Court,Case Title,Case Number,Judgment Date,Judges,Acts Cited,Sections Cited,Legal Topics,Outcome,Fact/ Petitioner,Fact/ Respondent,Issues,Petitioner Argument,Respondent Argument,Factors to be Considered,Decision,Citation link/citation number/Drive link,Ground (Primary),All Grounds,Judgment Year,Relief Status,Marriage Dissolved,Legal Era,Substantive Adjudication,Equivalent Citations,Kanoon Doc ID,Canonical Source URL,Chunks Indexed
Bombay High Court,"Mrs. Pragati Varghese And Etc. vs Cyril George Varghese And Etc. on 6 May, 1997",AIR1997BOM349,1997-05-06,"ORDER    Agarwal, J., Present suits were filed on the original side of this Court and came up for hearing before the learned single Judge Mrs K. K. Baam, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 1, Section 10, Section 112, Section 125, Section 13, Section 16, Section 17, Section 22, Section 3, Section 377, Section 488, Section 498, Section 7",Constitutional Validity; Adultery; Desertion; Cruelty; Wife Specific,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Agarwal, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"17. After independence, in 1955, the issue whether the statute of sovereign Republic could be made subordinate to the laws of a foreign power, was examined by the Madras High Court in the case of, "" George Swamidoss Joseph v. Miss . Harriet Sundari Edward', (FB). The Court held to the following effect: 11. .. ... Time has also come for a reappraisal and reconsideration of the other anachronistic incongruities fundamental and discriminatory in nature manifest not only in procedure but in substantial core provisions of such Act. The fact whether wife should be discriminated against in the matter of getting relief, only on the ground of sex, has been seriously called into question not only in the arena of family laws but in other spheres as well concerning avocation of life. The highest Court of the land has already raised and considered such questions in the backdrop of protection...","41. In the light of our findings that the impugned provisions are violative of the provisions in Arts. 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India, normally the above provisions as a whole are liable to be declared as null and void in terms of Art. 13 of the Constitution of India. However, as contended by the petitioners, a declaration to that effect and striking down of the entire provisions will really go against the interest of the petitioners and other similarly situated Christian wives inasmuch as they are provisions providing grounds for dissolution however harsh and unreasonable they may be. To avoid such a result, the learned counsel for the petitioner as already indicated has prayed that the offending portions of the impugned provisions alone be declared severable and liable to be struck down as ultra vires leaving, the remaining portion as a valid provision allowing dissolution of marriage on grounds of adultery, desertion and cruelty. In this connection, strong reliance was placed on the decision in D. S. Nakara v. Union of India to contend that such...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. Present suits arc filed by Christian wives for dissolution of their marriages under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred as 'the Act'). Each of them impugn the vires of the provisions of Section 10 of the Act which provides for the grounds on which a husband and wife can sue for dissolution of marriage. It is contended that the provisions are archaic and adversely discriminate wives as against husbands merely on ground of sex and are, therefore, violative of article 15 of the Constitution. It is further contended that the aforesaid provisions adversely discriminate them vis-a-vis wives belonging to other communities. They are, therefore, denied equality before law and hence the provisions are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is also contended that the aforesaid provisions force them to continue to live with their husbands as wives even though they are subjected to cruelty or desertion. They are, therefore, deprived of their right to life and personal liberty thereby violating their dignity. The provisions, therefore, contravene Article 21 of the Constitution. 2. Plaintiffs have also impugned certain ancillary provisions of the Act namely Sections 17 and 20 of the Act which provide for a requirement of confirmation of decrees for dissolution of marriage or nullity of marriage, passed by District Judges, by the...","24. Learned counsel for the Central Government has however tried to support the constitutionality of the provision relying strongly upon the reasoning contained in Dwarke Das v. Nainan. . In that case Panchapakesa Iyyer, J. has held that ""since the husband even by committing' adultery,"" does not bear a child as a result of such adultery and make it child of his wife to be maintained by the wife,"" the wife by committing adultery ""may bear a child as a result of such adultery and 'the husband will have to treat it as his legitimate child and will be liable to maintain that child under S. 488 Criminal Procedure Code read with S. 112 of the Indian Evidence Act,'' and that ""this very ""difference in the result of the adultery may form some ground"" of justification for this differentiation."" We think that so long as the difference in the aftereffect of adultery committed by the husband and wife pointed out that the learned Judge as a justification for differential treatment is a difference solely resulting from sex, and that cannot...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1401518/ | AIR1997BOM349, 1997(4)BOMCR551, 1997BOMCR(CRI)~, (1997)3BOMLR333, II(1997)DMC407, 1997(3)MHLJ602",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; adultery; desertion; cruelty; wife_specific,1997,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1997BOM349, 1997(4)BOMCR551, 1997BOMCR(CRI)~, (1997)3BOMLR333, II(1997)DMC407, 1997(3)MHLJ602",1401518,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1401518/,33
Kerala High Court,"Ammini E.J. And Etc. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 24 February, 1995",oples Council for Social Justice,1995-02-24,"JUDGMENT   Ramakrishnan, J., Trivandrum, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 112, Section 13, Section 13B, Section 18, Section 2, Section 22, Section 27, Section 28, Section 32, Section 32A, Section 488",Constitutional Validity; Adultery; Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Ramakrishnan, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,32. The further question to be considered is if this be the direct and envitable consequence of the law governing dissolution among Christians governed by the Act whether such a provision will be valid in the light of Arts. 14 and21 of the Constitution of India.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The constitutional validity of Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (for short ""the Act"") which regulated divorce among Christians in India for a century and a quarter is directly under challenge in the two Original Petitions at the instance of two Christian women on the ground that the provisions in Section 10 are violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed to them and other similarly situated Christian women under Articles 14 , 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 2. Mary Sonia Zachariah, petitioner in O. P. No. 5805 of 1988 is a Syrian Christian governed by the Act. At the time of filing the O, P. she was aged 36 and was working as an Asst. Warden at Corpus Christi School, Kottayam. She was married to one P,C. Zachariah on 6-1-1972 at Emmanual Mar-thoma Church, Pazhanni, Thrissur according to the customary rites and ceremonies of the church. A daughter, Elizabeth Zachariah alias Kittu was born out of the said wedlock on 16-9-1974. On the basis of Exts. P3 and P 4 letters the petitioner has specifically pleaded that her husband has taken an irreversible decision to live with an English lady whom he met while in Nairobi where he was employed from 1977 onwards, deserting the petitioner and her child once and for all. Petitioner has...",The Original Petitions would stand allowed as indicated above.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1591531/ | AIR1995KER252, AIR 1995 KERALA 252, (1995) 1 KER LJ 624",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; adultery; desertion; cruelty,1995,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1995KER252, AIR 1995 KERALA 252, (1995) 1 KER LJ 624",1591531,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1591531/,23
Kerala High Court,"P.E. Mathew vs Union Of India (Uoi) on 3 May, 1999",operate with the fullest efficacy without any confir,1999-05-03,"JUDGMENT    Ar. Lakshmanan, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 0, Section 10, Section 17, Section 18, Section 20, Section 7, Section 8",Constitutional Validity,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Ar. Lakshmanan, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"Coming to Articles Hand 15(1) of the Constitution, the Bench has emphasized that both the Articles stress the equality before law. Article 14 confers the right upon every person whereas the right given under Article 15(1) is confined to the citizens of India. If there is any discrimination in law, then the law would not have an equal application to all persons, unless the discrimination can be justified on some reasonable basis or the distinction made has some reasonable relation to the subject of the legislation. Article 15(1) further emphasises the fact that any discrimination which is based only on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth can never be a reasonable discrimination. Referring to Article 44 , the Division Bench observed that the said Article recognises separate and distinctive personal laws because it lays down as a directive to be achieved that within a measurable...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. It is further submitted that a decree for dissolution of marriage among Hindus, Budhists, Sikhs and Jains under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , among the Parsis under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 and among the Muslims under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 are made by the District Courts and under the last mentioned Act even by Courts of lower rank and all such decrees operate with the fullest efficacy without any confirmation from the High Court. Section 17 of the Act only result in protracting and prolonging the litigation even where none of the parties is interested to have a further review or reconsideration of their case by any higher Court. 3. The Union of India filed a counter affidavit. According to them: (a) Article 44 of the Constitution itself recognises separate and distinctive Personal Laws; (b) What is contained in Section 17 of the Act is a special procedure in dealing with decree for dissolution of marriages among Christians and it cannot be said that the Legislature was discriminating against the Christians only on tfie ground of religion; (c) It is clearly for the Legislature to lay down its policies, State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali , AIR 1952 Bombay 84 : (1952 Cri LJ 354). (d) Section 17 of the Act...","1. These two Original Petitions raise the same question with regard to the validity of Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') which says that a decree for dissolution of marriage passed by a District Judge has to be confirmed by a three-Judge Bench of the High Court. According to the petitioners, this confirmation is required only for Christians and so it is discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Articles 13(1) , 14 , 15(1) and 21 of the Constitution of India. It is further submitted that since this section is to consistent with Part III of the Constitution, it violates Article 13(1) which says that all pre-Constitutional laws have to be consistent with Part III of the Constitution. The other grounds of attack are as under: (a) The section is applicable only to Christians and, therefore, it amounts to a discrimination based on religion and so is violative of Article 15(1) of the Constitution of India; (b) The Section is also violalive of Article 21 of the Constitution because even if the husband...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1353346/ | AIR1999KER345, AIR 1999 KERALA 345, ILR(KER) 1999 (2) KER 751, (1999) 1 KER LJ 824, (2000) 1 MARRILJ 246, (1999) 3 RECCIVR 463",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity,1999,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1999KER345, AIR 1999 KERALA 345, ILR(KER) 1999 (2) KER 751, (1999) 1 KER LJ 824, (2000) 1 MARRILJ 246, (1999) 3 RECCIVR 463",1353346,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1353346/,15
Gujarat High Court,"P.V. Josheph Christian vs Deenamma Josheph Christian on 30 October, 2002",No. 3 of 1997,2002-10-30,"JUDGMENT    J.N. Bhatt, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 14, Section 16, Section 17, Section 8",Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT J.N. Bhatt, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(1) Whether the plea and relevant claim for dissolution of marriage by the husband suffers from the vice of collusion or not? (2) Whether parties are professing or belonged to Christian religion or not? (3) Whether the valid factum of marriage, including the rites and custom with which the marriage between the spouses has been solemnized as per the personal law of Christianity or not? (4) Whether there is sufficient proof of alleged adultery is established as alleged or as per law or not? It may be noted at this stage before we consider the viva-voce evidence on record, coupled with documentary-testimonial collection, that the marriages are made in heaven, they are enjoyed on the earth and they are dissolved in the Court. It has been noticed that the marital bliss with which initially spouses enjoyed started becoming vulnerable, gradually, on passing of more and more time of matrimony and...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. A short, but interesting question which has been put in focus, for our consideration and adjudication in this reference, under Section 17 of the Divorce Act, 1869 (the Act) by the District Court, Ahmedabad Rural at Mirzapur Court, arising out of Civil Suit No. 3 of 1997 instituted for dissolution of marriage under Section 10 , on the ground of respondent-wife being guilty of adultery and passing of decree for dissolution of marriage is whether the factual profile and the evidence on record constitutes a legal launching pad for passing of decree for dissolution or not? 2. In order to examine and satisfy our conscience, we have thought it expedient to have a close scrutiny of relevant and material factual matrix, giving rise to the reference under Section 17 of the Act, as it stood then before amendment. Short conspectus of facts, therefore, may be highlighted at this juncture. 3. In this reference for confirmation of the decree for dissolution of marriage, arising out of a Civil Suit No. 3 of 1997 for decree under Section 10 by the original petitioner-plaintiff husband, on the ground of respondent-original defendant-wife, allegedly being guilty of adultery, the following aspects have emerged from the record incontrovertible. (1) The spouses are professing Christian religion. (2) The wedlock between them came to be solemnized as...","7. As against that neither the respondent No. 1-respondent wife nor respondent No. 2-adulterer Satyam has been examined. Obviously, no further evidence on behalf of the respondent-party came to be adduced. Upon examination, evaluation and assessment of the evidence, the trial Court granted decree for dissolution of marriage under unamended Section 10 of the Act, by passing a judgment and order, on 7-1-2000, on the ground of adultery of wife holding that there was no collusion between the parties either for filing the suit or for obtaining the decree for dissolution of marriage. Therefore, the trial Court, invoking unamended provisions of Section 17 of the Act made a reference for confirmation of the decree, passed for dissolution of marriage accepting the case propounded by the husband. That is how the matter for confirmation upon a reference has come up before three of us, as constituted by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court, under Section 17 . 8. We have dispassionately examined and considered the factual profile, and the evidence emerging from the record of the present case. Since, parties...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1196471/ | II(2004)DMC592, (2003)1GLR196",Adultery,adultery; desertion,2002,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: II(2004)DMC592, (2003)1GLR196",1196471,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1196471/,11
Madras High Court,"Pasumpon Gandhi vs Shirely Gandhi on 28 November, 2002",O.P.No. 856/92 dated 8-3-93 on the file of the,2002-11-28,"Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. SATHASIVAM and The Hon, Mr. Justice K. GNANAPRAKASAM Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No., Judgment of the Court was made by P. Sathasivam, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 12, Section 13, Section 19, Section 23",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[pre_1] IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Dated: 28/11/2002 Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. SATHASIVAM and The Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. GNANAPRAKASAM Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 946 of 1993 Pasumpon Gandhi. .. Appellant/Petitioner. -Vs- 1. Shirely Gandhi, E/o. Pasumpon Gandhi, Working at A.F.Ferguson and Company Geena Building Annexe, 304/305, Anna Salai, Madras-600 002. 2. Rahamadullah @ Basha Bai, Partner, Aaysons Apparels, 312, Ist Floor, Thambu Chetty Street, Madras-1. .. Respondents/Respondents. Appeal filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act against the order and decretal order passed in F.C.O.P.No. 856/92 dated 8-3-93 on the file of the Additional Family Court at Madras. !For Appellant :Mrs. Radhika for Mr. M.S. Krishnan ^No appearance: For respondents. :JUDGMENT [p_1] (Judgment of the Court was made by P. Sathasivam, J.) Petitioner in F.C.O.P.No. 856 of 92 on the file of the Additional Principal Judge (Additional Family Court), Madras, dismissing his petition filed under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 to dissolve the marriage performed between him and the first respondent herein, has filed the above appeal. He filed the...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Dated: 28/11/2002 Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. SATHASIVAM and The Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. GNANAPRAKASAM Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 946 of 1993 Pasumpon Gandhi. .. Appellant/Petitioner. -Vs- 1. Shirely Gandhi, E/o. Pasumpon Gandhi, Working at A.F.Ferguson and Company Geena Building Annexe, 304/305, Anna Salai, Madras-600 002. 2. Rahamadullah @ Basha Bai, Partner, Aaysons Apparels, 312, Ist Floor, Thambu Chetty Street, Madras-1. .. Respondents/Respondents. Appeal filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act against the order and decretal order passed in F.C.O.P.No. 856/92 dated 8-3-93 on the file of the Additional Family Court at Madras. !For Appellant :Mrs. Radhika for Mr. M.S. Krishnan ^No appearance: For respondents. :JUDGMENT (Judgment of the Court was made by P. Sathasivam, J.) Petitioner in F.C.O.P.No. 856 of 92 on the file of the Additional Principal Judge (Additional Family Court), Madras, dismissing his petition filed under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 to dissolve the marriage performed between him and the first respondent herein, has filed the above appeal. He filed the said petition before the Family Court under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act to dissolve the marriage on the ground of adultery coupled with cruelty and desertion. It is contended before the Family Court that the marriage between him and the...","6. In the result, the order of the Family Court dated 8 -3-1993 made in F.C.O.P.No. 856/92, dismissing the said petition is set aside and we grant a decree for divorce to the appellant under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed and in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. (P.S.J.,) (K.G.P.J.,) 28-11-2002 R.B. Index:- Yes Internet: Yes. To: 1) The Additional Family Court, Madras (with records). 2) The Section Officer, V.R Section, High Court, Madras",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1667509/,Adultery,adultery,2002,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,1667509,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1667509/,4
Jharkhand High Court,"Abhishek Kerketta vs Shobha Kujur on 14 July, 2026",opriety of impugned judgment passed on 03.07.2025 an,2026-07-14,"Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 19, Section 2, Section 3, Section 32, Section 621",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2026:JHHC:20890-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI F.A. No.184 of 2025 ------ Abhishek Kerketta, aged about 44 years, son of Late Eliyas Kerketta, permanent residing at Bajra Kumba Toli, Near ITI Bus Stand, PO Hehal, PS Sukhdeonagar, District-Ranchi, presently residing at Gorabari, PO Jagadalla, PS-Bankura, Distt. Bankura, West Bengal. ... ... Appellant Versus Shobha Kujur, aged about 43 years, wife of Mr. Abhishek Kerketta, daughter of Mr. Vincent Kujur, R/o Pathalkudwa Church Lane, PS - Lower Bazar, PO-GPO, District-Ranchi. ... ... Respondent PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA ..... For the Appellant : Mr. Arbind Kumar, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Ashok Kumar Jha, Advocate. ..... C.A.V. on 22.06.2026 Pronounced on 14/07/2026 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer:","54. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, defending the impugned order, has submitted that appellant and respondent are legally married couple and she has filed a suit for restitution of conjugal right but the appellant does not want to keep her and has deserted her without any rhyme and reason. 55. It has further been submitted that the respondent is still ready to reside with the appellant-petitioner and the allegation levelled against her by the appellant-husband are false and fabricated as she never subjected him with cruelty rather it is the appellant-husband who has deserted her. 56. It has been submitted that still she wants to live with appellant and prayed to dismiss the suit filed by appellant. 57. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife on the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the impugned judgment requires no interference by this Court. Analysis 58. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant- husband as also learned counsel for the respondent-wife and 16 perused the material available on record and the finding recorded in the impugned order. 59. This Court, before looking into the legality and propriety of the impugned order, requires to refer the testimonies of the witnesses, as available on record....","I. Whether the suit as framed is maintainable? II. Whether the appellant has valid cause of action for the suit? III. Whether the respondent wife has treated the appellant husband with cruelty? IV. Whether the respondent wife has deserted the appellant husband since 24.10.2015? V. Whether the appellant husband is taking advantage of his own wrong? VI. Whether the appellant is entitled to get the decree of divorce? VII. Whether the appellant is entitled to get any other relief or reliefs? 41. The aforesaid issues were decided against the appellant-husband and in favour of respondent-wife and the suit was dismissed on contest. 42. The appellant-husband, being aggrieved with the judgment passed on 03.07.2025 and decree signed on 14.07.2025 by learned Additional Principal Judge, 13 Additional Family Court-I, Ranchi approached this Court by filing the instant appeal. Submission made on behalf of the appellant-husband 43. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband...","63. Since the learned counsel for the appellant has raised the issue of perversity by contending that the findings recorded by the learned Family Court while answering issue no. (iii) i.e. issue of cruelty are perverse, therefore, before addressing the aforesaid seminal issue it would be apt to discuss herein the appropriate meaning of word ""perverse"". 64. This Court while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant on the issue of perversity needs to 36 refer herein the interpretation of the word ""perverse"" as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. 65. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr. , (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice...","54. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, defending the impugned order, has submitted that appellant and respondent are legally married couple and she has filed a suit for restitution of conjugal right but the appellant does not want to keep her and has deserted her without any rhyme and reason. 55. It has further been submitted that the respondent is still ready to reside with the appellant-petitioner and the allegation levelled against her by the appellant-husband are false and fabricated as she never subjected him with cruelty rather it is the appellant-husband who has deserted her. 56. It has been submitted that still she wants to live with appellant and prayed to dismiss the suit filed by appellant. 57. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife on the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the impugned judgment requires no interference by this Court. Analysis 58. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant- husband as also learned counsel for the respondent-wife and 16 perused the material available on record and the finding recorded in the impugned order. 59. This Court, before looking into...","1. The instant appeal has been filed under section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 for challenging the legality and propriety of impugned judgment passed on 03.07.2025 and decree signed on 14.07.2025 by learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court-I, Ranchi whereby and whereunder the Original Suit No. 246 of 2022 filed by the appellant-husband under Section 10(ix) and (x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 for a decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion and cruelty, has been dismissed. Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case as narrated before the trial court by the appellant/petitioner husband is that the appellant-husband and respondent-wife are by caste Oraon, by faith Christian and their marriage was solemnized on 19.10.2015 according to Christian rites and rituals at N.W. GEL Church, Main Road, Ranchi and after marriage respondent-wife was brought to her matrimonial home at village Bajra, Kumbatoli, P.S. Sukhdeo Nagar, District Ranchi where the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife lived together as husband and wife only for a few days and the marriage has been consummated but after completion of the customaries, the respondent- wife, against the consent of her husband, went to her workplace at Chhattisgarh. 3. It has been stated that during the stay of respondent-wife in the house of appellant-husband, she caused a lot of intolerable...","(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) Date : 14/07/2026 Birendra / A.F.R. Uploaded on 15/07/2026 59",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/2641238/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,2641238,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/2641238/,16
Allahabad High Court,"Smt. Deepika Alizabeth Couto vs Gabriel Anthony Couto on 3 October, 1977",opinion of the majority shall prevail,1977-10-03,"JUDGMENT    M.N. Shukla, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 16, Section 17, Section 4, Section 55, Section 8",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. It is apparent from the perusal of Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 as amended by the Indian Divorce (U. P. Amendment) Act XXX of 1957 that a decree passed under Section 10 of the Act, as in the instant case, does not require any confirmation by the High Court. Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, prior to the U. P. Amendment Act, stood as follows :-- ""17. Confirmation of decree for dissolution by District Judge.-- Every decree for a dissolution of marriage made by a District Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court. Cases for confirmation of a decree for dissolution of marriage shall be heard (where the number of the Judges of the High Court is three or upwards) by a Court composed of three such Judges, and in case of difference the opinion of the majority shall prevail, or (where the number of the Judges of the High Court is two) by a Court composed of such two Judges; and in case of difference, the opinion of the senior Judge shall prevail. The High Court, if it thinks further enquiry or additional evidence to be necessary, may direct such enquiry to be made, or such evidence to be taken. The result...","1. This reference purporting to be one under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act. 1869 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) reveals a curious state of affairs. A petition was made under Section 10 of the Act by the petitioner Smt. Deepika Alizabeth Couto in the court of the District Judge, Gorakhpur. The allegations in the petition were that she .and her husband were married in the year 1965 according to the Christian rituals; that the respondent was a habitual drunkard who constantly beat the petitioner using filthy abuses and treated her with cruelty whenever she went to live with him at Jamshedpur. On account of this cruel treatment her physical and mental health was completely impaired and it was no longer safe for her to live with him. It appears that the respondent did not contest the petition in the court below. In support of these allegations, the petitioner examined herself. The learned District Judge passed an ex parte order dated Dec. 18, 1976 whereby he allowed the petition and a decree nisi was passed. Thereafter, the petitioner...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/893002/ | AIR1978ALL27, AIR 1978 ALLAHABAD 27, 1977 ALL WC 591 (1978) 4 ALL LR 7, (1978) 4 ALL LR 7",Cruelty,cruelty,1977,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1978ALL27, AIR 1978 ALLAHABAD 27, 1977 ALL WC 591 (1978) 4 ALL LR 7, (1978) 4 ALL LR 7",893002,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/893002/,9
Madras High Court,"Dr. Dwaraka Bai vs Professor Nainan Mathews on 28 January, 1953",AIR1953MAD792,1953-01-28,"JUDGMENT    Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 112, Section 35, Section 488",Adultery; Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. 1. This is a long-drawn-out petition, having a tangled history which must be set out briefly for the purpose of understanding the facts and issues involved. 2. The petition is by Dr. Dwaraka Bai, M.B.B.S.. an Indian Christian doctor of Guntur, now aged 43, for divorce against her husband Professor Nainan Mathews M.A., B.L., a retired Indian Christian Professor, now aged 60, and till recently 'a regular student of the United Theological College, Bangalore. The petitioner took her M.B.B.S. degree in Madras in 1935 and began practising at Guntur where her father also is a doctor. When she became nearly 36 years old, i.e., in the beginning of 1946, she felt an urgent desire to get married. She, therefore, wanted to find out a suitable man to marry. One Mrs. Joseph, a Syrian Christian doctor of Bapatla, in Guntur district, told her about the respondent, Nainan Mathews, and told her also that he was by age, education, culture, family and character eminently fitted to be her husband. So, a long paper correspondence began between Mrs. Joseph and the respondent and then between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner told the respondent in Ex. P. 27...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"8. The following issues were framed: 1. Has the respondent deserted the petitioner for upwards of two years prior to the date of the petition? 2. Has the respondent been guilty of cruelty to the petitioner? 3. Has the respondent committed adultery as alleged in paragraph 15 of the petition? 4. Is the petition barred by 'res judicata? 5. To what reliefs, if any, are the parties entitled? 9. But, before the trial, the respondent suddenly withdrew his defence unconditionally. His counsel Mr. p. S. Ramachandra Ayyar, however continued to be on record but was merely watching the proceedings on the final day of hearing, 8th April 1952, without the least attempt to contest the case or disprove the facts alleged by the petitioner. The reasons for the sudden 'volte face' by the respondent were not clear to me even that day. I considered that either he was unable to...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","6. The petitioner took the matter in appeal. Rajamannar C. J. and Viswanatha Sastry J. heard the appeal O. S. A. No. 73 of 1947 and by their Judgment dated 13-9-1950, dismissed the appeal with costs. They disbelieved the petitioner's story of attempted sodomy and observed further that they were not also impressed with the evidence adduced on her behalf about her mental prostration, nervous breakdown etc. after the wedding night. They went on to observe: ""The impression left on us is that as soon as she saw him she was intensely disappointed, shocked as she says and was practically compelled by circumstances to go through the marriage. She, however, felt afterwards that it was impossible to be the wife of the respondent except in name, and the respondent was obviously insisting on his rights as a husband. There was no other go for the appellant to be free from the shackles of this unfortunate marriage except to file a -petition for divorce. As the law stood, it was necessary to allege one or other of the grounds mentioned in Section 10 of the Divorce Act to obtain a dissolution of the marriage. That was why resort was sought to the story of an attempt on the part of the respondent to commit an unnatural offence. We have no hesitation...","10. The petitioner put in Application No. 4219 of 1952, on 29-9-1952 for recording a compromise she had entered into with the respondent in this matrimonial suit instead of proceeding with the hearing of the petition further for making the decree nisi absolute. I perused all the records and heard Mr. Thyagarajan, for the petitioner and Mr. P. S. Ramachandran Ayyar for the respondent, and on 29-9-1952 passed an order refusing to record the compromise. My order contained the following observations: ""I am of opinion that no Court in the Indian Union, should under the law as it stands, use its discretion in allowing a compromise of this sort which gives the petitioner liberty to rake up the old adultery, 'even after the compromise' and resumption of the status of husband and wife, as the basis of a fresh petition for dissolution of her marriage. The policy of law, is, of course, to see that marriages are, as far as possible, kept intact, and divorces only granted wherever unavoidable. The law of divorce in the Indian Union is not so...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/210422/ | AIR1953MAD792, AIR 1953 MADRAS 792",Adultery,adultery; desertion; cruelty,1953,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1953MAD792, AIR 1953 MADRAS 792",210422,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/210422/,11
Madras High Court,"M.T. Carunya vs S. Joseph Chellappa on 15 September, 1995",(1996)1MLJ409,1995-09-15,"ORDER   Srinivasan, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 22, Section 3, Section 32, Section 4, Section 488, Section 494, Section 497, Section 7",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Srinivasan, J. 1. The wife is the petitioner. She has sought divorce on the ground that the husband is guilty of bigamy with adultery. The husband remained ex parte. The wife has given evidence deposing that the husband has married another woman. The learned District Judge, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the wife, granted a decree for divorce. The said decree has come up before us for confirmation.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"Bigamy was defined as the marriage of any person during the life of the former husband or wife, whether the second marriage shall have taken place within His Majesty's dominion or elsewhere. The learned Judge also referred to the following passage in Rattigan on his Law of Divorce in India at p.24, which read: 19. ...In Websters New English Dictionary, 1888, the following meaning is given; ""Violation of marriage bed; voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with one of the opposite sex, whether unmarried or married to another; (the former case being technically designated single, the latter double adultery) The same meaning is given in Fowler's Concise Oxford Dictionary: Voluntary sexual intercourse of married person with one of opposite sex married (double adultery) or not (single adultery).",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The amicus curiae, appointed for the respondent, has raised a contention that there is no allegation in the original petition or proof in the evidence of any adultery on the part of the husband. According to him, the evidence makes out only bigamy and not bigamy with adultery. For this purpose, he places reliance on the definition of adultery in Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. Under that section, necessary ingredient is that the woman concerned is the wife of another man. According to learned Counsel, in this case, the husband is only having, if at all, intercourse with a woman, whom he has married and she not being the wife of another woman he is not guilty of adultery as defined by Indian Penal Code . 3. The question, therefore, arises whether the definition of adultery as found in the Indian Penal Code can be applied for the purposes of the Indian Divorce Act . It is too well-settled that a definition of an expression found in one particular statute cannot be utilised for the purposes of another statute unless the context warrants the same, as held in Ram Narain v. The State of U.P. . While the Indian Penal Code is dealing with offences against State and containing definition for the purpose of punishing persons who...","11. Applying the above principles of law, we find that once it is approved beyond doubt that the husband has married another woman and is continuously living with her, the husband is guilty of bigamy with adultery. There is no evidence to the contra. Husband has not chosen to cross-examine the wife on her deposition. The view taken by the District Judge that the wife is entitled to a decree of divorce is fully justified and we are upholding the same. Hence, the decree passed by the District Judge is confirmed.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1316952/ | (1996)1MLJ409,Adultery,adultery,1995,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1996)1MLJ409,1316952,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1316952/,8
Madras High Court,"M.T. Carunya vs S. Joseph Chellappa on 15 September, 1995",1996(1)CTC573,1995-09-15,"ORDER   Srinivasan, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 22, Section 3, Section 32, Section 4, Section 488, Section 494, Section 497, Section 7",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Srinivasan, J. 1. The wife is the petitioner. She has sought divorce on the ground on that the husband is guilty of bigamy with adultery. The husband remained ex parte. The wife has given evidence deposing that the husband has married another woman. The learned District Judge, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the wife, granted a decree for divorce. The said: decree has come up before us for confirmation.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""Bigamy was defined as the marriage of any person during the life of the former husband or wife, whether the second marriage shall have taken place within His Majesty's dominion or elsewhere"". The learned Judge also referred to the following passage in Rattigan on his Law of Divorce in India at p.24, which read: ""19.....In Websters New English Dictionary 1888, the following meaning is given; ""Violation of marriage bed; voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with one of the opposit sex, whether unmarried or married to another; (the former case being technically designated single, the latter double adultery)"". The same meaning is given in Foller's Concise Oxford Dictionary; 'Voluntary sexual intercourse of married person with one of opposite sex married (double adultery) or not (single adultery)'.",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The amicus curiae, appointed for the respondent, has raised a contention that there is no allegation in the original petition or proof in the evidence of any adultery on the part of the husband. According to him, the evidence makes out only bigamy and not bigamy with adultery. For this purpose, he places reliance on the definition of adultery in section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. Under that section, the necessary ingredient is that the woman concerned is the wife of another man. According to learned counsel, in this case, the husband is only having, if at all, intercourse with a woman whom he has married and she not being the wife of another woman, he is not guilty of adultery as defined by Indian Penal Code . 3. The question, therefore, arises whether the definition of adultery as found in the Indian Penal Code can be applied for the purposes of the Indian Divorce Act . It is too well settled that a definition of an expression found in one particular statute cannot be utilised for the purposes of another statute unless the context warrants the same, as held in Ram Narain v. The sate of U.P., . While the Indian Penal Code is dealing with offences against State and containing definition for the purpose of punishing...","12. Applying the above principles of law, we find that once it is approved beyond doubt that the husband had married another woman and is continuously living with her, the husband is guilty of bigamy with adultery. There is no evidence to the contra. Husband has not chosen to cross examine the wife on her deposition. The view taken by the District Judge that the wife is entitled to a decree of divorce is fully justified and we are upholding the same. Hence, the decree passed by the District Judge is confirmed.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1858140/ | 1996(1)CTC573,Adultery,adultery,1995,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: 1996(1)CTC573,1858140,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1858140/,8
Bombay High Court,"Saroj W/O Maical @ Babasaheb Patole vs Maical @ Babasaheb Sadanana Patole on 7 December, 1999",2000(4)BOMCR532,1999-12-07,"ORDER    V.K. Barde, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954","Section 10, Section 17",Cruelty; Desertion; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER V.K. Barde, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is reference under section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (For short, hereinafter referred to as ""the Act""). The learned Judge of the Family Court, Aurangabad, has passed the decree for dissolution of marriage under section 10 of the Act, in Petition A. 182/97. 2. The petitioner, Smt. Saroj, filed the petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of ill-treatment and desertion. She also contended that the respondent Maical @ Babasaheb was already married with a woman prior to his marriage with the petitioner and on that ground also, dissolution of marriage was prayed. 3. The respondent Maical, by his written statement, denied all the allegations. 6. The first important question to be considered is whether the petitioner can claim the decree for divorce only on the ground of cruelty or desertion when there being no allegation that the respondent has committed adultery. In this respect, the learned Judge of the Family Court has relied upon the ruling of the Full Bench, of this Court, in the matter between Pragati Varghese v. Cyril George Varghese, (F.B. ). In the said matter, constitutional validity of section 10 of the Act was considered by the Full Bench and it is observed in para 43 (Full Bench of Kerala High Court A.I.R. 1995 Ker. 525 on Bom.C.R. page 575)...","4. The learned Judge of the Family Court recorded the evidence of both sides and then came to the conclusion that the petitioner failed to prove that the respondent was already married before his marriage with the petitioner. However, the learned Judge held that the petitioner proved that the petitioner was being treated with cruelty by the respondent and, therefore, the decree nisi is passed. 5. The petitioner and respondent both are served. Both were present before us at the time of hearing of the reference. Considering the circumstance of the case, Shri M.V. Deshpande, learned Advocate is appointed as amicus curiae for the petitioner. 15. Hence, the reference is accepted. The decree for dissolution of marriage passed under section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, by the learned Judge of the Family Court, Aurangabad, in Petition A-1 82/97, is confirmed. In the given circumstances, no order as to costs. 16. Order accordingly.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1562590/ | 2000(4)BOMCR532, 2000(2)MHLJ512",Cruelty,cruelty; desertion; adultery,1999,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2000(4)BOMCR532, 2000(2)MHLJ512",1562590,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1562590/,6
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Anjali Michael vs Anthony Michael on 27 February, 2017",No.41 of 2017,2017-02-27,HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 24",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"TA No.41 of 2017 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH TA No.41 of 2017 Date of decision: 27.02.2017 Anjali Michael ... Applicant Vs. Anthony Michael ... Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK Present: Mr. Deepak Gupta, Advocate for the applicant. Mr. Amit Jhanji, Advocate for the respondent. ******* RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK, J. (ORAL)",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Applicant-wife, by way of instant transfer application under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ' CPC '), seeks transfer of a petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 ('the Act' for short) bearing case No.HMA/1022/2016 titled as Anthony Michael Vs. Anjali Michael filed by the respondent-husband from Karnal to SAS Nagar (Mohali). Notice of motion was issued and in the meantime, further proceedings before the learned Court at Karnal were stayed. Heard learned counsel for the parties. It has gone undisputed before this Court that the applicant-wife, along with her minor child, is living with her parents in Tehsil Dera Bassi, District SAS Nagar (Mohali). Since the applicant-wife is not working, she is dependent on her parents. Respondent-husband is not paying any amount of maintenance either for the applicant-wife or for the minor child. Distance 1 of 7 ::: Downloaded on - 06-03-2017 02:01:16 ::: TA No.41 of 2017 2 between Karnal and Mohali is more than 100 kilometers. Other litigations between the parties, at the instance of the applicant-wife, are also pending at Mohali. In view of the abovesaid undisputed fact situation of the case, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that it is just and expedient to transfer the petition under Section 10 of the Act from Karnal to Mohali....",[ RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK ] 27.02.2017 JUDGE vishnu Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether reportable Yes/No 7 of 7 ::: Downloaded on - 06-03-2017 02:01:17 :::,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/75771816/,Procedural,procedural,2017,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,75771816,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/75771816/,5
Bombay High Court,"Mr. Anil Kumar Vasant Lokhande vs Mr. Purushottam Vinayak Sansare And ... on 12 January, 1993",No. 473 of 1970,1993-01-12,"JUDGMENT    A.A. Halbe, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 12, Section 13, Section 14, Section 15, Section 16, Section 17, Section 17A, Section 3, Section 37, Section 4, Section 45, Section 5, Section 55, Section 56, Section 8",Procedural; Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT A.A. Halbe, J.","9. Now, taking the allegation that the will is not a valid will and that there are several circumstances which indicated that this was not the last legal will of deceased Virbala, I feel that no longer discussion is warranted. The learned trial Judge has discussed as to how the will is valid. The learned advocate for the appellant has contended that if one looks to the signature of the testator Virbala, it would be found that there are tremors in the signature of the testator and this should persuade the Court to hold that the will is not a properly executed valid will. On the other hand, the learned advocate for the respondent has contended that there is not a single suggestion to any of the witnesses examined on behalf of the petitioner that Virbala was not in a, fit mental condition to execute the will. Suggestions regarding tremors etc. would fall into insignificance if there is nothing on record to show that Virbala was not in a fit mental condition to execute the will. 10. I do find a lot of substance of this argument. One Bond writer by name Laxman Dagadu Kolhe has been examined at Exhibit...","2. In view of the extensive arguments advanced on behalf of the parties it has become necessary to reconsider this view and ascertain as to whether this view of the scheme of the said Act. Whereas the learned advocate for the appellant has vehemently argued that this view is patently erroneous and deserves to be dissented from, the learned advocate for the respondent has urged that this is the view of the Full Bench of the High Court and that the reasons in support of that view appear to be wholly legitimate and need not be deviated from and that the same view should be taken in this matter and accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed. Whether the omission is international or in advertent is no concern of the Court and a casus omissus cannot be supplied by Court of law. The omission can only be supplied by statute or...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"9. Now, taking the allegation that the will is not a valid will and that there are several circumstances which indicated that this was not the last legal will of deceased Virbala, I feel that no longer discussion is warranted. The learned trial Judge has discussed as to how the will is valid. The learned advocate for the appellant has contended that if one looks to the signature of the testator Virbala, it would be found that there are tremors in the signature of the testator and this should persuade the Court to hold that the will is not a properly executed valid will. On the other hand, the learned advocate for the respondent has contended that there is not a single suggestion to any of the witnesses examined on behalf of the petitioner that Virbala was not in a, fit mental condition to execute the will. Suggestions regarding tremors etc. would fall into insignificance if there is nothing on record to show that Virbala was not in a fit mental condition to execute the will. 10. I do find...","3. The question arises as follows : The deceased Virbala Sumant Lokhande was married to Sumant Madhav Lokhande in the year 1964. However, on account of differences between husband and wife, Virbala filed petition for divorce against her husband being Marriage Petition No, 12 of 1968 in the District Court, Pune. The petition was dismissed by the District Judge, Pune and Virbala, therefore preferred appeal before the High Court of Bombay being Appeal No. 473 of 1970. The said divorce petition was filed on the allegations that Sumant - the husband - had indulged in adultery coupled with desertion for two years under Section 10 of the Divorce Act. 4. It may be stated that the parties were Indian Christians and were governed by the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act . The High Court allowed the appeal and ordered dissolution of marriage between these spouse upholding the allegations of the wife that the husband had indulged in adultery coupled with desertion for two years, as envisaged under Section 10 of the said Act reported in AIR 1974 Bom 279 Sumant Lokhande died on 20th March, 1974 at Pune. He was in service at Khadaki in Gurhi Depot Workshop. Virbala was the only legal heir. She was, therefore, entitled to family pension of Rs. 2,700/-; service gratuity of Rs. 9.600/-...","1. The important question which has been posed for determination in this appeal is whether the decree passed by the High Court in appeal, dissolving the marriage between the husband and wife, against the decree passed by the District Judge dismissing the claim for dissolution of marriage is decree nisi and is subject to Sections 16 and 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. The question has become important in view of the clear ratio laid down by the Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in the case of Rev. Po Tun v. Na Chit and Anr. AIR 1938 Rangoon 204, wherein the High Court clearly laid down that a decree for dissolution of marriage made by the High Court under the Indian Divorce Act , either in its appellate or in its original jurisdiction, shall be decree nisi and not a decree subject to confirmation by the High Court under Section 17 of the said Act. 5. However, Anilkumar Vasant Lokhande, the nephew of deceased Sumant Madhav Lokhande, filed Misc. Applicant No. 449 of 1976/in the District Court,...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/790723/ | (1994)96BOMLR373,Procedural,procedural; adultery; desertion,1993,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1994)96BOMLR373,790723,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/790723/,16
Calcutta High Court,"Adelaide Mande Tobias vs William Albert Tobias on 8 March, 1967",AIR1968CAL133,1967-03-08,"ORDER    P.B. Mukharji, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 1, Section 10, Section 178, Section 3, Section 4, Section 7",Adultery; Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER P.B. Mukharji, J. 1. This is a wife's petition for divorce on the ground of ""adultery coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for 2 years or upwards"". 2. The wife Adelaide Mande Tobias states in the petition the following facts. She was married on May 15. 1935 to the Respondent William Albert Tobias at the Church of the Secred Heart of No. 3 Dha-ramtala Street, Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court. The Marriage Certificate has been proved and marked as Ext. A in this suit. Both the wife and the husband are domiciled In India and are Roman Catholic Christians. 3. After marriage they lived and cohabited at 25 Dharamtalla Street and also at 9 Crooked Lane, Calcutta, both within the jurisdiction of this Court. There are three issues of the marriage now living: one is John Andrey Tobias, daughter born on March 20, 1936; Daphne Tobias, daughter born on August 26, 1938; and Harold Tobias, son born on April 26, 1940. It was immediately after the birth of the son that the respondent-husband is alleged to have deserted the petitioner. The matrimonial home was of a very short duration, lasting barely five years. 4. The petitioner's case...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"18. On this solitary incident of the 6th January 1966 hangs the whole charge of adultery in this case. The only evidence on this point is that of Joseph Okeeffe, the private detective. He produced no diary of his detective work although he has one. See his answers to questions 16-17. The gist of his evidence is that in January 1966, presumably on the 6th day of January at about 7.30 in the evening, he followed in a taxi the respondent husband from his flat, who in another taxi drove up to Park Street in Calcutta, right on to Chowringhee and near Lloyds Branch of the National and Grindleys Bank. There he is supposed to have seen the husband talking with some common women of the town (Q. 20). His further evidence is that one of these women got into the cab and then the husband and the woman drove...","12. I put this very same question to Mr. Dutt, the learned counsel for the petitioner and he said that the reason perhaps of seeking this divorce after so many years was that she did not want to have any more the stigma of being known as ""Mrs. so and so"" when the husband was charged with adultery. But that submission of Mr. Dutt did not impress me. First, because that was not the case made by the petitioner herself in her evidence. If she thought that there was a stigma attaching to the name of Mrs. Tobias and it was to get rid of that name that she wanted the divorce now after 26 years, then she could have said so in evidence. But this is exactly what she did not say; and secondly, because if the stigma was there then why carry the stigma for 26 years and not make an end of it much earlier. I have come to the conclusion that this is not the reason for this delay. 13. In this situation the Court wanted...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","19. Having analysed the evidence on desertion and adultery, it will now be appropriate to examine first the arguments for and against desertion in this case. Desertion is defined under Section 3(6) of the Indian Divorce Act as implying ""an abandonment against the wish of the person charging it."" Leaving the matrimonial home by consent or separate living by mutual consent, express or tacit la not ""desertion"" within the meaning of this law. Any and every departure from matrimonial home is not ""desertion"". It has to be an abandonment against the wish of the person making the charge of desertion. Again desertion in order to be a ground for divorce under the last clause of Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act must be desertion ""without reasonable excuse"". In other words, if desertion is with a ""reasonable excuse"" it cannot be a ground of divorce under that section. 20. Mrs. Bose on the basis of the evidence above makes this criticism that this desertion has not been proved in fact and law on the ground that the whole case of the wife is that he left due to mere misunderstanding. That in her submission is not enough to establish desertion in law and within the meaning of Section 3(9) of the Indian Divorce Act read with the last clause of...","52. I, therefore, grant a decree nisi for dissolution of marriage as prayed by the petitioner wife in prayer (1) of the petition and I also order that the respondent husband shall pay the costs of these proceedings to the petitioner.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1516991/ | AIR1968CAL133, 71CWN605, AIR 1968 CALCUTTA 133",Adultery,adultery; desertion; cruelty,1967,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1968CAL133, 71CWN605, AIR 1968 CALCUTTA 133",1516991,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1516991/,10
Patna High Court,"Raphael Damacious vs Mrs. Teresa Raphael And Anr. on 8 September, 1989",opment,1989-09-08,"U.P. Singh and B.N. Agrawal, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT N.P. Singh, U.P. Singh and B.N. Agrawal, JJ.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. A decree for dissolution of the marriage between the applicant and respondent No. 1 has been forwarded to this Court by the District Judge, Dumka for confirmation in accordance with the provisions of Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. In appears that the applicant filed an application under Section 10 of the Act levelling a charge of adultery against his wife, respondent No. 1, and sought a decree for divorce on that ground. I, may be mentioned that Under section 10 any husband may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court, paying that his marriage may be dissolved on the ground that his wife has been guilty of adultery. The claim made on behalf of the applicant was contested by respondent no. 1 who refuted the allegation that she was guilty of adultery. The learned District Judge, on consideration of the materials on record, cams to the conclusion that the applicant has been able to prove that respondent No. 1 was freely mixing with respondent no. 2, Brother Birendra Prasad, and; on the basis of the materials, finding has been recorded in favour of the applicant. 4. The learned Counsel appearing for respondent no. 1, the wife, pointed out they from a bare reference to...","3. The learned Counsel appearing for the applicant and respondent No. 1, the wife, at the outset, informed the Court that, after the decree for divorce was passed by the District Judge, at the intervention of the two sons of the applicant, the difference between the applicant and respondent No. 1 has been settled and they have started living together as husband and wife. It was pointed out that as there is no provision under the Act enabling this Court, while considering the question of confirmation of the decree for divorce, to set aside the decree on the ground that later the parties have entitled into settlement or have come to understanding, the question of confirmation of the decree for divorce has to be considered on merit. Normally, in View of the subsequent development, we would have disposed of this application on that ground alone but, in absence of any provision, we have to examine the judgment of the learned District Judge, on merit. 6. Section 10 enables any husband to present a petition for dissolution of his marriage only...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1815443/ | 1991(39)BLJR356, II(1991)DMC258",Adultery,adultery,1989,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 1991(39)BLJR356, II(1991)DMC258",1815443,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1815443/,8
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Sonia Kuruvilla vs Simon Chaudhary on 3 November, 2017",FAO No.1088 of 2016(O&M) # 1#,2017-11-03,- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASWANT SINGH,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 12",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"FAO No.1088 of 2016(O&M) # 1# IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. FAO No.1088 of 2016(O&M) Date of Decision:-03.11.2017 Dr. Sonia Kuruvilla. ......Appellant. Versus Dr. Simon Chaudhary. ......Respondent. CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASWANT SINGH Present:- Mr. Vipul Aggarwal, Advocate for the Appellant. Mr. Ashish Chopra, Advocate for the respondent. *** JASWANT SINGH, J.","6. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent- husband has argued that the Ld. trial court had rightly come to a conclusion that appellant-wife had committed cruelty upon the husband and therefore, the well reasoned findings returned by the trial court does not warrant any interference. He has however, argued that although it is not proved that any dowry articles were given, still, in case the court directs for an amicable settlement, he is ready to compensate to the extent of 17 lakhs (which includes alleged household articles given to the respondent-wife at the time of marriage to the tune of Rs. 14 lakhs and Rs. 3 lakhs spent by wife's family at the time of solemnizing marriage in Kerala). Thus, he has prayed that the present appeal may be dismissed. 7. I have heard Ld. counsel for the parties and have perused the paper book as well as the record with their able assistance very minutely and have come to a conclusion that the present appeal is devoid of any merit and deserves to be dismissed.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"6. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent- husband has argued that the Ld. trial court had rightly come to a conclusion that appellant-wife had committed cruelty upon the husband and therefore, the well reasoned findings returned by the trial court does not warrant any interference. He has however, argued that although it is not proved that any dowry articles were given, still, in case the court directs for an amicable settlement, he is ready to compensate to the extent of 17 lakhs (which includes alleged household articles given to the respondent-wife at the time of marriage to the tune of Rs. 14 lakhs and Rs. 3 lakhs spent by wife's family at the time of solemnizing marriage in Kerala). Thus, he has prayed that the present appeal may be dismissed. 7. I have heard Ld. counsel for the parties and have perused the paper book as well as the record with their able assistance very minutely and have come to a conclusion that the present appeal is devoid of any merit and deserves to be dismissed.","1. Appellant-Wife-Sonia Kuruvilla has filed the present appeal aggrieved against the judgment dated 19/01/2016, whereby petition filed by respondent husband-Simon Chaudhary under Section 10 of the Divorce Act 1869, has been allowed and consequently, marriage dated 05/11/2012 between the parties was dissolved on account of subjecting the husband to severe mental cruelty by wife. 2. In brief, facts of the case are that the parties to the present 'Lis' are Christian by religion, doctors by profession and their marriage was solemnized on 05/11/2012 according to Christian rites and 1 of 11 ::: Downloaded on - 09-11-2017 01:55:49 ::: FAO No.1088 of 2016(O&M) # 2# ceremonies at a Church of South India, Christ Church, Thiruvananthapuram (Kerala). Thereafter, the parties started residing at their matrimonial home at House No. 823, Sector 2, Panchkula. The matrimonial home consisted of the parents and brother of the husband, wife and the husband himself. However, as per the petition filed for divorce, after a few days, the behaviour of wife started to change and she used to get recurrent attacks of insanity. Further, as per the allegations, wife wanted to reside separately from the joint household of husband and after a few months, husband allegedly accepted the demand of wife and shifted to a separate household in January 2013 at House No. 139-B, Sector 4, Panchkula....","( JASWANT SINGH ) JUDGE November 3rd, 2017 Vinay Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether Reportable Yes/No 11 of 11 ::: Downloaded on - 09-11-2017 01:55:51 :::",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/70995842/,Cruelty,cruelty,2017,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,70995842,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/70995842/,5
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Nirmala vs Swaran Masih on 2 August, 2010",No. 428 of 2009,2010-08-02,Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajesh Bindal,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 32, Section 9",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"T.A. No. 428 of 2009 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Transfer Application No. 428 of 2009 (O&M) Date of Decision: 2.8.2010. Nirmala ....Applicant Versus Swaran Masih ...Respondent CORAM : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajesh Bindal Present:- Mr. L.S. Sidhu, Advocate for the applicant. None for the respondent.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","RAJESH BINDAL J Prayer in the present application is for transfer of petition, titled as Swaran Masih Vs. Smt. Nirmala filed under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, (for short 'the Act') by the respondent-husband from the Court of District Judge, Gurdaspur to the Court of competent jurisdiction at Mansa. Service of respondent is complete. However, at the time of hearing, no one had appeared for him. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that marriage of the applicant was solemnised with the respondent according to Christian rites at Gurdaspur on 24.4.1994. Out of the wedlock two children were born. The applicant is working as Staff Nurse at Civil Hospital, Mansa. Both the children are residing with the applicant and are studying at Mansa. The respondent is B.A.M.S. and is doing private practice as Medical Practitioner at Gurdaspur. The distance between Mansa to Gurdaspur is about 200 kms. It was further submitted that earlier also this Court vide order dated 22.1.2007 passed in C.M. No. 20745-CII of 2006 was pleased to transfer the petition under Section 32 of Indian Divorce Act, pending in the Court of District Judge, Gurdaspur to the Court of District Judge, Mansa. The submission is that it is difficult for the applicant to attend the hearings of the petition under Section 10 of the Act filed...",(RAJESH BINDAL) 2.8.2010 JUDGE Reema,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/40589340/,Procedural,procedural,2010,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,40589340,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/40589340/,7
Bombay High Court,"Maria Sera Pinto vs Milton Dias on 25 August, 2000",No. 4543 of 1999,2000-08-25,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 16, Section 17, Section 19, Section 20, Section 7, Section 8",Procedural; Adultery; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,JUDGMENT,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"9. The question that confronts us is : whether, in a situation like this, we must hold that the Full Bench has merely interpreted the provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and that view taken by the Full Bench would be the law with effect from 1984 when the said Act came into force? Though our first instinct was to say so, on deeper reflection we are satisfied that taking such a view would cause great prejudice, inconvenience and injustice to the parties in the 200 petitions, which are almost over, by sending them to the Family Court for further trial and disposal in accordance with the Family Courts Act . Three considerations prompt us to take the view that the law laid down by the Full Bench in Romila 's case must be deemed to have been brought into prospectively. First, whether the view taken by the Full...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. These petitions have been placed before us at the direction of the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a decision as to whether the procedure contemplated under Section 16 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 of confirmation of a decree nisi made by the High Court on its original side is still required in view of the coming into force of the Family Courts Act, 1984 . The present petitions are all petitions filed under section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of the marriage on different grounds. In each of these petitions a decree nisi has been made by a learned Single Judge of this Court in exercise of the matrimonial Jurisdiction of this Court. These decree nisi are required to be confirmed by virtue of provisions in section 16 of the Indian Divorce Act. We are informed that there are about 200 other similar matters where decree nisi has already been made by a learned Single Judge of this Court in exercise of powers under section 16 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. It is not necessary to discuss the facts giving rise to these petitions to decide the question referred to us. We shall refer to the facts of M. J. Petition No. 4543 of 1999 as a typical case. 2. In M. J. Petition...","8. The peculiar problem that has arisen today before us was not apparently presented to the Full Bench as otherwise the Full Bench might have resolved that issue also. The problem arises only in the case of matrimonial jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 . As we have already pointed out, dissolution of a marriage under the Indian Divorce Act is a two step procedure - first, there is a decree nisi and, second, a decree nisi is either made absolute by the High Court, itself or confirmed by the High Court depending whether the decree nisi was passed by a Single Judge of this Court or by a District Court. For a period of about nine years (from 27.2.1991 on which date Kanak Mehta's was decided till 5.5.2000 when Romila 's case was decided) this Court continued to exercise jurisdiction in matrimonial cases arising under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 . A number of petitions were tried and decrees nisi for dissolution were made. While these were pending confirmation by the...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1968969/ | 2001(1)BOMCR585, (2001)1BOMLR56, I(2002)DMC554, 2000(4)MHLJ633",Procedural,procedural; adultery; nullity_sec19,2000,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2001(1)BOMCR585, (2001)1BOMLR56, I(2002)DMC554, 2000(4)MHLJ633",1968969,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1968969/,11
Madras High Court,"A. George Cornelius vs Elizabeth Dopti Samadanam on 4 August, 1969",ope of Section 7 of the Act. The petitioner married,1969-08-04,"JUDGMENT    K.S. Palaniswamy, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 13, Section 16, Section 27, Section 7",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT K.S. Palaniswamy, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"7. The position is no doubt anomalous. Whereas persons seeking relief under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 or the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , among other grounds the right to ask for divorce on the ground that the other party to the marriage is not heard of for seven years or more, and should be presumed to be dead, persons seeking divorce under the Act in question are not entitled to urge that ground for no obvious reason. It is for the Legislature to consider whether the Act should not be suitably amended so that the law may be uniform.",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This suit filed by the husband under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (IV of 1869) hereinafter referred to as the Act raises an important question about the scope of Section 7 of the Act. The petitioner married the respondent on 16th September, 1935. He has alleged that after the marriage they lived together for sometime when the respondent gave birth to three children, that all the three children are married, that in or about May, 1952 when the couple were living at Bhuvanagiri, the respondent deserted the petitioner against his will and without reasonable cause and went away, that the enquiries made by the petitioner about the respondent proved futile and that inasmuch as the respondent's whereabouts are not known from 1952, it should be presumed that she is dead. The petitioner prays that a decree for dissolution of the marriage, may, therefore, be granted. The respondent could not be served in person and service was effected by substituted service. 2. The question for consideration is whether upon the presumption which the petitioner wants to draw as regards the death of the respondent, dissolution of the marriage can be decreed under Section 10 of the Act. Section 10 , which provides for dissolution of marriage consists of two parts. The first part deals with a case...","6. Up to 1st January, 1938, the grounds for judicial dissolution of marriage in England were adultery or certain unnatural practices. By the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, and the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 several new grounds for divorce were added so as to enable the husband as well as the wife to sue for divorce. But the Indian Legislature, though it has amended the Act in question several times has not thought it necessary to make suitable amendments in the Act to give effect to the modification made in English law. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the words "" subject to the provisions contained in this Act "" occurring in Section 7 cannot be ignored and we cannot adopt all the provisions that have been made in English Matrimonial Causes Act, from time to time, while applying the provisions of the Act, thereby enabling the husband or wife to ask for divorce on a ground not provided for in Section 10 . For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that this petition for divorce...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/86845/ | (1970)2MLJ351, AIR 1970 MADRAS 240, (1970) 2 MADLJ351 1983 MADLW 63, 1983 MADLW 63",Adultery,adultery,1969,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (1970)2MLJ351, AIR 1970 MADRAS 240, (1970) 2 MADLJ351 1983 MADLW 63, 1983 MADLW 63",86845,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/86845/,5
Jharkhand High Court,"Paikas Khaka vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 20 January, 2003",writ petition. The petitioner joined on 20.3.1986.,2003-01-20,"JUDGMENT    Tapen Sen, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 4, Section 5, Section 66",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Tapen Sen, J. 1. The petitioner, Paikas Khaka has filed this Writ Application for quashing the order dated 14.5.1993 issued by the respondent No. 2 (The District Superintendent of Education, Ranchi) as contained at Annexure 10 communicating his approval of the petitioner's dismissal from the service. 2. According to the petitioner, the school is a Government aided school and it is run by the Managing Committee on funds of the Government.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"3. The petitioner has stated that he is a member of the Scheduled Tribe and was appointed by the Secretary of the Saint Stephen's Boys' Middle School, Itki, Ranchi by letter dated 20.1.1986 as contained at Annexure-1 to the writ petition. The petitioner joined on 20.3.1986. 4. Subsequently, the petitioner's appointment was provisionally approved by the respondent No. 2 (the District Superintendent of Education, Ranchi) by his letter dated 28.8.1986 and payment of salary in the prescribed scale was made by the Government. The petitioner has stated that his appointment had also been confirmed by the Managing Committee by resolution dated 31.3.1987 (Annexure 3) with effect from 20.3.1986. 5. On 23.7.1992, the petitioner received a show-cause notice from the respondent No. 3 (the Chairman of the School) giving him 72 hours to file explanation in relation to the allegations contained therein. In the aforementioned show-cause notice, copy of which is contained at Annexure 4, the allegation against the petitioner was that although he had married one Ursulla Nag according to Christian rites on 1.6.1987, yet, while functioning as Head Master...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","11. The respondent No. 2 (District Superintendent of Education) has filed a counter affidavit in this case and has attempted to justify the action of the Managing Committee. At paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit, he has stated that prior to dismissal, the petitioner had been given sufficient time by the Managing Committee and the Managing Committee was competent to take disciplinary action as per Section 5(2) of the bye-laws. In support of the aforesaid contention, the respondent No. 2 has brought on record the show-cause notice issued by the Chairman of the school dated 11.7.1992 (Annexure A) giving the petitioner 72 hours to file his explanation. Annexure A appears to be the same letter which the petitioner has brought on record as Annexure 4 to the writ application. The respondent No. 2 has also annexed the bye-laws regulating the constitution and function of the Managing Committee of Minority Schools in Chhotanagpur and relying upon Section 4 thereto, the respondent No. 2 has submitted that the Managing Committee of all Minority Schools has the right to appoint teaching and non-teaching staff and also to take disciplinary action etc. 13. The respondent Nos. 3 and 4 (Chairman and Secretary of the School) have also come up with a counter affidavit and they have stated at paragraph 7 that it is wrong...","20. For the reasons stated above, ""this Court holds that no illegality was committed by the respondents in taking action against the petitioner. Consequently, there is no merit in this Writ Application. The same is accordingly dismissed. There shall however be no order as to costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1611668/ | 2003(51)BLJR529, [2003(2)JCR336(JHR)]",Unclear,unclear,2003,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2003(51)BLJR529, [2003(2)JCR336(JHR)]",1611668,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1611668/,8
Kerala High Court,"Binu vs Sajan on 7 November, 2002",opposite side for dissolution of marriage under Sect,2002-11-07,"ORDER   R. Rajendra Babu, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 15, Section 16, Section 18, Section 45",Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER R. Rajendra Babu, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (desertion) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The wife filed this Original Petition for dissolution of her marriage with the respondent under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. 2. The respondent filed a counter denying all the allegations levelled against him. But, he made a counter claim for a declaration that the marriage was null and void under Sections 18 and 19 of the Act on the ground of fraud. When the respondent sought to let in evidence for proving his allegation of fraud in obtaining his consent for the marriage, the petitioner objected contending that the respondent is not entitled to a decree declaring the marriage null and void in a proceedings initiated by the petitioner for dissolution of marriage under Section 10 of the Act. Accordingly, the above question has to be considered as a preliminary issue and the learned counsel for both sides were heard on the preliminary issue. 3. The only question for consideration is whether the respondent is entitled to a declaration of the marriage as null and void under Sections 18 and 19 of the Act in a proceedings initiated by the opposite side for dissolution of marriage under Section 10 of the Act. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of Section 15 of the Act, a...",Preliminary issue is found accordingly.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/103425/ | AIR2003KER93,Desertion,desertion; cruelty,2002,nullity,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,Equivalent citations: AIR2003KER93,103425,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/103425/,3
Orissa High Court,"Pradip Kumar Sahu vs Sobharani Samantaray on 30 August, 1983",opposite party who was serving in the V. S- S. Medic,1983-08-30,"JUDGMENT   Pathak, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17",Cruelty; Desertion; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Pathak, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a reference made by the learned District Judge, Sambalpur under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter called the 'Act') arising out of a petition purported to have been made under Section 10 of the Act. 2. The learned District Judge, on a perusal of the solitary evidence of the petitioner, has passed a decree nisi dissolving the marriage between the parties and hence this reference. 3. On a perusal of the petition filed by the husband, it is amply clear that the case is not covered by the ground available to the husband under Section 10 of the Act. According to the provision of"" Section 10 , the only ground on which the husband can apply for dissolution of the marriage is adultery committed by the wife. On a bare reading of the petition, we find that this is a case of cruelty which is not a ground available to the husband under Section 10 of the Act for making an application for dissolution of marriage. 4. The learned District Judge has overlooked the provision of Section 10 of the Act where the only ground available to the husband for filing such a petition for dissolution of marriage is adultery. Neither from the petition nor from the evidence adduced by the petitioner, there is...","7. In the result, we are not in a position to confirm the decree of dissolution passed by the learned District Judge, However, we pass a decree on the facts as noticed above for judicial separation, P.K. Mohanti, J. I agree. J.K. Mohanty, J. I agree.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/351553/ | AIR1984ORI29, AIR 1984 ORISSA 29, (1983) 56 CUTLT 363, (1984) 1 DMC 381, (1984) MATLR 84",Cruelty,cruelty; desertion; adultery,1983,judicial_separation,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1984ORI29, AIR 1984 ORISSA 29, (1983) 56 CUTLT 363, (1984) 1 DMC 381, (1984) MATLR 84",351553,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/351553/,6
Kerala High Court,"Joseph vs Mary on 21 July, 1999",I(2000)DMC554,1999-07-21,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 11, Section 12, Section 13, Section 14, Section 16, Section 17, Section 8",Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT AR. Lakshmanan, Atg. C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"3. The Principal District Judge, Thalassery formulated the following points for consideration in the petition : ""(1) Whether the respondent committed adultery. (2) Whether petitioner has committed any act which disentitled him from claiming relief. (3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to get decree of divorce. (4) Relief and cost.""",2. The respondent filed a counter affidavit denying the allegations as baseless. It is submitted that she does not know any person by name Joseph Kizhakkekara. The allegation that the respondent is leading a loose life is also denied. It is averred that she was treated with cruelty by the petitioner and that the petitioner is having illicit relationship with a number of women. Hence the respondent prayed for dismissal of the petition.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. Petitioner, who is the husband of the respondent Mary, filed the petition for divorce under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act on the ground of adultery. According to the petitioner, the marriage between him and the respondent was solemnised on 17.6.1974 in accordance with their customary rites and that he and the respondent were residing together from the date of marriage and in that wedlock five children were born to them. It is stated that since his father was taking treatment in the hospital at Manipal, he stayed in the hospital to help his father and during that period one Johny Thottupurath aged 25 came to the house of the petitioner almost every night and had adulterous intercourse with the respondent. The eldest daughter of the petitioner is stated to be the eye-witness. The said Johny subsequently committed suicide. It is further averred that on 15.1.1988 the respondent left the matrimonial home without the knowledge and consent of the petitioner and she was moving from place to place with different persons. It is alleged that during 1992-93 she was residing with one Joseph Kizhakkekara, whose whereabouts are not known to anyone who ought to know it and that the respondent is leading a loose life. It is also stated that there is no collusion between the parties. 4....","The petitioner examined himself as P.W. 1 and his eldest daughter Sheena as P.W. 2. Exts. A1 and A2 were also marked on his side. The respondent examined herself as R.W. 1. No exhibits were marked. The learned District Judge, on the basis of the evidence adduced before him, came to the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of adultery. To come to the said conclusion the learned District Judge relied on the evidence adduced by P.W. 2, who is none other than the eldest daughter of the petitioner, who was aged 21 and married at the time of giving evidence. The learned District Judge also held that there was no effective cross-examination challenging the evidence of P.W. 2 regarding the relationship between the respondent and the other persons named in the petition. Counsel for the respondent pointed out certain contradictions in the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2. The arguments advanced by Counsel for the respondent that P.W. 2 is highly interested in P.W. 2, that she is completely under the control of her father and that under his...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/527509/ | I(2000)DMC554,Adultery,adultery; cruelty,1999,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: I(2000)DMC554,527509,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/527509/,11
Madras High Court,"G.Priya @ Braisie vs D.Balamurugan @ Moses on 23 September, 2020",O.P.No.15 of 2013,2020-09-23,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125, Section 22, Section 4, Section 498, Section 55",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[pre_1] C.M.A.No.607 of 2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 23.09.2020 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE T.RAJA C.M.A.No.607 of 2015 G.Priya @ Braisie .. Appellants Versus D.Balamurugan @ Moses .. Respondent Prayer: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has been filed under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act against the order of the Court of Principal District Judge-II at Kancheepuram, in O.P.No.15 of 2013, dated 19.09.2014. For Appellant : Mrs.R.Sumithra Chakkaravarthi For Respondent : Mr.G.Balasubramanian for M/s.Leela and Co. JUDGMENT [p_1] Heard Mrs.Sumithra Chakkaravarthi, learned counsel for the appellant/wife, and Mr.G.Balasubramanian, learned counsel for the respondent/husband, through Video Conferencing, due to COVID-19 pandemic. [p_3] 2. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against the impugned order passed by the learned Principal District Court-II, Kanchipuram, in I.D.O.P.No.15 of 2013, dated 19.09.2014, granting divorce on the ground of cruelty. [p_4] 3. Short facts leading to the filing of this appeal are stated below:- [blockquote_1] http://www.judis.nic.in 1/18 C.M.A.No.607 of 2015 The appellant is the","Heard Mrs.Sumithra Chakkaravarthi, learned counsel for the appellant/wife, and Mr.G.Balasubramanian, learned counsel for the respondent/husband, through Video Conferencing, due to COVID-19 pandemic. 2. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against the impugned order passed by the learned Principal District Court-II, Kanchipuram, in I.D.O.P.No.15 of 2013, dated 19.09.2014, granting divorce on the ground of cruelty. 3. Short facts leading to the filing of this appeal are stated below:- http://www.judis.nic.in 1/18 C.M.A.No.607 of 2015 The appellant is the wife and the respondent is the husband. The marriage was solemnized between the appellant and the respondent on 09.04.2010 at A.G.Church, ECR Road, Pudupattinam, Kancheepuram District, as per Christian Rites and Customs. Out of the conjugal relationship, they were blessed with a female child on 12.01.2011 at J.S.P. Hospital, Chengalpattu. Thereafter, she went to her parental home with child and the respondent/husband also visited her every week. Whileso, on two occasions i.e. on 28.06.2011 and 15.07.2011, when he visited his wife, he was ill-treated, intimidated and deterred him not to visit again. His mother-in-law also prevented her daughter from talking to him. Even on the first birthday function of his child, he was not invited. 9. Mr.G.Balasubramanian, learned counsel for the respondent/husband, submitted that...",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Heard Mrs.Sumithra Chakkaravarthi, learned counsel for the appellant/wife, and Mr.G.Balasubramanian, learned counsel for the respondent/husband, through Video Conferencing, due to COVID-19 pandemic. 2. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against the impugned order passed by the learned Principal District Court-II, Kanchipuram, in I.D.O.P.No.15 of 2013, dated 19.09.2014, granting divorce on the ground of cruelty. 3. Short facts leading to the filing of this appeal are stated below:- http://www.judis.nic.in 1/18 C.M.A.No.607 of 2015 The appellant is the wife and the respondent is the husband. The marriage was solemnized between the appellant and the respondent on 09.04.2010 at A.G.Church, ECR Road, Pudupattinam, Kancheepuram District, as per Christian Rites and Customs. Out of the conjugal relationship, they were blessed with a female child on 12.01.2011 at J.S.P. Hospital, Chengalpattu. Thereafter, she went to her parental home with child and the respondent/husband also visited her every week. Whileso, on two occasions i.e. on 28.06.2011 and 15.07.2011, when he visited his wife, he was ill-treated, intimidated and deterred him not to visit again. His mother-in-law also prevented her daughter from talking to him. Even on...","C.M.A.No.607 of 2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 23.09.2020 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE T.RAJA C.M.A.No.607 of 2015 G.Priya @ Braisie .. Appellants Versus D.Balamurugan @ Moses .. Respondent Prayer: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has been filed under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act against the order of the Court of Principal District Judge-II at Kancheepuram, in O.P.No.15 of 2013, dated 19.09.2014. For Appellant : Mrs.R.Sumithra Chakkaravarthi For Respondent : Mr.G.Balasubramanian for M/s.Leela and Co. JUDGMENT Subsequently, the husband filed divorce case under Section 22 and 10(X) of the Indian Divorce Act in I.D.O.P.No.84 of 2012 before the learned Principal District Court, Chengalpattu, which was later-on transferred to the file of learned Principal District Court- II, Kanchipuram, and renumbered as I.D.O.P.No.15 of 2013. Learned trial Court, vide order dated 19.09.2014, granted the divorce as sought for by the husband. Aggrieved by the same, the wife/appellant herein has filed the present appeal. 4. Assailing the impugned order, Mrs.R.Sumithra Chakkaravarthy, learned counsel for the appellant/wife argued that the wife wants to live with her husband along with the child. When the respondent/husband lodged a complaint before the All Women Police Station, Mamallapuram, requesting for reunion on 16.01.2012, a panchayat was organized, wherein the respondent/husband undertook before the police that he would take a http://www.judis.nic.in 2/18 C.M.A.No.607 of 2015...",23.09.2020 http://www.judis.nic.in 18/18,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/32240815/,Cruelty,cruelty,2020,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,32240815,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/32240815/,10
Gujarat High Court,"Lillykutty Mathew vs C.J. Simon on 20 April, 2000",oposal of marriage through his friend Mr Mathachan.,2000-04-20,"JUDGMENT    M.S. Shah, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 12, Section 18, Section 19, Section 2, Section 3, Section 4",Nullity Sec19; Constitutional Validity,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M.S. Shah, J. 1. This is a petition filed by a Christian wife for a decree of nullity of marriage with the respondent, also a Christian, particularly on the ground that the consent of the petitioner for the marriage in question with the respondent was obtained by fraud. 2. The petitioner's case, as stated in the petition, is as under :- 2.1 Both the petitioner as well as the respondent are Christians. Their marriage was solemnized on 19.5.1985 at St.Marry""s Church, Kuravilangadu, Kerala in accordance with the religious rites and customs of Roman Catholic. 2.2 The petitioner had a decent job in Ahmedabad since 1982, but due to the frequent communal riots in Ahmedabad, the petitioner thought of getting married and settling down in Kerala. During the summer vacation of 1985, the petitioner went to Kerala to meet her parents. At that time, one of her neighbours Mr Chako brought a proposal of marriage through his friend Mr Mathachan. Mr Mathachan is a marriage broker who had taken Rs.1000/- by way of commission. Mr Mathachan introduced the respondent as an eligible bachelor to the petitioner. The respondent informed the petitioner and her parents that he had done his B.A....","3. The respondent has filed counter affidavit denying the petitioner's case and stating that the respondent had done his B.A. in Economics and the respondent was employed as a representative with Agro Chemicals and was receiving Rs.1500/- from the said employment. The respondent has asserted that the respondent was a degree holder and had a reasonable job, temporarily, at the time of marriage and that his financial stability was also sound, that he never informed anybody that he was the owner of 3 acres of land and a house; the 3 acres of land and a house was the property belonging to the respondent's father. The marriage was an arranged marriage and there were sufficient enquiries from both the families before the marriage as the two families are situated within a distance of 8 kms. The financial status of both the families was equal at the time of marriage and since the respondent had a reasonably good job, temporarily, at the time of marriage, the respondent's financial stability was also sound. The petitioner was a Typist and she did not pass the pre-degree course. Hence, she cannot legitimately expect a higher qualification from her husband. Before the marriage, the petitioner's...",6. The following issues have been raised for decision of this Court :- (i) Whether this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and try this petition ? (ii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to a decree of nullity of marriage on the ground that her consent for the marriage in question with the respondent was obtained by fraud ? (iii) Whether this Court can take a view different from the view taken by the Ecclesiastical Court that the petitioner's consent cannot be said to have been obtained by fraud ?,"2.6 The petitioner has stated that if the petitioner had the knowledge about the real state of affairs of the respondent, she would not have given her consent for the marriage. The petitioner had given the consent for the marriage particularly with a reference to the purported quality of the respondent which he claimed to have, but the respondent deliberately concealed several significant factors and made representations to the petitioner in order to obtain her consent for the marriage. The representations made by the respondent and the broker regarding the employment, financial status and educational qualifications were all false and were made with an intent to defraud the petitioner. Thus, the consent of the petitioner for the marriage was obtained by fraud and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to get a decree declaring her marriage with the respondent as null and void. 2.7 In the petition, the petitioner had initially stated that with a view to see that the behaviour of the respondent changes, the petitioner brought the respondent to Ahmedabad and petitioner and the respondent lived at Azad Society,...","3. The respondent has filed counter affidavit denying the petitioner's case and stating that the respondent had done his B.A. in Economics and the respondent was employed as a representative with Agro Chemicals and was receiving Rs.1500/- from the said employment. The respondent has asserted that the respondent was a degree holder and had a reasonable job, temporarily, at the time of marriage and that his financial stability was also sound, that he never informed anybody that he was the owner of 3 acres of land and a house; the 3 acres of land and a house was the property belonging to the respondent's father. The marriage was an arranged marriage and there were sufficient enquiries from both the families before the marriage as the two families are situated within a distance of 8 kms. The financial status of both the families was equal at the time of marriage and since the respondent had a reasonably good job, temporarily, at the time of marriage, the respondent's financial stability was also sound. The petitioner was a Typist and she did not...","2.8 In the petition, as originally drafted, the petitioner had also invoked the ground contained in Section 19(1) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 to the effect that the respondent was impotent at the time of marriage and at the time of the institution of the suit. However, the said ground was not pressed at the hearing of this petition and, therefore, the petition has been heard only for the prayer for decree of nullity of marriage on the ground that the petitioner's consent was obtained by the respondent by fraud.","(a) in a State, the High Court for that State; (b) to (ee) ... ... ... ... and in the case of any petition under this Act, ""High Court"" means the High Court for the area where the husband and wife reside or last resided together. (2) ""District Judge"" means a Judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction however designated; (3) ""District Court"" means, in the case of any petition under this Act, the Court of the District Judge within the local limits of whose ordinary jurisdiction, or of whose jurisdiction under this Act, the husband and wife reside or last resided together; ""Court"" (4) ""Court"" means the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 4. Matrimonial jurisdiction of High Courts to be exercised subject to Act - Exception.- The jurisdiction now exercised by the High Courts in respect of divorce a mensa et toro, and in all other causes, suits and matters matrimonial, shall be exercised by such Courts and by the District Courts subject to the provisions...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/906675/,Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; constitutional_validity,2000,nullity,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,,906675,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/906675/,7
Kerala High Court,"Unknown vs By Adv.Sri.V.N.Ramesan Nambisan on 6 October, 2006",MAT.APPEAL.NO. 155 OF 2007,2006-10-06,THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.HARILAL,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unsound Mind; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.HARILAL & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.M.BABU MONDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF JUNE 2018 / 28TH JYAISHTA, 1940 MAT.APPEAL.NO. 155 OF 2007 ------------------- AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN OP 387/2003 OF FAMILY COURT, KANNUR DATED 06-10-2006 ---------------------- APPELLANT(S)/APPELLANT/PETITIONER JOSEKURIYAN PULLIALIEKAL CHUNDA P.O., VAYAKKARA, PULINGOM DESOM,, TALIPARAMBA. BY ADV.SRI.V.N.RAMESAN NAMBISAN RESPONDENT(S)/RESPONDENT: SOFI JOSE KAITHOTTUNGAL, D/O, VARGHESE, KAITHOTTUNGAL, ALAKODE, VAYATTUPARAMBA P.O.,, TALIPARAMBA TALUK. BY ADVS. SRI.K.R.AVINASH (KUNNATH) SRI.ABDUL RAOOF PALLIPATH THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 18-06-2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: DXY K.HARILAL & A.M.BABU, JJ. ---------------------------------------- Mat.Appeal.No. 155 of 2007 ------------------------------------------------ Dated this the 18th day of June, 2018 JUDGMENT Harilal, J Appellant is the husband of the respondent. He filed O.P.387/2003 before the family court, Kannur, seeking a decree for dissolution of marriage under Sec.10(iii) and (x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 . The respondent resisted the said application and both parties adduced evidence to prove their rival contentions. After considering the evidence on record, the family court dismissed the petition on a finding that the appellant miserably failed to prove that the respondent has been incurably of unsound mind for a...","cruelly towards the appellant in front of the children or relatives and friends. She has not picked up quarrel always as alleged by the appellant. The appellant had never shown any love or affection towards the respondent. The allegation that the respondent had mental ailment even before the marriage is false. She was not suspicious of the appellant, as alleged by him. She never accused the appellant any immoral relations with any other woman. The allegation that the respondent had psychiatric complaint and she was mentally ill and treated in different hospitals before the marriage is not correct. She is fit both physically and mentally. Thus, the respondent denied all the allegations levelled against her as grounds for getting the marriage dissolved. 4. Both parties adduced evidence. The appellant was examined as AW.1 and two other witnesses were examined as AW.2 and AW.3. AW.2 is an independent witness and AW.3 is the Doctor, who treated the respondent for the alleged mental illness. Exts.A1 to A4(c) and X1 to X2 were marked from the part Mat.Appeal.No. 155 of 2007 ::7:: of the appellant and the respondent was examined as RW.1. On an appraisal of the aforesaid evidence, the Family Court found...","April,2002, as she was not residing with the appellant after 2002. The point to be considered is, whether the appellant has succeeded to prove that the respondent was incurably of unsound mind for a period from 06.10.2004 to 06.10.2006 i.e, two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition? 9. It has come out in pleadings and evidence in Exts.X1 and X2 that when her behaviour got aggravated at first, she was taken to hospital on 28.02.2002. Ext.X1 as well as Ext.X2 and Ext.A1 series of documents would prove that the respondent had some kind of mental ailment from 1998 and she was treated up to 31.05.2004. Ext.X1 is the photostat copy of the case records of the respondent from S.H. Hospital, Paynkulam. As per Ext.X1, the treatment starts from 30.11.1998 and ends on 31.07.2002. 10. None of the entries would show any kind of treatment during the period from...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"cruelly towards the appellant in front of the children or relatives and friends. She has not picked up quarrel always as alleged by the appellant. The appellant had never shown any love or affection towards the respondent. The allegation that the respondent had mental ailment even before the marriage is false. She was not suspicious of the appellant, as alleged by him. She never accused the appellant any immoral relations with any other woman. The allegation that the respondent had psychiatric complaint and she was mentally ill and treated in different hospitals before the marriage is not correct. She is fit both physically and mentally. Thus, the respondent denied all the allegations levelled against her as grounds for getting the marriage dissolved. 4. Both parties adduced evidence. The appellant was examined as AW.1 and two other witnesses were examined as AW.2 and AW.3. AW.2 is an independent witness and AW.3 is the Doctor, who treated the respondent for the alleged mental illness. Exts.A1 to A4(c) and X1 to X2 were marked from the part Mat.Appeal.No. 155 of 2007 ::7:: of...","6. On an analysis of the impugned judgment under challenge, it could be seen that the Family Court has rejected the prayer for dissolution of marriage on a finding that the appellant failed to plead and prove the facts constituting statutory requirements, to get the marriage dissolved under Section 10(iii) of the Act. The statutory requirement to get the marriage dissolved under Section 10(iii) of the Act is that the respondent has been incurably of unsound mind for a continuous period not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of Mat.Appeal.No. 155 of 2007 ::8:: the petition. Therefore, the point to be considered in the instant case is, can the Family Court be justified in rejecting the prayer for dissolution of marriage on the ground that the appellant has failed to plead and prove the facts constituting statutory requirements as contemplated under Section 10(iii) of the Act? We have meticulously gone through the averments in the Original Petition. According to the averments in the petition, the appellant admitted that they have lived together as husband and wife from 1992-2002 and two children were born out of the said wedlock. From the very beginning of the marriage, he came to know that the respondent is a person with abnormal character and behaviour and subsequently, the said abnormal behaviour became aggravated...","Hence, this Mat. Appeal is dismissed. Sd/- K.HARILAL, JUDGE Sd/- A.M.BABU, JUDGE Mrcs/DST/Dxy",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/94103353/,Unsound Mind,unsound_mind; cruelty,2006,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,94103353,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/94103353/,9
Bombay High Court,"Lavina Martin vs Sam Bosco Martin on 5 May, 2017",op working in shifts and instead work during regular,2017-05-05,A.S. OKA,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Cruelty; Desertion; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Megha fca_183_2008.doc IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.183 OF 2008 WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO.192 OF 2009 IN FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.183 OF 2008 Mrs. Lavina Martin ...Appellant Versus Mr. Sam Bosco Martin ...Respondent ..... Shri A.N. Mulla for the Appellant. None for the Respondent. CORAM : A.S. OKA & SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, JJ. JUDGMENT RESERVED ON: 1st MARCH, 2017 JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 5th MAY, 2017 Judgment (Per Smt. Anuja Prabhudessai, J.):-",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"27. The aforesaid evidence reveals that in the month of April- 1992 the Appellant-wife had gone to Kenya for about 15 days to see her brother. The mere fact that the Appellant-wife had visited her brother at Kenya with or without consent of the Respondent - husband, or that upon her return she had started residing at her parental house would not per say amount to desertion or final separation as alleged by the Respondent-husband. The moot question is whether the Appellant-wife had no intention of resuming cohabitation. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the evidence of Appellant-wife indicates that she had made attempts to join matrimonial house and that the Respondent-husband had not allowed her to resume cohabitation. The contention of the Appellant-wife is fortified by the fact that the Respondent-husband had issued a legal notice immediately after her return from Kenya. In the said legal...","11. Mr. Mulla, the learned counsel for the Appellant-wife has assailed the judgment on the following grounds. a) The learned Judge has blindly accepted the allegations levelled against the Appellant-wife and discarded the case of the Appellant-wife without any cogent reason. b) The inference drawn by the learned Judge on the basis of the writing at Exhibit-16 that the Appellant-wife was avoiding physical relations with the Respondent-husband is totally erroneous. c) The learned Judge has failed to consider that the marriage was consummated and a child was born in the wedlock. Therefore, the finding that the Appellant-wife was frigid and psychologically impotent are totally contrary to the evidence on record. d) The learned Judge erred in holding that the Appellant- wife had subjected the Respondent-husband to cruelty. e) The learned Judge discarded the evidence of the Appellant-wife that she was forced to leave the matrimonial-home and that the efforts to resume co- Megha 6/21 ::: Uploaded on - 05/05/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 07/05/2017 00:56:15 ::: Megha fca_183_2008.doc habitation were frustrated by the Respondent-husband. f) The findings on cruelty and...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The Appellant wife has by this application challenged the judgment and decree dated 17th July, 2008 whereby the 7th Family Court, Mumbai allowed the Petition under section 10(x) and 10(ix) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 filed by the Respondent-husband and dissolved the marriage solemnised between them. 2. The brief facts necessary to decide this Appeal are as under: The marriage between the Appellant-wife and the Megha 1/21 ::: Uploaded on - 05/05/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 07/05/2017 00:56:15 ::: Megha fca_183_2008.doc Respondent-husband was solemnised on 2.1.1988 at St. Joseph Church, Umarkhadi, Mumbai as per Christian Rules and rituals. On 19.6.1989, a son was born in the wedlock. On 12 th October, 2006 the Respondent -husband filed a petition under section 10(x) and 10(ix) of the Divorce Act, 1869 for a decree of divorce. 3. The Respondent-husband claimed that the Appellant-wife had agreed to stop working in shifts and instead work during regular office hours. However, after marriage she refused to alter her work schedule. The Respondent-husband claimed that the Petitioner-wife was frigid and psychologically impotent. The Respondent-husband further claimed that the Appellant-wife had given in writing that she did not have any objections if he had affair with or marries any other girl and that she displayed total lack of interest and indifference towards him. 4. The Respondent-husband further...","31. Under the circumstances and in view of discussion (supra) the Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 17 th July, 2008 is hereby quashed and set aside. The Application No.192 of 2009 stands dismissed as not maintainable. (ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.) (A.S. OKA, J.) Megha 21/21 ::: Uploaded on - 05/05/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 07/05/2017 00:56:15 :::","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/309082/ | AIR 2017 BOMBAY 156, 2017 (4) ABR 221",Cruelty,cruelty; desertion; nullity_sec19,2017,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 2017 BOMBAY 156, 2017 (4) ABR 221",309082,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/309082/,8
Calcutta High Court,"Mrs. Esther Kiron vs Franklin Promod Kiron on 7 May, 1982",AIR1983CAL56,1982-05-07,"JUDGMENT    Amitabha Dutta, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 3, Section 45",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Amitabha Dutta, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The petitioner-wife pleaded for a decree for dissolution of the marriage with the respondent under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act alleging in the petition that she was married to the respondent according to Christian rites on 18-2-74 at the Baptist Church at Chitaldanga, P. O. Rupnarayanpur, P. S. Salanpur, District Burdwan within the jurisdiction of the learned District Judge, Burdwan. She further stated that after marriage the petitioner went to live with her husband at Gumia, District Giridih (Bihar) where they lived together till 14-6-75. Soon after her marriage the petitioner came to learn that the respondent had illicit connection with one Nili William of Chelidanga of Asansol and when the petitioner tried to prevent the respondent from having such illicit relationship the respondent began to torture the petitioner for which she had to leave the place of her husband on 15-6-75. Since then she has been living with her father at Chitaldanga. According to the petition, the respondent deserted the petitioner by his conduct by living adulterous life with the said woman for which the petitioner was compelled to leave the matrimonial home. There is no averment in the petition that at the time of presentation thereof the respondent-husband was living within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Judge, Burdwan. 3. In view of the averments...","1. This is a Reference under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act for confirmation of the decree nisi passed ex parte by the learned District Judge, Burdwan for dissolution of marriage between the petitioner Mrs. Esther Kiron and respondent Mr. Franklin Promod Kiron in this Divorce Suit. 5. In the circumstances, we find that the learned District Judge, Burdwan had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act andj so the decree nisi passed by him is without jurisdiction. As under Section 45 of the Indian Divorce Act the provisions of the Civil P. C. apply to proceedings under the Indian Divorce Act we find that the petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act filed by the petitioner should be returned under Order 7, Rule 10 of the Civil P. C. for presentation in the Court having jurisdiction to entertain the lame. 6. We, therefore, reject the Reference and set aside the decree nisi passed by the District Judge, Burdwan and send the case back to him for return of the...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1641037/ | AIR1983CAL56, AIR 1983 CALCUTTA 56, 1983 (1) DMC 262 1983 MATLR 205, 1983 MATLR 205",Procedural,procedural,1982,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1983CAL56, AIR 1983 CALCUTTA 56, 1983 (1) DMC 262 1983 MATLR 205, 1983 MATLR 205",1641037,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1641037/,5
Kerala High Court,"George Joseph vs Alphonsa Alias Lovely Mathew And Anr. on 15 October, 1998",AIR1999KER25,1998-10-15,"JUDGMENT    Usha, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 176, Section 18, Section 19, Section 8",Nullity Sec19; Unsound Mind; Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Usha, J.","5. Even though the petitioner has impleaded the 2nd respondent to represent the 1 st respondent as guardian, no order is seen sought or passed for appointing the 2nd respondent as guardian of the 1 st respondent, on the other hand, a counter affidavit has been filed by the 1st respondent herself on behalf of both the respondents and she has been examined as RW1 before the learned single Judge in support of the contentions taken by her in the written statement. The 1 st respondent has denied all the allegations made against her. According to her, the marriage between the petitioner and herself was consummated on the 1st day of the marriage itself and it was incorrect to contend that she refused to have sexual intercourse on that night. They returned to the house of the petitioner on 5-9-1995 and it is not correct to say that she immediately went back to her parental home. She stayed for seven days in petitioner's house. She denied the allegations regarding taking medicine etc. According to her, she did not show any symptoms of an insane person during the above period. She made an allegation in the counter statement that the petitioner's...","13. We will now consider the medical evidence in this case given by PWs 3 and 4, two doctors. PW 4 Dr. K. Sivaramakrishnan have a Master degree in Psychiatry. He was working in Ashirwad Hospital, Kannur. He stated in his chief examination that he was treated the 1st respondent for mental illness. Ext X 3 is the records of treatment. The 1 st respondent was brought to PW 4 by her husband and her father on 17- 1(J-1995. At the time of admission she was reported to have sleeping disturbances, howling occasionally, absent mindedness irrelevant talking and suspicious ideas. Ext. A 1 is the discharge certificates, and Ext. A 2 is the prescription given to the 1st respondent. After discharge from the hospital the 1st respondent was brought to him on 25-10-1995, 18-11 -1995 and 18-12-1995 by her father. As per the records the treatment continued up to 18-1-1996....","2. The marriage between the petitioner and the 1 st respondent was solemnised on 4-9-1995 at St. Thomas Forane Church, Thomapuram as per the rites and ceremonies prevailing in the Syrian Catholic Community. It is alleged in the petition that on the very first day of the marriage itself there was abnormal behaviour on the part of the 1st respondent. At the time of marriage ceremony she was over talkative and was laughing continuously. On the first night after the marriage which they spent at the parental home of the 1st respondent, it is alleged by the petitioner, the 1st respondent refused to have sex with him for the reason that she was having her menstrual period and therefore not doing well. It seems that she was afraid of something in the night. On 5-9-1995 the parties returned to the petitioner's house but they immediately went back to the 1st respondent's parental home, as the 1 st respondent expressed fear of something. She said that she has not feeling well and has forgotten to take medicine from her house. She...","5. Even though the petitioner has impleaded the 2nd respondent to represent the 1 st respondent as guardian, no order is seen sought or passed for appointing the 2nd respondent as guardian of the 1 st respondent, on the other hand, a counter affidavit has been filed by the 1st respondent herself on behalf of both the respondents and she has been examined as RW1 before the learned single Judge in support of the contentions taken by her in the written statement. The 1 st respondent has denied all the allegations made against her. According to her, the marriage between the petitioner and herself was consummated on the 1st day of the marriage itself and it was incorrect to contend that she refused to have sexual intercourse on that night. They returned to the house of the petitioner on 5-9-1995 and it is not correct to say that she immediately went back to her parental home. She stayed for seven days in petitioner's house. She denied the allegations regarding taking medicine etc. According to her, she did not show any...","1. This appeal is at the instance of a Christian husband whose prayer for a decree of nullity of his marriage with the 1 st respondent has failed. The appellant contended that the 1st respondent was a lunatic at the time of the marriage and therefore he is entitled to a decree for nullity of his marriage under Section 18 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 read with Section 19 . He had also alleged fraud on the part of the respondent in obtaining his consent for the marriage. The petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge holding that the petitioner husband has failed to prove that the 1st respondent was a lunatic at the time of the marriage. The allegation of fraud was also found against him. Aggrieved by the above judgment of the learned single Judge the petitioner husband has filed this appeal. 4. The petitioner would further allege that on enquiry it was understood that besides the 1st respondent, her mother, uncle, brother and younger sister are also suffering from lunacy. Dr. Sivaramakrishnan who treated her expressed the opinion that her mental disease is inherited from her parents and it is incurable. It was also revealed on enquiry that she had been undergoing treat-ment for insanity till the date of her marriage. The petitioner, therefore, approached...","18. There may be cases where one of the spouses becomes incurably unsound in mind which would have been sufficient forgetting a decree for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act or other enactments. But as far as the Christians in Kerala are concerned they are still governed by the provisions of the Divorce Act, 1869 . Therefore, even in such cases of incurable mental illness of a spouse after the marriage no decree for dissolution of the marriage could be obtained. This anomaly can be cured only at the instance of the Legislature by bringing in appropriate amendments, to the Statute.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1194173/ | AIR1999KER25, II(1999)DMC238, AIR 1999 KERALA 25, (1999) ILR(KER) 1 KER 567, (1998) 2 KER LT 1036, (1999) 1 CIVLJ 786, (1999) 2 MARRILJ 346, (1999) MATLR 187, (1999) 1 RECCIVR 412, (1999) 2 DMC 238, (1999) 2 HINDULR 460",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; unsound_mind; adultery; cruelty,1998,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1999KER25, II(1999)DMC238, AIR 1999 KERALA 25, (1999) ILR(KER) 1 KER 567, (1998) 2 KER LT 1036, (1999) 1 CIVLJ 786, (1999) 2 MARRILJ 346, (1999) MATLR 187, (1999) 1 RECCIVR 412, (1999) 2 DMC 238, (1999) 2 HINDULR 460",1194173,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1194173/,13
Bombay High Court,"Alfred Wilkinson vs Grace Emily Wilkinson on 4 April, 1923",opted the same defence as the respondent. When the c,1923-04-04,"Kt., C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 1, Section 10, Section 112, Section 130, Section 131, Section 16, Section 17, Section 2, Section 21, Section 22, Section 27, Section 3, Section 31, Section 35, Section 36, Section 362, Section 4, Section 45, Section 5, Section 7, Section 9",Adultery; Cruelty; Constitutional Validity,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Norman Macleod, Kt., C.J.","2. The petitioner alleged that he was married to the respondent on August 8, 1914, at Poona. That he resided in Poona till 1317 and in Bombay until 1920 when he went to England with his wife and two children. That he returned on March 18, 1921, and resided at Poona. From May 1, he was employed in Bombay while his wife remained at Poona and they last resided together at Poona. In Poona the respondent became familiar with the co-respondent and on various occasions committed adultery with him. On August 22, the respondent came to Bombay to the petitioner and on the 23rd left him to go away with the co-respondent who left her that night at the Apollo Hotel. On September 1, the respondent wrote to him that she was going away altogether. The petition was filed on September 7. The respondent denied that she had committed adultery on various occasions at Poona. She alleged that on August 23 the petitioner turned her out of the house when the co-respondent gave her a helping hand and found a room for her at the Apollo Hotel where she stayed till her father arrived and took her back to Poona....","1. Whether plaintiff proves adultery between respondents 1 and 2? 2. If plaintiff proves adultery, has he condoned it by his subsequent conduct? 3. Although no issues were raised with regard to the domicil of the petitioner or the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the petition, it appears that the question of jurisdiction was argued on the basis that the parties were domiciled in England. The learned Judge said: The jurisdiction depends on the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 , and so long as that Act is in force, this Court cannot decline jurisdiction. Moreover the Courts in India are not subject to the Probate Division of the High Court of Justice in England. As apparently divorces granted in India between parties of non-Indian domiciles are not recognised in England, now, the present position of the law is anomalous but that is a matter for the Legislature and not...","104. The point of jurisdiction may be shortly stated. It is contended that the petitioner has an English domicil. The domicil of the wife is the domicil of the husband, and in the case of persons not domiciled in India it is contended that the Indian Courts have no jurisdiction to give a decree for dissolution of marriage.","2. The petitioner alleged that he was married to the respondent on August 8, 1914, at Poona. That he resided in Poona till 1317 and in Bombay until 1920 when he went to England with his wife and two children. That he returned on March 18, 1921, and resided at Poona. From May 1, he was employed in Bombay while his wife remained at Poona and they last resided together at Poona. In Poona the respondent became familiar with the co-respondent and on various occasions committed adultery with him. On August 22, the respondent came to Bombay to the petitioner and on the 23rd left him to go away with the co-respondent who left her that night at the Apollo Hotel. On September 1, the respondent wrote to him that she was going away altogether. The petition was filed on September 7. The respondent denied that she had committed adultery on various occasions at Poona. She alleged that on August 23 the petitioner turned her out of the house when the co-respondent gave her a helping hand and found a...","1. This is a reference under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act IV of 1869 to the High Court of Bombay for the confirmation of a decree for dissolution of marriage in a suit filed in the Court of the District Judge of Poona by the petitioner Alfred Wilkinson against his wife Norah Wilkinson as the respondent and a Captain D' Arcy as co-respondent. 5. By Section 2 of the Act nothing thereinafter contained shall authorise any Court to grant any relief under the Act, except in cases where the petitioner professes the Christian religion and resides in India at the time of presenting the petition, or to make decree of dissolution of marriage except in the following cases: (a) where the marriage shall have been solemnized in India, or (b) where the adultery, rape or unnatural crime complained of shall have been committed in India, or (c) where the husband has, since the solemnization oil the marriage, exchanged his profession of Christianity for the profession of some other form of religion. 6. By Section 7 subject to the provisions contained in the Act, the High Courts and District Courts shall, in all suits and proceedings thereunder, act and give relief on principles and rules which, in the opinion of the said Courts, are as nearly as may be...","9. It has been contended before us that the District Court of Poona had no jurisdiction to pass the decree under reference for two reasons: (1) because the Indian Councils Act, 1861, could not be deemed to warrant the making of laws by the Indian Government to interfere with the status of subjects of the Crown not domiciled in India, (2) because even if the Indian Councils Act did warrant the making of such laws, the Indian Divorce Act itself did not give such jurisdiction to the Indian Courts. It cannot be disputed that ever since Act IV of 1869 was passed, the Indian Courts have assumed to themselves jurisdiction to divorce non-domiciled parties. It has never been questioned that decrees of divorce in such cases were valid in India and it has been taken for granted that they were also valid in England: Thornton v. Thornton (1886) 11 P.D. 176; Warier v. Warier (1890) 15 P.D. 152; and In re Norton's Settlement, Norton v. Norton [1908] 1 Ch. 471. The decision of the President of the Probate, Divorce and...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/983780/ | (1923)25BOMLR945, AIR 1923 BOMBAY 321",Adultery,adultery; cruelty; constitutional_validity,1923,judicial_separation,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (1923)25BOMLR945, AIR 1923 BOMBAY 321",983780,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/983780/,45
Kerala High Court,"M.P. Mary vs V. Varghese on 29 September, 2008",Cr.P.C.? These,2008-09-29,"Justice R.BASANT  Dated, O R D E R  R.BASANT, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 124, Section 125, Section 127, Section 22, Section 26, Section 7",Desertion; Cruelty; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM RPFC.No. 11 of 2003() 1. M.P. MARY, D/O. PAILY, ... Petitioner Vs 1. V. VARGHESE, KOCHERIL HOUSE, ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.P.V.BABY For Respondent :SMT.M.MEENA JOHN The Hon'ble MR. Justice R.BASANT Dated :29/09/2008 O R D E R R.BASANT, J ------------------------------------ R.P.F.C.No.11 of 2003 ------------------------------------- Dated this the 29th day of September, 2008 ORDER What is the effect and consequences of a decree for judicial separation under Sec.22 of the Indian Divorce Act (for short `the Act') ? What impact, does such a decree have on the subsequent claim of a wife for maintenance under Sec.125 Cr.P.C.? These questions arise for consideration in this RP(FC). 2. On basic facts, it appears that there is no dispute. The petitioner and the respondent are spouses. Their marriage took place on 2/9/1979. A child was born in the wed-lock. That child has already attained majority. The spouses started separate residence from 15/7/1980. The husband filed an application for divorce on the ground of cruelty. That was dismissed. Later, he filed an application for decree of judicial separation. That was also rejected. He renewed his prayer for a decree for judicial separation and the same was...","7. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends that it having already been concluded by a decree of a competent civil court that the wife is guilty of the matrimonial misconduct of desertion and the husband having already secured a decree for judicial separation, the wife is not entitled to claim maintenance under Sec.125 Cr.P.C. 8. I have considered all the relevant contentions. The records have been perused by me. I shall now proceed to advert to the various contentions raised by the learned counsel for the rival contestants. 9. First of all, there is an attempt to contend that the parties had agreed that an application under Sec.125 Cr.P.C. would be maintainable. This is evident from the judgment dated 3.4.97 in M.F.A.No.697/96, it is contended. A copy of the same has been marked as Ext.P2 and I have already extracted the relevant statements in para-2 of the said judgment. I am unable to agree that the said agreement would in any way advance the case of either contestant. What is agreed, to extract the words of the Division Bench was as follows: ""It is also agreed between R.P.F.C.No.11 of 2003 5 the parties that the...","b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate, as such magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct: Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the...","6. The learned counsel for the petitioner assails the impugned order on various grounds. It is contended that the securing of a decree for judicial separate reveals that the husband was not interested in cohabitation. Such a husband cannot later on turn round and advance a contention that the wife is residing separately without just or sufficient cause. The decree for judicial separation is itself sufficient cause. The absence of any offer to maintain her convincingly justifies the separate residence. Ext.P3 confirms the husband's remarriage R.P.F.C.No.11 of 2003 4 and birth of a child in such subsequent marriage. It is, in these circumstances, contended that even accepting all the contentions, the claimant/wife is entitled for maintenance. 28. It is contended that the wife by her anterior conduct has sufficiently shown that she has no sufficient reason or just ground to reside separately. That is at an anterior point of time. He has not made any offer to maintain her on condition that she lives with him in response to the claim for maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. She has not refused...","7. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends that it having already been concluded by a decree of a competent civil court that the wife is guilty of the matrimonial misconduct of desertion and the husband having already secured a decree for judicial separation, the wife is not entitled to claim maintenance under Sec.125 Cr.P.C. 8. I have considered all the relevant contentions. The records have been perused by me. I shall now proceed to advert to the various contentions raised by the learned counsel for the rival contestants. 9. First of all, there is an attempt to contend that the parties had agreed that an application under Sec.125 Cr.P.C. would be maintainable. This is evident from the judgment dated 3.4.97 in M.F.A.No.697/96, it is contended. A copy of the same has been marked as Ext.P2 and I have already extracted the relevant statements in para-2 of the said judgment. I am unable to agree that the said agreement would in any way advance the case of either contestant. What is agreed, to extract the words...","41) has chosen not to follow the decision in 2001(2) KLT SN 44 and has taken the view that the decree for judicial separation cannot be equated to a decree for divorce. I am in complete agreement with the decision in Thomas Kuriakose (supra). In a decree for judicial separation the marital tie remains in tact without severance. That is the crucial distinction between a decree for judicial separation and a decree for divorce. It will be apposite in this context to refer to Section 22 of the Act. It reads as follows: ""22. Bar to decree for divorce a mensa et toro but judicial separation obtainable by husband or wife:- No decree shall hereafter be made for a divorce a mensa et toro, but the husband or wife may obtain a decree of judicial separation, on the ground of adultery or cruelty or desertion for two years or upwards, and such decree shall have the effect of a divorce a mensa et toro under the existing law, and such other legal effect as hereinafter mentioned."" (emphasis supplied) 11. It is crucial to note that a decree for a divorce a mensa et toro is not equivalent to a decree for divorce. The mere fact that under the English law as amended later a decree for divorce a mensa et...","12. It will now be apposite to ascertain the nature, effect and consequences of a decree for judicial separation. Section 22 of the Act says that it shall have the effect of a decree for divorce a mensa et toro and such other legal effect as hereinafter mentioned. Chapter V of the Act - having Sections 22 to 26 , does not at all refer specifically to the obligation to cohabit after R.P.F.C.No.11 of 2003 8 securing a divorce or about the right/obligation to receive/pay maintenance. In a decree for divorce a mensa et toro which is the equivalent of a decree for judicial separation the spouses continue to be man and wife. That marital nexus continues without interruption. Marital obligations remain intact. But the matrimonial indiscretions of cruelty, adultery and desertion for a period of 2 years on the part of the guilty spouse entitles the other for a decree for divorce a mensa et toro. Such spouse gets freedom from bed and board. Such spouse has no obligation to share his/her bed or table with the other. The...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/829453/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty; adultery,2008,judicial_separation,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,829453,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/829453/,19
Delhi High Court,"Balbir Singh vs Shanti Devi on 6 January, 1970",ILR1970DELHI21,1970-01-06,"JUDGMENT   V.S. Deshpande, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 100, Section 13, Section 157, Section 18, Section 21, Section 22, Section 23, Section 25, Section 32, Section 33, Section 9",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT V.S. Deshpande, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(13) It is in the light of the above legal position that the pleadings and the evidence on record have to be scrutinised to find out whether such ""reasonable excuse"" is wanting to justify the withdrawal of the wife from the society of the husband in the present case. The burden of proving the want of such reasonable excuse is of course on the husband who was the petitioner and who is now the appellant. The burden is however a negative one and can be discharged by the husband if he shows that his conduct has been completely free from blame and that he has not done any act which would justify the wife in withdrawing from his society. (14) The petition by the husband was, therefore, not expected to state anything, more than that the wife had withdrawn from the society of the husband without reasonable excuse. The wife...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","(1) This appeal is by the husband Balbir Singh (hereinafter called the husband) whose petition for restitution of conjugal rights under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Act) against his wife respondent Shanti Devi (hereinafter called the wife) was dismissed by the trial Court. (2) The husband was at first married to the elder sister of the wife and has a daughter from her. The elder sister died on 8-12-1954 after which the parties were married on 16-2-1955. A daughter was born of this marriage on 1-12-1956. (3) The husband alleged that the wife left him on 11-5-1960 without any reasonable cause at the instigation of her father Naval Singh who is Respondent No. 2. Since then the wife has not come back to live with the husband. The husband, therefore, filed a petition on 18th May 1960 against the wife alleging that the wife had withdrawn from his society without any reasonable cause and, therefore, prayed for a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. (4) The petition was resisted by the wife on the following grounds :- THErelations between the parties were normal up to the year 1958. Thereafter the husband fell in love with one Usha Kiran and began to ill-treat the wife. He even abused her and even threatened physical violence and...","(12) Sections 9(1) and 10(1)(a) are also related to the question cf the maintenance of a spouse residing separately. It is the ""brooding omnipresence"" of this question in the background which gives importance to the proceedings instituted under section 9 and section 10 . For, ""the conduct of the parties"" would have to be taken into account by the Court under section 25(1) of the Act in granting maintenance to one party to the marriage even after a matrimonial relief is finally granted by the Court to the other party. A finding by the Court under section 9(1) or section 10(1)(a) as to whether the party claiming maintenance had reasonable excuse or cause for living apart from the other party would be relevant under section 25(1) when the grant of maintenance is considered by the Court. The expression '""conduct of the parties'"" is also a general one in the same way as the expression ""reasonable excuse"". Neither of them can be said to be confined only to a matrimonial offence or to a ground sufficient to obtain judicial separation, nullity...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1387227/ | ILR1970DELHI21,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,1970,restitution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: ILR1970DELHI21,1387227,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1387227/,11
Gauhati High Court,"Lal Changmunga vs Lianpari on 7 January, 1988",oped between them. He was required to go to Shillong,1988-01-07,"JUDGMENT   Saikia, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 11, Section 112, Section 17, Section 3",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Saikia, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"5. We have carefully perused the petition for divorce and the evidence on record The petitioner spoke about misunderstanding and non-adjustment between him and the respondent and that he doubted and denied the paternity of the child born after the respondent separated from him. The date of separation, according to the respondent, is 19th May, 1981 in which case the date of birth (January, 1982) of the child would be well within the period of gestation, which the respondent stated in her evidence. The statement that the respondent refused to live with the petitioner has also been denied by the respondent saying that no customary go between was sent inviting her back home. Of course the fact that the respondent has been living separately for the last six years has not been denied. The petitioner has not expressly alleged adultery of the respondent with any one. What he alleged was...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. We have perused the records of the case. We find that the petitioner has not named the person with whom the respondent is alleged to have ""developed intimacy"". No co-respondent has been impleaded. 4. Section 11 of the Indian Divorce Act provides : ""Upon any such petition presented by a husband, the petitioner shall make the alleged adulterer a co-respondent to the said petition, unless he is excused from so doing on one of the following grounds, to be allowed by the Court- (1) that the respondent is leading the life of a prostitute, and that the petitioner knows of no person with whom the adultery has been committed; (2) that the name of the alleged adulterer is unknown to the petitioner although he has made due efforts to discover it; (3) that the alleged adulterer is dead."" In the instant case, the petitioner did not apply for excuse and he was not excused on any of these grounds by the Court. The adulterer could not be named by the petitioner despite the challenge thrown by the respondent. 6. As regards the first question what has been alleged in the petition and in the deposition of the petitioner is that the respondent ""developed intimacy"" with a friend of the plaintiff. The learned District Judge has also referred to this...","1. This is a reference under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for confirmation of decree nisi dated 16-7-87 passed by the District Judge, Cachar at Silchar under Section 10 of the Act. The petitioner sued for dissolution of the marriage between him and the respondent. Both of them are Mizos by birth and Christians by religion. 2. Examining himself, the petitioner deposed that he married respondent Lianpari on 12th April, 1979 at Silchar according to Christian rites at Silchar Christian Mission. In that wedlock a son was born to them in September, 1980. However, thereafter ""non-adjustment and misunderstanding"" developed between them. He was required to go to Shillong for training and during his absence the respondent ''developed intimacy"" with one of his friends and a child was born in February, 1981, and that she was living separately and so he wanted divorce. He also stated that the respondent sent affidavit alleging divorce. It appears from the records that the respondent sent a letter dt. 27-1-87 to the Court authenticated by a Gazetted Officer stating that she left...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/823353/ | AIR 1988 GAUHATI 53, (1988) 24 REPORTS 358, (1988) 1 DMC 433, (1988) 2 HINDULR 77",Adultery,adultery,1988,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 1988 GAUHATI 53, (1988) 24 REPORTS 358, (1988) 1 DMC 433, (1988) 2 HINDULR 77",823353,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/823353/,9
Jharkhand High Court,"Bhalerian Tirkey vs Lily Grase Minz on 29 March, 2010",No. 183 of 2009,2010-03-29,THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. Y. EQBAL,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 22",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI F.A. No. 183 of 2009 Bhalerian Tirkey ... ... ... ... ... Appellant Versus Lily Grase Minz ... ... ... ... ... Respondent ------ CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. Y. EQBAL THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR ------ For the Appellant: M/s. Prashant Pallav, Shekhar Kumar For the Respondent: M/s. P.P.N. Roy, Neeraj Kumar, Arvind Kr. ------ Reserved on: 08.2.2010 Pronounced on: 29th March, 2010 M. Y. Eqbal, J. Heard the parties. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 03.8.2009",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi in Matrimonial Title Suit No.206 of 2008 whereby he has allowed the suit filed by the respondent-wife for a decree of divorce under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act and dissolved the marriage between the parties. 3. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass: The respondent-wife filed the aforementioned suit for a decree of divorce under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act. Both the appellant and the respondent are Christians and their marriage was solemnized on 30.12.1986 at Catholic Church and out of the wedlock, one female child was born in the year 1991 and one male child was born in 1996. The respondent's case was that the appellant was initially employed in Railway but subsequently after qualifying Bihar Public Service Examination, posted as District Superintendent of Education at Ramgarh. The respondent-wife alleged that the appellant occasionally visited the place of the respondent and after taking liquor, used to abuse and torture the respondent. He was also having affairs with another lady and threatened her to kill if she interferes with the affairs of the appellant. The respondent's further case was that she was living separately since November, 2005 and in spite of several attempts of reconciliation, the appellant refused to keep her with him. 4. The...","6. The petitioner has been able to prove cruelty on the part of the respondent as well as withdrawal of respondent from the society of petitioner. The petitioner is entitled to get a decree of divorce for the aforesaid reasons. Accordingly, the prayer of the petitioner is hereby allowed. The marriage between the parties held on 30.12.1986 is hereby dissolved by a decree of divorce. Office is directed to prepare decree. 7. There is prayer for grant educational expenditure of the children against the respondent. The petitioner will be at liberty to file a separate suit for initiate a proceeding for the educational expenses as demanded by her. With this observation the suit stands allowed."" 8. I have gone through the lower Court records, from which it reveals that the appellant, who was the respondent in the Court below, in spite of service of notice, did not appear. Consequently on 21.2.2009 the suit was fixed for ex-parte hearing. The Court below, thereafter, proceeded for hearing of the suit ex-parte. In the meantime on 25.5.2009 two petitions were filed by the...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/815655/ | (2010) 2 JCR 564 (JHA), AIR 2010 JHARKHAND 112, 2010 (2) AIR JHAR R 517, 2010 A I H C 3486, (2010) 89 ALLINDCAS 744 (JHA)",Unclear,unclear,2010,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (2010) 2 JCR 564 (JHA), AIR 2010 JHARKHAND 112, 2010 (2) AIR JHAR R 517, 2010 A I H C 3486, (2010) 89 ALLINDCAS 744 (JHA)",815655,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/815655/,3
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Jaspal vs Thaplass Mohan Singh on 5 September, 2023",2023:PHHC:116473,2023-09-05,HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARVIND SINGH SANGWAN,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 12, Section 125, Section 24",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:116473 TA-1137-2023 (O&M) -1- Neutral Citation No. 2023:PHHC:116473 IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH TA-1137-2023 (O&M) Date of decision: 05.09.2023 Jaspal ...Petitioner Versus Thaplass Mohan Singh ...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARVIND SINGH SANGWAN Present:- Mr. Ravinder Pankaj, Advocate for Mr. C. S. Rana, Advocate for the petitioner. ARVIND SINGH SANGWAN, J. (Oral)",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,"Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon 2022 Live Law (SC) 627 N.C.V. Aishwarya vs. A.S. Saravana Karthik Sha , wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: After hearing the counsel for the petitioner, considering the fact that issuance of notice to the respondent has the consequences of staying further proceedings before the trial Court, otherwise the petitioner- wife will have to bear the litigation expenses and transportation expenses and in view of the fact that in case notice of motion is issued, even the respondent/husband has to bear the litigation expenses and in also in view of the judgments rendered in Sumita Singh 's case, Rajani Kishor Pardeshi's case as well as N.C.V. Aishwarya 's case (supra), this Court deems it appropriate to allow the present petition, with the following directions:-","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Prayer in this petition is for transfer of the petition filed by the respondent-husband under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, pending before the Family Court, Abohar to the competent Court of jurisdiction at Ludhiana. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that a minor child is residing in the care and custody of the petitioner and the petitioner, on account of a matrimonial discord, has filed a petition under Section 12 of the DV Act at Ludhiana, which is pending. It is further submitted that the respondent-husband has filed the present petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 at Abohar in order to harass the petitioner. It is further submitted that the petitioner is facing great difficulty in prosecuting the said case, as there is a distance of about 218 Kms between the aforesaid two places. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgments Sumita Singh Vs. Kumar Sanjay , 2002 SC 396 and Rajani Kishor Pardeshi Vs. Kishor 1 of 4 ::: Downloaded on - 18-09-2023 12:39:33 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:116473 TA-1137-2023 (O&M) -2- Neutral Citation No. 2023:PHHC:116473 Babulal Pardeshi, 2005(12) SCC 237, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that ""while deciding the transfer application, the Courts are required to give more weightage and consideration to the convenience of the female litigants and transfer...",05.09.2023 (ARVIND SINGH SANGWAN) Waseem Ansari JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether reportable Yes/No Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:116473 4 of 4 ::: Downloaded on - 18-09-2023 12:39:34 :::,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/149180892/,Procedural,procedural,2023,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,149180892,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/149180892/,7
Madras High Court,"Arokia Raj Morais vs Mabia Bibia Rani Morais And Ors. on 24 March, 2006",II(2007)DMC209,2006-03-24,"ORDER   M. Thanikachalam, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER M. Thanikachalam, J.","18. The specific case of the petitioner that the first respondent continued her adulterous life with the second respondent must be incorrect, which could be seen from Ex.P-3. The first respondent has stated in Ex.P-3 that the second respondent left to Singapore. It is not the case of the petitioner, that the first respondent had any sexual activities with any other person apart from the second and third respondents. There is no mention in Ex.P-5, that the second respondent is the father of the male child. If at all, Ex.P-5 may lead to the conclusion that the petitioner is not the father, but that does not mean, the second respondent must be the father of the child. This being the position, it may not be safe to come to the conclusion that the child born to the first respondent on 18.2.1996 is not the child of the petitioner. Assuming that the first respondent had illegal activities with some other person than the second and the third respondents resulting the birth of a male child, then that person also should have been impleaded as a party, as mandated under law, which is not the case in the petition. Therefore, relying upon...","7. On the above pleadings, the following issues were framed on 10.4.2002 for decision: (1) Whether the respondent is guilty of adultery ? (2) Whether the petitioner is entitled to a Decree of divorce on the ground of adultery ? 8. The third respondent by name Pasupathyrajan though arrayed as adulterer, subsequently, he was given up and therefore, it is needless to go into the allegations levelled in the petition connecting the first respondent and the third respondent. Issues 1 & 2: 9. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner and the first respondent belong to Christianity, that their marriage was solemnised according to Christian Rites and Customs on 3.5.1995, that thereafter, they were living as husband and wife for some tine very happily, that the first respondent also gave birth to a male child on 18.2.1996 (though paternity is disputed) and that within two years, the happy married life...","11. In this case, by going through the entire petition, I am unable to find any specific instances of adultery said to have been committed by the first respondent, except the bald allegations levelled, that too more or less prior to the marriage, not subsequent to the marriage giving specific dates with specific instances. In para-6 of the petition, the conduct of the first respondent narrated appears to be prior to the marriage i.e. during her school days, which will not come to the aid of the husband to snap the matrimonial relationship. In para-7 of the petition, though it is stated that respondents 1 & 2 applied leave, left the school, etc., no other details are given, where they had been to, where they have stayed, etc. Similarly in paragraph-8 also, the details given are regarding the conduct of the first respondent at Villupuram during her school days and no instance is specifically stated that after the marriage also, the alleged illegal activities or immoral activities of the first respondent continued with the other respondents. In paragraph-10, some anonymous...","18. The specific case of the petitioner that the first respondent continued her adulterous life with the second respondent must be incorrect, which could be seen from Ex.P-3. The first respondent has stated in Ex.P-3 that the second respondent left to Singapore. It is not the case of the petitioner, that the first respondent had any sexual activities with any other person apart from the second and third respondents. There is no mention in Ex.P-5, that the second respondent is the father of the male child. If at all, Ex.P-5 may lead to the conclusion that the petitioner is not the father, but that does not mean, the second respondent must be the father of the child. This being the position, it may not be safe to come to the conclusion that the child born to the first respondent on 18.2.1996 is not the child of the petitioner. Assuming that the first respondent had illegal activities with some other person than the second and the third respondents resulting the birth of a male child, then that person also should have...","1. This is a suit filed by the husband to dissolve the marriage between himself and the first respondent on the ground of adultery, under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869, hereinafter called 'the Act'. 2. The marriage between the petitioner and the first respondent was solemnised on 3.5.1995 in accordance with the Christian Rites and Customs, at St. Andrews Church, Madras-600 112. After the marriage, both were living happily in the matrimonial home. At the time of the marriage, the first respondent was working as a teacher and obtaining permission from the petitioner, she continued to work as a teacher even after the marriage also. 3. In the month of September 1995, the family members of the petitioner and the first respondent including the petitioner and the first respondent went to Mysore for sight-seeing, where they happened to meet a teacher of Holy Cross Convent, Villupuram, where the first respondent did her school studies. On seeing the teacher, the first respondent not only became nervous but also ran away from the place, which conduct revealed on enquiry, that she was having illegal relationship and immoral activities during her school days. The first respondent without any reason used to go to the matrimonial home in the evenings very late and even she used to leave the house on Saturdays...","In the result, the petition is dismissed, but under the facts and circumstances of the case, ordering the parties to bear their respective costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/442538/ | II(2007)DMC209, [2006(4)JCR90(MAD)], (2006)2MLJ537",Adultery,adultery,2006,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: II(2007)DMC209, [2006(4)JCR90(MAD)], (2006)2MLJ537",442538,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/442538/,10
Allahabad High Court,"Dennis Lall vs Smt. Amita Lall on 3 March, 1997",First Appeal No. 432 of 1996.,1997-03-03,"JUDGMENT    G.P. Mathur, J., Family Court, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 17A, Section 20, Section 22, Section 26",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT G.P. Mathur, J. 1. The two appeals have been placed before this Special Bench, on a reference made by Judge, Family Court, Jhansi. The appeals are being disposed of by a common order as the controversy raised is identical.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","5. Section 17 of the Principal Act which provides that every decree for dissolution of marriage made by a District Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court has been amended by the (Indian) Divorce (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1957 (U. P. Act No. XXX of 1957) which came into force on October 21, 1957. The Amending Act received assent of the President of India and therefore in view of Article 254 of the Constitution it shall prevail over the Central Act. The Central Act has been drastically amended by the U. P. Act and Section 17 has been amended in the following manner: ""1. Paragraph one to five shall be omitted. 2. In paragraph six words ""or special"" occurring between the words ""general"" and ""or"" shall be omitted.""","2. Dennis Lal filed a petition under Section 22 of Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against his wife Smt. Amita Lall, which was registered as suit No. 270 of 1994, praying that a decree of judicial separation be passed on the ground of adultery and cruelty. The Judge, Family Court, Jhansi passed a decree for judicial separation on 21-5-96 but directed that the same shall be effective after confirmation by the High Court and accordingly made a reference to this Court which has been registered as First Appeal No. 432 of 1996. 3. Smt. Anita Rohini Shirin Newton filed a petition under Section 10 of the Act against her husband Ivan Alphonsus Michael Lewis, which was registered as Suit No. 321 of 1993, praying that her marriage with her husband be dissolved by a decree of divorce. The Judge, Family Court, passed a decree for divorce on 29-8-95 but directed that the same shall be effective after confirmation by the High Court in accordance with Section 17 of the Act and accordingly made a reference to...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1660230/ | AIR1998ALL12, II(1997)DMC119, AIR 1998 ALLAHABAD 12, 1998 A I H C 676",Procedural,procedural,1997,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1998ALL12, II(1997)DMC119, AIR 1998 ALLAHABAD 12, 1998 A I H C 676",1660230,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1660230/,4
Madras High Court,"Mrs. Dawn Henderson vs D. Henderson on 11 February, 1969",AIR1970MAD104,1969-02-11,"JUDGMENT    M. Anantanarayanan, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 22",Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M. Anantanarayanan, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a reference under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, by the learned District Judge of Tiruchirapalli, for confirmation of the decree nisi dissolving the marriage between the parties under Section 17 of the same Act. 2. The petitioner is the wife, and she has put forward, as the ground for dissolution of the marriage, the Clause of Section 10 which refers to ""adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa et thoro."" In the body of the petition, the petitioner states that the respondent, her husband, married her, according to Christian rites, at St. Joseph's Church Golden Rock, Tiruchirapalli on 27-5-1961. But soon after the marriage, the respondent behaved to her with great cruelty, and brought drunken young men to the house and attempted to constrain or induce the petitioner to submit to the indecent overtures of those men. He also beat her and starved her, and in brief, attempted to compel her to lead a life of prostitution. Because she resented this and resisted the attempts with all might, the respondent forced her to leave the house in September 1961, and she has since been living with her parents. In paragraph 10 the petitioner also states that the respondent was leading an adulterous immoral life, visiting...","7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that it may still be open to the petitioner, if the respondent is continuing in his profligate ways and is committing acts of adultery with other women, to take out further proceedings for actual divorce, on the basis of evidence about such a specific act. We merely record this with the observation that it may certainly be open to the petitioner to resort to such a remedy, if there is an adequate basis for it, in the future.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1267482/ | AIR1970MAD104,Adultery,adultery; cruelty,1969,judicial_separation,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: AIR1970MAD104,1267482,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1267482/,3
Allahabad High Court,"Smt. Chitra Alias Mahima vs Mohit Kumar (Maisi) on 29 November, 2023",Opposite Party :- Mohit Kumar (Maisi),2023-11-29,"Saral Srivastava,J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:225491 Court No. - 2 Case :- TRANSFER APPLICATION (CIVIL) No. - 632 of 2023 Applicant :- Smt. Chitra Alias Mahima Opposite Party :- Mohit Kumar (Maisi) Counsel for Applicant :- Vikas Singh Hon'ble Saral Srivastava,J. Order on Order Sheet. In view of the office report dated 28.11.2023, service of notice upon opposite party is deemed sufficient. No one has put in appearance on behalf of the opposite party even in repeated calls. Order on Transfer Application. 1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"3. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the applicant that applicant along with her minor daughter is residing with her aged parents at Orai whereas opposite party has instituted the divorce petition at Kanpur Nagar. It is submitted that financial condition of the applicant is not good and parents of the applicant is not in a position to attend the proceeding along with the applicant at Kanpur Nagar. It is further submitted that distance between Orai to Kanpur Nagar is about 130 kilometres and applicant has no source of income to meet the litigation expenses and other expenses which is to be incurred in travelling from Orai to Kanpur Nagar to contest the case instituted by opposite party at Kanpur Nagar along with her minor daughter on each and every date fixed in the matter. Thus, the submission is that if the case is allowed to be proceeded at Kanpur Nagar, applicant would suffer serious prejudice. 4. The opposite party has neither put in appearance nor filed any counter affidavit. As the averments contained in the affidavit filed...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The present application has been filed by the applicant-wife seeking transfer of Case No.1108 of 2023 (Mohit Kumar (Maisi) Vs. Smt. Chitra Alias Mahima), under Section 10 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869 pending in the court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Kanpur Nagar to the competent court at Jalaun at Orai. 6. In such view of the fact, Case No.1108 of 2023 (Mohit Kumar (Maisi) Vs. Smt. Chitra Alias Mahima), under Section 10 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869 pending in the court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Kanpur Nagar is transferred to the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Jalaun at Orai. 7. The Principal Judge, Family Court, Kanpur Nagar is directed to remit the record of Case No.1108 of 2023 (Mohit Kumar (Maisi) Vs. Smt. Chitra Alias Mahima), under Section 10 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869 to the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Jalaun at Orai for disposal of the same. 8. The Transfer Application is allowed with no order as to costs.",Order Date :- 29.11.2023 R.S. Tiwari,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/36101639/,Unclear,unclear,2023,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,36101639,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/36101639/,5
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"Fazal Masih vs Smt. Patience on 18 February, 1974",1974(7)WLN74,1974-02-18,"JUDGMENT    Beri, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 12, Section 13, Section 14, Section 17, Section 32, Section 47",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Beri, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a reference under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act (hereinafter called ""the Act"") for confirmation of a decree nisi for dissolution of the marriage of the petitioner Fazal Masih and his wife Smt. Patience. 2. The petitioner and the respondent were married on December 4, 1959, under the Indian Christian Marriage Act The respondent gave birth to two male children. Domestic bickerings appear to have been a part of their married life. Certain proceedings had taken place between the husband and the wife with regard to the maintenance of the latter. 3. It appears to us that the learned District Judge who passed the consent decree for divorce under the Act had not taken the trouble of studying the relevant provisions of law. In view of the provisions of the Act a divorce on consent is not permissible and it is only possible if the misconduct as envisaged under Section 10 of the Act is established by either spouse. Section 12 of the Act requires that the Court shall satisfy it-sell so far as it reasonably can, not only as to the facts alleged, but also whether or not the petitioner has been in any manner accessory to, or conniving at the adultery, or has condoned the same and shall also enquire into any counter charge...","However on August 9, 1966 the petitioner presented a petition in the Court of the District Judge, Udaipur, under Section 32 of the Act for restitution of coniuaal rights. Issues were framed in the case and the trial proceeded. In the course of the proceedings, on December 14, 1968 the husband and the wife filed a joint petition saying that their relations had deteriorated to such an extent that it was impossible for them to live as husband and wife and the Court may be pleased to pass a decree for divorce in terms of a compromise reached between them. The Court accorded its approval to the compromise and a decree for divorce was passed on that very day, that is, 14-12-1968. It was on April 27, 1972 that the learned District Judge transmitted the record to this Court for confirmation of the decree. 4. In these circumstances, we regret, we cannot confirm the decree and set aside the decree for divorce passed by the learned District Judge in utter ignorance of the law on the subject. We direct the...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/480131/ | 1974(7)WLN74,Adultery,adultery,1974,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: 1974(7)WLN74,480131,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/480131/,5
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Rekha vs Emanuel on 27 November, 2008",oppose the prayer made in this,2008-11-27,HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RAJIVE BHALLA,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 9",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"TA No.259 of 2008 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH. TA No.259 of 2008 Date of Decision: 27.11.2008 Rekha .....Applicant Vs. Emanuel ....Respondent .... CORAM : HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RAJIVE BHALLA **** Present : Mr.Munish Behl, Advocate for the applicant. .... RAJIVE BHALLA, J (Oral) Prayer in this application is for transfer of a petition filed by the respondent titled as ""Emanuel V. Rekha"" under Sections 25 and 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act') for custody of the minor child from the Court of District Judge, Gurdaspur, to a Court of competent jurisdiction at Amritsar.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Counsel for the applicant submits that as per Section 9 of the Act, a petition praying for custody of the minor has to be filed within the jurisdiction of a Court, where the minor ordinarily resides. In the present case, the minor's ordinary place of residence is Amritsar. It is further prayed that as the application for custody of the minor arises, in essence, from a matrimonial dispute, being defended by the respondent i.e. a criminal trial and a petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act both at Amritsar., TA No.259 of 2008 2 the petition for custody of the minor be transferred to Amritsar. The petition filed under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act was transferred to Amritsar, vide order dated 25.4.2008, passed in T.A. No.144 of 2007 titled as ""Rekha V. Emanuel"". I have heard learned counsel for the applicant and after giving my thoughtful consideration to the facts noticed herein above, hold that it would be just and expedient that the case is transferred from the Court of District Judge, Gurdaspur, to the Court of competent jurisdiction at Amritsar. In addition, the petition for grant of divorce filed under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act has already been transferred by this Court to the District Judge, Amritsar. It would be necessary to mention...",27.11.2008 (RAJIVE BHALLA) GS JUDGE,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/321408/,Procedural,procedural,2008,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,321408,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/321408/,3
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Samanthia Jacob vs Xavier Jacob @ Bobby & Anr on 5 September, 2009",No. 3 of 2001,2009-09-05,Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vinod K.Sharma,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"MATRF No. 3 of 2001 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH MATRF No. 3 of 2001 Date of Decision: 5.09.2009 Samanthia Jacob ...Petitioner Vs. Xavier Jacob @ Bobby & Anr. ..Respondents Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vinod K.Sharma Present: None. Vinod K.Sharma,J. (Oral)",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","This reference under section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (for short the Act) has been made by learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh on a petition filed by Samanthia Jacob for dissolution of marriage under section 10 of the Act. The petitioner filed a petition under section 10 of the Act for dissolution of marriage on the ground of adultery. It was pleaded that the parties are Christian and were married on 10.8.1990 according to Christian rites in Catholic Church, Chandigarh. The parties lived together as husband and wife. From the wedlock two daughters were born who were minor on the date of filing of the petition. It was pleaded case of the petitioner that respondent No.1 was addicted to wine and remained intoxicated throughout MATRF No. 3 of 2001 2 the day. He was also said to be addicted to smoke, smack and other intoxicated drugs to the extent that he was often seen lying on roads in Chandigarh in intoxicated condition. The petitioner claimed that the respondent deserted her on 4.3.1998 without any reasonable cause and their matrimonial relations were irretrievably broken and there was no chance of reconciliation between the parties. The petitioner was employed and was looking after the minor children whereas the respondent never visited her or her daughter for the last 2 years....","No body has put in appearance on behalf of the parties. Special Bench of Lahore High Court in the case of Inayat Masih Vs. Mt.Dhani w/o Inayat Masih and another AIR (31) 1944 Lahore 162, has been pleased to lay down that High Court has power to act on a reference under section 17 of the Divorce Act without any further application by the parties. The High Court under section 17 of the Act can proceed with reference for the confirmation of decree of dissolution of marriage passed by the learned District Judge even when the parties are absent, and have not obtained a motion for confirmation of the decree. The reading of the judgment and evidence on record proves that MATRF No. 3 of 2001 4 there were sufficient grounds to justify the dissolution of marriage. Decision of the learned Additional District Judge is, therefore, correct on facts and deserves to be confirmed. Ordered accordingly. The decree of divorce dissolving the marriage between the parties is confirmed. (Vinod K.Sharma) 5.09.2009 Judge rp",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/425092/,Procedural,procedural,2009,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,425092,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/425092/,3
Madhya Pradesh High Court,"Muriyal Almeda vs Laren Almeda on 3 November, 1992",opposed the petition filed by the wife by filing rep,1992-11-03,"JUDGMENT   D.M. Dharmadhikari, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT D.M. Dharmadhikari, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The decree of divorce granted in favour of the applicant-wife by the Trial Court in proceedings under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 on 9th April, ly92 has come before this Court for confirmation under Section 17 of the said Act. 2. The wife claimed divorce on the alleged ground that the non-applicant-husband is leading an adulterous life with another wife by name Vijaya. The non-applicant-husband opposed the petition filed by the wife by filing reply in the Trial Court; but absented on the date of evidence and did not enter the witness box. The wife who examined herself in the Trial Court, stated that after her marriage with the non-applicant, she discovered that he had already kept another woman in the house and had a child from that woman. Her testimony is supported by P.W. 2 Smt. Anna Kutti Thomas. The learned Judge of the Trial Court believed the testimony of the wife and the witness supporting her to hold that the alleged ground of husband being guilty of adultery under Section 10 of the Act was fully made out against him and granted the desired relief to the wife of a decree of divorce. In this reference, both the parties were noticed; but only wife, assisted by her Counsel, appeared. The husband failed to appear....","5. The decree granted by the Trial Court on 9-4-92 is hereby confirmed. Since the husband has not appeared, we make no order as to costs.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/504706/ | I(1993)DMC467,Unclear,unclear,1992,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: I(1993)DMC467,504706,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/504706/,4
Madras High Court,S.M.J.Naveena vs C.Gipson Villavarayer,O.P.No.50 of 2018,,THE HONOURABLE DR.JUSTICE G.JAYACHANDRAN,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 19, Section 2, Section 55",Cruelty; Desertion; Non Consummation; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[pre_1] 2023/MHC/645 C.M.A.(MD)Nos.725 and 832 of 2019 & Cross Obj.(MD)No.23 of 2019 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT Date of Reserving the order Date of Pronouncing the order 01.02.2023 15.02.2023 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE DR.JUSTICE G.JAYACHANDRAN and THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUNDER MOHAN C.M.A.(MD)Nos.725 and 832 of 2019 and Cross Objection (MD)No.23 of 2019 in C.M.A.(MD)No.725 of 2019 and C.M.P.(MD)No.12364 of 2019 in Cross Obj.(MD)No.23 of 2019 C.M.A.(MD)No.725 of 2019:- S.M.J.Naveena ... Appellant vs. C.Gipson Villavarayer ... Respondent Prayer :- Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act read with Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, against the judgment and decree, dated 23.04.2019, passed in I.D.O.P.No.50 of 2018, on the file of the Family Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil. For Appellant : Mr.Isaac Mohanlal Senior Counsel for Mr.T.Cibichakaraborthy For Respondent : Mr.J.Barathan https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 1/20 C.M.A.(MD)Nos.725 and 832 of 2019 & Cross Obj.(MD)No.23 of 2019 C.M.A.(MD)No.832 of 2019:- C.Gipson Villavarayer ... Appellant vs. S.M.J.Naveena ... Respondent",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"2. The point for consideration before this Court is whether the Family Court right in ordering judicial separation for two years while deciding the divorce petition filed by the wife and the petition for restitution of conjugal right filed by the husband. 3. The undisputed facts on either side are:- 10. The Family Court framed the following points for consideration:- ''1.Whether the petitioner-wife proved the plea of non- consummation of marriage as prayed for? 2.Whether the petitioner-wife proved the plea of cruelty? 3.Whether the petitioner-wife is entitled for the relief of divorce as prayed for? 4.Whether the respondent-husband is entitled for the relief of restitution of conjugal rights? 5.To what other relief the parties are entitled?'' 11. The Court below disbelieved the contention of the wife that the marriage never consummated and she was subjected to cruelty and torture. To arrive at this conclusion, the trial Court has considered the...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2023/MHC/645 C.M.A.(MD)Nos.725 and 832 of 2019 & Cross Obj.(MD)No.23 of 2019 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT Date of Reserving the order Date of Pronouncing the order 01.02.2023 15.02.2023 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE DR.JUSTICE G.JAYACHANDRAN and THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUNDER MOHAN C.M.A.(MD)Nos.725 and 832 of 2019 and Cross Objection (MD)No.23 of 2019 in C.M.A.(MD)No.725 of 2019 and C.M.P.(MD)No.12364 of 2019 in Cross Obj.(MD)No.23 of 2019 C.M.A.(MD)No.725 of 2019:- S.M.J.Naveena ... Appellant vs. C.Gipson Villavarayer ... Respondent Prayer :- Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act read with Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, against the judgment and decree, dated 23.04.2019, passed in I.D.O.P.No.50 of 2018, on the file of the Family Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil. For Appellant : Mr.Isaac Mohanlal Senior Counsel for Mr.T.Cibichakaraborthy For Respondent : Mr.J.Barathan https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 1/20 C.M.A.(MD)Nos.725 and 832 of 2019 & Cross Obj.(MD)No.23 of 2019 C.M.A.(MD)No.832 of 2019:- C.Gipson Villavarayer ... Appellant vs. S.M.J.Naveena ... Respondent Prayer :- Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act read with Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, against the judgment and decree, dated 23.04.2019, passed in I.D.O.P.No.127 of 2018, on the file of the Family Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil. For Appellant : Mr.J.Barathan For Respondent : Mr.Isaac Mohanlal Senior Counsel for Mr.T.Cibichakaraborthy Cross Obj.(MD)No.23 of 2019:-...","26. The wife has chosen to challenge the common order of the Family Court, reiterating the allegations against her husband, which has been found to be false. If her appeal is allowed, it will tantamount to holding her baseless allegations against her husband as true. 27. Therefore, the principle of irretrievable break down of marital relationship cannot be applied to the facts of the case. The false allegations against the husband in fact a cruelty to the husband. When he is ready to condone that and wants to rejoin, the wife refused to rejoin. In Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh reported in (2007) 4 SCC 511, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has illustrated cases where inference of mental cruelty can be drawn. Taking note of 16 ½ years long separation, it stated that the long period of continuous separation, may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. Such a situation may lead to mental cruelty. 28. In this case, it is the wife, who is cause for separation. She cannot take advantage of her own fault, make baseless...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/96167579/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion; non_consummation; nullity_sec19,0,judicial_separation,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,,96167579,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/96167579/,10
Bombay High Court,"John Over vs Muriel A.I. Over on 14 October, 1924",opinion that the adultery of the respondent with ano,1924-10-14,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 12, Section 14, Section 18, Section 2, Section 45, Section 58, Section 7",Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"37. There are certain passages in the evidence taken on remand which would tend to suggest that the lady had committed adultery with Captain Chamberlain and with several other persons. The petitioner there stated :- In 1922 Capt. Chamberlain came to stay with us. I had reason to complain of his behaviour with respondent. While J, was away from Kirkoe 1 received a letter in September 1922 from respondent saying that she was leaving me and not returning. I. returned to Kirkeo and she came back. 1 thus condoned the offence with Capt. Chamberlain. I tried to reform respondent; but in January 1923 she again left me and took my daughter. Before she loft I had suspicions that she was corresponding with Capt. Chamberlain, and I heard that he had given her Rs. (5,000 to enable her to rejoin him. 38. Then later on he stated :- She has misconducted herself with four or five men. I. have heard that she is now married.","42. But I wish to add this. 1 am much struck with the difference in the way in which divorce work is done in the District Courts, as compared with the normal criminal and civil work. In the latter, and particularly in the criminal work, we usually get every assistance. If, for instance, a criminal case depended on an accomplice's evidence, then the trial Judge would be sure to deal carefully with the question whether there was any corroborative evidence. In practice the confession of a guilty party in a divorce case ought to be treated on somewhat similar lines of caution to those of an accomplice's evidence in a criminal case. And yet in the present case it was accepted almost as a matter of course. If this was the only instance of the kind. I would have regarded it as an exception. But in Wilkinson v. Wilkinson (reported on other points in 25 Bom, L K. 945) and again in Hewson v. Hewson (1924) 26 Bom. L. R. 467 this Court has had to comment adversely on the loose way in which divorce cases are at present conducted in the trial Courts, If it is once realised that...","27. The evidence before us in support of the petition practically rests on three main points, viz., (1) the alleged worthless character of the respondent and her past immorality; (2) her desertion of her husband and family; and (3) the letters written by her after her last desertion. There is no corroborative evidence of the wife's statement that she is living in adultery with another man. Captain Chamberlain is alleged in the petition to have gone to Australia. No other man's name is even suggested by the petitioner. Beyond her own letters there is nothing to show even where she is living nor whether alone or with any man. The case, therefore, is a very exceptional one in which to grant a decree and demands the greatest Care and caution in approaching it 28. The general rule of practice adopted in the English Divorce Courts is thus stated in Halsbury,...","37. There are certain passages in the evidence taken on remand which would tend to suggest that the lady had committed adultery with Captain Chamberlain and with several other persons. The petitioner there stated :- In 1922 Capt. Chamberlain came to stay with us. I had reason to complain of his behaviour with respondent. While J, was away from Kirkoe 1 received a letter in September 1922 from respondent saying that she was leaving me and not returning. I. returned to Kirkeo and she came back. 1 thus condoned the offence with Capt. Chamberlain. I tried to reform respondent; but in January 1923 she again left me and took my daughter. Before she loft I had suspicions that she was corresponding with Capt. Chamberlain, and I heard that he had given her Rs. (5,000 to enable her to rejoin him. 38. Then later on he stated :- She has misconducted herself with four or five men. I. have heard that she is now married.","42. But I wish to add this. 1 am much struck with the difference in the way in which divorce work is done in the District Courts, as compared with the normal criminal and civil work. In the latter, and particularly in the criminal work, we usually get every assistance. If, for instance, a criminal case depended on an accomplice's evidence, then the trial Judge would be sure to deal carefully with the question whether there was any corroborative evidence. In practice the confession of a guilty party in a divorce case ought to be treated on somewhat similar lines of caution to those of an accomplice's evidence in a criminal case. And yet in the present case it was accepted almost as a matter of course. If this was the only instance of the kind. I would have regarded it as an exception. But in Wilkinson v. Wilkinson (reported on other points in 25 Bom, L K. 945) and again in Hewson v. Hewson (1924) 26 Bom. L. R. 467 this Court has had to comment adversely on the...","JUDGMENT Lallubhai Shah, Kt., Acting C.J. 1. When this matter came before us on June 20 last, we directed the District Court to record further evidence as to the alleged adultery, and to examine the petitioner. The District Court has recorded further evidence. The petitioner has been examined on oath now, and his son also has given evidence. The respondent, the wife of the petitioner, has not appeared at any stage of the proceedings. The letters written by the wife to the petitioner are on the record. On the strength of the letters and the evidence given by the petitioner and his son, the learned District Judge has expressed his opinion that the adultery of the respondent with another person not known is proved. He held the letters written by the respondent to be conclusive. 2. The matter is now before us, and the learned pleader for the petitioner supports that new. The respondent has not appeared. In the evidence given by the petitioner, he stated that the respondent had committed adultery with one person named in the evidence in 1922: but there was no further evidence about it. He also stated that she had misconducted herself with four or five men before she left his house. That also is not supported by any evidence. It appears that she ultimately...","17. This matrimonial case presents exceptional features. It is a husband's petition founded en the alleged adultery of his wife with some person unknown. He has already been divorced from her once, viz.., by a decree nisi passed by me on August 12, 1918, on the Original Side of this High Court, which decree was made absolute on March 3, 1919. He, however, married her again on December 22, 1920, at Poona. She left him from September 8, 1922, to October 7, 1922. It would appear that her husband then thought he had cause to complain of her conduct with a Captain Chamberlain who had been living with them, but who, the petition states, has since gone to Australia. What exactly the petitioner alleges took place between Captain Chamberlain and the respondent is by no means clear on the evidence taken before the learned District Judge. But the petitioner deposes that he condoned ""the offence"" with Captain Chamberlain, and it is clear from the evidence of his son that there were disputes between the husband and wife over the latter's...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1701348/ | (1925)27BOMLR251, AIR 1925 BOMBAY 231",Adultery,adultery; desertion,1924,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (1925)27BOMLR251, AIR 1925 BOMBAY 231",1701348,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1701348/,10
Madras High Court,"Shivkarthik G.S vs Nil on 4 September, 2025",CRP.No.4013 of 2025,2025-09-04,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 13B, Section 28, Section 32B",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Order reserved on : 25.08.2025 Order pronounced on : 04.09.2025 CORAM THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.BALAJI CRP.No.4013 of 2025 1.Shivkarthik G.S 2.M.Swetha Pierce ..Petitioners Vs. Nil ..Respondent Prayer: Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India, to set aside the Docket order dated 10.07.2025 passed by the Family Court, Coimbatore in DOP.CFR.No.3726 of 2025. For Petitioners : Mr.G.R.Deepak ORDER",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,"4.The learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr.G.R.Deepak, would state that the parties have agreed to present the mutual consent divorce petition on account of irreconcilable differences and misunderstandings and also in view of the marriage having been irretrievably broken down. The learned counsel for 2/10 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 08/09/2025 03:22:27 pm ) the petitioners would fairly state that the date of separation is only on 01.01.2025 and the mandatory period of one year of separation has not lapsed in the present case. 7.I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr.G.R,Deepak.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The revision petitioners are husband and wife, they had moved the Family Court, Coimbatore, seeking mutual divorce, invoking Section 10(A) of the Indian Divorce Act. 1/10 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 08/09/2025 03:22:27 pm ) 2.The said OP was filed on 16.04.2025. The learned Family Court has returned the petition on 21.04.2025, stating that the petition filed before completion of two years from the date of separation is not maintainable. According to the petitioners and also as seen from the petition filed under Section 10A , the date of separation is 01.01.2025. 3.The return of the OP was challenged before this Court in CRP.No.1915 of 2025 and this Court, by order dated 29.04.2025, directed the petitioners to represent the papers before the Family Court, Coimbatore. It is thereafter that the petitioners have represented the mutual consent divorce petition. However, by docket order dated 10.07.2025, the Family Court, Coimbatore, has held that the mandatory one year period of separation under Section 10A(1) of Indian Divorce Act cannot be dispensed with. Aggrieved by the same, the present revision petition has been filed. 5.The learned counsel for the petitioners, relying on the decision of the Kerala High Court in Anup Disalva and Another vs Union of India , reported in 2022 SCC Online Ker 6415, would contend that the provisions of Section 10A ,...","9/10 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 08/09/2025 03:22:27 pm ) P.B.BALAJI.J, ata Pre-delivery order made in CRP.No.4013 of 2025 04.09.2025 10/10 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 08/09/2025 03:22:27 pm )",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/199222473/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,199222473,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/199222473/,7
Madras High Court,"Alphonsa vs Rajathasammal on 30 April, 2002",OP No.10,2002-04-30,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 14, Section 2, Section 299, Section 3, Section 5, Section 59, Section 60, Section 63, Section 68",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"7. The learned counsel for the appellants in CMA.No.1535 of 2002 would submit that the learned trial Court erred in law and on 6/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 30/01/2026 07:36:52 pm ) C.M.A.No.1535 of 2022 and Tr.A.S Nos.704 and 705 of 2002 facts in accepting the case of the respondent based on Ex.B29 (the alleged Will). According to the evidence of RW2, the testator had bequeathed the land and building under Ex.B29. However, the respondent Rajathasammal, who examined herself as RW1, has categorically deposed that the building in the said property was constructed by her after the death of her husband, namely the testator. This inherent contradiction in the evidence of RW1 and RW2 itself is sufficient to disbelieve the respondent’s claim and to hold that the alleged Will was not in existence at the relevant point of time. The Court below further failed to consider that RW2, the attesting witness to Ex.B29, has clearly admitted in his evidence that he had signed the Will only before it was filing before the Court, and not at the time of its alleged execution. This admission strikes at the very root of the due execution and attestation of the Will as mandated...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1.Whether Smt.Alphonsa is the first wife of the deceased Smile Daniel ? 2. Whether the marriage between the deceased Smile Daniel and Alphonsa, the petitioner in SOP No.13 of 1999 dissolved by way of mutual divorce deed, executed between 10/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 30/01/2026 07:36:52 pm ) C.M.A.No.1535 of 2022 and Tr.A.S Nos.704 and 705 of 2002 both the parties ? 3. Whether the marriage between Smile Daniel and Rajathasammal held on 12.09.1984, as per Ex.B9 is valid in law ? 4. Whether the Will executed by Smile Daniel on 30.09.1996 is valid and proved by Rajathasammal as per law ? 13. Point Nos.1 to 4 The petition in SOP.No.13 of 1999 was filed by Alphonsa and her daughter Viji claiming to be the wife and daughter of late.Smile Daniel and seeking issuance of a succession certificate in their favour, thereby enabling them to receive a sum of Rs.1,65,000/-...","7. The learned counsel for the appellants in CMA.No.1535 of 2002 would submit that the learned trial Court erred in law and on 6/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 30/01/2026 07:36:52 pm ) C.M.A.No.1535 of 2022 and Tr.A.S Nos.704 and 705 of 2002 facts in accepting the case of the respondent based on Ex.B29 (the alleged Will). According to the evidence of RW2, the testator had bequeathed the land and building under Ex.B29. However, the respondent Rajathasammal, who examined herself as RW1, has categorically deposed that the building in the said property was constructed by her after the death of her husband, namely the testator. This inherent contradiction in the evidence of RW1 and RW2 itself is sufficient to disbelieve the respondent’s claim and to hold that the alleged Will was not in existence at the relevant point of time. The Court below further failed to consider that RW2, the attesting witness to Ex.B29, has clearly admitted in his evidence that he had signed the Will only before it was filing before the Court, and not at the time of its...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","C.M.A.No.1535 of 2022 and Tr.A.S Nos.704 and 705 of 2002 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT Date of Reserved 11.11.2025 Date of Pronounced 30.01.2026 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE R.POORNIMA C.M.A.No.1535 of 2002, Tr.AS Nos.704 and 705 of 2002 and C.M.P.No.11718 of 2002 (1)CMA.No.1535 of 2002:- 1.Alphonsa 2.Viji : Appellants/Respondents Vs. Rajathasammal : Respondent/Petitioner Prayer:- This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 against the fair order and decreetal order of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Nagercoil, made in Probate OP No.10 of 1998, dated 30.04.2002. For Appellants : Mr.S.Meenakshisundaram for Mr.M.R.Sreenivasan For Respondent : Mr.S.Giridharan (No representation) 1/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 30/01/2026 07:36:52 pm ) C.M.A.No.1535 of 2022 and Tr.A.S Nos.704 and 705 of 2002 2.Tr.AS.No.704 of 2002:- 1.Alphonsa 2.Viji : Appellants Vs. Rajathasammal : Respondent Prayer :- This Appeal is filed under Order 41 Rule 1 of C.P.C , 1908, as amended under Act 104 of 1976, to set aside the judgment and decree, dated 30.04.2002 passed in SOP No.13 of 1999 by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Nagercoil. 3.Tr.AS.No.705 of 2002:- 1.Alphonsa 2.Viji : Appellants Vs. Rajathasammal : Respondent Prayer :- This Appeal is filed under Order 41 Rule 1 of C.P.C , 1908, as amended under Act 104 of 1976, to set aside the judgment and decree, dated...","20. Except for the provision stated above there is no provision under the Divorce Act , for obtaining divorce. Under the Christian law in India, a deed of divorce executed and registered by mutual consent has no validity. Christian marriage in India are governed exclusively by Indian Divorce Act, 1869 and in terms of the above Act, the Christian marriage can be dissolved on a decree of divorce passed by a competent Court., viz., District Court. Such marriage, cannot be terminated by a contract or agreement between the parties. 17/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 30/01/2026 07:36:52 pm ) C.M.A.No.1535 of 2022 and Tr.A.S Nos.704 and 705 of 2002 21. Smt.Rajathasammal, went to claim that she was married to Smile Daniel as evidenced by the marriage certificate marked as Ex.B9 and stated that the marriage was solemnized on 12.09.1984, as shown in the copy of marriage invitation marked as Ex.B10. 37. With the above observation, C.M.A.No.1535 of 2002 is partly allowed and the order, dated 30.04.2022 passed in OP No.10 of 1998 by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Nagercoil is hereby modified...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/191479048/,Adultery,adultery,2002,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,191479048,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/191479048/,11
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana),"Youth Welfare Federation Rep. By Its ... vs Union Of India (Uoi) Rep. By Its ... on 9 October, 1996","opriately heard by a Division Bench as ""this case ra",1996-10-09,"JUDGMENT   Lingaraja Rath, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 1, Section 10, Section 112, Section 14, Section 17, Section 18, Section 2, Section 22, Section 26, Section 292, Section 293, Section 3, Section 311, Section 494, Section 57, Section 7",Constitutional Validity; Adultery; Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Lingaraja Rath, J. 1. Questions of deep significance, some of which in many respects are perplexing in nature have teen referred to this Bench in the context of consideration of the vires of Sections 10 and 22 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as ""the Act."").",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"2. W.P. No. 9717 of 1983 was filed as public interest litigation raising the question of vires of the Sections. During the hearing of the case the learned single Judge felt the matter should be appropriately heard by a Division Bench as ""this case raises very important questions touching the personal law of the Christians as contained in 1 he Indian Divorce Act ."" The learned Judge also felt that it is appropriate for the Court to hear representations of organisations of the Christian community including of women which should be vitally interested in the matter. Notices were issued to seven organisations whose names were ascertained from the Bar and permission was also allowed to any other person, organisation or institution to intervene in the matter either for or against the contentions raised in the writ petition. In pursuance of the direction a press-note was issued by the Registrar of...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. Mr. V.L.N.G.K. Murthy who has advanced the main submissions, and I must say with great clarity, analysis and erudition, has confined the attack only to Section 10 of the Act as providing for gender discrimination by requiring the wife to establish far more difficult and onerous grounds to obtain divorce than the husband who becomes entitled to divorce if he only proves the wife to have been guilty of adultery. He has also urged the Section to be violative of Article 21 as the wife is, as the effect of the provisions, compelled to lead a life of drudgery and continuous oppression of being tied to the bond of marriage even where the marriage has, without a chance of any repair, unmistakably lapsed into a coma and an euthanasia of it would be the more healthy operation. The Act was enacted more than 125 years back which has been left unamended ever since then even though great strides have been made in the context of emancipation and liberation of women, even though the law in England, on which the statute was based, has itself undergone vast improvements. Questions have been urged on the basis of Article 13(1) of the Constitution of India that because of the discrimination practised by the statute it became void on the introduction of the...","24. Section 10 of the Act provides the grounds for dissolution of marriage. A husband may file a petition for dissolution of the marriage if the wife has been guilty of adultery since the solemnization of marriage, but so far as the wife is concerned, the grounds are, apart from change of religion of the husband and going through a form of marriage with another woman, of he having been guilty, of adultery which must be incestuous or coupled with bigamy or of adultery with marriage with another woman, or of such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa et thoro, or of adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or upwards. The other grounds for divorce are rape, sodomy or beastiality. It is easy to perceive that so far as the ground of adultery is concerned, the husband can maintain a petition only on the ground of plain adultery of the wife but so far as she is concerned she can present such petition only if the adultery is of...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/476455/ | 1996(4)ALT1138,Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; adultery; desertion; cruelty,1996,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: 1996(4)ALT1138,476455,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/476455/,32
Karnataka High Court,"Monika Sanctis vs Henry Joseph And Anr. on 17 December, 2002",operly nor was introduced to his parents in a proper,2002-12-17,"JUDGMENT    Shylendra Kumar, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001","Section 10, Section 11, Section 13, Section 14, Section 15, Section 16, Section 17, Section 17A, Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 22, Section 34, Section 35, Section 45, Section 5, Section 52, Section 55, Section 56, Section 57, Section 8",Adultery; Cruelty; Nullity Sec19; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Shylendra Kumar, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"8. The respondents having remained absent and set ex parte, the trial Court was only required to look into the petition averments and framed question as to whether the petitioner is entitled for a decree of divorce. 9. The petitioner examined herself and deposed that she has been treated with such cruelty and that the first respondent was living in adultery and also that the first respondent has committed acts of sodomy and perverse sex. 10. The learned trial Judge though recorded a finding of cruelty as against the husband accepting the pleadings supported by the evidence, nevertheless thought that act of adultery on the part of the first respondent having not been proved inasmuch as the petitioner had not deposed that she had seen the first and second respondents' living in adultery, that a decree of divorce cannot be granted and only granted the relief of Judicial separation. 11....",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is an appeal by the wife under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act r/w Section 19 of the Family Court Act directed against the order dated 8-3-1999 passed by the II Addl. Principal Judge, Family Court, at Bangalore in M.C. No. 117/1998 allowing the petition of the wife under Sections 10 and 11 of the Indian Divorce Act partially and granting a decree for judicial separation. 2. The wife being aggrieved by the order of the trial Court, refusing her the full relief of dissolution of marriage and denying her a decree of divorce has come up in appeal, 3. The first respondent-husband remained absent before the Court below and was set ex parte. The second respondent with whom it was alleged that the first respondent-husband was having an adulterous relationship had also been served but remained absent and has been set ex parte by the Court below. 4. The position is the same in this appeal and the respondents have not contested the proceedings though served. 5. The petition pleadings are that the appellant-wife and first respondent-husband married at Bangalore as per the customary rites of Christian community as on 3-7-1997, that the marriage was an arranged marriage through a friend one FR. A Ignatius of Holy Ghost Church. The first respondent-husband was working at Dubai...","14. In the circumstances, we allow this appeal and modify the order passed by the Court below and dissolve the marriage between the appellant-wife and the first respondent which had taken place on 3-7-1997. However, in terms of Section 16 of the Act we pass a decree nisi as of now which can enable the appellant to seek a decree of divorce absolute, after the expiry of minimum period required to be allowed under Section 16 of the Act. We reserve liberty to the appellant to move this Court after the expiry of the minimum period required under Section 10 of the Act. ORDERS ON ""FOR BEING SPOKEN TO"" 20. A new Section has been introduced which provides for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent which was not there in the parent Act. In Section 16 of the Principal Act the words ""not being a confirmation of a decree of a District Court,"" has been omitted by Section 11 . One important change is doing away with the confirmation of a decree for dissolution passed by the District Court by...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/417034/ | AIR2003KANT190, AIR 2003 KARNATAKA 190, 2003 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 676, (2003) 2 KANT LJ 588, (2003) 2 MARRILJ 525, (2003) MATLR 505, (2003) 9 ALLINDCAS 294 (KAR), (2003) 1 KCCR 635, (2004) 3 CIVLJ 472",Adultery,adultery; cruelty; nullity_sec19; desertion,2002,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR2003KANT190, AIR 2003 KARNATAKA 190, 2003 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 676, (2003) 2 KANT LJ 588, (2003) 2 MARRILJ 525, (2003) MATLR 505, (2003) 9 ALLINDCAS 294 (KAR), (2003) 1 KCCR 635, (2004) 3 CIVLJ 472",417034,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/417034/,10
Bombay High Court,"Henry Fernandes And Etc. vs Succorinha Fernandes And Etc. on 18 January, 2001",No. 318 of 1988,2001-01-18,"JUDGMENT   B.N. Srikrishna, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954",Section 10,Cruelty; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT B.N. Srikrishna, J. 1. Both these suits have been referred to this Division Bench by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The issue we have to answer is;",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""Whether in view of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Pragati Varghese v. Cyril George Varghese , , a Christian husband would be entitled to a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty.""",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. Though the issue of law referred to this Court is the same in both the cases, the facts are marginally different. It would be necessary to indicate the facts very briefly. In M. J. Petition No. 318 of 1988 the parties are Christians and a marriage was solemnized on 4th May, 1983 at St. Anne's Church, Bombay in accordance with Christian Rites and Ceremonies. On 13-8-1986 a male child named Jude Fernandes was born to the couple. On 30-3-1991 a female child was born to the couple. Differences arose between the husband and wife and a number of incidents have been pleaded which, according to the petitioner-husband, amounts to cruelty. The petitioner brought M.J. Suit No. 318 of 1998 before this Court under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 praying for a decree of divorce between himself and respondent on the ground that the respondent is guilty of cruelty as contemplated under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as ""Act""). 3. In M.J. Suit No. 7132 of 1999 the husband and wife are both Christians and were married in accordance with Christian Rites and Ceremonies at Bombay on 3-2-1991. A female child is born of the marriage on 9-10-1992 named Samantha. A number of incidents took place between the husband and wife...","6. In the result, we answer the reference made to us in the following manner : ""Notwithstanding the judgment of the Full Bench in Pragati Varghese v. Cyril George Varghese , , a Christian husband is not entitled to a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty or on any other ground except the ground of adultery."" Issuance of certified copy expedited.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1912562/ | AIR2001BOM208, 2001(3)BOMCR360, II(2001)DMC536, 2001(2)MHLJ806, AIR 2001 BOMBAY 208, (2001) 2 ALLMR 93 (BOM), (2001) 2 DMC 536, (2001) 2 HINDULR 97, (2001) 2 MAH LJ 806, (2002) 1 MARRILJ 416, (2002) 2 RECCIVR 253, (2001) 3 CIVLJ 478, (2001) 3 BOM CR 360",Cruelty,cruelty; adultery,2001,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR2001BOM208, 2001(3)BOMCR360, II(2001)DMC536, 2001(2)MHLJ806, AIR 2001 BOMBAY 208, (2001) 2 ALLMR 93 (BOM), (2001) 2 DMC 536, (2001) 2 HINDULR 97, (2001) 2 MAH LJ 806, (2002) 1 MARRILJ 416, (2002) 2 RECCIVR 253, (2001) 3 CIVLJ 478, (2001) 3 BOM CR 360",1912562,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1912562/,6
Calcutta High Court,"Olga Thelma Gomes vs Mark Gomes on 27 January, 1959",opened it and while the respo,1959-01-27,"JUDGMENT    S.C. Lahiri, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 17, Section 2, Section 3, Section 46, Section 488, Section 497, Section 7",Adultery; Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT S.C. Lahiri, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""In the divorce court, adultery means willing sexual intercourse between a husband or wife and one of the opposite sex while the marriage subsists."" In the case of Abson v. Abson, (1952) 1 All E. R. 370, the question arose whether a divorced woman could be held guilty of adultery, the allegation being that the divorced wife was guilty of adultery as she took part in acts of sexual intercourse with one Rayner. On this question Karminski J. observed as follows at page 372 of the Report: ""When the wife took part in an act of sexual intercourse with Rayner, was he then dishonouring or defiling her own marriage bed or that of the man with whom the intercourse took place? Clearly, so far as the wife was concerned, she could not be defiling or dishonouring her own marriage bed, because, as a single woman, she had no marriage bed...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a Reference under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act for confirmation of a decree nisi for dissolution of marriage between the petitioner Olga Thelma Gomes and her husband Mark Gomes. The petitioner filed the petition for dissolution against her husband on the allegation that her husband was guilty of adultery coupled with desertion for more than two years and also on the allegation that her husband was guilty of adultery coupled with cruelty. From the marriage certificate which has been produced in this case it appears that the petitioner was married to the respondent on 26-4-1936, at St. Francis Xavier Church at 68, Bow Bazar Street according to Christian rites. As a result of the marriage one daughter was born to the petitioner. Upon the evidence which has been believed by the court below the petitioner and her husband lived happily for some time and their last matrimonial home was at premises No. 38 Beckbagan which is within the jurisdiction of the District Judge of 24-Parganas. The petitioner states on oath that both she and her husband have been living in India since their birth and both of them are Indian Christians. The court of the District Judge, 24-Parganas, therefore, has jurisdiction to make a decree for dissolution of marriage under Section 2 of the Indian...",17. I agree.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1367854/ | AIR1959CAL451, 63CWN395, AIR 1959 CALCUTTA 451, ILR (1960) 1 CAL 520 63 CAL WN 395, 63 CAL WN 395",Adultery,adultery; desertion; cruelty,1959,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1959CAL451, 63CWN395, AIR 1959 CALCUTTA 451, ILR (1960) 1 CAL 520 63 CAL WN 395, 63 CAL WN 395",1367854,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1367854/,10
Kerala High Court,"Kuruvilla Varghese vs Sapnam Elizabeth Joseph on 25 May, 2007",operate for sexual union during those days and there,2007-05-25,"JUDGMENT   K.T. Sankaran, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 14, Section 16, Section 23",Non Consummation; Cruelty; Nullity Sec19; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT K.T. Sankaran, J.","5. The respondent-wife contended that she had to waste twelve years of her 'prime life' by agreeing to the request made by the husband to her to act the role of his wife. She further stated that the husband was bidding for time to settle his family affairs. He has settled all his brothers well in life and now he wants a divorce. The respondent also contended that the petition is not a bona fide one and that it is highly belated. The respondent asserted that she is not impotent. She also denied the case of cruelty. 16. The respondent also stated in evidence that there was no attempt to get the opinion of a doctor to rule out the possibility of begetting any child with mental retardation. We quote her own words : ""on the basis of my observation in the family members of the petitioner, I formed an opinion that he is also carrier of mentally retarded genes."" The only bodily relationship between the parties, according to the husband, was a permission to kiss when he presented a Maruti car to the wife. The wife denied in evidence even this act on her part-. According to the respondent,...","6. Before us, the respondent-wife argued the case herself, without the assistance of a counsel. She argued the case efficiently, in fluent English. She is educated and is fully aware of the Court proceedings and the nuances of litigation. Since she appeared in person, we had heard the case in greater detail and we had also occasion to ascertain whether she is willing to consummate the marriage at least at this belated stage. She expressed her unwillingness for the same. The position is thus clear that the state of affairs as between the parties continue to be the same as before. (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent- (i) has...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"5. The respondent-wife contended that she had to waste twelve years of her 'prime life' by agreeing to the request made by the husband to her to act the role of his wife. She further stated that the husband was bidding for time to settle his family affairs. He has settled all his brothers well in life and now he wants a divorce. The respondent also contended that the petition is not a bona fide one and that it is highly belated. The respondent asserted that she is not impotent. She also denied the case of cruelty. 16. The respondent also stated in evidence that there was no attempt to get the opinion of a doctor to rule out the possibility of begetting any child with mental retardation. We quote her own words : ""on the basis of my observation in the family members of the petitioner, I formed an opinion that he is also carrier of mentally retarded genes."" The only bodily relationship between the parties, according to the husband, was a permission to kiss when he presented a...","1. The questions involved in this Matrimonial Appeal are : (1) Whether a petition for dissolution of marriage filed by the husband on the ground that the wife wilfully refused to consummate the marriage and the marriage has not therefore been consummated (which is a ground for dissolution of marriage under Clause (vii) of Section 10 introduced by The Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, Act 51 of 2001 by the substitution of Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869) is liable to be dismissed on the ground that the petition was filed twelve years after the marrjage and therefore the petitioner is guilty of unreasonable delay in presenting the petition within the meaning of Section 14 of the Act, when the petition was presented within reasonable time after the commencement of Act 51 of 2001? (2) Whether refusal by the wife to consummate the marriage on the ground that there is likelihood of her begetting children with mental disorder as the relatives of the husband have children with mental retardation, amounts to wilful refusal to consummate the marriage? 2. The parties are Indian Christians. Their marriage was solemnized on 29-8-1991 at St. Mary's Malankara Syrian Catholic Church, Vettiyar. The husband was working as a Mechanical Engineer in H.M.T. Kalamassery at the time of marriage. After the wedding, for three days,...","For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the Appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court below and allow the petition for dissolution of marriage under Clause (vii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869. A decree nisi is issued for dissolution of marriage under Section 16 of the Divorce Act.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/600946/ | AIR2007KER240, AIR 2007 KERALA 240, 2007 (5) ALL LJ NOC 918, 2007 (6) ABR (NOC) 1032 (KER), 2007 AIHC NOC 552, (2008) MATLR 481, (2007) 3 KER LT 228",Non Consummation,non_consummation; cruelty; nullity_sec19; adultery,2007,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR2007KER240, AIR 2007 KERALA 240, 2007 (5) ALL LJ NOC 918, 2007 (6) ABR (NOC) 1032 (KER), 2007 AIHC NOC 552, (2008) MATLR 481, (2007) 3 KER LT 228",600946,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/600946/,15
Kerala High Court,"Saleenamma Oomman vs K.I.Jose @ Davidson on 3 September, 2010",Mat.Appeal.No. 136 of 2004(),2010-09-03,"Justice R.BASANT The Hon, Justice M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS  Dated","Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM Mat.Appeal.No. 136 of 2004() 1. SALEENAMMA OOMMAN, ... Petitioner Vs 1. K.I.JOSE @ DAVIDSON, S/O.ISSAC, ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.SATHISH NINAN For Respondent :SRI.C.C.PADMAKUMAR The Hon'ble MR. Justice R.BASANT The Hon'ble MR. Justice M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS Dated :03/09/2010 O R D E R R. BASANT & M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS JJ., - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Mat. Appeal No.136 of 2004 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dated this the 3rd day of September, 2010. JUDGMENT","4. The respondent was served in this appeal. He has entered appearance through counsel. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent is not interested in continuing the marital relationship. Appropriate orders may be passed. The Mat. A No.136 of 2004 4 respondent does not want to oppose the prayer for divorce in this appeal. It is further pointed out that as per the order in O.P. No. 1135 of 2003, the Family Court has directed the respondent/husband and his father to pay an amount to the appellant herein. Against that order, an appeal was taken before this court and that Appeal ; M.A. No. 341 of 2006 now stands dismissed.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"4. The respondent was served in this appeal. He has entered appearance through counsel. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent is not interested in continuing the marital relationship. Appropriate orders may be passed. The Mat. A No.136 of 2004 4 respondent does not want to oppose the prayer for divorce in this appeal. It is further pointed out that as per the order in O.P. No. 1135 of 2003, the Family Court has directed the respondent/husband and his father to pay an amount to the appellant herein. Against that order, an appeal was taken before this court and that Appeal ; M.A. No. 341 of 2006 now stands dismissed.","Basant J., The wife is the appellant. She claimed a decree for divorce against the respondent, her husband, under Section 10 of the Divorce Act. It is relevant that the subsection of section 10 under which the claim was made was not specified. The marriage took place on 27.11.1999 at the Vakathanam Salvation Army Church in accordance with the Christian religious rites. Ext.A1 is the Certificate of marriage. The spouses lived together as husband and wife thereafter. While the wife, a qualified Nurse was employed at Delhi earlier, after marriage she did not resume her employment. The spouses were not blessed with any children. It is the case of the claimant wife that she was the victim of baseless allegations and insult as a result of the failure to conceive. According to her, there Mat. A No.136 of 2004 2 was no defect in her but she had accepted the request of her husband, the respondent to undergo treatment. According to her, mental and physical cruelty were inflicted on her on account of her alleged inability to conceive. The spouses started seperate residence from 21.10.2002. All the efforts made by the wife and her relatives to ensure that the spouses resumed cohabitation met with cruel retorts/responses. No maintenance was paid. The wife was not enquired about at all. Baseless and...","8. In the result; (a) This appeal is allowed. (b) The impugned order is set aside. (c) The marriage between the appellant and the respondent solemnised as per Ext.A1 certificate of marriage on 27.11.1999 at Mat. A No.136 of 2004 8 Salvation Army Church at Vakathanam is hereby dissolved with effect from this date. (d) The parties are directed to suffer their respective costs throughout. R. BASANT, JUDGE M. L. JOSEPH FRANCIS, JUDGE dl/",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1353368/,Cruelty,cruelty,2010,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,1353368,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1353368/,5
