance.\nAs the graphical solution in Figure 1 illustrates, integration in markets increases the welfare of the household. Apart from the welfare implications for the household, interaction between producer and consumer decisions may result in unexpected results. For example, if the objective of a food price policy is to increase the marketed surplus, limited market integration of households may yield adverse results. Household models help in understanding counterintuitive response to policy changes, as well as identifying possible complementary policies that promote the desired response.\n\nNonseparability has become an important feature of household models, but is absent in existing general equilibrium models. A study by Löfgren and Robinson (1999) provides a stylized application of including farm-household models in a general equilibrium model, but this approach has not yet been implemented in an empirical analysis.\n\nGiven the recent transformations in China, markets are still developing and imperfections can be expected to be abound. Studies of factors influencing migration decisions (Hare, 1999; Murphy, 2000; Rozelle _et al._, 1999a; Rozelle _et al._, 1999b) and of patterns in inequality (Benjamin and Brandt, 1999), refer to imperfect land, labor and credit markets as being relevant in the Chinese context. Such 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "a partial integration in markets may give rise to nonseparability of household decisions, or may create (thin) local markets through which household decisions affect each other.\n\nIf households interact with each other in local village markets, and these markets are not integrated with markets outside of the village, local general equilibrium effects occur. Studies of market integration in China find villages to be integrated in markets for major outputs (Huang _et al._, 2003) and for fertilizer (Qiao _et al._, 2003). While villages may thus be assumed to be integrated in agricultural input and output markets, integration of factor markets is limited. Labor markets are highly segmented (Gilbert and Wahl, 2003), resulting in a rural labor surplus (Cook, 1999). Village labor markets, however, can be expected to be limited. Due to the collective ownership of land, all households have access to land. Lacking landless households and generally having similar agricultural production patterns, there is little scope for local labor markets.\n\nWhile limiting the prospect for local labor markets, collective ownership of land results in village land markets. Land rights remain ambiguous, in spite of land tenure reforms that have granted household user rights for 30 years, and recently were changed to permit inheritance (Huang and Rozelle, 2004).\nLand is allocated on the basis of demographic criteria, and readjustments occur to adjust for changes in household size, despite formal household user rights. The result is an ambiguous land tenure situation (Ho, 2001) in which households have an incentive to keep their land cultivated to avoid loosing it during a next readjustment. Households that migrate to urban areas therefore rent their land to other households, to maintain their claim to the land in case they are unable to secure a living in the urban areas. Given the ambiguity of land tenure, land rental markets are restricted to villagers, resulting in local land markets.\n\nVillage interactions may also arise through informal credit markets. Government intervention in the formal banking sector remains strong. Regulated interest rates are well-below market clearing levels, while soft loans to state enterprises seize a large share of available funds. Rural households are thus rationed out of credit markets. In the late 1980s, rural cooperative funds developed, targeted at rural households. These funds proofed too successful competitors of existing rural credit cooperatives and were dissolved in 1999 (Park _et al._, 2003). As a result of the lack of formal credit options, household have to rely on loans from friends and relatives, generating local informal credit markets.\n\nDespite the integration in agricultural input and output markets, local markets for land and capital are thus expected to exist, and imperfect labor markets are expected to result in nonseparability of household production and consumption decisions. In this study we therefore use a village level general equilibrium model to account for the interactions among households in local markets, while paying due attention to nonseparability of household decisions.\n\nTaylor and Adelman (1996) pioneered the use of general equilibrium models at village level. Their model closely follows the structure of macro level models, for example by modeling production at sector level, which misses the impact of nonseparability of household decisions. We take a different approach to village modeling, placing differences in household response due to nonseparability at the center of the model. This household perspective on general equilibrium modeling results in a different model structure than used in macro level general equilibrium models and in existing village level models. We model production activities as being household-specific. This allows for idiosyncratic household response consistent with nonseparability of production and consumption decisions. A 7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "second major difference is the nesting structure used for modeling production decisions. For each activity the structure is calibrated on the household survey data [1] . As a result we have household specific production functions, capturing differences in household access to inputs [2] .\n\nBy placing households at the center of the model, the village model used in this study is able to capture differences in production decisions reflecting differences in access to the inputs, interactions between household production and consumption decisions, and interactions among different households within a village economy.\n\n2 Models and data 2.1 Macro level analysis The macro economic analyses are performed using the GTAP model, with some important modifications to the version 5 database. Van Tongeren and Huang (2004) describes the changes made and the baseline simulation which is the reference for the scenarios used in the present study.\nSpecifically, we have updated policy information on China from the original version 5 GTAP database to include recent changes in domestic policies and changes in border policies. In addition we have adjusted the Chinese input-output table to incorporate microdata information on primary factor shares. We also made adjustments to the data on livestock production and – consumption. Using macro-economic information, and incorporating known imminent policy changes, we project the database forward in time to the year 2010 and beyond. The policy changes along the baseline include the full implementation of China’s WTO accession and the phasing out of export quota under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. This baseline is the reference for simulations to assess the effects of further trade liberalization under the WTO Doha round.\n\nOur experiment reduces multilaterally the support to agriculture grouped under the three classical pillars, market access, export competition and domestic support, and it reduces border distortions in non-agricultural sectors. The simulation for agriculture follows closely the original modalities proposal tabled in 2002 by the European Commission (European Commission, 2002). This proposal contained a certain asymmetry between the treatment of OECD countries and developing countries.\nSpecifically, we model a reduction of import tariffs by –36% for trade amongst OECD countries and total elimination of import barriers against LDCs, while LDCs themselves are not reducing their import barriers. In the area of export competition, we reduce the value of subsidies by -45% in OECD countries only, and eliminate fully the export subsidies on wheat and oilseeds. In the area of domestic support, the AMS ceiling is lowered by -55%, but the blue box payments are maintained. All reductions are made from the final Uruguay Round commitments. For Non-agricultural Market access, we apply a straight –50% reduction of applied rates. It should be noted that this simulation is illustrative for the possible effects of a successful round. Within the spectrum of proposals offered prior to the ministerial meeting in Cancun, September 2003, the EC proposal is rather conservative.\nAn assessment of the more far-reaching proposals tabled by the CAIRNS group and the US are discussed in Van Tongeren and van Meijl (2004).\n\n1 This calibration also rejected the commonly assumed separability of factors and intermediate inputs, and this assumption was therefore dropped in the village equilibrium model.\n\n8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["GTAP database"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["household survey data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "version 5 database", "confidence": 0.45399612188339233}, {"text": "GTAP database", "confidence": 0.3188023567199707}, {"text": "Chinese input-output table", "confidence": 0.252285897731781}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "microdata information on primary factor shares", "confidence": 0.2866908609867096}, {"text": "data on livestock production and – consumption", "confidence": 0.1830219030380249}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey data", "confidence": 0.9271080493927002}]}}}
{"input": "The main findings for China from the Doha simulation can be summarized as follows. Processed food, labor intensive horticulture and textiles obtain the highest production gain. In these sectors, China has already a comparative advantage, and exports are an important part of total demand. For processed food tariffs cuts are relatively high and exports are important. We observe a modest output growth in rice. For textiles tariff cuts are modest but exports are very important, so export growth leads to growth production. We also observe an increase in livestock output.\n\nWhile exports are estimated to grow in some products, the further reduction of remaining import barriers also enables China to import more products. Imports in such commodities as coarse grains, sugar, cotton, dairy and intensive livestock products are expected to rise.\n\nTable 1: Shocks administered to village model (% change with respect to base) _Trade_ _Price changes_ _Employment_ _liberalization_\n**Agricultural outputs** One season rice 2 - 2\nTwo season rice 2 - 2 Other crops 2 - 2 Cattle 2 - 2 Pigs 2 - 2 Other livestock 2 - 2\n**Agricultural inputs** Fertilizer 0 - 0\nHerbicides 0 - 0 Pesticides 0 - 0 Seed 2 - 2 Purchased feed 2 - 2 Other inputs 1 - 1\n**Consumption goods** Food 2 - 2\nProcessed food 2 - 2 Nonfood 1 - 1 Durables 1 - 1 Other expenditures 1 - 1\n\n**Wages** Non-agricultural employment - 3 3\nMigration, inside province - 3 3 Migration, outside province - 3 3\n**Outside employment** Non-agricultural employment - 9 9\nMigration, inside province - 9 9 Migration, outside province - 7 7 It can be concluded that China can gain a lot from a new WTO round, but most from liberalization in manufacturing. Around 60% of the potential income gains can be attributed to improved market access for manufacturing goods into OECD countries. Labor intensive manufacturing and food processing industries have the potential to absorb labor and generate incomes in activities outside 2 Detailed description of the village equilibrium model and calibration procedures can be obtained from the 9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Doha simulation", "confidence": 0.3720053732395172}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "primary agriculture. Expanding labor intensive industries in rural areas may be part of a rural development strategy.\n\nThe simulation is performed relative to the year 2010 baseline, and yields amongst other things changes in market prices for key commodities in China, and changes in manufacturing labor demand.\nThese results are fed into the village CGE model. Table 1 summarizes the shocks administered to the village model.\n\n2.2 Linking the macro results to the village model To link the macro analysis to the village model, we follow the conceptual framework of Winters (2002), and focus on prices and labor demand. Studies of market integration of three main staple crops and fertilizer (Huang _et al._, 2003; Qiao _et al._, 2003) show integrated regional and national markets, with village level prices responding to changes at national level. These integrated commodity markets allow us to translate relative price changes derived from the macro level analysis to the village level. As in Huang _et al_ . (2003) we use a price transmission coefficient of 0.75 to link macro national level price changes to village level price changes, for commodities that are traded outside the village. This implies that a 1 percent change in the national price is modeled as resulting a 0.75 percent change in village level prices. A less than unitary transmission coefficient reflects existing frictions in domestic trade in China. These frictions are expected the persist in the future, given the findings in Poncet (2003), of a disintegration of domestic markets alongside the continuing integration of China in international markets.\n\nIn addition to the transmission of price changes, we analyze the impact of changes in employment opportunities. Studies of trade liberalization find an expansion of labor-intensive sectors in which China has a comparative advantage. We thus need to link an aggregate expansion of employment to village level changes in outside village employment. Lacking data to quantify the link between national level changes in employment and household decisions, we assume percentages changes in aggregate labor demand to be completely transmitted to the village. Percentages changes in outside village employment are thus set equal to changes in aggregate labor demand. Such a one-on-one relation between national level employment and off-farm activities of the households in the case study village seems justified given the findings in Diao _et al._ (2003). Comparing the change in rural-urban migration across regions following WTO accession, they find the fastest increase in rural-urban migration in the central provinces. The case study village is located in Jiangxi, one of these central provinces, and migration outside of the province plays an important role in the village economy, justifying the assumption of a complete transmission of the demand for labor to the village level.\n\n2.3 The case study village The case-study village has been selected to be representative of rice producing villages in the plain areas of Jiangxi Province, one of the poorer provinces in China. Data on production and consumption of 168 households were collected for 2000, using standard household questionnaires with questions authors.\n\n10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["Data on production and consumption of 168 households"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Data on production and consumption of 168 households", "confidence": 0.4659413695335388}], "vague_data": [{"text": "standard household questionnaires", "confidence": 0.18033243715763092}]}}}
{"input": "on source and destination of commodities added to allow construction of a village SAM. These surveyed households account for about a quarter of the village population, totaling 729 households.\n\nDifferences among households are at the center of our village equilibrium model. Four groups of households are distinguished, using ownership of draught power (cattle or tractor) and access to outside province employment as grouping criteria. The resulting groups represent households with differential capacity for earning a living from agriculture and from (transitory) migration to coastal cities.\n\nTable 2 presents the activities of each household type in terms of contribution to value-added. For all household types off-farm employment contributes a significant share of income, but there exist important differences in the nature of non agricultural income sources. Comparing the two household groups lacking a link outside the province, we find households lacking draught power oriented more towards local off-farm employment, with agricultural activities contributing about 60 percent to valued-added. The households with draught power obtain about 70 percent of value-added from agriculture, which is similar to the importance of agriculture for the other household group owning draught power. The household group with access to migration but lacking draught power derives about 40 percent of value-added from outside province migration, and only derives about 45 percent of value-added from agricultural activities. Differential access to agricultural and migration opportunities is thus reflected in the composition of to value-added.\n\nTable 2: Activity composition (percentage of value-added) _Link outside province:_ _No link_ _Link_ _Village_ _Owning draught power:_ _No_ _Yes_ _No_ _Yes_ _N=_ _78_ _100_ _256_ _295_ _729_\n**Agriculture** One season rice 9.4 10.8 8.2 10.5 9.5\nTwo season rice 28.5 28.2 18.6 27.1 23.9 Other crops 21.2 24.7 18.4 22.4 20.9 Cattle - 7.5 - 8.1 4.1 Pigs 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 Other livestock 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0\n**Village employment** Agricultural labor 1.3 2.2 - 0.1 0.4\nLocal business 19.4 13.5 2.4 2.7 5.2\n**Outside village** Outside employment 18.0 12.9 9.1 5.4 8.9\n**Migration** Inside province 2.1 - 4.2 0.9 2.3\nOutside province - - 38.8 22.3 24.6 _100_ _100_ _100_ _100_ _100_ Note: ‘-‘ indicates that the household is not involved in this activity Differences in activities result in differences in income patterns across the four household groups.\nTable 3 presents income per adult consumer equivalent [3] to allow a direct comparison across 3 Adult equivalent instead of per capita consumption is used to account for differences in consumption between males and females and between age groups. Lacking survey data, conversion factors were taken from detailed 11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "detailed", "confidence": 0.2072640061378479}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data", "confidence": 0.6217327117919922}, {"text": "surveyed households", "confidence": 0.1094944179058075}]}}}
{"input": "households. The first thing to note is that the household group with an outside link and draught power has the highest income per adult consumer equivalent. This is in line with the assumptions made when grouping households in terms of opportunities for earning agricultural and nonagricultural income.\nThe two household groups without an outside link have similar incomes.\n\nTable 3: Sources of household full income (percentage of total income) and total income (yuan) _Link outside province:_ _No link_ _Link_ _Village_ _Owning draught power:_ _No_ _Yes_ _No_ _Yes_\n\n**Labor** shadow wage income 57.4 52.8 52.6 62.1 57.4\n\nabove shadow wage income 17.5 12.3 23.3 6.0 13.5\n\n**Land** irrigated land shadow income 12.4 13.3 12.8 11.4 12.1\n\nirrigated land above shadow income 4.8 6.5 1.4 4.5 3.7 non-irrigated land 7.3 7.9 7.7 6.6 7.2\n\n**Capital** Cattle - 3.3 - 3.1 1.8\n\nTractor - 1.6 - 0.8 0.6\n\n**Transfer** within village transfers 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.3\n\nreceipts from outside village 0.0 1.9 2.2 5.0 3.3\n\n**Income/adult consumer equivalent (1,000 yuan)** **4.4** **4.3** **5.0** **5.5** **5.0**\n\nNote: ‘-‘ indicates that the household does not receive income from this source Specific features of the village SAM and equilibrium model appear in Table 3, in splitting income from labor and irrigated land between shadow income [4] and above shadow income. The household survey data reveal imperfect labor and land markets. Households are involved in a variety of off-farm activities with different wages. These wages are well above the estimated shadow wage, indicating restricted access to off-farm employment and suggesting a situation of labor surplus at the local level.\nThis does not come unexpected, given the high population density in China and similar findings in a study by Bowlus (2003). In the SAM and village equilibrium model the demand-constrained labor market is accounted for by valuing labor against household-specific shadow wages, estimated using the household survey data. In case of off-farm activities, labor then earns a revenue above the shadow wage which is tracked in a separate account of the SAM.\n\nThere is trade in irrigated land (paddy fields), with all four household groups renting in land. Dealing with a village level analysis we would expect the land market to balance. In total, however, households rent in an amount of irrigated land equal to about a third of their contracted land, that is not supplied by surveyed households. When conducting the survey using an official list obtained from the village administration, a number of the randomly selected households were found to have permanently left the village. These were replaced with households of which at least some members consumption data of a study in Bangladesh (Zeller _et al._, 2001). In addition to differences in age and gender, consumer equivalents were corrected for the length of absence of household members due to migration.\n4 Nonseparability results in household-specific shadow prices balancing households’ demand and supply that cannot be observed. We therefore estimated a production function, explaining the total value of household output by labor, land, manure, feed and external inputs. Based on the estimated production function we computed for each household in the sample the household-specific shadow prices for household non-tradables as the marginal value product of each input. Averaging over the households constituting a household group renders a shadow price for each household nontradable that differs across household groups. These shadow prices are used in constructing the SAM and in calibrating the village equilibrium model.\n\n12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["consumption data of a study in Bangladesh"], "vague_data": ["household survey data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "village SAM", "confidence": 0.13390514254570007}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "consumption data of a study in Bangladesh", "confidence": 0.5863558053970337}, {"text": "official list obtained from the village administration", "confidence": 0.2758297622203827}, {"text": "household survey data", "confidence": 0.14107178151607513}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey data", "confidence": 0.9267999529838562}]}}}
{"input": "were still living in the village, resulting in a biased sample. Lacking households that have moved to the cities, our sample misses the supply of land by households that have moved to the cities. As discussed in Section 1, the combination of collective ownership with household user rights has resulted in an ambiguous land tenure system. This applies to the case study village, were according to the survey data, land reallocations are still occurring. Migrated households thus have an incentive in keeping their land cultivated by renting it to other households.\n\nGiven the ambiguous land tenure system, assuming a perfect land market seems a far stretch from the pattern observed in the data. We therefore estimated a shadow price for irrigated land, which on average was about 1.5 times the rent paid for the land. This result fits a distorted land market, where insecure land tenure prevents households leaving the village from obtaining a rent reflecting the true production value of the land. At the demand side, this implies that households can rent land for a price well below the productive value of the land. In the SAM and village equilibrium model this is accounted for by having all household groups earning a profit on the land rented in, which is equal to the difference between the estimated valued of the land and the rent paid. The amount of rented land is kept fixed in the village model, since additional supply is assumed to be associated with the migration of a complete household, which is beyond the scope of this study.\n\nA last remark on the village SAM is the lack of data for modeling capital flows in the village. The SAM shows that the household group most involved in migration is a net supplier of money for the other three groups of households. Although the survey contains some data on the conditions on which money is provided, insufficient information is available to model a village capital market. In the analysis money flows among households are therefore assumed fixed at the level observed in the SAM. This excludes one way through which income from migration could be transmitted through village linkages, thus potentially underestimating the village-wide impact of migration.\n\nTo summarize the discussion so far, we are analyzing the response of four different types of households, distinguished on the basis of their access to agricultural income and income from outside province migration. Analyzing sources of income pointed to imperfect labor and land markets. These are accommodated by estimating household-specific shadow prices, introducing profits earned on offfarm employment and renting of land, and by modeling household production and consumption decisions as nonseparable.\n\n2.4 The village equilibrium model Despite introducing nonseparability of household production and consumption decisions, the mathematical structure of the model closely resembles macro level general equilibrium models.\nConsumption decisions are modeled through a linear expenditure system, while production is modeled by nested CES functions. Because of the level of detail in the village model, we do not observe twoway flows of commodities with the outside world. Households consume farm output, but do not purchase these goods from outside the village, nor from other households in the village. Household sales to outside village markets are thus equal to total production, minus household consumption.\n\nOff-farm employment options were found to be restricted, resulting in wages exceeding the shadow price of labor. This is handled in the village equilibrium model by fixing the levels of outside village employment and having households earn a profit above labor costs on off-farm activities. Levels of 13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["survey data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "village SAM", "confidence": 0.3790086805820465}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data", "confidence": 0.9580765962600708}]}}}
