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hll-240052-3 | 0.1 | constitutional | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "24-0052",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462693/240052.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Kelly Hancock, Acting Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas; The Office of the Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas; and Ken Pax... | {
"[A]": "Kelly Hancock, Acting Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas",
"[B]": "RJR Vapor Co., LLC",
"[C]": "Ken Paxton, Attorney General of the State of Texas",
"[Product]": "VELO",
"[Justice]": "Justice Busby",
"[Concurring Justice]": "Justice Sullivan"
} | [B] sells oral nicotine pouches in Texas under the brand [Product]. Each pouch is a porous fleece sachet, somewhat like a tea bag, filled with a dry powder whose primary ingredient is microcrystalline cellulose (processed non-tobacco plant matter) infused with nicotine isolate (99% pure nicotine chemically extracted fr... | Must the Supreme Court of Texas conduct a separate void-for-vagueness analysis of the tax statute? Identify the two due-process concerns vagueness doctrine addresses, explain how the court treats each in the tax context, and state the court's disposition of the vagueness argument. | {
"outcome": "other",
"issue": "Whether a taxpayer's void-for-vagueness challenge to a tax statute requires independent analysis where the court has held the statute unambiguously applies to the taxpayer's product and the taxpayer also asserts an equal-and-uniform challenge.",
"standard": "A vague statute can off... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We hold that RJR’s void-for-vagueness argument is inapt."
},
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Accordingly, there is no need for a distinct analysis of RJR’s vagueness challenge."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "A vague statute can offend due process... | {
"hallucination": "Any citation not in the opinion or fabricated case name/holding caps the item at 25%; check reporter volumes and pin cites against the opinion.",
"issue": "Full credit: frames the issue as whether vagueness adds anything beyond existing tax doctrines, not as a freestanding merits question on vag... | null | null |
hll-240102-3 | 0.1 | constitutional | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "24-0102",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462695/240102.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. City of Corsicana and Navarro County"
} | {
"[A]": "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.",
"[B]": "City of Corsicana",
"[C]": "Navarro County",
"[D]": "Corsicana Industrial Foundation",
"[E]": "Gander Mountain",
"[F]": "Fun Town RV",
"[G]": "Home Depot",
"[Shopping Center]": "Corsicana Crossing",
"[Justice]": "Blacklock",
"[Dissenting Justice]": "Gray... | A municipality ([B]) and a county ([C]) in Texas sought to spur development of a large new shopping center ([Shopping Center]) by attracting a flagship outdoor-retail store ([E]) and a big-box hardware store ([G]) as anchors. [B] and [C] entered agreements with a nonprofit corporation ([D]) that owned the project site,... | The lower courts held the agreements unconstitutional in part because they lacked sufficient controls to ensure the public purpose would be accomplished, reasoning that nothing in the contracts ensured the anchor store would keep operating. Assume the Supreme Court of Texas holds that Gift Clause scrutiny (including th... | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether, measured against the constitutionally relevant public purpose of economic development (rather than continued operation of one store), the sales-tax grant agreements contained sufficient controls to ensure the public purpose is accomplished and to protect the ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "An overly narrow conception of the deal’s public purpose also infected the lowe... | {
"issue": "Full credit: identifies that the controls question must be measured against economic development generally, not the single store.",
"standard": "Full credit: TML's 'retain public control over the funds to ensure the public purpose is accomplished and protect the public's investment'; partial for a gener... | null | null |
hll-240385-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "24-0385",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462610/240384_240385pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-04-24T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Greg Abbott, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Texas; Stephanie Muth, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of... | {
"[Governor]": "Abbott, Greg (Governor of the State of Texas)",
"[Commissioner]": "Muth, Stephanie (Commissioner of DFPS)",
"[Former Commissioner]": "Masters, Jaime",
"[Agency]": "Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS)",
"[A]": "Doe, Jane and John (parents of Mary Doe)",
"[A-child]": "Doe, Mar... | Several families of minors diagnosed with gender dysphoria obtained temporary injunctions in a Texas district court prohibiting the state's child-protective-services agency ([Agency]) and its commissioner from investigating reports that a minor received puberty blockers or hormone therapy for gender transitioning, afte... | Evaluate the plaintiffs' voluntary-cessation argument. State the standard the Supreme Court of Texas applies to a defendant's voluntary cessation of challenged conduct in the mootness analysis, explain whether the agency's closure of the investigations and its testimony satisfy that standard despite the plaintiffs' con... | {
"outcome": "vacated",
"issue": "Whether an agency's voluntary closure of its investigations, coupled with its testimony that it will not investigate new reports involving the same allegation, moots the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief notwithstanding the plaintiffs' argument that voluntary cessation is a ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgments, dismiss the appeals, and vacate the trial court’s temporary-injunction orders for lack of jurisdiction."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "Instead, they argue that dismissal for... | {
"issue": "Full credit: frames the question as whether voluntary cessation (closure plus no-reinvestigation commitment) moots the injunctive claims; recognizes plaintiffs do not dispute the facts but contest the legal effect.",
"standard": "Full credit: 'absolutely clear the conduct could not reasonably be expecte... | null | null |
hll-240782-2 | 0.1 | constitutional | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "24-0782",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462696/240782.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Ryan Busse, Josh Klostermann, Russel Klostermann, Layne Klostermann, Mitch Thomas, Olivia Rincones, Robert Rincones, Ruben Rincones, Enrica Rincones, Angelita ... | {
"[A]": "Ryan Busse, Josh Klostermann, Russel Klostermann, Layne Klostermann, Mitch Thomas, Olivia Rincones, Robert Rincones, Ruben Rincones, Enrica Rincones, Angelita Garcia, Adelaida Garcia, Aniceto Garcia, Betty Garcia, Railey Rincones, Gary Busse, Alison Savage (the individual Taxpayers)",
"[B]": "Lyford Conso... | [C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters jo... | Does [B] have standing? Identify the governing test and the standard for reviewing an evidence-based plea to the jurisdiction, explain how each element applies to [B]'s alleged injuries and to its reliance on the school-finance cases, and state the disposition as to [B]'s claims. | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether a school district located within a neighboring taxing district's boundaries has constitutional standing to challenge that district's ad valorem tax based on alleged funding disadvantages, double taxation of its residents, and competitive harm.",
"standard": "When a plea ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Thus, we hold the court of appeals did not err in dismissing LCISD’s claims for lack of standing."
},
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "and we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment to the extent it dismisses LCISD’s claims on that basis."
},
{
"field": "stan... | {
"issue": "Full credit: standing of the neighboring district on all three elements, distinct from the individual taxpayers.",
"standard": "Full credit: evidence-based plea reviewed like traditional summary judgment (Alamo Heights/Miranda), plea must be granted if no fact issue; three-part standing test including t... | true | null |
hll-240782-3 | 0.1 | constitutional | 5 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "24-0782",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462696/240782.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Ryan Busse, Josh Klostermann, Russel Klostermann, Layne Klostermann, Mitch Thomas, Olivia Rincones, Robert Rincones, Ruben Rincones, Enrica Rincones, Angelita ... | {
"[A]": "Ryan Busse, Josh Klostermann, Russel Klostermann, Layne Klostermann, Mitch Thomas, Olivia Rincones, Robert Rincones, Ruben Rincones, Enrica Rincones, Angelita Garcia, Adelaida Garcia, Aniceto Garcia, Betty Garcia, Railey Rincones, Gary Busse, Alison Savage (the individual Taxpayers)",
"[B]": "Lyford Conso... | [C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters jo... | As to [A] only: which standing framework applies (the general three-part constitutional test or the taxpayer-standing doctrine), and why? Address each of [C]'s three arguments and the 'significant disruption' rationale drawn from Bland, and state whether the court of appeals' dismissal of [A]'s claims should stand. | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether individual taxpayers who personally pay an allegedly unconstitutional ad valorem tax must satisfy the narrow taxpayer-standing doctrine-and may be denied standing because their suit would disrupt government operations-or whether their pocketbook injury satisfi... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "But we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing the Taxpayers’ claims for lack of standing."
},
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Because these allegations establish the Taxpayers’ constitutional standing, the court of appeals erred in relying on the taxpay... | {
"issue": "Full credit: recognizes the choice of framework (ordinary constitutional standing vs. taxpayer-standing doctrine) is itself the dispositive question and that pocketbook injury satisfies the ordinary test.",
"standard": "Full credit: three-part test; shared injury still particularized (Data Foundry, Mexi... | true | null |
hll-240924-4 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "24-0924",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462698/240924.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "MV Transportation, Inc. v. GDS Transport, LLC"
} | {
"[A]": "MV Transportation, Inc.",
"[A-Sub]": "MVCT (MV Contract Transportation, Inc.)",
"[B]": "GDS Transport, LLC",
"[Authority]": "Dallas Area Rapid Transit Authority (DART)",
"[Justice]": "Young, J."
} | [Authority] is one of the state's largest regional public-transit authorities organized under Chapter 452 of the Tex. Transp. Code. Its mission includes microtransit and paratransit services (small-vehicle and origin-to-destination service for riders who cannot use fixed routes). After a request for information seeking... | Was the court of appeals correct that [A]'s § 452.056(d) defense was not established as a matter of law, so that the fraud claim survives Rule 91a? State what Rule 91a permits the court to consider, whether an affirmative statutory limitation on liability can ground a Rule 91a dismissal at the pleading stage, the stand... | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether an affirmative statutory defense limiting a contractor's liability to that of the transit authority can support Rule 91a dismissal when the facts establishing the defense come from the plaintiff's own live pleading and its incorporated agreement.",
"standard... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The trial court correctly granted the Rule 91a motion. We reverse the court of appeals’ contrary judgment and reinstate the trial court’s judgment of dismissal as to MV Transportation."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "The court held, see id., that the trial court... | {
"issue": "Full credit: whether an affirmative statutory defense (§ 452.056(d)) is established as a matter of law on the plaintiff's own pleading (and incorporated agreement) so as to support Rule 91a dismissal; not a general derivative-immunity question.",
"standard": "Full credit: 91a.1 no-basis-in-law test; 91a... | null | null |
hll-250012-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 5 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "25-0012",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462613/250010_250012pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-04-24T00:00:00",
"caseName": "The Mabee Ranch Royalty Partnership, L.P.; 315 MR, Inc.; 93 JM, Inc.; Rock River Minerals, LP; Primitive Petroleum, Inc.; Austen Campbell, Co-Executor... | {
"[A]": "Fasken Oil and Ranch, Ltd.; Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.; and Fasken Royalty Investments, Ltd. (plaintiffs/respondents, the royalty holder)",
"[B]": "The Mabee Ranch Royalty Partnership, L.P.; 315 MR, Inc.; 93 JM, Inc.; Rock River Minerals, LP; Primitive Petroleum, Inc.; Austen Campbell and Janet Campbe... | Under a 1930s deed covering a large ranch in West Texas ([Ranch]), [A] holds a reserved “undivided one-fourth (1/4th) of the usual one eighth (1/8th) royalty” in the oil, gas, and other minerals. For roughly 85 years the parties to the deed and their successors treated the instrument as reserving a fixed 1/32 royalty: ... | Decide the petitions for review as to jurisdiction. Was the court of appeals correct that it lacked jurisdiction in a permissive interlocutory appeal to reach the presumed-grant doctrine because the trial court’s certification order did not expressly list that doctrine among its controlling questions of law? State the ... | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether an appellate court that has accepted a permissive interlocutory appeal has jurisdiction to reach an issue (the presumed-grant doctrine) that the trial court’s certification order did not expressly identify as a controlling question of law.",
"standard": "Onc... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We accordingly grant the petitions for review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment as to jurisdiction, vacate the judgment on the merits, and remand the case to the court of appeals for a fresh consideration of the merits."
},
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We... | {
"issue": "Identifies scope of permissive-appeal jurisdiction (fairly-included subsidiary/ancillary issues), not merely whether the doctrine was listed.",
"standard": "States the Elephant Ins. v. Kenyon rule: same principles as any other appeal; the order is reviewed; no strict construction of issues presented.",
... | null | null |
hll-250461-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "25-0461",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462700/250461.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In re ACE American Insurance Company; Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company; GuideOne National Insurance Company; Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, Lon... | {
"[A]": "ACE American Insurance Company",
"[B]": "Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company",
"[C]": "GuideOne National Insurance Company",
"[D]": "Underwriters at Lloyd's, London and Company Market",
"[E]": "StarStone Specialty Insurance Company",
"[F]": "Starr Specialty Lines Insurance Agency, LLC",... | [I], [J], and [K] (collectively, the Insured) own, lease, and manage commercial properties nationwide. A group of carriers, [A], [B], [C], [D], [E], [F], and [G] on behalf of [H] (collectively, the Insurers), issued commercial-property policies covering those properties for a one-year policy period. A water line supply... | Was the Insurers' right to demand appraisal triggered? Decide whether a policy clause conditioned on the parties' disagreeing on the amount of loss requires the insurer to have stated a definitive, consistent valuation (or to have reached an impasse) before a genuine disagreement exists, and state the Court's dispositi... | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether a genuine 'disagreement on the amount of loss' sufficient to trigger the appraisal clause requires the insurer to have taken a definitive and consistent position on the amount of loss.",
"standard": "To 'disagree' is simply 'to fail to agree'; the appraisal ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We conditionally grant Insurers’ petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to grant Insurers’ motion to compel appraisal."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "To “disagree” is, quite simply, “to fail to agree.”"
