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**REFERENCES**

African Population and Health Research Center (2002) _Population and Health_ _Dynamics in Nairobi’s Informal Settlements,_ Nairobi: African Population and Health Research Center.
Anderson, D.M. (2005) ‘‘Yours in Struggle for Majimbo’. Nationalism and the Party Politics of Decolonization in Kenya, 1955-64’, _Journal of Contemporary_ _History_, 40(3): 547-564.
Anderson, D.M. (2002) ‘Vigilantes, violence and the politics of public order in Kenya’, _African Affairs_, 101: 531-555.
Bakewell (2007) ‘Keeping Them in Their Place: the ambivalent relationship between development and migration in Africa’, African Studies Seminar, University of Oxford, 10 [th] May 2007.
Campbell, E.H. (2005) _Formalizing the informal economy: Somali refugee and_ _migrant trade networks in Nairobi_, Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration Global Migration Perspectives No. 47.
Crisp, J. (1999) _A state of insecurity: a political economy of violence in refugee-_ _populated areas of Kenya_ Geneva: UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No.16.
Crisp, J. (2003). No Solution in Sight: the Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa. Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper No.
68. San Diego: University of California.
DFID (1999) Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets. London: DFID Dick, S. (2002) ‘Liberiatns in Ghana: living without humanitarian assistance’ _UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research_ No. 57. Geneva: UNHCR Farah, N. (2000) _Yesterday, tomorrow: voices from the Somali diaspora_, London: Cassell.
Gimode, E.A. (2001) ‘An Anatomy of Violent Crime and Insecurity in Kenya: The Case of Nairobi 1985-1999’, _Africa Development_, 26(1 & 2): 295-335.
Goldsmith, P. (1997) ‘The Somali Impact on Kenya 1990-1993: The View From Outside the Camps’, in H.M.Adam and R.Ford (eds.) _Mending Rips in the Sky:_ _Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century_, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press: 461-483.
Horst, C. (2006). _Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope with Refugee Life in_ _the Dadaab Camps of Kenya_ . Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Human Rights Watch (2002) _Hidden in Plain View: Refugees Living Without_ _Protection in Nairobi and Kampala_, New York: Human Rights Watch.
Hyndman, J. (2000) _Managing Displacement. Refugees and the Politics of_ _Humanitarianism_, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Jacobsen, K. (2005) _The Economic Life of Refugees_, Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.
Kibreab, G. (1993) ‘The Myth of Dependency among Camp Refugees in Somalia 1979-1989’, _Journal of Refugee Studies_ 6(4):321-349.
Lewis, I.M. (2002) A Modern History Of Somalia - Nation And State In The Horn of Africa, London: Longman, 4th Edition.
Lindley, A. (2006a) The dynamics and effects of remittances in insecure settings: the Somali case, DPhil Thesis, Department of International Development, University of Oxford.

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Lindley, A. (2007a) ‘Remittances in Fragile Settings: A Somali Case Study,’ Households in Conflict Network Working Paper No. 27. Brighton: University of Sussex.
Lindley, A. (2007b) ‘The Early Morning Phonecall: Remittances from a Refugee Diaspora Perspective,’ Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper No.47. Oxford: University of Oxford.
Milner, J. (2006) ‘Somali refugees in Kenya: Abdication and containment’, in _The_ _politics of asylum in Africa: the cases of Kenya, Tanzania and Guinea_, DPhil Thesis, Department of International Development, University of Oxford.
Moret, J., S. Baglioni and D. Efionayi-Mäder (2005) _The Path of Somali Refugees_ _into Exile: A Comparative Analysis of Secondary Movements and Policy_ _Responses_ . SFM Studies No. 46. Geneva: Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies Pérouse de Montclos, M and P. Kagwanja (2000) ‘Refugee Camps of Cities? The Socio-economic Dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma Camps in Northern Kenya.’ _Journal of Refugee Studies_, 13(2): 205:222 Riak Akuei, S. (2005) _Remittances as unforeseen burdens: the livelihoods and social_ _obligations of Sudanese refugees_, Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration, Global Migration Perspectives No.18 Savage, K. and Harvey, P. (Eds.) (2007) _Remittances during crises: Implications for_ _humanitarian response_ . Humanitarian Policy Group Report No.25. London: Overseas Development Institute.
Sirola, S. (2001) ‘A Comparative Study of the Psychosocial Situation of the East African Refugees in Kenya and Finland’, in M.S.Lilius (ed.) _Variations on the_ _Theme of Somaliness_, Turku: Centre for Continuing Education, Åbo Akademi University: 336-345.
Sperl, S. (2001) Evaluation of UNHCR’s policy on refugees in urban areas. A case study review of Cairo. Geneva: UNHCR Evaluation Policy Analysis Unit Turton, D. (1972) ‘Somali Resistance to Colonial Rule and the Development of Somali Political Activity in Kenya 1893-1960’, _Journal of African History_, 13(1): 119-143.
UNHCR (2004) Protracted Refugee Situations Standing Committee 30 [th] Meeting, 10 [th] June 2004. EC/54/SC/CRP/14.
UNHCR (2006). _The State of the World’s Refugees: Human displacement in the new_ _millennium._ Oxford: Oxford University Press.
UNHCR (2007) _2006 Global Trends_, Geneva: UNHCR.
USCR (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants) (1997) _World Refugee Survey_ _1997_ . Washington DC: USCR.
Van Hear, N. (2002) ‘Sustaining societies under strain: remittances as a form of transnational exchange in Sri Lanka and Ghana’, in N.Al-Ali and K.Koser (eds.) _New Approaches to Migration?_ London: Routledge.
Van Hear, N. (2003) From durable solutions to transnational relations: home and exile among refugee diasporas. New Issues in Refugee Research No. 83.
Geneva: UNHCR.
Verdirame, G. (1999) ‘Human Rights and Refugees: The Case of Kenya’, _Journal of_ _Refugee Studies_, 12(1): 54-77 World Bank (2006) _Global Economic Prospects. Economic Implications of_ _Remittances and Migration_, Washington: World Bank.

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**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

Report No: PAD5029 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT


Input: CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective April 27, 2022) Currency Unit = Jordanian dinar (JOD) JOD 1 = US$1.41 US$ 1 = JOD 0.71 FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 Regional Vice President: Ferid Belhaj Country Director: Saroj Kumar Jha Regional Director: Ayat Soliman Practice Manager: Marianne Grosclaude Task Team Leader(s): [Svetlana Edmeades, Mohamed Hassan Abdulkader, ] Tobias Baedeker


Input: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ACG Anti-Corruption Guidelines ARDI Agriculture Resilience, Value Chain Development and Innovation Program CBJ Central Bank of Jordan CCDR Country Climate and Development Report COVID Coronavirus disease CPI Consumer Price Index DA Designated Account DFIL Disbursement and Financial Information Letter E&S Environmental and Social ECT Emergency Cash Transfers EHS Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines ESF Environmental and Social Framework ESCP Environmental and Social Commitment Plan ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework ESIA Economic and Social Impact Assessment EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FM Financial Management FO Financial Officer GDP Gross Domestic Product GFMIS Government Financial Management Information System GFRP Global Food Crisis Response Program GIIP Good International Industry Practice GOJ Government of Jordan GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism IFRs Interim Financial Reports INT Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) IMF International Monetary Fund JACPA Jordan Association of Certified Public Accountants LMP Labor Management Plan MENA Middle East and North Africa MOA Ministry of Agriculture MOF Ministry of Finance MOITS Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply MOPIC Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation MOSD Ministry of Social Development mVAM mobile Vulnerability, Analysis and Monitoring NAF National Aid Fund OHS Occupational Health and Safety OP/BP Operational Policies/Bank Procedures PCT Project Coordination Team PDO Project Development Objective PforR Program for Results


Input: POM Project Operations Manual PPSD Project Procurement Strategy for Development SEA/SH Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment SEP Stakeholder Engagement Plan SMEs Small- and Medium Enterprises SSN Social Safety Net STEP Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement TA Technical Assistance TOR Terms of Reference UN United Nations UNHCR The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees US United States US$ United States Dollar WA Withdrawal Application WBG World Bank Group WFP World Food Programme yoy Year-on-year


Input:
**The World Bank**
Emergency Food Security Project (P178936) TABLE OF CONTENTS

**DATASHEET ........................................................................................................................... 1**

**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT ...................................................................................................... 6**

A. Country Context................................................................................................................................ 6 B. Sectoral and Institutional Context .................................................................................................... 8 C. Relevance to Higher Level Objectives ............................................................................................. 12

**II.** **PROJECT DESCRIPTION .................................................................................................. 15**

A. Project Development Objective ..................................................................................................... 15 B. Project Components ....................................................................................................................... 15 C. Project Beneficiaries ....................................................................................................................... 20 D. Results Chain .................................................................................................................................. 20 E. Rationale for Bank Involvement and Role of Partners ................................................................... 22 F. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design .................................................................... 22

**III.** **IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS ............................................................................ 24**

A. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements .......................................................................... 24 B. Results Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements......................................................................... 24 C. Sustainability ................................................................................................................................... 25

**IV.** **PROJECT APPRAISAL SUMMARY ................................................................................... 25**

A. Technical, Economic and Financial Analysis (if applicable) ............................................................ 25 B. Fiduciary .......................................................................................................................................... 27 C. Legal Operational Policies ............................................................................................................... 31 D. Environmental and Social ............................................................................................................... 31

**GRIEVANCE REDRESS SERVICES ............................................................................................ 33**

**KEY RISKS ............................................................................................................................ 33**

**RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND MONITORING .......................................................................... 36**

**ANNEX 1: Implementation Arrangements and Support Plan .......................................... 44**

**ANNEX 2: Financial Management .................................................................................. 45**

**ANNEX 3: Summary of Wheat and Barley Value Chains ................................................. 53**


Input:
**The World Bank**
Emergency Food Security Project (P178936) DATASHEET

**BASIC INFORMATION**
~~BASIC~~ ~~INFO~~ ~~TABLE~~ Country(ies) Project Name Jordan Emergency Food Security Project Environmental and Social Risk Project ID Financing Instrument Process Classification Investment Project P178936 Substantial Financing