{"input": "village employment (agricultural and nonagricultural) cannot be fixed, although for these activities wages also exceed shadow wages. Demand for agricultural labor is therefore assumed to be demanddriven, with prices being fixed [5] . Demand for village non-agricultural labor is linked to local business activities, discussed below.\n\nVillage markets exist for traction by draught animals or tractors, and for locally produced consumption goods. Of these village markets, only animal traction has an endogenous village price in the model. The SAM indicates that only limited use is made of the tractors. This under-utilization of available tractors is therefore modeled through fixed prices for tractor services, and tractor endowments adjusting to demand (‘unemployment’ closure).\n\nDue to lack of data on other inputs, local business activities use only labor (village non-agricultural labor), yielding a return that exceeds the shadow wages. All households are involved in local business activities and all purchase locally produced goods. This reflects a heterogeneity in goods not captured by the aggregates used in the SAM and village model. Because of lack of data we fix village prices of local goods to deal with the gap between product prices and costs of labor. Assuming fixed prices seems justified since prices of village produced goods are common knowledge, while shadow wages cannot be observed. Given the unobservable character of shadow wages, it seems unlikely that a change in labor costs will be reflected by a changed village price. A second reason for fixing prices of local business activities is the absence of a peak season. Production can therefore be shifted to times when little labor is needed in agriculture, limiting the need to increase the price when shadow wages increase.\n\nFor all demand-driven activities (local consumption goods, hired agricultural labor, tractor services), market equilibrium is established by allocating demand to suppliers based on the market shares observed in the SAM.\n\nSummarizing, the village equilibrium model resembles macro level general equilibrium models by the way in which consumption and production are modeled. A major difference with macro and existing village level models is the household-specific production, which is affected by household consumption decisions through endogenous household shadow. Lack of data resulted in most village markets to be modeled as demand-driven. The only exception is the village market for animal traction, which is balanced through an endogenous village price. Household production and consumption decisions are calibrated on the household survey data, resulting in household-specific demand and supply functions.\n\n3 Household production response to trade liberalization Following the analytical framework of Winters (2002) we analyze two pathways through which trade affects households: prices and employment. We first separately analyze the impact on household response these two aspects of trade liberalization, followed by an assessment of their combined effect.\n\n5 Agricultural wages are a multitude of shadow wages. Households are therefore always willing to supply agricultural labor.\n\n14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["SAM"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["household survey data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "SAM", "confidence": 0.46292927861213684}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household survey data", "confidence": 0.28093644976615906}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey data", "confidence": 0.8200747966766357}]}}}
{"input": "3.1 Household level impact of price changes Trade liberalization increases prices of all agricultural outputs and some inputs. In terms of crop production, all household groups show a limited response in other crop production, and a significant change in rice production (Table 4). This difference in response is due to the fixed amount of land used in other crops. This is the only activity which uses non-irrigated land, which is a household nontradable. This fixed input limits the adjustment possibilities, although the change in shadow price of non-irrigated land (Table 5) indicates that households are adjusting to the price changes, despite their limited production response. This provides a classic illustration of the point made in de Janvry _et_ _al._ (1991) that, although market imperfections may cause sluggish production response, households accommodate price changes by making internal adjustments.\n\nTable 4: Household production response to price shocks (% change compared to base) _Link outside province:_ _No link_ _Link_ _Owning draught power:_ _No_ _Yes_ _No_ _Yes_\n**Crops** One season rice 3 84 -12 -22\nTwo season rice 0 -35 6 11 Other crops 0 -1 0 0\n**Livestock** Pig production -11 -84 -1 -7\nOther livestock 148 2420 16 104 In the case of rice, land can be allocated between two different types of rice production. One season rice consists of a single crop, while two season rice is a double-cropping system. Consisting of two crops, the latter uses more inputs, for example for transplanting which is a rather labor intensive activity. This difference in labor requirements accounts for the difference between households with no link outside the province (moving to one season rice) and those with a link outside the province (moving to two season rice).The exogenous increase in rice prices raises shadow wages, which are based on the value of their marginal product. _Ceteris paribus,_ the increase in the price of rice makes two season rice more attractive than one season rice, since it has a higher yield. This higher yield, however, is obtained through a more intensive production. Expanding two season rice thus requires more labor, increasing shadow wages. For the two household groups lacking an outside link, this increase in production costs counterweighs the exogenous increase in output prices.\n\nTable 5: Household-specific price response to price shocks for traded commodities (% change compared to base) _Link outside province:_ _No link_ _Link_ _Owning draught power:_ _No_ _Yes_ _No_ _Yes_\n**Agricultural output** Two season rice 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.0\nPig production 2.0 4.6 2.0 2.0 Feed 3.4 9.4 2.4 3.4\n**Endowments** Family labor 2.7 7.2 1.2 4.3\n**(shadow wages and** Irrigated land 2.6 5.0 2.0 2.7\n**rental rates)** Non-irrigated land 1.0 -2.4 2.4 0.2\n\n15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "As the more moderate shadow wage increases in Table 5 suggests, the two household groups with an outside link have a larger labor endowment, even after accounting for the absence of household members due to migration. As a result their shadow wage increases less, despite shifting to more intensive rice cultivation. The shadow wage increase of 7.2 percent for the household with no outside link but owning draught power, reflects that this household type has the smallest labor endowment, explaining its shift to one season rice.\n\nIf we then turn to the livestock activities, we find pig production to be reduced, while other livestock production increases. These different responses have to do with differences in production technology.\nPig production is largely based on farm-produced feed, mainly consisting of crop-residues that are relatively fixed in supply. An increase in pig production will raise the price of feed, being a household nontradable, making it a less attractive activity. Other livestock uses mainly purchased feed and a limited amount of labor. The feed is purchased outside the village against a fixed price, and other livestock production can thus be expanded as long as cash and labor are available.\n\nThe household owing draught power and lacking an outside link, shows a dramatic expansion in other livestock production. This expansion is less dramatic than it seems at first sight because of the small size of this activity in the SAM, accounting for only 0.1 percent of value added. The attraction of other livestock for this household is that it uses much more purchased feed, as opposed to farmproduced feed, than the other household types. As a result the response of this household is less affected by the increasing costs of farm-produced feed, resulting in its strong production response.\n\nHouseholds consume part of their own production. With the linear expenditure system, consumption of farm output is inelastic. The change in production is thus not matched by a change in consumption, resulting in a stronger change in marketed surplus than in produced output (Table 6). The strong production response of the household owning draught power and lacking an outside link, is reflected by its withdrawal from the market for two season rice and pigs. For these two activities this household limits production to its own consumption needs. Not being active in the market, the market price is no longer relevant. Instead two season rice and pigs have a household-specific shadow price which exceeds the market price that still holds for the other three household groups (see Table 5).\n\nTable 6: Household marketed surplus response to price shocks (% change compared to base) _Link outside province:_ _No link_ _Link_ _Owning draught power:_ _No_ _Yes_ _No_ _Yes_\n**Crops** One season rice 12 119 -24 -43\nTwo season rice -4 -100 19 39 Other crops -9 -12 1 -5\n**Livestock** Pig production -11 -100 -2 -10\nOther livestock 332 5123 62 284 The discussion of price changes focused on the impact of changes in agricultural prices. The scenario analyzed also includes an increase in the price of consumption goods. Given nonseparability, this 16", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "price increase may affect household production decisions. The impact of the price of consumer goods on production are found to be minor, and are therefore not discussed further.\n\n3.2 Household level impact of changes in outside village employment We now turn to analyzing the impact of labor demand, providing the second pathway through which trade liberalization affects households. Demand for agricultural labor is determined endogenously by agricultural production decisions, and we therefore focus this section on non-agricultural employment.\nAs discussed in the introduction, economic growth in China has concentrated in the coastal provinces, resulting in an uneven distribution of the benefits of growth. Lacking information to link national level changes to regional changes in non-agricultural sectors, we can only make a crude assessment of the impact of uneven economic development, through a two-step analysis of changes in nonagricultural employment. To capture the concentration of economic growth in the coastal cities, we start by analyzing the impact of an increase in outside province employment.\n\nOnly two of the four households groups have access to outside province employment. Comparing the production response between the household groups with and without access to outside province, we find opposite production responses, which is most pronounced for rice (Table 7). Households that have an increased opportunity for outside province migration, move from one season to two season rice, reducing demand for labor which has become more scarce. The households lacking access to outside province migration move in the opposite direction by increasing two season rice production.\nSince these household are not directly affected by the increased migration opportunities, interactions in local markets cause their response. It turns out that interactions in the village market for animal traction transmit the effects of the increased migration, and therefore mainly affect the household owning draught power. The shift to one season rice by the migration households reduces the demand for animal traction, resulting in a decrease of the price for traction. The two households not involved in migration do not face a increased shadow wage, which combined with the lower costs for traction makes the more intensive two season rice production more attractive.\n\nTable 7: Household production response to increase in outside province migration (% change) _Link outside province:_ _No link_ _Link_ _Owning draught power:_ _No_ _Yes_ _No_ _Yes_\n**Crops** One season rice -2 -22 5 77\nTwo season rice 1 10 -2 -34 Other crops 0 0 -1 0\n**Livestock** Pig production 0 0 3 -2\nOther livestock -5 -47 -24 93 The reduction in the price of animal traction also reduces cash income of the two household groups owning draught power. For the household group with access to migration, this decrease in cash income is outweighed by an increase in remittances. A net increase in cash remains, which in combination with the higher shadow wage results in an expansion of other livestock production. The household lacking access to migration faces a reduction in the available cash due to the decreased 17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "incomes from renting animal traction services. This household group also has the most capital intensive other livestock production, resulting in a contraction of this activity.\n\nOnly shocking outside province employment thus shows that because of asymmetric access to outside province migration and village interactions, opposing production changes occur. Despite a concentration of economic growth in coastal cities, other regions benefit from trade liberalization as well. Since all household types are involved in off-farm employment, they will all benefit from an increased demand for nonagricultural labor outside the village. An increase in all types of off-farm employment, either inside or outside the province, has a similar impact as found above for the two households with an outside province link (Table 8). Migration outside the province accounts for about 70 percent of their off-farm employment income, and the analysis above about covers the impact of an increase in outside village employment.\n\nTable 8: Household production response to increase in outside village employment (% change compared to base) _Link outside province:_ _No link_ _Link_ _Owning draught power:_ _No_ _Yes_ _No_ _Yes_\n**Crops** One season rice -15 15 8 77\nTwo season rice 5 -6 -4 -33 Other crops 0 0 -1 0\n**Livestock** Pig production 2 3 4 -1\nOther livestock -44 -47 -27 78 Of the two households lacking an outside province link, the household owning draught animals shows a qualitatively different response in terms of rice production, than when analyzing outside province migration. This household type has a limited involvement in outside village employment (accounting for 12 percent of its value-added), but having the smallest labor endowment its shadow wage does increase when off-farm employment increases. At the same time, the demand for animal traction drops further, due to the twice as strong reduction in two-season rice of the household with an outside link but not owning draught power. An increasing shadow wage combined with a reduction in cash income that is only partly compensated by an increased off-farm income, the household owning draught power but not having access to migration increases one season rice production. This shift reduces demand for labor and cash, that have both become scarcer.\n\nSummarizing, an increase in outside village employment has a differential impact on households groups, depending on their factor endowments and access to different types of off-farm employment.\nSeparately analyzing an increase in migration to coastal provinces shows that the access to employment by two household groups, triggers a strong production response of the households lacking such access. Local markets for animal traction provide the main link through which these changes are transmitted through the village economy. If the increased demand for labor is not concentrated in the coastal cities, all households benefit from an increase in off-farm income.\nConcentrated versus evenly distributed increase in labor demand qualitatively changes the response of one household type, pointing to a need for a more disaggregated analysis of the impact of trade liberalization.\n\n18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "3.3 Household level impact of trade liberalization Analyzing the two pathways through which trade liberalization affects households resulted in opposing production responses (compare Table 4 and 8). This raises the question what the net impact of these two types of shocks are. Major changes occurred with rice and livestock production, for these activities we therefore indicated whether the increase in agricultural prices or the increase in outside village employment dominates household response. From the entries in Table 9 we can conclude that the dominant aspect of trade liberalization depends on the household type.\n\nTable 9: Household production response to trade liberalization (% change compared to base) (*) _Link outside province:_ _No link_ _Link_ _Owning draught power:_ _No_ _Yes_ _No_ _Yes_\n**Crops** One season rice -32 ( _o_ ) 83 ( _i_ ) -5 ( _a_ ) 78 ( _o_ )\nTwo season rice 11 ( _o_ ) -34 ( _i_ ) 4 ( _a_ ) -33 ( _o_ ) Other crops -1 -1 -1 -0\n**Livestock** Pig production -7 ( _a_ ) -84 ( _i_ ) 3 ( _o_ ) -9 ( _i_ )\nOther livestock 84 ( _a_ ) 2398 ( _i_ ) -15 ( _o_ ) 209 ( _i_ ) Note: ( _a_ ) means the change in agricultural prices dominates; ( _o_ ) means the change in outside village employment dominates; ( _i_ ) means prices and employment have an identical impact in qualitative terms. (*) combined effect of price changes and outside village employment.\n\nIn case of the household type owning draught power and lacking a link outside the province, the two aspects of trade liberalization have the same qualitative impact. The total impact is almost identical to the impact of changing agricultural prices, which is due to the limited involvement in off-farm employment of this household type. The other household group owning draught power has a similar pattern of shifts in agricultural production. In this case the impact of outside village employment dominates, which is not surprising since this already accounts for a quarter of its value-added in the base run. Both household groups owning draught power thus shift to one season rice and other livestock production, but this is because of change in agricultural prices for one household type while being due to changes in outside province migration for the other.\n\nThe two household groups not owning draught power display an opposite shift in crop production, by moving to two season rice. Both earn a significant share of their value-added from outside village employment. Surprisingly, for the household involved in migration the impact of the increase in employment (accounting for 50 percent of value-added) does not dominate its response. The increase in rice prices combined with the decreased costs of animal traction outweighs its increased shadow wage. The importance of off-farm employment thus does not fully determine which aspect of trade liberalization dominates.\n\nThe other household type that does not own draught power earns a smaller part of its income through off-farm employment, and therefore has a more modest increase in its shadow wage (Table 10). For this household type the decreased price of animal traction following an increase in employment outweighs the rise in labor costs, resulting in a shift to two season rice.\n\n19", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Table 10: Household-specific price response to price shocks for traded commodities (% change compared to base) _Link outside province:_ _No link_ _Link_ _Owning draught power:_ _No_ _Yes_ _No_ _Yes_\n**Agricultural output** Two season rice 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.1\nPig production 2.0 4.2 2.0 2.0\n**Endowments** Family labor 8.8 10.3 14.3 8.9\n**(shadow wages and** Irrigated land 1.7 5.2 2.6 3.7\n**rental rates)** Non-irrigated land -0.8 -3.9 -2.3 -0.2\nAnimal traction services n.a. -2.6 n.a. -2.6 Three of the households groups increase other livestock production. This activity uses a lot of external inputs and is constraint by the availability of cash needed for purchasing external inputs. The increase in output prices and outside village employment release this cash constraint, resulting in an spectacular percentage increase in other livestock production. Actual marketable amounts are more modest since it only accounts for a fraction of total output in the base run (see below). The household with an outside link and not owning draught power increases pig production while reducing other livestock production. This different response is due to the household-specific calibration of the production functions. As a result this household type gains more from increasing the amount of purchased feed in pig production than in other livestock production.\n\n4 Village level impact of trade liberalization: supply response and income distribution The previous section focused on differences across household types. This discussion illustrated that differences in household endowment and access to off-farm employment affect household production response. Finding opposing production responses to agricultural price changes and employment changes, begs the question what the aggregate village supply response to trade liberalization is. A second question that comes to mind is which household gains most from the trade liberalization. The second part of this section therefore discusses the income and welfare impacts of trade liberalization.\n\n4.1 Village agricultural supply response As with analyzing household response, we look at price and employment effects of trade liberalization separately before assessing the combined effect on the village marketed surplus (Table 11). We also computed the change in total marketed surplus of rice, summing one and two season rice.\n\nThe discussion of household response was cast in terms of percentage changes, ignoring the different sizes of the household groups. As indicated in Table 2, the two household groups with an outside link are larger than the two household groups lacking such a link. This difference in size affects the contribution of each household group to the village marketed surplus. The household type with an outside link and owning draught power forms the largest group (295 households), and the village marketed surplus follows the same pattern as the production response of this household group.\n\n20", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Table 11: Village marketed surplus with trade liberalization _Price changes_ _Employment changes_ _Trade liberalization_ _(1)_ _(2)_ _(1) and (2) combined_\n**Village marketed surplus (% change compared to base):**\n\nOne season rice -5 63 73 Two season rice 6 -51 -57 _Rice_ _2_ _-14_ _-15_ Other crops -3 -6 -8 Pig production -16 2 -13 Other livestock 1214 2 1253\n\n**Composition of village marketed surplus (% of total surplus):**\nOne season rice 13 32 25 Two season rice 26 17 11 Other crops 9 11 8 Pig production 22 37 23 Other livestock 30 3 32 100 100 100 The change in agricultural prices following trade liberalization increases total exports of rice from the village, due to a shift to two season rice by the two largest household groups. This shift is induced by an increase in rice prices, with most other input prices remaining unaffected. This asymmetric price changes makes intensive rice cultivation more attractive. The increase in other livestock production is largely due to the explosion of the marketed surplus by the household owning draught power but lacking an outside province link (see also Table 6), which is only partly tempered by the relatively small size of this household group (100 households).\n\nThe increased labor demand following trade liberalization has the opposite impact of agricultural price changes. The increasing shadow wages result in a shift to less intensive rice cultivation, and total rice exports from the village drop by 14 percent. Differences across household types in marketed surplus of other livestock almost cancel each other, leaving a very modest 2 percent increase.\n\nCombining price and employment changes, the impact of increased employment dominates the marketed surplus of crops, while agricultural price changes dominate the impact on the marketed surplus of livestock activities. The net result is a decrease in rice exports from the village, while exports from other crops also drop with 8 percent. Declines in household production response of other crops were modest for all three scenarios. But after summing over all households, and accounting for increased household consumption following the increased incomes, the reduction becomes significant at village level.\n\nThe explosion in marketed surplus of other livestock in percentage terms raises questions on the size of the other livestock sector following trade liberalization. Table 2 indicates a limited share of other livestock in production in the village SAM, which amounts to 3 percent of the value of village marketed surplus. The explosion of other livestock production results in ten-fold increase in its 21", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "contribution to the value of village marketed surplus. Simultaneously rice production drops in importance, accounting for 50 percent of marketed surplus in the SAM, which drops to 36 percent following trade liberalization. In terms of total marketed surplus, the village thus can be characterized as shifting from rice-producing to a livestock producing village.\n\n4.2 Household income and welfare The discussion so far has focused on changes in agricultural production which was found to shift considerably in response to changes in prices and employment. The impact of these changes on household income and welfare has been left untouched. Since growing income inequalities are a rising concern in China, we now turn to analyzing income and welfare. Again, we split the impact of trade liberalization in prices, before looking at their combined impact.\n\nTable 12: Changes in full income and welfare following trade liberalization per household and village total _Trade_ _Prices_ _Employment_ _(1) and (2)_ _(1)_ _(2)_ _combined_\n\n**Full income per household (% change):**\n\nNo draught power, no outside province link 2.5 4.2 7.0 Draught power, no outside province link 4.9 1.9 7.0 No draught power, outside province link 1.3 8.0 9.3 Draught power, outside province link 3.2 3.7 6.1\n**Total** **[1]** **increase in full income (% change):** **2.7** **4.9** **7.4**\n\n**Welfare increase per household (EV, 1,000 yuan):**\nNo draught power, no outside province link 0.3 0.5 0.9 Draught power, no outside province link 0.7 0.3 1.0 No draught power, outside province link 0.2 1.3 1.5 Draught power, outside province link 0.6 0.8 1.2\n**Total** **[1]** **welfare increase (EV, 1,000 yuan):** **313.9** **630.0** **910.0**\n\n1 Computed as the sum over all households.\n\nThe upper-part of Table 12 presents percentage changes in full income per household. The household lacking an outside link but owning draught power benefits most from the agricultural price changes.\nThis is a direct result of its activity composition (see Table 2), which focuses on agricultural production. Not surprising given its orientation on outside province migration, the household with an outside link but lacking draught power benefits least from the price change, but most from the increased employment opportunities. The total increase in full income is considerable for all households, ranging from 6 to 9 percent.\n\nThe lower part of Table 12 presents the welfare increase per household, measured by the equivalent variation. The pattern is similar as with the changes in full income. The households owning draught power are oriented towards agriculture and benefit most from the price changes, while the households involved in outside province migration benefit most from the increased employment opportunities.\n\n22", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The total increase in welfare following trade liberalization varies between 900 and 1,500 yuan per household.\n\nTable 13: Full income and cash income per adult equivalent following trade liberalization (,000 yuan) _Base_ _Prices_ _Employment_ _Trade_\n**Full income per adult equivalent:**\n\nNo draught power, no outside province link 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 Draught power, no outside province link 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.6 No draught power, outside province link 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.2 Draught power, outside province link 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.5 _Village average_ _4.1_ _4.2_ _4.3_ _4.4_\n\n**Full income per adult equivalent adjusted for migration:**\nNo draught power, no outside province link 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 Draught power, no outside province link 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.6 No draught power, outside province link 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.6 Draught power, outside province link 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.9\n\n**Cash income per adult equivalent adjusted for migration:**\nNo draught power, no outside province link 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 Draught power, no outside province link 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 No draught power, outside province link 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 Draught power, outside province link 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 The full income and welfare per household indicate that although all households benefit from the trade liberalization, welfare gains are concentrated with the households with access to outside province migration. To assess the impact on the income distribution within the village, Table 13 presents different measures of income per capita. The upper-part presents the full income per adult equivalent, which is the household size measured in male-equivalent consumer units ignoring the absence of migrated household members. As can be expected given the egalitarian distribution of land, income differences are not huge. Note that in terms of income per adult, the household type involved in outside province migration and lacking draught power is the poorest household. Since this household benefits most from the trade liberalization, this would suggest that access to rural-urban migration reduces the income differences.\n\nMeasuring income, however, is a tricky matter. The middle part of Table 13 presents an alternative income measure, adjusting household size for the absence of migrants [6] This turns the ranking of households up-side down and the income distribution appears much less egalitarian. Using his measure, households involved in outside province migration are the richer households to start with and income differences grow with trade liberalization. Accounting for reduced consumption demand with an increase in migration thus increases both the gains from trade liberalization as the widening of income differences.\n\n6 The household survey data only include remittances received from migrants, we thus lack data on the actual income received by the migrants. The remittances are net of the consumption expenditures by the migrants made while being away. We can thus deduct the time which migrants are absent from the consumption needs of the households.\n\n23", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["household survey data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey data", "confidence": 0.7803544998168945}]}}}