Karnataka High Court,"Rosy Kurian Kannanaikal vs Joseph Verghese Cheeran on 5 April, 2002",No. 648 of 1994,2002-04-05,"ORDER   N.K. Jain, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 14, Section 16, Section 17, Section 18, Section 19, Section 2, Section 20, Section 22, Section 29, Section 55, Section 56, Section 6, Section 7, Section 8",Mutual Consent 10A; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER N.K. Jain, C.J. A Full Bench of this Court not agreeing with the view taken by an earlier Full Bench decision in the case of Jayakumar v. Smt. Harriet Nirmala and observing that ""there are number of reference petitions pending in this Court which shall now have to await the decision of the larger Bench"", has referred this matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice to constitute a larger Bench vide its order dated 15-12-2000. 2. As per the direction of the Chief Justice vide order dated 8-3-2002, the matter has been placed before this larger Bench of five Judges with advance notice on 15-3-2002. The points referred for consideration, are:",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(i) Whether a reference to High Court for confirmation of a decree for dissolution of marriage or nullity of marriage, under Sections 17 and 20 of the Divorce Act, 1869, is necessary where such decree is granted by a Family Court, under the Family Courts Act, 1984 ? (iii) If the answer to point (ii) is in the negative, whether confirmation is called for in the instant case? 3. The facts leading to the order of reference are as follows: ""10-A. Dissolution of marriage by mutual consent.--(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, a petition for dissolution of marriage may be presented to the District Court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The petitioner-wife and the respondent-husband are Christians. They were married according to the Christian rites on 28-4-1991 at Bangalore. The petitioner filed the petition in M.C. No. 648 of 1994 under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869 (for short, ""the Divorce Act "") in the Family Court at Bangalore, making allegations against her husband with regard to his having relationship with other women, in addition to allegations of sodomy, physical injury, demanding of dowry and subjecting her to mental cruelty stating that she has become an object of divine displeasure. The petition was hotly contested. It was allowed by an order dated 5-12-1998 dissolving the marriage between the contesting parties under the provisions of the Divorce Act . 5. The said judgment of the High Court was challenged by the wife before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4205 of 2000. The Supreme Court after considering the rival contentions held as the civil reference under Section 17 of the Divorce Act was pending before a Bench of three learned Judges of the High Court, the same should be clubbed with the appeal filed under Section 19(6) of the F.C. Act and both could be heard together by a Blench of three learned Judges. The Supreme Court did not express any opinion on the correctness of the order dated...","(ii) Whether an appeal lies to a Division Bench of the High Court under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 against a judgment and decree of the Family Court passed under Section 14 or 19 of the Divorce Act, 1869 ? 4. The Family Court in purported compliance of Section 17 of the Divorce Act has submitted the impugned decree of dissolution of marriage to the High Court for confirmation by a three Judges Bench. The reference was numbered as C.R.C. No. 31 of 1999. However, the respondent-husband preferred an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short, ""the F.C. Act"") against the aforesaid decree in M.F.A. No. 164 of 1999. When the appeal preferred by the husband was taken up for consideration, the respondent contended the same was not maintainable. The Division Bench which heard the appeal, considering the provisions of the F.C. Act and the Divorce Act came to the conclusion that as the impugned judgment and decree of dissolution of marriage has been passed under Section 17 of the F.C. Act...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/706144/ | II(2002)DMC79, ILR2002KAR1831, 2004(3)KARLJ75",Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; nullity_sec19,2002,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: II(2002)DMC79, ILR2002KAR1831, 2004(3)KARLJ75",706144,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/706144/,20
Jharkhand High Court,"Mr. George Raju Singh vs Mrs. Nisha Nidhi on 21 April, 2026",opriety of impugned judgment passed on,2026-04-21,"Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J., Family Court, J, Golmuri, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 2",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI F.A. No.58 of 2021 ----- - Mr. George Raju Singh, aged about 54 years, Son of Late David Alexander Singh, Resident of Quarter No.-22. Dhalla Raod, P.O & P.S Golmuri Town Jamshedpur, District East singhbhum (Jharkhand). Present Residing at House No. 10, New Shiv singh Bagan Sidhgora, P.O & P.S Sidhgora, District - East Singhbhum. ... ... Appellant Versus Mrs. Nisha Nidhi, wife of George Raju Singh, daughter of Mr. Benjamin Joseph, permanent and present resident of Flat No. 1242 in Block Sabarmati, Vijaya Shatabdi, P.O. & P.S. Sonari, Town Jamshedpur, District - East Singhbhum. ... ... Respondent PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD ..... For the Appellant : Mr. Anurag Kashyap, Advocate : Mr. Bhaswat Prakash, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Shresth Gautam, Advocate. ..... C.A.V. on 10.04.2026 Pronounced on 21/04/2026 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer:","40. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, defending the 12 impugned order, has submitted that appellant and respondent are legally married couple and they are blessed with two children, but since the beginning of their marital life, appellant had greedy eyes over the property of the respondent and the respondent-wife purchased a flat in Shatabdi Tower at her own income, however, the appellant manipulated and got his name entered in the ownership of flat. 41. It has further been submitted that the appellant always treated the respondent-wife with cruelty as he has criminal background and several criminal cases are pending against him. 42. It has further been submitted that appellant used to get blank cheque signed by the respondent-wife and received money, even, without consent of respondent, the appellant inducted a tenant in her company quarter and when the respondent came to know, she had to pay Rs.1,00,000/-to the tenant, which was received by the appellant. 43. It has further been submitted that on 30.10.2013, the appellant brutally assaulted the respondent-wife and snatched valuable articles from her and since 30.10.2013 both parties have bitter relation and their marital tie has broken to such extent that it is not repairable. 44. Learned...","II. Whether the applicant has got valid cause of action? III. Whether the defendant has committed acts of cruelty on the applicant? IV. Whether applicant is entitled to a decree of divorce? V. To what other relief or reliefs the applicant is entitled to? 25. The aforesaid issues were decided against the appellant-husband and in favour of respondent-wife and the suit was decreed on contest in the following terms: ""That the suit be and the same is decreed on contest. The marriage of plaintiff Nisha Nidhi and defendant George Raju Singh solemnized on 28.10.1998 is hereby dissolved. It will be 8 effected from the date of decree. Let a decree be prepared accordingly."" 26. The appellant-husband, being aggrieved with the judgment passed on 05.08.2021 and decree signed on 12.08.2021 by learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur approached this Court by filing the instant appeal. Submission made on behalf of the...","32. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the respondent-wife had earlier filed a suit for dissolution of marriage, which was dismissed due to the reason that the appellant had always supported the respondent and led a happy conjugal life without any complaint till the month of October, 2013, thereafter his father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law, uncle and aunt-in-law came to his flat having three bed rooms at Vijaya Shatabdi and started residing there and when he objected the same, then the disturbances between the parties arose and his in-laws influenced the respondent-wife to lodge a frivolous complaint against him, but the learned court has not considered the same. 10 33. Learned counsel has further submitted that the appellant has applied for a joint loan along with his wife and Flat No. 1242 situated at Vijaya Shatabdi is registered in their joint name and both of them along with their children were happily residing there, but the learned court has not considered the same. 34. It has been submitted that the appellant's father-in-law and mother-in-law have assaulted his daughter resulted in...","40. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, defending the 12 impugned order, has submitted that appellant and respondent are legally married couple and they are blessed with two children, but since the beginning of their marital life, appellant had greedy eyes over the property of the respondent and the respondent-wife purchased a flat in Shatabdi Tower at her own income, however, the appellant manipulated and got his name entered in the ownership of flat. 41. It has further been submitted that the appellant always treated the respondent-wife with cruelty as he has criminal background and several criminal cases are pending against him. 42. It has further been submitted that appellant used to get blank cheque signed by the respondent-wife and received money, even, without consent of respondent, the appellant inducted a tenant in her company quarter and when the respondent came to know, she had to pay Rs.1,00,000/-to the tenant, which was received by the appellant. 43. It has further been submitted that on 30.10.2013, the appellant brutally assaulted the respondent-wife and snatched valuable articles from her and since 30.10.2013 both...","1. The instant appeal has been filed challenging the legality and propriety of impugned judgment passed on 05.08.2021 and decree signed on 12.08.2021 by learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur whereby and whereunder the Original Suit No. 238 of 2016 filed by the Respondent-wife under Section 10(x) of the Divorce Act for a decree of divorce has been allowed. Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case of the plaintiff- respondent-wife as narrated, is that the marriage of plaintiff and defendant was solemnized on 28.10.1998 at Queen of the Apostle Church, Kurji, Patna, Bihar, according to Christianity and customs and after the marriage, the plaintiff came to her matrimonial house at 20E/M.S. Flat, Sisham Road, Golmuri, Jamshedpur and their marriage was consummated and out of the aforesaid wedlock, one daughter namely Simran Shreya was born on 02.08.1999 at Tata Main Hospital, Jamshedpur and a son namely Akshay Anand was born on 27.01.2007 at Tata Main Hospital, Jamshedpur and presently both the children are residing with plaintiff (respondent herein) and she being a mother and natural guardian is looking after their day to day affairs. 3. It has been alleged by the plaintiff that just after the marriage, defendant (appellant herein) always used to demand money from her and on refusal of demand, he used to torture the plaintiff both...","10. The plaintiff has further stated before the learned Family Court that there is no collusion in filing the suit for dissolution of marriage therefore, a decree may be passed by dissolving her marriage with the defendant. 11. The case was admitted for hearing and upon notice the respondent husband appeared. 12. Thereafter, the appellant-husband filed his written statement strongly denouncing the contentions of the appellant, as made in the plaint and refuted the allegations made against him. 13. In his written statement, he took preliminary objection that the plaintiff has filed a Matrimonial Suit No.39 of 2014 against him for dissolution of marriage u/s 10(x) of the Divorce Act, which was dismissed by the learned court below on 11.04.2015, but in the present suit, there has been no whisper about the said matrimonial suit and order related thereto, hence, the present suit is liable to be dismissed. 14. He has further stated that the present suit filed u/s 10(x) of the Indian Divorce Act is not maintainable in its present form against him. 15. The defendant has admitted the...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/13407850/,Cruelty,cruelty,2026,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,13407850,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/13407850/,18
Bombay High Court,"Asha Gomes vs Arthur Gomes on 18 February, 2002",opportunity to go abroad,2002-02-18,"JUDGMENT   H.L. Gokhale, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India",Section 10,Cruelty; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT H.L. Gokhale, J. 1. Heard Mr. Rego for the appellant. None is present for the respondent, though he has been served. This appeal seeks to challenge the judgment and order passed by the Family Court, Mumbai dated 23rd August, 2001 in Petition No. A-1135 of 2000. The appeal was admitted on 23rd October, 2001 and the hearing was expedited. The record of the proceedings from lower Court is received thereafter and the appellant has filed paper book.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""10(1) Any marriage solemnized whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solamnization of the marriage, the respondent- xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (x) has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent.""",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. When the matter reached for final hearing before this Bench, Mr. Rego, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, pointed out that the respondent had remained absent though served in the Family Court also. The appellant herein had filed the above referred matrimonial petition, seeking divorce under the provisions of Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 on the ground of cruelty, as interpreted by the Full Bench of this Court in Pragati Varghese v. Cyril George Varghese , reported in II (1997) DMC 407 (FB)=1997 (3) Mh. LJ 602. It is the case of the appellant that the appellant was treated with such cruelty that it was impossible for her to continue her married life with the respondent. 3. The appellant was Hindu by birth though she and the respondent got married as per Christian religious rites on 16th April, 1994. It was a love marriage. The appellant and the respondent had met each other when they were doing the course of travel and tourism and thereafter they decided to marry. After the marriage, they lived together till end of October, 1998 when the appellant was constrained to leave the matrimonial home due to the cruel treatment. There is no issue from this marriage. 4. It was the case of the appellant in the Trial Court that...","""56. In the result, we hold that the indicated portions of Section 10 of the Act are ultra vires Articles 14,15 and 21 of the Constitution and the same are accordingly struck down. We further find the provisions of Sections 16 , 17 and 20 of the Act are also arbitrary and unreasonable. We suggest that the Legislature should intervene and carry out suitable amendments to the Act at the earliest. We direct that a copy of this order may be forwarded forthwith to the Ministry of Law and Justice for such action as they may deem fit to take."" Relying upon these observations, the petition was filed in the Family Court. Mr. Rego points out that similarly many other petitions have been filed on the basis of this judgment. 9. Mr. Rego has drawn our attention to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddy , , wherein the Apex Court has pointed out that in the present times there is change in the life around us and ideas of cruelty will...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1563100/ | I(2002)DMC794,Cruelty,cruelty; adultery,2002,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,Equivalent citations: I(2002)DMC794,1563100,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1563100/,6
Kerala High Court,"Elam Plakkat Mathew Alias Joly Joseph vs Mulam Kothrayil Kochurani Alias Rani on 14 July, 1999",opy of the certificate issued from St. George Church,1999-07-14,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 17, Section 19",Nullity Sec19; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Ar. Lakshmanan, Actg. C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"2) that the parties are within the prohibited degree of consanguinity (whether natural or legal) or affinity; 3) that either party was a lunatic or idiot at the time of the marriage; 4) that the former husband or wife of either party was living at the time of the marriage, and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force. The Section also provides that nothing in the said Section shall affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to make decrees of nullity of marriage on the ground that the consent of either party was obtained by force or fraud.",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. Husband is the petitioner in this reference. Respondent is his wife. The marriage was solemnised in accordance with the Christian rites on 24-6-96. It is alleged that even prior to the marriage respondent was pregnant by somebody else and she delivered a baby on 27-1-97. The petitioner filed O. P. 122/97 before the Family Court for an injunction to restrain the respondent from using his name as the father of the child born to her. When the Original Petition came up for evidence on 23-1-98 the respondent admitted that the petitioner is not the father of the child born to her and O. P. 112/97 was allowed in his favour. It is further alleged that the petitioner has been living separately from the respondent prior to one year from the filing of the petition and that the respondent was impregnated by somebody else, could not live with her and that she is living in adultery and therefore the petitioner is entitled for a decree on the ground of adultery. The respondent remained ex parte. Before the lower Court petitioner was examined as PW1 and Ext. A1, copy of the certificate issued from St. George Church, Vilangad was marked. Respondent remained ex parte and no evidence was adduced on her behalf either oral or documentary. The Family Court, Kozhikode on...",Registry is directed to despatch the entire records to the lower Court along with a copy of this judgment.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1454739/ | AIR1999KER354, I(2000)DMC126, AIR 1999 KERALA 354, ILR(KER) 1999 (3) KER 221, (2000) 1 HINDULR 468, (1999) 2 KER LJ 227, (2000) 1 DMC 126, (1999) 2 KER LT 776, (2000) 1 MARRILJ 108, (1999) MATLR 579, (1999) 4 RECCIVR 404",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; adultery,1999,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1999KER354, I(2000)DMC126, AIR 1999 KERALA 354, ILR(KER) 1999 (3) KER 221, (2000) 1 HINDULR 468, (1999) 2 KER LJ 227, (2000) 1 DMC 126, (1999) 2 KER LT 776, (2000) 1 MARRILJ 108, (1999) MATLR 579, (1999) 4 RECCIVR 404",1454739,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1454739/,6
Supreme Court of India,"Reynold Rajamani & Anr vs Union Of India & Anr on 30 July, 1982",1982 AIR 1261,1982-07-30,"PATHAK, R.S.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 1, Section 10, Section 13B, Section 2, Section 27, Section 28, Section 3, Section 7",Constitutional Validity,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Learned counsel for the appellants then points out that a Christian marriage can be registered under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and that there is no reason why a marriage registered under the Indian Christian Marriage Act should not enjoy an advantage which is available to a marriage registered under the Special Marriage Act . Reliance is placed on the constitutional prohibition against discrimination embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. Assuming that the marriage in this case could have been registered under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 , inasmuch as it was solemnised in 1967 it was open to the parties to avail of that Act instead of having resort to the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 . In the circumstances, it is not open to the appellants to com plain of the disadvantage now suffered by them. It is also urged by the appellants that the Letters Patent jurisdiction enjoyed by the High Court in matrimonial matters is sufficiently extensive to enable the High Court to make a decree for divorce on the ground now pleaded. We have examined the matter carefully and we do not see how that jurisdiction can be construed to include a ground which...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"Divorce Act cannot be enlarged by reference to s. 7 of the Act. So also has a Special Bench of the Madras High Court in T.M. Bashiam v. Victor (l) and a Single Judge of that Court in A. George Cornelius v. Elizabeth Dopti Samadanam .(2) Miss Thomas appeals to us to adopt a policy of ""social engineering"" and to give to s. 7 the content which has been enacted in s. 28 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and s. 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, both of which provide for divorce by mutual consent. It is possible to say that the law relating to Hindu marriages and to marriages governed by the Special Marriage Act presents a more advanced stage of development in this area than the Indian Divorce Act . However, whether a provision for divorce by mutual consent should be included in the Indian Divorce...","Learned counsel for the appellants then points out that a Christian marriage can be registered under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and that there is no reason why a marriage registered under the Indian Christian Marriage Act should not enjoy an advantage which is available to a marriage registered under the Special Marriage Act . Reliance is placed on the constitutional prohibition against discrimination embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. Assuming that the marriage in this case could have been registered under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 , inasmuch as it was solemnised in 1967 it was open to the parties to avail of that Act instead of having resort to the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 . In the circumstances, it is not open to the appellants to com plain of the disadvantage now suffered by them. It is also urged by the appellants that the Letters Patent jurisdiction enjoyed by the High Court in matrimonial matters is sufficiently extensive to enable the High Court to make a decree for divorce on the ground now pleaded. We have...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","PETITIONER: REYNOLD RAJAMANI & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT30/07/1982 BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) ISLAM, BAHARUL (J) CITATION: 1982 AIR 1261 1983 SCR (1) 32 1982 SCC (2) 474 1982 SCALE (1)566 ACT: Indian Divorce Act 1869, Ss. 7, 10 - `Mutual consent' whether a ground for divorce. Interpretation of Statutes-Matrimonial statutes - Legislation by incorporation - Post 1947 British laws whether incorporated into Indian law. HEADNOTE: The appellants, who were husband and wife belonging to the Roman Catholic Community were married under section 27 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872. They filed a joint petition under Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act for a decree of divorce by mutual consent in the District Court. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that section 28 of the Special Marriage Act could not be availed of. The Supreme Court allowed the appellants to amend their joint petition to enable them to rely on section 7 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869 read with section 1 (2)(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 of England and to seek divorce on the ground that they had been living separately for more than two years and had not been able to live together and that the marriage had broken...",N.V.K. Appeal dismissed. 42,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/81548/ | 1982 AIR 1261, 1983 SCR (1) 32, AIR 1982 SUPREME COURT 1261, (1982) MARRILJ 498, (1982) MATLR 359, (1982) 95 MAD LW 141, 1982 CRI APP R (SC) 223, 1982 UJ (SC) 570, (1982) 2 DMC 268, (1982) 8 ALL LR 649, 1982 (2) SCC 474",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity,1982,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 1982 AIR 1261, 1983 SCR (1) 32, AIR 1982 SUPREME COURT 1261, (1982) MARRILJ 498, (1982) MATLR 359, (1982) 95 MAD LW 141, 1982 CRI APP R (SC) 223, 1982 UJ (SC) 570, (1982) 2 DMC 268, (1982) 8 ALL LR 649, 1982 (2) SCC 474",81548,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/81548/,7
Kerala High Court,"A vs B on 18 January, 1996",ophrenic,1996-01-18,"JUDGMENT   K. Narayana Kurup, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 15, Section 18, Section 19",Cruelty; Nullity Sec19; Desertion; Adultery; Non Consummation,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT K. Narayana Kurup, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. Whether the respondent is schizophrenic before the marriage and at the time of marriage and even thereafter ? 2. Whether the respondent is physically under-developed and impotent (frigid) ? 3. Sine the marriage is not consummated as admitted by both parties whether a decree for nullity can be issued ? 4. Whether the marriage solemnised on 12th February, 1995 between the petitioner and respondent is liable to be declared as null and void as provided in the Indian Divorce Act ? 5. Whether the respondent is entitled to get divorce on the ground of alleged cruelty ? 6. Whether the relief prayed for by the petitioner is liable to be granted on the facts and circumstances of the case as pleaded by the parties ? 7. Whether the petitioner is entitled to get his costs in prosecuting the case ? 3. The evidence in the case consists of the...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a petition for nullity of marriage filed by the husband under Section 18 of the Indian Divorce Act. 2. The parties belong to the Syrian Christian community. Their marriage was solemnised on 12.2.1995 at the St. Thomas Catholicate Aramana Church, Muvattupuzha. Admittedly, the parties resided together only for 15 days. On 27.2,1995, the respondent returned to her own house at Trichur. The allegations of the petitioner are that the respondent was and is a schizophrenic, that she is physically under-developed, and impotent, that these facts were suppressed from the petitioner before marriage and that, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to a decree of nullity of marriage under Section 19 of the Indian Divorce Act on the grounds of insanity and impotency of the respondent and fraud. It is also alleged in the petition that because of the respondent's mental and physical deficiencies, she also refused to have sexual intercourse with the petitioner and thereby failed to consummate the marriage. The averments contained in the petition are repudiated by the respondent. According to the respondent, she is absolutely normal-physically and mentally. Her further case is that she never refused to have sexual intercourse with the petitioner. On the contrary, it was the petitioner who refused to have normal sexual intercourse with her. According to the respondent, the petitioner...","In the result, the prayer of the petitioner for nullity of marriage is rejected and the respondent is granted a decree for dissolution of marriage on the grounds of cruelty simpliciter. The petition is disposed of as above. No costs.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/796249/ | II(1997)DMC373,Cruelty,cruelty; nullity_sec19; desertion; adultery; non_consummation,1996,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: II(1997)DMC373,796249,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/796249/,9
Kerala High Court,"Sajan Ninan vs Binu S. George on 10 January, 2003",opposite party to defend the case put up by the othe,2003-01-10,"JUDGMENT   K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 15, Section 18, Section 45",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The respondent wife filed an application under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869 alleging desertion and cruelty by the appellant/husband. The appellant/husband filed a counter affidavit dated 24.7.2001. The parties went on trial. The respondent/petitioner closed her evidence. The appellant/husband commenced his evidence. He introduced certain evidence as the nullity of the marriage between them. At that point the respondent wife objected contending that such evidence could not be adduced in a petition under Section 10 filed by her on the ground of desertion and cruelty. This was answered by the appellant contending that in the counter affidavit he had already raised a counter claim for declaring the marriage a nullity in terms of Rule 6A Order 8 CPC read with Section 45 of the Divorce Act, 1869. Thereupon the learned single Judge was called upon to decide whether a counter claim will lie in a proceedings under Section 10 in the light of Section 15 of the Act alleging nullity of marriage. That was decided as per the order impugned wherein it is held that a counter claim as to nullity of marriage cannot be raised under Section 15 by respondent in a proceedings under Section 10 . That order is impugned in this appeal. 2. It is contended by the appellant that his counter claim raised...",Appeal is dismissed. No costs.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1347059/ | AIR2003KER213, II(2003)DMC257, 2003(1)KLT740, AIR 2003 KERALA 213, (2003) 2 KHCACJ 152 (KER), 2003 (2) KHCACJ 152, ILR(KER) 2003 (2) KER 382, (2003) 1 CIVILCOURTC 307, (2003) MATLR 660, (2003) 3 RECCIVR 44, (2003) 7 INDLD 649, (2003) 1 KER LJ 375, (2003) 2 DMC 257, (2003) 2 HINDULR 246, (2003) 1 KER LT 740, (2004) 2 MARRILJ 739, (2003) 2 CURCC 178, (2002) 94 CUT LT 628",Unclear,unclear,2003,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR2003KER213, II(2003)DMC257, 2003(1)KLT740, AIR 2003 KERALA 213, (2003) 2 KHCACJ 152 (KER), 2003 (2) KHCACJ 152, ILR(KER) 2003 (2) KER 382, (2003) 1 CIVILCOURTC 307, (2003) MATLR 660, (2003) 3 RECCIVR 44, (2003) 7 INDLD 649, (2003) 1 KER LJ 375, (2003) 2 DMC 257, (2003) 2 HINDULR 246, (2003) 1 KER LT 740, (2004) 2 MARRILJ 739, (2003) 2 CURCC 178, (2002) 94 CUT LT 628",1347059,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1347059/,5
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Shallu Rani vs Shamoun on 2 February, 2017",Cr.P.C. at the instance of the applicant-wife are also,2017-02-02,HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 125, Section 24",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"TA No.738 of 2016 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH TA No.738 of 2016 (O&M) Date of decision: 02.02.2017 Shallu ... Applicant Vs. Shamoun ... Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK Present: Mr. Jimmy Singla, Advocate for the applicant. Mr. Amit Gupta, Advocate for the respondent. ******* RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK, J. (ORAL)",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Applicant-wife, by way of instant transfer application under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ' CPC '), seeks transfer of the petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act ('the Act' for short) titled as Shamoun Vs. Shallu Rani filed by respondent-husband from Gurdaspur to Patiala. Notice of motion was issued and learned trial Court was directed to adjourn the case beyond the date fixed before this Court. Heard learned counsel for the parties. It has gone undisputed before this Court that applicant-wife, along with her minor child, is staying with her parents at Patiala. Since the applicant-wife is not working, she is dependent on her parents. Respondent- husband is not paying any amount of maintenance either for the applicant- wife or for the minor child. Distance between Gurdaspur and Patiala is about 1 of 7 ::: Downloaded on - 06-02-2017 04:43:59 ::: TA No.738 of 2016 2 250 kilometers. Other litigations between the parties, including under Section 125 Cr.P.C. at the instance of the applicant-wife are also pending at Patiala. In view of the abovesaid undisputed fact situation of the case, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that it is just and expedient to transfer the petition under Section 10 of the Act from Gurdaspur to Patiala. It is so said because all...",[ RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK ] 02.02.2017 JUDGE vishnu Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether reportable Yes/No 7 of 7 ::: Downloaded on - 06-02-2017 04:44:00 :::,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161620777/,Procedural,procedural,2017,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,161620777,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161620777/,5
Kerala High Court,"Sherly Thomas vs Johny on 29 November, 2001",O.P. 21040/98 for dissolution of the marriage between,2001-11-29,"JUDGMENT    R. Rajendra Babu, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 13, Section 13B, Section 16, Section 18, Section 19, Section 8",Mutual Consent 10A; Adultery; Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT R. Rajendra Babu, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the 1st respondent.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The important question for consideration is whether a joint petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act can be entertained before the High Court in a pending case filed by one of the spouses for dissolution of their marriage. 2. The wife filed O.P. 21040/98 for dissolution of the marriage between the petitioner and the 1st respondent alleging the grounds of cruelty, desertion and adultery. It was alleged that the marriage between the petitioner and the 1st respondent was soleminzed on 21.4.1988 at St. George Forane Church, Kaipuzha, Kottayam, as per the religious rites among Christian community and thereafter they lived in the house of the 1st respondent. A child was born on 7.9.91 out of the above wedlock, and the 1st respondent was always cruel towards the petitioner and she was subjected to physical as well as mental cruelty. Thereafter he deserted the petitioner and the child from January, 1998 onwards, and the 1st respondent was leading was leading an adulterous life with respondents 2 and 3 and hence the petitioner sought for a decree for dissolution of the marriage. 3. The 1st respondent filed an objection denying all the allegations raised against him, and contended that he was not leading an adulterous life as alleged, but the petitioner was leading an adulterous life. On the basis of...",11. In the result C.M.P. 53500/2001 is allowed and the marriage between the petitioner and the 1st respondent is dissolved by a decree nisi.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1009881/ | I(2002)DMC703, AIR 2002 KERALA 280, ILR(KER) 2002 (1) KER 432, (2002) 1 DMC 703, (2002) 1 KER LJ 243, (2002) 1 KER LT 467, (2002) 2 MARRILJ 456, (2002) 2 ICC 504",Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; adultery; desertion; cruelty,2001,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: I(2002)DMC703, AIR 2002 KERALA 280, ILR(KER) 2002 (1) KER 432, (2002) 1 DMC 703, (2002) 1 KER LJ 243, (2002) 1 KER LT 467, (2002) 2 MARRILJ 456, (2002) 2 ICC 504",1009881,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1009881/,7
Bombay High Court,"Premchand Hira vs Bai Galal on 25 June, 1927",operly have been done in the trial Court.,1927-06-25,"Kt., C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 12, Section 14, Section 17, Section 2, Section 3, Section 34, Section 4, Section 47, Section 7",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J. 1. This is another instance of the apparent difficulty of the mofussil Courts in appreciating the essentials for a valid decree under the Indian Divorce Act . In a case from Poona not long ago Walsh v. Walsh , (1926) 29 Bom, L.R. 308 we had to send the case back no less than twice for remands in order to have the essential evidence before the Court. In the present case from Nadiad, I regret that it is also necessary to send the case to the learned District Judge for a remand to determine essential points. I also regret that like several other divorce cases from the mofussil we have not had the benefit of the assistance of counsel, and that the time of no less than three Judges is occupied in doing work that should properly have been done in the trial Court.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"16. As regards what my brother Blackwell has just said about the effect of the decision of the House of Lords in Russell v. Russell [1924] A.C. 687 I should like to reserve my final opinion until the matter has been argued before me by counsel, and in particular as to whether there is any difference in India arising from the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act . But I entirely agree, as I have already said, that the proper way to avoid the difficulty altogether is to prove otherwise than by the evidence of the wife that she has been living in adultery with the co-respondent. And I may point out that when this Court's judgment in Hewson v. Hewson (1924) 26 Bom. L.R. 467 was given, the decision of the House of Lords overruling the Court of Appeal in Russell v. Russell had not been given, and consequently...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. Now in the first place the learned Judge here has never had the marriage proved properly. There is no certificate of marriage. There is a statement in the petition that the marriage was solemnized in a Salvation Army Hall. Whether that was a duly licensed place for the performance of Christian marriages, and whether the marriage was performed by a duly licensed person in pursuance of the requirements of the Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872, we do not know. But I do unhesitatingly say that in every divorce case that has hitherto come before me in this High Court-and I believe the same is true of the Divorce Court in England-one principal element is that the marriage should be proved strictly and that in general a certificate of marriage should be produced. The learned Judge will, therefore, take that course in the present ease, and he will he careful to see that the requirements of the Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872 have been carried out in this particular case. In this connection I would draw his attention to the fact that in her evidence before the Court the wife describes herself as a Hindu and that both parties have Hindu names. But under Section 4 of that Act it is essential to prove that one or both of the...",31. I agree.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1799882/ | (1927)29BOMLR1336, AIR 1927 BOMBAY 594",Adultery,adultery,1927,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (1927)29BOMLR1336, AIR 1927 BOMBAY 594",1799882,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1799882/,13
Telangana High Court,"Alwala Swamy vs Alwala , Kothi Savithri on 14 November, 2023",O.P.No.94 of 2008 by the Judge,2023-11-14,Justice K. Lakshman,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Special Marriage Act, 1954","Section 10, Section 125, Section 27, Section 498",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN AND HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA FAMILY COURT APPEAL No.44 OF 2010 JUDGMENT: (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice K. Lakshman) Heard Mr. M.Ram Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr.C.Damodar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent. 2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 27.06.2009 passed in F.C.O.P.No.94 of 2008 by the Judge, Family Court-cum-Additional District and Sessions Judge at Karimnagar, the appellant preferred the present appeal. Facts of the case:-",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,"6. Sri M.Ram Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant would contend that after marriage, both the parties lived together for about two months. Since 05.09.2009, they are living separately and therefore, there is no chance of reunion. During the pendency of the 5 present appeal, the appellant re-married and he is staying with his second wife. The Family Court did not consider the said aspects and dismissed the O.P. erroneously. 7. Whereas, Mr.C.Damodar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent/wife would contend that the appellant in order to obtain decree of divorce to get rid of the respondent/wife filed one petition after the other. Respondent never subjected the appellant to cruelty. In fact, the appellant himself did not take care of their minor daughter and did not pay the maintenance. The appellant and his parents subjected the respondent/wife to cruelty and therefore, she was compelled to file a complaint. However, the same was ended in acquittal. She was compelled to file M.C.No.17 of 2001 seeking maintenance to her daughter. Despite the same, she is willing and ready to join the...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. The appellant herein filed a petition vide O.P.No.94 of 2008 under Section 10 (ix) (x) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 to dissolve his marriage with the respondent/wife on the ground of cruelty contending as follows:- The marriage of the appellant with the respondent was solemnized on 24.06.1999 at Karimnagar as per Christian religious rites. After marriage, they lived together for about two months. 2 Thereafter, the respondent/wife started quarrelling with the appellant/ husband for nothing. She used to harass him mentally and subjected him to extreme mental and physical cruelty. 05.09.1999, she left the society of the appellant by filing a false complaint with the Police, I Town Police Station, Karimnagar. She also filed a complaint with the Police, II Town Police Station, Karimnagar on 20.02.2021 stating that the appellant along with his parents, harassed her for additional dowry, which is registered as a case in Cr.No.24 of 2001 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC. On completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer has filed charge sheet against the appellant and the same was taken on file vide C.C.No.237 of 2001 by the Addl.Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Karimnagar. The same was ended in acquittal. She also filed a petition under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. vide M.C.No.17 of 2001 against him seeking maintenance for her minor daughter....","18. In view of the above discussion, this appeal is dismissed. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed. ________________________ JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN ____________________ JUSTICE K. SUJANA Date:14.11.2023.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/86361259/,Cruelty,cruelty,2023,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,86361259,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/86361259/,7
Delhi High Court,"Mrs. Indu Bala Toppo vs Mr. Francis Xavier Toppo on 7 September, 2001",op's house,2001-09-07,"ORDER    Arijit Pasayat, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17",Cruelty; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Arijit Pasayat, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"8. The expression 'cruelty', as noted above has not been defined. It has been used in relation to human conduct or human behavior. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. Cruelty is a course of conduct of one, which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the Court will have no problem in determining it. It is a question of fact and degree.If it is mental, the problem presents difficulties. First, the enquiry must begin at to the nature of cruel treatment, second the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse, whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately,it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and...",4. Inspite of notice there is no appearance on behalf of the respondent. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","5. Grounds on which a wife can present a petition for dissolution of marriage are set out in Section 10 of the Act. The said provisions read as follows: "" Section 10 : When husband may petition for dissolution-Any husband may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court, praying that his marriage may be dissolved on the ground that his wife has, since the solemnization thereof, been guilty of adultery. When wife may petition for dissolution-Any wife may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court, praying that her marriage may be dissolved on the ground that, since the solemnization thereof, her husband has exchanged his profession of Christianity for the profession of some religion, and gone through a form of marriage with another woman; Or has been guilty of incestuous adultery, Or of bigamy with adultery Or of marriage with another woman with adultery Or of rape, sodomy or bestiality, Or of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa et toro Or of adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or upwards."" 6. One of the grounds is adultery coupled with such cruelty,as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa et toro. A...","1. This is a reference under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (in short the Act') seeking confirmation of the decree for dissolution of marriage passed by learned Additional District Judge. Petitioner (hereinafter also referred to as the wife') filed and application under Section 10 of the Act praying for a decree of divorce from the respondent (hereinafter also referred to as the husband') on the ground that cruelty was meted out to her by the husband and his family members. Said prayer was accepted by learned Additional District Judge, Tis Hazari, Delhi in I.D.A. 661 of 1998. 2. Factual background according to the petitioner is as follows: Parties entered into marital ties on 7th September 1996 and the marriage was solemnized according to Christian rites at Sacred Heart Cathedral, Ashok Place, Gole Dakkhana, New Delhi. Five priests conducted the ceremonies. After they entered into the marital life, husband and his family members did not treat the wife with love, affection and dignity and they expressed dissatisfaction about various arrangements made by the petitioner's parents and she was...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1503366/ | AIR2002DELHI54, 94(2001)DLT306, II(2001)DMC631, 2001(60)DRJ331, AIR 2002 DELHI 54, 2002 A I H C 808, (2002) 2 JCR 109 (DEL), (2001) 94 DLT 306, (2001) 2 DMC 631, (2001) 60 DRJ 331, (2001) 2 HINDULR 584, (2002) 1 MARRILJ 494, (2002) MATLR 32, (2002) 1 RECCIVR 472",Cruelty,cruelty; adultery,2001,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR2002DELHI54, 94(2001)DLT306, II(2001)DMC631, 2001(60)DRJ331, AIR 2002 DELHI 54, 2002 A I H C 808, (2002) 2 JCR 109 (DEL), (2001) 94 DLT 306, (2001) 2 DMC 631, (2001) 60 DRJ 331, (2001) 2 HINDULR 584, (2002) 1 MARRILJ 494, (2002) MATLR 32, (2002) 1 RECCIVR 472",1503366,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1503366/,8
Telangana High Court,"Nishkal Singampalli, vs Kannepamula Vijaya Kumar on 10 February, 2025",opies of judgment may be,2025-02-10,"MOUSHUMI BATTACHARYA,J, B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO,J, Justice B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 13",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"*THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BATTACHARYA AND THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO + FAMILY COURT APPEAL No.5 OF 2023 % 10--02--2025 # Nishkal Singampalli ... Appellant vs. $ Kannepamula Vijaya Kumar ... Respondent !Counsel for the Appellant: Sri Sanjeev Reddy Gillela ^Counsel for Respondent: Sri Ms.A.Harini <Gist : >Head Note : ? Cases referred: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3285 2011 (1) DMC 364 = 2010:KER:34522 2022 SCC OnLine Delhi 726 = 2022:DHC:894-DB (1975) 2 SCC 326 (1988) 1 SCC 105 (1994) 1 SCC 337 (2007) 4 SCC 511 2 IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA HYDERABAD **** FAMILY COURT APPEAL No.5 OF 2023 Between: Nishkal Singampalli ... Appellant And Kannepamula Vijaya Kumar ... Respondent JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 10.02.2025 THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BATTACHARYA AND THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO 1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be allowed to see the Judgments? : No 2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes 3. Whether His Lordship wishes to see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes _______________________ MOUSHUMI BATTACHARYA,J _____________________ B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO,J 3 THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA AND THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO F.C.A.NO.5 OF 2023 J U D G...","17. The respondent-husband leveled allegations against the appellant-wife that she opposed for sex and in the month of July, 2011 when he insisted for sex then he noticed white patches increased in her body and he was scared to see the patches as it was spreading on her body parts. Respondent-husband stated in his cross-examination that they separated in the year 2014 and during their stay together they used to move along with the appellant's friends, families to Nirmal, Srisailam and other parts and that the appellant-wife visited Bangalore in the year, 2015 along with his sister on the eve of his birthday, in the presence of the appellant, respondent's sister asked him about the reunion, in turn the respondent-husband said that he will think over it, he has not issued legal notice nor put any E-Mail to the appellant-wife seeking for divorce. 18. The appellant-wife has stated in her cross-examination that she and her husband stayed together till September, 2012 and that she visited her husband in the month of January, 2016, by then the Vitiligo has become prominent. Witness stated that she and her husband met weekly once after 2017. She denied the suggestion that parties cannot take...","8. The core issue which arises for our consideration is whether the appellant-wife treated the respondent-husband with cruelty or not? 9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the appeal is barred by law. The impugned order is passed on 03.11.2022, the appellant-wife has made copy application on 10.11.2022, copy was delivered on 08.12.2022, appeal is filed on 27.12.2022 which is within limitation and that the decision cited by respondent counsel in Arunoday Singh 's case (supra) is not applicable. 10. In matrimonial life, cruelty can be defined in many ways. It has many perspectives which depend upon the socio-economic status and 8 circumstances of parties to the marriage. It varies from person to person. It also varies with time, place, economic status and other circumstances. Cruelty can be physical and mental. Physical cruelty provides more of a direct evidence, that it can be perceptible when compared to mental...","*THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BATTACHARYA AND THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO + FAMILY COURT APPEAL No.5 OF 2023 % 10--02--2025 # Nishkal Singampalli ... Appellant vs. $ Kannepamula Vijaya Kumar ... Respondent !Counsel for the Appellant: Sri Sanjeev Reddy Gillela ^Counsel for Respondent: Sri Ms.A.Harini <Gist : >Head Note : ? Cases referred: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3285 2011 (1) DMC 364 = 2010:KER:34522 2022 SCC OnLine Delhi 726 = 2022:DHC:894-DB (1975) 2 SCC 326 (1988) 1 SCC 105 (1994) 1 SCC 337 (2007) 4 SCC 511 2 IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA HYDERABAD **** FAMILY COURT APPEAL No.5 OF 2023 Between: Nishkal Singampalli ... Appellant And Kannepamula Vijaya Kumar ... Respondent JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 10.02.2025 THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BATTACHARYA AND THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO 1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be allowed to see the Judgments? : No 2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes 3. Whether His Lordship wishes to see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes _______________________ MOUSHUMI BATTACHARYA,J _____________________ B.R.MADHUSUDHAN...","17. The respondent-husband leveled allegations against the appellant-wife that she opposed for sex and in the month of July, 2011 when he insisted for sex then he noticed white patches increased in her body and he was scared to see the patches as it was spreading on her body parts. Respondent-husband stated in his cross-examination that they separated in the year 2014 and during their stay together they used to move along with the appellant's friends, families to Nirmal, Srisailam and other parts and that the appellant-wife visited Bangalore in the year, 2015 along with his sister on the eve of his birthday, in the presence of the appellant, respondent's sister asked him about the reunion, in turn the respondent-husband said that he will think over it, he has not issued legal notice nor put any E-Mail to the appellant-wife seeking for divorce. 18. The appellant-wife has stated in her cross-examination that she and her husband stayed together till September, 2012 and that she visited her husband in the month of January, 2016, by then the Vitiligo has become prominent....","(per Justice B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO) The Appellant-wife has preferred the instant Appeal aggrieved by the order, dated 03.11.2022 in O.P.No.778 of 2017 passed by I Additional Family Court at Hyderabad, whereby the Divorce petition filed by the respondent-husband under Section 10 (iv) (x) of Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (for short 'the Act') was allowed. 2. The factual background of the case is as follows: 2.1. The respondent-husband has initially filed O.P. under Section 10 (iv) of the Act that his marriage was performed with the appellant-wife on 29.12.2010 as per Christian Rules and Customs. He alleged that on the first night of the marriage, he noticed white patches on the lips and body of the appellant-wife, when the respondent-husband ascertained with the appellant-wife about the white patches on her lips and body, she informed that they were sun burns. It is further alleged in the petition that in the month of January, 2012, the respondent-husband requested the appellant-wife to visit a Doctor and get treatment. Whenever there was a quarrel, the appellant-wife used to do Caste differentiation by saying that the respondent-husband belongs to labour class. After shifting to Hyderabad, the respondent-husband 4 insisted the appellant-wife for sex, then he noticed that the white patches increased in his wife's body and he was scared to see that the patches were spreading...","22. In view of the above discussions, Appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 03.11.2022 in O.P.No.778 of 2017 passed by I Additional Family Court at Hyderabad is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, Miscellaneous application/s, pending if any, shall stand closed. ____________________________ MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J _________________________ B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO, J 10th February, 2025. PLV",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/164045118/,Cruelty,cruelty,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,164045118,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/164045118/,9
Madras High Court,"Maria Alias Omini vs K. Ignatius Alias Ronnie on 30 April, 1999",opulation.,1999-04-30,"JUDGMENT    R. Jayasimha Babu, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 12, Section 13, Section 18, Section 19",Nullity Sec19; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT R. Jayasimha Babu, J. 1. This appeal by the wife is directed against the judgement of the learned single Judge of this Court who dismissed her application for annulment of her marriage.","3. It has also been alleged by the petitioner that having become completely frustrated, she had to leave the matrimonial home and go back to her parents place after which she caused a legal notice to be issued. In response to that notice the respondent denied the allegations made against him, but he stated that he was not interested in living with the petitioner and that he needed some time to return the money which he had taken from the petitioner's parents at the time of the marriage. The personal effects of the petitioner were also returned after that exchange of notices. 4. The respondent/husband in his written statement did not deny the fact that the marriage had remained without being consummated, even though the parties had lived together as husband and wife for ten months under the same roof, and there was no impediment to the marriage being consummated while they so lived together. The fad that they were married in the Church was not disputed. In paragraph 4 of the written statement it was stated by the respondent that he had undergone medical examination which would show that the petitioner's allegations are not true. 10. The learned trial...","5. After the written statement was filed the petitioner took out an application to direct the respondent to submit himself before a medical board for ascertaining as to whether the respondent is impotent or not and submit a report to the Court. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondent-husband to that application it was stated by him that he would rely on the medical report referred to in his written statement at the time of trial. 6. When the matter proceeded to trial, the wife examined herself and spoke to all the averments made in her petition. She also stated that she was prepared to present herself for medical examination to prove that she was perfectly alright and that she was not in any way preventing the consummation of the marriage. She was cross-examined by the counsel for the plaintiff. She denied the suggestion that she was responsible for...","2. In the petition, it had been alleged that she and the respondent were married on 18-8-96 as per Roman Catholic rites at Loyola Church in Nungambakkam and that Immediately after the marriage she was taken to the respondent's house, wherein she lived with the respondent. The respondent instead of acting like any normal husband had avoided having coitus with the petitioner, which gave rise the suspicion in the petitioner's mind regarding such very unusual behaviour on the part of the respondent. The petitioner has alleged that the respondent went to the extent of informing the petitioner that sex is not an immediate attraction, and avoided having intercourse with the petitioner. Such behaviour on the part of the petitioner continued for months together, and the marriage remained unconsummated despite the entereaties of the petitioner. The respondent did not engage in intercourse even though the petitioner lived with him for ten months. It was, therefore, alleged by her that the respondent suffered from serious sexual disability and had failed to fulfil a fundamental obligation of matrimony. It was alleged by her...","3. It has also been alleged by the petitioner that having become completely frustrated, she had to leave the matrimonial home and go back to her parents place after which she caused a legal notice to be issued. In response to that notice the respondent denied the allegations made against him, but he stated that he was not interested in living with the petitioner and that he needed some time to return the money which he had taken from the petitioner's parents at the time of the marriage. The personal effects of the petitioner were also returned after that exchange of notices. 4. The respondent/husband in his written statement did not deny the fact that the marriage had remained without being consummated, even though the parties had lived together as husband and wife for ten months under the same roof, and there was no impediment to the marriage being consummated while they so lived together. The fad that they were married in the Church was not disputed. In paragraph 4 of the written statement it was stated by the respondent...","8. The reasonable inference, having regard to this conduct of the respondent in the background of the pleading in the case and the evidence given by the wife is that the respondent was incapable of consummating the marriage, and that debility continued even when the matter was taken up for trial. Any man, who has no doubt about his potency, would not decline to submit himself to medical examination to establish that fact. Though the respondent had claimed that he bad been medically examined and he had a report, no such report was placed before the Court. He also unwilling to submit himself to medical examination. The wife offered to have himself medically examined. The respondent did not call upon her to undergo such examination. That would go to show that his allegation that she was responsible for the marriage not being consummated, was incorrect. 9. The learned trial Judge, has misdirected himself completely in holding that there was no allegation of impotency in the petition. As already noticed by us, paragraph 4 of the petition categorically and in the most unambiguous terms sets out the averments to the effect that it is because of the debility of the respondent the marriage had not been consummated. The serious sexual debility of the respondent has also been referred to in paragraph...","15. We, therefore, allow the appeal set aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial judge and declare the marriage that was solemnised between the petitioner and the respondent on 18-8-1996 as null and void. Parties to bear their respective costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1346801/ | AIR 2000 MADRAS 202, (2000) 2 MARRILJ 583 (2000) MATLR 393, (2000) MATLR 393",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; adultery,1999,nullity,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 2000 MADRAS 202, (2000) 2 MARRILJ 583 (2000) MATLR 393, (2000) MATLR 393",1346801,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1346801/,9
Bombay High Court,"Virbala Sumant Lokhande vs Sumant Madhay Lokhande on 10 April, 1973",AIR1974BOM297,1973-04-10,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 3, Section 37",Desertion; Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,JUDGMENT,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"The President of the Division, Siri J. Hannen, rejected the petition on the narrow ground that the husband's conduct did not amount to desertion for two years. but whether the conduct amount to desertion or not is made clear in his following lucid observations:- ""I have on other occasions pointed out that if an is living with another woman the wife is justified in saying 'I shall not return to you, nor shall I allow you to have access to me while you are living in open adultery with another woman'. And it may be that in this case that which amounts to desertion has commenced, and that when the necessary time has elapsed the wife may claim relief both on the ground of adultery and desertion"". The above mentioned decision was cited with approval in (1888) 13 PD 216 Garcia v. Garcia. The facts here were that the parties...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The appellant original applicant held filed a petition for divorcee against her husband under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act. The appellant claimed divorce on two distinct grounds. She prayed that her marriage may be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization thereof her husband has been guilty of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce, a mensa et toro. She also claimed dissolution of marriage on the additional ground that since the solemnization of the marriage her husband was guilty of adultery coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for two years or upwards. 2. The respondent-husband resisted the application and denied the allegations about adultery, cruelty and desertion. After consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned Extra Joint Judge at Poona came to the conclusion that the petitioner failed to establish that the petitioner failed to establish the ground based upon adultery coupled with legal circulate. However, the learned Judge was sufficient for recording a finding that the respondent husband was living in adultery for two years or more since the solemnization of the marriage. But according to the learned Judge the evidence adduced to the learned Judge the evidence adduced by the petitioner was not sufficient to support a finding that the husband was...","15. In the result the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the learned Extra Joint Judge. Poona, is set aside and a decree for dissolution of the marriage under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act is passed in favour of the e appellant on the ground that the respondent-husband has been guilty of adultery coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for two years or upwards. The appellant will be entitled to costs throughout. 16. Appeal allowed.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/511543/ | AIR1974BOM297, (1974)76BOMLR364, ILR1974BOM459, AIR 1974 BOMBAY 297, ILR (1974) BOM 451 76 BOM LR 364, 76 BOM LR 364",Desertion,desertion; adultery; cruelty,1973,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1974BOM297, (1974)76BOMLR364, ILR1974BOM459, AIR 1974 BOMBAY 297, ILR (1974) BOM 451 76 BOM LR 364, 76 BOM LR 364",511543,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/511543/,7
Kerala High Court,"Susan Samuel vs Oommen Mathew on 26 February, 2009",OPAL NAMBIAR,2009-02-26,"Justice P.R.RAMAN The Hon, Justice P.S.GOPINATHAN  Dated, P.S.GOPINATHAN, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 3, Section 7",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM WP(C).No. 1913 of 2009(S) 1. SUSAN SAMUEL, D/O.MR. P.S. SAMUEL, ... Petitioner Vs 1. OOMMEN MATHEW, S/O.MR. A.M. MATHEW ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.V.V.NANDAGOPAL NAMBIAR For Respondent :SRI.S.SUBHASH CHAND The Hon'ble MR. Justice P.R.RAMAN The Hon'ble MR. Justice P.S.GOPINATHAN Dated :26/02/2009 O R D E R P.R.RAMAN & P.S.GOPINATHAN, JJ. ------------------------------- W.P.(C) No.1913 of 2009 ------------------------------- Dated this the 26th February, 2009 J U D G M E N T Raman, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Petitioner who is the wife has initiated proceedings for getting a decree of divorce under the Divorce Act before the Principal Family Court, Bangalore, as M.C.No.2687 of 2006, Ext.P1 produced in the case. At the same time, the respondent herein, also filed a petition for divorce, O.P.(Div) No.652 of 2007, before the Family Court, Thiruvalla, Ext.P2 in this case, though later in point of time. Hence, the petitioner moved the Family Court, Thiruvalla, under Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, where the latter proceedings was filed, for a stay of further proceedings, in view of the matter pending before the Family Court, Bangalore, as per Ext.P3. By the impugned order under challenge, Family Court, Thiruvalla, held that the Family Court at Bangalore has no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute in question and refused to stay the further proceedings pending before the W.P.(C) No.1913 of 2009 2 Family Court, Thiruvalla. The petitioner challenges the correctness of the order passed by the Family Court, Thiruvalla, in this writ petition. 2. Sri.V.V.Nandagopal Nambiar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that as per Section 7 of the Family Court Act, Bangalore Court, where the proceedings have been initiated by his client is fully competent to entertain the same. According to him, the nature of the dispute will squarely come...",nj.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/332665/,Procedural,procedural,2009,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,332665,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/332665/,4
Karnataka High Court,"M.R.G.L.J. Vailsher vs Smt. Ramola Vailshery And Others on 26 June, 1997",AIR1997KANT341,1997-06-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 12, Section 13, Section 14, Section 15, Section 3, Section 497, Section 5, Section 6, Section 7, Section 8, Section 9",Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER R. P. Sethi, C. J.","14. The teamed counsel for the respondent contended that as the petitioner continued to live with the respondent even after they came to know about the adultery, there has been condonation of Ihe adultery by the petitioner and as such she would not be entitled to a decree of divorce. It is no doubt true that even after coining to know about the respondent's relationship with R.W. 3 the petitioner continued to live with the respondent till about January, 1991. But it must be remembered that this is not a case of a stray act of adultery by the respondent, which could be said to have been condoned by the petitioner cohabiting with the respondent even after the act of adultery. The evidence of R.W.-3 shows that the respondent was living with her till 1993. As such, the act of adultery committed by respondent with R.W.-3 has been a continuous one and it is admitted that before filing this petition, the petitioner filed a suit against the respondent and obtained an order of temporary injunction restraining him from coming to her house. This conduct clearly shows that by the date of filing of this petition, the petitioner had not condoned...","""(a) whether the petitionor has established that the respondent is guilty of adultery (b) Whether the petitioner has established that the respondent has treated her with such cruelty as to entitle her to a decree of judicial separation? (c) Whether the petitioner has condoned the adultery committed by respondent? (d) Whether the petitioner is presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent? and, (e) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the divorce sought for?"" On proof of points (a) and (b) and in the absence of evidence for point (c), the learned single Judge allowed the petition as noted herein above. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently submitted that herelient was not proved to have violated any of the conditions specified under S. 10 of the Act. It was submitted that as respondent-2 was admittedly an un-married woman and respondent No. 3 a widow, the appellant...","2. The facts leading to the filing of the appeal are that the appellant and respondent No. 1 were married in accordance with the Christian rites on 20th December, 1981 at Hudson Memorial Church. Bangalore. Out of the wedlock, one male and another female children were born. The appellant husband was alleged to have neglected his wife and the children from 1-1-1991 onwards. The appellant was alleged to have come in contact with Miss Premakumari, R2 herein. She was stated to be a Nurse and the appellant husband hired an apartment adjoining to his work spot where they used to meet. It was further alleged that he managed her transfer to Vani Vilas Hospital, Bangalore, by allegedly giving a bribe of Rs. 12,000/-. Premakumari was alleged to have given birth to a daughter in 1986. The daughter was alleged lo have been conceived out of the illicit relationship of the husband and the said Premakumari. The name of the appellant husband was shown in the Kumud Nursing Home, Jayanagar, Bangalore, as father of the child. Out of this illicit relationship...","14. The teamed counsel for the respondent contended that as the petitioner continued to live with the respondent even after they came to know about the adultery, there has been condonation of Ihe adultery by the petitioner and as such she would not be entitled to a decree of divorce. It is no doubt true that even after coining to know about the respondent's relationship with R.W. 3 the petitioner continued to live with the respondent till about January, 1991. But it must be remembered that this is not a case of a stray act of adultery by the respondent, which could be said to have been condoned by the petitioner cohabiting with the respondent even after the act of adultery. The evidence of R.W.-3 shows that the respondent was living with her till 1993. As such, the act of adultery committed by respondent with R.W.-3 has been a continuous one and it is admitted that before filing this petition, the petitioner filed a suit against the respondent and obtained an order of temporary injunction restraining him from coming to...","The Supreme Court in Smt. Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India , held that ""'adultery' under the civil law has a wider connotalion man under the Penal Code."". On the technical ground of the applicability of Section 497 of the Penal Code, stability of the marriage cannot be permitted to be scorned or sacrificed. There is therefore no substance in the argument of the learned counsel that as the respondent wife had not proved the ingredients of Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, the charge of adultery for the purpose of deciding the application under Section 10 of the Act had not been proved. 9. The learned counsel has further submitted that merely being guilty of adultery cannot be a ground for divorce in favour of the wife. It is true that under Section 10 of the Act the wife can pray for discussion of marriage on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, her husband had exchanged his profession of charistianity for the profession of some other religion and gone through a form of marriage with another woman or has been guilty of incestuous adultery, or of bigamy with adultery, or of marriage with another woman with adultery, or of rape, sodomy or bestiality, or of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have...","1. Alleging adultery coupled with cruelly, respondent-1 wife tiled a petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act (hereinafter called the 'Act'), praying to pass a decree nisi and to grant her the custody of the minor children. She further prayed for issuance of directions 10 the appellant-husband for providing sufficient means by way of settlements towards education, shelter, food, clothing, medical and other incidental expenses. On proof of the averments made, a decree nisi for dissolution of the marriage between the parties was passed in favour of the wife granting her six months time to seek an absolute decree. Minor children were directed to be given in the custody of the wife till the decree was made absolute. In the absence of sufficient evidence, the other reliefs claimed by the wife were not allowed by the learned single Judge in the order impugned in the appeal. It is submitted that the judgment and decree passed against the appellant is against law and facts which requires to be set aside. 13. Appeal dismissed.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1522983/ | AIR1997KANT341, II(1997)DMC604, ILR1998KAR1874, 1997(3)KARLJ531, AIR 1997 KARNATAKA 341, (1998) ILR (KANT) 1874, (1998) 1 HINDULR 300, (1997) 3 KANT LJ 531, (1997) 4 CURCC 224, (1998) 1 MARRILJ 245, (1998) 3 ALLCRILR 269, (1998) 3 RECCRIR 310, (1998) 3 RECCIVR 99, (1997) 2 DMC 604",Adultery,adultery; cruelty,1997,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1997KANT341, II(1997)DMC604, ILR1998KAR1874, 1997(3)KARLJ531, AIR 1997 KARNATAKA 341, (1998) ILR (KANT) 1874, (1998) 1 HINDULR 300, (1997) 3 KANT LJ 531, (1997) 4 CURCC 224, (1998) 1 MARRILJ 245, (1998) 3 ALLCRILR 269, (1998) 3 RECCRIR 310, (1998) 3 RECCIVR 99, (1997) 2 DMC 604",1522983,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1522983/,10
Tripura High Court,"Sri Surajit Debbarma vs Smt. Sonali Debbarma on 23 September, 2020",MAT App. 06 of 2015,2020-09-23,"Per S.G. Chattopadhyay, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 2, Section 27, Section 32, Section 34, Section 494, Section 498A",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[pre_1] HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AGARTALA MAT App. 06 of 2015 BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. TALAPATRA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G. CHATTOPADHYAY Sri Surajit Debbarma, S/O- Lt. Budhu Debbarma Resident of Gorkhabasti, Bholananda Palli P.S.-West Agartala, District-West Tripura ---- Appellant(s) Versus Smt. Sonali Debbarma W/O- Sri Surajit Debbarma D/O- Sri Abhijit Debbarma, A.D. Nagar Mission Complex, P.S-A.D. Nagar District-West Tripura ---- Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. K.N. Bhattacharjee, Sr. Adv. Mr. P. Saha, Adv. For Respondent(s) : Mrs. A.S. Lodh, Adv Mr. J. Majumder, Adv Date of hearing : 10.09.2020 Date of pronouncement : 23.09.2020 Whether fit for reporting: Yes No ✔ Judgment [Per S.G. Chattopadhyay, J] The husband is the appellant before us impugning the judgment and order dated 17.04.2015 passed by the Judge, Page 2 of 32 Family Court at Agartala in Matrimonial proceedings No. TS (Divorce) 305 of 2012 whereby the learned trial court dismissed the petition of the appellant seeking dissolution of marriage with the respondent wife under section 10 of The Divorce Act, 1869 on the ground of cruelty. [2] The appeal was once heard...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party- .............................................................................. (ia) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or"" Provided that in every suit for divorce on this ground it shall be in the discretion of the Court whether it should grant a decree for divorce or for judicial separation only;"" [38] In the given case, the appellant has sought for divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. He has made no allegation of physical cruelty against his wife. In Shobha Rani (supra), the Apex Court observed that the court will have no problem to determine physical cruelty because it is question of fact and degree. But when it is mental, it creates difficulty. The...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AGARTALA MAT App. 06 of 2015 BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. TALAPATRA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G. CHATTOPADHYAY Sri Surajit Debbarma, S/O- Lt. Budhu Debbarma Resident of Gorkhabasti, Bholananda Palli P.S.-West Agartala, District-West Tripura ---- Appellant(s) Versus Smt. Sonali Debbarma W/O- Sri Surajit Debbarma D/O- Sri Abhijit Debbarma, A.D. Nagar Mission Complex, P.S-A.D. Nagar District-West Tripura ---- Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. K.N. Bhattacharjee, Sr. Adv. Mr. P. Saha, Adv. For Respondent(s) : Mrs. A.S. Lodh, Adv Mr. J. Majumder, Adv Date of hearing : 10.09.2020 Date of pronouncement : 23.09.2020 Whether fit for reporting: Yes No ✔ Judgment [Per S.G. Chattopadhyay, J] The husband is the appellant before us impugning the judgment and order dated 17.04.2015 passed by the Judge, Page 2 of 32 Family Court at Agartala in Matrimonial proceedings No. TS (Divorce) 305 of 2012 whereby the learned trial court dismissed the petition of the appellant seeking dissolution of marriage with the respondent wife under section 10 of The Divorce Act, 1869 on the ground of cruelty. [2] The appeal was once heard and considered ex parte by this court against the respondent since she did not appear after receiving notice and it was disposed of by order dated 08.03.2017 whereby the appeal was allowed granting decree of divorce in favor of the appellant....",The appeal is allowed accordingly. JUDGE JUDGE Rudradeep,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/186623837/ | AIR 2021 (NOC) 485 (TRI.), AIRONLINE 2020 TRI 315",Cruelty,cruelty,2020,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 2021 (NOC) 485 (TRI.), AIRONLINE 2020 TRI 315",186623837,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/186623837/,14
Kerala High Court,"Suo Motu Reference In The Matter Of ... vs Unknown on 1 April, 2002",opriate to relegate the parties to the concerned Fam,2002-04-01,"JUDGMENT    B.N. Srikrishna, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 16, Section 17, Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 23, Section 37, Section 4, Section 40, Section 43, Section 44, Section 45, Section 55, Section 56, Section 6, Section 7, Section 8, Section 9",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT B.N. Srikrishna, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. This reference has been made for judicial determination of the following questions which vitally concern the jurisdiction of this Court in matrimonial matters where the parties are Christians. The questions which arise for consideration and determination of this Court are as under: ""1. Whether there is exclusion of the original jurisdiction of the High Court in matrimonial matters under the Divorce Act by virtue of the provisions of Sections 7 , 8 and 20 of the Family Courts Act? 2. ' How far the amendments effected to the erstwhile Indian Divorce Act have interfered with or curtailed the original jurisdiction of the High Court in matrimonial matters under the Divorce Act ? 4. Whether the Original Petitions under the Divorce Act , pending in the High Court, which are at the stage of prior to decree, should be transferred to the concerned Family Courts/District Courts for being dealt with...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","7. Considering the wider powers now given to the District Court to pass a decree absolute at the first instance itself while the High Court can only pronounce a decree nisi at the first instance under Section 16 of the Divorce Act, which has to be made absolute after the expiry of six months from the date of decree, will it be appropriate to relegate the parties to the concerned Family Court/District Court by ordering return of the petitions filed after 3.10.2001? 8. In view of the deletion of Ss. 17 and 20 requiring confirmation by the High Court of decrees passed by the District Court/Family Court, what further step is to betaken with regard to the matters pending for confirmation by the High Court in which decrees were passed prior to 3.10.2001 ?"" 2. The Indian Divorce Act, 1869 was enacted to amend the law relating to persons professing the Christian religion and confer upon certain courts the jurisdiction on matrimonial matters. Even prior to the enactment of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 , the High Courts in India exercised jurisdiction in matrimonial matters under the enabling provisions of the High Courts Act and the provisions of the Letters Patent establishing the High Court. Under the Act , jurisdiction was concurrently conferred on the High Court as well as...","3. If there is exclusion, how the petitions under the Indian Divorce Act in which decree nisis have been passed by the High Court should be dealt with? 3. The amending Act of 2001 has changed the title of the Act from ' Indian Divorce Act ' to ' Divorce Act '. Prior to the coming into force of this amending Act, the High Court and the District Court had concurrent jurisdiction to entertain petitions for dissolution of marriage under Section 10 on the grounds specified therein, for pronouncing a decree of nullity under Section 18 on the grounds specified in Section 19 , for making a decree for judicial separation under Section 23 , for ordering permanent alimony after making the decree absolute declaring a marriage to be dissolved under Section 37 , to enquire into antenuptial and post-nuptial settlement under Section 40 , to make orders to the custody of children after a decree for dissolution or nullity under Section 43 , to make orders with regard to the custody, maintenance and education of minor children under Section...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1231919/ | II(2002)DMC753,Procedural,procedural,2002,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,Equivalent citations: II(2002)DMC753,1231919,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1231919/,17
Kerala High Court,"Jose vs Ali Joseph on 29 June, 1990",op's House,1990-06-29,"JUDGMENT   Varghese Kalliath, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Varghese Kalliath, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,"6. In the petition, the petitioner has stated thus :--(Matter ommitted as in Vernakular) 7. Further, in paragraph 9 of the petition, he has stated that even though he has asked about the parentage of the children, the counter petitioner did not disclose the same. He has also stated that he has made the necessary enquiries to find out the name of the adulterer, and his address, but he was unsuccessful. These things are stated in the petition as excuses for not impleading the adulterer.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. A well educated young couple with two children are before us. The husband filed a petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, for short, the Act, to shap the marriage tie by a decree of the court dissolving the marriage with his wife, the counter petitioner Their marriage was on 21-5-1979. Parties belong to Roman Catholic Community and their marriage was solemnised at the Bishop's House, Kottayam. After the marriage, the counter petitioner gave birth to two children, 2. Section 10 of the Act provides that a husband may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court praying that his marriage may be dissolved on the ground that his wife has, since the solemnization thereof, been guilty of adultery. The provision for dissolution of marriage, particularly, a dissolution at the instance of the husband, is a very stringent provision. The husband is entitled to claim divorce only if the wife is found to be guilty of adultery. Even in a case where the marriage is irretrievably broken and the parties cannot lead with peace and tranquillity a married life, for sufficient reasons, other than the ground of adultery and even if the court is satisfied that the marriage relationship cannot be resurrected by conciliation so long as the law provides that the court...","With the above observations, appeal is disposed of. Case is remitted back to the court below. No order as to costs. Parties are directed to appear before the lower court on 30th July, 1990.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/40579/ | I(1991)DMC392,Adultery,adultery,1990,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: I(1991)DMC392,40579,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/40579/,7
Madras High Court,"Dr. David Chakravarthy Arumainayagam ... vs Geetha Chakravathy Arumainayagam And ... on 18 March, 2000",matrimonial suit. The respondent filed the main case under section,2000-03-18,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 19, Section 2, Section 39",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER 1. Application filed by the applicant/defendant under Order 14, Rule 8 of Original Side Rules read with Order 14, Rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code to decide the maintainability of the O.M.S. before this Court on the ground of jurisdiction based on domicilary requirement as a preliminary issue. 2. The case in brief is as follows:","7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent mainly contended that the question of domicile depends upon the question of fact and law and as it requires evidence, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. Learned counsel further stated that the main suit itself was filed in the year 1993 and after lapse of seven years only, the applicant had filed this application raising the ground of jurisdiction to be tried as a preliminary issue and on the ground of delay, the application has to be dismissed.",5. The point that arises for consideration is whether the Original Matrimonial Suit 19 of 1993 is maintainable before this Court on the ground of jurisdiction based on domicile requirement ?,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent mainly contended that the question of domicile depends upon the question of fact and law and as it requires evidence, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. Learned counsel further stated that the main suit itself was filed in the year 1993 and after lapse of seven years only, the applicant had filed this application raising the ground of jurisdiction to be tried as a preliminary issue and on the ground of delay, the application has to be dismissed.","The applicant is the defendant in the main original matrimonial suit. The respondent filed the main case under section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act. Even in para. 3 of the main petition, the respondent had conceded that the applicant is domiciled in the United Kingdom. It is also conceded that the co-respondent is in Ireland and the alleged matrimonial wrong took place in Malaysia. The applicant sent a notice for grant of divorce from England where she is domiciled. k The respondent also filed an Application as 4438 of 1993 under section 39 of the Indian Divorce Act. He also filed O.A.No.107 of 1993 to restrain the applicant from alienating her property. There is a candid admission on the part of the respondent that the applicant is no longer in India and she is domiciled in United Kingdom. The marriage solemnized between the parties was already dissolved by a decree passed by the County Court in United Kingdom where she is domiciled. Under section 2 of the Indian Divorce Act, domicile is the relevant factor for exercising jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the case. There is no need to waste the judicial time of this Court. The respondent is only interested in usurping her property situated at Anna Nagar. The daughters are majors and have their lives...","15. For the reasons stated above, the application is allowed and O.M. S.19 of 1993 is dismissed as not maintainable.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/518807/ | II(2001)DMC276,Procedural,procedural,2000,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: II(2001)DMC276,518807,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/518807/,8
Karnataka High Court,"Mr Walter Alexander Monteiro vs Mrs Kripalatha Benedicta Lobo on 14 September, 2012",WRIT PETITION NO.27486 OF 2012 (GM-FC),2012-09-14,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 498",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE DATED THIS THE 14TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2012 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MOHAN SHANTANAGOUDAR WRIT PETITION NO.27486 OF 2012 (GM-FC) BETWEEN: MR. WALTER ALEXANDER MONTEIRO, AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS, SON OF FRANCIS MONTEIRO, RESIDING AT PANNADKA, KALLIGE VILLAGE, BANTWAL TALUK, D.K., ... PETITIONER (BY SRI.NISHIT KUMAR SHETTY, ADVOCATE) AND: MRS. KRIPALATHA BENEDICTA LOBO, @ BENEDICTA ANNA LOBO, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, WIFE OF WALTER MONTEIRO, RESIDING AT C-1, DUKES MANOR, MATADAKANI ROAD, URVA MARKET, MANGALORE ... RESPONDENT (BY SRI.M. SUDHAKAR PAI, ADVOCATE) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER ANNEXURE - A, DATED 28.07.2012 MADE ON I.A. NO.1 IN M.C. NO.10/2012 PENDING BEFORE THE COURT OF SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, BANTWAL, D.K. THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING: 2 ORDER",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","By the impugned order, the Court below has allowed the application for amendment filed by the respondent herein. The records reveal that the petitioner is the husband of the respondent. However, it seems disputes have arisen between the parties, hence they decided to live apart and consequently, they jointly filed MC No.10/2012 before the jurisdictional Court under Section 10(A) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 praying for dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent by a decree of divorce. During the pendency of the said matter, again it seems that the disputes have aggravated between the parties and ultimately, the respondent herein having felt that no useful purpose will be served in continuing the divorce petition filed under Section 10(A) of Indian Divorce Act, 1869, sought to get itself converted as the one filed under Section 10 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869. According to the respondent, since the differences have started mounting even after filing the consent divorce petition, the petitioner 3 herein started misbehaving with her and hence she felt that the petitioner will not give his consent for divorce. 2. It is the case of the petitioner herein that the respondent has misused the funds of the petitioner to certain extent and that false cases are being filed by her against him either under section 498 of IPC...",JUDGE PMR,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97025470/,Unclear,unclear,2012,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,97025470,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97025470/,5
Kerala High Court,"Mathai Joseph vs Marikutty Joseph on 19 December, 2012",Mat.Appeal.No. 617 of 2010 ( ),2012-12-19,THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE PIUS C.KURIAKOSE,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE PIUS C.KURIAKOSE & THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BABU MATHEW P.JOSEPH WEDNESDAY, THE 19TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2012/28TH AGRAHAYANA 1934 Mat.Appeal.No. 617 of 2010 ( ) ------------------------------ OP NO.914/2008 of FAMILY COURT, KOTTAYAM APPELLANT(S)/RESPONDENT: ------------------------- MATHAI JOSEPH, AGED 51 YEARS, S/O.MATHAI RESIDING AT KAKKATT HOUSE, KATTAPPANA P.O. PARAKKADAVU, UDAMBANCHOLA TALUK, IDUKKI DISTRICT. BY ADV. SRI.JOICE GEORGE RESPONDENT(S)/PETITIONER: ------------------------ MARIKUTTY JOSEPH, AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS, W/O.MATHAI JOSEPH, RESIDING AT MANIMALAKUNNEL (H) NARIYANI P.O.,ELAMKULAM VILLAGE, KANJIRAPPALLY TALUK, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT-PIN-686506 R, BY ADV. SRI.SURIN GEORGE IPE THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 19-12-2012, ALONG WITH MA. 715/2010, RPFC. 270/2010, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: PIUS C. KURIAKOSE & BABU MATHEW P. JOSEPH, JJ. ---------------------------------------------------- Mat. Appeal Nos. 617 & 715 OF 2010 and R.P.(FC) No.270 of 2010 ----------------------------------------------------- Dated this the 19th day of December, 2012 J U D G M E N T PIUS C. KURIAKOSE, J The parties to the above cases have compromised all the issues between them. A written compromise signed by them and attested by the respective counsel is filed. They also pray that the matrimony between them be dissolved in...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. We have gone through the compromise as well as the petition under Section 10(A) . All necessary ingredients for granting a divorce under Section 10(A) are agreed upon by the parties in their compromise petition. It is stated by the parties that they are convinced that the matrimony between them has Mat. Appeal Nos. 617 & 715 OF 2010 and R.P.(FC) No.270 of 2010 -:2:- become irretrievably broken down and they have realized that continuance of the matrimonial bond will not be useful to either of them. There is no collusion between them in the matter of mutual divorce agreed between them. It is averred that unsuccessful attempts for resolution of marriage were made. It is also averred in the compromise petition that in full and final settlement of all the claims the wife, Smt.Mary has received an amount of Rs.17,00,000/-(Rupees Seventeen Lakhs only) from the husband, Sri.Joseph. Under the above circumstances, we record the compromise and order that the matrimony between the appellant in Mat. Appeal No.715 of 2010 and the respondent therein is liable to be dissolved by a decree of divorce in terms of S.10(A) . We, therefore, allow Mat. Appeal No. 617 of 2010 in view of the compromise and the payment. The impugned order in Mat. Appeal No.617 of 2010 is set aside. 3....",[True copy] P.S. to Judge.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/155539854/,Unclear,unclear,2012,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,155539854,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/155539854/,3
Calcutta High Court,"Mrs. Myrtle Stephenson vs Robert Stephenson And Anr. on 7 May, 1982",AIR1983CAL31,1982-05-07,"JUDGMENT    Chittatosh Mookerjee, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 3, Section 45",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Chittatosh Mookerjee, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. After perusing the records we are unable to confirm under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act the decree for divorce granted by the learned District Judge dissolving the marriage of the petitioner Mrs. Myrtle Stephenson. Any petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act may be presented to the 'District Court' which according to Section 3 means the Court of the District Judge within the local limits of whose ordinary jurisdiction under this Act the husband and wife reside or last resided together. In the instant case the petitioner-wife neither pleaded nor proved that she and the respondent No. 1 either reside or had last resided together within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas. 2. The petitioner in para i of her petition averred, no doubt, that the marriage between the parlies was registered at the Church of Christ King at 5, Syed Amir AH Avenue, P. S. Beniapukur, District 24 Parganas within the jurisdiction of the District Judge's Court at 24 Parganas. But she pleaded in para 2 that a few days after marriage the respondent had taken her to her temporary place of service at Railway Quarter, Block No 89, Warangal-3, Kazipet, Andhra Pradesh. Her further case was that immediately thereafter the respondent had began to treat her...",8. I agree.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/96175/ | AIR1983CAL31, (1983)1COMPLJ69(CAL), 86CWN924, AIR 1983 CALCUTTA 31, (1982) 86 CAL WN 924, 1982 (2) CAL HN 71, (1983) 1 CALLJ 69, 1983 (1) DMC 299",Procedural,procedural,1982,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1983CAL31, (1983)1COMPLJ69(CAL), 86CWN924, AIR 1983 CALCUTTA 31, (1982) 86 CAL WN 924, 1982 (2) CAL HN 71, (1983) 1 CALLJ 69, 1983 (1) DMC 299",96175,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/96175/,3
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana),"Swamidas Ravi Prasad Rao vs T. Kasturibai And Anr. on 24 September, 1993",O.P. No. 336 of 1988 on the file of Additional Distric,1993-09-24,"JUDGMENT   P.L.N. Sarma, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125, Section 14, Section 17",Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT P.L.N. Sarma, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. Husband filed O.P. No. 336 of 1988 on the file of Additional District Judge, Tirupathi under Section 10 of "" The Act "" seeking dissolution of the marriage solemnized on 25.5 1984 in the Church at Burripalem. O.P. 336 of 1988 was presented alleging that the husband and the wife are Christians by birth and their marriage was solemnized in the Church at Burripalem on 25.5.1984 and that the wife even from the date of the marriage developed dislike towards the husband and after the marriage she was brought to Tirupathi on 3.6.1984, but she returned to her parent's house on 30.6.1984. The allegation was that she deserted the husband on the said date and returned to her parent's house at Burripalem. Inspite of several requests, she did not join her husband and on 27.10.1984 the husband himself went to her parent's house and was able to persuade her to come to his house at Tirupathi. However, within a short period again on 30.12.1984 she deserted the husband and went back to her parent's house. Mediation took place between the parties on 15.5.1985, pursuant to which she came to Tirupathi, but she left Tirupathi again on 16.5.1985. Having lost his patience, the husband filed O.P. No. 334 of 1986 on the file of Principal District judge's Court. Chittoor for...","This reference case is coming up before us under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, (for short ' The Act ') for confirmation of the decree dissolving the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent passed by the Additional District Judge, Tirupathi. 1. Petitioner is the husband while the first respondent is the wife and second respondent is the alleged adulterer. The parties are referred to as such in this Judgment for convenience sake. 15. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the decree for dissolution of the marriage granted by the learned Additional District Judge, Tirupathi, is not at all sustainable and it is not in accordance with law and Court is cot satisfied on the evidence on record that the allegations made by the husband are true. On the other hand, we are clearly of the opinion that the allegations made are false. Therefore, the judgment and decree for dissolution of the marriage on the ground of adultery granted by the Additional District Judge, Tirupathi is set aside, and O.P. No. 336 of...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1135507/ | 1994(1)ALT81, II(1994)DMC480",Adultery,adultery; desertion,1993,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 1994(1)ALT81, II(1994)DMC480",1135507,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1135507/,7
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Miss Shireen Mall vs John James Taylor on 21 December, 1951",oposed to marry her. He was in Meerut from June 1943,1951-12-21,"ORDER    Soni, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 14, Section 17, Section 176, Section 19, Section 2, Section 3, Section 7",Desertion; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Soni, J. 1. This is an application by Shireen Mall under the provisions of Sections 18 and 19 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Indian Matrimonial Causes (War Marriages) Act XL of 1948, praying that this Court may declare the marriage between her and the respondent to be null and void.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"12. I would, however, go further than this in the present case. The petitioner was undoubtedly a minor as understood in the Indian Christian Marriage Act and her father being dead her mother's consent should have been obtained. This consent was never given and I doubt whether her marriage could have been validly solemnized in Dehra Dun, there being no consent of an undoubted guardian. This fact was known to the officiating priest.","2. The facts as deposed to by the petitioner are that she was employed as a Sergeant in the Women's Auxiliary Corps (India) and was stationed at Meerut. In June 1943 she came to know the respondent John James Taylor, then a Lieutenant in the British Army. They fell in love with each other and he proposed to marry her. He was in Meerut from June 1943 till November 1943. The petitioner states that Taylor had repeatedly told her and had promised that alter they had been married they would live in England after his repatriation. Her point is that it was just a false promise. Many letters have been produced showing great affection by the respondent for the petitioner. My special attention was drawn by the counsel for the petitioner to a letter written by the respondent to the petitioner bearing date 26th November 1943 marked Ex. P. 7 in which the respondent Taylor, wrote to her thanking her for a present to his mother and telling her that he had told all about her to his mother in...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The petitioner's case is that the respondent's oral as well as written representations were such that the respondent appeared to her to be genuine in his proposal of marriage and in saying that the respondent would take her along with him to England to live there as husband and wife. She and the respondent were married in the Roman Catholic St. Francis Church at Dehra Dun on the 23rd October 1944. The petitioner gives her date of birth as 5th November 1924, so that she was not quite 20 yet when she was married. Under the provisions of Section 3 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872, she was a minor as she had not completed the age of 21 years. She states that no notice was given by Father Luke who was the officiating priest regarding their getting married. Taylor was a Roman Catholic while she belonged to the Church of England. A special dispensation was obtained from probably the Roman Catholic Bishop and that after the dispensation no banns were published and no notice was given. It is in her statement that she wanted her mother to give her consent but she never did so. Her father was dead and the only person who could give consent was her mother. Father Luke never asked her about anybody's consent....","* * * * (3) a promise made without any intention of performing it; * * * The respondent lured her into the belief that he was deeply interested in her. He disappeared from this country soon after their last meeting in Delhi during the Christmas week of 1944. He never even let her know that he was going to leave this country, and the letter that he sent her from England bearing date 2nd August 1945 shows what kind of man he was and how he had behaved to wards her. This is a most disgraceful and disgusting letter. This conclusively proves in my opinion that he was using the petitioner merely for his pleasure during the short time that he was going to be in India without the slightest intention of taking her as his wife to England and living there with her as husband and wife. In my opinion there is no doubt that fraud was practised on her. In these circumstances I consider that the petitioner and the respondent went through a ceremony without any intention...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71126/ | AIR1952P&H277, AIR 1952 PUNJAB 277",Desertion,desertion; adultery,1951,nullity,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1952P&H277, AIR 1952 PUNJAB 277",71126,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71126/,8
Madras High Court,"Mrs. Dawn Henderson vs D. Henderson on 11 February, 1969",(1969)2MLJ196,1969-02-11,"JUDGMENT    M. Anantanarayanan, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 22",Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M. Anantanarayanan, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,"9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that it may still be open to the petitioner, if the respondent is continuing in his profligate ways and is committing acts of adultery with other women, to take out further proceedings for actual divorce, on the basis of evidence about such a specific act, We merely record this, with the observation that it may certainly be open to the petitioner to resort to such a remedy, if there is an adequate basis for it, in the future.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a Reference under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act by the learned District Judge of Tiruchirapalli, for confirmation of the decree nisi dissolving the marriage between the parties under Section 17 of the same Act. 2. The petitioner is the wife, and she has put forward, as the ground for dissolution of the marriage, the clause of Section 10 which refers to adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce a mesne et toro. 3. In the body of the petition, the petitioner states that the respondent, her husband, married her, according to Christian rites, at St. Joseph's Church, Golden Rock, Timchirapalli, on 27th May, 1961. But soon after the marriage, the respondent behaved to her with great cruelty, and brought drunken young men to the house and attempted to constrain or induce the petitioner to submit to the indecent overtures of those men. He also beat her and starved her, and in brief attempted to compel her to lead a life of prostitution. Because she resented this and resisted the attempts with all her might, the respondent forced her to leave the house in September, 1961 and she has since been living with her parents. In paragraph 10, the petitioner also states that the respondent was leading an...",10. No costs.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1522061/ | (1969)2MLJ196, AIR 1970 MADRAS 104, 1982 MADLW 458 (1969) 2 MADLJ196, (1969) 2 MADLJ196",Adultery,adultery; cruelty,1969,judicial_separation,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (1969)2MLJ196, AIR 1970 MADRAS 104, 1982 MADLW 458 (1969) 2 MADLJ196, (1969) 2 MADLJ196",1522061,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1522061/,4
Kerala High Court,"Dr.Smitha Mathew vs Dr.Prasoon Kuruvila on 5 July, 2011",Mat.Appeal.No. 263 of 2010(),2011-07-05,"Justice K.M.JOSEPH The Hon, Justice M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS  Dated, M.L. JOSEPH FRANCIS, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM Mat.Appeal.No. 263 of 2010() 1. DR.SMITHA MATHEW, ... Petitioner Vs 1. DR.PRASOON KURUVILA, S/O. KURUVILA, ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.CHITAMBARESH.V. (SR.) For Respondent :SRI.MATHAI M PAIKADAY(SR.) The Hon'ble MR. Justice K.M.JOSEPH The Hon'ble MR. Justice M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS Dated :05/07/2011 O R D E R K.M. JOSEPH & M.L. JOSEPH FRANCIS, JJ. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Mat.A..Nos. 263 & 265 of 2010 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dated this the 5th day of July, 2011 JUDGMENT Joseph Francis, J.","12. Heard learned senior counsel for the appellants and the learned senior counsel for the respondent. 13. In Mat.A.No. 263 of 2010 the learned counsel for the appellant mainly raised the following contentions. The Court below failed to take note of the actual problems between the parties and instead of addressing it with a view to save the marital relationship between the parties, proceeded to dissolve the marriage. In paragraph 18 of the impugned judgment, the Family Court wrongly found that 'the petitioner/husband' has succeeded to prove that the wife behaved cruelly and indifferently towards him and a complete reading of the said paragraph will show that the Court below has not assigned any reason whatsoever to arrive at the said conclusion. 19. The learned senior counsel for the respondent husband submitted that the Family Court is fully justified in granting a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty on the basis of evidence on record. 25. The learned counsel for the respondent/husband pointed out seven instances of cruelty. The first instance is the repeated slapping of the respondent/husband by his wife, which is confirmed by PW3. In the proof affidavit filed by PW1 the husband has sworn to...","""11. The expression `cruelty' has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. Cruelty is a course or conduct of one, which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the court will have no problem in determining it. It is a question of fact and Mat.A..Nos. 263 & 265 of 2010 18 degree. If it is mental, the problem presents difficulties. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel treatment, second the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse, whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to love with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct...","14. The learned senior counsel for the appellant wife submitted that the finding in paragraph 18 of the judgment is to the effect that the wife wanted to stay away from the matrimonial home. She disliked Mat.A..Nos. 263 & 265 of 2010 11 parents-in-law and failed to look after the husband even while he was suffering from serious illness - jaundice' is entered into contrary to evidence on record. The circumstance under which the appellant stayed away from home i.e., in connection with the education, work etc, was not considered while arriving at the conclusion. The Court below also failed to take note of the fact that the particular course in Radiology specialized by the appellant is offered only in Medical Colleges at Thiruvananthapuram and Kozhikode. Appellant if at all stayed away from home, is under compulsions of education or work. That by itself cannot be treated as a reason to arrive at the finding that the 'respondent avoided to stay in matrimonial home'. Instead of finding that the wife stayed away from husband during his illness, the court below...","12. Heard learned senior counsel for the appellants and the learned senior counsel for the respondent. 13. In Mat.A.No. 263 of 2010 the learned counsel for the appellant mainly raised the following contentions. The Court below failed to take note of the actual problems between the parties and instead of addressing it with a view to save the marital relationship between the parties, proceeded to dissolve the marriage. In paragraph 18 of the impugned judgment, the Family Court wrongly found that 'the petitioner/husband' has succeeded to prove that the wife behaved cruelly and indifferently towards him and a complete reading of the said paragraph will show that the Court below has not assigned any reason whatsoever to arrive at the said conclusion. 19. The learned senior counsel for the respondent husband submitted that the Family Court is fully justified in granting a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty on the basis of evidence on record. 25. The learned counsel for the respondent/husband pointed out seven instances of cruelty. The first instance is the repeated slapping of the respondent/husband...","Mat.A. No.263 of 2010 is filed by the respondent/wife in O.P. 491 of 2009 on the file of the Family Court, Kottayam. The respondent in this appeal is the petitioner in that petition, which was filed by him under Section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act for divorce on the ground of cruelty. Mat. A.No. 265 of 2010 is filed by respondents 1 to 3 in O.P.No. 492 of 2009 on the file of the Family Court, Kottayam. The respondent in that appeal was the petitioner in that Original Petition, which was filed by him for the custody of the child. The first respondent in that Original Petition is his wife and respondents 2 and 3 are the parents of the first respondent. 2. The averments in O.P.No.491 of 2009 are briefly as follows: The petitioner is the husband and the respondent is the Mat.A..Nos. 263 & 265 of 2010 2 wife and their marriage was solemnised on 3.2.2003 as per the Christian rites. After the marriage they lived together in the house of the petitioner. A male child was born in this wedlock on 20.2.2004. The petitioner is a doctor by profession and was doing his MD in General Medicine at Kottayam at the time of marriage. The respondent is also a doctor preparing for the entrance examination for MD...",(M.L. JOSEPH FRANCIS) Judge tm (True copy) P.S. to Judge.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80201601/,Cruelty,cruelty,2011,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,80201601,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80201601/,18
Madras High Court,"C.Rajamani vs Rathna Bai on 21 October, 2009",oper behaviour of the respondent. Since the said occ,2009-10-21,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 18, Section 19, Section 21, Section 45, Section 73",Desertion; Cruelty; Nullity Sec19; Non Consummation; Conversion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 21.10.2009 CORAM THE HON'BLE Ms. JUSTICE R.MALA O.M.S.No.50 of 1998 and A.No.5047 of 2008 C.Rajamani ... Petitioner vs. Rathna Bai ... Respondent Petition under Sections 18 and 22 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869 and order XXVII of original side Rules prays for a declaration of the marriage solemnized on 22.01.1981 at Roman Catholic Church Thalayavattai Kanniyakumar District as null and void on the ground the same is vitiated by fraud or in the alternative for judicial separation on the grounds of desertion coupled with cruelty and for other relief. For Petitioner : Mr. A.S.Nixon For Respondent : Mr. V.Suryanarayana Reddy JUDGMENT This Petition has been filed for a declaration of the marriage solemnized on 22.01.1981 at Roman Catholic Church Thalayavattai Kanniyakumar District as null and void on the ground the same is vitiated by fraud or in the alternative for judicial separation on the grounds of desertion coupled with cruelty. 2. The averments in the petition is as follows:- (i) The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent took place on 22.01.1981. The marriage was solemnized at Roman Catholic Church Thalayavattai at Kanniyakumar District. At the time of marriage 12...,"14. Learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the application has been filed belatedly stating that the respondent/wife is concealing something and prayed fraud and obtained consent for the marriage. So the marriage itself is void. The marriage has taken place on 22.1.1981. He filed application in 1998. Therefore there is a delay. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the decision reported in 1(2001) DMC 640 (SC) (D.BALAKRISHNAN V.PAVALAMANI) and urged that in the matrimonial matter there is no limitation and ""annulment of marriage: Non-consummation of marriage due to impotency: petition filed 10 years after marriage:petition cannot be held barred by limitation"". 15. It is true in matrimonial matter, there is no limitation. But however, this citation is not applicable to the facts of the case because the marriage has been consummated that admittedly the petitioner/P.W.1 himself has taken the respondent/wife to hospital and took treatment to begot child. As per the documents filed by him and oral testimony of both the parties P.W.1 and R.W.1 corroborated the same. In the above said circumstances the above citation is not applicable. Per contra the learned counsel for the respondent would rely upon the following decisions: A.I.R.1937...","4. After hearing the arguments on both sides, counsel and perused the materials available on records. The following issues were framed for trial: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion and cruelty? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the alternative relief of judicial separation on the ground of desertion coupled with cruelty? 3. To what other reliefs the plaintiff is entitled?"" 5. The additional issues was framed as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to declare that the marriage solemnised on 22.1.1981 between the petitioner and the respondent is null and void on the ground that the same is vitiated by fraud. 6, Additional Issue : On the side of the petitioner P.W.1 was examined and Exs.P1 to P11 were marked. On the respondent side, R.W.1 was examined and Exs.R.1 to R16 were marked. 7. During the pendency of the trial,...","10. But It is contented by the learned counsel for the petitioner that during the trial only he came to know that the respondent/wife has played fraud and obtained consent for marriage since she has not attained puberty. She is not capable of performing conjugality. Hence, she has wantonly suppressed the same and marriage has been performed and fraud has been played by this respondent. Hence the marriage is vitiated by fraud. It is pertinent to note that it is the duty of the petitioner to plead the fraud and prove the same. It is appropriate to incorporate Order VI Rule 4 of CPC . It is as follows: ""Particulars to be given where necessary- In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars with dates and items (if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading"" 11. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner has not...","14. Learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the application has been filed belatedly stating that the respondent/wife is concealing something and prayed fraud and obtained consent for the marriage. So the marriage itself is void. The marriage has taken place on 22.1.1981. He filed application in 1998. Therefore there is a delay. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the decision reported in 1(2001) DMC 640 (SC) (D.BALAKRISHNAN V.PAVALAMANI) and urged that in the matrimonial matter there is no limitation and ""annulment of marriage: Non-consummation of marriage due to impotency: petition filed 10 years after marriage:petition cannot be held barred by limitation"". 15. It is true in matrimonial matter, there is no limitation. But however, this citation is not applicable to the facts of the case because the marriage has been consummated that admittedly the petitioner/P.W.1 himself has taken the respondent/wife to hospital and took treatment to begot child. As per the documents filed by him and oral testimony of both the parties P.W.1 and R.W.1 corroborated the same. In the above said circumstances the...","8. It is an admitted fact that arranged marriage has been solemnized between the petitioner and the respondent at Roman Catholic Church, Thalayavattai Kanniyakumar District on 22.1.1981. Even though the plaintiff has filed this suit under Section 21 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for declaration of marriage between the petitioner and respondent as null and void on the ground the same is vitiated by fraud or in the alternative for judicial separation on the grounds of desertion coupled with cruelty. 9. Section 18 and 19 of the Indian Divorce Act is as follows: 18. Petition for decree of nullity- Any husband or wife may present a petition to the District praying that his or her marriage may be declared null and void. Objects and Reasons- Clause 14- This clause seeks to amend section 18 of the Act relating to petition for decree of nullity. The omission of the words"" or to the High Court"" as proposed in this clause is consequential to the amendment proposed in section 10 . 19. Ground of decree.- Such decree may be made on any of the following grounds:- (1) that the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage and at the time of the institution of the suit; 13. Learned counsel for the respondent has raised a plea that this Court...",kua/tsi,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1178522/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty; nullity_sec19; non_consummation; conversion,2009,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,1178522,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1178522/,24
Bombay High Court,"Jyotsna W/O Suresh Jagtap vs Suresh John Jagtap on 2 February, 2001",2001(3)BOMCR14,2001-02-02,"JUDGMENT   B.N. Srikrishna, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 17, Section 19, Section 2, Section 20, Section 7, Section 8",Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT B.N. Srikrishna, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"4. This reference raises a question of some importance and is likely to affect other similarly placed parties. We have, therefore, bestowed anxious consideration on the following issue which arises in the case: ""Whether, after the coming into force of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and the establishment of Family Courts, the procedure of decree nisi followed by confirmation by the High Court under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 , is to be followed by the Family Court?""",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a reference made to this Court by the Family Court at Nagpur, purportedly under section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, for confirmation of a decree for dissolution of marriage made by the Family Court. 2. The facts giving rise to the present reference fall within a limited matrix as under : 3. The parties before us are Christians by religion and they were married on 7-5-1995 as per Christian religious rites and customs at the Methodist Marathi Church, Civil Lines, Nagpur. The marriage ran aground and a petition came to be filed before the Family Court at Nagpur on 31-8-1999 by the petitioner wife under section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, seeking dissolution of the marriage on the grounds of cruelty coupled with adultery. This petition was contested by the respondent-husband. The Family Court tried the petition and by its judgment and decree dated 28-5-2000 allowed the petition and ordered dissolution of the marriage between the parties solemnized on 7-5-1995, by a decree of divorce. The Family Court, however, declared that the decree of divorce granted by it was subject to confirmation by the High Court. The Family Court thereafter has forwarded the reference to this Court, purportedly under section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, for confirmation of the decree dated 28-5-2000...","10. In the result, we answer the question as follows: - 11. In the result, we make the following order: 12. Reference accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1703655/ | 2001(3)BOMCR14, I(2001)DMC776",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19,2001,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2001(3)BOMCR14, I(2001)DMC776",1703655,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1703655/,10
Madras High Court,"Doris Padmavathy vs Christodass on 11 February, 1969",oping that his conduct would improve,1969-02-11,"JUDGMENT   M. Anantanarayanan, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 22",Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M. Anantanarayanan, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a reference under Sections 10 and 17 of the Indian Divorce Act (IV of 1869) made by the learned District Judge, Tiruchirapalli, for confirmation of the decree nisi granted by him dissolving the marriage between Doris Padmavathy (petitioner) and her husband V. Christodass (respondent),, We may state, at the outset, that the respondent has remained ex parte throughout, and that the petitioner seeks divorce on the ground specified in a clause of Section 10 of the Act, namely, "" adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to divorce a mensa et toro "". 2. The facts are quite simple. In her petition, the petitioner states that she married the respondent on 15th September, 1958 according to the rights of the Christian religion. Immediately after the marriage, the husband and wife lived together at Bhilai and later at Tiruchirapalli. The respondent was then transferred in 1961 to the Thermal Station at the Neyveli Lignite Corporation. The respondent was in poor health and began to act in a cruel manner towards the petitioner, sometimes even using physical violence. She tolerated this, hoping that his conduct would improve, as also, his health. On 17th September, 1966, the respondent was enraged at the refusal of the petitioner to give finance for a foreign trip, and he...","8. As has been the course taken by us in similar cases where cruelty alone is a proved, and not adultery, we are competent to grant a decree for judicial separation under Section 22 of the Act, on the ground of the established grave cruelty. In the present case also, we accept the reference to this extent, and grant a decree for judicial separation between the parties. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that, if the alleged adulterous relationship between the respondent and a third party is even now continuing, it may be open to the petitioner to take out fresh proceedings for divorce upon that fresh and future cause of action. We do not desire to make any observations in anticipation on such a matter: but if the necessary facts exist, the petitioner may certainly proceed to such remedies at law as the petitioner may be advised to take. No order as to costs throughout.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/429790/ | (1969)2MLJ645,Adultery,adultery; cruelty,1969,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1969)2MLJ645,429790,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/429790/,4
Gauhati High Court,"Ka. Amal Lyngdoh vs U. Jabin Pakem on 15 May, 1987",Divorce Suit No. 4/86 has come up for confirmation under Secti,1987-05-15,"District Council Court, J, Hills Autonomous District Council, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 17, Section 22, Section 23",Cruelty; Desertion; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Saikia, Actg. C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"6. For confirmation of the decree nisi two questions arise for consideration, namely, (1) Whether the facts and circumstances stated by the petitioner amounted to cruelty under the law; (2) Whether the grounds stated in the petition, namely, desertion and cruelty constituted valid grounds for dissolution of marriage?",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The decree nisi dated 29-7-86 dissolving the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent granted by the Judge, District Council Court, Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council, Jowai in Divorce Suit No. 4/86 has come up for confirmation under Section 17 , Divorce Act, 1869. The parties are Christians. They were married according to the Christian Marriage Act, 1872 and they had 7 children. The petitioner sued the respondent for divorce on the grounds that the respondent had deserted her for more than 7 years since 1979 without any reasonable cause and had not maintained her and her children since then; and he had treated her with cruelty having often threatened to injure her person, and to burn her house and make her unsafe. 2-3. The petitioner examined herself as witness 1 and one U. Kilbert Latam as witness 2. The petitioner deposed that she married the respondent in 1967 whereafter they cohabited and lived together as husband and wife for about 12 years and had 7 children. Since 1979 the respondent deserted her and her children and he, very often, threatened to hurt her and to burn her house whenever she met him, and made her life miserable and unsafe wherefore she had to leave her village and come to stay at Jowai town where also whenever the respondent...",16. We are accordingly unable to confirm the decree nisi for dissolution of marriage. The reference is accordingly rejected.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1944622/ | AIR1987GAU69, AIR 1987 GAUHATI 69, (1987) 2 DMC 403 (1987) 2 CURCC 267, (1987) 2 CURCC 267",Cruelty,cruelty; desertion; adultery,1987,judicial_separation,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1987GAU69, AIR 1987 GAUHATI 69, (1987) 2 DMC 403 (1987) 2 CURCC 267, (1987) 2 CURCC 267",1944622,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1944622/,9
Karnataka High Court,"Sri Victor Sebastian S/O Hilari Karkada vs Smt. Thorulatha D/O John Bangera on 24 February, 2006",II(2006)DMC844,2006-02-24,"JUDGMENT   R. Gururajan, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 13",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT R. Gururajan, J. Page 0244","4. Sri. Ananda Shetty, learned Counsel for the respondent supports. the order of the learned Judge.","10. Grounds for dissolution of marriage: (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent- (x) has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent. Page 0246",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"4. Sri. Ananda Shetty, learned Counsel for the respondent supports. the order of the learned Judge.","2. The appellant-husband married respondent on 8.5.1996 at U.B.M. Jublee Church, Udupi as per the customary rights of Protestant Christians. Parties are related to each other. The respondent is a daughter of appellant's mother's younger sister. Parties were knowing each other from their childhood and at the time of marriage, the appellant was working at Dubai. After marriage, at the respondent's instance, the newly married couple had rented a house and they were staying together at Udupi. After four months of the marriage, the respondent had vacated the rented house and gone to her parents house, taking away an advance deposit amount paid by the appellant to the landlord in the. matter. She did not join her husband. The respondent in the light of the amendment to the Indian Divorce Act 2001 filed a petition Under Section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act 1869 before the learned Judge alleging cruelty in the matter. Objections were filed. Witnesses were examined. The learned Judge, after hearing has chosen to allow the application filed by the respondent-wife in terms of the impugned order. This order is challenged before us.- 3. Sri. Vishwajith Shetty, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant argues that in terms of the evidence available on record, it cannot be said that Section 10(x) is attracted to the facts of this case....","1. Sri. Victor Sebastian is before us aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree dated 11.8.2005 passed in MC No. 24/2002 on the file of the Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Udupi in this appeal. 15. No grounds. Appeal stands reacted.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/882118/ | II(2006)DMC844, ILR2006KAR3097, AIR 2006 (NOC) 858 (KAR), 1997 (4) SCC 565, 2006 (3) AIR KANT HCR 270, 2006 A I H C 1742, (2006) 2 DMC 844, (2006) 4 ICC 486, (2006) 2 HINDULR 264, (2006) 3 KANT LJ 257, (2006) 2 KCCR 984, (2006) MATLR 609, (2007) 1 CIVLJ 554, (2006) 3 CIVILCOURTC 229, (2006) 4 RECCIVR 577, (2006) 4 CURCC 36, (1997) 1 CURLR 809, (1997) 1 RAJ LW 141, (1997) 2 LABLJ 26, (1997) 2 SCALE 569, (1997) 2 SCR 472 (SC), (1997) 2 SERVLR 378, (1997) 30 ALL LR 389, (1997) 33 BANKLJ 146, (1997) 3 JT 500 (SC), (1997) 3 SUPREME 312, (1997) 4 LAB LN 5, (1997) 76 FACLR 176, 1997 ADSC 3 408, 1997 LABLR 409, 1997 SCC (L&S) 1241",Cruelty,cruelty,2006,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: II(2006)DMC844, ILR2006KAR3097, AIR 2006 (NOC) 858 (KAR), 1997 (4) SCC 565, 2006 (3) AIR KANT HCR 270, 2006 A I H C 1742, (2006) 2 DMC 844, (2006) 4 ICC 486, (2006) 2 HINDULR 264, (2006) 3 KANT LJ 257, (2006) 2 KCCR 984, (2006) MATLR 609, (2007) 1 CIVLJ 554, (2006) 3 CIVILCOURTC 229, (2006) 4 RECCIVR 577, (2006) 4 CURCC 36, (1997) 1 CURLR 809, (1997) 1 RAJ LW 141, (1997) 2 LABLJ 26, (1997) 2 SCALE 569, (1997) 2 SCR 472 (SC), (1997) 2 SERVLR 378, (1997) 30 ALL LR 389, (1997) 33 BANKLJ 146, (1997) 3 JT 500 (SC), (1997) 3 SUPREME 312, (1997) 4 LAB LN 5, (1997) 76 FACLR 176, 1997 ADSC 3 408, 1997 LABLR 409, 1997 SCC (L&S) 1241",882118,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/882118/,9
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Jyoti Gagneja vs Ajit Paul on 31 August, 2022",Jyoti Gagneja vs Ajit Paul,2022-08-31,HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARVIND SINGH SANGWAN,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 24",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"TA-984-2019 (O&M) -1- IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH 209 TA-984-2019 (O&M) Date of decision: 31.08.2022 Jyoti Gagneja ...Petitioner Versus Ajit Paul ...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARVIND SINGH SANGWAN Present:- Mr. Manu Loona, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. M. S. Basra, Advocate for the respondent. ARVIND SINGH SANGWAN, J. (Oral)","Learned counsel for the respondent-husband has not opposed the prayer of the petitioner-wife. It is well settled that while considering the transfer of a matrimonial dispute/case at the instance of the wife, the Court is to consider family condition of the wife, custody of the minor child, economic condition of the wife, her physical health and earning capacity of the husband and most important, convenience of the wife i.e. she cannot travel alone without assistance of a male member of her family, connectivity of the place to and fro from her place of residence as well as bearing of the litigation charges and travelling expenses.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,"Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner is having a minor child, who is living in her care and custody, therefore, it is very difficult for her to defend the said case at Gurdaspur. 1 of 4 ::: Downloaded on - 02-09-2022 00:57:37 ::: TA-984-2019 (O&M) -2- Learned counsel has relied upon the judgments Sumita Singh Vs. Kumar Sanjay , 2002 SC 396 and Rajani Kishor Pardeshi Vs. Kishor Babulal Pardeshi, 2005(12) SCC 237, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that ""while deciding the transfer application, the Courts are required to give more weightage and consideration to the convenience of the female litigants and transfer of legal proceedings from one Court to another should ordinarily be allowed, taking into consideration their convenience and the Courts should desist from putting female litigants under undue hardships."" Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon 2022 Live Law (SC) 627 N.C.V. Aishwarya vs. A.S. Saravana Karthik Sha , wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: After hearing the counsel for the petitioner, considering the fact that if the...","Learned counsel for the respondent-husband has not opposed the prayer of the petitioner-wife. It is well settled that while considering the transfer of a matrimonial dispute/case at the instance of the wife, the Court is to consider family condition of the wife, custody of the minor child, economic condition of the wife, her physical health and earning capacity of the husband and most important, convenience of the wife i.e. she cannot travel alone without assistance of a male member of her family, connectivity of the place to and fro from her place of residence as well as bearing of the litigation charges and travelling expenses.","Prayer in this petition is for transfer of the petition filed by the respondent-husband under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, pending before the Family Court, Gurdaspur to the competent Court of jurisdiction at Fazilka. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that on account of a matrimonial discord, the petitioner is residing at Fazilka and in order to harass the petitioner, the respondent-husband has filed the present petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act at Gurdaspur. It is further submitted that the petitioner is facing great difficulty in prosecuting the said case, as there is a distance of about 300 Kms between the aforesaid two places. ""9. The cardinal principle for exercise of power under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that the ends of justice should demand the transfer of the suit, appeal or other proceeding. In matrimonial matters, wherever Courts are called upon to consider the plea of transfer, the Courts have to take into consideration the economic soundness of both the parties, the social strata of the spouses and their behavioural pattern, their standard of life prior to the marriage and subsequent thereto and the circumstances of both the parties in eking out their livelihood and under whose protective umbrella they are seeking their sustenance to life. Given the...",31.08.2022 (ARVIND SINGH SANGWAN) Waseem Ansari JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether reportable Yes/No 4 of 4 ::: Downloaded on - 02-09-2022 00:57:38 :::,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/21247772/,Procedural,procedural,2022,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,21247772,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/21247772/,8
Kerala High Court,"Roshini @ Thresiamma vs Rajesh Joseph @ Chacko on 14 June, 2010",Mat.Appeal.No. 751 of 2010,2010-06-14,THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.T.SANKARAN,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.T.SANKARAN & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS WEDNESDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF JANUARY 2013/26TH POUSHA 1934 Mat.Appeal.No. 751 of 2010 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN OP.725/2009 DATED 14-06-2010 OF THE FAMILY COURT, KOTTAYAM AT ETTUMANOOR. APPELLANT: RESPONDENT: ROSHINI @ THRESIAMMA, AGED 29 YEARS, D/O. P.D.APREM,PAMPOORICKAL HOUSE, KAVUMBHAGAM P.O., CHERUVALLY VILLAGE, KANJIRAPPALLY TALUK KOTTAYAM DISTRICT. BY ADVS.SRI.TPM.IBRAHIM KHAN (SR.) SMT.P.SHYNI RESPONDENT: PETITIONER: RAJESH JOSEPH @ CHACKO, AGED 38 YEARS, S/O. A.V.JOSEPH,AKKATTU PUTHENPURACKAL HOUSE KARIKKATTOOR P.O.,KANJIRAPPALLY TALUK KOTTAYAM DISTRICT,PIN-686 544. BY ADV. SRI.P.JACOB VARGHESE (SR.) BY ADV. SRI.VIVEK VARGHESE P.J. THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 16.01.2013, ALONGWITH MAT. APPEAL NOS.761 AND 762 OF 2010 AND O.P.(FC) NO.2198 OF 2012, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: I.A.NO.2352/2010 IN M.A.NO.751/2010 DISMISSED SD/- K.T.SANKARAN, JUDGE 16/01/2013 SD/- M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS, JUDGE //TRUE COPY// AHZ/ K.T.SANKARAN & M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS, JJ. ---------------------------------------------------- Mat. Appeal Nos.751, 761 & 762 of 2010 and O.P.(F.C.) No.2198 OF 2012 ---------------------------------------------------- Dated this the 16th day of January, 2013 JUDGMENT K.T.Sankaran, J. In Mat. Appeal Nos.751 of 2010 and 762 of 2010, the appellant is Roshni @ Thresiamma, the wife of the respondent Rajesh Joseph @...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","9. The petitioner and the respondent are today filing a Joint Petition under section 10(A) of the Indian Divorce Act before this Hon'ble Court in the Mat. Appeal 762/2010 pending before this Hon'ble Court and pray that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass appropriate orders allowing the joint petition declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the 1st respondent solemnized on 14/1/2007 at St.James Church, Karikattoor, Manimala. 10. It is further agreed that an amount of Rs.1,58,400/- (Rupees one lakh and fifty eight thousand four hundred only) deposited by the 1st respondent on 18/12/2010 by Receipt No.32, in E.P.No.136/2010 in Family Court, Ettumanoor as directed by this Hon'ble Court in IA.No.2387/2010 in Mat.Appeal No.761/2010, can be withdrawn by him and the petitioner has no claim or objection over the said amount being refunded to the 1st respondent on the basis of the settlement. 11. This Settlement is applicable to all the other connected cases, Mat. Appeal Nos.751/2010, 762/2010 and OP(FC) No.2198/2012 before this Hon'ble Court."" Mat. Appeal Nos.751, 761 & 762/2010 and O.P. (F.C.) No.2198 OF 2012. :: 7 :: The husband and wife together have filed a joint petition for divorce under Section 10(A) of the Divorce Act as well in Mat. Appeal No.762 of 2010. In view of the compromise between the parties, the Matrimonial Appeals...",(K.T.SANKARAN) Judge (M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS) Judge ahz/,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/92102026/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2010,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,92102026,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/92102026/,3
Calcutta High Court,"Patrick Herbert Van-Hek vs Mrs. More Ilma Van-Hek on 23 December, 1981",Divorce Suit No. 5 of 1978 of his Court. The petitioner instit,1981-12-23,"JUDGMENT    B.C. Chakrabarti, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17",Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT B.C. Chakrabarti, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a reference under Section 17 of the Divorce Act made by the learned Additional District Judge, 7th Court, Alipore after having passed a decree of divorce in Divorce Suit No. 5 of 1978 of his Court. The petitioner instituted the suit in 1977 on an allegation that the petitioner and the respondent both of whom are Indian citizens professing the Christian, faith were married in May, 1944. Since after the marriage they were living peacefully and four children were born to them. The children have attained majority and art now living abroad. Sometime in 1965 the respondent wife picked up acquaintance and intimacy with a seaman and became very friendly with him. She started mixing with the said seaman freely and in such a manner that the petitioner felt humiliated and lowered in the estimation of others. His attempts to correct and mend the wife turned futile. On the 25th Dec. 1965 the respondent left the matrimonial home and went away to her mother's place at No. 1 Molisii Street, Calcutta. She has been residing there ever since and has been leading an adulterous life with the said seaman. It is said that the name and whereabouts of the seaman with whom the respondent is living is not known to the petitioner as the seaman lives away...","5. Having considered the case made out in the application for divorce and the evidence on record we are unable to sustain and affirm the decree of dissolution of marriage as passed by the learned Additional District Judge. The case in the application for dissolution is that the respondent has been very friendly and intimate terms with a particular seaman from the year 1965, The suit was instituted in 1977 i.e, to say nearly 12 years thereafter, The law requires that in the case of a suit for dissolution of marriage by the petitioner husband on the ground of adultery, it is necessary to make the adulterer a co-respondent. In order to evade making the said person a co-respondent it is said in paragraph 22 of the petition that the name and whereabouts of the said seaman is not known to the petitioner as he lives away from India and seldom comes back. The evidence however, suggests otherwise. It reads as if that the respondent deserted the matrimonial home with the sole object of meeting the said seaman as often...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1907060/ | AIR1982CAL356, AIR 1982 CALCUTTA 356, 1982 (2) DMC 266 1982 MATLR 209, 1982 MATLR 209",Adultery,adultery; desertion,1981,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1982CAL356, AIR 1982 CALCUTTA 356, 1982 (2) DMC 266 1982 MATLR 209, 1982 MATLR 209",1907060,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1907060/,3
Madras High Court,"L.Anandaraj vs Unknown on 23 November, 2022",C.R.P.No.3827 of 2022,2022-11-23,THE HONOURABLE Mr. JUSTICE S.SOUNTHAR,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"C.R.P.No.3827 of 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 23.11.2022 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE Mr. JUSTICE S.SOUNTHAR C.R.P.No.3827 of 2022 1.L.Anandaraj 2.T.Jenifer Ranjitha Mary ... Petitioners PRAYER: Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to set aside the fair order and final order passed in I.A.No.3 of 2022 in I.D.O.P.No.224 of 2022 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Thiruvallur, Thiruvallur District. For Petitioner : Mr.J.Titus Enock ORDER",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The petitioners herein filed this revision challenging the order passed by the Court below dismissing their petition seeking waiver of six months waiting period under Section 10(A) of the Indian Divorce Act. 2. According to the petitioners, the marriage between them had taken place on 10.05.2008. It is specifically stated by the petitioners in their petition seeking https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 1 of 4 C.R.P.No.3827 of 2022 divorce by mutual consent that though they lived under the same roof, there was no cohabitation between them and there was no possibility of continuing the marital tie. It was further averred that they mutually agreed to dissolve the marriage by mutual consent. It was further averred that the 1 st petitioner had vacated the house and started staying along with his relatives. Therefore, it is seen from the averments found in the petition that there has been no cohabitation between the parties from the inception of marriage. Therefore for all practical purpose they having been living apart without matrimonial cohabitation for the period of three years, the petitioners have filed a petition seeking divorce by mutual consent on 12.07.2022. 3. In view of the fact that the parties never lived together with meaningful cohabitation from the date of marriage, the six months period mentioned under Section 10 (A) of the Indian Divorce Act, need...","4. In the case on hand , in the petition filed for divorce by mutual consent, the petitioners had averred that they never had cohabitation after the date of marriage. Therefore, from the inception the petitioners have been living apart without any https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 2 of 4 C.R.P.No.3827 of 2022 cohabitation. In these circumstances, the six months waiting period mentioned under Section 10(A) (2) of the Indian Divorce Act, cannot be insisted. Consequently, the order impugned in this revision is set aside and the Court below is directed to advance the hearing and consider the petition for divorce filed by the petitioners on the ground of mutual consent without insisting for six (6) months waiting period. Accordingly, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed. No costs. 23.11.2022 Index: Yes/ No Speaking Order / Non-Speaking Order jai To The Principal District Judge, Thiruvallur, Thiruvallur District. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 3 of 4 C.R.P.No.3827 of 2022 S.SOUNTHAR, J. jai C.R.P.No.3827 of 2022 23.11.2022 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 4 of 4",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/138585656/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2022,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,138585656,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/138585656/,3
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana),"V. Bhagyalaxmi vs V. Rahul Kumar on 20 November, 2007",opala Krishna Tamada,2007-11-20,"ORDER    Gopala Krishna Tamada, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 13",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Gopala Krishna Tamada, J.","3.1 In my considered view, the trial Court grossly erred in entertaining the O.P. itself when the parties to the proceedings are Hindus. In fact, in the preamble to the Divorce Act , it is made clear that the enactment of the Divorce Act is meant for those persons professing the Christian religion. Therefore, it is not known as to how the original petition filed by the respondent-husband seeking divorce under the Divorce Act is maintainable. In fact, the trial Court should have rejected the O.P. at the threshold. After coming to know of the mistake that has crept in, the respondent-husband filed the present application seeking amendment of the provision, which, in my considered view, is not permissible under law. The provisions under which a divorce can be sought under the Divorce Act are entirely different from the provisions under which a divorce can be sought under the Hindu Marriage Act . No doubt, the original petition for divorce is maintainable at any stage during the subsistence of the marriage between the spouses, but it is not known what prevented the respondent-husband in withdrawing the said O.P. filed under the Divorce Act and filing a separate O.P. under the...",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"3.1 In my considered view, the trial Court grossly erred in entertaining the O.P. itself when the parties to the proceedings are Hindus. In fact, in the preamble to the Divorce Act , it is made clear that the enactment of the Divorce Act is meant for those persons professing the Christian religion. Therefore, it is not known as to how the original petition filed by the respondent-husband seeking divorce under the Divorce Act is maintainable. In fact, the trial Court should have rejected the O.P. at the threshold. After coming to know of the mistake that has crept in, the respondent-husband filed the present application seeking amendment of the provision, which, in my considered view, is not permissible under law. The provisions under which a divorce can be sought under the Divorce Act are entirely different from the provisions under which a divorce can be sought under the Hindu Marriage Act . No doubt, the original petition for divorce is maintainable at any stage during the subsistence of the marriage between the spouses, but it is not known what...","1. This civil revision petition is directed against the order, dated 20.2.2007 made in IA No. 91 of 2006 in O.P. No. 89 of 2005 on the file of the Family Court, Warangal, whereby, the learned Judge allowed the application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C . amending the provision of law as Section 13(1)(ia)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act instead of Section 10(x) of the Indian Divorce Act. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the husband i.e., the respondent herein instituted O.P. No. 89 of 2005 seeking divorce under Section 10(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 stating that his wife i.e., the petitioner herein treated him with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his mind that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live with her. Before the trial commenced, the respondent-husband filed the present application seeking amendment of the provision of law as Section 13(1)(ia)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act instead of Section 10(x) of the Indian Divorce Act. As stated above, the trial Court allowed the application by amending the provision as sought for. Aggrieved by the order dated 20.2.2007, the petitioner-wife has filed this civil revision petition. 3. Heard the learned Counsel for both the parties and perused the material placed on record.","4. In the result, this civil revision petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is allowed and the order dated 20.2.2007 made in IA No. 91 of 2006 in O.P. No. 89 of 2005 is hereby set aside. Consequently, in the light of the observations made by this Court that only Christians can maintain a petition for divorce under the Divorce Act , the O.P. filed by the respondent-husband is hereby dismissed. If the respondent-husband so chooses and is advised, he can file a separate O.P. under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act . No costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/195414232/ | 2008(2)ALD36, 2008(3)ALT32",Unclear,unclear,2007,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2008(2)ALD36, 2008(3)ALT32",195414232,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/195414232/,4
Karnataka High Court,"Kallu Daniel vs G.D. Hemalatha on 31 May, 2005",oper Court.,2005-05-31,"JUDGMENT   Anand Byrareddy, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954","Section 10, Section 12, Section 23",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Anand Byrareddy, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The present Appeal is filed against the order of the Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.), Hubli, returning the petition of the appellant, seeking a decree of divorce filed under Section 12 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, to present it before the proper Court. 2. The respondent has been served, she remains unrepresented. The only question to be considered in this Appeal is; 'Whether the Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) Hubli, did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition seeking divorce under the Divorce Act, 1869 ?' The reasoning of the Court in returning the petition is two fold. Firstly, that the petition was filed under Section 12 of the Divorce Act, 1869, whereas it should have been filed under Section 10 of the Divorce Act and secondly, that the Act prescribed that a petition for divorce under Section 10 shall be presented before the District Court or the High Court and therefore, that Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition. 3. Firstly, the reasoning that the petition ought to have been filed under Section 10 and not under Section 12 of the Divorce Act, 1869, need not detain me for long. Even if the petition had been preferred under a wrong provision of law, it was incumbent upon the Court to look at the relief sought...","4. In the light of the above, this Appeal is allowed. The order returning the petition is set aside. The matter is remitted for fresh consideration. In so far as the application seeking a direction in respect of a certain amount in deposit before the Trial Court, it is open for the appellant to approach the Trial Court for appropriate directions.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/905650/ | II(2005)DMC264, ILR2005KAR2708, 2006(3)KARLJ132, AIR 2006 (NOC) 66 (KAR), 2005 A I H C 3844, (2006) 3 KANT LJ 132, (2005) 2 HINDULR 136, (2005) 4 ICC 179, (2005) 3 KCCR 1812, (2005) 33 ALLINDCAS 505 (KAR), 2005 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 1838, (2005) 2 DMC 264",Procedural,procedural,2005,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: II(2005)DMC264, ILR2005KAR2708, 2006(3)KARLJ132, AIR 2006 (NOC) 66 (KAR), 2005 A I H C 3844, (2006) 3 KANT LJ 132, (2005) 2 HINDULR 136, (2005) 4 ICC 179, (2005) 3 KCCR 1812, (2005) 33 ALLINDCAS 505 (KAR), 2005 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 1838, (2005) 2 DMC 264",905650,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/905650/,3
Bombay High Court,"Allan John Waters vs State Of Maharashtra on 23 July, 2008",NO. 476 OF 2006,2008-07-23,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 109, Section 120, Section 161, Section 164, Section 23, Section 313, Section 323, Section 34, Section 372, Section 373, Section 375, Section 377",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Dist.: MUMBAI CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 476 OF 2006 1. Allan John Waters ] Age 53, 24, Cador Drive, ] Portchester, Fareham Hants, ] P.O. 169 EP, United Kingdom ] 2. Duncan Alexander Grant Age 60, Great South Sea Street, ] ] Portmouth, Fareham Hants, ] P.O. 53 BY, United Kingdom ] (Both presently lodged at Nagpur Prison)] ...Appellants (Ori. Accused No. 2 & 3) Versus 1. State of Maharashtra ] (Colaba Police Station C.R.No. 312/2001) 2. Maharukh Adenwalla ] R. No. 4/D 1st Floor ] Ismail Building ] 381 Dr. D.N. Road ] Mumbai 400 001 ] ...Respondents WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 603 OF 2006 The State of Maharashtra ] ...Appellant (Ori. Complainant) Versus ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:37:21 ::: 2 1. William Michael D'souza ] Age 45 years ] R/o. Tihur Taluka Murud-Janjira ] District Raigad ] 2. Allan John Waters ] Age 53, ] R/o. Cador Drive, ] Portchester, Fareham Hants, ] P.O. 169 EP, United Kingdom ] 3. Duncan Alexander Grant ] Age 50 years, R/o. Great South Sea Street, ] ] Portmouth, Fareham Hants, ] P.O. 53 BY, United Kingdom ] ...Respondents (Ori....",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"At the time of making the statement, he was living with his mother in Aeroli. He did not know where his father was residing. He did not know whether he was alive. He had one younger brother and one elder sister. The sister was married. He was an illiterate person. From the age of 12 to 13 years, he started earning for himself by doing some work. He had no shelter, and he used to sleep on foot-path. From year 2000, he started residing with his mother. He was in contact with his brother and sister. 17. It may be noted that when this statement was recorded on 20th April, 2005, after the portion of the statement was recorded in examination-in-chief, which has been referred to hereinabove, the learned Special Public Prosecutor sought an adjournment on the ground that he had yet to study the case, and the adjournment was...","Only Advocate Adenwalla and Kranti Londhe were produced before the Court. The other witness whose testimony has been discussed hereinabove, viz., Sunil Kadam, who was produced before the Court, was not even interrogated by the Investigating Officer. His statement was received by the Investigating Officer from Cuffe Parade Police Station, where his statement had been recorded in connection with another complaint. It is not even known whether any F.I.R. was registered by the Cuffe Parade Police Station. The learned counsel for the accused-appellants further submits that in the absence of any statement having been recorded by this Investigating Officer of Sunil Kadam and any statement having been provided to the defence before trial or before the appeals in the Court, the accused's right got prejudiced, as it was not known to the accused as to what type of the case they would have to face. Therefore, it is submitted that Sunil Kadam's testimony should not be taken into consideration at all for ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:37:23 ::: 40 coming to the conclusions about the guilt or innocence of...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","They were tried for offences under Sections 372, 373, 377, 323 read with Sections 109 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. They were also tried under Section 23 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. These cases were filed against the accused persons in unusual circumstances. A Criminal Writ Petition was suo motu entertained by the High Court, being Writ Petition No. 585 of 1985. Ms. Maharukh Adenwalla was appointed amicus curiae in this Writ ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:37:22 ::: 4 Petition and also in another Criminal Writ Petition. She had also been appointed amicus curiae in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1107 of 1996 by this Court. 3. It appears that in the year 1985, a girl had been brought from Gujarat to Mumbai as a maid servant. A news item appeared that this girl was being sexually exploited. The High Court took notice of the matter, and a Writ Petition was entertained, being Writ Petition No. 585 of 1985. 4. In the year 1986, a petition was brought, complaining about the plight of children at various children homes in Maharashtra. This Criminal Writ Petition came to be registered as Writ Petition No. 1107 of 1996. In the same petition, the High Court appointed a Committee, which was named as ""the Maharashtra State...","S.A. BOBDE, J.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/453012/,Procedural,procedural,2008,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,453012,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/453012/,22
Bombay High Court,"A. vs B. on 21 August, 1992",oposal to marry the respondent but even the responde,1992-08-21,"ORDER   Tipnis, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 3",Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Tipnis, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (nullity sec19) are established by substantive evidence.,"2. The petitioner-husband filed M. J. Petition No. 3758 of 1989 on the Original Side of this Court seeking a declaration and decree of nullity of the marriage between the petitioner-husband and the respondent-wife solemnised on 19th January, 1986. The repondent-wife is the cousin of the petitioner-husband. Broadly, the case of the petitioner is that not only he was forced to accept the proposal to marry the respondent but even the respondent was unwilling to marry and her consent was obtained by force by the mother of the respondent. After the engagement, the petitioner went to Dubai from where he wrote many letters to the respondent but she never replied. Even after his return to India from Dubai, despite his efforts, the wife did not respond. Thereafter, the marriage was solemnised on. 19th January, 1986. After the marriage, the petitioner tried to nave sexual relationship with the respondent, but the respondent did not respond. Ultimately, the respondent told the petitioner not to have any sexual relations. The respondent told the petitioner that she was forced to marry him. The respondent...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. This petition was heard by the learned single Judge sitting on the Original Side of this Court who by his judgment and order felt himself bound by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Dnyneshwar v. Surekha AIR 1984 Bom 310 and held that this court will not have any jurisdiction as the parties reside outside the territorial limits of the original civil jurisdiction of this High Court. He directed the petition to be returned to the petitioner for presenting to the proper Court. 5-6. ************** 7. As we shared the doubt expressed by the learned single Judge in his decision regarding the correctness of the proposition in respect of the jurisdiction of the High Court under the Indian Divorce Act as enunciated by the Division Bench of this Court in Dnyaneshwar v. Surekha (AIR 1984 Bom 310), we have heard not only the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-husband, but also Advocate Mr. S. Radhakrishnan and Advocate Mr. G. Rebello on the point. After hearing them and after considering the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act and various other decisions of different Courts, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Dnyaneshwar 's case does not lay down the correct legal position. 8. In Dnyaneshwar 's case...","1. This is a reference under Section 20 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for confirmation of the decree of nullity passed by the learned District Judge, Thane. 9. A bare reading of Section 10 and Sec. 18 of the Indian Divorce Act makes it clear that the petition may be presented either to the District Court or to the High Court. So far as the District Court is concerned, by definition under Section 3(3) , it means in the ' case of any petition under the Act, the Court of the District Judge within the local limits of whose ordinary jurisdiction, or. of whose jurisdiction under the Act, the husband and wife reside or last resided together. Under Sec. 3(1) , ""High Court"" means with reference to any area, in a State, the High Court for that State and in the case of any petition under the Act, ""High Court"" means the High Court for the area where the husband and wife reside or last resided together. In our opinion, looking to the scheme of the Act, the District...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/848450/ | I(1994)DMC238, AIR 1993 BOMBAY 61, 1992 BOM CJ 993, (1993) 1 HINDULR 117, (1992) MAH LJ 1566, (1993) 1 CIVLJ 799, (1993) 2 CURCC 2, (1994) 1 DMC 238, (1993) MARRILJ 264, (1992) 3 BOM CR 474",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19,1992,nullity,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: I(1994)DMC238, AIR 1993 BOMBAY 61, 1992 BOM CJ 993, (1993) 1 HINDULR 117, (1992) MAH LJ 1566, (1993) 1 CIVLJ 799, (1993) 2 CURCC 2, (1994) 1 DMC 238, (1993) MARRILJ 264, (1992) 3 BOM CR 474",848450,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/848450/,8
Madras High Court,"L.Stella vs V.Ponnusamy on 11 September, 2015",O.P.No.122 of 2008 on the file of the Additional Princ,2015-09-11,The Hon'ble Mr.Justice S.MANIKUMAR,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 11, Section 19, Section 2, Section 22, Section 3",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"4.The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Respondent (wife) contends that the order of the learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Coimbatore in D.O.P. No.22 of 2008 dated 06.02.2015 is against facts and evidence. 6.The Learned Counsel for the Appellant proceeds to take a plea that the Learned Trial Judge had failed to appreciate that once the parties to the marriage performed the marriage and submit to the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 , their marital relationship and their marital rights are governed by the said Act and as such, the parties are bound to seek redressal only under the said Act. 7.The Learned Counsel for Appellant brings it to the notice of this Court that the Appellant had filed the S.M.O.P No.192 of 2000 seeking the relief of 'Restitution of Conjugal Rights' on the file of Family Court and the same was allowed. Further more, the Respondent/Husband had filed S.M.O.P.No.339 of 1998, seeking a relief of Divorce on the file of Family Court, Coimbatore and the same was dismissed as not pressed. In fact, these two aforesaid Petitions were filed under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and when that be the fact situation, the Respondent/Husband strangely filed D.O.P....","10.Conversely, it is contention of the Learned Counsel for the Respondent/Husband that the trial court came to the conclusion that the Appellant/Wife had deserted the Respondent/Husband from 30.03.1992 and further that, she treated him cruelly and consequently granted the relief of divorce in his favour and the same need not to be interfered with by this Court sitting in Appellate Jurisdiction. 11.Admittedly, the Appellant/Wife is Christian and that the Respondent/Husband is Hindu. At the time of marriage on 18.03.1991, the Appellant/Wife was a widow. Further, the Respondent/Husband at the time of his marriage was serving as a clerk in the Postal Department and subsequently he retired voluntarily and is receiving monthly pension. 12.The main grievance of the Respondent/Husband is that the Appellant/Respondent left the marital home and went to her mother's place and when he went there to bring his wife, her family members used abusive language and ill-treated him. Apart from that, the Appellant had failed to prepare food and look after him as dutiful wife. Also that the Appellant had not visited him when he was admitted into the hospital as an in-patient on two occasions. Indeed, the stand of the Respondent/Husband is that only his brother's family...","31.Undoubtedly, the term of 'Desertion' is a matter to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a given case. To put it succinctly, an inference of 'Desertion' may be drawn by a Court of Law from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; ie., to mention, the facts have to be necessarily viewed as to the purpose which is established by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the real acts of separation. If there is a separation, the main issue that crops up for rumination is whether the Act is attributable to an animus deserendi? The act of Desertion starts when the factum of separation and the animus deserendi co-exists. However, it is not necessary that the two should start at the same time, as opined by this Court. 32. In regard...","4.The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Respondent (wife) contends that the order of the learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Coimbatore in D.O.P. No.22 of 2008 dated 06.02.2015 is against facts and evidence. 6.The Learned Counsel for the Appellant proceeds to take a plea that the Learned Trial Judge had failed to appreciate that once the parties to the marriage performed the marriage and submit to the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 , their marital relationship and their marital rights are governed by the said Act and as such, the parties are bound to seek redressal only under the said Act. 7.The Learned Counsel for Appellant brings it to the notice of this Court that the Appellant had filed the S.M.O.P No.192 of 2000 seeking the relief of 'Restitution of Conjugal Rights' on the file of Family Court and the same was allowed. Further more, the Respondent/Husband had filed S.M.O.P.No.339 of 1998, seeking a relief of Divorce on the file of Family Court, Coimbatore and the same was dismissed as not pressed. In fact, these two aforesaid Petitions...","10.Conversely, it is contention of the Learned Counsel for the Respondent/Husband that the trial court came to the conclusion that the Appellant/Wife had deserted the Respondent/Husband from 30.03.1992 and further that, she treated him cruelly and consequently granted the relief of divorce in his favour and the same need not to be interfered with by this Court sitting in Appellate Jurisdiction. 11.Admittedly, the Appellant/Wife is Christian and that the Respondent/Husband is Hindu. At the time of marriage on 18.03.1991, the Appellant/Wife was a widow. Further, the Respondent/Husband at the time of his marriage was serving as a clerk in the Postal Department and subsequently he retired voluntarily and is receiving monthly pension. 12.The main grievance of the Respondent/Husband is that the Appellant/Respondent left the marital home and went to her mother's place and when he went there to bring his wife, her family members used abusive language and ill-treated him. Apart from that, the Appellant had failed to prepare food and look after him as dutiful wife. Also that the Appellant had not visited him when he was admitted into...","In the High Court of Judicature at Madras Dated: 11.09.2015 Coram: The Hon'ble Mr.Justice S.MANIKUMAR and The Hon'ble Mr.Justice M.VENUGOPAL C.M.A.No.1974 of 2015 and M.P.No.1 of 2015 L.Stella ..Appellant Vs. V.Ponnusamy ..Respondent Prayer: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 to set aside the Judgment and Decree dated 06.02.2015 in D.O.P.No.122 of 2008 on the file of the Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Coimbatore For Appellant : Mr.K.S.Karthik Raja For Respondent : Mr.K.Premkumar J U D G M E N T [Judgment of the Court was delivered by M.VENUGOPAL, J.] The Appellant/Respondent has preferred the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal as against the Order dated 06.02.2015 in DOP.No.122 of 2008 passed by the learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Coimbatore. 2.The Learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Coimbatore while passing the Impugned Order in D.O.P. No.122 of 2008 (filed by the Petitioner/Husband) on 06.02.2015 at Paragraph No.12 had interalia observed that the failure of the respondent (Appellant) to perform the duty of a wife, is proved to have caused cruelty which is harmful to the Petitioner (Respondent/Husband). Thus, the above said fact fits into the ground for dissolution of marriage adumbrated under Section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 and resultantly allowed the Petition by dissolving the marriage solemnized between the parties...","39.In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Resultantly, the Order passed by the Learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, in D.O.P. No.122 of 2008 dated 06.02.2015 is affirmed by this Court for the reasons assigned in this Appeal. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. [S.M.K., J.] [M.V., J.] 11.09.2015 Index:Yes/No Internet:Yes/No. ssd S.MANIKUMAR, J. and M.VENUGOPAL, J. ssd To The Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Coimbatore C.M.A.No.1974 of 2015 and M.P.No.1 of 2015 11.09.2015",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/52032345/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2015,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,52032345,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/52032345/,9
Supreme Court of India,"Ms. Jordan Diengdeh vs S.S. Chopra on 10 May, 1985",special leave petition filed by wife,1985-05-10,"REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 11, Section 12, Section 125, Section 13, Section 18, Section 19, Section 2, Section 22, Section 23, Section 24, Section 25, Section 27, Section 28, Section 30, Section 31, Section 32, Section 34, Section 4, Section 488, Section 5",Cruelty; Nullity Sec19; Adultery; Desertion; Venereal Disease; Unsound Mind; Leprosy,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"PETITIONER: MS. JORDAN DIENGDEH Vs. RESPONDENT: S.S. CHOPRA DATE OF JUDGMENT10/05/1985 BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) MISRA, R.B. (J) CITATION: 1985 AIR 935 1985 SCR Supl. (1) 704 1985 SCC (3) 62 1985 SCALE (1)952 ACT: Constitution of India-Article 44-Uniform Civil Code- Necessity of-Emphasised. Indian Divorce, Act, 1869 -Ss. 18, 19 and 22-Petition by wife-Allegation of impotence of husband-Nullity of marriage or judicial separation sought-High Court rejecting prayer for nullity, but granting judicial separation on account of cruelty-Validity of order-Supreme Court holding irretrievable break-down of marriage. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ss. 10 and 13 B-Special Marriage Act, 1954 -Ss. 23 to 28- Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 -Ss. 31 to 34- Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 -S. 2-Grounds for dissolution of marriage not uniform- Necessity for uniform Civil Code-Stressed. HEADNOTE: The petitioner belonged to the 'Khasi Tribe' of Maghalaya and was born and brought up as a Presbytarian Christian. She is now a member of the Indian Foreign Service. The respondent-husband is a Sikh. They were married under the Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872. The petitioner filed a petition in 1980, for declaration of nullity of marriage or judicial separation under ss. 18...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(2) that the parties are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity (whether natural or legal) or affinity; (3) that either party was a lunatic or idiot at the time of the marriage; (4) that the former husband or wife of either party was living at the time of the marriage and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in fore."" (iv) that her marriage (whether consummated or not) was solemnized before she attained the age of fifteen years and she has repudiated the marriage after attaining that age but before attaining the age of eighteen years.""",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The facts of the case are somewhat novel and peculiar. The wife, who is the petitioner before us claims to belong to the 'Khasi Tribe' of Meghalaya, who was born and brought up as a Presbytarian Christian at Shilong. She is now a member of the Indian Foreign Service. The husband is a Sikh. They were married under the Indian Christen Marriage Act, 1872. The marriage was performed on October 14, 1975. The present petition for declaration of nullity of marriage or judicial separation was filed in 1980 under sections 18 , 19 and 20 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. The prayer for declaration no nullity of marriage was rejected by a learned single judge of the High Court, but a decree for judicial separation was granted on the ground of cruelty. On appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the judgment of the learned single judge. The wife has filed this petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court. She seeks a declaration of nullity of marriage. The ground on which the declaration was sought in the courts below and the ground on which it is now sought is the impotence of the husband in that though the husband is of achieving 707 erection and penetration, he ejaculates prematurely before the...",A.P.J. 718,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/569459/ | 1985 AIR 935, 1985 SCR SUPL. (1) 704, AIR 1985 SUPREME COURT 935, (1985) 9 DRJ 164, 1985 ALL CJ 669, (1985) 2 CURCC 509, (1985) 2 DMC 42, (1985) MATLR 279, 1985 (3) SCC 62",Cruelty,cruelty; nullity_sec19; adultery; desertion; venereal_disease; unsound_mind; leprosy,1985,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 1985 AIR 935, 1985 SCR SUPL. (1) 704, AIR 1985 SUPREME COURT 935, (1985) 9 DRJ 164, 1985 ALL CJ 669, (1985) 2 CURCC 509, (1985) 2 DMC 42, (1985) MATLR 279, 1985 (3) SCC 62",569459,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/569459/,9
Bombay High Court,"Joseph John Carvalho vs Leila Joseph Carvalho on 21 August, 1992",oposal to marry the respondent but even the responde,1992-08-21,"JUDGMENT   V.P. Tipnis, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 3, Section 8",Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT V.P. Tipnis, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"7. The learned District Judge framed the issue as to whether the petitioner proves that the consent of the respondent was Obtained by force and against her wish and on the basis of evidence on record, answered that issue in the affirmative. He accepted the evidence of the petitioner and Father Rodrigues. He came to the conclusion that the marriage was performed with- out free consent of the respondent-wife and was performed by force against her wish. Thus, fraud was committed. Ultimately, by his judgment and decree dated 15th January, 1991, the learned District Judge declared the marriage to be null and void. The said judgment and decree of the learned District Judge has come up before us for confirmation.","3. Broadly, the case of the petitioner is that not only he was forced to accept the proposal to marry the respondent but even the respondent was unwilling to marry and her consent was obtained by force by the mother of the respondent. After the engagement, the petitioner went to Dubai from where he wrote many letters to the respondent but she never replied. Even after his return to India from Dubai, despite his efforts, the wife did not respond. Thereafter, the marriage was solemnised on 19th January, 1986. After the marriage, the petitioner tried to have sexual relationship with the respondent, but the respondent did not respond. Ultimately, the respondent told the petitioner not to have any sexual relations. The respondent told the petitioner that she was forced to marry him. The respondent threatened the petitioner that if he tried to have sex with her, she would commit suicide. The petitioner has stated that the marriage was never consummated. The petitioner again went to Saudi Arabia for about a year. During this period also, despite many letters, he did...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","8. As we shared the doubt expressed by the learned Single Judge in his decision regarding the correctness of the proposition in respect of the jurisdiction of the High Court under the Indian Divorce Act as enunciated by the Division Bench of this Court in Dnyaneshwar v. Surekha (A.I.R. 1984 Bombay 310). we have heard not only the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner-husband, but also Advocate Mr. S. Radhakrishnan and Advocate Mr. G. Rebello on the point. After hearing them and after considering the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act and various other decisions of different Courts, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Dnyaneshwar's case does not lay down the correct legal position. 9. In Dnyaneshwar'i case (A I. R. 1984 Bombay 310), the Division Bench referred to the decision of the Karnataka High Court in I.A, Jayaraj v. I.M. Florence and of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Saroja v. Christie Francls , . However, the Division Bench held that the decision does not seem to make a reference to the requirement of residence within the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court, probably because that question was not at all relevant for decision of the question which the Special Bench was called upon to deal with....","1. This is a reference Under Section 20 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for confirmation of the decree of nullity passed by the learned District Judge, Thane. 2. The petitioner-husband filed M.J. Petition No. 3758 of 1989 on the Original Side of this Court seeking a declaration and decree of nullity of the marriage between the petitioner-husband and the respondent-wife solemnised on 19th January, 1986. The respondent-wife is the cousin of the petitioner husband. 17. The reference is disposed of accordingly.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/804380/ | (1992)94BOMLR958, II(1992)DMC524",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19,1992,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (1992)94BOMLR958, II(1992)DMC524",804380,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/804380/,8
Delhi High Court,"Ms. Saramma Ninan vs Mr. Ninan John & Others on 19 February, 2001",opriate Division Bench,2001-02-19,"ORDER   Arijit Pasayat, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 113, Section 20",Constitutional Validity,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Arijit Pasayat, C.J. 1. This matter has placed before this Bench because of the following order passed by learned single judge on 11th December, 2001 ""Since the constitutional validity of a statute is involved, List the matter before an appropriate Division Bench, subject to the orders of Hon'ble the Chief Justice, on 9th January, 2001.""",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"2. Court may add Government as party - The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order that the Central Government or a state Government shall be added as a defendant in any suit involving any such question as is referred to in clause (1) of Article 132 , read with Article 147 , of the Constitution, if the Attorney General for India or the Attorney-General of the State as the case may be, whether upon receipt of notice under rule 1, or otherwise, applies for such addition and the Court is satisfied that such addition is necessary or desirable for the satisfactory determination of the question of law involved. 2A. Power of Court to add Government or other authority as a defendant in a suit relating to the validity of any statutory instrument - The Court may, at any stage of the proceedings in any suit involving any...","3. The provisions referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner read as follows: ORDER XXVIIA, CPC Suits involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution or as to the validity of any statutory instrument. 1. Notice to the Attorney General or the Advocate General- In any suit in which it appears to the Court that any such question as is referred to in clause (I) of Article 132 , read with Article 147 of the constitution, is involved, the court shall not proceed to determine that question until after notice has been given to the Attorney General for India if the question of law concerns the Central Government and to the Advocate General of the State if the question of law concerns a State Government. 1A. Procedure in suits involving validity or any statutory instrument - In any suit in which it appears to the Court that any question as to the validity of any statutory instrument, not being a question of the nature mentioned in rule 1, is involved the Court shall not...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. When the matter was taken up we wanted to find out from the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as to how vires of certain provisions of Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (in short the 'Act') can be decided in an original petition filed under Section 10 of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to order XXVIIA of the Code of Civil Procedure , 1908(in short the 'Code') and Section 113 thereof. Reference was also made to Article 228 of the Constitution of India, 1950(in short the 'Constitution'). Reference was also made to a decision of the Apex Court in Ganga Pratap v. Allahabad Bank Ltd. , to contend that it is not impermissible to decide the vires. In the proceedings at hand. Reference was also made to decisions of Kerala and Bombay High Court in Ammini E.J. v. Union of India , and Pragati Varghes & Ors v. Cyril Varghes & Ors. (II ) 1997 DMC 407 respectively to urge that vires questions were considered and decided in similar proceedings. 3. Costs - Where, under rule 2 or rule 2A the Government or any other authority is added as a defendant in a suit, the Attorney-General. Advocate General, or Government Pleader or Government or other authority shall not be entitled to, or liable for, costs in the...","7. Validity of the provisions as challenged in the petition under Section 10 of the Act cannot be adjudicated in the said petition. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that the matter has to be placed before the learned Single Judge for disposal of the matrimonial case on 26th March, 2001. Ordered accordingly.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/636765/ | 2001IVAD(DELHI)439, 91(2001)DLT60, II(2001)DMC43",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity,2001,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2001IVAD(DELHI)439, 91(2001)DLT60, II(2001)DMC43",636765,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/636765/,8
Bombay High Court,"Rajesh Premchand Suryawanshi vs Ujwala Rajesh Suryawanshi on 28 April, 2000",I(2002)DMC536,2000-04-28,"JUDGMENT   B.B. Vagyani, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 13, Section 17, Section 28, Section 7",Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT B.B. Vagyani, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (desertion) are established by substantive evidence.,"1. Heard Mr. D.B. Arole, learned Counsel for the petitioner. The respondent, though duly served with notice of Reference is absent.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","5. After having lost all hopes, the petitioner husband filed marriage petition under Section 10 of the Divorce Act in the District Court at Ahmednagar for getting a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. After service of notice divorce petition, the respondent wife appeared in the Trial Court through her Advocate. She filed an application for interim alimony. However, the respondent wife did not press the said application for grant of interim alimony. The respondent wife did not file her written statement. She neither remained present in the Court nor participated in the divorce proceeding. Therefore, the learned Additional District Judge, Ahmednagar proceeded with the matter ex-parte. 6. The petitioner husband examined himself at Exh. 22. He spoke in terms of the allegations made in the petition. The oral testimony of the petitioner husband has gone unchallenged in the evidence on record. 7. The learned Additional District Judge appreciated the solitary oral evidence of the petitioner husband. On the basis of unchallenged version of the petitioner husband, the learned Additional District Judge has come to a conclusion that the respondent wife has deserted the petitioner husband without any reason and consequently dissolved the marriage of the petitioner husband with the respondent wife by decree for dissolution of marriage, as contemplated under Section 10 of the Divorce Act. The...","2. This is a Reference under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as the Divorce Act for the sake of brevity), for confirmation of a decree for dissolution of marriage made by the Additional District Judge/ Ahmednagar. The learned Additional District Judge, Ahmednagar passed the decree for dissolution of marriage on 23.3.1999 and after expiry of statutory period of six months, as contemplated in Proviso to Section 17 of the Divorce Act, the said decree is placed before us for confirmation. Few facts relevant for the purpose of digesting the point involved in the matter of confirmation of divorce decree, are these. 3. The original petitioner Rajesh and original respondent Ujwala profess Christian religion. Petitioner Rajesh married to respondent Ujwala on 31.5.1995 as per Christian religious rites. The marriage took place at Ahmednagar. After solemnization of the marriage, respondent Ujwala lived with the petitioner Rajesh as his wife at Ahmednagar. The respondent Ujwala stayed with the petitioner Rajesh for short duration. During this short period, the parties did not pull on well. There used to...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/155134/ | I(2002)DMC536, AIR 2000 BOMBAY 369, 2000 A I H C 4122, (2001) 2 HINDULR 412, (2000) 4 CIVLJ 292, (2002) 1 DMC 536, (2000) 3 MAH LJ 822, (2001) 1 MARRILJ 86, (2000) 3 ALLMR 554 (BOM), (2000) BOM CR 377, 2000 (3) BOM LR 339, 2000 BOM LR 3 339",Desertion,desertion,2000,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: I(2002)DMC536, AIR 2000 BOMBAY 369, 2000 A I H C 4122, (2001) 2 HINDULR 412, (2000) 4 CIVLJ 292, (2002) 1 DMC 536, (2000) 3 MAH LJ 822, (2001) 1 MARRILJ 86, (2000) 3 ALLMR 554 (BOM), (2000) BOM CR 377, 2000 (3) BOM LR 339, 2000 BOM LR 3 339",155134,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/155134/,9
Karnataka High Court,"Smt.J.H.Veronica @ J.H. Manila vs Mr.D.Anil Kumar Son Of Late Doreraja on 24 March, 2022",MFA No.103466 OF 2017(FC),2022-03-24,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001","Section 10, Section 16, Section 2, Section 55",Cruelty; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"10. In addition to the various contentions urged in the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that during the pendency of this appeal, the husband has repeatedly assaulted the wife and the complaint was also registered before the Women's Police Station, Ballari and on such complainant, the Jurisdictional Police has warned the husband and he has given an undertaking that he will not harm or cause any injury to 7 the wife. On this ground, the learned counsel for the appellant has filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC seeking to produce certain additional documents in order to substantiate that the wife is subjected to cruelty by the husband even during the pendency of the appeal. The affidavit accompanying the application for production of documents reads as under; 1. I state that, believing he giving the undertaking, I went back to stay with him but, unfortunately it was repeated and on 08.01.2016 he assaulted me and tried to kill me by throttling my neck. 2. I state that, in the apprehension of the acts being repeated myself on 09/01/2016 I filed complaint (File No.2147) against my husband D. Anil Kumar at Santvana Mahila Sahayavani...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"5. The Family Court on the basis of the pleadings framed following points for consideration; POINTS 1. Whether the petitioner/ wife proves that the respondent/ husband has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with respondent ? 2. Whether the petitioner is entitled for decree of divorce as prayed for? 3. What Order ? 6. The wife in order to substantiate her case examined herself as PW.1 and one witness as PW.2 and got marked 22 documents at Ex.P.1 to 22. On the other hand, the respondent examined himself as RW.1 and one witness as RW.2 and got marked Ex.R.1. 11. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant the points that arises for consideration are; POINTS 1. Whether the application I.A. No.2/2019 seeking for additional documents needs...","10. In addition to the various contentions urged in the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that during the pendency of this appeal, the husband has repeatedly assaulted the wife and the complaint was also registered before the Women's Police Station, Ballari and on such complainant, the Jurisdictional Police has warned the husband and he has given an undertaking that he will not harm or cause any injury to 7 the wife. On this ground, the learned counsel for the appellant has filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC seeking to produce certain additional documents in order to substantiate that the wife is subjected to cruelty by the husband even during the pendency of the appeal. The affidavit accompanying the application for production of documents reads as under; 1. I state that, believing he giving the undertaking, I went back to stay with him but, unfortunately it was repeated and on 08.01.2016 he assaulted me and tried to kill me by throttling my neck. 2. I state that, in the apprehension of the acts...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF MARCH, 2022 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S. SUNIL DUTT YADAV AND THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA MFA No.103466 OF 2017(FC) BETWEEN: SMT. J.H. VERONICA @ J.H. MANILA W/O. D. ANIL KUMAR, AGED 25 YEARS, PRESENTLY RESIDING AT SBI COLONY, NEAR WATER TANK, GANDHINAGAR, MOKA ROAD, BALLARI. ....APPELLANT (BY SMT. ARUNA R. DESHPANDE, ADVOCATE) AND: MR. D. ANIL KUMAR S/O. DORERAJA, AGED 26 YEARS, R/O. LIG-340, KHB COLONY, MOKA ROAD, BALLARI MB:9620933245. ....RESPONDENT (SERVED) THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 55 OF DIVORCE ACT, 1869 READ WITH ORDER 41 OF THE CPC , AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 18.08.2017 PASSED IN MATRIMONIAL CASE NO.163/2016 ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL JUDGE, FAMILY COURT, BALLARI, DISMISSING THE PETITION FILED U/SECTION 10(x) OF THE DIVORCE ACT. THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 09.03.2022 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, K.S. HEMALEKHA J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: 2 JUDGMENT 'Right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessity of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head and facilities for reading, writing, expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving out and mixing and co-mingling with fellow human beings'. This...","12. Perusal of I.A. No.2/2019 filed by the appellant would show that on 09.01.2016, the appellant had given a complaint against her husband to 'SANTVANA MAHILA SAHAYAVANI KENDRA, BALLARI' as the matter could not be settled before the 'MAHILA KENDRA' the appellant-wife decided to approach the Family Court. The appellant has also sought to produce the complaint given to the Women's Police Inspector, Women's Police Station, Devinagar, Ballari, complaining that the husband has been harassing her in the public and without any reason tried to assault the wife on 15.11.2017. In view of the complaint filed by the wife the Police authorities had called the husband and in presence of the both, the Police has warned the husband not to misbehave with the wife and 11 harass at the public places. These documents sought to be produced are undisputed documents and the same is not rebutted by the respondent. The document sought to be produced are relevant bearing in mind the issue involved in this proceedings. In the result point No.1 framed for consideration is answered in the affirmative and...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/135035113/,Cruelty,cruelty; adultery,2022,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,135035113,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/135035113/,18
Madras High Court,"Dexter S. Anthony vs June P. Anthony And Anr. on 21 November, 1984",No. 388 of 1984,1984-11-21,"ORDER   R. Sengottuvelan, J., Moosaranpet is within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Chengalpattu. According to the office note the petition for divorce has to be filed in the District Court within whose jurisdiction both the parties last resided. The office also points out two conflicting judgments of this Court relating to jurisdiction and seeks clarification in the matter. Balasubrahmanyan, J., Sadasivam, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 2, Section 3, Section 4, Section 6, Section 8",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER R. Sengottuvelan, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"On the question whether the District Courts should be allowed a jurisdiction in divorce cases, there was a difference of opinion. The main reason why the Select Committee had given this jurisdiction was that the refusal of it would amount to a denial of relief to large classes of persons affected by the Bill. It would be a mere mockery of Europeans and East Indians in distant cities, and Native Christians in mofussil villages, to tell them to come to the High Courts in the Presidency towns for judgments of divorce. It is however said that the District Courts are not equal to those duties. That argument is one which should be looked upon with great distrust. If it be established that certain new legal rights and remedies should be created for the benefit of any class of Her Majesty's subjects, and the Indian Courts are incompetent to administer them,...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The reference in the above Diary No. 388 of 1984 raises an interesting question relating to the matrimonial jurisdiction of this Court. The petitioner presented an application under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act for the relief of divorce of the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent. In paragraph 6 of the application it is stated as follows: After the marriage the petitioner and the respondent lived and cohabitated as husband and wife first at Little Mount, Saidapet, Madras, for five years, and then at Gunidy, Madras, for three years and lastly at Kennedy Valley, Moosaranpet, Madras-600 091, until February, 1983, when the respondent left the petitioner in the following circumstances. 2. Moosaranpet is within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Chengalpattu. According to the office note the petition for divorce has to be filed in the District Court within whose jurisdiction both the parties last resided. The office also points out two conflicting judgments of this Court relating to jurisdiction and seeks clarification in the matter. Balasubrahmanyan, J. in Diary No. 6509 of 1975, held that in respect of petition under Sections 8 , 10 and 23 of the Indian Divorce Act, the High Court and the District Court within whose jurisdiction the petitioner and the respondent last resided has got concurrent jurisdiction, disagreeing with...","10. For the above reasons I am not inclined to agree with Balasubrahmanyan, J. in his conclusion that in cases of applications under Sections 10 , 18 and 23 both the High Court and the District Court concerned are vested with the concurrent jurisdiction. The contention that this Court has got concurrent jurisdiction had been negatived by Sadasivam, J. in O.M.S.No. 13 of 1963, Sethuraman, J. in Diary No. 1680 of 1974 and Fakir Mohammed, J. in O.M.S.No. l of 1978. The learned Judges in the abovesaid three cases have taken into consideration the proviso to Clause 35 of the Letters Patent and the definition of 'Court' occurring in Section 3(4) of the Act and negatived the plea that this Court is to exercise concurrent jurisdiction along with the District Court concerned in matters arising under Sections 10 , 18 and 23 . I am inclined to agree with the preponderence of Judicial opinion in this regard and hold that in view of the fact that the petitioner and the respondent have last resided within the jurisdiction of the District...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1664293/ | (1985)2MLJ200,Procedural,procedural,1984,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1985)2MLJ200,1664293,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1664293/,5
Kerala High Court,"P.L.Shaju vs Anitha on 9 October, 2007",Mat.Appeal.No. 108 of 2008 (A),2007-10-09,THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.K.MOHANAN,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 18, Section 3",Non Consummation; Nullity Sec19; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.K.MOHANAN & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.HARILAL MONDAY, THE 8TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2014/17TH AGRAHAYANA, 1936 Mat.Appeal.No. 108 of 2008 (A) ------------------------------- AGAINST THE ORDER IN OP 529/2003 of FAMILY COURT,THRISSUR DATED 09-10-2007. APPELLANT(S)/PETITIONER:: ------------------------- P.L.SHAJU, S/O. PERUMBILLY LONAPPAN, KARUVANNUR DESOM, PORATHISSERY VILLAGE, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT. BY ADV. SRI.N.P.SAMUEL RESPONDENT(S)/RESPONDENT: ------------------------- ANITHA, D/O.CHEERAKATHIL MATHAI, P.O.NALUKETTU, KONNOOR VILLAGE, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN 680 308. R1 BY ADV. SRI.N.SUBRAMANIAM R1 BY ADV. SRI.M.S.NARAYANAN R1 BY ADV. SMT.P.T.GIRIJAN THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 30-10-2014, THE COURT ON 08-12-2014 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: V.K. MOHANAN & K. HARILAL, JJ. ------------------------------------------------------ Mat. Appeal No. 108 of 2008-A ------------------------------------------------------ Dated this the 8th day of December, 2014 JUDGMENT Harilal J. The appellant is the petitioner in O.P.No.529 of 2003 on the files of the Family Court, Thrissur. He is the husband of the respondent herein. The above O.P. was filed under Sec.10(vii) and (x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 on the ground that the respondent has wilfully refused to consummate the marriage and the marriage has, therefore, not been consummated and the non-consummation of the marriage amounted to an act of cruelty to...","7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent advanced arguments to justify the findings of the court below whereby the Original Petition was dismissed. The learned counsel drew our attention to the respondent's pleadings and contended that in the written statement she has emphatically denied the non-consummation due to his wilful refusal alleged by the appellant. It is true that she made an allegation of imminent ejaculation against the appellant. But the non- consummation alleged by the appellant and imminent ejaculation alleged by the respondent are entirely different and Mat. Appeal No. 108 of 2008 -: 7 :- distinct. The non-consummation cannot be presumed or inferred from the respondent's allegation of imminent ejaculation in view of her oral evidence. He further invited our attention to her oral evidence during the course of cross- examination and pointed out that she unequivocally deposed that the effective and successful intercourse had been effected thrice and emphatically denied the question suggesting that effective intercourse had never been taken place during the period of cohabitation. He pointed out that if the marriage had been consummated once, thereafter the ground for divorce under Sec.10(vii) of the Divorce Act cannot be made available for claiming divorce....","8. In view of the rival contentions raised at the Bar, the point to be considered is, whether the appellant had succeeded in proving that the respondent had wilfully refused to Mat. Appeal No. 108 of 2008 -: 8 :- consummate the marriage with him and as a result of that, the marriage has not been consummated?","5. We have heard Sri. Dilip J. Akkara, the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri. M.S. Narayanan, the learned counsel or the respondent. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant advanced arguments challenging the findings whereby the court below dismissed the Original Petition. He fervently attacked the finding that the marriage had been consummated. According to him, the said finding is contrary to the admissions in the pleadings of the respondent. The respondent, in her pleadings, made a complaint admitting imminent ejaculation of the appellant during the course of intercourse. That admission would amount to an approval of the appellant's case that the marriage has not been consummated so far. But the learned Family Court Judge failed to appreciate the said admission well Mat. Appeal No. 108 of 2008 -: 6 :- inferable from the pleadings in its correct perspective. The learned counsel further drew our attention to Exts.A3 and A4 medical reports and contends that the said reports obviously proved that the appellant is a physically and sexually quite normal man having capacity to have sexual intercourse. So,...","7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent advanced arguments to justify the findings of the court below whereby the Original Petition was dismissed. The learned counsel drew our attention to the respondent's pleadings and contended that in the written statement she has emphatically denied the non-consummation due to his wilful refusal alleged by the appellant. It is true that she made an allegation of imminent ejaculation against the appellant. But the non- consummation alleged by the appellant and imminent ejaculation alleged by the respondent are entirely different and Mat. Appeal No. 108 of 2008 -: 7 :- distinct. The non-consummation cannot be presumed or inferred from the respondent's allegation of imminent ejaculation in view of her oral evidence. He further invited our attention to her oral evidence during the course of cross- examination and pointed out that she unequivocally deposed that the effective and successful intercourse had been effected thrice and emphatically denied the question suggesting that effective intercourse had never been taken place during the period of cohabitation. He pointed out that if the marriage had been...","9. The point raised above is a factual dispute. But before re-appreciating the evidence on record to decide the above point, we find that the statutory requirements to grant divorce on the ground of non-consummation of marriage under Sec.10 (vii) of the Divorce Act have to be analysed at first. What does the term 'consummation of marriage' employed under Sec.10 (vii) of the Divorce Act, 1869 mean and intend? The Divorce Act does not provide a definition for the same under Sec.3 of the interpretation Clause. So, it is apposite to consider the meaning given in various dictionaries as given below. In Black's Law Dictionary: ""Consummate. 1. To bring to completion; esp., to make (a marriage) complete by sexual intercourse. 2. To achieve; fulfil. 3. To perfect; carry to the highest degree."" In Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary: ""Consummate- 1. to make a marriage or a relationship complete by having sex: The marriage lasted only a week and was never consummated. 2. to make complete or perfect."" ""Consummation. 1. the act of making a marriage or relationship complete by having sex. 2. the fact of making complete or perfect"". In Advanced Law Lexicon Dictionary: ""Consummation of marriage. The first post-marital act of sexual intercourse between a husband and wife. Under canon law, a refusal to consummate the marriage may be grounds...","Hence this Mat. Appeal is dismissed. Sd/- (V.K. MOHANAN, JUDGE) Sd/- (K. HARILAL, JUDGE) Nan/ //true copy// P.S. to Judge",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/140046761/,Non Consummation,non_consummation; nullity_sec19; cruelty,2007,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,140046761,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/140046761/,18
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana),"N. Sarada Mani vs G. Alexander And Anr. on 21 October, 1997",oppose the petition for divorce,1997-10-21,"JUDGMENT   P. Ramakrishnam Raju, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 20",Adultery; Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT P. Ramakrishnam Raju, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"12. Argumentum inconvenienti, principle of hardship, absurdity, have no application, while interpreting the statutes. But, however the cardinal principle is that the statute should be interpreted in such a way as to avoid absurdity and to have harmonious effect. The Court must construe a section, unless it is impossible to do so to make it workable rather than make it meaningless. Thus, an attempt must always be made to reconcile the relevant provision as to advance the remedy by the statute. Therefore, where the literal meaning of the words in a statutory provision, would manifestly defeat its object by making a part of it meaningless and ineffective, it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provisions and to make whole of it effective and operativer Especially in cases of Pre-constitutional statutes. Courts are to find and follow...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is an application filed by the wife under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') seeking divorce on the ground that her husband, the first respondent, is living in adultery with the second respondent and that he treated her with cruelty, beating her and threatening to kill her. The first respondent-husband, while admitting his marriage with the petitioner on 28-6-1989, denied that he received any dowry nor treated the petitioner with any cruelty. He also further denied that he had any illicit intimacy with the second respondent. He alleges that the petitioner herself deserted him two years back. Of course, he does not oppose the petition for divorce, but rests con tended by saying that because of the suspicious nature of the petitioner, he got vexed and therefore, he also prays the Court to pass a decree for divorce declaring dissolution of marriage between them. After filing the counter, he remained ex parte during the course of the trial. 2. The second respondent in her counter-affidavit states that she is a married woman living with her husband in 257, Housing Board Colony at Rajahmundry. The allegation that when the first respondent took the petitioner after marriage to his house in Hyderabad, to her surprise and dismay, she found the second respondent living in...","15. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the grounds which are available to the wife under Section 10 should also be made available to the husband in a petition filed by him seeking divorce and the Parliament should immediately take note of the discrimination writ large :between the grounds available to the wife and the husband in a petition for divorce. It is for the Parliament to take note of this anamoly and fill-in the void by suitable legislation. A pre-constitution discrimination by the provision in Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, it is rightly held by the Full Bench in Youth Welfare Federation case (supra), cannot survive the test of equality between men and women as envisaged under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. Unless special provision is made for men and women as contemplated under Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India and which passes the test of reasonableness for survival it is irresistible that men and women have to be provided similar grounds for dissolution of marriage except one which is...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/850953/ | AIR1998AP157, 1997(6)ALT270, AIR 1998 ANDHRA PRADESH 157, (1998) 1 MARRILJ 159, (1997) 6 ANDH LT 270, (1998) 1 APLJ 445, (1997) 6 ANDHLD 740",Adultery,adultery; desertion; cruelty,1997,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1998AP157, 1997(6)ALT270, AIR 1998 ANDHRA PRADESH 157, (1998) 1 MARRILJ 159, (1997) 6 ANDH LT 270, (1998) 1 APLJ 445, (1997) 6 ANDHLD 740",850953,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/850953/,6
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Lorna vs Alison Leen And Anr. on 10 January, 2003",oped an illicit relationship with the wife of his yo,2003-01-10,"JUDGMENT    J.S. Khehar, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 17",Adultery; Cruelty; Wife Specific,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT J.S. Khehar, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,"2. In the petition filed by Lorna, she asserted that she married Alison Leen (respondent No. 1) in a Church at Ambala Cantt. on 5.1.1994. After her marriage she commenced to reside with respondent No. 1 at Delhi in a joint family. The said joint family comprised of, the family of A. Leen (father of Alison Leen respondent No. 1), the family of Alison Leen (respondent No. 1) and the family of Michael Leen (brother of respondent No. 1). In the petition for dissolution of marriage, Lorna impleaded Meryelen Leen (wife of the younger brother of Alison Leen i.e. wife of Micheal Leen as respondent No. 2). The case set up by the petitioner is that her husband Alison Leen had developed an illicit relationship with the wife of his younger brother i.e. with Meryelen Leen. It is claimed that even the father of Alison Leen confirmed to the petitioner that the younger son of Micheal Leen born to Meryelen Leen was from the loins of respondent No. 1. It is alleged that on account of protestations, made by the...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The petitioner Lorna wife of Alison Leen filed a petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the dissolution of her marriage with Alison Leen. There is no dispute that the petitioner Lorna as well as her husband Alison Leen are Christians and as such their marriage could only be dissolved under the provisions of the Act. In order to substantiate her claim for dissolution of marriage, Lorna accused her husband of being guilty of adultery coupled with cruelty as well as for having committed sodomy with her. It is obvious from a perusal of the Section 10 of the Act that the petitioner had based her claim for dissolution of marriage on two separate and distinct pleas available to her under Section 10 of the Act. 4. The allegations of adultery coupled with beating (on the basis of which the petitioner alleged cruelty) constitute a ground for dissolution of marriage (available to a Christian wife under Section 10 of the Act). It would be pertinent to mention that sodomy by itself constitutes an independent ground for dissolution of marriage (available to a Christian wife) under Section 10 of the Act. 5. The Distt. Judge, Ambala issued notices of the petition to the respondents Alison Leen and Meryelen Leen for...","8. We have perused the unrefuted pleadings of Lorna depicted in petition for dissolution of marriage under Section 10 of the Act. We have also noticed the fact that proceedings of the case were conducted exparte against the respondents by the Distt. Judge, Ambala as the respondents failed to appear before the Distt. Judge, despite the service. We have also perused the unrebutted statement of the petitioner Lorna recorded as PW-1 as well as the statement of her mother Mrs. D.C. Collins recorded as PW-2. The allegations levelled by the petitioner in her petition for dissolution of marriage stand fully substantiated. In view of the fact that no evidence was produced at the hands of the respondents controverting the assertions made by the petitioner, we are fully satisfied that the Distt. Judge, Ambala was justified in concluding that the respondent Alison Leen was guilty of having committed adultery with Meryelen Leen i.e. the wife of the younger brother of respondent No. 1, as well as, having been cruel to her on account of having beaten her up when she had...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/294953/ | (2003)135PLR52,Adultery,adultery; cruelty; wife_specific,2003,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,Equivalent citations: (2003)135PLR52,294953,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/294953/,7
Madras High Court,"M.T. Carunya vs S. Joseph Chellappa on 15 September, 1995",I(1996)DMC562,1995-09-15,"JUDGMENT   Srinivasan, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 22, Section 3, Section 32, Section 4, Section 479, Section 488, Section 494, Section 497, Section 7",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Srinivasan, J. 1. The wife is the petitioner. She has sought divorce on the ground that the husband is guilty of bigamy with adultery. The husband remained ex-parte. The wife has given evidence deposing that the husband has married another woman. The learned District Judge, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the wife, granted a decree for divorce. The said decree has come up before us for confirmation.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""Bigamy was defined as the marriage of any person during the life of the former husband or wife, whether the second marriage shall have taken place within His Majesty's dominion or elsewhere."" The learned Judge also referred to the following passage in Rattigan on Law of Divorce in India at p. 24, which read : ""19. .......In Webster's New English Dictionary, 1888, the following meaning is given : violation of marriage bed; voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with one of the opposite sex, whether unmarried or married to another; (the former case being technically designated single, the latter double adultery)."" The same meaning is given in Fowler's Concise Oxford Dictionary :",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The amicus curiae, appointed for the respondent has raised a contention that there is no allegation in the original petition or proof in the evidence of any adultery on the part of the husband. According to him, the evidence makes out only bigamy and not bigamy with adultery. For this purpose, he places reliance on the definition of adultery in Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. Under that Section, the necessary ingredient is that the woman concerned is the wife of another man. According to learned Counsel, in this case, the husband is only having, ifatall,intercoursewithawomanwhomhehas married and she not being the wife of another man, he is not guilty of adultery as defined by Indian Penal Code . 3. The question, therefore, arises whether the definition of adultery as found in the Indian Penal Code can be applied for the purposes of the Indian Divorce Act . It is too well-settled that a definition of an expression found in one particular statute cannot be utilised for the purposes of another statute unless the context warrants the same, as held in Ram Narain v. The State of U.P. . While the Indian Penal Code is dealing with offences against State and containing definitions for the purpose of punishing persons who have committed such offences, the Indian Divorce Act...","12. Applying the above principles of law, we find that once it is proved beyond doubt that the husband has married another woman and is continuously living with her, thereby the husband is guilty of bigamy with adultery. There is no evidence to the contra. Husband has not chosen to cross examine the wife of her deposition. The view taken by the District Judge that the wife is entitled to a decree of divorce is fully justified and we are upholding the same. Hence, the decree passed by the District Judge is confirmed.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/260116/ | I(1996)DMC562, (1996)IMLJ409",Adultery,adultery,1995,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: I(1996)DMC562, (1996)IMLJ409",260116,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/260116/,8