**Financing & Implementation Modalities**

Urgent Need or Capacity Constraints (FCC)

[ ] Multiphase Programmatic Approach (MPA) [ ] Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC)

[ ] Series of Projects (SOP) [ ] Fragile State(s)

[ ] Performance-Based Conditions (PBCs) [ ] Small State(s)

[ ] Financial Intermediaries (FI) [ ] Fragile within a non-fragile Country

[ ] Project-Based Guarantee [ ] Conflict

[ ] Deferred Drawdown [✓] Responding to Natural or Man-made Disaster

[ ] Alternate Procurement Arrangements (APA) [ ] Hands-on Enhanced Implementation Support (HEIS) Expected Approval Date Expected Closing Date 13-May-2022 31-Dec-2024 Bank/IFC Collaboration No

**Proposed Development Objective(s)**

To ensure the availability of basic grains and mitigate the impact of high commodity prices in Jordan Page 1 of 54


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**The World Bank**
Emergency Food Security Project (P178936)

**Components**

**Component Name** **Cost (US$, millions)**

Securing food and feed to reduce short term vulnerability to supply shocks 460.00 Addressing food security to mitigate commodity risks 30.00

**Organizations**

Borrower: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) Implementing Agency: Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply (MoITS)

**PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)**

**SUMMARY-NewFin1**

**Total Project Cost** 490.00

**Total Financing** 490.00

**of which IBRD/IDA** 490.00

**Financing Gap** 0.00

**DETAILS-NewFinEnh1**

**World Bank Group Financing**

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 490.00

**Expected Disbursements (in US$, Millions)**

**WB Fiscal Year** 2022 2023 2024 2025

**Annual** 0.50 480.00 8.00 1.50

**Cumulative** 0.50 480.50 488.50 490.00

**INSTITUTIONAL DATA**

**Practice Area (Lead)** **Contributing Practice Areas**

Page 2 of 54

PROJECT FINANCING DATA

INSTITUTIONAL DATA

PROJECT FINANCING DATA


Input:
**The World Bank**
Emergency Food Security Project (P178936) Agriculture and Food Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation

**Climate Change and Disaster Screening**

This operation has been screened for short and long-term climate change and disaster risks

**SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL (SORT)**

**Risk Category** **Rating**

1. Political and Governance ⚫ Moderate

2. Macroeconomic ⚫ Substantial 3. Sector Strategies and Policies ⚫ Substantial 4. Technical Design of Project or Program ⚫ Moderate 5. Institutional Capacity for Implementation and Sustainability ⚫ Substantial 6. Fiduciary ⚫ Substantial 7. Environment and Social ⚫ Substantial 8. Stakeholders ⚫ Substantial 9. Other 10. Overall ⚫ Substantial

**COMPLIANCE**

**Policy**
Does the project depart from the CPF in content or in other significant respects?

[ ] Yes [✓] No Does the project require any waivers of Bank policies?

[✓] Yes [ ] No Page 3 of 54

SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL


Input:
**The World Bank**
Emergency Food Security Project (P178936) Have these been approved by Bank management?

[✓] Yes [ ] No Is approval for any policy waiver sought from the Board?

[ ] Yes [✓] No

**Environmental and Social Standards Relevance Given its Context at the Time of Appraisal**

**E & S Standards** **Relevance**

Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts Relevant Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure Relevant Labor and Working Conditions Relevant Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention and Management Relevant Community Health and Safety Relevant Land Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement Not Currently Relevant Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities Not Currently Relevant Not Currently Relevant Cultural Heritage Relevant Financial Intermediaries Not Currently Relevant

**NOTE** : For further information regarding the World Bank’s due diligence assessment of the Project’s potential
environmental and social risks and impacts, please refer to the Project’s Appraisal Environmental and Social Review Summary (ESRS).

**Legal Covenants**

Sections and Description The Borrower, through MoITS, shall prepare by May 31, 2022 an interim Project Operations Manual (POM) for Component 1, which will also constitute a condition for disbursement of proceeds from Component 1.

Sections and Description Page 4 of 54


Input:
**The World Bank**
Emergency Food Security Project (P178936) The Borrower shall by no later than two (2) months after the Effectiveness Date prepare a complete Project Operations Manual for both components.

Sections and Description The Borrower shall by no later than two (2) months after the Effectiveness Date designate a Project Steering Committee that includes representatives of MOPIC, MOF, MOITS, and Ministry of Agriculture.

Sections and Description The Borrower shall by no later than two (2) months after the Effectiveness Date prepare an annual work plan and budget acceptable to the World Bank.

**Conditions**

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Input:
**The World Bank**
Emergency Food Security Project (P178936)

**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT**

**A. Country Context**

**1.** **Over the past decade, Jordan has faced a number of external shocks that directly affected economic**
**growth and the economy’s ability to create enough productive jobs for its young and fast-growing population.**
Headwinds started with the global financial crisis in 2008 leading to a dampening of economic activity in 2009, while the accompanying policy response—including lower taxes and debt accumulation— was not enough to stimulate growth. Second, regional conflicts erupting in 2011 disrupted trade routes to key trade partners, including Turkey and the European Union (EU). For example, exports have been adversely affected by the closure of the border with Iraq in 2014. World Bank estimates show that the Syrian conflict alone has led to a 1.6 percentage point lower growth during 2010-18. [1] Moreover, Jordan experienced a large refugee influx and is currently hosting almost 1.3 million Syrians (representing almost 13 percent of the total population, of which 674,268 are registered refugees with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) [2], which has put tremendous pressure on public services, and on food security [3] . Third, the disruption of favorably priced natural gas supplies from Egypt (also in 2011), created another major shock and had a serious implication for Jordan’s energy intensive manufacturing sector, negatively impacting competitiveness [4], economic growth and public debt. [5] Fourth, the economic slowdown in Gulf countries (following depressed oil prices in 2014) led to a significant drop in external inflows. These external shocks have dampened Jordan’s growth momentum leading to persistently sluggish growth dynamics along with increased macroeconomic vulnerability.

**2.** **The COVID-19 pandemic has had significant economic impact on Jordan, given the country’s small and**
**open economy with strong linkages with the rest of the world.** Jordan’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
contracted by 1.6 percent in 2020, compared to 2.0 percent growth in 2019. The pandemic has had particularly profound impacts on key sectors for the Jordanian economy, such as the service sector, including travel and tourism. Jordan’s unemployment rate, which marginally increased from 18.3 percent to 19.1 percent between 2017 and 2019, rose significantly as a result of the pandemic shock, reaching 23.2 percent in 2020. Female unemployment, which had been declining between 2017 and 2019, from 31.2 percent to 27 percent, rose sharply to 30.7 percent in 2020. Moreover, youth unemployment (15-24 years) soared from 40.6 percent in 2019 to an unprecedented high of 46.0 percent in 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic has also had severe impacts on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), which provide 52 percent of private sector employment in the country, [6] including a decline in demand, reduced supply, tightening credit conditions, and a fall in investment.

**3.** **Jordan’s economy nonetheless has weathered the COVID-19 shock better than many peers.** In global
comparison, Jordan’s GDP contraction in 2020 remained relatively muted, in part due to the Government of Jordan 1 World Bank. 2020. _The Fallout of War: The Regional Consequences of the War in Syria_ . Washington, DC: World Bank.
_[https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/fallout-of-war-in-syria.](https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/fallout-of-war-in-syria)_ 2 As of 31 March 2022.
3 Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. (World Food Summit, 1996) 4 By 2015, although, the balance between NEPCO revenues and the generation cost has been restored but electricity cost had become the binding constraint to growth and product diversification. (Hausmann, R., et al., 2019. "Jordan: The Elements of a Growth Strategy," CID Working Papers 346, Center for International Development at Harvard University.).
5 Government of Jordan caped the tariff response to spare the bulk of the population from large tariff increases and produced an accumulated energy sector debt of about 18 percent of GDP, held by the Central Government and NEPCO (World Bank, 2018: “Jordan First Equitable Growth Job Creation Programmatic Development Policy Financing Project”).
6 Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation (JLGC). June 2019.

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Input:
**The World Bank**
Emergency Food Security Project (P178936) (GOJ)’s timely fiscal and monetary stimuli, efficient management of the health crisis as well as a substantial improvement in terms of trade (as a result of the decline in international oil prices during 2020). In 2021, real GDP grew by 2.2 percent reflecting reasonably strong bounce back. Nevertheless, despite this turn around, high unemployment rates and unresolved structural challenges remain a concern. According to the World Bank’s Jobs Diagnostic (2019) [7] the economy needs at least six percent growth to make a dent in the unemployment rate, which is three times the level experienced since 2010. Thus, the current rate of unemployment at 23.3 percent (last quarter of 2021) and of labor force participation rate (33.5 percent total, 53.8 percent for men and 13.6 percent for women), present a sizeable challenge for Jordan. Furthermore, Jordan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have notably declined over the past decade, from 6.1 percent of GDP in 2010 to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2019—foregoing a potential source for productivity gains, dynamism, and external funding for the economy. [8]

**4.** **Jordan’s economy is facing increased price pressures.** Even before the war in Ukraine, significant
disruptions to global supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have further affected trade, increasing the economic vulnerability of Jordan. Being an import-dependent small open economy, unfavorable changes in Jordan’s terms-of-trade have negatively impacted domestic price settings during 2021. This trend was further accentuated by the rise in global transportation costs. [9] Consequently, headline CPI inflation clocked in at an average 1.3 percent in 2021 - the highest rate in 3 years. However, in regional comparison, inflation in Jordan remained low. In 2021, the central government’s overall fiscal deficit (including grants) reached 5.7 percent of GDP, or 1.6 percent of GDP lower than 2020 and 0.4 percent of GDP below the budget target. Timely donor support, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program [10] (including program augmentation as well as front loading) have helped alleviate pressure from the external sector. At end 2021, the Central Bank of Jordan’s gross official foreign reserves reached US$19 billion or almost US$2 billion higher than the previous year.