{"input": "Through incorporating farm-household models in the village model we are able to measure the full income of households, including the consumption of farm output. Measurements of income or poverty generally need to rely on recorded expenditures, and we therefore included a measure of the cash income of households in the bottom part of Table 13. The cash income is measured as the total expenditures on consumption goods, purchased inside or outside the village. Comparing these numbers to the full income measures shows the importance of the consumption of farm produced output. Comparing across scenarios, the impact of trade liberalization appears limited when measured in terms of cash expenditures. Again, because of the increase in migrants, the household with an outside link and lacking draught power gains most from trade liberalization.\n\n5 Conclusions In this study we employed an innovative village equilibrium model, which fully accounts for the impact of nonseparability on household production and consumption response. This allowed us to analyze the impact of trade liberalization on agricultural supply response and off-farm employment, while accounting for household consumption decisions. To our knowledge this is the first empirical village level study that accounts for nonseparability of household production and consumption decisions, both in construction of village SAM, the structure of the village model and the calibration of household production and utility functions. The village model is used to analyze the impact of trade liberalization which was quantified through a macro level GTAP model. We analyzed the impact of price changes and labor demand, the two major pathways through which international trade affects households.\n\nAnalyzing the impact of changes in agricultural prices we find that labor endowments determine the choice for more or less intensive rice cultivation. Two household groups shift to less intensive one season rice production, since an increase in shadow wages outweighs the increase in rice prices. The other two household groups move in the opposite direction moving to more intensive rice production.\nSince the latter two groups are larger, the village marketed surplus of rice increases in response to the agricultural price changes. The village marketed surplus of other livestock also increases, mainly due to an explosion of this activity by one type of household which uses a lot of external inputs and little labor in producing other livestock. The rise in output prices increases the availability of cash, allowing this household to expand its production.\n\nAnalyzing the impact of an increase in employment we find that it matters whether the increased demand for labor is concentrated in the coastal cities, or spread more evenly throughout the provinces.\nComparing household production response to an increase in outside province employment, we find that households having access to migration move to less labor intensive rice production, while households lacking access to migration move to more labor intensive cultivation. The response of the latter group of households is triggered by a decreased price of animal traction services, due to the lessintensive cultivation of households involved in migration. If both inside and outside province employment increases, one type of household qualitatively changes it production response. A rise in its shadow wage combined with a further decrease in demand for animal traction, has the household owning draught power but lacking an outside province link to shift to one season rice as well. The net impact of an increase in employment is a reduction in the village-marketed surplus of rice.\n\n24", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "village SAM", "confidence": 0.3066428005695343}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The two pathways through which trade affects households thus have an opposite impact on household production response. Assessing the combined effect at household level, the dominant aspect of trade liberalization depends on household endowments and on production activities. We furthermore found that a strong involvement in off-farm employment does not necessarily imply that the employment aspect of trade liberalization dominates household response, hampering a _ex ante_ judgment on the most relevant aspect of trade liberalization for a specific household type.\n\nRising income inequalities are a growing concern in China. Analyzing the income and welfare impacts of trade liberalization we find that although all households benefit, the households involved in outside province migration gain most. Whether this improves or worsens within-village income distribution depends on whether one accounts for the reduction in consumption demand when household members migrate. If the consumption impact of migration is ignored, income distribution improves with trade liberalization. Accounting for the absence of migrants leads to the opposite conclusion, with the richer households gaining most from trade liberalization. Thus although ruralurban migration can transfer benefits from economic growth in the coastal provinces to inland provinces, asymmetric access to migration implies that the rising rural-urban income differences are transferred as well.\n\nThe findings of this study clearly illustrate the advantages of using a village equilibrium model that allows for household-specific production. Opposite movements in production, reflecting different household endowments, temper the village level production response. The impact of differential household endowments would have been missed with a sector level modeling of production which separates firm production decisions from household consumption decisions. The analysis also highlights the importance of local links in transmitting shocks throughout the village economy, despite the village being well integrated in agricultural output and input markets.\n\nGiven the relatively standard data needed for the model, the most important limitation for applying this methodology elsewhere is the amount of detail at village level, which comes at the cost of coverage. A relevant question is whether the results of the case study village are representative for villages outside Jiangxi province. An interesting avenue for answering this question it to use the model as a laboratory for understanding mechanisms and for formulating testable hypotheses on the impact of trade on household incomes and production decisions. Using data collected in other villages, these hypotheses could then be tested to see whether the findings from the village equilibrium model can be generalized.\n\n6 References Benjamin, D., and Brandt, L. (1999). “Markets and inequality in rural China: parallels with the past” in _The American Economic Review,_ Vol. 89, No. 2: 292-295.\nBowlus, A. J., and Sicular, T. (2003). “Moving Towards Markets? Labor Allocation in Rural China” in _Journal of Development Economics,_ Vol. 71: 561-583.\nCook, S. (1999). “Surplus labour and productivity in Chinese agriculture: evidence from household survey data” in _The Journal of Development Studies,_ Vol. 35, No. 3: 16-44.\n\n25", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["household survey data", "data collected in other villages"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "data collected in other villages", "confidence": 0.3143211603164673}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey data", "confidence": 0.9359938502311707}]}}}
{"input": "de Janvry, A., Fafchamps, M., and Sadoulet, E. (1991). “Peasant household behavior with missing markets: some paradoxes explained” in _Economic Journal,_ Vol. 101: 1400-1417.\nDémurger, S., Sachs, J. D., Woo, W. T., Bao, S., and Chang, G. (2002). “The relative contributions of location and preferential policies in China's regional development: being in the right place and having the right incentives” in _China Economic Review,_ Vol. 13: 444-465.\nDiao, X., Fan, S., and Zhang, X. (2003). “China's WTO accession: impacts on regional agricultural income - a multi-region, general equilibrium analysis” in _Journal of Comparative Economics,_ Vol. 31: 332-351.\nEuropean Commission. (2002). “The EC's Proposal for Modalities in the WTO Agriculture Negotiations.” Ref. 625/02, Directorate-General for Trade / Directorate-General for Agriculture, Brussels.\nGilbert, J., and Wahl, T. (2003). “Labor market distortions and China's WTO accession package: an applied general equilibrium assessment” in _Journal of Comparative Economics,_ Vol. 31: 774794.\nHare, D. (1999). “'Push' versus 'pull' factors in migration outflows and returns: determinants of migration status and spell duration among China's rural population” in _The Journal of_ _Development Studies,_ Vol. 35, No. 3: 45-72.\nHo, P. (2001). “Who Owns China's Land? Policies, Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity” in _The China Quarterly,_ Vol., No. 166: 394-420.\nHuang, J., Li, N., and Rozelle, S. (2003). “Trade Reform, Household Effects, and Poverty in Rural China” in _American Journal of Agricultural Economics,_ Vol. 85, No. 5: 1292-1298.\nHuang, J., and Rozelle, S. (2004). “Agricultural Development and Policies in China.” in F. W. v.\nTongeren and J. Huang (eds.) _China's food economy in the early 21st Century; Development_ _of China's food economy and its impact on global trade and on the EU._ Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI), Report 6.04.04, The Hague.\nJones, D. C., Li, C., and Owen, A. L. (2003). “Growth and regional inequality in China during the reform area” in _China Economic Review,_ Vol. 14: 186-200.\nLöfgren, H., and Robinson, S. (1999). “Nonseparable farm household decisions in a computable general equilibrium model” in _American Journal of Agricultural Economics,_ Vol. 81, No. 3: 663-670.\nMurphy, R. (2000). “Migration and Inter-household Inequality: Observations from Wanzai County, Jiangxi” in _China Quarterly,_ Vol. 0, No. 164: 965-82.\nPark, A., Brandt, L., and Giles, J. (2003). “Competition under credit rationing: theory and evidence from rural China” in _Journal of Development Economics,_ Vol. 71, No. 2: 463-495.\nPoncet, S. (2003). “Measuring Chinese domestic and international integration” in _China Economic_ _Review,_ Vol. 14: 1-21.\nQiao, F., Lohmar, B., Huang, J., Rozelle, S., and Zhang, L. (2003). “Producer Benefits from Input Market and Trade Liberalization: the Case of Fertilizer in China” in _American Journal of_ _Agricultural Economics,_ Vol. 85, No. 5: 1223-1227.\nRozelle, S., Guo, L., Shen, M., Hughart, A., and Giles, J. (1999a). “Leaving China's farms: survey results of new paths and remaining hurdles to rural migration” in _The China Quarterly,_ Vol., No. 158: 367-393.\nRozelle, S., Taylor, J. E., and deBrauw, A. (1999b). “Migration, remittances, and agricultural productivity in China” in _The American Economic Review,_ Vol. 89, No. 2: 287-291.\nTaylor, J. E., and Adelman, I. (1996). _Village economies: the design estimation and use of villagewide_ _economic models_, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, etc.\nTaylor, J. E., and Adelman, I. (2003). “Agricultural Household Models: Genesis, Evolution, and Extensions” in _Review of Economics of the Household,_ Vol. 1: 33-58.\nvan Tongeren, F. W., and Huang, J. (2004). “China's food economy in the early 21st Century; Development of China's food economy and its impact on global trade and on the EU.”, Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI), Report 6.04.04, The Hague.\n\n26", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "van Tongeren, F. W. and H. van Meijl (2004). \"Beyond the Uruguay Round: An evaluation of Doha Development Round proposals\", in F. W. v. Tongeren and J. Huang (eds.) _China's food_ _economy in the early 21st Century; Development of China's food economy and its impact on_ _global trade and on the EU._ Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI), Report 6.04.04, The Hague.\nWinters, L. A. (2002). “Trade, Trade Policy and Poverty: What Are the Links?” in _The World_ _Economy,_ Vol. 25: 1339-67.\nZeller, M., Sharma, M., Ahmed, A. U., and Rashid, S. (2001). “Group Based Financial Institutions for the Rural Poor in Bangladesh. An Institutional and Household Level Analysis.” Research Report _120_, IFPRI, Washington D.C.\n\n27", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\n### **Trade Costs, Export Development and Poverty in Rwanda**\n\nNdiame Diop [a], Paul Brenton [a] and Yakup Asarkaya [b][*]\n\n#### **Abstract**\n\nFor Rwanda, one of the poorest countries in the world, trade offers the most effective route for substantial poverty reduction. However, the poor in Rwanda, most of whom are subsistence farmers in rural areas, are currently disconnected from markets and commercial activities by extremely high transport costs and by severe constraints on their ability to shift out of subsistence farming. The constraints include lack of access to credit and lack of access to information on the skills and techniques required to produce commercial crops. The paper is based on information from the household survey and a recent diagnostic study of constraints to trade in Rwanda. It provides a number of indicative simulations that show the potential for substantial reductions in poverty from initiatives that reduce trade costs, enhance the quality of exportable goods and facilitate movement out of subsistence into commercial activities.\n\nWorld Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3784, December 2005 _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the_ _exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly,_ _even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should_ _be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely_ _those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors,_ _or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at_ _http://econ.worldbank.org._\n\n- [a] Trade Department, World Bank. [b] University of Virginia. We would like to thank Ataman Aksoy, John\nBaffes, Kene Ezemenari and Waly Wane for helpful comments and Yakup Asarkaya for research assistance.\n\n1", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["diagnostic study of constraints to trade in Rwanda"], "vague_data": ["household survey"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "household survey", "confidence": 0.7875920534133911}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "household survey", "confidence": 0.20988932251930237}]}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\n#### **1. Introduction**\n\nRwanda is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income of $230 in 2003. The vast majority of the poor reside in rural areas so that rural development is crucial to sustained poverty reduction. The majority of the poor are farmers and the poorest are those that produce mainly or solely for subsistence. Farmers involved in the production of commercial crops, primarily tea and coffee, tend to be less poor and have a high propensity to spend on other products produced in rural areas. Given its small domestic market, it is trade that offers the best prospect of sustained growth and poverty reduction. But at present, handicapped by extremely high trade costs, Rwanda’s rural economy is trapped in subsistence activities. Annual exports per capita in Rwanda amount to just $18 compared to an average of $145 in Sub-Saharan Africa.\n\nThis paper shows how opening up rural Rwanda to commercialization and trade could have a substantial impact on poverty. Three major interrelated routes by which trade can enhance rural incomes, unleash the potential for specialization and reduce poverty are analyzed. First, reducing rural transport costs is central to initiate a strong growth impulse through higher farm gate prices for exportables and more specialization in commercial products. We highlight this issue by concentrating on coffee, the principal agricultural export. Transport costs facing producers in Rwanda are very high and many farmers are effectively delinked from national and international markets. High transport costs depress farm gate prices and represent an implicit tax on exportable producers. Second, a key element of the Rwanda government’s strategy for the coffee sector, as well as for other commercial crops, is to increase quality through a fully washed strategy. Fully washed coffee has been commanding prices that are more than double that of standard coffee.\n\nFinally, reducing transport costs and the introduction of quality-enhancing techniques will increase the incentives for rural households to participate in the production of exportable products. We assess the impact on incomes and poverty of successful switching of the poorest farmers into higher return economic activities.\n\nOur analysis, based on information from the 2001 household survey, suggests that all three mechanisms have a very strong potential for reducing poverty in Rwanda, with 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["2001 household survey"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2001 household survey", "confidence": 0.9726898670196533}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\nparticularly strong impacts on small farms which support the poorest households. For example, facilitating the shift out of subsistence into coffee production for those farmers that have a propensity to produce coffee would reduce the national poverty headcount index by more than a quarter. However, substantial barriers to rural development will constrain movements out of subsistence into commercial production. The key barriers are the lack of availability of credit in rural areas to finance the transition and lack of knowledge of relevant techniques for cultivating and preparing new crops. While these constraints remain and transport costs are high the poverty reducing potential of trade in Rwanda cannot be realized. Rwanda is severely constrained in addressing these structural barriers, which should be a focus of assistance from the international community.\n\nThe rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes the main determinants of poverty in Rwanda, emphasizing the role of trade costs. Sections 3 and 4 examine the impacts of lower transport costs and higher quality coffee on poverty, respectively. Section 5 looks at the structural implications of those two simulations on the rural economy. It highlights the poverty impact of switching from subsistence to more commercial agriculture and open trade. The main policy implications and conclusion are drawn in section 6.\n\n#### **2. Trade Costs as Key Determinants of Poverty in Rwanda**\n\nThe first step in putting in place policies and programs to reduce poverty is to gain an understanding of its key determinants. We investigate here the role of trade costs, among other key determinants, in allowing individuals to escape poverty in Rwanda. To do this, we estimate the determinants of the probability of not being poor in Rwanda through a probit regression, using the Rwanda Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV). The EICV was carried out between October 1999 and July 2001 and it contains community characteristics indicators together with information from 6,420 households distributed among Rwanda’s 12 provinces. [1] The overwhelming majority of the households interviewed live in rural areas, where the incidence of poverty is highest. Indeed, the 1 The sample design contains three main strata: (i) rural prefecture; (ii) urban Kigali and (iii) other prefecture urban centers. The rural prefecture stratum is further subdivided into 11 sub-strata corresponding to each rural prefecture.\n\n3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Rwanda Household Living Conditions Survey"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Rwanda Household Living Conditions Survey", "confidence": 0.903435468673706}, {"text": "EICV", "confidence": 0.12217532843351364}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "community characteristics indicators", "confidence": 0.15843039751052856}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\nheadcount index in rural Rwanda stands at 47 percent, against only 13 percent in urban areas [2] (Table 1). The EICV also shows that poverty varies substantially across provinces.\n\nThe poverty incidence is highest in Gikongoro (57 percent) and lowest in Kigali Ville (10 percent).\n\nDenoting _y_ as the poverty status (incidence index) of observed individuals within the sample, and _X_ as a vector of major individual, household, community and regional characteristics, the probability of escaping poverty is defined by the probit model: Pr( _y_ = 1 _X_ ) = Φ ( _Xb_ ) (1) Φ is the standard cumulative normal probability distribution and _Xb_ is the probit score or index. The probit coefficient, _b_, shows the impact of a one-unit increase in the predictor on the probability of not being poor. A one-unit increase in the predictor leads to an increase in the probit score by _b_ standard deviations. We model the probability of being out of poverty as a function of the following predictors: market access community variables (such as, access to roads, access to electricity, proximity of markets), household and individual characteristics (demographic profile, head of household education, land size, livestock, etc.), and a set of control variables such as provincial dummies.\n\nTable 2 shows the results of the probit estimation. A key feature of these results is the central role of community variables in escaping poverty. Access to year-round roads, credit and electricity increase significantly the chances of escaping poverty. Of particular interest in the context of this paper is that all of the market access variables significantly influence the chance of escaping poverty. Households that do not have easy access to a road and/or have to use impracticable earth roads to connect to secondary or main roads have limited or no access to product and factor markets, substantially reducing the opportunities for escaping poverty. Regional disparities in the probability of being poor partly reflect this result. Residents of Kibuye, Kigali, Gikongoro, Byumba, and Butare that are more likely to be in poverty have poor access to community infrastructures, rural 2 For our analysis the poverty line is conventionally defined as the per capita income of the final individual in the 4 [th] decline of the income distribution. The headcount index, P0, is the proportion of population with per capita expenditure below the poverty line. The poverty-gap, P1, estimates the average distance separating the poor from the poverty line, as a proportion of that line.\n\n4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["EICV"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["headcount index"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "EICV", "confidence": 0.6922325491905212}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\ntransport in particular. In contrast, residents of Gisenyi and Kibungo, better endowed in infrastructures, are more likely to be out of poverty.\n\nAmong the household characteristics that affect poverty, occupation appears to be the single most important variable. The results suggest that someone who earns a wage in the non-farm sector has a substantially higher chance of not being poor and that a self employed non-farm worker is also much more likely to be non-poor. On the other hand, being an agricultural worker (4 percent of rural households) implies a higher probability of being poor. However, these three categories represent only 4 and 8.5 percent of rural households, respectively. About 76 percent of household heads are farmers. Being a farmer helps many households escape from poverty but only insofar as the comparator category is households without occupation (7 percent are in other sectors or have no occupation). [3] The other household characteristics that significantly affect poverty include household size, education and the level of wealth, reflected in terms of land and livestock holdings.\n\nHouseholds with a low dependency ratio, large land and livestock holdings and a more educated head are more likely to be out of poverty. The result regarding land is interesting given a proposed revision to the land law in Rwanda that seeks to increase the feasibility of larger land plots. Also of importance here is the role of cooperatives, which can successfully bring small scale farmers together to allow for more efficient utilization of land, improved access to credit and better dissemination of information. The key message here is that a reorganization of the rural sector, which leads to the more effective use of agricultural land, is likely to have a substantial effect in reducing poverty.\n\n#### **3. The Poverty Impacts of Lower Rural Transportation Costs**\n\n_Direct short run narrow effects_ The analysis in this section shows that allowing and improving access to markets through better rural infrastructure, especially rural transport, has a strong potential for reducing 3 These results are consistent with those of Dabalen, Paternostro and Pierre (2004) on the returns to participation in the nonfarm sector in Rwanda.\n\n5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\npoverty. [4] The analysis concentrates on coffee, the main exportable crop and the main vehicle for raising cash incomes in rural areas and for stimulating a switch from subsistence to more market oriented agriculture. Beyond coffee farmers, reductions in rural transport costs will benefit all producers and consumers in rural areas and will be integral to a policy that seeks to increase the role of markets and market oriented production in rural areas. Thus, the impact of policy and investment initiatives to improve access to rural transport will by far exceed the more narrow simulations on poverty that we investigate here.