Madras High Court,"Mary Latha Regini vs Maria James on 9 January, 2026",O.P.No.86 of 2018 passed by the learned Family,2026-01-09,THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.VELMURUGAN,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Family Courts Act, 1984; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 19, Section 55",Cruelty; Desertion; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"5. According to the husband, though the marriage subsisted in form, the appellant-wife never showed compassion, understanding, true love or affection. It is alleged that she persistently humiliated him, both at home and in public, including in the presence of neighbours, strangers and colleagues, by levelling wild accusations of adultery, and sodomy with young children, without any foundation. The husband would allege that these accusations were figments of imagination, for which she refused to correct herself despite his exhortations. 6. The husband further alleged that after the appellant took employment at Vaniyakudi, she gradually withdrew from the matrimonial home and ultimately left in the year 2004 along with her personal belongings and the minor children, ceased to discharge marital obligations, never cooked or cared for him, and refused to return to the matrimonial home, thereby causing mental cruelty and desertion. On these allegations, the husband approached the learned Family Court seeking dissolution of the marriage on the twin grounds of cruelty and desertion. 4/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 02/02/2026 06:05:06 pm ) C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 Case of the Wife before the learned Family Court: 7. The appellant-wife entered contest and filed a detailed counter, stoutly denying the allegations and, in...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"3. The appeal raises, in essence, the recurring question as to when a spouse’s protest, suspicion and complaint regarding the conduct and association of the other spouse crosses the line and becomes “cruelty” in law, and equally, whether such protest, if founded upon some admitted factual substratum, can at all be branded as reckless and unfounded so as to furnish a ground for divorce. Case of the Husband before the learned Family Court: 13. Before the learned Family Court, the husband examined himself as P.W.1 and produced Exs.P1 to P5. The wife examined herself as R.W.1 and produced Exs.R1 to R4. The learned Family Court framed issues, inter alia, as to (i) whether the husband had proved cruelty, (ii) whether he had proved desertion, and (iii) whether he was entitled to a decree of divorce and consequential reliefs. 14. Ultimately, while holding that desertion was not proved, the learned Family...","5. According to the husband, though the marriage subsisted in form, the appellant-wife never showed compassion, understanding, true love or affection. It is alleged that she persistently humiliated him, both at home and in public, including in the presence of neighbours, strangers and colleagues, by levelling wild accusations of adultery, and sodomy with young children, without any foundation. The husband would allege that these accusations were figments of imagination, for which she refused to correct herself despite his exhortations. 6. The husband further alleged that after the appellant took employment at Vaniyakudi, she gradually withdrew from the matrimonial home and ultimately left in the year 2004 along with her personal belongings and the minor children, ceased to discharge marital obligations, never cooked or cared for him, and refused to return to the matrimonial home, thereby causing mental cruelty and desertion. On these allegations, the husband approached the learned Family Court seeking dissolution of the marriage on the twin grounds of cruelty and desertion. 4/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 02/02/2026 06:05:06 pm ) C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 Case of the Wife before...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT Reserved on : 05.11.2025 Pronounced on : 09.01.2026 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.VELMURUGAN and THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE L.VICTORIA GOWRI C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 and CMP(MD)No.5884 of 2021 Mary Latha Regini ... Appellant / Respondent Vs. Maria James ... Respondent / Petitioner PRAYER: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, 1984, to call for the records pertaining to the fair and decreetal order in I.D.O.P.No.86 of 2018 passed by the learned Family Court, Kannyakumari at Nagercoil dated 27.03.2019 and set aside the same. For Appellant : Mr.K.P.Narayana Kumar For Respondent : No appearance 1/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 02/02/2026 06:05:06 pm ) C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 JUDGMENT (Judgment of the Court was made by L.VICTORIA GOWRI, J.) This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, read with Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, to set aside the judgment and decree dated 27.03.2019 made in I.D.O.P. No.86 of 2018 on the file of the learned Family Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil, whereby the marriage between the appellant and the respondent solemnised on 08.05.2003 was dissolved under Section 10(ix)(x) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, on the ground of cruelty. Prologue: 2. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against the judgment...","42. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed. 43. The judgment and decree dated 27.03.2019 passed in I.D.O.P. No.86 of 2018 on the file of the learned Family Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil, in so far as it grants a decree for dissolution of marriage between the appellant and the respondent, are hereby set aside. 47. In fine, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed. [P.V.,J.] [L.V.G.,J.] 09.01.2026 NCC : Yes / No Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes Sml 22/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 02/02/2026 06:05:06 pm ) C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 To The Family Court, Kannyakumari at Nagercoil Copy to The Section Officer, Vernacular Records, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai. 23/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 02/02/2026 06:05:06 pm ) C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 P.VELMURUGAN, J., AND L.VICTORIA GOWRI, J., Sml C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 .2026 24/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 02/02/2026 06:05:06 pm )",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/190233259/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion; nullity_sec19,2026,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,190233259,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/190233259/,14
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana),"Amarthala Hemalatha vs Dasari Balu Rajendra Varaprasad on 5 March, 1990",O.P. No. 88/82 under Section 22 of the Indian Divorce,1990-03-05,"ORDER   Jagannadha Rao, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 1, Section 10, Section 13, Section 14, Section 17, Section 22, Section 24, Section 25, Section 26, Section 27, Section 28, Section 7",Desertion; Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Jagannadha Rao, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"4. The point therefore arises whether the matter arising under the Indian Divorce Act 1869 the District Court could pass a decree for divorce, subject to confirmation of the High Court, at the instance of the wife merely because there has not been resumption of cohabitation for more than two years after the husband obtained adecree for judicial separation? 5. As the parties were unrepresented we requested Sri C. Sadasiva Reddy to assist the Court as amicus curiae. It may be noted that earlier under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950, in England a party could obtain diverge, if, for three years after the decree for judicial separation there had been no resumption of cohabitation between the wife and the husband. The said provisions have been further liberalised in the Matrimonial ""Causes Act 1973 as stated above. But the question is whether Sec. 7 of the Act permits resort to the...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","This reference application has come before us under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869 (hereinafter called the Act) for confirmation of the order of lower Court in regard to the dissolution of marriage between the petitioner and the respondent. 3. It is true that under Section 13(1)(A) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 as well as under Sec.27(1)(i) of the Special Marriage Act 1954 parties to the marriage become entitled to a decree for divorce if they have not resumed cohabitation for a specified period after the passing of a decree for judicial separation. We have to decide whether the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 contains any such provision and if it does not, whether S. 7 of the Act which permits recourse to certain principles of English law to be applied in India, permits the application of current English statute law in India.. 6. It will be noticed that under the Indian Divorce Act 1869 the grounds for divorce at the instance of the wife are not the same as the grounds for divorce at the instance of the husband. Section 10 of the Act which deals with the question of dissolution of marriage states that a husband may obtain divorce on the ground that the wife has been guilty of adultery. So far as the wife is...","2. The petitioner before the learned District Judge was the wife and she filed the application under Sec. 14 of the Act for dissolution of the marriage between her and the respondent. It is averred in the petition that the petitioner and the respondent are Christians and have been married on 6-1-1975 at Eluru, that the husband deserted the petitioner and that he filed O.P. No. 88/82 under Section 22 of the Indian Divorce Act on 7-6-1982 seeking judicial separation. The Court granted a decree for judicial separation on 29-6-1984 in favour of the husband. Alleging that after the said decree the parties have never lived together, the wife has filed the present petition on 27-1-1987 for divorce. The respondent-husband filed a counter pleading no objection for the dissolution of marriage. The learned District Judge addressed himself to the question whether the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is liable to be dissolved on the ground that the petitioner and the respondent have never cohabitated together after 29-6-1984 when the decree for judicial separation was passed. Divorce was granted...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/672495/ | AIR1990AP220, II(1991)DMC194, AIR 1990 ANDHRA PRADESH 220",Desertion,desertion; adultery; cruelty,1990,judicial_separation,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1990AP220, II(1991)DMC194, AIR 1990 ANDHRA PRADESH 220",672495,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/672495/,15
Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati,"Dr. G.M. Pradeep Kumar, Kadapa District vs Smt. Uma Maheswari, Proddatur on 2 January, 2025",opies of judgment may be Yes/No,2025-01-02,"RNT,J, CGR,J, RAVI NATH TILHARI,J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Desertion; Cruelty; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[pre_1] 1 (RNT,J & CGR,J C.M.A.NO.650 OF 2008) * THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI *THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN + CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 650 OF 2008 % 02.01.2025 # Dr. G.M. Pradeep Kumar, Kadapa District ......Petitioner And: $ Smt Uma Maheswari Proddatur ....Respondent. !Counsel for the petitioner : Sri S.Lakshminarayana Reddy ^Counsel for the respondent : Sri Nagaraju Naguru <Gist: >Head Note: ? Cases referred: NIL 2 (RNT,J & CGR,J C.M.A.NO.650 OF 2008) HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI **** CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 650 OF 2008 DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 02.01.2025 SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL: THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI & THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN 1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No may be allowed to see the Judgments? 2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No marked to Law Reporters/Journals 3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair Yes/No copy of the Judgment? ____________________ RAVI NATH TILHARI,J _______________________ CHALLA GUNARANJAN,J 3 (RNT,J & CGR,J C.M.A.NO.650 OF 2008) APHC010310802008 IN THE","1 (RNT,J & CGR,J C.M.A.NO.650 OF 2008) * THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI *THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN + CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 650 OF 2008 % 02.01.2025 # Dr. G.M. Pradeep Kumar, Kadapa District ......Petitioner And: $ Smt Uma Maheswari Proddatur ....Respondent. !Counsel for the petitioner : Sri S.Lakshminarayana Reddy ^Counsel for the respondent : Sri Nagaraju Naguru <Gist: >Head Note: ? Cases referred: NIL 2 (RNT,J & CGR,J C.M.A.NO.650 OF 2008) HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI **** CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 650 OF 2008 DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 02.01.2025 SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL: THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI & THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN 1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No may be allowed to see the Judgments? 2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No marked to Law Reporters/Journals 3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair Yes/No copy of the Judgment? ____________________ RAVI NATH TILHARI,J _______________________ CHALLA GUNARANJAN,J 3 (RNT,J & CGR,J C.M.A.NO.650 OF 2008) APHC010310802008 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI [3509] (Special Original Jurisdiction) THURSDAY ,THE SECOND DAY OF JANUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH...",8. Now the point that arises for determination is :-,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"1 (RNT,J & CGR,J C.M.A.NO.650 OF 2008) * THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI *THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN + CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 650 OF 2008 % 02.01.2025 # Dr. G.M. Pradeep Kumar, Kadapa District ......Petitioner And: $ Smt Uma Maheswari Proddatur ....Respondent. !Counsel for the petitioner : Sri S.Lakshminarayana Reddy ^Counsel for the respondent : Sri Nagaraju Naguru <Gist: >Head Note: ? Cases referred: NIL 2 (RNT,J & CGR,J C.M.A.NO.650 OF 2008) HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI **** CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 650 OF 2008 DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 02.01.2025 SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL: THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI & THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN 1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No may be allowed to see the Judgments? 2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No marked to Law Reporters/Journals 3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair Yes/No copy of the Judgment? ____________________ RAVI NATH TILHARI,J _______________________ CHALLA GUNARANJAN,J 3 (RNT,J & CGR,J C.M.A.NO.650 OF 2008) APHC010310802008 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI [3509] (Special...","2. This appeal has been filed by the appellant/husband, challenging the dismissal of the petition for divorce under Section 10 4 (RNT,J & CGR,J C.M.A.NO.650 OF 2008) of the Indian Divorce Act,1869 (in short „the Act‟) by order, dated 17.04.2008 passed in D.O.P.No.349 of 2004 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Kadapa. 3. The appellant/husband filed D.O.P.No.349 of 2004 under Section 10 of the Act seeking dissolution of marriage, which was performed on 17.08.1998 at Pulivendula, as per Christian customs. 4. The respondent/wife filed counter denying the main averments, on which ground the divorce was sought. 5. The learned Judge dismissed the aforesaid petition, pointing out, at paragraph 7 of the order that, the application was made under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, under which divorce could be granted only on the ground of ""adultery of wife"". No such ground was raised by the appellant/husband and as such, the divorce could not be granted, on the grounds raised of cruelty or desertion. The learned Court dismissed the petition only on the said reason assigned in the order. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there are specific grounds of „cruelty‟ and „desertion‟ under Section 10 (1)(ix)(x) of the Act respectively for divorce. Section 10 of the Act was substituted by Act No.51 of 2001 from...","12. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed. The order, dated 17.04.2008 passed in D.O.P.No.349 of 2004 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Kadapa is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted to the learned Court for fresh consideration of the petition for divorce, with due notice to the respondent/wife, in accordance with law, within a period of one (01) year from the date of the receipt of a copy of this judgment. No order as to costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand closed. ____________________ RAVI NATH TILHARI, J _______________________ CHALLA GUNARANJAN,J Date : 02.01.2025. RPD. (RNT,J & CGR,J C.M.A.NO.650 OF 2008) 220 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN (ALLOWED) CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 650 of 2008 Date: 02.01.2025 RPD.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/18226488/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty; adultery,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,18226488,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/18226488/,5
Calcutta High Court,"Susanta Kumar Mitra vs Sm. Himangshu Prova Mitra on 24 May, 1963",ople into the house and used to pass nights with the,1963-05-24,"JUDGMENT   P.B. Mukharji, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 17",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT P.B. Mukharji, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. These proceedings have come up before us for confirmation under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act. The learned Judge decreed the suit ex parte without costs subject to confirmation by this Court. The petition was by the husband against the wife for dissolution of the marriage. 2. The petitioner examined himself and called his mother as a witness. On that evidence the learned Judge gave the decree as aforesaid. 4. It is true that desertion is one of the allegations in the petition and that has been proved. The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent look place on the 14th December, 1953. The allegation and the evidence are that she left and deserted the petitioner at the end of 1954 and has not been heard of since. But mere desertion is not enough to claim dissolution of marriage under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act. There has to be adultery along with it, the last clause of section being ""adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or upwards"". That is the point which the learned District Judge makes in his judgment and treats that application as one under that clause. But then we are of opinion that that there again the learned Judge made a mistake. Adultery coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse...","3. The learned Judge treats this petition as one under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act on the ground of adultery coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for more than two years. Unfortunately he has failed to notice that the word ""adultery"" was not even alleged in the petition. Paragraph 5 of the petition says that ""the respondent used to bring people into the house and used to pass nights with them"". That, in our opinion. Is not enough assertion and allegation of the actual act of adultery. Adultery must at least be averred and alleged in the petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act and reasonably proved. In fact the petitioner in his evidence also uses the same expression, namely, ""my wife used to bring young men into the house and spend nights with them."" It is true that towards the end of his evidence he says that he had not condoned the ""adultery"" and that his application was not collusive. But then before any question of condonation of adultery arises it must first at least...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/50670/ | AIR1964CAL33, 68CWN683, AIR 1964 CALCUTTA 33",Adultery,adultery,1963,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1964CAL33, 68CWN683, AIR 1964 CALCUTTA 33",50670,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/50670/,6
Calcutta High Court,"M. Barnard vs G.H. Barnard on 31 January, 1928",AIR1928CAL657,1928-01-31,"JUDGMENT   Costello, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 1, Section 10, Section 176, Section 2, Section 3, Section 4, Section 7",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Costello, J. 1. This is a petition by Margaret Barnard praying for a dissolution of her marriage with the respondent George Henry Barnard on the ground of his adultery with a woman unknown on 17th November 1927. The petitioner was married to the respondent on 18fch October 1917 according to the rights of the Christian Church at the Wesleyan Churoh at Jhansi. At the time of the marriage the respondent was domiciled in England and before her marriage the petitioner was also domiciled in England and after the marriage they retained their English domicile. It was duly averred in the petition that the respondent at the time of the presentation of the petition was domiciled in England. It may therefore be taken that when this petition was filed both the parties to the marriage were domiciled in England. Both the parties to the marriage profess the Christian religion. It appears from the evidence of the petitioner that after her marriage she and the respondent lived and cohabited together first of all at Jhansi and afterwards at No. 5, Carnac Street, Calcutta and finally at No. 9 Rawdon Street in Calcutta, and therefore the place where the parties last resided...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"4. At the end of the first day's hearing I was some what dubious as to whether or not adultery on the part of the respondent has been sufficiently established. At that stage of the case the evidence merely came to this : that the respondent on the evening of 17th November 1927 had come to the Continental Hotel in Calcutta and had there entered in the Registration Book the names ""Mr. and Mrs. Barnard"" and the evidence of a clerk from the hotel indicated that the respondent stayed for the night at that hotel with a lady who was not the petitioner. The khansama from the hotel in question was called to say that on the next morning, somewhere about 9-30, he was summoned to room No. 77 (which was the number of the room set against the names of Mr. and Mrs. Barnard) and that there he found...","5. Counsel for the petitioner-invited me to infer from those facts alone that the respondent had in fact committed adultery, but I was inclined to take the view that had the case stopped at that point the matter would have fallen within the decision of Lord Merivale in the case of Farnham v. Farnham (1925) 41 T.L.R. 543. There the learned President said: It was impossible to make a decree on the case as first presented to me. It came before the Court as if a married man who wished to he divorced had only to go to an hotel with a woman to achieve that end, and that, if he did so, the Court was of necessity obliged to grant a decree. If the Court were so to hold it would be the greatest possible encouragement to collusive proceedings. Divorce by consent is not part of the law in England. 6. In that case the learned President gave an opportunity to the petitioner in the case to call further evidence and following that precedent I allowed the petitioner in...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The suit was brought under the Statute 16 and 17, Geo. V. Ch. 40, which is the Indian and Colonial Divorce (Jurisdiction) Act, 1926, and accordingly the petition was in the form required by the rules made under that Act which form is similar to that of the petition for dissolution of marriage in use in England. The petitioner as required by Prov. (a), Section 1, Sub-section (1) of the Statute (16 and 17 Geo. V. Ch. 40) stated in para. 9 of her petition that in the interest of justice it is desirable that this suit should be determined in India inasmuch as the petitioner for want of sufficient means was prevented from taking proceedings in the Courts in England and the witnesses to the charge of adultery are in Calcutta. 3. So far as the facts of the case are concerned the petitioner has established to my satisfaction all the necessary formal averments in her petition and she has proved before me that the respondent has been guilty of adultery as alleged in para. 8 of the petition. 7. I came to that conclusion because the petitioner produced and proved before me two letters written to her by the respondent whilst she was away in England from which it seemed quite clear that the respondent had committed...","12. It is to be observed, therefore, that the basis of the jurisdiction conferred by the Act of 1869 was the residence of the petitioner at the time of presenting the petition, and upon that footing for a space of something like 50 or 60 years, apparently, decrees for dissolution of marriage were from time to time granted by the various High Courts in India. The validity of such decrees was, however, challenged in 1921 in the case of Keyes v. Keyes and Gray (1921) P. 204 and it was there decided by Sir Henry Duke, President of the Divorce Court in England, that the Courts in India had in fact no jurisdiction to make decrees for dissolution of marriage in the case of parties not domiciled in India, even though the marriage was celebrated in India and the parties were resident in India, and the acts of adultery relied on were committed within the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts. The learned President in the course of his judgment pointed out that Lord Westbury in the case of Shand v....","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106077/ | AIR1928CAL657, AIR 1928 CALCUTTA 657",Adultery,adultery,1928,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1928CAL657, AIR 1928 CALCUTTA 657",106077,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106077/,16
Patna High Court,"Anita Ruby Paul vs Sandeep Paul And Anr. on 22 August, 1996",Opposite party No. 1,1996-08-22,"JUDGMENT   P.K. Deb, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955",Section 10,Cruelty; Desertion; Adultery; Constitutional Validity,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT P.K. Deb, J. 1. The petitioner, Anita Ruby Paul and the Opposite party No. 1, Sandeep Paul, both the Christians and they were married to each other on negotiation of both the families and marriage was solemnised on 22.2.1990 at All Saints Church Chaibasa. At the time of marriage, the petitioner Anita Ruby Paul was 25 years of old while the respondent No. 1 Sandeep Paul was 26 years of age. It is the case of the petitioner that at the time of marriage, the petitioner's parents spent a huge amount and gifted many domestic articles for her use in Sasural, such as Double Bed, Dressing Table, Big Iron Trunk, Television, Mixy, Gas Oven, Dinner set and clothes etc. After the marriage, the petitioner went to her Sasural situated at Lucknow alongwith all her articles as mentioned above on 24.2.1990. Over had above the above articles, it is stated that the petitioner was given a cash of Rs, 20, 000/- to purchase Godrej Steel Almirah, Refrigerator and Sofa Set and the said cash was taken away by Opposite party No. 1, but the articles were never purchased. The started living together as husband and wife in the Sasural of...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, following issues were named by this Court vide order dated 6.2.1996: (i) Is the suit maintainable in its present form? (ii) Whether the allegation of desertion as made by the applicant-wife is true? (iii) Whether the Opposite-party was living in adultery with Seema Srivastava and as such committed cruelty on the applicant-wife? (iv) What relief, if any, is the applicant entitled to? 5. For an on behalf of the petitioner, four witnesses have been examined including the petitioner herself and her brother Dr. Michad Lakra. Two other witnesses have been examined, who happened to be the friend of PW-2 who ad visited the house of PW-2 when allegedly the O.P. No. 1 appeared there and begged apology of his misdoings against the petitioner, Anita Ruby Paul. 6. For and on behalf of the Opposite party No. 1, three witnesses have...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","It must be mentioned here that the petitioner at the time of marriage, was a medical representative serving in R.E.C.K.T.T. & Colma Company. The petitioner in the meantime became pregnant and her husband was transferred to Kanpur. She started residing with her husband at Kanpur but on Saturdays, both the couple used to come down to Lucknow. It was brought to the notice of the petitioner that the parents of the Opposite party No. 1 was pressuring her husband to get her pregnancy terminated. Ultimately, she was forced to go back to chaibasa and on 8.2.1991 she gave birth to a male child in Marsi Hospital, Jamshedpur but ill luck would have it, the child could survive for only 18 days, due to the malnutrition and weakness of the petitioner during the period of her pregnancy. It is further stated that the parents of the Opposite party No. 1 came down to Chaibasa and demanded Rs. 50, 000/- from the parents of the petitioner but when the same was refused the petitioner was not taken back to her Sasural. In the month of May, 1991, the petitioner was again brought to Lucknow by her elder brother, but again torture started on her. According to the petitioner, while she was residing at Chaibasa and Jamshedpur for her child' birth, her husband...","20. In the circumstances of the case, no cost is awarded to either of the parties, but as undertaken by the parties, they should discharge their undertakings as mentioned in the joint petition itself without fail.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1489194/ | 1997(1)BLJR618,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion; adultery; constitutional_validity,1996,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: 1997(1)BLJR618,1489194,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1489194/,5
Delhi High Court,"Debra Clare Seymour vs Pradeep Arnold Seymour on 1 April, 2002",2002IVAD(DELHI)499,2002-04-01,"JUDGMENT   J.D. Kapoor, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India",Section 10,Cruelty; Adultery; Constitutional Validity; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT J.D. Kapoor, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"18. Even the Supreme Court in Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane has unequivocally stated that cruelty charged must be of such a character as to cause in mind of the petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent. It was also pointed out that it was not necessary as is the requirement of English Law that the cruelty must be of such a character as to cause danger to life, limb or health or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. Harm or injury to health, reputation, the working character or the like would be an important consideration in determining whether the conduct of the respondent amounts to cruelty or not. 19. The Supreme Court also laid down the tests though these cannot be put in straight-jacket, to determine whether cruelty is...","6. Case of the petitioner lies in moderate compass. The parties entered into the wedlock on 6th August, 1977 in the Catholic Church at Gole Dak Khana, New Delhi. After the marriage the petitioner stayed in Delhi while the respondent went to Chandigarh which was his place of business where he had an Intercom's Agency. The petitioner being unemployed was totally dependant upon the respondent. After waiting for the respondent to make arrangement for her stay at Chandigarh the petitioner went to Chandigarh and found the respondent occupying a huge Bungalow and sharing the same with his friend, though he had been representing to the petitioner that he was looking for house for her. It is alleged that shortly after the marriage the respondent had shown utter careless attitude towards his responsibilities and duties. 7. From the wedlock one male child was borne on 2nd June, 1978 in Chandigarh. It is alleged that no money for household expenses was given by the respondent to the petitioner nor any toys or clothes were bought by the respondent for their son. Even...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The parties are Christians. The petitioner wife had initially sought a decree for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty but subsequently converted it into a petition for dissolution of marriage though under Section 10 of the India Divorce Act, 1869, a Christian wife subjected to cruelty cannot seek divorce on the ground of cruelty alone unless it is accompanied with the ground of adultery whereas a Christian husband can dissolve the marriage on the ground of adultery alone. Relevant extracts of Section 10 are as under:- ""10. When husband may petition for dissolution Any husband may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court, praying that his marriage may be dissolved on the ground that his wife has, since the solemnization thereof, been guilty of adultery. When wife may petition for dissolution - Any wife may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court, praying that her marriage may be dissolved on the ground that, since the solemnization thereof, her husband has exchanged his profession of Christianity for the through a form a marriage with another woman; or has been guilty of incestuous adultery, or of bigamy with adultery, or of marriage with another woman with adultery, or of rape, sodomy or bestiality, or of adultery coupled with such cruelty...",22. As a consequence the petition is allowed and marriage is dissolved. A decree of divorce in hereby passed,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/657513/ | 2002IVAD(DELHI)499, 98(2002)DLT34, II(2002)DMC144, 2002(63)DRJ375",Cruelty,cruelty; adultery; constitutional_validity; desertion,2002,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2002IVAD(DELHI)499, 98(2002)DLT34, II(2002)DMC144, 2002(63)DRJ375",657513,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/657513/,5
Patna High Court,"Walter Ekka vs Jyoti Ekka on 8 December, 1993",Opposite party) may be declared as null and void. Th,1993-12-08,"JUDGMENT   G.C. Bharuka, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 17",Cruelty; Nullity Sec19; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT G.C. Bharuka, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This reference is under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter the Act only) for confirmation of the decree of nullity of marriage dated 18-2-1991 made by the 2nd Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, in Matrimonial Title Suit No. 36 of 1987. The aforesaid Title Suit had been filed by Walter Ekka (petitioner) inter alia, praying therein that his marriage with Jyoti Ekka (Opposite party) may be declared as null and void. The Opposite party (wife) in spite of service of notice on her as also publication of the same is local newspaper has not opted to contest the proceeding either in the trial court or before this Court. 2. I may first record the relevant facts pleaded by the petitioner for seeking the intended relief. The petitioner and the Opposite party both of whom are of Roman Catholic faith got married on 5th June, 1985, in Roman Catholic Church, Doranda. After marriage on 5th June, 1985, though the Opposite party came to the residence of the petitioner but showed a complete indifference towards the petitioner and only after 5 days she went back to her parent's house. When the petitioner, his mother and other family members went to her mother""s house for persuading her to come back they were insulted and humiliated by use of abusive language....","A reading of the aforesaid provision unambiguously postulates only one ground on which a husband can seek dissolution of marriage and that is that his wife has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been guilty of adultery. In the present case admittedly this is not the ground alleged against the wife Opposite party. Therefore, the petitioner, on a bare reading of the said provision, is not entitled to a decree as passed in his favour. 8. Though I share the view expressed by Mr. Dayal for making of effective provisions to give relief to a husband like the petitioner, who is in constant mental torture at the instance of or because of the behaviour of deterrent and uncompromising wife, but as held by the Supreme Court, I, in my judicial capacity, am unable to provide any remedy and the lead has to be taken by the Legislature. Despite my all sympathy towards the petitioner. I find myself unable to confirm the decree of dissolution as passed by the trial Court. S.K. Chottopadhayaya, J. 9. I agree. Narayan Roy, J. 10....",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/367787/ | 1995(1)BLJR423,Cruelty,cruelty; nullity_sec19; desertion,1993,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: 1995(1)BLJR423,367787,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/367787/,7
Kerala High Court,"Jacob Mathew vs Mrs. Maya Philip Alias Annama And Anr. on 15 September, 1998",opinion developed between the petitioner and the 1st,1998-09-15,"ORDER    K.A. Mohammed Shafi, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 14, Section 15, Section 19, Section 23, Section 25, Section 3, Section 34, Section 4, Section 43, Section 497, Section 5, Section 825",Adultery; Cruelty; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER K.A. Mohammed Shafi, J. 1. This petition is filed by a Christian husband under Sections 10 and 34 of the Indian Divorce Act for dissolution of his marriage with the 1st respondent on the ground of her adultery after the marriage and for compensation of Rs. 2.5 lakhs as damages from the 2nd respondent for the adultery committed by him. 2. The petitioner has also filed C.M.P. 12768/ 97 for custody of the minor child from the 1st respondent. 3. It is the common case that the petitioner and the 1st respondent belong to Syrian Christian community of Roman Catholic Sect and their marriage which was an arranged one was solemnized on 16-9-1990 at Vimalamatha Church, Kadalikkad according to Christian rites and ceremonies and after marriage they have been living together in the house of the petitioner. It is also admitted that a child was born in the wedlock on 9-8-1991 and after delivery the 1st respondent joined the petitioner at his residence in Thevara in early October, 1991. It is also the common case that difference of opinion developed between the petitioner and the 1st respondent thereafter and from 5-1-1992 onwards the petitioner and the 1st respondent have...","5. The respondents resisted the O.P. by filing separate counter-affidavits. The 1st respondent has contended as follows. The continued harassment and cruelty to which the 1st respondent was subjected to by the petitioner and his mother is the reason for the difference of opinion that arose between the petitioner and the 1st respondent which ultimately became irreconcilable. Being the only child of the mother, she had an all pervasive influence and hold on the petitioner which overwhelmed all other considerations including his duties as husband. The mother of the petitioner had been interfering and influencing the normal personal and marital affairs of the petitioner and the 1st respondent. When difference of opinion arose between them, the petitioner always sided with his mother and both of them used to abuse and humilitate her. The petitioner occasionally assaulted the 1st respondent from Kadalikkad as well as from Ernakulam. When the physical and mental cruelty assumed unbearable proportions the 1st respondent had to leave the petitioner for good. The Ecclesiastical Tribunal found the contentions of the 1st respondent true and declared her marriage with the petitioner as null and void. The allegations that the 1st respondent is living in adultery with the 2nd...",11. The issues that arise for consideration in this O.P. are : (1) Whether the petitioner is entitled to dissolution of his marriage with the 1st respondent on the ground of adultery with the 2nd respondent. (2) Whether the 1st respondent is entitled to a decree for dissolution of her marriage with the petitioner on the ground of cruelty. (3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to any and what damages from the 2nd respondent. (4) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the custody of the minor child.,"16. The petitioner has contended that after the 1st respondent deserted him on 5-1-1992 illicit intimacy developed between the respondents and they are living in adultery and they are living together as husband and wife fully conscious of the fact that the marriage between the 1st respondent and the petitioner is subsisting and the 2nd respondent has got his wife and two children living. Apart from stating that the petitioner was informed through third parties, the names of the persons through whom the petitioner was allegedly informed about the proposed marriage between the respondents are not mentioned in the counter-affidavit. In the counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent in Para 5 it is stated that before deciding to marry the 1st respondent he had approached the petitioner on more than one occasion through persons known to all the parties to know about the response of the petitioner to the proposal and he learnt through those persons that the petitioner has absolutely no objection to his marrying the 1st respondent and in fact he welcomed it. It is also stated that...","5. The respondents resisted the O.P. by filing separate counter-affidavits. The 1st respondent has contended as follows. The continued harassment and cruelty to which the 1st respondent was subjected to by the petitioner and his mother is the reason for the difference of opinion that arose between the petitioner and the 1st respondent which ultimately became irreconcilable. Being the only child of the mother, she had an all pervasive influence and hold on the petitioner which overwhelmed all other considerations including his duties as husband. The mother of the petitioner had been interfering and influencing the normal personal and marital affairs of the petitioner and the 1st respondent. When difference of opinion arose between them, the petitioner always sided with his mother and both of them used to abuse and humilitate her. The petitioner occasionally assaulted the 1st respondent from Kadalikkad as well as from Ernakulam. When the physical and mental cruelty assumed unbearable proportions the 1st respondent had to leave the petitioner for good. The Ecclesiastical Tribunal found the contentions of the 1st respondent true and declared her marriage...","6. The 1st respondent filed an additional counter-affidavit contending that the above O.P. under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act is not maintainable before this Court since the proceedings ought to have been initiated before the Family Court under the provisions of Section 15 of C.P.C., in the absence of any allegation of fraud made in the petition seeking relief under Section 19 of the Indian Divorce Act. 9. The 1st respondent has filed C.M.P. No, 8956/97 under Section 15 of the Indian Divorce Act to pass a decree for dissolution of her marriage with the petitioner on the ground of cruelty. 10. PW1 and RWs. 1 to 3 are examined. Exts.A1 to A5 and B1 to B6 are marked. 12. The preliminary objection raised by the 1st respondent regarding maintainability of this petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act before this Court was considered by this Court and by order dated 30-7-1997 held that the above O.P. is maintainable and can be tried before this Court. That orderpassed by this Court was challenged by the 1st respondent before a Division Bench of this Court in M.F.A. No. 951/ 97. By judgment dated 9-12-1997 the Division Bench of this Court confirmed the order passed by this Court regarding maintainability of the above petition before this Court and...","14. In February, 1992 the 1st respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the petitioner before the Ecclesiastical Court and a decree declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the 1st respondent as null and void on the ground of incompatibility is passed by the Ecclesiastical Court on 17-10-1994 as evidenced by Ext. B 6 order. It is admitted that the matter is pending in appeal before the Eparchial Tribunal and no order is passed so far by the appellate authority. 15. The 1st respondent sent a registered notice claiming Sthreedhanam and ornaments from the petitioner on 15-3-1992 to which the petitioner sent a reply dated 28-3-1992 denying Sthreedhanam and custody of jewels. Then the 1st respondent filed O. S. 825/93 before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Kottayam claiming Sthreedhanam and ornaments against the petitioner and his mother. A certified copy of the plaint is Ext. B1. The petitioner and his mother filed written statement dated 20-7-1994 denying their liability to pay the Sthreedhanam and gold ornaments. Ext. B 2 is the certified copy of the written...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1129437/ | AIR1999KER192, AIR 1999 KERALA 192, (1999) 2 MARRILJ 574 (1999) MATLR 409, (1999) MATLR 409",Adultery,adultery; cruelty; nullity_sec19,1998,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1999KER192, AIR 1999 KERALA 192, (1999) 2 MARRILJ 574 (1999) MATLR 409, (1999) MATLR 409",1129437,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1129437/,36
Bombay High Court,"Ramesh Ramanlal Saraiya vs Kusum Madgaokar on 6 April, 1948",(1948)50BOMLR426,1948-04-06,"JUDGMENT   M.C. Chagla, C.J., Mr. Justice Coyajee. The respondent, Mr. Justice Coyajee decreed the wife","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 1, Section 10, Section 100, Section 16, Section 17, Section 19, Section 2, Section 20, Section 22, Section 36, Section 37, Section 45, Section 7, Section 87",Nullity Sec19; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M.C. Chagla, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (nullity sec19) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. This is a section that appears in the Part which deals with jurisdiction, and undoubtedly Section 7 confers jurisdiction upon the Court of the nature and character provided in that section. The Courts in India are empowered to act and give relief on the principles and rules which prevail in England, not only which prevailed at the time when the Divorce Act was passed in 1869 but which may prevail from time to time subsequently. The section does not deal with procedural matters because Section 45 of the Act which appears in the Part headed ""Procedure"" expressly deals with procedure and provides that all proceedings under the Act between party and party shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure . It really deals with matters of substantive law and not adjective law, and, therefore, according to the principles and rules prevailing in England, even substantive law can be altered and modified under this section. Mr. Taraporewala has argued that it is only in giving relief that the principles and rules on which the English Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes acts that should be taken into consideration. Mr. Taraporewala says that as far as the relief itself is concerned, that relief must be expressly found in the statute, and when the Court here proceeds to grant that...","1. This is an appeal from an order of Mr. Justice Coyajee. The respondent, who is the wife, filed a petition against her husband for a declaration that the marriage between them was null and void on the ground of the impotency of her husband. The husband filed a counter petition also praying for a decree of nullity on the ground that the wife suffered from impotency. Mr. Justice Coyajee decreed the wife's petition and gave her a decree for nullity of marriage. The petition of the husband was dismissed. Having granted the decree Mr. Justice Coyajee proceeded to pass the order which is the subject of this appeal, viz. to order an inquiry for the purpose of fixing the amount of permanent alimony which should be given to the wife. It was contended before Mr. Justice Coyajee that the Court had no jurisdiction to grant permanent alimony to the wife in a case where a decree for nullity was passed. Mr. Justice Coyajee rejected that contention and held that the Court had jurisdiction and the necessary inquiry should be-made...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1618971/ | (1948)50BOMLR426, AIR 1949 BOMBAY 1",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; adultery,1948,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (1948)50BOMLR426, AIR 1949 BOMBAY 1",1618971,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1618971/,21
Jharkhand High Court,"(Against The Judgment And Decree Dated ... vs Mrs. Premlata Murmu on 3 November, 2025",First Appeal (DB) No. 161 of 2023,2025-11-03,"Per Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 498A",Adultery; Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Neutral Citation 2025:JHHC:33098-DB First Appeal (DB) No. 161 of 2023 (Against the judgment and decree dated 09.06.2023(decree signed on 17.06.2023) passed by Sri Sanjay Kumar Singh No. 1, learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dumka in Original Suit No. 116/2019.) Mr. Lukhiram Hansda, S/o Late Dhona Hansda, R/o Vill- Fasiya Dangal, P.O.- Bando Haripur, P.S.- Dumka Mufassil, Sub & Dist.- Dumka. ... Appellant Versus 1. Mrs. Premlata Murmu, W/o Lukhiram Hansda, D/o Mukta Murmu, R/o Vill- Fasiya Dangal, P.O.- Bando Haripur, P.S.- Dumka Mufassil, Sub & Dist.- Dumka. 2. Debasish Baskey, S/o Late Sonalal Baskey, Vill- Dhawatnar, P.O.- Nonihat, P.S.- Jarmundi, Dist.- Dumka. 3. Bachan Pandey, S/o Late Baiju Pandey of Babupur, P.O.- Bara Haripur, P.S.- Dumka (M), Dist.- Dumka. 4. Amit Singh, S/o Sashi Bhusan Singh, of Dudhani, P.O. & P.S.- Dumka, Dist.- Dumka. ... Respondents ---- PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA ---- For the Appellant : Mr. Niladri S. Mukharjee, Adv. For the Respondent : Mr. Manoj Kr. No. 4, Adv. ---- CAV On : 18/09/2024 Pronounced on : 03/11/2025 JUDGMENT Per Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J. : 1. Heard Mr. Niladri Sekhar Mukharjee, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Manoj Kumar No....",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"7. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for adjudication. I. Is the suit maintainable in its present form? II. Has the plaintiff got valid cause of action for the suit? III. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, i.e., alleged adulterers and in absence of, the suit is liable to be dismissed? Neutral Citation 2025:JHHC:33098-DB IV. Whether the defendant is residing separately from the plaintiff since 2004 having no cohabitation and thereby causing cruelty to the plaintiff? V. Whether the defendant deserted the plaintiff since 28.05.2019 without any sufficient cause and the defendant has deserted the plaintiff for continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the petition? VI. Whether the defendant is leading adulterous life with another person other than her husband, namely, Debasis Baskey, Bachan Pandey and Amit Singh? VII. Is the plaintiff entitled for decree of...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. The plaintiff (appellant herein) had preferred a suit under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of his marriage with the defendant no. 1 (respondent no. 1 herein) in which inter alia, it has been stated that the marriage of the plaintiff was solemnized with the defendant no. 1 on 19.02.1996 as per Christian rites and customs at village Gulamsuli, District- Dumka. After marriage, the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 started residing together as husband and wife at village Fasiya Dangal since 1996. Out of the said wedlock, a son was born to the couple in the year 2000. After marriage, owing to the difference in temperament, the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 deteriorated. From the first night of the marriage, the character of the defendant no. 1 became doubtful and questionable in the mind of the plaintiff due to which the plaintiff has suffered continuous mental agony. The defendant no. 1 had illicit relationship with Debasis Baskey in the year 2004 and with Bachan Pandey in the year 2017 for which panchayati was also held. It has been stated that the defendant no. 1 also had an illicit relationship with Amit Singh and the tape-recorded conversation is in possession of the plaintiff. 5. On being noticed, the defendant no. 1 had...","2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 09.06.2023 (decree signed on 17.06.2023) passed by Sri Sanjay Kumar Singh No. 1, learned Principal Judge, Family FIRST APPEAL NO. 161 OF 2023 1 Neutral Citation 2025:JHHC:33098-DB Court, Dumka in Original Suit No. 116/2019 whereby and whereunder, the suit preferred by the appellant under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869 has been dismissed. 3. For the sake of convenience, both the parties are referred to in this judgment as per their status before the learned trial court. 18. We, therefore, on the basis of the discussions made hereinabove, do not find any reasons to interfere in the impugned judgement and decree dated 09.06.2023 (decree signed on FIRST APPEAL NO. 161 OF 2023 12 Neutral Citation 2025:JHHC:33098-DB 17.06.2023) passed by Sri Sanjay Kumar Singh No. 1, learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dumka in Original Suit No. 116/2019 and consequently, we dismiss this appeal. 19. Pending I.A.s, if any, stands closed. (RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY, J.) (PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated the 3rd Day of November, 2025 Preet/N.A.F.R....",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/86433026/,Adultery,adultery; desertion; cruelty,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,86433026,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/86433026/,8
Madras High Court,"A. George Cornelius vs Elizabeth Dopti Samadanam on 4 August, 1969",ope of Section 7 of the Act. The petitioner married,1969-08-04,"JUDGMENT   Palaniswamy, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 16, Section 27, Section 33, Section 7",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Palaniswamy, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"5. The position is no doubt anomalous. Whereas persons seeking relief under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 or the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , have among other grounds the right to ask for divorce on the ground that the other party to the marriage is not heard of for seven years or more, and should be presumed to be dead, persons seeking divorce under the Act in question are not entitled to urge that ground for no obvious reason. It is for the Legislature to consider whether the Act should not be suitably amended so that the law may be uniform.",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This suit filed by the husband under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (Act IV of 1869) hereinafter referred to as the Act raises an Important question about the scope of Section 7 of the Act. The petitioner married the respondent on 16th September 1935. He has alleged that after the marriage they lived together for some time when the respondent gave birth to three children, that all the three children are married, that in or about May 1952 when the couple were living at Bhuvanagiri the respondent deserted the petitioner against his will and without reasonable cause and went away, that the enquiries made by the petitioner about the respondent proved futile and that Inasmuch as the respondent's whereabouts are not known from 1952, it should be presumed that she is dead. The petitioner prays that a decree for dissolution of the marriage may, therefore be granted. The respondent could not be served in person and service was effected by substituted service. 2. The question for consideration is whether upon the presumption which the petitioner wants to draw as regards the death of the respondent, dissolution of the marriage can be decreed under Section 10 of the Act. Section 10 , which provides for dissolution of marriage, consists of two parts. The first part deals with...","4. Up to January 1, 1938, the ground for judicial dissolution of marriage in England were adultery or certain unnatural practices. By the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, and the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 several new grounds for divorce were added so as to enable the husband as well as the wife to sue for divorce. But the Indian Legislature, though it has amended the Act in question several times, has not thought it necessary to make suitable amendments in the Act to give effect to the modification made in English Law. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the words ""subject to the provisions contained in this Act"" occurring in Section 7 cannot be ignored and we cannot adopt all the provisions that have been made in English Matrimonial Causes Act, from time to time, while applying the provisions of the Act, thereby enabling the husband or wife to ask for divorce on a ground not provided for in Section 10 . For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that this petition for divorce on the...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1597988/ | AIR1970MAD240,Adultery,adultery,1969,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: AIR1970MAD240,1597988,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1597988/,5
Gujarat High Court,"Kanku D/O Dhulabhai Dahyabhai vs Khristi Shanabhai Fulabhai on 3 May, 1963",Divorce Suit No. 1 of 1961 on 1st September 1961,1963-05-03,"JUDGMENT    N.M. Miabhoy, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 18, Section 19, Section 2, Section 20, Section 21, Section 37, Section 4, Section 45, Section 5, Section 6, Section 7, Section 8, Section 9",Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT N.M. Miabhoy, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(2) that the parties are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity (whether natural or legal) or affinity; (3) that either party was a lunatic or idiot at the time of the marriage; (4) that the former husband or wife of either party was living at the time of the marriage, and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force. Nothing in this section shall affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to make decrees of nullity of marriage on the ground that the consent of either party was obtained by force or fraud"". (2) that the parties are within the prohibited degrees of consangunity (whether natural or legal) or affinity, (3) that either party was a lunatic or idiot at the time of the marriage; (4) that the former husband or wife of either party was living at the time of the marriage, and the marriage...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The main question which Mr. Shah raised was one about the jurisdiction of the District Court to grant under the Act the relief for nullity of marriage on a ground which was mentioned in another statute. Mr. Shah contended that a petition under the Indian Divorce Act for nullity of marriage was not maintainable on the ground that the marriage was not solemnized in accordance with Section 4 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872. He contended that the proper forum for decision on this subject was the Court of ordinary civil jurisdiction and not the special Court established under the Act. Normally, having regard to our finding that a new issue requires to be framed and additional evidence requires to be taken, we would not have undertaken an examination of this intricate and difficult question unless a finding was received on the subject and unless it was established that one of the parties was Christian at the time when the marriage was celebrated, because it is quite clear that, if an adverse finding is recorded on this point, the marriage would not be a nullity and the petition would be dismissed on that ground. But, we are in the course of confirmation proceedings. The jurisdiction to confirm the decree arises under Section 20 of the Act. We would...","1. A decree has been passed by the learned District Judge, Kaira at Nadiad, in Divorce Suit No. 1 of 1961 on 1st September 1961, by which the learned Judge has declared the marriage between the petitioner Kanku and the respondent Shanabhai null and void, subject to the declaration being confirmed by this Court under Section 20 of the Divorce Act, 1869 (hereafter called 'the Act'). The learned District Judge by his letter, dated 1st March 1962, has sent the proceedings in the suit to this Court for confirmation. The petition, which was numbered in the District Court as Suit No. 1 of 19 1, was made by the petitioner under Section 18 of the Act. It is common ground that the petitioner and the respondent were married about 14 years ago under Hindu marriage rites. The petitioner first filed Suit No. 4 of 1960 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nadiad, under the Hindu Marriage Act , 19SS, for dissolution of that marriage on the ground that the husband had changed his religion and had...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1208421/ | (1968)9GLR511,Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19,1963,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1968)9GLR511,1208421,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1208421/,27
Karnataka High Court,"Grace Jayamani vs E.P. Peter on 17 July, 1981",opulation with her per anus and per os Thus,1981-07-17,"JUDGMENT   Sabhahit, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 22, Section 7",Wife Specific; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Sabhahit, J. 1. This reference under S. 17 of the Indian Divorce Act. 1869 is by the District Judge. Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore in Matrimonial Case No. 3 of 1979 on his file. 2. Smt. Grace Jayamani presented a petition to the District Judge. Dakshina Kannada. Mangalore. under S. 10 of the Indian Divorce Act for dissolution of the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent, Sri E. P. Peter and for grant of a decree of divorce. She averred in the petition thus: The petitioner and the respondent belong to Protestant Christian community and profess the said religion. They were married on 4-11-1971 at Shanthi Cathedral, Balmatta, Mangalore, according to the customs prevailing in their community. From the date of the marriage, according to the petitioner, her life with the respondent has been one of misery, brutality and cruelty. The Respondent, husband has been forcing her for sexual intercourse in an unnatural way. His treatment to her is one of brutality. Even when she was suffering from fever and even during the menstrual periods, respondent would not give her any respite with repeated acts of sex all through the night. Whenever she refused the demands in sexuality of the...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(i) Whether the provisions of the Act apply to the petitioner and the respondent? (ii) Whether the petitioner and the respondent reside or last resided together within the jurisdiction of this Court? (iv) Whether there is no collusion between the petitioner and respondent? (v) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the decree of dissolution of her marriage with the respondent? 5. During the hearing, the petitioner examined herself as P. W. 1 and examined her father Wilfred Ammanna as P. W. 2 and she got marked Exhibit P. 1, true copy of the Marriage Certificate and Exhibit P. 2. Certified copy of the order dated 29-1-1977 for judicial separation passed in M. C. No. 3/1976 by the District Judge, Dakshina Kannada. As against that, the respondent did not enter the Box nor did he examine any witness on his behalf. The learned District Judge assessing the evidence on record held...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","(iii) Whether the petitioner has made out grounds under Section 10 of the Act for dissolution of her marriage with respondent? Thus it is evident that the term 'Sodomy', as it is understood currently in the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial cases in England, to which this Court shall conform as nearly as may be under the provision made in S. 7 of the Act, is noncoital, carnal copulation with a member of the same or opposite sex, e. g., per anus or per os. Thu§ a man may indulge in Sodomy even with his own wife.Taylor's Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, XII Edition, Volume II. also states thus in this behalf:","15. In the result, the decree for dissolution of the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent is hereby confirmed. 16. Order accordingly.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1600938/ | AIR1982KANT46, ILR1982KAR196, AIR 1982 KARNATAKA 46, ILR (1982) 1 KANT 196",Wife Specific,wife_specific; cruelty,1981,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1982KANT46, ILR1982KAR196, AIR 1982 KARNATAKA 46, ILR (1982) 1 KANT 196",1600938,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1600938/,7
Jharkhand High Court,"Smt. Rima Das vs Pradeep Kumar Das on 24 June, 2025",Original Suit No. 344 of 2017,2025-06-24,HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 19, Section 3, Section 7, Section 96",Cruelty; Desertion; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2025:JHHC:16813-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI F.A. No. 76 of 2020 1. Smt. Rima Das, aged about 52 years, wife of Pradeep Kumar Das, D/o B.C. Mahapatra, resident of C/o B.C. Mahapatra at Nonibala, Girls School, Jhargram, P.O. & P.S. - Jhargram, District Medinipur, West Bengal, at present resident of H. No. 184, Zone No. 4, Birsanagar, P.O. & P.S. - Birsanagar, Jamshedpur, District - East Singhbhum. (Jharkhand) ... ... Appellant/Defendant Versus Pradeep Kumar Das, son of H.N. Das, resident of H. No. 184, Zone No. 4, Birsanagar, P.O. & P.S. - Birsanagar, Jamshedpur, District - East Singhbhum. (Jharkhand) ... ... Respondent/Plaintiff ------- CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR ------- For the Appellant : Mr. Anurag Kashyap, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Mukesh Kumar Dubey, Advocate ---------------------------- Order No. 19 CAV on 16th June, 2025 Pronounced on 24th June, 2025 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(ii) Whether the plaintiff has got valid cause of action for the suit? (iii) Whether the defendant has deserted the plaintiff prior to two years from the date of filing of this suit? (iv) Whether the plaintiff has suffered cruelty from the hand of the defendant? (v) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion? 5 F.A. No. 76 of 2020 2025:JHHC:16813-DB (vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for any other relief or reliefs claimed in the suit? 5. The issue of cruelty has been answered in favour of the respondent- husband and accordingly, the judgment of dissolution of marriage has been passed and decree for the same has been prepared in favour of the respondent-husband which is the subject matter of the present appeal. Submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant: 6. It has been contended on behalf...","9. It is submitted that the appellant has never ever given any harmful medicine in his food to the respondent/husband to cause him physical harm, rather the same has been alleged without any basis only because the Respondent/Husband wants divorce from the appellant/wife. 10. Further it is submitted that the appellant had good relationship with her husband and both were living happily but she came to know that the Respondent/Husband is having illicit relationship with one lady namely Shruti Chawla, who is a teacher in Beldih Church School and always interfered in the family matter. The said Shruti Chawla has started exploiting and blackmailing the respondent/ husband on the basis of some photographs. This fact was informed to her by her husband, thereafter she has reported the matter to Mahila Thana, Sakchi, Jamshedpur where Shruti Chawla was noticed to appear and Shruti Chawla has given an undertaking before police not to create trouble to the respondent. The learned Family Court has not considered that the appellant/wife has filed 17 photographs which have been marked as 'X' and 'Y' Series to...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment dated 06.07.2020 and Decree dated 15.07.2020 passed by the learned Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur in Original Suit No. 344 of 2017, whereby and whereunder, the petition filed under Section 10(ix)(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 by the appellant/ defendant seeking a decree of divorce against his wife, has been allowed. 1 F.A. No. 76 of 2020 2025:JHHC:16813-DB Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case leading to filing of the divorce petition by the respondent/ plaintiff needs to be referred herein as under: The marriage between the appellant/defendant and respondent/plaintiff was solemnized on 27.12.1996 according to Christian rites and customs. Thereafter, the appellant/defendant came to the house of respondent/plaintiff and started residing with him, their marriage was consummated and out of the said wedlock, they are blessed with two sons namely Obed Kumar Das and John Paul on 23.10.1999 and 27.05.2007 respectively. The further case of respondent/plaintiff that after few months of marriage, the behavior of appellant/defendant abruptly changed and she started behaving differently, losing her interest in the respondent/plaintiff and stopped taking interest in kitchen and other necessities of her husband. The further case of respondent/plaintiff is that appellant/defendant used to go out from the house without giving...","70. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the impugned judgment cannot be said to be passed on proper consideration of the ground of divorce, i.e., the element of cruelty. As such, the impugned judgment needs interference and, accordingly, the judgment dated 06.07.2020 and the decree dated 15.07.2020 passed in Original Suit No.344 of 2017 by the learned Addl. Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur is hereby quashed and set aside. 71. In the result, First Appeal No. 76 of 2020 is allowed. Decree accordingly. 72. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) I agree, (Rajesh Kumar, J.) (Rajesh Kumar, J.) /A.F.R. Samarth 42 F.A. No. 76 of 2020",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/188011628/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion; nullity_sec19,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,188011628,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/188011628/,14
Karnataka High Court,"Leena Monteiro vs Alwyn D Cruz on 21 June, 2022",M.F.A. NO.4795 OF 2020 (IDA),2022-06-21,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 55",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF JUNE 2022 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE AND THE HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE J.M. KHAZI M.F.A. NO.4795 OF 2020 (IDA) BETWEEN: LEENA MONTEIRO W/O ALWYN D'CRUZ AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS R/AT. FF5, DHANUSH PALACE APARTMENT 13TH MAIN, 7TH CROSS NEAR SANA SUPER MART VIJAYA BANK COLONY BILEKALAHALLI, BEGUR HOBLI BANNERGHATTA ROAD BENGALURU-560043. ... APPELLANT (BY MR. SATYEN BAJAJ, ADV.,) AND: ALWYN D'CRUZ S/O LATE CHRISTOPHER D'CRUZ AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS RESIDING AT JYOTHI NILAYA HOSAMANE EXTENSION CHIKMAGALURU-577101. ... RESPONDENT (BY MR. H.N. MANJUNATH PRASAD, ADV.,) 2 THIS MFA IS FILED U/S.55(1) OF THE DIVORCE ACT, 1869, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DT.22.06.2020 PASSED IN MC NO.33/2020 ON THE FILE OF THE VII ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, BENGALURU, DISMISSING THE PETITION FILED U/S.10 OF INDIAN DIVORCE ACT. THIS M.F.A. COMING ON FOR HEARING, THIS DAY, ALOK ARADHE J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: JUDGMENT",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,"8. Learned counsel for the appellant while inviting the attention of this Court to the averments made in the petition as well as the examination in 6 chief of the appellant submitted that the appellant had proved that the Respondent had subjected the appellant to cruelty. It ought to have been appreciated by the Family Court that the Respondent despite service of notice did not appear before the Family Court and had not entered the witness box. It is also submitted that no evidence in rebuttal was led and therefore, the version of the appellant ought to have been accepted. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondent has supported the judgment and decree passed by the Family Court.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","This appeal under Section 55(1) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short) arises out of judgment dated 22.06.2020, by which petition filed by the appellant under Section 10 of the Act seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, has been dismissed. 2. Facts giving rise to filing of this appeal in nutshell are that the appellant and the respondent were married on 17.05.1999 at Chikkamagalur. Out of the wedlock, a girl child was born on 06.10.2001. On 08.06.2017, the appellant filed a petition under 3 Section 10 of the Act. It was pleaded that family of the respondent has financial issues, which led to fights and arguments between parents, siblings and children. The respondent was unable to take care of the financial needs of the appellant. She therefore, decided to take up a job. It was averred that in order to support the respondent, she moved to UAE in 2008 and started working in Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank in October 2008. The appellant thereafter started paying of the debts of the family of the respondent and brought some agricultural properties in the name of respondent. However, despite the effort put in by the appellant, the respondent failed to be financially independent and instead of taking care of financial needs of the...","In the result, the appeal is allowed. Sd/- JUDGE Sd/- JUDGE SS",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110604638/,Cruelty,cruelty,2022,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,110604638,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110604638/,7
Delhi High Court,"Katherine vs Mr. Samuel Denial @ Chand on 6 August, 2001",op Married as top.,2001-08-06,"JUDGMENT    A.K. Sikri, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT A.K. Sikri, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,"3. In so far as judicial separation is concerned, the main ground on which it is ought is that the petitioner was treated with cruelty by the respondent. Although certain allegations of adultery are also made, learned counsel for the petitioner is not pressing that ground. 4. It may be mentioned at this stage that after the summons in this petition were served upon the respondent although respondent appeared and filed the written statement. He stopped appearing thereafter. The respondent was accordingly proceeded ex-parte by order dated 12th October, 2000 and the petitioner was permitted to lead evidence by way of affidavit. The affidavit already filed by the petitioner was accepted and the matter listed for final disposal. 5. In the affidavit filed by the petitioner, it is stated that the respondent started torturing her for dowry since the time the petitioner came to live with him. However, in several manners the petitioner was physically and mentally tortured by respondent. It is also stated that the petitioner suffered in silence without any complaints with the full hope that her patience...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This petition is filed by the petitioner for divorce under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act (for short 'Act') or in the alternative for judicial separation under Sections 22 and 23 of the Act. The petitioner is the wife of respondent who are Christians by religion. It is stated in the petition that the marriage between the parties was solemnised on 20th October, 1993 at Sacred Heart Cathedral, Delhi in accordance with the Christian Marriage Laws, customs and ceremonies. They do not have any children out of their wedlock. The status, age and place of residence of the petitioner and the respondent before marriage and at the time of presentation of petition are as under: PETITIONER/WIFE RESPONDENT/HUSBAND ---------------------------------------------------- Status Age Place of Status Age Place of residence residence ---------------------------------------------------- Before Marriage Christian 20 yrs. Type-II Christian 27 yrs. D-4/391 Bachelor Qtr.11 Sultanpuri Jalvihar Delhi Colony, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. At the time of filing the petition Christian 22 yrs. Address Christian 29 years. Address as top Married as top. ---------------------------------------------------- 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner does not press the prayer for divorce under Section 10 of the Act as he has fairly conceded that in view of the legal position contained in Section 10 , the present petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable. It is...",7. This petition is accordingly allowed. Decree for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty is passed under Sections 22 and 23 of the Act. Decree be drawn accordingly. No cost.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1000354/ | 94(2001)DLT371, II(2001)DMC697",Cruelty,cruelty,2001,judicial_separation,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 94(2001)DLT371, II(2001)DMC697",1000354,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1000354/,4
Kerala High Court,"Sebastian Joseph M vs Lija P.Sebastian on 17 October, 2025",MAT.APPEAL NO. 65 OF 2023,2025-10-17,"Devan Ramachandran, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2025:KER:77683 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN & THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.B. SNEHALATHA FRIDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 25TH ASWINA, 1947 MAT.APPEAL NO. 65 OF 2023 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 28.12.2021 IN OP NO.835 OF 2018 OF FAMILY COURT, KANNUR APPELLANT/PETITIONER: SEBASTIAN JOSEPH M., AGED 48 YEARS S/O. JOSEPH, MANNARTHARA HOUSE, PULIKKURUMBA P.O, TALIPARAMBA TALUK, KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN-670 582. BY ADV. SHRI.P.U.SHAILAJAN RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 LIJA P.SEBASTIAN, AGED 46 YEARS D/O. SEBASTIAN, PAALATHADATHIL HOUSE, PERUMBADAVU P.O, TALIPARAMBA TALUK, KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN-670 581, NOW WORKING AT LITTLE FLOWER ENGLISH MEDIUM SCHOOL, KOTTOOR, SREEKANDAPURAM. 2 JITHESH JOHN, AGED 30 YEARS S/O. JOHN, KOCHUPURACKAL HOUSE, CHEMBERI P.O, ERUVESSRI AMSOM DESOM, 2025:KER:77683 MAT.APPEAL NO. 65 OF 2023 -2- TALIPARAMBA TALUK, KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN-670 632. BY ADVS. SRI.LIJIN THAMBAN SRI.G.S.KRISHNAN KARTHA SMT.AKSHARA K.V. THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 17.10.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: 2025:KER:77683 MAT.APPEAL NO. 65 OF 2023 -3- JUDGMENT Devan Ramachandran, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The appellant filed OP No.835/2018 before the learned Family Court, Kannur, seeking divorce from the 1st respondent herein, namely his wife, invoking the provisions of Section 10(x) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 ('Act', for short). 2. The appellant alleges that his wife has had an adulterous relationship with the 2 nd respondent, as also with another person - who, in fact, testified as PW2; and hence that he is entitled to a decree for divorce on the ground of adultery. 3. The learned Family Court took the matter to trial and recorded the deposition of 2025:KER:77683 MAT.APPEAL NO. 65 OF 2023 -4- the appellant as PW1, as also that of PW2 and PW3; while, the 1st respondent offered testimony as RW1. The Court also marked Exts.A1 to A3 documents produced by the appellant, but did not admit Ext.A4 series pen drives into evidence. It, after evaluation of the evidence on record, dismissed the Original Petition, finding the allegations to be unproved. 4. We are constrained to record upfront that this is a rather strange case where, the appellant had summoned one of the alleged adulterers as a witness on his side and examined him as PW2, but without arraying him as a respondent. After the said witness testified in his favour, agreeing that he had had an adulterous relationship...",M.B.SNEHALATHA akv JUDGE,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93957062/,Adultery,adultery,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,93957062,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93957062/,5
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana),"M. Esthar Rani vs M. Devadanam on 27 July, 1987",operly with the seriousness attached to the solemn f,1987-07-27,"JUDGMENT    K. Bhaskaran, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 17",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT K. Bhaskaran, C.J. 1. An application under S. 10 , Divorce Act, (,the Act) for a decree dissolving the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent has been disposed of by the learned District Judge without adverting to the, pleadings, appreciating the evidence or stating the ground on which the decree for dissolution of marriage had been granted. For the sake of precision, we would quote the whole of the order: ""P. W. 1 examined, Petitioner's advocate represents. Petitioner's side evidence is closed. I am satisfied from the, evidence of P. W. 1 which remained unchallenged and as there is no evidence to the contra that the divorce prayed for should be granted. Hence this petition is allowed, but in the circumstances without costs, subject to confirmation by the High Court"". 2. Dissolution of marriage is a matter of considerable importance which would have its repercussion on the future life and well being not only of the parties to the proceedings but also of their children. It is significant to note that the jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the application for dissolution of marriage or for declaration that the marriage between the parties is null and void is...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"3. The first and foremost duty of a District Judge dealing with an application for dissolution of marriage is to address himself to the grounds on which the relief could be granted under S. 10 of the Act. Secondly, he should find out whether the necessary averments are made in the application, and, if. so, whether they are supported by acceptable and credible evidence. Thirdly, it is also his duty to see whether the proceedings (are?) vitiated by collusion between the parties, Fourthly, it is his further duty to see whether the alleged adulterer is made co- respondent where the petitioner is the husband, in compliance with the provisions of S. 11 of the Act. 4. It is noted that very often some of the District Judges adopt shortcuts without taking pains to ascertain at least whether the ground, if any, alleged is one on which a decree for dissolution...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Court evaluated standard of proof under the Indian Divorce Act, corroboration of testimony, and statutory separation requirements.",7. Order accordingly.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1342943/ | AIR1988AP1, AIR 1988 ANDHRA PRADESH 1, (1987) 2 ANDHLT 628, (1987) 2 LS 221, (1987) 2 APLJ 343, (1988) 1 HINDULR 438, (1988) 1 DMC 4, (1988) MATLR 14, (1988) 1 CURCC 658",Unclear,unclear,1987,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1988AP1, AIR 1988 ANDHRA PRADESH 1, (1987) 2 ANDHLT 628, (1987) 2 LS 221, (1987) 2 APLJ 343, (1988) 1 HINDULR 438, (1988) 1 DMC 4, (1988) MATLR 14, (1988) 1 CURCC 658",1342943,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1342943/,3
Orissa High Court,"Pabitra Swal Singh vs Manikya Devi on 24 August, 1993",oped illicit relationship with one P. Kaliamma who w,1993-08-24,"JUDGMENT   S.C. Mohapatra, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT S.C. Mohapatra, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. Application for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act having been dismissed, this appeal has been preferred. 2. Case of plaintiff is that he and respondent remained together for some time at the intervention of gentlemen. During that period, they had sexual relationship. At the instance of one Nityananda Jena, an influencial man of the locality, the marriage register was signed by both of them in the house of the appellant though it is required to be signed either in the house of the bride or in the Church. However, parties resided as husband and wife and had the reputation as such. Since the marriage was not in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Christians Marriage Act , it is not valid. When it was found that respondent was leaving the house of the plaintiff in odd hours of night in the company of bad elements and continued to ill-treat the plaintiff falsely alleging that plaintiff had illicit relationship with one P. Kaliamma Dolai, she left the house of the plaintiff sometime in 1976 and did not return to the matrimonial home in spite of several requests of the plaintiff. Accordingly, application was filed for dissolution of marriage and divorce. Respondent on the other hand stated that plaintiff is...","5. In result, there is no merit in this appeal which accordingly dismissed. No costs.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1255526/ | I(1994)DMC16,Adultery,adultery,1993,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: I(1994)DMC16,1255526,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1255526/,3
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Romy vs Stephan on 6 March, 2017",opinion that instant one has been found to be a fit,2017-03-06,HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 24",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"TA No. 835 of 2016 1 HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH TA No. 835 of 2016 Date of decision: 6.3.2017 Romy ...Applicant Versus Stephan ...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK Present: Mr. A.K.Khunger, Advocate for the applicant. Mr. R.K.Arya, Advocate for the respondent. RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK, J. (Oral)",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Applicant, by way of instant transfer application under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ' CPC '), seeks transfer of the petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 ('the Act' for short), bearing DMC/0013/2016 titled as Stephan Vs. Romy, filed by respondent husband from Gurdaspur to Fazilka. Notice of motion was issued and learned trial court was directed to adjourn the case beyond the date fixed before this Court. Heard learned counsel for the parties. It has gone undisputed between the parties that applicant-wife is staying with her parents at her parental village in District Fazilka. Respondent-husband is not paying any amount of maintenance to the 1 of 7 ::: Downloaded on - 11-03-2017 21:27:25 ::: TA No. 835 of 2016 2 applicant. Since applicant-wife is not having any regular source of income, she is dependent on her parents. Distance between Gurdaspur and Fazilka is more than 150 Kms. Other litigations between the parties, at the instance of the applicant-wife, are also pending at Abohar, District Fazilka. After giving anxious consideration to the contentions raised and careful perusal of the record of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that instant one has been found to be a fit case for ordering the transfer of petition under Section 10 of the...",6.3.2017 (RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK) AK Sharma JUDGE Whether Speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether Reportable : Yes/No 7 of 7 ::: Downloaded on - 11-03-2017 21:27:26 :::,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/163313563/,Procedural,procedural,2017,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,163313563,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/163313563/,5
Kerala High Court,"Mrs. Hazel Arnone vs George Thomas Robert Arnone And Anr. on 10 August, 1965",opposite party,1965-08-10,"JUDGMENT    M.S. Menon, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 02, Section 10, Section 12, Section 17, Section 17A, Section 193, Section 30, Section 4, Section 44, Section 45, Section 47, Section 51, Section 5T, Section 7",Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M.S. Menon, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The petitioner is the wife of the first respondent She seeks a dissolution of her marriage under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. 2. Under Section 10 a wife can present a petition praying that her marriage should be dissolved on the ground that, since the solemnization thereof, her husband Las been guilty of adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse for two years or upwards. The petition is based on that ground, and has been allowed by the District Court of Kozhi-kode, subject to confirmation by this Court of the decree for dissolution as required by Section 17 of the Act. 3. No witness has been examined in this ease. The only evidence in support of the petition is Ext. A-t, an affidavit of the petitioner dated 21-3-1964. 4. Section 47 of the Act provides that the statements contained in every petition under the Act shall be verified by the petitioner or some other competent person in manner required by law for the verification of plaints, and may at the hearing be referred to as evidence; and Section 51 : ""The witnesses in ail proceedings before the Court, where their attendance can be had, shall be examined orally, and any party may offer himself or herself as a witness, and shall be examined, and may be...","40. However, as the majority of the Bench have set sside the decree and directed remit of the case for fresh trial, effect may he given thereto.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/746672/ | AIR1966KER34, AIR 1966 KERALA 34, ILR (1965) 2 KER 339, 1966 KER LJ 29, 1965 KER LT 915",Adultery,adultery; desertion,1965,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1966KER34, AIR 1966 KERALA 34, ILR (1965) 2 KER 339, 1966 KER LJ 29, 1965 KER LT 915",746672,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/746672/,7
Madras High Court,"Maria Soosai vs Clara Mary on 22 August, 1994",(1995)1MLJ282,1994-08-22,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 16, Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 4, Section 45, Section 5, Section 7",Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,JUDGMENT Srinivasan. J.,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"11. As the section refers to the principles and rules on which the court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England for the time being acts and gives relief; it is necessary to refer to the English law on the subject and at the same time, we must bear in mind that the law in England cannot be imported into the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act if it is contrary to the provisions of the said Act. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition at page 258 in paragraph 529 it is stated that no action or other proceeding is open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby and the High Court may make binding declarations of right whether or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed. In para. 531 it is stated that if anyone persistently and falsely...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This case raises an interesting question of law. The original petition is one filed under Section 4 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872, by the husband for a decree declaring that the alleged marriage between him and the respondent is null and void and consequently, the respondent is not his legally wedded wife. In the petition, it is stated that he was having intimacy with the respondent for a few months and in order to compel him to marry her, the respondent's parents and relatives, with the help of the Police, by force got executed a deed of marriage on paper bearing Rs. 2.50 stamp on the 27th October, 1988 and got it registered in the Office of the Sub Registrar, Andimadam. According to the provisions of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 , a Christian marriage can be solemnized only in any of the modes prescribed in Section 5 of the said Act. No formality or ceremony was gone through and only an agreement was executed as stated earlier and that too, under compulsion. The registration of the document would not amount to registration of the marriage and therefore, the marriage is null and void. 2. The respondent remained ex parte and the petitioner gave evidence in support of the allegation made in the petition. He has...","That brings us to an examination of the question as to whether there is anything in the provisions of the Act, which would exclude the ground of the relief for nullity of marriage on the aforesaid statutory ground. We have already set out Sections 18 and 19 of the Act which appear to be relevant for this purpose. At a previous stage of the judgment, we have examined those sections from a different angle with a view to find out whether those sections contain any ground for the grant of the decree of nullity of marriage on a statutory ground. Now, we have to examine the sections from a different angle with a view to discover whether there is anything in those section which negatives the jurisdiction of the court to grant a relief on a ground other than those mentioned in Section 19 . Now, in this connection, the two sections must be read together. Section 18 only gives a right to a husband or a wife to present a petition for a decree for nullity of marriage. That...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/490849/ | (1995)1MLJ282,Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19,1994,nullity,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1995)1MLJ282,490849,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/490849/,10
Madhya Pradesh High Court,"Peter Messtas vs Mrs. Jennifer Messias on 25 February, 2003",AIR2003MP214,2003-02-25,"JUDGMENT   S.P. Khare, J., Vehicle Factory, J, Higher Secondary School, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 13, Section 22, Section 23, Section 55",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT S.P. Khare, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is an appeal by the husband under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') against the judgment and decree by which his application under Section 23 of the Act for ""judicial separation"" has been rejected. 2. It is not in dispute that plaintiff Peter Messias and defendant Mrs. Jennifer Messias are Christians, the plaintiff is Chargeman Grade-I (Technical) in Vehicle Factory, Jabalpur (a Govt. of India Undertaking) and the defendant is a Teacher in English and Music in St. Joseph's Convent Girls' Higher Secondary School, Jabalpur holding M.A. degree in English Literature; the plaintiff is an accomplished musician playing guitar and the defendant is fond of playing piano; it is this ""common bond of music"" that brought them together and after their courtship for 8 years they married at Jabalpur on 31-5-1980; unfortunately they have no issue out of this wedlock; they lived together in Flat No. 19, L.I.C., M.P. Housing Board Colony, South Civil Lines, Jabalpur; the present petition was filed on 7-5-1992; the plaintiff has purchased Flat No. 101-A, Amba Apartment, South Civil Lines, Jabalpur on 25-9-1994 and the defendant has also purchased a separate house in June, 1994 and she is living there; the efforts of the trial Court and this Court to bring reconciliation between...","6. In this appeal it is argued on behalf of the appellant that there is sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant has been treating the appellant with cruelty and there has been irretrievable breakdown of marriage as the parties are admittedly living separately for about 11 years and, therefore, the decree for dissolution of their marriage should be passed in view of the amendment in the Indian Divorce Act in 2001 which has come into force from 3-10-2001, according to which cruelty is now a ground for passing the decree of dissolution of marriage. On the other hand it is submitted that the defendant is still ready and willing to live with the plaintiff as his wife and the ground of cruelty for divorce has not been established. 7. The evidence on record has been scrutinised by this Court. Peter Messias (P.W. 1) has deposed that after the marriage the defendant, was treating him very shabbily and she has adopted dominating nature. According to him she wanted him to dance at her tune. She was not providing him food....","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/750960/ | AIR2003MP214, AIR 2003 MADHYA PRADESH 214, (2003) 1 MPHT 134, (2003) 1 MPLJ 99, (2003) 2 JAB LJ 390, (2003) 2 MPLJ 371, (2003) 3 CIVLJ 570",Cruelty,cruelty,2003,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR2003MP214, AIR 2003 MADHYA PRADESH 214, (2003) 1 MPHT 134, (2003) 1 MPLJ 99, (2003) 2 JAB LJ 390, (2003) 2 MPLJ 371, (2003) 3 CIVLJ 570",750960,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/750960/,8
Karnataka High Court,"Shri P.G.Raju vs Smt Salamma on 19 January, 2023",MFA No. 2800 of 2017,2023-01-19,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 13, Section 19, Section 2, Section 27, Section 55",Cruelty; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Family Court has failed to properly appreciate the oral and documentary evidence available on record. She submits that -6- MFA No. 2800 of 2017 the respondent was in habit of making baseless allegations against the appellant alleging that he had extra marital relationship with various ladies. She submits that the appellant was not respected in his house and the respondent was in a habit of abusing him in public which resulted in lowering his image in neighbourhood. She also submits that the respondent had filed false criminal cases against the appellant and she had also filed a suit in O.S.No.44/2013 in respect of the property which belonged to the appellant. She submits that the appellant was ill-treated by the respondent in his house and as a result, he suffered health problems and ultimately he also suffered a heart attack and therefore, he apprehended it was not safe for him to continue the relationship with the respondent. In support of her contention, she has relied upon the judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of Mary Marget vs. Jos P Thomas - MAT Appeal No.1119/2015 and also on the judgment of...","7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the appellant has failed to prove the allegation of cruelty against the respondent and therefore, the Family Court -7- MFA No. 2800 of 2017 was justified in dismissing the petition. He submits that mere wear and tear in the family life cannot be construed as cruelty for the purpose of granting a decree of divorce. He submits that the material on record would go to show that the appellant had treated the respondent with cruelty and not vice-versa. He submits that the appellant had not taken care of his wife and children and the respondent was burdened with the educational expense of the children who are now practicing advocacates. He also submits that first son is now married. He also submits that merely for the reason that parties are residing separately for the last many year, the same cannot be a ground for granting decree of divorce and accordingly, he prays to dismiss the appeal. 8. We have carefully considered the arguments addressed on behalf of the parties and also perused the material evidence available on record. 9. The appellant had approached the Family Court seeking the relief of...",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,"6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Family Court has failed to properly appreciate the oral and documentary evidence available on record. She submits that -6- MFA No. 2800 of 2017 the respondent was in habit of making baseless allegations against the appellant alleging that he had extra marital relationship with various ladies. She submits that the appellant was not respected in his house and the respondent was in a habit of abusing him in public which resulted in lowering his image in neighbourhood. She also submits that the respondent had filed false criminal cases against the appellant and she had also filed a suit in O.S.No.44/2013 in respect of the property which belonged to the appellant. She submits that the appellant was ill-treated by the respondent in his house and as a result, he suffered health problems and ultimately he also suffered a heart attack and therefore, he apprehended it was not safe for him to continue the relationship with the respondent. In support of her contention, she has relied upon the judgment of Kerala High Court...","7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the appellant has failed to prove the allegation of cruelty against the respondent and therefore, the Family Court -7- MFA No. 2800 of 2017 was justified in dismissing the petition. He submits that mere wear and tear in the family life cannot be construed as cruelty for the purpose of granting a decree of divorce. He submits that the material on record would go to show that the appellant had treated the respondent with cruelty and not vice-versa. He submits that the appellant had not taken care of his wife and children and the respondent was burdened with the educational expense of the children who are now practicing advocacates. He also submits that first son is now married. He also submits that merely for the reason that parties are residing separately for the last many year, the same cannot be a ground for granting decree of divorce and accordingly, he prays to dismiss the appeal. 8. We have carefully considered the arguments addressed on behalf of the parties and...","-1- MFA No. 2800 of 2017 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2023 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S VISHWAJITH SHETTY M.F.A. NO.2800/2017 (IDA) BETWEEN: Digitally signed by B A KRISHNA SHRI P.G. RAJU KUMAR S/O LATE GEORGE P.T. Location: High Court of AGED 57 YEARS Karnataka R/A UP-STAIRS 311/55, 6TH CROSS VENKATAPURA KORAMANGALA BANGALORE - 560 034. ...APPELLANT (BY SMT. RADHIKA M, ADV.) AND: SMT. SALAMMA W/O P.G. RAJU AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS R/A GROUND FLOOR #311/55, 6TH CORSS VENKATAPURA KORAMANGALA BANGALORE - 506 034. ...RESPONDENT (BY SRI THOMAS V PETER, ADV.) THIS M.F.A. IS FILED UNDER SECTION 55(1) OF THE DIVORCE ACT READ WITH UNDER SECTION 19(1) OF FAMILY COURT ACT 1984, PRAYING AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT AND DECREE DATED 22.03.2017 PASSED IN M.C.NO. 2987 OF 2013 ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL JUDGE, FAMILY COURT, BENGALURU, DISMISSING THE PETITION FILED UNDER SECTION 10(1)(x) OF THE DIVORCE ACT, 1869. THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING THIS DAY, VISHWAJITH SHETTY J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: -2- MFA No. 2800 of 2017 JUDGMENT 5. To substantiate his case, the appellant had examined himself as PW1 and got marked 16 documents as Ex.P1 to Ex.P16. The respondent examined herself as RW.1 but no documents were marked...","This Miscellaneous First Appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is filed by the appellant-husband assailing the judgment and decree dated 22.03.2017 passed in M.C.No.2987/2013 by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore dismissing his petition filed under Section 10(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1869') wherein he had sought the relief of dissolution of the marriage that was solemnized between the parties on 23.10.1989, by a decree of divorce. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 3. Brief facts as revealed from the records that may be relevant for the purpose of disposal of this appeal are, the marriage of the appellant with the respondent was solemnized on 23.10.1989 at St. Joseph's Church, Calicut, Kerala in the presence of their family members. The parties knew each other even before their marriage and it was a love cum arranged marriage. The appellant was working at Durgapur, West Bengal at the time of marriage. Immediately after the marriage, the couple left to Durgapur and started residing there. The respondent conceived...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/16674075/,Cruelty,cruelty; nullity_sec19,2023,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,16674075,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/16674075/,13
Karnataka High Court,"Ruth vs Dr. M. Danial on 29 November, 1993",oped illicit intimacy with a Municipal Councillor an,1993-11-29,"ORDER   Raveendran, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 15, Section 17",Adultery; Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Raveendran, J.","17. At this stage, the learned Counsel for the respondent submits that the matter be remitted back instead of driving the respondent to a fresh proceedings which will be time consuming. We, therefore, remit the matter to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law. The petitioner and the respondent will be entitled to place such additional material as may be advised and the respondent may also, if he is so advised, seek the impleading of the alleged adulterer a co-respondent to the proceedings.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,"8. In a petition by wife, mere cruelty or desertion cannot be a ground for dissolution of marriage unless such cruelty or desertion is coupled with adultery on the part of the husband. Neither in the petition nor in her evidence, the petitioner has alleged or made out, any adultery on the part of the respondent-husband. Hence the trial Court rightly held that petition for dissolution filed by the wife is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected.","17. At this stage, the learned Counsel for the respondent submits that the matter be remitted back instead of driving the respondent to a fresh proceedings which will be time consuming. We, therefore, remit the matter to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law. The petitioner and the respondent will be entitled to place such additional material as may be advised and the respondent may also, if he is so advised, seek the impleading of the alleged adulterer a co-respondent to the proceedings.","1. This Reference arises out of a decree-nisi granted by the Additional District Judge, Mandya on 10.9.1992, in M.C.No. 1/1991, a petition presented under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 ('Act' for short) by a Christian wife against the husband. Petitioner and respondent were married on 9.5.1974 and there are two children out of the wedlock. 2. Petitioner sought dissolution of marriage alleging cruelty by the husband and also alleging that there was no cohabitation for more than two years between them. The respondent filed objections denying cruelty as alleged by the petitioner. On the other hand, he contended that petitioner was having illicit intimacy with someone and was leading an adulterous life. He did not name the alleged adulterer, but merely described him as a Political personality of the locality stating that his name could not be mentioned on account of his 'threatening and powerful nature'. On the above allegations, the respondent stated that he had no objection for dissolution of the marriage, so as to safeguard the interest of himself and his children. 3. Petitioner examined herself as P.W.1 and gave evidence about the cruel conduct of the respondent in imputing adultery. She denied having committed adultery. In the cross-examination she denied having any illicit intimacy with a Municipal Councillor of that area; but admitted that...","18. Having regard to the fact that the petition is already three years old, the trial Judge is directed to dispose of the matter within four months from the date of receipt of the papers and copy of this order.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1195642/ | ILR1994KAR4, 1994(2)KARLJ347, 1995 A I H C 849, (1994) 1 HINDULR 340, (1994) 2 KANT LJ 347, (1994) MARRILJ 393, (1994) MATLR 137",Adultery,adultery; cruelty; desertion,1993,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: ILR1994KAR4, 1994(2)KARLJ347, 1995 A I H C 849, (1994) 1 HINDULR 340, (1994) 2 KANT LJ 347, (1994) MARRILJ 393, (1994) MATLR 137",1195642,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1195642/,6
Madras High Court,"Christinamary Stella vs Vijay Siddharaj And Anr. on 7 September, 1978",opposition we permitted the petition and admitted th,1978-09-07,"JUDGMENT    Ramaprasada Rao, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 3, Section 47",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Ramaprasada Rao, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This case comes up before us for confirmation of the order passed by the District Judge, Pudukottai, who allowed the petition filed by the first wife and dissolved the marriage as between the petitioner and the first respondent on the ground that the first respondent contracted a second marriage with the second respondent after the solemnisation of the first marriage and that the first respondent deserted the petitioner and is permanently living with the second respondent and had a child through her also. The facts, as disclosed in the petition, are that the first respondent married the petitioner on 19-2-1973 in the Sacred Heart Church, Pudukottai. and the marriage solemnisation certificate though not filed in the trial court, has been filed in this court which we marked as Ex. C. 1. having thus married the petitioner on 19-2-1973, it appears that the first respondent married again, 20 days thereafter on 11-3-1973, the second respondent and was not frequenting the petitioner. The case of the petitioner is that after the first respondent took the second respondent as his wife without her knowledge and consent, the first respondent suppressed such an act of adultery and neglected the petitioner also for a considerable length of time. They petitioner's further case is that by mistake she did not add in the original pleadings...",7. Order confirmed.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/105078/ | AIR1979MAD100,Procedural,procedural,1978,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: AIR1979MAD100,105078,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/105078/,3
Madras High Court,"S.Rinu vs Nil on 18 June, 2026",OP.No.4080 of 2025 on the file of,2026-06-18,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 19",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"4. The learned counsel for the appellants also affirmed the said fact. 5. Even otherwise, we note that, as on date, the mandatory period of two years has expired from the date of separation. The appellants have taken a conscious decision to dissolve their marriage. We are also satisfied that there is no possibility for re-union and every attempt of reunion has failed. The parties are firm that they will not rejoin in the marital life. Hence, we would allow this Appeal and direct dissolution of marriage solemnised between the appellants on 12.06.2024 at CSI Christ Church, Kodungaiyur, Chennai. __________ Page3 of 4 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis CMA No. 1213 of 2026 C.V.KARTHIKEYAN, J. AND K.RAJASEKAR, J. GSK 6. Accordingly, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal stands allowed. No costs. (C.V.K.,J.) (K.R.S.,J.) 18-06-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No GSK To V Additional Family Court, Chennai. CMA No. 1213 of 2026",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"4. The learned counsel for the appellants also affirmed the said fact. 5. Even otherwise, we note that, as on date, the mandatory period of two years has expired from the date of separation. The appellants have taken a conscious decision to dissolve their marriage. We are also satisfied that there is no possibility for re-union and every attempt of reunion has failed. The parties are firm that they will not rejoin in the marital life. Hence, we would allow this Appeal and direct dissolution of marriage solemnised between the appellants on 12.06.2024 at CSI Christ Church, Kodungaiyur, Chennai. __________ Page3 of 4 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis CMA No. 1213 of 2026 C.V.KARTHIKEYAN, J. AND K.RAJASEKAR, J. GSK 6. Accordingly, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal stands allowed. No costs. (C.V.K.,J.) (K.R.S.,J.) 18-06-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No GSK To V Additional Family Court, Chennai. CMA No. 1213 of 2026","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","CMA No. 1213 of 2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 18-06-2026 CORAM THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE C.V. KARTHIKEYAN AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.RAJASEKAR CMA No. 1213 of 2026 1. S.Rinu D/o Suresh Kumar, No 4/2, 3rd Street, Narayanasami Thottam, Kodungaiyur, Chennai 600 118. 2. R.Shyam Solomon S/o Raja David, P.No 3A, ZLMJ Avenue, Sivashakthi Nagar Extn, Kurinji Street, New Perungalathur, Srinivasanagar, Kancheepuram, Chennai 600 063 ..Appellant(s) Vs Nil Nil ..Respondent(s) PRAYER :Appeal filed under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, to set aside the order dated 03.03.2026 passed in IDOP.No.4080 of 2025 on the file of the V Additional Family Court, Chennai and consequently allow the petition filed under section 10-A of the Indian Divorce Act for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. For Appellant(s): Mr.S.Venkatesan for Mr.R.Arunkumar __________ Page1 of 4 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis CMA No. 1213 of 2026 JUDGMENT (Judgment of the Court was delivered by C.V.Karthikeyan J.) The Appeal has been filed by the petitioners / appellants challenging the order dated 03.03.2026 passed in I.D.O.P.No.4080 of 2025 by the V Additional Family Court, Chennai, by which order, the petition seeking dissolution of marriage under Section 10(A) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, was dismissed. 2. The marriage between the petitioners / appellants has been solemnised on 12.06.2024 at CSI Christ Church, Kodungaiyur, Chennai. The...",__________ Page4 of 4 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/14646681/,Unclear,unclear,2026,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,14646681,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/14646681/,3
Kerala High Court,"James K.Avaran vs Jancy Ritamma George @ Jancy Avarah on 5 June, 2009",Mat.Appeal.No. 364 of 2007(),2009-06-05,"Justice R.BASANT The Hon, Justice M.C.HARI RANI  Dated, M.C. HARI RANI,J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 19, Section 2",Cruelty; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM Mat.Appeal.No. 364 of 2007() 1. JAMES K.AVARAN, S/O.KUNJUVAREED, ... Petitioner Vs 1. JANCY RITAMMA GEORGE @ JANCY AVARAH, ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.M.RAMESH CHANDER For Respondent :DR.SEBASTIAN CHAMPAPPILLY The Hon'ble MR. Justice R.BASANT The Hon'ble MRS. Justice M.C.HARI RANI Dated :05/06/2009 O R D E R C.R. R.BASANT & M.C. HARI RANI,JJ ============================== MAT.A. NO. 364 OF 2007 ============================ DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF JUNE 2009 JUDGMENT Basant,J.","32. Counsel for the respondent/wife has placed before us materials to show that suggestion of the High Court of Madras in paragraph 5 of that decision is being pursued by the Law Commission to avoid unnecessary hardship and difficulty, if any court were to take a technical and literal view of the expression - 39. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that the doctrine of revival applies and even assuming that the wife has chosen to condone such reckless allegations made earlier, the repetition of such allegations after the alleged event of condonation must give rise to a revived cause of action. We MAT.A.364/2007 -37- agree with the learned counsel for the respondent.","""Domicile is a mixed question of law and fact and there is perhaps no chapter in the law that has from such extensive discussion received less satisfactory settlement. This is no doubt attributable to the nature of the subject, including as it does, inquiry into the animus of persons who have either died without leaving any clear record of their intentions, but allowing them to be collected by inference from acts often equivocal, or who, being alive and interested, have a natural tendency to give their bygone feelings a tone and colour suggested by their present inclinations. The traditional statement that, to establish domicile, there must be a present intention of permanent residence merely means that so far as the mind of the person at the relevant time was concerned, he possessed the requisite intention. The relevant time varies with the nature of the inquiry. It may be past or...","3. Marriage is admitted. Separate residence is also admitted. Allegations of mental and physical cruelty are raised by the wife. It is alleged that the husband has been tormenting the wife perpetually raising allegations of unchaste and adulterous conduct. It is further alleged that physical cruelty was also inflicted on the wife by the husband while they were residing together raising such allegations. 4. The matrimonial discord has a long history behind it. Sans unnecessary details, crucial skeletal facts can be narrated thus: 5. The marriage took place on 26-11-1989. The marriage MAT.A.364/2007 -3- was solemnized in accordance with the Christian religious rites at Thrissur District in Kerala. The wife was employed as a Nurse in the Indian Army at that time. The wife went to Switzerland on 5-9-1990. The brother of the husband was employed and living there at that time. Long later, the husband who was a lawyer practising in Kerala also left for Switzerland and joined the wife on 13-11-1993. Matrimonial discord developed and admittedly separate residence commenced on 17-8-2002. There were certain proceedings initiated before the...","32. Counsel for the respondent/wife has placed before us materials to show that suggestion of the High Court of Madras in paragraph 5 of that decision is being pursued by the Law Commission to avoid unnecessary hardship and difficulty, if any court were to take a technical and literal view of the expression - 39. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that the doctrine of revival applies and even assuming that the wife has chosen to condone such reckless allegations made earlier, the repetition of such allegations after the alleged event of condonation must give rise to a revived cause of action. We MAT.A.364/2007 -37- agree with the learned counsel for the respondent.","What constitutes domicile under Section 2 of the Indian Divorce Act? Who is to plead and prove that domicile of birth/origin has been abandoned and a fresh domicile of choice has been acquired by the spouses? Does long residence in an alien country where one is employed with prospects of continued residence for a further long period in connection with such employment lead to a ready inference of change of domicile? Should both spouses (and not either) be domiciled in India for the Family court to assume jurisdiction in a Divorce application? Is the expression of intention of one spouse in the course of proceeding to acquire domicile by choice in an alien country sufficient to divest Indian courts of their jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings for divorce under Section 2 of the MAT.A.364/2007 -2- Indian Divorce Act ? These interesting questions are thrown up for consideration in this appeal. 2. This appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act is directed against an order passed under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act dissolving the marriage between the appellant/husband and the respondent/wife on the ground of cruelty. 6. The wife claimed divorce under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act on the ground of cruelty. As stated earlier, she alleged that the husband has been guilty of mental cruelty...","42. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. No costs. R. BASANT, JUDGE M.C. HARI RANI, JUDGE ks.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93629/,Cruelty,cruelty; adultery,2009,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,93629,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93629/,17
Kerala High Court,"Robert Sebastian vs Linet Suba Also Known As Linet Suba ... on 2 July, 1992",oped with the second respondent and the first respon,1992-07-02,"JUDGMENT   Sreedharan, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 17, Section 34, Section 366, Section 55, Section 97",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Sreedharan, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"14. A marriage udambadi was executed between the first respondent and the second respondent in the Sub-Registrar's Office, Varkala. The first respondent has alleged in her objection that the said agreement has been cancelled. Learned counsel representing the second respondent stated before Court that his client is not having any contact whatsoever with the first respondent at present. We enquired with the counsel representing the petitioner/husband as to whether he is having any objection in directing the amount of damages awarded to the husband to be given to the first respondent/wife. Learned counsel fairly and rightly submitted that petitioner has no objection in allowing first respondent to get the amount from the second respondent. Taking note of this fact and the entire facts and circumstances of this case, we order that Rs. 25,000/- directed to be paid by the second respondent as damages will be paid by him to the...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a reference made by the District Court, Kollam, under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, hereinafter referred to as ""the Act"". Court below, by order dated 4-7-1991, dissolved the marriage between the petitioner/husband and first respondent/wife. It also directed second respondent, the adulterer, to pay damages to the tune of Rs. 25,000/- to the petitioner. 2. Husband moved a petition under Sections 10 and 34 of the Act, alleging as follows:-- Marriage of the petitioner with the first respondent was solemnised on 9th July, 1981 at the Immaculate Conception Church, Pullichira. At the time of the marriage, petitioner was employed in Abudhabi. After 21 days of cohabitation, he returned to Abudhabi on 28th July, 1981. He returned on leave on 5th October, 1982 and stayed with the first respondent till 16th November, 1983. A male child was born through the wedlock on 25th July, 1983. Later he stayed with the first respondent from 28th March, 1984 to 2nd May, 1984. Thereafter, he could return to India only in September, 1989. On 29-3-1990, petitioner's cousin brother informed him over the phone that first respondent and the child are missing. Father of the first respondent sent letters to the petitioner informing that first respondent and the child are missing. Petitioner's father lodged a complaint with the police on...","8. The question that remains to be considered is whether the second respondent is entitled to challenge the order directing him to pay damages to the petitioner to the tune of Rs. 25,000/- in this proceedings. As stated earlier, the matter that has come before us is the confirmation of the decree for dissolution of the marriage passed by the District Court. The order directing the second respondent to pay damages to the petitioner is not one required to be confirmed by this Court. So, that issue is not before this Court in a reference under Section 17 of the Act. This proviso relates only to the decree for dissolution of the marriage or of nullity of marriage. Other orders passed by the District Court falling outside the purview of the proviso are appealable. Second respondent, if was aggrieved by the order directing him to pay damages, should have challenged the same by preferring an appeal to this Court. He has not cared to challenge that part of the order by preferring an appeal. 15. We confirm the decree of...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/604178/ | AIR1992KER412, II(1992)DMC345, AIR 1992 KERALA 412, (1992) 2 KER LT 107, ILR(KER) 1992 (3) KER 20, (1992) 2 DMC 345, (1992) 2 KER LJ 69, (1993) MARRILJ 121, (1993) MATLR 11, (1993) 1 CIVLJ 159",Adultery,adultery,1992,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1992KER412, II(1992)DMC345, AIR 1992 KERALA 412, (1992) 2 KER LT 107, ILR(KER) 1992 (3) KER 20, (1992) 2 DMC 345, (1992) 2 KER LJ 69, (1993) MARRILJ 121, (1993) MATLR 11, (1993) 1 CIVLJ 159",604178,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/604178/,9
Karnataka High Court,"Mr Vimalanathan Sigamani T vs Mrs Melo Kamalam on 22 October, 2024",MFA No. 5891 of 2019,2024-10-22,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 498A, Section 55",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"7. We have heard Sri Abhinav Ramanand, learned counsel for the appellant. The respondent appeared in person and put forth her contentions. They also filed their written arguments. 8. The points arising for discussion are : (i) Has the Family Court erred in drawing a conclusion that the appellant has failed to establish the allegations amounting to cruelty meted out to him by the respondent?",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(ii) Whether application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC can be allowed? 9. Before reappraisal of the case, it may be stated that in matrimonial cases, where suppression and exaggeration of events is common place, evidence cannot - 10 - NC: 2024:KHC:42501-DB MFA No. 5891 of 2019 be appreciated in the way it is appreciated in other civil cases; Euclid formula cannot be applied; there is nothing wrong in traversing beyond pleadings. Comprehensive approach is needed, documents for every allegation cannot be expected, in fact it is impossible to produce document for every allegation. The Family Court has observed that in regard to allegation of pouring hot water on the appellant, he should have produced some materials to substantiate that allegation. It is observed that medical documents could have been produced. It is to be stated here that the respondent does not dispute the fact of appellant sustaining burns,...","7. We have heard Sri Abhinav Ramanand, learned counsel for the appellant. The respondent appeared in person and put forth her contentions. They also filed their written arguments. 8. The points arising for discussion are : (i) Has the Family Court erred in drawing a conclusion that the appellant has failed to establish the allegations amounting to cruelty meted out to him by the respondent?","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","(PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR) This appeal is by the petitioner in M.C.3492/2011 on the file of IV Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru, who initiated action for dissolution of his marriage with respondent/wife, by invoking section 10(x) of Indian Divorce Act. Since the Family Court by its judgment dated 11.6.2019 dismissed the petition, he has filed this appeal. 2. The appellant and the respondent are Christians, their marriage was solemnized on 04.01.2002 at Church of South India (CSI), Karungal, Tamil Nadu. In the wedlock, they begot two sons. The appellant was doing business in Computers at Chennai at the time when he married the respondent, and in the year 2004, he and the respondent shifted their residence to Bengaluru as he secured an employment in Bengaluru. NC: 2024:KHC:42501-DB MFA No. 5891 of 2019 3. The appellant, in his petition, has narrated several instances to seek divorce on the ground of cruelty. The main allegations are that in the course of time, the respondent started harassing him, and sometime in the year of 2005, she poured hot water on him consequent to which he sustained burn injuries and could not walk properly. She refused to prepare food for him and the child, and she was not taking care of the child also. She along with her kith and...","-1- NC: 2024:KHC:42501-DB MFA No. 5891 of 2019 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF OCTOBER, 2024 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE UMESH M ADIGA MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO. 5891 OF 2019 (IDA) Between: Mr Vimalanathan Sigamani T, S/o Mr. S. Thiagaraj, Aged about 49 years R/at. Prakruthi Ganga Apartment, R.T. Nagar, Bangalore 560032 Also at: Microsoft India (R&D) Pvt. Ltd., Global Technical Support Centre, Prestige Ferns Galaxy, Sixth floor, Survey No.7/1, 7/2 & 8/1A, Ambalipura Village, Varthur Hobli, Outer Ring Road, Bengaluru 560103. - Appellant (By Sri. Abhinav R, Advocate) Digitally signed by VEERENDRA And: KUMAR K M Location: HIGH COURT OF Mrs. Melo Kamalam W/o Mr. Vimalanathan KARNATAKA D/o Joseph Kamalam, Aged about 47 years R/a.312, B No.8, 1st Floor, Golden Nagar, K.P. Nagar, Parvathipuram, Nagercoil Post Office 629003 Kanya Kumari Dist., Tamil Nadu. Also at: No.19/1, 1st Floor, 2nd Main, IV Cross, Ganganagar Extension R.T. Nagar Post, Bengaluru 560032 - Respondent (Smt. Melo Kamalam, respondent, appearing as party-in-person) -2- NC: 2024:KHC:42501-DB MFA...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/98359440/,Cruelty,cruelty,2024,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,98359440,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/98359440/,8
Bombay High Court,"Ronald Lawrence Pereira vs Flory Pereira And Benny Gonsalves on 5 December, 1991",II(1994)DMC618,1991-12-05,"JUDGMENT   I.G. Shah, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT I.G. Shah, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The Petitioner, who is a husband of the Respondent has filed this Petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act to claim dissolution of the marriage and Rs. 8,000/- by way of damages from the co-respondent. 2. Both the respondent and the co-respondent though duly served, are absent and have not participated in the proceedings. 3. The Petitioner examined himself and has deposed that his marriage with the respondent took place on 15th November, 1969, as per Christian rites. He deposed that the respondent is also Christian. He produced in support of his contention an extract of the Marriage Certificate issued by the Church. In view of this, the Petitioner is able to establish that he is legally married husband of the Respondent. He also further deposed that after residing with the Respondent after their marriage four issues were born to them. The eldest daughter, however, is married and there are two other daughters and the son who are minors. He also deposed that in August 1984, he secured a job in Kuwait as a carpenter and, therefore, he went to Kuwait. On 5th August, 1987, he returned from Kuwait for a short vacation and at that time he noticed that the respondent was having an affair with the co-respondent. The respondent also admitted the said relationship of...","6. In the result, the marriage of the Petitioner with the Respondent is dissolved. The Respondent and the Co-Respondent are ordered to pay costs of Rs. one thousand of this Petition to the Petitioner. No order is passed in respect of the claim of damages. DEPOSITION OF THE PETITIONER I do hereby state on solemn affirmation as under : My name is : Ronal Lawrence Pereira. Age : 48 years. Address : 16 Lila Mansion, Gokhle Road, South Dadar, Bombay : Occupation, Service. Examination-in-Chief by Shri Clive D'souza for Petitioner. 1. I am the Petitioner. I am the Christian. Respondents are also Christians. On 15-11-1969, I married Flory Pereira the Respondent, at the Church of Our Lady Salvation, Dadar, Bombay, according to Roman Catholic rites. I produce extract of the marriage certificate issued by the Church Ex.-B. After the marriage, I cohabited with the Respondent at Dadar. On 5-8-1984, I secured a job in Kuwait as a carpenter. So I went to Kuwait on 5-8-1987. I returned to Bombay, for short vacation. At that time I learnt that the respondent...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1568567/ | II(1994)DMC618,Unclear,unclear,1991,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: II(1994)DMC618,1568567,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1568567/,5
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Anju Masih vs Prince Procha on 16 January, 2017",No.561 of 2016,2017-01-16,HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 151, Section 24",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Transfer Application No.561 of 2016 ...1... IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Transfer Application No.561 of 2016 (O&M) Date of Decision: January 16, 2017 Anju Masih ...Applicant Versus Prince Procha ...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK Present: Ms.Sharmila Sharma, Advocate, for the petitioner. Dr.Naresh Kaushik, Advocate, for the respondent. RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK, J.(Oral)",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Applicant-wife, by way of instant transfer application under Section 24 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeks transfer of petition under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869, titled as ""Prince Procha vs. Anju Masih"" filed by the respondent-husband from Amritsar to Panipat. Notice of motion was issued and the learned trial Court at Amritsar was directed to adjourn the case beyond the date fixed before this Court. Heard learned counsel for the parties. It is a matter of record that the applicant is living with her parents at her parental village in District Panipat. She is not having any regular source of income and is dependent on her parents. Respondent- 1 of 3 ::: Downloaded on - 21-01-2017 18:46:36 ::: Transfer Application No.561 of 2016 ...2... husband is not paying any amount of maintenance to the wife. Distance between Panipat and Amritsar is more than 400 km. Keeping in view said undisputed facts, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that petition filed by the respondent-husband under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869, deserves to be transferred from Amritsar to Panipat. It is so stated because source of income of the applicant-wife and distance between two places are some of the relevant consideration for transferring the matrimonial proceedings, like the present one. Denial of...","January 16, 2017 (RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK) seema JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether reportable Yes/No 3 of 3 ::: Downloaded on - 21-01-2017 18:46:37 :::",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/166851357/,Procedural,procedural,2017,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,166851357,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/166851357/,3
Madras High Court,"Johnsi Amalarani vs S.Arul Prakash on 19 July, 2016",O.P.No.25 of 2016,2016-07-19,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 24",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2. Mr.P.Mahendran, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is the wife of the respondent and she is a permanent resident of Karaikudi. The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 11.11.2012, as per the Christian Rites and Customs. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that the petitioner has been blessed with twins and both of them are in the custody of the petitioner, that after the petitioner left from the matrimonial house due to harassment met by her, she is now residing with her aged parents and she could not travel for more than 80 Kilometers to defend the case filed by her husband. 5. Despite service of notice, the respondent has not chosen to appear either in person or through counsel and contest the petition. 6. It is settled law and in the cases arise out matrimonial disputes, the convenience of the wife shall be given preference. 7. In such view of the matter, this petition is allowed and the petition in I.D.O.P.No.25 of 2016 is ordered to be withdrawn from the file of the learned District and Sessions Judge, Thiruchirappalli and transferred to the file of the...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"2. Mr.P.Mahendran, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is the wife of the respondent and she is a permanent resident of Karaikudi. The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 11.11.2012, as per the Christian Rites and Customs. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that the petitioner has been blessed with twins and both of them are in the custody of the petitioner, that after the petitioner left from the matrimonial house due to harassment met by her, she is now residing with her aged parents and she could not travel for more than 80 Kilometers to defend the case filed by her husband. 5. Despite service of notice, the respondent has not chosen to appear either in person or through counsel and contest the petition. 6. It is settled law and in the cases arise out matrimonial disputes, the convenience of the wife shall be given preference. 7. In such view of the matter, this petition is allowed and the petition in I.D.O.P.No.25 of 2016 is ordered to...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED : 19.07.2016 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.KALYANASUNDARAM TR.C.M.P.(MD).No.333 of 2016 and C.M.P.(MD)No.6334 of 2016 Johnsi Amalarani ... Petitioner/Respondent Vs. S.Arul Prakash ... Respondent/Petitioner PRAYER : Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition is filed under Section 24 of Civil Procedure Code, to withdraw and transfer the I.D.O.P.No.25 of 2016 from the file of the learned District and Sessions Judge, Tiruchirappalli and transfer the same to the District and Sessions Court, Sivagangai be tried along with I.D.O.P.No.23 of 2015 on his file. !For Petitioner : Mr.P. Mahendran ^For Respondent : No appearance. :O R D E R This Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition has been filed to withdraw the application in I.D.O.P.No.25 of 2016 from the file of the learned District and Sessions Judge, Thiruchirappalli and transfer the same to the District and Sessions Court, Sivagangai to be tried along with I.D.O.P.No.23 of 2015. 3. It is further submitted that earlier, the respondent filed I.D.O.P.No.103 of 2013 before the III Additional District and Sessions Court, Thiruchirappalli against the petitioner for restitution of conjugal rights and the same was transferred from the III Additional District and Sessions Court, Thiruchirappalli to the District and Sessions Court, Sivagangai in Tr.C.M.P.No.74 of 2014 filed by the petitioner. While so, the respondent has now filed I.D.O.P.No.25 of 2016 before the District...","2. The District and Sessions Court, Sivagangai. .",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/103985033/,Unclear,unclear,2016,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,103985033,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/103985033/,5
Madras High Court,"D. Thomas vs Tara on 28 November, 1977",AIR1978MAD415,1977-11-28,"JUDGMENT    Ramarrasada Rao, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Ramarrasada Rao, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The husband went to court seeking for a divorce under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act on the ground that the defendant was unfaithful to him from December 1972 and that she was guilty of adultery. In the pleadings, the plaintiff as husband has set out in the various paragraphs the illegal conduct of the defendant and her illicit connections with the various named persons. In fact, he would allege that he had to leave the residence along with his children to his uncle's house unable to bear the misconduct of the defendant. He so separated himself from her on 13-1-1973. He says that the defendant is living the life of a prostitute and would add that she is living as the mistress of one Murali. In general, the case of the plaintiff-husband is that the defendant was leading an adulterous life with men known and unkonwn. He did not, however, make the adulterers as parties to this suit. The defendant's case was that she led such a life because of her husband himself and that on many occasions she refused to succumb to the invitation of the plaintiff to commit such indecent acts and that this is the reason for the suit. 2. We are not inclined at this stage to go into the merits of this...",4. Suit dismissed.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/824406/ | AIR1978MAD415, AIR 1978 MADRAS 415, 1991 MADLW 528",Adultery,adultery,1977,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1978MAD415, AIR 1978 MADRAS 415, 1991 MADLW 528",824406,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/824406/,3
Karnataka High Court,"Mrs Olivia D Souza vs Mr Prakash Peedikayil on 10 January, 2019",NO.82 OF 2018,2019-01-10,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 125, Section 24",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[pre_1] 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF JANUARY 2019 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE CIVIL PETITION NO.82 OF 2018 BETWEEN: Mrs. Olivia D'Souza W/o. Prakash Peedikayil, Aged about 36 years R/o. Gaytown, Near Masjid, Bangarappanagar, Shirwad Karwar-581 306 Presently residing at: Near Government High School Sodoixem, Canacona, Goa - 403 702. ... Petitioner (By Sri. V.P. Kulkarni, Advocate) AND: Mr. Prakash Peedikayil, S/o. Anthony Peedikayil Aged about 37 years R/o. No.18, HRBR Layout, III Block, II Main, III Cross Kacharakanahalli, Bangalore. 560 084. ... Respondent (By Sri. V.S. Biju, Advocate) 2 This Civil Petition is filed under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying to transfer the M.C.No.5527/2017 which is pending before the V Addl. Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore to the District and Sessions Judge, Uttara Kannada District, Karwar, in the interest of justice and equity. This Civil Petition coming on for Admission this day, the Court made the following:- ORDER [p_1] Mr. V.P. Kulkarni, learned counsel for the petitioner. [p_3] Mr. V.S. Biju, learned counsel...","Mr. V.S. Biju, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. The civil petition is admitted for hearing. With consent of the parties, the same is heard finally.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Mr. V.S. Biju, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. The civil petition is admitted for hearing. With consent of the parties, the same is heard finally.","1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF JANUARY 2019 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE CIVIL PETITION NO.82 OF 2018 BETWEEN: Mrs. Olivia D'Souza W/o. Prakash Peedikayil, Aged about 36 years R/o. Gaytown, Near Masjid, Bangarappanagar, Shirwad Karwar-581 306 Presently residing at: Near Government High School Sodoixem, Canacona, Goa - 403 702. ... Petitioner (By Sri. V.P. Kulkarni, Advocate) AND: Mr. Prakash Peedikayil, S/o. Anthony Peedikayil Aged about 37 years R/o. No.18, HRBR Layout, III Block, II Main, III Cross Kacharakanahalli, Bangalore. 560 084. ... Respondent (By Sri. V.S. Biju, Advocate) 2 This Civil Petition is filed under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying to transfer the M.C.No.5527/2017 which is pending before the V Addl. Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore to the District and Sessions Judge, Uttara Kannada District, Karwar, in the interest of justice and equity. This Civil Petition coming on for Admission this day, the Court made the following:- ORDER Mr. V.P. Kulkarni, learned counsel for the petitioner. 3. This petition under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code' for short) has been filed by the wife seeking transfer of the proceedings instituted by the respondent under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to...",JUDGE BMV*,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/18406917/ | AIRONLINE 2019 KAR 311,Unclear,unclear,2019,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 KAR 311,18406917,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/18406917/,5
Allahabad High Court,"Smt. Praveen Rodney vs Sanjeev Kumar Rodney on 24 May, 2022",opted by defendant-respondent the case could not pro,2022-05-24,"Vipin Chandra Dixit,J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Court No. - 7 Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 4080 of 2022 Petitioner :- Smt. Praveen Rodney Respondent :- Sanjeev Kumar Rodney Counsel for Petitioner :- Azhar Hussain Hon'ble Vipin Chandra Dixit,J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"Heard Mr. Azhar Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking a direction to the Principal Judge, Family Court, Allahabad to decide Matrimonial Case No.409 of 2020 (Smt. Praveen Rodney vs. Sanjeev Kumar Rodney) under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869 within a stipulated time period. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has filed Matrimonial Case No.409 of 2020 (Smt. Praveen Rodney vs. Sanjeev Kumar Rodney) under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869 on 5.3.2020 and the defendant-husband has put in appearance before the court below but on account of delaying tactics adopted by defendant-respondent the case could not proceed and is pending since 2020. Without going into merit of the case, it is appropriate that the above case be decided expeditiously. In view of above, Principal Judge, Family Court, Allahabad/Court concerned is directed to decide the Matrimonial Case No.409 of 2020 (Smt. Praveen Rodney vs. Sanjeev Kumar Rodney) under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869 expeditiously, if possible within six months from the date of production of certified copy of this order without granting adjournment unnecessarily to either of the parties, unless there is any legal impediment. With aforesaid direction, the instant petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is finally disposed of.",Order Date :- 24.5.2022 P.P.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/73336891/,Unclear,unclear,2022,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,73336891,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/73336891/,4
Madhya Pradesh High Court,"Lalit Lazarus vs Smt. Lavina Lazarus And Anr. on 24 November, 1978",AIR1979MP70,1978-11-24,"JUDGMENT    C.P. Sen, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955",Section 10,Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT C.P. Sen, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The case has come up before the Full Bench for confirmation of the decree nisi for dissolution of marriage granted by the District Judge under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. 2. The parties in this proceeding are Christians. The petitioner's case is that he is employed as Director-cum-Psychologist in the Educational and Vocational Guidance Centre run by E.L. Church at Chhindwara. The respondent No. 1 Lavina Lazarus was married to the petitioner according to the Christian rites at Indore in Dec. 1971. After the marriage the respondent No. 1 lived with the petitioner and his family members at Chhindwara for a few days, Thereafter at the instigation of the parents of the respondent No. 1 she started demanding that the petitioner should break relations with his family members and reside separately with her. When the petitioner did not agree with this, she reacted violently and held out the threat that either she would commit suicide or poison the petitioner and his family members. In a meeting of the Church Council, Chhindwara, convened on 2-9-1972 Lavina Lazarus was asked to improve her behaviour. She, however, left for Indore, She again visited Chhindwara from time to time on 13-10-1972, 23-10-1972 and 31-10-1972. On the first occasion she was accompanied by her parents and on the subsequent occasions accompanied...","However, the petitioner is directed to deposit the paper book cost of Rs. 18.20/-.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/517848/ | AIR1979MP70, AIR 1979 MADHYA PRADESH 70, (1979) MPLJ 184, (1979) JAB LJ 299, (1979) MATLR 239",Adultery,adultery,1978,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1979MP70, AIR 1979 MADHYA PRADESH 70, (1979) MPLJ 184, (1979) JAB LJ 299, (1979) MATLR 239",517848,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/517848/,3
Karnataka High Court,"M. Clarance vs M. Raicheal And Anr. on 11 April, 1963",oposed order dismissing the petition. As some of the,1963-04-11,"JUDGMENT    N. Sreenivasa Rau, C.J., I agree with the conclusions arrayed at by my learned brother Mir Iqbal Husain, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 12, Section 13, Section 14, Section 16, Section 17, Section 19, Section 3, Section 31",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT N. Sreenivasa Rau, C.J. 1. I agree with the conclusions arrayed at by my learned brother Mir Iqbal Husain, J., on all the questions arising in this case and with the proposed order dismissing the petition. As some of the points involved are of great importance, I am adding the following observations: 2. The question of jurisdiction of the Court in which the petition was filed is one of some difficulty. It may also be mentioned that the petition itself does not contain any averment as to the place of residence of either party with reference to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Petitioner (husband) is, however, described as residing at Vaniambadi in North Arcot District, Madras State, and Respondent-I (wife) is stated to be a school mistress in Robertsonpet, Kolar Gold Fields, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court, Bangalore, to which the petition was present.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"4. There appears to be some difference of opinion among the High Courts as to whether the word 'together' qualifies only the words 'last resided' or it also qualifies the word 'reside'. While some High Courts have held that even in the case of invoking the Court's jurisdiction on the ground that the husband and the wife are residing within the jurisdiction of the Court at the time of the presentation of the petition it is necessary that they should be residing 'together', other High' Courts have held that it is enough that both of them are residing within the jurisdiction of the Court, though it may be that they are residing separately. It is, however, unnecessary to express any view on this point, since it is beyond question in this case that the petitioner (husband) was not residing within the jurisdiction of the District Court, Bangalore, at the time...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. Under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act a petition for dissolution of marriage has to be presented to the District Court or the High Court. Section 3(1) of the Act, while defining 'High Court', says: ""In the case of any petition under this Act, 'High Court' is the one of the aforesaid Courts within the local limits of whose ordinary appellate jurisdiction, or of whose jurisdiction under this Act, the husband and wife reside or last resided together."" Sub-section (3) says: "" 'District Court' means in the case of any petition under this Act, the Court of the District Judge within the local limits of whose ordinary jurisdiction, or of whose jurisdiction under this Act, the husband and wife reside or last resided together."" It will thus be seen that the test for determining the jurisdiction of the High Court or the District Court is the territorial jurisdiction with reference to where the husband and wife reside or last resided together. 5. The question arises what would be the position in a case where the two parties to a marriage met only at the time of the marriage and did not reside together at all afterwards though such cases must, in the very nature of things, be extremely rare. If valid grounds for judicial separation or divorce exist,...","42. The above discussion leads us to only one result viz., that the petition is liable to be dismissed and it is so ordered. No costs. 43. Petition dismissed.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/818267/ | AIR1964KANT67, AIR1964MYS67, ILR1963KAR788, (1963)2MYSLJ",Adultery,adultery,1963,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1964KANT67, AIR1964MYS67, ILR1963KAR788, (1963)2MYSLJ",818267,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/818267/,22
Kerala High Court,"Manju Padayatti vs Midhun Jose on 6 November, 2014",Mat.Appeal.No. 68 of 2015 (),2014-11-06,THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.K.ABDUL REHIM,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954","Section 10, Section 22, Section 27",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.K.ABDUL REHIM & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY TUESDAY, THE 19TH DAY OF APRIL 2016/30TH CHAITHRA, 1938 Mat.Appeal.No. 68 of 2015 () --------------------------- AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN O.P.NO.1369/2014 of FAMILY COURT,ERNAKULAM DATED 06-11-2014. APPELLANT/PETITIONER: -------------------- MANJU PADAYATTI, D/O.P.M.POULOSE, VILLA NO.1, CHAKOLAS HABITAT, NEAR MILMA, EDAPPALLY P.O., KOCHI-682024 BY ADV. SRI.ROY CHACKO RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT: --------------------- MIDHUN JOSE, HOUSE NO.18, PUTHUSSERY HOUSE, KALLUPALAM ROAD, ANGAMALY-683 572. BY ADV. SRI.SAIBY JOSE KIDANGOOR THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 01-04-2016, ALONG WITH MAT.APPEAL NOS.81 & 103 OF 2015, THE COURT ON 19.04.2016 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: P.T.O C.K. ABDUL REHIM & SHAJI P. CHALY, JJ. -------------------------------------------------- Mat. Appeal Nos.81, 68 & 103 of 2015 ----------------------------------------------- Dated this the 19th day of April, 2016 JUDGMENT Shaji P. Chaly, J. Above Matrimonial Appeals arise from a common judgment of the Family Court, Ernakulam, dated 06.11.2014 in O.P.No.2205 of 2012, O.P.No.1369 of 2014 and O.P.No.2204 of 2012 respectively. O.P.No.2205 of 2012 is filed by the appellant seeking dissolution of marriage under Sec.27 of the Special Marriage Act r/w Sec.10 of Indian Divorce Act, which was dismissed by the Family Court. O.P.No.1369 of 2014 was...","11. The respondent entered appearance and filed objection. According to the appellant, the denial made in the objections was not in accordance with law, by extracting the averment in its entirety and denying the same in one sentence ""are utter false and hence denied by the respondent"". After extracting the contentions of the appellant in the Original Petition and after denying the same, the respondent has stated that the father of the appellant had desired for marital alliance of his daughter with the respondent for the reason that he had a decent job and was about to pursue his employment in Finland. That apart, it is stated that, since his father-in-law found that the assignment in Finland was terminated, he became furious. He wanted his daughter to go to the parental house as a sequel to parting company with the respondent. It is contended that the father of the appellant acted as a hindrance to their marital relationship. It is also contended by the respondent that the parties do not have any serious differences, but it is only the father of the appellant who wants to create problems and to put an end to the matrimonial relationship on account of...","12. From the pleadings, the Family Court has raised two points for determination: (1) Whether the petitioner is entitled to get a decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty? and (2) Relief and costs? 13. In Mat. Appeal No.68 of 2015, the appellant is challenging the judgment of the Family Court granting the decree sought for by the respondent for restitution of conjugal rights. The contentions of the respondent therein are that, there are no serious matrimonial disputes existing by and between the appellant and the respondent, that the respondent has taken all the contentions raised by him under his objection in O.P.No.2205 of 2012. That apart it is contended that, the father of the appellant was instrumental in causing disruption to the matrimonial harmony and peace of the appellant and the respondent. It is also contended that the respondent, his friends and well-wishers had requested the appellant to...","3. At the time of marriage, the respondent was working at IBM India Projects Ltd., at Bangalore as a Software Engineer and he was deputed for an assignment to Finland, a country in Western Europe. On 25.07.2011, the respondent along with the appellant went to Finland to take up his assignment. It is contended by the appellant that during the Mat. Appeal No.68/2015 & conn. cases 3 short period of the parties united as man and wife, appellant found that respondent was a chronic drunkard and behaved in a very abnormal manner, under intoxication. That apart, it is contended that, the respondent was not at all interested in maintaining a cordial and amicable marital relationship with the appellant and the appellant stated several incidents in the Original Petition pointing out the abnormal and unusual behaviour from a highly educated person and he fails to discharge his duties as a husband. The attitude and behaviour of the respondent was unbecoming of a lovable husband, which under the ordinary circumstances would compel the life partner to leave the matrimonial home to join...","11. The respondent entered appearance and filed objection. According to the appellant, the denial made in the objections was not in accordance with law, by extracting the averment in its entirety and denying the same in one sentence ""are utter false and hence denied by the respondent"". After extracting the contentions of the appellant in the Original Petition and after denying the same, the respondent has stated that the father of the appellant had desired for marital alliance of his daughter with the respondent for the reason that he had a decent job and was about to pursue his employment in Finland. That apart, it is stated that, since his father-in-law found that the assignment in Finland was terminated, he became furious. He wanted his daughter to go to the parental house as a sequel to parting company with the respondent. It is contended that the father of the appellant acted as a hindrance to their marital relationship. It is also contended by the respondent that the parties do not have any serious differences, but it is only the father...","23. However, question remains is, whether from the evidence adduced by the parties, there is any sufficient evidence so as to grant a decree of dissolution of marriage, reversing the findings of the Family Court. The Family Court had mostly relied on Ext.B1 series of photographs produced by the respondent to arrive at a conclusive finding that the parties led a happy matrimonial life and with the said evidence on board, it cannot be said that there were severe matrimonial disputes and discord by and between the appellant and the Mat. Appeal No.68/2015 & conn. cases 21 respondent. However, the appellant has adduced evidence in terms of the pleadings put forth by her in the Original Petition. In the cross-examination of the appellant, even though at length, nothing was brought out to discredit her testimony in the chief examination. The specific instances pleaded by the appellant and deposed in her chief affidavit was not specifically subjected to cross-examination. The tenor of cross- examination persuade us to think that the attempt of the respondent was mostly to non-suit the appellant in her claim for realization of money. In that view of the matter, even if the pleadings in the Original Petition can be termed to be specifically denied by the respondent, during cross- examination, in our view, nothing was brought out...","39. Therefore, we do not find any reason to interfere with the partial decree passed by the Family Court for an amount of Rs.40,000/-. However, in the body of the petition, the Family Court has granted 9% interest to the said amount of Rs.40,000/-, but at the relief portion, only 6% interest is awarded. Taking into account the facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the interest that was granted by the Family Court to the said amount of Rs.40,000/- is at the rate of 9% p.a. from 17.11.2011 till its realization. We order Mat. Appeal No.68/2015 & conn. cases 40 accordingly. Therefore, the said appeal is dismissed, subject to the above clarification and modification in the decree. 40. In the result, Matrimonial Appeal Nos.68 of 2015 and 81 of 2015 are allowed and Matrimonial Appeal No.103 of 2015 is dismissed, subject to the clarification with respect to the interest awarded by the court below. The parties are directed to suffer their respective costs. Sd/- C.K. ABDUL REHIM JUDGE Sd/- SHAJI P. CHALY JUDGE //true copy// P.S. to...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/173272640/,Cruelty,cruelty,2014,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,173272640,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/173272640/,12
Kerala High Court,"Shaji Sebastian vs Julie Joseph on 29 January, 2026",Mat.Appeal Nos.537/2014,2026-01-29,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 27, Section 3, Section 37",Desertion; Cruelty; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Mat.Appeal Nos.537/2014, 538/2014 1 2026:KER:6855 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SATHISH NINAN & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR THURSDAY, THE 29TH DAY OF JANUARY 2026 / 9TH MAGHA, 1947 MAT.APPEAL NO. 537 OF 2014 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 15.06.2013 IN OP NO.573 OF 2012 OF FAMILY COURT, MUVATTUPUZHA APPELLANT/PETITIONER : SHAJI SEBASTIAN S/O SEBASTIAN, THARIAKKU, PUTHUSSERY HOUSE, PRAROOR P.O, VIA KALADY, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN:683 572. BY ADVS. SHRI.M.P.RAMNATH SHRI.P.RAJESH (KOTTAKKAL) SMT.S.SANDHYA SMT.UMA R.KAMATH RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT: JULIE JOSEPH D/O JOSEPH, NURSE, MANICKATHAN HOUYSE, EDAVOOR P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN:686 544. BY ADV SRI.N.K.SUBRAMANIAN THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING ON 21.01.2026, ALONG WITH MAT.APPEAL.538/2014, THE COURT ON 29.01.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: Mat.Appeal Nos.537/2014, 538/2014 2 2026:KER:6855 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SATHISH NINAN & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR THURSDAY, THE 29TH DAY OF JANUARY 2026 / 9TH MAGHA, 1947 MAT.APPEAL NO. 538 OF 2014 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 15.06.2013 IN OP NO.574 OF 2012 OF FAMILY COURT, MUVATTUPUZHA APPELLANT/RESPONDENTS: 1 SHAJI SEBASTIAN S/O SEBASTIAN, THARIAKKU PUTHUSSERY HOUSE, PRAROOR P.O., VIA KALADY, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN:683 574. 2 SEBASTIAN @ DEVASSIKUTTY S/O OUSEPH, THARIYAKKU...","8. We have heard Sri.M.P.Ramnath, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri.N.K.Subramaniam, the learned counsel for the respondent.","9. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, though an appeal was preferred against the order in the divorce petition to the extent it declined to grant divorce on the grounds of cruelty and adultery, the appellant is now satisfied with the decree granted on the ground of desertion. In view of the said submission, we do not propose to examine the question whether the grounds of cruelty and adultery were established. It was further submitted that the appellant does not intend to oppose the direction in the judgment for payment of past maintenance to the child. 10. Thus, the points that arise for consideration are as Mat.Appeal Nos.537/2014, 538/2014 8 2026:KER:6855 follows: (1) Is the respondent entitled to get the gold ornaments and money claimed in the petition? (2) Is the respondent entitled to get past maintenance? 11. It is not in dispute that...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"8. We have heard Sri.M.P.Ramnath, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri.N.K.Subramaniam, the learned counsel for the respondent.","14. Upon a careful evaluation of the evidence in its entirety, we are unable to accept the aforesaid contentions. It is true that the respondent answered in the affirmative when such a question was put to her during cross- examination. However, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the said answer, by itself, is insufficient to discard her entire testimony, particularly when it is corroborated by the evidence of PW2 on the same point. What the respondent admitted was only a suggestion put to her that the ornaments were purchased prior to the engagement. Such an answer cannot, in our opinion, be treated as an admission on the fact in issue, namely, whether the gold ornaments were purchased using the Mat.Appeal Nos.537/2014, 538/2014 11 2026:KER:6855 amount entrusted at the time of engagement. 15. It is only an inference drawn from her answer to the suggestion that, if the gold was purchased prior to the engagement, the money used for its purchase could not have been the amount given at the time of engagement. When a witness is subjected to cross-examination, several factual situations may be put to him or her for different purposes, including testing veracity. The effect of such inferential aspects has to be analysed in the totality of the circumstances...","In the result, Mat.Appeal No.537/2014 is dismissed. Mat.Appeal No.538/2014 is partly allowed and the direction to pay past maintenance to the wife is set aside. The impugned judgment is upheld in other respects. No costs. Sd/- SATHISH NINAN JUDGE Sd/- sv P. KRISHNA KUMAR JUDGE",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/118606983/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty; adultery,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,118606983,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/118606983/,9
Bombay High Court,"Muncherji Cursetji Khambata vs Jessie Grant Khambata on 20 April, 1934",(1934)36BOMLR1021,1934-04-20,"JUDGMENT    Blackwell, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 1, Section 10, Section 16, Section 17, Section 18, Section 19, Section 2, Section 3, Section 4, Section 41, Section 42, Section 43, Section 60, Section 7",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Blackwell, J.","5. There is no evidence as to what the law of Scotland is in reference to a marriage entered into in Scotland before a Registrar. The learned Chief Justice has assumed for the purposes of his judgment that the Scotch law is the same as the English law. Whether the law is the same or not, I do not know. Before us counsel for the respondent wished to argue that the law was not the same, and that the marriage in Scotland should be regarded as equivalent to a marriage in Mahomedan form, but, in the absence of evidence upon the subject, we declined to allow him to do so, and as the case was argued in the Court below upon the assumption that the law was the same, we have decided this appeal upon that assumption.","1. In this case the petitioner sues for a divorce by reason of the respondent's alleged adultery and cruelty. Among other defences, the respondent pleads that a previous marriage of the petitioner with one Gulam Mahomed Ebrahim has never been dissolved or annulled by any Court of competent jurisdiction and is still subsisting. The question, whether the first marriage had been validly dissolved before the marriage in suit took place, was tried as a preliminary issue. The learned Chief Justice answered that issue in the affirmative, and this is an appeal from his decision. 2. The issue was tried upon an agreed statement of facts. From this it appears that on December 4, 1906, the petitioner, who was domiciled in Scotland, married at the General Registry Office in Edinburgh Gulam Mahomed Ebrahim, who was a Sunni Mahomedan domiciled in India (which includes not only British India, but the various Native...","25. Even if the law of the domicile were to be applied, therefore, there can be little doubt, in my opinion, that the marriage which these parties contracted must be regarded as a marriage in the Christian sense, a monogamous marriage. It did not seem to me that the learned Counsel for the petitioner seriously disputed this position. According to him the Court is not concerned with any question of monogamy or polygamy in this case. Divorce has nothing to do with the marriage contract. The authorities clearly show that the dissolution of a marriage, and the determination of the manner in which a marriage may be dissolved, are matters for the lex. domicilii. Therefore, he says, all that the Court has to consider in the present case is, whether the lex domicilii permits the husband to divorce his. wife by talak. 28. The learned Counsel for the appellant has naturally relied strongly on Mir-Anwaruddin's case. But there the question for decision was, whether a declaration of divorcement made by a Mahomedan, who had married an English woman before a...","5. There is no evidence as to what the law of Scotland is in reference to a marriage entered into in Scotland before a Registrar. The learned Chief Justice has assumed for the purposes of his judgment that the Scotch law is the same as the English law. Whether the law is the same or not, I do not know. Before us counsel for the respondent wished to argue that the law was not the same, and that the marriage in Scotland should be regarded as equivalent to a marriage in Mahomedan form, but, in the absence of evidence upon the subject, we declined to allow him to do so, and as the case was argued in the Court below upon the assumption that the law was the same, we have decided this appeal upon that assumption.","4. It may here be mentioned that Secunderabad is a British Cantonment, but that it still remains part of the Hyderabad State and is the property of the Nizam see Hossain Ali Mirza v. Abid Ali Mirza (1893) I.L.R. 21 Cal. 177 and Ananta-padmanabhaswami v. Official Receiver of Secunderabad (1933) L.R. 60 I.A. 167 : S.C. 35 Bom. L.R. 747. By virtue of the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order in Council 1902, which was made under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, the Governor General in Council has applied to the Cantonment of Secunderabad various enactments, subject to any amendments to which the enactments are for the time being subject in British India. The notification, which is dated March 22, 1913, is to be found at p. 227 of Vol. I of Macpherson's British Enactments in force in Native States. Among the Acts applied are the Indian Divorce Act , IV of 1869, the Special Marriage Act , III of 1872, the Indian Christian Marriage Act , XV of 1872, and the Specific Relief-Act, I of 1877. As regards the Indian Divorce Act it appears from the notification that ""District Court"" in Section 3 of the Act means the First Assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad. The power of the Governor General in Council to apply Acts by notification in this manner...","30. For these reasons, I hold that the learned Chief Justice's finding as to the validity of the divorce of the petitioner by her Mahomedan husband should be upheld. As to the other matters, which have been the subject of argument, I agree with my learned brother and have nothing to add.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1334922/ | (1934)36BOMLR1021, AIR 1935 BOMBAY 5",Adultery,adultery,1934,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (1934)36BOMLR1021, AIR 1935 BOMBAY 5",1334922,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1334922/,19
Supreme Court of India,"Sharda vs Dharmpal on 28 March, 2003",Sharda vs Dharmpal,2003-03-28,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 112, Section 114, Section 115, Section 12, Section 13, Section 151, Section 17, Section 185, Section 19, Section 2, Section 20, Section 27, Section 3, Section 32, Section 37, Section 4, Section 41, Section 5, Section 50, Section 53, Section 64, Section 75",Constitutional Validity; Unsound Mind; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. Whether a party to a divorce proceeding can be compelled to a medical examination is the core question involved in this appeal. This question arises out of a judgment dated 17.11.1999 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 1414/99 dismissing an application filed by the appellant herein questioning an order of the Addl. District & Session Judge No. 1, Hanumangarh Camp Sangaria dated 8.10.1999 directing to submit herself to medical examination on the question as to whether she is of unsound mind. (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds, namely,- (a) ..... (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The parties herein were married on 26.6.1991 according to the Hindu rites. On or about 3.6.1995, the respondent filed an application for divorce against the appellant under Section 12(1)(b) and 13(1)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. He filed an application seeking directions for medical examination of the appellant on 5th May, 1999. The appellant objected thereto inter alia on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to pass such directions. By an order dated 8.10.1999 the said application was allowed directing the appellant to submit herself to the medical examination. Aggrieved by the said order, she filed a Revision Petition before the High Court which was dismissed by the impugned judgment. 3. Mr. Kaushik, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein has principally raised two contentions in support of this appeal. Firstly, compelling a person to undergo a medical examination by an order of the Court would be violative of right to 'personal liberty' guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Secondly, in absence of a specific empowering provision, a court dealing with matrimonial cases cannot subject a party to the lis to undergo medical examination against his her volition. In the event, if a party does not undergo such medical examination, the Court may merely draw an adverse inference. 4. The...","87. Subject to the observations made hereinbefore we are of the opinion that the High Court cannot be said to have committed a jurisdictional error in passing the impugned judgment. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/149969440/,Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; unsound_mind; nullity_sec19,2003,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,149969440,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/149969440/,41
Supreme Court of India,"Navtej Singh Johar vs Union Of India Ministry Of Law And ... on 6 September, 2018",AIR 2018 SUPREME COURT 4321,2018-09-06,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 115, Section 118, Section 120, Section 13, Section 139, Section 14, Section 144, Section 15, Section 16, Section 18, Section 186, Section 198, Section 2, Section 21, Section 21227, Section 22, Section 228, Section 27, Section 3, Section 30, Section 309, Section 32, Section 321, Section 337, Section 375, Section 376, Section 377, Section 4, Section 416, Section 424, Section 44, Section 49, Section 511, Section 515, Section 54, Section 558, Section 586, Section 6, Section 609, Section 620, Section 624, Section 66A, Section 677, Section 744, Section 833",Constitutional Validity; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 76 OF 2016 NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR & ORS. …Petitioner(s) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE …Respondent(s) WITH WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 572 OF 2016 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 88 OF 2018 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 100 OF 2018 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 101 OF 2018 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 121 OF 2018 JUDGMENT,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"‗By a metaphor the word intercourse, like the word commerce, is applied to the relations of the sexes. Here also there is the temporary visitation of one organism by a member of the other organisation, for certain clearly defined and limited objects. The primary object of the visiting organisation is to obtain euphoria by means of a detent of the nerves consequent on the sexual crisis. But there is no intercourse unless the visiting member is enveloped at least partially by the visited organism, for intercourse connotes reciprocity.‘ Therefore, to decide whether there is intercourse or not, what is to be considered is whether the visiting organ is enveloped at least partially by the visited organism. In intercourse between the thighs, the visiting male organ is enveloped at least partially by the organism visited, the thighs: the thighs are kept together and tight. 20. Then about penetration. The word ‗penetrate‘...","13. We have heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Saurabh Kirpal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016, Ms. Jayna Kothari, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 572 of 2016, Mr. Arvind P. Datar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 88 of 2018, Mr. Anand Grover, learned senior counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 100 of 2018 and 101 of 2018 and Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 121 of 2018. We have also heard Mr. Ashok Desai, Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Mr. Shyam Divan and Mr. Krishnan Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing for various intervenors in the matter. A compilation of written submissions has been filed by the petitioners as well as the intervenors. 14. We have heard Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General for the Union of India, Mr. K. Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel appearing in Interlocutory Application No. 94284 of 2018 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No....","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Dipak Misra, CJI (for himself and A.M. Khanwilkar, J.) CONTENTS S. No(s). Heading Page No(s) Signature Not Verified A. Introduction………………………………………… 3-11 Digitally signed by CHETAN KUMAR The Reference……………………………………… Date: 2018.09.06 15:12:35 IST Reason: B. 11-15 2 C. Submissions on behalf of the petitioners…… 15-30 D. Submissions on behalf of the respondents and other intervenors.………………………….… 31-44 E. Decisions in Naz Foundation and Suresh Koushal………………..…………………………….. 45-48 F. Other judicial pronouncements on Section 377 IPC ……………………….………………………….. 48-57 G. The Constitution – an organic charter of progressive rights………………………………… 57-64 H. Transformative constitutionalism and the rights of LGBT community………………………. 65-74 I. Constitutional morality and Section 377 IPC…. 74-81 J. Perspective of human dignity…………………… 81-89 K. Sexual orientation…………………………………. 89-96 L. Privacy and its concomitant aspects…………... 96-111 M. Doctrine of progressive realization of rights…………………………………………………. 111-118 N. International perspective…………………………. 118 (i) United States……………………………… 118-122 (ii) Canada…………………………………….. 123-125 (iii) South Africa………………………………. 125 (iv) United Kingdom…………………………. 126-127 (v) Other Courts/Jurisdictions…………….. 127-129 3 O. Comparative analysis of Section 375 and Section 377 IPC………………………………….… 129-140 P. The litmus test for survival of Section 377 IPC…….……………………………………………… 140-156 Q. Conclusions………………………………………… 156-166 A. Introduction Not for nothing, the great German thinker, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, had said, ―I am what I am, so take me as I am‖ and similarly, Arthur Schopenhauer had pronounced, ―No one can escape from their individuality‖. In this regard, it...","We allow the writ petition in the above terms.” 4. Despite the fact that no appeal was filed by the Union of India, in appeals filed by private individuals and groups, the 3 Supreme Court in Suresh Kumar Koushal and Anr. v. Naz Foundation and Ors. (“Suresh Kumar Koushal” ), (2014) 1 SCC 1, reversed the judgment of the High Court. Reviews that were filed against the aforesaid judgment, including by the Union of India, were dismissed by this Court. 5. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court delivered an important judgment reported as National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (“NALSA”), (2014) 5 SCC 438, which construed Articles 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India as including the right to gender identity and sexual orientation, and held that just like men and women, transgenders could enjoy all the fundamental rights that other citizens of India could enjoy. Thereafter, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (“Puttaswamy” ), (2017) 10 SCC 1, a nine-Judge Bench of this Court unanimously declared that there is a fundamental...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/168671544/ | AIR 2018 SUPREME COURT 4321, AIR 2018 SC( CRI) 1169, (2018) 4 MAD LJ(CRI) 306, (2018) 4 BOMCR(CRI) 289, (2018) 10 SCALE 386, 2019 (1) SCC (CRI) 1, (2018) 4 CURCRIR 1, (2018) 105 ALLCRIC 258, (2018) 3 ALLCRIR 3234, (2018) 3 CRIMES 233, 2018 (10) SCC 1, 2018 (190) AIC (SOC) 1 (SC), 252 (2018) DLT 1 (CN)(SC), 2018 (3) KCCR SN 325 (SC), 2018 (4) KLT SN 1 (KER), AIRONLINE 2018 SC 146",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; cruelty,2018,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 2018 SUPREME COURT 4321, AIR 2018 SC( CRI) 1169, (2018) 4 MAD LJ(CRI) 306, (2018) 4 BOMCR(CRI) 289, (2018) 10 SCALE 386, 2019 (1) SCC (CRI) 1, (2018) 4 CURCRIR 1, (2018) 105 ALLCRIC 258, (2018) 3 ALLCRIR 3234, (2018) 3 CRIMES 233, 2018 (10) SCC 1, 2018 (190) AIC (SOC) 1 (SC), 252 (2018) DLT 1 (CN)(SC), 2018 (3) KCCR SN 325 (SC), 2018 (4) KLT SN 1 (KER), AIRONLINE 2018 SC 146",168671544,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/168671544/,114
Supreme Court of India,"Sujata Uday Patil vs Uday Madhukar Patil on 13 December, 2006",2007 AIR SCW 896,2006-12-13,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125, Section 13, Section 18, Section 25, Section 28, Section 494",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 5779 of 2006 PETITIONER: Sujata Uday Patil RESPONDENT: Uday Madhukar Patil DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/12/2006 BENCH: G.P. Mathur & A.K. Mathur JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 18502-18503 of 2004) G.P. Mathur, J. Leave granted.","""After giving my thoughtful consideration the submissions made by the counsel for the parties and also having gone through the evidence recorded at the trial and findings recorded by the courts below and reasons assigned therefore, I am of the opinion that it was a case where the wife was guilty of deserting the husband without sufficient cause and the desertion was certainly with the intention to put an end to the matrimonial relations. The trial court as well as appellate court have rightly found that the wife was guilty of conduct amounting to cruelty. Here as rightly submitted by Mr. Dixit learned counsel for the respondent, the act of cruelty was pertinent and grave on account of police complaints lodged against the appellant and his father and that too during the period when the marriage of respondents brother was settled. It was in that background that the wife voluntarily left the matrimonial home and desertion on her part stood confirmed by the fact that she lived separately for over two years and did not make any efforts to come back to matrimonial home for cohabitation. The wife having failed to establish the alleged acts of cruelty on the part...","10. Matrimonial disputes have to be decided by courts in a pragmatic manner keeping in view the ground realities. For this purpose a host of factors have to be taken into consideration and the most important being whether the marriage can be saved and the husband and wife can live together happily and maintain a proper atmosphere at home for the upbringing of their offsprings. This the court has to decide in the fact and circumstances of each case and it is not possible to lay down any fixed standards or even guidelines. 11. In the case in hand it is an established fact that the respondent has married again and has a child from the second wife. In such circumstances even if the decree for divorce granted by the learned District Judge which has been affirmed by the High Court is set aside, as prayed by the appellant herein,...","""4. It is submitted that the petitioner in her application has pointed out that the respondent is holding agricultural land gut No. 34 admeasuring 24 are, gut No. 380/2 admeasuring 96 are and a residential house admeasuring 45/12.5 feet situated at Shevge, Tehsil- Pachora, District Jalgaon. It is submitted that the said properties are joint family properties and same are not the independent properties of the respondent. However, with consent of father and brother towards full and final settlement I am ready to give all the three aforesaid properties to the petitioner and son Charul in lieu of the maintenance subject to withdrawal of all the proceedings and orders obtained by the petitioner against respondent in various courts below.""","""After giving my thoughtful consideration the submissions made by the counsel for the parties and also having gone through the evidence recorded at the trial and findings recorded by the courts below and reasons assigned therefore, I am of the opinion that it was a case where the wife was guilty of deserting the husband without sufficient cause and the desertion was certainly with the intention to put an end to the matrimonial relations. The trial court as well as appellate court have rightly found that the wife was guilty of conduct amounting to cruelty. Here as rightly submitted by Mr. Dixit learned counsel for the respondent, the act of cruelty was pertinent and grave on account of police complaints lodged against the appellant and his father and that too during the period when the marriage of respondents brother was settled. It was in that background that the wife voluntarily left the matrimonial home and desertion on her part stood confirmed by the fact that she lived separately for over two years and did not make any efforts to come...","3. The marriage of the appellant and the respondent was performed on 1.3.1994 and a son Charul @ Chaitanya was born out of the wedlock on 6.2.1995. In the year 1999 the respondent (husband) filed a petition for a decree of divorce against the appellant (wife) under Section 13(1)(i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on the ground that the appellant had treated him with cruelty and had also deserted him for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. The petition was contested by the appellant on various grounds. The Joint Civil Judge (Senior Division) passed a decree for judicial separation on 10.12.2001. The appellant and respondent both preferred appeals against the said decree and the learned District Judge, Jalgaon, by the judgment and decree dated 12.11.2002, dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant and allowed the appeal filed by the respondent and dissolved the marriage of the parties by a decree of divorce. He further directed that the respondent shall pay permanent alimony @ Rs.700/- per month to the appellant and @ Rs.500/- per month to the son Charul @ Chaitanya. The second appeals preferred by the appellant against the decree passed by the learned District Judge were dismissed by the High Court on 9.3.2004. 6. Sub-section (1)...","2. These appeals, by the special leave, have been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 9.3.2004 of Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) by which the second appeals preferred by the appellant herein were dismissed and the decree of divorce passed by the learned District Judge, Jalgaon, on 12.11.2002 was affirmed. 4. The trial court held that the appellant behaved in a cruel manner and did not cohabit with the husband; that the husband failed to prove that the wife deserted him without any reasonable excuse and that the appellant was ill-treated by the respondent and his parents. On these findings the trial court came to a conclusion that the respondent was not entitled for a decree of divorce but had made out a case for judicial separation and a decree was accordingly passed. The learned District Judge, after a detailed discussion of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the wife had treated the husband with cruelty; that she had deserted the husband for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/814683/ | 2007 AIR SCW 896, 2006 (13) SCC 272, 2007 (2) AIR BOM R 551, 2007 (2) AIR KAR R 502, (2007) 2 ANDHLD 45, (2007) 2 ALL WC 1421, (2007) 1 ALLCRILR 734, (2007) 3 ALLMR 319 (SC), (2007) 1 DMC 6, (2007) MATLR 139, (2007) 1 CTC 266 (SC), (2007) 2 WLC(SC)CVL 158, (2007) 1 CIVILCOURTC 606, (2007) 1 HINDULR 546, (2007) 1 MARRILJ 255, (2007) 1 RECCIVR 404, (2007) 3 ICC 159, (2007) 51 ALLINDCAS 480 (SC), (2007) 3 ANDH LT 43, 2007 (1) KLT SN 43 (SC), (2007) 1 BOM CR 858, 2007 (2) AIR JHAR R 366, (2007) 66 ALL LR 787, (2007) 3 PUN LR 521, (2006) 13 SCALE 412, (2007) 2 JCR 229 (SC)",Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2006,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2007 AIR SCW 896, 2006 (13) SCC 272, 2007 (2) AIR BOM R 551, 2007 (2) AIR KAR R 502, (2007) 2 ANDHLD 45, (2007) 2 ALL WC 1421, (2007) 1 ALLCRILR 734, (2007) 3 ALLMR 319 (SC), (2007) 1 DMC 6, (2007) MATLR 139, (2007) 1 CTC 266 (SC), (2007) 2 WLC(SC)CVL 158, (2007) 1 CIVILCOURTC 606, (2007) 1 HINDULR 546, (2007) 1 MARRILJ 255, (2007) 1 RECCIVR 404, (2007) 3 ICC 159, (2007) 51 ALLINDCAS 480 (SC), (2007) 3 ANDH LT 43, 2007 (1) KLT SN 43 (SC), (2007) 1 BOM CR 858, 2007 (2) AIR JHAR R 366, (2007) 66 ALL LR 787, (2007) 3 PUN LR 521, (2006) 13 SCALE 412, (2007) 2 JCR 229 (SC)",814683,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/814683/,18
Supreme Court of India,"Ahmedabad Women Action Group (Awag) & ... vs Union Of India on 24 February, 1997",AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 3614,1997-02-24,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 13, Section 18, Section 2, Section 28, Section 3, Section 30, Section 494",Constitutional Validity,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"PETITIONER: AHMEDABAD WOMEN ACTION GROUP (AWAG) & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/02/1997 BENCH: CJI, SUJATA V. MANOHAR, K. VENKATASWAMIW I T HWRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 196 OF 1996LOK SEVAK SANGH & ORS.V.UNION OF INDIAW I T HWRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 721 OF 1996YOUNG WOMAN CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION (YWCA) & ORS.V.UNION OF INDIA ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T VENKATASWAMI. J. All these Writ Petitions are filed as Public Interest Litigation. In W.P. (C) No. 494/96. the reliefs prayed foe are as follows : (a) to declare muslim Personal Law which allows ploygamy as void as offending Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution; (b) to declare Muslim Personal Law which enables a Muslim male to give unilateral Talaq to his wife without her consent and without resort to judicial process of courts. as void, offending Articles 13. 14 and 15 of the Constitution; (c) to declare that the mere fact that a Muslim husband takes mote than one wife is an act of cruelty within the meaning of Clause VIII",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""A question has been raised as to whether it is for the Legislature to decide what constitutes social reform. It must not be forgotten that in democracy the Legislature is constituted by the chosen representatives of the people. They are responsible for the welfare of the State and it is for them to lay down the policy that the State should pursue Therefore. It is for them to determine what legislation to put up on the statute bock in order to advance the welfare of the State. ""The next question is whether this Act discriminates against the Hindus in reference to the Christian and the Parsi citizens of this State, in so the specially severe provisions as to punishment and procedure. It is true that whereas under the general criminal law the offence of bigamy is cognizable only on the complaint of the wife, the impugned Act makes it cognizable...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","(f) of Section 2 of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act. 1939. (d) to declare that muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce Act. 1986 is void as infringing Articles 14 and 15. (e) to further declare that the provisions of Sunni and Shia laws of inheritence which discriminate against females in their share as compared to the share of males of the same status. void as discriminating against females only on the ground of sex. In writ Petition (CO No. 196/96. the reliefs prayed for are the following:- (a) to declare Sections 2(2) . 5 (ii) & (iii), 6 and Explanation to Section 30 of Hindu Succession Act. 1956. as void offending Articles 14 and 15 read with Article 13 of the Constitution of India: (b) to declare Section (2) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , as void offending Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India; (c) to declare Sections 3 (2) , 6 and 9 of Hindu minority and Guardianship Act read with Sections 6 of Guardians and wards Act void; (d) to declare the unfettered and absolute discretion allowed to a Hindu spouse to make testamentary disposition without providing for an ascertained share of his or her spouse and dependant. void. In writ Petition (C) No. 721/96. the reliefs prayed for are following :- (a) to...","In the result and having regard to the earlier decisions of this Court noticed above, we decline to entertain these writ petitions. Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1743680/ | AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 3614, 1997 AIR SCW 1620, (1997) 2 SCR 389 (SC), 1997 (2) SCR 389, 1997 (3) SCC 573, (1997) MARRILJ 367, 1997 (2) SCALE 381, 1997 (3) ADSC 181, 1997 (1) UJ (SC) 548, (1997) 3 JT 171 (SC), 1997 (3) JT 171, 1997 UJ(SC) 1 548, (1997) 3 GUJ LR 1882, (1997) 2 HINDULR 258, (1997) 3 SCJ 107, (1997) 2 SCALE 381, (1997) 1 CURCC 470, (1997) 1 MAD LW 688, (1997) 2 DMC 224, (1997) 2 SUPREME 670, 1997 (100) BOM LR 150, 1997 BOM LR 2 150",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity,1997,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 3614, 1997 AIR SCW 1620, (1997) 2 SCR 389 (SC), 1997 (2) SCR 389, 1997 (3) SCC 573, (1997) MARRILJ 367, 1997 (2) SCALE 381, 1997 (3) ADSC 181, 1997 (1) UJ (SC) 548, (1997) 3 JT 171 (SC), 1997 (3) JT 171, 1997 UJ(SC) 1 548, (1997) 3 GUJ LR 1882, (1997) 2 HINDULR 258, (1997) 3 SCJ 107, (1997) 2 SCALE 381, (1997) 1 CURCC 470, (1997) 1 MAD LW 688, (1997) 2 DMC 224, (1997) 2 SUPREME 670, 1997 (100) BOM LR 150, 1997 BOM LR 2 150",1743680,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1743680/,11
Supreme Court of India,"Anil Kumar Mahsi vs Union Of India on 20 July, 1994",1994 SCC (5) 704,1994-07-20,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 377",Constitutional Validity; Adultery; Desertion; Wife Specific,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"PETITIONER: ANIL KUMAR MAHSI Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA DATE OF JUDGMENT20/07/1994 BENCH: SAWANT, P.B. BENCH: SAWANT, P.B. YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J) CITATION: 1994 SCC (5) 704 JT 1994 (4) 409 1994 SCALE (3)447 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(iii) coupled with marriage with another woman, (iv) coupled with cruelty which without adultery would have entitled her to divorce a mensa et thoro, (v) coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for two years or upwards. It is, therefore, clear that as far as the ground of adultery is concerned, it is the husband who is in a favourable position as against the wife, since it is not enough for the wife to prove adultery simpliciter on the part of her husband. To that extent, undoubtedly, it is the wife who is discriminated against. As regards the other grounds which are available to the wife to claim dissolution of the marriage, which grounds are impliedly not available to the husband, the same are as follows (a) that the husband has exchanged his profession of Christianity for the profession of some other religion and gone through a form of marriage with...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SAWANT, J.- The hearing of this petition is confined only to examining the vires of Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The petitioner was married to Respondent 2, Monika on 8-10-1986 as per the Christian rites in a Methodist Church at Muzaffarpur in Bihar. After marriage, the parties returned to Delhi on 10- 10-1986. Respondent-Monika, however, left the matrimonial home on 26-12-1986, i.e., two months and a fortnight thereafter and never returned to it again. It is not in dispute (respondent-Monika has not filed any counter to the petition) that the parties have been living separately since the day of the desertion by Monika on 26-12-1986 as alleged in the petition. The petitioner further alleges that she has been working as a teacher in St. Mary Girls' High School, Deogarh, Bihar. 2. In spite of notice to respondent-Monika and intimation to her that the petitioner had deposited Rs 3000 for her costs in attending the Court and the assistance of a Senior Advocate, Shri K.K. Venugopal is given to her to conduct her case, she has neither filed counter, nor attended the Court. On 706 the other hand, by a letter of 5-1-1993 she has intimated the Court that she is unable to attend...","11. In this view of the matter, we find no merit in the petition and it is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1953502/ | 1994 SCC (5) 704, JT 1994 (4) 409, AIRONLINE 1994 SC 710",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; adultery; desertion; wife_specific,1994,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 1994 SCC (5) 704, JT 1994 (4) 409, AIRONLINE 1994 SC 710",1953502,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1953502/,5
Supreme Court of India,"Anil Kumar Mahsi vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr. on 20 July, 1994",1994(3)ALT17(SC),1994-07-20,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 377",Constitutional Validity; Desertion; Adultery; Wife Specific,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT P.B. Sawant, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"It will be apparent from the aforesaid provisions that while the husband can seek dissolution of marriage on the ground that his wife has been guilty of adultery simpliciter, the wife has to prove that the husband has been guilty of adultery which is (i) incestuous, (ii) coupled with bigamy, (iii) coupled with marriage with another woman, (iv) coupled with cruelty which without adultery would have entitled her to divorce a mensa et tora, (v) coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for two years or upwards. It is, therefore, clear that as far as the ground of adultery is concerned, it is the husband who is in a favourable position as against the wife, since it is not enough for the wife of prove adultery simpliciter on the part of her husband. To that extent, undoubtedly, it is the wife who is discriminated against. As regards the other grounds which...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The hearing of this petition is confined only to examining the vires of Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 [hereinafter referred to as the ""Act""]. The petitioner was married to respondent No. 2, Monika on 8th October, 1986 as per the Christian rites in a Methodist Church at Muzaffarpur in Bihar. After marriage, the parties returned to Delhi on 10th October, 1986. Respondent-Monika, however, left the matrimonial home on 26th December, 1986, i.e., two months and a fortnight thereafter and never returned to. It again. It is not in dispute [respondent-Monika has not filed any counter to the petition] that the parties have been living separately since the day of the desertion by Monika on 26th December, 1986 as alleged in the petition. The petitioner further alleges that she has been working as a teacher in St. Marry Girls High School, Deogarh, Bihar. 2. In spite of notice to respondent-Monika and intimation to her that the petitioner had deposited Rs. 3,000 for her costs in attending the Court and the assistance of a senior advocate, Shri K.K. Venugopal is given to her to conduct her case, she has neither filed counter, nor attended the Court. On the other hand, by a letter of 5th January, 1993 she has intimated the Court that she is unable to attend...","7. In this view of the matter, we find no merit in the petition and it is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/198217826/ | 1994(3)ALT17(SC), I(1995)DMC254SC, JT1994(4)SC409, 1994(2)KLT399(SC), 1994(3)SCALE447, (1994)5SCC704, [1994]SUPP2SCR1, 1994(2)UJ412(SC)",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; desertion; adultery; wife_specific,1994,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 1994(3)ALT17(SC), I(1995)DMC254SC, JT1994(4)SC409, 1994(2)KLT399(SC), 1994(3)SCALE447, (1994)5SCC704, [1994]SUPP2SCR1, 1994(2)UJ412(SC)",198217826,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/198217826/,5
Supreme Court of India,"Jane Kaushik vs Union Of India on 17 October, 2025",Jane Kaushik vs Union Of India,2025-10-17,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 105, Section 11, Section 13, Section 14, Section 141, Section 15, Section 16, Section 18, Section 2, Section 21, Section 22, Section 3, Section 35, Section 357, Section 377, Section 424, Section 44, Section 497, Section 7, Section 8, Section 9",Constitutional Validity; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2025 INSC 1248 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1405 OF 2023 JANE KAUSHIK …PETITIONER VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT J.B. PARDIWALA & R. MAHADEVAN, JJ. , For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the following parts:- INDEX A. FACTUAL MATRIX........................................................................................... 4 B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES. .................................... 15 I. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER. .............................................. 15 II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 (“THE FIRST SCHOOL”). ............................................................................................................... 21 III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 4 (“THE SECOND SCHOOL”). ............................................................................................................... 23 C. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION ................................................................ 24 D. ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................... 25 I. OPENING REMARKS ......................................................................................... 25 II. RETHINKING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE 2019 ACT. ................................................................................................................ 34 a. Evolution of Canadian Jurisprudence. .......................................................... 44 b. A Reading of Reasonable Accommodation for Gender Dysphoria in the United States of America ..................................................................................... 46 c. EU on Reasonable Accommodation .............................................................. 48 III. ADDRESSING OMISSION IN DISCRIMINATION LAW ....................................... 50 a. A Four-Dimensional Approach to Address Substantial Equality: Situating ‘Discrimination’ in Omissive Discrimination ..................................................... 52 i. Redressing disadvantage. ..................................................................... 53 ii. Addressing stigma and stereotypes .................................................... 71 iii. Enhancement of voice...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. It has been more than half a decade since the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights Act ), 2019 (the “2019 Act”), came to be enacted and it has been more than a decade since this Court rendered the judgment in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (“NALSA”), reported in (2014) 5 SCC 438. However, the question whether the transgender persons are living a life with dignity continues to beg for an answer. One may get to read a lot about their rights in the statute books, but the reality is that these rights remain only an empty formality. 2. There is no gainsaying that the Union of India and the States need to do a lot more to create mechanisms for the transgender persons to translate their rights into reality. The lethargy exhibited on part of the concerned Government has also led the non-state establishments to put...","02.12.2022. During these eight days, it is alleged that she was subjected to name-calling, harassment and body shaming by her colleagues and students for her inability to conform to the gender norms of a ‘female’ body. On 01.12.2022, the petitioner informed the Principal of the First School about the harassment she was being subjected to. The materials on record reveal that the Principal took cognizance of one specific faculty-member exhibiting hostile behavior towards Ms. Jane. The school Principal assured that the management would be talking to the concerned teacher to discontinue the harassment and assured her of all the support. iii. It is the case of the petitioner that on 03.12.2022 she was forced to resign on account of having revealed her identity to one of the students at the school. It is her case that the school attempted to garner a resignation from her forcefully, by threatening her that they would withhold her monetary compensation for the period of eight days during which she had worked. In the resignation letter as well, she cited the reason that the school...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","12. Mr. Yashraj Singh Deora, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that lack of adequate compliance, enforcement and implementation of the 2019 Act and the 2020 Rules by the State Respondents has led to the discrimination W.P. (C) No. 1405 of 2023 Page 15 of 176 faced by the Petitioner. He submitted that the First and the Second School respectively could be said to have flagrantly violated the provisions of the 2019 Act by not providing a procedure for grievance redressal as per Section 11 of the 2019 Act and Rule 13 of the 2020 Rules respectively. He brought to our notice that the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3-States have failed to notify the Rules under Section 22(1) of the 2019 Act. He submitted that the statutory protections for the transgender persons, are failing to have a trickle down effect. 13. Mr. Deora submitted that the present petition seeks the enforcement of Fundamental Rights as enshrined under Articles 14 , 15 , 17 , 19 and 21 respectively, and the following statutory recognitions of these Fundamental Rights and corresponding duties of the Respondents under the 2019 Act: i) Section 3(b) of the 2019 Act which prohibits discrimination through unfair treatment in employment or occupation. ii) Section 3(c) of the 2019 Act which prohibits discrimination through denial of or termination from employment...","51. Indirect discrimination has also been recognised by the High Courts in India [Patel Suleman Gaibi v. State of Maharashtra, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4639 : (2015) 3 Mah LJ 855] . For instance, in the matters of public sector employment, the Delhi High Court in Ravina v. Union of India [Ravina v. Union of India, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 14619] and in Madhu v. Northern Railway [Madhu v. Northern Railway, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6660. A challenge to conditions of employment/promotion in the Army Dental Corps was also made before the Delhi High Court in Jacqueline Jacinta Dias v. Union of India , 2018 SCC OnLine Del 12426. However, the challenge could not succeed as the Court failed to discern any manifest bias. In doing so however, the High Court pointed out to the lack of clear norms regarding indirect discrimination in India and noted : ( Jacqueline Jacinta Dias case, SCC OnLine Del para 35)“35. This Court is conscious of the fact that indirect discrimination is harder to prove or establish. Hidden biases, where establishments or individuals do...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/109624343/,Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; cruelty,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,109624343,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/109624343/,42
Supreme Court of India,"Geddam Jhansi vs The State Of Telangana on 7 February, 2025",Geddam Jhansi vs The State Of Telangana,2025-02-07,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 155, Section 156, Section 3, Section 41, Section 482, Section 498A",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2025 INSC 160 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). _____ OF 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.9556 of 2022) GEDDAM JHANSI & ANR. ...APPELLANTS (S) VERSUS THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S) With CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). _____ OF 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.428 of 2024 GEDDAM JHANSI ...APPELLANTS (S) VERSUS THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J. Leave granted in both the SLPs. 17:42:54 IST Reason: 2. This common order disposes of both the Criminal Appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9556 of 2022 and Special 1 Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 428 of 2024 as both these appeals relate to similar and connected incidents.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 19. Perusal of the charge-sheet would show that the investigating agency had relied on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two other witnesses who are Panchayat elders to substantiate the allegations. As far as the statement of the complainant is concerned, it is in the form of the complaint which has been already reproduced hereinabove. We will now examine whether any new or fresh evidence has 10 been revealed in the course of the investigation from the examination of other witnesses, namely, the complainant's parents and the two panchayat witnesses. 20. The statements of the parents are carbon copy of each other and as such we may refer to the statement...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9556 of 2022 was filed against the judgement and order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 3105 of 2022 whereunder the High Court declined to quash the criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 46 of 2022 under Section 498A , 506 Indian Penal Code (for short “ IPC ”) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short “ Dowry Act ”) pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “ CrPC ”) by holding that, prima facie, there are certain allegations against both the appellants, Geddam Jhansi and Geddam Sathyakama Jabali, and that these are triable issues for which the appellants have to face trial and prove their innocence. 4. Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 428 of 2024 has been preferred against the judgement and order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 1002 of 2022 whereunder the High Court declined to quash the criminal proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short “ DV Act ”) in DVC No. 25...","40. Accordingly, we allow both the present Criminal Appeals as below: February 07, 2025.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/192533816/,Cruelty,cruelty,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,192533816,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/192533816/,11
Supreme Court of India,"Rajiv Varghese vs Rosy Chakkrammakkil Francis on 19 November, 2024",Rajiv Varghese vs Rosy Chakkrammakkil Francis,2024-11-19,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2024 INSC 876 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. …………………. OF 2024 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.4109 OF 2023) DR. RAJIV VERGHESE …APPELLANT VERSUS ROSE CHAKKRAMMANKKIL FRANCIS …RESPONDENT With Civil Appeal No…………………of 2024 (arising out of SLP(C) No.19922 of 2023) JUDGMENT 1. Leave granted. 2. These are two appeals arising out of the impugned order dated 01.12.2022 passed by the Madras High Court in C.M.A. No.1539 of 2022, whereby the High Court has reduced the maintenance amount to be paid to the wife from Rs.1,75,000/-(Rupees One Lakh and Seventy-five thousand only) per month to Signature Not Verified Rs.80,000/- (Rupees Eighty Thousand only) per Digitally signed by month. Both parties have challenged the said order NEETU KHAJURIA Date: 2024.11.19 19:12:43 IST Reason: of the High Court. The husband is the appellant in appeal @ SLP(C) No.4109/2023 and the wife is the appellant in appeal @ SLP(C) No.19922/2023. The husband is praying for further reduction of the maintenance amount and the wife is praying for enhancement of the same. For our purpose, the wife will be referred to as the ‘appellant’ and the husband as the ‘respondent’.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. The factual background of the present case is that the marriage between the appellant wife and respondent husband was solemnised on 15.09.2008 according to Christian customs. The respondent husband had one son from his previous marriage and there are no issues from this marriage. As the relations between the parties got estranged, on 19.03.2019, the respondent husband filed a petition for divorce being IDOP No.1284 of 2019 under Section 10(i) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 stating that the parties have developed incompatibility. He alleged cruelty while citing various incidents and prayed for divorce. 4. During the pendency of the divorce petition, the appellant wife herein filed an application being I.A No.1 of 2019 in IDOP No.1294 of 2019 before the SLP(CIVIL) NO.4109 OF 2023 Page 2 of 9 Family Court, Chennai praying for maintenance of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lakh and Fifty Thousand only) per month along with litigation expenses amounting to Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakh only). The wife claimed that the husband is a Cardiologist in MJ Hospital, Cochin and draws a salary of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh and Fifty Thousand only) per month. Plus, he has further income from a joint venture, by virtue of which he is earning a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakh only) per month. Further, he is earning rental income from...","12. Consequently, we allow the appeal of the appellant wife and set aside the order of the Madras High Court dated 01.12.2022 and restore the order of the Family Court. The respondent husband is directed to pay a sum of Rs.1,75,000/- (Rupees One Lakh and Seventy Five Thousand only) per month as interim maintenance as per the order of the Family Court dated 14.06.2022. 13. The appeal of respondent husband is accordingly dismissed in view of the above reasoning. …………………………………………J. (VIKRAM NATH) …………………………………………J. (PRASANNA B. VARALE) NEW DELHI NOVEMBER 19, 2024 SLP(CIVIL) NO.4109 OF 2023 Page 9 of 9",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/87105153/,Unclear,unclear,2024,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,87105153,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/87105153/,4
Supreme Court of India,"Mr. 'X' vs Hospital 'Z' on 21 September, 1998",AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 495,1998-09-21,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 13, Section 2, Section 20A, Section 27, Section 32, Section 33",Constitutional Validity; Venereal Disease; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 4641 of 1998 PETITIONER: MR. 'X' RESPONDENT: HOSPITAL 'Z' DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/09/1998 BENCH: S. SAGHIR AHMAD & B.N. KIRPAL JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT 1998 Supp(1) SCR 723 The Judgment of the Court Was delivered by SAGHIR AHMAD, J. Infringement of 'Suspended Right to marry' cannot be legally compensated by damages either in Torts or common law, is our answer to the problem raised in this appeal which is based on the peculiar facts of its own. the appellant; after obtaining the Degree of MBBS in 1987 from Jawaharlal Institute of Post Graduate Medical Education and Research. Chandigarh, completed his internship and junior residence at the same college. In June, 1990 he joined the Nagaland State Medical and Health Service as Assistant Surgeon Grade-I. Thereafter, the appellant joined the MD Pharmacology Course though he continued in the Nagaland State Service on .the condition that he would resume his duties after completing the MD Course. In September, 1991 the appellant joined the further Course of Diploma in Opthamalogy which completed in April, 1993, In August, 1993 he resumed his duties in the Nagaland State Health Service as Assistant Surgeon Grade-I. One Itokhu Yepthomi who was ailing from a disease...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a ""right to be let alone:"" A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent - whether truthful of otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however; be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy,"" In an American decision, Jane Roe v. Henry Wade, 410 US 113, the Supreme Court of United States said that : ""Although the Constitution of the U.S.A. does not explicitly...","Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that the principle of"" ""duty of care"" as applicable to persons in medical profession. includes the duty to maintain confidentiality and since this duty was violated by the respondents, they are liable in damages to the appellant. Duty to maintain confidentiality has its origin in the Hippocratic Oath, which is an ethical code attributed to the ancient Greek physician Hippocrates, adopted as a guide to conduct by the medical profession throughout the ages and still used in the graduation ceremonies of many medical schools and colleges: Hippocrates lived and practised as a Physician between third and first Century B.C. He has been referred to by Plato as a famous Ascleplad who had philosophical approach to medicine. His manuscripts, the Hippocratic Collection (Corpus Hippocracticum), contained the Hippocractie Oath which is reproduced below : ""I swear by Apollo the physician and Aesculapius and health and all-heal and all the gods and goddesses that according to my ability arid judgment I will keep this path and this stipulation - to reckon him who taught me...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Here, in this country, there is the Indian Medical Council Act , which controls the medical education and regulates the professional conduct. Section 20A which was inserted by the Indian Medical Council (Amendment) Act 1964 provides as under : ""Professional Conduct : (1) The Council may prescribe the standards of professional con-duct and etiquette and a code of ethics for medical practitioners, (2) Regulations made by the Council under sub-section (1) may specify which violations thereof shall constitute infamous conduct in any professional respect, that it is to say, professional misconduct, and such provision shall have effect notwithstanding anything Contained in any law for the time being in' force."" At the same time, that is, by the same Amending Act ; clause (m) was also introduced in Section 33 and this clause provides as under : ""33. Power to make regulations - The Council may, with the previous sanction of the Central Government, make regulations generally to carry out the purposes of this Act, and, without prejudice to the generality of this power, such regulations may provide for - (a) xxx xxx xxx (m) the standards of professional conduct and etiquette and code of ethics to be observed by medical practitioners,"" It is under these provisions that the Code of Medical Ethics has been made by the Indian Medical Council...","For the reasons stated above, the appeal is without merits and is, consequently, dismissed.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/382721/ | AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 495, 1998 (8) SCC 296, 1998 AIR SCW 3662, (1999) 1 KER LT 14, 1999 BLJR 2 1306, (1999) 1 ALLMR 469 (SC), 1999 (1) COM LJ 23 SC, (1999) 2 BLJ 634, 1999 (1) UJ (SC) 232, 1998 (6) SCALE 230, 1999 (1) SRJ 88, 1998 (9) ADSC 109, 1999 UJ(SC) 1 232, (1998) 7 JT 626 (SC), 1998 (7) JT 626, (1999) 2 EASTCRIC 18, (1999) 1 GUJ LH 1008, (1999) 1 MAHLR 750, (1998) 9 SUPREME 220, (1999) 1 RECCIVR 324, (1998) 6 SCALE 230, (1999) 1 ALL WC 274, (1999) 2 ANDHWR 205, (1998) 3 CPJ 12, (1999) 2 BOM CR 474",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; venereal_disease; nullity_sec19,1998,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 495, 1998 (8) SCC 296, 1998 AIR SCW 3662, (1999) 1 KER LT 14, 1999 BLJR 2 1306, (1999) 1 ALLMR 469 (SC), 1999 (1) COM LJ 23 SC, (1999) 2 BLJ 634, 1999 (1) UJ (SC) 232, 1998 (6) SCALE 230, 1999 (1) SRJ 88, 1998 (9) ADSC 109, 1999 UJ(SC) 1 232, (1998) 7 JT 626 (SC), 1998 (7) JT 626, (1999) 2 EASTCRIC 18, (1999) 1 GUJ LH 1008, (1999) 1 MAHLR 750, (1998) 9 SUPREME 220, (1999) 1 RECCIVR 324, (1998) 6 SCALE 230, (1999) 1 ALL WC 274, (1999) 2 ANDHWR 205, (1998) 3 CPJ 12, (1999) 2 BOM CR 474",382721,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/382721/,13
Supreme Court of India,"Lachman Utamchand Kiriplani vs Meena Alias Mota on 14 August, 1963",1964 AIR 40,1963-08-14,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 2, Section 23, Section 3, Section 9",Desertion; Cruelty; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"The result of the said discussion may be stated thus The legal burden is upon the petitioning spouse to establish by convincing evidence beyond any reasonable doubt that the respondent abandoned him or her without reasonable cause. The petitioner must also prove that there was desertion throughout the statutory period and there was no bona fide attempt on the respondent's part to return to the matrimonial home and that the petitioner did not prevent the other spouse by his or her action by word or conduct from cohabitation. The expression ""willful neglect"" included in the section does not introduce a new concept in Indian law unknown to the English law, but is only an affirmation of the doctrine of constructive desertion. The said doctrine is not rigid but elastic and without doing violence to the principles governing it, it can be applied to the peculiar situations that arise in an Indian society and home. No inspiration could 'be derived from s. 9 of the Act in order to construe the scope of the expression ""without reasonable cause"" and whether there is a reasonable cause or not is a question of fact to be decided on the facts of each case....",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"Even at the outset we might state that the decision of the appeal does not depend so much on any substantial question of law but rather on an appreciation of the facts on two matters on the basis of which the learned Judges of the High Court have decided the case against the appellant: (1) whether the appellant had established that the respondent had an irrevocable determination to break up the matrimonial home when she admittedly left the petitioner on February 26, 1954, and did not return to him thereafter, it being common ground that the onus of proving this to the reasonable satisfaction of the Court was on the appellant, and (2) whether the respondent had a justifiable cause for not returning to the husband the existence of which prevented her admitted absence from the matrimonial home from constituting ""desertion"" as to serve as the foundation for an order...","The result of the said discussion may be stated thus The legal burden is upon the petitioning spouse to establish by convincing evidence beyond any reasonable doubt that the respondent abandoned him or her without reasonable cause. The petitioner must also prove that there was desertion throughout the statutory period and there was no bona fide attempt on the respondent's part to return to the matrimonial home and that the petitioner did not prevent the other spouse by his or her action by word or conduct from cohabitation. The expression ""willful neglect"" included in the section does not introduce a new concept in Indian law unknown to the English law, but is only an affirmation of the doctrine of constructive desertion. The said doctrine is not rigid but elastic and without doing violence to the principles governing it, it can be applied to the peculiar situations that arise in an Indian society and home. No inspiration could 'be derived from s. 9 of the Act in order to construe the scope of the expression ""without reasonable cause"" and whether there...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","PETITIONER: LACHMAN UTAMCHAND KIRIPLANI Vs. RESPONDENT: MEENA alias MOTA DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/08/1963 BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) SUBBARAO, K. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR CITATION: 1964 AIR 40 1964 SCR (4) 331 CITATOR INFO : R 1972 SC 459 (5) ACT: Husband and wife-judicial separation-Desertion without just- cause-offer to return to matrimonial home must be shown to be bona fide-Petition for judicial separation-Burden of proof-Hindx Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), s. 10(1)(a). HEADNOTE: Where an application is made under s. 10(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for a decree for judicial separation on the ground of desertion, the legal burden is upon the petitioning spouse to establish by convincing evidence beyond any reasonable doubt that the respondent intentionally forsook and abandoned him or her without reasonable cause. The petitioner must also prove that there was desertion throughout the statutory period and there was no bona fide attempt on the respondent's part to return to the matrimonial home and that the petitioner did not by his or her action by word or conduct provide a just cause to the other spouse to desist from, making any attempt at reconciliation or resuming cohabitation; -but where, however, on the facts it is clear that the conduct of the deserted spouse has had no...","The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court reversed and the decree for judicial, separation passed by the learned trial judge restored with costs here and in the High Court. For the aforesaid reasons, I agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court. The appeal deserves to be dismissed and I accordingly dismiss it with costs. ORDER OF COURT In accordance with the majority opinion, the appeal is allowed with costs here and in the High Court.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1376469/ | 1964 AIR 40, 1964 SCR (4) 331, AIR 1964 SUPREME COURT 40",Desertion,desertion; cruelty; adultery,1963,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 1964 AIR 40, 1964 SCR (4) 331, AIR 1964 SUPREME COURT 40",1376469,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1376469/,32
