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**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**

the information needed to complete the journey and settle/find employment once the destination is reached. In 2007–08, 44 percent of migrants choosing destinations other than Iran, Pakistan, or the Arabian Peninsula had secondary or tertiary education. Such results are in line with data collected in the recent _Joint IDP Profiling Services_ initiative, according to which male Afghans arriving in Greece in early 2016 were mostly single youth possessing higher education.

**Table 1** **Monthly labor income in Afghanistan**

**and remittances from abroad**

**MEAN** **MEDIAN**

**Agriculture** 5930 4800

**Manufacturing** 7496 7000

**Construction** 6516 5600

**Services** 9927 8000

**Public sector** 14368 12000

**Health and Education** 9402 7000

**Remittances** 8581 5833

**Total (excl. remittances)** **8529** **7000**

Notes: labor income has been computed for male workers aged [14,35] Source: Authors’ calculation based on ALCS 2013–14

**Figure 13** **Distribution of remittances,**

**by sending country**

Afghanistan Pakistan Iran UAE Other Gulf Europe Australia Other 0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 MONTHLY REMITTANCES, AFS Note: The figure shows a box and whiskers plot. The box ranges from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile. The line in the middle of the box shows the median. The two lines on either side of the box extend to minimum and maximum values, excluding outliers. The dots indicate outliers.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on ALCS 2013–14 The importance of individual economic migration in Afghan households’ livelihood strategy is confirmed by data on remittances. **The vast majority of economic**
**migrants send remittances.** In 2013–14, 80 percent of Afghans who left the
household seeking employment opportunities abroad had sent remittances, contributing on average about 70 percent of total labor income to their household.
Such numbers are striking, especially when considering that the information on remittances is collected on household members who left just during the year preceding the survey. This implies that over a very short period of time the vast majority of migrants were able to find employment and contribute to the welfare of their households in Afghanistan. **Remittances’ amounts vary by destination**
**country,** reflecting differences in the education profile of migrants and in local
wages. On average, remittances are approximately 8600 Afs per month, in line with the average monthly income of a male worker below the age of 35 in Afghanistan.
However, the median value of remittances is 20 percent lower, confirming the prevalence of low-skilled workers among migrants.

### The vast majority of economic migrants send remittances. Remittances’ amounts vary by destination country.

9

ALCS

IDP Profiling Services_

data on remittances

data on remittances


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**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**

## **MAIN MESSAGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Afghanistan is facing a severe security and economic crisis. This crisis is taking place in a context already complicated by an explosive mix of population growth, excess labor supply, widespread poverty, poor governance and lack of government capacity and financial resources to respond to the needs of its citizens. While Afghans have traditionally relied on migration to navigate times of distress, their options are shrinking at a time when needed the most; Iran is slowly recovering from an economic crisis, Pakistan is imposing strict border controls, and Europe is struggling with a political backlash resulting from the large mixed-migratory flows from Syria, Afghanistan and SubSaharan Africa.

The available evidence suggests that “push factors” are the primary motivators for migration both within and outside Afghanistan. While migrants might choose where to go depending on available opportunities, leaving is more of a necessity, rather than a choice. With rampant unemployment and escalating conflict, security and economic motives are two sides of the same coin. Can these flows be contained or reversed? The past history of displacement and returns to Afghanistan indicates the potential destabilizing effects of increasing population pressure on limited local resources. Given the increase in secondary displacement among more recent waves of returnees, local absorption capacity appears already overtaxed. Additional returns from Pakistan, Iran, or Europe are likely to result in further secondary displacement, unemployment, and instability. _In such context, the_ _**international**_ _**community should increase its advocacy to ensure voluntary, safe, dignified, and phased returns**_ _as further population shocks could undermine civilian and military aid efforts and further escalate_ _conflict. Peace and stability in Afghanistan are not only a pre-requisite for its development but also_ _a global public good. If no country or institution alone has the capacity to help Afghanistan manage_ _its displacement issues,_ _**the international community as a whole should mobilize resources to assist**_ _**those countries such as Pakistan and Iran who have shared the burden for decades, conditioned**_ _**on continued willingness to host refugee populations.**_ _Similarly, the international community as a_ _whole should support the development of_ _**legal channels for temporary economic migration and**_ _**more effective management of asylum requests**_ _which could help Afghanistan overcome its current_ _crisis and ease its structural challenges._ Second, evidence suggests that factors affecting poverty risks among mobile households are the same as the one observed in the general population. As Afghanistan’s context is characterized by widespread poverty and the degree of destitution among mobile households is not dissimilar from the rest of the population, _**targeting needs should be preferred to targeting categories,**_ _not to_ _create perceptions of unequal treatment that may exacerbate social fragmentation._ Such approach might be particularly important as the government and international community move towards a developmental approach in the management of displacement issues. As the fiscal space for social spending shrinks, _**consolidation of interventions should contribute to the development of a**_ _**nationwide safety net system**_ aimed at helping household cope with risk and, possibly, at reducing some of the causes of displacement.

10


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**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**

Third, _**particular attention should be devoted to minimizing any possible negative impact of**_ _**displacement on human capital investments for future generations.**_ Evidence suggests that the lack human capital is the main determinants of the risk of poverty and that households are likely to respond to negative shocks by pulling children out of school. While a comprehensive safety net system could help mitigating such negative consequences, bureaucratic barriers such as residency status and transferability of school records could negatively impact displaced or, more generally, mobile populations. Moreover, given the prevalence of mobility and displacement in Afghanistan, greater focus should be devoted to investing in functional literacy and skill-development programs that display greater portability and provide displaced individuals with greater access to economic opportunities, wherever they end up being.

Lastly, evidence suggests that migrants will likely continue to converge towards Afghanistan’s urban centers as they seek better security, jobs, and services. _Urbanization trends require immediate_ _intervention by local authorities to increase shelter capacity and access to services. National and_ _provincial authorities should further recognize that, in the medium and long term,_ _**local integration in**_ _**urban and semi-urban areas is inevitable and it requires adequate planning**_ _to maximize the returns_ _from urban agglomeration, for example by investing in connectivity and accessibility, while ensuring_ _access to basic services and a minimum standard of living._

## **ENDNOTES**

1. UN Population Movement Bulletin, Issue 5, 7 Sept, 2016.

2. Based on UNHCR assisted returns data, 78 percent of returns occurred between 2002 and 2006. Districts with “high” intensity of returns in 2007 had an average share of returnees over the population of 70 percent.

3. Returnee households are considered to have “reintegrated” successfully if they were able to return to the place where they used to live before displacement, and if they were able to achieve—on average—socio-economic outcomes and legal protection in line with those of the local/host population. Household ability to reintegrate successfully might depend on several factors related to the social, economic and institutional conditions prevailing in the host community, as well as on the physical, human and social capital accumulated by returnee households while in asylum, and on their returns “on arrival”.

4. According to NRVA 2007–08 data, approximately 85 percent of Afghan households reported to have been negatively affected by a “large influx of returnees” during the 12 months preceding the survey.

5. Demographic and Health Survey (2014).

6. The youth bulge is defined as the share of youth aged 15–24 to the adult population aged 15+.

7. Growth is expected to remain slow over coming years, reflecting weak demand, increasing output gap and the lack of fiscal space for increasing social transfers in order to boost short-term economic growth (World Bank, 2016; _Navigating Risk and Uncertainty in Afghanistan_ ).

8. Urdal, Henrik. 2004. _The devil in the demographics: The effect of youth bulges on domestic armed conflict,_ 1950–2000. Social Development Papers: Conflict and Reconstruction Paper 14.

9. Low-technology, rain-fed agriculture remains the country’s primary sector of employment, especially for its poorest and more vulnerable people.

10. ALCS 2013–14.

11. Probability of having a household member abroad was estimated using a Linear Probability model and ALCS 2013–14 data. Controls include a dummy indicating whether the household feels insecure in the district of residence; the number of security incidents per thousand inhabitants in the district of residence; composition and employment outcomes at the household level; dummy variables identifying returnee households, IDP households and households migrating for economic reasons; a dummy indicating urban residence and quintiles of a wealth index to proxy for household welfare.

11

Demographic and Health Survey
NRVA 2007–08 data
ALCS 2013–14 data

Demographic and Health Survey

NRVA 2007–08 data

ALCS 2013–14

ALCS 2013–14 data

UNHCR assisted returns data

UN Population Movement Bulletin

UNHCR assisted returns data

NRVA 2007–08 data


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**FRAGILITY AND POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**

12. The World Bank, 2011. _Migration and poverty. Towards better opportunities for the poor._ Washington DC.

13. The share of literate household heads in IDP households decreases to 43 percent when excluding secondary displacement, i.e. returnees who have been internally displaced upon return and that were IDPs at the time of the survey.

14. Due to a relatively small sample size, the poverty rates of IDP and economic migrant households are estimated with lower precision, and therefore the difference in poverty rate compared to non-mobile households is not statistically significant.

15. Afghanistan is characterized by sizeable differences in access to education between rural (low) and urban areas (high). As detailed in the 2015 _Poverty Status Update_ report, urban/rural differences account for approximately one-third of differences in education opportunities for Afghan children.

16. Probability of being in school was estimated using a Probit model and ALCS 2013–14 data. Controls include sex and age of the child; composition and employment outcomes at the household level; dummy variables identifying returnee households and IDP households; whether the household has migrants and receives remittances; quintiles of a wealth index; urban residence and quintiles of an index indicating the severity of conflict in the district of residence.