**5.** **The war in Ukraine has caused a major shock to global commodity markets and poses a major threat to**
**global food security** . With Ukraine and the Russian Federation being major global producers of basic agricultural
commodities (wheat, maize, oilseeds), fertilizer and fuel, the war in Ukraine has introduced significant instability and uncertainty in global agricultural commodity, energy and fertilizer markets. The disruptions in production and trade caused by the war have pushed international prices in these markets to new all-time highs in recent months.
The most recent World Bank Food Security Update (April 7, 2022) highlighted that since January 2021 the agricultural price index is up 29 percent, the cereals price index 11 percent, and the export price index 64 percent.
Wheat prices retreated somewhat from the peak reached on March 7, 2022, but they are still nearly 36 percent higher than in early February 2022, before the war in Ukraine, and 60 percent higher since January 2021. Maize prices are about 20 percent above the early February level and 48 percent higher than in January 2021, while rice prices have continued to remain remarkably stable. Meanwhile, fertilizer prices surged in March 2022, up nearly 20 percent since January and almost 3 times higher compared to a year ago, whereas energy prices had surged 63.4 percent year on year.

7 Winkler, Hernan; Gonzalez, Alvaro. 2019. “Jordan Jobs Diagnostic.” Jobs Series; No. 18. World Bank, Washington, DC.
8 In 2019, FDI inflows fell to the lowest point over the past two decades, accounting for only 1.5 percent of GDP.
9 International freight charges peaked around US$11,109 in September 2021 from US$1,500 pre-pandemic. These currently stand around US$ 9,430 (source: Bloomberg).
10 Jordan’s fiscal adjustment remains supported by the IMF. The Third Review of the IMF EFF program was completed on December 20, 2021. This allowed IMF to disperse almost US$335 million (or cumulatively US$1.23 billion) under the program). According to the IMF, sound policies have helped maintain macroeconomic stability, while the government remains on track to narrow its fiscal deficit, and reserves remain at a comfortable level.

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Jobs Diagnostic

World Bank Food Security Update


Input:
**The World Bank**
Emergency Food Security Project (P178936)

**6.** **Jordan’s fragility to external shocks and internal factors can exacerbate food security in the country.**
Jordan’s structural impediments in a context of needs for regional stability and response to imminent global risk factors arising from the war in Ukraine represent key challenges for immediate recovery. Jordan is positioned at the epicenter of one of the most volatile regions in the world. The government has consistently preserved its stability, drawing from its unique geopolitical positioning and socio-political resilience. The country has been highly exposed to exogenous shocks, particularly the spillovers from regional conflicts, including Syria, Iraq and the West Bank and Gaza, dependency on foreign aid and inflow of capital, and shifts in geopolitical relations, all of which have compounded the country’s existing vulnerabilities. Regional insecurity and any subsequent displacement of refugees into Jordan coupled with the pandemic pose a risk for the food security of the country and stress its food system. Although direct trade links with Ukraine and the Russian Federation are limited, a continuous and accelerated surge in commodity prices (especially those of wheat and barley) and stronger slowdown in global growth represent imminent downside risks to the economy and food security.

**B. Sectoral and Institutional Context**

**7.** **Globally and in the region, Jordan is one of the most import dependent countries for covering its**
**national grains consumption needs.** The country is highly vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruptions in
global markets for basic agricultural commodities. Jordan does not produce significant volumes of basic agricultural commodities domestically. For example, annual domestic wheat and barley production averaged 21,499 tons and 54,234 tons respectively between 2018 and 2020 compared to monthly domestic consumption levels of 90,000 tons of wheat and 80,000 tons of barley [11] . In the period 2018-2020, total annual import volumes of wheat and barley averaged 913,334 tons and 770,068 tons respectively, which amounted to an average annual import bill of US$ 227 million for wheat and US$ 177 million for barley (UN Comtrade, 2022). The Black Sea region is the principal origin for the bulk of Jordan’s grain imports (given lower freight costs compared to other origins), with the region representing 98 percent of Jordanian wheat imports and 78 percent of barley imports. Yet the supply shock caused by the war in Ukraine has changed the geopolitics and economics of grain trade where small buyers, like Jordan, are competing in a tight market with large countries and fewer suppliers, that are geographically farther from the region, and where not only price, but also grain quality play an important role in the purchasing decisions of the GOJ, further reducing market options for the country. This could further exacerbate the ability of the GOJ to secure the required grain purchases on time to meet domestic consumption levels at socially acceptable prices.

**8.** **Jordan’s vulnerability to shocks in global commodity markets is further compounded by the**
**demographic pressures facing the country** . In addition to the structural challenges of sluggish growth, growing
debt, high unemployment, declining FDI and trade disruptions due to regional conflicts, Jordan is confronted with growing demographic, climate and environmental pressures. Between 2000 and 2020 the Jordanian population (excluding refugees) grew at rates between 1.37 and 5.00 percent. When adding the influx of 1.3 million refugees from Syria into Jordan since the start of the civil war, Jordan’s effective population growth in 2020 amounted to 14 percent.

**9.** **Moreover, climate change is significantly reducing the opportunities to respond to growing domestic**
**consumption and improve resilience to external shocks through increased domestic production of grains** .
Climate change poses a serious challenge to the Jordanian agriculture sector. Not only is Jordan endowed with limited natural resources (Jordan is the second most water scarce country in the world with only 97 cubic meters 11 As a result, Jordan is entirely dependent on global markets to meet domestic consumption needs for basic commodities such as cereals (95 percent overall and more than 95 percent for wheat and barley), vegetable oil (79 percent), rice (100 percent) and sugar (100 percent).

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Input:
**The World Bank**
Emergency Food Security Project (P178936) of water available per capita per year – well below the absolute water scarcity threshold of 500 cubic meters per capita per year), but those resources are increasingly vulnerable to climate-related hazards (Jordan ranks 72 out of 182 countries in the ND-GAIN index for climate vulnerability in 2019), including droughts [12], extreme temperature, storms, landslides and flash floods [13] . These changes are likely to have negative effects on crop production as they will decrease the availability of water for irrigation, diminishing the suitability of key crops and increase the vulnerability of smallholder farmers who are already extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change due to their low-incomes, poor access to technical capacities and lack of technology to increase productivity under extreme weather conditions [14] . In the livestock sub-sector, rising drought risks reduce the carrying capacity of rangelands and increase the dependency on grains for fodder, thereby contributing to import dependency and vulnerability to external price shocks. Finally, adaptation options to reduce vulnerability along grain import supply chains and the grain import system and physical grain storage will need to be pursued to reflect increasingly hot and dry conditions, as well as heavy precipitation events.

**10.** **High and volatile food prices due to shocks in global commodity markets disproportionately impact**
**poor and vulnerable households in Jordan.** In February 2022, annual food price inflation trended at 2.7 percent

- the highest rate recorded over the past 12 months. Growing inflationary pressures as a result of higher food
prices pose a significant threat to vulnerable households. Importantly, short-term demand for wheat products, which account for the largest share in the food basket, is relatively inelastic in Jordan as in the Arab world in general (World Bank, 2012). Many Jordanian households hover around the national poverty line making poverty numbers very sensitive to even small increases in the cost of living (Figure 1). [15] Moreover, households are affected by higher food prices in different ways, with women, including female-headed households resorting to harmful coping strategies, such as reducing their own nutrition consumption to feed members of their family, or taking on risky jobs to acquire food as a result of having limited access to assets and markets, and fewer pathways out of the crisis as compared to their male counterparts (Oxfam, 2019). Furthermore, poor and near-poor households in Jordan tend to spend a larger share of their income on food. Food purchases account for over one-third of poor and near poor Jordanian household budgets and a quarter among the richest 20 percent of the population (Figure 2). Similarly, food purchases account for over one-third of refugee household budgets. Within Jordanians’ food basket basic agricultural commodities account for most of the caloric intake, in particular wheat products (28 percent), sugar (14 percent), rice (8 percent), sunflower seed oil (7 percent) and soybean oil (4 percent) (Department of Statistics of Jordan, 2022).

12 In 2021, Jordan experienced one of the most severe droughts in its history.
_13_ [Jordan - Vulnerability | Climate Change Knowledge Portal (worldbank.org)](https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/jordan/vulnerability#:~:text=Climate%2Drelated%20hazards%20in%20Jordan,include%20periodic%20earthquakes%20and%20epidemics.)
14 IPCC projections for the future indicate that by 2030 temperatures are projected to increase by 1–2oC and that there will be a significant
increase in the number of crop heat stress days throughout Jordan. Climate models from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase
5 (CMIP5) ensemble project a decline in future precipitation rates of 6 percent, 11.5 percent, and 19 percent by 2030, 2050, and 2070,
respectively (RCP 8.5). The whole country is expected to experience a decrease in precipitation. The northern region and King’s Highway
are projected to experience the largest precipitation declines by 2030: 12.5 percent and 10.4 percent respectively. Rainfall decreases in the
Eastern and Southern desert are projected to be 9.4 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively. Jordan’s Eastern and Southern Desert regions,
which are primarily rangelands, are likely to experience more warming than the Northern region and the King’s Highway, which currently
rely mostly on rainfed and irrigated agriculture.
15 World Bank analysis indicates that if food prices were to increase by 10 percent in Jordan (a smaller increase than in the 2007-2008 food
price crises), poverty would increase by an additional 1.3 percentage points and the poverty gap would rise by half a percentage point,
while a 20 percent increase in food prices would increase the poverty rate from 15.7 percent to 19.4 percent (43,000 new poor families).