Supreme Court of India,"Jeet Singh And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Ors. on 25 November, 1992",1992(3)SCALE233,1992-11-25,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 19, Section 2, Section 23, Section 3, Section 494, Section 64, Section 82",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT V. Ramaswami, J. 1. The facts as found by the courts below are as follows. Jeet Singh the appellant in the Civil Appeal No. 3732 of 82 had two wives. The first wife is the appellant in the Civil Appeal No. 3733 of 82. She filed sometime in 1966 a criminal complaint against her husband under Sections 494 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code. During the pendency of the criminal proceedings they entered into a compromise before a Nyaya Panchayat constituted under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 and the same was recorded by the Adalat Nyaya Panchayat Angadpur Mukam, Meerut District and that consent order dated 14.11.1966 recorded by the Nyaya Panchayat reads as follows:",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Today dated 14th November, 1966, A.D. Nyaya Panchayat held meeting under the Chairmanship of Sri Bhanwar Singh Sarpanch. Sri Hem Raj Son of Ram Sharrna Brahman, resident of Village Barawad. Jeet Singh, S/o Hem Raj and Smt. Ramo Devi wife of Jeet Singh Brahman, resident of Village Barawad party one and Smt. Maya Wati daughter of Nam Chand, resident of Village Chhaprauli second party with some of their relations are also present. Before the panch both parties stated that Smt. Maya Wati Devi had filed a case under Section 494 / 109 , Indian Penal Code, against Hem Raj and others and continuance of criminal case shall ruin the family. Relatives of both parties have come and wish to resolve the dispute by mutual settlement. They want to enter into settlement and get it verified. Both the parties by agreement have entered into the following settlement which both the parties and their relatives have admitted before the Sarpanch and panchs and verified the same. The settlement is like this. Smt. Mayawati, who has filed a criminal case before a Magistrate at Meerut, shall get it dismissed. Hem Raj out of his property shall execute a sale deed in favour of Smt. Maya Wati Devi of two Bhumidhari plots Khasra numbers 157, 17 biswa and 159, 6 biswa 14 biswansis for...",We are unable to agree with the ratio of this judgment. As already stated it is not correct to say that there arc no provisions for Muslims or the Christians for obtaining orders of judicial separation in a court of law. Apart from that if under any personal law the person is not entitled to get any order of a court for a judicial separation it would only mean that they would not be entitled to the benefit of exclusion provided under the definition. We are unable to agree with the learned Judge that separation other than the one which was in pursuance of an order of court could be recognised for the purpose of Section 3(7) . In the result the appeals fail and they are dismissed.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/315012/ | 1992(3)SCALE233, (1993)1SCC325, [1992]SUPP3SCR246, AIRONLINE 1993 SC 384, AIRONLINE 1992 SC 241",Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,1992,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 1992(3)SCALE233, (1993)1SCC325, [1992]SUPP3SCR246, AIRONLINE 1993 SC 384, AIRONLINE 1992 SC 241",315012,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/315012/,3
Supreme Court of India,"Molly Joseph @ Nish vs George Sebastian @ Joy on 18 September, 1996",AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 109,1996-09-18,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 3, Section 4",Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"PETITIONER: MOLLY JOSEPH @ NISH Vs. RESPONDENT: GEORGE SEBASTIAN @ JOY DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/09/1996 BENCH: N.P. SINGH, S.B. MAJUMDAR ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT: O R D E R This appeal has been filed on behalf of the wife for setting aside the judgment of the Special Bench of the Kerala High Court, directing the District Judge to conduct enquiry into the allegations relating to the subsistence of a former marriage of the appellant and then to pass a decree accordance with law. A petition was filed by the respondent- husband before the District Judge for a declaration that (i) the marriage with the appellant is nullity on the ground he marriage between the appellant and one Prince Joseph was subsisting on the date the appellant married the respondent; (ii) the appellant was insane and continued to be so till the date of marriage. That application was contested by the appellant saying that although she had married earlier with aforesaid Prince Joseph, the said marriage was annulled by the order of the Ecclesiastical Tribunal (Church Court as it is referred to at times). It was also asserted on her behalf that previous marriage was known to the respondent and inspite of...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(1) that the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage and at the time of the institution of the suit; (2) that the parties are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity (whether natural or legal) or affinity; (3) that either party was a lunatic or idiot at the time of the marriage; (4) that the former husband or wife of either party was living at the time of the marriage, and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force. Nothing in this section shall affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to maks decrees of nullity of marriage on the ground that the consert of either party was obtained by force or fraud.""",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The learned District Judge did not conduct any enquiry and he declared the marriage between the appellant and the respondent a nullity merely on basis of the pleadings of the parties. According to him, as the appellant had admitted the earlier marriage and as there was no decree of any Civil Court in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as the ' Divorce Act ') the former marriage continued inspite of annulment order passed by the Ecclesiastical Tribunal, and the marriage had to be declared a nullity because of Section 19(4) of the Divorce Act. As required by Section 20 read with Section 17 of the aforesaid Act the order of the District Judge was placed before a Bench of three Judges presided over by Justice K.T. Thomas (as he then was) for confirmation. The High Court held: ""Canon Law (or personal law of Christians) can have theological or acclesiastical implications to the parties. But after the Divorce Act came into force a dissolution or annulment granted under such personal law cannot have any legal impact as statute has provided a different procedure and a different code for divorce or annulment."" This appeal is against the aforesaid judgment of the High Court. The preamble of the Divorce Act says: ""Whereas it is expedient...","As the District Judge had disposed of the application for divorce without any enquiry into the allegations relating to the subsistence of the former marriage, the High Court was justified in remitting the matter to the District Judge for fresh decision in accordance with law. We find no reason to interfere with the said order. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/250473/ | AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 109, 1996 (6) SCC 337, AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 109(2), 1996 AIR SCW 4267, (1997) 1 MATLR 38, (1997) 1 KER LT 1, (1997) MARRILJ 127, (1996) 9 JT 120 (SC), 1996 (9) JT 120, 1996 (2) UJ (SC) 729, (1997) 1 MAD LJ 109, (1996) 2 DMC 452, (1997) 1 HINDULR 5, (1996) 3 SCJ 532, (1997) 1 LJR 231, (1997) 1 CIVLJ 411, (1996) 4 CURCC 79, (1996) 2 RENCR 573, (1996) 4 ICC 586, 1996 (6) SCC 228, (1997) 1 MAD LJ 109.1, (1997) 1 RENCJ 579, (1997) 5 SCJ 220, 1997 HRR 106, 1997 SCFBRC 37",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19,1996,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 109, 1996 (6) SCC 337, AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 109(2), 1996 AIR SCW 4267, (1997) 1 MATLR 38, (1997) 1 KER LT 1, (1997) MARRILJ 127, (1996) 9 JT 120 (SC), 1996 (9) JT 120, 1996 (2) UJ (SC) 729, (1997) 1 MAD LJ 109, (1996) 2 DMC 452, (1997) 1 HINDULR 5, (1996) 3 SCJ 532, (1997) 1 LJR 231, (1997) 1 CIVLJ 411, (1996) 4 CURCC 79, (1996) 2 RENCR 573, (1996) 4 ICC 586, 1996 (6) SCC 228, (1997) 1 MAD LJ 109.1, (1997) 1 RENCJ 579, (1997) 5 SCJ 220, 1997 HRR 106, 1997 SCFBRC 37",250473,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/250473/,5
Supreme Court of India,"Rajnesh vs Neha on 4 November, 2020",AIR 2021 SUPREME COURT 569,2020-11-04,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 106, Section 12, Section 125, Section 128, Section 151, Section 165, Section 17, Section 18, Section 19, Section 199, Section 2, Section 20, Section 209, Section 21, Section 22, Section 23, Section 24, Section 25, Section 26, Section 28, Section 28A, Section 3, Section 340, Section 36, Section 37, Section 4, Section 421, Section 488, Section 5, Section 6, Section 9",Constitutional Validity; Conversion; Nullity Sec19; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 730 OF 2020 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9503 of 2018) RAJNESH …APPELLANT Versus NEHA & Anr. …RESPONDENTS INDEX PART A Order passed in Criminal Appeal No.730 of 2020 PART B General Guidelines and Directions I. Issue of Overlapping Jurisdictions II. Payment of interim maintenance III. Criteria for determining quantum of maintenance IV. Date from which Maintenance to be awarded V. Enforcement of orders of maintenance VI. Final Directions Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Jatinder Kaur Date: 2020.11.04 13:33:16 IST Reason: 1 INDU MALHOTRA, J. PART A Leave granted. (i) The present Criminal Appeal arises out of an application for Interim Maintenance filed in a petition u/S. 125 Cr.P.C. by the Respondent-wife and minor son. The Respondent No.1-wife left the matrimonial home in January 2013, shortly after the birth of the son-Respondent No.2. On 02.09.2013, the wife filed an application for interim maintenance u/S. 125 Cr.P.C. on behalf of herself and the minor son. The Family Court vide a detailed Order dated 24.08.2015 awarded interim maintenance of Rs.15,000 per month to the Respondent No.1- wife from 01.09.2013; and Rs.5,000 per month as interim maintenance for...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"“18. Maintenance of wife.— (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime. (2) A Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance— (a) if he is guilty of desertion, that is to say, of abandoning her without reasonable cause and without her consent or against her wish or willfully neglecting her; (b) if he has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live with her husband; (c) [****] (d) if he has any other wife living; (e) if he keeps a concubine in the same house in which his wife is living or habitually resides with a concubine elsewhere; (f) if...","(v) By a subsequent Order dated 05.08.2020, it was recorded that an Affidavit of Compliance had been filed on 04.08.2020 by the Appellant-husband, wherein it was stated that arrears of Rs.1,45,000 till 11.09.2019 had been paid by him in January, 2020. However, he had made no further payment to the wife thereafter. With respect to the amount of Rs.10,000 p.m. payable for the minor son, the Order had been complied with till July 2020. A statement was made by the Counsel for the Appellant that he was not disputing the payment of maintenance for his son, and would continue to pay the same. A direction was issued by this Court to pay the entire arrears of maintenance to the wife @ Rs.15,000 p.m. as 3 fixed by the Family Court, and continue to pay the said amount during the pendency of proceedings. (vi) By the Order dated 25.08.2020, it was noted that the Appellant had filed an Affidavit dated 23.08.2020 wherein he had admitted and acknowledged that an amount of Rs.5,00,000 was pending towards arrears of maintenance to the Respondent...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","PART B Given the backdrop of the facts of the present case, which reveal that the application for interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. has remained pending before the Courts for seven years now, and the difficulties encountered in the enforcement of orders passed by the Courts, as the wife was constrained to move successive applications for enforcement from time to time, we deem it appropriate to frame guidelines on the issue of maintenance, which would cover overlapping jurisdiction under different enactments for payment of maintenance, payment of Interim Maintenance, the criteria for determining the quantum of maintenance, the date from which maintenance is to be awarded, and enforcement of orders of maintenance. Guidelines / Directions on Maintenance Maintenance laws have been enacted as a measure of social justice to provide recourse to dependant wives and children for their financial support, so as to prevent them from falling into destitution and vagrancy. Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India provides that : “Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children.” Article 15 (3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India, which envisages a positive role for the State in fostering change towards the empowerment of women, led to the enactment of various legislations from time to time. Justice Krishna...","“8. Section 24 of the Act empowers the matrimonial court to award maintenance pendente lite and also litigation expenses to a needy and indigent spouse so that the proceedings can be conducted without any hardship on his or her part. The proceedings under this Section are summary in nature and confers a substantial right on the applicant during the pendency of the proceedings. Where this amount is not paid to the applicant, then the very object and purpose of this provision stands defeated. No doubt, remedy of execution of decree or order passed by the matrimonial court is available under Section 28A of the Act, but the same would not be a bar to striking off the defence of the spouse who violates the interim order of maintenance and litigation expenses passed by the said Court. In other words, the striking off the defence of the spouse not honouring the court's interim order is the instant relief to the needy one instead of waiting endlessly till its execution under Section 28A of the Act. Where the spouse who is to...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/117541087/ | AIR 2021 SUPREME COURT 569, AIRONLINE 2020 SC 915",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; conversion; nullity_sec19; desertion,2020,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 2021 SUPREME COURT 569, AIRONLINE 2020 SC 915",117541087,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/117541087/,52
Supreme Court of India,"Samar Ghosh vs Jaya Ghosh on 26 March, 2007",AIRONLINE 2007 SC 347,2007-03-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 1, Section 10, Section 13, Section 3",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 151 of 2004 PETITIONER: Samar Ghosh RESPONDENT: Jaya Ghosh DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/03/2007 BENCH: B.N. Agrawal, P.P. Naolekar & Dalveer Bhandari JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T Dalveer Bhandari, J. This is yet another unfortunate matrimonial dispute which has shattered the twenty two year old matrimonial bond between the parties. The appellant and the respondent are senior officials of the Indian Administrative Service, for short 'IAS'. The appellant and the respondent were married on 13.12.1984 at Calcutta under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 . The respondent was a divorcee and had a female child from her first marriage. The custody of the said child was given to her by the District Court of Patna where the respondent had obtained a decree of divorce against her first husband, Debashish Gupta, who was also an I.A.S. officer. The appellant and the respondent knew each other since 1983. The respondent, when she was serving as the Deputy Secretary in the Department of Finance, Government of West Bengal, used to meet the appellant between November 1983 and June 1984. They cultivated close friendship which later developed into courtship. The respondent's first husband, Debashish Gupta filed a belated...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"The learned Additional District Judge decreed the appellant's suit on the ground of mental cruelty. We deem it appropriate to analyze whether the High Court was justified in reversing the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge in view of the law declared by a catena of cases. We deem it appropriate to deal with the decided cases. Before we critically examine both the judgments in the light of settled law, it has become imperative to understand and comprehend the concept of cruelty. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines 'cruelty' as 'the quality of being cruel; disposition of inflicting suffering; delight in or indifference to another's pain; mercilessness; hard-heartedness'. The term ""mental cruelty"" has been defined in the Black's Law Dictionary [8th Edition, 2004] as under: ""Mental Cruelty - As a ground for divorce, one spouse's course of conduct (not involving actual violence) that creates such anguish that it endangers the...","Admittedly, the appellant and the respondent have been living separately since 27th August, 1990. The appellant further stated that the respondent refused cohabitation and also stopped sharing bed with him without any justification. Her unilateral decision not to have any child also caused mental cruelty on the appellant. The appellant was not permitted to even show his normal affection to the daughter of the respondent although he was a loving father to the child. The appellant also asserted that the respondent desired sadistic pleasure at the discomfiture and plight of the appellant which eventually affected his health and mental peace. In these circumstances, the appellant has prayed that it would not be possible to continue the marriage with the respondent and he eventually filed a suit for the grant of divorce. In the suit for divorce filed by the appellant in Alipur, Calcutta, the respondent filed her written statement and denied the averments. According to the version of the respondent, Prabir Malik, the domestic servant did not look after the welfare and well-being of the child. The respondent was apprehensive...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","In the case of Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi reported in (1988) 1 SCC 105, this Court had an occasion to examine the concept of cruelty. The word 'cruelty' has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act . It has been used in Section 13(1)(i)(a) of the Act in the context of human conduct or behaviour in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties or obligations. It is a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, it is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment and then as to the impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other, ultimately, is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. There may, however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty...","This appeal is accordingly disposed of but, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/766894/ | AIRONLINE 2007 SC 347,Cruelty,cruelty,2007,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2007 SC 347,766894,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/766894/,13
Supreme Court of India,"Lily Thomas, Etc. Etc. vs Union Of India & Ors. on 5 April, 2000",2000(2)ALD(CRI)686,2000-04-05,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 11, Section 12, Section 13, Section 17, Section 18, Section 198, Section 494, Section 495, Section 497, Section 498, Section 5, Section 61",Constitutional Validity; Conversion; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER S. Saghir Ahmad, J. 1. I respectfully agree with the views expressed by my esteemed Brother, Sethi, J., in the erudite judgment prepared by him, by which the Writ Petitions and the Review Petition are being disposed of finally. I, however, wish to add a few words of my own. 2. Smt. Sushmita Ghosh, who is the wife of Shri G.C. Ghosh (Mohd. Karim Ghazi) filed a Writ Petition [W.P.(C) No. 509 of 1992] in this Court stating that she was married to Shri G.C. Ghosh in accordance with the Hindu rites on 10th May, 1984 and since then both of them were happily living at Delhi. The following paragraphs of the Writ Petition, which are relevant for this case, are quoted below. 15. That around the 1st of April, 1992, the Respondent No. 3 told the petitioner that she should in her own interest agree to her divorce by mutual consent as he had any way taken to Islam so that he may remarry and in fact he had already fixed to marry one Miss Vanita Gupta resident of D-152 Preet Vihar, Delhi, a divorcee with two children in the second week of July 1992. The Respondent No....","Shri Mahajan submitted that since the apprehended second marriage has not yet taken place, it is appropriate that we stop the happening of that event till disposal of this petition. Learned Counsel for the respondent-husband says that he would file a counter affidavit within four weeks. He assures that his client would not enter into a marriage in hurry before the counter-affidavit is filed. 6. On 30th November, 1992, this Writ Petition was directed to be tagged with Writ Petition (C) No. 1079/89 ( Smt. SarlaMudgal, President, ""Kalyani"" and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. and W.P. (Civil) No. 347/90 Sunita @ Fatima v. Union of India and Ors.. 7. It may be stated that on 23rd April,1990 when the Writ Petition (C) No. 10797 89 and Writ Petition (C) No. 347/90 were taken up together, the Court had passed the following order: 44. Moreover, as pointed out by Brother Sethi, J., learned ASG appearing for the respondent has stated before the Court that the Govt. of India did not intend to take any action in this regard on the basis of that judgment alone. 45. These affidavits and the statement made on behalf of the Union of India...","8. Thus, in view of the pleadings in Smt. Sushmita Ghosh 's case and in view of the order passed by this Court in the Writ Petitions filed separately by Smt. Sarla Mudgal and Ms. Lily Thomas, the principal question which was required to be answered by this Court was that where a non-Muslim gets converted to the 'Muslim' faith without any real change or belief and merely with a view to avoid an earlier marriage or to enter into a second marriage, whether the marriage entered into by him after conversion would be void? 9. Smt. Sushmita Ghosh, in her Writ Petition, had clearly spelt out that her husband, Shri G.C. Ghosh, had not really converted to 'Muslim' faith, but had only feigned conversion to solemnise a second marriage. She also stated that though freedom of religion is a matter of faith, the said freedom cannot be used as...","18. That the petitioner asserts her fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 15(1) not to be discriminated against on the ground of religion and sex alone. She avers that she has been discriminated against by that part of Muslim Personal Law which is enforced by the State Action by issue of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1937 . It is submitted that such action is contrary to Article 13(1) and is unconstitutional. 19. That the truth of the matter is that Respondent No. 3 has adopted the Muslim religion and became a convert to that religion for the sole purpose of having a second wife which is forbidden strictly under the Hindu Law. It need hardly be said that the said conversion was not a matter of Respondent No. 3 having faith in the Muslim religion. 20. The petitioner is undergoing great mental trauma. She is 34 years of age and is not employed anywhere. 21. That in the past several years, it has become very common amongst the Hindu males who cannot get a divorce from their first wife,...","Shri Mahajan submitted that since the apprehended second marriage has not yet taken place, it is appropriate that we stop the happening of that event till disposal of this petition. Learned Counsel for the respondent-husband says that he would file a counter affidavit within four weeks. He assures that his client would not enter into a marriage in hurry before the counter-affidavit is filed. 6. On 30th November, 1992, this Writ Petition was directed to be tagged with Writ Petition (C) No. 1079/89 ( Smt. SarlaMudgal, President, ""Kalyani"" and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. and W.P. (Civil) No. 347/90 Sunita @ Fatima v. Union of India and Ors.. 7. It may be stated that on 23rd April,1990 when the Writ Petition (C) No. 10797 89 and Writ Petition (C) No. 347/90 were taken up together, the Court had passed the following order: 44. Moreover, as pointed out by Brother Sethi, J., learned ASG appearing for the respondent has stated before the Court that the Govt. of India did not intend to take any action in this regard on...","22. That a Woman's Organisation ""Kalyani"" terribly perturbed over this growing menace and increase in number of desertions of the lawfully married wives under the Hindu Law and splitting up and ruining of the families even where there are children and when no grounds of obtaining a divorce successfully on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act is available to resort to conversion as a method to get rid of such lawful marriages, has filed a petition in this Hon'ble Court being Civil Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1989 in which this Hon'ble Court has been pleased to admit the same. True copy of the order dated 23.4.90 and the order admitting the petition is annexed to the present petition and marked as Annexure-III (Collectively) 3. She ultimately prayed for the following reliefs: (a) by an appropriate writ, order or direction, declare polygamy marriages by Hindus and non-Hindus after conversion to Islam religion are illegal and void; (b) Issue appropriate directions to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to carry out suitable amendments in the Hindu Marriage Act so as to curtail and forbid the practice of polygamy; (c) Issue appropriate direction to declare that where a non Muslim male gets converted to the ""Muslim"" faith without any real change of belief and merely with...","36. From the above, it would be seen that mere conversion does not bring to an end the marital ties unless a decree for divorce on that ground is obtained from the court. Till a decree is passed, the marriage subsists. Any other marriage, during the subsistence of first marriage would constitute an offence under Section 494 read with Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the person, in spite of his conversion to some other religion, would be liable to be prosecuted for the . offence of bigamy. It also follows that if the first marriage was solemnized under the Hindu Marriage Act , the 'husband' or the 'wife', by mere conversion to another religion, cannot bring to an end the marital ties already established on account of a valid marriage having been performed between them. So long as that marriage subsists, another marriage cannot be performed, not even under any other personal law, and on such marriage being performed, the person would be liable to be prosecuted for the offence under Section 494 IPC. Rectification of...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80351/ | 2000(2)ALD(CRI)686, 2000(1)ALT(CRI)363, 2001(1)BLJR499, 2000CRILJ2433, II(2000)DMC1SC, JT2000(5)SC617, 2000(4)SCALE176, (2000)6SCC224, 2000(2)UJ1113(SC)",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; conversion; adultery,2000,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2000(2)ALD(CRI)686, 2000(1)ALT(CRI)363, 2001(1)BLJR499, 2000CRILJ2433, II(2000)DMC1SC, JT2000(5)SC617, 2000(4)SCALE176, (2000)6SCC224, 2000(2)UJ1113(SC)",80351,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80351/,19
Supreme Court of India,"Lily Thomas, Etc. Etc vs Union Of India & Ors on 5 May, 2000",AIR 2000 SUPREME COURT 1650,2000-05-05,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 12, Section 13, Section 17, Section 198, Section 494, Section 497, Section 5, Section 61",Conversion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"PETITIONER: LILY THOMAS, ETC. ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/05/2000 BENCH: R.P.Sethi, S.S.Ahmad JUDGMENT: S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J. I respectfully agree with the views expressed by my esteemed Brother, Sethi, J., in the erudite judgment prepared by him, by which the Writ Petitions and the Review Petition are being disposed of finally. I, however, wish to add a few words of my own. Smt. Sushmita Ghosh, who is the wife of Shri G.C. Ghosh (Mohd. Karim Ghazi) filed a Writ Petition [W.P.(C) No. 509 of 1992] in this Court stating that she was married to Shri G.C. Ghosh in accordance with the Hindu rites on 10th May, 1984 and since then both of them were happily living at Delhi. The following paragraphs of the Writ Petition, which are relevant for this case, are quoted below: ""15. That around the 1st of April, 1992, the Respondent No. 3 told the petitioner that she should in her own interest agree to her divorce by mutual consent as he had any way taken to Islam so that he may remarry and in fact he had already fixed to marry one Miss Vanita Gupta resident of D-152 Preet...","""Counter affidavit shall be filed in four weeks. Place this matter before a Bench of which Hon'ble Pandian, J. is a member. Shri Mahajan submitted that since the apprehended second marriage has not yet taken place, it is appropriate that we stop the happening of that event till disposal of this petition. Learned counsel for the respondent-husband says that he would file a counter affidavit within four weeks. He assures that his client would not enter into a marriage in hurry before the counter-affidavit is filed."" On 30th November, 1992, this Writ Petition was directed to be tagged with Writ Petition (C) No. 1079/89 ( Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, ""Kalyani"" & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. ) and W.P. (Civil) No. 347/90 (Sunita @ Fatima vs. Union of India & Ors.). It may be stated that on 23rd April, 1990 when the Writ Petition (C) No. 1079/89 and Writ Petition (C) No. 347/90 were taken up together, the Court had passed the following order : ""Issue Notice to respondent No. 3 returnable within twelve weeks in both the Writ Petitions. Learned counsel for the petitioners in the Writ Petitions, after taking instructions, states that the prayers in both...",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (conversion) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"""Counter affidavit shall be filed in four weeks. Place this matter before a Bench of which Hon'ble Pandian, J. is a member. Shri Mahajan submitted that since the apprehended second marriage has not yet taken place, it is appropriate that we stop the happening of that event till disposal of this petition. Learned counsel for the respondent-husband says that he would file a counter affidavit within four weeks. He assures that his client would not enter into a marriage in hurry before the counter-affidavit is filed."" On 30th November, 1992, this Writ Petition was directed to be tagged with Writ Petition (C) No. 1079/89 ( Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, ""Kalyani"" & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. ) and W.P. (Civil) No. 347/90 (Sunita @ Fatima vs. Union of India & Ors.). It may be stated that on 23rd April, 1990 when the Writ Petition (C) No. 1079/89 and Writ Petition (C) No. 347/90 were taken up together, the Court had passed the following order : ""Issue Notice to respondent No. 3 returnable within twelve weeks in both the...","18. That the petitioner asserts her fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 15(1) not to be discriminated against on the ground of religion and sex alone. She avers that she has been discriminated against by that part of Muslim Personal Law which is enforced by the State Action by virtue of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1937 . It is submitted that such action is contrary to Article 15 (1) and is unconstitutional. 19. That the truth of the matter is that Respondent No. 3 has adopted the Muslim religion and became a convert to that religion for the sole purpose of having a second wife which is forbidden strictly under the Hindu Law. It need hardly be said that the said conversion was not a matter of Respondent No. 3 having faith in the Muslim religion. 20. The petitioner is undergoing great mental trauma. She is 34 years of age and is not employed anywhere. 21. That in the past several years, it has become very common amongst the Hindu males who cannot get a divorce from their first wife, they convert to Muslim religion solely for the purpose of marriage. This practice is invariably adopted by those erring husband who embrace Islam for the purpose of second marraige but again become reconvert so as to retain their rights...","494. Change of religion does not dissolve the marriage performed under the Hindu Marriage Act between two Hindus. Apostasy does not bring to an end the civil obligations or the matrimonial bond, but apostasy is a ground for divorce under Section 13 as also a ground for judicial separation under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Hindu Law does not recognised bigamy. As we have seen above, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides for ""Monogamy"". A second marriage, during the life-time of the spouse, would be void under Sections 11 and 17 , besides being an offence. In Govt. of Bombay vs. Ganga ILR (1880) 4 Bombay 330, which obviously is a case decided prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act , it was held by the Bombay High Court that where a Hindu married woman having a Hindu husband living marries a Mahommedan after conversion to `Islam', she commits the offence of polyandry as, by mere conversion, the previous marriage does not come to an end. The other decisions based on this principle are...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1762508/ | AIR 2000 SUPREME COURT 1650, 2000 AIR SCW 1760, (2000) 5 JT 617 (SC), 2000 (4) SCALE 176, 2000 (2) LRI 623, 2000 (6) SCC 224, 2000 SCC(CRI) 1056, 2000 (2) UJ (SC) 1113, 2000 BOM CR 464, 2000 (6) SRJ 387, 2000 UJ(SC) 2 1113, 2001 (1) BLJR 499, (2000) 3 ALLMR 251 (SC), (2000) 2 KER LT 62, (2000) 2 MADLW(CRI) 837, (2000) 2 MAHLR 409, (2000) 2 CURCC 233, (2000) 2 CURLJ(CCR) 88, (2000) 2 CURCRIR 193, (2000) 4 SCALE 176, (2000) 2 DMC 1, (2000) 2 HINDULR 374, (2000) 3 MAD LW 371, (2000) 2 MARRILJ 1, (2000) 6 ANDHLD 16, (2000) 3 SUPREME 601, (2000) 3 RECCIVR 252, (2001) 2 ALLCRIR 1809, (2001) 42 ALLCRIC 421, (2001) 1 BLJ 53, 2000 (1) ANDHLT(CRI) 363 SC, (2000) 1 ANDHLT(CRI) 363",Conversion,conversion,2000,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 2000 SUPREME COURT 1650, 2000 AIR SCW 1760, (2000) 5 JT 617 (SC), 2000 (4) SCALE 176, 2000 (2) LRI 623, 2000 (6) SCC 224, 2000 SCC(CRI) 1056, 2000 (2) UJ (SC) 1113, 2000 BOM CR 464, 2000 (6) SRJ 387, 2000 UJ(SC) 2 1113, 2001 (1) BLJR 499, (2000) 3 ALLMR 251 (SC), (2000) 2 KER LT 62, (2000) 2 MADLW(CRI) 837, (2000) 2 MAHLR 409, (2000) 2 CURCC 233, (2000) 2 CURLJ(CCR) 88, (2000) 2 CURCRIR 193, (2000) 4 SCALE 176, (2000) 2 DMC 1, (2000) 2 HINDULR 374, (2000) 3 MAD LW 371, (2000) 2 MARRILJ 1, (2000) 6 ANDHLD 16, (2000) 3 SUPREME 601, (2000) 3 RECCIVR 252, (2001) 2 ALLCRIR 1809, (2001) 42 ALLCRIC 421, (2001) 1 BLJ 53, 2000 (1) ANDHLT(CRI) 363 SC, (2000) 1 ANDHLT(CRI) 363",1762508,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1762508/,5
Delhi High Court,"Rohit Shekhar vs Shri Narayan Dutt Tiwari & Anr. on 23 September, 2011",Rohit Shekhar vs Shri Narayan Dutt Tiwari & Anr.,2011-09-23,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 10B, Section 11, Section 112, Section 114, Section 125, Section 13, Section 144, Section 151, Section 165, Section 17, Section 185, Section 19, Section 2, Section 20, Section 21, Section 23, Section 27, Section 3, Section 32, Section 350, Section 351, Section 367, Section 37, Section 4, Section 41, Section 432, Section 45, Section 47, Section 482, Section 501, Section 508, Section 509, Section 52, Section 53, Section 531, Section 54, Section 57, Section 622, Section 646, Section 7, Section 75, Section 8, Section 9",Constitutional Validity; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"76. As noticed above, there is no specific statutory regime in India under civil law which empowers the court to direct the medical examination including the blood test for DNA profiling of the parties or any third party to a case where paternity of a child is in issue. Such a position subsisted before the courts in England prior to the amendment to the Family Reforms Act. In the judgment pronounced on 14th March, 1963 reported at [1963] 2 All E.R. 386, W. v. W. The question before IA No.10394/2011 in CS(OS) 700/2008 43 the court was whether the wife can be compelled against her will to undergo such a test. Cairns, J, it was observed that ""no such application as this has ever been made in this country before"". The court rejected the argument of the counsel for the petitioner expanding the definition of the said statutory provision regarding samples which could be taken or appointment of experts. In this pronouncement, it was ruled that medical inspections have, in some circumstances, been authorised by statute. For instance under the Old Workman‟s Compensation Act, 1275. So far as the probate, divorce and admirality division was concerned, medical inspections were provided...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"In all such matrimonial cases where divorce is sought, say on the ground of impotency, schizophrenia...etc. normally without there being medical examination, it would be difficult to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the allegation made by his spouse against the other spouses seeking divorce on such a ground, is correct or not. In order to substantiate such allegation, the Petitioner would always insist on medical examination. If respondent avoids such medical examination on the IA No.10394/2011 in CS(OS) 700/2008 9 ground that it violates his/her right to privacy or for a matter right to personal liberty as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and with the extensive interpretation of the phrase ""personal liberty"" this right has been read into Article 21 , it cannot be treated as absolute right. What is emphasized is that some limitations on this right have to be imposed and particularly...","76. As noticed above, there is no specific statutory regime in India under civil law which empowers the court to direct the medical examination including the blood test for DNA profiling of the parties or any third party to a case where paternity of a child is in issue. Such a position subsisted before the courts in England prior to the amendment to the Family Reforms Act. In the judgment pronounced on 14th March, 1963 reported at [1963] 2 All E.R. 386, W. v. W. The question before IA No.10394/2011 in CS(OS) 700/2008 43 the court was whether the wife can be compelled against her will to undergo such a test. Cairns, J, it was observed that ""no such application as this has ever been made in this country before"". The court rejected the argument of the counsel for the petitioner expanding the definition of the said statutory provision regarding samples which could be taken or appointment of experts. In this pronouncement, it was ruled that medical inspections have, in some circumstances, been authorised by statute. For instance under the...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","""7. The Plaintiff argues that the correct legal position was, however, restated and clarified by a subsequent larger - 3 Judges Bench ruling reported as Sharda v. Dharmpal AIR 2003 SC 3450. In the said judgment , the Court held as follows: ―39. Goutam Kundu (supra) is, therefore, not an authority for the proposition that under no circumstances the Court can direct that blood tests be conducted. It, having regard to the future of the child, has, of course, sounded a note of caution as regard mechanical passing of such order. In some other jurisdictions, it has been held that such directions should ordinarily be made if it is in the interest of the child. xxx xxx xxxx 80. The matter may be considered from another angle. 14. The decision in Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Convenor Secretary, Orissa State Commission for Women and Anr. AIR 2010 SC 2851 was cited to say that the Court should never as a rule grant applications directing one party or the other to undergo DNA test. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the previous ruling in Sharda 's case in the context of a submission that it conflicted with the reasoning in Goutam Kundu's case and held as follows: ―13. In a matter where paternity of a child is in issue before the...","IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI IA No.10394/2011 in CS(OS) No. 700/2008 Reserved on : August 2, 2011 Date of decision: September 23, 2011 ROHIT SHEKHAR ... Plaintiff through: Mr. P.S. Patwalia, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Vedanata Verma and Mr. Manu Aggarwal, Adv. VERSUS SHRI NARAYAN DUTT TIWARI & ANR. ... Defendants through: Mr. Bahar U. Barqi and Mr. Pramod Kr. Sharma, Adv. for D-1 Mr. Gaurav Mitra, Adv. for D-2 CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE GITA MITTAL 1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes 2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes GITA MITTAL, J 1. The present application displays a blatant refusal by a party to the litigation to comply with the court direction made in accordance with law to furnish a blood sample for DNA testing which would enable authoritative adjudication on the real issue in the matter. For this purpose, the defendant no. 1 has filed IA No. 10394/2011 dated 30th May, 2011 seeking the following prayers...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1378226/,Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; nullity_sec19,2011,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,1378226,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1378226/,46
Delhi High Court,"Mamta Das vs Puneet Das on 22 September, 2025",Mamta Das vs Puneet Das,2025-09-22,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 19, Section 27, Section 3, Section 32, Section 55, Section 57, Section 7, Section 9",Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"$~ * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Judgment reserved on: 27.08.2025 Judgment delivered on:22.09.2025 + MAT.APP.(F.C.) 160/2022 & CM APPL.43569/2022 (Stay) MAMTA DAS .....Appellant Through: Mr. Zishan Alam Siddiqui, Mr. Akash & Ms. Amisha Upadhyay, Advs. versus PUNEET DAS .....Respondent Through: Mr. Francis Paul, Advocate CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR JUDGEMENT HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR J.","32. Per contra, learned Counsel for the Respondent would support the Impugned Judgment and submit that the learned Family Court had correctly appreciated the pleadings, evidence, and surrounding circumstances, and therefore, rightly granted the decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. 38. In order to claim relief of dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion, as discussed above, petitioner had to prove the factum of ""desertion"" and the ""intention to desert"" on the part of respondent. In the present case, both parties had admitted that they are residing separately since 01.12.2011, although Respondent had stated that even after 01.12.2011 petitioner used to come and stay with her at her rented apartment. But in major way both parties have admitted that they are residing separately since December, 2011, except few instance of staying together, as alleged by respondent but denied by petitioner. Thus ""factum of desertion"" is proved by petitioner. 39. As regards ""animus deserendi"" ie the ""intention to desert"", on the part of respondent is concerned, Petitioner had specifically and categorically stated that Respondent is residing away from him without any reasonable cause or explanation. No reason has been attributed by Petitioner on Respondent for living separately from...","""19. After completion of the pleadings, following issues, were framed by my Ld. Predecessor on 10.12.2018: - (1) Whether the petitioner-husband has been subjected to cruelty by the respondent-wife as claimed in the petition, and if so, to what effect? OPP. (2) Whether the respondent-wife has deserted the petitioner-husband for a continuous period of more than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition without reasonable cause? OPP (3) Whether the respondent-wife is entitled to decree of restitution of conjugal rights as claimed by her in her counter claim? OPP (4) Relief. ***** EVIDENCE: 22. Petitioner-husband has tendered his affidavit in evidence as Ex.PW1/X. He has reiterated the facts as mentioned in the petition. He has also relied upon documents Ex. PW1/A and Ex. PW1/B. Ex. PW1/A is copy of marriage certificate and Ex. PW1/B is copy of pre-litigation mediation application filed by the respondent. 23. In order to...","24. Learned Counsel for the Appellant would contend that the finding of desertion recorded by the learned Family Court is wholly misconceived, for her departure from the matrimonial home on 02.12.2011 was not voluntary but occasioned by persistent hostility and humiliation inflicted by the Respondent's mother, and it was further compounded by the Respondent's own insistence that she shift to separate accommodation; hence, the learned Family Court erred in holding her guilty of desertion by overlooking the settled doctrine of constructive desertion. 25. It would be submitted by the learned Counsel that the Appellant was compelled to leave the matrimonial home owing to sustained cruelty and hostile conduct of her in-laws, while the Respondent remained a silent spectator, and it was the conduct of the Respondent and his family that forced her to arrange separate accommodation in 2011, which, in any event, was done with the Respondent's consent and therefore could not establish an intention on her part to abandon the marital relationship. 26. Learned Counsel would further argue that the learned Family Court erred in relying upon the Appellant's...","32. Per contra, learned Counsel for the Respondent would support the Impugned Judgment and submit that the learned Family Court had correctly appreciated the pleadings, evidence, and surrounding circumstances, and therefore, rightly granted the decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. 38. In order to claim relief of dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion, as discussed above, petitioner had to prove the factum of ""desertion"" and the ""intention to desert"" on the part of respondent. In the present case, both parties had admitted that they are residing separately since 01.12.2011, although Respondent had stated that even after 01.12.2011 petitioner used to come and stay with her at her rented apartment. But in major way both parties have admitted that they are residing separately since December, 2011, except few instance of staying together, as alleged by respondent but denied by petitioner. Thus ""factum of desertion"" is proved by petitioner. 39. As regards ""animus deserendi"" ie the ""intention to desert"", on the part of respondent is concerned, Petitioner had specifically and categorically stated that Respondent is residing away from...","1. The present appeal has been preferred under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, read with Section 55 of the Divorce Act, 18691, by the Appellant-Wife, assailing the Judgment and Decree dated 31.05.20222 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Tis Hazari Courts (Central), Delhi3, in IDA No. 13/2017. 2. By the Impugned Judgment, the learned Family Court allowed the divorce petition filed by the Respondent-Husband and dissolved the marriage of the parties under Section 10(1)(ix) of the Divorce Act on the ground of desertion, while simultaneously dismissing the 1 Divorce Act 2 Impugned Judgment 3 Family Court Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR MAT.APP.(F.C.) 160/2022 Page 1 of 36 BHATIA Signing Date:23.09.2025 15:14:24 Counter-Claim bearing No. 01/20224, instituted by the Appellant seeking restitution of conjugal rights. BRIEF FACTS: 3. The parties were married on 26.12.2007 at Free Church, Sansad Marg, New Delhi, in accordance with Christian rites and ceremonies. The marriage was consummated, but no children were born out of wedlock. 4. After marriage, the Appellant-Wife resided in her matrimonial home with the Respondent-Husband at Christian Colony, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, along with the Respondent's family members. 5. According to the Appellant, soon after the marriage, she was subjected to hostile treatment by her in-laws. They allegedly ridiculed her, created an atmosphere of discord, and...","SEPTEMBER 22, 2025/sm/ds/rn Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR MAT.APP.(F.C.) 160/2022 Page 36 of 36 BHATIA Signing Date:23.09.2025 15:14:24",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/141378512/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty,2025,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,141378512,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/141378512/,19
Delhi High Court,"Neetu Grover vs Union Of India & Ors. on 22 January, 2024",Neetu Grover vs Union Of India & Ors.,2024-01-22,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 15, Section 2, Section 29, Section 3, Section 4, Section 5, Section 7",Constitutional Validity,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"$~67 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + W.P.(C) 910/2024 & CM APPL. 3776/2024 NEETU GROVER ..... Petitioner Through: Mr. Tushar Kumar, Mr. Junaid Qureshi, Ms. Dishani Guha, Ms. Varnika Bajaj and Mr. Rishub Kapoor, Advocates versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondents Through: Mr. Apoorv Kurup, CGSC, R-1/UOI with Mr. Akhil Hasija, Advocate and Ms. Archana Surve, GP % Date of Decision: 22nd January, 2024 CORAM: HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA J U D G M E N T(ORAL) CM APPL. 3776/2024 (for exemption) Allowed, subject to all just exceptions. Accordingly, the present application stands disposed of. W.P.(C) 910/2024",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (constitutional validity) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. By way of the present writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner inter-alia seeks issuance of an appropriate writ for striking down Section 5 (v) ('Impugned Section') of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ('HMA Act'). Arguments of the Petitioner 2. Learned counsel for the Petitioner states that the personal facts of the Petitioner show that though her marriage with her distant cousin Mr. Gagan Grover was solemnized with the mutual consent of the families and by Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed W.P.(C) 910/2024 Page 1 of 10 By:Rashmi Dabas Signing Date:23.01.2024 12:32:02 conducting the religious ceremony in presence of members of the civil society, Mr. Gagan Grover has succeeded in having the marriage declared null and void by seeking a declaration from a competent Court under Section 5(v) of the HMA Act. He states that the Petitioner has become a victim of a fraud perpetuated by Mr. Gagan Grover and his family members who induced her to believe in the validity of their marriage but have since been released from legal obligations associated with a valid marriage due to the invocation of the impugned Section of the HMA Act. 2.1 He states that marriages amongst blood relatives is an established practice in southern states of India more specifically in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka....","4. As is evident from prayers (ii) and (iii) of this petition, the Petitioner is effectively aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 23.10.2007 passed by a competent Court in HMA No. 396/2003 declaring that the marriage between the Petitioner and her distant cousin Mr. Gagan Grover was solemnized in contravention of Section 5(v) of the HMA Act and therefore, null and void. The said judgment of the competent Court was impugned by the Petitioner in MAT.APP. (F.C.) 35/2023; however, the said appeal as well has been dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 09.10.2023. ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J JANUARY 22, 2024/hp/sk Click here to check corrigendum, if any Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed W.P.(C) 910/2024 Page 10 of 10 By:Rashmi Dabas Signing Date:23.01.2024 12:32:02",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/165310576/,Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity,2024,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,165310576,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/165310576/,7
Delhi High Court,"Mrs. Nisha Ribero vs Mr. George Mario Ribeiro on 26 September, 2003",2004IAD(DELHI)70,2003-09-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 12, Section 16, Section 17, Section 8",Adultery; Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,ORDER,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This Reference has been made by the Additional District Judge under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 by his order dated 25.9.2001. By a judgment and order of the same date i.e., 25.9.2001, the learned Additional District Judge allowed the petition of the petitioner (wife) which had been filed under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage on the grounds of cruelty, adultery and desertion. The petitioner and the respondent No.1 (George Mario Riberio) were married on 1.6.1992 in New Delhi under the Indian Christian Marriage Act,1872 . Various allegations were made in the Petition. The respondent/husband filed a written statement on 30.11.2000. The case was posted on 4.1.2001 for conciliation but the Respondent No.1/husband did not turn up on that date and, accordingly, the respondents were proceeded ex parte thereafter. To prove her case the petitioner examined herself, her two brothers-in-law and her brother. On the basis of the unchallenged and non-rebutted deposition of the petitioner and her other witnesses the trial Court came to the conclusion that the respondent No.1(husband) had treated the petitioner with cruelty, both physical and mental. The trial Court also came to the conclusion that the respondent No.1 had been living in adultery with respondent No.2 and had deserted the petitioner for more than two years...","The said amendment Act also altered the name of the Act from "" Indian Divorce Act "" to "" Divorce Act, 1869 "". Thus, after the amendment, which took effect on 3.10.2001, no confirmation by the High Court of a decree of dissolution passed by the trial Court was necessary. The question, therefore, is whether the present decree needs to be confirmed by this Court or not? It is clear that on 25.9.2001 when the judgment and order was made by the learned Additional District Judge the amendment had not come into effect. As such, the date on which the order forwarding the records to this Court was passed for the purposes of confirmation of the decree, the provisions of the old Section 17 were very much in force. This petition would, therefore, have to be disposed of under the old provisions of Section 17 and, therefore, a confirmation of the decree would be necessary. 4. Reference stands disposed of accordingly.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1586826/ | 2004IAD(DELHI)70, 108(2003)DLT48, II(2003)DMC807, 2003(71)DRJ763",Adultery,adultery; desertion; cruelty,2003,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2004IAD(DELHI)70, 108(2003)DLT48, II(2003)DMC807, 2003(71)DRJ763",1586826,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1586826/,5
Delhi High Court,"Kanchan Daniel vs Sh. Michael Daniel And Anr. on 6 February, 2004",Kanchan Daniel vs Sh. Michael Daniel And Anr.,2004-02-06,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a Matrimonial Reference under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. By a Judgment and Order dated 16.9.1997, the learned Additional District Judge, Delhi allowed the petition of the petitioner (wife) which had been filed under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, for dissolution of her marriage with the respondent No.1 (Shri Michael Daniel) on the ground of cruelty, desertion and adultery. 2. The petitioner and the respondent No.1 are Christians and got married on 10.11.1982 at Delhi. They lived together as wife and husband up to August,1992 when the Respondent No.1 (husband) left the matrimonial home. They have two male children which were in the care and custody of the petitioner. The petitioner filed the petition for divorce under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 on the allegations that the respondent No.1 (husband) treated her with cruelty, was living in adultery with respondent No.2 and that he had, in any event, deserted her as he left the matrimonial home in August, 1992. There was no appearance on behalf of respondent No.2 and she was proceeded ex parte by the learned Additional District Judge. Initially, there was an appearance entered on behalf of respondent No.1 and the advocate took time for filing of the written statement. However, subsequently, neither there was any...",4. The Reference is disposed of accordingly.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/849748/,Unclear,unclear,2004,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,849748,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/849748/,4
Delhi High Court,"A.S. Puri vs K.L. Ahuja on 14 April, 1970",AIR1970DELHI214,1970-04-14,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 202, Section 203, Section 497",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,ORDER,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The petitioner (Mr. Puri) is aggrieved by the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge setting aside the dismissal by the learned S. D. M. Delhi preferred against him under Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code by the respondent (Dr. K. L. Ahuja). The learned S.D. M. held an enquiry under Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code, during which he examined seven witnesses on behalf of the complainant and dismissed the said complaint. As against the said dismissal, Dr. Ahuja preferred a revision petition to the Additional Sessions Judge which was accepted. 2. It is seen from the records that even though the learned Additional Sessions Judge had merely ordered issue of notice to the respondent in that revision (described as State) appearance was entered in that criminal case on behalf of the present petitioner. An objection was raised, on behalf of the complainant, to the learned Additional Sessions Judge hearing counsel for the present petitioner, but the learned Additional Sessions Judge considered it appropriate to invite his counsel (who was present) also to address arguments. 3. It has been urged on behalf of the present petitioner that the learned Sessions Judge acted erroneously in setting aside the order of dismissal of the complaint when the learned Magistrate opined that there were not sufficient grounds for proceeding...",34. Revision allowed.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1939643/ | AIR1970DELHI214, 1970CRILJ1441, AIR 1970 DELHI 214",Adultery,adultery,1970,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1970DELHI214, 1970CRILJ1441, AIR 1970 DELHI 214",1939643,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1939643/,3
Delhi High Court,"Ms. X vs Mr. Z And Anr. on 20 December, 2001",96(2002)DLT354,2001-12-20,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 112, Section 125, Section 488",Constitutional Validity; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT V.S. Aggarwal, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. The main question which craves for an answer is as to whether the petitioner can resist the request of respondent No. 1 for directing the Pathology Department of the All India Institute of Medical Science, New Delhi to prepare a slide containing the blood cells of respondent No. 1 and calling for the slides and blocks of the case relating to the petitioner and order a DNA test with a view to ascertain if respondent No. 1 is the father of the foetus. The petitioner's claim is that such an order would infringer has constitutional right of her privacy. 3. Respondent No. 1, by virtue of I.A. 3804/99 contends that case of the petitioner is that respondent No. 1 had adulterous affair with respondent No. 2 and the respondent No. 1 on the contrary assest that petitioner had adulterous affairs with one Jose Thomas, which resulted in petitioner being...","4. Needless to state that in the reply filed, the application as such, has been contested. It has been asserted that the petition has been filed only to delay the disposal of divorce petition and the respondent No. 1 is trying to create smoke screen for his own affairs. It is denied that DNA examination of the slides would conclusively prove the paternity of the foetus. It is alleged that the Courts in India do not have the authority to order DNA test in civil and quasi-civil matters in particular, where it is to establish the paternity even of living child where husband had the access. Such an order, it is alleged, would be in violation of the constitutional and legal rights of the petitioner. 5. It is in this back-drop of these facts that the main question referred to above, comes up for consideration. But before converging into the same, it would be appropriate to deal with the other submissions that were made at the Bar. Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that there is no provision permitting the...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The present application under consideration arises as a result of the following facts. The petitioner has filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and adultery against respondent No. 1 under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act. The said petition is being contested on the ground of counter- allegations of similar nature. 8. In another case, reported as Sabayya Gounder v. Bhoopala Subramanian , , when a similar question cropped up under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1908 corresponding to Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The same Court referred to Article 20(3) of the Constitution to conclude that no person accused of any evidence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself and once again the finding was that if the party concerned is unwilling to such a test, the Court cannot direct them to submit accordingly. It was held: In India there is no special Statute and there is no provision either in the Criminal Procedure Code or in the Indian Evidence Act empowering Courts to direct such a test to be made. Similarly, as pointed out by Raghava Rao, J. in Venkateswarulu v. Subbayya, , there is no procedure either in the Civil Procedure Code or the Evidence Act which provides for a blood...",List it for further proceedings on 12.2.2002.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/627683/ | 96(2002)DLT354, I(2002)DMC448, AIR 2002 DELHI 217, (2002) 4 CIVLJ 155, (2002) 1 DMC 448, (2002) 62 DRJ 851, (2002) 2 HINDULR 32, (2002) 2 MARRILJ 180, (2002) MATLR 494, (2002) 3 RECCRIR 140, (2002) 3 RECCIVR 131, (2002) 2 CURCC 12, (2002) 96 DLT 354",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; adultery,2001,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 96(2002)DLT354, I(2002)DMC448, AIR 2002 DELHI 217, (2002) 4 CIVLJ 155, (2002) 1 DMC 448, (2002) 62 DRJ 851, (2002) 2 HINDULR 32, (2002) 2 MARRILJ 180, (2002) MATLR 494, (2002) 3 RECCRIR 140, (2002) 3 RECCIVR 131, (2002) 2 CURCC 12, (2002) 96 DLT 354",627683,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/627683/,10
Delhi High Court,"Smt. Linda Constance Edwards vs Shri William Edwards & Anr. on 4 December, 2000",2001IIIAD(DELHI)482,2000-12-04,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 22",Adultery; Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER J.D. Kapoor, J. 1. Marriage between the parties who are Christians took place more than 25 years ago. Its dissolution has been sought on the ground of cruelty coupled with adultery.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"10. Whether refusal to have sexual intercourse amounts to cruelty or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Sexual intercourse is just one of marital rights. No doubt, the denial of sexual relations causes frustration and misery to the aggrieved party and is likely to destroy the fibre of marriage yet reasonable denial on the part of either party does not constitute cruelty. This aspect of marital obligation has been dealt with in most elaborate manner in Jacobson vs. Jacobson, 130 Ny.S.II D 762. It is observed that this obligation is of a personal and delicate nature and depends on sentiments and feelings to such an extent that it would be an intrusion into the privacy of domestic life to stipulate reasonable denial on the part of either party to submit to marital intercourse constitutes cruelty. Such denial does not constitute cruelty even though refusal to have...","2. It is alleged that right from day one respondent No.1, i.e. the husband started exhibiting symptoms of cruelty, apathy and lack of interest towards the petitioner and somehow or other the petitioner pulled on with the marriage till the year 1978 in the hope that the respondent No.1 may change. The impression of the petitioner was that the problems of his character may be due to temperament and not a basic trait of his character that may be incorrigible or unchangeable. That off and on the respondent No.1 used to come home fully drunk and indulged in physical beatings. However, when all efforts failed, the petitioner found that respondent No.1 was psychologically ill and has maniac traits right from his childhood and his character is unsuitable for a marital life and so much so the doctors, psychologists and priests have advised him not to entry into a marital life but the respondent No.1 played a fraud upon the petitioner and obtained her consent. In spite of the fact that two children were born to the petitioner during the three...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","14. Though the statutory provisions of Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act all for proof of adultery also if the divorce is sought on the ground of cruelty but in view of the view taken by the Special Bench of Kerala High Court in , Ammini E.J. and etc. v. Union of India and others and the Full Bench of Maharashtra in , Mrs. Pragati Varghese and etc. vs. Cyril George Varghese and etc., it is no more necessary for a party seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty to prove adultery. 15. In Ammini's case (supra) the provisions of Section 10 were held to be violative of Article 21 as well as 14 of the Constitution of India as they compel a deserted or cruelly treated Christian wife to live perpetually tied down to a marriage which has for all intents and purposes ceased to exist as a result of desertion and cruelty shown by the husband concerned are highly harsh and oppressive and as such arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Christian spouses alone are not entitled to get dissolution of their marriage on the ground of cruelty and desertion even if perpetrated continuously for any length of time. They are entitled to get only a decree for judicial separation under Section...","22. Taking over-all view and the long course of cruel conduct coupled not only with adulterous dispositions but actual indulgence in adultery, I feel pursuaded to allow the petition and grant decree for dissolution of marriage. Accordingly the marriage is dissolved. A decree sheet be prepared.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/999818/ | 2001IIIAD(DELHI)482, 91(2001)DLT355, I(2001)DMC746, 2001(58)DRJ731",Adultery,adultery; cruelty; desertion,2000,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2001IIIAD(DELHI)482, 91(2001)DLT355, I(2001)DMC746, 2001(58)DRJ731",999818,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/999818/,5
Delhi High Court,"Dr.(Mrs.) Kiran Robinson vs Ajeet Malcolm Robinson And Ors. on 21 May, 2002",AIR2003DELHI44,2002-05-21,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Adultery; Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT J.D. Kapoor, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,"3. It is alleged that respondent No. 1 before marriage was working and studying at Russia and came to India for the purpose of marriage and lived here from August, 1991 to October, 1991 where after he left for Russia. Since the petitioner was doing research work at Banaras Hindu University, Varansi, she along with respondent No. 1 came there to apprise him about the research work. Respondent No. 1 left for Russia in October, 1991. The petitioner stayed with her parents to prosecute her study from mid of November, 1991 to 23rd December, 1991 and rejoined her husband when he came back from Russia on 25th December, 1991 and stayed with him till 1st week of March, 1992. For completing her remaining research work, she came back to Varansi and remained there up to 23rd June, 1992 and returned to Delhi on 30th June, 1992 and started living with her in-laws. Respondent No. 1 came to Delhi in 1st week of July, 1992 and remained here till November, 1992. 4. It is alleged that respondent No. 1 never wanted...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage on behalf of wife-petitioner on the ground of cruelty, desertion and adultery. This trite trinity has been responsible for larger number of broken marriages. Apart from this, there is allegation that respondent is medically unfit to impregnate the petitioner as he is suffering from Polycystic Kidney Disease which means he is capable of sexual intercourse but not able to make the wife conceive. 2. The parties entered into wedlock on 7.8.1991. The petitioner possessed postgraduate degree in Chemistry at the time of marriage and completed her Ph.D. after her marriage. She is presently working as P.G.T. in a Government Senior Secondary School. The respondent is a photographer by profession. After marriage she started living with her in laws at 1 B.P., Maurya Enclave, M.I.G. Flats, Pitampura (Poorvi) Delhi. She stayed there from August, 1991 to 2nd week of September, 1991.","15. As a consequence, petitioner is entitled for dissolution of marriage on the aforesaid three grounds. Petition is allowed. Marriage is hereby dissolved. Decree of divorce be prepared.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/805113/ | AIR2003DELHI44, 99(2002)DLT111, II(2002)DMC462, 2002(63)DRJ708, AIR 2003 DELHI 44, (2003) 1 RECCIVR 523, (2002) 99 DLT 111, (2002) 2 DMC 462, (2002) 63 DRJ 708, (2003) 1 HINDULR 601, (2003) 2 MARRILJ 73, (2003) 2 CIVLJ 376",Adultery,adultery; cruelty; desertion,2002,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR2003DELHI44, 99(2002)DLT111, II(2002)DMC462, 2002(63)DRJ708, AIR 2003 DELHI 44, (2003) 1 RECCIVR 523, (2002) 99 DLT 111, (2002) 2 DMC 462, (2002) 63 DRJ 708, (2003) 1 HINDULR 601, (2003) 2 MARRILJ 73, (2003) 2 CIVLJ 376",805113,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/805113/,4
Delhi High Court,"Annu J. Thomas vs Thomas Koshy on 25 April, 1997",1997IVAD(DELHI)222,1997-04-25,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 22",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,JUDGMENT,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Mahinder Narain, A.C.J. (1) The petitioner Ms. Annu J. Thomas has filed a petition under the Indian Divorce Act against the respondent Mr. Thomas Koshy. Originally the petition was filed under Section 22 of the Indian Divorce Act and later the petition was amended and pleas under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act was also added thereto. (2) EX-PARTE evidence of the petitioner was recorded by the learned Additional District Judge. (3) The petitioner deposed that the marriage between the parties was solemnised on 25th September, 1989 at Gregarios Orthodox Syrian Church, Near Diamond Garden, Chembur, Bombay. (4) That the parties had gone to Goa for their honeymoon. According to the petitioner wife, for the first one or two days there was no problem, but abnormal behaviour of the respondent started to manifest itself thereafter. (5) The petitioner stated that the respondent used to take drugs and alcohol. As a result, he used to have swings of mood and used to force the petitioner for unnatural sexual intercourse which the petitioner found disgusting. Such behaviour had made it impossible for the petitioner to live with the respondent. (6) The petitioner further deposed that the unnatural sexual behaviour of the respondent was unbearable when he was drunk. That the respondent continued to force the petitioner for unnatural sexual intercourse. Specifically,...","(12) For the aforesaid reasons, we confirm the order of the learned Additional District Judge and dissolve the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1592200/ | 1997IVAD(DELHI)222, AIR1997DELHI345, 67(1997)DLT263, 1997(42)DRJ73, AIR 1997 DELHI 345, (1998) 1 MARRILJ 178, (1998) 1 RECCIVR 97, (1997) 67 DLT 263, (1997) 42 DRJ 73, (1997) MATLR 496",Unclear,unclear,1997,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 1997IVAD(DELHI)222, AIR1997DELHI345, 67(1997)DLT263, 1997(42)DRJ73, AIR 1997 DELHI 345, (1998) 1 MARRILJ 178, (1998) 1 RECCIVR 97, (1997) 67 DLT 263, (1997) 42 DRJ 73, (1997) MATLR 496",1592200,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1592200/,4
Delhi High Court,"Surinder Singh vs Tejinder Kaur on 21 August, 1986",1987(12)DRJ78,1986-08-21,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125, Section 13, Section 26, Section 27, Section 28",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT S.S. Chadha, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,"(4) The main submission of Shri Mohinder Goel, the learned counsel for the appellant-wife is that the trial Court has failed to appreciate the pleadings of the parties and the evidence produced by the parties in support of the case. The evidence produced by the husband is alleged to be beyond the. pleadings of the parties. It is urged that the trial Court has wrongly decided both the issues as the relevant oral and documentary evidence has not been correctly appreciated. The learned counsel took me through the pleadings of the parties and the relevant evidence on the record. (5) In para 7 of the petition, the husband has alleged that he stayed with the parents of the wife at Ghaziabad for only few days and during the stay the wife and her parents used to taunt the husband and used to insult the husband with the sole object to humiliate and degrade the husband and that the husband had been tolerating all the taunts with the hope and expectation that on one day a wiser counsel would prevail upon...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","(1) F.A.O. 189/84 is an appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 against the judgment and decree of Shri R.C. Jain, Additional District Judge, Delhi dated 27/7/1984 dissolving the marriage between the parties by a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Said Act. F.A.O. 181/84 is also an applauder Section 28 of the said Act against the order dated 27/7/1984 of Shri R.C. Jain, Additional District Judge, Delhi under Section 27 of the Act directing the husband to pay a sum of Rs. 5,000.00 to the wife towards compensation in respect of the articles mentioned in list, Ex. RW-1/1 and further directing the payment of the sum of Rs. 175.00 per month towards maintenance and education of the minor son. Both these appeals are disposed of by this common order. (3) During the pendency of the proceedings before the trial Court, an; application under Section 27 of the said Act was also made by the wife claiming the return of various articles as detailed in the list. The trial Court after evaluating the evidence on the record ordered the husband to pay a sum of Rs. 5,000.00 to the wife towards her claim in ""respect of the articles at Sl. Nos. 14 to 22, 25, 26 and 29 in the list, Ex.RW-l/l. The...",(2) The case of the husband as set out in the petition and the defense of the wife as set out in the written statement has succinctly been set out in the judgment of the trial Court and may be seen from there. The first issue in the case is whether the wife treated the husband with cruelty after the solemnization of the marriage. The second issue is whether the wife deserted the husband for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. The trial Court considered the entire evidence and the material brought on the record and after hearing the counsel for the parties gave its findings. The trial Court referred to the two incidents of cruelty of 11/11/1975 and 22/11/1977 and the Conduct of the parties relating to it and came to the conclusion that the acts of commission and omission on the part of the wife and her other family members were bound to result in the great physical and mental torture of the husband and no husband can...,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1132171/ | 1987(12)DRJ78,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,1986,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: 1987(12)DRJ78,1132171,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1132171/,7
Delhi High Court,"Easmie Mukand Lal vs Mukand Lal Etc. on 18 December, 1990",44(1991)DLT25,1990-12-18,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 497, Section 7",Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Usha Mehra, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(15) Collusion is a bar to divorce. Collusion can be defined as agreement to give false evidence or to suppress material evidence. On the facts of this case we have to determine whether husband's statement that he was not interested to contest the case and that divorce be granted, would amount to collusion ? The court has to be satisfied that the petition is not presented in collusion whether it is a defended or undefended petition. Respondent- husband No. 1 has not filed any written statement, but respondent no. 2 co-adulterer has filed one. Merely because husband has not filed his defense by itself would not amount to agreement to withholding material evidence, nor it would mean that husband has concealed from this court some pertinent facts with the sole object to allow the petitioner to procure divorce, even otherwise the fact that both the spouses desire a divorce does...","(14) We are in respectful agreement with the view so expressed. Admittedly, the respondents have not cared to contest the proceedings but that would not justify for this Court to come to the conclusion that whatever the petitioner has stated is worthy of credit. The petitioner has to satisfy the court of the truth of her allegations of adultery Viewing in this background we have to see whether the petitioner in this case has been able to show satisfactorily the adulterous relation of the respondents. We have evidence of the wife that her husband was found with one Karuna on the same bed in her bed room on the night of 22nd October, 1986 She saw them lying on the same bed. Karuna was not properly dressed. Her husband and Karuna were in compromising position. So-much-so in her presence also respondent-husband brought Karuna, took her in the bed room He even took Karuna with him to his native village, where he introduced Karuna as his wife. He remained absent from office because he took Karuna out of Delhi. The petitioner's...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","(1) The case has come to us on a reference made by Additional District Judge under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act. In spite of notice having been served, there has been no appearance on behalf of the respondents. (2) Briefly, the relevant facts stated are that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 was solemnized at Delhi on 11th March, 1971 according to Indian Christian Marriage Act . For some time the couple lived happily and on 22nd December 1971 were blessed with a female child named, Sujata and on 3rd January, 1973 with another female child named Meenakshi. The husband-respondent no. 1, however, could not remain faithful to the petitioner-wife for long and developed illicit relations with one Karuna, the respondent no 2. On account of his having developed unholy alliances with Karuna his attitude towards the petitioning-wife became indifferent, harsh and cruel. He used to beat her and made her life miserable on account of his involvement with Karuna. (3) PETITIONING-WIFE is a nurse in T B. Hospital, Kingsway Camp, Delhi. Being a nurse, she was required to be on shift duties. On some days she had to be on night duty. On 22nd October, 1986, she was on night duty. however, after finishing the same when she came to her house, she...","(13) The Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was dealing with the standard of proof required in case of a matrimonial offence in a. petition for divorce in the case of Prem Masih v. Mst . Kumudani Bai , which reads as under:- ""THE case of Blyth v. Blyth (1966) 1 All Er 524 will, therefore, show that the view expressed in Preston-Jones' case (1951 Ac 391) that the standard of proof in case of a matrimonial offence in a petition for divorce is proof beyond reasonable doubt, does not now hold the field and that the correct test in that matter is that expressed by Dixon, J. in (1948) 77CLR 191 (Supra), in view of the mandate in Section 7 of the Act that the principles and rules on which the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England for the time being ads and gives relief should be applied by the Indian Courts, we feel that now the standard of proof recommended in (1966) I All Er 524) (Supra) will have to be applied by the...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1479506/ | 44(1991)DLT25, 1991(20)DRJ196",Adultery,adultery; cruelty,1990,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 44(1991)DLT25, 1991(20)DRJ196",1479506,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1479506/,7
Delhi High Court,"Stephen Joshus And Anr. vs J.D. Kapoor on 9 March, 1995",1995IAD(DELHI)1361,1995-03-09,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 13B, Section 2, Section 28, Section 39",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,(2) I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","(1) The petitioners are Indian Christians and were married to each other on 25th August, 1973 under the provisions of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 . A joint petition was preferred by them under Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') seeking the dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce by mutual consent. Petition was dismissed on 5.10.1991 by Shri J.D. Kapur, Additional District Judge, Delhi. One of the grounds for dismissal was that the marriage was solemnised under the Christian Marriage Act whereas divorce had been sought under the Special Marriage Act , therefore, the petition was not maintainable. Petitioners have questioned the decision in this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and under Section 39 of the Act. (3) The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners has been that Special Marriage Act, 1954 is a piece of legislation, which applies equally to all citizens of India, therefore, irrespective of the fact that the marriage was solemnised under some other provisions of law, section 28 thereof does not create any bar for obtaining a decree of divorce by mutual consent. It is contended that on harmonious construction of all the statutes dealing with the personal religious law of marriage and divorce, in the light...","(10) The petition in view of the ratio of decision in Renold Rajamani and another v. Union of India and another (supra) has no force and deserves dismissal, which is hereby dismissed.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1280278/ | 1995IAD(DELHI)1361, 58(1995)DLT57, 1995(33)DRJ258",Unclear,unclear,1995,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 1995IAD(DELHI)1361, 58(1995)DLT57, 1995(33)DRJ258",1280278,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1280278/,5
Delhi High Court,"Mrs. Zena Mary Rodgers vs Mr. Troy Steven Rodgers And Ors. on 6 February, 2004",Mrs. Zena Mary Rodgers vs Mr. Troy Steven Rodgers And Ors.,2004-02-06,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a Matrimonial Reference under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. By a Judgment and Order dated 8.6.2001, the learned Additional District Judge allowed the petition of the petitioner (wife) which had been filed under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, for dissolution of her marriage with the respondent No.1 (Mr. Troy Steven Rodgers) on the ground of adultery coupled with cruelty. The petitioner and the respondent No.1 are Christians and they had a Christian marriage on 3.2.1996 at Masihgarh Church at Okhla, Delhi. In the petition for divorce, the petitioner made various allegations including the allegation of adultery committed by the respondent No.1 with the respondents 2 and 3. Several instances have been narrated in the petition. The respondents could not be served through ordinary process. Insofar as the respondent No.3 was concerned the petitioner was unable to furnish her complete address and, therefore, she withdrew her case against respondent No.3. As regards respondents 1 and 2, the Trial Court ordered that they be served through publication as attempts to serve them through the ordinary process had failed. Publication was made. However, Respondents 1 and 2 did not appear and accordingly, they were proceeded ex parte. 2. In her ex parte evidence, the petitioner examined herself as PW-1 and her mother as PW-2....",5. The Reference is disposed of accordingly.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/864262/,Adultery,adultery,2004,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,864262,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/864262/,4
Delhi High Court,"Alika Khosla vs Thomas Mathew And Anr. on 20 December, 2001",2002(62)DRJ851,2001-12-20,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 112, Section 125, Section 488",Constitutional Validity; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT V.S. Aggarwal, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. The main question which craves for an answer is as to whether the petitioner can resist the request of respondent No. 1 for directing the Pathology Department of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi to prepare a slide containing the blood cells of respondent No. 1 and calling for the slides and blocks of the case relating to the petitioner and order a DNA test with a view to ascertain if respondent No. 1 is the father of the foetus. The petitioner's claim is that such an order would infringe her constitutional right of her privacy. 3. Respondent No. 1 by virtue of I.A. 3804/99 contends that case of the petitioner is that respondent No. 1 had adulterous affair with respondent No. 2 and the respondent No. 1 on the contrary asserts that petitioner had adulterous affairs with one Jose Thomas, which resulted in petitioner being...","4. Needless to state that in the reply filed, the application as such, has been contested. It has been asserted that the petition has been filed only to delay the disposal of divorce petition and that respondent No. 1 is trying to create smoke screen for his own affairs. It is denied that DNA examination of the slides would conclusively prove the paternity of the foetus. It is alleged that the courts in India do not have the authority to order DNA test in civil and quasi-civil matters in particular, where it is to establish the paternity even of living child where husband had the access. Such an order, it is alleged, would be in violation of the constitutional and legal rights of the petitioner. 5. It is in this back-drop of these facts that the main question referred to above, comes up for consideration. But before covering into the same, it would be appropriate to deal with the other submissions that were made at the bar. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that there is no provision permitting the...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The present application under consideration arises as a result of the following facts. The petitioner has filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and adultery against respondent No. 1 under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act. The said petition is being contested on the ground of counter-allegations of similar nature. 8. In another case, reported as SABAYYA GOUNDER v. BHOOPALA SUBRAMANIAN , when a similar question cropped up under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 corresponding to Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The same court referred to Article 20(3) of the Constitution to conclude that no person accused of any evidence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself and once again the finding was that if the party concerned is unwilling to such a test, the court can not direct them to submit accordingly. It was held : In India there is no special statute and there is no provision either in the Criminal Procedure Code or in the Indian Evidence Act empowering Courts to direct such a test to be made. Similarly, as pointed out by Raghava Rao, J. in Venkateswarlu v. Subbayya there is no procedure either in the Civil Procedure Code or the Evidence Act which provides for a blood test...",23. Order was pronounced on 20th December 2001. On it being mentioned the file has been taken up. At joint request it is directed that if the matter has to be reported the names of the parties should not appear. In case of the petitioner it should be mentioned as Ms. X. In case of the respondent it should be mentioned as Mr. Z.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/133578/ | 2002(62)DRJ851,Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; adultery,2001,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,Equivalent citations: 2002(62)DRJ851,133578,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/133578/,10
Delhi High Court,"Mini Mathew vs Thomas Mathew on 10 April, 2003",2003IVAD(DELHI)370,2003-04-10,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT J.D. Kapoor, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""The question whether the misconduct complained of constitutes cruelty and the like for divorce purposes is determined primarily by its effect upon the particular person complaining of the acts. The question is not whether the conduct would be cruel to a reasonable person or a person of average or normal sensibilities, but whether it would have that effect upon the aggrieved spouse. That which may be cruel to one person may be laughed off by another, and what may not be cruel to an individual under one set of circumstances may be extreme cruelty under another set of circumstances."" 13. However, for the purpose of Indian Law of which Indian Divorce Act is also a part, the Supreme Court has in Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane , while dealing with the meaning of cruelty has taken the view that like English Law it is not necessary that the...","8. In response respondent levelled volley of similar allegations against the petitioner by filing the written statement but left it in the midway as after 27.9.1999, neither the respondent nor did his Counsel appear and accordingly vide order dated 6.9.2000, respondent was proceeded ex-parte. Allegations mainly verge on the conduct of the petitioner in getting rid of him after having extracted huge amount as he has been seeking money from time-to-time to the petitioner by bank drafts when he was in Muscat running into thousands and lacs of rupees. It is averred that it was only in the month of December, 1993 when the petitioner wrote a letter to the respondent that he noticed drastic change in the behavior of the petitioner inasmuch as not only was the petitioner cruel and stubborn in her behavior and attitude but was also demanding and would order the respondent to send money every now and then on one pretext or the other. On 1.12.1994 the respondent came from Muscat on annual leave and went to Kerala to the house of the petitioner. The...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a petition by the wife under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (substituted by Act 51 of 2001) seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty. 2. Put briefly the facts pleaded by the wife are as under: The marriage between the parties was solemnised on 17.8.1992 at St. Mary's Church, Vettimukal, Kerala according to Christian religious rites. Soon after the marriage, parties stayed together for about a week in Kerala and due to want of extended leave of the respondent, the parties returned to Delhi and stayed for a short while at the residence of the respondent's brother at E-440, Greater Kailash, Part II, New Delhi. Petitioner alleges that within 20 days of her marriage, she came to know that the respondent was making inquiries at Delhi about her character and morals from some of her friends and her friends in turn informed her. On questioning as to suspicious nature of the respondent the petitioner was beaten up mercilessly. However, this did not last longer since the respondent left for Muscat in September, 1992. The petitioner tried to forget these incidents and made an earnest attempt to bring about good relationship with her husband and wrote letters to him in Muscat with the firm belief that their relationship will be in order sooner...",17. Petition is allowed. Marriage is dissolved to be followed by decree of divorce.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/634239/ | 2003IVAD(DELHI)370, 104(2003)DLT760, II(2003)DMC33, 2003(68)DRJ481",Cruelty,cruelty,2003,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2003IVAD(DELHI)370, 104(2003)DLT760, II(2003)DMC33, 2003(68)DRJ481",634239,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/634239/,8
Delhi High Court,"Mamta Das vs Puneet Das on 24 December, 2025",Mamta Das vs Puneet Das,2025-12-24,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 114",Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"$~ * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Judgment reserved on:18.12.2025 Judgment pronounced on:24.12.2025 + MAT.APP.(F.C.) 160/2022 MAMTA DAS .....Appellant Through: Mr. Zishan A. Siddiqui and Ms. Amisha Upadhyay, Advocates. versus PUNEET DAS .....Respondent Through: None. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR JUDGMENT HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. REVIEW PET. 624/2025 (Seeking review in judgment dt. 22.09.2025 filed by Petitioner) CM APPL. 78637/2025 (Stay) & CM APPL. 78638/2025 (Delay of 2 days in Re-filing the review petition)",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"18. Courts ought not mix up or overlap one jurisdiction with another jurisdiction. Having noted the appellate and review jurisdiction of the Court, we will apply these principles to the impugned order to determine whether the High Court was within its power of review jurisdiction or had exceeded it by reversing the findings, as if the High Court were sitting in appeal against the order dated 23.09.2022. We appreciate the above tabulated summary of the view taken in the impugned order while doing so."" 8. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid settled principles, even though a factual clarification has been noticed in the present case, the same does not disclose any error of such a nature which can be characterised as an error apparent on the face of the record so as to warrant interference in review. Importantly, the said clarification does 2 2025 SCC OnLine 1927 Signature Not...","2. During the course of arguments in the Review Petition, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant-wife contended that Paragraph 50(c) of the Impugned Judgment suffers from a material error apparent on the face of the record. In order to examine the said submission, we consider it appropriate to reproduce Paragraph 50(c) of the Impugned Judgment, which reads as follows: ""50. Upon a scrutiny of the pleadings, depositions, and documents placed on record, the learned Family Court, arrived at the following, though not exhaustive, material conclusions: ***** (c) After 2013-2014, all forms of communication between the parties came to an end. Importantly, the Wife moved to Doha in November 2012 without even informing the Husband, while the Husband relocated to Nigeria in December 2012. The parties thereafter lived abroad in different countries and never reunited under one roof. ***** ...."" 3. It was contended that while the said paragraph records that the Appellant-wife left for Doha without informing the husband, the admitted factual position, as borne out from the record, is that the Petitioner-wife had relocated to Doha in November 2012...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.",,"1. The present Review Petition instituted under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950, read with Section 114 and Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure , 1908, seeks review of the final Judgment dated 22.09.20251 passed by this Court in MAT.APP. (F.C.) No. 160/2022, whereby this Court affirmed the Judgement and Decree dated 31.05.2022 passed by the learned Principal Judge, 1 Impugned Judgement Signature Not Verified MAT.APP.(F.C.) 160/2022 Page 1 of 6 Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date:24.12.2025 11:59:09 Family Court, Tis Hazari Courts (Central), Delhi, in IDA No. 13/2017, granting a decree of divorce in favour of the Respondent- husband on the ground of desertion under Section 10(1)(ix) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. 17.1 The ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence is a ground available if it is demonstrated that, despite the exercise of due diligence, this evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced by the party at the time, the original decree or order was passed. 17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/131989964/,Desertion,desertion,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,131989964,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/131989964/,6
Delhi High Court,"Alika Khosia vs Thomas Mathew on 1 May, 1996",1996IIIAD(DELHI)325,1996-05-01,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14",Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Manmohan Sarin, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,"(3) The respondent No. 1 has filed his detailed reply to the petition ;for dissolution of marriage denying the allegations, accusing the petitioner of immoral behavior and adulte (4) One of the preliminary submissions made by the respondent is that the petitioner is herself guilty .of adultery and cruelty. Matrimonial disco was caused by her adulterous affair and neglect of the children. It is alleged that the present petition has been filed on totally false and concocted allegations against respondent No. 1, with a view to harass and pressurize the respondent No. 1 to give up the custody of the children to her. (5) Mr. P.N. Lekhi, Senior Advocate, has drawn my attention to portions of the transcript of the tape recorded conversations as filed: His argument is that the tape recorded conversations between the petitioner and her mother as well as those of Mr. Jose Thomas with petitioner, clearly show that the petitioner was lietselfliavaigan adulterous relationship. Not only that, she Was privy to disruption of the fairi fly life by encouraging there respondent's sister-in-law in the latter's alleged...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","(1) The petitioner's wife has filed the present Matrimonial petition for dissolution of the marriage with respondent No. I on ground of cruelty and adultery under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act. (2) The petitioner, who was a hindu by birth got converted into Christianity prior to marriage to the respondent No. 1 on 29-12-1985 through a Church ceremony. There are two children a daughter aged 8 years named Divya and a son named George aged 6 years born of the marriage. The allegation in the petition is that the petitioner was forced to leave matrimonial home in Cochin, due to cruel and inhuman behavior of the respondent No.1 husband, who was at that time posted as Collector in Cochin. The respondent No. 1 is an officer belonging to the Indian Administrative Service and is presently posted as Private Secretary to the Cabinet Minister for Industries Mr. K. Karunakaran. The allegation in the petition is that respondent No.1 was having and still continues to have an adulterous relationship with respondent No.2, Mrs. Padamja Venugopal, who is daughter of Mr. K. Karunakaran. (6) Learned counsel relying on Section 14 of the Indian Divorce Act submits that the petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. Section 14 of the Indian Divorce Act may be usefully reproduced:- ""POWER to...","(8) MS.INDIRAJAI Singh, Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner urged that petitioner had not taken any specific objection in this regard in the written statement. Para D of the preliminary objection only questioned the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court to try and entertain the petition. Learned counsel further argued that there was no absolute bar under Section 14 of the Indian Divorce Act to a decree being passed. All that it provided was that the Court was not bound to pronounce such a decree, if it finds that the petitioner had been guilty of adultery or the other acts as noted above. It was a matter of discretion of the Court. Further that the stage for the application of the proviso under the Section would arise only after recording of evidence and trial. The Court had to be satisfied after evidence that the petition had proved her case. It is at that stage that the Court would consider whether or not to exercise the discretion on account of the alleged acts on behalf of the petitioner. The...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1306472/ | 1996IIIAD(DELHI)325, 63(1996)DLT120, 1996(37)DRJ525",Adultery,adultery; cruelty,1996,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 1996IIIAD(DELHI)325, 63(1996)DLT120, 1996(37)DRJ525",1306472,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1306472/,10
Calcutta High Court,"Ramish Francis Toppo vs Violet Francis Toppo on 22 August, 1988",AIR1989CAL128,1988-08-22,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 11, Section 13A, Section 14, Section 17, Section 193, Section 20, Section 22, Section 23, Section 27A, Section 3, Section 32, Section 33, Section 45, Section 47, Section 51",Adultery; Constitutional Validity; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT A.M. Bhattacharjee, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,"12. Now all that the petitioner has stated in his deposition about the adultery is that the wife-respondent ""is leading an immoral life and many people are visiting her"". This is, if weareto, as we should govern ourselves by the Special Bench decision in Susanta Kumar (supra), not even allegation of adultery, far less any proof thereof. In Susanta Kumar (supra, at 34, para 3), the evidence of the petitioner-husband was that ""my wife used to bring young men into the house and spend nights with them"" and the evidence of the petitioners mother was that the wife-respondent was ""living a vicious life"". But the Special Bench clearly ruled that no adultery could be said to have been proved thereby and that ""a life of vice is not necessarily one of adultery"", for ""living a vicious life may or may not be adultery and that evidence is not enough"". I would also like to hold accordingly that ""leading an immoral life"", as alleged by the petitioner-husband in the case at hand, is not necessarily living an adulterous life and a...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. In her Written Statement, the wife-respondent has no doubt put forward a case of reasonable excuse for her withdrawing from the matrimonial home and has asserted that the conduct of the petitioner compelled her to do so. It is true, as pointed again in Kamal v. Kalyani (supra), in a matrimonial case on the ground of desertion, very often the question arises as to who has deserted and who is deserted, because the physical act of withdrawal or departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party. For, if a husband has behaved in such a way as to make it impossible for the wife to live in the matrimonial home and the wife in consequence leaves the home, may be with animus deserendi and animus non-revertendi, then, even if the wife has herself made the physical departure, she would not be guilty of desertion as the husband has given the wife reasonable cause to form such animus and to make the departure. But not only the wife has not turned up to prove such a case, there is also nothing on record to show that the conduct of the husband was such as to justify the wife to withdraw and depart. It is the wife's own case in the Written Statement that there has...","1. I have no doubt that we cannot but decline to confirm this decree nisi for dissolution of marriage passed by the learned District Judge in the Divorce Suit under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869, which has come up before us for confirmation under Section 17 of the Act. I am, however, of opinion that, for the reasons stated hereinafter, a decree for divorce a mensa et thoro. i.e., a decree of judicial separation should instead be passed in favour of the petitioner-husband against the wife-respondent under Section 22 of the Divorce Act. 2. In Swapna Ghosh v. Sadananda Ghosh (SB ) disposed of by this Bench, I have confessed my inability to appreciate the utility of retaining any longer the provisions of Section 17 of the Divorce Act of 1869, which compulsorily requires confirmation by this Court of the decree for dissolution of marriage passed by the District Court and that too, by a Bench of not less than three Judges. It may be that the concerned Legislature in that mid-nineteenth century intended the continuance of the...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1808647/ | AIR1989CAL128, (1989)1CALLT87(HC), 1988(2)CHN241, 93CWN165, 1(1989)DMC322, AIR 1989 CALCUTTA 128, (1989) 1 CIV LJ 675, (1988) 93 CAL WN 165, (1988) 2 CAL HN 241, (1988) 2 CALLJ 294, (1990) 1 LJR 132, (1989) 1 DMC 322, (1989) 1 HINDULR 456, (1989) MATLR 142, (1988) 2 HINDULR 760",Adultery,adultery; constitutional_validity; desertion,1988,judicial_separation,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1989CAL128, (1989)1CALLT87(HC), 1988(2)CHN241, 93CWN165, 1(1989)DMC322, AIR 1989 CALCUTTA 128, (1989) 1 CIV LJ 675, (1988) 93 CAL WN 165, (1988) 2 CAL HN 241, (1988) 2 CALLJ 294, (1990) 1 LJR 132, (1989) 1 DMC 322, (1989) 1 HINDULR 456, (1989) MATLR 142, (1988) 2 HINDULR 760",1808647,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1808647/,10
Calcutta High Court,"T.O. Aykut vs M.O. Aykut on 17 March, 1939",AIR1940CAL75,1939-03-17,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 1, Section 10",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER McNair, J. 1. This is a wife's petition for a decree that her marriage with the respondent may be declared null and void. There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent. The petitioner at the time of the marriage was domiciled in Austria and was an Austrian subject. The respondent was a Turk. The parties went through the form of marriage at the register office in Calcutta on 8th March 1937. The petitioner has given evidence in which she has stated that she is a professing Christian and a Roman Catholic. She has further stated that she would not marry anybody who was not a Roman Catholic; prior to their marriage the respondent informed her that he was a Roman Catholic and he signed a paper to that effect. She also states that when they went to the register office where the form of marriage was celebrated, the respondent swore that he was a Roman Catholic and she states further that she would never have married him had she known that he was a Mahomedan. That information she obtained in England in May 1937 when her passport expired. She then found that in a document purporting to be...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. Detective Sgt. Clarke has given evidence that he had known the respondent for some time having come into contact with him in connexion with a passport. In February of this year he arrested the respondent for disorderly conduct and the respondent then made a voluntary statement in which, amongst other things, he stated that he was a Mahomedan and that he did not remember whether he stated that he was a Mahomedan or a Christian at the time of his marriage. Mr. R.C. Bonnerjee on behalf of the petitioner has referred me to Section 10 , Divorce Act, which provides that a wife may obtain dissolution of her marriage if her husband has since the solemnization of the marriage exchanged his profession of Christianity for the profession of some other religion and he argues that if the alleged husband never professed the Christian religion, there would be even stronger grounds for dissolving the marriage tie. It is clear that the policy of the Act does not contemplate a valid marriage between a Christian and a person professing a religion which is not monogamous. Section 1 .9, Divorce Act , provides that a decree for nullity may be made on any of the grounds mentioned and it further provides that nothing in the Section shall affect the jurisdiction of the...","3. The High Court has accordingly power to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud, and on the evidence which has been given before me I am satisfied that the consent of the petitioner to the marriage was obtained by fraud with the consequence that the marriage is void. The respondent was served personally with the petition and does not appear to defend. Although the petitioner is domiciled in Austria she has lived and cohabited with the respondent in Calcutta and she was residing in Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court at the time when she filed her petition. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to entertain the petition. There will be a decree nisi in terms of the prayer of the petition and the respondent must pay the costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1440557/ | AIR1940CAL75, AIR 1940 CALCUTTA 75",Procedural,procedural,1939,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1940CAL75, AIR 1940 CALCUTTA 75",1440557,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1440557/,3
Calcutta High Court,"Surendra Nath Dutt vs Malati And Anr. on 29 May, 1942",AIR1942CAL546,1942-05-29,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 115, Section 17, Section 24, Section 41, Section 43, Section 45, Section 62, Section 8",Adultery; Conversion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Edgley, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. In this case the learned District Judge of the 24-Parganas by his order, dated 17th September 1911, has directed that the marriage of the petitioner, Surendra Nath Dutt, with his wife, Malati alias Baby Dutt, be dissolved subject to confirmation by the High Court. The matter has accordingly come before us under Section 17 , Divorce Act, for confirmation of the order passed by the learned Judge. The admitted facts of the case are as follows : Surendra Nath Dutt went through a form of marriage in 1919 with a lady named Indubala Das. This marriage appears to have been solemnized according to Hindu rites but, in spite of this fact, the petitioner and Indubala went through a further form of marriage on 3rd August 1920, under the provisions of Act 3 of 1872. On 2nd September 1938, Indubala Das, on the allegation that she had become a convert to Islam, filed a Plaint in the Court of the third Munsif of Alipore in which she asked for a declaration to the effect that her marriage with Surendra Nath Dutt stood dissolved by reason of her conversion to Islam and disinclination on the part of her husband to be converted to Islam. The case was uncontested before the learned Munsif and, on 21st September 1938, Indubala obtained an ex...","3. The learned Judges further expressed the opinion that as no final order had yet been passed in the suit ""it would be open to the petitioner to raise this question of jurisdiction if she is so advised if any decree for dissolution of marriage is at all passed in this case and the matter comes up for confirmation before this Court under the provisions of the Divorce Act ."" 18. I agree.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/582424/ | AIR1942CAL546, AIR 1942 CALCUTTA 546",Adultery,adultery; conversion,1942,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1942CAL546, AIR 1942 CALCUTTA 546",582424,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/582424/,11
Calcutta High Court,"Sm. Susama Singh vs Sri Sailendra Nath Singh And Anr. on 27 January, 1961",AIR1961CAL373,1961-01-27,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 19, Section 3, Section 494",Adultery; Desertion; Cruelty; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Bhattacharya, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""Marriage with another woman means marriage of any person being married to any other person during the life of the former wife, whether the second marriage shall have taken place within the Dominion of India or elsewhere"". 16. It is true that there was no issue framed as to whether respondent No. 1 was guilty of bigamy with adultery. I do not think, however, that this caused any prejudice to respondent No. 1. He does not also appear before us to make any grievance. 17. Regarding the delay in claiming divorce, the finding of the Court below is that the wife petitioner had not sufficient fund to start the proceeding earlier and also that she hoped that the husband might come back to her. Since the court be-low was satisfied, on that evidence, that there was no unreasonable delay, I do not desire to differ from that finding, in the...","3. The allegations are of adultery and desertion. According to the petitioner the parties lived as husband and wife for the last time on 24th August, 1950. On 26th August next the respondent drove her out and left her at her father's place at 218 Lalji Shall Road, Dum Dum, A point was taken that there was unreasonable delay in presenting the petition for divorce which was filed on 14th May, 1957. The petitioner had stated that she could not file the suit earlier as she had not enough money to file one and that she was hoping that her husband would return to her. The petitioner is getting a monthly salary of only BE. 75/-. In the circumstances the plea of poverty may be accepted. She was expecting that her husband would return to her as all women in such circumstances might. But that would not amount to condonation of the offence in question, namely, adultery. 4. Even before 24th August, 1950, according to the evidence, the co-respondent Depali used to meet the respondent. The petitioner has proved that...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a reference under Section 17 of the Indian-Divorce Act for confirmation of a Decree Nisi parsed by an Additional District Judge of Alipore in an application under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act filed by Sm. Susaina Singh against her husband, Sailendra Nath Singh, under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act for dissolution of their marriage. 2. Both parties are Indian Christian and both are of Indian domicile. The parties were married at the Methodist Church, Dum Dum on 27th June, 1945. The marriage was consummated. The parties lived together as husband and wife for the last time on 24th August, 1950 at 3/1, Jannagar Second Lane at Entally within the jurisdiction of Alipore Court. The petitioner is now living at her father's place at 218, Lalji Shah Road, Dum Dura which also is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Alipore. The respondent contested the jurisdiction of the learned Additional District Judge who heard the application. But since both parties were living together at 3/1 Jannagar Second Lane within the jurisdiction of the Alipore Court for the last time, the learned Additional District Judge was competent to hear the case. The husband raised a point that in a previous application for divorce filed by the petitioner, which was with-drawn ultimately, 22/1D Dixon Lane, which...","9. This is a reference under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act for confirmation of the Decree Nisi, passed by an Additional District Judge of Alipore, in favour of Sm. Susama Singh, for dissolution of her marriage with respondent No. 1, Sailendra Nath Singh. The prayer for divorce was made on the ground of cruelty and adultery with desertion. The husband filed a written statement challenging the allegations made by the petitioner wife and in that written statement he also made certain counter allegations against the wife. On the date the case was taken up for hearing, the husband, did not appear. The petitioner, wife gave extremely scrappy evidence on the merits of the claim as hereinbelow set out: ""On 24th August, 1950, I was driven away by the respondent. Since then he is not maintaining mo, I have not colluded with him to bring the suit nor have I condoned the conduct."" Upon the aforesaid type of evidence, however, the trial court found that the allegations of cruelty, adultery and desertion, as alleged by the petitioner, had been...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/807630/ | AIR1961CAL373, 65CWN412, AIR 1961 CALCUTTA 373, ILR (1962) 1 CAL 173 65 CAL WN 412, 65 CAL WN 412",Adultery,adultery; desertion; cruelty; nullity_sec19,1961,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1961CAL373, 65CWN412, AIR 1961 CALCUTTA 373, ILR (1962) 1 CAL 173 65 CAL WN 412, 65 CAL WN 412",807630,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/807630/,12
Calcutta High Court,"Apurba Mohan Ghosh vs Manashi Ghosh on 10 June, 1988",AIR1989CAL115,1988-06-10,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13B, Section 21, Section 23",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT A.M. Bhattacharjee, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. The appellant-husband petitioned against the wife-respondent in court below for dissolution of the marriage on the ground of her alleged mental disorder and the petition having been dismissed, the husband has preferred this appeal to this Court. But both the parties have now filed a joint-petition before us praying that the marriage between them may be dissolved by a decree of divorce on compromise on the terms and conditions contained therein. The question that has accordingly arisen for our consideration is whether such a course is permissible under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 .",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. Under Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act, ''all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Civil P.C."", which would accordingly include Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, providing for compromise of suit. But as indicated in Section 21 itself in its opening words, the Civil P.C. would apply ""subject to the other provisions contained in this Act"", and as provided in Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code, the Rule would apply only when the Court is satisfied that the ""agreement of compromise"", on the basis of which the proceeding is sought to be decreed, is ""lawful"". We would accordingly have to ascertain as to whether the ""agreement or compromise"" in question is lawful and whether there is anything in the Hindu Marriage Act , express or implied, to outweigh the operation of Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Civil P.C. to a proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act . 4. Since marriage is an institution around which our civilised society has germinated, the question of public policy involved in the matrimonial law providing for the maintenance as well as dissolution of marriage is no less important than the public policy involved in the Rent Control Laws seeking to provide protection to the tenants. On a parity of...","3. Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act, providing for decree to be awarded thereunder, expressly provides that only when ""any of the grounds for granting relief exists"", obviously meaning thereby any of the grounds specified in the Act, and the other relevant provisions in Cls. (a) to (e) are also satisfied, then only, ""but not otherwise"", the Court can decree the reliefs prayed for. The expression ""but not otherwise"" is weighty enough to indicate with unmistakable clarity that a decree can be granted by the Court only when any of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act for the grant of relief is found to exist and not merely on the grounds that the parties have agreed to the grant of such a decree. If a special statute governs the grant of relief therein and affirmatively provides that decrees for such reliefs can be granted on those grounds and also negatively provides that decrees can be granted not otherwise, i.e., on no other grounds, then the decree on any ground not provided in the statute would not only be...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1487189/ | AIR1989CAL115, 93CWN79, I(1990)DMC145, AIR 1989 CALCUTTA 115, (1988) 2 CAL HN 449, (1988) 93 CAL WN 79, (1990) 1 HINDULR 496, (1990) 1 DMC 145, (1989) 1 HINDULR 247",Unclear,unclear,1988,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1989CAL115, 93CWN79, I(1990)DMC145, AIR 1989 CALCUTTA 115, (1988) 2 CAL HN 449, (1988) 93 CAL WN 79, (1990) 1 HINDULR 496, (1990) 1 DMC 145, (1989) 1 HINDULR 247",1487189,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1487189/,8
Calcutta High Court,"Mrs. Rose Simpson vs Binimoy Biswas on 23 April, 1979",AIR1980CAL214,1979-04-23,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 13, Section 15, Section 18, Section 19, Section 21, Section 24, Section 57, Section 60, Section 7, Section 88",Nullity Sec19; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Monjula Bose, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""It would be all the more hazardous in the case of marriage laws to treat a marriage in breach of a certain condition void even though the law does not expressly provide for it. Craies on Statute Law 6th Edition pages 263 and 264 may be referred to with advantage: ""The words in this section are negative words, and are clearly prohibitory of the marriage being had without the the prescribed requisites, but whether the marriage itself is void.....is a question of very great difficulty: It is to be recollected that there are no words in the Act rendering the marriage void and I have sought in vain for any case in which a marriage has been declared null and void unless there were words in the statute expressly, so declaring it (emphasis supplied).....From this examination of these Acts I draw two conclusions. First, that there never appears to have...","1. The suit instituted by Rose Simpson the petitioner under the Indian Divorce Act is primarily for a declaration that her marriage with the respondent is a nullity. The parties profess the Christian religion. In the petition it is, inter alia, alleged that at the time of the impugned marriage on May 7th, 1955, the respondent represented to the petitioner that his prior marriage with the petitioner's eldest sister Agnes Simpson had been lawfully dissolved. Subsequently, in a suit for divorce on charges of adultery, initiated by the petitioner against her husband being Suit No. 9, 1973 (Mrs. Rose Biswas v. Binimoy Biswas) she came to know that the prior marriage of her eldest sister with her husband, the present respondent had not been dissolved. On advice the petitioner obtained leave to withdraw the said suit with liberty to institute appropriate proceedings. The present suit was caused to be filed thereafter. It is contended that inasmuch as the said prior marriage of the respondent was in force at the material time, the subsequent marriage between the petitioner and the respondent...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","7. Mr. P. K. Roy, learned Advocate for the petitioner, contended on the other hand that the term ""may"" has been incorporated in Section 19 of the Indian Divorce Act in respect of grounds for both void and voidable marriages and grounds (2) and (4) thereof deal with statutory incapacities viz., marriage between persons within prohibited degrees of relationship, or subsistence of earlier' marriage which makes a marriage void ab initio. He contended further that if a marriage is void, the term ""husband or wife"" referred to in the said section cannot validate the marriage. The statute applied where either the petitioner or the respondent professed Christianity and there could be instances where the personal law of either party allowed a marriage for a second time. It was in that context the term ""husband or wife"" has been used in the section. In India the right to apply for a decree of nullity was given by the statute only to the parties to the marriage, whereas in English Law a third party could seek such a declaration. The use of the expression ""husband or wife"", he contended, did not mean that legislative sanction was given to a Christian to marry more than once, contrary to his or her personal law. If. a second marriage was contracted during the subsistence of...","6. Mr. S. K. Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate for the respondent, submitted that under Sections 18 and 19 of the Indian Divorce Act a ""husband"" or ""wife"" was no doubt given a right to seek declaration of nullity of their marriage prima facie net void, but it was the intention of the legislature that a decree of nullity was not to be granted as a matter of right but in the discretion of the Court. He stressed that the parties had been living together as husband and wife for 22 years and the petitioner had borne respondent 7 children 3 of whom were born after the marriage. He contended, the presumption was always in favour of the validity of a marriage and there was nothing in the Indian Divorce Act which rendered a marriage void ipso jure. He submitted that if a decree declaring the marriage a nullity was passed in the instant case, the children born after the marriage would be labelled ""illegitimate"". Whilst exercising its judicial discretion the Court will consider the effect of the decree on the lives...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1257066/ | AIR1980CAL214, AIR 1980 CALCUTTA 214",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; adultery,1979,nullity,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1980CAL214, AIR 1980 CALCUTTA 214",1257066,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1257066/,11
Calcutta High Court,"Brojendra Kumar Ghosh vs Mrs. Arpana Ghosh And Anr. on 23 December, 1981",AIR1982CAL360,1981-12-23,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 34",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Sudhindra Mohan Guha, J. 1. The instant reference has been made by Sri A. K. Chatterjee, District Judge, Burdwan for confirmation of the decree passed in Matrimonial Suit No. 70 of 1976 under the Indian Divorce Act 2. An application under Sections 10 and 34 of the Divorce Act, 1869 was presented by the petitioner, Brojendra Kumar Ghosh for dissolution of marriage of the petitioner with respondent No. 1, Mrs. Arpana Ghosh on the ground that she had been guilty of adultery with the corespondent No. 2, Sri Dilip Sen and for damages amounting to Rs. 2,000/- against the co-respondent.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.",,"3. Both the respondent and co-respondent made their appearance before the court below, but ultimately the suit was not contested by them and as a result the decree was passed ex parte. 4. The petitioner is a Christian by religion and both the parties are domiciled in India for all material times. The petitioner alleged that respondent No. 1 who was married to him had been guilty of adultery with co-respondent since the solemnization of marriage between them. The petitioner, who examined himself in court, stated on oath that there was no ground to suspect that the petitioner had in any manner been accessory to the charge of adultery or that he had condoned the same. On evidence the learned District Judge was of the opinion that there was nothing on record to indicate that the petition for divorce was presented and prosecuted in collusion with either of the respondents. On evidence it was found by the learned District Judge that the wife, respondent No. 1, was guilty of adultery. In the circumstances, a decree declaring the marriage of the...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1851304/ | AIR1982CAL360, (1982)2COMPLJ132(CAL), AIR 1982 CALCUTTA 360, (1982) 2 CALLJ 132, 1982 (2) DMC 257, 1982 HINDULR 464",Unclear,unclear,1981,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1982CAL360, (1982)2COMPLJ132(CAL), AIR 1982 CALCUTTA 360, (1982) 2 CALLJ 132, 1982 (2) DMC 257, 1982 HINDULR 464",1851304,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1851304/,2
Calcutta High Court,"Wang Chen Tshering vs Smt. Lorretta Tshering Nee Fuller And ... on 7 May, 1982",AIR1983CAL50,1982-05-07,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Chittatosh Mookerjee, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The order of the learned District Judge, Darjeeling allowing the petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, filed by the husband has been placed before us for confirmation under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act. 2. After perusing the records we are satisfied that the learned District Judge has rightly allowed the petition dissolving the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent No. 1, under Section 10 of the Divorce Act. 3. On the 15th Sept., 1974 the marriage between the parties was solemnised at Zakhama, Nagaland and it has been proved by evidence that thereafter the parties lived together at Mirik within the district of Darjeeling. The petitioner has proved by cogent evidence that on 27th Aug., 1977 the respondent-wife had left the matrimonial home at Mirik without his consent and knowledge and had stayed in a neighbouring tea garden with the co-respondent on 29th Aug., 1979. It has been further proved by the evidence of P. W. 3 that the respondent-wife with the co-respondent had lived in a hotel at Kathmandu for about ten days. Although the respondent No. 1 had filed written statement she did not ultimately appear and contest the case and controvert the evidence given by the petitioner-husband that she had deserted her husband for the requisite period and had lived...","4. In the circumstances, we accept the Reference and confirm the decree for dissolution of marriage passed by the District Judge, Darjeeling dissolving the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent No. 1. 5. There will be no order for costs. Sharma, J. 6. I agree. Amitabha Dutta, J. 7. I agree.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/826951/ | AIR1983CAL50, AIR 1983 CALCUTTA 50",Unclear,unclear,1982,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1983CAL50, AIR 1983 CALCUTTA 50",826951,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/826951/,3
Calcutta High Court,"Dr. Niranjan Das Mohan vs Mrs. Ena Mohan W/O Dr. Niranjan Das Mohan ... on 30 November, 1942",AIR1943CAL146,1942-11-30,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14, Section 15, Section 17, Section 2, Section 21, Section 39, Section 7, Section 77",Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Rau, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,"14. It is now a settled rule that damages in proceedings of this kind must be compensatory, not punitive. The amount must depend as laid down in (1920) L.R. 1920 P. 126 (1920) L.R. 1920 P. 126 : 89 L.J.P. 151 : 122 L.T. 804 : 36 T.L.R. 265, Butterworth v. Butterworth at p. 142 on (1) the actual value of the wife to the husband, (2) the proper compensation to the husband for the injury to his feelings, the blow to his marital honour and the serious hurt to his matrimonial and family life. The question of the amount or damages was raised in issue No. 13 before the District Judge, but has not been dealt with by him, presumably because he dismissed the petition. We have therefore to assess the damages ourselves with the help of the materials on the record. As to the first head of damages, namely, the actual value of the wife to the husband, we have some evidence as to its pecuniary aspect inasmuch as the petitioner has stated that the expenses of the...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This appeal arises out of a judgment of the District Judge of the 24 Parganas dismissing a petition for dissolution of marriage presented on 19th January 1940 by the appellant Dr. Niranjan Das Mohan against his wife Ena Mohan and three corespondents, (1) Brojendra Nath Pal, (2) H.K. Lalvani and (3) M.G. Mennon. The petition was presented under Sections 10 and 34, Divorce Act, 4 of 1869 (which provide respectively for dissolution of marriage and award of damages) and Section 17, Special Marriage Act, 3 of 1872 (which makes the Divorce Act applicable to marriages contracted under the Special Marriage Act ). The statements in the petition, so far as they are relevant for the purposes of this appeal, may be briefly summarised thus: The petitioner is a Hindu of the Arya Samaj sect. The respondent was born of Christian parents, but became a convert to the Arya Samaj sect on 5th April 1925. They were married according to Arya Samaj rites that very day; but they had also been married under the Special Marriage Act on 13th March 1925. The parties lived together until 28th January 1938. There are 5 children of the marriage, 3 sons and 2 daughters whose ages at the date of the petition ranged between 3 and 13 years. The respondent has since 1929...","5. In the result, he dismissed the petition, the parties being directed to bear their own costs. It may be mentioned incidentally that the accusation of cruelty was held to be wholly without foundation in the wife's suit for judicial separation. The appellant contends that the District Judge was wrong in holding that there was unreasonable delay in presenting the petition. This contention is plainly well-founded. It is true that there was a period of nearly two years between the date when the respondent finally left the petitioner (28th January 1938) and the date when the petition for dissolution of marriage was presented (19th January 1940). But the petition was not founded on her going away: it was founded on the adulteries committed afterwards, which, by themselves as well as by reviving previous offences, gave the petitioner a cause of action. The latest of these subsequent adulteries, according to the District Judge's findings was between 9th December 1939 and 7th January 1940. The petition was presented on 19th January 1940 so that there was hardly any delay so far as...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1190629/ | AIR1943CAL146, AIR 1943 CALCUTTA 146",Adultery,adultery; cruelty,1942,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1943CAL146, AIR 1943 CALCUTTA 146",1190629,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1190629/,11
Calcutta High Court,"Constance Catherine Moreno vs Henry William Bunn Moreno on 7 April, 1920",57IND. CAS.216,1920-04-07,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 14, Section 438",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Asutosh Mookerjee, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"3. As regards the first contention, namely that the husband had condoned the adultery and was consequently no longer entitled to an order for dissolution of marriage, reliance has been placed upon the admitted fast that the parties resumed cohabitation in 1913. The only point in controversy is whether at the time when cohabitation was resumed or during the continuance thereof the husband was aware of the antecedent adultery on the part of his wife The wife asserts that he had full and definite knowledge of all the circumstances before cohabitation was resumed; the husband maintains on the other hand that he had no such knowledge when he took back his wife and that as soon as he made the discovery, he separated from her in the beginning of 1914. There is conflict of testimony on this point; and upon an examination of the evidence we have arrived at the...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is an appeal against a decree nisi for dissolution of marriage made upon a petition presented by a husband under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, on the ground that his wife had, since the solemnization of the marriage, been guilty of adultery. 2. The petitioner and the respondent were married on the 21st May 1S02 and lived together until the month of February 1905, Daring this period, two children were born to them, a daughter, now sixteen years of age, and a son who is dead. In February 1905, the respondent left the petitioner and lived apart till the end of the year 1912, or the beginning of the year 1913. The petitioner alleges that after the respondent had left him, she lived in adultery with one Pratti, now deceased. She gave birth to two children in 1907 and 1908; but the petitioner was not aware either of the adultery with Pratti or of the birth of the children. In 1909 one Abro commenced divorce proceeding against his own wife and made the petitioner a co-respondent, on the allegation of adultery with her. Shortly after, in 1910, the respondent instituted divorce proceedings against the petitioner on the basis of the adultery alleged in the Abro suit. Both the suits were dismissed as against the petitioner....","7. The result is that this appeal is allowed and the petition dismissed with costs in both Courts. Fletcher, J. 8. I agree.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/15735/ | 57IND. CAS.216, AIR 1920 CALCUTTA 439",Adultery,adultery,1920,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 57IND. CAS.216, AIR 1920 CALCUTTA 439",15735,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/15735/,6
Calcutta High Court,"Simon Rajan vs Anita Simon Rajan on 3 February, 1999",(1999)2CALLT137(HC),1999-02-03,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 23",Cruelty; Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,JUDGMENT The Court,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The plaintiff instituted the suit fn the form of an application under section 10 or section 23 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 whichever will be applicable in the present case. 2. The cause of making such alternative relief is that the husband/ petitioner made out case of adultery as well as physical and mental cruelty or desertion simultaneously as against the wife. 3. The petitioner/husband served a notice of making this application and filed the Affidavit-of-Service along with other incidental papers to establish that service was effected upon the respondent. In addition thereto, he produced a certificate issued by the Deputy Registrar, Original Side of this court wherefrom it appears that the respondent did not appear either in person or by Advocate. Let the Affidavit-of-Service and other incidental papers along with the Certificate issued by the concerned Deputy Registrar be kept with the record. 4. Since no denial was there, I was inclined to proceed on the basis of Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure but Mr. K.S.Roy, learned senior counsel with the able assistance of Mrs. Swapna Mukherjee learned counsel appearing with him, contended that in view of the circumstances particulars when the husband has brought certain charges of adultery as well as cruelty and desertion against wife, there should be witness action...",16. Decreed in terms of prayer 'A',"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1432375/ | (1999)2CALLT137(HC), I(2000)DMC116, AIR 2000 CALCUTTA 8, (1999) 2 CAL WN 558, (2000) 1 DMC 116, (2000) 1 HINDULR 503, (2000) 1 MARRILJ 495, (2000) 2 CAL LJ 94, (1999) 2 CALLT 137, (1999) 4 CIVLJ 310",Cruelty,cruelty; adultery; desertion,1999,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (1999)2CALLT137(HC), I(2000)DMC116, AIR 2000 CALCUTTA 8, (1999) 2 CAL WN 558, (2000) 1 DMC 116, (2000) 1 HINDULR 503, (2000) 1 MARRILJ 495, (2000) 2 CAL LJ 94, (1999) 2 CALLT 137, (1999) 4 CIVLJ 310",1432375,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1432375/,3
Calcutta High Court,"Charles James Wickins vs Eden Ris Rita Wickins & Another on 14 June, 1991",AIR1992CAL306,1991-06-14,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 47",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER A.M. Bhattacharjee, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. The unchallenged evidence of the petitioner-husband and of P.W. 2, a ""close friend"" of the parties, read with the statements made in the petitioner, which also, under the provisions of Section 47 of the Divorce Act, 1869, ""may at the hearing be referred to as evidence"", can, as they did, reasonably satisfy the Court that the alleged adultery, on which the petition is grounded, has been proved. We, therefore, find no reason not to confirm the decree passed by the trial Judge for dissolution of marriage between the petitioner-husband and the wife-respondent and we hereby do so. 5. We, on our own, raised certain questions as to the vires of Section 10 , Section 17 and some other provisions of the Divorce Act, 1869 , which were adverted to, though not finally decided, by two Special Benches of this Court in Swapna Ghosh v. Sadananada Ghosh , and in Ramish Francis Toppo v. Violet Fancis Toppo , . Mr. Chatterjee and Mrs. Mitra the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Wilson De Rose, the learned counsel for the opposite party and Mr. Kundu, the learned counsel for the Union of India, have advanced interesting argument on those questions at our request, but have nevertheless advised us not to go into those questions as those were not urged or pressed...","1. The decree for divorce passed by the learned Additional District Judge in favour of the Petitioner-husband has, as it must, come up before us under Section 17 of the Divorce Act, 1869, for confirmation or such other order as the matter would warrant. 2. The matter was heard ex parte in the trial Court and it has not been urged before us by or on behalf of the respondent that such ex parte hearing was in any way illegal, irregular or improper. This aspect therefore need not detain us. 3. Not that a suit heard ex parte must be decreed; it may, even if uncontested, still be dismissed if there is any legal bar thereto or such infirmity in the evidence which cannot sustain a decree. No such infirmity, either in law or on facts, shows its head. 7.Order accordingly.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/53008/ | AIR1992CAL306, AIR 1992 CALCUTTA 306, (1992) MATLR 131",Unclear,unclear,1991,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1992CAL306, AIR 1992 CALCUTTA 306, (1992) MATLR 131",53008,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/53008/,4
Calcutta High Court,"Swapna Ghosh vs Sadananda Ghosh And Anr. on 22 July, 1988",AIR1989CAL1,1988-07-22,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 112, Section 17, Section 22, Section 488",Constitutional Validity; Adultery; Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT A.M. Bhattacharjee, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (constitutional validity) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This decree for dissolution of marriage made by the Additional District Judge in a Divorce Suit under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 , has come, as it must, before us for confirmation under Section 17 of the Act and we confirm the same as we are satisfied that the materials on record would warrant such confirmation. But the manner in which the trial Judge has decided the issues involved has not earned our satisfaction and we would accordingly like to draw the attention of the learned Judge to the fact that trial of matrimonial causes, even if undefended as the present one, is a matter, not of easy insouciance, but of most anxious advertence. 2. I have, however, my own doubts as to whether the provisions of Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act requiring confirmation of the decree of the trial court by the High Court should any longer be retained. A decree for dissolution of marriage among the Hind us, Buddhists, Sikhs anJ Jains under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , among the Parsis under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 , among the Muslims under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 are made by the District Courts and under the last mentioned Act, even by courts of lower rank and all such decrees operate...","3. Before I proceed further to consider as to whether the grounds alleged by the wife for the dissolution of the marriage have been proved and the decree for dissolution passed by the trial court should be confirmed. I would like to note that. Section 17 apart, there are several other provisions in this Century-old Divorce Act of 1869 which are not only manifestly anachronistic, but have rendered themselves patently open to Constitutional challenge. To start with, under Section 10 of the Act, while the husband is entitled to a dissolution on the ground of the wife's adultery, the wife is not so entitled unless she proves that the husband's adultery is incestuous or is coupled with cruelty or bigamy or desertion. If the husband is entitled to dissolution on the ground of adultery simpliciter on the part of the wife, but the wife is not so entitled unless some other matrimonial fault is also found to be super-added, then it is difficult to understand as to why this provision shall not be held to be discriminatory on the ground...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/296734/ | AIR1989CAL1, 93CWN231, AIR 1989 CALCUTTA 1, (1989) 1 CIV LJ 687, (1988) 93 CAL WN 231, (1988) 2 CAL HN 153, (1988) 2 CALLJ 156, (1988) 2 DMC 343, (1989) EASTCRIC 236, (1988) 2 HINDULR 742, (1988) 2 HINDULR 592, (1988) MATLR 351, (1988) 2 CURCC 540",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; adultery; cruelty; desertion,1988,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1989CAL1, 93CWN231, AIR 1989 CALCUTTA 1, (1989) 1 CIV LJ 687, (1988) 93 CAL WN 231, (1988) 2 CAL HN 153, (1988) 2 CALLJ 156, (1988) 2 DMC 343, (1989) EASTCRIC 236, (1988) 2 HINDULR 742, (1988) 2 HINDULR 592, (1988) MATLR 351, (1988) 2 CURCC 540",296734,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/296734/,9
Allahabad High Court,"Smt. Balwant Kunwar And Ors. vs Addl. Munsiff, Dehra Dun And Anr. on 30 April, 1958",AIR1959ALL7,1958-04-30,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 12, Section 18, Section 19, Section 2, Section 21, Section 23, Section 28, Section 29, Section 32, Section 4, Section 9",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER V.G. Oak, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. The question raised in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is whether, in view of the enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, or the 1955 Act), a Munsif has jurisdiction to entertain a suit for restitution of conjugal rights where the parties are Hindus. 2. Ranjit Singh filed suit No, 306 of 1955 in the Court of Munsif, Dehra Dun against Smt. Bal-want Kunwar, Bakshish Singh and Inder Kunwar. Defendant No. 1 is plaintiff's wife. Defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 3 are her brother and mother respectively. The reliefs claimed by the plaintiff are : (a) a decree against the defendant No. 1 directing her to live with the plaintiff and to allow him a free exercise of his conjugal rights: (b) an injunction restraining the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 from preventing the defendant No. 1...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. It appears that the parties are Sikhs. According to Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act, the Act applies to Sikhs also. So the present par-hies are governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 . 5. Section 9 of the Act deals with restitution of conjugal rights. Section 9 states- ""(1) When either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the district court, for restitution of conjugal rights and the court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly. (2) Nothing shall be pleaded in answer to a petition for restitution of conjugal rights which Khali not be a ground for judicial separation or for nullity of marriage or for divorce"". The petitioners' contention is that the plaintiffs only remedy was to file a petition under Section 9 of the Act, and a suit was not maintainable in ""the Munsif's Court. 6. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the general jurisdiction of Civil Courts. Section 9 , Civil Procedure Code states: ""The Courts shall (subject to the provisions...","21. The petition is allowed. Proceedings in suit No. 306 of 1955 pending before the learned Additional Munsif, Dehra Dun are quashed. Parties shall bear their own costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1754000/ | AIR1959ALL7, AIR 1959 ALLAHABAD 7, 1958 ALL. L. J. 556 ILR (1958) 2 ALL 761, ILR (1958) 2 ALL 761",Procedural,procedural,1958,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1959ALL7, AIR 1959 ALLAHABAD 7, 1958 ALL. L. J. 556 ILR (1958) 2 ALL 761, ILR (1958) 2 ALL 761",1754000,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1754000/,6
Allahabad High Court,"Alfred Stanley Barrett vs Mrs. Kathleen Barrett on 26 August, 1949",AIR1950ALL193,1949-08-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 3, Section 34, Section 55, Section 56",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,JUDGMENT,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(1) Whether the respondent committed adultery with the co-respondent at the Royal Hotel, Lucknow, on 31st August 1943. (2) Whether there is any connivance or collusion between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1? (3) Is the petitioner entitled to a decree for damages against the co-respondent? If go, to what amount? (4) Has this Court jurisdiction to try the suit? 4. On issue No. 1 as to adultery, the finding was in the affirmative. 5. On the issue of connivance and collusion the answer was in the negative. 6. On the question of jurisdiction the learned trial Court held that the petitioner and his wife last resided together at Lucknow, and so the Court had jurisdiction. The Court accordingly awarded on 17th December 1946, the petitioner a decree for dissolution of marriage subject to confirmation by the Hon'ble Chief Court (now High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench)....",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The petitioner Alfred Stanley Barett filed a petition under Section 10 , Divorce Act for dissolution of his marriage with the respondent, Mrs. Kathleen Barett, on the ground of her adultery with the co-respondent Lachhmi Chand Srivastava. It was stated that the parties were married on 19th August 1937, at the Catholic Church, Cawnpore, that they were domiciled in India and that both of them were Roman Catholic Christians. The petitioner alleged that he and his wife lived together happily till 1938 when he noticed a strange change in the behaviour of his wife and that she finally left him in October 1944 from Partabgarh where the petitioner was posted. The petitioner alleged that there was an exchange of love letters between his wife, the respondent, and the co-respondent; that his wife stayed at the Royal Hotel, Lucknow, with the co-respondent on 31st August 1943; that both of them stayed at the Hotel under the name of Mr. and Mrs. S. P. Singh; that the respondent and the co-respondent used to go about in trains as husband and wife and that after his wife left him in October 1944, the petitioner put in an advertisement in the Statesman of 4th July 1945, disclaiming any responsibility for the debts incurred by his wife as she had left his protection. It...","It will be noticed that, this English case is baaed on the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20 and 21 V. C. 85) and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1860 (23 and 24 V. C. 144). The Bombay authority was followed later in Charles Wakehearst Peyton v. Mrs. Ada Peyton, A. I. R. (24) 1937 Lah 417 : (169 I. C. 654 S. B.). The learned Judges there gave no reasons except to say that they were following the view in Kyte, 20 Bom. 362. It seems to us that the English precedents cannot help us in the present case as the English law iw not the same as the Indian law. The procedure instituted by Section 17 , Indian Divorce Act is a new procedure which has no parallel in English law and is specific in itself and contains a specific procedure for confirmation of a decree passed by a District Judge. In the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20 and 21 V. C. 85) and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1860 (23 and 24 V. C. 144), there is no procedure for trial of...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/615345/ | AIR1950ALL193, AIR 1950 ALLAHABAD 193",Adultery,adultery,1949,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1950ALL193, AIR 1950 ALLAHABAD 193",615345,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/615345/,6
Allahabad High Court,"David Campbell vs Smt. Shiphali Aayreen Campbell on 1 September, 2025",David Campbell vs Smt. Shiphali Aayreen Campbell,2025-09-01,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:153821 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD TRANSFER APPLICATION (CIVIL) No. - 894 of 2023 David Campbell .....Applicant(s) Versus Smt. Shiphali Aayreen Campbell .....Opposite Party(s) Counsel for Applicant(s) : Sanjay Mishra, Satya Prakash Pandey Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Bhriguram Ji Court No. - 37 HON'BLE CHANDRA KUMAR RAI, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant/ husband and Mr. Bhriguram Ji, leaned counsel for the opposite party/wife.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. Brief facts of the case are that marriage of applicant was solemnized with opposite party according to Christian religion & rites on 30.1.2008. Two children were born on 9.8.2009 and 8.11.2012 out of wedlock of applicant and opposite party. Applicant filed a case for dissolution of marriage (divorce) under Section 10 of Divorce Act, 1869 before Principal Judge, Family Court, Jhansi. Opposite party/ wife has put in her appearance and filed her reply in the aforementioned divorce case filed by husband/ applicant. The aforementioned divorce case has been transferred from the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Jhansi to the Court of Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Jhansi vide order dated 29.9.2023. 3. The instant transfer application has been filed in November, 2023 for the following reliefs: ""It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to call for the records and to allow the present application and the proceedings of Case No.450 of 2021 (David Campbell vs. Smt. Shiphali Aayreen) pending in the Court of Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, District- Jhansi, under Section 10 of Divorce Act, 1869 may be transferred to some other Family Court from District- Jhansi such as Agra and Mathura etc. in the interest of justice. It is further prayed that the further proceeding of Case No.450 of...","(Chandra Kumar Rai,J.) September 1, 2025 Rameez",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/73410623/,Unclear,unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,73410623,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/73410623/,3
Allahabad High Court,"Smt. Alpna Rolston vs Shri Darwin Rolston on 8 May, 2023",Smt. Alpna Rolston vs Shri Darwin Rolston,2023-05-08,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 24",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:98152 Court No. - 1 Case :- TRANSFER APPLICATION (CIVIL) No. - 776 of 2022 Applicant :- Smt. Alpna Rolston Opposite Party :- Shri Darwin Rolston Counsel for Applicant :- Diptiman Singh,Abhijit Chatterji Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar Singh,J. 1. Heard S/Sri Diptiman Singh and Abhijit Chatterji, learned counsel for the applicant and perused the record. 2. Despite service of notice, no one has put in appearance on behalf of the opposite party.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. The present application under Section 24 of Code of Civil Procedure has been filed seeking transfer of Case No.2065 of 2022 (Darwin Rolston Vs. Alpana Rolston) filed under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 from the court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Kanpur Nagar to the court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Allahabad. 4. The applicant is wife of the opposite party. The applicant has three years girl child born out of the wedlock and lives in Allahabad (Prayagraj) with her parents and due to poor financial condition of her parents, it is very difficult for the applicant to attend the proceedings at Kanpur Nagar. 5. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, it would be appropriate to transfer the case as prayed for. 6. Application is accordingly allowed and the proceedings of Case No.2065 of 2022 (Darwin Rolston Vs. Alpana Rolston) filed under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 is transferred from the court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Kanpur Nagar to the court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Allahabad.",Order Date :- 8.5.2023 Rao/-,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/77570879/,Unclear,unclear,2023,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,77570879,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/77570879/,3
Allahabad High Court,"Smt. Prerna Paul vs Jugunu George Das on 19 February, 2021",Smt. Prerna Paul vs Jugunu George Das,2021-02-19,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Court No. - 5 Case :- TRANSFER APPLICATION (CIVIL) No. - 270 of 2020 Applicant :- Smt. Prerna Paul Opposite Party :- Jugunu George Das Counsel for Applicant :- Ram Prakash Dwivedi Hon'ble Saral Srivastava,J. Order on Order Sheet. This Court by order dated 09.02.2021 held the service of notice upon opposite party sufficient. Accordingly, the transfer application is being heard exparte. Order on Transfer Application. Heard learned counsel for the applicant.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that applicant is working in Bank and at present she is posted at Agra. He further submits that the applicant has a minor child which she has to look after, and therefore, in this circumstances, it is very hard for her to travel alongwith her child to Meerut to contest the case instituted by the opposite party. Necessary averments in this respect have been made in paragraph 12 of the affidavit filed in support of the transfer application which is being reproduced hereinbelow:- ""12. That the Applicant has a minor child and a serviceman lady, who is working in Bank at Agra, due to this reason she is not able to attend the Court at Meerut. The Applicant is living alone at Agra and no one look after her child."" The averments made by the applicant in paragraph 12 are unrebutted, and therefore, they are being treated to be correct.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The present application has been filed by the applicant-wife seeking transfer of Case No.555 of 2020 (Jugunu George Das Vs. Smt. Prerna Paul), under Section 10 (ix) & (x) of the Divorce Act 1869 pending in the court of Principal Judge, Family Court, District Meerut to the Principal Judge, Family Court, Agra. As the applicant has a minor child whom she is taking care of, therefore, it is very difficult for her to travel alongwith her child to Meerut to contest the case instituted by the opposite party, therefore, this Court is of the opinion that balance of convenience lays in favour of applicant, and accordingly, in the interest of justice, the Case No.555 of 2020 (Jugunu George Das Vs. Smt. Prerna Paul), under Section 10 (ix) & (x) of the Divorce Act 1869 is transferred from the court of Principal Judge, Family Court, District Meerut to the Principal Judge, Family Court, Agra. The Principal Judge, Family Court, Meerut is directed to remit the record of Case No.555 of 2020 (Jugunu George Das Vs. Smt. Prerna Paul), under Section 10 (ix) & (x) of the Divorce Act 1869 to the court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Agra for disposal of suit. The Transfer Application is allowed with no order as to costs.",Order Date :- 19.2.2021 Sattyarth,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/88349819/,Unclear,unclear,2021,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,88349819,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/88349819/,5
Allahabad High Court,"Sri Aulvin V. Singh vs Smt. Chandrawati on 15 March, 1974",AIR1974ALL278,1974-03-15,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 15, Section 18, Section 24, Section 27, Section 31",Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Yashoda Nandan, J.","10. Learned counsel for the parties have taken me through the evidence on record and I am satisfied that it was the appellant who for reasons of his own drove away his wife from his house and took no serious steps to bring her back. Even in his statement recorded by the trial Court, the appellant stated that he was not prepared to take back his wife. On the other hand, the respondent clearly stated that she was prepared to live with her husband provided he undertook not to treat her with cruelty and beat her. The only witness produced by the appellant in support of his case that the respondent left the matrimonial home without any rhyme or reason and subsequently refused to return back is P. W. 2 Kamal Nain. It is true that Kamal Nain is the uncle of the respondent but from his own statement it appears that he has several litigations not only with the father of the respondent but also with the respondent herself. He is clearly a witness inimical to the respondent and entered the witness box merely to embarrass her. The evidence of D. W. 1 Smt. Chandrawati appears to be spontaneous...","4. The trial Court framed the following issues:-- ""(1) Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner without any cause for more than three years immediately preceding the presentation of the present petition ? If so its effect? (2) Is the petition not maintainable as framed ?"" It may also be pointed out in this connection that the preamble of the Act shows that so far as divorce is concerned, the Act is all embracing and would govern the dissolution of all marriages irrespective of the consideration whether the marriage is of the special form envisaged in the Act and whether it has been registered under the Act or not. In this view of the matter, I can see nothing in the Act of 1954 which would exclude the application thereof to the case of the petitioner, no matter that the provisions of the Act of 1869 in this respect are...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"10. Learned counsel for the parties have taken me through the evidence on record and I am satisfied that it was the appellant who for reasons of his own drove away his wife from his house and took no serious steps to bring her back. Even in his statement recorded by the trial Court, the appellant stated that he was not prepared to take back his wife. On the other hand, the respondent clearly stated that she was prepared to live with her husband provided he undertook not to treat her with cruelty and beat her. The only witness produced by the appellant in support of his case that the respondent left the matrimonial home without any rhyme or reason and subsequently refused to return back is P. W. 2 Kamal Nain. It is true that Kamal Nain is the uncle of the respondent but from his own statement it appears that he has several litigations not only with the father of the respondent but also with the respondent herself. He is clearly a witness inimical to the respondent and...","1. This is an appeal by the husband arising out of a petition under Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. The material facts giving rise to this appeal are that the appellant presented a petition under Section 27 of the Act seeking divorce from his wife Smt. Chandrawati. who figures as a respondent before me. The appellant Sri Aulvin V. Singh and Smt. Chandrawati, respondent, are admittedly Christians and they were married in a Christian Church according to Christian rites on the 2nd May, 1957. The appellant alleged that they lived happily together as husband and wife till the 5th September, 1964, when all of a sudden the respondent for no rhyme or reason went away to her father's place. It was alleged that the appellant awaited her return for a few months but when she did not return back to the matrimonial home he made all efforts to bring her to his place but in vain. The petition was founded on the allegation of desertion by the wife without any cause for more than three years. The appellant prayed for a decree for divorce and dissolution of marriage. 3. The respondent admitted that she had been married to the appellant according to Christian rites in a Christian Church on the 2nd...","Both the issues were decided by the learned District Judge, Dehra Dun, against the appellant. It was held that as the evidence exists on record it could not be said that the respondent had herself left the roof of ""her husband's house, the fact of the matter being that the appellant himself had turned her out of his house because she had not borne any child and he wanted to remarry and so started troubling the respondent. The trial Court recorded a finding that it was the husband who had made the life of his wife miserable by neglecting her and beating her off and on and ultimately on the 6th September, 1964, forcibly turned her out of the matrimonial home and it was then that the respondent went to live at her father's house. On Issue No. 2, it was held that the scheme of the Act disclosed that its provisions will apply only to those cases where marriage had been solemnized under the Act or where marriages celebrated under other forms have been registered under the Act. The...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1671377/ | AIR1974ALL278, AIR 1974 ALLAHABAD 278, 1974 ALL. L. J. 924 ILR (1974) 1 ALL 53, ILR (1974) 1 ALL 53",Desertion,desertion; cruelty,1974,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1974ALL278, AIR 1974 ALLAHABAD 278, 1974 ALL. L. J. 924 ILR (1974) 1 ALL 53, ILR (1974) 1 ALL 53",1671377,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1671377/,11
Allahabad High Court,"Jijo C. George vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others on 1 December, 2022",Jijo C. George vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others,2022-12-01,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 157, Section 173, Section 376, Section 482",Constitutional Validity,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Court No. - 83 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 35719 of 2022 A.F.R. Applicant :- Jijo C. George Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Applicant :- Arun Kumar Tripathi Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Amit Tiwari,Shakti Shanker Tiwari,Subhash Chandra Tiwari Hon'ble Arvind Kumar Mishra-I,J.","(1) Heard Sri V.P. Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Arun Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Subhash Chandra Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondent no.4, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the material available on record.","(28) Now this Court would have to consider the very language and import of allegations contained in the first information report and to contemplate on the point whether bare description contained in the first information report makes out, inter-alia, alleged offence of rape and commission of cognizable offence or not? (29) In that regard, as this Court proceeds with the description contained in the FIR it is reflected that the allegations are expressive of solitary view that ""taking advantage of the opposite party no.4 on 05.12.2019"", the applicant allegedly ""invited"" the opposite party no.4 ""at his residence in ECC campus served tea and admixed some noxious substance in tea due to which she became unconcious"". Consequently, rape was committed upon her. When she regained her consciousness, she asked the applicant as to why he deceived her when he threatened her and told that he has made a video clip of...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"(1) Heard Sri V.P. Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Arun Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Subhash Chandra Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondent no.4, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the material available on record.","(2) This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed to quash the effect and operation of the impugned order dated 18.10.2022 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate- IX, Allahabad, in Case - State vs. Jijo C. George arising out of the First Information Report registered at Case Crime No.0070 of 2022, under Sections 376 , 328 , 323 , 504 and 506 IPC, Police Station- Mutthiganj, District- Praygraj and the operation and effect of the order impugned dated 21.10.2022 passed by Sessions Judge / Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Allahabad, in C.N.R. No. UPAD01-013127-2022, whereby he allowed the application of the Investigating Officer cocnerned to proceed with blood test / DNA test of the applicant during investigation. (3) The applicant- Jijo C. George- feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid direction/order of the Magistrate has approaced this Court invoking inherent powers of this Court in this matter wherein investigation is in progress and the applicant has been directed for undergoing DNA test. (4) In this case, a peep into facts of the case proceeds on line that an F.I.R. was lodged by the victim (opposite party no.2) that on 21.05.2022 referring to some incident that allegedly occurred on 05.12.2019 and onwards. The description in the first information report proceeds on to claim that the informant/prosecutrix was engaged in teaching profession at Ewing...",Order Date :- 1.12.2022 rkg,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/88752786/,Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity,2022,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,88752786,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/88752786/,6
Allahabad High Court,"Navneet Kaur & Anr vs Principal Judge Family Court Lko on 31 May, 2018",Navneet Kaur & Anr vs Principal Judge Family Court Lko,2018-05-31,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125, Section 13, Section 13B, Section 23, Section 28, Section 40",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH AFR Reserved Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 881 of 2017 Petitioner :- Navneet Kaur & Anr Respondent :- Principal Judge Family Court Lko Counsel for Petitioner :- Suresh Chandra Shukla, Harjot Singh, Vivek Kumar Rai Hon'ble Rakesh Srivastava,J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""13-B Divorce by mutual consent.-(1) Subject to the provisions of the Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976), on the ground that (1) they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, (2) that they have not been able to live together and (3) that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. ""23. Decree in proceedings-(1) In any proceeding under this Act, whether defended or not, if the Court is satisfied that- [(bb) When a divorce is sought on the ground of mutual consent, such consent has not been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence, and]......"" 3. The learned Judge observed that...","17. As of now, there is no authoritative pronouncement by the Apex Court on this point. At least the learned counsel for the petitioners has not placed any such authority before this Court. However, various High Courts, along the length and breadth of the country have spoken in one voice. At this stage, it would be apposite to take note of the views expressed by the various High Courts.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. In their third innings before this Court, the petitioners: Navneet Kaur (wife) and Kanwaljeet Sachdev (husband), have jointly assailed the order dated 19.07.2016 passed by the Family Court, Lucknow whereby the petitioners have been directed to appear before the Family Court in person for making a joint motion in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 (for short 'Act') to obtain divorce by mutual consent. 2. The petitioners got married on 24.09.2012 in accordance with Hindu-Sikh rites, rituals and customs in Kanpur. At the time of marriage, Kanwaljeet Sachdev, a Software Engineer, was working and residing at San Jose, California (USA). For a brief period after marriage, the petitioners stayed together in Kanpur. On 18.12.2012, Navneet Kaur-the wife went to USA to live with her husband. Unfortunately, within a month, serious differences surfaced between the petitioners to such an extent that it became impossible for them to live together and ultimately, on 18.01.2013, the wife returned to India, never to go back to her husband again. The differences between the petitioners led to the filing of a large number of cases, both civil and criminal against each other. 3. On 29.05.2013, in Criminal Case No. 436 of 2013, the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow passed an ex-parte order under Section 125 Cr.P.C....","29. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition is allowed. The order dated 19.07.2016, to the extent it directs the parties to appear in person, is set aside. The Family Court is directed to dispose of the matter in the light of the observations made in this order within two months from the date a certified copy of this order is placed before it, without insisting on the personal presence of any of the parties. 30. There will be no order as to costs. Order Date :- 31.05.2018 Anupam-Pradeep/-",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/184501474/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2018,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,184501474,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/184501474/,13
Allahabad High Court,"Jitendra Singh @ Monu And 3 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another on 29 August, 2024",Jitendra Singh @ Monu And 3 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another,2024-08-29,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 3, Section 482",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:139101 Court No. - 75 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 4857 of 2023 Applicant :- Jitendra Singh @ Monu And 3 Others Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Kuldeep Singh Chahar Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A. Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J. 1. Heard Mr. Kuldeep Singh Chahar, learned counsel for the applicants as well as Mr. Pramod Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the State and perused the record. 2. This application u/s 482 has been filed by the applicant with the prayer to quash the entire criminal proceeding of the Case Crime No.536 of 2010, under Sections 498-A , 323 , 504 , 506 I.P.C. and 3/4 D.P. Act , Police Station- Jagdishpura, District- Agra arising out of Charge Sheet dated 29.03.2012 as well as stay the further proceeding of the aforesaid case, on the basis of the compromise between the parties. 3. On 09.02.2023, the following order was passed:- ""Heard Mr. Kuldeep Singh Chahar, learned counsel for the applicants and the learned A.G.A. for the State.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"Whether a compromise has taken place or not can at best be ascertained by the court, where the proceedings are pending, after ensuring the presence of the parties before it. Put up this case on 22.03.2023 before the appropriate Bench. Learned counsel for the parties undertake that they shall make a fresh compromise application before the court below within a week from today for verification of the aforesaid compromise. They further undertake to ensure their presence before the court below or any other transferee court, as the case may be, on 14.03.2023 and the court concerned, thereafter, shall ascertain the veracity of the compromise. If the said compromise is verified, the same shall be made part of the record and report to that effect, will be prepared and the parties would be allowed to obtain certified copy thereof and file the same before this Court. Office is directed to send...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the entire proceedings of Case Crime No. 536 of 2010, under Sections 498-A , 323 , 504 , 506 I.P.C. and Section 3 / 4 D.P. Act, Police Station Jagdishpura, District Agra as well as charge-sheet dated 29.03.2012 on the basis of compromise so entered into between the parties. It is submitted on behalf of the applicants that applicant nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 are the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law of opposite party no.2 and the dispute between the parties are matrimonial in nature. He further submits that on account of intervention of well-wishers of the applicants and opposite party no.2, they have settled their disputes and arrived at a compromise. On the basis of said compromise, an affidavit has been filed by opposite party no.2 before the court below that she does not want to press the criminal proceedings initiated by her against the applicants. He next submits that a petition under Section 10-A of the Indian Divorce Act, 2001 has also been filed by applicant no.1 and opposite party no.2 for divorce with mutual consent. It is, thus, contended that proceedings of the aforesaid case be quashed in the light of law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh v. State of...",Order Date :- 29.8.2024 Kalp Nath Singh,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/63891412/,Unclear,unclear,2024,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,63891412,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/63891412/,4
Allahabad High Court,"Abhishek Pandey And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another on 13 February, 2023",Abhishek Pandey And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another,2023-02-13,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 3, Section 482",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Court No. - 52 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 5216 of 2023 Applicant :- Abhishek Pandey And 2 Others Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Hanuman Prasad Mishra Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A. Hon'ble Shiv Shanker Prasad,J. Heard Mr. Hanuman Prasad Mishra, learned counsel for the applicants and the learned A.G.A. for the State.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"Whether a compromise has taken place or not can at best be ascertained by the court, where the proceedings are pending, after ensuring the presence of the parties before it. Put up this case on 28.03.2023 before the appropriate Bench. Learned counsel for the parties undertake that they shall make a fresh compromise application before the court below within a week from today for verification of the aforesaid compromise. They further undertake to ensure their presence before the court below or any other transferee court, as the case may be, on 15.03.2023 and the court concerned, thereafter, shall ascertain the veracity of the compromise. If the said compromise is verified, the same shall be made part of the record and report to that effect, will be prepared and the parties would be allowed to obtain certified copy thereof and file the same before this Court. Office is directed to send...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the entire proceedings of Case No. 1691 of 2021 ( State Vs. Abhishek Pandey and Others ), arising out of Case Crime No. 286 of 2020, under Sections 420 , 498-A , 313 , 323 , 504 , 506 I.P.C. and Section 3 / 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Patiyali, District Kasganj, pending in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kasganj on the basis of compromise so entered into between the parties. It is submitted on behalf of the applicants that applicant nos. 1, 2 and 3 are the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law of the sister of opposite party no.2 and the dispute between the parties are matrimonial in nature. He further submits that on account of intervention of well-wishers of the applicants and opposite party no.2, they have settled their disputes and arrived at a compromise. On the basis of said compromise, an affidavit has been filed by opposite party no.2 before the court below that she does not want to press the criminal proceedings initiated by her against the applicants. He next submits that a petition under Section 10-A of the Indian Divorce Act, 2001 has also been filed by applicant no.1 and opposite party no.2 for divorce with mutual consent. It is, thus, contended...",Order Date :- 13.2.2023 Abhishek Singh,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/167604166/,Unclear,unclear,2023,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,167604166,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/167604166/,4
Allahabad High Court,"Smt. Uma Rani Urf Aisleen vs Rohit Chand on 12 August, 2021",Smt. Uma Rani Urf Aisleen vs Rohit Chand,2021-08-12,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Court No. - 43 Case :- TRANSFER APPLICATION (CIVIL) No. - 19 of 2020 Applicant :- Smt. Uma Rani Urf Aisleen Opposite Party :- Rohit Chand Counsel for Applicant :- Ashutosh Kumar Pandey,Shiv Sharan Tripathi Counsel for Opposite Party :- Ganesh Shankar Patel,Sanjay Srivastava Hon'ble Vivek Varma,J. In re: Civil Misc. Restoration Application No. 6 of 2021 This is an application for recall of the order dated 22.07.2021, whereby the transfer application was dismissed for non prosecution. The application is supported with an affidavit. The grounds shown in the affidavit for non-appearance of learned counsel for the applicant on 22.07.2021 is sufficient. This application is allowed. The order dated 22.07.2021 is recalled. The transfer application is restored to its original number. Order on transfer application:","Heard Sri Ashutosh Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Ganesh Shankar Patel, learned counsel for the respondent.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Heard Sri Ashutosh Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Ganesh Shankar Patel, learned counsel for the respondent.","This is a transfer application filed by the applicant-wife seeking transfer of a Divorce Petition No. 152 of 2018 ( Rohit Chandra Vs. Smt. Uma Rani @ Aisleen ), under Section 10 (I) (IX, X) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 filed by the husband at Badaun. Its transfer is being sought to District Aligarh on the ground of convenience. It is submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant has filed a Complaint Case No. 1934 of 2018 ( Uma Rani Vs. Rohit Chandra and others ), under Sections 498A , 323 , 504 , 506 IPC and 3/4 D.P.Act and in the said case the opposite party has been summoned and the said case is pending consideration before the court of Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh. She has filed a Complaint Case No. 1789 of 2018 ( Uma Rani Vs. Rohit Chandra and others ) under Sections 12 , 19 , 21 , 22 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the same is pending consideration before the Court of Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate-II, Aligarh. She instituted a proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for maintenance being Case No. 1004 of 2018 ( Smt. Uma Rani Vs. Rohit Chandra ) and the same is pending before the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Aligarh....",Order Date :- 12.8.2021 Lbm/-,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102411102/,Unclear,unclear,2021,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,102411102,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102411102/,4
Allahabad High Court,"Firoz Karim vs Smt. Dimple Karim And Another on 2 July, 2024",Firoz Karim vs Smt. Dimple Karim And Another,2024-07-02,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14, Section 19",Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:106764-DB Court No. - 39 Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 130 of 2016 Appellant :- Firoz Karim Respondent :- Smt. Dimple Karim And Another Counsel for Appellant :- Sanjay Kumar Yadav,Abhishek Counsel for Respondent :- Brahmdatt Pathak,R.P. Tiwari,Shiv Shankar Prasad Gupta,Vijay Kumar Gupta Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J. Hon'ble Donadi Ramesh,J.","1. Heard Shri Abhishek, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri R.P. Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondents. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents would contend that entire fact allegations made in the divorce petition are false. Respondent no.1 has never committed adultery. No ingredient of adultery was proven. Only vague and general allegations were made as may never lead any Court to accept adulterous relationship formed by any party. He has referred to oral evidence of respondent no.1 to establish that she never admitted having committed adultery. As to oral allegations made by PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, he would submit, sufficient doubt exists as to correctness of the statement made by those witnesses during their examination in chief. 11. The appellant never led any evidence to establish that he had witnessed any occurrence / transaction as may amount to adultery committed by the respondents. In fact, he chose to rely on hearsay. Neither he named the persons who may have seen the respondents having formed adulterous relationship nor he led any credible evidence to establish such occurrence. The appellant as also respondent no.1 are school teachers. Respondent no.2 was receiving tuition class from the appellant....",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,"4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit, in his testimony, the present appellant had clearly described the commission of adultery by alleging that respondent no.2 had often visited respondent no.1 at his home in the absence of the appellant. He had further proved that respondent nos.1 and 2 were often seen roaming around / travelling in a car belonging to respondent no.2. 5. According to the appellant, respondent no.1 had admitted of her forming an adulterous relationship with respondent no.2. The appellant further alleged having established payment of Rs.84,000/- made by respondent no.2 to respondent no.1 in her bank account as a result of adulterous relationship formed between those parties. The appellant further alleged that respondent no.1 admitted having formed such a relationship with respondent no.2. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has further referred to SMS / text messages received and saved on the mobile phone of the appellant as were received by him from respondent nos.1 and 2 and as were elaborated and thus proved during the course of oral evidence. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant...","1. Heard Shri Abhishek, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri R.P. Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondents. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents would contend that entire fact allegations made in the divorce petition are false. Respondent no.1 has never committed adultery. No ingredient of adultery was proven. Only vague and general allegations were made as may never lead any Court to accept adulterous relationship formed by any party. He has referred to oral evidence of respondent no.1 to establish that she never admitted having committed adultery. As to oral allegations made by PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, he would submit, sufficient doubt exists as to correctness of the statement made by those witnesses during their examination in chief. 11. The appellant never led any evidence to establish that he had witnessed any occurrence / transaction as may amount to adultery committed by the respondents. In fact, he chose to rely on hearsay. Neither he named the persons who may have seen the respondents having formed adulterous relationship nor he led any credible evidence to establish...","2. The present appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 against the judgment and order dated 23.02.2016 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Jhansi, in Petition No.410 of 2013 (Firoz Karim Vs. Smt. Dimple Karim and another). By that order, learned court below has dismissed the divorce petition filed by the present appellant under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as ""the Act"" ) 3. Primarily, the divorce petition had been filed by the present appellant on two grounds. First adultery and second desertion had been pleaded. As to the ground of adultery, according to the appellant, respondent no.2 had committed adultery. That pleading was made in the divorce petition. However, the same was not admitted. Rather the allegation of adultery was denied by respondent no.1. Respondent no.2 / adulterer did not appear in the proceeding. As to evidence of adultery, the appellant examined himself as PW-1, his mother Smt. Mercy Karim as PW-2 and Parvez Ahmed, neighbour as PW-3. 9. As to ground of desertion, relying on Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and referring to the police complaint made by respondent no.1, dated 18.10.2014 as was part of the record of the learned court below, it has been vehemently urged that respondent no.1 deserted...",Order Date :- 2.7.2024 rkg,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/49943376/,Adultery,adultery; desertion,2024,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,49943376,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/49943376/,9
Allahabad High Court,"Natasha James vs Avinash Simon on 7 May, 2022",Natasha James vs Avinash Simon,2022-05-07,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 12, Section 24",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH ?Court No. - 20 Case :- TRANSFER APPLICATION (CIVIL) No. - 183 of 2019 Applicant :- Natasha James Opposite Party :- Avinash Simon Counsel for Applicant :- Prashant Singh Gaur,Amitabh Pratap Singh Counsel for Opposite Party :- Pankaj Singh,Pooja Bhargava Singh Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh,J.","None has put in appearance on behalf of the respondent though the names of Sri Pankaj Singh and Ms. Pooja Bhargava Singh, Advocates are printed in the cause list as counsel for the respondent.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"Heard Sri A.P.Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner. On 27-04-2022, the court noticing the affidavit filed in support of the petition by Ms. Priyanka Spring, had called upon the learned counsel for the petitioner to explain the maintainability of the petition. In the meantime, learned counsel for the petitioner has filed a Supplementary Affidavit reiterating the contents of the transfer application alongwith an affidavit of the petitioner, Natasha James. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that any anomaly or defect in filing the aforesaid petition, which might have occurred in view of the affidavit filed by Ms. Priyanaka Spring on behalf of the petitioner would stand cured as the petitioner herself has filed her affidavit reiterating the contents and the same may be considered by the court for the purposes of transfer application. Since, the matter is engaging attention of this court since the year 2019, as a result proceedings filed before the Principal Judge, Family Court at Lucknow are held up. Accordingly, instead of entering into the technicalities, the court accepts the affidavit filed by the petitioner...","None has put in appearance on behalf of the respondent though the names of Sri Pankaj Singh and Ms. Pooja Bhargava Singh, Advocates are printed in the cause list as counsel for the respondent.","The instant petition has been preferred by the petitioner under section 24 C.P.C. seeking transfer of the divorce suit bearing no. 2253 of 2017 (Avinash Simon Vs. Natasha James) under section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, pending in the court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow to the appropriate court in distict-Meerut. Initially, the transfer petition was filed on 09-12-2019 alongwith an affidavit of one Ms. Priyanka Spring and it was stated that she was a relative(cousin) of the petitioner. Notice was issued to the respondent, which was duly served, however, no Counter Affidavit has been filed as yet. At this stage, the petitioner also filed an F.I.R. against the respondent bearing Case Crime No. 437 of 2017 at Police Station-Sadar Bazar, district-Meerut. The petitioner also instituted a petition under section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act,2005 bearing Case No. 799 of 2017. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the respondent has instituted a petition for divorce bearing case no. 2253 of 2017 before the Family Court at Lucknow. Further submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the father and mother of the petitioner have expired. Since prior to the death of the mother of the petitioner, who suffered from renal failure, the petitioner had to spend a large amount of money and she was...",Order Date :- 7.5.2022 AKS,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/46775776/,Unclear,unclear,2022,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,46775776,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/46775776/,7
Allahabad High Court,"Dr. Ashim Kumar Natheniel vs State Of U.P. And Another on 2 August, 2019",Dr. Ashim Kumar Natheniel vs State Of U.P. And Another,2019-08-02,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 482",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Court No. - 72 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 3510 of 2018 Applicant :- Dr. Ashim Kumar Natheniel Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And Another Counsel for Applicant :- A Kumar Srivastava,Manish Kumar Pandey Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A. Hon'ble Rajiv Joshi,J. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. for the State.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"h) That it has been agreed between the parties that all the cases whether criminal and civil filed by them against each other shall be withdrawn by them by taking appropriate steps before the court/authorities concerned at the earliest."" In view of above, proceedings of the aforesaid case including the summoning order are quashed on the condition that the parties shall abide the terms of the agreement. The application stands allowed.",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Present application under Section 482 , Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the entire proceedings of Complaint Case No.361/2015, under Sections 420 , 406 , 504 , 506 , IPC, P.S. Sipri Bazar, District Jhansi, pending before the A.C.J.M. Court No.2, Jhansi and also the summoning order dated 7.1.2016. This Court vide order dated 6.2.2018 referred the matter to the Mediation and Conciliation Centre, High Court, Allahabad and pursuant to the said order, parties appeared before the mediator and entered into the settlement on 7.8.2018. The terms of the settlement is quoted as under:- ""a) That the marriage of Dr. Ashim Kumar Natheniel (Applicant-Husband) and Smt. Manisha Gardner (Opposite Party No.2-Wife) was solemnized on 5.5.2014. After living together till 22.6.2014, the relations between the parties became strained and they started living separately. Out of aforesaid wedlock, parties have no issue. b) That as per interim settlement dated 26.6.2018, Dr. Ashim Kumar Natheniel (Applicant-Husband) and Smt. Manisha Gardner (Opposite Party No.2-Wife) have decided to take divorce by mutual consent on the condition of a Permanent Alimony including Stridhan of Rs.7,50,000/- (Seven lakhs fifty thousand only) which shall be paid by the husband to the wife in two instalments. c) That as agreed during interim settlement dated 26.6.2018, Dr. Ashim Kumar Natheniel (Applicant-Husband) and Smt. Manisha Gardner (Opposite Party No.2-Wife) have filed...",Order Date :- 2.8.2019 T. Sinha,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/19227929/,Unclear,unclear,2019,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,19227929,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/19227929/,4
Allahabad High Court,"Sushil T. Williams vs Smt. Kakoli Williams on 16 October, 2024",Sushil T. Williams vs Smt. Kakoli Williams,2024-10-16,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 19",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Court No. - 39 Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 65 of 2017 Appellant :- Sushil T. Williams Respondent :- Smt. Kakoli Williams Counsel for Appellant :- Rajeshwar Prasad Sinha Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J. Hon'ble Donadi Ramesh,J. 1. List revised. None is present for the appellant, in either call.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The present appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 arising from the judgment and order dated 02.01.2017 passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Allahabad in Matrimonial Petition No.686 of 2015 ( Sushil T Williams Vs. Smt. Kakoli Williams ) whereby proceedings for divorce under Section 10 A of the Divorce Act, 1869 have been dismissed. 3. Perusal of the impugned order reveals, proceedings have been wrongly described as proceedings under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.","4. The present appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution. Order Date :- 16.10.2024 rkg (Donadi Ramesh, J.) (S.D. Singh, J.)",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/159958974/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2024,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,159958974,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/159958974/,3
Allahabad High Court,"Smt. Shirin Samuel And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others on 12 October, 2020",Smt. Shirin Samuel And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others,2020-10-12,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Court No. - 66 Case :- HABEAS CORPUS WRIT PETITION No. - 292 of 2020 Petitioner :- Smt. Shirin Samuel And 2 Others Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Nitin Mukesh Counsel for Respondent :- G.A. Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.",,"This petition has been filed by Smt. Shirin Samuel, wife of Danise Samuel, against the fourth respondent, asking this Court to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of habeas corpus to order the first and the second petitioner, the two minor children of parties to be produced before this Court and set at liberty by entrusting them into the first petitioner's custody, their mother. The first petitioner and the fourth respondents were married according to Christian rites on 01.11.2007. Two children were born of the wedlock of parties. It appears that the matrimonial discordovertook the parties and they parted ways. The first petitioner and the fourth respondent have become an estranged couple. The fourth respondent filed for divorce before the Family Court, Kota, Rajasthan under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act. A decree dated 17.12.2019, has been passed by the Judge, Family Court, Kota, Rajasthan. It appears from the averments made in the petition that the first petitioner and the fourth respondents last resided together as a family at Kota, Rajasthan. They did not live together...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/118450587/,Procedural,procedural,2020,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,118450587,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/118450587/,2
Kerala High Court,"Preman vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 16 October, 1998",AIR1999KER93,1998-10-16,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 118, Section 125, Section 15, Section 17, Section 176, Section 20, Section 22, Section 23, Section 28, Section 29, Section 3, Section 303, Section 31, Section 332, Section 4, Section 43, Section 50, Section 57, Section 58",Constitutional Validity; Desertion; Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Ar. Lakshmanan, J.","13. On the above pleadings, we heard arguments from Mr. P. Chithambaram, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioners in both the Original Petitions and Mr. K. Ramakumar, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondents.","It is then submitted that the teachings from the Book of Holy Bible also encourage Christians to practice charities to attain spiritual salvation. Whenever fundamental right to freedom of conscience and to profess, practice and to propagate religion is invoked, the petitioners contend that the act complained of as offending the fundamental right must be examined to discover whether such act is to protect public order, morality and health, whether it is to give effect to the other provisions of Part III of the Constitution or whether it is authorised by a law made to regulate or restrict any economic, financial, political or secular, activity which may be associated with religious practice or to provide for social welfare and reform. It is the duty and function of the Court so to do. Since in the instant case the impugned law has nothing to do with any of the aforesaid restrictions...","It is submitted that Bhagavad Geeta and some of the Smritis encourage charity for the spiritual well being of humanity. 6. It is then submitted that as for Christians, faith, hope and charity are the three theological virtues. Disposition of property for the religious and charitable purposes, according to the petitioner, is an integral part of Christian religious-faith. Both the Holy Bible and the canon law speak on the obligation of a Christian to give property for religious and charitable purposes. In support of the submission counsel for the petitioner cited verses 18 to 22 of Chapter XIX of the Holy Gospel according to St. Luke which reads thus : ""18. A Jewish leader asked Jesus, ""Good Teacher, what must I do to receive eternal life."" 19. ""Why do you call me good?"" Jesus asked him. No one is good except God alone. You know the commandments: 'Do not commit adultery; do not commit murder; do not steal, do not accuse anyone falsely; respect your father and your mother' "". 21. The man replied, ""Ever since I was young, I...","13. On the above pleadings, we heard arguments from Mr. P. Chithambaram, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioners in both the Original Petitions and Mr. K. Ramakumar, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondents.","1. Heard Mr. P. Chidambaram, Senior Advocate, for Mr. Tony George Kannathanam and Mr. Romy Chacko for the petitioner and Mr. K. Ramakumar, Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the first respondent in O.P. No. 5150 of 1995 and the sole respondent in O.P. No. 16501 of 1996. The petitioners in both the Original Petitions are Christians. Aggrieved against Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, they have filed the Original Petitions to declare the said provision as unconstitutional, discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Articles 13(1) , 14 , 15(1) , 25 and 51A of the Constitution of India and to direct the State Government to exempt Christians from Section 118 by invoking Section 3 of the Indian Succession Act since Section 118 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A further direction is also sought for to the State Government to take a decision on Ext. P-1 representation and pass a speaking order within one month. 2. According to the petitioners, they are aggrieved by the discriminatory treatment meted out to members of Christian community under the Indian Succession Act by which they are practically prevented from bequeathing property for religious and charitable purposes. The Indian Succession Act, 1865 was repealed and replaced by the Indian Succession Act, 1925 , which was enacted consolidating various...","We, therefore, declare that Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act is anomalous and anachronistic being violative of Articles 14,15,25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act is therefore struck down as unconstitutional. There will be no order as to costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1673703/ | AIR1999KER93, AIR 1999 KERALA 93, (1999) ILR(KER) 2 KER 113, (1998) 2 KER LJ 758, (1998) 2 KER LT 1004, (1999) 1 CIVLJ 811",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; desertion; adultery; cruelty,1998,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1999KER93, AIR 1999 KERALA 93, (1999) ILR(KER) 2 KER 113, (1998) 2 KER LJ 758, (1998) 2 KER LT 1004, (1999) 1 CIVLJ 811",1673703,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1673703/,32
Madras High Court,"Sasivarnam vs S. Gnanasundari Kamalam on 29 March, 1954",AIR1954MAD1018,1954-03-29,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 2",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Satyanarayana Rao, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This matter comes before us under Section 17 , Indian Divorce Act 4 of 1869 for confirmation of the decree nisi granted by the learned District Judge of Madurai. 2. The husband of the first respondent is the petitioner, and he claimed in the petition dissolution of marriage between himself and the respondent on the ground, that she was guilty of adultery with the co-respondent. The husband is a Hindu and the wife is a Christian. Their marriage was solemnised according to Christian rites on 22-8-1934 at Madurai, and Ex. A. 1 is the marriage certificate. They lived at Calicut for three years after the marriage and there was no trouble till 1938. In 1938 the husband saw the wife writing a letter to one Gnanamuthu Isac. He caught hold of the letter, which is dated 27-2-1938, Ex. A. 2. Gnanamuthu Isac was found in the house of the petitioner in July 1938, when he went away to his office and returned suddenly to his house. When asked to explain his presence, the wife could not give a satisfactory answer, and as he suspected her conduct, there was some quarrel between them and he gave her a beating. After he lelt the house the wife wrote a letter dated 14-7-1938, Ex. A. 3, in which she stated, ""There will...","which clearly shows that if either of them is a Christian, it would be sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under the Indian Christian (sic) Divorce Act for relief under it and this was the view taken by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in -- 'Nina Dalai v. Merwanji ', AIR 1930 Bom 385 (FB) (A). We therefore think that the District Court had ample jurisdiction to deal with the matter and the decree 'nisi' granted by the District Judge must be confirmed. The decree 'nisi' is accordingly confirmed.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/968128/ | AIR1954MAD1018, AIR 1954 MADRAS 1018, 1967 MADLW 1137",Adultery,adultery,1954,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1954MAD1018, AIR 1954 MADRAS 1018, 1967 MADLW 1137",968128,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/968128/,3
Kerala High Court,"Samdeep Mohan Varghese vs Anjana on 15 September, 2010",Samdeep Mohan Varghese vs Anjana,2010-09-15,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 2, Section 27, Section 32",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM Mat.Appeal.No. 99 of 2009() 1. SAMDEEP MOHAN VARGHESE, AGED 35, ... Petitioner 2. ANJANA JOSE, D/O.T.T.JOSE, Vs 1. ANJANA ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.GEO PAUL For Respondent :SRI.V.V.ASOKAN The Hon'ble MR. Justice R.BASANT The Hon'ble MR. Justice M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS Dated :15/09/2010 O R D E R R.BASANT & M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS, JJ ........................................... MAT.APPEAL. Nos.99 & 152 OF 2009 ............................................ DATED THIS THE 15th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2010 JUDGMENT BASANT, J Does the concept of matrimonial cruelty vary in accordance with the religious persuasions of individuals? Is a spouse bound to suffer greater amount of matrimonial cruelty because the spouses belong to a religion which considered marriage as indissoluble? Can the secular constitutional republic recognise and accept the existence of different varieties of matrimonial cruelty - Hindu cruelty, Christian cruelty, Muslim cruelty and secular cruelty? Should not matrimonial cruelty entitling a spouse for divorce yield to a uniform conceptualisation notwithstanding the different semantics employed in different pieces of matrimonial legislations applicable to different religions? Should not the courts take inspiration from Art.44 of the Constitution and attempt to understand the concept of matrimonial cruelty in a uniform manner to ensure that the right...","44. The learned counsel for the respondent/wife submits that inasmuch as Exts.B2 and B3 series have been filed as documents in the joint trial, the respondent/wife was not able to MA 99 & 152 OF 2009 45 request that they be released to her earlier. In the light of the specific directions, it is prayed that Exts.B2 and B3 series may be ordered to be released to the respondent/wife with specific directions to the bank concerned to renew the deposit if necessary and release the proceeds to the respondent.","22. The learned counsel for the wife contends that even if we go by the case of the appellant, he was guilty of matrimonial cruelty to his wife in that he did not recognise, accept and respect the personality and preferences of the wife. It is the very case of the husband that the wife had aspirations of an active and energetic career. In fact we see the appellant accusing the wife of entertaining aggressive career aspirations. She was herself an Engineer. Her husband was also an Engineer. Her husband had secured admission to Government Engineering College, by getting into the merit list whereas the wife was compelled to pursue her education elsewhere by securing a seat by payment of money, obviously. The husband was well employed. Wife could not secure such good employment. This admittedly caused frustration in the wife. She also wanted to secure a good job for...","7. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent. The learned counsel for the appellant assails the impugned order on the following grounds. i) The court below has significantly omitted to record a specific finding on the disputed question of cruelty. 14. A word about appreciation of evidence in this case. Certain broad aspects must be considered before the challenge against appreciation of evidence is considered. Matrimonial cruelty between educated spouses belonging to a higher strata of society cannot evidently be expected to be proved by occular corroboration from independent sources. By its very nature it would be difficult to secure such independent corroborative evidence. The fact that PW1's evidence is not corroborated by independent sources is thus insignificant. The evidence of RW2 and RW3 is again not of any vital significance. Go by the evidence of PW1 or RW1, they had traumatic experiences when they cohabited in Bombay. RWs 2 and 3 appear to be fairly close friends of RW1. Even then their evidence suggests that they did not know or perceive any difficulty in...","44. The learned counsel for the respondent/wife submits that inasmuch as Exts.B2 and B3 series have been filed as documents in the joint trial, the respondent/wife was not able to MA 99 & 152 OF 2009 45 request that they be released to her earlier. In the light of the specific directions, it is prayed that Exts.B2 and B3 series may be ordered to be released to the respondent/wife with specific directions to the bank concerned to renew the deposit if necessary and release the proceeds to the respondent.","5. The learned Judge of the Family Court, by the impugned common order, came to the conclusion that the wife was entitled for a decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act. The claim of the wife for divorce under Section 10(1)(vii) on the ground of refusal to consummate the marriage was rejected by the Family Court. O.P.69 of 2005 was thus allowed. Husband's prayer for restitution of conjugal rights in O.P.399 of 2006 was turned down by Family Court. The claim for return of money in O.P.68 of 2005 was allowed in part. The counter claim of the husband was rejected. MA 99 & 152 OF 2009 4 6. Both parties appear to have accepted the decree/order in O.P.68 of 2005 and the counter claim. No appeal is seen preferred against the said part of the impugned order by either spouse. The appellant/husband has preferred these appeals to assail the decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section 10(1)(x) and the rejection of his claim for a decree for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 32 of the Divorce Act. ii) The court below should, at any rate, have held that the ground of cruelty under Section 10(1)(x) has not been validly established by the evidence adduced by the wife....","""In the result, O.P.68/2005 is decreed in part; that the respondent is directed to pay the petitioner the amount covered by Ext.B2 series FD receipts and the amount as per the three FD receipts of the South Indian bank mentioned in the petition together with the interest accrued thereon from the date of deposit till payment."" 48. In the result: a) These appeals are dismissed; b) The impugned common order is upheld; c) I.A.No.2292 of 2010 is allowed. Exts.B2 and B3 series, which are marked in the impugned judgment shall forthwith be released by the Registry to the respondent/wife, the petitioner in this I.A. The Registry shall forthwith hand over the same to the respondent/wife (after substituting certified copies in their place for further reference if necessary. There shall be a direction to the Banks concerned - Federal Bank and South Indian Bank to renew the deposits on the instructions of the respondent in accordance with the rules of the bank and on maturity to release the entire amounts covered by those deposit receipts to the respondent/wife, ie. the petitioner...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1439693/,Cruelty,cruelty,2010,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,1439693,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1439693/,26
Gauhati High Court,"Paul Tushar Biswas vs Addl. Dist. Judge And Anr. on 21 November, 2005",II(2006)DMC59,2005-11-21,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 14, Section 2, Section 3, Section 4000, Section 4002, Section 43, Section 44, Section 44A, Section 45, Section 454, Section 55",Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (desertion) are established by substantive evidence.,"15. Chapter IV of the Gauhati High Court Rules outlines the general rules for applications and affidavits to be filed before this Court. Clause 8 thereof mandates that every application should be signed with the full name and date either by the applicant or the declarant or his Advocate. Chapters VA and VB dealing with rules governing applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India also do not prescribe the requirement of signing each and every page of the petition. In that view of the matter, omission to sign all the pages of the instant petition cannot be held to be violative of the High Court Rules. The affidavit annexed to the petition has been sworn and signed by the attorney on being identified by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The affidavit is in prescribed form and the petitioner has stood by the statements made in the petition. The underlying purpose of a verification and/or the affidavit required by the law being to obviate the possibility of disownment of the pleaded facts by the party concerned...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. The prefatory facts building up the factual edifice would be essential. The petitioner claims to be an Indian National presently residing at California in the United States of America and is serving the Sheriffs Department of the County of Fresno, California. The petition before this Court is through his legally constituted attorney. The parties who profess Christian faith were married on 4.10.1990 at All Saints Church, Shillong, under the Christian Marriage Act, 1872 (hereafter referred to as the Marriage Act ). The child, a son named hereinabove was born to them. He is a minor and is presently residing with the mother, respondent No. 2. The petitioner in the year 1999 filed an application under Section 10 of the Divorce Act in the Court of the District Judge at Alipore, West Bengal, praying inter alia for a decree for divorce which was registered as Matrimonial Suit No. 388/1999. While the summons in the said proceedings were yet to be served on the respondent No. 2, she also filed an application under Section 10 of the Divorce Act before the learned Additional District Judge, Shillong, seeking dissolution of the marriage. It was amongst others alleged therein that the petitioner had deserted her from the year 1994 and had been living in adultery since February, 1993. The divorce proceeding initiated by...","1. The matrimonial alliance between the parties though conclusively determined by a decree of divorce, the issue pertaining to maintenance of their minor son has kept them belligerently engaged in Courts of law. The instant application witnesses a challenge by the petitioner/husband to the judgment and order dated 9.4.2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Shillong, in (Civil) Miscellaneous Application 7(H)/2002 arising out of matrimonial case No. 6(H)/ 2000 under Section 43 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereafter referred to as the Divorce Act ), rejecting his application to allow him to provide child maintenance to the offspring, Timothy Biswas. 2. I have heard Ms. A. Paul, Advocate assisted by Mr. K. Paul, Advocate for the petitioner and Ms. P.D.B. Baruah, Advocate for the respondent No. 2. 19. Is the Court at Shillong, the only Forum competent in law to entertain the prayer for child support/maintenance, in view of Section 43 of the Divorce Act, so as to oust the jurisdiction of any other Court including the Superior Court of the State of California as asserted on behalf of...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1104468/ | II(2006)DMC59,Desertion,desertion,2005,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,Equivalent citations: II(2006)DMC59,1104468,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1104468/,20