},
{
"field": "standard",
... | {
"issue": "Identifies trigger question: whether a definitive valuation is a precondition to disagreement.",
"standard": "Plain meaning of disagree = fail to agree; distinguishes impasse (waiver-by-delay) from disagreement (trigger).",
"authority": "In re Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d 404 (impasse vs disagre... | null | null |
hll-251085-1 | 0.1 | real-property | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "25-1085",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462701/251085pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Kevin F. Karli, James W. Dobbs, Margaret E. Dobbs, Henry C. McQuaide, III, Chris H. Hoegemeyer, Kyle W. Hoegemeyer, William H. Hoegemeyer II, Sam Wigington, ... | {
"[A1]": "Kevin F. Karli",
"[A2]": "James W. Dobbs",
"[A3]": "Margaret E. Dobbs",
"[A4]": "Henry C. McQuaide, III",
"[A5]": "Chris H. Hoegemeyer",
"[A6]": "Kyle W. Hoegemeyer",
"[A7]": "William H. Hoegemeyer II",
"[A8]": "Sam Wigington, III",
"[A9]": "Justin T. Price",
"[A10]": "Robert Hugh William... | This is an oil-and-gas title dispute over a mineral or royalty interest conveyed by an old Texas deed. The deed describes the interest using a double fraction (a fraction multiplied by another fraction, such as a fraction 'of one-eighth'). Petitioners [A1] through [A16] and respondents [B1] through [B9] are competing s... | Decide the petition for review. Identify the doctrinal issue the deed implicates, the intervening authority that controls how the Supreme Court of Texas handles the petition, and the precise disposition the Court should enter (grant/deny; affirm/reverse/vacate; render or remand, and to which court), and explain why the... | {
"outcome": "vacated",
"issue": "Whether a court of appeals decision construing a deed that uses double fractions-and thus implicating the Van Dyke presumption-should stand when it was issued without the benefit of the Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in Clifton v. Johnson.",
"standard": "Under Van Dyke v. Nav... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "we grant the petition for review, vacate the judgment of the court of appeals, and remand the case to that court for further proceedings."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "This oil-and-gas case involves a deed that uses double fractions and thus implicates the pre... | {
"issue": "Full credit: identifies the double-fraction / Van Dyke presumption issue and that the dispositive problem is an intervening Supreme Court decision (Clifton v. Johnson) the court of appeals lacked.",
"standard": "Full credit: states the Van Dyke presumption for double fractions in antiquated instruments ... | null | null |
hll-251085-3 | 0.1 | real-property | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "25-1085",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462701/251085pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Kevin F. Karli, James W. Dobbs, Margaret E. Dobbs, Henry C. McQuaide, III, Chris H. Hoegemeyer, Kyle W. Hoegemeyer, William H. Hoegemeyer II, Sam Wigington, ... | {
"[A1]": "Kevin F. Karli",
"[A2]": "James W. Dobbs",
"[A3]": "Margaret E. Dobbs",
"[A4]": "Henry C. McQuaide, III",
"[A5]": "Chris H. Hoegemeyer",
"[A6]": "Kyle W. Hoegemeyer",
"[A7]": "William H. Hoegemeyer II",
"[A8]": "Sam Wigington, III",
"[A9]": "Justin T. Price",
"[A10]": "Robert Hugh William... | This is an oil-and-gas title dispute over a mineral or royalty interest conveyed by an old Texas deed. The deed describes the interest using a double fraction (a fraction multiplied by another fraction, such as a fraction 'of one-eighth'). Petitioners [A1] through [A16] and respondents [B1] through [B9] are competing s... | What substantive doctrine does this deed implicate, and what are the controlling Supreme Court of Texas authorities on it as of the time the petition is decided (name both the foundational 2023 decision and the later 2026 decision the court of appeals lacked)? Given that the court of appeals ruled without that later au... | {
"outcome": "vacated",
"issue": "Whether a double-fraction deed implicating the Van Dyke presumption must be reconsidered by the court of appeals in light of the Supreme Court's later opinion in Clifton v. Johnson.",
"standard": "A deed using double fractions implicates the presumption discussed in Van Dyke v. N... | [
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "involves a deed that uses double fractions and thus implicates the presumption discussed in Van Dyke v. Navigator Group"
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Van Dyke v. Navigator Group, 668 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2023). When the court of appeals issued its decision, it di... | {
"issue": "Full credit: double-fraction deed / Van Dyke presumption plus the intervening Clifton v. Johnson decision.",
"standard": "Full credit: names Van Dyke and Clifton as the controlling double-fraction authorities and the vacate-and-remand consequence.",
"authority": "Full credit: 668 S.W.3d 353 and 2026 W... | null | null |
hll-cl11229891-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11229891",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1461808/250641c.pdf",
"decided": "2025-12-22T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Ken Paxton and the Office of the Attorney General"
} | {
"[A]": "Ken Paxton",
"[B]": "Office of the Attorney General",
"[C]": "the State",
"[D]": "the real parties in interest (district attorneys, local attorneys, and counties)"
} | [A] and [B] promulgated rules requiring [D] to submit twelve categories of information, including work product and privileged matters, with non-compliance punishable as official misconduct. [D] brought ultra vires and constitutional challenges to the rules. After a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded th... | Did the court of appeals abuse its discretion by granting a stay under Rule 29.3 without considering the prosecutors' likelihood of success on the merits? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether the court of appeals erred in granting a stay under Rule 29.3 without evaluating the preliminary merits of the parties' positions.",
"standard": "Appellate courts must inquire into the likely merits of the parties' positions and the balance of harms to the p... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "I agree the court of appeals erred in not evaluating the preliminary merits of the parties' positions before issuing a stay to preserve its jurisdiction. I therefore concur with the Court's decision to grant relief."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "the court of a... | {
"issue": "Identify that the dispositive issue is the failure to consider merits, not the balance of harms.",
"standard": "Cite In re State for the two-part test: merits and harms.",
"application": "Explain that the court of appeals only did a harm analysis, which is insufficient.",
"outcome": "The correct out... | null | null |
hll-cl11229891-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11229891",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1461808/250641c.pdf",
"decided": "2025-12-22T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Ken Paxton and the Office of the Attorney General"
} | {
"[A]": "Ken Paxton",
"[B]": "Office of the Attorney General",
"[C]": "the State",
"[D]": "the real parties in interest (district attorneys, local attorneys, and counties)"
} | [A] and [B] promulgated rules requiring [D] to submit twelve categories of information, including work product and privileged matters, with non-compliance punishable as official misconduct. [D] challenged the rules as ultra vires and unconstitutional. The trial court granted a temporary injunction after a hearing, find... | What legal standard must an appellate court apply when considering a Rule 29.3 motion to stay enforcement of a trial court's temporary injunction after [C] has superseded the order? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "The legal standard for a Rule 29.3 stay against the State's supersedeas right requires both a preliminary merits evaluation and a balance of harms.",
"standard": "Appellate courts must inquire into the likely merits of the parties' positions and the balance of harms... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "I agree the court of appeals erred in not evaluating the preliminary merits of the parties' positions before issuing a stay to preserve its jurisdiction. I therefore concur with the Court's decision to grant relief."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "the court of a... | {
"issue": "Identify that the standard requires both merits and harms, not just one.",
"standard": "Quote the exact standard from In re State as restated in the opinion.",
"application": "Explain that the court of appeals only did the harms part, missing the merits part.",
"outcome": "The Court conditionally gr... | null | null |
hll-cl11229892-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11229892",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1461807/250641pc.pdf",
"decided": "2025-12-22T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Ken Paxton and the Office of the Attorney General"
} | {
"[A]": "Ken Paxton",
"[B]": "Office of the Attorney General",
"[C]": "Garza"
} | Relators [A] and [B] (the Attorney General and his office) promulgated administrative rules requiring local prosecutors to report certain information. A group of counties, county attorneys, and district attorneys sued, alleging that the Attorney General lacked statutory authority to issue the rules. The trial court gra... | Did the court of appeals abuse its discretion by issuing a stay under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3 without conducting a preliminary inquiry into the likely merits of the parties' legal positions? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether a court of appeals may issue a stay under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3 without a preliminary inquiry into the likely merits of the parties' legal positions.",
"standard": "Appellate courts asked to issue temporary relief pending appeal should make ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "P. 52.8(c), we conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the court of appeals to evaluate the merits to determine, by January 5, 2026, whether a Rule 29.3 stay is warranted."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "This Court has held that \"appellate courts aske... | {
"issue": "The key issue is whether the court of appeals was required to conduct a merits inquiry before issuing a Rule 29.3 stay. The answer is yes, as per In re State.",
"standard": "The correct standard is that appellate courts must make a preliminary inquiry into the likely merits. The model should cite the ex... | null | null |
hll-cl11239022-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11239022",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1461914/240796pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-01-09T00:00:00",
"caseName": "4 Families of Hobby, LLC, 4 Families of Houston, LLC, and Pappas Restaurants, Inc v. City of Houston, Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "4 Families of Hobby, LLC, 4 Families of Houston, LLC, and Pappas Restaurants, Inc. (collectively 'Pappas')",
"[B]": "City of Houston, Texas",
"[C]": "Areas HOU JV, LLC",
"[D]": "Hobby Airport"
} | [A] sued [B] alleging that the [C] Agreement with [C] violated Chapter 252 of the Texas Local Government Code because it required an expenditure of more than $50,000. [B] filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the contract was a revenue-generating contract and therefore not subject to Chapter 252. The court of a... | Did the court of appeals err in holding that Chapter 252 of the Texas Local Government Code applies only to expenditure contracts and not to revenue-generating contracts? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether Chapter 252 distinguishes between revenue contracts and expenditure contracts, such that a revenue-generating contract is not subject to the statute's requirements.",
"standard": "Chapter 252 makes no distinction between revenue contracts and expenditure con... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "CONCLUSION Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, without hearing oral argument, we grant the petition for review, reverse the portion of the court of appeals' judgment dismissing Pappas's Chapter 252 claims, and remand those claims to the trial court for jurisdi... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11241975-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11241975",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1461980/240581c.pdf",
"decided": "2026-01-16T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Shamrock Enterprises, LLC D/B/A Frsteam gulfcoast/la v. Top Notch Movers, LLC"
} | {
"[A]": "Shamrock Enterprises, LLC D/B/A Frsteam gulfcoast/la",
"[B]": "Top Notch Movers, LLC",
"[C]": "Summerdale, Alabama",
"[D]": "Foley, Alabama",
"[E]": "Kenner, Louisiana"
} | [B] sued [A] in Texas state court. [A] is an [C] company with no registered agent in Texas, so [B] requested substituted service through the Texas Secretary of State at an address in [D]. The Secretary of State sent the citation by certified mail to that address; the mailing was returned bearing the notation "Return to... | According to the concurring opinion, what does the Due Process Clause require when a plaintiff's attempt at service via certified mail is returned undelivered, and why did the plaintiff's actions here fail to meet that standard? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether due process requires a plaintiff to take additional reasonable steps to notify a defendant after a certified mailing is returned undelivered, and whether the plaintiff's failure to do so here violates due process.",
"standard": "Notice reasonably calculated,... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "I agree with the Court that this record does not show strict compliance with the applicable service statute and that default judgment was therefore improper."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "For this reason, under both the United States and Texas Constitutions... | {
"issue": "The model must identify that the dispositive sub-issue is the constitutional due process requirement for additional reasonable steps after a failed mailing.",
"standard": "The model should quote the Mullane standard and the 'desirous of actually informing' language.",
"application": "The model must ap... | true | null |
hll-cl11248468-3 | 0.1 | family | 5 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11248468",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462036/240053.pdf",
"decided": "2026-01-30T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Debbie Jo Morrison v. Rodney Wayne Morrison"
} | {
"[A]": "Debbie Jo Morrison",
"[B]": "Rodney Wayne Morrison",
"[Judge]": "Justice Bland",
"[Counsel]": "Counsel"
} | After the parties' divorce, [A] moved for enforcement of the decree, alleging [B] damaged the marital home and failed to deliver personal property. The trial court held hearings over 18 months. During that time, the court's registry received $850,434 from sales of the marital home ($449,254.96), shop ($140,392.68), per... | When a trial court exceeds its enforcement authority under Section 9.007 by reallocating property without proper findings, does that error deprive the court of all subject matter jurisdiction to consider the enforcement motion, or does the court retain continuing jurisdiction to enter a proper enforcement order? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether a trial court that exceeds its enforcement authority under Section 9.007 by entering an order that improperly modifies the property division loses all subject matter jurisdiction over the enforcement proceeding, or whether the court retains continuing jurisdic... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Because the trial court had jurisdiction to order enforcement but erred in interpreting the decree and Chapter 9's relevant provisions, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings."
},
{
"field": "standard",... | {
"issue": "Must identify the distinction between lack of jurisdiction to modify and retention of jurisdiction to enforce.",
"standard": "Must recognize that Section 9.007 is jurisdictional but only limits the power to modify, not the power to enforce under Sections 9.002/9.006.",
"authority": "Must cite Herrera ... | null | null |
hll-cl11259842-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11259842",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462113/240132.pdf",
"decided": "2026-02-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange v. Jeff Mankoff and Staci Mankoff"
} | {
"[A]": "Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange",
"[B]": "Jeff Mankoff",
"[C]": "Staci Mankoff"
} | In 2019, a tornado damaged the home of [B] and [C] (collectively, the insureds). Following the tornado, it 'likely' rained for approximately two minutes. The damaged property was covered by a homeowners insurance policy issued by [A] (the insurer). The insureds submitted a claim for damages, but the insurer paid only a... | Did the court of appeals err in holding that the term 'windstorm' in the homeowners insurance policy is ambiguous and does not unambiguously include a tornado, such that the windstorm or hail deductible should not apply to damage caused by a tornado? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether the term 'windstorm' in a homeowners insurance policy unambiguously includes a tornado for purposes of applying a windstorm or hail deductible.",
"standard": "When a contract's meaning is disputed, we ascertain the parties' intent as expressed in the instrum... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Conclusion We hold that the term \"windstorm,\" when undefined in a homeowners insurance policy, is not ambiguous and that its ordinary meaning encompasses a tornado. Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Insurer on the ground that Insureds' cove... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11259842-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11259842",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462113/240132.pdf",
"decided": "2026-02-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange v. Jeff Mankoff and Staci Mankoff"
} | {
"[A]": "Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange",
"[B]": "Jeff Mankoff",
"[C]": "Staci Mankoff"
} | In 2019, a tornado damaged the home of [B] and [C]. Their homeowners insurance policy, issued by [A], contained a deductible for 'Windstorm or Hail' but did not define 'windstorm.' The insurer applied the deductible, and the insureds sued. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted su... | Did the separate listing of 'tornado' and 'windstorm' in Texas Insurance Code and Property Code provisions create ambiguity in the insurance policy's use of the term 'windstorm,' such that a reasonable interpretation could exclude a tornado? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether the separate listing of 'tornado' and 'windstorm' in Texas statutes indicates that the ordinary meaning of 'windstorm' excludes a tornado for purposes of interpreting an insurance policy.",
"standard": "To determine the ordinary meaning of an undefined term,... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Conclusion We hold that the term \"windstorm,\" when undefined in a homeowners insurance policy, is not ambiguous and that its ordinary meaning encompasses a tornado."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "We have recognized that the Legislature may repeat itself fo... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11259843-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11259843",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462112/240778pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-02-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In the Estate of J. Hugh Wheatfall"
} | {
"[A]": "Isaiah Wheatfall",
"[B]": "Theresa DeBose",
"[C]": "J. Hugh Wheatfall"
} | In a probate proceeding, [A] filed an application for letters of administration of [C]'s estate, claiming [C] died intestate and [A] was the sole heir. [B] filed an application to probate a 2009 will. The trial court heard both applications together. Before the court ruled, [A] filed a contest to probate of the will, a... | Was the trial court's September 16, 2019 order admitting the will to probate a final, appealable judgment that disposed of [A]'s will contest? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the trial court's September 16, 2019 order admitting the will to probate was a final, appealable judgment that disposed of all issues in the probate phase, including [A]'s will contest filed the day before the order.",
"standard": "Under the general one-fina... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand to that court to consider the merits of the appeal."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Under the general one-final-judgment rule, a judgment is final if it either \"actually disposes of every pending claim and... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11275135-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11275135",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462452/240525.pdf",
"decided": "2026-03-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "S&B Engineers & Constructors, Ltd. and Zurich American Insurance Company v. Scallon Controls, Inc."
} | {
"[A]": "S&B Engineers & Constructors, Ltd.",
"[B]": "Zurich American Insurance Company",
"[C]": "Scallon Controls, Inc.",
"[D]": "Sunoco Logistics Partners Operations GP, LLC and Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP",
"[Judge]": "Justice Young"
} | [B] is the insurer of [D] and intervened to assert subrogation claims for indemnification against [C] after [D] nonsuited its claims. The accident occurred in January 2015, and the workers settled with [A] and [D] in May 2019. [B] intervened in December 2021, nearly seven years after the accident but less than three ye... | The court of appeals held that [B]'s indemnity claim was time-barred because it intervened more than four years after the accident. Did the Texas Supreme Court agree? What is the correct standard for when an indemnity claim accrues, and what is the disposition? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether an indemnity claim brought by an intervening insurer is time-barred when it was filed less than three years after the settlement that fixed the indemnitee's liability.",
"standard": "Indemnity claims begin to run when 'the indemnitee's liability becomes fixe... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Indemnity claims begin to run when \"the indemnitee's liability becomes fixed and certain\" through settlement o... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11292024-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11292024",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462490/241049.pdf",
"decided": "2026-03-27T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Diamond Hydraulics, Inc. v. Gac Equipment, LLC D/B/A Austin Crane Service"
} | {
"[A]": "Diamond Hydraulics, Inc.",
"[B]": "GAC Equipment, LLC d/b/a Austin Crane Service",
"[C]": "Dr. John Behrendt",
"[D]": "Dr. Kevin Macfarlan",
"[E]": "KnightHawk Engineering, Inc.",
"[F]": "Dr. Jim Wiethorn",
"[G]": "Dr. Michael Hoerner",
"[Judge]": "Justice James P. Sullivan"
} | [A] repaired a crane cylinder for [B]. The cylinder later bent while lifting a bridge. [B] sued [A] for breach of contract and warranty. Discovery was hotly contested. Under the local rules, expert designations were due by a deadline. [A] timely designated [C] as its testifying expert. However, [B] delayed allowing [A]... | Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6(a), when a trial court finds good cause for an untimely expert designation, must it also consider whether the failure will not unfairly surprise or prejudice the other party? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether a court must consider the unfair surprise/prejudice exception in Rule 193.6(a) when good cause has already been established, given that the two exceptions are joined by the disjunctive 'or'.",
"standard": "Rule 193.6(a) states that a party may offer untimely... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case for a new trial."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "But Rule 193.6(a) uses the disjunctive \"or\" to join its two exceptions."
},
{
"field": "application",
"quote": "Because we hold ... | {
"issue": "Identify the disjunctive nature of the two exceptions.",
"standard": "Correctly state Rule 193.6(a) and the 'or' language.",
"authority": "Cite Rule 193.6(a) and Jackson v. Takara.",
"application": "Explain that good cause obviates the need to consider the second exception.",
"outcome": "Reversed ... | null | null |
hll-cl11308098-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11308098",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462567/240966.pdf",
"decided": "2026-04-10T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Texas Department of Public Safety v. Robert Christopher Callaway"
} | {
"[A]": "Texas Department of Public Safety",
"[B]": "Robert Christopher Callaway",
"[C]": "Steve McCraw",
"[Judge]": "Justice Sullivan"
} | [A] hired [B] as a Texas Ranger in 2012. [B] suffered from PTSD and took medical leave. On January 15, 2020, [B] rushed to his daughter's high school with his badge, handcuffs, and gun, and menaced counselors and police officers. [A] terminated [B] after an investigation. [B] sued [A] under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labo... | Did the trial court err in denying [A]'s plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment on [B]'s disability discrimination claim, given that the claim fails as a matter of law under Section 21.105 of the Texas Labor Code? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether the trial court erred in denying DPS's plea to the jurisdiction and summary judgment because Callaway's disability discrimination claim fails as a matter of law under §21.105.",
"standard": "Section 21.105 provides that a provision referring to discriminatio... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reverse in part the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment dismissing Callaway's claims against DPS."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The plain text of Section 21.105, however, makes short work of the lone claim left in this case: A provision ... | {} | true | null |
hll-cl11308100-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11308100",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462568/240879.pdf",
"decided": "2026-04-10T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Leo Lapuerta, M.D., F.A.C.S., and the Plastic Surgery Institute of Southeast Texas, P.A."
} | {
"[A]": "Leo Lapuerta, M.D., F.A.C.S.",
"[B]": "The Plastic Surgery Institute of Southeast Texas, P.A.",
"[C]": "Jose Torres",
"[D]": "Dr. Henry",
"[E]": "Dr. Hua",
"[F]": "Dr. Robison",
"[G]": "Dr. Conoley",
"[H]": "Dr. Rensimer",
"[Judge]": "James D. Blacklock"
} | Same background as item 1. During deliberations, the jury asked: 'Does the charge relate to the whole finger or partial finger?' The court declined to answer. The jury returned a defense verdict. [C] moved for a new trial, arguing that the loss of chance instruction caused confusion and probably resulted in an improper... | Did the district court abuse its discretion by granting a new trial on the ground that the jury's question about the instruction indicated confusion that probably caused an improper judgment? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether the district court erred in concluding that the jury's question about the instruction, without more, demonstrated that the instruction probably caused an improper judgment.",
"standard": "The question is whether the defect in the instructions 'probably cause... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The petition for writ of mandamus is conditionally granted."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The question is whether the defect in the instructions \"probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.\" TEX."
},
{
"field": "application",
"quote... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11308102-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 5 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11308102",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462570/240310.pdf",
"decided": "2026-04-10T00:00:00",
"caseName": "H-E-B, L.P. v. Marissa Peterson"
} | {
"[A]": "H-E-B, L.P.",
"[B]": "Marissa Peterson",
"[C]": "John Wayne",
"[Judge]": "Justice Bland",
"[Counsel]": "Counsel"
} | While shopping in the toy aisle at an HEB grocery store, [B] slipped on a clear liquid puddle and fell. She sued [A] for premises liability. The trial court granted [A]'s motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that earlier roof leaks in the store need not be in the area of a puddle to su... | Under Texas premises liability law, can evidence of roof leaks in other parts of a store, combined with the presence of buckets and signs elsewhere in the store, establish constructive knowledge of a puddle in a specific aisle where the plaintiff fell? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether evidence of roof leaks in other locations of the store and the presence of buckets and signs elsewhere can establish constructive knowledge of a puddle in a specific aisle, or whether the leak must be in the vicinity of the dangerous condition.",
"standard":... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and reinstate the trial court's summary judgment for the grocer."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "The knowledge inquiry-whether actual or constructive-concerns knowledge of the dangerous condition \"at the ti... | {
"issue": "Must identify that the issue is whether evidence of leaks in other locations can establish constructive knowledge of a condition in a specific location.",
"standard": "Must articulate the 'vicinity' requirement from Rodriguez and the 'time and place' requirement from Mohammadi and Taylor.",
"authority... | true | null |
hll-cl11315031-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11315031",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462612/240883.pdf",
"decided": "2026-04-24T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Bell Helicopter Services Inc. and Bell Helicopter Textron Inc."