17. Ministry of Economy, World Bank (2015): _Afghanistan Poverty Status_ Update.

18. Some useful information can be obtained from the three available and comparable rounds of the Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS) conducted in 2013–14, 2011–12 and 2007–08 which collect information about household members who have left the household in the 12 months preceding the survey and about their reason for migrating.

19. The collapse in oil prices had a strong impact on Iran’s economy, further magnified by international sanctions imposed in 2011. Limited employment opportunities, a weaker exchange rate, and progressive reduction in universal subsidies (notably electricity) might have affected the returns of economic migrants choosing Iran as a destination, and possibly the choice of trying to reach Europe.

20. Unfortunately, information on the education and employment outcomes of individual migrants was only collected in 2007–08, so it is not possible to assess any changes in migrants’ profiles.

21. In 2007–08, migrants abroad were mostly employed as day laborers (82 percent) and salaried employees in the private sector (12 percent).

12

Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey
ALCS 2013–14 data

Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey

ALCS 2013–14 data

ALCS

ALCS 2013–14 data


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**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT

Report No: PAD4830


Input:
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective April 30, 2022)

Currency Unit =  Ethiopian Birr

51.86 Ethiopian Birr = US$1

US$1.34 = SDR 1

GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA FISCAL YEAR

July 8 – June 7

Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem

Country Director: Boutheina Guermazi

Regional Director: Catherine Signe Tovey

Practice Manager: Helene Monika Carlsson Rex

Task Team Leaders: Matthew Stephens, Esayas Nigatu Gebremeskel


Input:
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

3R-4-CACE Response-Recovery-Resilience for Conflict-Affected Communities in Ethiopia Project
BoA Bureau of Agriculture
BoF Bureau of Finance
AWPB Annual Work Plan and Budget
CAC Community Audit Committee
CBO Community-Based Organization
CDD Community-Driven Development
CERC Contingent Emergency Response Component
CFT Community Facilitation Team
CHS Community Health and Safety
CIF Community Investment Fund
CIG Common Interest Group
COVID Coronavirus Disease
CPC Community Procurement Committee
CPF Country Partnership Framework
CPMC Community Project Management Committee
CRRF Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DA Designated Account
DRDIP Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project
E&S Environment and Social
EHS Environmental Health and Safety
EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return
ERM Emergency Response Manual
ESCP Environmental and Social Commitment Plan
ESF Environmental and Social Framework
ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework
ESRM Environmental and Social Risk Management
ESRS Environmental and Social Risk Summary
ESS Environmental and Social Standards
ETB Ethiopian Birr
EU European Union
FA Financing Agreement
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FCV Fragility, Conflict and Violence
FLID Farmer-Led Irrigation Development
FM Financial Management
FPCU Federal Project Coordination Unit
FSC Federal Steering Committee
FTC Federal Technical Committee
FTC Farmers Training Center
FY Financial Year
GBV Gender-based Violence
GCR Global Compact on Refugees
GEMS Geo-enabling initiative for Monitoring and Supervision


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GoE Government of Ethiopia
GP Global Practice
GRF Global Refugee Forum
GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism
GRS Grievance Redress Service
HoA Horn of Africa
HoAI Horn of Africa Initiative
HROC High Risk of Ongoing Conflict
IBEX Integrated Budget and Expenditure
IBM Iterative Beneficiary Monitoring
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA International Development Association
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IFMIS Integrated Financial Management Information System
IFR Interim Financial Report
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPF Investment Project Financing
IPV Intimate Partner Violence
IWUA Irrigation Water Users Association
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MoA Ministry of Agriculture
MoF Ministry of Finance
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NBE National Bank of Ethiopia
NPV Net Present Value
NRM Natural Resource Management
NROC Non-High Risk of Ongoing Conflict
OFAG Office of the Federal Auditor General
OP Operational Policy
PCU Project Coordination Unit
PDO Project Development Objective
PFM Public Financial Management
PIM Project Implementation Manual
PP Procurement Plan
PPSD Project Procurement Strategy for Development
PTC Pastoralist Training Center
PWDs Persons with Disabilities
RCC Refugee Central Committee
RF Resettlement Framework
RMEAL Results Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
RPCU Regional Project Coordination Unit
RRS Refugees and Returnees Service
RSW IDA 18 Sub-window for Refugees and Host Communities
SA Social Assessment
SACCO Savings and Credit Cooperative
SEA/SH Sexual Exploitation and Abuse/Sexual Harassment


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SEP Stakeholder Engagement Plan
SIF Strategic Investment Fund
SOP Series of Projects
SORT Systematic Operations Risk-Rating Tool
SRAMP Security Risk Assessment and Management Plan
SSI Small-scale Irrigation
STEP Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement
TPM Third-Party Monitoring
TPMA Third-Party Monitoring Agent
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
USD United States Dollar
WBG World Bank Group
WHR IDA 19 Window for Host Communities and Refugees
WNCCA Woreda Needs, Conflict and Capacity Assessment
WoFED Woreda Office of Finance and Economic Development
WPCU Woreda Project Coordination Unit


Input:
**The World Bank**
Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

**DATASHEET ........................................................................................................................... 1**

**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT ...................................................................................................... 7**

A. Country Context................................................................................................................................ 8

B. Sectoral and Institutional Context .................................................................................................. 10

C. Relevance to Higher Level Objectives ............................................................................................. 14

**II.** **PROJECT DESCRIPTION .................................................................................................. 15**

A. Project Development Objective ..................................................................................................... 15

B. Project Components ....................................................................................................................... 16

C. Project Beneficiaries ....................................................................................................................... 33

D. Results Chain .................................................................................................................................. 33

E. Rationale for Bank Involvement and Role of Partners ................................................................... 34

F. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design .................................................................... 35

**III.** **IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS ............................................................................ 36**

A. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements .......................................................................... 36

B. Results Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements......................................................................... 37

C. Sustainability ................................................................................................................................... 38

**IV.** **PROJECT APPRAISAL SUMMARY ................................................................................... 39**

A. Technical, Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................................... 39

B. Fiduciary .......................................................................................................................................... 40

C. Legal Operational Policies ............................................................................................................... 43

D. Environmental and Social ............................................................................................................... 43

**V.** **GRIEVANCE REDRESS SERVICES ..................................................................................... 47**

**VI.** **KEY RISKS ..................................................................................................................... 47**

**VII.** **RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND MONITORING ................................................................... 50**

**Annex 1 : Implementation Arrangements and Support Plan .......................................... 70**

**Annex 2: Map ............................................................................................................... 80**


Input:
**The World Bank**
Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)

DATASHEET

**BASIC INFORMATION**
~~BASIC~~ ~~INFO~~ ~~TABLE~~

Country(ies) Project Name

Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II
Kenya, Uganda

Project ID Financing Instrument Environmental and Social Risk Classification

Investment Project
P178047 High
Financing

**Financing & Implementation Modalities**

[ ] Multiphase Programmatic Approach (MPA) [✓] Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC)

[✓] Series of Projects (SOP) [✓] Fragile State(s)

[ ] Performance-Based Conditions (PBCs) [ ] Small State(s)

[ ] Financial Intermediaries (FI) [ ] Fragile within a non-fragile Country

[ ] Project-Based Guarantee [ ] Conflict

[ ] Deferred Drawdown [ ] Responding to Natural or Man-made Disaster

[ ] Alternate Procurement Arrangements (APA) [ ] Hands-on Enhanced Implementation Support (HEIS)

Expected Approval Date Expected Closing Date

06-Jun-2022 31-Dec-2027

Bank/IFC Collaboration

No

**Proposed Development Objective(s)**

To improve access to basic social and economic services, expand livelihood opportunities and enhance
environmental management for host communities and refugees in the target areas.

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Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)

**Components**

**Component Name** **Cost (US$, millions)**

Social and Economic Services and Infrastructure 83.60

Sustainable Environmental Management 13.60

Livelihoods Program 64.80

Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation and Learning 18.00

Contingent Emergency Response 0.00

**Organizations**

Borrower: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Implementing Agency: Ministry of Agriculture

**PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)**

**SUMMARY-NewFin1**

**Total Project Cost** 180.00

**Total Financing** 180.00

**of which IBRD/IDA** 180.00

**Financing Gap** 0.00

**DETAILS-NewFinEnh1**

**World Bank Group Financing**

International Development Association (IDA) 180.00

IDA Grant 180.00

**IDA Resources (in US$, Millions)**

**Credit Amount** **Grant Amount** **Guarantee Amount** **Total Amount**

**Ethiopia** 0.00 180.00 0.00 180.00

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PROJECT FINANCING DATA

PROJECT FINANCING DATA

PROJECT FINANCING DATA


Input:
**The World Bank**
Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)

National PBA 0.00 34.07 0.00 34.07

Regional 0.00 45.93 0.00 45.93

Refugee 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00

**Total** **0.00** **180.00** **0.00** **180.00**

**Expected Disbursements (in US$, Millions)**

**WB Fiscal Year** 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028

**Annual** 0.00 18.00 40.00 65.00 41.00 16.00 0.00

**Cumulative** 0.00 18.00 58.00 123.00 164.00 180.00 180.00

**INSTITUTIONAL DATA**

**Practice Area (Lead)** **Contributing Practice Areas**

Agriculture and Food, Environment, Natural Resources & the
Social Sustainability and Inclusion
Blue Economy, Fragile, Conflict & Violence, Water

**Climate Change and Disaster Screening**

This operation has been screened for short and long-term climate change and disaster risks

**SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL (SORT)**

**Risk Category** **Rating**

1. Political and Governance ⚫ High

2. Macroeconomic ⚫ High

3. Sector Strategies and Policies ⚫ Moderate

4. Technical Design of Project or Program ⚫ Substantial

5. Institutional Capacity for Implementation and Sustainability ⚫ Substantial

6. Fiduciary ⚫ Substantial

7. Environment and Social ⚫ High

8. Stakeholders ⚫ Moderate

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SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL

INSTITUTIONAL DATA


Input:
**The World Bank**
Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)

9. Other ⚫ Substantial

10. Overall ⚫ High

**COMPLIANCE**

**Policy**
Does the project depart from the CPF in content or in other significant respects?

[ ] Yes   [✓] No

Does the project require any waivers of Bank policies?