Gauhati High Court,"Smt. Ann Sarkar vs Anil Sarkar on 27 January, 1988",AIR1989GAU44,1988-01-27,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13B, Section 17, Section 22",Cruelty; Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Saikia, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"11. To find cruelty it is not necessary to, find physical violence. It is doubtful whether any definition of cruelty applies equally well to cases where there has been physical violence and to cases of nagging or to cases where there has been a deliberate intention to hurt and to cases where temperament and unfortunate circumstances have caused much of the trouble. It is undesirable, if not impossible, by judicial pronouncements, to create certain categories of acts of conduct as having or lacking the nature of quality which renders them capable or incapable in all circumstances amounting to cruelty in cases where no physical violence is averred. 12. In para 516 we read the following considerations which in general are material. Either of the spouses may be guilty of the offence or cruelty. The general rule in all questions of cruelty is that the whole matrimonial relations must be considered...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. Learned District Judge after observing, and we think rightly, that the Act does not contain a provision similar to Section 13B , Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for divorce by mutual consent and in view of the provisions of Sections 12 , 13 , 14 and 47 of the Act has held that a decree for divorce on consent is not permissible. 6. We have perused the evidence on record and the decree nisi. While agreeing that the marriage could not be dissolved on mutual consent the learned District Judge failed to notice that under Section 10 of the Act any wife may present a petition praying that her marriage may be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization thereof her husband has been guilty of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to divorce a mense et toro or of adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or upwards and the burden of proof is on the party who alleges. Again under that Section every such petition shall state, as distinctly as the nature of the case permits, the facts on which the claim to have such marriage dissolved is founded. In the instant case desertion, cruelty, and adultery have not been specifically alleged as grounds for dissolution. On the...","1. The decree nisi dt. 11-11-87 passed by the District Judge, Dibrugarh under Section 10 , Divorce Act, 1869, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', has come up for confirmation in this reference under Section 17 of the Act. 2. The petitioner sued for dissolution of her marriage with the respondent on ground of adultery coupled with cruelty. Examining herself as witness 1, she deposed that she was married to the respondent Anil Sarkar on 6-12-79 at Dibrugarh Christ Church as both of them were Christians. Ext. 1 was their marriage certificate. After marriage they lived conjugal life at Moran but had no issue. Since about 3 months after the marriage the respondent showed indifference towards her, at the same time having affairs with other women and when her protests proved to be useless she went to her mother's house. When her husband used to be with other women and when she objected her husband threw things at her and behaved very rudely in presence of her daughter by her previous marriage. The respondent also had a son by his...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1992585/ | AIR1989GAU44, AIR 1989 GAUHATI 44, (1988) 24 REPORTS 405, (1988) 1 DMC 462, (1988) 2 HINDULR 147, (1990) 1 CIVLJ 43",Cruelty,cruelty; adultery; desertion,1988,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1989GAU44, AIR 1989 GAUHATI 44, (1988) 24 REPORTS 405, (1988) 1 DMC 462, (1988) 2 HINDULR 147, (1990) 1 CIVLJ 43",1992585,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1992585/,13
Gauhati High Court,"Ka Steldoris Syiemlieh vs U. Skipland Sanglyne And Anr. on 2 May, 1985",AIR1986GAU24,1985-05-02,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14, Section 17, Section 17A",Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT K. Lahiri, C.J.(Acting)",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. What about appointment of an officer by the State Government under Section 17A of ""the Act"" and making of the necessary Rules for their control and guidance? Long thirty and seven years have rolled by and thousands of decree nisi have been confirmed ex parte by the High Court. The Government is fully aware that even a Respondent has no right to show cause against the decree nisi being made absolute. Only Officers under Section 17A of the Act or the third person are entitled to intervene or show cause against the decree nisi being made absolute. Even though serious allegations like adultery, rape, cruelty, bigamy, sodomy or beastiality are alleged, the charge of such cases remains with the officers appointed under Section 17A of the Act, and, he cannot leave the responsibility of the case in the hands of the Respondent. How is it that the State Governments have so long failed to appoint Officers under Section 17A of the Act? We feel that the State Governments, particularly the Government of Meghalaya should appoint such Officers. The Officer in each State shall exercise jurisdiction exercisable by King's Proctor in England. We are of the opinion that the time is ripe when each State Government should appoint an Officer, preferably an Advocate conversant with matrimonial causes able to assist...","1. The decree nisi for dissolution of marriage passed by the District Council Court, Khasi Hills under Section 14 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for short ""the Act"", has come up for confirmation under Section 17 of the Act. 2. Divorce Galore Syndrome : The other names of dissolution are ""destruction end of life and death"". We are alarmed to note the mercurial upswing of divorce proceedings in this region. A considerable number of cases coming from this region relates to 'legal separation of man and wife'. These are all divorce a vinculo matrimony', a total divorce of husband and wife dissolving the marriage tie and releasing the parties wholly from their matrimonial obligations. Two young persons go to Church solemnly pledge that they shall ever live as man and wife. The marriages are religiously and solemnly performed. In all systems, be that Hindu, Islamic, Christian etc. marriage is a legal union of one man and woman as husband and wife-- it is a legal status, condition or relation between a man and woman united in law for life...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1378942/ | AIR1986GAU24, AIR 1986 GAUHATI 24, 1986 (2) HINDULR 339, (1985) 2 HINDULR 339, (1985) 1 GAULR 487, (1985) 2 CURCC 226, (1985) 2 DMC 51, (1986) MATLR 130, (1986) 1 RECCRIR 434",Adultery,adultery; desertion,1985,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1986GAU24, AIR 1986 GAUHATI 24, 1986 (2) HINDULR 339, (1985) 2 HINDULR 339, (1985) 1 GAULR 487, (1985) 2 CURCC 226, (1985) 2 DMC 51, (1986) MATLR 130, (1986) 1 RECCRIR 434",1378942,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1378942/,7
Gauhati High Court,"Malza D. Shira vs Archana Marak And Anr. on 27 March, 2003",AIR2004GAU165,2003-03-27,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 15, Section 17, Section 34, Section 39",Adultery; Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT P.P. Naolekar, CJ. 1. None appears for the respondents.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. When the matter came up for confirmation of decree of divorce as required under Section 17 of the Act, Miss A. Paul, the counsel for the petitioner-husband submitted that the decree for divorce by the Court on the basis of the allegations made in the written statement could not have been granted. Besides this, the Court has no jurisdiction or authority to adjudicate upon the title to the property or give directions of return of that property to the wife holding it that the wife has right, title and interest over the property as per customary law applicable to the Garos while granting the decree for divorce under the Act 1869. 4. It is true that Court below has refused decree of divorce on the allegations made by the petitioner-husband as he has failed to substantiate those allegations, but has granted decree of divorce on the basis of grounds alleged by the wife in her written statement having found them proved by the respondent wife. Miss A. Paul urged that the husband-petitioner having failed to prove the allegations, the Court could have at best dismissed the petition for divorce and has no jurisdiction to pass decree on the basis of allegations made in the written statement. Answer to the question of the counsel lies in Section 15 of the...","2. The petitioner-husband Shri Malza D. Shira has filed a suit for divorce under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (for short ""the Act""). It is alleged that Smti Archana Marak, the wife of the petitioner and Simon Sangma, had adulterous relations. His wife has deserted him without any justifiable cause. The respondent No. 1, the wife has entered appearance and filed her written statement denying the allegations of adultery and desertion. On the contrary, she has alleged adultery, cruelty and desertion on the part of the husband. She further prayed for return of all the matrimonial properties and maintenance of Rs. 2,000 per month for herself and minor children. The Court below after recording evidence of the parties have reached to the conclusion that both the parties have failed to prove the adultery alleged by them against each other. However, the wife has successfully proved the cruelty and desertion against the petitioner-husband and consequent thereof, the decree of divorce was passed. The Court further directed custody of the minor children with the mother Smti Archana Marak. While...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/165206/ | AIR2004GAU165, (2004)1GLR109, AIR 2004 GAUHATI 165, 2004 A I H C 4922, (2004) 1 GAU LR 109, (2003) 2 GAU LT 256, (2004) 2 CIVLJ 220",Adultery,adultery; desertion; cruelty,2003,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR2004GAU165, (2004)1GLR109, AIR 2004 GAUHATI 165, 2004 A I H C 4922, (2004) 1 GAU LR 109, (2003) 2 GAU LT 256, (2004) 2 CIVLJ 220",165206,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/165206/,7
Gauhati High Court,"Wenmanard Marak vs Smt. Poiby Momin on 27 January, 1988",AIR1988GAU50,1988-01-27,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 17, Section 5, Section 58",Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Saikia, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","5. We have perused the petition for divorce and the evidence on record and we find no infirmity in the finding that the respondent deserted the petitioner as long back as in 1954 and had since then been living separately with one Honith Sangma. This has been admitted by the respondent herself. We also find no evidence, of any collusion or connivance between the parties . in the matter of filing this petition for divorce. 6. We, however, find one procedural defect in this petition. Under Section 11 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 where adultery is taken by the husband as a ground for dissolution of marriage the adulterer had to be made a co-respondent. Section 11 of that Act provides : ""11. Adulterer to be co-respondent-- Upon any such petition presented by a husband, the petitioner shall make the alleged adulterer a co-respondent to the said petition, unless he is excused from so doing on one of the following grounds, to be allowed by the Court: (1) that the respondent is leading the life of a prostitute, and that the petitioner knows of no person with whom the adultery has been committed; (2) that the name of the alleged adulterer is unknown to the petitioner, although he has made due efforts to discover it; (3) that the alleged...","1. The decree nisi passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, West Garo Hills, Tura under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 has come up for confirmation under Section 17 of that Act in this reference. 2. The petitioner sued for dissolution of his marriage with the respondent Smt. Poiby Momin on the ground of adultery coupled with desertion. Examining himself, he deposed that the parties were married according to the Christian rites on 15th April, 1954 whereafter they lived as husband and wife. After about 6 months of marriage the respondent deserted him and subsequently she lived with one Honith Sangma as his mis tress and thereby committed adultery with him and the petitioner and the respondent have remained completely separate since then. He further deposed that there was no collusion or connivance between the parties in the matter of filing the petition for divorce; and that the respondent had no objection to the dissolution of their marriage which might be dissolved on the ground of adultery and mutual consent. He examined another witness Sabilson Momin who fully...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/471365/ | AIR1988GAU50, AIR 1988 GAUHATI 50, (1988) 1 GAU LR 261, (1988) 2 CIV LJ 39, (1988) 1 DMC 405, (1988) 2 HINDULR 93, (1988) MATLR 231",Adultery,adultery; desertion,1988,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1988GAU50, AIR 1988 GAUHATI 50, (1988) 1 GAU LR 261, (1988) 2 CIV LJ 39, (1988) 1 DMC 405, (1988) 2 HINDULR 93, (1988) MATLR 231",471365,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/471365/,8
Gauhati High Court,"Mrs. Thaza Akoijam vs Dr. Vashum Mathew Thomas on 4 November, 2019",Mrs. Thaza Akoijam vs Dr. Vashum Mathew Thomas,2019-11-04,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 15, Section 5",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Page No.# 1/2 GAHC010109612019 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Mat.App. 60/2019 1:MRS. THAZA AKOIJAM W/O- DR. VASHUM MATHEW THOMAS, D/O- LATE LANNGAM AKOIJAM, R/O- KWAKEITHEL NGANAPI THONG, P.O. IMPHAL, P.S. SINGJAMAI, DIST.- IMPHAL (WEST), MANIPUR, PIN- 795001. VERSUS 1:DR. VASHUM MATHEW THOMAS S/O- LATE JOSEPH THOMAS, R/O- NAGARAM NEAR STADIUM VIEW HOTEL LAIPHAM LHUNAO, P.O. LAMLONG, P.S. HEINGANG, DIST.- IMPHAL (EAST), MANIPUR, PIN- 795001, AND OFFICE OF SENIOR DMO, RAILWAY HOSPITAL, N.F. RAILWAY, DIMAPUR, NAGALAND, PIN- 797112. Advocate for the Petitioner : MR J SHARMA Advocate for the Respondent : BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ACHINTYA MALLA BUJOR BARUA HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NELSON SAILO ORDER",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"Date : 04-11-2019 Heard Mr. J. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant. Page No.# 2/2 Issue notice on the respondent by registered post with A/D, returnable by 4 (four) weeks. Steps within 3 (three) days.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The petition under Section 10(1)(x) read with Section 15 of the Divorce Act, 1989 was preferred by the appellant herein for a dissolution of a marriage with the respondent. By the Order of 14.09.2018, the learned Principal Judge, Family Court No. 1, Kamrup arrived at a conclusion that the appellant is a Hindu by birth and religion, whereas, the respondent is a Christian by birth and religion belonging to the Scheduled Caste community and therefore, they could not have solemnized their marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act . By referring to section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it was taken note of that a marriage may be solemnized under the Act between only two Hindus and therefore a marriage solemnized under the Hindu rites and rituals between one Hindu and one Christian cannot be treated as a valid married, and accordingly the petition stood disallowed. List again on 04.12.2019.",JUDGE Comparing Assistant,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102827841/,Unclear,unclear,2019,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,102827841,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102827841/,4
Gauhati High Court,"Mrs. Neikhol Changsan @ Neikhol Halolai vs Mr. Thongkomang Armstrong Changsan on 30 June, 2022",Mrs. Neikhol Changsan @ Neikhol Halolai vs Mr. Thongkomang Armstrong Changsan,2022-06-30,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14, Section 19, Section 3, Section 5, Section 55",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Page No.# 1/24 GAHC010240362015 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : CRP/209/2015 MRS. NEIKHOL CHANGSAN @ NEIKHOL HALOLAI DR. R.P. ROAD, BEHIND MLA - HOSTEL, P.O. and P.S.- DISPUR, GHY- 6, KAMRUP M, ASSAM. VERSUS MR. THONGKOMANG ARMSTRONG CHANGSAN INDIAN FOREIGN SERVICE, C/O DIPLOMATIC BAG, SOUTH BLOCK, MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, NEW DELHI. ALSO AT- MR. THONGKOMANG ARMSTRONG CHANGSAN, S/O- LT. V. CHANGSAN, MOLNOM VENG, SONGPIJANG, HAFLONG, DIMA HASAO, PIN- 788819, ASSAM. ALSO AT Advocate for the Appellant : Mr. H. S. Kalsi, Advocate Advocate for the Respondent : Mr. A. K. Das, Senior Advocate Mr. R. J. Barua, Advocate Amicus Curiae : Mr. T. J. Mahanta, Senior Advocate BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH Date of Hearing : 14.06.2022 Date of Judgment : 30.06.2022 Page No.# 2/24 JUDGMENT AND ORDER (CAV) Heard Mr. H. S. Kalsi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. A. K. Das, the learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. R. J. Barua, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. I have also heard Mr. T. J. Mahanta, the learned Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court. 2. This is an application under Article...","23. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court take into consideration the question of maintainability of the application under Article 227 of the Page No.# 19/24 Constitution, more so taking into consideration that the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent to the effect that a matrimonial appeal was filed along with an application for condonation of delay against the order dated 23.02.2011 impugned in the instant proceedings and the said application for condonation of delay was withdrawn which resulted in the order dated 23.02.2011 attaining finality. For the purpose of deciding the maintainability of the instant application under Article 227 of the Constitution it would be relevant to take note of the impugned order and the jurisdiction which the learned court below exercised. 26. At this stage, this Court would like to take into consideration the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent to the effect that apart from Christian marriage which was solemnized before the Presbyterian Church, Songpijang (Ngalsong), the petitioner and the respondent have also married as per the Kuki customs and rituals and the divorce between the petitioner and the respondent was duly recognized by the Songpijang Village Committee in...","10. The record further shows that on 27.02.2014, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had given his no objection. Thereupon the petitioner approached a legal firm 'Consortium of Lawyers' and through the legal firm the petitioner wrote a letter dated 03.03.2014 to the President of KUKI INPI ASSAM, the highest Governing Body of the Kuki tribe seeking information relating to customary laws relating to divorce and marriage. Various queries were made including the procedure for getting divorce under the Kuki Customary Law and as to whether the Christian marriage performed in a church can be dissolved by the Kuki Forum/Village Committee/Gaonbura under the Page No.# 7/24 Customary Laws of Kukis and if yes, then under what circumstances. To the said communication dated 03.03.2014, the KUKI INPI ASSAM vide a communication dated 17.03.2014 answered to the queries. In doing so, it had categorically mentioned that the Kuki Customary...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"23. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court take into consideration the question of maintainability of the application under Article 227 of the Page No.# 19/24 Constitution, more so taking into consideration that the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent to the effect that a matrimonial appeal was filed along with an application for condonation of delay against the order dated 23.02.2011 impugned in the instant proceedings and the said application for condonation of delay was withdrawn which resulted in the order dated 23.02.2011 attaining finality. For the purpose of deciding the maintainability of the instant application under Article 227 of the Constitution it would be relevant to take note of the impugned order and the jurisdiction which the learned court below exercised. 26. At this stage, this Court would like to take into consideration the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent to the effect that apart from Christian marriage which was solemnized before the Presbyterian Church, Songpijang (Ngalsong), the petitioner and the respondent have also married as per the Kuki customs...","8. The petitioner thereupon filed a matrimonial appeal under Section 55 of the Divorce Act, 1969 read with Section 19 (1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 Page No.# 6/24 challenging the order dated 23.02.2011 passed by the learned Judge, Subordinate Autonomous Council Court, Dima Hasao, Haflong, Assam in T.S. No.12/2011. As there was a delay of one year, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was filed for condoning the delay. The said matrimonial appeal filed before the court was not registered but allotted a filing number being 175531 and the application for condoning the delay was registered and numbered as Misc. Case No.1073/2012. In the written objection so filed to the application seeking condonation of delay, the respondent denied that his wedlock with the petitioner was as per the Christian Law because the same was as per the customs and/or customary laws of the Kuki tribe. Thereafter, it has been alleged that the learned counsel for the petitioner for reason best known to the said counsel withdrew the said application for condonation of delay with a liberty to file afresh. 9. The Division Bench of this Court, vide an order dated 22.06.2012, closed the application for condonation of delay on withdrawal, however, granted the liberty to the petitioner to approach this Court or any other...",JUDGE Comparing Assistant,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/181312363/,Procedural,procedural,2022,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,181312363,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/181312363/,15
Gauhati High Court,"Ka Dymmiew Silty Giri vs U. Moonly Passah on 9 July, 1981",AIR1982GAU74,1981-07-09,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 12, Section 13, Section 14, Section 17",Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,ORDER,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. We have noticed certain shortfalls in the proceedings which cannot be overlooked. To obtain relief under the Divorce Act, 1869 , for short, 'the Act', the conditions set out in the provisions of 'the Act' must be strictly complied by the parties. The Act is applicable to the partie? who profess Christian religion. However, if one of the parties profess Chritian faith it would give jurisdiction to the Court to give relief under 'the Act'. Dissolution of a marriage is a serious thing and the Court trying matrimonial cases should carefully follow the provisions of 'the Act'. The grounds on which a Christian marriage may be dissolved have been set forth in Section 10 of ""the Act"". Section 11 makes it obligatory on a husband, in a petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of adultery, to make the adulterer a co-respondent unless he is exempted or excused by the Court on one of the three grounds mentioned in the Section. Leave for such ""excuse"" must be applied for and duly obtained. Collusion to obtain a decree for dissolution of a marriage has been expressly prohibited under Section 12 of 'the Act'. Collusion in judicial proceeding is a secret agreement between two persons that one should institute a suit against the other, in order to obtain the decision...","7. As a result of the foregoing discussions we confirm the decree for dissolution of the marriage made by the learned Judge under Section 17 of the Act. However, there will be no order as to costs as the respondents have not turned up to contest the proceedings before this Court as well.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/756271/ | AIR1982GAU74, AIR 1982 GAUHATI 74, (1982) 2 DMC 362",Adultery,adultery; desertion,1981,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1982GAU74, AIR 1982 GAUHATI 74, (1982) 2 DMC 362",756271,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/756271/,5
Gauhati High Court,"Smt. Baby Deb vs Ajit Deb on 12 October, 2007",AIR2008GAU49,2007-10-12,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 111, Section 12, Section 13, Section 13A, Section 13B, Section 14, Section 15, Section 19, Section 2, Section 20, Section 21, Section 23, Section 24, Section 25, Section 26, Section 28, Section 401, Section 44, Section 482, Section 55, Section 7, Section 8, Section 9",Nullity Sec19; Unsound Mind,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER R.B. Misra, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"D) Whether the petitioner or opposite party is a minor or of unsound mind, a statement of that fact. E) The facts constituting the cause of action. F) The facts showing that the Court has jurisdiction. And also the relief claimed. And basically, these are the ingredients of a plaint which has to be covered in an application or petition. 7. The Trial Court below interpreted the terms 'Petition' on the basis of dictionary meaning holding that a petition is a formal written request, made to a Judge or a Superior, a document embodying such a formal request petition and application mean the same thing. 8. Serial 1(c), 17(iii) and Serial 20 of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (Tripura) provide as under: 1. (c) Application or petition xx xx xx when presented to a Collector or other officer making a settlement of land revenue, or to the Chief...","1. Heard Mr. C. Chakraborty, learned Counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. B. Debnath, learned Counsel for the opposite-party. At the request of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, in the facts and circumstances this petition is being disposed of at the admission stage itself. 2. The present Civil Revision Petition has been preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 24-1-2007 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura in T.S. (Divorce) No. 228 of 2008 indicating that a title suit for divorce was to be presented in the form of the plaint and since the relief claimed through such petition is declaratory in nature, therefore, the court-fee of Rs. 20/- has to be paid under the Court Fees Act, 1870 (for short ' Court Fees Act '). 35. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and I have perused the records and also gone through the relevant provisions of law and I find that though divorce has been sought for by presenting a Title Suit (Divorce) No. 228 of...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. The petitioner presented a petition, i.e. T.S. (Divorce) No. 228 of 2006, before learned Family Court on 18-5-2006 under Section 13(1)(1a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (in short called Hindu Marriage 'Act') for dissolution of marriage between the parties by way of decree of divorce. While presenting the petition for divorce court-fee of an amount of Re. 1/- was affixed by the petitioner but the Sheristradar of the Family Court reported deficit of court-fee of Rupees 19/- on the petition presented by the petitioner. 4. Shri R. Chakraborty, learned advocate appointed as amicus curiae by learned Family Court assisted learned Family Court. Learned Family Court vide impugned order dated 24-1-2007 has observed that the legislature has used the word 'petition' in Section 13 of the 'Act' which is essentially a plaint. For obtaining a declaratory decree without consequential relief, court-fees of Rs. 20/- has to be paid on the petition and T.S. (Divorce) No. 228 of 2006 under Schedule II, Article 17(III) of the Tripura Court Fees Act. According to learned Family Court, a petition for divorce being plaint in nature and relief claimed in such petition being declaratory in nature shall have to be presented affixing court-fees of Rs. 20/- and as such the petitioner was directed to supply additional court-fee of Rs. 19/- within 31st January,...","22. The Hindu Marriage Act provides for preparation of decree for special purposes which is not a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure; Section 21 of the 'Act', provides that procedure of CPC is applicable in regulating all the proceeding in the 'Act' subject to other provisions of the 'Act' and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf. Decree under the Hindu Marriage Act and Decree under the CPC therefore, are not of the same in nature and character. For example, a decree passed under Section 10 of the 'Act' may be rescinded by the Trial Court itself on the application by petition of either party on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in the petition if it considers just and reasonable to do so'. But, a decree passed under the CPC can, in no circumstances, be rescinded, altered, cancelled or modified by the Trial Court; such a decree may be rescinded or changed only by the Higher Court. Therefore, interpretation regarding the meaning...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154000/ | AIR2008GAU49, AIR 2008 GAUHATI 49, 2008 AIHC NOC 368, (2008) 5 GAU LR 903, (2008) MATLR 346, 2008 (3) AKAR (NOC) 358 (GAU.), 2008 AIHC (NOC) 368 (GAU.) = AIR 2008 GAUHATI 49",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; unsound_mind,2007,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR2008GAU49, AIR 2008 GAUHATI 49, 2008 AIHC NOC 368, (2008) 5 GAU LR 903, (2008) MATLR 346, 2008 (3) AKAR (NOC) 358 (GAU.), 2008 AIHC (NOC) 368 (GAU.) = AIR 2008 GAUHATI 49",154000,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154000/,11
Gauhati High Court,"Salil Mochari vs Smti Bani Mochari on 25 February, 2020",Salil Mochari vs Smti Bani Mochari,2020-02-25,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 125, Section 37, Section 8",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Page No.# 1/4 GAHC010019512018 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Mat.App. 11/2018 1:SALIL MOCHARI S/O SRI SIMON MOCHARI R/O RLY QTR. NO.253/A CENTRAL GOTANAGAR, GOSHALA, MALIGAON P.S. JALUKBARI, GUWAHATI 781032 DIST KAMRUP(M),ASSAM. VERSUS 1:SMTI BANI MOCHARI W/O SRI SALIL MOCHARI R/O KOKAJHAR, P.S.- KOKRAJHAR BARSAPARA INDUSTRIAL ROAD DIST KOKRAJHAR, BTAD, ASSAM AND C/O SRI SUMAN GAYARI RLY QTR.NO 1(A) CENTRAL GOTANAGAR, GOSHALA , MALIGAON P.S. JALUKBARI, GUWAHATI 781032 DIST KAMRUP (M) ASSAM. Advocate for the Petitioner : MS. R B BORA Advocate for the Respondent : MR. S ALIM Linked Case : I.A.(Civil) 589/2020 1:BANI MOCHARI W/O. SRI SALIL MOCHARI R/O. KOKRAJHAR P.S. KOKRAJHAR BARSAPARA INDUSTRIAL ROAD DIST. KOKRAJHAR BTAD ASSAM AND C/O. SRI SUMAN GAYARI RLY QTR. NO.1(A) CENTRAL GOTANAGAR GOSHALA MALIGAON P.S. JALUKBARI GHY-32 DIST. KAMRUUPU(M) ASSAM PRESENT ADD. R/O. WARD NO. 10 BODOLAND TRANSPORT P.O. AND DIST. KOKRAJHAR (BTR) ASSAM. VERSUS 1:SALIL MOCHARI S/O. SRI SIMON MOCHARI R/O. RAILWAY QUARTER NO.253/A CENTRAL GOTANAGAR GOSHALA MALIGAON P.S. JALUKBARI GHY-32 DIST. KAMRUP (M) ASSAM. Page No.# 2/4 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S ALIM Advocate for the Respondent : MRS. R B BORA -BEFORE- HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""10A. Dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, a petition for dissolution of marriage may be presented to the District Court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement* of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of two years or more, that they have not been able to live together and they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The application has been filed by Smti. Bani Mochari under Section 8 read with Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 (for short, ""Act of 1869"") to consider the matter and dissolve the marriage by mutual consent. 3. Section 8 of the Act of 1869 reads as under:- ""8. Extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court. - The High Court may, whenever it thinks fit, remove and try and determine as a Court of original jurisdiction any suit or proceeding instituted under this Act in the Court of any District Judge within the limits of its jurisdiction under this Act."" 4. Section 10A of the Act of 1869 reads as under:- (2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn by both the Page No.# 3/4 parties in the meantime, the Court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and making such inquiry, as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of decree."" 5. We have taken judicial notice of the...",JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Comparing Assistant,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/65194385/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2020,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,65194385,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/65194385/,9
Patna High Court,"Rasan Trigun Barla vs Rilan Sandhya Toppno And Anr. on 2 April, 1998",[2005(2)JCR552(PAT)],1998-04-02,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT R.A. Sharma, Loknath Prasad and A.K. Prasad, JJ.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The plaintiff-petitioner filed a suit under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)for dissolution of his marriage with defendant No. 1 on the ground of adultery. The alleged adulterer was impleaded as defendant No. 2. In the suit notice were issued to the defendant, who appeared and prayed for time for filing written statement. But thereafter they remained absent, resulting in ex parte judgment dissolving the marriage of the plaintiff with defendant No. 1. The ex parte judgment was recalled on the application of defendant No. 1 under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Thereafter written statement was filed. On 15.10.1996 a joint application was filed by both the parties, i.e. husband and wife, in the Court below seeking dissolution of marriage and for passing consent decree of divorce. The Court below after hearing the parties decreed the suit in terns of the compromise. On 18.11.1996 the decree for dissolution of marriage was prepared. The said decree has been sent for confirmation under Sections 17 and 20 of the Act to this Court. 2. After receipt of the records from the Court below for confirmation, notices were issued to the defendants, but inspite of personal service on them none has appeared on their behalf. 3. We have...","4. In view of the the facts and circumstances the case, we confirm the decree of divorce dated 17.10.1996/2.11.1996 passed by the 4th Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi in matrimonial Title Suit No. 24 of 1993. Divorce decree confirmed.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1426023/ | [2005(2)JCR552(PAT)],Unclear,unclear,1998,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: [2005(2)JCR552(PAT)],1426023,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1426023/,3
Patna High Court,"Danda Samaul Raj vs Smt. Shila Agnush Raj And Anr. on 12 December, 1983",AIR1985PAT139,1983-12-12,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"6. The aforesaid evidence of the petitioner was corroborated by the testimony of Amar Bahadur Singh, A,W. 2. He deposed that he knew the parties for more than 5-6 years and the petitioner's wife was not living with him, but instead was living at Ramgarh. He narrated that about 1 or 1 1/2 years (ago) he had noticed the two respondents travelling together in a rickshaw and further when he talked to respondent No. 1, Shila Agnush Raj, and enquired whether she would return to the home of the petitioner at Gomia, she replied that she would live at Ramgarh and would continue to do so.",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a reference under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, for confirmation of the decree nisi for the dissolution of marriage granted by the learned District Judge, Giridih. 2. Danda Samaul Raj had preferred the petition against his wife, Smt. Shila Agnush Raj, averring that both of them were married according to the Christian rites in the Bijulia Baptist Church at Ramgarh in the district of Hazaribagh. Later, both of them lived together at Ramgarh as also at Pipradih within Gomia Police Station. Out of the said wedlock, two children, namely, Rajesh Niresh Raj and Manish Raj were born to them. 3. It was alleged that since April, 1976 respondent No. 1, Smt. Shila Agnush Raj, started living separately and despite persuasion by him, she did not return to the marital home. The petitioner was compelled to give registered notice to the respondent-wife requesting her to return to Gomia and reside with him, which met with no response whatsoever. It was the petitioner's case that for three years preceding January, 1980, respondent No. 2, Sudhir Back, had been constantly coming and living with the respondent-wife and during that period he had committed adultery with her. It was alleged that the petitioner himself had witnessed the two respondents engaged in such like unlawful acts. It was averred...","10. In the result, I allow the reference and confirm the decree nisi. S.K. Choudhuri, J. 11. I agree. Satyeshwar Roy, J. 12. I agree.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/376042/ | AIR1985PAT139, AIR 1985 PATNA 139",Procedural,procedural,1983,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1985PAT139, AIR 1985 PATNA 139",376042,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/376042/,5
Patna High Court,"Binod Anand Lakra vs Smt. Belulah Lakra And Anr. on 2 March, 1982",AIR1982PAT213,1982-03-02,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 26, Section 7",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Lalit Mohan Sharma, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"10. The house in which the couple were living belongs to the respondent's father. To give a ring of truth to his story, the petitioner stated in his evidence that he changed his residence after the incident and first stayed with his relative Mr. Kujur and thereafter in the Heavy Engineering Corporation's quarter where he is working. The respondent has asserted that the petitioner was living with her till 9-4-1980 when he after informing her about the present proceeding changed his residence. The change of residence is relevant for ascertaining the truth of the incident as also on the question whether the petitioner must be deemed to have condoned the respondent's misbehaviour (if found to be correct). The petitioner in the first instance did not explain as to why he cut his leave short to return back to Ranchi suddenly. In support of his case that he left the respondent's...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This case arises out of an application by the petitioner filed under Section 17 of the Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as the Act.) In 1978 he filed an application under Section 10 of the Act before the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, who by his judgment dated 18-8-1979 granted a decree of divorce. The petitioner has now moved this Court for confirming the decree. 2. The petitioner and his wife, respondent No. 1, are Christians and were married in 1966 at a Church in Ranchi town. According to the petitioner's case he and his wife had been living at different places, all within the jurisdiction of the Ranchi Court and led a normal conjugal life for several years. In 1976 the petitioner discovered close friendly relationship between his wife and Umesh Sinha co-respondent in this case, which he did not like. The wife did not react reasonably when the petitioner protested. Their relation then started cooling down and she started neglecting and refusing to fulfil her matrimonial obligations. The petitioner went to his village home in January, 1978 and on his return on 22-1-1978, he found the co-respondent staying in their house. On the petitioner demanding an explanation, his wife told him that the co-respondent was looking after her on being invited to do so. The petitioner found certain...","14. In the result the decree nisi pronounced by the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, is set aside, but the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout This reference case is accordingly disposed of.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/345554/ | AIR1982PAT213, 1982(30)BLJR372, AIR 1982 PATNA 213, (1982) 2 DMC 128, (1982) MATLR 156, 1982 BBCJ 486, (1982) BLJ 416, 1982 MATLR 416, 1982 BLT (REP) 234, 1982 PATLJR 156, 1982 BLJ 128, 1982 BLJR 372, (1982) PAT LJR 314",Adultery,adultery,1982,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1982PAT213, 1982(30)BLJR372, AIR 1982 PATNA 213, (1982) 2 DMC 128, (1982) MATLR 156, 1982 BBCJ 486, (1982) BLJ 416, 1982 MATLR 416, 1982 BLT (REP) 234, 1982 PATLJR 156, 1982 BLJ 128, 1982 BLJR 372, (1982) PAT LJR 314",345554,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/345554/,7
Patna High Court,"Mrs. Sweta Dcruz vs Vinod Joseph Sebestian on 5 October, 2026",Mrs. Sweta Dcruz vs Vinod Joseph Sebestian,2026-10-05,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (desertion) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.",,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Miscellaneous Appeal No.83 of 2025 CNR No. BRHC010090932025 ====================================================== Mrs. Sweta Dcruz, Wife of Vinod Jaseph Sebestian, Daughter of Navin Kumar @ N. Deruz, Resident of Ward No-7, Jarahabhatha, Omnagar, Bilaspur, Municipal, Corporation, Bilaspur, Chattisgarh-495001 ... ... Appellant/s Versus Vinod Joseph Sebestian, Son of K.J Sebestian Resident of 1/10 New Patloputra, Colony Church Road, Disrtict-Patna, Bihar ... ... Respondent/s ====================================================== Appearance : For the Appellant/s : Mr. Sagar Suman, Advocate For the Respondent/s : Mr. Rohitabh Das, Advocate ====================================================== CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BIBEK CHAUDHURI and HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RANA VIKRAM SINGH ORAL JUDGMENT (Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BIBEK CHAUDHURI) Date: 05-10-2026 1. The instant matrimonial appeal is directed against the judgement and decree of dismissal of Matrimonial (Divorce) Case No. 5313 of 2014, decided by the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court at Patna under Section 10(1) of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872. 2/13 Patna High Court MA No. 83 of 2025 dt.05-10-2026 2. Indisputably, the marriage between the parties were solemnized on 24th of January, 2010 according to christian rights...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/195485687/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,195485687,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/195485687/,1
Patna High Court,"Antala Gope Alias Antilal Gope vs Smt. Sarbo Gopain And Anr. on 27 April, 1962",AIR1962PAT489,1962-04-27,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 12, Section 13, Section 2, Section 20, Section 21, Section 25, Section 28, Section 34, Section 47, Section 75, Section 96",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,ORDER,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""(1) any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party--(i) is living in adultery : etc"".",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This matter has come before us in the following circumstances. One Antalal Gope alias Antilal Gope filed an application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for a decree of divorce against Sarbo Gopain and impleaded another person as a co-respondent on the allegation that he had committed adultery with respondent No. 1, the applicant's wife. In that application, he had also asked for a damage of Rs. 500/- against respondent No. 2. His application failed so far as both the reliefs were concerned, and he has preferred an appeal to this Court, which has been numbered as First Appeal No. 228 of 1961. 2. The Stamp Reporter of this Court pointed out that, on the memorandum of appeal, the appellant was to pay a court-fee of Rs. 22.50 under Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act so far as the relief of divorce was concerned. He was also of the view that the same court-fee was payable on the original application. Further, he pointed out that there was a claim for damages in the original application as well as in the present appeal, and so it was a matter for consideration whether any additional court-fee was payable for that. The whole case came before Sahai, J., as the Taxing Judge, after the Taxing Officer...","The question for consideration, is whether ""a decree of divorce"" contemplated under Section 13 will be treated as a ""decree"", as defined in Section 2 (2) of the Code ; of Civil Procedure, and, if that is so, then the appeal preferred against that will have to be treated as an appeal from an original decree. In some other sections of the Act, the word ""decree"" has also been mentioned, such as, ""a decree for judicial separation"" in Section 10 . Section 28 , however, refers not only to ""decrees"" under the Act but also to orders passed by the Court in any proceeding under the Act. If the word ""a decree for divorce"" or ""a decree for judicial separation"" was used in the Act in the sense of a ""decree"", as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure , then there was no necessity to provide in Section 28 to the effect that such decrees : ""shall be enforced in like manner as the decree . . . of the court made in the exercise of the original civil...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/120511/ | AIR1962PAT489, AIR 1962 PATNA 489, ILR 41 PAT 757",Adultery,adultery,1962,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1962PAT489, AIR 1962 PATNA 489, ILR 41 PAT 757",120511,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/120511/,9
Patna High Court,"Rabindra Prasad vs Sita Devi on 12 February, 1985",AIR1986PAT128,1985-02-12,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 12, Section 13, Section 14, Section 18, Section 23, Section 28, Section 29, Section 5",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Satya Brata Sanyal, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This appeal arises out of a suit for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act'). The divorce is at the instance of the husband. Divorce has been refused. Hence this appeal has been preferred under Section 28 of the said Act. The marriage admittedly was solemnised on 27-4-1977. 2. Four grounds were taken in support of suit for dissolution of marriage, namely, (a) on the date of the marriage the bridegroom did not complete the age of 18 years. He was only 17 years 5 months. The marriage, therefore, was solemnised in contravention of Section 5(iii) of the Act. (b) on 3rd of May, 1977 the marriage was dissolved by mutual consent, (c) The consent of the bridegroom and/or of the guardian was obtained by practising fraud; hence vitiated under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act. The fact that the bride was suffering from physical infirmity i.e. she had no right breast was suppressed, (d) the bride was leading an adulterous life and, therefore, the marriage be dissolved under Section 13(1) of the Act. 3. It may be stated at the outset that the paramours with whom the bride is stated to have immoral connections have not been impleaded as co-respondents in the suit. 4. The trial Court held...","19. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 250/-.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/431765/ | AIR1986PAT128, AIR 1986 PATNA 128, (1986) 1 CIV LJ 255, 1986 BBCJ 58, (1986) 2 DMC 31, (1985) 2 HINDULR 69, (1985) BLJ 737, (1986) 2 HINDULR 52",Adultery,adultery,1985,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1986PAT128, AIR 1986 PATNA 128, (1986) 1 CIV LJ 255, 1986 BBCJ 58, (1986) 2 DMC 31, (1985) 2 HINDULR 69, (1985) BLJ 737, (1986) 2 HINDULR 52",431765,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/431765/,5
Patna High Court,"Saba Praveen vs State Of Bihar & Anr on 31 March, 2016",Saba Praveen vs State Of Bihar & Anr,2016-03-31,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 15, Section 164, Section 17, Section 18, Section 2, Section 24, Section 4, Section 482, Section 5, Section 9",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Criminal Miscellaneous No.24990 of 2015 Arising Out of PS.Case No. -376 Year- 2014 Thana -BODHGAYA District- GAYA =========================================================== 1. Saba Praveen wife of Arbind Paswan, daughter of Md. Kamrul Hoda resident of Mohalla - Manpur Koyali Pokhar, P.S. - Buniyadganj, District - Gaya at present resident of village - Rati Bigha, P.S. - Bodh Gaya, District - Gaya. .... .... Petitioner/s Versus 1. The State of Bihar. 2. Md. Islam Ansari son of late Md. Siddik Ansari resident of village - Bakraur, P.S. - Bodh Gaya, District - Gaya. .... .... Opposite Party/s =========================================================== Appearance : For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Ramakant Sharma, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Adv. Mr. Rakesh Kumar Sharma, Adv. Mr. Santosh Kumar Pandey, Adv. For the State : Mr. Raj Kishore Singh, APP For Opposite Party No.2 : Mr. Nagendra Kumar, Adv. =========================================================== CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHWANI KUMAR SINGH ORAL JUDGMENT",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"19. A marriage under Muslim law is perfectly valid if parties have attained puberty and satisfied all other conditions specified by law. The law with regard to marriage with a non-Muslim is different under Sunni law and Shia law. A Muslim woman cannot marry a non- Muslim man. A marriage of a Muslim female with a non-Muslim male, whether he is a Christian, or a Jew or an Idolater or a Fire- worshipper is not permissible. According to Mulla, such marriage is irregular. But according to Fyzee, such a marriage is totally void. Under Shia law a marriage with a non-Muslim is void. Both the spouses are required to be Muslims. 20. In India, marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim can only take place under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 . 25. In the present case, this court has already held the orders passed by the courts below in...","24. Coming back to the facts of the present case, an argument has been advanced by Mr. Ramakant Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner, a Muslim girl has married one Arbind Paswan, a Hindu boy in a temple. For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the opinion that such a marriage is neither permissible under the Hindu Law nor under the Muslim Law. It has got no legal sanctity. It is an admitted position that the marriage was not performed under the Act of 1954.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Date: 31-03-2016 By way of the present application preferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short „ CrPC ‟), the petitioner has sought for quashing of the order dated 30th April, 2015 passed by the learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Gaya in Cr. Revision No. 2/15/7/15, whereby he has affirmed the order dated 13th January, 2015 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gaya (for short „CJM‟) in Bodh Gaya P.S.Case No. 376 of 2014 by which he has directed the petitioner to be released in favour of her parents. Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.24990 of 2015 dt.31-03-2016 2/16 2. The Opposite Party No.2, Md. Islam Ansari submitted a written report on 29th November, 2014 addressed to the S.H.O. of Bodh Gaya Police Station alleging therein, inter alia, that his niece Saba Praveen (petitioner), aged about 16 years, was abducted by one Arbind Paswan in conspiracy with Guddu Paswan, Pankaj Paswan, Gautam Paswan, Padum Paswan, Surendra Paswan, Deepak Paswan, Lakhan Paswan, Laxmi Paswan, Shravan Paswan and others, all resident of village Rati Bigha, for the purpose of marriage. On query, they threatened the informant that they would sell his niece in some big city and implicate him in false case of raping a lady of Scheduled Caste community. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid written...",U T,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/74359794/,Unclear,unclear,2016,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,74359794,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/74359794/,8
Patna High Court,"Ranjana Mina (Simen) Jones vs Arun Kumar Stauly Jones on 16 December, 2016",AIR 2017 PATNA 105,2016-12-16,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 100, Section 17, Section 55",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Matrimonial Reference No.1 of 2007 =========================================================== Ranjana Mina (Siman) Jones, wife of Arun Kumar Stauly Jones, resident of Mohalla- Nawada, Government Ministerial Quarter No. 29A, Nawada, near Railway Station Arrah, P.O.- Arrah, District- Bhojpur. .... .... Petitioner/s Versus Arun Kumar Stauly Jones, son of Mr. Stanly Jones, at Mohalla- Gazadharganj, Near Railway Station- Buxar, P.O.- Buxar, P.S.- Buxar, District- Buxar. .... .... Opposite Party/s =========================================================== Appearance : For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate Mrs. Bandana Sinha, Advocate For the Opposite Party/s : =========================================================== CORAM: HONOURABLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE and HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE VIKASH JAIN and HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH ORAL JUDGMENT (Per: HONOURABLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE) Date: 16-12-2016 The present reference has been sent by Principal Judge, Family Court, Bhojpur, Arrah on 24th of February, 2007 for confirmation of decree of divorce in Divorce Suit No. 33/98 instituted on 2nd of November, 1998.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The decree for divorce was granted on 5th of June, 2006 and thereafter the matter has been referred to this Court under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, since repealed by Patna High Court MAT. REF. No.1 of 2007 dt.16-12-2016 2/7 Central Act No. 51 of 2001 with effect from 3rd of October, 2001. The said reference was sent to this Court for confirmation of decree of divorce in view of the decision of this Court in a case reported as Mrs. Larley Vs. Mr. John @ Johny C.A. , 2004 (1) P.L.J.R. 564 wherein, it has been, inter alia, held that right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences, although it may actually be exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced. 3. We find that said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case as Section 17 of the Divorce Act, 1869 was substituted vide Central Act No. 51 of 2001 with effect from 3rd of October, 2001. As per the original provision of Section 17 , the decree for divorce could not be given effect to unless it is confirmed by the High Court. Such provision stands substituted with...","(Hemant Gupta, ACJ) (Vikash Jain, J) (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J) P.K.P. AFR/NAFR A.F.R. CAV DATE N.A. Uploading Date 23.12.2016 Transmission Date","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/61469909/ | AIR 2017 PATNA 105, (2017) 1 RECCIVR 1006, (2017) 171 ALLINDCAS 703 (PAT), (2017) 2 CIVLJ 33, (2017) 2 KER LT 39, (2017) 1 PAT LJR 282",Procedural,procedural,2016,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 2017 PATNA 105, (2017) 1 RECCIVR 1006, (2017) 171 ALLINDCAS 703 (PAT), (2017) 2 CIVLJ 33, (2017) 2 KER LT 39, (2017) 1 PAT LJR 282",61469909,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/61469909/,5
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"Shri N.D. Mantri vs Smt. Kamla Mantri on 11 November, 1980",1980WLN584,1980-11-11,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 19, Section 28, Section 3, Section 488",Cruelty; Nullity Sec19; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT S.K. Mal Lodha, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issue were framed by the learned Additional District Judge on July 29, 1978: 1. Whether Non-Petitioner has throughout her marital career with the petitioner acted in a manner which caused him such mental agony which amounted to cruety? (P) 2. Whether the conduct of the Non-Petitioner with the Petitioner during their married life has been such as occasioned the Petitioner physical and mental ill-health? (P) 3. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to divorce? (P) 4. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear the petition? (P) 5. Whether the application has not been filed bonafide and the petitioner is taking benefit of his own wrong? 6. Whether the petitioner has condoned the wrong of the non-petitioner upto 1968? 7. Relief. The appellant examined himself as P.W. 1, Suraj Narain Rathi, (P.W. 2) Girdharsingh, (P.W. 3) Om Prakash, (P.W. 4)...","4. The appellant was married to the respondent in May, 1944 at Ramsar Village, District Ajmer according to the Hindu customs. According to the respondent, the marriage was solemnsed in the Year 1942 or 1944. After solemnisation of the marriage, the appellant lived with the respondent periodically and also cohabited with her occasionally, at Srinagar, District Ajmer from 1944 to 1950, 1951, 1953, 1955, 1957 to 1962, 1963 to 1967. As a result of that, they have nine issues (seven sons and two daughters). The appellant has stated that at intervals, the respondent in 1946, 1948, 1952, 1956 and 1968 made several accusations and as a result of that he had to lead life alone. He has further stated that the respondent treated him with cruelty, by abusing, using filthy language and hurling all sort of defamatory accusations and thus made his life miserable both in private and public. Such instances, according to the appellant, took place at Ajmer in 1946, 1948, 1952 and at Jodhpur in the Year 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1967. It was also stated that the...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The husband-appellant filed a petition for divorce under Section 13 read with Section 10 of the Act before the District Judge, Jodhpur on July 11, 1974. The wife-respondent filed her reply on October 9, 1977. Thereafter, the petition was amended by the husband and the amended petition was filed on May 15, 1978. The reply to the amended petition was filed on July 5, 1978. The petition was, however, transferred to the Court of Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur for disposal. 3. The facts giving rise to this appeal as stated hereinunder will be those as are borne out from the amended pleadings of the parties. 7. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has assailed the finding of the learned Additional District Judge in respect of issue No. 4. The learned Additional District Judge, as stated above, held that the court at Jodhpur has no jurisdiction to hear the petition. Learned Counsel for the appellant pressed for my consideration that the appellant has been successful in establishing that they last resided together in 1966-67 at. Jodhpur and, therefore, under Section 19 of the Act, the District Judge at Jodhpur or for that matter, the Additional District Judge at Jodhpur has jurisdiction to hear the petition. He invited my attention to the following extracts occurring in the statement of...","1. This appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act (No. XXV of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is directed against the decree dated February 12, 1979 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur in Civil Misc. Case No. 5-A/76, by which, he dismissed the petition for divorce filed by the appellant under Section 13 read with Section 10 of the Act. 23. The result is that this appeal has no force and it is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as costs of this appeal.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1344413/ | 1980WLN584,Cruelty,cruelty; nullity_sec19; desertion,1980,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: 1980WLN584,1344413,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1344413/,13
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"Babulal And Ors. vs Otmal on 19 September, 1983",1983WLN408,1983-09-19,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 12, Section 18, Section 25, Section 27, Section 35, Section 45, Section 5, Section 76, Section 86",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT K.S. Lodha, J. 1. The alleged debtors Babulal and others have filed this appeal against the order of the learned District Judge, Jalore, dated 26-2-83, directing the return of the application of the creditor for adjudicating the appellants insolvents, for proper presentation. 2. This case had a chequered history and had been pending before the learned District Judge, Jalore, for a considerable long time and had also travelled up to this Court on question of jurisdiction itself when it was remanded to that court. After the remand, the order under appeal has been passed. 3. I have heard the earned Counsel for the parties, it is agreed by them that the apnea may finally be disposed of at this stage and for that purpose, the record would not be necessary. I have, accordingly, proceeded to hear them.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. Two contentions have been raised before me by the earned Counsel for the appellants. The first contention is that there is no provision under the Provincial Insolvency Act there in after called 'the Act') for return of the application and therefore, the order of return of the application by the aid of Section 5 of the Act passed by the court below was wrong. The second contention is that while returning the application for proper presentation, the court improperly left the parties to bear their own costs whereas it should have awarded costs to the appellants. 5. So far as the first contention goes, the earned Counsel has strenuously urged that under the Act, the only provision for disposing of an application is under Section 25 and that does not envisage a return of the application. He also contended that the provisions of Order 7, Rule 10 CPC would not be applicable to an application under the Act with the aid of Section 5 of the Act. In this connection, he has placed reliance upon a few authorities to which f presently refer. He also specifically drew my attention to Section 12 , 14 , 18 , 19 and 27 of the Act. In my opinion, the contention of the earned Counsel for the appellants cannot be sustained. Section...","10. The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs in this court.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1791873/ | 1983WLN408,Procedural,procedural,1983,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: 1983WLN408,1791873,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1791873/,5
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur,"Smt. Edvina Samuel vs Abhishek Walter (2025:Rj-Jd:19348) on 21 April, 2025",Smt. Edvina Samuel vs Abhishek Walter (2025:Rj-Jd:19348),2025-04-21,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 24",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[2025:RJ-JD:19348] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR S.B. Civil Transfer Appl. No. 190/2024 Smt. Edvina Samuel W/o Shri Abhishek Walter, Aged About 31 Years, D/o Shri Shashi Samuel Resident Of Plot No 66, Sector 4 , Navdurga Vihar, Jhalamand, Jodhpur ----Petitioner Versus Abhishek Walter S/o Late Shri Sunil Walter, Aged About 34 Years, Resident Of Plot No 28, Mission Compound, Ajmer Road, Jaipur ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : None present For Respondent(s) : Mr. Mahesh Joshi HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YOGENDRA KUMAR PUROHIT Order 21/04/2025",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The instant civil transfer application has been filed by the petitioner-wife seeking transfer of Case No.165/2024 ""Abhishek Walter Vs. Edvina Samuel"" preferred by the respondent-husband under Section 10 of the Divorce Act seeking divorce pending before Family Court No.1, Jaipur Metro to the Family Court, Jodhpur. 2. Vide order dated 24.09.24, notices were directed to be issued to the respondent and further proceedings in Civil Misc. Case No. 165/2024 ""Abhishek Walter Vs. Edvina Samuel"" pending before Family Court No.1, Jaipur Metro were stayed. 3. None present for the petitioner. Heard learned counsel for the respondent and perused the material available on record. (Downloaded on 24/04/2025 at 09:50:08 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:19348] (2 of 4) [CTA-190/2024] 4. It is averred in the transfer petition on behalf of the petitioner-wife that the marriage between the petitioner-wife and respondent-husband was solemnized as per Christian rituals on 18.11.2016 at Jodhpur. Since the petitioner-wife was harassed, maltreated for bringing less dowry and turned out of her matrimonial home, therefore, she lodged an FIR No.0117/2019 at P.S. Mahila Thana, District Jodhpur City West for the offences under Sections 498A , 406 and 323 IPC, in which, challan has been filed and matter is pending trial before Special Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, PCPNDT Cases, Jodhpur Metro. It is also stated that with a view to harass and humiliate...",(Downloaded on 24/04/2025 at 09:50:08 PM) Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org),https://indiankanoon.org/doc/37988096/,Unclear,unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,37988096,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/37988096/,3
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"Veena Danial vs Sunil Danial on 26 July, 1993",I(1994)DMC375,1993-07-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. On the last turn when the application was listed before us, we made an order for service to be effected on the respondent but that has come back with the endorsement 'unclaimed' 'intimated'. We have perused the summons and we find that the service was effected on the mother of the respondent. In the circumstances, the service on the respondent will be deemed to be sufficient. No one has appeared today on behalf of the respondent to controvert the allegations made by the appellant about the behaviour, as he was doing carnal intercourse, which is unnatural Under Section 10 of Indian Divorce Act a wife could get a decree in her favour for dissolution of marriage if her husband commits sodomy on her. We are of the opinion that the appellant was rightly given a decree against the respondent. Consequently, we confirm the same.","1. This reference has been made by the Distt. Judge. Bharatpur for confirming the decree nisi passed in favour of the appellant against the respondent. The respondent and the appellant were married in accordance with the Christian Rites in June, 1984. Shortly, after the marriage the respondent in order to satisfy his lust asked the appellant to have intercourse with him by indulging in sodomy. She resisted but the respondent succeeded in committing sodomy with the appellant. Thereafter, appellant left the place of her husband and come to her mother's house in Bharatpur in December, 1984. The respondent thereafter came to Bharatpur to take her. The mother of the appellant intervened and wanted to settle the matter in between them. But she could not succeed as a result whereof the appellant and the respondent could not have marital relations. The appellant, thereafter, filed an application before the Distt, Judge Bharat-our for passing of a decree for dissolution of marriage. The learned Distt. Judge issued notice to the respondent of the application. But that returned unserved The appellant produced evidence to...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/951643/ | I(1994)DMC375,Unclear,unclear,1993,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: I(1994)DMC375,951643,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/951643/,4
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"Smt. Veena Danial vs Sunil Danial on 26 July, 1991",1992(1)WLC84,1991-07-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M.R. Calla, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. On the last turn when application was listed before us, we made an order for service to be effected on the respondent but that has come back with the endorsement 'unclaimed' 'intimated'. We have perused the summons and we find that the service was effected on the mother of the respondent. In the circumstances, the service on the respondent will be deemed to be sufficient. No one has appeared today on behalf of the respondent to controvert the allegations made by the appellant about the behaviour, as he was doing carnal intercourse, which is unnatural Under Section 10 of Indian Divorce Act a wife could get decree in her favour for dissolution of marriage if her husband commits sodomy on her. We are of the opinion that the appellant was rightly given a decree against the respondent. Consequently, we confirm the same.","1. This reference has been made by the Distt. Judge, Bharatpur for confirming the decree nisi passed in favour of the appellant against the respondent. The respondent and the appellant were married in accordance with the Christian Rites in June, 1984. Shortly, after the marriage the respondent in order to satisfy his lust asked the appellant to have intercourse with him by indulging in sodomy. She resisted but the respondent succeeded in committing sodomy with the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant left the place of her husband and came to her mother's house in Bharatpur in December, 1984. The respondent thereafter came to Bharatpur to take her. The mother of the appellant intervened and wanted to settle the matter in between them. But she could not succeed as a result whereof, the appellant and the respondent could not have marital relations. The appellant, thereafter, filed an application before the Distt. Judge Bharatpur for passing of a decree for dissolution of marriage. The learned Distt. Judge issued notice to the respondent of the application. But that returned unserved. The appellant produced evidence...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/820397/ | 1992(1)WLC84, 1991(2)WLN325",Unclear,unclear,1991,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 1992(1)WLC84, 1991(2)WLN325",820397,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/820397/,4
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"Darshan Singh vs Mst. Daso on 3 August, 1979",AIR1980RAJ102,1979-08-03,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 12, Section 13, Section 13B, Section 16, Section 2, Section 21, Section 23, Section 25, Section 26, Section 28, Section 37, Section 55, Section 9",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M.C. Jain, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,"5. I have heard Shri M. L. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant and Shri S. N. Sharma, learned counsel for the non-petitioner-respondent. 6. As regards the relief of restitution of conjugal rights, Shri Garg has not seriously contested the appeal and in my opinion, rightly so. The finding of the learned District Judge on issue No. 1, relating to second marriage by the petitioner, is unimpeachable. The petitioner has led no evidence and as such there was no escape for the learned District Judge except to hold that the petitioner married a second wife and on that basis further it has been found that there was reasonable cause for the non-petitioner not to live with the petitioner. The statement of Mst. Daso and her father Jangir-singh {D. W. 3) were to the effect that the non-petitioner was turned out from the house and not accepted by the petitioner in view of his second marriage, although Mst. Daso stated that she is still prepared to live with the petitioner, provided she is kept with love. There are no reasons to...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is an appeal against the judgment dated 17-10-1978 passed by the District Judge, Sri Ganganagar, whereby the appellant's petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as ""the Act""), was dismissed and the petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay maintenance to the non-petitioner-respondent for herself and her daughter to the tune of Rs. 300/- per month. 2. The appellant's case was that the parties were married about seven years ago according to Hindu rites. They lived as husband and wife at Chak 3 M.D., Tehsil Anupgarh, and a daughter was born out of the wedlock. About three years ago, the non-petitioner left the company of the petitioner without any reasonable excuse and went to her parents. Despite several efforts, she did not return to her matrimonial home. The non-petitioner admitted the other facts as averred by the petitioner. She, however, denied the allegations made against her with regard to leaving the company of the petitioner without any reasonable excuse. After traversing these allegations, it was averred by her that the petitioner in her absence married one Mst. Puni about 3-4 years ago without her consent and when her father came to leave her at the petitioner's house, the petitioner refused to accept her. The non-petitioner had no alternative, but under compulsion had to go...","7. The main attack of Shri Garg is on the order awarding maintenance to the non-petitioner. Shri Garg urged that when the petition for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed, then under Section 25 of the Act, no alimony could be awarded. Section 25 of the Act would be attracted only when any decree is passed granting any relief under Sections 9 to 13 . The order awarding maintenance under Section 25 in the present case, according to Shri Garg, is without jurisdiction, as, such an order can only be passed ""at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto"". Shri Garg in support of his contention placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Purshotam Kewalia v. Smt. Devki , (1972) 5 WLN 654. 10. Section 9 provides for a petition for restitution of conjugal rights and it lays down that if there is no legal grounds why the application should not be granted, the court may decree restitution of conjugal rights. Similarly, under Section 10 of the Act the petition is presented for...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/388485/ | AIR1980RAJ102, 1979()WLN412",Procedural,procedural,1979,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1980RAJ102, 1979()WLN412",388485,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/388485/,14
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"Chistopher Andrew Neelakantan vs Mrs. Anne Neelakantan on 23 February, 1959",AIR1959RAJ133,1959-02-23,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 27, Section 31, Section 39, Section 96",Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT I.N. Modi, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"7. Again, in Dicey's Conflict of Laws, Seventh Edition, Chapter XII at page 289, it has been laid down that the principles now finally adopted by English courts is that jurisdiction in matters of divorce depends upon domicile, or, in other words, the question whether parties to a marriage ought to be divorced is one which concerns the community of the country where they live and have their legal home, and, therefore, it is the courts of the country where the parties are so living at the time of the demand for divorce to which should be referred the question whether the marriage between the parties should or should not be dissolved. 8. This, to my mind, clearly establishes the principle that it is the court of domicile which will have jurisdiction to deal with a matter like the present. Thus again at page 103 of his book on Private...","4. The contention o£ learned counsel, however, is that the matter should not be held to be concluded by this. His submission is that it is well-established that on general principles it is the court of domicile which has or can have jurisdiction in matters of divorce. It is further argued that a woman on her marriage acquires the domicile of her husband. From this it is contended that the respondent acquired an Indian domicile in spite of the fact that she is an English woman and has never been to India.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a miscellaneous first appeal against an order of the learned District Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 2nd December, 1958, under Section 39 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, (No. XLIII of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1954) read with Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure in a divorce matter. 2. The petitioner is the husband Chistopher Andrew Neelakantan. His case is that he is a citizen of India and is an officer in the Air Force of the Government of India, and has been holding the post of Wing Commander in the Air Force at Jodhpur for the past several years. It is further alleged that the petitioner and the respondent Mrs. Anne Neela-kantan were married in England on the 20th Febru-ary, 1955, and a copy of the certificate of marriage (Annexure I) is produced in support of this. Among other allegations, which it is unnecessary to mention at this stage, the petitioner's case further was that when he wanted the respondent to come over to India and live as his wife, she flatly refused. Consequently, the petitioner made the present application in the court of the District Judges Jodhpur, on the 1st May, 1958, in which he prayed for a decree for the dissolution of his marriage with the respondent. It may...","I may add that as the question of jurisdiction has been decided by me without having the benefit of any assistance from the side of the respondent, and the question is by no means free from difficulty or complexity, the respondent would be at liberty to raise the question of jurisdiction before the learned District Judge, if she so desires, and it would be open to the learned District Judge in that event to give his considered opinion on the point in the light of any further submissions that might be made to him in this regard. I may also add that for the purposes of the present appeal, I have assumed that the petitioner is domiciled in India, and it would be open to the respondent also to raise a question as to that, if and when she chooses to contest the present application for divorce in the court of the District Judge. I order accordingly. The appellant will bear his own costs in this Court.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/359575/ | AIR1959RAJ133,Desertion,desertion,1959,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: AIR1959RAJ133,359575,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/359575/,9
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"Purshotam Kewalia vs Smt. Devki on 26 September, 1972",AIR1973RAJ3,1972-09-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 144, Section 15, Section 2, Section 21, Section 23, Section 25, Section 37, Section 47, Section 9",Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Kan Singh, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"2. The appellant Purshotam Kewalia and Smt. Devki respondent were married according to Hindu rites in July, 1937. At that tune they were both children, while the husband was 15, the wife was 10 years of age. According to the husband, the wife started living with the husband's parents at Jaisalmer and at that time the husband's relatives came to know that the wife was mentally deranged and was of violent nature. Then the wife had left her in-laws some two or three days thereafter without informing anyone and for no cause. The wife never returned to her husband and there was no cohabitation between the couple at any time. The husband proceeded to state that he continued to make efforts to fetch his wife, but the wife did not show her willingness to return. According to the husband, the wife did not even communicate with him for almost 22...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a husband's appeal directed against the judgment of the learned District Judge, Bikaner dated 25-2-1970 whereby the learned Judge dis-missed the husband's application under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, hereinafter to be referred as the ""Act"", for judicial separation and while dismissing the application the learned Judge awarded an amount of Rs. 40/- per month as permanent maintenance to the wife under Section 25 of the Act. 3. Learned counsel for the appel-lant has raised a twofold contention. In the first place, he argued that the husband has been successful in showing that the wife had been in desertion for a continuous period of more than two years preceding the filing of the application. In the second place, he submitted that the learned District Judge had no juris--diction to award permanent maintenance to the wife under Section 25 of the Act once he had dismissed the application for judicial separation. 4. In a recent case Devi Singh v. Smt. Sushila Devi , 1972 WLN 296 = (AIR 1972 Raj 303). I had occasion to discuss the concept of desertion within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act. After referring to a Supreme Court case I had noticed that two essential conditions must be there so far as the deserting spouse is concerned: (1)...","ing in a rented house near the house of the husband's mother. It was in these circumstances that the husband applied for judicial separation against the wife. The main ground taken by him was desertion for a continuous period exceeding two years before the presentation of the application. The learned District Judge recorded evidence of the parties and came to the conclusion that the wife has not been shown to be in desertion, In the result, he dismissed the husband's application for judicial separation, but at the same time award-ed permanent maintenance to the wife at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month. 8. In the result, I allow this appeal in part. While the order of the learned District Judge for the dismissal of the husband's application for judicial separation shall stand, his order granting maintenance to the wife is set aside. Since no one has appeared to oppose this appeal. I leave the appellant to bear his own costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1381097/ | AIR1973RAJ3, 1972()WLN654",Desertion,desertion,1972,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1973RAJ3, 1972()WLN654",1381097,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1381097/,8
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"Chhaganlal vs Smt. Sakkha Devi And Anr. on 6 April, 1974",AIR1975RAJ8,1974-04-06,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14, Section 23, Section 24, Section 25, Section 28",Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Kan Singh, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"4. The learned District Judge framed the following issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties:-- ""1. Whether the respondent No. 1 developed illegal intimacy with respondent No. 2 in July 1963 and is leading an adulterous life with her ? 3. Whether the respondent No. 2 is entitled to special damages ? 4. What should the relief be ?"" ""As regards the question whether the adultery on the part of the wife has been established the learned Additional District Judge is no doubt, right in saying, that it is not necessary to prove the fact of adultery toy direct evidence. It would be unreasonable to expect direct evidence and such evidence, if produced, would be normally suspect and is likely to be discarded. Normally the matrimonial offence of adultery is expected to be established by circumstantial evidence, but in that event the circumstances must be such as...","2. Whether the respondent No. 1 is guilty of cruelty towards the petitioner as alleged in para 4 of the petition; and, if so, its effect ?","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This appeal is brought under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, hereinafter to be referred as the ""Act"" by a husband against the judgment of the learned District Judge, Ajmer, dated 30-11-1972 whereby the learned District Judge passed a decree for judicial separation against the appellant-husband in favour of his wife Smt. Sakkha Devi and at the same time ordered the husband to pay interim maintenance to the wife at Rs. 30/- per month under Section 24 of the Act. 2. The petition under Section 10 of the Act was made by the wife Smt. Sakkha Devi on 28-2-1968. It was averred by her that Chhaganlal appellant and Smt. Sakkha Devi were married according to the Hindu rites in April, 1953 and that the parties lived together happily as husband and wife in village Tabijee near Ajmer till the month of October, 1963. Since October, 1963. the relations between the two spouses were strained. It was further averred by the wife that the husband had developed illicit intimacy with one Smt. Savari. a married woman, sometime in July, 1963. The coming in of a second woman between the two spouses resulted in the husband, being cruel to the wife. He was alleged to have behaved in a most insulting manner towards the wife and he disgraced her...","The other clauses namely (b), (c) and (e) relate to condonation, collusion and the like, with which we are not concerned in the present case. Section 23 lays down the conditions for passing a decree in proceedings under Sections 9 , 10 and other related sections of the Act. The first condition is a positive one, namely, that the grounds for granting relief exist. The other condition before a decree can be passed is inter alia that there has not been unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding. Whereas under the English Law unreasonable delay in presenting the petition for divorce or judicial separation is not an absolute bar but a discretionary one under the scheme of the Act the bar is a stringent one. The expression ""unnecessary or improper delay"" connotes culpable delay. Consideration of the application of the bar of delay may arise in a variety of cases and it would be difficult to find rules which may be helpful in all cases. It will be a question of fact to be determined in each case whether...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1739277/ | AIR1975RAJ8, 1974(7)WLN301",Adultery,adultery; cruelty,1974,judicial_separation,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1975RAJ8, 1974(7)WLN301",1739277,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1739277/,12
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"B.D. Charles vs Smt. Nora Benjamin And Anr. on 26 March, 1979",AIR1979RAJ156,1979-03-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 17, Section 28, Section 34, Section 47, Section 497, Section 55",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Lodha, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. Whether non-petitioner No. 1 (wife) has been living in adultery with non-petitioner No. 2 (adulterer) for more than three years ? 2. Whether non-petitioner No. 1 (wife) and non-petitioner No. 2 (adulterer) lived in adultery with the connivance of the petitioner (husband) and whether the petitioner has condoned the same ? 3. Relief. 14. It is well settled that condonation means forgiveness of all such material offences which are known to or believed by the offended spouse so as to restore, between him/her and the offending spouse, the position which existed prior to the commission of the matrimonial offence, i.e. restoration between them the status quo ante. It is equally well settled that whether or not there has been condonation is a question of fact in every case. 15. Connivance in the cases of adultery is such conduct by one spouse as intentionally or recklessly allowing the adultery on...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","6. The burden of issue No. 1 was placed on the husband as he moved the petition under Section 10 of the Act for dissolution of the marriage on the ground that his wife has, since the solemnization thereof been guilty of adultery. Section 11 enjoins upon a husband-petitioner to make the alleged adulterer a co-respondent to a petition under Section 10 of the Act unless he is excused from doing so on one of the grounds mentioned in the section. Until leave to dispense with the presence of the adulterer as co-respondent is actually obtained, the petition cannot succeed. Relying on Loveden v. Loveden, (1810) 161 ER 648, Pullan, J., in George Arthur Canning Hearsey v. A. M. Hearsey, AIR 1931 Oudh 259, observed that it is a fundamental rule that it is not necessary to prove the direct fact of adultery and that in every case, almost, the fact is inferred from circumstances that lead to it by fair inference as a necessary conclusion, and unless this were the case, and unless this were so held no protection whatever could be given to the marital rights. It was also held that the circumstances must be such as would lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to the conclusion. 7. In Mrs. Agnes Cecillia Gome v....","1. F. B. Civil Misc. Reference (Divorce) No. 120 of 1978 has come up before us exercising jurisdiction over matrimonial causes under Sec, 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (No. IV of 1869) (for short, 'the Act' hereafter) for confirmation of a decree nisi passed by the learned District Judge, Jodhpur dated January 3, 1978. S. B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 32 of 1978 under Sec. 55 of the Act is directed against the aforesaid order of the learned District Judge by which he awarded Rs. 1,000/- as damages to the petitioner-husband by the appellant-non-petitioner No. 2 (alleged adulterer). The reference and the appeal were heard together. As common questions of law and fact are involved, it is convenient to decide them by a common judgment. 2. B. D. Charles is the husband, Smt. Nora Benjamin is his wife and Ravikumar Goswami is the alleged adulterer, who will hereafter be referred to as the 'husband', 'the wife' and 'the adulterer' respectively. In the petition of the husband under Sec. 10 of the Act, the wife and the adulterer were...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/724500/ | AIR1979RAJ156,Adultery,adultery,1979,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: AIR1979RAJ156,724500,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/724500/,11
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"Vinay Kumar vs Smt. Purnima Devi on 15 September, 1972",AIR1973RAJ32,1972-09-15,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 24",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Kan Singh, J.","5. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the learned District Judge had a wide discretion in the matter and he could pass an order on the basis of the affidavits that were before him and it was not necessary for him to record any evidence of the parties. He further submitted that whereas the wife had filed a proper affidavit in support of her application, the affidavit filed by the husband in answer is defective in the extreme as it does not conform to the requirements of Order 19, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code in that the deponent had not disclosed what paragraphs of the affidavit were based on his personal knowledge end what paragraphs were based on his belief; the deponent having said in one breath that the several paragraphs in the affidavit were true to his knowledge find belief. Learned counsel then pointed out that this amount of Rs. 55/- per month covers both maintenance as well as expenses of litigation and in the circumstances is reasonable.","""The various elements prescribed in the section must be enquired into and it is the bounden duty of the Court to record findings after enquiry on each of the elements and then come to the conclusion whether interim maintenance and expenses of the proceeding should be awarded. The learned District Judge failed to exercise his jurisdiction in refusing to go into this question on the ground that a consolidated sum of Rupees 100/- had already been received by the petitioner to defray the expenses. Judicial determination cannot be deferred on other consideration. The order under appeal cannot be upheld"". It is true, the various elements prescribed in the section have to be inquired into, but I am afraid, the mode of inquiry need not always be as in the case of the trial of a regular suit or for that matter regarding the main petition. The mode of inquiry normally...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"5. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the learned District Judge had a wide discretion in the matter and he could pass an order on the basis of the affidavits that were before him and it was not necessary for him to record any evidence of the parties. He further submitted that whereas the wife had filed a proper affidavit in support of her application, the affidavit filed by the husband in answer is defective in the extreme as it does not conform to the requirements of Order 19, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code in that the deponent had not disclosed what paragraphs of the affidavit were based on his personal knowledge end what paragraphs were based on his belief; the deponent having said in one breath that the several paragraphs in the affidavit were true to his knowledge find belief. Learned counsel then pointed out that this amount of Rs. 55/- per month covers both maintenance as well as expenses of litigation and in the circumstances is reasonable.","1. This is a husband's appeal directed against an order of the learned District Judge, Jhunihunu, dated 22-12-1971 awarding pendente lite maintenance to the respondent wife under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, hereinafter to be referred as the ""Act"", during the trial of the application moved by the wife under Section 10 of the Act for judicial separation. 2. Respondent Smt. Purnima Devi had filed the application against the appellant-husband in the court of the learned District Judge under Section 10 of the Act. The respondent also filed the application under Section 24 of the Act on 26-7-1971. She averred in this application that she had no movable or immovable property and had no source of income. As regards the appellant's income she averred that his monthly income was Rs. 400/-. Therefore, she prayed that an amount of Rs. 125/- per month be granted to her as pendente lite maintenance and Rs. 561/- be awarded as litigation expenses. The appellant-husband contested the application. He submitted that his own income was only Rs. 200/- per month and that the respondent wife had been earning rupees 4 to 5 daily on account of tailoring or sewing work. 3. The learned District Judge held that the husband was earning Rupees 282/- per month. The husband had admitted that his pay was...","11. The result is that the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The parlies are, however, left to bear their own costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/157107/ | AIR1973RAJ32, 1972()WLN698",Unclear,unclear,1972,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1973RAJ32, 1972()WLN698",157107,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/157107/,10
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur,"Pankaj Bhatnagar vs Smt. Shanti Devi @ Pappi & Anr on 22 August, 2013",AIR 2014 RAJASTHAN 59,2013-08-22,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 23, Section 24, Section 25, Section 28, Section 3, Section 420, Section 498A",Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 7th of May 1998, the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. M.D. Boob has strenuously argued that the learned Court below has not appreciated the evidence tendered by the rival parties in right perspective and therefore the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. Learned counsel for the appellant would urge that the respondent-husband has miserably failed to prove physical and mental cruelty against the appellant inasmuch as according to learned counsel, no evidence has been tendered on behalf of the respondent to show that conduct of the appellant was of [8] such type that it was not reasonably expected from the respondent to live with her. Mr. Boob has contended that there is no evidence worth the name tendered by the respondent indicating that the treatment accorded to him by the appellant has caused such apprehension in his mind so as to think that cohabitation with the appellant would be harmful or injurious and it is not reasonably possible for the respondent to live with the appellant in such circumstances. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that while deciding issue No.2 against appellant, the learned court below has not properly construed the...","9. Shyam Sunder Kohli V/s. Sushma Kohli @ Satya Devi 2005 (1) CCC 85 (SC) Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent- husband has vociferously defended the impugned judgment and decree and submitted that the learned court below has thrashed out the matter in its right perspective and that being so it has rightly passed the decree for annulment of marriage. Buttressing his submissions with full emphasis, the learned counsel for the respondent would urge that on meaningful consideration of the statement of the respondent and other supporting witnesses, there remains [10] no room of doubt that appellant has failed to discharge her marital obligations and has treated the respondent with cruelty. The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that a cumulative reading of the evidence tendered by the respondent clearly goes to show that appellant has always adopted a stubborn posture and cultivated the habit of leaving matrimonial home from time to time on trifle matters. Learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the appellant never maintained cordial relations with the respondent as well as his family members and despite sincere efforts made by the respondent, she has refused to resume cohabitation and consequently the conclusions arrived...","On the basis of pleadings of the rival parties, the learned trial Court framed following issues for determination: 1. आय व पक द न क 05.12.87 स अक रण प र स अलग जयपर म रह रह ह और उसन प र क! मपतय सबध& स च(त ककय हआ ह। यद ऐस ह त! कय प र व ह व च/ क0 ड2क0 प न क अचधक र ह ? 2. आय य च(क म रण5त तथय& क आध र पर व पक क वय ह र प र क स र क8रत प8ण5 रह ह। यद ऐस ह त! कय प र व ह व च/ क0 ड2क0 प न क अचधक र ह ? 3. रस ? After framing of the issues by the learned trial Court, the rival parties tendered their evidence. On conclusion of the evidence of both the parties, the learned trial Court heard final...","Assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 7th of May 1998, the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. M.D. Boob has strenuously argued that the learned Court below has not appreciated the evidence tendered by the rival parties in right perspective and therefore the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. Learned counsel for the appellant would urge that the respondent-husband has miserably failed to prove physical and mental cruelty against the appellant inasmuch as according to learned counsel, no evidence has been tendered on behalf of the respondent to show that conduct of the appellant was of [8] such type that it was not reasonably expected from the respondent to live with her. Mr. Boob has contended that there is no evidence worth the name tendered by the respondent indicating that the treatment accorded to him by the appellant has caused such apprehension in his mind so as to think that cohabitation with the appellant would be harmful or injurious and it is not reasonably possible for the respondent to live with the appellant in such circumstances. The learned counsel for...","9. Shyam Sunder Kohli V/s. Sushma Kohli @ Satya Devi 2005 (1) CCC 85 (SC) Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent- husband has vociferously defended the impugned judgment and decree and submitted that the learned court below has thrashed out the matter in its right perspective and that being so it has rightly passed the decree for annulment of marriage. Buttressing his submissions with full emphasis, the learned counsel for the respondent would urge that on meaningful consideration of the statement of the respondent and other supporting witnesses, there remains [10] no room of doubt that appellant has failed to discharge her marital obligations and has treated the respondent with cruelty. The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that a cumulative reading of the evidence tendered by the respondent clearly goes to show that appellant has always adopted a stubborn posture and cultivated the habit of leaving matrimonial home from time to time on trifle matters. Learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the appellant never maintained cordial relations with the respondent as well as his family...","[1] IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR JUDGMENT (1) S.B. CIVIL MISC. APPEAL NO.212/2001 Smt. Shanti Devi Vs. Pankaj (2) S.B. CIVIL MISC. APPEAL NO.776/1999 Pankaj Bhatnagar Vs. Smt. Shanti Devi & Anr. Appeals under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act DATE OF JUDGMENT: August 22, 2013 ::P R E S E N T:: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.K. LOHRA Mr. M.D. Boob, for the appellant-wife. Mr. Shatish Sharma, for the respondent-husband. *** Reportable BY THE COURT: These two appeals under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1955') are directed against the judgment and decree dated 7th of May 1998 under Section 13 of the Act of 1955 and order dated 20.08.1999 under Section 25(1) of the Act of 1955 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No.1, Bikaner, involving matrimonial dispute between the rival parties and therefore both are heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. Apposite facts necessary for both these appeals are that appellant-wife and respondent-husband entered into matrimony as per Hindu rites and rituals at Jaipur on 21st of February 1987. As per version of the respondent, soon after marriage, the appellant adopted a defiant posture and refused to carry out her obligations as a wife. Despite altruistic behaviour...",arora/,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/17731280/ | AIR 2014 RAJASTHAN 59, (2014) 3 DMC 700, (2014) 133 ALLINDCAS 3 (RAJ), (2014) 4 CIVILCOURTC 520, (2014) 3 WLC(RAJ) 767, 2014 (133) ALLINDCAS 3 SOC, (2014) 1 RAJ LW 899",Desertion,desertion; cruelty,2013,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 2014 RAJASTHAN 59, (2014) 3 DMC 700, (2014) 133 ALLINDCAS 3 (RAJ), (2014) 4 CIVILCOURTC 520, (2014) 3 WLC(RAJ) 767, 2014 (133) ALLINDCAS 3 SOC, (2014) 1 RAJ LW 899",17731280,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/17731280/,10
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"Chand Narain Gautam vs Smt. Saroj Gautam on 1 November, 1974",AIR1975RAJ88,1974-11-01,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 1, Section 10, Section 18, Section 24, Section 9",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT B.P. Beri, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,In Oldroyd v. Oldroyd ((1896) P. 175)) the test laid down is whether it has become a practical impossibility for the two spouses to live together.,"14. Before we come to examine the facts of this case on the principles aforesaid, we might dispose of the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant is correct that the pleadings in the present case leave much to be desired. It is time that it was recognised that cruelty is a matter specifically within the knowledge of the complaining party and it was, therefore, right that every specie of cruelty in respect of which evidence is proposed to be led should be specifically pleaded. But we cannot equally ignore the principle that muffasil pleadings as a matter of necessity are to be liberally construed. The wife has not pleaded, it is correct, the husband's drunkenness on the first night after their wedding but such a fact was elicited in cross-examination. But even if this fact is ignored for the sake of argument then too, as we shall presently see, there is plenty of material to come to the conclusion to which the learned single Judge had reached. The argument of variance between...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. Captain Chand Narain Gautam, the appellant before us, obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights from the court of the learned District Judge, Jaipur. Smt. Saroj Gautam, the wife of the appellant, appealed to this Court against that decree and the learned single Judge reversed the same, aggrieved by which the husband comes up in an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. 2. It is not disputed that Captain Chand Narain Gautam and Smt. Saroj Gautam, hailing from Brahmin families, were married at Bundi on February 11, 1963. They have no issue from this union. At the time of marriage the husband held a Master's Degree in English Literature while the wife was studying in the final year of the Bachelor of Arts. She also obtained later a Master's degree in Political Science. The husband after marriage obtained a Commission in the Army and the couple came to live at Panjim (Gpa) and Panchmarhi (M. P.) and last resided together at Chaksu near Jaipur. The husband is now employed in the Border Security Force. 3. The husband presented a petition on February 18, 1969 saying that after marriage he encouraged his wife to prosecute her studies and in spite of all his efforts she did not improve her habits and temperament. His grievance is...",9. The remedy of restitution of conjugal rights owes its origin to the Ecclesiastical Courts of the West. Such courts by a decree of restitution of conjugal rights compelled the recalcitrant spouse to discharge the due obligations towards the complaining spouse. For disobedience of such a decree the punishment in the Ecclesiastical Courts was by way of excommunication but by a statute of George III imprisonment was substituted. Later in England the remedy was recognised by the various Matrimonial Causes Acts passed from time to time and we might add that with effect from 1-1-1970 the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is no longer available in England. 18. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/522159/ | AIR1975RAJ88, 1974(7)WLN808",Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,1974,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1975RAJ88, 1974(7)WLN808",522159,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/522159/,12
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"B.D. Charles vs Smt. Nora Benjamin And Anr. on 26 March, 1979",1979WLN217,1979-03-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 17, Section 28, Section 31, Section 34, Section 47, Section 497, Section 55",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT S.K. Mal Lodha, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. Whether bon petitioner No. 1 (wife) has been living in adultery with non-petitioner Np. 2 (adulterer) for more than three years? 2. Whether non-petitioner No. 1 (wife) and non-petitioner No. 2 (adulterer) lived in adultery with the connivance of the petitioner (husband) and whether the petitioner has condoned the same? 3. Relief. 14. It is well settled that condonation, means forgiveness all such material offences which are known to or believed by the offended spouse so as to restore, between him/her & the offending spouse, the position which existed prior to the commission of the matrimonial offence i.e. restoration, between them the status quo ante. It is equally well settled that whether or not there has been condonation is as question of act in every case. 15. Connivance in the cases of adultery is such conduct by one spouse as intentionally or recklessly allowing the adultery on the part...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","6 The burden of issue No. 1 was placed on the husband as he moved the petition under Section 10 of the Act for dissolution of the marriage on the ground that his, wife has, since the solemnisation thereof been guilty of adultery. Section 11 enjoins upon a husband-petitioner to make the alleged adulterer co-respondent to a petition under Section 10 of the Act unless he is excused from doing so on one of the grounds mentioned in the section. Until leave to dispense with the presence of the adulterer as co respondent is actually obtained, the petition cannot succeed. Relying on Loveden v. Loveden 161 ER 648, Pullan, J., in George Arthur Canning 'Hearsey v. Anna Marguarite Hearsey and Anr. AIR 1964 Cal. 28 observed that it is a fundamental rule that it is not necessary to prove the direct fact of adultery and that in every case, almost, the fact is inferred from circumstances that had to it by fair inference as a necessary conclusion, and unless this were the case, and unless this were so held no protection Whatever could be given to the marital lights It was also held that the circumstances most be such as would lead the guarded discretion of, a reasonable and just man to the conclusion. 7. In Mrs. Agnes Cecillia Gome...","1. FB Civil Misc Reference (Divorce) No. 120 of 1978 has come up before us exercising jurisdiction over matrimonial causes under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (No. IV of 1869)(for short, 'the Act' hereafter) for confirmation of a decree nisi passed by the learned District Judge, Jodhpur dated January 3, 1978 SB Civil Misc. Appeal No. 32 of 1978 under Section 55 of the Act is directed against the aforesaid order of the learned District Judge by which he awarded Rs. 1,000/- as damages to the petitioner-husband by the appellant-non-petitioner No. 2 (alleged adulterer). The reference and the appeal were heard together. As common questions of law and fact are involved, it is convenient to decide them by a common judgment. 2. BD Charles is the husband, Smt. Nora Benjamin is his wife and Ravikumar Guswsami is the alleged adulterer, who will hereafter be referred to as 'the husband', 'the wife' and 'the adulterer' respectively. In the petition of the husband under Section 10 of the Act, the wife and the adulterer were impleaded as non-petitioners Nos....",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1625359/ | 1979WLN217,Adultery,adultery,1979,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: 1979WLN217,1625359,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1625359/,11
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"Ajay Pram vs Smt. Abha Pram on 14 March, 2005",RLW2005(3)RAJ2022,2005-03-14,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 14, Section 151, Section 36",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT S.K. Keshote, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material available on the record.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. This appeal under Section 36 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter shall be referred to as 'the Act, 1869') read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is directed against the order, dated 24.8.2004 of the learned Family Court No. 1, Jaipur. Under the impugned order the learned Family Court allowed the application filed by the respondent wife and directed to husband to pay to her Rs. 1000/- per month maintenance allowance; Rs. 1000/- for litigation expenses and Rs. 300/- for expenses towards her appearance in the court for each date to and fro Ajmer-Jaipur with one assistant. 3. During the pendency of the appeal the parties have settled their dispute and agreed to get their marriage dissolved by a decree of divorce by mutual consent; accordingly they filed a joint application under Section 10A of the Act, 1869. The compromise entered into between the parties have been attested by the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) under the directions of the Court. 4. Section 10A of the Act, 1869 makes a provision for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. It provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, a petition for dissolution of marriage may be presented to the District Court by both the parties to the marriage together whether such marriage...","11. In view of this order passed, the appeal and the stay application, filed therewith, also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1134759/ | RLW2005(3)RAJ2022,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2005,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,Equivalent citations: RLW2005(3)RAJ2022,1134759,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1134759/,3
Himachal Pradesh High Court,"Sandeep Malachi Son Of Shri L.D. Malachi ... vs State Of H.P. And Another ... on 22 April, 2015",Sandeep Malachi Son Of Shri L.D. Malachi ... vs State Of H.P. And Another ...,2015-04-22,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 307, Section 34, Section 482, Section 498",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,". IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA Cr.MMO No. 185 of 2014 Order Reserved on 10th April, 2015 Date of Order 22nd April, 2015 ________________________________________________________ Sandeep Malachi son of Shri L.D. Malachi & others ....Petitioners Versus State of H.P. and another ....Non-petitioners ________________________________________________________ Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.S. Rana, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. ______________________________________________________________ For the Petitioners: Mr. Lalit K. Sharma, Advocate. For Non-petitioner No.1: Mr. M.L. Chauhan, Additional Advocate General. for quashing of FIR No.196 of 2006 dated 4.4.2007 registered under Sections 498-A / 34 IPC at P.S. (East) Shimla H.P. with further prayer for quashing the proceedings of criminal case 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. No. 41-2 of 2007 titled State of H.P. vs. Sandeep and others pending disposal before learned CJM Shimla. It is pleaded that .",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","For Non-petitioner No.2: Mr. Naresh Sharma, Advocate. _____________________________________________________________ P.S. Rana, Judge Order Present petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. petitioner No. 1 and non-petitioner No. 2 solemnized their marriage on dated 15.4.2005 at Shimla in accordance with Christian rites. It is pleaded that out of wedlock no issue was born and both parties resided together as husband and wife at Chandigarh upto 21.4.2006 when non-petitioner No. 2 left the matrimonial house and both parties are residing separately from each other after 21.4.2006. It is pleaded that thereafter non-petitioner No. 2 filed complaint against petitioner No.1 and further pleaded that thereafter criminal case under Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC was registered in P.S. (East) Shimla vide FIR No. 196/2006 on dated 4.4.2007. It is pleaded that thereafter challan was filed before learned CJM Shimla and case No. 41-2 of 2007 is pending for disposal. It is further pleaded that thereafter petitioner No.1 and non- petitioner No. 2 settled their differences amicably and both have filed divorce petition under Section 10-A of Indian Divorce Act 1869 as amended up to date for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. It is pleaded that case is pending before learned District Judge UT Chandigarh which was registered as petition 3587/14. It is pleaded that thereafter said petition was transferred to learned ADJ...","April 22,2015 (P.S. Rana) ms. Judge ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:02:14 :::HCHP",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/23445856/,Unclear,unclear,2015,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,23445856,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/23445856/,6
Himachal Pradesh High Court,"Sandeep Daniel vs Mary David on 5 July, 2019",Sandeep Daniel vs Mary David,2019-07-05,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125, Section 2001",Mutual Consent 10A; Conversion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA FAO (HMA) No.2/2019 Decided on: 5.7.2019 . Sandeep Daniel .....Appellant Versus Mary David .....Respondent Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. Whether approved for reporting ?1 No For the appellant: Mr. Dheeraj K. Vashisht, Advocate. For the respondent: Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, Advocate. Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge (oral) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, a petition for dissolution of marriage may be 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the Judgment ?Yes( ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 00:24:51 :::HCHP 2 presented to the District Court by both the parties to a 2 For the reasons stated in the application, the same is marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized allowed andbefore the FAO No. 2/2019 or after is ordered oftothe the commencement be Indian converted to Divorce .",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","CMP No. /2019 By medium of this application, the parties have jointly prayed that the present proceedings be converted to the one under Section 10(A) of the Divorce Act, 1869, which is applicable to the parties and reads as under:­ ""10A Dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. the petition (Amendment) Act, 10(A) under Section 2001, on of the theground thatAct, Divorce they1869. have been The living separately for a period of two years or more, that application stands disposed of. they have not been able to live together and they have FAO (HMA) mutually No. that agreed 2/2019 the marriage should be dissolved."" 3 It is heartening to note that the parties have amicably resolved the dispute before the learned Mediator and the final terms and conditions of the settlement mutually arrived at between the parties are as under:­ 1. That by way of a decree of divorce/annulment of marriage between the parties, their marital status will be severed. For the said purpose the parties will take appropriate legal steps either by converting the petition for divorce filed before the learned court below into a joint petition (if otherwise permissible) or by filing appropriate petition/application before an appropriate court and, if permissible, before the Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the present FAO No. 2 of 2019. Soul and...","3. On payment of aforesaid amount of Rs. 20,00,000/­, the consequential decree for divorce will be passed between the parties. The amount of Rs. 10,00,000/­ into the Bank Account of the minor son will be deposited immediately ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 00:24:51 :::HCHP 4 within a period of 15 days from the date when the Hon'ble Court accepts this settlement between the parties. Also an amount of Rs. 5,00,000/­ within the . same period will be deposited into the account of the respondent. The balance amount of Rs. 5,00,000/­ due to the respondent will be paid and deposited into her account by the appellant within a further period of one month thereafter. 4. That the pending petition before the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court which has been filed by the appellant Sh. Sandeep Daniel herein will be withdrawn and the order of maintenance impugned therein in the said petition will also be got set aside by mutual consent of the parties, in view of the fact that the appellant has already paid towards the maintenance of the minor...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/173661105/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; conversion,2019,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,173661105,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/173661105/,7
Himachal Pradesh High Court,"Smt. Shushila Devi vs Dhani Ram And Anr. on 10 July, 1964",AIR1965HP12,1964-07-10,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 24, Section 28",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Om Parkash, J. 1. This appeal is directed against an order of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge, Bilaspur, awarding maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings, to the appellant.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The appellant had filed a petition, under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), for judicial separation, from respondent No. 1, her husband. She had, also, moved an application, under Section 24 of the Act, for the grant of maintenance pendente lite, and expenses of the proceedings. It was alleged, in the application, that the appellant was poor and had no independent income to support herself and for the necessary expenses of the proceedings and that respondent No. 1 was a rich man and his monthly income was Rs. 500/- The appellant had prayed that she be granted maintenance of Rs. 100/- per mensem, pendente lite, and a sum of Rs. 500/-, as expenses of the proceedings. 3. The application was opposed, on behalf of respondent No. 1. It was denied that the appellant was poor and had no independent income for her support. It was alleged that the appellant was managing the entire property of her father, which consisted of considerable lands etc., and that, in lieu of her services, she was being looked after, by him. Respondent No. 1 denied that his monthly income was Rs. 500/-. He pleaded that he was employed as a compositor, in the Government Printing Press, Simla, and his monthly emoluments were Rs. 175.50 nP. He,...","13. The stay granted, on 8-11-63 is hereby vacated.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/850708/ | AIR1965HP12,Unclear,unclear,1964,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: AIR1965HP12,850708,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/850708/,5
Himachal Pradesh High Court,"Kubja Devi vs Shri Ishwar Dass on 24 November, 2016",Kubja Devi vs Shri Ishwar Dass,2016-11-24,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 13, Section 23, Section 25, Section 40, Section 6, Section 60, Section 61",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. FAO(HMA) No. 138 of 2010. . Date of decision: November 24, 2016. Kubja Devi. ......Appellant. Versus Shri Ishwar Dass. ......Respondent. of Coram rt The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1Yes. For the appellant : Mr. Surinder Saklani, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. R.K. Gautam, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Megha Kapur Gautam, Advocate. Dharam Chand Chaudhary, J. (Oral) Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? yes. 2. The facts are not in controversy. The petitioner was admittedly wife of the respondent. The petitioner-wife had filed . 3. Learned trial Judge has framed the following issues in the petition: . 1. Whether the petitioner is entitled for enhancement of the alimony amount, if so, to what extent? OPR 2. Whether the petition is not maintainable? OPR 3. Whether the petition is...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Appellant, hereinafter referred to as the petitioner, is divorced wife of the respondent. She is aggrieved by the order dated 2.3.2010 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Mandi in an application under Section 25(2) of Hindu Marriage Act registered as HMP No. 30 of 2005 whereby her prayer for enhancement of maintenance allowance/alimony amount from `450/- per month to `6000/- per month has been dismissed. a petition under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act for a decree of judicial separation. The petition was allowed by learned District Judge Mandi, Kullu and Lahaul & Spiti districts at Mandi on 31.1.1983. The respondent-husband has filed an of appeal registered as FAO No. 76 of 1983 in this Court against the judgment and decree passed by learned District Judge, Mandi. rt During the course of proceedings in the appeal before this Court the petitioner and respondent have agreed to dissolve the marriage by a decree of customary divorce. The divorce deed in original has been produced in evidence by the petitioner and marked as Ext.DA. In terms of this document, the parties mutually agreed for payment of `450/- per month towards alimony/maintenance allowance to the petitioner by her husband, the respondent, till her death or she remarried. There is no controversy so as to the payment of `450/- per month by the...","November 24, 2016, (vs) ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:37:04 :::HCHP",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33713263/,Procedural,procedural,2016,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,33713263,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33713263/,18
Himachal Pradesh High Court,"Mt. Padma vs Parma Ram on 6 May, 1959",AIR1959HP37,1959-05-06,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 22, Section 24, Section 28, Section 488, Section 9",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT T. Ramabhadran, J.C.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,"The Court below has not relied upon this incident on the ground that it did not find a place in Mt. Padma's written-statement in case No. 63 of 58. I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that it was not necessary tor Mt. Padma to enumerate in her written-statement details of the evidence to be produced by her later on at the trial. In case No. 74 of 1958, the trial Court has held that the incident of Magh, 2014 (when Mt. Padma was beaten by Parma Ram resulting in injuries to her nose) was condoned by her subsequent conduct in continuing to live with Parma Ram. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that condonation, if any, by Mt. Padma was conditional upon the future good behaviour of Parma Ram and if the offences were repeated, the right to make the condoned offences a ground for divorce would revive. Reliance was placed upon Morena v. Morena, ILR 47 Cal 1068, where a Division Bench of that High Court remarked that: ""Condonation of past matrimonial offences...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. These two appeals can be conveniently disposed of by means of one judgment. Misc. First Appeal 22 of 59 arises out of a petition under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, instituted by Mt. Padma against her husband, Parma Ram, for judicial separation (case No. 74 instituted in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Mandi, exercising powers of a District Court under the above Act on 27-5-1958). Misc. First Appeal No. 23 of 59 arises out of a petition under Section 9 (case No. 63 for restitution of conjugal rights) instituted by Parma Ram against Mt. Padma in the same Court on 28-4-1958. The learned Judge granted Parma Ram's petition, but dismissed that of Mt. Padma, by means of his judgments D/-6-2-1959. Aggrieved by these decisions, Mt. Padma has come up in appeal under Section 28 of the Act in both cases. Mt. Padma was married to Parma Ram some years ago and there is a child of the marriage. The marriage was what is known as an exchange marriage, i. e., while Mt. Padma was married to Parma Ram, Parma Ram's sister, Mt. Vidya was married to Saran, brother of Mt. Padma. Mt. Padma's case was that Mt. Vidya had contracted liaison with Nokhu and declined to live with her husband, Saran. Parma Ram put...",Appeals allowed.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/287442/ | AIR1959HP37,Cruelty,cruelty,1959,judicial_separation,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: AIR1959HP37,287442,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/287442/,7
Himachal Pradesh High Court,"Sunil Dutt Sharma vs Sangeeta Sharma on 18 August, 2015",Sunil Dutt Sharma vs Sangeeta Sharma,2015-08-18,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 3, Section 406",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA FAO(HMA) No. 415/2007 Reserved on: 17.8.2015 Decided on. 18.8.2015 . _________________________________________________________________ Sunil Dutt Sharma ..Appellant Versus Sangeeta Sharma ..........Respondent _________________________________________________________________ Coram: of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 yes. For the Appellant rt : Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Vinay Thakur, Advocate. _________________________________________________________________ Rajiv Sharma, Judge: This appeal has been instituted against Judgment dated 11.7.2007 rendered by learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Kangra at Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh in HMP No. 18-P/04/01. 2. ""Key facts"" necessary for the adjudication of the present appeal are marriage between the parties was solemnised on 19.10.1994 at Amritsar, Punjab. Parties lived together at Dharamshala and Thakurdwara District Kangra after marriage. A daughter was born on 11.6.1996. Parties lived happily at Dharamshala till 24.12.1996 lastly at Thakurdwara at Kangra. Whether the reporters of the local papers may...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Respondent filed a complaint dated 30.8.1997 to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Kangra at Dharamshala. Complaint was also referred to Chief General Manager, State Bank of Patiala. She also filed a false complaint against him, his parents and his sisters under Section 406 , 498A IPC in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar. Matter was got transferred from Amritsar to Gurdaspur. Summoning orders of few of accused were also quashed by Punjab & Haryana High Court. Appellant was maligned by the respondent. Police used to call him to the police ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:46:19 :::HCHP 3 station. Respondent was transferred to Government High School Aund, Tehsil Nurpur in 1998. He remained under Depression. Respondent has deserted the appellant for more than 2 years . before filing the petition without reasonable cause. Petition was contested by the respondent. According to the averments made in the reply, appellant has earlier filed a petition for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act on 18.3.1998. It was decided of on 11.12.2000. It was specifically averred that neither respondent nor her parents were desirous of the appellant getting himself transferred to Amritsar. The appellant has never come to the rt respondent's house at Amritsar on 5.1.1997. She never refused to accompany him. It is also denied that appellant visited the...","Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. No costs. (Rajiv Sharma) Judge August 18, 2015 (vikrant) ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:46:19 :::HCHP",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/130847643/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2015,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,130847643,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/130847643/,24
Himachal Pradesh High Court,"Prabhat Singh vs Maya Devi on 6 August, 2015",Prabhat Singh vs Maya Devi,2015-08-06,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125, Section 13, Section 3, Section 498",Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"4. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and . also gone through the judgment carefully. 5. Marriage was solemnised between the parties in November, 1988. Appellant has led evidence by filing affidavit Ext. PW-1/A He retired from Indian Army in the year 2006. He has of never kept respondent with him during his entire service period. He used to come to his house for 15-20 days in a year. Son was born after five years of marriage. He used to send his salary to his rt mother. He has denied the suggestion that his mother and two brothers used to beat the respondent. He had gone to bring his wife home in 1998, 2002 and 2005 with Pradhan Khyali Ram and Ward Member Murli Ram. However, respondent did not come back. 6. PW-2 Ashok Kumar deposed that respondent used to leave his house without any reason and demanded his entire salary. However, he did not know in which year, respondent has gone to her parental house and when appellant has gone to bring her back. 7. PW-3 Kushal Kumar deposed that respondent used to leave her matrimonial house when appellant used to come home. She used to...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA FAO(HMA) No. 263/2015 Reserved on: 5.8.2015 Decided on. 6.8.2015 . _________________________________________________________________ Prabhat Singh ..Appellant Versus Maya Devi ..........Respondent _________________________________________________________________ Coram: of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 No. For the Appellant rt : Mr. Nimish Gupta, Advocate. For the Respondent : Nemo _________________________________________________________________ Rajiv Sharma, Judge: This appeal has been instituted against Judgment dated 8.5.2015 rendered by learned Additional District Judge, Chamba, District Chamba, Himachal Pradesh in HMA No. 32/12/11. which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical the court will have no problem to determine it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental the problem presents difficulty. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment. Second, the impact of such treatment in the mind...","4. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and . also gone through the judgment carefully. 5. Marriage was solemnised between the parties in November, 1988. Appellant has led evidence by filing affidavit Ext. PW-1/A He retired from Indian Army in the year 2006. He has of never kept respondent with him during his entire service period. He used to come to his house for 15-20 days in a year. Son was born after five years of marriage. He used to send his salary to his rt mother. He has denied the suggestion that his mother and two brothers used to beat the respondent. He had gone to bring his wife home in 1998, 2002 and 2005 with Pradhan Khyali Ram and Ward Member Murli Ram. However, respondent did not come back. 6. PW-2 Ashok Kumar deposed that respondent used to leave his house without any reason and demanded his entire salary. However, he did not know in which year, respondent has gone to her parental house and when appellant has gone to bring her back. 7. PW-3...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. ""Key facts"" necessary for the adjudication of the present appeal are that appellant has instituted a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act against the respondent for dissolution of marriage. Marriage between the parties was solemnised in the month of November, 1988 according to the Hindu rites and customs. A male child Ishwar Dass was borne in 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? No. ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:42:47 :::HCHP 2 the year 1994. Initially behaviour of the respondent was cordial with the appellant for abut 4-5 years. Thereafter, her behaviour changed towards the appellant and his family members. Appellant . was working in Indian Army. When he used to come to his house, then respondent used to leave the house without any reason. Respondent is a hot tampered lady and never looked after the parents of appellant. Respondent demanded the entire salary of of the appellant. Respondent always wanted to have a separate accommodation. Respondent left the house of the appellant in the month of April 2001. She also lodged false complaint against rt appellant and two brothers in April, 2001 under Section 498 and 323 IPC. Appellant and his family members were acquitted by JMIC Dalhausie vide judgment dated 21.2.2011. She filed an application under...","No costs. (Rajiv Sharma) Judge August 6, 2015 (vikrant) ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:42:47 :::HCHP",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/182881949/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty,2015,judicial_separation,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,182881949,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/182881949/,14
Himachal Pradesh High Court,"Chanchal Rana vs Vibha Tanu Shree Pathania on 24 May, 2024",Chanchal Rana vs Vibha Tanu Shree Pathania,2024-05-24,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 106, Section 128, Section 165, Section 20, Section 24, Section 28, Section 340, Section 5, Section 6, Section 9",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No. 463 of 2023 Reserved on: 08.05.2024 Decided on: 24.05.2024 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . Chanchal Rana ......Petitioner Versus Vibha Tanu Shree Pathania .......Respondent -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Satyen Vaidya, Judge Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Petitioner : Mr. Kuldeep Singh Chandel and Mr. Kamaljeet Sharma, Advocates. For the Respondent : Mr. Mohit Jaitak, Advocate. 2. Petitioner has filed a petition for dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce against respondent, which is pending adjudication before learned Additional Principal 1 Whether reporters of print and electronic media may be allowed to see the order?","Judge-II, Family Court, Una. It is alleged by the petitioner that his marriage with respondent, that had taken place on 16.01.2020, could not be consummated and the respondent . has been alleged to be responsible therefor. As averred in the petition for divorce, the petitioner had submitted an application dated 2.11.2020 to Secretary, DLSA, Una for counselling of the parties and respondent in particular but on the same day, respondent had left the matrimonial home parents. r to forever and since then has been residing in the house of her","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Satyen Vaidya, Judge The petitioner has invoked supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against order dated 02.08.2023 passed by learned Additional Principal Judge-II, Family Court, Una, District Una, H.P. in case No. 205/2023 whereby the application of respondent under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act has been granted. 3. During the pendency of petition for divorce, respondent filed an application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act for grant of maintenance pendente lite and litigation charges. Petitioner contested the application, however, the Family Court granted the application vide impugned order dated 02.08.2023 and directed the petitioner to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs.10,000/- per month from the date of filing of petition and also to pay Rs.25,000/- towards litigation charges. 4. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order dated 02.08.2023, the petitioner has filed the instant petition ::: Downloaded on - 24/05/2024 20:36:29 :::CIS 3 primarily on the ground that the respondent is employed in a bank and she is earning almost the same amount as petitioner, who also is an employee of the bank. It has also . been contended that the petitioner was always willing to maintain cordial relations with the respondent, but he was forced to seek decree of divorce on account of serious lapses of respondent in...","(Satyen Vaidya) 24th May, 2024 Judge (GR) ::: Downloaded on - 24/05/2024 20:36:29 :::CIS",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114911119/,Unclear,unclear,2024,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,114911119,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114911119/,7
Himachal Pradesh High Court,"Mahender Baroor vs Reena Kumari Alias Bhawna on 31 March, 2015",Mahender Baroor vs Reena Kumari Alias Bhawna,2015-03-31,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 12, Section 125, Section 13, Section 3, Section 34, Section 9",Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. FAO No. 327 of 2014. Decided on: 31.03.2015. .",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"Mahender Baroor ......Appellant. Versus Reena Kumari alias Bhawna .......Respondent. Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the appellant: Mr. J.R.Poswal Advocate. For the respondent: Mr. Sanjay Kumar Sharma, Advocate. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Justice Rajiv Sharma, J (oral). This FAO is directed against the judgment dated 14.5.2014, passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Ghumarwin, Distt. Bilaspur, H.P. in HMA No. 18/3 of 2008. the English law those essential conditions must continue throughout the course of the three years immediately preceding the institution of the suit for divorce, under the Act, the period is four years without specifying that it should immediately precede the commencement of proceedings for divorce. Whether the omission of the last clause has any ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 17:55:37 :::HCHP 7 practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case. Desertion is a...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. Key facts, necessary for the adjudication of this appeal are that the appellant-petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) has instituted a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, against the respondent. The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 27.2.2004 according to Hindu rites and customs. A son and daughter were born out of the wed lock. According to the averments contained in the petition, the respondent had been using abusive and filthy language and thereby created unhealthy atmosphere at home. She also threatened the petitioner and his family members with dire consequences. The appellant's father had allotted them a separate house, however, the respondent never used to clean the house. She had been leaving the matrimonial house without any information. False complaints were filed by the respondent against the appellant and his family members. 3. The petition was contested by the respondent. She denied the averments made in the petition. She has never threatened the appellant . with dire consequences; rather she was ill-treated by the appellant and his parents. She has never demanded separate house. She was turned out of the matrimonial home in September, 2008. She was neither provided proper food nor clothing. The petition for restitution of conjugal rights was filed by her before the learned District Judge, Hamirpur. 4. The...","March 31, 2015, ( Rajiv Sharma ), (karan) Judge. ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 17:55:37 :::HCHP",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3277500/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty,2015,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,3277500,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3277500/,9
Himachal Pradesh High Court,"______________________________________________________ vs Sneh Lata on 19 August, 2015",______________________________________________________ vs Sneh Lata,2015-08-19,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125, Section 13, Section 3",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. . Decided on: 19.8.2015 ______________________________________________________ Yashwant Singh Chauhan. ...Appellant. Versus Sneh Lata. ...Respondent. ______________________________________________________________ of Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"rt Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Appellant : Mr. Anuj Gupta, Advocate. For the Respondent : Nemo. ____________________________________________________________ Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge (oral). This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 16.5.2015 rendered by the Additional District Judge- Shimla in Case No.12-R/3 of 2010. elements in the two spouses respectively. Here a difference between the English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay Legislature may be pointed out. Whereas under the English law those essential conditions must continue throughout the course of the three years immediately preceding the institution of the suit for divorce, under the Act, the period is four years without specifying that it should immediately precede the commencement of proceedings for divorce. Whether the omission of the of last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case. Desertion is...","5. Mr. Anuj Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that his client has been subjected to cruelty by the respondent. Respondent has deserted the of appellant without any reasonable cause. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant 7. rt and have gone through the judgment carefully. Appellant has appeared as PW-1. According to him, he was treated by the respondent with cruelty. She used to abuse him with intention to humiliate him. She used to leave the house without permission. Respondent has left his company without any reason and cause. 8. PW-2 Roshan Singh has shown ignorance to the specific case of respondent that the appellant has contracted second marriage with Yashoda Devi. PW-4 Gulab Singh has also shown ignorance regarding second wife of the appellant having two children. PW-5 Mehar Sain has also shown ignorance regarding contracting second marriage by the appellant. However, fact of the matter is that these witnesses ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:46:35 :::HCHP 4 have not denied the case of respondent that appellant has contracted second marriage specifically....","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. ""Key facts"" necessary for the adjudication of this appeal are that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 5.5.1995 according to Hindu ritual, rites and custom prevalent in the area. Appellant has filed petition under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce. According to the 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:46:35 :::HCHP 2 appellant, conduct of the respondent always remained arrogant, cruel and quarrelsome. Respondent without any . reasonable cause withdrew from the society of the appellant. She has also filed petition for maintenance. There is no possibility of conciliation between the parties. Respondent has subjected him to cruelty. of 3. Petition was contested by the respondent. The averments made in the petition were denied. According to rt the respondent, a sum of Rs. 25,000/-, which was given to her at the time of marriage was also utilized by the appellant. Appellant has contracted second marriage with another lady, namely, Smt. Yashodha. She has given birth to two children. She has filed a petition under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the appellant seeking maintenance. It was allowed by the Court. The appellant was Government servant. He was drawing more than...",19.8.2015 *awasthi* ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:46:36 :::HCHP,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/21201721/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2015,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,21201721,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/21201721/,12
Himachal Pradesh High Court,"Ajay Kumar vs Anita Devi on 6 August, 2015",Ajay Kumar vs Anita Devi,2015-08-06,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 3",Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA FAO(HMA) No. 61/2008 Reserved on: 5.8.2015 Decided on. 6.8.2015 . _________________________________________________________________ Ajay Kumar ..Appellant Versus Anita Devi ..........Respondent _________________________________________________________________ Coram: of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1Yes. For the Appellant rt : Mr. Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate with Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocate. For the Respondent : None _________________________________________________________________ Rajiv Sharma, Judge: This appeal has been instituted against Judgment dated 29.10.2007 rendered by learned Additional District Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan in HMA Petition No. 6-N/3 of 2003. 20. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and its categories can never be closed. Whether the husband is cruel to his wife or the wife is cruel to her husband has to be ascertained and judged by taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the given case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Cruelty in...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. ""Key facts"" necessary for the adjudication of the present appeal are that appellant has filed a divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, for dissolution of marriage. Marriage was solemnised between the parties in the year 1985 at Naha as per Hindu rites and customs. Relations between the parties remained cordial till October, 1988. However, after 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.. October, 1988, respondent subject him with cruelty. In December, 1988, appellant started living separately from the parents. In the year 1990, respondent left the house of the appellant. Thereafter, . respondent left the house of the appellant on 8.2.2001 without his consent. Respondent deserted the appellant for a continuous period of about more than two years without any reason and cause. Petition was contested by the respondent factum of of marriage is admitted. According to the respondent, appellant wanted to get rid of her. She was not able to conceive a child and hence, appellant intended to solemnise second marriage. She used rt to look after the parents of the appellant. Appellant used to misbehave with her being habitual drunkard. He used to give her beatings. She was ready and willing to join the company of the appellant but appellant was not allowing her...","Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. No costs. (Rajiv Sharma) Judge August 6, 2015 (vikrant) ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:42:46 :::HCHP",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/166159972/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty,2015,judicial_separation,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,166159972,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/166159972/,13
Jharkhand High Court,"Abhishek Kerketta vs Shobha Kujur on 14 July, 2026",Abhishek Kerketta vs Shobha Kujur,2026-07-14,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 19, Section 2, Section 3, Section 32, Section 621",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2026:JHHC:20890-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI F.A. No.184 of 2025 ------ Abhishek Kerketta, aged about 44 years, son of Late Eliyas Kerketta, permanent residing at Bajra Kumba Toli, Near ITI Bus Stand, PO Hehal, PS Sukhdeonagar, District-Ranchi, presently residing at Gorabari, PO Jagadalla, PS-Bankura, Distt. Bankura, West Bengal. ... ... Appellant Versus Shobha Kujur, aged about 43 years, wife of Mr. Abhishek Kerketta, daughter of Mr. Vincent Kujur, R/o Pathalkudwa Church Lane, PS - Lower Bazar, PO-GPO, District-Ranchi. ... ... Respondent PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA ..... For the Appellant : Mr. Arbind Kumar, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Ashok Kumar Jha, Advocate. ..... C.A.V. on 22.06.2026 Pronounced on 14/07/2026 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer:","54. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, defending the impugned order, has submitted that appellant and respondent are legally married couple and she has filed a suit for restitution of conjugal right but the appellant does not want to keep her and has deserted her without any rhyme and reason. 55. It has further been submitted that the respondent is still ready to reside with the appellant-petitioner and the allegation levelled against her by the appellant-husband are false and fabricated as she never subjected him with cruelty rather it is the appellant-husband who has deserted her. 56. It has been submitted that still she wants to live with appellant and prayed to dismiss the suit filed by appellant. 57. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife on the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the impugned judgment requires no interference by this Court. Analysis 58. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant- husband as also learned counsel for the respondent-wife and 16 perused the material available on record and the finding recorded in the impugned order. 59. This Court, before looking into the legality and propriety of the impugned order, requires to refer the testimonies of the witnesses, as available on record....","I. Whether the suit as framed is maintainable? II. Whether the appellant has valid cause of action for the suit? III. Whether the respondent wife has treated the appellant husband with cruelty? IV. Whether the respondent wife has deserted the appellant husband since 24.10.2015? V. Whether the appellant husband is taking advantage of his own wrong? VI. Whether the appellant is entitled to get the decree of divorce? VII. Whether the appellant is entitled to get any other relief or reliefs? 41. The aforesaid issues were decided against the appellant-husband and in favour of respondent-wife and the suit was dismissed on contest. 42. The appellant-husband, being aggrieved with the judgment passed on 03.07.2025 and decree signed on 14.07.2025 by learned Additional Principal Judge, 13 Additional Family Court-I, Ranchi approached this Court by filing the instant appeal. Submission made on behalf of the appellant-husband 43. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband...","63. Since the learned counsel for the appellant has raised the issue of perversity by contending that the findings recorded by the learned Family Court while answering issue no. (iii) i.e. issue of cruelty are perverse, therefore, before addressing the aforesaid seminal issue it would be apt to discuss herein the appropriate meaning of word ""perverse"". 64. This Court while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant on the issue of perversity needs to 36 refer herein the interpretation of the word ""perverse"" as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. 65. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr. , (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice...","54. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, defending the impugned order, has submitted that appellant and respondent are legally married couple and she has filed a suit for restitution of conjugal right but the appellant does not want to keep her and has deserted her without any rhyme and reason. 55. It has further been submitted that the respondent is still ready to reside with the appellant-petitioner and the allegation levelled against her by the appellant-husband are false and fabricated as she never subjected him with cruelty rather it is the appellant-husband who has deserted her. 56. It has been submitted that still she wants to live with appellant and prayed to dismiss the suit filed by appellant. 57. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife on the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the impugned judgment requires no interference by this Court. Analysis 58. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant- husband as also learned counsel for the respondent-wife and 16 perused the material available on record and the finding recorded in the impugned order. 59. This Court, before looking into...","1. The instant appeal has been filed under section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 for challenging the legality and propriety of impugned judgment passed on 03.07.2025 and decree signed on 14.07.2025 by learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court-I, Ranchi whereby and whereunder the Original Suit No. 246 of 2022 filed by the appellant-husband under Section 10(ix) and (x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 for a decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion and cruelty, has been dismissed. Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case as narrated before the trial court by the appellant/petitioner husband is that the appellant-husband and respondent-wife are by caste Oraon, by faith Christian and their marriage was solemnized on 19.10.2015 according to Christian rites and rituals at N.W. GEL Church, Main Road, Ranchi and after marriage respondent-wife was brought to her matrimonial home at village Bajra, Kumbatoli, P.S. Sukhdeo Nagar, District Ranchi where the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife lived together as husband and wife only for a few days and the marriage has been consummated but after completion of the customaries, the respondent- wife, against the consent of her husband, went to her workplace at Chhattisgarh. 3. It has been stated that during the stay of respondent-wife in the house of appellant-husband, she caused a lot of intolerable...","(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) Date : 14/07/2026 Birendra / A.F.R. Uploaded on 15/07/2026 59",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/185961565/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,185961565,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/185961565/,16
Jharkhand High Court,"Junul Topno vs Phibi Franciska Kongari Daughter Of ... on 5 January, 2026",Junul Topno vs Phibi Franciska Kongari Daughter Of ...,2026-01-05,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14, Section 19, Section 5",Desertion; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2026:JHHC:19-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI First Appeal No. 172 of 2025 With I.A No.12917 of 2025 Junul Topno, aged about 66 years, son of Late Ashiyan Topno, resident of village-Maindan Toli Khunti, P.O & P.S-Khunti, District-Khunti (Jharkhand) .........Plaintiff/ Petitioner/Appellant Versus Phibi Franciska Kongari daughter of Late Mangaldan Kongari, resident of Village-Ukauli, PO-Bano, PS-Bano, District-Gumla, at present residing at Village-Serendih, Chaibasa Road, Khunti, P.O & PS-Khunti, District- Khunti .... ..... Defendant/Respondent/Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR ------- For the Appellant : Mr. Pankaj Kumar Dubey, Advocate For the Respondent : ............... Order No.03/Dated:5th January, 2026 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [ Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P. , 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the Legal Department. 3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department as it appears...","4. In the divorce suit, the respondent-wife had appeared and filed her written statement denying all the allegations levelled against her by her husband. The factum of marriage has been admitted but it is denied that she had withdrawn herself from the life of the petitioner and deserted him. It has been alleged that the petitioner did not like company of the wife and he used to continuously give her ill-treatment. The petitioner always misbehaved with her but she ignored the same hoping that the matter would be resolved in future. It is alleged that the petitioner used to misbehave with his son, namely, Anup Topno and never paid any expenses to his son. It has been alleged that the petitioner always quarreled with her as he kept another lady, namely, Manju Tirkey with him and due to that reason dispute arose between them. The petitioner is leading an adulterous life with the said Manju Tirkey and his behaviour 3 2026:JHHC:19-DB with the respondent was very inhuman. On the aforesaid ground, she has prayed that the suit for divorce may...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The instant appeal under section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment dated 17.12.2024 and the decree dated 04.01.2025 passed in Matrimonial Case No.09 of 2023 by the learned Principal District Judge, Khunti whereby and whereunder the petition filed under sections 10(1) , (i) and 10(1) (ix) of Divorce Act, 1869 by the appellant-husband against the respondent-wife has been dismissed on contest. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the plaint having been recorded by the learned Principal District Judge, needs to be referred herein reads under as: 2026:JHHC:19-DB (i) The case of the petitioner as per plaint in brief is that the marriage of the petitioner was solemnized with the respondent on 18.07.1985 as per Christian rites and rituals at G.E.L. Church Beralonger, P.S-Bano, District-Gumla under G.E.L. Church Lotakel Paris. (ii) It is further stated that after solemnization of marriage both the parties started peaceful conjugal life with each other at the house of the petitioner at village- Maidan Toli, Khunti for about one and half years. (iii) It is further case of the petitioner that after some time difference arose between the spouse. The petitioner with his moral obligation always tried to maintain happy conjugal life with the opposite party with hope that gradually everything will...","(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Rajesh Kumar, J.) Sudhir Dated:05.01.2025 Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi AFR 20",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161958801/,Desertion,desertion; adultery,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,161958801,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161958801/,17
Jharkhand High Court,"Junul Topno vs Phibi Franciska Kongari Daughter Of ... on 5 January, 2026",Junul Topno vs Phibi Franciska Kongari Daughter Of ...,2026-01-05,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14, Section 19, Section 5",Desertion; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2026:JHHC:19-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI First Appeal No. 172 of 2025 With I.A No.12917 of 2025 Junul Topno, aged about 66 years, son of Late Ashiyan Topno, resident of village-Maindan Toli Khunti, P.O & P.S-Khunti, District-Khunti (Jharkhand) .........Plaintiff/ Petitioner/Appellant Versus Phibi Franciska Kongari daughter of Late Mangaldan Kongari, resident of Village-Ukauli, PO-Bano, PS-Bano, District-Gumla, at present residing at Village-Serendih, Chaibasa Road, Khunti, P.O & PS-Khunti, District- Khunti .... ..... Defendant/Respondent/Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR ------- For the Appellant : Mr. Pankaj Kumar Dubey, Advocate For the Respondent : ............... Order No.03/Dated:5th January, 2026 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [ Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P. , 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the Legal Department. 3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department as it appears...","4. In the divorce suit, the respondent-wife had appeared and filed her written statement denying all the allegations levelled against her by her husband. The factum of marriage has been admitted but it is denied that she had withdrawn herself from the life of the petitioner and deserted him. It has been alleged that the petitioner did not like company of the wife and he used to continuously give her ill-treatment. The petitioner always misbehaved with her but she ignored the same hoping that the matter would be resolved in future. It is alleged that the petitioner used to misbehave with his son, namely, Anup Topno and never paid any expenses to his son. It has been alleged that the petitioner always quarreled with her as he kept another lady, namely, Manju Tirkey with him and due to that reason dispute arose between them. The petitioner is leading an adulterous life with the said Manju Tirkey and his behaviour 3 2026:JHHC:19-DB with the respondent was very inhuman. On the aforesaid ground, she has prayed that the suit for divorce may...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The instant appeal under section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment dated 17.12.2024 and the decree dated 04.01.2025 passed in Matrimonial Case No.09 of 2023 by the learned Principal District Judge, Khunti whereby and whereunder the petition filed under sections 10(1) , (i) and 10(1) (ix) of Divorce Act, 1869 by the appellant-husband against the respondent-wife has been dismissed on contest. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the plaint having been recorded by the learned Principal District Judge, needs to be referred herein reads under as: 2026:JHHC:19-DB (i) The case of the petitioner as per plaint in brief is that the marriage of the petitioner was solemnized with the respondent on 18.07.1985 as per Christian rites and rituals at G.E.L. Church Beralonger, P.S-Bano, District-Gumla under G.E.L. Church Lotakel Paris. (ii) It is further stated that after solemnization of marriage both the parties started peaceful conjugal life with each other at the house of the petitioner at village- Maidan Toli, Khunti for about one and half years. (iii) It is further case of the petitioner that after some time difference arose between the spouse. The petitioner with his moral obligation always tried to maintain happy conjugal life with the opposite party with hope that gradually everything will...","(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Rajesh Kumar, J.) Sudhir Dated:05.01.2025 Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi AFR 20",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80182007/,Desertion,desertion; adultery,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,80182007,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80182007/,17
Jharkhand High Court,"Sangeeta Kujur vs Vijay Kujur Son Of Fedrick Kujur on 1 November, 2022",Sangeeta Kujur vs Vijay Kujur Son Of Fedrick Kujur,2022-11-01,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 3",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction) FA No. 409 of 2018 ----- Sangeeta Kujur, wife of Mr. Vijay Kujur, daughter of Flora Lakra, resident of Tiril Road, Kokar, Bariatu, PO & PS Bariatu, District Ranchi at present residing at Office of French Embassy, 68-Sundar Nagar, PS Nizamuddin PO Zorbagh, New Delhi-110003. ... .... Appellant Versus Vijay Kujur son of Fedrick Kujur, resident of village Kokar, Tiril, PO & PS Bariatu, District-Ranchi ... .... Respondent ------- CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RATNAKER BHENGRA ------ For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Satish Kumar Keshri, Advocate Mr.Neel Kamal, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Shyam Narsaria, Advocate ------ ORDER 1st November 2022 Per, Shree Chandrashekhar,J. We have examined the additional documents sought to be produced by the appellant as additional documents. However, keeping in mind the principles under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure , we do not find it necessary to take these documents on record as additional documents because these documents are completely unrelated to the issue arising in this case and are not necessary to pronounce judgment in the present case. 2. IA No. 9845 of 2022...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""10. Grounds for dissolution of marriage.--(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent-- ............................................................................................ (x) has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent.""","6. Mr. Satish Kumar Keshri, the learned counsel for the appellant has urged that in her evidence the appellant referred to the divorce petition and while so the allegations made by her in the petition for divorce can be read into the evidence. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the complaint filed by the appellant a copy of which was marked as Ext-X (for identification), if read in the background of the allegations made by the appellant in the divorce suit, would amount to mental cruelty as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 3 FA No. 409 of 2018 "" Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh "" (2007) 4 SCC 511. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on the following judgments: 10. In "" Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh "" (2007) 4 SCC 511, on which the learned counsel for the appellant has placed heavy reliance, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: ""101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. Sangeeta Kujur filed a petition under section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 seeking dissolution of her marriage solemnized with Vijay Kujur on 22nd April 2007. This petition was registered as Original Suit No. 473 of 2016 (in short, ""divorce suit"") which has been dismissed on contest by the judgment dated 30th July 2018. 4. This First Appeal has been preferred by the wife on the ground that the Family Court has misconstrued meaning of the expression 'cruelty' as envisaged under section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869, inasmuch as, false accusations on her character by the respondent would amount to mental cruelty which shall be a ground for divorce. 5. For examining the aforesaid plea, it is necessary to have a glance 2 FA No. 409 of 2018 through discussions by the Family Court in the divorce suit, which are as follows: ""9. From the fact mentioned in the present suit, it appears that petitioner Sangeeta Kujur is presently residing at Delhi. According to case of petitioner marriage between the parties was solemnized on 22.04.2007 as per Christian (Catholic) rituals at Kokar Ranchi. In the petition allegation about the alleged cruelty and bad habits of respondent is made but in the evidence of petitioner herself (the only witness examined on her behalf), these allegations and facts stated in...","25. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment dated 30th July 2018 passed in Original Suit No. 473 of 2016 and, accordingly, this First Appeal is dismissed. (Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) (Ratnaker Bhengra, J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated: 1st November, 2022 SB/Nibha-AFR",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/83534216/,Cruelty,cruelty,2022,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,83534216,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/83534216/,9
Jharkhand High Court,"Sobha Minz vs Ajay Lakra on 4 October, 2023",Sobha Minz vs Ajay Lakra,2023-10-04,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14",Mutual Consent 10A; Desertion; Cruelty; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"First Appeal No. 07 of 2020 ........... [Against the judgment dated 27.08.2019 and decree dated 04.09.2019 passed by Shri Sandeep Srivastava, learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Gumla in Original Suit No. 28 of 2016] ........... Sobha Minz ... ... Appellant Versus Ajay Lakra ... ... Respondent ........... PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN ........... For the Appellant : Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel, Advocate For the Respondent : None ........... C.A.V. on 24.08.2023 Pronounced on 04.10.2023 Per Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J. Heard Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. None appears on behalf of the respondent.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,6. Based on the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed for adjudication: (I) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form ? (II) Whether the petitioner has got valid cause of action for this suit ? (VI) Whether the petitioner is entitled for reliefs as prayed for ? 7. The petitioner has examined three witnesses in support of his case. 8. P.W.1 (Ajay Lakra) is the petitioner himself who has stated about his marriage having been solemnized with Sobha Minz on 06.05.2014 at Aamgaon Church. He has posted in the Railways as a Loco Pilot Driver while his wife works in Punjab National Bank. After the marriage from 17.05.2015 disputes started between both the sides and the respondent no. 1 did not want to lead a conjugal life with him as the respondent no. 1 was having an illicit relationship with respondent no. 2. He has...,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","(III) Whether the O.P. has illegal relations with co-respondent and co-respondent has committed adultery with the wife of petitioner is true ? (IV) Whether the respondent does not want to lead the conjugal life with the petitioner is true ? (V) Whether the petitioner is entitled for a decree of divorce under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 ? 10. P.W.3 (Bhaula Oraon) had presided over the Panchayati which was held in village Silam for resolving the dispute between the petitioner and the respondent. The respondent had disclosed before him and the other members of the Panchayati that she will not stay with the petitioner. He has produced the document prepared in the Panchayat and which also bears the seal of the Panchayat which has been marked as Exhibit-1. He has proved the signatures of the petitioner and the respondent which have been marked as Exhibit-2 and 2/1 respectively. In cross-examination, he has deposed that the meeting of the Panchayat was held on 31.05.2015 and since he was the village Pradhan he was asked to preside over the meeting. In the meeting both the sides had placed their cases but the same was not taken down in writing. The fact that the respondent no. 1 does not want to stay with the petitioner does not find place in...","2. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 27.08.2019 and decree dated 04.09.2019 passed by Shri Sandeep Srivastava, learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Gumla in Original Suit No. 28 of 2016, whereby and whereunder the suit preferred by the petitioner (respondent herein) for dissolution of marriage u/s 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 has been allowed and the marriage between the appellant and the respondent has been dissolved. 3. For the sake of convenience both the parties are referred to in this judgment as per their status in the learned court below. 4. The petitioner (respondent herein) had filed a suit against the respondent (appellant herein) u/s 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 wherein it has been stated that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 06.05.2014 at Aamgaon Church as per Christian religion and customs. The petitioner is an employee in the Railways and he was posted at Rourkela while the respondent is an employee in a Bank and posted at Bihar Sharif. The marital dispute started on -2- 17.05.2015 as the...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/99646487/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; desertion; cruelty; adultery,2023,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,99646487,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/99646487/,9
Jharkhand High Court,"Salon Lomga vs Hanna Lomga on 15 March, 2023",Salon Lomga vs Hanna Lomga,2023-03-15,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI First Appeal No. 247 of 2018 Salon Lomga --- --- Appellant Versus Hanna Lomga --- --- Respondent ---,"5. Learned counsel for the respondent has contested the plea. She however submits that the only reason for the respondent not to appear and -3- contest the matrimonial suit was lack of awareness and enough resources to defend the suit for dissolution of marriage instituted by her husband. However, on being asked she has conveyed her intention to continue with the marriage and live with the appellant. It is submitted that efforts for amicable settlement of the matrimonial dispute through mediation have failed twice because the appellant is not interested in keeping her. The grounds of desertion or mental cruelty made out by the appellant, are not made out by any cogent piece of evidence. The appellant has never properly taken care of the respondent who lives in penury and has no regular sources of income to maintain. She had to abandon nursing course because of lack of finance and presently is engaged on temporary basis from time to time as an Aaya to the nursing assistant. She is spending her life in misery and penury. Therefore, the marriage may not be dissolved. However, learned counsel for the respondent has not disputed the contention of the appellant that neither has...",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,"CORAM: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aparesh Kumar Singh Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Roshan --- For the Appellant : Mr. Yogendra Prasad, Advocate Mr. Nitin Nitesh Bhengra, Advocate For the Respondent : Mrs. Shilpi Sandil Gadodia, Advocate --- 24/15.03.2023: Heard learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Yogendra Prasad and learned counsel Mrs. Shilpi Sandil Gadodia representing the respondent as a legal aid counsel.","5. Learned counsel for the respondent has contested the plea. She however submits that the only reason for the respondent not to appear and -3- contest the matrimonial suit was lack of awareness and enough resources to defend the suit for dissolution of marriage instituted by her husband. However, on being asked she has conveyed her intention to continue with the marriage and live with the appellant. It is submitted that efforts for amicable settlement of the matrimonial dispute through mediation have failed twice because the appellant is not interested in keeping her. The grounds of desertion or mental cruelty made out by the appellant, are not made out by any cogent piece of evidence. The appellant has never properly taken care of the respondent who lives in penury and has no regular sources of income to maintain. She had to abandon nursing course because of lack of finance and presently is engaged on temporary basis from time to time as an Aaya to the nursing assistant. She is spending her life in misery and penury. Therefore, the marriage may...","2. By the impugned judgment dated 30.08.2016 and decree dated 09.09.2016 passed by learned Principal Judge, Family Court, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa in Original Suit No.14/2015 the Suit for dissolution of marriage under Section 10(ix) and (x) of the Divorce Act 1869 has been dismissed ex-parte since the respondent even after valid service of notice and through paper publication also did not appear to contest the Suit. The pleadings as made out in the plaint have therefore remained unrebutted. Appellant had adduced two witnesses: himself as P.W.2 and one Ishwar Lomga P.W.1 in support of his case. As per the pleadings of the Suit preferred by the petitioner/appellant herein, parties entered into marital relationship on 7th February 2012 at G.E.L. Church, Kadma (Khunti) and lived together for four days at the paternal place of the appellant at village Budungkel, P.O. Gudri, P.S. Sonuwa, District West Singhbhum as husband and wife. Thereafter without any rhyme or reason she left the place and has never returned despite efforts made by the plaintiff and their family members. There are no offspring born out of the wedlock. Appellant is employed in Indian Railways as a Clerk and is presently posted at Gujarat. 3. During pendency of this appeal also, even after valid service of notice through paper publication, the respondent did not appear. Thereafter, on...","11. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Decree accordingly. Impugned judgment dated 30.08.2016 and decree dated 09.09.2016 are set aside. The Secretary, High Court Legal Services Committee is directed to pay the admissible legal remuneration to the learned counsel Mrs. Shilpi Sandil Gadodia representing the respondent. (Aparesh Kumar Singh, J.) (Deepak Roshan, J.) Shamim/",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/73398738/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2023,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,73398738,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/73398738/,6
Jharkhand High Court,"Sudhira Minj vs Amit Anuj Minj on 4 July, 2018",AIR 2018 JHARKHAND 189,2018-07-04,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"1 Appeal from the Original Decree No. 132 of 2016 --- Against the judgment dated 05.03.2016 passed in M.M. Case No. 114/2015 by the Learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Garhwa. --- Sudhira Minj --- ---- Appellant Versus Amit Anuj Minj --- --- Respondent --- For the Appellant: Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel, Advocate For the Respondent: Mr. Jayant Franklin Toppo, Advocate --- PRESENT Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aparesh Kumar Singh Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ratnaker Bhengra --- Reserved on: 25/06/2018 Pronounced on: 04/07/2018 --- Aparesh Kumar Singh, J: Wife is the appellant aggrieved by the judgment dated","10. Learned counsel for the Respondent has opposed the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant. He submits that the appellant despite several efforts made including service of notice through paper publication, never turned up to contest the suit. Therefore, she cannot complain against the conduct of the proceeding ex-parte before the Learned Family Court. Respondent despite being unwilling to continue with marital relationship with the appellant has filed this appeal with a vengeful attitude. Appellant's persistent misbehavior, as borne out from the evidence of the petitioner and his other witnesses, clearly gets established. Ext-2 further corroborates it. Taking an overall view of the matter, Learned Family Court has allowed the suit and dissolved their marriage. Therefore, no interference should be made.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,"5. PW-2 has also supported the case of the petitioner and stated that it was impossible for the petitioner to lead happy matrimonial life with her. 6. PW-3 besides supporting the case of the petitioner on the point of marriage and employment and her behavior, has also stated that despite compromise between the parties at the police station, Respondent did not live with the petitioner and is living separately. 7. PW-4, father of the petitioner, has also stated about his employment in Electricity Department and the Respondent being employed as Nurse in Central University, Brambe, Ranchi. He talked about humiliation of the petitioner at her hands. He also stated about an incidence when she and her family members 3 attacked the petitioner. On hearing alarm, he reached to the place and somehow got rid of this risk of assault. He had also sustained injury on his person. He referred to an application by the Respondent before the Mandar P.S. which bore her signature. Certified copy of the petition dated 15.02.2015 was marked as Ext-2.","10. Learned counsel for the Respondent has opposed the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant. He submits that the appellant despite several efforts made including service of notice through paper publication, never turned up to contest the suit. Therefore, she cannot complain against the conduct of the proceeding ex-parte before the Learned Family Court. Respondent despite being unwilling to continue with marital relationship with the appellant has filed this appeal with a vengeful attitude. Appellant's persistent misbehavior, as borne out from the evidence of the petitioner and his other witnesses, clearly gets established. Ext-2 further corroborates it. Taking an overall view of the matter, Learned Family Court has allowed the suit and dissolved their marriage. Therefore, no interference should be made.","05.03.2016 passed in M.M. Case No. 114/2015 instituted by the petitioner husband / Respondent herein for a decree of divorce under section 10(x) of the Christian Divorce Marriage Act, 1869. 2. Case of the petitioner / husband: Parties entered into nuptial knot as per Christian customs and rites on 18.05.2012. The Respondent / wife was employed as a Nurse in Central University, Brambe, Ranchi. She had also got accommodation there. They lived together in the accommodation of University. Petitioner was working in the Electricity Department. Husband alleged repeated taunts and remarks against him by the wife, alleging that he was a worthless person employed in a private Institution. His in-laws also started living in the said quarter and ill-treating him. It became impossible for him to lead life with the Respondent. She used filthy language and also assaulted him and asked him to leave the quarter on 05.05.2014. He submitted an application before Sarpanch of village Aamgaon, Gumla on 07.11.2014 alleging cruel behaviour of his wife. He also made an application before Mandar P.S. on 15.05.2015 stating that she wanted to leave him forever. He also submitted an application before the police with an undertaking that he was ready to keep his wife with due respect. On 21.02.2015 he submitted an application to N.W.G.E.L Church at Aamgaon. Petitioner alleged that...","(Aparesh Kumar Singh, J) (Ratnaker Bhengra, J) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated 04th July 2018 Ranjeet/","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/143329289/ | AIR 2018 JHARKHAND 189, AIRONLINE 2018 JHA 119",Cruelty,cruelty,2018,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 2018 JHARKHAND 189, AIRONLINE 2018 JHA 119",143329289,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/143329289/,7
Jharkhand High Court,"Neha Neelima Ekka vs Abhishek Rohit Khalkho on 8 December, 2020",Neha Neelima Ekka vs Abhishek Rohit Khalkho,2020-12-08,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI F.A. No. 02 of 2020 Neha Neelima Ekka --- --- Appellant Versus Abhishek Rohit Khalkho --- --- Respondent ....... CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY Through Video Conferencing For the Appellant : Mr. Awinash Kumar, Advocate For the Respondent : Ms. Priyanka Bobby, Advocate 06/08.12.2020 Heard learned counsel Mr. Awinash Kumar for the appellant and Ms. Priyanka Bobby for the respondent on the prayer for condonation of delay of 141 days in preferring the instant memo of appeal, made through I.A. No. 3858 of 2020.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"2. 8986601912 On their approaching, learned Member Secretary, JHALSA would place the matter before the learned Mediator, JHALSA for undertaking mediation. Parties may indicate beforehand to the learned Member Secretary, JHALSA whether they want to join mediation exercise physically or through online. Since the appellant wife is from Ranchi, she can very well join the mediation physically. It is open for the respondent husband, who is stationed at Bokaro, to either join mediation physically or request the Member Secretary, JHALSA to permit him to join mediation online. In case, he makes such a request for availing facility at concerned D.L.S.A., Bokaro for joining online, he should do so beforehand so that proper arrangement may be made on the date on which proceedings are to be held. Parties are expected to cooperate in the mediation process and attend each of the sittings. Needless to say, if the parties are able to...","Learned counsel for the appellant wife contends that the impugned judgment was not timely communicated by her counsel and after having procured, she undertook steps to contact her counsel in the High Court. The appeal was drafted and ultimately filed on 07.01.2020. Appellant was undergoing financial crisis and was not able to incur expenses in filing appeal. There is opposition to the prayer by learned counsel for the respondent. Having considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties and the grounds urged in instant I.A., delay is condoned. I.A. stands disposed of. Let the parties participate in the mediation process for amicable settlement of the matrimonial dispute before adjudicating it on merits. Accordingly, parties are directed to approach the learned Member Secretary, JHALSA on 16.12.2020 between 10.00 a.m. to 1.30 p.m. for commencing the mediation online. Learned Member Secretary, JHALSA can be approached on the following numbers: 1. 0651-2482392","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.",,"Appellant wife is aggrieved by the judgment dated 08.07.2019 and decree dated 20.07.2019 passed in Original Suit No. 562 of 2018/ Original Suit No. 365 of 2017 ( Bokaro) by the court of learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi whereby the suit instituted by the petitioner / respondent herein under Section 10(vii)(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 has been decreed by granting divorce in favour of the petitioner husband / respondent herein. ((Aparesh Kumar Singh, J.) (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) A.Mohanty",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/182032015/,Unclear,unclear,2020,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,182032015,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/182032015/,5
Jharkhand High Court,"Deo Prakash vs Smt. Usha Roy on 11 August, 2023",Deo Prakash vs Smt. Usha Roy,2023-08-11,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 19, Section 9",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction) First Appeal No. 346 of 2017 --------- Deo Prakash, S/o Sri Narad Saran Sant, Present Address- Qr. No- C.D- 417, Sector-III, PO & PS- Dhurwa, Ranchi, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand. ... Appellant Versus Smt. Usha Roy, W/o Deo Prakash, D/o Sri Nathun Roy, Present Address-Zone No-1.B, Birsanagar, Town- Jamshedpur, PO & PS- Birsanagar, District- East Singhbhum. ... Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY For the Appellant : Mrs. (Dr.) Vandana Singh, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Parambir Singh Bajaj, Advocate --------- JUDGMENT 11th August 2023 Per, Shree Chandrashekhar, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"5. The following issues were framed by the Family Court Judge on the basis of pleadings of the parties: ""I. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? II. Whether the petitioner has got valid cause of action for the suit ? III. Whether the petitioner wife has been suffered cruelty from the hands of the respondent? IV. Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner for period of more than two year preceding the date of filing of this case? V. Whether the petitioner wife is entitled for decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion? VI. To what other relief or reliefs the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of this case?"" ""10. ... If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion....","""20. It is settled law that for proving desertion, the factum of separation and the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end, animus deserendi, are required to be proved. In the instant case, as evident from the discussion of the evidences made above, the parties are living separately from 20.10.2005 that is for more than five years prior to filing of this case and now for more than 12 years but it is also evident that the respondent husband has obtained ex- parte decree for restitution of his conjugal right against the petitioner wife and the said decree is still in existence. The document filed on behalf of the respondent husband shows that the reconciliation proceeding before the JHALSA and before the High Court legal services authorities were terminated unsettled because of the none appearance of the petitioner wife. The record further shows that the mediation attempts during pendancy of this case has failed because the wife was not willing to reside with the respondent husband. Thus, the material available on record clearly shows that the animus deserendi on...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The husband has challenged the judgment in Matrimonial Suit No.380 of 2010 by filing this First Appeal under section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. 2. Matrimonial Suit No.380 of 2010 was instituted by Usha Roy (hereinafter referred as the respondent) under section 13(1) (i-a) & (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for a decree of divorce by dissolution of the marriage solemnized with the appellant on 10 th March 2004. The respondent pleaded that after the marriage which was solemnized at Kargali in the district of Bokaro she started conjugal life with her husband in the matrimonial home and her marriage was duly consummated. According to the respondent, at the time of marriage her father was compelled to give Rs.2 Lacs in cash, gold ornaments worth Rs.55,000/- and cloths worth Rs.10,000/- to the family of the appellant. She has alleged that the expenses for reception of ""barat party"" was also borne by her parents who paid Rupees One Lac. However, the appellant and his family were not satisfied and they demanded more dowry and in connection therewith started torturing the respondent. She has made allegations of mental and physical cruelty including physical assaults upon her by the appellant at the instigation of his family members and, that, her husband has written vulgar letters to her. Finally, she...","(Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated: 11th August 2023 R.K/A.F.R",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33552463/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2023,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,33552463,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33552463/,11
Jharkhand High Court,"Alfondius Soren Son Of Late Simon Soren vs Bina Bhengra Wife Of Alfondius Soren on 1 September, 2026",Alfondius Soren Son Of Late Simon Soren vs Bina Bhengra Wife Of Alfondius Soren,2026-09-01,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14, Section 19, Section 5",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[2026:JHHC:26602-DB] IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI F.A. No.258 of 2026 ----- Alfondius Soren son of late Simon Soren, aged about 51 years, resident of vill-Gopalpur, P.O. and P.S. Shikaripara, District-Dumka, Jharkhand ... ... Appellant Versus Bina Bhengra wife of Alfondius Soren, aged about 49 years, resident of village-Makrampur, Baganpara, P.O. Makrampur, P.S. Lal Bazar, District-Birbhum, West Bengal ... ... Respondent ------- CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD ------- For the Appellant : Mr. J.J. Sanga, Adv. : Mr. Randhir Kumar Sharma, Adv. : Ms. Angel Khalkho, Adv. For the Respondent : Ms. Shivani Jhaluka, Adv. ------ Order No.08/Dated 01 September, 2026 th Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"11. The expression ""sufficient cause"" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. ( Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [( 2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195] .) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. ""A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to...","6. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on delay condonation application and before considering the same, this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court with respect to the approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay. 2 [2026:JHHC:26602-DB] 7. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis. 8. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time,...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The instant first appeal, under Section 19(1) of Family Courts Act, 1984, is directed against the order/judgment dated 30.07.2024 passed by learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dumka in Original Suit No.57 of 2022 whereby and whereunder the suit filed by the appellant under Section 10(vii) of Divorce Act has been dismissed. I.A. No. 17127 of 2025 2. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by limitation since there is delay of 233 days in preferring the appeal, therefore, an application being I.A. No. 17127 of 2025 has been filed for condoning such delay. 3. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant appeal has been filed after inordinate delay of 233 1 [2026:JHHC:26602-DB] days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation application before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has submitted that delay in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the Interlocutory Application on the basis of grounds shown therein treating the same to be sufficient. 5. The ground for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal, as has been mentioned at paragraph-5 of the interlocutory application is that the delay of 233 days in filing the First Appeal was neither intentional nor deliberate rather the appellant/applicant/plaintiff was into...","(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.) 01st September, 2026 Shahid/A.F.R. Uploaded on 03.09.2026 14",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/104844798/,Unclear,unclear,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,104844798,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/104844798/,14
Jharkhand High Court,"Alfondius Soren Son Of Late Simon Soren vs Bina Bhengra Wife Of Alfondius Soren on 1 September, 2026",Alfondius Soren Son Of Late Simon Soren vs Bina Bhengra Wife Of Alfondius Soren,2026-09-01,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14, Section 19, Section 5",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[2026:JHHC:26602-DB] IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI F.A. No.258 of 2026 ----- Alfondius Soren son of late Simon Soren, aged about 51 years, resident of vill-Gopalpur, P.O. and P.S. Shikaripara, District-Dumka, Jharkhand ... ... Appellant Versus Bina Bhengra wife of Alfondius Soren, aged about 49 years, resident of village-Makrampur, Baganpara, P.O. Makrampur, P.S. Lal Bazar, District-Birbhum, West Bengal ... ... Respondent ------- CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD ------- For the Appellant : Mr. J.J. Sanga, Adv. : Mr. Randhir Kumar Sharma, Adv. : Ms. Angel Khalkho, Adv. For the Respondent : Ms. Shivani Jhaluka, Adv. ------ Order No.08/Dated 01 September, 2026 th Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"11. The expression ""sufficient cause"" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. ( Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [( 2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195] .) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. ""A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to...","6. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on delay condonation application and before considering the same, this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court with respect to the approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay. 2 [2026:JHHC:26602-DB] 7. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis. 8. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time,...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The instant first appeal, under Section 19(1) of Family Courts Act, 1984, is directed against the order/judgment dated 30.07.2024 passed by learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dumka in Original Suit No.57 of 2022 whereby and whereunder the suit filed by the appellant under Section 10(vii) of Divorce Act has been dismissed. I.A. No. 17127 of 2025 2. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by limitation since there is delay of 233 days in preferring the appeal, therefore, an application being I.A. No. 17127 of 2025 has been filed for condoning such delay. 3. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant appeal has been filed after inordinate delay of 233 1 [2026:JHHC:26602-DB] days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation application before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has submitted that delay in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the Interlocutory Application on the basis of grounds shown therein treating the same to be sufficient. 5. The ground for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal, as has been mentioned at paragraph-5 of the interlocutory application is that the delay of 233 days in filing the First Appeal was neither intentional nor deliberate rather the appellant/applicant/plaintiff was into...","(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.) 01st September, 2026 Shahid/A.F.R. Uploaded on 03.09.2026 14",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71833813/,Unclear,unclear,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,71833813,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71833813/,14
Jharkhand High Court,"Sushil Kumar Ray vs Terresa Murmu Daughter Of Charies Murmu ... on 30 June, 2025",Sushil Kumar Ray vs Terresa Murmu Daughter Of Charies Murmu ...,2025-06-30,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14, Section 19, Section 32, Section 4, Section 9",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2025:JHHC:17157-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI First Appeal No.131 of 2023 ------ Sushil Kumar Ray, son of Sri Ishak Rai @ Dilip Ray aged about 58 years Resident of Mohalla-Karkari (Sindur), P.S.-Korrah, P.O. & District-Hazaribag, Jharkhand-825301. .... .... Petitioner/Husband/Appellant Versus Terresa Murmu daughter of Charies Murmu wife of Sushil Kumar Rai, Resident of C/o William Bara, at South Gandhi Maidan, Matwari, P.O. and P.S. Korrah, District-Hazaribag, Jharkhand-825301, present address Supervisor, Child Development Project (Bal Vikash Pariyojna), P.O.-Simariya, P.S.-Simariya, District-Chatra, Jharkhand. .... .... Respondent/Wife/Respondent CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR ------ For the Appellant : Mr. A.K. Rashidi, Advocate Md. Azam, Advocate Ms. Aulia Begum Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Ajay Kr. Singh, Advocate ------ 13/Dated: 30.06.2025 I.A. No.12826 of 2024","Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent-wife 11. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, based upon the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the decree passed by the learned Family Judge therefore needs no interference. Analysis 12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment.","13. This Court, after having considered the argument advanced on behalf of the parties and material available on record, is required to consider the following issues;","1. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that he is not pressing the instant interlocutory application since the document which has been sought for by way of additional evidence in view of the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC has been exhibited and considered by the learned Family Judge and in that view of the matter, the instant application is not being pressed. 2. Accordingly, interlocutory application being I.A. No.12826 of 2024 is dismissed as not pressed. 1 2025:JHHC:17157-DB First Appeal No.131 of 2023 Prayer Arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant-husband 7. Mr. A.K. Rashidi, Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned Family Judge has not taken into consideration the factual aspect of the matter that the respondent wife was well aware with respect to the pending suit of restitution of conjugal right being Original Suit No.68 of 2018, as such, there was no requirement to communicate anything apprising the respondent wife regarding the decree passed in the aforesaid original suit being O.S. No.68 of 2018 filed for restitution of...","Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent-wife 11. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, based upon the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the decree passed by the learned Family Judge therefore needs no interference. Analysis 12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment.","5. It appears from the material available on record that the sole ground has been taken for dissolution of marriage under Section 10(viii) & (ix) of the Act, 1869. 6. The ground has been taken that prior to filing of the suit, an application was filed under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for restitution of conjugal right. The said judgment was decreed in favour of the appellant, husband. The respondent-wife has not turned up to live together in compliance to the judgment passed under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. Therefore, the application has been filed for dissolution of marriage on the ground of applicability of reason available under Section 10(viii) & (ix) of the Act, 1869. 8. The argument therefore has been advanced that the learned Family Judge has committed gross error in refusing to grant divorce even though, the ground as available under Section 4 2025:JHHC:17157-DB 10(viii) & (ix) of the Act, 1869 is well available, hence, the present appeal. 9. Per contra, Mr. Ajay Kr. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-wife has submitted that there is no error in the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge, reason being that, the original suit being O.S. No.68 of 2018 filed under Section 32 of the Act, 1869 for restitution of conjugal right...","3. The instant appeal preferred under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment and decree dated 10.05.2023 (decree signed on 26.05.2023) passed in Original Suit No.170 of 2022 by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Hazaribag, whereby and whereunder, the dissolution of marriage on the ground, as available under Section 10(viii) & (ix) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as ""the Act, 1869"") has been refused to be granted in favour of the husband, appellant herein. Factual Matrix 4. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the memo of appeal, as also, based upon the pleading made in the plaint, read as under: - It is the case that the parties are legally married, i.e., husband, (appellant herein) and the wife (respondent herein). Their marriage was solemnized on 17.01.1990 at Dula Bitha Kaitholic Mission Church, Giridih, as per Christian rites and customs. After marriage, they led conjugal life at Mohalla-Sindur, Karkari, P.S.-Sadar, District-Hazaribagh. Out of their wedlock, two sons, namely, Amit Kumar and Sumit Nayan were...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/65577305/,Unclear,unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,65577305,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/65577305/,18
Jharkhand High Court,"Sushil Kumar Ray vs Terresa Murmu Daughter Of Charies Murmu ... on 30 June, 2025",Sushil Kumar Ray vs Terresa Murmu Daughter Of Charies Murmu ...,2025-06-30,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14, Section 19, Section 32, Section 4, Section 9",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2025:JHHC:17157-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI First Appeal No.131 of 2023 ------ Sushil Kumar Ray, son of Sri Ishak Rai @ Dilip Ray aged about 58 years Resident of Mohalla-Karkari (Sindur), P.S.-Korrah, P.O. & District-Hazaribag, Jharkhand-825301. .... .... Petitioner/Husband/Appellant Versus Terresa Murmu daughter of Charies Murmu wife of Sushil Kumar Rai, Resident of C/o William Bara, at South Gandhi Maidan, Matwari, P.O. and P.S. Korrah, District-Hazaribag, Jharkhand-825301, present address Supervisor, Child Development Project (Bal Vikash Pariyojna), P.O.-Simariya, P.S.-Simariya, District-Chatra, Jharkhand. .... .... Respondent/Wife/Respondent CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR ------ For the Appellant : Mr. A.K. Rashidi, Advocate Md. Azam, Advocate Ms. Aulia Begum Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Ajay Kr. Singh, Advocate ------ 13/Dated: 30.06.2025 I.A. No.12826 of 2024","Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent-wife 11. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, based upon the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the decree passed by the learned Family Judge therefore needs no interference. Analysis 12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment.","13. This Court, after having considered the argument advanced on behalf of the parties and material available on record, is required to consider the following issues;","1. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that he is not pressing the instant interlocutory application since the document which has been sought for by way of additional evidence in view of the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC has been exhibited and considered by the learned Family Judge and in that view of the matter, the instant application is not being pressed. 2. Accordingly, interlocutory application being I.A. No.12826 of 2024 is dismissed as not pressed. 1 2025:JHHC:17157-DB First Appeal No.131 of 2023 Prayer Arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant-husband 7. Mr. A.K. Rashidi, Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned Family Judge has not taken into consideration the factual aspect of the matter that the respondent wife was well aware with respect to the pending suit of restitution of conjugal right being Original Suit No.68 of 2018, as such, there was no requirement to communicate anything apprising the respondent wife regarding the decree passed in the aforesaid original suit being O.S. No.68 of 2018 filed for restitution of...","Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent-wife 11. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, based upon the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the decree passed by the learned Family Judge therefore needs no interference. Analysis 12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment.","5. It appears from the material available on record that the sole ground has been taken for dissolution of marriage under Section 10(viii) & (ix) of the Act, 1869. 6. The ground has been taken that prior to filing of the suit, an application was filed under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for restitution of conjugal right. The said judgment was decreed in favour of the appellant, husband. The respondent-wife has not turned up to live together in compliance to the judgment passed under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. Therefore, the application has been filed for dissolution of marriage on the ground of applicability of reason available under Section 10(viii) & (ix) of the Act, 1869. 8. The argument therefore has been advanced that the learned Family Judge has committed gross error in refusing to grant divorce even though, the ground as available under Section 4 2025:JHHC:17157-DB 10(viii) & (ix) of the Act, 1869 is well available, hence, the present appeal. 9. Per contra, Mr. Ajay Kr. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-wife has submitted that there is no error in the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge, reason being that, the original suit being O.S. No.68 of 2018 filed under Section 32 of the Act, 1869 for restitution of conjugal right...","3. The instant appeal preferred under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment and decree dated 10.05.2023 (decree signed on 26.05.2023) passed in Original Suit No.170 of 2022 by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Hazaribag, whereby and whereunder, the dissolution of marriage on the ground, as available under Section 10(viii) & (ix) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as ""the Act, 1869"") has been refused to be granted in favour of the husband, appellant herein. Factual Matrix 4. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the memo of appeal, as also, based upon the pleading made in the plaint, read as under: - It is the case that the parties are legally married, i.e., husband, (appellant herein) and the wife (respondent herein). Their marriage was solemnized on 17.01.1990 at Dula Bitha Kaitholic Mission Church, Giridih, as per Christian rites and customs. After marriage, they led conjugal life at Mohalla-Sindur, Karkari, P.S.-Sadar, District-Hazaribagh. Out of their wedlock, two sons, namely, Amit Kumar and Sumit Nayan were...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/145850094/,Unclear,unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,145850094,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/145850094/,18
Jharkhand High Court,"Parden Firda Kujur W/O Manoranjan Anand ... vs Manoranjan Anand @ Manoranjan Bakhla ... on 23 April, 2025",Parden Firda Kujur W/O Manoranjan Anand ... vs Manoranjan Anand @ Manoranjan Bakhla ...,2025-04-23,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 114, Section 14, Section 19, Section 27",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2025:JHHC:12053-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI First Appeal No.214 of 2023 ----- Parden Firda Kujur W/o Manoranjan Anand @ Manoranjan Bakhla and d/o late Paulus Kujur, aged about 26 years, r/o village-Nini, PO- Narinawadih, Ps-Kisko, District-Lohardaga ....... ... Appellant Versus Manoranjan Anand @ Manoranjan Bakhla S/o late Vinod Bakhla r/o village-Jhaljamira, PO & PS-Senha, District-Lohardaga ... ... Respondent ------- CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR ------- For the Appellant : Mr. Kishore Kumar Singh, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Nawin Kumar, Advocate ------ rd Order No.05/Dated:23 April, 2025 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.","Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff: 7. While on the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-husband who has appeared by virtue of the notice issued vide order dated 30.11.2023 submitted that the judgment and decree impugned passed by the learned Family Judge, Lohardaga cannot be said to be ex- parte, since, the notice has been deemed to be served as would be evident from the order dated 08.08.2022 of the learned Family Court. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent-husband, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned judgment and decree, therefore, needs not fit to be quashed Analysis: 9. We have heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties, gone through the Trial Court Records, as also the impugned judgment and decree, the testimonies of the witnesses and the documents exhibited therein.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,"(v) It is alleged that the defendant is lady of bad character. She always remained busy in talking with her lover on mobile. She lived about 15 days in her matrimonial house and thereafter she fled away to Nainital with her Jija, namely, Anil Toppo without knowledge and consent of the plaintiff. After that plaintiff several times contacted the defendant on mobile, but she refused to live with plaintiff. Later on, she left receiving the mobile call sent by the plaintiff. 2 2025:JHHC:12053-DB (vi) In the month of December 2014, all of sudden the defendant wife came in her matrimonial house and resided few days. During that period, she resided separately in another room and denied to cohabit with plaintiff. After few days, she again left her matrimonial house without permission of the plaintiff. The plaintiff several times contacted the defendant and her family members, but she refused to come in her matrimonial house. In the month of November 2015, again defendant came in her matrimonial house and she lived there about one week. After that she went away to...","Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff: 7. While on the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-husband who has appeared by virtue of the notice issued vide order dated 30.11.2023 submitted that the judgment and decree impugned passed by the learned Family Judge, Lohardaga cannot be said to be ex- parte, since, the notice has been deemed to be served as would be evident from the order dated 08.08.2022 of the learned Family Court. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent-husband, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned judgment and decree, therefore, needs not fit to be quashed Analysis: 9. We have heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties, gone through the Trial Court Records, as also the impugned judgment and decree, the testimonies of the witnesses and the documents exhibited therein.","1. The instant appeal under section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment dated 29.11.2022 and the decree dated 01.12.2022 passed in Original Case No.14 of 2022 by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Lohardaga (in short, learned Family Judge) whereby and whereunder the marriage between the appellant-wife, namely, Parden Firda Kujur and the respondent-husband, namely, Manoranjan Anand @ Manoranjan Bakhla has been dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the plaint having been recorded by the learned Family Judge, needs to be referred herein as: (i) The plaintiff's (respondent herein) case in brief is that the plaintiff and defendant wife (appellant herein) are by caste Oraon Schedule Tribe and by religion Christian and they are governed by Christian religion. The marriage of plaintiff was solemnized with defendant 2025:JHHC:12053-DB on 04.04.2013 as per Christian rites and custom in N.W.G.E.L Church, Nini. After marriage defendant came to her matrimonial house and both of them started their conjugal life. (ii) On the first day of her marriage, the defendant wife disclosed that her marriage was solemnized under pressure of her parents. She wants to marry with another boy to whom she loves. After few days of marriage, the real face...","4. The ground has been taken on behalf of the appellant-wife that the impugned judgment and decree has been passed ex-parte. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has substantiated the said argument by referring to the order dated 08.08.2022 passed by the learned trial Court wherein the learned Court on the presumption of deemed service of notice has proceeded ex-parte and thereafter concluded the proceeding finally for dissolution of marriage. 6. It has, therefore, been contended that the impugned judgment and decree since have been passed ex-parte on the fiction of deemed service of notice, therefore, the impugned judgment and decree needs to be interfered with. 10. The sole ground as has been taken by the appellant that the impugned judgment and decree have been passed ex-parte and, as such, we have not gone through the issue on merit, rather we have concentrated ourselves on the issue of the fact that as to whether the impugned judgment and decree can be said to be ex-parte or not. 11. This Court in order to asses the aforesaid fact has gone...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/153169273/,Cruelty,cruelty,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,153169273,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/153169273/,14
Orissa High Court,"Sanjeeb Deepak Sahu vs Sukanti Mala Bagh @ Sahu on 30 July, 2024",Sanjeeb Deepak Sahu vs Sukanti Mala Bagh @ Sahu,2024-07-30,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK MATA No. 211 of 2022 Sanjeeb Deepak Sahu .... Appellant -versus- Sukanti Mala Bagh @ Sahu .... Respondent Advocates appear in the case: For appellant: Mr. Brundaban Rout, Advocate For respondent: None CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM SINHA AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.S. SAHOO JUDGMENT -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date of hearing and Judgment:30th July, 2024 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ARINDAM SINHA, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""10. Grounds for dissolution of marriage.- (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent- xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (x) has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent."" 9. In this case while appellant alleged that togetherness lasted 45 days since solemnization of the marriage, respondent alleged that togetherness was for four months. Togetherness ceased long before earlier prosecuted civil proceeding for divorce filed by appellant was dismissed on 10th January, 2014. There is no evidence on record that the parties reconciled soon thereafter....",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The appeal has been preferred by the husband. He says the parties are Christian and their marriage was solemnized on 6th February, 2007 in J.E.L. Church, Koraput by the Reverend. According to him respondent resided in` the matrimonial home for 45 days only, during which time she frequently visited her parent's house. In his Page 1 of 9 petition he said he had earlier filed petition under section 10 of Divorce Act, 1869, dismissed on 10th January, 2014. On 14th April, 2014 respondent along with her father, her advocate and others had formed unlawful assembly in front of residence of his mother. Complaint was lodged before the police, registered as F.I.R. on that day under sections 147, 148, 454, 294, 506 and 149 in Indian Penal Code , 1860. Police arrested, inter alia, respondent and she along with others were forwarded to the Court in G.R. Case no.213 of 2014. On 20th January, 2017 petitioner happened to meet husband of his sister- in-law. From him he came to know of respondent's promiscuity. Inter alia, on such pleadings appellant had filed for divorce. 2. Mr. Rout, learned advocate appears on behalf of appellant but none appears on behalf of respondent. Coordinate Bench on order dated 17th March, 2023 recorded that notice had been delivered to respondent but there is no...",(Arindam Sinha) Judge (M.S. Sahoo) Judge Sks Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SISIR KUMAR SETHI Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT Date: 31-Jul-2024 17:49:49 MATA no. 211 of 2022 Page 9 of 9,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/167729395/,Cruelty,cruelty,2024,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,167729395,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/167729395/,6
Orissa High Court,"Smt. Kuni Dei @ Kuni Behadi vs Pabitra Mohan Behadi & Another on 7 August, 2013",AIR 2014 (NOC) 172 (ORI.),2013-08-07,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 1, Section 10, Section 11, Section 125, Section 13, Section 164, Section 19, Section 3, Section 30, Section 42, Section 497, Section 6",Adultery; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","ORISSA HIGH COURT: CUTTACK MATA No. 55 of 2006 & RPFAM No.15 of 2006 In the matter of an appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and an application under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. ---------- In MATA No. 55 of 2006 Smt. Kuni Dei @ Kuni Behadi ......... Appellant -versus- Pabitra Mohan Behadi & another ......... Respondents For appellant : M/s. Maheswar Satpathy, D. Sahu. For respondents : Mr. Rajani Chandra Mohanty, K.C. Swain. In RPFAM No. 15 of 2006 Kuni Bihadi @ Behadi ......... Petitioner -versus- Pabitra Behadi ......... Opposite Party For petitioner : M/s. Maheswar Satpathy, D. Sahu. For opp.party : Mr. Rajani Chandra Mohanty, K.C. Swain. PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE KUMARI JUSTICE S. PANDA AND THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE B.R.SARANGI Date of hearing: 01.08.2013| Date of judgment : 07.08.2013 2 Dr. B.R.Sarangi, J. Husband- Pabitra Mohan Behadi filed Civil Proceeding No.138 of 2000 seeking for a decree of divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act on the ground of adulterous life of his wife Kuni Dei with Nilu. 2. Kuni Dei, the wife filed Criminal Proceeding NO.291 of 2000 under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. claiming maintenance from her husband Pabitra Mohan Behadi at the rate of Rs.500/- per month on the ground of his negligence and refusal to...","3. Since the parties to the dispute is same, learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack passed an order on 14.12.2001 in C.P. No.138 of 2000 to hear both the matters analogously and accordingly they were heard together and judgment was passed on 21.08.2006 granting ex parte decree of divorce as against the wife Kuni Dei. Against the said judgment, Kuni Dei-wife has preferred an appeal bearing MATA No.55 of 2006 under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act to set aside the ex parte decree of divorce passed against her and also filed RPFAM No.15 of 2006 claiming maintenance of Rs.1500/- per month. Both the matters were heard together with the consent of learned counsel for both the parties. S.Panda, J. I agree. ................................... S.Panda, J. Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 7th August, 2013/PKSahoo",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/111745513/ | AIR 2014 (NOC) 172 (ORI.),Adultery,adultery; nullity_sec19,2013,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,Equivalent citations: AIR 2014 (NOC) 172 (ORI.),111745513,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/111745513/,4