} | {
"[A]": "Bell Helicopter Services Inc. and Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.",
"[B]": "Matthew Kawamura",
"[C]": "Westwind Helicopters, Inc."
} | The same helicopter crash as above. The plaintiffs' theory was that the flight manual was defective because it omitted a warning about flying with a loose cowling. The manual had never contained such a warning. The plaintiffs argued that because [A] revised the manual in other respects within 18 years of the crash, tho... | Did the Texas Supreme Court correctly hold that GARA bars a failure-to-warn claim when the allegedly defective warning was never included in the flight manual, and the manufacturer's revisions to the manual did not add or alter the omitted warning, because the rolling provision does not treat a continued omission as a ... | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether a manufacturer's failure to include a warning in a flight manual, where the manual has never contained the warning, can be treated as a 'new' part under GARA's rolling provision when the manual is revised in unrelated respects.",
"standard": "The rolling pro... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The petition for writ of mandamus is conditionally granted."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The rolling provision, the court explained, requires a \"causal nexus between the replaced part and the complained of injuries\"; absent that causal connection, the ro... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11319047-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11319047",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462654/230887.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-01T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Texas Department of State Health Services and Dr. Jennifer A. Shuford, in Her Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health Ser... | {
"[A]": "Texas Department of State Health Services",
"[B]": "Dr. Jennifer A. Shuford",
"[C]": "Sky Marketing Corp.",
"[D]": "Create a Cig Temple, LLC",
"[E]": "Darrell Surif",
"[F]": "David Walden",
"[G]": "Hometown Hero",
"[Judge]": "Justice Young",
"[Judge2]": "Justice Sullivan"
} | In 2020, the federal DEA issued an interim final rule clarifying that hemp-derived extracts with less than 0.3% delta-9 THC are decontrolled. The commissioner of [A] objected to that rule under [A] & Safety Code § 481.034(g), which allows the commissioner to reject federal scheduling changes. The commissioner published... | Did the commissioner act ultra vires by modifying the 2021 schedules under § 481.034(g) rather than following the alternative procedures in §§ 481.034–.035? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether the commissioner's use of the § 481.034(g) objection procedure to modify the schedules was within her lawful discretion, thereby defeating the procedural ultra vires claim and preserving sovereign immunity.",
"standard": "the commissioner's § 481.034(g) obje... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We hold that the commissioner complied with the procedural requirements enumerated in § 481.034(g), which means that the vendors' procedural 22 ultra vires claim fails and sovereign immunity applies."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The commissioner's § 481.03... | {
"issue": "The model must identify that the procedural ultra vires claim turns on whether the commissioner properly invoked § 481.034(g) and whether the alternative procedures were required.",
"standard": "The model should cite the finality provision of § 481.034(g) and the court's holding that the commissioner ha... | true | null |
hll-cl11319049-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11319049",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462653/230953d.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-01T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Tatia Ortiz v. Ramu Nelapatla"
} | {
"[A]": "Tatia Ortiz",
"[B]": "Ramu Nelapatla",
"[Judge]": "Justice Sullivan"
} | [A] sued [B] for personal injuries. At trial, [A] sought to prove medical expenses using affidavits under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 18.001. [B] served a controverting affidavit that challenged only part of the matters in [A]'s affidavits. The trial court excluded the affidavits entirely and refused to grant a new t... | After a defendant serves a counteraffidavit that challenges only part of the plaintiff's medical expense affidavit under Section 18.001, what is the plaintiff's evidentiary burden regarding the uncontroverted portions of the affidavit? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the plaintiff's burden to prove the reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses is shifted for the entire affidavit or only for the controverted parts when a counteraffidavit is served.",
"standard": "the affidavit remains admissible as to everything th... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The Court reads the unless clause differently."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "This case is about the scope of that italicized exception-to-the-exception."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "the affidavit remains admissible as to everything the coun... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11323652-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11323652",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462696/240782.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Ryan Busse, Josh Klostermann, Russel Klostermann, Layne Klostermann, Mitch Thomas, Olivia Rincones, Robert Rincones, Ruben Rincones, Enrica Rincones, Angel... | {
"[A]": "South Texas Independent School District",
"[B]": "Lyford Consolidated Independent School District",
"[C]": "Ryan Busse, Josh Klostermann, Russel Klostermann, Layne Klostermann, Mitch Thomas, Olivia Rincones, Robert Rincones, Ruben Rincones, Enrica Rincones, Angelita Garcia, Adelaida Garcia, Aniceto Garc... | In 1974, voters in [D] approved the formation of [F] (later renamed [A]) to serve disabled persons, authorizing an ad valorem tax up to 5 cents per $100 valuation. [A] now primarily serves non-disabled students. In 2023, [A]'s board levied the tax. [C] (individual taxpayers in [D]) and [B] (a school district in [D]) su... | After the Supreme [E] held that the individual taxpayers have standing, what must the court of appeals do on remand regarding the alternative jurisdictional arguments that [A] raised but the court of appeals did not reach? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the court of appeals must consider the defendant's alternative jurisdictional challenges—the political question doctrine and governmental immunity—when it previously dismissed the case for lack of standing without reaching those issues.",
"standard": "A cour... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We 15 remand the case to the court of appeals for it to consider STISD's unaddressed jurisdictional challenges in the first instance."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "But because the \"political question doctrine is an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction,\" V... | {
"issue": "Identify that the issue is the scope of remand: the court of appeals must consider the political question and immunity arguments because they were not previously decided.",
"standard": "Explain that the political question doctrine is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised at any time, and that the co... | true | null |
hll-cl11323654-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11323654",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462698/240924.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Mv Transportation, Inc. v. Gds Transport, LLC"
} | {
"[A]": "MV Transportation, Inc.",
"[B]": "GDS Transport, LLC",
"[C]": "MV Contract Transportation, Inc.",
"[D]": "Dallas Area Rapid Transit Authority",
"[Judge]": "Justice Young"
} | This case arises from a dispute over a subcontract for paratransit and microtransit services. [D] is a regional public transportation authority. In 2018, [D] issued a request for information and awarded a contract to [A] via a master agreement. [A]'s wholly owned subsidiary, [C], then contracted with [B] for vehicles a... | Should the Texas Supreme Court reverse the court of appeals' judgment and reinstate the trial court's dismissal of [B]'s fraud claim against [A] under Rule 91a, based on [A]'s statutory immunity under Tex. Transp. Code § 452.056(d)? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether [A] is entitled to statutory immunity under Tex. Transp. Code § 452.056(d) such that [B]'s fraud claim has no basis in law under Rule 91a.",
"standard": "Under Rule 91a, a cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with i... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reverse the court of appeals' contrary judgment, reinstate the trial court's judgment of dismissal as to the fraud claim, and remand what is left of the case to the trial court."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Appellate courts review the merits of a Rule 9... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11323654-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11323654",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462698/240924.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-08T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Mv Transportation, Inc. v. Gds Transport, LLC"
} | {
"[A]": "MV Transportation, Inc.",
"[B]": "GDS Transport, LLC",
"[C]": "MV Contract Transportation, Inc.",
"[D]": "Dallas Area Rapid Transit Authority",
"[Judge]": "Justice Young"
} | This case arises from a dispute over a subcontract for paratransit and microtransit services. [D] is a regional public transportation authority. In 2018, [D] awarded a contract to [A] via a master agreement. [A]'s subsidiary [C] then contracted with [B] for vehicles and drivers. After [B] terminated the subcontract, [B... | Does the omission of the master agreement (the contract between [D] and [A]) from the appellate record preclude the Texas Supreme Court from reviewing the trial court's Rule 91a dismissal of the fraud claim? | {
"outcome": "other",
"issue": "Whether the omission of a document relied on in the pleading from the appellate record prevents a court from determining the legal viability of a claim under Rule 91a.",
"standard": "Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, the court may not consider evidence and must decide the mo... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "For several reasons, however, the omission here is not an obstacle to our review, and neither party suggests otherwise."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "When an original petition invokes a document in that way, the document is not mere \"evidence\" but may ins... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11328857-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11328857",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462723/240250.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-15T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Sadie Weldon v. the Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity"
} | {
"[A]": "Sadie Weldon",
"[B]": "The Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity",
"[C]": "Neesha Davé",
"[Judge]": "Justice J. Brett Busby"
} | Respondent [B] sued Petitioner [A] for a declaratory judgment that S.B. 8 (the Texas Heartbeat Act) is unconstitutional, along with injunctive relief and attorney's fees. The suit was filed 48 days after [A] filed a Rule 202 petition in Jack County to depose [C], [B]'s deputy director, regarding potential violations of... | Does the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) apply to [B]'s declaratory judgment action against [A] that was filed in response to [A]'s Rule 202 petition? The lower courts disagreed on the applicability of the TCPA at step one. | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the Fund's declaratory judgment action is 'based on or in response to' Weldon's Rule 202 petition such that the TCPA applies at step one.",
"standard": "The TCPA applies if the legal action is 'based on or in response to' the defendant's exercise of the righ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We hold that the Fund's legal action is based on or in response to Weldon's exercise of her right to petition, so the TCPA applies. Because Weldon's motion to dismiss satisfied step one of the TCPA analysis, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment affirming the denial of th... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11328861-3 | 0.1 | constitutional | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11328861",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462729/250674_0687.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-15T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "Greg Abbott",
"[B]": "State of Texas",
"[C]": "the absent House members",
"[D]": "the Attorney General",
"[Judge]": "Chief Justice Blacklock"
} | In the summer of 2025, the Texas [C] of Representatives lacked a quorum because several dozen members (the respondents, [C]) left the state in early August 2025 to prevent the [C] from functioning. They returned two weeks later, and a quorum was achieved in mid-August. The Governor ([A]) and the [B] ([B]), through [D] ... | Did the Texas Supreme Court properly decline to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over the petitions for writ of quo warranto because the political branches resolved the dispute themselves, or should the court have addressed the merits of the removal claims? | {
"outcome": "denied",
"issue": "Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to issue a writ of quo warranto when the political branches have resolved the underlying dispute through their own mechanisms.",
"standard": "The courts’ institutional 'reluctance . . . to involve themselves ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "the petitions for writ of quo warranto, which are denied."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The courts' institutional \"reluctance . . . to involve themselves in contests of factional political power,\" a reluctance we reiterate and reinforce today, is a check ... | {
"issue": "Identify the court's reliance on the political question doctrine and its discretionary jurisdiction.",
"standard": "Quote the 'reluctance to involve themselves in contests of factional political power' language.",
"application": "Explain that the political resolution made judicial intervention unneces... | null | null |
hll-cl11328864-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11328864",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462725/250317.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-15T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Home Depot U.S.A., Inc."
} | {
"[A]": "Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.",
"[B]": "Werner Enterprises, Inc.",
"[C]": "Werner's driver",
"[D]": "Natalio Garcia",
"[E]": "Garcia's parents and estate"
} | The decedent, [D], died when his motorcycle collided with a tractor-trailer owned by [B] and operated by [C] after [C] ran a red light. [E] sued [B] and [C] for negligence and later added [A] as a defendant, alleging negligent hiring of [B]. [A] moved to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing that the... | Under Texas law, what standard of review applies to a trial court's denial of a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, and is mandamus an appropriate remedy to challenge such a denial? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "The standard of review for a Rule 91a motion and the availability of mandamus to review a denial of such a motion.",
"standard": "Whether that standard is met is a legal question we consider de novo based on the allegations in the plaintiffs’ live petition, which we... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Because the trial court should have granted the customer's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, we conditionally grant mandamus relief directing it to do so."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Whether that standard is met is a legal question we consider de ... | {
"issue": "The model must identify that the standard of review is de novo for the legal question and that mandamus is available for abuse of discretion.",
"standard": "The model should quote the de novo standard and the mandamus standard verbatim.",
"authority": "The model should cite Rule 91a, Bethel, In re Far... | null | null |
hll-cl11328864-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 5 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11328864",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462725/250317.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-15T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Home Depot U.S.A., Inc."
} | {
"[A]": "Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.",
"[B]": "Werner Enterprises, Inc.",
"[C]": "Werner's driver",
"[D]": "Natalio Garcia",
"[E]": "Garcia's parents and estate"
} | The decedent, [D], died when his motorcycle collided with a tractor-trailer owned by [B] and operated by [C] after [C] ran a red light. [E] sued [B] and [C] for negligence and later added [A] as a defendant, alleging that [A] was directly liable for negligently hiring [B] as an independent motor carrier. [A] moved to d... | Under Texas law, can a shipper be held directly liable for negligent hiring of an independent motor carrier, and does such a claim impose a duty to investigate the carrier's safety record when the cargo is ordinary? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether a shipper can be held directly liable for negligent hiring of an independent motor carrier and whether such a claim imposes a duty to investigate the carrier's safety record.",
"standard": "Even if such a claim is viable, it is no less derivative than vicari... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Because the trial court should have granted the customer's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, we conditionally grant mandamus relief directing it to do so."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "As an initial matter, \"we have not ruled definitively on the ex... | {
"issue": "The model must identify that the core issue is whether a negligent-hiring claim against a shipper of ordinary goods imposes a duty to investigate the carrier's safety.",
"standard": "The model should note that even if such a claim exists, it is derivative and requires control or creation of risk, which ... | null | null |
hll-cl11328865-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11328865",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462727/250812pc.pdf",
"decided": "2026-05-15T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Helena Chemical Company v. Phillip Bales, Derek Dieringer, Wilbert Dieringer, Michael Hoch, Cmh Farms, Inc., Mh Farms Services, Inc., Whit Braden, Donald... | {
"[A]": "Helena Chemical Company",
"[B]": "Phillip Bales",
"[C]": "Derek Dieringer",
"[D]": "Wilbert Dieringer",
"[E]": "Michael Hoch",
"[F]": "CMH Farms, Inc.",
"[G]": "MH Farms Services, Inc.",
"[H]": "Whit Braden",
"[I]": "Donald Braden",
"[J]": "Streicher Farms, Inc."
} | A group of farmers ([B] through [J]) claim that [A] damaged their crops through the aerial application of herbicide to a neighboring property. The Texas Supreme Court previously decided a similar case, [A] [A] Co. v. Cox, 664 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. 2023), involving different farmers but similar facts. In Cox, the Court held t... | Did the court of appeals err in denying the permissive interlocutory appeal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 51.014(d) by holding that the existence of controlling precedent precludes a finding of a 'substantial ground for difference of opinion'? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether a trial court's order that may be at odds with binding precedent satisfies Section 51.014(d)(1)'s requirement of 'a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.'",
"standard": "Section 51.014(d)(1) is satis... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "we grant the petition for review and direct the court of appeals to accept the appeal"
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Section 51.014(d)(1) is satisfied when there is a substantial ground for concluding that a trial-court ruling is at odds with binding precede... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11338096-3 | 0.1 | family | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11338096",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462852/260077c.pdf",
"decided": "2026-06-05T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In the Interest of K.L.B., a Child"
} | {
"[A]": "Mother",
"[B]": "K.L.B.",
"[C]": "DFPS"
} | In a parental-rights termination case involving [B], the trial court denied [A]'s request for a 180-day extension of the automatic dismissal date under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b). [A] had a substance-abuse treatment program in her service plan. She waited approximately ten months after removal to start services, then ... | Under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b-3), when is a trial court required to make an extraordinary-circumstances finding to extend the automatic dismissal date, and did that provision apply to [A]'s case? | {
"outcome": "denied",
"issue": "Whether the trial court was required to make an extraordinary-circumstances finding under § 263.401(b-3) when the parent made a good-faith effort to complete the service plan and DFPS's permanency goal was reunification.",
"standard": "Subsection (b-3) of § 263.401 provides that t... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "I concur in today's decision to deny review because Mother isn't entitled to relief from the trial court's judgment terminating her parental rights."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Under the new Subsection (b-3), a trial court must make such a finding if (1) ... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11338097-2 | 0.1 | family | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11338097",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462851/250941c.pdf",
"decided": "2026-06-05T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In the Interest of J.M. a Child"
} | {
"[A]": "J.M.",
"[B]": "Father",
"[C]": "Mother",
"[D]": "Department of Family and Protective Services"
} | In a parental termination suit involving child [A], the trial court commenced trial on the jurisdictional deadline (Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a)) by hearing a few minutes of testimony, then recessed repeatedly. The trial was completed five months later, exceeding the 90-day completion deadline (Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011... | Is the 90-day trial completion deadline in Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011 jurisdictional, such that a violation would automatically divest the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction? | {
"outcome": "other",
"issue": "Whether the 90-day trial completion deadline under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011 is jurisdictional.",
"standard": "Unlike the deadline for commencing a trial, the deadline for completing it isn’t jurisdictional.",
"authorities": [
"Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011",
"Tex. Fam. Code ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "I agree with today's denial of review"
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Unlike the deadline for commencing a trial, the deadline for completing it isn't jurisdictional."