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ND-GAIN index


Input:
**The World Bank**
Emergency Food Security Project (P178936)

**Figure 1: Jordan 2017-18 household per capita consumption**
**distribution relative to the national poverty line**

**Figure 2: Share of food expenditure in total expenditure p.c. (%)**

Source: 2017-18 HEIS and World Bank calculations. Source: World Bank

**11.** **Existing food insecurity levels are particularly high among Jordan’s refugee population.** According to the
most recent mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (mVAM) [16] completed by the World Food Program (WFP) in Jordan, 7 percent of Jordanian households (representing 535,559 individuals) were found to be food insecure as of February 2021 and another 51 percent of households (representing 3,843,701 individuals) were vulnerable to food insecurity, meaning that they were very likely to experience an acute decline in food access or consumption levels below minimum survival needs. WFP’s mVAM also found that food insecurity levels among Jordan’s refugee community (which are not covered by Jordan’s social security net system) are significantly higher than those registered at the level of Jordanian households. Of the more than 750,000 refugees [17] registered in Jordan (89 percent of whom came from Syria), an estimated 17 percent live in the Za’atari and Azraq refugee camps, while the remaining 83 percent are mostly in Jordan’s urban areas. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, food security has been a key concern for refugees in both camps and in host communities mainly due to the loss of income from temporary and informal labor activities. More than 80 percent of labor activities performed by non-Jordanians are estimated to take place in the informal economy versus 40 percent for Jordanian citizens (MOSD, 2019). February 2021 mVAM data showed that 23.3 percent of refugee households in host communities are food insecure (over 154,777 individuals), while another 63.7 percent of refugee households (equivalent to approximately 423,344 individuals) are vulnerable to food insecurity.

**12.** **Ensuring food security and social stability are at the core of the urgent need to ensure availability of**
**and access to staple food** . Bread is an essential part of the diet in Jordan and represents the main caloric source
for the poorest Jordanians and the many refugees in the country. Similarly, barley import dependent livestock herding is the mainstay of the rural economy and the livelihoods of about 200,000 people in traditional nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin tribal communities. While trade in basic food commodities (such as sugar, rice, cooking oil, milk powder) is managed mainly by the private sector in Jordan, the GOJ maintains full control of grain reserves by directly managing the purchase, import, storage and domestic sales of wheat and barley. In 2021, the GOJ discontinued the bread subsidy and, as a response to the COVID-19 outbreak, it fixed the domestic price of bread to ensure its affordability (at 0.32 JOD per kilogram) for the entire population of Jordan. This intervention model (in combination with the effective appreciation of the Jordanian dinar) has helped control inflationary pressures.
However, maintaining this status quo in a context of all time high international grain prices is costly, also coinciding with Bond maturity obligations of the GOJ, further reducing the availability of financial resources at a critical time.

**13.** **Public procurement of strategic agricultural commodities is at the core of Jordan’s food security strategy**
**as rising food prices pose a significant threat to social stability** . Historically, Jordan has played a key role as an

_16_ [WFP | Jordan: Mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Dashboard | As of June 2021 (arcgis.com)](https://unwfp.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=7210a3ee33b14c5b9a989590345cb49a)
_17_ _As of July 2021_

Page 10 of 54

mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping


Input:
## Secondary Data Review
# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods

APRIL 2019

### CRISIS OVERVIEW

Tropical Cyclone Idai made landfall on 14 March, in Beira city (Sofala province), Central Mozambique. As of 15 April, over 600 people are confirmed to have died in the cyclone and subsequent events. A total 1.5 million people are affected, and over 140,000 people are displaced in more than 120 accommodation centers, public buildings and schools in the affected provinces. Sofala province has the highest number of displaced
[population, followed by Manica province (INGC, 4/2019).](https://cycloneidai.onalabs.org/)

### CRISIS IMPACT

_Source: OCHA_ _SitRep No.6 (as of_ _13 April 2019)_

#### KEY TAKEAWAYS

This document consolidates information of the pre-crisis context and vulnerability of women and girls in Mozambique, and reviews all main post-disaster assessment results, field reports and other sources available on the disaster impact, needs and risks of the vulnerable groups.

**Key Priorities**

- Past lessons as well as assessment reports both highlight that women and girls and
their families have been adopting negative mechanisms to cope with basic needs and economic hardship, including being exposed to sexual exploitation, sex work, early and forced marriage. Reviving livelihood and income generating activities are key to mitigate GBV risks.

- The displaced population living in sites are under stressed conditions, overcrowding
and lack of wash facilities increase the risk of GBV. With sporadic ongoing relocation, women and girls are exposed to less safe and dignified environment.

- Living conditions are more severe and needs are largely unfulfilled in the
communities outside the camps, especially in areas that are hard to reach. In these communities, a lack of basic needs including food and shelter has been reported, which increases risks of vulnerable population.

- The number of female-headed households as well as widowed women has
increased in the aftermath of the disaster. Accompanied by a high number of pregnant women who are estimated to give birth, it is critical to ensure access to functional Sexual and Reproductive Health services and social care.

- Community-based referral and psychosocial support by local partners have been
operational prior to the cyclone. As they act as the main first contacts for vulnerable groups in the communities, more resources and capacity building on GBV in emergencies are needed to scale up the existing community-based services.

**Key Vulnerable Groups:**

Female-headed households; single women, adolescents 1


Input:
## Secondary Data Review
# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods

APRIL 2019

### Operating Environment - Contextual Review LEGAL SYSTEM AND JUSTICE

Since independence in 1975, Mozambique has put in efforts to make strides in gender equality. Systems have been put in place, and achievements have been made, for example in political representation. Since 1994 the ruling party implemented a quota on the representation of women in the government. This has ensured that women have approximately one third of seats in the National Assembly. However, a lot of progress still needs to happen to reach gender equality – not just in systems and institutions, but
[also at a community level (Tvedten 2008).](https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3326-)

**Rule of law:** After the civil war (1984–1992), which had a large impact on the Central
[Provinces, turnover in the government has been democratic (Tvedten 2008).](https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3326-)

**Women’s rights:**

- The 2004 constitution upholds the principle of gender equality and prohibits
discrimination based on sex.

- Mozambique has ratified CEDAW, as well as the Protocol to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa [(Government of](http://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/-/media/files/un%20women/vaw/full%20text/africa/mozambique%20%20nap%20to%20combat%20and%20prevent%20vaw%2020082012.pdf?vs=5313)
[Mozambique 2012).](http://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/-/media/files/un%20women/vaw/full%20text/africa/mozambique%20%20nap%20to%20combat%20and%20prevent%20vaw%2020082012.pdf?vs=5313)

- Polygamy has been prohibited by the Family Law (2004), yet is commonly
practiced. In effect, polygamous unions are not legally recognized, but there are no legal restrictions against the practice itself (CARE [29/03/2019).](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Regional-RGA-Cyclone-Idai-29032019.pdf)

- The Act on Domestic Violence Perpetrated Against Women was passed in 2009,
criminalizing domestic violence including physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional and psychological abuse, stalking, harassment, intimidation, damage
[to property, and other controlling or abusive behavior (UNWOMEN 2009).](http://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/fr/countries/africa/mozambique/2009/law-on-domestic-violence-perpetrated-against-women--2009-)

- The Multisectoral Mechanism for Integrated Assistance to Women Victims of
Violence (2012) outlines the roles of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Action [(USAID](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Floriza_Gennari/publication/293491456_Lessons_from_the_Gender-Based_Violence_Initiative_in_Mozambique/links/56b9311908ae3b658a88c87e/Lessons-from-the-Gender-Based-Violence-Initiative-in-Mozambique.pdf) 2016).

- The Land Laws of 1997 specifies that, although land belongs to the state, legal
measures can help communities and individuals (men and women) to obtain land without requiring written proof of use. However, in reality the gender equality in land ownership is not reflected as patriarchal cultures still favor land
[ownership for men (SIDA 2006).](https://www.sida.se/contentassets/80caaf7d1aaf48738b7b70386574b59e/towards-gender-equality-in-mozambique_693.pdf)

**Access to justice:** Although the Mozambican government has put into place efforts to
combat violence against women, women have difficulty accessing courts for various reasons (details in below content “GBV PROTECTION NEEDS”). Instances of GBV including rape, are more often settled through informal local/community courts, or privately
[through financial renumeration (Slegh 2010;](http://medanthrotheory.org/site/assets/files/3123/slegh.pdf) [US Department of State 2017).](https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277271.pdf)

#### SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC ENVIRONMENT

**Female-headed households:** As of 2015 approximately 36% of households in
[Mozambique are female-headed (DHS 2015).](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf)

**Economy:** In 2008, a study found that approximately 79% of women were economically
active. Women are largely responsible for the household. This may also be included into the high percentage for economic activity – although returns on this are low. Furthermore, employed women mostly work in the agricultural sector (89%), a sector in which they form a large share of unskilled labor (59%). This shows that, though women may take up a large part of economic activity, they may not take home a large amount of money.
Women active in agriculture work an estimated average of 14 hours per day, which also
[leaves them little time for partaking in public participation or education (Tvedten 2008; SIDA](https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3326-) 2006).

When employed, women are often performing unskilled jobs, which are low-paid. In addition, in 2008 only around 4% of women were employed in the government, public, or private sector. These jobs entail a fixed monthly salary with predictability and more
[certainty (Tvedten 2008).](https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3326-)

**Education:** Literacy rates in Mozambique stand at 70.5% for the population aged 15–
24. When only looking at the population over 15, the literacy rate stands at only 56%.
Women are significantly less literate than their male counterparts. High discrepancies in literacy rates among men and women can point to inequality, where girls tend to be the first who are denied access to education, or taken out of school as their education is not prioritized.