[ ] Yes   [✓] No

**Environmental and Social Standards Relevance Given its Context at the Time of Appraisal**

**E & S Standards** **Relevance**

Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts Relevant

Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure Relevant

Labor and Working Conditions Relevant

Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention and Management Relevant

Community Health and Safety Relevant

Land Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement Relevant

Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural
Resources

Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional
Local Communities

Relevant

Relevant

Cultural Heritage Relevant

Financial Intermediaries Not Currently Relevant

**NOTE** : For further information regarding the World Bank’s due diligence assessment of the Project’s potential
environmental and social risks and impacts, please refer to the Project’s Appraisal Environmental and Social Review
Summary (ESRS).

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**The World Bank**
Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)

**Legal Covenants**

Sections and Description

The Recipient shall no later than three (3) months after the Effective Date, appoint a Third-Party Monitoring Agent
(“TPMA”), with terms of reference, mandates, staffing, and other resources satisfactory to the Association, to
monitor the implementation and supervision of Project activities in high risk of conflict areas.

**Conditions**

Type Financing source Description
Effectiveness IBRD/IDA The Recipient has adopted an updated Project Implementation
Manual in accordance with the provisions of Section I.B.1 of
Schedule 2 to the Financing Agreement.

Type Financing source Description
Effectiveness IBRD/IDA The Recipient, through its Ministry of Agriculture, has contracted an
implementing agency with terms of reference, mandate, staffing,
and other resources satisfactory to the Association, to be
responsible for implementing Project activities in high risk of
ongoing conflict areas.

Type Financing source Description
Effectiveness IBRD/IDA The Association is satisfied that the Recipient has an adequate
refugee protection framework.

Type Financing source Description
Disbursement IBRD/IDA No withdrawal shall be made for payments made prior to the
Signature Date.

Type Financing source Description
Disbursement No withdrawal shall be made for Emergency Expenditures under
Category (2), unless and until all of the following conditions have
been met in respect of said expenditures:
(i) (A) the Recipient has determined that an Eligible Crisis or
Emergency has occurred, and has furnished to the Association a
request to withdraw Financing amounts under Category (2); and (B)
the Association has agreed with such determination, accepted said
request and notified the Recipient thereof; and
(ii) the Recipient has adopted the CERC Manual and Emergency
Action Plan, in form and substance acceptable to the Association.

Type Financing source Description
Effectiveness IBRD/IDA The Recipient has adopted and disclosed: (i) a resettlement

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**The World Bank**
Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)

framework; (ii) an environmental and social management
framework; (iii) a social assessment; (iv) labor management
procedures; (v) gender-based violence/sexual exploitation and
abuse/sexual harassment action plan; and (vi) a security risk
assessment and management plan, all in accordance with the
provisions of the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan.

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Input:
**The World Bank**
Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)

**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT**

1. **Any engagement in Ethiopia at present must consider the fluid conflict-related developments in the country**

**and the rapid pace at which these developments could lead to changes in the country’s context.** The proposed
Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP) in the Horn of Africa (HoA) Phase II (DRDIP II) was
prepared with this understanding, with a flexible design that can be adapted to the country’s evolving needs. DRDIP
II includes several important new design features compared to the ongoing Phase I, as follows: (a) refugees are
included as direct beneficiaries; (b) the geographic scope is expanded to cover all communities in the country that are
affected by the refugee presence; (c) deeper support to help the government of Ethiopia implement its policies for
refugee inclusion; (d) integration of refugee concerns into local development planning; and (e) enhanced focus on
women’s economic and social empowerment. Furthermore, the Government has agreed to third-party
implementation and third-party monitoring in areas at high risk of ongoing conflict.

2. **Global forced displacement presents significant humanitarian and development challenges.** Over 84 million

people are now forcibly displaced because of conflict, persecution, and natural disasters. This includes 26.6 million
refugees – the highest number ever recorded – and 51 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). [1] Forced
displacement remains largely concentrated in low- and middle-income countries. The HoA and the Great Lakes
Regions in Africa host 20 percent of the world’s refugees and asylum-seekers (five million) and 25 percent of the IDPs
(12.4 million). [2] This is an increase of two million refugees and 500,000 IDPs since DRDIP in the HoA (P152822)
commenced in 2016. Displacement is protracted in the HoA and is driven by natural events and human actions, with
climate change and environmental degradation acting as threat multipliers.

3. **Displacement has emerged as a regional phenomenon in the HoA, with spillover effects in neighboring**

**countries, posing major challenges for poverty reduction, stability and community resilience.** Despite its rich
endowment in human, social and natural capital, the HoA is affected by a complex history of marginalization, pockets
of poverty and insecurity and increasing environmental degradation. Conflict remains endemic, compounded by
demographic shifts because of population growth and movement of people; imbalanced service provision; increasing
competition for scarce natural resources; and harsh climatic conditions, including frequent droughts and floods.

4. **In line with the growing importance of regional integration goals to combat fragility, five countries (Djibouti,**

**Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia) launched the Horn of Africa Initiative (HoAI) in 2019 to forge closer economic**
**ties in the sub-region. Subsequently, Sudan also joined the HoAI.** Highlighting the importance of regional
cooperation in resilience building, the initiative includes four pillars: (i) Regional Infrastructure Networks; (ii) Trade
and Economic Integration; (iii) Resilience; and (iv) Human Capital. Developed with support from the African
Development Bank, the European Union (EU) and the World Bank, the HoAI agreed on priority projects and programs
for the region requiring financing of up to US$15 billion. Responding in part to requests at the October 2021 HoAI
Ministerial meeting to increase support for resilience considering the heightened fragility risks faced by the region
that spill over national boundaries, this project supports the Resilience Pillar.

5. **The proposed project is the second phase of an ongoing operation benefiting Ethiopia and is part of a series of**

**ongoing regional projects—also covering Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda.** Designed as a series of projects (SOP), DRDIP
addresses the regional spillover effects of conflict and forced displacement. DRDIP supports a development response

1 _[https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/mid-year-trends.html](https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/mid-year-trends.html)_ .
2 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/rbehagl

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Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)

that helps refugee-hosting countries to overcome the negative impacts of forced displacement, while maximizing the
positive opportunities it can also present, thus creating a refugee space contributing to a regional “public good”. The
first phase of DRDIP commenced in 2016, supporting Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda, with Kenya joining in 2017. Both
projects include grants to the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for regional coordination and
learning. DRDIP II follows the World Bank’s people-centric approach for the HoA. The project will support
approximately 2.5 million people, of whom 1.76 million are host community members and 740,000 are refugees. The
SOP allows for other countries in the HoA to opt into the program at a later date, or for second phases and Additional
Financing for existing DRDIP countries, as in the case of this operation.

**A. Country Context**

6. **With a population of over 115 million people (2020), Ethiopia is the second most populous nation in Africa**

**after Nigeria, and one of the most diverse** . Ethiopia’s location in the center of the HoA and close to the Middle East
gives it high strategic importance. It is physically connected to six other countries, namely Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia,
South Sudan, Sudan and – essential in terms of global trade – to Djibouti and its deep-sea port. Ethiopia hosts about
86 ethnic groups and 90 spoken languages and is also religiously and geographically diverse. [3]

7. **Consistent economic growth and poverty reduction have underpinned significant development progress in**
**Ethiopia over the last two decades** . Driven by average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of more than ten percent
annually over the last 15 years, Gross National Income per capita increased from US$140 in 2004 to an estimated
US$890 by 2020. Poverty reduced from 38.4 percent in 2004 to 23.5 percent in 2016. This sustained growth has,
however, exacerbated inequality, with the Gini coefficient increasing from 29.8 in 2004 to 35 in 2015. The rise in
inequality is largely due to increasing urban-rural disparity, with 88 percent of the country’s poor living in rural areas. [4]

8. **Ethiopia’s development gains are being challenged by a combination of the global pandemic, natural disasters**
**and violent conflict.** The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has had severe impacts on the country’s economy. [5]
Growth slowed to 6.3 percent in 2020/21 and is expected to decline to 3.3 percent in 2021/22. World Bank projections
estimate that the pandemic has caused a significant increase in the poverty headcount – particularly in urban areas –
and has also exacerbated inequality. [6]

9. **Flooding and a locust infestation over the past two years have seriously affected food security** **and livelihoods**
**and highlighted the risks of climate change.** The number of people requiring food assistance has increased to as many
as 13.2 million. [7] Ethiopia is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate variability and climate change due to its
high dependence on rain-fed agriculture and natural resources. The country’s relatively low adaptive capacity to deal
with current and expected changes amplifies resource scarcity and the risk of instability.