\n\nAs a small coffee exporter, Rwanda is a price taker in the world markets. Hence in the analysis below we take world prices as exogenous and assume that changes in coffee supply in Rwanda have no impact on the world price. For all coffee farmers, regardless of the quality of their crop, one of the key determinants of the producer price that they receive in Rwanda will be the transport cost.\n\nTransport costs incurred by exporters both within Rwanda and on the main corridor routes to ports in neighboring countries are very high. It is estimated that the transport cost from the farm-gate in Rwanda to the port in Mombassa is about 80 percent of the producer price. Rural transport costs alone, that is, of transport from the farm gate to the capital, Kigali, is estimated at 40 percent of the farm gate price! [5] These costs represent an implicit tax on coffee (and other exportable) producers.\n\nPorto (2005) shows how reducing trade costs in Moldova could have a substantial impact on poverty. We follow a similar approach simulating lower rural and international transport costs leading to higher prices for farmers, which encourage greater production and raise the incomes of rural farmers. Here, we look specifically at the effect of a 50 percent cut in rural transport costs on coffee farmers’ income. This is not unrealistic.\n\nMost of the roads in rural areas are unpaved. Vehicle operating costs are estimated to be 4 Access to rural transport is also a key element in providing access to other key services related to poverty and standards of living, such as, participation in education and access to health services.\n5 World Bank (2005) 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\nabout 50 per cent higher on poor quality roads compared to good quality roads. [6] For many farmers roads are not accessible or totally inadequate and head carrying is the only available mode of transport. Given the uncertainty of the magnitude of such a reduction in transport costs on producer prices, we perform the simulations using two pass-through assumptions that is the extent to which the fall in transport costs is reflected in higher producer prices for farmers: a 100 percent pass-through and a 50 percent pass-through.\n\nWe follow Deaton (1989, 1997) whereby the short-run effects of price changes are directly proportional to income shares. In particular, holding all the other components of household income constant and assuming that coffee produced in Rwanda is entirely exported (there is almost no domestic consumption of coffee), the direct short-term welfare impact of a price shock on household _i_ is given by: Δ _Y_ ) _i_ = φ _icoffee_ - ( Δ _Pcoffeecoffee_ ) (2) Δ _YY_ ) _i_ = φ _icoffee_ - ( Δ _PPcoffeecoffee_ ( ) = φ _coffee_ - ( ) 0 _i_ _i_ _P_ 0 _coffee_ Where _Y_ 0 is initial income of household _i_, Δ _Y_ is the change in income following a change in the price of coffee _,_ [φ] _icoffee_ is the share of coffee income (sales) in total household income as provided by the EICV survey and _P_ 0 _coffee_ the initial average producer price of coffee _._ Table 3 shows the different sources of income for Rwandan households, including income derived from coffee sales. At the national level, close to 57.6 percent of households’ income comes from labor market activities and almost 26 percent of income is derived from the sale of agricultural products. In rural areas, agricultural income accounts for close to 42 percent of total income, most of which is derived from the sale of food crops (33 percent) while a smaller portion comes from the sale of commercial crops, 6 A World Bank study found that lack of maintenance on the road between Gitarama and Kibuye raised vehicle operating costs from a 1989 level of $1.00 per kilometer to almost $3.40 per kilometer in 1996. The recent rehabilitation of the road has resulted in a fall of more than 50 percent in vehicle operating costs and to a reduction of overall transport costs of about 40 percent. As a result, agricultural surpluses in the area can now be sold in markets throughout the country, and a general shift is taking place from subsistence agricultural to production for the market (World Bank (2005)).\n\n7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["EICV survey"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "EICV survey", "confidence": 0.9755454659461975}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\nmainly from the sale of coffee (3 percent). Labor market income constitutes about 43 percent of the income of rural households, but agriculture contributes little to this (8 percent), most of the income coming from collective services (16 percent).\n\nSince the direct effect of an increase in the farm gate price of coffee is on coffee farmers, we restrict the sample to coffee growers (those that produce a nonzero quantity of coffee in the year before the administration of the questionnaire). This allows us to see more clearly the contribution of coffee to the total income of a group that represents 10 percent of rural households and about 400,000 people. The share of income derived from coffee varies between 14.4 percent for coffee farmer households in the 4 [th] decile and 1.79 percent for the top decile (table 4). Due to different agro-ecological conditions and infrastructure availability across regions, there is a wide disparity in households’ ability to engage in coffee production and, therefore, in the contribution of coffee to total income. The share of coffee sales in total income is the greatest in Cyangugu province with 14 percent, while coffee is not a viable option in Umutara and represents a minor activity in Ruhengeri and Buyamba (table 5).\n\nTable 6 shows the results of the simulations. A 50 percent reduction in rural transportation costs that translates into a 20 percent increase in coffee producer prices reduces the poverty incidence among coffee farmers by almost 6 percent (from 42 to 39.6 percent), and the poverty gap of coffee farmers by 7 percent (from 0.136 to 0.126) [7] . This corresponds to about a half percent reduction in national poverty incidence, or about 16400 people [8] . This reduction in the number of poor is not trivial given that no second round effect is incorporated in the analysis (see below). The impact of reductions in transport costs on coffee farmers’ incomes is fairly linear, smaller or larger changes in transport costs will have proportionate effects on incomes. Here we have assumed a 50 percent fall in rural transport costs alone. If international transport costs were also to fall by a similar magnitude the impact on coffee farmers incomes would be approximately 7 As a starting point, note that coffee farmers are located in the middle section of the income distribution.\nThey are neither extremely poor nor rich. Their poverty gap for coffee producers is of less than 0.14 against 0.16 for non-coffee farmers also clearly indicates that poverty is less deep among coffee farmers than noncoffee farmers.\n8 Calculated as: 0.0053*0.43*7,200,000.\n\n8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\ndouble that presented in table 6. There is substantial potential for lower transport costs on the main trade routes. It is estimated that the cost per ton of transport between Mombasa and Kigali can be more than 70 percent higher than the cost of transport between Mombasa and Kampala (World Bank 2005).\n\nFurthermore, reducing rural transport costs has a positive impact on the distribution of income – the poor benefit (those in the first four deciles) proportionally more than their wealthier counterparts (table 7). The effect on the distribution of income (ranked in deciles) mirrors the distribution of the share coffee income in total income. Coffee farmers in the 4 [th] decile, for whom coffee provides 14 percent of total income, would see a 3 percent rise in their income. In contrast, coffee farmers at the top of the income distribution would only enjoy a 0.36 percent increase in income. In terms of the different regions, the largest welfare gain accrues to Cyangugu (+2.7 percent), Kigali Ngali (+1.8 percent) and Kibuye (+1.8 percent) whilst in regions where coffee is less important as a source of income, Umutara, Ruhengeri and Buyamba, there is little increase in income (table 7).\n\n_Potential second-round effects_ .\n\nWhile the direct effect of changes in coffee producer prices falls on the welfare of coffee farmers, other farmers and non-farmers may reap significant indirect benefits from higher coffee incomes. The two traditional channels through which spillover effects work are through the labor market and the markets for food and other local non-farm goods. In Rwanda, only 8 percent of coffee farmers employ paid labor, implying that greater returns to coffee farming may have little employment impact in the short run.\n\nFurthermore, since farmers use sub-optimal levels of fertilizer, they may be more inclined to use some of their extra income to apply more fertilizer and boost productivity, rather than increasing employment. Finally, given Rwanda’s very high labor to land ratio (with a population density of 350/ km2), a land constraint may prevent high incremental employment while at the same time, a large pool of landless people may suppress the potential increase in wage rates (in other words, it is unlikely that a neoclassical closure rule --full employment and flexible wage rate- applies in rural Rwanda).\n\n9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\nIn contrast, significant spending spillover effects are likely to arise from the higher incomes for coffee farmers. On average, some 40 percent of coffee farmers’ income is spent on food products. The share of income spent on food is actually higher is some regions, mirroring the geographical disparities in coffee production in Rwanda. Food expenditures have the highest share in consumption in Cyangugu and Kibuye, accounting for about 54 percent of total consumption and the lowest share in Umutara and Kibungo, with 38-40 percent (table 8). The marginal spending of extra incomes on local goods and services can have strong multiplier effects in the rural economy, especially in Cyangugu and Kibuye [9] . Given the constraint on land however, provinces where a growing number of farmers engage in producing exportable crops will increasing rely on other regions and the international market for their food and other goods imports. Once again lower transport costs are important, as is an open trade regime [10], to reap the benefits of specialization.\n\n#### **4. The Poverty Impacts of Higher Quality Coffee**\n\nEnhancing the quality of agricultural products produced in Rwanda’s rural economy is another vehicle for poverty reduction. A key element of the government’s strategy for the coffee sector is to increase the proportion of washed or quality coffee in output and exports. Fully washed coffee has been commanding prices that are more than double that of standard coffee. Here we investigate the potential impacts of this strategy on poverty.\n\nIt is worth noting that improvements in rural transport logistics are crucial to the success of the fully washed coffee strategy since the coffee cherries must be washed within 6 hours of being harvested or the quality starts to depreciate. Clearly farmers that are currently more than 6 hours distant from a washing station will be unable to benefit from this strategy.\n\n9 The magnitude of multiplier effects depends on supply elasticities of local goods, as demonstrated by Delgado et al. (1998), after Haggblade et al. (1991). If capital constraints or high transaction costs result in inelastic supply of non-tradable goods, then costs of production will quickly rise with expanded demand, and the growth in production of local goods and services will be dampened.\n10 For example, tariffs on imports of rice are currently high at more than 25 percent.\n\n10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\nUsing the same methodology as above, we explore a number of scenarios. First, we simulate the impact of half of coffee farmers receiving double the price for their coffee as a result of producing higher quality coffee. Second, we assess the impact when only large farms are able to increase quality and receive double the price for their coffee, whilst the third simulation constrains the impact of higher quality to medium sized farms. Next, we allow for both large and medium farms to receive the 100 percent price increase for higher quality coffee. A final scenario assumes that only small farms raise quality and receive double the price for their coffee. Small farms are defined as farms with less than 0.5 hectare, medium sized farms are those with between 0.5 and 1 hectare, while large farms have more than 1 hectare.\n\nThe results suggest that the coffee quality program has a strong poverty-reducing potential. For instance, doubling the price received by half of coffee farmers reduces the incidence of national poverty by about 5 percent (table 9). Further, the poverty impact of the quality program is inversely proportional to the level of income. Targeting small farms, through technical assistance and access programs, could reduce the incidence of national poverty by 6 percent, compared to a reduction of 2 percent if only large farms adopt the quality program. This reflects that most of the large farmers are not poor. On the other hand, they are more capable of adopting the quality program and their resulting increase in income could indirectly benefit the poorest farmers.\n\n#### **5. Welfare Gains from Switching from Subsistence to Coffee Farming**\n\nLower transport costs and the introduction of quality-enhancing techniques will boost the incentives to produce coffee in Rwanda. Existing farmers will seek to raise productivity and will be better able to purchase fertilizer and invest in new coffee trees and improved techniques. Higher returns to coffee will also lead to an increase in the number of farmers who wish to switch from subsistence to coffee production. In this section, we explore the potential gain to farmers from switching from subsistence agriculture to coffee farming in Rwanda and then assess the impact on national poverty if such switching were to occur.\n\nThe purpose of this analysis is to stress that initiatives to reduce transport costs and raise 11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\nthe quality of exported crops will have a much greater impact and return if constraints to farmers moving out of subsistence and into commercial crops are also addressed.\n\nTo do this analysis, one cannot just compare the average observed income of coffee farmers with that deduced for subsistence farmers since these two groups of farmers have different characteristics, some of which are correlated with the probability of belonging to one or other category. It is important to take into account the propensity of farmers to move out of subsistence and into coffee production. Here this is based on the characteristics of those already producing coffee.\n\nThe propensity score matching (PSM) methods, pioneered by Rubin (1977), Rosembaun and Rubin (1983), and Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), allow one to build a counterfactual and estimate the average effects of participating in coffee markets on monetary household incomes. In other words, they help determine how much extra income is associated with switching from subsistence to coffee, assuming a binding land constraint. The method consists of first estimating the probability of producing coffee (probit model) that defines a propensity score p( **x** ), for a given vector of observable characteristics **x** . In a second stage, one can use either traditional (one-to-one) or more recent matching methods to pair participants (coffee farmers) and non-participants (subsistence farmers). Traditional PSM methods (Rubin 1977, Rosembaun and Rubin 1983) pair each participant with a single non-participant, the matching being based on the degree of similarity in the estimated probabilities of being a participant. More recently developed non-parametric matching estimators use a weighted average over multiple observations to construct the matches (see Heckman et al, 1997). We apply both methods in this analysis. Finally, the outcome differential, here the per capita income gain, is estimated using kernel methods.\n\nMore formally, denote _[Y]_ 1 [ the outcome (income) conditional on participation in coffee ] farming and _Y_ 0 the outcome conditional on non-participation. The impact of participation is Δ = _Y_ 1 - _Y_ 0 (3) 12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\nLet _D =_ 1 for individuals who participate and for whom _[Y]_ 1 [ is observed and ] _[D]_ [ = 0 for ] non-participants, for whom _Y_ 0 is observed. Finally let Z denote a vector of observed characteristics of individuals used as conditioning variables. Our task is to estimate the mean impact of participation (“the mean treatment effect on the treated”), given by:\n\n## TT = E ( Δ Z, D = )1 = E { ( Y 1 − Y 0 ) Z, D = 1 }= E ( Y 1 Z, D = )1 − E ( Y 0 Z, D = )1 (4)\n\nThe parameter _TT_ estimates the average impact among participants. However, while observed data on _[Y]_ 1 [ allows a computation of ] _E_ ( _Y_ 1 _Z_, _D_ = )1, the counterfactual mean, _E_ ( _Y_ 0 _Z_, _D_ = )1, cannot be directly estimated, hence the recourse to matching estimators.\n\nDenoting P, the propensity score, i.e., the probability of participation given Z, _P_ = Pr( _D_ = 1 _Z_ ), one key assumption made is: _E_ ( _Y_ 0 _P_, _D_ = )1 = _E_ ( _Y_ 0 _P_, _D_ = 0,) _P_ < 1 (5) In other words, the outcome for non-participants matched to participants using the closeness of their propensity score (characteristics) is a proxy for the outcome for participants had they not participated.\n\nThe mean impact of participation thus becomes [11] :\n\n## φ p = E ( Y 1 D = )1 − E P D = 1 { EY ( Y D =,1 P ) }= E ( Y 1 D = )1 − E P D = 1 { EY ( Y D =,0 P ) }   (6)\n\nApplying this method to our purpose, φ _P_ is the average extra income that an individual would gain from switching from subsistence to coffee farming.\n\nTo model the decision to engage in coffee farming, we build on the large literature on the determinants of adoption of new techniques in agriculture (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995, 11 For an in-depth discussion of the matching techniques and assumptions, see Smith and Todd (2001).\n\n13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["observed data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "observed data", "confidence": 0.39045748114585876}]}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\nConley and Udry 2004, Besley and Case 1994). This literature identifies human capital (measured by education, gender, and age), learning by doing and learning externalities as major determinants of technology adoption. We model the decision to engage in coffee farming as a function of market access community variables, household characteristics (head of household education, demographic profile, level of wealth, etc.), and a set of control variables such as provincial dummies and availability of extension services. The probit regression is performed for heads of households. The switch from subsistence to coffee can be interpreted as technology adoption in agriculture.\n\nCommunity characteristics strongly influence the probability of participating in coffee farming with access to electricity, road and extension services all being important (table 10). Extension services are a set of technical supports, training and information about markets provided to farmers to increase productivity and profitability through the promotion of new crops, new techniques and new quality-enhancing practices. Other studies on African economies also show the importance of extension services. For instance, Balat et al. (2004) find that households in Zambia that have received extension services are on average more productive in market agriculture than households that have not. Clearly, provision of high-quality extension services is central to facilitating a structural transformation of agriculture in Rwanda.\n\nDemographic profile is the most important household characteristic that significantly influences the likelihood of engaging in coffee farming. Households with many dependents and headed by a male are more likely to be involved in coffee farming in Rwanda. Coffee is a labor-intensive activity and in a situation where labor markets are imperfect, having a large pool of family labor appears to be an advantage. This is important because our earlier broad analysis of the determinants of poverty showed that a high number of dependents is positively associated with the probability of being poor.\n\nThis suggests that, after controlling for community characteristics, those households currently involved in subsistence activities who have a relatively strong propensity to produce coffee are more likely to be poor. Hence, initiatives that facilitate the movement 14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\nof these households into coffee production are likely to have a very strong impact on poverty.\n\nEducation and land and livestock holdings affect positively the probability of participating in coffee farming. This is not surprising. Engaging in a tradable sector presents different challenges to farmers, compared to those that arise in producing non marketable products. These include substantial initial investments, the capacity to adjust to frequent changes in prices as well as adoption of new technologies and marketing skills, all of which are helped by education and wealth reflected in terms of land and livestock. [12] Thus, in the absence of effective financial markets in the rural area, it is only relatively wealthy farmers who have the capacity to move into coffee production. Finally, agro-ecological conditions are an important endowment for some provinces and districts (Cyangugu, Butare, Gitarama) and a serious constraint to engaging in coffee farming for others (Umutara, Ruhengeri and Buyamba). Farmers in the latter provinces are less likely to gain from a switch from subsistence to coffee farming because of natural constraints.\n\nHaving examined the main determinants of the probability of being able to participate in coffee farming, we now look at the potential gain from participating in coffee farming by estimating the average agricultural income subsistence farmers would have earned had they participated in coffee production. We find that farmers who have a propensity to produce coffee who actually shift out of subsistence agriculture into coffee production would have earned between 17,000 and 22,000 RwF more (depending on the particular matching method that is used). This translates into a difference in income of between 23 and 30 percent (table 11). [13] If the subsistence farmers identified as having a propensity to produce coffee (40 percent of our sample) actually shifted into coffee production then the national poverty headcount index would fall by more then 25 percent and the poverty gap would drop by 12-13 percent.\n\n12 Access to credit did not appear significant in the regression, but this is very likely to relate to how this variable was defined in the questionnaire. The question asked is whether credit is available in the community without precision of the type of credit (micro-credit, credit for farm investment, etc.).\n13 Balat and Porto (2005) find similar quantitative effects in Zambia, where a shift out of subsistence into cotton production leads to gains of around 20 percent of average expenditure for the representative poor farmer.\n\n15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["national poverty headcount index"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "national poverty headcount index", "confidence": 0.6669094562530518}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\nThese average gains are substantial and raise the question of why farmers are not already making this shift if there is a strong incentive in terms of higher incomes. There must be constraints which are preventing farmers in rural areas from moving away from subsistence agriculture even though they have a propensity to produce coffee. There are a number of issues here that must be addressed including the costs that are incurred in shifting into coffee, in terms of the investment in plants and so on, the lack of income whilst the new plants become harvestable, and the higher risks associated with cash crops. Cadot et al (2005) suggest that these adjustment costs can be very large. They estimate that the cost of moving out of subsistence for farmers in Madagascar can amount to around 250 percent of the value of a subsistence farmer’s annual production. These costs and investments all necessitate the effective provision of credit to rural communities, something which is severely lacking at present. In addition, there is also the need for information on techniques for producing different crops, and so a need for widely available extension services, as well as access to transport.\n\n16", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\n**6. Policy Implications and Conclusions**\n\nIncreasing incomes in rural areas is necessary for poverty reduction in Rwanda since the majority of the poor live in rural areas. Improvements in returns to exportable commercial crops are the most direct and probably the most effective way of increasing the flow of cash into rural areas and so must lie at the heart of poverty reduction in Rwanda. This paper has shown that reducing trade costs can have a profound impact on poverty. The benefits of lower transport costs, if reflected in higher producer prices, will be realized by all coffee farmers, and indeed all commercial farmers. Reducing transport costs and providing access to transport to those who are currently remote is therefore a crucial element in the poverty reduction strategy. Similarly, our analysis shows that the government’s strategy of increasing returns by raising quality and therefore the market price of Rwandan produce will have a significant impact on poverty, particular if small farmers are targeted and assisted in improving the quality of their coffee crop. However, the success of this strategy requires effective rural logistics services and transport capacity, to ensure that coffee is washed in good time before its quality starts to deteriorate. This capacity is currently lacking.\n\nWe also show the substantial impact on poverty that could arise if higher returns to commercial crops encourage larger numbers of farmers to shift from subsistence activities into the production of coffee or other commercial crops. We find that a key characteristic linked to the probability of being poor in the overall sample, a large dependency ratio, is associated with a strong propensity to produce coffee. This suggests that measures that facilitate switching into coffee will have an especially strong impact on the incomes of the poorest families in rural areas. Nevertheless, there are substantial barriers to this process of switching into commercial crops in terms of access to credit to finance the adjustment away from subsistence and access to knowledge and skills to successfully cultivate commercial crops. Unless these are addressed, the role of trade in reducing poverty in Rwanda will be severely hampered.\n\nWe have found significant impacts on poverty while only considering the most direct reactions to changing prices. However, the effects will be considerably larger, since 17", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\ncoffee farmers typically have a high propensity to spend on other products produced in the rural communities. Increasing returns to commercial farmers could have substantial multiplier effects within rural communities. The challenge is to provide an infrastructure and framework by which rural markets can develop and flourish. Given the current level of development in Rwanda it is clear that this will require a significant response and engagement from the international institutions and donors.