2


Input:
## Secondary Data Review
# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods

APRIL 2019 LITERACY RATE (%) TOTAL MALE FEMALE
**15–24 years** 70.5 79.1 62.3
**15 years and older** 56.0 70.8 43.1
**65 years and older** 26.0 46.3 8.8
UNCESCO 2015 The DHS data from Mozambique further shows that improving access to education for girls, particularly following the completion of primary school, can be an important determinant of the use of health facilities (or at least correlates with facility use). Higher levels of education for mothers is associated with declining under-five mortality rates, i.e.
the higher the education level of the mother, the lower the mortality levels in under-five[year-olds (ODI, 6/2014).](https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9073.pdf)

#### COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT

Despite changes at an institutional level, Mozambique remains a highly patriarchal society where men dominate power positions in communities and the household.

**GBV perception:** While more updated data is not available, in 2009 an estimated 70%
of perpetrators of GBV against their partners never faced charges. The reasons for this included that the survivor has to deal with the case alone or through the family (47%), the act was not deemed serious (15%), the act was considered a private issue (9%), or the survivor feared retaliation and reprisal (11%) [(UNIFEM 2009).](https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/violence_against_women_mozambique%5b1%5d.pdf) This indicates that in Mozambique, GBV is being normalized, and a GBV case is considered a family or private affair without much institutional and systematic support. However, the Multisectoral Mechanism for Integrated Assistance to Women Victims of Violence was established in 2012 and strives to provide accessible and integrated services for vulnerable people and more systematic fighting against GBV.

In addition, an anthropological study found that generally in Mozambique, a ‘good woman’ submits to her husband, other male relatives, and the husband’s family. Male dominance in the household is seen as a given, and maltreatment of women is often seen as a result of their own behavior. These socio-cultural explanations about women’s role
[in society justify acts of gender-based violence as natural and private matters (Slegh 2009).](http://medanthrotheory.org/site/assets/files/3123/slegh.pdf)

**Gender roles:** Generally, men are still seen as the power-holders and the culture in
Mozambique is patriarchal and male-dominated. This may be rooted in historical influences when political powerholders were men in charge of chieftainships. On top, Central Mozambique knew a more patrilineal system, meaning a woman belongs to the husband’s family – which has been symbolized through dowry ( _lobolo)_ . Though at times women can be in influential positions (e.g. in clans) – these are usually not formalized
[positions of power (Tvedten 2008).](https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3326-) _Division of labor:_ Generally, men and boys are responsible for working outside the home while women and girls take care of domestic issues. These include taking care of children and older people, as well as cooking, fetching water, and cleaning [(CARE 29/03/2019).](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Regional-RGA-Cyclone-Idai-29032019.pdf) Reduced accessibility and availability of water and other household items are likely to put women and girls more at risk when performing domestic tasks.

_Household decision-making:_ Despite women’s large participation in the household, their
[decision-making is described as limited (FHI 360 2015). This is backed up by data from the](https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/resource-spt-cap-mozambique-gbv-integration.pdf) Demographic Health Survey [(2015), which shows that men generally tend to take the](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf) decisions in the household regarding health expenditures and groceries. In Sofala, over 80% of men solely took the decisions in these areas.

_Political participation_ : Mozambique has the 14th highest level of women’s participation in
[parliament in the world (World Bank).](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?view=chart)

**Traditional marriage practices:** Dowry, or _lobolo_ still plays a large role in the central
[provinces including Sofala (Tvedten 2008). Though polygamy is not legalized in the Family](https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3326-) Law (2004), it is still practiced. In these cases, the husband is only legally married to the first wife, but has multiple relationships outside the marriage. Polygyny is often recommended when the first wife is infertile – but is generally common in the patrilineal
[cultures (Arnaldo 2003). In the same Family Law, the age for marriage is set at 18.](http://www.bioline.org.br/pdf?ep04008)

**Harmful practices:** In some instances, widowhood can be seen as needing ‘purification’.
This purification practice is common among the Sena ethnic group in Sofala. A woman, upon the death of her husband, needs to be purified by having sex with his male relative three times a day for a week. This practice called _pita-kufa_ (or _khupita-_ khufa) increases the risk of HIV and may cause unwanted pregnancy [(IRIN 2008; Vera Cruz 2018).](http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/243963) 3

Demographic Health Survey

DHS data

DHS data from Mozambique


Input:
## Secondary Data Review
# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods

APRIL 2019

#### Crisis Impact and Pre-Crisis Baseline BASIC NEEDS

GBV does not happen in a silo and is never a standalone incident. Disasters, conflicts, pre-crisis vulnerabilities, stressed living conditions, and a lack of resources are all exacerbating factors for the manifestation of GBV and related negative coping mechanisms. Reduced availability and accessibility of basic services (source of income; health facilities, food, market etc.) as a result of the cyclone and floods increase the vulnerabilities of women and girls.

**Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene:** According to the Demographic Health Survey [(2015),](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf)
approximately 23.7% of people in Sofala did not have access to an improved water source. A further 23.1% used a hand pump. In previous years, during periods of drought, it was noted that during the water collection activities, girls faced increased risk of
[confrontations with wild animals and GBV (CARE, 2016).](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/southern-eastern-africa/document/ares-rapid-gender-analysis-commitment-addressing-gender) _Water_
[Over 50% of displacement sites assessed have water sources on site (DTM R2, 4/2019). As](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) women and girls are responsible for fetching water, they are exposed to more GBV risks when looking for alternative water sources. The post-disaster multi-sectoral assessment (MRA) in six affected districts further noted that the availability of potable/drinking water has decreased significantly, particularly in Nhamatanda (MRA, 4/2019).

_Sanitation and hygiene_ Wash conditions are stretched and overcrowding is observed in sites in Beira. Wash facilities cannot be installed or completed and prepared in time with sporadic and rapid ongoing relocations (Protection cluster, 4/2019). In 20% of the sites assessed in DTM it is reported that nobody has access to bathing and shower facilities. Less than half of sites have gender-segregated latrines and bathing facilities [(DTM R2, 4/2019).](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) At new accommodation sites women are reported to be showering inside the latrines (Protection cluster, 4/2019). Recent research also shows that over 40% of women do not use latrines
[provided (CARE, 3/2019).](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/southern-eastern-africa/document/ares-rapid-gender-analysis-commitment-addressing-gender) The MRA further noted that almost all assessed communities in Buzi, Gondola, Nhamatanda and Sussundenga districts are facing a major deterioration in the quality of sanitation facilities. Whereas previously all communities mostly used household latrines, they now have to resort to open defecation. It is reported that privacy for washing and defecating is an issue for women and girls, especially in Dondo and Nhamatanda (MRA, 4/2019).

The lack of safe and quality hygiene and sanitation facilities, latrines and bathing facilities that are not safely lit all lead to worsened hygiene condition and higher the risk to GBV. In addition, women and girls who cannot access safe facilities might face additional burdens as they may aim to limit their use of facilities, which can lead to reduced food and water intake.

**Health:** According to the existing referral mechanism in place by the Ministry of Gender,
Children and Social Action (MGCAS), there are three entry points of services for any vulnerable groups and potential GBV survivors: health facilities, social action and the police. Health facilities with trained staff and post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) kits for rape survivors to perform clinical management of rape (CMR), and specialized psychosocial intervention are only available at district or provincial hospital.

As social workers can be the first point of entry for many GBV survivors, they need to be trained to deliver psychosocial support. Pre-crisis reports further point out that specialized knowledge on treating survivors of GBV is often not sufficient in the health facilities: women who seek help after physical violence are not always properly consulted prior to being sent back home [(Slegh 2010).](http://medanthrotheory.org/site/assets/files/3123/slegh.pdf) Therefore, there is also a need to train personnel in health facilities.

Cyclone and floods have caused major damage to at least 93 health centers (Health cluster, 4/2019). More complete assessment on health facilities are ongoing, however field visits suggested that district level hospitals in Nhamatanda, Dondo, Buzi and Beira districts are functional, despite some structural damages. However information on the overall availability of stocks and supplies of PEP kits remains a gap [(HeRAM, 2019).](http://www.herams.org/) The administration of PEP within 72 hours of a reported rape case is vital to save lives of survivors, especially considering the high prevalence rate of HIV in the population.
Preliminary health facility assessments have showed that around 55% of assessed health facilities in Sofala province do not have PEP kits available (FHI360, preliminary data on health facility assessments, 4/2019).

In the majority of displacement sites people reportedly have no problem accessing health facilities, and in more than 70% it is reported that health facilities have female staff.
80% key informants reported that women are seeing health professionals during pregnancy [(DTM R2, 4/2019). The MRA findings in six districts show that in more than half of](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) communities women have access to sexual and reproductive health care. In Gondola and Sussendenga districts, the nearest health facilities in most locations are reportedly very 4

FHI360, preliminary data on health facility assessments

Demographic Health Survey

post-disaster multi-sectoral assessment


Input:
## Secondary Data Review
# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods

APRIL 2019 difficult to access. As a result of the cyclone and floods, people in remote affected areas face challenges accessing district hospitals.

To ensure a private and protective environment, there is a need to refurbish the maternity wards, where the survivors are treated. Further, the administrative offices of the Women and Children’s Protection desk need to be rehabilitated, so a private and protective environment can be restored for women and girls to report confidentially.

**HIV:** It is estimated that almost 1.6 million people, including more than 90,000 children,
are infected with HIV in Mozambique. More than half of those infected are women, and
[15% of pregnant women aged 15–49 are HIV-positive (ODI, 2014). The prevalence rate](https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9073.pdf) of HIV in the population aged 15-49 is 13.2% (15.4% in women and 10.1% in men).
Sofala has a higher rate (16.3%) than other affected districts [(DHS, 2015). Furthermore,](https://www.dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12_SP.pdf) women and girls are particularly affected by the epidemic because they usually lack the
[power to refuse unsafe sex, choose their partners or influence sexual behavior (ODI 2014).](https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9073.pdf)

**Sexual and Reproductive Health:** According to the latest estimation, about 438,000
women affected by the cyclone are of reproductive age (15-49). Among those, 64,000 women are estimated to be pregnant and more than 37,000 women in affected areas are estimated to give birth in the next three months. Among those giving birth, up to 9,600 may be at risk of complications during their pregnancy in the next three months.
They will they will need access to functioning health facilities and care (UNFPA, 4/2019).