},
{
"field": "application",
"quote": "the only remedy for the district court's... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11338100-1 | 0.1 | family | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11338100",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462846/250008.pdf",
"decided": "2026-06-05T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In the Interest of C.S. Jr. and Z.S., Children"
} | {
"[A]": "Mother",
"[B]": "Department of Family and Protective Services",
"[C]": "C.S. Jr.",
"[D]": "Z.S.",
"[E]": "Danna Wolfe",
"[Judge]": "Justice Young"
} | This is a parental-rights termination case. The trial court correctly identified March 11, 2024, as the automatic-dismissal date under Texas [B] Code § 263.401(a). At a February 23 pretrial hearing, the trial judge stated: 'I am grant—I am going to have to grant an extension.' The judge then directed the [B] counsel to... | Did the trial court lose subject-matter jurisdiction when it failed to render an extension order before the statutory automatic-dismissal date under Texas [B] Code § 263.401(a), even though the judge expressed an intention to grant an extension at a pretrial hearing? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether the trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction when it failed to render an extension order before the statutory automatic-dismissal date under Texas Family Code § 263.401(a).",
"standard": "Under Texas Family Code § 263.401(a), 'on the first Monday after t... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The judgments below are accordingly vacated, and the case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "We conclude that neither the trial court nor the court of appeals had jurisdiction to reach the merits in this case, and we therefore... | {
"issue": "Must identify that the dispositive issue is whether the trial court lost jurisdiction for failing to render an extension order before the automatic-dismissal date.",
"standard": "Must quote or closely paraphrase § 263.401(a)'s automatic-dismissal provision and the requirement that an extension be grante... | true | null |
hll-cl11341709-3 | 0.1 | professional-responsibility | 5 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11341709",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462885/240613.pdf",
"decided": "2026-06-12T00:00:00",
"caseName": "William W. Ruth v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline"
} | {
"[A]": "William W. Ruth",
"[B]": "Commission for Lawyer Discipline",
"[Counsel]": "Stephanie Strolle",
"[Judge]": "Justice Lehrmann"
} | [A] is a lawyer who was found to have violated Rule 4.02(a) by communicating with represented [B] members while representing himself in a disciplinary proceeding. The trial court suspended [A] from the practice of law for five years, and the court of appeals affirmed. [A] argues that the rule is ambiguous and that the ... | Should the rule of lenity be applied to the interpretation of Texas Disciplinary Rule 4.02 in a disciplinary proceeding where the penalty includes suspension from the practice of law? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether the rule of lenity requires a narrow construction of Rule 4.02 such that it does not apply to a pro se lawyer.",
"standard": "This rule of lenity, which applies only to the extent the statute at issue is unclear or ambiguous, is motivated by the principle th... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.01 cmt. 4. 16 the court of appeals' judgment and dismiss the disciplinary proceeding against Ruth."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "The sole issue presented involves the meaning and application of the Texas Disciplinary Rule... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11341710-2 | 0.1 | professional-responsibility | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11341710",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462888/240613c.pdf",
"decided": "2026-06-12T00:00:00",
"caseName": "William W. Ruth v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline"
} | {
"[A]": "William W. Ruth",
"[B]": "Commission for Lawyer Discipline",
"[C]": "Commission members",
"[D]": "Commission counsel",
"[E]": "Texas Committee on Professional Ethics"
} | [A] is a licensed attorney who represented himself in a disciplinary proceeding brought by [B]. While acting pro se, [A] caused court filings to be served directly on [C] (the individual members of [B]) via email, rather than on [D] ([B]'s counsel). After [D] warned [A] that such direct communications were improper, [A... | Can a lawyer be disciplined for conduct that he reasonably relied on an advisory opinion of the [E], which stated that the disciplinary rule did not apply to his situation? | {
"outcome": "reversed",
"issue": "Whether a lawyer who reasonably relied on an advisory opinion of the Texas Committee on Professional Ethics should be disciplined for conduct that the opinion stated was not prohibited.",
"standard": "Because Ruth may have reasonably relied upon the guidance provided by the Comm... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "I would therefore reverse the judgment of suspension, as the Court does, for this narrower reason."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "To correct for this imperfection, we have made exceptions to protect due-process rights where individuals have honestly relied o... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11345118-3 | 0.1 | criminal | 3 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11345118",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462909/250127.pdf",
"decided": "2026-06-19T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings D/B/A Laboratory Corporation of America v. the State of Texas and Npt Associates"
} | {
"[A]": "Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings d/b/a Laboratory Corporation of America",
"[B]": "the State of Texas",
"[C]": "NPT Associates",
"[D]": "Humana",
"[E]": "Cigna",
"[F]": "United HealthCare"
} | [A] is a laboratory testing company and Texas Medicaid participant. [B] alleged that [A] violated regulations and made false statements and omissions. [A] disclosed its billing practices to [B] in 2014, and [B] continued to pay its claims for seven years without objection. In 2021, [B] intervened in a qui tam action an... | Under the Texas Health Care Program Fraud Prevention Act, what is the proper standard and burden-shifting framework for a defendant seeking summary judgment on the ground that an alleged omission was not material? | {
"outcome": "other",
"issue": "What standard governs a defendant's summary judgment motion to negate materiality under the Act?",
"standard": "We hold today that the defendant can do so by offering competent evidence of undisputed facts that, when viewed as a whole, are incompatible with materiality. When the de... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reinstate that judgment and reverse the contrary judgment of the court of appeals."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "We next decide whether the trial court correctly granted LabCorp summary judgment by concluding that any false statements, misrepresentations, o... | {} | null | null |
hll-cl11345119-3 | 0.1 | criminal | 5 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11345119",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462910/250127d1.pdf",
"decided": "2026-06-19T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings D/B/A Laboratory Corporation of America v. the State of Texas and Npt Associates"
} | {
"[A]": "Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, d/b/a Laboratory Corporation of America",
"[B]": "The State of Texas",
"[C]": "NPT Associates",
"[Judge]": "Chief Justice Blacklock",
"[E]": "Texas Health and Human Services Commission"
} | [A] is a clinical laboratory company that contracted with [E] to participate in the Texas Medicaid program. [B] and [C] filed a qui tam action under the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act, alleging that [A] failed to disclose information that permitted improper payments. [A] moved for summary judgment, arguing that th... | According to the dissenting opinion, does the word 'permits' in section 36.002(2) impose a subjective causation requirement or an objective materiality requirement? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether the word 'permits' in section 36.002(2) imposes a subjective causation requirement or an objective materiality requirement.",
"standard": "The word 'permits' imposes a simple subjective causation requirement, which is not at all without teeth.",
"authoriti... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "LabCorp's materiality argument is the only ticket to reversal on offer."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "In my view, the word \"permits\" imposes a simple subjective causation requirement, which is not at all without teeth and which in many cases would overlap... | {} | true | null |
hll-cl11345124-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11345124",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462905/241062.pdf",
"decided": "2026-06-19T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Dr. Robert Tafel"
} | {
"[A]": "Dr. Robert Tafel",
"[B]": "Bear Creek Family Dentistry",
"[C]": "Dr. Scott Ludlow",
"[D]": "Lauren Ludlow",
"[E]": "Joshua LaFountain",
"[F]": "Xerox Corporation",
"[Judge]": "Justice Busby",
"[Counsel]": "Counsel"
} | [C] filed a qui tam action under the Texas Health Care Program Fraud Prevention Act in August 2021, alleging that [A] and a group of dental practices operating as [B] (collectively '[B] [B]') performed unnecessary dental treatments on patients and billed the Texas Medicaid program for those procedures. Dr. [C] claimed ... | Did the trial court clearly abuse its discretion by denying [B] [B] motion for summary judgment that sought dismissal of the qui tam action on the ground that the claims extinguished upon the relator's death? | {
"outcome": "denied",
"issue": "Whether a pending qui tam action under the Texas Health Care Program Fraud Prevention Act survives the relator's death when the State has not intervened as a party.",
"standard": "The common-law rule is that 'all causes of action for damages die with the person of the party injure... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We therefore deny the petition."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "Bear Creek's first issue concerns whether a pending qui tam action under the Texas Health Care Program Fraud Prevention Act survives the relator's death when the State has not chosen to intervene as... | {
"issue": "Must identify that the dispositive issue is whether qui tam claims survive the relator's death under the Act, not whether the relator's estate has capacity to proceed.",
"standard": "Must quote or closely paraphrase the common-law survivability rule from Belt and the statutory provisions showing the cla... | true | null |
hll-cl11345126-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11345126",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462907/241062c2.pdf",
"decided": "2026-06-19T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Dr. Robert Tafel"
} | {
"[A]": "Dr. Robert Tafel",
"[B]": "Dr. Scott Ludlow",
"[C]": "Executrix of the estate of Dr. Scott Ludlow",
"[D]": "State of Texas"
} | Dr. [B] filed a qui tam action under the Texas Health Care Program Fraud Prevention Act against Dr. [A], alleging that [A] sought reimbursement from the Texas Medicaid program for unnecessary dental treatment. While the suit was pending, [B] died. The trial court permitted [C], the executor of [B]'s estate, to substitu... | Did the trial court err in allowing the executor to substitute as relator, and what is the proper procedural course for the State to pursue the claim after the relator's death? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether the trial court erred in allowing the executor to substitute as relator, and what is the proper procedural course for the State to intervene and prosecute the claim after the relator's death.",
"standard": "The parties did not argue capacity before the trial... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The Court holds that qui tam claims survive a relator's death because the State owns and ultimately directs these claims, and I agree."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "\"[I]t frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that w... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11345129-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-scotx",
"docket": "cl-11345129",
"url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462913/250149c1.pdf",
"decided": "2026-06-19T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Demaree Reed"
} | {
"[A]": "Demaree Reed",
"[B]": "Rail Link",
"[C]": "Surface Transportation Board"
} | Relator [A] filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court. The underlying dispute involves a Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) claim brought by [A] against [B]. The trial court referred a portion of the case to the [C] under the primary-jurisdiction doctrine, seeking the agency's preliminary vi... | Did the Texas Supreme Court affirm, reverse, or otherwise dispose of the petition for writ of mandamus in this case, and what is the procedural disposition of the underlying referral issue? | {
"outcome": "granted",
"issue": "Whether the Texas Supreme Court granted or denied mandamus relief regarding the trial court's referral of a FELA claim to the Surface Transportation Board under the primary-jurisdiction doctrine.",
"standard": "The modern Texas primary-jurisdiction doctrine is a prudential doctri... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "I gladly concur in the Court's well-reasoned opinion."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Accordingly, the primary-jurisdiction doctrine currently \"arises when a court and an agency have concurrent original jurisdiction over a dispute.\" Cash Am., 35 S.W.3d at 1... | {
"issue": "must identify that the concurrence does not state the Court's holding but supports a grant of relief",
"standard": "must quote the modern concurrent-jurisdiction formulation from Cash America or Forest Oil (not the exclusive-jurisdiction original formulation)",
"application": "must note that the opini... | null | null |
hll-cl11410511-1 | 0.1 | tort | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-13",
"docket": "cl-11410511",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=e15323ca-e392-4928-aa2a-53a2889ff076&coa=coa13&DT=Opinion&MediaID=b2c3037e-6966-400b-bc80-607feea400f1",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "City of Brownsville v. Hortencia Villarre... | {
"[A]": "City of Brownsville",
"[B]": "Hortencia Villarreal Quintero",
"[C]": "Brownsville Public Utility Board",
"[D]": "Adolfo Edgar Cortez"
} | [A] is a Texas municipality. [B] filed suit against [A] for premises and special defect claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) after her vehicle fell into a hole in the street in front of her residence on June 9, 2023. [B] alleged that workers had been repairing a water main and that the backfill failed. The tri... | Did the City have actual knowledge of the dangerous condition that caused the plaintiff's injury, as required for premises liability under the TTCA? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "Whether the City had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition on the street that caused the plaintiff's injury is a jurisdictional fact issue.",
"standard": "Under the TTCA, for a premises defect claim, the governmental unit owes the duty of a licensee, and the l... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The trial court's judgment is reversed. We render judgment granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing all of Quintero's claims against it."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Under the TTCA, \"if a claim arises from a premise defect, the governme... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11410512-3 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-13",
"docket": "cl-11410512",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=35aa8886-3a9d-44c1-a03f-e473b7811e66&coa=coa13&DT=Opinion&MediaID=4caa1449-33c1-463b-a736-241115240ec8",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Christopher Alan Young v. the State of Te... | {
"[A]": "Christopher Alan Young",
"[B]": "The State of Texas",
"[C]": "Debra Mosier-Young",
"[D]": "Bruce Morton Mosier",
"[E]": "Valeri Reeder",
"[F]": "Rick Reeder",
"[G]": "Danny Stephens",
"[H]": "Dallas Brasseaux",
"[I]": "Teresa Davis",
"[J]": "Nathaniel Head",
"[K]": "Alex Bundy",
"[L]":... | [A] was convicted of theft of an elderly individual's coin collection. On appeal, [A] challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding intent to deprive. The evidence showed that when [C] accused [A] of taking the coins, [A] became angry and left. He later fled to [AD] with [D]'s property in his truck. [A] sold coi... | Was the evidence sufficient to establish that [A] intended to deprive [D] of his property? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that [A] intended to deprive [D] of the stolen coins and other property.",
"standard": "Intent to deprive must be determined from the words and acts of the accused.",
"authorities": [
"Garcia v. State, 2019 WL 3720634, at *3 (Te... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We affirm because the evidence was sufficient."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Intent to deprive must be determined from the words and acts of the accused."
},
{
"field": "application",
"quote": "The record contains a multitude of evidence regardi... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11410514-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-13",
"docket": "cl-11410514",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=d5fa74e6-35cd-4d15-a1d4-7001923207cc&coa=coa13&DT=Opinion&MediaID=5b48c81d-d980-4e34-955d-dfa8a2fd54f6",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Company LP... | {
"[A]": "Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Company LP",
"[B]": "Texas Crude Energy, LLC",
"[C]": "Amber Harvest",
"[D]": "ConocoPhillips",
"[E]": "NuStar Logistics",
"[F]": "JAG Tanking of Texas",
"[G]": "Flint Hills Resources Corpus Christi",
"[H]": "BP Products",
"[I]": "John Saltsman",
"[J]": "Ange... | After remand, [A] filed a combined motion for summary judgment under both no-evidence and traditional standards regarding the deductibility of deficiency fees. The motion argued that as a matter of law, deficiency fees are post-production costs. [A] attached evidence including affidavits and transportation agreements. ... | When a summary judgment motion combines no-evidence and traditional grounds, may an appellate court review the traditional ground first, and what is the standard of review? Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment on the traditional ground? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the appellate court may review the traditional summary judgment ground first when a motion combines both no-evidence and traditional grounds, and whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment under the traditional standard.",
"standard": "To prevail on a trad... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The trial court granted Burlington's motion for summary judgment and dismissed appellees' claims against it."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "To prevail on a traditional summary judgment, a movant has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue o... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11411034-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-2",
"docket": "cl-11411034",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=10a60236-75dd-45f2-8d94-1f93f95f7bfe&coa=coa02&DT=Opinion&MediaID=ef24dc0b-176c-4fee-be58-e87574aa0113",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Steven Daniel v. the State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "Steven Daniel",
"[B]": "State of Texas",
"[C]": "Officer Donovan McCray",
"[D]": "Volkswagen"
} | The jury assessed [A]'s punishment at 365 days confinement and no fine. The trial court sentenced [A] accordingly but orally pronounced only the confinement term, not a fine. However, the written judgment included a $100 fine. The trial court probated the sentence. [A] appealed, but did not raise the issue of the fine.... | Did the trial court err by including a $100 fine in the written judgment when it was not orally pronounced as part of the sentence? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the trial court's inclusion of a $100 fine in the written judgment that was not orally pronounced constitutes error that requires modification of the judgment.",
"standard": "When a variation exists between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written memorializati... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Having overruled Daniel's only point, we modify the judgment of the trial court to delete the $100 fine and affirm the trial court's judgment as modified."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "App.- Fort Worth Jan. 8, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for pu... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11411040-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-2",
"docket": "cl-11411040",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=87a80fff-3645-45f6-9846-6880c8d97f76&coa=coa02&DT=Opinion&MediaID=3476fb32-f5c9-4da9-ad01-f76108ebf020",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Norman Bell v. the State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "Norman Bell",
"[B]": "the State of Texas",
"[Judge]": "Justice Womack",
"[Counsel]": "appointed appellate counsel"
} | [A] was convicted of indecency with a child by exposure and sentenced to ten years. On appeal, [A]'s appointed counsel filed an Anders brief and motion to withdraw. [A] filed a letter requesting different counsel and a pro se motion to be bench warranted back to Tarrant County, which the court understood to be in antic... | Was [A] entitled to the appointment of new appellate counsel based on his request for different counsel after his appointed counsel filed an Anders brief? | {
"outcome": "denied",
"issue": "Whether an appellant is entitled to new appellate counsel after his appointed counsel files an Anders brief, when the appellant requests different counsel but does not argue that the Anders brief was improperly filed.",
"standard": "In the context of Anders, an appellant is entitl... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Therefore, we grant counsel's motion to withdraw."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "But in the context of Anders, an appellant is entitled to new appellate counsel only if the appellate court concludes that the appellant's present counsel improperly filed an An... | {
"issue": "Must identify the sub-issue of entitlement to new counsel during Anders review.",
"standard": "Must quote the Limauro standard.",
"authority": "Must cite Limauro.",
"application": "Must explain that the court found no improper filing, so request for new counsel was denied.",
"outcome": "Must recog... | null | null |
hll-cl11411041-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-2",
"docket": "cl-11411041",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=551af810-6417-4c8d-9662-e9553f775f47&coa=coa02&DT=Opinion&MediaID=e94863ec-cb43-4b59-b530-bff0721f146a",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Melissa Hollmann and Scot Hollmann v. Van ... | {
"[A]": "Melissa Hollmann",
"[B]": "Scot Hollmann",
"[C]": "Van Shaw",
"[D]": "Paul Kramer",
"[E]": "PK Industries d/b/a Castlegate Homes",
"[F]": "Poly America, LP",
"[G]": "David Bell",
"[Judge]": "Justice Wallach"
} | After a bench trial, the trial court awarded [C] $180,000 in attorney's fees under the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act. [C] had asserted multiple claims against [A] and [B], including breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and sanctions (for which fees are recoverable), as well as tortious interference with contract,... | Did the trial court err by awarding [C] attorney's fees under the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act without requiring him to segregate fees between recoverable and non-recoverable claims? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to Shaw without requiring segregation of fees between causes of action for which fees are recoverable and those for which they are not.",
"standard": "Where a claimant seeks recovery on multip... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We 2 will affirm the trial court's judgment except that we (1) will modify the judgment to carry 7.5 percent post judgment interest instead of 8.5 percent and (2) will reverse the attorney's fee award to Shaw and remand that issue to the trial court to determine a just and eq... | {
"issue": "Must identify the failure to segregate as the key issue.",
"standard": "Must quote the segregation burden from Jackson Walker or Tony Gullo Motors.",
"application": "Must note that Shaw had mixed claims and gave only general testimony.",
"outcome": "Reversed and remanded."