\n\n#### **References**\n\nBalat, J. and G. Porto (2005) ‘Globalisation and Complementary Policies: Poverty Impacts in Rural Zambia’, NBER Working Paper 11175.\n\nBesley, T. and A. Case (1994). “Diffusion as a Learning Process: Evidence From HYV Cotton,” mimeo, Princeton University.\n\nCadot, O., L. Dutoit and M. Olarreaga (2005) ‘Subsistence Farming, Adjustment Costs and Agricultural Prices: Evidence from Madagascar’, mimeo, World Bank.\n\nConley, T. and C. Udry (2004). “Learning About a New Technology: Pineapple in Ghana,” mimeo, Yale University.\n\nDabalen A., S. Paternostro and G. Pierre (2004). “The Returns to Participation in the Nonfarm Sector in Rural Rwanda” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3462.\n\nDeaton A. (1989). Rice prices and Income Distribution in Thailand: A non parametric Analysis”. _Economic Journal_ 99 (395) (supplement), 1-37.\n\nDeaton, A. (1997). _The Analysis of Household Surveys. A Microeconometric Approach to_ _Development Policy_, The World Bank and The Johns Hopkins University Press.\n\nDelgado, C. J. Hopkins, and V. Kelly (1998). _Agricultural Growth Linkages in Sub-_ _Saharan Africa._ Research report 107, IFPRI.\n\nFoster, A. and M. Rosenzweig (1995). “Learning by Doing and Learning from Others: Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture,” _Journal of Political Economy_, 103, 1176-1209.\n\nHaggblade S, J. Hammer and P. Hazell (1991). “Modelling Agricultural Growth Multipliers”, _American Journal of Agricultural Economics_, 361-378.\n\nHeckman, J., H. Ichimura, and P.E. Todd (1997) \"Matching as an Econometric Evaluation Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Program.\" _Review of_ _Economic Studies_, 64, 605-654.\n\n18", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["Household Surveys"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "Household Surveys", "confidence": 0.8709985613822937}]}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\nPorto, G (2005) ‘Informal Export Barriers and Poverty’, _Journal of International_ _Economics_, 66, 447-470 Rosenbaum, P., and D. Rubin (1983). “The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects,” _Biometrika_, 70, 41-55.\n\nRubin D. (1977) “Assignment to a Treatment Group on the Basis of a Covariate,” _Journal of Educational Statistics_, 2, 1-26.\n\nSmith, Jeffrey and Petra Todd. 2001. “Reconciling Conflicting Evidence on the Performance of Propensity Score Matching Methods,” _American Economic Review_ _Papers and Proceedings_, 91, 112-118.\n\nWinters L.A.; McCulloch N.; McKay A. (2004) “Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The Evidence So Far” _Journal of Economic Literature_ ; 42, 72-115.\n\nWorld Bank (2005). _Rwanda: Diagnostic Trade Integration Study_ . May 2005. The World Bank.\n\n19", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\n**Table 1. Poverty Incidence and Poverty Gap in Rwanda**\n\n**Headcount Index (%)** **Poverty Gap**\n**P0** **P1**\nNational 42.92 0.16 Urban 4.09 0.01 Rural 46.06 0.17 Note:\n\n1. The headcount index, P0, is the proportion of population with per capita expenditure below the poverty line\nThe poverty-gap, P1, estimates the average distance separating the poor from the poverty line, as a proportion of that line 2. Poverty line: 50,145.73 RwF = Income per capita of the last individual in the fourth decile of expenditure ranked by adult equivalent 3. All farm households in urban provinces are considered as \"rural\"\n\n**Table 2. Determinants of the Probability of being non-poor in Rwanda**\n\n**Standard**\n\n**Wald 95% Confidence**\n\n**Parameter** **Estimate**\n\n**Parameter** **Estimate** **Error** **Limits** **Chi-Square Pr > Chi-Sq**\n\nIntercept -0.3879 0.0178 -0.4229 -0.353 472.47 <.0001 Dummy Access to Road 0.1077 0.0059 0.0962 0.1192 336.26 <.0001 Distance to market -0.018 0.0003 -0.0187 -0.0173 2673.26 <.0001 Electricity dummy 0.2431 0.0075 0.2285 0.2577 1064.67 <.0001 Access to credit dummy 0.0297 0.0035 0.0229 0.0366 72.83 <.0001 H Head's education (years) 0.0885 0.0009 0.0866 0.0903 9077.28 <.0001 Dependents ratio -0.2029 0.0007 -0.2043 -0.2014 74556.8 <.0001 Land area detained 0.1733 0.0017 0.1701 0.1766 10893.6 <.0001 Livestock heads detained 0.1304 0.0006 0.1291 0.1317 41019.7 <.0001 Occupation: Farmers only 0.0663 0.0066 0.0534 0.0793 100.31 <.0001 Occupation: Agri wage worker -0.0851 0.0099 -0.1046 -0.0657 73.77 <.0001 Occupation: Non-farm wage 0.9515 0.0097 0.9325 0.9705 9678.01 <.0001 worker Occupation: Non-farm self 0.9175 0.0122 0.8936 0.9415 5641.28 <.0001 employed Dummy Province: Butare -0.413 0.0088 -0.4302 -0.3958 2219.65 <.0001 Dummy Province: Byumba -0.1436 0.0089 -0.1611 -0.1261 258.35 <.0001 Dummy Province: Cyangugu -0.0079 0.0093 -0.0262 0.0104 0.72 0.3973 Dummy Province: Gikongoro -0.6147 0.0095 -0.6334 -0.5961 4172.71 <.0001 Dummy Province: Gisenyi 0.3932 0.0092 0.3752 0.4112 1835.89 <.0001 Dummy Province: Gitarama 0.087 0.0087 0.0699 0.1041 99.07 <.0001 Dummy Province: Kibungo 0.2772 0.009 0.2596 0.2949 944.15 <.0001 Dummy Province: Kibuye -0.2396 0.0098 -0.2589 -0.2203 593.72 <.0001 Dummy Province: Kigali -0.3153 0.0086 -0.3321 -0.2984 1342.69 <.0001 Dummy Province: Ruhengeri -0.2806 0.0087 -0.2977 -0.2635 1034.2 <.0001\n\n**Note:**\nExcluded categories: “No occupation” and “other occupation”; “Kigali City” and “Umutara” 20\n\n**Error**", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["Headcount Index"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\n**Table 3. Source of Household Income**\nIncome Category Rural Urban National Labor Market Income 42.5% 83.6% 58.6% Agriculture/Livestock/Sylvic/Fishing/Hunting 7.9% 0.8% 5.1% Manufacturing Industries 3.3% 6.0% 4.4% Buildings and Public Works 3.1% 5.6% 4.1% Commerce 7.3% 20.3% 12.4% Services a la Collectivite 16.0% 31.3% 22.0% Other Sectors 5.0% 19.6% 10.7% Agricultural Income 41.6% 0.7% 25.5% Industrial Crops: 2.9% 0.0% 1.8% Coffee 2.4% 0.0% 1.5% Tea 0.4% 0.0% 0.3% Food Crops: 33.2% 0.4% 20.3% Beans 3.6% 0.0% 2.2% Sorghum 2.2% 0.0% 1.3% Cassava 3.7% 0.1% 2.3% Sweet Potatoes 2.6% 0.0% 1.6% Livestock Income: 5.5% 0.3% 3.4% Cattle 3.5% 0.3% 2.2% Sheep 1.2% 0.0% 0.7% Transfers 8.9% 3.6% 6.8% Other Income 7.0% 12.1% 9.0% Total Income 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Note: All farm households in urban provinces are considered rural\n\n**Table 4. Percentage of Farmers Growing Coffee, by Income Decile**\n\n**Expenditure decile** **% of farmers growing coffee**\nPoorest decile 8.4 2nd decile 9.7 3rd decile 10.3 4th decile 13.5 5th decile 12.0 6th decile 11.8 7th decile 13.6 8th decile 10.4 9th decile 8.7 Richest decile 1.5 Total 10.0 21", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\n**Table 5. Share of Income from Coffee, by Province**\n**Province** **Share of Coffee in Total Income (%)**\nButare 3.7 Byumba 2.5 Cyangugu 13.9 Gikongoro 5.5 Gisenyi 6.0 Gitarama 6.7 Kibungo 2.6 Kibuye 9.0 Kigali Ngali 9.2 Kigali Town 1.2 Ruhengeri 2.4 Umutara 0.0 Source: Rwanda EICV 2001\n\n**Table 6. Impact of a 50 Percent Reduction of Rural Transport Costs on Incomes**\nEffect on: Reduction transport pass- Headcount Change Poverty Change cost through index Gap coffee farmers 0 0 41.97 0.136 coffee farmers 50% 1 39.60 -5.65% 0.126 -7.12% coffee farmers 50% 0.5 41.31 -1.57% 0.131 -3.72% National 0 0 42.92 0.157 National 50% 1 42.69 -0.53% 0.156 -0.59% National 50% 0.5 42.86 -0.15% 0.157 -0.31% Source: Computed by authors from EICV data 22", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["EICV data"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "EICV data", "confidence": 0.7705621719360352}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\n**Table 7. Distributional and Regional Impact of a 50 percent Fall in Transport Costs**\n**among Coffee Farmers (assuming 100 pass-through)**\nShare of coffee in total income Change in real income\n**Expenditure decile**\nPoorest decile 6.70% 1.34% 2nd 8.23% 1.65% 3rd 7.16% 1.43% 4th 14.42% 2.88% 5th 4.33% 0.87% 6th 5.06% 1.01% 7th 5.04% 1.01% 8th 3.09% 0.62% 9th 4.16% 0.83% Richest 1.79% 0.36%\n**Province**\nButare 3.72% 0.74% Byumba 2.51% 0.50% Cyangugu 13.89% 2.78% Gikongoro 5.50% 1.10% Gisenyi 6.02% 1.20% Gitarama 2.68% 0.54% Kibungo 2.59% 0.52% Kibuye 9.03% 1.81% Kigali Ngali 9.22% 1.84% Ville de Kigali 1.15% 0.23% Ruhengeri 2.42% 0.48% Umutara 0.00% 0.00% 23", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\n**Table 8. Composition of household budget by Province**\n**Province** **Butare** **Byumba** **Cyangugu** **Gikongoro** **Gisenyi** **Gitarama** **Kibungo**\n**Food Bought** 42.2% 48.7% 54.4% 45.8% 49.5% 42.8% 39.8%\n**Dry beans** 5.4% 8.5% 3.4% 10.6% 7.2% 4.4% 2.5%\n**Irish Potatoes** 2.4% 4.2% 1.9% 4.8% 7.4% 4.6% 1.6%\n**Rice** 3.8% 2.0% 4.1% 1.5% 1.7% 2.7% 2.9%\n**Beef** 1.4% 1.7% 2.6% 0.8% 2.0% 2.1% 1.7%\n**Beverages** 3.4% 5.5% 3.4% 4.0% 5.8% 2.5% 5.1%\n**Energy** 2.7% 4.7% 3.7% 2.2% 3.1% 2.6% 3.3%\n**Housing** 4.6% 0.9% 1.3% 2.1% 2.3% 0.5% 1.9%\n**Cleaning** 6.7% 6.0% 6.7% 5.8% 6.8% 6.4% 7.5%\n**Leisure** 1.2% 0.9% 1.9% 1.1% 1.8% 1.1% 0.8%\n**Clothing** 6.8% 6.1% 4.8% 6.8% 7.2% 7.3% 10.4%\n**Education** 2.7% 3.0% 4.0% 4.4% 2.4% 4.7% 3.9%\n**Health** 1.4% 0.9% 1.5% 0.6% 0.9% 1.4% 1.2%\n**Transport** 3.0% 1.8% 1.1% 0.6% 2.2% 1.3% 2.8%\n**Other** 25.2% 21.4% 17.3% 26.6% 17.9% 29.5% 23.3%\n\n**Total Consumption** 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%\n\n**Province** **Kibuye** **Kigali** **Kigali City** **Ruhengeri** **Umutara National**\n**Food Bought** 53.7% 46.0% 33.9% 46.8% 38.7% 41.8%\n**Dry beans** 12.9% 6.8% 1.7% 7.2% 4.2% 4.6%\n**Irish Potatoes** 6.5% 5.3% 2.5% 7.5% 1.9% 3.8%\n**Rice** 1.4% 2.3% 3.0% 1.4% 2.6% 2.7%\n**Beef** 1.0% 1.2% 2.8% 1.2% 1.1% 2.0%\n**Beverages** 4.6% 3.6% 2.9% 3.3% 4.7% 3.7%\n**Energy** 2.8% 2.9% 3.6% 2.3% 4.0% 3.3%\n**Housing** 2.2% 3.6% 9.0% 1.4% 0.8% 4.5%\n**Cleaning** 5.9% 6.4% 6.6% 4.7% 11.9% 6.6%\n**Leisure** 1.2% 1.0% 1.7% 0.7% 1.2% 1.4%\n**Clothing** 4.4% 5.3% 3.3% 5.9% 5.9% 5.4%\n**Education** 2.9% 5.9% 3.7% 3.3% 4.3% 3.8%\n**Health** 3.0% 1.7% 1.3% 1.0% 2.1% 1.3%\n**Transport** 1.0% 3.0% 5.1% 1.7% 2.2% 3.1%\n**Other** 18.3% 20.5% 28.9% 28.9% 24.0% 25.2%\n\n**Total Consumption** 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%\n\n24", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\n**Table 9. Impact of Quality-Driven Price Premium**\n\nSimulation: doubling Headcount % change Poverty Change in % change in % change coffee price: P0 in P0 gap (P1) P1 expenditure in income _**baseline coffee farmers**_ _**41.88**_ _**0.00%**_ _**0.135**_ _**0.00%**_ _**0.00%**_ _**0.00%**_ 50% of all coffee farmers 39.86 -4.82% 0.124 -8.25% 2.49% 4.85% all large coffee farmers 41.15 -1.74% 0.131 -2.93% 1.34% 3.15% all medium coffee farmers 40.77 -2.65% 0.132 -2.79% 0.87% 1.92% all medium and large 40.05 -4.37% 0.128 -5.72% 2.21% 5.07% coffee farmers small coffee farmers 39.23 -6.33% 0.120 -11.08% 2.93% 4.85% Source: Computed by authors from EICV data\n\n**Table 10. Determinants of the Probability of Being a Coffee Farmer (propensity score)**\n\n**Parameter** **DF Estimate** **Standard**\n\n**Error**\n\n**Wald 95% Confidence**\n\n**Limits**\n\n**Chi-**\n**Square**\n\n**Pr > ChiSq**\n\nIntercept 1 -3.1209 0.0318 -3.1832 -3.0586 9651.42 <.0001 Distance to road 1 -0.0353 0.0028 -0.0407 -0.0298 158.7 <.0001 Access to electricity 1 1.0688 0.0372 0.9959 1.1418 824.84 <.0001 Extension services 1 0.1843 0.0049 0.1747 0.1938 1439.03 <.0001 dummy Head's Education 1 0.023 0.0014 0.0202 0.0258 257.34 <.0001 Dependency ratio 1 0.0441 0.0011 0.042 0.0462 1687.25 <.0001 Land area 1 0.0345 0.0012 0.0321 0.037 763.17 <.0001 Livestock heads 1 0.0058 0.0004 0.0051 0.0066 234.77 <.0001 Head is male dummy 1 0.1184 0.0058 0.1069 0.1298 411.64 <.0001 Use fertilizer dummy 1 0.1508 0.0048 0.1414 0.1602 984.59 <.0001 Dummy Butare 1 1.7102 0.0247 1.6617 1.7587 4779.86 <.0001 Dummy Byumba 1 1.1653 0.0251 1.1162 1.2145 2158.49 <.0001 Dummy Cyangugu 1 2.5895 0.0252 2.5401 2.639 10529.5 <.0001 Dummy Gikongoro 1 1.4111 0.0253 1.3615 1.4606 3114.6 <.0001 Dummy Gisenyi 1 1.3244 0.0253 1.2748 1.3739 2740.1 <.0001 Dummy Gitarama 1 1.5732 0.0246 1.5249 1.6214 4078.33 <.0001 Dummy Kibungo 1 1.2965 0.0249 1.2477 1.3453 2712.76 <.0001 Dummy Kibuye 1 1.3999 0.0255 1.35 1.4498 3023.54 <.0001 Dummy Kigali 1 1.0657 0.0255 1.0158 1.1156 1752.61 <.0001 Dummy Ruhengeri 1 0.2822 0.0273 0.2288 0.3357 107.17 <.0001 25", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["EICV data"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "EICV data", "confidence": 0.9787303805351257}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "# WPS3784\n\n**Table 11. Income Gains from Switching from Subsistence to Coffee Farming**\n\nMatching Matching method: method:\n**Sample: all household heads** Epanechnikov Normal kernel\n\nObserved average agricultural income coffee farmer 99876.3 99876.3 Observed average agricultural income subsistence farmer 74072.8 74072.8 Subsistence farmers' agricultural income had they participated 91256.2 96267.1 Gain from participation in coffee farming 17183.4 22194.4 _Proportionate change in subsistence farmers' income_ 23.2% 30.0% _Impact on the headcount level_ -24.9% -27% _Impact on the poverty gap_ -12.5% -12.9% _Total sample (household heads)_ ~~_1_~~ 2753 _Number of people that switch and gain_ 1073 _Percentage of people that switch and gain_ 39% _Note:Missing values are excluded, so the sample size reported here is smaller than the actual_ _number of head farmers_ _* = Statistically significant as established through bootstrapping._ 26", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Epanechnikov Normal kernel", "confidence": 0.15503475069999695}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2839\n# I\n\nAbstract\n\nEmran and Shilpi use survey data from Bangladesh to commodity externality effects in the sale of farm\npresent empirical evidence on externalities at household households. The vegetable markets in villages with low\nlevel sales decisions resulting from increasing returns to marketable surplus seem to be trapped in segmented\nmarketing. The increasing returns that arise from thick local market equilibrium. The analysis points to the\nmarket effects and fixed costs imply that a trader is able coordination failure in farm sale decisions as a plausible\nto offer higher prices to producers if the marketed explanation for the lack of development of rural markets\nsurplus is higher in villages. The semi-parametric even after market liberalization policies are implemented.\nestimates identify highly nonlinear own and cross\n\n\nThis paper-a product of Rural Development, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to\nunderstand the process of development of rural markets. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818\nH Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Forhad Shilpi, room MC3-536, telephone 202-458-7476, fax 202522-1151, email address fshilpi@worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://\necon.worldbank.org. Shahe Emran may be contacted at emran@stanford.edu. May 2002. (31 pages)\n\n\n_The_ _Policy Research_ _Working Paper Series disseminates the findings_ _of work_ _in progress to_ _encourage the_ _exchange of ideas about_\n_development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly,_ _even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The_\n_papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in_ _this_\n_paper are entirely_ _those of the authors. They_ _do_ _not necessarily represent the view_ _of the World Bank,_ _its Executive Directors, or the_\n_countries they_ _represent._\n\n\nProduced by the Research Advisory Staff", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["survey data from Bangladesh"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey data from Bangladesh", "confidence": 0.5518863797187805}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey data", "confidence": 0.9004722833633423}]}}}
{"input": "Marketing Externalities and Market Development [1] 2\n\n\nM. Shahe Emran\nStanford University and\nGeorge Washington University\n\n\nForhad Shilpi\nWorld Bank\n\n\nKey Words: Increasing Returns, Externalities, Marketing, Market **Development,**\nSemiparametric Estimation\n\n\nJEL Classification: D13; D43; **012;** M31\n\n\n'Emails: emranAstanford.edu, fshilpi@worldbank.org.\n\n**2** We would like to thank Joseph Stiglitz, Hanan Jacoby, Fahad Khalil, Marcel Fafchamps, Gershon Feder, Jose\nCanals-Cerda, Takashi Kurosaki, Jishnu Das, Don Larson, Shabbir Jilany and the seminar participants **at** the\nNEUDC, 2001 at Boston University, and at BIDS for useful comments. We would also like to thank **Salman** **Zaidi**\nand Masako Hiraga for assistance with data, Misuzu Otsuka for superb research assistance.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Marketing Externalities and Market Development\n\n\nIntroduction\n\n\nThe importance of increasing returns, externalities, and multiple equilibria in explaining the\n\npersistence of underdevelopment has been a perennial theme in the development literature. 1\n\nThat there can be multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria due to increasing returns and its associated\n\npecuniary externalities, and that an economy (or a region) can be trapped in a low-level equilib\nrium has gained wide acceptance in recent theoretical literature, ranging from endogenous growth\n\ntheory to new economic geography. Different sources of increasing returns and externalities have\n\nbeen identified and analyzed (for example, fixed costs of production in urban manufacturing sector\n\nas in Krugman (1991) and in subsequent literature on new economic geography, and endogenous\n\ntechnology adoption in final goods sector in Ciccone and Matsuyama(1996)). 2 However, the\n\nextant literature has not paid adequate attention to the role of **marketing** which is an important\n\nsource of increasing returns and externalities in a market economy, especially at an early stage\n\nof development. The increasing returns to marketing arise from thick market effects and from\n\nthe existence of fixed costs, for example, in hiring a truck and in renting in a storage space. [3]\n\nUnderstanding the implications of increasing returns and externalities associated with marketing\n\nfor development of markets is of paramount importance, as well-functioning markets are widely\n\nviewed as the _sine_ _qua_ _non_ of economic development. The objective of this paper is to address\n\nthis important but largely neglected issue; particularly to provide formal empirical evidence on\n\nthe existence and magnitudes of the externalities in farm level sales decisions that result from\n\nincreasing returns to marketing.\n\n'The literature can be traced back at least to the presidential address of Allyn Young to the Royal Economic\nSociety (1928). The recent revival in interest owes much to the work of Murphy et. al. (1989). See also, Matsuyama\n(1992), Eswaran and Kotwal (1996), Rodriguez-Clare (1996), Hoff and Stiglitz (2000) and Ray (2000), among others.\nHoff (2000) provides an excellent summary of the theoretical literature focusing on underdevelopment traps.\n2 There is a small (relative to the theoretical literature) but rapidly expanding empirical literature on increasing\nreturns, externalities and multiple equilibria. For instance, in Ciccone and Matsuyama(1996), private return to\ninvestment increases with the aggregate level of investment. Productivity of firms increases with the size/density\nof activities e.g. in Ciccone and Hall(1996).\n3In their in-depth study on the peasant marketing in Indonesia, Hayami and Kawagoe (1993) report that there\nare large economies of scale in long-distance trade. It costs about Rp. 1000- Rp. 2000 to charter a pony wagon\nto Garut bazaar, carrying a load up to 200 kg. It costs Rp. 5000 to charter a mini truck for any load, up to the\nmaximum capacity of 2 tons. Therefore the cost of transportation is Rp. 5/kg or higher if a load of up to 200 kg\nof soybean is carried from the study village to Garut Bazaar by pony wagon, but the cost declines to Rp. 2.5/kg if\na two ton load is carried by a mini truck. (P.54)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "The increasing returns to marketing imply that a trader can offer better prices to a farm\n\nhousehold located in a village with high aggregate surplus, as she can achieve significant economies\n\nof scale in marketing. This results in pecuniary externalities at the households level; the sales of\n\nan individual household of any given commodity becomes a positive function of the village level\n\naggregate marketed surplus of (i) the commodity itself (called _own externality),_ and _(ii)_ all other\n\ncommodities produced in the village (called _cross externality)._ The cross externality effect arises\n\nfrom the fact that, when the marketable surplus of any given commodity is small, a trader needs\n\nto pool multiple commodities for reaping economies of scale.\n\nThe existence of fixed costs and externalities also implies that there can be multiple equilibria\n\nwhich can be identified with different levels of market development. We identify three distinct\n\nstages of niarket development in the rural areas of developing countries. In the first and most\n\nunderdeveloped stage, the rural markets are isolated, and the market clearing occurs at the local\n\nlevel. The marketable surplus is so low that it constrains the emergence and operation of a long\nrange intermediary class that can connect the local market to the central or urban market(s),\n\nas it is not possible to reap any significant economies of scale in marketing. At this stage of\n\nmarket development, both the own and cross externality effects in the sales decisions discussed\n\nearlier are absent or insignificant. Moreover, the price an individual farm household gets for the\n\noutput is likely to be negatively correlated with the aggregate supply brought to the local market\n\ndue to the standard supply shift effect. This, in turn, implies a negative _own_ _externality like_\n\n_effect,_ as a farm household's sales, _ceteris paribus,_ tend to be lower, when the neighbors bring in\n\nmore to the market, and thus depress the (local) market price. Observe that the existence of\n\nfixed costs implies that there can be a coordination problem in the sales decisions of the farm\n\nhouseholds and a village can be trapped in a segmented local market equilibrium. Given the\n\nlocal market clearing, it might be individually optimal for the farm households not to produce\n\nmore surplus, but when everyone produces enough surplus, this might make long range marketing\n\nintermediary profitable, and thus integrate the market with the urban centers. 4 In the second\n\nstage of the market development, the long range marketing intermediaries are in operation, but\n\n4Observe that the coordination failure can occur at two levels. First, the sales decisions of all the farm households\nneed to be coordinated. But that might not be sufficient to break out of the local equilibrium, as the increased\nsurplus will only glut the local market if it can not be coordinated with the entry of the prospective marketing\nintermediary.\n\n\n2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "they need to pool together multiple commodities to cover the fixed costs in transportation and\n\nstorage and to reap the economies of scale. So this intermediate stage of market development\n\nis characterized by the presence of both own and cross externality effects. In the last and most\n\ndeveloped stage of market development, the marketable surplus of each commodity is large enough\n\nto permit commodity-wise specialization by the marketing intermediaries. As such there is no\n\ncross commodity externalities at this stage, and it is characterized by the existence of only own\n\nexternality effect.\n\nUsing household level data from Bangladesh, we find significant evidence of both own and\n\ncross commodity externality effects. While there are evidence of strong own externality effects in\n\nrice markets, the cross externality effect seems to be absent. The evidence thus imply that the\n\nrice markets in Bangladesh have attained the most developed stage of the three stages described\n\nearlier. For a farm household located in a village in the first quartile (sorted by village surplus\n\nof rice), the total sales of rice increases by 47 percent when the average sales of rice by all others\n\nin the village doubles. In contrast, for vegetables, there is a negative own externality like effect\n\nin villages with low marketable surplus, indicating the existence of segmented and local market\n\nequilibrium. The sales of vegetables by a farm household in a village in the first quartile ( sorted\n\nby surplus of vegetables) tends to _decrease_ by 26 percent when the average sales by all others\n\ndoubles, _ceteris paribus._ _5_ The vegetables markets in these villages seem to be trapped in the\n\nlow-level isolated market equilibrium. The analysis and evidence presented here thus point to a\n\nplausible explanation of the apparently puzzling observation that, in many developing countries,\n\nthe deregulation and liberalization policies have largely failed to accelerate the development of\n\nthe rural markets (Kherallah et. al. (2000)). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first\n\nattempt at a formal econometric analysis of the externalities associated with increasing returns\n\nto marketing in the rural markets of developing countries. [6]\n\nThe rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the different sources of\n\nincreasing returns to marketing and the many economic functions performed by a marketing\n\nintermediary in developing countries. Section 2 describes a simple model of a marketing interme\n5 The elasticities reported here are based on 2SLS estimates.\n61t is interesting to compare our analysis to that of Demsetz (1968). Using data from a well developed market,\ni.e. the New York Stock Exchange, Demsetz finds evidence of significant scale economies in securities trade. The\nscale economies arise from thick market externalities from better matching of buyers and sellers when trade volume\nof a given security increases. Thus only a subset of what we call own externality effects is considered.\n\n\n3", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["household level data from Bangladesh"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "2SLS estimates", "confidence": 0.11872221529483795}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household level data from Bangladesh", "confidence": 0.8541193008422852}, {"text": "data from a well developed market", "confidence": 0.4137103855609894}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household level data", "confidence": 0.33312875032424927}]}}}