10. **Climate change is expected to cause severe damage to infrastructure, increase the risk of water scarcity and**
**increase crop land exposure to drought** . This will increase demand for water, raising the potential for conflict and

3 According to Ethiopia’s 2007 Census.
4 World Bank Poverty and Equity Brief for Ethiopia, October 2021.
5 As of May 11, 2022, Ethiopia had registered 470,760 COVID cases and 7,510 fatalities: _[https://covid19.who.int/region/afro/country/et](https://covid19.who.int/region/afro/country/et)_
6 World Bank analysis suggests that the poverty headcount in the 23.5th percentile (the national poverty rate) increased by 11.2 percent
and for the bottom 40 [th] percentile by 7.7 percent between 2018/19 and October 2020. Inequality is estimated to have increased, with
the Gini coefficient rising to 42 in October/November 2020. See Christina Wieser et al (2021) “Poverty projections and profiling based on
Ethiopia’s High Frequency Phone Surveys of households using a SWIFT-COVID-19 package” World Bank: Washington DC.
7 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan. _[https://www.wfp.org/countries/ethiopia](https://www.wfp.org/countries/ethiopia)_

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**The World Bank**
Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Phase II (P178047)

forced displacement. [8] Higher temperatures, which will cause increased aridity, may also lead to livestock stress and
reduced crop yields. This is likely to result in significant economic losses, damage to agricultural lands and
infrastructure, as well as human casualties. [9] Investments will be needed in climate-resilient infrastructure such as
transport networks and public institutions for basic services.

11. **The war in Ukraine is exacerbating economic and food security challenges** . Russia and Ukraine account for close
to 30 percent of the global wheat market. As a result of anticipated shortages due to the war, the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) global Food Price Index reached an historical high in March 2022. While the index dropped slightly
in April 2022, it remains 30 percent higher than one year previously. [10] In Ethiopia the latest official data shows that
the price of food has increased by 43 percent over the past year. [11] Across the HoA, the impact of the price increases
and food shortages will be felt acutely by the poor, particularly refugees, who are highly dependent on dwindling
humanitarian aid for livelihood and food security. [12]

12. **The last five years have seen an increase in violent conflict which has carried a major human and economic cost**
**to Ethiopia** . The most significant recent manifestation of conflict is the Northern Ethiopian Crisis, which began in Tigray
in November 2020 and has since spilled over to the adjoining regions of Amhara and Afar. The current wave of conflict
has been triggered by a complex web of drivers and grievances, including political rivalries, contestation over natural
resources, and perceptions of regional and historical inequalities. These triggers have been aggravated by unfulfilled
employment expectations among youth, shrinking availability of land, and the impacts of climate change. [13] Some of
these conflicts have long histories (for instance, between different ethnic groups over control of local resources such
as water or pasture) and have re-emerged during the recent political transition. Political competition and rivalry
between elites has intensified over this period – locally, and at the national and regional levels. These tensions have
manifested across both rural and urban areas and have largely been organized along ethnic lines. Conflict is affecting
various parts of the country, complicating access to several refugee-hosting areas, raising risks for both humanitarian
and development programming and affecting social cohesion in different regions. It has also forced refugees to move
to new areas, creating a new set of humanitarian and development needs for displaced populations.

13. **The conflict has triggered a humanitarian crisis, particularly in northern Ethiopia.** The United Nations estimates

that 5.2 million people in the north, or more than 75 percent of the region’s population, need humanitarian
assistance. [14] There are now more than four million IDPs in the country, 50 percent of whom have been displaced in
the past six months alone. Overall, half are female and 18 percent are children. [15] Approximately 60,000 Ethiopians

8 Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) “Climate Change Amplifies Instability in Africa”, April 21, 2021. See also German Federal
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development “Climate Risk Profile: Ethiopia”.
9 Average temperatures in Ethiopia have increased by an average of 1°C since 1960s, increasing evapotranspiration and reducing soil
moisture. The incidence of drought has increased and the rains in central and northern areas occurring in February to May have become
less predictable. Projections of future change indicate increased temperatures, and as much as a 20 percent decline in spring and summer
rainfall in southern and central regions and an increase in southwest and southeast areas. Projected warming trends for the entire
country are expected to exacerbate observed declines in rainfall, leading to increased water stress.
10 https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/
11 https://www.statsethiopia.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/7.CPI-Mar-2022-HB.pdf
12 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2022) The Impact on Trade and Development of the War in Ukraine.
13 ‘Across Africa, the effects of climate change are shaping conflict patterns, in particular the pattern of violence arising from forced
[migration into contested space…’: https://aoav.org.uk/2021/how-is-climate-change-driving-conflict-in-africa/](https://aoav.org.uk/2021/how-is-climate-change-driving-conflict-in-africa/)
[14 OCHA https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia](https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia)
15 IOM. 2021. Ethiopia National Displacement Report 10 (August-September 2021), published 13 December 2021:
[https://dtm.iom.int/ethiopia](https://dtm.iom.int/ethiopia)

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# **NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH**

**Research Paper No. 143**

# **Protracted displacement and remittances:** **The case of Somalis in Eastleigh, Nairobi**

**Anna Lindley**

ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow Centre on Migration, Policy and Society University of Oxford, United Kingdom

[E-mail: anna.lindley@compas.ox.ac.uk](mailto:anna.lindley@compas.ox.ac.uk) August 2007

**Policy Development and Evaluation Service**


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**Policy Development and Evaluation Service**
**United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees**

**P.O. Box 2500, 1211 Geneva 2**

**Switzerland**

**E-mail: hqpd00@unhcr.org**

**Web Site: www.unhcr.org**

These papers provide a means for UNHCR staff, consultants, interns and associates, as well as external researchers, to publish the preliminary results of their research on refugee-related issues. The papers do not represent the official views of UNHCR. They are also available online under ‘publications’ at <www.unhcr.org>.

ISSN 1020-7473


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**Introduction**

There are more than 5.5 million people around the world struggling in situations of protracted and unresolved exile (UNHCR 2006). [1] These people are allowed to remain in the country where they have sought asylum, but lack basic rights. They often receive meagre - and dwindling – levels of international aid, and must therefore find alternative and additional ways to provide for themselves and their households (Jacobsen 2006).

Remittances from family members in other countries appear to be one way that some people cope with protracted displacement: the money can alleviate poverty and can provide possibilities for improving recipients’ situations, within their considerable constraints (Crisp 2003; Jacobsen 2006). On a global scale, remittances are a significant source of income for developing countries: officially recorded flows totalled $160 billion in 2004, compared with $166 billion Foreign Direct Investment and $79 billion Official Development Assistance (World Bank 2006). Most research explores the remittances of labour migrants and the effects in their countries of origin.
In contrast, very little is known about the dynamics and effects of remittances in displacement settings (relevant research includes Dick 2002; Horst 2006; Riak Akuei 2005; Savage and Harvey 2007; Van Hear 2002).

This paper explores experiences of the remittance process among Somali refugees living in Nairobi. Hundreds of thousands of people have fled to Kenya since 1991 as a result of the civil war in Somalia. Many people still live in refugee camps, mainly dependent on international aid, but over time many others have defied the host government’s attempts to contain them in camps and sought a living in urban areas.
The paper focuses on Eastleigh, a bustling suburb of Nairobi with a large Somali population. Known in Swahili as _Mogadishu ndogo_ (little Mogadishu), Eastleigh has a reputation for thriving business activity, dilapidated infrastructure and crime. Many Somali refugees in this district receive cash remittances from relatives overseas through the Somali money transfer system popularly known as _xawilaad_ . As we shall see, this money has complex effects on their lives.

The research was conducted in January - April 2005, during which time the researcher lived in Eastleigh with a Somali host. The paper is based on informal conversations, observations, and interviews (with residents of various socio-economic and demographic characteristics and clans, conducted with the support of a local researcher). [2] The paper also draws on consultations and interviews with people professionally knowledgeable about the politico-legal and socio-economic situation of Somalis in Kenya, including UNHCR. [3] While a comprehensive quantitative survey 1 This estimate excludes Palestinian refugees under UNRWA’s mandate, and is based on national groups of refugees of 25,000 living for five years or more in the same country of asylum.
2 Thanks go to the research participants for their time; Abdullahi Mohamed Qambi for his excellent research assistance; and Nafisa Nur Osman for her warm hospitality.
3 A total of 24 interviews were conducted with recipients and others. All names have been changed and some details have been altered to preserve interviewees’ anonymity. The research was part of a broader multi-sited project also involving research in Hargeisa and London (Lindley 2006, 2007a and 2007b).

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was not feasible, the data collected paint a broadly indicative picture of remittance experiences among Somali refugees in Eastleigh.

The next section gives a brief account of the refugee situation, and the changes in the Eastleigh district of Nairobi as it became a major hub for Somali people in Kenya.
The third section explores the patterns of remittances and roles in people’s livelihoods. The fourth section explores how remittances intertwine with regional and global mobility, and the final section outlines repercussions in the wider urban economy. The paper concludes by summarising the findings and discussing their policy implications.

**Somalis in Kenya: from the northern frontier to Nairobi**

Kenya has a substantial indigenous Somali Kenyan population, particularly in the North Eastern Province (NEP, known as the Northern Frontier District under British rule). Somali pastoralists have long lived in this harsh, semi-arid area, with its troubled history of political unrest and state repression. Other Somali Kenyans trace their families back to colonial employees or independent traders who settled in Kenya’s towns and cities (Anderson 2005; Turton 1972; Goldsmith 1997; Lewis 2002).

When civil war broke out in southern Somalia and the state collapsed in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees sought safety in Kenya, initially mainly Marehan (the clan of the former president Siyad Barre) and other Darod clans, but as the violence intensified, people of other clans joined them. They fled on foot or crammed into vehicles over the border into the NEP; by _dhow_ from Somalia’s coastal towns to Mombasa; and by plane to Nairobi. After initial attempts to block arrivals, Kenya allowed them in: around 400,000 refugees arrived from Somalia in 1991 and 1992 (Milner 2005).