Orissa High Court,"Srikanta Pati vs State Of Odisha And Others ..... ... on 27 November, 2025",Srikanta Pati vs State Of Odisha And Others ..... ...,2025-11-27,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 4, Section 482, Section 498, Section 528",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLMC No.3706 of 2025 Srikanta Pati ..... Petitioner Represented By Adv. - Lingaraj Sarangi -versus- State Of Odisha and others ..... Opposite Party Represented By Adv. - Santosh Chandra Atabudhi Mr. C.M. Singh, ASC CORAM: MR. JUSTICE ADITYA KUMAR MOHAPATRA ORDER 27.11.2025 Order No. 03. 1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Arrangement (Virtual /Physical Mode).",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"2. Heard learned counsel for the Petitioner as well as learned counsel for the Opposite Party No.3 as well as learned counsel for the State representing Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2. Perused the application as well as the prayer made therein. 3. Both the Petitioner as well as the Opposite Party No.3 are present in Court in person and are duly identified by their respective counsels. 5. Learned counsel for the Petitioner-husband at the outset contended that due to a misunderstanding between the husband and wife the above noted criminal case was registered. He further contended that in the meantime, a C.P. has been filed before the learned judge, Family Court, Bhubaneswar which was registered as C.P. No.34 of 2024. 7. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further contended that the aforesaid C.P. has been disposed of on contest by judgment dated 8th October, 2025 and the learned Judge, Family Court, Bhubaneswar has already granted a decree of divorce by dissolving the marriage between the Petitioner and the Opposite Party No.3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further contended after dissolution...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. By filing the present application under Section 528 of the BNSS which corresponds to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Petitioner seeks quashing of the entire criminal proceeding in C.T. Page 1 of 5. Case No.64 of 2024 pending in the file of learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar. The above noted C.T. Case arises out of Bhubaneswar Maitri Vihar P.S. Case No.14 of 2024 which was registered on the allegation of Opposite Party No.3-Informant, the commission of an offence punishable under Section 498-A / 294 of IPC read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act. 6. On perusal of the C.P. at Annexure-4 it can be seen that the same has been filed under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869, with a specific prayer for grant of a decree of divorce by dissolving the marriage between the Petitioner and Opposite Party No.3, which was solemnized on 13.02.2009, and to pay a permanent alimony of Rs.30,00,000/-(Rupees thirty lakh). 10. Having regard to the submissions made by learned counsels appearing for the respective parties, further taking into consideration the statement of the victim made before this Court, while being present in-person, as well as the report of the IIC, Maitri Vihar P.S. dated 22.11.2025 and keeping in view the decree of divorce dated 08.10.2025 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Bhubaneswar...",( A.K. Mohapatra) Judge Sisir Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SISIR KUMAR SETHI Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT Date: 01-Dec-2025 20:08:10 Page 5 of 5.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/158058978/,Unclear,unclear,2025,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,158058978,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/158058978/,8
Orissa High Court,"Anurag Suren vs Poonam Tirkey on 10 March, 2025",Anurag Suren vs Poonam Tirkey,2025-03-10,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Non Consummation,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: MANAS KUMAR PANDA Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: OHC, Cuttack Date: 19-Mar-2025 17:23:54 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK MATA No.405 of 2023 Anurag Suren .... Appellant Mr. S. Harichandan, Advocate -versus- Poonam Tirkey .... Respondent Mr. S. Mohapatra, Advocate CORAM: JUSTICE B. P. ROUTRAY JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH ORDER 10.3.2025 Order No.","03. 1. Heard Mr. S. harichandan, learned counsel for the Appellant and Mr. S. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the Respondent. 2. Present appeal is filed assailing judgment dated 29th September, 2023 of learned Judge, Family Court, Jharsuguda passed in C.P. No.60 of 2022 wherein decree of divorce was granted in favour of the wife by dissolution of marriage along with direction for payment of permanent alimony to the tune of Rs.15,30,000/-.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (non consummation) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"03. 1. Heard Mr. S. harichandan, learned counsel for the Appellant and Mr. S. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the Respondent. 2. Present appeal is filed assailing judgment dated 29th September, 2023 of learned Judge, Family Court, Jharsuguda passed in C.P. No.60 of 2022 wherein decree of divorce was granted in favour of the wife by dissolution of marriage along with direction for payment of permanent alimony to the tune of Rs.15,30,000/-.","3. The substances of contentions of the wife in presenting petition under Section 10(1) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 is non-consummation of marriage. According to the wife the husband was incapable to consummate the marriage and suffering from erectile dysfunction. The husband was subjected to medical examination and as per medical opinion he is potent and free from any erectile dysfunction. It is also opined that the husband is capable of performing sexual intercourse. Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: OHC, Cuttack Date: 19-Mar-2025 17:23:54 4. Despite such opinion of the medical officer it still remains admitted on the part of the husband that the marriage has not been consummated, and thus the statement of the wife regarding her allegation about non-consummation of marriage is found to be a truth. 5. Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act prescribes in one of its clauses that party has willfully refused to consummate the marriage and the marriage has not therefore been consummated. 6. It is seen from the facts and evidences brought on record that the marriage, took place on 7th December, 2020 could not be consummated till date. Though the husband is making allegation on the part of the wife that she did not cooperate for consummation of marriage, but the evidences led on behalf of the parties tilt...","8. In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the impugned judgment and decree of learned Family Judge dated 29th September, 2023 is confirmed. The amount deposited before this court by the Appellant - husband pursuant to direction dated 31st January, 2024 shall be refunded to the Appellant on proper application. The husband is directed to pay entire amount of permanent alimony as directed by learned Judge, Family Court within a period of two months from today by depositing the same before learned Judge, Family Court, Jharsuguda, failing which the wife is at liberty to take steps in accordance with law. (B.P. Routray) Judge (Chittaranjan Dash) Judge M.K.Panda Page 3 of 3",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/166005443/,Non Consummation,non_consummation,2025,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,166005443,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/166005443/,4
Orissa High Court,"Sasmita Mishal @ Samita Misal vs Apurba Andrapu .... Opposite Party on 11 April, 2025",Sasmita Mishal @ Samita Misal vs Apurba Andrapu .... Opposite Party,2025-04-11,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 24, Section 32",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK TRP(C) No.89 of 2025 Sasmita Mishal @ Samita Misal .... Petitioner Mr. Soubhagya Kumar Dash, Advocate -versus- Apurba Andrapu .... Opposite Party CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN Order No. ORDER 01. 11.04.2025 TRP(C) No.89 of 2025 & I.A.No.83 of 2025 This matter is taken up through Hybrid Mode.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. This application has been filed by the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for transfer of the C.P. No.5 of 2025, filed by the Opposite Party-husband under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for restitution of conjugal right pending before the Court of the learned Judge, Family Court, Paralakhemundi in the district of Gajapati to the Court of the learned Judge, Family Court, Rayagada. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner submitted that the Petitioner-wife has filed Civil Proceeding No.6 of 2025 under Section 10(i)(ix) & (x) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce at the instance of Opposite Party-husband before the Court of the learned Judge, Family Court, Rayagada. Therefore, the said C.P. No.5 of 2025 pending before the Court of the learned Judge, Family Court, Paralakhemundi Page 1 of 2 in the district of Gajapati is required to be transferred to the Court of the learned Judge, Family Court, Rayagada for convenience. 4. Issue notice to the Opposite Party by Registered Post/Speed Post with A.D., requisites for which shall be filed within three working days. In the event of furnishing such requisite within the period stipulated, the Office shall send the notice to the Opposite Party by...","(M.S. Raman) Judge Laxmikant Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: LAXMIKANT MOHAPATRA Designation: Senior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 11-Apr-2025 16:54:11 Page 2 of 2",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58235279/,Unclear,unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,58235279,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58235279/,3
Orissa High Court,"Deepak Chetty @ vs Marthama Bisoi @ Putuki on 8 October, 2026",Deepak Chetty @ vs Marthama Bisoi @ Putuki,2026-10-08,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 24",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK TRP(C) No.315 of 2026 CNR No. ODHC010714072026 Deepak Chetty @ ..... Petitioner Deepak Kumar Chetty Mr. Bikash Karna, Advocate -versus- Marthama Bisoi @ Putuki ..... Opposite Party Bisoi CORAM: JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MISHRA ORDER 08.10.2026 Order No. 01. This matter is taken up through hybrid mode.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"2. Heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner. 4. Reiterating the grounds urged in the transfer petition, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits, the Petitioner is a daily labourer having uncertain income. That apart, the application for divorce, i.e., C.S. (MAT) No.02 of 2026 has been instituted by Opposite Party-wife Page 1 of 3. at Malkangiri. He has no relation or family members at Malkangiri, where he can stay on the date of attending the Court proceeding. That part, the distance from his village, i.e., Lulla, in the district of Koraput, to the Court of learned District Judge, Malkangiri would be around 150 KMs. 5. Neither it has been pleaded in the transfer petition nor the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is able to apprise the Court as to the status of the Opposite Party- wife, her income and other aspects, which may be good ground to consider the prayer for transfer, in addition to the grounds urged in the transfer petition, to demonstrate before this Court that the Opposite Party- wife is in a better footing than the Petitioner, deserving...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. This transfer petition has been preferred by the Petitioner-husband under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking transfer of proceeding of C.S. (MAT) No.02 of 2026, preferred by the Opposite Party- wife under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage, pending in the Court of learned District Judge, Malkangiri, to the Court of learned District Judge, Koraput on the grounds detailed in the transfer petition.","Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack. Date: 09-Oct-2026 18:45:43",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/75756480/,Unclear,unclear,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,75756480,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/75756480/,5
Orissa High Court,"Pratik Kumar Chouhan vs State Of Odisha .... Opposite Parties on 14 July, 2025",Pratik Kumar Chouhan vs State Of Odisha .... Opposite Parties,2025-07-14,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 4",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK ABLAPL No.3614 of 2025 Pratik Kumar Chouhan .... Petitioner Mr. A. Mohanty,Sr. Advocate -versus- 1. State of Odisha .... Opposite Parties 2. Rachana Mohanty Mr. S.N. Das, ASC Mr. L.K Maharana, Advocate (Informant) CORAM: JUSTICE V. NARASINGH ORDER 14.07.2025 Order No.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"7. Before releasing the learned Court shall verify as to whether this order has been assailed before the Apex Court and if so, the result thereof. 8. It is needless to state that the Petitioner shall cooperate with the ongoing investigation. 9. Accordingly, the ABLAPL stands disposed of.","02. 1. Heard learned counsel for the Petitioner and learned counsel for the State as well as the Informant. 3. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel that taking into account the litigation, inter se, between the parties, the Petitioner may be protected by pre-arrest bail. 5. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the Informant that just to wriggle out of the criminal liability, the Civil Suit has been instituted and merely because of the filing of the Civil Proceeding, which is filed admittedly, after the registration of F.I.R, the same not to weigh with this Court, in considering the prayer of the Petitioner. And, taking into account the nature of allegations, he ought not to be protected by pre-arrest bail. 6. On considering the rival submission, it is directed that on surrendering within three weeks hence and moving for bail, the Petitioner shall be released on bail by the learned Court in seisin on such terms as deemed just and proper.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The Petitioner is seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with G.R. Case No.248 of 2025 pending in the Court of learned S.D.J.M., Cuttack, arising out of Mahila P.S. Case No.49 of 2025 for commission of offence punishable under Sections 115(2)/296/85 of BNS and Section 4 of DP Act. 4. Such submission is opposed by the learned counsel for the State as well as the Informant referring to the memo of documents which are placed on record including the Plaint in C.S No.477 of 2025, which relates to the ownership of the Car between the parties, which was filed by the Petitioner as plaintiff in the Court Senior Civil Judge 1st Court, Cuttack in which the Informant has already appeared and application for divorce under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act by the Informant in C.P Case No.51 of 2025, pending in the Court of Family Judge, Bhubaneswar.",(V. NARASINGH) Judge Soumya Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SOUMYA RANJAN SAMAL Designation: Jr. Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa Date: 15-Jul-2025 18:35:19 Page 3 of 3,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/134823960/,Unclear,unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,134823960,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/134823960/,8
Orissa High Court,"Madhumita James vs Tanmaya Mohanty on 25 November, 2025",Madhumita James vs Tanmaya Mohanty,2025-11-25,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK MATA No. 445 of 2025 Madhumita James .... Appellants Represented by Adv.- Ms. P. Naidu, Advocate -Versus- Tanmaya Mohanty .... Respondent Represented by Adv. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANASH RANJAN PATHAK AND HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MRUGANKA SEKHAR SAHOO ORDER",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Order No. 25.11.2025 (Hybrid mode) 01. 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant-wife.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.",,"2. The appellant-wife is before this Court challenging the judgment and decree dated 30.10.2025 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack in C.P. No. 423 of 2019 under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869, thereby dissolving the marriage solemnized between the appellant-wife and respondent- husband on 02.01.2008 at Union Church, Bhubaneswar. 3. Issue notice along with this order. Requisites for issuance of notice by Speed Post with AD be filed within five working days. Early returnable date be fixed. 4. The I.A. has been filed seeking interim stay of the order dated 30.10.2025 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack in C.P. No.423 of 2019. 5. Issue notice as above. Accept one set of process fee as well as the postal requisites along with the appeal. 6. As an interim measure, it is directed that either of the parties i.e. appellant-wife and respondent-husband shall not marry again during pendency of the appeal. 7. List after SR. Liberty to mention. (Manash Ranjan Pathak) Judge (Mruganka Sekhar Sahoo) Judge Manoj/Ranjeeta Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: RANJEETA SAHOO...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/66374243/,Unclear,unclear,2025,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,66374243,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/66374243/,3
Orissa High Court,"Tanmaya Mohanty vs Madhumita James on 8 April, 2026",Tanmaya Mohanty vs Madhumita James,2026-04-08,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK MATA No.52 of 2026 Tanmaya Mohanty .... Appellant Represented by Adv.- Mr. Gajendra Nath Rout, Advocate -versus- Madhumita James .... Respondent Represented by Adv. Ms. Pratyusha Naidu, Advocate CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANASH RANJAN PATHAK AND HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA ORDER Order No. 08.04.2026 (Hybrid mode) I.A. No.84 of 2026 03. 1. The appellant as petitioner has preferred Civil","1. Heard Mr. Gajendra Nath Rout, learned counsel for the appellant-husband and Ms. Pratyusha Naidu, learned counsel for the respondent-wife. 2. Admit this appeal. 3. The appellant shall serve a copy of the memo of appeal on Ms. Pratyusha Naidu, learned counsel for the respondent-wife, if not already served.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,4. Learned counsel for the appellant as well as the respondent may obtain the soft copies of the records from the Registry. 5. List this matter after the ensuing summer vacation along with MATA No.445 of 2025.,"1. Heard Mr. Gajendra Nath Rout, learned counsel for the appellant-husband and Ms. Pratyusha Naidu, learned counsel for the respondent-wife. 2. Admit this appeal. 3. The appellant shall serve a copy of the memo of appeal on Ms. Pratyusha Naidu, learned counsel for the respondent-wife, if not already served.","Proceeding No.423 of 2019 under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869 against the respondent-wife before the Court of the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack. By the impugned judgment dated 30.10.2025, the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack allowed the said Civil Proceeding and dissolved the marriage between the parties solemnized on 02.01.2008 directing the appellant to pay an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs) to the respondent-wife as permanent alimony. 2. Aggrieved by the said judgment dated 30.10.2025, the appellant has preferred the connected appeal with a reported delay of 45 days. 3. It is to be noted herein that the respondent-wife as appellant has also filed an appeal being MATA No.445 of 2025 in the impugned judgment dated 30.10.2025 as noted above, which is duly admitted. 4. We have heard learned counsels for both the appellant as well as the respondent. 5. Ms. Pratyusha Naidu, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-wife has no objection in condoning the delay of 45 days in preferring the appeal by the appellant-husband, subject to payment of cost. 6. Accordingly, the delay of 45 days is condoned, subject to payment of cost of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) to be paid by the appellant-husband to the respondent-wife by way of Demand Draft or in her Account. 7. The I.A. stands disposed of. (Manash Ranjan Pathak)...","(Manash Ranjan Pathak) Judge (Sibo Sankar Mishra) Judge Subhasis Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SUBHASIS MOHANTY Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack. Date: 08-Apr-2026 19:09:48 Page 3 of 3",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/67515852/,Unclear,unclear,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,67515852,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/67515852/,5
Orissa High Court,"Nithoniel Nayak vs Mimansa Sinha on 15 July, 2026",Nithoniel Nayak vs Mimansa Sinha,2026-07-15,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK TRP(C) No.382 of 2025 Nithoniel Nayak .... Petitioner Mr. Ramdas Achary, Advocate -versus- Mimansa Sinha .... Opp. Party CORAM: JUSTICE MRUGANKA SEKHAR SAHOO ORDER 15.07.2026 (Hybrid Mode) Order No. 05. 1. The Office has pointed out typographical error in order dated 15.05.2026, wherein the number of the case has been wrongly typed as '382 of 2026' instead of '382 of 2025'. The wrong entry i.e. numerical '6' shall be corrected as '5' in the body of the order as per Rules. 2. The petitioner before this Court is the husband in the marriage. He seeks transfer of C.P. No.763 of 2024 pending before the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack to the Court of learned Judge, Family Court, Phulbani.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"3. It is submitted that both the parties to the litigation stay at Phulbani and there would be no difficulty for the Page 1 of 2 present Opp. Party, who is the petitioner in the C.P. to attend the matter at Phulbani, which is around 235 kms. from Cuttack. 4. Issue notice to the Opp. Party along with this order. Requisites for issuance of notice by Speed Post with Registration and proof of delivery shall be filed within five working days. 5. Returnable date be fixed to 17.08.2026. The matter shall be listed 'For Orders' in the week commencing 24.08.2026. 6. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. He reiterates his submissions as noted above. 7. Issue notice as above. Accept one set of process fee as well as postal requisites. The returnable date as well as next the date of listing shall be as directed above.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Signed by: RAJESH KUMAR BADHEI Reason: Authentication marriage under section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869 Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK Date: 22-Jul-2026 18:49:37 seeking decree of divorce and dissolution of marriage solemnized between the parties on 30.09.2014.","8. In the interim, it is directed that the C.P. No.763 of 2024 pending before the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack shall be adjourned to a date beyond 31.08.2026 as would be convenient to the learned Court in seisin of the matter upon a prayer being made for the said Signature Not Verified purpose. Digitally Signed Signed by: RAJESH KUMAR BADHEI Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, Urgent certified copy be issued as per Rules. CUTTACK Date: 22-Jul-2026 18:49:37 (Mruganka Sekhar Sahoo) Judge Rajesh Page 2 of 2",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/148550812/,Unclear,unclear,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,148550812,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/148550812/,4
Orissa High Court,"Salem Bikram Kumar And Others vs State Of Orissa .... Opposite Party on 12 December, 2022",Salem Bikram Kumar And Others vs State Of Orissa .... Opposite Party,2022-12-12,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLMC No.14 of 2016 Salem Bikram Kumar and Others .... Petitioners Mr. R.K. Nayak, Advocate -Versus- State of Orissa .... Opposite Party Mr. T.K. Praharaj, SC CORAM: MR. JUSTICE R.K. PATTANAIK ORDER",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"Order 12.12.2022 No. 07. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. None appears for opposite party No.2. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that notice was served on opposite party No.2 through local PS which is said to have been received by her father. Despite such service, opposite party No.2 has not entered appearance. In view of service of notice through local PS, it is held to be sufficient as against opposite party No.2.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that matter has been compromised between the parties, inasmuch as, both of them obtained mutual divorce on consent by approaching Family Court at Cuttack. While contending so, learned counsel for the petitioner refers to Annexure-3 series, on perusal of which the Court finds that by order dated 13th August, 2015 in C.P. No.66 of 2015, the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack considering an application under Section 10(A) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 dissolved the marriage between the petitioner and opposite party No.2 by a decree on mutual consent. 4. One of the accused persons, namely, mother-in-law is dead and in support thereof, a copy of her death certificate as at Annexure-4 is referred to. 5. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that at the time of resolution of marriage, parties agreed that steps would be taken by them for withdrawal of cases pending in different forums including the present one i.e. G.R. Case No.1253 of 2012 arising out of Cuttack Mahila P.S. Case No.142 of 2012. A copy of the application under Section 10(A) of the Indian Divorce Act which is under Annexure-3 series is brought to the notice of the Court with regard to such an understanding between the parties for withdrawal of the cases as agreed...",(R.K. Pattanaik) Judge TUDU Page 2 of 2,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/130878775/,Unclear,unclear,2022,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,130878775,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/130878775/,4
Orissa High Court,"Diptimoyee Mondal vs Salem Gomango on 6 March, 2026",Diptimoyee Mondal vs Salem Gomango,2026-03-06,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK MATA No.212 of 2025 Diptimoyee Mondal .... Appellant Represented by Adv.- Mr. Hemanta Mohanta, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Soubhagya Kumar Dash -versus- Salem Gomango .... Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANASH RANJAN PATHAK AND HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN ORDER 06.03.2026 (Hybrid Mode) Order No. 02. 1. Heard Mr. Hemanta Mohanta, learned counsel on behalf of Mr. Soubhagya Kumar Dash, learned counsel for the appellant.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"4. Learned counsel for the appellant files a memo in Court today seeking withdrawal of this appeal. The said memo is taken on record. 5. Accordingly, this appeal, being infructuous on the death of the respondent-husband, stands dismissed as withdrawn.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The appellant, as a petitioner, earlier filed a petition under Section 10(1)(ix) of the Indian Divorce Act before the Court of learned Judge, Family Court, Parlakhemundi, being Civil Proceeding No.08 of 2025, seeking a decree of dissolution of her marriage with the respondent-husband. The learned Judge, Family Court, Parlakhemundi, by judgment dated 08.05.2025, dismissed the said Civil Page 1 of 2 Proceeding No.08 of 2025 preferred by the appellant-wife. Hence, this appeal. 3. In the meanwhile, during pendency of the appeal, the respondent-husband expired on 20.02.2026.","(Manash Ranjan Pathak) Judge (Murahari Sri Raman) Judge Aswini Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR SETHY Designation: Personal Assistant (Secretary-in-charge) Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 07-Mar-2026 15:50:13 Page 2 of 2",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/176263479/,Unclear,unclear,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,176263479,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/176263479/,4
Orissa High Court,"Nithoniel Nayak vs Mimansa Sinha .... Opp. Party on 24 February, 2026",Nithoniel Nayak vs Mimansa Sinha .... Opp. Party,2026-02-24,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK TRP(C) No.382 of 2025 Nithoniel Nayak .... Petitioner Mr. Parth Agrawal, Advocate On behalf of Mr. Ramdas Achary, Advocate -versus- Mimansa Sinha .... Opp. Party CORAM: JUSTICE MRUGANKA SEKHAR SAHOO ORDER 24.02.2026 (Hybrid Mode) Order No.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,01. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Learned counsel after arguing some time has adjournment to address regarding the territorial jurisdiction where the proceeding under section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869 can be initiated. As it is contended that the wife petitioner before the learned trial Court could not have moved the petition before the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack. 2. List on 05.03.2026.",(Mruganka Sekhar Sahoo) Digitally Signed Judge Signed by: RAJESH KUMAR BADHEI Reason: Authentication Rajesh Location: OHC Date: 24-Feb-2026 18:29:42 Page 1 of 1,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187479871/,Unclear,unclear,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,187479871,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187479871/,4
Orissa High Court,"Madhusmita Nayak vs Simadri Nayak And Anr. on 5 March, 1997",AIR1997ORI162,1997-03-05,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 11, Section 17",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT S.N. Phukan, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. on perusal of judgment of learned Judge. Family Court, Cuttack we find that learned Judge. Family Court did not at all apply his mind to the provisions contained in Section 10 of the Act. He did not consider the case of the parties in the background of Section 10A Christian marriage can be dissolved only under the provisions of a statute of general application to such marriages. Grounds for dissolution of marriage enumerated in Section 10 cannot be extended. In view of the provisions of Sections 12 , 13 , 14 and 47 of the Act a decree for divorce on consent of the parties is not permissible. It is only on the proof of misconduct as envisaged by Section 10 of the Act that a decree for divorce is permissible subject to the restrictions contained in Sections 16 and 17 of the Act. Further, object of Section 11 being the prevention of any form of collusive divorce, it is not a mere formality to dispense with the presence of the co-respondent. In the case at hand, alleged adulterer has not been impended as a correspondent. Until leave to dispense with the presence of the co-respondent, the suit cannot proceed. In absence of an application under Section 11 for excusing the petitioner-husband from not making the adulterer a co-respondent...","1. Decree for dissolution of Marriage passed by Iearned Judge. Family Court, Cuttuck in Misc. Cane No. S9 of 1993 arising out of Civil Proceeding No. 83 of 1993 his come up before this Bench for Confirmation as required under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act. 1869 (in short, the 'Act'). 2. Admittedly, parties are Christians and decree for dissolution of marriage can he passed if conditions mentioned in Section 10 of the Act are fulfilled, apart from compliance of Section 11 . The provisions run as follows : ""10. When husband may petition for dissolution.- Any husband may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court, praying that his marriage may be dissolved on the ground that his wife has, since the solemaization thereof been guilty of adultery. When wife may petition for dissolution. Any wife may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court, praying that her marriage may be dissolved on the ground that since the solemaization thereof, her husband has exchanged his profession of Christianity for the...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/220561/ | AIR1997ORI162, AIR 1997 ORISSA 162, (1997) 3 CIVLJ 601 (1997) 84 CUT LT 132, (1997) 84 CUT LT 132",Adultery,adultery,1997,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1997ORI162, AIR 1997 ORISSA 162, (1997) 3 CIVLJ 601 (1997) 84 CUT LT 132, (1997) 84 CUT LT 132",220561,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/220561/,4
Orissa High Court,"Sandeep Kumar Senapati vs Jyotirmayee Sahoo on 26 March, 2025",Sandeep Kumar Senapati vs Jyotirmayee Sahoo,2025-03-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 9",Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK MATA No.12 of 2023 Sandeep Kumar Senapati .... Appellant -versus- Jyotirmayee Sahoo .... Respondent Advocate(s) appeared in this case:- For Appellant : Mr. G. N. Parida, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. A. P. Bose, Advocate CORAM: JUSTICE B.P. ROUTRAY JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH JUDGMENT 26th March, 2025 By The Bench. 1. Heard learned counsel for the Parties. 2. Present Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 21st December, 2022 of the learned Judge, Family Court, Khurda passed in C.P. No.147 of 2017, wherein the learned Court refused to grant decree of divorce to the husband. 3. The husband being the Petitioner before the Family Court, filed aforesaid Civil Proceeding praying for dissolution of marriage and grant of decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion. His allegation against the wife is that, the marriage which took place on 17th February 2016, could not be consummated due to non-cooperation of the wife. Both parties stayed together in the matrimonial house till 6 th March 2016. 4. Conversely, the wife filed her Written Statement alleging that the marriage between her and the Appellant was well consummated on several occasions during their...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (desertion) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","""15. If so, the question arises what kind of cruel treatment does clause (i-a) contemplate? In particular, what is the kind of mental cruelty that is required to be established? While answering these questions, it must be kept in mind that the cruelty mentioned in clause (i-a) is a ground now for divorce as well as for judicial separation under Section 10. Another circumstance to be kept in mind is that even where the marriage has MATA No.12 of 2023 Page 2 of 8 irretrievably broken down, the Act, even after the 1976 (Amendment) Act, does not permit dissolution of marriage on that ground. This circumstance may have to be kept in mind while ascertaining the type of cruelty contemplated by Section 13(1)(i-a). 16. Mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(i-a) can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is...",(B.P. Routray) Judge (Chittaranjan Dash) Judge AKPradhan/Bijay Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: ANANTA KUMAR PRADHAN Designation: Sr. Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA Date: 17-Apr-2025 16:17:39 MATA No.12 of 2023 Page 8 of 8,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/85141704/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,85141704,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/85141704/,7
Orissa High Court,"Prafulla Kumar Sahu vs Sarojabala Sahu And Anr. on 30 June, 1980",AIR1980ORI168,1980-06-30,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 100, Section 17, Section 22",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT R.N. Misra, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a reference made under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 4 of 1869 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') by the learned District Judge of Cuttack for confirmation of the decree for dissolution of marriage between the petitioner and respondent No. 1. Their marriage took place on 21-3-1969. It was alleged that the spouses lived together for about three months and the wife was taken by her father on the plea that wife's mother was seriously ill. Several attempts of the petitioner to bring back his wife failed. Intervention of well-wishers also did not prove effective. Petitioner applied under Section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the wife was produced in court. She made a statement that she did not like to reside with the husband. He thereupon applied for judicial separation and obtained a decree on 23-9-1971 (Ext. 2). The spouses never lived together thereafter. It was further alleged that the wife (respondent No. 1) had adulterous relationship with her own uncle (respondent No. 2). 2. The wife (respondent No. 1) did not enter contest. Respondent No. 2 alone entered contest and denied the allegation of adultery. Three witnesses were examined in support of the application and respondent No. 2 examined himself in support of his defence. The learned District Judge came to...","3. The decree for judicial separation under Ext. 2 had been passed upon acceptance of the plea of desertion without reasonable excuse for more than two years prior to the application. Section 22 of the Act provides :-- ""No decree shall hereafter be made for a divorce a mensa et toro, but the husband or wife may obtain a decree of judicial separation, on the ground of adultery, or cruelty, or desertion without reasonable excuse for two years or upwards, and such decree shall have the effect of a divorce a mensa et toro, under the existing law, and such other legal effect as hereinafter mentioned."" ""It is admitted that in certain earlier proceedings between the parties, which are among the typed papers as O. P. No. 240 of 1962, a decree was granted in favour of the petitioner (the wife) for judicial separation from the respondent (the husband) under Section 22 of the Indian Divorce Act. The petitioner alleges that though four years have passed since that decree, there has been no resumption of matrimonial living between the parties....","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1289084/ | AIR1980ORI168, AIR 1980 ORISSA 168, (1980) 50 CUT LT 138",Adultery,adultery,1980,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1980ORI168, AIR 1980 ORISSA 168, (1980) 50 CUT LT 138",1289084,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1289084/,8
Kerala High Court,"Saumya Ann Thomas vs The Union Oof India on 25 February, 2010",2010 A I H C 3118,2010-02-25,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 13B, Section 28, Section 32B",Constitutional Validity,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM WP(C).No. 20076 of 2009(R) 1. SAUMYA ANN THOMAS, AC-18, ARTIEE COMFORT ... Petitioner Vs 1. THE UNION OOF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY ... Respondent 2. PRAVEEN THOMAS, THAZHETHIL ST. MARYS For Petitioner :SRI.P.B.SAHASRANAMAN For Respondent :SRI.PRATHEESH.P The Hon'ble MR. Justice R.BASANT The Hon'ble MRS. Justice M.C.HARI RANI Dated :25/02/2010 O R D E R R. BASANT & M.C. HARI RANI, JJ. ------------------------------------------------- W.P.(C) No. 20076 of 2009-R ------------------------------------------------- Dated this the 25th day of February, 2010 JUDGMENT Basant,J. Is the stipulation of a period of two years as the minimum mandatory period of separate residence in Sec.10A(1) of the Divorce Act right, just and fair? Is it arbitrary, fanciful and oppressive? Does that stipulation offend Art.14 and/or Art.21 of the Constitution? Does that stipulation deserve to be read down to ""one year"" to save the provision from the vice of unconstitutionality? These interesting contentions are raised for our consideration in this writ petition. 2. These questions arose for consideration before us in this writ petition as also in W.P.(C) No.24219/08. Both were heard together. We have had the advantage of hearing Sri. G.Shrikumar, the learned counsel who was requested to render W.P.(C) No....",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""10A. Dissolution of marriage by mutual consent.-- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, a petition for dissolution of marriage may be presented to the District Court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnised before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of two years or more, that they have not been able to live together and they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. (emphasis supplied) We have serious doubts about the proposition that a piece of personal law - whether statutory or precedent recognised or otherwise, will not be law or law in force within the meaning of Art.13 of the Constitution. This would go against the fundamental and core constitutional values as also the scheme of Art.13...","4. The learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent have been heard. The learned counsel for the spouses assail the impugned order on the following grounds: 1. The period of two years stipulated under Sec.10A(1) and the period of six months stipulated under Sec.10A(2) of the Divorce Act must have been waived and dispensed with by the learned Judge of the Family Court. 2. The stipulation of a period of two years under Sec.10A(1) is arbitrary, capricious and fanciful; is not fair, just, right and reasonable and consequently offends the right to equality of the petitioner under Art.14 of the Constitution and her right to life under Art.21 of the Constitution. The same is liable to be read down as one year and consequently divorce under Sec.10A of the Divorce Act is liable to be granted. W.P.(C) No. 20076 of 2009 -: 4 :- 5. To appreciate this contention raised, we deem it necessary to extract Sec.10A of the Divorce Act. It reads thus: 13. It is contended that the incorporation and insistence...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn by both the parties in the meantime, the Court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and making such inquiry, as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnised and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree declaring W.P.(C) No. 20076 of 2009 -: 5 :- the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of decree."" (emphasis supplied) The provision is in substance a verbatim reproduction of the provision in Sec.13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, Sec.32B of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act and Sec.28 of the Special Marriage Act. The only difference is that instead of the period of two years mentioned in Sec.10A(1) emphasised above, one year is the period of separate residence stipulated in those provisions. 6. The first contention is that the period of two years under Sec.10A(1) and the period of six months under Sec.10A(2) of the Divorce Act must have been waived by the Family Court in its discretion. We find absolutely no merit in this contention at all. Under the body...","22. It is also brought to our notice that a learned single Judge of Bombay High Court in Re Smt. Amina (AIR 1992 Bombay 214) has doubted the proposition enunciated in Narasu Appa (supra) and had referred the matter to a larger Bench. Our attempts to ascertain the result of the said reference has not been successful. We note that the Delhi High Court had also made an effort to trace the answer on reference by the larger Bench; but as stated in Kalawati v. Union of India (L.A.A.No.650/08 and CM No.9226/08 dated 27/1/09), that court was also not able to trace the outcome of the reference. We are now given to understand that the Division Bench had declined to answer the reference by judgment dated 6/11/1993. 23. The learned ASGI submits that a Division Bench of this Court in Mathew & Another v. Union of India (1999 (2) KLJ 824) has also accepted the dictum in Narasu Appa (supra) and, in these circumstances, no doubts can be entertained now about the acceptability of that dictum. The learned ASGI further...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/475313/ | 2010 A I H C 3118, (2010) 2 DMC 526, (2011) 2 CURCC 468, (2010) 2 HINDULR 72, (2010) 1 KER LT 869",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity,2010,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2010 A I H C 3118, (2010) 2 DMC 526, (2011) 2 CURCC 468, (2010) 2 HINDULR 72, (2010) 1 KER LT 869",475313,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/475313/,18
Kerala High Court,"Benzine Sylvester vs Sibin Islin Kochuparambil on 24 October, 2025",Benzine Sylvester vs Sibin Islin Kochuparambil,2025-10-24,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Mat.A Nos.434, 442 & 460 of 2020 1 2025:KER:79729 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN & THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.B. SNEHALATHA FRIDAY, THE 24TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 2ND KARTHIKA, 1947 MAT.APPEAL NO. 434 OF 2020 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2019 IN OP NO.1246 OF 2016 OF FAMILY COURT,THIRUVANANTHAPURAM APPELLANT/PETITIONER: BENZINE SYLVESTER, AGED 43 YEARS S/O. ANTONY CRUZ MARIA ANTONY, RESIDING AT 27/459, KUNUKUZHI LANE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695037. BY ADVS. SHRI.P.B.KRISHNAN (SR.) SRI.P.B.SUBRAMANYAN SRI.SABU GEORGE SRI.MANU VYASAN PETER SMT.MEERA P. RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT: SIBIN ISLIN KOCHUPARAMBIL, AGED 40 YEARS D/O. KOCHUPARAMBIL CHACKO ISAC, RESIDING AT KOCHUPARAMBIL HOUSE, ISLIN NIVAS, ATHANI P.O., THRISSUR-680771. BY ADVS. SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.) SRI.P.MARTIN JOSE SRI.P.PRIJITH SRI.THOMAS P.KURUVILLA SHRI.AJAY BEN JOSE SRI.MANJUNATH MENON SMT.HANI P.NAIR SRI.R.GITHESH SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S. THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING ON 24.10.2025, ALONG WITH Mat.Appeal.442/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: Mat.A Nos.434, 442 & 460 of 2020 2 2025:KER:79729 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN & THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.B. SNEHALATHA FRIDAY, THE 24TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 2ND KARTHIKA, 1947 MAT.APPEAL NO. 442 OF 2020...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. In view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, appellant and respondent have filed a petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, wherein they have stated that they have mutually agreed and decided Mat.A Nos.434, 442 & 460 of 2020 5 2025:KER:79729 for dissolution of marriage voluntarily . Further it is stated that there is no collusion in filing the petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869; that the spouses are living separately from December, 2012 onwards; and there is no marital relationship between them and therefore, they seek divorce by mutual consent. 5. Both parties have affirmed that the entire disputes between the parties have been settled in terms of the joint petition filed by the parties. 6. We are convinced that the marriage between the spouses has been irretrievably broken down and they are living separately from December 2012 onwards and there is no possibility of reunion and divorce is the viable option and all the attempts of reunion have been failed. We are also convinced that the parties have voluntarily filed the petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 and there is no collusion between the parties and this Court is satisfied that the consent was not obtained through fraud or coercion....","Ben4ty/ester ApplicantNo.I/Appellant Sibintsqu±#il Applicant No.2Res ondent Sabu Gel""-gl.fK,-i11/1998) ENfa=an.s (K497/2-19) Counsel for the Appellant Counsel for the Respondent",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33363578/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,33363578,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33363578/,5
Madras High Court,"Emmanuel Kannan vs Respondent ... None on 2 January, 2023",Emmanuel Kannan vs Respondent ... None,2023-01-02,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 1, Section 10A, Section 19, Section 20, Section 21, Section 45",Mutual Consent 10A; Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2023/MHC/46 C.R.P.No.4314 of 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 02.01.2023 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.M.SUBRAMANIAM C.R.P.No.4314 of 2022 1.Emmanuel Kannan 2.Dr.Daisy Dhanaseeli ... Petitioners Vs. Respondent ... None Prayer: Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying to set aside the docket order dated 21.09.2022 passed in OP.Sr.No.6669/2022 by the Principal District and Session Court, Chengalpattu and consequently direct the said Court to number the OP.SR.No.6669 of 2022 and decide the mutual divorce petition filed under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 and to pass any further order or orders as this Hon'ble Court. For Petitioners : Mr.P.Ayyamperumal Page 1 of 8 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.4314 of 2022 ORDER The Civil Revision Petition has been filed, questioning the Docket order dated 21.09.2022 passed in OP.Sr.No.6669/2022 on the file of the Principal District and Sessions Court, Chengalpattu and consequently direct the said Court to number the OP.SR.No.6669 of 2022 filed for mutual divorce between the petitioners. 2. The petitioners are husband and wife, jointly presented a mutual divorce petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869. The Principal District Court, Chengalpattu, returned the divorce petition on the ground that the first petitioner/husband is residing at Secunderabad, Telangana and therefore, the Principal District Court at Chengalpattu has no jurisdiction to entertain the...","12. With these directions, the Civil Revision Petition stands allowed. No costs. 02.01.2023 kak Index : Yes Speaking order:Yes Neutral Citation:Yes To The Judge, The Principal District and Sessions Court, Chengalpattu. Page 7 of 8 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.4314 of 2022 S.M.SUBRAMANIAM, J. kak C.R.P.No.4314 of 2022 02.01.2023 Page 8 of 8 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/143450101/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; procedural,2023,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,143450101,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/143450101/,2
Kerala High Court,"Dayana Sebastian vs Jill Joseph on 26 August, 2025",Dayana Sebastian vs Jill Joseph,2025-08-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Mat.A No.191 of 2020 2025 : KER: 65584 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERAIA AT ERNAKUIAM PRESET THE HONouRABI.I in. TuSTlcE DIVAN RAMACHANDRAN & THE HONouRABI.I ems. TusTlcE M.B. SNEHAIATHA TUESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF AVGUST 2025 / 4TH BHADRA, 1947 RAT.APPEAI. NO. 1910F 2020 AGIAINST THE ruDGnENT DATED 11.11.2019 IN op No.2254 oF 2ol4 oF FaMII.¥ couRT,ERNAKulnM APRELIIANT /RE SPONDENT : DAYANA SEBASTIAN, ACEt) 42 YEARS D/O DEVASIA.N.J, NJANDUKUZHIYII. HOUSE, UPPUKANDAM. P. O , KATTAPPANZI VIIIIAGE , uDVlutEENCHoln TAI,uK, plN-68551o. BY ADVS. SRI . JOENSCIN GOMEZ SRI. JOSH JOSEPH (CHEMPI.AYIL) RESPONDENT/PETITIONER: TIEL rosEPH, AGED 48 yEARs, S/O JOSEPEI, PADINJAREVEEFTIII HOUSE , THOTTUMUGIIAM.P.0, ALUVA, PIN-683105. BY ADVS. SRI . GEORGE mTHEw SHRI . PRAVEEN S . SMT.EI.SA DENNY PINDIS SRI . M . D . sAslKumRAN SRI.DIPU JZDGS SHRI.STEPHY K REGI THls RATRIMONIAL APPEAI. HAVING ConE Up FOR HEARING oN 26.08.2025, THE COURT 0N THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE F0I.LOWING: Mat.A No.191 of 2020 2025 : KER: 65584 DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN & M.B.SNEHALATHA, JJ. -------11111-1111,-I,--11111I-I----I--11-I- Mat.Appeal No.191 of 2020 ----,--I-I,111--I--I-1111-1111,----111--I-I Dated, this the 26th August, 2025 JUDGMENT",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"Appellant Respondent #?ny„ul""qg- Counsel for the Appellant Counsel for the R a ffi;.`o` 1 IA 2/2025 IN Mat.Appeal 191/2020-Petition iE BEFORE THE HONoiiRABLE rilGi] count oF KERf`L^` ERi`tAKtJLj\M '^ No. Of 2t'2§ ln Mat Appeal No.191/2020 Pe'i€E-rs Dayana Sehas¢}an Jill Joseph I. Dayana Sebastian. aged 50 ycars` D/a Pelfitio ncrs/^ppel)an t and Dcvasia N.I, NiandLikuzhiyil House. Resepondent : Uppukandam P.0, K@ttappana Village. Ubumbanchola Taluk. PIN - 68S510 `ha C.hrisLian communits'. The rriavy`ng€ t)etufeen PetitiQne[ No. ` and 2 were Solemnized on 3 I -I 2-2001 in €iccordance with the customary rites and ceTemonic`q of lhe Christian religion a( St Dominic`s Church, Alu\.a. f\L\tS- FS0 VERIFEED -26 2 IA 2/2025 IN Mat.Appeal 191/2020-Petition iiiH =. T``.a i.hi|dri-i` `vcrl` born o`it t}f the ``.Cdlock and both Childrel` have noN^ €`|taincd t|i.` ag|` ol` miLjoril>' .111d thcrcfore their guardianship and i-uslod}! Llrc not ii""ti`i.i.dl considcratioJ)s al this point in timi`. 3. ht\er the marriage. a difference ot` apin.1on oupred between the I...titioncrs and as su.-h they have bccn li`.ing separately sii`e|- June. 2012. After lbis date thcrl. is Ilo marital rl-lationship bet`~.c`en ihi`...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","M.B,Snehalatha, J Mat.A No.191/2020 is an appeal filed by the appellant/wife challenging the decree of divorce granted by the Family Court, Ernakulam under Section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act. 2. Today, when this appeal came up for hearing, the learned counsel appearing for both sides submitted that the entire disputes between the parties have been settled in the mediation held under the aegis of Mediation Centre, Ernakulam and a memorandum of settlement agreement has been filed before this Court. 3. We have examined the memorandum of settlement agreement and we notice that it has been signed by the parties and subscribed by their counsel. The terms of the agreement are lawful and therefore, the settlement arrived at by the parties is accepted. 4. In view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, appellant and respondent have filed a petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, wherein they have stated that they have mutually agreed and decided for dissolution of marriage voluntarily. Further it is stated that there is no collusion in filing Mat.A No.191 of 2020 2025 : KER: 65584 the petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act; that the spouses are living separately from 2012 onwards; and there is no marital relationship between them and therefore, they seek...",2. True copy of ^adhar C.ard of the Petitioners Counsel for Pctition€r No. I Counsel for Pctiti FSO VERIFHED -26,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/105417665/,Unclear,unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,105417665,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/105417665/,6
Supreme Court - Daily Orders,"Cliona Francis Noronha vs Manuel John D Costa on 10 April, 2026",Cliona Francis Noronha vs Manuel John D Costa,2026-04-10,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 13B, Section 142",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TRANSFER PETITION(S)(CIVIL) NO(S).2770/2024 CLIONA FRANCIS NORONHA PETITIONER(S) VERSUS MANUEL JOHN D COSTA RESPONDENT(S) O R D E R This Transfer Petition has been filed by the petitioner who is the wife of the respondent seeking the following prayer:,"4. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 09.12.2025, a sum of Rs.20 lakhs + 19 lakhs has been deposited with the Registry of this Court and a sum of Rs.one lakh lying in a fixed deposit has been withdrawn by the petitioner herein. Thus, the petitioner may be paid the sum of Rs.40 lakhs towards alimony in respect of all the claims made by the petitioner herein as against the respondent. Learned counsel for the respondent therefore submitted that the application filed by the respondent herein under Article 142 of the Constitution of India may be allowed since the petitioner is agreeable for such a relief. 5. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner also submitted that the petitioner is agreeable for the dissolution of the marriage and the application filed by the respondent herein may be allowed. 6. In the above backdrop we have taken on record, the application filed by the respondent herein. 7. We have considered the arguments advanced at the bar. 8. The parties are also present before this Court through video conferencing facility. 9. When we queried the parties, they submitted that they have indeed arrived at a...",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"4. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 09.12.2025, a sum of Rs.20 lakhs + 19 lakhs has been deposited with the Registry of this Court and a sum of Rs.one lakh lying in a fixed deposit has been withdrawn by the petitioner herein. Thus, the petitioner may be paid the sum of Rs.40 lakhs towards alimony in respect of all the claims made by the petitioner herein as against the respondent. Learned counsel for the respondent therefore submitted that the application filed by the respondent herein under Article 142 of the Constitution of India may be allowed since the petitioner is agreeable for such a relief. 5. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner also submitted that the petitioner is agreeable for the dissolution of the marriage and the application filed by the respondent herein may be allowed. 6. In the above backdrop we have taken on record, the application filed by the respondent herein. 7. We have considered the arguments advanced at the bar. 8. The parties are also present before this...","“(a) Transfer the Divorce Petition filed by the respondent/husband under Section 10(1)(x) of Indian Divorce Act, 1869 being S.M.P.No.9 of 2024 titled as “Mr. Manuel John D’Costa Vs. Mrs. Cliona Francis Noronha”, pending before the Ld. District Judge-I & Additional Sessions Judge, Palghar at District Palghar, Maharashtra to the Family Court, Bangalore, Karnataka; and (b) Pass such other or further order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.” 2. During the pendency of the Transfer Petition, the respondent-husband filed an application under Article 142 of Signature Not Verified the Constitution of India seeking dissolution of the marriage Digitally signed by BORRA LM VALLI Date: 2026.04.16 17:43:22 IST Reason: by a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A of 1 the Divorce Act, 1869 . The parties have explored the possibility of a settlement pursuant to the application filed by the respondent herein. 3. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that pursuant to the order dated 09.12.2025 passed by this Court the petitioner is ready and willing to accept a sum of Rs.40 lakhs in full and final settlement of all her claims against the respondent herein by way of permanent alimony in the...","15. Consequently, we allow the application filed by the respondent under Article 142 of the constitution of India. The marriage solemnised between the parties on 05.04.2021 at Maharashtra stands dissolved by a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869, stands dissolved. 5 16. The Registry is directed to transmit a sum of Rs.39 lakhs to the petitioner herein with accrued interest, if any, to account of the petitioner herein through RTGS/IMPS viz., Account Number; 0444101019074, Canara Bank, Account Holder Name: Cliona C.Noronha, IFSC Code: CNRB0000411; Branch Address: #628, 629, III Block, Rajajinagar. 17. In view of the aforesaid order, it is expected that the parties shall not litigate against each other. 18. Registry to draw up a decree in the aforesaid terms. 19. Transfer Petition is accordingly allowed in the aforesaid terms. ………………………………………………………, J (B.V. NAGARATHNA) …………………………………………………………, J (PRASHANT KUMAR MSIHRA) NEW DELHI APRIL 10, 2026 6 ITEM NO.60 COURT NO.4 SECTION IX S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/185293649/,Unclear,unclear,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,185293649,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/185293649/,4
Supreme Court - Daily Orders,"G. Saraswathi vs G. Narasimha Rao on 4 July, 2023",G. Saraswathi vs G. Narasimha Rao,2023-07-04,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 28",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ITEM NO.1 COURT NO.11 SECTION XVI-A S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 745/2022 IN TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 404/2020 G. SARASWATHI Petitioner(s) VERSUS G. NARASIMHA RAO Respondent(s) (NOT TO BE DELETED FROM 04.07.2023 AS BAILABLE WARRANTS ISSUED REQUIRING THE RESPONDENT TO BE PERSONALLY PRESENT ON 04.07.2023 BEFORE THE HON'BLE COURT) Date : 04-07-2023 This petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HRISHIKESH ROY HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PANKAJ MITHAL For Petitioner(s) Mr. Tanvir Nayar, AOR For Respondent(s) Ms. Prerna Robin, Adv. Mr. B. Shravanth Shanker, AOR Mr. B Yeshwanth Raj, Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R 1. Heard Mr. Tanvir Nayar, learned counsel, who is appearing together with the petitioner. Also heard Ms. Prerna Robin, learned counsel, who is appearing together with the respondent. 2. This contempt proceeding is initiated alleging non-compliance of the following two conditions recorded in the settlement agreement dated 08.12.2021:",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","“(i) That both the parties agree and undertake to file the Signature Not Verified Divorce Petition by mutual consent under Section 10A of Digitally signed by NITIN TALREJA Date: 2023.07.06 Divorce Act, 1869 or under Section 28 of the Special 15:04:17 IST Reason: Marriage Act 1954, as applicable, before the Principal Family Judge, Family Courts, Patiala House Courts, New 1 Delhi on or before 15.04.2022. Both the parties undertake to be present before the appropriate Court for filing and for recording of the statements in the mutual consent divorce petition. 4. It has been agreed between the parties that Respondent-husband Mr. G. Narasimha Rao shall pay a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lakh Only) as full and final settlement to Mrs. G. Saraswathi @ Pokuri Saraswati towards her Stridhan if any, her maintenance past, present, future and permanent Alimony and towards maintenance of their child namely G. Madhumeeta. The Respondent-husband has agreed to provide a copy of his Aadhaar Card for the benefit and use of child G. Madhumeeta.” 3. On the above, Ms. Prerna Robin, the learned counsel submits that the respondent had a mishap and therefore, he could arrange only Rs. 3 lakhs (Rupees Three Lakhs Only) but is prepared to pay the balance Rs. 5 lakhs (Rupees Five Lakhs Only) within two months, if this is permitted...",(NITIN TALREJA) (KAMLESH RAWAT) COURT MASTER (SH) ASSISTANT REGISTRAR 2,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/111379001/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2023,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,111379001,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/111379001/,3
Kerala High Court,"Jittymon Joseph vs Tania Chacko on 25 February, 2010",Jittymon Joseph vs Tania Chacko,2010-02-25,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 125",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM WP(C).No. 24219 of 2008(S) 1. JITTYMON JOSEPH ... Petitioner Vs 1. TANIA CHACKO, AGED 23 YEARS, ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.H.B.SHENOY For Respondent :SRI.LIJI.J.VADAKEDOM The Hon'ble MR. Justice R.BASANT The Hon'ble MRS. Justice M.C.HARI RANI Dated :25/02/2010 O R D E R R. BASANT & M.C. HARI RANI, JJ. ------------------------------------------------- W.P.(C) No.24219 of 2008-S ------------------------------------------------- Dated this the 25th day of February, 2010 JUDGMENT Basant,J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"The only question that survives for consideration in this writ petition is whether the joint application for dissolution of marriage under Sec.10A of the Divorce Act can be allowed and the marriage dissolved? 2. A brief reference to the facts may be relevant. The parties are Christians by religion. Their marriage was solemnized in accordance with the Christian religious rites on 31/12/07. There was instant acrimony in matrimony and the couple started separate residence from 10/2/08. A series of matrimonial litigations followed and the husband filed O.P.No.502/08 before the Family Court for restitution of W.P.(C) No.24219 of 2008-S -: 2 :- conjugal rights. The wife filed M.C.No.78/08 claiming maintenance under Sec.125 Cr.P.C.; O.P.No.319/08 claiming a money decree from the husband and O.P.No.512/08 claiming divorce under Sec.10 of the Divorce Act. While these proceedings were pending before the court below, the wife filed M.P.239/08 in M.C.No.78/08 claiming interim maintenance under Sec.125...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.",,"8. In the result: (a) This writ petition is allowed. (b) I.A.No.1572/09 filed jointly by the contestants reporting settlement is accepted. The same shall be appended to this judgment. (c) I.A.No.1573/09 is allowed. Invoking the powers of the Family Court under the Divorce Act , the marriage between the petitioner and the 1st respondent solemnized on 3/12/07, in accordance with the Christian religious rites, is hereby dissolved under Sec.10A of the Divorce Act. Sd/- R. BASANT (Judge) Sd/- M.C. HARI RANI (Judge) Nan/ //true copy// P.S. to Judge W.P.(C) No.24219 of 2008-S -: 5 :-",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33546/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2010,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,33546,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33546/,3
Kerala High Court,"Ajayakumar @ John vs Nizha.P.@ Marry on 20 December, 2010",Ajayakumar @ John vs Nizha.P.@ Marry,2010-12-20,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM Mat.Appeal.No. 577 of 2009() 1. AJAYAKUMAR @ JOHN, ... Petitioner Vs 1. NIZHA.P.@ MARRY, D/O BALAN NAIR, ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.T.G.RAJENDRAN For Respondent : No Appearance The Hon'ble MR. Justice R.BASANT The Hon'ble MR. Justice K.SURENDRA MOHAN Dated :20/12/2010 O R D E R R.BASANT & K.SURENDRA MOHAN, JJ. ------------------------------------------- MAT Appeal Nos.577 of 2009 and 852 of 2009 ------------------------------------------- Dated this the 20th December, 2010 JUDGMENT Basant, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Mat.Appeal No.577/2009 is filed by the appellant/husband against the dismissal of his claim for divorce under Section 10 of the Divorce Act. Mat.Appeal No.852/2009 is filed by the appellant against a decree for restitution of conjugal rights passed against him by the Family Court on the application filed by the respondent, his wife. 2. During the pendency of these appeals, the parties have settled their disputes. Accordingly, a joint application for divorce has been filed under Section 10A of the Divorce Act. That petition was filed on 15.6.2010. That was received and the matter was adjourned on 16.6.2010 to 20.12.2010. 3. We have heard both counsel. Both spouses have filed affidavits to confirm that they want the marriage to be dissolved by mutual consent under Section 10A of the Mat.A.577/2009 &852/2009 2 Divorce Act . All requisite formalities under Section 10A have been complied with. The spouses are legally married. They have been residing separately for a period in excess of two years. They have decided to get their marriage dissolved. An application has been filed under Section 10A of the Divorce Act on 15.6.2010. The waiting period of six months under Section 10A(2) of the Divorce Act has already elapsed. Spouses have confirmed that they want their marriage to be dissolved under Section 10A of the Divorce Act. We...","4. In the result, a) Mat.Appeal No.852/2009 is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. b) Mat Appeal No.577/2009 is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. R.BASANT JUDGE K.SURENDRA MOHAN JUDGE css/",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1412246/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2010,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,1412246,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1412246/,5
Kerala High Court,"Sumi Mathew vs Shiju Abraham on 26 August, 2025",Sumi Mathew vs Shiju Abraham,2025-08-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Mat.A Nos.338/2022, 621/2022, 14/2023 & 878/2023 2025 : KER: 6568 9 IN THE HIGH COURT 0F KERAIA AT ERNAKULAM PRESET THE HONouRABLE in. ]usTlcE DEVAN EumcllzniDRAN & THE HONOURABIE MRS. JUSTICE M.B. SNEHA14ATHA TUESDAY, THE 26TH DAY 0F AUcOST 2025 / 4TH BHADRA, 1947 RAT.APPEAL NO. 338 0F 2022 AGHENST TEE euDCB4mtT DATED o8.12.2o21 IN op No.143 oF 20±9 0F FTLMIL¥ COURT, KANNUR APPEI.IANT/PETITIONER: SHIOu ABRAHAM, AGED 38 YEARS S/o.ABRAHm4, puTHUMArmTHII. VEED, MANlppARA (co) , unmNKAXAM, NucHlyzD vll.LACE , TAI.IPARZDGA TALUK, KmiNUR, PIN -67o 7o5. BY ADVS. SHRI . P . V . ANcOP SRI.PHIJO PRADRESH PHII.IP SHRI . M . p . pRlyESHKuinR SRI . K . V . SREERAJ RESPONDRES/RESPONDENTS: 1 SUMI mTHEw, AGED 34 rEARs W/O.SHIJU ABRAHAM, IKKARA VEED, KARUVANCHAII (PO) , KantlvENCHAL, AIAKKODE , KANNUR DlsTRlcT , plN - 67o 571 Now TEBeoRAR¥ REslDING AT SUMI RATHEW, MILE.ENIUM INSURANCE BRORERS CO.I.II.C. AN RMs GRoup coMPAN¥, oFFlcE No.2o682o8, KARAln STAR BulLDING, KARmm, p.o.Box.34602, DUBAI, u.A.I. JOJO ""THEW KUZHIMUI.I,IL HouSE , inRANCIATTuPAI,L¥ (po) , KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN -686 635. mTHAI IKKARA VRED , KARUVANCHAI. (PO). , KARUVIINCHAI-, AI.AREroDE , TALlpARAI>GA TAI,uK, KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN -670 571. BY ADV SHRI.M. SASINDRZDl THls mTRIMONIAI, AppEAL HAVING cold up FOR HEARING...","Dated this the 15th day of July 2025 cfty Counsel for the Appellant/wife Phu`D #uofs::n: {#;'l?fo|„ Counsel for the respondentyhusband Tbffi#s7 FSO VERIFIED-46 IA 2/2025 IN Mat.Appeal 621/2022-Petition (Page-7) BEFOFtE THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT EFLNAKUu IA. i of 2025 in Mat. Appeal No. 621 of2022 Petitioners/ Respondent and ADDellant Shiju Abraham, aged 39 years, S/o. Abraham, Puthumattathil House, Manippara.P.O., Karimankayam, Nichiyad Village, Taliparamba, Kannur District -670 705.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,"5. It is submitted that the entire issues jn all the above referred cases has been settled between the parties amicably out of Court. As per settlement arrived at between the parties, the Appellant/wife agreed to pay an amount of Rs.9,00,000/- (Nine Lakhs only) to the respondent / husband in full and final settlement of the issues involved in all the above referred Appeals. The Appellanvwife agreed to pay the above sum of Rs.9,00,000/- (Nine Lakhs only) to the respondenvhusband by transferring the amount to the Bank account of the respondenvhusband or 6f his counsel within 15 days from today. 6. The respondent/ husband has no objection for, and agrees to allow Mat.Appeal 621/2022 by granting decree of divorce as prayed for in OP No.624/2017. 7. The respondent/ husband agrees to relinquish his right over the joint locker maintained in the Alakode Branch of the State Bank of India, and the entire articles in the locker, and would furnish neeessary instructions to the Bank to permit the appellant / wife to own and operate the locker independently. 8. In view...","Dated this the 15th day of July 2025 cfty Counsel for the Appellant/wife Phu`D #uofs::n: {#;'l?fo|„ Counsel for the respondentyhusband Tbffi#s7 FSO VERIFIED-46 IA 2/2025 IN Mat.Appeal 621/2022-Petition (Page-7) BEFOFtE THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT EFLNAKUu IA. i of 2025 in Mat. Appeal No. 621 of2022 Petitioners/ Respondent and ADDellant Shiju Abraham, aged 39 years, S/o. Abraham, Puthumattathil House, Manippara.P.O., Karimankayam, Nichiyad Village, Taliparamba, Kannur District -670 705.","3. During the pendency of these appeals, in view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, appellant and respondent have filed a petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, wherein they have stated that they have mutually agreed and decided for dissolution of marriage voluntarily; that there is no collusion in filing the petition. Mat.A Nos.338/2022, 621/2022, 14/2023 & 878/2023 2 02 5 : KER : 65 68 9 Further it is stated that there is no force, fraud or undue influence in filing. the petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869; that the spouses are living separately from 2016 onwards; and that they cannot live together as husband and wife due to strained relationship and therefore, they seek divorce by mutual consent. 4. The learned counsel also took our attention to the decision of this Court in Mat.Appeal Nos.751/2010 and 297/2005 wherein on a similar set of facts, the Division Bench this Court granted divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A of the Divorce Act based on a compromise entered into between the parties during the pendency of the Matrimonial Appeal. 5. Both parties have affirmed that the entire disputes between the parties have been settled in terms of the I.oint petition filed by the Parties. 6....","Dated this th EEEEiE ay of August, 2025 Counsel „ . Jar ; vut qu FSO VERIFIED -40",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/199571092/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2025,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,199571092,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/199571092/,8
Kerala High Court,"James.V.O vs Betty on 12 November, 2025",James.V.O vs Betty,2025-11-12,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2025 : RER: 87114 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERAIA AT E AKULAM PRESENT THE HONouRABLE MR. ]usTlcE DIVAN RZDmcHzniDRzua & THE IIONOURABIE MRS. JUSTICE M.B. SNEIIAIATHA WEDNESDAY, THE 12TH DAY OF NOVEREER 2025 / 21ST KARTHIRA, 1947 MAT.APPEAI. NO. 12510F 2016 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.06.2016 IN OP NO.652 0F 2015 0F FAIILY COURT , IRINdAliAKUDA APPEIIiANT/PETITIONER: JRES . V . 0 june 54 ¥Eas, S/O OUSEH, VADAKKZEN HOUSE, MulilASERI P.O, NEAR BLOCK, CHA:VAKKAD TAIIUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT 680 509. BY ADVS. sum. GlsA susAN THOMzis sin . K .7jREIL¥ sin . G . ASHENI sam . A . R . I) IV¥A RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT: BEFT AGrm 49 ±, D/O VARU, PAIAYOOR HOUSE, THOYAKKA:VU, THRISSUR DISTRICH 680 513. 8¥ anvs ., SHRI. REBIN vlNCENT GRAlnN SHRI.I>IRESH G TgzrmlER TH I S IATRIMON IAII APPEAL HZIVING BEEN FINALI.Y HEARD ON 12.11.2025, AI.ONG WITH Mat.Appeal.1247/2016, 1252/2016, THE COURT oN TI]E- SAME DAY DE`I]IVERE-D TI]E` FOLLowlNe: Mat.A Nos.1247/2016,1251/2016 & 1252/2016 2 2025 : KER: 87114 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERAIA AT E AKUILAM PRESENT THE HONouRABLE in. TusTlcE DEVAN RZDmcHANDRznT & THE HONotJRELE MRS. JUSTICE M.B. SNEHALHTHA wEDNESDAy, THE i2TH DAy OF NOvEreER 2o25 / 21sT KARTHIRA, 1947 RAT.APPEAL NO. 1247 0F 2016...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. In view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, appellant and respondent have filed a joint petition .under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, wherein they have stated that the marital relationship between them Mat.A Nos.1247/2016,1251/2016 & 1252/2016 7 2 0 2 5 : KER : 8 7114 has been irretrievably broken down and there is absolutely no chance for a reunion. Further it is stated that they mutually and voluntarily decided to settle all their disputes and issues in between them; that the spouses are living separately from 13.7.2010 onwards; and there is no marital relationship between them and therefore, they seek divorce by mutual consent. 5. Both parties have affirmed that the entire disputes between the parties have been settled in terms of the joint petition filed by the parties. 6. We are convinced t:hat the marriage between the spouses has been irretrievably broken down and there is no possibility of reunion and divorce is the viable option and all`the attempts of reunion have been failed. We are also convinced that the parties have voluntarily filed the petition under Section 10A of the . Divorce Act, 1869 and there is no collusion between the parties. 7. We are of the view that this is a fit case to...","BJE7£Hj32JD# JAM.ES V.O. BETTY I „' Petitioner 2""d iict:itiolicr FSO .VERl.FIE.D -8",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/87144778/,Unclear,unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,87144778,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/87144778/,5
Kerala High Court,"James V.O vs Betty on 12 November, 2025",James V.O vs Betty,2025-11-12,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2025 : RER: 87114 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERAIA AT E AKULAM PRESENT THE HONouRABLE MR. ]usTlcE DIVAN RZDmcHzniDRzua & THE IIONOURABIE MRS. JUSTICE M.B. SNEIIAIATHA WEDNESDAY, THE 12TH DAY OF NOVEREER 2025 / 21ST KARTHIRA, 1947 MAT.APPEAI. NO. 12510F 2016 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.06.2016 IN OP NO.652 0F 2015 0F FAIILY COURT , IRINdAliAKUDA APPEIIiANT/PETITIONER: JRES . V . 0 june 54 ¥Eas, S/O OUSEH, VADAKKZEN HOUSE, MulilASERI P.O, NEAR BLOCK, CHA:VAKKAD TAIIUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT 680 509. BY ADVS. sum. GlsA susAN THOMzis sin . K .7jREIL¥ sin . G . ASHENI sam . A . R . I) IV¥A RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT: BEFT AGrm 49 ±, D/O VARU, PAIAYOOR HOUSE, THOYAKKA:VU, THRISSUR DISTRICH 680 513. 8¥ anvs ., SHRI. REBIN vlNCENT GRAlnN SHRI.I>IRESH G TgzrmlER TH I S IATRIMON IAII APPEAL HZIVING BEEN FINALI.Y HEARD ON 12.11.2025, AI.ONG WITH Mat.Appeal.1247/2016, 1252/2016, THE COURT oN TI]E- SAME DAY DE`I]IVERE-D TI]E` FOLLowlNe: Mat.A Nos.1247/2016,1251/2016 & 1252/2016 2 2025 : KER: 87114 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERAIA AT E AKUILAM PRESENT THE HONouRABLE in. TusTlcE DEVAN RZDmcHANDRznT & THE HONotJRELE MRS. JUSTICE M.B. SNEHALHTHA wEDNESDAy, THE i2TH DAy OF NOvEreER 2o25 / 21sT KARTHIRA, 1947 RAT.APPEAL NO. 1247 0F 2016...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. In view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, appellant and respondent have filed a joint petition .under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, wherein they have stated that the marital relationship between them Mat.A Nos.1247/2016,1251/2016 & 1252/2016 7 2 0 2 5 : KER : 8 7114 has been irretrievably broken down and there is absolutely no chance for a reunion. Further it is stated that they mutually and voluntarily decided to settle all their disputes and issues in between them; that the spouses are living separately from 13.7.2010 onwards; and there is no marital relationship between them and therefore, they seek divorce by mutual consent. 5. Both parties have affirmed that the entire disputes between the parties have been settled in terms of the joint petition filed by the parties. 6. We are convinced t:hat the marriage between the spouses has been irretrievably broken down and there is no possibility of reunion and divorce is the viable option and all`the attempts of reunion have been failed. We are also convinced that the parties have voluntarily filed the petition under Section 10A of the . Divorce Act, 1869 and there is no collusion between the parties. 7. We are of the view that this is a fit case to...","BJE7£Hj32JD# JAM.ES V.O. BETTY I „' Petitioner 2""d iict:itiolicr FSO .VERl.FIE.D -8",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3359176/,Unclear,unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,3359176,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3359176/,5
Kerala High Court,"James V.O vs Betty on 12 November, 2025",James V.O vs Betty,2025-11-12,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2025 : RER: 87114 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERAIA AT E AKULAM PRESENT THE HONouRABLE MR. ]usTlcE DIVAN RZDmcHzniDRzua & THE IIONOURABIE MRS. JUSTICE M.B. SNEIIAIATHA WEDNESDAY, THE 12TH DAY OF NOVEREER 2025 / 21ST KARTHIRA, 1947 MAT.APPEAI. NO. 12510F 2016 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.06.2016 IN OP NO.652 0F 2015 0F FAIILY COURT , IRINdAliAKUDA APPEIIiANT/PETITIONER: JRES . V . 0 june 54 ¥Eas, S/O OUSEH, VADAKKZEN HOUSE, MulilASERI P.O, NEAR BLOCK, CHA:VAKKAD TAIIUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT 680 509. BY ADVS. sum. GlsA susAN THOMzis sin . K .7jREIL¥ sin . G . ASHENI sam . A . R . I) IV¥A RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT: BEFT AGrm 49 ±, D/O VARU, PAIAYOOR HOUSE, THOYAKKA:VU, THRISSUR DISTRICH 680 513. 8¥ anvs ., SHRI. REBIN vlNCENT GRAlnN SHRI.I>IRESH G TgzrmlER TH I S IATRIMON IAII APPEAL HZIVING BEEN FINALI.Y HEARD ON 12.11.2025, AI.ONG WITH Mat.Appeal.1247/2016, 1252/2016, THE COURT oN TI]E- SAME DAY DE`I]IVERE-D TI]E` FOLLowlNe: Mat.A Nos.1247/2016,1251/2016 & 1252/2016 2 2025 : KER: 87114 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERAIA AT E AKUILAM PRESENT THE HONouRABLE in. TusTlcE DEVAN RZDmcHANDRznT & THE HONotJRELE MRS. JUSTICE M.B. SNEHALHTHA wEDNESDAy, THE i2TH DAy OF NOvEreER 2o25 / 21sT KARTHIRA, 1947 RAT.APPEAL NO. 1247 0F 2016...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. In view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, appellant and respondent have filed a joint petition .under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, wherein they have stated that the marital relationship between them Mat.A Nos.1247/2016,1251/2016 & 1252/2016 7 2 0 2 5 : KER : 8 7114 has been irretrievably broken down and there is absolutely no chance for a reunion. Further it is stated that they mutually and voluntarily decided to settle all their disputes and issues in between them; that the spouses are living separately from 13.7.2010 onwards; and there is no marital relationship between them and therefore, they seek divorce by mutual consent. 5. Both parties have affirmed that the entire disputes between the parties have been settled in terms of the joint petition filed by the parties. 6. We are convinced t:hat the marriage between the spouses has been irretrievably broken down and there is no possibility of reunion and divorce is the viable option and all`the attempts of reunion have been failed. We are also convinced that the parties have voluntarily filed the petition under Section 10A of the . Divorce Act, 1869 and there is no collusion between the parties. 7. We are of the view that this is a fit case to...","BJE7£Hj32JD# JAM.ES V.O. BETTY I „' Petitioner 2""d iict:itiolicr FSO .VERl.FIE.D -8",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/169360697/,Unclear,unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,169360697,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/169360697/,5
Kerala High Court,"Shiju Abraham vs Sumi Mathew on 26 August, 2025",Shiju Abraham vs Sumi Mathew,2025-08-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Mat.A Nos.338/2022, 621/2022, 14/2023 & 878/2023 2025 : KER: 6568 9 IN THE HIGH COURT 0F KERAIA AT ERNAKULAM PRESET THE HONouRABLE in. ]usTlcE DEVAN EumcllzniDRAN & THE HONOURABIE MRS. JUSTICE M.B. SNEHA14ATHA TUESDAY, THE 26TH DAY 0F AUcOST 2025 / 4TH BHADRA, 1947 RAT.APPEAL NO. 338 0F 2022 AGHENST TEE euDCB4mtT DATED o8.12.2o21 IN op No.143 oF 20±9 0F FTLMIL¥ COURT, KANNUR APPEI.IANT/PETITIONER: SHIOu ABRAHAM, AGED 38 YEARS S/o.ABRAHm4, puTHUMArmTHII. VEED, MANlppARA (co) , unmNKAXAM, NucHlyzD vll.LACE , TAI.IPARZDGA TALUK, KmiNUR, PIN -67o 7o5. BY ADVS. SHRI . P . V . ANcOP SRI.PHIJO PRADRESH PHII.IP SHRI . M . p . pRlyESHKuinR SRI . K . V . SREERAJ RESPONDRES/RESPONDENTS: 1 SUMI mTHEw, AGED 34 rEARs W/O.SHIJU ABRAHAM, IKKARA VEED, KARUVANCHAII (PO) , KantlvENCHAL, AIAKKODE , KANNUR DlsTRlcT , plN - 67o 571 Now TEBeoRAR¥ REslDING AT SUMI RATHEW, MILE.ENIUM INSURANCE BRORERS CO.I.II.C. AN RMs GRoup coMPAN¥, oFFlcE No.2o682o8, KARAln STAR BulLDING, KARmm, p.o.Box.34602, DUBAI, u.A.I. JOJO ""THEW KUZHIMUI.I,IL HouSE , inRANCIATTuPAI,L¥ (po) , KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN -686 635. mTHAI IKKARA VRED , KARUVANCHAI. (PO). , KARUVIINCHAI-, AI.AREroDE , TALlpARAI>GA TAI,uK, KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN -670 571. BY ADV SHRI.M. SASINDRZDl THls mTRIMONIAI, AppEAL HAVING cold up FOR HEARING...","Dated this the 15th day of July 2025 cfty Counsel for the Appellant/wife Phu`D #uofs::n: {#;'l?fo|„ Counsel for the respondentyhusband Tbffi#s7 FSO VERIFIED-46 IA 2/2025 IN Mat.Appeal 621/2022-Petition (Page-7) BEFOFtE THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT EFLNAKUu IA. i of 2025 in Mat. Appeal No. 621 of2022 Petitioners/ Respondent and ADDellant Shiju Abraham, aged 39 years, S/o. Abraham, Puthumattathil House, Manippara.P.O., Karimankayam, Nichiyad Village, Taliparamba, Kannur District -670 705.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,"5. It is submitted that the entire issues jn all the above referred cases has been settled between the parties amicably out of Court. As per settlement arrived at between the parties, the Appellant/wife agreed to pay an amount of Rs.9,00,000/- (Nine Lakhs only) to the respondent / husband in full and final settlement of the issues involved in all the above referred Appeals. The Appellanvwife agreed to pay the above sum of Rs.9,00,000/- (Nine Lakhs only) to the respondenvhusband by transferring the amount to the Bank account of the respondenvhusband or 6f his counsel within 15 days from today. 6. The respondent/ husband has no objection for, and agrees to allow Mat.Appeal 621/2022 by granting decree of divorce as prayed for in OP No.624/2017. 7. The respondent/ husband agrees to relinquish his right over the joint locker maintained in the Alakode Branch of the State Bank of India, and the entire articles in the locker, and would furnish neeessary instructions to the Bank to permit the appellant / wife to own and operate the locker independently. 8. In view...","Dated this the 15th day of July 2025 cfty Counsel for the Appellant/wife Phu`D #uofs::n: {#;'l?fo|„ Counsel for the respondentyhusband Tbffi#s7 FSO VERIFIED-46 IA 2/2025 IN Mat.Appeal 621/2022-Petition (Page-7) BEFOFtE THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT EFLNAKUu IA. i of 2025 in Mat. Appeal No. 621 of2022 Petitioners/ Respondent and ADDellant Shiju Abraham, aged 39 years, S/o. Abraham, Puthumattathil House, Manippara.P.O., Karimankayam, Nichiyad Village, Taliparamba, Kannur District -670 705.","3. During the pendency of these appeals, in view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, appellant and respondent have filed a petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, wherein they have stated that they have mutually agreed and decided for dissolution of marriage voluntarily; that there is no collusion in filing the petition. Mat.A Nos.338/2022, 621/2022, 14/2023 & 878/2023 2 02 5 : KER : 65 68 9 Further it is stated that there is no force, fraud or undue influence in filing. the petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869; that the spouses are living separately from 2016 onwards; and that they cannot live together as husband and wife due to strained relationship and therefore, they seek divorce by mutual consent. 4. The learned counsel also took our attention to the decision of this Court in Mat.Appeal Nos.751/2010 and 297/2005 wherein on a similar set of facts, the Division Bench this Court granted divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A of the Divorce Act based on a compromise entered into between the parties during the pendency of the Matrimonial Appeal. 5. Both parties have affirmed that the entire disputes between the parties have been settled in terms of the I.oint petition filed by the Parties. 6....","Dated this th EEEEiE ay of August, 2025 Counsel „ . Jar ; vut qu FSO VERIFIED -40",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/85893174/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2025,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,85893174,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/85893174/,8
Kerala High Court,"Sheelu Abraham vs James Abraham on 21 August, 2025",Sheelu Abraham vs James Abraham,2025-08-21,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 89",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Mat.A No.540 of 2025 2025 : KER: 63900 IN THE HIGH cOuRI OF KERAln AT ERNAKul,AM PRESET THE HonouRABIE MR. JusTlcN= DEvaN RAimcHANDRZDi & TEE HCINouRABIE ims. eusTlcE M.B. SNEHAI+ATHA THURSDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF AUcOST 2025 / 30TH SRAV:Era, 1947 MAT.APPEAI. NO. 540 0F 2025 AGAINST THE ruDGBdENT DATED 07.03.2025 IN opDrv No.1454 0F 2023 0F FAMILY COURT, PUNALUR APEqLILANT/PETITIONER: SHEELU ABRAHAM, AGED 42 YEARS VELIKKAKATHU VEEDU, KUIATHcOR 9A, suBRZDmN¥A STREET , CHENNAI TowN, THIRUVALliooR DISTRICT, TAMIIi NADU, PIN - 600009 BY ADVS. SHRI .AI,Ex THODms SRI. PHILIP I.VARGHESE SRI . THODms I .VARGHESE sbor . v . I . I.ITIA sin . K . R . iooNI sin RESPONDENT/RESPONDRT: JRES ABRAIIZ\M, AGED 47 YEARS l«JTTATHIII KAIAYIL VEEDU, PILACHERY P.O, cHERUTHANNcOR , vAIAKroDu vll,Iace , PUNAI+uR TALUK, roLLEN, plN - 691331 BY Ays. SHRI.RENJITH R. NAIR (rot.I.AM) SRI.M. RA4ENDRmi NAIR (THONNAI+LOOR) SRI . SREEJITH R.NAIR SRI.SENO. R. NAIR slur . AKSHARA K . p . THls imTRIMONIAI. AppEAI. EIAvlNG COME up FOR HEARING oN 21.08.2025, THE CotJRT CAN THE SAME DAY DEIIIVERED THE roLLc~G: Mat.A No.540 of 2025 2025 : KER: 63900 DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN & M.B.SNEHALATHA, JJ. -1111-----11-----,,11,,I1-11-I1111--,,-I--I Mat.Appeal No.540 of 2025 111,,I--I,----11--I-11-1111111111,1111-111- Dated, this the 21st August, 2025...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. In view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, appellant and respondent have filed a petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, wherein they have stated that they have mutually agreed and decided for dissolution of marriage voluntarily. Further it is stated that there is Mat.A No.540 of 2025 2025 : KER: 63900 no fraud, coercion or undue influence in filing the petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act; that the spouses are living separately from 2018 onwards; and there is irretrievable breakdown of marriage and there is no chance for reunion and therefore, they seek divorce by mutual consent. 5. Both parties have affirmed that the entire disputes between the parties have been settled in terms of the joint petition filed by the parties. 6. We are convinced that the marriage between the spouses has been irretrievably broken down and they are living separately from 2018 onwards and there is no possibility of reunion and divorce is the viable option and all the attempts of reunion have been failed. We are also convinced that the parties have voluntarily filed the petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act and there is no collusion between the parties and this Court is satisfied that the consent was not obtained...",|St Petitioner (Sheelu Abraham) 2nd Petitioner(James Abraham) FS0 VERIFIED -39,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154618433/,Unclear,unclear,2025,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,154618433,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154618433/,5
Kerala High Court,"Shijo Mon Joseph vs Sabin Philip on 20 May, 2025",Shijo Mon Joseph vs Sabin Philip,2025-05-20,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Mat.A No.683 of 2024 1 2025:KER:34360 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN & THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.B. SNEHALATHA TUESDAY, THE 20TH DAY OF MAY 2025 / 30TH VAISAKHA, 1947 MAT.APPEAL NO. 683 OF 2024 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN OP NO.749 OF 2018 OF FAMILY COURT, KOTTAYAM APPELLANT/PETITIONER: SHIJO MON JOSEPH, AGED 46 YEARS S/O. OUSEPH CHACKO, VALIYAPARAMBILL HOUSE, KARUMADI P.O., AMBALAPUZHA VILLAGE, AMBALAPUZHA TALUK, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT, PIN - 688562 BY ADVS. T.J.SEEMA BHAVANA VELAYUDHAN DEVAVRATHAN S. V.GANESH KUMAR S.SANAL KUMAR (SR.)(K/582/1994) RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT: SABIN PHILIP D/O. PHILIP, KOTTACKAL (ROSE VILLA), PERUMBANACHI P.O., CHANGANACHERRY TALUK, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN - 686536 BY ADVS. GIGIMON ISSAC TOBIAS TOGI MATHEW(K/867/2018) THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING ON 19.05.2025, THE COURT ON 20.5.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN & M.B.SNEHALATHA, JJ. ------------------------------------------- Mat.Appeal No.683 of 2024 ------------------------------------------- Dated this the 20th May, 2025 JUDGMENT",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","M.B.Snehalatha, J This appeal has been filed by the appellant who is the petitioner in O.P.No.749/2018 on the file of the Family Court, Kottayam. The said Original Petition seeking divorce under Section 10(ix) and (x) of the Divorce Act was dismissed by the Family Court. 2. During the pendency of the appeal, appellant and respondent have filed a petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, wherein they have stated that they have mutually agreed and decided for dissolution of marriage voluntarily; that there is no collusion or connivance in filing the petition. Further it is stated that there is no fraud or collusion in filing the petition under Section 10A of the Divorce Act; that the spouses are living separately from 2018 onwards; and there is irretrievable breakdown of marriage and there is no chance for reunion and therefore, they seek divorce by mutual consent. 3. The learned counsel also took our attention to the decision of this court in Mat.Appeal Nos. 751/2010 and 297/2005 wherein on a similar set of facts, the Division Bench this court granted divorce by Mat.A No.683 of 2024 3 2025:KER:34360 mutual consent under Section 10A of the Divorce Act based on a compromise entered into between the parties during the pendency of the Matrimonial Appeal....",M.B.SNEHALATHA JUDGE ab,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/174389194/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2025,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,174389194,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/174389194/,5
Kerala High Court,"Remyaelza Mathew Aged 27 Years vs Nil on 7 February, 2014",Remyaelza Mathew Aged 27 Years vs Nil,2014-02-07,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALAATERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE HARUN-UL-RASHID & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALEXANDER THOMAS FRIDAY,THE 7TH DAYOF FEBRUARY 2014/18TH MAGHA, 1935 Mat.Appeal.No. 62 of 2014 () ----------------------------- AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN OP(DIV) 976/2013 of FAMILY COURT,MAVELIKKARA DATED19-10-2013 APPELLANT(S)/PETITIONERS: ------------------------------------------------ 1. REMYAELZA MATHEW AGED 27 YEARS D/O.PROF. MATHEW VARGHESE, KANKALIL MEENTHETHIL HOUSE KANDIYOOR, THATTARAMBALAM PO, MAVELIKKARA ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT 2. DILEEP JOHN MATHAI AGED 34 YEARS S/O.VARGHESEMATHEW, USHALIN HOUSE CHANEERKARA PO KULANADA NOW RESIDING AT CHALLARICKAL HOUSE, TC 11/1759(2), NANTHANCODE, KAVADIYAR PO TRIVANDRUM, KERALA STATE BY ADVS.SRI.K.SHAJ SRI.SAJJU.S SRI.RENJIT GEORGE SMT.ANJU MOHAN SRI.R.ARUN (KAYAMKULAM) SRI.S.K.SUJITH KRISHNA SRI.S.SHAJAHAN (ADOOR) RESPONDENT(S): ---------------------------- NIL THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 07-02-2014, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAYDELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: AV HARUN-UL-RASHID & ALEXANDER THOMAS, JJ. ------------------------------------ MAT Appeal No.62 of 2014 ----------------------------------- Dated this the 7th day of February, 2014 J U D G M E N T Harun-Ul-Rashid, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (mutual consent 10A) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The appellants herein are the petitioners in O.P.(Div) No.976/2013 on the file of the Family Court, Mavelikara. The appeal is filed against the judgment dated 19.10.2013 in the original petition. The original petition was filed by the appellants for a decree of dissolution of marriage by mutual consent under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869. The original petition was filed before the Family Court, Alappuzha. After the establishment of the Family Court at Mavelikara, the same was transferred to the said court. The court below by the impugned order held that the period of separate living of the spouse should be two years in the case of an application under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 and hence the application filed by the petitioners/appellants under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869 is not allowable. 2. Due to clerical mistake, which did not come to the notice of the petitioners or to the notice of their counsel, it is MAT Appeal No.62 of 2014 2 averred in the petition that the parties are living separately from 20.08.2012. The petition for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent under Section 10A of the Divorce Act was filed on 14.03.2013. They filed a proof affidavit before the court. In that affidavit also it is stated that they are living separately from...","In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside. The case is remanded for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The petitioners/ appellants are at liberty to amend the pleadings by filing necessary application before the court below, if so advised. The petitioners/appellants shall appear before the court below on 18.02.2014. The court below shall consider and dispose of the original petition within a period of two months. Sd/- HARUN-UL-RASHID, JUDGE Sd/- ALEXANDER THOMAS, JUDGE AV /True Copy/ P.A to Judge",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/170425593/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2014,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,170425593,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/170425593/,3
Kerala High Court,"Kurian Mathew Abraham vs Teuny Johns on 4 November, 2009",Kurian Mathew Abraham vs Teuny Johns,2009-11-04,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM WP(C).No. 16439 of 2009(R) 1. KURIAN MATHEW ABRAHAM, AGED 32, ... Petitioner Vs 1. TEUNY JOHNS, AGED 27 YEARS, ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.S.MUHAMMED HANEEFF For Respondent :SRI.SAJAN MANNALI The Hon'ble MR. Justice R.BASANT The Hon'ble MRS. Justice M.C.HARI RANI Dated :04/11/2009 O R D E R R.BASANT & M.C.HARI RANI, JJ. * * * * * * * * * * * * * W.P.(C).No.16439 of 2009 ---------------------------------------- Dated this the 4th day of November 2009 J U D G M E N T Basant,J This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner who is the respondent in O.P.No.254/06 pending before the Family Court, Ernakulam. This petition has been filed to challenge Ext.P5 order.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. During the pendency of the proceedings, parties have settled all their outstanding disputes. It is submitted before court that O.P.No.254/06 for divorce as also O.P.No.1669/06 claiming a money decree pending between the parties before the Family Court have all now been settled. Parties have agreed that the marital tie can be dissolved by an application under Section 10A of the Divorce Act. They have further agreed to pay a lump sum amount of Rs.3,00,000/- in full settlement of the monetary claims. It is submitted at the Bar that the amount has already been paid. 3. It is prayed that an order granting divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A of the Divorce Act may be passed by W.P.C No.16439/09 2 this court in this writ petition and that O.P.No.1669/06 may be dismissed by an order in this writ petition. I.A.No.13836/09 has been filed before this court to report such settlement and I.A.No.13837/09 has been filed for an order dissolving marriage under Section 10A of the Divorce Act by mutual consent. 4. We wanted the learned counsel to explain why they have not moved the Family Court, Ernakulam before which O.Ps are pending and why they have come before this court with these I.As. The learned counsel submit that there have been precedents where such course has been followed by...","6. In the result, a) This writ petition is dismissed. b) I.A.Nos.13836 & 13837 of 2009 shall be returned to the petitioners to seek appropriate remedy before the Family Court before which the O.Ps are pending. 7. The learned counsel pray and it is directed that the Family Court, Ernakulam must pass appropriate orders expeditiously in O.P.Nos.254/06 and 1669/06 when settlement is reported by advancing the hearing of the said O.Ps, if necessary. (R.BASANT, JUDGE) (M.C.HARI RANI, JUDGE) jsr // True Copy// PA to Judge W.P.C No.16439/09 4 W.P.C No.16439/09 5 R.BASANT & M.C.HARI RANI, JJ. .No. of 200 ORDER/JUDGMENT 29/07/2009",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/732159/,Unclear,unclear,2009,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,732159,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/732159/,3
Kerala High Court,"M.Krishna Preetha vs Dr.Jayan Moorkkanatt on 22 February, 2010",AIR 2010 KERALA 157,2010-02-22,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 13, Section 13B, Section 28, Section 4",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM Mat.Appeal.No. 633 of 2008(A) 1. M.KRISHNA PREETHA, AGED 29 YEARS, ... Petitioner Vs 1. DR.JAYAN MOORKKANATT, AGED 36 YEARS, ... Respondent 2. DR. P.SIVASANKARAN ""KRISHNA"", For Petitioner :SRI.SHOBY K.FRANCIS For Respondent :SRI.G.SREEKUMAR (CHELUR) The Hon'ble MR. Justice R.BASANT The Hon'ble MRS. Justice M.C.HARI RANI Dated :22/02/2010 O R D E R CR R. BASANT & M.C. HARI RANI, JJ. ------------------------------------------------- Mat. Appeal No. 633 of 2008-A ------------------------------------------------- Dated this the 22nd day of February, 2010 JUDGMENT Basant,J. Can the waiting period after filing the joint petition for divorce under Sec.13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, Sec.10A of the Indian Divorce Act and Sec.28 of the Special Marriage Act be waived by the court suo motu or on the application of both parties? 2. This question arose for consideration in various petitions and we posted all such cases together for hearing. Sri. G. Shrikumar, Advocate, has rendered assistance as amicus curiae for the court. We have had the advantage of hearing Advocates M/s S. Subash Chand, , Sandhya Raju, M.R. Rajesh, R. Sunilkumar, Shoby K. Francis and others on the question. We are answering that question in this case. The finding on that...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"Divorce by mutual consent.-- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnised before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976), on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. ""10 A of the Divorce Act . Dissolution of marriage by mutual consent.-- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, a petition for dissolution of marriage may be presented to the District Court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnised before or...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. The concept of marriage being solemn, sacrosanct and indissoluble is deeply rooted in the Hindu and Christian thoughts and way of life. The concept of divorce was itself accepted and recognized in these systems of personal laws after a long period which witnessed slow evolution of the law. Divorces on the ground of contumacious fault of the spouses and on the ground of absence of unavoidable requirements/essentials for a healthy married life were recognized by law initially. But the voluntary dissolution of marriage at the option of the spouses was not accepted as a concept for a long period of time in many systems of personal laws. With the progressive development of the society and in its march towards modernism, marriage was looked upon more as a social institution entered into by the Mat. Appeal No. 633/08 -: 3 :- spouses voluntarily as an incident of the right to life and pursuit of happiness. The institution of marriage started to be reckoned and perceived as one of complementarity partnership, friendship, association, love, affection, caring and sharing etc. With that, the concept of marriage as an institution made in heaven over which spouses have no control started waning. With that came the further thought and idea of terminating the relationship of marriage by the spouses voluntarily by mutual consent. Many...","""16. Although, the decision rendered in Sureshta Devi (supra) was referred to in the decision rendered in Asokh Hurra's case (supra) and it was observed therein Mat. Appeal No. 633/08 -: 19 :- that the said decision possibly required reconsideration in an appropriate case, none of the other cases has dealt with the question which arose in Sureshta Devi's case (supra), namely, whether in a proceeding under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, consent of the parties was required to subsist till a final decree was passed on the petition. In all the subsequent cases, the Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in order to do complete justice to the parties when faced with a situation where the marriage-ties had completely broken and there was no possibility whatsoever of the spouses coming together again. In such a situation, this Court felt that it would be a travesty of justice to continue with the marriage ties. It may, however, be indicated that in some of the High Courts, which do not possess...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/76014/ | AIR 2010 KERALA 157, (2010) 91 ALLINDCAS 632 (KER), 2010 (91) ALLINDCAS 632, (2010) 2 CIVLJ 623, (2010) 3 CIVILCOURTC 213, (2010) 2 KER LT 459, (2011) 1 CURCC 168",Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2010,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 2010 KERALA 157, (2010) 91 ALLINDCAS 632 (KER), 2010 (91) ALLINDCAS 632, (2010) 2 CIVLJ 623, (2010) 3 CIVILCOURTC 213, (2010) 2 KER LT 459, (2011) 1 CURCC 168",76014,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/76014/,21
Madras High Court,"Mr.John Vincent vs Ms.Nancy on 10 November, 2016",Mr.John Vincent vs Ms.Nancy,2016-11-10,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 161, Section 498, Section 55",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Today when the matter was taken up as part-heard, as usual, no one appeared for the respondent/wife. Finding no response whatsoever in spite of service of notice on the respondent, this Court is inclined to proceed with the matter, after hearing the learned counsel for the appellant. 2. The matter pertains to a long matrimonial dispute between the parties and this appeal is against the order of the Court below in dismissing the petition filed by the appellant/husband seeking a decree for dissolution of marriage between the parties solemnised on 23.8.1998 at St.Antony's Church, Avadi by the Parish Priest Rev.Fr.K.T.Mathew and for custody of the children as well as award of costs. 3. The facts in brief leading to the filing of the appeal are as follows:-","4. Per contra, the respondent in her counter affidavit denied the averment that she was brainwashed by her mother and sisters. She also denied the allegation of the appellant that her parents had asked the appellant to construct a house next to her sister's house. Only the appellant and his family members demanded the transfer of the land in the appellant's name, when the respondent refused the same, resultantly the appellant and his family started to harass the respondent. While he was working in Delhi, he was transferred to Madhya Pradesh. It is at this point of time, the respondent was sent to her parents house for delivery. After delivery, the appellant did not take back the respondent to Madhya Pradesh. Only after great efforts, the appellant was convinced to take back the respondent. Even in Madhya Pradesh, the respondent was put to harassment, cruelty and physical torture. Only the respondent's mother spent the expenses for the entire family while she came for help. When a complaint was made, the appellant being a Sub Inspector of Police influenced his officials not to take any action against the complaint. When the respondent did not create any problem at any point of...","10. Grounds for dissolution of marriage.--(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent-- (i)has committed adultery; or (ii)has ceased to be Christian by conversion to another religion; or (iii)has been incurably of unsound mind for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or (iv)has, for a period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, been suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy; or (v)has, for a period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form; or (vi) has not been...","Today when the matter was taken up as part-heard, as usual, no one appeared for the respondent/wife. Finding no response whatsoever in spite of service of notice on the respondent, this Court is inclined to proceed with the matter, after hearing the learned counsel for the appellant. 2. The matter pertains to a long matrimonial dispute between the parties and this appeal is against the order of the Court below in dismissing the petition filed by the appellant/husband seeking a decree for dissolution of marriage between the parties solemnised on 23.8.1998 at St.Antony's Church, Avadi by the Parish Priest Rev.Fr.K.T.Mathew and for custody of the children as well as award of costs. 3. The facts in brief leading to the filing of the appeal are as follows:-","4. Per contra, the respondent in her counter affidavit denied the averment that she was brainwashed by her mother and sisters. She also denied the allegation of the appellant that her parents had asked the appellant to construct a house next to her sister's house. Only the appellant and his family members demanded the transfer of the land in the appellant's name, when the respondent refused the same, resultantly the appellant and his family started to harass the respondent. While he was working in Delhi, he was transferred to Madhya Pradesh. It is at this point of time, the respondent was sent to her parents house for delivery. After delivery, the appellant did not take back the respondent to Madhya Pradesh. Only after great efforts, the appellant was convinced to take back the respondent. Even in Madhya Pradesh, the respondent was put to harassment, cruelty and physical torture. Only the respondent's mother spent the expenses for the entire family while she came for help. When a complaint was made, the appellant being a Sub Inspector of Police influenced his officials...","IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 10.11.2016 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE T.RAJA C.M.A.No.2373 of 2014 Mr.John Vincent .. Appellant -Vs- Ms.Nancy D/o P.V.Job .. Respondent Memorandum of Grounds of Civil Miscellaneous Appeal under Section 55 of the Divorce Act, 1869, as amended by the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 Act 51 of 2001, against the order and decretal order dated 19.04.2011 made in I.D.O.P.No.140 of 2006 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur. For Appellant :: Mrs.Rita Chandrasekaran for Mrs.R.Meenakshi For Respondent :: No appearance JUDGMENT (a) The appellant/husband is working as a Sub Inspector of Police in the Central Reserve Police Force. He filed the I.D.O.P.No.140 of 2006 under Section 10(1)(iii) & (x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 before the learned Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur seeking a decree for dissolution of marriage inter alia that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent took place as per the Christian rites and customs on 23.8.1998 at St.Antony's Church, Avadi, Chennai and out of the wedlock, two female children, namely, Anie John, aged 6 years, and Patricia, aged 3 years, were born. In the meanwhile, the appellant was transferred to Madhya Pradesh battalion. However, the behaviour of the respondent started to change after the birth of the first child at the instigation of her parents and...","6. Mrs.Rita Chandrasekaran, learned counsel for the appellant, assailing the decretal order passed by the Court below, has submitted that the appellant was subjected to repeated cruelty and harassment at the hands of his wife and her parents, for the reason that on 11.9.2009, she made a complaint to the appellant's higher authority with a false allegation of cruelty against him. Again on 8.10.2009, she made another complaint to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF, Avadi seeking legal right and retirement benefits from the appellant. She also lodged a criminal complaint before the W6 All Women Police Station, Avadi, which was registered in CSR No.295 on 18.10.2009. This apart, when the respondent had made a false complaint to the Hon'ble Prime Minister of India on 10.7.2010 in the names of his daughters, which was further forwarded to the CRPF, Avadi through the Ministry of Home Affairs, the appellant was directed to submit his explanation and he also submitted the same on 28.10.2010 to the higher authority explaining that the above complaints were totally false and bereft of any merit....",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/77033645/,Cruelty,cruelty,2016,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,77033645,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/77033645/,12
Bombay High Court,"Shiv Indersen Mirchandani Of Bombay And ... vs Natasha Harish Advani Alias Natasha ... on 5 December, 2001",2002(2)BOMCR436,2001-12-05,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 13, Section 16, Section 2, Section 23, Section 3, Section 488, Section 5",Adultery; Conversion; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT J.A. PATIL, J. 1. ""Marriages are settled in heaven and they are performed on earth.""",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"Whether and where a marriage can be dissolved is a matter in the domain of the earthly law governing the spouses. But the matrimonial laws are not common everywhere in the world and they differ from country to country. The problem arises when the parties have their domicile in one country and one of them obtains matrimonial relief in a foreign country. The moot question posed in this Notice of Motion is whether the decree passed by a Swedish Court can be recognised by this Court, as being conclusive, or not. 2. This is a case where a Hindu domiciled in India got married in civil form in New York to a Swedish woman of Christian religion, who lived with him after the marriage for about six years and bore two children to him. Thereafter, she separated from him and went back alongwith her two children to Sweden. Six years...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","7. I have heard the learned Counsel Shri Setalwad for defendant Nos. 1(a), 1(b) and 3, Shri D.V. Merchant for defendant Nos. 4 to 7 and Shri E.S. Kotwal for the plaintiffs, at length. Shri Setalwad made the following submissions: (i) that the domicile of the deceased was India. (ii) that as per the private international law the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband and therefore, the domicile of defendant No. 8 must, at the relevant time, be held to be India and not Sweden though she was residing there for quite some time. (iii) that the parties are governed by the law of their matrimonial domicile. (iv) that domicile of parties is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the foreign Court. (v) that under section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, the judgment of the Swedish Court is not conclusive as to the divorce of the deceased and defendant No. 8. Since it does not fulfil the conditions contemplated by Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (f) of that section. (vi) that the marriage between the deceased and defendant No. 8 thus not having been dissolved by a valid decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction; it continued to subsist on 30-8-1964 when plaintiff No. 2 claims to have married the deceased. (vii) that the marriage between...","8. Shri Merchant who represents the executors under the Will for the deceased submitted that as executors, it is their duty to see that the property goes to the right persons. He further submitted that right to file a caveat arises from a statute which gives a person a right to claim on intestacy. He also argued that in order to fall within Schedule I of the Hindu Succession Act , plaintiff No. 2 must establish that she was legally wedded wife of the deceased. As regards the divorce between the deceased and defendant No. 8, the submission of Shri Merchant is that their marriage was governed by the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 and there is no provision in the said Act to obtain divorce by mutual consent and therefore, the decree of divorce passed by the Swedish Court is in breach of the law in force in India at the relevant time. 9. Shri Kotwal for the plaintiffs made the following submissions: (i) Plaintiff No. 2 has been treated as the wife of the deceased for about 18 years...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/888648/ | 2002(2)BOMCR436, II(2002)DMC89",Adultery,adultery; conversion; desertion,2001,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2002(2)BOMCR436, II(2002)DMC89",888648,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/888648/,25
Madras High Court,"David Christopher vs Dr.Jayanthi on 11 October, 2011",David Christopher vs Dr.Jayanthi,2011-10-11,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 4, Section 6, Section 7",Cruelty; Conversion; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 11.10.2011 CORAM THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI and THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.RAJENDRAN O.S.A.No.355 of 2006 David Christopher ... Appellant Vs. Dr.Jayanthi ... Respondent Original Side Appeal is filed under Order XXXVI Rule 1 of the Original Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 13.04.2006 made in O.M.S.No.15 of 2001 on the file of this Court. For Appellant : Mr.A.R.Nixon For Respondent : Ms.Chitra Sampath JUDGMENT R.BANUMATHI,J This appeal is preferred against the order dated 13.04.2006 made in O.M.S.No.15 of 2001 allowing the Petition filed by Respondent-wife and dissolving the marriage between the Appellant and the Respondent which was solemnised on 11.12.1984. 2. Briefly stated case of Respondent-wife is that Appellant and his family migrated from Sri Lanka to India and Appellant joined in Madras Medical College and Respondent was also a student in the same college. Both of them loved each other. Respondent was a Hindu and Appellant was a Christian. Respondent got converted to Christianity and the name of the Respondent has been changed to ""Mary Jayanthi"" and the marriage was solemnised at Velankanni Church, Besant Nagar, Chennai. After getting over the...","10. Ms.Chitra Sampath, learned counsel appearing for Respondent has submitted that inspite of many opportunities given to the Appellant to mend his ways, Appellant has not mended himself and that he continuously inflicted mental cruelty upon the Respondent. Reiterating the findings, learned counsel would further submit that upon analysis of the evidence and materials, learned Judge rightly held that the allegations levelled against the Respondent would certainly amount to mental cruelty and that the marriage life has gone to the extent of ""no point of return"", granted decree of divorce and the impugned order cannot be interfered with. 11. The facts are not in dispute. Love marriage between the Appellant and the Respondent was solemnised on 11.12.1984. For the purpose of marriage, Respondent got converted to Christianity. After getting over the initial obstacles of love marriage, the spouses lived happily till 1994. In 1995, Appellant was detained under COFEPOSA for allegedly smuggling gold from Singapore. He was released on bail on 21.04.1996. Respondent alleges that Appellant had developed friendship with another co-detenu Padmakumar who was released earlier than the Appellant. Per contra, Appellant alleges that Respondent became very close to the said Padmakumar and that she had developed acquaintance with...","20. It is settled by a catena of decisions that ""mental cruelty"" can cause very serious injury than the physical harm and create apprehension in the mind of the spouse so as to render continued living together of spouses harmful or injurious. The word ""cruelty"" has not been defined and it has to be examined in the facts and circumstances of each case. The question whether the act complained of was a cruel act is to be determined from the whole facts and the matrimonial relations between the parties. In this connection, the culture, status in life, background of parties and many other things have to be considered. 21. Observing that if by the continued ill conduct of a spouse the relationship deteriorates then such an action alone would amount to ""mental cruelty'. In ( 2007) 4 SCC 511 [Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh ], the Supreme Court held as...","3. Appellant is alleged to have developed friendship with another detenu who had been released earlier than the Appellant. But the Appellant was suspicious about the conduct of the Respondent-wife that she had developed relationship with the said Padmakumar and ill-treating her on that suspicion. On 26.05.1996, Appellant attempted to strangulate the Respondent. Fearing for her life and safety of the children, Respondent left the house to live with her parents. Appellant again agreed to change his ways and that on 05.06.1996, an agreement was entered into between the parties and Respondent returned to the matrimonial house. After a few months, Appellant again physically and verbally abused the Respondent and on 28.01.1997, Respondent returned to her parents house. Appellant forcibly entered into the Respondent's parents house and took away the children and put them in a Boarding School in Ooty, even though the younger child was only 3 years old. Only on the orders of the Court dated 16.06.1997, Respondent was able to get back the custody of the children. In the said order, Appellant was permitted to visit the...","10. Ms.Chitra Sampath, learned counsel appearing for Respondent has submitted that inspite of many opportunities given to the Appellant to mend his ways, Appellant has not mended himself and that he continuously inflicted mental cruelty upon the Respondent. Reiterating the findings, learned counsel would further submit that upon analysis of the evidence and materials, learned Judge rightly held that the allegations levelled against the Respondent would certainly amount to mental cruelty and that the marriage life has gone to the extent of ""no point of return"", granted decree of divorce and the impugned order cannot be interfered with. 11. The facts are not in dispute. Love marriage between the Appellant and the Respondent was solemnised on 11.12.1984. For the purpose of marriage, Respondent got converted to Christianity. After getting over the initial obstacles of love marriage, the spouses lived happily till 1994. In 1995, Appellant was detained under COFEPOSA for allegedly smuggling gold from Singapore. He was released on bail on 21.04.1996. Respondent alleges that Appellant had developed friendship with another co-detenu Padmakumar who was released earlier than the Appellant....","4. The above arrangement continued till February 2000, when the younger daughter fell ill and needed to have her tonsils surgically removed. Appellant began visiting the children more often and began interacting with the Respondent and Appellant requested the Respondent to give him one more chance to mend his ways. Keeping in mind the future of the children, Respondent rejoined the Appellant and they moved into No.54, First Main Road, Indira Nagar, Chennai-20 in October 2000. After a short while, Appellant reverted to his old ways and began accusing the Respondent having affairs and Appellant physically abused the Respondent. In November 2000, again problem arose and Respondent returned to her parental house on 03.12.2000. On 09.12.2000, Appellant alleged to have broken into the Respondent mother's Flat M-48-B, L.B.Road, Adyar, Chennai and re-occupied the same for which a police complaint was also lodged. According to Respondent, inspite of all chances given to the Appellant, he continued to abuse the Respondent and manhandled her and therefore, Respondent was forced to leave the matrimonial house on 03.12.2000. In February 2001, Respondent filed O.P.No.15 of 2001 under Section 10 of Indian Divorce Act seeking for dissolution of the marriage solemnised between her and the Appellant on 11.12.1984. 13. Elaborating upon the alleged friendship between the Respondent and Padmakumar in Paragraph (14), Appellant has alleged...","32. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. Consequently, connected M.P. is closed. No costs. [R.B.I.,J] [B.R.,J] 11.10.2011 Index: Yes/No Internet: Yes/No bbr To The Sub Assistant Registrar, Original Side, High Court, Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J and B.RAJENDRAN,J bbr Judgment in O.S.A.No.355 of 2006 11.10.2011",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101392267/,Cruelty,cruelty; conversion; adultery,2011,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,101392267,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101392267/,13
Madras High Court,S.M.J.Naveena vs C.Gipson Villavarayer,S.M.J.Naveena vs C.Gipson Villavarayer,,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 19, Section 2, Section 55",Cruelty; Desertion; Non Consummation; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"2. The point for consideration before this Court is whether the Family Court right in ordering judicial separation for two years while deciding the divorce petition filed by the wife and the petition for restitution of conjugal right filed by the husband. 3. The undisputed facts on either side are:- 10. The Family Court framed the following points for consideration:- ''1.Whether the petitioner-wife proved the plea of non- consummation of marriage as prayed for? 2.Whether the petitioner-wife proved the plea of cruelty? 3.Whether the petitioner-wife is entitled for the relief of divorce as prayed for? 4.Whether the respondent-husband is entitled for the relief of restitution of conjugal rights? 5.To what other relief the parties are entitled?'' 11. The Court below disbelieved the contention of the wife that the marriage never consummated and she was subjected to cruelty and torture. To arrive at this conclusion, the trial Court has considered the...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2023/MHC/645 C.M.A.(MD)Nos.725 and 832 of 2019 & Cross Obj.(MD)No.23 of 2019 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT Date of Reserving the order Date of Pronouncing the order 01.02.2023 15.02.2023 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE DR.JUSTICE G.JAYACHANDRAN and THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUNDER MOHAN C.M.A.(MD)Nos.725 and 832 of 2019 and Cross Objection (MD)No.23 of 2019 in C.M.A.(MD)No.725 of 2019 and C.M.P.(MD)No.12364 of 2019 in Cross Obj.(MD)No.23 of 2019 C.M.A.(MD)No.725 of 2019:- S.M.J.Naveena ... Appellant vs. C.Gipson Villavarayer ... Respondent Prayer :- Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act read with Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, against the judgment and decree, dated 23.04.2019, passed in I.D.O.P.No.50 of 2018, on the file of the Family Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil. For Appellant : Mr.Isaac Mohanlal Senior Counsel for Mr.T.Cibichakaraborthy For Respondent : Mr.J.Barathan https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 1/20 C.M.A.(MD)Nos.725 and 832 of 2019 & Cross Obj.(MD)No.23 of 2019 C.M.A.(MD)No.832 of 2019:- C.Gipson Villavarayer ... Appellant vs. S.M.J.Naveena ... Respondent Prayer :- Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act read with Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, against the judgment and decree, dated 23.04.2019, passed in I.D.O.P.No.127 of 2018, on the file of the Family Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil. For Appellant : Mr.J.Barathan For Respondent : Mr.Isaac Mohanlal Senior Counsel for Mr.T.Cibichakaraborthy Cross Obj.(MD)No.23 of 2019:-...","26. The wife has chosen to challenge the common order of the Family Court, reiterating the allegations against her husband, which has been found to be false. If her appeal is allowed, it will tantamount to holding her baseless allegations against her husband as true. 27. Therefore, the principle of irretrievable break down of marital relationship cannot be applied to the facts of the case. The false allegations against the husband in fact a cruelty to the husband. When he is ready to condone that and wants to rejoin, the wife refused to rejoin. In Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh reported in (2007) 4 SCC 511, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has illustrated cases where inference of mental cruelty can be drawn. Taking note of 16 ½ years long separation, it stated that the long period of continuous separation, may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. Such a situation may lead to mental cruelty. 28. In this case, it is the wife, who is cause for separation. She cannot take advantage of her own fault, make baseless...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/21953237/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion; non_consummation; nullity_sec19,0,judicial_separation,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,,21953237,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/21953237/,10
Bombay High Court,"Kamal V.M. Allaudin And Etc. Etc. vs Raja Shaikh And Etc. Etc. on 7 March, 1990",AIR1990BOM299,1990-03-07,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 105, Section 106, Section 12, Section 14, Section 15, Section 18, Section 19, Section 2, Section 20, Section 21, Section 223, Section 28, Section 29, Section 3, Section 35, Section 4, Section 4A, Section 5, Section 6, Section 67, Section 7, Section 8, Section 9",Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,ORDER,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. These are Matrimonial Petitions and Suits which involve a common question of law, namely, whether these matters stand transferred or should be transferred to the Family Court, Bombay established the Family Courts Act, 1984 (Act No. LXVI of 1984). The Family Court was established in the City of Bombay as from 7th October 1989, and the Act has been brought into force for the purpose of the said court as from that day. Since the question involved is likely to arise in several other Matrimonial Suits or Petitions pending in this court, I thought it convenient to request the counsel appearing in all these matters to address me, in the first instance, on this question, without going into the merits of each case which will be done separately. Whether the matrimonial jurisdiction ex-ercisable by this Court (High Court) on its Original Side is not affected by S. 7 of...","""7. Learned Counsel for the appellants would point out that as per Cl. 11 of the Letters Patent dt. 28-12-1865 this High Court has got civil original jurisdiction of general nature with local limits which is analogous to the jurisdiction of a District Court and that X X X X X X In fact, he accepted that this Court cannot exercise any jurisdiction under Cl. 11 of the Letters Patent dt. 28-12-1865 in respect of matters covered by the Act from the time of the commencement of the Act. But his main contention was that this Court under the abovesaid Letters Patent possessed in addition to territorial general jurisdiction under Cl. 11, a special jurisdiction relating to infants and lunatics under Cl. 17, that such jurisdiction was not affected since the High Court in exercise of that jurisdiction could not be equated to a District Court and that S. 8 of the Act would not operate. He further added that jurisdiction once conferred could be taken away only by an express provision, that since S. 8 did not take away...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The question that arises for consideration may be formulated thus:-- Sub-section (e) of S. 2 lays down that- ""all other words and expressions and but not defined in this Act and defined in the Code of Civil Procedure , 1908, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Code."" 6. Chapter III of the Act deals with jurisdiction. 7. It is necessary to set out Ss. 7 and 8 of the Act which read as follows:-- JURISDICTION ""7(1). Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall- (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any Subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purpose of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district Court or, as the case may be, such Subordinate Civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family court extends. Explanation.-- The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, name-ly:- (a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void, or, as...","70. In the result, I hold that the Family Court established in Bombay on 7-10-1989 is the 'district Court' for the purposes of Sections 7 and 8 read with Section 2(e) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, for the area of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (vide Maharashtra Government Gazette dated 20-4-1989, Part 4-B, PP. 498-505 and dated 23-11-1989 Part 4-A, p. 1444) in respect of matters indicated in paragraph 68 above, and that, to that extent the jurisdiction of High Court stands excluded. I therefore answer the preliminary point in the negative. 72. Order accordingly.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1046228/ | AIR1990BOM299, AIR 1990 BOMBAY 299, (1990) 2 BOM CR 335",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19,1990,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1990BOM299, AIR 1990 BOMBAY 299, (1990) 2 BOM CR 335",1046228,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1046228/,28
Bombay High Court,"Jethabhai Ratanshi Lodaya vs Manabai Jethabhai Lodaya on 6 April, 1973",AIR1975BOM88,1973-04-06,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 12, Section 13, Section 14, Section 18, Section 19, Section 2, Section 22, Section 23, Section 488, Section 5, Section 7",Desertion; Cruelty; Adultery; Restitution Noncompliance,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Nathwani, J.","101. In the appeal from the order which appeal, as stated above, was also dismissed by a Single Judge of this Court (Gatne J.) on the 12th of October 1971, the learned Single Judge on the basis of the statement made by the appellant which has been quoted above and on the contention raised by the respondent in her written statement, that she was always willing to live under the roof of her husband, made the following observations:-","""Either party to a mortgage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this Act, may also present a petition for the dissolution of the marriage of divorce on the ground- (i) That there was has been no resumption of co-habitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of two years or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parities: or ""(1) In any proceedings under this Act, whether defended or not, if the Court is satisfied that - (a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief, and 43. It is, therefore, appropriate to first of all notice the state of the law in this behalf and then to find out in...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"101. In the appeal from the order which appeal, as stated above, was also dismissed by a Single Judge of this Court (Gatne J.) on the 12th of October 1971, the learned Single Judge on the basis of the statement made by the appellant which has been quoted above and on the contention raised by the respondent in her written statement, that she was always willing to live under the roof of her husband, made the following observations:-","2. The facts are not in dispute. The appellant is the husband and was married to the respondent wife according to Hindu FDIC rites on Dec. 16, 1956 at Bombay. They lived together for about 5 months at Thana till May 1957 when the wife left the husband and continued to live separately from him. On April 26, 1961 the wife filed Miscellaneous Petition No.1526 of 1961 in the City Civil Court at Bombay for judicial separation on the grounds of desertion, cruelty and adultery. The husband filed his written-statement denying the said allegations. In November 1963 when the suit came up for hearing the wife did not press her allegations of cruelty and adultery and the husband did not contest the suit on the remnant ground of desertion and the Court passed a decree for judicial separation on the ground of desertion. No attempt was made for reconciliation between the parties and on March 10, 1968 the husband filed M. Petition No.1735 of 1968 against the wife in the Bombay City Civil Court for divorce on the ground of non-resumption of cohabitation under Section 13(1A)(i) of the Act. At the hearing of the suit on the 12th October 1968 the husband gave evidence and categorically stated that he made no attempt to see or meet the wife because the...","1. This is a letters patent appeal by the original petitioner-husband against the decree of Mr. Justice Gatne in appeal confirming the decree of the City Civil Court. Bombay, dismissing his petition for divorce and raises a point of importance and interest arising out of judicial separation, namely, whether desertion by a spouse on which ground a decree for judicial separation was passed in favour of the original petitioner spouse under Section 10(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. 1955 ( hereinafter referred to as the Act) continues unless the original respondent spouse makes efforts to resume cohabitation and constitutes a wrong which would disentitle the spouse so failing to get the relief of divorce on ground of non-resumption of cohabitation, and involves construction of Sections 10(2) , 13(1A) , 23(1)(a) of the Act. (ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of two years or upwards after the passing of a proceeding to which they were parities"". By the amendment a very conspicuous change is made and the...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1107018/ | AIR1975BOM88, (1974)76BOMLR304, AIR 1975 BOMBAY 88, 1975 HINDULR 449 76 BOM LR 304, 76 BOM LR 304",Desertion,desertion; cruelty; adultery; restitution_noncompliance,1973,judicial_separation,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1975BOM88, (1974)76BOMLR304, AIR 1975 BOMBAY 88, 1975 HINDULR 449 76 BOM LR 304, 76 BOM LR 304",1107018,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1107018/,56
Madras High Court,"Thapita Pater vs Thapita Lakshmi And Anr. on 26 January, 1894",(1894)ILR 17MAD235,1894-01-26,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 1, Section 10, Section 17, Section 18, Section 19, Section 2, Section 48, Section 7",Adultery; Conversion; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Arthur J.H. Collins, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"10. The question which it is necessary to determine in this suit is whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for divorce on the ground of his wife's adultery under Act IV of 1869. The facts which give rise to this question are shortly these. The plaintiff was born in 1862. In 1879 he married the first defendant by Hindu rites, both being then Hindus by religion. In 1880 the wife left her husband and commenced to live in adultery with the second defendant, to whom she has since borne four children. In 1882 the plaintiff embraced Christianity, and about two years prior to this suit, which was brought in 1893, the defendants also became Christians. 12. In connection with a Hindu marriage, there are several legal incidents as to which no doubt can possibly exist. The first is that such marriage is in its nature not monogamous, and...","8. In Hyde v. Hyde (L. R., 1 P. & D., 130), the petitioner, an English subject, married in Utah, in the United States of America, a Miss Hawkins according to the rites of the Mormons. At the time of the celebration of the marriage, polygamy was a part of the Mormon doctrine and was the common custom in Utah. The marriage was a valid marriage according to the lex loci and polygamy was then lawful in Utah. The petitioner and his wife were both single and the petitioner had never taken a second wife. The petitioner [238] sometime after the marriage renounced Mormonism, was excommunicated, and his wife declared free to marry again. The wife did marry again and the petitioner then petitioned the Divorce Court for a dissolution of his marriage on account of his wife's adultery. The counsel for the petitioner argued, inter alia, that this was not a polygamous marriage, for both the parties were single at the time when it was contracted; but the Judge Ordinary observed that it would be extraordinary if a marriage...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. Thapita Peter brought a suit against Thapita Lakshmi, his wife, alleging her adultery with Lunkapalli Gauth, and praying, therefore, that his marriage may be dissolved. The District Judge of Kistna granted a decree dissolving the marriage under the provisions of Act IV of 1869, and the decree now comes before the High Court for confirmation under Section 17 of Act IV of 1869. 2. The petitioner and his wife were married according to the rites of the Hindu religion in 1879, petitioner and his wife being Hindus at that time. About a year after the marriage the petitioner's wife left him and has since been living in adultery with the second respondent. In 1882 the petitioner became a Christian, and about 1890 his wife and the second respondent also became Christians. The question to be decided is--can the Courts of this country pass a decree dissolving his marriage under Act IV of 1869 ? 3. Section 1 of the Act enables relief to be granted where the petitioner professes the Christian religion. 4. Section 7 directs that the Courts in India shall act and give relief in all suits and proceedings hereunder on principles and rules which, in the opinion of the said Courts, are, as nearly as may be, conformable to the principles and rules on which the...","Any wife may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court, praying that her marriage may be dissolved on the ground that, since when wife may position the solemnization thereof, her husband has exchanged his proton a dissolution. fession of Christianity for the profession of some other religion, and gone through a form of marriage with another woman ; or has been guilty of incestuous adultery, or of bigamy with adultery, or of murnago with another woman with adultery, or of rape, sodomy or bestiality, or of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa et there, or of adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or upwards. Every such petition shall slate, as distinctly as the nature of Contents of petition. the case permits, the facts on which the claim to have such marriage dissolved is founded.]",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1924389/ | (1894)ILR 17MAD235,Adultery,adultery; conversion; nullity_sec19,1894,nullity,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1894)ILR 17MAD235,1924389,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1924389/,15
Allahabad High Court,"Amit Singh vs Smt. Sandhya Singh on 14 November, 2019",AIRONLINE 2019 ALL 2674,2019-11-14,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 11, Section 125, Section 13, Section 13A, Section 14, Section 18, Section 21, Section 23, Section 4, Section 488, Section 5, Section 9",Constitutional Validity; Nullity Sec19; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH A.F.R. Court No. - 3 Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 64 of 2018 Appellant :- Amit Singh Respondent :- Smt. Sandhya Singh Counsel for Appellant :- Amol Kumar Counsel for Respondent :- Sanjay Kumar Pandey Hon'ble Anil Kumar,J. Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania,J. (As per Saurabh Lavania,J.) Case called out in the revised list. None appeared on behalf of the respondent.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"For deciding the issue involved in the present case, which is to the effect that ""whether a petition for getting the decree of judicial separation can not be filed prior to completion of one year of marriage?"", we feel it appropriate to quote relevant sections of the Act, 1955. The same are as under:- ""4. Overriding effect of Act.--Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,-- (a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act; (b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act. 9. Restitution of conjugal...","Heard learned counsel for the appellant. The instant appeal has been filed challenging the judgment and order dated 16.05.2018, passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow, in Misc. Case No. 19/2018 ( Amit Singh v. Smt. Sandhya Singh ). We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and gone through the record.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Facts, in brief, of the present case are to the effect that the marriage between the appellant and respondent was solemnized on 15.12.2017 at Shiv Mandir, Shivpuri, Ghaziabad as per Hindu Rites and Rituals. Thereafter, the matrimonial relations between the parties become estranged, as such, the respondent left here matrimonial house and started living at her parental house w.e.f. 10.05.2018. In these circumstances, appellant filed a Suit under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (in short 'Act, 1955') registered as Misc. Case No. 18/2018 ( Amit Singh v. Smt. Sandhya Singh ), which was withdrawn as not pressed. Thereafter, the appellant filed a Suit for judicial separation under Section 10 of the Act, 1955 registered as Misc. Case No. 19/2018 ( Amit Singh v. Smt. Sandhya Singh ), which was dismissed on 16.05.2018 by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow with the following observation:- ""iqu% /kkjk&10 esa ;g Li""V izko/kku micaf/kr fd;k x;k gS fd /kkjk&13 esa mfYYkf[kr fdUgha Hkh vk/kkj ij /kkjk&10 dk okn izLrqr fd;k tk ldrk gSA fgUnw fookg vf/kfu;e ds bu izko/kkuksa ds lexz voyksdu ls ;g Li""V gS fd fookg gksus ds ,d o""kZ i'pkr~ gh U;kf;d i`FkDdhdj.k dk dksbZ okn U;k;ky; esa izLrqr fd;k tk ldrk gSA oknh dk izfrokfnuh ds lkFk fookg fnukad 15-12-2017 dks lEiUu gqvk FkkA vr% oknh dk...","16. While deciding the question whether the respondent will be entitled to any relief on the petition for divorce, the question of exceptional hardship and exceptional depravity also will have to be considered, and taking into consideration the same, the Court may also give such direction as it may think necessary. If by the time the Court takes up the case merits, one year time has also expired, I think the Court can take note of the subsequent events also. In a case whether a decree could be granted subject to the condition that it will not take effect until one year after the date of marriage, it is also clear therefrom that a decree on merits also could be passed if the court takes up the matter for consideration on merits after a period of one year from the date of marriage. The question of dismissing the petition for divorce also will not arise. 10. Judicial separation.--[(1) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this Act, may present a petition praying for a...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/129696889/ | AIRONLINE 2019 ALL 2674,Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; nullity_sec19; desertion,2019,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 ALL 2674,129696889,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/129696889/,27
Madras High Court,"Jerry Garman @ Geraldine @ Jayalakshmi vs A.S.Sethuraman on 22 January, 2016",Jerry Garman @ Geraldine @ Jayalakshmi vs A.S.Sethuraman,2016-01-22,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 151, Section 19, Section 2, Section 5, Section 7",Conversion; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"3. Ms.Geetha Ramaseshan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the trial Court has erred in holding a view that the marriage between parties to the CMA was solemnized as per the Hindu Rites and Customs, though the appellant had filed Ex.R.1, which would establish that her marriage was solemnized only as per Indian Christian Marriage Act and the respondent herein changed his name as A.S.Paul and got married the appellant herein. The appellant is an Anglo Indian, by birth she is a born Christian throughout in her life. However, the respondent had deliberately mislead the trial Court by claiming the appellant's as Jayalakshmi, as if she is a Hindu. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, she is a Christian, whose name is Jerry Garman @ Geraldine. The said name has also find a place in the cause title of the Original Petition (OP), which shows her name clearly as Jerry Garman @ Geraldine. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that merely because the parties had arranged a Hindu form of marriage as a ceremony just to satisfy the elders of the family, it would not ipso facto attract the provisions of the Hindu Marriage...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"5. Per contra, Mrs.Bhavatharini, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the trial Court, rightly held that the petition filed by the appellant, seeking divorce was not maintainable. Challenging the said order, the appellant herein had filed C.R.P.No.3230 of 2011 before this Court and when the said matter was taken up, this Court (R.S.Ramanathan, J) passed an order, dated 04.09.2012 that the Family Court should take up the preliminary issue and decide whether the petition filed by the respondent herein could be maintainable or not. Learned counsel further submitted that from 1986 the appellant and the respondent herein were living together and as the appellant had insisted, that to have the marriage solemnized in any one of the forms, the respondent got married the appellant as per the Hindu rites and customs, in the presence of his family members and relatives.","3. Ms.Geetha Ramaseshan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the trial Court has erred in holding a view that the marriage between parties to the CMA was solemnized as per the Hindu Rites and Customs, though the appellant had filed Ex.R.1, which would establish that her marriage was solemnized only as per Indian Christian Marriage Act and the respondent herein changed his name as A.S.Paul and got married the appellant herein. The appellant is an Anglo Indian, by birth she is a born Christian throughout in her life. However, the respondent had deliberately mislead the trial Court by claiming the appellant's as Jayalakshmi, as if she is a Hindu. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, she is a Christian, whose name is Jerry Garman @ Geraldine. The said name has also find a place in the cause title of the Original Petition (OP), which shows her name clearly as Jerry Garman @ Geraldine. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that merely because the parties had arranged a Hindu form of marriage as a ceremony...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Reserve Date : 22-01-2016 Date of Decision : 29- 01-2016 CORAM : THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE S.TAMILVANAN AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE G.CHOCKALINGAM C.M.A.No.2535 of 2015 Jerry Garman @ Geraldine @ Jayalakshmi ..... Appellant vs A.S.Sethuraman .... Respondent Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 19 of the Family Court Act, seeking to set aside the order, dated 15.04.2015 passed in I.A.No.623 of 2010 in O.P.No.2490 of 2007 on the file of the III Additional Family Court, Chennai. For Appellant : Ms.Geetha Ramaseshan For Respondent : Mrs.K.Bhavatharini J U D G M E N T (Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.TAMILVANAN, J) This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has been preferred under Section 19 of the Family Court Act, seeking to set aside the order, dated 15.04.2015 passed in I.A.No.623 of 2010 in O.P.No.2490 of 2007 on the file of the III Additional Family Court, Chennai. 2. The appellant herein had filed the petition in O.P.No.2940 of 2007 under Section 10 (1) (x) of the Indian Divorce Act, seeking divorce, dissolving the marriage solemnized between the appellant and the respondent herein at Chennai on 17.08.1992. Pending the said Original Petition, the appellant herein, who was the respondent in the O.P.No.2940 of 2007, filed Interlocutory Application in I.A.No.623 of 2010, under Section 151 of Civil Procedure...","In the result, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed and the order, dated 15.04.2015 made in I.A.No.623 of 2010 in O.P.No.2940 of 2007 on the file of the III Additional Family Court, Chennai is set aside. The Court below is directed to restore the O.P.No.2940 of 2007 on file and the dispose the same at an early date, preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (S.T., J.) (G.C., J.) 29.01.2016 Index : Yes Internet : Yes tsvn S.TAMILVANAN, J AND G.CHOCKALINGAM, J tsvn To The III Additional Family Court Chennai. Pre-Delivery order in C.M.A.No.2535 of 2015 29-01-2016",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/193742511/,Conversion,conversion; nullity_sec19,2016,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,193742511,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/193742511/,10
Kerala High Court,"Momet Alex vs Asha John on 10 September, 2021",Momet Alex vs Asha John,2021-09-10,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13",Cruelty; Unsound Mind,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH FRIDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2021 / 19TH BHADRA, 1943 MAT.APPEAL NO. 971 OF 2017 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN O.P.NO.706/2013 OF FAMILY COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA, DATED 29.03.2017 ----------- APPELLANT/S: 1 MOMET ALEX, AGED 39 YEARS, S/O.LATE ALEXANDER, R/O. MUTHIRAPARAMBIL, KOODAL P.O, KOODAL MURI, KOODAL VILLAGE, KALANJOOR PANCHAYATH, ADOOR TALUK, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT. 2 KUNJAMMA ALEX, AGED 70 YEARS, W/O. LATE ALEXANDER, R/O MUTHIRAPARAMBIL, KOODAL P.O, KOODAL MURI, KOODAL VILLAGE, KULANJOOR PANCHAYATH, ADOOR TALUK, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT. BY ADV SRI.V.PHILIP MATHEW RESPONDENT/S: ASHA JOHN, AGED 35 YEARS, W/O. MOMET ALEX, R/O.CHAKKALAMANNIL, KOODAL MURI, KOODAL VILLAGE, ADOOR TALUK, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT, PIN-689 693. BY ADVS. SRI.M.JAYAKRISHNAN SRI.G.UNNIKRISHNAN THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 04.08.2021, ALONG WITH Mat.Appeal NO.1146/2018, THE COURT ON 10.09.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH FRIDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2021 / 19TH BHADRA, 1943 MAT.APPEAL NO. 1146 OF 2018 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN O.P.(DIV.)NO.197/2016 OF FAMILY COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA, DATED 29.03.2017 -------------- APPELLANT/S: MOMET ALEX, AGED 39 YEARS,...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,"6. The other appeal, M.A.No.1146/2018 is filed by the husband, aggrieved by the dismissal of petition for divorce filed by him. The grounds canvassed for divorce are alleging cruelty and unsound mind attributable to the wife. To substantiate the claim for divorce, the husband was examined. A Psychiatrist was also examined on the side of the husband. It is alleged by the husband that the wife used to abuse his mother often and also had manhandled her. It is also stated by him that she used to doubt the fidelity of the husband. It is further stated by him that his brother was working abroad and his brother's wife was residing near to his house and the appellant's wife used to cook up stories having illicit relationship with the brother's wife. It is also his case that the wife is having mental ailment and on account of this, she had serious behavioural problem. The wife denied all the allegations. According to her, the marital life was smooth till the demise of husband's father on 4/12/2008. It is alleged by her...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","8. The medical records and the evidence and pleadings of the husband clearly establish the pattern of behaviour of the wife. Though divorce was sought on the ground of unsound mind as referable under Section 10 (1)(iii) of the Divorce Act 1869, the ailment as above cannot be treated as something falling under the above ground. We are also not adverting to this inasmuch as there were no arguments at the Bar in regard to divorce on the ground of unsound mind of the wife. Much argument has been Mat. Appeal Nos.971/2017 & 1146/2018 -:10:- raised relying on the medical evidence to substantiate the claim for divorce on the ground of cruelty. 9. Before adverting to the ailment and related behaviour of the wife and the claim for divorce on the ground of cruelty, we shall advert to some of the precedents of the Apex Court. The Apex Court in Vinitha Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit [2006 (2) KLT 150 (SC)] adverted to cruel behaviour attributable to Schizophrenia and concluded at para.18 as follows: 18. The appellant filed a petition for divorce under S.13(1) (i-a) and (iii) of the Act on the ground of mental and physical cruelty. It is also her case that on account of Paranoid Schizophrenia that the respondent was suffering from, the appellant could not be reasonably...","Accordingly, we dismiss M.A.No.971/2017 and allow M.A.No.1146/2018 and declare that the marriage solemnised between the appellant and the respondent on 30.6.2003 is dissolved by a decree of divorce. No order as to costs. Sd/- A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, JUDGE Sd/- DR.KAUSER EDAPPAGATH, JUDGE ms",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/121901071/,Cruelty,cruelty; unsound_mind,2021,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,121901071,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/121901071/,4
Kerala High Court,"Jojo Joy Aged 33 Years vs Aruvi Prasoonam on 31 January, 2013",Jojo Joy Aged 33 Years vs Aruvi Prasoonam,2013-01-31,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANTONY DOMINIC & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.D.RAJAN WEDNESDAY, THE 11TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2013/20TH AGRAHAYANA, 1935 Mat.Appeal.No. 771 of 2013 () ------------------------------ AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN OP 427/2012 of FAMILYCOURT, MUVATTUPUZHA DATED 31-01-2013 APPELLANT(S)/PETITIONER: ---------------------------------------------- JOJO JOY AGED 33 YEARS S/O.JOY POOPPATH, RESIDING AT POOPATH HOUSE CHIRAPPADY, MUVATTUPUZHA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT PIN 686673. BY ADVS.SRI.D.NARENDRANATH SRI.M.HARISHARMA RESPONDENT(S)/RESPONDENT: -------------------------------------------------- ARUVI PRASOONAM, AGED 24 YEARS D/O.ARULAPPAN, RESIDING AT ARUVI HOUSE, PALOORKONAM PRAVACHAMBALAM, NEMOM P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695020. THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 11-12-2013, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: acd ANTONY DOMINIC & P.D. RAJAN, JJ. ------------------------------------------- Mat. Appeal No. 771 of 2013 ---------------------------------------------- Dated this the 11th day of December, 2013 JUDGMENT ANTONY DOMINIC,J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""10. Grounds for dissolution of marriage.- (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent - xxx xxx xxx (iii) has been incurably of unsound mind for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition;"" 4. Reading of this provision shows that to sustain a claim for divorce, the respondent should be proved to be incurably of unsound mind for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The appellant filed O.P.No.427/2012 on the file of the Family Court, Muvattupuzha. In that O.P., he sought decree of divorce on the grounds under Section 10 (1)(iii) and (x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 . 2. Before the Family Court, Pws 1 and 2 were examined and the respondent was examined as RW1. Exts.A1 to A3(a), B1 to B5 and X1 medical records were marked in evidence. The Family Court, by its judgment under appeal dismissed the O.P. 3. In the pleading, the only ground urged by the appellant was that the respondent was suffering mental ailment and that even before the marriage, she was under treatment in the S.M.C.S.I. Medical College Hospital, Karakkonam, Thiruvananthapuram. It is on that basis, the appellant sought divorce under Section 10(1)(iii) and (x) of the Divorce Act . Mat. Appeal No.771/13 2 Section 10(1)(iii) of the Indian Divorce Act,1869 reads thus: 5. Insofar as this case is concerned, on the issue of mental illness of the respondent, the medical evidence available is that of PW2, the Professor of Psychiatry in the S.M.C.S.I. Medical College Hospital, Karakkonam. This witness produced Ext.X1, medical records of the respondent and also gave details of the treatment that were given to the respondent. However, during the course of her evidence, she clearly deposed that the respondent recovered from her...",acd Mat. Appeal No.771/13 4 Mat. Appeal No.771/13 5,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/132557119/,Unclear,unclear,2013,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,132557119,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/132557119/,5
Kerala High Court,"Joseph T.M. @ Sony vs Nirmala Raphel @ Mary Nirmala on 3 November, 2010",Joseph T.M. @ Sony vs Nirmala Raphel @ Mary Nirmala,2010-11-03,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANTONY DOMINIC & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.D.RAJAN TUESDAY, THE 3RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2013/12TH BHADRA, 1935 Mat.Appeal.No. 264 of 2011 ( ) ------------------------------- AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN OPDIV 1137/2005 of FAMILY COURT, ALAPPUZHA DATED 03-11-2010 APPELLANT(S)/RESPONDENT: ------------------------------------------- JOSEPH T.M. @ SONY AGED 38 YEARS, THANNIPPILLY,SEBASTIAN ROAD, KALOOR P.O., KOCHI. BY ADV. SMT.K.V.RASHMI RESPONDENT(S)/PETITIONER: -------------------------------------------- NIRMALA RAPHEL @ MARY NIRMALA, AGED 31 YEARS, THYKOOTTATHIL HOUSE, AROOR P.O., ALAPPUZHA, PIN 688 534. BY ADV. SRI.BABU S. NAIR BY ADV. SMT.SMITHA BABU THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 03-09-2013, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: acd ANTONY DOMINIC & P.D. RAJAN, JJ. ------------------------------------------- Mat. Appeal No.264 of 2011 ---------------------------------------------- Dated this the 3rd day of September, 2013 JUDGMENT ANTONY DOMINIC,J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,"Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. This appeal arises from the judgment and decree passed by the Family Court, Alappuzha in O.P.No.1137/2005. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the evidence adduced in the case did not make out a case of cruelty and according to her, the incident that happened on 8.1.2005 and relied on by the Family Court was a stage managed one and therefore, could not have been relied on by the respondent. 6. Insofar as her first contention that the respondent did not make out a case of cruelty is concerned, we were referred to the evidence of respondent, who was examined as PW1. In her proof affidavit, which was filed in lieu of the chief examination, she has narrated various instances of cruelty. The evidence also shows that, though she was cross examined in detail, nothing was brought out to disbelieve her testimony. It was in such circumstances, the Family Court has accepted the case of cruelty. 7. Admittedly, the appellant is a...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. The appellant and the respondent are husband and wife. Their marriage was solemnized on 29.9.2003. In the wedlock, a female child was born on 26.4.2004. On 13.7.2005, the respondent wife filed the O.P. seeking divorce urging grounds of cruelty and that the appellant was incurably of unsound mind as provided under Section 10(1)(iii) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. 4. Before the Family Court, evidence was adduced by both sides by examining Pws 1 to 3 and Rws1 and 2. Exts.A1 to A14, B1 to B3 and Exts.X1 and X2 were also marked. The Family Court by judgment dated 3rd November 2010, disposed of the O.P. rejecting the case of the appellant under Section 10(1)(iii) of the Indian Divorce Act and accepting the case on the ground of cruelty, dissolving the Mat.Appeal No.264/11 2 marriage by a decree of divorce. It is aggrieved by this judgment, the appellant husband has filed this appeal.",acd Mat.Appeal No.264/11 5 Mat.Appeal No.264/11 6,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/132477295/,Cruelty,cruelty,2010,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,132477295,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/132477295/,5
Madras High Court,"Gnanambal vs G.R. Selvaraj on 20 April, 1970",(1970)2MLJ429,1970-04-20,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 1, Section 10, Section 13, Section 14, Section 90",Unsound Mind; Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER K.S. Palaniswamy, J. 1. This is an appeal filed by the wife from the decision of ?he Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, confirming he decree of he trial Court dissolving the marriage between he appellant and the respondent on the ground that he appellant was incurably of unsound mind for a continuous period of three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition for divorce. The husband-respondent is employed as an Appraiser in the Customs Department. He married the appellant in February, 1949, when hey were respectively aged about 22 and 16. There are five children of he marriage, a boy and four girls. The boy is the eldest and is aged about 15 and the youngest girl is aged 7. The last child was born in January, 1959, and at hat time the appellant was sterilised. Therefore, there is no prospect of the appellant bringing forth any more child. Even in the middle of 1951, the appellant appears to have showed signs of mental ailment. That necessitated her being treated by Dr. Dairiam, Superintendent of the Mental Hospital, Madras. She was also treated by other doctors. But hat treatment did not give the desired relief. The appellant...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"13. (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party: (i) ... (ii) ... (iii) has been incurably of unsound mind for a continuous period of not less than three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. The framers of this provision have taken into account the provisions of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950. The English Act of 1950 reproduced what was contained in the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, and has been reproduced in the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965. According to the English Act, a petition for divorce can be presented on the ground that the respondent is incurably of unsound mind and has been continuously under care and treatment for a period of at least five years...","4. On the evidence, she learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the findings of the Courts below that the appellant was of incurable unsound mind for a continuous period of three years prior to (he presentation of he petition is not warranted and that at the worst against the appellant it could only be said that she appellant is a person of weak intellect. It is also contended on behalf of the appellant that it has not been proved hat he disease from which the appellant is suffering is incurable or that the unsoundness of mind was for a continuous period of three years immediately before the presentation of the petition. 5. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary at page 2141, the distinction between unsoundness of mind and lunacy or mania is brought out in the following terms: 'Unsound mind ' which all persons must understand to be a Depravity of Reason or want of it. Mere centricity is not such an unsoundness of mind as will amount to testamentary incapacity. There is an important difference between ' unsoundness of mind...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","10. In the light of the foregoing, we may examine what the respondent husband seeking divorce under Section 13 (1) (iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, has to establish. That section reads thus: I am satisfied, without saying any more, that, although this is by no means an aggravated case of unsoundness of mind, or a violent or an extreme case, it is proved on he evidence, and not merely by the fact of certification'--which, of course, alone would not be enough--proved beyond any doubt whatever on the medical evidence, that this lady is of unsound mind, and the only question which has caused me any doubt at all is the question whether, having regard to the medical evidence, it can be said to be proved that the is incurably of unsound mind. With regard to that, it is unnecessary to say more than that, on the evidence on either side, I am satisfied that, having regard to the long history of her illness, not forgetting in that connection the two very considerable periods during which she was restored--temporarily, at any rate--to health, but in particular having regard to length of the last onset, which now extends over 11 years, and above all to her age, I am satisfied hat there is no prospect of cure. That being so,...","16. Coming to the Indian decisions Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar relied upon A. S. Mehta v. Vasumati , There , the husband applied for decree of nullity of the marriage or divorce. He alleged that he relied upon the representation made by the wife's father about the condition of the wife and went through the marriage, that after the marriage the respondent came to reside with him, that at that time he found that the wife's mental condition was defective and that she was insane and did not know how to lead a married life. On these allegations he said that as the wife's mental condition was incurable, he was entitled to a decree of mullity or in the alternative a decree of divorce. The trial Court held that the husband had failed to establish that the wife was either an idiot or lunatic at the time of the marriage or that her mental condition had not been disclosed at the time of the marriage. It was also held that the husband had failed to prove that the wife of unsound...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/51395/ | (1970)2MLJ429,Unsound Mind,unsound_mind; adultery; desertion,1970,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1970)2MLJ429,51395,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/51395/,13
Kerala High Court,"Xxxxx vs Xxxxx on 31 May, 2021",Xxxxx vs Xxxxx,2021-05-31,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 18, Section 19",Cruelty; Nullity Sec19; Unsound Mind,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH MONDAY, THE 31ST DAY OF MAY 2021 / 10TH JYAISHTA, 1943 MAT.APPEAL NO. 254 OF 2015 AGAINST THE ORDER IN OP 2091/2011 OF FAMILY COURT,THRISSUR APPELLANT/RESPONDENT IN OP NO.2091/2011: XXXXX BY ADVS. P.GOPAKUMARAN NAIR B.BINDU N.K.SUBRAMANIAN RESPONDENT/PETITIONER IN OP NO.2091/2011: XXXXX BY ADVS. K.N.ABHILASH SUNIL NAIR PALAKKAT THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 18.05.2021, ALONG WITH Mat.Appeal.67/2015, THE COURT ON 31.05.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: Mat.Appeal Nos.67 & 254/2015 :2: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH MONDAY, THE 31ST DAY OF MAY 2021 / 10TH JYAISHTA, 1943 MAT.APPEAL NO. 67 OF 2015 AGAINST THE ORDER IN OP 1113/2012 OF FAMILY COURT,THRISSUR APPELLANT/PETITIONER IN OP NO.1113/2012: XXXXX BY ADVS. P.GOPAKUMARAN NAIR B.BINDU N.K.SUBRAMANIAN RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT IN OP NO.1113/2012: XXXXX BY ADVS. K.N.ABHILASH SUNIL NAIR PALAKKAT THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 18.05.2021, ALONG WITH Mat.Appeal.254/2015, THE COURT ON 31.05.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: Mat.Appeal Nos.67 & 254/2015 :3: ""C.R."" JUDGMENT [ Mat.Appeal Nos.67/2015 & 254/2015 ] Dated this the 31st...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"13. Cruelty which constitutes a ground for divorce under the Act, whether it be mental or physical in nature, is a question of fact. Determination of such a fact must depend on the evidence in the individual case being considered by the Court. No uniform standard can be laid down for guidance; behaviour which may constitute cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another. There must be to a large Mat.Appeal Nos.67 & 254/2015 :13: extent a subjective as well as an objective aspect involved; one person may be able to tolerate conduct on the part of his or her spouse which would be intolerable to another. Under S.10(1)(x) , the cruelty must be such as to cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner spouse that it would be harmful or injurious for him/her to live with the respondent. The Division Bench of this court in...","7. The consent in relation to a marriage must be the result of a free will. In case the consent of one spouse is obtained by the other, through force or fraud, law recognizes the same as basis for annulment of marriage. As stated already, there is nothing on record to show that the respondent was suffering from incurable unsoundness of mind at the time of marriage. The respondent has admitted in the pleadings as well as in the evidence that she had delusion disorder. Admittedly, the respondent or her parents did not disclose the said fact to the appellant. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that though 'delusion disorder' may not be a disease that warrants divorce, the respondent has suppressed vital information about her health condition at the time of settlement of marriage and that itself is sufficient for annulment of the marriage. 17. Yet another facet of mental cruelty on the part of the respondent canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant is the false accusation made by the respondent against the...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","5. The appellant sought for decree of nullity on the ground Mat.Appeal Nos.67 & 254/2015 :5: that his consent to the marriage was obtained by fraud perpetrated by the respondent in suppressing material facts regarding her mental condition under Section 18 and the proviso to Section 19 of the Divorce Act, 1869 (for short 'the Act'). He also, in the alternative, prayed that the marriage be dissolved on the grounds of incurable unsound mind and cruelty on the part of the respondent under Section 10(1)(iii) and 10(1)(x) of the Act. 6. According to the appellant, the respondent was suffering from incurable unsoundness of mind and mental disorder prior to the marriage and his consent to marriage was obtained by suppressing the said fact. In order to prove the same, the appellant relied on his own oral testimony. Though it was alleged by the appellant, and practically admitted by the respondent, that two psychiatrists viz., Dr. K.P. Raghavan and Dr. K.S. Rajeev treated the respondent, no steps were taken by the appellant to examine them or to produce the treatment records. It is true that the respondent has admitted that she was suffering from some kind of delusion disorder. The essential ingredient to be proved for securing an order of dissolution of marriage under Section 10 (1) (iii) of the Act,...",In the result; (i) Both the appeals are allowed. (ii) The order in OP No. 2091/2011 is set aside. (iii) The order in OP No. 1113/2012 to the extent rejecting the claim for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty is set aside. DR. KAUSER EDAPPAGATH Rp True Copy JUDGE PS to Judge,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/146457187/,Cruelty,cruelty; nullity_sec19; unsound_mind,2021,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,146457187,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/146457187/,13
Bombay High Court,"Sou. Ramkuvar Madanlal Atale vs Madanlal Surajkaran Atale on 21 August, 1974",(1977)79BOMLR143,1974-08-21,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 1, Section 10, Section 12, Section 13, Section 18, Section 2, Section 21, Section 225, Section 23, Section 27, Section 28, Section 38, Section 88, Section 9, Section 98",Desertion; Cruelty; Unsound Mind,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Vimadalal, J.","18. The petition for judicial separation was resisted by the respondent who denied the allegations of the petitioner. She denied that she was of unsound mind when she had come to live with the petitioner or otherwise. She also denied that she and the petitioner had stayed together for only twenty-one days or so. Her contention was that before her marriage she had suffered from fever and had been sent for treatment at the Mental Hospital Yerwada, where she stayed as a voluntary patient for a few weeks and was discharged as completely cured. The respondent further contended that her marriage with the petitioner took place nearly one and half years after the said ailment for which she had been treated at the Yerwada Hospital and subsequently discharged. She contended that her ailment had been fully disclosed by her father to the petitioner and that only after full inquiry and after the petitioner had met her, did he (the petitioner) agree to marry her and in fact married her. She denied the allegations about fraud and in particular she denied that she had deserted the petitioner or that they could not lead a happy married life if the petitioner was...","3. My brother Mukhi has delivered a very learned and well-considered judgment in which he has dealt exhaustively with the various questions that were argued and raised at the hearing before them. My brother Bhole has also delivered a well-considered judgment in which, however, he has confined himself to a narrower compass. In my opinion, the matter is concluded by a very recent decision of the Supreme Court, and the only question that arises in this appeal is one of applying the principles laid down in that decision to the present case. In that view of the matter, it is really unnecessary for me to consider any of the other decisions which were cited before the learned differing Judges or before me. Before I deal with that judgment of the Supreme Court, it is, however, necessary for me to set out the relevant statutory provisions contained in the Hindu Marriage...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"18. The petition for judicial separation was resisted by the respondent who denied the allegations of the petitioner. She denied that she was of unsound mind when she had come to live with the petitioner or otherwise. She also denied that she and the petitioner had stayed together for only twenty-one days or so. Her contention was that before her marriage she had suffered from fever and had been sent for treatment at the Mental Hospital Yerwada, where she stayed as a voluntary patient for a few weeks and was discharged as completely cured. The respondent further contended that her marriage with the petitioner took place nearly one and half years after the said ailment for which she had been treated at the Yerwada Hospital and subsequently discharged. She contended that her ailment had been fully disclosed by her father to the petitioner and that only after full inquiry and after the petitioner had met her, did he (the petitioner) agree to marry her and in fact married her. She denied the allegations about fraud and in particular she denied...","4. Section 10 of the said Act lays down the grounds on which a petition for judicial separation can be presented, and the very first ground is, desertion for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. Section 13 lays down the grounds on which a petition for divorce may be presented, and Sub-section (1A) thereof enacts that a petition for divorce may be presented on the ground that there had been no resumption of cohabitation between the parties to the marriage for a period of two years or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parties. Section 21 of the said Act provides that, subject to the other provisions contained in the said Act, all proceedings thereunder are to be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure . Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act is in the following terms: (b) where the ground of the petition is the ground specified in clause (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 10, or in Clause (i) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13, the petitioner has not in any manner been accessory to or connived at or condoned the act or acts complained of, or where the ground...","1. This appeal has been referred to me under Section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure on a difference of opinion between my brother Bhole and my brother Mukhi. The facts have been set out in detail by my brother Mukhi in his judgment and it is not necessary for me to set them out again. Suffice it to say that, on a petition filed by the respondent-husband for judicial separation on the ground, inter alia, of desertion under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , being Marriage Petition No. 5 of 1966, after evidence was taken, the parties presented a joint compromise purshis on September 5, 1966 in which it was stated that, in view of the evidence led before the Court, it appeared that the parties could not live together as husband and wife and there was, therefore, no objection from them to a decree for judicial separation being passed by the Court. It was, therefore, prayed in the purshis that a decree might be passed accordingly, and it was further stated that the parties were agreed that...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1904898/ | (1977)79BOMLR143,Desertion,desertion; cruelty; unsound_mind,1974,nullity,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1977)79BOMLR143,1904898,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1904898/,67
Gujarat High Court,"Ajitrai Shivprasad Mehta vs Bai Vasumati on 20 June, 1967",AIR1969GUJ48,1967-06-20,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 12, Section 13, Section 19, Section 5, Section 84, Section 90",Unsound Mind; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT J.B. Mehta, J. 1. The petitioner husband has filed this appeal under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , hereinafter referred to as ""the Act"", as his original petition for obtaining decree of the nullity of his marriage or for divorce had been dismissed by trial Court. 2. The short facts which have given rise to this appeal are as under :--","3. The petitioner and the respondent are Brahmins by caste. The petitioner is deaf and dumb from the birth. The petitioner's father originally resided at Umreth, while the original place of residence of the respondent is Vaso. But the parents of both parties had been residing at Ahmedabad since many years. According to the petitioner he was married to the respondent at Vaso on 15th April 1954 according to the religious rites and as per the custom of the community. It is the petitioner's case that he relied upon the representations made by the respondent's father to the petitioner's father. After the marriage the respondent came to reside with the petitioner when he found that her mental condition was defective and she was insane and did not know how to lead a married life with the petitioner. These facts were not known to the petitioner at the time of the marriage and so, the petitioner contended that as the respondent's mental condition was incurable, he was entitled to a decree of nullity of his marriage or in the alternative to a decree of divorce. After the exchange of notices the petitioner has filed the present petition for the aforesaid reliefs....","The aforesaid decision concisely explains the various terms with which we have to deal with and brings out the subtle distinction between the medical and legal view on the question of insanity. In the case of idiocy, the insanity is congenital and incurable and the mind is originally so defective as to be incapable of directing the person in any matter which requires thought or judgment or in other words, there is such a complete state of amentia from birth or early childhood, that the person is almost without any glimmering of reason at all. On the other hand, in case of lunacy or insanity or unsoundness of mind such mental defect arises from the weakening of the mind, originally strong, by reason of some disease, accident or other such cause resulting in some mental illness by which memory, reason or understanding is lost and the faculties are so paralysed....",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"3. The petitioner and the respondent are Brahmins by caste. The petitioner is deaf and dumb from the birth. The petitioner's father originally resided at Umreth, while the original place of residence of the respondent is Vaso. But the parents of both parties had been residing at Ahmedabad since many years. According to the petitioner he was married to the respondent at Vaso on 15th April 1954 according to the religious rites and as per the custom of the community. It is the petitioner's case that he relied upon the representations made by the respondent's father to the petitioner's father. After the marriage the respondent came to reside with the petitioner when he found that her mental condition was defective and she was insane and did not know how to lead a married life with the petitioner. These facts were not known to the petitioner at the time of the marriage and so, the petitioner contended that as the respondent's mental condition was incurable, he was entitled to a decree of nullity of his marriage or in the alternative to...","5. In order to appreciate the first contention of Mr. Vakil, it would be proper to consider the scheme of the relevant sections of the Act. Section 5 provides for conditions for a Hindu marriage and Section 5(ii) provides that a marriage may be solemnized between two Hindus, if the following condition is fulfilled: Viz., ""neither party is an idiot or a lunatic at the time of the marriage."" Section 10(1)(e) provides for a decree for judicial separation, if either party to a marriage had been continuously of unsound mind for a period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. Section 12(1)(b) , however, provides that any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on the ground that the marriage was in contravention of the conditions specified in Clause (ii) of Section 5 . Section 13(1)(iii) then provides that a marriage solemnised, whether before or after the Act, could, on a petition presented by the spouse, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other spouse ""has been incurably of unsound mind for a continuous period of not less than three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition"". From this scheme it is...","""Unsoundness of mind may be occasioned either by perversion of intellect, manifesting itself in delusions, antipathies, or the like; or it may arise from a defect of the mind. There is no allegation here of anything like a perversion of the mind, or what is more properly called mania. With respect to defects of the mind, they are of two kinds: The mind may be originally so deficient as to be incapable of directing the person in any matter which requires thought or judgment, which is ordinarily called idiocy or the defect may arise from the weakening of a mind, originally strong by disease or some accident of a physical nature, by which memory is lost and the faculties are paralysed, although there is no perversion of the mind, nor any species of that insanity which is ordinarily called mania"". The defendant in that case had tried to put forward a case of simple idiocy invalidating the marriage of a lady, who was shown to have been deaf and dumb and of extremely dull intellect. Other people could not make...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/81755/ | AIR1969GUJ48, (1969)GLR253, AIR 1969 GUJARAT 48",Unsound Mind,unsound_mind; nullity_sec19,1967,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1969GUJ48, (1969)GLR253, AIR 1969 GUJARAT 48",81755,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/81755/,11
Madhya Pradesh High Court,"Disha Kushwaha vs Rituraj Singh on 1 October, 2019",(2020) 1 DMC 136,2019-10-01,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 1, Section 10, Section 125, Section 13, Section 19, Section 24, Section 25, Section 3, Section 482, Section 9",Cruelty; Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"1 HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH ****** Division Bench : Hon'ble Shri Justice J.K. Maheshwari Hon'ble Smt. Justice Anjuli Palo ****** First Appeal No.653/2016 Disha Kushwaha -Versus- Rituraj Singh Writ Petition No. 5967/2015 Ritu Raj Singh v. Smt. Disha Kushwaha (Singh) M.Cr.C. No. 16660/2015 Ritu Raj Singh v. Smt. Disha Singh & others ****** Shri Praveen Dubey, Advocate for husband Ritu Raj Singh. Shri Ankit Saxena, Advocate for wife Smt. Disha Kushwaha. ******* (J UD G M E N T) (1.10.2019) As per : J.K.Maheshwari, J.- 1. This judgment shall govern the disposal of all the aforesaid three cases which are filed by the either parties on matrimonial issues like divorce, restitution of conjugal rights, maintenance pendente lite or 2 grant of regular maintenance. However, they are being heard and decided by this common order.","7. In reply to it, the respondent denied all the allegations of the plaint and taking the same plea as taken in his suit for divorce, prayed for dismissal of the suit for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the wife.","After the marriage has ceased to exist in substance and in reality, there is no reason for denying divorce. The parties alone can decide whether their mutual relationship provides the fulfillment which they seek. Divorce should be seen as a solution and an escape route out of a difficult situation. Such divorce is unconcerned with the wrongs of the past, but is concerned with bringing the parties and the children to terms with the new situation and developments by working out the most satisfactory basis upon which they 24 may regulate their relationship in the changed circumstances. Moreover, the essence of marriage is a sharing of common life, a sharing of all the happiness that life has to offer and all the misery that has to be faced in life, an experience of the joy that comes from enjoying, in common, things of the matter and of the spirit and...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"7. In reply to it, the respondent denied all the allegations of the plaint and taking the same plea as taken in his suit for divorce, prayed for dismissal of the suit for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the wife.","2. The first appeal is filed by the appellant-wife under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 02.09.2016 passed in Civil Suit No.828-A/2014 by First Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Bhopal granting decree of divorce on a suit filed by the respondent-husband under Section 13 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The appellant wife has also assailed the judgment passed in Civil Suit No.464-A/2015 filed by her for restitution of conjugal rights against the respondent which was dismissed by the same order. W.P. No. 5967/2015 has been filed by the husband against grant of maintenance pendente lite vide order dated 5.1.2015 passed in R.C.S. No. 828- A/2014; and M.Cr.C. No. 16660/2015 has been filed by the husband under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for setting aside of the order dated 12.1.2015 passed in M.J.C. No. 450/2014 granting maintenance of Rs. 35,000/- to the wife. 3. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the appellant is legally wedded wife of the respondent. The marriage was solemnized on 06.02.1999 as per Hindu rituals. They are having three children by the said wedlock i.e. twin daughters and a son. The appellant along with the children is residing separately from the respondent since February, 2013 and they are litigating in the Court by filing...","2. We grant decree for divorce in the above terms. The Divorce Petition No. O.P. 1019 of 1992 filed by the respondent (husband) pending before the Principal Family Court, Madras shall stand disposed in the above terms. No costs. 27. In Kanchan Devi (Smt.) Vs. Promod Kumar Mittal and another reported in (1996) 8 SCC 90, the Apex Court found that the parties were living separately for last more than 10 years and there is no possibility of reconciliation. On being found by the parties that the marriage has been irretrievably brokedown, they mutually agreed to dissolve the marriage. The Apex Court has observed as under:- 3. During the pendency of the proceedings in this Court, an effort was made for reconciliation between the parties. It was admitted by the learned counsel for the parties that the parties have not been living together for the last more than one decade as husband and wife and their relationship was totally strained and bitter against each other. On 7-12-1995, it appeared to us that there was no possibility of any reconciliation 22...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/132173216/ | (2020) 1 DMC 136, AIR 2019 MADHYA PRADESH 217, (2019) 4 MPLJ 694, (2020) 1 HINDULR 385, AIRONLINE 2019 MP 1408",Cruelty,cruelty; adultery; desertion,2019,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (2020) 1 DMC 136, AIR 2019 MADHYA PRADESH 217, (2019) 4 MPLJ 694, (2020) 1 HINDULR 385, AIRONLINE 2019 MP 1408",132173216,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/132173216/,15
Kerala High Court,"Xxxxx vs Yyy on 19 November, 2021",Xxxxx vs Yyy,2021-11-19,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13",Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH FRIDAY, THE 19TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2021 / 28TH KARTHIKA, 1943 MAT.APPEAL NO. 434 OF 2016 AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN OP 1692/2012 OF FAMILY COURT,ERNAKULAM, ERNAKULAM APPELLANT/S: 'X' BY ADVS. SRI.C.M.NAZAR SRI.G.CHANDRASEKHAR SMT.K.BINDU RANI RESPONDENT/S: 'Y' BY ADVS. SRI.BOBY MATHEW SMT.K.MEERA THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING BEING FINALLY HEARD ON 15/09/2021, THE COURT ON 19.11.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ""C.R."" A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & DR.KAUSER EDAPPAGATH, JJ. ------------------------------------------ Mat.Appeal No.434 of 2016 ------------------------------------------ J U D G M E N T Dated this the 19th day of November, 2021 A.Muhamed Mustaque, J. ""People are always good company when they are doing what they really enjoy."" Samuel Butler (1) When marriage is in trouble due to inherent incompatibility, enjoyment vanishes and what left in the marriage is often confounding the Court. The troubled marriage never ends happily; it gets worsened when one party moves the Court. Here is a case of divorce of the parties who are living separately since 2003. 2. A case for divorce on the ground of 'desertion' moved by the husband ended in dismissal with scathing remarks about",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"4. The respondent-wife had a different story to tell. According to the respondent, the appellant never provided any emotional or familial security and he was more pre-occupied in MAT.APPEAL NO. 434 OF 2016 -:5:- forming various romantic internet alliances using multiple identical aliases. It is further contended that the appellant was more interested to lead a bachelor life without any family responsibility. She pointed out that she and her children were completely neglected. She also stated that she was compelled to single handedly perform social and domestic chores including medical, schooling and recreational needs of the children. It is stated by her that her parents being convinced of neglect, forced to take the children along with her to Bangalore in the year 2001. The defense of the wife clearly would show that there was no emotional bonding between the parties ever since the marriage and disillusionment with husband made her...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1) Considerations of the decline of Italian Art [See: Delphi Complete Works of Samuel Butler (Illustrated)] (Series Five Book 19) Kindle Edition] MAT.APPEAL NO. 434 OF 2016 -:3:- his conduct and life style. He, accordingly, approached this Court in this appeal. The parties are Christian by faith. Their marriage was solemnized in accordance with the Christian rites on 26.12.1994. Two daughters born in the wedlock in the year 1997 and 1999 respectively, have attained majority and they are looking forward to lead a quiet and steady life. When we looked into the case, we thought on assigning ordinary meaning to 'desertion'; the Family Court was justified in dismissing the petition for divorce. However, on a deeper consideration of the law, we are of the view that a glaring misunderstanding on the point of law had resulted in dismissal. We looked at the true meaning of 'desertion' in the context of divorce under Divorce Act, 1869 . We find 'desertion' also mean refusal of a spouse to 'cohabit' even if such spouse has no intention to abandon the marriage. Before venturing to the above exercise, we deem to refer the brief factual situation. MAT.APPEAL NO. 434 OF 2016 -:4:- 3. The appellant-husband is a retired Navy Officer. His marriage with the respondent was an arranged marriage. The appellant asserts that the...","19. In this case, it is clear from the pleadings as well as the evidence adduced on the side of the respondent that she has no intention to resume cohabitation with the appellant. It also has come out in evidence adduced by the appellant that he made attempt to resume cohabitation. The oral testimony of PW2 and PW3 cannot be overlooked in order to prove the attempt made by the appellant to resume cohabitation. The evidence shows that the appellant had no intention to abandon or separate the marriage. The problem appears to be inherent incompatibility of the parties. Ext.A3 report of the Consultant Psychiatrist and Ext.A4 of the private Mediator vouchsafe that there exist lack of emotional intimacy between the parties. The life style of the MAT.APPEAL NO. 434 OF 2016 -:16:- appellant is attributed as the cause for separation by the respondent-wife. However, it is to be noted that the respondent failed to prove or substantiate any case of forced separation. If the emotional intimacy is not built in a marriage, such marriage is bound to collapse. If...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/50540379/,Desertion,desertion,2021,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,50540379,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/50540379/,6
Madras High Court,"Samuel Asirvatham Raja vs Stella Janci Rani on 12 March, 2024",Samuel Asirvatham Raja vs Stella Janci Rani,2024-03-12,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 55",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"7. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 31.08.2005 and a male child was born on 01.08.2006. After marriage, the respondent behaved abnormally and frequently, she left from the matrimonial home and stayed with her parents and the petitioner used to conduct panchayat and take back her to the matrimonial home. The respondent has affairs with one Doctor prior to marriage even now she is continuing her contact with the said Doctor through phone. Before the trial Court, in order to prove the case of the appellant, he examined himself as PW1 and he deposed about the mental cruelty caused by the respondent and the father of the petitioner was also examined as PW2. He also categorically deposed about the mental cruelty caused by the respondent. But the trial Court did not consider the above said evidence 6/12 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 and wrongly came to a conclusion that the petitioner has not satisfactorily established the cruelty. However, the trial Court has given much importance to the evidence of the respondent's side and disbelieved the evidence of the petitioner's side and therefore, the order passed by the...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,(i)Whether the appeal is liable to be allowed or not?,"7. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 31.08.2005 and a male child was born on 01.08.2006. After marriage, the respondent behaved abnormally and frequently, she left from the matrimonial home and stayed with her parents and the petitioner used to conduct panchayat and take back her to the matrimonial home. The respondent has affairs with one Doctor prior to marriage even now she is continuing her contact with the said Doctor through phone. Before the trial Court, in order to prove the case of the appellant, he examined himself as PW1 and he deposed about the mental cruelty caused by the respondent and the father of the petitioner was also examined as PW2. He also categorically deposed about the mental cruelty caused by the respondent. But the trial Court did not consider the above said evidence 6/12 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 and wrongly came to a conclusion that the petitioner has not satisfactorily established the cruelty. However, the trial Court has given much importance to the...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT Dated: 12.03.2024 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE P. DHANABAL C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 and CMP(MD)No.6600 of 2017 Samuel Asirvatham Raja .. Appellant/Petitioner Vs. Stella Janci Rani .. Respondent/Respondent Prayer : This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act, against the judgment and decree dated 28.10.2010 in IDOP.No.47 of 2009 on the file of the I-Additional District Judge, Tirunelveli. For Appellant : Mr.T.A.Ebenezer For Respondent : Mr.S.Siva Thilakar 1/12 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 JUDGMENT This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has been filed by the appellant as against the order passed by the I-Additional District Judge, Tirunelveli, in IDOP.No.47 of 2009 dated 28.10.2010 wherein the appellant herein has filed a petition seeking divorce on the ground of desertion as well as cruelty. The trial Court has dismissed the petition. As against the order passed by the trial Court, the present appeal is filed. 2. For the sake of convenience and brevity, the parties hereinafter will be referred to as per their status/ranking in the Tribunal. 3. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner filed before the trial Court is as follows: The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 31.08.2005 at St. Paul's Church, NGO 'A' Colony, Tirunelveli. Out of the wedlock, a male...","14. In view of the above discussion, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. No Costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 12.03.2024 NCC : Yes/No Index : Yes/No Internet: Yes/No PJL To 1. The I-Additional District Judge, Tirunlveli. 2.The Record Keeper, Vernacular Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai. 11/12 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 P. DHANABAL,J. PJL C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 and CMP(MD)No.6600 of 2017 12.03.2024 12/12 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/63826476/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2024,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,63826476,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/63826476/,6
Madras High Court,"Samuel Asirvatham Raja vs Stella Janci Rani on 12 March, 2024",Samuel Asirvatham Raja vs Stella Janci Rani,2024-03-12,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 55",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"7. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 31.08.2005 and a male child was born on 01.08.2006. After marriage, the respondent behaved abnormally and frequently, she left from the matrimonial home and stayed with her parents and the petitioner used to conduct panchayat and take back her to the matrimonial home. The respondent has affairs with one Doctor prior to marriage even now she is continuing her contact with the said Doctor through phone. Before the trial Court, in order to prove the case of the appellant, he examined himself as PW1 and he deposed about the mental cruelty caused by the respondent and the father of the petitioner was also examined as PW2. He also categorically deposed about the mental cruelty caused by the respondent. But the trial Court did not consider the above said evidence 6/12 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 and wrongly came to a conclusion that the petitioner has not satisfactorily established the cruelty. However, the trial Court has given much importance to the evidence of the respondent's side and disbelieved the evidence of the petitioner's side and therefore, the order passed by the...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,(i)Whether the appeal is liable to be allowed or not?,"7. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 31.08.2005 and a male child was born on 01.08.2006. After marriage, the respondent behaved abnormally and frequently, she left from the matrimonial home and stayed with her parents and the petitioner used to conduct panchayat and take back her to the matrimonial home. The respondent has affairs with one Doctor prior to marriage even now she is continuing her contact with the said Doctor through phone. Before the trial Court, in order to prove the case of the appellant, he examined himself as PW1 and he deposed about the mental cruelty caused by the respondent and the father of the petitioner was also examined as PW2. He also categorically deposed about the mental cruelty caused by the respondent. But the trial Court did not consider the above said evidence 6/12 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 and wrongly came to a conclusion that the petitioner has not satisfactorily established the cruelty. However, the trial Court has given much importance to the...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT Dated: 12.03.2024 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE P. DHANABAL C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 and CMP(MD)No.6600 of 2017 Samuel Asirvatham Raja .. Appellant/Petitioner Vs. Stella Janci Rani .. Respondent/Respondent Prayer : This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act, against the judgment and decree dated 28.10.2010 in IDOP.No.47 of 2009 on the file of the I-Additional District Judge, Tirunelveli. For Appellant : Mr.T.A.Ebenezer For Respondent : Mr.S.Siva Thilakar 1/12 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 JUDGMENT This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has been filed by the appellant as against the order passed by the I-Additional District Judge, Tirunelveli, in IDOP.No.47 of 2009 dated 28.10.2010 wherein the appellant herein has filed a petition seeking divorce on the ground of desertion as well as cruelty. The trial Court has dismissed the petition. As against the order passed by the trial Court, the present appeal is filed. 2. For the sake of convenience and brevity, the parties hereinafter will be referred to as per their status/ranking in the Tribunal. 3. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner filed before the trial Court is as follows: The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 31.08.2005 at St. Paul's Church, NGO 'A' Colony, Tirunelveli. Out of the wedlock, a male...","14. In view of the above discussion, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. No Costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 12.03.2024 NCC : Yes/No Index : Yes/No Internet: Yes/No PJL To 1. The I-Additional District Judge, Tirunlveli. 2.The Record Keeper, Vernacular Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai. 11/12 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 P. DHANABAL,J. PJL C.M.A.(MD)No.89 of 2011 and CMP(MD)No.6600 of 2017 12.03.2024 12/12 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80987595/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2024,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,80987595,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80987595/,6
Kerala High Court,"Kochurani Chacko vs K.M.Chackochen on 22 July, 2009",Kochurani Chacko vs K.M.Chackochen,2009-07-22,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125, Section 13, Section 13B",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE & THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN WEDNESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF JULY 2017/14TH ASHADHA, 1939 Mat.Appeal.No. 832 of 2009 ( ) ------------------------------- AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN OP 523/2006 of FAMILY COURT, ALAPPUZHA DATED 22-07-2009 APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS: ----------------------- 1. KOCHURANI CHACKO, AGED 43, D/O. M.V.EAPPEN, MADATHIL KATTUKUNNEL, VELLARIKUNDU P.O. KASARGOD,NOW AT KALAKUTTUMPARAMBIL, THAKAZHY, ALAPPUZHA. 2. STEPHY MARIA JACOB @ CHIKKU D/O. KOCHURANI CHACKO, KALAKETTUMPARAMBIL, THAKAZHY VILLGE, ALAPPUZHA. 3. SUBIN MUCHAEL JACOB @ KUTHU, MINOR REPRESENTED BY THE, 1ST PETITIONER MOTHER KOCHURANI CHACKO, AGED 43,, D/O. M.V. EAPPEN, MADATHIL KATTUKUNNEL, VELLARIKUNDU P.O.,KASARGOD NOW AT KALAKETTUMPARAMBIL, THAKAZHY, ALAPPUZHA 4. ARANTAX MARGARAT JACOB @ MICHU, MINOR,REPRESENTED BY THE 1ST PETITIONER MOTHER, KOCHURANI CHACKO, AGED 43,D/O.M.V.EAPPEN, MADATHIL KATTUKUNNEL, VELLARIKUNDU P.O., KASARGOD NOW AT KALAKETTUMPARAMBIL, THAKAZHY, ALAPPUZHA. BY ADV. SRI.K.V.SADANANDA PRABHU RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT: ------------------------- K.M.CHACKOCHEN, AGED 43, S/O LATE MICHAEL, KALAKETTUMPARAMBIL,, THAKAZHY, ALAPPUZHA. R1 BY ADV. SRI.ROY CHACKO R1 BY ADV. DR.P.L.JOHN THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 06- 06-2017, ALONG WITH MA. 833/2009, MA. 834/2009, MA. 77/2010, THE COURT ON 5/7/2017 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: A.M. SHAFFIQUE & ANU SIVARAMAN, JJ. =========================== Mat.Appeal Nos. 832, 833 & 834 of 2009 & 77...","17. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the parties had been living separately since April,1996. More than 20 years had lapsed which clearly amounts to an instance of irretrievable break down of marriage and therefore, this is a fit case in which the judgment of the Family Court requires to be confirmed. Learned counsel also submits that irretrievable break down of marriage can also be considered Mat.Appeal No.832/09 & conn.cases -:15:- as a ground for divorce in exceptional circumstances though there is no statutory provision enabling the same.","13. Though in Ismayil's case (supra), the Court was concerned with the question as to whether marriage expenses are to be paid to a daughter, from the principle laid down, it is apparently clear that the daughters are to be maintained until they are given in marriage or until they are capable of maintaining themselves. In the light of the above discussion, we Mat.Appeal No.832/09 & conn.cases -:10:- are of the view that the Family Court was not justified in restricting the maintenance to the daughters until the age of majority. They are entitled for maintenance until their marriage or until they are gainfully employed, whichever is earlier. 20. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent placed reliance upon a judgment in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli [(2006) 4 SCC 558] to contend that when parties are living separately for a sufficient length of time, and one...","11. Out of the petitioners, second petitioner attained majority during the pendency of the petition, on 17/5/2007.The Family Court restricted the claim for maintenance of the 2nd petitioner till 17/5/2007. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in P.M.Devassia v. Ancy and Others [(2007) 1 ILR Kerala 206] to contend that a girl child is entitled for maintenance until her marriage. 14. In regard to the other claim for recovery of `2 lakh and 50 sovereigns of gold ornaments, the petitioner's case was that on 9/9/1987, the date of betrothal, the respondent made a demand to the first petitioner's parents that an amount of `2 lakhs and 50 sovereigns of gold ornaments should be given as sthreedhanam and that the amount should be paid before the marriage. Accordingly, `2 lakhs was paid to the respondent on 20/9/1987, a day prior to the marriage. Further, on the day of marriage, 1st petitioner was given 50 sovereigns of gold ornaments. It is alleged that the first petitioner entrusted the same with...","17. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the parties had been living separately since April,1996. More than 20 years had lapsed which clearly amounts to an instance of irretrievable break down of marriage and therefore, this is a fit case in which the judgment of the Family Court requires to be confirmed. Learned counsel also submits that irretrievable break down of marriage can also be considered Mat.Appeal No.832/09 & conn.cases -:15:- as a ground for divorce in exceptional circumstances though there is no statutory provision enabling the same.","12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Cholamarakkar and another v. Pathummamma [2008 (3) KHC 973]. This judgment is relied upon for the proposition that a minor girl on attaining majority is not entitled for maintenance. That was a case in which a Division Bench was considering the entitlement of an unmarried daughter after attaining the age of majority and belonging to Muslim community. It is held that unless it is established that the inability to maintain herself is on account of the physical or mental abnormality or injury, she will not be entitled to claim maintenance. After referring to the case Mat.Appeal No.832/09 & conn.cases -:8:- law on the point, it was held that ""thus the physical or mental abnormality or injury leading to the inability to maintain herself is a precondition for a child who has attained majority and also in the case of an unmarried daughter to claim maintenance from the parents"". This case was decided with reference to the grant of maintenance under Section 125(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, where the Court is bound by the statutory prescription. But in Ismayil v. Fathima (2011 (4) KLT 40), another Division Bench had occasion to consider a claim for marriage expenses...","ANU SIVARAMAN, JUDGE Rp //True Copy// P.S to Judge",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/128478824/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2009,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,128478824,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/128478824/,15
Telangana High Court,"N.Manikya Rao vs Smt.Lillian Swaroopa on 7 March, 2025",N.Manikya Rao vs Smt.Lillian Swaroopa,2025-03-07,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 40",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA AND THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO F.C.A.NO.143 OF 2014 J U D G M E N T: (per Justice B.R.Madhusudhan Rao),"7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the appellant has failed to prove cruelty and desertion and the learned Trial Court has rightly dismissed the OP by assigning reasons.","57. The Court dealing with the petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty has to bear in mind that the problems before it are those of human beings and the psychological changes in a spouse's conduct have to be borne in mind before disposing of the petition for divorce. However, insignificant or trifling, such conduct may cause pain in the mind of another. But before the conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain pitch of severity. It is for the Court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen whether the conduct was such that no reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to be considered whether the complainant should be called upon to endure as a part of normal human life. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen...","12. The appellant has stated in his cross-examination that the respondent has been living in the same house in which he is living in a separate portion since 2010, witness added that living from 2010 in the portion of the house is in accordance with the Court orders. He further went on to say that himself, his wife and children were living in the same house since the construction of the house. 10 FCA_143_2014 13. Ex.P3 is the order in DVC No.120 of 2010 dated 30.03.2012. It is contended by the respondent in the DVC that on 24.02.2009 her husband has abused her in filthy language, assaulted her physically in the presence of her daughter and son-in-law. Ex.P3 order goes to show that the respondent herein/petitioner therein is the absolute and rightful owner to reside in the shared house-hold in the capacity of a contributor and more particularly in the capacity of a legally wedded wife. There is no doubt that the house in which the appellant and the respondent are residing is a shared house. 14. It is the...","7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the appellant has failed to prove cruelty and desertion and the learned Trial Court has rightly dismissed the OP by assigning reasons.","1. The instant Appeal arises out of an order dated 09.05.2014 passed by the Judge, Family Court, Hyderabad in FCOP.No.1661 of 2010 filed by the appellant-husband under Section 10(1)(ix) and (x) of Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of his marriage with the respondent-wife by a decree of divorce. 2. The Family Court dismissed the petition for divorce on the ground that appellant failed to prove cruelty and desertion. 3. The contentions of the appellant and the respondent argued before the Family Court are as follows: 3.1. The appellant sought dissolution of marriage on the ground that they lived happily till 2000 and thereafter, the respondent got influenced by the life style of her elder sister Smt.Sarala, she used to compare the life style with that of the appellant and used to express that he should live the life like that of her brother-in-law Mr.Udayabhanu who retired as an Officer from the Forest Department. The respondent used to pick up quarrels with the appellant without any reason and used to go to her sister's house at Mettuguda, 2 FCA_143_2014 Secunderabad and stay there for months together, leaving behind the children and the appellant used to take care of them. The respondent used to insult the appellant in front of his children and outsiders, the appellant has tolerated the behaviour of...",PLV,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/13565390/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2025,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,13565390,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/13565390/,9
Madras High Court,"L.Stella vs V.Ponnusamy on 11 September, 2015",L.Stella vs V.Ponnusamy,2015-09-11,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 19, Section 2, Section 22, Section 3",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"4.The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Respondent (wife) contends that the order of the learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Coimbatore in D.O.P. No.22 of 2008 dated 06.02.2015 is against facts and evidence. 6.The Learned Counsel for the Appellant proceeds to take a plea that the Learned Trial Judge had failed to appreciate that once the parties to the marriage performed the marriage and submit to the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 , their marital relationship and their marital rights are governed by the said Act and as such, the parties are bound to seek redressal only under the said Act. 7.The Learned Counsel for Appellant brings it to the notice of this Court that the Appellant had filed the S.M.O.P No.192 of 2000 seeking the relief of 'Restitution of Conjugal Rights' on the file of Family Court and the same was allowed. Further more, the Respondent/Husband had filed S.M.O.P.No.339 of 1998, seeking a relief of Divorce on the file of Family Court, Coimbatore and the same was dismissed as not pressed. In fact, these two aforesaid Petitions were filed under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and when that be the fact situation, the Respondent/Husband strangely filed D.O.P....","10.Conversely, it is contention of the Learned Counsel for the Respondent/Husband that the trial court came to the conclusion that the Appellant/Wife had deserted the Respondent/Husband from 30.03.1992 and further that, she treated him cruelly and consequently granted the relief of divorce in his favour and the same need not to be interfered with by this Court sitting in Appellate Jurisdiction. 11.Admittedly, the Appellant/Wife is Christian and that the Respondent/Husband is Hindu. At the time of marriage on 18.03.1991, the Appellant/Wife was a widow. Further, the Respondent/Husband at the time of his marriage was serving as a clerk in the Postal Department and subsequently he retired voluntarily and is receiving monthly pension. 12.The main grievance of the Respondent/Husband is that the Appellant/Respondent left the marital home and went to her mother's place and when he went there to bring his wife, her family members used abusive language and ill-treated him. Apart from that, the Appellant had failed to prepare food and look after him as dutiful wife. Also that the Appellant had not visited him when he was admitted into the hospital as an in-patient on two occasions. Indeed, the stand of the Respondent/Husband is that only his brother's family...","31.Undoubtedly, the term of 'Desertion' is a matter to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a given case. To put it succinctly, an inference of 'Desertion' may be drawn by a Court of Law from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; ie., to mention, the facts have to be necessarily viewed as to the purpose which is established by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the real acts of separation. If there is a separation, the main issue that crops up for rumination is whether the Act is attributable to an animus deserendi? The act of Desertion starts when the factum of separation and the animus deserendi co-exists. However, it is not necessary that the two should start at the same time, as opined by this Court. 32. In regard...","4.The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Respondent (wife) contends that the order of the learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Coimbatore in D.O.P. No.22 of 2008 dated 06.02.2015 is against facts and evidence. 6.The Learned Counsel for the Appellant proceeds to take a plea that the Learned Trial Judge had failed to appreciate that once the parties to the marriage performed the marriage and submit to the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 , their marital relationship and their marital rights are governed by the said Act and as such, the parties are bound to seek redressal only under the said Act. 7.The Learned Counsel for Appellant brings it to the notice of this Court that the Appellant had filed the S.M.O.P No.192 of 2000 seeking the relief of 'Restitution of Conjugal Rights' on the file of Family Court and the same was allowed. Further more, the Respondent/Husband had filed S.M.O.P.No.339 of 1998, seeking a relief of Divorce on the file of Family Court, Coimbatore and the same was dismissed as not pressed. In fact, these two aforesaid Petitions...","10.Conversely, it is contention of the Learned Counsel for the Respondent/Husband that the trial court came to the conclusion that the Appellant/Wife had deserted the Respondent/Husband from 30.03.1992 and further that, she treated him cruelly and consequently granted the relief of divorce in his favour and the same need not to be interfered with by this Court sitting in Appellate Jurisdiction. 11.Admittedly, the Appellant/Wife is Christian and that the Respondent/Husband is Hindu. At the time of marriage on 18.03.1991, the Appellant/Wife was a widow. Further, the Respondent/Husband at the time of his marriage was serving as a clerk in the Postal Department and subsequently he retired voluntarily and is receiving monthly pension. 12.The main grievance of the Respondent/Husband is that the Appellant/Respondent left the marital home and went to her mother's place and when he went there to bring his wife, her family members used abusive language and ill-treated him. Apart from that, the Appellant had failed to prepare food and look after him as dutiful wife. Also that the Appellant had not visited him when he was admitted into...","In the High Court of Judicature at Madras Dated: 11.09.2015 Coram: The Hon'ble Mr.Justice S.MANIKUMAR and The Hon'ble Mr.Justice M.VENUGOPAL C.M.A.No.1974 of 2015 and M.P.No.1 of 2015 L.Stella ..Appellant Vs. V.Ponnusamy ..Respondent Prayer: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 to set aside the Judgment and Decree dated 06.02.2015 in D.O.P.No.122 of 2008 on the file of the Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Coimbatore For Appellant : Mr.K.S.Karthik Raja For Respondent : Mr.K.Premkumar J U D G M E N T [Judgment of the Court was delivered by M.VENUGOPAL, J.] The Appellant/Respondent has preferred the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal as against the Order dated 06.02.2015 in DOP.No.122 of 2008 passed by the learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Coimbatore. 2.The Learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Coimbatore while passing the Impugned Order in D.O.P. No.122 of 2008 (filed by the Petitioner/Husband) on 06.02.2015 at Paragraph No.12 had interalia observed that the failure of the respondent (Appellant) to perform the duty of a wife, is proved to have caused cruelty which is harmful to the Petitioner (Respondent/Husband). Thus, the above said fact fits into the ground for dissolution of marriage adumbrated under Section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 and resultantly allowed the Petition by dissolving the marriage solemnized between the parties...","39.In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Resultantly, the Order passed by the Learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, in D.O.P. No.122 of 2008 dated 06.02.2015 is affirmed by this Court for the reasons assigned in this Appeal. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. [S.M.K., J.] [M.V., J.] 11.09.2015 Index:Yes/No Internet:Yes/No. ssd S.MANIKUMAR, J. and M.VENUGOPAL, J. ssd To The Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Coimbatore C.M.A.No.1974 of 2015 and M.P.No.1 of 2015 11.09.2015",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3738797/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2015,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,3738797,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3738797/,9