{"input": "diary that guides the empirical analysis. A discussion of the econometric issues involved in the\n\nestimation of externality effects and of the specification of the estimating equation is provided in\n\nthe next section. Section 4 gives a brief discussion of the data. The main empirical results on\n\nexternalities, using a semi-parametric approach, are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes\n\nthe paper with a summary of the results and a discussion on the implications of the results of\n\nthis paper for the broader theme of agricultural market development and poverty alleviation in\n\ndeveloping countries.\n\n\nSection 1: The Economics of Marketing and Market Development\n\n\nSeveral sources of increasing returns to marketing can be identified from existing theoretical\n\nand empirical literature. First, the cost of transacting in a market can decline with the scale of\n\ntrading due to _thick market externalities_ from better matching of buyers and sellers, and from bet\nter generation and transmission of information (e.g. Demsetz (1968), Diamond (1982), Rubinstein\n\nand Wolinsky (1987)). Second, as we mentioned above, two of the most important components\n\nof marketing: transportation and storage give rise to natural increasing returns due to fixed costs\n\ninvolved. These are known as increasing returns to _bulking_ in the marketing literature. Third,\n\nsetting up of a marketing network frequently involves substantial sunk investments in \"intangible\n\nassets\" like trust and reputation. The available empirical evidence from developing countries\n\nindicate that markets in agricultural and many manufacturing inputs and outputs operate on the\n\nbasis of relational contracts. The relational contracts facilitate information sharing and informal\n\nenforcement of contracts (Aoki and Hayami(1999)). The intermediaries traders need to incur\n\nsignificant costs in developing these informal relationships, which can be termed as a trader's\n\n\"social capital\". _An_ _important implication of the existence_ _of increasing returns to marketing is_\n\n\n_that,_ _under plausible conditions, it_ _generates pecuniary externalities at the level_ _of individual farm_\n\n_households._ As the aggregate volume of trade increases allowing a trader to take advantage of\n\nthe many different sources of increasing returns, part of the gain is passed on to the producers in\n\nthe form of higher prices, especially when the entry into marketing is not restricted. [7] Also, there\n\n71n 1960s, there were extensive government interventions in the agricultural markets of developing countries\nthat often restricted entry by private traders. The markets have, however, been deregulated and liberalized starting\nfrom late 1970s. Although stories of monopsonistic behavior in agricultural markets abound in popular accounts,\nthe prevailing consensus from more careful studies is that the markets, especially at the local level, are reasonably\n\n\n4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "are significant cross commodity externalities, especially at the early stages of development, as the\n\nmarketed surplus of a single commodity may not be large enough to recover the fixed costs, thus\n\nproviding incentives for pooling of different commodities. [8] The lack of specialization in mar\nketing, both horizontally and vertically, at early stages of development is well-documented (see,\n\nfor example, Hirsch (1961), Hayami and Kawagoe (1993)). The wide prevalence of producers\n\nand traders associations in developing countries probably reflects, at least in part, the outcome of\n\nattempts to capture increasing returns to marketing at low levels of production and marketable\n\nsurplus. 9\n\nWhile the existence of increasing returns to marketing can generate positive externalities, an\n\nincrease in the volume of trade, particularly of different commodities, can also increase transaction\n\ncosts, and thus eventually limit the number of commodities traded in a given market (Demsetz\n\n_(op_ _cit))._ Market intermediaries play a critical role in inspecting and verifying quality of a\n\ncommodity thereby facilitating its exchange even without personal examination by the buyers.10\n\nThis is especially important in developing countries because of a lack of standardization. The\n\nmarketing intermediary can be looked upon as an expert in judging the quality of a product who\n\nhelps resolve the adverse selection problem _d_ _la_ Akerlof's lemon, and thus can stop a market\n\nfrom unravelling completely (see, for example, Biglaiser (1993)). However, at early stages of\n\ndevelopment, any given intermediary usually handles a number of commodities, and she can not\n\nbe expected to be equally expert in verifying quality of all of them. The _diseconomies of scope_\n\nin performing quality verification is higher, the larger the number and volume of commodities in\n\ncompetitive or at least \"contestable\" (see, for example, Chowdhury (1992) on Bangladesh, Kherallah et al (2000)\non Sub-Saharan Africa). That these markets are essentially contestable was forcefully argued early on by Bauer\nand Yamey (1954).\n8For instance, in smaller markets, once a truck is hired, traders are often seen to pool different commodities so as\nto operate the truck near its capacity (to the extent possible). If a single trader's volume is not large enough, then\nmultiple traders, possibly dealing with different commodities, may hire a truck in partnership (see, for example,\nBelshaw (1965) for evidence on Fiji, and Hayami and Kawagoe _(op_ cit) for Indonesia.)\n9There are evidence that the same produce gets better price when marketed through a marketing association in\ncomparison to individual marketing. For example, while per box of squash marketed through the Ha-ee vegetable\nmarketing group in Korea got $6.58, the price fetched by individual marketers was $5.92 in 1982 (P.118, Abbot,\n1987). This gave an average $800 additional income to a member of the group. Although part of the price\ndifferential might reflect better bargaining power of the group, economies of scale in marketing (transportation,\nstorage and packaging) arising from fixed costs is also an important factor.\n10Even for relatively homogenous commodities like foodgrains, there are multiple dimensions of quality that can\nbe important: color, taste, appearance of kernels, moisture content, impurity, breakage of kernels, and baking\nqualities (Gabre-Madhin, 1999).\n\n\n5", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "the portfolio of a trader. [1 1] With the increase in income and production, as marketed surplus\n\nincreases beyond a threshold, a trader can reap the economies of scale without pooling different\n\ncommodities together which leads to specialization in marketing and creates experts in quality\n\nverification. The above discussion forms the basis for the three stages of market development\n\ndiscussed earlier.\n\nWe utilize household level survey data from Bangladesh to test for the existence of the exter\nnality effects and to estimate them when they are present. The choice of Bangladesh as a case\n\nstudy is motivated by two characteristics of its agriculture. The average farm size is very small\n\nand economic activity is very densely distributed over geographic space, an ideal combination for\n\ngenerating pecuniary externalities at the individual farm level.1 [2] If the farm size is large enough\n\nas is the case in much of Latin America, it is easy for individual farmers to reap the benefits of\n\nincreasing returns to marketing, and one should not observe any externality effects across different\n\nproducers. On the other hand, if the farms are small but geographically isolated, it would be\n\nextremely difficult, if not impossible, to reap any economies of scale in marketing. The high\n\ngeographic density and small farm size coupled with the fact that most of the households produce\n\nmultiple commodities due to risk diversification reasons, imply that the forces of both own and\n\ncross externalities are likely to be important in Bangladesh agriculture.\n\n\nSection 2: Price formation in the presence of increasing returns to marketing\n\n\nAt the heart of our analysis of externalities in farm level sales is the formation of producer\n\nprice of a commodity at a given market (or at the farm gate) in the presence of increasing returns\n\nto marketing. In this section, we develop a simple model of price formation by considering\n\nthe optimization problem of an intermediary/trader. Let qi denote the amount of commodity i\n\nshipped from the local market, and Q be the total volume of all commodities shipped from that\n\n\" [1] As pointed out before, even if traders are specialized commodity wise, but deal with relatively small volume, a\nnumber of traders can pool together and hire a truck to transport to the nearest urban market. In this case, there\nare no diseconomies from spreading thin the quality inspection skill, but there are costs associated with coalition\nformation and collective action. Time and efforts need to be spent to establish such an arrangement and to hold\nit together. Private marketing cooperatives, producers' associations fit into this category. The model developed in\nthe next section of the paper can be easily adapted to represent such an association where the quality verification\ncosts are replaced by the costs of coalition formation and collective action.\n1 [2] With population density of more than 2000 per square mile, Bangladesh is considered as the most densely\npopulated non-city country in the world. The average farm size is about 1 hectare.\n\n\n6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["household level survey data from Bangladesh"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "household level survey data from Bangladesh", "confidence": 0.7286277413368225}], "vague_data": [{"text": "household level survey data", "confidence": 0.615836501121521}]}}}
{"input": "_**The World’s Largest Open Access Agricultural & Applied Economics Digital Library**_\n\n**This document is discoverable and free to researchers across the**\n\n**globe due to the work of AgEcon Search.**\n\n**Help ensure our sustainability.**\n\n[Give to AgEcon Search](https://shorturl.at/nIvhR) AgEcon Search\n[htp://ageconsearch.umn.edu](http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/)\n\n[aesearch@umn.edu](mailto:aesearch@umn.edu) _Papers downloaded from_ _**AgEcon Search**_ _may be used for non-commercial purposes and personal study only._ _No other use, including posting to another Internet site, is permitted without permission from the copyright_ _owner (not AgEcon Search), or as allowed under the provisions of Fair Use, U.S. Copyright Act, Title 17 U.S.C._ _No endorsement of AgEcon Search or its fundraising activities by the author(s) of the following work or their_ _employer(s) is intended or implied._", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS www.elsevier.com/locate/agecon The Green Revolution and the productivity paradox: evidence from the Indian Punjab Rinku Murgai _Development Research Gtvup, The World Bank, 1818 H Street,_ _N. W.,_ _Washington,_ _DC 20433,_ _USA_ Abstract Contrary to a widespread belief, total factor productivity (TFP) growth, as measured by the conventional growth accounting approach, contributed little to economic growth during the Green Revolution in the Indian Punjab. This paper shows that this 'productivity paradox' arises because of a fundamental problem with conventional measures of TFP growth. When technical change is not Hicks-neutral, it is impossible to separate the contribution of technical change from that of factor accumulation.\nSimple exercises to assess the magnitudes involved in the Punjab case show that the bias in conventional TFP estimates is severe: 'corrected' measures of productivity growth are between 100 and 200% higher per year during the Green Revolution.\n© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.\n\n_JEL classification:_ 013; 030; 047; Q16 _Keywords:_ Total factor productivity; Biased technical change; Green Revolution; Agricultural sustainability\n\n1. Introduction\n\nThe Green Revolution of the mid-1960s led to a dramatic increase in agricultural production and radically transformed the course of Indian agriculture.\nWithin India, the state of Punjab has been the star performer.lt was the first state to widely adopt the modem high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of wheat and rice, and has been the most widely cited Indian success story of the Green Revolution. From 1966 to 1974, production of wheat, the primary winter crop, increased at an annual rate in excess of 9%. Rice, which was not widely grown prior to the Green Revolution, grew at a remarkable rate of 18% during this period. Overall, agricultural production increased at a rate of 6%.\nThis record of growth in production has led many economists to believe that productivity growth must have also been high in Punjab's agricultural sector.\n\n_E-mail address:_ rmurgai@worldbank.org (R. Murgai).\n\nMore recently, in the years following the Green Revolution, there has been growing concern that high rates of productivity growth have not been sustained in the light of heavy water and fertiliser inputs, diminishing growth in the yields of the major crops, and degradation of the water and land resource base.\nHowever, the empirical evidence of productivity growth, as measured by the conventional growth accounting methods, goes directly contrary to expectations. Productivity growth in Punjab was lowest during the Green Revolution years, even as farmers switched from traditional varieties of wheat and rice to hybrid seed varieties and the agricultural sector experienced stellar growth rates in production. Productivity growth increased during a phase of rapid factor accumulation that immediately followed, after adoption of HYVs was essentially complete. This is the puzzle - \"why are trends in productivity growth exactly opposite to our expectations?\" 0169-5150/01/$ -see front matter© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.\nPII: SO 169-5150(0 1 )00077 -9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "200 _R._ _Murgail Agricultural Economics 25 (2001) 199-209_ Table I Conventional estimates of productivity growth, 1961-1994 Entire period, 1961-1994 I. Conventional TFP growth (% per year) TFP 1.9 Output 5.0 Input 3.0 II. Contribution of TFP to output growth (%) 38.8 Green Revolution, 1966-1974\n\n1.3\n5.9 4.6 22.3 Input intensification, 1975-1985\n\n1.8\n4.3 2.4 43.0 Post-Green Revolution, 1986-1994\n\n1.5\n4.5 3.0 33.5 This paper shows that the 'productivity paradox' arises because of a fundamental problem with the widely used measure of total factor productivity (TFP) growth. [1 ] TFP is calculated by subtracting the share-weighted growth in factor inputs from the growth rate in output, so that the residual is attributed to technical progress. However, when technical change is not Hicks-neutral, the shares of payments to each factor depend on the rate and bias of technical change. As a result, the contribution of technical change is misattributed to factor accumulation and the derived residual of productivity growth is biased.\nSimple exercises to assess the magnitudes involved in the Punjab case show that the bias in conventional TFP estimates is severe; 'corrected' measures of productivity growth are between 100 and 200% higher per year during the Green Revolution. This error has been neglected in the current literature, but is potentially extremely serious in many other regions and sectors that have undergone rapid factor accumulation amidst factor-biased technological change.\nConsidering the widespread importance placed on measures of productivity growth to monitor the aggregate performance and sustainability of agricultural systems, it is critical that such correction procedures be used to assess and improve the accuracy of TFP estimates.\n\n1 The term 'productivity paradox' is borrowed from the literature that seeks to explain the sudden decline in productivity growth in industrialised countries after 1973, even though there were significant technological advances in some fields. Diewert et a!.\n(1999) provide a summary of recent research on the productivity slowdown in the service sectors of industrialised countries.\n\n**2. Conventional estimates of productivity growth**\n\nThere are several measures of TFP that use different rules for aggregating outputs and inputs. The method commonly used to minimise the impact of relative price changes when forming the aggregate quantity indices is a Divisia indexing procedure (Alston et al., 1995). Among alternative discrete approximations to the Divisia index, the chain-linked Tornqvist-Theil TFP index is often preferred, since it is exact for the linear homogenous translog production function (Diewert, 1976). TFP is obtained by taking the difference between the growth rates of the aggregate output and input indices.\n\nwhere _Q/1_ is the Divisia output index, _Xl1_ the Divisia input index, and _Rit_ and _Sjr_ are the revenue shares of output _i,_ and the cost share of input _j,_ at time _t,_ respectively.\nFor the purposes of computing TFP, annual data on all inputs, outputs and prices were collected at the district level during the period 1961-1994. [2 ] Major 2 Considerable resources were invested to collect data (from the Indian Directorate of Economics and Statistics and various secondary sources) on individual crop and livestock products, inputs and prices at the district-level. This exercise resulted in a more comprehensive data-set than has been previously used in the Indian context. For a detailed discussion of the aggregation and valuing methods, see Murgai (1997).\n\nTFP::::::ln · ( _TFPr_ ) =ln ( -- _Qlr_ ) -In ( -- _Xlr_ ) TFPr-1 _Qlr-I_ _Xlr-1_ =~-(Rit+R;r-I)ln \"1 ( _--Q·r_ _1 -_ ) . 2 Qit-1 _l_\n\n-L: ~(Sjt + _Sjr-1)_ In ( _Xjt_ )\n. 2 _Xjr-1_ _J_ (1)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Tornqvist-Theil TFP index"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["Divisia input index", "Divisia output index", "annual data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Tornqvist-Theil TFP index", "confidence": 0.21895456314086914}, {"text": "Divisia output index", "confidence": 0.15990743041038513}, {"text": "Divisia input index", "confidence": 0.14525002241134644}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "annual data", "confidence": 0.28556564450263977}]}}}
{"input": "_R._ _Murgai/ Agricultural Economics 25 (2001) 199-209_ 201 farm outputs - 20 crops, fruits and livestock products\n\n- were aggregated into a Divisia output index using\ndistrict-specific farm harvest prices for the crops and state-level prices for livestock and fruits. The input categories included land, labour, water, machinery, draught animals, fertilisers and pesticides. To minimise the aggregation bias, inputs of different qualities were valued by the price of each input-quality type.\nLand was divided into irrigated and unirrigated land, labour was disaggregated into skilled and unskilled labour based on the rural literacy rate in each district, water was divided into canal and tubewell water, and fertiliser into individual nutrient sources - nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium. [3 ] Growth in TFP was analysed for three periods corresponding to different phases of Green Revolution technical change (Byerlee, 1992). The Green Revolution period (1966-197 4) corresponds to the widespread adoption of input-responsive modern varieties of wheat and rice, which led to a dramatic increase in production. This was followed by an input intensification period (1975-1985) when the use of fertilisers and capital inputs increased rapidly, and a post-Green Revolution period (1986-1994) when input use levelled off.\nTable 1 reports the estimates of the Tornqvist-Theil index of TFP growth. Punjab sustained productivity 3 As far as possible, the prices used to value inputs and outputs were those faced by the producers. That is, all taxes on the value of output were removed but all subsidies and taxes on the factors of production were retained (see Young, 1995 for discussion). For example, the fertiliser was valued at the subsidised price paid by the producers. However, using the price paid by producers to compute the factor shares is problematic in the case of inputs that are effectively rationed. In the case of canal water (a subsidised but rationed input), the price does not reflect the true shadow value paid by producers. Consequently, canal water's factor share, when computed at the levied charges, likely understates its true factor share and biases our TFP estimates. The extent of bias depends on the rate of growth of canal water use relative to other inputs and on the share of canal water in factor payments. Simulations suggest that underestimation of the shadow price biases our TFP estimates, but that the degree of bias is small since canal water use grew at a much slower rate than other relatively high priced inputs.\nUnderestimation of the shadow price of groundwater (which may arise due to electricity shortages in the case of producers who rely upon water purchased from electric tubewells) would bias our estimates upwards. Evidence from simulations suggests that the bias is unlikely to be severe. For example, a 40% increase in the hourly price of water from electric tubewells would lower annual TFP growth rates from 1.9 to 1.8%.\n\ngrowth rates of 1.3% or more in each period, averaging 1.9% from 1961 to 1994. [4 ] These estimates are comparable to the long-term productivity growth estimates reported for Punjab and at the higher end of those reported for India as a whole. [5 ] The productivity gains explain approximately 39% of the 5% growth rate in aggregate output from 1961 to 1994.\nComparing performance across periods, we see that the Green Revolution was indeed a period of extraordinary agricultural performance. Output growth was most rapid during that period, at nearly 6% per year.\nParadoxically, however, productivity performance was the lowest during the Green Revolution; only 22% of the growth in output was explained by TFP growth.\nIn the following section, we present evidence on the trends in factor accumulation versus factor shares over the sample period. This evidence, combined with a closer look at the assumptions underlying the TFP calculations, casts doubt on the validity of conventional growth accounting estimates in the Punjab context.\n\n**3. Explaining the productivity paradox**\n\n_3.1. Are conventional TFP estimates biased?_ According to the TFP estimates reported in Table 1, more than three-quarters of the rate of growth in agricultural output during the Green Revolution was explained by factor accumulation. Much of this factor accumulation was in the form of rapid investment in tubewells for accessing groundwater for irrigation, tractors for land preparation, and increased use of pesticides and fertilisers. By contrast, overall labour utilisation declined (rapidly in the case of draught animals, but less so in the case of human labour since 4 To minimise the impact of end-points on the period-specific growth rates, all growth rates reported in the paper are computed by using a spline function with semi-log regressions. Growth rates for the 1961-1965 period are not reported since it is too short.\n5 See, for example, Evenson et al. ( 1999), Rosegrant and Evenson (1993), Desai (1994), Kumar and Rosegrant (1994), Sidhu and Byerlee (1992), Dholakia and Dholakia (1993). Ahluwahlia (1996) and Pingali and Heisey ( 1999) provide summaries of TFP estimates for Indian agriculture.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["Tornqvist-Theil index"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Divisia output index", "confidence": 0.6317369341850281}, {"text": "Tornqvist-Theil index", "confidence": 0.3245476484298706}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Divisia output index", "confidence": 0.11014322936534882}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "202 _R._ _Murgai/ Agricultural Economics 25 (2001) 199-209_ 600 _<!)_ .8 \"' ] 500 400 .g !3 300 ....:1 ~ ...\n\n., ..., • - -•- - Labour Index ~ 200 .......\n§< .~~>• ..... - - -• - - - Capital Index u ......\n\n......., __,.,_ \" ....\n..\n........\n\n....:1 300 ~ ~ 200 .~~>• ..... - - -• - - - Capital Index 100 $4..:\" **M..;._** .... **............. ._.................** _... ......,., ..... ............................................ ._.._._ .... .\n\n0+-----,------r-----r----~------r-----~--~ (a) 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Year\n\n1.00\n\n# e e • ............. .._ . o ··•• ..... ..... ....... ·.:-;; ·.\n\n0.90 ..<:: </.) .... ~ \"' 0.80 0.70 ..<:: </.) .... ~ 0.80 0.70 _**.Jij-**_ e _**..**_ .,. **e •** ............. .._ **o** ··•• .....\n#### ~ ~ 0.60 ............. ., .. ..,·• ·•· .. • ·- ~ ....... • Labour Share\n\n!3 0 0.50 •. •· ·.. .:!•t _ ... . - '+ ... • • - Capital Share ~ - • - • **···'!...t** ~ ~ 0.60 ~ !3 0 0.50 •. •· ·.. .:!•t _ ... . - '+ ... • • - Capital Share ~ - • - • **···'!...t** ....:1 0.40\n**....... f' ... :** **••**\n~ .......\n~ [0.30 ] §< 0.20 u 0.10\n\n- Capital Share\n# ·~-~ . .. ~~ .. ·. .. .................. ._.\n\n0.00 **+------.-----.....,...------,r------r------r----r-----.** 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 (b) Year Fig. I. (a) Evolution of weighted capital and labour indices, 1961-1994 and (b) evolution of capital and labour factor shares, 1961-1994.\n\nutilisation rates fell but the labour force grew). [6 ] The contrasting patterns of factor accumulation are starkly evident in a comparison of the patterns of evolution of weighted capital and labour indices over the sample period (Fig. la). [7 ] 6 Hazell and Ramaswamy (1991) found a similar decrease in the labour utilisation rates in a study of the effects of the Green Revolution in South India. They attribute the change to increased mechanisation of irrigation and paddy threshing.\n\n7 All non-labour inputs (including machinery, water, land and fertiliser) are aggregated into a capital index, while human and animal labour inputs are aggregated into a labour index.\n\nThese patterns of input use are consistent with the differences in relative price movements. Since the beginning of the Green Revolution, the prices of capital inputs and fertilisers declined largely due to government subsidies, while there was a modest increase in real wages. [8 ] However, there was a rather surprising pattern in the movement of factor shares over the same time period (Fig. lb). With rapid capital accumulation and a decrease in the relative price of capital, it seems reasonable to expect a decrease in the share of factor payments that accrue to capital.\n\n8 For a more detailed discussion of the trends in input and output use and prices, see Murgai (1997).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["Labour Index", "Capital Index"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_R._ _Murgail Agricultural Economics 25 (2001) 199-209_ 203 Instead, capital accumulation was accompanied by an increase, not decrease, in its share in total factor payments.\nThere are two contending explanations for the increase in the capital share despite tremendous capital-deepening. First, the underlying production function for the Green Revolution technologies had an elasticity of substitution between capital and labour that was high enough to compensate for the reduction in the marginal productivity of the capital. Alternatively, there was labour-saving technical change which led to an increase in the relative return to capital and therefore an increase in the share of capital. While we cannot be sure which explanation is true, there are strong reasons to believe the latter.\nWe know from other empirical sources (Kako, 1978; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; Thirtle, 1985a,b) that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour inputs is typically close to one (and usually smaller than one) which is too low to explain the increase in capital's share. [9 ] Moreover, the changes in factor proportions during the Green Revolution were so large that it is highly implausible that these changes represent pure substitution effects along a fixed production function with constant technology.\nWe also have ample evidence that the seed improvements that spearheaded the Green Revolution were directed towards the selection of more fertiliser and water-responsive varieties. The traditional varieties had equal or higher yields than the improved varieties at lower levels of fertilisation and irrigation, but they did not respond to higher applications of these inputs (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). It is likely, therefore, that the increase in capital's share reflects the development of crop varieties that were biased toward water and fertiliser use. [10 ] 9 If ordinary factor substitution in response to relative price movements was the only reason underlying changes in the factor share, the observed capital share changes would imply an elasticity of substitution close to 7, if the underlying production function were a scale-neutral CES.\n\n10 Indeed, the extent to which the factor shares would have changed in the absence of relative price changes is precisely how the degree of biased technological change has been measured in the literature (Binswanger, 1974, 1978; Yeung and Roe, 1978; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985).