Large numbers of people were registered by UNHCR and sent to camps at Mombasa on the coast, Thika near Nairobi, Liboi and Dadaab in the NEP, and Kakuma in the North West (Crisp 1999). Since the peak of the early nineties, the refugee population decreased. Some refugees returned voluntarily to Somalia (although not always permanently) [4] and others travelled independently or were formally resettled overseas.
Since 1999, the camp population has remained relatively stable in the region of 150,000, although the numbers for 2007 may be higher as a result of developments in the war in southern Somalia.

Kenya has signed and ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Refugee Convention.
But until late 2006, when the Refugee Act was passed, there was no national legislation for refugees in Kenya. In contrast to the more open and accommodating refugee policy of earlier years, Milner (2005) characterises Kenya’s refugee policy 4 Some of my interviewees in 2005, who were mainly of Darod and Hawiye clans and grew up in the central and southern Somali regions, had tried going back and had traumatic and discouraging experiences. None of the interviewees were contemplating returning to live in southern Somalia while there is still no effective government.

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after 1990 as effectively one of ‘abdication and containment’. [5] First, the government abdicated to UNHCR the responsibility of determining the status of asylum seekers and ensuring their protection. Most refugees were designated _prima facie_ refugees as often occurs when refugees flee generalised insecurity and conflict in large numbers and it is not feasible to conduct individual status determinations. Second, the government tried to contain the problem by only allowing Somali refugees to reside and work in these designated camps, restricting their movements and not giving them the right to take up employment. UNHCR only gave UN Travel Letters for people to travel to Nairobi for resettlement interviews, to university students, to people needing medical treatment and people with particular security problems (Crisp 1999). [6] The Refugees Act 2006 represents a step forward, translating the 1951 and the OAU Convention into national law for the first time. Yet, at this early stage it seems likely that the freedom to work and the freedom of movement of refugees in Kenya will remain considerably restricted. Since the act came into force, further upheaval in Somalia has prompted more people to seek refuge in Kenya, and there have been border closures and evidence of some forcible returns. [7] There is a clear risk now that the will to deal with the problems of protracted displacement will be subsumed by the emergency response to recent arrivals.

The deep material deprivation and physical insecurity of life in the refugee camps is well-documented (Crisp 1999; Horst 2006; Hyndman 2000; Milner 2005). Indeed, life outside the camps in the NEP is also often difficult: considerable numbers of Kenyan Somali pastoralists were so poor that they joined their co-ethnics in the camps; others bought ration cards from refugees heading for the city (Hyndman 2000).

It has been suggested, that given their size, population, permanence and other features, camps like the Dadaab group (Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley) might better be thought of as cities than camps (Pérouse de Montclos and Kagwanja 2000). Of particular relevance to this paper, Horst’s (2006) critique of the common depiction of refugee camps as isolated places highlights the connections between Somali refugees in Dadaab and relatives elsewhere in the Horn of Africa and beyond. She found that a minority – she estimates roughly 15 per cent – of refugees received regular remittances which, given the meagre international aid and limited local income opportunities, greatly affected their lives and the wider economy of the refugee camps.

However, despite the government’s attempts to contain them in remote regions, many refugees end up in Nairobi and other towns or cities. A minority of those Somalis 5 Milner (2005) suggests that a combination of factors contributed to this shift in policy in the early 1990s, including the large numbers and protracted nature of the Somali refugee situation; weakened government capacity in Kenya due to the suspension of international aid in 1991 (based on donor concerns regarding human rights and democracy); the failure of humanitarian aid to keep up with the needs of the refugees; the history of _shifta_ wars and an attempted coup against President Moi in 1982; and security concerns over the alleged Somali involvement in small arms proliferation and the 1998 US Nairobi Embassy attack.
6 The latter two groups are eligible for assistance from UNHCR during their stay in the city.
7 Jesuit Refugee Service briefing, Nairobi, 23 April 2007, _Kenya: border remains closed to asylum_ _seekers_ . See also UNHCR press release, Geneva, 3 January 2007, _UNHCR calls on Kenya to halt_ _Somali returns._ 3

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arriving in the 1990s had the wherewithal to set up home in Nairobi or Mombasa, or stayed with relatives, and never declared themselves to UNHCR (Farah 1996; Goldsmith 1997). When the Mombasa camps closed in the mid-1990s, many refugees took themselves to Nairobi instead, relocating to other camps or voluntarily repatriating to Somalia. Some refugees from Dadaab and Kakuma also moved to Nairobi. The numbers of displaced Somali people living informally in urban areas are obviously uncertain – estimates in the mid 1990s ranged up to 100,000 (Hyndman 2000; Moret _et al._ 2005; USCR 1997). In general much less is known about the situation of urban refugees, possibly because they can be harder to locate (compared with the ‘captive population’ in the camps), and are generally not entitled to assistance, and also because the containment policy encouraged politicians to play down the existence of refugees in urban areas (Campbell 2005).

Most of these people have ended up in Nairobi’s Eastleigh district. Located to the far east of the Central Business District, Eastleigh used to be a lower middle class suburb (Goldsmith 1997; Sirola 2001). Eastleigh was formerly a predominantly Asian residential estate, with some shops and businesses, then over the years Kenyan Kikuyu landlords began to buy up property there. There was a small Somali community prior to the civil war - some of the Kenyan Somali shopkeepers in Eastleigh grew up on the estate. The precise population size is unknown: some hazard guesses of 300,000-500,000. Some have suggested that there may be as many at 60,000 displaced Somali people living informally in Nairobi, mainly in Eastleigh (African Population and Health Research Center 2002; Campbell 2005; Moret _et al._ 2005).

Since 1990, Eastleigh has developed dramatically, shaped by its growing population – rural Kenyans, Sudanese, Eritreans, Ethiopians, but above all, in the largest numbers, Somalis. Their presence is closely linked with four key areas of change during the 1990s and since: business activity, housing and public infrastructure, crime, and social relations.

Since 1991, Eastleigh has become a major business and shopping district in Nairobi.
Businesspeople, including incoming refugees, invested in import and export businesses, retail outlets (from small-scale hawking and street stalls to large shopping malls), chemists, property letting and real estate development, hotels, lodges, _miraa_ (khat / _qaad_ ) outlets, cafés and restaurants, long-distance transport companies and taxi-drivers, phone and internet bureaux, and international money transfer and exchange services. The shopping area attracts customers from all over Nairobi and further afield. According to one commentator, “Eastleigh is ‘openly informal’, neither hidden from authorities nor entirely consistent with an official, public place of business. At the same time it is integral to the service economy of Nairobi and its 2.5+ million residents.” (Little 2003: 164) A second key change in Eastleigh in the 1990s was the effect of the influx of refugees in the local property and housing market. Increased demand from Somalis, as Eastleigh became known as a Somali enclave, raised the cost of accommodation: the rent for single rooms after the influx in the early 1990s was five or more times the previous levels, pushing many Kenyans tenants out into other areas of Eastlands, while the refugees often lived in over-crowded conditions, sharing and sub-letting (Goldsmith 1997; Sirola 2001; Campbell 2005; Hyndman 2000).

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Commercial development, particularly in the district known as Section Two, also accelerated, pushing up the price of land for redevelopment as shopping malls. The centrepieces of Eastleigh’s commercial development are its large shopping malls, such as Garissa Lodge and Amal Plaza. The largely unregulated expansion of business and the increasingly overcrowded population long outpaced repairs and improvements to public infrastructure. Drains, sewers and rubbish collection are very visibly inadequate. Roads are in a dilapidated condition, with deep mud during the rainy season and rising dust when it is dry.

Third, Eastleigh became strongly associated with crime, which has been on the rise in the wider area of Eastlands, and in Nairobi in general, often associated with the increased hardship created by structural adjustment (Anderson 2002). Muggings and street thefts of mobile phones and cash are common, and _matatus_ (buses) to Eastleigh are held up and robbed fairly frequently, particularly at night. Refugees in particular have suffered from police harassment. Some Somali refugees had obtained a Kenyan or Alien ID card through various means, but the majority just had their UNHCR letter saying that they are a _prima facie_ refugee, which was of little use due to their ambiguous politico-legal situation outside the camps (Hyndman 2000; Verdirame 1999). Threatened with arrest for being in Kenya illegally, many Somalis would pay bribes to be released. According to the refugees, such extortion has varied over time, reportedly reaching particular heights of openness and impunity in 2001-2002. Many people remain cautious, sticking to their area, not venturing into town or out at night. [8] The last of the changes in Eastleigh explored here is the effect on social relations of the arrival of the new Somalis. Somali Kenyan families were an important source of assistance for their close relatives and clanspeople (Goldsmith 1997; Horst 2006).
Although there are some tensions between people of different clans, some more generalized solidarity is derived from being Somali and Muslim in Kenya.

For their part, Kenyans in Eastleigh generally appear to have come to terms with the obvious fact that ‘Somalis are our neighbours’. Kenyans, Somalis and other refugee nationalities share washing lines and cramped stairways, their children go to school together; they truck and barter (Goldsmith 1997; Campbell 2005). However, when times are tough, the history of rebel activities in the NEP, Somalia’s present disarray and the large numbers of refugees in the capital, make Somali nationals a convenient ideal scapegoat for urban ills (Gimode 2001; Verdirame 1999).