Madras High Court,"Joan Christy vs Roche Gilbert on 28 August, 2025",Joan Christy vs Roche Gilbert,2025-08-28,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 19",Cruelty; Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"(b) The petitioner further stated that at the time of marriage, her parents had given 75 sovereigns of gold ornaments, Rs.1,00,000/- cash and a Hyundai I20 sports car as Sridhana to the respondent. (c) Before the marriage, the petitioner was working in the Office of the Rural Development Department, Thirumayam, whereas, the respondent was working as a teacher in a Government-aided Minority School, Muthupettai, Ramanathapuram District. 2/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 28/08/2025 04:40:03 pm ) C.M.A(MD)No.483 of 2024 (d) After the marriage, the respondent has not shown any love and affection towards her and he simply abandoned her without providing any small help to attend her duties during the COVID-19 pandemic period. Thereafter as decided by both families, they have shifted their matrimonial home to Thirumayam for a rental house after obtaining the consent of both families. Even after relocating the matrimonial home to Thriumayam, the respondent continued to quarrel with the petitioner and her parents for trivial issues. (e) Later, she came to know that the respondent had involved in an extramarital affair with someone before their marriage and continued the illicit relationship thereafter. When, she confronted him regarding the same, the respondent openly admitted that he was maintaining...","(a) The respondent denied all the allegations contained in the petition. He also denied the allegations regarding the demand for dowry and gifts. He has a 3.5 sovereigns of gold chain and an engagement ring. He did not receive any other jewellery or cash from the petitioner's parents. The Hyundai I20 car was not given as dowry, it was only parked at the marriage hall for photos, and the RC book and documents are still in the petitioner's father's name. The respondent had given Rs.6,70,000/- to the parents of the petitioner for making the mangalsutra and 4/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 28/08/2025 04:40:03 pm ) C.M.A(MD)No.483 of 2024 engagement ring. The petitioner has his gold chain and gold ring. (b) The allegations of domestic violence, abuse, are false. The respondent attempted to reconcile the dispute on 14.02.2021 at Ramanathapuram. However, the petitioner's claims regarding the decision to rent a house at Karaikudi are false. The petitioner visited the respondent's home only three times, after the marriage. In most of the occasions the petitioner accompanied her brother. (c) The respondent denied the petitioner's claim about an accident involving a dog, but alleges that it was caused by a person named Karthik....","11. In this case, the points for consideration are (i) Whether the order passed by the trial Court is proper or liable to be set aside? 10/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 28/08/2025 04:40:03 pm ) C.M.A(MD)No.483 of 2024 12. Heard the learned counsel on either side and carefully perused the entire material record. 33. Further, the petitioner, has not specifically mentioned any date of harassment either in her petition or in evidence, before 12.08.2021, however, she stated that a panchayat was held on 14.02.2021 at Ramnathapuram, wherein it was decided that the petitioner and respondent should reside at Karaikudi and attend their respective employment, the respondent refused to reside with her at Karaikudi. On 12.08.2021, the petitioner called the respondent over the phone, enquired whether he had set up house at Karaikudi, but the respondent refused to reside with her at Karaikudi. He further stated that he did not wish...","(b) The petitioner further stated that at the time of marriage, her parents had given 75 sovereigns of gold ornaments, Rs.1,00,000/- cash and a Hyundai I20 sports car as Sridhana to the respondent. (c) Before the marriage, the petitioner was working in the Office of the Rural Development Department, Thirumayam, whereas, the respondent was working as a teacher in a Government-aided Minority School, Muthupettai, Ramanathapuram District. 2/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 28/08/2025 04:40:03 pm ) C.M.A(MD)No.483 of 2024 (d) After the marriage, the respondent has not shown any love and affection towards her and he simply abandoned her without providing any small help to attend her duties during the COVID-19 pandemic period. Thereafter as decided by both families, they have shifted their matrimonial home to Thirumayam for a rental house after obtaining the consent of both families. Even after relocating the matrimonial home to Thriumayam, the respondent continued to quarrel with the petitioner and her parents for trivial issues. (e) Later, she came to know that the respondent had involved in an extramarital affair with someone before their marriage and...","(a) The respondent denied all the allegations contained in the petition. He also denied the allegations regarding the demand for dowry and gifts. He has a 3.5 sovereigns of gold chain and an engagement ring. He did not receive any other jewellery or cash from the petitioner's parents. The Hyundai I20 car was not given as dowry, it was only parked at the marriage hall for photos, and the RC book and documents are still in the petitioner's father's name. The respondent had given Rs.6,70,000/- to the parents of the petitioner for making the mangalsutra and 4/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 28/08/2025 04:40:03 pm ) C.M.A(MD)No.483 of 2024 engagement ring. The petitioner has his gold chain and gold ring. (b) The allegations of domestic violence, abuse, are false. The respondent attempted to reconcile the dispute on 14.02.2021 at Ramanathapuram. However, the petitioner's claims regarding the decision to rent a house at Karaikudi are false. The petitioner visited the respondent's home only three times, after the marriage. In most of the occasions the petitioner accompanied her brother. (c) The respondent denied...","C.M.A(MD)No.483 of 2024 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT Reserved on : 17.07.2025 Pronounced on : 28.08.2025 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.D.JAGADISH CHANDIRA AND THE HONOURABLE MS.JUSTICE R.POORNIMA CMA(MD)No.483 of 2024 Joan Christy ... Appellant/ Petitioner Vs. Roche Gilbert ...Respondent / Respondent PRAYER: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, 1984, to set aside the fair and decreetal order dated 24.02.2023 made in O.P.No.305 of 2021 and counter claim in O.P. No.183 of 2022 on the file of the Family Court, Sivagangai and allow this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal. For Appellant : Mr.A.Mohan For Respondent : Mr.M.Gurudas 1/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 28/08/2025 04:40:03 pm ) C.M.A(MD)No.483 of 2024 JUDGMENT (Judgment of this Court was delivered by R.POORNIMA, J.) The appellant/petitioner/wife has filed this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal against the fair order and decreetal order dated 24.02.2023 passed in O.P No.305 of 2021 and Counter claim in O.P.No. 183 of 2022 on the file of the Family Court, Sivagangai. 2.Brief facts of the petition before the lower Court is as follows: (a)The petitioner submits that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 02.07.2020 at Saint Soosaiyappar Church at Kalathoorpatti Village in Trichy District, as per the customs prevailed in the Christian community. 13. The appellant/petitioner/wife filed the divorce petition under Section...","40. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. The fair and decreetal order dated 24.02.2023, passed in OP No.305 of 2021 and counter claim in O.P.No.183 of 2022, by the Family Court, Sivagangai, is confirmed. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. (A.D.J.C., J.) & (R.P., J.) 28.08.2025 Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No NCC : Yes / No RM To 1.The Judge, Family Court, Sivagangai. Copy to 1.The Section Officer, ER/VR Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai. 25/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 28/08/2025 04:40:03 pm ) C.M.A(MD)No.483 of 2024 A.D.JAGADISH CHANDIRA, J. AND R.POORNIMA, J. RM Judgment in C.M.A.(MD)No.483 of 2024 28.08.2025 26/26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 28/08/2025 04:40:03 pm )",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/89024751/,Cruelty,cruelty; adultery; desertion,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,89024751,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/89024751/,9
Bombay High Court,"Shri Raymond Lancy Rodrigues vs Smt. Yogita W/O Raymond Rodrigues on 3 April, 2017",Shri Raymond Lancy Rodrigues vs Smt. Yogita W/O Raymond Rodrigues,2017-04-03,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"fca287.14.odt 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.287/2014 APPELLANT: Shri Raymond Lancy Rodrigues Org. Petitioner Aged about 63 years, Occupation - Retired, R/o Shirthadi Main Road, P.O. Shirthadi, District - Mangalore, Taluka Karkal. ...VERSUS... RESPONDENT : Smt. Yogita w/o Raymond Rodrigues, Org. Respondent Aged about 30 years, R/o C/o Mrs. Alexandar Vincent, Yerkheda, Kamptee, Tahsil Kamptee, District Nagpur. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Shri Amit Khare, Advocate for appellant Shri N.M. Kolhe, Advocate for respondent -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CORAM : SMT. VASANTI A NAIK, AND MRS. SWAPNA JOSHI, JJ. DATE : 03.04.2017 ORAL JUDGMENT (PER : SMT. VASANTI A. NAIK, J.)","3. The respondent filed the written statement and denied the claim of the appellant. Every adverse allegation that was made by the appellant against the respondent was denied by the respondent. It is pleaded by the respondent in the specific pleadings that the marriage between the parties was settled by the consent of the parties and at the relevant time, the appellant was working as a professor in the Hislop college. It is pleaded that the appellant was addicted to liquor and under the influence of liquor, he used to compare the respondent with his two former wives and used to abuse and insult her. It is pleaded that the appellant used to fight with the respondent on trivial issues and used to beat her in the fit of anger. It is pleaded that in the presence of public, the appellant used to insult her by saying that she cannot give birth to a ::: Uploaded on - 11/04/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2017 21:59:48 ::: fca287.14.odt 4 child. It is pleaded that when the uncle of the respondent expired in April-2005, the appellant quarrelled with the respondent and objected to her visit to her uncle's place. It is pleaded...",(I) Whether the appellant proved that the respondent had treated him with cruelty? (II) Whether the appellant proved that the respondent had deserted him? ::: Uploaded on - 11/04/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2017 21:59:48 ::: fca287.14.odt 8 (III) Whether the appellant is entitled to a,"5. Shri Khare, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the learned District Judge was not justified in refusing to grant a decree of divorce in favour of the appellant. It is submitted that the parties had lastly resided together in the year 2007 and the learned District Judge erroneously held that the parties had not resided separately for a period of two years preceding the date of filing of the petition. It is ::: Uploaded on - 11/04/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2017 21:59:48 ::: fca287.14.odt 6 stated that the admissions of the respondent in her cross-examination are not considered by the learned District Judge in the right perspective while refusing to grant the decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. It is submitted that the marriage between the parties is irretrievably broken down and though there was an attempt in the year 2011 to consider whether there was a possibility of a settlement between the parties and though the parties started residing at Mangalore in different houses which were at a distance of four kilometers from...","3. The respondent filed the written statement and denied the claim of the appellant. Every adverse allegation that was made by the appellant against the respondent was denied by the respondent. It is pleaded by the respondent in the specific pleadings that the marriage between the parties was settled by the consent of the parties and at the relevant time, the appellant was working as a professor in the Hislop college. It is pleaded that the appellant was addicted to liquor and under the influence of liquor, he used to compare the respondent with his two former wives and used to abuse and insult her. It is pleaded that the appellant used to fight with the respondent on trivial issues and used to beat her in the fit of anger. It is pleaded that in the presence of public, the appellant used to insult her by saying that she cannot give birth to a ::: Uploaded on - 11/04/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2017 21:59:48 ::: fca287.14.odt 4 child. It is pleaded that when the uncle of the respondent expired...","By this family court appeal, the appellant-husband challenges the judgment of the learned District Judge-7, Nagpur, dated 07.09.2013 dismissing a petition filed by the appellant under Section 10(1)(ix) and (x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 . 2. The appellant-husband and the respondent-wife were married at Sadar, Nagpur as per the Christian custom on 01.10.2003. The appellant was originally from Shirthadi, Mangalore, in the State of Karnataka and the respondent was a resident of Nagpur. The parties ::: Uploaded on - 11/04/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2017 21:59:48 ::: fca287.14.odt 2 resided together for some time at Nagpur after the marriage. A son named Marshall was born from the wedlock. At the relevant time, the appellant was serving with the government in Nagpur and after his retirement on 31.08.2008, the appellant started residing at Shirthadi. According to the appellant, the respondent's behaviour was objectionable since the inception of the marriage. It is pleaded by the appellant in the petition filed by him for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion that the respondent did not show any love and affection towards him. It is pleaded that the respondent was in the habit of developing illicit relationship with strangers despite strong objection of the appellant. It is pleaded that the respondent used to frequently quarrel with the appellant...","13. In the result, the Family Court Appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. JUDGE JUDGE Apte and Wadkar ::: Uploaded on - 11/04/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 27/08/2017 21:59:48 :::",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102582017/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2017,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,102582017,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102582017/,11
Kerala High Court,"Roy Mathew vs Rebeca Mani on 28 January, 2021",Roy Mathew vs Rebeca Mani,2021-01-28,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Mat.Appeal.No.617 OF 2012 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS THURSDAY, THE 28TH DAY OF JANUARY 2021 / 8TH MAGHA, 1942 Mat.Appeal.No.617 OF 2012 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN OP(DIV) 853/2009 DATED 24-08-2012 OF FAMILY COURT, ALAPPUZHA APPELLANT/PETITIONER: ROY MATHEW AGED 54 YEARS S/O.MATHEW, THOOMPUNKAL HOUSE, MATTOM SOUTH, THATTARAMBALAM P.O., MAVELIKARA. BY ADVS. SRI.R.PADMAKUMAR SRI.P.ARAVIND RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT: REBECA MANI, AGED 50 YEARS, W/O.ROY MATHEW, KANIYAMKULAM HOUSE, KOTTAYAM-1, KOTTAYAM, NOW AT POOZHIKKATTU PUTHUPARAMBIL, CHENNITHALA P.O., MAVELIKARA 690105. R1 BY ADV. SRI.M.GOPAKUMAR THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 28.01.2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: Mat.Appeal.No.617 OF 2012 2 JUDGMENT Dated this the 28th day of January 2021 C.S.Dias, J.","7. Heard Sri.R.Padmakumar, the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner and Sri.M.Gopakumar, the learned counsel for the respondent/respondent.",8. The sole question that emerges for consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant is entitled to a decree of divorce or not?,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"7. Heard Sri.R.Padmakumar, the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner and Sri.M.Gopakumar, the learned counsel for the respondent/respondent.","The appellant had filed O.P(Div).No.853/2009 against the respondent before the Family Court, Alappuzha under Section 10 (1)(ix) & (x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 , seeking a decree of divorce to dissolve their marriage. 2. The compendious facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows: The appellant had married the respondent on 21.5.1990. The parties are Christians by religion. The couple lived together at the residence of the appellant and, thereafter, in abroad where the appellant was working since 21.11.1990. A son named Deepak Mathew Roy was born in their wedlock on 15.9.1991. On 2.12.1991, the respondent returned to India and secured a job as a Teacher in the Parish School of the appellant. The appellant had paid an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- as donation to secure the Mat.Appeal.No.617 OF 2012 3 employment. The respondent was leading a life of her own choice. She used to leave the matrimonial home without informing the parents of the appellant. On 19.12.1996, the respondent insisted to accompany the appellant's brother's wife 'Rejimol' to Kottayam, which was objected to by the appellant's mother. The respondent pushed down the appellant's mother, abused the appellant over phone and left the matrimonial home, leaving the child behind. The appellant returned to India and requested the respondent to return to the marital home, but she refused. The...","In the result, the Mat.Appeal is allowed is follows: (i) The judgment and decree in O.P.(Div) 853/2009 is set aside. (ii) The marriage between the appellant/ petitioner and the respondent//respondent solemnised on 21.5.1990 is dissolved by a decree of divorce. (iii) In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their respective costs. Sd/-A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE JUDGE Sd/- C.S.DIAS, JUDGE ma/2.2.2021 /True copy/",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/184822696/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2021,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,184822696,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/184822696/,7
Kerala High Court,"Sabu M Varghese vs Vimala Rosy A.A on 21 October, 2022",Sabu M Varghese vs Vimala Rosy A.A,2022-10-21,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 19, Section 3",Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR FRIDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF OCTOBER 2022 / 29TH ASWINA, 1944 MAT.APPEAL NO. 701 OF 2021 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 31.08.2022 IN O.P.NO.200 OF 2018 OF THE FAMILY COURT, ERNAKULAM APPELLANT/PETITIONER: SABU M VARGHESE AGED 48 YEARS, S/O. VARGHESE, MANGALAPPILLY HOUSE, NO.43/406, EROOR WEST P.O, THRIPUNITHURA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT. BY ADV JOSEPH M.P. RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT: VIMALA ROSY A.A AGED 40 YEARS, W/O. SABU M VARGHESE, D/O. ANTONY, ADICHIYIL HOUSE, THYKOODAM, VYTILLA P.O, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT. BY ADV M.V.KISHORE KUMAR THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL HEARING ON 21.10.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: 2 Mat.Appeal No.701 of 2021 JUDGMENT Ajithkumar, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"15. After referring to the said principle the Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli v. Kakumoni Kataky [(2022) 5 SCC 459] held that the reasons for a dispute between 10 Mat.Appeal No.701 of 2021 husband and wife are always very complex and every matrimonial dispute is different from another. Whether a case of desertion is established or not will depend on the peculiar facts of each case. It is a matter of drawing an inference based on the facts brought on record by way of evidence. 16. In Darshan Gupta v. Radhika Gupta [(2013) 9 SCC 1] it was held that merely because the husband and wife are staying separately, an inference regarding desertion on the wife's part cannot be drawn. It must be shown that separation is wilful and deliberate. Desertion should be with animus deserendi, meaning thereby, there must be a vicious intention to part with the matrimonial company...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The petitioner in O.P.No.200 of 2018 on the file of the Family Court, Ernakulam is the appellant. He filed the original petition for dissolution of his marriage with the respondent on the ground of desertion under Section 10(1)(ix) of the Divorce Act, 1869. That petition was dismissed as per the judgment dated 31.08.2021, which is under challenge in this appeal filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. 2. On 15.12.2021 this appeal was admitted. 3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 4. Marriage of the appellant and the respondent was solemnized on 15.04.2002. They have two daughters. The appellant seeks dissolution of marriage on the basis of the allegations that the respondent voluntarily left the matrimonial home on 29.12.2013 and ever thereafter she has not turned up to have cohabitation with the appellant. 3 Mat.Appeal No.701 of 2021 5. The respondent resisted the petition contending that she had to leave the company of the appellant since she has been experiencing total neglect, mental and physical cruelty and lack of support from the appellant. He never discharged his marital obligations. It is contented that they had to leave the family house where she along with the appellant and the children were residing, following partition. They shifted to a...","P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE dkr",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10132518/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty,2022,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,10132518,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10132518/,5
Kerala High Court,"Jiby John vs Mincy M.L on 10 October, 2018",Jiby John vs Mincy M.L,2018-10-10,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.K.ABDUL REHIM & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. NARAYANA PISHARADI WEDNESDAY,THE 10TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2018 / 18TH ASWINA, 1940 OP (FC).No. 516 of 2018 AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 29.05.2018 IN I.A.NOS.1560/2018 & 1559/218 IN OP 450/2017 of FAMILY COURT,THRISSUR PETITIONER/PETITIONER: JIBY JOHN AGED 41 YEARS S/O.YOHANNAN, PUTHENVILA THEKKETHIL HOUSE, KODUMON VILLAGE AND DESOM, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT 691555. BY ADVS. SMT.M.R.JAYALATHA SRI.A.P.VASAVAN RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 MINCY M.L. AGED 37 YEARS D/O.M.T.LONAPPAN, MECHRY HOUSE, MELUR P.O, CHALAKKUDY, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT 680311. 2 BINU AGED 41 YEARS, S/O.JACOB, PLAMOTTATHIL KODUMON VILLAGE AND DESOM, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT 691555. THIS OP (FAMILY COURT) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 03.10.2018, THE COURT ON 10.10.2018 PASSED THE FOLLOWING: O.P.(FC) No.516/2018 2 C.K.ABDUL REHIM & R.NARAYANA PISHARADI, JJ. ************************** O.P.(FC) No.516 of 2018 ------------------------------------------------ Dated this the 10th day of October, 2018 JUDGMENT R.Narayana Pisharadi, J The petitioner is the husband and the first respondent is the wife.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,"6. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petition for divorce is filed on the ground of adultery also. We do not find any substance in this submission. 9. At this juncture, we may note that in the copy of the petition for divorce produced before this Court as Ext.P1, paragraph No.19 is seen incorporated after paragraph No.13 and paragraph Nos.14 to 18 are missing. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not offered any explanation for this.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The petitioner has filed O.P.No.450/2017 in the Family Court for granting a decree of divorce under Section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The petition for divorce was filed by him on 30.05.2016. However, in March, 2018 he filed two applications as I.A.Nos.1559/2018 and 1560/2018 in the Family Court. The application I.A.No.1559/2018 was filed for amendment of the petition for divorce to incorporate an averment that the first respondent had illicit relationship with a person by name Binu. The application I.A.No.1560/2018 was filed for impleading the aforesaid person as a co-respondent in the petition for divorce, on the ground that he is the adulterer. 3. The first respondent filed objection to the aforesaid O.P.(FC) No.516/2018 3 applications. 4. The Family Court dismissed both the applications mentioned above. The order passed by the Family Court in I.A.No.1560/2018 reads as follows: ""Counter filed. Heard. In the original petition the OP is for divorce on the ground of cruelty. A fresh ground of adultery and to implead additional respondent is not permitted in law. Hence the petition is dismissed."" The Family Court dismissed the application I.A.No.1559/2018 stating as follows: ""Since the impleading petition is dismissed, I.A is also dismissed."" 5. The aforesaid orders passed by the Family Court are under challenge in this Original Petition filed...","Consequently, we dismiss the Original Petition. (sd/-) C.K.ABDUL REHIM, JUDGE (sd/-) R.NARAYANA PISHARADI, JUDGE jsr/08/10/18 O.P.(FC) No.516/2018 9 APPENDIX PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS: EXHIBIT P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL PETITION IN O.P.450/2017 ON THE FILES OF FAMILY COURT, THRISSUR. EXHIBIT P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED BY THE FIRST RESPONDENT IN O.P.NO.450/2017. EXHIBIT P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION IN IA.NO.1560/2018 IN O.P.450/2017. EXHIBIT P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION IN IA.NO.1559/2018 IN O.P.450/2017. EXHIBIT P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED IN IA.NO.1560/2018 IN O.P.450/2017 DATED 7.4.2018. EXHIBIT P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED IN IA.NO.1559/2018 IN O.P.450/2017 DATED 7.4.2018. EXHIBIT P7 A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER IN IA.1560/2018 DATED 29.5.2018. EXHIBIT P8 A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER IN IA.1559/2018 DATED 29.5.2018. RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS : NIL TRUE COPY PS TO JUDGE",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/183286182/,Adultery,adultery; cruelty,2018,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,183286182,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/183286182/,10
Madhya Pradesh High Court,"Praveen Maben vs Mrs. Nalini Maben on 16 February, 2018",Praveen Maben vs Mrs. Nalini Maben,2018-02-16,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,,"5. The respondent in her written statement denied the pleadings of the appellant. She pleaded that earlier a suit was filed for declaring the marriage as nullity, which was dismissed on merits. Hence, the second suit on the same ground is not maintainable. The respondent admitted the fact that a daughter namely Jhalak was born in January, 1981 from the wedlock of the appellant and the respondent. She specifically denied the fact that she is not willing to live with the appellant. She further pleaded that she is in great affection to her daughter. She further pleaded that the appellant is not willing to keep the respondent with him. The appellant never treated the respondent properly as a wife after the date of marriage. He practiced cruelty.","1 HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, PRINCIPAL SEAT AT JABALPUR First Appeal No. 176 of 2008 Parties Name Praveen Maben vs Mrs. Nalini Maben Bench Constituted Hon'ble Shri Justice S.K. Gangele & Hon'ble Smt. Justice Anjuli Palo Judgment delivered by Hon'ble Shri Justice S.K. Gangele Whether approved for Yes/No reporting Name of counsels for parties For appellant: Shri R.K. Sanghi, Advocate. For respondent: None. Law laid down Significant paragraph numbers (J U D G M E N T) Pronounced on : 16.02.2018 6. The appellant in his evidence deposed the same facts as pleaded by him in his plaint. He further deposed that the respondent made reckless allegations about the character of the appellant. She made inquiry from the Peon of the school. She also instructed my daughter that whether I was living with any female or not. The respondent tried to paint me as a characterless person. It is...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"5. The respondent in her written statement denied the pleadings of the appellant. She pleaded that earlier a suit was filed for declaring the marriage as nullity, which was dismissed on merits. Hence, the second suit on the same ground is not maintainable. The respondent admitted the fact that a daughter namely Jhalak was born in January, 1981 from the wedlock of the appellant and the respondent. She specifically denied the fact that she is not willing to live with the appellant. She further pleaded that she is in great affection to her daughter. She further pleaded that the appellant is not willing to keep the respondent with him. The appellant never treated the respondent properly as a wife after the date of marriage. He practiced cruelty.","11. Section 10 (1) (ix) and (x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 prescribes desertion and cruelty to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner/appellant that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the respondent. The aforesaid Section reads as under: -:- 7 -:- F.A. No.176 of 2008 10. Grounds for dissolution of marriage - (1) .... (ix) has deserted the petition for at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or (x) has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent. 13. From the evidence of the daughter of the appellant and respondent namely Km. Jhalak Maben, this fact has been proved that the respondent has been living separately from the appellant since 1992. Efforts were made by the daughter and the appellant to take her back. In spite of that, the respondent did not return back to live with the appellant. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the daughter. Normally, a daughter does not depose against her own mother. Apart from this, there is evidence that the respondent leveled allegations about the character of the appellant. In our opinion, the trial Court has...","1. Appellant has filed this appeal against the judgment and decree dated 24.01.2008 passed in Civil Suit No. 133-A/07. By the aforesaid judgment and decree, the trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the appellant for dissolution of marriage under Section 10 of The Divorce Act, 1869. 2. The appellant pleaded in the plaint that marriage between the appellant and the respondent was solemnized in accordance with rituals of Christian religion. After marriage, a daughter Km. Jhalak was born from their wedlock in January, 1981 at Jabalpur. Subsequent to marriage, the appellant filed petition for -:- 2 -:- F.A. No.176 of 2008 nullity of marriage under the provisions of Indian Divorce Act, 1869 . He came to know that the respondent suppressed the fact about her mental status at the time of solemnization of marriage. The trial Court dismissed the suit. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree, a first appeal was filed before this Court. It was registered as First Appeal No.413/1997. 3. The appellant withdrew the appeal filed before the High Court mentioning the fact there was a compromise...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/126989671/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2018,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,126989671,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/126989671/,9
Calcutta High Court,"V.H. Lopez vs E.J. Lopez on 8 September, 1885",(1885)ILR 12CAL706,1885-09-08,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 17, Section 18, Section 19, Section 2, Section 21, Section 35, Section 4, Section 5, Section 6, Section 7, Section 8, Section 88, Section 9",Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Wilson, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"5. In examining the second branch of the inquiry, as to the effect of the legislation prior to the Divorce Act , it will be convenient to begin with the charter under which the Supreme Court was constituted in 1774. By the 22nd section of that Charter the Court ""shall be a Court of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, and shall have full power to administer and execute within and throughout the said provinces, districts, or countries called Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, and towards and upon our British subjects there residing, the Ecclesiastical law, as the same is now used and exercised in the Diocese of London in Great Britain, so far as the circumstances and occasions of the said provinces and people shall admit or require,"" with power to entertain all suits belonging to the Ecclesiastical Courts. Like powers were given to the Bombay and Madras Courts by their Charters. These Courts...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The main question we have to answer upon this reference is, whether a marriage between a man and his deceased wife's sister, celebrated in Calcutta in the year 1877, is liable to be declared null and void, under Section 19 of the Indian Divorce Act, on the ground that the parties are within the prohibited degrees, both parties being domiciled in British India and resident in Calcutta, and both being Roman Catholics. It is not found whether either of the parties to this marriage is the descendant of English ancestors, or of European settlers in this country other than English, or of native converts to Christianity, or of mixed race; their names suggest a Portuguese origin. We are bound to presume every matter of fact in favour of the validity of a marriage, and therefore if there be rules as to the prohibited degrees which would invalidate a marriage between persons connected as these were, 'and if those rules be applicable to any one class of Christians, but not to all Christian^, we must presume, in the absence of any proof that they did, that the parties did not belong to that class. In particular, we must presume, so far as that point is material, that they are not of British descent, or British in any other sense than...",33. The appellant will have her costs of this appeal and also her costs in the Court below of the trial of the issues which have been tried.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1898865/ | (1885)ILR 12CAL706,Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19,1885,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1885)ILR 12CAL706,1898865,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1898865/,9
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Munishwar Datt Vashisht vs Smt. Indra Kumari on 28 February, 1963",AIR1963P&H449,1963-02-28,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 12, Section 13, Section 177, Section 19, Section 28, Section 5",Unsound Mind; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Tek Chand, J.",The learned counsel for the respondent has inter and contended that Dr. Dayal Singh's statement is inadmissible as hearsay evidence and omission to cross-examine Dr. Dayal Singh on hearsay evidence would not make such evidence admissible. The Privy Council in Lim Yam Hong and Co. v.,"5. The trial Court framed the following issue: ""Was the respondent Indra Kumari of unsound mind at the date of the presentation of the petition and is she still incapable of defending herself in these proceedings?"" The Additional District Judge, after recording evidence on this issue, decided it against the petitioner by his order dated 3rd of May 1956 and directed that the respondent would defend the proceedings by herself without any guardian ad litem. Two issues were framed on merits:-- ""1. Was the respondent lunatic at the time of her marriage? 2. Was the petitioner's consent to his marriage with the respondent obtained by fraud and if so, what is the effect of it?"" 6. At the trial, the second issue was not contested. Moreover, it was found that there was no evidence to show that the petitioners consent had been obtained by fraud. The issue was thus found...","A good deal of stress was laid in the trial Court as well as in this Court regarding the observations quoted above in the register to the effect that her father had denied history of mental disease in her ancestors and the illness had started suddenly on the day when her marriage party was expected towards the evening. This was with a view to show that she was of unsound mind the evening before the marriage and, therefore, had become a lunatic at the time of her marriage. The learned counsel for the petitioner also commented on the fact that Dr. Dayal Singh was not cross examined with a view to show that the above entry was erroneous and that the girl's father had never admitted that the attack had suddenly started on that evening, Shri Baldev Inder Singh, who appeared as his own witness, however, denied having made the statement attributed to him. The Additional District Judge has not attached much importance to this entry. He construed the words ""as the illness suddenly started on the day when her...",The learned counsel for the respondent has inter and contended that Dr. Dayal Singh's statement is inadmissible as hearsay evidence and omission to cross-examine Dr. Dayal Singh on hearsay evidence would not make such evidence admissible. The Privy Council in Lim Yam Hong and Co. v.,"1. This first appeal has been preferred by Manishwar Dutt Vashisht against his wife Indra Kumari under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act (Act 25 of 1955) from the order of the Additional District Judge, Delhi, dated 29th of March 1961. 3. In the written statement, the allegations as to her lunacy were denied and it was maintained that she was and always had been a person of sound mind ever since her birth and has been enjoying good health both bodily and mentally. It was denied that any facts relating to her mental and physical health had been concealed from the petitioner or his parents or that any fraudulent representation was made in that behalf. It was stated that she had passed the Matriculation and Intermediate Examinations from the University of Punjab prior to her marriage. She had also passed ""Bhushan"" and ""Prabhakar"" Examinations in Hindi language and at the time of the presentation of the petition she was studying for the B.A. Examination in Government College at Amritsar. It was stated that the petition under Section 12 was made by the petitioner with some ulterior purpose with a view to get the marriage annulled so that the petitioner might be free to marry again. It was also said that the petitioner wanted to keep the dowry which...","2. A petition was made by the husband on 28th of October 1955 under Section 12 of the Act, praying that the marriage of the petitioner with respondent Indra Kumari be annulled and a decree of nullity passed on the ground that the marriage was in contravention of the condition specified in Section 5(ii) in so far as the respondent Indra Kumari was a lunatic at the time of the marriage. The marriage between the parties was performed on 9th of May 1955 at Amritsar when the petitioner was under 30 years and the age of the respondent was 20/21 years. It is alleged in the petition that after the marriage he learnt that his wife was a lunatic both before and at the time of the marriage and has been of unsound mind; and her insanity prior to marriage had been concealed by the respondent's parents from the petitioner and his relations and that fraudulent representation had been made that she had passed the Intermediate Examination and was studying for B.A. and that she was mentally and physically sound....","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/328378/ | AIR1963P&H449, AIR 1963 PUNJAB 449, ILR (1963) 2 PUNJ 263 65 PUN LR 1029, 65 PUN LR 1029",Unsound Mind,unsound_mind; nullity_sec19,1963,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1963P&H449, AIR 1963 PUNJAB 449, ILR (1963) 2 PUNJ 263 65 PUN LR 1029, 65 PUN LR 1029",328378,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/328378/,15
Karnataka High Court,"Sri. K. S. Shankar S/O L. Shekappa vs Smt. K. Jyothi W/O K. S. Shankar on 11 September, 2019",Sri. K. S. Shankar S/O L. Shekappa vs Smt. K. Jyothi W/O K. S. Shankar,2019-09-11,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 19, Section 22",Cruelty; Adultery; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"24. In the light of the rival submissions, the following points for consideration arise: a. Whether it is permissible for the family Court to consider events that are subsequent to the filing of the petition in deciding a petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, and if the subsequent events could be considered, whether the family Court has considered the subsequent events, more specifically the subsequent events relied upon by the husband. c. If the subsequent events as asserted by the husband are considered, whether any ground is made for interference with the impugned judgment and decree. 25. The points for consideration formulated will have to be considered in the background of the couple's station in life and how their marital life has panned out. 26 The wife is employed as a teacher in a government school, and the husband is employed as a personnel with the...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","These appeals are filed by the husband impugning the common judgment and decree dated 19.02.2011 in matrimonial cases in M.C.No.5/2008 and M.C.No.2/2009 on the file of the II Additional Sessions Judge, Bellary (for short, 'the family 'Court'). The matrimonial case in M.C.No.5/2008 is filed by the husband for divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section 10 of the (Indian) Divorce Act, 1989 (for short, 'the Divorce Act ') and the matrimonial case in M.C.No.2/2009 is filed by the wife for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 22 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (for short, 'the Special Marriage Act '). These cases have been clubbed, and decided by the common judgment and decree dated 19.2.2011. The husband's petition for divorce in M.C.No.5/2008 is dismissed, and the wife's petition for restitution of conjugal rights in 4 M.C.No.2/2009 is allowed. As such, these appeals by the husband. 2. The undisputed facts are that the couple's marriage is solemnised on 13.11.2005 according to the Christian rites and customs. The couple have a daughter, Miss.Krupa born on 30.10.2006. The husband is working as a police constable, and just prior to the wedding, he was working at Hospet, but after the marriage, he started working at Siruguppa. The wife is a government teacher, and even as of the date of the marriage, she was...","IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2019 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NARAYANA SWAMY AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.M. SHYAM PRASAD MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.24044 OF 2011(MC) C/W MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.24045 OF 2011 IN M.F.A. NO.24044/2011: BETWEEN: SRI. K.S. SHANKAR S/O L. SHEKAPPA AGE: 32 YEARS, OCC: WORKING AS POLICE CONSTABLE NO.226 AT SIRUGUPPA POLICE STATION R/O: NEW BLOCK, POLICE QUARTERS SADASHIVA NAGAR, SIRUGUPPA TAL: SIRUGUPPA, DIST BELLARY. ... APPELLANT (BY SRI. SRINAND A. PACHHAPURE, ADVOCATE) AND: SMT. K. JYOTHI W/O K.S. SHANKAR D/O R. KENCHAPPA AGE:34 YEARS, OCC: TEACHER IN BHP SCHOOL R/O: HALEKOTE, SIRUGUPPA TALUK DIST: BELLARY. ... RESPONDENT (BY SRI. V. SHIVARAJ HIREMATH, ADVOCATE) THIS MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 19 OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT 1984, AGAINST THE 2 JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED:19.02.2011 PASSED IN M.C.NO.5 OF 2008 ON THE FILE OF THE II-ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE, BELLARY, DISMISSING THE PETITION FILED UNDER SECTION 10 OF THE (INDIAN) DIVORCE ACT, 1869. IN M.F.A. NO.24045/2011: BETWEEN: SRI. K.S. SHANKAR S/O L. SHEKAPPA AGE: 32...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/12436028/,Cruelty,cruelty; adultery; nullity_sec19,2019,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,12436028,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/12436028/,5
Karnataka High Court,"Sri. K. S. Shankar S/O L. Shekappa vs Smt. K. Jyothi W/O K. S. Shankar on 11 September, 2019",Sri. K. S. Shankar S/O L. Shekappa vs Smt. K. Jyothi W/O K. S. Shankar,2019-09-11,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 19, Section 22",Cruelty; Adultery; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"24. In the light of the rival submissions, the following points for consideration arise: a. Whether it is permissible for the family Court to consider events that are subsequent to the filing of the petition in deciding a petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, and if the subsequent events could be considered, whether the family Court has considered the subsequent events, more specifically the subsequent events relied upon by the husband. c. If the subsequent events as asserted by the husband are considered, whether any ground is made for interference with the impugned judgment and decree. 25. The points for consideration formulated will have to be considered in the background of the couple's station in life and how their marital life has panned out. 26 The wife is employed as a teacher in a government school, and the husband is employed as a personnel with the...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","These appeals are filed by the husband impugning the common judgment and decree dated 19.02.2011 in matrimonial cases in M.C.No.5/2008 and M.C.No.2/2009 on the file of the II Additional Sessions Judge, Bellary (for short, 'the family 'Court'). The matrimonial case in M.C.No.5/2008 is filed by the husband for divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section 10 of the (Indian) Divorce Act, 1989 (for short, 'the Divorce Act ') and the matrimonial case in M.C.No.2/2009 is filed by the wife for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 22 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (for short, 'the Special Marriage Act '). These cases have been clubbed, and decided by the common judgment and decree dated 19.2.2011. The husband's petition for divorce in M.C.No.5/2008 is dismissed, and the wife's petition for restitution of conjugal rights in 4 M.C.No.2/2009 is allowed. As such, these appeals by the husband. 2. The undisputed facts are that the couple's marriage is solemnised on 13.11.2005 according to the Christian rites and customs. The couple have a daughter, Miss.Krupa born on 30.10.2006. The husband is working as a police constable, and just prior to the wedding, he was working at Hospet, but after the marriage, he started working at Siruguppa. The wife is a government teacher, and even as of the date of the marriage, she was...","IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2019 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NARAYANA SWAMY AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.M. SHYAM PRASAD MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.24044 OF 2011(MC) C/W MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.24045 OF 2011 IN M.F.A. NO.24044/2011: BETWEEN: SRI. K.S. SHANKAR S/O L. SHEKAPPA AGE: 32 YEARS, OCC: WORKING AS POLICE CONSTABLE NO.226 AT SIRUGUPPA POLICE STATION R/O: NEW BLOCK, POLICE QUARTERS SADASHIVA NAGAR, SIRUGUPPA TAL: SIRUGUPPA, DIST BELLARY. ... APPELLANT (BY SRI. SRINAND A. PACHHAPURE, ADVOCATE) AND: SMT. K. JYOTHI W/O K.S. SHANKAR D/O R. KENCHAPPA AGE:34 YEARS, OCC: TEACHER IN BHP SCHOOL R/O: HALEKOTE, SIRUGUPPA TALUK DIST: BELLARY. ... RESPONDENT (BY SRI. V. SHIVARAJ HIREMATH, ADVOCATE) THIS MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 19 OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT 1984, AGAINST THE 2 JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED:19.02.2011 PASSED IN M.C.NO.5 OF 2008 ON THE FILE OF THE II-ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE, BELLARY, DISMISSING THE PETITION FILED UNDER SECTION 10 OF THE (INDIAN) DIVORCE ACT, 1869. IN M.F.A. NO.24045/2011: BETWEEN: SRI. K.S. SHANKAR S/O L. SHEKAPPA AGE: 32...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/177131760/,Cruelty,cruelty; adultery; nullity_sec19,2019,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,177131760,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/177131760/,5
Karnataka High Court,"Mrs Helen Bennis Pinto @ Helen Pinto vs Sri Donald Bharath Pinto on 30 September, 2020",Mrs Helen Bennis Pinto @ Helen Pinto vs Sri Donald Bharath Pinto,2020-09-30,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 24, Section 32",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"4. It is further submitted that from within the said wedlock they have two children. It is submitted that the petitioner has been taking care of the children and they are pursuing their education at Chikmagaluru. It is submitted that the petition filed seeking dissolution of marriage is before the Family Court at Mangaluru and the petition filed by the respondent in M.C. No.84/2018 seeking for restitution of conjugal rights is pending before the Family Court at Chikmagaluru. It is submitted that if the petitioner were to attend the proceedings at Chikmagaluru, the petitioner would be required to travel a distance of about 200 Kms. It is submitted that there is great inconvenience in travelling such distance which interferes with a right of fair trial and hence, submits that proceedings instituted by respondent - husband be withdrawn and transferred to 5 the Court where M.C.No.345/2018 is pending consideration before the Family Court at Mangaluru. It is submitted that wife had instituted proceedings seeking relief of partition in O.S.No.116/2018 which was pending before the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Chikmagaluru and subsequently the said plaint has been ordered to be returned with liberty to represent the same before the Family Court...","5. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that he has filed a separate transfer petition in C.P.No.142/2019, wherein he has sought for transfer of proceedings in M.C.No.345/2018 pending before the Principal Judge, Family Court at Mangaluru to be withdrawn and transfer to the Court at Chikmagaluru to be tried along with M.C.No.84/2018.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"4. It is further submitted that from within the said wedlock they have two children. It is submitted that the petitioner has been taking care of the children and they are pursuing their education at Chikmagaluru. It is submitted that the petition filed seeking dissolution of marriage is before the Family Court at Mangaluru and the petition filed by the respondent in M.C. No.84/2018 seeking for restitution of conjugal rights is pending before the Family Court at Chikmagaluru. It is submitted that if the petitioner were to attend the proceedings at Chikmagaluru, the petitioner would be required to travel a distance of about 200 Kms. It is submitted that there is great inconvenience in travelling such distance which interferes with a right of fair trial and hence, submits that proceedings instituted by respondent - husband be withdrawn and transferred to 5 the Court where M.C.No.345/2018 is pending consideration before the Family Court at Mangaluru. It is submitted that wife had instituted proceedings seeking relief of partition in O.S.No.116/2018 which was pending before the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Chikmagaluru and...","5. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that he has filed a separate transfer petition in C.P.No.142/2019, wherein he has sought for transfer of proceedings in M.C.No.345/2018 pending before the Principal Judge, Family Court at Mangaluru to be withdrawn and transfer to the Court at Chikmagaluru to be tried along with M.C.No.84/2018.","1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2020 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S. SUNIL DUTT YADAV CIVIL PETITION No.306/2018 c/w CIVIL PETITION No.142/2019 Civil Petition No.306/2018 Between: Mrs.Helen Bennis Pinto @ Helen Pinto, W/o Donald Bharath Pinto, Aged about 45 years, R/o Bendore Benedictus House, Mercara Hill, Mangaluru - 575 002. ... Petitioner (By Sri.Vishwajith Rai M., Advocate) And: Sri.Donald Bharath Pinto, S/o late Henry Pinto, Aged about 46 years, R/at St.Lawrence Estate, Mundugodu, Karimane, Jayapura, Koppa Taluk, Chikmagaluru District - 577 126. ... Respondent (By Sri.M.Sudhakar Pai, Advocate) This Civil Petition is filed under Section 24 of CPC, praying to transfer the Matrimonial Case in M.C.No.84/2018 filed by the respondent before the Prl. Judge, Family Court, Chikmagaluru, under Section 32 of Indian Divorce Act for 2 the relief of Restitution of Conjugal Rights, to the Family Court at Mangaluru to be tried along with M.C.No.345/2018 pending on the file of Prl. Family Judge, Mangaluru filed under Section 10(i) and (x) of the Divorce Act 1989, in the interest of justice and equity. Civil Petition No.142/2019 Between: Donald Bharath Pinto, S/o late Henry Pinto, Aged about 47 years, R/at St.Lawrence Estate, Tuluvina Koppa village, P.O.Kalkere - 577 180, Koppa Taluk, Chikkamagaluru District. ... Petitioner (By Sri.M.Sudhakar Pai, Advocate) And: 1. Mrs.Helen...",JUDGE NS,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/162207073/,Unclear,unclear,2020,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,162207073,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/162207073/,5
Madras High Court,"Jerina vs Koilraj on 24 September, 2018",Jerina vs Koilraj,2018-09-24,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 19, Section 32, Section 55",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 24.09.2018 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MS.JUSTICE V.M. VELUMANI CMA(MD).No. 1445 of 2013 and 1446 of 2013 and M.P(MD).No. 1 of 2013 in CMA(MD).No.1445 of 2013 Jerina : Appellant in both CMA Vs. Koilraj : Respondent in both CMA Prayer in CMA(MD).No. 1445 of 2013: This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed under Section 55 of Indian Divorce Act, against the Judgment and Decree passed in DOP.No.79 of 2011 on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Thoothukudi, dated 30.11.2012. Prayer in CMA(MD).No. 1446 of 2013: This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed under Section 19 of Family Courts Act, 1984, against the Judgment and Decree passed in DOP.No.8 of 2012, on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Thoothukudi, dated 30.11.2012. !For Appellant : Mr. D. Srinivasa Ragavan in both CMAs ^For respondent : No appearance :COMMON JUDGMENT These Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are filed against the common Order dated 30.11.2012, passed in DOP.No. 79 of 2011 and DOP.No. 8 of 2012, on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Thoothukudi. 2. The appellant in both the appeals is wife and the respondent is the husband. Hereinafter, the parties are referred to as ?husband? and ?wife?. 3. The petition in DOP No.79 of 2011 filed by the husband against wife for restitution...","15. In the result, these Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. To 1. The Principal District Judge, Thoothukudi, 2. The Record Keeper, VR Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai. .",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/123238155/,Unclear,unclear,2018,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,123238155,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/123238155/,2
Karnataka High Court,"Mr. Vinod Aloysius Miranda vs Mrs. Angeline Sylvia Sophia Menezes on 10 October, 2014",Mr. Vinod Aloysius Miranda vs Mrs. Angeline Sylvia Sophia Menezes,2014-10-10,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 19",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"1 MFA NO.8298/2013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2014 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.L.MANJUNATH AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.V.CHANDRASHEKARA M.F.A. NO.8298/2013 (MC) BETWEEN: MR. VINOD ALOYSIUS MIRANDA S/O LATE RAYMOND MIRANDA AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS RESIDING AT DOOR NO.2-6-367 BEHIND KAPIKAD GOVT SCHOOL BEJAI POST, KAPIKAD MANGALORE - 4 ... APPELLANT (By Sri: CYRIL PRASAD PAIS, ADV.) AND: MRS. ANGELINE SYLVIA SOPHIA MENEZES D/O CAMEL MENEZES W/O VINOD ALOYSIUS MIRANDA AGED 50 YEARS R/AT DOOR NO.2-3-200-2 ""THUSHAR"" KOTTARA CROSS ROAD BEJAI POST 2 MFA NO.8298/2013 MANGALORE-4 ... RESPONDENT (By Sri:K SHASHIKANTH PRASAD, ADV. ) MFA FILED U/S 55 OF THE INDIAN DIVORCE ACT, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED:03.08.2013 PASSED IN M.C.NO.152/2012 ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL JUDGE, FAMILY COURT, D.K., MANGALORE, PARTLY ALLOWING THE PETITON FILED U/S 10(1)(ix)(x) OF INDIAN DIVORCE ACT. THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 23.09.2014 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, A.V.CHANDRASHEKARA, J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: JUDGMENT",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"a) Whether the petitioner/wife proves that the respondent/husband has deserted her for at least two years immediately proceding the presentation of the petition? b) Whether the petitioner/wife proves that respondent/husband has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it would be harmful or injurious for her to live with respondent? c) Whether the petitioner/wife is entitled for decree of divorce? d) Whether petitioner/husband proves that the respondent/wife is residing separately without reasonable cause and excuse and failed to discharge her marital obligations? e) Whether petitioner/husband proves that he is entitled to get the relief for restitution of conjugal rights f) What order? 7. To prove their respective contentions, the petitioner herself has been examined as PW-1 and she has relied upon 10 documents and respondent is examined as RW-1 and he has relied upon 16 documents. 8. After noticing the evidence and...","4. The parties are Christians and their marriage had been solemnized as per the customs of their religion. The petitioner is a widow and respondent is a divorcee. Their marriage was solemnized on 21.10.2009 at St.Jude Shrine Pakshikere in the presence of friends and relatives and it was an arranged marriage. After the marriage, the respondent started to live in the house of 4 MFA NO.8298/2013 the petitioner at Kottara-Mangalore till February 2010. It is the case of the petitioner that both of them lived together happily in Bejai and after sometime, the respondent started changing his attitude towards her. The respondent used to come home fully drunk at odd hours and used to abuse the petitioner in filthy words and at times, he used to assault her is the allegation. The petitioner's further case is that respondent started extracting money from her by causing bodily injury and as a result of which, she suffered mental agony. The petitioner is stated to have tolerated all his behaviors hoping that he would mend himself. He is stated have deserted her on...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The present appeal is filed under Section 19 of Family Courts Act challenging the order passed by the Learned Judge of the Family Court, Mangalore in M.C.No.152/2012 clubbed with M.C.No.245/2012 dated 3.8.2013. 2. The appellant-husband herein was the respondent in M.C.152/2012 filed against him by his wife for decree of divorce on the ground of desertion and 3 MFA NO.8298/2013 cruelty. The respondent-husband herein had filed M.C.245/2012 for restitution of conjugal rights. M.C.152/2012 has been allowed and decree of divorce has been granted on the ground of cruelty and M.C.245/2012 has been dismissed for relief of restitution of conjugal rights. Hence, the present appeal is filed by the husband. 3. Appellant-husband herein will be referred to as respondent and respondent-wife herein will be referred to as petitioner as per their ranking in M.C.152/2012. 5. The respondent has filed detailed written statement denying all the material allegations except the marriage solemnized between them as per rituals of Roman Catholics. It is averred that he got introduced to 5 MFA NO.8298/2013 the petitioner in October 2008 and there was sufficient time for the petitioner to understand him before the marriage. He is stated to have presented her Karimanisara weighing around 37 gms gold and costly wedding sarees at the time of the marriage. The petitioner is stated to have foisted a false...",ORDER The appeal is dismissed as unfit for admission. There is no order as to costs. Sd/- JUDGE Sd/- JUDGE DM/-,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/81359144/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2014,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,81359144,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/81359144/,6
Madras High Court,"K. Revathi vs V. Wilson Kumar @ Kumaran on 9 November, 2017",K. Revathi vs V. Wilson Kumar @ Kumaran,2017-11-09,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 19, Section 24, Section 32",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"3. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the affidavit, the petitioner has stated that it is difficult for her to travel to Chennai for each hearing as the matter is pending before the Family Court, where the presence of the parties is mandatory. She has also stated that she is living with her aged parents and has got no independent income on her own and it would be difficult for her to get financial support.",4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"3. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the affidavit, the petitioner has stated that it is difficult for her to travel to Chennai for each hearing as the matter is pending before the Family Court, where the presence of the parties is mandatory. She has also stated that she is living with her aged parents and has got no independent income on her own and it would be difficult for her to get financial support.",4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent.,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 09.11.2017 CORAM : THE HONOURABLE Mrs. JUSTICE PUSHPA SATHYANARAYANA Tr.C.M.P.No.187 of 2017 and C.M.P.No.3448 of 2017 K. Revathi ... Petitioner vs. V. Wilson Kumar @ Kumaran ... Respondent Prayer: This transfer petition has been filed under Section 24 of C.P.C. praying to withdraw the case in O.P.No.83 of 2017 pending before the III Additional Family Court, Chennai and the same be transferred to the Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Thiruvannamalai for joint trial with the case in I.D.O.P.No.39 of 2016 pending on the file of the Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Thiruvannamalai. For Petitioner : Mr.V.R.Appaswamee For Respondent : Ms.M.Roselet Helen O R D E R The petitioner/wife in a matrimonial dispute has filed this Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition, seeking transfer of H.M.O.P.No.83 of 2017, pending on the file of III Additional Family Court, Chennai to the file of Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Thiruvannamalai to be tried along with I.D.O.P.No.39 of 2016 which is already pending. 2. The respondent/husband has filed O.P.No.83 of 2017 under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act, before III Additional Family Court, Chennai, for restitution of conjugal rights, whereas, the wife has filed O.P.No.39 of 2016 under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, now pending on the file of Fast...","7. Accordingly, the Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition is allowed by withdrawing O.P.No.83 of 2017 from the file of III Additional Family Court, Chennai and transferring the same to the file of Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Thiruvannamalai to be tried along with I.D.O.P.No.39 of 2016. No Costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 09.11.2017 rsi To 1. The III Additional Judge, Family Court, Chennai. 2. The Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Thiruvannamalai. PUSHPA SATHYANARAYANA, J. rsi Tr.C.M.P.No.187 of 2017 and C.M.P.No.3448 of 2017 09.11.2017",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/123352330/,Unclear,unclear,2017,nullity,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,123352330,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/123352330/,5
Bombay High Court,"Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad vs Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad on 16 April, 2026",Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad vs Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad,2026-04-16,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 32",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2026:BHC-AUG:17004-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD 992 FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.8 OF 2024 Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad ..Appellant Versus Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad ..Respondent ..... Shri. Parag Vijay Barde, Advocate for the Appellant Shri. Bhushan S. Dhawale, Advocate for the Respondent ..... WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7644 OF 2023 IN FCA/8/2024 ...... AND FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO. 9 OF 2024 Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad ..Appellant Versus Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad ..Respondent ..... Shri. Parag Vijay Barde, Advocate for the Appellant Shri. Bhushan S. Dhawale, Advocate for the Respondent ..... WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7651 OF 2023 IN FCA/9/2024 ..... CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI AND NEERAJ P. DHOTE, JJ. DATED : 16TH APRIL, 2026 PER COURT : - . In view of the order dated 24.07.2024, the matter was referred for mediation. Office note shows that, the Report was received on 2 06.12.2024. Thereafter, by order dated 06.12.2024 the following order was passed: 'List the matter after the terms of settlement have been completely complied with.' 2. It appears that thereafter the matter was not listed at all till it was circulated for 02.04.2026 for withdrawal. On 02.04.2026, after taking note of the fact that mediation was...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. It appears that, the parties were before the Family Court, Ahmednagar and Petition No.A-335 of 2018 was filed by the Wife for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 32 of the Divorce Act, whereas Petition No.A-48 of 2021 was filed by the husband for divorce under Section 10 of the Divorce Act. The Petition for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed by the learned Trial Judge, whereas the Petition for divorce was decreed by the Judgment and Decree dated 3 28.02.2023. 5. In view of the compromise terms taken on record and marked as Exh.'X', the Wife accepts the decree of divorce. Under such circumstances, the orders passed in both the Petitions are confirmed and in view of the same, both the Family Court Appeals filed by the Wife stand disposed of in terms of the compromise terms marked as Exh. 'X'. 6. Decree be drawn up accordingly. 7. Pending Civil Application/s, if any, stand/s disposed of. 8. No order as to costs in any of the matters.",[NEERAJ P. DHOTE] [SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI] JUDGE JUDGE GGP,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187462189/,Unclear,unclear,2026,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,187462189,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187462189/,3
Bombay High Court,"Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad vs Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad on 16 April, 2026",Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad vs Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad,2026-04-16,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 32",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2026:BHC-AUG:17005-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD 992 FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.8 OF 2024 Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad ..Appellant Versus Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad ..Respondent ..... Shri. Parag Vijay Barde, Advocate for the Appellant Shri. Bhushan S. Dhawale, Advocate for the Respondent ..... WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7644 OF 2023 IN FCA/8/2024 ...... AND FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO. 9 OF 2024 Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad ..Appellant Versus Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad ..Respondent ..... Shri. Parag Vijay Barde, Advocate for the Appellant Shri. Bhushan S. Dhawale, Advocate for the Respondent ..... WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7651 OF 2023 IN FCA/9/2024 ..... CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI AND NEERAJ P. DHOTE, JJ. DATED : 16TH APRIL, 2026 PER COURT : - . In view of the order dated 24.07.2024, the matter was referred for mediation. Office note shows that, the Report was received on 2 06.12.2024. Thereafter, by order dated 06.12.2024 the following order was passed: 'List the matter after the terms of settlement have been completely complied with.' 2. It appears that thereafter the matter was not listed at all till it was circulated for 02.04.2026 for withdrawal. On 02.04.2026, after taking note of the fact that mediation was...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. It appears that, the parties were before the Family Court, Ahmednagar and Petition No.A-335 of 2018 was filed by the Wife for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 32 of the Divorce Act, whereas Petition No.A-48 of 2021 was filed by the husband for divorce under Section 10 of the Divorce Act. The Petition for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed by the learned Trial Judge, whereas the Petition for divorce was decreed by the Judgment and Decree dated 3 28.02.2023. 5. In view of the compromise terms taken on record and marked as Exh.'X', the Wife accepts the decree of divorce. Under such circumstances, the orders passed in both the Petitions are confirmed and in view of the same, both the Family Court Appeals filed by the Wife stand disposed of in terms of the compromise terms marked as Exh. 'X'. 6. Decree be drawn up accordingly. 7. Pending Civil Application/s, if any, stand/s disposed of. 8. No order as to costs in any of the matters.",[NEERAJ P. DHOTE] [SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI] JUDGE JUDGE GGP,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114258726/,Unclear,unclear,2026,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,114258726,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114258726/,3
Bombay High Court,"Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad vs Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad on 16 April, 2026",Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad vs Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad,2026-04-16,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 32",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2026:BHC-AUG:17006-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD 992 FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.8 OF 2024 Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad ..Appellant Versus Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad ..Respondent ..... Shri. Parag Vijay Barde, Advocate for the Appellant Shri. Bhushan S. Dhawale, Advocate for the Respondent ..... WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7644 OF 2023 IN FCA/8/2024 ...... AND FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO. 9 OF 2024 Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad ..Appellant Versus Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad ..Respondent ..... Shri. Parag Vijay Barde, Advocate for the Appellant Shri. Bhushan S. Dhawale, Advocate for the Respondent ..... WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7651 OF 2023 IN FCA/9/2024 ..... CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI AND NEERAJ P. DHOTE, JJ. DATED : 16TH APRIL, 2026 PER COURT : - . In view of the order dated 24.07.2024, the matter was referred for mediation. Office note shows that, the Report was received on 2 06.12.2024. Thereafter, by order dated 06.12.2024 the following order was passed: 'List the matter after the terms of settlement have been completely complied with.' 2. It appears that thereafter the matter was not listed at all till it was circulated for 02.04.2026 for withdrawal. On 02.04.2026, after taking note of the fact that mediation was...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. It appears that, the parties were before the Family Court, Ahmednagar and Petition No.A-335 of 2018 was filed by the Wife for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 32 of the Divorce Act, whereas Petition No.A-48 of 2021 was filed by the husband for divorce under Section 10 of the Divorce Act. The Petition for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed by the learned Trial Judge, whereas the Petition for divorce was decreed by the Judgment and Decree dated 3 28.02.2023. 5. In view of the compromise terms taken on record and marked as Exh.'X', the Wife accepts the decree of divorce. Under such circumstances, the orders passed in both the Petitions are confirmed and in view of the same, both the Family Court Appeals filed by the Wife stand disposed of in terms of the compromise terms marked as Exh. 'X'. 6. Decree be drawn up accordingly. 7. Pending Civil Application/s, if any, stand/s disposed of. 8. No order as to costs in any of the matters.",[NEERAJ P. DHOTE] [SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI] JUDGE JUDGE GGP,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/195111958/,Unclear,unclear,2026,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,195111958,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/195111958/,3
Kerala High Court,"Mary vs Jacob on 13 August, 2025",Mary vs Jacob,2025-08-13,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2025:KER:61183 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SATHISH NINAN & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR WEDNESDAY, THE 13TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 22ND SRAVANA, 1947 MAT.APPEAL NO. 1082 OF 2017 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 31.08.2017 IN OP NO.333 OF 2015 OF FAMILY COURT, MUVATTUPUZHA ----- APPELLANT/RESPONDENT: MARY D/O PAILY, AGED 54 YEARS,MALEKUDY, EAST OKKAL KARA,OKKAL P.O., CHELAMATTOM VILLAGE, KUNNATHUNADU TALUK,ERNAKULAM DISTRICT. BY ADV SRI.T.K.AJITHKUMAR (VALATH) RESPONDENT/PETITIONER: JACOB S/O ANTHONY, AGED 57 YEARS,MALEKUDY, EAST OKKAL KARA,OKKAL P.O., CHELAMATTOM VILLAGE, KUNNATHUNADU TALUK,NOW RESIDING AT MANCHIRA, ANAMALY P.O, MUTHALAMADA, CHITTUR TALUK, PALAKKAD DISTRICT-678507. BY ADV SRI.BENNY VARGHESE THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING ON 13.08.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: 2025:KER:61183 SATHISH NINAN & P. KRISHNA KUMAR, JJ. = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = Mat. Appeal No.1082 of 2017 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = Dated this the 13th day of August, 2025 J U D G M E N T Sathish Ninan, J. The original petition filed by the husband against the wife...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""10. Ground for dissolution of marriage.--(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent-- (i) xxxxx (viii) has failed to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights for a period of two years or upwards after the passing of the decree against the respondent."" 2025:KER:61183 -: 3 :- 6. In terms of the section, if the respondent failed to comply with the decree for restitution of conjugal rights for a period of two years, then petitioner is entitled for dissolution of marriage on such ground. 7. In the case at hand, it is the respondent who had obtained a decree against the petitioner, for restitution of conjugal rights. The petitioner...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The marriage between the parties were solemnised on 16.02.1987. Dissolution of marriage was sought under Section 10(1)(viii) of the Divorce Act, 1869. The claim was that, the earlier original petition filed by the wife as OP 176/2012, seeking restitution of conjugal rights, was decreed on 31.05.2013; since there has been no resumption of cohabitation for the statutory period of two years, divorce Mat. Appeal No.1082 of 2017 2025:KER:61183 -: 2 :- is liable to be granted under Section 10(1)(viii) of the Divorce Act. 3. The Family Court, finding that there has been no resumption of cohabitation even after lapse of two years since the date of decree for restitution of conjugal rights, granted a decree for divorce. 4. We have heard learned counsel on either side. 5. Section 10(1)(viii) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 reads thus :-","Resultantly, the appeal is allowed. The decree for dissolution of marriage granted in OP 333/2015 will stand Mat. Appeal No.1082 of 2017 2025:KER:61183 -: 4 :- set aside. The OP will stand dismissed. It is clarified that this shall not affect the rights of the petitioner to seek for dissolution of marriage on any other grounds available under law. Sd/- SATHISH NINAN JUDGE Sd/- P. KRISHNA KUMAR JUDGE kns/- //True Copy// P.S. To Judge",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/144017763/,Unclear,unclear,2025,restitution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,144017763,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/144017763/,4
Bombay High Court,"Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad vs Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad on 16 April, 2026",Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad vs Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad,2026-04-16,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 32",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2026:BHC-AUG:17007-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD 992 FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.8 OF 2024 Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad ..Appellant Versus Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad ..Respondent ..... Shri. Parag Vijay Barde, Advocate for the Appellant Shri. Bhushan S. Dhawale, Advocate for the Respondent ..... WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7644 OF 2023 IN FCA/8/2024 ...... AND FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO. 9 OF 2024 Manjushri Nilesh Gaikwad ..Appellant Versus Nilesh Uttam Gaikwad ..Respondent ..... Shri. Parag Vijay Barde, Advocate for the Appellant Shri. Bhushan S. Dhawale, Advocate for the Respondent ..... WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7651 OF 2023 IN FCA/9/2024 ..... CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI AND NEERAJ P. DHOTE, JJ. DATED : 16TH APRIL, 2026 PER COURT : - . In view of the order dated 24.07.2024, the matter was referred for mediation. Office note shows that, the Report was received on 2 06.12.2024. Thereafter, by order dated 06.12.2024 the following order was passed: 'List the matter after the terms of settlement have been completely complied with.' 2. It appears that thereafter the matter was not listed at all till it was circulated for 02.04.2026 for withdrawal. On 02.04.2026, after taking note of the fact that mediation was...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. It appears that, the parties were before the Family Court, Ahmednagar and Petition No.A-335 of 2018 was filed by the Wife for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 32 of the Divorce Act, whereas Petition No.A-48 of 2021 was filed by the husband for divorce under Section 10 of the Divorce Act. The Petition for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed by the learned Trial Judge, whereas the Petition for divorce was decreed by the Judgment and Decree dated 3 28.02.2023. 5. In view of the compromise terms taken on record and marked as Exh.'X', the Wife accepts the decree of divorce. Under such circumstances, the orders passed in both the Petitions are confirmed and in view of the same, both the Family Court Appeals filed by the Wife stand disposed of in terms of the compromise terms marked as Exh. 'X'. 6. Decree be drawn up accordingly. 7. Pending Civil Application/s, if any, stand/s disposed of. 8. No order as to costs in any of the matters.",[NEERAJ P. DHOTE] [SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI] JUDGE JUDGE GGP,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/29240663/,Unclear,unclear,2026,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,29240663,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/29240663/,3
Madras High Court,"R. Frederick vs H. Malini on 7 November, 2017",R. Frederick vs H. Malini,2017-11-07,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 19, Section 32",Cruelty; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"(iii) Due to the wedlock between the appellant and the respondent, on 09.02.1990, a son Michael Fredrick was born. Soon after the birth of the male child, the male child was left under the care of the mother of the respondent at Krishnagiri as they felt that he would be brought up well by the grand mother. During 1992, the father of the appellant died and therefore his mother stayed with him. Thereafter, in the year 1993, the appellant purchased a house in Hosur, which house is situate few meters away from the house where the mother of the respondent was living. The appellant, who is a Doctor by profession, attended to his work at a Primary Health Centre, Bangalore and came back to Hosur in frequent intervals. In the year 1995, the second son Daniel Fredrick was born. In the meantime, the mother of the respondent, under the guise of visiting the respondent in his house, ill-advised her which led to frequent quarrel between the appellant and the respondent. Above all, the respondent suspected the appellant as having an illicit affair with other women and ranked him as a womaniser. The respondent also informed the alleged illicit affair of...","11. As regards averments relating to cruelty, the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the respondent has clearly stated in the counter in OP No. 2385 of 2006 that she never suspected the appellant and she was not a person to be ranked as suspicious in nature. It was further stated that she never disclosed the friendly relationship the appellant had with his colleagues or others to any one, including his family member. Further, the respondent has clearly proved through the evidence of RW2, son of the appellant and the respondent that the appellant has taken the children along with him on several occasion, while so, the averment that the respondent denied access to the children and thereby caused him mental cruelty is without any basis. Even according to RW2, the appellant regularly met him and his brother intermittently and therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent prevented the appellant from interacting with his children. Therefore, the averment that the respondent subjected the appellant to matrimonial cruelty by denying access to the children is disproved by the respondent through oral evidence of PW2. 21. Yet another allegation made by the appellant is that he was subjected to...","16. Now, it has to be seen whether such averments relating to adulterous relationship of the appellant with other woman has been proved to the satisfaction of the Court. This is more so because according to the appellant, it is because of the suspicious nature of the respondent that he is having illicit relationship with other women, he was subjected to matrimonial cruelty and had underwent sleepless night for several months. 17. First of all, the appellant, in his cross-examination, has clearly stated that the said Shubha was not his Secretary at any point of time and she was a colleague. Further, to prove the relationship between appellant and the said Shubha, the respondent filed two photographs, marked as Exs. R9 and R10. According to the appellant, the photographs were taken during their training in Singapore along with other co-worker one Poonam and these photographs would not make out a...","(iii) Due to the wedlock between the appellant and the respondent, on 09.02.1990, a son Michael Fredrick was born. Soon after the birth of the male child, the male child was left under the care of the mother of the respondent at Krishnagiri as they felt that he would be brought up well by the grand mother. During 1992, the father of the appellant died and therefore his mother stayed with him. Thereafter, in the year 1993, the appellant purchased a house in Hosur, which house is situate few meters away from the house where the mother of the respondent was living. The appellant, who is a Doctor by profession, attended to his work at a Primary Health Centre, Bangalore and came back to Hosur in frequent intervals. In the year 1995, the second son Daniel Fredrick was born. In the meantime, the mother of the respondent, under the guise of visiting the respondent in his house, ill-advised her which led to frequent quarrel between the appellant and the respondent. Above all, the respondent suspected the appellant as having an...","11. As regards averments relating to cruelty, the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the respondent has clearly stated in the counter in OP No. 2385 of 2006 that she never suspected the appellant and she was not a person to be ranked as suspicious in nature. It was further stated that she never disclosed the friendly relationship the appellant had with his colleagues or others to any one, including his family member. Further, the respondent has clearly proved through the evidence of RW2, son of the appellant and the respondent that the appellant has taken the children along with him on several occasion, while so, the averment that the respondent denied access to the children and thereby caused him mental cruelty is without any basis. Even according to RW2, the appellant regularly met him and his brother intermittently and therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent prevented the appellant from interacting with his children. Therefore, the averment that the respondent subjected the appellant to matrimonial cruelty by denying access to the children is disproved by the...","IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Reserved on : 30.08.2017 Pronounced on : 07-11-2017 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. SUBBIAH and THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P. VELMURUGAN Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1799 and 1800 of 2016 --- R. Frederick .. Appellant in both appeals Versus H. Malini .. Respondent in both appeals Appeals filed under Section 19 of The Family Courts Act, 1984 against the order and decreetal order dated 18.04.2015 passed in O.P. No. 2385 of 2006 and O.P. No. 2809 of 2007 on the file of II Additional Judge, Family Court, Chennai. For Appellant : Mrs. Sheila Jayaprakash in both the appeals For Respondents : Mr. S. Silambannan, Senior Advocate for Mr. S. Kalimuthu in both the appeals COMMON JUDGMENT R. SUBBIAH, J Both these appeals arise out of the common order dated 18.04.2015 passed in O.P. No. 2385 of 2006 and O.P. No. 2809 of 2006 on the file of II Additional Judge, Family Court, Chennai. By the said order dated 18.04.2015, the Family Court dismissed OP No. 2385 of 2006 filed by the husband/appellant under Section 10 (ix) & (x) of Indian Divorce Act for dissolution of the marriage dated 14.01.1988 and consequently OP No. 2809 of 2007 filed by the wife/respondent under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act for restitution of...","25. For all the above reasons, the common order dated 18.04.2015 passed in O.P. No. 2385 of 2006 and O.P. No. 2809 of 2007 on the file of II Additional Judge, Family Court, Chennai are set aside. Consequently, both the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are allowed. No costs. Resultantly, OP No. 2385 of 2006 filed by the appellant for dissolution of marriage is allowed granting a decree of divorce and OP No. 2809 of 2007 filed by the respondent for restitution of conjugal rights is dismissed. (R.P.S.J.,) (P.V.J.,) 07-11-2017 rsh Index : Yes To The II Additional Judge Family Court, Chennai R. SUBBIAH, J and P. VELMURUGAN, J rsh Pre-delivery Common Judgment in CMA Nos. 1799 & 1800/2016 07-11-2017",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/169558625/,Cruelty,cruelty; adultery,2017,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,169558625,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/169558625/,12
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana),"M. Vijaya vs Chairman And Managing Director, ... on 29 August, 2001",I(2002)ACC32,2001-08-29,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 13, Section 17, Section 2, Section 27, Section 32, Section 37, Section 52, Section 53",Constitutional Validity,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER S.B. Sinha, C.J. 1. This is a writ petition taken up on the basis of a letter written by one Suit. Masaraboina Vijaya wife of Ailaiah, a resident of Indiranagar, Regional Hospital Area, Godavarikhani, Karimnagar District, addressed to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court alleging that she was infected with dreadful disease of AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) on account of the negligence on the part of the authorities of Maternity and Family Welfare Hospital, Godavarikhani, a hospital under the control of Singareni Collieries Company Ltd., (SCCL), in conducting relevant precautionary blood tests before transfusion of blood of her brother (donor) into her body when she was operated for hysterectomy (Chronic Cervicitis) on 30-1-1998 at the hospital. She prays for an enquiry into matter and to take action against those responsible for causing the infectious disease and for a direction to the SCCL to provide sufficient financial assistance.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"7. A lengthy counter-affidavit has been filed by the Medical Superintendent of SCCL, wherein the allegations made in the petition were denied. But, it is admitted that her blood was not tested for HIV status but the blood of the donor was tested and was found to be negative. The counter-affidavit narrates the events from the day the petitioner approached the hospital for treatment on 23-1-1998 onwards, purported care being taken by the company for the health of its employees as well as their dependants, the history of the hospital, and details regarding the spreading of AIDS etc. It was stated that the brother of the petitioner was conducted blood test ten months after donating the blood and it is not known whether he had been infected with HIV+ve at the time he had donated the blood. 8. The counter also states about the background of chronic cervicitis disease the...","6. When HIV tests were conducted both to her husband and to her elder brother, the donor of the blood, it was revealed that her brother was a HIV+ve patient. It is alleged that before transfusion of the blood of her brother, no care was taken to conduct the relevant and necessary blood tests and because of the negligence on the part of the hospital authorities, she was infected with the disease. She got issued a notice to SCCL through a consumer welfare council to which it was replied that the medical and health staff of the hospital are neither responsible nor negligent in conducting any blood tests.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The matter has been referred to a Larger Bench having regard to the importance and magnitude of the problem, the inhabitants of the State had been facing with. When the matter came up for admission on 11-7-2001, we directed the Registry to issue a public notice in various national and regional newspapers inviting intervention of the Non-Governmental Organisations and the public-spirited persons. The respondents were also directed to file counters as regards the precautionary measures taken by them, amenities available in the hospitals and blood banks, regulatory measures taken by the State in relation to running of such hospitals and blood banks, treatment, including the mode and manner of treatment, rehabilitation of the patients, as also spreading of awareness amongst the general people. 3. In response to the said notice, one Sri S. Jeevan Kumar, Convenor, Human Rights Forum, Hyderabad, Dr. P.V.R. Bhaskara Rao, Chairman, ""People for Economical and Effective Medicare"", Hyderabad and Ms. Jyotirmayee, Secretary, Srikakulam Mandal Mahila Viniyogadarula Sangham, Srikakulam have filed separate petitions to permit them to participate in the proceedings as interveners. The husband of the petitioner also filed a petition to implead him as 2nd petitioner, Sri K.G. Kannabhiran, learned Senior Counsel also appeared as intervener. 4. The factual matrix leading to the invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court to intervene in the...",75. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/859256/ | I(2002)ACC32, 2002ACJ32, 2001(5)ALD522, 2001(5)ALT154, AIR 2001 ANDHRA PRADESH 502, 2002 A I H C 475, (2002) 3 RECCIVR 135, (2002) 1 ACJ 32, (2001) 5 ANDHLD 522, (2001) 5 ANDH LT 154",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity,2001,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: I(2002)ACC32, 2002ACJ32, 2001(5)ALD522, 2001(5)ALT154, AIR 2001 ANDHRA PRADESH 502, 2002 A I H C 475, (2002) 3 RECCIVR 135, (2002) 1 ACJ 32, (2001) 5 ANDHLD 522, (2001) 5 ANDH LT 154",859256,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/859256/,15
Karnataka High Court,"H.M. Prakash @ Dali vs The State Of Karnataka on 19 March, 2004",ILR2004KAR2637,2004-03-19,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 112, Section 125, Section 13, Section 139, Section 165, Section 17, Section 173, Section 185, Section 2, Section 3, Section 313, Section 319, Section 32, Section 37, Section 5, Section 53, Section 54, Section 540, Section 73",Constitutional Validity; Venereal Disease,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Mohan Shanthanagoudar, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. Assailing the correctness of the order dated 01.02.2003 passed by learned J.M.F.C Somwarpet in crime No. 156 of 2002, whereby the Magistrate has allowed the application dated 26.11.2002 filed by the Investigation Officer seeking direction to the medical officer to conduct blood test, of the accused by collecting sample of blood from him in order to ascertain as to whether the accused has caused pregnancy of the complainant or not, the accused has come forward with the present petition . 2. The brief facts of the case giving raise to the present petition are that : 7. In our justice dispensation system, while adjudicating the questions involved in litigation, in the absence of any direct and positive evidence on record, if the Court is of the considered opinion that the scientific investigation is just and necessary for proper adjudication of the dispute, the Court will make use of the...","19. As aforesaid, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of AMARJIT KAUR v. HARBHAJAN SINGH AND ANR. in support of his contention. In the said judgment , the Apex Court referred to the judgment of GOUTAM KUNDU v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR. , wherein, the legal position was declared as to the circumstances and the limitations to be observed in compelling anyone to give a sample of blood against his/her will for DNA analysis, keeping in view, the serious consequences flowing from the same, i.e., the branding of a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman. The facts in the case of Amarjit Kaur, cited supra, disclose that the High Court had imposed a condition, while considering the question of grant of maintenance pendentelite, of subjecting the child to DNA test. The said condition imposed by the High Court was questioned in the Apex Court. The Apex Court, while considering the said question observed thus: 27. Specimen handwriting, signature, finger impressions, blood...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Crime No. 156/2002 is registered in Somwarpet police station on the basis of the complaint lodged by one G.S. Poornima on 15.11.2002 for the offences punishable Under Section 313 , 417 , 506 I.P.C. It is alleged in the said complaint that the accused-petitioner herein was in love with the complainant Poornima, assuring the complainant that he would marry her and made her to believe so, had illicit intercourse with her on number of occasions since December 2000; when the complainant was pregnant on account of such sexual intercourse, she informed the same to the accused and requested him to marry her, but the accused asked her to terminate the said pregnancy medically and that he would bear the expenses and again promised the complainant of marrying her. However, the accused and his family members started evading her. Therefore, the accused left the village itself and came back a week prior to lodging of the complaint and told the villagers that he has married another girl. The complainant is now having one and a half year old baby boy who is born out of the sexual relationship between the accused and the complainant. During the course of the investigation, the accused was released on bail. The investigation officer filed an application before the jurisdictional Magistrate seeking permission to take blood...",The petition is dismissed accordingly.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1502997/ | ILR2004KAR2637,Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; venereal_disease,2004,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,Equivalent citations: ILR2004KAR2637,1502997,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1502997/,28
Karnataka High Court,"H.M. Prakash Alias Dali vs State Of Karnataka on 19 March, 2004",2004(3)KARLJ584,2004-03-19,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 112, Section 125, Section 13, Section 139, Section 165, Section 17, Section 173, Section 2, Section 27, Section 3, Section 319, Section 32, Section 37, Section 5, Section 53, Section 54, Section 540, Section 6, Section 73",Constitutional Validity; Venereal Disease,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Mohan Shanthanagoudar, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. Assailing the correctness of the order dated 1-2-2003 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Somwarpet in Crime No. 156 of 2002, whereby the Magistrate has allowed the application dated 26-11-2002 filed fey the Investigation Officer seeking direction to the medical officer to conduct blood test of the accused by collecting sample of blood from him in order to ascertain as to whether the accused has caused pregnancy of the complainant or not, the accused has come forward with the present petition. 2. The brief facts of the case giving raise to the present petition are that: 7. In our justice dispensation system, while adjudicating the questions involved in litigation, in the absence of any direct and positive evidence on record, if the Court is of the considered opinion that the scientific investigation is just and necessary for proper adjudication of the dispute, the Court will make use of...","19. As aforesaid, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Amarjit Kaur , supra, in support of his contention. In the said judgment , the Apex Court referred to the judgment of Goutam Kundu 's case, wherein the legal position was declared as to the circumstances and the limitations to be observed in compelling anyone to give a sample of blood against his/her will for D.N.A. analysis, keeping in view, the serious consequences flowing from the same, i.e., the branding of a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman. The facts in the case of Amarjit Kaur , supra, disclose that the High Court had imposed a condition, while considering the question of grant of maintenance pendente lite, of subjecting the child to D.N.A. test. The said condition imposed by the High Court was questioned in the Apex Court. The Apex Court, while considering the said question observed thus: 27. Specimen handwriting, signature, finger impressions, blood or semen samples by themselves are not testimony...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Crime No. 156 of 2002 is registered in Somwarpet Police Station on the basis of the complaint lodged by one G.S. Poornima on 15-11-2002 for the offences punishable under Sections 313 , 417 and 506 of the IPC. It is alleged in the said complaint that the accused-petitioner herein was in love with the complainant-Poornima; assuring the complainant that he would marry her and made her to believe so, had illicit intercourse with her on number of occasions since December 2000; when the complainant was pregnant on account of such sexual intercourse, she informed the same to the accused and requested him to marry her; but the accused asked her to terminate the said pregnancy medically and that he would bear the expenses and again promised the complainant of marrying her. However, the accused and his family members started evading her. Thereafter, the accused left the village itself and came back a week prior to lodging of the complaint and told the villagers that he has married another girl. The complainant is now having one and half year old baby boy who is born out of the sexual relationship between the accused and the complainant. During the course of the investigation, the accused was released on bail. The investigation officer filed an application before the jurisdictional Magistrate seeking permission to...",The petition is dismissed accordingly.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1093244/ | 2004(3)KARLJ584, 2004 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 1485, (2004) 3 KANT LJ 584, (2004) 3 RECCRIR 879, (2004) 3 ALLCRILR 517(2)",Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; venereal_disease,2004,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2004(3)KARLJ584, 2004 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 1485, (2004) 3 KANT LJ 584, (2004) 3 RECCRIR 879, (2004) 3 ALLCRILR 517(2)",1093244,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1093244/,26
Madras High Court,"D.Samuvel Joseph vs J.Mercy Sheefa on 16 April, 2025",D.Samuvel Joseph vs J.Mercy Sheefa,2025-04-16,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 16.04.2025 CORAM THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.VIJAYAKUMAR C.R.P.(PD)(MD)No.1192 of 2025 D.Samuvel Joseph ...Petitioner/Petitioner Vs. J.Mercy Sheefa ...Respondent/Respondent PRAYER: Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India, to set aside the order passed in Unnumbered I.D.O.P.No. of 2025, on the file of Principal District and Sessions Court, Virudhunagar District at Srivilliputhur, dated 28.03.2025, and thereby allow the present civil revision petition and thereby order to take into file of the Petition and number the I.D.O.P. and pass such further orders in accordance with law. For Petitioner : Mr.V.Meenakshi Sundaram for Mr.S.Kishore Kumar ***** ORDER The petitioner in unnumbered I.D.O.P.CNR.TNVR01-0001104 of 2025, on the file of the Principal District and Sessions Court, Virudhunagar District at Srivilliputhur, has filed the present revision petition challenging the rejection of I.D.O.P. without being numbered. 1/4 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 24/04/2025 02:48:16 pm )",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2.A perusal of the divorce petition reveals that it has filed under Section 10(1)(vii)(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869. In other words, the petitioner has sought divorce on the ground of non-consummation of marriage and mental cruelty. The learned Principal District Judge, has rejected the application on the ground that the marriage has been solemnized only on 28.09.2023 and so far, two years have not lapsed. Two years embargo has been prescribed under Section 10 only when divorce is sought for, on the ground of unsoundness of mind or on the ground that the partner is suffering from Venereal disease or there is desertion. Two years waiting period has not been prescribed, if the divorce petition has been filed on the ground of non-consummation of marriage or on the ground of cruelty. 3.In view of the above said facts, the order impugned in the revision petition is hereby set aside and the trial Court is directed to number the same, if it is otherwise in order.","4.With the above said observations, this Civil Revision Petition stands disposed of. No costs. 2/4 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 24/04/2025 02:48:16 pm ) 5.The Registry is directed to return the original impugned order after obtaining due signature from the learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner. 16.04.2025 Internet:Yes/No Index:Yes/No RJR To The learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Virudhunagar District at Srivilliputhur. Copy to:- The Section Officer, VR Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 24/04/2025 02:48:16 pm ) R.VIJAYAKUMAR, J. RJR C.R.P.(PD)(MD)No.1192 of 2025 16.04.2025 4/4 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 24/04/2025 02:48:16 pm )",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/116407105/,Unclear,unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,116407105,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/116407105/,3
Calcutta High Court,"Rabindra Nath Mukherjee vs Iti Mukherjee @ Chatterjee on 22 January, 1991",95CWN1085,1991-01-22,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 13, Section 13A, Section 14, Section 21B, Section 23, Section 23A, Section 29, Section 34, Section 9",Cruelty; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Bhattacharjee, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,"21. The petitioner Rabindra Nath Mukherjee, a Commerce Graduate working in a Bank, was married to the respondent Iti on the 4th December, 1979 according to Hindu rites. At the time of their marriage, which was a negotiated one, Rabindra Nath was 34 years old and Iti 19. On the following day, that is on 5th December, the petitioner brought his wife to his place of reidence at Makardah within district Howrah where he used to live jointly with his widowed mother P.W. 3 Binapani, brother P.W. 4 Madan, his wife and their children P.W. 5 Ranjit and P.W. 6 Kalpana. 'Phulsajya' Ceremony took place in the groom's house on 6th December. The petition for divorce starts with the narration of two incident stated to have taken place in the petitioner's house on that night. It is alleged that the petitioner was surprised to see ""the ugly and silly behaviour of the respondent towards her brother-in-law before the petitioner's relations who had to move away'. The second one is alleged to have occurred when the petitioner got his wife exclusively...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. A petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce filed by the appellant-husband against the respondent-wife on the ground of cruelty has been dismissed by the trial Court on merits as well as on the ground of the petition having been presented few days before the expiry of one year from the date of the marriage in contravention of the provisions of Section 14(1) . My learned brother Banerjee, J. has, for the reasons stated in his judgment hereinafter, upheld the decision of the trial Judge on merits. While I respectfully agree with the view of Banerjee, J. that the petition has been rightly dismissed on merits and that the alleged cruelty by the wife has not been proved. I have my doubts as to whether the provisions of Section 14(1) prohibiting the entertainment of a petition for divorce before the expiry of one year from the date of marriage is that mandatory to require compliance with mathematical precision and to warrant rejection for any and every non-compliance. The provisions of Section 14(1) are reproduced herein below : ""14(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, it shall not be competent for any Court to entertain any petition for dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce, unless...","24. With regard to the incidents referred to in paragraphs 17 and 21 of the petition, there is no corroboration. Even P.W. 1 who claimed to be a colleague of the petitioner does not state anything about the alleged threatening by the father-in-law inside the petitioner's office. No neighbour has been examined to prove the incidents dated 16th and 19th November. P.W. 1, a colleague of the petitioner, speaks nothing about the relationship between Robin and Iti. Is it not surprising that the petitioner, who had been subjected to severe mental agony for more than eleven months, would not give vent to his feelings to his colleague working in the same branch ? As regards the accusation of physical assaults on Robin by Iti, P.W. 4. Madan has stated that Robin had reported that he was kicked twice on the belly by Iti, who also throttled her husband and on another occasion Iti pressed Robin's testicles and on the last occasion she hit him on the chest with a glass. P.W. 3 Binapani speaks about the incidents when Iti kicked...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1432260/ | 95CWN1085, II(1991)DMC227",Cruelty,cruelty; adultery,1991,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 95CWN1085, II(1991)DMC227",1432260,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1432260/,4
Madras High Court,"Mahalingam Pillai vs Amsavalli on 3 January, 1956",(1956)2MLJ289,1956-01-03,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 107, Section 13, Section 172, Section 2, Section 209, Section 22, Section 24, Section 28, Section 36, Section 39, Section 397, Section 4, Section 45, Section 488, Section 5, Section 531, Section 535, Section 546, Section 557, Section 560, Section 561, Section 6, Section 62, Section 7, Section 9",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Ramaswami, J. 1. This is an appeal preferred against the order made by the learnt Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam in O.P. No. 43 of 1953.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"5. Two points that arise for determination in this appeal are: Firstly, whether on the facts alleged a case of concubinage or prostitution or living in adultery has been made out; and secondly, what is the scope and extent of and the consequence of the contumacious non-compliance with the order of Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., regarding the payment of costs and alimony pendente lite. 22. Adultery is nowhere defined either in the English or Indian Divorce Act . But its meaning in Divorce Law is beyond doubt and is understood to mean the willing sexual intercourse between a husband or wife with one of the opposite sex while the marriage subsists Sexual commerce falling short of complete penetration may constitute adultery It is immaterial whether the marriage itself has been consummated or not. The act of intercourse must be voluntary but if it is involuntary, for example, rape, there can...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The facts are: The appellant-petitioner before us Mahalingam Pillai is the husband of the respondent Amsavalli. The appellant is a resident of Poundarigapuram village and the respondent is a resident of Abhishekamangalam village in Nannilam Taluk. The married life of this couple pawed short-lived. The case for the husband in a notice which he gave before filing this O.P. was that the respondent had left him to lead an openly immoral and improper life. In this petition his case was that she had eloped with one Saravana Pillai, P.W. 4, of Maruvancheri in Nannilam Taluk in January, 1952 and has been living with him as his concubine openly. The case for the wife was that this appellant has had incestuous relationship with his sister Gundu Achi and that on that account there were quarrels-and finally the petitioner beat her, removed her tali, branded and drove her away from his residence. The petitioner has come to Court on the foot of the allegations-setout above for dissolution of marriage under Section 5(1)(b) of Madras Act VI of 1919. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the petitioner had not proved his case for dissolution of marriage and dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal. 4. In the lower Court the respondent applied that her husband might be directed to provide her with...","34. In regard to alimony pending appeal, inasmuch as the order for payment of alimony pendente lite comes to an end with the passing of the decree in the O.P., and even though the appeal is a continuation of the proceeding, still the wife, or the husband will have to move the appellate Court for alimony during the pendency of the appeal. Hirabai v. Dhunijbhai (1893) I.L.R. 17 Bom. 147, Devasahayam v. Devamony A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 211 : (1922) I.L.R. 46 Mad. 133. The appellate Court can exercise the powers of the original Court and it can pass the necessary order (see Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure) or continue the order passed by the lower Court till the disposal of the appeal unless the conduct of the party is unreasonable and vexatious or the findings of the lower Court show that the appeal is only an engine of oppression Noronha v. Noronha (1948) 50 Bom. L.R. 471 at 478, Jones v. Jones (1872) 2 P. & D. 333 : 17 Am. Jur. Section 557, or the party...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/91910/ | (1956)2MLJ289,Adultery,adultery,1956,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1956)2MLJ289,91910,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/91910/,12
Madhya Pradesh High Court,"Madhusudan vs Smt. Chandrika on 22 March, 1975",AIR1975MP174,1975-03-22,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 12, Section 13, Section 17, Section 19, Section 25, Section 28, Section 5",Venereal Disease; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Singh, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"6. The first question that arises in this appeal is whether the finding of the trial Court that the wife was suffering from venereal disease of syphilis at the time of marriage is correct. The wife was first examined by Dr. (Miss) Swami (P.W. 1) on 11th December, 1972. At that time the wife complained of temperature and cold. Dr. Swami made a general examination and prescribed medicines for sore throat. On 12th December the husband and wife again came to Dr. Swami. The husband complained that the wife was having an ulcer on her private parts. On examination of the wife, Dr. Swami found an ulcer on the left labia majora. She first thought that this might be a local ulcer, but she advised for blood examination. She prescribed penicillin injections. The blood examination was done on 12th December by Dr. Raja Indurkhya (P.W. 2), who practices as Radiologist...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a husband's appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, against a decree passed by the Fifth Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, on 18th December, 1973, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage under Section 12(1)(c) and, in the alternative, for judicial separation under Section 10(1)(d) of the Act 2. The parties were married at Raipur on 6th December 1972. After marriage the wife came to Jabalpur on 7th December, 1972, where the husband resides, At the time of marriage the husband was aged 24 years and the wife 21 years. Both of them are graduates and come from respectable Guiarati families. The parties had marital intercourse from 8th to 10th December, 1972. The husband, it seems, noticed some ulcer near the private parts of the wife. He got her examined by Dr. (Miss) Swami (P.W. 1) who advised blood test. The husband then took the wife to Dr. Raja Indurkhya (P.W. 2) for pathalogical examination of the blood. The blood test was positive for syphilis. On further examination Dr. Swami diagnosed that the wife was suffering from syphilis and prescribed treatment. On 17th January, 1973 the husband applied under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act for annulment of marriage. The wife was again examined at the instance of the husband by Dr. (Mrs.) Urmila Jamdar (P.W....","24. For the reasons given above, the appeal fails and is dismissed. We shall, however, make no order as to costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1948843/ | AIR1975MP174, AIR 1975 MADHYA PRADESH 174, 1975 MPLJ 381 1975 JABLJ 486, 1975 JABLJ 486",Venereal Disease,venereal_disease; nullity_sec19,1975,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1975MP174, AIR 1975 MADHYA PRADESH 174, 1975 MPLJ 381 1975 JABLJ 486, 1975 JABLJ 486",1948843,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1948843/,11
Madras High Court,"M.Jasmine Devapriya vs A.Stephen Dhanaraj on 20 September, 2017",M.Jasmine Devapriya vs A.Stephen Dhanaraj,2017-09-20,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 55",Leprosy,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (leprosy) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 20.09.2017 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.R.SWAMINATHAN C.M.A.(MD).No.1772 of 2010 M.Jasmine Devapriya ... Appellant/Respondent Vs. A.Stephen Dhanaraj ... Respondent/Petitioner PRAYER : This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act, to set aside the order passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Tuticorin in I.D.O.P.No.165 of 2004, dated 27.08.2010. !For Appellant : Mr.N.Dilip Kumar ^For Respondent : Mr.S.Kadarkarai :JUDGMENT This Appeal is at the instance of the wife. The respondent herein filed I.D.O.P.No.165 of 2004 on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Tuticorin on 05.07.2004, seeking dissolution of his marriage with the appellant herein that was solemnised on 21.01.2004. The said Original Petition was filed under Section 10 (1) (iv) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1969. 2. According to the pleadings set out in the said Original Petition, the appellant herein was suffering from leprosy and that without disclosing the existence of the said disease, the appellant was given in marriage to the respondent. The parties herein lived together for hardly few months. The appellant left the matrimonial house on 12.05.2004. In support of his case, he examined himself as P.W.1. He also examined his mother as P.W.2. The marriage invitation was marked as Ex.P.1. 3. The appellant herein filed her counter controverting the allegation...","8.This Court therefore sets aside the order dated 27.08.2010 made in I.D.O.P.No.165 of 2004 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Tuticorin. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal stands allowed. No costs. To 1.The Principal District Judge, Tuticorin. 2.The Record Keeper, VR Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai. .",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/128723555/,Leprosy,leprosy,2017,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,128723555,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/128723555/,2
Bombay High Court,"Atul Sashikant Mude vs Niranjana Atul Mude on 16 December, 1997",AIR1998BOM264,1997-12-16,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125, Section 144, Section 151, Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 24, Section 25, Section 3, Section 4, Section 75, Section 9",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER V.P. Tipnis, J. 1. This appeal, which was admitted by the 1st Court on 29th July 1997, was taken up for hearing as it was stated on behalf of the appellant that the order is such that it is impossible for him to comply with and will result into grave hardship to the appellant-husband.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""18. Maintenance of wife---(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime. (2) A Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance--- (a) if he is guilty of desertion, that is to say, of abandoning her without reasonable cause and without her consent or against her wish, or of wilfully neglecting her; (b) If he has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live with her husband; (c) If he is suffering from a virulent form of leprosy; (d) If he has any other wife living; (e) If he keeps a concubine in the same house in which his wife is living...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The order impugned is an ad-interim order passed by the learned Single Judge in a Notice of Motion taken out in a suit filed by the wife under section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the ""Act"") for maintenance for herself and her minor daughter. The learned Judge by the impugned order dated 17th July 1997 awarded an ad-interim maintenance of Rs. 7,500/- per month commencing from July 1997. The amount, the learned Judge clarified would include Rs. 1,600/- which the defendant-husband is prepared to pay for the maintenance of the child. 3. Mr. Naphade, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-husband, read out the impugned order and raised three points. He, firstly, contended that the Court has no jurisdiction to pass an ad-interim order of the nature in a suit filed for maintenance under section 18 of the Act. Mr. Naphade contended that the provisions of section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be pressed into service as, in his submission, those provisions do not confer any additional jurisdiction upon the Court and if there is any specific provision in the statute for the matter involved, then recourse cannot be had to the provisions of section 151. Mr. Naphade took us through the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure...","16. In our opinion, the decisions on the issue by the learned Single Judge of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1983 Bombay 480 and another learned Single Judge of this Court reported in 1993 Mah. L.J. 851 appear to lay down the correct position in law. We find it difficult to accept the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court . We have already referred to the reasoning of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in para 9 of the aforesaid judgement. The reason given for not reading any power to grant interlocutory reliefs under section 18 are that where the husband fails to discharge the obligation of maintaining his wife, the wife can enforce her right to maintenance by instituting an appropriate action and to such an action the defendant may have several defences. He may deny the marriage itself. He may deny that the marriage is subsisting. He may plead that the wife is unchaste or has ceased to be a Hindu. He may plead that the wife is living separately from him without any just cause. All these...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/598966/ | AIR1998BOM264, 1998(4)BOMCR83, II(1998)DMC271, 1998(1)MHLJ618",Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,1997,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1998BOM264, 1998(4)BOMCR83, II(1998)DMC271, 1998(1)MHLJ618",598966,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/598966/,11
Madras High Court,"Salome vs Dr.Prince D.Immanuel on 6 April, 2017",AIR 2017 MADRAS 256,2017-04-06,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 23, Section 55",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"11.The learned counsel for the appellant referred various averments in the petition, counter statement filed by the appellant and the grounds of appeals. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that mental cruelty is not defined under the Act and there is no strait-jacket definition for the same. Each case must be decided based on its own facts and circumstances of the case to conclude whether the incidents alleged by the party amounts to mental cruelty or not. In the present case, the appellant has averred various incidents, by which, the respondent has repeatedly caused mental agony and cruelty to the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant stated that the respondent has admitted in his evidence that he put up 10 locks, not 22 locks to lock the home. Any normal prudent man would not put 10 locks to lock the home. This fact coupled with the fact that the respondent was friendly with the parents of the appellant in their presence and talked about them shows mental illness of the respondent. Only due to the mental cruelty, the appellant has left the matrimonial home and due to the character and attitude of the respondent, it is not safe...","5.The respondent filed counter statement and denied all the averments made by the appellant. According to respondent, the marriage is an arranged marriage. After the appellant and the respondent met only, the marriage was arranged and after betrothal, they were married. The respondent is very proud of having appellant as his wife and has lot of love and affection for her. He took her along with him wherever he went and when she was staying with him in Hyderabad, they visited number of places. He denied the various allegations made by the appellant in her petition. According to the respondent, he informed the appellant and her parents when he left to U.S.A. and gave his address. The notice issued by the appellant was served on him only in U.S.A. The respondent also stated that he has not put 22 locks in his home. The appellant only without any reason, left the matrimonial home and at the instigation of her father, she made these allegations. The respondent was not informed about betrothal and marriage of appellant's younger sister and was not invited for the marriage. When the appellant had a trouble with one of the co-employees at TLM, Kothara, the respondent...","?10.The question for consideration is whether the conduct of the respondent/wife in the circumstance of the case, amounted to cruelty, to entitle the husband to divorce. Cruelty could be physical or mental or both. While it is easy to discern physical cruelty, mental cruelty has to be assessed from the overall behavior of spouses as well as other incidental factors. There is no doubt that in a matrimonial setup, a couple, which decides to live together, invariably has different attitudes and opinions, likes and dislikes, and more often than not spouses behave differently when faced with the same situations. While disputes and arguments are normal in a marriage, in order to constitute cruelty, the conduct of the spouse should be something more serious than the ordinary ?wear and tear? of a marital life.","11.The learned counsel for the appellant referred various averments in the petition, counter statement filed by the appellant and the grounds of appeals. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that mental cruelty is not defined under the Act and there is no strait-jacket definition for the same. Each case must be decided based on its own facts and circumstances of the case to conclude whether the incidents alleged by the party amounts to mental cruelty or not. In the present case, the appellant has averred various incidents, by which, the respondent has repeatedly caused mental agony and cruelty to the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant stated that the respondent has admitted in his evidence that he put up 10 locks, not 22 locks to lock the home. Any normal prudent man would not put 10 locks to lock the home. This fact coupled with the fact that the respondent was friendly with the parents of the appellant in their presence and talked about them shows mental illness of the respondent. Only due to the mental cruelty, the...","5.The respondent filed counter statement and denied all the averments made by the appellant. According to respondent, the marriage is an arranged marriage. After the appellant and the respondent met only, the marriage was arranged and after betrothal, they were married. The respondent is very proud of having appellant as his wife and has lot of love and affection for her. He took her along with him wherever he went and when she was staying with him in Hyderabad, they visited number of places. He denied the various allegations made by the appellant in her petition. According to the respondent, he informed the appellant and her parents when he left to U.S.A. and gave his address. The notice issued by the appellant was served on him only in U.S.A. The respondent also stated that he has not put 22 locks in his home. The appellant only without any reason, left the matrimonial home and at the instigation of her father, she made these allegations. The respondent was not informed about betrothal and marriage of appellant's younger sister and was not...","BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 06.04.2017 Reserved on : 14.03.2017 Delivered on : 06.04.2017 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MS.JUSTICE V.M.VELUMANI C.M.A.(MD)Nos.238 of 2012 and 239 of 2012 C.M.A.(MD)No.238 of 2012: Salome, W/o.Prince D.Immanuel .. Appellant Vs. Dr.Prince D.Immanuel .. Respondent Prayer:- Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 55 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869, to set aside the Judgment and Decree, dated 19.11.2011, passed in I.D.O.P.No.8 of 2007, by the learned Principal District Judge, Thoothukudi. C.M.A.(MD)No.239 of 2012: Dr.Salome Devadson, W/o.Prince D.Immanuel .. Appellant Vs. Dr.I.Prince Devadson .. Respondent Prayer: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal Petition filed under Section 55 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869, to set aside the Judgment and Decree, dated 19.11.2011, passed in I.D.O.P.No.42 of 2007, by the learned Principal District Judge, Thoothukudi. !For Appellant : Mr.G.Prabhu Rajadurai (in both the C.M.As.) for Mr.D.Rajkumar ^For Respondent : Mr.M.Vallinayagam (in both the C.M.As.) Senior Counsel for Mr.K.Samidurai :COMMON JUDGMENT These Civil Miscellaneous Appeals have been filed by the appellant to set aside the Judgment and Decree, dated 19.11.2011, passed in I.D.O.P.Nos.8 and 42 of 2007, by the learned Principal District Judge, Thoothukudi. 2. Since the issues involved in both the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are interlinked, they are heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. 3.The appellant is the wife and the respondent is the husband. The...","?88.In short, it would be difficult for the parties to bury the past and to begin a new relationship of Husband and Wife. For the past 15 years both parties have remained separately. During these years, they developed their own life style, remained in isolation and grown in their own thoughts. Marriage tie between the parties has become emotionally dead and the same is beyond repair because of the emotionally dead relationship which is a positive act of oppressive mental cruelty, in our considered opinion. There is no chance for both parties to live together in future. In such a context, the decree of Divorce is the only remedy to be passed, so that the parties may choose their life of their own way, when there has been no scope for their reunion.? 30.The second proposition is that although the Supreme Court can, in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, convert a proceeding under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, into one under Section 13-B and pass a decree for mutual divorce, without...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/163276397/ | AIR 2017 MADRAS 256, (2019) 1 HINDULR 564, (2017) 4 MAD LJ 69, (2018) 1 CIVILCOURTC 490, (2018) 3 CURCC 230, (2017) 176 ALLINDCAS 616 (MAD), (2017) 178 ALLINDCAS 8 (MAD)",Cruelty,cruelty,2017,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR 2017 MADRAS 256, (2019) 1 HINDULR 564, (2017) 4 MAD LJ 69, (2018) 1 CIVILCOURTC 490, (2018) 3 CURCC 230, (2017) 176 ALLINDCAS 616 (MAD), (2017) 178 ALLINDCAS 8 (MAD)",163276397,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/163276397/,17
Madras High Court,"Gnanasigamani vs Kamala Bai And Anr. on 17 April, 1990",(1990)2MLJ80,1990-04-17,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 12, Section 14, Section 19, Section 4, Section 45, Section 9",Adultery; Leprosy; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Jagarthanam, J. 1. O.M.S. No.9 of 1985 has been filed by Gnanasigamani, the husband, for the dissolution of his marriage with his wife, Kamala Bai. O.M.S. No. 12 of 1983 has been filed by the wife for the restitution of conjugal rights.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,(i) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the restitution of conjugal rights? (ii) Whether the first respondent has withdrawn from the company of the petitioner? 8. Following are the issues framed for trial in O.M.S.No.9 of 1985: (i) Whether the first respondent had committed adultery as alleged by the petitioner? (ii) Whether this petition is maintainable in view of the dismissal of O.M.S. No. 19 of 1982 for the same relief? (iii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to a decree of divorce as prayed for?,"2. The facts and circumstances leading to the filing of these two suits and the defences raised therein, in pith and substance, may succinctly be stated as follows: The marriage between the spouses was solemnized on 14,5.1979 in the C.S.I. Church, S.T. Mangaud, Kanyakumari District. The husband was employed as Junior Assistant. Medical Section, University of Madras and was residing in Madras. Even before marriage, the wife, who was a resident of Kalliyikkavilai Village in Kanyakumari District, was employed as a Typist in the office of the Christian Literary Society, Madras, and she continued her employment after marriage also, living at the matrimonial abode. It is alleged that while so living, the wife's behaviour towards the elders at home was beyond tolerable limits and very often she returned home late in the night for no reason whatsoever, giving rise to a suspicion of her fidelity. When the husband enquired, he came to know that his wife even before marriage was intimate with one John Rose for fairly long period, in the sense of they living as husband and wife, and...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Section 45 of the Act (Indian Divorce Act) reads as under: Code of Civil Procedure To Apply: Subject to the provisions herein contained, all proceedings under this Act between party and party shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure . There is no manner of doubt whatever that, on the same set of facts and circumstances and the same cause of action as detailed in the present suit, the husband earlier filed O.M.S.N0.19/82 for the same relief as prayed for in the present suit, which was in fact dismissed for default, and the initial restoration application as well as the subsequent one filed by the husband were also dismissed, vide Exs. P-12 to P-15, P-17 and R-5. The matter was not at all agitated further and consequently the dismissal of that suit has become final. 10. For understanding the provision of Order 9 Rule 9(1) C.P.C., it is better to extract the provision of Order 9 Rule 8 C.P.C. Order 9 Rule 8 C.P.C . reads as follows: Procedure Where Defendant Only Appears: Where the defendant appears and the plaintiff does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed, unless the defendant admits the claim, or part thereof, in which case the Court shall pass...","9. Issue No. (ii) in O.M.S. No. 9 of 1985 revolving on the question of maintainability of the suit can be taken up for consideration, first and foremost, and the other Issues in O.M.S. No. 9/85 viz. Issues (i) and (iii) can compendiously be grouped together along with Issues (i) and (ii) in O.M.S. No. 12/83, and disposed of, for the simple reason that the finding given one way or the other on Issues (i) and (iii) in O.M.S.No.9/85 will have a direct bearing on Issues (i) and (ii) in O.M.S. No. 12/83, in the sense, that, if the question of adultery is found against the husband and consequently no decree nisi for divorce can be passed, it goes without saying that there can be no justification whatever for the husband to resist the other suit for restitution of conjugal rights and the same has to result in a decree as prayed for. No doubt, true it is that the maintainability of O.M.S.No.19 of 1982 had been questioned on the legal plea of res judicata. Learned Counsel for the wife,...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1264372/ | (1990)2MLJ80,Adultery,adultery; leprosy; desertion,1990,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1990)2MLJ80,1264372,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1264372/,6
Madras High Court,"A.V. Arockiam And Etc. vs Arul Mary Alias Latchumi Devi And Anr. on 5 March, 2002",AIR2002MAD435,2002-03-05,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 120, Section 15, Section 16, Section 18, Section 19, Section 2, Section 20, Section 22, Section 23, Section 24, Section 3, Section 4, Section 45, Section 482, Section 6, Section 7, Section 8",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER K.S. Sampath, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. The question for consideration in both these matters is whether the High Court will have jurisdiction to entertain matrimonial matters irrespective of whether the husband and wife reside at Madras or last resided together at Madras or not? ""On the question whether the District courts should be allowed a jurisdiction in divorce cases, there was a difference of opinion. The main reason why the Select Committee had given this jurisdiction was that the refusal of it would amount to a denial of relief to large classes of persons affected by the Bill. It would be a mere mockery of Europeans and East Indians in distant cities, and Native Christians in mofussil villages, to tell them to come to the High Courts in the Presidency towns for judgments of divorce. It is however said that the District Courts are not equal to those duties. That argument is one which should...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. As pointed out in Thelma Agnes Kershaw v. Archibald Cyril Kershaw, AIR 1930 Lahore 916, in cases under the Divorce Act , the question of jurisdiction is of paramount importance and does not fall to be determined purely on allocation of the onus of proof. In these cases, it is the duty of the Court, apart from any objection that might have been taken by one or other of the parties, to enquire into and set out in the judgment, facts which show clearly that it possesses jurisdiction to pronounce a decree' for dissolution of marriage. 3. Apart from the preamble, the sections relevant in the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (now the Divorce Act ) are Sections 3(1) , 3(3) , 3(4) , 4 . 6, 8, 10, 11, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23 and 45. We have also to advert to Clause 35 of the Amended Letters Patent and Sections 15 and 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We may have occasion to refer to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. Sengottuvelan, J. in Dexter S. Anthony v. June P. Anthony (1985) 2 Mad LJ 200 has made a thorough study of the position relating to jurisdiction. It is worthwhile to advert to the various portions of the judgment of the learned Judge, 5....",40. Both O.M.S. No. 24/96 and O.M.S. No. 7/2001 are disposed of accordingly.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1768126/ | AIR2002MAD435, (2002)2MLJ506",Procedural,procedural,2002,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR2002MAD435, (2002)2MLJ506",1768126,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1768126/,14
Madras High Court,"Maharaja Nadar vs Muthukani Ammal on 5 December, 1985",AIR1986MAD346,1985-12-05,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125, Section 13, Section 18, Section 2, Section 4, Section 488",Desertion; Cruelty; Conversion; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT 1. This is a second appeal preferred against the judgment and decree dated 30-1-1979 of the learned II Additional Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli, in A. S. No. 147 of 1978. 2. The defendant, Maharaja Nadar in the suit is the appellant herein. - 3. The plaintiff, Muthukani Animal filed the suit for maintenance. Her case is as follows : - The marriage of the plaintiff with the defendant was celebrated about 11 years prior to the institution of the suit, in the father's house of the plaintiff at Sivahthipuram, as per the caste custom and usage of the community to which they belong. Since the date of marriage, they lived happily as husband and wife. The defendant was often beating the plaintiff and was cruelly treating her and was driving her out of his house. In spite of it, the plaintiff was bearing all the cruel treatment of her husband and was living as dutiful wife. At one time, the plaintiff was charged with the commission of offence of, theft. The defendant demanded the plaintiffs consent for the second marriage since they have no child. On her refusal, she was beaten and treated with cruelty. At last, the end of...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""(1) Whether the cruelty and desertion alleged by the respondent herein i.e., the plaintiff in the suit are true? (2) Whether the respondent herein is entitled to maintenance? If so, what is the quantum of maintenance?"" 8. The point for consideration in this Second Appeal is whether the concept of the act of desertion and the act of cruelty under Hindu law, as codified, have been properly understood and applied to the facts of the present case before us. 9. It is not in dispute that the defendant-appellant is the husband of the respondent-plaintiff and their marriage took place 11 years prior to the date of the suit, as per the Hindu custom and usage. It is also not in dispute that they were living happily for some time after marriage and they have no issues. According to the respondent, the appellant often beat her and drove her away to...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","11. Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act (LXXVII of 1956), reads as follows : - 26. The husband is the lawful guardian of his minor wife and is entitled to require her to live with him, however young she may be, unless there is a custom enabling the wife to live with her parents until she hag arrived at puberty Arumuga v. Viraraghava (196 1) ILR 24 Mad 255. As soon as the wife is mature, her home is necessarily in her husbands house Kondal Roya v. Rangayanaki (1923) ILR 46 Mad 791 : (AIR 1924 Mad 49), Dadaji v. RukmaBai(1886) ILR 10 Bom301, and Tekait v. Basanta(1901) ILR28 Ca175l. He is bound to maintain her in his house while she is willing to reside with him and discharge her duties. If she quits him of her own accord, either without cause or on account of such ordinary quarrels as are incidental to married life in general, she can set up no claim to separate maintenance vide Bommadevaraya Naganna v. Bommadevara Rajya Lakshmi Devi (1928) 55 Mad U 242 : AIR 1928 PC 187; Kullya Nessuree v. Dwarkanath 6 Suth WR 115 (2), Sidlingappa v. Sidava ( 1878) ILR 2 Bom 634, and Surampalli Bangaramma v. Surampalli Branbaze (1908) ILR 31 Mad338. 27. Where the husband keeps...","6. The lower appellate Court held that it is clear from the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3 that the second marriage alleged by the plaintiff/respondent herein is not proved, and there is no positive proof. to show that the defendant/appellant herein has married the said Bommi Ammal as his second wife. The lower appellate Court has also held that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 shows that the defendant/ appellant herein is living with Bommi Ammal, and as such, the plaintiff/respondent herein has justifiable cause to live separately from her husband and demand separate maintenance from him. The lower appellate Court also held that the desertion alleged by the plaintiff/respondent herein is true. The lower appellate Court also held that the defendant/ appellant herein had deserted the plaintiff/respondent herein and also treated her with cruelty. According to the defendant/ appellant herein, items 13 and 14 are the exclusive properties of his mother. The respondent herein has not preferred any cross-objection against the finding of the trial Court awarding maintenance with charge over the 1/4th share of the...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/219392/ | AIR1986MAD346, AIR 1986 MADRAS 346, (1986) 99 MADLW 24",Desertion,desertion; cruelty; conversion; adultery,1985,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1986MAD346, AIR 1986 MADRAS 346, (1986) 99 MADLW 24",219392,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/219392/,12
Madras High Court,"A.Anand Abeson Daniel vs P.R.Sheena Parimala on 20 March, 2024",A.Anand Abeson Daniel vs P.R.Sheena Parimala,2024-03-20,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 114, Section 32, Section 494",Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"C.M.A.(MD).Nos.1118 and 1119 of 2018 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT RESERVED ON : 19.12.2023 PRONOUNCED ON : 20.03.2024 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE L.VICTORIA GOWRI C.M.A.(MD)Nos.1118 and 1119 of 2018 A.Anand Abeson Daniel ... Appellant in both C.M.As. Vs. P.R.Sheena Parimala ... Respondent in both C.M.As. COMMON PRAYER : Civil Miscellaneous Appeals filed under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, to set aside the judgment and decree in I.D.O.P.Nos.84 and 151 of 2012 on the file of the learned District Judge, Kanyakumari District at Nagercoil. For Appellant : Mr.T.Arul For Respondent : Mr.N.Shankar Ganesh COMMON JUDGMENT These Civil Miscellaneous Appeals have been filed by the appellant/husband, challenging the common order passed by the learned District Judge, at Nagercoil, Kanyakumari District in I.D.O.P.Nos.84 and 1/40 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD).Nos.1118 and 1119 of 2018 151 of 2012 dated 27.07.2017. 2.For the sake of convenience, the parties are addressed herein as appellant husband and respondent wife.","12.Per contra the learned counsel for the respondent refuting the arguments put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the trial Court has elaborately dealt with both the cases and on the basis of the appropriate oral and documentary evidence had proceeded to dismiss the petition for divorce and allowed the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. In view of the same, he pressed for dismissal of the appeal. 13.It is the specific case of the appellant husband that the respondent wife had deserted him during October 2003 and right from the inception of marriage, the respondent wife never showed any love 7/40 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD).Nos.1118 and 1119 of 2018 and affection towards him. However, it is pertinent to note that the first child Trevor Daniel was born on 29.11.1998 and the second child namely Rakesh Daniel was born on 15.05.2000 and during the pregnancy period, in both the occasions, the respondent wife was living with the appellant husband at Dubai. Hence, it is needless to state that from the year 1997 till 2000, the marriage between the appellant husband and the respondent wife must have been cordial. Hence, the allegation of the appellant husband that the respondent...","“18.It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Actually such a definition is not possible. In matrimonial relationship, cruelty would obviously mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between the spouses which embitters the relationship and often leads to various outbursts of behavior which can be termed as cruelty. Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of violence, some time it may take a different form. At times, it may be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behavior defies any definition and its category can never be closed. Whether husband is cruel to his wife or the wife is cruel to her husband has to be ascertained and judged by taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the given case and not by any pre- determined...","7.The learned counsel for the appellant husband claimed that the respondent wife always quarrelled with the appellant husband and she failed to maintain smooth and cordial relationship with her husband and continued disrespecting the appellant husband even after giving birth to two children. She went to the extent of stabbing the appellant husband with knife. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent wife did not even take minimum care to maintain 3/40 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD).Nos.1118 and 1119 of 2018 children and did not even provide the children with food in time, which caused untold pain and agony to the appellant husband. That apart, on 30.05.2005, the respondent wife dropped their children in the appellant's parent's house and after which, she failed to come forward to maintain her children. 8.It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent wife wantonly took away the second child Rakesh Daniel with the help of her sister and sister's husband at the time of final examination, which resulted in demotion of the second child and...","12.Per contra the learned counsel for the respondent refuting the arguments put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the trial Court has elaborately dealt with both the cases and on the basis of the appropriate oral and documentary evidence had proceeded to dismiss the petition for divorce and allowed the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. In view of the same, he pressed for dismissal of the appeal. 13.It is the specific case of the appellant husband that the respondent wife had deserted him during October 2003 and right from the inception of marriage, the respondent wife never showed any love 7/40 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD).Nos.1118 and 1119 of 2018 and affection towards him. However, it is pertinent to note that the first child Trevor Daniel was born on 29.11.1998 and the second child namely Rakesh Daniel was born on 15.05.2000 and during the pregnancy period, in both the occasions, the respondent wife was living with the appellant husband at Dubai. Hence, it is needless to state that from the year 1997 till 2000, the marriage between the...","3.D.O.P.No.151 of 2012 was filed by the appellant/husband under Section 10(1)(IX)(X) of Indian Marriage Act to dissolve the marriage between the appellant husband and respondent wife. D.O.P.No.84 of 2012 was filed by the respondent wife under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 as amended by Act, 51 of 2001 for Restitution of Conjugal Rights for restitution of conjugal rights of the respondent wife with the appellant husband. 4.The learned trial Court has framed two issues. The petitioner was examined as P.W.1 and one Lingadurai was examined as P.W.2 and 3 documents Ex.P1 to Ex.P3 were marked on the side of the petitioner. The respondent was examined as R.W.1 on the side of the respondent and 14 documents Ex.R1 to Ex.R14 were marked. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence and the arguments put forth by the respective 2/40 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD).Nos.1118 and 1119 of 2018 parties, the learned trial Court allowed D.O.P.No.84 of 2012 filed by the respondent wife seeking restitution of conjugal rights with costs and dismissed D.O.P.No.151 of 2012 filed by the appellant husband seeking relief of divorce. 5.Assailing the said common judgment, the appellant/husband has preferred these Civil Miscellaneous Appeals. 6.Heard Mr.T.Arul, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr.N.Shankar Ganesh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent and perused the entire materials available on...","20.03.2024 NCC : Yes / No Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes Mrn 39/40 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.(MD).Nos.1118 and 1119 of 2018 L.VICTORIA GOWRI, J. Mrn To 1.The District Judge, Nagercoil, Kanyakumari District. 2.The Section Officer, V.R. Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai. C.M.A.(MD)Nos.1118 and 1119 of 2018 20.03.2024 40/40 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/119259366/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty,2024,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,119259366,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/119259366/,15
Karnataka High Court,"Monika Sanctis vs Henry Joseph And Anr. on 17 December, 2002",operly nor was introduced to his parents in a proper,2002-12-17,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001","Section 10, Section 11, Section 13, Section 14, Section 15, Section 16, Section 17, Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 22, Section 34, Section 35, Section 45, Section 5, Section 52, Section 55, Section 56, Section 57, Section 8",Adultery; Cruelty; Nullity Sec19; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,JUDGMENT,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"8. The respondents having remained absent and set ex parte, the Trial Court was only required to look into the petition averments and framed question as to whether the petitioner is entitled for a decree of divorce. 9. The petitioner examined herself and deposed that she has been treated with such cruelty and that the first respondent was living in adultery and also that the first respondent has committed acts of sodomy and perverse sex. 10. The learned Trial Judge though recorded a finding of cruelty as against the husband accepting the pleadings supported by the evidence, nevertheless thought that act of adultery on the part of the first respondent having not been, proved inasmuch as the petitioner had not deposed that she had seen the first and second respondents living in adultery, that a decree of divorce cannot be granted and only granted the relief of judicial separation. 11....",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is an appeal by the wife under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act read with Section 19 of the Family Court Act directed against the order dated 8-3-1999 passed by the II Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, at Bangalore in M.C. No. 117 of 1998 allowing the petition of the wife under Sections 10 and 11 of the Divorce Act partially and granting a decree for judicial separation. 2. The wife being aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court, refusing her the full relief of dissolution of marriage and denying her a decree of divorce has come up in appeal. 3. The first respondent-husband remained absent before the Court below and was set ex parte. The second respondent with whom it was alleged that the first respondent-husband was having an adulterous relationship had also been served but remained absent and has been set ex parte by the Court below. 4. The position is the same in this appeal and the respondents have not contested the proceedings though served. 5. The petition pleadings are that the appellant-wife and first respondent-husband married at Bangalore as per the customary rites of Christian community as on 3-7-1997, that the marriage was an arranged marriage through a friend, one Fr.A. Ignatius of Holy Ghost Church. The first respondent-husband was working at...","14. In the circumstances, we allow this appeal and modify the order passed by the Court below and dissolve the marriage between the appellant-wife and the first respondent which had taken place on 3-7-1997. However, in terms of Section 16 of the Act we pass a decree nisi as of now which can enable the appellant to seek a decree of divorce absolute, after the expiry of minimum period required to be allowed under Section 16 of the Act. We reserve liberty to the appellant to move this Court after the expiry of the minimum period required under Section 10 of the Act. A.M. Farooq and D.V. Shylendra Kumar, JJ. 6th January, 2003 ORDERS ON ""FOR BEING SPOKEN TO"" 6. A new section has been introduced which provides for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent which was not there in the parent Act. In Section 16 of the principal Act the words ""not being a confirmation of a decree of a District Court"", has been omitted by Section 11 . One important change is doing away with the confirmation of...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/447004/ | ILR2004KAR2081, 2003(2)KARLJ588",Adultery,adultery; cruelty; nullity_sec19; desertion,2002,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: ILR2004KAR2081, 2003(2)KARLJ588",447004,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/447004/,10
Madras High Court,"Mary Latha Regini vs Maria James on 9 January, 2026",O.P.No.86 of 2018 passed by the learned Family,2026-01-09,THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.VELMURUGAN,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Family Courts Act, 1984; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 19, Section 55",Cruelty; Desertion; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"5. According to the husband, though the marriage subsisted in form, the appellant-wife never showed compassion, understanding, true love or affection. It is alleged that she persistently humiliated him, both at home and in public, including in the presence of neighbours, strangers and colleagues, by levelling wild accusations of adultery, and sodomy with young children, without any foundation. The husband would allege that these accusations were figments of imagination, for which she refused to correct herself despite his exhortations. 6. The husband further alleged that after the appellant took employment at Vaniyakudi, she gradually withdrew from the matrimonial home and ultimately left in the year 2004 along with her personal belongings and the minor children, ceased to discharge marital obligations, never cooked or cared for him, and refused to return to the matrimonial home, thereby causing mental cruelty and desertion. On these allegations, the husband approached the learned Family Court seeking dissolution of the marriage on the twin grounds of cruelty and desertion. 4/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 12/01/2026 03:20:31 pm ) C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 Case of the Wife before the learned Family Court: 7. The appellant-wife entered contest and filed a detailed counter, stoutly denying the allegations and, in...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"3. The appeal raises, in essence, the recurring question as to when a spouse’s protest, suspicion and complaint regarding the conduct and association of the other spouse crosses the line and becomes “cruelty” in law, and equally, whether such protest, if founded upon some admitted factual substratum, can at all be branded as reckless and unfounded so as to furnish a ground for divorce. Case of the Husband before the learned Family Court: 13. Before the learned Family Court, the husband examined himself as P.W.1 and produced Exs.P1 to P5. The wife examined herself as R.W.1 and produced Exs.R1 to R4. The learned Family Court framed issues, inter alia, as to (i) whether the husband had proved cruelty, (ii) whether he had proved desertion, and (iii) whether he was entitled to a decree of divorce and consequential reliefs. 14. Ultimately, while holding that desertion was not proved, the learned Family...","5. According to the husband, though the marriage subsisted in form, the appellant-wife never showed compassion, understanding, true love or affection. It is alleged that she persistently humiliated him, both at home and in public, including in the presence of neighbours, strangers and colleagues, by levelling wild accusations of adultery, and sodomy with young children, without any foundation. The husband would allege that these accusations were figments of imagination, for which she refused to correct herself despite his exhortations. 6. The husband further alleged that after the appellant took employment at Vaniyakudi, she gradually withdrew from the matrimonial home and ultimately left in the year 2004 along with her personal belongings and the minor children, ceased to discharge marital obligations, never cooked or cared for him, and refused to return to the matrimonial home, thereby causing mental cruelty and desertion. On these allegations, the husband approached the learned Family Court seeking dissolution of the marriage on the twin grounds of cruelty and desertion. 4/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 12/01/2026 03:20:31 pm ) C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 Case of the Wife before...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT Reserved on : 05.11.2025 Pronounced on : 09.01.2026 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.VELMURUGAN and THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE L.VICTORIA GOWRI C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 and CMP(MD)No.5884 of 2021 Mary Latha Regini ... Appellant / Respondent Vs. Maria James ... Respondent / Petitioner PRAYER: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, 1984, to call for the records pertaining to the fair and decreetal order in I.D.O.P.No.86 of 2018 passed by the learned Family Court, Kannyakumari at Nagercoil dated 27.03.2019 and set aside the same. For Appellant : Mr.K.P.Narayana Kumar For Respondent : No appearance 1/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 12/01/2026 03:20:31 pm ) C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 JUDGMENT (Judgment of the Court was made by L.VICTORIA GOWRI, J.) This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, read with Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, to set aside the judgment and decree dated 27.03.2019 made in I.D.O.P. No.86 of 2018 on the file of the learned Family Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil, whereby the marriage between the appellant and the respondent solemnised on 08.05.2003 was dissolved under Section 10(ix)(x) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, on the ground of cruelty. Prologue: 2. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against the judgment...","42. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed. 43. The judgment and decree dated 27.03.2019 passed in I.D.O.P. No.86 of 2018 on the file of the learned Family Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil, in so far as it grants a decree for dissolution of marriage between the appellant and the respondent, are hereby set aside. 47. In fine, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed. [P.V.,J.] [L.V.G.,J.] 09.01.2026 NCC : Yes / No Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes Sml 22/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 12/01/2026 03:20:31 pm ) C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 To The Family Court, Kannyakumari at Nagercoil Copy to The Section Officer, Vernacular Records, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai. 23/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 12/01/2026 03:20:31 pm ) C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 P.VELMURUGAN, J., AND L.VICTORIA GOWRI, J., Sml C.M.A.(MD)No.606 of 2021 .2026 24/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 12/01/2026 03:20:31 pm )",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/49821959/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion; nullity_sec19,2026,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,49821959,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/49821959/,14
Madras High Court,"M.Kumar vs Nil on 5 November, 2025",CRP No.5257 of 2025,2025-11-05,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 28, Section 32B",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"2025:MHC:2594 CRP No.5257 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 05-11-2025 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S. SOUNTHAR CRP No. 5257 of 2025 1. M.Kumar S/o. Manjan, No.40/1, 1st Street, Vijayaragavapuram, Saligramam, Chennai 93. 2.Nancy Basilica D/o. Sebastin, No.78, Rasu Street, Subam Nagar, Old Pallavaram, Petitioner(s) Chennai 117. Vs NIL Respondent(s) PRAYER: Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India to set aside the order dated 24.07.2025 in OP.SR.No. 3223/2025 on the file of the Principal Judge, Family court at Chennai by allowing the Revision and thereby direct the Principal Judge Family court, Chennai to number the OP.SR.No. 3223/2025. For Petitioner(s): Ms. Srividhya aravindan For Ms. G.Charuvasine 1 of 8 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 14/11/2025 02:33:04 pm ) CRP No.5257 of 2025 ORDER",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(1) subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, a petition for dissolution of marriage may be presented to he District Court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of 2 of 8 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 14/11/2025 02:33:04 pm ) CRP No.5257 of 2025 the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 (51 of 2001), on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of 2 years or more, that they have not been able to live together and they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. (2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the pettiion referred to in sub- section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","This civil revision petition is filed, challenging the order passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai, rejecting the petition in OP Sr No.3223 of 2025 filed by the petitioner, seeking divorce under Section 10(A) of the Indian Divorce Act on the ground that the statutory minimum period of 2 years has not been completed on the date of presentation of the O.P. 2. The petitioner/ husband and the respondent/wife filed the above said petition seeking divorce under Section 10(A) of Indian Divorce Act on the ground of mutual consent. The marriage between the parties got solemnized on 13.05.2024 and the petition for divorce on the ground of mutual consent was filed on 11.06.2025. The said petition was rejected by the court below by citing Section 10(A) of Indian Divorce Act “Dissolution of marriage by mutual consent”, which says that the petition shall be filed only after two years of separation. 3. Section 10(A) of Indian Divorce Act reads as follows. 10 A. Dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. 4. The validity of the said section was challenged before the Kerala High Court in Saumya Ann Thomas V. The Union of India reported in 2010 KLT 1869 mainly on the ground that this stipulation offends the right to equality under Article 14 of Constitution of India, as it prescribed...",MST CRP No.5257 of 2025 05-11-2025 8 of 8 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 14/11/2025 02:33:04 pm ),https://indiankanoon.org/doc/22771704/,Unclear,unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,22771704,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/22771704/,7
Law Commission Report,The Indian Divorce Act 1869,opinion that,1869-01-01,"Minister for Law, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 102, Section 14, Section 16, Section 17, Section 18, Section 2, Section 20, Section 22, Section 3, Section 55",Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[pre_1] \CA_' LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FOURTH REPORT ON THE INDIAN DIVORCE ACT (IV OF 1869) NOVEMBER, 1998 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA SHASTRI BHAWAN NEW DELHI - 110 001 TEL.:338447S Refldencez 1,JANPATH NEW DELHI 1 10 011 TEL. I 3019465 JUSHCE B.RJEEVANREDDY ...Cha. .an, Law Covnnussmn 01 India ' 2 DO.N0.6(3)(50)/98-LC(LS) 18.11.1998 Dear Dr.M.Thambi Durai, I am sending herewith 164th report on "" The Indian Divorce Act (IV of 1869)"". 2. The subject was taken up by the Commission suo motu in view of the discriminatory provisions based on sex as appiicabie to the Christians in India, so as to make recommendations for removing anomaiies and ambiguities in the Taw. 3. It may be mentioned that the Law Commission had suggested comprehensive amendments to the Act in the Biii titied ""The Christian Marriage and Matrimoniai Causes Biii, 1960"" submitted aiongwith its 15th report. The Commission had aiso deait with this matter in its 22nd and 90th reports. The Commission is of the considered opinion that the recommendations made by it on the subject be impiemented expeditiousiy in...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (desertion) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","\CA_' LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FOURTH REPORT ON THE INDIAN DIVORCE ACT (IV OF 1869) NOVEMBER, 1998 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA SHASTRI BHAWAN NEW DELHI - 110 001 TEL.:338447S Refldencez 1,JANPATH NEW DELHI 1 10 011 TEL. I 3019465 JUSHCE B.RJEEVANREDDY ...Cha. .an, Law Covnnussmn 01 India ' 2 DO.N0.6(3)(50)/98-LC(LS) 18.11.1998 Dear Dr.M.Thambi Durai, I am sending herewith 164th report on "" The Indian Divorce Act (IV of 1869)"". 2. The subject was taken up by the Commission suo motu in view of the discriminatory provisions based on sex as appiicabie to the Christians in India, so as to make recommendations for removing anomaiies and ambiguities in the Taw. 3. It may be mentioned that the Law Commission had suggested comprehensive amendments to the Act in the Biii titied ""The Christian Marriage and Matrimoniai Causes Biii, 1960"" submitted aiongwith its 15th report. The Commission had aiso deait with this matter in its 22nd and 90th reports. The Commission is of the considered opinion that the recommendations made by it on the subject be impiemented expeditiousiy in the interest of sociai justice to the Christian community in India. with regards, Yours sincereiy, Z} /3 . (B.P.J§EVAN REDDY) Dr.M.Thambi Durai, Hon'b1e Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Shastri Bhawan, New Deihi. \c..,_,,,.u.. .. CHAPTER I CHAPTER II CHAPTER...","So1omon Devasahayam Se1varaj v. Qhghdirah Magi, (1968) 1 M.L.J. 289.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/86162589/,Desertion,desertion,1869,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,,86162589,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/86162589/,3
Law Commission Report,The Ground Of Divorce Amongst Christians In India,opments have taken place both,,"Minister of Law, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 13, Section 19, Section 22, Section 32, Section 320, Section 34, Section 4, Section 5, Section 50, Section 7",Nullity Sec19; Adultery; Cruelty; Desertion; Constitutional Validity; Non Consummation,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[pre_1] LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA NINETIETH REPORT ON THE GROUNDS OF DIVORCE AMONGST CHRISTIANS IN INDIA: SECTION 10 INDIAN DIVORCE ACT 1869 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA : MINISTRY OF L.-\\\' K, K_ MATHEW D.O. No. F. 2(6)/82-I.C. Chairman Law Commission ' Government of India Shastri Bhavan New Delhi--1 l0 001 1'7th May, 1983. My dear Minister, I send herewith the 90th Report of the Law Commission regarding ""Grounds of Divorce amongst Christians in India: Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869"". ' 2. Revisionlof Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, was taken up by the Law Commission suo moto in view of the existing element of discrimination based on sex under the Indian Divorce Act as applicable to the Christians in India. ' 3. In the field of marriage law, extensive developments have taken place both in law and in Society.-It is proper that these developments should""'bc taken note . of and the law brought in tune with the times. 4. The Commission expresses its appreciation to Shri P. M. Bakshi, Part-time Member of the Commission for the...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"that the parties are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity (whether natural or legal) or atlinity; that either. party was a lunatic or idiot at the_ time of the marriage; that the former husband or wife or either party was living at the time of the marriage; and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force."" Nothing in this section shall affect the jurisdiction -of the High Court to make decrees of nullity of. marriage on the ground that the consent of either party was obtained by force or fraud. . - _ We proceed to examine if the section leaves out any important ground_ of nullity that might have been canvassed in the View pressed on the subject, 4.8. In this connection, we may again state that concrete points as to the Annutmnt in deieets, if any, in the ""existing legal approach have been made...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA NINETIETH REPORT ON THE GROUNDS OF DIVORCE AMONGST CHRISTIANS IN INDIA: SECTION 10 INDIAN DIVORCE ACT 1869 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA : MINISTRY OF L.-\\\' K, K_ MATHEW D.O. No. F. 2(6)/82-I.C. Chairman Law Commission ' Government of India Shastri Bhavan New Delhi--1 l0 001 1'7th May, 1983. My dear Minister, I send herewith the 90th Report of the Law Commission regarding ""Grounds of Divorce amongst Christians in India: Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869"". ' 2. Revisionlof Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, was taken up by the Law Commission suo moto in view of the existing element of discrimination based on sex under the Indian Divorce Act as applicable to the Christians in India. ' 3. In the field of marriage law, extensive developments have taken place both in law and in Society.-It is proper that these developments should""'bc taken note . of and the law brought in tune with the times. 4. The Commission expresses its appreciation to Shri P. M. Bakshi, Part-time Member of the Commission for the finalisation of the Report. ' With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd/- (K. K. MATHEW w Shri Jagannath Kaushal, Minister of Law, Justice & 'Company Affairs, Shastri Bhavan, A NEW DELHI. .84-LlB(D)117MofLJ&CA--1 CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 4 CHAPTER 5 CHAPTER...","Canon 1080, Persons who according to the civil law are regarded as incapable of marrying each other because of a legal relationshipiarising from adoption, cannot .v_alidly contract marriagetogether according to canon law. _A ' \ ""sis.r.:iacI>)1t71\f¢or1JaccA--s3o--2§.5.ss-'-airsu :_, -- .",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90496067/,Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; adultery; cruelty; desertion; constitutional_validity; non_consummation,,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,,90496067,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90496067/,10
Kerala High Court,"Mary Sonia Zachariah vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 24 February, 1995",O.P. No. 5805 of 1988 is a Syrian Christian governed b,1995-02-24,"JUDGMENT   T.V. Ramakrishnan, J., Trivandrum, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 112, Section 13, Section 13B, Section 18, Section 2, Section 22, Section 27, Section 28, Section 32, Section 32A, Section 488",Constitutional Validity; Adultery; Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT T.V. Ramakrishnan, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,32. The further question to be considered is if this be the direct and/ inevitable consequence of the law governing dissolution among Christians governed by the Act whether such a provision will be valid in the light of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The constitutional validity of Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (for short ""the Act"") which regulated divorce among Christians in India for a century and a quarter is directly under challenge in the two Original Petitions at the instance of two Christian women on the ground that the provisions in Section 10 are violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed to them and other similarly situated Christian women under Articles 14 , 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 2. Mary Sonia Zachariah, petitioner in O.P. No. 5805 of 1988 is a Syrian Christian governed by the Act. At the time of filing the O.P. she was aged 36 and was working as an Asst. Warden at Corpus Christi School, Kottayam. She was married to one P.C. Zachariah on 6.1.1972 at Emmanual Marthoma Church, Pazhanni, Thrissur according to the customary rites and ceremonies of the Church. A daughter, Elizabeth Zachariah @ Kittu was born out of the said wedlock on 16.9.1974. On the basis of Exts. P. 3 and P. 4 letters the petitioner has specifically pleaded that her husband has taken an irreversible decision to live with an English lady whom he met while in Nairobi where he was employed from 1977 onwards, deserting the petitioner and her child once and for all. Petitioner has specifically...","24. Learned Counsel for the Central Government has however tried to support the constitutionality of the provision relying strongly upon the reasoning contained in Dwarka Bai v. Maiman (AIR 1953 Mad. 792). In that case Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. has held that ""since the husband even by committing adultery does not bear a child as a result of such adultery and make it child of his wife to be maintained by the wife"", the wife by committing adultery ""may bear a child as a result of such adultery and the husband will have to treat it as his legitimate child and will be liable to maintain that child under Section 488 , Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act"", and that ""this very difference in the result of the adultery may form some ground"" of justification for this differentiation."" We think that so long as the difference in the after effect of adultery committed by the husband and wife pointed out by the learned Judge as a justification for differential treatment is a difference solely resulting...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/637104/ | II(1995)DMC27,Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; adultery; desertion; cruelty,1995,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: II(1995)DMC27,637104,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/637104/,24
Gujarat High Court,"S. vs E. on 11 May, 1999",opponent No. 1 filed her written statement. The same,1999-05-11,"JUDGMENT   M.S. Parikh, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 3, Section 497, Section 498A, Section 60",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M.S. Parikh, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"6. Following issues were framed on 3-5-1999: I. Is it proved that the marriage between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 was solemnized at Ahmedabad on 4th November, 1995 as per the custom of the caste and as per the Christian form of marriage as alleged? II. Is it proved that the relations between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 strained in October/November, 1996 and they started living separately as alleged? III. Is it proved that on 2nd November, 1998, the first respondent and the second respondent got married with each other as alleged and that since then, the respondent No. 1 herein has been guilty of adultery ? IV. Is there any other legal impediment in granting prayer for decree of dissolution of marriage between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 as solemnized on 4th November, 1995 by a decree of divorce nisi ? V. What order and decree...","2. When the parties have been called in the chamber for knowing their present status, the opponent No. 1 [*** ***] stated before this Court that she had entered into customary divorce as per divorce deed dated 4-6-1998. The petitioner also stated before this Court that such divorce deed was entered into between the petitioner and the opponent No. 1. Opponent No. 1 [******] has further stated before this Court that she has married opponent No. 2 [*** ***] who is also present before the Court. He also states before this Court that he has married opponent No. 1. Such marriage has been solemnized in the presence of [*** ***] Registrar of Marriage. Both the opponents jointly submit that they do not want to adduce any evidence even after issues are framed. 3. Under the aforesaid circumstances, this Court could not suggest any possibility of reconciliation of the petitioner and the opponent No. 1. 4. There does not appear to be any collusion between the parties. The matter is now kept for framing of issues and recording of evidence of...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 moved by the petitioner-husband against the respondent No. 1 -wife, joining the respondent No. 2 as alleged adulterer. Short facts on the basis of which this petition has been moved may briefly be noted: 2. The marriage of the petitioner and the 1st respondent was solemnized according to the Christian Law on 4-11-1995. There is no child out of the said marriage. The parties could not live together for more than a year and in October/ November 1996 their relations got strained with the result that they were required to live separately from each other. It is the petitioner's case that thereafter on or around 2-11-1998 the respondent No. 1 got married with respondent No. 2 and on account of that occasion, it is further the case of the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 is guilty of adultery. 3. The petitioner has, therefore, prayed for obtaining decree of dissolution of his marriage with the respondent No. 1 solemnized on 4-11-1995. 4. The matter was placed for further proceedings before this Court on 29-4-1999 when the parties were called in the chamber. After communicating with the parties, following order was required to be passed and the same appears at Exh. 8 in the record of this...","5. The written statement of respondent No. 1 appearing at Exh. 8A discloses no other facts except those which have been recorded in the aforesaid order. The only stand of the 1st respondent is that since she got married with the 2nd respondent on account of a divorce deed between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1, it could not be said that she had been living in adultery and hence, no decree for divorce could be passed in favour of the petitioner. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the State Bar Council for taking appropriate steps or action into the matter in respect of the consent divorce deed which the petitioner and respondent No. 1 were advised to enter into.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/143044/ | (1999)2GLR1814,Adultery,adultery,1999,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1999)2GLR1814,143044,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/143044/,13
Gujarat High Court,"Silvance Franklin Baria vs Elizabeth David Hendry on 11 May, 1999",opponent No. 1 filed her written statement. The same,1999-05-11,"JUDGMENT    M.S. Parikh, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 3, Section 497, Section 498A, Section 60",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M.S. Parikh, J. 1. This is a petition u/S. 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 moved by the petitioner - husband against the respondent No. 1 - wife, joining the respondent No. 2 as alleged adulterer. Short facts on the basis of which this petition has been moved may briefly be noted :- 2. The marriage of the petitioner and the 1st respondent was solemnized according to the Christian law on 4/11/1995. There is no child out of the said marriage. The parties could not live together for more than a year and in October/November 1996 their relations got strained with the result that they were required to live separately from each other. It is the petitioner's case that thereafter on or around 2/11/1998 the respondent No. 1 got married with respondent No. 2 and on account of that occasion it is further the case of the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 is guilty of adultery. 3. The petitioner has, therefore,prayed for obtaining decree of dissolution of his marriage with the respondent No. 1 solemnized on 4/11/1995. 4. The matter was placed for further proceedings before this Court on 29/4/1999 when the parties were called in the...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"6. Following issues were framed on 3/5/1999 :- I. Is it proved that the marriage between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 was solemnized at Ahmedabad on 4th November, 1995 as per the custom of the caste and as per the christian Form of Marriage as alleged ? II. Is it proved that the relations between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 strained in October/November, 1996 and they started living separately as alleged ? III. Is it proved that on 2nd November, 1998, the first respondent and the second respondent got married with each other as alleged and that since then, the respondent No. 1 herein has been guilty of adultery ? IV. Is there any other legal impediment in granting prayer for decree of dissolution of marriage between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 as solemnized on 4th November, 1995 by a decree of divorce nisi ? V. What...","2. When the parties have been called in the chamber for knowing their present status, the opponent No. 1 - Elizabeth David Hendry stated before this Court that she had entered into customary divorce as per divorce deed dated 4/6/1998. The petitioner also stated before this Court that such divorce deed was entered into between the petitioner and the opponent No. 1. Opponent No. 1 Elizabeth David Hendry has further stated before this Court that she has married opponent No. 2 - Sanjay Alick Stephen, who is also present before the Court. He also states before this Court that he has married opponent No. 1. Such marriage has been solemnized in the presence of John T. Christian, Registrar of Marriage. Both the opponents jointly submit that they do not want to adduce any evidence even after issues are framed. 3. Under the aforesaid circumstances, this Court could not suggest any possibility of reconciliation of the petitioner and the opponent No. 1. 4. There does not appear to be any collusion between the parties. The matter is now kept for framing...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","9. It is clear that neither the petitioner nor the respondeat No. 1 can be said to be taking advantage of any wrong on the part of the either of the parties. As a matter of fact, they were under a grossly erroneous legal advice from the respective advocates in entering into divorce by mutual consent or customary divorce by mutual consent as per the aforesaid deed of divorce of marriage. They clearly appeared to have been wrongly advised by their learned advocates, who have more particularly not cared even to look at the provisions of the Indian Christian Marriage Act and Indian Divorce Act. In order that appropriate action might be thought of or might be initiated, it would be appropriate to send a copy of this judgment to the State Bar Council. Issue No. IV is answered accordingly in the negative. 10. As stated above, from the evidence which has been placed on record it is clear that the marriage of the petitioner with respondent No. 1 was solemnized according to Christian Form of marriage on 4/11/1995. They started residing separately from around October/November 1996. Then there was an occasion for the 1st respondent to file a complaint u/S. 498A of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner and his mother on or around 7/10/1997. As stated above,...","5. The written statement of respondent No. 1 appearing at Exh. 8A discloses no other facts except those which have been recorded in the aforesaid order. The only stand of the 1st respondent is that since she got married with the 2nd respondent on account of a divorce deed between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1, it could not be said that she had been living in adultery and hence, no decree for divorce could be passed in favour of the petitioner. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the State Bar Council for taking appropriate steps or action into the matter in respect of the consent divorce deed which the petitioner and respondent No. 1 were advised to enter into.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/208893/,Adultery,adultery,1999,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,,208893,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/208893/,11
Karnataka High Court,"Sameer Joseph Francis Saldanha vs Shona Christable D'Sa Prabhu on 11 March, 2014",WRIT PETITION NO.12422 OF 2013 (GM-FC),2014-03-11,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 11, Section 14",Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF MARCH 2014 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER WRIT PETITION NO.12422 OF 2013 (GM-FC) BETWEEN: SAMEER JOSEPH FRANCIS SALDANHA S/O. H.R.T.SALDANHA AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS R/AT NO.804, SYMPHONY APARTMENTS STURROCK ROAD FALNIR MANGALORE .... PETITIONER (BY SRI L. GOVINDRAJ, ADV.) AND: SHONA CHRISTABLE D'SA PRABHU W/O. SAMEER JOSEPH FRANCIS SALDANHA AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS R/AT NO.20, REST HOUSE CRESCENT BANGALORE - 560 001 ... RESPONDENT (BY SRI. R.I.D'SA, ADV., FOR SMT.SUNITHA H SINGH, ADV.) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 12.02.2013 MADE ON I.A.NO.6 IN M.C.NO.3610/2009 BY VI ADDITIONAL PRINCIPAL 2 JUDGE, FAMILY COURT, BANGALORE (ANNEXURE-F) & IN TURN ALLOW THE APPLICATION AND ETC., THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B' GROUP THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ORDER This writ petition is directed against the order in M.C.No.3610/2009 dated 12.02.2013, on the file of the VI Additional Principal Judge, Family Court at Bangalore, whereby the Court below has rejected the application filed by the petitioner seeking amendment of the petition.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"9. Whether, the petitioner is also guilty of adultery or not has to be established by the respondent by leading evidence. Similarly, whether, the adultery complained of, is after desertion or willfully separating himself from the respondent and without reasonable excuses has also to be established by leading evidence. These questions are on the merits of the case. It is settled that merits of the case cannot be gone into, while considering the application for amendment of the pleadings.",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The petitioner filed the above case for dissolution of his marriage with the respondent solemnized on 27.05.2000 under Section 10(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 (for short 'the Act'). He filed the application - I.A.No.6 under Order 6 Rule 17 of Code of Civil Procedure , seeking amendment of the petition. He wanted to 3 introduce additional grounds under Section 10(i) and (ix) of the Act. 3. The application was opposed by the respondent. As noticed above, the Court below has rejected the application. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the petitioner wants to incorporate additional plea available under Section 10(i) and (ix) of the act. These developments have taken place subsequent to the filing of the writ petition. The amendment does not change the nature of the petition for divorce nor the cause of action. No prejudice, whatsoever will be caused to the respondent, if the amendment application is allowed. 5. On the other hand, learned advocate appearing for the respondent submits that in order to 4 plead commission of adultery as a ground under Section 10(i) of the act, the petitioner has to make the alleged adulterer as a co-respondent unless the petitioner is excused from doing so. The petitioner has not made an application seeking exemption from impleading the adulterer as a party....","10. I am of the view that the Court below is not right in rejecting the application. Therefore, the order of the Court below on IA.No.6 dated 12.02.2013 in M.C.No.3610/2009 is hereby quashed. The application I.A.No.6 is allowed. The petitioner is permitted to amend the petition in M.C.No.3610/2009 within two 8 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. SD/- JUDGE HJ*",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/47827097/,Adultery,adultery; desertion,2014,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,47827097,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/47827097/,4
Madras High Court,"Varadharajan John D. Britto vs Saraswathi And Moni on 15 November, 2007",O.P. No. 2 of 1999.,2007-11-15,"JUDGMENT   P.P.S. Janarthana Raja, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT P.P.S. Janarthana Raja, J. 1. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed against the Fair and Decreetal Order of the Principal District Court at Perambalur dated 15.12.1999 in I.D.O.P. No. 2 of 1999. 2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:","4. Learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent has submitted that the Lower Court had considered all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case and came to the correct conclusion and that therefore, the order passed by the Lower Court is in accordance with law. 5. Heard the counsel. On the side of the appellant, witnesses P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 were examined. P.W. 1 is the appellant himself. P.W. 2 is one Arockiaswamy, who is the common friend of both the appellant and the first respondent. On the side of the first respondent, witness R.W. 1 was examined, who is the first respondent herself. No documents were adduced on both the sides.","Whether the appellant is entitled to divorce on the ground of adultery or not? 10. Grounds for dissolution of marriage.-(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent-",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"4. Learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent has submitted that the Lower Court had considered all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case and came to the correct conclusion and that therefore, the order passed by the Lower Court is in accordance with law. 5. Heard the counsel. On the side of the appellant, witnesses P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 were examined. P.W. 1 is the appellant himself. P.W. 2 is one Arockiaswamy, who is the common friend of both the appellant and the first respondent. On the side of the first respondent, witness R.W. 1 was examined, who is the first respondent herself. No documents were adduced on both the sides.","The marriage between the appellant and the first respondent was solemnised on 23.05.1973 at St. Joseph Church, Narkunam, Perambalur Taluk, Tiruchirapalli District according to the rules, rites, ceremonies and custom of the Roman Catholic Church. The marriage was an arranged one. They have three children. At the time of marriage, the appellant was employed as a Teacher at Little Flower Middle School at Nakalathur, Thanjavur Taluk, Thanjavur District. The appellant is now employed as a Teacher at St. Mary's School, Ariyalur, Tiruchirapalli District. The first two children are under the care and custody of the appellant and the third child is under the custody of the first respondent. Later, the appellant made allegations against the first respondent that the first respondent has been living in adultery with the second respondent for the past two years and also the first respondent lost her love for the children. Hence the appellant filed a petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act (""Act"" in short) on the ground of adultery. The said petition was filed before the District Court at Tiruchirapalli in Matrimonial O.P. No. 15 of 1992. The first respondent denied all the allegations and resisted the claim. On the pleadings, the following issue was framed: The District Court, after hearing the oral and documentary evidence, held that the appellant has...","7. In view of the foregoing reasons, I find no error or illegality in the order of the Lower Court so as to warrant interference. Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. No costs.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1313746/,Adultery,adultery,2007,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,1313746,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1313746/,9
Law Commission Report,Law Relating To Marriage And Divorce Amongst Christians In India,op priority basis. A draft of the,,"The Commission desires to express its appreciation of the services rendered by Shri D. Basu, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 1, Section 10, Section 11, Section 118, Section 12, Section 13, Section 14, Section 140, Section 15, Section 16, Section 17, Section 17A, Section 18, Section 19, Section 193, Section 199, Section 2, Section 20, Section 21, Section 22, Section 23, Section 24, Section 25, Section 26, Section 27, Section 28, Section 29, Section 2D, Section 3, Section 30, Section 31, Section 32, Section 33, Section 34, Section 35, Section 36, Section 37, Section 38, Section 39, Section 4, Section 40, Section 41, Section 42, Section 43, Section 44, Section 45, Section 46, Section 47, Section 48, Section 49, Section 495, Section 4O, Section 5, Section 50, Section 51, Section 52, Section 53, Section 54, Section 55, Section 56, Section 57, Section 58, Section 59, Section 5O, Section 6, Section 60, Section 61, Section 62, Section 63, Section 66, Section 67, Section 69, Section 7, Section 70, Section 71, Section 73, Section 74, Section 75, Section 76, Section 79, Section 8, Section 80, Section 81, Section 83, Section 831, Section 84, Section 86, Section 88, Section 9",Nullity Sec19; Desertion; Adultery; Cruelty; Conversion; Non Consummation; Venereal Disease; Leprosy,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"the full by the authorities; and it is submitted that it ' consistent with sound principle, because a person's fiatus is, as a general rule, determined by the law of his domicile, questions of status cannot be affected by ' e intention of the parties, and a person's capacity Eldmarry is a matter of public concern to the country if his domicile."" Schmitthofi"" thinks that the decision, however, could be sustained on other grounds than those on which it was decided and he also points out that the decision of Willmer J. in Chapelle v. Chap-elle° indicates clearly that the alleged exception does not exist. In that case, it may be stated, the marriage was celebrated in England while the husband was domiciled in Malta where the wife went after the- marriage and where she lived with him for about ten (1379) 5 PI). 94- 31:1908) P. 46. 'Dicey on Private Intcmaiionll Law, 7th ed. pp. 250-51. '($77) PD. 1, 6-7. 'Clive M. Schmitthofl, The English Conflict of Lawn, 3rd ed, p. 3.52- |(195o) P. 134. . an anomalous exception to the negative- years; the marriage was valid by English law but void by the law of Malta. Willmer J....",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(i) whether the Church is properly organised; {till wheilicr the Church is 1*egistei'ed under any law for the time being in force relatlnr' to the regis- tration of societies in general or religious societies in ioarticular; {iii} whether the Church has well--established rules for the sole:-nnization of marriages; ii-o} whether the Church has proper places oi worship; (1)) whether, according to the rules of the Church, clergj,-'men are ordinarily ordained to solemnize marriages; {oi} whether the strength or standing of the Church is such as to justify recognition being accord- ed thereto. (3) The State Government, after taking into considera- tion the recommendations made by the Committee under this section, may by notification in the Oillcial Gazette declare any Church to be a recognised Church for the purposes of this Act, and any such notification may also dectare a group of Churches belonging to any organisation or denomination to be...","the full by the authorities; and it is submitted that it ' consistent with sound principle, because a person's fiatus is, as a general rule, determined by the law of his domicile, questions of status cannot be affected by ' e intention of the parties, and a person's capacity Eldmarry is a matter of public concern to the country if his domicile."" Schmitthofi"" thinks that the decision, however, could be sustained on other grounds than those on which it was decided and he also points out that the decision of Willmer J. in Chapelle v. Chap-elle° indicates clearly that the alleged exception does not exist. In that case, it may be stated, the marriage was celebrated in England while the husband was domiciled in Malta where the wife went after the- marriage and where she lived with him for about ten (1379) 5 PI). 94- 31:1908) P. 46. 'Dicey on Private Intcmaiionll Law, 7th ed. pp. 250-51. '($77) PD. 1, 6-7. 'Clive M. Schmitthofl, The English Conflict of Lawn, 3rd ed, p. 3.52- |(195o) P. 134. . an anomalous exception...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","_.,,,_'J_'*_ 35 whenever there is a decree for divorce or nullity of mar- riage. For the reasons already given, we are unable to agree with this view. It may be mentioned here 'that no such provision has been enacted either in the Special Mar- riage Act, 1954, or in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 . Qur proposal to omit section 39 will bring the law in line with those two statutes. 69. We shall now deal tvith questions relating to Iufigdicfion. jurisdiction and procedure under the proposed Act._ The provisions of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 , relating to jurisdiction fall under two categories: (1) Section 2 pres- cribes the conditions on which the court could pass decrees under the Act, such as for dissolution of marriage, for nullity and so forth. (2) The Act further specifies in the several sections relating to the different kinds of action, the courts in which they could be instituted. These two categories have reference to two distinct aspects of juris- diction. The former views the question from the stand- point of private international law, the latter from that of municipal law. Dealing first with the former, a Sovereign State can enact laws providing for the conditions on which its courts could grant relief by Way of decree for divorce or nullity of marriage,...","LD. 92 XV 3000 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA F IF TEENTH REPORT (LAW RELATING TO MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AMONGST GHRISTIANS IN INDIA) GOV-'ERI\'IVIEI\'T OI' INDIA 1 MINISTRY OF LAW I'R1I\iTED IN INDIA BY Tl-IF, (EIZNFILAL I»'I.-RNAGER. GOVI'. OF INDIA PRESS, ,""~II'*.'\.-'If ])El.I-II AND PLIBLISIIFD BY THE i\-IANAGFR 0}' PUBLICATIONS. DELHI 196i] CHAIRMAN LAW COMMISSION. New Delhi--3. August 19, 1960. Shri Asoke Kumar Sen, Minister of Law, New Delhi. MY DEAR Mrnrsrsaj I have great pleasure in forwarding herewith the Fifteenth Report of the Law Commission on the lawv relating to Marriage and Divorce among Christians in India. 2. This subject was referred by the Law lllinistrjv to the previous Law Commission, and was taken up '.)};..»' the present Law Commission on a top priority basis. A draft of the proposed legislation was prepared by me, and was revised by the Commission in its meetings held on the 2 3rd and the 24th April, and the 4th May, 1959. The revised draft was circulated for opinion, and as a number of persons and associations desired to make oral representations on the...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/26391119/,Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; desertion; adultery; cruelty; conversion; non_consummation; venereal_disease; leprosy,,nullity,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,,26391119,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/26391119/,63
Kerala High Court,"Mary Soniz Zachariah vs Union Of India (Uoi) on 13 December, 1989",opted the provisions of the English Matrimonial law,1989-12-13,"JUDGMENT   Thomas, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Special Marriage Act, 1954",Section 10,Constitutional Validity,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Thomas, J. 1. A primitive statute which still lingers in the law book is being attacked by a woman who is one of the victims struggling to squirm out of the legal tentacles of broken marriage alliance. The statute under attack is the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 passed by the British Parliament more than a century and two decades ago as the law to govern the marriages of Christians in India. The British Parliament in enacting the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act practically adopted the provisions of the English Matrimonial law, as they stood in 1869. The British Parliament did not make any improvement in the Indian Divorce Act until the British left India, even though they made substantial improvements in the mother statute, namely, the English Matrimonial Causes Act. After independence, the Indian Parliament brought about radical changes in the marriage law applicable to Hindus, Parsis and even to foreigners living in India by incorporating progressive and realistic grounds for divorce in such enactments. But either for no reason or for reasons which are not easy to comprehend, the law of marriage applicable to Christians remains unrealistic and antiquated. 2. One of the reasons advanced for not...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (constitutional validity) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. Different High Courts have, on different occasions, strongly expressed in favour of legislative reforms in the Indian Divorce Act . Ananthanarayanna, C.J. speaking for the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Bashiam v. Victor , AIR 1970 Madras 12 stated thus : ""Before parting with the case, we may observe that the provisions of Act 4 of 1869 appear to be highly antiquated, and that they have not kept pace with the provisions of similar enactments relating to marriage in other communities, which are of a far more progressive character It is only under this Act 4 of 1869 that the law remains where it was, when this enactment was born, so that parties governed by this law are under the grave disadvantage that, even if a husband deserts his wife for a considerable period, that will be no ground for divorce; in our view, it is a genuine hardship, and there is urgent need for re-examination of the provisions of Act 4 of 1869, as the Act governs a large body of persons in this country to see that its provisions are rendered humane and up-to-date"". A Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has, in emphatic terms, recommended for updating the statute. ( Vide Neena v. John , AIR 1985 M.P. 85). A Full...","4. Without establishing adultery of the other spouse a decree for divorce is unthinkable under the Indian Divorce Act . Those spouses who found their matrimonial lives irretrievably broken down remain helpless in view of the unrealistic and unhelpful provisions of the Indian Divorce Act . (A decree declaring the marriage null and void can be passed if it is established that opposite party was insane at the time of marriage). Thus, unless one of the spouses was insane, or one of them is guilty of adultery, Indian Divorce Act will not help a spouse to get out of the marriage alliance. As the legislature did not help them till how, some of them invented devices to wriggle out the imbroglio. One device is to undergo a marriage again under the Special Marriage Act and then apply for a decree for divorce under that law. Some other spouses, in order to surmount the difficulty, collide between each other, so that one of them would make false allegations of adultery against the other and the latter would remain ex parte. Some...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1298038/ | II(1990)DMC119,Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity,1989,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: II(1990)DMC119,1298038,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1298038/,7
Madras High Court,"G. Packia Raj vs P. Subbammal Alias Susila Bai on 9 November, 1990",oped illicit intimacy with other men during the time,1990-11-09,"ORDER    Abdul Hadi, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 17, Section 2, Section 4, Section 5, Section 7, Section 7A",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Abdul Hadi, J. 1. The judgment dated 9-3-1988 in O.S. No. 79 of 1987 on the flic of the District Judge, Kanyakumari dissolving the marriage of the plaintiff/husband with the 1st defendant/ wife under S. 10 of the Indian Divorce Act (IV of 1869) hereinafter referred to an 'the Act"") on the ground that the 1st defendant has been guilty of adultery is placed before us for confirmation under S. 17 of the Act. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff, a Christian, married in 1975 the 1st defendant who was a Hindu then, according to ""seerthirutha"" form of marriage and also brought forth a child. The further case is that the 1st defendant developed illicit intimacy with other men during the time when the plaintiff used to go for his daily work, that on 16-5-1987 when the plaintiff returned home from the place of work unusually earlier, he found the 1st defendant ""keeping bed"" with the 2nd defendant, that he reprimanded her for her immoral act, that she then left the house and that subsequently she also refused to receive a notice sent by plaintiff on 10-6-1987. 3. The Ist defendant, in her written statement,...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""Nevertheless, the proviso does show that in a case to which it applies, relief can be had under the Indian Divorce Act in respect of any kind of marriage, whether monogamous or not"". (Underlining is ours ) The said decision also observed as follows (Paras 15 and 16): However, the whole position has been radically altered by the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, which, by S. 2(a) , applies to Arya Samajist. A Hindu Marriage has now been rendered monogamous by that Act, as S. 5 makes it a condition that 'neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage'. The bar to relief emanting from English law by virtue of S. 7 of the Indian Divorce Act no longer operates. Relief can now be had under that Act in respect of a Hindu Marriage provided, of course, one of the parties professess the Christian religion when the...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","6. Even before us, the 1st defendant is not represented by counsel. Jn fact that all the three parties in this case are represented by different Amicus Curiae only. The plaintiff is represented by Mr. D. Rajagopal. The learned counsel Mr. Sundarasan and Mr. S. Natarajan, appearing respectively for defendants 1 and 2, raise a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the above suit under S. 10 of the Act on the ground that the marriage between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant having been not celebrated in accordance with the Indian Christian Marriage Act (XV of 1872), the Indian Divorce Act is not applicable at all. They draw our attention to Section 4 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act. No doubt, the said S. 4 says ""every marriage between persons, one or both of whom are a Christian or Christians, shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of the next following section; and any such marriage solemhized otherwise than in accordance with such provisions shall be void. In the present case, admittedly the marriage between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant was celebrated according to seerthirutha form of marriage and not in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Christian Marriage Act . Further, both the learned counsel contend that though the plaintiff may be a Christian, the...","""Nowhere in the Act is it required that the marriage, in respect of which relief is sought, should have been solemnised in any particular form. It is sufficient that one of the parties is a Christian when the petition is filed: see Sasivarnamv. Gnanasundari Kamalam, (SB); Nina Dalai v. Merwanji Pherozshaw Dalai , AIR 1930 Bom 385 (FB) and Mrs. Chandramani Oubey v. Rama Shankar Dubey, . Consequently, it was held in Gobrdhan Das v. Jasa Damoni Dassi , (1891) ILR 18 Cal 252, that a marriage between Hindus, who afterwards became converts to Christianity, could be dissolved under the Indian Divorce Act as the petitioner was a Christian at the time of presenting the petition. That case expressly rules that a decree of dissolution may be passed under that Act though the marriage ""was not performed according to Christian rites"". Since; here the petitioner has unequivocally alleged in her petition that she 'professes the Christian religion' this requirement of the Act is fulfilled"". The said decision also pointed out the proviso to S. 7 of the Indian Divorce Act....","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/982655/ | AIR1991MAD319, (1991)IMLJ271, AIR 1991 MADRAS 319, (1991) 1 MADLJ271, (1991) 2 HINDULR 4, (1992) MARRILJ 49, (1991) 2 CIVLJ 365",Adultery,adultery,1990,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1991MAD319, (1991)IMLJ271, AIR 1991 MADRAS 319, (1991) 1 MADLJ271, (1991) 2 HINDULR 4, (1992) MARRILJ 49, (1991) 2 CIVLJ 365",982655,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/982655/,5
Madras High Court,"Dr.Rajiv Verghese vs Rosy Chakkrammakkil Francis on 1 December, 2022",O.P.No.1284 of 2019,2022-12-01,THE HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE V.M.VELUMANI,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 19, Section 24, Section 25, Section 28, Section 36, Section 397, Section 55, Section 96",Nullity Sec19; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[pre_1] C.M.A.No.1539 of 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 01.12.2022 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE V.M.VELUMANI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE SUNDER MOHAN C.M.A.No.1539 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.11428 of 2022 Dr.Rajiv Verghese ... Appellant Vs. Rosy Chakkrammakkil Francis ... Respondent PRAYER: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 r/w. Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869, against the order dated 14.06.2022 passed by the learned VII Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai in I.A.No.1 of 2019 in I.D.O.P No.1284 of 2019. For Appellant : Mr.B.Vijay for Mr.S.Namasivayam 1 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.No.1539 of 2022 For Respondent : Mr.Rahul Jagannathan JUDGMENT [p_1] [Judgment of the Court was made by SUNDER MOHAN, J.] The appellant/husband aggrieved by the order passed by the learned VII Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai in I.A.No.1 of 2019 in I.D.O.P.No.1284 of 2019, directing him to pay maintenance of Rs.1,75,000/- per month to the wife, the respondent herein, has preferred the present appeal. [p_3] 2. Heard Mr.B.Vijay, learned","11. The learned counsel for the respondent took us through the 17 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.No.1539 of 2022 contents of the exhibits marked by the respondent before the Family Court, Chennai. Ex.P2 is an agreement entered into between the appellant and an Hospital in Kerala wherein the hospital agreed to pay a monthly salary of Rs.1,25,000/- to the appellant. Further, the agreement provided for 70% share to the appellant in the profit of the hospital. That apart, the lease agreement entered between the appellant and his mother on one hand and Mr.Jijo George, the lesseee on the other hand dated 01.06.2018 (Ex.P.3) would show that the appellant along with his mother was getting a monthly rent of Rs.2,73,301/-. The respondent further took us through Ex.P4, an agreement of sale entered into between the appellant and his mother on one side and M/s.Abad Builders Private Limited, wherein it is stated that the builder would pay the appellant and his mother the sale consideration in monthly installment of Rs.20 lakhs. The learned counsel further submitted that the Family Court, Chennai therefore had taken into consideration all these facts and rightly concluded that the respondent is entitled to Rs.1,75,000/- as interim maintenance. 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.No.1539...",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (nullity sec19) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"11. The learned counsel for the respondent took us through the 17 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.No.1539 of 2022 contents of the exhibits marked by the respondent before the Family Court, Chennai. Ex.P2 is an agreement entered into between the appellant and an Hospital in Kerala wherein the hospital agreed to pay a monthly salary of Rs.1,25,000/- to the appellant. Further, the agreement provided for 70% share to the appellant in the profit of the hospital. That apart, the lease agreement entered between the appellant and his mother on one hand and Mr.Jijo George, the lesseee on the other hand dated 01.06.2018 (Ex.P.3) would show that the appellant along with his mother was getting a monthly rent of Rs.2,73,301/-. The respondent further took us through Ex.P4, an agreement of sale entered into between the appellant and his mother on one side and M/s.Abad Builders Private Limited, wherein it is stated that the builder would pay the appellant and his mother the sale consideration in monthly installment of Rs.20 lakhs. The learned counsel further submitted that the Family Court, Chennai therefore had taken into...","C.M.A.No.1539 of 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 01.12.2022 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE V.M.VELUMANI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE SUNDER MOHAN C.M.A.No.1539 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.11428 of 2022 Dr.Rajiv Verghese ... Appellant Vs. Rosy Chakkrammakkil Francis ... Respondent PRAYER: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 r/w. Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869, against the order dated 14.06.2022 passed by the learned VII Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai in I.A.No.1 of 2019 in I.D.O.P No.1284 of 2019. For Appellant : Mr.B.Vijay for Mr.S.Namasivayam 1 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.No.1539 of 2022 For Respondent : Mr.Rahul Jagannathan JUDGMENT [Judgment of the Court was made by SUNDER MOHAN, J.] The appellant/husband aggrieved by the order passed by the learned VII Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai in I.A.No.1 of 2019 in I.D.O.P.No.1284 of 2019, directing him to pay maintenance of Rs.1,75,000/- per month to the wife, the respondent herein, has preferred the present appeal. 2. Heard Mr.B.Vijay, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/husband and Mr.Rahul Jagannathan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/wife. 3. The brief facts of the case is as follows: a)The appellant had filed a petition for divorce in I.D.O.P.No.1284 of 2019 under Section 10(i) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 stating that the marriage between him and...",rgr/kj C.M.A.No.1539 of 2022 22.12.2022 26 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55261276/,Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; cruelty,2022,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,55261276,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55261276/,7
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana),"Meesarapu Mary Ratnam vs Measarapu Babu Rao on 10 December, 1984",oper appreciation of the problem posing for resoluti,1984-12-10,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 14, Section 17, Section 2, Section 50, Section 55, Section 7",Desertion; Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT P. Chennakesav Reddy, Actg. C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. In this case which comes up before us on a reference by the District Judge under S. 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (Act IV of 1869), hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', a question of considerable importance and frequent occurrence arises. The question is whether fresh notice of hearing should be effected on the party to be affected before a decree for dissolution of marriage under S.17 of the Act by the High Court. 2. For the full and proper appreciation of the problem posing for resolution, the facts may be made plain at the outset. The wife, Meesarapu Mary Ratnam presented a petition before the District Judge, West Godavari at Elura, for dissolution of the marriage with her husband Meesarapu Baburao under S.10 of the Act on grounds of adultery coupled with cruelty and desertion. The respondent husband on service of notice of the petition appeared...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration is whether fresh service of notice of the proceedings under S.17 of the Act should be affected party who had remained ex parte in the original proceedings before the District Judge under S. 10 of the Act Before The High Court confirms the decree for divorce. 4. Having regard to the importance of the question we appointed Sri J. V. Suryanarayana Rao, Advocate as amicus curiae. He presented the entire case before us with ability and clarity. 5. To answer the question, a survey or scrutiny of the relevant provisions of the Act would be useful. The Act is one of the oldest Acts which provides inter alia for dissolution of a marriage when one of the parties to the marriage is a Christian ( Section 2 of the Act). Section 7 of the Act provides that the Court shall act and give relief on principles laid down by the English divorce courts. This was so stated obviously because divorce was not known to the general Hindu Law at that time, the reason being that a marriage from the Hindu point of view was considered to be indissoluble. Neither party who is a Hindu could divorce the other unless divorce was allowed by custom till the Hindu Marriage Act was enacted in...",The reference is ordered accordingly. No costs. 20. Reference answered accordingly.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/563709/ | AIR1985AP340, AIR 1985 ANDHRA PRADESH 340, 1985 MATLR 153, (1984) 2 ANDHLT 418, (1985) 1 HINDULR 123, (1985) 1 APLJ 1, (1985) 1 CURCC 637",Desertion,desertion; adultery; cruelty,1984,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1985AP340, AIR 1985 ANDHRA PRADESH 340, 1985 MATLR 153, (1984) 2 ANDHLT 418, (1985) 1 HINDULR 123, (1985) 1 APLJ 1, (1985) 1 CURCC 637",563709,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/563709/,6