**Shelter:** According to the Demographic Health Survey some 28% of people in Sofala did
not have electricity. A further 28.9% of people lived in a cement house, 36.9% in an earthen mud-house [(DHS, 2015).](https://www.dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12_SP.pdf) According to the latest DTM there are currently over 13,600 people hosted in 24
[displacement sites in Beira (DTM R2, 4/2019). This includes five planned sites, the remainder](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) are temporary transit sites including schools and public buildings. Site plans of the five accommodation centers suggest that currently up to 5–6 families are sharing one tent,
[and averagely 12m2 space is available per person (calculated based on CCCM site plans](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/mozambique/infographic/temporary-relocation-sites-layout) and
[DTM Round 2, 4/2019). The SPHERE standards prescribe a minimum of 30m2 for camp-like](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) settlements. Overcrowding and inadequate privacy for women and girls are observed, which is a risk to GBV.
While the site plans are designed to follow minimum standards and provide suitable living conditions, many elements have contributed to increased vulnerabilities and overstretched capacity on site: ad-hoc relocation plans, lack of sensitization among surrounding communities, lack of communication to the population, and a lack of systematic allocation of tents (Protection Monitoring, 4/2019). It is also reported that more than half of the sites do not have adequate lighting in any common place; which is considered a major risk to GBV and can hamper the freedom of movement of women and girls [(DTM](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e)
[R2, 4/2019). The MRA in Dondo district shows that in more than half surveyed locations,](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) people have been sleeping in open areas. In Buzi all but one location there were surveyed families who reported they were sleeping outside (MRA, 4/2019). Sleeping out in the open is unsafe and can increase the risk of GBV to women and girls.

**Documentation:** The affected population have lost most or all of their documents during
the cyclone. This include identity documentation and other vital certificates. An estimated 19% of people in Sofala already did not have birth certificates or registration in 2015
[(DHS 2015). The lack of mechanisms to facilitate attainment of these documents is likely to](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf) hinder access to services, including enrolment in schools and engagement in some livelihood activities (Protection cluster, 4/2019). A lack of basic needs, or possibility to engage in livelihood activities, will lead to faster depletion of coping mechanisms of the affected population. This means that negative coping mechanisms including those that pose a higher risk to GBV will be adopted faster. A lack of engagement in school for children also increases the risk of child labor and exploitation.

**Eviction** : Assessments in the displacement sites suggested that 11 (3 in Nhamatanga
[district and 8 in Beira district) out of 41 sites reported there is an eviction threat (DTM R2,](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e)
[4/2019). However the answer is perception-based and it is likely to indicate the lack of](https://displacement.iom.int/reports/moçambique-—-ciclone-tropical-idai-inquérito-dos-locais-de-deslocamento-beira-dondo-e) communication and sensitization to the displaced population. In multiple reports the importance for communities to get timely and clear information on relocation processes is emphasized (Protection cluster, 4/2019).

**Child Protection:** Over 28% of households in Mozambique have adopted children [(DHS](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf)
[2015).](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf) Almost 50% of young Mozambican women aged 20-24 years were married
[before the age of 18, while 14% were married before the age of 15 (CARE, 3/2019).](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Regional-RGA-Cyclone-Idai-29032019.pdf) According to MRA in Dondo, among children under 14 years old, a total of 22.3% were orphan by father (13.2%), by mother (6%) or both parents (3%). The assessment further showed that in six affected districts, helping out the family by doing chores and other work are among the main reason children (both boys and girls) are not attending schools.
In about 10% of locations assessed, communities reported that they have noticed there are children disappearing (or being trafficked). In almost 40% of assessed locations communities reported having come across children who are forced to work to provide 5

Demographic Health Survey
CCCM site plans

Demographic Health Survey

CCCM site plans

CCCM site plans


Input:
## Secondary Data Review
# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods

APRIL 2019 food and other goods (MRA, 4/2019). Being out of school and engagement in other livelihood activities increase the exposure to GBV risks.

#### GBV PROTECTION NEEDS

Affected population, displaced population and estimated affected women at reproductive age who could be at risk of GBV in all affected provinces Affected districts in Sofala Province – affected, displace population and estimated women at reproductive age

**Affected District**

Affected Population (INGC Ponto de Situacao, 10 April) Total Displaced Population (INGC Novo Centro Update, 4 April) Estimated affected women at Affected reproductive age (15 – 49)

**Affected** Population Total Displaced (*Calculated based on two
**Province** (INGC Ponto de Population sources: Affected

Situacao, 10 (INGC Novo Centro population[INGC] * % of April) Update, 4 April) women at reproductive age

[2017 census]) Zambezia 6,035 5,235 1,417

**Affected**
**Province**

Affected Population (INGC Ponto de Situacao, 10 April) Total Displaced Population (INGC Novo Centro Update, 4 April) Tete 54,721 2,655 12,021 Manica 262,890 13,115 60,040 Sofala 1,190,594 120,995 288,480 Inhambane 422 - 103

**Grant Total** **1,514,662** **142,000** **362,061**

*Note on different data sources:
1. According to the latest DTM (round 2, 10 April) assessments in 41 displacement sites, there are
a total 13,616 people who are displaced in 24 sites in Beira. The table above uses the INGC source for a more complete presentation of the displaced population across whole Safala province.
However the INGC displacement data is dated 4 April for all provinces.

2. The number of estimated women at reproductive age (WRA) is based on a calculation of the affected population [INGC] * % of WRA [2017 census]. The total number is different than the UNFPA estimated figures in above paragraph, because the methodology of calculation and sources are different (INGC figures are not used in the latter calculation).

Gorongoza 28,460 550 6,338 Marínguè 26,900 6,085 Caia 12,040 2,751 Cheringoma 7,060 490 1,544 Chibabava 3,975 4,134 1,008 Machanga 2,335 552 Chemba 330 74

**TOTAL** **1,190,594** **120,995** **288,480**

**Gender based violence:** The post disaster multi-sectoral assessment (MRA) in Dondo and
Buzi districts reported that families are resorting to negative coping strategies to meet their most basic needs and risks of GBV was reported (MRA, 4/2019). There were also cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by people in positions of power in the community and village chiefs when assigning relief items. This entailed forcing women and girls into
[sex in exchange for food and other relief items (Jornal de Noticias, 4/2019).](https://observador.pt/2019/04/14/mocambique-mulheres-forcadas-a-ter-sexo-em-troca-de-ajuda-humanitaria/) 6 Estimated affected women at Affected reproductive age (15 – 49) Population Total Displaced (*Calculated based on two

**Affected District** (INGC Ponto de Population sources: Affected population

Situacao, 10 (INGC Novo Centro

[INGC] * % of women at April) Update, 4 April) reproductive age [2017 census]) Beira 436,640 15,393 114,073 Nhamatanda 273,676 56,342 61,766 Dondo 166,511 19,737 39,880 Búzi 154,332 16,714 37,196 Marromeu 41,810 9,344 Muanza 36,525 7,635 7,869

2017 census

post disaster multi-sectoral assessment

INGC displacement data

INGC displacement data


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## Secondary Data Review
# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods

APRIL 2019 In times of disaster the prevalence of GBV increases and new forms of violence emerge.
Rape, trafficking, early marriage and other forms of violence against women tend to
[increase in times of conflict and natural disasters (CARE, 3/2019). GBV happens everywhere](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Regional-RGA-Cyclone-Idai-29032019.pdf) in all contexts and is recognized as one of the most pervasive yet most under-reported forms of violence in the world. Any GBV prevalence data needs to be treated with extreme caution. Field visits to district hospitals suggest that the functional hospitals have received less cases in comparison to the pre-crisis situation, which can be an indication of increased challenges in access to services or increased reporting barriers for the affected population.

Stressed living conditions and tensions in communal living spaces expose people to a higher risk of GBV as people live in crowded and less safe environments. Economic hardship and loss of livelihood are likely to trigger negative coping strategies, like early and forced marriage, in the need to engage in survival sex or sex work for food and money etc.

Prior to the cyclone, women and girls already faced GBV protection needs: According to the latest Demographic Health Survey [(2015),](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf) 24% of women aged 18 – 49 are estimated to have suffered physical violence since the age of 15. A further 6% of women aged 18–49 are estimated to have experienced sexual violence. 12% of women report having been forced to have sex in their lives. Those who experience physical violence _only_ are more likely to seek help than those who only experience sexual violence. Among those who are survivors of physical violence within the marriage, an estimated 13% suffered from eye injuries, burns, or sprains. A further 23% is estimated to have suffered sexual violence as well [(DHS 2015).](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf) In Sofala, 6.5% of women aged 15–49 thought it was acceptable for a husband to beat his wife. [1] When posed the same question, 13% of men in Sofala thought it was acceptable to beat their wife. In particular, arguing and refusing to have sex were seen
[as legitimate reasons to beat a wife (DHS 2015). Within this environment, keeping silent is](https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AIS12/AIS12.pdf) the most adopted way for women to cope and is considered to increase their individual
[chance to survive (Slegh, 2009).](http://medanthrotheory.org/site/assets/files/3123/slegh.pdf) 1 Thought it was acceptable for a husband to beat his wife in one or more of the following instances: burning food, arguing with husband, leaving the house without informing the husband, not taking care of the children, when hitting the children.

The challenges of survivors to seek help include but are not limited to access constraints to service providers, fear of stigmatization, and ostracization. With limited presence of district level services, most GBV cases are settled through traditional courts by community committees. It is critical to take into account the power dynamics of the households in any community engagement and programme design, survivors are not serviced properly when
[they need to risk their family’s protection in order to stand up for their rights (Slegh, 2009).](http://medanthrotheory.org/site/assets/files/3123/slegh.pdf)

#### INFORMATION GAPS AND NEEDS

- Critical demographic data disaggregated by sex and age remains a gap for
most vulnerable population groups, e.g. female headed households.