**Remittance traffic and livelihood strategies in Eastleigh**

Livelihoods are conventionally defined as the capabilities, assets (natural, physical, human, social and financial capital) and activities required for a means of living (DFID 1999; Jacobsen 2006). Several types of livelihoods were evident among Somali refugees in Eastleigh. The most obvious strategies were running small businesses or working in local businesses and homes. [9] _Prima facie_ refugees were considered irregular migrants in the city and were largely confined to working in the 8 It is still early days to tell how much the new Refugee Act will affect this.
9 Wages vary: in 2005 _matatu_ drivers were earning around KSh600 per day, and touts half this; cyber café assistants might earn KSh6,000 a month; shop assistants KSh4,000-5,000. Those working in Somali homes may be casual domestic workers, or younger female relatives who are given bed and board but may not be paid for their work.

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informal economy, although some businesses already gradually began to move into the formal economy, by registering with the relevant authorities and paying taxes.

Outside the camps, a minority of refugees - only those in the city formally for health or security reasons - receive on-going assistance from UNHCR. Less obvious livelihood strategies involved people mobilizing social capital to meet their needs.
Receiving overseas remittances are a clear example of people using their social capital to obtain financial capital, but there are other examples of people drawing on social capital, with some people being taken in or provided for by better-off families or assisted by the Mosque or other charitable contributions. Of course, some people use more than one of these livelihood strategies at once, or use different strategies over time.

Although some people never received remittances, many of the refugees in Eastleigh have had the experience at some point of receiving some money from relatives overseas. Recipients are demographically mixed and, like many refugees gravitating towards urban areas in Africa, often lived relatively comfortable urban lives before their displacement (Jacobsen 2005). The assistance commonly came from husbands, siblings and adult children – although other relatives also remit – living mainly in Europe and North America, and in some instances, the Middle East, South Africa or elsewhere. There were varying patterns of remittance traffic into Eastleigh. Some recipients get a set sum of money on a regular, usually monthly basis, commonly $150-$250 per month. [10] Others receive variable amounts on an ad-hoc basis. It follows that the role of remittances in recipients’ livelihoods varies considerably. The examples of Rhoda, Abdi, Abdiwali and Mahamoud help illustrate this. [11] Rhoda is a mother of seven in her early forties. When the war broke out in the Central Region, the family businesses and home were looted. The militia killed her father and two brothers. She fled with her husband, children, mother and three sisters to Mogadishu, then Kismayo, then Liboye refugee camp in Kenya. In 1992, some relatives overseas sent $1,000 and she and her husband, children and two sisters moved to Nairobi. But after their money ran out, they went to Thika camp, then the Mombasa camps, where their home was set on fire three times. They received little international aid, so she began selling charcoal and food stuffs.

When the camps closed they were relocated to Kakuma, where life was really tough: there were more fires, plus it was dangerous as there were armed men and killings, and there was less water. A relative there arranged for Rhoda’s husband to go to Canada on a spouse’s visa, as the relative’s husband. As soon as he arrived in Canada, he and his relatives sent $500 to Rhoda to move the family to Nairobi - they were worried about the risks in the refugee camp for a woman and children alone. He found work immediately and now he sends to her $350 each month, $200 for living expenses and school fees at the beginning of the month and $150 for the rent later on.
In addition to her seven, she looks after two of her sisters’ children. Her husband cannot send more as his job does not pay very well, but according to Rhoda, ‘he’s 10 Sometimes the money for one month is sent in two instalments, either to help the recipient to budget or because this suits the sender.
11 Please note that all names have been changed and some details have been altered to preserve interviewees’ anonymity.

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very good, he’s someone who is dedicated, he’s stable, he’s a father... Life could be much worse.’ It remains uncertain how, indeed if, the family will be reunited.

Abdi, who was born in Mogadishu is now a successful wholesaler. He was born in the early 1980s, his father worked in the military and his mother used to sell groceries in a small shop. When the war broke out his father was killed and the fighting was very violent so his mother sent him to Ethiopia with some friends. He went to Kenya in 1994 and made great efforts to locate his dispersed relatives, travelling to the various refugee camps, sending messages through personal contacts and the BBC Somali Service programme, _Baafin_ . He finally located, though a _xawilaad_ (money transfer) agent, an uncle and sister in Norway and two cousins in the UK: ‘I got the contact telephone numbers... They were very shaken... it was a giant cry, when they found me they were very happy and they sent me an express money of happiness.’ That sum allowed him to leave Kakuma and go to Eastleigh, where he earned his living by hawking dead stock that large stores needed to shift. He bought the stock at cost price and retained any profit.

A year later, once he had proved that he was working hard, his uncle and sister decided to send a substantial sum. He received around $2,400 in instalments over the course of two years. He developed a wholesale business, sourcing goods from the Middle East, Asia and the Far East and supplying stores in Eastleigh. His relatives sometimes ask him for particular items, usually traditional crafts or gold, so he often sends goods when people he knows travel to Europe. His relatives there support his mother in Somalia, but he sometimes also helps out.

Abdiwali, a former teacher, lived in the camps for many years before coming to Nairobi. With his monthly income of KSh 8,000 (about $105) [12], he could not afford to bring his wife and six children to join him, so they remain in Dadaab. He tries to send around $25 a month to his wife to supplement their rations and her KSh 3,000 teacher’s incentive. He also tries to bring money, clothes and other items that they need when he goes back to the camps. Very occasionally, he or his wife receive some money from relatives overseas. He found that “if I have a problem today, for example road accident or maybe I’m arrested, then people will contribute money to solve my problems...Not only in Nairobi. These people will communicate to those who are outside, they will say this person has that problem, he’s admitted to hospital, he’s [in] a very serious condition. Then they collect money... The first people who will support me is my sub-clan in Nairobi. Then if they are not able to solve at home, then they contribute outside...” Mahamoud is a shopkeeper in Eastleigh with a young family. He was born in the late 1970s in Beled Weyne. The family was comfortably off and after the war broke out he ran a café with his mother and brothers. His uncle was by that time living in Nairobi, but maintained close contact with Mahamoud’s mother, via the _taar._ She told him how badly things were going in Somalia.

The uncle paid for Mahamoud and his younger brother to come to live with him in Eastleigh. Mahamoud was happy to go, as he wanted to help his mother and ‘take some of the load’. At that time his uncle was doing well; he had a retail business and was receiving assistance from relatives abroad, but in the mid-1990s this assistance 12 Exchange rate: 0.01322 US$ to 1 KSh (1 March 2005) 7


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dried up and the business was deteriorating. Mahamoud and his brother turned the business around and he is now pretty comfortably off, although he does not receive any remittances. He is able to send $50-$100 to his mother and brothers in Beled Weyne whenever business is bad or a relative falls sick.

These cases exemplify four key points. First, for people like Rhoda, receiving remittances is their primary or only livelihood strategy. For example, Saad, a former civil servant, received $250 from his sons and daughters in the United States each month to look after his wife and other children while he waited to be resettled in the US. These were regular stipends to cover living expenses. Within family groups it is not unexpected that some members rely on others to provide for them. Most regular stipends come from close relatives, reflecting a traditional relationship of support, for example, husbands supporting wives and children, or adult children supporting elderly parents. Thus, often emigration and remitting can be seen as the main livelihood strategy for the family unit in question. [13] Second, for other recipients, remittances are combined with other livelihood strategies. As Abdiwali’s case illustrated, some refugees solicit remittances in response to particular crises, for example, to help pay living expenses when other livelihood strategies collapsed, or to address health or legal crises. Other people have jobs or ran their own business, but also received remittances, or another member of the family did.

For example, Hussein, a father of ten, worked in the mornings in a friend’s shop for KSh100-300 each day, but his family’s main source of income was the $300 per month that they received in remittances. However, in general it was not common for people with regular income to receive regular remittances as well: even if they had relatives overseas, funds would be directed to more needy family members.

Hashi, a scholarship student in his twenties, had a sister in Canada, three aunts and three uncles in the US, an uncle in the UK, and many cousins abroad, but explained that he did not receive any regular support. “It’s nonsense to support someone who can support himself so I wasn’t really getting regular money... But... if I ask them, if I tell them there is this or that issue, in that case they send... I said that I wanted to start a course, in that case I asked. Such cases... You don’t need from them regularly... So when you need support they will support you very happily.” In other instances remittances were not expected to fulfil any narrowly economic function, but rather were gifts, either sent on a special occasion (for example, Ramadan, a wedding or a birth), or as a spontaneous act of kindness.

Third, remittances were also often triggered to finance a particular livelihood-related project. The major example here was when people ask for money to establish a business. Some of the more wealthy Somalis arrived in Eastleigh with cash in hand or saved in foreign bank accounts and made investments. But most people lost assets in the civil war – homes and their contents, land and crops, businesses, money in accounts (when the banking system collapsed), cash (robbed or used up in the course of displacement), and gold (sold by women to raise funds). Moreover, in the camps they were deprived of gainful employment and in Eastleigh informal sector wages 13 This is commonly the perspective brought to bear in labour migration contexts, although here too, the sedentarist bias of development studies can tend to obscure this (Bakewell 2007).

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were usually low. It was hard to save up money to invest. Thus loans or gifts from local and overseas relatives are a key part of the history of many of the businesses in Eastleigh.

Abdi’s case illustrates several points regarding diaspora support for businesses in Eastleigh. There is often more than one ‘investor’, and the group may include local as well as overseas relatives. Remittances for investment are usually sent in instalments and distinguished from regular subsistence transfers. People do not usually ‘save up’ remittances. A hard-working independent reputation helps to mobilize contributions as two businessmen explained: You know... people [are] going out [to other countries], maybe I’m going there and I meet his relative [points to his friend], and they say, what’s he doing that guy, and I say, he’s a good man, he’s working, so they will be happy. Even the people outside is looking for information... so they trying to add some money to establish him....
They like the person who normally works, they don’t like somebody they are giving _biil_ [14] ... _Friend:_ Endless _biil_ ! _Interviewee:_ Yeah, endless. So they like somebody who’s working. So they normally look in the family, who is very active. And they pick up the person who is very active who can generate a business and then they give some money.