} | true | null |
hll-cl11411042-3 | 0.1 | real-property | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-2",
"docket": "cl-11411042",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=3bf13c4d-61ee-4507-a5e7-8bad224d3e96&coa=coa02&DT=Opinion&MediaID=da805c6f-d8cf-4f79-9159-8073daf77870",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Juanita Burch and William Burch v. MCLP As... | {
"[A]": "Juanita Burch",
"[B]": "William Burch",
"[C]": "MCLP Asset Company, Inc.",
"[D]": "Selene Finance LP",
"[E]": "Homestar Group, LLC"
} | Same core facts as Items 1 and 2. The jury found that [C] and [D] provided both statutory and contractual notices of default. The appellate court held that there was legally insufficient evidence of contractual notice of default, making the acceleration ineffective and the foreclosure void. The borrowers prayed for the... | What is the proper remedy when a lender fails to give contractual notice of default before accelerating a loan and conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure sale? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_rendered",
"issue": "What relief should be granted when a foreclosure sale is void ab initio due to the lender's failure to give notice of default (notice of intent to accelerate) as required by the deed of trust.",
"standard": "Noncompliance with the requirements of notice of default a... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Having sustained the Burches' second issue, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment setting aside the foreclosure sale."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "App. 47.1. 11 consequence of a lender's failure to give notice of default is that the forecl... | {
"issue": "Identify the remedy as setting aside the foreclosure sale and rendering judgment voiding the sale.",
"standard": "Cite Slaughter, Mathis, and Diversified for the rule that noncompliance makes the sale void ab initio.",
"authority": "Use the cases cited in the remedy section.",
"application": "Explai... | true | null |
hll-cl11411046-1 | 0.1 | family | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-2",
"docket": "cl-11411046",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=54449b6e-90bf-4b9b-a380-2a1f04e081aa&coa=coa02&DT=Opinion&MediaID=1eec4e35-c8d9-4d48-a63c-c3f28d531568",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re M.M. v. the State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "Father",
"[B]": "Mother",
"[C]": "Darren"
} | [A] and [B] were divorced in 2021. In December 2024, [B] filed a TRO application alleging [A] threatened not to return their three children after his Christmas possession. The trial court denied the TRO but ordered [A] to surrender the children on December 28, 2024, per the decree. [A] failed to return the children. [B... | Is the criminal contempt provision of the order void due to the discrepancy between the 60-day sentence and the 180-day commitment? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether the criminal contempt provision of the order is void because it contains conflicting sentences of 60 days and 180 days, making it ambiguous and violative of due process.",
"standard": "A contempt order cannot contain uncertainty or susceptibility of more tha... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Here, the discrepancy in the criminal-contempt sentences makes it unclear which one applies; thus, the criminal-contempt part of the order is void."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "A contempt order 'cannot contain uncertainty or susceptibility of more than one... | {
"issue": "Must identify the ambiguity in the sentence vs. commitment.",
"standard": "Must cite the requirement of clarity and specificity.",
"application": "Must apply the standard to the 60/180 day discrepancy.",
"outcome": "Must conclude the provision is void.",
"procedure": "Must recognize mandamus as th... | null | null |
hll-cl11411046-3 | 0.1 | family | 5 | {
"court": "tx-coa-2",
"docket": "cl-11411046",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=54449b6e-90bf-4b9b-a380-2a1f04e081aa&coa=coa02&DT=Opinion&MediaID=1eec4e35-c8d9-4d48-a63c-c3f28d531568",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re M.M. v. the State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "Father",
"[B]": "Mother",
"[C]": "Darren"
} | [A] and [B] were divorced in 2021. After [A] failed to return the children from his Christmas possession, [B] filed an enforcement petition and also sought a TRO and a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court denied the TRO but later held [A] in criminal contempt for the possession violation and in civil contempt for oth... | Is the attorney's fees award of $23,670.21 valid under Texas Family Code §157.167(b)? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether the attorney's fees award is void because it is based on a now-void contempt finding and because the fees for the TRO and habeas proceedings were not authorized under Family Code §157.167(b) without a predicate finding of noncompliance with a possession order.... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Thus, we likewise vacate the $17,364.67 attorney's fees award based on that now-void finding."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Texas Family Code Section 157.167(b) provides that in an enforcement proceeding, [i]f the court finds that the respondent has failed ... | {
"issue": "Must identify the statutory predicate for fees.",
"standard": "Must cite §157.167(b) and the requirement of a finding of noncompliance.",
"application": "Must explain that the TRO/habeas fees lacked the required finding.",
"outcome": "Must conclude the fees are vacated.",
"procedure": "Must recogn... | null | null |
hll-cl11411048-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-2",
"docket": "cl-11411048",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=9dff55d1-bc0d-4b30-874f-91e4edfeba3b&coa=coa02&DT=Opinion&MediaID=d40b6628-0b98-4a28-b6ce-21d53b3b6d60",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Ex Parte Sunil Keshavan Nair v. the State ... | {
"[A]": "Sunil Keshavan Nair",
"[B]": "State of Texas",
"[C]": "Clifton Richard",
"[D]": "Malani's",
"[E]": "Sajwani",
"[F]": "Malani"
} | [A] was arrested for engaging in organized criminal activity and financial abuse of the elderly. The trial court set bond at $15 million on Count One and $15 million on Count Two. After a hearing, the court reduced Count One to $75,000 but kept Count Two at $15 million. [A] appealed the total bond of $15,075,000 as exc... | What is the controlling legal standard for determining whether a bond amount is excessive, and what are the primary factors the court must consider under Texas law? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "The dispositive legal issue is the proper standard for evaluating bond excessiveness under Texas law, specifically the primary factors from Ex parte Rubac and the Article 17.15 guidelines.",
"standard": "The court must consider the factors in Tex. Code Crim. Proc. a... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Having sustained Nair's sole issue, we reverse the trial court's order on Nair's bond-reduction motion and habeas application and remand the case to the trial court to set reasonable, non-excessive bond amounts."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The nature of N... | {
"issue": "Frame the issue as what standard governs bond excessiveness review.",
"standard": "Correctly state the primary factors from Rubac and the Article 17.15 list.",
"authority": "Cite Rubac, Article 17.15, and Chavez.",
"application": "Show how the court applied the primary factors to the weak evidence a... | null | null |
hll-cl11411049-3 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-2",
"docket": "cl-11411049",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=76d24396-e86e-4c92-882b-897fbe3ef029&coa=coa02&DT=Opinion&MediaID=9754a113-58a3-460c-aabe-932aa8998a2c",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Ex Parte Rafiq Sajwani v. the State of Tex... | {
"[A]": "Rafiq Sajwani",
"[B]": "Ashraf Nizar",
"[C]": "Son in Canada",
"[D]": "Malani Jewelers"
} | [A] was charged with organized criminal activity and financial abuse of the elderly. The trial court set bond at $7.5 million on Count 2. At the habeas hearing, [A]'s daughter [B] testified that [A] has no criminal history, works at a jewelry store, lives with family in Allen, has liquid assets under $125,000, and cann... | Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying a bond reduction when the evidence showed that [A] had limited liquid assets and no evidence contradicted his inability to post a $7.5 million bond, and the trial court speculated about his flight risk without evidentiary support? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the trial court abused its discretion by setting a $7.5 million bond on Count 2 when the evidence of [A]'s inability to pay was uncontradicted and the trial court could not speculate about hidden assets or flight risk without evidentiary support.",
"standard... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We therefore reverse the portion of the trial court's order denying relief on Count 2 and remand this case to that court to set a reasonable, non-excessive bond on Count 2."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "App.-Fort Worth July 16, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op., ... | {
"issue": "The issue is the trial court's ability to rely on speculation when the evidence of inability to pay is uncontradicted.",
"standard": "The standard is that bail is oppressive if set higher than the defendant can afford to force incarceration, and the trial court cannot speculate without evidence.",
"au... | null | null |
hll-cl11411066-2 | 0.1 | discovery | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-1",
"docket": "cl-11411066",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=2beb28e2-2be7-4299-b315-d945cc9ae67c&coa=coa01&DT=Opinion&MediaID=ad995181-a5da-461a-b6fd-09d160da83f4",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "John Tomaszewski and Heather Bryan v. K Ho... | {
"[A]": "John Tomaszewski",
"[B]": "Heather Bryan",
"[C]": "K. Hovnanian of Houston II, L.L.C., D/B/A Brighton Homes",
"[Judge]": "Justice Jennifer Caughey"
} | [A] and [B] sued [C] for construction defects. After the trial court imposed over $50,000 in monetary sanctions for discovery abuse, [A] and [B] nonsuited their claims and appealed the sanctions. On appeal, they argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the amount of sanctions. [C] responded that [A] and [B]... | Did the appellants need to preserve error by objecting at trial to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the monetary sanctions, or could they raise the challenge for the first time on appeal? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether error preservation is required for a sufficiency challenge to the evidence supporting monetary sanctions imposed for discovery abuse.",
"standard": "Our court has repeatedly held that when the trial court sits as factfinder as to attorney's fees, challenges ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reverse the sanctions orders signed by the trial court on November 6, 2023, November 21, 2023, and April 30, 2024, as well as the contempt order signed by the trial court on March 28, 2024."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Our court has repeatedly held that... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11411077-1 | 0.1 | real-property | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-1",
"docket": "cl-11411077",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=916a7870-3dac-471e-bd50-3d2375fd476c&coa=coa01&DT=Opinion&MediaID=b8886162-7049-4752-9b89-0d86feb4bb34",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "170 Rittenhouse LLC v. BOKF National Assoc... | {
"170 Rittenhouse LLC": "[A]",
"170 Rittenhouse": "[A]",
"BOKF National Association": "[B]",
"BOKF": "[B]",
"Bank of Texas": "[B]",
"St. Stephen Missionary Baptist Church": "[C]",
"Harris County": "[D]",
"David Gunn": "[Judge]"
} | A church ([C]) owned real property and obtained a religious exemption under Tex. Tax Code § 11.20(a)(1). The church conveyed the property to a bank ([B]) after defaulting on a loan. The bank then sold the property to [A] under a contract that contained a proration clause. The clause stated that buyer [A] would be respo... | Did the court of appeals hold that the additional taxes resulting from the loss of the religious exemption under § 11.20(a)(1) constitute 'rollback' taxes within the meaning of the contract's proration clause? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the additional taxes incurred due to the lapse of a religious exemption under Tex. Tax Code § 11.20(a)(1) constitute 'rollback' taxes within the meaning of the contract's proration clause.",
"standard": "A rollback tax entails a penalty for taking the land o... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reverse the trial court's order granting final summary judgment in BOKF's favor and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "a rollback tax entails a penalty for taking the land out of a favored use."
}... | {
"issue": "The model must identify the core question: whether the taxes are 'rollback' taxes. Partial credit for distinguishing between rollback and recapture.",
"standard": "Must quote the penalty definition of rollback taxes. Accept any verbatim quote from the opinion that states the penalty element.",
"author... | null | null |
hll-cl11412959-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-6",
"docket": "cl-11412959",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=cff8277c-0a73-4a35-85b1-55800f77bbc2&coa=coa06&DT=Opinion&MediaID=ce467e25-9bbc-403b-b6fe-867575a2a577",
"decided": "2026-08-11T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Fernando Santos v. the State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "Fernando Santos",
"[B]": "The State of Texas"
} | A Titus County jury found [A] guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a six-year-old child, which occurred in 2012. The trial court sentenced [A] to life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. The punishment charge included an instruction that [A] could earn good-conduct time and that the jury could consider the existence of ... | Did the court of appeals correctly apply the four-factor egregious harm analysis to conclude that the erroneous jury instruction did not cause egregious harm to [A]? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the court of appeals correctly applied the four-factor egregious harm analysis in finding no egregious harm from the erroneous jury instruction.",
"standard": "The egregious harm analysis requires consideration of (a) the jury charge as a whole; (b) the state of the evid... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Even so, we find that Santos was not egregiously harmed by the trial court's jury instruction. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's judgment."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "(b) the state of the evidence, including contested issues and the weight of prob... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11412962-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-6",
"docket": "cl-11412962",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=6cc46e7e-2823-4106-9f6c-a8c2cb9ac987&coa=coa06&DT=Opinion&MediaID=1200222e-cf6e-4fa5-a570-7bc91e3be153",
"decided": "2026-08-07T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Gabriel Sanchez v. Officer Wren, Mayor L. ... | {
"[A]": "Gabriel Sanchez",
"[B]": "Officer Wren",
"[C]": "Mayor L. Kelly Jones",
"[D]": "City of Westworth Village",
"[E]": "Tarrant County",
"[F]": "Tarrant County Judge",
"[G]": "Tarrant County District Attorney",
"[H]": "State of Texas",
"[I]": "Texas Attorney General",
"[J]": "Westworth Village... | [A] was stopped by [B] for a traffic violation. After the citation was dropped, [A] sued [B], [C], and [D] for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and emotional distress. [D] filed a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion under Section 101.106, and a Rule 91a motion. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed... | What standard of review did the appellate court apply to the trial court's rulings on the plea to the jurisdiction and the Rule 91a motion? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "The standard of review for a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction and a Rule 91a motion is de novo.",
"standard": "The trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. We review the merits of a Rule 91a motion de novo becau... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We affirm the trial court's judgment."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "\"We review the merits of a Rule 91a motion d... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11414190-1 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-7",
"docket": "cl-11414190",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=fbc81289-6262-46d3-8136-58226a70fd5d&coa=coa07&DT=Opinion&MediaID=7dc98287-f4ab-491e-8a19-9f72827a6ba5",
"decided": "2026-08-11T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Thomas McClendon v. the State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "Thomas McClendon",
"[B]": "State of Texas",
"[C]": "Ronnie Cheak",
"[D]": "Thomas Hooper",
"[E]": "Christian Delgadillo",
"[Judge]": "Vincent Giardino"
} | This appeal arises from a criminal conviction for evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. On February 18, 2024, Fort Worth police officers [D] and [E] received a license-plate alert that a Toyota pickup had been reported stolen. They pursued the vehicle, activating lights and siren. The driver, [A], signaled and pu... | Did the trial court's exclusion of hearsay testimony regarding [A]'s statements during a telephone call, even if erroneous, constitute harmless error under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b)? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the trial court's exclusion of hearsay testimony regarding [A]'s statements during a telephone call, even if erroneous, was harmless error under Rule 44.2(b).",
"standard": "Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), any non-constitutional error that does not affec... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Having overruled Appellant's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "We independently review the entire record to determine whether Appellant's substantial rights were affected. Loch v. State, 621 S.W.3d 279, 282 (Tex. Cr... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11414193-2 | 0.1 | family | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-7",
"docket": "cl-11414193",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=37149e3b-fe60-4f29-837f-eb73703226e8&coa=coa07&DT=Opinion&MediaID=a1879469-5197-4383-8c3d-381e3a700278",
"decided": "2026-08-10T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In the Interest of D.R.S., D.M.F., and D.L... | {
"[A]": "Mother",
"[B]": "R.P.",
"[C]": "D.F.",
"[D]": "H.S.",
"[E]": "W.M.",
"[F]": "Vanessa Jones",
"[G]": "Erica Flores",
"[H]": "Sean Ryan",
"[Judge]": "Jack M. Graham",
"[Child1]": "D.R.S.",
"[Child2]": "D.M.F.",
"[Child3]": "D.L.F.",
"[Department]": "Texas Department of Family and Prote... | [A] ([A]) is the parent of three children: [Child1] (16), [Child2] (14), and [Child3] (13). The [Department] became involved in May 2024 after a report of negligent supervision due to [A]'s suicidal threats. [A] was arrested for kicking a police officer, then after release continued to express suicidal ideation. The ch... | Under the clear and convincing evidence standard and the Holley factors, was the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of [A]'s parental rights was in the best interest of the children? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's best-interest finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2).",
"standard": "The best-interest determination is guided by the non-exclusive Holley factors, including the child's desires, emot... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Having overruled the issues raised by Mother, we affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to D.R.S., D.M.F., and D.L.F."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "In assessing whether termination is in a child's best interest, the cour... | {
"issue": "The model must identify that the dispositive issue is sufficiency of evidence for the best-interest finding.",
"standard": "Must reference the Holley factors and the clear and convincing evidence standard.",
"authority": "Must cite Holley and at least one other case from the list.",
"application": "... | true | null |
hll-cl11414406-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-7",
"docket": "cl-11414406",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=78c83272-ce7d-41ce-92d8-a5e56295a7d1&coa=coa07&DT=Opinion&MediaID=8b343597-9430-4487-abc6-e2f67808096f",
"decided": "2026-08-12T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Next Level Automotive, LLC v. Allied Solut... | {
"[A]": "Next Level Automotive, LLC",
"[B]": "Allied Solutions, LLC",
"[C]": "Dejanique Deshay Hodges",
"[D]": "Brandon Stewart",
"[Judge]": "Don Pierson"