- More complete data on damage and impact is still to be obtained with
improvement of humanitarian access.

- More granular level information needed at community level on GBV protection
needs

- Assessment/survey data using different data collection methods that are not
limited to key informants are needed. Surveys, FGD with women groups, community committee are recommended.

#### LESSONS LEARNED

- Adolescent girls are often at high risk of GBV, yet not always specifically
targeted for provision of reproductive healthcare. Specific attention should be paid to adolescent girls who often do not access healthcare due to their age,
[lack of decision-making power, and limited access to care (UNFPA GBViE Minimum](https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/GBVIE.Minimum.Standards.Publication.FINAL_.ENG_.pdf)
[Standards 2015)](https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/GBVIE.Minimum.Standards.Publication.FINAL_.ENG_.pdf)

- The GBV prevalence rate in Sofala province is high. Strong evidence exists
regarding the risks GBV poses for HIV, specifically among women, and numerous studies have highlighted the benefits of tackling GBV and HIV as twin epidemics [(WHO, 2004). GBV integration into HIV prevention programmes that](https://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/pht/InfoBulletinIntimatePartnerViolenceFinal.pdf) address social and cultural norms that support inequalities in the family, 7

Demographic Health Survey

GBV prevalence data

demographic data


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## Secondary Data Review
# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods

APRIL 2019 community and institutions [(FHI360, 2015)](https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/resource-spt-cap-mozambique-gbv-integration.pdf) should be included as a response strategy in the medium and long term.

- With the onset of the drought in Mozambique (2016), many families have used
child marriage as a coping mechanism to raise income (through dowry) or to reduce the number of dependents per household [(CARE, 3/2019).](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Regional-RGA-Cyclone-Idai-29032019.pdf) Girls are at increased risk of GBV as they are married off for dowry. As described above, many families have lost documentation as a result of the cyclone and subsequent floods. This makes it more difficult for children to attend school. In addition, many communities observed children who had to work. Being out of school exposes children to higher risks of GBV and may also contribute to more child marriage.

#### LIMITATIONS

- Prevalence of GBV or number of GBV cases reported are never an indication
of needs or risks. Numbers should be interpreted in close reference to the context and it should be considered that GBV is underreported in most contexts.

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## Secondary Data Review
# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods

APRIL 2019

#### Response Capacity

The response capacity to protection needs of women and girls are threefold in the aftermath of the emergency: government institutions which provide specialized health care, psychosocial support, social care, legal and judicial assistance; community-based organization, who work closely with relevant line ministries, and perform communitybased case management and referral for vulnerable people in need; humanitarian partners (UN, INGOs etc.) who are providing support to disaster-affected population.

Humanitarian partners

- Currently provide limited and scattered services on prevention and
mainstreaming, not response.

- Service provision is concentrated in Beira cities and evolved around
accommodation centers/displace sites, non-specialized psychosocial support, psychosocial first aid is the most common service provided in and near sites.

- Community engagement through NFI distribution (dignity kits) is the main
intervention for risk mitigation and has highest number of locations and beneficiaries reached, even still very limited in terms of quantity.

- Efforts are made towards strengthening and reinforcing the government-led
integrated GBV services, including bringing government social workers to major sites for referral and case management.

- There is a need to provide more psychosocial support, more training on
psychosocial first aid for community activities/volunteers and more specialized capacity in providing psychosocial intervention.

- With the unfold of the crisis and scale up of humanitarian response, more than
180 organizations and agencies are providing humanitarian assistance. More constant GBV mainstreaming and risk mitigation through all cluster response and humanitarian partners is required, especially when carrying out distributions, through site planning and programme designs.

- Many humanitarian agencies’ operations are time-bound and are subjected to
funding status, which poses challenges on continuity and consistency. More capacity building of government counterparts and community-based organizations are needed for more sustainable and long term recovery.

Government Response Source: [MGCAS, Mecanismo Muntisectorial de Atendimento a Mulher Vitima de Violencia, 2012](http://www.wlsa.org.mz/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/MecanismoMultisectorial.pdf) Community based organizations

- Based in communities, with networks of trained community volunteers /activists
for referral and case follow-up

- Depends on which line ministry CBOs are working with, some has focuses on
SRH, some on GBV and others provide integrated services i.e. nutrition services, health, legal counselling.

- These CBOs train and maintain the activists network covering whole Safala
province, however the resources are limited, some have chosen to focus on building capacity of government counterpart (health staff etc.) 9

- The Multisectoral Mechanism for Integrated Assistance to Women Victims of
Violence in 2012 outlines the three pillars of services/points of entry for integrated GBV response: specialized health services, social action and police.
The system also encompasses further legal assistance if required by the victim/survivor.

- Within this integrated mechanism, the victim/survivor can seek help by
contacting either of these services. Regardless of the service point of entry (health, social action or police), the respective service provider must ensure the victim/survivor/vulnerable individuals is referred to all other pillars of the service provision.

_Specialized health_ _service provider_ _National level_ Ministry of Health (MoH) _Social Action, GBV_ _service provider_ Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action (MGCAS) _Police_ Ministry of Interior _Provincial level_ DPS Serviços de Urgência nas Unidades Sanitárias; _Provincial level_ DPS DPGCAS Police Serviços de Centro de Gabinete de Urgência nas Atendimento Atendimento à Unidades Integrado (CAI) Mulher e Criança Sanitárias; (GAMC) _District level_ DDS DMCAS Police GAMC _Community level_ Health posts, Community clinics committees, CBOs DPGCAS Centro de Atendimento Integrado (CAI) Community committees, CBOs


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## Secondary Data Review
# GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE – Mozambique: Cyclone Idai and Floods

APRIL 2019

Secondary Data


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# **NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH**

**Research Paper No. 127**

# **Land conflicts and their impact on refugee women’s** **livelihoods in southwestern Uganda**

**Kalyango Ronald Sebba**

Department of Women and Gender Studies Makerere University Uganda E-mail kalyango@infocom.co.ug July 2006

**Policy Development and Evaluation Service**


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**Policy Development and Evaluation Service**
**United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees**
**CP 2500, 1211 Geneva 2**
**Switzerland**

**E-mail: hqep00@unhcr.org**
**Web Site: www.unhcr.org**

These papers provide a means for UNHCR staff, consultants, interns and associates, as well as external researchers, to publish the preliminary results of their research on refugee-related issues. The papers do not represent the official views of UNHCR. They are also available online under ‘publications’ at <www.unhcr.org>.

ISSN 1020-7473


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**Introduction**

This paper presents the preliminary findings of a study on land conflicts between refugees and host communities in southwestern Uganda and their impact on refugee women’s livelihoods. Uganda has a long history of hosting refugees that dates back to the 1940s, when it hosted Polish refugees; Rwandese and Sudanese in the 1950s (Holborn 1975:1213-1225). Refugees were placed in gazetted areas in close proximity to the local populations such as in the settlements of Nakivale, Oruchinga, Kyaka 1 and II in Southwestern Uganda; Rhino Camp, Imvepi and Ikafe in the West Nile region; Achol Pii, Parolinya and Adjumani settlements in Northern Uganda; and Kiryandongo and Kyangwali settlements in Central Uganda.

On the whole, placement in rural settlements was based on an assumption that the refugee problem was temporal and would end as soon as the circumstances that led to their flight had ceased (Pincwya, 1998:8-25). However, this has not been the case and the government was not prepared for a protracted refugee situation exacerbated by an increase in the population of both refugees and nationals.

Land conflicts between refugees and nationals are a result of government policy of settling refugees in gazetted areas (Kalyango & Kirk, 2002). Placement in rural settlements is based on the assumption that majority of refugees are of a rural background and can support themselves through agriculture until their repatriation (Kibreab, 1989; UNHCR, 2000, Jacobsen, 2001). Host populations first welcomed refugees as those in need of protection and also as would-be beneficiaries of infrastructure to be left behind on their repatriation (Harrell-Bond, 1986; 2002).

However, as the refugee situation became protracted, hospitality gave way to a competition for resources such as agricultural and grazing land, water and forest resources (Pirouet, 1988; Bagenda et al, 2002; Jones, 2002). This has not been helped by persistent refugee flows from Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Somalia, Burundi and Ethiopia resulting in increased xenophobia against refugees and a call for them to repatriate.

Land is central to the sustainable livelihoods of rural households. For them it is not just land per se but arable and grazing land on which they depend for their livelihood.
As a result, any conflict over land impacts the households directly, and this impact is gender differentiated (Verma, 2001:3-4). The impact of land conflicts on refugee women’s livelihoods has to be situated in the larger context of land problems in Sub Saharan Africa.

These include but are not limited to growing land concentration and scarcity; competition over land use and environmental and land degradation. Other problems include corruption in land markets, indeterminate boundaries of customarily held lands, a weak land administration system, and a lack of equity in land systems (Tshikaka, 2004). Women’s interests in land were eroded by colonial policies and agrarian change that never addressed the core issues of gendered accessibility and equity. For instance, processes of differentiation and individualisation of land rights and land shortages have resulted in the concentration of land rights in men (Tshikaka, 2004; Verma, 2001).

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**Research focus and aims**

Gender inequalities persist in refugee situations and limit the extent to which women and girls can attain sustainable livelihoods. According to the World Bank (2003), gender inequalities tend to lower productivity and intensify unequal distribution of resources. They also contribute to non-monetary aspects of poverty, such as lack of security, opportunity and empowerment, which lower the quality of life for both men and women (Ibid.; Tinker 1990). Whereas refugee women and girls face the brunt of these factors, protection and assistance has largely focused on men. This resonates through almost all refugee policies and practices, which focus on men as household heads (Kalyango, forthcoming).