\n\nSince capital is the more rapidly growing input and its share is higher than it would have been in the absence of technical change, the aggregate input growth is over-estimated (see Eq. (1)). As a result, the TFP residual under-estimates true productivity growth. The next sub-section spells out this argument in greater detail.\n\n_3.2. Non-identifiability_ _of factor accumulation_ _and technical progress_ Although distinguishing factor-biased technical change from the price-induced substitution effects has been the focus of a significant fraction of the agricultural production economics literature (see Alston et al., 1995), the implications of biased technical change for index number approaches to productivity measurement have been neglected.\nThe basic issues are most easily demonstrated in a two-factor case. Consider a production function with two inputs, capital _(K)_ and labour (L), (2) where _A_ is the coefficient of Hicks-neutral technical change, _EK_ and _EL_ are the coefficients of capital-saving and labour-saving technical change, and the production function _(j)_ is linear homogenous and well-behaved. Rewriting Eq. (1) for this simple production function, conventional productivity growth is measured as the residual growth in output, after subtracting the weighted growth in inputs _K_ and _L,_ ln ( T~~~~J =In ( Q~~J _-a_ ln ( K~~J\n\n-(1 -a) ln (~) (3)\n_Lr-1_ where _a_ is the average share of capital in factor payments between period _t-_ 1 and _t._ Notice that the rates of growth of the two inputs are weighted by their observed factor shares.\nIf factors are paid their marginal products, the growth rate of the share of factor payments to capital in total output is\n##### a= ( -CJ- [1-CJ) ] (1- at_I)[(EL- A EK)- A (K- A L)] A\n\n(4)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "204 _R._ _Murgail Agricultural Economics 25 (2001) 199-209_ where the hat symbol n denotes the growth rate, _a_ the share of capital in factor payments and _CY_ the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. As Eq. (4) shows, the evolution of factor shares depends on (1) the form of the production function, as encapsulated by _CY,_ (2) the effect of factor-substitution along a fixed-technology isoquant in response to the changes in relative factor prices and (3) the effect of biased technical change. [11 ] Factor shares are independent of technical change only if the elasticity of substitution between the inputs is unity _(CY_ = 1) or if the technical change is Hicks-neutral _(EL_ _E_ _K_ = 0). [12 ] When it is relatively difficult to substitute capital for labour _(CY_ < 1), an increase in the capital:labour ratio _((K_ - _L)_ - 0), would lead to a decrease in the share of factor payments to capital. However, if there is labour-augmenting technical change _(EL_ - _EK),_ the relative return of capital increases.\nConsider the case of the Green Revolution. The increase in capital's share despite capital deepening could be either because of _CY_ that is much greater than 1 (as noted in footnote 9) or because of labour-saving technical change. In the latter case, since capital is the more rapidly growing input and its weight in the Divisia input index is higher than it would be in the absence of technical change, too much of the output growth is attributed to factor accumulation, and too little to the residual (i.e. TFP growth). [13 ] 11 For a non-homothetic production function, factor shares also depend on the scale of production since the expansion path is non-linear (Antle and Capalbo, 1988; Alston eta!., 1995). In this paper, we focus on the homothetic case, since empirical evidence on Green Revolution technologies suggests that the underlying production function is linear homogenous and therefore, homothetic (Ruttan and Binswanger, 1978; Hazell and Ramaswamy, 1991).\n\n12 For the formulation of the decomposition of factor shares into substitution and biased technical change effects based on the cost function (dual) approach, see Binswanger (1974) and Hayami and Ruttan (1985). Rodrik (1997) uses the primal decomposition approach to make the same argument about the difficulty of measuring biased technical change in the context of the east Asian economies.\n\n13 In practice, any chain-linked Divisia index (not just the Tornqvist-Theil index) that uses observed factor shares to aggregate inputs suffers from this problem. Mathematically, the bias arises because of the path-dependent properties of the Divisia index as a line integral (Hsieh, 1998). The TFP index is not path dependent only if technological change is Hicks-neutral.\n\n_3.3. Bias-corrected measures of productivity growth_ How can we correct conventional TFP estimates? In order to separately identify the contribution of factor accumulation from that of technical change, we need to estimate what factor shares would have been in the absence of a technical change. The task is to sort out to what extent the share changes have been due to biased technical change and to what extent to price changes.\nHowever, we need to contend with a fundamental identification problem, related to the Diamond et al.\n(1978) 'non-identification theorem' which shows that given the actual observations on input change and factor shares, it is impossible to separately identify the parameters of the underlying production function from the bias of technological change. [14 ] As a result, it is impossible to isolate the contribution of technological change from that of factor accumulation, without making assumptions about the underlying production function.\nGiven this identification problem, we cannot correct TFP estimates without knowing the 'true' substitution parameters of the production function. However, we can improve the accuracy of the estimates by making assumptions about reasonable values of _CY_ that are available from other empirical studies. [15 ] Assuming a certain _CY,_ and using initial factor shares (in year 0) and growth rates of factor deepening (between year 0 and _t),_ the differential equation for factor share changes (Eq. (4)) can be solved to estimate what factor shares at time _t_ would have been in the absence of 14 Stated differently, given time series data for a single economy with a classical aggregate production function, one finds that the same time series could have been generated by an alternative production function having an arbitrary _C5_ or bias at the observed points. In addition, if the underlying production function were non-homothetic, it may be possible to assign an arbitrary elasticity of substitution and the bias of technical change, and explain the observed time series solely in terms of scale bias.\n\n15 We cannot estimate _C5_ using our data because of the small number of cross-sectional units (districts) in our sample. The parameters of the production function must be estimated with cross-section, rather than time-series data, since the effects of biased technical change are incorporated in the observed evolution of factor shares (Binswanger, 1978; Diamond et a!., 1978). The difficulty with cross-sectional estimation, of course, is that all units should be on the same production function (i.e. there is no unobserved heterogeneity).", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Tornqvist-Theil index"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["Divisia input index", "Divisia index", "time series data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Divisia input index", "confidence": 0.5934810042381287}, {"text": "Tornqvist-Theil index", "confidence": 0.2133280634880066}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "time series data", "confidence": 0.9208140969276428}, {"text": "time-series data", "confidence": 0.13637569546699524}]}}}
{"input": "_R._ _Murgai! Agricultural Economics 25 (2001) 199-209_ 205 Table 2 Conventional vs. corrected estimates of TFP growth (two-factor CES) Entire period, 1961-1994 I. Conventionni TFP growth (% per year) TFP 1.9 II. Corrected TFP growth (% per year) _a_ = 0.3 4.8 _a=_ 0.7 3.7 _a_ = 1.3 2.9 III. Bias in TFP ( = II - I) _a_ = 0.3 2.9 _a_ = 0.7 1.7 _a_ = 1.3 1.0 Green Revolution, 1966-1974\n\n1.3\n\n4.0 3.0 2.7 2.7\n1.7\n1.4\n\nInput intensification, 1975-1985\n\n1.8\n\n2.9 2.6 2.5\n\n1.1\n0.8 0.7 Post-Green Revolution, 1986-1994\n\n1.5\n\n2.2\n1.2\n0.9 0.7\n-0.3\n-0.6\n\nbiased technical change. [16 ] The Divisia input index is then computed using the corrected factor shares, and the residual growth in output gives us a measure of bias-corrected productivity growth. [17 ] Table 2 reports bias-corrected estimates of TFP for three different values of _a_ in a two-factor scale-neutral CES production function. [18 ] For the ease of comparison, the first row in the table reproduces the conventional TFP estimates from Table 1. There are several points of note. First, the bias in conventional TFP estimates is extremely high. Comparing the first and second panels, the conventional TFP estimates under-estimate true productivity growth by 1-3% per year. Putting it differently, depending on the choice of _a,_ the bias-corrected TFP estimates are more than double the conventional estimates, per year. Second, the bias is greater for lower elasticities of substitu 16 This correction procedure is analogous to the approach that has been used to measure the degree of biased technical change (Binswanger, 1974; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). The approach has been to (l) measure the elasticity of substitution using cross-sectional data and (2) based on these parameters, measure the extent to which the factor shares would have changed had the factor prices remained constant. This approach, although the authors do not state it explicitly, also circumvents the identification problem by making reasonable assumptions about the value of _a_ in the underlying production function.\n\n17 The solution for the factor share differential equation and the bias-corrected Divisia input index is provided in Appendix A.\n\n18 As in Fig. Ia and b, the two factors are 'capital', which is a weighted index of all non-labour inputs, and 'labour', which is a weighted index of human and animal labour. For a detailed discussion of aggregating different input types into a single index, see Young (1995).\n\ntion. Clearly, the lower our priors about the substitutability between factors, greater we must assume the under-estimation in conventional productivity estimates to have been. Third, the under-estimation in conventional TFP estimates is the greatest during the Green Revolution period. This is expectedly because the shift from traditional varieties to modern HYVs was much more drastic in terms of the technological bias than the later shifts from the original Green Revolution varieties to further improved varieties. Finally, comparing the corrected TFP estimates across the periods (and contrary to the trends in conventional estimates), there is a clear decline in TFP growth after the Green Revolution, regardless of the assumptions about the elasticity. For example, when the elasticity of substitution is 0.7, TFP growth declines from 3% per year during the Green Revolution to 1.2% in the post-Green Revolution period. These estimates confirm suspicions about the declining productivity of irrigated agricultural systems that are typical of South Asia. [19 ] The under-estimation in conventional TFP is robust to other specifications of the production function. We repeated the exercise for a multi-factor CES production function, with land and labour as the two primary factors of production, and capital goods decomposed into those that substitute for land and those that substitute for labour (Hayami 19 Murgai et a!. (2000) relate the decline in the productivity of irrigated agriculture in the Indian and Pakistan Punjabs to resource degradation, especially in the rice-wheat cropping system.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["cross-sectional data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Divisia input index", "confidence": 0.8070336580276489}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": [{"text": "cross-sectional data", "confidence": 0.8682871460914612}]}}}
{"input": "206 _R._ _Murgail Agricultural Economics 25 (2001) 199-209_ Table 3 Corrected estimates of TFP growth, 1961-1994 (multi-factor CES)a _a=_ 0.2 _a=_ 0.5 _a=_ 0.9 Average annual TFP growth (%) _a A= aL_ = 0.2 5.07 4.98 4.94 _a A= aL_ = 0.7 4.99 4.87 4.84 _a A_ = 0.8; _a L_ = 0.7 4.98 4.85 4.81 _a A_ = 0.7; _a L_ = 0.8 4.97 4.86 4.82 a Note: _a A_ is the elasticity of substitution between labour and labour-saving inputs (machines), _a_ _L_ the elasticity of substitution between land and land-saving inputs (fertiliser and water) and _a_ the elasticity of substitution between land and labour aggregates.\n\nand Ruttan, 1985). Land-saving capital is identified with biological, chemical and water control investments, while the labour-saving capital consists of machinery, particularly tractors. Technical change is classified as land-saving or labour-saving according to whether it increases the productivity of the land-saving or the labour-saving capital goods.\nTable 3 reports the bias-corrected TFP growth rates for the period 1961-1994. For all reasonable values of the elasticities of substitution, the estimated growth rate of TFP lies between 4 and 5% per year. [20 ] For these values, the conventional TFP estimate of\n1.9% per year, therefore, under-estimates the contribution of technical progress by approximately 2%\nper year.\n\n4. Conclusions India's Punjab exemplifies the Green Revolution of the mid-1960s, when it achieved dramatically high rates of growth in agricultural output. Growth during the Green Revolution can be attributed largely to improvements in the yields of wheat and rice and to the expansion of area under wheat and rice HYV s.\n\n20 The elasticities used for the simulations in this paper are the ones reported by de Janvry et a!. (1989) as the average of those reported by several empirical studies. From a survey of various empirical estimates of the Allen partial elasticities of substitution between the inputs in the same sub-function and between the inputs in different sub-functions, de Janvry eta!. (1989) report that elasticities within sub-functions are higher than elasticities across the sub-functions and that they are all systematically lower than unity.\n\nHowever, most yield improvements resulted from rapid factor accumulation, especially in fertilisers and capital inputs. Contrary to a widespread belief, productivity growth, as measured by the conventional growth accounting approach, contributed little to the economic growth.\nA discussion of the conventional method of growth accounting helps to explain why measured productivity growth was much lower than expected. When technical change is not Hicks-neutral, it is impossible to separate the contribution of technical change from that of factor accumulation. The difficulty arises because when technical change is biased, the share of payments to each factor depend on the rate and bias of the technical change. As a result, when observed factor shares are used to compute an aggregate Divisia input index, part of the effects of technical change are captured in the index of factor accumulation.\nIn the case of the Indian Punjab, the bias in conventional TFP estimates is severe. Conventional estimates of TFP growth are biased downward during the Green Revolution because some of the contribution of labour and land-saving technical change is attributed to factor accumulation. Corrected TFP estimates also show that, contrary to the trends observed in the conventional estimates, there has been a marked decline in the productivity since the Green Revolution, raising concerns about the sustainability of irrigated agricultural systems.\nMore generally, in this paper, we have used the Tornqvist-Theil index as an example to illustrate the problem with conventional growth accounting in the presence of biased technical change. In practice, any chain-linked Divisia index that uses observed factor shares to aggregate the inputs needs to be corrected if there is a likelihood that technical change has been biased towards one or more factors. Indeed, if we believe in the role of induced innovation in maintaining the productivity growth, we should start incorporating its impact into our measures of productivity growth.\n\nAcknowledgements I am grateful to Dr. M.S. Bhatia at the Indian Directorate of Economics and Statistics without whom the", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["Tornqvist-Theil index"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["Divisia input index"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Tornqvist-Theil index", "confidence": 0.6609222888946533}, {"text": "Divisia input index", "confidence": 0.18884630501270294}], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey of various empirical estimates", "confidence": 0.20723040401935577}], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_R._ _Murgai/ Agricultural Economics 25 (2001) 199-209_ 207 data collection would not have been possible. I wish to thank Pranab Bardhan, Derek Byerlee, Calogero Carletto, Alain de Janvry, Navroz Dubash, Chang-Tai Hsieh, Nancy McCarthy, Prabhu Pingali, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Paul Winters and seminar participants at the University of California, Berkeley, the World Bank, and the XXIV International Conference of Agricultural Economists for comments. All the remaining errors are mine. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent those of the World Bank or any of the affiliated organisations.\n\n**Appendix A. Correcting factor shares and factor**\n**accumulation for technical change bias**\n\n_A. I. Corrections for a two-factor CES production_ _function_ A scale-neutral CES production function with two inputs, capital _(K)_ and labour (L) can be written as _Q=[y(ELL)(a-1)/a_ +(1-y)(EK _K)(a-1)/a]aj(l-a)_ (A.1) where _EK_ and _EL_ are the coefficients of capital-saving and labour-saving technical change, _y_ is a distribution parameter between 0 and **1**, and _O\"_ the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Under profit maximization (when factors are paid their marginal products), the rate of growth of the share of capital in factor payments is given by Eq. ( 4) (see Section 3.2).\nGiven the initial factor share for capital observed at time 0 (1961), by solving the differential Eq. (4), the factor shares that would have been observed in the time period _T_ ( 1994) in the absence of Hicks-biased technical change can be computed as _ao_ exp[(O\"- 1)/0\"](K- _L)T_ _aT_ = --------~------------~--~1 - _ao_ + _ao_ exp[(O\"- 1)/0\"](K- _L)T_ (A.2) TFP growth is computed by subtracting the bias-corrected growth rate of aggregate inputs (Eq. (A.3)) from the observed growth rate of aggregate output. The sensitivity of the corrected TFP growth rate to different assumptions about _O\"_ depends on the growth rate of the capital:labour ratio and on the initial shares of capital and labour in total income.\n\n_A.2. Corrections for_ _a multi-factor CES_ _production function_ A multi-factor production function that makes a distinction between labour, land, labour-saving and land-saving factors can be represented as _Q_ = [(XA)(a-1)/a + (1 _ _y)(XL)(a-1)/af!(l-a),_ _XA_ = _[8(EAA)(ar1)/aA_ +(1 _ _8)(EF F)(arl)/aA ]aA/0-aA),_ _XL=_ _[f3(ELL)(aL-1)/aL_ +(1- _f3)(EMM)(aL-I)faLfL/(I-aL)_ (A.4) where _XA_ (·)is the 'land' input index, XL(·) the 'labour' input index, _A_ and _L_ are land and labour use, respectively, _F_ the land-saving capital (fertiliser), _M_ the labour-saving capital (machinery), and the _Ei_ s are indices of biased technical change (see Hay ami and Ruttan (1985) for a discussion of the advantages of the two-level CES function over the translog function in the context of characterising biased technical change in agriculture). When factors are paid their marginal products, the rate of growth of factor shares is given by _aF_ A _-aA'_ A = ((JA-1)( ----- 1-- _aF)_ _O\"A_ _aA'_\n#### aM A -au A = (0\"£ ----- 1) ( 1 - - aM)\n\n_O\"L_ _au_ X _[(M-_ L) - _(EL_ - _EM)]_ (A.5) where the hat symbol () denotes growth rate, _a F_ and _aM_ are the shares of land-saving and labour-saving inputs in total income. The shares ofthe land (XA) and labour (XL) aggregates in total income are given by _a A'_ The bias-corrected Divisia input index, using the corrected factor shares is then given by A A [0\"/(1-0\")]ln(aT/ao) _I_ = _K_ + .::..__:_~ ___ __:_T=-----'------_ (A.3)", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Divisia input index", "confidence": 0.11119049042463303}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "208 _R._ _Murgai/ Agricultural Economics 25 (2001) 199-209_ and _au,_ respectively (i.e. _a A'= ap +a A_ and _au=_ _aM+ aL)._ As in the two-factor case, given the initial factor shares in time period 0 (1961), the factor shares (more precisely, _ap faA'_ and _aM /au)_ that would have been observed in time period _T_ (1994) in the absence of Hicks-biased technical change can be computed for different values of the elasticities of substitution.\nThe Divisia input index using these bias-corrected factor shares is then given by where (A.7) The TFP residual is computed by subtracting the bias-corrected growth rate of aggregate inputs (Eq. (A.6)) from the observed growth rate of the aggregate output. The sensitivity of the computed TFP growth rate to different assumptions about _CJ,_ _CJ A,_ and _CJ L_ depends on the growth rate of the fertiliser:land ratio and machines:labour ratio, and the initial shares of fertiliser and land in the total income.\n\n**References**\n\nAhluwahlia, D., 1996. Agricultural growth in India: trends, sources and challenges. Manuscript. World Bank Resident Mission, New Delhi.\nAlston, J.M., Norton, G.W., Pardey, P.G., 1995. Science under scarcity: principles and practice for agricultural research evaluation and priority setting. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, London.\nAntle, J.M., Capalbo, S.M., 1988. An introduction to recent developments in production theory and productivity measurement. In: Capalbo, S.M., Antle, J.M. (Eds.), Agricultural Productivity: Theory and Measurement. Resources for the Future. Washington, DC.\nBinswanger, H.P., 1974. The measurement of technical change biases with many factors of production. Am. Econ. Rev. 64 (6), 964-976.\nBinswanger, H.P., 1978. Measured biases of technical change: the United States. In: Binswanger, H.P., Ruttan, V.W., et a!. (Eds.), Induced Innovation: Technology, Institutions, and Development.\nJohns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.\nByerlee, D., 1992. Technical change, productivity and sustainability in irrigated cropping systems of South Asia: emerging issues in the post-Green Revolution Era. J. Int. Dev.\n4, 477-496.\nde Janvry, A., Sadoulet, E., Fafchamps, M., 1989. Agrarian structure, technological innovations and the state. In: Bardhan, P. (Ed.), The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions. Oxford University Press, Oxford.\nDesai, B., 1994. Contribution of institutional credit, self-finance and technological change to agricultural growth in India. Indian J. Agric. Econ. 49 (3), 457-475.\nDholakia, R.M., Dholakia, B.M., 1993. Growth of total factor productivity in Indian agriculture. Indian Econ. Rev. 28 (I), 25-40.\nDiamond, P., McFadden, D., Rodriguez, M., 1978. Measurement of the elasticity of factor substitution and bias of technical change.\nIn: Fuss, M., McFadden, D. (Eds.), Production Economics: A Dual Approach to Theory and Applications, Vol. 2.\nNorth-Holland Press, Amsterdam.\nDiewert, W.E., 1976. Exact and superlative index numbers. J.\nEconometr. 4, 115-146.\nDiewert, W.E., Nakamura, A.O., Sharpe, A., 1999. Introduction and overview. Canadian J. Econ. 32 (Suppl. 5), 5-15.\nEvenson, R.E., Pray, C.E., Rosegrant, M.W., 1999. Agricultural research and productivity growth in India. Research Report 109, International Food Policy Research Institute.\nHayami, Y., Ruttan, V.W., 1985. Agricultural development: an international perspective. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.\nHazell, P., Ramaswamy, C., 1991. The Green Revolution reconsidered: the impact of high-yielding rice varieties in South India. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.\nHsieh, C.T., 1998. Measuring biased technological change.\nWorking Paper, Princeton University.\nKako, T., 1978. Decomposition analysis of derived demand for factor inputs: the case of rice production in Japan. Am. J. Agric.\nEcon. 60, 628-635.\nKumar, P., Rosegrant, M., 1994. Productivity and sources of growth for rice in India. Econ. Pol. Weekly 29 (53), 183-188.\nMurgai, R., 1997. Diversity in economic growth and technical change: a district wise disaggregation of the Punjab and Haryana growth experience. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.\nMurgai, R., Ali, M., Byerlee, D., 2000. Productivity growth and sustainability in post-Green Revolution Agriculture in the Indian and Pakistan Pun jabs. World Bank Research Observer (in press).\nPingali, P.L., Heisey, P.W., 1999. Cereal crop productivity in developing countries: past trends and future prospects.\nCIMMYT Economics Paper 99-03, Mexico DF, CIMMYT.\nRodrik, D., 1997. TFPG Controversies, Institutions, and Economic Performance in East Asia. NBER Working Paper 5914, Cambridge, MA.\nRosegrant, M.W., Evenson, R.E., 1993. Agricultural productivity growth in Pakistan and India: a comparative analysis. Pakistan Dev. Rev. 32 (4), 433-451.\nRuttan, V.W., Binswanger, H.P., 1978. Induced innovation and the Green Revolution. In: Binswanger, H.P., Ruttan, V.W., et a!. (Eds.), Induced Innovation: Technology, Institutions and Development. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "Divisia input index", "confidence": 0.10562737286090851}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "_R._ _Murgai/ Agricultural Economics 25 (2001) 199-209_ 209 Sidhu, D.S., Byerlee, D., 1992. Technical change and wheat productivity in the Indian Punjab in the post-Green Revolution period. CIMMYT Economics Paper 92-02, Mexico, DF.\nThirtle, C., 1985a. The microeconomic approach to induced innovation: a reformulation of the Hayami and Ruttan model.\nManchester Sch. Econ. Social Stud. 53 (3), 263-279.\nThirtle, C., 1985b. Induced innovation in United States field crops, 1939-1978. J. Agric. Econ. 36, 1-14.\n\nYeung, P., Roe, T.L., 1978. A CES test of induced technical change: Japan. In: Binswanger, H.P., Ruttan, V.W., et al.\n(Eds), Induced Innovation: Technology, Institutions and Development. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.\nYoung, A., 1995. The tyranny of numbers: confronting the statistical realities of the East Asian growth experience. Quart.\nJ. Econ. 110 (3), 641-680.", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Chong, Alberto; Galdo, Virgilio\n\n**Working Paper**\n## Should State-Owned Firms Change CEOs Before Privatization? The Case of the Telecommunications Industry\n\nWorking Paper, No. 481\n\n**Provided in Cooperation with:**\nInter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, DC _Suggested Citation:_ Chong, Alberto; Galdo, Virgilio (2003) : Should State-Owned Firms Change CEOs Before Privatization? The Case of the Telecommunications Industry, Working Paper, No. 481, InterAmerican Development Bank, Research Department, Washington, DC This Version is available at:\n[https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88052](https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88052)\n\n**Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:**\n\nDie Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.\n\nSie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.\n\nSofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.\n\n**Terms of use:**\n\n_Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal_ _and scholarly purposes._ _You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to_ _exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the_ _internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public._ _If the documents have been made available under an Open Content_ _Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise_ _further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence._", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "EconStor", "confidence": 0.6408195495605469}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Inter-American Development Bank Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) Research Department Departamento de Investigación Working Paper #481\n\n# Should State-Owned Firms Change CEOs Before Privatization? The Case of the Telecommunications Industry\n\nby\n\n### Alberto Chong Virgilio Galdo\n\n#### Inter-American Development Bank\n\nFebruary 2003", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the**\n**Inter-American Development Bank**\n**Felipe Herrera Library**\n\nChong, Alberto.\n\nShould state-owned firms change CEOs before privatization : the case of the telecommunications industry / by Alberto Chong, Virgilio Galdo.\n\np. cm. (Research Department Working paper series ; 481) Includes bibliographical references.\n\n1. Telecommunication. 2. Government business enterprises.  3. Government business\nenterprises--Employees. 4. Privatization. I. Galdo, Virgilio. II. Inter-American Development Bank. Research Dept. III. Title. IV. Series.\n\n384 C889--------dc21 ©2003 Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue, N.W.\nWashington, D.C. 20577 The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its behalf.\n\nThe Research Department (RES) produces the Latin American Economic Policies Newsletter, as well as working papers and books, on diverse economic issues.\n\nTo obtain a complete list of RES publications, and read or download them please visit our web site at: [http://www.iadb.org/res](http://www.iadb.org/res/32.htm) 2", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "Cataloging-in-Publication data", "confidence": 0.19134961068630219}], "vague_data": [{"text": "Cataloging-in-Publication data", "confidence": 0.18140408396720886}]}}}