} | On January 16, 2025, [B] filed a First Amended Petition against [A] and [C] for breach of contract, foreclosure of security interest, and conversion. Citation and a writ of sequestration were issued against [A] on February 10, 2025, and against [C] on February 14, 2025. The record contained an Officer’s Return of Servi... | Did the citation return's temporal inconsistencies and reference to a sequestration writ rather than the petition render the service invalid and defeat the default judgment? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the Citation Return (Amended) affirmatively showed strict compliance with service rules when it contained nonsensical dates and referenced a sequestration writ instead of the underlying petition.",
"standard": "Texas courts have held that a reviewing court c... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for a new trial."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Texas courts have held that a reviewing court cannot ignore temporal references in a citation's return that are nonsensical and incapable of rec... | {
"issue": "Must focus on the specific defects in the return (date inconsistency and wrong writ reference).",
"standard": "Must cite the rule that nonsensical temporal references are fatal.",
"application": "Must explain how the return's dates and content fail to show strict compliance.",
"outcome": "Must state... | true | null |
hll-cl11414411-3 | 0.1 | tort | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-7",
"docket": "cl-11414411",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=1cf9992c-5dd4-4801-9dd1-c5bdd3e3c7b7&coa=coa07&DT=Opinion&MediaID=3e604b5e-713b-40a1-afbd-9ca8bc329554",
"decided": "2026-08-12T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Haritha Mikkilineni v. PentaVia Custom Hom... | {
"[A]": "Haritha Mikkilineni",
"[B]": "PentaVia Custom Homes LLC",
"[C]": "Curt Dubose",
"[D]": "Soleil Development, LLC",
"[E]": "Ambe Hotels FW LLC",
"[F]": "Amit Patel"
} | [A] was interested in purchasing a residential lot in the Granada community. On June 21, 2021, [A] and [B] (an officer, [C], is a representative of [B]) signed a Lot Deposit Agreement. [A] paid a $20,000 deposit. The agreement stated that if a contract to purchase the property is executed, the deposit would be applied ... | Can a civil conspiracy claim survive when the underlying tort is barred by the statute of frauds? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether a civil conspiracy claim is derivative of the underlying tort and thus barred when the underlying tort is barred by the statute of frauds.",
"standard": "A civil conspiracy requires two or more persons who agree upon an object, a meeting of minds on the object to be acco... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We conclude that Mikkilineni's bases for recovery are barred by operation of the statute of frauds. The trial court's judgment is therefore affirmed."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "A civil conspiracy requires two or more persons who agree upon an object, a m... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11415528-1 | 0.1 | tort | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-10",
"docket": "cl-11415528",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=5af674d8-eeb6-451f-b039-1ba0df6d4278&coa=coa10&DT=Opinion&MediaID=692ec322-72b8-4829-a0ab-a51b31691a2e",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Olivia J. Mack, as Next Friend of M.Y.M.,... | {
"[A]": "Olivia J. Mack, as Next Friend of M.Y.M.",
"[B]": "Amber Nicole Martinez",
"[C]": "M.Y.M.",
"[D]": "D.M.",
"[E]": "Linda Morris",
"[F]": "China Spring High School",
"[G]": "Dr. Rutherford",
"[H]": "David Mack"
} | Appellant [A], as next friend of her minor daughter [C], sued Appellee [B] for personal injuries arising from an incident at a high school science fair in California. [C] alleged that [B] pointed a finger, spoke angrily, and forced her to back into a crowd. The suit asserted claims for assault, intentional infliction o... | Did the trial court err in applying Texas law rather than California law to the substantive tort claims, given that the alleged injury and conduct occurred in California but all parties are Texas residents and their relationship centered in Texas? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the trial court erred by applying Texas law instead of California law to the tort claims under the most significant relationship test.",
"standard": "Texas courts apply the 'most significant relationship' test found in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to deci... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We affirm the trial court's judgment."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Texas courts use the \"most significant relationship\" test found in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to decide choice-of-law issues."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quo... | {
"issue": "Must identify that the dispositive issue is choice of law under the most significant relationship test, not the merits of the underlying torts.",
"standard": "Must correctly state the Restatement's presumption and the Section 6 factors as applied in Texas.",
"application": "Must recognize that the cou... | null | null |
hll-cl11415529-1 | 0.1 | family | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-10",
"docket": "cl-11415529",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=9835d9da-cea3-47b5-8bcb-b046fbd714e7&coa=coa10&DT=Opinion&MediaID=edcc6b7d-df19-40fe-ae68-046ea4bf7c15",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In the Matter of the Marriage of Kathryn ... | {
"Kathryn Marks Smith": "[A]",
"K. Smith": "[A]",
"Carey Dennis Smith": "[B]",
"C. Smith": "[B]",
"Texcrete, Inc.": "[C]",
"Texcrete": "[C]",
"Blanco Home": "[D]",
"701 N. Smith, Hebbronville, Texas": "[E]",
"701 Property": "[E]",
"the 701 Property": "[E]",
"Judge Wendy Wood Hencerling": "[Judge]... | [A] and [B] were married prior to August 29, 2002, and entered into a premarital agreement. [A] filed for divorce on May 2, 2020. The trial court severed the issue of enforceability of the premarital agreement and found it enforceable. At a bench trial, the parties stipulated to the characterization of some assets as s... | Should the appellate court grant the motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal based on the acceptance of benefits doctrine? | {
"outcome": "dismissed",
"issue": "Whether the acceptance of benefits doctrine bars the appellant's appeal when she sold real property awarded to her in the divorce decree.",
"standard": "Under the acceptance of benefits doctrine, which bars appeal if the appellant voluntarily accepts the judgment's benefits and... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Because we agree Kathryn Marks Smith has accepted the benefits of the judgment that she challenges on appeal, we agree that this appeal should be dismissed."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Under the acceptance of benefits doctrine, which bars appeal if the ap... | {} | null | null |
hll-cl11415529-3 | 0.1 | family | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-10",
"docket": "cl-11415529",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=9835d9da-cea3-47b5-8bcb-b046fbd714e7&coa=coa10&DT=Opinion&MediaID=edcc6b7d-df19-40fe-ae68-046ea4bf7c15",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In the Matter of the Marriage of Kathryn ... | {
"Kathryn Marks Smith": "[A]",
"K. Smith": "[A]",
"Carey Dennis Smith": "[B]",
"C. Smith": "[B]",
"Texcrete, Inc.": "[C]",
"Texcrete": "[C]",
"Blanco Home": "[D]",
"701 N. Smith, Hebbronville, Texas": "[E]",
"701 Property": "[E]",
"the 701 Property": "[E]",
"Judge Wendy Wood Hencerling": "[Judge]... | [A] and [B] were married prior to August 29, 2002, and entered into a premarital agreement. [A] filed for divorce on May 2, 2020. The trial court severed the issue of enforceability of the premarital agreement and found it enforceable. At a bench trial, the parties stipulated to the characterization of some assets as s... | Does the sale of real property awarded in a divorce decree constitute acceptance of benefits that bars the appeal, even if the appellant could return the cash proceeds? | {
"outcome": "dismissed",
"issue": "Whether the sale of real property, as opposed to cash, constitutes acceptance of benefits that bars an appeal because real property is not fungible and cannot be restored to the community estate.",
"standard": "Unlike the fungible nature of cash, real property like the 701 Prop... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Because we agree Kathryn Marks Smith has accepted the benefits of the judgment that she challenges on appeal, we agree that this appeal should be dismissed."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Unlike the fungible nature of cash, real property like the 701 Propert... | {} | null | null |
hll-cl11415533-1 | 0.1 | criminal | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-10",
"docket": "cl-11415533",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=72b0e17b-0d41-42df-8bb4-ffd9cf44da71&coa=coa10&DT=Opinion&MediaID=0b9878ce-9219-4cc9-95ae-94af9a14dbc6",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Earnest Johnson v. the State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "Earnest Johnson",
"[B]": "State of Texas"
} | [A] was charged with felony offenses in the 272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas. After a series of competency evaluations, a jury found [A] competent to stand trial. During the competency jury trial, [A] attempted to introduce his pro se filings into evidence. However, [A] did not offer the filings until after... | Did the trial court err in refusing to admit [A]'s pro se filings into evidence during the competency jury trial, given that [A] did not offer them until after both sides had rested and closed? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit pro se filings when the appellant did not offer them until after both sides had rested and closed, thereby failing to preserve error.",
"standard": "To preserve error, a party must make a timely request, objection, or motion wit... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Therefore, we overrule Johnson's first issue."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "To preserve error, a party must make a timely request, objection, or motion with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the grounds for the complaint, and the issue... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11415569-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-9",
"docket": "cl-11415569",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=98381b07-6661-4cb1-ae85-c1ab22819811&coa=coa09&DT=Opinion&MediaID=ce641288-c606-462b-a853-b44ca094eb76",
"decided": "2026-08-12T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Jason Gregory Noble v. the State of Texas"... | {
"[A]": "Jason Gregory Noble",
"[B]": "the State of Texas",
"[C]": "KLK",
"[D]": "AK",
"[E]": "David Millich",
"[F]": "Alton Baise",
"[G]": "Jake Benoit",
"[H]": "Marie Thibault",
"[I]": "Aaron Taylor",
"[J]": "Phillip Jones",
"[K]": "Officer Moss",
"[L]": "Officer Knowles",
"[Judge]": "Leann... | [A] was convicted of aggravated assault-family violence after a jury trial. The victim, [C], and his wife [D] did not testify at trial. The State presented evidence including testimony from law enforcement and medical personnel, photographs of [C]'s injuries including a circular wound consistent with a gun barrel, and ... | Did [A] satisfy the four requirements for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Carsner v. State? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the appellant satisfied the four elements required for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Carsner v. State, including that the evidence is probably true and would probably bring about a different result.",
"standard": "To be entitled to a new trial for ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "(2) the defendant's failure to discover or obtain the new evidence was not due to the defendant's lack of diligence; (3) the new... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11416567-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-11",
"docket": "cl-11416567",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=b8a522b1-911d-4719-9ea3-d0683afbee0f&coa=coa11&DT=Opinion&MediaID=5ebf1237-2848-4e96-a62e-ee859897be59",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Howard J. Redmond Jr. A/K/A Howard J. Red... | {
"[A]": "Howard J. Redmond, Jr.",
"[B]": "PNC Bank, National Association",
"[C]": "BBVA USA",
"[D]": "Stephen Pisha",
"[Judge]": "W. Stacy Trotter"
} | [A] borrowed $25,000 from [C] on February 18, 2020, under a promissory note. When [A] defaulted, [B] sued [A] for breach of contract, alleging an outstanding balance of $19,004.71. [B] moved for summary judgment, attaching a copy of the loan agreement, account balance records, and an affidavit from [D], a Default Litig... | May an appellate court take judicial notice of a corporate merger between PNC Bank and [C] to fill a gap in the summary judgment evidence regarding the chain of title of a promissory note, when the merger was not presented to the trial court? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether an appellate court may take judicial notice of a corporate merger on appeal when the merger was not presented to the trial court and is central to the merits of the dispute.",
"standard": "Appellate courts are reluctant to take judicial notice of matters whi... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reverse the judgment of the trial court, and we remand this cause to it for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Even if it had, \"[a]ppellate courts are reluctant to take judicial notice of matters which go to ... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11417874-3 | 0.1 | tort | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-13",
"docket": "cl-11417874",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=bb83ae6c-e2a4-4713-afdd-b800214ebe71&coa=coa13&DT=Opinion&MediaID=806fbe40-0919-4721-b46e-4f8df1fee263",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "U.S. Risk, Inc. v. ISI Contracting, Inc."... | {
"[A]": "U.S. Risk, Inc.",
"[B]": "ISI Contracting, Inc.",
"[C]": "Ricardo Guerra",
"[D]": "RGR Industries",
"[E]": "Guerra Construction",
"[F]": "James E. Capt & Associates, LLC",
"[G]": "Scottsdale Insurance Company",
"[H]": "Jackie Baca",
"[I]": "Lucy Magallan",
"[J]": "Nora Quintanilla",
"[K]... | This case arises from a permissive interlocutory appeal of an order denying summary judgment in an insurance coverage dispute. [A] was a managing general agent for [G]. [B] subcontracted with [E] (owned by [C]) for guardrail work. [A]'s underwriter [H] allegedly misrepresented coverage to [G] in emails. [B] sued [A] un... | Should common law misrepresentation requirements, such as the requirement that a misrepresentation be made to the claimant, be read into Texas [G] Code § 541.061? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether common law misrepresentation requirements apply to a claim under Texas Insurance Code § 541.061.",
"standard": "Unlike Section 705.051, Section 541.061 and its predecessors do not appear to have 'functioned side by side with the common law.' The court found no case apply... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "In sum, we hold that Section 541.061 does not require a misrepresentation to be made directly to the claimant."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Unlike Section 705.051, Section 541.061 and its predecessors do not appear to have \"functioned side by side with th... | {
"issue": "Identify the common law incorporation argument.",
"standard": "Recite the rule that courts do not imply language omitted by the Legislature and the distinction from Arce.",
"authority": "Cite the Lennar case and Arce.",
"application": "Explain that the court refused to adopt common law requirements ... | null | null |
hll-cl11417877-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-13",
"docket": "cl-11417877",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=00b8f0ba-ef8c-475f-b56e-528763a51a29&coa=coa13&DT=Opinion&MediaID=bc7b65e2-7132-435c-9531-c975db98eb10",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Randy Ray Gutierrez v. the State of Texas... | {
"[A]": "Randy Ray Gutierrez",
"[B]": "the State of Texas",
"[C]": "K.R.",
"[D]": "Kelly Cruz",
"[E]": "D.R.",
"[F]": "K.R.'s grandmother",
"[G]": "Connie McElwain",
"[H]": "Gutierrez's wife"
} | [A] was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child. After appeals, the case was remanded for a new punishment hearing. The hearing was conducted before the trial court without a jury. During closing argument, the prosecutor made a statement that [A]'s counsel did not object to. On appeal, [A] claimed ineffective... | Does the presumption that a trial judge disregards improper argument in a bench trial affect the analysis of an ineffective assistance claim for failure to object to such argument? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the presumption that a trial judge does not consider improper argument in a bench trial precludes a finding of prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to object to the argument.",
"standard": "It has been uniformly held that when the tria... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The trial court's judgment is affirmed."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "App. 1969) (\"[I]t has been uniformly held that when the trial is before the court it will be presumed that he did not consider improper argument.\"); see also Price v."
},
{
"fie... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11417878-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-13",
"docket": "cl-11417878",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=66f6bb69-7a74-40db-a902-d38f0ca4dbf0&coa=coa13&DT=Opinion&MediaID=9ab7c99b-9e39-4964-8729-cfb12b1f8a61",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "R C Curtis v. the State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "R C Curtis",
"[B]": "the State of Texas",
"[C]": "Paula Mendez Boyd",
"[D]": "Brenda Boyd Perez",
"[E]": "Donald Lee Barnett",
"[F]": "David Rocha",
"[G]": "Jamie Pomykal",
"[H]": "Robert Sailors",
"[I]": "Raul Tapia",
"[J]": "Richard Richardson",
"[K]": "Randal Hines",
"[L]": "William... | [A] was convicted of capital murder for the death of [C], a 75-year-old woman. [C] was found naked and deceased in her apartment on October 21, 2015, having been beaten and strangled. The medical examiner testified that [C] suffered blunt impact to the face, neck, and chest, as well as strangulation. DNA analysis of or... | Under Texas law, what are the elements of capital murder that the State was required to prove, and how did the court measure the sufficiency of the evidence against those elements? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that [A] committed murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit aggravated sexual assault or robbery, as required for capital murder.",
"standard": "We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We affirm the trial court's judgment."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge."
},
{
"field": "authority",
"quote": "... | {
"issue": "Must identify that the issue is whether the evidence meets the elements of capital murder as defined by a hypothetically correct charge.",
"standard": "Must state the hypothetically correct jury charge standard from Malik/Villarreal.",
"authority": "Must cite Malik and Villarreal; bonus for citing the... | true | null |
hll-cl11417878-3 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-13",
"docket": "cl-11417878",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=66f6bb69-7a74-40db-a902-d38f0ca4dbf0&coa=coa13&DT=Opinion&MediaID=9ab7c99b-9e39-4964-8729-cfb12b1f8a61",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "R C Curtis v. the State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "R C Curtis",
"[B]": "the State of Texas",
"[C]": "Paula Mendez Boyd",
"[D]": "Brenda Boyd Perez",
"[E]": "Donald Lee Barnett",
"[F]": "David Rocha",
"[G]": "Jamie Pomykal",
"[H]": "Robert Sailors",
"[I]": "Raul Tapia",
"[J]": "Richard Richardson",
"[K]": "Randal Hines",
"[L]": "William... | [A] was convicted of capital murder for the death of [C], a 75-year-old woman. [C] was found naked and deceased in her apartment on October 21, 2015, having been beaten and strangled. The medical examiner testified that [C] suffered blunt impact to the face, neck, and chest, as well as strangulation. DNA analysis of or... | Did the court properly consider [A]'s false statements to police and his possession of the victim's property as circumstantial evidence of guilt in the sufficiency analysis? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether false statements to police and possession of recently stolen property can be considered as circumstantial evidence of guilt in a capital murder sufficiency review.",
"standard": "Attempts to conceal incriminating evidence, inconsistent statements, and implausible explana... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We affirm the trial court's judgment."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Attempts to conceal incriminating evidence, inconsistent statements, and implausible explanations to the police are probative of wrongful conduct and are also circumstances of guilt."