Refugee women have complained against the status quo because it discriminates them in asylum claims, acquisition of identity documents and food ration cards, limits their freedom of movement and makes them dependent on men (UNHCR 2001). Despite several attempts to address this anomaly, such as in the Convention for the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and in the UNHCR guidelines for refugee women and for Sex and Gender Based Violence, wide gender disparities between women and men in refugee situations remain common (UNHCR, 2000; 2003; UNIFEM, 2003; ).

The overall objective of the study was to establish the gendered impact of land conflicts on livelihoods of refugee women. Specifically, the paper takes a special focus on the gender dimensions of the land conflicts and their impact on household livelihoods. Gender is construed to refer to the socially constructed differences between men and women. Differences are embedded in social relations and therefore differ between cultures; they are constituted through and also help to constitute the exercise of other forms of social difference such as those of age, race or class (Kabeer, 1994).

In identifying the gender impacts of the land conflicts, analysis was based on the concepts of identity and agency. Identity concerns the social process whereby individuals come to identify themselves with a particular configuration of social roles and relationships and agency describes the strategies used by individuals to create a viable and satisfying life for themselves in the context of or in spite of these identities (El Bushra, 2000). These concepts, as El-Bushra (Ibid.) noted, enable an understanding of the nature of violent conflicts and also an interrogation of the motivations of different actors in a conflict.

**Area of study**

The study was carried out in southwestern Uganda, Nakivale refugee settlement established in the early 1960s to cater for Rwandese refugees fleeing a bitter Tutsi/Hutu ethnic conflict in 1959. It spreads over 21,756 hectares and is located in a semi arid zone with limited arable land. The main economic activity is animal rearing and agriculture by both refugees and host populations. Nakivale is found in one of the remotest areas of Mbarara district with poor transport and social infrastructure which make it not easily accessible.

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Today, the settlement is home to over 15,000 refugees of different nationalities (see table 1) and administered by a camp commandant under the government ministry of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees. UNHCR through its implementing partner the Uganda Red Cross provides humanitarian assistance to the refugees. Unlike the host population, refugees have access to adequate social services provided by UNHCR.
This in itself has been a cause of xenophobia against refugees who are seen as more privileged by the local population.

**Table 1:** **Nakivale refugee population at 30 September 2004**

**Age Group** 0-4 5-17 18-59 60 **Total**
**Nationality** M F M F M F M F
Rwandan 2596 2347 2009 1796 1967 1814 57 49 12,635 Kenyan 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 Somali 70 65 137 138 230 233 8 3 884 Ethiopian 4 4 7 5 38 15 0 0 73 Congolese 188 201 199 203 238 229 17 19 1,294 Burundi 39 36 59 41 88 63 0 0 326 Sudanese 6 6 15 25 19 18 0 0 89
**Total** 2903 2659 2426 2209 2581 2373 82 71 15,304

_Source: Camp commandant’s office, Nakivale_ Ever since its establishment, the settlement has been a centre of controversy as regards its size and original boundaries. Located in central Ankole [1], it has been prone to encroachment by the populace who saw it as an area for expansion of their grazing activities. Encroachment was of two types: extension of national land holdings into gazetted land and land loans given to nationals by refugees. This was also precipitated by the fact that there was a shrink in land availability for settlement and grazing in surrounding areas especially after gazetting of Lake Mburo National Park in 1983 and out migration from neighbouring districts of Bushenyi and Ntugamo.

Land conflicts are fuelled by the fact that large expanses of settlement land are unutilised land since the refugee population is small. This has resulted in a limitation on expansion of refugee agricultural activities especially women in other parts of the settlements; limited access to natural resources such as fuel wood and water and grazing land.

**Land conflicts between refugees and host populations**

Generally, it is vital to place refugee - host population conflict over land in the context of Uganda’s land tenure system. Land tenure is the mode of land holding, together with terms and conditions of occupancy. It is about ‘the bundle of rights’ held and enjoyed in the land resource. The relative degree to which individuals can profit from land resources is influenced by three factors: utilisation, duration of occupancy and relocation rights (Nuwagaba et al, 2002). It is important to note that ambiguities exist in land tenure systems in Uganda as a result of its colonial history. For instance, at independence in 1962, there were three land tenure systems: Mailo tenure, a system that was exclusive to the kingdom of Buganda and traced its origins in the Buganda 1 The people of Ankole are both pastorists and agriculturalists.

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agreement of 1900; Freehold tenure, a system created under the Crown Land Ordinance of 1903; the native freeholds, where the community control over land was woven into a number of land rights (Nuwagaba et al, 2002).

The degree of enjoyment of the land resource has become a point of contention between host populations and refugees. At first, refugees were settled in sparsely populated areas and enjoyed good relations with the host populations (Holborn, 1975:1212). However, population increase and the advent of a cash economy increased the value of land, leading to strained social relations between refugees and nationals (Kasfir, 1988:158). Moreover, refugees are regarded as non-citizens who should not have any rights over land.

Land conflicts between refugees and host population can be attributed to two main factors, that is, exceeding of field or residential boundaries (encroachment) and acquisition by nationals (sometimes in the form of land loans). Land conflicts in the refugee hosting areas are partly attributed to lack of clear refugee settlement boundaries (Mugerwa, 1992; Nuwagaba, 2002; Bagenda, 2003). According to the chairman of the district land board in Mbarara, there are no clear demarcations between refugees’ and host population’s land [2] .

The lack of clarity can be traced to reluctance of the Ankole kingdom [3] to favour permanent settlement of refugees in 1962 when they were first given land to settle (Holborn, 1974:1223). As a result there has been increased encroachment on refugee land by nationals, a practice exacerbated by weak administration systems. For instance, some encroachers have even acquired land tittles on gazetted land, since the procedure of acquiring a land title is very simple and open to abuse. All one needs is to fill out an application form from the district land board and take them to Local Council 1 (LC1) and have a ‘neighbour’ sign for confirmation.

After the District Land Board has confirmed, land is surveyed and a land title issued.
The system has also been exploited by refugees, especially those of the 1959 caseload who have acquired land tittles [4] on settlement land. For instance, there is a case of a Rwandan refugee with a title for seven square kilometres of settlement land.
Interestingly, it was also found out that the camp commandant of Nakivale refugee settlement has had to appear in court on charges of distributing land to refugees in the settlement [5] .

Furthermore, there have also been disagreements between Mbarara district administration officials and the government over land in refugee settlements. Part of the disagreements are because the government has refused nationals to use refugee land. One district official interviewed said that government has not always agreed with the district on matters pertaining to land conflicts in refugee settlement. The findings of the study revealed that in fact, some of the district officials are themselves encroachers on settlement land. Institutional responses are further hindered by migration of nationals from other areas, such as Nyabushozi and Bushenyi, because of land shortages. This migration is caused by anticipation that refugees will repatriate 2 The settlement boundary was determined by ridges that surround it.
3 These were the original owners of the land in Nakivale and Oruchinga before government gazetted the settlement.
4 Under the Ugandan law, refugees are not supposed to own land.
5 Interviews camp commandant Nakivale and Refugee Desk officer Mbarara, October 2004.

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1959 caseload


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especially to Rwanda and leave vacant land in the settlements. On the other hand, refugees from Rwanda are coming to Uganda because there is land for settlement (Bagenda et al, 2002). In response, government is in the process of resurveying the land and cancelling all land titles acquired on refugee land.

To further analyze the land conflicts, one also needs to understand the land problem in Rwanda. According to Hajabakiga (2004:1-3) Rwanda has a population of 8.1 million and a population density of 308 inhabitants per square kilometre. On a whole, this places pressure on land leading to landlessness. Limited access to land in Rwanda has also had an influence on the repatriation of Rwandese in that they prefer to stay in areas where they have access to land for their own livelihoods. For instance, it is this lack of land in Rwanda that has partly led to secondary refugee movements from Tanzania to Uganda.

Even some of the refugees who had repatriated after the genocide in 1994 returned to Uganda to repossess their land holdings in refugee settlements. When asked about their repatriation, Rwandan refugees indicated that they had no land to return to in Rwanda [6] . Indeed, Hajabakiga (2004) observed that between the 1950s and 1980s many people in Rwanda lost their land rights for politically and ethnically motivated reasons. This, according to her, caused a problem when Rwandese repatriated after 1994 since they had no lands to repossess, and some of them ended up taking up the lands of those who had fled that same year.

Generally, conflicts over land in Nakivale can be perceived as ‘livelihood clashes’ between refugees and nationals, since land is a critical resource for supporting livelihoods (Mugerwa, 1992, Verma, 2001:79). Hence it is important to understand the interplay of various factors that influence access to and utilisation of land by both host communities and refugees. For instance, despite settlement size, each refugee household is given 0.04 hectares (20m x 20m) of land for homestead establishment and 0.15 as agricultural plots. This leaves a large part of the land under–utilized providing room for encroachment by nationals in need of grazing land.

Quite often, animals stray into refugees’ agricultural plots leading to a conflict between refugees and local populations. Usually, conflicts arise when livelihoods are threatened and this threat can be internal (within the households or communities) or external-from outside the households or communities (Mugerwa, 1992:23; Verma, 2001:97). At the centre of land conflicts are questions of ownership, access to and control over natural resources. Land is regarded by locals as belonging to Ugandans with refugees having no rights whatsoever. Regarding their interests in land, locals accuse the government of placing refugees’ above those of the national population [7] .
For refugees, access is determined by legislation, as land is allocated for a settlement.
Paradoxically, settlements are sometimes established in non-agricultural productive areas, limiting livelihood opportunities. Furthermore, the government confines the refugees in the settlement, allowing them only limited freedom of movement.
Refugees have had to devise survival strategies such as spontaneous movement out of settlements with no permission to do so.

6 Fc Group Discussion Kigali zone, Nakivale (July 2004).
7 Refugee Desk Officer, Mbarara October 2004.

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