Like I tell them I want to start a business, I ask them for support...
Now, the relatives over there will consult each other and contribute some money, each one some amount... Maybe you are sent about $2,000, $3,000, you start the business. If you are seen to be hardworking, they might even send you more.

As these speakers hint, starting a business is seen by those overseas as an alternative to sending regular remittances, a way to help people provide for themselves and, quite possibly, as time goes on, help out other family members too. Hashi explained: One thing that is becoming quite common these days is that relatives instead of sending you regular money decide to engage you in an activity. They get together some resources and they ask if there is anything you can do, if you can do tailoring, anything, work in a shop. Once they see what you can do, they’ll send you a good amount to start that business... So we’ve moving away from this dependency, it’s not really going to be around much longer...

Last but not least, despite this expectation, many business attempts – diaspora-backed and otherwise - flounder, leading to relapsed reliance on remittances, other family assistance, or aid. Alternatively, the business may not be successful immediately, and they may continue to call on support from overseas to supplement their earnings.
Much depends on the resources available to invest, the economic viability of the activity, entrepreneurial skill and luck, and the personal and clan connections of the individual.

14 _Biil_ is a catch-all term for living expenses, which is often used as a term for a regular remittance.

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Thus, incoming remittances may be a primary or supplementary livelihood strategy, and they may be used to deal with particular crises or to fund specific projects. But the fourth key point illustrated by the cases above is that there is also _outgoing_ remittance traffic: a minority of Somalis in Eastleigh also send money to Somalia and to the refugee camps. While smaller than international flows, regional remittances are important, particularly for the turbulent southern Somali region, which still has a substantial regional refugee diaspora. Some people remit out of their wages, or business income, like Mohamed, Abdiwali and Abdi. Other people receive money from relatives overseas or from other household members and send it on to relatives in the camps or in Somalia. For example, Saad, who relied on regular remittances from his children in the US, would send around $100 every two to four months to his parents and siblings who are nomads in Sanaag. Maryan, a housewife, explained that sometimes her husband, an import-export trader, gives her $50 to send to her mother in Kismayo and she tries to send perfume or clothes whenever someone she knows goes there.

Before turning to the issue of mobility patterns, it is important to mention that some interviewees felt that relying mainly on remittances was negative, for example: ‘it takes away the feeling of... the need to be self-sufficient. It takes away your pride to be dependent on someone abroad for all your needs.’ But it is also important to remember, as illustrated above, that in many cases remitting occurred between close family members where co-reliance was seen as entirely normal – and to bear in mind that the strong Somali tradition of mutual support in extended families and clans means that a wider circle of relatives may be reasonably called on for assistance than in many other contexts.

Besides, what constitutes ‘normal’ relationships and patterns of economic reliance is affected by protracted exile, the fluid and unpredictable patterns of refugee resettlement and the fact that many people working overseas are able quite easily to send what are substantial amounts by Nairobi standards. Moreover, many recipients found it hard to see alternatives, given the policy of containing refugees and giving them such limited economic rights. Finally, people often saw their reliance as a temporary phase, explaining that the remittances were to tide them over while finding work; that they were being supporting while studying; or that they were waiting to emigrate.

**Remittances and mobility patterns**

Beyond shaping people’s livelihoods in Eastleigh, remittances often intertwine with mobility to and from Nairobi, as the cases above illustrated. Interviewees’ decisions to leave Somalia were commonly prompted by the killing of relatives, often parents or siblings, in the early 1990s. During displacement, families were often split up, with parents allocating children to the care of relatives, particularly their siblings, aunts and uncles, where this seemed best for their security and welfare. This is quite common in Somali culture, but in the process of displacement the shuttling of people between households (in Somalia, in the refugee camps, and in urban areas) became a more urgent and frequent strategy for survival.

This regional mobility is often facilitated by someone sending money from abroad.
People still leave Somalia, largely in response to the insecurity in the south. Leaving 10


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overland is hazardous and where possible people prefer to travel on _qaad_ or commercial flights, in which case the flight and necessary documents have to be paid for. People also have good reasons for wanting to leave the refugee camps for Nairobi: to avoid the harsh conditions (heat, scarce rations, recurrent sickness among their children, risk of rape and violence); to access better educational opportunities and health facilities; to find work and build a different future for themselves and their families; and to get in contact with relatives abroad with a view to resettlement.
Travelling from the camps to Nairobi can be a costly and risky trip for those without proper documents. As there is the risk of ambush and attack by bandits, most refugees prefer to travel by the main road, but are frequently subjected en route to police detention and extortion or return to the camps, incurring extra costs that sometimes trigger requests to relatives overseas for assistance.

Once in Nairobi, it can take a while to start earning your living: in the interim, relatives often help out – those overseas with cash and those locally by providing somewhere to stay, food and sometimes work. There is a group of people whose presence in Eastleigh is contingent on receiving remittances, otherwise they could not afford to live there and would have to return to the camps. Thus, Rhoda moved to the city with money from her husband overseas, motivated by a mixture of health and security concerns. Conversely, some come to Nairobi intending to contact relatives overseas in order to secure assistance – as telephone, internet and money transfer services are more widely available in the city, at competitive rates.

Moreover, households receiving remittances are often less likely to fragment, with parents able to provide for all their children rather than sending them away to relatives, and able to expand, by taking in relatives, from the camps, and from Somalia, particularly siblings or their children, and often subletting rooms to others.
In a fluid and sometimes hazardous economic setting, such solidarity is an important cultural and economic asset.

The second key point is that remittances also intertwine with mobility beyond the region. Many people come to Nairobi to try to arrange resettlement in the West, often with the heartfelt wish to be reunited with much-missed children, husbands and wives, and parents resettled overseas. The circumscribed legal and economic existence of Somali refugees in Kenya is another major motivation: Many people were supposed to make money here, but the government... Even me myself, if I get a permit to stay in Nairobi...
then I can make money, I can try to sustain my own life... [but] there is no way... my last incentive was $50 per month... When I was _teaching_ ... Not enough for myself alone, not enough for the family.

I would love to export myself! Otherwise, you know the suffering here. You can’t find jobs, you can’t find any other opportunities...
personally, the only thing I can do is... community service. But that will not pay me much to take care of the family. It is difficult.

While idealized images of the West certainly abound, the basic material inequalities are staggering and undeniable. Indeed, remittances seem to have a potent ‘demonstration effect’ for the benefits of migration: 11


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Once they are here, they are not very useful, they are not very productive, they’re just consumers, because there’s no source of employment, there’s no way they can find money, so they have to ask for money every time... So, it is better for us to go to the countries where there are opportunities, the greener grasses, so we eat that grass and send some of it to our relatives back home!

There are three main channels of onward migration to the West. First, there is family reunion or sponsorship. Conditions for family reunion vary across countries, but it is generally an option for spouses and children under 21, but often requires a financial guarantee of some kind. The second channel is through official resettlement programmes aimed at resettling individuals or groups deemed to face particular persecution. There were around 4,000 refugees resettled through UNHCR in 2006 (UNHCR 2007).

Third, there are other channels often termed ‘irregular’, sometimes piggy-backing on elements of the two ‘official’ methods outlined above, sometimes involving brokers ( _mukhalis_ ). Sperl (2001) points out that originally UNHCR used ‘irregular’ only to describe unlawful methods of entry, but the term ‘irregular mover’, carrying pejorative overtones, is increasingly applied to all refugees leaving a first country of asylum. He challenges this: ‘What is “irregular” about people who seek to leave an often de facto hopeless situation in a camp or a slum, in order to seek a better future through education, employment or resettlement?’ (Sperl 2001: 26).

Although viewed by governments as illegal, ‘irregular’ migration has a rather everyday quality when viewed from the streets of Eastleigh. Against the background of the constraints of life as refugees in Kenya, arranging to be smuggled to a richer country is seen by those involved as entirely acceptable behaviour. In contrast, going abroad and earning a good living but failing to help relatives back in Kenya or Somalia is seen as unacceptable behaviour. According to UNHCR, ‘irregular secondary movement... may... be a symptom of protracted hopelessness among longstanding refugee populations,’ (UNHCR 2004: 5). Put another way, this onward movement can be part of a quest for self-reliance and rights.

The diaspora often plays a key role in facilitating and financing resettlement in the West. First, they provide information, are sometimes able to request reunion, and deal with paperwork or other arrangements from abroad, and assist on arrival. Second, they often meet the costs of emigration, which can range from nil – on some resettlement programmes - to around $5,000+ for alternative arrangements. In both official and informal emigration arrangements, Nairobi is a key location –where people can meet, make arrangements through social networks, access brokers, and attend interviews at the UNHCR and the Joint Voluntary Agency (JVA) which resettles refugees in the US. A third common element is to send money so that relatives can come and stay in Nairobi while making their arrangements.

Yet while many people come to Eastleigh with _buufis_ (longing for resettlement, explored in detail by Horst 2006), those doing successful business are less likely to be affected. Moreover, many people come to Nairobi to arrange resettlement, but months gradually turn into years.