},
... | {
"issue": "Must identify that the issue concerns the use of false statements and possession of stolen property as circumstantial evidence of guilt.",
"standard": "Must cite Guevara for the proposition that false statements are probative of guilt.",
"authority": "Must cite Guevara; bonus for citing Torres.",
"a... | true | null |
hll-cl11417882-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-13",
"docket": "cl-11417882",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=fed01605-52a8-4347-b620-f333226bea9e&coa=coa13&DT=Opinion&MediaID=ed654d64-7427-4958-82c3-0cb73420258f",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Heather Lyn Shumake v. the State of Texas... | {
"[A]": "Heather Lyn Shumake",
"[B]": "the State of Texas",
"[C]": "Justin Simpkins",
"[D]": "Krisenda Besetsny",
"[E]": "Wendy Migl",
"[F]": "Ariana Vavrusa",
"[Judge]": "Clarissa Silva"
} | [A] was convicted of possession of methamphetamine (1–4 grams) after a bench trial. Deputy [C] testified that he found methamphetamine and paraphernalia in [A]'s trailer. [A] testified that the door did not lock, that she had been assaulted by [D] and moved back into the trailer, and that she believed [D] planted the d... | In a sufficiency challenge, does the existence of an alternative reasonable hypothesis that the drugs were planted by another person automatically render the evidence insufficient? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the mere existence of an alternative reasonable hypothesis, such as that the drugs were planted, renders the evidence insufficient to support a conviction.",
"standard": "the mere existence of an alternative reasonable hypothesis does not render the evidence . . . insuff... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We affirm the trial court's judgment."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "App.- Corpus Christi-Edinburg Mar. 10, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding same reasonable inference based on similar evidence). 12 Shumake argues on appeal t... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11419332-3 | 0.1 | criminal | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-3",
"docket": "cl-11419332",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=b8dac149-c573-4e5c-aeb2-605d37281edc&coa=coa03&DT=Opinion&MediaID=a66ad6c2-decb-45e0-9c3c-242179e9f4e0",
"decided": "2026-08-11T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Fay Eugene Cantwell v. the State of Texas"... | {
"[A]": "Fay Eugene Cantwell",
"[B]": "Shawnette Jimenez",
"[C]": "Edwin Guzman, Jr.",
"[D]": "Tom Wolff",
"[E]": "Tempress Heller",
"[Judge]": "Darlene Byrne",
"[Counsel]": "Counsel for the parties"
} | [A] was convicted of aggravated assault against a family or household member with a deadly weapon. The evidence showed that [A]'s truck struck [B] in a hotel parking lot, causing serious injuries. At trial, [B] testified that she stepped in front of the truck as a test of [A]'s love and that she did not think [A] saw h... | What is the correct standard of review for evaluating [A]'s sufficiency of the evidence challenges on appeal? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "What standard of review applies when a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction on direct appeal.",
"standard": "When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient, we affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in ... | {
"issue": "Identifies the standard of review as the dispositive procedural issue.",
"standard": "Recites the Jackson v. Virginia standard correctly with deference to the factfinder.",
"authority": "Cites Jackson and Zuniga as the controlling authorities.",
"application": "Explains how the court applied deferen... | null | null |
hll-cl11419339-1 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-3",
"docket": "cl-11419339",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=e6324cd8-7a81-4ffa-af86-591787445eaa&coa=coa03&DT=Opinion&MediaID=734b3f7a-e684-428e-881b-3e8bcfe03a1c",
"decided": "2026-08-06T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re the State of Texas, Ex Rel. Jennifer... | {
"[A]": "Eric Wray Fabian",
"[B]": "Kay Reed",
"[Counsel]": "Jennifer A. Tharp",
"[Judge]": "Dibbrell Waldrip"
} | The State charged [A] with the felony offense of continuous violence against the family. A jury acquitted [A] of that offense but found him guilty of the lesser-included misdemeanor offense of assault causing bodily injury, family violence. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict, sentenced [A] to 365 days’ co... | Did the trial court have a ministerial duty to enter an affirmative finding of family violence in the judgment and to impose the $100 family violence fine, given that the court had determined the offense involved family violence? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether the trial court's determination that the offense involved family violence triggered a ministerial duty under Articles 42.013 and 42A.504 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to enter an affirmative finding of family violence in the judgment and to require t... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We conditionally grant the State's petition for writ of mandamus."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Ministerial duty Article 42.013 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, \"In the trial of an offense under Title 5, Penal Code,\" which includes assault, \"i... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11419378-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-2",
"docket": "cl-11419378",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=717cc11a-5d81-45e6-a1aa-28207339483d&coa=coa02&DT=Opinion&MediaID=2fb09c95-dbe6-4846-8d49-f01d034015db",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Sandra Larson v. Medical City Hospital For... | {
"[A]": "Sandra Larson",
"[B]": "Medical City Hospital Fort Worth",
"[C]": "Antonio Castaneda M.D.",
"[D]": "Dr. Muhammad A. Khan",
"[Judge]": "Justice Dana Womack"
} | [A], proceeding pro se, sued [B] and [C] on June 21, 2024, alleging health care liability claims arising from medical care provided to her husband. [A] alleged that on or around April 16, 2022, her husband was hospitalized at [B] due to complications from hernia surgery leading to a massive infection, and that medical ... | Did the summary judgment evidence support the elements of fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of limitations for [A]'s health care liability claims? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether a plaintiff can establish fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of limitations based solely on evidence that a hospital delayed providing medical records, without evidence of actual knowledge of a wrong and a fixed purpose to conceal.",
"standard": "Fraudulent conce... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Even if it had not been waived, the summary judgment evidence did not support the elements of fraudulent concealment."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Fraudulent concealment is \"a fact-specific, estoppel counter-defense to an assertion of limitations with fou... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11419385-3 | 0.1 | tort | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-2",
"docket": "cl-11419385",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=b667a3dc-92f5-4a9d-850b-dab5509f2788&coa=coa02&DT=Opinion&MediaID=917e0652-6aeb-4cfb-ad18-5c0535399a27",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Kevin W. Kiss and Fonda H. Kiss v. State F... | {
"[A]": "Kevin W. Kiss and Fonda H. Kiss",
"[B]": "State Farm Lloyds",
"[Judge]": "Brian Walker"
} | [A] sued [B] for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The jury found for [A] and awarded $15,732.29 in damages. [B] had made a settlement offer in November 2021 under Texas Insurance Code Section 541.157 for $14,500 in damages and $2,500 in attorney's fees. The trial court reduced the damages to $7,161.20... | Can an appellee who did not file a notice of appeal obtain greater relief on appeal than it received in the trial court, specifically by asking the appellate court to render judgment that no attorney's fees are recoverable? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether an appellee who did not file a notice of appeal can obtain greater relief on appeal than it received in the trial court.",
"standard": "Because [B] did not file a notice of appeal, we cannot grant it greater relief that it received in the trial court.",
"authorities": ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "we cannot grant it greater relief that it received in the trial court"
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "But because State Farm did not file a notice of appeal, we cannot grant it greater relief that it received in the trial court."
},
{
"field": "applic... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11419397-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-2",
"docket": "cl-11419397",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=49fbfbbc-a28f-49db-9d6d-1eff88da6122&coa=coa02&DT=Opinion&MediaID=ab69efc7-390a-41c6-9c65-1e0217a45637",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Eric Ellis v. City of Fort Worth; Amelia H... | {
"[A]": "Eric Ellis",
"[B]": "City of Fort Worth",
"[C]": "Amelia Hope Heise",
"[D]": "George Ferguson",
"[E]": "Deborah Fowler"
} | After a vehicle co-owned by [A] was stolen, the city's police department found and impounded it. [A] requested release without payment of towing and storage fees, but [B] (the [B]) and its employees [C], [D], and [E] refused. [A] sued for constitutional violations, statutory violations, conversion, negligence, unjust e... | What standard of review did the appellate court apply to the trial court's ruling on the Rule 91a motion, and did the court find that the error was harmful? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the trial court's error in granting the Rule 91a motion without notice was harmful and required reversal.",
"standard": "Appellate courts typically review a trial court’s ruling on a Rule 91a motion to dismiss de novo. We further hold that this error harmed ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Accordingly, we will sustain Ellis's issues complaining about the lack of notice of a hearing or a submission date, and we will reverse the trial court's dismissal order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"q... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11419402-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-2",
"docket": "cl-11419402",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=e50459cf-f90d-49df-b88a-68aa159450a8&coa=coa02&DT=Opinion&MediaID=d47341eb-86e8-4ace-85b7-7761213cdb9e",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Braylen Kyyon Pruitt v. the State of Texas... | {
"Braylen Kyyon Pruitt": "[A]",
"the State of Texas": "[B]",
"State of Texas": "[B]",
"Sudderth": "[Judge]",
"Kerr": "[Judge]",
"Walker": "[Judge]",
"Bonnie Sudderth": "[Judge]",
"Chief Justice Sudderth": "[Judge]"
} | [A] pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery in 2023 and was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for eight years. In 2025, [B] filed a petition to adjudicate, alleging multiple violations. [A] pleaded true to all allegations. At a hearing, the trial court stated that it had three options: (1) reinstate de... | Did the appellant's plea of true, entered before the trial court's inaccurate admonishment, preclude a finding that the admonishment rendered the plea involuntary? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether a plea of true entered prior to a trial court's inaccurate admonishment can be rendered involuntary by that admonishment when the appellant failed to show any reliance on the admonishment.",
"standard": "To warrant a reversal on direct appeal, the record must support an ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "we will overrule his issue and affirm the trial court's judgment."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "But \"to warrant a reversal on direct appeal, the record must support an inference that [he] did not know the consequences 5 of his plea.\" Burnett v."
},
{
... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11419448-2 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-1",
"docket": "cl-11419448",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=e5881b51-275f-4086-b06a-b45ea394d6d8&coa=coa01&DT=Opinion&MediaID=b062a413-668b-4d65-a584-6a14874dc808",
"decided": "2026-08-13T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Estate of David Luke Brown v. the St... | {
"[A]": "Valeriya Ruzynska",
"[B]": "David Luke Brown",
"[C]": "Louis Ditta",
"[D]": "Elizabeth Green Beam-Lawson"
} | [A] appealed the probate court's dismissal of her will contest for lack of standing. On appeal, the court first considered the appropriate standard of review for a trial court's determination of standing. The court noted that standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and reviewed the case accordingly. | What standard of review did the appellate court apply to the trial court's determination of standing, and was it correctly applied? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "The proper standard of review for a trial court's determination of standing is de novo because standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction.",
"standard": "We review questions of standing de novo because standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction.",
"auth... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We affirm the probate court's order."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "We review questions of standing de novo because standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Standing is a constitutional prerequi... | {
"issue": "Identify the standard of review issue.",
"standard": "Recite the de novo standard verbatim.",
"authority": "Cite the two cases on standing review.",
"application": "Explain the court's independent analysis.",
"outcome": "Affirmed.",
"procedure": "Recognize de novo review."
} | null | null |
hll-cl11419455-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-1",
"docket": "cl-11419455",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=006ca38d-cead-4ef0-8c04-0f07ad454e9d&coa=coa01&DT=Opinion&MediaID=3aad4b3d-f1e6-43f9-8554-b1e9a510e529",
"decided": "2026-08-11T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Sonya Faye Zanes v. the State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "Sonya Faye Zanes",
"[B]": "the State of Texas"
} | A jury found [A] guilty of driving while intoxicated with a child passenger. [A] filed a motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, including the claim that counsel failed to investigate and call witnesses from her grandson’s school and obtain surveillance video. At the hearing, [A] testifie... | Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying [A]’s motion for new trial based on trial counsel’s failure to investigate and call school witnesses? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether trial counsel’s failure to investigate and call witnesses from the school constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.",
"standard": "in order to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim based on failure to present testimony from these witnesses, Zanes needed to show... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We affirm the trial court's judgment."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "As with the failure to call an expert witness, in order to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim based on failure to present 8 testimony from these witnesses, Zanes needed to show that... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11419455-3 | 0.1 | criminal | 5 | {
"court": "tx-coa-1",
"docket": "cl-11419455",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=006ca38d-cead-4ef0-8c04-0f07ad454e9d&coa=coa01&DT=Opinion&MediaID=3aad4b3d-f1e6-43f9-8554-b1e9a510e529",
"decided": "2026-08-11T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Sonya Faye Zanes v. the State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "Sonya Faye Zanes",
"[B]": "the State of Texas"
} | A jury found [A] guilty of driving while intoxicated with a child passenger. At trial, the State introduced a certificate of analysis for toxicology lab results. [A]’s trial counsel orally objected based on the Confrontation Clause, but the objection was overruled because the applicable statute, Texas Code of Criminal ... | Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying [A]’s motion for new trial, or should the appellate court find ineffective assistance, based on trial counsel’s failure to file a written objection to the certificate of analysis? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether trial counsel’s failure to file a written objection to the certificate of analysis constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.",
"standard": "Trial counsel 'should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions' before being denounced as ineffective.",
... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We overrule Zanes's issues related to ineffectiveness of her trial counsel."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Trial counsel 'should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions' before being denounced as ineffective."
},
{
"field": "appl... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11419458-3 | 0.1 | real-property | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-1",
"docket": "cl-11419458",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=ee174e18-514e-4b1b-8aba-cc150092e911&coa=coa01&DT=Opinion&MediaID=45a2c692-4e1b-4433-9a01-3331ddb317ba",
"decided": "2026-08-11T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Pat Black Properties, LLC v. Lyndall v. Mu... | {
"[A]": "Pat Black Properties, LLC",
"[B]": "Lindall V. Murff",
"[C]": "MWV Investments, LLC",
"[D]": "Bill Murff Turf Farm, Inc."