{"input": "**Abstract** **[*]**\n\nShould state-owned enterprises change chief executive officer before privatizing?\nWe test competing views on this question by complementing a recently released database with newly collected data. We are able to cover 77 telecommunications privatizations, which account for nearly 80 percent of the sector in terms of value.\nWe find that CEO replacement will improve performance in the telecommunications industry before privatization as measured by penetration, operating efficiency, and profitability. CEO change before privatization does appear to have real consequences in firm performance before privatization.\nMoreover, findings are consistent with previous research that links CEO replacement and an increase in privatization prices.\n\n**JEL Classification** : G32, H10, J45, O1\n**Word Count** : 2,195\n**Key Words** : Privatization, Corporate Governance, Telecommunications\n\n- Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank. Luisa Zanforlin provided comments and suggestions.\nThe usual disclaimer applies. The findings and interpretations of the authors do not necessarily represent the views of the Inter-American Development Bank or its executive directors. Corresponding author: Alberto Chong, Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank, Stop W-0436, 1300 New York Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20577, USA. Fax: (202) 623-2481, Tel: (202) 623-1536. E-mail: _albertoch@iadb.org_ 4", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "recently released database", "confidence": 0.19921010732650757}, {"text": "newly collected data", "confidence": 0.1787755787372589}], "vague_data": [{"text": "newly collected data", "confidence": 0.161235511302948}]}}}
{"input": "#### **1. Introduction**\n\nRecent research shows that the change in CEO before privatization has a bearing on privatization prices. In fact, when taking endogeneity problems into account, López-de-Silanes (1997) shows that replacing the CEO before privatization is linked with a 54 percent increase in the net privatization price in the case of Mexico. Buyers may be willing to pay higher prices for firms whose CEOs have been replaced, as profitability of the firm may have improved due to restructuring before privatization. The new owners may have to do less tweaking with the firm after privatization and may reap benefits relatively faster. This finding is particularly important as CEO replacement before privatization has become a relatively common policy issue in developing countries, and it tends to receive relatively broad political support (Chong and López de-Silanes, 2002a). Still, taking the findings by López-de-Silanes (1997) at face value, there is still some lack of understanding on the mechanisms by which CEO replacement may affect the productive process of a firm before privatization.\n\nIn this note we seek to complement the research by López-de-Silanes, by exploring the two key possible views by which replacement of top management before privatization may impact the productive process of the firm and thus increase privatization prices. The first view is that a change in CEO before privatization sends an unequivocal signal to prospective buyers on the seriousness of the privatization process. This eliminates incentives for corruption on the part of the old management that otherwise, would have tried to maximize rents before the firm is privatized. According to this signaling view, top management replacement before privatization will contribute to the increase in privatization prices once the firm is on sale, regardless of any restructuring done before privatization (Kikeri, 1999).\n\nOn the other hand, according to the restructuring view, the managers of state-owned enterprises are good in terms of political abilities but are not good at actually running firms. The current management has the wrong human capital to face competition and the new market conditions that the firm will soon face once it is privatized. A new chief executive officer, with the appropriate human capital, is thus needed in order to implement all necessary restructuring and run the firm efficiently until privatization takes place (Rosen, 1992; Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova, 1996). Thus, replacing the chief executive officer before privatization provides the firm with a step forward towards adapting the firm to the forthcoming market conditions before actual transference of ownership to private hands takes place. This, it is 6", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "believed, helps smooth out the transition of the firm to a competitive market economy.\n\nAccording to this view, top management replacement before privatization will yield higher privatization prices, as prospective buyers will value the restructuring done before privatization. [1] We build on a recent data set by Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002b) who collect information on privatization characteristics of state-owned enterprises for firms around the world. We focus on the sub-group of firms from the telecommunications sector. As is well known, until recently this sector has been typically considered among the “jewels” of privatization. Focusing on one single sector allows us to minimize potential problems related with industry heterogeneity. Also, the gathering of additional data necessary for this research is relatively less complicated, as several data sources are available for the case of telecommunications. We are thus able to expand the data set from Chong and López-de-Silanes and further minimize sample bias problems, if any. [2] Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data employed. Section 3 presents our empirical findings. Finally, the last section concludes.\n\n#### **2. Data**\n\nOur sample is based on a data set by Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002b) who obtained information for 400 privatizations around the world for the period 1984-2000, of which around 74 were from the telecommunications sector. The sample covers about 75 percent of the privatizations carried out in the telecommunications sector in the world and account for an estimated 80 percent of the revenues brought in by privatizations in the sector worldwide during the 1990s (World Bank, 2001). [3] Furthermore, we are able to expand their sample for telecommunications firms by around five percent by using three additional sources: the firms themselves, the regulatory agencies, and the International Telecommunications Union (2002). To 1 Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996) use a survey of Russian shops to measure the importance of alternative channels through which privatization promotes restructuring. While they find that the presence of new managers in privatized firms raises the likelihood of restructuring the firm after privatization, they show that keeping old managers but adding equity incentives in such firms do not promote restructuring after privatization. According to these researchers, their findings provide empirical support to the view that management replacement after privatization is crucial in the restructuring process of the firm.\n2 Still, Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002b) provide evidence that their sample of firms is unbiased.\n3 These researchers prepared a detailed questionnaire addressed to the CEO with a recommendation to direct it to the chief financial officer and the director of human resources of the corresponding firms. They also used additional sources extensively, in particular, documents from multilateral organizations, regulatory agencies, ministries, and international publications (Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2002b).\n\n7", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": ["survey of Russian shops", "data set by Chong and López-de-Silanes"], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "survey of Russian shops", "confidence": 0.8258439302444458}, {"text": "data set by Chong and López-de-Silanes", "confidence": 0.16318446397781372}, {"text": "recent data set by Chong and López-de-Silanes", "confidence": 0.10934586822986603}], "vague_data": [{"text": "survey of Russian shops", "confidence": 0.19287320971488953}, {"text": "data set", "confidence": 0.12383083999156952}]}}}
{"input": "achieve this, we followed a procedure analogous to that in Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002b).\n\nThus, we organized a questionnaire in two different areas. The first area covered pre privatization firm characteristics, such as sales, profits, liabilities, CEO change, and the presence of unions. The second area focused on the privatization process, and in particular, on shares sold, the type of sale, and foreign participation. The key explanatory variable of interest is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm changed CEO up to three years prior to privatization, and zero otherwise. [4] We complemented our firm-specific information with country-level macroeconomic data, mainly from the World Bank (2001) and Wallsten (2001). In particular, we used the rate of growth, the rate of inflation, the gross domestic product, and the presence of an independent regulatory agency at the time of CEO replacement, among other measuress. Additionally, we gathered information on economic performance at the firm level from Bloomberg, Economatica, Worldscope, and the International Telecommunications Union (2002). [5] Following related work on the telecommunications literature, three basic outcome measures were collected: change in telephone lines per inhabitant before and after CEO change (penetration), change in telephone lines per employee before and after CEO change (operational efficiency), and change in returns on sales before and after CEO change (profitability). Table 1 presents exact definitions of all the variables used in this paper. [6]\n\n#### **3. Evidence**\n\nAlong the basic lines of the methodology by La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999), Table 2 provides empirical evidence on the link between CEO change before privatization and change in economic performance after replacement. The evidence points towards a confirmation of the view that CEO replacement before privatization is associated with firm restructuring, rather than with firm signaling. Not only is the coefficient of our variable of interest positively associated with change in firm performance before privatization, but it is also statistically significant at 1 4 In fact, according to our sample, CEO change before privatization varies widely from region to region. While it has been common in Africa, Latin America, and developed countries, it has been much less used in Asia and Transition Economies.\n5 Subscription-based Bloomberg, Economatica, and Worldscope deliver international financial information in a standardized format that facilitates comparisons between companies, countries, regions, and industries. Worldscope, for instance, covers approximately 90 percent of the worlds stock market value and includes records on more than 20,000 active companies representing over 50 emerging and established markets.\n\n8", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": ["country-level macroeconomic data"]}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [{"text": "country-level macroeconomic data", "confidence": 0.7388865947723389}], "vague_data": [{"text": "country-level macroeconomic data", "confidence": 0.39290449023246765}]}}}
{"input": "percent with respect to change in penetration, and at 5 percent with respect to both change in operating efficiency and change in profitability. In fact, the results suggest that CEO change has a considerable positive impact on changes in performance, as it adds 35 percentage points to mean changes in penetration, 57 percentage points to mean changes in operating efficiency and 7 percentage points to mean changes in profitability. Interestingly, these results are stable to the inclusion of a dummy variable that accounts for the presence of an independent regulatory agency at the time of CEO replacement. The latter is also shown in Table 2.\n\nFurthermore, according to our results, CEO replacement is the only statistically significant variable that is robustly linked with change in firm economic performance among the privatization characteristics considered in this research. In fact, while foreign participation in the privatization process yields a positive and statistically significant sign with respect to change in firm profitability, it does not have any bearing on either change in penetration or change in operating efficiency. Similar results are obtained in the case of the percentage of shares sold, as such a variable is only statistically significant when associated with change in profitability, but not when linked with change in penetration or change in operating efficiency. [7] Similarly, most of the firm characteristics considered in this paper do not appear to have a bearing on change in economic performance either. For instance, a dummy that accounts for net total liabilities before privatization usually does not yield a statistically significant link with the change in performance variables considered, and when it does, it is at ten percent and with the wrong sign (operating efficiency). On the other hand, average sales before privatization is statistically significant with change in profitability only, while a dummy that accounts for the presence of unions has no bearing on performance change. However, some country-specific variables do appear to have a bearing on change in firm performance. In particular, a dummy that accounts for whether the country has pursued economic reforms yields a positive sign, which is statistically significant at five percent or better with respect to change in penetration and change in profitability. However, such a variable is only weakly significant with respect to change in operating efficiency in the absence of a regulatory agency dummy.\n\n6 Summary statistics for all the variables used are presented in Appendix 1.\n7 Moreover, we do not obtain the expected sign.\n\n9", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "#### **4. Conclusions**\n\nIn a context in which state-owned enterprises still represent a sizable fraction of the world’s gross domestic product, investment, and employment (Kikeri, 1999) and in light of the current political sensitivities towards privatization in several regions, we provide evidence on the benefits of CEO replacement before privatization that complements López-de-Silanes (1997) by showing that actual firm restructuring may be the missing link between CEO replacement and privatization prices. From a policy perspective, our research helps provide a better understanding of what works and what does not work in privatization programs, and thus may help improve the design of future programs. In fact, as actual firm reform appears to be the mechanism at play between CEO replacement and privatization prices, governments should weigh the trade-off between political costs and economic benefits of restructuring the firm.\n\n10", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "#### **References**\n\nBarberis, N., M. Boycko, A. Shleifer et al. 1996. “How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops.” _Journal of Political Economy_ 114: 764-790.\n\nChong, A., and F. López-de-Silanes. editors. 2002a. “Costs and Benefits of Privatization in Latin America.” Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.\n\nManuscript.\n\n----. 2002b. “Privatization and Labor Force Downsizing Around the World.” New Haven, United\n\nStates: Yale University. Forthcoming as NBER Working Paper.\n\nInternational Telecommunication Union (ITU). 2002. _Yearbook of Statistics Telecommunication_ _Services 1991-2000_ . Geneva Kikeri, S. 1999. “Privatization and Labor: What Happens when Governments Divest?” World Bank Technical Paper 396. Washington, DC, United States: World Bank.\n\nLa Porta, R., and F. López-de-Silanes. 1999. “The Benefits of Privatization: Evidence from Mexico.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 114(4): 1193-1242.\n\nLópez-de-Silanes, F. 1997. “Determinants of Privatization Prices.” _Quarterly Journal of_ _Economics_ 112(4): 965-1025.\n\nRosen, S. 1992. “Contracts and the Markets for Executives.” In: L. Werin and H. Wijkander, editors. _Contract Economics_ . Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell.\n\nWallsten, S. 2001. “An Empirical Analysis of Competition, Privatization, and Regulation in Africa and Latin America.” _Journal of Industrial Economics_ 49(1): 1-19.\n\nWorld Bank. 2001. World Development Indicators. Washington, DC, United States: World Bank. CD-ROM.\n\n11", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": ["World Development Indicators"], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [{"text": "World Development Indicators", "confidence": 0.8450949788093567}], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "Variable _**Privatization Characteristics**_\n\n**Table 1. Definition of Variables**\n\nDescription CEO change Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company changed CEO up to three years prior to privatization, 0 otherwise (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002).\nForeign participation Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign participation was allowed in the privatization process, and 0 otherwise (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002).\nShare sold Percentage of firm's shares sold in privatization (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002).\nIndependent agency Dummy variable equal to 1 when an independent regulatory agency was established, and 0 otherwise. An independent agency means that the country has a regulatory agency not directly under control of a ministry (Wallsten, 2001) .\n\n_**Firm Characteristics**_ Penetration Percentage change between the two-year average of firm lines per 100 inhabitants before CEO change and the two-year average after CEO change (WorldScope, 2001; International Telecommunications Union, 2002).\nOperating eficiency Percentage change between the two-year average of firm lines per employee before CEO change and the two-year average after CEO change (WorldScope, 2001; International Telecommunications Union, 2002).\nProfitability Change between the two-year average of return on sales before CEO change and the two-year average after CEO change (WorldScope, 2001; International Telecommunications Union, 2002 ; Bloomberg and Economatica).\nNet total liabilities Dummy variable equal to 1 if net total liabilities are greater than zero up to three years prior to privatization, and 0 otherwise (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002).\nSales The net present value of the three-year average of firm sales before CEO change. The sales value were denominated in US$ of the initial year (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002).\nPresence of unions Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm had unions or strikes up to three years prior to privatization, and 0 otherwise (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002).\n\n_**Country-Specific Variables**_ Economic growth Average rate of growth of the country three years prior to privatization (World Bank, 2001).\nGross domestic product Gross Domestic Product (US$ PPP) in logs. Average of the three years prior to privatization (World Bank, 2001).\nUrban population Average percentage of urban population three years prior to privatization (World Bank, 2001).\nExpropriation risk Index that can take values between 0 and 10, with lower scores indicating a lower risk of expropriation (ICRG’s risk ratings).\nEconomics reforms Dummy variable equal to 1 if telecom privatization took place in an economics reform context (World Bank).\nContinental dummies Dummy equal to 1 if to account for the following regions: Latin America, Middle East and Africa, Transition Economies, 0 otherwise.\n\n12", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Table 2. CEO Change and Pre-Privatization Performance**\n\nVariables Penetration Operating Efficiency Profitability _**1.- Privatization Characteristics:**_ CEO change 0.3583 *** 0.3574 *** 0.5800 ** 0.5776 ** 0.0722 ** 0.0722 ** (0.095) (0.095) (0.274) (0.266) (0.033) (0.033) Foreign Participation -0.1128 -0.0722 -0.3208 -0.2179 0.0669 - 0.0679 (0.123) (0.123) (0.261) (0.259) (0.039) (0.040) Share Sold -0.0023 -0.0007 -0.0097 -0.0055 -0.0022 - -0.0021 (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) Independent Agency -0.2393 ** -0.6067 ** -0.0063 (0.097) (0.229) (0.027) _**2.- Firm characteristics:**_ Net total liabilities 0.0875 0.0488 0.4488 - 0.3505 0.0367 0.0357 (0.107) (0.104) (0.256) (0.222) (0.033) (0.034) Sales 0.0026 0.0011 0.0064 0.0025 -0.0039 ** -0.0039 ** (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) Presence of unions -0.0011 -0.0972 -0.1631 -0.4068 0.0230 0.0204 (0.251) (0.244) (0.364) (0.372) (0.049) (0.053) _**3.- Country-Specific Variables:**_ Economic Growth 0.0222 0.0220 0.0624 0.0617 *** 0.0049 0.0049 (0.018) (0.016) (0.072) (0.068) (0.005) (0.005) Gross Domestic Product -0.0092 0.0069 -0.0790 -0.0381 -0.0256 - -0.0252 (0.034) (0.031) (0.093) (0.092) (0.012) (0.012) Urban Population -0.0178 *** -0.0175 *** -0.0199 *** -0.0191 *** 0.0013 0.0013 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) Expropriation Risk 0.0160 0.0265 -0.0040 0.0227 -0.0728 ** -0.0725 ** (0.051) (0.050) (0.123) (0.117) (0.017) (0.017) Economics Reforms 0.2653 ** 0.1919 - 0.4510 - 0.2648 0.1087 *** 0.1068 ** (0.118) (0.112) (0.244) (0.226) (0.040) (0.040) Latin America 0.5677 *** 0.5879 *** 1.4845 ** 1.5358 *** -0.0580 -0.0575 (0.174) (0.154) (0.586) (0.558) (0.054) (0.054) Asia 0.7435 ** 0.7280 - 0.3214 0.2822 -0.1492 *** -0.1496 *** (0.307) (0.315) (0.543) (0.559) (0.052) (0.052) Africa and Middle East 0.2725 0.3020 -0.4543 -0.3795 -0.1276 ** -0.1268 ** (0.253) (0.243) (0.388) (0.393) (0.056) (0.056) Transition Economies 0.3140 *** 0.2869 ** 0.3731 0.3044 -0.1038 ** -0.1045 ** (0.142) (0.138) (0.351) (0.350) (0.044) (0.045) Constant 1.3200 0.9251 3.7332 2.7318 1.2463 *** 1.2359 *** (0.900) (0.930) (2.573) (2.662) (0.371) (0.376) Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77 R-squared 0.73 0.76 0.50 0.54 0.62 0.62 F 12.81 15.54 5.47 6.59 3.85 3.62 Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Robust standard errors in parentheses\n\n- significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%\n\n13", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Appendix 1. Summary Statistics**\n\nVariable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max _**Privatization Characteristics**_ CEO change 77 0.468 0.000 0.502 0.000 1.000 Foreign Participation 77 0.870 1.000 0.338 0.000 1.000 Share Sold 77 34.612 30.000 19.676 1.000 95.000 Independent Agency 77 0.351 0.000 0.480 0.000 1.000 _**Firm Characteristics**_ Penetration 77 0.534 0.265 0.617 0.001 2.431 Operating efficiency 77 0.862 0.351 1.231 -0.350 6.418 Profitability 77 0.059 0.040 0.165 -0.476 0.792 Net total liabilities 77 0.468 0.000 0.502 0.000 1.000 Sales 77 3.545 1.430 5.079 0.003 21.991 Presence of unions 77 0.870 1.000 0.338 0.000 1.000 _**Country-Specific Variables**_ Economic growth 77 2.928 3.319 3.726 -11.144 12.822 Gross Domestic Product 77 25.382 25.571 2.176 19.448 28.856 Urban Population 77 66.198 70.500 19.778 12.853 100.000 Expropriation Risk 77 2.221 2.000 1.510 1.000 7.000 Latin America 77 0.247 0.000 0.434 0.000 1.000 Asia 77 0.104 0.000 0.307 0.000 1.000 Africa and Middle East 77 0.117 0.000 0.323 0.000 1.000 Transition Economies 77 0.156 0.000 0.365 0.000 1.000 14", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}
{"input": "**Appendix 2. Firm and Country Sample**\n\nC om pany C o untry Y ear of privatization A lbanian M ob ile C om m unications A lb ania 2000 B elgacom B elgium 1995 B elize T elecom m unication s L td. B elize 1988 B ezeq Israel 1998 B ritish T elecom U n ited K ingdo m 1984, 1991 B ulgarian T elecom m un ications C o. B u lgaria 2000 C A N T V V enezuela 1991 C T E E l S alvador 1998 C abo V erde T eleco m C ape V erde 1995 C hina T elecom - H on g K ong L td. C h in a 1997 C om pania de T elefon os C hile (C T C ) C h ile 1988 D eutsche T elekom G erm an y 1996, 1999 E N T E L B o livia 1995 E m b ratel S A B razil 1998 E ntel and C P T P eru 1994 E ntel- T eleco m S A A rgentina 1990 E ntel- T elep honica de A rgen tin a S A A rgentina 1990 E sto nia T elecom E ston ia 1993, 1999 F rance T elecom F ran ce 1 997, 19 98 G hana T elecom G h ana 1996 G uyan a T elephone and T elegrap h G u yana 1991 H rvatske T eleko m u nicacije C ro atia 1999 IN D O S A T Indonesia 1994 IN T E L E l S alvador 1998 IN T E L S A P an am a 1997 Jordan T elecom Jordan 2000 K orea T elecom K orea, R ep. 1999 L attelekom L atvia 1994 L ietu vos T elekom as L ithuania 1998 N T T Japan 1987, 1 988, 199 8, 1999 P .T .T elkom Indonesia 1995 P o rtugal T elecom P ortugal 199 5, 1996, 1997 P u erto R ico T eleph one C o . (P R T C ) P uerto R ico 1999 Q -tel Q atar 1998 R oyal K P N N eth erlands 1994, 1995 S K A N T E L S t. K itts and N evis 1992, 1994 S P T T elecom C zech R epublic 1994 S in gapore T elecom m u nications S ingapore 1993, 1996 S o natel S en egal 1997 S o nera F inlan d 1998, 1999 S ri L anka T elecom m unications S ri L anka 1997 S vyazinvest R u ssian F ederation 1997 S w isscom S w itzerland 1998 T ele C entro S ul B razil 1998 T eleD anm ark D enm ark 1998 T elecom E ireanne Ireland 1996 T elecom Italia Italy 1997 T elecom S erbia Y u goslavia, F R 1997 T elecom m unication s of Jam aica (T O J) Jam aica 1990 T elefon ica del P eru P eru 1996 T elekom A ustria A u stria 1998 T elekom unikacja P olska S A P olan d 1998, 2000 T elesp C elular P articipaco es S A B razil 1998 T elfonica S pain 1997 T elgua G u atem ala 1998 T elia S w eden 2000 T elkom S ou th A frica 1997 T elstra A u stralia 1997, 1999 T elus C anada 1990 T rinidad and T obago T elephon e C o. (T & T T ) T rinidad an d T obago 1989 U gand a T elecom m unications L td U ganda 2000 15", "output": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}, "predictions": {"entities": {"named_data": [], "descriptive_data": [], "vague_data": []}}}