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For example, Fadumo, a young woman originally from the north east of Somalia, now has a business in a market in Eastleigh. When the civil war broke out and the relatives she was living with fled, she was forced into a marriage at a young age for protection. Later her husband subsequently left for Europe and cut off contact with her and her first child. An aunt helped her to come to Nairobi, so that she could be resettled in the US with the aunt’s family. But she was rejected during the screening process and was left high and dry in Eastleigh with her daughter, with no resources and few contacts. She made friends with women working in the market and began selling clothes for them on credit to other women she knew, gradually building up the funds for her own business. She keeps in touch with her parents, who are pastoralists, via the _taar_ (radio operator), and every four months or so, when she is able, she sends them $50 or $100. She is not a registered refugee and has no prospects of resettlement.

**Repercussions in the wider urban economy**

Beyond the direct effects on those receiving remittances and their immediate families, which was the main focus of the fieldwork, remittances have some indirect effects in the wider urban economy, in terms of social differentiation and economic activity.

First, remittances can affect relative socio-economic statuses. The task of assessing the impact of remittances on social differentiation in Eastleigh is particularly complex both because the Somali refugee presence is relatively new and transient, and for some their presence in Eastleigh is entirely contingent on remittances. Moreover, their fortunes are likely to be particularly fluid compared with a more established population. The socio-economic status of individual refugees has anyway changed dramatically since 1991 as many were dispossessed of assets in Somalia, and, in the words of one interviewee: ‘Up till now, we have not regained the life we had in Somalia.’ Thus, both the reference group and the baseline for comparison are unclear.

However, on the whole, refugees in Nairobi are more likely to be from urban than rural backgrounds, and those benefiting from remittances mainly come from originally comfortable families able to finance long-distance emigration of a close relative to the West. People who receive regular remittances, although often living frugally, are visibly more comfortable than those eking out a living at the harder end of the informal economy. According to one resident: “You see a difference between those who receive remittances and those who do not – even in simple terms, those who receive usually dress better. They can afford to send their children to good schools. Other people live in much more critical situations.” While it is a place of both deprivation and entrepreneurial wealth, Eastleigh is a long way from being the poorest district in Nairobi, and there are other parts of Eastlands and the slum settlements where people live much harder lives. Remittances undoubtedly make a difference by providing for a number of families who might otherwise be competing for low-wage jobs in the informal economy. Moreover, the benefits of receiving remittances are to a degree re-circulated through local family and social family networks, building the social capital of recipients.

A second wider repercussion of remittances involves the effects of the spending and investment of this money by recipients in the local economy. In contrast with the 13


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outward-bound traffic of remittances by Kenyan city residents to rural relatives and investment in their rural homes, Somali remittances are largely in-bound traffic.
Money transfer operators usually pay remittances and trade transfers out to recipients in hard currency, which is then converted into Kenyan Shillings. They are spent in the city economy, indeed mainly in Eastleigh as many refugees tend to avoid going into town, contributing to high levels of local demand for goods and services, fuelling business expansion on a considerable scale.

Many of the businesses meeting this demand are Somali businesses, initiated with the help of relatives overseas. By 2005, a total of 2,800 business people, mainly Somalis, were registered with Eastleigh Business Community (EBC), which was established in 1999. Eastleigh is increasingly attracting customers from all over Nairobi, and becoming an important part of the wider city economy.

More specifically, there is a thriving business in providing services specifically of use to Somali and other refugees, including money transfer and exchange, travel agencies, telephone and internet bureaux, language schools, many of which are meeting a primarily remittance-driven demand. Money transfer is the most obvious example: there are numerous money transfer operators, popularly known as _xawilaad_ in Eastleigh.

In Kenya, officially only banks or money transfer operators in partnership with banks are licensed to transfer money. Western Union offices are everywhere, but it has made little headway with the Somali refugees who tend to use Somali operators, some of whom have forex licences and others operate entirely in the informal market. [15] Money exchange is also in great demand in Eastleigh, in part because many remittances are collected in dollars and may then be exchanged into Kenyan Shillings.
There is a large informal market with numerous small-scale operators.

Another example of making business out of recipients is language schools. For example, Yusuf came to Kenya as a boy and grew up in the camps. He then came to Eastleigh and borrowed money from relatives living locally to establish one of the district’s many one-room private schools for adults. By the third month he had 50 students, learning English, Arabic, and Maths while trying to arrange onward migration to the West or the Middle East. He had also begun to repay his relatives: ‘So life’s not now bad, it’s moving. To me, I get no other help from like, UK or from America, but I get indirectly because the students I have at school, they get assistance from their relatives in the UK, Europe or America or elsewhere.’

**Conclusions**

Many people displaced from Somalia and living a protracted exile in Kenya have selfsettled in Nairobi’s Eastleigh district, defying the Kenyan government’s attempts to contain the refugee population in remote areas, not content to wait for elusive durable solutions. The newcomers have had a significant impact on the urban landscape and social and economic relations in Eastleigh.

15 Consultations with businesspeople and international agencies (February 2005) and
[www.centralbank.go.ke](http://www.centralbank.go.ke/) 14


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While Nairobi is a distant outpost from the regions of the Horn of Africa that they have historically occupied, it has become a crossroads for displaced people from Somalia. It is an important hub in Somalis’ increasingly global information, trade, finance and family networks. For many, Eastleigh is a staging post to an uncertain future. It is a place where, by connecting into wider social networks, opportunities might arise. A minority, it seems – and generally people with secure status in Kenya or business interests - actually make a conscious decision to settle there. For many, though, a few months turn into a few years, passing the time working, strategizing, or simply waiting.

While many of the uses of remittances in this context were similar to those in the countries of origin, remittances were also used by people to deal with the specific problems of protracted and unresolved displacement. For example, people are moving from Somalia and the camps to Nairobi, often with the help of funds from relatives in the region or overseas. Women with children sometimes receive money from relatives overseas to relocate from the camps to the city because of fears for their safety.

Once in Nairobi, some people’s living expenses are covered by people overseas. By investing larger remittances in businesses, some refugees are able to provide for themselves and often subsequently assist others locally, in the camps or in Somalia.
But interviewees’ investment of remittances was limited to the informal sector and constrained by their ambiguous politico-legal status in Nairobi. Sometimes people requested money to secure release from police detention. Remittances and other forms of diaspora support are also intertwined with patterns of onward movement whereby refugees seek a new life overseas.

All this has consequences in terms of reducing reliance on international aid in the refugee camps. An unknown number of displaced people from Somalia never registered with UNHCR sometimes because they received diaspora assistance and were able to stay in the city. Receiving remittances allowed many people to leave the camps. It is well-known that those leaving the camps routinely give their cards to another family, so that they can benefit from the rations, before the card is eventually cancelled (Hyndman 2000; Kibreab 2004). It seems likely that a portion of Eastleigh’s refugee population would have to return to the camps if they did not receive remittances to cover their living expenses. Thus, remittances in many cases partially or fully release refugees from the aid relationship.

Yet there is a strong sense of contingency about remittances as a livelihood strategy among recipients in Eastleigh. They tended to be incorporated into the remittance process in a secondary or supplementary role. A minority of Somali people in Eastleigh - often those occupied in successful trading activities or those who themselves receive remittances – send remittances to Somalia or to the refugee camps.
But they are less often able to completely cover the recipients’ needs, and if there are relatives _dibadaha_ (outside), these are usually the main port of call for assistance.

Turning to recipients in Eastleigh, if there are other relatives in serious need in Somalia, then their needs may be prioritised. Most regular recipients in Eastleigh did not expect to continue to receive remittances in the long term. Even people relying on remittances as a primary source of income, whose sender had a strong social responsibility to support them, usually had a plan to emigrate, or find a job, or start a 15


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business. Few people saw their current situation – in Eastleigh, relying on remittances

- as a feasible long-term status quo.

While undoubtedly greatly ameliorating the living conditions of many refugees, the extent to which remittances, in this context, are generating sustainable livelihoods is in doubt. The general view is that ‘a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capability and assets both now and in the future’ (DFID 1999: 1). Although remittances clearly responded to crises experienced by recipients in many instances, often the transfers left people no more capable of dealing with future crises themselves than they were before. The major exception was when remittances were invested in providing an independent livelihood, by establishing a business.

There is a growing recognition of the role played by resettled refugees and labour migrants in the welfare of refugees affected by protracted displacement (Jacobsen 2006; Sperl 2001; UNHCR 2006; Van Hear 2003). Van Hear asks whether ‘...transnationalism may in itself be a “durable solution” for conditions of displacement – or at least an “enduring” solution. This might mean considering the encouragement or promotion of transnationalism,’ (Van Hear 2003:15). According to UNHCR’s 2006 report _The State of the World’s Refugees_, UNHCR has been considering the possibility of encouraging migration for work as a means for refugees to provide for themselves.

It is important to underline, as Van Hear does, that refugees engaging in transnational activities have not necessarily found a ‘durable solution’ to their original displacement. For example, a Somali man working in the Gulf, with a permit to work as a labourer may send money back to help maintain his family who are _prima facie_ refugees in Kenya.

While this can certainly improve the welfare of the recipients, and the arrangement may indeed be ‘enduring’, it is clear this is not a solution to their legal predicament in the way that repatriation, local integration or resettlement in a third country can be.
Neither party has regained in their countries of residence the rights denied them in their country of origin. Indeed, the remittance economy is in some respects maintained by immigration and asylum restrictions that can separate close family members.

Moreover, in contexts of protracted and unresolved displacement, it is hard for refugees to maximize the potential value of any remittance funds that they receive.
Furthermore, the capacity of resettled refugees and labour migrants to offer support to family back home may be greatly limited (Lindley 2007b; Riak Akuei 2005). In sum, while remittances are an important aspect of refugees’ livelihoods, it is critical that we continue to campaign for better legal security and recognition of the rights of displaced people in Kenya and elsewhere.

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