} | [A] owns property that flooded. [A] sued for fraud and sought an injunction. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the fraud claim was time-barred because the underlying nature of the claim was injury to real property, subject to a two-year limitations period. The motion did not mention Texas Water Co... | Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on a claim under Texas Water Code section 11.086 when the defendants' summary judgment motion did not specifically mention that statute, but argued that the plaintiff's claim was for injury to real property and time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether a summary judgment motion that argues that the plaintiff's claims are time-barred because the underlying nature of the claim is injury to real property is broad enough to encompass a claim under Texas Water Code section 11.086 that was not expressly pleaded but was implied... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "In light of the supreme court's decision in JLMH II, we affirm the summary judgment."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "When the trial court does not state the basis for granting summary judgment, the appealing party must negate all grounds that support the judg... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11419472-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-1",
"docket": "cl-11419472",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=b8d54b02-e9de-4095-86c7-b0bcb570d24c&coa=coa01&DT=Opinion&MediaID=4d956ebe-1ad4-40f6-96f1-a594c7b0987d",
"decided": "2026-08-11T00:00:00",
"caseName": "AM Lube Auto Care v. Tysheika Simmons"
} | {
"[A]": "AM Lube Auto Care",
"[B]": "Tysheika Simmons",
"[C]": "Bahaa Immad Elabbasi"
} | [B] filed a claim in justice court against [A], alleging breach of contract for installing a remanufactured engine instead of a new engine. [A] did not appear at trial, and the justice court entered a default judgment. [A] appealed to the county court for a trial de novo. The county court set the matter for trial; [B] ... | Did the county court abuse its discretion by denying [A]'s motion to set aside the default judgment and for a new trial based on [A]'s failure to establish a meritorious defense under Craddock? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the county court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial when the movant failed to establish a meritorious defense as required by the second Craddock element.",
"standard": "Under Craddock, a default judgment should be vacated and a new trial granted if... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We affirm the county court's judgment."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Under Craddock, a default judgment should be vacated and a new trial granted if the defaulting party establishes that (1) its failure to appear was not intentional or the result of conscio... | {
"issue": "Identify the dispositive element as the meritorious defense requirement.",
"standard": "Recite the Craddock test and the definition of meritorious defense.",
"application": "Explain why the motion failed to meet the standard.",
"outcome": "Affirm because the trial court did not abuse its discretion.... | true | null |
hll-cl11419703-3 | 0.1 | real-property | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-4",
"docket": "cl-11419703",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=713456c3-922b-4ed0-a694-d042422e7d51&coa=coa04&DT=Opinion&MediaID=459b7ac4-6209-4c7e-a631-ecf6b92cf8c9",
"decided": "2026-08-12T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Randy Baker and Heart of the Heart Ranch, ... | {
"[A]": "Randy Baker",
"[B]": "Heart of the Heart Ranch, LLC",
"[C]": "David Powell",
"[D]": "Double 09 Ranch, LLC",
"[E]": "Heart of the Heart Whitetails, LLC",
"[F]": "Syngenta",
"[Judge]": "Stephen B. Ables"
} | [A] and [B] are neighboring landowners who formed [E] (HHW), a company to breed deer and provide guided hunts. [C] and [D] are the other member. The Company Agreement required unanimous consent and provided that if [A] withdrew within eight years, [A] would reimburse [C] for capital contributions. In 2019, disputes aro... | Do [A] and [B] have standing to appeal the trial court's determination that the Company Agreement did not create an easement on [C]'s property, given that the easement rights belong to [E] (HHW) and not to the individual members? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether a member of a limited liability company has standing to appeal a judgment regarding the company's property rights.",
"standard": "A limited liability company is a separate entity; a member does not have an interest in the company's property and lacks standing to assert c... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Accordingly, we hold Baker/HHR do not have standing to address this issue on appeal and reject Baker/HHR's point of error."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "A limited liability company is considered a separate entity from its members and, as such, a member of a... | {
"issue": "Identify that the standing question is whether the appellants have a personal stake in the easement determination.",
"standard": "Quote the rule that a member of an LLC has no interest in company property and lacks standing to assert company claims.",
"application": "Explain that the court applied the... | null | null |
hll-cl11419715-2 | 0.1 | real-property | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-4",
"docket": "cl-11419715",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=d30434af-1d75-46aa-92d3-c6e368badece&coa=coa04&DT=Opinion&MediaID=c58e7947-6b5c-4deb-ac74-5a962e99bd51",
"decided": "2026-08-12T00:00:00",
"caseName": "EKRE of TX, LLC v. Elizabeth Anne Robinson... | {
"[A]": "EKRE of TX, LLC",
"[B]": "Elizabeth Anne Robinson"
} | Appellant [A] ([A]) filed a forcible detainer action in justice court against [B] ([B]), seeking possession of a residential property in San Antonio. In 2016, [B]'s brother conveyed the property to her. In 2022, [A] and [B] entered into a contractual relationship and executed several documents, including a Residential ... | What is the burden of proof on a defendant in a forcible detainer action to divest the justice court of jurisdiction based on a title dispute, and did [B] meet that burden? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether the defendant met her burden to provide specific evidence of a genuine title dispute that is intertwined with the issue of immediate possession, thereby divesting the justice court of jurisdiction.",
"standard": "If the pleaded facts establish jurisdiction, ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reverse the county court's order and remand this cause to the justice court for resolution of EKRE's forcible detainer petition."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "If the pleaded facts establish jurisdiction, the forcible detainer defendant must then \"provid... | {
"issue": "Identify the dispositive issue as the burden on the defendant to provide specific evidence.",
"standard": "Must state the burden shifting and the definition of specific evidence.",
"authority": "Must cite Guillaume, Yarto, and Henderson.",
"application": "Must apply the standard to the facts: the op... | true | null |
hll-cl11421540-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-7",
"docket": "cl-11421540",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=dd79f654-13df-4f3d-b4e6-679053761b3e&coa=coa07&DT=Opinion&MediaID=7aa750d8-8b9d-4f22-8321-f53ac0312031",
"decided": "2026-08-18T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Shanelle Anquinette Craig v. the State of ... | {
"[A]": "Shanelle Anquinette Craig",
"[B]": "State of Texas",
"[C]": "boyfriend",
"[D]": "sister",
"[E]": "probation officer",
"[F]": "first officer",
"[G]": "second officer",
"[Judge]": "Andy Porter",
"[Counsel]": "court-appointed counsel"
} | [A] was placed on deferred adjudication for injury to a child. After the State moved to adjudicate, a hearing was held. [A] testified in her own defense. The trial court adjudicated her guilty. On appeal, [A] filed a pro se response arguing that the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose a text message... | Can [A] raise a Brady violation for the first time on appeal without having preserved the issue in the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion for new trial? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether a Brady claim that the State failed to disclose favorable evidence is preserved for appellate review when the appellant did not alert the trial court to the alleged violation.",
"standard": "A defendant must first alert the trial court to the alleged violation through a ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Finding no arguable ground for appellate review, we grant counsel's motion to withdraw, deny Appellant's motion to send exhibits, and affirm the trial court's judgment as modified."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "That leaves the claim that the State failed to di... | {
"issue": "Must identify the preservation requirement for Brady claims on appeal.",
"standard": "Must quote or cite Keeter v. State and the rule that the defendant must alert the trial court.",
"application": "Must explain that the record lacks any preservation effort, so the claim is waived.",
"outcome": "Aff... | null | null |
hll-cl11421613-1 | 0.1 | tort | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-6",
"docket": "cl-11421613",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=5f90dfd7-329e-4f72-bd33-dd59a0519fac&coa=coa06&DT=Opinion&MediaID=6ddb8575-a5e4-456a-b318-be56defad8a5",
"decided": "2026-08-20T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Jason Beene and Meredith Beene, Individual... | {
"[A]": "Jason Beene",
"[B]": "Meredith Beene",
"[C]": "H.A.B.",
"[D]": "H.R.B.",
"[E]": "The Woodlands Township",
"[F]": "Andrew Richard Temple",
"[G]": "Brightview Landscapes, LLC",
"[H]": "Montgomery County",
"[I]": "Chris Nunes",
"[J]": "the Beenes",
"[Judge]": "Scott E. Stevens, van Cleef, R... | The minor child [D] was riding an electric scooter across a crosswalk when he was struck by a vehicle driven by [F]. [D] suffered serious injuries. [J] (collectively, [A] and [B] individually and as next friends of [D] and [C]) sued [E] (a governmental entity) for negligence, alleging that overgrown vegetation along th... | Did the trial court err in granting [E]'s plea to the jurisdiction based on [J]'s failure to allege that [D] did not actually know of the alleged dangerous condition created by overgrown vegetation? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the trial court properly granted a governmental entity's plea to the jurisdiction when the plaintiffs failed to allege that the minor licensee did not actually know of the dangerous condition created by overgrown vegetation.",
"standard": "The duty owed to a licensee req... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We find that the trial court properly granted the plea to the jurisdiction."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The Texas Supreme Court has explained that [t]he duty owed to a licensee requires that \"a landowner not injure a licensee by willful, wanton or grossl... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11421613-3 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-6",
"docket": "cl-11421613",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=5f90dfd7-329e-4f72-bd33-dd59a0519fac&coa=coa06&DT=Opinion&MediaID=6ddb8575-a5e4-456a-b318-be56defad8a5",
"decided": "2026-08-20T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Jason Beene and Meredith Beene, Individual... | {
"[A]": "Jason Beene",
"[B]": "Meredith Beene",
"[C]": "H.A.B.",
"[D]": "H.R.B.",
"[E]": "The Woodlands Township",
"[F]": "Andrew Richard Temple",
"[G]": "Brightview Landscapes, LLC",
"[H]": "Montgomery County",
"[I]": "Chris Nunes",
"[J]": "the Beenes",
"[Judge]": "Scott E. Stevens, van Cleef, R... | The minor child [D] was riding an electric scooter across a crosswalk when he was struck by a vehicle driven by [F]. [D] suffered serious injuries. [J] (collectively, [A] and [B] individually and as next friends of [D] and [C]) sued [E] (a governmental entity) for negligence, alleging that overgrown vegetation along th... | Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, what is the proper standard of review for a governmental entity's plea to the jurisdiction when the entity challenges the existence of a jurisdictional fact element of a premises defect claim? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "What is the standard of review and burden of proof when a governmental entity files a plea to the jurisdiction supported by evidence challenging a jurisdictional fact in a premises defect claim?",
"standard": "The governmental entity's burden is similar to that of a movant for s... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We find that the trial court properly granted the plea to the jurisdiction."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "As a result, The Woodlands' \"burden is similar to that of a movant for summary judgment.\" Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 391 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 2... | null | true | null |
hll-cl11421616-3 | 0.1 | family | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-7",
"docket": "cl-11421616",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=913f3eb0-c457-49c1-8d4e-51e62e2b72d5&coa=coa07&DT=Opinion&MediaID=31ae70a2-0a0b-4deb-bd7e-ac8459c38149",
"decided": "2026-08-19T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In the Interest of R.R., a Child v. the St... | {
"[A]": "Dazie Diaz",
"[B]": "Valente Ramirez Avila",
"[C]": "R.R.",
"[Judge]": "Tiffany Haertling"
} | Appellant [A] and appellee [B] are the parents of minor child [C]. [A] filed a suit to determine conservatorship, possession, and child support. [B] answered and counterpetitioned. Both sought sole managing conservatorship. [A] alleged domestic violence and asked that [B] have no access. [B] asked that [A]'s possession... | Was the appellant's due process claim regarding the trial court's failure to accommodate her autism diagnosis preserved for appellate review? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the appellant's due process claim regarding the trial court's failure to accommodate her autism diagnosis was preserved for appellate review.",
"standard": "A party must preserve error, including error of constitutional dimension, by presenting a timely request, objectio... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "The final issue is overruled."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "A party must preserve error, including error of constitutional dimension, by presenting a timely request, objection, or motion to the trial court and obtaining a ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); In... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11421926-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-10",
"docket": "cl-11421926",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=fa1eea0b-6c64-4376-a19b-04d15615506e&coa=coa10&DT=Opinion&MediaID=65d4600b-e615-4849-862e-2e0373286a18",
"decided": "2026-08-20T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Kevin B. Miller v. College Station Proper... | {
"[A]": "Kevin B. Miller",
"[B]": "College Station Properties KP6, LLC",
"[C]": "Cardinal Group Management Midwest, LLC",
"[D]": "Landon",
"[Judge]": "G. Jerrell Wise",
"[Counsel]": "Counsel"
} | [A] is guarantor on a residential lease executed by his son, [D], with [B]. [C], the building manager, notified [A] and [D] that, based on security camera footage, they identified [D] and others as being responsible for disturbances on their floor. [A] filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the lease has not be... | Did the trial court err by dismissing [A]'s claim for attorney's fees under the UDJA as moot, given that the underlying declaratory judgment claim regarding the lease breach was rendered moot by [B] and [C]'s waiver? | {
"outcome": "reversed_and_remanded",
"issue": "Whether a claim for attorney's fees under the UDJA survives the mootness of the underlying substantive declaratory judgment claim.",
"standard": "If a statute allows a non-prevailing party to recover fees under equitable principles, the claim for fees always breathe... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reverse the trial court's order dismissing Miller's claim for attorney's fees and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "If a statute allows a non- prevailing party to recover fees under equitable princi... | {
"issue": "Must identify that the dispositive issue is whether the UDJA fee claim survives mootness of the underlying claim.",
"standard": "Must quote or closely paraphrase the 'breathes life' rule from Best v. Harper.",
"application": "Must explain that because the UDJA allows fees to a non-prevailing party, th... | null | null |
hll-cl11421955-1 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-9",
"docket": "cl-11421955",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=748d47ff-e36d-45d2-a120-7dabfa83faaa&coa=coa09&DT=Opinion&MediaID=0af99f77-9dda-4f97-b72b-b75c856c9d9d",
"decided": "2026-08-19T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Robert Allen Berman v. the State of Texas"... | {
"[A]": "Robert Allen Berman",
"[B]": "the State of Texas",
"[C]": "Diane Peterson"
} | [A] pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography in an open plea and elected to have the trial court assess punishment. At the sentencing hearing, the State called [C], an ICAC investigator. [C] testified about the egregiousness of the images and opined that a substantial sentence would deter others.... | Did the trial court err by admitting the investigator's opinion testimony about the deterrent effect of a substantial sentence, given that the appellant objected only on relevance and hearsay grounds and not on the witness's qualifications under Rules 701 or 702? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the appellant preserved error regarding the admission of opinion testimony when his trial objection did not match his appellate complaint about the witness's qualifications.",
"standard": "To preserve error, Rule 33.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires th... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Having determined that Berman failed to object to the admission of the evidence and the State's statements, we affirm the trial court's judgments."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "He asserts that Peterson was also not qualified to offer this opinion as a lay w... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11421955-3 | 0.1 | criminal | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-9",
"docket": "cl-11421955",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=748d47ff-e36d-45d2-a120-7dabfa83faaa&coa=coa09&DT=Opinion&MediaID=0af99f77-9dda-4f97-b72b-b75c856c9d9d",
"decided": "2026-08-19T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Robert Allen Berman v. the State of Texas"... | {
"[A]": "Robert Allen Berman",
"[B]": "the State of Texas",
"[C]": "Diane Peterson"
} | [A] pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography after the State agreed to dismiss three other charges (a charge bargain). [A] elected to have the trial court assess punishment, and the court sentenced him to ten years and five years consecutively, which did not exceed the prosecutor's recommended pu... | Did the trial court's grant of permission to appeal confer appellate jurisdiction over the appellant's sentence following a charge bargain, where the appellant pleaded guilty in exchange for dismissal of three charges and elected to have the trial court assess punishment? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the trial court's grant of permission to appeal confers appellate jurisdiction despite the charge bargain that limited the defendant's right to appeal.",
"standard": "When a defendant pleads guilty and elects to have the trial court assess punishment and the punishment d... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We therefore reject the State's argument and determine this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "When a defendant pleads guilty and elects to have the trial court assess punishment and the punishment does not exceed the pros... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11421956-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-9",
"docket": "cl-11421956",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=bb1b2252-87c0-4c92-b7f7-50ff19471633&coa=coa09&DT=Opinion&MediaID=dc18224c-9425-4bdc-9fb1-1a8ce9d4a385",
"decided": "2026-08-19T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Ramon Figueroa Jr. v. the State of Texas"
... | {
"[A]": "Ramon Figueroa Jr.",
"[B]": "State of Texas",
"[C]": "Erin",
"[D]": "Ashley",
"[E]": "Caitlin Adams",
"[F]": "Sonia",
"[G]": "Manuel",
"[H]": "Joseph Brown",
"[I]": "Mae",
"[J]": "Father",
"[X]": "Snapchat"
} | The State charged [A] with continuous sexual abuse of a young child and online solicitation of a minor. The parties agreed that [A] would plead guilty to the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child instead of proceeding on the continuous sexual abuse charge. At the plea hearing, the trial court ... | Did the court of appeals have jurisdiction over [A]'s appeal given that the guilty plea involved a charge bargain that effectively capped punishment? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction when a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a charge bargain that reduces the maximum punishment, and the trial court grants permission to appeal.",
"standard": "When a defendant pleads guilty and the punishment does not exceed the pr... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We reject the State's argument and determine this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal based on the trial court's giving Figueroa permission to appeal."
},
{
"field": "issue",
"quote": "Jurisdiction The State argues that we do not have jurisdiction over this app... | {
"issue": "Must identify the jurisdictional challenge based on charge bargain.",
"standard": "Must cite Shankle and Thomas for the effect of charge bargaining on appeal rights, and the rule that trial court permission can cure.",
"authority": "Must reference Shankle, Thomas, Kennedy, Alvarado.",
"application":... | null | null |
hll-cl11421959-1 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-9",
"docket": "cl-11421959",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=678f3230-eeae-4864-8bfa-094008fea3b5&coa=coa09&DT=Opinion&MediaID=b59a53fc-c3a9-4c8f-b55d-30023a95dec1",
"decided": "2026-08-19T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Johnny Matthew Scholler v. the State of Te... | {
"[A]": "Johnny Matthew Scholler",
"[B]": "Rebecca",
"[C]": "Deputy Adam Smith",
"[D]": "Deputy Lizbeth Rodriguez",
"[Judge]": "Kent Chambers",
"[Counsel]": "Defense Counsel"
} | [A] was charged with assault of a family member by impeding breath with prior conviction. At trial, [B] testified that [A] squeezed her neck and covered her mouth, causing difficulty breathing. [C] [C] observed marks on [B]'s neck and possible petechiae in her eyes. [A] testified and denied putting his hands around [B]... | Was the evidence legally sufficient to support [A]'s conviction for assault family violence by impeding breath, given that the victim testified she could breathe and the defense challenges the adequacy of the investigation? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction for assault family violence by impeding breath when the victim testified she could breathe and the defense claims the investigation was insufficient.",
"standard": "The evidence is legally sufficient to support t... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "Having overruled all of Scholler's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "The evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction if any rational trier of fact could have found each of the essential elements of the ... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11423246-1 | 0.1 | criminal | 3 | {
"court": "tx-coa-13",
"docket": "cl-11423246",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=3cfbe63d-7302-4e24-b9b4-2945256dd1d6&coa=coa13&DT=Opinion&MediaID=6d5e9004-0504-42a4-8ece-0a9589177288",
"decided": "2026-08-18T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Willie Maxwell v. the State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "Willie Maxwell",
"[B]": "State of Texas",
"[C]": "Adell Brumfield",
"[D]": "Officer Stephanie Lopez",
"[E]": "Dollar General",
"[Judge]": "L. Aron Peña Jr.",
"[Counsel]": "Defense Counsel and State Counsel"
} | [A] was indicted for robbery by threatening or placing [C] in imminent fear of bodily injury while committing theft. At trial, evidence showed that on December 26, 2023, [A] visited a [E] store where [C] was the manager. [C] saw [A] intoxicated and asked him to leave. [A] returned, tried to hide items, and when confron... | Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying [A]'s motion for mistrial after [D] [D] mentioned extraneous offenses during re-direct examination? | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial after a witness mentioned extraneous offenses.",
"standard": "We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling ... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for mistrial."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Hallman v. State, 721 S.... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11423247-1 | 0.1 | civil-litigation | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-13",
"docket": "cl-11423247",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=850a1ce7-c82e-4ca8-b529-2b2951dc58e8&coa=coa13&DT=Opinion&MediaID=4ab27baf-50e3-4e5f-84a9-cfdffd600be5",
"decided": "2026-08-18T00:00:00",
"caseName": "In Re Flor De Jesus Esquivel v. the State... | {
"[A]": "Flor De Jesus Esquivel",
"[B]": "Paulo Pedraza Jr.",
"[C]": "Nereida Lopez-Singleterry",
"[D]": "Matthew Kaplan",
"[E]": "Blaine Hendrick",
"[F]": "Adelino Young"
} | In a personal injury lawsuit arising from a motor vehicle collision, [B] sued [A] for negligence. The case was tried to a jury, which found that neither party's negligence proximately caused the occurrence. Despite this no-liability finding, the jury answered the damages question and awarded [B] $17,500. [B] moved for ... | Is the trial court's new trial order facially invalid because it fails to set forth specific reasons for granting a new trial, and if so, what relief is appropriate? | {
"outcome": "conditionally_granted",
"issue": "Whether a trial court abuses its discretion by granting a new trial without providing a specific explanation for setting aside the jury's verdict.",
"standard": "The trial court must provide an 'understandable, reasonably specific explanation' for disregarding a jur... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus, in part, and we direct the trial court to vacate its order of May 29, 2026, and to proceed in accordance with this memorandum opinion."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "In other words, trial courts are r... | null | null | null |
hll-cl11424987-2 | 0.1 | criminal | 4 | {
"court": "tx-coa-4",
"docket": "cl-11424987",
"url": "https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=8da32ac1-fc3a-47d6-b308-a04be8980229&coa=coa04&DT=Opinion&MediaID=f691ba5e-7bbc-487b-8ecb-4a1cad1d3979",
"decided": "2026-08-19T00:00:00",
"caseName": "Roberto Guzman v. the State of Texas"
} | {
"[A]": "Roberto Guzman",
"[B]": "the State of Texas",
"[C]": "Gerald Sanchez",
"[D]": "Jasmine Zuniga",
"[Judge]": "Lori I. Valenzuela",
"[Counsel]": "Guzman's attorney"
} | [A] was convicted after a jury trial of possession of less than one gram of cocaine, a controlled substance, and sentenced to two years in state jail, suspended for five years of probation. The conviction arose from a traffic stop initiated by Chief of Police [C] after [A] was observed speeding. During the stop, [C] sm... | Was the evidence legally sufficient to support [A]'s conviction for possession of a controlled substance, where the cocaine was found between the driver's seat and center console of a truck [A] was driving and owned, and where [A] exhibited behavior indicative of concealing contraband, but no fingerprints were found on... | {
"outcome": "affirmed",
"issue": "Whether the combined and cumulative force of the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that [A] exercised actual care, custody, control, or management of the cocaine found in his vehicle.",
"standard": "In determining whethe... | [
{
"field": "outcome",
"quote": "We hold that the logical force of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, was sufficient to sustain the conviction."
},
{
"field": "standard",
"quote": "Standard of Review In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to sup... | null | null | null |
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