Delhi High Court,"Usborn Lewis vs Phylis Jordan on 23 May, 1985",F.A.O. 155/82 in this court.,1985-05-23,"JUDGMENT   Sunanda Bhandare, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 13, Section 14, Section 16, Section 17, Section 55, Section 56, Section 8",Adultery; Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Sunanda Bhandare, J. (1) This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the Judgment of the Single Judge dated 12. 8. 85 whereby the Single Judge remanded the case back to the Adj for a fresh decision and refused to exercise power u/s 8 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 as (the'Act') and also without disposing of the main appeal on merits. (2) The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass. The appellant and respondent 1 being Christians were married according to Roman Catholic rites at St. Thomas Church, Calcutta on 26.11.49. A female child was born out of this wed-lock on25.l2.56. Since the appellant got a job at Delhi, the Appellant Along with respondent 1 shifted to Delhi in 1967. However, sometimes in 1974 respondent 1 returned to Calcutta and refused to come back to Delhi. The appellant persuaded her to come back but without any success. The appellant, therefore, filed a petition for judicial separation in the court of Adj, Delhi in 1979. Though notice was sent to respondent 1 she did not appear and therefore, the Adj on 1. 2 80 granted an ex-parte decree for Judicial separation. (3) On 15. 10. 80 a...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,"(5) A separate application was filed by the appellant being C.M. No. 492 of 1985 praying that the High Court should exercise its power u/s 8 of the Act and dispose of the main petition on merits instead of remitting it back to the Adj for deciding it afresh. This prayer of the appellant also did not find favor with Single Judge and by a separate order dated 14. 2. 85 Single Judge refused to exercise jurisdiction u/s 8 of the Act. The appellant has filed this L.P.A. only against the order of remand made by Single Judge in F. A. O. 155/82 (6) It was contended by the counsel for the appellant that once the Single Judge had held that the judgment and order of Adj was patently illegal and absurd, the Single Judge ought to have allowed the appeal on merits and not remanded the case back for a fresh decision. It was contended that the Single Judge failed to appreciate that since the case had proceeded ex-parte all the evidence that could be available to the appellant...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.",(8) It may be necessary to analyze the scheme of the Act in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court while deciding an appeal filed against the order of the District Judge refusing to pass a decree for dissolution of marriage. Section 8 of the Act empowers the High Court to remove and try and determine as a Court of original jurisdiction any suit or proceedings under the Act in the Court of any District Judge within the limits of its jurisdiction under the Act. Section 10 provides that any husband or wife may present a petition to the District Judge or to the High Court praying that his/her marriage may be dissolved on the ground specified in the said section. S. 13 empowers the District Judge to dismiss the petition in case he is satisfied that the petitioner's case has not been proved. Section 13 further provides that the petitioner may even after the dismissal of the petition by the District Judge present a similar petition to the High Court. Section 14 confers the power on the Court meaning either the District Court or the High Court to pronounce a decree declaring such marriage to be dissolved in the manner and subject to all the provisions and limitations in S. 16 and 17 of the Act. Under...,"(7) It may be useful to re-produce the observations made by the learned Single Judge of this Court while remitting the case back to the Adj for a fresh decision : ""The learned Judge had described this petition as a petition u/s 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act for the decree of judicial separation. The learned Judge held that grounds of cruelty and adultery mentioned in the petition and in the evidence were not substantiated by necessary particulars. The learned Judge, on these findings, refused to grant decree of judicial separation to be sustained. The impugned judgment to say the least is ab initio illegal and void. It is beyond the imagination how the learned Judge did not even read the petition for dissolution before passing the impugned order. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, substantiated that these are only clerical mistakes which I should correct in my appellate power u/s 8 of the Indian Divorce Act, exercise my extraordinary power mentioned in S. 8 are not meant for such situation where the illegality amounts to the absurdity of...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1552703/ | AIR1986DELHI72, 1986RLR175",Adultery,adultery; cruelty; desertion,1985,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1986DELHI72, 1986RLR175",1552703,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1552703/,7
Bombay High Court,"Lavina Martin vs Sam Bosco Martin on 5 May, 2017",op working in shifts and instead work during regular,2017-05-05,A.S. OKA,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Cruelty; Desertion; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Megha fca_183_2008.doc IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.183 OF 2008 WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO.192 OF 2009 IN FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.183 OF 2008 Mrs. Lavina Martin ...Appellant Versus Mr. Sam Bosco Martin ...Respondent ..... Shri A.N. Mulla for the Appellant. None for the Respondent. CORAM : A.S. OKA & SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, JJ. JUDGMENT RESERVED ON: 1st MARCH, 2017 JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 5th MAY, 2017 Judgment (Per Smt. Anuja Prabhudessai, J.):-",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"27. The aforesaid evidence reveals that in the month of April- 1992 the Appellant-wife had gone to Kenya for about 15 days to see her brother. The mere fact that the Appellant-wife had visited her brother at Kenya with or without consent of the Respondent - husband, or that upon her return she had started residing at her parental house would not per say amount to desertion or final separation as alleged by the Respondent-husband. The moot question is whether the Appellant-wife had no intention of resuming cohabitation. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the evidence of Appellant-wife indicates that she had made attempts to join matrimonial house and that the Respondent-husband had not allowed her to resume cohabitation. The contention of the Appellant-wife is fortified by the fact that the Respondent-husband had issued a legal notice immediately after her return from Kenya. In the said legal...","11. Mr. Mulla, the learned counsel for the Appellant-wife has assailed the judgment on the following grounds. a) The learned Judge has blindly accepted the allegations levelled against the Appellant-wife and discarded the case of the Appellant-wife without any cogent reason. b) The inference drawn by the learned Judge on the basis of the writing at Exhibit-16 that the Appellant-wife was avoiding physical relations with the Respondent-husband is totally erroneous. c) The learned Judge has failed to consider that the marriage was consummated and a child was born in the wedlock. Therefore, the finding that the Appellant-wife was frigid and psychologically impotent are totally contrary to the evidence on record. d) The learned Judge erred in holding that the Appellant- wife had subjected the Respondent-husband to cruelty. e) The learned Judge discarded the evidence of the Appellant-wife that she was forced to leave the matrimonial-home and that the efforts to resume co- Megha 6/21 ::: Uploaded on - 05/05/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 07/05/2017 00:56:16 ::: Megha fca_183_2008.doc habitation were frustrated by the Respondent-husband. f) The findings on cruelty and...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The Appellant wife has by this application challenged the judgment and decree dated 17th July, 2008 whereby the 7th Family Court, Mumbai allowed the Petition under section 10(x) and 10(ix) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 filed by the Respondent-husband and dissolved the marriage solemnised between them. 2. The brief facts necessary to decide this Appeal are as under: The marriage between the Appellant-wife and the Megha 1/21 ::: Uploaded on - 05/05/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 07/05/2017 00:56:16 ::: Megha fca_183_2008.doc Respondent-husband was solemnised on 2.1.1988 at St. Joseph Church, Umarkhadi, Mumbai as per Christian Rules and rituals. On 19.6.1989, a son was born in the wedlock. On 12 th October, 2006 the Respondent -husband filed a petition under section 10(x) and 10(ix) of the Divorce Act, 1869 for a decree of divorce. 3. The Respondent-husband claimed that the Appellant-wife had agreed to stop working in shifts and instead work during regular office hours. However, after marriage she refused to alter her work schedule. The Respondent-husband claimed that the Petitioner-wife was frigid and psychologically impotent. The Respondent-husband further claimed that the Appellant-wife had given in writing that she did not have any objections if he had affair with or marries any other girl and that she displayed total lack of interest and indifference towards him. 4. The Respondent-husband further...","31. Under the circumstances and in view of discussion (supra) the Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 17 th July, 2008 is hereby quashed and set aside. The Application No.192 of 2009 stands dismissed as not maintainable. (ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.) (A.S. OKA, J.) Megha 21/21 ::: Uploaded on - 05/05/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 07/05/2017 00:56:17 :::",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3294126/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion; nullity_sec19,2017,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,3294126,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3294126/,8
Kerala High Court,"Thresiamma.P.J vs Bijo Abraham Varkey on 3 November, 2008",OP.No. 22537 of 1998(G),2008-11-03,"Justice M.N.KRISHNAN  Dated, O R D E R  M.N. KRISHNAN, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 1, Section 10, Section 16",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM OP.No. 22537 of 1998(G) 1. THRESIAMMA.P.J. ... Petitioner Vs 1. BIJO ABRAHAM VARKEY ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.BIJU ABRAHAM For Respondent : No Appearance The Hon'ble MR. Justice M.N.KRISHNAN Dated :03/11/2008 O R D E R M.N. KRISHNAN, J. = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = O.P.NO. 22537 OF 1998 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = Dated this the 3rd day of November, 2008. J U D G M E N T This writ petition is filed u/s 10 of the Divorce Act for dissolution of marriage. It is a petition filed by the wife against the husband alleging cruelty. A brief reference to the writ petition would reveal that the unfortunate couples got married on 16.12.97 and immediately after three days the husband left for his place of work in gulf countries. The wife would allege that even for obtaining consent it was misrepresented that he is a graduate in science with diploma in polytechnic and thereafter it was revealed that he is only a S.S.L.C. with ITC and he did not have a...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Therefore the O.P. is allowed and dissolution of marriage under clause (x) of sub- section 1 of Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869 is granted and a decree Nisi is issued for dissolution of marriage u/s 16 of the Divorce Act. M.N. KRISHNAN, JUDGE. ul/- O.P. 22537 of 1998 -4- M.N. KRISHNAN, J.","= = = = = = = = = = O.P. No. 22537 OF 1998 = = = = = = = = = = = J U D G M E N T 3rd November, 2008.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1258284/,Unclear,unclear,2008,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,1258284,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1258284/,3
Bombay High Court,"Nina Dalal vs Merwanji Pheeozshaw Dalal on 11 April, 1930",(1930)32BOMLR1046,1930-04-11,"Kt., C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 1, Section 10, Section 18, Section 2, Section 22, Section 32, Section 33, Section 4, Section 6, Section 7",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"28. The trial Court in deciding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition followed with some reluctance the decision of this Court in Wadia v. Wadia , and what this Bench has to decide is whether that case, in which it was decided that the High Court had no jurisdiction to grant a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against a respondent who is not a Christian or who is not within its jurisdiction, was correctly decided. I agree with the learned Chief Justice that our answer ought to be that Wadia v. Wadia was not correctly decided and that it should be overruled.","1. This appeal comes before us on the preliminary issue whether this High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the petitioner for restitution of conjugal rights. The learned trial Judge decided that issue in the negative feeling himself bound by a decision of the appellate Court in Nusserwanji Wadia v. Eleonora Wadia (1913) 15 Bom. L.R. 693, s.c. I.L.R. 38 Bom. 125. The petitioner now appeals, and as this is a Full Bench, we are not bound, as the learned Judge was, by that particular decision. So in effect this appeal is an appeal from the decision in Wadia v. Wadia . The sole ground on which it is contended by the respondent that the judgment should be upheld is that both parties to the petition are not Christians but only one, and that, consequently, the jurisdiction given or continued to this Court by the Indian Divorce Act 1869, as subsequently amended, does not apply.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. As regards the facts, it is sufficient to say that the lady claims to be a Russian and a Christian who was married in Paris in June 1929 to the defendant, a Parsi, according to the law of France before the local mayor. A certificate of that marriage is annexed to the petition. She alleges that at her husband's invitation she subsequently came to Bombay, but has been neglected by him ; and accordingly she brings her petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Both parties at the date of the petition and previously were residing in Bombay, and so far as the evidence before us goes, are still residing in Bombay. So it is clear that at material dates they were residing within the jurisdiction of this High Court. 3. Now the petition, as I have already said, is one for the restitution of conjugal rights. That is based on Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act of 1869 which runs :-- When either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, either wife or husband may apply, by petition to the District Court or the High Court, for restitution of conjugal rights, and the Court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition, and that...","35. Per Curiam. Appeal allowed. Order of the lower Court discharged. Answer preliminary issue in the affirmative. Remand suit to be dealt with according to law. Respondent to pay petitioner's costs of this appeal and of the preliminary issue in any event, and also of the notice of motion.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/577119/ | (1930)32BOMLR1046, **AIR 1930 BOMBAY 385",Procedural,procedural,1930,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (1930)32BOMLR1046, **AIR 1930 BOMBAY 385",577119,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/577119/,12
Bombay High Court,"David Alias Balasaheb Sunderrao ... vs Kalpana Alias Mai Alias Vijayamala ... on 12 December, 1974",Operator's course and a course in Stenography and th,1974-12-12,"JUDGMENT   Gandhi, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 12, Section 18, Section 19, Section 2, Section 22, Section 23, Section 3, Section 34, Section 37, Section 417, Section 537, Section 7",Nullity Sec19; Adultery; Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Gandhi, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"6. Mr. Sethna has further submitted that the petitioner has led evidence to show that certain representations were made and those representations were false. He further submits that the evidence discloses that the petitioner who was a believer in Christian religion, had made it clear that he would not have married the respondent unless she was a virgin and a woman of good character. He also submits that the petitioner would not have married the respondent if the representations which were made, were not made, but they were made to induce the petitioner to consent to a marriage. Mr. Sethna submits that there is sufficient evidence to draw an inference that the respondent's parents must have known that their daughter, the respondent, was not bearing good moral character or was not virgin and knowingly made false representations. He further submits that in any event the respondent was present when such...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. The petitioner further states in the petition that the respondent begged of the petitioner not to disgrace her publicly and requested the petitioner to take her to Pimpri for a short time and thereafter to take her back to her parents. The petitioner to keep up the appearance, took the respondent to his quarters at Pimpri for two days, but had no sexual connection with her whatsoever. The petitioner thereafter took the respondent from Pimpri to respondent's parents at Goregaon, Bombay, where after staying the night at Goregaon, the petitioner and the respondent stayed for about six days at the residence of the petitioner's maternal uncle Pandit at Abbott House, Sophia Zuber Road, Byculla, Bombay. But it is the case of the petitioner that he had no sexual intercourse with the respondent during this period. It is further stated in the petition that thereafter from June 1968 to January 25, 1969 the petitioner and the respondent resided together at the petitioner's quarters at Pimpri viz. room No, 8 in quarter No. HB/17, Sindhi Camp, Pimpri, but the petitioner had no sexual relations with the respondent at all. It is further stated in the petition that quarrels broke out between the petitioner and the respondent and ultimately the respondent left the petitioner on or about January 25, 1969 with ""the...","1. This is a petition filed by the husband who is an Indian Christian under the Indian Divorce Act and under Clause 35 of the Letters Patent for obtaining a decree that his marriage with the respondent be declared null and void. The original petition has been amended pursuant to the order dated April 3, 1974 on April 17, 1974, making allegation that the respondent committed frequent acts of adultery with the co-respondent since December 6, 1970. An additional prayer has been made that in the alternative to the prayer of declaring the marriage null and void, the Court may pass a decree of divorce in favour of the petitioner. Though this was an ex parte matter, after recording the evidence of certain witnesses, my brother Kania J. felt that the petition raises some important questions of law and the Court would require assistance of some advocate and made an order requesting Mrs. Manohar to appear as amicus curiae to assist the Court. After this order, the petitioner has amended the petition and has also prayed for a decree for...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1617543/ | (1976)78BOMLR85,Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; adultery; cruelty; desertion,1974,nullity,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1976)78BOMLR85,1617543,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1617543/,14
Madras High Court,"T.M. Bashiam vs M. Victor on 17 February, 1969",opposed to the scheme and the provisions of the Indi,1969-02-17,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 1, Section 10, Section 14, Section 17, Section 22, Section 7, Section 8",Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M. Anantanarayanan C.J. 1. This is a reference by the learned District Judge of South Arcot at Cuddalore, under Sections 10 and 17 of the Indian Divorce Act (4 of 1869), for making absolute the decree nisi granted by him dissolving the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent. As the entire reference involves an issue of law with regard to jurisdiction, and, further, an issue concerning which we are unable to see any room for doubt or difficulty, it is not necessary to canvass the merits, except to the strict extent required for the disposal of this reference.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","3. It is sufficient to point out that this is plainly opposed to the scheme and the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act (4 of 1869). Though one may doubt the wisdom of the legislative provisions of this Act, in the light of more progressive marriage laws that have since been enacted with regard to other communities, as far as the parties governed by this Act are concerned, the decree for judicial separation does not ripen into a decree for dissolution of the marriage, because of the lapse of any interval of time. On the contrary, a wife under this Act, can obtain a decree for dissolution of the marriage under Section 10 only on the grounds exhibited under that section. If she alleges adultery against the husband, it will either have to be adultery coupled with cruelty as defined in the relevant clause, or adultery coupled with desertion for two years or upwards. 4. The learned Judge (District Judge) was perfectly aware of the limited nature of the reliefs that could be granted, under the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act . But it appeared to him that, under Section 7 of that Act, it would be competent for him to invoke the clauses of Section 7(1) to (3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, of the United Kingdom....","2. It is admitted that in certain earlier proceedings between the parties, which are among the typed papers as O. P. No. 240 of 1962, a decree was granted in favour of the petitioner (the wife) for judicial separation from the respondent (the husband) under Section 22 of the Indian Divorce Act. The petitioner alleges that though four years have passed since that decree, there has been no resumption of matrimonial living between the parties. In brief she now desires that she should be granted a decree nisi for dissolution of the marriage, merely because of the lapse of an interval of four years after the decree for judicial separation under Section 22 . 9. The decree is accordingly set aside. There will be no order as to costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/504250/ | AIR1970MAD12, AIR 1970 MADRAS 12, 1982 MADLW 422 ILR (1970) 1 MAD 591, ILR (1970) 1 MAD 591",Adultery,adultery; desertion,1969,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1970MAD12, AIR 1970 MADRAS 12, 1982 MADLW 422 ILR (1970) 1 MAD 591, ILR (1970) 1 MAD 591",504250,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/504250/,9
Kerala High Court,"Biju @ Abraham vs Reni @ Claramma on 28 October, 2010",Mat.Appeal.No. 55 of 2011 ( ),2010-10-28,THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANTONY DOMINIC,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANTONY DOMINIC & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.D.RAJAN FRIDAY, THE 25TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2013/3RD KARTHIKA, 1935 Mat.Appeal.No. 55 of 2011 ( ) ------------------------------ AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN OPDIV 1267/2009 of FAMILYCOURT,KOTTAYAM AT ETTUMANOOR DATED 28-10-2010 APPELLANT(S)/PETITIONER: --------------------------------------------- BIJU @ ABRAHAM, AGED 35, S/O. JOSE ABRAHAM,KONNACKAL HOUSE, PANACHEPPALLY KARA, PANACHEPPALLY P.O. KOOVAPPALLY VILLAGE, KANJIRAPPALLY TALUK, NOW WORKING AT BIJU JAMES, WEETHERFORD OIL TOOL LTD., P.O. BOX. 4627, JEBEL ALI, U.A.E.KOTTAYAM DISTRICT. BY ADV. SRI.GEORGE POONTHOTTAM RESPONDENT(S)/RESPONDENT: -------------------------------------------------- RENI @ CLARAMMA, AGED 31 YEARS, D/O. JOY JOSEPH, KOLLAMPARAMBIL HOUSE, CHENAPPADY KARA KANJIRAPPALLY TALUK, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT - 686 507. THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 25-10-2013, ALONG WITH MA. 56/2011, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: acd ANTONY DOMINIC & P.D. RAJAN, JJ. ------------------------------------------- Mat. Appeal Nos.55/2011 & 56/2011 ---------------------------------------------- Dated this the 25th day of October, 2013 JUDGMENT ANTONY DOMINIC,J. These appeals are filed against the common judgment passed by the Family Court, Kottayam in O.P.(Div)No.1267/2009 and O.P.No.56/2010.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"17. Now the question is whether the appellants in Mat. Appeal No.56/2011 are liable to return 20 sovereigns of gold ornaments. 18. As far as this issue is concerned, this liability arises only if it is proved by the wife that the ornaments in question were entrusted to the appellants. Insofar as this aspect of the matter is concerned, evidence is totally lacking and there is also no conclusive finding by the Family Court on this aspect. 19. For that reason, we are unable to sustain the Family Court required the appellants to return 20 sovereigns of gold Mat. Appeal No.55/10 & con.case 8 ornaments. Therefore, the decree passed by the Family Court, Kottayam in O.P.No.56/2010 to the extent it requires the appellants to return 20 sovereigns of gold ornaments or its then market value of Rs.2,60,000/- with 7% interest from the date of the suit, is set aside. 20....",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. O.P.(Div)No.1267/2009 was filed by the appellant husband seeking divorce on the ground of desertion and cruelty as provided under Section 10(ix) and (x) of the Indian Divorce Act 1869 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' for short). O.P.No.56/2010 was filed by the respondent wife, seeking return of 28 sovereigns of gold ornaments, Rs.1 lakh PF amount, steel almirah and certificates from the appellant. These cases were jointly tried and on behalf of the husband, PWs 1 to 4 were examined and on behalf of the wife, Rws 1 to 3 were examined. Exts.A1 to A3 and B1 and B2 were marked by both sides. The Family Court by the common judgment rendered on 28th October Mat. Appeal No.55/10 & con.case 2 2010 dismissed O.P.(Div)No.1267/2009 and partly allowed O.P.No.56/2010. The counter claim raised by the appellant was also rejected. It is in these circumstances, the appellants have filed these appeals 3. Insofar as Mat. Appeal No.55/2011 arising out of O.P.(Div)No.1267/2010 is concerned, as already stated by us, the grounds urged are desertion and cruelty. 4. Insofar as plea of desertion is concerned, Section 10 (ix) of the Act permits divorce on this ground, if it is proved that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. In this case, the...","ANTONY DOMINIC, JUDGE P.D. RAJAN, JUDGE acd Mat. Appeal No.55/10 & con.case 9 Mat. Appeal No.55/10 & con.case 10",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/104118662/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty,2010,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,104118662,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/104118662/,4
Madras High Court,"Mariasoosai vs Clara Mary on 22 August, 1994",AIR1995MAD35,1994-08-22,"ORDER    Srinivasan, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 16, Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 4, Section 45, Section 5, Section 7",Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Srinivasan, J. 1. This case raises an interesting question of law. The original petition is one filed under S. 4 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 by the husband for a decree declaring that the alleged marriage between him and the respondent is null and void and consequently, the respondent is not his legally wedded wife. In the petition, it is stated that he was having intimacy with the respondent for a few months and in order to compel him to marry her, the respondent's parents and relatives, with the help of the police, by force got executed a deed of marriage on paper bearing Rs. 2.50 stamp on the 27th October, 1988 and got it registered in the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Andimadam. According to the provisions of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 , a Christian marriage can be solemnized only in any of the modes prescribed in S. 5 of the said Act. No formality or ceremony was gone through and only an agreement was executed as stated earlier and that too, under compulsion. The registration of the document would not amount to registration of the marriage and therefore, the marriage is null and void....",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"11. As the section refers to the principles and rules on which the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England for the time being acts and gives relief; it is necessary to refer to the English law on the subject and at the same time, we must bear in mind that the law in England cannot be imported into the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act , if it is contrary to the provisions of the said Act. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, at page 258 in paragraph 529, it is stated that no action or other proceeding is open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby and the High Court may make binding declarations of right whether or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed. In para 531 it is stated that if anyone persistently and...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. Both the petitioner and the respondent have not chosen to engage counsel in this proceeding which has come on a reference from the District Court. Hence the Court appointed amicus curiae for the petitioner as well as the respondent. The amicus curiae, who is representing the petitioner, submitted that the petition for declaration that the marriage is void is not maintainable as there is no provision in the Indian Christian Marriage Act enabling a party to file any proceeding before the Court for such a relief. On the other hand, the amicus curiae representing the respondent submitted that the petition was not maintainable in the District Court and the only remedy of the petitioner was to have filed proceedings in this Court. According to him, the High Court has jurisdiction to declare the marriage to be void. He places reliance on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Alfred Robert Jones v. Mt. Titli , AIR 1933 Allahabad 122. The learned Judge of that Court referred to the judgments of the Calcutta High Court in Gasper v. Gonsavas, (1874) 13 Beng LR 109 and Lopez v. Lopez, (1886) ILR 12 Cal 706 (FB) as well as the judgment of the Lower Burma Chief Court in Consterdine v. Smaine, AIR 1918 LB 83 : 47 IC 544 and proceeded...","""That brings us to an examination of the question as to whether there is anything in the provisions of the Act, which would exclude the ground of the relief for nullity of marriage on the aforesaid statutory ground. We have already set out Sections 18 and 19 of the Act which appear to be relevant for this purpose. At a previous stage of the judgment, we have examined those sections from a different angle with a view to find out whether those sections contain any ground for the grant of the decree of nullity of marriage on a statutory ground. Now, we have to examine the sections from a different angle with a view to discover whether there is anything in those sections which negatives the jurisdiction of the Court to grant a relief on a ground other than those mentioned in S. 19 . Now, in this connection, the two sections must be read together. Section 18 only gives a right to a husband or a wife to present a petition for a decree for nullity of marriage. That...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/838393/ | AIR1995MAD35, II(1995)DMC562, AIR 1995 MADRAS 35, (1995) 2 DMC 562, (1996) MARRILJ 74, (1995) 2 CIVLJ 516, (1995) 3 CURCC 248, (1995) 2 MAD LW 44, (1995) 1 HINDULR 275, (1995) 1 MAD LJ 282",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19,1994,nullity,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1995MAD35, II(1995)DMC562, AIR 1995 MADRAS 35, (1995) 2 DMC 562, (1996) MARRILJ 74, (1995) 2 CIVLJ 516, (1995) 3 CURCC 248, (1995) 2 MAD LW 44, (1995) 1 HINDULR 275, (1995) 1 MAD LJ 282",838393,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/838393/,9
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Neha vs Ashok Kumar on 20 September, 2022",Cr.P.C. at Pathankot,2022-09-20,HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARVIND SINGH SANGWAN,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 12, Section 125, Section 24",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"TA-1115-2022 (O&M) -1- IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH 106 TA-1115-2022 (O&M) Date of decision: 20.09.2022 Neha ...Petitioner Versus Ashok Kumar ...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARVIND SINGH SANGWAN Present:- Mr. Gautam Kaile, Advocate for the petitioner. ARVIND SINGH SANGWAN, J. (Oral)",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,"Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner is having two minor children, who are living in her care and custody, therefore, it is very difficult for her to defend the said case at Gurdaspur. 1 of 4 ::: Downloaded on - 21-09-2022 12:52:10 ::: TA-1115-2022 (O&M) -2- Learned counsel has relied upon the judgments Sumita Singh Vs. Kumar Sanjay , 2002 SC 396 and Rajani Kishor Pardeshi Vs. Kishor Babulal Pardeshi, 2005(12) SCC 237, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that ""while deciding the transfer application, the Courts are required to give more weightage and consideration to the convenience of the female litigants and transfer of legal proceedings from one Court to another should ordinarily be allowed, taking into consideration their convenience and the Courts should desist from putting female litigants under undue hardships."" Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon 2022 Live Law (SC) 627 N.C.V. Aishwarya vs. A.S. Saravana Karthik Sha , wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: After hearing the counsel for the petitioner, considering the fact that issuance of...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Prayer in this petition is for transfer of the petition filed by the respondent-husband under Section 10 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869, titled as Ashok Kumar vs. Neha , pending before the Family Court, Gurdaspur to the competent Court of jurisdiction at Pathankot. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that on account of a matrimonial discord, the petitioner has filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. at Pathankot, which is pending. It is further submitted that as a counter-blast to the aforesaid case, the respondent-husband has filed the present petition under Section 10 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869 at Gurdaspur in order to harass the petitioner. It is further submitted that the petitioner is facing great difficulty in prosecuting the said case, as there is a distance of about 40 Kms between the aforesaid two places. ""9. The cardinal principle for exercise of power under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that the ends of justice should demand the transfer of the suit, appeal or other proceeding. In matrimonial matters, wherever Courts are called upon to consider the plea of transfer, the Courts have to take into consideration the economic soundness of both the parties, the social strata of the spouses and their behavioural pattern, their standard of life prior to the marriage and subsequent thereto...",20.09.2022 (ARVIND SINGH SANGWAN) Waseem Ansari JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether reportable Yes/No 4 of 4 ::: Downloaded on - 21-09-2022 12:52:11 :::,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/164255174/,Procedural,procedural,2022,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,164255174,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/164255174/,7
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana),"Choppala Lalitha Kumari vs Gogulamudi Bhaskara Rao on 6 October, 2005",O.P. filed by the petitioner under Section 10-A(1) rea,2005-10-06,"ORDER    P.S. Narayana, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 15, Section 16, Section 17, Section 19, Section 3, Section 4, Section 8",Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER P.S. Narayana, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(2) that the parties are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity (whether natural or legal) or affinity; (3) that either party was a lunatic or idiot at the time of the marriage; (4) that the former husband or wife of either party was living at the time of the marriage, and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force. Nothing in this section shall affect the jurisdiction of the District Court to make decrees of nullity of marriage on the ground that the consent of either party was obtained by force or fraud. 10-A. Dissolution of marriage by mutual consent:- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made there under, a petition for dissolution of marriage may be presented to the District Court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of...",4. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. Heard Sri B. Devadas, the learned Counsel representing the petitioner. The matter is coming up for orders of this Court on an objection taken by the office while numbering the O.P. filed by the petitioner under Section 10-A(1) read with Section 8 of the Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter in short referred to as ""Act"" for the purpose of convenience). 2. This O.P is presented before this Court praying for dissolution of marriage on the strength of an agreement dated 26-11-1984. It is stated that the elders had settled the matter and in pursuance thereto, an agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the respondent. The office raised an objection ""it should be stated how this petition can be presented in the High Court directly without approaching District Court in view of the provisions of Amendment Act (Act 51/2001) which came into force from 3-10-2001"". It was also pointed out ""petition may be filed in the Court of lowest grade competent to try it as per Section 15 C.P.C."" Complying with the office objections, the counsel for the petitioner re-presented the Original Petition and stated."" Prior to Amendment Act 51/2001 this Hon'ble Court has got jurisdiction to deal with the Matrimonial Cases. In this case, the department issued proceedings to submit Decree of Divorce after 20 years of service...","""It will, therefore, be seen that persons domiciled in India who profess Christian religion may present a petition for dissolution of marriage under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869 on the various grounds contained in the said section either before the High Court or before the District Court. Though concurrent jurisdiction is given to the District Court and the High Court for entertaining a petition for dissolution of marriage the procedure to be followed and the power conferred under the various provisions and the Act are different. Section 17 of the Act provides that when a decree for dissolution of marriage is made by the District Judge it shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court. Where the number of Judges of the High Court is three or upwards the confirmation of the decree has to be made by a Bench composed of at least three Judges. The decree for dissolution of marriage passed by the District Court cannot be confirmed under this section till after the expiration of not less than six months."" 19. In Joseph John...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1651492/ | 2005(6)ALT628, I(2006)DMC607",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19,2005,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2005(6)ALT628, I(2006)DMC607",1651492,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1651492/,13
Madhya Pradesh High Court,"Benzmin vs Rundbhai on 7 December, 1987",AIR1989MP25,1987-12-07,"JUDGMENT    Faizan Uddin, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 11, Section 12, Section 13, Section 14, Section 15, Section 16, Section 17, Section 20, Section 22, Section 24, Section 25",Desertion; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Faizan Uddin, J.","9. In view of the aforesaid decision taken by us, it is now not necessary for us to go into the questions raised by the learned counsel for the respondent and we decline to express any opinion about the same.","4. The reference made by the learned District Judge appears to be wholly misconceived and, therefore, without going into the merits of the case, we shall first examine whether the law requires a decree for judicial separation to be confirmed by the High Court.",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"9. In view of the aforesaid decision taken by us, it is now not necessary for us to go into the questions raised by the learned counsel for the respondent and we decline to express any opinion about the same.","7. Section 22 of the Act which is most relevant for the purposes of the case before us reads as under : -- ""22. Bar to decree for divorce a mensa et thoro :-- but judicial separation obtainable by husband or wife No decree shall hereafter be made for a divorce a mensa et thoro, but the husband or wife may obtain a decree of judicial separation on the ground of adultery, or cruelty, or desertion without reasonable excuse for two years or upwards, and such decree shall have the effect of a divorce a mensa et thoro, under the existing law, and such other legal effect as hereinafter mentioned.""","1. This is a reference made by the learned District Judge, Hoshangabad for confirmation of decree of judicial separation under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') passed in Matrimonial Civil Suit No. 38-A of 1986. 2. The petitioner and respondent were married according to the Christian religion in the Methodist Church of Igatpuri on 15-5-1963. Both lived together happily as husband and wife till May, 1964 at Harda. Since the respondent wife was in the family way and the petitioner was transferred from Harda to Itarsi, the respondent went to her parents at Igatpuri and stayed with them. The respondent gave birth to a female child named Margret. According to the petitioner husband, he made concerted efforts to bring back his respondent wife and his daughter Margret to his place but she did not turn up as she had taken up a job as Assistant Teacher in Marathi Girls School, Igatpuri. His daughter Margret committed suicide in March, 1985 and thereafter the petitioner initiated proceedings for judicial separation against his wife respondent...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/540325/ | AIR1989MP25, AIR 1989 MADHYA PRADESH 25, (1988) 2 CIV LJ 643, (1988) 24 REPORTS 411, (1988) JAB LJ 721, (1988) 2 HINDULR 657, (1988) 2 DMC 426, (1988) MPLJ 500, (1988) 2 CURCC 786",Desertion,desertion; adultery,1987,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1989MP25, AIR 1989 MADHYA PRADESH 25, (1988) 2 CIV LJ 643, (1988) 24 REPORTS 411, (1988) JAB LJ 721, (1988) 2 HINDULR 657, (1988) 2 DMC 426, (1988) MPLJ 500, (1988) 2 CURCC 786",540325,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/540325/,8
Kerala High Court,"Abraham Kurian Plamthottam vs Reenu Aliyamma Cherian on 30 June, 2026",Mat.Appeal No.204/2022,2026-06-30,"P. KRISHNA KUMAR, J, P.Krishna Kumar, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Mat.Appeal No.204/2022 1 2026:KER:46426 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SATHISH NINAN & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR TUESDAY, THE 30TH DAY OF JUNE 2026 / 9TH ASHADHA, 1948 MAT.APPEAL NO. 204 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.12.2021 IN OP NO.106 OF 2018 OF FAMILY COURT, KOTTAYAM AT ETTUMANOOR APPELLANT/PETITIONER: ABRAHAM KURIAN PLAMTHOTTAM AGED 41 YEARS S/O LATE KURIAN P.KURIAN, 51, VINAYAKA LAYOUT, 2ND STAGE, 4TH CROSS, BANGALORE, KARNATAKA, PIN-560024. BY ADVS. DR.SEBASTIAN CHAMPAPPILLY DR.ABRAHAM P.MEACHINKARA SRI.GEORGE CLEETUS SMT.ANNIE GEORGE SMT.MARGARET MAUREEN DROSE RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT: REENU ALIYAMMA CHERIAN, AGED 35 YEARS D/O DR. CHERIAN THOMAS, CHERADI HOUSE, ST. GEORGE LPS ROAD, EDAPPALLY P.O.,ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN-682 024. BY ADV SMT.ASHA BABU THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING ON 24.06.2026, THE COURT ON 30.06.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: Mat.Appeal No.204/2022 2 2026:KER:46426 SATHISH NINAN & P. KRISHNA KUMAR, JJ. = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = Mat.Appeal No.204 OF 2022 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = Dated this the 30th day of June, 2026 JUDGMENT P.Krishna Kumar, J.","8. Considering the comparatively young age of the appellant and the respondent and the repeated assertion made by the learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent-wife was willing to resume cohabitation, we thought it appropriate to interact Mat.Appeal No.204/2022 6 2026:KER:46426 with both parties. However, the interaction did not instill in us any confidence that there remains a realistic possibility of reconciliation.","9. In the light of the rival contentions, the point that arises for determination is whether the appellant is entitled to a decree of divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. 10. The appellant seeks a decree of divorce primarily on the allegation that, from the very inception of the marriage, the respondent showed no interest in leading a normal matrimonial life as she was suffering from an illness or disease, the details of which she never disclosed to him. It is further alleged that the respondent caused him severe mental agony and hardship by her various acts of cruelty.",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"8. Considering the comparatively young age of the appellant and the respondent and the repeated assertion made by the learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent-wife was willing to resume cohabitation, we thought it appropriate to interact Mat.Appeal No.204/2022 6 2026:KER:46426 with both parties. However, the interaction did not instill in us any confidence that there remains a realistic possibility of reconciliation.","A petition filed under Section 10(ix) and (x) of the Divorce Act, 1869 (""the Act"", for short), by the husband was dismissed by the Family Court, Ettumanoor. Aggrieved thereby, the husband has preferred this appeal. 2. The appellant married the respondent on 26.12.2011 in accordance with Christian religious rites and ceremonies. The appellant alleges that their matrimonial relationship completely broke down on account of the cruel conduct of the respondent towards him and his mother. According to him, the respondent made false and scandalous allegations against him and his mother, thereby subjecting him to cruelty. The appellant further alleges that the respondent had been undergoing regular medical treatment but never disclosed to him the actual nature of her illness. According to the appellant, when he realised that the respondent had been making false allegations against him and his mother, he arranged several counselling sessions, which both parties Mat.Appeal No.204/2022 3 2026:KER:46426 attended. However, all such attempts proved futile. It is also alleged that the respondent deserted the appellant on 13.01.2013. Accordingly, the appellant filed the petition for divorce, about five years after the marriage. 3. The respondent resisted the petition by contending that it was the appellant's mother who was responsible for all the problems in their matrimonial life, though the respondent had been leading the life of a devoted...","In the result, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned decree and judgment. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent is dissolved by a decree of divorce under Section 10 (ix) and (x) of the Divorce Act . Sd/- SATHISH NINAN, JUDGE Sd/- sv P. KRISHNA KUMAR, JUDGE",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68419600/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2026,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,68419600,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68419600/,8
Madras High Court,"Vanitha Arockiyam vs Immanuvel Thomas on 16 March, 2022",O.P.No.87 of,2022-03-16,THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.SUBRAMANIAN,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 55",Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"7. Despite his best efforts, the learned counsel for the appellant is unable to pick holes in the conclusion of the learned District Judge and the finding reached by him regarding the factum of desertion. Though a faint attempt is made by the learned counsel to contend that it is because of her employment, the wife was living away at Kumarapalayam, the same was not accepted by the learned District Judge, as the wife was earlier working in Page 4/6 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis CMA(MD)No.981 of 2008 the husband's place at Murasampatti and she quit the job and joined the job at Kumarapalayam.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (desertion) are established by substantive evidence.,"7. Despite his best efforts, the learned counsel for the appellant is unable to pick holes in the conclusion of the learned District Judge and the finding reached by him regarding the factum of desertion. Though a faint attempt is made by the learned counsel to contend that it is because of her employment, the wife was living away at Kumarapalayam, the same was not accepted by the learned District Judge, as the wife was earlier working in Page 4/6 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis CMA(MD)No.981 of 2008 the husband's place at Murasampatti and she quit the job and joined the job at Kumarapalayam.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","CMA(MD)No.981 of 2008 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED : 16.03.2022 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.SUBRAMANIAN CMA(MD)No.981 of 2008 and M.P.No.1 of 2008 Vanitha Arockiyam ... Appellant vs. Immanuvel Thomas ... Respondent Appeal filed under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, against the fair and decreetal order dated 25.03.2008 in I.D.O.P.No.87 of 2004 on the file of the 1st Additional District Judge, Tirunelveli. For Appellant : Mr.G.Prabhu Rajadurai For Respondent : Mr.S.Mani Page 1/6 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis CMA(MD)No.981 of 2008 JUDGMENT Challenge in this appeal is to the decree for divorce granted by the learned District Judge, Tirunelveli in I.D.O.P.No.87/2004 on the ground that the appellant had deserted her husband in terms of Section 10(ix) of the Divorce Act, 1869. 2. According to the husband, the spouses were married on 02.07.1999 and a male child was born out of the said wedlock on 08.05.2000. Though the wife was behaving indifferently, she went for delivery to her parents' house and did not return thereafter. All his efforts to bring her back were in vain. The husband would also claim that she apart from deserting him wilfully, without any reasonable excuse, the wife also committed cruelty by refusing to live with his parents. 3. The wife resisted the claim of the husband contending that she was forced to live...","8. In the above backdrop, I do not find any infirmity in the decree passed by the learned trial Judge and the civil miscellaneous appeal fails and it is accordingly, dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. 16.03.2022 Index : Yes / No RR To The 1st Additional District Judge, Tirunelveli. Page 5/6 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis CMA(MD)No.981 of 2008 R.SUBRAMANIAN, J. RR JUDGMENT MADE IN CMA(MD)No.981 of 2008 DATED : 16.03.2022 Page 6/6 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/193277983/,Desertion,desertion,2022,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,193277983,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/193277983/,3
Madras High Court,"Christinamary Stella vs Dr. Vijay Siddharaj And Anr. on 7 September, 1978",opposition we permitted the petition and admitted th,1978-09-07,"JUDGMENT   T. Ramaprasada Rao, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 3, Section 47",Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT T. Ramaprasada Rao, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (desertion) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This case comes up before us for confirmation of the order passed by the District Judge, Pudukkottai, who allowed the petition filed by the first wife and dissolved the marriage as between the petitioner and the first respondent on the ground that the first respondent contracted a second marriage with the second respondent after the solemnisation of the first marriage and that the first respondent deserted the petitioner and is permanently living with the second respondent and had a child through her also. The facts, as disclosed in the petition, are that the first respondent married the petitioner on 19th February, 1973 in the Sacred Heart Church, Pudukkottai, and the marriage solemnisation certificate, though not filed in the trial Court, has been filed in this Court which we mark as Exhibit C-1. Having thus married the petitioner on 19th February, 1973, it appears that the first respondent married again, 20 days thereafter on the 11th of March 1973, the second respondent and was not frequenting the petitioner. The case of the petitioner is that after the first respondent took the second respondent as his wife without her knowledge and consent, the first respondent suppressed such an act of adultery and neglected the petitioner also far a considerable length of time. The petitioner's further ease is that by mistake she...","6. We place on record our appreciation of the assistance rendered by Mrs. Hamsala Rajendran as amicus curiae for the first respondent who brought to our notice certain lacune appearing on record, which had to be rectified only in this Court.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1474626/ | (1979)1MLJ57, AIR 1979 MADRAS 100, (1979) 1 MADLJ57, 1992 MADLW 110, (1978) 10 LAWYER 224, (1979) MATLR 202, (1978) 92 MAD LW 110",Desertion,desertion,1978,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (1979)1MLJ57, AIR 1979 MADRAS 100, (1979) 1 MADLJ57, 1992 MADLW 110, (1978) 10 LAWYER 224, (1979) MATLR 202, (1978) 92 MAD LW 110",1474626,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1474626/,5
Bombay High Court,"Asis Ubaldo Rodrigues And Ors. vs Maria Asis Rodrigues And Anr. on 13 January, 2006",operate. Maria left the matrimonial home on 24.8.199,2006-01-13,"JUDGMENT   Lodha R.M., J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 17, Section 19, Section 2, Section 20, Section 3, Section 4, Section 7, Section 8",Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Lodha R.M., J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"5. The first question that falls for our consideration is whether the procedure of decree nisi under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 is required to be followed in a case where the petition has been tried and decided by the Family Court under the Family Courts Act, 1984 . 10. The Division Bench of this court in Jyotsna Suresh Jagtap v. Suresh John Jagtap 2001(3) Bom. C.R. 14 was seized with the question ""whether after coming into force of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and the establishment of Family Courts Act , the procedure of decree nisi followed by confirmation by the High Court under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 is to be followed by the Family Court"".",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The Principal Judge, Family Court No. 2, Pune passed the judgment on 9th August, 1996 dissolving the marriage between the parties under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act and has referred the matter to this Court for confirmation. This is how this civil reference has been placed before us. 8. The Family Courts Act, 1984 was enacted to provide for the establishment of Family Courts with a view to secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs. Section 3 provides for establishment of Family Courts. Section 4 relates to the appointment of Judges of the Family Courts. Section 7(1)(a) provides that subject to the other provisions of the Act, a Family Court shall have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any Subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the explanation. The nature of the suits and proceedings in respect of which the jurisdiction is exercisable by the Family Court are set out in the explanation appended to Section 7 . Section 8 excludes the jurisdiction of District Court or any other subordinate Civil Court in respect of any suit or proceedings of the nature referred to in Section 7(1) where a Family Court...","2. Asis and Maria got married on 24.1.1982 as per Christian religious rites at Pune. Out of the wedlock, three daughters were born. The matrimonial relationship between the parties got disturbed on diverse grounds. According to Asis, Maria was suffering from some mental disorder prior to the marriage but that was not disclosed. Allegedly after few days of the marriage, Maria started quarreling with Asis and also used to insult his old parents. Maria was taken to Dr. Naik for her medical examination but she refused to cooperate. Maria left the matrimonial home on 24.8.1990 without telling Asis and without his consent. Asis alleged that Maria developed intimate relations with John Victor D""Souza and was having illicit relations with him. In this backdrop, Asis prayed that the marriage solemnized between the parties on 24:971982 be dissolved and decree be passed. 3. The notice was issued to Maria as well as John Victor D'Souza. Despite service of notice, neither of them appeared. The petition was proceeded with ex parts and as noticed above, the Judge, Family Court ordered dissolution of marriage...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/659710/ | AIR2006BOM143, 2006(1)BOMCR705, 2006(2)CTC32, II(2006)DMC591, [2006(3)JCR20], 2006(2)MHLJ407, 2009 (4) AIR BOM R 285, AIR 2006 BOMBAY 143, 2006 (3) ALL LJ 186, 2006 (2) AIR BOM R 119, 2006 (3) AIR KANT HCR 220, 2006 A I H C 1670, (2006) 1 HINDULR 686, (2006) 2 ALLMR 402 (BOM), (2006) 41 ALLINDCAS 844 (BOM), (2006) 2 MAH LJ 407, (2006) 2 CTC 32 (BOM), (2006) 3 JCR 20 (BOM), (2006) 1 DMC 867, (2006) 4 EASTCRIC 197, (2006) 1 BOM CR 705",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19,2006,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR2006BOM143, 2006(1)BOMCR705, 2006(2)CTC32, II(2006)DMC591, [2006(3)JCR20], 2006(2)MHLJ407, 2009 (4) AIR BOM R 285, AIR 2006 BOMBAY 143, 2006 (3) ALL LJ 186, 2006 (2) AIR BOM R 119, 2006 (3) AIR KANT HCR 220, 2006 A I H C 1670, (2006) 1 HINDULR 686, (2006) 2 ALLMR 402 (BOM), (2006) 41 ALLINDCAS 844 (BOM), (2006) 2 MAH LJ 407, (2006) 2 CTC 32 (BOM), (2006) 3 JCR 20 (BOM), (2006) 1 DMC 867, (2006) 4 EASTCRIC 197, (2006) 1 BOM CR 705",659710,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/659710/,10
Madras High Court,"Doris Padmavathy vs V. Christodass on 11 February, 1969",oping that his conduct would improve,1969-02-11,"JUDGMENT    M. Anantanarayanan, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 22",Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M. Anantanarayanan, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a reference under Sections 10 and 17 of the Indian Divorce Act IV of 1869 made by the learned District Judge, Tiruchirapalli, for confirmation of the decree nisi granted by him dissolving the marriage between Doris Padmavathi (petitioner) and her husband v. Christodass (respondent). We may state, at the outset, that the respondent has remained ex parte throughout, and that the petitioner seeks divorce on the ground specified in a clause of Section 10 of the Act, namely, ""adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to divorce a mensa et thoro."" 2. The facts are quite simple. In her petition, the petitioner states that she married the respondent on 15-9-1958, according to the rights of the Christian religion. Immediately after the marriage, the husband and wife lived together at Bhilai and later at Tiruchirapalli. The respondent was then transferred in 1961 to the Thermal Station at the Neyveli Lignite Corporation. The respondent was in poor health and began to act in a cruel manner towards the petitioner, sometimes even using physical violence. She tolerated this, hoping that his conduct would improve, as also, his health. On 17-9-1966, the respondent was enraged at the refusal of the petitioner to give finance for a foreign trip, and he beat her and actually attempted to...","8. As has been the course taken by us in similar cases where cruelty alone is proved, and not adultery, we are competent to grant a decree for judicial separation under Section 22 of the Act, on the ground of the established grave cruelty, In the present case also, we accept the reference to this extent, and grant a decree for judicial separation between the parties. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, if the alleged adulterous relationship between the respondent and a third party is even now continuing, it may be open to the petitioner to take out fresh proceedings for divorce upon that fresh and future cause of action. We do not desire to make any observations in anticipation on such a matter; but if the necessary facts exist, the petitioner may certainly proceed to such remedies at law as the petitioner may be advised to take. No order as to costs throughout.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1246170/ | AIR1970MAD188, AIR 1970 MADRAS 188, 1982 MADLW 595 (1969) 2 MADLJ645, (1969) 2 MADLJ645",Adultery,adultery; cruelty,1969,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1970MAD188, AIR 1970 MADRAS 188, 1982 MADLW 595 (1969) 2 MADLJ645, (1969) 2 MADLJ645",1246170,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1246170/,4
Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati,"Sanadakka Divya Prasanthi vs Sandaka Srikanth on 31 October, 2025",OPALA,2025-10-31,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 151, Section 24, Section 85",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"Today, when the matter has been taken up for hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that proof of service Memo has been field before the Registry on 30.10.2025 vide U.S.R.No.123433 of 2025 and the same is placed on the record. As per the Registry endorsement, notice was sent to the respondent and the same was served on 24.09.2025. Despite service of notice, there is no representation on behalf of the respondent. Therefore, „service held sufficient‟. III. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further contend that the petitioner being a woman, has been residing separately along with her child aged about two (2) years and depending upon the mercy of her parents at Vijayawada and the distance between Vijayawada and Narsapuram is more than 130Kms, it is very difficult for her to travel to attend the divorce case proceedings which was filed by the respondent/husband, before the Court at Narsapuram without any male assistance and that she was constrained to file the present petition against the respondent/husband, seeking for withdrawal of C.M.O.P.No.131 of 2025 on the file of the X Additional District Judge, Narsapuram, West Godavari District and transfer the same to the Judge, Family Court, Vijayawada, Krishna District,...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"Today, when the matter has been taken up for hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that proof of service Memo has been field before the Registry on 30.10.2025 vide U.S.R.No.123433 of 2025 and the same is placed on the record. As per the Registry endorsement, notice was sent to the respondent and the same was served on 24.09.2025. Despite service of notice, there is no representation on behalf of the respondent. Therefore, „service held sufficient‟. III. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further contend that the petitioner being a woman, has been residing separately along with her child aged about two (2) years and depending upon the mercy of her parents at Vijayawada and the distance between Vijayawada and Narsapuram is more than 130Kms, it is very difficult for her to travel to attend the divorce case proceedings which was filed by the respondent/husband, before the Court at Narsapuram without any male assistance and that she was constrained to file the present petition against the respondent/husband, seeking for withdrawal of C.M.O.P.No.131 of 2025 on the file of the...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","APHC010482772025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI [3397] (Special Original Jurisdiction) FRIDAY, THE THIRTY FIRST DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA KRISHNA RAO TRANS. CIVIL MISC.PETITION NO: 301/2025 Between: 1. SANADAKKA DIVYA PRASANTHI, W/O .SANDAKA SRIKANTH, D/O.PEDDI SRINIVASA RAO LABOR COLONY ,VIDYADARAPURAM, VIJAYAWADA -520012 KRISHNA DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH. ...PETITIONER AND 1. SANDAKA SRIKANTH, s/o. Venkateswarao D/o.9-1-9, BrodiPeta 3rd street, Palakol Village, Palakol Mandal, West godavari district, Andhra Pradesh - 534260. ...RESPONDENT Petition Under Section 24 of the C.P.C. Praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to pleased to withdraw the .C.M.O.P. No.131 / 2025, on the file of X Additional District Judge, West Godavari District at Narasapuram, and transfer the same to Family court at Vijayawada or any other court at Vijayawada, and pass IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant stay of all proceedings in .CM.O.P. No. 131/2025, on the file of X Additional District Judge, West Godavari District at Narasapuram, and pass Counsel for the Petitioner: 1. DASARI S V V S V PRASAD Counsel for the Respondent: 1. THE...","11. In the result, the present Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition is allowed and the C.M.O.P.No.131 of 2025 on the file of the X Additional District Judge, Narsapuram, West Godavari District, is hereby withdrawn and transferred to the Additional Family Court, Vijayawada, Krishna District. The learned X Additional District Judge, Narsapuram, West Godavari District, shall transmit the case record in C.M.O.P.No.131 of 2025, to the Additional Family Court, Vijayawada, Krishna District, duly indexed as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two (02) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending and the Interim Order granted earlier, if any, shall stand closed. _______________________________ JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO Date: 31.10.2025 CVD",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/164169846/,Unclear,unclear,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,164169846,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/164169846/,6
Kerala High Court,"'A' vs 'B' on 20 October, 2000",oposal for the marriage appeared in the matrimonial,2000-10-20,"ORDER   D. Sreedevi, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13",Cruelty; Nullity Sec19; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER D. Sreedevi, J. 1. Petitioner under Sections 10 , 18 and 19 of the Indian Divorce Act. Petitioner Is the wife and the respondent is the husband. The petitioner is a member of the Church of South India and the respondent is a member of Syrian Jacobite Christian Community. 2. At the time of marriage, the petitioner was a practising Gynaecologist after having passed her M.B.B.S. and D.G.O. and at present she is employed at S.U.T. Hospital, Trivandrum. The respondent is an Engineer employed in Traco Cables Ltd.. a Public sector Undertaking of the Government of Kerala. Their marriage was solemnized on 29-11-1993 at Syrian Jacobite Puthen Church, Kundara as per the religious custom prevailing among the member of the Syrian Jacobite Church. It was an arranged marriage. The proposal for the marriage appeared in the matrimonial column of the Malayala Manorama, on behalf of the respondent. This was followed by negotiation among the members of the petitioner's and respondent's families and the marriage was later settled. 3. At the time of negotiation, it was represented to the petitioner that the respondent had already secured a highly paid job in Saudi Arabia, that he would take the petitioner with...","12. In order to prove fraud on the part of the respondent, Dr. Sebastian Champappilly, counsel for the petitioner, submitted that eventhough the advertisement was given with his address as ""Thomas Madathiparambil, Thiruvalla"", the address of the respondent's father was given in Ext. Bl on Il-10rl993as""C.I.ThomasTharakan, Tomland, HospitalJunction, Kundara.""The respondent has stated that Thomas Madathiparambil is the owner of Engineers Quarters to whom he is paying rent ; The respondent has confessed that he does not know whether a person by name Thomas Madathiparambil really exists or not. According to the petitioner, the respondent adopted this mode of concealment of real identity as people who knows him would understand that he has issued a false matrimonial advertisement. 13. Simply because the advertisement was given with a different address it cannot be said to be a fraud because in response to the advertisement when the petitioner's father sent a letter, the respondent's father gave a detailed reply, wherein his address has been correctly noted. Therefore, a false address given in the advertisement cannot be said to be a fraudulent act. 14. Another argument advanced is that the respondent has represented to the petitioner that he was drawing a salary of Rs....","1. Whether the consent of the petitioner was obtained by fraud ? 2. Whether the petitioner was treated with cruelty and 3. Whether the petitioner was deserted for a period of two years and upwards ? 4. Reliefs and costs. 10. The next question is whether the respondent is holding a chartered gulf employment. The respondent as RW-1 stated that he has disclosed all his educational qualifications and job to the petitioner and her parents. Exhibit B5 is the letter issued by the General Manager of Traco Cables asking his willingness to undergo training in Spain on condition to serve the Company for five years after training. This would go to show that there was a proposal to send Engineers of Traco Cable Ltd., including the petitioner, for training abroad. According to him, it is a stepping stone for seeking employment abroad. He has also stated that if he gets...","5. The petitioner gradually discovered that the respondent was playing fraud on her. The story of having secured employment in Saudi Arabia and the related matters were all utter falsehood. The papers and documents shown at the time of negotiation, before marriage, were all frabricated. The petitioner's father was a senior I.A.S. Officer under the Government of Kerala. Only after the marriage she has come to know that the respondent did not have an adequate income from his employment to support his family as his two brothers were students at that time. The petitioner has agreed to marry the respondent on the specific assurance given by him that he has secured a lucrative job in Saudi Arabia. The respondent was deliberately cheating the petitioner and her parents. Therefore, she prays for a decree declaring that the marriage is a nullity on the ground that her consent was obtained by fraud. She has also prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground that the respondent has treated her with cruelty and refusing to consummate the marriage. She also alleged that...","12. In order to prove fraud on the part of the respondent, Dr. Sebastian Champappilly, counsel for the petitioner, submitted that eventhough the advertisement was given with his address as ""Thomas Madathiparambil, Thiruvalla"", the address of the respondent's father was given in Ext. Bl on Il-10rl993as""C.I.ThomasTharakan, Tomland, HospitalJunction, Kundara.""The respondent has stated that Thomas Madathiparambil is the owner of Engineers Quarters to whom he is paying rent ; The respondent has confessed that he does not know whether a person by name Thomas Madathiparambil really exists or not. According to the petitioner, the respondent adopted this mode of concealment of real identity as people who knows him would understand that he has issued a false matrimonial advertisement. 13. Simply because the advertisement was given with a different address it cannot be said to be a fraud because in response to the advertisement when the petitioner's father sent a letter, the respondent's father gave a detailed reply, wherein his address has been correctly noted. Therefore, a false address given in the advertisement cannot be said to be a fraudulent act. 14....","21. The respondent has also stated that the petitioner's father is facing a Vigilance enquiry. But, he could not produce any evidence to prove the same. Another allegation raised against her is that her brother tried to commit suicide. That was also denied by the petitioner and to prove this, the respondent has not produced any evidence. In spite of the mental illness, previous love affair and drug addiction, the respondent wants to live with her. This also appears to be strange. The respondent has made false and scandalous statements against her mental condition. In Gangadharan v. T.K. Thankam , AIR 1988 Kerala 244, this Court held that false, scandalous, malicious, baseless and unproved allegations made by one spouse, whether by letters or written statement or by any other mode, amounts to cruelty. It reads as follows : (Para 19) ""Cruelty should be of such a nature as to satisfy the conscience of the court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress to entitle the party to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of the...","In the result, the Original Petition is allowed and the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent which was solemnized on 29-11-1993 at Syrian Jacobite Puthen Church, Kundara is dissolved by a decree nisi.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1782590/ | II(2001)DMC35, AIR 2001 KERALA 71, (2001) ILR(KER) 2 KER 235, (2000) 2 KER LJ 734, (2000) 4 ARBILR 467, (2001) 1 ICC 15, (2001) 1 RECCRIR 291, (2001) 2 DMC 35, (2001) 1 HINDULR 434, (2001) 2 KER LT 653, (2001) 2 MARRILJ 52, (2001) MATLR 254, (2001) 1 RECCIVR 436",Cruelty,cruelty; nullity_sec19; desertion,2000,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: II(2001)DMC35, AIR 2001 KERALA 71, (2001) ILR(KER) 2 KER 235, (2000) 2 KER LJ 734, (2000) 4 ARBILR 467, (2001) 1 ICC 15, (2001) 1 RECCRIR 291, (2001) 2 DMC 35, (2001) 1 HINDULR 434, (2001) 2 KER LT 653, (2001) 2 MARRILJ 52, (2001) MATLR 254, (2001) 1 RECCIVR 436",1782590,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1782590/,11
Kerala High Court,"Jaison K.Sani vs Rasna on 3 October, 2016",OP (FC).No. 5 of 2017 (R),2016-10-03,THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125, Section 146, Section 275, Section 276, Section 278",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"""CR"" IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.RAMAKRISHNAN THURSDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2017/27TH MAGHA, 1938 OP (FC).No. 5 of 2017 (R) -------------------------- AGAINST THE ORDER IN OP 764/2012 of FAMILY COURT, IRINJALAKUDA PETITIONER: ----------- JAISON K.SANI S/O.THEKKEKARA KORATH VEETTIL SANI, PULLUR DESOM & VILLAGE, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT. BY ADV. SRI.DINESH MATHEW J.MURICKEN RESPONDENT: ---------- RASNA D/O.KOKKADAN VEETTIL JOSEPH, PUTHUKKAD DESOM, THORAV VILLAGE, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN 680 301. R1 BY ADV. SRI.P.RAMAKRISHNAN R1 BY ADV. SMT.PREETHI KESAVAN R1 BY ADV. SRI.T.C.KRISHNA R1 BY ADV. SRI.C.ANIL KUMAR R1 BY ADV. SMT.ASHA K.SHENOY R1 BY ADV. SRI.PRATAP ABRAHAM VARGHESE THIS OP (FAMILY COURT) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08-02-2017, THE COURT ON 16.02.2017 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: OP (FC).No. 5 of 2017 (R) -------------------------- APPENDIX PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS: ----------------------- EXT.P1 TRUE COPY OF THE IA NO. 3494/2016 IN OP NO. 764/2012 ON THE FILE OF THE FAMILY COURT, IRINJALAKUDA DATED 3.10.2016 EXT.P2 TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION IN IA NO. 3494/16 IN OP NO. 764/2012 FILED BY THE RESPONDENT BEFORE TEH FAMILY COURT, IRINJALAKUDA, DATED 4.10.2016 EXT.P3 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER IN IA NO. 3494/2016 IN OP...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""When the Presiding Officer is satisfied that there is mistake in recording and he has no doubt as to what exactly that mistake is, he can correct the same without the consent and even against the opposition of the opposite party of the Advocate. He can even ignore the opposition of the witness or the party who cited him or his Advocate. The witness who gave evidence alone is having a voice in the matter and that too is only subject to the decision of the Presiding Officer. The Court has a duty to see that its records are truly and correctly recorded and maintained and nobody is prejudiced by any mistake committed by the court. When the Court feels any doubt whether recording was correct or not then alone the question of ascertaining the views of the party O.P.(FC).No.5 of 2017 12 or Advocate will arise"".",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. It is alleged in the petition that the petitioner herein is the husband of the respondent and their marriage was solemnized on 22.8.2004 and two children were born to them in that wedlock. Thereafter their relationship strained and the respondent herein filed OP.No.764/2012 for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty against the petitioner under Section 10(1)(x) of the Indian Divorce Act. The respondent also filed MC.No.92/2003 before the same Court claiming maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. She also filed OP.No.294/2013 before the Family Court, Irinjalakuda for return of gold ornaments and money. The petitioner filed GOP.No.907/2013 for custody of the children. He also filed OP.No.261/2014 for restitution of conjugal rights. The petitioner further filed IA.No.2104/2014 in OP.No.764/2012 for joint trial of these cases and that was dismissed by the Court below. The petitioner filed OP(FC). No.603/2014 before this Court and this Court allowed the petition O.P.(FC).No.5 of 2017 2 and directed joint trial of all the cases. When the trial started, the respondent was examined as PW1 and her witnesses were examined as Pws 2 and 3 and they were partly cross examined. The learned counsel for the petitioner sought time for cross examination of Pws 1 to 3 as the petitioner was unwell, but the Court below did not allow the...",cl,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/69907908/,Unclear,unclear,2016,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,69907908,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/69907908/,8
Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati,"Smt Kondru Komal Raj vs Kondru Sarat Babu on 3 November, 2025",OPALA,2025-11-03,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 151, Section 2023, Section 24",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"III. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further contend that the petitioner being a woman, has been residing separately and depending upon the mercy of her parents at Inturu Village, Bapatla District and it is very difficult for her to travel to attend the divorce case proceedings which was filed by the respondent/husband, before the Court at Gudivada without any male assistance and that she was constrained to file the present petition against the respondent/husband, seeking transfer of D.O.P.No.103 of 2025 on the file of the XI Additional District Judge, Gudivada, Krishna District, to the file of the XI Additional District Judge, Tenali, Guntur District, for trail and disposal of the same. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the petitioner/wife filed three (3) cases against the respondent/husband before the II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tenali. The fact remains that the respondent/husband has not filed any prima facie proof to show that the petitioner/wife herein is residing in Guntur, but the averments mentioned in the affidavit of the petitioner filed in the petition goes to show that she has instituted three (3) cases i.e., C.C.No.84 of 2020, Maintenance Case vide M.C.No.9 of 2025 and Domestic Violence...","4. Learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the petitioner/wife is now residing at Guntur, but not within the territorial jurisdiction of Tenali. As stated supra, no prima facie proof has been filed by the respondent to show that the petitioner has been residing at Guntur. He further submitted that the respondent/husband herein is a Government employee and working in Municipal Department at Vijayawada, if this Court is inclined to transfer the said case i.e., D.O.P.No.103 of 2025, the personal appearance of the respondent/husband may be dispensed with before the transferee Court. 5. Heard learned counsel appearing on both sides. 6. Perused the material available on record. 10. On considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for both sides and in view of the ratio laid down by the aforesaid case laws and on considering the facts and circumstances of the present case that in matrimonial proceedings, the convenience of the wife has to be taken into consideration than that of the inconvenience of the husband. In view of the matrimonial disputes between the spouses, the petitioner/wife has been residing separately at Inturu Village, therefore, I am of the considered view that there are justifiable grounds to...",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,"III. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further contend that the petitioner being a woman, has been residing separately and depending upon the mercy of her parents at Inturu Village, Bapatla District and it is very difficult for her to travel to attend the divorce case proceedings which was filed by the respondent/husband, before the Court at Gudivada without any male assistance and that she was constrained to file the present petition against the respondent/husband, seeking transfer of D.O.P.No.103 of 2025 on the file of the XI Additional District Judge, Gudivada, Krishna District, to the file of the XI Additional District Judge, Tenali, Guntur District, for trail and disposal of the same. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the petitioner/wife filed three (3) cases against the respondent/husband before the II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tenali. The fact remains that the respondent/husband has not filed any prima facie proof to show that the petitioner/wife herein is residing in Guntur, but the averments mentioned in the affidavit of the petitioner filed in the petition goes to show...","4. Learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the petitioner/wife is now residing at Guntur, but not within the territorial jurisdiction of Tenali. As stated supra, no prima facie proof has been filed by the respondent to show that the petitioner has been residing at Guntur. He further submitted that the respondent/husband herein is a Government employee and working in Municipal Department at Vijayawada, if this Court is inclined to transfer the said case i.e., D.O.P.No.103 of 2025, the personal appearance of the respondent/husband may be dispensed with before the transferee Court. 5. Heard learned counsel appearing on both sides. 6. Perused the material available on record. 10. On considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for both sides and in view of the ratio laid down by the aforesaid case laws and on considering the facts and circumstances of the present case that in matrimonial proceedings, the convenience of the wife has to be taken into consideration than that of the inconvenience of the husband. In view of the matrimonial disputes between the spouses, the petitioner/wife...","APHC010425292025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI [3397] (Special Original Jurisdiction) MONDAY,THE THIRD DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA KRISHNA RAO TRANS. CIVIL MISC.PETITION NO: 300/2025 Between: 1. SMT KONDRU KOMAL RAJ, WIFE OF SARAT BABU, CHRISTIAN, AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS, OCCUPATION HOME MAKER, A RESIDENT OF 10-43, NEAR OLD GOVERNMENT HOSPITAL, LOCK CENTRE, INTURU VILLAGE, AMARTHALURU MANDAL, BAPATLA DISTRICT. ...PETITIONER AND 1. KONDRU SARAT BABU, son of late Someswara Rao, Christian, aged about 38 years, occupation employee, resident of D.No.4-52, Zamigolvepalli post Gangadharapuram, Gudiwada Mandal, Krishna District ...RESPONDENT Petition Under Section 24 of the C.P.C. Praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith,the High Court may be pleased topleased to transfer the D.O.P.No. 103/2025 on the file of the Court of the XI Additional District Judge Krishna, at Gudiwada, to the Court of the XI Additional District Judge, at Tenali and pass IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to stay all further proceedings of D.O.P.No. 103/2025 on the file of the Court of the XI Additional District Judge Krishna, at Gudiwada, and pass Counsel for the Petitioner: 1....","11. In the result, the Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition is allowed and the D.O.P.No.103 of 2025 on the file of the XI Additional District Judge, Gudivada, Krishna District, is hereby withdrawn and transferred to the file of the XI Additional District Judge, Tenali, Guntur District. The learned XI Additional District Judge, Gudivada, Krishna District, shall transmit the case record in D.O.P.No.103 of 2025, to the file of the XI Additional District Judge, Tenali, Guntur District, duly indexed as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of one (01) week from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. Both the parties are directed to appear before the XI Additional District Judge, Tenali, Guntur District, on 21.11.2025, at 10.30 a.m. Later, the transferee Court i.e., learned XI Additional District Judge, Tenali, Guntur District,, is hereby directed not to insist for the personal appearance of the respondent herein i.e., the petitioner in D.O.P.No.103 of 2025, as long as his counsel is attending the Court proceedings and representing the case except on the day when re-conciliation proceedings are being taken up...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/144736472/,Procedural,procedural,2025,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,144736472,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/144736472/,6
Madras High Court,"Captain David Aberneathy Greenwood vs Gladys Hildred Greenwood (Otherwise ... on 30 July, 1945",(1945)2MLJ389,1945-07-30,"JUDGMENT   Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Indian Evidence Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 107, Section 108, Section 19, Section 7",Nullity Sec19; Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"2. Before dealing with the question of law involved, we will state the facts in some detail. The. appellant's first marriage was to one Mary Rachel Greenwood and look place at the Roman Catholic Church, Agra Cantonment, on the 10th September, 1913. On the 12th July, 1914, a son was born to this union. On the 20th January, 1920, the wife left her husband and took the boy with her; but in the month of November of the following year she handed over the child to him at Bellary where he was employed as the superintendent of the local jail. From then until the middle of 1923, they corresponded, but the correspondence then ceased. In 1924, the appellant took the boy to England, and placed him in a school there. In 1927, the boy was taken seriously ill and the appellant tried to get in touch with his wife but...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This case is unparalleled and it raises an important question of law. The appellant was married to the respondent on the 9th June, 1933, at All Souls Church, Coimbatore. The appellant had been previously married, but he had not heard of his first wife for over seven years and consequently presumed her to be dead. The appeal arises out of a petition filed by the respondent on the Original Side of this Court under the Indian Divorce Act for a declaration that her marriage with the appellant was null and void because his first wife was still alive. She failed to prove this fact, but maintained that she was entitled to rely on the presumption stated in Section 107 of the. Indian Evidence Act , which says that when the question is whether a person is alive or dead, and it is shown that the person was alive within 30 years, the burden of proving the person to be dead is on him who affirms it. In other words, she maintained that all she had to prove was that the appellant's first wife was alive within 30 years of the petition and if the appellant failed to prove affirmatively that his first wife was dead on the 9th June, 1933, she was entitled to the declaration. The learned Judge...",11. The appeal is allowed and the respondent's petition dismissed.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1466251/ | (1945)2MLJ389, AIR 1946 MADRAS 65",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; adultery,1945,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (1945)2MLJ389, AIR 1946 MADRAS 65",1466251,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1466251/,7
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana),"Dr. B. Vamsi Pavani And Ors. vs Government Of A.P. And Ors. on 9 July, 2004",writ petitions relate to admission into Post-Graduate Courses i,2004-07-09,"JUDGMENT   B.S.A. Swamy, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India","Section 10, Section 19, Section 28, Section 3",Constitutional Validity; Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT B.S.A. Swamy, J. 1. The subject-matter of these writ petitions relate to admission into Post-Graduate Courses in Dental Sciences. Writ Petition No. 12486 of 1999: The complaint of the petitioner in this writ petition is that though she secured highest marks in the common merit list from Andhra University local area for admission to MDS Course, she could not get the admission, while respondent Nos.4 and 5 who secured lesser rank got seats in MDS Course from the local areas of Osmania and Sri Venkateswara University in Dental College, a State wide institution on the basis of class reservation. Hence, she questioned the vires of Rule 4 of the A.P. Regulation of Admission to the MDS Course in the Government Dental College and Hospital, Hyderabad Rules, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'Dental Course Rules') providing reservation to the reserved categories speciality-wise on rotation basis by contending that the same is contrary to Full Bench Judgment of this Court reported in Devarakonda Rajesh Babu v. Nizam 's Institute of Medical Sciences, (FB). (1) Writ Petition No.18723 of 1999: 2. The case of the petitioner in this writ petition is that he hails from Warangal and he studied upto VII Class...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"7. During the course of hearing, this Court noticed that certain grey areas are left open on the issues that arise for consideration under Article 371-D of the Constitution of India. Hence, I have formulated the following issues and directed all the Counsel to address arguments on these issues: 1. Article 371-D is intended to remove the regional imbalances. That being the case, whether it is open to the authorities concerned to fix the local area of a particular individual on the basis of his study. 2. Whether regional reservations provided under Article 371-D override the reservations in favour of constitutionally permissible classes under Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India on the ground that they are general reservations and those reservations are special reservations. 3. Whether the Health University is justified in conducting separate entrance tests to each of the colleges for admission into Post-Graduate Courses,...","17. With the result the decisions cited supra upholding the constitutional validity of Article 371-D of the Constitution became non-est and the issue whether Article 371-D opposes the basic structure of the Constitution or not is at large and it has to be gone into. In fact in Devarakonda Rajesh Babu 's case (supra), a Full Bench of this Court did not permit the Counsel for the petitioner to raise the question of constitutional validity of Article 371-D of the Constitution vis-a-vis whether it violates the basic structure of the Constitution on the same ground since the issue was not raised in the writ petition and requires examination at a deeper depth. Hence I am of the opinion that the issue whether Article 371-D is ultra vires of the Constitution or not is wide open and it requires reconsideration.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","5. It is brought to the notice of this Court that none of the medical colleges functioning in the State got affiliated to the University of Health Sciences and they are affiliated only to the respective Universities in whose territorial jurisdiction these institutions are located, but at the same time, University of Health Sciences is conferring Bachelor, Post-Graduate and Super Speciality degrees. When no colleges are affiliated to it, the question that arises for consideration would be, whether Health University is empowered to confer degrees or can the University have any control or say in the matter of admissions to Medical Courses. 6. When a particular student's residence is determined on the basis of his study in a particular area for the purpose of education, how his residence will be decided (i.e.,) on the basis of birth or study for purposes of employment. 8. Since the Court is well within its limits to mould the relief in a given circumstances of the case, I requested all the Counsel to address arguments on these issues to put an end to the everlasting controversy as there is no authoritative pronouncement on the issue raised above. Indeed, the Additional Advocate-General as well as other Counsel of eminence consented to address arguments on the questions of law and also the objective underlying under Article...",6. Office is directed to place this order before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and obtain appropriate orders for referring the matter to a Large Bench in the light of the importance of issues raised in this order.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1620495/ | 2004(6)ALD751,Constitutional Validity,constitutional_validity; nullity_sec19,2004,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,Equivalent citations: 2004(6)ALD751,1620495,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1620495/,15
Madras High Court,"Jayaraj Antony vs Mary Seeniammal on 12 August, 1966",AIR1967MAD242,1966-08-12,"JUDGMENT    M. Anantanrayan, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 18, Section 19",Nullity Sec19; Non Consummation,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M. Anantanrayan, C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(3) When the matter came up before us at the first hearing, we were so dissatisfied with the state of the record that we instructed the learned counsel appearing amicus curiae for the wife (respondent) to get into touch with her and to obtain instruction including the instruction whether she would be willing to submit herself to a medical examination. The learned counsel appearing as amicus cruise reports that he has been unable to get into touch with the respondent, and that she has declined service of a letter sent trough registered post of her address. The respondent (wife) never appeared before the learned District Judge of Tirunelveli, and did not in any way meet the main allegation. As fat as the petitioner(husband) is concerned, the record, as we stated earlier, is sadly inadequate and imperfect. All that is clear from the record, including the letters filed, is that the...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a reference made by the learned District Judge of Triunveli under Section 18 of the Indian Divorce Act (4 of 1869) in a petition by the husband (Jayaraj Anthony) for a declaration of nullity in respect of the marriage between him and his wife (mary Seeniammal) on the substantive ground that the wire(respondent) declined all access to the husband subsequent to the marriage, refused to consummate the marriage, and hence must be regarded as ""important"" both at the time of the marriage and at the time of the proceeding. The learned District Judge accepted the evidence for the plaintiff and granted a decree in the usual form, subject to our confirmation. (2) Under Section 19(1) of Act 4 of 1869, one of the grounds on which the petition for a decree of nullity, in respect of a marriage, could be successfully maintained is that the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage, and at the time of the institution of the suit. This is what the husband alleged, and we have got to see whether there is evidence which the court can accept in proof of this averment, which is the foundation of the petition for nullity. (5) At the outset itself we may observe that it is noticeable that the Divorce Act IV of...",(9) Order accordingly.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/319980/ | AIR1967MAD242, AIR 1967 MADRAS 242, (1966) 79 MADLW 640 (1967) 1 MADLJ152, (1967) 1 MADLJ152",Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; non_consummation,1966,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1967MAD242, AIR 1967 MADRAS 242, (1966) 79 MADLW 640 (1967) 1 MADLJ152, (1967) 1 MADLJ152",319980,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/319980/,6
Madras High Court,"K. Jagan Mohan Rao vs K. Swarup on 20 April, 1971",opet from March,1971-04-20,"JUDGMENT   G. Ramanujam, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 11, Section 13, Section 151, Section 19, Section 20, Section 21, Section 25, Section 3, Section 45, Section 47, Section 488, Section 73, Section 9",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT G. Ramanujam, J.","8. Point 1 : On the question of jurisdiction, the learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the marriage did not take place in Madras, nor the couple resided at Madras at any time, and that, therefore, the lower Court should not have entertained the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. What the learned Counsel says is that mere temporary stay in Madras for some time will not make Madras a place of residence of the couple, that the decisive test was to find out whether the parties intended to make Madras as their permanent place of residence, and that the Court below has overlooked certain admissions made by the respondent in her evidence as P.W. 6 before the Court that the appellant had no intention to reside at Madras at any time. The learned Counsel for the respondent, however, states that the couple had no permanent place of residence when they came to Madras in September, 1959, they having vacated their rented premises at Vizag that their stay at Madras between 10th September, 1959 to 14th September, 1959, should be treated as their place of residence and that the lower Court was, therefore, clothed with the jurisdiction to entertain...","(1) Whether the lower Court h ad jurisdiction to entertain the petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the respondent? (2) Whether this appeal is liable to be dismissed on the ground that the appellant's petition for dissolution of marriage or for judicial separation had been dismissed by the Courts in Andhra Pradesh? (3) Whether the respondent is guilty of adulterous conduct? (4) Whether there has been a condonation of the same by the appellant and (5) Whether the respondent is entitled to any permanent alimony and if so, at what rate? In Baroda State v. Habib Ullah A.I.R. 15 Mad. 82 the question arose as to whether it is open to the defendant to raise a plea of jurisdiction after having defended the suit on its merits. It was held that the defendant though took the plea of want of jurisdiction had taken part in a protracted trial,...","3. The case of the appellant husband is, however, as follows : - The couple never intended to vacate their residence at Vizag in September, 1959, but they - came to Madras only for a temporary visit and when it was found that the respondent was unchaste and was writing letters to her paramours in a clandestine manner, the appellant while he was at Neilore on 25th September, 1959, sent a telegram to the respondent's father to come to Neilore and when he came there with his wife and daughter (the respondent), the letters written by the respondent to her paramours were shown to him and he was thoroughly put out and immediately left to Madras with his wife and daughter. Ever since that date both the appellant and the respondent have been living apart and that he has filed O.P. No. 65 of 1961 on the file of the District Court, Vizag for dissolution of marriage impleading the paramours as co-respondents. The appellant also stated that in view of the fact that he is claiming a dissolution of marriage,...","8. Point 1 : On the question of jurisdiction, the learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the marriage did not take place in Madras, nor the couple resided at Madras at any time, and that, therefore, the lower Court should not have entertained the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. What the learned Counsel says is that mere temporary stay in Madras for some time will not make Madras a place of residence of the couple, that the decisive test was to find out whether the parties intended to make Madras as their permanent place of residence, and that the Court below has overlooked certain admissions made by the respondent in her evidence as P.W. 6 before the Court that the appellant had no intention to reside at Madras at any time. The learned Counsel for the respondent, however, states that the couple had no permanent place of residence when they came to Madras in September, 1959, they having vacated their rented premises at Vizag that their stay at Madras between 10th September, 1959 to 14th September, 1959, should...","1. This appeal arises out of a petition filed by the respondent herein under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights. The appellant herein married the respondent in March, 1955, and they lived together at Narasaraopet from March, 1955, to the middle of 1957. As the respondent became pregnant, she was taken to Madras by the appellant and was left with her parents for confinement. She delivered a still-born child on 10th August, 1957. The respondent thereafter joined the appellant at Guntur by the end of 1967 where she lived with him till about May, 1-958. In May, 1958, the appellant went on leave and took the respondent to Madras and after leaving her with her parents, he went away to Salur, his native place to attend to a litigation concerning his family house. On the expiry of the leave, the appellant was posted to Srikakulam where the respondent joined him in November, 1958. In June, 1959, the appellant was promoted from Supervisor to Assistant Engineer and posted to Vizag. The appellant went to Vizag leaving the respondent at Srikakulam and took charge on 16th June, 1959. After fixing up an accommodation at Vizag the appellant went to Srikakulam and brought the respondent to Vizag on 6th July, 1959. On 9th September, 1959, the couple...","4. The trial Court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain and try the petition for restitution of conjugal rights, expressing the view that the appellant and the respondent when they came over *O Madras on 10th September, 1959, had intended to take up permanent residence in Madras after winding to their establishment at Vizag, and that the appellant and the respondent had stayed in Madras for a period of 4 days from 10th September, 1959, to 14th September, 1959 with intention to set up a home there. On the question whether the respondent had forfeited her rights to obtain restitution of conjugal rights by reason of her adulterous conduct, the lower Court had found that the letters, Exhibits B-1 to B-3 said to have been written by the respondent to her paramours h ad not been duly proved, that the evidence adduced in the case showed that the appellant himself was a victim of a plot hatched up by his brother and others, and that the letters, Exhibits B-1 to B-3 had been concocted by them with a view...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1646892/ | (1972)2MLJ77,Adultery,adultery,1971,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: (1972)2MLJ77,1646892,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1646892/,20
Delhi High Court,"Ashok Ratti Lal Trivedi vs Anjani Madhusudan Oza on 16 May, 1967",4(1968)DLT235,1967-05-16,"JUDGMENT   M.M. Ismail, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 11, Section 115, Section 12, Section 13, Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 22, Section 23, Section 24, Section 25, Section 36, Section 37, Section 5, Section 7, Section 9",Nullity Sec19,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M.M. Ismail, J.","The learned counsel for the respondent submits that the learned Judges of the Madras High Court in the decision reported in Naraganaswami v. Pudmanabhan referred to only one aspect of the reasoning of the learned Judge in this Madras case but did nto refer to the toher aspect, namely that under our law certain phrases are used which have gto wider implications than they bear if literally interpreted. The learned counsel for the Respondent 1n this c""ntext relied upon a decision in Bullmore v. Wenter"". In that case one Henry Bullmore, by his will dated in 1865, devised his residue to trustees upon trust to sell and covert the same, and to hold the trust moneys upon trust to pay the income to his daughter Beatrice during her life for her separate use, independent of any husband, restrained from anticipation; and after the death of his said daughter, in trust for any husband with whom she might intermarry, if he should survive her, for his life. Bestrice Bullmore married W. Barber in 1867, who died in 1870 and in 1972 she carried the defendant W. R. Wynter. On the 4th of June, 1878, on the petition of W. R. Wynter,...",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (nullity sec19) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"The learned counsel for the respondent submits that the learned Judges of the Madras High Court in the decision reported in Naraganaswami v. Pudmanabhan referred to only one aspect of the reasoning of the learned Judge in this Madras case but did nto refer to the toher aspect, namely that under our law certain phrases are used which have gto wider implications than they bear if literally interpreted. The learned counsel for the Respondent 1n this c""ntext relied upon a decision in Bullmore v. Wenter"". In that case one Henry Bullmore, by his will dated in 1865, devised his residue to trustees upon trust to sell and covert the same, and to hold the trust moneys upon trust to pay the income to his daughter Beatrice during her life for her separate use, independent of any husband, restrained from anticipation; and after the death of his said daughter, in trust for any husband with whom she might intermarry, if he should survive her, for his life. Bestrice Bullmore married W. Barber in 1867, who died in 1870 and in 1972...","(3) Before me the learned counsel repeated the contentions put forward before the Court below and relied upon the same two decisions. The contention of the learned counsel is that sectiont 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , contemplates an application being filed by the husband or the wife, as the case may be, for the grant of maintenance and that necessarily indicates that the person applying for the grant of maintenance must have the status of the husband or the wife. 'In the case of a marriage which has been declared to be a nullity it is as If no marriage has taken place at all and consequently the parties to that marriage could nto have been described as the husband and the wire. In the alternative, he conferded that with reference to an application filed after the passing of the decree of nullity the parties to the marriage, which was the subject-matter of that decree, could nto be described as continuing to be husband and wife and consequently the description of husband or wife will nto be applicable to the man or woman whose marriage has been annulled, subsequent to the decree of nullity and, therefore,an application for the award of maintenance cannto be made by such person after the decree. Belore considering the validity and soundness...","(1) This Civil revision petition filed under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, raises an important question regarding the construction of section 25 of the. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Central Act 25 of 1955). The petitioner married the respondent herein in May, 1864. On a petition filed by the respondent herein in January, 1965, the marriage was annulled uner section 12(1)(a) of the Hindu Marrriaga Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act by a decree of mullity passed by learned Additional District Judge, Delhi, on 26th April, 1966. On. 9th June, 1966, the respondent herin applied for an order for payment of permanent alimony to her. That application of the respondent wa resisted by the petitioner herein on the ground that the marriage having been declared to be a nullity, the relationship of husband and wife never existed between the parties and hence, in any event, it ceased with the passing of the said decree and in consequence 237. the petition filed by the respondent was nto maintainable. It was contended by the petitioner herein, in the alternative, that the...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/354444/ | 4(1968)DLT235,Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19,1967,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: 4(1968)DLT235,354444,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/354444/,18
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Sapna vs Dalbir Singh on 13 February, 2020",Cr.P.C. for grant of maintenance filed,2020-02-13,- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Special Marriage Act, 1954","Section 10, Section 125, Section 19, Section 32",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"TA No.520 of 2019 (O&M) 1 Sr. No.205 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH TA No.520 of 2019 (O&M) Date of Decision: 13.02.2020 Sapna ... Applicant Versus Dalbir Singh ... Respondent CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA Present:- Mr. Sunil Agnihotri, Advocate, for the applicant. Mr. A.S.Manaise, Advocate, for the respondent. ARUN MONGA, J.(ORAL)",4. Learned counsel for the respondent opposes the transfer application on the ground that distance from the residence of the applicant to Gurdaspur is only 50 Kms. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,4. Learned counsel for the respondent opposes the transfer application on the ground that distance from the residence of the applicant to Gurdaspur is only 50 Kms. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case.,"1. Applicant-wife seeks transfer of petition filed by the respondent-husband under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act for restitution of conjugal rights titled as ""Dalbir Singh Vs. Sapna"" pending in the Court of Learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Gurdaspur to the Court of competent jurisdiction at Mukerian, District Hoshiarpur. 2. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that one petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for grant of maintenance filed by the applicant-wife is already pending at Mukerian. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant further submits that petitioner is residing at Village Muradpur Jattan, Mukerian, District Hoshiarpur. She has no source of income. The distance from her village to Gurdaspur is about 50 Kms. One minor daughter 2 years old is in the custody of applicant-wife, who needs 1 of 4 ::: Downloaded on - 01-03-2020 09:55:02 ::: TA No.520 of 2019 (O&M) 2 constant care and attention of the mother. She cannot leave her behind to attend the Court proceedings. It is difficult for her to go to Gurdaspur on each date of hearing. 6. Both the cases pending between the parties are aftermath of matrimonial discord. Keeping in view the contentions in the application and the conceded position that petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for grant of maintenance is already pending in the Court at Mukerian, it would be...",(ARUN MONGA) 13.02.2020 JUDGE vandana Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether Reportable Yes/No 4 of 4 ::: Downloaded on - 01-03-2020 09:55:03 :::,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/120453283/,Procedural,procedural,2020,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,120453283,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/120453283/,5
Gujarat High Court,Wolson vs Anjali,opponent on 6th June 2002 as per the,,HONOURABLE,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 125, Section 24, Section 32, Section 36",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"SCA/17262/2011 7/ 7 ORDER IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No. 17262 of 2011 ========================================================= WOLSON VISHVAS HARRY - Petitioner(s) Versus ANJALI , D/O BABUBHAI PANDAV - Respondent(s) ========================================================= Appearance : MR MAKBUL I MANSURI for Petitioner(s) : 1, MRCRMISHRA for Respondent(s) : 1, ========================================================= CORAM : HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI Date : 24/04/2012 ORAL ORDER 1. This petition is preferred challenging the order of the Family Court passed below Exhibit 9 in Family Suit No. 1529 of 2009 dated 30th July 2011.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1.1 To briefly state the facts : The petitioner herein is the original applicant before the Family Court who preferred Family Suit under section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for restitution of conjugal rights. It is the say of the petitioner that he married the respondent original opponent on 6th June 2002 as per the Christian Rites and Rituals and two children were begotten of the said wedlock. On 6th September 2009 the respondent alleged to have left the home of the petitioner and started living with her step mother at Himmatnagar. She also never cared for the children and therefore notice was issued in the month of November 2009 asking the respondent to fulfill her obligation of conjugal rights. Reply to which was received and thereafter the said suit was filed being Family Suit No.1529/2009. 2. An application was preferred by the respondent vide Exh. 9 for alimony as well as for expenses. An application under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code for maintenance was also preferred being Criminal Misc. Application NO. 1555/2010. 3. The petitioner since decided not to pursue the proceedings of the Family Suit a purshis was filed for withdrawal of the said suit which was accepted with a noting ""recorded"" however, to the dismay of the petitioner the Court granted application preferred...","(Ms. Sonia Gokani,J.) mary//",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/81860953/,Unclear,unclear,,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,,81860953,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/81860953/,3
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana),"Giddi Gowthami @ Jyoti vs Giddi Samuel on 19 November, 2004",O.P.No. 790 of 2003 on the file of the District Judge,2004-11-19,"ORDER    B. Seshasayana Reddy, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 20, Section 32, Section 36",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER B. Seshasayana Reddy, J. 1. This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the Order dated 27-7-2004 passed in I.A.No. 162 of 2001 in O.P.No. 790 of 2003 on the file of the District Judge, Vizianagaram, whereby the learned District Judge refused to grant interim alimony.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""In any suit under this Act, whether it is instituted by a husband or a wife, and whether or not she has obtained an Order of protection, the wife may present a petition for expenses of the proceedings and alimony pending the suit. Such petition shall be served on the husband; and the Court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements therein contained, may make such Order on the husband for payment to the wife of the expenses of the proceedings and alimony pending the suit as it may deem just.",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The petitioner is the wife of the respondent. The respondent herein filed O.P.No. 790 of 2003 for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (for short 'the Act'). The petitioner/wife filed I.A.No. 162 of 2001 under Section 36 of the Act for grant of interim alimony at the rate of Rs. 1,000/-(rupees one thousand only) per month and legal expenses of Rs. 2,000/- (rupees two thousand only) pending the main proceedings. The respondent/husband filed counter resisting the application. It is averred in the counter that the petitioner filed M.C.No. 2 of 2003 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Vizianagaram, claiming maintenance and the same was ended in dismissal on 25-2-2004, and therefore the petitioner/wife is not entitled for interim alimony pending disposal of the main proceedings in O.P.No. 790 of 2003. 3. The learned District Judge on considering the material brought on record and on hearing both parties, refused to pass any Order with regard to interim alimony and directed both the parties to get ready for disposal of the main petition. The operative portion of the Order passed by the learned District Judge, Vizianagaram, reads thus: ""Perused the record. The respondent stated that the petitioner resided only for two months after marriage and that subsequently, she never, obliged to...","In the result, the petition is ordered to be called along with main Divorce Petition, Both the parties are directed to get ready for disposal of main divorce petition."" 4. Assailing the Order passed in I.A.No. 162 of 2001 in O.P.No. 790 of 2003, the petitioner/wife filed this Civil Revision Petition. 14. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the Order dated 27-7-2004 passed in I.A.No. 162 of 2001 in O.P.No. 790 of 2003, and remanding the matter back to trial Court for fresh disposal. The learned District Judge, Vizianagaram is directed to dispose of the I.A.No. 162 of 2001 in O.P.No. 790 of 2003 on merits.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/44914/ | 2005(3)ALT102, II(2005)DMC605",Unclear,unclear,2004,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2005(3)ALT102, II(2005)DMC605",44914,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/44914/,7
Madras High Court,"Lucas Daniel Raj vs Pertreesia Maria on 11 November, 2022",O.P.No.4741 of 2019 on the file of,2022-11-11,"Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUNDER MOHAN, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 125, Section 19, Section 32",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"3. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that: a. The grant of interim maintenance is unsustainable and erroneous and that the maintenance cannot be awarded on mere filing of petition. She further submitted that the appellant is working in a Multi National Company and it was not possible for him to appear before the Court on all hearings. No sufficient opportunity was given for the appellant to file his affidavit of assets and liabilities. 3/10 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.No.220 of 2022 b. It was the appellant who took efforts for re-union and hence he filed O.P.No.4741 of 2019 for restitution of conjugal rights. The respondent on her own making spoilt the chances of re-union by filing a false complaint against the appellant and his relatives. The appellant was therefore forced to file a memo in I.D.O.P.No.4741 of 2019 praying for permission to withdraw the said O.P. for restitution of conjugal rights. Strangely, the Family Court did not permit the withdrawal of the said petition since the respondent herein had made an endorsement in the said memo stating that she had strong objections to the withdrawal of the petition. Thereafter, she filed the objections stating that she was entitled to receive interim...","2. The learned Judge found that the respondent had stated that the 2/10 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.No.220 of 2022 appellant was earning Rs.3,00,000/- per month and that the appellant had not denied the said fact. The learned Judge found that the appellant had not filed his affidavit of assets in spite of several opportunities and the respondent had filed her affidavit of assets. The learned Judge thereafter found that the respondent was entitled to get maintenance and the litigation expenses. The learned Judge directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.30,000/- per month towards interim maintenance from the date of filing of the petition and further directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.25,000/- towards litigation expenses. The appellant aggrieved by the said order has filed the above appeal. 5. Heard, Ms.Shabhnam Banu learned counsel for the appellant and Ms.Revathi Radhakrishnan, learned counsel for the respondent and perused 5/10 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.No.220 of 2022 the entire materials on record.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"3. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that: a. The grant of interim maintenance is unsustainable and erroneous and that the maintenance cannot be awarded on mere filing of petition. She further submitted that the appellant is working in a Multi National Company and it was not possible for him to appear before the Court on all hearings. No sufficient opportunity was given for the appellant to file his affidavit of assets and liabilities. 3/10 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.No.220 of 2022 b. It was the appellant who took efforts for re-union and hence he filed O.P.No.4741 of 2019 for restitution of conjugal rights. The respondent on her own making spoilt the chances of re-union by filing a false complaint against the appellant and his relatives. The appellant was therefore forced to file a memo in I.D.O.P.No.4741 of 2019 praying for permission to withdraw the said O.P. for restitution of conjugal rights. Strangely, the Family Court did not permit the withdrawal of the said petition since the respondent herein had made an endorsement in the said memo stating that she had strong...","2. The learned Judge found that the respondent had stated that the 2/10 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.No.220 of 2022 appellant was earning Rs.3,00,000/- per month and that the appellant had not denied the said fact. The learned Judge found that the appellant had not filed his affidavit of assets in spite of several opportunities and the respondent had filed her affidavit of assets. The learned Judge thereafter found that the respondent was entitled to get maintenance and the litigation expenses. The learned Judge directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.30,000/- per month towards interim maintenance from the date of filing of the petition and further directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.25,000/- towards litigation expenses. The appellant aggrieved by the said order has filed the above appeal. 5. Heard, Ms.Shabhnam Banu learned counsel for the appellant and Ms.Revathi Radhakrishnan, learned counsel for the respondent and perused 5/10 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.No.220 of 2022 the entire materials on record.","C.M.A.No.220 of 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 11.11.2022 CORAM THE HONOURABLE Ms.JUSTICE V.M.VELUMANI and THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUNDER MOHAN C.M.A. No.220 of 2022 and C.M.P.No.1516 of 2022 Lucas Daniel Raj, S/o. Noel Balasamy, Rep. by his Power Agent. ... Appellant Vs. Pertreesia Maria W/o.Lucas Daniel Raj ... Respondent (Cause title accepted vide Court order dated 20.01.2022 made in C.M.P.Nos.529 and 530 of 2022 in C.M.A.SR.No.1295 of 2022 by RSMJ) PRAYER: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act against I.A.No.6 of 2020 in O.P.No.4741 of 2019 on the file of the III Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai dated 06.12.2021. For Appellant : Ms.Shabnam Banu Assisted by Mr.T.Sushil Sarayu and Mr.Naren Gautham For Respondent : Ms.Revathi Radhakrishnan 1/10 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.No.220 of 2022 JUDGMENT (Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUNDER MOHAN, J.) The appeal is filed by the appellant/ husband aggrieved by the grant of maintenance by the learned III Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai, in I.A.No.6 of 2020 in O.P.No.4741 of 2019 wherein the appellant was directed to pay Rs.30,000/- per month as interim maintenance and Rs.25,000/- per month towards litigation expenses to the respondent herein. The marriage of the appellant and the respondent was solemnised on 05.02.2018 at Chennai. The respondent left the matrimonial home due...","9. With the above observations, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. [V.M.V., J.] [S.M., J.] 11.11.2022 Index : Yes/ No mka To: The III Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai. 9/10 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A.No.220 of 2022 V.M.VELUMANI, J. AND SUNDER MOHAN, J. mka C.M.A.No.220 of 2022 and C.M.P. No.1516 of 2022 11.11.2022 10/10 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/32826119/,Unclear,unclear,2022,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,32826119,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/32826119/,8
Madras High Court,"J. Jenifa Arul Mary vs R. Sathish Kumar on 9 March, 2018",O.P.No.1984 of 2017 from the file of Honble I Addition,2018-03-09,THE HONOURABLE Mrs. JUSTICE PUSHPA SATHYANARAYANA,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 24",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[pre_1] IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 09.03.2018 CORAM : THE HONOURABLE Mrs. JUSTICE PUSHPA SATHYANARAYANA Tr.C.M.P. No.526 of 2017 and C.M.P.No.10792 of 2017 J. Jenifa Arul Mary ... Petitioner versus R. Sathish Kumar ... Respondent Prayer:- The Petition is filed under Section 24 of C.P.C. praying to withdraw I.D.O.P.No.1984 of 2017 from the file of Honble I Additional Family Court, Chennai and transfer the same to the file of Honble Family Court, Tirunelveli. For Petitioner : Mr.S.Consciousilango For Respondent : Mr.P.Prakash Paul O R D E R [p_1] The petitioner/wife in the matrimonial proceedings has filed this transfer petition seeking to withdraw I.D.O.P.No.1984 of 2017 filed by the respondent/husband under Section 10(1)(x) of Indian Divorce Act for divorce on the ground of cruelty, pending on the file of I Additional Family Court, Chennai and transfer the same to the file of Family Court, Tirunelveli. [p_2] 2. In paragraph 6 of the affidavit it is stated that the petitioner is staying with her aged parents and her father is also suffering with various physical ailments and...","3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent. 4. Considering the convenience of the wife, this Court finds it appropriate to transfer the I.D.O.P.No.1984 of 2017 from I Additional Family Court, Chennai to Family Court, Tirunelveli. Before the Family Court, Tirunelveli, the appearance of the parties is mandatory. However, the fact that the respondent/husband is living out side India and he is being represented through his mother, who is the power of attorney, the appearance of the respondent/husband is dispensed with till the commencement of the trial. The respondent/husband is also directed to be personally present from the date it is posted for trial.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent. 4. Considering the convenience of the wife, this Court finds it appropriate to transfer the I.D.O.P.No.1984 of 2017 from I Additional Family Court, Chennai to Family Court, Tirunelveli. Before the Family Court, Tirunelveli, the appearance of the parties is mandatory. However, the fact that the respondent/husband is living out side India and he is being represented through his mother, who is the power of attorney, the appearance of the respondent/husband is dispensed with till the commencement of the trial. The respondent/husband is also directed to be personally present from the date it is posted for trial.","IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 09.03.2018 CORAM : THE HONOURABLE Mrs. JUSTICE PUSHPA SATHYANARAYANA Tr.C.M.P. No.526 of 2017 and C.M.P.No.10792 of 2017 J. Jenifa Arul Mary ... Petitioner versus R. Sathish Kumar ... Respondent Prayer:- The Petition is filed under Section 24 of C.P.C. praying to withdraw I.D.O.P.No.1984 of 2017 from the file of Honble I Additional Family Court, Chennai and transfer the same to the file of Honble Family Court, Tirunelveli. For Petitioner : Mr.S.Consciousilango For Respondent : Mr.P.Prakash Paul O R D E R The petitioner/wife in the matrimonial proceedings has filed this transfer petition seeking to withdraw I.D.O.P.No.1984 of 2017 filed by the respondent/husband under Section 10(1)(x) of Indian Divorce Act for divorce on the ground of cruelty, pending on the file of I Additional Family Court, Chennai and transfer the same to the file of Family Court, Tirunelveli. 2. In paragraph 6 of the affidavit it is stated that the petitioner is staying with her aged parents and her father is also suffering with various physical ailments and he will not be able to accompany her to go to Chennai. Besides, it is stated that the distance is around 600 kms from Tirunelveli to Chennai and it would be difficult for her to travel alone and get back for each hearing....","5. With the above directions, the Transfer Civil Miscellaneous petition is allowed and I.D.O.P.No.1984 of 2017, pending on the file of I Additional Family Court, Chennai is transferred to the file of Family Court, Tirunelveli. No Costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 09.03.2018 rsi To 1. The I Additional Judge, Family Court, Chennai. 2. The Family Judge, Tirunelveli. PUSHPA SATHYANARAYANA, J. rsi Tr.C.M.P. No.526 of 2017 and C.M.P.No.10792 of 2017 09.03.2018",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/145584492/,Unclear,unclear,2018,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,145584492,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/145584492/,3
Kerala High Court,"Philip Thomas Palamoottil vs Sherry Susan Koshy on 17 June, 2009",Mat.Appeal.No. 7 of 2008(A),2009-06-17,"Justice R.BASANT The Hon, Justice M.C.HARI RANI  Dated, M.C.HARI RANI, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Desertion; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM Mat.Appeal.No. 7 of 2008(A) 1. PHILIP THOMAS PALAMOOTTIL, ... Petitioner Vs 1. SHERRY SUSAN KOSHY, ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.V.PHILIP MATHEW For Respondent :SRI.MVS.NAMBOOTHIRY The Hon'ble MR. Justice R.BASANT The Hon'ble MRS. Justice M.C.HARI RANI Dated :17/06/2009 O R D E R R.BASANT & M.C.HARI RANI, JJ. ------------------------------------ Mat.Appeal No.7 of 2008 ------------------------------------- Dated this the 17th day of June, 2009 JUDGMENT BASANT, J. This appeal is preferred by the appellant/petitioner/husband against an order of the Family Court rejecting his prayers under the Indian Divorce Act for declaration of nullity of marriage and for dissolution on the ground of cruelty and desertion.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"11. The first question is whether there has been any cruelty. Except the oral evidence of PW1, there is absolutely not a semblance of material to conclude that there was any cruelty on the part of the wife. The boot appears to be on the other foot as can be seen eminently from the fact that 15 years after marriage and after birth of 2 children, the husband comes up with the claim for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that her masculine nature and peculiar conduct and character were suppressed from him fraudulently at the time of marriage. The wife on the other hand has stated very clearly that till separate residence started on 11.11.2002 consequent to the conduct of the appellant absconding with his young colleague, there was never allegations of cruelty, misbehaviour or any contumacious conduct on her part. 12. The circumstance looms large, and...","2. Admittedly, the parties are Christians. Admittedly the marriage took place in accordance with the Christian Religious rites on 13-1-1990. The appellant was a Lecturer in English at St.Thomas College, Kozhencherry whereas the respondent is and continues to be a Bank official in the State Bank of Travancore. Two children, both daughters aged 17 and 10 years now, have been born in the wedlock. Admittedly, the parties continue to reside together till June 2002. It is alleged that from June 2002, Mat.Appeal No.7 of 2008 2 the spouses, though they were sharing a common roof, were virtually leading independent and separate life. It is conceded that they started separate residence with effect from 11-11-2002. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and for dissolution on the ground of cruelty and desertion was filed on 9-11-2005. 3. The husband alleged that the wife was masculine in nature and had peculiar behaviour and habits. These were suppressed from him. According to him the marriage which was solemnized on 13-1-90 was hence liable to be declared to be null and void. This...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","14. Coming to the ground of desertion, admittedly from 11.11.2002, the appellant was not available in the locality. Fanciful excuses are advanced by him to explain such absence from locality. Inference is irresistible for a prudent mind that the version of RW1 is probable, more reasonable and appealing. The husband, it appears to us, was guilty of desertion from Mat.Appeal No.7 of 2008 9 11.11.2002. Whatever may have been the alleged strain in the relationship from June, 2002 to November, 2002, it is evident that actual desertion started only from November, 2002 and the blame for such separate residence must be placed entirely at the doors of the appellant. 15. Nay, it is interesting to note that the wife even now hopes of better days and marital reunion. She offers to condone, forget, forgive and accept the appellant again. But it is the very clear assertion of the appellant even before us that he does not want to resume the marital relationship. It is such husband who claims divorce on the ground of desertion. We are not in the least impressed or persuaded to accept that separate residence of the spouses is attributable to any desertion on the part of the wife. The plea for divorce on the ground of desertion must also hence fail.","(R.BASANT, JUDGE) (M.C.HARI RANI, JUDGE) rtr/-",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1327323/,Desertion,desertion; cruelty,2009,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,1327323,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1327323/,6
Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati,"Talluri Nagamani Mary Mani vs Talluri Krishna 3 Others on 1 July, 2022",No.563 of 2008,2022-07-01,Justice G. Ramakrishna Prasad,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 13, Section 3, Section 498",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G. RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD C.M.A.No.563 of 2008 JUDGMENT (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice G. Ramakrishna Prasad) Heard the learned counsel for Appellant and Respondents.,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (cruelty) are established by substantive evidence.,"4. Learned counsel for the Appellant contended that the order impugned herein is erroneous inasmuch as the learned Trial Judge 2 rendered a finding of Mental Cruelty against the Appellant-wife, for the reason of filing criminal cases against the husband and his family members. According to the learned counsel for the Appellant, filing of criminal cases by Appellant-wife against the Respondent No.1- husband, does not constitute Mental Cruelty.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The Appellant is the wife and Respondent No.1 is her husband in the present Appeal. Respondent No.1-husband filed a petition seeking divorce under Section 10(i) of Indian Divorce Act, 1869 against the Appellant-wife on the ground of Mental Cruelty. 3. After trial, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Ongole passed a decree of divorce in favour of the Respondent No.1-husband by Order dated 26.06.2007 in Divorce Original Petition No.6 of 2004 as he successfully established Mental Cruelty against his wife. Wife filed the present Appeal challenging this Order. On the death of Respondent No.1/husband during the pendency of this Appeal, Respondent Nos.2 to 4 (wife and two daughters respectively of the Respondent No.1/husband) were brought on record as legal representatives vide Order dated 10.03.2017 in CMAMP No.2026 of 2016 and 292 of 2017. 5. This Court has gone through the order of the Trial Court. It is seen from the facts narrated therein, that the Appellant has filed C.C.No.69 of 2004 under Section 498-A IPC against the Respondent No.1-husband, his parents and his sister, which eventually ended in acquittal. 6. The second case which is narrated in the impugned order is about another criminal case filed by the Appellant against the Respondent No.1-husband in Cr.No.4 of 2005 under Section 498-A and 420 IPC and under Section 3 of Dowry...","10. In this view of the matter, this Court confirms the findings of the 1st Additional District Judge, Ongole in Divorce Original Petition No.6 of 2004 dated 26.06.2007 to the effect that the actions and conduct of the Appellant-wife towards her husband-Respondent No.1 herein constitutes Mental Cruelty. This Court is of the view that there are no grounds to interfere in the present Appeal. Hence, the Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, stand closed. ________________________________ (U. DURGA PRASAD RAO, J) ________________________________ (G. RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD, J) Date:01-07-2022. JKS 5 131 HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G. RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD C.M.A.No.563 of 2008 01.07.2022 JKS",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/150047074/,Cruelty,cruelty,2022,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,150047074,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/150047074/,5
Telangana High Court,"K P B V Kumar , Junia Kumar, Karimnagar ... vs M Sabitha, Ranga Reddy Dist on 19 January, 2026",OP No.311 of 2012 by the Judge,2026-01-19,Justice K. Lakshman,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 12, Section 125, Section 3, Section 428, Section 498",Cruelty; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN AND HON'BLE JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY FAMILY COURT APPEAL No.136 OF 2015 Date:19.01.2026 Between XXXXXXX ....Appellant and XXXXXXX ......Respondent This Court passed the following JUDGMENT: (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice K. Lakshman) Heard Sri Telugu Amarnath, learned counsel representing Sri B. Nalin Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. Despite service of notice, there is no representation on behalf of the appellant. 3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 20.03.2014 passed in FCOP No.311 of 2012 by the Judge, Family Court, at Secunderabad, the appellant - husband preferred the present 2 appeal. Vide the said order, the Judge, Family Court, dismissed the said FCOP.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"1. Whether the appellant - husband is entitled for divorce? 2. To what relief? 9. On consideration of the evidence on record, both oral and documentary, vide impugned order dated 20.03.2014, the learned Judge, Family Court, on elaborate discussion, gave a specific finding 4 that the appellant - husband failed to prove cruelty and desertion and dismissed the petition filed by him seeking dissolution of marriage. 10. It is the specific contention of the appellant that the respondent - wife subjected him to cruelty by filing series of cases against him and also deserted him for no fault of him. 11. It is the specific contention of the respondent - wife that she never subjected the appellant to cruelty. She was constrained to file cases against him as he subjected her to cruelty and neglected her and her children to maintain. 17. Cruelty is not defined in any statute. It...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","4. The appellant - husband filed FCOP No.311 of 2012 under Section 3 (ix) and (x) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (for short, 'the Act, 1869') against his wife seeking dissolution of marriage on the grounds of cruelty and desertion alleging that respondent -wife is an adamant and headstrong person. She started ill-treating him under one pretext or the other. She sold away household articles, pattu sarees, gold ornaments purchased by him and, rice etc., to help her parents. She used to misbehave and abuse him in filthy language in front of his friends and guests when they visit his house and she did not even prepare food for him causing mental agony to him. She is frigid and used to deny his company. She sent him scandalous and defamatory messages in respect of his character and reputation. Since 2005, in spite of his attempts, she did not join him. She used to visit his workplace to defame him. She is highly educated and has a good source of income. There is no chance of re-union as she had deserted him since 2005. She also filed a petition under Section 125 of Cr.P.C., seeking maintenance vide M.C.No.72 of 2005, a petition under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short, 'the 3 DV Act ') vide DVC...",__________________________ JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN _________________________________________ JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY Date:19.01.2026 vvr.,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/29448943/,Cruelty,cruelty; desertion,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,29448943,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/29448943/,6
Madhya Pradesh High Court,"Filomina Mavi vs Petric on 12 May, 1991",opposite party inspite of notice has not filed any w,1991-05-12,"JUDGMENT   K.M. Pande, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 2, Section 20, Section 23, Section 3, Section 7, Section 8",Procedural,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT K.M. Pande, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (procedural) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The point that has arisen for consideration is as to whether after coming into force the Family Courts Act 1984, the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Section 23 of the Indian Divorce Act of 1869. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petition Philomina Bhavi has presented this petition under Section 23 of the Indian Divorce Act of 1869 for judicial separation and maintenance. The opposite party inspite of notice has not filed any written statement and absented himself on the date of hearing. It is the applicant's counsel himself who raised the point of jurisdiction and wanted to make some submissions about this Court's jurisdiction after the Constitution of the Family Court. He was heard and the records have been perused. 3. As said earlier, the petitioner has come to this Court with a petition under Section 23 of the Indian Divorce Act alleging that she was married with the non-applicant according to Christian rites on 18-6-1973 in the city of Ratlam in a Roman Catholic Church and since then they were living as husband and wife. Her husband treats her with cruelty and does not maintain her and three children who have taken birth after the marriage. 4. Indian Divorce Act is an special Act Section 2 of this Act...",10. Fix 10-9-91 for hearing Petitioner to lead evidence as directed earlier.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1127535/ | II(1991)DMC534, 1991(0)MPLJ860",Procedural,procedural,1991,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: II(1991)DMC534, 1991(0)MPLJ860",1127535,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1127535/,3
Punjab-Haryana High Court,"Sonia Kumar vs Dr. Harshit Kumar on 9 October, 2000",Sonia Kumar vs Dr. Harshit Kumar,2000-10-09,"JUDGMENT   R.L. Anand, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 13",Nullity Sec19; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT R.L. Anand, J.","4. The respondent has denied the allegations of the petitioner. Rather, he made the allegations against the petitioner that she had intercourse with another person before the marriage and that she was a lady of loose character. 5. It may also be mentioned here that in compliance to the directions dated 19.7.1998 of the High Court, the parties and appeared before the Medical Board, and vide the report dated 25.8.1999, the Board gave the following opinion vis-a-vis the petitioner :- ""The Medical Board constituted by the Medical Superintendent comprising of: 1. Dr. Kala Vasishta 2. Dr. Savita Malhotra 3. Dr. Sarita Mahajan is of the opinion that Smt. Sonia Kumar d/o Sh. Parvez Wilson, r/o H.No. 1479, Sector 42-B, Chandigarh has no psychiatric or medical illness and on gynaecological examination she is found to have normally developed secondary sex characters and the hymen is torn posteriorly. This finding suggests that penetration could have occurred."" 6. Similarly, vide the report dated 22.9.1999, the Medical Board gave the following opinion, vis-a-vis the respondent :- ""Dr. Harshit Kumar denied suffering from impo-tency. On examination he did not manifest any primary psychiatric disorder or any evidence of endocrinopathy. His hormonal profile was within normal...",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (nullity sec19) are established by substantive evidence.,"1. Sonia Kumar w/o Dr. Harshit Kumar has filed the present petition u/ss 18 and 19 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 , and has sought a decree of nullity of marriage between the parties on the allegations that the marriage between the parties was solemnised on 20.11.1998 at Ludhiana, as per Christian rites. The petitioner has alleged that the respondent at the time of the marriage and presentation of the petition was impotent and, therefore, he was incapacitated to consummate the marriage. The respondent is also guilty of cruelty towards Ihe petitioner as his behaviour was indifferent right from the very day of the marriage, as he used to get irritated over small issues. Moreover, the respondent had no healthy physical contact with the petitioner which amounts to mental torture and is an act of cruelty. The parents of the petitioner; namely Parvez Wilson and Sheela Wilson, came to know about the maltreatment and misbehaviour of the respondent towards the petitioner from her after about a week of the solemnisation of the marriage. Thereafter, the petitioner came to her...","4. The respondent has denied the allegations of the petitioner. Rather, he made the allegations against the petitioner that she had intercourse with another person before the marriage and that she was a lady of loose character. 5. It may also be mentioned here that in compliance to the directions dated 19.7.1998 of the High Court, the parties and appeared before the Medical Board, and vide the report dated 25.8.1999, the Board gave the following opinion vis-a-vis the petitioner :- ""The Medical Board constituted by the Medical Superintendent comprising of: 1. Dr. Kala Vasishta 2. Dr. Savita Malhotra 3. Dr. Sarita Mahajan is of the opinion that Smt. Sonia Kumar d/o Sh. Parvez Wilson, r/o H.No. 1479, Sector 42-B, Chandigarh has no psychiatric or medical illness and on gynaecological examination she is found to have normally developed secondary sex characters and the hymen is torn posteriorly. This finding suggests that penetration could have occurred."" 6. Similarly, vide the report dated 22.9.1999, the Medical Board gave the following opinion, vis-a-vis the respondent :- ""Dr. Harshit Kumar denied suffering from impo-tency. On...","8. It has been stated by the petitioner in her statement that Parvez Wilson is her father. She and her father are Christians and they believe in Christianity. She was married with the respondent-Dr. Harshit Kumar, on 20.11.1998, at Ludhiana as per Christian rites. Her father gave an advertisement in the newspaper and the same appeared in the Times of India dated 28.6.1998. In response to that advertisement, Shri H.S. Lall, father of the respondent, wrote a letter on 29.6.1998 and gave the particulars of the respondent. Thereafter, he again wrote a letter on 18.8.1998. Exs.A-1 andA-2 are the original letters, which were received by her father. She is in a position to identify the handwriting and signatures of Shri H.S. Lal, father of the respondent, as she had been seeing him writing and signing. After the marriage, she went to the house of the respondent and stayed with him up to 30.11.1998. During her stay in the house of the respondent, she noticed that the respondent was impotent and he was not in a position to consummate the marriage in spite of the fact that she gave full access to him for the consumation of Ihe marriage and when she pointed out to the respondent about his impotency, he started quarrelling with her. On 1/2 occasions, he even slapped...","12. In these circumstances, I allow this petition under Sections 18 and 19 of the Indian Divorce Act and pass a decree of nisi for the dissolution of the marriage between the parties, which shall be made absolute after a period of six months on the making of an application by the petitioner in this regard.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/352814/,Nullity Sec19,nullity_sec19; cruelty,2000,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,,352814,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/352814/,5
Gujarat High Court,"Nileshbhai Jonbhai Mekwan vs Pritiben D/O Arneshtbhai Christian on 11 February, 2026",FIRST APPEAL NO. 2908 of 2019,2026-02-11,HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE SANGEETA K. VISHEN,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Indian Evidence Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 14, Section 15, Section 20, Section 65B",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2908/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 2908 of 2019 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2019 In R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 2908 of 2019 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE SANGEETA K. VISHEN Sd/- and HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE NISHA M. THAKORE Sd/- ================================================================ Approved for Reporting Yes No  ================================================================ NILESHBHAI JONBHAI MEKWAN Versus PRITIBEN D/O ARNESHTBHAI CHRISTIAN ================================================================ Appearance: MR AS ASTHAVADI(3698) for the Appellant(s) No. 1 MR A A ZABUAWALA(6823) for the Defendant(s) No. 1 ROMESH C NIVEN(9064) for the Defendant(s) No. 1 ================================================================ CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE SANGEETA K. VISHEN and HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE NISHA M. THAKORE Date : 11/02/2026 ORAL JUDGMENT (PER : HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE SANGEETA K. VISHEN) 1. Captioned appeal is directed against the judgment dated 11.04.2019 passed by the Family Court in Family Suit No. 42 of 2018 and Criminal Misc. Application No. 82 of 2018 (hereinafter referred to as the ""impugned judgment""), whereby the Family Suit No. 42 of 2018 is allowed and the marriage solemnized on 08.11.2007 is dissolved. So far as the Criminal Misc. Application No. 82 of 2018 filed by the respondent is concerned, the same...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"i. Whether the original applicant-respondent proves that her marriage was solemnized with the original opponent -appellant. ii. Whether the original applicant-respondent proves that she was subjected to cruelty by the original opponent- appellant and his family members. iii. Whether the original opponent-appellant proves that the original applicant-respondent, is short tempered and hence, was not fulfilling her matrimonial obligations as a wife and has deserted the original opponent- appellant. 8. As regards issue no.1 there is no dispute considering the fact that the marriage of the appellant and the respondent was solemnized in the year 2007. Centre to the issue is respondent-wife being subjected to cruelty. The learned Judge, while accepting the request of the respondent-wife seeking dissolution of the marriage, dissolved the marriage solemnized on 08.11.2007 of the appellant Page 9 of 18 Uploaded by RAVI PRAVINCHANDRA PATEL(HC01068) on Thu Mar 05 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 21:35:39...","2. Mr A. S. Asthavadi, learned advocate, while inviting the attention of this Court to the cross-examination of the respondent- wife, submitted that a reference is made of interaction which took place before marriage, when both the parties were trying to know about their nature. In the question posed, it is categorically stated by the respondent that she is short tempered and gets emotional. It is submitted that considering the sensitive nature of the respondent, it is difficult to believe the allegations levelled by her against the appellant-husband. Therefore, the respondent herself is responsible for the separation. While inviting the attention of this Court to the plaint, it is submitted that in paragraph 3, allegations are made against the appellant about the demands, which is not supported by any evidence. On the other hand, the evidence produced would suggest that the respondent, instead of staying with the husband, was determined to stay separately. 2.1 It is further submitted that initially the respondent was serving at Nadiad; however, she secured a job in Vadilal Sarabhai Hospital, Ahmedabad where, initially, she was...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2.3 It is submitted that in connection with CCTV footage, evidence at Exhs.37, 45, and 48 would be relevant. Exh.37 the evidence of Mr Manibhai Sukhabhai Solanki, a Head Constable who had received the CCTV footage in a Compact Disc/Digital Versatile Disc (hereinafter referred to as ""the disc"") on 12.04.2018, in his cross- examination he has stated that he has no information from where the disc was provided but claims to have received it from the Railway Protection Force Officer, and was handed over to the respondent. He has also admitted that the voice in the disc was inaudible. Besides, he is not aware if there is any alteration in the disc. Furthermore, the evidence at Exh. 45 of Mr. B. B. Vanjara, Police Sub-Inspector, he admits that though the disc was given to the respondent, he has not verified the contents thereof. He also states that he has no authority or power to provide any information Page 3 of 18 Uploaded by RAVI PRAVINCHANDRA PATEL(HC01068) on Thu Mar 05 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 21:35:39 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2908/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as ""the Act of 2005""). Evidence at Exh. 48 is of Mr. Hiteshbhai Narendrabhai Patel who was working with Nimit Electronics. It is...","(NISHA M. THAKORE,J) RAVI P. PATEL Page 18 of 18 Uploaded by RAVI PRAVINCHANDRA PATEL(HC01068) on Thu Mar 05 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 21:35:39 IST 2026",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55229237/,Cruelty,cruelty,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,55229237,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55229237/,10
Madras High Court,"Ambujam G. Ammal vs M.R. Arumugham on 6 September, 1965",opy of the petition submitted by the plaintiff to th,1965-09-06,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 22",Adultery; Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT M. Anantanarayanan, Offg. C.J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"(1) In this reference by the learned District Judge of Tirunelveli under Ss. 10, 17 and 22 of the Indian Divorce Act , (IV of 1869), the moot question is whether the plaintiff-petitioner (Ambujam G. Ammal) has established, on the facts, her claim for divorce. The plaint shows that the plaintiff-petitioner prayed for divorce, upon one of the grounds specified in the second part of S. 10 , viz., ""of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa et thoro"". (2) In the plaint, there is a long account given of the conduct of the respondent (defendant) subsequent to this marriage, particularly in the form of dissolute living, physical violence towards the petitioner and her children, seizure of her earnings, and imputations of unchastity. Broadly stated, the situation is that the plaintiff was a student in the S.S.L.C. class when the...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","(3) But, unfortunately for the petitioner, such cruelty, by itself, is not an adequate ground for divorce. The scheme of S. 10 is that if the wife is to succeed in a decree for divorce against the husband, she must show not merely cruelty, but adultery coupled with cruelty. It is true that the petitioner in her plaint did allege that the defendant (respondent) was guilty of loose living, and unfaithfulness to her. She refers to illicit intimacy between the defendant and other parties at Chikka Narasayyanna Village. But, obviously, a vague averment of loose conduct will not be sufficient as proof of adultery. Adultery is a specific matrimonial offence, and this court had occasion to point out in the Full Bench decision in Siluvaimani Ammal v. Thangiah Nadar , 1956-2 Mad LJ 69: (AIR 1956 Mad 421 FB) that vague allegations of adultery, or evidence confined to a mere statement that the respondent was keeping a woman, will not be adequate to sustain a finding of adultery. Learned counsel as amicus curiae for plaintiff-petitioner has urged that there is the evidence of Henry John Peter (P.W. 3) of adultery committed by the respondent with a Chetty girl, living adjacent to the house of P.W. 1. But, P.W. 3 himself does not state whether he had any personal knowledge of...",LI/ DHZ (5) Order accordingly.,"https://indiankanoon.org/doc/52764/ | AIR1966MAD153, AIR 1966 MADRAS 153, 1978 MADLW 731 (1966) 1 MADLJ1, (1966) 1 MADLJ1",Adultery,adultery; cruelty,1965,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1966MAD153, AIR 1966 MADRAS 153, 1978 MADLW 731 (1966) 1 MADLJ1, (1966) 1 MADLJ1",52764,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/52764/,5
Kerala High Court,"State Of Kerala vs Santhosh on 13 November, 2008",open the door and entered the room. He found that th,2008-11-13,"Justice K.BALAKRISHNAN NAIR The Hon, Justice M.C.HARI RANI  Dated, M.C. HARI RANI,J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973","Section 10, Section 113B, Section 125, Section 16, Section 302, Section 304B, Section 428, Section 494, Section 498A, Section 5, Section 50",Cruelty,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM CRL.A.No. 363 of 2005() 1. STATE OF KERALA, REP. BY THE ... Petitioner Vs 1. SANTHOSH, S/O. CHEMBIPARAMBIL, ... Respondent For Petitioner :PUBLIC PROSECUTOR For Respondent :SRI.K.G.ANIL BABU The Hon'ble MR. Justice K.BALAKRISHNAN NAIR The Hon'ble MRS. Justice M.C.HARI RANI Dated :13/11/2008 O R D E R K. BALAKRISHNAN NAIR & M.C. HARI RANI,JJ === = = ========================== CRL.A.NO. 363 OF 2005 ============================ DATED THIS THE 13th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2008 JUDGMENT Balakrishnan Nair,J. The State has come up in appeal challenging the judgment of the III Additional Sessions Court(Ad hoc)Fast Track Court No.I, Thrissur in S.C.No.125/2003. The accused in that case was charge sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 498 A, 201, 302 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code . The accused was found not guilty and acquitted of all the charges. Hence, this appeal by the State. 2. The prosecution case in brief is as follows: The accused and the deceased were husband and wife. Apparently for the reason that she was the sister of the brother's wife of the accused, the family members of the accused were against their marriage. So, they got married in the Sub...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"17. The postmortem report, Ext.P8 would show that there was smell of kerosene on the dead body. Ext.P4 would show that kerosene was detected on three items recovered from the scene of occurrence. They were (1) charred hairs, (2)burnt mat and (3) burnt cloth. Going by the evidence of the witnesses, the body of Shyamala did not catch fire from the burning house. In fact, her body was completely burnt before the building burnt and collapsed. So, the death of Shyamala can be homicidal, that is somebody poured kerosene on her and set fire. It can be suicidal also. She might have poured kerosene on her body and set fire. But there is no clinching evidence as to whether it is a case of homicide or suicide. Evidence pointed out against the accused by the prosecution is the presence of the accused in the scene of occurrence. PW1 has stated...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","was tied using coir. Immediately on opening the door, it was found that the body of Shyamala, his sister, was engulfed by fire. A portion of the building was already burnt and the roof of the room in which she was lying has only just started falling down. The same would prove that Shyamala's body caught fire not from the fire in the building but her body was set on fire by somebody. The postmortem report would show that there was smell of kerosene on the body. So, it is evident that somebody poured kerosene on her body and set fire to her. It is also pointed out that when PW1 entered the room, he found the accused going out of it. If it was a case of suicide, the husband would have definitely tried to save his wife, but without doing anything he was going out. PW7 has also stated that the accused was going out of the house. So, the above conduct of the accused would point an accusing finger against him. He was carrying a tapper's knife in his hand. The same would support the prosecution case that on the day of the incident, he inflicted injuries on his wife, as a result of which she CRL.A.363/05 - 5 - fell unconscious. So, the learned Public Prosecutor...",dsn,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1424442/,Cruelty,cruelty,2008,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,1424442,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1424442/,12
Madras High Court,"Revision vs V.Sobhana Kumar on 18 July, 2023",C.R.P.(MD).Nos.1794 and 1795 of 2017,2023-07-18,THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.KUMARAPPAN,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Constitution of India; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 114, Section 5, Section 96",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"C.R.P.(MD).Nos.1794 and 1795 of 2017 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED : 18.07.2023 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.KUMARAPPAN C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)Nos.1794 and 1795 of 2017 and C.M.P(MD) No.9582 of 2017 in C.R.P(MD) No.1795 of 2017 C.R.P(MD) No. 1794 of 2017: D.Vimala Shanthi ... Revision Petitioner/Petitioner/ Respondent -vs- V.Sobhana Kumar ... Respondent/Respondent/Petitioner PRAYER: Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the return order passed in Unnumbered I.A.No.Nil of 2016 in I.D.O.P.No.30 of 2015, dated 22.06.2017, on the file of the learned District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil. For Petitioner : Mr.C.Kishore For Respondent : Mr.K.P.Krishnadoss 1/16 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.(MD).Nos.1794 and 1795 of 2017 C.R.P(MD) No. 1795 of 2017: D.Vimala Shanthi ... Revision Petitioner/Petitioner/ Respondent -vs- V.Sobhana Kumar ... Respondent/Respondent/Petitioner PRAYER: Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the return order passed in Unnumbered I.A.No.Nil of 2016 in I.D.O.P.No.30 of 2015, dated 22.06.2017, on the file of the learned District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil. For Petitioner : Mr.C.Kishore For Respondent : Mr.K.P.Krishnadoss COMMON ORDER The present Civil Revision Petitions have been filed by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to set aside the return order...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"5. The learned counsel for the petitioner/wife would submit that the very order passed by the learned trial Judge is contrary to the provisions of Order 17 Rule 2 of C.P.C , and also would submit that the revision petitioner/wife has not filed a counter statement and that she has not cross 6. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in 2010 (1) MWN (Civil) 612 ( Muneeswari vs. Vanmathi ) and Paragraph Nos.20, 21 and 22 are extracted as follows: 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in 2014 (4) L.W. 193 ( Vijaya and others Vs. Ranganathan and others ) and Paragraph No.17 is extracted as follows: 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in 2013 (1) L.W 737 ( Arunachalam Vs. Valliyappan ) and Paragraph Nos.3 and 12 are extracted as follows: “3. The epitome and the long and short of the germane facts...","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","2. The revision petitioner is the petitioner/respondent before the trial Court. She filed this Civil Revision Petition against the unnumbered Section 5 of Limitation Act application and an unnumbered Order 9 Rule 13 of C.P.C . application. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as per the litigative status before the trial Court. 4. It appears that the petitioner/husband has filed an application for the relief to dissolve the marriage solemnized on 26.08.1993. While the application was pending, the learned trial Judge has passed an order on 08.08.2016, after set the respondent/wife exparte and ultimately, granted the relief of divorce to the petitioner/husband. Against the said order, the respondent/wife has filed an application to set aside the exparte decree along with the delay condonation application. However, both the applications have not been numbered and have been returned as per the following endorsements: “Returned on 18.01.2017: “This Court has disposed off the cases by considering the case records and evidence on had 3/16 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.(MD).Nos.1794 and 1795 of 2017 pronounced considered Judgment on merits, How this petitioner is entertainable. Time one month”. Thereafter represented on 13.02.2017 and the same was further returned on 16.02.2017: “(1) How this petition is maintainable. (2) Any rulings in the supporting of the representation may be submitted. Time one month” and...","A mere running of the eye over it would clearly indicate and exemplify that if a decree is passed without recording evidence at least partly, of the absentee party, the question of treating it as the one passed under Order XVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure , does not arise and it is deemed to be an exparte decree only and such a decree can be got set aside on petitioning the same trial Court.” “.........13. Setting aside decree ex parte against defendant. -- In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the Court that 10/16 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.(MD).Nos.1794 and 1795 of 2017 the summons was not duly served,or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into Court...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114037796/,Unclear,unclear,2023,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,114037796,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114037796/,15
Madhya Pradesh High Court,"Prem Masih vs Mst. Kumudani Bai And Anr. on 30 November, 1973",AIR1974MP88,1973-11-30,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 14, Section 16, Section 17, Section 7",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,ORDER,Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","Court evaluated standard of proof under the Indian Divorce Act, corroboration of testimony, and statutory separation requirements.","1. This is a reference under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act made by the District Judge, Bilaspur, for confirmation of a decree nisi Passed by him under Section 16 of the Act on the ground of adultery of the wife. 2. The petitioner Prem Masih was married to Smt. Kumudanibai, the first respondent on 6th July 1964 and they lived as husband and wife at Jyotipur, Pendra Road, where they were married for about two months. The petitioner wanted the wife to shift to his village home in Chakapendra, District Durg but she refused to so there. At that time, Rajendra Kumar, the second respondent, used to visit the wife and the petitioner suspected intimacy between them. The petitioner joined military service in October 1965. When he came on leave, he found the first respondent residing with the second respondent as wife and husband. The first respondent has also given birth to two children while she was living with the second respondent. These facts have been fully established from the evidence of the petitioner and his witnesses namely....","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/484949/ | AIR1974MP88, AIR 1974 MADHYA PRADESH 88, 1974 JABLJ 247, 1974 MPLJ 188, ILR (1975) MP 565",Adultery,adultery,1973,dissolution,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1974MP88, AIR 1974 MADHYA PRADESH 88, 1974 JABLJ 247, 1974 MPLJ 188, ILR (1975) MP 565",484949,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/484949/,2
Madras High Court,"M. Mallika vs M. Raju And Anr. on 11 February, 2005",OP.No. 30 of 2002,2005-02-11,"ORDER   Prabha Sridevan, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955",Section 10,Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER Prabha Sridevan, J. 1. This revision has been filed against the interlocutory order passed in HMOP.No. 30 of 2002, impleading the second respondent herein as correspondent. 2. The first respondent herein filed the above OP for divorce on the grounds of adultery, cruelty and desertion. The petitioner herein filed her counter denying all the allegations. Subsequently, the first respondent filed this application in I.A.No. 31 of 2003 to implead the second respondent alleging that he is the paramour and that his wife (the petitioner herein) is living with him in adultery. According to the first respondent, the presence of the second respondent was necessary for effective adjudication for the main controversy. 3. The petitioner herein resisted the said application on the ground that it is not necessary to implead the second respondent and the first respondent having failed to raise specific pleadings and having failed to set out specific acts of adultery and having failed to speak about the same when he was in the box as a witness, cannot now fill up the lacuna in his case by impleading the second respondent.","4. The Court below came to the conclusion that the first respondent had stated in the main petition, that the petitioner has developed illicit intimacy with her sister's husband (the 2nd respondent herein) and was continuously living in adultery with her sister's husband and that in Ex.R-2, reply notice the name of the alleged paramour is specifically mentioned, but in the petition, as well as in the box, the first respondent had only stated that the petitioner was living an adulterous life with her sister's husband without naming the second respondent. The Court below came to the conclusion that without impleading the second respondent, the issue cannot, be fully decided. The Court below referred to the decision in Easwaran v. Mani , 2001 (1) MLJ 318, in support of its conclusion. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that while the impleadment of the co-respondent is made mandatory in the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act , the legislature thought it fit not to introduce a similar Section in the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore, it is not necessary to implead the second respondent. The learned counsel would also submit that the allegations in the pleadings are...",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"4. The Court below came to the conclusion that the first respondent had stated in the main petition, that the petitioner has developed illicit intimacy with her sister's husband (the 2nd respondent herein) and was continuously living in adultery with her sister's husband and that in Ex.R-2, reply notice the name of the alleged paramour is specifically mentioned, but in the petition, as well as in the box, the first respondent had only stated that the petitioner was living an adulterous life with her sister's husband without naming the second respondent. The Court below came to the conclusion that without impleading the second respondent, the issue cannot, be fully decided. The Court below referred to the decision in Easwaran v. Mani , 2001 (1) MLJ 318, in support of its conclusion. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that while the impleadment of the co-respondent is made mandatory in the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act , the legislature thought it fit not to introduce a similar Section in the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore, it is...","8. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand submitted that in the pleadings it is clearly stated that the petitioner is having an adulterous relationship with her sister's husband, who is none other than the 2nd respondent. The learned counsel submitted that the Court below had rightly held that the presence of the second respondent was necessary to adjudicate the dispute. 9. The extract from the judgment, in Easwaran v. Mani , 2001 (1) MLJ 318, was not just a passing comment and this is seen from the following paragraphs in the said judgment : ""10..... The husband also had not given the name of any particular individual as the adulterer. In the absence of any particular individual being named and in the absence of proof of want of access to the parties living in the same village, it is very dangerous to come to the conclusion that the wife committed adultery exposing herself to be slapped with a proceedings for divorce........ 14. It has been held in Rajee v. Baburao , 1995 TNLJ 239 as follows: ""In a petition for divorce, rules require that the specific act of adultery and the occasion when and the place where such acts were committed together with the name and address of the person with whom such adultery was...","13. The CRP is therefore dismissed accordingly. Consequently, connected CMP is closed.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/140596/ | 2005(2)CTC28, II(2005)DMC143",Adultery,adultery,2005,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: 2005(2)CTC28, II(2005)DMC143",140596,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/140596/,5
Calcutta High Court,"Joseph Anthony Sweenney vs Mercy Beatrice Catherine Sweenney And ... on 18 March, 1935",operly. But time and again she relapsed into her dis,1935-03-18,"JUDGMENT    Costello, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Indian Evidence Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 112, Section 118, Section 17",Adultery; Desertion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Costello, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. This is a reference under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act for confirmation of a decree for dissolution of marriage made by the District Judge of Midnapore. 2. The petitioner is Joseph Anthony Sweenney and the respondent is Mercy Beatrice Catherine Sweenney. The husband petitioner was seeking dissolution of his marriage with the respondent on the ground of latter's adultery with a man named Lazarus Thaddeus who was made the co-respondent in the proceedings and against whom the learned Judge made an order for payment of costs. 3. The petitioner by his petition averred that he was married to the respondent on June 29, 1926, at the Church of the Sacred Heart at Kharagpur. The respondent at that time was a spinster. Both the petitioner and the respondent profess the Christian religion. They are Anglo-Indians and are domiciled in India. After the marriage the petitioner lived and cohabited with the respondent at Kharagpur. There was no issue of the marriage. The petitioner's case was that within a few months of the marriage he discovered that his wife had a number of lovers amongst the young men at Kharagpur. The petitioner endeavoured to check and control the behaviour of the respondent, and from time to time the respondent is said to have asked forgiveness of the petitioner and promised...","19. I, therefore, agree that the case should be remanded.",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/870023/ | 163IND. CAS.749,Adultery,adultery; desertion,1935,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,Equivalent citations: 163IND. CAS.749,870023,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/870023/,5
Madras High Court,"Subbarama Reddiar vs Saraswathi Ammal on 16 March, 1966",No. 9 of 1964,1966-03-16,"Venkatadri, J., Second Appeal. That was held by Kailasam, J., Kailasam, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 100, Section 13, Section 25, Section 56",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"[pre_1] JUDGMENT M. Anantanarayanan, O.C.J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been instituted by one Subbarama Reddiar, the respondent before Venkatadri, J., in C.M.S. No. 9 of 1964, from the judgment and decree of the learned Judge. We may very briefly state that the proceeding before the learned Judge was of the nature of a Second Appeal, in respect of a petition under Section 10(f) and Section 13 of the Hindu, Marriage Act (XXV of 1955), for a decree for judicial separation originally before the learned Principal Subordinate Judge of Chingleput. 2. The learned Principal Subordinate Judge of Chingleput went into the facts of the evidence before him, elaborately on the merits, and held that the act of adultery alleged by the husband (appellant) against his wife Saraswathi Ammal (Respondent) on the occasion in question, was legally proved, and hence that the husband was-entitled to a decree for judicial separation Under Section 10(f) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The matter went up on appeal to the learned District Judge of Chingleput (C.M.A. No. 64 of 1962), and the learned District...","12. Regarded in this light, there are only two arguments that would appear to merit further discussion at our hands. The first is an argument put forward by the learned Counsel for the respondent, but not referred to by the learned Judge. It is that the conclusion of the trial Court, and even the conclusion of the first appellate Court are not couched in such explicit terms as to lead to an inference that those Courts thought that the fact of adultery had been established beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, reference is made to one observation of the trial Court, that the evidence about adulterous intercourse was very flimsy, and depended entirely on the interested testimony of P.W. 1 and the corroborative testimony of P.W. 2 etc. We do not think that we would be justified in taking a stray observation from the judgment of the trial Court, and basing any power of interference upon that as involving a principle of law. The judgments of the two Courts are clear and explicit that on the evidence, they found the fact of adultery proved to their satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt. Nor can it be doubted that, if the evidence is to...",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"12. Regarded in this light, there are only two arguments that would appear to merit further discussion at our hands. The first is an argument put forward by the learned Counsel for the respondent, but not referred to by the learned Judge. It is that the conclusion of the trial Court, and even the conclusion of the first appellate Court are not couched in such explicit terms as to lead to an inference that those Courts thought that the fact of adultery had been established beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, reference is made to one observation of the trial Court, that the evidence about adulterous intercourse was very flimsy, and depended entirely on the interested testimony of P.W. 1 and the corroborative testimony of P.W. 2 etc. We do not think that we would be justified in taking a stray observation from the judgment of the trial Court, and basing any power of interference upon that as involving a principle of law. The judgments of the two Courts are clear and explicit that on the evidence, they found the fact...","JUDGMENT M. Anantanarayanan, O.C.J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been instituted by one Subbarama Reddiar, the respondent before Venkatadri, J., in C.M.S. No. 9 of 1964, from the judgment and decree of the learned Judge. We may very briefly state that the proceeding before the learned Judge was of the nature of a Second Appeal, in respect of a petition under Section 10(f) and Section 13 of the Hindu, Marriage Act (XXV of 1955), for a decree for judicial separation originally before the learned Principal Subordinate Judge of Chingleput. 2. The learned Principal Subordinate Judge of Chingleput went into the facts of the evidence before him, elaborately on the merits, and held that the act of adultery alleged by the husband (appellant) against his wife Saraswathi Ammal (Respondent) on the occasion in question, was legally proved, and hence that the husband was-entitled to a decree for judicial separation Under Section 10(f) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The matter went up on appeal to the learned District Judge of Chingleput (C.M.A. No. 64 of 1962), and the learned District Judge of Chingleput confirmed the judgment of the Court below in first appeal, in a judgment of some length, which again proceeds to an analysis of the evidence. There can be no doubt that the appeal against this order before the...","15. In the light of the above analysis, we allow the Letters Patent Appeal, set aside the decree of Venkatadri, J. and restore the decree for judicial separation, granted by the trial Court. We also direct, Under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act (XXV of 1955), that the husband do pay the wife alimony of Rs. 35 per mensem awarded by the Courts originally till such time as she becomes-disentitled to it by any second marriage. The parties will bear their own costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/450349/ | (1966)2MLJ263, AIR 1967 MADRAS 85, (1966) 79 MADLW 382, (1966) 2 MADLJ263, ILR (1968) 1 MAD 205",Adultery,adultery,1966,judicial_separation,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: (1966)2MLJ263, AIR 1967 MADRAS 85, (1966) 79 MADLW 382, (1966) 2 MADLJ263, ILR (1968) 1 MAD 205",450349,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/450349/,4
Calcutta High Court,"A.J. Tulloch vs M.P. Tulloch And Anr. on 30 July, 1974",open concubinage with the co-respondent. The petitio,1974-07-30,"JUDGMENT    Sudhamay Basu, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Indian Evidence Act, 1872","Section 10, Section 115, Section 188, Section 3, Section 488, Section 50, Section 7",Adultery,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT Sudhamay Basu, J.","2. In an answer the respondent denied that she resided with the petitioner at 83, Park Street within the jurisdiction of this Court or that she resides or ever resided with the corespondent at Santragachi as alleged or at all. She has, inter alia, denied the allegations that she had met or was living with the co-respondent at Santragachi as alleged or at all. She had denied that the petitioner or the private investigator did or could find her sharing the same bed room with the co-respondent as alleged or at all. She further denies that she confessed or that there can be any reason or occasion for the confession that she was a concubine of the co-respondent. She has also dealt with other allegations in the petition which will not be material to take note of. 3. The co-respondent has also filed an answer denying that the respondent was residing with him or ever resided with him as alleged or at all. The co-respondent has also denied the allegations of adultery or living in concubinage with him by the respondent. 4. On the basis of the said allegations the following three issues were raised. 1. (a) Did the petitioner...",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (adultery) are established by substantive evidence.,"27. It maybe mentioned that Rao did not impress the Court. Mr. D'Rose fairly conceded that perhaps too much of confidence in himself induced him to make statements which were not always correct. Prosad's state-merits also involved contradiction but as Mr. D'Rose pleaded, his evidence in entirety need not be discarded. The Court assumes from his statement as corroborated by others such as Mr. Macmarquis, Mr. Tulloch, Rodney and Mrs. Charlesworth that Maxine was seen at the house of Mr. Macmarquis on the 24th, 30th April, 1st May and 22nd of May, 1973 and that some ladies' clothes were found in the bed room of Mr. Macmarquis which Mrs. Charlesworth sought to explain to be hers. The demeanour of Mr. Macmarquis was good. Rodney Everson, however, did not make a good impression. Many of his answers failed to be forthright. Mr. D'Rose. however, made comments that he did not want his past to be investigated. His letter and his prolonged stay at Santragachi were also subject of some legitimate comments by Mr. D'Rose. It is not necessary for the purpose...","2. In an answer the respondent denied that she resided with the petitioner at 83, Park Street within the jurisdiction of this Court or that she resides or ever resided with the corespondent at Santragachi as alleged or at all. She has, inter alia, denied the allegations that she had met or was living with the co-respondent at Santragachi as alleged or at all. She had denied that the petitioner or the private investigator did or could find her sharing the same bed room with the co-respondent as alleged or at all. She further denies that she confessed or that there can be any reason or occasion for the confession that she was a concubine of the co-respondent. She has also dealt with other allegations in the petition which will not be material to take note of. 3. The co-respondent has also filed an answer denying that the respondent was residing with him or ever resided with him as alleged or at all. The co-respondent has also denied the allegations of adultery or living in concubinage with him by the...","6. Mr. Sarkar, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent challenged the factum of residence at 83, Park Street, Calcutta by the petitioner and the respondent from the 1st of February to 8th of February, 1971. His contention was mainly twofold. Firstly that the petitioner has failed to establish the factum of stay; Secondly that even if the factum was there, it constituted no residence within the meaning df Section 3 of the Indian Divorce Act. Referring to the evidence of the petitioner in this Court and also his evidence in a previous proceeding Mr. Sarkar took pains to point out some discrepancies with regard to this fact. The petitioner's answer that the co-respondent left at the end of December, came back in January and lived with the respondent (questions 37, 38) and his further answer (questions 421 and 428) that she left him initially were cited as being contrary to the petitioner's case that the petitioner and the respondent lived at Park Street from 1st of February to 8lh of February. After pointing out some other discrepancies in the evidence of the petitioner as to his age and the age of the respondent. Mr. Sarkar invited the Court not to rely on the evidence of the petitioner. 7. He next submitted that even assuming that the factum of stay...","1. The petitioner has come up before this Court for a decree dissolving his marriage with the respondent, Maxine Patrica Tulloch. The petitioner's case is that the petitioner was married with the respondent on the 2nd of July, 1970, according to the Roman Catholic rites. A certificate extract from the register of marriages is annexed to the petition. It is alleged further that the petitioner and tho respondent last resided together at 83, Park Street, Calcutta at the home of the petitioner's sister between 1st of February and the 8th of February, 1971. The petitioner acknowledges the paternity of a child born to tha respondent on the 7th of June, 1972. It is stated that in a previous suit filed by the petitioner in this Court a decree was passed ex parte on 21st of April, 1971 but the same was later on set aside. It transpires that an appeal from the same has since been disposed of against the petitioner. The petitioners case is that the respondent was living in adultery with the co-respondent at Santragachi. The petitioner engaged...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/332380/ | AIR1975CAL243, 79CWN157, AIR 1975 CALCUTTA 243",Adultery,adultery,1974,none,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1975CAL243, 79CWN157, AIR 1975 CALCUTTA 243",332380,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/332380/,9
Delhi High Court - Orders,"Sh Abhinav David Singh & Anr vs State Nct Of Delhi And Anr on 18 May, 2026",Sh Abhinav David Singh & Anr vs State Nct Of Delhi And Anr,2026-05-18,HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 528",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"$~108 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + CRL.M.C. 3885/2026 SH ABHINAV DAVID SINGH & ANR. .....Petitioners Through: Mr. N.L. Singh and Ms. Anita Sharma, Advocates. Petitioner No.1 in-person. Petitioner No.2 via video- conferencing. versus STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ANR .....Respondents Through: Ms. Kiran Bairwa, APP for the State. SI Rohit, P.S.: Uttam Nagar. Ms. Preeti D. Chaudhary and Mr. Amit Masih, Advocates for R-2. Respondent No.2 in-person. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI ORDER % 18.05.2026 CRL.M.A. 15762/2026 (exemption) Exemption granted, subject to just exceptions. The application stands disposed-of.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","By way of the present petition filed under section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023, the petitioners, who are the former husband and sister-in-law of the complainant/respondent No. 2, seek quashing of case FIR No. 0499/2018 dated 07.06.2018 registered under sections 498-A / 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (' IPC ') at P.S.: Uttam Nagar, Delhi. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 29/05/2026 at 21:12:53 2. The petition is premised on Settlement Agreement dated 05.06.2023 arrived at through mediation before the Mediation Centre, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi; and Divorce Decree dated 19.09.2024, which is the culmination of petitions under sections 10A(1) and 10A(2) of the Divorce Act, 1869, whereby the parties had sought dissolution of their marriage by mutual consent. 3. The petition is supported by affidavits of the petitioners, as also of respondent No. 2, alongwith proof of their IDs. 4. Petitioner No.1 as well as respondent No. 2 are present in court. Petitioner No.2 is present via video-conferencing. Their credentials have been verified and they have also been identified by their respective counsel. 5. The parties have confirmed that no child was born from...",The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 29/05/2026 at 21:12:53,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/51134356/,Unclear,unclear,2026,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,51134356,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/51134356/,3
Madhya Pradesh High Court,"Pritish Nandi vs Not Mention on 22 November, 2022",WRIT PETITION No. 21344 of 2022,2022-11-22,"GHAMAPUR, J, Family Court,  J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Family Courts Act, 1984","Section 10, Section 10A, Section 13, Section 13B, Section 23, Section 28, Section 9",Mutual Consent 10A; Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR BEFORE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI ON THE 22nd OF NOVEMBER, 2022 WRIT PETITION No. 21344 of 2022 BETWEEN:- 1. PRITISH NANDI S/O PRASANT KUMAR NANDI, AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS, OCCUPATION: UNEMPLOYED PRAGATISHEEL COLONY NARMADA ROAD BEHIND VIJAYA NURSING HOME JABALPUR (M.P.) (MADHYA PRADESH) 2. HARSHA NANDI W/O PRITISH NANDI, AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, OCCUPATION: TECHNICAL RECRUITER AT AKCELLENCE INFO SOLUTIONS R/O H.NO. 806, BAI KA BAGHECHA, FOURTH STREET, GHAMAPUR, JABALPUR MP (MADHYA PRADESH) .....PETITIONERS (BY SHRI SALEEM REHMAN - ADVOCATE) AND NOT MENTION NOT MENTION NOT MENTION (MADHYA PRADESH) .....RESPONDENTS (NOT MENTION ) This petition coming on for admission this day, th e court passed the following: ORDER",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""13B Divorce by mutual consent.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the District Court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage wa s solemnised before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 , on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. ""10A. Dissolution of marriage by mutual consent.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, a petition for dissolution of marriage may be presented to the District Court by both t h e parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of...","It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the husband and Date: 2022.11.23 18:45:00 IST 2 wife are of Indian domicile and are Christians by faith and religion. On 23.7.2018 both of them were lawfully married. Marriage certificate dated 29.8.2018 was issued. Since their marriage was not successful, therefore, they have decided to obtain the decree of divorce by mutual consent. Both of them have decided to seek divorce and to live separately, therefore, it was prayed that pendency of divorce petition may be waived off. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no possibility of compromise between the parties in future.","Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","The husband and wife have jointly filed an application under section 10-A of the Divorce Act, 1869, before the Addl. Principal Judge, Family Court, Jabalpur, in Case No.CCB/16/2009.RCSA.91/2022 for waiving off the cooling Signature Not Verified SAN period, which has been rejected. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Amardeep singh Vs. Harveen Kaur , reported in AIR 2017 SC 4417 , has considered the question whether the minimum period of six months stipulated under section 13(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1955') for a motion for a passing decree of divorce on the basis of mutual consent is mandatory or directory and whether such period can be relaxed in exceptional situation. The object of the provisions contained in section 13B of the Act of 1955 was considered by the Apex court and it was held as follows :- ""7. In Amardeep Singh (supra), after analysing the provision contained in Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Hon'ble Supreme Court further held as follows: ""18. Applying the above to the present situation, we are of the view that where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13-B(2) , it can do so after considering the...",(S. A. DHARMADHIKARI) JUDGE HS Signature Not Verified SAN Digitally signed by HEMANT SARAF Date: 2022.11.23 18:45:00 IST,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10164126/,Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; unclear,2022,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,10164126,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10164126/,12
Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati,"Smt. Ganta Kathimanda Sharmila, vs Ganta Prashant Kumar, on 27 July, 2022",OP No.91 of 2021 on,2022-07-27,"KVL, J","Indian Divorce Act, 1869",Section 10,Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"1 KVL, J Trcmp No.46 of 2022 HON'BLE SMT JUSTICE KONGARA VIJAYA LAKSHMI Transfer CMP No.46 of 2022 ORDER: This transfer CMP is filed seeking to transfer FC OP No.91 of 2021 on the file of the Judge, Family Court (III Additional District Judge), Vizianagaram to be tried by the Judge, Family Court (V Additional District Judge), Visakhapatnam.","Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent is at present working at Chennai and that it will be difficult for him to travel to Visakahpatnam. As the respondent is not residing at Vizianagaram, where HM OP No.91 of 2021 was instituted by him, it makesno difference for him, even if the case is transferred from Vizianagaram to Viskhapatnam. In view of the facts and circumstances and in the light of the above referred judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, FC OP No.91 of 2021 on the file of the Judge, Family Court, Vizianagaram is withdrawn and 6 KVL, J Trcmp No.46 of 2022 transferred to the file of the Judge, Family court, Visakhapatnam, to be tried in accordance with law. As the respondent is working in a private institution at Chennai, his appearance may be dispensed with except on the dates when his appearance is necessary for the disposal of the case. The transfer CMP is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this petition, shall stand closed.",Whether grounds for dissolution under Section 10 (unclear) are established by substantive evidence.,"Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent. Perused the record. The number of divorce and related matters are increasing day by day for various reasons and in such matters both the spouses may face genuine difficulties. The spouse against whom the transfer proceeding is instituted would face hardship and inconvenience by being required to commute to a distant court, while the spouse who has instituted the original proceeding may genuinely suffer grave inconvenience if the proceeding is transferred to a distant court within whose jurisdiction the other spouse resides. Hence, the transfer matters have to be decided basing on the facts of each case. In Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena 1 , the Hon‟ble Supreme Court referred to the decision in „K.A. Abdul Jaleel vs. T.A.Shahida 2 and laid stress on securing speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the said case held as follows: ""It has come to the notice of the Court that on certain occasions the Family Courts have been granting adjournments...","Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent is at present working at Chennai and that it will be difficult for him to travel to Visakahpatnam. As the respondent is not residing at Vizianagaram, where HM OP No.91 of 2021 was instituted by him, it makesno difference for him, even if the case is transferred from Vizianagaram to Viskhapatnam. In view of the facts and circumstances and in the light of the above referred judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, FC OP No.91 of 2021 on the file of the Judge, Family Court, Vizianagaram is withdrawn and 6 KVL, J Trcmp No.46 of 2022 transferred to the file of the Judge, Family court, Visakhapatnam, to be tried in accordance with law. As the respondent is working in a private institution at Chennai, his appearance may be dispensed with except on the dates when his appearance is necessary for the disposal of the case. The transfer CMP is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this petition, shall stand closed.","Brief facts of the case are that, respondent is the husband of the petitioner and their marriage was performed on 14.02.2018 at Pentecoastal Church, Vizianagaram as per Christian customs and religious rites; out of the wedlock, they were blessed with a female child on 16.04.2019; after the marriage, as the respondent used to harass the petitioner in all forms, she filed MC No.4 of 2021 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Chodavaram seeking maintenance to herself and for her minor child; after receipt of the notice in the above case, respondent filed FC OP No.91 of 2021 on the file of the Judge, Family Court, Vizianagaram for dissolution of the marriage under Section 10(x) of the Divorce Act, 1869; at the time of filing of the MC No.4 of 2021, petitioner was staying along with her mother at Chodavaram, where her mother used to work as a Teacher and she retired from service on 30.11.2021 and later they came down to Visakhapatnam; as the petitioner being a house wife, dependent on her mother, with a minor child and does not have financial support, it is very difficult for her to travel to Vizianagaram from Visakhapatnam and hence, she filed the present petition to transfer FC OP No.91 of 2021 to the Court of the Judge, Family...","__________________________ KONGARA VIJAYA LAKSHMI, J Date: 27.07.2022 BSS 7 KVL, J Trcmp No.46 of 2022 HON'BLE SMT JUSTICE KONGARA VIJAYA LAKSHMI Transfer CMP No.46 of 2022 30 Date: 27.07.2022 BSS",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68470164/,Unclear,unclear,2022,unclear,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,68470164,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68470164/,5
Karnataka High Court,"Kashavva W/O. Lagmanna Hanamannavar vs Devaki Alleging To Be W/O. Lagamanna ... on 13 July, 2023",operties. Plaintiff asserted that,2023-07-13,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869","Section 10, Section 100, Section 50",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"9. Heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as respondent. Perused records. 10. This Court while admitting the appeal on 23.08.2013 has framed the following substantial question of law:- 11. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that admittedly, the defendant is the daughter of elder sister of Lagamanna and he would contend that her marriage was solmanised about 35 years aback along with the marriage of other brothers of Lagamanna. He would contend that plaintiff in her entire pleading, nowhere pleaded as to when her marriage was solmanised, where it was solmanised and who have attended the marriage. It is further asserted that she has also not examined any of the witnesses to show that Society has treated them as -9- RSA No. 5446 of 2012 husband and wife and even her brothers and sisters were not examined in this regard. He would also contend that no doubt certain records show her as wife of Lagamanna, but, she had illicit relationship with Lagamanna and the documents produced by the defendant would disclose that she was married well in advance with Lagamanna and as such, question of plaintiff claiming legally wedded wife does...","26. The learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the long standing relationship between Lagamanna and plaintiff establish the legal status. But, the same rule is also applicable to defendant. As - 22 -","5. The Trial Court on the basis of the rival pleadings has framed the following issues:- Issues ""1. Whether the plaintiff proves she is the legally wedded wife of deceased Lagamanna Appanna Hammannavar? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves she was in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties as on the date of suit? 3. Whether the plaintiff proves alleged interference? 4. Whether the defendant proves she is the legally wedded wife of Lagamanna Appanna Hammannavar? 5. Whether defendant proves she is the absolute owner and in possession of the suit property? 6. Whether the suit defendant proves there is no cause of action for this suit? 7. Whether the defendant proves that the plaintiff has paid proper court fee has not properly valued the suit? 8. Whether the defendant is entitled for compensatory cost of Rs.10,000/-? 9. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaratory relief as sought...","9. Heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as respondent. Perused records. 10. This Court while admitting the appeal on 23.08.2013 has framed the following substantial question of law:- 11. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that admittedly, the defendant is the daughter of elder sister of Lagamanna and he would contend that her marriage was solmanised about 35 years aback along with the marriage of other brothers of Lagamanna. He would contend that plaintiff in her entire pleading, nowhere pleaded as to when her marriage was solmanised, where it was solmanised and who have attended the marriage. It is further asserted that she has also not examined any of the witnesses to show that Society has treated them as -9- RSA No. 5446 of 2012 husband and wife and even her brothers and sisters were not examined in this regard. He would also contend that no doubt certain records show her as wife of Lagamanna, but, she had illicit relationship with Lagamanna and the documents produced by the defendant would disclose...","26. The learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the long standing relationship between Lagamanna and plaintiff establish the legal status. But, the same rule is also applicable to defendant. As - 22 -","This appeal is filed under Section 100 of CPC, by defendant challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Fast Track court and Adhoc District Judge, Hukkeri, in RA No.364/2011 dated 07.03.2012 and sought for allowing the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment of the First Appellate Court by restoring the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred with the original ranks occupied by them before the Trial Court. 3. Brief facts of the case are as under: This is a suit filed by the plaintiff seeking relief of declaration that she is the legally wedded wife of Lagamanna Appanna Hammannavar and sought injunction against the defendant from causing obstruction and interference in the peaceful possession and enjoyment of -3- RSA No. 5446 of 2012 the suit schedule ABC properties. Plaintiff asserted that she is the legally wedded wife of Lagamanna and their marriage was solmanised as per the customs and traditions of their caste in Ingali village. It is also alleged that after the marriage, she joined Lagamanna for leading marital life and the society has recognized them as husband and wife and the name of the plaintiff is appearing in voters list, ration card, voters ID card as wife of Lagamanna and after the death...","-1- RSA No. 5446 of 2012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF JULY, 2023 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAJENDRA BADAMIKAR REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 5446 OF 2012 BETWEEN SMT. KASHAVVA W/O LAGAMANNA HAMMANNAVAR, AGE: 53 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE & HOUSEHOLD, R/O: INGALI, TAL: HUKKERI, DIST: BELAGAVI. ...APPELLANT (BY SRI. RAMESH.N.MISALE, ADVOCATE) AND SMT. DEVAKI ALLEGED W/O LAGAMANNA HAMMANNAVAR, AGE: 53 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE & HOUSEHOLD, Digitally signed by R/O: INGALI, TAL: HUKKERI, SUJATA SUJATA SUBHASH SUBHASH PAMMAR DIST: BELAGAVI. PAMMAR Date: 2023.07.15 10:50:37 - 0700 ...RESPONDENT (BY SRI. S.B.MANE FOR C/R, ADVOCATE) THIS RSA IS FILED U/S. 100 OF CPC AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DTD: 07.03.2012 PASSED IN R.A.NO.364/2011 ON THE FILE OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER, FAST TRACK COURT AND ADHOC DISTRICT JUDGE, HUKKERI, ALLOWING THE APPEAL BY SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DTD: 11.11.2011 PASSED IN OS.69/06 ON THE FILE OF THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, HUKKERI, AT HUKKERI, DISMISSING THE SUIT FILED FOR DECLARATION AND CONSEQUENTIAL RELIEF OF INJUNCTION. -2- RSA No. 5446 of 2012 THIS APPEAL HAVING...",https://indiankanoon.org/doc/190393115/,Unclear,unclear,2023,none,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,,190393115,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/190393115/,12
Karnataka High Court,"Deva Prasad Reddy vs Kamini Reddy And Anr. on 19 April, 2002",openly claiming herself to be the wife of the defend,2002-04-19,Not specified,"Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 13, Section 2D, Section 44",Mutual Consent 10A; Conversion,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT 1. This is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for declaration and consequential relief. The Court Below has while decreeing the suit held that the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 in this appeal is the legally wedded wife of the defendant-appellant and their daughter Ms. Mrinalini Reddy their only legal heir. The Court has also declared the marriage between the appellant and defendant-respondent No. 2 to be a nullity and restrained the said respondent from claiming herself to be the wife of the appellant. 2. The appellant and plaintiff-respondent No. 1 are Christians by faith. They were married on 21st of January 1992 at Madras as per Roman Catholic rites. After the marriage they lived for sometime in Koramangala from where they later shifted to a house in Coxtown, Bangalore. In May 1992, the plaintiff-wife is alleged to have discovered an extra marital affair between her husband and respondent No. 2 Smt. Nagina. The plaintiffs case is that when confronted the appellant could not explain the illicit liaison and walked out of the house leaving the plaintiff in a helpless state and forcing her to shift residence with her parents in Madras. At Madras she gave birth to a...",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"9. What then remains to be examined is whether the decree of divorce granted by the American Court is valid for if it is a nullity as argued by the appellant, the marriage contracted by the appellant with respondent No. 1 shall also be non-est in the eye of law. On the contrary, if the decree is held to be valid as between the parties and even qua the appellant, the marriage between the appellant and respondent No. 1 shall have to be treated as validly contracted and a declaration to that effect granted. As a necessary consequence, the marriage contracted by the appellant and respondent No. 2 shall have to be declared to be illegal and void ab initio. 23. It is in the light of what we have said in the foregoing paragraphs unnecessary to examine the question whether the judgment and decree passed by the Court in...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","7. By the impugned Judgment, the Family Court decided issue No. 1 in the affirmative and held that the plaintiff was the legally wedded wife of the defendant-appellant herein. Issue No. 2 relating to the subsistence of the marriage between the plaintiff and Sri Robert Selvam was held in the negative. So also issue No. 3 was found against the husband rejecting his version that the marriage between him and the plaintiff was the result of fraud and deceit on the part of the plaintiff. Issue No. 4 relating to the parentage of Ms. Mrinalini Reddy was held in the affirmative and so was issue No. 5 relating to the marriage between the appellant and defendant-respondent No. 2. A decree for declaration and injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff was accordingly granted to the plaintiff, aggrieved whereof the defendant husband has filed the present appeal as noticed earlier. 8. Appearing for the appellant M/s. Raghavan & Ponnappa submitted that the only question that required to be examined in this appeal was whether the decree of divorce granted by the Court in America was valid and enforceable in law. They urged that if the answer to that question be in the affirmative, nothing further would survive for consideration for in that case the marriage between the appellant and respondent No....","13. In Smt. Satya v. Teja Singh , , the Supreme Court held that the Private International Law is not the same in all countries and that there is no system of private international law which could claim universal recognition. The question whether a decree of divorce passed by a foreign Court is entitled to recognition in India must depend principally on the Rules of Private international Law as recognised by Indian Courts. Such recognition is accorded not as an act of courtesy but on considerations of justice. It is implicit, declared the Court, in that process that the foreign law must not offend against the public policy in India. 14. In Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb , the Court was dealing with the question of lack of jurisdiction or mere error of jurisdiction. It pointed out that a distinction had to be drawn between the lack of jurisdiction which strikes at the very root of the exercise and vitiates the proceedings themselves and a mere error in the exercise of jurisdiction, which does not vitiate the legality and validity...","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1539845/ | AIR2002KANT356, II(2002)DMC482, AIR 2002 KARNATAKA 356, 2002 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 1722, (2002) ILR (KANT) (3) 2835, (2002) 2 DMC 482, (2003) 3 KANT LJ 38, (2003) 1 MARRILJ 252, (2002) 4 RECCIVR 758, (2002) 3 ICC 657, (2002) 4 CIVLJ 295",Mutual Consent 10A,mutual_consent_10A; conversion,2002,dissolution,Yes,Post-2001 Amendment,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR2002KANT356, II(2002)DMC482, AIR 2002 KARNATAKA 356, 2002 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 1722, (2002) ILR (KANT) (3) 2835, (2002) 2 DMC 482, (2003) 3 KANT LJ 38, (2003) 1 MARRILJ 252, (2002) 4 RECCIVR 758, (2002) 3 ICC 657, (2002) 4 CIVLJ 295",1539845,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1539845/,11
Orissa High Court,"Smt. Jayanti Munjet vs Asit Kumar Mohanty on 8 January, 1988",opposite party,1988-01-08,"ORDER   S.C. Mohapatra, J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908","Section 10, Section 115, Section 36",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"ORDER S.C. Mohapatra, J.",Respondent contested the allegations and sought dismissal of the petition.,"""36. Alimony pendente lite -- In any suit under this Act, whether it be instituted by a husband or a wife, and whether or not she has obtained an order of protection, the wife may present a petition for alimony pending the suit. Such petition shall be served on the husband, and the Court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements therein contained, may make such order on the husband for payment to the wife of alimony pending the suit as it may deem just : Provided that alimony pending the suit shall, in no case exceed one-fifth of the husband's average net income for the three years next preceding the date of the order, and shall continue, in case of a decree for dissolution of marriage or of nullity of marriage, until the decree is made absolute or is confirmed, as the case may be.""",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"Respondent denied allegations of desertion/cruelty, contending no cause of action under Section 10.","1. The defendant in a suit by the husband under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (for short 'the Act') is the petitioner against an order under Section 36 thereof relating to alimony pendente lite. 2. Section 36 reads as follows : -- 3. There is no dispute that in such a proceeding the application is maintainable. Mr. Aziz, the learned counsel for the wife-petitioner, submitted that the trial Court has not kept in mind the ingredients for determining the quantum of alimony and has arbitrarily fixed the amount basing his determination on surmises. Mr. S.K. Dey, the learned counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand submitted that the determination is reasonable in the circumstances of the case and I ought not to interfere with the order in exercise of power under Section 115 , C.P.C 4. Under Section 36 wife alone has the right to file an application. Principle of natural justice has been reflected in the section itself which requires the copy of the application to be served on the husband. Trial Court is required to consider the truth of the statements made in the application and thereafter, on its findings shall make such order on the husband as it may deem just for payment of alimony to the wife, pending disposal of the suit. In the...","8. With the aforesaid observation, this civil revision is disposed of. No costs.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/739007/ | AIR1988ORI195, AIR 1988 ORISSA 195, (1988) MATLR 301, (1988) 1 ORISSA LR 277, (1988) 1 CURCC 702",Unclear,unclear,1988,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1988ORI195, AIR 1988 ORISSA 195, (1988) MATLR 301, (1988) 1 ORISSA LR 277, (1988) 1 CURCC 702",739007,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/739007/,5
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur,"Mrs. Priti Parihar vs Flt. Lt. Kailash Singh Parihar on 4 October, 1974",AIR1975RAJ52,1974-10-04,"JUDGMENT    B.P. Beri, C.J.","Indian Divorce Act, 1869; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955","Section 10, Section 24, Section 7",Unclear,Decree of Dissolution Granted / Confirmed,"JUDGMENT B.P. Beri, C.J.","9. Learned counsel for the respondent urged that it was a peculiar case where the cross-examination of the petitioner is continuing for the last 27 days and meaningless applications are being endlessly moved. We would not like to express any opinion on the length of the cross-examination in this appeal. The learned District Judge will be at liberty to assess each item of the costs claimed and if he comes to the conclusion that it was unnecessary, he will be well justified in refusing such an expense. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent also urged that the wife is possessed of sufficient means. We are not inclined to open this question in this appeal because the question whether the wife was entitled to expense or not stood settled on 6-4-1972. 11. There are no rules framed for regulating the expenses in matrimonial disputes. The learned District Judge may adopt the standard of costs fixed by the High Court Rules in analogous matters in assessing the quantum of costs. 12. The result is that the wife has made out a case for increase of the costs allowed on 6-4-1972. What that costs would be just shall be determined by the...","4. The first question is, whether this Court had conclusively fixed the expenses by its order dated 6-4-1972 ? The order says.-- ""Out of this amount of Rs. 500/- a sum of Rs. 400/- will be adjusted towards the expenses of litigation in the trial Court and Rs. 100/- towards the expenses of this appeal. It is however, further made clear that this amount of Rs. 400/-will not include the expenses which the present appellant may have to incur in paying reasonable witness expenses in the lower Court."" 5. Would it be right to say that this conclusively determined expenses regardless of the course of litigation ? The answer is in the negative. It is not always possible for any Court to anticipate the situations in the course of a litigation and it should be read to mean that if the litigation proceeded normally this amount was assessed to be...",Petitioner submitted that matrimonial offences of cruelty/desertion/adultery render continuation of marriage impossible.,"9. Learned counsel for the respondent urged that it was a peculiar case where the cross-examination of the petitioner is continuing for the last 27 days and meaningless applications are being endlessly moved. We would not like to express any opinion on the length of the cross-examination in this appeal. The learned District Judge will be at liberty to assess each item of the costs claimed and if he comes to the conclusion that it was unnecessary, he will be well justified in refusing such an expense. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent also urged that the wife is possessed of sufficient means. We are not inclined to open this question in this appeal because the question whether the wife was entitled to expense or not stood settled on 6-4-1972. 11. There are no rules framed for regulating the expenses in matrimonial disputes. The learned District Judge may adopt the standard of costs fixed by the High Court Rules in analogous matters in assessing the quantum of costs. 12. The result is that the wife has made out a...","1. This is an appeal by a wife, who is defending a suit for judicial separation under the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter called ""the Act"") in the Court of the District Judge. Jodhpur, directed against the judgment of the learned single Judge dated July 4, 1973, who summarily dismissed her appeal, wherein she had claimed additional expenses from her husband under Section 24 of the Act. 2. In S. B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 49/72 this Court had allowed a sum of Rs. 500/- to the wife for meeting her expenses of the litigation by its order dated 6-4-1972. The wife urged before the trial Court by an application dated 4-4-1973 that in order to defend herself she had to go up to the High Court twice. Apart from this expenditure, several applications were moved by her before the trial Court, besides the petitioner having amended his petition she had to amend her written statement and she had thus incurred expenditure to the extent of Rs. 765/-. which sum did not include the professional fees of the lawyers for the trial Court, The learned District Judge observed, reading the order dated 6-4-1972 passed by this Court, that it ""conclusively determined the right of the non-petitioner to claim expenses to contest and defend this matrimonial case ..... and the expenses now...","13. We allow this appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and remand the case to the learned District Judge, Jodhpur and fix a sum of Rs. 100/-for costs in this Court as well as before the learned single Judge by way of an additional expense. This enquiry shall not paralyse the progress of the parent petition.","https://indiankanoon.org/doc/974415/ | AIR1975RAJ52, 1974(7)WLN639",Unclear,unclear,1974,unclear,Yes,Pre-2001 Act,Yes,"Equivalent citations: AIR1975RAJ52, 1974(7)WLN639",974415,https://indiankanoon.org/doc/974415/,8