#!/usr/bin/env python3 """Run analysis Python while denying network and child-process escape paths.""" from __future__ import annotations import ctypes import errno import os import runpy import sys from pathlib import Path BLOCKED_AUDIT_PREFIXES = ("socket.", "subprocess.") BLOCKED_AUDIT_EVENTS = { "os.fork", "os.forkpty", "os.exec", "os.posix_spawn", "os.spawn", "os.system", } WORKSPACE = Path(os.getenv("BIOEVAL_WORKSPACE", "/app")).resolve() SYSTEM_READ_ROOTS = tuple( Path(path).resolve() for path in ( "/usr", "/bin", "/lib", "/lib64", "/etc", sys.prefix, sys.base_prefix, ) if Path(path).exists() ) SCMP_ACT_ALLOW = 0x7FFF0000 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO = 0x00050000 SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ = 7 CLONE_THREAD = 0x00010000 BLOCKED_SYSCALLS = ( "socket", "socketpair", "connect", "bind", "listen", "accept", "accept4", "sendto", "sendmsg", "sendmmsg", "recvfrom", "recvmsg", "recvmmsg", "shutdown", "fork", "vfork", "execve", "execveat", "ptrace", "process_vm_readv", "process_vm_writev", "mount", "umount2", "pivot_root", "chroot", "setns", "unshare", "bpf", "keyctl", "add_key", "request_key", "userfaultfd", ) class ScmpArgCmp(ctypes.Structure): _fields_ = [ ("arg", ctypes.c_uint), ("op", ctypes.c_uint), ("datum_a", ctypes.c_uint64), ("datum_b", ctypes.c_uint64), ] def install_seccomp_filter() -> None: """Kernel-enforce no network, child process, namespace, or tracing syscalls.""" try: seccomp = ctypes.CDLL("libseccomp.so.2", use_errno=True) except OSError as exc: raise RuntimeError("libseccomp is required for restricted Python") from exc seccomp.seccomp_init.argtypes = [ctypes.c_uint32] seccomp.seccomp_init.restype = ctypes.c_void_p seccomp.seccomp_syscall_resolve_name.argtypes = [ctypes.c_char_p] seccomp.seccomp_syscall_resolve_name.restype = ctypes.c_int seccomp.seccomp_rule_add.argtypes = [ ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_uint32, ctypes.c_int, ctypes.c_uint, ] seccomp.seccomp_rule_add.restype = ctypes.c_int seccomp.seccomp_rule_add_array.argtypes = [ ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_uint32, ctypes.c_int, ctypes.c_uint, ctypes.POINTER(ScmpArgCmp), ] seccomp.seccomp_rule_add_array.restype = ctypes.c_int seccomp.seccomp_load.argtypes = [ctypes.c_void_p] seccomp.seccomp_load.restype = ctypes.c_int seccomp.seccomp_release.argtypes = [ctypes.c_void_p] context = seccomp.seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW) if not context: raise RuntimeError("could not initialize seccomp") try: deny = SCMP_ACT_ERRNO | errno.EPERM for name in BLOCKED_SYSCALLS: number = seccomp.seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(name.encode()) if number < 0: continue result = seccomp.seccomp_rule_add(context, deny, number, 0) if result != 0: raise OSError(-result, os.strerror(-result)) clone_number = seccomp.seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(b"clone") if clone_number >= 0: comparison = ScmpArgCmp(0, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_THREAD, 0) result = seccomp.seccomp_rule_add_array( context, deny, clone_number, 1, ctypes.byref(comparison) ) if result != 0: raise OSError(-result, os.strerror(-result)) clone3_number = seccomp.seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(b"clone3") if clone3_number >= 0: result = seccomp.seccomp_rule_add( context, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO | errno.ENOSYS, clone3_number, 0 ) if result != 0: raise OSError(-result, os.strerror(-result)) result = seccomp.seccomp_load(context) if result != 0: raise OSError(-result, os.strerror(-result)) finally: seccomp.seccomp_release(context) def _inside(path: Path, root: Path) -> bool: try: path.relative_to(root) return True except ValueError: return False def _check_open(args: tuple[object, ...]) -> None: if not args or isinstance(args[0], int): return path = Path(os.fspath(args[0])) resolved = (Path.cwd() / path if not path.is_absolute() else path).resolve() mode = args[1] if len(args) > 1 else None flags = args[2] if len(args) > 2 and isinstance(args[2], int) else 0 write_requested = ( isinstance(mode, str) and any(marker in mode for marker in ("w", "a", "x", "+")) ) or flags & os.O_ACCMODE != os.O_RDONLY or bool( flags & (os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC | os.O_APPEND) ) if write_requested: if not _inside(resolved, WORKSPACE): raise PermissionError("Analysis Python may only write inside /app.") return readable = _inside(resolved, WORKSPACE) or any( _inside(resolved, root) for root in SYSTEM_READ_ROOTS ) if resolved in {Path("/dev/null"), Path("/dev/urandom"), Path("/dev/random")}: readable = True if not readable: raise PermissionError("Analysis Python may only read workspace and runtime files.") def deny_unsafe_runtime(event: str, args: tuple[object, ...]) -> None: if event == "open": _check_open(args) elif event in BLOCKED_AUDIT_EVENTS or event.startswith(BLOCKED_AUDIT_PREFIXES): raise PermissionError( "Network and child-process access are disabled in analysis Python; " "use the guarded research tools." ) def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: args = list(sys.argv[1:] if argv is None else argv) if not args: raise SystemExit("restricted Python requires -c, -m, or a script path") install_seccomp_filter() sys.addaudithook(deny_unsafe_runtime) if args[0] == "-c": if len(args) < 2: raise SystemExit("-c requires code") sys.argv = ["-c", *args[2:]] namespace = {"__name__": "__main__", "__file__": ""} exec(compile(args[1], "", "exec"), namespace, namespace) return 0 if args[0] == "-m": if len(args) < 2: raise SystemExit("-m requires a module") sys.argv = [args[1], *args[2:]] runpy.run_module(args[1], run_name="__main__", alter_sys=True) return 0 sys.argv = [args[0], *args[1:]] runpy.run_path(args[0], run_name="__main__") return 0 if __name__ == "__main__": raise SystemExit(main())